

DO POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE: AN ANALYSIS  
OF DİKMEN VALLEY PROJECT

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **DO POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF DİKMEN VALLEY PROJECT**

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Urban regeneration is the last part of a series of policies that are implemented to tackle the problems that cities face. The concept of urban regeneration has been evolved in relation to a series of social, economic and political change that mark different periods in historical context. There are both continuities and discontinuities between different periods of historical progress of urban regeneration.

Urban regeneration projects are multi-faceted processes that require involvement of various actors in which the state holds the strongest position. Dikmen Valley Project is among the first examples of large-scale urban regeneration projects in Turkey. The Project has witnessed a local government change through its historical progress and gone through a significant change because of administrative and ideological shifts. In this context, the aim of this study is to scrutinize how urban regeneration projects are affected by ideological and political changes through the analysis of Dikmen Valley Project as case study. The thesis also aims to discover the continuities and discontinuities resulted from the ideological and political changes that happened during the implementation of the project.

**Keywords:** Urban Regeneration, Dikmen Valley, Politics, Ideology

## ÖZ

### POLİTİKA VE İDEOLOJİ FARK YARATIYOR MU: DİKMEN VADİSİ PROJESİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME

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Yüksek Lisans, Kentsel Politika Planlaması ve Yerel Yönetimler Ana Bilim Dalı  
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Kentsel dönüşüm, şehirlerin tarihsel süreç içerisinde karşılaştığı sorunlar ile mücadele etmek için uygulanan politikalar halkasının en güncel parçasıdır. Kentsel dönüşüm kavramının gelişimi; bir dizi sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasal değişim ile yakından ilişkilidir ve bu değişimler temelinde tarihsel dönemlere tekabül eden süreçlerde meydana gelmiştir. Kentsel dönüşümün tarihsel gelişim sürecinde ortaya çıkan farklı dönemler arasında kopmalar olduğu kadar devamlılıklar da söz konusudur.

Kentsel dönüşüm projeleri, çok katmanlı yapıları dolayısıyla farklı aktörlerin beraber çalışmasını zorunlu kılan projelerdir. Bu bağlamda ortaklıklar temelinde gerçekleştirilen kentsel dönüşüm projelerinde her ne kadar her aktörün kendi etki alanı olsa dahi devlet, bu aktörler arasında bir projeyi en çok etkileyen aktör olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Dikmen Vadisi Projesi Türkiye'nin büyük ölçekli ilk kentsel dönüşüm projelerinden bir tanesidir. Proje, tarihsel gelişimi sürecinde bir yerel yönetim değişikliğine tanık olmuş ve bu yönetsel ve ideolojik değişiklik projeyi önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın amacı kentsel dönüşümün tarihsel gelişimini ve devlet politikalarının ve ideolojilerin kentsel dönüşüm

projelerini nasıl etkilediđini Dikmen Vadisi rneđi zerinden incelemektir. Tez, Dikmen Vadisi Projesi'nin farklı tarihsel dnemleri arasında ortaya ıkan kopuklukları ve devamlılıkları ortaya ıkartmayı ve devlet politikalarındaki deđişimlerin projeyi nasıl etkilediđini incelemeyi amalamaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kentsel Dnüşm, Dikmen Vadisi, Politika, İdeoloji

To My Parents



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Cities are subject to constant change under social, economic, political, environmental and cultural factors and at some occasions are the reasons beneath such changes. Spatial effects of social and economic change have always been there throughout the history and these changes often resulted in destroying the settlements that they created. A natural disaster, an economic shift at the production type, a war can create the result of a city's destruction. Charles Fraser seems to be right when he asks "To Machu Pichu, Mohenjo Daro and a thousand other 'lost' cities are we to add the names of Liverpool, Glasgow, Lille, the Ruhr and many smaller towns?" (Fraser, 2003, 17). Avoiding such a fate has been a continuous interest of urban policy for a long time. Many policies have been and are being developed to tackle the problems that our cities face. A specific part of such policies focused on upgrading and improvement of certain inner city areas. Urban renewal, revitalization, rehabilitation, redevelopment, conservation and more recently urban regeneration, as an umbrella term, are the terms that cover various types of intervention to address problems that contemporary cities encounter. All these intervention types to (re)build urban environment have been utilized in different historical and geographical contexts and they are still in use for various purposes. Although the struggle to adapt and change the cities in relation to wider social, economic and political challenges is a common initiative all around the world, policies and projects to this aim are rather local in certain ways. While the common grounds and shared experiences in the field contributed to the creation of a common literature that paves the way for a universal understanding of urban problems and solutions that are invented, the literature of different geographies also display unique qualities and differences. Turkey's urban experience also shares certain common aspects with global trends while there are also differences through its trajectory. It is also important to investigate these differences

and discontinuities as well as investigating the common aspects in order to understand the historical development of urban experiences in a geography.

Urban regeneration is the most recent one of a series of urban policies that were utilized to face and tackle the multifaceted problems that our cities faced during their historical course. The evolution of urban policies is studied under three distinctive historical periods. The first period is from the years in the wake of industrial revolution to the post-war years after the Second World War (WWII). This period witnessed rapid industrialization rates both in Europe and United States as the industrial revolution took off recreating the modern cities and also revealing the problems of our cities. In this period the quality and main characteristic of urbanization was dictated by the fast pace of industrialization as the industrial cities started to face issues, such as overcrowding, pollution, degrading of public health, and insufficient infrastructure to sustain the fast pace of industrialization. First urban policies to tackle these problems could be observed in both Europe and United States as the local governments implemented policies such as constructing new houses for the working classes, construction of sufficient infrastructure necessary for industrial sector and enacting laws concerning public health issues in the cities. The second period covers the years from the end of the WWII to the late-1970s, after when neoliberal globalization began to gain dominance.

The second period witnessed the efforts to rejuvenate cities that were damaged by two following world wars. While the reconstruction of the war-struck cities was one of the main focuses of this era; persisting slum area problems were still there. As it became obvious in the former period that urban redevelopment policies fell short of their agenda, new types of urban interventions were introduced. Urban rehabilitation, urban renewal and conservation terms gained popularity as the urban policies started to grow in both their scales and types of policies being implemented. Urban policies in this period were termed generally as urban redevelopment and were criticized for being ruthless against the working-class neighbourhoods as slum clearance was the main focus of the era. The demolishing of slums without providing the poor affordable housing deepened the social problems in the cities. In the U.S. urban redevelopment policies were also said to have racial bias as most of the cleared slum areas were neighborhoods of Afro-American people causing urban renewal policies to be termed as "negro removal" (Hyra, 2008) to emphasize the racial characteristics of urban



policies of the era. Other than persisting housing problems, many of the large cities of Europe and U.S. started to experience deindustrialization at the end of this period as the old industries of cities started decline. Unemployment that was caused by this deindustrialization process also caused cities to lose a significant percent of their population. These developments created declining city centers which also led to financial decline of cities. Urban renewal in this context basically aimed to revive the financial and physical structure of the cities. This period is also a period that witnessed the diversification of urban interventions as the problems underlying these developments were explored to have multifaceted bases.

Finally, the third period is the current era of neoliberalism since the 1980s. As financialization gained pace, deindustrialization started to become the major threat for cities. The structural transformation of the world economy led to economic, social and political changes, which threatened current *raison d'etre* of cities and forced them to define their base structures (Evans, 2013). Cities were forced to change and the change was to be implemented by a new urban policy. Urban regeneration as a form of urban intervention was regarded as the main tool for this intervention. Urban regeneration is usually defined as a;

"comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change" (Roberts & Sykes, 2000, 17).

Urban regeneration is a term coined in the neoliberal era of capitalism so urban regeneration projects share the conceptual and organizational aspects with neoliberalism. After 1980s, governance has become the dominant term and approach to define and form the necessary organizational form of any project that is to be implemented. In this context, partnerships are seen as the most effective form of organization. Partnerships are also one of the main characteristics of urban regeneration as it is stated that solving of urban problems surely require an inter-institutional form of organization which will allow the participation of multiple actors in society. With the governance model, urban regeneration goes beyond the vision and approach of urban renewal policies. The multifaceted characteristics of urban regeneration include policies about not only physical renewal or development but also

creation of decent public spaces, educational institutions, public health institutions, green spaces and job opportunities in an area.

Turkey's urbanization experience also followed a route that could be studied under three periods. The first period starts with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and continues until the post-war years of 1950s when parliamentary democracy was established. This first period saw the creation of new cities and transformation of the old ones in a way to become the beacons of the Republic and its core values. Following Şengül (2012), this period is termed "Urbanization of the Nation-State". This transformation was not achieved purely by physical redevelopment but with institutional rearrangements such as the establishment of a modern municipality organization. Ankara as the capital of the modern republic has undertaken an important role to be the exemplary city of the nation. As the new capital struggled with insufficient housing provision and land speculation, the very first modern city plan was developed for Ankara. However, the plan's ambitions and aims were soon to be ignored and Ankara was to experience a rapid urban growth with a major problem of squatter housing. The second period in Turkish urbanization experience covers the years between 1950s and 1980s after when neoliberalism started to dominate Turkey's economic and political life too. This second period witnessed fast industrialization rates, the modernization of agricultural production and shifting to multi-party political life in Turkey. With the modernization of agricultural production through industrial means acquired from the U.S. Marshall Aids, masses started to migrate to newly industrialized cities from rural parts of the country. The rural parts started to "push" people because of diminishing employment possibilities and degrading qualities of rural life but the problem was that the urban areas were not ready to welcome these masses. This period is called as "the Urbanization of Labor Power" (Şengül, 2012).

Growing cities of Turkey were still not ready to accommodate the migrating people as housing provision was still a problem. With the scarcity of affordable housing, large cities of Turkey started to experience a massive problem of squatters and slums so much that half of the population of certain cities became squatter settlers at some point. First response of public authorities towards squatters was demolition as they were seen as the source of urban problems like their western counterparts. With the failure of demolition approach and the growing need for workers for new

industries the state's approach towards the squatters started change its tune in time. Local governments started to implement development policies that enabled the squatters to turn into apartment blocks. While this would seem like a good idea, only the squatters who enjoyed a locational advantage were redeveloped as the redevelopment processes were undertaken by small-scale builders who in return hoped for high revenue rates. Also, the development of squatters into apartment blocks without any comprehensive city planning approach caused an organic but unsustainable form of urbanization that left our cities face to face with problems such as overcrowding, low-quality housing, traffic congestion and environmental degradation they are still facing. The third period of Turkey's urban experience is the "Urbanization of Capital" named by Şengül (2012). At this period with continuous rural to urban migration and financialization in economy, production of urban space has become a focus for capital accumulation (Şengül, 2012; Balaban, 2011). Several institutional arrangements such as reformation of municipality organizational structure, establishment of mass housing fund and mass housing administration led to changes in housing provision. With decentralization attempts, municipalities were expected to act as entrepreneurial institutions who would cooperate with financial and industrial actors. Urban regeneration projects started to become one of the main focuses of urban policy after 1980s in Turkey. It must be noted that at least two main aspects differ in Turkey's urban regeneration experience as compared to its western counterparts. One of them is the conceptual difference and the other is the time factor. Urban regeneration in Turkey is largely referred with the term "urban transformation". This conceptual difference also differentiates the implementation of urban regeneration projects in Turkey. Most of the urban transformation projects in Turkey focus on transformation of squatter areas and they do not show the multifaceted nature of theoretical approaches. Second the urban regeneration experience of Turkey lag behind the north-western experience (Balaban, 2013).

Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project is renowned to be the first urban regeneration project in Turkey's urban experience. None of the previous projects had its scale and its scope. The project is an important field of study for several reasons. First of all Dikmen Valley Project is the first urban project that can be referred to as an urban regeneration project. Its scope not only covers housing provision and redevelopment of squatter housing units in the area but also creation of

an urban park and green space as well as of new commercial and public utilities necessary for Ankara and rearrangement of pedestrian and vehicle traffic order. Second, the project has made itself a real hype in the starting years and is believed to achieve its aims in first two stages. Though in time, and especially with the change in the administration of Greater Municipality of Ankara, the project is also believed to fall behind its aims and narrowed in its scope and aims so much that the projects last stages came to an hold and was abandoned recently due its failure. This historical change and evolution of a project from a hyped up urban regeneration project that seemed to be doing just fine to a project that started to encounter heavy resistance from squatter inhabitants and financially collapsed make the project worthy of investigating. And third, the project has an exemplary status for showing how approaches and ideological differences of local governments can change the outcomes of urban regeneration projects.

In this context the aim and scope of this thesis is to investigate Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project's historical progress in a holistic manner to scrutinize and discover how an urban regeneration project's outcome is effected by the change in the policy and ideological approaches of local governments. Also by doing this as a historical narrative, it becomes possible to emphasize both continuities and discontinuities in its historical progress.

This thesis consists of 5 chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which presents the background discussion with regard to the main problematic of the thesis. Chapter I, discusses the conceptual development of urban regeneration concept, starting from the roots of urban problems in the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards. This chapter aims to lay the theoretical foundations of urban regeneration and practical development in pioneering countries while giving us a chance to make a comparison in the following chapters. Chapter III presents the history of urban experience of Turkey starting from urban policies implemented in the establishment years of the Republic of Turkey. This chapters aims to investigate the historical context of this thesis' main focus; Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project. Chapter IV is the main chapter where case study analysis is presented. Both a literature review on Dikmen Valley Project and the results of the case study research are presented and discussed in this chapter.

The case study research of the thesis was conducted in the summer of 2015. The field study consisted of 50 surveys conducted with people from different households and 5 in-depth interviews conducted with old and recent squatter inhabitants and junk collectors in the area. Also a group interviews was conducted with squatter inhabitants who resist against the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project. Last but not the least, six interviews were conducted with people who were the main actors of the project at the outset. One of these people is Murat Karayalçın, who was the mayor of Ankara when the project was kicked off. Two people were the lead developers of the project, two people who were also lead executives in the project and one official from the recent municipality administration.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN REGENERATION**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter examines the evolution of the concept and policies of urban regeneration in an historical manner, within three major periods. The first period is from the years in the wake of industrial revolution to post-war years after the Second World War (WWII). The second period covers the years from the end of the WWII to the late-1970s when neoliberal restructuring and globalization of the world economy have started. Finally, the third period is the current era of the “actually existing neoliberalism” since the 1980s (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). This periodization mainly rests upon the major stages of the evolution of the capitalist mode of production. In particular, the shifts from liberalism to Keynesian economics and finally to neoliberalism have been influential in determination of the major periods under which urban regeneration policies had gone through significant changes. However, it must be noted that any periodization attempt will have a risk to result in over-simplification of the historical processes and with emphasizing the discontinuities by pushing aside the continuities between the periods (Şengül, 2009). In order to overcome this hardship, at least, at the conceptual level, a version of the conceptualization of Massey’s geological metaphor (Massey, 1984) is implemented in the discussion. This metaphoric approach conceptualizes every historical period as a layer and a transitional moment. While each layer is formed by taking previous layer as base, it also forms the context of the next layer (Şengül, 2009, 98). One advantage

of this approach is that it gives the chance of emphasizing the continuities between different historical periods (layers) as well as discontinuities. Considering this advantage, the discussions on both evolution of urban regeneration (Chapter 2) and urbanization experience of Turkey (Chapter 3) will be made with reference to this conceptual approach.

## **2.2 Emergence of Contemporary Urban Problems: The Era of Post-Industrial Revolution**

The roots of urban regeneration as a planned intervention in cities could be traced back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (Tallon, 2010, 9). The initial examples of such planned intervention to solve urban problems were observed in major European cities after 1840s. Engels names the initial examples of urban interventions as “Hausmann” with reference to Hausmann’s restructuring of Paris:

By Hausmann I mean the practice, which has now become general, of making breaches in the working-class quarters of our big cities, particularly in those which are centrally situated, irrespective of whether this practice is occasioned by considerations of public health and beautification or by demand for big, centrally located business premises or by traffic requirements... No matter how different the reason may be, the result is everywhere the same; the most scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-glorification by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success (Engels, 1975 cited in Smith, 1996, 33).

The period after the industrial revolution is known for rapid industrialization rate, which influenced the pace and quality of urbanization in both Europe and the United States (Roberts, 2000). The rise in population of Britain to nearly four times and in the proportion of people living in urban areas to 77% from 17% shows the dramatic changes that industrialization caused (Home, 2007, 1). American cities were also facing similar pressures for urban population increased from 5% in 1790 to 64% counted in 1950 (Osgood & Zwerner, 1960). The immense rise in urban population, introduction of new modes of transportation and the absence of sufficient urban infrastructure have caused a discourse of “urban blight” and started to make pressure

for urban redevelopment. At this point, slums and existing urban problems were deemed to be unacceptable in terms of public health and living conditions (Roberts, 2000). Although urban problems were becoming apparent, it seemed hard to find a comprehensive approach and a coherent policy to address these problems. Most of the approaches of the period conceptualized urban problems as health issues and social pathologies; therefore the first regulations consisted of health acts and redevelopment schemes. The first Public Health Act in 1848 foresaw the improving of planning controls, widening the streets and lowering the densities of housing in order to supply satisfactory housing standards for a healthy society (Home, 2007). In the US the local governments answered these problems with slum clearance moves, which were named as “federal bulldozer” (Anderson, 1964) policies and “negro removal” (Hyra, 2008). It is stated that the renewal process in the UK started at a wide scale with the Greenwood Act of 1930, while in the United States there is a debate whether the process started with the Housing Law of 1937 or the legislation of 1949 (Carmon, 1999). These first attempts in the US were simply implications resting on tearing down the slums and replacing them with public housing (Greer, 1965, 15). Europe too, followed a similar path by emphasizing the slum clearance and infrastructure redevelopments. It is stated that almost 500.000 slum houses were still required to be demolished by 1939 (Couch, 2010, 37). In the UK of the 1930s, over a quarter of million housing units were told to be demolished and more than a quarter million people are said to be relocated as the result of first urban renewal programs (Carmon, 1999). While the early projects of renewal were largely based on redevelopment and followed a similar path in both UK and US, the role of the state showed differences. In the UK the public institutions executed both the demolition and the rebuilding processes in urban renewal by providing council housing to the relocated families and individuals, whereas in the US the public institutions only managed the demolition and clearance of renewal sites while the construction was done by private actors and entrepreneurs. As a result the number of apartments demolished in the US by urban renewal programs were said to be much greater in number when compared to the number of housing units built (Carmon, 1999). One major critique of US urban renewal projects also based on the argument that most of the urban renewal projects produced more shopping centers, office buildings and cultural centers than housing units.



As stated above, while it is too hard to find a comprehensive and coherent “urban policy” to tackle problems such as “urban blight” and “urban decay” and the efforts to overcome these urban problems mostly start in the post-war era; the New Deal policies of 1930s and schemes of Federal Housing Administration in the US (Gold, 2014).

### **2.3 Birth of Urban Renewal: Post-War Era**

Rapid industrialization and urban population growth have formed the basis for many urban problems that modern societies still face and to make things worse two World Wars also brought destruction to a large number of European cities. The first systematic and relatively comprehensive policies to tackle such problems started to appear after the WWII. In Europe, the main purpose of such policies was to repair the war damage and ensure the reconstruction of towns or cities (Roberts, 2000). In the UK and the US, the post-war reconstruction period included not only the physical redevelopment but also area-based programs to provide services and infrastructure for ever-increasing urban populations and to address problems of urban decay and decline (Tallon, 2010, 7). The Labour Government of 1945 in the UK had to deal with a housing problem with two major dimensions: housing shortage and an existing housing supply in poor condition (Atkinson & Moon, 2010, 4). The Labor Government’s approach to the problem was simple and could be expressed as demolishing of the housing stock in poor condition to redevelop the site and supply public housing in the form of council housing construction (Atkinson & Moon, 2010, 5). In the US, on the other hand, we have seen some significant steps taken to address the urban problems that American cities were facing. The Housing Act of 1949 initiated the urban redevelopment and renewal programs by providing cities with funding to cover the cost of obtaining slum areas and allowing them to be reconstructed by private developers (Osgood & Zwerner, 1960). The 1949 Housing Act was later revised as 1954 Housing Act and used the term “urban renewal” for the first time in an official document under the Title 1 heading “Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal” (Gold, 2014).

The term urban renewal deserves some definition thus it is a loose term with a blurry meaning being used as both conventional slum clearance and as a comprehensive planned policy (Grebler, 1964). Grebler defines urban renewal as “a deliberate effort to change the urban environment through planned, large-scale adjustment of existing city areas to present and future requirements for urban living and working” which would include both residential and non-residential uses (Grebler, 1964, 13). Also the US federal law defines an urban renewal area as a “slum area or a blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating area as appropriate for an urban renewal project, but does not distinguish between rehabilitation and conservation” which were not a part of the federal urban renewal program until the Housing Act of 1954 (Osgood & Zwerner, 1960, 706). Many sources define urban renewal in relation to slum clearance and physical redevelopment of an area (Couch, Sykes & Börstinghaus, 2011).

On the other hand, urban redevelopment can be defined as a more specific and small-scale intervention or policy that involves new construction on a site which is already occupied to a certain extent (Zheng, Shen & Wang, 2014). Urban renewal differentiates from urban redevelopment not only in terms of scale but also by means of the intervention types it encompasses. Urban renewal schemes rely not only on redevelopment but may also include rehabilitation and conservation attempts. Rehabilitation can be defined as reuse of older parts of cities by repairing old buildings and improving them for their continued use (Steinberg, 1996). The US Housing Act of 1954 emphasized rehabilitation and conservation of existing housing stock besides redevelopment (Greer, 1965, 19). While urban renewal indicates a more complex and larger-in-scale process when compared to pre-war urban redevelopment policies, it must be noted that urban renewal projects during the post-war era also relied mostly on physical redevelopment of inner-city parts. Thus by the mid-1960s, it became obvious that many of the immediate post-war renewal attempts did not provide long term solutions to urban problems but simply transferred the location of such problems to other areas (Roberts, 2000).

In the US the need for an urban renewal programme started to become obvious at the end of 1930s. Two documents seem to be important on defining the major features of the urban renewal legislation of 1949 in the US. “A Handbook on Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States”, published in November of 1941 by

the Federal Housing Administration and the article by Guy Greer and Alvis H. Hansen with the title “Urban Redevelopment and Housing” all dealt with the problem of urban slums and blight and foresaw policy suggestions that later became the main mechanics of 1949 legislation (Foard & Fefferman, 1960). “Urban Redevelopment and Housing” by Guy Greer and Alvis H. Hansen open with the statement that:

With few exceptions, our American cities and towns have drifted into a situation, both physically and financially, that is becoming intolerable. Their plight, moreover, is getting progressively worse. (Foard & Fefferman, 1960).

In the United States, urban redevelopment projects and urban renewal programs gained pace after post-war years with the Title I legislation of 1949 later revised as the legislation of 1954. The succession of the passing of Title I of the Housing Act in the US comes from its success on uniting different interest groups under its aegis. As Teaford states: “Central-city business interests viewed it as a means of boosting sagging property values; mayors and city councils perceived as a tool to increase tax revenues; social welfare leaders hoped it would clear the slums and better the living conditions of the poor; and more specifically, advocates of low- and moderate-income housing thought it would increase the stock of decent, affordable dwellings in the central cities” (Teaford, 2000, 444). The Housing Act of 1949 boosted this optimistic expectations with its abstract formulation of aims by stating that the aim of the legislation is: “the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family” (Leach, 1960). Title I authorized the Housing and Home Finance administrator to provide finance to local public agencies in forms of grants on urban redevelopment projects by funding two-thirds of the total cost of assembly, clearance and preparation of the site and leasing, selling of the land. So public authorities were authorized and supported with the processes previous to construction and development of the land of redevelopment projects. The role of local public agencies was to demolish and clear the project site, acquiring it and then selling it to the private developers for construction. The public agencies generally did not directly provide housing for low-income citizens like the council housing example in the UK. According to the Title I, the federal government was charged only to subsidize the

redevelopment of areas, which were “predominantly residential” and were to be dominantly residential after the redevelopment project. This usage of the word “residential” raised the hopes of welfare interest groups that decent housing would be provided for low-income people, even if not directly, by the trickle-down effect. But the formulation of the law formed a confusion and the outcome was not as expected because nothing in the law made it mandatory to construct low or moderate-income housing because local governments were only responsible of the pre-development parts and the new construction was the responsibility of the private developers (Teaford, 2000). This uncertainty resulted in slum areas to be redeveloped only to become shopping centers, cultural centers, and office buildings which would provide more gains to private developers and local governments. Another problem of early redevelopment projects was that they were told to create more vacant land than the buildings they produced. The slum areas were cleared by local governments hoping that clearance of the area would drive market forces to the area (Wallace, 1968). However, it was understood that this hope was out of place when the sight of vacant lands started to dominate urban landscapes of the cities promoting urban redevelopment projects.

The 1954 revision made some changes to the law. Amended law was titled as “Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal” and replaced the term redevelopment with renewal. Renewal pointed out to a wider and more comprehensive approach than redevelopment projects (Foard & Fefferman, 1960) which were more like a collection of projects rather than a comprehensive policy and was concerned with redevelopment of small areas in a piecemeal fashion without linking the projects to a wider urban scale policy (Wallace, 1968). This change aimed at widening of the program into the blighted areas where the lands could not be acquired by local governments and to eliminate blight with rehabilitation of existing housing stock before it reaches a level where demolition is the only choice (Foard & Fefferman, 1960). With this aim an urban renewal project was defined as being more than just the acquisition and clearance of the project site but also as “carrying out plans for a program of voluntary repair and rehabilitation of building or other improvements in accordance with their urban renewal plan” (Foard & Fefferman, 1960, 656). But these conceptual changes proved to matter little in terms of the success and sustainability of the projects executed during this period.

The urban renewal projects of this era became subject to severe criticism about various aspects. The urban renewal in the US was criticized as serving the benefits of the business networks rather than people with low- and middle-income. Carmon (1999), quoting Gans (1967, 46), states that “between the years 1949 and 1964, only one half of one percent of all expenditures by the US federal government for urban renewal was spent on relocation of families and individuals removed from renewal sites” (Carmon, 1999, 146). Another common problem, which seemed to doom all renewal projects was the time lag. Because of the paperwork and bureaucratic requirements and the time needed for the physical clearance and reconstruction processes, completion of a renewal project seemed to take longer than desired. The House Banking and Currency Committee, in 1964, stated that “the poor public image created by too many incomplete projects, particularly those which seem to have come to a halt at the demolition stage” while two years later the National Commission on Urban Problems emphasized the fact that an urban renewal project’s completion took more than 10 years with a 4 years to plan and 6 more years for the construction (Teaford, 2000, 246). Besides the proving to be a serious barrier to the private sector by extending the time for the capital to return; this temporal problem also prevented local governments from realizing the social aspect of renewal projects that also served as legitimizing aspects of these projects: clearance of slums and providing decent housing for every American family. It is stated that between 1950 and 1960, studies estimate that 22.000 dwelling fell into sub-standard housing category (Leach, 1960, 778). The time-lag did not only prove to be a problem in terms of providing decent structures in a reasonable time in the renewal areas; but also the program started to fall short in terms of renewing the city.

The urban renewal experience in the US had its own successful stories despite the harsh critics it has faced especially between 1960s and 1970s. Some of the Title I projects tried to hang on to the aim of producing low- and moderate-income housing units, and some of the renewal projects were successful at providing employment and economic benefits to the city. For instance, first four Title I project of the New York City which was sponsored by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and one third of the housing units produced were intended to be built for union workers while Philadelphia’s first Title I project the East Poplar Project aimed to provide racially integrated housing environment for low- and moderate-income citizens

(Teaford, 2000). While these first projects intended to provide decent and affordable housing for the low- and moderate-income families and individuals, this approach to urban renewal schemes started to fade as local governments and business interests promoted and shifted to production of shopping malls, office buildings where the capital return and economic benefits were higher. Among successful projects in terms of economic revival can be shown Baltimore's Charles Center, which is a complex of restaurants, offices, shops, apartments and a theatre. This project was admired greatly and it was different from the majority of renewal projects for in this project a rehabilitation approach, rather than a bulldozer approach, formed the basis and planners rehabilitated and integrated already existing structures into each other to form a complex (Teaford, 2000).

Europe, especially the UK was experiencing a post-war boom, which meant that between early 1950s and the early 1970s labor productivity and wages doubled under a full employment regime and new industries such as vehicle manufacture, chemical and petroleum production experienced a rapid growth (McCarthy, 2007). However, while new industries were enjoying high growth rates, old industries were in a decline. During the 1970s and 1980s most of the major North Atlantic cities started to experience deindustrialization and population decline, which were to become chronic and severe problems in the mid-1970s. At the beginning this decline in old manufacture industries stayed relative to outpacing growth of service industries but later it turned to absolute decline as manufacturing employment fell drastically, for instance, more than 1 million jobs were lost between 1968-1976 (McCarthy, 2007). Between 1971 and 1981, cities of the UK lost 34.5% of their manufacturing industries, and this massive deindustrialization process triggered the loss of population that most cities in Britain were facing (Jones and Evans, 2013, 66). The decline in manufacturing sector caused by new transportation and communication technologies and rationalization of production was doubled by population loss throughout manufacturing cities as a result of both suburbanization and employment loss. Between 1951 and 1981 the largest cities in the UK lost on average a one third of their population (McCarthy, 2007).

Both the failure of physical redevelopment programs to rise social welfare and the fear of a racial unrest have drawn the attention of the UK government on inner city problems, leading the government to create three initiatives for inner cities:

educational priority areas, the urban programme and the community development programme (Home, 2007, 7). The Urban Programme “provided grants to local authorities which faced with social need urban deprivation and racial tension” (McCarthy, 2007, 27). Just like the Urban Programme, Community Development Programme was also an area based initiative. Within the scope of the CDPs a specific area was identified as in social deprivation and an action team was deployed for understanding the sources of social deprivation and making policies to overcome social deprivation (McCarthy, 2007). The local authorities were to finance %25 of the programmes and the central government financed %75 (McCarthy, 2007). Both the Urban Programme and the Community Development Programme were built upon the idea of social pathology. But in time the action teams that were deployed as a part these programmes started to conflict with this idea thus seeing the problem at the structural uneven development that capitalist mode of production brought.

Thus, the 1970s marked an important point for urbanization trajectory of the UK. The Government White Paper: Policy for the Inner Cities (issued in 1977), which drew lessons from conclusions of the Inner Area Studies of the early 1970 and the Community Development Programme, provided the basis for changes in inner-city policies of the UK (Home, 2007). The White Paper of 1977 pointed to the decline of economy as the main reason behind inner city problems and aimed to strengthen the economies of inner city areas in terms of job creation, etc. This was to be achieved by improving the physical fabric of inner city areas and making their environments more attractive; and introducing policies with a balance between inner-city areas and city regions (Home, 2007). The 1977 White Paper also underlined the need for some institutional approaches like emphasizing local governments as natural agencies of urban policy and pointed out the need for partnerships between central government and local governments as well as communities.

#### **2.4 Emergence of Urban Regeneration: After 1980s**

The 1970s witnessed a fundamental change in the economic structure of many major cities around the world. Rapid deindustrialization and population decline have

become major concerns under the changing conditions of the economic system. The manufacturing centers of the post-war period were losing their economic “raison d’être” and trying to adapt themselves to the requirements of the emerging “new economy” (Evans, 2013). The new economy “was based on services, communication, media and biotechnologies, and tended to be characterized by information and knowledge-intensive activities” (Jones and Evans, 2013, 67). To find their place in the new system, cities were suggested to compete with each other to attract investments. While competing for investment and business opportunities, the local governments were to be more entrepreneurial. Accordingly, the late-1970s have witnessed a shift from managerial governments to entrepreneurial modes of governance and this shift gained pace through the 1980s (Harvey, 1989). These shifts in urban economies and governance were taking place in relation to processes at the national and global levels. After the structural crises of capitalism in 1970s, a new structure was to be built by leading countries and global institutions of capital. The restructuring of economy was accompanied by the restructuring of national and global institution as well as the coming back of liberal ideology more aggressive than before as what we now call neoliberalism. The basis of neoliberal ideology is “the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state inference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 2). Although there is a literature that gives us the main frame of “neoliberalism” on a macro theoretical scale, it is also important to state that there is no one neoliberalism that is evenly experienced throughout the world. Neoliberalism is more likely to be experienced with differing qualities in different context depending on different institutional formations and economic structures thus making it more likely to talk about “actually existing neoliberalism” to emphasize its path-dependent qualities (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Another important point is that neoliberalism as we call is not an end product but a continuous process thus making it more appropriate to talk about “neoliberalization” instead of a static state of neoliberalism.

In the UK, the emergence of neoliberalism can be traced to the Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government’s rise to power. UK version of the first wave of neoliberal policies were also called Thatcherism, showing its path-dependent way in the UK. Also the rise of Reagan government in the US and Özal government in Turkey more or less marks the emergence of neoliberalism in core and periphery countries.



Emergence of neoliberalism and intensification of globalism created various results for cities. With the crises of welfare state, the main discourse focused on minimal state and deregulated markets for the sake of capital accumulation. In this context, the entrepreneurial city governments were to be less active in the provision of welfare, public services and collective consumption while trying to secure their advantage in the economic competition (Hall & Hubbard, 2010, 126). The institutional shift towards governance, rising emphasis on competitiveness and unleashing of market forces also formed one of the bases of a new urban policy and a shift from urban renewal to urban regeneration.

It is hard to make a precise definition of urban regeneration because of its practical and context-based character of urban regeneration policies. Urban regeneration can be defined as:

Comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change (Roberts & Sykes, 2000, 17).

As is emphasized in this definition, urban regeneration goes beyond the limited vision - demolishing and building new - of urban renewal by also aiming at social and environmental improvement. It must be noted that even if there are improvements in the vision of urban regeneration, it is mostly doubtful if it is the case in urban regeneration practice. The wide and vague definition of the concept led to the fact that “the large-scale process of adapting the existing built environment, with varying degrees of direction from the state is today generally referred to in the UK as urban regeneration” (Jones & Evans 2013, 2).

Urban regeneration, as an urban policy that came out during 1980s, has a neoliberal context and also differentiates not only with its extended vision but also about institutional policies that it foresees. Urban regeneration policies mostly emphasize “governance” as the optimal organizational approach. With the accepted assumption that welfare-state failed to provide economic growth and promotion of the powers of free-markets, states were to transfer their economic activities to free market actors or handle the production with these market actors. So, public administration of the welfare state transformed to new public management, which emphasizes cost

effectiveness, consumer choice, and financial effectiveness (Jones & Evans, 2013). With this shift towards entrepreneurial forms of urban policy, local governments were expected to leave the production of built environment to private actors or realize urban regeneration schemes in collaboration with private actors to attract capital and private investment to have the lead in inter-city competition and to achieve sustainable economic growth. Governance, in this context has become a widely used term almost seen characteristic with urban politics after 1980. Pierre defines governance in contrast to government as “the interplay between state and society and the extent to which collective projects can be achieved through a joint public and private mobilization of resources” (Pierre, 2011, 5). Thus, governance is usually used in relation to public-private partnerships, emphasizing the liberal pluralist approach that should be embraced in order to achieve aims of effective management in urban problems. This emphasis on partnerships and the discourse of governance goes hand to hand with the neoliberal ideology, by defending that for governments and the state to be effective it must act in partnerships with private capital and reconfigure itself in a more flexible and minimal fashion hence the new public management and privatization policies stated. Many commentators saw this change in the approach of local governments through governance as a shift from managerial forms of local governance to entrepreneurial forms of governance (Harvey, 1989). Indeed, the policies, which local governments followed in urban renewal projects, started to change in terms of actor participation, scale and division of labor between state institutions. In this context, local governments sought ways to establish governance models with various actors in the society. Although forms of partnerships are also path dependent, Jonathan Davies (2001) came up with a useful typology of different forms of governance; governance by government, governance by partnership, governance by networks, and governance by regime (Davies, 2001). Governance by government can be defined as the model where different institutions of the state aim to work in coordination to achieve a certain result. As Jones & Evans (2013) put it:

Governments are very large institutions operating in a variety of guises and at different geographical scales, hence it can be appropriate for different parts of the state, with different remits, to work together on particular projects (Jones & Evans, 2013, 47).

The White Paper (1977) in the UK foresaw a governance model fit into this typology by stating that local authorities are to be the natural actors of urban regeneration and will act in cooperation with other public institutions to overcome inner city decline.

Governance by partnerships is the form of governance where the state gets into partnerships with private sector and voluntary sector actors to share some of its responsibilities and resources for completion of a certain project (Jones & Evans, 2013). In urban regeneration policies, this form of governance became dominant after 1980, local governments started to form partnerships with private capital holders for completion of urban regeneration projects (Balaban & Puppim de Oliveira, 2014). Local governments' roles in these partnerships varied from providing incentives, tax breaks to developers, to provide infrastructure to project areas. The Urban Development Corporations in the UK present a form of this governance. The Urban Development Corporations were established by the Conservative Government, which came to power in the UK in 1979 as a flagship policy of urban regeneration. The UDCs were quasi-public institutions who were financed by and responded to central government and had extreme privileges (Parkinson, 2010). UDCs were armed with strong financial, planning and political powers. They had the authority over "land acquisition, finance and planning" (Parkinson, 2010) and in some instances were given "direct land ownership by the central government" and were also planning authorities in their areas (Parkinson, 2010). Governance by networks is another form of governance in urban regeneration. Definition of governance by networks requires the definition of a network as something different than partnership.

Partnership, according to Davies (2001), "is a concept which describes a wide range of public-private interactions, whereas governance by network ... is a specific form of partnership working" (Davies, 2001). Networks are also partnerships but rather than depending on the guidance and dominance of the state during the process, actors involved in a governance by network type relation stay independent from each other and only come together for a mutual benefit (Jones & Evans, 2013). In this form of governance then, actors in the process form a partnership founded upon sharing a common interest and the actors act relatively independent in contrast to governance by partnerships where the state still takes to leading role of coordination and policy making. Still the difference between a partnership and a network poses a problem for

it cannot be precisely pointed when a network would turn into a partnership, and how much state interference would make a network a partnership (Jones & Evans, 2013). The last form of governance in Davies' typology is governance by regime. The concept of regime also requires some explanation as a unique set of coordination and relation. Regimes, unlike previous forms of governance, require an explanation. Stone (1989, 6) defines an urban regime as "the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions" (Davies, 2001, 23). Regimes, different from networks and partnerships, emphasize a long-term relation dependent on trust and shared visions between institutions (Davies, 2001). Whereas partnerships and networks maybe formed around short termed projects and aims, regimes define long-term relations. This kind of governance is dominant mostly in American cities where private stakeholders are in a relatively organic relationship based on mutual benefits, common ideology and mutual trust. In most cases it is stated that trying to find a regime governance structure in non-American cities is futile. One of the reasons of the term governance's popularity since late 1970s is the need for a partnership approach in urban regeneration. There are several reasons why urban regeneration requires participation of different actors in a partnership structure. Roberts & Sykes (2000) draw up these reasons as:

- The current political agenda and funding requirements require the development of partnerships,
- The multidimensional and complex nature of urban problems require integrated, coordinated strategies involving various actors,
- The difficulties with the centralization and decentralization of power in urban areas can only be overcome with partnerships between different agencies,
- In many policy spheres, from housing to crime, health to education, social movements and people are challenging the paternalistic structure of the state and voice their demands.

As the nature of urban problems is rediscovered through time, development of partnerships for fighting the urban decline became a need. Although it is possible to define different models of partnerships and governance as stated above, it must also be noted that the development of a partnership will mostly depend on local conditions thus demonstrate a path-dependent content.

Within the conceptual framework given above, it becomes possible to analyze the politics of urban regeneration in the UK and the US. Starting from 1960s, the UK governments sought ways to execute urban renewal projects through public-public partnerships, which fall into the category of governance by government in Davies' typology. By the 1980s, with the Conservative Government's coming to power, this approach to urban renewal started shift to public-private partnerships, which fall into the category of governance by partnerships. With the coming of conservative government in the UK, the urban policies showed a significant shift, which was also defined as a shift from managerial to entrepreneurial forms of governance. The conservative government inherited a neoliberal approach to urban regeneration as in all fields of its activity. As stated above, the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) proved to be the major instrument of Thatcher Government in the UK. These UDCs were established as institutions with wide powers from land ownership to planning and operated at an arm's length to the central government. The UDCs became responsible for all regeneration activities in their areas, bypassing local governments in terms of planning and finance; and formed partnerships with private sector. The emphasis shifted from public expenditure to partnership with private capital to achieve urban regeneration. The UDCs defined how urban regeneration should be organized in terms of governance. But it must be noted that the change in the organization of urban regeneration in the UK was not solely came out of purely economic reasons. At the time when Conservative Government came to power, some of the local governments were still in control of the Labor Government, which was seen as a radical socialist party. The UDCs' extensive powers that let them bypass local governments were also instruments of political warfare of the Thatcher Government against the Labor Party owned city administrations (Evans & Jones, 2013). This shift in urban policy was not restricted to only the political organization of urban regeneration in the UK but also effected the funding of local governments and urban regeneration projects. Although the neoliberal ideology foresees the cut down of state expenditures to a minimum level, in the UK, it didn't mean the abandonment of funding the local governments through central government resources. In the UK, in contrast to the United States where the economy of cities depended to their tax bases, the funds transferred from the central state remained as the main source of local governments. It just meant that now the central government had total control

over urban regeneration resources. Since the 1980s, urban policies and regeneration projects in the UK are funded through competitive methods. From City Challenge to Single Regeneration Budget, funding schemes in the UK emphasized inter-city competition for receiving funds available to local government for using in their urban regeneration projects. Urban regeneration projects through the 1980s were also called “property-led regeneration” projects for they mainly consisted of efforts to vitalize urban economies through the privation of social services, relaxing of planning restrictions, providing tax incentives to private developers hoping that in return they will create a business-friendly climate that will boost urban regeneration throughout the city (Healey, 1990). One of the main assumptions underlying these policies was that this market-oriented policies would boost area-based regeneration efforts which would in turn boost the city’s economy and provide benefits to whole city with a trickle-down effect.

In this context given above, urban regeneration since 1980s relied on schemes of prestige projects and flagship projects. A prestige project is defined as:

A pioneering or innovative, high profile, large-scale, self-contained development which is primarily justified in terms of its ability to attract inward investment, create and promote new urban images, and act as the hub of a radiating renaissance – facilitating increases in land values and development activities to adjacent areas (Loftman & Nevin, 1995, 300).

During the 1980s as the inter-city competition gained pace as never before to capture the loose capital prestige projects gained an important place in urban policy. The high profile and large-scale they have made it almost mandatory to establish partnerships while executing prestige projects. And these projects mostly emphasized the role of private capital in regenerating cities. However, prestige projects were not expected to be highly profitable in them because their main goal was to stimulate further and greater economic prosperity and development throughout the city (Loftman & Nevin, 1995). Prestige projects were used as means to attract investment to a city by private capital from national and international levels, and were supposed to trigger a trickle-down effect that would spread this investment to whole city by creating jobs, providing a positive image of the city that would attract business and generating higher tax base for local governments, thus making these projects seem as a solution to all maladies of a city. Flagship projects, on the other hand, are local and


small-scale projects, which aim to promote development or create a positive image to change the perception towards those localities in particular localities or neighborhoods (Loftman & Nevin, 1995). Prestige projects and flagship projects share the same aspects with property-led development as being a part of it, and following Loftman and Nevin, are influenced by five factors: the global restructuring of industry; the intensification of inter-urban competition for private investment; the shift of urban policy away from welfare towards privatization and economic development; the changes in urban governance models (resulted with weakening local government powers in the UK) and the influence of United States urban policy (obviously in the UK but also can be seen as a global trend) (Loftman & Nevin, 1995).

The prestige project and flagship projects, which can be seen as practical results of property-led development approaches, received and still encounter harsh criticism. First of all, completion of these large-scale projects take a long time period which makes these projects vulnerable against the national and international property market fluctuations thus making these urban development projects risky (Loftman & Nevin, 1995). Also, the trickle-down effect which is assumed to widen and spread the benefits of these projects to a city-wide scale, usually do not occur and the projects generate too low employment chances or social benefits that would not be able to affect the prosperity of whole city let alone the neighborhoods. In addition, the governance and participation mechanism so emphasized and considered to be a vital part of urban regeneration does not seem to work as expected. Various studies have shown that “local democratic participation mechanisms are not respected or are applied in a very formal way” (Swyngedouw & Moulaert, 2002, 542). Last but not least, most of these project seem to create isolated pockets of urban regeneration rather than being able to benefit the whole city as they are mostly poorly integrated to city scale planning and usually do not regard city wide processes.

But by the 1990s, urban regeneration was again subject to various critiques for ignoring the social problems and not being able to realize the expected economic boost. The social consequences of urban regeneration and urban renewal was a subject of debate since the 1960s but through the 1990s community participation in urban regeneration became a matter of concern again. In this respect community participation in urban regeneration started to be acknowledged as an important factor of success of urban regeneration projects. Arnstein (1969), conceptualizes community

participation with an eight level scheme starting with lowest level of participation to highest depending on communities’ power to effect the outcome of projects.

*Table 1 – Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation. (Arnstein, 1969).*



As can be seen in the figure that Arnstein developed, eight levels also fit into three categories as nonparticipation, tokenism and citizen power. The lowest two nonparticipation levels consist of manipulation and therapy, where the main focus is not to let participation of the community but rather “enable power holders to “educate” or “cure” the participants” (Arnstein, 1969, 217). At manipulation level, people or placed into dysfunctional committees and boards where they are to be educated for engineering their support towards the project whereas at therapy level participants are offered health advisors to help them and cure them (Arnstein, 1969). It can be said that in these lowest levels of participation, participants are conceived as passive subjects to be directed rather than active decision makers of the process thus making these two levels nonparticipation. Informing, consultation and placation is placed at



the tokenism level. Informing and consulting to citizens is a vital part of democratic processes but they will not provide any good to participants if there is no feedback mechanism thus making this process a one way communication. Also the information process must include all steps during the project making because if the informing takes place after a threshold, for example the planning process of an urban regeneration project, the participants would have no choices and power left to change the outcome. Informing and consultation will not have any good effects if they are not backed up by other forms of participation thus making this process a one way communication process which will not guarantee if the advices or opinions of the participants will be heeded at all (Arnstein, 1969). At the placation level some representatives are placed into public bodies but tokenism is apparent at this level also because the judgment and consideration of the opinions of the representatives are still at the hands of the power holders (Arnstein, 1969). Also here the quality of participation also becomes questionable. There is no or little possibility that the representatives will have sufficient knowledge about the legal, financial and technical details of the projects therefore they will not be informed as effectively as they should and their feedbacks will not mean too much without proper advices. At this level the participation inherits a risk of staying as a theatrical and rhetorical participation show rather than a real participatory process. At the highest level is the category of citizen power where the participants have managerial and decision making power to effect and change the outcome of the projects. At the partnership level the participants get into trade-offs with the power holders and this participation process may work more effectively when the participants are organized as a community and have their own legal, technical advisors (Arnstein, 1969). The top two participation levels, delegation and citizen control stand for participation models where the community hold a majority of managerial apparatuses and have their financial powers. At these levels community can be also defined as power holders. Ball (2004), quotes from Carley (2000) and narrates a threefold participation scheme consisting of consultation (surveys, panels etc.), representation (boards etc.), and empowerment (where communities control resources and decision making) (Ball, 2004). Although Arnstein developed this ladder scheme in 1969 based on the U.S. experience, it can still serve as a useful analytical categorization to evaluate the participation policies of recent urban regeneration projects.


Another dynamic that influenced the evolution of urban regeneration concept during the 1990s has been the entering of the concept of sustainable development into policy debates on all scales during the 1990s. The concept has been introduced to mainstream policy debates by the report of World Commission on Environment and Development also known as Brundtland Report, which was published in 1987 with the name *Our Common Future*. The report formulated what came to be the standard definition of sustainable development as the “development that meets the needs of the present without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Wheeler & Beatley, 2004, 53). With the underdeveloped countries facing the challenges of deforestation, desertification while industrial and developed countries facing toxification, acidification and overconsumption of raw materials, environmental problems started to threaten all human existence on earth (Wheeler & Beatley, 2004). The environmental problems every nation facing are also linked to poverty with the fact as Wheeler and Beatley states:

Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive: They will cut down forests, their livestock will overgraze their grasslands, they will overuse marginal land, and in growing numbers they will crowd into congested cities (Wheeler & Beatley, 2004, 55).

Cities and urban systems also have great effects on environment. At the same time our cities are greatly affected from the environment. The earthquake risk, storm risks, water supplies, form of landscape all effect our cities in an important way. Also as cities are the main hubs of human activities, they relate to environment in various ways that are still hard to pinpoint scientifically. Air pollution, water pollution, scarcity of natural resources and climate change still pose important challenges for the future of cities. The inter-relational nature of cities and the environment makes sustainable development as one of the important concepts that affects our urbanization dynamics. The concept of sustainable development - which was used first in the book *Limits to Growth* published in 1972 – entered into urban planning and architecture practices after 1990s (Wheeler & Beatley, 2004). The 1996 Habitat II City Summit, which was held in Istanbul, produced the document *Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements*, which stated:

In order to sustain our global environment and improve the quality of living in our human settlements, we commit ourselves to sustainable patterns of production, consumption, transportation and settlements development; pollution prevention, respect for the carrying capacity of ecosystems; and the protection of opportunities for future generations (Wheeler&Beatley, 2004, 64).

In the light of all the documents stated above it can be said that the environmental problems are strongly inter-relational with social, economic problems, especially poverty. After these influential efforts on emphasizing environmental problems and sustainable development, the need to adapt our cities to new modes of sustainable development and to plan our cities in coordination with sustainable development goals became obvious. On this aspect, sustainable development and urban regeneration share some crucial common goals. Jones & Evans (2013) define the goals of sustainable development with a scheme consisting of three pillars depicted as overlapping circles: economic, social and environmental.



*Figure 1. Three Overlapping circles of Sustainable Development. (Jones&Evans, 2013)*

One of the main aims of urban regeneration has been to combine social, economic and environmental amelioration, which are also defined as the main goals of sustainable development. Therefore, sustainable development and urban regeneration concepts started to be blended from the late 1980s, and the concept of sustainable urban regeneration dominated the policy-making and implementation in cities of advanced countries during the 1990s (Balaban & Puppim de Oliveira, 2014). Also, the published documents about sustainable development all emphasize the importance of governance and partnerships between actors at various scales, which is also one of the institutional aims and challenges of urban regeneration (Jones & Evans, 2013).

Gentrification is another process that seemed to gain pace after the 1980s along with the urban regeneration agenda. The term gentrification was first used by Ruth Glass to define an urban transformation process as follows:

One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages – two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period – which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation – have been upgraded again. Nowadays, many of these houses are being subdivided into costly flats or “houselets” (in terms of the new real estate snob Jargon). The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their status, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighborhoods. Once this process of “gentrification” starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced and the social character of the district is changed (Glass, 1964, xviii-xix; cited by Lees, Slater & Wyly, 2008, 4).

Gentrification, as Ruth Glass defines, is usually described as a process of neighborhood change that occurs with the influx of middle class homeowners to move into degraded working class neighborhoods and start an economic inflation of housing prices and displacement of the original working class residents of the neighborhood. Smith defines gentrification as “the process by which working class residential neighborhoods are rehabilitated by middle class homebuyers, landlords, and professional developers” (Smith, 1982, 139). The underlying causes of this gentrification process have been a topic of debate between two modes of explanation:

supply side and demand side explanations. The first, supply side explanations, mostly referred to Neil Smith's work "has stressed the production of urban space, the operation of the housing and land market, the role of capital and collective actors such as developers and mortgage finance institutions" (Hamnett, 1991, 175). According to supply side explanations, gentrification is a process that takes place in the context of uneven geographical development. Neil Smith explains uneven geographical development around three processes: differentiation and equalization, the valorization of built environment capital and, reinvestment and rhythm of unevenness (Smith, 1982). In the widest sense:

Uneven geographical development refers to the circumstance that social, and economic processes under capitalism are not distributed uniformly or homogeneously across earth's surface, but are always organized within distinct socio-spatial configurations – such as urban agglomerations, regional clusters, rural zones, national territories, supranational economic blocs, and so forth, that are characterized by divergent socioeconomic conditions, developmental capacities, and institutional arrangements (Brenner, 2004, 13).

The geographical uneven development as defined above is translated into urban scale as the "Rent Gap". The rent gap is defined as "the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use" (Smith, 1996, 65). The source of rent gap can be various such as the de-valorization of existing built structures through time by being worn out or outdated by technological advancements or the over development of adjacent buildings can have a depressing effect on the built structures thus causing rent gap to widen.

The second explanation of gentrification – consumption side explanations – emphasizes the role of gentrifiers in the process of gentrification. David Ley's argument emphasized cultural factors inherent to middle classes (creative class as he puts it) by stating that "the neighborhoods themselves include a measure of lifestyle, ethnic and architectural diversity, valued attributes of middle-class movers to central city" (Hamnett, 1992, 177). The middle-class gentrifiers in consumption side explanations take an important place.

Through the 1990s, debates about the underlying causes of gentrification process took a new level and researchers who make supply-side explanations stated that gentrification process started to take a new form now with development

companies and mortgage institutions backed up with brute state power thus getting away from the classical form of gentrification into a new form thus taking the gentrifiers lost their important place in the process. Lees states “gentrifiers who starred in Caulfield’s and Ley’s books... like the hippies in 1970s... for the most part no longer star” (Lees, 2000, 402).

## **2.5 Conclusion of the Second Chapter**

The evolution of urban regeneration mostly followed the evolution of economic and political structures around the world. But it is also stated that, while the general structure seems to be forced through the global economic and political pressures and trends, urban regeneration is still path dependent as it is strongly a local response to urban change thus making it context dependent. Since the industrial revolution various challenges had to be tackled for cities on a scale from population congestion to the quality of built environment, technological renovation to traffic congestion, environmental pollution to social conflicts urban policies had to and still have to tackle a wide scale of problems.

In the three periods drawn above, urban policies changed in response to new political and economic trends. After the industrial revolution, population congestion because of the agglomeration of working class populations in the central city and the need for new modes of urban transportation paved the way to urban renewal. Urban renewal consisted mostly of urban redevelopment, which was essentially the demolition and rebuilding of the worn-out buildings or the building which were categorized as outdated. This era is usually known for slum clearance schemes and urban redevelopment initiatives. In the U.S however, these schemes encountered harsh criticism because urban redevelopment schemes seemed to demolish more buildings than they built and it was stated that the schemes usually targeted the neighborhoods of people of color thus these redevelopment schemes were often named as “negro removal” policies.

In the post-war era, the renewal projects gained pace while most of the European countries tried also to repair the war damage in their cities. In the US, urban

renewal became the consensus level for both social welfare defenders and business networks. While the business networks saw urban renewal as a means to boost property values and inner city economies, the welfare defenders saw it as a means to deliver quality housing to people in need. But the hopes seemed to diminish as urban renewal policies of the U.S cities turned out to be tools of boosters of inner city economy at the expense of social justice. Too many people were displaced and too little were provided with the public aid or public housing for resettling. This approach to urban renewal was often called “federal bulldozer” and emphasized the demolitions that dominated the renewal process, which was told to produce more demolished buildings and vacant lots than it created finished renewed buildings. Through 1960s and 1970s, with the deindustrialization and suburbanization processes, the inner cities started to show signs of serious degradation and economic failure. While the well-off populations and middle-classes seemed to leave the inner city with the moving industries, the low-classes often took their place in the inner city thus blamed for depressing the property values and inner city life. In the UK, the old manufacturing centers of the UK such as Liverpool and Manchester found themselves in an economic crisis as deindustrialization gained pace and the inner-city problem was more linked to economic restructuring processes. The publishing of the White Paper marked an official recognition of inner city problem and the need for an urban policy to tackle these challenges.

By the 1980s, the world economy went through a radical restructuring with the global fiscal crisis of the Keynesian welfare states throughout the world. This crisis was countered with the rising of neoliberal ideology coupled with privatization. Neoliberal doctrine defended the withdrawal of social welfare and the restructuring of the state with privatization. While public services and utilities were privatized, the social welfare services such as public housing and income aids were cut down and either transferred to private sector or were tried to get solved through market mechanism. At the urban scale, this transformation was called the transformation of local governments from managerialism to entrepreneurialism for local governments in this context were restructured as local institutions which should act like private institutions and carry out their services with cooperation with private capital. This necessity to act with or inside the market mechanism gave rise to a new institutional concept: Governance. In the context of this shift from government to governance and

managerialism to entrepreneurialism, partnerships became the main institutional approach to urban policy.

During the 1990s, the environmental problems became much clearer and the global efforts, which aimed at bringing environmental problems into mainstream policy debates can be said to have a relative success in doing so. With these developments another shift was the shift from urban renewal to urban regeneration. Urban regeneration, unlike urban renewal, did not consist of only physical regeneration but aimed at combining social, economic and environmental regeneration at the same time. The accomplishment such various tasks at various scales made it necessary for public and private institutions in partnership and the discourse of partnership also included the local communities as actors in the urban regeneration process. Urban regeneration projects often take the form of large-scale and multi-functional urban projects that aim to contribute to a city's employment, economic gains, environmental sustainability, quality of built environment and local democratic practices. Although the optimistic definition of urban regeneration as a solution to all evils, in practice we can say that urban regeneration managed to success little. The participation stayed as a discourse while in practice the partnerships were usually between private capital and public institutions where local communities were usually left in a weak position unable to determine the outcome of the urban regeneration projects. As Roberts & Sykes put it:

Despite the recognition of the need for partnership, which unites different levels of government and other public, private and community actors and agencies, 'the problem of generating the right institutional machinery with adequate incentives, sanctions and resources to integrate the actions of national and local, of public, private and community institutions and agencies – to make partnership a reality rather than a cliché remains a challenge (Roberts & Sykes, 2000, 43).

Besides, urban regeneration projects, being large-scale projects, usually require massive amounts of investment thus strengthening the hand of private capital amongst other participants thus rendering the aims of social welfare rather weak. Also, most of the urban regeneration projects are said to fail in terms of creating employment opportunities. In terms of planning urban regeneration seems to fail as Roberts & Sykes state:



Problems are being addressed in a piecemeal manner and the linkages between different aspects of regeneration have not been developed. Planning and action on a city-wide or regional level have also been sidelined by the focus on local initiatives. Consequently, a duplication of effort is occurring, economic activity is shifted around at public expense and problems of dereliction and deprivation continually reappear and deepen as economic restructuring proceeds (Roberts & Sykes, 2000, 38).

While urban regeneration seemed to achieve some success in individual projects, in most examples it fell short behind its aims and proved to be a little different from the previous urban renewal efforts.

Parkinson's (Parkinson, 2010) statement for British urban policy can also be said for the historical evolution of urban policy as a whole. Parkinson states that: "Although the economic problems facing British cities may have intensified during the 1980s, they did not substantially change their nature" (Parkinson, 2010, 92).

This analysis can be widened to the whole history of urban policy for the problems that our cities have been facing; population and traffic congestion, pollution, physical deprivation, social injustice etc. have been here at least since the industrial revolution. Although these problems did not change as Parkinson stated, in each period that we formed in this study policy responses constantly changed trying to tackle these problems.

While these differences mark the discontinuities in the history of urban policies, it is also possible to see continuities in the history of urban policies. The continuity of problems also can be seen in the level of policies. Although the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism can also be perceived as a discontinuity, it can also be stated "the role of city governors has always been to promote production as well as to ensure a satisfactory level of consumption for citizens" (Hall & Hubbard, 2010, 127). It should also be stated that although the shift from government to governance is a fact, the over-emphasis on the capital faction of this interplay can be said to be misleading for the government still plays an important role in the partnership organization (Pierre, 2011, 5). Another continuity is the approaches to urban regeneration. Although urban regeneration differs itself from urban renewal with its aims, the execution of these schemes mostly rely on redevelopment of existing buildings. There are a lot of examples of urban regeneration projects where the original settlers of the regeneration area are displaced and a little portion of them are

resettled in the finished project. Thus, the application of recent urban regeneration projects inherent some of the old disadvantages of earlier urban renewal schemes.

## CHAPTER III

### URBANIZATION IN TURKEY

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Turkey's urbanization experience has been highly affected by spatial conditions inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The dissolution of the Empire has put Turkey in different spatial processes than European countries. While European countries has passed through a process where fragmented political geography of feudalism was overcome by formation of nation states, the Modern Turkish Republic was founded based on the already fragmented political geography of the time. The former process experienced by European countries was the unification of existing feudal identities under national identities, while the latter process that Turkey experienced did not mean the unification but the dissolution of the existing political identities (Tekeli, 1998, 4). The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire meant the de-territorialisation of existing geographical formation and decoding of existing social values and identities, whereas the foundation of the nation-state meant the re-territorialization of the state in a new geographical formation and recoding of new values and identities (Şengül, 2012, 415).

The founders of the modern republic have followed two major spatial strategies (Tekeli, 1998, 4). First of all, the political and economic geography was to be redesigned as the geography of a nation-state. Second, cities were aimed to be planned and organized as the major spaces of the modern republic.

Şengül (2012) classifies and discusses the urbanization experience of Turkey under three major periods. These periods are defined as follows:

- Urbanization of the Nation-State (1923-1950)
- Urbanization of Labour Power (1950-1980)

- Urbanization of Capital (1980- After)

### **3.2 The Era of the Urbanization of the Nation-State**

The state was the major organizer of the urban process between 1923 and 1950 in Turkey. For this reason, the first sub-period of Turkish urbanization is defined as the urbanization of the nation state. This period is mainly consisted of re-territorialization of the state as a nation-state and recoding of social and political values according to the ideology and economy of the newly founded republic. Tekeli (1998, 4) determines three main pillars for the spatial strategy adopted during the initial phase of Turkish urbanization. First strategy was the transfer of the national capital from Istanbul to Ankara. Declaration of Ankara as the capital city had both political and economic reasons. During the last years of Ottoman Empire, Istanbul and Ankara started to share the status of capital. Istanbul, as the official capital city, was perceived as the capital city of the Ottoman State, whereas Ankara has become the unofficial capital of the rising Turkish Republic. Therefore, transfer of capital city status from Istanbul to Ankara was politically a proof of succession of the new Turkish Republic over the Ottoman State. At the same time, the change of the capital city had economic meanings and reasons. Economically it could be said that the transfer of capital city status to Ankara facilitated the new nation-scale spatial strategy of spreading investments throughout Anatolia. Besides, designation of Ankara as the capital city was an important step towards the adoption of the policy to overcome regional underdevelopment and uneven development throughout the country (Keskinok, 2006, 34).

The second main spatial strategy that was followed by the founders of the new republic was the establishment of a nation-wide railway system to connect major cities in Anatolia. New railway lines were determined and constructed very rapidly with the aim of integrating the entire territory of the new republic. Keskinok (2006, 34) argues that development of a national railway system made it possible for new industrial centers to emerge and for the existing ones to merge.

The third spatial strategy was about the economic integration of Anatolian cities. The statist (state-oriented) economic paradigm that was developed after the crises of 1929 foresaw the transfer of industrial investments throughout Anatolian cities. Keskinok (2006, 15) evaluates the urbanization policies in 1930s with reference to six principles:

1. national integration (especially the integration of urban-rural and industrial-agricultural areas),
2. development of underdeveloped parts of the country and rural development,
3. development central planning tools,
4. development of public services and public benefits,
5. urbanization on publicly owned lands,
6. Development and empowerment of socialization and publicity.

The economic paradigm of the 1930s aimed to develop industrial activity in a way to provide domestic markets with enough supply and protect the domestic production. With the First Industrial Plan, the state was defined as an actor, which would play a direct role as a producer in sectors that cannot be handled by private entrepreneurs. In the 1930s, another critical step for the formation of modern cities was the establishment of municipal authorities. The Municipality Law (No. 1580), which was enacted in 1930, provided the legal basis for establishment of municipalities in settlements with a population of at least 2000 people.

During 1930s, particularly the urbanization of Ankara as the capital city has served as the model of urbanization of the new republic. The preparation of the Jansen Plan was one of the major developments within Ankara's urbanization process. Unfortunately, this plan was not very successful to overcome the housing problem of Ankara, which grew by 6% annually at that time (Tekeli, 1998, 8). After being the new capital of the new state, Ankara started to face rapid migration. Jansen Plan was expected to overcome such problems of urbanization. However, due to financial restrictions and political opposition for speculative rents, the Jansen Plan became obsolete and it became nearly impossible to develop Ankara as suggested by the plan. With all the economic policies of the era, the growth rate of Ankara jumped to a level even higher than the growth rate of Istanbul and the housing problem became chronic

with the insufficient state investment on housing and the speculative pressures of middle-classes towards the Jansen Plan (Şengül, 2012; Şenyapılı, 2004).




Figure 2 - Jansen Plan

Table 2 – Growth Rates of İstanbul and Ankara (Şengül, 2012, 419).

	1927	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	Artış
Ankara	74.784	122.720	157.242	226.712	288.537	451.241	% 603
İstanbul	690.857	741.143	793.949	860.558	983.041	1.268.771	% 183

The initial years of the new Turkish Republic witnessed the chronic housing problem due to low level of state investment on housing, unplanned development of cities, and speculative pressures of middle-classes on production of urban lands. These problems could be defined as the first steps towards the production of illegal housing known as squatters (*gecekondu* in Turkish which literally means *built overnight*) in Turkey. As the housing problem and population growth through migration continued, working classes started building squatters to provide themselves the housing they needed.

### **3.3 The Era of the Urbanization of Labor**

Şengül (2012) classifies the period between 1945 and 1980 as the era of the urbanization of labor power. The main characteristics of this period are rapid industrialization and migration in cities, production of squatters and emergence of petty entrepreneurs and the informal sector. Throughout the post-war period, industrialization and mechanization in agriculture have become the main economic policies. Industrialization was the main path of achieving economic growth and supported largely by the state intervention. Because the economic paradigm of this period depended upon the development of national economy through import-substituting industrialization strategies, this period is also named as the import-substituting period (Baharoğlu, 1996) and the main economic policy as the import-substituting industrialization (Balaban, 2008). Besides the development of the national economy through import substituting, the state also aimed to create a national bourgeoisie through its policies. With the import substituting strategy, the state aimed at developing the industry and creating a national bourgeoisie. For this reason, the interest rates for credits were kept at artificially low levels and the wages were also supported through direct and indirect social welfare investments to establish a vibrant purchasing power to support the domestic production that was being protected by the state policies (Baharoğlu, 1996).

To support the domestic production, the state introduced several protection policies to protect the national producers from international competition and this was mainly achieved by providing cheap credits, keeping the interest rates at a low level and deploying quotas on imported goods and establishing strict custom control policies (Balaban, 2008). The aim was to provide the national bourgeoisie with state protection in order to achieve industrial development. Throughout the import-substituting period, the state's policy was not only to provide protection to the domestic market, but also to step into the industrial sector as a producer. The state invested in such sectors as iron-steel, machinery-agriculture, paper that require massive amounts of capital with the aim of providing cheap inputs to domestic industry and also keeping them safe from investing in such capital-intensive sectors (Balaban, 2008, 72). These policies provided high levels of profits to national capitalists because they were not only provided with cheap credits and inputs but also were protected from international competition.

Industrial production has become the main economic activity of this period due to intense state support and investments. For example, "the net national production of Turkey went up from 9 billion Turkish Liras in 1950, to 16 billion in 1960 and to nearly 21 billion in 1965, and doubled by 1972" (Karpas, 1976, 58). This significant rise in industrial production was accompanied by a fall in agricultural production. The agriculture production, which was nearly 80% of the GNP in 1950, fell to 55% in 1970 (Karpas, 1976, 58).

Another important development that affected the cities of Turkey after 1950 was the Marshall Aid provided by the United States. Turkey received a total of 164 million dollars with the Marshall Aid and 22% of this aid was to be used on agricultural production and machinery (Şenyapılı, 2004, 118). With the investment opportunities provided by the Marshall Aid, a more effective way of agriculture production was achieved, which unfortunately resulted in unemployment in rural areas. With modernization and mechanization of agricultural production, a huge number of rural residents lost their jobs and the remaining population started to suffer from falling incomes, which triggered a massive migration from rural areas to urban areas. According to Karpas (1976, 56) "about 1 million people were dislocated by some 40.000 tractors". The Marshall Aid did not only contribute to industrialization of



agricultural production but also to construction of a national highway system, which in return made it easy for unemployed people to migrate to urban areas.

As industrial sector has become the main economic activity and agricultural sector has started to suffer from lower productivity and profit levels, rural populations were found themselves in need of moving to cities. With migration from rural areas to cities, big cities like Istanbul and Ankara started to crumble down under large waves of population rise. While the main push factor from rural areas consisted of low income, poverty and lack of medical and educational opportunities (Karpaz, 1976, 21), major cities were also not ready to welcome the population that arrived. As was mentioned before, cities lacked the necessary housing opportunities and infrastructure because of lack of state investment in cities.

The relationship between the state and housing sector during the import-substituting period remained secondary as most of the state's resources were spent on investments in industrial sector. The state remained as a regulator in housing market and did not involve in housing sector as actively as it was engaged with industrial sector. "Shares of public sector's fixed investments in housing were 3% in 1965, 4.5% in 1970, 2.6% in 1975 and 2.4% in 1980" (Balaban, 2008, 93). While investments in housing sector stayed on these low levels, the state's only direct involvement in housing sector was to provide housing to its own employees (Balaban, 2008). As the state allocated most of its resources on supporting industrial sector, the construction sector and housing was left to petty capital and small producers (Balaban, 2008). Large construction firms avoided the housing sector because of fragmented land ownership and the absence of complementary sectors such as building materials industry, which did not provide the necessary conditions for mass housing construction (Baharoğlu, 1996, 48).

The small producers -mostly one-man firms- known as "yap-satçı" dominated the formal housing production in cities during 1960s and 1970s. These small producers mostly started the production process by coming to an agreement with landowners, offering up to 50% of the apartment units to be constructed upon their land. The construction process was largely financed by the sales, which compromised nearly 60% of the total cost, while borrowing from construction material sellers or others constituted about 14% (Baharoğlu, 1996, 48). This type of housing production provided small-scale producers the chance to build multi-story apartments with small

amounts of capital by letting them sell the units being constructed and saving them also from the land payment. While this mode of production, depending on small producers, led to a housing boom, it was not enough to meet all the housing need of growing cities. With the lack of a formal state policy on (social) housing and city planning a chronic housing problem occurred and the unsatisfied housing need resulted in illegal squatter areas to develop in big cities. The development of squatter areas was further encouraged by the inability of the regime to provide the migrants with legal housing opportunities. In a short period of time, squatter areas became the pools of cheap labor force required by the newly developing industry.

Squatters were usually constructed illegally on publicly or privately owned vacant lands in short period of time with materials obtained from small construction material sellers by borrowing. With the housing crisis, the rentals for housing in most of the cities were so high that even people who had a stable income started to prefer to live in a squatter to get rid of high rents and to save for having their own houses (Karpas, 1976). The squatter on this account also provided benefits to employers. As squatters lowered the cost of housing in cities and provided squatter dwellers with the possibility of saving for their own houses, employers had the opportunity to keep wages lower (Karpas, 1976). The reaction of the state against squatters evolved in time. Şengül (2012) defines three different attitudes of the state towards squatters in this period. Throughout the 1950s, the relationship of the state and the middle classes with squatter has been external and tense when first reactions towards squatters were of shock and assault in terms of demolishing them (Şengül, 2012). In 1960s, this relationship evolves in a more inclusive way. While the general dislike towards squatters in the social sphere persisted, the state's attitude towards squatters started to change. In this period, the state seems to come to an understanding of the political and economic role of the squatters for dominant classes and the state itself.

The concept of transformation of squatters was introduced after 1948 through various improvement and development laws (Dündar, 2001). Before the series of improvement and development laws, laws concerning squatter areas generally aimed at legalizing existing squatters and forbidding the construction of new ones, and the general urban policy towards squatters were simply about demolishing them which made no contribution to the solution of the squatter problem, as the demolished ones were rebuilt in a very short time. However, the Improvement and Development Laws

aimed not only to demolish squatters but also transform them into apartment units in a way to create urban renewal on a mass scale. This was to be achieved in various ways. First, with the development plans the large development firms were encouraged to transform the squatter areas, which were located in prestigious parts of the city where they could capture high urban rents. Second, small-scale developers and constructors were to carry the transformation process of squatter districts which still benefited from locational advantages but did not offer such high rents enough to attract large firms. Third, the squatter owners in areas, which did not enjoy advantageous locations, were to carry out the transformation process with their own resources and turn their squatters into apartment blocks. But most of the squatter areas that did not promise high profits to developers had to wait until the rent levels of their neighborhoods started to increase. While this approach towards squatters initiated the transformation of squatter areas, it was for sure not enough to solve the housing problem that led to squatter development. On the contrary, the state policy to encourage development of squatter areas through cooperation with squatter inhabitants started to make the squatter a speculative way of capturing urban rent by both developers and squatter inhabitants. The state generally ignored this speculative rent gains and preferred not to challenge speculation for various reasons. Baharoğlu (1996), explains these reasons as follows:

In an environment where the need for land and housing was increasing and prices for urban land housing were rocketing, and more importantly where the State presented seemingly positive approach towards this illegal mode of provision and the fear of demolition had decreased, gecekondü land and housing inevitably became a speculation throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Baharoğlu, 1996, 56).

Not only did the conditions made the speculation on urban land inevitable but also the state saw the speculative gains through squatter transformation a positive phenomenon for housing provision (Baharoğlu 1996). In a period where the state's resources were allocated to industrialization, housing provision became a chronic problem due to lack of resources and state investment. In this environment, the promise of high urban rents provided an indirect incentive for the private developers to enter the housing construction sector, thus compensated the lack of state investment. Therefore, the state's possible challenge to speculation would harm the housing sector;

since the rising effective demand and hence the rapid growth of housing stock was mainly stimulated by rising prices (which promise speculative gains) and by rising rents (which would not only provoke owner occupiers into buying second or third houses in order to obtain rent incomes, but would also further stimulate tenants to become owner-occupiers) (Baharoğlu, 1996, 48).

The state's approach towards supporting the land speculation can also be seen with the abolition of rent control law in 1963.

All in all, from the mid-1970s, the Import Substituting Industrialization started to face its crisis because of decrease in foreign currency reserves in the Central Bank. This has forced the industrial sector to cut down production and inflation rates started to rise dramatically from 2.7% in 1977, to 43% in 1978, 59% in 1979, and 110% in 1980 while GNP growth started to decline to the rates; 3.9% in 1977, 2.9% in 1978, -0.4% in 1979 and to -1.1% in 1980 (Baharoğlu, 1996, 49). The crisis of the import substitution was coincided with the global economic crises of the late 1970s and has led to adoption of a new accumulation regime. The state's response to the crises was to change the capital accumulation regime and strategies from an inward looking one to an outward-oriented one (Balaban, 2008). This change in the accumulation regime brought about significant changes in key urban processes.

### **3.4 The Era of the Urbanization of Capital**

The economic and political crisis of the late 1970s resulted in a series of liberalization policies. The import substitution policies were abandoned and the economic regime shifted from an inward-oriented one towards a deregulated and export-oriented regime. One of the major economic policies adopted after the crisis was the “stabilization and liberalization package”, which was dictated by the IMF. The main components of this package was increasing the interest rates for credits, lowering the level of wages and devaluation of Turkish Lira (Baharoğlu, 1996). Also another important event was the enactment of a financial decision in 1989 known as Decision No. 32, which “provided full freedom to the capital flows from foreign financial markets into Turkey” (Balaban, 2008, 81). All these policies resulted in a

process that can be called financialization, which in return had drastic effects on production of urban space, as urban process have become an alternative channel of capital accumulation (Şengül, 2012). With abolishment of protective policies towards industrial sector as part of import substitution strategy, profits in industrial sector declined. The falling rates of profits in industry, in return, resulted in shift of investments from industry to financial sector and production of urban space in line with Harvey's argument (Harvey, 1985) on capital switching. During this period, the share of fixed capital investments in industry witnessed a decrease, as fixed capital investment rate of 38% in 1975 declined to 15% in 1989 (Balaban, 2008). Also the share of manufacturing has gone through a decline as its share fell from 28.5% to 14.8% meaning that industrial production lost its attractiveness during this period (Balaban, 2008). But, at the same time, employment in industrial sector rose to 12.6% in 2000 from the level of 6% in 1955 and 11% in 1980 (Balaban, 2008). The rise of employment in industry was accompanied by loss of work force in agriculture. The share of population working in agricultural production fell from 77.4% in 1955 to 66.1% in 1970, 57.9% in 1980 to 52.1% in 1990 and to 47.8% in 2000 (Balaban, 2008). As a result it can be concluded that migration from rural parts to urban parts continued as the urban population witnessed a steady increase from 25% in 1950 to 44% in 1980 and 65% in 2000 (Balaban, 2008).

The continuing growth in rural to urban migration has created significant demand for affordable housing in big cities that were the focus of migration. Besides, the decline in employment and real wages contributed to the housing problem in cities. Many urban residents in big cities were in search of favorable and affordable conditions in formal housing market. The living conditions of the working class have significantly degraded during the period after 1980. For instance, wages decreased in terms of their share in GNP. While wages in 1980 constituted 27% of the GNP, this rate decreased to a level of 14% in 1988 (Baharoğlu, 1996). Also daily wages in public sector showed a decline as they decreased 45% in real terms in the time period between 1983-1988, while private sector wages decreased by 20% (Baharoğlu, 1996). This dramatic decrease in wages also effected the demand for housing. The wage repression combined with inflation and the crisis in provision of authorized housing can be said to increase the demand for illegal housing and squatters. The estimated numbers of population living in unauthorized housing in 1980 was around %50 in

Istanbul and İzmir while this rate was even higher in Ankara which was around 60% (Baharoğlu, 1996).

With continuous rural to urban migration and financialization in economy, production of urban space has become a focus for capital accumulation after 1980s. Several important regulations that affected housing sector and production of urban space have been made during this period in Turkey. An institutional arrangement on structure of local governments in 1984 made it possible to establish Greater Municipalities in big cities. Besides, planning authorities have in large part been decentralized and were given to local governments. Decentralization of planning powers had significant effects on Turkish cities. Another important event is the enactment of the Mass Housing Act in 1981. With this act, a public fund that comprised 5% of national budget was established in order to provide credits to key actors of housing market with a repayment period of 10-20 years with interest rates lower than the inflation rate (Baharoğlu, 1996). This fund was formed to provide cheap credits to developers, contractors and individuals, who were willing to build or buy houses. However, the accessibility of low-income groups to this fund is largely criticized as it indirectly excluded these groups with the requirements of application. Substantial direct payments were required for application and a minimum monthly income was necessary, which was 59.000 TL in 1981; much more than the income of most of the civil servants (Baharoğlu, 1996). These conditions made the planned low-income housing production impossible while these credits started to be used for housing production towards middle classes. In this respect, the Mass Housing Fund did little for solution of affordable housing problem for low-income groups. In 1984, the Mass Housing Law was revised and the Mass Housing Administration was established. While the fund seemed to fail to provide affordable housing to low-income groups; the establishment of both the fund the administration had significant effects in housing sector.

After the foundation of Mass Housing Administration and the Mass Housing Fund, mass production of housing started to become widespread. While the Fund has provided cheap credits to firms and cooperatives along with individuals, Mass Housing Administration got involved in the production of urban space directly with infrastructure investments and housing development projects (Balaban, 2011). This environment that is created with the incentives provided by the state in forms funds

and investments generated a growth in the housing sector. As Balaban (2008) puts it: “Total number of all types of buildings in Turkey rose from 4.4 million in 1984 to 7.8 million in 2000 with an increase percentage of 78.6%. The rate of increase of dwelling units, which is 128.8% appears to be much higher” (Balaban, 2008, 103).

Another figure provided by Balaban (2008) show that the number of residential units showed an increase rate of 75% between 1984 and 2000; while the number of commercial buildings increased 84% between the same years (Balaban, 2008, 104).

It must also be noted that this construction growth did not continue in a stable fashion. Balaban (2008, 2011) distinguishes three sub-periods concerning the construction sector after 1980. The first period, between the years 1982-1988, consists of a rapid growth in construction sector due to creation of a profitable and productive environment with state policies as mentioned above (Balaban, 2008; Balaban, 2011). During this period important regulations concerning squatter settlements, local governments, urban planning system, etc. were also enacted, and these laws and regulations resulted in a construction boom (Balaban, 2011). The second period covers the years between 1994 and 2003, which is a period of decline (Balaban, 2008). The volume of building construction and vitality in construction and real estate sectors has declined dramatically during this period. Due to the ongoing macroeconomic crises during 1990s, this period proved to be a period of decline for the construction sector as the economic figures kept falling (Balaban, 2008). The last period, which is defined as a period of a construction boom, is the period after 2003 (Balaban, 2011). Almost all of the figures concerning construction and real estate sectors, such as number of new building construction, new companies in construction sector and employment share of the sector, have risen substantially in this period. For instance, growth rate in construction sector experienced an increase starting from 4.6% in 2003 to 21.5% and 19.4% in 2004 and 2006 (Balaban, 2008, 160).

These numbers show that built environment in Turkey started to provide high profitability as both public and private sector raised their investments in construction sector. As profitability of construction and real estate sectors raised, foreign investments in both sectors have increased after 2003. In 2003, 57% of foreign investments that flowed into Turkey were in the form of direct real estate purchases (Balaban, 2008). The level foreign investment in Turkey raised in trending fashion as the number foreign construction companies in Turkey rose “from 147 in 1999 to 1.553

in 2007” and foreign construction investment volume rose from “3 million dollars in 2002 to 278 million dollars in 2006” (Balaban, 2008, 169). As can be seen from these figures, construction sector in Turkey started to enjoy high levels of profit after a period of decline. It can be said that the devaluation during the decline period established a profitable environment for investment through degraded costs of land and production in construction sector.

Along with rising foreign and private investments, the attitude of the state also changed, as the level of public investments in construction sector rose. While public investments were increased, new institutional arrangements concerning the construction sector were also made. One of the most significant of the arrangements was empowerment of the Housing Development Agency. Eleven laws concerning the institutional authority of the Housing Development Agency was enacted after 2003 (Balaban, 2012), and the agency earned exceptional powers in terms of planning, land purchase and construction activities. In this period the state did not only stay as a regulator in the construction sector but also took part as a direct producer. In time the agency became one of the main institutions in urban regeneration policies and still is one of the driving institutions in the field.

In a nutshell, the dynamics of production of urban space have changed significantly after 1980 in Turkey due to the radical changes in economic policies and accumulation regime. Urban space has been highly commodified and become an alternative channel of capital accumulation. This has increased the attention and involvement of private and public sectors in built environment production. Majority of urban buildings in Turkey today have been built after 1980. One significant outcome of this process has been the growing attention on urban regeneration policy and practices in Turkey. Starting from 1980, public sector has taken several steps to foster urban regeneration as a means to rebuild urban space. Squatter areas have become the first and most widespread subjects of urban renewal and regeneration policies since 1980.



### **3.5 Urban Regeneration in Turkey**

Although the evolution of urban regeneration policies in Turkey has common points with their western counterparts, there are two facts that make it harder to compare these two experiences. First, there is a big conceptual difference and second, Turkey's experience of urban regeneration lags behind its western counterpart.

The term urban regeneration in Turkey does not actually exist as a distinguishable urban policy in practice. Instead, the term urban transformation is used as an umbrella term to define a wide range of urban policies from urban renewal to urban redevelopment and etc. As was mentioned before, we investigated the development of urban regeneration in Turkey in three historical periods. The first period was the urbanization of the nation-state, when main focus was on the development of cities, which would be the spatial backbones of the values of the republic. The main focus of urban policies of this era were on the development of a contemporary city planning approach, creation of modernist urban spaces, development of Ankara as the new capital of Turkey in a way to become the spatial monument of the republican ideology and establishing the contemporary spatial institutions necessary for the new economy-politics of the republic. This period did not witness widespread applications that would be named urban regeneration. Main objectives of physical applications of the era were to recover the war-stuck cities and to build new ones. Thus new legal and institutional arrangements were undertaken. Municipality Law No. 1580 and Law of Public Health No. 1593 enacted in 1930; Municipality Bank Law No. 2033 and Structures and Roads Law No. 2290 enacted in 1933; Municipality Appropriation Law No. 2722 enacted in 1934 were important laws that aimed to reform and change the institutional structure inherited from Ottoman State.

The second period was defined as the urbanization of labor when the first examples of urban renewal and redevelopment initiatives were started to be seen. With the immense rise of industrialization and the resulting in-migration from rural to urban areas, local governments started to have hardships about providing affordable and sufficient housing to people. As a result, illegal houses built in the form of squatters, which were called "gecekondu", started to mushroom in big cities and spread all around the country very fast. These illegal housing units were usually single floor

houses that were built by their inhabitants on vacant public and private lands. As illegal housing units started to dominate the urban landscape of big cities, the first approach towards them by the state agencies was demolition. Major urban policies of this era included redevelopment of gecekondu areas, establishing necessary infrastructure for developing industry particularly road widening applications in city centers that resulted in demolishing of old neighborhoods in Istanbul (Baharoğlu, 1996). Two important legal arrangements of this period were the Gecekondu Law No. 775 enacted in 1966 and Flat Ownership Law No. 634 enacted in 1965. Flat Ownership Law had significant effects on the development and redevelopment of cities of Turkey as it allowed the construction of multi-story apartments and redevelopment of squatter units as multi-story apartments, which would soon become the major application of urban redevelopment in Turkey. Although the ability to transform squatters into apartments would be seen as a solution to housing problem in cities, the uncontrolled transformation of squatters to apartments for multiplying rent caused housing construction without any infrastructural investment. This uncontrolled spread of non-standardized apartments now poses a challenge to Turkey's cities and urban regeneration.

The third period corresponds to the post-1980 era, when Turkish urban policy has gone through significant changes. This period witnessed the decentralization of urban policymaking between 1980 and 2000, and recentralization of urban policy back again since the early 2000s. Before 2000s, squatters stayed as the main focus of urban regeneration policies. But the most important difference in public intervention to squatter areas between the two sub-periods is that in the 1980s the first projects that can be regarded as urban regeneration projects were realized in cities of Turkey. Starting with examples such as Dikmen Valley Project and Portakal Valley Project, first examples of urban projects closest to what can be called urban regeneration were implemented in Ankara. With the formation of Greater Municipalities in 1980s urban planning authorities were decentralized and municipalities sought ways to renew the urban environment and new revenue sources for their budgets. The central government in this period was not directly involved in urban renewal projects and municipalities created their own means to realize their projects. As is explained in following chapters, Greater Municipality of Ankara sought its own financial mechanisms and legal means to realize Dikmen Valley Urban Regeneration Project.

These projects of the 1980s were also mainly focused on squatter areas with certain differences from previous squatter transformation projects. First of all, the scale of the projects went way bigger as the transformation promoted from single unit redevelopment to mass housing projects. Second, where previous redevelopment schemes usually realized with participation of squatter owners and private builders, later schemes after 1980s saw active participation of public sector in the form of local governments. In most of the schemes the local governments sought ways to unite squatter inhabitants and private builders to realize an urban regeneration project prepared by public institutions. While urban transformation projects are larger in scale and more complex in terms of organization and finance, it is still hard to call these projects urban regeneration projects as they mostly show the characteristics of urban renewal projects just in a larger scale. The focus is still the redevelopment of squatter housing stock and renewal of the environmental and cultural spaced in the project areas. But as the scale has got larger, social problems also started to manifest themselves in more obvious ways. The redevelopment of hundreds of squatter housing units into apartment units benefited some squatter owners while dispossessing and displacing some others as was discussed before. Although policies were introduced to tackle such social problems, it did not shift the physical focus of these projects to social aspects and the project kept on showing a physically focused characteristic.

After the 2000s, planning and policymaking authorities on urban projects started to move from local governments to central governments as new institutional and legal arrangements were made. Some of the most important arrangement are as follows. Municipality Law No. 5393 enacted in 2005, Law No. 5366 About Preservation and Usage of Deprived Historical and Cultural Properties Through Renewal and Rejuvenation enacted in 2005, Ankara North Entrance Urban Transformation Project Law No. 5104 enacted in 2004 and Law No. 6306 About Transformation of Areas Under Disaster Risk enacted in 2012. All these laws that were enacted by the central government shows that the central government focused its attention on urban projects after the 2000s as revenues in urban projects started to rise significantly. As the construction sector became one of the leading sectors in Turkey's economy, the focus of all the projects shifted solely to rents that would be gained from these urban projects, meaning the abandonment of little social aspects they had before.

As can be seen, the urban projects in Turkey mostly focused on physical redevelopment and renewal of deprived neighborhoods and squatter areas. Most widespread examples of urban projects in Turkey included, renewal and rejuvenation of historical and cultural properties to be used as commercial or touristic establishments; redevelopment of old and squatter neighborhoods into luxury housing sites and transform inner city areas into big shopping malls. While all these projects focus on financial revenues to be gained, the social, environmental and traffic problems these projects would cause are usually ignored or accepted as necessary evils. Widespread displacement, creation of extra traffic, over-crowding of areas without proper infrastructure and damaging the environmental aspects of the cities are common problems that most of the urban projects cause. As was mentioned above urban regeneration is defined as;

Comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change (Roberts & Sykes, 2000, 17).

When this definition is taken as the valid definition of urban regeneration; it is hard to say that any project in Turkey is a clear and a typical urban regeneration project. Projects that are called urban transformation projects in Turkey usually lack the integrative approach and focus solely on physical and financial aspects while ignoring the urban scale and rather being planned on a piecemeal manner as isolated projects. It must also be noted that one of the only urban transformation projects realized in Turkey that got as near to be an urban regeneration project as the definition goes was the Dikmen Valley Urban Regeneration Project. This is one of the main reasons that Dikmen Project is seen as a milestone in urban regeneration experience in Turkey.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: DIKMEN VALLEY URBAN REGENERATION PROJECT**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The Project Area, Dikmen Valley, is located between two densely populated and urbanized districts; Dikmen and Ayrancı which also are crowded housing areas in southern part of Ankara. Tanyeli Street defines the northern border of the Valley, while the Valley stretches approximately 6kms to South. Prestigious areas of Ankara surround the Valley as it stretches from city center to Middle East Technical University Forest and Diplomatic Sites for Embassies and Parliament Housing Site to the South. The Valley is approximately 6kms long and 300 meters wide on the average and constitutes of 158 hectares.




Figure 3 – Location of Dikmen Valley in Ankara

The topographic structure of the Valley fits into the definition of a classical Valley formation. The slopes on the sides of the Valley range between 20%-30% while the slope on the Valley bottom is 5%. The two top points of the sides of the Valley are 1130 meters and 950 meters with a difference of 180 meters. The geological studies

carried out in the Valley show that the common rock structure of Ankara, epithamorphic schists are found on the southern parts of the Valley. The geological studies that take place in the project report state that the schists in the southern part of the Valley have been decomposed largely so the bearing capacity problems can be expected in this area. On the other hand, the middle parts of the Valley have fewer decomposed structures, thus this area is more suitable for housing because of its higher bearing capacity. The alluvial and artificial fillings that form the bottom of the Valley make the linear base of the Valley unsuitable for heavy construction (Project Report, 1991).

It known that during the 1930s the Valley was still empty and was mentioned as a garden and a green space (Şenyapılı, 2004). The Valley started to become a settlement of squatters only after the 1950s. The project site of the Valley consists of four neighborhoods: Ayrancı, İlkadım, İlker and Metin Akkuş neighborhoods. The survey carried out in 1989 stated that there were around 9089 people residing in the project site of the First Phase of the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project, which consisted of five neighborhoods that were mentioned above (1/5000 Project Report, 1991, 4). The surveys carried out in 1991 shows that this number increased to 10.350 in the following two years (Dündar 1997, 129). The project report states that there were around 2500 squatter houses, which around 1800 of them were constructed before the date 10.11.1985 and could benefit from the amendment law (Project Report, 1991, 6). Most of the population in the Valley was migrants. There were two categories of squatters in the Valley. One of them consisted of squatters, which were built by people moved to the Valley from other districts in Ankara. According to the information gathered through interviews with squatter owners in the project area, most of the squatter owners were living in Ankara before they moved into a squatter in the Valley and they were working in Ankara for a long time. The other category consisted of people who came to the city as they migrated to Ankara. These people usually are linked with some other squatter habitants and came to move with them. This points that squatter inhabitants, who migrated to Ankara and successfully adapted to the city life then brought their relatives with themselves (1/5000 Plan Report, 4). There are also other groups of people who cannot be categorized as squatter settlers but do live in empty and abandoned squatter houses left in the Valley. The interviews also highlighted that this latter mentioned group

mostly consisted of rag pickers and Syrian migrants who came to the Valley in the last 10 years.

Dikmen Valley is an important part of the ecological system of Ankara. The Valley is an important air corridor and a part of the water basin system therefore the protection of the area has always been a concern. Although, the protection of the Valley has always been an important issue, Dikmen Valley found a place in most of the plans relatively late. The Valley was left out of the Jansen Plan, which was prepared in 1930s because it was not yet inside the improved land (Şenyapılı, 2004). In the Yücel-Ubaydin Plan, which was prepared in 1957, Dikmen and Ayrancı were taken into improved land of Çankaya and Dikmen River was left as a green space between these two areas. With the implications after 1957, small parts of the valleys of Ankara were started to be taken under control but Dikmen Valley was left out so it became an area of illegal housing (1/5000 Plan Report, 6). In 1986, a study carried out by City and Regional Planning Department at the Middle East Technical University to determine the planning strategies for the Ankara 2015 Structural Plan stated that a green belt was necessary in Ankara and proposed 8-10 km long green belt around Ankara which would then stretch into the city through the valleys (Dündar, 1997, 134). With the influence of this study, Greater Municipality of Ankara approved the Dikmen River Green Area Project (1/5000 Plan Report, 9). Dikmen Valley was destined as a green space in the 1990 master plan. Increasing air pollution and ecological degradation started to become a critical factor making the protection of green areas and natural Valleys throughout the city. Therefore, in 1989, Greater Municipality of Ankara gave a top priority to Dikmen Project and revised Dikmen River Green Area Project as Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project (1/5000 Plan Report, 9). There were various reasons behind the choice of prioritizing Dikmen Valley over other and many squatter areas in Ankara. First of all, Dikmen Valley was in the middle of highly crowded and prestigious housing areas and was considered to be a “blight zone” and secondly, the area was included in the 1950 Yücel-Ubaydin Plan inside the developed zone of the master plan, as mentioned by some of the interviewees. The mayor of Ankara of the time explained another reason behind this choice as follows:



The inhabitants of the Valley invited me to and asked me to a challenge. They asked if the creator of the BATIKENT project would solve their problems. And I promised them to solve their problems by resettling them in the Valley without dispossessing them (Based on information provided from the interview).

As it can be seen, the Dikmen Valley Project was also a political choice while also being an urban planning choice. As a social democrat party's project, Dikmen Valley project was not only a regeneration project but also was a flagship of social democrat ideology. The former projects concerning the Valley considered at expropriating the lands, demolishing the squatters, relocating the squatter inhabitants to some other area of the city and keeping the Valley as a natural park. Urban planners whom we interviewed stated that this was impossible for various reasons. First, expropriation costs of such a large land would cost a fortune, which would be too much for municipalities' budgets to overcome. Second, inhabitants of the Valley resisted to this plan and if the plan were forced it would cause a serious social unrest in the area. Although these reasons of abandoning the former approaches seems correct, our interviewees also stated that former approach was correct in urban planning terms. They stated that although it would be hard and incorrect in terms of politics, the best approach would have been keeping the Valley as a natural park. Urban planners whom we interviewed stated that natural qualities of the Valley could be protected only this way for any kind of construction permit or development project in the area was meant to open a path for further development which would result in the transformation of Dikmen Valley to a high density housing area. So they also mentioned that the Dikmen Valley Project was more a political project rather than an urban planning project.

Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project can be regarded as the first major example of a regeneration project in Turkish cities. In general terms the project aimed at renewing the built environment by clearing out squatter housing, building recreation areas and modern infrastructure while maintaining the Valley's green characteristic. Though it was easily said than done. As was mentioned before, in 1991 when the project started to take off, there were around 2500 squatter houses and 10.305 people residing in these squatters. The clearance of these squatters was a great challenge in many ways. 1800 of these squatters were built before 1985 so they had legal status, which legalized their squatters. Also the squatter inhabitants who did

not have any legal right ownership were also a reason of concern for the demolition of hundreds of houses would surely cause a social unrest in the city. Therefore the local government had to innovate and invent an approach, which was not used before.

Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project will be studied under two historical periods. The first Period covers the years starting from 1989, when the Project took off to 1994, when the metropolitan mayor of Ankara was changed. The second period covers the years 1994 and until today, the years that the new mayor and thus the local government stood in power. Dikmen Valley Project is actually made up of two sub-projects, one being Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project's 1/1000 and 1/5000 scale plans that were approved by the city council in 1990 and the second being the sub-project Dikmen Valley II. Phase Regulation Plan and Yıldız-Oran Axis Revision Regulation Area that was approved in 1992 (Dündar, 1997, 127). These two phases were actually two different projects concerning the Valley. The second phase Dikmen Valley II. Phase Regulation Plan and Yıldız-Oran Axis Revision Regulation Area project used a different model than Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project. Dikmen Valley Project covered the whole first two implementation zones in the Valley but covered only the western side of the Valley after the second implementation zone.

## **4.2 The First Period of the Project**

The aim of the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project is defined as follows:

Within the framework of this Project, an environmental planning to enable the disrupted ecological balance to be set up again will be prepared by analyzing the natural structure and the existing problems in the Valley. Furthermore, a cultural and recreational corridor to serve the whole city will be created on the one hand with the planned restructuring and on the other hand, the Project aims at solving the housing problems of present squatter owner inhabitants of the Valley within the same area through a participatory rehabilitation model (Project Report, 1991; translated by Dündar, 1997, 135).

With this general framework, as per the project report, the Project sets its four basic objectives as follows:

1. To create a green corridor running into central areas through which will allow the air to circulate and will thus affect the ecological balance and microclimate of the city in a positive way; and will make a positive contribution to the city in terms of providing green spaces to Ankara.
2. To provide a cultural, recreational, commercial and social center that will serve the whole city and which will become a well-planned landmark for the capital.
3. To supply the Valley's inhabitants with high quality housing, upgraded technical and social infrastructure by using self-financing mechanisms and a participatory planning approach.
4. To realize public-private sector collaboration on a higher level within the framework of this Project; an example of contextually broad, multi-dimensional projects requiring large amounts of investment and to consequently encourage concentration of private sector investments in the direction of local planning strategies, therefore enabling feasibility and shorter repayment periods for local government infrastructure investments without loss of time and capacity.

The Project aims to realize these aims and objectives with a participatory organizational structure, through a self-financing mechanism and an ecologically sustainable approach. Project-makers also added that this project had aimed to provide certain benefits to the macro form of the city of Ankara other than producing a recreational and cultural corridor for the city. As was mentioned above, Dikmen Valley is located in the middle of highly crowded housing areas, thus it also separates two sides and disrupts the transportation and integration of two housing areas that are located on two sides of the valley. Dikmen Valley Project also aimed at building bridges on the valley that will connect the two sides of the valley for both vehicles and the pedestrians. These bridges are called Culture Bridge and other than aiming to provide a more integrated transportation network in the urban scale, these bridges were also planned to have cultural and commercial facilities on them (1/1000 Plan Report, 1991, 4). Thus, on the urban scale, the project aimed at creating; an integrated transportation network that will render both sides of the Valley accessible to each

other, a green and cultural corridor that will become an important social hub for the city, an air corridor and a healthy water system that will contribute to the ecological sustainability of the city (Based on the interviews with urban planners).

Another aim of the Project is to provide the squatter inhabitants of the Valley with high-quality and affordable housing with a participatory mechanism that will also keep them in the Valley thus preventing the disintegration of their present social and cultural systems. Doing this would also solve the legal problems concerning the squatters and provide them with a legal homeownership, which would grant them a kind of security that they didn't enjoy with their squatters (1/1000 Plan Report, 1991, 3). To achieve this aim, the Project foresaw a unique organizational structure that was not used before Dikmen Valley Project. The squatters were to be organized under four housing cooperatives that will be formed based on the four neighborhoods they will operate. These housing cooperatives are (Project Report, 1991, 32):

1. Ayrancı Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative
2. İlkadım Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative
3. İlker Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative
4. Metin Akkuş Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative

These Cooperatives were to carry out operation as listed in the Project Feasibility Report (Project Report, 1991, 32):

1. Carrying out all necessary work related to providing its members with apartment flats and arranging all necessary documents with municipality such as contracts.
2. Undertaking the presentation of its members, keeping its members constantly informed of the Project developments and passing information between project participants.
3. Handling relations with finance bodies, ensuring the efficient use of finance that is provided during the process of the construction of housing and infrastructure facilities.
4. Acting as an information device with higher level organizations within the framework of this Project or with regard to coordination of similar projects in Ankara.

5. Carrying out maintenance of common facilities and housing units after the completion of the Project.

These housing cooperatives were designed as devices that would carry the bargaining process between the squatters, right holders and the local government while also providing information channel acting as a consensus builder. Thus, these cooperatives were crucial for achievement of the participation aspect that the Project promoted. These cooperatives held routine meetings and evaluated the Project development. In these meetings, the project makers informed the inhabitants of the Valley about the recent developments and the stage of the Project while the inhabitants of the Valley voiced their needs and demands about the Project. Each Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative consisted of: Mukhtars, representatives of squatter owners, head of the Metropol Development Company, head of the Municipal Hydraulic and Sewerage Works (ASKI) and head of the Greater Municipality of Ankara.<sup>1</sup> According to urban planners we interviewed, it was during one of these meetings that squatter owners convinced the municipality to convert 80 m<sup>2</sup> gross size of the houses that were to be built to 80 m<sup>2</sup> net houses. One of the downside of these housing cooperatives was that renters who resided in squatters and squatter owners who did not have the right owner status were not made a part of these processes. Because of the legal constrictions the squatters who built their homes before 1985 and the renters in the Valley were not right owners so they were not made a part of the project at all.

Along with the housing cooperatives, a company whose shareholders were only public actors was also formed. The shareholders of this company were various district municipalities and the Greater Municipality of Ankara. This company named as Metropol Development Company was also an important part of the governance model that the Dikmen Project relied upon. Metropol Development Company's duties were: preparing the project plans, maps, making necessary arrangement and agreements with private construction firms to undertake the construction process. Metropol Development Company did not take over the construction process by itself, rather passed the construction process of the Project by bidding method to contractor companies. Metropol Development Company was not formed only for the Dikmen

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<sup>1</sup>Mukhtar (also spelled Muktar) meaning "chosen" in Arabic, refers to the head of a village or mahalle (neighbourhood) in many Arab countries as well as in Turkey and Cyprus.


Valley Project but had one of the major roles during the process. According to former mayor of Ankara, namely Murat Karayalçın whom we interviewed, the company was actually established to develop urban regeneration projects around the country. First idea was to create a public institution that would develop, execute and evaluate urban regeneration projects all around the country and to make this institution an umbrella organization for urban regeneration generally, as per the urban planners we interviewed. At this point it can be said that the idea behind Metropol İmar is similar to Urban Development Corporations in the UK.

The main decision-maker organization of the Dikmen Valley Project was the Dikmen Steering Commission. The commission's members consisted of Greater Municipality of Ankara, District Municipality of Çankaya, Metropol Development Company and representatives from the Housing Cooperatives (Dündar, 1997, 141) Duties of this commission was listed in the Project Feasibility Report as follows (Project Report, 1991, 3):

1. To undertake the preparation and coordination of all architectural and engineering projects, and to establish the integration of Dikmen Valley Project,
2. To establish coordination of contractor companies with each other and with the support group,
3. To provide the coordination of the planning process of investment-finance relations,
4. To undertake feasibility studies and to update these studies concerning the construction of Project facilities in the context of wholeness of the project,
5. To research and determine the marketing methods for marketing of structures to provide for the project and to do these in the framework of the feasibility studies,
6. To establish information and bargaining relations with the inhabitants of the Valley,
7. To prepare all kinds of publications and materials for promotion and advertisement of the project.

As can be seen, The Steering Committee is designed as the umbrella organization for the coordination of the Project. It does not undertake any of the processes in the project but rather it functions as a level of coordination and decision-making with all the partners' participation in the project. But it should also be noted that the Steering Committee was far from being a fully democratic organization and thus it was still

under the heavy influence of the Greater Municipality of Ankara. As a part of the participatory process that the Project aimed, a journal named “Our Valley” was published every week by the Steering Committee to inform the squatter inhabitants of the developments and achievements of the Project. This journal was usually filled with information about the project’s recent situation and was also filled with promotional interviews hyping the project in the eyes of the public.




Photograph 1 – Cover of the periodical called “Our Valley”, February 1994.



METROPOL  
İMAR A.Ş.'NİN  
YAYIN ORGANIDIR

EYLÜL 1992  
SAYI:4

# VADİMİZ



Sevgili Dikmen'li Hemşehrilerim,

Vadideki inşaat çalışmaları hızla devam ederken, projemizin önemli merkezlerinden birisi olacak Dikmen Köprüsü ve Konut Kulelerinin ihalesinin tamamlandığını ve inşaaata önümüzdeki günlerde başlanacağını müjdelemek istiyorum.

Dikmen Köprüsü Kompleksi vadi projemizin gerçekleşmesinde gelir kaynağı yaratacak; tamamlandığında vadinin iki tarafını yaya geçişiyle ilk kez birbirine bağlayacaktır. Böylece önemli eksikliği duyulan ulaşım bağlantısı sağlanacaktır. Ayrıca projenin

ilerideki aşamalarında dört ayrı noktada yapılacak köprülerle vadinin iki yakası taşıt yolları ile de bütünleştirilmiş olacaktır.

Sizler için inşa ettiğimiz konutlar, kültür köprüsü, havuzlar, parklar, gezinti ve dinlenme mekanları, sizlerin de katkı ve desteği ile vademizi Ankara'nın en önemli prestij alanlarından birisi haline getirecektir.

Sevgi ve saygılarımla.

Murat Karayalçın  
Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı



*Photograph 2 - Cover of the periodical called "Our Valley", September 1992.*

Other than its participatory mechanisms, the Dikmen Valley Project was also promoted by its innovative financial approach to realize the objectives of the project. Dikmen Valley Project was financially designed in a model that was foreseen to finance itself through a kind of cross-subsidy approach. During the project, various instruments were utilized to cover the budget needs for the Project. First of all, Greater




Municipality of Ankara issued bonds to international markets. Actually the sources that were created by Greater Municipality of Ankara by bond issues were not only used in Dikmen Valley Project but were also utilized in other Projects such as the Metro Project, Ankaray LRT Project, and the Intercity Bus Terminal (AŞTİ), Altınpark and Batıkent Projects (Karayalçın, 2009, 16). In the case of Dikmen Valley Project, the bond issues were used as leverage and 2.5 billion USD worth of investment package was realized with a bond issue of 600 million USD (Karayalçın, 2009, 17). This investment package that was created through bond issues were used as intermediate financing instruments in other projects whereas in Dikmen Valley Project they were used as the main investment source.

Another major source for the Project was the surplus that would be created by the project. Dikmen Valley Project foresaw different uses for the land in the project area. These different usage types were: housing, cultural, commercial, recreational, public facilities and green spaces. All of these usages provided the project some sort of financial tool. The revenues of the project specially relied on houses, shops and offices that were to be built. Of all the housing units that were to be built, 1700 of them were to be given right holder squatter inhabitants while the remaining was planned to be luxury housing units to be sold to provide the project with necessary revenues (Project Report, 1991, 1). One of the most important terms in this context was the Municipality Service Areas. Municipality Service Area was the name given to all the facilities and units that were built to provide revenues to the Project. One of the major municipality service areas was the structure that was called “Culture Bridge”. This bridge was planned as a two-story bridge, which would connect the sides of the Valley for pedestrians. Lower level of the bridge was planned to have social and commercial facilities such as a cinema, retailers, cafes etc., while the upper level would be a pedestrian walk that connects two sides of the Valley. The bridge was also planned to have elevators to provide vertical accessibility to the Valley with horizontal accessibility. Two high storey buildings at the edge of the bridge were also municipality service areas. These two towers were consisted of office spaces, commercial units and luxury housing units that would provide the revenues needed to finance the project without putting any extra burden to municipality’s budget.



*Photograph 3 – The Culture Bridge Between Housing Towers (Anonymous).*



*Photograph 4 – Culture Bridge and the Residential Towers (Anonymous).*

Another municipality service area were the two towers near Dikmen Street which are now totally converted to luxury housing units.

In the first plans of the Project, it is stated that the project-makers aimed to avoid excessive rent inflation and they calculated the housing units to be built in relation to existing population in the Valley while keeping the rent raise in a level to compensate the resettlement of the squatter owners. With the assumed financial it was aimed to create enough revenues from the luxury housing units, office spaces and commercial spaces to compensate the costs of the whole Project.

The costs of the Project were categorized as follows:

1. Organizational Costs
  - a. Financial Costs
  - b. Administrative Costs
2. Land and Infrastructure Costs
  - a. Expropriation Costs
  - b. Implementation Costs
3. Infrastructure
  - a. Roads and Bridges, Rainwater Drainage, Sewerage Network, Daily Use Water, Electricity, Communications
4. Construction Costs
  - a. Landscaping, Housing, Commerce and Service Centers

Of the above costs, the most troublesome cost of the project proved to be the expropriation costs since in the Valley approximately 73 hectares of the land was in private property (Dünder, 1997, 144). The lawsuits that these private landowners filed for raising the values of their land damaged the feasibility of the Project badly in the long term especially after the completion of the first phase of the Project. According to one of the landowners whom we interviewed, there are still re-appreciation lawsuits filed by the landowners in the Valley to raise the prices of their land that are expropriated.

As for the calculation of the value of housing units and determination of the standard values for the project; the project uses its own terminology (Karayalçın, 2009, 9):

1. Transformation Measure: Transformation Measure is the measurement that represents the average size of the squatters in the Valley. This average size also forms a standard value for the expropriation of the squatters in the Valley. The Project executor pays surplus money to squatters with larger size than this, and the smaller squatters get in debt to the project. The Transformation Measure in the case of Dikmen Valley Project has been determined as 350 meters.
2. Transformation Factor: Transformation factor is a term used to define the size of the housing area and how many units of that will be built in exchange of one units of squatter that will be demolished. In the case of Dikmen Valley Project, it was planned to gain 270 m<sup>2</sup> of new building area in Exchange of 100m<sup>2</sup> of squatter area to be demolished; meaning that 2.7 m<sup>2</sup> areas were to be gained in Exchange of 1 m<sup>2</sup> of squatter area. In this case the transformation factor was to be 2.7.
3. Transformation Value: Transformation value defines the total market prices of the houses and commercial building that will be built on the Project site. In the case of the Dikmen Valley, transformation value is assumed to be around 600 million German Marks.

The Project makers also determined the values of the existing squatters in the Valley and the consensus elements of the first phase were as follows (Project Report, 1991):

1. A land size of 350 m<sup>2</sup> was set as the transformation measure.
2. This standard land's value was calculated by the Çankaya District Value Determination Commission as 100.000 TL/m<sup>2</sup>, which makes 35.000.000 TL on a standard land size equal to the transformation measure.
3. The Commission also determined the value of the rubble and trees on a land as 10.000.000 TL.

With these determined values, evaluations were made for every individual squatter units and depending on the size of their land, some became debtor and some became debtor.

Contractor firms who won the municipality's outsource bidding undertook the constructions. The conditions of agreements in those times were more like a "build-and-sell" type of housing provision. The developers built the houses in return of a certain number of housing units they built. Planners whom we interviewed stated that in that time the agreement conditions were mostly 50%-50%, which means that the developer company who built the housing units took half of the units they built for them to sell at market value. They also stated that there were around 1800 squatter houses, which also had legal ownership so the project had to build at least 3600 housing units just for the squatter owners. When the luxury houses and other housing units are added to this number, the project is found to aim at building a total of 5500 housing units in the Valley. The squatter owners, who agreed on the project, were to leave their houses and move to another rental house until the project was completed. The planners who took part in the project state that they also left the demolition of the squatters to the squatter owners for a reason. If the squatter owner demolished their own house, they would sell the material of the rubble to earn money and the municipality thought this as a minor incentive to help the squatter inhabitants. They then moved to other houses as renters until the project was completed but by the mean time the municipality paid them rent aids until they moved into their new houses in the Valley. Interviewees stated that this was the first project in Turkey where squatter inhabitants demolished their own squatters and agreed on a project by their own will.

The Dikmen Valley Project was planned to be implemented step by step through the realization of five implementation zones. These zones also corresponded to five neighbourhoods that were mentioned above. The above-mentioned policies designed for the project were only implemented fully at the first implementation zone and partially in the second implementation zone. In 1994 the Greater Municipality of Ankara changed hands and passed to another political party, namely the Welfare Party, which had an Islamist political background. This change showed great differences in the implementation of the Project overtime.

The first implementation phase and the first project was deemed successful and was promoted by its three aspects: participation, self-financing mechanism and creating an environmental and cultural landmark for the city. But the end product of the first phase was not without its criticisms.

First of all, the participation mechanism that was established in the project was not as communicative as it was claimed. Although the housing cooperatives were innovative devices for realizing the participation of squatter inhabitants to the project, this participation couldn't go beyond giving information to the squatter owners. The meetings that took place in the housing cooperatives were more informative meetings rather than platforms where the squatter owners could affect the outcome of the project. Most of the squatter owners were not really aware of the details of the project and the meetings that took place barely could inform every squatter inhabitant. Also, renters and squatter owners, who were not right holders, did not have any seats to be represented in these cooperatives and meetings that took place. Therefore, it can be said that these cooperatives actually acted as devices that established the hegemony of the local government and sought to capture the squatter inhabitant's support for the Project.

Second, the project claimed that they were to build high quality houses for the right holders among squatter inhabitants and provide them with a modern built environment. But the surveys that were performed in the Valley show that the houses that were built in the first phase had major problems about the quality of materials that were used in their construction. Most of the Valley inhabitants who live in the new built apartment units stated that the houses got rundown in a short time and the infrastructure of houses were rapidly degrading (Dündar, 1997). Other than that, the houses built for the squatter inhabitants were deemed too small (which were 80m<sup>2</sup>). Most of the squatter inhabitants enjoyed the flexible architecture of the squatters as they would widen the house or build add-ons as they needed under circumstances such as marriage, birth or moving of the relatives. New built apartment blocks were not only too small for families to fit but also dispossessed them from these flexible conditions. Former squatters stated during the interviews that the built environment that was created with the Project was not suitable for the cultural and social lives of the Valley inhabitants.

Another problem with the built environment created by the first phase of the project was the newcomers to the project area. The rising value of the Valley and the luxury environment that was created acted as a magnet for the upper classes. As the upper classes moved to the Valley social segregation started to show itself. Some of the former squatter residents stated during the interviews that the upper class people



that moved into the Valley did not want to share the same social spaces with them and that they did not allow them to use sports facilities or did not let their children to play with theirs. Former studies also showed that a high percentage of the former squatter owners moved out of their new homes in the Valley, thus a voluntary displacement seems to be in affect (Güzey, 2009).



*Photograph 5 - Dikmen Valley After Project (Greater Municipality of Ankara).*

### **4.3 The Second Period of the Project**

At 1994, the local elections paved the way to the change of the political party that controlled the Greater Municipality of Ankara. The new administration, which was backed with an Islamist origin and a conservative ideology, has declared to follow a completely new agenda and goals in municipal operations during and after the elections. For instance, one of the first attempts of the new administration was to change the logo of the Greater Municipality of Ankara. As opposed to the previous one, the new logo was an unsophisticated combination of various Islamic and nationalist symbols, implying the upcoming changes to other major fields of urban policy in Ankara. The Dikmen Valley Project constituted one of the major

controversial issues between the two periods of the local administration in Ankara. The new administration has been criticized for changing the main logic and key aspects of the project, and thus for causing the current and ongoing problems in the project area between the municipality and residents. In this section, mainlines and key aspects of the change in approach to the project after Melih Gökçek has become the metropolitan mayor of Ankara in 1994.

Administration change had significant effects on the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project. One of the most important developments at the start of this period was the changing of the whole project team who were working in Metropol Development Company. The other changes in the project started to show its effects especially after the 3rd implementation zone of the Project. The first 3 implementation zones continued more or less as per the former administration's plans. The second implementation zone was also already prepared and nearly finished when the municipal administration changed. The problems concerning the project broke out especially in the 4th and 5th implementation zones.

The planners, whom we interviewed, stated that one of the first things that the new mayor of Ankara, namely Melih Gökçek, made was the dissolution of the whole project team and issuing of file lawsuits against the project team. Interviewees stated that most of the lawsuits were political in their essence but the accusations were about the development of the project. The main accusation was about the bond issuance of the municipality and getting into debt because of the project costs. Although our interviewees stated that the project's first implementation zone was successful at compensating itself, the new administration of the municipality alleged that the project caused a debt that was passed onto them. Although this change in the project crew was an anti-democratic step, it can also be stated that changing the executive crews of former administrations is a common practice. The second major step that the new administration took was the abandonment of the five Housing and Environmental Development Cooperatives which constituted a vital part of the participatory process of the project that was established by the former government. The legal statuses of these five cooperatives were not terminated but in practice, they were not used anymore. The regular meetings of the cooperatives came to a halt and they were abandoned so that they did not function anymore. This step can be read as a sign that the new administration was about to change the project's governance model.



The financial structure of the project was also changed significantly as the project has evolved towards a more pure version of the public-private partnership model. Before 1994 the development companies were more like contractor firms who realized the projects that were prepared by the project team in Metropol Development Company in exchange of a certain percent of housing units that were to be built. After the change of the municipal administration, the model was evolved into a more private sector-lead approach where the development companies were one of the decision-makers. The municipality and private sector negotiated the terms of the project between each other as the people in the Valley were completely left out of the renewal process. Municipality gave the development companies extra rights of construction and freedom to prepare their own projects and transferred the expropriation cost to development companies, as per the information provided by our interviewees. The development companies were to bargain with the Valley inhabitants about the terms for their leave and build their projects in the Valley.

The 4th and 5th implementation zones are still squatter areas at present. There are various groups living on site and the social structure of these neighborhoods has been changed immensely in time. The planners of the 1st implementation zone stated that even in their time there were many squatter inhabitants who were not right-owners for most of them moved to the Valley after 1985 (Based on interviews with planners). There are no studies that show how many squatters are there in the Valley right now and the Gökçek municipality also did not do any studies in the field regarding the social and legal status of the squatters in the Valley. Actually the whole Dikmen Valley Project became obsolete in 2009 according to the former mayor of Ankara, namely Murat Karayağçın (Karayağçın, 2009). As was mentioned before, areas of the 4th and 5th implementation covered only the western side of the Valley while the eastern side was a part of the Dikmen Valley Yıldız Oran Axis Project. Phase 2 project relied on a renewal model led by market approach. In the second phase the municipality was only an intermediate actor who set up the legal and institutional framework of the process while the bargaining process relied upon the development companies and squatter inhabitants. It seems that after the abandonment of the Dikmen Valley Project in 2009, this model was enlarged to the whole 4th and 5th zones.

Before the abandonment of the project the municipality made two offers to squatter inhabitants in the 4th and 5th zones of the Dikmen Valley. One offer was to sell them new houses in Mamak with prices lower than the existing market prices. The houses mentioned were told to be 80m<sup>2</sup> houses, which would be sold to squatter inhabitants at a price of approximately 54.000 TL. The squatter owners were expected to pay this amount as a long-term debt to be paid back in 15 years. The squatter owners stated that they considered the offer and went over to inspect the houses with their advocates but at the end of the inspections they learned that the houses were approximately 50m<sup>2</sup> net wide so they rejected the offer (Based on the interviews with squatter inhabitants). Squatter inhabitants whom we interviewed also stated that the price they were going to be indebted to was subject to high interest rates so the debt would rise to around 100.000 TL, a level they could not afford. Another offer was also made to squatter owners. The Greater Municipality of Ankara offered inhabitants of the Valley a land of 200m<sup>2</sup> where they would build their own houses. One of the planners in the municipality stated that these lands were to be sold to them with their market price, which they were to pay in 15 years. When asked about this offer, the squatter owners stated that the land they were offered was located very far from the city where there were not enough social, infrastructural and public facilities. Also, they stated that the municipality only offered them the land so they would have to build their own houses, which would add to the cost of this offer. It must also be stated that the municipality cannot offer anymore to non-right-holder squatter inhabitants because of legal restrictions. According to the interviews with planners, the Greater Municipality of Ankara claims that they will build social houses that they will give to right holders but they can do nothing about the non-right-holder inhabitants.

At the end of these offers and bargaining process between squatter inhabitants and the municipality, the project still cannot be initiated as a result of objections from a large group of stakeholders. It should be noted that squatter owners do not form a unity in the Valley rather there are various groups residing in the squatters. Beyond the classical categorization of right holders and non-right holders amongst the squatter inhabitants, different groups that cross with these two categories can be seen. The first group that we observed was the group organized around the Bureau of Housing Right,

a civil organization that was established by Halk Evleri<sup>2</sup> to organize the squatter inhabitants to help them through their struggle in the Project. Another group is the squatter inhabitants whom are not organized around the Bureau and whom do not have good relations with the ones organized around it. These two groups form the original inhabitants of the Valley as most of them have been living in squatters of Dikmen Valley more around 20 years or more. Both of these groups include right holder and non-right holder squatter inhabitants. Other than original squatter inhabitants, there are two more groups who seem to have growing numbers in the Valley. One of these groups are the junk dealers (also known as paper collectors). This group is mostly consisted of people who migrated to Ankara from Southeastern part of Turkey and are now earning their living from extracting valuable recyclable waste in the city. The squatter inhabitants whom we interviewed stated that when this group first arrived in the Valley they caused an unrest due to their waste and junk depots near their houses and the cultural differences. Interviewees also stated that after a while the junk dealers started to form some kind of mutual respect for each other and now they are holding the empty squatters in the eastern side of the Valley. Another group is Syrians who migrated to Turkey and found their way to Ankara after the civil war in Syria. These people are also the newest inhabitants of the Valley. Based on the observations made during the field research, Syrian refugees in the Valley were approximately 150 people. They were living in cardboard shacks and were settled at the entrance of the Valley that is close to İlker neighborhood. Squatter inhabitants and junk dealers stated that they have minimal relations with the Syrian refugees for various reasons. Squatter inhabitants say that the Syrians are radical in terms of their religious sect and they also do not know Turkish so it is impossible to communicate with them. In our interviews, junk dealers stated that they had no reason to communicate with them and it was also quite hard because of cultural differences. The squatter inhabitants also mentioned that they did not want Syrian migrants in the squatter area because of cultural and social differences that proved to be problematic in time.

After the offers failed to solve the problem in the Valley, the municipality started to search for direct and indirect ways of violence to get squatter inhabitants out

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<sup>2</sup> Halk Evleri: An NGO that aims to advocate people's rights on topics such as transportation, sheltering, environment, health and women's rights. The name can roughly be translated as "House of People".

of the Valley. The squatter inhabitants stated that the municipality cut off every public service they had in the Valley in recent years. The municipality closed the only bread kiosk in the Valley and stopped renewing the licenses of the convenient stores and supermarkets in the Valley, as per the interviews. Other than that the municipality also cancelled public transportation services to the Valley. The squatter inhabitants stated that it had become much harder to live in the Valley after the municipality cut off all of public services. The water and sewerage systems in the Valley are also underdeveloped and they get broken frequently. During the field study it has been observed that there were water pipe breakouts throughout the 4th and 5th zones, which the squatter inhabitants told they reported to the municipality but no one came after their call. Also while in the field there were frequent sights of rubbles all around the Valley and the squatter inhabitants said that the rubbles were brought and dumped by the municipal trucks. The interviewees argued that this was another attempt of the municipality to make the Valley look like a blight area so that the Valley's public image would be deteriorated and urban regeneration would be legitimized in the eyes of the public. A major intervention of the state into the project area was the police raid to the Valley at 14.03.2013. The media and squatter inhabitants claimed that a police force of approximately 5000 police squad and armored vehicles raided the Valley without any warning and a clash continued for 8 hours between the squatter residents and the police (Based on the information provided during the interviews). The squatter inhabitants mentioned that they had faced a massive demolition attempt but not even a single squatter was demolished due to their persistent defense.

In 2009, the Greater Municipality of Ankara abolished the Dikmen Valley Project. As was mentioned above, after 2009, the model of the phase II of the project was widened to the whole area and development companies got on the driver seat. The bargaining process between developers and squatter inhabitants has begun. Though the bargaining process was much less than an institutional one. As per the interviews with squatter inhabitants, developers offered payments to squatter inhabitants to persuade them to leave their squatters, yet most of the squatter inhabitants stated, "they had come a long way to quit now". However, not all squatter inhabitants thought the same way, as a significant number of squatter inhabitants seem to have left the neighborhood and moved away. The remaining squatter inhabitants stated in the interviews that the ones who left "left the fight" because "they were tired

of all that was happening for years”. The bargaining process between developers and squatter inhabitants also turned into a fight as the media and squatter residents mentioned that “men of the development companies came to the Valley with demolition vehicles and guns” in 14.03.2013 (Based on interviews with squatter residents).

As argued above, squatter inhabitants in the Valley are facing direct and indirect pressure from both the municipality and development companies. The squatter inhabitants who are organized around the Bureau of Housing Rights stated that they would not abandon their squatters unless their demands were fulfilled. In the interviews, they also stated that their demands were as follows:

1. The municipality should provide all squatter inhabitants with a house. These houses should not be smaller than 80m<sup>2</sup> net, and should be within the Dikmen Valley.
2. If the municipality insists on relocating the squatter inhabitants of the Dikmen Valley, then the 4th and 5th zones of the Valley should be designated and developed as a natural park.

After the change of the administration of the Greater Municipality of Ankara in 1994, significant changes have been made to the Dikmen Valley project. But it must also be stated that a significant continuity can also be traced in the historical progress of the project. While it is common believed and stated that the first period of the project was a success and the project started to fail in the second period; it can be stated that some of the failures were inherited from the first period of the project and were already clear in the project making process and that the approaches in the two distinguished periods also had a lot in common. In the next section, the continuities and discontinuities in the projects historical progress will be discussed in terms of plan aims and policies and also in terms of ideological foundations.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The discontinuities in the project policies are studied under four categories: financial policies, participatory policies, environmental and planning policies, and social policies.

#### **5.1 Discontinuities in the Project Policies**

##### **5.1.1. The Financial Approach**

The financial model established for the realization of the Dikmen Valley Project was a kind of mixed model of various housing provisions that we encountered in history of Turkey combined with a cross-subsidizing finance mechanism. The major financial policy of the project was to establish a model that would provide self-financing to the project. The project makers of the original plan praise their financial model for its self-financing attributes. This was to be achieved by various strategies. First of all, the Greater Municipality of Ankara searched for credits to be used on various projects such as Ankara Metro, Intercity Bus Terminal, Batıkent Residential Area and Dikmen Valley Project. While these credits were used as direct investments for other projects, they were used as leveraging financing tools for the Dikmen Valley Project. To acquire the credits and loans necessary for the start-up of the project, the Greater Municipality of Ankara issued bonds to international markets. A 2.5 billion USD worth investment volume was realized with a bond issue of 600 million USD. To render the project self-financing, these loans and credits were to be compensated

by value created by the project itself. This was to be achieved with various implementations. One of the main revenue sources of the project was the luxury housing units that were to be built. Of all the housing units that were to be built in the Valley, 1700 of these units were planned to be delivered to squatter settlers while the rest of the housing units were planned to be luxury housing to provide revenues to the project. Another revenue source of the project was the creation of public service areas. As was mentioned before one major municipality service area was the Culture Bridge and the two high towers that were linked to this bridge. These towers were planned to include, office spaces, commercial units and luxury housing units as a complex and provide significant revenues to the project combining with the Culture Bridge. The financial model was planned in a way to use revenues that were extracted from the project to finance the loans and credits used for realization of the project. This way the municipality assumed that the project would be realized with no or little burden to the municipal budget.

The financial model of the original project depended upon a public-private partnership where public had the upper hand. Private sector operated as contractor with no or little power upon decision-making processes. The plans of both the environment and the buildings that are to be constructed were prepared by planners who worked in a public company, Metropol İmar. Although one of the major aims and concern of the project was still creating a surplus value through the project this was sugar coated by a lot of social democratic discourse about rising the living standards of squatter settlers and doing this by keeping them in the Dikmen Valley. After 1994, this model of partnership was changed into the favor of a new one that depended mostly on private sector investments. The municipality outsourced both the planning and construction of the project to construction companies as it also promoted a new participation approach, which depended on negotiations between the construction companies and the squatter inhabitants. In the original project, the financing of the project was provided by the Greater Municipality of Ankara through the loans and credits, which acted as leverages. The credits and loans were to be paid back with the revenues realized by the project. After the change in the municipality administration, the municipality did not directly invest in the project, trying to transfer the project costs to the private sector to maximize their profits and share the profits between the municipality and private sector. The privatization of the project also led

to the shift of decision making from public sector to private sector as construction companies who overtook the costs now started to seek ways to maximize their profits. The original project was praised by its self-financing mechanism. The project was financially designed to finance itself through payment of loans and credits that were acquired by the municipality with the realization of surplus values created by luxury housing units, municipality service areas. In spite of major differences in financial approaches, this discourse stayed the same as the new administration also kept the project costs to municipality in a minimal level by outsourcing the costs the private sector actors.

Although the project's financial model seemed to be self-financing, the project started to live financial hardships in the last years of its historical process. With the rising speculative expectations of both the land owners and construction companies the expropriation costs were told to be too high for a municipality to take and as the municipality sought ways to outsource all these costs to construction companies the financial model of the project changed its course from a mere self-financing to profit maximizing through speculation. The privatization of the project also led the decision-making shift from public sector to private sector as the construction companies who overtook the costs now started to seek ways to maximize their profits. The change in the financial model led to increased densities in the Valley, increased construction permits and abolishment of public service investments and environmental concerns. The pursuit of profit in the form of private investment in the Valley also led to the abandonment of the participatory mechanism, which was one of the unique characteristics of the original Project.

### 5.1.2. Public Participation

As was mentioned above, the original project was organized as a participatory project where the decision-making process consisted of negotiations between squatter inhabitants and the municipality. The Greater Municipality of Ankara founded five housing cooperatives based on five neighborhoods included in the project area, which



were to act as the representative organizations of the squatter inhabitants in the Valley. These five housing cooperatives were:

1. Ayrancı Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative
2. İlkadım Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative
3. İlker Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative
4. Metin Akkuş Environmental Development and Housing Cooperative

These cooperatives were to call for periodical meetings and then act as the main negotiating actors with the project makers. As a part of the participatory process, a journal named “Our Valley” was published every week by the Steering Committee to inform the squatter inhabitants of the developments and achievements of the Project. This journal aimed to inform the squatter inhabitants of the recent situations and justify the project in the eyes of the public. After 1994, the participatory mechanism was completely abandoned as the Greater Municipality of Ankara cut the communication with housing cooperatives and withdrew its officials from cooperatives. The cooperatives were not officially abolished but they were no longer active as the municipality withdrew from negotiation processes. Publication of the Journal, Our Valley, was shut down and now the official periodical of the municipality took over its role. Though this periodical no longer reflected the squatter inhabitants as participants of the project but started to label squatter inhabitants as invaders on public land.

The criminalization of squatter inhabitants in the Valley was accompanied with political pressure as the municipality changed its approach about major services in the Valley such as cutting down the public transportation, canceling the commercial permits of markets located in the Valley and cutting down its sanitary services in the Valley. Cut off from public services, the Valley started to turn into an isolated location in the middle of the city and turned into socially and environmentally a blight area.

### 5.1.3. Environmental Policies and Planning Approach

Environmental degradation and social unrest followed the cutting down of public services. Environmental degradation started to become a serious problem in the last implementation zones of the project and the area is still filled with junks, excavation wastes and with the cutting of sanitary services, the water reservoirs in the area are also polluted. Another major reason for environmental degradation in the Valley is the increasing volume of new constructions. As rent speculation and profit expectations rose significantly during the second period of the project, construction permits are granted easily to construction companies who accepted to operate in the Valley thus leading to loss of green spaces.

Another major change in the project was the change in the physical planning approach. The physical approach of the original project depended upon the creation of a vast green space, construction of various public service areas and recreational facilities throughout the Valley, low-density housing. The physical approach of the project changed drastically after 1994 as the creation of a green space and social infrastructure was neglected in favor of creating a high-density residential area. The number of luxury housing units increased and the Valley started to become an overcrowded housing area. Social facilities in the Valley are not open to all residents of the Valley but are private properties of gated communities located in the Valley.

### 5.1.4. Social Issues

Because of these changes in the project policies, the Valley started to become a blight area and a group of people that were living in the Valley migrated out of the Valley as the conditions degraded rapidly. The political, social, environmental pressures rendered the life in the valley very hard for the squatter inhabitants who still live in the Valley. The social change in the valley is not limited to migration. New social groups started to show up in the recent years. The rising numbers of junk dealers and Syrian refugees almost made the original squatter population of the Valley a

minority, alienating them from their own neighborhood. Only a small portion of squatter inhabitants in the Valley who struggle to be heard by the local government is left in the Valley.

*Table 3 - Policy Differences in Two Periods of the Project.*

<b>Policies</b>	<b>1. Period</b>	<b>2. Period</b>
Financial	Public Funding	Privatization
Organizational	Participatory	Non-Participation
Environmental	Creation of Green Spaces	Increased Residential Buildings
Planning	Medium Density Mixed Community	High Density Gated Community

## **5.2 Continuities in the Project Policies**

While these changes in the project principles points to a significant detachment from the previous period of the project, it can also be stated that some of these changes also point out to certain continuities on policies and approaches. First of all, it must be stated that both approaches rely on neoliberal policies. The financial model of the original plan leaned its back to revenues that were gained by selling of luxury housing units and municipality service areas, which means the project relied on the surplus land rent that would be created. As was mentioned above, the planners I interviewed stated that the best choice for ecological system and sustainability in the Valley would be a resettlement project where squatter inhabitants would be resettled somewhere out of the Valley and the Valley would be defined as a preservation zone. As that model was not chosen, project-makers decided to resettle the squatter inhabitants in the Valley. This approach was justified with a social approach stating that resettlement of squatter inhabitants where they lived for so many years would serve to protect preservation of social structure in the Valley. However, this meant that the Valley would be subjected to building construction throughout the project. It was obvious

that the number of high-rise towers and luxury housing units in the project area would rise significantly after 1994. But it was also possible to say that these rises were made possible by the conditions created in the original project. Also it is not clear if the financial approach of the first two implementation zones were sustainable at all. It is confirmed by the planners I interviewed that the financial model aimed zero cost to public with a cross-subsidy plan and relied on creation of a controlled land rent gain in the valley. They stated that this financial approach had been successful in the first two implementation zones, but they were also doubtful whether the model was sustainable or not.

It is commonly accepted by our interviewees that the major damage to the project was caused by the delay of the project implementation. Some planners stated that the delay caused land rents to rise out of control and speculation to start in a way to harm the feasibility of the project. These delays were mostly caused because of the social unrest and resistance against the project in the further implementation zones. The unrest and resistance were caused by the fact that the number of squatter inhabitants who could not become right holders in the project started to rise significantly as the project progressed. As was explained before, the social issues could not be solved and problems between the municipality and squatter inhabitants continued up to date. But if the main reason behind the delay of the project is the resistance of squatter inhabitants against the fact that a significant part of the squatter population in the Valley is being kept outside the right holder status in the project, it can be stated that this was inevitable to happen no matter whom the municipal government belongs to. In this case, it is unclear how the rising rents due to delays in realization of the project would be encountered by former planners and Murat Karayalçın himself. The only comment they made about this was that the project would not be delayed if they were still the project executors and so the rent gap would not rise this much while also accepting that there was little to do when the laws did not allow to define a significant number of squatter inhabitants as right holders.

Second, voluntary displacement in the Valley can also be regarded as a feature of the original project. It was known from the start that the project would cause a rise of land rents in the Valley. Although the municipality tried to avoid excessive rise in land rents, existence of luxury housing units was sure to change the class structure of the Valley. As was mentioned above, the social relations between former squatter

inhabitants and new coming upper-middle classes were not as was expected to be in a mixed community but rather were exclusionist. The rises in land rent also provided the former squatter inhabitants with an opportunity to sell their houses in the Valley for a fair profit. With these factors in combination, voluntary displacement started to take place in the Valley. While some former squatter inhabitants moved away without any regrets, my interviewees noted that a significant number of former squatter inhabitants had to move away because of these conditions in the Valley. The project-makers stated that they knew from the start that this would happen, but there was nothing to do to avoid displacement so at least they provided the former squatter inhabitants with a financial prosperity by giving them houses that are valuable in the market thus transforming their social capital in the Valley to financial capital.

Third, the problem of right ownership in the Valley is also worth looking through the continuity perspective. It was mentioned above that the project only defined squatters that were built before 1986 as right owners referring to the law. While this proved to be a minor problem in the first two implementation phases, the rising numbers of squatters built after 1986 constituted a major problem for the last two implementation phases. The planners of the project that I interviewed stated that they were aware of the new coming squatters to the Valley when they were in the first implementation phase. Aerial photographs were taken for detection of these squatters when the project arrived at last phases. While this can be said to be an effective method for applying the law and keeping the feasibility of the project, what should have been done was the prevention of building of new squatters.

Another problem was that the municipality did not guarantee the rights of squatters in the project area. The municipality signed contracts with squatter inhabitants as the project progressed phase by phase. So when squatter inhabitants in the first phases signed their contracts with the municipality, the squatter inhabitants in the last phases did not have any legal agreements concerning the project. This has adversely affected the outcome of the project for squatter inhabitants in the Valley. Because the deals in the project were not secured for all of the inhabitants in the Valley, the administration change in 1994 had the possibility to give up the project and the promises given to the squatters by the former administration. The squatter inhabitants in the 4th and 5th implementation zones stated during the interviews that "Murat Karayalçın should have secured the project and the rights of the squatter

inhabitants in the project zone from the start by some kind of mass protocol that would also prevent future changes in the terms of the project".

Related to this aspect is another problem of newcomer squatter inhabitants to the Valley in the period after the project kicked off. The project-makers and the administration of the first implementation zone recorded and controlled the squatter inventory in the Valley through aerial photographs. While this is a solid strategy for detecting the right holders correctly even after the time that would pass during project implementation, it was not a preventive strategy against the formation of new squatters in the Valley. Without taking necessary preventive steps taken, further squatter development in the Valley was inevitable and the plan makers stated that they knew this would happen according to our interviews. Although the plan-makers were aware of a possible in-migration of squatter inhabitants into the Valley, no precautions were taken and this can be said to make the matters in the last implementation zones of the project by causing a significant squatter population rise without legal right into the Valley thus making the possible resistance much stronger. It is known that there are squatter renters and squatter inhabitants who moved to the Valley after 1986 who are not right holders thus cannot benefit from any urban regeneration project because of law restrictions. Precautious policies to prevent further squatter in-migration to the Valley would also prevent the social failure of the project in the last implementation zones.

In the light of these findings it can be stated that the original project also shared common approaches and inherited the flaws that became visible in the later implementation zones of the project. While it can be said that the original project relied on a social democratic ideological discourse, the project still carried common aspects with its latter form. Most of the flaws and antidemocratic practices that found its place during the implementation of the last zones of the project were inherited in the original project. The original project played a part on the degradation of the environmental quality in the Valley by implementing the project in the first place. By choosing to reside squatter settlers in the Valley rather than pursuing more costly but environmentally sound alternatives, the project makers chose to develop the squatter settlements into middle-class residential areas to catch the revenues while hiding the other alternatives behind a social democratic discourse on giving the people houses where they lived for years.

Also, it can be stated that assuming the project's first form was financially sound with only depending on data extracted from the first two implementation zones is not correct. The project started to face financial problems after the implementation of the third implementation zone and there is no scientific data to prove that the original project would succeed where the former failed. When it comes to the social conflict, which is based on the right-owner status of squatter settlers in the project area, it must be stated that the original project also gave no chance for the non-right-owner squatter settlers and renters in the project zone. The renters and non-right-holder squatter settlers were left out of the project. Also, the project makers not only divided the construction of the project into implementation zones but also divided the carrying of contracts with the squatter settlers into implementation zones, which had significant results for the future of the project. First of all, while the original project was surrounded by the social democratic rhetoric of giving every right-holder a contract to secure their houses, this was not realized and it gave way to the antidemocratic practices on right-holders in the former implementation zones of the project. Second, the migration into the project zone was not controlled and restrained so the non-right-holder population in the Valley rose to a level that paved the way to social conflicts. Another flaw of the original project is the much-praised participatory qualities it had. The participatory mechanism of the project, while it was well established and organized, served not as a mechanism to give the squatter settlers a decision-making power but rather acted as an informative institution. The periodical "Our Valley" and the meeting held in housing cooperatives undertook the role of informing the citizens about the progress and status of the current project.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Türkçe Özet

Tarih boyunca şehirler, sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik, siyasal ve çevresel etkenler dolayısıyla değişim göstermişlerdir ve etkisi altında buldukları bu etkenlere uyum sağlayarak varlıklarını sürdürmüş; sağlayamadıkları noktada ise varlıkları ciddi tehlikelerle karşılaşmıştır. Şehirlerin varlıklarını sürdürebilmeleri için çağdaş kentlerin tarihi boyunca çeşitli politikalar üretilmiştir ve farklı alanlarda üretilen bu politikalar ile kentlerin varlıklarını sürdürmeleri amaçlanmıştır. Tarihsel süreç boyunca kent mekanına yönelik müdahaleler; kentsel yenileme, kentsel yeniden geliştirme, kentsel dönüşüm, kentsel canlandırma gibi kavramlarla karşılanmaya çalışılmıştır. Kentsel mekanın yaşadığı dönüşümün tarihi; siyasal iktisadi tarih ile yakından ilişkili olup aynı şekilde farklı dönemler altında incelenebilmektedir. Ancak bu dönemlendirme çabaları kendi içerisinde indirgemeci ve genelleyici olma tehlikesi taşımaktadırlar. Farklı tarihsel dönemler birbirinden kopuk süreçler olmaktan ziyade, birbirinin üzerine binen katmanlar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadırlar. Farklı tarihsel dönemler arasında ciddi farklılıklar ve kopmalar olacağı gibi aynı şekilde devamlılık ve süreklilik sergileyen olgular da olacaktır.

Bu çalışmada, kentsel mekana müdahalenin tarihi üç dönem çerçevesinde incelenmiştir.

Birinci dönem Sanayi Devrimi'nin gerçekleşmesi ile başlamaktadır ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı ile de son bulmaktadır. Bu dönem hızlı sanayileşmenin egemen etken olarak ortaya çıktığı ve kentlerin yapısını da değişime zorladığı yılları kapsamaktadır. Sanayileşme hızla yayılırken kentlerde aşırı kalabalıklaşma, kirlilik, kamu sağlığını tehdit eden unsurların artması ve sanayileşmeyi kaldırabilecek altyapıların eksikliği sorunları ortaya çıkmıştır. Hızlı bir şekilde gerçekleşen nüfus artışı ve giderek eskimiş bulunan bir mekansal yapı kent hayatını büyük sorunlarla yüzyüze getirmiştir. Bu dönemde ortaya çıkan kentsel politikalar da söz konusu sorunların kısa vadeli çözümlerine odaklanmıştır ve sanayileşmenin ihtiyaç duyacağı kentsel altyapının kurulması, kamu sağlığını artırmayı amaçlayan yasal çerçevenin oluşturulması amaçlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, yolların genişletilmesi, etkin bir sıhhi tesisat sisteminin

kurulması ve fiziksel olarak sağlıklı yapıların yıkılması uygulamaları başlatılmıştır. Kentsel mekanın yaşadığı dönüşümün ikinci dönemi ise İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bitmesi ile başlamakta ve neoliberal siyasal iktisadın egemenliğini kurmaya başlayacağı 1970'lerin son yıllarına kadar devam etmektedir. Bu dönemde özellikle savaşa katılan ülkelerin kentlerinin ardarda yaşanan iki dünya savaşı sonrasında geçirdikleri fiziksel yıkım dolayısıyla kentsel yenileme çalışmaları ana kentsel politika uygulama alanlarından bir tanesi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Avrupa ve Birleşik Devletler kentlerinin bu dönemdeki bir başka büyük sorununu ise konut yetersizliği ve çöküntü alanları oluşturmaya başlamış olan eski konut stokları oluşturmaktaydı. Bu dönemde kentsel yenilemenin yanı sıra kentsel yeniden yapma politikalarının da yaygınlık kazandığı görülmektedir. Bu dönemde eskimiş konut alanları yıkılırken, yeni konutların inşası hız kazanmıştır ancak bu süreç adil bir yol izlememiştir. Dönemin araştırmaları, kentsel yenilemenin sadece teknik bir süreç olmadığını, aynı zamanda politik ve ideolojik tercihler üzerinde yükseldiğini belirtirken, yıkılan konut stoklarının Birleşik Devletler'de daha çok siyahi vatandaşların evlerinden oluşmasına, Avrupa'da ise işçi sınıfının kullandığı konutların hedefte olmasına dikkat çekmektedirler. Bunun yanı sıra, kentsel yenileme uygulamalarında ve yeni konutların inşasında alınan kararların ve oluşturulan projelerin, vatandaşları değil sermayedarları ve iş çevrelerini memnun etmeyi temel aldığı da belirtilmiştir. Kentsel mekanın değişiminin üçüncü dönemi, dünyanın siyasal iktisadi paradigmasının kökten bir değişikliğe uğradığı ve neoliberalizmin egemen ideoloji halini almaya başladığı 1980'lerin başından günümüze kadar süregelen dönemdir. 1970'lerin sonunda yaşanan küresel kriz ile beraber dünya ekonomisi radikal değişiklikler geçirmiştir ve bu değişim dünya kentlerini de son derece derinden etkilemiştir. Sınai üretim temelinde yükselen eski ekonominin krizi ile beraber sanayi kentleri de kendilerini varoluşsal bir kriz içerisinde bulmuşlardır ve yeni ekonominin içerisinde kendilerine yeni bir varoluş amacı aramaya başlamışlardır. Neoliberal ideoloji ve ekonomi politikaları ile güçlenen; denetimsizleştirilen serbest ve rekabetçi bir piyasa mekanizmasının ekonomik gelişmenin en iyi aracı olacağına dair inanç ile beraber kentler de yeni ekonomik sistemde yerlerini bulabilmek ve güçlenmek için serbest piyasa içerisinde rekabet etmeye başlamışlardır. Serbest dolaşan yatırımları kendilerine çekebilmek için kentler girdikleri bu mücadelede eski yönetim ve idare biçimlerini de terk etmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Bu dönemde neoliberal siyasal



iktisadın öngördüğü rekabetçi, serbest piyasanın gereklerine uygun yönetsel yapı olarak yönetim ve ortaklıklar ortaya çıkartılmıştır. Yönetişim, devletin tek başına ekonomik gelişmeyi gerçekleştirebilecek etkinliğe sahip olmadığı kabulünden yola çıkarak kamusal ve özel aktörlerin işbirliği ve ortaklıklar çerçevesinde çalışmasını öngören bir yönetim biçimi olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Egemen yönetim anlayışı olarak ortaya çıkan yönetişimde kentsel politikalar da artık sadece devletin karar mekanizmasına bağlı süreçler olmaktan çıkmıştır ve özel ve kamu sektörlerinden farklı aktörlerin bir arada yer aldığı süreçler haline gelmişlerdir. Bu dönemde kentsel mekanın üretimi ve yeniden üretimi konusunda uygulanan politikalar yaygın bir biçimde kamu ve özel sektör aktörlerinin ortaklıkları çerçevesinde yürütülen projeler olarak oluşturulmaktadır. Yerel yönetimler, inşaat firmaları ve kentliler bu projeler kapsamında kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda projelerin şartlarını ve uygulanış esaslarını etkilemeye çalışmaktadırlar.

Retorik olarak daha demokratik ve daha etkili görünen bu yönetsel anlayış pratikte ise büyük eşitsizliklere yol açmıştır. Devlet kurumları, özel sermaye sahipleri ve halkın beraber katıldığı kent mekanının üretim sürecinde açık bir şekilde ne güçsüz aktör halk olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu dönem, devlet desteği ile kamusal alanların ve kent mekanlarının özel sektöre devri yaygınlık kazanırken halkın aleyhine üretim ve bölüşüm mekanikleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Halkın diğer aktörler karşısındaki bu güçsüzlüğü sonucu ortaya çıkan sosyal adaletsizlik 1990'lar itibariyle eleştirilmeye başlanmış ve kentsel projelere halk katılımının sağlanması önemli bir konu haline almıştır. Halk katılımı birçok projenin temel uygulama kriterlerinden bir tanesi haline almasına rağmen, zaman içerisinde katılımın çoğunlukla sağlanmadığı; sağlandığı zamanlarda ise sadece biçimsel olarak uygulandığı görülmüştür. Halkın projelere katılımı daha çok kamu kurumlarının halkı bilgilendirmesi şeklinde tek yönlü bir biçimde uygulanmıştır.

Finansallaşmanın yaygınlaşması ve inşaat sektörünün birçok ekonominin lokomotif sektörü haline alması ile beraber başlayan hızlı kentleşme ve yaygınlaşan kentsel dönüşüm projeleri ile beraber sadece sosyal adalet sorunları değil aynı zamanda kentlerde sürdürülebilirlik sorunu da ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Çoğunlukla kent ölçeği hesaba katılmadan, parça parça gerçekleştirilen kentsel dönüşüm projeleri kentlerin çevresel ve sosyal değerlerini de tehdit eder hale gelmişlerdir. 1990'lardan itibaren bu doğrultuda önem kazanan bir başka olgu ise sürdürülebilirlik olmuştur.

Ekonomik, sosyal ve çevresel gelişiminin birbirine zarar vermeden sağlanabilmesi öngörüsüne dayanan sürdürülebilirlik kavramı kentsel mekanın üretimi alanında da tartışılmaya başlanmış ve kentlerin de ekonomik büyümeyi gerçekleştirirken sosyal ve çevresel varlıklarına zarar vermeden bunu gerçekleştirmesi gerekliliğine vurgu yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Tüm bu kavramsal hazine ile Avrupa ve Birleşik Devletler’de günümüzde de popülerliğini sağlayan kentsel politika kentsel yeniden canlandırma olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Kentsel yeniden canlandırma politikaları daha çok projeler temelinde uygulanmaktadır ve temel amaçları uygulandıkları bölgenin ekonomik, sosyal ve çevresel kalitesini artıracak kentsel mekanların oluşturulmasıdır. Türkiye’de bu yaklaşımın karşılığı kentsel dönüşüm projeleri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır ve günümüzde bu politikalar dünyanın her yanında sert eleştirilere hedef olmaktadır.

Türkiye’nin kentleşme tarihi de, Avrupa ve Birleşik Devletler deneyimlerden faydalanarak çizdiğimiz dönemlendirmeye paralel özellikler taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda Türkiye’nin kentleşme deneyimi de üç dönem çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Birinci dönem Osmanlı Devleti’nin çöküşü ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluşu ile başlamakta ve 1950 yılı ile son bulmaktadır. Bu dönemde yaygın ve baskın kentsel mekansal uygulamalar devletin yeniden mekansallaşma çalışmaları olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Yeni bir ekonomik ve siyasal model çevresinde örgütlenen yeni bir devletin kendi değerleri çerçevesinde yeni kentlerin oluşturulması ve var olanların da geliştirilmesi bu dönemin kentsel politikalarının temel amaçları olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Başkentini İstanbul’dan Ankara’ya taşınması, ülke genelinde demiryolu ağının kurulmaya başlanması, Belediye Kanunu’nun çıkartılması ve başkent Ankara için Jansen Planı’nın oluşturulması bu dönemin önemli politikalarındandır. Görülebileceği gibi bu dönemin kentsel politikalarının temelinde Cumhuriyet değerlerine uygun, çağdaş planlama anlayışı ile oluşturulmuş ve entegre kent mekanlarının üretilmesi olmuştur. Bu dönemi Tarık Şengül’ün sınıflandırmasını izleyerek Ulus-Devletin Kentleşmesi olarak adlandırdık.

Türkiye kentleşmesinin ikinci dönemi ise 1950 ve 1980 yılları arasındaki dönemi kapsamaktadır. Bu dönemin kentleşme dinamiklerini belirleyen olgular olarak; Marshall Yardımları ile tarımsal üretimin sanayileşmesi sonucunda ortaya çıkan kırdan kente göç, büyük şehirlerin sanayinin yükselmesi ile bu göçü çekmeye başlaması ile ortaya çıkan nüfus artışı sayılabilir. Marshall Yardımları ile tarımsal

üretimin sanayileşmesi kırdaki ciddi bir iş gücünü boşa çıkartmıştır ve kırdaki artan işsizlik ve gerileyen yaşam koşulları ile birlikte kırdan kente göç hatırı sayılır bir hacime ulaşmıştır. Yoğun göç dalgaları ile karşı karşıya gelen büyük şehirlerin yönetimlerinin yeterli konut arzını sağlayamaması kaçak konut yapımlarının ve gecekondulaşmanın temellerini oluşturmuştur ve bu dönemde Ankara'nın nüfusunun yarısının gecekonduda yaşadığı yıllar kayda geçmiştir. Devletin gecekondulara ilk tepkisi ilgisizlik olmuştur ancak zamanla bu ilgisizlik saldırgan bir yıkım politikasına dönüşmüştür. Zamanla gecekonduların sçemen havuzu olarak politik rolünü ve ucuz emek havuzu olarak ekonomik rolünü yeniden değerlendiren devlet daha kapsayıcı çözümler arama yoluna gitmiştir. Gecekonduların dönüşümü bu dönemin en önemli kentsel politika konularından bir tanesini oluşturmaya başlamıştır ve ardarda çıkan gecekondular yasaları ile gecekonduların yapımları engellenmeye çalışılmıştır. Her seferinde bir önceki dönemde yapılan gecekonduların yasallaştırırken kendisinden sonra gelen gecekonduların yasaklayan bu yasaların uygulamada beklendiği kadar başarılı olamamışlardır. Kat Mülkiyeti Kanunu'nun çıkartılması ve İmar Islah Planları'nın oluşturulması ile birlikte gecekonduların alanları yap-satçı olarak adlandırılan küçük ölçekli inşaat aktörleri öncülüğünde dönüştürülmeye başlanmıştır. Gecekonduların dönüşümü uygulamalarının bu bağlamda günümüzdeki kentsel dönüşüm uygulamalarının temellerini oluşturduğu söylenebilir.

Türkiye'nin kentleşme tarihinin son ve günümüzde içerisinde olduğumuz dönemi 1980 yıllarında başlamaktadır. 1970'lerin son yıllarında yaşanan küresel kriz ile beraber egemenliğini kurmaya başlayan neoliberal siyasal iktisat Türkiye'de de dönemin egemen paradigması olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Neoliberal siyasal iktisat öncülüğünde içe dönük, ithal ikameci iktisat politikaları terkedilmiş ve ihracat temelli dışa dönük iktisadi politikalar benimsenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda IMF'nin yapısal uyum programları ile piyasalar kontrol ve düzenlemelerden arındırılmıştır. Yerel sanayileri koruma politikalarının terk edilmesi ile birlikte sanayideki kar marjları düşmeye başlamış ve kentsel mekan sermaye birikimi için çekici bir alternatif oluşturmaya başlamıştır. Bir yandan devam eden konut arzı sorunu, gecekondular sorunu ve finansallaşmanın etkisiyle kentsel mekan sermaye birikiminin odaklarından bir tanesi haline gelmiştir. Yine bu dönemde kurulan Toplu Konut İdaresi, ilk kuruluşunda alt ve orta gelir gruplarına konut arzını sağlamak maksadıyla kurulsa da günümüzde kentsel dönüşüm aracılığıyla kentsel rant sağlamanın önemli kurumlarından bir

tanesine dönüşmüştür. 1980 sonrasında Türkiye'nin ilk kentsel dönüşüm projelerinin de ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir. Bu tezin de inceleme nesnesini oluşturan Dikmen Vadisi Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi bu projelerin ilklerinden bir tanesi sayılmaktadır.

Dikmen Vadisi, hem Ankara'nın ekolojik sisteminin önemli bir parçası hem de merkezi bir bölgesidir. Vadi önceden önemli bir su havzası, rüzgar koridoru ve yeşil alan rolünü üstlenmekteydi. Zaman içerisinde vadinin korunmaması ve imar planlarının dışında bırakılması ile vadi gecekondular bölgesine dönüşmüş ve bu özellikleri tehlikeye girmiştir. Uzun süre iyileştirici bir politikanın uygulanmadığı bölge için ilk uygulanan kentsel dönüşüm projesi 1989 yılında dönemin Belediye Başkanı Murat Karayalçın'ın inisiyatifinde başlamıştır. Dikmen Vadisi projesi, bölgedeki gecekonduların yıkılmasını, yerine planlı bir kentsel dokunun üretilmesini ve bu sayede bölgedeki çevresel, sosyal ve ekonomik çöküntüyü iyileştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Proje, tarihsel süreci içerisinde iki farklı yerel yönetim altında uygulanmış ve bu iki farklı dönemde projenin uygulanmasında dikkate değer değişimler yaşanmıştır. Proje terk edildiği 2009 yılına kadar söz konusu iki farklı yönetim için bir başarı ve başarısızlık tartışmasına konu olmuş ve kıyaslama ölçütü olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Dikmen Vadisi Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi, Murat Karayalçın yönetimi dönemi ve İ. Melih Gökçek yönetimi dönemi olarak iki dönemde incelenmiştir. Bölgedeki gecekondular sakinleri, hak sahipleri ve proje yürütücüleri ile yapılan görüşmeler; proje planlarının incelenmesi ile yönetim değişikliğinin proje üzerindeki etkilerinin ve sonuçta yol açtığı farklılıkların incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Yürütülen bu çalışma ile Dikmen Vadisi Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi üzerinden cevaplanmaya çalışılan soru: değişen politik ve ideolojik yaklaşımların kentsel dönüşüm projeleri açısından herhangi bir fark yaratıp yaratmadığıydı.

Gecekondular sakinleri, iki dönemden de proje yürütücüleri ile yapılan görüşmeler ve planların incelenmesi sonrasında projenin her tarihsel dönemlemede olduğu gibi devamlılıklar ve kopmalar sergilediği görülmüştür. Projenin tarihsel sürecinde ortaya çıkan bu devamlılıklar ve ortaya çıkan kopmalar, projenin dört niteliği etrafında incelenmiştir: Katılım mekanizması, finansal model, çevre politikası ve sosyal politika. İlk proje, gecekonduda yaşayan ve gecekondular affından faydalanabilecek statüde bulunan vadi sakinlerinin gecekondularını yıkmaları karşılığında gecekondularına karşılık bir dairenin verilmesini hedeflemekteydi. Proje yapıcıları, bu sürecin yürütülebilmesi için katılımcı bir mekanizmanın kurulmasını öngörerek

Dikmen Vadisi sınırlarında yer alan beş mahalleye karşılık beş kooperatif kurarak katılımı sağlamayı amaçlamışlardır. Her bir kooperatif, bölgesinde yer alan gecekonduların sakinlerinin temsilcileri ile yerel yönetim temsilcilerinin yer aldığı katılımcı bir süreç yönetmekle görevlendirilmiştir. Kooperatifler bünyesinde toplantılar düzenlenmiş, gecekonduların sakinleri proje hakkında bilgilendirilmiş ve proje süreci ile ilgili olarak sürekli bilgilendirilmeleri için bir de periyodik yayın çıkartılmıştır. Yönetim değişikliği ile beraber kooperatifler kaldırılmamış ancak kullanılmayarak etkisizleştirilmiştir. Yeni yönetim gecekonduların sakinleri ile iletişim kurmayı tercih etmemiş ve projeyi kendi şeffaf olmayan planları çerçevesinde yürütmeyi tercih etmiştir. Katılım mekanizmasının terk edilmesi her ne kadar projenin gecekonduların sakinleri gözündeki meşruiyetini sorgulanır hale getirmişse de önceki modelin de katılımcı bir model olarak işlevselliği tartışma konusudur. Gecekonduların sakinleri ile yapılan görüşmeler sonucunda anlaşılmıştır ki önceki katılımcı mekanizma da yerel yönetimin gecekonduların sakinlerine kendi projesini anlattığı ve bilgi aktardığı tek taraflı bir iletişim mekanizması olmaktan öteye geçememiştir. Bunun yanı sıra katılımcı mekanizmaya sadece aştan yaralanabilen gecekonduların sakinleri dahil edilmiş; tapu senedi olmayan gecekonduların sakinleri ve kiracılar projeye veya katılım mekanizmasına dahil edilmemişlerdir.

İlk proje finansal olarak kendi kendisini finanse eden bir proje modeli öngörmüştür. Bu finansal modele göre, proje kapsamında inşa edilecek lüks konutlar ve belediye servis alanlarından elde edilecek karlar ile hak sahibi gecekonduların sakinlerine verilecek dairelerin finansmanının sağlanması amaçlanmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra, projenin hem finansal olarak hem de yürütücüsü olarak yerel yönetim karar verici ve uygulayıcı olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yerel yönetim kendi elde ettiği krediler ve karlar doğrultusunda projeyi gerçekleştirirken inşaat firmaları bu süreçte sadece iş yüklenici firmalar olarak projede yer almışlardır. Yönetim değişikliği sonrasında inşaat firmaları sadece birer yüklenici olarak değil aynı zamanda karar verici düzeyinde projeye dahil olmaya başlamışlardır. Belediye'nin bütçesine yük oluşturmadan projelerin yürütülmesi amacı ile meşrulaştırılan bu yöntemle, konut inşaatlarının, peyzaj düzenlemelerinin giderleri ve gerekli altyapı yatırımları özel firmalara devredilmiş, karşılığında ise söz konusu firmalara ek imar hakları ve inşa edecekleri konutların mülkiyeti verilmiştir. Yönetim değişikliği sonrasında inşaat firmaları adeta büyük ölçekli yapı satıcılar olarak projede rol oynamaya başlamışlardır.

Çevresel olarak Dikmen Vadisi gecekonduları, yeterli sıhhi tesisatın bulunmaması, belediye servislerinin düzenli sağlanmaması dolayısıyla ciddi su kirliliği sorunları ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Aynı zamanda vadi, sel ve heyelan tehlikesi bulunan bir bölgedir. İlk proje bölgeye sel kapanları yapılmasını ve su havzasının ıslah edilmesini, yeşil dokunun artırılmasını öngörmüştür. Ayrıca proje, konut yoğunluğunu arttırmaktan kaçınmayı ve bölgedeki konut stoğunu optimum düzeyde tutmayı amaçlamıştır. Yönetim değişikliği sonrasında, proje direksiyonuna inşaat firmalarının da geçmesi ile birlikte konut yoğunluğu ciddi oranlarda artırılmış ve çevresel düzenlemeler estetik peyzaj düzenlemelerine indirgenmişlerdir.

Sosyal politikalar açısından ilk proje, ortak kullanım alanları ve tesisler üreterek karma bir sosyal çevre yaratmaya amaçları arasında yer vermiştir. Bunun yanı sıra proje bölgedeki gecekondulara sakinlerine yüksek standartlarda konut sağlayacağını ve gecekondulara sakinlerini mağdur etmeden bölgede dönüşümün gerçekleştirileceğini öngörmektedir. Ancak zamanla anlaşılmıştır ki, sadece projenin ilk üç etabında yer alan ve aften yararlanabilen gecekondulara sakinleri proje kapsamında daire sahibi olabilmişlerdir. Projenin başında proje alanındaki bütün hak sahibi gecekondulara sakinlerine tapularının verilmemesi, geçen yıllar içerisinde bu hak sahibi olabilecek niteliklere sahip gecekondulara sakinlerinin de hak sahibi statüsü elde etmesini engellemiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, proje kapsamında ev sahibi olan gecekondulara sakinleri kendilerine verilen dairelerde kullanılan malzemelerin kalitesiz olduğunu, dairelerin çok çabuk yıprandığını ve eski aile yapılarını koruyarak yaşamalarına izin vermeyecek kadar küçük olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir.

Projenin iki dönemi arasında göze çarpan kopmalar olmasına rağmen denilebilir ki projenin ilk döneminde yer alan bazı özellikler ve uygulamalar projenin ilerleyen dönemde karşılaştığı sorunlara yol açabilecek niteliktedir. Bunun yanı sıra projenin ilk etaplarında övgü ile bahsedilen uygulamaların bir kısmı ise iddia edilen veya arzulanan sonuçları doğurmaktan uzaktır.

Araştırmamız sonucunda farklı ideolojik ve politik yaklaşımlara ve yönelimlere sahip iki farklı yönetimin uygulamalarının temelde ciddi bir farklılığa işaret etmediği; her iki yaklaşımında neoliberal politikalar ekseninde politikalar oluşturduğu, yönetim temelli kamu-özel ortaklığı ekseninde örgütlendiği ve kentsel rantın adaletsiz bir bölüşümüne meydan verecek finansal yaklaşımlar öngördüğü ortaya çıkmıştır. İdeolojik ve politik konumun önemli olduğu gerçeğini bir kenara bırakmamak

kaydıyla, temel siyasal iktisadi yaklaşımların farklılaşmaması durumunda bu konumlanmaların kentsel mekana yapılan müdahalelerde ciddi farklılıklara yol açmayacağını söylemek mümkündür. Dikmen Vadisi Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi ise her ne kadar iki farklı yönetim döneminde de uygulanmış olsa da bu iki farklı dönemin de aynı siyasal iktisadi dönemin birer alt dönemi olması önemlidir.

## Appendix B: Vita

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Eren, Mert Anıl  
Nationality: Turkish (TC)  
Date and Place of Birth: 9 December 1985, Gölçük  
Marital Status: Single  
Phone: +90 549 861 05 15  
Email: manileren@gmail.com

### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU UPL	2016
BS	AIBU Public Administration	2011
High School	Ankara Anadolu High School, Ankara	2010

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014-	Loomis Güvenlik Hizmetleri	HR Responsible
Present	A.Ş.	

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Beginner French

### PUBLICATIONS

1. Eren, M. A. "2B Arazileri ve 12.09.2010 Tarihli Anayasa Değişikliğinin Olası Sonuçları", Memleket Mevzuat, 6(64), 3-13. (2010)

### HOBBIES

Anime, Manga, PC Games, PC Modification, Reading, Bass Guitar, Drums



## Appendix C: Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

### YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: