

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE STRONG MAYOR:
THE CASES OF ADANA, ESKİŐEHİR AND ŐANLIURFA
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES

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ABSTRACT

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE STRONG MAYOR: THE CASES OF ADANA, ESKİŐEHİR AND ŐANLIURFA METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES

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This thesis aims to comprehend political consequences of administrative reforms inspired by the new public management perspective in Turkey. Especially, it investigates how such reforms in the field of local government alter the profile and practice of top decision maker. It develops its arguments concentrating on the cases of Adana, Eskiőehir and Őanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality with an emphasis on the post-1980 developments in Turkey.

Keywords: New Public Management, Strong Mayor, Local Government

ÖZ

YENİ KAMU İŞLETMECİLİĞİ VE GÜÇLÜ BELEDİYE BAŞKANI:
ADANA, ESKİŞEHİR VE ŞANLIURFA BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ
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Bu tez, Türkiye’de yeni kamu işletmeciliği perspektifinden ilham alan yönetsel reformların siyasal sonuçlarını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Özellikle, yerel yönetim alanındaki böylesi reformların en üstteki karar vericinin profilini ve kılığını nasıl değiştirdiğini incelemektedir. Savlarını Adana, Eskişehir ve Şanlıurfa Büyükşehir Belediyesi örneklerinde ve Türkiye’deki 1980 sonrası gelişmelere vurgu yaparak geliştirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni Kamu İşletmeciliği, Güçlü Belediye Başkanı, Yerel Yönetimler

*To My Father, Ahmet Engin Köse
whose wonderful and gentle soul will forever remain in our hearts...
May he rest in peace!*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DLP	Democratic Left Party
DP	Democrat Party
FP	Felicity Party
IMCD	Investment Monitoring and Coordination Directorate
JDP	Justice and Development Party
MP	Motherland Party
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party
NPM	New Public Management
RPP	Republican People's Party
SDPP	Social Democratic Populist Party
VP	Virtue Party
WP	Welfare Party

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Subject Matter

This thesis problematizes the metropolitan mayors in Turkey as politically powerful figures. It does so by concentrating on the tension between administrative decentralization and political centralization shaped by neoliberal administrative reforms. It argues that these reforms such as, decentralization and privatization has brought a dispersed and complex urban policy network in Turkey, and this network is managed, not moderated, by the metropolitan mayor. In this regard, the thesis defends that aforementioned reforms produces metropolitan mayor as the sole authority in local politics for whom the mechanisms of transparency, accountability, supervision, and participation become inoperative. To establish the grounds of aim and research question this thesis, first leadership theories, forms of local government, and New Public Management (henceforth NPM) will be introduced. Then, the evolution of local governments in Turkey will be elaborated. Thirdly, the metropolitan mayors in the midst of the tension between decentralization and centralization will be discussed in detail. Lastly, within the framework of previous discussions, the cases of Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba will be examined.

At the end of 1970s, capitalism went through a crisis that resulted in social, political and administrative transformation. This transformation led to the rise of a political perspective called the New Right. It ended the welfare state which took part and intervened in the economy, and Keynesian economic policies. The reflection of New Right on the public administration was the minimization of public administration, downsizing its scope of activity, and its reorganization in the framework of public management. In this approach, conception of public administration corresponded to

the pro-administration side in the politics-administration dichotomy. That is, it was aimed that the administration become neutral through its detachment from political context.

The conceptual basis of this administrative transformation was formulated into the NPM approach, a perspective advocating the organization of public administration and delivery of public services in accordance with the market principles and in the logic of managerialism. In that regard, public administration must be catalyzer, competitive, objective-driven, result-oriented, farsighted and decentralized (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Moreover, public administration must delegate its authorities to the private sector, and just steer and catalyze the issues related to these authorities.

A dynamic and flexible understanding of public administration must be adopted so that public organization could work efficiently, and in a competitive, objective-driven, result-oriented, farsighted, innovative and entrepreneurial way. This understanding is not possible to implemented through a strict organizational structure, but a flexible one (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2013). Thus, hierarchy must be reduced and decision-making must be removed from the central government and decentralized toward the local sub-units.

The governments adopting the New Right policies and the NPM perspective were criticized due to the decrease in social welfare, following the abolishment of welfare state. At this stage, governance approach emerged in order to eliminate these reactions by suggesting pluralist decision-making processes while at the same time it preserved the principles of the NPM. According to the governance approach, public services should not only be loaded to the states; instead, public sector, private sector and civil societal actors must establish a partnership in the public service delivery by allocating these services among these three parties.

Considering the capitalism at a global scale, it is possible to assert that local, regional, national, international, and supranational companies, organizations, and civil society have become dependent on one another. This created networks composed of ever-increasing number of actors. For governance approach, the management of these networks required the coordination of complex systems and the practice of governing together, yet it did not adopt a hierarchical centralist

administrative management type (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2013). Hence, governance also emphasized the importance of participation and decentralization.

Nevertheless, the minimization of the state defended by the NPM and governance does not suggest a decrease in the power of the key decision-makers (Üstüner, 2000). On the contrary, a stronger executive system and a stronger administrative structure are necessitated so that the decision-making and implementing processes could be quickly concluded, and multipartite state structure could be managed in cooperation. As can be seen, the rise of stronger executive systems and administrative structures contradicted with the principles of governance approach including pluralism and participation.

The impact of these developments on local governments was administrative decentralization accompanied with political centralization. On the one hand, the administrative and financial authorities of local governments were increased. On the other hand, the political power was centralized in the personality of mayors, especially metropolitan mayors; as a result, they were transformed into authoritarian figures.

The aim of this decentralization was to transform local governments into enterprising institutions which privatize public services and/or deliver these services within the framework of market principles. As a result of this, private sector and civil society actors at local, regional, national, and supranational scale became legitimate stakeholders of local decision-making and implementing processes due to their role in service delivery (Bayırbağ, 2016, forthcoming). This multi-sector policy environment must operate in cooperation and coordination. Nevertheless, it is difficult to enable these cooperation and coordination through formal rules binding public authorities because of the nature of private sector and civil society sector based on informal relationships.

Taking into account this dispersed and informal urban policy environment, it is not difficult to predict the rise of strong, entrepreneurial, fixer, flexible, and adaptable mayor who is required to be available in her/his office for longer terms and act like a professional top-level manager. This situation results from the fact that various actors taking part in urban policies are associated with each other through the mayor

(Bayırbağ, 2016, forthcoming). They are also dependent on the mayor so that they could protect their legitimacy in the policy network. However, the mayor is also contingent upon these actors since they expand the mayor's radius of action and provide her/him flexibility. Furthermore, the centralization of political power in the hands of the mayor provides her/him autonomy from the party politics, which makes him a professional mayor who is possible to be elected regardless of party affiliation.

The NPM and governance approaches embracing decentralization, pluralism, and public-private-civil society partnership in local service delivery produced a strong mayor who dominates the ambiguous urban policy environment due to her/his central position in this environment. To this end, the main focus of this study is to comprehend this relationship between the NPM perspective and the strong mayor through three cases from Turkey.

As can be seen, the mayor plays the role of urban leadership in this complex local network. S/he holds the political leadership position, on the one hand. On the other hand, s/he leads the municipality which is a public organization and thus, holds an organizational leadership position as well. Hence, the leadership style of the mayor matters because the mayor not only shapes the decision-making and implementing processes, but also is shaped by these processes in return. Given these realities, it is possible to infer that a strong, entrepreneurial, fixer, flexible and adaptable mayor is necessitated in municipality by the NPM perspective. In order to identify what kind of mayoral leadership style is required by the NPM, leadership theories are addressed in the theoretical framework of the thesis, which comprises the second chapter of this study.

The organizational setting which is one of the factors of decision-making and implementing processes is also significant for a mayor, since the mayor holds an organizational leadership position. There are two forms of local government that are expected to become prominent within the framework of the NPM perspective. The first one is the strong mayor-council form because it is compatible with the NPM's pursuit for strong mayors. The second one is the council-manager form which defends a local government structure managed by a professional manager who is qualified with respect to her/his managerial skills and experience. Besides, these are

the two primary forms of local government adopted throughout the European countries. Therefore, an analysis on these forms of local government is regarded as contributive to the theoretical framework of this study.

The NPM perspective and its theoretical grassroots are also discussed in the theoretical framework of this study because this perspective has become dominant in the current practice of public administration. The strong mayor, as a phenomenon of contemporary local governments, could be comprehended through the concepts of NPM, such as decentralization, professionalization, right to manage, instant decision-making and implementing, entrepreneurship, ambiguity and dispersion. Therefore, Managerialism, Neo-Taylorism and Public Choice Theory are also examined in detail in the theoretical foundations of the NPM.

The third chapter of the thesis discusses the historical development of local governments in Turkey. The significance of this discussion stems from the historical tension between decentralization and centralization in the public administration of Turkey. The concerns on national unity and integrity obstructed the establishment of a local government system autonomous from the central government. In such a system, strong mayors are not expected to emerge. However, the political power of the mayor was consolidated in 1963 with the regulation bringing the direct election of mayors by the public, and the strong mayor-council form of local governments was introduced in Turkey. Moreover, metropolitan municipalities with significant administrative and financial powers were established in the greater cities of Turkey in 1984. Nevertheless, the tutelage power of the central government was upon the local governments just as Damocles' Sword. In addition, there were waves of administrative reforms at the beginning of 2000s which were inspired by the NPM perspective, and this further enhanced the administrative and financial powers of municipalities, especially metropolitan municipalities. However, these powers were gradually withdrawn from the local governments to the central government due to the distrust to the mayors. In order to comprehend the rise of strong mayors in spite of the central government's tutelage power, this tension between the decentralization and centralization must be covered and evaluated in its historical context.

The tension between the decentralization and centralization becomes visible in the personality of mayors. It is because administrative decentralization brings the centralization of political power in mayors, on the one hand. On the other hand, there is a backward tendency towards the centralization of administrative and financial powers, as mentioned above. In such a political and administrative environment, mayors have to be political entrepreneurs who strive to open a room for maneuver against the central government. The position of mayors in urban policy network could be understood by an analysis on their relationship with the actors taken part in this network. Hence, in the fourth chapter, the strong mayors in the midst of the tension between decentralization and centralization are discussed with a focus on their relationship with the municipal organization, district municipalities, service recipients, interest groups, political parties and central government.

The aim of fifth chapter is to take a closer look at the strong mayors in the midst of the tension between decentralization and centralization through the cases of Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba. These three metropolitan mayors were chosen due to their autonomy from the party politics. Durak was elected as Adana Metropolitan Mayor from three different political parties for five times. Büyükerşen was elected as Eskişehir Metropolitan Mayor from two different parties for four times. Fakıbaba won the local elections in Şanlıurfa as a candidate of a political party once and as an independent candidate once again. On the other hand, these cases show a considerable degree of similarity regardless of their different geographical context. Adana is located in the Mediterranean Region, Eskişehir in the Central Anatolian Region, and Şanlıurfa is in the Southeastern Anatolia Region. Moreover, these three mayors explicitly adopted and operationalized the NPM perspective so as to ensure their autonomy from the central government and party politics although their political views are different. Considering these instances, the findings of the study are presented on the basis of the arguments set in the previous chapters.

The concluding chapter summarizes the key empirical and theoretical findings. It revisits the fundamental ideas introduced in the study and the conclusions of preceeding chapters. In addition, policy conclusions and recommendations addressing the challenges of the office a metropolitan mayor occupies are elaborated

in light of these findings. The study is concluded with a discussion on directions and suggestions for further research including the limitations of the study together with further concepts, theories and subjects in the field

1.2. Method

In this thesis, content analysis is adopted as a research method. In the chapter on theoretical framework, the literature regarding leadership theories, local government forms, NPM, managerialism, neo-Taylorism and Public Choice Theory was covered. In the chapter on historical framework, the literature related to the evolution of local government in Turkey, legal documents, and formal documents were examined.

In the chapter covering the case study, content analysis is adopted as a research method to analyze the qualitative data. In content analysis, the texts are gathered, examined and interpreted (Neuman, 2014). This analysis includes books, local and national newspapers, magazines, and official documents.

The first book chosen as a source of data to be analyzed was “*Söyleyeceklerim Var*” written by Aytaç Durak in 2015. In addition, a local newspaper named “Adana Kulis”, a nationwide news portal named “*Bianet*”, national newspapers, such as “*Bugün*” and “*Hürriyet*”, and the magazine of the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers named “*Bülten*” were examined for the Adana case. On Eskişehir case, the book named “*Zamanı Durduran Saat*”, which is based on Cemalettin N. Taşçı’s interview with Yılmaz Büyükerşen in 2009 was reviewed. Moreover, local newspapers including “*2 Eylül*”, “*Anadolu*”, “*Es*” and “*Yeniğün*” were analysed. For Şanlıurfa, “*Doğrudan Doğruya*” a book written by Ömer N. Kapaklı in 2009, who is a local journalist in Şanlıurfa and the media advisor of Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba was overviewed. Besides, local newspapers including “*GAP Gündemi*”, “*Şanlıurfa Sembol*”, “*Urfa Haber*”; a local news portal named “*sanliurfa.com*” and national newspapers including “*Hürriyet*”, “*Zaman*”, “*Taraf*”, “*Yeniçağ*” and “*Milliyet*” were scanned.

The content analysis was carried out by identifying and counting the key events related to the subject matter in the chosen texts. These texts are valuable source of

public information although they do not cover all of the events and information related to these events. In addition, they were accessible and current even though they might be incomplete, distorted or reflected a one-sided perspective. In order to overcome these methodological problems and ensure reliability and validity, the texts are crosschecked from multiple resources.

Lastly, statistical data of Turkish Statistical Institute and İhlas News Agency on local government elections were benefitted to confirm the vote rates obtained by these three figures and their parties in the respective local elections. The laws regarding local governments and five-year development plans prepared by the State Planning Organization were also examined to comprehend the policy frameworks adopted by the state with respect to local governments.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As noted in the introduction, to understand the change in the profile and practice of the strong mayors, we need to examine (a) leadership theories to explain the strategies employed by the mayors assuming both political and organizational leadership position, (b) forms of local governments to comprehend the leader-oriented administrative environment regarding local governments and (c) the NPM perspective to elucidate the rationale behind the political centralization in the figure of mayor.

The NPM perspective emphasizing administrative decentralization and managerialism defends the delegation of power to local government and privatization of local services or service delivery in accordance with the market principles. In addition, the involvement of private sector and civil society organizations in the local policy-making and policy-implementing processes results in a dispersed network. Thus, the leadership style of mayors and institutional setting of local governments sought by the NPM perspective must be identified. The way that mayors lead is significant since they lead public and public institutions by taking into consideration the distribution of benefits and costs, reconciliation of different interests, and delivery of public services. The leadership style adopted by mayors might enable them to extract power from this distribution, reconciliation and delivery. On the other hand, the institutional settings of local governments might be influential for mayors' radius of action because mayors might have broad administrative powers on urban benefits, costs, interests, and public services. Or these powers might be delegated to a council, manager or commissions. However, the NPM perspective embraced mayors having the right to manage, which means mayors must be granted a wider authority for quick decision-making, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness to demands and adaptability to conditions. That is to say, in this dispersed local network, mayors as

the politicians in the executive acting like managers became local leaders. Hence, in this chapter, the theories of leadership, forms of local government and the NPM perspective will be discussed so as to draw the analytical framework of the study.

2.1. Theories of Leadership

Human beings live together and form a society so as to be physically safe, obtain vital resources, control the resources and minimize the costs of these resources. At this point, the roles in division of labor, determination of shared goals and priorities, distribution of benefits and costs, decision on the share of resources between social actors, and protection of social order in these tensions are the significant concerns of living together. These concerns might be to overcome physical force and power relation. However, physical force is not a sufficient condition because human beings might benefit from technology and develop strategy in order to gain power. Besides, governing human beings is difficult since they have free will. Taking all of these into account, it is substantial to establish mechanisms of negotiation, persuasion, and guidance, which can be called politics. On the other hand, human beings produce surplus value which is the amount of production exceeding their minimum needs. With the emergence of new needs and exchange of surplus value, artisans, merchants, guardsmen and scientists become influential in decision-making with respect to accumulation and distribution of surplus value. Following this, the power struggle between these social classes appears. As a result, the structure called as state seizes the power and organizes the social life in order to maintain the production of surplus value, to control the producer of surplus value and to reconcile different class interests (Bayırbağ, 2012).

This structure brought the phenomenon of ruler and ruling class. According to Weber (1978), the legitimacy of ruler may be based on the three pure types of authority: Traditional authority, charismatic authority and rational authority. In the case of traditional authority, the legitimacy stems from the sanctity of immemorial traditions. Thus, people obey the leader who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position and who is bound by tradition. In the case of charismatic authority, the legitimacy originates from people's trust and belief in the leader's exceptional sanctity, heroism

or exemplary character. In the case of rational authority, however, the legitimacy is based on the belief in the legality of enacted rules. Leader is obeyed because there is a legally established impersonal order in which s/he is elevated to power under legal rules and s/he exercises the authority of office within the formal legal framework.

This hierarchical order between the ruling and the ruled enables leaders to be followed by the other members of society. Hence, leadership is both an institutional position and a mobilization process since the leader is supposed to lead the social organization with respect to division of labor, shared goals and priorities, distribution of benefits and costs, production of surplus value, reconciliation of class interests and protection of social order. As can be seen, leadership is not a linear and unilateral phenomenon, but a phenomenon based on interaction since the leader mobilizes individuals and they are influenced by her/him (Yüksek, 2005).

The studies on leadership have increased in twentieth century because managerial and organizational problems became the main concern after the Industrial Revolution (Aykanat, 2010). These problems were mainly concerned with efficient, effective and economic management of organizations. Hence, there were scientific attempts to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the management of organizations. To illustrate, Frederick Taylor's study on "Scientific Management" (2004) emphasized strict division of labor, hierarchical structure, and implementation of time and motion studies. In this regard, the appointed manager administrating the structures, activities and staff of organizations must comply with the specifications and expectations of the organization. However, Elton Mayo's "Hawthorne Studies" (2003) revealed that human relations is significant for the motivation of workers and thus, for the productivity of organization. Based on this, it was thought that managers tend to lead insufficiently while they administrate excessively. Therefore, managers should be leaders accepted by subordinates because management activities, such as planning, organizing, and decision-making are void unless leader releases the power of motivation and guides people to certain goals (Răducan & Răducan, 2014).

As can be seen, the studies on organizations are expected to be closely related to the theories of leadership. It is because theories of leadership composed of different leadership models and frameworks were in use throughout the public and private

sector organizations and they still are (Bolden, Gosling, Marturano, & Dennison, 2003).

It is possible to classify leadership theories in four parts according to the historical developments in the study field. The first one is the trait theory which was the main approach on leadership in the early twentieth century. It concentrates on different personal characteristics of leaders. Then, the behavioral theory became dominant between 1940s and 1960s. This notion aims to explicate how leaders are supposed to behave. Thirdly, situational theory became attractive between 1960s and 1980s since the debate on contingency of leader behaviors due to the changing conditions of modern world was introduced by the respective scholars and practitioners. Lastly, the latest approaches to leadership deal with managerial leadership which means integration of leader characteristics with managerial duties. These approaches include transactional leadership and transformational leadership theories.

2.1.1. Trait Theory

Trait theory is composed of early studies on leadership which suggest that leadership is an inborn gift for some individuals, and everyone does not have the necessary abilities to become leaders. Hence, trait theory intends to identify the characteristics of successful leaders. Those who have the proper combination of traits are supposed to be successful leaders. Stodgill (1948) identified the main leadership traits and skills including intelligence, alertness, insight, responsibility, initiative, persistence, self-confidence, and sociability.

Nevertheless, it was argued that leadership traits are not universal; that is, a trait set proposed for a specific leader does not comply with the trait set proposed for other leaders (Yüksek, 2005). Some individuals who are leaders under one condition may take the role of follower under other conditions while the opposite might also be true (Stodgill, 1948) in another context. In addition, Aykanat (2010) argues that there are followers who are not able to become leaders although they carry leadership traits or there are effective leaders in spite they do not have these traits. On the other hand, the exclusion of the follower factor also causes a defect in which leadership is viewed as a unilateral process. In other words, characteristics of followers are not

expected to influence leaders' behaviors. There were also a critique on the methodology of this approach since the scholars almost never tested their theories with true leadership personalities, such as chief executives, but lower level managers or inexperienced ones (Kristic, 2012). Lastly, Northouse (2004) asserts that the observed traits by the conducted studies were subjective and often interpreted differently by the researchers since the collected data is very extensive and broad.

Trait theory lost its effect in 1940s because it ignores the situational factors and the follower variable. Rather, its only concern was the leader variable. Besides, its methodology was criticized with respect to theory-testing and subjective observations. As a result of these critiques, scholars wanted to look beyond leader traits and consider the influence of leader behaviors on effectiveness. Thus, the behaviorist theory was introduced.

2.1.2. Behaviorist Theory

The behaviorist theory suggested that there are certain behavioral patterns of leaders, which could be observed and would explain the reasons for effective leadership (Kristic, 2012). The behavioral patterns were investigated by observing leaders in their usual working situations, by talking to their subordinates or under laboratory conditions (House & Aditya, 1997). Therefore, it was assumed that attitudes, behaviors and activities of leaders make them effective and successful, rather than traits. That is to say, leaders' manners in communication, devolution of authority, planning, and supervision determine the effectiveness and success of leader (Aykanat, 2010). According to the theory, leadership capabilities can be taught and leaders can be made or improved, once the effective leadership behaviors are identified. Moreover, the approval of leader's attitudes, behaviors and activities by followers is considered as the foundation of relationship between the leader and followers. Thus, leadership is viewed as a relational process, in contrast to trait theory.

There were a great deal of studies on behaviorist theory; however, the basis and content of behaviorist approach were presented by three of these studies which are Ohio State Leadership Studies, Michigan Leadership Studies and Managerial Grid

Theory (Yüksek, 2005). In general, these studies revealed that there are two types of leadership: The first one includes person-oriented behaviors while the second one includes job-oriented behaviors. Both leadership types aimed to increase efficiency and effectiveness; however, they adopted different methods. The former regarded the welfare of the followers by treating them as equal, by asking for and considering their opinions and individual needs (Krstic, 2012). On the other hand, the latter tended to define the work processes, describing the goals to be achieved, insisting on meeting the deadlines and deciding alone what should be done and how (Bass & Bass, 2008). In these studies, it was argued that the person-oriented behaviors of leaders have positive effects on the followers, but there is no consensus with respect to behavioral patterns which result in the most effective leadership type.

The behaviorist theory has been criticized in many aspects. Firstly, the most accurate leader behaviors are difficult to be identified since behaviors shaped by values and motives are subjective. Thus, when the accuracy of behaviors is measured by different researcher and/ or through different methods, the results might contradict with each other (Aykanat, 2010). Secondly, there is a causality problem which is not discussed by the theory. It means that the theory overlooks the effects of outputs on leader behaviors; rather, it focuses on the effect of leader behaviors on outputs. It also discusses leadership issue only with respect to the leader, as the trait theory does. The group of followers which might have various characteristics and demands are ignored. Furthermore, situational variables, such as, economic, social, cultural, technological, political and legal developments in which the leader and her/his organization took place have not been mentioned. There is no one effective behavioral pattern and universal set of effective leadership behavior that will work in every situation and lead to successful outcome (Krstic, 2012). The contingency (situational) theory has come forward in order to overcome these deficiencies of behaviorist theory.

2.1.3. Contingency (or Situational) Theory

Scholars drew attention to the situational variables in 1960s since leadership could not be described by the traits and behaviors of leaders. The basic assumption of the contingency theory is that leaders effective in a specific situation may fail in another

situation by adopting the same leadership style. Certain situations depending on different factors have impact on the leadership styles. For instance, the leaders' styles and abilities, followers' behaviors and characteristics, technology, time demands, the organization's structure, external threat, and stress are some of the factors that may affect the situation and thus the leadership style (Barrow, 1977). Fred Fiedler's Contingency Model (1967), Robert House and Martin Evans's Path-Goal Theory (1971) and The Vroom-Yetton Leader Participation Model (1973) are the pioneers of contingency studies in regard to identification of these circumstances.

Fiedler's Model (1967) attributes the effectiveness of leadership to three conditions: leader-follower relations, task structure, and leader position power. If leaders build good relationship with followers, then they are more likely to be supported by the followers. If leaders clearly explain task structure, goals, methods, and performance standards, then they are able to put followers under the influence. If followers confer powers on leaders for the sake of task accomplishment, then leaders become more effective (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). Fiedler's work did not focus on traits, behaviors, and situations individually, but the relationship between situations and their impact on the leader. What is to be done in a case where a leader does not fit the situation is left vague by the approach. It recommends changing the situation through situational engineering; however, it does not clearly describe the instruments (Kristic, 2012).

Then, House and Evans's Path-Goal Theory (1971) concentrates on how motivation, satisfaction and performance of followers could be increased by leader behaviors and situational variables. According to this approach, the leader is ought to choose one of the four leadership styles which are directive, supportive, participatory and achievement-oriented leader behaviors. In contrast to Fiedler's Model, House and Evans argues that leadership styles are flexible and thus, leader behaviors might be adjusted according to the demands of situation.

Lastly, the Vroom-Yetton Leader Participation Model (1973) views leadership as a decision-making process between the leader and followers. The model aims to define the conditions in which leader embraces either further participation or lesser participation of followers in decision-making. The model defends that since required leadership style can be learned, leaders can adopt new leadership styles once there is

a different setting and/or different identities. This approach suggests five decision-making processes between the ranges of most autocratic and most participative. The first type solves the problem or makes the decision by her/himself using available information at that time. The second type obtains any necessary information from followers, and then decides on a solution to the problem her/himself. The third type shares the problem with the relevant followers individually, gets their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. Then, s/he makes the decision. The fourth type shares the problem with followers in a group meeting in which s/he obtains their ideas and suggestions. Then, s/he makes the decision which may or may not reflect their influence. The fifth type shares the problem with her/his subordinates as a group. Leader and group generate and evaluate alternatives and attempt to reach agreement on a solution. Leader, as a chairman, coordinates the discussion, maintains the discussion focus on the problem, and makes sure that the critical issues are discussed. S/he does not push followers to adopt her/his solution and is willing to accept and implement any solution supported by the entire group.

To sum up, the effectiveness of leadership depends on the cohesiveness between leader traits and/or behaviors with situations. Thus, the theory examines these certain situations contributing to effectiveness of different leadership styles. That is to say, there is no one best way of explaining leadership under all circumstances since the leadership style to be adopted depends on factors such as situation, people, task, organization, and other environmental variables (Bolden, Gosling, Marturano, & Dennison, 2003). Hence, the theory views leadership as a complex process composed of the relationships between leader, followers, and circumstances (Deliveli, 2010).

2.1.4. Transactional and Transformational Leadership Theories

The latest discussions on the issue of leadership include transactional and transformational leadership theories. Transactional leaders are the ones who are committed to the chain of command and the reward and punishment system so that efficiency and effectiveness could be achieved. On the other hand, transformational leaders are the ones who appeal to higher ideals and ethical values and seek for innovation, change and reform so as to obtain higher performance.

Transactional leadership involves an exchange in which the leader offers rewards in return for compliance and performance by his or her followers (Diaz-Saenz, 2011). That is to say, if outputs are satisfactory, followers are encouraged with rewards. However, if there is negative feedback, leader holds the power to use disciplinary instruments. As can be seen, there is a mutual dependence between leader and followers. It is because the leader must detect and satisfy the needs of the followers in exchange for efficiency and effectiveness. James MacGregor Burns (1978) indicates that transactional leaders approach their followers with an eye to trading one thing for another.

Transformational leadership is defined by Burns (1978) as a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents. Transformational leaders are expected to be a role-model for followers and empower them to participate in the transformational process. Moreover, they are visionary leaders who seek to appeal to followers' better nature and move them toward higher and more universal needs and purposes (Bolman & Deal, 1997). They consider the interests of followers, ensure awareness and acceptance of the goals, and guide followers to look beyond their own self-interests (Bass, 1991). Thus, it is argued that the approach seeks to satisfy transcendental needs of followers, motivate them to do more than expectations and rise above their own boundaries (Yukl, 2010).

The drawback of transactional leadership approach is that followers are regarded as rational beings and thus, followers are thought to be motivated by reward and punishment. However, unpredictability of follower behaviors due to emotional and social conditions is ignored. On the other side, the main challenge on transformational leadership is that it attributes all the changes to the leader. It ignores the influence of other factors bringing change, such as, follower's contributions, situational factors or process factors (Krstic, 2012).

2.2. Forms of Local Government

Public service is a term whose scope changes in time. Initially, the state provides the classical public services regarding internal and external security. However, these

services are insufficient so that people's lives are maintained. Therefore, the services, such as communication, transportation, education, health, mass housing and environmental protection are undertaken by the state, resulting from the rise of welfare state after the World War II (Toprak, 2014). The state has taken more responsibilities so as to overcome poverty and destruction caused by the war. This has enhanced the level of education, welfare, freedom, democracy, individual enterprises and initiatives. That is, individual progressions, social developments and competitive market conditions have been emerged. Therefore, the state intervention in social and economic areas has become redundant (Gül, Kiriş, Nilüfer, & İsmail, 2014).

In 1970s, the further increase in the responsibilities of state due to the populist service delivery caused that welfare state expenditures could not be financed. Hence, states share their authorities, resources and responsibilities with local governments, private sector and civil society since 1980s. As a result of these developments, the approaches of NPM and governance have been developed and implemented (Gül, Kiriş, Nilüfer, & İsmail, 2014). The NPM approach, on the one hand, suggests that public services should be delivered by the private sector or within the framework of market principles. On the other hand, governance approach favors the participation of public sector, private sector and civil society organizations in the process of public service delivery. At this stage, the concept of public service had to be reviewed since the demands and complaints of electorates cannot be ignored (Toprak, 2014).

Considering this, the public services can be defined as sustainable and regular services provided to the public under the supervision of state and other public corporate entities so as to satisfy general and collective needs and fulfil public interests (Onar, 1966). The delivery of all public services by the central government is very difficult. Even if all public services are provided by the central government, the provision of these services is expected to be inefficient and ineffective. That is, there will be an inconsistency between the aim of public service and the resource allocated to it, and the cost of services cannot be reduced. Besides, democracy cannot advance and public concern on services diminishes since the opinions and demands of individuals are not reflected on the services. Therefore, local governments have appeared as a consequence of some problems and needs, such as differences between

local conditions, spatial distance, public participation in administration and better service delivery to public (Eryılmaz, 2010).

According to the *Kamu Yönetimi Sözlüğü* (A Dictionary of Public Administration), local government is defined as a democratic and autonomous administrative level and as a public organization which is established apart from the central government in order to satisfy the common needs of a local community and whose decision-making body is directly elected by the public (Bozkurt, Ergun, & Sezen, 2014). Local governments have legal personality apart from state's legal personality, assets and its own source of income. In general, they are assigned to deliver numerous services regarding a local community. In unitary state structure, there is an administrative decentralization. Thus, local governments share public duties with the central government and they are responsible from the delivery of services related to certain duties. On the other hand, in federal state structure, there is a political decentralization and local governments enjoy legislative and judicial powers in addition to the executive power.

In general, local governments are composed of two bodies: decision-making body and executive body (Yalçındağ, 1997). In representative democratic systems, the decision-making body of local governments consists of members elected by people. The legal regulations of a country on local governments affects the authority of this decision-making body. Nevertheless, the decision-making body of local governments basically makes choices on public services, develops public service policies, finds financial resources, determines the organizational structure and size of labor force, establishes rules concerning daily life, and imposes sanctions for those violating the rules.

According to Yalçındağ (1997), the executive body of local governments is central in the implementation of the decisions by considering the principles of effectiveness and efficiency. He advocates that the executive body is supposed to be an entrepreneur so as to serve the interests of local community and achieve effective and efficient administrative structure. It should also encourage other actors to be an entrepreneur in submitting and fulfilling new projects. Besides, the executive body is expected to ensure the coordination between decision-making body and service

providers. Lastly, the executive body should interpret the decisions for implementers and persuade implementers of public service policies. It should transfer and explain the remarks of local bureaucracy and citizens to decision-making body.

At the local level, the provision of public goods and services might be realized by local governments and/or delegated to the private sector and/or civil society by local governments. Therefore, the decisions of local governments on the delivery of public goods and services might affect the daily lives of citizens directly. In other words, the quality of citizens' daily life depends on how local governments are led and managed. Thus, it is important to understand the impact of leadership and management in local government and the roles played by the elected and appointed officials in this arena (Nollenberger, 2007).

In local governments, the leadership position might be undertaken by a mayor, a manager or a commission. Accordingly, models of local governments can be classified under four forms. These are strong mayor-council form, weak mayor-council form, council-manager form, and commission form (Nollenberger, 2007; Toprak, 2011; Yalçındağ, 1997). In the strong mayor-council form, the directly elected mayor holds a broad administrative power and the council operates as the legislative body which is not involved in administration. In the weak mayor-council form, the mayor having ceremonial duties is elected by the council and the council holds both legislative and executive powers. In the council-manager form, however, the council operates as legislative body and appoints a manager whose profession is to carry out administrative activities. Lastly, in the commission form, ad-hoc commissions are constituted through elections and local public services are carried out by these commissions.

The focus in this part of study will be on the strong mayor-council form and council-manager form because these are the two primary forms of local government (Nollenberger, 2007). To illustrate, the strong mayor-council form has been increasingly adopted in Western European countries. Besides, it has been established in Italy, Norway, some regions of Germany, France, Russia, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Turkey and it is becoming more and more common across Europe, such as the United Kingdom (Fenwick & Elcock, 2005). On the other hand, council-manager form has been established in Canada, Ireland and Scandinavian countries (Yalçındağ,

1997). The municipalities in Germany and the United States of America are managed both through the strong mayor-council form and council-manager form.

2.2.1. Strong Mayor-Council Form

In the strong mayor-council form, mayor is a politician who is elected by the local citizens, a single personality to represent majority and the head of local executive body. On the other hand, council is the legislative organ of local government which is also elected by the local citizens. As can be seen, the strong mayor-council form is designed according to the separation of powers principle. Hence, there might be a conflict over the mission, goals, and policies as well as the boundaries of the administration dimension since both are given authority by the public in order to rule and represent it (Nollenberger, 2007). Nevertheless, this conflict can be considered necessary for the accountability of local governments.

The mayor, as the head of local executive body, is elected by local people and responsible for the local administrative issues. S/he embodies both political and administrative leadership in her/his personality and thus, holds the most visible position. S/he is the political leader of the city and serves as a directly elected chief executive. Therefore, s/he has significant political powers, such as presiding in council meetings, setting the agenda of meetings and preparing the budget for council consideration. In this respect, political leadership of mayor is interactive in nature due to mobilizing the administration for political objectives, mobilizing the public for a political vision and establishing modes of interaction and common understanding (Haus & Sweeting, 2006). Regarding her/his other role of administrative leadership, s/he can administer the budget approved by the council, control the city administration, appoint and remove chief officers, and veto legislation passed by the council (Hambleton, 1998). Thus, administrative leadership of mayor can be viewed as the process of providing the results required by authorized processes in an efficient, effective and legal manner since s/he is the frontline supervisor of municipal organization and endorses strict political accountability (Van Wart, 2003).

However, the combination of political and administrative leadership in the personality of mayor is contradictory. It is because, according to Güzelsarı (2004), mainstream scholars studying public administration advocate the separation of administration from politics so that state apparatus could work according to the principles of management and public administration could work rational, efficient and economic like the private sector. This makes the distinction between public administration and business management ambiguous. The dichotomy of administration and politics results from the definition of administration as a technical function. The administrative structures are the providers of services while services are determined in the political area. To illustrate, mayors as the directly elected political leaders mostly do not have the technical expertise with respect to the services to be delivered; nevertheless, they are expected to deliver services in a rational, effective and economic way.

The mayor in the strong mayor-council form might be expected to be entrepreneur and innovator since s/he leads the most complex structures of city (Svara, 1999). It means that this mayor must suggest creative solutions to local issues and accumulates resources to build coalitions and gain leverage. The administrative leadership of mayor brings formal resources, such as appointment of the department heads, development of budget, direction of departments and veto authority while political leadership brings informal resources; such as, political-party or community support, strong popular backing, private backers indebted to the mayor for various reasons (Nollenberger, 2007). That is, the strong mayor is the key initiator of action.

The mayoral leadership might be approached within the framework of situational leadership theory, claiming that leadership is contingent upon the situation, people, task organization, and other environmental variables. The task organization and structure of administrative staff in local governments are in a continuous evolution because there are various and rapidly changing demands on local public services. These changes and evolution lead to the modification of mayor's traits and/or behaviors according to the situations. That is, the leadership style of a strong mayor is dependent on the tasks, followers composed of citizens and staff, environmental factors, and current situation. The strong mayor might adopt one of the leadership

styles which are directive, supportive, participatory or achievement-oriented on the basis of situations and conditions.

Furthermore, the transactional and transformational leadership theories might be helpful in understanding the role of strong mayor. Firstly, the strong mayor might enable the provision of public services to the districts in which majority of votes are for her/him. This means the encouragement of followers with rewards. S/he might also use disciplinary instruments by preventing the provision of public services to the districts in which s/he did not receive vote. Hence, the leadership style of strong mayor can be approached within the framework of transactional leadership theory since there is an interchange and a mutual dependence between the mayor and citizens. Secondly, the mayor is expected to bear the characteristics of a transformational leader which are problem-solving, creativity, innovation, entrepreneurship and flexibility to changes. S/he should improve the relationship between local government institutions and the communication between citizens and local government so that local government can operate in harmony and the views of citizens are reflected in the city administration. S/he is also ought to be a role model since s/he is the political representative of the city and symbolizes the administrative unity of the city. The power attached to her/him stems from these expectations from her/him. This is why he is supposed to be a transformational mayor.

The council has a representative role and is supposed to balance the strong mayor in the city administration. However, the council is a more purely legislative body with less involvement in administration (Christensen & Hogen-Esch, 2006). The council is given the power to approve the budget, policies and appointments made by the mayor. The mayor is able to veto the council actions, but the council might insist upon its action and override the veto.

It is discussed that the strong mayor-council form has benefits, such as leadership, accountability to the voters, and effective government to deal with complex problems. However, there might be some drawbacks of this form of local governments. For example, the strong mayor having excessive power on local issues might not have skills to run a complex administrative apparatus. After the elections, partisan politics might be observed from the behaviors of the mayor. The mayor who wants to stay in office might focus on winning elections and ignore administrative

concerns of the city. In short, the strong mayor-council form of government emphasizes separation of powers with a focus on mayoral leadership (Nollenberger, 2007). On the other side, the council which represents the local community remains in the background of city administration.

2.2.2. Council-Manager Form

The council-manager form is designed to ensure integrity in city administration by concentrating both legislative and executive powers under the roof of the council. Nevertheless, the council does not use executive power directly, but uses it through appointing a manager who is equipped with managerial skills and experience. The manager is supposed to be politically neutral. According to Christensen and Hogen-Esch (2006), this form is modeled on modern business practices, with the voters equivalent to corporate stockholders, the council to the board of directors, and a professional manager responsible for operations.

In this form, council performs legislative function and makes decisions regarding the public policy of a city. It is the link between public and local government because of its representation duty. The demands of local citizens are conveyed to the city manager and administration through the city council. It appoints and removes the city manager. The decisions made by the council cannot be objected and/or vetoed by the manager. The council possesses all authority except for what is delegated to the manager (Nollenberger, 2007). To illustrate, it has control over local financial resources, and it can investigate all procedures of policy implementation. The manager is accountable to the council and has to be present at the every council meeting so that s/he answers the questions addressed by council members (Yalçındağ, 1997). It is evident that the council also acts as a supervisor and a judge in the name of citizens.

The city manager is selected by the council according to her/his professional, technical and administrative skills, not her/his political views or connections. The manager's role in the policy-making process is to direct the municipal departments providing public services, control and supervise their implementations, and ensure the cooperation and coordination between them. S/he also must act as a bridge

between the council and local administrative units. In other words, recommendations of the administrative units and decisions of the council must be translated from one to another by the manager.

In addition, the manager has the power to hire staff in local government units. Her/his staff must be hired according to merit system rather than nepotism and partisan politics because s/he is supposed to be neutral and is accountable to the council. The manager is a professional leader who carries out technical works by employing the principles of private sector in the local government. That is, the manager leads her/his staff in line with the principles of effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the provision of public services. If economy, efficiency and effectiveness are realized in local governments, the manager might encourage the staff and satisfy its needs. Otherwise, the manager might use disciplinary instruments against them. The manager cannot use carrot-stick approach on citizens as it might be used in the strong mayor-council form since s/he has no political identity and has to be neutral.

The manager is also supposed to act as a chief executive officer (CEO), make performance measurement, take strategic decisions and run the city as running a private company (Toprak, 2011). According to Nollenberger (2007), the credibility of the manager rests on her/his role in running government in a businesslike manner. He argues that excellent managers are risk takers and encourage others to take risks, celebrates success, has clear understanding of performance, and visualizes broad objectives, distant goals and far-sighted projects. He also presents high level of concern for people, care about employees as human beings and is interested in equity and balanced participation as the other features to be embraced by the manager.

In council-manager form, the city manager holds a visible position since s/he given broad administrative power; however, s/he does not have political responsibility since her/his role is not political leadership, but professional leadership. In order to overcome this problem, a mayor might give a political lead to the work of city manager (Hambleton, 1998). The mayor might be elected directly by citizens or elected among council members. In council-manager form, the mayor does not have legislative and executive powers, but ceremonial powers. The mayor's role, as

political leadership, is to build consensus, promote cohesion, foster communication and facilitate interaction among officials (Nollenberger, 2007).

To sum up, the council-manager form aims to fulfill public interest and remove the influence of political parties and interests of certain groups through the appointment of non-partisan, professional and skilled manager who can efficiently implement the policies set by the council. Therefore, this form can be considered as the reflection of a private company organization on local governments. However, there might be numerous criticisms directed to the council-manager form regarding the debates on democracy, politics-administration dichotomy and professionalization. Firstly, delegation of too much power to city manager and her/his staff might be resulted with autocratic type of city administration which ignores political representation of minorities and their views. Secondly, the separation of administration from politics is not realistic since politics takes place in the policy process which covers finding resource, allocating resource, setting priority, and realizing priority (Yalçındağ, 1997). Lastly, a highly technical and mechanical role is proposed for the city manager. With the adoption of private sector principles in public sector, efficiency, effectiveness and economy are prioritized while human side of administration is excluded from the policy implementation process.

2.3. New Public Management

The capitalist economic order has been going through a severe economic crisis in the 1970s. This crisis has been attributed to the social welfare state understanding which defends state intervention in economy. Therefore, the debates on state's withdrawal from economic sphere have been reinvigorated. Neoliberal ideology supporting the minimal state has been offered as the cure of crisis. The minimization of state was to be carried out through privatizations, liberalization, marketization and deregulation. That is, economic development was expected to be realized by private sector and through free market mechanisms. The state was supposed to assure the proper functioning of this mechanism.

Neoliberal reconstruction of state has been reflected upon public administration as the Public Management Approach in 1980s. Public organizations are reduced to the

executive power of state which has pure technical-mechanical function. In other words, public management approach embraces the classical theory of separation of powers indicating that public administration is related to the executive power, political science with legislative power and law with judicial power. However, it is not likely that public administration could function separately from the legal and political framework of society (Üstüner, 2000). It is also theoretically not possible that the theory and discipline of public administration establish a field excluding law, politics, and other disciplines. On the other side, it is also argued that administration of public organizations and management of private organizations resemble each other due to their bureaucratic structures. According to Michael Murray (1975), neither private organizations solely pursue profit, nor do public organizations ignore input-output ratio. However, Graham T. Allison (1983) puts forward that public and private management are alike as much as they are unlike and the dissimilarities with respect to performance measurement, human resources, equity, efficiency, transparency and supervision are more important than the similarities. The Public Management Approach experienced an intellectual crisis in the end of 1980s due to its reductionist and restrictive theoretical assumptions (Üstüner, 2000). Nevertheless, the approach continues to be effective because of its internal openings and efforts for legitimacy. Thus, it has been redefined with the birth of NPM Approach.

In the beginning of 1990s, the general principles of NPM Approach was developed through inductive observation of practices. It was not a set of concepts built upon theory. It was aimed that the new approach is to be legitimized through its practical foundations (Üstüner, 2000). Thus, there is no one and the best way in management because its practice might differ due to national characteristics and local conditions. Nevertheless, there are no radical difference between the former and the latter. The novelty of NPM Approach is related to the reconstruction of state and redefinition of state's role in the process of neoliberal globalization (Ömürgönülşen, 1998). It is because this approach has been becoming a widespread model aiming marketization of public sectors and articulation of public sectors into global economy and competition (Güzelsarı, 2004).

The concepts proposed by the NPM Approach are liberalization, deregulation, privatization, flexibility, performance measurement, business-like-management,

transparency, competition, efficiency and effectiveness. The approach aims to obtain rapid and concrete results through economic-managerial rationality rather than to obey abstract rules and procedures through legal rationality. For instance, flexibility resulting from deregulation might lead to informality in decision-making and implementation. Therefore, the term ‘administration’ has been replaced by the term ‘management’.

This replacement should be dealt with in the light of seven basic elements of NPM suggested by Christopher Hood who first used the term “new public management” in 1991. These seven basic elements include hands-on management, output controls, discipline in resource use, competition, use of private sector techniques, disaggregation of units, and explicit standards of performance measurement (Hood, 1991). Hands-on management refers to the active participation of managers in management and their right to manage. It means that managers must be pragmatic, proactive, and equipped with broad authority in order for quick decision-making, efficient and effective resource use, responsiveness to the demands of citizens, and adaptability to changing conditions. Output controls prioritize the quantity of outputs and realization of goals rather than compliance with rules and procedures. Discipline in resource use is oriented to control inputs; in other words, the aim is the efficient use of scarce resources (Kutlu, 2013). Competition indicates public institutions competing with other public institutions and private sector. It is argued that competition encourages public officials to compete with each other and their concern becomes cheaper provision of higher quality services. The use of private sector techniques aims to establish profit-making public sector through flexibility, effective resource use, and quick decision-making mechanism. Thus, citizens are regarded as the clients of public services. Their preferences might differ and flexible provision of services is crucial for their satisfaction (Güzelsarı, 2004). Disaggregation of units could be viewed as a step to simplify large bureaucratic units. Effective management, efficient service provision, quicker decision-making and less red-tape are the achievements expected from this step. Lastly, explicit standards of performance measurement present a general overview about the input-output ratio and success or failure of the public organizations accordingly.

In 1990s, the destructive effects of neoliberal policies resulted in critiques to the NPM Approach. According to these critiques, the relationship between political, social and economic institutions were neglected. For example, public services cannot be imposed only to the state; instead, social and economic responsibilities must be fulfilled jointly by the actors belonging public sector, private sector and civil society, networks and active citizens (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2013). Therefore, the governance model including partnership between state, market and civil society instead of state-market antagonism has been put forward. The regulative, directive, cooperative, coordinative and interactive role of state has been acknowledged by the governance. Peck and Tickell (2002) identify this process of neoliberalism as “roll-out” process, which refers to the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations. This process also involves public-private initiatives and socially interventionist policies (Kayasü & Yetişkul, 2014). In this respect, the dichotomy between politics and public administration vanishes because public administration has become one of the actors cooperating and ensuring coordination and interaction in this pluralist structure (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2013). Nonetheless, the governance model is not the opposite of the NPM Approach, but has appeared as an alternative suggestion for it so as to extend its scope (Güzelsarı, 2004). The aim was to extend the marketization to the area of social relations which is defined according to economic measurements, such as competition, efficiency, effectiveness and profitability. Bayramoğlu (2002) defines governance as the marketization of state, which means linking state with public and other actors through the market logic.

The NPM Approach advocates that the state should not only be minimized, but also be market-oriented with the spirit of entrepreneurship. That is, provider of public services must be entrepreneur, competitive, fragmented, professional and autonomous units so as to prevent waste of resources. The relationship between the state and citizens must be redefined as the relationship between service provider and consumers and/or clients. In this way, state becomes a facilitating actor in economic order by establishing new internal and external markets and contributing to the proper operation of market mechanisms and private sector. Although the NPM Approach and governance have introduced the minimization of bureaucracy, this does not refer to a decline in the effectiveness of public administration (Üstüner,

2000). On the contrary, in order to maintain the neoliberal transformation process and reproduction of capitalism, stronger executive system and administrative structure are needed so as to be fixer in the process of decision making and implementation, manage the multipartite state structure in coordination and become able to act quickly (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2013). As can be seen, an administrative logic composed of higher governing power and quicker decision-making capacity conflicts with the principles of governance model, such as participation and relatively more democratic decision making processes. Consequently, today's practices of administration are inevitably becoming more and more authoritarian, even though political discourse strives to conceal it through the governance approach emphasizing pluralism, participation, democratic decision-making process, interaction, practice of governing together, and so forth.

2.3.1. Theoretical Grassroots of NPM Approach

The NPM Approach relies upon three standpoints:managerialism, neo-Taylorism, and public choice theory (Güzelsarı, 2004). Managerialism and neo-Taylorism are interdependent since both approaches propose the transfer of free market principles into public sector. On the other hand, public choice theory mainly puts forward the idea that economic theories and practices have impacts on political and bureaucratic mechanisms.

2.3.1.1. Managerialism

Managerialism is an approach which underlines the identification of standards and performance criteria, management by objectives, economy, effectiveness, efficiency, professionalization, client-orientation, total quality management and innovation. Bureaucrats are supposed to perform their jobs by taking these concepts into consideration just as business managers. That is to say, the term 'administration' should be replaced with the term 'management' because the former refers to the commitment to the formal procedures and routines while the latter stands for the efficient and effective use of resources on the way to the designated results.

The managerialist approach proposes the principles of decentralization, deregulation and delegation in order to overcome the inefficiency problem of classical public administration regarding organization and operation (Eryilmaz, 2010). In parallel, it is also advocated that bureaucrats must be free to manage. That is, they must be given the right to manage by politicians so that they could improve their performance because being productive, planning, implementing and measuring depend on the quality and professionalism of managers (Pollitt, 1990). However, the autonomy of bureaucracy from politicians and citizens caused by professionalization might result in bureaucracy-democracy dichotomy. The participation and supervision of citizens and accountability of bureaucrats in administrative process might be at stake (Üstüner, 2000).

Market-oriented management is also recommended in the light of competition and supremacy of private sector. Competition in producing public goods and services between public organizations is supposed to create an internal market and realize efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. The mentality of these public organizations must be reconstructed according to the supremacy of private sector principle suggesting that public organizations employ the instruments of private sector. Public organizations are expected to set objectives, monitor performance indicators, implement performance evaluation and generate a wage payment system accordingly so as to discipline labor force in accordance with the productivity ideal (Pollitt, 1990). It is possible to claim that the central and hierarchical structures are expected to be preserved.

Managerialism aims to provide the social legitimacy of public administrators who gain autonomy from politicians, citizens and labor force as a result of professionalization. This legitimacy and autonomy are maintained by the application of scientific methods and scientific management into public administration. Thus, the political and social context of public administration is restricted by scientific principles, findings, and calculation. It means that managerialism approaches public administration at the organizational level and reduces it to a technical-mechanical issue. Besides, decentralization of management accompanied by central and hierarchical structures is supposed to bring centralization via decentralization.

2.3.1.2. Neo-Taylorism

Neo-Taylorism is the modification of Taylorism, which was the dominant paradigm in organizational theory and classical management theory until 1980s. Neo-Taylorism evaluates performance in order to collect data on outputs and adjust the management accordingly whereas Taylorism evaluates performance in order to reach one single best way and establish the process and procedures in this determined direction (Hughes, 2014). It is also claimed that reflection of neo-Taylorism on public administration is the redefinition of state's role according to flexible production systems which is promoted by Post-Fordism (Güzelsarı, 2004). In this way, public sector is expected to be compatible with the conditions of global economy.

This approach could also be regarded as the complement of managerialism because it is an attempt to secure bureaucracy's right to manage and room for maneuver. This right originates from legitimization of bureaucrats as professional public managers who are trained, equipped with knowledge and supported with science and principles of scientific management. In addition, the main impetus of neo-Taylorism is to define certain goals, develop performance indicators in order to measure the accomplishment of these goals and give rewards to those accomplishing the goals on the basis of merit (Pollitt, 1993). It means that bureaucrats are autonomous from politicians, citizens, and labor force. Hence, as public managers get professional, participation and supervision of citizens in administrative process become problematical (Üstüner, 2000).

Neo-Taylorism attributes the administrative failure of pre-1980 period to the activities of bureaucracy, which have both individual and organizational dimensions. Individual dimension of administrative failure stems from the public officials undertaking risk-free tasks. In other words, career system of classical bureaucracy prevents entrepreneurship. On the other hand, organizational dimension of administrative failure is about public organizations, which are in pursuit of their permanence rather than the provision of services. This view offers four means to overcome administrative failures. These can be listed as: supervision through economic and financial data, determination of costs of production, performance

evaluation techniques to test success and carrot-and-stick approach to encourage individual entrepreneurship (Keraudren & van Mierlo, 1998).

2.3.1.3. Public Choice Theory

Public choice theory is one of the economic theories and practices on politics and bureaucracy. It is built upon methodological individualism which states that every single human being is selfish and struggles to maximize her/his interests. That is, public officials and private sector employees are not different since both pursue their own interests and these interests are defined within economic framework (Sönmez, 2007). Therefore, the concept of public interest is rejected by public choice theory.

According to the theory, electorates, politicians, their parties and bureaucrats are viewed as rational beings pursuing their interests. Electorates demand enhancement of services to be provided. Interest groups are rent-seeking communities which carry out lobbying activities and put pressure on politicians in order to influence decision-making process. Politicians and their parties promise to enhance services for electorates and make decisions in favor of interest groups for the maximization of votes to be received. Once they are elected, they need to create new service areas or extend the existing ones in order to fulfill their populist promises and to be re-elected in the next electoral process. In parallel with this, bureaucracy as the instrument of political authority for providing services expands in size and budget (Aksoy, 1995). According to Niskanen (1971), bureaucrats individually profit from the expansion of their bureau with respect to size and budget since it enhances their prestige, status, wage, and other side benefits. For the public choice theory, bureaucrats and politicians generally do not pursue society's wellbeing. The theory maintains the idea that demands of electorates and interest groups, vote maximization motive of politicians and bureau maximization motive of bureaucracy overlap. Hence, pluralist democratic systems are strongly criticized by the public choice theory because individual ambition of politicians and bureaucrats causes excessive supply of services and thus, irrational increase in public expenditures.

In order to overcome this problem of pluralist democracy, public choice theory suggests "Constitutional Economics". It advocates that a political order must be

constructed according to the market conditions and this order must be guaranteed by the constitution so that political populism could be prevented (Sönmez, 2007). In addition, central and large-scale bureaucratic organizations must be decentralized; that is, they must be fragmented into smaller and less complicated ones. These smaller public organizations are expected to compete with each other in service provision, to encourage entrepreneurship, to provide freedom to choose for consumers, to be transparent and to increase efficiency. On the other hand, the state is expected to steer the market rather than row. According to the public choice theory, state should be the catalyzer of market mechanism through privatizations, legal regulations and new organizations independent from the central government which contribute to the establishment of new markets (Güzelsarı, 2004).

The freedom to economic activity is viewed as the fundamental freedom by the theory. Therefore, the development of individual economic freedom is attached to competitive market economy. The more state provide services, the more it intervenes in the market. State intervention in economy and public enterprises are regarded as waste of resources in economy. In this sense, state intervention is also viewed as incentive for monopolies, barrier for entrepreneurship, restriction of choices and cause of inefficiency. Therefore, public choice theorists advocate the minimization of state by criticizing the inefficient use of resources. The minimal state also ought to be managed according to the logic of market. In service delivery, competition against bureaucratic monopoly and privatization against waste of resources are suggested. In this stage of economic structural transformation, the advocates of public choice theory argue that the state could act within oppressive and authoritarian juridical/legal/constitutional framework due to political and social unrest of opposition (Aksoy, 1995). They strive to moderate the problems caused by the neoliberal transformation process through conservative discourses, such as strong state, disciplined society, social authority, hierarchy, obedience, partnership, nation, tradition and so forth. In other words, the priority given to individual freedom with respect to economic liberalization is not reflected on the political sphere.

On the other hand, according to the public choice theory, the demands of electorates do not take place as rational choices and/or behaviors. It is because citizens are unaware of the costs of their demands and there is no direct purchasing transaction

between the state and citizens as it is in market transaction. Once citizens begin to pay in exchange for the services it is argued that they gain sense of responsibility and introduce more realistic demands from politicians (Bilgiç, 2013). Thus, public choice theory promotes the economic and mathematical analyses of political and bureaucratic behavior through micro-economic assumptions (Aksoy, 1995). This means the financial control of public institutions through accounting, budgeting, and supervising.

In general, theoretical grassroots of NPM Approach argue that the state should withdraw from the economic activities and thus, public administration must be shrunk, reorganized and managed according to the market principles. The fields from which state has withdrawn must be filled by private sector. Nevertheless, the state shrinking in quantity might lead to stronger administrative structures because it is inevitable that state reconstitutes economy and society through legal regulations in the transition period. In addition, political and social unrest caused by neoliberal transition might result in oppressive and authoritarian state mechanism. Therefore, political and social sphere could be re-regulated by a legal framework in which the daily lives of citizens are regulated by more rules. On the one hand, the concepts of effective state, coordination and supervision are brought into the forefront by public choice theory so as to prevent the weakening of politicians against bureaucrats, but managerialism and neo-Taylorism, on the other hand, promote decentralization, deregulation and devolution (Sözen, 1998). Hence, the key feature of public sector reforms might be viewed as centralized decentralization (Hoggett, 1991). The goal is establishment of rational, efficient, and effective state organization and use of resources which is possible by the virtue of professionals. This goal necessitates a public administration that is proactive, dynamic and competent in instant job-oriented decision-making and implementing (Üstüner, 2000). Neoliberal formulation of shrinking state-strong market is being transformed into the cooperation of strong market with effective state. It is likely that democracy, participation, representation, political interaction, social justice, social equality, accountability to public and public interest are ruled out (Aksoy, 1995). The social welfare declining as the result of neoliberal policies introduced political reactions against both governments and the attempts to transform administrative logic. At this stage, the governance approach serves to overcome the complaints brought by the NPM's emphasis on

managerialism and marketization (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2013). Consequently, public administration has become one of the actors cooperating, coordinating, and providing interaction in the pluralist structure in which public sector, private sector and civil society are supposed to govern together. However, in neoliberal transformation process, the need to act quickly in decision-making and implementing, and to cooperate multipartite state structure results in the decentralized state power governed by stronger executive and administrative structures.

2.3.2. The Effects of NPM on the Local Governments

The fundamental goal of NPM is the efficient and effective provision of services by private sector; if not, by a minimal and managerial state. The instruments to achieve this goal are privatization and decentralization. It means that organizational structure under monolithic, holistic, and sole authority must be abandoned (Aksoy, 1998). The widespread and flexible provision of services must be realized by multiple local units so that the preferences of service receivers could be determined more realistically and thus, excessive production of services could be controlled. Hence, this approach highlighted the private sector and local government for efficient, effective, and economic service delivery.

In general, the reforms envisaged by the NPM Approach for local governments cannot be dissociated from the ones for public administration since local governments deliver services in urban and rural areas as a part of public administration. To illustrate, local governments must privatize certain services to private sector, execute them through public-private partnership and/or delegate them to voluntary organizations. They must also abolish red-tape, reduce costs, enhance its financial management through market mechanisms, and use the methods of private sector in their personnel regime (Mengi, 1997). The determination and implementation of local services must be separated. Local governments must be given the authority to determine which services are needed while the realization of these needs must be left to private sector entrepreneurship (Aksoy, 1998). Competition between private and public organizations in service delivery must be given particular importance. With the principle of user-pays, the citizens are

transformed into customers and those who cannot afford the services could benefit from them unequally. That is, local governments must be customer-oriented and therefore, accurately determine the needs of their customers, ensure their participation, be closer to them and be transparent. This is expected to result in competing local governments striving to make their localities attractive for their current and prospective customers. Thus, they need to be enterprising, risk-taking, inventive, and profit-motivated in their entrepreneurial role (Sager, 2011).

Local governance, on the other hand, which is the implementation of NPM and governance at the local level, depends on public-private-voluntary partnership and cooperation in service delivery (Şahin, 2009). Flexibility for rapid economic and political decisions necessitated by market economy and public-private-civil network management for the mobilization of local resources are the determinants of this change in administrative structure of local governments. It means that local governance does not envisage a better public service delivery and the participation of citizens in decision-making process, but rather financing local public services. Consequently, in this dispersed administrative environment, mayors arise as strong network managers staying in office for extended periods of time and acting like a CEO (Bayırbağ, 2016, forthcoming).

2.4. Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, the relation of the phenomenon of strong mayor with leadership theories, forms of local government, and the NPM perspective is analyzed with reference to decentralization, privatization, and dispersed local network. It is indicated that situational, transactional and transformational leadership theories explain the strategies employed by the mayors in the midst of this administrative environment. These theories envisaged a problem solver, creative, innovative, entrepreneur, and flexible leaders who must be able to modify their traits and behaviors according to the situations. Moreover, it is stated that the institutional setting of local government in this leader-oriented network is strong mayor-council form in which mayor holds the most visible position due to her/his political and administrative leadership. In this way, the municipal council remains in the background of city management so that mayor could overcome the council's

opposition, solve problems and manage effectively. In this regard, the reflection of NPM on local governments is the centralization of political and administrative powers in the personality of mayor. That is, the mayor is reproduced as the sole authority in local politics as a result of the administrative reforms inspired by the NPM while these reforms aim to remove monolithic and holistic organizational structure. The following chapter aims to examine the historical background of local governments in Turkey and investigate how the administrative reforms inspired by the NPM perspective affected local governments in Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY

Local governments are public institutions ensuring the provision of public goods and services in local areas. In Western societies, local governments have sprung as a regional opposition in twelfth century with the achievement and consolidation of financial and administrative autonomy against central governments. However, the Ottoman Empire embraced absolutism and centralization, and avoided the establishment of local governments (Çiçek, 2014). There was no endeavor to install local autonomy in Ottoman Empire due to the experience of Anatolian Seljuk Empire in which the provinces were organized according to the principle of decentralization and ruled autonomously. When Anatolian Seljuk Empire lost its authority, districts gained their independence from the Empire and constructed their principalities, one of which was the Ottomans.

In the Ottoman Empire, sultans accumulated state authority in their personalities. They were also caliphs, who are the ruler of Islamic government, political and religious successors to the Islamic Prophet Muhammed and leader of the entire Muslim society (Kadi & Shahin, 2013). Therefore, the subjects in local areas were not able to demand autonomous local governments from the central government ruled by the sultan. Any structure emerging out of the central government was regarded as politically and religiously illegitimate (Eryılmaz, 2010). Thus, the modern structure of local government did not appear until 1839 in which the Gülhane Rescript was announced.

In the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire, local governments have emerged so that the unity and integrity of political-administrative authority are preserved and strengthened. However, the debates on their administrative and financial autonomy from the central government proceeded because local governments could become an opposition and a threat to the unity and integrity of

political-administrative authority. Hence, the dominance of central government on the local governments was preserved in the administrative structure of Turkey.

This attitude towards local governments has been preserved after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. In the republican period, political conjuncture and disruption of democracy with military interventions avoided the development of local autonomy although the autonomy of local governments was emphasized in development plans, researched by state institutions and promised in the political party programs. After 1980s, the discussions on the autonomy of local governments have been escalated due to the social and economic developments. The strict dependence of local governments to central government has brought some concerns, such as local democracy, participation, effectiveness and efficiency. Certain attempts have been made in order to delegate power to local governments and strengthen their administrative and financial structure. At the beginning of 2000s, the need for reform in local governments is approached within the context of new public management and governance. Accordingly, the reforms oriented to decentralization have gained momentum after 2004.

In this chapter, the historical development of local governments in Turkey will be analyzed. Especially, the period after 1984 will be the major focus since the metropolitan municipalities were introduced in 1984 and three comprehensive reforms on municipalities and metropolitan municipalities were made in 2004, 2005 and 2012. This analysis is significant to comprehend the transformation of local governments with respect to their administrative and financial autonomy and their dichotomy with the central government. Moreover, the evolving role of mayors in this process, as strong figures *vis-à-vis* central government will be presented.

3.1. Local Governments in the Pre-Republican Period

In the Ottoman Empire, three main actors were taking part in municipal services before the modernization movement. Firstly, the primary institution ensuring the provision of municipal services was the office of religious judge (*kadı*). These judges were being appointed by the central government. They were responsible for numerous issues about their towns, such as maintaining safety, supervising artisan

and foundation (*vakıf*), controlling bazaars and goods prices, planning town, and delivering sanitation and infrastructure services (Çiçek, 2014). Secondly, foundations occupied an important position in municipal services by providing educational, cultural and social services, such as building schools, libraries, hospitals, soup kitchens and guest houses (Uyar, 2004; Eryılmaz, 2010). Lastly, the other institution participating in municipal services was the guild (*lonca*) which was inspecting occupational activities of artisans and settling disputes between them. These institutions do not have autonomy *vis-à-vis* the central government since they were administered by the officials appointed by the central government and working under the supervision of the central government. Those who are in charge of the local service delivery were not elected by the public. They were appointed by the central government and serving under the supervision of central government officials. That is, local people were not able to make a decision on the person or institution that provides local services.

The modernization of local governments in the Ottoman Empire is affiliated with the leverage put by the Western states due to the demands of minorities regarding modern, well-kept and clean towns (Çiçek, 2014). A modern municipal organization named “*şehremaneti*” was first established in Istanbul in 1855. The decision-making body was the city council and the executive body was *şehremini* which is the mayor. It is significant that urban problems were treated through a holistic approach (Eryılmaz, 2010). The *şehremini* was going to deal only with municipal services unlike *kadı*. Both the members of city council and the mayor were appointed by the central government. As can be seen, the central government did not consider municipality as the foundation of political and administrative structure in local areas (Uyar, 2004). Rather, the dependence of local government to the central government was ensured and the authority of central government was consolidated.

In 1868, “*Dersaadet İdare-i Belediye Nizamnamesi*” was published. This was a regulation on administration of Istanbul Municipality. According to the regulation, Istanbul was divided in fourteen districts. Every district was going to be ruled by its own bureau and the bureau was going to be attached to the mayor appointed by the central government. Also, the appointed city council was still in operation. In 1912, the district bureaus were abolished. Instead, district offices were formed and

directors were appointed to administer these offices. The city council was also replaced with the committee.

In other provinces, municipal organizations were established in 1864 by “*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*”, which means regulation on province administration. This regulation aimed at establishing city councils in other cities. Thus, the city councils were going to be transferred authority from the central government and supposed to be responsible for municipal services. The mayor, as the head of city council, was going to be appointed by the governor or district governor.

In 1876, the constitutional monarchy was constituted in the Ottoman Empire. The Article 112 of *Kanun-i Esasi* (the 1876 Constitution) stated that “Municipal business will be administered in Istanbul and in the provinces by elected municipal councils”. Then, “*Vilayetler Belediye Kanunu*”, which means provinces municipality law, was enacted in 1877 so as to regulate administration of municipal business. According to the Law, the mayor is appointed among the members of municipal council by the central government.

In conclusion, local governments were introduced to Ottoman administrative system by the central government due to the pressures of the European countries, not as a result of public demand or movement (Eryilmaz, 2010). A municipality was not designed as a local government in which both representation and participation of public are realized. On the contrary, it is designed as a local office providing municipal services whose organs and tasks are appointed by the central government.

3.2. Local Governments in the Republican Period

3.2.1. The Single-Party Period

The Republic of Turkey was established by the cadres of Republican People’s Party (RPP) in 1923. The RPP participated in the elections without a rival until 1945. The opposition parties were either closed or personally dissolved. Therefore, the RPP party formed the governments alone until 1950. This period is called the single-party period.

In the 1921 Constitution, the administration of provinces was addressed in the Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14. In the Article 11, province was regarded as an autonomous legal entity. In addition, the participation of people in local governments was ensured in the Article 12, which stated “Province councils are composed of members who are elected by people of provinces”. In addition, province councils are given numerous duties which are about social issues related to foundations, education, health, finance, agriculture and construction. External and domestic politics; religious, legal and military issues; and international economic relations were excluded from the local governments’ field of activity. In 1922, the Law no. 278 brought the election of mayors by the members of municipal council among themselves which might lead to the situation where mayors are under the influence of the council.

Ankara had become the capital city of Turkey in 1923. The municipality of Ankara was established in 1924 by the “Law no. 417 on Ankara *Şehremaneti*”. A special form of local government was formed in Ankara because Ankara must be reconstructed and improved so that it could become an example for the other cities (Çiçek, 2014; Uyar, 2004). The municipality was going to be administered by a mayor appointed by the central government and a municipal council elected by the people of Ankara (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010). It means that the influence of municipal council on the mayor was removed, but the influence of central government was replaced instead. In other words, in the process of the foundation of Republic, the participation and demands of people in city administration through the municipal councils was ruled out. Rather, mayors were kept under the control of the central government because municipalities were generally viewed as the supplement of the central government (Göymen, 1990).

In the Article 91 of 1924 Constitution, devolution of power to provinces and division of duties between the government and provinces were adopted (Keleş, 2012). However, in this Constitution, provinces were no longer regarded as autonomous entities and their duties were not specified, as they were in the 1921 Constitution. The autonomy and numerous duties given to municipalities by the 1921 Constitution were withdrawn by the 1924 Constitution because the localities were perceived as a

potential sources of conflict and counteracted by strict centralist administrative measures (Joppien, 2014).

The last regulation on Istanbul municipal organization in 1912 and the law on municipalities in 1877 had remained in force until the Municipality Law No. 1580 was adopted in 1930. The aims of this law were to authorize municipalities for the provision of local services and maintain equality between provinces with respect to municipal services. Although the special laws on Istanbul and Ankara Municipalities were repealed by this law, it brought distinction between Istanbul, Ankara and the other cities with respect to the appointment of mayors. In Istanbul, the office of governor was united with the municipality and thus, the governor of Istanbul was also the mayor of Istanbul. The mayor of Ankara was being appointed by the minister of interior. In the other districts, mayors were elected by the members of municipal councils among the members or outside the council for four years (Erençin, 2007). Nevertheless, the election of mayors was finalized by the approval of provincial governors, minister of interior and president because mayors were seen as political figures who must be kept subordinate to the central government due to the concern on the unity and integrity of the country. Thus, it is possible to claim that the tradition of strong central government was inherited from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey.

The Municipality Law was not able to avoid the dominance of central government over municipalities because of the centralist tradition. Since the local governments were viewed as a threat to political and administrative unity and integrity of the country, they were not allowed to develop independent policies and thus, the central government was authorized to intervene in local services (Çiçek, 2014). Moreover, the single-party regime resulted in the integration of party with state; that is, the governors and district governors were the party leaders and mayors of their provinces and districts (Kılınç, 2010). There were also mayors and elected members of municipal councils who were removed from their offices by the central government (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010). As can be seen, the tutelage power of party and central government on municipalities might result in mayors who are insensitive to the participation and demands of people in city administration.

The Law no. 1580, on the other hand, is crucial because the right to elect and be elected have been bestowed to women for the first time. Regardless of their genders, all citizens over the age of 18 have right to vote and those over the age of 25 have right to stand for election.

To sum up, in the single-party period, the state was interlocked with party politics and the central government was holding the power to make decisions on mayors and municipal organizations. The administrative and financial autonomy of local governments could not be realized due to the concerns about national unity and integrity. As a result, both representation and participation of public in local governments could not be realized. Rather, local governments served as auxiliary and supportive departments of the central government.

3.2.2. The Transition Period to Multi-Party System

In 1946, the Democrat Party (DP) was established by those who were the members of RPP, but discontent with the policies of RPP. The DP was mainly in favor of liberal economy, democracy and decentralization while opposing the statist policies. In other words, the DP was promising to minimize the state, democratize the administration, decentralize the public service provision, ensure the participation, and empower the municipalities (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010).

In 1950s, the liberalization of economy increased the use of machinery in agriculture which limited the employment opportunities in rural areas and reduced the wages of agricultural workers. On the other hand, the industrialization was accelerated in the cities because the DP attached itself to growing Turkish bourgeoisie from which it enjoyed important support (Tekeli, 1983). Thus, the interests of big capital were being protected at the central level while the interests of local notables and small entrepreneurs were being protected at the local level (Şengül, 2001). The acceleration of industrialization in urban areas created employment opportunities in cities. As a result, the migration from rural areas to urban areas increased rapidly and cities faced with the problem of overpopulation.

This rapid increase in population caused to squatting problem in urban areas. The problem of squatter's houses, which are houses illegally built in the periphery of the urban areas by those migrating from rural areas, brought unplanned urbanization since squatting exceeded the boundaries of municipalities (Yörükoğlu, 2009). This directly affected local governments in the urban areas because this massive and sudden migration with unplanned urbanization revealed the problems of housing, infrastructure, public service and administration in cities (Göymen, 1999).

The central government was claiming that the local governments are responsible for the solution of urban problems; nevertheless, the local governments did not have legal and financial power to overcome these problems although they were one of the public authorities to deal with these problems (Kazancı, 1983). There was no significant change with respect to the legal framework of the local governments until 1960; however, the municipal revenues were increased in comparison with the former period (Elma, 2007).

There were some limited attempts to reform local governments in this period. First, Turkish Municipality Association has been established so as to make municipalities democratic and autonomous and build a unity between municipalities (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). Then, the office of governor has been separated from the municipality in both Ankara in 1948 and Istanbul in 1954. However, the central government's authority on the appointment of mayors elected by the municipal council was preserved; that is, centralist tradition of public administration in Turkey continued to exist. As opposed to the survival of centralization, local governments strived to serve through the individual qualities of mayors (Kazancı, 1983).

The transition to multi-party system has been a vital step so that the public could participate in both central and local governments and supervise them. Nevertheless, there were hardly changes in the former laws regarding municipalities in 1950s. The centralist legal framework of the single-party period regarding municipalities was in effect. Therefore, local democracy and autonomy of local governments could not be realized. Local governments were viewed as a social relation in which both central and local interests were represented (Şengül, 2001). The municipal councils became

the representatives of local merchants and craftsmen at the local level while mayors became the representatives of central government.

3.2.3. The Period Between 1960 and 1980

A group of military officers seized the control of government through a coup d'état on May 27th, 1960. The 1924 Constitution and the Turkish Grand National Assembly were abolished, and political activities were suspended. Several politicians of the DP were unseated and arrested, including the president, prime minister, ministers and members of parliament. On the other hand, the reflection of coup d'état at the local level was the removal of mayors from their duty in provinces and districts. Instead, governors and district governors became responsible for the municipalities in provinces and districts for two years (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010).

Following the coup d'état, a new constitution was adopted in 1961. In the Article 112 of 1961 Constitution, it was stated that the organization and functions of the administration were based on both on the principles of centralization and decentralization. In the Article 116, the local governments were viewed as public corporate entities created to meet the common local needs of provinces, municipal districts, villages, whose policy-making organs are elected by the people. Thus, the legal status of local governments was guaranteed (Elma, 2007) and the provisions ensuring that mayors come to office according to the principles of democracy were included in the Constitution (Tekeli, 1978).

The Article 116 admitted that local governments are able to constitute unions. That is, the Constitution promoted the cooperation between municipalities although it did not include any provision for the establishment of metropolitan administrative units. Moreover, it is specified that sources of income for local governments must be proportional to the functions laid to their authority.

Another development regarding local governments was an amendment to the Municipality Law in 1963. According to this amendment, mayors were no longer going to be elected by the members of municipal councils, but they were to be elected directly by the public. In addition, the governors and district governors were

no longer going to approve the members of municipal councils once they had been elected so that they could begin performing their duty. Instead, the provincial boards of election were to approve elected members of municipal councils and they began to perform their duty. The approval of mayors by the governors and minister of interior has been also abolished (Taşdan & Gül, 2013). Lastly, the courts have been authorized to supervise the acquisition or loss of status of an elected organ in the local governments (Ersoy, 1992). The election of mayor by the public instead of the members of municipal council has strengthened the position of mayor against the municipal council and the mayor has become more accountable to the public (Erençin, 2007). This shift in administrative infrastructure has opened a path for strong leadership of mayors in local governments.

In 1960, the State Planning Organization was established as a technical institution which was preparing five-year development plans so that the planned development could be sustained. The administrative structure is one of the issues dealt with by the development plans. The four development plans prepared between 1960 and 1980¹ revealed the problems of local governments and suggested solutions to these problems. According to these development plans, the main problem of local governments was the lack of financial resources. They suggested that equity capital of municipalities must be enhanced, financial resources must be used in line with the predetermined targets and principles, autonomy of municipalities from the central government must be ensured and public must be encouraged to participate in the city administration (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). It is possible to claim that development plans intended to equip municipal executives with further financial resources for the realization of targets, principles and autonomy. It means that mayors as the head of municipal executive could control more resources, hold further financial power and become stronger.

In the post-1960 era, a protected economic regime emerged and Import Substitution Industrialization was adopted in Turkey. The period of planned development also

¹ The other regulation on local governments in this period was the establishment of the Ministry of Local Government in January 1978. The ministry was aiming to overcome administrative and financial problems of local governments and make them effective and operational. However, conflicts between the Ministry of Local Government and other ministries with respect to their jurisdictions, incompetency of the ministry and clashes between local governments and the ministry caused to the abolishment of the ministry in November 1979 (Taşdan & Gül, 2013).

started in 1960s. Planning defined the form of state intervention (Önder, 2003) and further centralized the decision-making structure. According to Bayırbağ (2013), these economic and political developments resulted in two different forms of exclusion. First one was the exclusion of emerging smaller-scale industrialists located in non-metropolitan cities from the rents created by the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy. This form of exclusion brought a counter-hegemonic mobilization under the Islamic-oriented National Order Party in 1970 and its successor, National Salvation Party in 1972 since these parties put the reactions and these industrialists on their agendas (see Table 1). The parties were blaming the big capital for cooperating with the ‘Capitalist West, while regarding Anatolian capital as the real actors of national development (Barkey, 1990).

On the other hand, second one was the prioritization of industrialization over urbanization which means that the needs of in-migrants from rural areas who concentrated in the metropolitan cities of Turkey were ignored as public resources were spent (Şengül, 2001) (see Table 1). This social change after 1960s brought new debates on local governments. In 1970s, the migration towards urban areas has intensified because cities were providing better access to economic and social opportunities. Hence, squatter’s houses have increased in the metropolitan cities and this has changed the appearance of cities. The RPP presented a local program suggesting solutions to the problems of squatters and came to power in metropolitan cities by obtaining the votes of squatters (Uyar, 2004). This brought a conflict between mayors who were elected by the urban poor living in the squatter areas and municipal councils and local branches of political parties, including the RPP, which were largely composed of small entrepreneurs and artisans benefiting from urban rents (Şengül, 2001; Bayırbağ, 2013). However, the resistance of municipal councils and political parties to mayors could not avoid mayors developing policies which are in favor of the urban poor and against these entrepreneurs.

The Justice Party was holding the power at the center. As a result of this distinction, financial amelioration of local governments and removal of central government’s dominance over local governments became the issues discussed frequently (Elma, 2007). The mayors were no longer satisfied with their representative role and they were demanding the adoption of decentralization in ruling cities. Thus, “the

movement of social democratic municipality” was initiated and this movement was aiming to transform municipalities into democratic, participative and productive institutions (Göymen, 1999). Especially the municipalities of metropolitan cities adopted the urban managerialism approach; that is, they attempted to create their own resources and the projects regarding mass housing, health, education, public transportation and basic consumption goods were brought forward by the social democratic municipalities (Şengül, 2001). Besides, some of the mayors initiated the formation of municipality unions acting like organized interest group so as to end the intervention of party headquarters in municipal administration (Erençin, 2007).

To conclude, in this period, there were attempts to form the legal framework of local governments, to reduce the dominance of central government over local governments, to unveil the problems of local governments and to make local governments effective and operational as well. In addition, social changes brought new debates on the characteristics of municipalities. However, the central government held the power of administrative tutelage and sometimes used it as political and financial tutelage (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010). On the other side, the political power of mayors was strengthened against the municipal council and the accountability of mayors to the public was enhanced as a result of the direct election of mayors by the public. Besides, mayors fought with the central government and party leadership through the adoption of urban managerialism approach and initiatives for the establishment of municipality unions. These changes have paved the way for the transformation to strong-mayor model.

3.2.4. The Period Between 1980 and 1990

The military seized the control of government on September 12th, 1980 on the excuse that anarchy has raised all over the country. The effects of this military coup were similar to those of the former one with respect to both central and local government. That is, the national assembly was abolished, politicians were unseated and arrested, political parties are banned, mayors were removed from their duties and all local councils were also abolished (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010). According to Bayırbağ (2013), on the other hand, the coup was staged so as to overcome the systemic crisis and

implement the economic reforms known as the ‘measures of 24 January’ which envisage a liberalized, open-market economy.

The National Security Council, consisting commanders-in-chief of armed forces, began to use both legislative and executive powers. The council has made some regulations regarding local governments. The Council Decision No. 34 abolished the public corporate personalities of small-scaled municipalities located in the periphery of large cities. These small-scaled municipalities are attached to the municipalities of large cities as a department (Kılınç, 2010). In 1981, the Law No. 2464 on Municipal Revenues has been enacted and the revenues of municipalities have been increased. This law was aiming at solving the major urban problems and depoliticizing local governments rather than providing autonomy for local governments (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010).

Turkey has been adopted a new constitution² in 1982. There is a novelty regarding larger urban centers in the 1982 Constitution. Introduction of special administrative arrangements for larger urban centers has been made possible in the constitution. On the basis of this regulation, metropolitan municipalities were established in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir by the Statutory Decree no. 195 in 1984 when the Motherland Party (MP) was in power³. The Law No. 3030 on the Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities has been enacted on June 27th, 1984 in order to clarify the status and duties of metropolitan municipalities and their sub-provincial municipalities (Kılınç, 2010).

With the model brought by this law, the administrative logic of metropolitan municipalities has changed and their financial resources have been enhanced due to the change in ideological atmosphere. The rationale behind these developments was

² The 1982 Constitution has designed a centralist structure so as to protect, strengthen and enhance the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation (Karaaslan, 2007). According to the constitution, the administration of provinces is based on the principle of devolution of powers; however, the central government has been given the power of administrative tutelage over the local governments. Moreover, the constitution states that until the court announce its final judgment, the Minister of Internal Affairs may remove from office those organs of local administration or their members against whom an investigation or prosecution has been initiated on grounds of offences related to their duties. This is a statement extending the tutelage power of central government.

³ Between 1986 and 1988, Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Konya and Kayseri; in 1993, Antalya, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Erzurum, Mersin, İzmit and Samsun and in 2000, Adapazari have become metropolitan municipalities.

to make some structural changes, such as transition from interventionist social welfare state to regulatory neoliberal state, privatization, and decentralization (see Table 1). Therefore, the transition from the traditional public administration approach to the NPM Approach has begun in Turkey in 1980s (Emini, 2009). In relation to this, the MP preferred decentralization in administration by claiming that decentralization advances democracy and realizes the effective provision of urban services (Göymen, 1999). However, it is not likely to claim that this enhancement of resources and powers contributed to the democratization of local politics (Bayraktar, 2007). In this way, the squatter areas and the smaller municipalities located at the outskirts of the metropolitan cities and seen as the source of anarchy could be controlled and supervised by the metropolitan municipalities (Bayırbağ, 2013). Thus, it is possible to claim that decentralization reforms were implemented to consolidate the capacity of the central government in policy-making (see Table 1). The local governments resembled a lot to the presidential system at the national scale with a very strong mayor at the center of municipal system in Turkey after 1980. Particularly with the status of metropolitan municipality, mayors obtained considerable financial and administrative power and the metropolitan mayors have gained strength against the metropolitan councils (Doğan, 2007).

The reflections of this transition on local governments can be traced in the Law No. 3030. Urban areas and urbanization were located at the center of the new accumulation strategy, which initiated the urbanization of capital (Şengül, 2001) (see Table 1). Hence, the metropolitan municipalities have been authorized to plan their cities, receive internal and external loans, establish municipal incorporations, contract out the municipal services and collect taxes. In this way, the MP was aiming to increase the financial capacity of metropolitan municipalities in service delivery. However, the corruption emerged in this period since the mechanisms of supervision and inspection were not put into effect adequately (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010). Therefore, financial control over the municipalities became tighter, especially for those whose mayors were affiliated with a party different from the one(s) controlling the central government (Bayırbağ, 2013). Hence, increase in the financial capacity of metropolitan municipalities did not result in enhanced financial autonomy.

In this period, the common ground of five-year development plans was decentralization and adoption of private sector principles. In the fifth development plan (1985-1989), effective cooperation and coordination between the institutions related to local governments are emphasized. The municipalities are viewed as the main institution in local service delivery and thus, it is stated that central government will devolve some of its municipal activities to municipalities. The municipalities are encouraged to establish unions so that local problems can be solved in a cheaper and efficient way. It is aimed that municipal corporations will operate on the basis of profitability and efficiency and also, non-profitable municipal services are going to be contracted-out to private sector (State Planning Organization, 1984).

Another development for local governments in Turkey was the signing of the European Charter of Local Self-Government by the government in 1988. In the Charter, local authorities are viewed as the main foundations of any democratic regime. It is defended that the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs can be most directly exercised at the local level. Furthermore, the existence of local authorities with real responsibilities is thought to provide an administration which is both effective and close to the citizen. The Charter also states that the safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government contributes to the construction of a Europe based on the principles of democracy and the decentralization of power. Furthermore, it is claimed that the construction of such a Europe is possible through the existence of local authorities endowed with democratically constituted decision-making bodies and possessing a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their responsibilities (European Charter of Local Self-Government, 1985). As can be seen, the Charter attributes important responsibilities to Turkey regarding the redefinition of local governments (Emini, 2009). Nevertheless, Turkey has reservations on some important articles concerning local autonomy and thus, the Charter was not able to become effective in Turkey (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014).

In summary, the local government system of Turkey has been radically changed in 1980s. A hierarchical two-tier metropolitan municipality model has been adopted. Metropolitan municipality became the first tier while district municipalities became the second. This model had two main targets. First one was to control the urban poor

living at the outskirts of the metropolitan cities. Second one was to practice the new accumulation strategy which is based on urban areas and urbanization. Therefore, mayors must be strong entrepreneurs and managers of this socioeconomic transformation who have enhanced administrative and financial capacity. However, enhanced administrative and financial capacity of municipalities did not amount to autonomous local governments. It is because the coup destroyed the political opponents of the MP, the mayoral candidates of the MP won the local elections of 1984 and mayors remained under the tight control of the Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was the leader of the MP, due to the leader orientation of political parties in Turkey (Bayırbağ, 2013). That is to say, policy coordination between the central and local government was established through the political party and thus, the administrative logic of the term was decentralization serving centralization in policy-making.

Table 1: Continuity and change in the local governments of Turkey since 1960s

	1960-1980	1980s	1990s	2000s
Administrative Logic	Centralization	Decentralization to serve centralization	Increased policy capacities of municipalities, no explicit demand for decentralization	Centralization of policy-making, decentralization of policy-implementing
Dominant Ideology	Keynesianism	Neoliberalism	Political Islam	A compromise between Political Islam and Neoliberalism
Political Atmosphere	Counter-hegemonic	Hegemonic	Counter-Hegemonic	Hegemonic
Economic Model	Redistribution	Capital accumulation	Redistribution	Capital accumulation (+redistribution subordinated)
Social Profile/ Urbanization	In-migration from rural areas (The poor masses living in the squatter areas of metropolitan cities)	In-migration from rural areas	Urban social policy implementations to attract the urban poor and working class	Transformation of urban social policy into a national program

Source: Bayırbağ, M. K. (2013). Continuity and Change in Public Policy: Redistribution, Exclusion and State Rescaling in Turkey. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 37(4), 1123-1146.

3.2.5. The Period Between 1990 and 2000

In 1989, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) succeeded in the local elections due to the corruptions that emerged in the MP period and social democratic promises with the effect of rising labor movement between 1988 and 1992 (Doğan, 2005). However, the local governments ruled by the SDPP also took part in corrupt practices (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010).

In 1994, the National Outlook Movement organized under the umbrella of the Welfare Party (WP) has come into power through local elections. The WP was criticizing the disadvantaged position of Anatolian industrial bourgeoisie and its discourse of 'Just Order' was attracting the urban poor and the working class (see Table 1). The municipalities controlled by the WP employed the mechanisms of social policy based on an Islamic understanding of charity in order to fulfill this discursive move (Bayırbağ, 2013). The social aids scaled up due to the strengthening of financial structure in especially metropolitan cities (Elma, 2007). Besides, the WP built a very strong grassroots organization working as an informal arm of the local governments and establishing networks with Islamic business (Öniş, 1997). In this way, municipalities became the key actors in social policy which control broader financial resources. However, this period cannot be dissociated from the MP period because managerial approach towards municipalities was maintained through privatization of local services, reduction in the costs of personnel, increase in external loans, development of major urban projects, attraction of capital into local areas and promotion of local capital as a social actor (Doğan, 2005).

The concepts of decentralization, effectiveness, autonomy and professionalization regarding local governments were also guarded in the development plans prepared by the central government in the 1990s while interaction and participation were first debuted⁴. In 1990s, there were also a research project and a draft law regarding local

⁴ In the sixth development plan (1990-1994), decentralization of service delivery are viewed fundamental for effectiveness and rational use of resources. It is stated that duties, jurisdictions and responsibilities of local governments are going to be increased in proportion to their incomes. It is also aimed that local governments and citizens communicate in the processes of decision-making, implementation and supervision (State Planning Organization, 1989). Seventh development plan (1996-2000) commits that local governments are to be provided regular and consistent sources of income and thus, their dependence to central government is going to diminish. It is going to be

governments⁵. Nevertheless, the consensus on local government reform could not be built especially after 1990s since Turkey was ruled by the coalition governments in this period and the coalition parties were reluctant to carry out the reform. The programs of coalition governments and development plans included local government reform; however, it could not be implemented (Arikboğa, 2007).

The central government formed by the WP had to resign because of the military memorandum on February 28th, 1997. Then, the Party was abolished by the Constitutional Court because its activities were regarded as a threat to the secular characteristic of the state. Instead, the Virtue Party (VP) is formed by the members of the National Outlook Movement. Two opposing groups emerged in the VP resulting from the process of self-criticism after abolishment of the party. The first group was the traditionalists who are in favor of equality discourse and distant from globalization and the West. The second group was the reformists who adopted a pro-European Union, pro-globalization discourse and rethought the party's take on neoliberal values and secularism question while still retaining the emphasis on solidarity (Bayırbağ, 2013). The reformists have broken away from the VP and established the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 2001. The AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in 1994, won the national elections in 2002. Erdoğan became the prime minister in 2003 and he has been elected as the President of the Republic of Turkey by the public in 2014. This

ensured that those who are benefitting from the local services are going to pay the price. Local governments are going to be authorized to collect taxes and fees. Professional managers are going to be employed in the executive organ of municipalities. Administrative and financial autonomy is going to be provided to local governments. The public will participate in the decision-making and implementation processes of local governments (State Planning Organization, 1995).

⁵ In 1991, the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East (TODAIE) conducted the Public Administration Research (KAYA) in cooperation with the State Planning Organization (DPT). The aim was to make contributions to the reform and reorganization of the public administration in Turkey. The Research was suggesting the improvement of cooperation and coordination in public administration, advancement of local governments in terms of financial structure and personnel and enhancement of their performance (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). On the other hand, a draft law on local governments was brought to the parliament in 1998. According to the draft law, local governments must operate more effectively, use resources more efficiently, be closer to citizens and provide services. The targets of the draft law were the provision of local services in accordance with the principle of decentralization, financial autonomy of local governments, improvement of their decision-making and implementation capacity, privatization of local services, transparency, participation and subsidiarity (Ökmen, 2003). In other words, this draft law was an attempt to put NPM approach into practice (Emini, 2009).

case is significant because it shows that local governments function as a school of politics in Turkey (Koçak & Ekşi, 2010).

In sum, the adoption of NPM in local governments has been maintained since 1980s although parties in power was changed. However, there are minor distinctions between the implementation of NPM by different parties. The municipalities ruled by WP employed the mechanisms of social policy to attract urban poor and working class while privatizing local services and adopting market principles. This instrumentalization of social policy was not a result of decentralization of policy-making powers down to municipalities, but rather a locally pursued pragmatic legitimacy-building effort to draw support for this counter-hegemonic movement by opening up a room to maneuver in service delivery (see Table 1). This local effort considerably increased the influence of mayors, as in the case of Erdoğan who was first mayor of İstanbul, then prime minister as the leader of his own party (Bayırbağ, 2013) and later president.

3.2.6. From 2000 to the Present

The birth of the JDP was a compromise between political Islam and the neoliberal state, taming the radical edge of the National Outlook Movement and channeling the discontent of the masses into active support for its neoliberal program (Tuğal, 2002). The JDP was expected to complete the neoliberalization of the economy and the state apparatus on the one hand and to serve social justice on the other (Atasoy, 2009). Actually, the JDP's success could be attributed its ability to establish cross-class alliance by a moral Islamic discourse of solidarity addressing the poor urban masses and the emerging Islamic bourgeoisie (Öniş, 1997). This alliance was formed through social policies meeting the minimum biological and social requirements of the urban poor, and making them dependent on these policies of the JDP (Yıldırım, 2009). These charity activities were formulated into a national policy agenda, but the practices of these activities emerged at the local scale (Bayırbağ, 2013). As can be seen, policy-making powers were centralized while policy implementation was decentralized (see Table 1). The decentralization of policy implementation and enhanced financial capacity of mayors could result in relative autonomy of mayors as

elected political figures. Therefore, the JDP stipulated loyalty as a condition for mayoral candidates in the local elections of 2009.

In the beginning of 2000s, Turkey has experienced a reformation process in public administration. This process started with a report published by the prime ministry in 2003. The report was recommending a change in administrative understanding, mentality and attitude. This change was supposed to include goal-oriented administration, governance, individual and society centric structure, multilateral participation, strategic management, result orientation, effectiveness, transparency, performance, supervision by multiple actors, decentralization, flexible and horizontal organization (Dinçer & Yılmaz, 2003). In the light of the report, the Law on the Basic Principles and Reorganization of the Public Administration has been prepared by the government on December 29th, 2003. It is enacted by the parliament; however, it did not take effect since the president vetoed it by asserting that the constitutional principle of unitary state is violated (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2004). The draft law was expanding the field of responsibility of local governments, including provisions which protects the autonomy of local governments against central government, adopting strategic management and performance measurement, establishing human resources department in the public sector, regulating the tenure of top officials according to the tenure of politicians and paving the way for the delivery of public services by the private sector and civil society. Hence, the NPM approach has been established in the administrative system of Turkey because the draft law has set ground for the following legislative efforts on public administration (Arikboğa, 2007).

The JDP has attached a great importance to the reorganization of public administration, restriction of centralization, efficient use of resources and improvement of democracy (Elma, 2007). Hence, the JDP government has been introducing certain legal regulations on local governments since 2004 despite the fact that the Law on the Basic Principles and Reorganization of the Public Administration did not take effect (Urhan, 2008). To illustrate, the Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities was passed in 2004, Law No. 5393 on Municipality in 2005, Law No. 5747 on Establishing Districts within Boundaries of Metropolitan Municipalities and Amending Various Laws and Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Thirteen

Metropolitan Municipalities in Thirteen Provinces and Twenty-six Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-laws in 2012.

3.2.6.1. The Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities

The Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities was enacted in 2004. It aims to establish the legal status of metropolitan municipality administration and ensure that services are provided in a planned, programmed, effective, efficient and consistent manner. The metropolitan municipality is defined as a public entity having administrative and financial autonomy which comprises at least three districts or first-tier municipalities, coordinates the functioning of such municipalities, discharges its statutory duties, responsibilities and exercises statutory powers and whose decision-making body is elected by voters (Law No. 5216, 2004).

In order to establish a metropolitan municipality, certain criteria regarding population and space are determined in the Article 4 (Law No. 5216, 2004): “Where the total population of the settlements located within the boundaries of a provincial municipality and of those located no farther than 10,000 meters away from those boundaries exceeds 750,000 according to the latest population census, that provincial municipality may, depending also on its spatial settlement pattern and level of economic development, be transformed by a law into a metropolitan municipality.” Besides, the metropolitan municipality boundaries for the provinces of Istanbul and Kocaeli become the administrative boundaries of the province due to the high population density (Kılınç, 2010). As regards other metropolitan municipalities, taking the existing provincial governor’s office building as the center and remaining within the administrative boundaries of the province, the metropolitan municipality boundary is a circle with a radius of 20 kilometers for cities with a population of up to one million, a radius of 30 kilometers for cities with a population of between one and two million and a radius of 50 kilometers for cities with a population of more than two million (Law No. 5216, 2004). That is to say, the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities were expanded and administrative integrity of urban areas was aimed to be realized by the Law no. 5216 (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). As a result, financial, administrative and technical capacity of these municipalities was

improved. The mayor became the sole directly elected person at the expanded metropolitan level, and accordingly s/he is equipped with the improved financial, administrative, and technical capacity of metropolitan municipalities.

On the other hand, according to the Article 14, the metropolitan mayor may refer resolutions of the metropolitan council which he considers unlawful back to the metropolitan council for review, stating his reasons for doing so, within seven days. S/he may also refer resolutions of the district and first-tier municipal councils which he considers unlawful back to the relevant council for review (Law No. 5216, 2004). The resolutions of the metropolitan council and district municipal councils are transmitted to the highest civil administrator of the locality within seven days of finalization so that they enter into force (Çağdaş, 2011). Therefore, it is possible to claim that the authority of metropolitan mayor in terms of referring resolutions back to council for review brings the tutelage of mayors on the council resolutions.

The metropolitan council verifies the resolutions of district and first-tier municipal councils on land development planning and control with respect to its compliance with the master plan within three months of receiving such resolutions, adopt them unchanged or with amendments and refer them to the metropolitan mayor. The mechanisms of referring back and upholding are not adopted in resolutions on land development and control (Erençin, 2005). Article 11 states that metropolitan municipalities are authorized to supervise the land development planning and control activities of district and first-tier municipalities. If the municipality concerned fails to remedy deficiencies and violations identified within three months, the metropolitan municipality is empowered to remedy them. Article 25 indicates that the metropolitan, district and first-tier municipality budgets are submitted to the metropolitan council and adopted either unchanged or with amendments (Law No. 5216, 2004). Thus, the Law no. 5216 has transferred the final authority on land development planning, control and budget to the metropolitan mayors and metropolitan councils whose resolutions might be made under the tutelage of mayors.

In conclusion, the Law No. 5216 attempts to prevent the troubles stemming from task and authority sharing between metropolitan, district and first-tier municipality and to

ensure that services are provided in a planned, programmed, effective, efficient and consistent manner. Therefore, expansion in the tasks and authority of metropolitan municipalities is preferred. As a result of this, district and first-tier municipalities are excluded from the mechanisms of cooperation, task and authority sharing and participation. Rather, these mechanisms are withdrawn in favor of metropolitan administrators, which means centralization in a higher level of locality (Erençin, 2005). In addition, the authority of metropolitan mayor in terms of referring resolutions back to council for review brings the tutelage of mayors on the council resolutions instead of administrative tutelage power (Erençin, 2007).

3.2.6.2. The Law No. 5393 on Municipality

Another reform in municipal administration was made by the Law No. 5393 on Municipality in 2005. The law defines municipality as a public entity having administrative and financial autonomy which is established to meet common local needs of inhabitants of a town and whose decision-making body is elected by voters. Moreover, it defends the provision of municipal services to the public at the nearest possible locations and by the most appropriate methods (Law No. 5393, 2005).

There are regulations in terms of participation in the municipal administration. Firstly, it is stated in the Article 41 that the strategic plan is prepared in consultation with universities if any, professional organizations and civil society organizations concerned with the subject, and enter into force after adoption by the municipal council (Law No. 5393, 2005). With the new legal regulations, the authority to prepare, implement and supervise the strategic plan in a participative way is given to the mayors (Erençin, 2007). Hence, the administrative and financial capacity of mayors has also been increased because the authority to draw up strategic plans formulating the municipality's institutional strategies, goals, budget and performance criteria for municipal activities and staff was granted to them.

Secondly, in order to ensure civil participation in service delivery, the establishment of citizens' assembly is intended in the Article 76 (Canpolat, 2010). The citizens' assembly aims to realize the development of city vision and citizenship awareness; protection of the city's rights, laws and regulations; sustainable development;

environmental awareness; social solidarity and mutual assistance; transparency; accountability; participation and local self-government. It comprises of public professional organizations, trade unions, notaries public, universities if any, the civil society organizations concerned, political parties, public entities and neighborhood masters, and other parties concerned (Law No. 5393, 2005). However, according to Dolu (2014), the attitudes of local managers towards citizens' assemblies are distant from viewing them as a process of democratic participation. He also claims that as a result of these attitudes, mayors might become or struggle to be the chairs of assemblies. Besides, the assemblies in which deputy mayors, municipality bureaucrats or relatives of mayors become the chairs of citizens' assemblies or members of their executive committees reflect these attitudes (Dolu, 2014).

According to the Law no. 5393, the municipal council resolutions cannot be annulled or adopted with amendments by the highest civil administrators. Her/his approval on loan contracts of municipalities is abolished. That is, her/his tutelage power is restricted to apply to the administrative courts against municipal council resolutions as they consider unlawful (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). The tutelage power of the highest civil administrator on the decision-making organ of municipalities is limited in accordance with the principle of autonomy, but conserved to a certain extent.

The Ministry of Interior also monitors the municipality's administrative acts in terms of legal compliance and integrity of administration (Law No. 5393, 2005). Article 47 of the Law no. 5393 indicates that municipal organs or members thereof in respect of which or whom an investigation or prosecution is initiated on account of an offence connected with their duties may be suspended from office by the Minister of Interior pending the final judgment. As can be seen, central government is given administrative tutelage power to be instructive, directive, constructive and consultative for local governments. Nonetheless, according to Eryılmaz (2010), it is used by the central government as a sanction and an instrument of discipline against local governments. Therefore, it is not easy to mention the autonomy of local governments from the central government within the legal framework. On the basis of Articles 47 and 55, the Minister of Interior could create financial and administrative barriers for mayors, especially those who are the members of

opposition parties and even suspend them from office. As can be seen, if the supervision of central government was not attached to objective and legal terms, its administrative tutelage power on local governments could turn into political tutelage power and the Ministry of Interior could act arbitrarily against the mayors.

The municipal councils deliberate on and adopt strategic plans and performance criteria for municipal activities and staff. They are authorized to create, abolish and alter job positions in the municipality and its affiliated entities in accordance with the standard job positions. Besides, by a resolution of a municipal council, municipalities may contract out some services to third parties, such as the maintenance of and repairs to parks and gardens, vehicle rentals, engineering supervision, sanitation, security and food services, maintenance of and repairs to machinery and equipment, computer systems and electronic services, health care support services, festival and exhibition services, infrastructure, asphalt road construction and repairs, public transport services, and tasks relating to the operation of social facilities. Also, municipalities are authorized to generate a supply of planned landlots; build, sell and rent housing and mass housing; cooperate in this area with other public entities and banks; and carry out joint projects with them. The sale of housing and commercial units is not subject to the provisions of the Law on State Procurement. Lastly, municipalities may, by a resolution of the municipal council, carry out urban regeneration and development projects in order to create housing areas, industrial areas, business areas, public service areas, recreation areas and all sorts of social facility areas, rebuild and restore worn-out parts of the city, preserve the historical and cultural heritage of the city or take measures against earthquake. (Law No. 5393, 2005).

The law reflects the indeterminacy problem regarding local government autonomy *vis-à-vis* the central government. On the one hand, the approval of provincial governor and the Ministry of Interior on some resolutions of the municipal council sustains, such as neighborhoods, the name of a town, domestic loans, membership of international organizations, joint activities or projects with international organizations and foreign local governments, and establishment of town twinning (Law No. 5393 , 2005). Moreover, it is possible that the Ministry of Interior might exploit its administrative tutelage power on local governments and use it as a

political tutelage. As a result of this, the Ministry could act arbitrarily against the mayors, especially those who are the members of opposition parties. On the other hand, the law claims that municipalities have administrative autonomy. There are important steps taken in the light of NPM Approach which intend to provide autonomy for local governments. For example, there are regulations so as to improve the personnel capacity of municipalities, pave the way for contracting-out, enable the production of land and housing, overcome the limitations of State Procurement Law and facilitate urban regeneration. The law also adopts a participative and open understanding in municipal administration; that is, it includes regulations which may be described as a transition to governance (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). It is because the participation of universities, professional organizations and civil society organizations are emphasized so as to implement the principles of sustainable development, social solidarity, transparency, accountability, and local self-government. However, the authority of mayors regarding strategic plan both strengthens the position of mayors in the municipalities and enables them to establish and control the local networks in the processes of preparing and implementing the plan (Erençin, 2007). In conclusion, this indeterminacy problem of the Law no. 5393 causes that mayors are stuck in between the supervision of central government and autonomy from it. This provokes the fight between mayors and central government.

3.2.6.3. The Law No. 5747 on Establishing Districts within Boundaries of Metropolitan Municipalities and Amending Various Laws

In the Law No. 5393 on Municipality, the population condition of establishing a municipality was raised from 2000 to 5000. This amendment was made so that the government defended that the existence of minor municipalities causes the municipalities with insufficient income and unqualified public servant, not perform the service responsibility as it should be done (Zengin, 2013). Therefore, the Law No. 5747 adopted in 2008 also aims to overcome one of the most substantial problem of local government system in Turkey which is the redundancy of minor municipalities (Canpolat, 2010).

The Law No. 5747 has three main features (Öner & Şen, 2008): Firstly, legal personalities of municipalities whose populations are fewer than 2000 were lost and these municipalities were transformed into a village. Secondly, legal personalities of the first-tier municipalities of metropolitan municipalities were lost and these municipalities were attached to metropolitan district municipalities as neighborhoods. Thirdly, new districts are established in the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities.

On the other hand, the limitation of ten days on civil administrators regarding application to the administrative courts against such resolutions as s/he considers unlawful was removed by the Law No. 5747. The authority of metropolitan mayors in terms of referring the resolutions of district and first-tier municipalities, except those on budget and land development planning, back for review was abolished. Moreover, the authority of metropolitan mayor with respect to taking the resolutions finalized by the upholding of the municipal council to the administrative courts within ten days was abolished. The following provision was also inserted in the Article 14: “Resolutions not deliberated in the metropolitan council within three months shall be considered adopted.” Lastly, transmission of resolutions of the metropolitan council and district municipal councils to the highest civil administrator of the locality within seven days of finalization became a must. Otherwise, resolutions did not enter into force (Law No. 5747, 2008).

By the Law No. 5747, minor municipalities were united and new districts were established, minor first-tier municipalities were united with existing or newer districts, and major first-tier municipalities were transformed into district municipalities (Arikboğa, 2009). That is, the first-tier municipalities were *de facto* removed and thus, the system of metropolitan municipalities became simpler because there was district municipality at the lower level and metropolitan municipality at the higher level of the system (Arikboğa, 2013). In this way, it was assumed that the metropolitan municipalities composed of bigger district municipalities deliver services effectively, efficiently and cooperatively, and thus, the waste of resources is prevented (Çınar, Çiner, & Zengin, 2009). In this hierarchical metropolitan municipality model, metropolitan municipalities became the superiors of bigger district municipalities. Thus, their financial and administrative capacities were

broadened due to the expansion of municipal areas. The metropolitan mayors became responsible for broader and lesser municipal areas. As a result of this, they became stronger and capable of controlling broader financial resources and urban areas since they are the only directly elected official within the metropolitan municipal areas. On the other side, the authority of metropolitan municipalities regarding the resolutions of metropolitan and district municipalities was diminished. The tutelage power of civil administrators on metropolitan and district municipalities was also sustained.

3.2.6.4. The Law No. 6360 on the Establishment of Thirteen Metropolitan Municipalities in Thirteen Provinces and Twenty-six Districts and Amending Certain Laws and Decree-laws

The Law No. 6360 has been enacted on December 6th, 2012 and become valid after the local elections held on March 30th, 2014. The motives of this law were to realize integrity in land development plans and master plans, provide effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery, avoid waste of resources by abolishing the local government units whose administrative capacity are inadequate and prevent the conflict in duties (Zengin, 2014).

In order to put these motives into practice, new metropolitan municipalities has been established, borders of the metropolitan municipalities has been overlapped with provincial borders, special provincial administrations in the districts of metropolitan municipalities have been removed, town municipalities and villages in these areas have been transformed into neighborhoods, the Directorate of Investment Monitoring and Coordination has been constituted in the metropolitan cities, and metropolitan municipalities' share of tax revenue has been rearranged (Arikboğa, 2013). As can be seen, there are important changes regarding the administrative and financial system of metropolitan areas. In addition, the law affects the sociocultural and political structure since the overlap of metropolitan municipality border with provincial border resulted with the abolishment of rural administrations and change in the political geography. Lastly, the law makes modifications with respect to service delivery and land development because the overlap in borders caused enlargement of areas to deliver services and make land development plans (İzci & Turan, 2013).

There are some views which are in favor of the new metropolitan system. Parlak (2013) suggests that the law is in parallel with the contemporary tendencies in regard to the issue of optimum scale since decrease in the numbers of administrative levels and units, and attainment of optimum administrative scale are administrative reforms requested in recent years. This new scale adjustment is expected to increase the capacity of service delivery, to decrease the service costs per unit, to achieve the effective use of resources, to enable making of land development plans containing the whole provincial border. Moreover, the new scale adjustment is also thought to make the implementation of large-scale projects possible, to eliminate the lack of coordination, to provide rapid and effective service delivery, and to realize fair distribution of resources in provincial-wide (Bingöl, Yazıcı, & Büyükakın, 2013).

On the other hand, there are significant criticisms directed to this law. Firstly, Zengin (2014) criticizes that there is no scientific preliminary examination, feasibility study or comparative analysis containing various countries in the preparation phase of the law. In addition, according to Gözler (2013), the abolishment of special provincial administrations and villages is viewed unconstitutional because they are public corporate bodies having constitutional and legal foundations and thus, they could not be abolished unless the constitution is amended. He also defends that the constitution allows special administrative arrangements for larger urban centers, not for larger provinces. Nevertheless, the law allows the establishment of metropolitan municipality within a larger provincial boundary which includes several distant settlements.

It is argued that the law constitutes a problem for local autonomy, local democracy and representation since town municipalities and villages have been abolished without the consent of local people (Zengin, 2014). This is also contrary to Article 5 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government on which Turkey do not have reservation. The article states that changes in local authority boundaries is not made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted by statute. Moreover, the decision-making organs of inhabitants living in minor localities have been abolished as a result of the abolishment of minor local authorities. The metropolitan council has become more crowded because all district councils within the boundaries of metropolitan

municipality sent representatives to the metropolitan council (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). That is, the decision-making capacity of metropolitan council declines and the metropolitan mayor gets stronger against the council. Furthermore, the rural inhabitants living distant from urban centers have become able to have a word on the formation of urban decision-making organs.

With the law, the metropolitan mayor has become a powerful leader representing entire province because the election of metropolitan mayor starts to be held throughout the entire province. In parallel with this, Çukurçayır (2012) finds out that the metropolitan mayors propose the abolishment of district municipalities and they desire to be the sole actor in metropolitan cities. Hence, he asserts that the concepts of subsidiarity, decentralization and local democracy is going to be ruled out once the authority of metropolitan mayors is extended to the provincial borders. This might contribute to overcome the obstacles brought by the opposition, attain an effective administration and fix problems rapidly; however, its contribution to the local democracy is questionable (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013).

Another criticism concerning the law is its contradiction with the principle of subsidiarity, which means the exercise of public responsibilities by the closest authorities to the citizen (European Charter of Local Self-Government, 1985). Special provincial administrations have been removed and instead, metropolitan municipalities have been made the primary authority in service delivery to the rural settlements (Arikboğa, 2013). As a result of this, the public must contact with the metropolitan municipality so as to express the local concerns, demands, different interests and problems in service delivery. Likewise, the metropolitan municipality faces with various demands from the entire province and thus, has difficulty in satisfying these demands. Arikboğa (2013) thinks that even though the district municipality is aware of the demands and has alternative solutions to satisfy these demands, it does not have the authority to meet these demands when the public appeals. The only action that the district municipality could take is to transfer the demands to the metropolitan municipality and pursue whether the demands are satisfied or not. He also suggests that the solutions proposed by the metropolitan municipality are not capable of covering the various demands from localities because

the metropolitan municipality, as a central authority in the province, is usually prone to generate standardized and uniform solutions.

The contradiction with the principle of subsidiarity is expected to result in ineffectiveness and waste of resources. It is because the distance between authorities delivering services and citizens to whom services are delivered is increased. Therefore, costs of services might increase; quality of services might fall; delivery of services might fail; services might not be delivered on time; and citizen satisfaction might not be fulfilled (Zengin, 2014). Besides, the overlap of metropolitan municipality border with provincial border means that the rural-urban distinction is lost (Zengin, 2013). Metropolitan council makes decisions on the needs of neighborhoods which were the former villages remote from the city center (Genç, 2014). The metropolitan municipality, which is experienced only on the urban services, is expected to deliver services to the rural areas although it does not have knowledge on rural life and needs (Atmaca, 2013).

The most remarkable characteristic of the Law No. 6360 is the centralist decentralization at the level of metropolitan municipality (Arikboğa, 2013). The administrative decentralization has resulted in political centralization since 1980s and the Law no. 6360 in 2012 is the last stage of this centralization at the provincial level. As a result of this, metropolitan municipality mayors gradually become authoritarian figures and political parties in power becomes able to shape their policies regarding local governments and urban areas from the top (Bayırbağ, 2013). The Law turns the metropolitan mayors into strong leaders at the provincial level who are responsible from the whole province and capable of representing the province and its people in administrative and political issues (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). In this process, the effectiveness in service delivery is viewed as democracy and thus, this model was supported by the masses in local elections.

This law has given metropolitan municipalities the responsibility to prepare and approve urban development plans within the provincial boundaries; however, some ministries and central government agencies were given the authority to act and prepare/implement plans regardless of the plans of local governments. According to Şahin (Şahin, 2013), this authority conflict could create a representation gap which is

filled by ‘city bosses’ being mayors at the local level and ‘boss of cities’ being prime minister at the central level. Hence, mayors could manage cities more than one term due to this conflictual and ambiguous network which depends on favoritism and their power to control vital urban resources, personal charisma and leadership skills. To sum up, although the law aims to establish an optimum scale concerning metropolitan municipality borders, the issue of optimum scale creates concerns on legal basis of the law, decentralization, local autonomy and democracy, authority of mayors, principle of subsidiarity, transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency.

3.3. Conclusion

In Turkey, the history of local governments is shaped by the dominance of central government on the local governments which was rooted in the pre-republican period. Local governments were introduced as a public organization delivering public services on behalf of the central government, rather than representing local people and ensuring the participation of them in the administration. After the foundation of the Republic, the concerns on the national unity and integrity prevented the autonomy of local governments from the central government. In the single-party period, municipalities continued to serve as departments of the central government for local service delivery. The centralist legal framework of the single-party period was maintained in the multi-party period. Thus, local governments became a mechanism in which the interests of the central government were represented. The other notable development in this period is the composition of municipal councils, which were dominated by local merchants and craftsmen. In the 1960s, the central government maintained its administrative tutelage power and sometimes imposed this power on municipalities and mayors. However, the direct election of mayors by the public increased the political power of mayors and the strong mayor model installed into the local government system in Turkey. In this period, the individual efforts of mayors through the urban managerialist approach and municipality unions provided them a room for maneuver against the central government and party leadership. In 1980s, the municipal system of Turkey experienced a radical change which was the establishment of metropolitan municipality in the greater cities. The aim was to control the political opponents in cities and practice the new

accumulation strategy based on urban areas. Although the administrative and financial capacity of municipalities was improved, their autonomy could not be accomplished since the motive of this change was decentralization serving central government in policy-making. In 1990s, the impacts of mayors increased through their individual pragmatic efforts benefiting from the new administrative environment opening them a room for manoeuvre, including social policies and privatizations. Furthermore, the administrative reforms conducted in 2000s expanded the authorities of metropolitan municipalities *vis-à-vis* district municipalities; equipped them with the instruments of the NPM perspective, made regulations in line with governance approach, abolished smaller districts and overlapped the adjacent of metropolitan municipalities with provincial borders. As can be seen, these reforms indicate centralization of administrative powers in the metropolitan level and centralization of political powers in the personality of mayors because they enable municipalities and mayors to establish and control broader local networks. Nevertheless, the central government maintained its administrative tutelage power over local governments which can be used as a political and financial tutelage power. Moreover, the authority to act, prepare and implement plans regardless of local governments were transferred to the central government. Hence, it is possible to claim that there is an indeterminacy problem regarding the autonomy of local governments from the central government in Turkey and this problem provokes an authority conflict between mayors and central government. In other words, there are top-down reforms aiming to consolidate the tutelage of central government on local governments while there are bottom-up efforts striving to provide local governments autonomy from the central government. This conflict enabled mayors to establish ambiguous networks and located them at the center of this network. The actors of these networks will be focused and discussed in detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

METROPOLITAN MAYORS IN THE MIDST OF THE TENSION BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

In this chapter, metropolitan mayors as a strong figures in local politics is going to be discussed in order to indicate that the reforms inspired by the NPM Approach embracing decentralization and managerialism result in further centralization. The administrative decentralization gearing up especially after 1980s is accompanied by the tendency of political centralization. This political centralization indicates the strengthening of metropolitan mayors in particular due to the increase in the authorities of metropolitan municipalities. On the other hand, the increase in the actors of policy-making and policy-implementing processes, such as private sector and civil society- causes a dispersed decision-making network which necessitates a strong network manager, being the mayor. Hence, mayors could expand their radius of action. The private sector and civil society became dependent on mayors so that they could preserve their place in decision-making process. This political popularity gave mayors the opportunity to act autonomously from their political parties and to gain influence in their parties. This political influence enables mayors to conduct municipal affairs with the central government quite easily and turns them into a bridge between central government and local actors/interest groups (Bayırbağ, 2016, forthcoming). As a result, it is not easy to claim that the reforms within the framework of the NPM advocating decentralization and governance defending pluralism in decision-making ended up with more democratic and transparent urban policy process.

Hence, the basic question of this chapter is “What are the political consequences of administrative reforms in the field of local government inspired by the NPM perspective with respect to the profile and practice of top decision-maker?” In order to answer this question, the chapter will concentrate on the relationship of

metropolitan mayor with the organization of metropolitan municipality, other local government agencies, local service recipients/electorates, interest groups, her/his political party and central government. Thus, the dominance of mayors and their relative autonomy from the actors taking part in local decision-making process are going to be analyzed in this chapter.

4.1. General Overview on Mayors and the Case of Turkey

There are numerous ways through which mayors take the office. When the practices of various countries are reviewed, it is observed that the mayors might take the office through appointment or election (Keleş, 2012). Mayors might be appointed by the central government, agents of central government in the locality or municipal councils. To illustrate, in Belgium, local council nominate a member of the council for the office of mayor and central government appoints the mayor if it approves. In Netherlands, the confidential commission within municipal council recommends two candidates among the members of the council to the provincial governor and the central government appoints one of the candidates as the mayor (Toprak, 2014). Lastly, in the United States of America, there are some cities in which local council appoints mayor from the outside of the council who is called city manager. The mayors who are appointed might have experience, know-how and managerial qualities which are required as a matter of course. However, they might be responsive to the demands of those who appoint them, not of the public, because of their concerns on office term.

Mayors might be directly elected or elected by the municipal councils among their members. For example, in Germany, the election of the mayors differs in that they are either directly elected or elected by the municipal council among its members. In the United Kingdom, mayors are also elected by the local councils; however, there is a tendency towards the direct election of mayors (Toprak, 2014). Moreover, in France and Spain, the mayors are elected by the local councils among their members. The rationale behind the direct election of the mayor is to strengthen local democracy and the political accountability of local government by giving the local citizens and electorate the right to directly determine the mayor as a key local political, and

administrative figure (Wollmann, 2004). However, the result is not necessarily a more democratic and accountable local governments.

In Turkey, mayors are directly elected by the public since 1963. Then, a hierarchical two-tier metropolitan municipality model, in which metropolitan municipality is the first tier while district municipality is the second, was established in the greater cities in 1984. The metropolitan municipality comprises of three fundamental organs which are metropolitan municipal council, metropolitan executive committee and metropolitan mayor.

The institutional power of the office of directly elected mayor stems from its three characteristics. First, s/he is dominant in the municipal organization as the head of executive. Second, s/he is influential in the agenda and meetings of municipal council as the chair of the council which is the decision-making organ of the municipality. Third, the democratic legitimacy of her/his office is strong since s/he is directly elected. Therefore, providing for local political and executive leadership, particularly by combining the chair of the local council with the CEO function and based on direct democratic legitimacy, the directly elected executive mayoral form resembles a 'local presidential system' (Wollmann, 2008). In Turkish, the word 'mayor' means '*belediye başkanı*' which could be translated into English as 'the president of municipality'. An effective leadership and solutions to local problems are expected from the mayors since they are the executive organs of municipalities who are directly elected (Kamalak, Kiriş, & Gül, 2013).

On the other hand, the issue of decentralization is crucial for this study. It is because the leftist demand for strengthening local governments and administrative decentralization expressed by political and social pressure of grassroots in 1970s was covered after 1980 by a rightist (neoliberal) economic program which is realized through an authoritarian and strong mayor-centered way (Bayırbağ, 2016, forthcoming). As mentioned before, the administrative decentralization, which accelerated after 1980, was accompanied by political centralization and this transformed mayors, especially metropolitan mayors, into authoritarian figures.

In the second half of twentieth century, the debates on decentralization focused on the localization of administration, effective participation of citizens in local decision-

making process and provision of democratic participation and supervision with respect to the delivery local public services and use of local public resources (Edis-Şahin, 2009). However, the content of these debates changed after 1970s. As mentioned before, the involvement and contribution of private sector in the delivery of local services was encouraged (Aksoy, 1995). Besides, the civil society is and voluntary organizations are also promoted so that they can deliver local services (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). In such a structure, the mayor's role is going to be crucial since s/he is the chair of the council in which policies on local services are decided, the head of executive through which these policies are implemented. Now, s/he is in control of more resources and private sector and civil society are in reach of her/his influence. The debate about introducing the principles and tools of NPM into local government in line with decentralization principle added managerialist dimension and demands to the profile of the directly elected mayor (Wollmann, 2004), thereby further strengthened this figure.

In this new scheme of local governance, local people, public agencies (at supra-national, national, regional and local scale), private sector and civil society take part in local politics as legitimate stakeholders (Bayırbağ, 2016, forthcoming). The field of local politics revolving around local governments expanded while local governments move more to the center of local politics. All these actors taking part in local politics might have different interests and expectations. These interests and expectations might contradict with each other. That is, local politics has become a fragmented and complicated network composed of vertical and horizontal relationship patterns of interest groups and stakeholders. At this stage, the mayor must demonstrate a capacity in building and wielding frames that give meaning to a situation or a problem, suggest solutions or lines of action, and establish links with actors' identities and interests (Borraz & John, 2004). As mentioned before, s/he is expected to become a transformational leader who considers the interests of actors, ensures the awareness and acceptance of them on the problems and guides them to overcome these problems (Bass, 1991). Hence, the directly elected mayor has been highlighted as an institutional remedy for restoring and ensuring the governability of local government and manageability of local network.

In the light of the debates on decentralization, the metropolitan municipalities have been established in the large cities of Turkey with the Law no. 3030 in 1984. This reform has increased the financial resources of the municipal administrations in large cities and expanded the scope of their activities. Therefore, the establishment of the metropolitan municipalities significantly enhanced the political status and power of the metropolitan mayors, as a great deal of authority and resources were concentrated in their office (Kalaycıoğlu, 1989). In other words, the relative administrative and financial decentralization generated a political, administrative and financial centralization in the personality of metropolitan mayor. For this reason, it is significant to discuss the metropolitan mayor's relationship with the other actors introduced above which take part in local politics, as these constitute the pillars of the network s/he is managing now.

4.2. The Relationship Between the Metropolitan Mayor and the Organization of Metropolitan Municipality

The urbanization of Turkey has gained momentum in 1950s due to the socio-economic and technological developments (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014), as elaborated earlier in the chapter on the evolution of local governments in Turkey. In 1980s, the process of urbanization differentiated and urban sprawl, multicenter urbanization and low-density urban form have sprung. Numerous local government agencies have been established due to the expansion of urban areas. Therefore, urban areas confronted problems about the coordination, efficiency and scale of service delivery. The distribution of urban space, opportunities and services must be performed in a rational way so as to satisfy changing, increasing and diversifying local and urban demands and needs. Nevertheless, this distribution mechanism was highly selective in favor of business interests and against working class. The squatter areas and the smaller municipalities located at the outskirts of the metropolitan cities were seen as a source of anarchy (Bayırbağ, 2013) since working class having potential to resist this distribution mechanism lives there. They were to be controlled by a greater municipality which is capable to supervise the smaller ones. As a result of these neoliberal settings, a distinct administrative model is required for the large

cities of Turkey. Hence, the metropolitan municipalities have been established by the government ruled by the Motherland Party with the Law no. 3030 in 1984.

In Turkey, as mentioned recently, the administration of metropolitan municipality is composed of three main bodies which are metropolitan council, metropolitan executive committee and metropolitan mayor. The members of metropolitan council are not elected directly, but indirectly: Metropolitan district mayors and one-fifth of the members of district municipal council form metropolitan council. On the other hand, metropolitan executive committee consists of the appointed top-level bureaucrats of municipality and the members of metropolitan council who are elected by the council. Lastly, the metropolitan mayor is elected by the popular vote through the first-past-the-post system in which election is won by the candidate receiving more votes than others.

Metropolitan mayor is the sole directly elected body of metropolitan municipality within the metropolitan municipal adjacent area since 1984. By the Law no. 5216 in 2004, borders of metropolitan municipality were expanded with respect to the population residing in this area. Lastly, in 2012, the borders of metropolitan municipality were overlapped with the provincial borders by the Law no. 6360 which has made the metropolitan mayor the only directly elected body of metropolitan municipality within the provincial borders while further expanding her/his area of influence. The election of metropolitan mayor by the popular vote, not by the metropolitan council, has enabled her/him to take action oriented to the vast majority of public by going beyond the influence of the council (Tekeli, 1978). Thus, metropolitan mayor who is more accountable to public has become stronger than the council (Erençin, 2007).

At the same time, metropolitan mayor is the chair of metropolitan municipal council. The agenda of metropolitan council is determined by the mayor. The members of metropolitan council could propose topics for the agenda with the absolute majority votes of whom attended the council meeting. According to Akbulut (2007), metropolitan mayor being the chair of metropolitan municipal council might create a problem with respect to the relationships and power balance between the bodies of metropolitan municipality. He suggests that this might be the result of seeking

stability and manageability in municipal administration. The balancing powers of metropolitan municipal council against the metropolitan mayor are to be addressed in the following paragraphs.

One of the regulations which increases the significance of metropolitan mayor *vis-a-vis* metropolitan council is related with the finalization of the council resolutions. According to the Article 14 of the Law no. 5216, the mayor may refer resolutions of the metropolitan council which he considers unlawful back to the council for review, stating his reasons for doing so, within seven days. The resolutions which are referred back for review but upheld by the simple majority of the full membership of the council become final. According to Erençin (2007), this means that the council resolutions are subjected to the metropolitan mayor's "delaying" veto and the mechanism of "delaying" veto also means the tutelage power of metropolitan mayor on the metropolitan council resolutions. In addition, the metropolitan mayor might take the resolutions finalized by the upholding of the metropolitan council to the administrative courts within ten days. The condition of ten days was removed by the Law no. 5747 in 2008. For Akbulut (2007), this is an indirect way of veto. The metropolitan mayor as a member and the chair of metropolitan council is one of the constituents forming the will of resolution although s/he might oppose the resolution. However, her/his ability of referring the resolutions back to the council for review, which stems from her/his role as the head of executive, might cause a contradiction between democracy and administrative law.

Another issue shaping the relationship between metropolitan mayor and metropolitan council is the council's power on supervising and unseating the mayor. Unseating mayor is made difficult since it is attached to a majority of three quarters of the full membership of the council who considers that the explanations given in the activity report submitted to the council by the mayor are unsatisfactory and/or approve motion of censure against her/him (Law no. 5393, 2008). Unseating the mayor by the will of the council members might be difficult because the majority condition is hard to be reached in case of a fragmented council (Akbulut, 2007).

Strategic plan and performance criteria, which are proposed by the NPM perspective due to its economic-managerial rationality, are other subjects influential on the

relationship between metropolitan mayor and metropolitan council. Article 41 of the Law no. 5393 charges metropolitan mayor to draw up the strategic plan and performance program which serve as the basis for budget and set ground for the predictions and policy choice of municipal administration regarding service delivery area. According to the same article, the strategic plan is prepared in consultation with universities, professional organizations and civil society organizations concerned with the subject. Thus, the preparation of strategic plan by the metropolitan mayor in a participative way paves the way for forming and controlling the local networks required in the process of preparing and implementing the plan (Erençin, 2007). This invigorates the central position of metropolitan mayor in the metropolitan municipal administration.

On the other hand, local politics is effective regarding the central role of the metropolitan mayor. The researches on the local elections in Turkey indicate that metropolitan mayor and majority in the metropolitan council are elected from the same political party (Akbulut, 2004). When the metropolitan mayor, as the head of executive, and the majority of metropolitan council, as the decision-making body, belong to the same political party they might form a solidarity (Arikboğa, 2008). In this case, the members of council and the mayor belonging to the same political work together so as to turn their issues into council resolutions (Arikboğa, 2010). In other words, metropolitan mayor aims to fulfill her/his ideas and projects by acting together with those members of council. In parallel with this, the negotiations are made between the mayor and those members of council in the process of decision-making. If majority in the metropolitan council and metropolitan mayor are the members of different parties, then the mayor might become incapable of performing her/his duties and responsibilities (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). S/he might also have to form a coalition with the opposition groups in the council once s/he comes into conflict with the members of council belonging the same political party with her/him (Ünal, 2012). As can be seen, the local election system forces that metropolitan mayor and majority of metropolitan council are the members of same political party. Thus, intra-party and extra-party networks become significant for metropolitan mayor so that s/he could realize her/his ideas and projects with the approval of metropolitan council. As mentioned before, the mayor is expected to be

entrepreneur and innovator so that s/he could suggest creative solutions to local issues, build coalitions, and gain leverage.

One of the municipal organizations that empower metropolitan mayor against the metropolitan council is the metropolitan executive committee. The duties assigned to metropolitan council are performed by metropolitan executive committee when the council does not hold a meeting (Azaklı & Özgür, 2002). Hence, the executive committee might make significant decisions on the delivery of local services (Keleş, 2012). According to the Article 35 of the Law no. 5393, the matters which are not referred to metropolitan executive committee by metropolitan mayor might not be discussed on the committee. Members of the executive committee might propose agenda items subject to the approval by the mayor. Moreover, metropolitan executive committee, to be chaired by the mayor, comprise five members elected by the metropolitan council among its own members and five members appointed each year by the mayor among the heads of municipal units (Law no. 5216, 2004). It means that half of the members of metropolitan executive committee is appointed by the mayor. It is a slight possibility that the appointed members of metropolitan executive committee contradict with the mayor (Azaklı & Özgür, 2002). If some of the elected members belong to the same political party with the mayor, then the mayor might become more influential. That is, the mayor effectively serves as the powerful CEO of metropolitan municipality.

Another aspect of municipal organization increasing the influence of metropolitan mayor is the general secretariat of metropolitan municipality. The secretary general is appointed by the Minister of the Interior on a proposal from the metropolitan mayor (Law no. 5216, 2004). S/he is responsible for the conduct of services under the directives of metropolitan mayor and s/he is accountable to the mayor, not metropolitan council (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013).

Other municipal organizations presided by the metropolitan mayor are infrastructure coordination center and transport coordination center. Infrastructure coordination center was established to coordinate the management of infrastructure services in the metropolitan area while transport coordination center is established to coordinate all land, maritime, waterway, lake and rail transport services in the metropolitan area

(Law no. 5216, 2004). Decisions taken by the coordination centers are binding both metropolitan and district municipalities. Both coordination centers include representatives of public entities and private organizations which are concerned with the issue. At this stage, metropolitan mayor's network with public entities and private organizations might become crucial so that the infrastructure and transport services can be delivered.

In conclusion, legal regulations and mayor-oriented local politics highlight the metropolitan mayor as a visible political figure whose political significance stems from her/his control over metropolitan executive committee as well as her/his relationship with the municipal council. The increase in her/his executive roles makes her/him politically stronger. The compliments and critiques toward municipal administration from both inside and outside of the metropolitan council become concrete in the personality of mayor. Thus, the supervision of metropolitan council on metropolitan mayor is restricted by some legal/institutional obstacles due to the concern on instability in municipal administration and distrust toward the council (Arikboğa, 2010). Metropolitan mayor comes into prominence regarding decision-making and implementation through metropolitan executive committee and secretary general. In this model, metropolitan council is deactivated considerably by legal regulations and practices. In this way, the mayor might have the chance to get rid of the opposition's obstacles, attain an effective management and solve problems (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). On the other hand, the duties and authorities of the mayor including preparing strategic plan, managing the municipality in line with this plan and designing, implementing and monitoring performance criteria are the reflection of managerialist municipalism (Akbulut, 2007). The relationship between the mayor and municipal organization is an indicative of strong mayor-council form of local government in Turkey due to the combination of political and administrative leadership in the personality of mayors. To sum up, the relative decentralization shaped in the metropolitan municipalities equipped with administrative and financial power is centralized in the personality of metropolitan mayor due to her/his critical position between the decision-making and executive bodies.

4.3. The Relationship Between the Metropolitan Mayor and Other Local Authorities in the Same Area

The other local authorities operating in the metropolitan area are metropolitan district municipalities⁶. Special provincial administrations in metropolitan areas which deliver services to rural areas within provincial boundaries have been abolished in 2012. Provincial governors are going to be discussed in the further chapter on the relationship between metropolitan mayor and central government since provincial governor is the agent of central government in the locality.

There are some problems in metropolitan areas, such as lack of coordination, overlapping and/or failure, weak cooperation in service delivery because there are numerous local authorities (Gül, 2012). This problem was aggregated after the Law no. 6360. As mentioned before, with the Law no. 6360, the borders of metropolitan municipalities was overlapped with the provincial orders. Metropolitan municipalities became the primary authority in service delivery to the entire province. This might create an authority conflict regarding municipal adjacent between district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities. Both district and metropolitan municipalities might intend to deliver services or neither of them might deliver services. According to Zengin (2014), this might result in increasing costs of services, falling quality of services, failing service delivery and unsatisfied citizens. Also, Arikboğa (2013) asserts that district municipalities might become incapable of delivering services to its citizens and metropolitan municipalities might have difficulties in satisfying demands from the entire province.

As a result of these problems in metropolitan areas, new models of metropolitan administration have arisen so as to overcome these problems. According to Keleş (2012), there are two fundamental groups of models. The first one is temporary and small-scale model including service agreements between administrations, unions of service delivery and *ad-hoc* metropolitan organizations. To illustrate, Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration is an *ad-hoc* metropolitan organization which has

⁶ Before the Law no. 6360 was passed, there were also first-tier municipalities having the same duties and responsibilities as district municipalities and established in the metropolitan areas where there is no district. First-tier municipalities have been abolished *de facto* by the Law no. 5747 in 2008 and *de jure* by the Law no. 6360 in 2012.

independent budget and public entity. The second one is long-term model including integrations and local federations. The integration of small municipalities into larger municipalities in Turkey after the establishment of metropolitan municipalities with the Law no. 3030 is an example of the second model. In this way, metropolitan municipalities became the first tier while district municipalities became the second in this hierarchical two-tier model.

The main idea of metropolitan municipality model in Turkey is that the services which are not delivered at the level of district municipalities are going to be delivered at the level of metropolitan municipalities through establishing a federative structure and taking advantage of scale economies (Azaklı & Özgür, 2002). In this model, the metropolitan municipality is held responsible for the coordination of service delivery because of the concern on efficient and effective delivery of services while the district municipalities are ruled out although they are more local, smaller and participative element of the system (Turan & Duru, 2014). The indivisible functions which are related to the whole city are delegated to metropolitan municipality while the duties regarding local and daily life left to district municipalities. That is, the significant decisions and implementations were centralized at the metropolitan level while the duties and authorities of metropolitan district municipalities were restricted (Heper, 1987). As mentioned before, the executive body of local government is supposed to be an entrepreneur so as to satisfy local community and achieve effective and efficient administrative structure (Yalçındağ, 1997). The responsibility of ensuring the organizational efficiency and effectiveness is concentrated on the mayor. At this stage, mayor becomes a political entrepreneur who is in charge of metropolitan municipality displaying some characteristics of a private organization, such as organizational efficiency and effectiveness (Magnier, 2006). Hence, managerialism might be read as a specific mode of political entrepreneurship.

In this model, metropolitan municipalities might impose tutelage power on the services carried out by district municipalities. According to the Law no. 3030 in 1984, the resolutions of district municipality councils were directly sent to metropolitan mayors for review. After the Law no. 5216, the resolutions and implementations of district municipalities on land development and budget are also

subject to the supervision of metropolitan municipalities. Metropolitan municipalities were enabled to remedy the deficiencies and violations identified as a result of the supervision process of land development if the municipality concerned does not remedy them in three months. For Erençin (2005), this might be considered as a hierarchical supervision of metropolitan municipalities over district municipalities with their own directly elected mayors and councils so that problems about land planning could be solved by the absolute decisions of metropolitan municipalities. At this point, it is significant to highlight the political tutelage of metropolitan municipalities over district municipalities which are another autonomous political body.

The tutelage power of metropolitan municipalities was widened especially after 2005. It was because metropolitan municipalities were authorized to declare an urban transformation and development area within the boundaries of the metropolitan municipality and adjacent areas by the Article 73 of the Law no. 5393. District municipalities might implement urban transformation and development projects within their boundaries if it is approved by the metropolitan municipal council. In addition, the Laws no. 5226 and 5366 enabled municipalities to carry out transformation projects in historical and natural protection zones. The protection zone status has prevented big developers and investors from undertaking large-scale regeneration projects (Kuyucu T. , 2014). Thus, these laws allowed municipalities to commodify these areas. As mentioned before, the borders of metropolitan municipality have been overlapped with the provincial borders by the Law no. 6360 in 2012. This means that the power of land development planning is further centralized in metropolitan municipalities. Metropolitan municipalities were viewed as the focus of interest derivation due to their roles in distribution of urban rents (Tekeli, 1992) which serves to the neoliberal accumulation strategy initiating the urbanization of capital (Şengül, 2001). The control of metropolitan municipality and thus, its mayor on urban transformation, development area and land development planning might enhance their control on the urban rent, which means resources to be distributed to actors in the local network.

On the other hand, metropolitan mayors became the only elected political actors at the metropolitan level with the Law no. 6360. Thus, they might gain political power

and high-profile in public. Furthermore, their central role in decision-making, executive organs and local networks within the metropolitan boundaries might enable them to have control over district municipalities. At this stage, metropolitan mayors might have a tendency to generate relationships with district municipalities on the grounds of political affiliations. According to Akman and Acar (2014), the objectivity of resolutions made by the metropolitan municipality on district municipalities is doubtful when they are controlled by the same political party or different political parties.

Other issues designating the relationship between metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities might be the resources and scope of authority. Metropolitan municipalities have substantial financial resources since their incomes were added more pecuniary resources by the regulations concerning local governments, such as Laws no. 5779 and 6360 (Turan & Duru, 2014). The rise in the incomes of metropolitan municipalities is proportionately more than that of district municipalities. This might increase the financial dependence of district municipalities on metropolitan municipalities.

The ambiguities and loopholes in the laws might produce uncertainties and gaps regarding the jurisdictions of metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities. Ambiguous and imprecise wording in the articles of laws has given municipalities too much room for maneuver and arbitrariness in defining themselves which area can be subject to service delivery, such as authorization of district municipalities in “derelict, obsolescent and unsafe parts of the cities” with respect to urban transformation (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010). Due to this, some local services might be delegated to more than one local authorities, some might cause tension between metropolitan municipality and district municipality and some might not be undertaken by any municipality (Turan & Duru, 2014). This vagueness in legal documents might also enable implementers to enforce some elements of the existing regulatory frameworks while ignoring others (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013). According to the Article 27 of the Law no. 5216, metropolitan council is empowered to pass guiding and regulatory resolutions in the event of a dispute between the metropolitan and district municipalities concerning service provision. Hence, those who have power on the metropolitan municipal administration might intervene in the

jurisdiction of district municipalities if it is favorable with respect to their political or economic interests (Azaklı & Özgür, 2002).

Metropolitan mayors, on the other hand, might constitute a control mechanism over district mayors through the metropolitan municipal bureaucracy (Tekeli, 1992). Metropolitan mayors usually assigns secretaries general and deputy secretaries general since the mayor have many duties to perform and thus, district mayors mostly deal with the bureaucrats of metropolitan municipality with respect to affairs concerning their districts (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). The bureaucrats of metropolitan municipality might interfere in their affairs although district mayors perform their duties in consultation with the bureaucrats of district municipalities (Kalaycıoğlu, 1989). According to the Articles 8 and 9 of the Law no. 5216, the district mayors take part as members in the meetings of the coordination centers when issues of concern to their own municipalities are discussed. Consequently, districts are represented by one vote of their mayors in these meetings composed of numerous metropolitan municipal bureaucrats (Turan & Duru, 2014).

In sum, decentralization of management accompanied by central and hierarchical structures is supposed to bring centralization via decentralization. Metropolitan municipalities are transformed into a centralized and superior authority due to their coordination role and financial, political and administrative powers (Tekeli, 1992). As a result of this, district municipalities became unauthorized representatives of districts at the metropolitan level. In his study on the division of responsibility between İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality and district municipalities, Kalaycıoğlu (1989) states that district mayors view themselves as the offices of metropolitan municipality rather than elected mayors since significant resolutions on their districts are subject to the supervision and interference of metropolitan municipality and its bureaucrats. The relationship between metropolitan and district municipality became the relationship between metropolitan mayor and district due to the mayor's central role in metropolitan municipal organization (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). This role might enable the metropolitan mayors to control rents and resources in the districts through land development planning and urban transformation and redistribute them arbitrarily to local network by enjoying the ambiguities and loopholes in the laws.

4.4. The Relationship of Metropolitan Mayor with Service Recipients

Metropolitan municipalities were established in 1984 and their adjacent was expanded in 2004 with respect to the population residing in this area. In 2012, metropolitan municipal boundaries were further expanded to the provincial areas by the Law no. 6360. With this, metropolitan mayors started to be directly elected by all electorates of respective provinces. They became local leaders and representatives of those provinces since they are directly elected, responsible and authorized at the provincial level (Gül & Batman, 2014). Within this framework, metropolitan mayors have to maintain infrastructure, superstructure and services, prepare major projects, get the support of city-dwellers, inform them and convince them (Göymen, 1999).

Political parties and elections, which are the important elements of modern democracies, are both method and instrument of determining people's representatives (Kamalak, Kiriş, & Gül, 2013). Political parties are institutions transmitting the demands of people to political system, presenting alternative public policies with respect to the different interests and opinions, raising cadres to govern offices, competing in national and local elections in order to have the majority, providing operation of pluralist democratic system and forming a government if it succeeds (Erdoğan-Tosun & Tosun, 2007). On the other hand, election systems are the most basic method of reflecting public choice on the political system, determining public's representatives and realizing the participation which is the essential element of democracy (Çukurçayır, 2008).

The relationship between mayor and electorates begins with the local elections. In Turkey, the characteristics of local electoral system is influential on the results of the local elections (Kamalak, Kiriş, & Gül, 2013). Electorates vote separately for mayors, municipal councils and general provincial councils. The results of the mayoral elections and general provincial council elections might differ because the proportional representation system is practiced in the general provincial council elections while first-past-the-post system is implemented in the mayoral elections. In the proportional system, the electorates might remain loyal to their party preferences since they are aware of the fact that their views are to be expressed in this system. On the other hand, first-past-the-post system might restrict the representation of minority

views and thus, electorates might not vote for their first choice. The loyalty of electorates to their political parties might diminish. Hence, it is possible to claim that electorates vote according to their party preferences in the general provincial council elections while they consider the characteristics of candidates as much as their party affiliations in the mayoral elections.

In Turkey, the mayoral candidates usually announce their candidacy on the basis of a political party and thus, they are strictly attached to their parties with certain exceptions which are going to be discussed in the chapter on the relationship between mayor and her/his political party. They are elected by the popular vote through the first-past-the-post system. In this election system, electorates might develop a rational voting behavior and not vote for their first choice since the representation of minority is restricted (Çitçi, 2005). Electorates might determine their tendencies according to characteristics and promises of mayoral candidates, activities and performance of municipalities run by political parties, performance of party organizations in the electoral area, public opinions on the parties and their candidates, and competence of candidates in representing the area as well as they consider the political orientations of candidates (Çaha & Guida, 2011). The representation of locality and expression of local interests at the national level is realized through the mayor (Sharpe, 1966), in addition to the representatives of respective province in the national assembly. Hence, the direct election of mayors might attract the attention of electorates on local governments and electorates might place the profile of mayor forefront against her/his political party affiliation.

On the other side, those residing in the areas requiring more public resources might strategically vote for the candidate of ruling party so that more services are delivered to the locality (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). However, those finding the performance of ruling party insufficient might be discontent with the party due to local and national problems (Altan, 2005). This increases the significance of candidates nominated for the office of mayor by the political parties. As a result, city-dwellers might vote for the mayoral candidates of opposition parties by taking into consideration the personal qualities of these candidates.

City-dwellers view municipal organizations as a structure embodied in the personality of mayors. For example, the citizens having a demand from municipalities firstly try to talk to the mayors or make contact with mayors so as to speed up their process once they have applied to the relevant departments (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). Mayors as the local CEOs are considered as primarily responsible for the issues and problems confronted by the city-dwellers. The solutions brought to the problems and improvements in the daily lives of citizens increases the support to the mayor while the democracy in administration is neglected by the electorates (Erder & İnciođlu, 2013). İlseven (2014) calls this as “service-driven municipalism” which means an understanding of local politics based upon provision of certain infrastructure services and social support projects in exchange for political support. The mayors who are driven by ethical or material projects and in search of votes might be viewed as “political entrepreneurs” by Magnier (2006). Thus, decentralization increasingly turned metropolitan mayors into political entrepreneurs.

Social aids were included as a right in the fellow townsmen law (*hemşeri hukuku*) by the Article 13 of the Law no. 5393 on Municipalities. As can be seen, social aids were included by the JDP in the national policy agenda, but social aids were distributed at the local scale (Bayırbađ, 2013). Dissemination of social aids by the municipalities results in the support to the mayor by both conservative electorates and those migrating to cities lately (Erder & İnciođlu, 2013). On the other hand, ones who want to subsidize the poor view municipalities as intermediaries because traditional aid instruments fall short in the cities where population increases and anonymous relations intensify (Çakır, 2003). This creates new resources for the municipalities for social aids. As discussed in the previous chapters, Öniş (1997) described this cross-class alliance as the success of JDP which was constructed upon a moral Islamic discourse on solidarity addressing both poor urban masses and the emerging Islamic bourgeoisie. In this way, the urban poor became dependent on these social policies of the JDP practiced by the local governments and mayors at the local scale.

The political life of mayor depends on whether s/he is deemed successful by the public or not. If municipalities provide more services and infrastructure, distribute

urban rents in an equitable way, transfer these rents to public in order to contribute the delivery of service and infrastructure and establish a successful public relations mechanism to explain it to the public, then mayors might be regarded as successful (Tekeli, 1992). Moreover, the success of mayors is sometimes measured according to their ability to accomplish the targeted works through taking extralegal actions and personal risks. This stems from the basic idea of NPM, managerialist school of thought which is a set of administrative norms prescribing appropriate behavior for public managers (Berg, 2006). These norms include strategic decision-making, leadership by mission and entrepreneurship. The fundamental idea is to provide mayors more flexibility, let them manage and increase the performance of the municipality. Following this idea, the authoritarian attitudes of mayors in city management are supported since the outcome is prioritized.

Another way through which local service recipients and electorates might affect the agenda of municipalities is citizens' assemblies⁷ which could submit opinions to municipal councils regarding local issues. According to the Article 76 of Law no. 5393, the citizens' assembly comprise representatives of public professional organizations, trade unions, notaries public, universities if any, the civil society organizations concerned, political parties, public entities and neighborhood masters, and other parties concerned.⁸

However, mayors have a tendency to preside over citizens' assemblies or make them function as executive committee by placing their officials because the by-law does not impose any restrictions on the mayors (Toprak, 2014). Besides, opinions of citizens' assemblies do not have a binding force on municipal councils and the members of citizens' assemblies do not have the right to vote in the decision-making processes of municipalities (Kerman, Altan, Aktel, & Lamba, 2011). In addition, citizens' assemblies are financed by the municipality budgets, according to the by-

⁷ Citizens' assemblies were given four important functions by this law (Özcan & Yurttaş, 2010). First one is the protection of the city's rights by citizens so that the city becomes livable and the quality of city life increases. Second one is the enhancement of social solidarity and mutual assistance between citizens. Third one is to create awareness of citizenship for the realization of sustainable development. The last one is the achievement of transparency, accountability, participation and governance at the local level.

⁸ In the By-law on Citizens' Assembly, the concept of governance is defined as an understanding of administration based on multi-actor and social partnership in the framework of transparency, accountability, participation, compliance, subsidiarity and effectiveness.

law.⁹ As a result, the success of citizens' assemblies regarding local democracy and governance is contingent upon the attitudes and actions of municipal executives toward the assemblies (Görmez & Uçar-Altınışık, 2011).

To sum up, there is a mutual relationship between the metropolitan mayor and citizens which is built upon the elections, public services, social aids and citizens' assemblies. The delivery of public services and social supports in exchange of political support brings the dependence of electorates to the mayor. Moreover, authoritarian attitudes of mayors are tacitly supported or ignored for the sake of accomplishing municipal works which originates from the NPM prioritizing the outcomes. Therefore, electorates composed of urban poor and service recipients might be obliged to vote for the present mayor in the next elections. Citizens' assembly, on the other hand, could not be regarded autonomous from the mayor due to mayor's efforts to control it and its financial dependence to the municipality budget. As can be seen, the elements of the relationship between metropolitan mayor and electorates strengthen mayors and provide them radius of autonomous action.

4.5. The Relationship of Metropolitan Mayor with Interest Groups

The other actor having an impact on the mayor is interest groups. Kapani (2002) defines interest groups as organized groups which league together on common interests and aim to influence the political power or bureaucracy so as to fulfill these interests. In that regard, interest groups having relationship with the metropolitan municipality and its mayor so as to profit from urban rents are small entrepreneurs, big capital and civil society organizations (CSOs).

In the 1980s, neoliberalism and globalization which began to dominate the whole world extended their influence over Turkey adopting a socioeconomic order based on a free market economy (Zengin, 2013). In this process, obstacles to the movement of capital were abolished and state intervention was decreased. Thus, central government delegated some of its authorities to international institutions,

⁹ Göymen (2010) asserts that citizens' assemblies might be criticized because they might be transformed into the "backyard of municipal administration". However, he also claims that citizens' assemblies might give rise to discussions about defining democracy only as voting and contribute the idea of participation to become prevalent.

international and national capital, and civil society organizations (Yüksel, 2007). At the local scale, the obstacles to the movement of capital were to be overcome through the commodification of cities (Şengül, 2001). Hence, increasing emphasis on the market forces under neoliberal globalization created a new policy framework in which metropolitan cities turned to be the target of rent-seeking activities around urban land (Şahin, 2007). In this process, local governments, metropolitan municipalities in particular, came into prominence as the public institutions which holds the power of distributing urban rents which is inherent in local services regarding lands, construction, housing, trade and consumer goods. The duties of metropolitan municipalities were stated in the Laws no. 3030 and 5216 with some expressions, such as “draw up or cause to draw up”, “build or cause to build”, “establish or cause to establish”, “operate or cause to operate” and “install or cause to install”. These expressions enabled voluntary organizations and especially big capital to deliver local services (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). Local governments were transformed through the criticisms of inefficiency and local services were privatized (Akbulut, 2007). Local service delivery was delegated to local/national/international capital and CSOs which became a legitimate stakeholder in the public decision-making and implementing processes of localities.

Small entrepreneurs are composed of merchants and craftsmen. The primary target of small entrepreneurs is to control municipal organizations because the decisions enabling them to benefit from rents are made in the municipalities (Tekeli, 1992). When the members of municipal councils in Turkey are analyzed with respect to their vocations, it is observed that merchants and craftsmen were dominant in number between 1960 and 1990 (Üste, 2005). Since 2000s, ones from different fields of vocation are observed in the council, such as lawyer, doctor, architecture and those related with administrative and legal sciences. That is to say, the producers of services regulated and monitored by the municipalities are represented in a higher rate when it is compared to their ratio in population (Çitçi, 1989). The representation of consumers, on the other hand, remains limited. In addition, the high national threshold in the election system leads to the exclusion of political parties, which do not receive one tenth of the national votes, from local politics (Bayraktar U. , 2007). Thus, Bulut and Tanıyıcı (2008) notes that relationships of power and interest

become prevalent, the members of municipal councils drift apart from citizens, the councils becomes a decision-making organ distributing rents and they can easily make decisions in line with their interests since the structure of municipal councils is close to vocational representation and the members of the councils carry on their businesses. To illustrate, a considerable amount of building contractors present in municipal councils might demonstrate that one of the main impetuses in the local political competition is to do business with municipality in general, to win tenders in particular (Uysal & Topak, 2013). However, urban rents could not be distributed beyond the knowledge of mayor because the strong mayor is dominant over the municipal council and has tutelage power over council resolutions, which was elaborated before. The members of municipal council either act with the mayor or negotiate with her/him through informal channels of connection so as to derive benefit from the distribution of urban rents.

The relationship between the municipality and small entrepreneurs originates from the production of rents which is to consumers' disadvantage (Tekeli, 1977). These rents might be produced through the municipal councils in two ways. First, small entrepreneurs might prevent new entrepreneurs to step in their work field organized around associations. Second, they might adjust the prices of their products as they request and citizens become obliged to pay that price. The private transportation and bakery are some of the examples illustrating the production of rents. However, mayors, rather than municipal councils, are under the pressure of public scrutiny. It is because mayors are elected independently of the councils while municipal councils, as the decision-making organ, are elected collectively. Therefore, citizens identify mayors as responsible from the decisions related to their cities. Consequently, mayors, rather than municipal councils, take the political consequence of decisions made by the councils. Hence, they are sensitive to the reactions of citizens while municipal councils, in which small entrepreneurs are mostly the majority, might make decisions in accordance with their interests. This might cause a conflict between mayors and councils. Small entrepreneurs and council members might get in touch with the local party organization and cause pressure on mayors (Tekeli, 1992). It might also cause a tension between mayors and the party organizations. Nevertheless, mayors might be able to put up resistance against the pressures of

small entrepreneurs in municipal councils because they are relatively independent from the councils.

Another dimension of the relationship between mayors and small entrepreneurs might be charity activities which emerge as an assistance to the needy. Municipalities might purchase coal, food and stationary supplies from the small entrepreneurs close to the mayor and making production in various sectors so as to distribute them to the needy (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). In this way, mayors could maintain both solidarity with small entrepreneurs and support of the needy in elections.

In Turkey, the squatter settlements emerged in the early 1950s due to the migrations from rural to urban areas. Between 1960 and 1980, central governments approached these settlements as inexpensive alternatives to the provision of social housing for low-income groups (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013). Therefore, informal practices has been implemented in squatter settlements through bribery or clientelistic networks, such as non-exercise of legal controls, postponement of demolition and delivery of substantial services like water, electricity and transportation. In general, the clientelism concept or patron-client relation represents the dyadic relations between unequals based on reciprocal exchange (Şahin, 1999). In these relations, the patron grants favors of any type in return for goods, loyalty, political allegiance and other services from her/his dependent clients in a mutually reciprocal way. The reflection of these relations at local scale might take place in such a way that the power is dominated by the local political leaders. These political leaders might use the local resources and deliver the substantial services to constitute a group of followers, obtain vote for their party and increase their own political power. That is, the relationship between patrons and clients is based on the provision of instrumental and economic resources by patrons in exchange for the political solidarity and loyalty of clients. Hence, these relations are not expected to be legal, but informal, flexible and secret. As can be seen, there is an imbalance between these partners because a feeling of debt and dependence might appear for clients to patron which stems from the patron's control on the resources. On the contrary, the autonomy of client might enhance, the loyalty in the relation might decline, continuity of the relation might decrease and even last once the benefits are achieved (Güneş-Ayata,

1990). The expanded and multipartite metropolitan municipal structure, which strengthens the mayor, also strengthens the clientelism.

Ambiguous context of the laws regarding local governments ensured the implementation of these practices by the municipal officials. This vagueness in legal documents might enable implementers to ignore some elements of the existing regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, politicians with populist concerns could not take the chance to tear down houses with people in them (Keyder, 2000). In the mid-1980s, a populist strategy aims to integrate squatter settlements as regular settlements within the rest of the city. Nearly all kinds of squatters were legalized and the land on which squatter settlements were built was assigned to squatter residents (Şahin, 2007). The urban rent emerged out of the building rights and out of transformation of the land in urban areas to the building plots (Şahin, 1999). This turned all squatter residents into potential rent-seekers in collaboration with petty builders because squatter settlements obtained the potential to transform into apartments. Consequently, a clientelistic relationship with the mayor based on rent-seeking arises.

In 1990s, with the legalization of squatter settlements, they were no longer viewed inexpensive alternatives to social housing but marketable and income-generating city spaces through land development and reconstruction plans (Demirtaş-Milz, 2013). It is because the financial burden on metropolitan municipalities increased with respect to the financial dependence of district municipalities on metropolitan municipalities and of metropolitan municipalities on central government. Hence, efficient, profitable and fast implementation of transformation projects and land development plans became one of the most important priorities of municipalities. As a result, clientelistic relations became an urban phenomenon closely related with construction sector where the mayor shapes profit opportunities (Şahin, 2007).

In the second half of the 1990s, the interventions to everyday life in the urban political realm changed significantly. Perceivable transportation services, landscape investments, social works and distribution of food and coal were used as elements of propaganda while services that could not be perceived like planning and infrastructural investments are mostly ignored. Thus, mayors became even more

active and significant since they are viewed as the source of physical change which has impacts in manipulating and reshaping public opinion. With urban transformation programs and a large program of housing production in 2000s, squatter areas and the vacant lands around the cities started to be transformed into settlement areas by large capital holding firms and global real estate companies because the limitations of the planning legislation were removed. That is, urban land rent started to be directly collected by partnerships between politicians and global capital.

Metropolitan municipalities were viewed as the focus of interest derivation because of their roles in distribution of urban rents, employment opportunities and initiation of major tenders (Tekeli, 1992). It means that municipalities having excessive control over strategic urban resources became dominant in urban areas. Big capital carrying business on these fields might become the clients of municipalities so that they could collect urban rents. Big capital as an interest group might either support their mayoral candidates in elections or support the candidates protecting their benefits (Ünal, 2012). It might also struggle to influence the related political and administrative decisions directly or through creating public opinion. Within this scope, metropolitan municipalities and the mayors are expected to build patron-client relations based on mutual interest with the big capital involved in local markets, just as they did with landowners in squatter areas. Especially, construction sector was perceived as the initiator of economic development since it requires lots of ingredients from a variety of different industries (Şahin, 2007). Hence, construction sector and production of large amount of housing units in metropolitan areas were promoted and further urban rent was created. It might be expected that the scope of these relations, especially ones with the construction industry, expands with the Law no. 6360 which enlarged the authority of metropolitan municipalities on urban land planning to provincial boundaries. Thus, the metropolitan mayors became able to control the urban rent of the entire province.

A flexible public-private-civil network emerged stemmed from diversifying actors in local politics must be managed so that economic and administrative decisions required by the market conditions could be taken quickly and local resources could be mobilized (Edis-Şahin, 2009). In such a model oriented to work accomplishment

and equating bureaucracy with red-tape, informal relationships are preferred (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). The relationship between metropolitan mayors and big capital might remind clientelism due to its characteristics of being informal, face-to-face and based upon mutual interest. According to Şahin (1999), in most cases, what establishes and makes patron-client relations survive is the mutually exclusive trust for both sides. The client knows that he can trust his patron when s/he needs resources and the patron knows that his followers will help him in times of need. The situation of mutually exclusive trust reveals the informality in the relation between partners. In addition, this relation is highly flexible because the needs and resources of partners and the nature of relation might vary and change in time. In this informal and flexible situation, the patron and/or client might attain extra gains by exceeding the legal boundaries. Therefore, the existence of this relation and the resources exchanged needs to be kept secret by both the patron and client. In other words, the decision-making process of the mayor might remain secret and not be penetrated because of the informality of this relationship. If there is a decision-making processes remaining secret in a municipality, suspicions of corruption might emerge regarding the decisions made in this process (Tekeli, 1992).

The belief that some groups are bestowed privilege against city-dwellers might become widespread. Exclusion of the members of municipal councils elected from ruling or opposition party to participate in the urban decision-making process might make the process antidemocratic. In this regard, the relationship of metropolitan mayor with the groups directly related with the decisions made on the metropolitan planning and investment might become significant. It is because there might be ones who are suffered from these decisions or ones benefitted from them. They must be organized for the common purpose. The former group might be difficult to be convinced. Hence, the latter group might be encouraged by the mayor to share the benefits obtained from these decisions with the latter group in exchange for their future business with the municipality. According to Erder & İncioğlu (2013), it is observed that there is a model in analogy to corporatist decision-making process composed of informal actors directly related with macro-scale decisions, who are mostly the representatives of big investor companies. As a result, mayors became an intermediary between the conflicting interests in these dispersed decision-making

process having the tendency of informality. According to Bayırbağ (2016), this results in a stronger mayoral figure who is needed to be permanent in the office and act like professional top manager (CEO) so that these actors could maintain their presence and legitimacy in the decision-making process.

The other element which is influential on the decision-making process of municipalities is CSOs. The Law no. 5393 enacted in 2005 has made regulations such that the representatives of CSOs could participate in and submit opinions to the municipal decision-making processes. CSOs might affect the decision-making process in accordance with their interest while they mediate citizens to participate in the administration of municipalities. Yalçındağ (1996) suggests that consciousness of citizens with respect to urban issues has been raised in many cities owing to CSOs. Then, individuals started to question the decisions, preferences and implementations of municipalities, and they became influential by reacting them. The other dimension of the relationship between the municipalities and CSOs is about filling the gap emerged after the withdrawal of welfare state (Edis-Şahin, 2009). At this point, volunteers within the network of capital, municipalities and civil society might be mobilized by citizens' assemblies so that social aids could be distributed. It means that services delivered by the welfare state as a right were transformed to reliefs and charities of volunteers. The central government and social aid funds of municipalities might step in when voluntary organizations fail. The local participation expected to be realized through CSOs might be aiming to create capacity and resource by establishing cooperation and partnership network between public sector, private sector and civil society, rather than enable citizens to participate in decision-making. In most of the cities, some CSOs pursue their interests by taking position close the party in power and/or ruling the municipality of these cities (Uysal & Topak, 2013). As can be seen, two kinds of CSOs has been observed. First ones might seek for participation and transparency by directing citizens to monitor municipalities and resist the activities of them when necessary. Second ones, on the other hand, might build a patron-client relationship with the municipalities based on mutual interests. They might be able to collect and distribute urban rents while local politicians, and in particular mayors, might enjoy the political consequences of it.

To summarize, the participation of societal stakeholders into processes open to mutual interaction was supported while small entrepreneurs and big capital were favored in these processes through creating resources. Uysal and Topak (2013) assert that the promotion of small entrepreneurs and big capital might be related with financing politics. The opposition of poor, unemployed and marginal groups was prevented through the organization of social aids. In this way, labor power in urban areas was also reproduced. As a result of these practices, metropolitan municipalities are viewed as the institutions creating and redistributing urban resources, rather than democratic institutions delivering public services. The redistributive role of municipalities for the urban rents in space and among different groups causes municipal structures to become a major tool for the maintenance of patron-client relations (Şahin, 1999). In other words, the main concern of decentralization became the financing decentralized local services, rather than participation of citizens in the local decision-making mechanisms. Metropolitan municipalities are expected to create their own resources because of financial dependence of district municipalities on them and of them on central government. Hence, metropolitan municipalities must be managed like a business which has to create resource and enhance its resources (Edis-Şahin, 2009). The level of local participation is restricted to creating capacity and resource by establishing public-private-civil partnership. At this stage, metropolitan mayor, as an effective leader directly elected by the entire province and representative of entire province, became a public ego who must coordinately manage the complex networks involving bureaucrats, technocrats, politicians, representatives of private sector and citizens in urban area (Şahin, 2007).

4.6. The Relationship Between the Metropolitan Mayor and Her/His Political Party

In the local electoral system of Turkey, candidates for the office of mayor and the municipal council might be included in the list of a political party or stand as an independent candidate (Law no. 2972, 1984). The personal characteristics of candidates and local election system encouraging strategic voting might cause a candidate-oriented mayoral election. Kamalak, Kiriş and Gül (2013) claims that the method of mayoral election highlights the candidates and this increases the ability of

candidates to receive votes regardless of their political party. As a result of this, the preference of a political party on mayoral candidate might make the political tendency of this party ambiguous (Altan, 2005).

On the other side, it became more difficult for independent candidates to be elected, whereas inclusion of a candidate in the list of a political party became more attractive. It is because political parties place more emphasis on the local elections than they did before since the budgets of larger municipalities was increased and these municipalities were viewed as the instruments of distributing local service and social aids (Kamalak, Kiriş, & Gül, 2013). In parallel with this, the election of mayor is also attached importance by the political parties so that they become able to maintain the patron-client relations. Therefore, the central role of mayor in local politics and urban rent distribution might create a competitive landscape for political parties. In this regard, the professionalism and financial power ensured by political parties for candidates come to the forefront in local elections (Çınar, 2007). This means that the influence of political parties might precede the features of candidates in local elections.

The political career of mayor is dependent upon the evaluation made by the political party of which s/he is a member along with the evaluation made by the electorates. The mayor might have to be successful in the primary elections held in her/his party so as to advance her/his political career. According to Tekeli (1992), the mayor who is largely supported by the citizens might not be supported by her/his party organization in the primary elections. It is because those taking part in the party organization and citizens might have different motivations in and expectations from local politics. Party members who could not benefit from the rent distribution of municipality might build coalitions against the mayor and corrode her/his status in the party.

The elected mayor becomes the mayor of entire province or district and thus, s/he is expected to deliver services impartially. However, the provincial or district head of mayor's political party might wish to consolidate her/his power in the party organization (Tekeli, 1992). S/he might want to draw advantage from the possibilities of municipality, such as patron-client relations, rent distribution,

employment and tenders. This might reveal a person who divides the power of mayor and becomes the competitor against the mayor in the next term. Hence, the mayor run into a contradiction with the head of local party organization in order to oppose the division of his power.

On the other hand, the mayor viewed as successful might consolidate his power in local politics and be nominated as a candidate for membership of parliament. This might result in an opposition in local politics against the mayor which is introduced by the current members of parliament elected in the same electoral district so that they could guarantee their candidacy in the next general elections (Tekeli, 1992). However, if the mayor is evaluated as unsuccessful by the public, this might be cause that the mayor and members of parliament defeat in the following elections and head of local party organization lose both her/his office and expectations about her/his political career. Therefore, both head of local party organization and members of parliament might wish that the municipality succeed at a certain level. Besides, they might strive to prioritize their own contributions in the success of municipality in order to protect their seats. Uysal and Topak (2013) observed this polarization in a local party organization where a mayor, provincial party organization and some members of parliament took joint action against a district head of party, another member of parliament, and a member of municipal council.

If a municipality as a local government is ruled by a mayor whose party is in power at the central government, the relationship between the mayor and central party organization becomes crucial with respect to the transfer of resources from central to local government (Azaklı & Özgür, 2002). According to Görmez (1997), parties in power at the central government mostly defend that municipalities must be under the tutelage of central government. It is because some members of parliament might want to control municipalities due to their concerns on reelection and wish to receive more votes by holding the power of central government in service delivery. This creates a contradiction between the mayor and central party organization.

The relationship between mayor and central party organization might decline when the political party of mayor which is in power at the central government lost the public support (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). Thus, the mayor might tend

towards another political party which gained the public support and came to power at the central government. S/he might think that the access to public resources could be easier for a mayor who is a member of the party ruling the central government and resources devoted to her/his locality might increase. Besides, if the mayor is not nominated as a mayoral candidate in the next elections or the mayor thinks that s/he can obtain more votes when nominated by another party, s/he can act autonomously from the central party organization. As can be seen, there might be professional mayors who become mayoral candidates regardless of their political views in case that they are not nominated by their current party or even if they are, there is the possibility to obtain fewer votes (Turan A. E., 2008).

In conclusion, the mayor, as the CEO of municipality at the center of patron-client relations in local politics, might take radical and enterprising actions and act autonomously from both local and central party organization when there is a contradiction and competition between the mayor, members of local party organization and members of parliament which basically stem from economic rent relations. It is because the election of mayor is candidate-oriented and the mayor is equipped with administrative, financial and political means enabling her/him to act autonomously from the party politics.

4.7. The Relationship Between the Metropolitan Mayor and Central Government

In Turkey, the organs of local governments are supervised by the appointed organs of central government (Görmez, 1997). The aim of this is to control municipalities, alienate them from politics and preserve the authority of central government due to the distrust in municipalities. If the party ruling central government and municipalities is the same, then central government might need hardworking, managerial and active mayors so as to remain in power. However, there are also possibilities that mayor acts autonomously from her/his party due to the reasons stated above or municipality is ruled by a different party than central government. In addition, elected officials might come into conflict with national interests and thus, they must be supervised by appointed officials (Türkcan, 1982). Within this

framework, the primary organs of central government concerning municipalities and mayor are governorship, the Ministry of Interior, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and the Housing Development Administration.

Firstly, the position of metropolitan mayors is consolidated *vis-à-vis* the governors who are the representatives of central government in metropolitan provinces. It is because the personnel, power and responsibility of provincial special administrations, which were presided by the governors and abolished by the Law no. 6360, have been transferred to the metropolitan municipalities. Moreover, the tutelage power of governors on municipalities has been restricted (Gül, Kiriş, Negiz, & Gökdayı, 2014). The governors' powers regarding the annulment, approval with amendment and stay of execution of council resolutions have been terminated. The approval of highest civil administrator concerning loan contracts of municipalities has been removed. Consequently, the significance of governors as an executive authority has declined. However, according to the Article 3 of the Law no. 5747, transmission of metropolitan council resolutions to the governor of the locality within seven days of finalization is made obligatory. Otherwise, these resolutions do not enter into force. Furthermore, the governor might apply to the administrative courts against the resolutions as s/he considers unlawful.

Governorship has become an office coordinating the provincial units of central government and the resources allocated to them and monitoring constitutional and legal compliance of the activities of all administrative units in the province (Gül & Batman, 2014). With the Article 34 of the Law no. 6360, the Investment Monitoring and Coordination Directorates (IMCDs) have been established in metropolitan provinces and linked to the governor so as to coordinate public resources at the provincial level. However, according to Gül, Kiriş, Negiz and Gökdayı (2014), the establishment of IMCDs fails to counterbalance the status and resources that governors have lost due to the abolishment of provincial special administrations because IMCDs do not have legal personality and their resources are limited.

Secondly, in the Article 127 of the 1982 Constitution, as a provisional measure until the final court judgment, the Ministry of Interior has been given the authority to

remove from office mayors against whom an investigation or prosecution has been initiated on grounds of offences related to their duties. Although the appointment of metropolitan municipality personnel by the Minister of Interior has been removed, the appointment of secretary general, who exercises her/his authority on behalf of the mayor, and municipality's top-level bureaucrats by the Minister of Interior on a proposal from the mayor might be considered as an example of administrative tutelage. In addition, the prerequisite for municipalities to carry out joint activities or service projects with international organizations or bodies and with foreign local governments is the conduct of these activities in a manner consistent with Turkey's foreign policy and with international treaties, and be subject to prior authorization by the Ministry of Interior (Law no. 5393, 2008). Municipalities might also engage in mutual cooperation with municipalities and unions of local governments abroad with the permission of the Ministry of Interior.

The development directorates which were linked to the central government in metropolitan areas have been attached to the municipalities. According to Görmez (1997), this is a positive development with respect to democratization since he assumes that the effective participation of citizens in decision-making process regarding public works is going to be realized through their representatives in municipalities. However, lately, authorities of municipalities concerning land development planning have been transferred to the central government (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). According to the Article 9 of the Law no. 3194 on Land Development Planning and Control, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization is authorized, where deemed necessary and by informing the relevant municipalities and collaborating with them as necessary, to make, cause to make, amend and approve land development plans and amendments. Increase in the demands with respect to the regeneration of squatter settlements and risk of disaster has paved the way for these regulations radically (Erder & İncioğlu, 2013). The authorities of municipalities regarding land development planning have been trimmed in favor of the Housing Development Administration and the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.

Although metropolitan municipalities have been fiscally reinvigorated after 1980, they were not given the authority to impose tax and their income resources have

remained dependent on central government. The local government reforms of recent years have not introduced any novelty for the capacity of municipalities to create equity capital (Zengin G. , 2014). Hence, the competence of metropolitan mayor regarding the establishment of constructive links with the political power at the center and transforming these links into resources for the provision of urgent urban needs becomes crucial (Erençin, 2007). On the other side, the most remarkable development with respect to the administrative power of metropolitan municipality has been experienced in comparison with the governorship. The Ministry of Interior has been maintained its tutelage power over the mayors as the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and Housing Development Administration have been equipped with the authority of making, amending and approving land development plans.

4.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, the relationship of metropolitan mayors with the municipal organization, district municipalities, service recipients, interest groups, their political parties and central government is analyzed. It is possible to draw six conclusions from this chapter: Firstly, the mayor becomes dominant over municipal organization due to her/his control over the executive committee and municipal council. Secondly, the hierarchical two-tier metropolitan municipality system leads to the superior role of metropolitan municipalities over district municipalities, which enables metropolitan mayors to control the rents and resources in the districts. Thirdly, there is a mutual relationship between the mayor and service recipients in which the mayor is dependent on the political support of service recipients in the elections whereas the service recipients are dependent on the mayor due to the delivery of public services and social aids. In this regard, authoritarian attitudes of mayors are tacitly supported or ignored in exchange for service delivery and social aids. Fourthly, municipalities became the instruments of urban rent distribution instead of public institutions delivering services in accordance with the public's will. In this way, a patron-client relation is established between the mayor who controls the urban rents and interest groups which seek to derive interest from urban rents. Thus, interest groups give political support to the mayor who manages this complex structure in coordination

due to her/his central role in rent distribution so that these relations could be maintained. The mayor, on the other hand, benefits from this relations with respect to longer terms in office, ability to finance local services and financial autonomy from the central government. That is, the public-private-civil partnership in local governments is about the intersecting interests of the parties of this partnership. Moreover, the mayor who is popularly elected has a tendency to act autonomously from the party politics due to her/his control over municipal organization, district municipalities and interest groups. It is because there is an economic contradiction and political competition between the mayor, local party organization, members of parliament and central party organization. Last but not least, the administrative tutelage power and financial dominance of central government over the municipalities might be regarded as the limits to the strong mayors and these limits were expanded by the administrative reforms of recent years as a result of the distrust to the mayor as an autonomous policy maker. In the following chapter, the conclusions drawn in this chapter are further elaborated focusing on the cases of three metropolitan mayors of the cities in Turkey; namely, Aytaç Durak in Adana, Yılmaz Büyükerşen in Eskişehir and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba in Şanlıurfa.

CHAPTER 5

THE CASES OF AYTAÇ DURAK, YILMAZ BÜYÜKERŞEN AND AHMET EŞREF FAKIBABA

This part of the study will focus on three metropolitan municipality mayors of Turkey: Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba. Durak was elected as the mayor of Adana for five times in the 1984, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 Local Elections. Büyükerşen was elected as the mayor of Eskişehir for four times in the 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 Local Elections. Fakıbaba, however, was elected as the mayor of Şanlıurfa for two times in the 2004 and 2009 Local Elections.

Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba were chosen for this study due to their autonomy from party politics. As can be seen in the Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4, they came first in the local elections regardless of their political party affiliations. In addition, these three mayors received more votes than their parties did in the general provincial council elections held in the respective electoral district. As discussed earlier, considering electorates voting according to their party preferences in the general provincial council elections and evaluating the characteristics of candidates in the mayoral elections, it is possible to claim that Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba received the popular support more than their parties did in the respective provinces.

These cases are also independent from geography. Adana is entirely in the Mediterranean Region which is bordered by the Aegean Region to the west, the Central Anatolia Region to the north, the Eastern Anatolia Region to the northeast, the Southeastern Anatolia Region to the east, Syria to the southeast, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south. Eskişehir is a province whose land is mostly laid down in Central Anatolian Region. The remaining territory of the province is laid down in both Black Sea Region and Aegean Region. Şanlıurfa, on the other hand, is a province entirely in the Southeastern Anatolia Region which is bordered by the

Mediterranean Region to the west, the Eastern Anatolia Region to the north, Syria to the south, and Iraq to the southeast.

Apart from the given differences, these three mayors share similarities with respect to the implementation of NPM perspective although their political views differ. The political views of the mayors will be specified according to their political parties which are described by İnciođlu (2002) and Kalaycıođlu (2014). Durak was first elected from the MP which is located at the center-right of the political spectrum. Then he joined to the Justice and Development Party JDP, a conservative political party with its roots in the political Islamist movement. Lastly, in the 2009 Local Elections, he was elected from the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), which is a Turkish ethnic nationalist party, as the Adana Metropolitan Municipality Mayor and supported the party's candidate in the 2014 Local Elections. As can be seen, it is possible to observe a shift from center-right to far-right in Durak's case.

Büyükerşen was nominated as the candidate of Eskişehir Metropolitan Mayorship for three consecutive times in 1999, 2004 and 2009 by the Democratic Left Party (DLP), which is a center-left party. Then, in 2011, he joined to the RPP, the democratic left, secular and Turkish nationalist party. He was also won the 2014 Local Elections as the Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipal Candidate of the RPP. That is to say, Büyükerşen maintains his political career at the center-left of the political spectrum.

Lastly, Fakıbaba was first elected as the Şanlıurfa Mayor in 2004 from the JDP which was described above. Later, he ran as an independent candidate in 2009. He joined to the Felicity Party (FP), which is an Islamist party, after he was elected. However, he resigned from the party in 2010 and returned to the JDP in 2013. In the case of Fakıbaba, it is possible to assert that he is in tide between the traditional Islamist movement and reformist Islamist movement.

5.1. Brief Biographies of the Mayors

Aytaç Durak, who was born in Adana in 1938, received education in the İstanbul Technical University Faculty of Engineering and Architecture. He served as the Chief of State Hydraulic Works in Adana between 1963 and 1965. He also served as

the Provincial Director of Rural Services in Adana between 1965 and 1968. Durak started his political career in 1963. He was elected as the member of Adana Municipal Council for 17 years between 1963 and 1980. In this period, he ran a contracting company in the construction business. In 1984, he was elected as the Mayor of Adana from the MP. He returned his construction business since he could not be elected in 1989. He was elected again as the Mayor of Adana from the MP in the 1994. After the elections, Durak left his party and joined the True Path Party in 1995. However, he returned to the MP before the 1999 Local Elections and won the elections. In 2004, he won the local elections as the candidate of the JDP and in 2009, as the candidate of the NMP. Nevertheless, he was removed from the office by the Minister of Interior in 2010 due to the allegations of corruption. He became an independent candidate for Adana Metropolitan Mayorship in the 2014 Local Elections; however, he withdrew in favor of the candidate of NMP.

Table 2: The local elections won by Aytaç Durak in Adana

Local Elections	Vote Rates for Aytaç Durak (%)	His Political Party	Vote Rates Received by His Political Party in the General Provincial Council Elections (%)
1984	42,7	MP	38,5
1989 ¹⁰	28,8 ¹¹	MP	21,8 ¹²
1994	31,5	MP	20,7
1999	26,4	MP	14,4
2004	39,8	JDP	37,5
2009	29,7	NMP	27,2

Source: Koç, T. (2009). *Yerel Demokrasi, Katılım ve Yönetişim: Adana Örneği* (Unpublished PhD. Thesis). Ankara: Ankara University.

Yılmaz Büyükerşen, who was born in Eskişehir in 1937, studied in the Eskişehir Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences. He became the doctor of

¹⁰ In 1989 Local Elections, Aytaç Durak came second and his political party, being MP, came third.

¹¹ İhlas News Agency, *26 March 1989 Metropolitan Mayor Election, Adana*. Retrieved December 22, 2015 from <http://secim.ihha.com.tr/Bolgeler.aspx?il=01&ilce=0&belde=0&parti=0&skod=1050&stip=6&s=26%20Mart%201989%20B%C3%BCy%C3%BCk%C5%9Fehir%20Belediye%20Se%C3%A7imi>

¹² İhlas News Agency, *26 March 1989 Provincial Council Election, Adana*. Retrieved December 22, 2015 from <http://secim.ihha.com.tr/Bolgeler.aspx?il=0&ilce=0&belde=0&parti=0&skod=1055&stip=3&s=26%20Mart%201989%20C4%B01%20Genel%20Meclisi%20Se%C3%A7imi>

philosophy in 1966 and was promoted to professorship in 1973. Büyükerşen was appointed twice as the President of Anadolu University in 1982 and 1987. He also served as the President of Radio and Television High Council for two consecutive terms until 1992. In 1999, 2004 and 2009, Büyükerşen was elected as the Mayor of Eskişehir from the DLP. In 2011, he resigned from his party and joined to the RPP. He also won the 2014 Local Elections in Eskişehir as the candidate of the RPP and still serves as the Eskişehir Metropolitan Mayor.

Table 3: The local elections won by Yılmaz Büyükerşen in Eskişehir

Local Elections	Vote Rate for Yılmaz Büyükerşen (%)	His Political Party	Vote Rates Received by His Political Party in the General Provincial Council Elections (%)
1999	42,9	DLP	35,9
2004	44,8	DLP	28,7
2009	51,5	DLP	32,4
2014	45,3	RPP	40,4

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, *Local Government Elections*. Retrieved December 21, 2015 from <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/yerel.zul>

Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba, who was born in Şanlıurfa in 1951, was graduated from the Atatürk University Faculty of Medicine in 1975. He served as the chief physician of Şanlıurfa SSK Hospital between 1994 and 2004. In 2004, Fakıbaba was elected as the Mayor of Şanlıurfa from the JDP. Before the 2009 Local Elections, he resigned from his party and won the elections in Şanlıurfa as an independent candidate. After the elections, he joined to the FP; however, in 2010, he resigned from the party due to the change in the party leadership. In 2013, he returned to the JDP from which he was elected as the Member of Parliament in the 2015 National Election and still serves as the Member of Parliament.

Table 4: The local elections won by Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba in Şanlıurfa¹³

Local Elections	Vote Rate for Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba (%)	His Political Party	Vote Rates Received by His Political Party in the General Provincial Council Elections (%)
2004	41,9	JDP	40,7
2009	44,4	Independent	-

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, *Local Government Elections*. Retrieved December 21, 2015 from <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/yerel.zul>

5.2. Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba in the Midst of the Tension between Decentralization and Centralization

The path for strong leadership of mayors in local governments was opened in 1963 in which direct election of mayors by the public was introduced in Turkey. However, the administrative reforms in the field of local government inspired by the NPM perspective and governance advocating decentralization, managerialism and participation of local actors in decision-making caused further political centralization in the personality of mayors, especially metropolitan mayors due to the increase in the powers of metropolitan municipalities, as discussed earlier. The reflections of this process could be observed in Turkey after 1984 in which the metropolitan municipalities were established. This process gained momentum because of the administrative reforms in the field of local governments carried out by the JDP governments since 2004. In this regard, the cases of Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba will explicitly exemplify the political centralization in these three mayoral figures. In order to grasp this political centralization, the relationships of these three mayors with their metropolitan municipal organization, district municipalities, electorates/service receivers/city-dwellers, interest groups, party organization, and central government are to be examined. In this examination, the articles from both local and national press were benefitted. In addition, a book written by Aytaç Durak in 2015 named “*Söyleyeceklerim Var*”, a book named “*Zamanı Durduran Saat*” published in 2009 which is based on Cemalettin N. Taşçı’s interview with Yılmaz Büyükerşen and a book named “*Doğrudan Doğruya*” written by Ömer N. Kapaklı in 2009, who is a

¹³ Ibid.

local journalist in Şanlıurfa and the media advisor of Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba were elaborated in this process.

5.2.1. The Relationship with the Metropolitan Municipal Organization

When the relationship of mayors with metropolitan municipal organization is analyzed, it is possible to observe that this relationship conglomerates in four issues. These are team-work, de-politicization, cost minimization, and tension with the municipal council.

Firstly, the three mayors place emphasis on the team-work in municipalities. To illustrate, Durak had a team that he worked with for 26 years and know the residents of Adana very well (Koç, 2010a). However, one of his advisors stated that he first shapes an idea in his mind, and then he shares that idea with his subordinates (Koç, 2010b). Büyükerşen also preferred to work with the personnel that he knew and found successful when he was the president of Anadolu University (Taşçı, 2009). Fakıbaba, on the other hand, stated that he controls and monitors all kinds of municipal work although municipalism is a team-work and he relies on his team.¹⁴ As can be seen, these mayors adopted a situational leadership style resembling with the second type of Vroom-Yetton Participation Model, which means that the mayor obtains any necessary information from her/his subordinates, but makes decisions her/himself in the end.

Then, they are also opposed to staff recruitment under the influence of politicians. The theoretical background of this opposition is based on managerialism and neo-Taylorism which advocates that executive staff must be free to manage and autonomous from politicians so that efficiency, effectiveness, and economy could be ensured. Durak (2015) evaluates this as the attempts of politicians to expand their political grassroots by the employment of new workers in the municipality. He also defends that those employed by the request of politicians do not work well and not

¹⁴ Urfa Haber (2012). *Fakıbaba: Şanlıurfa'da Ciddi Belediyecilik Yapıyoruz*. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from <http://www.urfahaber.net/haber/fakibaba-sanliurfada-ciddi-belediyecilik-yapiyoruz-video-10961.html>

let others to work. Hence, according to him, personnel increase and unnecessary expenses could be prevented if mayors do not bow to the external political pressures.

Büyükerşen indicated that he continues to work with the cadres employed before his term; however, this depends on the ability of these cadres in separating public service from political and religious views (Taşçı, 2009). He claimed that he pays special attention to the employment of the qualified personnel when the need of municipality in cadres is addressed. He emphasized the significance of competent cadres, capable secretary general in managing works, and excellent executive office which could manage the municipal process successfully.

Fakıbaba complained about the communication problems between the public and administrative staff of municipality employed by favoring before his terms.¹⁵ He articulated that if he had the chance to restructure the municipality, he would institutionalize the municipality, employ personnel through examination and struggle with the idle personnel.

Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba tried to minimize personnel expenses. Firstly, Durak aimed to minimize personnel expenses through privatizations (Koç, 2010a), which are one of the main pillars of the NPM perspective. Adana Metropolitan Municipality directly engaged in hardly any municipal works. Rather, the municipal works were contracted out to sub-contractors and transferred to the private sector. In this way, the municipality could employ fewer personnel and save on expenses. Durak (2015) put forward that when he came to office in 1984, the municipality employs 2500 municipal personnel and he handed over the municipality with 2600 personnel in 2010. His first action in office was to declare that he will run the municipality as he runs his corporation.

With respect to the cost minimization, Büyükerşen indicated that he executes the municipal works with a cadre as much as half of the permanent staff envisaged for the Eskişehir Metropolitan municipality (Taşçı, 2009). He stated that his fellow workers work day-and-night both on weekdays and at the weekends due to their love

¹⁵ Ibid.

of serving the public. This kind of flexible working conditions is a personnel regime of private sector which is transferred to public sector by the NPM.

In Fakıbaba's mayoral term, bus drivers working in the BELSAN firm affiliated with Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality claimed that the firm compels them to overwork and cuts from their wages by imposing fines on all occasions.¹⁶ These fines are used as disciplinary instruments for labor force suggested by the NPM so that effective, efficient and economic service delivery could be ensured. In addition, it is possible to claim that Fakıbaba adopted transactional leadership style which is committed to reward and punishment system for efficiency and effectiveness.

These three mayors were sometimes in tension with the members of metropolitan municipal council. Durak revealed a voice recording of the members of metropolitan municipal council on bribe offer in exchange of change in land development plan.¹⁷

Büyükerşen, on the other hand, defended that the members of metropolitan municipal council could be a close follower of the needs and demands of public in the council; that is, they could not directly follow these needs and demands in the offices of administrative staffs (Taşçı, 2009). Büyükerşen's other complaint regarding the metropolitan municipal council is that he could not accomplish his projects since his party remained as minority in his second mayoral term between 2004 and 2009, and the members of the majority party prevented him. As discussed earlier, the party difference between the majority in the metropolitan council and metropolitan mayor resulted in incapable metropolitan mayor in performing his duties and responsibilities. Moreover, there was a tension between Büyükerşen and the JDP group in a council meeting regarding right to have the floor.¹⁸ Thereupon, he said that the group must ask in written to have the floor, and the authority to give the floor to them belongs to him. At this point, his statement is based on the fact that he is also the chair of the metropolitan council, and he determines the agenda of the council.

¹⁶ Şanlıurfa Sembol (2013). *Şoförler: "Belsan Dolandırıcılık Yapıyor"*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.sanlıurfasembol.com/103640-soforler-belsan-dolandiricilik-yapiyor-haberi.html>

¹⁷ Bugün (2010). *Adana'da Koltuk Kavgası*. Retrieved October 15, 2015 from <http://www.bugun.com.tr/gundem/adanada-koltuk-kavgasi-97424.html?m=0>

¹⁸ 2 Eylül (2014). *Sanki Padişah!*. Retrieved October 15, 2015 from <http://www.2eyul.com.tr/gundem/sanki-padisah-h39242.html>

As mentioned earlier, this created a power imbalance between mayor and the municipal council. Furthermore, the 2013 Activity Report of Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality was regarded as unsatisfactory by the majority of the Metropolitan Municipal Council; however, Büyükerşen was not unseated since the majority of three quarters could not be reached and the Report was approved.¹⁹ The will of the council could not unseat the mayor since the fragmented Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipal Council could not constitute the required majority.

In Fakıbaba's case, the JDP's members of municipal council tabled a motion of censure right after he resigned from the JDP since he was not nominated as the mayoral candidate of the party (Kapaklı, 2009). This motion of censure was not also approved due to the majority condition.

In sum, the control of these mayors on their executive team, their struggle to depoliticize municipal administration and their attempt to minimize costs are not necessarily market-oriented. Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba were also in a political fight for autonomy in decision-making by adopting a directive leadership style, separating municipality from politics and managerialist municipalism. On the other side, they were in a political fight with the metropolitan municipal councils. The supervision of the councils on the mayors did not reach a conclusion due to the legal/institutional obstacles arising as a result of distrust toward the council and favoring the stability of municipal administration. In this way, municipal council is deactivated and mayors were able to overcome the barriers of opposition. Hence, these cases regarding the relationship between the mayors and municipal organization could be the indicative of strong mayors ruling metropolitan municipalities in Turkey.

5.2.2. The Relationship with the Other Local Authorities

District municipalities became the other local authorities operating in the metropolitan areas due to the abolishment of special provincial administrations within metropolitan provincial boundaries in 2012. Therefore, in this chapter, the

¹⁹ 2 Eylül (2014). '*Trafik Sorununu Düzeltemezsiniz*'. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eyul.com.tr/gundem/trafik-sorununu-duzeltemezsiniz-h30112.html>

relationship of Durak and Büyükerşen with the district municipalities will be examined and interpreted. There is no available data regarding the relationship between Fakıbaba and the district municipalities of Şanlıurfa. This might be caused by the transformation of Şanlıurfa Municipality into Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality in 2012, and there has been no district municipality within the boundaries of the municipality since then.

Both mayors had conflicts with the district mayors in their adjacent. However, it is observed that these district mayors belonged to different party than metropolitan mayors. Firstly, Durak contradicted with the Seyhan District Mayor from RPP with respect to the rail system. According to Durak (2015), the district mayor opposed the extension of railway system to the south of the district so that he could provoke the residents against Durak on the excuse that public services are not delivered to Seyhan. As mentioned before, there is an authority conflict regarding overlapping metropolitan and district adjacent and lack of cooperation with respect to service delivery. This conflict and lack of cooperation are the result of the ambiguities and loopholes producing uncertainties and gaps regarding the jurisdictions of metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities. In order to overcome these problems, Durak (2015) suggested the appointment of district mayors by the metropolitan mayors among the members of district municipal councils because there is a two-headed city management in which district mayor could intervene in the city plans formerly prepared by the metropolitan mayor. The metropolitan mayor is also the most visible person regarding service delivery and failure. Thus, district mayors act unaccountably and pursue personal interests, not public interests.

In addition, before 2009 Local Elections, Adana Metropolitan Municipality distributed a survey which was to inquire the success of metropolitan and district municipalities with respect to service delivery (Koç, 2010b). The way of asking the questions of survey was reflecting the tension between the metropolitan municipality and district municipalities. To illustrate, the questions regarding the activities of district municipalities were asked as in the following : “were streets and avenues recovered from mud”, “does your district mayor work in cooperation with your metropolitan mayor” ,and “were the preventive actions against mosquitos sufficient in summer”. These questions stem from the tutelage power of metropolitan

municipalities, which was given by the Law no. 3030 and widened by the Laws no. 5216 and 6360, on the services carried out by district municipalities, as discussed before.

Then, there was a debate with respect to land development plan between Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality and Odunpazarı District Municipality.²⁰ The Metropolitan Municipality identified constructions contradicting legislations on construction which were built in Sazova Science, Art and Culture Park by Odunpazarı Municipality. The Metropolitan Municipality allows Odunpazarı Municipality to remedy these deficiencies and violations in three months. Otherwise, the Metropolitan Municipality was to be able to make an absolute decision on the land planning of this park. This debate turned into reciprocal press statements between Büyükerşen and Odunpazarı Mayor from the JDP. In his statement, Büyükerşen raised the issue of unauthorized buildings within the park and declared that the Metropolitan Municipality will not withdraw its ideal of protecting city's social reinforcement and green spaces and creating more livable Eskişehir. Büyükerşen, as only elected political actor at the metropolitan level, could make this statement by depending on his political power and high-profile in public. In addition, his central role in decision-making and implementing as the metropolitan mayor enables him to have control over district municipalities.

Moreover, in 2014, Büyükerşen stated that the Metropolitan Municipality is not able to make investments in rural areas because of the current budget and thus, Sivrihisar and Çifteler District Mayors who are elected from the JDP objected this statement.²¹ In response, the district mayors mentioned that Büyükerşen would be viewed as responsible for this failure in service delivery to rural areas. This dispute between Büyükerşen and district mayors might stem from their political affiliations; however, the case is significant in showing financial dependence of district municipalities on metropolitan municipalities. Hence, the objectivity of financial relations between metropolitan municipality and district municipalities could become conflictual.

²⁰ Anadolu Gazetesi (2012). *Büyükerşen'den Sakallı'ya Jet Yanıt*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/buyukerenden-sakalliya-jet-yanit-n-3268.aspx>

²¹ 2 Eylül (2014). *Kırsala Hizmet Kavgası*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/kirsala-hizmet-kavgasi-h32202.htm>

In conclusion, Durak and Büyükerşen became a superior authority within the metropolitan boundaries due to the centralization of administrative and financial powers in metropolitan municipalities, and political power in metropolitan mayors. This centralization resulted in hierarchical supervision of metropolitan municipalities and mayors over district municipalities that are supposed to be autonomous political bodies whose decision-making organ and the head of executive, being the mayors, are directly elected.

5.2.3. The Relationship with the Service Recipients

In Turkey, mayors have been directly elected through the first-past-the post system since 1963. That is, the candidate who receives more votes than any others in local elections becomes the mayor. Therefore, as mentioned before, electorates might develop rational voting behavior and not vote for their first choice (Kamalak, Kiriş, & Gül, 2013). Furthermore, mayoral candidates might announce their candidacy on the basis of a political party or they might stand as an independent candidate. Therefore, the characteristics and promises of candidates, activities of municipalities with respect to political parties, performance of party organizations in the electoral area, public opinions on the parties and their candidates, and competence of candidates to represent the area are considered by the electorates as much as political affiliation of candidates (Çaha & Guida, 2011). In the cases of Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba, electorates seem to show regard to the mayoral candidates more than their political parties because, as indicated in the tables above, these three mayors were able to be elected more than once from different parties and received more votes than their political parties in their respective electoral area.

In order to understand the political popularity of these mayors, their public images must be first analyzed. Durak (2015) asserted that it was easy for him to win the elections from all parties because he always pursued public interest. He also remarked that interest groups, influential actors and political party executives underwhelmed although they opposed his mayoral candidacy. According to Koç (2010a), people voted for Durak who made it possible for the public to benefit from

cheaper public transportation, cheaper bread and moving of Adana to the north, no matter which party he was the candidate of. Durak gained the appreciation of electorates due to mass circumcision feasts and made a point of distributing the newspaper, in which the activities of metropolitan municipality were praised, along with the water bills to almost every household. As he distributed social aids and delivered municipal services, he was regarded successful and elected again. Furthermore, Durak announced eleven days before the 2009 Local Elections that free subway testing shuttles were going to be initiated. This is the result of the reforms inspired by the NPM perspective which attributes the success of mayors to the accomplishment of works through extralegal actions and personal risks. Adana Office of the Union of Mechanical Engineering has advocated that the initiation of subway testing shuttles with passengers risks the life security of citizens because the subway shuttles must be tested for a month without passengers.²²

Büyükerşen is popular among people since he initiated some changes in Eskişehir, such as establishing rail system in public transportation, cleaning Porsuk River flow through the city, landscaping the environment of the river, building regional parks, constituting cultural and artistic institutions, and correcting the deficiencies of city's infrastructure. He opposed to the increase in bread prices by asserting the revaluation of bread prices for the poor and low-income families.²³ He also vetoed the council resolution, which changes the status of an area from dormitory for the Poor and Indigent Relief Association to housing zone.²⁴ Because of these, he could take the support of Eskişehir residents. In 2012, the RPP made a survey among its grassroots and the result of this survey revealed that the grassroots wished for Büyükerşen to be the Ankara Metropolitan Mayor.²⁵ As can be seen, public support to Büyükerşen proceeds since 1999 due to the solutions brought to the problems and improvements

²² Chamber of Mechanical Engineers (2009). *Bülten*. Retrieved December 24, 2015 from http://www.mmo.org.tr/resimler/dosya_ekler/4d8b80caa6dfec9_ek.pdf?dergi=670

²³ 2 Eylül (2014). *Yoksul ve Dar Gelirliler İçin Hayır*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/yoksul-ve-dar-gelirliler-icin-hayir-h33589.html>

²⁴ 2 Eylül (2014). *Bir Tek O Hayır Dedi*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/bir-tek-o-hayir-dedi-h36916.html>

²⁵ Anadolu Gazetesi (2012). *Büyükerşen Gidiyor mu?*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/buyukeren-gidiyor-mu-n-4022.aspx>

in the daily lives of Eskişehir residents. Thus, he was regarded as the person who is capable to solve the problems and improve the daily life of the capital of Turkey.

Fakıbbaba was well-liked by the public and viewed by the public as a hardworking, honest and charitable person who protects the public interests *vis-à-vis* specific pressure groups (Kapaklı, 2009). His works were embraced by all segments of public. Especially, his works in poor regions of Şanlıurfa became prominent. This is why JDP grassroots in Şanlıurfa felt upset and reacted when Fakıbbaba were not nominated as the mayoral candidate of their party. Sedat Atilla (2009), who is a local columnist, expressed that Fakıbbaba's personal stance was never devoted to interest derivation for anybody and he was never be in the shadow of powerful groups. Another local columnist Yusuf Kürkçüoğlu (2009) put forward that the grassroots of JDP, NMP, FP and MP to whom he talked before 2009 Local Elections explained that they are going to vote for Fakıbbaba. As can be seen, Fakıbbaba was supported by the Şanlıurfa residents since he was thought to distribute urban rents in an equitable way and transfer these rents to public so as to contribute to the service delivery.

On the other hand, there were criticisms to these three mayors with respect to the participation. According to Aytaç Durak, it is disputable that showing regard to public tendency is accurate (Koç, 2010b). Moreover, a member of municipal council from Durak's team asserted that public opinion is not collected, it is not possible to mention public participation, but this does not create a discontent since decision is made fairly in favor of public interest. Koç (2010a) suggested that the issue of moving the city of Adana from south to north which was a new space containing two hundred thousand houses was not referred to the public opinion, but the significance and essentialness of this project were just explained.

In the case of Büyükerşen, a gigantic led screen was placed by the Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality in front of a shopping mall and received reactions from the residents.²⁶ As a result of reactions, the municipality lifted the screen; however, it was placed in the same location after a while. In this respect, the Provincial Head of Democrat Party argued that with the authority stemming from his office, Büyükerşen

²⁶ 2 Eylül (2013). *İktidarın Gücü ile Dayatıyor*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eyul.com.tr/gundem/iktidarin-gucu-ile-dayatiyor-h20584.html>

imposes his desires by force in a patronizing way without considering the demands of residents. Moreover, the candidate of Peoples' Democratic Party for Eskişehir Metropolitan Co-mayorship alleged that Büyükerşen's works for the sake of culture, art and urbanization drew the reaction of a vast majority of residents.²⁷ He claimed that all designs in the city were shaped by the ideas of Büyükerşen, not by consulting an art organization and/or a scholar.

Lastly, in his column, Veysel Polat (2012) discussed that Fakıbaba's ten-year works were exaggerated, and the investments were made to Şanlıurfa by either the central government or foundations. He indicated that Fakıbaba's promises, such as rail system, cloverleaf junctions and the project of city square were not fulfilled, the project of GAP Valley was not proceeding, and the municipality failed with respect to city planning and infrastructure. He also complained about the squatter areas in which parquet stones and sidewalk are constantly paved while urban transformation must be initiated. Furthermore, in a local newspaper named "*GAP Gündemi*", there was a column written by Mehmet Ali Kuş (2013) arguing that Fakıbaba's incomplete and false projects, repressive attitudes, aggressive behaviors, inability to reconcile and obstinacy damaged his value and image in the eye of the public. Hence, he was not nominated as a candidate by the JDP in 2014 Local Elections although he returned to the party in 2013 and declared that he expected to be nominated until the very last minute.

To conclude, in the respective electoral area, these three mayors received more votes than their political parties for multiple times although they were criticized about the issue of participation in the administration. This indicates that authoritarian attitudes of Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba were tacitly supported or ignored by the public so that municipal services could be delivered. In other words, there is a mutual relationship between the service delivery and political support. This mutual relationship turned these three mayors into strong political entrepreneurs who are driven by material projects and search of votes (Magnier, 2006) and it also provided them with radius of autonomous action, as can be seen in the cases of Durak and Büyükerşen. In the case of Fakıbaba, on the other hand, the discontent of citizens

²⁷ Yüksekova Haber (2014). '*Büyükerşen'in Oyununu Bozalım*'. Retrieved October 16, 2015 from <http://www.yuksekovahaber.com/haber/buyukersenin-oyununu-bozalim-124304.htm>

with respect to service delivery and infrastructure resulted in a situation where he was not nominated as the mayoral candidate by the JDP, and Fakıbaba's mayoral career ended after his second term.

5.2.4. The Relationship with the Interest Groups

Interest groups aim to influence municipalities in order to fulfill their interests which are embedded in the urban rent controlled by the municipal organizations. This urban rent is derived from municipal services, such as land development, infrastructure, transportation, social aids and so forth. Hence, the members of municipal council are mostly small entrepreneurs who aim to benefit from the urban rent. However, the derivation of urban rent by small entrepreneurs, big capital and CSOs might result in the disadvantage of consumers who are mostly service recipients. Then, mayors, rather than members of municipal councils, are reacted since mayors are elected by the public and thus, s/he is under the pressure of public scrutiny. That is, mayors are sensitive to the reactions of citizens. Hence, mayors might contradict with council members and interest groups. The council members and interest groups might make contact with the local party organizations and cause pressures on mayors. Nevertheless, the direct election of mayors enable them to resist these pressures due to their autonomy from municipal councils. It is possible to observe this tension between mayors and interest groups in the cases of Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba. Sometimes, they could resist the demands of interest groups while sometimes, they meet these demands.

Firstly, these three mayors conflicted with several interest groups and CSOs in regard to related issues. Durak (2015) remarked anonymously that he fought with certain interest groups because of corruptions in land development. He asserted that certain interest groups purchasing public land reserved for official and green areas in the development plan of district municipality make contact with municipal council members and district mayors for land development changes. Second example that Durak gave was on the construction inspection companies which are paid companies authorized by law. He declared that these companies try to plunder the city by land development corruptions in cooperation with bureaucrats giving building permit and

occupancy certificate, trade associations and experts. Moreover, he put into service municipality buses and provided cheaper public transportation because he defended that private buses and shared minibuses (*dolmuş*) reduced the competitiveness in the transportation sector (Koç, 2010a). He also took the initiative of cheaper bread production by establishing the public bread factory. Nevertheless, Durak privatized municipal works apart from public transportation and bread production. These privatizations enabled the municipality to employ fewer workers and cut expenditures. However, in this way, he transferred a share out of municipal budget to construction firms, contracting companies and local commercial capital. In addition, the New Adana Project of his administration, through which the city was moved from south to north, offered business opportunities for hundreds of contractor.

Büyükerşen also was in conflict with various interest groups. Firstly, in 2012, he blamed the Eskişehir Chamber of Commerce for filing a suit against the master plan and repealing it.²⁸ According to Büyükerşen, the chamber has a right to file a suit against the master plan; however, it filed the suit and repealed the plan because of the issues that it has no business. Then, he contradicted with the Union of Chambers of Merchants and Craftsmen regarding the paid parking lots on the streets.²⁹ The union defended that the metropolitan municipality should permit the transient parking for the customers of businesses located on the streets. Therefore, the union filed a suit against the implementation of paid parking lots on the streets and the court granted a motion for stay of execution. Yet, the implementation was proceeded by the municipality. Besides, there was a disagreement between Büyükerşen and private bus operators.³⁰ Although the bus fares were increased at the rate of 15 percent, the private bus operators decided not to transport the citizens who are over the age 65 and have the right to benefit from transportation services free of charge and not to carry out bus shuttles on the ground that they make loss. Thus, private busses not transporting these citizens and not carrying out shuttles were withdrawn by the

²⁸ 2 Eylül (2012). *ETO'ya ve Medyaya Yüklendi*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/etoya-ve-medyaya-yuklendi-h8617.html>

²⁹ 2 Eylül (2013). *Soruşturmanın Takipçisiyiz*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/sorusturmanin-takipcisiyiz-h24060.html>

³⁰ Yenigün Gazetesi (2014). *Büyükerşen: Eskişehir'e Zarar Verdiler*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.eskisehiryenigun gazetesi.com.tr/gundem/buyukersen-eskisehire-zarar-verdiler-h8114.html>

metropolitan municipality. Instead, the municipality leased busses and Büyükerşen declared that if the municipality could afford to purchase 250 busses, he would purchase these busses and terminate private bus business.

Fakıbaba had disputes with both industrialists and livestock dealers with respect to the area in which they run their business. Firstly, a new organized industrial site was constructed and some of the industrialists moved there. Those industrialists who remained in the older industrial site do not want to move the new organized industrial site since they cannot afford to purchase a workplace from there.³¹ However, the municipality aimed to demolish the older industrial site since the site remained in the city center. Fakıbaba stated that a constructional project was designed in partnership with Housing Development Administration of Turkey. Thus, Fakıbaba and industrialists disagreed in 2012. According to Fakıbaba, this is an ongoing process since 2006 and those who did not move to the new organized industrial site acted egocentrically since they aimed to increase their profits by staying in the older industrial site which is closer to the city. On the other hand, livestock dealers clashed with the municipality due to relocation of livestock market.³² The livestock dealers demanded free lands in the new livestock, but the municipality offered to reduce land prices. Fakıbaba asked citizens to put leverage on livestock dealers to move the new livestock market which is more hygienic. In addition, he had a problem with private bus operators since he removed turnboys from the private busses who assist the bus driver in shuttles.³³ Hence, he purchased new vehicles for BELSAN Incorporated Company which is affiliated to the municipality. Lastly, the Association of Tractor Dealers' Site conflicted with Fakıbaba since the Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality did not issue license for the land that was purchased by the tractor dealers from the General Directorate of

³¹ Urfa Haber (2012). *Fakıbaba: Şanlıurfa'da Ciddi Belediyecilik Yapıyoruz*. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from <http://www.urfahaber.net/haber/fakibaba-sanliurfada-ciddi-belediyecilik-yapiyoruz-video-10961.html>

³² Ibid.

³³ GAP Gündemi (2014). *Belediyeler Çadırda Başlayacak*. Retrieved October 3, 2015 from http://www.gapgundemi.com/haber-11700-1_nisanda_belli_olacak_sanliurfa_buyuk_sehir_haliliye_eyyubiye_belediye_baskanlari_ve_meclis_uyelerinin_binalari_belli_degil_10_yildir_belediye_baskanligi_yapan_fakibaba_arkasinda_degil_bina_bu_belediyeler_icin_bir_arsa_bile_birakamiyor_.html

National Estate.³⁴ The dealers claimed that if the 3680 square meters of this land lying next to the highway is handed over to the municipality, then the license is going to be issued. As can be seen, Fakıbaba took the initiatives in construction projects in the city center and made negotiations with livestock dealers regarding land price and tractor dealers regarding land appropriation. These negotiations point at patron-client relations between Fakıbaba and merchants due to their characteristics of being informal and face-to-face. In this way, Fakıbaba also transferred a share out of municipal budget to construction firms and created further urban rents to create resources for the municipality.

These three mayors were also in favor of cooperation with CSOs on a limited scale. According to Koç (2010b), through the Department of Public Relations and Citizens' Assembly, Adana Metropolitan Municipality attempted to provide the participation of CSOs which are closer to capital owners, such as Adana Chamber of Commerce and Adana Contractors Association.

Büyükerşen defended that CSOs exist so as to do what local governments cannot do and stated that he is in favor of supporting the activities of CSOs spiritually, not materially. On the other hand, after 2009 Local Elections, Fakıbaba promised that he is going to build a Şanlıurfa Model in which Şanlıurfa is to be a city governed jointly with the CSOs.

To sum up, Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba managed the metropolitan municipalities as they manage a business which has to create resources and enhance these resources. Hence, the municipalities holding the power to redistribute urban rents among different groups enabled these mayors to build a patron-client relations so as to finance local services and placed them in the center of the complex local networks involving bureaucrats, technocrats, politicians, private sector, CSOs and citizens, as Şahin (2007) emphasized. The participation of CSOs in local government was also limited to resource creating and/or funding local services. As a result, they were able to be elected more than once, remained in office at least a decade and

³⁴ GAP Gündemi (2013). *Galericiler Sitesi Yerinde Sayıyor*. Retrieved October 3, 2015 from http://www.gapgundemi.com/haber-10340-galericiler_sitesi_yerinde_sayiyor.html

became stronger mayors who are needed to be permanent in the office and act like a CEO so that these complex networks do not collapse.

5.2.5. The Relationship with Their Political Parties

As mentioned before, first-past-the-post system in mayoral election leads electorates to vote strategically since they thought that the representation of minority might be restricted. Therefore, mayoral election highlights the characteristics of candidates and candidates are able to receive votes independently of their political parties. This is how Durak was elected for five times from three different parties, Büyükerşen for four times from two different parties and Fakıbaba for two times one of which he run as an independent candidate. In this part of the study, the reasons why these mayors changed their parties and how their relationships with their local and central party organizations are going to be analyzed.

It was discussed earlier that Durak was elected from the MP, JDP and NMP which are located at the right of the political spectrum, Büyükerşen was elected from the DLP and RPP which are leftist parties and Fakıbaba was elected from the JDP, run as an independent, joined FP and returned to the JDP which are also located at the right. This indicates that these mayors were able to be elected from different parties, but they remained the same side of the political spectrum. Hence, it is not possible to assert that these three mayors were elected regardless of their ideological views. However, it is possible to defend that they became a supra-party politicians and were elected regardless of political party affiliations. As a result of their autonomy of party politics, they are decisive about the exclusion of political favoritism and nepotism from their municipalities. Besides, they have a tendency to shape the administration of their local party organizations so as to protect their autonomy from party politics. Therefore, they had disputes with their central/provincial/district party organizations and/or the member of parliaments of their provinces.

Firstly, these three mayors sought to obstruct the influence of politicians in their municipalities. In other words, mayors aimed a hands-on management which refers to their autonomy from politicians, active participation in city management and right to manage. As mentioned before, there is an attempt to separate administration from

politics and associate it with business management. In response to urban problems, mayors are expected to be pragmatic, proactive and unrestricted public managers for quick decision-making, efficient and effective use of resources, responsiveness to public demands and adaptability to conditions.

Durak (2015) asserted that he did not allow political favoritism into the municipality. He thought that if mayors resist to the demands of politicians, then they could be successful, but they might have to change their parties before every election. According to Durak, party administrators give particular importance to the daily interests of their relatives, do not intend to work in a planned, programmed and rational way and thus, the administrators of parties of which he is a member opposed to him. He stated that no matter which party he was elected from, he became *persona non grata* since he did not accept to fulfill the interests of the party and party administrators. Party members who could not benefit from the urban rents acted against the Durak and attempted to corrode his status in his party. He found dependence on a political party dangerous because the demands of this party could alienate the mayor from the program and citizens and prevent service delivery.

In his interview with Taşçı (2009), Büyükerşen stated that public officials should view themselves as public servants, not individuals prone to partisanship. In the ceremony after he was elected, he took off his party badge, said that he did his first activity and asked from council members to do the same. He also declared that he, municipal officials and employees are the servants of Eskişehir residents without discriminating and discrimination on the basis of political parties is not going to pass through the doors of the municipality. In the same ceremony, he also asked from his party administrators not to come municipality as a party member, not to follow up municipal works and not to attempt favoring for ones employed in the municipality.

As Büyükerşen, in 2009, Fakıbaba declared that after he is elected, he will take off his party badge and serve the public since he will be the mayor of entire Şanlıurfa.³⁵ In an interview published by a national newspaper, he expressed that political parties are instruments to take the office. Moreover, Fakıbaba articulated that he is a

³⁵Hürriyet (2009). 'Urfalılar Ağalarına Rağmen Oylarını Bana Verdiler'. Retrieved December 25, 2015 from http://www.gapgundemi.com/haber-10340-galericiler_sitesi_yerinde_sayiyor.html

conservative, modern and democrat individual, he has no connection with a religious sect and he does not have an Islamist political past. He added that he is not even a tight politician and the only reason of joining to the FP was the public demand. In 2012, he also claimed that he could be the mayoral candidate of another political party in the next elections, but he never demanded to become the member of any party.³⁶

Secondly, Aytaç Durak and Yılmaz Büyükerşen attempted to play the determining role in the administration of local party organization. This was also an attempt to minimize the impact of politicians on them since the member of municipal councils and interests groups might apply pressure on them through the local party organizations. In order to prevent this, Durak enabled one of his old friends with whom he carried out political activities earlier to become the Adana Provincial Head of the MP in 1984 and made him change the administrators of local party organization (Durak, 2015). Durak did not want to run into contradiction of the local party organization in order to oppose the division of his power and thus provided a companion to become the provincial head of his party. However, he found the intervention of mayors to party politics wrong and thus, explained his intervention to party politics with his lack of experience.

The intervention of Büyükerşen to party politics seems more intense because he does not only determining the local party administration, but also delivers his opinions on the candidates in local elections and general elections to the central party organization. In 2012, Büyükerşen gave a speech to the RPP provincial organization and municipal council members and he suggested a road map that should be followed by the local party organization before the local elections.³⁷ In addition, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of RPP stated that the opinions of the mayor and local party organization are going to be consulted in the process of determining the candidates of

³⁶ Urfa Haber (2012). *Fakıbaba: Şanlıurfa'da Ciddi Belediyecilik Yapıyoruz*. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from <http://www.urfahaber.net/haber/fakibaba-sanliurfada-ciddi-belediyecilik-yapiyoruz-video-10961.html>

³⁷ Anadolu Gazetesi (2012). *CHP Büyükerşen'in Kanatları Altında*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/chp-buyukerenin-kanatlari-altinda-n-3465.aspx>

Eskişehir for 2014 Local Elections.³⁸ A member of Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipal Council, who is a member of RPP, also indicated that he does not believe that the candidates of Eskişehir for 2014 Local Elections could be determined without consulting Büyükerşen's opinions and resolving his concerns.³⁹ There were debates in the local press on Büyükerşen's intervention to the nomination of Kazım Kurt for Odunpazarı District Mayor in 2014 Local Elections instead of Erman Gölet who brought up allegations of tender irregularities on Büyükerşen in 2002⁴⁰ and came first in the survey conducted among the RPP grassroots.⁴¹ Besides, Süheyl Batum, a former member of parliament from the RPP, expressed that his nomination for membership of parliament from Eskişehir was requested by Büyükerşen.⁴² A member of RPP from Eskişehir, who was not nominated as a candidate for member of parliament by the party in 2015 General Elections, criticized the intervention of Büyükerşen to party politics and claimed that he is going to fight with this local dictatorial regime which views itself supra-party and neglects the grassroots.⁴³

Lastly, these three mayors conflicted with the central/provincial/district organizations of their parties and/or the representatives of their provinces in the national assembly. Initially, Durak's struggle with his party started in the process of nomination as a candidate of JDP for the Adana Metropolitan Mayorship in 2004 (Soylu, 2012). Ömer Çelik, one of the founders of JDP, whose hometown is Adana, decisively objected to the candidacy of Durak; however, Durak was nominated since the JDP, which was established in 2001, was not effective in Adana yet. Before the 2009 Local Elections, Adana Provincial Head of the JDP resigned from his duty and

³⁸ Anadolu Gazetesi (2013). '*Adayımız Büyükerşen*'. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/chp-buyukerenin-kanatlari-altinda-n-3465.aspx>

³⁹ 2 Eylül (2013). '*El Ele Kol Kola Çalışacağız*'. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/el-el-kol-kola-calisacagiz-h20751.html>

⁴⁰ 2 Eylül (2013). '*O İlanları Unuttun mu?*'. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/o-ilanlari-unuttun-mu-h12375.html>

⁴¹ 2 Eylül (2013). '*Kurt Açıkladı, Örgüt Tepkili*'. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/kurt-acikladi-orgut-tepkili-h25861.html>

⁴² 2 Eylül (2013). '*Vekil Olmak İçin O Kentli Olmak Lazım*'. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/vekil-olmak-icin-o-kentli-olmak-lazim-h14554.html>

⁴³ 2 Eylül (2015). '*Karabasan Gibi*'. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/karabasan-gibi-h44653.html>

declared nomination candidacy for Adana Metropolitan Mayorhip (Tanyıldız, 2008). The central organization of the JDP was tacitly supported the provincial head by accepting his resignation. This is perceived as a negative message for Durak's candidacy from the JDP in 2009 Local Elections. In addition, the JDP conducted a tendency survey since there were multiple candidates for Adana Metropolitan Mayorship. Durak viewed the tendency survey as an insult to the electorates and himself and thus, he resigned from the JDP. He decided to act autonomously from the central organization of the JDP, resigned from the party and joined to the NMP. He also expressed that he did not allow the self-interested members of NMP to seek rents through the municipality (Durak, 2015). Hence, he thought that Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of NMP, called for Durak's resignation due to the allegations of corruption with the guidance of these members. In addition, he claimed that Kılıçdaroğlu requested him to be the candidate of RPP for Adana Metropolitan Mayorship; however, the self-interested members of RPP made Kılıçdaroğlu withdrew his offer because these members knew that Durak would not show favor to them. As mentioned before, party members who could not benefit from urban rents built coalitions against Durak and tarnished his image in the party.

Before 2014 Local Elections, Büyükerşen declared that he did not want primary election for the candidates of RPP in Eskişehir since the current delegates do not vote for the cadres that are able to contribute to the city, democracy and development in the primaries.⁴⁴ At the same period, a committee composed of fifteen people from the provincial and district organizations of the RPP in Eskişehir went to the RPP Headquarter so as to discuss on Erman Gölet who were not nominated as a candidate for Odunpazarı District Mayor because of Büyükerşen's intervention although he came first in the survey conducted among the grassroots.⁴⁵ Adnan Keskin, the former vice chairmen of RPP, mentioned to the committee that Büyükerşen was influential in the nomination of candidates. Süheyl Batum declared that Büyükerşen has no right to disregard the RPP provincial organization and the nomination of candidates

⁴⁴ Anadolu Gazetesi (2014). *Büyükerşen: Çaresini Düşünürüm*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/buyukeren-caresini-duunurum-n-24420.aspx>

⁴⁵ 2 Eylül (2013). *Görüşemediler Bile*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/gorusemediler-bile-h25890.html>

requested by Büyükerşen turn into a fight within the provincial organization.⁴⁶ A member of Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipal Council claimed that Büyükerşen do not need the RPP Provincial Organization since he is intolerant towards those telling the truth and he wants yes-men around him.⁴⁷ On the other hand, Büyükerşen accepted the objection of RPP provincial and district organizations regarding the person that he want to appoint to the General Directorate of Eskişehir Water and Sewerage Administration because of the fact that he is not a social democrat. In addition, RPP Seyitgazi District Head asserted that members of the party were not employed by the service units of Metropolitan Municipality in Seyitgazi because the RPP could not won the local elections in Seyitgazi.⁴⁸ Finally, 600 people from the RPP Eskişehir organization held a demonstration in front of the RPP Headquarter in order to demand primary elections to be held before 2015 General Elections and protest Büyükerşen's impact on candidate nomination.⁴⁹

On the other side, Fakıbaba conflicted with the representatives of Şanlıurfa and JDP Şanlıurfa organization after he was elected as the Şanlıurfa Mayor from the JDP in 2004. Kapaklı (2009) indicated that the reason of this conflict was the exclusion of them in every respect by Fakıbaba. Besides, Fakıbaba stated that he did not become mayor so as to implement the decisions made by others. In his column, Musa Çakmak (2009) stated that the tension between Fakıbaba and the JDP rose because Fakıbaba underestimated the projects instructed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the prime minister and the leader of the JDP; he did not embrace to receive orders from politicians; and he did not want the representatives to deal with municipal works. In other words, Erdoğan wanted Şanlıurfa Municipality under his tutelage power due to his reelection concern and thus, JDP's representatives attempted to control municipalities for reelection and increase in the votes. This created a conflict

⁴⁶ 2 Eylül (2014). *Batum: Büyükerşen CHP Örgütünü Hiçe Saydı*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/batum-buyukersen-chp-orgutunu-hice-saydi-h38323.html>

⁴⁷ 2 Eylül (2014). *Meclise Gideceğim Gündem Ona Göre Belirlensin!*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/meclise-gidecegim-gundem-ona-gore-belirlensin-h27683.html>

⁴⁸ 2 Eylül (2014). *Büyükerşen'in Adaleti*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eylul.com.tr/gundem/buyukersenin-adaleti-h36771.html>

⁴⁹ Es Gazete (2015). *CHP'lilerin Ön Seçim Talebine Genel Merkez Ne Dedi?*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.esgazete.com/siyaset/chplilerin-on-secim-talebine-genel-merkez-nededih28947.html>

between Fakıbaba and central organization of the JDP. Hence, seven representatives of Şanlıurfa from the JDP put leverage on the party headquarter so that Fakıbaba is not nominated as the candidate for Şanlıurfa Mayorship in the 2009 Local Elections (Kapaklı, 2009). At the same period, the Şanlıurfa provincial head of JDP resigned and became candidate for nomination from the JDP. As can be seen, Şanlıurfa provincial organization and some members of parliament took a joint action against the mayor. In addition, these representatives took this action in order to guarantee their candidacy in the next general elections by thinking that Fakıbaba could be a competitor for them in the next term. Sazak (2009) defended that Fakıbaba's choice on offering the municipal resources to Şanlıurfa residents was regarded as quite self-ordained and thus, a new candidate appeared in the tendency survey of the JDP in Şanlıurfa. After he elected independently as the Şanlıurfa Mayor, he stated that the representatives of the JDP who are the members of Şanlıurfa's strong families dared to instruct him, but he did not get his power from them, but from the public. It is possible to claim that there was a competition between Fakıbaba and representatives in prioritizing their roles in the urban politics so as to protect their seats. Moreover, Mahçupyan (2009) clarified the dispute between the Şanlıurfa's JDP representatives and Fakıbaba as follows:

“The JDP Headquarter was caught between its Şanlıurfa representatives and a successful mayor. The representatives imbued the prime minister with the idea that even if Erdoğan nominates his jacket as a candidate for Şanlıurfa Mayorship, it is going to be elected and he believed it. He failed to notice the actual tendency of public. In return, Fakıbaba did not turn this into inter-party competition by becoming a candidate of another political party. He stood before the public on his own and won.”

After the 2009 Local Elections, Fakıbaba joined the FP and expressed that he views parties as instruments, he does not have a relation with the party's past, he joined to the party due to the public demand and the party is aware of his independent personality.⁵⁰ In 2013, Fakıbaba returned to the JDP. This might be because his independent mayorship lost its public support and the access to public resources could be easier once he joined to the JDP, which is in power at the central

⁵⁰ Hürriyet (2009). *'Urfalılar Ağalarına Rağmen Oylarını Bana Verdiler'*. Retrieved December 25, 2015 from http://www.gapgundemi.com/haber-10340-galericiler_sitesi_yerinde_sayiyor.html

government. On the other hand, Fakıbaba's independent candidacy or candidacy from another political party was a potential risk for the JDP in the 2014 Local Elections.⁵¹ In other words, there was a relationship based on mutual interests between Fakıbaba and the JDP. In this return period, members of the JDP who are opposed to the return of Fakıbaba put pressure on the party headquarter.⁵² Şanlıurfa Provincial Head of the NMP alleged that Fakıbaba had troubles with the representatives of JDP since he refused to meet their demands on the ground that these demands are unfair to the poor; however, in the return period, there were negotiations with respect to land development plan and story height and some resolutions of metropolitan municipal council are the result of these negotiations.⁵³ Before 2014 Local Elections, it was discussed that Fakıbaba is not going to be nominated as a candidate of the Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Mayorship by the JDP staff due to the housing and traffic problems in Şanlıurfa and the tension between him and industrialists, dealers and bus operators.⁵⁴ Therefore, he was not nominated as a candidate for Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Mayorship in the 2014 Local Elections. He expressed that he was expecting to be nominated and he is sorry for not being nominated.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, he was nominated as a candidate for a member of parliament in the 2015 General Elections due to the potential risk mentioned above. To summarize, Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba fought for their political autonomy from their political parties. Durak and Fakıbaba strived to accomplish their autonomy from party politics by changing their parties while Büyükerşen aimed to protect his autonomy by dominating party politics at the local scale. On the path to the achievement of political autonomy, these three mayors run into contradiction with the district/provincial/central organizations and/or the representatives of their parties.

As a

⁵¹ Urfa Haber (2013). *Fakıbaba AKP Trenine Biniyor*. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from <http://www.urfahaber.net/haber/fakibaba-akp-trenine-biniyor-13175.html>

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Urfa Haber (2013). *Fakıbaba Adaylık İçin Taviz Veriyor*. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from <http://www.urfahaber.net/haber/fakibaba-adaylik-icin-taviz-veriyor-15725.html>

⁵⁴ Aydoğdu, Ş. (2014). *Bu Neyin Üzüntüsü Fakıbaba*. Retrieved October 3, 2015 from http://www.gapgundemi.com/haber-11778-bu_neyin_uzuntusu_fakibaba.html

⁵⁵ GAP Gündemi (2014). *Fakıbaba: Müşteri bulmakta zorlanıyoruz*. Retrieved October 3, 2015 from http://www.gapgundemi.com/haber-12195-fakibaba_musteri_bulmakta_zorlaniyoruz.html

, they became professional mayors who were able to become mayoral candidates regardless of their political parties in case that they are not nominated by their current party or even if they are, there was the possibility to obtain fewer votes, as Turan (2008) indicated. However, sometimes they had to make concessions to their political parties since their political career was dependent upon the political parties to some extent.

5.2.6. The Relationship with the Central Government

In Turkey, central government has a tutelage power over local governments due to the historical reasons mentioned earlier. The aim of the tutelage power is to control municipalities, to alienate them from politics and to preserve the authority of central government due to the distrust in municipalities (Görmez, 1997). The reason of this distrust is based upon three issues: (1) If both central government and municipalities are ruled by the same party, then central government pushes municipalities to work hard in order to remain in power, (2) Even if they are ruled by the same party, there is a possibility that the mayors might act autonomously from the party, as the cases of Durak and Fakıbaba which were discussed before, (3) there is no guarantee that all municipalities and all mayors can be controlled forever (i.e. Kurdish movement is strong at the level of local government in southeastern and eastern Anatolia) (Bayırbağ, 2013). Hence, Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba stated that they were not supported by the central government whether their parties were in power at the central level or not. They were directly subjected to the tutelage power of the central government. There were also disputes between these mayors and the governors of their provinces.

Initially, these three mayors conflicted with the central government since they were not elected as the mayor from the party in power at the central government. Durak (2015) asserted that the Adana Metropolitan Municipality that was not visited by inspectors when he was elected from the JDP was swarmed by them after he was elected from the NMP. He also claimed that the subway project which was initiated by him in 1996 and planned to serve in 1999 could enter into service only in 2011 due to the constant preventions by the political powers.

In the case of Büyükşehir, there was a dispute with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization concerning the regulations and decisions on urban transformation. He stated that the full authority with respect to the regulations and decisions on urban transformation was given to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization by the Article 9 of the Law no. 3194 and the municipality is supposed to do what the Ministry requests to do.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, officials of the Ministry expressed that the metropolitan municipality is responsible for these regulations and decisions. According to Büyükşehir, this was a provocation of the government before the 2014 Local Elections. Moreover, in 2013, a prosecution was brought against Büyükşehir with the charge of corruption. Büyükşehir stressed that the aim of government is to make the municipality dysfunctional through this prosecution.⁵⁷ Regarding this, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that this prosecution is a local electoral campaign of the JDP and asked why inspectors do not visit the municipalities governed by the JDP. On the subject of investments in the city, Nabi Avcı, who is the representative of Eskişehir from the JDP and the Minister of National Education, mentioned that a mayor speaking the same language with the central government could quadruple the investments to the city. He added that in Eskişehir, either central government or local government should be changed so that Eskişehir could have access to these investments. Hence, it is possible to stress that financial dependence of metropolitan municipalities to the central government could be exploited as a political instrument by the party in power at the central government in the mayoral elections.

Before the 2009 Local Elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister in that period, held a public meeting in Şanlıurfa. In the meeting, he addressed Fakıbaşa: “You run as an independent candidate. With whom are you going to build a council group? How are you going to find the resources and power that you held before?”⁵⁸ Furthermore, Kapaklı (2009) claimed that municipal officials and employees could not vote by their own will due to the fear of not receiving their wages or dismissal

⁵⁶ Anadolu Gazetesi (2014). *Büyükşehir*; “Kentsel dönüşüm yasası yetersiz”. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/buyukeren-kentsel-donuum-yasasi-yetersiz-n-18436.aspx>

⁵⁷ 2 Eylül (2013). *Keşke 81 İl Eskişehir Gibi Olsa*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.2eyul.com.tr/gundem/keske-81-il-eskisehir-gibi-olsa-h14763.html>

⁵⁸ Kürkçüoğlu, Y. (2009b). *Fakıbaşa Üzerinden Siyaset*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.sanliurfasembol.com/ydetay.php?id=863>

resulted from such statements concerning the discontinuation of resources allocated by the central government to the municipality. As can be seen, the prime minister implied that an independent mayoral candidate can not be successful without the political and financial support of the central government once he is elected.

Then, Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba indicated that they were not supported by their parties even if these parties were in power at the central government. When Durak was elected as the Adana Metropolitan Mayor from the MP, he initiated the construction of an artificial island inside the Seyhan Lake which was the property of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Durak, 2015). Therefore, Durak advocated that the Minister of Environment who was also from the MP sued him owing to the pressures from the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works and his political opponents. Besides, Durak spoke to the Minister of Environment and Forestry so that necessary regulations could be made on the issue of restraining mountain goats from entering the forests. However, he could not gain any results since peasants earning money from goat raising put pressure on the minister through representatives.

On the other hand, Büyükerşen was elected as the mayor from the DLP and visited Bülent Ecevit in 1999, who was the leader of DLP and the prime minister in that period, in order to seek for aid in personnel recruitment (Taşçı, 2009). However, he recommended Büyükerşen that he manage the municipality with less resources because he was against setting up a cadre and overstaffing in public offices.

Fakıbaba also requested from Faruk Çelik, the representative of Şanlıurfa from the JDP and the Minister of Labor and Social Security, the support of central government with respect to urban transformation.⁵⁹ Moreover, upon Fakıbaba's return to the JDP, Çelik was asked about the debts of the Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and he replied that he could not rule out these debts for the sake of his return to the party. In this way, the

⁵⁹ Şanlıurfa Sembol (2013). *Şanlıurfa Belediyesi Revizyona Gidiyor*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.sanliurfasembol.com/57968-sanliurfa-belediyesi-revizyona-gidiyor-haberi.html>

mayor is controlled by the central government through his financial dependence on the central government.⁶⁰

And then, Durak and Büyükerşen were also subjected to the tutelage power of central government. As mentioned before, by the Article 47 of the Law no. 5393, the Ministry of Interior was given the authority to remove from office mayors against whom an investigation or prosecution has been initiated on the grounds of offences related to their duties. Durak was removed from the office by the approval of the Minister of Interior on March 28, 2010 for the safety of investigation which was conducted due to the allegations of corruption. The decision of dismissal was reviewed and renewed every two months until 2014. Özdağ (2013) criticized the dismissal of a politician coming to power with the votes of the public for three years on the basis of the continuation of inspections conducted by the Ministry of Interior although Durak was acquitted of the lawsuits brought on him up to now.

Büyükerşen also wanted to appoint Osman Nuri Özcan to the general directorate of Eskişehir Water and Sewerage Administration.⁶¹ However, the Ministry of Interior submitted adverse opinion to the Eskişehir Metropolitan Municipality and did not approve the appointment of Özcan to the office. This administrative tutelage power of the central government is based on the Article 11 of the Law no. 2560 dated 1981 which states that the general directorate of water and sewage administration is appointed by the Minister of Interior on the proposal of the metropolitan mayor.

Lastly, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba had conflicts with the governors of their provinces. When there was a disagreement between Büyükerşen and private bus operators, he recommended people to file a complaint about the private bus operators to the governorship.⁶² However, according to Büyükerşen, the governorship did not interfere in the issue, yet made it look like the failure of municipality and acted politically instead of helping municipalities and elected officials. In addition, he

⁶⁰ Urfa Haber (2013). *Bakan Çelik'in Fakıbaba değerlendirmesi*. Retrieved October 4, 2015 from <http://www.urfahaber.net/haber/bakan-celikin-fakibaba-degerlendirmesi-13183.html>

⁶¹ 2 Eylül (2015). *Bakanlık Olmaz Dedi*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eyul.com.tr/gundem/bakanlik-olmaz-dedi-h45257.html>

⁶² Anadolu Gazetesi (2015). *Büyükerşen: Mafyavari işletmeci istemiyorum*. Retrieved October 5, 2015 from <http://www.anadolugazetesi.net/buyukeren-mafyavari-iletmeci-istemiyorum-n-24814.aspx>

expressed that the revenue of the Metropolitan Municipality is not sufficient to deliver services due to the debts of Special Provincial Administration transferred to the Metropolitan Municipality after the abolishment of Special Provincial Administrations by the Law no. 6360 in 2012.⁶³ In response, the governorship declared that the capacity of metropolitan municipality in service delivery was regarded when the debts of Special Provincial Administration was transferred and the revenues of metropolitan municipality expanded by the Law no. 6360 is sufficient to deliver services.

On the other side, Kapaklı (2009) asserted that before the 2009 Local Elections, in which Fakıbaba ran as an independent mayoral candidate, the Governor Yusuf Yavaşcan supported the candidate of the JDP through the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation, which is affiliated with the Şanlıurfa Governorship. Moreover, the Governor wanted to undertake the stadium project due to the persistence of Şanlıurfa representatives; however, Fakıbaba opposed it by suggesting that such projects were in the municipality's field of activity. Concerning the bus terminal, Fakıbaba claimed that the governor took a stand with the representatives.

In sum, these three mayors were limited by the tutelage power of central government and financial dependence to central government whether they were elected from the party in power at the central government or not. Inspections on the mayors, the appointments of municipality's top-level bureaucrats and removing mayors from the office are the cases that Ministry of Interior imposes administrative tutelage on the municipalities and mayors. On the other hand, distribution of financial resources, financial support and debts of municipalities became instruments in the hands of central government to pull the strings of mayors by exploiting the financial dependence of municipalities on the central government. In the cases of Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba, governors, as the representatives of central government in provinces, acted as an agent to oppose the current mayors and support the mayoral candidates of the JDP in provinces. In this way, the objectivity of supervision mechanism and autonomy of municipalities became suspicious.

⁶³ 2 Eylül (2014). *Büyükşehir'e Devredilenler Hizmet İçin Yeterli*. Retrieved October 6, 2015 from <http://www.2eyul.com.tr/gundem/buyuksehire-devredilenler-hizmet-icin-yeterli-h32471.html>

5.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, the cases of Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba are analyzed and interpreted so as to elucidate the further strengthening of metropolitan mayors with reference to NPM perspective. In that regard, the relationship of these three mayors with the municipal organization, district municipalities, service recipients, interest groups, political party organization, and central government is examined by taking into consideration the tension between centralization and decentralization. One of the conclusions drawn in this chapter is that these mayors are in a political fight with the municipal council in order to be dominant over the municipal organization. In this fight, the mayors have an advantage over the municipal council due to the legal and institutional obstacles which are formed as a result of the distrust toward municipal councils and pursuit of stability in municipal administration. Secondly, the hierarchical two-tier metropolitan municipality system established in 1984 results in centralization of administrative and financial authorities in metropolitan municipalities and political power in metropolitan mayors. As a result of this centralization, the mayors are observed to have attempted to discipline and/or control the district municipalities, and these attempts are expected to increase due to the expansion of the adjacent metropolitan municipality in 2012. Thirdly, the acts of Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba might be considered as authoritarian because of the criticisms directed at them regarding the public participation in city administration. However, these criticisms do not prevent them from being elected consecutively because electorates depend on the mayors with respect to service delivery and social aids. This dependence turns these mayors into political entrepreneurs who are driven by projects and who seek votes in return. Then, there are certain fluctuations concerning the relationship between these mayors and interest groups. On the one hand, they have to build a patron-client relations so as to finance local services and thus, they have to act like a CEO creating resources and enhancing them. On the other hand, they possess the ability to resist the demands of interest groups when these demands contradict with the public interests because they are directly elected by the public themselves. Despite these resistance coming from these mayors, the interests groups could not discard them because they are placed at the center of the complex local networks which run the risk of collapsing in

case of their absence in the office. As for the relationship with the political parties, it is possible to put forward that Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba become professional mayors; that is, they are able to be elected as the mayor regardless of their political party affiliations. They strive to separate politics from their municipal administration and achieve autonomy from party politics. Therefore, they conflict with their political parties. In addition, there are instances that the mayors compromise with their party organizations because their political career is dependent on the political parties when public support is in decline. Lastly, it is observed that the central government has enforced limits to these mayors regardless of their parties since the central government distrusted these mayors as autonomous policy makers and want to control their actions. These limits mainly cover the inspections, removal from the office, appointments of top-level municipal bureaucrats, restrictions on financial resources, and the opposing actions of governors.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The neoliberal reforms bringing local governments under the spotlight as well as the capital accumulation strategy targeting urban areas ignited debates on metropolitan cities, municipalities and mayors around the world. Neoliberal administrative reforms inspired by the NPM perspective were also implemented in Turkey. As a result of these reforms, the administrative and financial powers of municipalities were increased. The political consequence of these reforms was the rise of the figure of strong mayor, metropolitan mayor in particular. Hence, this study aimed to investigate the relationship between the NPM perspective and the figure of strong metropolitan mayor.

In order to achieve this aim, the first chapter of the thesis was allocated to building an analytical framework by examining the literature on theories of leadership, forms of local government, and the NPM perspective. Then, second chapter focused on the historical background of the local governments in Turkey from the pre-republican period up to the present. Next, as the major focus of the third chapter, the tension between decentralization and centralization was investigated with respect to the relationship of mayor with the other actors of local. Lastly, the cases of Aytaç Durak in Adana, Yılmaz Büyükerşen in Eskişehir and Ahmet Eşref Fakıbaba in Şanlıurfa were analyzed with the aim of further elaborating on the arguments developed in the previous chapters.

To summarize the main arguments of this thesis, taking the insights of situational, transactional, and transformational leadership theories as the departure point, I argue that the strong mayor further advances her/his central role in the complex urban policy network produced by the reforms which have been designed and implemented in the spirit of NPM and governance perspectives. Transactional metropolitan mayor's mutual relationship with service recipients, interest groups and her/his

political party, and attribution of all of the changes to the transformational mayor could be explicated and comprehended through particularly transactional and transformational leadership theories. Leader-orientation of the complex urban policy network results in an institutional setting of local government, especially in the strong mayor-council form, which enables the mayor to act autonomously from the council. The strong mayor, thus, appears to be the sole authority in local politics contrary to the aspirations of the NPM and governance approach, which aim to remove monolithic and holistic organizational structures and build decentralized, pluralist and, participatory local governance environment.

Secondly, there is an apparent historical authority conflict between the mayor and central government, as shown in the chapter where the evolution of local governments in Turkey is analyzed (Please See Chapter 3). Although there have been attempts of decentralization since the 1980s, the administrative tutelage power of central government over local governments has largely been preserved. However, despite the existence of administrative tutelage, political significance, and weight of mayors has constantly increased, starting from 1963 and further increasing with the reforms in 1980s and 2000s. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the administrative reforms implemented in the 2010s withdraw administrative and financial authorities of local governments to central government units due to the distrust to mayor. In other words, mayor's active search for autonomy on the one hand and central government's pragmatism on the other are the sources of the indeterminacy problem and tension regarding the autonomy of local governments from the central government in Turkey, the roots of which can be observed in in the Ottoman period. And thanks to the loopholes and ambiguities caused by this problem, the mayor, especially metropolitan mayor, could posit her/himself at the center of local politics and become stronger in his/her position.

Thirdly, the metropolitan mayor established her/himself as the main actor of local politics through different strategies pursued in her/his relations with metropolitan municipality organization, district municipalities, service recipients, interest groups, political parties, and central government. Within this framework, the mayor is dominant on municipal organization and district municipalities. In addition, the mayor and service recipients are mutually dependent considering the political

support in exchange of service delivery or vice versa. There was also a mutual relationship between the mayor and interests groups, where financial resources for service delivery are provided in exchange of a seat in decision-making process. The coexistence of mayor's dominance on municipal organization and district municipalities and her/his popularity among service recipients and interest groups enables mayor to act autonomously from her/his political party, which leads to contradictions and competition between the mayor and party organization. Nevertheless, due to the reasons mentioned earlier, central government's tutelage could be regarded as a limit to the mayor's power while this tutelage could well take the form of political and/or financial pressure.

Fourthly, when the cases of Adana, Eskişehir and Şanlıurfa are analyzed, it is observed that the relationship between the mayors of these metropolitan cities and the other actors of local politics lend considerable support to the theoretical and empirical findings of the study. The cases of Durak, Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba were chosen because these cases are considered to be the extreme ones. These cases were also significant due to their independence from the geographical context. Thus, the study was able to analyze the phenomenon of strong mayor by going beyond the social and political dynamics which are peculiar to localities.

Considering the relationship between these mayors and the municipal organization, it is possible to observe that these mayors' profiles and activities could be explained by the situational leadership theory since they seek full control over municipal organization although they refer to their subordinates for any necessary information. Furthermore, these mayors oppose to the intervention of politicians in municipal issues for not only gaining market-oriented ends, but also ensuring their autonomy from party politics in general, and their own party in particular. The supervision mechanisms of metropolitan municipal council on the mayors do not work because of the legal/institutional barriers (the strong mayor-council form of local government in Turkey).

With respect to the relationship with the district municipalities, these metropolitan mayors have had tensions with the district municipality mayors. Especially in the case of Eskişehir, district mayors from the JDP accuse Büyükerşen of the failures in

service delivery to rural areas. This case shows the financial dependence of district municipalities on metropolitan municipalities, which makes metropolitan municipality's neutral actions towards district municipalities questionable. The mayor in whose hands political power is concentrated could establish a *de facto* tutelage on district municipalities, which are actually expected to be autonomous political bodies.

The relationship of these three metropolitan mayors with the service recipients depends on their public images as well. That they managed to be elected from different parties, or independently, suggests that the public images of these three metropolitan mayors are positive. They owe their popularity to the implementation of visible and tangible services improving the daily lives of city residents, such as cheaper public transportation and bread, construction of parks, establishment of light rail transportation, feasts, landscaping and pavement of sidewalks. These mayors, however, have been reluctant to embrace a participatory approach, when it comes to city residents' involvement in municipal affairs. Durak, for instance, has had a suspicious outlook about 'public opinion', questioning its accuracy (Koç, 2010b). Taking these into account, it could be asserted that city residents are more concerned about the improvements in their daily lives than participating in urban policy. Hence, these mayors transform into authoritarian figures in local politics whose discretionary actions are disregarded, and into political entrepreneurs who are project-oriented so as to receive more votes.

The entrepreneurship of these mayors became evident in the case of their relationship with the interest groups. In order to create and improve resources for public services, they cooperate with the interest groups and thus, they could be reelected since the public services are successfully delivered to the city residents. As can be seen, there is a mutual relationship between these mayors and interest groups whereby mayors could remain in their offices while interest groups could continue to have a say in the local decision-making process. Nevertheless, once the demands of interest groups contradict with the public interests, these mayors begin to act autonomously from the interest groups. Meeting the demands of interest groups and ignoring public interests might cost them their mayoral offices because these mayors are directly elected by the public.

It is also possible to observe the mayors' fight for autonomy from party politics when the relationship between these mayors and their political parties is investigated. This fight stems from a concern with the "hands-on management" principle of the NPM perspective, referring to their autonomy from politicians and right to manage. The party organizations or the members of the parliament from the same party, however, are always keen to intervene in the municipal affairs with the aim of pursuing their own economic and/or political interests. In this process, these mayors get into conflicts with the local branches (district or provincial) and headquarters of their political parties, or they experience tensions with their parties' parliament members elected in the same electoral area. Nevertheless, the mayoral election system, which underlies the mayor's personal profile/popularity, provides advantage for these mayors to act autonomously from their political parties. Hence, Durak and Fakıbaba were able to change their political parties before the elections, while Büyükerşen dominates the local party politics so that they could be autonomous from party politics. As a result, they emerge as professional mayors, who are able to be elected regardless of their party affiliations. However, as in the case of Fakıbaba, these mayors may reach compromises with their party organizations especially when the public support is in decline and thus, they would require their parties' support.

The political career of a mayor could also be dependent on her/his relationship with the central government, as in the case of Aytaç Durak who was removed from the office by the Minister of Interior due to the investigations on the grounds of offences related to their duties. Büyükerşen has also experienced government interventions, especially through administrative investigations run by the Ministry of Interior, as well as through the obstacles posed by the government in the approval process of high bureaucratic post appointments by the mayor. Besides, financial dependence of municipalities to central government became a trump card in the hands of central government. Ministers and even the Prime Minister could publicly declare that these metropolitan municipalities would not receive financial support from the government if their mayors are elected from a political party different from the one ruling the central government, as in the case of Büyükerşen and Fakıbaba. Nonetheless, it should be expressed that even if the central government and metropolitan mayors belong to the same political party, mayors were subject to the financial limitations of

the central government. As a result, regardless of which party mayors belong to, the central government seeks for dependent and controllable metropolitan municipalities and mayors. Hence, there have been some attempts to limit the legal powers and responsibilities of municipalities in the 2010s.

As can be seen, reforms inspired by the NPM and governance perspectives and the emergent practice of local government resulted in the rise of strong mayors who could only be limited by the central government to some extent. These strong mayors, as the elected politicians, are seen as the main leadership figures in locality, thanks to an administrative environment bringing them to the center of local politics. They, thus, enjoy a political mandate from coming from local citizens, and their legitimacy to speak out on behalf of local people is difficult to challenge. Then, the mayors, as elected politicians, begin to play the decisive role in local decision-making and implementing processes which are complex and dispersed networks including various local actors. These complex and dispersed networks necessitate a strong network manager (Bayırbağ, 2015). For local politics, this strong network manager is the mayor, especially metropolitan mayor through whom various actors taking part in local politics are attached to each other. The mayor could both expand her/his room for manoeuvre and increase her/his term of office since s/he become an inalienable actor owing to his central role in the local policy network. As the NPM perspective defends, the mayor turns into public entrepreneurs obsessed with self-promotion, rule-breaking power politics, risk-taking and radical change (Terry, 1993), which conflicts with the principles of governance, such as pluralism, representation, participation, ruling together, transparency and democracy since entrepreneurial manipulation of public authority in pursuit of personal gain offends these principles (Diver, 1982). The inherently self-interested, risk-taking and rule-breaking orientations of the mayors create a dilemma for advocates of both the NPM and governance approaches (Terry, 1998). On the one hand, these qualities are embraced since they help mayors make innovations and radical changes. On the other hand, these qualities raise the concern on the excessive power in the hands of mayors. This concern calls for more constraints on the mayors, which conflicts with the principles of right to manage and flexibility assumed to mayors by the NPM.

Finally, one of the major caveats is that neither leadership theories nor the NPM approach can completely explain the emergence of this unique metropolitan mayor figure in Turkey as a result of the metropolitan municipality model inspired by the neoliberal administrative reforms after 1980s. Efficient and effective administration, participation of local citizens, satisfaction of their transcendental needs, and being a moral agent or a role-model are not the concerns of these mayors. The informal, dispersed and complex urban policy network, on the other hand, required a network manager, not a moderator. Consequently, a metropolitan mayor figure who is not bound by the mechanisms of supervision, accountability, transparency and participation emerges in this chaotic administrative environment contrary to the essence of the administrative reforms inspired by the NPM and governance approaches.

In addition, the thesis might not cover all events and all of related information about the events since the analyses are based on the books, local and national newspapers, magazines, and official documents. In order to overcome this problem, further researches might be carried out through interviews with all of the counterparts of local politics discussed in the fourth chapter. Comprehensive interviews might also contribute to eliminating the problem of possible incompleteness. This research agenda needs to be further developed by an analysis on the metropolitan mayors of JDP serving more than two consecutive terms so as to comprehend this trend with respect to their relationships with party politics and interest groups. Besides, different case studies in other countries might be conducted so as to discover the cross-cultural similarities or differences among the trends of these countries. Moreover, more focus on leadership theories might open up new horizons for the studies on metropolitan mayors as both political and administrative leaders. Considering these broader picture and comparative studies, there are limits to indepth analysis which would require a more qualitative approach and analytical method. It should be noted that the discussions made in this thesis serve as a starting point for this field of study. It is hoped that the questions raised by this thesis will yield further contributions to the field by other researchers.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez, Türkiye’de 1980 sonrası yeni kamu işletmeciliği (YKİ) perspektifinden ilham alan yönetsel reformların siyasi sonuçlarını, Türkiye’nin farklı coğrafi bölgelerinde yer alan üç büyükşehir belediyesi örneğine dayanarak anlamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu reformların özellikle büyükşehir belediye başkanlarının profilini ve kılığını nasıl değiştirdiğini incelemektedir. Ayrıca, YKİ perspektifinin belediye başkanları üzerindeki etkisi, liderlik kuramları ve yerel yönetim modelleri temelinde anlaşılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu amaçla, büyükşehir belediye başkanlarının belediye örgütü, alandaki diğer yerel yönetim aktörleri, hizmet alıcılar, çıkar grupları, siyasi partisi ve merkezi yönetim ile ilişkilerine odaklanılmaktadır. Bu analizin YKİ ile güçlü belediye başkanı arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamaya yardımcı olacağı iddia edilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, idari adem-i merkezîyetçiliği ve işletmeciliği savunan YKİ’nin belediye başkanının kişiliğinde siyasi bir merkezîleşme yaratacağı iddia edilmektedir.

Kapitalizmin 1970’lerin sonunda girdiği kriz sosyal, siyasal ve yönetsel dönüşümle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu dönüşümün adı Yeni Sağ’dır. Yeni Sağ, ekonomik süreçlere katılan ve müdahale eden refah devletine ve Keynezyen ekonomi politikalarına son vermiştir. Yeni Sağ’ın kamu yönetimindeki yansıması ise, kamu yönetiminin küçültülmesi, faaliyet alanının küçültülmesi ve kamu işletmeciliği çerçevesinde yeniden örgütlenmesi şeklinde olmuştur. Kamu yönetimi, siyaset-yönetim ikiliği çizgisinde ve klasik kamu yönetimi anlayışına referansla yeniden tanımlanmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, kamu yönetiminin siyasal ve sosyal bağlamından koparılarak tarafsızlaştırılması amaçlanmıştır.

Bu yönetsel dönüşüm için ileri sürülen kavramsallaştırma, kamu yönetiminin örgütlenmesinin ve kamu hizmetleri sunumunun piyasa ilkelerine ve işletmecilik mantığına uygun olarak yapılmasını savunan YKİ görüşüdür. Bu bakımdan, kamu yönetiminin katalizör, rekabetçi, amaç ve sonuç odaklı, öngörülü ve adem-i merkezi

olması gerektiği ileri sürülmektedir. Ayrıca kamu yönetimi, yetkilerini özel sektöre devretmeli ve bu yetkilere ilişkin konuları sadece yönlendirmeli ve kolaylaştırmalıdır.

Kamu kuruluşlarının etkin, rekabetçi, rekabetçi, amaç ve sonuç odaklı, öngörülü, yenilikçi ve girişimci kuruluşlar olarak işleyebilmesi için dinamik ve esnek bir kamu yönetimi anlayışı benimsemelidir. Bu anlayış, katı örgütsel yapılar yoluyla değil, esnek örgütsel yapılar yoluyla uygulanabilir. Bundan dolayı, örgütsel hiyerarşi azaltılırken karar alma yetkisi merkezden yerele doğru dağıtılmalıdır.

Yeni Sağ politikaları ve YKİ görüşünü benimseyen hükümetler, refah devletinin ortadan kaldırılması ve buna bağlı olarak toplumsal refahın düşmesi sonucunda tepki görmüşlerdir. Bu aşamada, YKİ ilkelerini muhafaza ederken çoğulcu karar alma süreçlerini öneren yönetim yaklaşımı bu tepkileri önleme amacıyla tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Yönetişim anlayışına göre, kamu hizmetlerinin sunumu sadece devletler tarafından yüklenilmemelidir; kamu sektörü, özel sektör ve sivil toplum aktörleri kamu hizmetlerinin sunumuna yönelik bir ortaklık inşa etmelidir.

Kapitalizm küresel ölçekte dikkate alındığında; yerel, bölgesel, ulusal, uluslararası ve ulus-üstü şirketler, örgütler ve sivil toplumun birbirine bağımlı hale geldiğini öne sürmek mümkündür. Bu ilişki, artan sayıda aktörlerden oluşan ağlar yaratmıştır. Yönetişim anlayışına göre, bu ağların yönetimi hiyerarşik merkeziyetçi bir yönetimi değil, karmaşık sistemlerin eşgüdümünü ve birlikte yönetme pratiğini gerektirmektedir. Bu sebeple, yönetim katılım ve adem-i merkeziyetçiliğe vurgu yapmaktadır.

Ancak, YKİ ve yönetim tarafından savunulan devletin küçültülmesi, kamu yönetiminin etkinliğinde bir azalma gerçekleşeceğine işaret etmemektedir. Aksine, karar alma ve uygulama süreçlerinin daha hızlı sonlandırılabilmesi ve çok parçalı devlet yapısının eşgüdüm içinde yönetilebilmesi için daha güçlü bir yürütme ve daha güçlü bir idari yapıya ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bunun sonucunda ortaya çıkan daha güçlü yürütme organı ve daha güçlü idari yapılar, yönetim anlayışının çoğulculuk ve katılım ilkeleri ile ters düşmektedir.

Bu gelişmelerin yerel yönetimler üzerindeki etkisi, siyasi merkezileşme eşliğinde idari adem-i merkezileşme olmuştur. Bir yandan yerel yönetimlerin idari ve mali yetkileri artırılırken, öte yandan siyasi güç belediye başkanlarında -özellikle büyükşehir belediye başkanlarında- merkezileşmiştir ve belediye başkanları otoriter figürlere dönüşmüştür.

Bu adem-i merkezileşmenin amacı, yerel yönetimleri kamu hizmetlerini özelleştiren ve/veya onları piyasa ilkeleri çerçevesinde sunan girişimci kurumlara dönüştürmektir. Bunun sonucunda, hizmet sunumundaki rollerine bağlı olarak yerel, bölgesel, ulusal ve ulus-üstü ölçeklerde faaliyet gösteren özel sektör ve sivil toplum aktörleri, yerel karar alma ve uygulama süreçlerinin meşru paydaşı haline gelmektedir. Bu çok sektörlü politika ortamı, eşgüdüm ve işbirliği içinde çalışmalıdır. Fakat özel sektör ile sivil toplumun gayriresmi ilişkiler üzerine kurulu doğası sebebiyle kamu kurumlarını bağlayan resmi kurullarla eşgüdüm ve işbirliğinin sağlanması mümkün değildir.

Bu parçalı ve gayriresmi ilişkileri içeren kentsel politika ortamı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, makamında daha uzun süre kalan ve profesyonel üst düzey yönetici gibi davranan, güçlü, girişimci, işbiririci, esnek ve şartlara uyum sağlayabilen belediye başkanlarının yükselişini öngörmek zor değildir. Çünkü kentsel politikalarda yer alan çeşitli aktörler belediye başkanı üzerinden birbirleri ile ilişkilenebilmektedirler. Politika ağındaki meşruiyetlerini muhafaza edebilmek için bu aktörler belediye başkanına bağımlıdır. Belediye başkanı da, hareket alanını genişletebilmek ve belli bir esnekliğe sahip olabilmek için bu aktörlere bağımlıdır. Ek olarak, siyasi gücün belediye başkanının elinde toplanması, onu parti bağından bağımsız olarak seçilme kabiliyetine sahip profesyonel belediye başkanına dönüştürmekte ve ona parti siyasetinden özerklik sağlamaktadır. Adem-i merkezileşme, çoğulculuk ve yerel hizmet sunumunda kamu-özel-sivil toplum ortaklığını kapsayan YKİ ve yönetim yaklaşımları sonucunda ortaya çıkan bu muğlak kentsel politika ortamı, merkezinde hakim ve güçlü bir belediye başkanı üretmiştir.

Görüleceği gibi, belediye başkanı bir yandan bu karmaşık yerel ağ içinde kentsel liderlik rolünü üstlenmektedir. Öte yandan, bir kamu örgütü olan belediyeye liderlik

yapması sebebiyle, örgütsel liderlik konumuna da sahiptir. Bundan dolayı, belediye başkanlığının liderlik tarzının incelenmesi önem arz etmektedir, çünkü başkan karar alma ve uygulama süreçlerini şekillendirmenin yanında bu süreçlerin unsurları tarafından da şekillendirilmektedir. Bunlar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, YKİ görüşünün güçlü, girişimci, işbiricisi, esnek ve koşullara uyumlu bir belediye başkanına ihtiyaç duyduğu ileri sürülebilir. YKİ görüşünün ne tür bir liderlik tarzına ihtiyaç duyduğunu tespit edebilmek için, liderlik kuramlarının incelenmesi gerekmektedir.

İncelenen liderlik kuramları arasından durumsal, etkileşimci ve dönüşümsel liderlik kuramlarının güçlü belediye başkanının karmaşık kentsel politika ağındaki merkezi konumunu güçlendireceği belirlenmiştir. Çünkü bu kuramlar, işbiricisi, yaratıcı, yenilikçi, girişimci, sonuç odaklı ve özellikleri ile davranışlarını durumlara göre değiştirebilen esnek liderler tasavvur etmektedir.

YKİ ve yönetim görüşleri sonucunda ortaya çıkan karmaşık kentsel politika ağının güçlü lider ihtiyacı sebebiyle, yerel yönetimlerin kurumsal yapıları, belediye başkanının hem siyasi hem de idari liderliği sebebiyle en görünür konumda bulunduğu güçlü başkan-meclis modeli olmuştur. Böylece, belediye başkanının meclisten özerk davranma kapasitesine sahip olacağı, meclisin muhalefetinden bağımsız olacağı, daha etkin çalışacağı ve yerel sorunlara daha hızlı çözümler bulacağı öngörülmüştür. Buradan anlaşılacağı gibi, monolitik ve bütüncül örgütsel yapıyı kaldırıp yerine adem-i merkezîyetçi, çoğulcu ve katılımcı bir örgütsel yapı inşa etme amacı taşıyan YKİ ve yönetim yaklaşımlarından ilham alan idari reformların sonucunda güçlü belediye başkanı yerel siyasetteki tek otorite haline gelmiştir.

Liderlik kuramları, yerel yönetim modelleri ve YKİ'nin kuramsal temellerinin incelenmesinin ardından, Türkiye'deki yerel yönetimlerin tarihsel arkaplanının incelenmesi, YKİ görüşünden esinlenen idari reformların yerel yönetimleri nasıl etkilediğini incelerken faydalı olacaktır. Bu sebeple, yerel yönetimlerin tarihsel arkaplanı, ülkenin siyasi ve idari yapısının önemli dönüşümler yaşadığı altı döneme ayrılarak ele alınmıştır. Bu dönemler Cumhuriyet öncesi dönem, tek parti dönemi,

çok partili sisteme geçiş dönemi, 1960-1980 arası, 1980-1990 arası, 1990-2000 arası ve 2000'den bugüne olarak belirlenmiştir.

Cumhuriyet öncesinden bugüne kadar olan dönemin ortak özelliği, merkezi hükümetin yerel yönetimler üzerindeki hâkimiyetidir. Türkiye'de yerel yönetimler, yerel halkın temsilinin ve onun yönetime katılımının sağlandığı mekanizmalar olarak görülmekten ziyade, kamu hizmetlerini merkezi hükümet namına sağlayan kamu kurumları olarak görülmüştür. Bunun sebebi, yerel yönetimlere verilecek yetkilerin ülkenin birliği ve bütünlüğüne tehdit oluşturabileceğine ilişkin kaygıdır. Yani yerel yönetimler, merkezi hükümetinin çıkarlarının yerelde temsil edildiği mekanizmalar halini almıştır. Bundan dolayı, merkezi hükümet yerel yönetimler üzerindeki idari vesayet gücünü korumuş ve bazen bu gücü belediyeler ve belediye başkanları üzerinde uygulamıştır.

1963 yılında, belediye başkanlarının halk tarafından seçilmeye başlanmasıyla, belediye başkanlarının siyasi gücünün arttığı ve Türkiye'deki yerel yönetimlerde güçlü başkanlık modelinin uygulanmaya başladığı ifade edilmektedir. Bu dönemde belediye başkanları, kişisel çaba göstererek kent işletmeciliği yaklaşımını benimsemiş ve belediye birlikleri kurarak merkezi yönetim ve parti yönetimi karşısında hareket kabiliyeti kazanmışlardır.

1980'lere gelindiğinde, Türkiye'nin belediye sisteminde radikal bir değişikliğin gerçekleştiği görülmektedir. Bu değişiklik, Türkiye'nin en büyük üç şehrinde büyükşehir belediyelerinin kurulmasıdır. Türkiye'deki büyükşehir belediyelerinin sayısı 1980'lerin sonunda sekize, 2000'lere kadar on altıya ve 2012'de otuza ulaşmıştır. Bu değişikliğin görünen amacı, büyükşehir belediyelerinin idari ve mali kapasitesinin artırılarak, bu şehirlerde sunulan yerel hizmetlerin etkinliğini ve verimliliğini artırmaktır. Ancak, büyükşehir belediyesinin kurulmasının altında yatan amacın kentlerdeki muhalefeti bastırmak ve kentsel alana dayalı yeni birikim stratejilerini uygulamak olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Bundan dolayı, her ne kadar idari ve mali kapasitesi artırılrsa da, belediyelerin merkezi yönetimden özerkliği sağlanamamıştır. Çünkü yapılan değişiklik, merkezi hükümetin siyasa yapımı sürecine katkı sunan bir adem-i merkezileşme çabasıdır.

1990’larda ise, sosyal politikalar ve özelleştirmeler gibi kişisel pragmatik çabalarla, belediye başkanları etkilerini artırmıştır. Buna ek olarak, 2000’lerde yapılan idari reformlar büyükşehir belediyelerinin yetkilerini ilçe belediyeleri karşısında artırmış, büyükşehir belediyelerini YKİ’nin savunduğu ilkeler doğrultusunda yeniden yapılandırmış, yönetim yaklaşımı çizgisinde yeniden düzenlemiş, küçük ilçeleri kaldırmış ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin mücavir alanlarını il mülki sınırlarına kadar genişletmiştir. Görüleceği gibi, bu reformlar idari yetkileri büyükşehir belediyelerinde merkezileştirirken siyasi gücü de belediye başkanlarında merkezileştirmektedir, çünkü belediyelerin ve başkanların etki alanı ile hâkim olduğu yerel ağ genişlemektedir. Yine de, merkezi yönetim zaman zaman siyasi ve mali vesayet yetkisi olarak da kullanabildiği idari vesayet yetkisini muhafaza etmektedir. Bunun yanında, merkezi yönetime bazı durumlarda, ilgili yerel yönetimin onayı olmaksızın, imar planında değişiklik yapma, imar planını hazırlama ve uygulama yetkileri aktarılmıştır.

Bunlar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Türkiye’de yerel yönetimlerin özerkliği konusunda bir kararsızlık problemi söz konusudur. Kimi yetkiler yerel yönetimlere aktarılırken kimi yetkiler merkezi yönetime geri çekilmektedir. Bu da, belediye başkanları ile merkezi yönetim arasında bir yetki çatışmasını kışkırtmaktadır. Bu çatışma sonucunda belediye başkanları, yerel hizmetlerin daha hızlı, etkin ve etkili sunulabilmesi için yukarıda bahsedilen karmaşık ve muğlak kentsel politika ağının merkezinde konumlanmaktadır.

Büyükşehir belediye başkanlarının kentsel politika ağındaki merkezi konumunu anlamak için, başkanların bu ağda ilişki içinde olduğu aktörlerin tespitinin ve bu aktörlerle olan ilişkinin niteliğinin incelenmesi gerekmektedir. İlk olarak, büyükşehir belediyesi örgütünün başkanı olması sebebiyle, başkanın belediye örgütü ile ilişkisi önem arz etmektedir. Bu ilişkide, encümen ve meclis üzerindeki hâkimiyeti sayesinde belediye başkanının belediye örgütü üzerinde kontrol sahibi olduğu öne sürülmektedir.

Ardından, büyükşehir belediyesi olması sebebiyle, başkanın mücavir alan içindeki diğer yerel yönetim birimleri, özellikle ilçe belediyeleri ile ilişkileri önemlidir. İki kademeli hiyerarşik büyükşehir belediyesi modeli, büyükşehir belediyelerini

hiyerarşik olarak ilçe belediyelerinin üzerinde konumlandırmıştır. Son dönemde yapılan idari düzenlemeler sonucunda, büyükşehir belediyesi mücavir alanlarının il mülki sınırlarıyla örtüşmesi ile büyükşehir belediye başkanları, ilçe belediyesi sınırları içindeki rant ve kaynakları da denetleme kabiliyetine sahip olmuştur.

Üçüncü olarak, yerel kamu hizmetlerinin belediye tarafından sunulması ve belediye başkanının doğrudan halk tarafından seçilmesi sebebiyle, başkanın yerel hizmet alıcıları/seçmenlerle ilişkisine yakından bakılmalıdır. Bu noktada, karşılıklı bir ilişki ortaya çıkmaktadır. Şöyle ki, hizmet alıcılar/seçmenler kamu hizmetlerinin ve sosyal yardımların sunulması aşamasında belediye başkanına bağımlı iken, belediye başkanı da hizmet alıcıların/seçmenlerin seçimlerde siyasi desteğine bağımlıdır. Bundan dolayı, belediye başkanının kent yönetiminde sergilediği otoriter tutumlar, hizmet sunumu ve sosyal yardımlar karşılığında göz ardı edilmekte veya zımnen desteklenmektedir.

Öte yandan, kentsel rantın dağıtımında en önemli kamu kurumu olan belediyelerin çıkar grupları ile ilişkisinin incelenmesi yerel siyaset dinamiklerinin anlaşılması bakımından gereklidir. Belediyelerin kentsel rantın dağıtımında en önemli kamu kurumu haline gelmesi sonucunda, bu rantı kontrol eden belediye başkanı ile söz konusu ranttan çıkar devşirmeyi amaçlayan çıkar grupları arasında patron-adamı ilişkisi kurulmaktadır. Böylece, çıkar grupları bu ilişkinin devam edebilmesi için bu karmaşık yapıyı eşgüdüm işinde yöneten belediye başkanına siyasi destek verir. Belediye başkanı da, yerel hizmet sunumunda mali kaynaklara erişim kapasitesine erişerek merkezi yönetimden mali olarak özerkleşme imkânı yakalamaktadır.

Beşinci olarak, büyükşehir belediye başkanının siyasi partisi ile ilişkisi incelenmelidir, çünkü belediye başkanının gücünün değişkenlerinden birisi de parti siyasetinden özerkleşme kapasitesidir. Doğrudan yerel halk tarafından seçilen belediye başkanı belediye örgütü, ilçe belediyeleri ve çıkar grupları üzerindeki denetimi sayesinde parti siyasetinden bağımsız davranma eğilimine sahiptir. Bunun sebebi ise, belediye başkanı ile parti yerel teşkilatı, milletvekilleri ve parti merkez teşkilatı arasındaki ekonomik çıkar çatışmaları ve siyasi rekabettir.

Son olarak, daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi, yerel yönetimlerin merkezi yönetimin idari vesayet yetkisine tabi olması ve bu yetkinin siyasi ve mali vesayete de

dönüştürülebilme olasılığı sebebiyle, belediye başkanı ile merkezi yönetim arasındaki ilişkinin niteliğinin anlaşılması gerekmektedir. Merkezi yönetimin sahip olduğu bu idari vesayet yetkisi ve mali kaynakları kontrol etme gücü, güçlü belediye başkanının önündeki sınırlılıklar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Merkezi hükümetin bu yetki ve güçleri, son dönem idari reformlar ile genişletilmiştir çünkü bağımsız bir kentsel politika yapıcısı olarak belediye başkanına karşı bir güvensizlik söz konusudur. Merkezi hükümet ile aynı siyasi partiden olmasından bağımsız olarak belediye başkanlarının sürekli kontrol altında tutulamaması böyle bir yetki genişlemesine yol açmaktadır.

Büyükşehir belediye başkanının muğlak ve karmaşık kentsel politika ağındaki aktörlerle olan ilişkisine dair yapılan çıkarımlar, bazı örnek olaylar aracılığıyla ayrıntılı bir biçimde incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada Adana, Eskişehir ve Şanlıurfa Büyükşehir Belediyeleri ve bu belediyelerin başkanları olan Aytaç Durak, Yılmaz Büyükerşen ve Ahmet Eşref Fakıbbaba örnek olayları seçilmiştir. Bunun ilk sebebi, Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbbaba'nın güçlü belediye başkanlığı eğiliminin en aşırı örnekleri olmalarıdır. Bir başka sebep, bu üç büyükşehir belediye başkanının parti siyasetinden bağımsız olmasıdır. Üç büyükşehir belediye başkanı da, yerel seçimleri siyasi parti bağlarından bağımsız olarak kazanmışlardır. Bu örneklerin seçilmelerinin bir diğer sebebi, farklı coğrafi bölgelerde bulunmalarıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, güçlü büyükşehir belediye başkanlığı olgusu coğrafya değişkeninden bağımsızdır. Böylece güçlü başkanların yükselişi, yerelliklere özgü toplumsal ve siyasal dinamiklerin ötesine geçilerek incelenmiştir. Bu belediye başkanlarının örnek olay olarak seçilmesindeki son sebep ise, siyasal tayfin farklı noktalarında yer almalarına rağmen, YKİ görüşünün uygulamalarında benzerlikler taşımalarıdır.

Bu üç belediye başkanı figürünün güçlü belediye başkanlığı eğilimine sahip olup olmadığının anlaşılması için; Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbbaba'nın belediye örgütü, ilçe belediyeleri, yerel hizmet alıcılar, çıkar grupları, siyasi parti örgütü ve merkezi yönetim ile ilişkileri incelenmiştir. Ortaya çıkan sonuçlardan biri, bu üç büyükşehir belediye başkanının belediye örgütü üzerinde hâkimiyet kurmak amacıyla belediye bürokrasisini kontrol ettikleri, belediye yönetimini siyasetten ayırmaya çaba gösterdikleri ve işletmeci belediyecilik anlayışını benimsedikleridir. Bunun yanında, büyükşehir belediye meclisleri ile siyasi çatışma içindedirler. Belediye meclislerine

duyulan güvensizlik ve belediye yönetiminde istikrar arayışı sonucunda oluşturulan yasal ve kurumsal engeller, Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbaba'ya büyükşehir belediye meclisleri ve muhalefetin engellemeleri karşısında üstünlük sağlamıştır.

İkinci sonuç, bu büyükşehir belediye başkanlarının ilçe belediyelerini disiplin etme ve/veya kontrol etmesi çabasına girmeleridir. Başkanların bu çabalarının 2012 yılında büyükşehir belediyesi mücavir alanının il sınırına genişletilmesi sonucunda daha da artacağını tahmin etmek güç olmayacaktır. Bunun kaynağı, 1984 yılında hiyerarşik iki aşamalı büyükşehir belediye sisteminin kurulmasıyla idari ve mali yetkilerin büyükşehir belediyesinde ve siyasi gücün büyükşehir belediye başkanının kişiliğinde merkezileşmesidir. Bu merkezileşme, büyükşehir belediyelerinin ve başkanlarının meclisi ve başkanı doğrudan seçilen ilçe belediyeleri üzerinde hiyerarşik denetimi ile sonuçlanmıştır.

Üç büyükşehir belediye başkanı da kent yönetimine halkın katılımı konusunda eleştirilse de, mensubu oldukları partilerin belediye meclisi seçiminde aldığı oydan daha fazlasını alarak tekrar seçilmişlerdir. Bu gerçeklikten yola çıkarak ulaşılan üçüncü sonuç, Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbaba'nın otoriter davranışlarının yerel halk tarafından sosyal yardımlar ve yerel hizmetlerin temini karşılığında üstü kapalı bir şekilde desteklendiği veya göz ardı edildiğidir. Diğer bir deyişle, yardım ve hizmet temini ile siyasi destek arasında karşılıklı bir ilişki söz konusudur. Bu karşılıklı ilişki, belediye başkanlarını proje yönelimli ve oy arayışında olan güçlü siyasi girişimciler haline getirmiş ve onlara hareket alanı sağlamıştır.

Dördüncü olarak, Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbaba'nın büyükşehir belediyesini kaynak yaratmak ve bu kaynakları geliştirmek zorunda olan bir işletme gibi yönettikleri sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Kentsel rantı yeniden dağıtma gücünün büyükşehir belediyelerinde toplanmasının sonucu olarak, bu başkanlarla farklı çıkar grupları arasında yerel hizmetlerin finansmanı için patron-adamı ilişkisi kurulmuştur. Öte yandan bu başkanlar, doğrudan seçildikleri için, yerel halkın talepleri ile çıkar gruplarının talepleri çeliştiğinde çıkar grupların taleplerine karşı direnç göstermişlerdir. Bu dirence rağmen, çıkar grupları başkanlar ile anlaşmazlığa düşmekten kaçınmışlardır, çünkü başkanlar kentsel rantın yeniden dağıtıldığı karmaşık yerel ağlarda merkezi konumda bulunmaktadır. Sivil toplum örgütlerinin

kent yönetimine katılımı da, kaynak yaratma ve/veya yerel hizmetlerin finansmanı ile sınırlı kalmıştır. Yine de, bu karmaşık ağın çökmemesi için belediye başkanlarının profesyonel yöneticiler (CEO) gibi davranması ve görevde kalıcı hale gelmesi gerekmektedir. Bundan dolayı, bu başkanlar çıkar gruplarınca desteklenmiş, tekrar seçilmiş, en az on yıl görevde kalmış ve güçlü belediye başkanları haline gelmişlerdir.

Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbaba'nın mensubu oldukları siyasi parti ile ilişkileri incelendiğinde ise, söz konusu başkanların profesyonel belediye başkanları haline geldikleri öne sürülmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, bu başkanlar siyasi parti bağlarından bağımsız olarak belediye başkanı seçilebilmektedirler. Daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi, belediye yönetimini siyasetten ayırmaya çabalamışlardır. Bu çaba, YKİ yaklaşımının belediye yönetiminin teknik bir konu olduğu varsayımı ve piyasa odaklı olma ilkesi ile aynı doğrultudadır. Ancak, bu çaba aynı zamanda Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbaba'nın parti siyasetinden bağımsızlaşmaya yönelik stratejileridir. Bundan dolayı, bu başkanlar siyasi partileri ile anlaşmazlığa düşmektedirler. Mevcut partilerinden aday gösterilmeme veya başka partiden aday olduklarında daha fazla oy alma olasılığı ortaya çıktığı zaman, bu başkanlar ya parti değiştirmiş ya da bağımsız olarak aday olmuşlardır. Fakat başkanların merkezi/yerel parti örgütü ile uzlaşma yoluna gittikleri örnekler de mevcuttur, çünkü halk desteği azaldığında başkanların siyasi kariyerleri partileri tarafından desteklenmelerine bağlıdır.

Son olarak, söz konusu büyükşehir belediye başkanlarının merkezi yönetimle olan ilişkisi incelendiğinde, merkezi yönetimin belediye başkanlarına parti bağlarından bağımsız olarak kısıtlamalar uyguladığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Belediye başkanlarının merkezi hükümetin vesayet denetimi altında olması ve mali olarak merkezi yönetime bağımlı olması bu kısıtlamaların aracı olmuştur. Bunun sebebi, merkezi yönetimin bağımsız politika yapıcısı olarak bu başkanlara güvenmemesi ve onları kontrol altında tutmak istemesidir. Başkanlar hakkında açılan soruşturmalar, belediyenin üst düzey yöneticilerinin atanması ve başkanların görevden uzaklaştırılması İçişleri Bakanlığının söz konusu belediyeler ve başkanlara uyguladığı idari vesayet yetkilerinden bazılarıdır. Öte yandan, Durak, Büyükerşen ve Fakıbaba'yı denetim altında tutabilmek için merkezi yönetim mali kaynakların dağıtımını, mali destek ve belediye borçları gibi konularda belediyelerin mali olarak

merkezi yönetime bağımlılığından istifade etmiştir. Son dönemde, merkezi yönetimin illerdeki temsilcisi olan valilerin siyasi bir figür gibi davranarak Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nden (AKP) olmayan belediye başkanlarına muhalefet ettikleri ve AKP'nin büyükşehir belediye başkanı adaylarına destek olduklarına ilişkin sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. Bunlar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, denetim mekanizmasının nesnelliği ve yerel yönetimlerin özerkliği şüpheli hale gelmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, YKİ ve yönetim perspektiflerinden ilham alan yönetsel reformlar ve yerel yönetimlerde ortaya çıkan uygulamalar, sadece merkezi yönetim tarafından bir yere kadar kısıtlanan güçlü belediye başkanlarının ortaya çıkışıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Seçilmiş siyasetçiler olarak bu güçlü başkanlar, kendilerini yerel siyasetin merkezine taşıyan yönetsel ekoloji sayesinde yereldeki temel lider figürleri olarak görülmüştür. Doğrudan halk tarafından seçildikleri için, yerel halkın vekilliği rolünü üstlenmişlerdir ve yerel halk adına konuşma konusunda meşruiyetlerine karşı çıkmak zordur. Bundan dolayı, başkanlar birçok yerel aktörü kapsayan karmaşık ve dağınık ağlar halini alan yerel karar alma ve uygulama süreçlerinde belirleyici rol oynamaya başlamıştır. Bu karmaşık ve dağınık ağlar güçlü bir ağ yöneticisini gerekli kılmaktadır. Yerel yönetimler için bu güçlü ağ yöneticisi yerel siyasette birçok aktörün birbirine bağlandığı kişi olan belediye başkanıdır, özellikle de büyükşehir belediye başkanıdır. Yerel politika ağındaki merkezi rolü sayesinde başkan vazgeçilemez bir aktör haline gelmiş, manevra kabiliyetini geliştirebilmiş ve görevde kalma süresini uzatabilmiştir. YKİ görüşü doğrultusunda belediye başkanı yükselmeyi, güç siyasetini, risk almayı ve radikal değişimleri saplantı haline getirmiş ve bu yolda kuralları ihlal etmekte beis görmemiştir. Fakat belediye başkanının benimsediği bu tutum çoğulculuk, temsil, katılım, birlikte yönetme, şeffaflık ve demokrasi gibi yönetim ilkeleri ile çelişmektedir, çünkü kamu otoritesinin bir girişimci gibi kişisel çıkar amacıyla kullanılması bu ilkelere aykırıdır. Bir yandan bu özellikler başkana yenilik ve radikal değişim yapmada yardımcı olduğu için savunulurken, diğer yandan başkanın elinde toplanan aşırı güç sebebiyle kaygıya yol açmaktadır. Bu kaygı, başkanlar için daha fazla kısıtlama gerektiğini dile getirirken YKİ tarafından başkanlar için öngörülen yönetme hakkı ve esneklik ilkeleri ile çelişmektedir.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Köse
Adı : Hami Doruk
Bölümü : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : New Public Management and the Strong Mayor: The Cases of Adana, Eskişehir and Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipalities

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezinden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

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