A STUDY ON MCGINN'S MYSTERIANISM

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY ON MCGINN'S MYSTERIANISM

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This thesis discusses in detail McGinn's mysterianism with respect to the mind-body problem. McGinn calls his hypothesis, which is formulated for the solution of this problem, 'transcendental naturalism'. There are some objections to McGinn's transcendental naturalism, and they will be analyzed in this thesis in detail. While McGinn's hypothesis seems to be consistent and reasonable to some extent with respect to its replies to these criticisms; it has some problematic aspects as well. And this thesis will be written to show both the reasonable and the problematic sides of McGinn's mysterianism.

Keywords: The mind-body problem, Mysterianism, Cognitive closure, Colin McGinn

ÖZ

MCGINN'İN GİZEMCİLİĞİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

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Bu çalışma beden-zihin problemi açısından McGinn gizemciliğini ayrıntılı olarak ele almaktadır. McGinn, beden-zihin probleminin çözümü üzerine geliştirdiği hipotezini 'transandantal natüralizm' olarak tanımlar. Transandantal natüralizm hipotezine bir takım itirazlar bulunmaktadır ve bu çalışmada söz konusu itirazlar ayrıntılı bir biçimde ele alınıp incelenecektir. McGinn'in hipotezi bir yandan bu eleştirilere verdiği cevaplar açısından bir dereceye kadar tutarlı ve akla yatkın görünürken, diğer yandan onun da problemli olduğu yanlar bulunmaktadır. Ve bu tez McGinn'in gizemciliğinin hem akla yatkın, hem de problemli yanlarını açıkça göstermek amacıyla yapılmış bir çalışmadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Beden-Zihin Problemi, Gizemcilik, Bilişel Kapanım, Colin McGinn

To My Parents

and

To the Memory of My Grandfather

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Consciousness is the most important aspect of our minds, and it leads to the most perplexing problems in the philosophy of mind. However, Chalmers thinks that some problems that stem from consciousness are easier to solve than others; and for this reason, in his study he makes a distinction between the 'easy problems' and the 'hard problems' of consciousness (2010, p: 4). According to him, easy problems of consciousness are concerned with phenomena such as: "the ability to discriminate", "categorize, and react to environmental stimuli", "the integration of information by a cognitive system", "the reportability of mental states", "the ability of a system to access its own internal states", "the focus of attention", "the deliberate control of behavior" or "the difference between wakefulness and sleep" (2010, p: 4). These phenomena reflect the ability for, or the performance of certain behaviours, and they are taken to be signs of consciousness. Chalmers identifies such problems as 'easy' for the reason that even if we do not have a full explanation of these mental states yet, we have an idea about how we can attain an explanation of them by using the methods of cognitive science. For instance, we can comprehend the integration of information by specifying the mechanism in which we piece the information together; or we can explain the difference between wakefulness and sleep by observing the neurophysical process that leads to the contrasting behaviours of being in these phenomenal states. Or we can explain the reportability of mental states by specifying the mechanism through which we report the information about our own internal states. (2010, p: 4-5).

On the other hand, Chalmers argues that we can make an effective distinction between 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness because while methods of neuroscience and cognitive science give us a chance to solve the 'easy problems' of consciousness, they are not adequate to be able to solve the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Chalmers defines the 'hard problem' of consciousness as the 'problem of experience' with the following explanation:

> When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect....When we see, for example, we *experience* visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. (2010, p: 5)

As seen in the quotation Chalmers insists on the subjectivity of conscious experiences as a hard problem because even though our empirical researches give an explanation for some of our behaviours and mechanic mental functions; they fail to give a satisfactory explanation of the subjective aspects of conscious experience, qualia, up to now. When we perceive something red there is an empirical neural process explaining this perception; but this process is not adequate to explain the subjective experience of the organism -what it is like to have the redness-.

By using the distinction of Chalmers we can say that although not all phenomena of consciousness seem to be complex and mysterious, for some philosophers there is something quite mysterious about consciousness, and we can identify this problem of consciousness as the mind-body problem or consciousness-brain problem. The mind-body problem is the problem trying to answer the questions of how the mind can be related with the physical body, how mental states emerge from the physical brain, or how neuro-chemical processes in the brain lead to the organism's subjective conscious experiences (Kim, 2011, p: 301). This problem is important both for scientific practices and for philosophy of mind, and there are lots of attempts to find an answer such questions.

This thesis covers a study on McGinn's hypothesis which he suggests for the mind-body problem – a hard problem of consciousness – and calls *Transcendental Naturalism*. Several approaches related to the solution of this problem have been presented until today. It is possible to analyze these approaches under two different general headings: the dualist one, which claims that body and mind are basically two different substances and are independent of each other, and the monistic materialistic one, which is based on brain and reduces mental conditions to neurological processes. Nevertheless, none of these approaches have been able to clear up the problem for years.

Recently, a movement called *Neo-Mysterianism* – or commonly just mysterianism – has brought a new perspective to the area. The principal argument of this movement is the fact that the mind-body problem, which is considered to be the difficult problem of philosophy of mind, cannot be solved by human being although it actually has a natural and a quite simple solution. For some who support mysterianism, given their current cognitive and technological restrictions human beings are not able to come up with a solution; however, owing to improvements in science and technology the solution of this problem may be comprehensible in the future. On the other hand, Collin McGinn, who is regarded as the pioneer of mysterianism, contends that human beings will never manage to find out a key to this issue because of their cognitive capacity even though in fact a natural and simple solution exists. McGinn's emphasis on the fact that the body-mind problem will never be solved by human beings is a notably serious claim, which many philosophers find difficult to accept, especially given the amount of time and labor put into searching for a solution to this question. Thus, there have been various objections to his hypothesis. McGinn's hypothesis is a successfully built one as it enables answers in itself; yet, this does not mean that it has no problematic sides. And this thesis paper has been written in order to both justify that McGinn's claim, which he bravely presents, is able to respond to dissenting opinions and to clearly discuss its problematic sides.

The next chapter of this thesis will mainly be devoted to the explanation of hypothesis of McGinn about the mind-body problem. McGinn claims that mental states cannot be reduced to the brain states. While mental states don't have any feature of space like spatiality, solidity or dimension, brain states have all of these features. And, it is quite problematic how something that does not have any features of the physical emerges from the physical thing. About this issue, by his thesis – transcendental naturalism- McGinn argues that there is a naturalistic and constructive solution to the mind-body problem; however, we as human beings are not capable of attaining this solution in principle. According to him, there is a property of the brain, *P*, which provides the link between the mind and the brain, and there is a theory, *T*, which explains this property and the mind-brain link. On the other hand, we as human beings have innate limitations with respect to our cognitive faculties; for this reason according to McGinn we are cognitively closed to the solution of the mind-body problem, just as monkeys are cognitively closed to trigonometry because of their innate limitations. Human beings have two distinct concept-forming faculties – introspection and perception- for comprehending the world. By introspection human beings obtain their internal conscious states, and form the concepts of consciousness; by perception human beings make an empirical investigation about the brain and form the concepts of brain; but, neither by introspection nor by perception can we achieve the property providing the link between the mind and the brain. The property of brain providing the nexus is not a spatial thing in the sense of having the ordinary spatial properties of the brain because the ordinary spatial properties of the brain are not adequate to explain the emergence of non-spatial mental phenomena. This property is non-spatial according to McGinn; to mediate between the mind and brain it must be neither phenomenal nor physical. For all of these reasons, McGinn claims that the solution of mind-body problem is not an ontological but an epistemological for human beings and in the next chapter his mysterianism will be analyzed in depth. Besides these, the similarities and differences between Levine's explanatory gap and McGinn's idea of cognitive closure will be discussed clearly in that chapter.

In the third chapter, I will argue for the possibility of human cognitive closure with respect to the mind-brain problem by discussing the arguments of Dennett and

Kriegel. In their studies Dennett and Kriegel argue against the possibility of cognitive closure by denying the analogy argument of McGinn. McGinn claims that we are also "biological products" like animals. There is an analogy between animals and human beings; and just as animals have cognitive closure with respect to somethings, human beings have cognitive closure about some realities of the world. On the other hand, according to Dennett and Kriegel we cannot make an analogy between animals and human beings about the possibility of cognitive closure because while animals are cognitively closed to some properties because of their language inability, human beings have language faculty. Because animals don't understand the questions about some properties they are cognitively closed to the solutions of these properties; but, this is not so for human beings because human beings can comprehend the questions about the mind-body problem. For Dennett and Kriegel it is implausible to assume that human beings can understand or formulate problems about some properties, but not understand the solutions of these properties. However, I think that their arguments against the possibility of cognitive closure are not successful enough to refute McGinn's thesis about the mind-body problem and this will be analyzed in the third chapter in detail.

In the fourth chapter of this thesis I will focus on the nature of McGinn's property providing the mind-brain nexus. McGinn asserts that there must a brain property mediating between the mind and the brain; however, this property must have a non-spatial character. The non-spatial nature of McGinn's property seems to be quite problematic, and there are some arguments about how the non-spatial nature of this property contradicts with the other arguments of McGinn such as the existence of a naturalistic solution to the mind-body problem. However, according to me some of these arguments misinterpret McGinn's thesis, and in the fourth chapter I will analyze these misinterpretations in detail. I also think that the non-spatial nature of McGinn's property creates some problems with respect to the mediating character of it; because if there is a mediating property, then it must be shared by both kinds of states. On the other hand, non-spatiality is not the feature that is shared by spatial brain states. Although McGinn tries to dissolve the mind-body puzzlement, he creates new problems. In other words, while we try to explain the relation between

consciousness and the brain; the non-spatial property of the brain creates new problematic relations like the relation between this non-spatial property and consciousness or the relation between the non-spatial property and the brain. For this reason, chapter four will address not only misinterpretations of McGinn's thesis, but also problematic aspect of his thesis in depth.

The final chapter of this thesis will be a summary of the other chapters and I will reach a conclusion about McGinn's mysterianism by using the argumentations in the previous chapters. McGinn's transcendental naturalism seems to be consistent and reasonable to some extent; however, I think that it has some problematic aspects as well, and conclusion chapter of this thesis will be written to summarize both the reasonable and the problematic aspects of McGinn's mysterianism.

CHAPTER II

MCGINN'S MYSTERIANISM

2.1. Explanation of McGinn's Mysterianism

Discussions on the question regarding the nature of the link between mind and body and attempts to explain the nature of consciousness occupy a central place in philosophy of mind. In this chapter of this thesis, I will extensively analyze McGinn's mysterianism with respect to the mind-body relation; but, before presenting this analysis I will take a look at the relation between consciousness and spatiality for this relation plays an important role in the emergence of mind-body puzzlement.

2.1.1. Consciousness and Spatiality

McGinn claims that the brain is the most important organ required for one to have a mental life. It is like the "seat" or "womb" of consciousness. Brain enables us to have mental experience, conscious states (1999, pp: 4-5). McGinn asserts that "We attribute consciousness to the brain not because we can observe it there, or infer it from what we can observe, but because first person introspection shows that it changes when the brain is altered. If it were not for introspection, we would have no reason to attribute consciousness to the brain at all –any more than a rock" (1996, p: 45). That is, ultimately by introspection we can realize that not heart or any other organs, but brain is the seat of consciousness, since changes in the brain lead to changes in the states of consciousness as well. There is a correlation between them; brain activities are correlated with the happenings in consciousness. For instance,

when we hit our heads on the wall, this can cause injury of brain and change of brain activity. Synchronously with this change, we can realise the alteration of our consciousness by introspection. We can observe the changes in our liver as well; but ultimately thanks to introspection we can realize that not liver but brain is the home for our consciousness.

However, although brain is the most important organ for consciousness, according to McGinn their characters are totally different from each other. McGinn claims that while brain is a spatial thing, mind is non-spatial. He illustrates this distinction in his article, "Consciousness and Space." Let's suppose that E is the visual experience of yellow flash and it is correlated with a set of neural structures and events, N. While N occupies a place back of the head and extends over some area of the cortex, E does not have any spatial extension and solidity. While N is composed of spatial properties and it is a citizen of space, E has no shape, volume, spatial dimensionality or any of other spatial characteristic (1995, p: 1). That is, while spatiality, extension, solidity and shape are not features that are compatible with consciousness, they are categories which are attributable to bodily structures like the brain. For instance, I feel pleasure when I eat soufflé; even though the object of my feeling of pleasure and complex of neural events in the brain correlated with this feeling are spatial things – they have spatial properties as dimensions, shape or solidity- my mental experience, feeling of pleasure itself, does not have spatial properties, it has a non-spatial character. Or, as another example, if I have claustrophobia, the object of my fear, closed areas, and the neural process of brain correlated with my fear have spatial features; but, my conscious state, the experience of fear itself, has none of these spatial characteristics.

Further, McGinn claims that unlike the brain, conscious states are not perceived. The non-spatial character of consciousness is related to the other feature of it; that is, imperceptibility of it (1995, p: 1). McGinn asserts that

> We perceive by our various sense organs, a variety of material objects laid out in space, taking up certain volumes and separated by certain distances. We thus conceive of these perceptual objects as spatial entities; perception informs us directly

> of their spatiality but conscious subjects and their mental states are not in this way perceptual objects. (1995, p: 1)

That is, by our sense organs -seeing, smelling, touching, hearing or tasting- we can perceive observable spatial objects in the world; on the other hand, by using these organs we can achieve neither the perception of our own nor that of another person's conscious states. For instance, when I look up at something blue, I can only perceive the features of that spatial thing, its shape, colour etc; but, I cannot perceive my experience of the blueness, namely my mental experience itself. In a similar way, when my friend listens to classical music, I can witness his behaviours at that time; but I cannot perceive his experience of classical music itself; that is, I cannot witness his feelings of pleasure by staring at him. Imperceptibility of consciousness is dependent upon the non-spatial character of it, for spatial objects are perceived by sense organs by virtue of their spatial features. My visual experience of blueness or my friend's experience of the music don't have any spatial features as form, shape, size or bulk; for this reason, we cannot perceive conscious states by our bodily senses. According to McGinn, perception reacts only to spatial characteristics. We can perceive brain states; but we cannot perceive conscious states, although they are causally related to the brain. In "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" McGinn supports this idea by saying that:

> You can stare into living conscious brain, your own or someone else's, and see there a wide variety of unstantiated properties –its shape, colour, texture, etc.- but you will not thereby *see* what the subject is experiencing, the conscious state itself. Conscious states are simply not potential objects of perception: they depend on the brain but they cannot be observed by directing the senses onto the brain. In other words, consciousness is noumenal with respect to perception of brain. (1989, p: 357)

As presented above, while properties like the neuro-chemical structure of the brain are spatially located and perceptible, consciousness is not a perceptible and spatial property of the brain.

However, can someone say that like the brain, consciousness is also spatially located in the world? Or, more clearly, can we claim that our conscious states have a spatial location in the brain as associated brain events have? McGinn asserts that "The realm of mental is just not bound up in the world of objects in space in the way that

ordinary physical events are so bound up" (1995, p: 2). That is, objects in space are connected with the spatial world by virtue of their spatial characteristics; on the other hand, mental states are related with the spatial world only through the medium of their causal dependence on the brain states. According to McGinn we cannot say that mental states have location in spatial world precisely, but we can attribute location to them in a fairly systematic way (1995, p: 2). That is, physical events in the brain cause changes in our mental states; there is a correlation between one another as we mentioned above, and we say that mental states are "in vicinity of" those physical events; but this kind of location doesn't depend on the fact that we perceive mental states at that location; rather, it depends on their causal relation with physical events which are intrinsically located in the spatial world. McGinn claims that "locating mental events as we do in the actual world is merely "theoretical", as one might say a sort of courtesy location" (1995, p: 3). Indeed it can be said that conscious states don't have an intrinsic connection with space, they have only derivative one (1999, pp: 5, 112). In other words, my mental experiences don't take up a place in the brain intrinsically; they have only causally based location by virtues of their relation with non-derivatively located brain states. This kind of location doesn't harm the intrinsic non-spatial character of the conscious states, since we still don't attribute any spatial feature as solidity, shape, size or dimension to the mental states.

A common wisdom is that two material objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time; this spatial exclusion is necessary in the nature of space and spatial objects (1995, p: 3). However, this cannot be thought for conscious states according to McGinn. That is, asking whether experience of redness can have the same place at the same time with experience of yellow is a category mistake. Since space exclusion requires the solidity, and solidity is the feature ascribed to spatial objects, not to mental states (1999, pp: 100-111). Conscious states don't have location and any other spatial characteristic; so they cannot compete for space. McGinn claims that "if the essential mark of the spatial is competition for space, as the metaphysical principle records, then the mental lacks that essential feature" (1995, p: 3).

On the other hand, there is a problem about the emergence and interaction of consciousness and McGinn says that "the problem arises from the specific clash between the essence of consciousness and its apparent origin, brain" (1995, p: 5). That is, although consciousness and brain have radically different characters, there is an interaction between them; non-spatial consciousness is causally related with the spatial brain However, how do non-spatial mental states connect with the spatial brain? How does matter lead to the emergence of non-spatial states? What is the nature of link between consciousness and brain?

We find questions like the ones mentioned above under the title "the mind-body problem. Now, I will present McGinn's transcendental naturalism, which is at the core of his answers to some of those questions.

2.1.2. McGinn's Hypothesis: Transcendental Naturalism

McGinn's explanation of transcendental naturalism (TN) starts with Chomsky's distinction among questions.[1] That is, he uses Chomsky's distinction between *problem* and *mystery*[2]. According to this distinction, a *problem* is a question of natural phenomena; but we can find an answer to this question, since we are designed biologically so, or it is in the limits of our cognitive capacities. A *mystery* is a question about the natural phenomena as well; that is these two kinds of question are alike about the naturalness of their subject-matter; but contrary to *problem* we cannot find an answer to this kind of question because such an answer is out of our cognitive limitations. For this reason, *mystery* is mystery for us (1993, p: 3). As can be understood from the distinction explained whether a question is *problem* or *mystery* depends on the epistemic capacity of the subject asking the question. In other words, a question might be in the class of *mystery* for one sort of creature; but it may be intrinsically solvable for other kind of creature, for they are different in terms of their cognitive capacities. Or, for instance, a question which is merely *problem* for us

[1] In the Problems in Philosophy McGinn explains four distinctions of questions as problems, mysteries, illusion and issues; but, I focused on two of them: problem and mystery.

[2] For the details of this issue you can see Chomsky's study (1976) "Problems and Mysteries in the Study of Human Language".

might be *mystery* for another creature which doesn't have cognitive capacity we have, and so although there is no innate change in the ontological status of the entity of the question, whether it is problem or mystery might vary from one creature to another because of their epistemic situation.

McGinn claims that according to TN about a certain question Q, the subject-matter of this question has three properties: reality, naturalness and cognitive inaccessibility in terms of the subject asking this question (1993, p: 4). Transcendental naturalism defends a strong form of realism about the nature of things that cognitive beings are confused about (1993, p: 5). That is, the subject of a certain philosophical question is an ontologically real thing in the objective world independently from the cognitive access of the subject in relation with it. He expresses this idea by saying that "for TN there may exist facts about the world that are inaccessible to thinking creatures such as ourselves. Reality is under no epistemic constraint" (1993, p: 5). Besides this, a second property of the subject-matter of the question is that it is intrinsically natural according to TN. In other words, it is not a magical thing or it doesn't have miracle or divine nature innately, rather it has natural explanation as concepts of three-dimensional space have. However, TN accepts that although there is a natural explanation of such a question, it is inaccessible in terms of subjects asking this question because of their cognitive capacities. That is, for McGinn we as human beings don't have to be capable of having cognitive access to all features of the world. Our cognitive structure may be closed to some realities of the world not because of the ontological nature of these things but because of the structure of our cognition. For instance, there might be beings that have cognitive deficiency about the atomic structure of material objects. And when they ask themselves how a material object can be separated into parts and how it can be compressed, although these questions have a particular explanation they cannot answer these questions because they are cognitively closed in terms of the required atomic theory (1993, p: 7). As explained above although these questions are solvable simply for us, with regards to these beings they are in the class of *mystery* because of their cognitive closure. Even though subjects of these questions have reality and natural explanation in the world, their solutions might not be accessible for some beings. For this reason,

in TN, cognitive closure is accepted as biological limitations, it is not related with the ontological structure of the subjects of the questions.

McGinn originally used transcendental naturalism for formulating the mind-body problem in the *Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?* However, in his more recent work, *Problems in the Philosophy,* he theorized this idea by calling it as 'transcendental naturalism' to formulate philosophical problems such as the self, meaning, free will and the a priori as well. According to McGinn philosophical perplexities derive from inherent constraints in our epistemic faculties; indeed there are not problems since philosophical questions are about the inherently perplexing, extraordinary or suspicious entities or facts (1993, p: 2).

There are, roughly, two sorts of approach concerning the nature of philosophical questions. According to the first, philosophical questions are empirical or scientific. By doing philosophy we use human faculties like perceptual observation used in empirical science. According to the second, however, philosophical questions are conceptual and analytical; that is, subjects-matters of such questions are about concepts but not the empirical objects of the world. For this reason, in the answer of philosophical questions we use not the faculty of perception but the faculty of self-reflection to elucidate the subjects of them (1993, pp: 9-10). On the other hand, as can be understood from the features of transcendental naturalism presented above, McGinn partially agrees with these approaches with regards to the nature of philosophical questions. TN accepts that subjects of philosophical questions are ontologically real objects of the world as in science. In so far as this claim conforms to the empirical approach, it disagrees with the conceptual one. On the other side, it conforms to the conceptual view in that it holds that we cannot use empirical investigation for solving such questions (1993, pp: 10-11). For him, although they have real subjects and a natural explanation, since we cannot attain them, we feel as if there were philosophical perplexities.

For McGinn, the mind-body problem is also among these questions about which we feel as if there is a philosophical perplexity. He says that "mind-body problem has a

merely scientific solution, but it seems to us like a peculiarly philosophical problem because the requisite theory lies outside of our cognitive bounds" (1993, p: 42). Although in reality there is not a philosophical but a scientific solution of this question, there are some philosophical doctrines which answer the mind-body problem with their own ways. And McGinn takes these philosophical positions as having a DIME shape:

"D" is for domesticating responses. Such responses attempt to persuade us that consciousness is not more than such-and-such (1993, p: 32). That is, according to this position consciousness can be reduced to metaphysically unproblematic facts. For instance, materialism or functionalism is incorporated by domesticating responses. The reason of this that these positions try to explain conscious states by reducing them to physical states, neural states or states identified by causal role (1993, p: 32).

"I" is for irreducibility. According to irreducibility, consciousness cannot be reduced to such things because of its intrinsic irreducibility. It is a primitive being, but not in a miraculous way. It is primitive as space and time are (1996, p: 41). This position claims that the emergence of consciousness from the brain must be accepted without explanation, since "nothing can be said to explain how this could be: it just is" (1996, p: 41).

"M" is for miracle thesis. According to such thesis the world does not have merely intelligible laws or natural forces, it also has ultimate anomalies. And consciousness has an immaterial, immortal and divine nature; it doesn't belong to this world. Its relation with the brain is totally miraculous (1993, p: 34).

"E" is for eliminativism. This position simply denies the existence of consciousness, and sensations, or emotions. These are the products of pre-scientific nonsense. Only material brain exists with its neuro-chemical structure. If there were a being as a consciousness, there would be a miracle thing; but there is no magic in the world so

there cannot be a being as consciousness (1993, p: 35). For consciousness doesn't really exist, there is no mind-body problem according to this position.

McGinn characterises the DIME shape for showing the alternative philosophical responses to the consciousness puzzlement, and he believes that his hypothesis TN supplies a better, not refutative, but diagnostic alternative. He says that in terms of the mind-body relation his approach, unlike E, accepts the full reality of consciousness. Also unlike M, his hypothesis denies the miraculous nature of consciousness. Unlike I, TN claims that mind-body relation has a natural explanation; but, unlike D, believes that our cognitive capacities are too limited to find this explanation (1996, p: 42).

McGinn claims that although there are unsuccessful approaches like DIME, according to transcendental naturalism we cannot understand anything which is not comprehensible in terms of CALM structure.

McGinn develops Chomsky's speculation about the structure of language itself and he refers to it as a CALM conjecture -Combinatorial Atomism with Lawlike Mappings-. As Chomsky claims, McGinn says that the human being has a biologically innate grammatical structure and language is fitted in this innate bordered structure. That is, as a faculty of the human being, language is determined by this innately limited grammatical structure of the human mind. According to McGinn this grammatical structure of language determines what is accessible and what is inaccessible to human reason. And this grammar of reason McGinn calls as CALM. CALM means combining atomic elements on the basis of certain laws and mapping them onto the facts to be explained (1993, p: 37). In other words, there are primitive things in the world, and we combine them with each other on the basis of certain laws and so, more complex things in the world are called as aggregates of primitive elements. This means that we can explain the properties of aggregates in terms of properties of primitive simple things combined on the basis of rules. McGinn says that we use the CALM structure to explain theories of some domains which are tolerably transparent to us such as geometry, arithmetic, language, physic

or biology (1994, p: 149). For example, material objects are composed of the combination of atoms on the basis of physical rules, sentences are the combination of words on the basis of syntactic rules, or geometrical figures are the combination of the lines, areas and volumes (1999, p: 56).

However McGinn uses this conjecture to separate what we can make theoretically intelligible from what we cannot, since he claims that while we can understand the properties which conform to CALM principles we cannot understand the entities which don't conform to them (1994, p: 148-9). For instance, we cannot achieve the explanation of theories of philosophical problems such as freewill, the self, meaning etc. by applying the CALM structure. And in a same way according to him CALM cannot be applied to the case of consciousness and the brain, as conscious states are not the complexes which consist of neural elements in the brain. Some aspects of the brain like neurons or other cellular structures conform to CALM schema, but they are not an effective part of the brain in the emergence of conscious states. To be able to explain the emergence of mental states that are not CALM products of neural process that fit the structure of CALM, there must be other aspects of the brain as well (1994, p: 149). There is a psycho-physical link between the mind and the brain, but psycho-physical link is not comprehensible by CALM structure; we cannot combine physical and psychological things with one another on the basis of certain laws.

2.1.3. McGinn's Arguments for Mind-Body Problem

McGinn uses TN for formulating the mind-body puzzle as well. If we handle the questions about how consciousness emerges from the brain or what the nature of the link between mind and body is, the explanation of McGinn's hypothesis (TN) to these questions is that there exist some natural process through which mental experience arises from the matter; but the nature of this process is cognitively closed for us. That is, this problem is insoluble for human beings, not because consciousness is miraculous or nonexistent but because of our cognitive limitations

(1996, p: 43). In his article, "*Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?*," McGinn establishes his hypothesis by arguing details of these three steps:

i. There exists some property of the brain that accounts naturalistically for consciousness.
ii. We are cognitively closed with respect to that property.
iii. There is no philosophical mind-body problem. (1989, p: 352)

We can also explain his hypothesis more clearly by analyzing these three claims step by step.

According to McGinn we are aware that there is a causal relation between brain and consciousness. That is, mental states are caused by brain states and "this causal nexus must proceed through necessary connections of some kind" (1989, p: 353). He says that if we don't accept eliminative materialism about consciousness; that is, if we don't believe that conscious states are a fiction of common sense and in fact they do not exist, then there must be some theory which explains this psycho-physical causal relation (1989, p: 353). Since according to McGinn even if it is out of our cognitive limitations there must be natural explanation for each reality in the world; "it is implausible to take these correlations (psychophysical correlations between mind-body) as ultimate and inexplicable facts" (1989, p: 353). According to him consciousness emerges from the brain thanks to some natural property in the brain. However this emergence cannot be a kind of radical way as emergence of consciousness from the brain in virtue of the cerebral (1989, p: 353). In other words, we cannot connect consciousness to the brain with respect to the neurons or brain cells in the brain; this connection cannot be explicable via neuro-chemical process of the brain. It is identical with supposing that consciousness emerges from the brain in a miraculous way, since we cannot obtain even a bit of clue about mental states via neuro-chemical process of the brain.

McGinn uses the example of the emergence of life from inorganic matter. He claims that life emerges from inorganic matter; but we cannot suppose it as a miraculous emergence or its expanding process as inexplicable facts. We think that even if we cannot know it, there must be some natural explanation of this process and as further

biological evolution consciousness must have some natural explanation as well (1989, p: 353). He supports this claim by saying that:

> ...there exists some property *P*, instantiated by the brain, in virtue of which the brain is the basis of consciousness. Equivalently, there exists some theory *T*, referring to *P*, which fully explains the dependence of conscious states on brain states. If we knew *T*, then we would have a constructive solution to the mind-body problem. (1989, p: 353)

As can be deduced from this quotation, the problem stemming from the unextended mind's dependence on extended brain does indeed has a natural explanation thanks to property of the brain.

McGinn especially insists on the existence of the naturalistic solution of the mind-body problem. Of course there may be a belief that consciousness emerges from the brain in a miraculous way as if Djinn emanates from the lamp, or it can be thought that consciousness arises from the brain thanks to the divine power of God. However, McGinn refuses all of these assumptions because he claims that as a part of our biological structure the brain is not different from our other organs. It is like the kidney or the liver, but the only differences between them are their physical structures, and features (Demircioğlu, 2016-a, p: 3). For this reason, according to McGinn just as we do not think that the liver secrets the bile in a miraculous way, we should accept that the brain secrets consciousness in a natural way as well. If we did not have the anatomical knowledge of how the liver secrets the bile, then we could think that bile emerges from the liver in a miraculous way. On the other hand, because we have the knowledge of this anatomical theory, we do not feel astonishment about this issue.

However, although there is a naturalistic solution of the mind-body problem, the most essential question is whether we can ever know theory T explaining this solution, and grasp nature of the property P. And moving on to (ii), according to McGinn we can never know theory T, and grasp nature of the property P because of our cognitive limitations. For being able to solve the mind-body puzzle we try to achieve the knowledge of mind-body nexus, however, our bafflement about this issue stems from the limits of our understanding capacity. He claims that in order to fully

understand why the problem of consciousness is so perplexing, we must examine the nature of human knowledge (1999, p: 31). Although there is a natural nexus between the mind and the brain in virtue of property P, we are *cognitively closed* to the knowledge of this connection and the nature of the property. We can explain more clearly what cognitive closure is by using the case of the Humean mind. According to David Hume, concepts can only be formed in the mind by way of impressions of senses. That is, for the Humean mind, perception has a critical role in the concept-forming process. If we have the perception of red, then we can have a concept of red, if you cannot see it, you cannot have anything about it either. On the other hand, according to McGinn human beings do not have Humean minds. And such a Humean mind is not capable of grasping and understanding some scientific theories or laws of nature (1999, p: 43-44). For instance, a Humean mind cannot comprehend scientific theories or unobservables like properties of atoms etc.; this means that scientific theories about unobservable things are *cognitively closed* to the Humean mind. In a similar way, we might have, as human beings, a mind that is unable to grasp some domains of reality of the world, since our concept-forming capacity has limitations as well. For this reason, similarly we might be *cognitively closed* to the knowledge of the mind-body link.

McGinn defines "cognitive closure" as follows: "A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to property P (or theory T) if and only if the concept-forming procedures at M's disposal cannot extend to a grasp of P (or an understanding of T)" (1989, p: 350). According to McGinn, our minds' concept-forming faculties are unable to grasp the nature of property making mind-body link possible or understand theory explaining this link.

We have two distinct faculties and by using them we apprehend the whole empirical world: introspection and perception. All information obtained from the world is either introspection-based or perception-based (2003, p: 158). While, we form our concepts of consciousness by introspecting our own inner mental states; we form our concept of the brain by observing or perceiving it. For instance; when you cut your finger, you experience pain. You experience this feeling "from the inside," and you

form the concept of pain through examining this inner mental state. On the other hand, you might also be aware of your brain's gray walnut looking, or network of crisscrossing fibers by making observation via technological instruments; that is, by the way of outer senses (1999, pp: 46-7). While you comprehend consciousness inwardly and directly, you comprehend the brain outwardly.

According to McGinn although there are only two possible ways –introspection and perception- to try to arrive at property P, as mentioned above either of them can be successful for this task. Firstly, we can evaluate introspection in terms of getting to property P. McGinn asserts that we can grasp P neither through introspection nor by some conceptual analysis of introspection-based concepts. Introspection means direct investigation of consciousness, so via this faculty we can acquire direct and immediate knowledge of only our mental states. That is, as introspection is limited with merely consciousness; "we have direct cognitive access to one term of the mind-brain relation, but we do not have such access to the nature of link" (1989, p: 354). For understanding the mind-brain relation, we must arrive at P, and for grasping P we must have a faculty mediating between mind and brain; but as a concept forming faculty introspection doesn't succeed this job, since it can show us only "vivid nakedness" of conscious states as merely one side of the mind-body relation.

Beside this, McGinn claims that "neither does it seem feasible to try to extract P from the concepts of consciousness we now have by some procedure of conceptual analysis" (1989, p: 354). Introspection gives us what our current mental states are, but by examining our current mental experiences we cannot obtain any information about P, since information about this kind of property is not included in the concepts of consciousness. For instance, we cannot infer how the experience of pain depends on the brain from an analysis of the concept of pain. According to McGinn trying to extract P from the analysis of concepts of consciousness is as implausible as trying to solve the life-matter problem by analysing the concept of life (1989, pp: 354-5). Therefore, for accessing the mind-body relation by analyzing the concepts of consciousness is inadequate and "faculty of introspection, as a concept-forming

capacity is cognitively closed with respect to P" (1989, p: 355). If it had not been so, then there would have not been a puzzle about the mind-body relation because we would have been able to solve it by introspection simply.

A further point about P and consciousness is related with the limitation of our *own* form of consciousness. McGinn claims that "the range of concepts of consciousness attainable by a mind M is constrained by the specific forms of consciousness possessed by M" (1989, p: 355). In other words, we can say that we can only form concepts of conscious states which are experienced by our own. According to McGinn this claim can be made more intelligible by the following examples: For instance, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat[3]. That is, we cannot conceptualise the bat's own subjective mental state, because our concepts of consciousness are formed through our own form of consciousness, and we cannot conceive anything that transcends our own consciousness. Similarly, if you had never seen red, you would not understand a certain theory about it. Since for understanding this theory there must be possession of red experience, but you had never had it (1999, pp: 53-4). Knowing what it is like to be a bat requires the concept of conscious property we cannot ever grasp due to *inherent* limitations of our own form of consciousness as a human being. Similarly, grasping property P and understanding theory T explaining mind-body link requires the concept of conscious property we cannot ever have by virtue of limitation in our consciousness structure. And for P and T transcend these limitations, they are inaccessible to us.

McGinn claims that if we make an empirical investigation of the brain as the last avenue to be able to access to the nature of such a property, we don't reach a conclusion better than the one we do with introspection. We investigate the structure of the brain by using perception as our other concept-forming faculty; that is, we form our concepts of the brain by the way of perception. However, McGinn claims that we know that there are properties of the brain which are necessarily closed to the perception of the brain (1989, p: 357). Since, for instance, consciousness as a property of the brain is closed to perception. As I have explained in the section "Consciousness and Spatiality" above, consciousness is noumenal in terms of the

[3] For the details of this example you can see Nagel (1974) "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"

perception of the brain; even if we stare into the whole structure of the brain, we cannot observe the mental states themselves. And McGinn claims that P is also one of the imperceptible properties of the brain. The argument of perceptual closure for P begins with the thought that "nothing we can imagine perceiving in the brain would ever convince us that we have located the intelligible nexus we seek" (1989, p: 357). In other words, even if we observe all of the properties of the brain, we will always remain as mystified about how consciousness emerges from the brain. According to McGinn the reason of our bafflement about this issue contains the fact that "senses are geared to representing a spatial world; they essentially present things in space with spatially defined properties" (1989, p: 357). Our sense organs merely reply to properties having spatial characteristics; but according to McGinn "these properties are of the wrong sort (the wrong category) to constitute P" (1989, pp: 357-8). He underlines this claim with these words:

> ... it is precisely *such* properties (spatial properties) that seem inherently incapable of resolving the mind-brain problem: we cannot link consciousness to the brain in virtue of spatial properties of the brain. There the brain is, an object of perception, laid out in space, containing spatially distributed process; but consciousness defies explanation in such terms. Consciousness does not seem made up out of smaller spatial processes; yet perception of the brain seems limited to revealing such processes. (1989, p: 357)

Because spatial properties cannot be successful about explaining the psycho-physical link between consciousness and the brain, P must be a non-spatial property, and for the reason that P is non-spatial, it cannot be perceived by our senses. As a conclusion of these claims, P is not only introspectively but also perceptively closed.

On the other hand, McGinn maintains that P has not only introspection and perception closure, but also conceptual closure on the ground that we cannot introduce any theoretical concept for getting P by *inference* from the physical data. For him "there are reasons for believing that no coherent method of concept introduction will ever lead us to P" (1989, p: 358). And his main reason for this claim is what he calls the *homogeneity principle*. It removes the magical emergence of new concepts because of the fact that according to this principle theoretical concept formation can only be possible by the way of analogical extension of what we

observe. For example, “we arrive at the concept of a molecule by taking our perceptual representations of macroscopic objects and conceiving of smaller scale objects of the same general kind” (1989, p: 358). However, by this way only unobservable material objects can be understood as in the example. We cannot grasp P, since McGinn claims that if observable entities of the brain are unsuitable for explaining the mind-body relation, then analogical extensions of these original entities are also inappropriate to arrive at P (1989, p: 359). According to the homogeneity principle in order to explain observed physical data, we appeal to only properties and occurrence of the same kind, not to properties of consciousness. P is a property of the brain as well, but it doesn’t have the characteristics of spatial properties of the brain; “brain has this property as it has the property of consciousness” (1989, p: 359). P must be a non-spatial property for explaining mind-brain relation as mentioned above; and for this reason, no spatial theoretical concept which is introduced to explain physical data observed in the brain can explain how consciousness emerges from the brain.

For McGinn, although consciousness is a property of the brain, introspection cannot give anything about the brain as a physical object; and, in a similar way even though consciousness originates from the brain, perception, as outer senses, cannot give any information about the noumenal conscious states (1999, p: 47). And therefore, they cannot give us any access to how P mediates between them. As presented above, according to McGinn not only by our concept-forming faculties, but also through the concepts inferred from these faculties we cannot achieve P, so P is *fully* cognitively closed for human beings.

McGinn adds another claim for underlining the puzzle of consciousness. He claims that a paradigm shift that is a theory revolution, which replaces the earlier claim with a more effective one cannot be a solution either. There have been paradigm shifts for explaining some puzzle like conceiving the universe, but in this theoretical shift there have been only new concepts and theory created with our present faculties. For explaining the puzzle of consciousness, however, a paradigm shift cannot be sufficient (2003, p: 160). Because of that, “no amount of paradigm-shifting will teach

us what it is like to be a bat, or teach a blind what is like to see, since these deficiencies go deeper than that...we need more than a paradigm shift to solve the mind-body problem" (2003, p: 160). We need a perspective shift; that is, we need a new faculty to apprehend the rest of the world. However, we cannot have such a new faculty, for as human beings we are created with these biological cognitive limitations. For having a perspective shift, according to McGinn "we need to become another type of cognitive being altogether" (2003, p: 160). And this means that from the point of McGinn as we won't ever know what it is like to be bat, we won't ever understand the mind-brain link either.

McGinn is considerably pessimistic about the solvability of the mind-body problem by human beings. On the other side, according to his third main claim, there is no philosophical mind-body problem he tries to show his optimism about the removal of the philosophical perplexity. According to him the emergence of consciousness from the brain does not have to be inherently miraculous, in order to be noumenal for us. Indeed the psychophysical nexus between the mind and the brain there is a non-mysterious and full explanation in a certain science; but this science is cognitively closed to human beings (1989, p: 361-2). If we accept that consciousness does not emerge from the brain by the miraculous way in which the Djinn emanates from the lamb, then there will be no philosophical problem about the mind-brain nexus (1989, p: 352). Even if we cannot attain it due to the inherent closure of our cognitive faculties, there is a natural explanation of the mind-body relation: consciousness emerges from the brain in virtue of a non-spatial property P in the brain in a natural way. For McGinn we are like the Humean mind in terms of our understanding of the connection between the mind and body, and we confuse our faculties' limitations and objective eeriness with each other. However, the generation of mind from the brain is not an objectively mysterious phenomenon in reality. McGinn identifies the explanation of mind-body relation as a kind of mystery as well; but, he explains the sense of mystery by means of our own cognitive limitations, not by the way of objective magical process in the world. That is, "the sense of miracle comes from us not from the world" (1989, p: 363). We can say that the nature of consciousness is mystery in one sense; but not in other sense and this position is the natural result of a

sharp separation between the epistemological and ontological dimensions of the problem. If we look at it epistemologically, it is a mystery in the sense that it is beyond human beings' cognitive limitations; but, if we look at it ontologically, it is not mystery in the sense that it is not inherently miraculous for it has natural and simple explanation in the reality (1996, p: 42). According to McGinn, because we cannot solve the mind-body puzzle, we may think that consciousness may be quite a complex phenomenon; but he mentions that consciousness is not complex; on the contrary, it is biologically simple. There is no reason to suppose that consciousness is more complex than digestion or sexual reproduction; but, because our cognitive limitations are not adequate to achieve the nature of its emergence we tend to believe that consciousness is extremely complex. In a similar way, if you had experienced the world in the light of blue, you would have begun to believe that experiencing the world in shades of red is more puzzling than experiencing it in shades of blue. In fact, red is not more complex than blue (1999, p: 64). Although there is also simple natural process between mind and body, we tend to project the bias of our minds onto nature as if there is an anomaly in nature itself (1999, p: 65). And the problem itself merely stems from this tendency. In, *Can we solve the mind-body problem?*, McGinn gives an answer to this question as both No and Yes (1989, p: 366). He says "No", because as mentioned in detail above, we cannot solve the mind-body relation by the reason of our own inherently cognitive limitations. On the other side, he says "Yes", since he thinks that the philosophical problem about this connection is removed thanks to his hypothesis.

As a conclusion, we can summarize McGinn's transcendental naturalism as follows. (1) Consciousness cannot be reduced to brain states. Since when we stare into the brain we can only see neurons and electro chemical activities which may correlate to our mental states, but we cannot access the mental experience itself. However, (2) state of consciousness emerge from the brain. Aristotle claimed that not brain but heart is the seat of consciousness; but this is wrong. This is because brain's activities correlate directly with those of consciousness. When our brain is injured, changes in the brain lead to change in the states of consciousness. For this reason, as McGinn says the brain houses consciousness (1999, p: 52). From (1) and (2) we infer that (3)

we feel as if there is a philosophical problem about the mind-brain connection. Since, while brain is the spatial thing mental states are non-spatial phenomena, and as mental states cannot be brain states themselves, we suppose that there is a philosophical puzzlement about that how matter causes the emergence of non-spatial phenomena. Indeed, (4) there is a non-spatial property P in the brain and by virtue of it there is a natural connection between the mind and the brain. However; (5) the concept-forming faculties of human being have inherent limitations. That is, there are two basic concept-forming faculties of human beings: introspection and perceptions. For this reason; there is not a mind body substance dualism; but there is a concept dualism. Since we can only form a concept of consciousness by introspection and we can only form a concept of brain by perception. Introspection is limited by consciousness and perception is limited by observable things. And (6) the nature of P and hence mind-body causal connection are beyond this limitation. There is no other faculty we have to form a concept of the unity emerging from the mind-body relation. When we try to access this connection, we can either analyze consciousness with introspection or investigate the brain with perception; but, this situation is like viewing an elephant either from the tail or from the trunk, we can never achieve a view of the whole elephant (1999, p: 48). And from (4), (5) and (6) we infer that (7) we can never produce a constructive solution to the mind-body problem, but we can remove the philosophical problem about it. That is, even if we are cognitively closed to the mind-body relation, there exists consciousness and a natural process of mind-body connection in reality. There is a theory T and it explains the mind-body relation by using no miraculous way than the way in which we explain relation between the liver and bile (1989, p: 362). T is noumenal for us, but this doesn't make it miraculous or less real. For this reason, there is no philosophical problem about the mind-brain connection.

2.2. Levine's Explanatory Gap and McGinn's Cognitive Closure

The explanatory gap is a term that is first used by Joseph Levine in his article: *Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.* He uses this term to indicate that the qualitative character of phenomenal state cannot be fully explained by physical

processes. In other words, in the psycho-physical identity theories there are some unexplainable crucial points with respect to phenomenal states for human beings and Levine calls this situation as 'explanatory gap' between physical and phenomenal states. And according to Levine the reason of our inability to grasp the relation between physical and phenomenal states is the existence of this explanatory gap.

In his article, before explaining the explanatory gap idea Levine mentions Kripke's objections to materialist arguments about the mind-body relation. He especially focuses on Kripke's argument about that psycho physical identity theories are metaphysically false. He explains this objection by saying that according to Kripke if something is true, then it must be necessarily true. And if something is necessarily true, then there is not a possible world in which it is false (1983, p: 355). To analyze this argument of Kripke's Levine uses two identity statements:

"(1) Pain is the firing of C-fibers."

"(2) Heat is the motion of molecules." (1983, p: 354)

According to Kripke, the theoretical identity thesis "heat is the motion of molecules" is necessarily true because there is not a possible world in which heat is experienced without the motion of molecules (Levine, 1983, p: 355). On the other hand, for him the psycho-physical identity thesis "pain is the firing of C-fibers is false because if it is true, then it must be necessarily true, and if it is necessarily true, then there is no possible world in which pain exists without C-fibers firing. However, according to him there is a possible world in which pain is experienced without C-fibers firing (Levine, 1983, p: 355).

Although Levine finds Kripke's argument to be really important, he does not think that Kripke's objection is totally successful. He claims that Kripke's objection is related with an epistemological thesis not with an ontological one, and the epistemological thesis is not sufficient to be able to claim that psycho-physical identity thesis is ontologically false (1983, p: 354).

Levine emphasizes that theoretical identities and psycho-physical identities are different from each other; theoretical identities can be *fully* explained in a theoretical

way; and for this reason, we can easily understand the identity of heat and the motion of the molecules. On the other hand, for pain and C-fibers firing there is no such explanation showing that how pain is identical with the C-fibers firing. We can easily understand this claim of Levine's in his following remark:

> Statement (2), I want to say, expresses an identity that is *fully explanatory*, with nothing crucial left out. On the other hand, [statement (1) does] seem to leave something crucial unexplained, there is a "gap" in the explanatory import of [this statement]. It is this explanatory gap, I claim, which is responsible for their vulnerability to Kripke-type objections. (1983, p: 357)

As can be deduced from the quotation above there is something about the phenomenal state pain which is not explained by the C-fibers firing. Levine accepts that of course, C-fibers firing can explain the causal role of the pain. That is, for instance, when we cut our skin by something sharp, some nerves are damaged and this situation stimulates the C-fibers which lead to pain as an avoidance mechanism (1983, p: 357). On the other hand, Levine says that our concept of pain involves more than its causal role; it has also a qualitative character (1983, p: 357). Its qualitative character is related with *what it is like to feel pain*, and when we identify pain with C-fibers firing this subjective quality of the pain experience still remains a puzzle for human beings. For Levine, this means that there is an "explanatory gap" between physical and phenomenal states, but this gap has a merely epistemological character not an ontological one. As can be seen in the quotation above he thinks that the reason of Kripke's argument against the materialist views is this explanatory gap. As an explanation of this claim Levine says that because we cannot explain how C-fibers firing has the qualitative character of the pain that is identical with it, or because we cannot understand what it is like to feel pain by identifying pain with physical properties of C-fibers firing, pain without C-fibers firing or C-fibers firing without pain comes to be conceivable for us (1983, p: 359). However, as I said before unlike Kripke he asserts that this epistemological thesis does not affect the truth of the ontological thesis, so we cannot reach the conclusion that the psycho-physical identity thesis is metaphysically false by the 'explanatory gap'. According to him, even if psycho-physical identity statements are ontological facts, we cannot access to the truth or falsity of them epistemologically because of this explanatory gap (1983, p: 360). Some psycho-physical identity statements may be true, but we

cannot know which one is true for such statements which have the explanatory gap (1983, p: 359).

In his thesis McGinn introduces the 'cognitive closure' thesis which appears similar to explanatory gap idea. However, there are some strong differences between Levine's 'explanatory gap' and McGinn's 'cognitive closure'. Firstly, as I explained before, according to McGinn's cognitive closure thesis, to be able to explain the mind-brain link we must have a concept of the property making possible this nexus, but according to him we can never obtain this concept not because it is ontologically miraculous, but because we have limited cognitive faculties. For this reason, according to McGinn this epistemological gap between physical and phenomenal domains will remain forever for human beings. On the other hand, Levine's account of the explanatory gap does not address anything about the *persistence* of this explanatory gap. That is, "unlike McGinn, he [Levine] doesn't go on to make the further claim that this gap will remain forever for us human being" (Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere, 1997, p: xviii).

Secondly, the more important difference between McGinn and Levine is about their approach to the psycho-physical relation. As I explained above, according to Levine there is no ontological gap between physical and phenomenal states; he leaves the door open for the possibility that phenomenal states can be identified with the physical process ontologically. In other words, he does not seem to be trying to draw a non-materialist conclusion; on the contrary, he tries to show that the explanatory gap creates not an ontological, but only an epistemological problem for materialism. For Levine this problem may bother materialists, but does not show that their theses about the mind-brain relation are false. On the other hand, McGinn does not think that phenomenal states can be identified with merely physical states. Of course, he claims that there is a necessary causal relation between the phenomenal mind and the physical brain, and that consciousness emerges from some natural properties of the brain, but he especially insists that phenomenal states cannot be reduced to physical processes and the properties making possible their relation are not ordinary physical properties of the brain either. While Levine emphasizes that we cannot claim the

falsity of materialism, McGinn clearly claims the falsity of materialism with these words:

> Materialism says there is nothing more to the mind than the brain as currently conceived. The mind is made of meat. It is meat, neither more nor less. A conscious state such as seeing something red is just a bunch of neurons, brain cells, doing their physical thing. Living meat, yes, complicated meat, but meat nonetheless. We might as well call materialism "meatism." (1999, p: 18)

As can be deduced from the quotation McGinn thinks that phenomenal states are not only epistemologically but also *ontologically* something more than merely physical processes. According to him, pain and C-fibers firing are the names of two ontologically distinct properties, so we cannot say that pain and C-fibers firing are identical with each other (1999, p: 20). Unlike Levine, McGinn finds the psycho-physical identity statement "Pain is C-fibers firing" to be not only epistemologically, but also ontologically problematic.

McGinn also uses a thought experiment by Frank Jackson to show the problematic aspect of materialism[4]. This thought experiment is about a brilliant scientist Mary. Mary is born in a black and white room and she has never experienced any colours apart from these for she has not investigated the world by leaving her room. However, she is also a talented scientist because she knows everything about the physical processes of the brain thanks to the black and white television monitor in her room. That is, she knows all the physical processes that take place in the brain when we see a red tomato or a blue sky etc. She uses the terms "blue" and "red", but she has never met with them. Let's suppose that one day Mary leaves her black and white room and she meets with the red tomato or the blue sky itself in the real world. This means that Mary will learn something new; she will have the experience of "redness" or "blueness" itself. She will have something that she did not know in her black and white room. When she was in the black and white room, although she obtains the whole information about the neurophysiology of visual experience, she cannot have the knowledge of *what it is like to have such experience.* And by using

[4] This thought experiment used by McGinn is the knowledge argument of Frank Jackson (we may call it as Mary's room), and he uses this argument in his study "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982) with intend to argue against physicalism.

this important thought experiment of Jackson's McGinn claims that materialism is clearly false because complete knowledge of the brain does not come to mean complete knowledge of the mind (1999, p: 22). According to him, we have the knowledge of what it is like to have conscious experience via introspection by which we can access our own conscious states; we cannot acquire it by our physical knowledge. There is a deep logical gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and the reason of this gap is not that introspection is inadequate to show the true nature of the phenomenal states. On the contrary, introspection reveals the fact that the physical and the phenomenal are distinct states with each other, and mental states cannot be reduced to physical neurons (1999, p: 23). As I explained before, in his study Levine also accepts the qualitative character of phenomenal states. However, according to him there is only an epistemological gap between pain and C-fibers firing because we cannot explain how C-fibers firing has the qualitative character of the pain identical with it. In other words, we can say that while for Levine the epistemological gap does not show that there is an ontological gap between the physical and the phenomenal, for McGinn this clearly creates an ontological gap and shows us that materialism is false.

In his study, Chalmers also touches on the difference between McGinn's and Levine's approaches to this hard problem by discussing some types of materialist and non-reductionist views[5]. Chalmers classifies Levine's attitude towards the mind-body problem as 'Type-B materialism'. He describes this kind of materialism by saying that according to this type, there is an epistemological gap between physical and mental states; however, there is no ontological gap between them (2010, p: 115). For instance, proponents of Type-B materialism would claim concerning the Mary's room thought experiment that in the black and white room, Mary is unaware of some phenomenal truths; but, these phenomenal truths are about physical realities identical with them. That is, when Mary is released from the room, she has the old facts in a

[5] In his book "The Character of Consciousness" (2010) Chalmers defines some types of materialist views: Type-A Materialism, Type-B Materialism and Type-C Materialism. Apart from these, he also explains some types of non-reductionist view: Type-D Dualism, Type-E Dualism and Type-F Monism. However, I will not be concerned with the all of these types; among them I will only focus on Type B Materialism and Type F Monism because each of these two types is related with Levine's and McGinn's approaches.

different way (2010, p: 115). With this analysis of Mary's room thought experiment from the perspective of Type-B materialists, we can conclude that while it can be a strong argument for McGinn about the falsity of materialism, probably for Levine it cannot be adequate to argue against the metaphysical truth of the materialist solutions.

Type-B materialists assert that phenomenal states can be identified with physical states. And they give H_2O-water example as evidence to this claim. They say that H_2O and water are identical with each other in the nature; they refer to the same thing; however, this does not mean that the concept *H_2O* and the concept *water* are similar with each other. These concepts do not have to be translated into each other. We cannot achieve the identity of H_2O and water by conceptual analysis; we can achieve it empirically because they are same thing in nature (2010, p: 115). According to this type of materialism in the same way, phenomenal states like pain and neural states like C-fibers firing can be identical with each other. That is, even though the concept 'pain' and the concept 'C-fibers firing' are not synonyms, in nature, the identity of them can be an ontological fact. On the other hand, McGinn claims that "[w]hat makes the concept *pain* different from the concept *C-fibers firing* is precisely that the two concepts express distinct properties, so we cannot say that these properties are identical" (1999, p: 20). From McGinn's perspective materialists try to assume different phenomena to be the same fact of nature.

While Chalmers defines Levine as a Type-B materialist, he defines McGinn as a Type-F monist; and contrary to Type-B materialism, Type-F monism is a non-reductionist view. Chalmers explains that Type-F monists think that consciousness arises from the intrinsic properties of the fundamental physical things. According to this type of monism physics does not show us the intrinsic nature of entities; and for this reason, there is a puzzle about how phenomenal states can be fitted in the physical world (2010, p: 133). As I said before although McGinn asserts that phenomenal states are necessarily causally related to physical states, they cannot be reduced to physical processes. In his thesis there are some intrinsic properties of physical entities; thanks to them phenomenal states emerges from the physical. And

because of these thoughts of McGinn we can define him as Type-F monist as Chalmers did. There are two possibilities about the intrinsic nature of the things in this type of monism. According to the first possibility, the intrinsic properties of physical entities are phenomenal properties themselves. However, according to the second possibility, they are "protophenomenal" properties apart from the phenomenal properties themselves (2010, p: 133). Thanks to these two possibilities physical states and phenomenal states can be fitted in the same natural world. Space includes the physical things having intrinsic "(proto)phenomenal" qualities; physics emerges from the causal relations among these physical things and consciousness emerges from the intrinsic nature of the physical things (2010, p: 133-4). We can see clearly that McGinn's thesis is closer to the second possibility, because he claims that there are some properties of the brain that make possible the emergence of consciousness from the brain; and these properties are neither physical nor phenomenal things. Further, according to McGinn even though these properties are not spatial, they are natural and intrinsic parts of the physical entities. However, we cannot access these intrinsic properties as other natural parts of space because we can conceive only the partial structure of objective space (i.e., we can only know physical aspect of the real space)[6]. As can be deduced from these, McGinn finds a place for phenomenal states in the physical world without reducing them to the physical process themselves.

In a nutshell, as can be deduced from the argumentation above and this successful analysis by Chalmers, although both Levine and McGinn agree with the explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal, by using this idea they move in the opposite directions and reach different ontological conclusions about the mind-brain relation. While Levine accepts the qualitative character of phenomenal states, he claims that there is only an explanatory gap and this epistemological gap does not lead to an ontological gap. That is, for Levine identity between the physical and the mental may be ontological fact in the world. On the other hand, although McGinn also believes that there is an epistemological gap between the physical and the mental, this gap emerges from the fact that these two have totally distinct characters

[6] I will explain this "objective" and "real" space idea of McGinn in the third chapter of this thesis in more detail

in the world; and they cannot be one and the same thing. They are ontologically different properties and the materialist views about this issue are false for him.

CHAPTER III

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN COGNITIVE CLOSURE

As explained in the first chapter in detail according to McGinn's kind of mysterianism although the problem of how the mind emerges from the physical brain has naturalistic solution, *we* are inadequate to obtain this solution due to an inherent limitation of our concept-forming faculties. He claims that

> We have been trying for a long time to solve the mind-body problem. It has stubbornly resisted our best efforts. The mystery persists. I think the time has come to admit candidly that we cannot resolve the mystery. But I also think that this very insolubility –or the reason for it- removes the philosophical problem. (1989, p: 349)

By these words, McGinn implies that it is time to wave the white flag for philosophers who think over the mind-body problem in the hope of explaining its solution clearly, because according to him we human beings are permanently incapable of having the adequate concepts to be able to explain the mind-brain nexus. Although there is no ontological mystery as the psychophysical link exists in the nature unproblematically, there is an epistemological mystery since we cannot uncover this link in principle. McGinn defends his epistemological mysterianism about the explanation of the mind-body nexus as a conclusion of his 'cognitive closure' thesis. According to him, human beings are innately cognitively closed to the properties providing the mind-brain relation and a theory explaining this solution because of their limited epistemic faculties. In his thesis McGinn tries to form a strong basis for his cognitive closure idea by using three main steps: Firstly, he mentions the idea of "realism about reality", and secondly, he makes an analogy between human beings and animals. With these two steps he tries to show us the possibility of cognitive closure for human beings. Finally, he mentions our concept-

forming faculties – introspection and perception – as two possible avenues to be able to grasp the property providing psychophysical link; and with this step he transforms the possibility of cognitive closure for human being to actuality. However, for the moment at least I will not be concerned with the third step of his argument; I will focus on the first and second stages because there are attacks to the possibility of human cognitive closure by Dennett and Kriegel; so in this chapter I will argue for the possibility of cognitive closure for human being[7].

3.1. Attitudes of Dennett and Kriegel with respect to Human Cognitive Closure

I define attitudes of Dennett and Kriegel as an "attack" because especially when we analyze the discussion of Dennett about McGinn's closure idea we can conclude that Dennett explicitly refuses the possibility of human cognitive closure. We can see his insistence on the impossibility of the idea of human cognitive closure idea clearly in his following sentences:

> We certainly cannot rule out the possibility in principle that our minds will be cognitively closed to some domain or other....[W]e can be certain that there are realms of no doubt fascinating and important knowledge that our species, in its actual finitude, will never enter, not because we will butt our heads against some stone wall of utter incomprehension, but because the Heat Death of the universe will overtake us before we can get there. This is not, however, a limitation due to the frailty of our animal brains, a dictate of "naturalism." (1995, p: 383)

As can be seen in the quotation above although Dennett seems as if he does not deny the possibility of cognitive closure, he indeed attacks its possibility, since he implies that our cognitive functions are limitless. We cannot access the knowledge of some realms of the world, but this is not a consequence of our limited capacity. According to him human being's cognitive structure is powerful enough to be able to comprehend all the realities of the world, because it progressively evolves. The only reason of our ignorance about some realms of the world will be the end of the world. That is, according to Dennett human cognitive closure which emerges from the innate limitation of human's cognitive faculties is not possible.

[7] I will discuss third step of McGinn's cognitive closure thesis in the next chapter.

Like Dennett, Kriegel also attacks the possibility of human cognitive closure. However, because of remarks like the followings Kriegel also, like Dennett, seems as if he does not deny the possibility of cognitive closure:

> There can be problems whose solution evades us, but *it cannot be a matter of conceptual poverty*. (2003, p: 179, italics mine)
> Surely we cannot presume that a biologically evolved mind can be immune to all forms of principled ignorance....this is what I want to argue: not that humans are immune to all forms of principled ignorance, but that the reason they are radically ignorant when they are *cannot pertain to missing conceptual powers*. (2003, p: 183, italics mine)

Although Kriegel accepts that human beings cannot be immune to all forms of ignorance, he refuses the possibility of McGinn's kind of cognitive closure. As can be seen in the quotation above, especially in the italicized parts, he thinks that humans' ignorance about some realities does not emerge from their innate cognitive inadequacy; according to him, the reason of *temporal* ignorance of human being is only the deficiency of the right empirical discovery.[8] Even though such remarks of Kriegel are somewhat confusing, he clearly confirms his attack on the possibility of human cognitive closure by saying that "my argument against McGinn will target the very possibility of cognitive closure" (2003, p: 180) and "I wish to present a general argument against the possibility of cognitive closure" (2003, p: 183).

3.2. McGinn's Arguments for the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure

As I mentioned before, in his thesis McGinn gives place to two different ideas to express the possibility of cognitive closure. Firstly, he tries to show with the assumption of "realism about reality" that everything real in the world does not have to be open to the cognitive structure of human beings. In *Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?* he argues for this claim by offering the following explanations:

[8] In his article Kriegel makes a distinction between McGinn's cognitive closure idea and his cognitive closedness argument: "Cognitive closure which is principled and permanent, cognitive *closedness*, which is unprincipled and provisional in character" (2003, p: 181). That is, according to cognitive closure thesis of McGinn, closure with respect to causal basis of a phenomenon emerges from our *inherent* limitations of cognitive capacity, and for this reason, it is permanent. However, according to cognitive closedness idea of Kriegel our closedness in terms of the causal basis of an event emerge from our deficient or unsuccessful discoveries about it and it can be eliminated by discovering the right part of the world; for this reason, closedness can have temporal quality.

> ...[C]ognitive closure with respect to [property] *P* does not imply irrealism about *P*. That *P* is (as we might say) *noumenal* for [mind] *M* does not show that *P* does occur in some naturalistic scientific theory *T* – it shows only that *T* is not cognitively accessible to *M*....Nothing, at least, in the concept of reality shows that everything real is open to the human concept forming faculty – if, that is, we are realists about reality. (p: 351)
>
> Only a misplaced idealism about the natural world could warrant the dogmatic claim that everything is knowable by the human species at this stage of its evolutionary development... (p: 353)

As McGinn mentioned that while idealism insists on the claim that fundamental reality is only what is conceived by the human mind, realism makes possible the existence of somethings independently from our knowledge or perception about them. I think that realism is a good starting point for the cognitive closure idea because claiming the real existence of things independently from the human's mind makes possible the cognitive closure idea for some domains of the world. And as can be seen in the quotations above, McGinn plausibly thinks that if realism is true, then it can provide a ground for the possibility of human being's cognitive closure with respect to some realms of the world. That is, realism makes possible the argument that the existence of the natural psycho-physical link is a reality of the world even though human beings are not cognitively open to the knowledge of it. About this issue Demircioglu also says that "...the possibility of cognitive closure simply follows from realism and some innocuous assumptions about a particular object's being independent from some other object's conceiving it" (2016-a, p: 4). Attack on the possibility of human cognitive closure seems as if it's idealistic position; however, I think that about the limits of human being's cognitive faculties idealism is too heroic a standpoint. As Demircioglu said, among all the discussions about McGinn's mysterianism, it is hard to find arguments that directly attack the possibility of cognitive closure for human being (2016-b, p: 2). Even though there are discussions concerning its actuality, the possibility of human cognitive closure is generally accepted. I also think that it is quite plausible that there are some realities of the world we are cognitively closed to for we have biologically limited cognitive capacities as McGinn said. It is too strong to suppose that our cognitive capacities are powerful enough to be able to comprehend all the realities of the world.

Secondly, for showing that cognitive closure is possible for human beings McGinn reminds us of the analogy between human beings and animals. He claims that like bodies both animals' minds and human being's mind are "biological products" as well; and for this reason, like bodies minds have "different shapes or size" or they are more or less adequate for different cognitive functions as well (1989, p: 350). That is, according to him just as animals like monkeys, rats, bats etc. have limitations of their own kinds' mental faculties; we as human beings have limitations of our own kind's mental faculty. He exemplifies that "what is closed to the mind of a rat may be open to the mind of a monkey, and what is open to us may be closed to the monkey" (1989, p: 350). In other words, he asserts that just as monkeys cannot grasp the concept of an electron due to their cognitive capacity human beings cannot grasp the concept of a property making the mind-body nexus possible because of their inherent cognitive limitations. Each natural evolved system has its own cognitive limitations; if animals have cognitive closure, similarly, and if we are not supernatural beings like God, we have cognitive closure to some domains of the world. He supports this idea with the following words:

> ...we are natural beings, descended from apes, living in a natural world, and our capacities are as finite as can be. We can, it is true, do more with our mind than apes can, but that does not mean that we somehow magically escape the constraints of biology. We are animals all the way down, or up, not angels. (1999, p: 42)

As can be deduced from the explanations above McGinn makes an inference from the analogy argument that just as animals have cognitive closure in terms of some properties, human beings as evolved animals have cognitive closure with respect to some properties as well.

3.3. Analyzing of Dennett's and Kriegel's Common Objection to the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure

Dennett and Kriegel argue against the analogy argument of McGinn by claiming that there is an important dissimilarity between animals and human beings. That is, it is not a good idea to arrive at the possibility of human cognitive closure by comparing our minds with those of all other species, because according to them while McGinn

reminds us of this analogy he ignores the important difference between our minds and the other species': Language ability. They think that it is a powerful enough factor to be able to block making an analogy between human being and other species about the possibility of cognitive closure. For Dennett and Kriegel, while McGinn makes an analogy between species' minds he ignores that animals are cognitively closed not only to the answer of a problem but also the problem itself owing to the lack of relevant linguistic skills. We can see these argumentations of them more clearly in the following remarks respectively:

> Monkeys, for instance, can't grasp the concept of an electron, McGinn reminds us, but I think we should be unimpressed by the example, for not only can the monkey not understand the answer about electrons, it can't understand the question. The monkey isn't baffled, not even a little bit. We definitely understand the question about free will and consciousness well enough to know what we're baffled by (if we are), so until...McGinn can provide us with clear cases of animals (or people) who can baffled by questions whose true answers could not unbaffle them, they have given us no evidence of the reality or even likelihood of "cognitive closure" in human beings. (Dennett, 1995, p: 382-3)

In the same way Kriegel argues against McGinn by asserting that:

> Rat's minds do not understand trigonometry. Nobody would want to deny that. But trigonometric problems do not pose themselves to rats. Indeed, that rats' minds do not understand trigonometry is precisely why trigonometric problems do not pose themselves to rats. For trigonometric problems pose themselves to rats, rats' minds would have to understand a great deal of trigonometry. (2003, p: 183)

As seen in the quotations above, according to Dennett and Kriegel, the main reason of animals' cognitive closure concerning some features of the world like electron or trigonometry is their inability to understand questions about these features due to lacking of language capacity. Monkeys have cognitive closure with respect to the concept of electron, since they cannot grasp the question of "what is an electron?". And in a same way rats cannot grasp trigonometry, since they can understand none of the problems relevant to trigonometry. If monkeys could understand the question "what is an electron?", or rats could grasp questions about trigonometry, there could be the possibility for animals to answer the questions and grasp the concept of these features. However, we human beings are not like animals, "we understand the unanswered question about consciousness" (Dennett, 1991, p: 3). For this reason, according to Dennett and Kriegel, making an analogy between animals and human

beings about cognitive closure and coming to the conclusion about the possibility of human's cognitive closure by using this analogy is implausible.

3.3.1. Reply to Common Objection of Dennett and Kriegel

From arguments of Dennett and Kriegel, we can come to the conclusion that according to them the ability of understanding the problem is a necessary condition for being able to explain or understand the answer pertaining to this problem. That is, if a being cannot understand, formulate or grasp the problem itself, then there cannot be cognitive openness in terms of its solution. And according to them, unlike animals, human beings have this necessary condition for cognitive openness with respect to unanswered realities of the world; for this reason, the analogy argument of McGinn can be blocked because of this dissimilarity between animals and human beings.

If understanding a problem was really a necessary condition for cognitive openness in terms of its solution, and if the absence of this condition alone led to cognitive closure with respect to the answer of this question, then Dennett and Kriegel's arguments against the analogical inference of McGinn would be successful. In other words, if the reason of all animal cognitive closure was the absence of the ability to understand questions, then their attack would harm the analogy argument of McGinn. However, about this issue Demircioglu claims that:

> If some animal cognitive closure has nothing to do with having the capacity to understand questions, then the analogical inference cannot be blocked by the observation that humans have the capacity to understand questions. This is because humans having that capacity can still be vulnerable to cognitive closure just as animals are if there are some properties such that it is not a necessary condition for human cognitive openness that humans do understand questions about those properties. (forthcoming, p: 5)

As can be seen in the quotation above, Demircioglu thinks that Kriegel and Dennett's objection cannot block the analogy argument of McGinn because according to him there are some forms of animal cognitive closure which does not stem from the inability of understanding questions. For instance, he claims that some colour-blind

animals are cognitively closed with respect to some properties like "redness"; however, the reason of this closure is not the animals' inability of understanding questions about "redness" itself. Just as animals' cognitive openness to some properties like "smells" is not related with their ability to understand questions about "smells", their cognitive closure with respect to "redness" is not related with the inability to understand relevant questions either (forthcoming, p: 5).

Demircioglu explains this idea more clearly by distinguishing between "linguistic cognitive closure" and "non-linguistic cognitive closure". While he calls cognitive closure which emerges from the inability to understand questions as 'linguistic cognitive closure', he calls cognitive closure which is not related with the capacity to understand questions as 'non-linguistic cognitive closure' (2016-b, p: 10-1). And he exemplifies that dogs are linguistically cognitively closed with respect to the property "being Tuesday" because if they have the ability to understand questions about it, they can be cognitively open to this property; on the contrary dogs' cognitive openness to the properties like colours does not require understanding relevant questions; for this reason, they are non-linguistically cognitive closedness with respect to certain colours (2016-b, p: 11). By making this distinction Demircioglu shows us that not all cognitive closure of animals emerges from their incapacity to understand problems[9]. Dennett and Kriegel assert that there cannot be an analogy between animals and humans because the reason of animal cognitive closure is the inability to formulate questions due to the absence of the faculty of language. However, Demircioglu shows us that not all cognitive closure of animals is linguistic cognitive closure, there is also some non-linguistic cognitive closure; for this reason, their objection to the analogy argument does not work. It can be fairly

[9] There might be an objection to the Demircioglu's idea of non-linguistic cognitive closure in animals. He mentions this objection in his article as well. Some might believe that all animal cognitive closure stems from linguistic inability, since according to these people "language is the mark of the cognition". That is, when animals are perceptually open to something, this does not mean that they are cognitively open with respect to these properties. However, Demircioglu replies to this objection and he claims that Dennett and Kriegel cannot raise such an objection because they presuppose the possibility of cognitive closure by quoting McGinn's monkey example about animal's cognitive closure. In addition to this, in his study Dennett also mentions a claim showing us existence of cognitive skills before language, and this can be evidence for the claim that language is not the mark of cognition. Demircioglu also claims that perception might be thought as "low-level intelligence" and it might be separated from "high-level cognitive phenomena like conscious belief", but still it is a cognitive phenomenon (2016-b, p: 12-3).

plausible to claim that animals have non-linguistic cognitive closure, and since human beings are similar to animals, this analogy can lead to the possibility of human cognitive closure. As a conclusion, Dennett and Kriegel think that McGinn makes an analogy argument; but he fails to notice the linguistic dissimilarity between animals and human beings. In response to this, we can say that Dennett and Kriegel try to block the analogy argument about cognitive closure by claiming that unlike human beings, animals don't have linguistic capacity; but they fail to notice the non-linguistic cognitive closure of animals. If there was only linguistic closure for animals, their argument would be effective; on the other hand, as Demircioglu said "what D&K [Dennett and Kriegel] have to say does not block the move from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure to the possibility of human cognitive closure" (2016-b, p: 12).

3.4. Kriegel's Objection to McGinn's Mysterianism

Apart from the analogy argument, in his article Kriegel continues to argue against the possibility of cognitive closure for human beings by using similar claims. Kriegel asserts that "there is a conceptual connection between understanding a problem and understanding its possible solution(s)" (2003, p: 184). According to him, we grasp a problem itself, and this requires having an opinion about its possible solutions, even if we do not know its exact solution. Or we cannot understand a problem itself; for this reason, we cannot grasp its solution either. However, it is implausible to assume that we can never understand the solution of a problem we can fully understand (Kriegel, 2009, p: 455). That is, formulating a problem itself involves formulating the possible solutions of the problem as well. Kriegel explains this claim more clearly by analyzing the relation between everyday questions and answers as follows:

> Just as a person cannot be said (truly) to understand the meaning of the sentence "John loves Mary" if she does not understand the meaning of the sentence "Mary loves John" or "John does not love Mary," it seems impossible that someone should be able to understand the meaning of "does John love Mary?" without being able to understand the meaning of both "John loves Mary" and "John does not love Mary" – and these two exhaust the possible answers. This is not only so for yes/no questions. One cannot be said to understand the question "What is John's weight?" if one does not understand the meaning of "John weighs 150 pounds."(2003, p: 184)

As can be deduced from the quotation above, Kriegel thinks that McGinn's cognitive closure idea fails because McGinn claims that we cannot understand the solution of the mind-body problem although we can "formulate" or "recognize" this problem. However, according to Kriegel "understanding a question is…necessarily coupled with understanding its possible answer" (2003, p: 184); for this reason, formulating the mind-body problem necessitates its possible answers as well, and for him this blocks the possibility of human cognitive closure with respect to mind-body problem. If organism's concept-forming faculties are powerful enough to be able to frame a problem itself, then it can be powerful enough to be able to achieve its possible solution according to Kriegel.

3.4.1. Reply to Kriegel's Objection

We can deny the claim that understanding a question necessitates understanding its possible solutions, and because of this reason we can say that this claim cannot rule out to the possibility of cognitive closure for human being. Kriegel insists on the conceptual connection between questions and their possible answers, and he defends this claim by using yes/no question as an example. When we focus on the yes/no question in the quotation above, his claim seems as true. However, Demircioglu claims that in Kriegel's example, the conceptual connection between the question and its possible answers depends on the special character of his example (forthcoming, p: 8). That is, conceptual connection argument seems plausible for yes/no questions, but when we generalize this claim for other types of question, we can see that it fails. Demircioglu analyzes the example of Kriegel about "what" questions and he shows us that the conceptual connection argument does not work for them. As can be seen in the quotation above Kriegel asserts that understanding "What is John's weight?" requires understanding its possible answer "John weighs 150 pounds". On the other hand, Demircioglu claims that one who does not know number 150 (for instance he may know numbers only up to 10), or a person who does not have the concept of "pound" (the only measure he has for calculating the weight may be kilogram) does not understand the answer "John weighs 150 pounds", but there is no reason to suppose that this person cannot understand the problem

"What is John's weight?" (forthcoming, p: 8). If one does not have the concept of pound and number 150, this situation leads to his incapability in terms of understanding relevant answer; but does not block understanding its question.

Besides this, there are also effective examples showing us that we can formulate questions without understanding their possible answers; and we don't have to be open to the solution of the problem we formulate. For instance, Demircioglu claims that for being able to understand a question "What is an F?" we need a particular concept *F*; however, for being able to understand its possible answer "An F is a G." we need to another particular concept *G* (forthcoming, p: 7). As can be deduced from this example a person formulating the question does not have to be able to formulate its solution; since the organism's concept forming faculties can be powerful enough to be able to form the concept of the problem, but it may not be powerful enough to be able to grasp the concept of its possible solutions. Moreover, there are other effective examples of Demircioglu showing us that we don't have to be cognitively open to the solutions of problems we understand. To illustrate, he claims that the colour-blind person is not open to the answer of question "what it is like to have red experiences?", even though he understands this question; and in the same way we can understand the question "what it is like to have batty experiences"; however, it does not seem that the solution of this question is open to us (forthcoming, p: 7). As can be deduced from these examples, Kriegel's argument against the possibility of human cognitive closure can be refused because understanding a question does not necessarily involve understanding its possible solutions. About this issue McGinn also says that:

> The incapacity to explain certain phenomena does not carry with it a lack of recognition of the theoretical problems the phenomena pose. You might be able to appreciate a problem without being able to formulate (even in principle) the solution to that problem (I suppose human children are often in this position, at least for a while). (1989, p: 351-2)

We cannot understand the possible solutions of the problems we formulate, if we cannot adequately grasp concepts of these solutions. That is, contrary to Kriegel's claim, if we can understand a question, this does not mean that we are cognitively open to the solution of this question as seen in the examples above.

In a nutshell, in his thesis McGinn claims that we human beings are cognitively closed to the solution of the mind-body problem. He claims "if we are realists about reality", then human cognitive closure with respect to the psycho-physical link can be possible, and he reminds us of an analogy between animals and human beings. He says that we are "biological products" like animals and just as they are cognitively closed to some properties, we are cognitively closed to some realities of the world as well. McGinn's analogical argument corroborates the possibility of cognitive closure for human beings. On the other hand, Dennett and Kriegel argue against the possibility of human cognitive closure by discussing the dissimilarity between animals and human beings. According to them while animals are cognitively closed to some properties because of their language inability, since human beings have language ability, they can understand the questions about these properties. For this reason, according to them McGinn cannot move from the animals' cognitive closure to the possibility of human cognitive closure. However, their argument against the possibility of cognitive closure does not work because they ignore the non-linguistic cognitive closure of animals. Not all animal cognitive closure stems from linguistic inability; some of them are not related with the ability to understand questions. And this makes possible the move from non-linguistic cognitive closure to the possibility of human cognitive closure. Apart from these, Kriegel also argues against the possibility of human cognitive closure by saying that there is a conceptual connection between problems and their possible solution. According to him understanding a problem contains understanding its possible solutions. However, there are some counter examples showing us that we can understand the problem without understanding its possible solutions. We don't have to be cognitively open to the possible solutions of the problems we can formulate. For these reason, none of these argument can rule out McGinn's claim about the possibility of human cognitive closure with respect to the mind-body problem.

CHAPTER IV

ON THE NATURE OF PROPERTY EXPLAINING THE MIND-BRAIN LINK

In the previous chapter I discussed the possibility of cognitive closure for human beings, and in this chapter I will focus on the final step of McGinn's cognitive closure idea. I would like to remind that in the final step of his cognitive closure idea McGinn mentions our concept-forming faculties – introspection and perception – as two possible avenues to be able to comprehend the property providing the mind-body relation.

4.1. Non-Spatiality of Brain Property Providing the Link between the Mind and the Brain

As I explained in detail before McGinn claims that even if we cannot access it, there is a natural link between the mind and brain. He asserts that there is a natural property P, instantiated by the brain, in virtue of which consciousness states can naturalistically emerge from brain. However, because we have two possible avenues for being able to achieve this property, we cannot grasp it. We can make a formulation of this final step of McGinn's cognitive closure idea in short as follows:

i. By direct investigation of the mind –introspection- we cannot get to P.
ii. By empirical study of the brain –perception- we cannot get to P.
iii. For these reasons, we cannot get to P in principle.

In this chapter I will only concern myself with the second stage of this formulation because the main issue I want to discuss is the *nature* of the property which makes possible the nexus between the mind and the brain and a theory fully explaining the

dependence of states of consciousness to brain states[10]. And when we focus on the second stage of this formulation, we can understand more clearly the nature identified by McGinn for the property providing the mind-brain relation. There are some serious criticisms that the non-spatial nature of this property is inconsistent with other claims of McGinn about the solution of the mind-body problem[11]. I also think that in McGinn's thesis there are some problems that emerge from the non-spatial nature attributed to this property. However, before I mention these problems, I want to focus on some criticisms emerging from some misinterpretations of McGinn's claims.

In the second stage of the formulation above McGinn argues that P is perceptually closed for human beings. Just as conscious states are imperceptible P has also imperceptible for us. As we cannot see conscious state itself even if we stare into the brain, we cannot get to P when we do empirical study on the brain. The reason of the imperceptibility of P is the non-spatial nature of it. Objects of perception are spatial

[10] There are also argumentations about the third stage of this formulation. That is, there are some discussions on the question of whether two possible avenues – introspection and perception – are adequate to transform the possibility of human cognitive closure to actuality or not. For instance, you can see Kirk (1991), Hanson (1993), Sacks (1994), Kukla (1995), Megill (2005); they mention this question briefly in their articles. However, in my thesis I will not discuss this question because criticisms concerning the third stage of this formulation are generally on the view that there may be a third route for the investigation of a property *P* apart from introspection and perception. For instance; in his article Hanson asserts that there may be a third route through which we can try to access the property P. That is, we can try to grasp the property through *indirect* investigation of consciousness by way of third person observation of behaviour and associated reasonings (1993, p: 583). According to Hanson "fine-grained behavioural studies may have much to teach us about the structure and scope of the capacities for consciousness of various species and individuals" (1993, p584). In a similar way, Kirk also thinks that if we study on introspection and perception simultaneously, we might access the mind-brain link. In other words, for an adequate investigation, we must appeal to the partnership of introspection and the observation of the individual's brain (1991, p: 22). About this issue, Megill follows Kirk as well and in his article he claims that "if one stimulates an agent's brain while the agent describes his experiences, this might enable us to understand the mind brain link" (2005, p: 122). As can be seen in this quotation, he focuses on the verbal behaviour as a third route for the investigation about *P*. However, I think that these are weak objections to McGinn because observable behaviours or appealing to introspection and perception simultaneously by using verbal behaviour seem to belong to the realm of perception as well; and as I explained in the second chapter of this thesis in his argument McGinn presents the inadequacy of perception in detail.

[11] There are limited criticisms about the nature of the property McGinn uses for making possible the mind-brain link. For instance, you can see Whiteley (1990), Hanson (1993), Garvey (1997), Worley (2000), Brueckner and Beroukhim (2003), and Demircioğlu (2016). I will appeal to some of them to be able to construct my thesis about the nature of the property leading to the mind-brain link.

things and according to McGinn P must be non-spatial because of the following reason:

> ...nothing we can imagine perceiving in the brain would ever convince us that we have located the intelligible nexus we seek. (1989, p: 357)
>
> ...sense are geared to representing a spatial world; they essentially present things in space with spatially defined properties. ...*such* properties that seem inherently incapable of resolving the mind-body problem... (1989, p: 357)
>
> ...no spatial property will ever deliver a satisfying answer to the mind-body problem. We simply do not understand the idea that consciousness states might intelligibly arise from spatial configuration of the kind disclosed by perception of the world. (1989, p: 358)

As mentioned in the quotations above McGinn claims that spatial properties of the brain cannot explain the causal relation between mind and body. For this reason, just as conscious states have a non-spatial character; P must have a non-spatial character as well to make possible the psycho-physical link.

However, about this issue Garvey claims that the perceptual closure of human being's with respect to property explaining the mind-brain nexus depends on a weak reason. As I mentioned above McGinn describes the reason of the imperceptibility of P as its non-spatial character. And in his article, Garvey argues that according to McGinn "...P cannot be spatial because we cannot imagine and cannot understand how a spatial property could underwrite consciousness. This is an alarmingly weak reason..." (1997, p: 199). Since according to Garvey the propositions that "earth is round" and "earth moves" were once unintelligible and unimaginable for human beings; however, now these are commonplace propositions for us (1997, p: 199). In a similar way, for the possibility of the spatial property explaining the mind-brain link he claims that:

> Perhaps, at the moment, we cannot imagine locating a spatial property of the brain that explains the mind-body connection, maybe we cannot now understand how conscious states might arise from spatial configurations. But these failings give us no reason to think that there is no spatial property of the brain that explains consciousness or that conscious states do not arise from spatial configurations. (1997, p: 199)

On the other hand, this assumption of Garvey is implausible. I think that the proposition "earth is round" is not a good example for making comparison with the mind-body problem, since Garvey's examples "earth is round" or "earth moves" was unintelligible due to the deficiency of our empirical research. However, mind-body problem is not a problem which emerges from the deficient empirical research, because although brain is an object of the empirical observation consciousness is not an object of empirical investigation. McGinn claims that the consciousness problem emerges from our *inherent* cognitive limitations not from the deficient empirical research. In his thesis McGinn claims that we, human beings, have two distinct faculties: by perception we access to brain states and by introspection we access consciousness states;[12] and because of our cognitive limitations we comprehend the mind and body as totally distinct things. However, even if we cannot access it because of our cognitive deficiency there is a property which is neither physical nor phenomenological; and it provides the mind-brain link in an unproblematic way according to McGinn. I think that for him this property must not be spatial for the reason that a spatial property does not share the nature of consciousness properties and hence it cannot perform the mediating role between the mind and the brain.[13] We can see clearly McGinn's idea about the property explaining the mind-brain link in the following remark:

> Neither phenomenological nor physical, this mediating level would not (by definition) be fashioned on the model of either side of the divide, and hence would not find itself unable to reach out to the other side....The operative properties would be neither at the phenomenal surface nor right down there with the physical hardware; they would be genuinely deep and yet they would not simply coincide with physical properties of the brain....it is my unhappy conviction that these properties are radically unknowable by us; they are not reachable from the kinds of concept-forming capacities we possess. (1991, p: 103-4)

As can be deduced from the quotation above McGinn does not merely make a baseless claim that this property cannot be spatial for the reason that we cannot

[12] I explained this claim of McGinn in detail in the several parts of this thesis especially in the second chapter; in the part of "McGinn's Arguments for Mind-Body Puzzlement".

[13] I don't defend McGinn with respect to nature of the property he uses in his thesis because I think that there is an incompatibility between the non-spatial character of property and its mediating character, and I will focus on this problem in the following pages of this paper. I only argue against Garvey about his possibility of spatial property idea which emerges from his misinterpretation of McGinn's thesis.

imagine how spatial property does this job; he asserts this on the grounds that something spatial cannot perform such a *mediating* role for being able to explain the mind-brain connection. Therefore, Garvey's persistence about the possibility of a spatial property is implausible. In her article Worley also argues against Garvey by saying that the fact that we cannot understand how consciousness emerges from the spatial shows us that the property making possible the mind-brain link cannot itself be brain's physical property; it must be a mediating property. "If it were spatial, then it could not play its mediating role, since precisely what we don't understand is how spatial properties give rise to consciousness" (2000, p: 61).

As McGinn nevertheless identifies his thesis as naturalistic and constructs the property which explains the mind-brain connection as a natural property of the brain; there are some criticisms about his naturalism and the non-spatial character of his property.

Garvey claims that we can take the property providing the explanation of the mind-brain problem as an ordinary property of the brain (as any other spatial property of the brain) and according to him if so, then McGinn's claim that empirical study of brain (perception) cannot show us P does not work. We can see clearly this claim of Garvey in the following explanation:

> But has he nevertheless established (A) that we are cognitively closed with respect to the brain property, P, in virtue of which the brain is the basis of consciousness? How we answer this question depends largely on what McGinn means by property P, and it is difficult to say just what he means. If we take him for the naturalist he purports to be and construe P as a natural property of the brain, then premiss (iv) seems obviously false. If P is a straightforward, physical property of the brain, then of course we can identify P by studying the brain. We have no reason to suppose that any given natural property should remain hidden. Surely if we slice up enough brains and poke around with enough scanners we are bound to bump into it.[14] (1997, p: 198)

As can be deduced from the quotation above Garvey thinks that there are not any reasons to believe that there can be a hidden structure of the brain and he thinks that P is one of the ordinary physical properties of the brain; for this reason, McGinn

[14] Premise (iv) is "Emprical study of the brain (perception) cannot identify P." (1997, p: 198)

cannot claim that empirical study of the brain cannot describe P. We can access the property by making sufficient observations on the brain according to Garvey.[15]

On the other hand, in his thesis McGinn especially emphasizes that the property explaining the mind-brain relation cannot be spatial. Even though McGinn claims that nothing spatial can be successful in the solution of the puzzlement that how spatial thing can lead to consciousness, since consciousness has totally distinct features from the spatial things; Garvey still implausibly insists on the assumption of a spatial property as the property providing the solution of this puzzlement. In his article Worley also asserts that Garvey takes the property which is responsible for consciousness as an ordinary physical property of the brain which is accessible by our usual methods of discovery; however, this is problematic for "...McGinn explicitly denies that P is an ordinary physical property, of the sort which can be discovered by 'slicing and dicing'" (2000, p: 59).

4.2. McGinn's Non-Spatial Property and Cartesian Dualism

In his article Demircioglu claims that if the property which explains the mind-brain relation in McGinn's thesis has a non-spatial character, then there is no naturalist solution of mind-body relation (2016-a, p: 10). He defends this idea by comparing McGinn's thesis with the supernatural character of Cartesian dualism. As mentioned before McGinn claims that something spatial cannot explain mind-body puzzlement; for this reason, the property providing the explanation of the mind-brain problem must be *non-spatial*. According to Cartesian dualism, the solution of mind-body problem can be possible only if mental states are taken as states of the *non-spatial substance* (2016-a, p: 8). That is, according to dualism mental states cannot be states of spatial stuff (brain), so something spatial cannot be responsible for consciousness. And according to Demircioglu why we assume that Cartesian dualism is non-naturalistic is not that it is a form of substance dualism; we assume it as super-naturalistic because one of its substances is non-spatial (2016-a, p: 8, n: 6). For the

[15] Garvey insists on the spatiality of the property for McGinn defines it as a natural property of brain. It appears that he associates naturalism with the physicalism or materialism. However, McGinn does not think so, and in his thesis he claims that there can be non-spatial natural properties of the brain even though we cannot access them, since we are cognitively closed to the real nature of the spatial things. I will explain this idea of McGinn in detail in the following part of this chapter.

same reason we can assume that McGinn's solution is not naturalistic as well for him. Demircioglu's remark about this issue is as follows

> ...the reason why we do not classify Cartesian dualism as a naturalist solution is that it is committed to the thesis that nothing spatial could do the job of solving the mind-body problem. Now, if this is so, then by parity of reasons, McGinn's mysterianism that holds that nothing spatial could do the job is also committed to the thesis that there can be no naturalist solution of the mind-body problem. (2016-a, p: 8)

I think that this is a strong and serious criticism for McGinn's claim about naturalistic solution. And not only Demircioglu but also Brueckner and Beroukhim insist on this issue in their article. They claim that:

> ...what becomes of McGinn's claim to have given a *naturalistic* solution to the mind-body problem, a solution that is preferable to Cartesianism? ... P is inaccessible to our best possible physicists' minds is one thing, but to say that P (along with consciousness) is non-spatial is another. If P is non-spatial in character, then it is hard to see what its being a *natural* property comes to, if not just being a *real* property of things. According to the Cartesian, properties of non-physical mental states and substances are natural in *that* sense. (2003, p: 404)

On the other hand, in his thesis McGinn gives some details about naturalism of his non-spatial property. And I think that with these assertions he may save his thesis from the accusation of being non-naturalistic.

As I explained before McGinn claims that the problem of how consciousness emerges from the mind arises from the clash between the nature of mind and brain. In other words, while consciousness is non-spatial; it doesn't have solidity, physical-dimension or perceptibility, the brain is spatial -it has solidity, three-dimension, perceptibility and the other spatial features- and the problem arises from their totally distinct character, since we don't find an answer to the question of how something that is not spatially located in space emerges from the spatially located thing.[16] If we could give place to consciousness in space, then a naturalist solution of this problem would be possible. On the other hand, according to McGinn this is possible because "...we are deeply wrong about what space is really like" (1999, p: 123). That is, he asserts that we have a concept of 'space', but our concept does not represent what

[16] I explained distinct natures of two different kinds in detail in the second chapter, in the part of "Consciousness and Spatiality".

objective space is. We describe space as if merely three-dimensional, solid things can be fitted in it; however, according to McGinn, *real, objective* space includes non-spatial things[17] as well. We can clearly find this claim of McGinn in the following explanation of him:

> It is not that consciousness is *non*spatial, after all; rather, space is quite other than we think, and consciousness fits comfortably into the nature of space as it *really* is. So when I repeated that the mind has no spatial properties, I must be taken to have meant that it does not have the spatial properties we *attribute* to space, which is consistent with saying that it has the properties that space *objectively* has. (1999, p: 123)

As can be deduced from the quotation according to McGinn we only have partial knowledge of objective space; for this reason, consciousness or other non-spatial properties of spatial brain seems as if they are not the denizen of space. However, although consciousness or other non-spatial properties don't have any dimension as length, height or depth and solidity, they can be fitted into the space because *objective* space has also "non-spatial dimension"[18].

McGinn mentions that the non-spatial character of the mind is related with our ignorance of space. He exemplifies that there are unobservable spatial objects in space and since we know the conceptual framework of the space, even though we don't perceive them, we know that how the existence of unobservable objects are possible. However, suppose that there are beings that perceive only physical objects in the world, but have ignorance of the conceptual framework of space. These beings can only understand the existence of perceivable objects, but they cannot understand how unobservable objects are possible. They may think that in reality unobservable

[17] Due to our partial knowledge of space they are described as *non-spatial* things.

[18] McGinn arrives at the idea of *objective* space by making a distinction between pre-Big Bang and post Big Bang universe. He claims that if cosmologists are right there is not a spatial universe before the Big Bang since matter emerged after the Big Bang. According to McGinn this means that the cause of the spatial was not spatial itself and spatial emerged from the non-spatial or pre-spatial. However, with the emergence of the physical, the non-spatial –earlier state of the universe- was not entirely eradicated; for instance, the non-spatial dimension is preserved in some forms like consciousness in the brain after the Big Bang. Although the pre-Big Bang universe became extinct, remains of it are generally preserved by human and animal minds in the post-Big Bang universe (1999, p: 119-22). As can be deduced from the sayings of McGinn in reality objective space includes not only spatial things but also earlier state of the universe, even if we cannot perceive such real space because of our limited cognitive faculties.

objects exist, but they don't have the concept needed to achieve this reality. For this reason, these beings will find themselves in the philosophical puzzlement about how unobservables exist (2004, p: 65-6). This bafflement of them emerges from their cognitive closure with respect to the framework of the space. In a similar way, if our concept of space had included only two dimensions, then we would have had problems about three-dimensional objects, because we would have had bafflement about how three-dimensional things such as an apple are fitted into the two-dimensional space. On the other hand, if this is so, this does not mean that an apple is non-spatial thing in itself, it only seems as if it is out of the space even though it is included by objective space (1999, p: 125). As can be deduced from these examples, things described by us as non-spatial like consciousness or some other properties of the brain are not outside space; they can be fitted into the objective space in a natural way although we don't have the knowledge of real space because of our cognitive limitations. "We experience space in a certain way, by means of our senses, and think about it in that way, but that may not represent what space is really like in itself" (McGinn, 1999, p:124).

As seen in the claim of McGinn explained above the *non-spatial* character of the property providing solution to the mind-brain problem does not affect the *naturalistic* character of this solution. I think that by claiming that objective space contains non-spatial things in itself as well McGinn blocks the criticism about the incompatibility between non-spatial property and a naturalistic solution. He claims that non-spatial consciousness itself is an ontologically natural thing fitted in the space, and there are non-spatial but natural properties of the brain, as denizens of real space, explaining relation between the mind and the body in a simple way. According to him the brain can generate consciousness because it is not just how we conceive to be; it contains itself some hidden aspects (1995, p: 6). There are not ontologically supernatural or miraculous things in the world, but because we are cognitively closed to the real nature of space we are cognitively closed to the non-spatial properties of brain as well. For this reason, there are only epistemologically mysterious things for human beings. We can easily say that McGinn does not associate naturalism with the physical or spatial things because physical or spatial comprises merely one part of

the *real* space. I also agree with McGinn about his claim that space may not be composed of merely spatial entities; they can form only one part of the real space and by our limited epistemological faculties we achieve only *that* part of the real space. About this issue Whiteley also claims that:

> ... [physical] description [of space] cannot be complete, though it does seem to be sufficient for the purpose of causally accounting for what happens in material world, including (there is reason to believe) human nervous systems. Nothing can be completely described by its spatial properties only; what moves must be something of some sort. (1990, p: 289)

Therefore, I think that with McGinn's non-spatial property there can be *naturalistic* solution of mind-body problem unproblematically[19].

On the other hand, it may be said that if McGinn's non-spatial property is naturalistic, then non-spatial substance of Cartesian dualism can be naturalistic in the same way, and we cannot classify dualism as a super-naturalist solution either[20]. I think that this is a plausible criticism because non-spatial substance and mental states of dualism can be fitted into the objective space as well. However, despite the objective space idea McGinn himself still insists on the supernaturalism of dualism in his studies. We can see his claim about dualism in his following remark:

> The other form [of the solutions to the mind-brain problem], which has been historically dominant, frankly admits that nothing merely natural could do the job, and suggests instead that we invoke supernatural entities or divine interventions. Thus we have Cartesian dualism and Leibnizian pre-established harmony. (1989, p: 350)

As can be deduced from the quotation above McGinn classifies dualism as supernatural solution because it admits that nothing merely natural could do the job. However, by saying that "nothing merely natural could do the job", McGinn does not imply that according to dualism nothing *spatial* could do the job, for this reason it is supernatural solution. Rather by saying that "nothing merely natural could do the

[19] I don't mean that McGinn's non-spatial property is successful for the solution of mind-body problem. I also think that its non-spatial character creates problems for the solution of this puzzlement; but I only tried to show that this nature is not incompatible with the *naturalistic* character of the solution.

[20] I would like to thank Erhan Demircioglu for pressing on this issue.

job", he implies that according to dualism "*no* brain property" could do the job; for this reason, it invokes supernatural entities. According to him "The dualists are right to doubt that the brain as currently conceived can explain the mind, but they are wrong to infer that *no* brain property can do the job" (1999, p: 29). That is, McGinn agrees with dualism about the claim that the spatial properties of the brain as currently conceived brain cannot solve the mind-brain problem; but he claims that according to dualism our current conception are enough to be able to grasp the nature of the mind-brain nexus (1999, p: 29). And although unknowable natural brain properties are responsible for consciousness, dualism assumes that *none* of the brain properties can do this job. Because for dualism not some natural brain properties but a "quite different agency" like God is responsible for the existence of the mind (1999, p: 118), according to McGinn dualism is supernatural attempt. Although McGinn's property is non-spatial as Cartesian non-spatial substance -that is, it is not located in the spatial world- differently from Cartesian non-spatial substance, it is fitted into the real space naturally.

For these reasons, the non-spatial nature of the McGinn's property seems to be harmless for the *naturalistic* solution of the mind-brain problem. However, is non-spatial nature really suitable for the property *mediating* between mind and brain?

4.3. The Problematic Aspect of McGinn's Hypothesis

As I explained before McGinn claims that the property which mediates between the mind and the brain cannot be spatial; a spatial property cannot do this job because conscious states are not made up of any spatial process. I also agree with McGinn since I think that if there is a property providing the solution of the mind-body problem, then it must have a mediating character to be able to connect two distinct states. However, for there to be a mediating character of this property, this property must be shared by both kinds of states; that is, it must have sufficiently common features of both kinds of states. In other words, the problem emerges from the totally opposite nature of the both kinds of states, and this problem can only be removed by a property sufficiently shared by both states. McGinn asserts that spatial nature

cannot be shared by the non-spatial properties of consciousness, but I think that non-spatial nature of property is also problematic. If we return to the features of McGinn's property P, they are the following:

i. P is the property of brain like consciousness.[21]
ii. P is non-spatial like conscious states.
iii. P is imperceptible like conscious states.

As can be seen in these steps P assumed by McGinn shares the features of conscious states. That is, while constituting the P, McGinn seems to be invoking the principle that "causes must be sufficiently like their effects"; for this reason, as a cause of consciousness, P itself must also be non-spatial like its non-spatial effect, consciousness (Hanson, 1993, p: 582). However, under these circumstances it does not share any feature with the spatial properties of brain states, and I think that this property cannot be successful for removing the problem emerging from the totally opposite character of the two states. About this issue Whiteley also asserts that:

> If we cannot make sense of a causal relation between heterogeneous entities, then to allay our disquiet P has to be sufficiently homogeneous with the physical to be plausible effect of physical cause, and sufficiently homogeneous with consciousness to be plausible cause of conscious effects. (1990, p: 289)

As seen in the quotation above Whiteley thinks that for there to be a solution of the mind-brain problem, there must be a property sufficiently homogeneous with both kinds of states. On the other hand, he also thinks that McGinn's non-spatial property cannot solve this problem, because non-spatial P is not sufficiently homogenous with respect to two different kinds (1990, p: 289). Non-spatial P is totally independent from the feature of spatial properties, and it cannot play its mediating role for solving mind-brain puzzlement. McGinn thinks that as a cause of conscious states P must be non-spatial like conscious states themselves, but he fails to notice that under this circumstance P should have had common feature with its causes – spatial brain properties –.

[21] McGinn identifies consciousness as noumenal property of brain. According to him this situation shows us that "...there are properties of the brain that are necessarily closed to perception of the brain..." and for him P is one of such properties of brain (1989, p: 357).

About this issue Demircioglu also claims that the non-spatial nature of the property is incompatible with the existence of constructive solution about the mind-body problem. He claims that "a necessary condition for a constructive solution appears to be there being at least one common property shared by different kinds of states" (2016-a, p: 9). However, McGinn assumes that the property explaining the mind-brain nexus has a non-spatial character; and according to Demircioglu "...if *P* is non-spatial, then it is not clear that there is any feature that it shares with spatial properties of the brain..."; for this reason, non-spatial feature of property excludes the possibility of constructive solution (2016-a, p: 9). And as an alternative solution Demircioglu assumes that if there was a spatial property, but only we conceived it as non-spatial, then constructive solution would be possible (2016-a, p: 10). While Demircioglu offers this alternative, he assumes that conscious states are spatial things as well, but we conceive them as non-spatial. For this reason, he claims that by this alternative solution property providing the psychophysical link would share common feature with both conscious states and brain states.

Besides these, the non-spatial nature of McGinn's property not only prevents from performing its mediating function, but also leads to two other unintelligible connections apart from the consciousness-brain relation. For being able to dissolve the problem about unintelligible connection between non-spatial consciousness and the spatial brain McGinn suggests a non-spatial epistemologically mysterious property; however, this situation leads to two different unintelligible relations: the relation between the mysterious non-spatial properties of brain and spatial properties of it, and the relation between mysterious *P* and consciousness. About this issue I agree with Hanson because he plausibly asserts that:

> By postulating *P* in [non-spatial character] threatens a regress. McGinn has in effects merely replaced one unintelligible connection with two: first the unintelligible connection between the spatial properties of the brain and *P*, and second, the unintelligible connection between the mysterious *P* and consciousness. Shall we introduce further unknown properties *Q* and *R* to mediate between these? (1993, p: 583)

As can be seen in the quotation above, McGinn's non-spatial P creates new problems because while we try to explain mind-body relation, we encounter with their

unintelligible connections with P in virtue of the non-spatial and unknowable character of P.

As a conclusion, we can say that McGinn claims that there must be a *mediating* property to be able to explain the mind-brain relation. However, the nature of this property must not be spatial; it is not suitable for performing a mediating function because consciousness does not include any feature of spatial space. It has to be non-spatial like its effect, consciousness. The non-spatial character of P supports the cognitive closure thesis of McGinn because human beings cannot arrive at it by perception. And by using the *objective* space idea McGinn can also place non-spatial things into the space *naturalistically*. Since according to this idea, space is not merely what we conceive it to be, it cannot be described only by its spatial properties in reality. And brain as a spatial thing does not include only spatial properties; there are also its natural non-spatial properties as a hidden structure of it. By using this explanation I think that McGinn supports his claim that there is *natural* solution of the mind-body problem and blocks the criticism about this issue. However, although McGinn postulates *mediating* property for there being a solution to the mind-brain relation, the non-spatial character of his property creates some problems. For there is a *mediating* property, this property has to be shared by both kinds of states. On the other hand, the non-spatial property as an unknowable natural property of the brain does not have any common features with the spatial properties of the brain. Besides these, while McGinn tries to dissolve the mind-body problem, he creates new problems because as Hanson says thanks to non-spatial property of McGinn we encounter with the two different unintelligible connections: relation between spatial properties of brain and P, and relation between P and noumenal consciousness. As I mentioned before the problem between mind and brain stems from their heterogeneous characters, and to be able to solve this problem it requires that there must be at least one property having sufficiently common feature with both kind of states. On the other hand, as I analyzed above neither spatial nor non-spatial property can be successful about having sufficiently common feature with these two heterogeneous states. For this reason, I am not sure about whether we can identify a property which provides the condition of sharing adequately common features with

both kinds of states; but at least it is certain that McGinn's non-spatial property cannot be suitable for the solution of the mind-body problem.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis I studied McGinn's mysterianism about the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how mental states connect with the brain states or how the brain leads to the emergence of conscious states. McGinn identifies the origin of this problem by emphasizing the difference between the nature of consciousness and the nature of brain. Even though consciousness and the brain have radically different features from each other, thanks to introspection we are aware of the causal interaction between them. On the other hand, we don't find the solution of questions such as how a *spatial* thing gives rise to the *non-spatial* phenomena or what the nature of the nexus between *non-spatial* conscious states and *spatial* brain states is; and this clash in their nature creates the mysterious mind-body problem for human beings according to McGinn.

As I explained in the second chapter before McGinn's mysterianism thesis about the mind-body problem is in brief as follows:

- There is a property of the brain *P* providing the link between the mind and the brain, and a theory *T* including *P* and explaining the link between the mind and the brain in a natural way.
- Although there is a naturalistic solution to the mind-body problem, since we as human beings have limited cognitive faculties, we are cognitively closed to the natural solution of this problem in principle.
- However, the philosophical mind-body problem is removed because there is not an ontological problem. There is an ontologically simple solution of the mind-body relation just as the relation between the liver and bile. There is

merely an epistemological mystery about the solution of this problem because of human beings' inherent limitations.

There are argumentations against some parts of McGinn's mysterianism. However, in this thesis I argued that McGinn's hypothesis is in a position that can reply to these discussions; for this reason, they don't become a threat for McGinn's mysterianism.

Dennett and Kriegel argue against the possibility of cognitive closure idea by denying McGinn's analogy argument. They claim that it is not plausible to arrive at the possibility of human cognitive closure by making an analogy between animals and human beings, since the reason of animals' cognitive closure with respect to something is their linguistic inability. On the other hand, as analyzed in the third chapter of this thesis not all forms of cognitive closure of animals stem from their linguistic inability, there are also non-linguistic animal cognitive closure such as dogs' cognitive closure with respect to certain colours. For this reason, making an analogy between animals and human beings does not seem to be implausible. This means that their argument against the analogy argument of McGinn does not work effectively.

Kriegel discusses the possibility of McGinn's cognitive closure idea by claiming that understanding problems requires understanding the possible answers to them as well. According to him McGinn's cognitive closure idea fails because McGinn assumes that human beings can formulate the mind-body problem without comprehending its solution. However, as analyzed by the effective examples of Demircioglu in the third chapter of this thesis, understanding a problem does not necessarily contain understanding its possible solutions. This means that Kriegel's argument against McGinn's mysterianism is not successful enough.

There are also argumentations against the nature of McGinn's property which makes the mind-brain nexus possible. Garvey insists that the brain property providing the relation between the mind and the brain is spatial; however, as discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis Garvey misinterprets McGinn's position with respect to mind-

body problem. McGinn especially emphasizes the non-spatial character of the property explaining mind-body nexus because the problem itself emerges from the spatial-non-spatial clash between the mind and the body. For this reason, McGinn's thesis reasonably claims that for mediating between the mind and the brain this property must be neither phenomenal nor physical.

Demircioglu, Brueckner and Beroukhim argue against McGinn's mysterianism by claiming that just as we assume that Cartesian dualism is non-naturalistic because of the non-spatial character of one of its substances, we can assume that McGinn's solution to the mind-body problem is also non-naturalistic due to the non-spatial character of its property. On the other hand, as explained in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis, thanks to McGinn's objective space idea a non-spatial property can fit into space in a natural way, because according to the idea of 'objective space' space is not as what we conceive it to be like; it includes something different from ordinary spatial properties. McGinn's 'Objective space' definition supports his argument about offering a naturalistic solution to the mind-body problem and blocks the criticism about this issue.

Although I believe that some of the arguments against McGinn's mysterianism stem from misinterpretation of his thesis about the mind-body problem and it is successful enough to reply to these criticisms, this is not to say that there are no problematic aspects of McGinn's mysterianism.

I also think that McGinn's mysterianism seems to be problematic with respect to the nature of the property providing the link between the mind and the brain. McGinn thinks that there must be neither phenomenal nor physical property for mediating between consciousness and brain; I agree with this idea of his as well. However, I think that for being a mediating property, it has to be shared by both kinds of states. And according to me McGinn's property cannot be shared by both kinds of states because of its non-spatial character. Just as a spatial property does not involve any common feature with the non-spatial states, a non-spatial property does not have any

characteristics in common with the spatial states. For this reason, I don't think that McGinn is successful enough to create a property mediating between mind and brain. Beside this, while McGinn tries to dissolve the problem about the relation between the mind and the brain for human beings, he confronts us with the two more problematic relations because of the non-spatial nature of the property *P*. Before McGinn's thesis there was only one problematic relation for us – the relation between consciousness and brain-, but owing to McGinn's thesis about this problem now there are two more problematic relations: (1) Relation between non-spatial *P* and consciousness, (2) Relation between non-spatial *P* and spatial brain.

As seen in the entirety of this thesis although McGinn's mysterianism is successful to some extent with respect to its replies to some criticisms, however, for being able to claim that there is a solution of mind-body problem there must be a property which shares sufficiently common feature with both kinds of states. On the other hand, I am not sure about whether we can identify a property which fulfils the requirement of having sufficiently common features with both kinds of states or not; but I am sure that McGinn's property is not successful enough to be able to claim that there is a solution of the mind-body problem.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezde McGinn'in beden-zihin problemi üzerine ortaya koyduğu ve 'transandantal natüralizm' olarak adlandırdığı hipotezi üzerine bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Beden-zihin problemi olarak adlandırılan, zihin ile bedenin nasıl bir etkileşim içinde olduğu, uzamsal olmayan zihnin nasıl olup da fiziksel bir bedenden ortaya çıktığı, zihnin bedenin bir parçası olan beyin ile aynı şey olup olmadığı soruları zihin felsefesinde cevap aranan en temel problemlerden biridir.

Günümüze kadar bu sorunun çözümü ile ilgili alternatif yaklaşımlar öne sürülmüştür. Getirilen yaklaşımlar; temelde zihin ve bedenin birbirinden bağımsız iki farklı töz olduğunu iddia eden düalist yaklaşım ile merkeze beyni alan ve zihinsel durumları beyindeki nörolojik süreçlere indirgeyen monist materyalist yaklaşım olmak üzere iki farklı genel başlık altında toplanabilir. Ancak yıllardır bu yaklaşımların hiçbiri beden-zihin probleminin çözümü olamamıştır. Son yıllarda 'yeni gizemcilik' adı ile anılan akım beden-zihin problemine yepyeni bir perspektif açmıştır. Bu akımın temel savı, zihin felsefesinin zor problemi olarak kabul edilen zihin probleminin gerçekte doğal ve oldukça basit bir çözümü olmasına rağmen insanoğlu tarafından çözüme kavuşturulamayacağı doğrultusundadır. Yeni gizemcilik akımının kimi savunucuları için insanoğlu şu an içinde bulunduğu bilişsel ve teknolojik şartlar itibari ile bu problemin çözümünü elde edemez, ancak bilim ve teknolojideki gelişmeler sayesinde gelecekte bu problemin çözümü insanoğlu için kavranabilir durumda olabilir. Diğer yandan yeni gizemcilik akımının öncüsü kabul edilen Colin McGinn ise beden-zihin probleminin gerçekte doğal ve basit bir çözümü olmasına rağmen insanoğlunun bilişsel kapasitesi sebebiyle bu çözümün hiçbir zaman insanlar tarafından ortaya çıkarılamayacağını iddia etmektedir. McGinn'in beden-zihin probleminin insanlar

tarafından asla çözülemeyecek bir sorun olduğunu vurgulaması zihin felsefesinde yıllardır süregelen çözüm arayışları göz önünde bulundurulduğunda oldukça ciddi ve birçok filozof tarafından hazmedilmesi zor bir iddiadır. Nitekim McGinn'in bu problem üzerine ortaya koyduğu hipotezine farklı açılardan itirazlar olmuştur. McGinn'in hipotezi bu itirazların birçoğuna kendi içerisinde cevap verebilecek kadar başarılı kurgulanmıştır, ancak elbette ki bu onun tezinin sorunlu bir yanı bulunmadığı anlamını taşımamaktadır. Bu tez ise; zihin felsefesinin en temel sorunu sayılabilecek olan beden-zihin problemi üzerine McGinn'in cesurca ortaya koyduğu iddiasının kendisine yapılan birçok karşı çıkışa cevap verebilecek pozisyonda olduğu gerçeğini gerekçeleriyle sunmak, diğer yandan da sorunlu yanlarını açıkça ortaya koymak amacıyla yazılmıştır.

McGinn tezine öncelikle şunu ortaya koyarak başlar: Beyin ile zihin arasında zorunlu bir bağlantı vardır. Zihin beyinden rastgele ortaya çıkmış bir şey değildir. Zihin durumlarının kaynağını kalp, karaciğer ya da herhangi başka bir organımız değil de beyin olarak işaret etmemizin de bir sebebi vardır. Beyinde gerçekleşen tüm değişiklerin insanoğlunun zihinsel durumlarında eş zamanlı değişiklikler meydana getirmesi beyin ile zihin arasında zorunlu bir bağlantı olduğunu kanıtlar niteliktedir.
McGinn beden-zihin probleminin çözümüne dair olan hipotezini üç ana aşamada bizlere sunar. Öncelikle, beyin ile zihin arasındaki bağlantının beynin doğal bir özelliği tarafından sağlandığını iddia eder ve beynin bu özelliğini kısaca "P" ile ifade eder. İkinci aşamada ise, beynin bu özelliği sayesinde beden-zihin probleminin doğalcı çözümü sağlanırken bizim insanoğlu olarak bilişsel becerimizin sınırları sebebiyle bu çözüme hiçbir zaman kavuşamayacağımı öne sürer. Son olarak ise, insan olarak bizler beden zihin-probleminin bilimsel çözümüne hiçbir zaman ulaşamayacak olsak da böyle doğalcı bir çözümün gerçekte var olmasının felsefi bir problemi ortadan kaldırmak için yeterli olduğunu iddia eder.

McGinn tezinin ilk aşamasını bizlere şu şekilde açıklar: Eğer zihnin ve zihin durumlarının varlığını inkâr etmiyorsak, zihin durumlarının beyinden mucizevî bir şekilde ya da ilahi bir güç yardımıyla ortaya çıkarıldığına inanmıyorsak, o halde şunu kabul etmeliyiz ki beyin ile zihin arasında tıpkı karaciğer ile safranın arasında olduğu

kadar doğal ve basit bir ilişki vardır. Nasıl ki karaciğerin safra salgılamasının doğal, biyolojik ve bilimsel bir açıklaması varsa aynı şekilde beynin de zihinsel durumları ortaya çıkarmasının bilimsel ve doğal bir açıklaması gerçekte mevcuttur. Beyin ve zihin arasındaki bu basit bağlantı beynin doğal bir özelliği tarafından sağlanmaktadır, ancak McGinn bu özelliğin, nöronlar gibi beynin sıradan fiziksel özelliklerinden farklı olduğunu söylemekte ve ne olduğunu hiçbir zaman tanımlayamayacağımızı söylediği bu özelliği P olarak adlandırmaktadır. P kavramını açıklayan ve böylece zihin ile bedenin arasındaki bağlantının ne menem bir şey olduğunu göstererek bu problemin çözümünü ortaya koyan bir teori gerçekte mevcuttur, ancak insanoğlu kavram oluşturma yeteneğinin sınırlarından dolayı bu teoriye bilişsel olarak kapalı durumdadır.

Ancak tezinin ikinci aşamasında McGinn bilişsel kapanım iddiasını ortaya atar ve beynin beden-zihin bağlantısını sağlayan özelliğinin gerçekte var olmasına rağmen ve bu bağlantıyı açıklayan bir teori olmasına rağmen insan olarak bizler bilişsel kapasitemizin doğuştan gelen sınırlarından dolayı bunlara kapalıyız der. Transandantal natüralizm hipotezinde McGinn bilişsel kapanım iddiasını iki aşamada ortaya koyar. İlk aşamada bizlere insanoğlu için bilişsel kapanımın olasılık durumunu gösterirken ikinci aşamada ise olasılıktan öteye geçerek zihin-beden problemi açısından bilişsel kapalılığı insanoğlu için gerçekte mevcut hale getirir. McGinn için realizm insanoğlu için evrenin bazı gerçekleri açısından bilişsel kapanımın olasılığını güçlendiren bir durumdur. Eğer tek gerçekliğin insanoğlunun algıladığı ile sınırlı olduğunu düşünen bir idealist değilsek o halde realizmin de iddia ettiği gibi evrende insanın algısından bağımsız bir takım gerçeklikler bulunduğu düşüncesi hiç de tuhaf gelmeyecektir. Realizmin evrende insanın bilgisinden ve algısından bağımsız gerçeklikler bulunduğu iddiası beden-zihin probleminin çözümünün de insanın bilgisinden ve algısından bağımsız doğada var olduğu savını desteklemektedir. Bu noktada insanoğlu sınırlı bir varlık olarak evrendeki tüm gerçekliklere vakıf olmak zorunda değildir, bazı gerçekliklere bilişsel olarak kapalı olma durumu hiç de yadırganacak bir durum değildir.

Bunun yanı sıra McGinn bilişsel kapanımın insanoğlu için olasılığını güçlendirmek adına bizlere insanlar ve hayvanlar arasındaki benzerliği hatırlatır. İnsanlar da hayvanlar gibi biyolojik bir makinedir der ve nasıl hayvanlar evrenin bazı gerçeklilerine bilişsel olarak kapalı durumda iseler aynı şekilde insanların da evrende kapalı durumda oldukları gerçeklikler mevcuttur ve McGinn için beden-zihin probleminin çözümü de bunlardan biridir.

Evrendeki bazı gerçeklikler açısından bilişsel kapalılık durumunun olasılığını ortaya koyduktan sonra McGinn bunun bir adım daha ötesine geçerek insanoğlunun beden-zihin problemi açısından bilişsel kapalılık durumunu kanıtlama yoluna gider. Zihin ve beyin arasındaki bağlantı açından bilişsel kapalılık durumumuzu kavram oluşturma yetilerimizin sınırlarına bağlar ve temelde insanoğlunun iki ayrı karam oluşturma yetisi olduğunu iddia eder: Bunlardan biri içe bakış (introspection) iken diğeri ise algılamadır (perception). İçe bakış yöntemi ile sadece kendi zihin durumlarımıza ulaştığımızı ve zihin kavramlarını oluşturduğumuzu açıklayan McGinn algılama yolu ile de yalnızca beyni gözlemlediğimizi ve beyin durumları ile ilgili kavramları oluşturduğumuzu ileri sürer. Ancak McGinn ne iç gözlem yoluyla ne de algılama yoluyla beyindeki beden ve zihin bağlantısını sağlayan özelliğe ulaşamayacağımıza vurgu yapar. Çünkü iç gözlem yoluyla yalnızca kendi kendimize deneyimlediğimiz ve sahip olabildiğimiz zihinsel durumlar için kavramlar üretebiliriz. Örneğin yarasa olmanın ne menem bir şey olduğu ile ilgili bir kavram üretebilmemiz mümkün görünmemektedir, çünkü daha önce yarasa olmanın zihinsel durumuna insan olarak hiç sahip olamadık. Aynı şekilde bilişsel kapasitemizin sınırları beynin zihin ve beden arasındaki bağlantıyı mümkün kılan özelliğini deneyimlememize engel olduğundan onun için de içe bakış yoluyla bir kavram üretemeyiz. Algılama yoluyla da beynin bu özelliğine ulaşamayız çünkü algının nesneleri uzamsal olmak zorundadır oysa zihin ve beden arasındaki bağlantıyı sağlayan beyin özelliği beynin diğer sıradan özellikleri gibi uzamsal bir doğaya sahip değildir. Bu nedenle beyni gözlemlemek bu özelliğine ulaşmak açısından faydasız olacaktır. McGinn'in iddiası birbirinden bağımsız iki ayrı kavram oluşturma yetimiz olduğu üzerinedir ve beden-zihin bağlantısı açısından her bir yetimiz bu bağlantının yalnızca tek bir yanını bizlere sunmaktadır.

Son olarak her ne kadar bizler insanoğlu olarak bilişsel yetimizin sınırlarından dolayı kapalı durumda olsak da beden zihin probleminin çözümünü sağlayan beyin özelliği ontolojik olarak mevcuttur ve bu durum bu problemin ontolojik gizemini ortadan kaldırarak McGinn'e göre onu bir felsefe sorunu olmaktan çıkarmıştır. Beden-zihin problemi insanoğlu için ontolojik bir gizem değildir ve bu konunun felsefi sorgulamasını yapmak yersizdir. Bilişsel kapasitemizin sınırlarından dolayı beden-zihin probleminin çözümü bizler için yalnızca epistemolojik bir gizemdir ve bilişsel kapasitemiz üzerine araştırmalar yapmak da bilişsel bilimin alanıdır.
McGinn'in bu hipotezine çeşitli açılardan kimi karşı çıkışlar bulunmaktadır. Bu tezde bu karşı çıkışlar üzerine çalışılmış, itirazlarda ortaya konulan kimi noktalar başarılı bulunurken kimilerinin ise McGinn'in hipotezini çürütmek için yeterince başarılı olmadığı tartışılmıştır.

Örneğin Dennett ve Kriegel çalışmalarında McGinn'in insanoğlu için bilişsel kapanım iddiasına karşı çıkmışlardır. Daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi McGinn bilişsel kapanımın olasılığını ortaya koymak için hayvanlar ve insanlar arasındaki benzerliği bizlere hatırlatmıştır. Nasıl ki maymunlar elektron kavramına bilişsel olarak kapalı durumdalarsa ya da farelerde trigonometri açısından bilişsel kapanım söz konusu ise aynı şekilde insanlar da beden-zihin probleminin çözümüne zihinsel olarak kapalı durumdadırlar. Ancak Kriegel ve Dennett dil yetisinin hayvanlar ve insanlar arasındaki en önemli farklılığı ortaya koyduğunu ileri sürerek McGinn'in benzerlik argümanına karşı çıkmışlardır. Dennett ve Kriegel'e göre hayvanların bazı problemlerin çözümlerine kapalı olmalarının sebebi onların dil konusundaki yetersizlikleridir. Yani eğer hayvanlar problemlerin kendisini anlayabiliyor olsalardı bu problemlerin çözümlerine de bilişsel olarak açık pozisyonda olurlardı. Örneğin, maymunlar "elektron nedir?" sorusunun cevabına bilişsel olarak kapalı durumdadırlar çünkü onlar zaten bu sorunun kendisini kavrayamaz ve anlayamazlar. Aynı şekilde fareler trigonometrik soruların cevaplarına zihinsel olarak kapalı durumdadırlar çünkü trigonometrik sorular, dilsel yetersizliklerinden dolayı fareler için hiçbir anlam ifade etmezler. Eğer dilsel kapasiteleri bu soruları anlayabilecek kadar yeterli durumda olsaydı, hayvanlar bu soruların cevaplarını da anlayabilecek pozisyonda olurlardı. Ancak hayvanlardan farklı olarak insanlar dilsel kabiliyetleri

sayesinde henüz cevaplanmamış soruları kavrayabilir durumdadır. Ve McGinn beden-zihin problemine dair olan soruları biçimlendirebildiğimizi ve kavrayabildiğimizi iddia eder. Dennett ve Kriegel için anlayabildiğimiz bir sorunun cevabını kavrayabilmemiz aşamasında herhangi bir sıkıntı görünmemektedir. Bu yüzden onlara göre McGinn'in yaptığı gibi dilsel farklılıkları göz ardı ederek insanlar ve hayvanlar arasında bilişsel bir benzerlik kurmak akıllıca bir yaklaşım değildir.

Ancak bana göre Dennett ve Kriegel'in McGinn'e yapmış oldukları bu itiraz amacına ulaşmamış ve sandıkları gibi McGinn'in bilişsel kapanım iddiasına zarar vermemiştir. Dennett ve Kriegel'in itirazlarının amacına ulaşabilmesi için hayvanların bilişsel kapalılık durumlarının tamamının kaynağı onların dilsel yetersizlikleri olmalıdır. Ancak Demircioğlu çalışmasında hayvanlar için dilsel kaynaklı olmayan bilişsel kapanım türünün de olduğunu bizlere göstermiştir. Demircioğlu hayvanlar açısından bilişsel kapanım türlerini ikiye ayırır: Birinci tür dilsel kaynaklı bilişsel kapanım, ikinci tür ise dilsel kaynaklı olmayan bilişsel kapanımdır. Örneğin köpekler bugün günlerden salı olması durumuna dilsel yetersizliklerinden dolayı zihinsel olarak kapalı durumdayken onların bazı renkler açısından bilişsel kapalılık göstermesi dilsel kaynaklı olmayan bir bilişsel kapanım türüdür. Nasıl ki köpeklerin bazı renklere zihinsel olarak açık durumda olmalarının sebebi onların bu renkler ile ilgili soruları kavrayabilmeleri ile bağlantılı değil ise, aynı şekilde onların kimi renklere bilişsel olarak kapalı durumda olmaları bu renkler hakkındaki soruları dilsel yetersizliklerinden dolayı anlayamamalarından kaynaklı değildir. Dennett ve Kriegel hayvanların bilişsel kapalılık durumlarının yalnızca onların dilsel yetersizlikleriyle ilgili olduğunu, bu nedenle dilsel yetkinlikleri olan insan türü ile bu konuda eksik olan hayvan türü arasında bilişsel kapalılık durumu ile ilgili kıyas yapılmaması gerektiğini savunmuşlardır. Dolayısıyla hayvanların bilişsel kapalılık durumlarından yola çıkarak insanoğlu için bilişsel kapanımın olasılığına varmak onlar için akıl karı bir sonuç değildir. Ancak Demircioğlu'nun çalışmasında bizlere gösterdiği üzere hayvanlar için dilsel kaynaklı olmayan bilişsel kapanım durumları da mümkündür ve bu durumun varlığı Dennett ve Kriegel'in McGinn'in iddiasına olan itirazlarını çalışmaz duruma getirir. Çünkü McGinn'in hayvanların dilsel kaynaklı olmayan bilişsel kapanım durumlarından yola çıkarak aynı şekilde

insanlar için de bazı konularda zihinsel kapalılığın mümkün olabileceğini iddia etmesi hiç de mantıksız görünmemektedir.

Bunun yanı sıra Kriegel çalışmasında McGinn'in bilişsel kapanım iddiasına itirazlarda bulunmaya devam eder ve bir problemi anlayabilmenin başlıca gerekliliğinin o problemin çözümlerini anlamak olduğunu iddia eder. Bu sebeple ona göre McGinn'in insanoğlu açısından bilişsel kapanım iddiası hatalıdır, çünkü McGinn insanların beden zihin problemi hakkındaki tüm soruları anlayabildiğini varsayarken bu soruların cevaplarına ulaşabilecek zihinsel yetilere sahip olması durumunu reddetmiştir, Kriegel içinse bu olanaksızdır. Ancak Kriegel'in McGinn'e olan bu itirazı bana göre McGinn'in hipotezine hiçbir zarar vermemektedir. Çünkü bana göre bir problemi anlamak için öncelikle o problemin çözümlerini kavrayabiliyor olmak gibi bir zorunluluk yoktur ve bu iddia Demircioğlu'nun bu konudaki etkili örnekleriyle desteklenebilir: "F nedir?" sorusunu ele aldığımızda bu soruyu kavrayabilmemiz için gerekli olan şey "F" kavramına sahip olup olmadığımız durumu ile ilgilidir. Eğer "F" kavramının ne olduğunu biliyorsak, o halde "F nedir?" sorusunu kavrayabilmek bizim için bir problem halin dönüşmeyecektir. Ancak "F nedir?" sorusunun cevabı olarak kabul ettiğimiz "F, G'dir" cümlesini ele alalım. Bu cümleyi kavrayabilmemiz için ise gerekli olan şey F'den bağımsız bir başka kavram olan "G" kavramına sahip olmamızdır. Görüldüğü üzere bir soruyu anlamak ve onun cevabı olarak varsaydığımız cümleyi anlayabilmek birbirlerinden bağımsız durumlardır, çünkü her birini anlamak birbirinden farklı kavramlara sahip olmayı gerektirir ve bu durum da bizlere cevabını anlayamadığımız bir sorunun kendisini kavrayabilmemiz noktasında önümüzde herhangi bir engel olmadığını göstermektedir. Demircioğlu'nun bir diğer örneği de bizi bu konuda ikna eder pozisyondadır. Örneğin, "Yarasa olmak ne menem bir şeydir?" sorusu sorulduğunda bizler bu soruyu anlayabildiğimizi, kavrayabildiğimizi söyleyebiliriz. Ancak bu sorunun cevabını bildiğimizi ya da anlayabileceğimizi söylememiz çok da inandırıcı görünmemektedir. Çünkü 'yarasa olmak' deneyimine biz insanlar olarak daha önce hiç sahip olmadık, dolayısıyla da daha önce hiç deneyimlemediğimiz bir durumu bilebileceğimizi söylemek yanlış olacaktır. Bu örnek de bizlere gösterir ki

bir soruyu anlayabilmenin ön koşulu o sorunun olası cevaplarını kavrayabilmekten geçmemektedir.

Bunların dışında, McGinn'in hipotezinde, beden-zihin problemini sağladığını iddia ettiği beyin özelliğinin doğası açısından da çeşitli itirazlar bulunmaktadır. Örneğin, Garvey beden ile zihin arasındaki bağlantıyı sağladığı iddia edilen beyin özelliğine algısal olarak kapalı durumda olmamızın McGinn tarafından çok güçsüz bir nedene dayandırıldığını düşünür. McGinn'in tezinde 'P' olarak adlandırdığı beyin özelliğinin insanlar tarafından algılanamaz olmasının nedeni onun uzamsal olmayan doğasıdır. Garvey, McGinn'in beyin ve zihin arasındaki bağlantıyı sağlayan P'nin uzamsal olmaması konusunda ısrarcı olmasının sebebini uzamsal bir beyin özelliğinin bu bağlantıyı nasıl sağlayacağını hayal edememe olduğunu düşünür. Yani ona göre McGinn uzamsal bir beyin özelliğinin bu bağlantıyı sağlaması durumunu anlaşılmaz bulduğu için, kolaya kaçmış ve uzamsal olmayan bir 'P' ilan etmiştir. Ancak dünyanın yuvarlak olması ya da kendi ekseni etrafında dönmesi de bizim için zamanında anlaşılmaz ve hayal edilemez şeylerdi, dolayısıyla Garvey'in bu örneklerle demek istediği şey şu an nasıl olduğu anlaşılamasa da niçin beynin uzamsal, sıradan bir özelliği beden-zihin arasındaki bağlantının sebebi olmasın? Ancak dünyanın dönmesi ya da yuvarlak olmasının zamanında insanlar tarafından bilinemez durumlar olduğunu örnekleyerek bunları beden zihin probleminin çözümü ile kıyaslamasının doğru bir yaklaşım olmadığı kanısındayım. Çünkü dünyanın dönmesinin zamanında insanlar tarafından bilinemez ya da hayal edilemez olmasının temel sebebi bu konudaki ampirik araştırmaların ve gözlemlerin eksikliğidir. Ancak diğer yandan, beden-zihin probleminin çözümünü ele aldığımızda bu ikili arasındaki bağlantıyı sağlayan beyin özelliğine ulaşamamızın sebebi bu konudaki ampirik araştırmaların eksikliği değildir. Yıllardır beynin uzamsal özelikleri olan nörolojik süreçler üzerine gözlemler incelemeler yapılmış, ancak uzamsal özellikler kişilerin öznel zihinsel deneyimlerini açıklamada yetersizlikler göstermiştir. McGinn bu nedenle beynin bu bağlantıyı sağlayan beyin özelliğinin uzamsal olmaması gerektiği konusunda ısrarcı davranmıştır. Sorun zaten uzamsal bir beyin ve uzamsal olmayan zihin arasındaki bağlantının nasıl sağlandığı sorunudur, dolayısıyla olması gereken birbirinden tamamı ile zıt özellikleri taşıyan beyin ve zihin arasında arabulucuk

edecek özelliklere sahip olan bir beyin özelliğinin varlığıdır. Uzamsal bir beyin özelliği ise bu şartı yerine getirememektedir.

Bunun yanı sıra Demircioğlu, Brueckner ve Beroukhim de çalışmalarında McGinn'in iddia ettiği beyin özelliğinin doğasına ilişkin itirazlarda bulunmuşlardır. Onların itirazları ise P'nin uzamsal olmayan doğasının McGinn'in hipotezinin doğalcı pozisyonuyla çeliştiği üzerine olmuştur. Yani daha açık olmak gerekirse, bizim Kartezyen düalizmi doğaüstü olarak tanımlamamızın sebebi düalizmin tanımladığı iki tözden birinin uzamsal olmayan yapısıdır. Ve onlara göre bu şartlar altında McGinn'in beden-zihin probleminin çözümüne dair gerçekte var olduğunu iddia ettiği doğalcı çözümü P'nin uzamsal olmayan doğasından dolayı doğaüstü olarak tanımlamak hiç de tuhaf olmayacaktır. Ancak McGinn'in hipotezi bana göre onların bu itirazlarına kendi içerisinde cevap verebilecek şekilde kurgulanmıştır. Çünkü gözden kaçırılan nokta şudur ki: McGinn beden-zihin probleminin asıl sebebini bizim uzam/mekân kavramını nasıl açıkladığımızla ilişkilendirmiştir. Bizim uzam kavramımız gerçekte olan objektif uzam kavramını yansıtmamaktadır. Bizim uzam kavramımızın içerisine yalnızca mekânsal olan objeler girerken aslında mekânsal olmayan, boyut, hacim gibi fiziksel özellikler taşımayan şeyler de gerçek uzamda kendilerine yer bulabilmektedir. Bu nedenle McGinn'in şu an kavradığımız şekliyle uzamsal olmayan P'si gerçek uzamda sorunsuzca var olabilmektedir. Böylece McGinn'in 'gerçek uzam' iddiası bir yandan onun beden-zihin problemini açısından doğalcı çözümünü desteklerken diğer yandan da bu konuda kendisine yöneltilen eleştirilere bir cevap niteliği taşımaktadır.

Yukarıda aktarıldığı gibi McGinn'e yöneltilen bazı itirazların onun hipotezinin yanlış ya da eksi anlaşılmasından kaynaklandığını iddia etmem ve bunların çürütülebileceğini düşünmem McGinn'in tezinin hiçbir sorunlu yanı yoktur anlamına gelmemektedir.

Beden ve zihin arasındaki bağlantıyı sağlayan beyin özelliğinin uzamsal olmayan doğası açısından bakıldığında McGinn'in tezinin problemli göründüğüne ben de katılmaktayım. McGinn bu beyin özelliğinin beden ve zihin arasında arabuluculuk

görevini yerine getirebilmesi için ne fiziksel ne de fenomenal olmaması gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Bu vurguyu yapmaktaki amacı beynin bu özelliğinin hem uzamsal beyin özellikleri hem de uzamsal olmayan zihin özellikleri ile yeterli ölçüde ortak özelliğe sahip bir beyin özelliği arayışında olmasıdır. Ben de McGinn'in bu düşüncesine katılmaktayım, eğer beden ve zihin arasında arabuluculuk edecek bir beyin özelliği varsa bu özellik hem uzamsal beyin durumları hem de uzamsal olmayan zihin durumları ile homojen durumda olmalıdır. Ancak McGinn'in uzamsal olmayan P'si bu gerekliliği yerine getirmemektedir. Çünkü nasıl beynin sıradan uzamsal özellikleri uzamsal olmayan zihin durumları ile homojen durumda değil ise ve bu yüzden zihin durumları ile bağlantısı bizler tarafından anlaşılamıyorsa, aynı şekilde uzamsal olmayan P de beynin diğer sıradan uzamsal özellikleri ile ortak noktalar taşımamaktadır. Ve bu durum P ile beynin sıradan uzamsal özellikleri arasındaki bağlantı konusunda problem ortaya çıkarmaktadır. İki heterojen durum arasındaki – beyin ve zihin arasındaki – bağlantının sorunsuzca gerçekleşmesi için bu iki durum ile eşit şekilde homojen en az bir arabulucuya ihtiyaç vardır. Ancak McGinn'in tezinde bizlere beden zihin probleminin çözümü için işaret ettiği beyin özelliğinin doğası bu ihtiyacı karşılayamamaktadır.

McGinn beden ve zihin arasındaki ilişkiden doğan problemi ortadan kaldırmaya çalışırken aslında farkında olmadan 1 olan gizemli ilişki sayısını bizler için 3'e çıkarmıştır. McGinn'in hipotezinden önce cevap bulmaya çalıştığımız ilişki yalnızca beyin ve zihin arasındaki bağlantı idi. Ancak McGinn bu hipotezi ortaya atarak bunlara iki yenisini daha eklemiş oldu. Bunlardan ilki; uzamsal olan beyin ve onun sonucu olan uzamsal olmayan P. İkincisi ise; uzamsal olmayan P ve onun sonucu olan zihin. McGinn tezinde 'nedenler sonuçları ile benzer özellikler taşımalı' ilkesine bağlı kalmış ve bu yüzden P'nin kendisinin sonucu olan zihin ile benzer özellikler gösterdiğini varsaymıştır. Ama bu noktada gözden kaçan şey P'nin de kendisinin nedeni olan beyin ile hiçbir ortak noktasının bulunmadığı gerçeğidir.

Sonuç olarak, bu tezin bütününde göstermeye çalıştığım: McGinn'in gizemcilik yaklaşımı kendisine yöneltilen kimi eleştirilere cevap vermek açısından bir dereceye kadar başarılı olmasına rağmen, hipotezinde beden zihin probleminin çözümünü

sağladığını iddia ettiği beyin özelliğinin işe yararlığı bu problemin çözümü için gerekli koşullar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda yeterince ikna edici değildir. Çünkü nasıl ki uzamsal olan bir beyin özelliği uzamsal olmayan durumlarla yeterli miktarda ortak özellik taşımıyorsa aynı şekilde uzamsal olmayan bir beyin özelliği sıradan uzamsal beyin özellikleriyle yeterli miktarda ortak özellik taşıyamaz. Her iki heterojen durum ile eşit olarak homojen olan bir beyin özelliğinin varlığı ve tanımlanabilmesi konusunda her ne kadar şüphelerim olsa da bu tezin sonunda emin olduğum şey şudur ki: McGinn'in uzamsal olmayan beyin özelliği beden-zihin probleminin çözümünün sağlanabilmesi için uygun karakterde değildir.

APPENDIX B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ■

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Işıkgil
Adı : Sena
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : A Study on McGinn's Mysterianism

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ■ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ■
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ■
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: