

ORCHESTRATING AN IDENTITY THROUGH MONUMENTS IN THE CITY:  
THE CASE OF ANKARA, 1923-2016

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ADAM ABDULLAH

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
CITY PLANNING

JUNE 2016



Approval of the Thesis:

ORCHESTRATING AN IDENTITY THROUGH MONUMENTS IN THE CITY:  
THE CASE OF ANKARA, 1923-2016

submitted by **ADAM ABDULLAH** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of **Master of Science in City Planning, Middle East Technical University**  
by:

Prof. Dr. Gülbin Dural Ünver  
Dean, Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Çağatay Keskinok  
Chairman, City and Regional Planning, METU \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Nil Uzun  
Supervisor, City and Regional Planning, METU \_\_\_\_\_

**Examining Committee Members:**

Prof. Dr. Bahar Gedikli  
City and Regional Planning, METU \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Nil Uzun  
City and Regional Planning, METU \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Osman Balaban  
City and Regional Planning, METU \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Elvan Altan  
Architecture, METU \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nihan Özdemir Sönmez  
Real Estate Dev. And Man., Ankara University \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name: Adam Abdullah

Signature:

## **ABSTRACT**

### **ORCHESTRATING AN IDENTITY THROUGH MONUMENTS IN THE CITY: THE CASE OF ANKARA, 1923-2016**

Abdullah, Adam  
Master's, City Planning  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Nil Uzun

June 2016, 133 pages

Throughout history, political power-holders and urban decision makers have ordered or endorsed the placement of awe-inspiring physical structures, or monuments, at visually significant locations within publicly accessible urban areas. These monumental constructions are highly visible, and are meant to convey subtle or explicit ideological messages.

How do monuments, or large scale physical transformations, in visual urban space indicate the ideological motives of the decision makers who direct such projects? This thesis follows the physical development of Ankara over the last century to address this question. Theories regarding identity, monuments, and urban space will be applied to Ankara's historical development, as well as the larger national and transnational context the city is situated within. This would help explain the various trajectories of physical development undertaken by the city's decision makers through history.

Two phases from the city's history will be examined: 1923-1940s and 2000s-2016, with a relevant summary of the period in between. As a conclusion, the research findings would be analyzed to understand how the monuments in each phase were based on ideological motives that were starkly different in their particular details, but interestingly similar in their approach and implementation method, as embodied by

the two decision makers of early and contemporary Turkey, Atatürk and President Erdoğan.

**Keywords:** Identity of city; national identity; monuments; visual public space; decision making

## ÖZ

### ŞEHİRDE ANITLAR YOLUYLA KİMLİĞİ YÖNLENDİRMEK: ANKARA, 1923-2016 ÖRNEĞİ

Abdullah, Adam  
Yüksek Lisans, Kentsel Tasarım  
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Nil Uzun

Haziran 2016, 133 sayfa

Tarih boyunca, siyasi iktidar sahipleri ve kentteki karar vericiler, etkileyici yapıların veya anıtların kamuya açık kentsel alanların önemli yerlerinde yapılmasını sağlamış ve desteklemiştir. Bu anıtsal yapıların görünürlüğü yüksek olup gizli veya açık ideolojik mesajlarını iletmeyi hedeflemişlerdir.

Anıtsal yapılar veya büyük ölçekli fiziksel dönüşümler görsel kentsel mekânda bu tür projeleri yöneten karar vericilerin ideolojik amaçlarını nasıl ifade eder? Bu sorunun yanıtı için tezde Ankara'nın son yüzyıldaki fiziksel gelişimi incelenmektedir. Ankara'nın tarihi gelişimi, kimlik, anıtsal yapılar ve kentsel mekân ile ilgili kuramlar ışığında incelenirken üst ölçekli ulusal ve uluslararası bağlamda değerlendirilmiştir. Bu da tarih boyunca kentteki karar vericilerin fiziksel gelişimdeki yönelimlerinin farklılıklarını açıklamaktadır. Tezde kentin tarihindeki iki dönem, 1923'den 1940'lara ve ile 2000'lerden 2016'ya, aradaki dönemin özeti verilerek incelenmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, araştırma bulguları, her iki dönemde de anıtsal yapıların nasıl, belirli detaylarında tamamen farklı olan ancak yaklaşım ve uygulama yöntemleri açısından benzer olan, ideolojik yönlendirmelere – Cumhuriyet döneminde Atatürk'ün günümüzde de Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın yönlendirmelerine – dayandığının anlaşılabilmesi için incelenmektedir.

**Anahtar sözcükler:** kent kimliđi; ulusal kimlik; anıtsal yapılar; görsel kamusal alan;  
karar verme

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All thanks due to the Almighty for keeping me tethered, and helping me to not deviate, academically and emotionally.

A sincere thank you to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Nil Uzun, for helping me get back on track whenever I deviated too much into subjects that went beyond the scope of the thesis, be it history, politics, social sciences, or fantasy, by her constant reminders: “This is a thesis in City Planning.” She helped give structure and order to my overall research. Without her the content would have been similar to my many other incoherent ramblings. Thank you Hocam!

And a special gratitude to my many siblings and my parents, for keeping me entertained and motivated through Skype calls, WhatsApp messages, Facebook statuses, and anything that could help being thousands of miles away from home.

You are ♥.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	v
ÖZ.....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ix
LIST OF TABLES.....	xii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xiii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH METHOD .....	1
1.1    Aim.....	1
1.2    The Premise.....	1
1.3    Choice of Context and Scale .....	3
1.4    Research Method.....	4
1.5    Limitation: Reliance on Secondary Data .....	5
1.6    Overview of Chapters.....	6
2. THE CONCEPTS .....	9
2.1    “Monument”.....	11
2.1.1    The Idea and its Manifestation.....	11
2.1.2    The Trajectories .....	12
2.1.3    Messages Conveyed by a Monument .....	15
2.1.4    Decision Makers Regarding the Monument .....	16
2.2    “City” .....	17
2.2.1    The City Exists as Multiple Realities.....	18
2.2.2    The City is a Social Construct .....	20
2.2.3    Decision Making in the City .....	21
2.2.4    Effects of City-Scale Decision Making on Various Audiences.....	23

2.3	“Identity” .....	25
2.3.1	Identity – Individual and Collective .....	25
2.3.2	Identity of the City.....	26
2.3.3	Nation as Identity .....	30
2.4	Orchestrating an “Identity” through “Monuments” in the “City” .....	36
3.	ANKARA.....	41
3.1	Introduction: History of the Turkish lands, and the Rise of Ankara.....	41
3.2	Phase I: 1923-1940s.....	43
3.2.1	Physical Transformations – City Plans.....	45
3.2.2	Physical transformations – Buildings .....	48
3.2.3	Physical Transformations – Social Engineering Projects.....	53
3.2.4	The Afterglow .....	54
3.2.5	Analysis .....	55
3.3	Interlude: 1940s-2000s .....	66
3.3.1	Political Developments.....	66
3.3.2	Physical Transformations .....	70
3.4	Phase II: 2000s-2016 .....	75
3.4.1	Physical Transformations – City Plans.....	75
3.4.2	Physical Transformations – Buildings.....	78
3.4.3	Physical Transformations – Social Engineering Projects.....	85
3.4.4	The Afterglow .....	88
3.4.5	Analysis .....	91
4.	CONCLUSION .....	97
5.	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	109
6.	APPENDIX – TABLES .....	119

## LIST OF TABLES

### TABLES

Table 6.1 - The Urban Planning Process in Ankara from 1924-2012. Adapted from the 2023 Report on Capital Ankara's Grand Master Development Plan, Development and City Planning Directorate of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 707-708, Ankara (2006). .....	119
Table 6.2- New administrative buildings during 1923-1940 .....	120
Table 6.3- New financial buildings during 1923-1940 .....	123
Table 6.4- New educational buildings during 1923-1940 .....	127
Table 6.5- New health buildings during 1923-1940 .....	130
Table 6.6- New social modernization projects during 1923-1940.....	132

## LIST OF FIGURES

### FIGURES

Figure 2.1- The pre-1995 Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi logo on the left; the redesigned one on the right.....	13
Figure 2.2 - The “I ♥antalya” sign outside the Antalya Migros Alış Veriş Merkezi	15
Figure 2.3 - The three temporal aspects to defining the identity of a city. Developed by author. ....	29
Figure 3.1- The juxtapositions observable in Turkey today:.....	42
Figure 3.2- View of Ankara, Anonymous, 1700 - 1799.....	44
Figure 3.3 – The first approved plan for Ankara: the Lörcher Plan, 1925. Source: (Cengizkan, 2004) .....	46
Figure 3.4 - The second approved plan for Ankara: the Jansen Plan, 1932. ....	47
Figure 3.5- The avenue leading from the station (far background) up to the Citadel, .....	48
Figure 3.6- Phase I interventions: the locations of buildings listed in Tables 7.2-7.6. Source: Prepared by author, 2016. ....	49
Figure 3.7- The Sümerbank building contained a large frontal window display of locally produced textiles. Source: Source: Haber Türk, www.haberturk.com. ....	50
Figure 3.9- The Faculty of Political Sciences (Mülkiye Mektebi).....	51
Figure 3.8- Atatürk High School, constructed in 1938. Table 7.4, Building 7.4 G. .	51
Figure 3.11- The Ministry of Health and Social Aid (Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekâleti). ....	53
Figure 3.10- The Faculty of Humanities (Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi). ....	52
Figure 3.12- A family outside the Sergi Evi, the city's Exhibition Hall.....	54
Figure 3.13- Atatürk on a visit to the Atatürk Forest Farm (Atatürk Orman Çiftliği). ....	55
Figure 3.14- The Victory Monument (Zafer Aniti) on the Atatürk Boulevard. ....	57
Figure 3.15- Refik Saydam Hygiene Institute and School (Refik Saydam Hıfzıssıhha Enstitüsü ve Okulu), constructed during 1928-32. Table 6.5, Building 7.5 B. ....	59

Figure 3.16- Turkish Republic Central Bank (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası). .....	59
Figure 3.17- The Exhibition Hall (Sergi Evi). .....	60
Figure 3.18- Bank of Municipalities (Belediyeler Bankası), also known as İller Bankası, constructed in 1933. ....	61
Figure 3.19- The Etibank building, constructed in 1935-36, also by a local architect Sami Arsev.....	61
Figure 3.20- People’s House (Türkocağı), constructed 1927-30. ....	64
Figure 3.21- The Ethnography Museum (Etnografya Müzesi), constructed in 1925- 1927. Table 6.6, Building 7.6 A. Source: Wikipedia, www.de.wikipedia.org. ....	64
Figure 3.22- All-Turkey Beauty Contest, 1925. Source: (Bozdoğan, 2001) .....	65
Figure 3.23 - The third approved plan for Ankara: the Yücel-Uybadin plan,, 1957. 72	
Figure 3.24 - The fourth approved plan for Ankara: the Grand Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan, 1982. Source: AMANP Bürosu.....	74
Figure 3.25- 2023 Capital Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan. ....	77
Figure 3.26- Phase II interventions: the locations of interventions, relative to the Phase I Intervention area.....	79
Figure 3.27- The Konya Gate. ....	80
Figure 3.28- The Istanbul Gate. ....	80
Figure 3.29- The Samsun Gate. ....	81
Figure 3.30- The Esenboğa Gate. ....	81
Figure 3.31 - Anka Park façade. ....	83
Figure 3.32- The Çankaya Köşkü (left, Source: www.radikal.com.tr. Retrieved: 17.07.2016) compared to the Ak Saray (right, Source: Twitter, www.twitter.com. Retrieved: 17.07.2016).....	84
Figure 3.33- The proposed Kuzey Ankara Camii ve Külliye Kongre Merkezi. Source: (Belediyesi, 2015).....	87
Figure 3.34- The Ankara Ulusal Camii ve Kültür Merkezi dominates the skyline going southeast along the Istanbul Caddesi. ....	88
Figure 3.35- The Alparslan İlköğretim Okulu in Tandoğan. ....	89
Figure 3.36- The proposed renovation of the Ankara Train Station.....	90
Figure 3.37- The Bilkent Şehir Hastanesi, under construction as of 2016. ....	90

Figure 3.38- After a Twitter poll carried out by Mayor Melih Gökçek in response to the Transformers copyright claim, the controversial Transformer robot was replaced by a generic dinosaur.....	94
Figure 4.1- Plaque at the War of Independence Museum (Kurtuluş Savaşı Müzesi), Ankara. ....	104
Figure 4.2- The panoptic gaze of Atatürk is omnipresent in Ankara, as seen here on a public building façade in Ulus. ....	107



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH METHOD

#### 1.1 Aim

How do physical transformations in visual urban space indicate the ideological motives of the decision makers who direct such projects? In other words, how have individual or societal ideologies been translated into physical interventions within the visual built environment of cities? This thesis aims to address these questions by following the physical development of Ankara over the last century.

The thesis will look at various domains of theory pertaining to planning discourse: physical interventions in cities, personal and collective identity, the agenda-driven design of visual public space, and citizens' association with various physical urban spaces. These theories would be assessed with regard to the particular historical development of the city, and the larger national and transnational context the city is situated within. This would also help explain the various trajectories of physical development undertaken by the city's decision makers through history. But rather than study the comprehensive urban morphology within Ankara, focus would be laid on individual monuments that were characteristic of their era of development. I have used the following terms interchangeably throughout this thesis: monument, physical intervention, project, and icon. All these refer to the physical manifestation of some ideology within the visual public space of a city, whether in the form of a public building, a memorial statue, or merely a cultural symbol such as the logo of a local municipality.

#### 1.2 The Premise

Throughout history, power-holders and decision makers – ranging from despotic emperors to democratic leaders – have ordered or endorsed the placement of awe-inspiring physical structures at visually significant locations within publicly

accessible urban areas. These monumental constructions are highly visible, and are meant to convey subtle or explicit messages: such as the proclamation of a power shift; the propagation of an ideology; the collective resolve or future aspiration for an established nation or community. Their very physicality makes them an inescapable element of the visual ambiance of everyday urban life, and hence inherent recipients of the public's emotional responses. A more recent manifestation of ideological expression, throughout the world, has been architecture: physical, immediately visible, and visually accessible to the public. There were those who proposed the re-design of cities, both in terms of architectural form and urban planning ideals, according to aesthetics and sensibility (Sitte, 1889). Then there was the pomp and flair of the Chicago World Exposition, the reintroduction of neo-classical architecture and the emphasis on the revival of post-industrial European cities on an ambitious scale. Attempts at visible, physical beautification (while presuming a particular, contemporaneous standard of beauty and good design) continued in the form of the Garden City Movement, Broadacre City, and other early examples of idealized urban living. Then came the modernists, with a "form follows function" approach – practical and robust, yet allowing the architect to experiment with emotion (LeCorbusier, 1931) – one that rapidly permeated through decades of personal and state-sponsored architectural projects. A number of nations that came into being during the 20<sup>th</sup> century relied heavily on such grand state-sponsored projects – massive, depicting totalitarian power: that of the newly conceived nation-state (Önge, 2007). These attempts were as much driven by the ideological preferences for a particular lifestyle as they were by functional and aesthetic requirements.

After the neoliberal reforms, cities (independently, as well as part of national development policies) have been pushing towards financially driven physical interventions. Examples include large scale urban regeneration projects, brownfield development, urban renewal, and sometimes purely cosmetic, synthetic facelifts to the city's most dilapidated areas in hope of bringing in greater economic or social opportunities. One form of cosmetic upgradation within the city, also linked to the concept of monuments in the past, is the construction of grand statues, buildings, and artworks across a city, all of which express a particular ideology of the designer or patron. The impact of such monuments on the public may range from passionate, proud association to an ordinary, indifferent sense of inescapable everyday experience.

### **1.3 Choice of Context and Scale**

The context chosen for this study is inevitably on a city-scale. The city hosts an assortment of opinion-holders and decision makers, each pursuing interest-driven agendas that might be complimentary or detrimental to one another, as well as to the city's collective progress. Hence the city is the arena where major decisions that impact urban life take form, not only in academic discourse but also in immediately implemented physical projects.

Ankara, the capital of the Republic of Turkey, has been chosen to apply the theoretical framework. In addition, two distinct phases in the history of the city are chosen to apply these theories: the first is 1923-1940s, and the second 2000s-2016. Naturally, the events occurring between the two phases cannot be overlooked in the larger temporal and spatial development of the city, and are therefore studied under an "Interlude" section with a brief analysis on the physical and political transformations. There are several reasons for the final choice of Ankara among the other cities that were considered<sup>1</sup> for this analysis. Firstly, Ankara comprises of an inherent duality: contemporary interpretations battle historic realities, with a mix of rigid, physical attributes confronted with abstract, socially constructed visions. In a city where the local administration has recently started to actively promote ideology driven physical interventions, alternate visions can be represented by academic criticism to grand state sponsored projects, and the abstinence of academia from superficial votes of confidence on such projects.

The second reason to choose Ankara is its status as the capital of Turkey. As observed in the literature reviewed, the manifestation of state power or nationalistic ideologies most strongly occur in capital cities: cities that embody "the values of the nation" (Kaymaz, 2013). It is for this reason that the capital Ankara has been selected. Ankara was proclaimed by Ataturk as a break off from the Ottoman Caliphate and Sultanate, shunning the values represented by Istanbul and moving towards a truer, more Anatolian Turkish identity. This meant that from the very beginning, it was home to architecture and urban design that derived from new values, ideologies, and lifestyle preferences. Of course, this physical transformation was also accompanied by a social

---

<sup>1</sup> The other cities under consideration were: Fez, Cairo, Isfahan, Istanbul, and Islamabad.

engineering program, to ensure that the physical component could be sustained long after its initiation.

The selection of Ankara is also significant as the city quite accurately represents the larger ideological struggles going on within Turkey itself. Ankara is the center of government, and home to various protest movements, including student activists, against government decision making, concerning both the city as well as national policy. The selection of Ankara hence helps read the inherent ideological struggles within the Turkish community, providing an ideal subject for theoretical analysis.

Lastly, the author is suitably acquainted with Ankara, which is his current place of residence. Hence fieldwork as well as substantial research material would be easily accessible.

#### **1.4 Research Method**

This research aims to understand the processes of physical transformation that occur in the physical and visual spaces of urban environments: environments that are visually accessible to (and perhaps visually unavoidable by) the public. When a physical intervention occurs in the city at a given time, it is part of a series of similar contemporaneous physical interventions. The physical object itself reflects the concept behind it: either some proclaimed concept, or an alternate reading by a critic or analyst, or a whimsical reading by a layman. In a different era, a different reading of the same object may come forward. In such scenarios, what are the parameters that are common across eras, and across specific local contexts? This will be analyzed by studying the changes in the physical and visual urban form that occurred within a specific urban context in two different time periods.

The research would be carried out by considering certain factors in the physical and visual development of Ankara's urban macroform. First, the vision statement for the city would be examined. How was Ankara envisioned as the epitome of ideology as a Republican model city after the Turkish war of independence? This would be followed by a discussion on the master plans for each Phase. Were the planning decisions in line with the initially stated visions, or were there inconsistencies from the start? How did planning practices evolve, not just administratively, but also in implementation? Who were the major actors in determining the direction and density of the city's growth? A brief discussion on these would help set up the discussion of

the major theme of the thesis, the individual monuments of the city. The monuments would be analyzed relative to their impact in the planning and decision making within the city's vision. This includes both new as well as altered monuments. New monuments are the ones that were erected in Ankara over the defined period of time. Altered monuments would include relevant buildings or monuments demolished, renamed, or modified within the city. These include: old roads or neighborhoods that have been renamed in honor of personalities or events, e.g. streets in Bahçelievler have been renamed after recent friendly relations with the Turkic Republics; older monuments now referred to in new terms, and the appropriation of their names to colloquial speech; appropriation of older monuments to suit new interests; and changes in the traditional roles assigned to the city's prominent spaces, e.g. Kizilay losing its significance as city center.

The monuments nominated for the study would be studied with respect to several indicators. The first is the placement of the monuments within the city's spatial plan, with the particular construction date and details, to help orient individual interventions relative to the urban scale. This will also include a graphic layout of the monuments in each phase, categorized by functional typology. Comments will be made on the monuments' impact on the visual macroform of the city, as viewed from several vantage points, and its particular architectural style, depicting visual supremacy and hierarchy. These indicators would be studied qualitatively, and a general commentary would be provided on how the chosen monuments interpret or portray the ideology being aimed at.

Conclusively, the monuments for each Phase will be analyzed with respect to the following parameters:

1. Personal preferences of decision makers behind constructing the monument;
2. International genericity or precedents in the design and execution of the monument;
3. Ideological motivations declared as being the basis for the monument.

### **1.5 Limitation: Reliance on Secondary Data**

The data to be studied for this research is mostly secondary. Conducting primary research is difficult for such a topic due to reasons explained below.

The first hindrance is the limited familiarity of the author with the Turkish language, coupled with a general tendency of most of the city's residents to converse primarily in Turkish. A few attempts were made by the author on several designated sites in Ankara to engage the city's users to talk about the city's monuments, or on the history of Turkey and Ankara, but meaningful conversation could not be achieved due to the two-way language problem. Getting a translator friend made the process cumbersome, and killed the spontaneity of answers, which then became limited to generic, absolutist "good" and "bad" adjectives about the various urban phenomena under discussion. It was then that the author decided to rely primarily on archival material, published research, and personal site visits to photograph a few monuments. A substantial amount of material on this topic was available at the METU library, as well the archives of the Faculty of Architecture at METU. Also, the time frame chosen for study is very extensive. Primary research could not be possible for issues going back a century. Naturally, a large part of the research would be derived from archival material, maps, and other records.

## **1.6 Overview of Chapters**

Chapter Two will start by building a theoretical base for the research question. It will discuss the three primary keywords as derived from the literature studied, namely Monument, City, and Identity. Alongside the theories surrounding these concepts, it will also give an overview of the international architectural and planning trends that have shaped, through the last century, the world we inhabit, and the ideologies underlying these trends.

Chapter Three will present the case of Ankara. It will explain the reasons for the choice of the city in light of the literature studied. The chapter will start with a relevant outline of the history of the Turkish nation and the geographical extents of what is today the Republic of Turkey. In order to develop the theoretical base for the subsequent argument, it will describe how ideological motives have shaped pre-modern Turkish society over the course of history, and how symbols and slogans have come to represent certain mindsets and societal behaviors in Turkish society today. This will lead to the main content of the chapter, which is the description of the physical transformations of the two Phases of Ankara followed by corresponding analyses. Two phases from the city's history will be examined: 1923-1940s and

2000s-2016, with a relevant summary of the period in between. An overview would be given of the morphological changes that were taking place in Ankara during the periods mentioned, and will link these physical changes with the larger ongoing political and societal ideologies in play at the time that led to the creation of a temporally relevant physical ambience. An Interlude section will briefly describe the political and physical transformations that were happening between the two Phases. Chapter Four will then conclude the overall research findings, and relate the Ankara case to the theoretical framework developed up till here. It will suggest how the monuments in each phase were based on ideological motives that were starkly different in their particular details, but interestingly similar in their approach and implementation method, as embodied by the two decision makers of early and contemporary Turkey, Atatürk and President Erdoğan. The analysis would be used to address the following questions that emerge naturally from the research method adopted: Is the declared vision, both for the city as well as for the individual monuments, still intact after the initial fervor is over? Are there other factors to explain why it was not met? Has the vision improvised over time to accommodate contemporary ideals, or does it stick unwaveringly to (arguably) defunct ideologies of the last century? And most importantly, does the lack of a meaningful vision redirect the society to an emphasis on flashy visuals only?



## CHAPTER 2

### THE CONCEPTS

Numerous questions arise with respect to monuments and their role in the visual environment of cities. What are urban monuments? How are they envisioned to propagate a message to the public? Is that message direct or subtle? Are these cues derived from local context, or some international standard following a global consumption culture, including visual and sensory consumption? What are the reasons behind the selection of the actual form of the monument, and the selection of the site where it is erected? Who decides, and why, to whom the project gets commissioned? These questions cover a broad range of academic and professional practice domains, but they also point to the ultimate users or experiencers of such monuments: the common public. Does the public play any role in determining the physical transformation in their living environment in the shape of such grandiose ideology-driven structures? Does the public know about, accept, endorse, and appreciate such monuments, or do they oppose them vocally and by action? Which brings us also to consider who exactly the public that we are talking about is made up of. What intellectually and financially significant portion of the city's population do they comprise? Why is their voice of consent or dissent even significant in the debate surrounding physical interventions by the authoritative administrative body that commissions such projects?

The visual, aesthetic, or functional evaluations of a publicly visible space or physical monument can differ radically, depending on what kind of an expert is doing the interpretation (Stephenson, 2008): which disciplines he seeks to rely more upon, which preferential nuances he chooses to engage with, and what subjects – economic, social, ecological, historical – play a more deterministic role in that evaluation. But often, as in such cases, an 'expert' evaluation of spaces or values leads experts to seek an objective definition of ambiguous concepts such as aesthetics, propriety, and

utility. But how objective indeed are these terminologies when defined outside a particular academic frame? Are the experts' views believed to be more credible or trustworthy than the non-experts' (ie, common public who are the everyday experiencers of these monuments) views on the same phenomena? And is it by some arbitrary standard (of education, specialized professional training, exposure to specific domains of knowledge) that the experts' views are deemed so?

If the disparity between outsider and insider (i.e. expert and local; designer and experiencer; decision maker and public) goes unbridged, it can lead to an elementary force of tension even as conversations about the multiple readings of the space or monument proceed. The physical object (space or monument) and its readings are then pulled two ways: the objectification of the space in aesthetic, economic, or political dimensions by experts who seek to place more weight on any one or more out of the many tangible aspects of that space; and the natural or unadulterated local view, as derived from the everyday experience of a living and working environment. Many of these insider readings are in fact subtle and untranslatable, expressing a wider range of values, more complex, rather than what the experts pick up selectively for the purposes of the study alone. These kinds of tension-ridden pluralistic readings of the city and its spaces can lead to more individual, conceptual and at times artistic endeavors: alternate maps and location names, unique navigational elements, writings and protests over ideological issues masked behind their link to a space or monument in the city – the Taksim Gezi Park movement is a recent case in point (Özkırımlı, 2014).

In order to address these interesting yet wide-ranging concepts, material from three broader academic disciplines has been reviewed for this study, and condensed into three related keywords:

1. Architecture and urban design ideas: these include readings on monuments, public space imageability, architectural elements and styles, and internationally generic architecture and spatial design. This eventually leads to the keyword “Monuments”.
2. Contemporary planning literature and practice: these include relevant literature on city image, planning practices, participatory approaches, stakeholders, and the subjectivity of opinions and interpretations. These lead to the keyword “City”.

3. Social sciences: issues of identity, nationalism discourses, and the validity of subjectivity in multi-user scenarios, such as complex urbanscapes. This stream led to the keyword “Identity”.

Interestingly, an overlapping concept occurs across all three domains: the role of the decision maker, or the power of decision-making. This is significant in all three related discourses, and will be worked upon further to evaluate how it is the most important element that ultimately defines how a physical urban space is shaped, and what reactions it engenders as a consequence of that decision.

## **2.1 “Monument”**

A monument<sup>2</sup> within an urban setting may be read as one or more of: a merely visual delight, a representative of popular material culture, a romanticized piece of heritage, a collective societal asset, an ecological relic, a social metaphor, a work of thematic art, a portrayal of power, a landmark for navigation, a declaration of contested turf or territory.

New monumental projects have also been used to define new identities for cities, or to re-enunciate obsolete identities. The link between a physical monument and individual or collective identity will be further explored in the section on “Identity” ahead.

### 2.1.1 The Idea and its Manifestation

Monuments have always played a role in shaping urban space (Classen, 2009). Their very physicality makes them an inescapable element of the visual ambiance of everyday urban life, and hence inherent recipients of the public’s emotional responses, such as acknowledgement, admiration, awe, inspiration, and remembrance, to name a few. Examples of such monuments range from prehistoric statues of primitive gods and kings within socializing spots, markets and agoras, to more recent architectural projects, landmarks, and artistic installations that act as indicators of today’s urban lifestyles. Even before the advent of city planning as a professional discipline in the last century, grand monuments have repeatedly been invoked within cities to convey ideals (Roth, 1993) like triumph over a subjugated people, epitomized by the Arch of

---

<sup>2</sup> I have used the following terms interchangeably throughout this document: monument, physical intervention, and project. For the purpose of this thesis, all these terms refer to the physical manifestation of some ideology within the visual public space of a city.

Titus (Canduci, 2010), or city beautification and development, such as the grand renovation of Isfahan under Shah Abbas the Safavid (Babaie, 2008). On a more personal level, rulers sometimes erect monuments for sentimental value: the series of Eleanor Crosses commissioned by Edward I for the funerary procession of his beloved queen (Cockerill, 2014) today mark a significant heritage trail through England. On the other hand, the Taj Mahal, testament to the glory of eternal love, was also simultaneously a proclamation of the rich, prosperous, and aesthetically advanced Mughal civilization (Philippa, 2000), one that ironically even led the Mughal Empire to the verge of bankruptcy. The age of colonization saw the transfer of foreign architectural styles into the dominion states. These new styles were sometimes alien to the local context, but at other times proved to be catalysts for local syntheses (Edwards, 2015). In more recent times, monuments such as the Bilbao Guggenheim have been used to not only redevelop a derelict urban zone (Plaza, 2006), but also to enhance the quality of life of a marginalized population group, the Basque (Rodriguez, Martinez, & Guenaga, 2001). In postmodern times, however, such physical interventions have come under increasing scrutiny: aspects of authenticity, identity, and the values expressed by particular physical interpretations have been questioned, fetishized, and criticized (Pop & Julean, 2015). In this way, cities act as the canvas upon which the material manifestations of abstract ideological phenomena can be put on display, through very physical interventions, for public acknowledgement.

### 2.1.2 The Trajectories

Where have the concepts behind monumental urban projects been coming from? I have categorized four trajectories for new physical interventions in existing urban fabrics:

#### 2.1.2.1 *Historic continuity:*

Monuments can be based on local traditions with strong historic precedents. They can represent (ideologically) a smooth transition from one era to the next, without any direct or declared confrontation or opposition. Examples include the export of Renaissance and Baroque styles across the Atlantic through the Voyages of Discovery, where architecture in the Caribbean replicated its Italian and Spanish precedents; and the revival of neoclassical or Romanesque architecture and urban design across Western Europe and the US.

### 2.1.2.2 Re-interpreting history:

Ideas behind monuments can also spring from a rapid propagation of newfound or newly defined ideals, such as an overshadowing or even an outright negation of history (Crawford, 2003): examples include the Republican architecture in Ankara to negate Ottoman and Baroque-Rococo Istanbul; and the renaming of British and Hindu roads and neighborhoods in Karachi after the Indian Partition, to re-emphasize the concept of an entirely “pure” Muslim homeland.

### 2.1.2.3 Selectively re-discovered/ salvaged values:

This comprises a rapid propagation of re-discovered ideals. These ideals are salvaged selectively from history, and usually carry reactive undercurrents in response to their preceding era. Examples include: in Ankara, after decades of secular Republican architecture and planning, the recent re-emergence of religious symbols on urban projects; the boom in mosque complexes (*külliye*) at significant urban nodes indicating “the revenge of the mosque” (Aydıntaşbaş, 2012); and the redesigning (Kaymaz, 2013) of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality (*Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi*) logo as a neo-Ottoman motif (Figure 2.1). This selective re-interpretation of history is inherently misleading, as it has at its crux the gullibility of the masses to



Figure 2.1- The pre-1995 Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi logo on the left; the redesigned one on the right.

The pre-1995 one portrays the Hittite sun disk, representing Ankara’s prehistoric continuity. The post-1995 one portrays Ankara’s identity as a combination of the Kocatepe mosque dome and the Atakule shopping mall. Adapted from (Kaymaz, 2013).

believe in any propagated value system merely because of its sentimental value, and not necessarily its connection with the truth – metaphors and myths, glorified narratives and personalities, are all potent tools for the propagation of such politically and religiously charged ideologies, even when they might “contain factual error or historical fiction” (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011).

#### *2.1.2.4 International genericity*

The physical shaping of today’s cities, including the architectural design and spatial planning, closely follows international styles, materials, and ornamentation schemes. This economically and intellectually cost-efficient way of planning and design forces an uneasy homogenization across radically diverse cities, pushing out expressions and manifestations of local culture (Scott & Storper, 2014), without a substantial conceptual or contextual basis. A rapidly globalizing physical and social environment is effectively standardizing cultural and psycho-social value systems, including the association of citizens and planners with public space. The advent of technology and the permeation of globally acknowledged symbols into local contexts have resulted in hastily mass produced, generic physical structures. Statues of cartoon characters and fiberglass dinosaurs are just two examples (Hurriyet, 2015) that can be placed in any location in virtually any city across otherwise diverse urban environments. Urban environments that are geographically apart, and socially, economically, and climatically distinct sometimes host strikingly similar physical structures, meant to convey similar ideals. This trend has little continuity from each environment’s particular historic evolution and is more of an adaptation to the flow of global capital and all-permeating global values (Figure 2.2).

This visual and sensory standardization of physical public space is based on the presumption of a generic urban mindset, disregarding local cues and context specific references. Cities’ race to be different and unique in the global scenario while, ironically, relying on generic international architectural styles or universally popular thematic events, can quickly escalate into a “counterproductive exercise in collective egotism” (Zukin, 2014). This can be extended to the growing trend of alternate tourist destinations that fall into the trap of attracting visitors by replicating the same physical and experiential ambience they try to provide an alternate to (Abdullah, 2015). This can potentially lead to the “Disneyfication” (Lawless, 1980) of otherwise historically distinct sites.



*Figure 2.2 - The “I ♥antalya” sign outside the Antalya Migros Alış Veriş Merkezi (Source: Author, 2015) evokes both the pop-culture driven “I ♥NY” logo (Source: Milton Glaser, 1977) and the highly touristic “Iamsterdam” sculpture (Source: NL Times, 2015) with its color selection, font style, and placement against a public building backdrop and a waterbody foreground.*

### 2.1.3 Messages Conveyed by a Monument

For the purpose of this research, monuments are considered as displaying certain ideologies. The messages conveyed through urban monuments are not just manifestations of specific cultural demands and value systems, but are also subtle expressions of one or more of several phenomena that project power. One form of this power projection can be the hierarchy of political positions, where monuments may depict the tussle between central and local governments, or between current and previous governments. Another can be doctrinal assertions: monuments may be religiously motivated, erected to create a particular image of apparent religiosity in a society. Monuments may also convey personal priorities in an individualistic and subjective way, glorifying an idolized leadership and enhancing personal status or generating a fan following (sometimes posthumously). Lastly, monuments might tap into the “us” versus “them” debate. They can be used to engender feelings of polarity, or to voice dissent. Examples include Republican Ankara negating Ottoman Istanbul during the early years of the Republic of Turkey, and now a Seljuk-Ottoman architectural revival in Ankara negating its Republican image; and the mistreatment of colonial monuments in formerly colonized cities like Karachi because they were erected by “outsiders”.

#### 2.1.4 Decision Makers Regarding the Monument

A monument, at the actual occasion of its creation, is just one instance in the entangled network of time-space and socio-cultural context. After this brief moment of “monumentification” (Pop & Julean, 2015) has passed, the monument and its immediate context are abstracted over time by subsequent users. The monument might lose its symbolic-functional essence, and take on a mere nostalgic or representational pretext for the new users of the site. The future users indulge and interact with the site, but in a manner that is different, and contextually isolated, from the generation that erected the monument with initial fervor. Insufficient as a reference for daily life, the monument is soon reduced to a remnant, a revered yet irrelevant relic in the urban fabric of a disenchanted generation. This disjunction between the monument and the public points to the short-lived ideology behind the monument – an ideology that did not endure the people who created it. Association with the monument on the level of the individual declines, even as the community continues to revere it as an expression of some abstractly understood and subtly communicated community ideals.

There are various user groups or stakeholders who are concerned with such urban monuments. I have classified these as:

##### 2.1.4.1 *The visionaries*

They are the ones who order the creation of such monuments. Atatürk nominated Ankara as a monument to the Republican ideals (Mango, 2004). Likewise, visionaries are the ones who would either announce clearly that they want a particular object or image; or declare that they want an idea to be expressed, in whatever physical terms, followed by a design competition, tender, or contract for the best interpretation of their idea.

##### 2.1.4.2 *The creators*

These include the designer, architect, planner, or artist. They are the ones who actually design or implement the project. Their personal views may or may not be compliant with the visionary’s views.

##### 2.1.4.3 *The spectators*

This is the everyday experiencer. These monuments act as the arenas within, and the backgrounds against, which everyday urban life unfolds. How is the daily grind of a commoner still related to these monuments or symbols in the long term, say a decade after their completion? People may develop a blasé (Simmel, 1903) attitude to such

interjections, a kind of indifference to the oft-recurring, banal national symbols even as they pass them daily.

#### *2.1.4.4 The opposers*

Any publicly visible physical intervention is rarely accepted unanimously by the city's various stakeholders, interest group, and the populace. Each has its own degree of resistance to the proposal, and expresses their dissent by varying methods in varying degrees of intensity. This opposition could stem from various reasons, for example, opposition to the particular person or regime who ordered the monument. These people may oppose the monument only because it has been proposed by a particular person or regime, and not on any inherent attribute of the monument. Sometimes, this covert opposition might be masked behind a literal opposition to the said monument, for example the Taksim Gezi Park protests (Özkırıklı, 2014). Opposition can also be in the form of not to the particular person or regime, but to the ideology behind the monument only. Such opposers disagree with the idea and its chosen form of expression. They might even disagree with the need for dedicating a monument to the particular ideology at all. A third kind of opposition might be neither to the person or regime, nor to the ideology behind the monument, but to the actual physical design of the monument only. This would include design experts who might argue the monument's visual or aesthetic demerits. This group is insignificant for the chosen research.

## **2.2 “City”**

The post-industrial, post-fordist society of today has given new dimensions to the reading and articulation of physical spaces. Spatiality is no longer merely a physical concept, but an amalgamation of socio-economic and psycho-social disciplines. The emergence of these new spatialities depends on complementarities, flows, and complex interdependencies (Healey, 2007). Spatial planning aims to create places that individuals and groups can associate themselves with, rather than feel alienated within. This depends not only on creating particular physical configurations using architectural elements and circulation networks, but also on creating easily relatable spaces where synaptic fusions occur amongst community, local economy, and subcultures to create dynamic, self-sustaining socio-spatial networks. The following

sections will analyze several ways of reading the layers of the city, as relevant to this research.

### 2.2.1 The City Exists as Multiple Realities

At any single moment, the contemporary city manifests itself as multiple potential co-existences of itself (Hillier, 2012). Cities can be generalized according to functions or specialized services. More recent parameters such as the quality of life or technological innovation have given a new dimension to categorizing cities. However, each city does retain a contextually distinctive authenticity, irreducible in its finer details (Scott & Storper, 2014). Generalization does help resolve issues of functional efficiency, citizen equality, and development, but it is the specifics of each city that truly define its unique identity in relation to other cities, and also express the city's identity within the nation or country. Oversimplifying cities based on their technical parameters can be misrepresentative. This kind of conceptual abstraction might aid academic endeavors, but each city provides challenges that must be overcome using specific communicative processes.

Considering any space within a city as existing merely in the present is, to say the least, misleading. Values and traditions associated with a particular urban space derive inevitably from the past, and hence any interpretation of the space in the present is also anchored to associations that lie within past interpretations. Any attempt in the present time to conserve, re-evoke, or negate these past palimpsests could come into direct confrontation with present realities as well as with future aspirations. But we cannot expect to fossilize and museify<sup>3</sup> (Selman, 2006) spaces or built structures within cities, deriving value and meaning only from their past. Nor can we complacently project cities into future scenarios that deviate from their historic trajectories, risking "Disneyfication" (Lawless, 1980). To ensure that the transition of these values and meanings from history to the present is sustainable, not superficial, based on realistic assumptions and projecting achievable objectives, a thorough understanding is required of the site's inherited past traits, present dynamics and the multiple potential trajectories that the site could take in the future.

---

<sup>3</sup> To convert into a museum exhibit. In the context of living objects and personalities, to raise them to a level of veneration that surpasses their corporeal existence. For non-living objects such as certain urban spaces, to cordon them off from public access but not from public view, so that they remain visible and distant, but not open to interaction and daily use.

Every reading of the cityscape is different; every user reads it differently. Cityscapes offer pluralistic interpretations to those who have “lived in them, suffered in them, journeyed in them or fallen in love in them” (Selman, 2006). Lynch’s work on the imageability of the city (Lynch, 1960), although quite thorough in physical and visual aspects, lacked the sensory or emotive facets of a city’s identity and image (Kaymaz, 2013).

A space becomes a place when it is imbued with meaning, association, or attachment. This is when a physical space transcends its mere corporal existence and can evoke emotive responses in viewers or experiencers. This only comes over time, as users of a particular space advance their mental, emotional, and empathetic selves within the physical and experiential confines of that space. To expect the same emotive response from a first time visitor or viewer of the space is mere fallacy. Place is security; space is freedom (Tuan, 1977). The notion of culturally imbued spaces encompasses both the physical and the psycho-social aspects of space. The human perception of physical space is based on actions and interactions within it, both real and imagined. For example, the untranslatable notion of a ‘bro’ in the Welsh language expresses an inseparability between a place and its people: the place does not have meaning without the people, whose shared traditions and endeavors have helped shape the land, and hence offer association and identity to the place as well as themselves (Selman, 2006). The place and the people are not mutually exclusive, but bound together in harmony. This way, the social constituent of space is as important as the physical aspect. Ultimately, the reading of the physical and visual ambience of the city is also open to interpretation. While some engage with the city and its multiple realities in a poetic, metaphorical fashion (Calvino, 1974), others may choose to categorize it physically (Lynch, 1960) or socio-ethnically (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). Cities can also be “contested” (Hepburn, 2004) between two or more ethnically diverse groups, where neither of them is willing to acknowledge the other as an equally prominent stakeholder group. On the brighter side, overlaying academic discussions on the multiple realities of the city and their respective legitimacies with these ground realities opens the city up to trans-disciplinary understandings rather than the meta-narrative perspective justified only in academic theory.

### 2.2.2 The City is a Social Construct

Cities are not merely physical entities. They have a substantial social dimension. The social composition of the city directly impacts its physical configuration. Conversely, the physical fabric of the city affects social and societal coherence within it too. For example, increased physical disparity leads to a socially fragmented society (Albrechts, 2010; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). This is quite common in today's developing metropolises.

The social capital within a space consists of its human population, as well as the relational networks between them, existing within a defined geographic location. This would include both the local residents as well as temporary visitors, different producer and consumer groups, and governance setups. The concept of governance entails attaining public objectives by means of partnerships with non-governmental structures. This enables flexible deliverables and schedules (Selman, 2006), as well as delegates responsibilities efficiently rather than leaving it in the hands of an (often incompetent) sole government sector. Even apparently altruistic initiatives by citizen groups might not be totally devoid of vested interests; these usually surface soon afterwards. Therefore, it is essential to bring all stakeholders – local populace, potential investors, official decision makers – together for the formulation of a collective vision for a future image of a city (North, 2014). A decision cannot be biased, or spring from a certain group's priorities only – it has to have a common ground in the present and a mutual benefit for the future of all stakeholders concerned. In addition, the significance of open, freely accessible public spaces within the city cannot be overemphasized. A harmonious urban life can only be brought about where people can come together and interact within the city's shared, secure public spaces irrespective of economic demarcations or social apprehensions. These spaces provide an arena for social interaction and informal activities, and enable people to be and express their natural selves in a socially and emotionally conducive atmosphere (Kaymaz, 2013). The lack or loss of such public spaces is detrimental not just to individuals' emotional development and societal empathy, but to social cohesion within the city as well. When social disparity increases, for example, through economic or ethnic stratification of the society, a two-fold toll is taken on the shared public spaces of the city: spaces of resentment, such as those of protest and encroachment, characterized by the dispossessed; and spaces of safety, such as gated

communities and exclusive havens, represented by the apprehensive social elite. Public space can become “squeezed and cordoned” (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). Hence, urban scenarios, with their host of users and interpreters, present the opportunity for multiple spaces (or multiple instances of one space) existing at the same physical place at any given time. The oscillating interactions and intersections of these spaces and their users provide dialectic and proactive instances of negotiating space amongst the city’s varying voices. Formal and informal, standard and improvised, official and traditional, all uses and readings of physical and visual urban space have the potential to be productively discussed upon and socially formulated for mutually satisfactory results.

### 2.2.3 Decision Making in the City

Planning disciplines involve categorical problem solving. The once dominant, all-encompassing paradigm of rational comprehensive planning is succumbing to its own limitations. Participatory planning appears a viable alternative as it integrates strategic decision making and the subjectivity of multi-user scenarios (Healey, 2007). New studies like complexity and assemblage theories mean the horizons of planning as a discipline and practice are just beginning to be broadened beyond purely academically driven understandings and aspirations. New means, inputs, and outcomes all spring from previously overlooked juxtapositions of people and spaces. The theoretical concepts and practical approaches in planning theory today draw inspiration from natural and applied sciences in addition to more conventional social studies and economic theories. These transdisciplinary ideas are incorporated into traditional planning discourse, and help broaden the potential scope and practical applications of planning as an academic discipline and a field of practice (Hillier, 2012).

Theories regarding complexity have gained prominence in the domain of contemporary planning discussions. Complexity introduces uncertainties or certain risks in scenarios, as well as an acknowledgement of unprecedented parameters (Wezemaal, 2012). Considering complexity while looking for solutions also helps to open up a number of potential pathways or trajectories, instead of limiting us to a select number of options that are often biased or uninformed, especially in the case of top-down implementations. Traditional spatial planning limits the scope of the applications of planning theory, especially when issues of multiplicity, plurality, and

collective (ir)rationality are emerging in today's socially aware cityscapes. Planning can also adopt more entrepreneurial means – inclusion of financial and technical experts in decision making, rather than merely planners and social scientists (Albrechts, 2010). Analysis of complex urban scenarios requires a keen understanding of the complex interdependencies (Innes & Booher, 2010) that exist amongst various stakeholders and community groups, and their individual aspirations for the space. A consistent negotiation process helps determine the most effective collaborative way forward, bypassing the unnecessary conflicts that may arise due to top-down, inflexibly imposed decision by technical or legal experts. A similar concept to the complexity paradigm is the Assemblage Theory (Hillier, 2012). This theory emphasizes the interaction of various kinds of networks amongst individuals and institutions. It stresses on the actual linkages more than the individual stakeholders and groups. The density and depth of these linkages helps define meaning for the decision making process, and gives it legitimacy (Wezemaal, 2012).

Decision making in planning has always relied on a presumed confidence on the ability to gather complete information and a systematic categorization of all valid parameters. However, recent literature and practice proves otherwise: an attempt to rationally list down all parameters is not only difficult, but often redundant. Planning decisions can no longer be made effectively using a top-down implementation model only (Innes & Booher, 2010). Planning decisions should be based on realistic, verifiable data from theory as well as practical fieldwork. But the totality of academic input does not necessarily equal the totality of the knowledge base regarding the site under concern. Planning decisions should therefore look to incorporate the equally significant non-academic sources of knowledge concerning the site, including but not limited to subjective local opinion, however apparently whimsical this might sound to academically trained experts. This kind of sensitization to stories and associations of local knowledge results in a sincere inclusionary approach that would lead to more equitable and socially more just planning decisions. It also indicates a transcultural and transdisciplinary acquaintance and tolerance (Albrechts, 2010).

Adopting an inclusive approach in decision making during planning processes is more meaningful, as it is done on levelling terms rather than hierarchically subordinate relationships. The spatial spread and intimate interactions of local value systems need to be acknowledged and respected when making decisions about them. Where decision are made primarily by outsiders, specific insider knowledge like tacit

customs and expectations needs to be communicated explicitly to the external facilitators or mediators. Decision makers should have detailed information on any significant deviations from academic presumptions about local behavior, including unique cultural trajectories, and how these specificities make or sustain the cultural uniqueness of that place (Stephenson, 2008). This is because decisions regarding the planning or management of an urban site or space will eventually have the most noticeable impact on locals: people who are behaviorally, emotionally, and intellectually different from the ‘trained’ decision maker. A basic trait of an external expert is that his reading of the site is vastly different from the mundane, lived experience of insiders. The outsider reads the space in the frame of standardized analysis tools and parameters, while the insider relies more on internally generated layman terminologies and intangible phenomena. The gap between this rationalized, categorically configured scientific data and the emotional, interactive impulsiveness of life should be bridged for effective decision making. External decision makers should understand that the values attached to a place differ in nature and range, and are at times unique from past academic experiences.

Finally, the decision making committee should be an enabling rather than a regulatory body. What we need today are creative context-specific *solutions* rather than generic, ineffective planning *decisions*. Planning in today’s complexity-riddled scenarios cannot unfold in a natural, organic way – it has to be consciously orchestrated and mediated through deliberate interventions and the designing of appropriate conditions (Tschumi, 1999). In this way, planning reasserts its importance in the form of a locally led resistance to global forces that seek to homogenize local landscapes with generic concepts and interventions.

#### 2.2.4 Effects of City-Scale Decision Making on Various Audiences

Decision making in the city is not a linear process. It involves complex and systematic negotiations between groups of stakeholders who will be affected by the ultimate outcome of the decision. For planning processes on an urban scale, stakeholders usually fall into one or more of the following categories (Selman, 2006):

1. Those whose interests are directly affected by a decision;
2. Those whose passive or deliberate decisions directly impact the issue or process;

3. Those who have the relevant skills and information needed to address the issue;  
and

4. Those who hold effective implementation power, authority, and jurisdiction.

Categorizing and analyzing stakeholders and their preferences within an urban scenario is a complex task. The first step on site is to list down individual personality traits that are relevant to the research, and then group individuals around it. Of course, many of these individuals would consist of more than one trait, and so a few subsets would be created with common trait combinations. The second step is judging the authenticity of the inputs being received from the stakeholders in case of field documentation. Are the inputs based on actual knowledge, transmitted experiences, informed guesswork, or whimsical speculations? The third parameter consists of determining the stakeholders' power to influence decisions. The decision making power of the various individual stakeholders can also be judged according to their sphere of influence relative to other stakeholders. This can be: high influence, where the stakeholder can directly and strongly affect the decision, whether formally or through informal means (such as through intimidation or by force); medium influence, where resistance to imposed decisions is strong, and negotiations can be difficult to tackle, but will probably succeed in the end; and low influence, where the voice of dissent is insignificant and the stakeholder will probably comply with whatever decision is imposed upon him, unable to affect the outcome in any substantial way (Selman, 2006).

Of course, the opinion of every stakeholder group is not equally justified nor can be given equal weightage. These issues remain subjective, depending largely on what direction the research strategy will ultimately maneuver towards. Some stakeholders will be considered mere informal informants, others might be consulted in various matters directly, and yet others may be asked to participate as co-actors and decision makers. It is essential that a common vocabulary be developed amongst the stakeholders, based on mutually communicable and comprehensible terminologies.

Insiders and outsiders to the space both have their own visions, assumptions, and aspirations regarding the space. Insiders tend to attach greater significance to the intangible, more experiential aspects of the site rather than the purely physical, economic, and visual ones. Insiders' tacit knowledge and experts' academic knowledge harmoniously come together to give a complete identity to the landscape.

This would provide a common frame of reference to weigh out the stakeholders (Stephenson, 2008).

### **2.3 “Identity”**

Identity stems from the Latin root *identitas*. The Oxford English Dictionary defines identity as “the sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances” (OED, 2015). Identity defines the uniqueness of a person, an object, or an idea which makes it distinct from similar ones around it. The following sections will discuss the various facets to individual, collective, urban and national identity which are relevant to this research, and highlight the ways these identities are manufactured, communicated, and understood.

#### **2.3.1 Identity – Individual and Collective**

Individual identity can be defined using various indicators, and there are several facets to one’s identity. These facets may overlap, such as in the case of a person’s national, religious, and ethnic identity: he does not choose only one, but defines his identity as an amalgam of all three (Fearon, 1999). Being coerced into choosing only one identity amongst these several overlapping facets often leads to violent confrontations, not just on a societal level, but also within one’s own conscience (Maalouf, 2012). These facets may also be mutually exclusive, like whether or not he identifies with a particular social segment of society. Philosophers described identity as the “the unity of the self” up to the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. However, the concept of identity encompasses a range of indicators, and is therefore highly subjective. Each individual assigns a differing weightage to the various parameters in the definition of his identity. Identity is hence a socially constructed phenomenon (Stephenson, 2008). Being socially constructed, much like the city itself, identity is rarely defined in an absolute way. It is relative to who does the defining (Kaymaz, 2013). Since identity is always defined as uniqueness with reference to something else, being in a constant referential frame is the basis of its definition – otherwise, it is homogeneity, not uniqueness. It is in this way that identity can never be a stable, static construct – it is constantly evolving, and based on oscillating interactions (Grosby, 2005). For this reason, it is often difficult to define the concept of identity in a concise way.

Much like the alternate existences of a city at a particular instance in time-space, identity is also circumstantial: resulting from a particular combination or trajectory of parameters, such that the alteration of even one of these initial parameters would produce a deviant version of the identity (Pop & Julean, 2015). An example could be an event of war between two rival nations – the resultant association with the outcome of the war on both sides depends not only on the actual casualties and losses, but also on the narrative channeled out to the masses through the official or idealized version of the war, even if this version conflicts with facts. Hence, the issue of identity creation by calling upon past events, personalities, or ideas also remains largely open to interpretation in the current era, and the potential for the exploitation of these parameters to achieve a particular objective in the present is highly likely.

The postmodernist discourse has given new opportunities for the inclusion of identity issues in humanities and social sciences, including multiculturalism on the city scale.

### 2.3.2 Identity of the City

The identity of a place, similar to that of a person, is multi-faceted. It reflects not just the physical aspects of the place, but also the emotive responses the place generates in its users (Tschumi, 2004). What makes us value a place? What makes us connect to, associate with, and claim ownership over a physical piece of land? People associate meaning to the physical ambience and elements within a place (Kaymaz, 2013), whether on an individual level or as a community. Similar to the identity of an individual or a community, a physical intervention such as a distinct piece of architecture, or a public urban space, cannot be comprehended or analyzed separately from its wider physical and cultural context (Tschumi, 2005). The visual and functional specifications only make sense within a particular, larger frame of reference: the city, or any particular monument within the city, cannot be merely a standalone intervention (Selman, 2006). The distinctive features of a cityscape become easily embedded in the minds of those who frequently inhabit the city's spaces: they can recall them from memory, and can relate physical structures to specific functions or values (Antrop, 2005).

A person's or a community's self-identity defines their surrounding place; but the place itself also helps define self-identity (Kaymaz, 2013). Being a "European" or a "Londoner" is self-explanatory: rather than point to a specific geographic origin, this

kind of self-identity in relation to place attachment offers a deeper insight into behaviors, preferences, and lifestyle choices. People create, upgrade, and maintain their immediate environment in a way that reflects their presumed value system: the physical environment reflects the users' proclaimed self-identity. Naturally, users who are attached to a place on a more personal level tend to care more for the place. This can be seen in the turf or territory claims, or land disputes, that keep surfacing in urban areas. Although such disputes can turn verbally or even physically violent, they point to that basic, inherent trait of human psychology: to lay claim and hold on to a physical entity to call one's own.

The link between place identity and social, communal, or cultural identity also has a spatial dimension; it is not isolated. Culture itself cannot exist based solely on social networks without a spatial context. Culture is very much grounded in the spatiality of these social relationships (Antrop, 2005): it is a communal reading of space as a place for expression and interaction. This concept of place-related identity is rising in significance in discourse related to design and planning (Kaymaz, 2013). Ideas such as maintaining sustainable place identity in the face of increasingly multicultural and heterogeneous societies are gaining significance. Local physical heritage and the intangible characteristics of places such as cultural values and colloquial references have assumed primary positions as factors in urban planning and design in recent years (Scott & Storper, 2014). The continuity of cultural traditions is now related to ideas of belonging and attachment to place. In this regard, recent urban theories, ranging from policy discourse to viable heritage management, tend to focus on either of two approaches (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011): "grand theory" – exploring universal patterns in urban issues and offering replicable solutions irrespective of particularities; or "grounded theory" – studying the specifics of each context in isolation from the larger homogenous global arena it sits within, and working at solutions from the inside out. Given the scale of urban planning theory, it would be impractical to consider each physical or social context as an irreducible case to be studied in its entirety from the beginning. Basic theoretical parameters developed academically for comparison of various contexts would still hold true. Nevertheless, each new context usually contains specific parameters that would warrant research beyond the theoretical expectations from it (Scott & Storper, 2014).

Foucault believed power to be immediately manifest in physical space. Several urbanists associate corporate hegemony and political supremacy as the drivers behind

visual representations of power in urban public space (Selman, 2006). The final physical manifestation always comes about as a product of an asymmetrically set out power game: it is rarely spontaneous, or justly induced. Urban landscapes are the physical manifestation of urban identity (Kaymaz, 2013). Whether this urban identity is unique or generic, agreed upon or contested, enduring or transitory, are all issues that will be addressed in this thesis.

The issue of place identity is also linked to the naming of places. Naming can be of several types: for newly founded cities; changing existing names; alternate names for the same place, in use simultaneously; and so on. Rome wouldn't have been named such without Romulus, Constantinople without Constantine, and the numerous Alexandrias without Alexander. The city's collective memory has immortalized these names in its historical process. On the other hand, the renaming of places or entire cities might be linked to the "claiming back" of the city after a period of political or socio-religious demographic change. In Algeria, the destruction of colonial remnants was seen as part of the declaration of independence. The renaming of British Indian cities such as Lyallpur to Faisalabad after Pakistan's independence also indicates this "casting off" of heritage or associations deemed alien or undesired to local sensitivities. On a more local scale, the renaming of roads and streets in Ankara points to more solemn ideological tendencies than a mere indulgence in linguistic or semantic sensibilities of the decision makers regarding the renaming. The existence of multiple names for the same place points inevitably to an inherent conflict in the association of various people to that place: Turkish Izmir is still referred to as Smyrna by the Greeks, and Istanbul as Costantinopoli<sup>4</sup>.

---

<sup>4</sup> The historically grounded Assassins Creed videogame series features a fictional dialogue between the Turkish Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and Ezio Auditore. Ezio, an Italian traveling to Istanbul by ship, sees the Istanbul skyline for the first time, and meets a young Suleiman on board.

**Ezio:** A magnificent sight.

**Suleiman:** It is a work in progress.

**Ezio:** No city in Europa has a skyline quite like this.

**Suleiman:** Well, to be precise, that is Europa... that is Asia.

**Ezio:** Ah... some borders even the Ottomans cannot move.

**Suleiman:** Very few. You are Italian by the sound of it, but your outfit is not. Have you been traveling long?

**Ezio:** Sì, da molto tempo. (Yes, a very long time.) I left Roma twelve months ago, looking for... inspiration. And that search brought me here. When I was a child, my father told me stories about the fall of Costantinopoli.

**Suleiman:** You must mean the conquest of Konstantiniyye. I suppose the moral of any story matches the temper of the man telling it.

**Ezio:** That we can agree on.

(Assassins Creed Revelations, 2011)




Figure 2.3 - The three temporal aspects to defining the identity of a city. Developed by author.

I have expanded upon these theories to explain the three temporal aspects to defining the identity of a city (Figure 2.3). I call these the *Passive*, *Active*, and *Emergent* aspects of the development of the city's identity:

1. The *Passive* aspect: values and meanings deriving directly from the past; seldom questioned, assumed inherent and coexistent with the city. This aspect is based to some degree on historic precedents, or already existing iconography and vocabulary that residents are familiar with, and represents a continuity of tradition (Antrop, 2005). The *Passive* aspect leads directly to the present scenario of the city, whether of harmonious coexistence or of contested spaces and ideologies.
2. The *Active* aspect: this includes any conscious initiatives taken to reassert meanings and values within the spatial and social fabric of the city. One form of these initiatives is the attempts taken by a position of authority (national or local) to intervene in visual public space, with or without the intention of contributing to city identity directly. Motives to *Actively* define the city's identity can spring from nationalistic ideals, regional power projection, or simply urban up-gradation or beautification projects.

3. The *Emergent* aspect: any unprecedented or unaccounted for activity in the future that happens either as a result of the *Active* aspect or independent from it. The *Emergent* aspect is usually an unplanned or improvised scenario (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). Examples include appropriation of public space in an informal manner, such as graffiti by street artists as an expression of civic life; or the gastronomic or colloquial language changes brought around by a significant influx of migrants, ever prevalent in today's cities.

### 2.3.3 Nation<sup>5</sup> as Identity

Humans have always had a tendency to divide themselves into groups throughout history. This categorization into groups is based around certain parameters in which one group is homogenous and stands out from the rest – a clear “us” vs “them” distinction (Grosby, 2005). One such categorization is the formation of a nation. The concept of being grouped together as a unique nation has elicited wars, genocides, and monumental levels of hate. It has also led to misplaced pride, reactionary patriotism, and the demonizing of opponents as being eternally sworn enemies. Despite being an apparently inherent phenomena (the last few generations have been born with distinct national attachments), nations are in reality human creations (Grosby, 2005). So is the concept of national identity (Billig, 1995).

A nation is tied to its land, and a land to its nation. The story of the nation is not merely abstruse legend or folklore set in a mythical, unfathomable time and space – the story of the nation is a “spatially situated” (Grosby, 2005) and geographically active phenomenon. The space thus no longer remains a neutral patch of land – imbued with meaning, it is now a place (Tuan, 1977), a national territory. Often, national identity is derived from this national territory, including the nation's name – the Austro-Hungarian, French, and British Empires, composed of the Austrian/Hungarian, French, and British populace. An interesting anomaly in empires being named after national territories can be observed in the Islamic civilizations: here, the names of dynasties determine the nationality, and land is not the primary determinant for the empire's physical extents (Al-Khateeb, 2014). We never hear of a grand “Turkic Empire”, but we see multiple empires of Turkic origin: the Persian Seljuks, the Turkish Ottomans, the Indian Mughals, the Egyptian Mamluks, and the various

---

<sup>5</sup> “Nation” and “country” are not used interchangeably for this research, as clarified ahead.

Central Asian dynasties competing for supremacy during the Medieval Ages (Bloom & Blair, 2002).

From the earliest religious creation legends, to historic pagan mythology, to more modern nationalistic narratives, the origin of nations is almost always tied to a dramatic overarching storyline, heroic characters, and impassioned ideals. The nationalist narrative thus relies heavily on a far-reaching collective memory, a continuous historic legacy, which bestows the present nation with authenticity, validity, and a continued fuel for its sustenance. The nation of ancient Israel occupied Palestine after the Exile from Egypt; England came into being recounting memories of King Alfred; the new Republic of Turkey shunned Ottoman imperialism and looked towards a technologically and socially advanced Europe; and Pakistan and India emerged out of a mutual opposition to British colonial rule and an inability to form a Hindu-Muslim coalition following the British departure from the Indian subcontinent. If the formation of nations is based on the predisposition of humans to self-identify with distinct groups, then we must naturally assume a substantial degree of homogeneity and unity within each particular national group. However, ground realities a century after the post-world war, post-colonial world indicate that the understanding of the nation varies considerably across the world.

Interpreting historical events and personalities in light of the present world's political alliances and hostilities often leads to incorrect assumptions and unsubstantiated prejudices (Al-Khateeb, 2014). For example, the military raids on the Indian subcontinent by Turks and Persians during the middle ages are considered as "Islamic" conquests today. However, at the time of the conquests, medieval Indian Sanskrit historians considered these invasions as being carried out by Central Asian (Turushka) warriors identified by their linguistic and ethnic origins, and not primarily by a Muslim army following a global pan-Islamist agenda (Dalrymple, 2015).

There is also a misinterpretation of the nation as the basis for nationalistic sentiment (Grosby, 2005). While a nation is an existing reality, nationalistic ideas about it change in intensity and over time, depending on who does the interpretation. Differences within a nation, as they manifest in the present, regarding its actual narrative and history are more political in nature rather than ideologically grounded (Maalouf, 2012).

Every nation has a unique understanding of its past, which might or might not include maligning another nation or group as part of its own national narrative. Selected

historical events, personalities, and ideological discussions are emphasized to achieve that objective: the quest to define the nation's own identity to itself in the present relies on the shared acknowledgement of a specifically defined collective past (Grosby, 2005). This link to history gives the nation a temporal depth: both authenticity and justification for its existence in the present.

Similar to the distinction between nation and ethnicity is the distinction between nation and state. Historically, nations and states have usually been intertwined together as one entity, with constantly evolving territorial borders. It was mostly in the post-industrial world, and more so in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, that nations started being defined in strictly geographical terms. What had been dynastic empires for centuries disintegrated into a number of smaller states – the Austro Hungarian, British, and Ottoman Empire are prime examples. Recently declared nations, such as those seceding from another, sometimes have an underdeveloped national identity (Smith, 2010). This is the case with Pakistan, which is comprised more of a number of ethnicities combined together in an uneasy national federation. Interestingly, some other nations secede only on the basis of a strong national identity, as Bangladesh did from Pakistan, and as several ethnic movements within Pakistan aim to do. This is not a region-specific or a postcolonial case only: the Basque and Catalan territories in Spain, Wallonia and Flanders in Belgium, Scotland in the UK, and Texas in the USA, among many others, are all examples of begrudging compromises of distinct sub-national identities with the national federation. Therefore, even today, many nations are not ethnically, linguistically, or socially consistent. The cultural homogeneity of a nation could easily be misjudged and misrepresented if based on incorrect presumptions.

National identity might also only be promoted to attract a tourist audience, so that the identity becomes part of contemporary economic ambitions rather than an indifferent actuality (Palmer, 1999).

#### *2.3.3.1 "Nationalism" as Identity*

Ethnicity, just like nationality, is determined by birth. Ethnicity and nationality are hence closely linked concepts, but various other social parameters create significant differences amongst these overlapping identities (Spivak, 2010). Nationality does not always indicate a homogenous ethnic composition across the nation. A nation may have a shared past, a well-defined geographic domain, and even the same religion, but

ethnic differences across a nation might still end up generating discord within the population (Grosby, 2005). The essence of ethnic identity lies strictly in identifying oneself with a particular family, bloodline, or dynasty – a shared ancestor – which binds together the ethnicity as a large extended family. National identity, on the other hand, is more territorially oriented.

A nation may contain several ethnic groups within itself: Pakistan includes Punjabi, Balochi, Sindhi, and Pashtun. A particular ethnic identity may also be spread across various nations, such as the Baloch people spread across Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan; or the Kurds spread across Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. This naturally means there are strong subdivisions, and inherently embedded conflicts, wherever multiple ethnicities constitute a nation. What is established, however, is that individuals seem to portray greater preference for people with the same nationality as theirs, in matters of public opinion or comparison with others (Grosby, 2005). But considering the nation as an essentially conflict-free and idyllic entity is a rather romanticized, misleading point of view. Even within the nation, individual and subjective preferences remain and cannot be ruled out. Choosing to disregard, or, worse yet, suppress these differences in opinion is often an exercise in futility, as well as in ignorance.

A large number of geographical and political conflicts today arise in actuality from such ethno-nationalistic ideals, brought on by the desire to be associated with a distinct, identifiable group with an acknowledged legitimacy (Palmer, 1999). The Kurds spread across Turkey, Iraq and Syria, and the Baluch people spread between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan present such examples.

The concept of “us” vs “them” fuels very strong distinctions within groups. It engenders a range of emotions and responses: mutual admiration and respect and untranslatable cultural connections on the one hand versus misplaced apprehensions and a shared contempt of alien ideas on the other (Maalouf, 2012). These lead to distinct sub-identities that shape a collective sub-conscious behavior. Public opinion can be moderated more conveniently around impassioned, profoundly patriotic rhetoric, slogans, and hashtags simple enough to “fit on a bumper sticker” (Fuller, 2011). Nationalism often requires a complacent and inflexible world view propagated systematically through images, symbols, and catch phrases that generate nationalistic fervor, where national identity becomes inseparable from and dependent upon belittling the other (Al-Khateeb, 2014). In this way, nationalism can swiftly escalate

into an obsessive fanaticism, including demonizing the “other” in strongly pejorative terms, sometimes to apocalyptic levels (Fuller, 2011). This causes an unsubstantiated sense of self-righteousness and an unfaltering pride of being the best (Grosby, 2005). What sets apart nationalism from other socially conceived ideas is the primary belief of the nation being the only objective worthy of striving for (Billig, 1995). This leads naturally to everything else in personal and communal life being subservient to the interests of the nation, where the nation assumes an unquestionable and inflexible symbolic position of authoritative power. Which person in actuality sits on that position of power as a titular representative of the nation, and whether the nation agrees with that single representative, are debatable issues.

#### *2.3.3.2 The Collective Nationalistic Narrative*

What is collective consciousness? Each individual is composed of a unique social and emotional baggage. This baggage makes him distinct relative to others. Understanding the self has been an uneven, ever debatable philosophical and ethical question. Extrapolating the understanding of the self to the scale of the nation makes things more complex: it demands an understanding of historically evolved and societally influenced identities that culminate into a shared definition of the self as part of a larger group of identical selves (Grosby, 2005). When a group of people share the same historical baggage, narrative or ideals, the group’s identity is no longer dependent upon the combined identities of each individual: in fact, the individuals, and usually their future generations, draw from the larger overarching identity of the group, even when they might not individually have anything to contribute to the identity.

Humans are imaginative beings. They can conjure up imagery of distant lands, traditions, and values as being associated closely to their own selves. They can lay claim to physically faraway places as antecedents to their own spatial history. They can assert ownership of characters and events miles and millennia apart as forerunners of their collective present and future.

A shared history serves as the binding agent in defining a shared national identity. The Sumerians distinguished themselves as ‘brothers of the sons of Sumer’ (Grosby, 2005), different from those around them. The Egyptians defined themselves as starkly dissimilar to the southern Nubians and the eastern Asiatics. The Romans appropriated the Greek gods to their own national gods with unique names and distinct national

mythologies. Many such ideas or emotional attachments are in fact a product of our imaginations only – they do not exist outside of our own conceived, or preferred, version of reality. This is likened to an “imaginary geography” (Selman, 2006).

A shared history might also give rise to conflicts in the present age, mostly related to claiming ownership over territories, characters, and artefacts. Ambiguous claims to past relics might occur on an individual or a national level. For example, Central Asian and Arab invaders of the Indian subcontinent are seen today by Indian Hindus as economic and military raiders. Many Indian and Pakistani Muslims, themselves sons of the soil, consider the same foreign invaders as national heroes, liberators, or “bringers of faith” to the land of the infidels. Of course, there are individuals within both groups that deviate from this generalized thought pattern, but the general individual narratives are derived from supra-national religious affiliations rather than fervent adherence to the sanctity of the Indian race or territory. Another case is of the famed “Indian” asset, the Kohinoor diamond that has changed hands between Afghans, Persians, Indians, and now lies in the British Museum. But who could the Kohinoor diamond be returned to? With so many legitimate claimants, it becomes unclear who the lawful owner in the current age would be (Pillalamarri, 2015). Similarly, who does Rumi belong to? His poetry is undoubtedly universal, but is he Persian or Turkish? Muhammad Iqbal, Pakistan’s national poet and an influential figure in Pakistan’s independence movement, is more popular in Iran than in Pakistan – two thirds of Iqbal’s poetry is in Persian (Farsi), and only one third in Urdu, Pakistan’s national language.

In an effective, impartial reading of history, there can be no generalizations: no absolute rights and wrongs, or goods and bads. Events and personalities cannot be read acontextually and anachronistically. Much of historical narrative is an indifferent product of human psychology and economically driven objectives to expand and conquer: imperialism, extension of empires, religious conversions, genocides, and mass migrations (Maalouf, 2012). The taking over of a city or a country by a particular ideology, masked at times by a distinctly visible individual such as the “Founder” of a nation, never produces the same effects on all factions of the population. After a takeover, the population is split into several groups (Pillalamarri, 2015): the ones who agree with the ideology assume a privileged position of an intellectual or social elite; some people remain indifferent to the development, and carry on with their

individualistic mundanities – for them, it is merely a change of faces, and not of ideology; and a third group, most hardly hit, are the voices of dissent.

#### **2.4 Orchestrating an “Identity” through “Monuments” in the “City”**

Considering the concepts of context-specificity, the spatial dimension of identity, the temporality of spatial identity, and the various facets of monuments in urban public space, we arrive at the natural questions: At this moment in time, who does the city and its visual spaces belong to? Is the city the property and jurisdiction of the political administration only? Does the city belong to a larger nationalistic agenda for development and power projection? Does the city occupy a specialized niche in a larger global agenda? How do the physical transformations in the city point to the ideological motives of the decision makers and the extent of their power? Who has the claim to represent its best interests, and how is that claim valid? How do such claimants justify their position of authority or representativeness? “Claim” becomes the keyword here, and the underlying motivation for constructing physical monuments, and then believing (and propagating) that such monuments are justified to and endorsed by all audiences.

Capital cities play a major role in defining and asserting a collective national identity. They house an assortment of architectural styles, the relics of bygone regimes. Contemporary rulers reaffirm their own authority over these previous styles by choosing either to remove or improvise upon these relics, or come up with new architectural styles that ignore, belittle, or outright contradict previously established and evolving styles (Blockmans, 2003).

Harvey believed the post-modern city to be characterized by the increased attention to visuals and imagery (Smith, 2007). The postmodern city is the center of visual consumption, where post-industrialist accomplishments rely heavily on the “organization of spectacle and theatricality”. The creation of an ideology-driven, narrative-imbued space, with provocative details that indulge the public, becomes an allegory for a dramatic performance with an actively engaged audience. The city, its space, and its physical ambience are all sold out to targeted users who subscribe to the spectacular visual stimuli as part of their urban lifestyle.

The built heritage of the city is undeniably one of the most important aspects of the authenticity, and the resultant identity, of an urban environment. It takes time for a

new idea or ritual to propagate to the deeper, subconscious levels of communal psyche and become embedded in communal memory and mundane tradition. Traditions or ideals have to be reinforced: they do not usually penetrate communal consciousness in an organic way. A law has to be written down using legal terminologies and references in order for it to become effective over time. Languages became firm only after rudimentary alphabets emerged, and the ancient Holy Scriptures are significant today because they have been translated into various common languages. Traditions and values are expressed through built forms that embody, express, or represent some aspect of a ritualistic tradition – the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the Pilgrimage to Makkah, various Disneyworlds as idealized family resorts, or “fabulous” Las Vegas as the city of pleasure. These physically established, pop-culture referenced images and representations help propagate and sustain the strength of a national culture or a greater, overarching supranational philosophy such as religious rites.

The notion of a defined, physically contained nation is an uneasy phenomenon: a tense transition between historic commitment and innovative aspirations for the future. It is therefore essential that this transition unfold naturally so that it is received more readily by the public. Nationalism, and a quest for national symbols, is a quite recent phenomena. Constructing national identities relies on selectively appropriating the past, redeeming geographical areas, salvaging symbols from previous narratives, and inventing new traditions. Orchestrating a new identity from scratch is a gamble: acceptance from the general public usually requires appealing to previously held (albeit weakened) beliefs, values, or traditions, and presenting them in a new way or through a new face. The population is unreceptive to starkly different, acontextual ideas or references. A policy or a planning decision cannot manifest out of a superficial analysis or an unsubstantiated religious or political whim. Any break or discontinuity, or outright disruption, of the urban fabric, through an intervention drastically different from its naturally evolving context, can annihilate locally nurtured values, creating a break in the natural, transient evolution of a society’s tradition or value system, and break the link between a community and its past (Antrop, 2005).

The presence of Iran as a Shiite state today is a testament to the drastic change that can occur within a nation when the obscure memory of a shared past is invoked and used to propel rebellion against a religion-wise different regime. In 1501, Shah Ismail I evoked his Shiite Sufi lineage and rebelled openly against the Sunni Ottoman

Empire. This was not just a religious drive – it was also aimed at distinguishing Persia as an entity geographically and politically distinct from Anatolia. The new political regime worked on grand urban design schemes in Isfahan, the new Safavid capital – palatial complexes, emissary pavilions, gardens, boulevards, and new residential quarters, all working together cohesively in the relocated city center (Lambton & Sourdel-Thomine, 2007). Similarly, the Republic of Turkey was envisioned by its founder Kemal Ataturk as a modern, secular, pro-Western country, emphasizing European ideals of social and technological development, and turning away from the outdated Ottoman systems of administration, religious attitudes, and patriarchal hegemony (Akşin, 2007). Pakistan was an attempt at the syncretism of multiple ethnic and linguistic identities into one overarching religious narrative – a homeland for the Muslims, with equal citizenship and rights for other religious minorities (Jaffrelot, 2002): the white in the flag represented the minorities, and the green the Muslims.

The current position of the decision maker in the city's physical and visual evolution is but one instance in a longer, broader trajectory for the city's future. Opinion formation depends on a person's exposure to a particular set of facts. An opinion can be drastically skewed (and blatantly incorrect) if the set of facts that it is based on are believed and propagated to be truer or more significant than they actually are (Rouner, 2015). Refusing to acknowledge the existence of information beyond what one already possesses leads to inflexibility in opinions. It can subsequently lead to deadlocks and uncomfortable standstills in the decision making or implementation stages. An opinion might be valid in a bubble of subjectivity, but where larger group decisions are concerned, everyone's opinions, whichever extreme of the spectrum they are on, have to be laid out on the table for mutual awareness and subsequent negotiation.

Problems can occur where decision making is fragmented or ineffectively delegated (Stephenson, 2008). This is where individuals or groups view the issue as possessing merely one facet – economical, physical, aesthetic, ecological, etc. – and fail to comprehend that another group would view it with a different angle. The lack of a holistic model here means that decision making remains inefficient, with a systematic deconstruction of specialist functions regarding the issue – technical, economical, or social – followed by a synthetic reassembly into a cosmetically constructed pseudo-comprehensive model.

Urban spaces almost always have a temporal dimension. Analyses of cityscapes and urban spaces (Stephenson, 2008) show that people who experience these sights and spaces for a limited period only develop a very practical, tangible outlook regarding them. This consists mostly of physical indicators and superficial sensory readings. Those who are exposed to the spaces for a longer duration associate with them on a more subjective and experiential level, with a greater temporal depth.

The preceding research and its analysis serves as the conceptual basis for the study ahead, which is based on the notion of creating and propagating an ideology to the nation through the proliferation of physical artefacts that proclaim the said ideology, encroaching upon the daily visual experience of the targeted public. But there is also a fine line to tread here: this “orchestration” does not always equate to “fabrication” (Anderson, 1983). An attempt to introduce ideologically charged physical interventions does not always include an attempt at imposition only; it can also reflect a sincere attempt at imaginative, aspirational projects for the city.



## CHAPTER 3

### ANKARA

#### **3.1 Introduction: History of the Turkish lands, and the Rise of Ankara**

Turkey presents a complex physical and ideological environment. The current geographical region of the Republic of Turkey has been home to a multitude of civilizations going back twelve thousand years (Sözen, 2011). The gradual evolution of Turkish society has been a process of amalgamation and amelioration, at times following violent confrontations. Prehistoric societies like the Phrygians and Hittites to the Middle Age Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and subsequent Seljuks and Ottomans, all have settled within and added to the montage of built environment within the geographical extents of this land. This has also made the land ever contested and its inhabitants correspondingly polarized, both geographically and ideologically, and evidence of this juxtapositions are observable all over Turkey today (Figure 3.1). Marked distinctions in the existing built environment of Turkey appear with each successive wave of invaders or settlers. The arrival of the Seljukids, for example, ushered in octagonal minarets and domes that soon overshadowed existing Greek orthodox domes; with the Ottomans, characteristic pencil minarets and Sinanesque<sup>6</sup> architecture become standard visual urban elements.

Although the built up physical landscapes within the current land mass of Turkey, as well as the ideological motives behind their construction, are starkly different from one landscape to the next, there have also been attempts throughout Turkish history, sometimes subtle and sometimes downright confrontational, to bring together various heterogeneous groups under a common value system, or on a shared ideological

---

<sup>6</sup> Mimar (Architect) Sinan (1490-1588) was the primary architect of the imperial Ottoman court, and is credited with popularizing a characteristic Ottoman style of architecture. His most famous works include the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne and the Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul.



*Figure 3.1- The juxtapositions observable in Turkey today: the Republic's flag flies over the ancient Roman citadel in the heart of the city, as middle income apartments rise in the background. Source: Author, 2014.*

platform. In the very recent past, these attempts include: the training of Janissaries<sup>7</sup> under the Ottomans (Akşin, 2007); the *Türkleştirme*<sup>8</sup> attempt and the state-sponsored (İnce, 2012) “*Vatandaş Türkçe konuş!*”<sup>9</sup> policy (Aslan, 2007); the renaming of words in minority languages, and the appropriation of minorities’ surnames to make them

---

<sup>7</sup> Janissaries (Turkish: *yeniçeri*) were highly trained infantry units that acted as personal soldiers and bodyguards of the Ottoman Sultan and his family. Murad I founded the group in 1383. Janissaries often consisted of prisoners of war, or young Christian boys kidnapped and converted to Islam. They were slowly assimilated into Turkish culture. Mahmud II abolished the force in 1826.

<sup>8</sup> *Türkleştirme* is the process of the assimilation of natively non-Turkish people into Turkish culture, and has been a part of Ottoman policy along with its territorial expansion that brought in various indigenous populations under the Empire.

<sup>9</sup> “*Vatandaş Türkçe konuş!*” means “Citizens speak Turkish!” The policy was adopted on 13 January 1928 by the Turkish Republic in an attempt to homogenize the national language. Fines were officially declared onto minorities that insisted on speaking in their indigenous languages. This move was abolished in 1930.

sound more Turkish<sup>10</sup> (Akşin, 2007). These can be seen as the earliest examples of social engineering (Üngör, 2008) experiments in Turkish society. The next phase of state-sponsored social engineering occurred soon after the establishment of the Republic and the declaration of Ankara as the capital – this will be elaborated upon further in the subsequent sections.

Much like the collage within Turkish society, the physical aspect of Turkish cities' architecture, city planning and urban design deals with such value-laden imagery and symbolism. As an initial example, small Anatolian towns proudly display local occupational or social icons as larger than life statues in the visual public sphere. A central town square or traffic roundabout would host local monuments such as those that depict production specializations like large carrots in Beypazari; a large apple monument in Amasya; a glass rooster in Denizli, where the town administration employed local glass workers to design a one-of-a-kind glass sculpture, which gave local craftsmen an opportunity to be part of the monument (Municipality, 2013). The messages contained in such monuments are direct, simply stated, and an expression of particular communal pride. But larger scale, more ideologically driven physical interventions are a source of much debate in larger cities such as the capital Ankara. Viewed and experienced by a larger public, these interventions are evaluated on factors such as aesthetic sensibility, economic efficiency, respect for local traditions, stakeholders or beneficiaries, and political patronage, to name a few.


The following sections will discuss the specific case of architecture and urban planning in Ankara since the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The physical interventions of two distinct chronological phases of Ankara (1923-1940s, and 2000s-2016) will be analyzed in line with the literature reviewed and the parameters that have been developed.

### **3.2 Phase I: 1923-1940s**

Phase I spans 1923-1940s, and documents the earliest attempts at defining a particular physical form, visual ambience, and social life for the city through grand public architecture and design projects. This period also roughly overlaps with the single-party period of the Republic of Turkey, where only one political party, Atatürk's own

---

<sup>10</sup> With the 1928 Law on the Adoption and Implementation of the Turkish Alphabet, names in secondary languages such as Kurdish could not be used officially within the Republic, as the Turkish alphabet did not have letters such as Q, W, and X which were used in Kurdish names.



*Figure 3.2- View of Ankara, Anonymous, 1700 - 1799.  
Source: Rijksmuseum collection*

Republican People's Party, (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP*), was dominant in Turkish politics. The various members of the CHP held a single vision for the direction of development for the new Republic, and so this phase is marked by an almost uninterrupted chain of grand construction schemes in line with the Republic's vision (Mango, 2004). After the analysis of the interventions in Ankara during Phase I, a quick summary would be provided on the subsequent years leading up to Phase II, under a section labelled Interlude. This summary would provide an overview of the political transition: the uneasy switch to a multi-party system, the charges of corruption and the public apprehension towards Islamist parties, and subsequent military coups that resulted in deteriorating socio-economic conditions within the capital (Akşin, 2007).

I will first look at the physical and functional planning and design efforts within Ankara during this phase, and analyze these efforts with respect to their symbolic and ideological value in the subsequent sections.

### 3.2.1 Physical Transformations – City Plans

After Ankara was declared the capital of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, it saw accelerated architectural and infrastructure development (Günay, 2014). The aim was to transform this small Anatolian town (Figure 3.2) into a model city for the new Turkish state, and Ankara was hence the first formally planned city in Turkey (Kaymaz, 2013). Besides representing the transition of Turkey from an obsolete Empire to a progressive, democratic nation-state, Ankara also had to represent the deliberate “public” effort to shun obsolete value systems, and the nation’s resolve to “be Western in spite of the West” as per the Kemalist ideology (Önge, 2007). Consequently, the rapid construction and development agenda within Ankara was not merely utilitarian, but also highly ideological in nature.

Table 6.1 summarizes the five master plans of Ankara since Turkish independence and their main strategies.

#### 3.2.1.1 *The 1<sup>st</sup> plan for Ankara, the Lörcher plan:*

The first master plan for the city, soon after the Republic of Turkey was established, was commissioned to a German planner, Lörcher, in 1924. This initial development master plan for Ankara worked only on the historic area of the city, planning to house the ever increasing urban population around the Citadel precinct (Özbilen, 2013). The plan proposed radical transformations by introducing interventions alien to the local context, and so it was rejected. However, in 1925, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM*) passed a law for expropriation of lands to the south of the main city as they foresaw the rapid expansion of the capital. Lörcher was asked to prepare a new plan in 1925 keeping in mind the anticipated urban growth. His new plan (Figure 3.3) focused on more progressive planning ideals: block configurations of residential areas, Baroque urban avenues, gridded streets and public spaces, and technologically adequate infrastructure facilities (Kezer, Chapter 8: Ankara, 2009).

The desperate need for immediate housing provision led to the speedy implementation of this plan (Önge, 2007). This *Emergent* situation – the housing crisis brought about by rapid in-migration – led to a utilitarian appropriation of Lörcher’s symbolic plan. This plan proved practically insufficient as the population of the city exploded over




Figure 3.3 – The first approved plan for Ankara: the Lörcher Plan, 1925. Source: (Cengizkan, 2004)

the next few years – the city’s population increased almost four times during 1924-1927 (Özbilen, 2013).

However, Lörcher’s plan did lay down a few structural precedents for the future development of Ankara: it enabled the provision of water distribution and drainage infrastructure, and a maintenance scheme for existing road networks. It also catalyzed mass transportation plans from Keçiören to Çankaya.

#### 3.2.1.2 The 2<sup>nd</sup> plan for Ankara, the Jansen plan:

In 1929, Jansen was chosen to design the new plan for Ankara (Figure 3.4), through a competition personally overseen and endorsed by Atatürk. Whereas Lörcher’s second plan was primarily utilitarian, Jansen’s plan introduced innovative planning ideas into the Turkish urban landscape (Günay, 2014). The city was to be divided into functionally segregated patches around the major north south axis. Zoning was introduced, and land was categorized into functional demands buffered by expansive green belts. The citadel and its environs were reduced to a single functional use: housing.

Jansen declared two distinct symbolic zones within Ankara: the citadel and its environs as the traditional Ankara, and the newly proposed southern residential and




Figure 3.4 - The second approved plan for Ankara: the Jansen Plan, 1932.  
Source: Çankaya Municipality.

functional settlement as the physical spaces within which the modern Turkish lifestyle could unfold. Both zones existed in harmony within the larger urban context. The government quarter (Regierungs-Viertel) that Jansen proposed would stand in “symbolic and spatial” (Önge, 2007) contrast to the citadel overlooking the city, expressing the administrative power of the newly established nation over the physically massive yet chronologically and functionally defunct remnants and values expressed by the Citadel. This was an ideologically assumed position which projected two contrasting loci of power: one redundant and receding, the other progressive and emerging.

Technological advancement also played a role in catalyzing the process of social modernization. The train station building proposed in 1935 was seen as a symbolic entrance “gate” to the capital city, branded as Europe’s “most modern” station at the time. The broad pedestrian and vehicular avenue leading from the station (Figure 3.5) would pass through the government quarter, and lead up to the historic Citadel precinct (Bozdoğan, 2001). This was a central spine as proposed by Jansen’s plan.

Table 6.2 to Table 6.5 summarize the various architectural manifestations of the Republic's ideas about the vision of authoritarian administration, the financial set-up of the new nation, and the state-sponsored social modernization program including



*Figure 3.5- The avenue leading from the station (far background) up to the Citadel, under the watchful eyes of Atatürk's statue. Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 16)*

educational and health buildings. The tables give the buildings' dates of construction, architects' details, and current status of the buildings where applicable.

### 3.2.2 Physical transformations – Buildings

Table 6.2 shows the administrative buildings constructed during this phase. As a general observation, these buildings represented the conscious will to introduce a new architectural tradition to the Anatolian context: one that was inspired from modernistic aspirations. They also represented the will to assimilate into a progressive, global urban arena, to bring the Anatolian city at par with any European capital. In this way, the individual buildings as well as the administrative clusters of this era became directly visible physical manifestations of the spatial and social modernity projects so ambitiously undertaken by the nascent Republic (Çınar, 2013). Figure 3.6 shows these individual building interventions with reference to the contemporary Ankara.




Figure 3.6- Phase I interventions: the locations of buildings listed in Tables 7.2-7.6. Source: Prepared by author, 2016.



*Figure 3.7- The Sümerbank building contained a large frontal window display of locally produced textiles. Source: Source: Haber Türk, [www.haberturk.com](http://www.haberturk.com).*

Table 6.3 shows the various financial institutions and facilities that were envisioned during this phase. These banks were the earliest financial buildings of Ankara (Önge, 2007) and are hence significant indicators of a transition from obsolete societal transactions to the modern lifestyles of the socially transforming community. For example, the Sümerbank building (Figure 3.7), a state owned-bank, included a large, frontal window display of locally produced textiles from industries supported by the government, and hence propagating national productivity, pride, and progress (Çınar, 2013).

Table 6.4 shows the various educational buildings for this phase. The Law for the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) took effect on 3 March 1924 with approval from the TBMM. This meant that from now on a single, secular national public education system was to replace the traditional, religious based system. The abolition of various Islamic theological schools, Dervish orders and lodges, and obsolete Ottoman theological institutions was enforced. The introduction of secular state education meant that new kinds of spatial configurations for social interaction were required, including the intermingling of young male and female students. This meant an overhaul in the educational system, from basic schooling (Figure 3.9) to specialized institutions such as the Faculty of Political Sciences (Figure 3.8) and



*Figure 3.9- Atatürk High School, constructed in 1938. Table 7.4, Building 7.4 G.  
Source: TC Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, [www.meb.gov.tr](http://www.meb.gov.tr)*



*Figure 3.8- The Faculty of Political Sciences (Mülkiye Mektebi).  
Established in 1935-36, today it functions as the Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences  
(Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi). Table 7.4, Building 7.4 E. Source:  
[www.wowturkey.com](http://www.wowturkey.com).*



*Figure 3.10- The Faculty of Humanities (Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi).  
Table 7.4, Building 7.4 F. Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009,  
p. 169)*

Faculty of Humanities (Figure 3.10). Within his original plan, Lörcher proposed clusters of monumental educational buildings within prominent urban spaces. Table 6.5 lists the health-related buildings constructed during this period. According to the Lörcher plan, the Sıhhiye<sup>11</sup> district was planned as a health precinct south of the old city center, Ulus. This concept was based on the notions of “youth” and “health” that were idealized by the Republic as part of its social modernization program (Önge, 2007). The Ministry of Health and Social Aid (*Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekâleti*) was the first government building built in Sıhhiye (Figure 3.11). After the 1950s, the Sıhhiye district became specialized in health related institutes and hospitals which were seen to usher in a modern, healthy lifestyle.

---

<sup>11</sup> Sıhhiye stands for “medical or health related”.



*Figure 3.11- The Ministry of Health and Social Aid (Sihhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekâleti). Constructed during 1925-27, today it functions as the Ministry of Health (Sağlık Bakanlığı). Table 7.5, building 7.5 A. Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 174)*

### 3.2.3 Physical Transformations – Social Engineering Projects

The new Republican regime propagated very clearly the kind of society they envisioned for the country: progressive, modernistic, and adaptive to international lifestyles. For this reason, the provision of adequately designed social interaction spaces and cultural venues was of great significance. Table 6.6 lists the various social spaces and building typologies that were introduced into the urban context of Ankara as an attempt at upgrading not just the modernization of lifestyles, but also to engender a new kind of social interaction. These spaces included museums, parks, and open air recreational areas. Where on the one hand these spaces and institutions would provide cultural entertainment and enlightenment, they would also act as homogenizing catalysts for the society, to subtly push out lifestyle choices and trends that were incompatible with the vision of the Republic. In time, these spaces became popular amongst the city's populace. Going to the theater, attending opera performances, and having sunny family picnics amongst other similar families became the social trend (Figure 3.12). People came to such spaces to “stroll, to see, and to be seen” (Bozdoğan, 2001). Perhaps the most significant of these spaces was the Atatürk Forest Farm




Figure 3.12- A family outside the Sergi Evi, the city's Exhibition Hall.

(*Atatürk Orman Çiftliği, AOÇ*). This was established by the founder of the nation Atatürk himself as a private estate in 1925 and was gifted to the city of Ankara in 1937 (Figure 3.13). The Farm is located in the very heart of the city, and constitutes a large green space amidst the rapidly densifying urban morphology. It also contributes organic produce to the urban market, including dairy products, meat items, and agricultural goods.

#### 3.2.4 The Afterglow

During the middle and late 1930s, unprecedented population growth within the city caused a demographic shift. The appearance of squatters was the new *Emergent* scenario that had to be resolved as a priority: squatter settlements sprang up across the city, occupying residual urban pockets. The breathing spaces of the city, its valleys and air corridors, were occupied by visually displeasing structures brought by the inevitable demands of incoming migrants.

Consequently, Jansen's original plan was encroached upon in 1937 due to practical reasons, by adding an east-west axis for residential development by the Directorate of Public Improvements. This intervention overruled the visual and symbolic orchestration of the connection between the old and new city that had been expressed



*Figure 3.13- Atatürk on a visit to the Atatürk Forest Farm (Atatürk Orman Çiftliği).  
Source: www.turknostalji.com*

up till now by the development parallel to the city's dominant north-south axis (Kezer, 2012). This transformation depicted shifting of priorities of the administrative authorities in charge of the decision making processes that created the image of the new city: from a pursuit of the ideological production of space and form, to a response to the contextually grounded realities that were still prevalent in Anatolian society, and would take years to mitigate.

Ankara's population continued to increase, so that it was well beyond 200,000 by 1945. Squatter housing became more common, and squatters were granted legal rights of land by 1949. Jansen estimated the population to reach 300,000 by 1978 – but this figure was achieved by the 1950s, which led to the call for a third formal plan for Ankara.

### 3.2.5 Analysis

The physical transformations that Ankara underwent during the early Republican planning and construction phase of the city will be evaluated as per the three parameters developed in light of the literature reviewed.

In such a scenario, the planning decision-making took a break from the ideological driving force that had till now directed the planning efforts. The focus shifted from the passionate production of agenda-driven physical and visual public space to meeting crucial functional requirements: housing construction, which was a more

contingency-based approach. The *Emergent* trajectory went off along a different tangent than the one projected by the planned estimates of Jansen. As a result of this unforeseen deviation from the more *Actively* planned phase, Jansen's contract was called off in 1939, as the population outgrew all his calculated predictions for the city's demographic growth.

#### 3.2.5.1 *Personal preferences behind the monuments*

This era was marked by Republican ideals, presumed loosely to be based on the utterances and approvals of the charismatic Atatürk. The general public had little to no knowledge about the actual intentions of the leader; the public ranged from those who had aspirations of progressive, Europe-inspired reforms to those who longed for the "days of the first caliphs" (Mango, 2004, p. 394) after the elimination of a corrupted Caliphate from their lands. This was the *Passive* scenario that Ankara received as part of its socio-intellectual baggage at the eve of the Republic.

Even though Atatürk tried several times to generate a multi-party democracy, those attempts usually resulted in violent rebellious factions in peripheral provinces more than they generated healthy political opponents in parliament (Akşin, 2007). Eventually, only a single political party dominated the TBMM, with Atatürk personally endorsing major decisions regarding the development of institutions and social engineering projects, including the plans and buildings for Ankara. The TBMM, under Atatürk, complied and passed planning and construction decisions to ensure two things. The first of these was *Active* interventions, that is, the consistent propagation of the new nationalist ideology during the earlier years; the second, in the later years, was more in response to *Emergent* scenarios, that is, the practical timely resolution of issues, such as instant need for housing for government employees as well as rural migrants to the city. Politically, the single party period came to an end soon after Atatürk's demise.

However, even within the proposed and accepted plans that were overseen and endorsed by Atatürk himself, some changes were made which stemmed from personal priorities rather than the planners' vision. This happened with both Lörcher's and Jansen's plans.

Lörcher had included a few very symbolic physical interventions: street names, such as the main boulevard being labelled Nation (*Millet*) Boulevard (Kezer, 2009). This would stretch from the northern Old Ankara to the southern government quarters

within the New Ankara, and would be anchored down with recurring monuments that recreated themes and ideals of the new Republic of Turkey deriving from and invoking the recent events of the Nationalist struggle.

The National Sovereignty (*Hakimiyet'i Milliye*) Monument was the first along this axis, commemorating the many silent heroes young and old of the War under Atatürk's leadership. The next monument was supposed to be a Triumphal Arch to commemorate the final victory at the War, and was a symbolic portal that connected the old and new parts of the city across a physical, visible, and clear spatial transition. However, the administrative decision makers, the patrons for Lörcher's plans, decided to replace this internationally generic representation of an arched monument with a locally revered one: Atatürk in his uniform as a Field Marshall (Figure 3.14). This was to be known as the Victory Monument (*Zafer Anıtı*). This was not just an aesthetic or stylistic change: it carried ideological undertones. The Arch would have been a symbolic yet functional architectural element in an urban scenario. It was based on architectural principles and theories of transition of history to the present, and of creating a symbolic connection between the old and new towns. A Triumphal Arch essentially replicates the same form and serves the same function from France to North Africa. The replacement of the Arch by Atatürk's statue departed from the



*Figure 3.14- The Victory Monument (Zafer Anıtı) on the Atatürk Boulevard. Originally intended to be a Triumphal Arch, replaced by a statue of Atatürk in uniform. Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 23)*

presumed glorification of merely the nation-state as an idea, as represented by the genericity of a Triumphal Arch, and presented an individual leadership – that of Atatürk – as the sole salvager of the past and the ultimate visionary for the future of the Turks and of the Republic of Turkey. Shortly afterwards, the Millet Boulevard was renamed to Atatürk Boulevard, and the National Sovereignty Square (*Hakimiyet'i Milliye Meydanı*) to Nation Square (*Ulus Meydanı*) as if to reinstate this idea, and to re-enunciate the significance of individual leadership and a contextually relevant charismatic patronage to be as guiding principles in the development of the new nation.

Although the alterations to Lörcher's plans were based on reverence to Atatürk, Jansen's plans underwent less dramatic and more politically affiliated alterations, for example the decision by town mayor Tandoğan to override some of Jansen's master plan designs in favor of more politically relevant interventions, covertly supported by the administration (Kezer, 2009).

In summary, this phase started off with a single charismatic decision maker, whose decisions were agenda driven, and who had substantial fan following. In the later years, the physical interventions shifted to contingency planning and decision making, where the nationalistic program was put on hold to let functional zones and requirements develop.

#### *3.2.5.2 International genericity in the design of monument:*

There was also a degree of international genericity in the overall image-building that took place in Ankara. Being modern was synonymous with assenting to and extending upon the internationally prevalent styles of architecture and design. The International School, the CIAM and the Bauhaus, and early hints of Art Deco were major influences in the overall designing and urban planning decisions taken within the city (Figure 3.16, Figure 3.15). Some elements of Neo-Baroque or Ottoman Rococo are also clearly observable in the TBMM and other buildings in the administrative quarter in Ulus. This was not unexpected, as the architects hired for the earliest buildings in the capital (Table 6.2 to Table 6.5) were mostly Swiss, German, and Austrian. They were trained in the internationally prevalent modernist and brutalist movements of architecture.



*Figure 3.16- Refik Saydam Hygiene Institute and School (Refik Saydam Hıfzıssıhha Enstitüsü ve Okulu), constructed during 1928-32. Table 6.5, Building 7.5 B. Source: Goethe Institute, [www.goethe.de](http://www.goethe.de).*

Was the hiring of foreign architects only because the government was looking westwards for inspiration and physical development standards, or was there actually a lack of local architects and designers as well? According to Bozdoğan, these foreigners eventually became the true ‘architects’ of Republican Turkey (Bozdoğan, 2001). The Republic only had a vision, but the foreign architects, planners, and designers helped give form, space, and order to that vision (Çınar, 2013). More than just the design of buildings and public places, they established architectural education



*Figure 3.15- Turkish Republic Central Bank (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası). Constructed during 1931-33. Table 6.3, Building 7.3 F. Source: [www.arkitera.com](http://www.arkitera.com).*



*Figure 3.17- The Exhibition Hall (Sergi Evi).  
Designed by Turkish architect Şevki Balmumcu in 1934, it reflects the early influences of  
European architects. Today it serves as the State Opera House. Table 6.6, Building 7.6 C.  
Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 159)*

systems in the universities and generated the architectural culture of the period in Turkey. This, again, is not a new trend for Turkish society. Istanbul experienced extensive influences of Baroque and Rococo architecture and interior decor during the last centuries of Ottoman rule. Foreign influence in architectural styles is not really an alien concept in the context of Turkey, and we see this genericity being re-invoked even as the Republic claims to sway away from Ottoman traditions.

Interestingly, these foreign architects helped train a new generation of Turkish architects: for example, Ernst Egli (Table 6.4), a Swiss architect who designed the Musiki Muallim Mektebi, Ticaret Lisesi, Yüksek Ziraat ve Baytar Enstitüsü, and Divan-ı Muhasebat, amongst other buildings, was appointed as the head of the Department of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts, in Istanbul. This international influence lasted up till about the first few batches of Turkish architects graduated, at which point the Second World War also broke out and the foreign architects had to return to their countries. These young Turkish architects carried on the legacy of the internationally established construction styles: the Sergi Evi (Figure 3.17), İller Bankası (Figure 3.18, Table 6.3) and the Etibank building (Figure 3.19, Table 6.3) all bespeak the early European influences on the visual image



*Figure 3.18- Bank of Municipalities (Belediyeler Bankası), also known as İller Bankası, constructed in 1933. Designed by Turkish architect Seyfi Arkan, it also shows influences from the earliest European architects employed by the Republic. Table 6.3, Building 7.3 H. Source: Mimdap, [www.mimdap.org](http://www.mimdap.org).*

of Ankara. However, as illustrated by the case of Lörcher's Triumphal Arch being replaced by the Zafer Anıtı above, there is one important aspect to keep in mind when analyzing the physical transformation of the city with regard to its international



*Figure 3.19- The Etibank building, constructed in 1935-36, also by a local architect Sami Arsev. Table 6.3, Building 7.3 G. Source: Google Earth Panoramio, [www.panoramio.com](http://www.panoramio.com).*

influences during this era. This genericity was selectively subservient to the greater nationalistic ideals of the Republic. Internationally generic monuments were only second to the nationalist agenda. Where local value-laden imagery could provoke a greater effect, this was employed as a priority, even if it meant making substantial alterations to the planners' proposals. The primary ideology remained the grand nation, a nation under a supreme leader. Internationally prevalent, generic standards for aesthetics and design value remained inferior to this primary ideology when considering monuments within the local context.

### *3.2.5.3 Ideological motivations behind the monuments*

The reasons for rejecting Lörcher's first plan were ideological. The plan's non-conformity to an already existing context, and the proposition of stark change incompatible with the nationalist vision were the two reasons that made it contextually unsuitable. The reasons for the approval of Lörcher's second plan were ideological as well. The proposed new development area in the second plan was consciously designed as being physically isolated from the Citadel. This area would function as an independent district. Gone were the days when the image of a Turkish capital would stir up images of a romanticized Oriental lifestyle against silhouettes of minarets and domes. The new capital precinct would not be comprised, as was the norm in Ottoman capitals, of central bazaars and mosques, which were emblems of the Ottoman society's clerical and mercantile classes; it would now proudly host administrative buildings and ministries, depicting the power of the nation-state within the globally competitive environment.

Similar ideological reasons motivated the acceptance and implementation of Jansen's plans. Originally, the citadel precinct had housed mixed functions: residential areas, workshop areas, warehousing, commercial outlets and street vendors, social and cultural facilities, religious and educational institutes, all intermingled, sometimes multiple utilities existing within a single building. With the implementation of Jansen's plan, the Citadel precinct receded into the passive position of an historic center, an artefact, and a remnant of the old Ankara. It eventually became confined within its own physical and socio cultural specifics, watching the New Ankara spring up towards the South, Çankaya and beyond. The government quarter, the *Regierungs-Viertel*, proposed by Jansen was deliberately designed to counter the obsolete referential significance of the citadel for the rest of the city. The government quarter

would express the authoritative power of the new Republic over the visually dominant but practically anachronistic Citadel.

However, Jansen also wanted to protect the physical environment of the Citadel precinct and to save it against potential speculation and degenerative development policies. This was observable within European old towns, where a failure to maintain the physical heritage due to any reason – investments, socio-economic, political, or historical – had resulted in the authentic fabric being replaced with hastily applied temporary cosmetic solutions (Egberts & Bosma, 2014).

This introduction of new typologies in social engineering planning and design was again an ideological deviation from the conventional typologies such as mosque complexes (*külliyeye*) and the financial and cultural institutions such as religious trusts (*vakıflar*) prevalent in traditional Turkish society. It was a deviation inspired by European planning ideals. The choice by the new administration of what *not* to build (Kezer, 2009) was of ideological significance. No large scale religious buildings or complexes were sponsored during the early years of the Republic. This was in sharp contrast to the Ottoman sultans, whose very legitimacy of rule sometimes depended on supporting and providing for religious trusts and their associated services. Under the Ottomans, funding and supporting a Külliye meant providing continuous religious, cultural, educational and sometimes economic services to communities, leading to enhanced urban development. The new Republic had different ideas on socio-cultural and educational activities. Parallel to the grand architectural treatment of the capital came the social engineering and modernization program: new administrative buildings symbolized, on the one hand, institutional modernization, and on the other, the power and authority of the new nation, which was at the time represented by a single political party that made decisions under a charismatic leader, and whose decisions were assumed to represent larger Turkish interests and aspirations. The envisioned social interaction patterns amongst Turkish society now required new building typologies and spatial configurations.



*Figure 3.20- People's House (Türkocağı), constructed 1927-30.  
Table 6.6, Building 7.6 B. Source: [www.arkitera.com](http://www.arkitera.com).*

New socio-cultural spaces such as the Türkocağı (Figure 3.20), the Ethnography Museum (Figure 3.21), the Gençlik Parkı and the Sergi Evi (Table 6.6) were part of the social engineering project which was an attempt at modernizing the lifestyles of the public, by providing them with spaces and communal activities derived from the cultural practices of the Western world. These new spaces engendered new kinds of societal behaviors and interactions – people came here “to stroll, to see, and to be



*Figure 3.21- The Ethnography Museum (Etnografya Müzesi), constructed in 1925-1927.  
Table 6.6, Building 7.6 A. Source: Wikipedia, [www.de.wikipedia.org](http://www.de.wikipedia.org).*

seen” (Bozdoğan, 2001), a phenomenon new to Turkish society (Figure 3.22). The introduction of the Latinized alphabet and adoption of a secular education system saw the construction of facilities such as the Musiki Muallim Mektebi and Mülkiye Mektebi along Western educational guidelines. The Sıhhiye district was planned as a health precinct, based on the notions of “youth” and “health” idealized by the Republic.

What about the traditional religious and community services represented by mosques, saints’ mausoleums, and külliye? Several such religious venues were forcefully closed down under the new Republican government in Ankara – the Hacı Bayram and Karyagdı Sultan complexes, for example. There were also attempts at appropriating finances from several Islamic trusts (*evkaf/vakıflar*). Most such religious communal bodies were brought under the central supervision of the state, rather than function as autonomous bodies. Interestingly, some of the most significant government buildings, such as the second building of TBMM and several ministries, were erected on lands that had been seized from such religious trusts. The first actual large scale urban mosque that the government was involved in was proposed well into the 1950s under the Democrat Party, after a multi-party system was finally adopted for the nation.



Figure 3.22- All-Turkey Beauty Contest, 1925. Source: (Bozdoğan, 2001)

### 3.3 Interlude: 1940s-2000s

This section will give a brief overview of the political developments along with the planning practices soon after Atatürk's demise, as the decision making shifted from individual charismatic leadership to a broader power sharing basis. In the presence of an unstable political leadership, the physical planning and design mechanism in Ankara during this era followed responses to *Emergent* scenarios more than proposing actual *Active* interventions due to the various shortcomings in previous plans that manifested themselves on a recurring basis. This section analyzes the negotiations that were occurring between the *Passive*, *Active*, and *Emergent* trajectories that occurred in the planning and design process of the city during this era.

#### 3.3.1 Political Developments

Atatürk's demise in 1938 left the Turkish nation in political uncertainty. Leadership options were limited. In 1946 competitive politics was introduced, and the 1950s elections saw the dramatic ousting of Atatürk's own CHP by the young Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti, DP*). The fall of the CHP from power in 1950 has been seen by some political analysts as the real cleavage in Turkish political history, one that even more significant than the abolishment of the Caliphate, though this notion remains debatable (Tachau, 2000). What is certain is that the 1950s elections had a deep impact on the subsequent political developments in the country, namely of challenging the assumption of a united Turkish socio-political opinion. Before this election, politics was about top-down dictation to the masses about the ideals of the Republic, with no room for dissension by the public. Political parties acted as tools of the all-mighty regime, practicing societal and political control rather than representing their electorates. The DP victory hinted at the first possibility of change within a rigid countrywide decision making mechanism (Ahmad, 2003). It was possible for power to be delegated now, and for national decisions to spring from sources other than that of the central, presumingly omniscient regime. The victory also highlighted the possibility of mitigating the gulf between the disenchanting rural residents and the national elite, who were mostly urban. But in the long term, the glorious DP victory served no more than a merely superficial adjustment. Most of their elected members had earlier belonged to the CHP, and consequently their political and social policies did not diverge greatly than those of the CHP. The DP did reinstate basic Islamic

tenets such as the Arabic call to prayer, pilgrimages, and religious education (Toprak, 2013), but this also meant that religion started being used as a political tool and a vote-catching mechanism. Such policies did however resonate with the previously marginalized rural populations that had started migrating to the more developed cities, providing a growing voter base. Migration had started with the 1950s and continued through the 1960s, but it was the 1970s that saw rapid rural-urban demographic shifts, not just in labor, but also in the associated lifestyles being imported into the previously sacrosanct urban spaces (Demirel, 2003).

In the 1950s the conservative DP government tried to sideline the military to a peripheral position to take away from it any say in the country's policymaking, resulting in the subsequent coup of 1960 (Heper, 2005) and the transfer of political power to the CHP. In Turkish politics, the civilian leadership has had two approaches regarding the military: they have either given it too much independence, or tried to curb its influence by any means available (Heper, 2005). The Turkish military has had a significant role to play in Turkish politics since the inception of the Republic. Highly nationalistic, the military has helped support secularism and progressive values, and stepped in several times when national ideals were under threat (Ahmad, 2003). During this period, the military regarded civilian politics to be rife with not just incompetence and inability, but also blatant corruption and general disorder. The role of the military in politics has been marked by the coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, and the intervention in 1997.

During the 1960s, even with the leftist CHP again in power, the Turkish political spectrum as a whole started inclining towards the right, possibly out of opposition to the CHP's incompetency. This resulted in "growing polarization, frustration, political paralysis, and violence" (Tachau, 2000, p. 137), forcing the military to intervene yet again in 1971 to save the democratic process. The military viewed itself as the last line of defense when the state was facing internal turmoil, and its intervention in politics was more an act of the dutiful restoration of stability than an unethical attempt at undermining a democratic process and acquiring long-term political power (Demirel, 2003).

By the 1970s, the Turkish society was more aware of the strong polarity that existed amidst them. The passionate republican ideals of pre-1940s followed by the radical pursuit of Islamist political authority in the 1950s led inevitably to political instability, and gave rise in the 1970s to the realization that either extreme, religious or secular,

was detrimental for the Turkish society. The oversimplified polar relationship of religion and the nation-state during the earlier years, of either strong affiliation or total detachment, was questioned during this time. Radical secularism of the Kemalist Republic of Turkey eventually gave way to traditionalism and moderate religious assimilation (Birttek & Toprak, 1993). This led to the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”. Society and politicians experimented with alternate syntheses of religion and politics, which ironically saw the resurgence of religious-minded individuals and institutions in political scenarios (Shankland, 2013). The first proto-Islamic party, National Order Party (*Millî Nizam Partisi, MNP*), was formed in 1970, but shut down by military intervention on charges of desecrating the secularist constitution. It re-emerged in 1972 as the National Salvation Party (*Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP*), but was again shut down in 1981 on the same charges, only to be revived again in 1983 as the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi, RP*).

During the 1980s, the domestic policies of free market and neoliberal economics (Dodd, 2013) also resulted in a very polarized income distribution across the country, with landlocked, rural Anatolian towns on one hand, and the wealthy, touristic western coastal cities on the other, each population apprehensive of the other’s residents (Ayata, 1996). This neoliberal restructuring of the economy meant that the state was steering away from a centralized development model (Erman, 2013). Development policies shifted from ameliorization of social issues, such as public housing, to their commercialization.

During the 1980s the role of the military was more restrained. During the 1960s and 1970s, the military had been viewed as a strong opponent to tackle, and so Turkish politics and policymaking struck up an uneasy and distant relationship with its military. During the 1980s, the military refrained from interfering in political affairs even when the Prime Minister Turgut Özal single handedly influenced decisions on defense and foreign policy (Heper, 2005).

Side by side, during the 1980s even the notion of “modernity” started shifting drastically in Turkish society. Modernity was no longer only exclusively defined by the secular-nationalist narrative as in the Republic of Turkey’s earliest years. The status of the state as definer and imposer of a particular version of modernity came under scrutiny, if not outright criticism. Simultaneously, the rise of various non-secular political and societal forces also accounted for a more religious-based identity. Especially in the 1990s, the state-centered ideology was competing with alternate

claims to representing the Turkish opinion, on politics as well as societal affairs. This alternate version was represented not only by Islamist movements, but various rights activists and civil society initiatives. All these had in common the suggestion that the linear, secular and inflexible model of state-sponsored politics and ideology was no longer an efficient urban decision maker (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003).

The 1990s was the period when “previously excluded peripheral identities began to question the fabricated and imposed monolithic republican citizenship in Turkey” (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003, p. 232). The religion-oriented RP under Necmettin Erbakan won a clear victory in the 1994 local elections, including mayorships of Istanbul and Ankara, cities that had been considered strongholds of secular ideology. Erbakan naturally declared this victory as an Islamist “reclaiming” (Ayata, 1996, p. 40) of the two cities, a claim that ideologically alluded to the Islamic conquest of Istanbul five centuries ago<sup>12</sup>.

During 1999-2002 the civilian-military relations were once more cordial, as the government demonstrated the ability to handle domestic policies and ensure economic development, thus diminishing the role of the “guardians” (Heper, 2005).

In 2001, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*) was formed and has since won local and parliamentary elections with noticeable majorities. Despite being suspected of hosting an Islamist agenda, the AKP declared itself as social conservative, adopting pro-business policies and demonstrating a satisfactorily nationalist approach (Heper, 2005), though it claims some alternate, albeit acceptable, interpretations of certain Kemalist ideologies (Özyürek, 2006). During the 2000s, significant developments happened in the military as well. General Hilmi Özkök became Chief of Staff in 2002. He was sympathetic towards both the civilian leadership as well as the more religiously oriented electorate. For Özkök, Atatürk’s ideals were not set in stone – they could be malleable as the national sentiment demanded (Heper, 2005). He had confidence in the rational judgement of the voting populace, and declared that nationalistic sentiment was not a “monopoly of the military” (Heper, 2005, p. 218).

The results of the 1999 and 2002 elections re-emphasized the existence of regional divisions in the Turkish political landscape. Political parties maintained distinct

---

<sup>12</sup> Istanbul, then Constantinople, was captured by a Turkish Muslim army under Conqueror (*Fatih*) Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. This is an event that is used widely in evoking the glorious past victories across the Islamic world, even today.

regional affiliations, based on “religion, ethnicity, regional economic prosperity, and previous state association” (West, 2005, p. 499). Even today, the varying levels of countrywide economic development and the wide spectra of cultural identities and ideological affiliations have resulted in very distinct regional associations when it comes to certain political parties (West, 2005).

During this Interlude Phase, we see that there is no longer a strict, unchallenged version of national identity, modernity and progress, as was the case in the earliest years of the Republic. Alternate visions for these concepts have start coming forward, all within the realm of the Turkish nation, and each vision receives its own fan following. The role of religion in national politics and ideological discourses had also begun expanding subtly since the introduction of multi-party politics in the 1950s. Though not very pronounced in its nascent years because of the watchful political atmosphere, it grew exponentially in the face of military and secular opposition, and finally established itself in an unimpeded way during the 1990s (Ayata, 1996). Hence, the existence of two contrasting opinions on national ideology has the potential to lead to a healthy variety of attitudes on ideological issues, but can also lead to an unhealthy polarity if not approached with respect for the other.

### 3.3.2 Physical Transformations

The decades from 1940s to 1990s witnessed large waves of rural-urban migration and rapid “urbanization without industrialization” in Turkey (Erman, 2013). The industrialization of rural agriculture forced unemployed workers into the more prosperous cities. Initially, migrants were looked down upon as less important citizens and less significant contributors to the modern city (Özyürek, 2006). The political atmosphere was also rife with several underhand measures and subtle clientelism. As an example, addressing the *gecekondu*<sup>13</sup> problem assumed a key role in Turkish politics, not just as a tool for populist politics, but also as a means of clientelism. Politicians were unwilling to completely solve the *gecekondu* issue. Solving the issue completely would mean that they would lose their bargaining position with the lower classes for instant votes near the time of elections (Toprak, 2013). This resulted in

---

<sup>13</sup> *Gece*; night; *kondu*: placed/put (verb, past tense). Vernacular Turkish word for (usually illegal) squatter house that has been hurriedly put together (literally: overnight) without appropriate permissions and infrastructure. *Gecekondu*s have become a common sight in peripheral urban areas in Turkey since the first wave of industrial migrants started coming to cities during the 1950s.

selective, incremental amelioration, to the physical detriment of the urban land and atmosphere. Subsequently, in the 1970s *gecekondus* became a commodity for land speculation as well (Erman, 2013).

Not only did the *gecekondus* pose a housing problem, but they posed physical and aesthetic challenges as well. The mayor and governor of Ankara, Nevzat Tandoğan, prohibited incoming rural migrants to set up camp within the urban limits. Even *gecekondu* dwellers would not be allowed within the sanctified urban schemes of the capital (Demirel, 2003), let alone *gecekondu* houses. Rural migrants viewed as secondary citizens, aloof from Turkey's modernization project, and therefore less deserving to take advantage of the capital's physical development (Erman, 2013).

On the academic side, the unstable political climate of the 1950s to the 1980s also had its impact on intellectual thought and educational preferences. Ideological interpretations and implementations of architectural design became secondary to more technical subjects. Most academic discourse on national architecture and heritage focused around surveys and theses, and a large part of these were carried out at Istanbul rather than Ankara (Çelik, 2013).

The 1980s was a decade of economic restructuring, with a zero *gecekondu* policy (Erman, 2013), and new urban transformation projects being introduced amongst continuously shifting political authority. National development became subordinate to market led neoliberal development policies. This further shifted the *gecekondu* issue from a slow amelioration process to the commercialization of a social issue. Side by side, central urban spaces were opened up for consumption, recreational and touristic purposes.

On an ideological level, Atatürk was still kept alive in fragmentary national projects. During the political turmoil of the 1980s, the military junta ensured that Atatürk's presence was re-evoked, with the naming of several national projects like dams, airports, and bridges in his name, as well as his large portrait on a mountain in Erzincan in 1982 (Özyürek, 2006).

Formal spatial planning in Ankara did continue, however. It was more about adjusting the previous plans and suggesting curative interventions rather than focusing on purely ideological initiations.

### 3.3.2.1 The 3<sup>rd</sup> plan for Ankara, the Yücel-Uybadin plan

The Yücel-Uybadin plan (Figure 3.23), approved in 1957, considered Ankara as a nucleic city, and gave newfound significance to the central position of Kızılay as the city's locus of commerce and social life. It attempted to consolidate the remnants of the Jansen's plan, which had led to fragmentary patches being developed outside the regulated areas. The Yücel-Uybadin plan preserved the primary north-south axis, as well as gave increased importance to the east-west axis of the city, which it foresaw as becoming the new spine for urban development. Additionally, the various ministries that had till now been housed in individual buildings spread across the city were to be brought together in a new cluster arrangement, similar to the governmental quarter that Jansen had proposed in his earlier plan. This was to be known as the Bakanlıklar. Where on the one hand this measure enhanced administrative functionality, on the other it was also a declaration and a projection of the eventual consolidation process of enhanced state power. Although the Yücel-Uybadin plan did predict a homogenous, high density growth for Ankara's next few decades, it also fell drastically short on the population growth estimation, similar to the plans before. But this could also be attributed to the various socio-political factors, including a boom in the market-driven “demolish, build and sell” strategy for new housing provision. Due




Figure 3.23 - The third approved plan for Ankara: the Yücel-Uybadin plan,, 1957.  
Source: Günay, 2005.

to this, quite a number of decades-old residential architecture within the city was demolished, creating a vacuum of historical continuity within the urban fabric of the city center.

This plan also predicted, and hence proposed, higher inner-city densities than the Jansen plan. After the implementation of this plan, Ankara started assuming a more compact and utilitarian form, with gecekondu squeezed in between the planned high density neighborhood apartments of middle income families.

Another innovation in the Yücel-Uybadin plan was the declaration of the city's various valleys and air corridors as being unsuitable for residential development, so that the natural air flow within the city would not be encroached upon (Özbilen, 2013). In 1965, the Condominium Law (*Kat Mülkiyeti Kanunu*) was passed, which accelerated apartment development due to a more efficient financing mechanism for new constructions (Uzun C. N., 2001). However, as infrastructure remained unchanged, the higher residential densities put increasing pressure on urban resources. The increased residential density also led to severe air pollution, especially during the winter months, where even middle income families burnt coal for heating. By the 1970s, smog was a common sight in the city.

The unprecedented rise in population once again called for a new plan – a fourth one. Thus we see that during this phase the planning process in Ankara is initiated not through a new will or passion – ie, not an *Active* process – but one that is brought around to cater to *Emergent* scenarios as they periodically arise. The new plans that are proposed as a result of these scenarios are not individual projects that proclaim a distinct, standalone vision for the city – they are instead ameliorations to the previous plans, put in place in order to curtail the unforeseen trajectories that went off beyond the idealistic planning and design proposals of their precedents.

*3.3.2.2 The 4<sup>th</sup> plan for Ankara, the Grand Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan:* The fourth plan, the Grand Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan (Figure 3.24), was officially launched in 1982, proposing a continuing westward increase in the city to ease pressure from the center, and to even out construction and population densities from neighborhoods that were already over-utilized. A westward expansion was practical also because the terrain of the city facilitated expansion in that direction.

In this plan, general concerns on the environmental quality of the city and its air pollution also motivated the adoption of corridor planning within the city's valleys. In addition, larger residential lots were allocated to the west along the İstanbul Yolu<sup>14</sup> and Eskişehir Yolu (highways). The new residential neighborhoods of Çayyolu, Koru, and Konut Kent, the elite suburban housing plans, were placed along the Eskişehir Yolu. The Eryaman and Batıkent mass housing schemes, initiated in 1970s, were located along the İstanbul Yolu. In this way, the plan pre-empted the future growth of the city on a massive scale, by consciously handing out development and housing opportunities to the peripheral areas. Industries were also placed along the northwestern peripheries (Kilciler, 2012). An *Emergent* scenario occurred here as well. Despite the many opportunities for development along the western arteries, the




Figure 3.24 - The fourth approved plan for Ankara: the Grand Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan, 1982. Source: AMANP Bürosu

<sup>14</sup> *Yol* is Turkish for road. *Yolu* is the possessive form of the noun.

city somehow retained its north-south growth at a steady rate, meaning that the city was now not only expanding westwards, but southwards as well. This was to shape the future morphological and socio-economic structure of the city.

### **3.4 Phase II: 2000s-2016**

Phase II spans 2000s-2016, and covers the recent physical developments, including mass evictions, production of generic housing, the more recent cosmetic Islamization of municipal projects within the city, and the impact of a pervasive international consumption culture that has homogenized urban landscapes and social interaction spaces to less contextual and more global standards of aesthetics and lifestyle choices. This phase also coincides with turbulent political processes within Turkey that have ultimately resulted in limiting the powers of the military so that it can no longer attempt to overthrow a civilian government. This has also been paired with the extension of the President's powers, which can be seen as driving Turkey again towards a new kind of authoritarian, single-vision system in the form of a Presidential rather than a pluralistic Parliamentary system as envisioned by Atatürk (Aydıntaşbaşı, 2012). The account of the visual transformation of the city during this Phase would be followed by an analysis along the parameters developed earlier.

#### **3.4.1 Physical Transformations – City Plans**

The more recent construction boom within Ankara, fueled by neoliberal policies and the delegation of governance (Kayasü & Yetişkul, 2014) with the emergence of luxury housing projects in symbiosis with low-income, high-density relocation schemes is a characteristic phenomenon of the AKP period. Even though urban projects such as Dikmen Valley (Türker-Devecigil, 2005) and Portakal Çiçeği (Uzun C. N., 2005) were initiated in the 1990s and were largely completed in the 2000s, the more recent Kuzey Yıldız Project (Northern Ankara Entrance Project)<sup>15</sup> was started off enthusiastically in 2004 with the passing of a special Law<sup>16</sup>, with the aim of

---

<sup>15</sup> The Kuzey Yıldız Project (Northern Ankara Entrance Project) is based around the demolition of a large gecekondu area near the northern part of Ankara, along the highway that leads to the Esenboğa airport. After demolition, new low- to middle-income flats are being erected to house the displaced people, together with the construction of various amenities including parks, mosque complexes, and recreational facilities. It is a massive urban transformation project (Erman, 2009).

<sup>16</sup> The North Ankara Entrance Urban Regeneration Project Law No. 5104 was passed in March 2004 specifically for this project.

demolishing gecekondu and erecting mass-produced TOKI housing for the displaced residents (Uzun & Şimşek, 2015). Apart from the drastic physical transformation, the Kuzey Yıldız project also had unprecedented social repercussions (Erman, 2009). These physical interventions and projects are depictions of various urban phenomena, each of which warrants individual studies: upgrading, relocation, social programming, economic efficiency, cultural bridges, work commutes, conflicting values, and land rent. But along with these generic global trends, there are also individual projects that spring from regional and social cues.

#### *3.4.1.1 The 5<sup>th</sup> plan, the 2023 Capital Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan:*

Ankara is now much beyond its humble Anatolian town origins. It has evolved from a plateau settlement of 20'000 people to about 4.8 million, according to a 2012 figure (Günay, 2014). The 2023 plan (Figure 3.25) is the most recent planning proposal for Ankara. This plan was designed and approved by the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 2007, and envisions Ankara's development projected for 2023. This would also be the year in which the Republic of Turkey celebrates its 100 years. The plan divides Ankara into five sub-zones apart from the Center: North, West, South West, South, and East. These five are the suburbs, or peripheries contained within the greater city of Ankara. The plan is for a relatively larger urban area as it envisions a population of 6-7 million people by 2023 (Günay, 2014). Its main targets include: the limitation of urban growth to already populated and developed areas, and discouraging new projects beyond the existing bounds; to reduce potential speculative ventures by opportunistic financiers by limiting this kind of growth; and to combine socio-spatial planning rather than isolated physical projects. The plan also provides opportunities for public participation through its framework (Özbilen, 2013). The plan predicts and supports further higher density growth along the western corridors. This has manifested itself as a staggeringly rapid construction of apartments along the Istanbul Yolu and Eskişehir Yolu, with a corresponding decline of the traditional




Figure 3.25- 2023 Capital Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan.  
Source: Greater Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara, 2007.

central business district of Kızılay. Uses such as educational institutes have eroded Kızılay, and pushed mainstream shopping malls and social entertainment venues along the main corridors leading out of the city (Günay, 2014).

### 3.4.2 Physical Transformations – Buildings

Since 2000, Turkey has been economically more stable, and much more physically developed, than it had been in its nascent years. The AKP-led government has focused on economic development and has attempted to steer clear of populist politics (Heper, 2005). The political presence since 2002 has been stable, albeit somewhat authoritative (Dodd, 2013). Ideological motives have not been as pronounced as they had been in the earliest years of the Republic, though many suspect the ruling AKP of an underhand Islamist agenda. The AKP, on various occasions, has expertly avoided engaging in the fallible, emotionally charged religious sentiment of previous Islamist parties, and pursues a post-Islamist agenda (Dağı, 2005): religion is used to endorse and accept individual civilian lifestyles in the social sphere but no longer as a political tool, at least not explicitly. The current leadership also departs from anti-Western sentiment, a mainstay of previous religious parties, and focuses instead on economic development first, supplemented by consumerism (Shankland, 2013), subordinating ideological discourses. Figure 3.26 lists the interventions that will be discussed for Phase II, and shows how widely spread across contemporary Ankara these are compared to the interventions of Phase I.

#### 3.4.2.1 *The City Gates*

The Central Train Station (*Tren Garı*) of Republican Ankara was designed as the metaphorical gateway into the nascent Republic's model city (Bozdoğan, 2001). An intensive program ensued of laying out railway lines throughout the country. Each city's central stations acted as the nodes as well as the entry portals that connected the entire nation logistically as well as symbolically. Today, a new kind of entry portal is being evoked in the capital. Five massive gates have recently been constructed on the five highways leading into Ankara: from Istanbul, Eskişehir, Samsun, Konya, and Çankırı and the Esenboğa airport.




Figure 3.26- Phase II interventions: the locations of interventions, relative to the Phase I Intervention area.  
Source: Prepared by author, 2016.

The gate constructed on the highway leading towards Konya, the capital of the ancestor dynasty of the Seljuks who enabled the entry of Central Asian Turks into Anatolia, is extensively decorated with motifs from the Seljukid era, like the characteristic octagonal domes (*kümbets*) which represented the tombs of the social elite of that time (Figure 3.27). The gate also features porcelain art (*çini*) that was commonplace during the Seljukid era, as well as the octagonal star motif. The Istanbul gate (Figure 3.28) conjures up images of the imperial glory of the Sultans with its unmistakable panache (*sorguç*) and quilted turban (*kavuk*) embellishments. The gate leading to Samsun (Figure 3.29) is treated with stylistic motifs similar to Istanbul's Topkapı Palace, the imperial residence of the Ottomans. It also features the crescent and star that was adopted as a royal emblem by Sultan Abdülhamit, a strict politico-



*Figure 3.27- The Konya Gate.*  
*Features octagonal domes (kümbets) representing the tombs of the Seljuk social elite, porcelain art (çini), and octagonal star motifs. Source: Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi, www.ankara.bel.tr*

religious figure and the last effective power-holder of the Ottoman dynasty before the Empire succumbed to its own incapacities.

The gate leading from the Esenboğa airport and Çankırı into Ankara (Figure 3.30) is perhaps the most symbolic. Apart from relief patterns of the Seljukid 12-pointed star, the gate contains motifs of tulips – an allusion to the early 18<sup>th</sup> century Tulip Period of the Ottomans’ diplomatic relations where, after several military defeats, the Empire’s focus was on peaceful diplomacy with foreign nations rather than violent confrontation. This treatment of the Esenboğa gate, which effectively connects the



*Figure 3.28- The Istanbul Gate.*  
*Features the panache (sorguç) motif. Source: Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi, www.ankara.bel.tr*



*Figure 3.29- The Samsun Gate.  
Features chimneys of the Topkapı Palace, and the crescent and star motif of Sultan Abdülhamit.  
Source: Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi, [www.ankara.bel.tr](http://www.ankara.bel.tr)*

capital to the international airport and hence the outside world, makes a statement about the foreign policy of the current regime.

The mayor has proclaimed the gates to be the new “symbols of Ankara” (Tasdizen, 2015) with their distinctive stylistic motifs reminiscent of Turkish national history. These gates signify not just the physical land connections to the significant cities within the country, but also the link between a capital and its subordinate cities. The gates, however, stand in stark contrast to the Republican image of Ankara that had been envisioned in Turkey’s earliest years. The identity evoked by these gates is not



*Figure 3.30- The Esenboğa Gate.  
Features the Seljukid star and the Tulip (Lale) motifs. Source: Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi,  
[www.ankara.bel.tr](http://www.ankara.bel.tr).*

new per se to the Turkish context; it is in fact the resurfacing of an identity that had fallen to selective amnesia as the Republic was declared. Reminiscent of Seljukid and Ottoman influences, with minarets and stylized motifs, these physical manifestations of the intentions of Turkey's new political administration indicate the resurfacing of a voice of dissent against the presumably unanimous Republican or Kemalist ideals. This attempt to promote a new alignment at the nation scale can be understood within the larger, ideologically polarized political climate of Turkey. The country's intellectual discourse is divided between an absolutist interpretation of the secular Republican model and a consistently struggling conservative redefinition of Kemalist and nationalist values, signified with recent constructions such as this one across the city.

#### 3.4.2.2 *AnkaPark – a Seljukid Disneyland?*

The AnkaPark is a large recreational complex being built in the city's center by the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. Proclaimed by the city administration as the largest theme park in Europe when it is completed by the end of 2016, the Anka Park complex was controversial from the day of its inception, due to several reasons. Proposed to be constructed on around 2 million square meters of the spatially and ideologically contested Atatürk Forest Farm (*Atatürk Orman Çiftliği*) land, the Park undermined several direct court orders that inhibited construction on the disputed land until an agreement was reached. It has also been severely criticized by Ankara's Chamber of Architects, yet construction continues as of early 2016.

It is interesting to note the design of the façade, which strongly evokes Seljukid minarets and octagonal domes (Figure 3.31). A museum of national history, or a politico-religious public space might be more suited to such nostalgic recreations. But for a society that has up till now been adamant on using only secular motifs in their architecture, the Park is provocative, if not outright confrontational.

Upon completion, the Park would contain 14 roller coasters, a floating cinema, a free-fall tower, and jet skiing facilities. Its more than 2000 other unique amusement rides and venues would also include a dinosaur playground and museum, an arcade arena for children, laser tag and a robot war area for adults, several cinemas and restaurants, as well as an outdoor wildlife and safari park featuring animals not found at any other zoo in Turkey.



*Figure 3.31 - Anka Park façade.  
The design draws from Seljukid inspirations, such as slender minarets and octagonal domes. Source: Author, 2015.*

The mayor of Ankara refers to the Park as a “prestige project” (Gökçek, 2015). With all its pomp and flair, the Park looks to enter the Guinness Book of World Records when it is opened to the public.

#### *3.4.2.3 The Presidential Complex*

Another prestige project, and perhaps the most controversial one because of its apparent projection of absolutist power, is the new Presidential Complex (*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesi*) or White Palace (*Ak Saray*) being constructed within the Atatürk Forest Farm lands. Besides the inherent controversy of being constructed on a protected site, the complex in itself has been criticized by numerous academic and political figures due to several factors: luxurious spending, unnecessary imports of materials and furnishings, its inherent gigantomania, and even the architectural style, which some architects claim to be an incoherent mix from various eras (Kenyon, 2015).

The complex contains more than 1100 rooms and costs over \$600 million. It doesn't follow a particular architectural scheme, but uses design principles and motifs and from various eras of history. The faux metal sheet roofing evokes Topkapı<sup>17</sup>, and the

---

<sup>17</sup> The Topkapı Palace (Turkish: *Topkapı Sarayı*) is a medieval palace in Istanbul. Construction began in 1459 at the orders of Sultan Mehmet II, conqueror of Constantinople, shortly after the conquest in 1453. It was the primary residence of the Ottoman Sultans and their harem for over 400 years. It follows a unique Ottoman Baroque architectural style. It was called Saray-ı Cedid-i Amire (Turkish:



Figure 3.32- The Çankaya Köşkü (left, Source: [www.radikal.com.tr](http://www.radikal.com.tr). Retrieved: 17.07.2016) compared to the Ak Saray (right, Source: [Twitter, www.twitter.com](https://www.twitter.com). Retrieved: 17.07.2016).

central staircase replicates the one at Dolmabahçe<sup>18</sup>. The massive, vertical façade hints at fascist, totalitarian architectural trends of the post-WWI era, evoking Turkey's Republican past<sup>19</sup>.

The presidential complex also contains the Beştepe People's Mosque, which was inaugurated in early 2015. At 5000 square meters spread over three floors and housing 3000 people at a time, it is one of the largest mosques of Ankara. The mosque is part of a larger complex of buildings which will include a library and public amenities, substantiating the designation of the complex as a Külliye. The President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has also expressed the desire to erect similar mosques on the remaining hilltops of Ankara, evoking the Ottoman's seven hilltop mosques overlooking Istanbul (Sabah, 2015).

Another significant aspect of the Presidential complex is the fact that it both physically and ideologically deviates from the traditional residence of the President of Turkey, the Çankaya Köşkü. The Çankaya Köşkü had been used as the Presidential Palace since Atatürk, and it was only in 2014 that it was designated as the Prime Minister's

---

*Imperial New Palace*) until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and Topkapı since then. Today it is a major tourist attraction, functioning as a museum housing various artefacts from the Islamic world.

<sup>18</sup> Dolmabahçe Palace (Turkish: *Dolmabahçe Sarayı*) was an opulent palace built in the European baroque and neoclassical style in Istanbul during 1843-1856. The medieval Topkapı Palace could no longer cater to contemporaneous living standards during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and Sultan Abdülmecid I wanted a palace matching European royal sensibilities, luxuries, and styles. Ironically, the construction cost was partially acquired through foreign loans. This was one of the major factors in the subsequent state bankruptcy of the Empire and its vulnerability to financial control by foreign powers.

<sup>19</sup> The very first monuments built in Ankara were meant to convey state power and authority, much like those in contemporaneous European totalitarian states before WWII.

residence as Erdoğan became the president and moved into the newly constructed *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesi* (Figure 3.32). This is very much in line with the vision of the “New Turkey” propagated by the President, which sees a strong central leadership of authority.

Everyone has his reasons for criticizing the complex – environmentalists emphasize the destruction of large tracts of the Atatürk Forest lands, and opposing political parties criticize the authoritarian vibes emanating from the gigantic edifice (Sarioğlu, Erdem, & Çelikkan, 2014). But supporters of the President maintain that the complex portrays accurately the President’s resolve to advance the image of Turkey at the domestic and international level (Guardian, 2014). President Erdoğan maintains that the complex is representative of Turkish power in the region, and not based off a personal or party-based agenda (Hurriyet, 2014). He has at several occasions invited critics, including Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the opposing CHP, to substantiate their allegations against luxurious spending by quoting credible empirical data. Qualitative criticism of the complex has been much more vocalized.

### 3.4.3 Physical Transformations – Social Engineering Projects

The most recent plan for Ankara does not explicitly propose socio-cultural spaces. There is no provision for social mobilization and engineering, as was the case with the Lörcher and Jansen plans, which clearly laid out guidelines for the new kinds of societal interactions envisioned by the Republic. According to the 2023 plan, leisure activities and social amenities are covered under a section titled “Social Life”, containing the sub-headings of “housing, social services, and urban and regional open-green system, conservation and development of urban historical and cultural values, and tourism” (Önder, 2013, p. 156). This means that there are no physical, spatial configurations that have been proposed to cater to the recreational demands of contemporary urban life. However, there are new kinds of typologies that are being developed within contemporary Ankara, and these can be seen as springing from the provisions of the 2023 plan. For example, the plan’s assumptions about determining the roles of females in civic life, and a focus on a family-centric society, has produced spaces exclusively for female interaction and community development. The Directorate of Women and Family<sup>20</sup> (*Kadın ve Aile Şube Müdürlüğü*) has proposed

---

<sup>20</sup> The English translation is copied from (Çavdar, 2010, p. 1)

some building typologies specifically for this purpose, like the Ladies' Clubs (*Hanım Lokalleri*). This function was introduced in 2000 by the Municipality as a social service. It today serves fifteen districts of the city, and caters to women from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. The purposes include integrating domestic women within the larger urban sphere and enhancing neighborhood relations amongst women (Çavdar, 2010), which gives new perspectives to the social activeness and regulations regarding the role of women in the public sphere. This can be seen as an interesting approach in an era where, within European and Western contexts, urban phenomena have started being defined with reference to gender-space issues within the public realm. In Turkey, these exclusively women-only facilities do provide modern sports and recreational facilities, but within a certain range of social acceptability. The free, unrestricted intermingling of the sexes during Phase I, which was nevertheless presumed as a natural prerequisite to the modernization program, has been replaced with a similar natural presumption, albeit one that is more conservative, about the roles and limitations of women in societal spheres. Although not architecturally very distinct or ideology-driven, the introduction of these socio-spatial typologies indicates the ideological motivations underlying the new social engineering program of contemporary Turkey in an intangible way.

Apart from the focus on family life, a new phenomenon around Ankara has been the recent surge in grand mosques complexes (*külliye*) being constructed at visually significant locations around the city. It is interesting to note the scale and placement of these mosques with respect to the city's most frequented areas as well as their visual impact on the surrounding urban form. In retrospect, this comes as a sharp contrast to Phase I's decision of what *not* to build (Kezer, 2009). The decision of what *to* build, or endorse, by the municipality, indicates a transformation of what is being considered relevant once more in the urban sphere. Socio-cultural needs, it becomes apparent, are not fully met with social clubs, entertainment venues, and parks and plazas only, like the European model of planning the Republican decision makers adopted. Specific, contextual spiritual needs also have to be integrated into the planning decision making, and this has led to the patronage of ostentatious *külliye* within the city, especially in areas where urban upgradation is being promoted. The most outstanding example of this *külliye* phenomenon is the Kuzey Yıldızı Project, an urban upgradation area north of Ankara, where gecekondu have been demolished and low- to mid-income TOKI apartments are being erected on a large scale. The




Figure 3.33- The proposed Kuzey Ankara Camii ve Külliye Kongre Merkezi.  
Source: (Belediyesi, 2015).

recreational area attached to the neighborhood already contains a large mosque, but a new, grander *külliye* is being constructed on site which will cater not just to the regular prayer functions, but also a lot of community needs, including a congress center (Figure 3.33). The elements of physical design, such as the central clock tower, the Ottoman gardens, baths (*hamam*), soup kitchen (*imaret*) and a guesthouse (*tabhane*) (Belediyesi, 2015), all evoke the functional correspondence to Istanbul's Topkapı Palace, which, although a private Ottoman residence, provided all these public services and functions as appendages to the imperial residence.

Another grand *külliye* project is the Ankara Ulusal Camii ve Kültür Merkezi, being constructed at İtfaiye Meydanı across from the main entrance of Gençlik Parkı in Ulus, right in the heart of the Phase I interventions. Construction began in 2013, and was expected to be completed by 2015, but the collapse of the central dome during construction hindered its progress. By 2016, the construction has resumed. When completed, it will house a Cultural Center as well as a Museum of Islamic Arts (*İslam Sanatları Müzesi*). When traveling along the İstanbul Caddesi near Gençlik Parkı, the silhouette of the *külliye* dominates the Ulus skyline (Figure 3.34).



*Figure 3.34- The Ankara Ulusal Camii ve Kültür Merkezi dominates the skyline going southeast along the Istanbul Caddesi.  
Source: Google Earth Panoramio, [www.panoramio.com](http://www.panoramio.com). Retrieved: 17.07.2016.*

#### 3.4.4 The Afterglow

There are other public projects that have recently materialized around Ankara that give us an insight into the administration's decision making preferences and its ideological motivations. Although these ideologies may not be very pronounced in the execution of such projects, but projects such as these do indicate some official form of endorsement. It is immediately apparent to the observant eye what principles and ideas are being evoked – certainly no longer a passionate pursuit of purely Republican ideologies, but a newer form of social and cultural conservatism coupled with the neoliberal permissibility's of capital-driven design.

There are no specific instances of a centrally driven educational reform program at the moment, although the reforms of 2012 did provide for the re-opening and enhancement of the Imam Hatip (religious) schools, which had been severely inhibited during the secularist era. Aimed at imparting practical religious knowledge and technical training for future prayer leaders, the Imam Hatip schools also deliver basic school education, so anyone graduating from an Imam Hatip school can enroll in any national university as well. There have been certain privileges that have been given to these schools over the normal public schools, such as electronic gadgets and

fees benefits. This step has sparked opposition from parents that send their children to public schools, but resonated really well with more conservative families (Jones, 2012). Interestingly, President Erdoğan himself is a graduate of an Imam Hatip school. But apart from the obvious support to religious schools, an interesting case is also found in the recent renovation of the Alparslan Primary School (*İlköğretim Okulu*) in the Tandoğan neighborhood of Ankara, right across from Atatürk's mausoleum. Immediately apparent on the façade are the arches and tilework, reminiscent of influences that are certainly not in line with the Republic educational modernization scheme (Figure 3.35).

There have been other physical interventions in line with more neoliberal economic policies and design philosophies. The renovation of Ankara's Train Station, which was a primary Republican icon during Phase I, speaks volumes about internationally generic, visually appealing designs (Figure 3.36). Similar is the case with the design of the ambitious Bilkent Hospital complex (*Bilkent Şehir Hastanesi*), which has elements of contemporary urban design and landscape (Figure 3.37).



*Figure 3.35- The Alparslan İlköğretim Okulu in Tandoğan.  
Source: Google Earth Panoramio, www.panoramio.com. Retrieved:  
13.07.2016.*



*Figure 3.36- The proposed renovation of the Ankara Train Station. Construction ongoing as of 2016. Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demiryolları, [www.tcdd.gov.tr](http://www.tcdd.gov.tr). Retrieved: 17.07.2016.*

Ankara maintains its position as a model Turkish city, constantly growing and evolving: demographically, culturally, and ideologically. It is directly evident, however, that the new physical interventions in Ankara are not, at least in



*Figure 3.37- The Bilkent Şehir Hastanesi, under construction as of 2016. Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlık Bakanlığı, [www.saglik.gov.tr](http://www.saglik.gov.tr). Retrieved: 17.07.2016.*

proclamation, essentially representative of either nationalistic policies or republican ideals. These physical changes are more capital driven, and related to urban rent, another phenomena that is common in global capital cities today. On the other hand, major physical interventions in the city also include projects driven by values not explicitly conflictual with, but nevertheless confrontational to, the earliest Republican ideals of a secular social life.

### 3.4.5 Analysis

These recent physical transformations in Ankara will be evaluated in a similar manner to those of the first Phase, according to the three parameters developed.

#### 3.4.5.1 *Personal preferences behind the monuments*

The Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has been under the same mayor, Melih Gökçek, since 1994. Although the mayor has shifted several political parties<sup>21</sup>, his ideological affiliations remain evident as made clear through the overlapping political vision of all these parties. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that any decisions regarding the city's physical transformations have a significant input or endorsement from the mayor's office.

The influence of one individual in decision making regarding the city is embodied not only in Gökçek's role, but also, through him, in a higher endorsing body – that of the President Erdoğan. The Presidential Complex is an overwhelming epitome of individualist decision making within a democratic nation. In all its glory, this one complex in the heart of the Turkish capital can be read as a strong expression of neo-imperial or pseudo-democratic power<sup>22</sup>, an indicator of the direction Turkish politics and society seem to be maneuvering towards. The complex is symbolic not only in its physical attributes claiming to invoke certain meanings, but also because it is carried out by the official endorsement, if not a direct order, of the head of a Republic that claims a democratic parliamentary system at its core. However, looking at the evolution of Turkish politics since the country's inception, the value of personal endorsement and decision making has been starting to gain momentum in the current decade. Processes of opinion formation and confidence building amongst concerned

---

<sup>21</sup> 1994-1999 under the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*), 1999-2004 under the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*), 2004 onwards under the ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*).

<sup>22</sup> Erdoğan reportedly challenged anyone with "the power and the courage (to) come and demolish this building." (Argano, 2014)

stakeholders or claimants for issues concerning national image-formation, or propagation of particular values, are vague, if at all present. During the early 2000s, then Prime Minister Erdoğan encouraged debate on policymaking within his party and welcomed criticism on government policies from the opposition, although even then he would expect endorsement on any final decisions he made (Heper, 2005). Today, as President, his position as decision maker is stronger. The recognition of a strong head of state, embodied in the President's position of authority, is now seen as the ultimate string puller for the most significant decisions regarding Turkey's political and social climate. This coincides with the constitutionally enhanced powers of the Turkish President over the last few years, with focus being shifted to strong central decision making rather than the previous pluralistic and more liberal parliamentary setup – a setup that had however proven to be incompetent at best, if not outright conflictual and unstable (Tachau, 2000). The decades of instability during the Interlude Phase, characterized by the lack of a leadership that was unanimously agreed upon coupled with contestations as to the vision forward for Turkish society, have resulted in the current role of an “overseeing” president, still a democratic role compared to the military junta and guardians (Demirel, 2003) of the previous decades. All this does point to a growing acknowledgement that only a strong decision maker can be apt for a society politically and socially in flux, interestingly also surrounded by countries that are in a perpetual state of domestic or international crises. But how far does the personal role of the decision maker warrant subordination? Are the President's individual actions detrimental to the broader Turkish effort to usher in greater democratic indicators (Shaheen, 2014) in its bid to enter the EU? An authoritarian approach to decision making poses multiple challenges to ideological opponents, be it politicians or designers and planners.

#### *3.4.5.2 International genericity in the design of monuments*

A switch has taken place between prioritizing what comes first: value laden nationalistic ideology, or practical financial concerns and a dramatically expressive religiosity, cloaked in a consumerist, recreational and contemporary urban lifestyle. During this phase, we see that the city mayor becomes the chief decision maker on the standards of the city's aesthetic sensibility (Hurriyet, 2015). This attitude falls close to the gigantomania practiced by absolutist regimes, but not much far from the initial fervor of the Republic of Turkey to impose onto the nation the

disproportionately amplified ideals of Republican values as a unifying national culture. What emerges as a reaction is generic but very cosmetic Islamization across the capital, emulating an Arabian Nights skyline with the silhouettes of domes, minarets, and palatial gates to an outsider approaching the city. Contemporary Ankara is not as much fantasy and nostalgia as it is hyper-reality (Sak, 2014) with its dramatically emphasized entertainment venues, visual treats, and dramatized allusions to a selective period of history.

In such a scenario, the city's aesthetic sensibilities also derive from generic international icons. The Mayor becomes the chief decision maker regarding city beautification. A recent example is the ornamentation scheme concerning Anka Park. Initially, robot-like cartoon characters were placed outside the main entrance. After a copyright claim by the international "Transformer" movie and comic series, the administration had to pull down the robot-like figure and replace it with a dinosaur (Figure 3.38). A poll carried out through the Mayor Melih Gökçek's official Twitter account was used to determine one out of several proposed dinosaur statues for the park (Hurriyet, 2015). Which also raises the question, why would the city's administration not evoke the locally relevant Angora cat or goat figures, if at all placing an animal statue at the Park entrance was even considered a worthwhile aesthetic intervention. The local precedent has been replaced by the flashier, more generic, and visually dominating dinosaur, which could be indistinguishable in any other urban context as well.

#### *3.4.5.3 Ideological motivations behind the monuments*

The choice of what *not* to build (Kezer, 2009) was perhaps more significant than the construction of actual physical prototypes during the Republican program. No new city mosques, and no other religious or cultural spaces linked to Ottoman society were to be allowed, at least not within the jurisdiction of the urban administration. The focus was on re-imagining Turkish society. In that way, we can observe a distinction in the ideological intentions behind each phase. Phase I was futuristic, aspirational, and proactive. The intentions for restructuring the new society stemmed from the observed failures of the previous one. Compared to Phase I, Phase II is more emotive,



*Figure 3.38- After a Twitter poll carried out by Mayor Melih Gökçek in response to the Transformers copyright claim, the controversial Transformer robot was replaced by a generic dinosaur.  
Source: Hurriyet, [www.hurriyetdailynews.com](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com)*

vengeful, and reactive with its choice of what *to* build, often right in the face of ideological opponents.

But it would be unfair to suggest that the ideological intentions of Phase II are purely of revenge and reaction. For example, the city's large theme park, the Anka Park, being built on the Atatürk Forest land has been heavily criticized for its choice of location. Apart from the fact that it encroaches and capitalizes on land set specifically aside for the public as an amenity by the founder of the Republic, the AOÇ venue was not the only option for the location of the Anka Park. Large scale open-air entertainment venues like the Miniaturk in Istanbul, or even Ankara's own Harikalar Diyarı Parkı, are usually located on the urban peripheries due to their specialized function drawing in specific audiences at very specific times of the year, so that valuable inner-city urban land could be put to more productive use. Open-air or green space is one such significant use, without adding to it the glamorized veneer of capital driven entertainment projects. But the motive for placing Anka Park on the AOÇ land does not spring from efforts in planning or design efficiency as much as it they do from the desire to "reclaim" city space for more capitalistic purposes. But this process

of desecrating one ideology for establishing another is also not a new trend in Turkish society. On a broader temporal scale, the Presidential Complex as an ideological encroachment on the same Atatürk Forest land can be seen as an equal yet opposite reaction to several Republican actions during Phase I. At the time, Republican authority to demolish and establish physical symbols at will went unchallenged, largely due to the absence of a voice of dissent. The razing of an Ottoman era barracks in Istanbul to construct Gezi Park<sup>23</sup> during 1939-1943 as part of the Republic's social modernization and urban lifestyle program, and the flattening of the Namazgah Hill<sup>24</sup> in Ankara to create the Ethnography Museum in 1930, also a social restructuring project, are just two examples of absolutist authority and the presumption of a homogenous or at least easily malleable social and ideological identity throughout the Turkish lands. In all three cases, physical land was associated with a previous functional and socio-cultural meaning; and a newly powerful regime tried to imbue new meaning into the land, through drastic physical interventions. These contested geographies and ideologies feed on belittling the ideology of the other – a pattern that can very well be extrapolated to the larger social scenario playing out across urban, and at times rural, Turkey.

---

<sup>23</sup> The Taksim square in Istanbul housed an Ottoman era barracks, the Halil Pasha Artillery Barracks (*Halil Paşa Topçu Kışlası*), constructed in 1806. The barracks was demolished in 1940 to create Gezi Park, a large urban green space, as part of Republican urban design interventions (Özkırmı, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> The Namazgah Hill was an important religious and socializing space in traditional, pre-Republican Ankara. Traditionally allotted as foundation/trust land (*vakıf*), it was transferred from the General Administration of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*) to the Ministry of National Education on 15 November 1925. The Ethnography Museum was constructed on the Hill in 1930 (Tak, 2007).



## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

Was the real creativity behind Sinan's genius the Hagia Sophia? It might be argued that the entirety of Ottoman architectural styles boils down to drawing inspiration from just one Greek orthodox precedent. The counter argument, however, declares that Ottoman motifs, designs, and engineering developed independently, deriving from Seljukid influences in an attempt to portray a truly nationalistic synthesis where the classical Ottoman style is equated to the contemporaneous high style of Europe (Çelik, 2013).

During the early years of the Republic, the process of modernizing the capital, and through it the Turkish nation, was not as superficial, erratic, or forcibly imposed as it might appear. Western influences had started seeping into architecture and lifestyles during the later Ottoman years: Italian Rococo facades and French décor in the imperial Yıldız Sarayı in Istanbul, for example, point to a realization by the elite that Ottoman society and values were rapidly becoming anachronistic in the face of a technologically and intellectually modernizing world. European architects being invited to design Ankara after the declaration of the Republic, then, couldn't possibly be seen as a break away from traditional architectural practices – traditional practices that had died out since Sinan's afterglow extinguished.

The efforts at westernizing the nation, initiated during the late Ottoman period, continued into the Republic of Turkey after 1923 (Kaymaz, 2013). However, now they were more vocally pronounced as well as starkly visible in the public domain, through proclamations of public policy and the architectural design within cities. The efforts were on a larger, grander scale and integrated into daily urban functions (Önge, 2007). The state-sponsored planning and development of urban areas during the early years of the Republic, in Phase I, led to new urban identities for the Turkish city (Kaymaz, 2013). This was an *Active* approach to formalizing the process of nation-

building, both physically and societally. The city was now a formally structured, centrally organized and controlled unit with land and resource allocations as per the charismatic leadership's choice, disseminated to the public via the TBMM. This was aimed at inculcating a modern lifestyle based on nationalistic rather than religious or cultural values. The nation state was the new, superior framework that was to be used as a springboard for achieving a united vision of progress. This was a new kind of optimism: non-verified, yet imposed as the new nationalistic experiment, calling to a new kind of association, that with geographical territory. This was an extension of the concept of Nation (*vatan*) proposed by Namık Kemal<sup>25</sup>: the obedience (*biat*) or oath of allegiance lay not with the sultan or ruler, but with the land or country. The state sought to derive its legitimacy from the call to a collective Turkish identity of the citizens (Çınar, 2013).

The physical upgradation in the urban centers was guided by ideas of modernity and western living: open boulevards, European styled piazzas, recreational areas, and a vibrant social scene, with specialized work, residential, and administrative areas. These spatial arrangements stood in contrast to the centuries of informally evolving organic street networks, cul-de-sacs, and incremental planning based on the culturally significant spatial configurations of central mosques and courtyard houses in the previous capital, Istanbul (Walton, 2010). The new state, through these very visible physical interventions, was broadcasting and encouraging a particular (modern) way of life, and discouraging another. No longer was the central mosque with its associated social amenities the heart of the new city. This function was overtaken by a central train station, banks, health and educational facilities, all under the watchful eyes of a larger-than-life statue of Atatürk (Çınar, 2013). Due to this *Active* planning and layout effort, Ankara began to show signs of a modern civic life from the 1930s onwards (Önge, 2007). The manifestations of the newfound Turkish identity were at first directly expressed through *Actively* planned out Republican architecture (directly visible buildings) to promote the agenda of the new nation and the new political setup, their priorities, and their socio-cultural orientation. Soon after, the Lörcher plan was hastily implemented as an *Emergent* response to cater to the growing practical need

---

<sup>25</sup> Namık Kemal (1840-1888) was a Turkish poet, intellectual and political activist who put forward various revolutionary ideals such as the concept of loyalty to the fatherland and new notions of freedom through his poetry and plays. He had a significant impact on several reformist movements within the Ottoman Empire, including the development of a nationalistic identity for the Turkish people.

for housing. Parallel to this, Jansen's symbolic plan with its clear demarcation of activities was implemented, foreseeing increased need for residential and administrative building demands.

During this phase, there were also *Passive* forces at work, larger than the Turkish context, which helped shape Turkish urbanscapes over the last century. Global awareness as well as standards pertaining to the role of physical design and social organization in the effective functioning of cities underwent drastic shifts (Boym, 2007). The 20<sup>th</sup> century began with utopian fervor: industrial development, the beginning of planning discourse and idealized living conditions, and the vision for greater metropolitan development and civic values, extending even into social orchestration and emotional restructuring. The architecture of that era was no different. It was ideologically derived from the value systems foreseen in subsequent societal developments. Large, imposing masses employing neoclassical and brutalist architectural styles were characteristic for authoritarian or centrally powerful regimes during the era, all across the world. The earliest standardization of planning practices, resulting from issues of public health and workplace efficiency, was largely about solution provision to urban degeneration problems. Totalitarian power, expressing indomitable political ideals, soon surfaced as cities grew strong with categorized industrial workers, and so did the city's architecture. The modernist wave swept across newly independent European nations, and subsequently into postcolonial territories. Turkey was no different. The Turkish appropriation of these architectural styles *Passively* into locally constructed building typologies came to be known as new (*yeni*), cubic (*kübik*), or modern (*asri*).

However, the Republican claims to modernity and secularism convinced "only part of the population, only part of the time" (Shankland, 2013, p. 109). Even the display of individual piety or religious affiliation meant that the perpetrators were treated as second class citizens, faced with political and social marginalization (Toprak, 2013). Along with this, the choice of what *not* to build in the capital city (Kezer, 2009) relied on the process of limiting the visibility of religious icons in the visual public urban spaces (Toprak, 2013). This involved erasing and creating alternate identities, such as flattening the Namazgah Hill to erect the Ethnography Museum. No new mosques were allowed to be constructed until the DP gained power in the 1950s (Çınar, 2013). In the 1920s and the 1930s, rebellions did break out against the intensely secularist and ethnically selective social engineering program of the Republic, but were subdued

by force, forcing insurgencies underground till the emergence of multiparty politics in 1946 (Toprak, 2013).

There were of course evident shortcomings in the utopian Republican program. Was secularism really applied in its true sense within the new Republic? Even a cursory overview of the “*Vatandaş Türkçe konuş*” movement, the concept of a superior Turkish ethnicity, and population exchanges with Greece and other territories hardly suggests so. Then, there were individual attempts to make sure that the primary decision maker, Atatürk, was shown only what he wanted to see: Nevzat Tandoğan, the mayor and governor of Ankara between 1929 and 1946, would check that the spaces that Atatürk personally visited were free of visual and societal nuisances. He personally ensured that peasants, inner city dwellers, migrants, and lower wage workers were kept away from the city’s main streets in Ulus and Çankaya, areas frequented by Atatürk, and also severely inhibited crime reporting by journalists, providing the police force with unrestrained authority to make sure the capital remained in order (Özyürek, 2006).

In retrospect, the architectural and social modernization program of the Republic summarized and analyzed in Phase I could be seen as a bold, progressive decision. This decision was necessary at the time to assimilate, in a graceful way, the fragmented remnants of a crumbling empire, to salvage the dignity of a re-emerging nation, and to project this nation’s shared vision for moving forward in the global arena. This might not have been possible without a strong, centrally projected position of power, such as that exercised by the charismatic leadership of Atatürk. This power was adequately expressed through *Active* monumental building programs in the new capital. The Republican program propagated an image of a good society where scientific progress, rationality and reason were the guiding forces. It imported nuances of secularism and modernism. But over time this program has come to be challenged by an alternate vision of a good society, based on domestic conservatism, religion, and selective traditions (Kalaycıoğlu, 2013).

Secular Turkey of the Interlude phase had particular social and administrative problems: allegations of corruption, mismanagement of national resources, unmerited nepotism, and scandals. During the political instability of the 1980s, there was substantial fear that Turkey might usher in an absolutist Islamist regime, and the precedents were not far off: the cleric Khomeini leading the Iranian Revolution of

1979, and Pakistan's Islamist military dictator Zia-ul Haq. During this era of political uncertainty, corresponding physical manifestations of ideology were few, as real decision making power was unclear and short-lived. What had started off as a fervent projection of nationalistic values in an *Active* way during Phase I transformed, in a few decades' time, to a more practical amelioration process responding to *Emergent* scenario of the timely resolution of urban issues and the provision of public housing. Aesthetics or ideology became subordinate to practical needs, and assumed a secondary position while continuing to work in the backdrop of *Emergent* urban scenarios.

A few decades later, in Phase II, urban life has gone through various phases of evolution at home and abroad. Within the context of the post-war world, various economic depressions, and experimentation with multiple societal systems, the 21<sup>st</sup> century evokes, on the one hand, futuristic aspirations (sustainable designs, technological innovations), and on the other, looks to nostalgia (Boym, 2007): the resurgence of salvaging meaning from history, the significance of physical and cultural heritage, and the discourse on identity, its manifestations and contestations as continued forth from various competing trajectories of the past. This nostalgia inevitably becomes increasingly defensive if ideologies of the past are contested with similar yet antagonistic ideologies; or if multiple interpretations or claims to the same personality or event arise in different connotations. This is evidently the case in the Turkish context, where the founding father's vision for a strong Turkish entity, and his wish for "peace at home", have been kept supreme over all political and social developments. However, the physical manifestation of this vision, and the claim to uphold it in letter and spirit, have varied in the decades of tumultuous socio-cultural processes within the country (Heper, 2005).

Within the arena of politics, the various Turkish political elite have tried to capitalize on the inherent polarities in society. They aim at "majoritarian parliamentary politics mired in confrontation and conflict, which the underlying socio-cultural cleavages in Turkish society have helped to nourish and sustain" (Kalaycıoğlu, 2013, p. 177). But President Erdoğan plays smart by capping into the as yet disillusioned minority groups in Turkish populace, which includes a large number of the working class, and the non-secular, non-elitist factions of civil society (Economist, 2011). His expansion of political powers as president, evident not only by his fiery oratory at popular AKP

gatherings all over the country but also by the various kinds of *Active* physical interventions he endorses for the capital, is supported by corresponding physical and social development that is systematically delivered to the masses (Birtek & Toprak, 1993). That is why, even though apparently swaying towards an increasingly religious approach, the current political administration has been able to keep its popular vote bank in the recent successive national and municipal elections. The multiple regional cleavages within Turkey's larger political landscape (West, 2005) ask for a broader, more embracing approach rather than purely nationalistic or starkly liberal, exclusionary policies. But the decision makers today steer clear of conciliatory or inclusive politics (Toprak, 2013), probably because they don't feel the need to engage other points of view in making decisions. This reflects on a smaller scale on the linear processes of design and planning implementations at the city level, and on the larger scale on foreign diplomatic relations. But political and ideological concerns aside, the urban public has witnessed physical development along with socio-economic uplifting in the recent decade, even if it comes at the cost of a proliferating ideological agenda, that of increased physical manifestations of the apparent religiosity (Yeşilada & Rubin, 2011). The attempt today to *Actively* create a physical identity for Turkey's capital by selectively salvaging symbolic elements of a particular era, but also keeping in line with global development and financial incentives, seems to stem naturally from the decades of ideology-driven experimentation within the capital. Visual public space, limited to plazas and socializing spots in the previous century, has now taken on a broader meaning. Anything visible within the city has become a billboard for advertising value-laden imagery, commercial or political. In such a scenario, grand infrastructure projects gain increasing significance: where on the one hand they justify and substantiate the capacity of the administrative decision makers, on the other they also proclaim, through visible embellishments independent of the structural or functional requirements, the larger vision that the decision maker ties these national projects to.

In the absence of a clear and coherent national vision, one that has been endorsed intellectually, socially, and societally, planning and urban design decision making often falls for flashy visuals and tacky taglines, one example of which is gigantic physical interventions. Public space becomes a play-ground as well as a display-ground that propagates the position of the decision making authority. Majestic structures remind ordinary citizens of the power of the decision maker. There is a

“complex transnational system behind neoliberal policies that feeds authoritarianism” (İğsız, 2014, p. 25), and this is highly evident in the case of Ankara’s physical transformation today.

Which brings the research to address a few questions. Is the kind of decision making in Phase II a neo-Ottoman, imperialist revival? Or is it rather an authoritarian form of selective liberalism? Is the nationalism of Phase I being replaced by a licentious, ideology-laden neoliberalism in Phase II? Can one assume that the decision making mechanism that regulated the orchestration of “Identity” through “Monuments” in the “City” during Phase I and Phase II is the same, that of top-down implementation, whether nationalistic or neoliberal? Of course, the author dare not equate Atatürk with President Erdoğan – it would be ethically, as well as constitutionally, inappropriate. Still, I will draw a few interesting comparisons between the ideologies at work behind Phase I and Phase II here, one relating them together, the other setting them apart. The first comparison is about image building and the proclamation of one’s ideology onto foreign observers. The Kuzey Yıldız Project (Northern Ankara Entrance Project) has been referred to several times by the urban administration as a prestige project. It is located along the highway leading into Ankara from the international Esenboğa airport. The first impression of Turkey that foreign dignitaries traveling into Ankara would get should ideally not be of gecekondü squatters, but of colorful apartments and sprawling amenities. This resonates ironically well with what Atatürk himself declared in 1928 (Figure 4.1), as demonstrating the new nation’s state of progress to the world: “With the monumental reforms we have undertaken, we have demonstrated to the world that we are a modern civilized nation.”<sup>26</sup> The second comparison is broader in temporal scope, and is meant to contrast the two Phases with respect to the details of their physical interventions. Falih Rıfkı Atay, honorary chairman of the Ankara Master Planning Commission during the Republican years and a personal friend of Atatürk, remarked that “the Ottomans built monuments, the Turks are the builders of cities” (Çınar, 2013, p. 303). He accused the Ottomans of wasting resources on pompous displays of imperial opulence, whilst commending the Republic of Turkey under Atatürk’s progressive vision for investing in social,

---

<sup>26</sup> “Yaptığımız muazzam inkılâplarla medenî bir millet olduğumuzu cihana ispat ettik.” Atatürk, 1928.




Figure 4.1- Plaque at the War of Independence Museum (*Kurtuluş Savaşı Müzesi*), Ankara.  
Source: Author, 2016.

intellectual and administrative infrastructure that was to outshine the visible glory of the Ottomans' merely physical monuments. This research actually analyzed the “City” in Phase I, and individual “Monuments” in Phase II, which points to the kinds of “Identity”-based ideologies at work on the urban level in both Phases.

Turkish society today is both post-Kemalist, and post-Islamist. It is high time to realize that the only two possible allegiances are not necessarily antagonistic, but that a certain middle ground can be reached as well. In the author's opinion, there is growing need for the reinterpretation of Namık Kemal's idea of *biat*. This time, the *biat* should be to the nation alone, and not to any one extreme ideology claiming to represent the interests of the nation.

The roles of religion and indeed of its antithetical secularism in Turkish politics and society have oscillated between one extreme and another, depending on who gets into the position of determining state ideology and making wide-ranging national decisions (Toprak, 2013). The matter is not as simple as alternating cycles of power between two different political and social points of view, but of a tussle for the display of electoral power between representatives of two essentially opposing worldviews,

creating a polarized society emulating “civil war without bloodshed” (Toprak, 2013, p. 217). For example, the Republic alone does not have a monopoly on understanding, propagating and implementing secularism (Heper, 2005). It is definitely not the first force in the Turkish context that has propagated secular values (Özdalga, 2013). During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the ineffectiveness of the conservative, religion-oriented Ottoman politics had given way to secularism with Mahmud II (r. 1809-1839), who abolished the Janissaries in 1826, and contributed to the Tanzimat reforms<sup>27</sup>. Soon afterwards, the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit (r. 1876-1909) proved to be a reaction to these secularizing attempts (Özdalga, 2013), where religion was politicized and Turkish society was forced to swing into the previous extreme. Then, the secular Republic of Turkey assumed charge and drew Turkish society towards secularism once again. A century later, pro-religion political parties intend to pull the society yet again towards religiosity. And interestingly, this game of political ping-pong manifests itself not just in fiery rhetoric (be it secular nationalist, or traditional nostalgic), but also in the physical and spatial planning decisions that they take about their cities. Through these cyclic processes of revolution and counter-revolution, two conflicting worldviews battle it out on the visual urban space. This was, till the last century, very visible in the urban spaces in Istanbul. Now the game of power is visible in urban spaces across Ankara, the new capital.

A “political community that seeks legitimacy with reference to a sacred authority lends itself to authoritarian manipulation” (Arat, 2001, p. 45), be it a sacred religious authority or a secular, nationalist one. The attempt towards questioning, if not outright challenging, the Republican ideals of Kemalism have been steadily, albeit subtly, growing in Turkish society (Kenyon, 2014). Although Atatürk remains a constitutionally, as well as socially, revered and infallible figure as to his intentions and actions regarding the Turkish people and the Republic of Turkey, there are now various interpretations of those intentions as opposed to their single absolutist reading during the early years. Each faction of society owns Atatürk, but in their own way (Özyürek, 2006). In hindsight, the *Emergent* physical development of Ankara over the decades has been contentious. The process of physical interventions is indicative

---

<sup>27</sup> The *Tanzimat* (meaning; Reorganization) were secular reforms that began in 1839 and continued till the First Constitutional Era in 1876, as part of the Ottoman Empire’s attempt at socio-political resuscitation. The reforms were aimed at greater integration of non-Turks and non-Ottomans into the broader folds of Ottoman society, and are seen as forerunners to the concepts of Turkish nationalism and Republican secularism.

not just of the confrontational ideologies within the capital, but can be extrapolated to represent the larger ideological and identity contestations within the Republic of Turkey. The spatial and morphological history of Ankara can be read as indicating the “archeology of Turkey’s political transformations” (Kezer, 2009). Turkey is perched on the edge of a point where opposing ideologies have to “coexist in uneasy balance” (Tachau, 2000), because any other alternative is cumbersome to visualize.

On that note, the research does leave some open-ended questions worth speculating upon. Can it be said that the initial fervor of the nationalistic experiment in planning and design of Ankara has eventually tapered off? Moreover, is the idea of a passionate pursuit and display of nationalism through physically and visually dominating edifices now redundant? Now that political stability and security has been achieved, is the focus of the Turkish nation on upgrading lifestyles rather than continuing to ingrain an already established idea of nationalism through repetitive, banal assertions in everyday public life? Or is the Turkish nation merely experiencing a break from that tradition of fervent national portrayals, brought around by the current decision makers; and someone else with a prioritized nationalistic agenda (such as certain nationalist political parties today) will take up a chance to re-evolve nationalistic monumentality when they attain corresponding jurisdictional power in the city?

The manifestations of a certain nationalistic ideology can be seen everywhere in Turkey today. These include daily use objects in homes and in shops, such as flags, posters, décor items, clothing, and portraits of Atatürk (Özyürek, 2006). But when a personal practice of loyalty to these principles extends onto the larger scale, such as the context of the visual urban fabric, it insinuates not just personal belief but also public displays of allegiance. This invites like-minded people to engage with the city’s spaces visually and spatially, and diverts dissenting ones to the sidelines of public participation. Any kind of uncompromising, absolutist decision-making about city planning and urban design, as was evident in both the Phases which were analyzed, adds to the ineffectiveness of societal amalgamation through its architectural interventions. What would be needed, then, is a more liberal and democratic process of inclusive decision making, respecting each other’s collective histories and value systems. Such decisions affect the larger public, and it must be kept in mind that the Turkish public is not monolithic or homogenous – ethnically, intellectually, and certainly not ideologically. It may contain significant support for the decision maker, but equally certainly it contains factions of the decision maker’s ideological

adversaries as well. A flexible approach is needed that avoids direct conflict, either verbal, intellectual, or architectural.

In an article comparing the recent surge in Islamism with the societally grounded Kemalism in the Turkish context, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş aptly sums up the physical and ideological transformation taking place within the country when she says: “Politics in Turkey has always been a struggle between the barracks and the mosque ... Because we never had a proper capitalist class, the Army represented the bourgeoisie, and the mosque represented the underprivileged. With AKP, we thought a democracy would emerge out of the mosque. But instead what we got was simply the revenge of the mosque” (Aydıntaşbaş, 2012).

In all these scenarios of ideological contestations and uneasy negotiations in urban public space, one thing is abundantly clear. Whatever trajectory the physical production of space and structures in Ankara takes, ever present within the visual public urban space of the city today is the “panoptic” gaze (Walton, 2010) of Atatürk: larger than life, in the forms of busts, horse-mounted statues, face molds, and portraits (Figure 4.2). The nation is and will continue to be tethered to his tradition, and will not venture far from the gloriously envisaged precedent that Atatürk aimed to set for his beloved offspring, the Republic of Turkey.



*Figure 4.2- The panoptic gaze of Atatürk is omnipresent in Ankara, as seen here on a public building façade in Ulus.  
Source: Author, 2014.*



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullah, A. (2015). The Fez Medina: Heritage, Tourism, and Resilience. *Heritage, Tourism & Hospitality International Conference 2015* (pp. 1-10). Amsterdam: CLUE+ Research Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
- Ahmad, F. (2003). *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: OneWorld Publications.
- Akşin, S. (2007). *Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to the Present*. Hurst.
- Albrechts, L. (2010). Enhancing Creativity and Action Orientation in Planning. In J. Hillier, & P. Healey, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Planning Theory: Conceptual Challenges for Spatial Planning*. Ashgate.
- Al-Khateeb, F. (2014). *Lost Islamic History: Reclaiming Muslim Civilization from the Past*. London: Hurst.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Antrop, M. (2005). Why landscapes of the past are important for the future. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 21-34.
- Arat, Y. (2001). Group-Differentiated Rights and the Liberal Democratic State: Rethinking the Headscarf Controversy in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 25, 31-46.
- Argano, T. (2014, 10 31). *Turkish Leader, Using Conflicts, Cements Power*. Retrieved 01 15, 2016, from The New York Times: [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/europe/erdogan-uses-conflict-to-consolidate-power.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/europe/erdogan-uses-conflict-to-consolidate-power.html?_r=0)
- Aslan, S. (2007, April). "Citizen, Speak Turkish!": A Nation in the Making. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 13(2), 245–272.
- Assassins Creed Revelations* (2011). [Motion Picture].
- Ayata, S. (1996). Patronage, Party, and State: the Politicization of Islam in Turkey. *Middle East Journal*, 50(1), 40-56.

- Aydıntaşbaş, A. (2012, 12 17). *Turkey: Is Atatürk Dead? Erdogan Islamism Replaces Kemalism*. Retrieved from Newsweek: <http://www.newsweek.com/turkey-ataturk-dead-erdogan-islamism-replaces-kemalism-63575>
- Babaie, S. (2008). *Isfahan and its Palaces: Statecraft, Shi'ism and the Architecture of Conviviality in Early Modern Iran*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Belediyesi, A. B. (2015). *Kuzey Ankara Camii ve Külliye Kongre Merkezi Yapım İşi*. Retrieved 07 17, 2016, from Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi: <https://www.ankara.bel.tr/index.php?CID=5545>
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.
- Birtek, F., & Toprak, B. (1993). The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Modernity. *Praxis International*, 13, 192-212.
- Blockmans, W. P. (2003, November). Reshaping Cities: The Staging of Political Transformation. *Journal of Urban History*, 7-20.
- Bloom, J. M., & Blair, S. S. (2002). *Islam: A Thousand Years of Faith and Power*. Yale University Press.
- Boym, S. (2007, 07). Nostalgia and Its Discontents. *Hedgehog Review*, 9(2).
- Bozdoğan, S. (2001). *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Calvino, I. (1974). *Invisible Cities*. Harvest.
- Canduci, A. (2010). *Triumph and Tragedy: The Rise and Fall of Rome's Immortal Emperors*. Sydney, Australia: Murdoch Books Pty Limited.
- Çavdar, S. (2010). *Gender, Policy, Place: Ladies' Clubs in Ankara*. Ankara: METU Master's in Urban Design Thesis.
- Çelik, Z. (2013). Chapter 12: Architecture. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 115-124). Routledge.
- Cengizkan, A. (2004). *Ankara' nın İlk Planı, 1924-25 Lörcher Planı*. Ankara: Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı ve Arkadaş Yayınları.
- Çınar, A. (2013). Chapter 29: Cities. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 303-313). Routledge.
- Classen, A. (2009). Urban Space in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age: Historical, Mental, Cultural, and Socio-Economic Investigations. In A. Classen (Ed.), *Urban Space in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age - Volume 4 of Fundamentals of Medieval and Early Modern Culture* (pp. 1-146). Walter de Gruyter.

- Cockerill, S. (2014). *Eleanor of Castille: The Shadow Queen*. Amberley.
- Crawford, C. (2003). Urban Space or State Monument? The Maydan in Kiev. *Archis* 2, 46-49.
- Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı*. (2009). Koleksiyoncular Derneği.
- Dağı, İ. (2005). Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization. *Turkish Studies*, 6(1), 21-37.
- Dalrymple, W. (2015, June 29). *The Great Divide - the violent legacy of Indian Partition*. Retrieved from The New Yorker: <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple>
- Demirel, T. (2003). The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980. *Armed Forces and Society*, 29(2), 253-280.
- Dodd, C. H. (2013). Chapter 6: The Turkish Republic. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 53-64). Routledge.
- Economist. (2011, 06 02). *The Turkish election: Erdogan's last hurrah (possibly)*. Retrieved 08 09, 2015, from The Economist: <http://www.economist.com/node/18772078>
- Edwards, H. (2015). *Of Brick and Myth: The Genesis of Islamic Architecture in the Indus Valley*. Oxford University Press.
- Egberts, L., & Bosma, K. (Eds.). (2014). *Companion to European Heritage Revivals*. Springer Open.
- Erman, T. (2009). Kuzey Ankara Girişi Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi ve Yerinden Edilme: Deneyimler, Söylemler, Uygulamalar. VI. *Ulusal Sosyoloji Kongresi "Toplumsal Dönüşümler ve Sosyolojik Yaklaşımlar" Bildiri Kitabı* (pp. 864-891). Aydın: Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi.
- Erman, T. (2013). Chapter 28: Urbanization and Urbanism. In S. Sayarı, & M. Heper, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 293-302). Routledge.
- Fearon, J. D. (1999, November 3). What is Identity (as we now use the word)? *Working Draft*.
- Fuller, G. E. (2011). *A World without Islam*. Little, Brown.
- Gaffikin, F., & Morrissey, M. (2011). *Planning in Divided Cities: Collaborative Shaping of Contested Space*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Gökçek, M. (2015). *ANKA Park*. Retrieved from İ.Melih Gökçek: <http://melihgokcek.com/proje-detay/anka-park-25.html>

- Grosby, S. (2005). *Nationalism – a Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford.
- Guardian. (2014, 10 29). *Turkey's new presidential palace unveiled - in pictures*. Retrieved 12 22, 2015, from The Guardian: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2014/oct/29/turkeys-new-presidential-palace-unveiled-in-pictures>
- Günay, B. (2014). *Ankara Spatial History*. Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi.
- Healey, P. (2007). *Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a Relational Planning for Our Times*. Taylor & Francis.
- Hepburn, A. (2004). *Contested Cities in the Modern West*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heper, M. (2005). The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 6(2), 215-231.
- Hillier, J. (2012). Baroque Complexity: 'If things were simple, word would have gotten round'. In G. d. Roo, J. Hillier, & J. v. Wezemaal, *Complexity and Planning: Systems, Assemblages, and Simulations*. Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate.
- Hurriyet. (2014, 05 27). *Turkish court rules against controversial presidential palace in Ankara*. Retrieved 03 10, 2016, from Hurriyet Daily News: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-court-rules-against-controversial-presidential-palace-in-ankara.aspx?PageID=238&NID=83028&NewsCatID=338>
- Hurriyet. (2015, 04 17). *Dinosaur statue to replace 'Transformers' robot in Ankara*. Retrieved from Hurriyet Daily News: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/dinosaur-statue-to-replace-transformers-robot-in-ankara.aspx?pageID=238&nID=81185&NewsCatID=341>
- İğsöz, A. (2014). Chapter 3: Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests: Authoritarianism in Flux, Law and Neoliberalism . In U. Özkırımlı, *The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey: #occupygezi* (pp. 25-49). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- İnce, B. (2012). *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey : from Atatürk's Republic to the Present Day*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2010). *Planning with Complexity: An introduction to collaborative rationality for public policy*. New York: Routledge.
- Jaffrelot, C. (2002). *Pakistan: Nationalism Without A Nation*. Zed Books.
- Jones, D. (2012, 09 25). *In Turkey, Religious Schools Gain a Foothold*. Retrieved from Voice of America: <http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-controversial-education-reform-imam-hatip-schools/1514915.html>

- Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2013). Chapter 17: Political Culture. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 171-181). Routledge.
- Kayasü, S., & Yetişkul, E. (2014, November). Evolving Legal and Institutional Frameworks of Neoliberal Urban Policies in Turkey. *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture*, 31(2), 209-222. doi:10.4305/METU.JFA.2014.2.11
- Kaymaz, I. (2013). Urban Landscapes and Identity. In M. Özyavuz (Ed.), *Advances in Landscape Architecture* (pp. 739-760). Intech.
- Kenyon, P. (2014, 08 10). *Turkey's Erdogan Seeks An Expanded Role As President*. Retrieved 03 10, 2016, from NPR: <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/08/10/339266869/turkeys-erdogan-seeks-an-expanded-role-as-president>
- Kenyon, P. (2015, 01 04). *Turkey's President And His 1,100-Room 'White Palace'*. Retrieved 03 10, 2016, from NPR: <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/12/24/370931835/turkeys-president-and-his-1-100-room-white-palace>
- Keyman, E. F., & İçduygu, A. (2003). Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses. *Citizenship Studies*, 7(2), 219-234.
- Kezer, Z. (2009). Chapter 8: Ankara. In E. G. Makas, & T. D. Conley, *Capital Cities in the Aftermath of Empires: Planning in Central and Southeastern Europe* (pp. 124-140). Routledge.
- Kezer, Z. (2012). Of Forgotten People and Forgotten Places: Nation-Building and the Dismantling of Ankara's Non-Muslim Landscapes. In D. F. Ruggles (Ed.), *On Location: Heritage Cities and Sites* (pp. 169-190). Springer.
- Kilciler, C. (2012). *Spatial Structure of Ankara*. emastudio2012.be. Retrieved from <https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/40355882/spatial-structure-of-ankarapdf-emastudio2012be>
- Lambton, A., & Sourdel-Thomine, J. (2007). Isfahan. In C. E. Bosworth, & C. E. Bosworth (Ed.), *Historic Cities of the Islamic World* (pp. 167-179). Brill.
- Lawless, R. I. (1980). The Future of Historic Centres: Conservation or Redevelopment? In R. I. G. H. Blake (Ed.), *The Changing Middle Eastern City* (pp. 178-208). London: Croom Helm.
- LeCorbusier. (1931). *Towards a New Architecture*. Courier Corporation.
- Lynch, K. (1960). *The Image of the City*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Maalouf, A. (2012). *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*. (B. Bray, Trans.) New York: Arcade Publishing.

- Mango, A. (2004). *Atatürk*. John Murray.
- Municipality, D. M. (2013, 08 21). *The Glorious Opening of Denizli's Rooster*. Retrieved from Denizli Metropolitan Municipality: <http://eng.denizli.bel.tr/Default.aspx?k=haber-detay&id=13012#.VjEhK7crKHt>
- North, S. (2014, August 21). *Why do most city branding campaigns fail?* Retrieved from City Metric: <http://www.citymetric.com/business/why-do-most-city-branding-campaigns-fail>
- OED. (2015, August 12). *Identity, n*. Retrieved from Oxford English Dictionary: <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91004?redirectedFrom=identity#eid>
- Önder, D. (2013). *Changing Geography of Urban Leisure: The Case of Ankara*. Ankara: METU PhD CRP Thesis.
- Önge, S. T. (2007). Spatial Representation of Power: Making the Urban Space of Ankara in the Early Republican Period. In J. Osmond, & A. Cimdina (Eds.), *Power and Culture: Identity, Ideology, Representation* (pp. 70-94). Pisa: Edizioni Plus.
- Özbilen, E. (2013). Urban Plans of Ankara in the 20th and 21st Century. *Prostor: A Scholarly Journal of Architecture and Urban Planning*, 301-311.
- Özdalga, E. (2013). Chapter 20: Secularism. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 205-216). Routledge.
- Özkırmılı, U. (2014). *The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey: #occupygezi*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Özyürek, E. (2006). *Nostalgia for the modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey*. Duke University Press.
- Palmer, C. (1999). Tourism and the Symbols of Identity. *Tourism Management*, 20, 313-321.
- Philippa, V. (2000). Architecture of the Great Mughals. In M. Hattstein, & P. Delius (Eds.), *Islam, Art and Architecture* (pp. 464-493). Konemann.
- Pillalamarri, A. (2015, July 24). *Sorry, the United Kingdom Does Not Owe India Reparations*. Retrieved from The Diplomat: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/sorry-the-united-kingdom-does-not-owe-india-reparations/>
- Plaza, B. (2006). The Return on Investment of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(2), 452-67.
- Pop, D., & Julean, D.-I. (2015). The Monument: Between Place and Fetishism. *Civil Engineering & Architecture*, 58(1).

- Rodriguez, A., Martinez, E., & Guenaga, G. (2001). Uneven Redevelopment - New Urban Policies and Socio-Spatial Fragmentation in Metropolitan Bilbao. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8(2), 161-78.
- Roth, L. M. (1993). *Understanding Architecture: Its Elements, History and Meaning*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rouner, J. (2015, July 23). *No, it's not Your Opinion. You're Just Wrong*. Retrieved from Houston Press: <http://www.houstonpress.com/arts/no-it-s-not-your-opinion-you-re-just-wrong-7611752>
- Sabah. (2015, 07 03). *Erdoğan opens 'Beştepe People's' Mosque in Presidential Palace*. Retrieved 10 21, 2015, from Daily Sabah: <http://www.dailysabah.com/ankara/2015/07/03/erdogan-opens-bestepe-peoples-mosque-in-presidential-palace>
- Sak, G. (2014, 06 14). *Come see Ankara, city of ultimate fakes*. Retrieved 03 10, 2016, from Hurriyet Daily News: <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/come-see-ankara-city-of-ultimate-fakes.aspx?pageID=238&nID=67772&NewsCatID=403>
- Sarıoğlu, B., Erdem, U., & Çelikkan, E. (2014, 11 05). *Erdoğan's 'Ak Saray' likened to Alamut Castle, Ceausescu's Palace*. Retrieved 10 12, 2015, from Hurriyet Daily News: <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/erdogans-ak-saray-likened-to-alamut-castle-ceausescus-palace.aspx?pageID=238&nID=73936&NewsCatID=338#>
- Scott, A. J., & Storper, M. (2014). The Nature of Cities: The Scope and Limits of Urban Theory. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 39(1), 1-15.
- Selman, P. (2006). *Planning at the Landscape Scale*. New York: Routledge.
- Shaheen, S. (2014). *Democracy and Secularism are Under Threat in Erdogan's Turkey*. Retrieved from The World Weekly: <http://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/i/aturks-nightmare/3288>
- Shankland, D. (2013). Chapter 11: Islam. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 107-114). Routledge.
- Simmel, G. (1903). *The Metropolis and Mental Life*.
- Sitte, C. (1889). *City Planning According to Artistic Principles*. Dover Publications.
- Smith, A. (2007). Monumentality in 'Capital' Cities and Its Implications for Tourism Marketing. *Journal of Travel & Tourism Marketing*, 22(3-4), 79-93.

- Smith, A. (2010). The Role of National Identity and Tourism in City Planning: the Case of Valletta. *Urban Research & Practice*, 3(1), 63-84. Retrieved June 29, 2015
- Sözen, G. (2011). *A Twelve Thousand Year Old Civilization - Anatolia*. Istanbul: Bilkent Kültür Girişimi Publications.
- Spivak, G. C. (2010). *Nationalism and the Imagination*. Sofia, Bulgaria: Seagull Books.
- Stephenson, J. (2008). The Cultural Values Model: An Integrated Approach to Values in Landscapes. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 127-139.
- Tachau, F. (2000). Turkish political parties and elections: Half a century of multiparty democracy. *Turkish Studies*, 1(1), 128-148. doi:10.1080/14683840008721224
- Tak, A. (2007). *Ankara, 1923-1950: The Socio-Spatial Manifestation of Republican Will*. Ankara: Middle East Technical University PhD in Sociology Thesis.
- Tasdizen, B. (2015, 06 15). *Enter and Exit Ankara: Five New Gates of Turkish Capital*. Retrieved 09 08, 2015, from Wordpress: <https://buraktasdizen.wordpress.com/2015/06/15/enter-and-exit-ankara-five-new-gates-of-turkish-capital/>
- Toprak, B. (2013). Chapter 21: Religion and Politics. In M. Heper, & S. Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* (pp. 217-226). Routledge.
- Tschumi, B. (1999). *Event Cities*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Tschumi, B. (2004). *Event Cities 2*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Tschumi, B. (2005). *Event Cities 3: Concept vs. Context vs. Content*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Tuan, Y.-F. (1977). *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Türker-Devecigil, P. (2005). Urban Transformation Projects as a Model to Transform Gecekondu Areas in Turkey: The Example of Dikmen Valley – Ankara. *International Journal of Housing Policy*, 5(2), 211-229. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616710500163390
- Üngör, U. Ü. (2008). Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk ‘Social Engineering’. *European Journal of Turkish Studies*.
- Uzun, B., & Şimşek, N. Ç. (2015). Upgrading of illegal settlements in Turkey; the case of North Ankara Entrance Urban Regeneration Project. *Habitat International*, 49, 157-164. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.05.026

- Uzun, C. N. (2001). *Gentrification in Istanbul: A diagnostic study*. Utrecht: Netherlands Geographical Studies.
- Uzun, C. N. (2005). Residential transformation of squatter settlements: Urban redevelopment projects in Ankara. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 20, 183-199. doi:10.1007/s10901-005-9002-9
- Walton, J. F. (2010). Practices of Neo-Ottomanism: Making Space and Place Virtuous in Istanbul. In D. Göktürk, L. Soysal, & I. Türeli (Eds.), *Orienting Istanbul: Cultural Capital of Europe?* (pp. 88-103). Oxfordshire: Routledge.
- West, W. J. (2005, May). Regional cleavages in Turkish politics: An electoral geography of the 1999 and 2002 national elections. *Political Geography*, 24(4), 499-523. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.01.003
- West, W. J. (2005). Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: An Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections. *Political Geography*, 24(4), 499-523.
- Wezemaal, J. v. (2012). Urban Governance and Social Complexity. In G. D. Roo, E. A. Silva, G. De Roo, & E. A. Silva (Eds.), *A Planner's Encounter with Complexity*. Surrey: Ashgate.
- Yeşilada, B., & Rubin, B. (2011). Introduction. In B. Yeşilada, *Islamization of Turkey Under the AKP Rule* (pp. 1-5). Routledge.
- Zukin, S. (2014, May 06). *Postcard-perfect: the big business of city branding*. Retrieved from The Guardian: <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/may/06/postcard-perfect-the-big-business-of-city-branding>



## APPENDIX – TABLES

*Table 6.1 - The Urban Planning Process in Ankara from 1924-2012. Adapted from the 2023 Report on Capital Ankara's Grand Master Development Plan, Development and City Planning Directorate of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 707-708, Ankara (2006).*

<b>Year:</b> <b>Plan Name (Target Year)</b>	<b>Existing Population (persons)/ Population Forecasting (persons)</b>	<b>Urban Settlement Area (hectares)/ Total Plan Area (hectares)</b>	<b>Realized Basic Strategy</b>
<b>1925:</b> Lörcher Plan (--)	~ 65,000/ ~ 150,000	~ 280/ ~ 700	Building an administrative town to the south of the historic Ankara Castle.
<b>1932:</b> Jansen Plan (1978)	~75,000/ 300,000	300/ 1500	Keeping the development along a north-south axis, starting a new improvement along the east-west Axis.
<b>1957:</b> Yücel-Uybadin Plan (1987)	455,000/ 750,000	~ 5,720/ 12,000	Continuing the development along the north-south and east-west axes.
<b>1982:</b> Grand Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan (1990)	1,200,000/ between 2,800,000 to 3,600,000	~ 22,500/ 43,250	Dispersing the central density, supporting development towards the west and creating a green zone.
<b>2007:</b> 2023 Capital Ankara Master Public Improvement Plan (2023)	4,500,000/ 6,500,000	80,000/ ~ 855,000	Dispersing the central density, supporting the development towards the west and creating recreational areas.

Table 6.2- New administrative buildings during 1923-1940

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
7.2 A	<p><b>1915.</b></p> <p>1<sup>st</sup> Turkish Grand National Assembly (<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM</i>).</p> <p>Used as TBMM 1923-1924.</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Hasip Bey.</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b></p> <p>Museum of War of Independence (<i>Kurtuluş Savaşı Müzesi</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.izlesene.com">www.izlesene.com</a>. Retrieved: 13.06.2015</p>  <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 16.12.2015</p>
7.2 B	<p><b>1923-24.</b></p> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> Turkish Grand National Assembly (<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM</i>).</p> <p>Used as TBMM 1923-1960.</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Vedat (Tek) Bey.</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b></p> <p>Museum of the Republic (<i>Cumhuriyet Müzesi</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 13.06.2015</p>  <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 16.12.2015</p>
7.2 C	<p><b>1925.</b></p> <p>Ministry of Finance (<i>Maliye Vekâleti</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Yahya Ahmet, Mühendis İrfan.</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b> Ministry of Customs and Trade (<i>Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı</i>)</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 16.11.2015</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
		 <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 14.09.2015</p>
7.2 D	<p><b>1925-26.</b> Hall of Justice (<i>Adliye Sarayı</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Giulio Mongeri. <b>Current Function:</b> Culture and Tourism Ministry building (<i>Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved:13.06.2015</p>  <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved:06.12.2015</p>
7.2 E	<p><b>1927.</b> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<i>Hariciye Vekâleti</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Arif Hikmet Koyunoğlu <b>Current Function:</b> Hacettepe University Social Sciences Technical School (<i>Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksek Okulu</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 14.11.2015</p>  <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 08.02.2016</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
7.2 F	<p><b>1935-37.</b></p> <p>Train Station (<i>Tren Garı</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Şekip Akalın.</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b></p> <p>Retains function as Train Station.</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 16.12.2015</p>  <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 03.06.2016</p>

Table 6.3- New financial buildings during 1923-1940

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos	
7.3 A	<p><b>1925.</b> Avenue of Banks (<i>Bankalar Caddesi</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Street included in Lörcher's plan.</p>	 <p>Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 46)</p>	 <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 25.06.2016</p>
7.3 B	<p><b>1926.</b> Ottoman Bank (<i>Osmanlı Bankası</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Giulio Mongeri.</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 19.11.2015</p>	 <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 12.05.2016</p>
7.3 C	<p><b>1926-29.</b> Agriculture Bank (<i>Ziraat Bankası</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Giulio Mongeri.</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.ankaratarihi.com">www.ankaratarihi.com</a>. Retrieved: 17.11.2015</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.tr.wikipedia.org">www.tr.wikipedia.org</a>. Retrieved: 05.07.2016</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos	
7.3 D	<b>1926.</b> Business Bank ( <i>İş Bankası</i> ).  <b>Architect:</b> Giulio Mongeri.	 <p>Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 127)</p>	 <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 21.07.2015</p>
7.3 E	<b>1930.</b> Court of Public Accounts ( <i>Divan-ı Muhasebat</i> ). Also called <i>Eski Sayıştay</i> .  <b>Architect:</b> Ernst Egli, Nazım Bey.	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 21.11.2015</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 17.09.2015</p>
7.3 F	<b>1931-33.</b> Republic of Turkey Central Bank ( <i>Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası</i> ).  <b>Architect:</b> Clemens Holzmeister.	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.arkitera.com">www.arkitera.com</a>. Retrieved: 12.11.2015</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.songaz.com">www.songaz.com</a>. Retrieved: 15.03.2016</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos	
7.3 G	<p><b>1935-36.</b></p> <p>Etibank (<i>Etibank</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Sami Arsev.</p> <p><b>Current Condition:</b> The building does not exist anymore.</p>	 <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved:09.01.2016</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.yapi.com.tr">www.yapi.com.tr</a>. Retrieved: 26.05.2016</p>
7.3 H	<p><b>1933.</b></p> <p>Bank of Municipalities (<i>Belediyeler Bankası</i>). Also known as <i>İller Bankası</i>.</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Seyfi Arkan.</p> <p><b>Current Condition:</b> The building does not exist anymore.</p>	 <p>Source: Mimdap, <a href="http://www.mimdap.org">www.mimdap.org</a>. Retrieved: 09.01.2016</p>	 <p>Source: Emlak Kulisi, <a href="http://www.emlakkulisi.com">www.emlakkulisi.com</a>. 03.07.2016</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos	
7.3 I	<b>1937-38.</b> Sumerbank/ Sümerbank.  <b>Architect:</b> Martin Elsaesser.	 <p>Source: Haber Türk, <a href="http://www.haberturk.com">www.haberturk.com</a>. Retrieved: 21.02.2016</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.picssr.com">www.picssr.com</a>. Retrieved: 22.05.2016</p>

Table 6.4- New educational buildings during 1923-1940

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
7.4 A	<p><b>1927-29.</b></p> <p>State Conservatory of Music (<i>Musiki Muallim Mektebi</i>).</p> <p>Also called <i>Devlet Konservatuvarı</i>.</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Ernst Egli.</p> <p>Building <b>Current Function:</b> Municipality of Mamak Cultural Center (<i>Mamak Belediyesi Kültür Merkezi</i>)</p>	 <p>Source: Arkiv V2, <a href="http://www.v2.arkiv.com.tr">www.v2.arkiv.com.tr</a>. Retrieved: 02.03.2016</p>  <p>Source: Mamak Belediyesi, <a href="http://www.mamak.bel.tr">www.mamak.bel.tr</a>. Retrieved: 04.03.2016</p>
7.4 B	<p><b>1928-30.</b></p> <p>High School of Commerce (<i>Ticaret Lisesi</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Ernst Egli.</p>	 <p>Source: Atılım Üniversitesi Ankara Digital Kent Arşivi, <a href="http://www.ankaraarsivi.atilim.edu.tr">www.ankaraarsivi.atilim.edu.tr</a>. Retrieved: 02.03.2016</p>  <p>Source: Ankara Ticaret Lisesi Eğitim ve Dayanışma Vakfı, <a href="http://www.atadev.org">www.atadev.org</a>. Retrieved: 04.03.2016</p>
7.4 C	<p><b>1928-33.</b></p> <p>Higher Agricultural and Veterinary Institute (<i>Yüksek Ziraat ve Baytar Enstitüsü</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: Prof. Dr. Ulvi Reha Fidancı, <a href="http://www.ulvireha.fidanci.org">www.ulvireha.fidanci.org</a>. Retrieved: 03.03.2016</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
	<b>Architect:</b> Ernst Egli.	
7.4 D	<p><b>1930.</b></p> <p>İsmet Paşa Girls' Institute (<i>İsmet Paşa Kız Enstitüsü</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Ernst Egli.</p>	 <p>Source: Docomomo Arşivi, <a href="http://www.docomomoturkey.tumblr.com">www.docomomoturkey.tumblr.com</a>. Retrieved: 03.03.2016</p>  <p>Source: Goethe Institute, <a href="http://www.goethe.de">www.goethe.de</a>. Retrieved: 05.03.2016</p>
7.4 E	<p><b>1935-36.</b></p> <p>Faculty of Political Sciences (<i>Mülkiye Mektebi</i>).</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b> Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences (<i>Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 03.05.2016</p>  <p>Source: <a href="http://www.mulkiyeistanbul.org">www.mulkiyeistanbul.org</a>. Retrieved: 05.05.2016</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
7.4 F	<p><b>1937-39.</b></p> <p>Faculty of Humanities (<i>Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi</i>).</p> <p><b>Architects:</b> Bruno Taut, Cebeci.</p>	 <p>Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 169)</p>  <p>Source: Wikipedia, <a href="http://www.tr.wikipedia.org">www.tr.wikipedia.org</a>. 02.04.2016</p>
7.4 G	<p><b>1938.</b></p> <p>Atatürk High Schools.</p> <p><b>Architects:</b> Bruno Taut and Franz Hillinger.</p>	 <p>Source: TC Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, <a href="http://www.meb.gov.tr">www.meb.gov.tr</a>. Retrieved: 05.06.2016</p>
7.4 H	<p><b>1938-40.</b></p> <p>Faculty of Law.</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Recep Akçay.</p>	 <p>Source: Google Earth Panoramio, <a href="http://www.panoramio.com">www.panoramio.com</a>. Retrieved: 06.06.2016</p>

Table 6.5- New health buildings during 1923-1940

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
7.5 A	<p><b>1926-27.</b></p> <p>Ministry of Health and Social Aid (<i>Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekâleti</i>). This was the first government building built in Sıhhiye.</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Theodor Jost.</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b> Ministry of Health (<i>Sağlık Bakanlığı</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 174)</p>
7.5 B	<p><b>1928-32.</b></p> <p>Refik Saydam Hygiene Institute and School (<i>Refik Saydam Hıfzıssıhha Enstitüsü ve Okulu</i>).</p> <p><b>Architects:</b> Theodor Jost and Robert Oerley.</p>	 <p>Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 6)</p>  <p>Source: Goethe Institute, <a href="http://www.goethe.de">www.goethe.de</a>. Retrieved: 06.06.2016</p>




Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details	Old and new photos
7.5 C	<p data-bbox="464 309 539 338"><b>1933.</b></p> <p data-bbox="464 365 703 394">Numune Hospital.</p> <p data-bbox="464 472 804 501"><b>Architect:</b> Robert Oerley.</p>	 <p data-bbox="852 651 1378 674">Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. Retrieved: 14.03.2016</p>

Table 6.6- New social modernization projects during 1923-1940

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details.	Old and new photos
7.6 A	<p><b>1925-27.</b></p> <p>Ethnography Museum (<i>Etnografya Müzesi</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> &gt;&gt;</p>	 <p>Source: Wikipedia, <a href="http://www.de.wikipedia.org">www.de.wikipedia.org</a>. Retrieved: 07.05.2016</p>
7.6 B	<p><b>1927-30.</b></p> <p>People's House (<i>Türkocağı</i>).</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.arkitera.com">www.arkitera.com</a>. Retrieved: 05.05.2016</p> <p>Source: <a href="http://www.turkocaklari.org.tr">www.turkocaklari.org.tr</a>. Retrieved: 06.01.2015</p>
7.6 C	<p><b>1934.</b></p> <p>Exhibition Hall (<i>Sergi Evi</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Şevki Balmumcu.</p> <p><b>Current Function:</b> State Opera House</p>	 <p>Source: (Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nin Yolu Atatürk Bulvarı, 2009, p. 159)</p>

Number on Map	Period. Name in English ( <i>Turkish</i> ). Details.	Old and new photos
7.6 D	<p><b>1934-36.</b></p> <p>19 May Stadium (<i>19 Mayıs Stadyumu</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Paolo Vietti-Violi</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.gaziler54.blogcu.com">www.gaziler54.blogcu.com</a>. Retrieved: 03.01.2015</p>
7.6 E	<p><b>1936-37.</b></p> <p>Youth Park (<i>Gençlik Parkı</i>).</p> <p><b>Architect:</b> Théo Leveau.</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.wowturkey.com">www.wowturkey.com</a>. 19.05.2016</p>
7.6 G	<p><b>1925-1937.</b></p> <p>Atatürk Forest Farm (<i>Atatürk Orman Çiftliği</i>)</p>	 <p>Source: <a href="http://www.turknostalji.com">www.turknostalji.com</a>. Retrieved: 06.07.2016</p>