

TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A COMPARISON OF  
STALINISM AND PUTINISM

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A COMPARISON OF STALINISM AND PUTINISM**

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This thesis aims to compare and contrast Stalin's Soviet Union with Putin's post-Soviet Russia by looking at the totalitarian and authoritarian characteristics that these two periods as well as these two leaders display. It is argued that despite certain differences that they have, the totalitarian regime of Stalin and authoritarian regime of Putin share certain similarities the roots of which go back to Russian history.

**Keywords:** Totalitarian, Authoritarian, Stalinism, Putinism, Regime Typology

## ÖZ

### TOTALİTER VE OTORİTER REJİMLER: BİR STALİNİZM VE PUTİNİZM KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

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Bu tez, Stalin'in Sovyetler Birliği ile Putin'in Sovyetler Birliği sonrası Rusya'sı dönemlerini, rejimlerin totaliter ve otoriter karakterleri kapsamında, iki liderin tutumlarını da göz önünde bulundurarak, karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Söz konusu iki rejim belli farklılıklar gösterse de, Stalin'in totaliter rejiminin ve Putin'in otoriter yönetiminin, kökleri Rus tarihine dayanan bazı benzerliklere sahip olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Totaliter, Otoriter, Stalinizm, Putinizm, Rejim Tipolojisi

To All the People who are Suppressed under Antidemocratic Regimes

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| ABM   | Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty                      |
| AUSW  | All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers                |
| AUW   | All-Russian Union of Writers                       |
| CIS   | Commonwealth of Independent States                 |
| CPSU  | Communist Party of the Soviet Union                |
| CSO   | Civil Society Organization                         |
| GUGB  | State Security Administration                      |
| KGB   | Committee for State Security                       |
| MGB   | Ministry of State Security                         |
| MVD   | Ministry of Internal Affairs                       |
| NATO  | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                 |
| NEP   | New Economic Policy                                |
| NKGB  | People's Commissariat for State Security           |
| NKTP  | People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry            |
| NKVD  | People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs          |
| OGPU  | Unified State Political Administration             |
| RAPP  | All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers     |
| SR    | Socialist Revolutionaries                          |
| U.S.  | United States of America                           |
| UN    | United Nations                                     |
| UR    | United Russia                                      |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USSR  | Union Soviet Socialist Republics                   |

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to compare and contrast Stalin's Soviet Union with Putin's post-Soviet Russia by looking at the totalitarian and authoritarian characteristics that these two periods as well as these two leaders display. It is argued that despite certain differences that they have, the totalitarian regime of Stalin and authoritarian regime of Putin share certain similarities the roots of which go back to Russian history. As Alec Nova suggests, "the habits of centuries assert themselves in two ways: they affect what the rulers consider right and proper to do, and also what the ruled are accustomed to regard as normal and tolerable in the behaviour of authority."<sup>1</sup>

The Russian historical periods are generally inter-related. The Tsarist period had effects on the Soviet era in social, cultural, economic aspects and especially in politics. For instance, it would be unrealistic to say that socialist revolution halted the Tsarist culture and interrupted social dynamics of Russian people. There are also interactions between the Soviet and contemporary Russian policies. It is really hard to understand present Russia without having a look to the past. It is sure that Soviet era came with some changes in people's lives, however; we cannot ignore the habits of Russian society which was shaped by the past as well as Russian political culture.

Recent authoritarian Russian policies have deep roots which come from various periods in Russian history. They are not totally different from each other and so the correlation between them is remarkable. Alec Nove considers that the state domination on society is one of the main characteristics in the Russian history. That domination would be witnessed in some other areas of the world. Yet, it is hard to

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<sup>1</sup> Alec Nova (1992) *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 5-6

find such total suppression anywhere else but Russia. Stalinist Soviet Union is a continuance of this long tradition.<sup>2</sup>

After the death of Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin gained upper hand among Soviet intelligentsia. His personal cult and one man rule opened the way to Stalinism. In Robert C. Tucker's definition, Stalinism represented a specific political culture made up of a leader cult dependent on Stalin's personality, the revolutionary civil war heritage of the Communist Party, and the inheritance of statist elements from the Tsarist past.<sup>3</sup>

Stalin's totalitarian rule left its marks on Russian and world chronicles. The world witnessed the toughest policies of the Soviets under Stalin administration during the Cold War against the United States (U.S.). His regime in the context of intrastate dimension was full of domination over policies, single party and formal ideology, ruthlessness and assassination. Great Purges and Show Trials were some bloody agents he applied to consolidate his regime and to eliminate his opponents.

In addition, Stalin's policy of revolution from above was highly harmful for the Soviet society. Collectivization was a kind of war between farmers and the Stalin's new system. A high Ukrainian Party official M. M. Khataevich told the following on this experience

a ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. . . . This year was test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We've won the war.<sup>4</sup>

This process entailed dekulakization. "It was an extremely blunt instrument that was used to promote collectivization."<sup>5</sup> The prosperous farmers were annihilated

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 3

<sup>3</sup> Lynne Viola (2009) "Stalinism and 1930s" in Abbott Gleason (eds.), *A Companion to Russian History*, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, (368-385) p. 368

<sup>4</sup> William Zimmerman (2014) *Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism from the Revolution to Putin*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 59

<sup>5</sup> Christopher R. Browning and Lewis H. Siegelbaum (2009) "Frameworks for Social Engineering: Stalinist Schema of Identification and the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft", in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Beyond Totalitarianism Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (231-265) p. 240

through dekulakization strategy. Moreover, desire of industrialization in rapid tempo, resulted with tragedy and death, necessitated labor camps which transformed social and economic structures of the country radically.

Due to his management mentality, lots of scholars called the duration of Stalin as a totalitarian type of rule.

Totalitarianism is a system, in which technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraints by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.<sup>6</sup>

Totalitarian systems are not enthusiastic with permitting other parties to perform. It is an example of one rule party.

Totalitarian parties distinguished by autocratic leadership, which Lenin first proclaimed as essential, by exclusivity instead of free recruitment; and by the monopoly which they possess in exercising the typical party functions in the body politic.<sup>7</sup>

In this process, the ideological aims are useful in the context of mobilization of the society as was the case, for example during to Second World War. “The communist system that accorded its own population only an instrumental significance in freeing the world began to speak of ‘Great Patriotic War’ because in this way it was easier to mobilize the efforts of the deprived population.”<sup>8</sup> Thanks to ideology, the number of participants to the party organizations increases and makes party recruitment easier unlike authoritarian systems. Therefore, their cadre would be composed of each level of society.

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<sup>6</sup> Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1962) *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, New York: Friederich A. Praeger Inc, pp. 19-20

<sup>7</sup> Carl J. Friedrich (1969) “The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes”, in Carl J. Friedrich, Michael , Benjamin R. Barber (eds.) *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views*, New York: Praeger Publishers (53-122) p. 146

<sup>8</sup> Eckhard Jesse (1998) “The Two Major Instance of Totalitarianism: Observations on the Interconnection Between Soviet Communism and National Socialism” in Achim Siegel (eds.) *Totalitarian Paradigm After the End of Communism: Towards Theoretical Reassessment*, Amsterdam: Rodopi (129-150) p. 138

Apart from Stalinism, also Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's fascist Italy can be given as the most known examples of totalitarian systems. Their similarities are much more than differences between them in the context of administrative approach. The rule of Hitler had its own ideology and components like other totalitarian regimes. "In the Nazism, discourses of nationalism, Volk, racism, anti-Semitism are main elements and also emphasis on national unity together with violence and force are essential characters."<sup>9</sup> In the Nazi Germany, Jews are one of the negative symbols while imperialism and capitalism are bad characters in the Soviet Union. For Hitler Jews are illness for the society and they are labeled as parasites. Thereby they have to be destroyed and with that liquidation the society would find peace and became purer and much cleaner than before. Totalitarian systems need to create an enemy and in this way the unification of the masses would be assured.

In his study *Legality and Legitimacy*, Carl Schmitt asserts that the outrages, annihilation of opposition groups and terroristic attitudes in the Nazi Germany got a foothold through fear of communist revolution.<sup>10</sup> This attitude legalizes the terror and violence. At this point, the justification of the system and causes of brutality form their own basis.

Furthermore, fear of losing power and addiction to control on society give rise to terror in totalitarian rules. Terroristic policies against regime opponents, being manipulated by ideological desires, make difference between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. The explicit function of the terrorism in totalitarian systems is observable in camps of the regime. "Even internment of political opponents is not in itself totalitarian; it becomes so only when it serves to break the prisoners' spirit and

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<sup>9</sup> Michael Curtis (1969) "Retreat From Totalitarianism", in Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, Benjamin R. Barber (eds.) *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views*, New York: Praeger Publishers, (53-122) p. 109

<sup>10</sup> Carl Schmitt (2004) *Legality and Legitimacy* (Translated and Edited by Jeffrey Seitzer) London: Duke University Press, p. xxi

to exploit the labor –when, in other words, the concentration camp is used as and indoctrination camp, a work camp, and a place of torture.”<sup>11</sup>

In the case of Mussolini’s Fascist Italy the most significant thing was the amalgamation of the state and nation. The regime was characterized by this aim. Giovanni Gentile, as a leading scholar of fascism, underlines that “the totalitarian scope of fascist doctrine identifies itself both with the political organization and whole will, thought and feeling of the nation.”<sup>12</sup> As a result of this tendency in the totalitarian regimes the sphere between private and public life is vanished. The realm of state reaches the furthest points and occupies the personal space. Mussolini asserts in *Encyclopedia Italiana* “Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State, the synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and gives strength to the whole life of the people.”<sup>13</sup>

Although all of mentioned three regimes are totalitarian, each one of them have various cornerstone elements and driving forces: the Soviet Union under Stalin used dictatorship of proletariat, in Hitler’s Nazi Germany the motto of the *volk* and Aryan race were exploited, and Mussolini in Fascist Italy concentrated on the fusion of masses and the state.

In totalitarian rules, the exact thing is creation of new way of life in the manner of social, economic, cultural and political spheres with leading of the state. Thereby, the focus is on power and discipline which are the main regulatory factors and which have influence on each dynamics of ordinary life. “One of the marks of totalitarianism is its extraordinary sense of purpose. Authoritarian rulers aim only to

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<sup>11</sup> Hans Buchheim (1968) *Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics*, (Translated by Ruth Hein and Kurt P. Tauber ) Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, p. 23

<sup>12</sup>Giovanni Gentile (1928) “The Philosophic Basis of Fascism”, *Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68854/giovanni-gentile/the-philosophic-basis-of-fascism>  
Access Date: April 13, 2015

<sup>13</sup> J.C. Johari (2006) *Contemporary Political Theory: New Dimensions, Basic Concepts and Major Trends*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, p. 717

stay in power, but the totalitarian party aims at the creation of new humanity and a perfect regime.”<sup>14</sup>

Forming a new person is one of the targets of totalitarianism. Shaping the society with new norms is a totalitarian approach. In this process, harsh policies would be applied such as “the police institutions and death camps whose only purposes are to transform citizens into foes, plural individuals into an identical species and then corpses.”<sup>15</sup>

In addition, totalitarian systems pursue belligerent foreign policy and target global rule whilst few authoritarians likely to follow this type aggressive policies at world stage.<sup>16</sup> The target of the totalitarianism is domination over the earth and becoming world leader together with internationalist discourse. The authoritarian leadership is naive contrary to totalitarians because they are more likely to control domestic policies rather than imperialistic desires.

In comparison to authoritarians,

the unique mission and transcendental qualities of totalitarians Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin were functional requisites to their ideological imperatives demanding the wholesale destruction, restructuring and expansion of state and society, domestically and internationally.<sup>17</sup>

As for authoritarian regimes, Vladimir Putin whose ruling style is an example of charismatic leadership has characteristics of this type of regime. His long term of presidency made Russia as a rising power against the United States after the Cold War. Thanks to Putin’s unquestionable rule, he tried to break the Western influence on Russian near abroad. Policies of Putin were complex and problematic. “Rather than being a preparation for democracy or for a more realistic and constructive role

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<sup>14</sup> Michael Walzer (1983) “On Failed Totalitarianism” in Irwing Howe (eds.) *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. (103-121) p. 105

<sup>15</sup> Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (2004) “Introduction” in Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (eds.) *Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Ceaserism and Totalitarianism*, Washington: Cambridge University Press, (1-26) p. 20

<sup>16</sup> Paul C. Sondrol (1991) “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Volume: 23 Number: 3 (599-620) p. 602

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 602

in world affairs, it looks much more like a tendency toward greater authoritarianism at home and troublemaking abroad.”<sup>18</sup>

Together with this pro-active foreign policy and relative economic progress which is driven by energy sector Putin gained self-confidence. That success brought him about a popularity and sympathy from masses. As a result of that, Putin consolidated his regime more easily and full control on the system was ensured.

Putin’s type of administration is generally labeled as Putinism by authors. It refers to control on political system, media, economy and society, that mostly depends on repression and fear. These are core elements of Putin’s authoritarian regime. In this way he has an effective control on the system.

Some have used the expression ‘managed democracy’ when looking for a way to explain the system he has created. Others refer to it as ‘corporate capitalism’. The system is a bit of both, and that it is closely aligned to the culture of the 1980s KGB from which Putin emerged.<sup>19</sup>

We can add some other labels to for Putin’s regime but the general acceptance is that Putinism is in parallel with authoritarian rule of type. In brief, authoritarianism is characterized by centralized power maintained by political repression and exclusion of potential challengers. In authoritarianism, generally, opponent parties take part even though the governing party has a leading role. In these systems, it is beneficial to apply parties and organizations in order to mobilize the mass for siding with the single leader.<sup>20</sup>

Reconstruction of the system entirely is a character of totalitarian regimes whilst the authoritarian regimes generally focus on differentiation. Hence, masses are squeezed through limited pluralism in civil society and printed and visual media. Only loyal movements are allowed to function in these sectors. If there are no faithful figures, the authoritarian leader attempts to create them. Actually, this is

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<sup>18</sup> Pierre Hassner (April 2008) “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy”, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume: 19 Number: 2 (1-15) p. 8

<sup>19</sup> Anne Applebaum (February 2013), “Putinism: The Ideology”, *Strategic Update* Volume: 13 Number: 2 p.3 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/su13-2-putinism.pdf> Access Date: March 10, 2016

<sup>20</sup> Theodore M. Vestal (1999) *Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State*, London: Praeger, p. 17

what Putin did during his administration. Putin's grasp on media was highly tight since his first days in office. "This was done by restricting access to broadcast licensing, raiding offices of media outlets, and helping to run independent newspapers out of business."<sup>21</sup>

"Putin has borrowed freely from the Tsarist and Soviet past, mixing aspects of both with more contemporary elements."<sup>22</sup> Therefore, Stalin's cult is still remarkable in Russia. Especially together with Putin administration, Stalin's reputation is in increase. "In 1988, only 12 percent of Russians considered Stalin a significant world leader. By the time Vladimir Putin became president in 1999 that number had increased to 53 percent of the Russian population."<sup>23</sup> The rehabilitation of Stalin in Russia again is beneficial concept for Putin's regime.

In comparison to totalitarian rule, authoritarian systems are temporary that means they can be overthrown by an election or by other ways because the roots of their regime are not so deep and they focus only on the transformation of the system. However, in totalitarianism we can talk about a huge radical change in the whole system that provides a total hegemony over the subjects. That is why the toppling of the totalitarian leader is not easy. The roots of the regime are much deeper and stronger than the authoritarian regimes.

In authoritarianism, the consolidation of the regime is accomplished with the help of loyal cadre. It is an elite group. This group is involved in the party organization which has no ideological discourse. Party elite generally comes from the upper strata. The gap between party clique and populace is noticeable. Thus,

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<sup>21</sup> Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (2010) "Comparing Oranges and Apples The Internal and External Dimensions of Russia's Turn away from Democracy" in Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul , Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (eds.) *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (253-273) p. 268

<sup>22</sup> Sean Cannady, Paul Kubicek (2014) "Nationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism: A Comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin", *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Volume: 5 Issue: 1 (1-9) p.6

<sup>23</sup> Jonathan Brent (2009) "Postmodern Stalinism", *The Chronicle of Higher Education* <http://chronicle.com/article/Postmodern-Stalinism/48426/> Access Date: March 10, 2016

achieving attendance of masses to the party needs more effort. The leading team of the organization must work hard in the atmosphere of lacking ideological stance.

Unlike totalitarian rules which aim to create a utopian world, authoritarian rulers do not attempt to create an ideological visionary future. There is no illusionary common good which is embodied by the will of subjects and their spirits. The authoritarian regimes, lacking of ideological concept, gain support by a mixture of fear and reward for their loyal figures which open rooms for kleptocracy.<sup>24</sup> Personal enrichment in authoritarian systems, contrary to totalitarian rules, is a common issue. Not only the ruler but also their family and close allies are utilized from this wealth.

Antonio de Oliveira Salazar of Portuguese can be given as another example for authoritarian regimes. His career in politics began with Ministry of Finance and then he was appointed as Prime Minister in 1932. His corporatist and authoritarian rule lasted until coup d'état of 1968 and it was called as Estado Novo that means New State. Hugh Kay in his study claims that in this new system Salazar aimed corporation to replace divisive parties because he believed that the party system had failed in the country and also he tended to prioritize *raison d'état* instead of individualistic interests.<sup>25</sup>

The name of his party was National Union which adopted nationalist and conservative policies. Salazar had full control on the system by favor of the single party. Furthermore, the new constitution provided dominance on the country for him. The opposition groups and leaders were exiled and punished. The civil rights of people were restricted and oppression over both masses and organizations were increased. In this process, police force was used as an instrument and became the main tool in order to spread fear.

In addition, when we take Uzbekistan into consideration, Islam Karimov is still in power since 1991. Uzbekistan emerged as an actor in international arena under his repressive regime after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and one man authoritarian rule was founded in Tashkent.

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<sup>24</sup> Paul C. Sondrol (1991) *Op. cit.*, p. 600

<sup>25</sup> Hug Kay (1970) *Salazar and Modern Portugal*, London: Eyre Spottiswoode, p. 53

Karimov administration in the country tried to control Islamic tendencies in order to protect secular and nationalistic regime as it is perceived a threat for his rule. According to him Islamic practices and rituals should be delimited in private or personal space. “A continuation of this critical perception enables him to justify his authoritarian style of government and allows him to crush not only the Islamist assembly but also more numerous group of opposition.”<sup>26</sup>

In case of transition from communism to market economy Karimov supported to take the process slowly and he was against the shock therapy that was based on rapid shift. The state domination on economy opened door to an authoritarian tendency and the state kept its active role in the market.

Uzbekistan’s leader Islam Karimov takes the power in his own hand especially after the Andijan Massacre of 2005 and he applies repressive policies in his long office term. Actually limited freedom of expression, restrictions and close monitoring of civil societies are signs of his authoritarian system.

Last but not least, as a comparison, Curtis mentions that totalitarian administrations generate a strong power and persistence on harmony in the population, mass mobilization, subordination of all classes to oppressive political clique, and attack on enemies of the system and their ideology. On the other hand, if it is not harmful, authoritarian regimes allow some freedom of expression and also system of free market economy. They rarely apply ideology or magnify history.<sup>27</sup>

With the help of aforementioned examples, our main standpoints would be clarified more easily. The argument of this thesis is that despite their distinctions, there is a familiarity between Stalin’s Soviet Union (a totalitarian regime) and Putin’s Russia (an authoritarian regime).

Our research questions are as follows: (1) what are the characteristics of totalitarianism and how can they be distinguished from other non democratic regimes, (2) what is Stalinism and how it corresponds to totalitarian regimes, (3) how

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<sup>26</sup> Petra Stainberg (2003) “Fundamentalism in Central Asia: Reasons, Reality and Prospects” in Tom Everett-Heath (ed.) *Central Asia: Aspects of Transition*, London: Routledge (219-243) p. 229

<sup>27</sup> Michael Curtis (1987) *Totalitarianism*, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc. pp. 3-4

can we define authoritarianism and what are the difference and similarities between authoritarian and totalitarian administrations, (4) why we label Putin administration as authoritarianism and which features make it authoritarian?

The thesis consists of six chapters. The first one is introduction and the last chapter is the conclusion. In the second chapter, in order to form a basis for our study totalitarianism and its characteristics will be pointed out. These are generally accepted by scholars and we picked up the common hallmarks. In addition, our references will be specifically chosen from Stalin's policies. In the third chapter, we look at the Stalin era and his policies which show the characteristics of a totalitarian regime.

The focal point of the fourth chapter is authoritarianism and its characteristics, so a theoretical background will be pointed out. We underline various definitions of authoritarianism and we will benefit from different views of authors. The fifth chapter will focus on Putin and his suppressive policies as an indicator of his authoritarian regime. His first and second terms of presidency are in our agenda. It would be early to make some considerations for Putin's last office era that has started in May 2012. Also it is an ongoing process so his last term of presidency is out of the content.

Finally, with the help of this thesis we have a chance to compare and contrast totalitarian Stalinism and authoritarian Putinism in the following chapters. Even they are different regime typologies, there are some similar aspects we will discuss.

Briefly, in this study we name Stalinism as a totalitarian rule by taking into account the mentality of his administration while Putinism is an example of authoritarianism because of his suppressive policies.

## CHAPTER II

### CHARACTERISTICS OF TOTALITARIANISM

*“Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed—no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull.”*<sup>28</sup>

*George Orwell*

Winston Smith, as the main character of George Orwell’s novel 1984, mentions these words for the world in which he lives. This world is generally named as an imaginary totalitarian regime. Totalitarianism simply refers to a regime which occupies and determines most people’s lives under its total authority. However, it is difficult to find a definition of totalitarianism which was created by consensus. Each author and academician have their own terminology and key points.

It would be better first to look at definitions for the word *totalitarianism* provided by dictionaries. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, totalitarianism is defined as “the belief that a government should have total power over its citizens.”<sup>29</sup> The Oxford Dictionary, however, describes totalitarianism as “a system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and requires complete subservience to the state.”<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> George Orwell, 1984, Free E-Books at Planet E-Books.com, p. 34

<sup>29</sup> <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/american-english/totalitarianism> Access Date: April 20, 2015

<sup>30</sup> [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/totalitarian?q=totalitarianism#totalitarian\\_10](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/totalitarian?q=totalitarianism#totalitarian_10) Access Date: April 20, 2015

The concept of totalitarianism first appeared in Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini's speeches on June 22, 1925 in the Chamber."<sup>31</sup> <sup>32</sup> The term has gained popularity especially in Mussolini's discourse that was formed by Giovanni Gentile who was labeled as father of fascism in Italy.

The first time the term *totalitarian* was used in English sources was in a translation of a book called "Italy and Fascismo" written by Luigi Sturzo in 1928. The same year the word was used in an article written by Giovanni Gentile in the Foreign Affairs. It was defined as "all-embracing" or "comprehensive" in the context of fascist doctrine. In 1929, the term was used in an article in The Times, where it referred to both National Socialist Germany and Communist Russia, and as a contradictory term with parliamentary governments.<sup>33</sup>

In the later years, the term became popular and the academic world began to use it more frequently. Michael Curtis underlines that by the 1950s the conceptual usage of totalitarianism increased.<sup>34</sup> Over time totalitarianism gained new aspects.

When we look at the definitions of academicians and theoreticians, it is obvious that each of them adds different dimensions to the understanding of totalitarianism. However, there is a general acceptance and many more citations on the principles of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's study which is called "Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy". That is why, this is a significant source for our thesis.

Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski first separate totalitarianism from other autocracies like tyranny, absolutism, monarchy or despotism. The autocratic regimes in the past did not follow harsh policies as totalitarian dictatorships do. They did not aim to capture human being totally when we compare it with totalitarian

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<sup>31</sup> Carl J. Friedrich (1969) Op. cit., p. 124

<sup>32</sup> Leonard Schapiro (1972), *Totalitarianism*, New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 13

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 14

<sup>34</sup> Michael Curtis (1969) "Retreat From Totalitarianism", in Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, Benjamin R. Barber (eds.) *Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views*, New York: Praeger Publishers, (53-122) p. 54

regimes, but they focus how to exploit people.<sup>35</sup> The high level of suppression in the totalitarian systems makes the difference between totalitarianism and other forms of undemocratic rule. For Franz Neumann, the difference between totalitarianism and absolutism is the destruction of the line between state and society and the total politicization of society by the device of a monopolistic party.<sup>36</sup> The unification of state and society distinguishes totalitarian rule from other autocracies, because this criteria would be counted as one of its main features.

After separating totalitarianism from other autocracies,

it can be described as the absolute reversal of radical politics: popular movements are demobilized and replaced by a disciplined elite party, revolutionary hope is turned into an ideology of domination; social control is intensified to the point where commitment and self-discipline lose all meaning.<sup>37</sup>

According to Hannah Arendt totalitarian movements designate a new political order which annihilate the old institutions and traditions, they always transform classes into masses, supplant the party system, replace the center of power and also they concentrate on the hegemony of their own policies on the world.<sup>38</sup> The transformation of the society and the regime are basic issues in the totalitarian rule.

In the aftermath of these definitions, we can give some characteristics of totalitarianism with the help of some significant theoreticians. In Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's book, the totalitarian dictatorships all possess the following characteristics:<sup>39</sup>

- An elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere at least passively.

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<sup>35</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965), *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.3-4

<sup>36</sup> Franz Neumann (1957) *Democratic and Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory*, Chicago: Free Press, p. 245

<sup>37</sup> Michael Walzer (1983) *Op. cit.*, p. 107

<sup>38</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Florida: A Harvest Book Harcourt Brace and Company, p. 460

<sup>39</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965), *Op.cit.*, p. 22

- A single mass party typically led by one man (the dictator) and consisting of a relatively small percentage of a total population (up to 10 percent) of man and woman, a hard core of them passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to ideology and prepared to assist in every way in promoting its general acceptance.
- A system of terror, whether physical or psychic effected through party and secret police control supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders and characteristically directed not only against demonstrable enemies of the regime but against more or less arbitrarily selected classes of the population.
- A technologically conditioned, near complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and of government, of all means of effective mass communication.
- A similarly technologically conditioned, near complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat.
- A central control and direction of the entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination of formerly independent corporate entities.

As an alternative statement we can give quotations from Juan J. Linz. He examines some definitions of totalitarianism in his book “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”. Then he provides his own three basic elements of totalitarianism as in the following:<sup>40</sup>

- There is a monistic but not monolithic center of power, whether pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the preexisting society.
- There is an exclusive, autonomous and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for political

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<sup>40</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 70

power or a tool for legitimization. The ideology has some boundaries beyond which lies heterodoxy that does not remain unsanctioned. The ideology goes beyond a particular program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to provide, presumably some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, and interpretation of social reality.

- Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy retreat into the role of “parochial” and “subjects”, characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers.

Below we will discuss the main characteristics of the totalitarian regimes one by one in detail.

### **1. The Party and State under One Leader**

The core element in the totalitarian rules is the leader. S/he has an ultimate authority and behavioral patterns of the others are shaped according to the leader’s will. The followers are identified through their leader so the leader is the focus of their existence. When the power is in the hands of a single man, the other groups organize themselves in accordance with the authority which is the totalitarian leader in this case.

The distinction of the leader from other subleaders and monopoly of responsibility for each decision differentiate totalitarian leader from an ordinary dictator or despot.<sup>41</sup> Total responsibility of the sole leader in totalitarian systems is the distinguishing characteristic. The leader is at the center of whole process and he is the final decision maker even in unimportant matters. As Wolin suggests, “the most powerful twentieth-century dictatorships were highly personal. Mussolini, Stalin, and Hitler did not just invent their personae; they literally built the

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<sup>41</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op.cit. pp. 374-375

organizations of their respective dictatorships. Each system was inseparable from its Fuhrer, or Duce.”<sup>42</sup>

Moreover, in the totalitarian regimes one of the most important things is the party discipline which is generally shaped by one leader. Obedience stems from the exact authority and strict control of the unquestionable leader. There is no tolerance for criticism of followers in totalitarian parties.

Leader’s principles direct the party and they are definitive. The tenets that are appointed by the leader are guidelines of the political movement for the subordinates. The ideologue or the leader determines the framework of the party and undertakes the responsibility. In totalitarian systems, the ideological orientation of the party becomes a tool for the leader in order to enforce discipline and secure his position. All other ideas are labeled as ideological corruption and deviation.

The organizational structure of the party is formed according to the leader’s will. At this point, ideological aspects would be secondary and unquestioned leader designates the distribution of roles. The elimination of other potential threats to the leader’s authority is necessary in order to provide party discipline. As a result, the centralization in the party is inevitable. The recruitment and training of new party cadre is observed generally during the period of clash with dissenting opinions. Furthermore, in the phase of consolidation not only the promotion of members to higher ranks, but also the elimination of new followers can be seen.<sup>43</sup>

In these parties, fanaticism is exceptionally high compared to the other parties, because their members are willing to make sacrifices for the party and ignore their self interest. As a result, the loyalty of members is above all other loyalties. No matter what happens, their leader and their party always do the right thing and they are above criticism. Ironically, in the end these dedicated subordinates are just tools when the single party achieves its objectives.

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<sup>42</sup> Sheldon S. Wolin (2008) *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 44

<sup>43</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) *Op.cit.*p. 92

Furthermore, the single party is very large as an institution in the totalitarian regimes. Its limitless power and organization comprise the state. In other words, the party is bigger than the state. However, the party's character is also affected by bureaucratic domination. The approach of bureaucrats identifies the party's direction. Thus, the party organization becomes slow and bulky and the ability of rapid decision making disappears. It should be also added that the initial enthusiasm which may be the most important thing for the revolution or change in system is lost after a while. This enthusiasm of the revolutionaries disappears because of bureaucrats' mentality. However, without dynamism among cadres, the movement stagnates. The parties which aim at a radical shift in the system require fraternity, but may not be able to enjoy it.

In addition, in totalitarian systems we can also talk about interdependency between the party and the state. In bureaucracy there is no place for the other people who are not the party members. The positions in the state are filled by the party administrators and the party cadres. That means the differentiation line between the party and the state is invisible. It is named "amalgamation of the party and the state" by Hannah Arendt.<sup>44</sup>

The amalgamation of the party and the state is a common feature in totalitarian movements. The cadre of the two organizations is integrated and this fusion prevents us to distinguish these two different apparatuses. That intertwinement inevitably brings jurisdictional disputes and power struggles. As Buchheim suggests:

After its 'seizure of power' the totalitarian movement converts the state, which up until then had been its enemy, into its slave. The movement maintains that it alone represents the will of a people or a class, and it deprives the state of its existence as a sovereign legal institution. Totalitarianism carries out its politics, not within the framework of governmental order, but beyond all norms, and in this endeavor it employs the state simply as a tool wherever such manipulation appears useful.<sup>45</sup>

The constitution of the state in totalitarian rule remains just as nominal, because the main thing is the will of the leader. The other issues like democracy,

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<sup>44</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op. cit.

<sup>45</sup> Hans Buchheim (1968) Op. cit., pp. 91-92

freedom, individual rights and rule of law are secondary. The single man determines the fate of his followers and he has the last word even though his rule is based on quasi constitutional or legal system.

In short, the toleration of personal choice is denied and it must be dominated by hegemonic purpose. The main point is the absolutism of the ruler and the legal structure was ignored. The subordination of the masses is expected by the party cadre and bureaucracy.

## **2. Ideology and Politics**

An ideology is “a set of literature ideas-a reasonably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to change and reform a society, based upon a more or less elaborate criticism of what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society.”<sup>46</sup>

Ideology is also defined as “a system of beliefs which relate to fundamental political aims and, moreover, a system which is designed, consciously or unconsciously, to influence and direct the course of action of those who are within its sphere of influence.”<sup>47</sup> Additionally he considers the term ideology as one of the most disputed terms of politics.

The inclination to see ideology as a static and dogmatic issue arises from Marx’s doctrine. However, ideologies are a kind of myths and myths are unstable. Furthermore, they contain dynamism within themselves.<sup>48</sup> Ideologies are really influential in order to mobilize people in totalitarian systems. Decisions of sympathizers originate from the ideology of the regime and ideology directs them to take part in social mobilization.

In addition, ideological orientation is generally used as an instrument for source of legitimacy. Totalitarian regimes generally claim that their roots come from people, so ideologies encourage leaders to behave in the name of folk and are mostly

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<sup>46</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) Op.cit. p. 88

<sup>47</sup> Leonard Schapiro (1972) Op. cit. p. 45

<sup>48</sup> Carl J. Friedrich (1969) Op.cit.p. 137

manipulated to legalize their authority. The absolute leader uses it to create a base for his undemocratic rule; thereby he tries to justify his dictatorship.

“Totalitarianism has been used in conjunction not only with specified political systems, but also with movements, parties, leaders, processes and ideas.”<sup>49</sup> A quasi-democratic atmosphere is attempted to be created by mass support. The elections are symbolically held and all people actually know who the winner is. Also, the leaders of the regime suppose that in this way their totalitarian rule would survive longer.

Although a multi-party system can be seen as a democratic way, it is generally used as a justification for totalitarian rule. People may take part in the elections, however, voters have a fear of voting for opponents or other parties who think differently from the mainstream. In these systems, the second party, if it even exists, is already like a satellite by having same or similar ideology with the main party. Under these circumstances we cannot talk about free will of voters. If there is no alternative candidate with the ability to spread his propaganda, there is no room for democratic tendencies. In democracies there should be an opportunity for opposition parties to form a government and the system allows for a change through propaganda and democratic methods.

However, in totalitarian systems, how propaganda works is different. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski

propaganda is essentially action-related; it aims to get people to do or not to do the certain things. That action focus may be either very visible or hidden away. In totalitarian dictatorships, virtually all propaganda is directed ultimately to the maintenance in power of the party controlling it.<sup>50</sup>

Mass propaganda is also based on the assumption that the people are ready to believe in any subject and that they are willing to obey the leader under any circumstances. Thus, even when the leaders lie, it is not significant, because fanaticism makes a great majority of people blind. In this way, the absolute leader easily creates a dream world which his followers readily believe in.

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<sup>49</sup> Benjamin R. Barber (1969) Op. cit. p. 6

<sup>50</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) Op.cit. p.131

In addition, masses aggrandize their magnificent leader by attributing various talents to him such as faultlessness of the leader. They try to find extraordinary attributes for their leader even under normal circumstances. The great leader's brilliant and desirable intelligence are highlighted and propagandized by inner circle of rulers. To give an example,

only Nazi sympathizers believed Hitler when he swore his famous legality oath before the supreme court of the Weimar Republic; members of the movement knew very well that he lied, and trusted him more than ever because he apparently was able to fool public opinion and the authorities.<sup>51</sup>

The totalitarian rule is differentiated from other type of regimes in its desire to control thoughts and actions. Mass support, staff and media pave the way for coercion, manipulation and indoctrination. In the course of events, the desired result that is acquiring a different character in thoughts and actions would be seen.<sup>52</sup>

Totalitarian leaders generally try to create a positive self-image. Propaganda and involvement in this process are beneficial in order to create a new culture. For instance, Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini had experience in the arts by being a painter, poet and violinist respectively. Thereby they had relations with cultural elites and interfered in cultural production of their own societies.<sup>53</sup>

The cultural production is possible with the indoctrination of the people. In this sense, education becomes a critical issue in manipulation. The regime can reach the entire population through the process of education. Perhaps there is no other instrument more efficient than education in the hands of the elites. The education system can reach each citizen and provides the opportunity to change people in line with official ideology.

The education system targets the group of younger minds which would be more influential in the future. They are a "tabula rasa" which does not contain any ideas or belief systems. Thus, they are likely to be shaped and indoctrinated more

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<sup>51</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op. cit. p.383

<sup>52</sup> Michael Curtis (1987) Op. cit. pp. 5-6

<sup>53</sup> Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele and Guiseppe Finaldi (2014) "Beyond The Delusion: New Histories of Totalitarian Dictatorship" in Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele and Guiseppe Finaldi (eds.) *Totalitarian Dictatorship: New Histories*, New York: Routledge, (1-20) p.11

easily. The education begins in the early ages and continues till adulthood stage. To inculcate this generation with the official ideology and to gain influence over this generation are extremely beneficial to rapidly energize this younger target group.

Characteristically, totalitarianism focuses on impossible targets such as the creation of new social dynamics and a new way of life and also remaking of the history within a definite framework.<sup>54</sup> The policy of creating the new Soviet man in the early times of the Soviet Union can be interpreted in this manner.

However, the desire of totalitarian movements to create a fictitious or utopian world loses its urgency when the movement comes to power, because it is realized that claims are too difficult to be actualized. The leaders and new elite try to cope with the daily routine of governmental works and other issues. They manage state apparatuses in order to control domestic issues instead of materializing the political commitment.

Totalitarianism has a revolutionary character because of its desire to demolish the existing system in the economic, social and cultural contexts.<sup>55</sup> However, after seizing power, leaders end up supporting the status quo in order to guarantee the continuation of the regime. They gain a conservative character and are in favor of the maintenance of the existing political order. Moreover, the goal of winning over other power groups and the aim of extending spheres of influence motivate them to create a new *modus operandi*.

Furthermore, the fear of losing power and control causes them to use violence via the police force to oppress their opponents or to send them to labor camps. In this way, facilities and apparatuses of the state are utilized for the creation of a new world that will be shaped according to will of absolute ruler without any dissent.

### **3. Terror by Police Force and Army**

Totalitarian ideology, compatible with both total destruction and reconstruction and in this process violence, is a tool used for ideological acceptance. This ideology concerns with how to change totally and how to create a society by

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<sup>54</sup> Hans Buchheim (1968) *Op.cit.* p.69

<sup>55</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) *Op.cit.* p.161

force and criticizes what is wrong with the existing one. That inclination is called a utopian attitude.<sup>56</sup>

In order to actualize the utopian world, totalitarian systems use violence and coercion as instruments. “Coercion in totalitarian systems has shown the following characteristics:

- Its unprecedented scale,
- Its use against social categories without consideration of guilt for specific acts,
- The disregard for even the appearance of legal procedures, the formalities of the trial, and the opportunity for some kind of defense, in imposing penalties,
- The moral self-righteousness and often the publicity surrounding it,
- The extension of the terror to members of the elite,
- The extension to members of the family of the accused not involved in the crime,
- The emphasis on the intent and social characteristics of the accused rather than on his actions,
- The use of organizations of the state and/or the party rather than of so-called uncontrolled elements, and the size and complexity of those organizations,
- The continuing and sometimes growing terror after the consolidation of the regime in power,
- The nonexclusion of the leadership of the armed forces from the repressive policy.”<sup>57</sup>

The armed forces being a liability to the regime gives the upper hand to totalitarian leaders. They act like a guard for the regime and provide legitimacy

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid. pp.88-89

<sup>57</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) Op.cit. p. 102

through reign of fear. In some cases, the police force replaces the military, and all are used to impose state policies through violence.

In general, totalitarian systems prefer to use secret police forces rather than the military. For the totalitarian regimes any territory is subject to conquest and this could be accomplished by means of the police forces. The Nazi administration took advantage of the SS (Schutzstaffel-Protection Squadron) a kind of police force, in order to annex new territories and rule them. It was an entity which was shaped by the merger of the police and the army.<sup>58</sup>

Through to use of the police and the army first, the clear enemies of the regime are annihilated and then the society is totally suppressed. Scaremongering is systematically applied and terror is to create fear. However, this fear is not limited to the general population. The administrators, too, are fearful. They fear losing power and the dissolution of the system which they created. Also, former interests groups are generally eliminated by the new leadership. The old regime's organizations and structures are targets of the new totalitarian leadership, because elites from the old system are a potential threat for their leadership.

When Germany was ruled by the Nazis, Jews, Gypsies, members of religious sects, the biologically unfit, certain prisoners of war, or the population of occupied territories were annihilated. When it comes to communist countries, belonging to certain social categories that could be labeled counterrevolutionary, like landlords, the clergy, and kulaks, or members of some ethnic groups were exterminated. There was no requirement to be personally guilty of any acts for the people who were oppressed by the regime.<sup>59</sup>

Terror and fear in a country give rise to anarchy and terror again. If fear becomes widespread among the people, it creates an atmosphere of defensiveness. Therefore, these people apply terror against those whom they are frightened of. It is the condition known as the "security dilemma". When a regime tries to overturn the social order to create a "new man" and to change the values of the people, the

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<sup>58</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973)Op.cit., p. xxxvi

<sup>59</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) Op.cit. p. 103

opposition to these changes increases and then more terrorist acts occur.<sup>60</sup> However, terror creates counter-terror and the result is the escalation of terror.

Terror and a state of fear are considered as desirable conditions for totalitarian administrations. In this atmosphere, it is easier to adjust the regime's policies because society has been intimidated and suppressed. The population is threatened by the system and faced with oppression when it tries to object to the formal ideology and its policies. As a result, terror is commonly applied by totalitarian rulers when they pursue their utopian policies.

#### **4. Society and Social Life**

One of the most important characteristics of totalitarian systems is the attempt to change society and social life by blurring the boundary between the social and individual lives. As Gleason indicates,

the concept of totalitarianism was used to describe the more extreme forms of the hypertrophic states of the twentieth century, with their ideologies, elaborate mechanisms of control, and uniquely invasive efforts to diminish or even obliterate the distinction between public and private.<sup>61</sup>

Totalitarian movements focus on a transformation in human nature in the context of culture, society and psychology. The regime wants to shape the masses based on its ideology. It means social life is suppressed through the orientation of the administration. Therefore, these regimes aim to transform human beings and society rather than change political and social institutions. They claim to know everything about life, as well as its meaning.<sup>62</sup>

Beyond a transformation of the former system in totalitarian rule, the other main target is a change in human beings and their psychology. Propaganda and indoctrination are means in the process of creating a society without opposition movements.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 112

<sup>61</sup> Abbot Gleason (2004) "Totalitarianism" in James R. Miller (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, New York: Macmillan Reference USA, p. 1561

<sup>62</sup> Hein Hürten (2004) "Waldemar Gurian and the Development of the Concept of Totalitarianism" in Hans Maier (eds.) *Totalitarianism and Political Religion Volume I: Concepts for Comparison of Dictatorship* Translated by Jodi Btuhn, New York: Routledge (40-49) p.46

The totalitarian system is similar to a creator who has plans for a new type of world and also a new man. Thus, a regime is absolute if it cannot accept any criticism. The desire for controlling everything opens the door for the domination of the system which includes the social life and even decisions of the people who are subject to the totalitarian will, even ignoring their own self-esteem and self-interest. In line with the ideology of the system, individuality is pejorative when the common good is at stake. In reality the common good becomes equivalent to the goals of administrators. The manipulation of society by inducements given by the absolute power are not surprising concepts in this atmosphere.

This is one of the main works of the totalitarian party.

Foremost among its functions is the politization of the masses, their incorporation in-cadration, integration, conscientization, and conversion, and their reciprocals, the detachment from other bonds, the destruction of the autonomy of their organizations, uprooting of other values and desocialization. This process is achieved by a mixture, which is very different in various totalitarian systems, of propaganda, education, and coercion.<sup>63</sup>

In this period, the media is extremely influential. Graybosch implies in his “Democracy, the Media and the Post-Totalitarian Experience” that the totalitarian press is a means of the government. Moreover it works as a propaganda machine which is lead by authority.<sup>64</sup> It is another method which is used to lead society and shape its values.

Ideology is also beneficial to bring society together and for the spirit of the solidarity. Society must be shaped with a new single orientation so that education system once again becomes the cornerstone in this system. Through training, the new elite and intellectual groups appear. Moreover, the orientation of minds and mass mobilization begin as quickly as possible. The new regime, having new cadres, eliminates objections to its rule through ideas such as fraternity and unity among the people.

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<sup>63</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) Op. cit. p. 91

<sup>64</sup> Antony J. Graybosch (2005) “Democracy, the Media and the Post-Totalitarian Experience” in Leszek Koczanowicz and Beth J. Singer (eds.) *Democracy and the Pos-Totalitarian Experience* (119-138) Amsterdam: Rodopi, p.119

The totalitarian regime enforces the new ideology on a new society which it creates on the old one. However, totalitarianism may not succeed in eliminating the old society completely, nor is it able to construct totally new social dynamics. Thus, we observe a merger of the old and natural society with the new and artificial one.<sup>65</sup>

### **5. Controlled Economy**

Another feature of totalitarian rule is a controlled economy which is directed by the regime to support its aims. The state or totalitarian administrators determine the rules of economic activities. The character of production and type of outputs are under the hegemony of the regime. We cannot talk about any possibility for a free-market economy, because almost all properties belong to the state, and the private sector is not allowed to create their own policies under the conditions of a managed economy.

Material and non-material resources are under the hegemony of power groups which also play a role in shaping the economy. There is no free will where economic freedom is destroyed. For instance, in Nazi Germany companies either belonged to the state or they were strictly controlled by the authorities. The aim in these systems is to become a monopoly power; as such it is not only a political matter, but also economic.<sup>66</sup>

The main decision makers are the state organizations and plans are prepared according to state-controlled economists. The most significant hallmark of a totalitarian economy is planning which aims to determine economic activity over the next four or five years. It is an attempt to elucidate and to clarify the future. However, there can be no perfect plan to design the economy, and no plan can be implemented perfectly, because the future is full of uncertainties. With this in mind, any plan needs to be flexible in its implementation. Revisions should be applied

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<sup>65</sup> Hans Buchheim (1968) Op. cit.p. 39

<sup>66</sup> Kamaludin Gadshiev (2004) "Totalitarianism as a Twentieth Century Phenomenon" in Hans Maier *Totalitarianism and Political Religion Volume I: Concepts for Comparison of Dictatorship* Translated by Jodi Btuhn, New York: Routledge (277-294) p. 279

whenever they are needed.<sup>67</sup> But totalitarian regimes are not flexible enough to revise their plans.

If flexibility is high, it can result in “losing plan discipline”<sup>68</sup> as it was called in the Soviet literature. Losing plan discipline is to deviate from planning principles when, at the end of day, it is seen that they cannot achieve the plan’s goals. On the other hand, if the economy is controlled tightly, society will feel more pressure and fear. Controlled economies have a common feature of being result oriented. In other words, the most important thing is the result. Everyone endeavors in order to accomplish the desired result. While all focus is on the objective, other things can be easily ignored.

It is a well known fact that administrators could change the numbers of factory statistics in order to meet the plan’s goal. Therefore, managers in a controlled economy need staff who will follow their sometimes unrealistic orders. This may result in a corrupt environment due to strong will of achieving the plan. Although it is obviously an unethical attitude, the manager can justify it with the slogan of common good. As Hayek indicates,

advancement within a totalitarian group or party depends largely on a willingness to do immoral things. The principle that the end justifies the means, which in individualist ethics is regarded as the denial of all morals, in collectivist ethics becomes necessarily the supreme rule. There is literally nothing which the consistent collectivist must not be prepared to do if it serves the ‘good of the whole’, because that is to him the only criterion of what ought to be done.<sup>69</sup>

The supremacy of the state over economic issues also comes with the social, political and cultural transformation of the population. Wielding absolute state power requires a radical break with past habits and traditions in order to create acceptance of the new system. The society requires meaningful changes to serve the achievement of economic targets. For instance, a politically motivated society is a must to be successful and people should be manipulated according to the level of the

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<sup>67</sup> Maurice Dobb (1970) *Socialist Planning: Some Problems*, London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., p. 24

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* p.25

<sup>69</sup> Friedrich A. Hayek (1999) *The Road to Serfdom*, London: Reader’s Digest, p. 45

economic aims. Not only the social, but also the cultural dimension of the population ought to be oriented in the context of state ideology as well.

Economic collectivism is the final phase which absolute regimes try to realize. There is inevitably a transitional period to reach economic collectivism. It requires supremacy over all aspects of society to operate a totalitarian economy. We observe some turning points which are a composition of capitalist and state-controlled economies before the final phase. For instance, the *New Economic Policy (NEP)* of the Soviet Union is a transition period. It was a time of relaxation after the *War Communism* which contains hyper-control and supremacy over the Soviet economic system. The NEP provided relative wealth and ease, however the ultimate objective of the Soviet system was the communist economy with the abolition of free enterprise. That is why it was called a transition period.

In the next chapter we will focus on Stalin and his policies during his time in office, known as Stalinism, that is one of the clearest examples of a totalitarian administration.

## CHAPTER III

### STALIN AND STALINISM

The world witnessed the emergence of great totalitarian regimes after the First World War. The 20<sup>th</sup> century had this kind of repressive and centralized systems. The most known examples are Stalin's Soviet Russia after the socialist revolution, the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler in *Third Reich* of Germany, and Italy under the fascist rule of Benito Mussolini. As Curtis suggests,

the term totalitarianism has been a valuable addition to the terminology of political science in that it has allowed one to differentiate the Nazi and Stalinist systems from other form of contemporary dictatorship and from earlier systems of autocracy or authoritarianism. The term can apply to regimes in which all aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life are subject to control, no limits to governmental interference are admitted, no political opposition or independent organization is permissible, and all citizens are expected to accept official, infallible doctrine.<sup>70</sup>

Russian totalitarianism, unlikely Nazizm and fascism, started after a revolution that brought a transformation from monarchy to socialist regime. Even it came with radical changes for people, the character of Tsarist Russian society was already in a period of change through industrialization process during the last years of 19<sup>th</sup> and early years of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Villagers had moved to towns from countryside in order to work in factories. This mobilization of population triggered differentiation of their mentality and accelerated modernization process. As Sakwa observes, "by 1914 the vigorous social and economic developments of the past half-century had closed the gap between Russia and the more developed countries and had elevated it to fifth place in the league of industrial powers."<sup>71</sup> Because of this

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<sup>70</sup> Michael Curtis (1969) Op. cit., p.58- 59

<sup>71</sup> Richard Sakwa (1998) Soviet Politics in Perspective, Oxon: Routledge, p. 8

rapid development, the number of proletariat increased dramatically. The revolutionary ideas began to be effective among workers when they tried to improve their working conditions. In addition, these ideas improved the intellectual level of general population. Thus social mobilization in the society and the number of demonstrations in Russia increased.

In addition, the First World War caused unrest among the Russian people. They faced scarcity and food shortage because of the war. Also, defeat of the Russian military stimulated the reactions against the war. In this atmosphere, Lenin called an armed insurrection with the slogan of *all power to the Soviets*. The socialist revolution led by Bolsheviks was accomplished on 25 October 1917. The October Revolution changed both Russian and the world history dramatically. Private property was abolished, so workers took control in factories while farmlands were owned by peasants in Russia.

After the revolution, the Council of People's Commissars or Sovnarkom was constructed. Sovnarkom was a government-like organization and Lenin was elected as Chairman of Commissariat. It was under the influence of one party, the Bolsheviks, and it did not reflect the general will of all Russians.

Later, Constituent Assembly elections were held but Bolsheviks were not successful against Socialist Revolutionaries (SR). These elections "gave the Bolsheviks only a quarter of the seats and an absolute majority to the peasant-based SRs."<sup>72</sup> Bolsheviks became the second organization after their political opponent SRs. The Constituent Assembly was closed by Sovnarkom after the first session because of the hegemony of SRs. The undemocratic attempts of the *avant garde* party started under Lenin. In addition, opposition newspapers and the Constitutional Party or Kadets were closed. They were liberals and giving support to the monarchy. Lenin's centralist and authoritative character began to affect Russian politics after the October Revolution. The revolution opened door to the civil war in Russia between opposing groups.

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<sup>72</sup> Ben Vosloo (2010) Political Economic Trends around the World, South Africa: Biblaridion, p. 78

Russia did not have a strong economy because of the First World War. Therefore, civil war brought more starvation and death for Russia. It was estimated that famine caused three to five million deaths during winter and spring 1921/1922. Not only did the bad economy cause loss of life, but also Soviet security organization Cheka was responsible for 280.000 deaths between 1917 and 1922.<sup>73</sup>

The Cheka or The All-Russian Emergency Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage was formed in 1918 as a secret police service. In addition, Cheka became an organization to suppress Bolsheviks' opponents. Felix Dzerzhinsky, the leader of the Cheka, and his organization were famous figures for terroristic actions, brutality and assassinations. The elimination of the *class enemies* were put into practice by Cheka with the consent of Lenin. It had a great importance regarding winning the civil war.

As one scholar observes, "the civil war was not a case of Whites versus Reds; the Bolsheviks resorted to administrative and physical violence to enforce their government, even against classes in whose name they had initially seized power. Even the working class seemed untrustworthy."<sup>74</sup> After the civil war, the first socialist country in the world, the Soviet Union, was founded in December 1922. The realm of freedom which was promised by Bolsheviks before the civil war disappeared due to the aim of elimination of *class enemies*. According to Cohen, "the Bolshevik Party's growing centralization, bureaucratization, and administrative intolerance after 1917 certainly promoted authoritarianism in the one-party system and abetted Stalin's rise."<sup>75</sup> Freedom in Bolshevik organization had already been destroyed under the extraordinary situation of the civil war. Inner party pluralism was annihilated so bureaucratic centralism became apparent. Other political

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<sup>73</sup> Gerhard Besier and Katarzyna Stoklosa (2013) *European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century*, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 35-36

<sup>74</sup> Dietrich Beyrau (2006) "Approximation of a Comparison: Stalinism, National Socialism and Their Intellectual Servants" in Jerzy W. Borejsza and Klaus Ziemer (eds.) *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons From the Twentieth Century* Warsaw: Berghahn Books (25-52) p. 34

<sup>75</sup> Stephen F. Cohen (1999) "Bolshevism and Stalinism" in Robert C. Tucker (eds.) *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, New Jersey: Transaction Publisher (3-29) p. 17

organizations were banned and Bolsheviks controlled the whole political system. It was the system of one party dictatorship. Therefore it was really hard to talk about democratic tendencies neither in the country nor in the Party under Lenin's leadership. Thus there was no need to call themselves as Bolsheviks or actually majority. As a result, they renamed their political organization as the Communist Party.

After Lenin came to power, the political atmosphere was highly disciplined and it was full of control mechanisms. When we look at the Lenin's period, the tight control of the Party was obvious. Lenin eliminated other socialist movements and defended the one party rule. According to him, "only the history of Bolshevism during the entire period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it has been able to build up and maintain, under most difficult conditions, the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat."<sup>76</sup> The centralization of all power in the hands of one man and abolishment of opponents and controlling of the Party by a small cadre led to undemocratic conditions.

Besides political control, the economic activities were also under the hegemony of the Communist Party. Private property was prohibited after the October Revolution. The whole industry and production mechanisms were controlled by the Party intelligentsia throughout the civil war. The economy was directed by one authority, which was the Communist Party. "During the Civil War the party apparatus had become bigger, more organized, and more involved in operational administrative matters."<sup>77</sup> Private trade was forbidden and free enterprise was blocked. Money was abolished and the market was under the influence of the Party. Also, economic incomes were used in favor of the Red Army and additional measures were introduced for the sake of winning the war. This system was applied by Lenin in order to overcome negative economic effects of the civil war.

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<sup>76</sup> <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/lwc/ch02.htm> Access Date: April 13, 2015

<sup>77</sup> Stephen Fortescue (2010) "Institutionalization and Personalism in the Policy Making Process of the Soviet Union and Post Soviet Russia" in Stephen Fortescue (eds.) *Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin*, London: Palgrave Macmillan (21- 50) p. 29

This centralization period between 1918 and 1921 during the civil war was named as *war communism*. Katherine Eaton defines war communism as

a phrase used to define the aggressive and even brutal actions taken by the Reds, or Communists, from 1918 to 1921, to defeat Whites and secessionists, overcome the countless problems caused by the severely diminished economy, and begin the socialist transformation of Russian society.<sup>78</sup>

As mentioned above, the control over Russian political, economic and social life after the revolution did not start with Stalin. The restraints during Lenin's leadership period were apparent and perceivable. However, Stalin subordinated the whole system regarding each aspect of life. Hence, his regime is called as a totalitarian rule. Lenin was afraid of Stalin's power-addicted character and he foresaw the future days.

Lenin was also not satisfied with conditions regarding political and economic aspects in the country. His expectations did not match with the real conditions in the country. The intelligentsia kept old habits of Tsarist term. Nepotism became widespread and positions in the party were started to be used for serving the interests of the party cadre. Also, the revolutionary spirit and energy were already not as powerful as before the revolution era. However Pravda had stated: "It must not be forgotten that to enter the sacred door of the Party one must be spotless not only in his public life but in his personal life as well."<sup>79</sup>

Shortly after to establishment of the Soviet Union, Lenin suffered from strokes that hindered him from taking active role in party issues. After being appointed as General Secretary in 1922, Stalin gained power in the Party and then he had a chance to perform more effectively. Lenin realized the threat, which was Stalin's hunger for power. His character and attitude showed signs of his tendency to centralize all power in his hands. As Lee suggested, "Stalin's ambitions incurred Lenin's distrust to the extent that, in his Political Testament, Lenin warned against Stalin and, in a codicil added in January 1923, recommended his removal from the

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<sup>78</sup> Katherine B. Eaton (2004) *Daily Life in the Soviet Union*, West Port: Greenwood Press, p. 5

<sup>79</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) *Op. cit.*, p. 52

post of General Secretary.”<sup>80</sup> Lenin’s political testament comprised the criticism of Politburo members. He emphasized the attitude of Stalin which paved way to one man rule. According to Lenin, Stalin gained too much power so he suggested limiting Stalin and preventing him from leadership. Also, Trotsky, an alternative candidate for leadership, was seen as a loyal but incapable man by Lenin. That is why he recommended collective leadership. In this chaotic atmosphere Lenin passed away in January 1924 and his death started a power struggle in the Party. In this struggle, Stalin came to the forefront and became the prominent character in Soviet history.

### **1. From Georgia to Soviet Leadership**

Iosif Vissarionovich Djughashvili or Stalin was one of the most powerful figures in the twentieth century. He left his mark on the world history. His policies had a great effect all over the world and also over Russia. His birthday is given as 6 December 1878 or as 21 December 1879. His father, Vissarion Ivanovich Dzhughashvili, was a shoe repairer and his mother Yekaterina Georgievna was a tailor.<sup>81</sup>

After elementary education at Gori in the Orthodox Church School, as a devout and intelligent pupil, he was recommended by teachers to enroll in the Seminar. In 1894, he started Orthodox Theological Seminary which was located in Tbilisi. It was the Georgian intellectual center. He got the charge of reading illegal books about revolution and Marxist theory which developed his awareness and philosophical thoughts. Stalin’s Georgian background impelled him to read these socialist books, because Armenians and Russians constituted the middle class in Georgia; however, the members of the titular nation belonged to the lower strata. In addition, Tsarist language policy which urged use of Russian and restricted the native language, under the name of Russification, became an important issue for Stalin.

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<sup>80</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) *Stalin and the Soviet Union*, New York: Routledge, p. 1

<sup>81</sup> Alter Litvin and John Keep (2005) *Stalinism: Russia and Western Views at the Turn of Millennium*, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 32-34

Thanks to this policy, he had the chance of reading various foreign texts and books in Russian translation.<sup>82</sup>

However, Stalin could not graduate from the Seminar because he was expelled. The reason of that was indefinite but it is obvious that his academic performance was not enough because of his involvement in political activities. He attended a social democratic organization which was called the Third Group. He used different pseudonyms during this period like Koba or Stalin. He began propaganda activities among workers. However, he was arrested in 1902 and exiled to Siberia where he escaped and turned back to Georgia in 1904.<sup>83</sup>

Stalin was linked to the robbery of Tbilisi State Bank in 1907 by the police so he went to Baku where he was arrested for the second time but he succeeded to escape again.<sup>84</sup> However, he was captured and this time his arrestment lasted until 1911, which was the date of his being released. After that, he moved to St. Petersburg and joined the editorial board of the Bolshevik Party's newspaper Pravda. He wrote his famous writing *Marxism and National Problem*. Also, he became a member of the Central Committee. His last custody in 1913 resulted in four years of exile in Siberia, which ended thanks to the February Revolution of 1917.<sup>85</sup>

After the October Revolution, Stalin was appointed as the Commissar for Nationalities in the organization of Sovnarkom. During the civil war, as the party commissar, he had inspected different regions of Russia. In the Party, Stalin became a member of Politburo and Orgburo and then he was appointed as General Secretary of Communist Party in 1922. His responsibilities were to control personnel policy of

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<sup>82</sup> Alan Wood (2005) *Stalin and Stalinism*, New York: Routledge, pp. 11-13

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>84</sup> It was around these times that Stalin's first wife Yekaterina Svanidze died because of typhus in 1907, just one year after their marriage. She was the mother of Stalin's first son Yakov. Then he married Nadezhda Allilueva in 1918 and they had a boy, Vasili, and a girl, Svetlana. Allilueva died by committing suicide in 1932.

<sup>85</sup> Oleg V. Khlevniuk (2015) *Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator*, Translated by Nora Seligman Favorov, London: Yale University Press, pp. 21-29

the Party and to set the agenda of Politburo.<sup>86</sup> It was regarded as an ordinary bureaucratic position.

However, different tasks of Stalin and the position of General Secretary especially enabled him for strict control on the Party's membership policy. The organizational skills of Stalin brought him further success in the Party organization. *Nomenklatura* or party elite who occupied the critical positions got their posts thanks to Stalin. Therefore, they were under the influence of Stalin and the new party cadre which was shaped by Stalin after the Revolution was exposed to manipulation. His posture and discourse motivated the organization and had a great effect on members whose enthusiasm was triggered by Stalin. These people were quite influential regarding elimination process of Stalin's leadership rivals.

The Soviet Union was personalized with Stalin after the annihilation of potential candidates for leadership like Trotsky. He was exiled because of "anti-party activities" and he was blamed as a "traitor". Also, Stalin considered Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamanev and then Nikolai Bukharin as threats for his rule. The leadership position of Stalin was secured via different precautions and policies.<sup>87</sup> The alternative characters were faced with suppression, assassination, exiles and imprisonment. After that, smashing of Soviet society with Stalin's iron fist began.

During 1930s, totalitarian control of Stalin increased. The Five Year Plans were adopted as a result of rapid industrialization requirement. The fear of "capitalist encirclement" and another world war resulted in the rise of the defense industry. In addition, the *revolution from above* started with the collectivization and dekulakization policies. It was the centralization of agricultural policy and liquidation of *kulaks* (referring to wealthy and leading people among farmers). This policy reflected the class struggle in countryside and facilitated workers-peasants alliance against rich one.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., pp. 64-66

<sup>87</sup> Gerhard Besier and Katarzyna Stoklosa (2013) Op. cit., pp. 37-42

<sup>88</sup> Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1967) *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.143

In this period, the whole opponents of Stalinist policies were tried to be eliminated with repression and fear. The show trials were used as tools in the context of elimination of “regime enemies”. The Great Purges which was a campaign aiming to suppress all “dangerous figures” started. The state terror was applied by Stalin in order to provide regime consolidation. Moreover, through the Gulag, which was responsible for organizing labor camps where millions of political prisoners were forced to work and live under inhumane conditions, the regime also created a system of oppression. However, the laborers in these camps played a major role in the development of the Soviet economy.<sup>89</sup>

The nationalist discourse during the Second World War increased Stalin’s popularity. Especially, the clashes in Barbarossa, Kursk, and Stalingrad increased Stalin’s influence in the country. During the “Great Patriotic War”, he was presented as a hero. The war united all Soviet people who aimed to defeat the enemy. Nationalism became an influential instrument in order to mobilize people for a great effort. Stalin triumphed against the Nazi army and he got the title of Generalissimo. The Soviet Union and Stalin gained a victory but the country was devastated and the people were ruined. However, Stalin built a reputation both at home and abroad. He was now the leader of the second superpower in the world. After the victory in 1945, Stalin became the leader of the Soviet Empire, an enormous socialist bloc from Berlin to Hanoi.<sup>90</sup>

The Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences which were held during the Second World War shaped Europe. Stalin as one of the leaders of the Big Three, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, attended those important meetings. They divided Europe in accordance with their own interests. The Soviet sphere of influence was formed in the eastern part of Europe. Throughout the Cold War, Western and Soviet camps in Europe and Balkans took a buffer zone role

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<sup>89</sup> Robert Conquest (2008) *The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 330

<sup>90</sup> Zhores A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev (2003) *The Unknown Stalin*, Translated by Ellen Dahrendorf, London: I.B. Tauris, p. 35

between two leading countries the Soviets and the U.S.<sup>91</sup> The area which was controlled by the Soviets was named as *iron curtain* by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Stalin performed as General Secretary of the Communist Party during 31 years. His period ended due to natural causes. He had cerebral hemorrhage before three days of his death. The leader of the Soviet Union died on 5 March 1953. He was the most influential Soviet leader who left his mark on the society in the political, economic, cultural, and social framework. Today's modern Russia still feels his effect in those fields. Not only Russian but also the world history was shaped by his policies and his totalitarian rule, the centerpieces of which are analyzed in the rest of the chapter.

## **2. Personality Cult**

As was mentioned, Stalin gained the upper hand in the inner circle of the power elite after the death of Lenin. When the office of the General Secretary of Party was assumed by Stalin, Party's apparatuses remained secondary because of Stalin's expanded role of his post. Stalin dominated the office which was introduced as a new position in the Party. With the help of this new position, he controlled the Party easily by recruiting new members, making appointments and dismissing people.

Actually, the bureaucratization of the Communist Party was really high and the Party had its own special hierarchical system with strict rules. The Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the highest body and the legislative branch, with delegates from all over the country. It normally gathered annually but under Stalin, it did not have any meetings between 1939 and 1952.<sup>92</sup>

The Central Committee was elected by the members of the Congress. It had a task of determining the Party policies during the intra assembly period of the

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<sup>91</sup> Vladislav M. Zubok (2007) *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, pp. 21-27

<sup>92</sup> Richard Sakwa (1998) *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-94

Congress. The Central Committee had to hold one meeting in every six months and it directed the activities of the Party, the local Party bodies, the works of central government bodies and social organizations of working people and also distributed the funds of the Party budget and controlled its execution. It set up various Party organs, institutions, enterprises and directed their activities. Besides, the Central Committee appointed the editors of the main newspapers and journals.<sup>93</sup> In sum, it acted as the major administrative body of the country.

The Central Committee also appointed the some members of the Political Bureau, or the Politburo, which after 1952 renamed as Presidium. It was the governing body of the Communist Party. In time, its role increased. It was not only a policy making organ but also the final decision making body. Major issues were determined at the sessions of the Politburo which compromised the most effective and powerful members of the Party.<sup>94</sup>

The second element of the Central Committee was Orgburo or Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The responsibility of the Orgburo was generally related with organizational works of the Party. The issues about local and other organizations of the Party were decided by the Orgburo. Furthermore, membership and recruiting of the Party cadres were its responsibility. It used to have weekly meetings and then it started to meet once in a month.<sup>95</sup>

The third apparatus was the Secretariat that was structured in 1917. The Party's technical affairs were managed by the Secretariat. Moreover, coordinating Party activities was also the job of the Secretariat. "It served as the executive arm of the Politburo and Orgburo, being responsible for preparing the sessions of the Politburo and Orgburo and overseeing the fulfillment of its resolutions."<sup>96</sup> It had

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<sup>93</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) Op. cit., p. 49

<sup>94</sup> E. A. Rees (2004) "Introduction" in E. A. Rees (eds.) *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship: The Politburo 1924-1953*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (1-18) pp. 1-3

<sup>95</sup> E. A. Rees (2004) "Stalin as Leader 1924-1937: From Oligarch to Dictator" in E. A. Rees (eds.) *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship: The Politburo 1924-1953*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (19-58) pp.30-33

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 31

departments which performed as supervisory bodies over ministries so it was claimed to be a shadow cabinet. The Secretariat was headed by the General Secretary. Besides, the chairman of the Party and leader of the country was the General Secretary, both of which were Stalin.

As aforementioned, the bureaucratization of the Party was enormous. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski described that complex system as follows:

At the top there are heads and workers of the various sections of the Central Committee to supervise the ministries and control the party operations; then there are the republic party secretaries with their staff and workers; there are the secretaries of the provincial and regional party committees and their staffs; there are the secretaries and staffs of hundreds of city party committees; there are finally the tens of thousands of district party committees; there are finally the tens of thousands of party workers who head the primary party organizations on the collective farms, in government institutions, and in military units.<sup>97</sup>

This huge organization was led by Stalin's personality cult and his iron fist. According to him:

The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. Iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline.<sup>98</sup>

As is clear from his words, Stalin aimed to dominate the regime and there was no place for democracy. Stalin transformed one party dictatorship into a totalitarian regime. It was the liquidation of factions and abolition of inner party democracy.<sup>99</sup> The elimination of his rivals was accomplished within the party organization. The old party members who were included since pre and post revolutionary terms were liquidated. Therefore, "by 1939 the leading role in the party was being increasingly played by young men, recruited after 1929, who owed both

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<sup>97</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) Op.cit. p.207

<sup>98</sup><https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/foundations-leninism/ch08.htm>  
Access Date: April 13, 2015

<sup>99</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op. cit., p. 379

their education and their advancement to the fact that they accepted Stalin's leadership, without question, hesitation, or scruple."<sup>100</sup>

As mentioned earlier, death of Lenin triggered the rivalry for leadership in the Party between Trotsky and Stalin. Grigory Zinoviev who was the leader of Communist International (Comintern) and chairman of Petrograd Soviet and also his companion Lev Kamenev, chairman of Moscow Soviet, sided with Stalin and formed an alliance against Trotsky. They had concern over Trotsky because he was the leader of the Red Army and he had a military power. However, it was too late when they realized Stalin's hunger for power and his desired regime which was akin to dictatorship. They lost their positions after Stalin consolidated his power.<sup>101</sup>

After all, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky constituted a united opposite against Stalin. Nonetheless, Stalin found new partners, Nikolai Bukharin and Aleksei Rykov, who formed the right wing of the Party. According to McCauley, "Stalin had to sow uncertainty and fear among innermost circle in order to maintain the upper hand, playing one group off against another to his mutual advantage."<sup>102</sup> The cult of Stalin was ensured in 1926 when Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev were expelled and removed from the Politburo. Next year, they were dismissed from the Central Committee and finally Zinoviev and Trotsky were expelled from the Party. Trotsky who was the leader of left opposition was exiled to Alma-Ata.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Leonard Schapiro (1972) Op. cit., p. 60

<sup>101</sup> Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod (1979) *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 140-141

<sup>102</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) *Stalin and Stalinism*, New York: Routledge, p.96

<sup>103</sup> Alan Ball (2006) "Building a New State and Society" in Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume III The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (168-191) pp. 185-186. The main contradiction between Stalin and Trotsky was about the socialist revolution. Trotsky wanted *permanent revolution* according to which the revolution had to expand to other parts of the world with the support of other nations. For Stalin, however, the motto was *socialism in one country*, which aimed to create a consolidated socialist regime in the Soviet Union. According to Stalin, the interests and security concerns of the Soviets had to come first. Once that was achieved, expanding Soviet sphere of influence or exporting revolution could be discussed. Stalin also focused on economic development to be realized with the natural resources of the Soviet Union. First, agriculture had to be modernized with advanced technology to become a self-sufficient nation.

According to Brzezinski “Stalin’s totalitarian edifice could be said to have rested on three supporting columns: the secret police, the state bureaucracy and the Party with all three coordinated by the old dictator’s personal secretariat.”<sup>104</sup> The party became the main instrument under the strong leadership of Stalin. It was used to eliminate the opponents, to gain upper hand and also to control the administration apparatuses. As such, “Stalin’s climb to power was made possible purely by internal bureaucratic measures, augmented by firm doses of terror and propaganda, while the appeal that rationalized his claim to power was phrased in terms of collectivization, industrialization, and preservation of the Soviet Union.”<sup>105</sup> All of them were mechanisms Stalin used professionally in order to strengthen his own regime as well as the personality cult in the Soviet Union.

Ronald Grigor Suny defines Stalin’s huge power as follows:

Stalin stood at the center of all strategic, logistical, and political decisions. He was chairman of the State Defense Committee, which included the highest party officials; the chairman of Stavka, the supreme military headquarters; General Secretary of the party and chairman of the Politburo; chairman of the Council of Ministers and People’s Commissar of Defense.<sup>106</sup>

Stalin penetrated into each organ of the Party as well as the governmental systems. Thus, as Khrushchev would later criticize, Stalin “expressed fears of what his successors, who were ‘as blind as kittens’ would do without him.”<sup>107</sup>

“Stalin was always thought to be: capricious, wily, ruthless, blessed with a remarkable memory but suspicious to the point of paranoia, even of his closest counselors.”<sup>108</sup> He was the chief man of each decision making process and had a great effort in editorial issues. Books, films, plays and even speeches of *apparatchiki* were intervened and controlled by Stalin. He believed that he was the leader of both

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<sup>104</sup> Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1962) Op.cit., p. 70

<sup>105</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) Op.cit., p. 43

<sup>106</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny (1991) “Proletarian Dictator in a Peasant Land: Stalin as Ruler”, CSST Working Paper Number: 69, p.27 <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/51226/460.pdf> Access Date: March 14, 2016

<sup>107</sup> Leonard Schapiro (1972) Op. cit., p. 21

<sup>108</sup> Alter Litvin and John Keep (2005) Op. cit., p.101

the Soviet proletariat and world working class. In addition, Stalin saw himself in the lineage of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great.<sup>109</sup>

Despite Lenin's objections, Stalin idolized Lenin after his death: "In order to legitimize his personal rule Stalin and the Party tried to retain elements of Lenin's charismatic leadership and transfer them to his successor."<sup>110</sup> The Bolshevik history was rewritten, which made Stalin superior and a great companion of Lenin. In this way, Stalin was presented as a major character during the revolution and the legal successor of Lenin.

Furthermore, the propaganda machine was put to use via the media aiming to portray Stalin as the source of happiness, wealth, and progress in the Soviet Union. This reached a climax when Stalin attained extraordinary qualifications like the builder and defender of the Soviets, teacher of his people, and inspirer of Soviet citizens. Also, film, music, poetry and literature were some of the other instruments the Party used in order to develop a positive perception of Stalin among the people. Various arts such as painting and sculpture were used in many public places which had portraits and statues of Stalin.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, the victory in the Second World War was explained with the supreme leadership of Stalin. "Official propaganda convincingly identified the victory over Nazism with the superiority of the Soviet system, its organic link with *rodina* (the motherland), and the personal genius of Stalin."<sup>112</sup> All of these policies contributed to the creation and consolidation of the Stalin's cult of personality.

Regardless of Stalin's efforts, Khrushchev, the new leader of the Soviet Union, denounced and criticized glorifying of Stalin and his cult after his death in the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 1956. It was the starting point of the de-Stalinization policy.

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<sup>109</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) Op. cit., pp. 91-97

<sup>110</sup> Xin Lu and Elena Soboleva (2014) Personality Cults in Modern Politics: Cases from Russia and China, Working Papers of the Center for Global Politics, Berlin: Freie Universitat, p. 10

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-13

<sup>112</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny (2003) "Stalin and His Stalinism: Power and Authority in the Soviet Union 1930-1953" in David L. Hoffmann (eds.) *Stalinism: The Essential Readings*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing (16-35) p.33

### 3. Creation of the New Soviet Man

The personalized Soviet political system inevitably affected the Russian society and culture. The main figure was Stalin who transformed the traditional aspects of society into socialist modernization dynamics. Radical changes were introduced in the fields of culture and social transformation under totalitarian structure. The aim was the creation of the *new Soviet man* who would be shaped by strict rules, discipline, oppression, manipulation and propaganda.

“The new man was both a distinct individual and a ‘little cog’; he strove for personal achievement and wanted to be a good member of the collective; he was to be a master of technology, yet he merged with technology as its intrinsic part.”<sup>113</sup>

Fitzpatrick underlines that

Western historians have commonly used for interpreting the Stalin period is state against society. According to this view, the state acts on society, trying to change and mold it in ways that serve state purposes; society acts primarily by re-acting to state pressure, which it tries to resist, evade, or subvert by passive resistance.<sup>114</sup>

The changes targeting the society firstly focused on the family as the smallest unit and cornerstone of society. Also, it was regarded as bourgeois type organization so the revolutionary break was needed in the case of family understanding. Although some measures were taken in order to free woman, such as the right of abortion and divorce, the social backlash forced Stalin to make reversal of the policy. Divorce was more difficult by 1935 and in the next year abortion became illegal.<sup>115</sup> Also, the regime, encouraged woman for child-bearing and it was utilized consciously for building socialist society.

Furthermore, societal changes in the area of religion were also on the agenda of Stalin. Atheism was promoted, and restrictions on religious activities and worship were introduced. Many churches were closed or converted to different buildings

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<sup>113</sup> Slava Gerovitch (2007) “New Soviet Man Inside Machine: Human Engineering, Spacecraft Design, and the Construction of Communism”, *OSIRIS*, Volume: 22 Number: 1 (135-157) pp. 139-140

<sup>114</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick (October 1986) “New Perspectives on Stalinism” in *Russian Review*, Volume: 45 Number: 4, (357-373), pp. 358-359

<sup>115</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) *Op. cit.*, p. 55

which were used for various aims. Church properties were confiscated and sold. Weddings were done at a governmental office which was named as *ZAGS*. It was responsible for registering marriages, births, and deaths.<sup>116</sup>

In addition, other religious groups faced restrictions as well. Muslim community was suppressed because Islam was seen as unifying concept among Turkic population. Therefore, Islam became a fearful concept for the Soviet *nomenklatura*. In order to hinder fraternity among them, “the 26,000 mosques that had existed in 1921 had been reduced to only 1,312 by 1942.”<sup>117</sup> It would be considered as a precaution because mosques were likely agents of socialization for Muslims. Jews were another religious group that was oppressed under the Stalinist regime. The regime set up a special zone for them, Birobijan, where was located in East Siberia. “Between 1928 and 1938, about 40,000 Jews settled in Birobijan, becoming almost one-fourth of the area's population”.<sup>118</sup> Although the official propaganda of the ruling classes focused on power given to workers and peasants, the fact was different. “Ordinary people felt that they were excluded from power, that those in power did not consult with the masses and ignored their opinions.”<sup>119</sup> Thus, needs of society and demands of people (including the religious ones) were not meet sufficiently and their priorities and moral values underrated.

According to Soviet leaders, education was another important weapon against backwardness, influence of religion and ethnic culture. “Narkompros (People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment) focused on creating education for the masses. The number of schools increased from 118,558 in 1927–8 to 166,275 by 1933, with the number of pupils rising from 7.9 million to 9.7 million.”<sup>120</sup> At the beginning of 1930s, school attendance was obligatory for all the children and also the regime encouraged adults to join basic literacy classes. At the end of 1930s, about 75 percent

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<sup>116</sup> Katherine B. Eaton (2004) Op. cit., p. 283

<sup>117</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) Op. cit., p. 59

<sup>118</sup> Katherine B. Eaton (2004) Op. cit., p. 294

<sup>119</sup> Sarah Davies (2000) “Us Against Them: Social Identity in Soviet Russia 1934-1941” in Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Stalinism: New Directions*, New York: Routledge, (47-70) p.50

<sup>120</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) Op. cit., p. 57

of adult population could read. It was a great success when we compare that with 1926 census which showed literacy rate as 41 percent. Also, regime had an effort for emancipation of women who were an oppressed group. They were regarded as an essential element in terms of socialist education of children. In late 1930s, literacy rate among woman was over 80 percent.<sup>121</sup>

In addition, the education issue for the Soviet regime was highly effective in the framework of indoctrination and manipulation process of masses and the creation of the uniform new Soviet person. "Secondary-school pupils went back into uniform - pinafores for the girls, cadet-type uniforms for the boys - and were encouraged to look and behave like the gymnasium pupils of thirty years earlier."<sup>122</sup> The regime, via education, had the chance to brainwash many citizens about glorification of the Soviet system. That is why party *apparatchiki* placed a particular importance to it.

Furthermore, education was one of polices highlighted and exploited by the inner circle. It was applied in order to shape those who had a potential to take part in the party cadre. Party schools provided general education and ideological training for communist officials, one of whom was Khrushchev.<sup>123</sup> "Similarly, the great majority of persons with higher education in the late 1930s were graduates of the First and Second Five-Year Plan period who had entered during the years of *vydvizhenie* (promotion of working class people) and socially discriminatory admissions."<sup>124</sup>

According to 1941 survey, despite the exclusion of military, security and party personnel, the group of leading cadres included 152,000 First Five-Year Plan graduates, or 89 percent of the total.<sup>125</sup> From now on, they were included in the new

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<sup>121</sup> David R. Shearer (2006) "Stalinism: 1928-1940" in Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume III The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (192-216) pp. 206-207

<sup>122</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick (1979) *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 250

<sup>123</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick (2000) *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in 1930s*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 87

<sup>124</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick (1979) *Op. cit.*, p. 240

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245

executive elite team. In this way, the *creation of new Soviet man* or *Homo Sovieticus* was accomplished.

When we compare numbers of people with higher education by years, we realized a sharp increase. “In January 1937, there were 105,000 Communists with completed higher education, or more than ten times the number shown by the 1927 party census. In 1937, 45% of all Communist graduates had received higher technical education, compared with 7.8% ten years earlier.”<sup>126</sup>

The new masses had to be introduced to an urban life style. It was a requirement that the new urban population were civilized first so the regime ensured discipline in this way. Therefore, the transformation of former peasants into members of modern society was an obligatory issue.<sup>127</sup> These civilization and transformation policies of the regime and its effects were called *kul'turnost* (culturedness). The aim was to obtain an upward trend in cultural form of newly created society.

Stalin declared in the 16<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 1930:

The theory of the fusion of all nations of ... the USSR into one common Great Russian nation with one common Great Russian language is a nationalist-chauvinist and anti-Leninist theory that contradicts the main thesis of Leninism, according to which national differences cannot disappear in the near future but will remain in existence for a long time, even after the victory of the proletarian revolution on a world scale.<sup>128</sup>

Actually, *korenizatsiia* (indigenization) policy which referred to promotion of members of titular nations in their own administrative units and bureaucracy was adopted in the early years of the Soviet Union, according to which local languages and culture were promoted. Local values were encouraged in name of ethnic harmonization with the slogan of *national in form, socialist in content*. Another

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p.242. Peasants were the largest group in Tsarist Russia and they formed one quarter of the work force on the eve of the First World War. The 6.1 million workers were also farmers and had small part of lands. (Besier and Stoklosa, 2013, p. 21) However, 25 percent of the population was peasants by 1964. Only 15 percent of Russian population was living in towns in 1917, by 1969 it increased 60 percent urbanized and universally literate population. (Curtis, 1969, p. 85)

<sup>127</sup> Vadim Volkov (1999) “The Concept of Kul'turnost': Notes on Stalinist Civilizing Process”, in Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Stalinism: New Directions*, New York: Routledge (210-230) p.215

<sup>128</sup> Yuri Slezkine (1999) “The Soviet Union as a Communal Apartment or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism” in Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Stalinism: New Directions*, New York: Routledge (313-347) pp. 327- 328

important slogan in the early years was *self-determination* which was evaluated by Talmon as offering legitimization to secession and to the creation of bourgeois class.<sup>129</sup>

However as Timasheff suggests by 1934 there emerged a *Great Retreat* that is defined as “the amalgamation of traits of the historical and national culture of Russia with traits belonging to the Communist cycle of ideas and behaviour patterns.”<sup>130</sup> The communist revolutionary values disappeared during the 1930s. A more traditional and conservative perspective emerged in social and cultural areas of life.

In this context, Russification was equated with Sovietization. Mostly due to the fear of rapprochement between Turkey and Turkic nations of Central Asia, for example there was a change in alphabet: “Between 1938 and 1940, the Latin alphabet was abandoned in favour of the Cyrillic script throughout Central Asia, while the teaching of the Russian language was made compulsory in all non-Russian schools across the Soviet Union in 1938.”<sup>131</sup> Likewise “rather than allowing different ethnic groups to develop their own cultural traditions, Soviet officials in the 1930s aggressively organised officially sanctioned forms of nationality.”<sup>132</sup> The relative liberal trend in 1920s was destroyed together with Stalin’s highly hierarchical and disciplined system.

The tight control on every branch of art such as architecture, painting, theatre, music and literature was clear and it was conducted under the hegemony of the party cadre. This sector was believed to help the regime by mobilizing the people and to construct a socialist spirit. “Historically, art that is universally regarded as good has

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<sup>129</sup> Jacob Leib Talmon (1981) *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of the Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century*, London: Martin Secker and Warburg, p. 447

<sup>130</sup> Nicholas S. Timasheff (1946) *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia*, New York: E. P. Dutton&Co., p. 354

<sup>131</sup> Ayşe Pamir Dietrich (2005) “Language Policy and the Status of Russian in the Soviet Union and the Successor States outside the Russian Federation”, *ASEES*, Vol: 19 Nos: 1-2 (1-27), pp.2-3

<sup>132</sup> David R. Shearer (2006) *Op. cit.*, p. 210

frequently served to embellish and glorify power.”<sup>133</sup> The censorship was inevitable and authority of the *apparatchiki* over the artistic sphere was limitless. Artists could perform if their works were in parallel with regime purposes. Even scientific research was shaped by ideological considerations. The products of artists had to go hand in hand with regime policies. The harmonization between them was a significant issue.

All independent cultural institutions were closed in 1932. It was a cultural holocaust that socialist realism was put into all branches of art as an obligatory method.<sup>134</sup> Furthermore, nationalism was especially pumped into society by artisans during the Second World War. “Soviet artists responded immediately and powerfully to the German invasion, creating songs, posters, newspaper and radio reports and later stories and movies that gave Soviet citizens an outlet for their fury and despair”.<sup>135</sup>

In addition, All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) was founded for propagating working class values. Also, there was another organization All-Russian Union of Writers (AUW) which involved most of the Russian writers. Then, All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers (AUSW) replaced the AUW. Half of the former members denied attending it. Thus, their works remained illegal as long as they were not the members. Finally, together with other unions they were dissolved and a single organization the Union of Soviet Writers were formed by 1932.<sup>136</sup> Hence, the subordination of writers to the government and party authorities become easier. The master, Stalin, regarded writers as *engineers of the soul* so they had to take role in the process of shaping the masses.

As Service suggests the Communists did not “hide the fact that they regarded society as a human mass to be indoctrinated, mobilised and, if circumstances

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<sup>133</sup> Boris Groys (1992) *The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond*, Translated by Charles Rougle, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.7

<sup>134</sup> Katerina Clark (2011) *Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 5

<sup>135</sup> James von Geldern (2006) “Culture: 1900-1945” in Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume III The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (579-604) p. 600

<sup>136</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) *Op. cit.*, pp. 46-48

appeared appropriate, sacrificed for the good of the cause.”<sup>137</sup> The indoctrination was ensured through propaganda apparatuses. The propaganda means such as media services and other communication tools belonged to the state in the Soviet Union. The control mechanism on media outlets was highly tight. From its foundation until the fall of Soviet Union, the media was under the control of *Glavlit*, the censorship office.<sup>138</sup> It provided means of information control throughout the Soviet Union.

Izvestiya (News) which echoed the official views of the government and Pravda (Truth) that belonged to the Party were the main tools in the propaganda and manipulation process. They were published six days in a week and in about 60 different languages. Moreover, a variety of the printed material for the youth, personnel of military, farmers and labor unions were used for propaganda purposes as well.<sup>139</sup> The radio broadcasting was another organ to affect the Soviet people. It was applied to keep the masses in the party line. “The state acted on the premise that it had the political right and ideological duty to command, indoctrinate and mobilize society for the ends prescribed by the ascendant party leadership.”<sup>140</sup> After the revolution, the only information service was Soviet controlled media. Without opponents, the manipulation of the people became easier.

To sum up, people in the Soviet Union experienced a great change during Stalin’s period in the cultural domain. The society was repressed with a variety of policies. Such a tight control brought a cultural change put into effect by the Soviet ruling class.

#### **4. Facts**

The creating of *Homo Sovieticus* required oppression and violence to build a socialist society. All aspects of life were subjugated and the line between private and public life was abolished to have a total domination over all subjects. However, it

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<sup>137</sup> Robert Service (2003) “Stalinism and the Soviet State Order” in Harold Shukman (eds.) *Redefining Stalinism*, London: Frank Cass Publishers (6-21) p. 7

<sup>138</sup> Katherine B. Eaton (2004) Op. cit., p. 270

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., pp.271-272

<sup>140</sup> Robert Service (2003) Op. cit., p. 8

could be said that one of the most essential character of Stalin administration, characteristic of totalitarian rule, was terror.

The terroristic policy focused annihilation of the regime opponents and elimination of potential threats. The enemies of the Soviet system could be Mensheviks, opponents of Stalin, local nationalist leaders, intellectuals, military and police leaders, kulaks, and former political leaders. Opponents were arrested, exiled and killed. Besides, when a citizen was arrested, friends and family members of that person were under the threat of imprisonment. Principle of individual criminal responsibility was ignorable in Stalin's regime. The security and intelligence services were the main characters in that process.

There were various organizations and names for security services during the history of the Soviet Union, which may be confusing. Although those organizations and services are not the focus of this thesis, they need to be mentioned due to their special role in the continuation of totalitarian rule. Paul R. Gregory is one of the professors who makes a good summary for all those services and organizations. He mentions that we need more than two hundred pages to guide history of Soviet state security organizations, their name changes and structural administration. He clarifies chronology and task of these organizations in detail as summarized below.<sup>141</sup>

After Cheka, the OGPU (Unified State Political Administration) was formed in February 1922 in order to handle security issues. Under Grigorevich Yagoda's leadership, the OGPU became the core security service (subordinating Worker-Peasant Militia or civil police organization) responsible for the Gulag administration. By Stalin's instruction, the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) was established in 1934 and Grigorevich Yagoda became the first minister. The OGPU was merged with the NKVD as State Security Administration (GUGB). The NKVD was also in charge of fire services, militia, border patrol, and citizen records.

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<sup>141</sup> Unless otherwise stated, the information on security organizations are taken from this source: Paul R. Gregory (2009) *Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (An Archival Study)*, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 81-105

Yagoda was replaced by Nikolai Yezhov in 1936. The period of 1936-1938 under Yezhov's rule of terror was known as *Ezhovshchina* or Great Terror.<sup>142</sup> Lavrenty Beria replaced Yezhov in 1939. These people were responsible for the repressive and bloody policies of Stalin. Under Beria, between 1939 and 1941, the NKVD arrested 134.000 people and exiled 200.000, and between 1941 and 1946 700.000 people were arrested and 70.000 of them were executed.

The GUGB by 1943 was transformed into a separate ministry as People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) carrying out foreign intelligence, combating espionage, and protection of leading cadres. After its reorganization in 1946, NKVD became the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and NKGB was named as Ministry of State Security (MGB). However, they were merged in 1953 under the name of MVD. It was a gigantic security organization now employing 1,095,678 people under leadership of Beria who had unprecedented power. This gave way to the unification of other leaders against Beria who was arrested and executed in 1953. After his period, MGB was split up from MVD again in 1954. Then in 1955 MGB turned into KGB (Committee for State Security) which performed until the end of the Soviet Union.

All of security apparatuses had a hidden agenda and all of them observed, tracked and watched each other. However there is no need to say that the supervisor was Stalin and his Politburo. "The secret police was under party supervision, with Stalin being responsible for such matters within the Politburo."<sup>143</sup> The power centers were mostly changeable. In this way, Stalin prevented any possible opposition with a potential to be a threat for his unquestionable dynasty. He sometimes relied heavy on different groups in the Party or gave weight to different strata in the NKVD. The multidimensional apparatuses were very influential to ensure their loyalty. "Stalin, whenever he shifted the power emphasis within his own movement from one

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<sup>142</sup> Barry McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott (2003) "Rethinking Stalinist Terror" in Barry McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott (eds.) *Stalin's Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union*, London: Palgrave Macmillan (1-18) p. 2

<sup>143</sup> Oleg Khlevniuk (2003) "Party and NKVD: Power Relationships in the Years of the Great Terror", in Barry McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott (eds.) *Stalin's Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union*, London: Palgrave Macmillan (21-33) p. 22

apparatus to another, had the tendency to liquidate the apparatus together with its staff.”<sup>144</sup>

The Soviet intelligence service was really gigantic with its enormous organization network which provided a control mechanism for the regime. The Communist Party had also a role in the manner of intelligence beside political issues. Its intelligence qualification strengthened its hand and procured dominance on many areas and throughout the country.

The assassination of Sergei Kirov, Party secretary of Leningrad, on 1 December 1934 was the turning point for Stalin’s terror. It gave way to the actions that ended with death of hundreds of thousands of people.<sup>145</sup> It strengthened Stalin’s hand in order to launch his repressive policies. It was followed by the Great Purges in literature. Fitzpatrick defines it as “mass arrests in the Communist elite and the episode of hysterical witch-hunting.”<sup>146</sup> The murder was like a pretext of Stalin’s unprecedented purge and for elimination of state intelligentsia. He was already a paranoid and this event increased Stalin’s paranoia and he began to get afraid to be killed.

Kirov was seen as successor of Stalin and enhanced his power in 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 1934 which was labeled as Congress of Victors. The reason of murder was unclear and remained as a conspiracy issue but it was known that oppressive policies against party members began after his death. It was exploited by Stalin in order to annihilate alternative figures in the Party. Khrushchev in his secret speech expressed that “1,108 of the 1,966 delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes (of whom 848 were executed).”<sup>147</sup> According to Arendt,

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<sup>144</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op. cit., p. 401

<sup>145</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) Op. cit., p. 49

<sup>146</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick (2000) Op. cit., p. 194

<sup>147</sup> Paul R. Gregory, Philipp J. H. Schröder, Konstantin Sonin (2006) Dictators, Repression and Median Citizen: An Eliminations Model of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives), Center for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School, Working Paper No: 91, p. 3

it took Stalin about two years, from 1936 to 1938, to rid himself of the whole administrative and military aristocracy of the Soviet society; nearly all offices, factories, economic and cultural bodies, government, party, and military bureaus came into new hands, when nearly half the administrative personnel, party and nonparty, had been swept out, and more than 50 percent of all party members and at least eight million more were liquidated.<sup>148</sup>

We observed three different major Show Trials that aimed to annihilate alternative figures to Stalin during 1936-1938. There were no definite evidences to accuse those who were jugged because of fabricated testimonies. The only crime was being an opponent to Stalin and to his rule. The victims were generally exposed to physical and physiological torture and in the trials the court did not only blame alleged guilty person but also their family and relatives were threatened or imprisoned. They were charged with acting in collaboration with foreign states and their intelligence organizations.

The first Moscow trial was in August 1936 which brought outstanding figures Zinoviev and Kamenev to trial. They were accused of having contact with German secret police service, Gestapo.<sup>149</sup> Also, they were claimed to be inspirers of terroristic activities, linked with ordering murder of Kirov and other party leaders including Stalin to be members of Anti-Soviet United Trotskyist-Zinovievite Centre.<sup>150</sup> They were forced to confess planning a murder with Trotsky targeting Stalin and other Politburo members. Two former leaders of the Party were executed. They were the first victims of Moscow Show Trials who were pressured to confess certain crimes and were accusing of being an agent of the capitalist western world.

The second Show Trial was held from 23 and 30 January 1937 to investigate the so-called Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center.<sup>151</sup> Sokolnikov, the former

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<sup>148</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op. cit., p. 321

<sup>149</sup> Mark Harrison (2008) "The Dictator and Defense" in Mark Harrison (eds.) *Guns and Rubles: The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State*, New Haven: Yale University Press (1-30) p. 7

<sup>150</sup> David Priestland (2007) *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power and Terror in Inter-war Russia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 348-350

<sup>151</sup> Oleg V. Khlevniuk (2009) *Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle*, Translated by Nora Seligman Favorov, New Heaven: Yale University Press, p. 157

Commissar of Finance, and economic official Pyatakov were blamed for being members of this Center. Sokolnikov died in labor camp and Pyatakov was shot. Also, Marshal Tukhachevsky, Deputy Commissar of Defense, was blamed for being a traitor and shot after a secret trial.<sup>152</sup>

The third Moscow Show Trial was staged in March 1938. It judged major figures Bukharin, Yagoda and Alexei Rykov.<sup>153</sup> Yagoda, old chief of NKVD, was on target and ironically, he had set up former show trials for Zinoviev and Kamenev. Bukharin was an important figure in the Party as a founder of the NEP. They were found guilty by wrecking actions such as industrial sabotage, plotting murder, links with foreign intelligence service and giving information to imperialist Japan and Nazi Germany. They were executed after confessing their crimes.<sup>154</sup>

In addition to Moscow Show Trials, Yezhov issued the operational Order 00447 in July 1937. It started mass operations of 1937 and 1938. The NKVD was authorized to begin mass shooting and imprisonment of harmful elements by the Politburo decree on which Order 00447 was based. According to regime, former kulaks, bandits and recidivist criminals, as well as the sectarians and former officials of Tsarist term were the most dangerous elements. When the operation ended by November 1938, about 766.000 people were caught up and 385.000 of those were arrested as “category I”. The decree separated two types criminals from each other: category I referring to those be shot and category II referring to those who were sentenced to work in labor camps from 5 to 10 years.<sup>155</sup>

“*Troiki* were established in the republics, *krais* and *oblasti* -administrative divisions- to decide the fate of those arrested. The *troiki* were accorded extraordinary powers, to pass sentences (including shootings) and issue orders for their

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<sup>152</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) Op. cit., pp. 51-52

<sup>153</sup> David D. Roberts (2006) *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics*, New York: Routledge, p. 253

<sup>154</sup> Alan Wood (2005) Op. cit., pp. 38-39

<sup>155</sup> David Shearer (2003) “Social Disorder, Mass Repression, and the NKVD during 1930s” in Barry McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott (eds.) *Stalin’s Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union*, London: Palgrave Macmillan (85-117) pp. 103-104

implementation without any check.”<sup>156</sup> Local administrators demanded more authority to suppress more individuals. They aimed to shoot and arrest more people than Moscow ordered.

Furthermore, the period of 1937-1938 was the eve of the Second World War, so regime had concerns about the loyalty of minorities who were regarded as politically suspect groups. On 20 July 1937, the NKVD received an order from the Politburo which demanded the arrest of all Germans working in defense factories. The NKVD order was approved on 9 August 1937 by the Politburo in order to liquidate “Polish diversionist groups” and Polish Organization of Military Personnel. The Politburo gave confirmation to the NKVD order on 19 September 1937. The target was, this time, Japanese who were connected with “terrorist diversionary and spying activities”. Furthermore, all Korean population in Far Eastern krai was deported to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of “Japanese espionage” through Central Committee and Sovnarkom resolution of 21 August 1937.<sup>157</sup> In the eyes of regime, all of them were dangerous populations who had to be suppressed. A threat of new world war caused cruel acts against minorities. Actions of the regime were likely a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Stalin’s terror was generally based on illegality, unfair courts, cases without evidence, executions, and arbitrariness depending on the wishes of the leader. These were also exercised not only over the ordinary people but also over the elite class, including the army. To give an example, “for the Stalinist purge 3 of the 5 marshals, 60 of the 67 corps commanders, 136 of the 199 divisional commanders, and about half of the officer corps some 35.000 either shot or imprisoned are testimony of that capacity.”<sup>158</sup> In addition, “all 11 deputy Commissars of Defense and 75 of the 80

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<sup>156</sup> Oleg Khlevnyuk (2003) “The Objectives of Great Terror, 1937-1938, in David L. Hoffmann (eds.) *Stalinism: The Essential Readings*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing (87-104) p. 91

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 92

<sup>158</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) *Op. cit.*, p. 103

members of the Supreme Military Council were executed. All eight admirals were shot.”<sup>159</sup>

In addition, some of those who were deported took different roles in labor camps. “The Soviets between the 1920s and 1953 developed a vast system of concentration camps (GULag) that exploited hundreds of thousands of slave laborers as part of the state plan.”<sup>160</sup> As mentioned earlier, the collectivization campaign of Stalin brought dekulakization policy which aimed liquidation of wealthy peasants or kulaks that were seen as socially marginal populations. About two million peasants who were labeled as kulaks deported from countryside to labor camps.<sup>161</sup> Not only kulaks but also opponents of Stalin were forced to settle in these camps. As Shearer puts it “overall the camp populations grew steadily from about 179,000 in 1930 to half a million by 1934. The huge influx of prisoners during the Great Purges in 1937 and 1938 swelled camp populations to 1.5 million by 1940.”<sup>162</sup>

These people were exploited as free labor source in the camps and became a critical component of the Soviet economic system which focused on rapid improvement.

Construction of mines, roads, railways and urban transport systems (such as the Moscow metro), canals and waterways (for example, the White Sea Canal), and new industrial towns, such as Magnitogorsk and Komsomol'sk-na-Amure, depended upon the labour of dispossessed kulaks and other forced labour.<sup>163</sup>

The propaganda and indoctrination would be counted as other object of the camps. The characters of camps' inmates were diversified under the ruthless and deadly conditions. Arendt divides the camps into three:

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<sup>159</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) Op. cit., p. 52

<sup>160</sup> Richard Hellie (2009) “Slavery and Serfdom in Russia” in Abbot Gleason (eds.) *A Companion to Russian History*, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing (105-120) p.119

<sup>161</sup> Lynne Viola (2009) Op. cit., p. 371

<sup>162</sup> David R. Shearer (2006) Op. cit., p. 202

<sup>163</sup> Peter Gatrell (2006) “Economic and Demographic Change: Russia's Age of Economic Extremes” in Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume III The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (383-410) p.401

In Russia, we must distinguish three more or less independent systems. First, there are the authentic forced-labor groups that live in relative freedom and are sentenced for limited periods. Secondly, there are the concentration camps in which the human material is ruthlessly exploited and the mortality rate is extremely high, but which are essentially organized for labor purposes. And, thirdly, there are the annihilation camps in which the inmates are systematically wiped out through starvation and neglect.<sup>164</sup>

In his last years Stalin had another paranoia, which was about the Jewish people. The anti-Semitic campaign in his last months was at climax due to thousands of dismissals of Jews from Soviet institutions. In addition, the arrestments of Kremlin doctors, many of whom were Jewish, were accused of giving wrong treatment to Stalin and poisoning him.<sup>165</sup> These actions against Jews, who were tried to be deported, is called Doctors' Plot in literature.

Therefore mass repression was used in order to destroy threats to regime and to deport socially harmful elements. These campaigns resulted in the reorganization of the Soviet population.<sup>166</sup> As Suny suggests “the unlimited despotism of Stalinism was the product of the Great Purges, which simultaneously eliminated all possible resistance and created a new and more loyal elite with which the tyrant could rule.”<sup>167</sup>

In this context the police campaigns are worth mentioning.

According to a report, dated 11 December 1953, sent to Khrushchev and Malenkov, the total number condemned by the political police (Cheka, NKVD, etc.) between 1921 and 1953 was 4,060,306. The number shot was 799,455 of which no fewer than 681,692 were executed during 1937 and 1938. Another remarkable statistic is that over the period 1923–53 over 42 million Soviet citizens were imprisoned (39.1 million in the RSFSR alone).<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Hannah Arendt (1973) Op. cit., p.443

<sup>165</sup> Vladimir Tismaneanu (2012) *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century*, California: University of California Press, p. 77

<sup>166</sup> Paul M. Hagenloh (2000) “Socially Harmful Elements and the Great Terror” in Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Stalinism: New Directions*, New York: Routledge (286-308) p. 303

<sup>167</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny (1991) Op. cit., p.23  
<https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/51226/460.pdf> Access Date: March 14, 2016

<sup>168</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) Op. cit., p. 51

When we look at Stalinist years in general and such policies in particular, we are faced with shocking numbers.

Between 1929, the year when the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture began, and 1939, a year after the last Moscow purge trial, about twenty million Soviet citizens were killed. They were shot, or died of famine, disease or exposure, directly resulting from the punitive actions of the Soviet government.<sup>169</sup>

It was an unquestionable fact that the Great Purges was directed by Moscow. It was impossible to operate without Stalin's ratification under such a totalitarian system. He liquidated all threats to his rule by labeling all of the accused people as anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary elements. Even purgers were purged. Main figures in politics and Soviet bureaucracy, intellectuals, minorities were removed, together with their families in some cases, as being "hostiles" via orders in the context of mass repression campaigns.

## **5. Revolution from Above**

In this final part, the imposed character of the policies developed during Stalin's era to realize the goals of revolution is analyzed. The state was essential element in this process. "Stalinism was not just a political system, let alone the rule of an individual. It was a set of values, a social identity, a way of life."<sup>170</sup> By its policies, intervention, and repression, it aimed to create a new revolutionary society.

In this context, ideology was put into effect to manipulate policies and also it was applied to suppress society with the fear of capitalism. The ideology of the regime was used as an instrument in order to justify different policies. The indoctrination and practice of communist ideology were seen as necessary tools for Stalin's dictatorship. In this perspective, one of the most important goals of the regime was the radical change in the economy. As Gouldner says: "Stalinism as a

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<sup>169</sup> Alvin W. Gouldner (Winter 1977-1978) "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism", *Telos* No: 34 (5-48) p. 11

<sup>170</sup> Stephen Kotkin (2003) "Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization", in David L. Hoffmann (eds.) *Stalinism: The Essential Readings*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing (111-126) p. 126

systematic regime of terror aimed at bringing about a property transfer, where private property (used for productive purposes) is supplanted by state property.”<sup>171</sup>

However, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union experienced a short period of relative free enterprise system which was called NEP. During this phase, “the peasants, after paying tax, were left to dispose of their surpluses as they saw fit. Private trade was again permitted. Small-scale private manufacture and petty craftsmen were given the go-ahead.”<sup>172</sup> After the term of *war communism*, NEP was like a recovery period. Bukharin, defender of pro-peasantry policies, was the architect of the NEP process. However, it was an interim era because there were great contradictory procedures with socialist ideology such as economic liberalization.

On the other hand, NEP came with disagreements in the Party. According to some people from the party *apparatchik*, it was a retreat from socialism and state planning economy. It was conciliation with kulaks, bourgeoisie, class enemies and capitalism. In spite of controlling foreign trade and heavy industry by the state, agriculture, light manufacturing and the service industries were owned by private sector.<sup>173</sup> It was a mixture of different paradigms. There was coexistence of state and private ownership but the state was still the main controller of market.

According to Kotkin “during the NEP, the dictatorship of the proletariat was beset by high unemployment, rising prostitution, millions of orphaned children (many of whom roamed the country engaging in criminal activities and forming gangs), and an explosion of private trade.”<sup>174</sup> The newly emerged class had a contradiction with the socialist ideology, named as NEP man, referring to merchants who became rich in these new economy. Also, the grain crises of 1927-1928 deteriorated the economy. Peasants inclined to hoard grain with the expectation of selling them at a high price. Thus, the black market and famine shaped the Soviet

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<sup>171</sup> Alvin W. Gouldner (Winter 1977-1978) Op. cit., p. 10

<sup>172</sup> Alan Wood (2005) Op. cit., p. 16

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., p. 25

<sup>174</sup> Stephen Kotkin (2003) Op. cit., p. 114

economic life. As a result, the NEP period, starting in the early years of 1920s, was over.

The new policies were collectivization and dekulakization. It began in 1929 and it was called a *Great Turn*.<sup>175</sup> The official starting point was the Central Committee decision to force peasants into collective farms in November of 1929. In fact, from 1928, some regions created special departments in rural party organizations in order to put the forced collectivization plan into operation.<sup>176</sup> Unlike the NEP period, the state regulated every aspect of the agricultural sphere. There was no sufficient scope for market economy except some small activities of farmers. State and its apparatuses were the controller of the every aspect of economic life. Moreover, the passport system was dictated in 1932 and peasants could not leave the territory without state permission. The Soviet people needed a special permission in order to move outside the district. Internal passports, which were used by the Tsarist system was issued at the end of 1932 in the Soviet Union as well.<sup>177</sup> Farmers were not freely moving because of this dependency. The aim was to be sure of continuity of production.

Two different types of farms were formed by the collectivization policy. First one was *kolkhoz* meaning collective farms. The wages of the peasants were equal to their production and paid after harvest; so they depended on the profit of the farm. Thus, inevitably an inequality among farmers emerged. The second type was *sovkhoz* or state farms. Unlike *kolkhoz* system, farmers of *sovkhoz* received salaries from the state<sup>178</sup> so this system remained ineffective and costly for the Soviet Union. In other words, production level was low and it did not meet the estimated level.

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<sup>175</sup> Lynne Viola (1996) *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and Culture of Peasant Resistance*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 24

<sup>176</sup> Lynne Viola (1990) "Guide the Document Series on Collectivization" in Sheila Fitzpatrick and Lynne Viola (eds.) *A Researchers Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s*, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., (105-128) p. 110

<sup>177</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick (1999) "Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia", in Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Stalinism: New Directions*, New York: Routledge (20-46) p. 35

<sup>178</sup> Martin McCauley (2013) *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44

According to Wood, “by 1932 over 60 percent of all peasant households had joined the *kolkhoz*, in comparison to only around one percent during the NEP.”<sup>179</sup> Likewise, “by 1934, 84.5 percent of agriculture had been collectivized; by 1939, the figure was 93.5 percent.”<sup>180</sup> Because of this quick process, Moscow lost the control on local authorities and Stalin blamed them in his work *Dizzy with Success*.<sup>181</sup>

Collectivization came with huge social changes. At the first stage of collectivization, equipments were imported and grain was one of the biggest sources of payment. It was used even when people were dying due to starvation. Also, tension in the region and the fear of the war caused stocking of grain for the army. When harvest was low, the state still tried to increase grain procurement. The persistence of grain requisition resulted in a major famine throughout the country. “Forced collectivization reached its tragic culmination only with the terror famine of 1932–33, which claimed three to six million lives.”<sup>182</sup> The result was great scarcity, so the population decreased as well. As Lee indicates,

production figures showed collectivization to be a disaster. The grain harvest declined from 73.3 million tons in 1928 (itself a problem year) to 71.7 million in 1929. An increase to 83.5 in 1930 was followed by a sharp downturn to 69.5 in 1931 and 69.6 in 1932. The figures for 1934 and 1935 were 67.6 and 75.0, respectively.<sup>183</sup>

The decline in the agricultural production and the fall of labor force due to the purges and famine brought about a chaotic condition. “The economy faced serious structural problems. Agricultural productivity was still low in the wake of the calamity of collectivization.”<sup>184</sup>

In addition, the enforcement of collectivization caused widespread slaughter of animals in the country. As Gouldner puts it

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<sup>179</sup> Alan Wood (2005) Op. cit., p. 33

<sup>180</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) Op. cit., p.264

<sup>181</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) Op. cit., p. 38

<sup>182</sup> David D. Roberts (2006)Op. cit., p. 243

<sup>183</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) Op. cit., p. 39

<sup>184</sup> Donald Filtzer (2004) *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6

between 1928 and 1934, there was a vast butchery of the country's livestock: the number of horses declined from 32 million to 15 million; cattle declined from 60 million to 34 million. By 1929, urban workers were eating substantially less meat, sugar and bread; by 1932, a countrywide famine was in full swing. In 1932, urban workers were eating one-third as much meat as they did in 1928 while people in rural areas were then eating slightly more than one-third of the 1928 meat consumption.<sup>185</sup>

During the collectivization period, more than one million peasant families or five to six million people faced dekulakization policy.<sup>186</sup> Furthermore, it was fortified by Stalin's statement that "we have gone over from a policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulak to a policy of liquidating the kulak as a class."<sup>187</sup>

The system defined kulaks, facing with great repression during collectivization, into three different categories. First one comprised the most dangerous element, around 60,000, who were mostly executed or sent to labor camps whereas their families were exiled to various parts of the country. The second group referred to less dangerous kulaks and around 150,000 families were exiled to remote places such as the Northern Region, Siberia, Urals and Kazakhstan. Their properties were expropriated. The final category included over half a million families whose properties were partly confiscated and they were resettled again.<sup>188</sup>

The prosperous peasants or kulaks as a class were tried to be eliminated so it was like a class war in the Soviet Union. Despite the regime's tight grip, peasants started resistance in countryside. Peasant terror or crimes against Soviet officials, assaults, murders, arsons, emerged as a response. "Terrorist incidents [of peasants] increased dramatically from a total of 1,027 in 1928 to 9,903 in 1929 to 13,794 in 1930."<sup>189</sup> Thus, it is possible to say that the collectivization process was like a civil war between center and countryside. As Viola indicates, "aggregate, national statistics on mass disturbances are available from 1928 to 1930. Mass disturbances

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<sup>185</sup> Alvin W. Gouldner (Winter 1977-1978) Op. cit., p. 29

<sup>186</sup> Lynne Viola (1996) Op. cit., 29

<sup>187</sup> Paul R. Gregory (2004) *The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 23

<sup>188</sup> Lynne Viola (1996) Op. cit., p. 27

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102

increased dramatically in these years, rising from a total of 709 in 1928 to 1,307 in 1929 to 13,754 in 1930.”<sup>190</sup> “In 1929, 244,000 peasants took part in disturbances. According to data on only 10,071 incidents, their number rose to 2,468,625 in 1930.”<sup>191</sup>

Collectivization caused mass migration, voluntarily or forcibly, during which about ten million young peasants moved from villages to cities to work in the industrial sector as part of the Five Year Plans prepared by Gosplan (Planning Commission).<sup>192</sup> The First Five Year Plan was launched in 1928 and it was followed by the second one in 1933. The Third Five Year Plan, interrupted by the German invasion, was started in 1937.<sup>193</sup> In this process, major construction projects were built such as Volga River-White Sea Canal system. New cities were built in advance in industrial sector. The most famous one was “Magnitogorsk, a metal city of 100,000 workers and families that was raised within the span of half a decade from the plains of central Siberia.”<sup>194</sup>

“The elimination of unemployment and narrowing of wage differentials during the First Five Year Plan placed a premium on other kinds of incentives to increase productivity, lower turnover, and raise labor discipline.”<sup>195</sup> One of the focal points of the five year plans was transformation of the agricultural Soviet economy, based on the backward farming system, to a collective farming with the support of machineries. Also, heavy industry focused on defense issue which was the kernel of industrialization.

Actually, the industrialization of the Soviet Union was highlighted by Stalin previously. At the fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, he claimed industry

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p. 135

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p. 140

<sup>192</sup> Alan Wood (2005) Op. cit., p. 34

<sup>193</sup> Stephen J. Lee (1999) Op. cit., pp. 36-37

<sup>194</sup> David R. Shearer (2006) Op. cit., p. 193

<sup>195</sup> Lewis H. Siegelbaum (1990) “Document Series on Industrialization” in Sheila Fitzpatrick and Lynne Viola (eds.) *A Researchers Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s*, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., (132-145) p. 141

as a priority of the regime. First period of NEP was over which focused on agriculture. In the second phase, the USSR gave preference to industry. The expansion of heavy industry was a must if agriculture was to be improved.<sup>196</sup> However, at the early stage of NEP there was not a total domination on the economy. The grip was tightened with the beginning of First Five Year Plan.

The factories or the equipments belonged to the state which determined what and which amount should be produced. People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP), one of the main actors during industrialization process, was founded in 1932. This ministry was responsible for all heavy industry such as metal, mining, machinery and defense goods. Its leaders, Sergo Ordzhonikidze and L. M. Kaganovich, were well-known loyal figures.<sup>197</sup>

Furthermore, for producing more amount of outputs, socialist competition was imposed on workers especially by the Stakhanovite movement. Aleksei Stakhanov, by exceeding daily quotas, mined 102 tons of coal in August 1935.<sup>198</sup> By pumping this record, labor productivity was tried to be enhanced and also different propagandist policies were applied. "Stakhanovites were represented in the Soviet media as embodying success stories from which the new Soviet workers could take instruction not only about work but about other dimensions of life."<sup>199</sup> They were introduced as new national heroes and celebrities to design a role model for other workers.

In addition, education had a major role in the context of breeding qualified generation. There were 52,000 engineering students in the Soviet Union by 1928 in 26 different high educational establishments. However, as a result of a great effort, there were 300,000 students and 175 institutions in 1955. At the same time, the

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<sup>196</sup> David Priestland (2007) Op. cit., p. 175

<sup>197</sup> Paul R. Gregory (2004) Op. cit., p. 154

<sup>198</sup> Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov (2000) *Stalinism as a Way of Life*, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 100

<sup>199</sup> Lewis H. Siegelbaum (2006) "Workers and Industrialization" in Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume III The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (440- 467) p. 447

United States enjoyed only 210 colleges offering engineering education to 194,000 students. In the period between 1928 and 1955 the Soviet Union produced 630,000 engineers and it equaled to 25 percent of high education graduates.<sup>200</sup>

“The Soviet industrialization drive, according to Stalin, was as much a political as an economic enterprise.”<sup>201</sup> The fact was that Russia, compared to the West, was an agrarian country which was tried to be turned into an industrial one. Furthermore, to bridge this gap with rapid tempo, Stalin paid attention to machinery systems, iron and steel industries. They were strategic sectors because of being used for weapon production and military technology.

The leaders of the Soviet Union thought that their country had to become a major power to defeat its capitalist rivals. It is possible to suggest that Stalin was successful in terms of defeating the Nazis during of the Second World War via the quick technological and military development of the country.

In Stalin’s era, revolution from above was a major goal which caused a great radical break with the past. The central planned economy in the light of communist ideology brought about five year plans, collectivization, dekulakization and also industrialization policies. As a result of the tight grip of Stalin on each aspect of administrative apparatuses, agricultural system and social structure experienced a revolutionary change.

Although Stalin achieved his objectives, Soviet people paid a heavy price for these aims, sometimes with their lives. Nevertheless the Soviet Union made a great industrial progress in a short period of time. The economic breakthrough of this era was undisputable. Underdeveloped Russia was turned into an industrial giant and a military superpower. As Stalin himself stated, he found the country with the wooden plough and left her with the atomic bomb.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1965) *Op. cit.*, p.233

<sup>201</sup> Hiroaki Kuromiya (2008) “Stalin in the Light of Politburo Transcripts” in Paul R. Gregory and Norman Naimark (eds.) *Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin’s Dictatorship*, New Haven: Yale University Press (41-56) p. 51

<sup>202</sup> Alan Wood (2005) *Op. cit.*, p. 2

In the next part, characteristics of authoritarianism are outlined with a specific emphasis on the major ideas of this regime type.

## CHAPTER IV

### CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Authoritarianism, as one of the regime types, is a controversial topic in political science since it is really hard to categorize different forms of authoritarian systems. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to classify different regimes. Such classifications in the literature generally depend on subjective considerations of the scholars contrary to natural and applied science which are shaped by objective criteria. A given regime could be named as authoritarian by a group of scholars while some others could label it as an example of totalitarian rule.

In addition, as Linz suggests, “regimes are the result of contradictory manifest and latent tendencies in different directions and therefore are all mixed forms. However, some regimes approach more one or another type.”<sup>203</sup> Thus, it would be controversial to place a particular political system within a particular typology. In this sense, to reach a consensus on classification of regimes is not easy for scientists.

However, in this chapter we will try to mention the relatively more agreed-upon characteristics of authoritarian regimes as much as possible. Therefore, it would be beneficial to take a look at the lexical meaning of the term. Oxford Dictionary defines authoritarianism as “the enforcement or advocacy of strict obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom.”<sup>204</sup> Additionally, the term of

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<sup>203</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) Op. cit., p.55

<sup>204</sup> <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/authoritarianism> Access Date: May 5, 2016

authoritarian is explained as “demanding that people obey completely and refusing to allow them freedom to act as they wish” by Cambridge Dictionary.<sup>205</sup>

In general it is possible to suggest that authoritarian systems “are often negatively defined as being regimes that do not meet certain criteria of democracy.”<sup>206</sup> This statement would perhaps be the simplest definition of authoritarian regimes. However, it would also be one of the most beneficial use of the term, giving us a general overview to work on this term.

Linz names political systems as authoritarian if they are

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercise power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.<sup>207</sup>

The numbers of authoritarian regimes in the world are slowly decreasing. Actually today they constitute one-fifth of world’s states. Moreover, authoritarian regimes have a tendency to adhere more to democratic values more likely to increase. In the past ten years, 70 percent of the authoritarian regimes held legislative elections. Also, more than one party was allowed to take part in election by more than three-quarters of authoritarian rules in this era.<sup>208</sup>

In the aftermath of such multi-party elections, we may have a chance to observe regime changes from authoritarian to democratic. However, it must also be kept in mind that the breakdown of an authoritarian regime would not guarantee the existence of a democratic rule. It may very well be replaced by another authoritarian administration. “Only 23 percent of authoritarian regime changes between 1942 and

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<sup>205</sup><http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/authoritarian?q=authoritarianism> Access Date: May 5, 2016

<sup>206</sup> Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius (2013) “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective”, *Contemporary Politics*, Volume: 19 Number: 1 (19–34) p. 19

<sup>207</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) Op. cit., p. 55

<sup>208</sup> Dawn Brancati (2014) “Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Volume: 17 Issue: 1 (313-326) p. 313

2003 resulted in democratic government.”<sup>209</sup> Likewise, “since World War II, only about 45% of leadership changes in autocracies led to regime change, and more than half of regime breakdowns were transitions from one autocracy to another.”<sup>210</sup>

Regime transitions take time, and nondemocratic regimes have a potential to turn into totalitarian administration. “Dictatorships, despotism and autocratic regimes are akin to totalitarian ones, in their elitist rule, arbitrary use of political power, minimization of private individual rights, and in their ordered and hierarchical institutions.”<sup>211</sup> In the case of authoritarianism, it may also transform into totalitarianism when the leading party focuses on the moral education of people in the country and it endeavors for subordinating consciences of citizens.<sup>212</sup> It is one of the separating lines between totalitarianism and authoritarianism which is the creation of new society together with new set of values and norms.

As a result, it would be said that authoritarianism is in contradiction both with totalitarianism and democratic state rules. Each of these have their distinctive characteristics. Nevertheless it should be remembered that authoritarian administrations have various features resembling to totalitarian systems; but they may also share some characteristics of a formal democracy.

Following characteristics of an authoritarian system can be accepted as the most important areas. In the rest of the chapter these characteristics will be further analyzed.

- Personalization of the system. A powerful leader who dominates the system in his/her favor together with an inner circle. The system affects social, cultural and economic aspects besides the political arena.

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<sup>209</sup> Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell (November 2006) *Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to Democracy*, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Paper, Number 331, p. 18

<sup>210</sup> Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz (2014) “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: New Data Set”, *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume: 12 Number: 2 (313-331) p. 314

<sup>211</sup> Michael Curtis (1987) *Op. cit.*, pp. 2-3

<sup>212</sup> Hans Buchheim (1968) *Op. cit.*, p. 23

- Limited pluralism in society. Freedom in media, cultural domain and civil society are all restricted. They are not totally oppressed as in totalitarianism however we cannot talk about a freedom of expression similar to liberal democracies.
- Search for legitimacy. It refers to a need of justification of an authoritarian ruler's administration under limited pluralistic atmosphere with the help of election process that is subjugated by the absolute leader and his/her followers.
- Economy under the domination of an authoritarian ruler. Economic issues in the country are determined by the single leader. He/she is the last decision maker in many economical topics.

In the following sections we will try to define and detail these characteristics one by one.

### **1. Role of the Leader and Inner Circle**

The leader of an authoritarian regime is powerful and controls many aspects in the country from political to social and economic domains. Therefore, his authority is absolute. Highly personal aggrandizement is another issue in authoritarian regime. Personalization of the system is applied generally in these regimes. However, it remains at the low level when we compare it to totalitarian rules. The effects of hegemony are easily perceivable but it should be mentioned that the leader does not direct each and every issue in the society as a totalitarian leader does.

One person plays a major role in the system. Likewise, the will of the leader forms the guiding principles for the administrative cadre. Even if their roles are minor and indirect as compared to the leader, this administration cadre helps the leader in the course of strengthening the regime and decision making process. In this period, the main things are the interests of the leader and the system. "Leaders' actions are shaped not only by their material interests and vocational backgrounds

but also by the political process by which immediate concerns become long-term considerations.”<sup>213</sup>

One of the main concerns of the single leader is loyalty which is a critical issue among administrative elites. Leading positions or assignments would be given to them as an award by the leader who wants to ensure the faithfulness of the elite circle. Collaborators of the leader may focus on their own personal interests so they can try to act in order to enhance their own benefits. This may result in a rivalry between them and the leader which brings about an inevitable fragmentation in the system. Gandhi and Przeworski imply that “authoritarian rulers may need cooperation and may fear a threat from various segments of society. Cooperation can be induced and the threat can be reduced by sharing spoils or by making policy compromises.”<sup>214</sup> However, it does not always guarantee a reliable inner circle.

Authoritarian regimes depend heavily on patronage and also loyalty. Therefore, professional competence of incumbents occurs as a problematic issue especially in the higher strata.<sup>215</sup> The loyalty and support for the leader bring the opportunity for promotion and authority. Herein, people from the elite cadre may come to office without sufficient qualifications. Merit may simply be ignorable at this point for the leader because the survival of his regime is more significant than efficient cadre.

Nevertheless the alliance of this incapable elite clique would be a threat for the single leader’s authority because of their opportunistic behaviors. In order to repel this threat, the ruler has to be sure about consolidation of the regime which should both establish devotion and suppression at the same time. Bove and Brauner with a quotation from Ronald Wintrobe argue that “if the ruler wishes to continue to exercise power, and enjoy the support of the armed forces, he must thwart the effort

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<sup>213</sup> Jason Brownlee (2007) *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 39

<sup>214</sup> Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski (November 2007) “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats” *Comparative Political Studies*, Volume: 40 Number: 11 (1279-1301) p. 1283

<sup>215</sup> Randall Baker (2002) “Introduction: Transition and Reform in Post-Authoritarian States”, in Randall Baker (eds.) *Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Role of the Bureaucracy*, London: Praeger (1-13) p. 9

of the generals to replace him; at the same time he has to prevent the risk of a civilian insurgency. To obtain these objectives, he relies on two instruments-loyalty and repression.”<sup>216</sup>

In this framework for instance, Putin, the absolute leader of Russia, created his own cadre which depended on devotion and discipline at large. As Huskey states, “Vladimir Putin surrounded himself with perhaps the only two groups on which he felt he could rely: those personally loyal (his co-workers from St. Petersburg) and those professionally disciplined (officials from the uniformed services).”<sup>217</sup>

Policy decisions of such a coalition would define societal and cultural dynamics. However, policies are not the only way to affect society so in authoritarian regimes, as these policies do not have the capacity to totally transform the society. In other words, authoritarian regimes remain inadequate in the framework of total subjugation of citizens or in the creation of a new type of common identity like the new Soviet man. They are only capable of building a limited pluralistic atmosphere.

## **2. Limited Pluralism in Society**

Authoritarianism is a kind of dictatorship that excludes democratic values. One leader or a group decides for the future of citizens and country by controlling and exploiting various sources of power. However, authoritarian regimes remain in the scope of their authority contrary to totalitarian rule. Authoritarian leaders attempt to influence social life according to their own viewpoints and understandings rather than aiming to create a totally new social life and values. Authoritarianism, unlike totalitarianism, permits citizens to act relatively free. It has not a total grasp and domination over society however its policies affect individuals.<sup>218</sup>

As Altemeyer suggests “authoritarians believe that proper authorities should be trusted to a great extent and deserve obedience and respect. They believe that

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<sup>216</sup> Vinconze Bove and Jennifer Brauner (2011) *The Demand for Military Expenditure in Authoritarian Regimes*, London: Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics & Finance, p. 5

<sup>217</sup> Eugene Huskey (2010) “Elite Recruitment and State-Society Relations in Technocratic Authoritarian Regimes: The Russian Case”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume: 43 Issue: 4 (363-372) P. 371

<sup>218</sup> Hans Buchheim (1968) *Op. cit.*, p.22

these are important virtues which children should be thought and if children stray from these principles, parents have a duty get them back in line.”<sup>219</sup> The indoctrination is provided firstly by families. They have a critical position when characteristics of the society are intervened by the regime. It would impose some visions upon society in order to create and protect regime privileges.

In some extreme cases, an authoritarian leader can be responsible for the execution of possible rivals to give a lesson to others, forces them to resign, discredits them, and also have them to be arrested or hindered from leading an office.<sup>220</sup> The fear and using violence are important agents in this process. Subordinated individuals cannot resist to authoritarian rule when they face various threats coming from regime apparatuses. They refrain from street demonstrations and being dissident citizens because of fear environment. This fear determines the behavior of people instinctively and causes them be hesitant to stand against the overwhelming policies of the regime. Killing of around 200 journalists having critical vision about Putin would be counted as a maneuver in order to spread fear in the country.<sup>221</sup> Hereby, the potential movements that would topple the leader are eliminated through pre-emptive actions.

The survival of authoritarian regimes mostly depends on internal factors in the limited pluralistic system such as unrest in society and incumbent elite coalition that would be a threat for regime durable. However, the external issues would also be a danger to the stability of an authoritarian system. The leaders have concerns related to neighbors’ political systems. A democratic transition in a neighboring territory may end in a regime change, so be a possible threat in the country.<sup>222</sup> The wave of democratization would pave the way for toppling of leader and regime or a breakdown in the system. For instance, the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space

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<sup>219</sup> Bob Altemeyer (1996) *Authoritarian Specter*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 9

<sup>220</sup> Kris A. Beck (2010) “On Tyranny: The Political and Economic Characteristics of the Authoritarian Regime”, *New England Journal of Political Science*, Volume: 5 Number: 1 (44-112) p. 76

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 89-91

<sup>222</sup> Thomas Ambrosio (2009) *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 19-24

frightened Putin administration in Russia. Therefore, they were alarmed and took same measures to halt effects of democratization in the country.

The essential concern of an authoritarian government is to preserve power. Thus, the main interest is abolishment of threats of the system and to assure maintenance of power.<sup>223</sup> Also, aggressive policies in domestic and foreign issues would be observed. Huntington claims that “if a nondemocratic state greatly increased its power and began to expand beyond its borders, this too could stimulate authoritarian movements in other countries.”<sup>224</sup>

Moreover, the media, as an important mean for manipulation of masses, is controlled by authoritarian leaders. The regime cannot tolerate criticism in media because it is clear that it would trigger a dissent movement. “In authoritarian regimes, state-controlled media seek to isolate activists from society at large, with the idea of preventing them from organizing and mobilizing.”<sup>225</sup> Therefore, reactions of opponents towards the leader and administration are attempted to be blocked. However, an authoritarian rule, unlike a totalitarian one, fails to ensure control on the media sector entirely. Its hegemony is not enough to unlimited subordination but it most likely have repression over media outlets.

Through coercion on media, loyal businessmen performing in media sector would be created. Shifting ownership to pro-regime entrepreneurs in visual and printed sector gives a much broader scope to the rulers for political actions. “State dominance enables regimes to put pro-government narratives front and center while using the power of editorial omission to limit criticism of official policies and actions.”<sup>226</sup> Regime propaganda and mass manipulation are ensured by placing

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<sup>223</sup>Christian von Soest (2015) “Democracy Prevention: The International Collaboration of Authoritarian Regimes”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume: 54 Issue: 4 (623-638) p. 627

<sup>224</sup> Samuel P. Huntington (Spring 1991) “Democracy’s Third Wave”, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume: 2 Number: 2 (12-34) p. 19

<sup>225</sup> Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker (2014) “Authoritarian Regimes Retool Their Media-Control Strategy”, *The Washington Post*, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/authoritarian-regimes-retool-their-media-control-strategy/2014/01/10/5c5bfa6e-7886-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/authoritarian-regimes-retool-their-media-control-strategy/2014/01/10/5c5bfa6e-7886-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_story.html) Access Date: May 18, 2016

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

restrictions on the press. It is utilized as a propaganda machine in order to change the perception of society in favor of the administration.

An oppositional movement would be influential if it is able to mobilize civil society. The authoritarian leader is aware of this fact so he tries to detain nongovernmental organization from running freely. “Where organisations such as independent trade unions, community movements, and social pressure groups are able, alongside parties, to establish themselves in civil and political society, the less space there is for the regime to impose its own institutions.”<sup>227</sup>

The regime encourages pro-governmental NGOs and the opponent organizations are generally oppressed. It is obvious that the demands for reform and demonstrations sponsored by civic organizations are fearful actions in authoritarian systems. By establishing a supportive civil society, the regime makes an effort to create a pseudo liberal atmosphere and limited pluralistic tendencies. By this way, the regime not only aims to avoid from reform demands coming from other countries or its citizens but also legitimizes its own rule. As White suggests “the ability to maintain persistently high levels of support for protest actions is a vital factor in undermining the legitimacy of the regime.”<sup>228</sup>

### **3. Seeking for Legitimacy**

Similar to a totalitarian system, in authoritarian systems too, the political party which is subjugated to a single leader is an essential mechanism for consolidation of the regime. The party is one of the main agents that the absolute ruler applies in order to run the country. Furthermore, the authoritarian system seeks to legitimize its privileged party in the eyes of the citizens, since it cannot ignore or oppress the will of individuals as a whole like totalitarian administrators do.

Political parties in authoritarian systems provide three different benefits for the leader. Firstly, they are useful in order to organize society and to make ruling easier. In this way, the survival and stability of the regime increase. The second one

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<sup>227</sup> David White (2013) “Taking it to the Streets: Raising the Costs of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Volume: 14 Number: 4 (582-598) p. 587

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 589

is authoritarian leader keeps his grip over legislature, military and bureaucracy by using the party. The party can place its officials in these institutions in order to monitor them closely. Lastly, the party is critical in the case of perception management. The leader would seem like having a major popular support behind him via the party.<sup>229</sup>

In the authoritarian systems, the privileged party is formed with an amalgamation of various elements. It is founded from above rather than by a grass roots movement. Also, it is set up by a group which is in power, contrary to totalitarian systems in which the party seizes power.<sup>230</sup>

In addition, some opposition parties are also allowed in authoritarian systems in order to create a seemingly pluralistic atmosphere. In this way, they would avoid domestic and international interventionist efforts to strengthen the scope of democracy. “Authoritarian rulers try to withstand external pressure to liberalize as long as possible.”<sup>231</sup> Elections are generally applied to avoid various inferences in authoritarian regimes. They serve to mask regime type. It is useful to create image of democracy.

The legitimization of incumbents is needed and elections breed grounds for this atmosphere. Extending the margin of representation through parties in the legislative branch paves the way for stability atmosphere in the country. Thus, unrest in the society or in the opposition movements would be mitigated relatively. “It now is widely accepted that authoritarian regimes like Russia that have legislative institutions tend to be more durable than authoritarian regimes without such institutions.”<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> Kris A. Beck (2010) Op.cit., p. 80

<sup>230</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) Op. cit., p. 162

<sup>231</sup> Julia Grauvogel and Christian von Soest (2014) “Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume: 53 Issue: 4 (635–653) p. 636

<sup>232</sup> Ora John Reuter and Graeme B. Robertson (2013) *Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Putin’s Russia*, University of Washington: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research Working Paper, p. 5

Herein, elections are popular phenomenon among nondemocratic countries even if they have one party system. “Though elections are typically associated with democracies, they are actually quite common in dictatorships. About three-quarters of all post-World War II dictatorships have held elections, half of them on a regular basis.”<sup>233</sup>

Although there are some political parties, the ideological divisions among them may not be clear. As Sondrol suggests “lacking a prophetic vision, authoritarian support is based not on a shared ideology, but on a vaguer ‘mentality’ or secular spoils system engendered by interests created by the dictator’s rule.”<sup>234</sup> The lacking of ideology in authoritarian regimes is a problematic issue in the context of mobilization of people. It causes a decrease in number of participants to party propaganda activities, campaigns and meetings. “Without ideology, the young, the students, the intellectuals are not likely to get involved in politics and provide the cadres for politicization of population.”<sup>235</sup>

The authoritarian rulers give reference to common grounds in the absence of an ideological orientation and in the atmosphere of limited pluralism. In this sense, they achieve to neutralize the possible threats which would come from opponents, since authoritarian rulers are deprived of highly mobilized mass support. Thanks to common denominators, not only rulers would gain loyalty of various elements but also common denominators provide adaptation to changing conditions more easily. Applying mostly general values such as nationalism, social justice, economic development and patriotism pragmatically breeds ground for rulers, coming to power without mobilized mass support, in order to eliminate ideological discrepancies, neutralize opponents, co-opt various supporters and decrease tension in politics.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz (2011) *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders*, London: Continuum, p. 67

<sup>234</sup> Paul C. Sondrol (1991) *Op. cit.*, p. 605

<sup>235</sup> Juan J. Linz (2000) *Op. cit.*, p. 167

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, *Op. cit.*, p. 164

In authoritarian regimes, harassment of the opponents is used frequently in order to be sure about being the victor in the elections. The targets of harassment are not only the opposition candidates but also electors potentially voting for them.<sup>237</sup> In this process, the loyal forces would take part in nondemocratic regimes in order to suppress potential threats which are formed by opposition movements. “This repression is often exercised by a specialized branch of the state, the military.”<sup>238</sup> Pro-government stance of them would be advantageous for the durability of the regime. However, the leader would give these offices to kinfolks if the leader’s concern about faithfulness increases for the sake of the system’s survivability.

#### **4. Economy under Dominance**

The definite state power on economy is another main characteristic of an authoritarian system which prevents the rise of an opposition force that is established by independent economic actors. It would be unrealistic to ignore the correlation between political hegemony and economy. The newly robust economic class would create a front against the authoritarian system if they rely on their economic power. It stems from their prosperous life and social status. Therefore, in order to prevent any potential economic challengers, this wealth should be directed and distributed by the single leader.

The emergent middle class has a threatening position for the absolute leader. The ruler must keep an eye on business oligarchs in order to ensure that they have no opportunity for independent activities in economic and political fields. “Modernization theory argues that once a large middle-class emerges, it wants more personal liberty, influence on the government, and a better standard of living.”<sup>239</sup> Moreover, a robust private sector out of state domination is a critical agent in order to create an independent media being financed by dissident figures.

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<sup>237</sup> Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz (2011) Op. cit, p. 72

<sup>238</sup> Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni (2010) “A Theory of Military Dictatorships”, *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, Volume: 2 Number: 1 (1-42) p. 1

<sup>239</sup> Kris A. Beck (2010) Op.cit., p. 83

The involvement of resolute businessmen in politics would damage the dynamics of authoritarian system. The demand of oligarchs, being in the parliament, is a harmful attempt that breaks the harmony between legislation and execution of authoritarian regime. For Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way “in most full-scale authoritarian regimes, legislatures either do not exist or are so thoroughly controlled by the ruling party that conflict between the legislature and the executive branch is virtually unthinkable.”<sup>240</sup> However, new middle class seeks for alternative and free movement that would replace authoritarianism.

Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that economic growth comes with popularity for authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, support of masses decreases when economy tends to be shaken. It can be seen obviously in Putin’s Russia.<sup>241</sup> We can say that briefly, economy has a key role in the context of authoritarian stability. The bad economic atmosphere also gives people a ground for unrest and demonstrations which are unfavorable situations for authoritarian leaders. Thus, it is likely for a single leader to have inclination to oppress these movements.

Close ties with the ruling class are generally established together with various affiliations. For instance, “in the Soviet Union, party membership was considered a necessary condition for inclusion and advancement on nomenklatura lists.”<sup>242</sup> This membership is an important assurance in order to take part in the privileged class. Especially, relations in the economic sector are shaped by political networks.

Therefore, the strategic sectors like energy and defense industry are subjected by the state or absolute leader. Alternatively, the loyal businessmen control these industries. These sectors do not belong to the state but they are not freely managed by their owners. It can be said that there is an organic bond between these enterprises and the state. It is an autonomous pattern in which the state has a right to intervene

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<sup>240</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way (2002) Op. cit. p. 55

<sup>241</sup> Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (2008) “Medvedev Should Move Beyond Autocracy”, *Energy Tribune*, <http://www.energytribune.com/1086/medvedev-should-move-beyond-autocracy#sthash.giWcp7eP.dpbs> Access Date: May 12, 2016

<sup>242</sup> Ora John Reuter and Rostislav Turovsky (2014) “Dominant Party Rule and Legislative Leadership in Authoritarian Regimes”, *Party Politics*, Volume: 20 Number: 5 (663-374) p. 665

and be involved in the administration process. As in the Russian case, loyal entrepreneurs in these managements can take part in leading party and its policies. Medvedev who was a former leader of the Gazprom took charge of the United Russia and became the Prime Minister and then the President of the country.<sup>243</sup>

Moreover, new regulations are made by the authoritarian leader in order to shape the economy. The arrangement of taxation system is one of the most frequently used methods. In this way, some investors, needless to say the loyal and devoted ones take full advantage while the market is formed by the hands of authoritarian leader. Other businessmen are impeded from competing fairly through some measures like additional taxes. Thus, the ruler buys the loyalty of elite class and a relationship based on mutual interests is structured. Finally, the leader forms a frame for economy by allocating the wealth under his authority.<sup>244</sup>

As was mentioned in the first part of this chapter, authoritarian regimes are difficult to be categorized and conceptualized due to the differences they display in different contexts. Next chapter analyzes Putin's Russia, one of the most typical cases of an authoritarian regime.

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<sup>243</sup>Arkady Ostrovsky (2009) "Reversal of Fortune", *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/reversal-of-fortune-2/> Access Date: May 13, 2016

<sup>244</sup> Kris A. Beck (2010) Op. cit., pp. 85-88

## CHAPTER V

### PUTIN AND PUTINISM

*“History proves that all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of government are transient. Only democratic systems are not transient.”<sup>245</sup>*

*Vladimir Putin*

Russia has experienced various forms of governments throughout its history, from monarchy to Tsarist regime and from communism during the Soviet period to democracy in modern Russia. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concept of democracy during Vladimir Putin’s leadership is really a disputed subject among different authors, academicians and political experts. Some of them label it as “electoral authoritarianism”<sup>246</sup> or “competitive authoritarianism”<sup>247</sup> while some others call it as “managed democracy”<sup>248</sup>, and it is an example of “hybrid regime”<sup>249</sup> for the rest of them.

Putin’s charismatic and controlling leadership with a harsh political rhetoric triggers the statement of authoritarian administration. His type of rule during two

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<sup>245</sup> The Globalist (2000) “What kind of Russia did Mr. Putin inherit from Boris Yeltsin?”, *The Globalist*, <http://www.theglobalist.com/putin-speaks/> Access Date: January 6, 2016

<sup>246</sup> Cameron Ross, “Federalism and Electoral Authoritarianism under Putin”, *Demokratizatsiya*, [https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU\\_DEMO\\_13\\_3/F347157H3656H776/F347157H3656H776.pdf](https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_13_3/F347157H3656H776/F347157H3656H776.pdf) Access Date: December 10, 2015

<sup>247</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way (2002) “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Democracy”, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume: 13 Number: 2 (51-65)

<sup>248</sup> Richard Sakwa (2011) *The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

<sup>249</sup> Henry E. Hale (2010) “Eurasian Politics as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin’s Russia”, *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Volume:1 Issue: 1 (33-41)

tenures of presidency and a premiership office era vindicates these interpretations. His leadership style is called as Putinism which is identified with personality of Putin. In this chapter, we will not point his last term of presidency between 2012 and 2018 because it is in process and it would be too early to make some remarks about it. Putin's the last presidency duration is beyond the scope of this study.

Putin's suppressive regime in domestic issues is a characteristic of his rule. Putin administration is full of his arbitrary attitudes. The duration of presidency was extended from four years to six years in order to provide a longer office term to Putin. The political atmosphere is shaped according to his will. In Russia, there are different political parties but Putin's party of United Russia dominates the national politics whereas the other parties except satellite parties generally face oppression. The Russian legislation system containing the lower house, State Duma, and the upper chamber, Federation Council, is shaped by Putin and his loyal cadre. Amendments are dependent on his political posture.

In addition to the above mentioned points, the judicial system is also under political pressure and judges cannot make free decisions. Putin, as an authoritarian leader, interferes to judicial system. The state machinery is exploited and used as a tool to suppress the opponents through undue arrests.

The main goal of Putin's regime is to shape the society in accordance with the preferences of the regime. The regime mostly enforces the people to follow the policies which are designed to help the ruling party. The masses are manipulated through different means in order to avoid any kind of resistance. Furthermore, suppression of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is one of the most frequently used methods by Putin's administration. It is claimed that "the surveillance of think tanks and NGOs receiving foreign funding be intensified."<sup>250</sup> Especially foreign civil society organizations are considered as agents and operational units of other countries in Russia. That paranoia stems from the Soviet past of administrative elite who generally belonged to the intelligence services. This

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<sup>250</sup> Charles Hawley (2012) "Russia Becoming a 'Bona Fide Dictatorship'", *Spiegel* <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/russian-ngo-raids-a-sign-of-growing-authoritarianism-say-commentators-a-891248.html> Access Date: December 12, 2015

elite team has been so close to Putin since Committee for State Security (KGB) times.

Controlling media is also a common practice of the authoritarian regimes. Russia, being an authoritarian rule, does not hesitate to repress the dissident journalists. The visual and print media are led by Putin's loyal oligarchs. This sector is under the monopoly of businessmen who have interdependency with Putin's movement. Thus, opposing decisions are harshly turned down and the representatives of the opposing group are often arrested or killed dubiously. "The well-known oligarch, Vladimir Gusinsky who was the owner of the holding company Media-MOST was unexpectedly arrested and sent to Butyrskaya prison. Here, he was forced to sign an agreement to sell his shares in the quasi-state concern Gazprom, after which he was let go in peace."<sup>251</sup>

The economic welfare has been provided for Russians during the Putin era after the devastated economy of the Soviet Union. At this point, natural gas and oil take an important position. Russian people during the Soviet times faced with scarcity of resources and economic crisis. The productivity under Putin strengthens his hands and this condition is transformed into a potential to political propaganda. It is one of the significant causes for Putin's long term leadership.

In future it seems that Putin has planned revitalization of Russia through internal peace and practicing influential foreign policy mainly shaped through gas and oil reserves.<sup>252</sup> As a result of the economic growth seen during the past decade, Putin has gained self-confidence, which is reflected through his foreign policy. Putin's will for Soviet legacy and the target of restoring Russian influence in near abroad direct aggressive attitudes. He tends to turn Russia into a pivotal country in the world which can stand against the United States' hegemonic policies. Therefore, Russia pursues security oriented policies and offensive posture.

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<sup>251</sup> Boris Kagarlitsky (2002) *Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-liberal Autocracy*, London: Pluto Press, p. 271

<sup>252</sup> Steve Levine (2008) *Putin's Labyrinth: Spies, Murder, and the Dark Heart of the New Russia*, New York: Random House, p. 24

In this chapter, we will discuss Putin's policies with an argument that the administration of Putin is an example of authoritarian regime because of his ruling style. We will use different examples to take this argument in detail. Moreover Putin's past would not be out of agenda because his career in intelligence service has influences on today's Russia and thus, we will discuss his life as well. In the following parts, firstly, we will focus on the domestic issues of Putin terms generally. This section will contain policies of Putin specifically in terms of politics, press and NGOs. Secondly, the economic policies related to Putinism driven by the energy sector and how this sector has been used by him for populist aims will be pointed. Finally, Putin's harsh foreign policy with imperialistic discourse will be brought into discussion.

### **1. From KGB to Presidency**

Vladimir Putin was born in Leningrad as the son of Maria and Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin on October 1952. His father was a factory worker and also the secretary of the local communist organization. His mother worked as a worker in order to get money.

Putin started his early education at Leningrad in a very meritorious school. His classmates and teachers remembered him "as a top student who was self-confident, but also as someone who did not try to draw attention to himself."<sup>253</sup> As an oft-told anecdote, after watching a Russian spy movie, Putin decided to be a member of the KGB. He went to Leningrad Headquarter to obtain information about how to become an agent. He was recommended to get a law degree so he applied to the Leningrad State University's Law School.

He was recruited in 1975 by the KGB in the foreign intelligence service. He continued his task in Leningrad about ten years. He was appointed to Dresden in East Germany in 1985 where he worked till 1990. However, he got married with Marries Lyudmila in the year of 1983 and he was not a single man when he was taken into

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<sup>253</sup> Charles J. Shields (2007) *Modern World Leaders Vladimir Putin*, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, p. 32

service in Dresden.<sup>254</sup> His job was monitoring East Germans closely and collecting information about the Western part. In addition, he focused on getting a hold of technological improvements of the West because of the changing circumstances of the Cold War.<sup>255</sup> His post was transformed due to the fall of the Berlin Wall and his duty lost its significance thus Putin turned back to Leningrad in 1990.

His new duty was to observe the foreign students in Leningrad State University which hardly had any potential for progress in his career. Also it was not as exciting as the assignment in Dresden. He looked for alternative options and resigned from KGB in 1991. Anatoly Sobchak, his law professor from the university, assigned Putin as an academic advisor in the university. Putin entered in the Sobchak cadre and worked with him when he was the mayor of St. Petersburg after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.<sup>256</sup> Putin took different titles in office of the mayor of St. Petersburg. He was an advisor, later became the chairman of the Committee for Foreign Relations and finally got promoted as the deputy mayor of St. Petersburg.

His boss could not get re-elected in 1996 local elections and then Putin resigned from his office of deputy mayor. After that, his career plans were shaped by Moscow and he was assigned as Deputy Chief Administrator in Kremlin. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration was his second promotion in Moscow. In a short while, he became the Deputy Chief of Staff and then he was promoted to the position of Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in 1998. It is a successor agency of the KGB after the fall of the USSR.<sup>257</sup> In a few months, he continued his rapidly developing career as Secretary of Russian Security Council and then he was assigned as Prime Minister in an unstable political atmosphere in the year of 1999. Also,

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<sup>254</sup> <http://eng.putin.kremlin.ru/bio> Access Date: February 26, 2016

<sup>255</sup> Charles J. Shields (2007) Op.cit. pp. 45-47

<sup>256</sup> David Hoffman (2000) "Putin's Career Rooted in Russia's KGB", *Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/putin.htm> Access Date: February 26, 2016

<sup>257</sup> Nick Paton Walsh (2004) "The Man who wasn't There", *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/29/russia.features> Access Date: February 26, 2016

Yeltsin mentioned that he wanted to see Putin as President after his term.<sup>258</sup> Yeltsin's surprised resignation in the last day of 1999 made Putin the Acting President until elections were held according to Russian constitution.

His coldblooded and disciplined character raised him to the prominence. Especially, the political turmoil atmosphere in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union needed an assertive figure like Putin. Moreover, both his loyalty to his cadre and hardworking style enriched his profile. There was a transition period going on for almost a decade for the Russians under the Yeltsin administration. People were tired of the reforms which were hardly working out to improve the standard of life. Yeltsin and his team were considered equally corrupt by the people. Particularly privatization period after the communist regime worsened when new oligarchic and power groups emerged. New rich partisans produced another powerful class in the Russian society. However, Putin's experience in KGB as an agent kept him out of degeneration process and made him a popular leader.<sup>259</sup>

Putin had harsh stance towards the Chechen problem and rebellions in Caucasus. His controlling and arrogant leadership with nationalistic discourse provided popularity to him. He was not only admired and idealized, but people also had an unknown fear of his personality. The tough-guy persona and the inclination to preserve status-quo for Russia were prominent dimensions of his administration. Putin's reliability among executive team and his patriotic and conservative attitude brought him particular importance which distinguished him from other political figures.

On 26 March 2000, the presidential elections concluded with Putin's victory by 52,94 percent of votes.<sup>260</sup> Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the major opponent of Putin, stood second with 29,17

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<sup>258</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/415087.stm> Access Date: February 26, 2016

<sup>259</sup> Charles J. Shields (2007) Op.cit. p. 71

<sup>260</sup> [http://tr.sputniknews.com/rsfmradio.com/2014\\_05\\_07/vladimir-putin-on-yillik-devlet-baskanligi-donemi/](http://tr.sputniknews.com/rsfmradio.com/2014_05_07/vladimir-putin-on-yillik-devlet-baskanligi-donemi/) Access Date: December 19, 2015

percent of votes.<sup>261</sup> There was no need to run for second round because he won more than 50 percent of the votes. His office terms began officially on 7 May 2000 after taking the presidential oath.

His approach to political issues during premiership and acting presidency gave some signals about how he would rule Russia. Few days after becoming the acting president “by signing an amendment to the Law on Operational Investigations, Putin gave all police and security agencies the right to monitor, at will, the private e-mail correspondence of 2 million Internet users in Russia.”<sup>262</sup> During the first term, democracy, civil rights and freedom of speech were always debated topics. His policies and his rule were generally criticized by Western countries and he was blamed of being an illiberal leader.

Vladimir Putin was re-elected for a second presidential term on 14 March 2004.<sup>263</sup> When Putin won 71.3 percent of votes, the Communist leader Nikolai Kharitonov was in second place by 13.7 percent of the votes.<sup>264</sup> It was a victory by a really high rate. He increased his vote rate dramatically compared to the elections of 2000. However, there were some complaints echoed by opponents about fraudulent election atmosphere and media in particular. The media under the control of state could not remain impartial and broadcasted in favor of incumbent. There was not equal chance for all of the candidates. The Central Election Committee was inadequate to react to the situation. The election process did not represent the atmosphere of a healthy democracy.<sup>265</sup>

After the second term of presidency, he had to leave the post because of Article 81 of the Russian constitution that underlines “one and the same person

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<sup>261</sup> Oktay F. Tanrısever, “Rusya’daki 2000 Yılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimlerinin Demokratikleşme Süreci Açısından Bir Analizi”, <http://www.21yyte.org/assets/uploads/files/277-290%20oktay.PDF> Access Date: December 19, 2015

<sup>262</sup> Charles J. Shields (2007) Op.cit. p. 77

<sup>263</sup> <http://eng.putin.kremlin.ru/bio> Access Date: December 19, 2015

<sup>264</sup> Sarah Oates (2006) Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia, New York: Routledge, p. 179

<sup>265</sup> OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report (2004) Russian Federation Presidential Election 14 March 2004, pp. 1-2 <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/33101?download=true> Access Date: December 19, 2015

cannot hold the office of the President of the Russian Federation for more than two terms running.”<sup>266</sup> By the end of tenure, he did not retire from politics. The presidential elections held in March 2008 resulted in victory of Medvedev and he inaugurated on 7 May a day before assigning of Putin.<sup>267</sup> Putin was appointed as the Prime Minister by the President Dmitry Medvedev on 8 May 2008 and he received 392 votes in 450 seat Duma that gave confirmation for his new duty.<sup>268</sup> “Between 2008 and 2012, Russia was governed by the tandem form of rule.”<sup>269</sup>

This exchange of positions is called as *tandemocracy* which refers to a partnership of two people in Russia who are Putin and Medvedev.<sup>270</sup> Medvedev was nominated by Putin as his successor. Even though Putin took a step backward from Presidency; many people know that he was the real policy maker. Medvedev was a custodian and the power behind the scenes belonged to Putin. This power shift was obligatory and also it was an interim period until next presidential elections in 2012. As expected, Putin again held the office of Presidency after the elections and Medvedev inaugurated Prime Ministry tenure. In this four year term of Premiership, Putin was still a dominant figure in Russia.

Putin constitutes an idiosyncratic rule in Russia during his office terms. Fareed Zakaria count elements of Putinism as “nationalism, religion, social

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<sup>266</sup> <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstEng4.shtml> Access Date: December 19, 2015

<sup>267</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-inauguration-idUSL0649335020080507> Access Date: December 19, 2015

<sup>268</sup> C. J. Chivers (2008) “Putin is Approved as Prime Minister”, *The New York Times*, [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/europe/09russia.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/europe/09russia.html?_r=1) Access Date: December 19, 2015

<sup>269</sup> Richard Sakwa (May 2013) “Developed Putinism: Change Without Development”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, No: 127, (2-4) p. 3

<sup>270</sup> Henry E. Hale and Timothy J. Colton (2009) *Russians and Putin-Medvedev Tandemocracy: A Survey-Based Portrait of 2007-08 Election Season*, University of Washington: The National Council For Eurasian and East European Research, p. 1 [http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/2009\\_823-03\\_2\\_Hale.pdf](http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/2009_823-03_2_Hale.pdf) Access Date: December 12, 2015

conservatism, state capitalism and government domination of the media.”<sup>271</sup> In the following parts we will discuss the distinctive features of Putinism.

## 2. Domestic Politics under Putin

It is commonly accepted that Putin is the most powerful figure in modern Russia. His ideas on any issue have a reflection on Russian political atmosphere. He is the top decision-maker in policies and he directs all walks of life from the most significant things to the ordinary daily issues.

Putin’s Russia is not a pure democracy because his references to democratic values remain as a façade. Even if the statements of Putin highlight the rule of law and pluralism, policies during his term are really different to what he claims. For example, he asserts that “there is no more effective mechanism for fighting corruption than the development of civil society and freedom of the press.”<sup>272</sup> However, he practices repression through which he creates only a virtually democratic Russia. According to Freedom House, Russia is a “not free” country. The duration from 2000 to 2012 which we are analyzing in this study, Russian freedom score is approximately five. While one represents the most free and seven the least free.<sup>273</sup>

Putin started repressive policies within days after his inauguration. As an expert points out,

Putin sent agents to search the offices of Russia’s biggest independent media group, allegedly as part of some vague criminal investigation. Eventually, he succeeded in shutting down Vladimir Gusinsky’s media conglomerate, Media-Most. Weeks later, the tax police searched the offices of environmental organizations, and the Kremlin abolished two environmental oversight bodies in the name of bureaucratic streamlining.

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<sup>271</sup>Fareed Zakaria (2014) “The Rise of Putinism”, *The Washington Post*, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-the-rise-of-putinism/2014/07/31/2c9711d6-18e7-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-the-rise-of-putinism/2014/07/31/2c9711d6-18e7-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html) Access Date: January 7, 2016

<sup>272</sup> Brian D. Taylor (2011) *State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 204

<sup>273</sup><https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.Vplf6JqLTIU> Access Date: January 14, 2015

By summer, the Duma had given him broad powers to fire regional governors, whom Putin had long accused of putting personal and provincial interests ahead of the good of the whole country.<sup>274</sup>

In this part, we will try to analyze the most significant developments in domestic policies introduced by Putin. Firstly, we will focus on the political aspects and examine how Putin gained upper hand in Russia. Next we will consider the status of media and society that are generally intervened by Putin. And finally the situation in which civil society takes part will be pointed. These are considered as indicators of healthy democracy that is why they are taken as the main points in this study.

#### **a) Political Aspects**

“Russia has become a state contemptuous of its people’s right: a country in which the head of the electoral commission says his guiding principle is that whatever Putin says must be correct, and the chairman of parliament describes it as no place for discussions”<sup>275</sup>

The period of Boris Yeltsin was characterized by power struggles among various groups due to the power vacuum left after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During those days, the influential people tried to create a new order as a result of the emergence of a new country and the transition from communism to democracy.

The fall of the Soviet Union was so sensational both for the world politics and Russians. They witnessed August Coup attempt during the last days of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin was hero in this period who later became the first President of the Russian Federation. Yet, he could not control the system totally because most of the ex-Soviet political elites did not want to lose their effective positions. The distribution of the power remained one of the major problems. Yeltsin endeavored for the adaptation of a new market economy, and tried to organize it through reforms

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<sup>274</sup> Charles J. Shields (2007) Op. cit., p. 83

<sup>275</sup> Angus Roxburg (2012) *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*, London: I.B. Taurus, p. viii

and privatization. After dealing with all this, he focused on coping with the political turmoil and restoring law and order.

The consolidation of the new post-Soviet regime has been accomplished during the period of Putin. The starting point was his premiership and acting president terms. One very effective way to do that was to elections. Therefore, “the Russian electoral system has been specifically tailored since 1999 to produce any required result whatever.”<sup>276</sup> Undoubtedly, he has achieved this thanks to the loyal majority in Duma which was controlled repressively. He was successful in controlling the agenda of the Duma in the coming years to pass legislations after he became president.<sup>277</sup>

Putin acts as if democracy solely means elections, and there is no other component which makes a system democratic. Yet, weakening the party competition was the main goal during his term, which was achieved by him. Parties of Fatherland and All Russia have been merged to form Unity. Later, several movements took part in the bloc and constructed the United Russia. The pressure on the business sector was increased to support United Russia which was a loyal party to Kremlin. The Just Russia as a fake party was founded. Putin successfully silenced the opposition and annihilated competitive elections using the law to establish a de-facto one party system.

In this system, the main figure is United Russia (UR) which is the most influential and the biggest political party in the country. Putin identifies himself with the UR, and he played major role in constituting the personality-based system in the party.<sup>278</sup> It is under the absolute control of Putin who overtook the leadership of the

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<sup>276</sup> Pavel Felgenhauer (2011) “Putin Moves Russia from Authoritarianism to Totalitarianism”, *The Jamestown Foundation*, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=37998#.VnhOiLaLTIV](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37998#.VnhOiLaLTIV) Access Date: December 01, 2015

<sup>277</sup> Thomas F. Remington (2009) “Parliament and Dominant Party Regime” in Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (eds.) *After Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (39-58) p. 41

<sup>278</sup> Richard Sakwa (2011) *The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 23

Party during his premiership duration. The United Russia also gripped the majority of 450 members of Duma by 238 seats in legislative elections of 2011.<sup>279</sup> In today's Russia, it is the only dominant party which directs the political arrangements in the context of approving of legislative drafts.

As explained by an expert,

Putin put through legislation raising the requirements for registration of parties, so that a party must have 50,000 members and branches in at least half the regions of the country to be legally registered. Moreover, only registered parties (and not other kinds of public organizations) were given the right to run candidates in elections. All these provisions made it still harder for small parties to compete.<sup>280</sup>

The requirements for the parties have been hardened and thus United Russia has easily become the only major organization in political arena.

Putin's aim was to address Russia's domestic issues and to increase Russian influence in world politics. Thus, his administration style which aimed to have the whole power in his own hands is criticized generally because of being undemocratic. He tried to enhance federal control on regional governors.

To that end, after being elected as President, Putin changed the election procedure of members of the Federation Council in a short period of time. The displacement of elected local governors from the upper house gave him a chance to control the process. The representatives were new members who were assigned by the regional legislators. However, Kremlin watched the appointments closely and ensured the loyalty of new comers.<sup>281</sup>

In addition to this, he established seven federal districts in Russia as part of an administrative reform. The aim was to increase the effectiveness of federal power in the regions and secure the constitutional authority of the president. The heads of

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<sup>279</sup> <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16042797> Access Date: December 21, 2015

<sup>280</sup> Thomas F. Remington (2009) Op.cit., pp. 47-48

<sup>281</sup> Boris Kagarlitsky (2002) *Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-liberal Autocracy*, London: Pluto Press, pp. 271-272

these seven units were appointed by Putin and five of them had the military or secret service background and they were close allies of Putin.<sup>282</sup>

The Russian power distribution depends on a vertical system under Putin's leadership which makes the hierarchy quite perceivable. Putin because of his dominative and workaholic personality is the sole decision maker who holds great authority over Kremlin, Duma or Federation Council. Moreover, his past attachment to the KGB compels him to be a "patriot" with the goal to constitute a strong government or to create a greater, powerful Russia. Putin not only ignores the participative decision making but also the lack of democratic values is a minor issue compared to Russian state interests because he has a pragmatic approach which makes the end results to be the most important thing for him.

Putin has also given importance to pro-market reforms between 2000 and 2007. He was concentrating power in his hands while forming new state owned corporations between 2004 and 2007.<sup>283</sup> In this period, the number of super-rich people has significantly increased. Yet, the relationship between them and authorities is different. The new bureaucracy tends to be the most dominant figure in all kinds of affairs leaving no tolerance against any liberty and any other political goals.<sup>284</sup> Putin has struggled to replace oligarchs with his self-created political elite group which is called *Silovik* that comprises former personnel of military and security service. The members of the security forces have become prominent and also people from St. Petersburg have distinguished themselves from other origins like Moscow. The new cadre has given him some elbow room in political arena.

Together with Putin administration, some oligarchs have been eliminated while others have gained impetus. "Putin's ability to maneuver among the oligarchs,

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<sup>282</sup> Vladimir Volkov (2000) "Russian President Putin Moves toward Authoritarian Rule", *World Socialist Web Site*, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/06/put-i03.html> Access Date: December 1, 2015

<sup>283</sup> Boris Kagarlitsky (2002) Op. cit, p. 49

<sup>284</sup> Stephen White (2011) *Understanding Russian Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.172

such as it is, depends on a steady stream of oil and gas revenues into state coffers.”<sup>285</sup> The mutual interests and interdependence shape this relationship. While the oligarchs obtain some economic privileges from Putin administration, they provide aid to Putin particularly in the process of elections through financial support and propaganda balloon of mass media which they have control on.

The most important aspect of Putin’s rule is the phenomenal strength added to the presidential powers and centralism. He has ensured practicing administrative oppression on managers for the expansion of state’s role. The federal hegemony on regional apparatuses is unquestionable. The autonomy of governors has been weakened, so Putin is the only omnipotent character in Russia. Amelia Gentleman mentions that within three weeks after Putin came to power, we observed structural political reform, attacks on press and undermining of democratic freedom. All of these make Russia distant to nascent democracy in the country and direct it toward oppression.<sup>286</sup> In addition to this, the rule of law has been neglected.

#### **b) Shaping the Media and the Society**

In Soviet times, media was seen as an instrument used for manipulation and channelizing the mass opinion. The media gradually became a political resource and propaganda apparatus. The modern Russia took it as a Soviet legacy to get advantage of this system. This practice continued and contemporary Russian mass media kept holding the propagandist attitude for the benefit of the government.<sup>287</sup>

In Russia, the state control on the media is one of the core elements of Putin administration. Repressing the press or to use force for changing the ownership of media institutions have been the most frequently used tactics by Kremlin.

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<sup>285</sup> Allen C. Lynch (2005) *How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 251

<sup>286</sup> Amelia Gentleman (2000) “Back to USSR”, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/29/russia.ameliagentleman> Access Date: January 7, 2016

<sup>287</sup> Svetlana Pasti and Jukka Pietilainen (2008) “Journalists in the Russian Regions: How Different Generations View Their Professional Roles” in Stephen White (eds.) *Media, Culture and Society in Putin’s Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (109-132) p. 127

Contemporary Russian media outlets mostly belong to the businessmen or holding groups which are the allies of Putin. Furthermore, leading media outlets have a close relation with the government agencies. Thus, the objectivity of the press is disputable in Russia. The lack of neutrality in the media outlets is a reality because most of the mass media works as government-led business sector. "In 2003, in contrast to 1999, the Kremlin controlled all national television stations as well as regional ones such as Moscow's TV Tsentr."<sup>288</sup> Although journalism is known for its oppositional spirit and criticism, Russian system controls and restrains the freedom of expression in media.

As an acting president and leading candidate Putin had the highest rate of television coverage in presidential elections held in the year 2000. During three week campaign period, he owned 43 percent of news coverage in all main television channels and it equaled to 45 hours. While state and commercial television channels spent around 40 percent of their campaign news covering Putin, each of the other main candidates had about only 10 percent. Putin was imaged as a hero, which faded the impression of the other candidates in people's mind.<sup>289</sup> Even during the initial years of his rule, Putin was very influential in the media, since he knows how media can play its role to affect people's opinion.

As will be described below in more detail, the repression process started with the attack on NTV channel, which was a turning point for Russian mass media. As an aftermath of this raid, the owners of other media outlets had begun to be more cautious and started avoiding harsh criticism on the government. The process of self-censorship has been escalated because of reign of fear. Therefore, arbitrary arrests of journalists and unexpected attacks on media paved the way for controlling the central media. Russians have been diverted through both intimidated bosses and journalists. The perceptions of Russian people have also been controlled. Finally, media has

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<sup>288</sup> Lucan A. Way (January 2005) "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine", *World Politics*, Volume: 57 Number: 2 (231-261) p. 259

<sup>289</sup> Sarah Oates (2006) Op.cit., pp. 123-124

become an instrument for political propaganda especially during the election process being an essential mean to influence social thought.

Many oligarchs who were influential in political and economic manner during Yeltsin period were eliminated. Three businessmen known for their investments in media sector have been labeled as dangerous for Putin administration. Mikhail Khodorkovsky's empire has been seized and he has been punished with eighty year term imprisonment. Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky have been exiled and their media assets have been forfeited by the government.<sup>290</sup> Oligarchs have been eliminated and media outlets of oligarchs have been confiscated and then *siloviks* have replaced them.

Kremlin has announced that it wants to tighten the conditions of journalism on Russian territory. The television channel TV Zentr, controlled by Moscow Mayor Yuri Lushkov, and a series of foreign-owned media have been regulated by the government. It is not the only example of suppression on the media. The oppositionist NTV channel of Media Most Group was attacked by the armed men. On 11 May 2000 just three days after Putin's inauguration, armed units of the secret service in black masks searched the offices of NTV. They confiscated many documents and equipment. The secret service asserts that "the holding company was committing illegal acts by monitoring and bugging its own workers, as well as well-known Russian politicians and entrepreneurs" as the formal reason for the raid.<sup>291</sup>

In April 2001 Russia's state owned gas giant Gazprom took the control of the NTV which was the only independent television channel of its time.<sup>292</sup> So, NTV was now under the authority of Gazprom Media which is a subsidiary of Gazprom. Gazprom Media also purchased Izvestia, a leading Russian nationwide daily in June

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<sup>290</sup> Markus Soldner (2008) "Political Capitalism and the Russian Media" in Stephen White (eds.) *Media, Culture and Society in Putin's Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (154-177) p. 166

<sup>291</sup> Vladimir Volkov (2000) Op. cit., <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/06/put-i03.html> Access Date: December 1, 2015

<sup>292</sup> Sophie Lambroschini (2001) "Russia: Gazprom Takes Control of Independent NTV", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1096130.html> Access Date: December 25, 2015

2005.<sup>293</sup> It has caused increasing concerns regarding freedom of press in Russia. In August 2005 Gazprombank, which is economic arm of the Gazprom, bought Gazprom Media.<sup>294</sup> Finally it has been sold to the National Media Group which is controlled by conglomerate Yury Kovalchuk who is a close ally of Putin.<sup>295</sup>

After taking control of the press by changing its ownerships, it is easy to use it for manipulation of the society. For instance, “Kommersant (Businessman) paper was independent at first until it was sold to businessman Boris Berezovsky in 1999, then in 2006 the whole publishing house ended up in the hands of businessman and general director of Gazprominvest Alisher Usmanov.”<sup>296</sup> The informing role of the media for the society has diminished and pro-government attitude has become dominant. When Putin stepped down from Premiership in 2012, according to Reporters without Borders, Russia’s rank was 142 out of 179 countries about press freedom. It was placed between Gambia and Colombia.<sup>297</sup>

The shuffle of ownership between state and private sector formed a basis for the hegemonic position of the government over television channels and newspapers. The links between the state-controlled companies and the newly created loyal oligarch class escalate the interdependency between bureaucracy and conglomerates. Reciprocal interests among them designate the governmental posts and rate of share holder’s capital in business sector.

In addition to this, new legislations have further restricted the media and freedom of speech. The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation by

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<sup>293</sup>Claire Bigg (2005) “Russia: State-Owned Gazprom Buys Leading Independent Daily ‘Izvestiya’”, *Global Security*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2005/russia-050603-rferl01.htm> Access Date: December 25, 2015

<sup>294</sup> <http://www.breakingnews.com/topic/gazprombank/> Access Date: December 25, 2015

<sup>295</sup>Tom Balmforth (2011) “Russia’s ‘Izvestia Undergoes Transformation from Broadsheet to Tabloid’”, *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, [http://www.rferl.org/content/russia\\_izvestia\\_transformed\\_from\\_broadsheet\\_to\\_tabloid/24229673.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_izvestia_transformed_from_broadsheet_to_tabloid/24229673.html) Access Date: December 25, 2015

<sup>296</sup> Katja Koikkalainen (2008) “Journalistic Source Practices in Russian Business Dailies” in Stephen White (eds.) *Media, Culture and Society in Putin’s Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (95-108) p.98

<sup>297</sup> [http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012\\_1043.html](http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012_1043.html) Access Date: January 14, 2015

the Security Council in September 2000 (Doktrina 2000) was confirmed as a first step. In this framework, normative acts in order to restrict the mass media were applied. The Law on Counter-Extremism was adopted in July 2002, which put a ban on releasing of extremist materials and activities through the mass media (On Counter-Extremism 2002, Article 11).<sup>298</sup>

The war in Chechnya and the Beslan Hostage Crisis in 2004 were used in order to justify aforementioned restrictions. The aim was to halt criticism of the government and to prevent Russian people from reaching the truth. “If the authoritarian shadow of Putin’s policy had not previously been fully visible, it now became clear in all its darkness.”<sup>299</sup> In 1999 Putin created Russian Information Center in order to escalate public support for military campaign in Chechnya to control news release about the region. Furthermore, the military was keen to limit journalists’ information flow. They recommended the journalists about the statement that should be used for reporting. Moreover the intensified accreditation procedure became a tool to get rid of “untrustworthy” journalists.<sup>300</sup>

To sum up, administrative grip of Putin on visual and print media has strengthened in order to make them like a political resource, propaganda instruments and manipulation systems to shape to the society as the government wants.

### **c) Russian Culture and Civil Society**

Putin’s authoritarian rule has its reflections on civil society as well. As Van Herpen points out

Russia has developed into an authoritarian state in which a symbiosis exists between the state elite and ruling the United Russia Party. The state dominates the economy, ultra-nationalism rampant, and the Kremlin conducts an assertive and sometimes openly aggressive policy.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> Markus Soldner (2008) Op.cit., p. 169

<sup>299</sup> Lena Jonson (2015) Art and Protests in Putin’s Russia, New York: Routledge, pp. 29-30

<sup>300</sup> Laura Belin (2004) “Politics and the Mass Media under Putin” in Cameron Ross (eds.) *Russian Politics Under Putin*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 134

<sup>301</sup> Marcel H. Van Herpen (2013) *Putinism: The Slow Rise of a Radical Right Regime in Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 167

Such an atmosphere is familiar for Russian people because their political culture has been shaped during the periods of Tsarist Russia and communist regime of the Soviet Union. Although each of them has distinctive characteristics and there are significant differences, in modern Russia, civil liberties are under the heavy control of Putin as it was in the past. Authoritarian tradition comes from past times and it is like a legacy. Russian people are acquainted with absolutism in many spheres of life.

This tradition is also reflected on civil society. “A civil society is a legal and political order in which individuals interact with others, sometimes in groups, but retain their own identity and interests, as opposed to a system based on kinship, hierarchy, tradition, patronage or power.”<sup>302</sup> The civil society provides an atmosphere in which it acts as a monitoring authority for state activities, it further assists to inform the citizens about state agenda. Thus, its role is so critical in terms of consolidation of democracy.

However, the mechanism of civil society which serves as a facilitating organization in the context of dialogue between state and society is suffocated in Putin’s Russia. The civil liberties are likely to erode because Putin tends to undermine freedom and enhance state capacity in these issues. Putin administration has constituted a Civic Forum in 2001 under guidance of the state in order to gather many NGOs and to debate on their problems. It was the first time that 5.000 activists met with bureaucrats and discussed the cooperation between the state and the NGOs.<sup>303</sup> The Civic Forum was determined as an intermediary function between governmental bodies and activists. Later, Public Chamber was founded in 2005 as an additional association for development of civic activities.<sup>304</sup> Herein “the question is

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<sup>302</sup> Richard Sakwa (2004) *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, New York: Routledge, p. 126

<sup>303</sup> Sarah Henderson (2011) *Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era*, University of Washington: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research Working Paper, p. 21 [https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/2011\\_824-17\\_Henderson.pdf](https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/2011_824-17_Henderson.pdf) Access Date: December 17, 2015

<sup>304</sup> Diana Schmidt-Pfister (2008) “What Kind of Civil Society in Russia?” in Stephen White (eds.) *Media, Culture and Society in Putin’s Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (37-71) p. 40

whether Russia is witnessing the emergence of modern civil society or the restoration of state-centered forms of social communication and political culture.”<sup>305</sup>

Many people have a doubtful approach because Putin’s patrimonial manner comes with weakness of an independent civic sector. Social and political life is subordinated and civil society remains a façade in today’s Russia. The super presidential system and the desire for designing from above cause arbitrary attitudes.

Under this patron-client environment most NGOs and civil society organizations are not very effective. According to Simon Pirani “three main types of human rights organisation have been active in Putin’s Russia: campaigners such as the Helsinki group, Memorial and others who focus primarily on research, and those such as Public Verdict who provide legal support to victims of abuses.”<sup>306</sup> Russian state takes pivotal role in this field and Putin being the strongest man in the country is the main figure.

The different presidential councils on society and on human rights have emerged under the name of Council for Civil Society and Human Rights. Its tasks are identified as

a consultative body to assist the President in the exercise of his constitutional responsibilities to guarantee and protect human rights and freedoms, keep the President informed on the situation in this area, facilitate development of civil society institutions in Russia, and draft proposals for the President on matters within its mandate.<sup>307</sup>

The NGOs with foreign donors are considered as agents in Russia hence they are pressurized in the name of national interest. The suspicion on Western funded organizations has risen, especially, after the Colored Revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan which were Soviet territories in the past. This was the result of the fact that these civil movements mobilized the society and gave way to government changes in three countries. For Russian elites, these were instruments to

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<sup>305</sup> Ikka Liikanen (2008) “Reconstitution of Russian Political Space: The Case of the Republic of Karelia” in Stephen White (eds.) *Media, Culture and Society in Putin’s Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (7-36) p. 11

<sup>306</sup> Simon Pirani (2010) *Change in Putin’s Russia: Power, Money and People*, London: Pluto Press, p. 57

<sup>307</sup> <http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/councils#institution-18> Access Date: January 6, 2016

interfere in Russian national security matters. In the course of events, civil rights were restricted and political pluralism was ignored; consequentially democracy has been undermined in Russia under the leadership of Putin. The NGOs have become a threat to the Putin regime in the eyes of ruling class.

A legislation which brought new regulations in this field was passed by the Duma in 2006. It introduced new requirements for this sector to suffocate civic space by new and complicated registration procedures particularly for foreign foundations; these acts elevated the state power. By this legislation, the government got the chance to design the conditions which the noncommercial organizations operate in and had ability to choose which NGOs maintain to serve.<sup>308</sup>

According to Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index which is a study of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in 2012 when Putin took charge as President by leaving Premiership, Russian CSO sustainability index was 4.4. This is measured between the numbers from 1.0 to 7.0 where the lowest value is 7.0 to present the level of sustainability. The degree of 4.4 means CSOs in Russia were in the phase of evolving sustainability.<sup>309</sup> He is heavily criticized particularly by Western countries regarding freedom of speech and suppression of civil society because it has remained fragmented and atomized. Putin has also taken steps for cooptation of NGOs and to let only loyal civil society organizations to function.

The consolidation of civic groups in fragile democracy is a desired result. It is beneficial for Russians to work with civil society because it would enhance quality of democracy in Russia by developing culture of accountability which is a lacking concept in modern Russia.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> Sarah Henderson (2011) Op. cit., p. 23

<sup>309</sup> The United States Agency for International Development (June 2013) 2012 CSO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia p. 166 [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/2012CSOSI\\_0.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/2012CSOSI_0.pdf) Access Date: January 6, 2016

<sup>310</sup> Sarah L. Henderson (2003) Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 19

### 3. Economy as a Weapon

It is obvious that not only has the political system changed radically in Russia since the Soviet Union times, but also economy has transformed extensively. We can hardly see any scarcity or lack of variety of goods, budgetary deficits, and long queues like the past years.<sup>311</sup> The living standards of Russians have progressed, welfare, health, education systems and wage rates have been improved relatively under Putin's rule. It is a relative phenomenon because the economic crisis of 1998 left long-lasting effects on Russian economy which was in recovery process after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Soviets left a devastated economy and it was very clear that for a long time such economy would not be able to satisfy the economic indicators. Reformation and privatization were in agenda of bureaucrats in the early 1990s. Russia went through an atmosphere of chaos and obscurity because a great change in the system was in progress.

In 1998, the oil price was lowest of past 25 years (around 12 dollar per barrel). Such price drop was highly reflected on the Russian economy which was already in decline since it mainly depended on petroleum products. The petroleum price started increasing in the year 2000, eventually it reached around 50 dollar per barrel by 2005. In 2008 it achieved unprecedented growth and reached approximately 140 dollar per barrel by 2008.<sup>312</sup>

The most influential item in growing Russian economy is revenue from natural resources. Energy is a key sector of Russian economy which flourished after the downswing period with the help of energy sector. The increase in oil and gas prices brought prosperity for energy rich Russia. Its reflection on Russian economy was an improvement. Between 2000 and 2004, the average GDP growth rate was 6-7 percent which placed Russia as the 3<sup>rd</sup> country after China and India in the context of fastest growing economies.<sup>313</sup> Putin administration has utilized this economic influx

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<sup>311</sup> Andrew Jack (2004) *Inside Putin's Russia*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 299

<sup>312</sup> Simon Pirani (2010) *Op. cit.*, p. 51

<sup>313</sup> Pedma Desai (2006) *Conversations on Russia: Reform From Yeltsin to Putin*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 52

to increase welfare of the society by sharing this income with all Russians, such populist policy improved Putin's vote bank and popularity.

On one hand, oil boom brought economic benefits which enabled Putin to introduce progressive social policies in terms of health, education and pension system. On the other hand, the gap between rich and poor grew and inequality continued to remain an issue.<sup>314</sup> Because limited number of people who are involved in the energy sector took advantage of that boom obviously and became richer.

Yet, the boomed economy was halted by the 2008 world economic crisis. By the crisis, the demand for energy products reduced. Thus, the decrease of oil price around 36 dollar per barrel,<sup>315</sup> affected the economy in a negative way. "The impact of the crisis on industry was immediate. Industrial production in November 2008 was 8.7 per cent lower than a year before; in January 2009 it was 16 per cent lower than a year before."<sup>316</sup> Needless to say, unemployment increased as a result of the energy-based economy of Russia which "every drop of \$1 in oil prices translates into annual losses to the Russian treasury of \$2 billion."<sup>317</sup>

Although Russia is at 8<sup>th</sup> rank in terms of oil reserves in the world, it is the second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. In addition to this, it has 27 percent of world's natural gas reserves which makes it the largest gas producer in the world.<sup>318</sup> "Oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 50% of Russia's federal budget revenues and 68% of total export in 2013."<sup>319</sup> The dependence on natural resource exports of Russian economy has declined the capability of competitiveness of other sectors such

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<sup>314</sup> Sam Vaknin (2003) *Russian Roulette: Russia's Economy in Putin's Era*, Skopje: Lidija Rangelovska, pp. 52-53

<sup>315</sup> <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/petrol-son-11-yilin-en-dibinde-40029672> Access Date: January 9, 2016

<sup>316</sup> Simon Pirani (2010) *Op. cit.*, p. 107

<sup>317</sup> Sam Vaknin (2003) *Op. cit.*, p.140

<sup>318</sup> Azime Telli (2014) *Rusya'nın Petrol ve Doğalgaz Rezervlerinin Analizi*, *Bilgesam* [http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-142-2014122215guvenlik\\_kongresi\\_bildirileri-12.pdf](http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-142-2014122215guvenlik_kongresi_bildirileri-12.pdf) Access Date: January 8, 2016

<sup>319</sup> The U.S Department of Energy <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS> Access Date: January 8, 2016

as industry or agriculture. As a petrostate, Russia has grown ever slower than the resource-poor countries. This situation is generally labeled as “curse of natural resources” by authors.<sup>320</sup>

The Russian economy, backing with energy revenue, has opened way to economic mobility in other spheres such as construction of pipelines, metal industry and manufacturing sector. Briefly, production capacity of Russia has increased dramatically. Even in five months after Putin sworn as Prime Minister, industrial production gained impetus and economy entered the recovery phase during the same year.<sup>321</sup> Furthermore, after 1998 devaluation, Putin maintained order and stabilized economic structure by regulating stock market and banking systems.

Putin also reformed the tax system to increase revenues for national treasury. During Yeltsin period the tax system was complex and easy to cheat. Therefore, he increased the federal tax revenues through energy sector taxes to a large extent. Moreover, Putin tightened the federal hegemony by taking the authority from the regional governments to collect tax.

Russian economic model is state-led capitalist development that means role of state in key areas of economy is an inconvertible fact. Russian state exercises control over energy sector to a large extent. Gazprom is under the authority of Russian state which owns 51 percent of shares of Gazprom. It is Russia’s largest gas company so directs the energy strategies of Russia.<sup>322</sup> The post exchanges between Gazprom and the government reflect the ties among them. Medvedev stepped down from the position of CEO of Gazprom before getting elected as president. The government has seized the control on the energy sector.<sup>323</sup> The Yukos case is the well-known example. Mikhail Khordovsky’s holding group Yukos, the largest oil company in Russia, was confiscated by the state. Khordovsky was arrested in 2003

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<sup>320</sup> Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner (2001) “The Curse of Natural Resources” *European Economic Review* 45 (827-838)

<sup>321</sup> Marshall I. Goldman (2008) *Petrostate: Putin, Power and New Russia*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 171

<sup>322</sup> <http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/> Access Date: February 26, 2016

<sup>323</sup> Marshall I. Goldman (2008) *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-104

and was charged with peculation, fraud and evasion of tax. Authorities calculated outstanding tax from the past years and imposed new penalties. Then Yuganskneftegaz, an asset of Yukos, was auctioned to unknown Baikal Finance Group in 2004. Actually, it was a shell company and in the same year state-led company Rosneft purchased it. Khordovsky was sentenced nine years together with his business partner Platon Lebedev. Not only two of them, but also different directors of Yukos were arrested and oppressed.<sup>324</sup> This case showed that property rights are not inviolable in Russia. Also, arbitrary actions could be taken by the government apparatuses to give a shape to the market in favor of the state.

However, economic succession of Putin with the help of energy resources is remarkable which brought economic boom through oil and gas revenues. Therefore, Putin's popularity has a tendency to increase under this economic environment. After a long term in office, popular support behind him still catches attention. Improved welfare activities do not guarantee freedom; anyhow Russia is performing better than a decade ago in terms of payments of pensions, salaries, and construction of roads. However, public safety has declined, corruption is at rise and security of property rights is worse than the period of 1990s.<sup>325</sup>

For Putin, the involvement of the state in energy sector is a strategic issue. "In 2000, the state's share of total crude oil production was 16 percent; by late 2007, it had increased to about 50 percent."<sup>326</sup> The hegemony of the state has been trumped at home and abroad. Russia as an energy superpower started practicing aggressive policies in international arena with imperial desires. Its energy based economy has become an effective weapon in foreign policy because energy is a key factor in terms of regaining national pride for Russia in international politics.

Energy became a weapon during Putin's period. He made use of oil and gas revenues in both of domestic and foreign policies. As for internal affairs, the

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<sup>324</sup> Martin Sixsmith (2008) *Putin's Oil: The Yukos Affair and The Struggle for Russia*, New York: Continuum, pp. 139-185

<sup>325</sup> Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (2008) "The Myth of Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown Hold Russia Back", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume: 87 Number: 1 (68-84) p. 74

<sup>326</sup> Marshall I. Goldman (2008) *Op. cit.*, p. 99

prosperity of Russian people is in increase with the help of boomed economy which is driven by high energy price. Therefore, the continuing popularity of Putin is really remarkable, considering the fact that he has been in power since 2000. In addition, the economic conditions in Russia affect external affairs inevitably. The unpredictability of the Yeltsin period was handled by Putin who made Russia non-negligible world power. Russia now has a major role as one of the great players in the *chess board*.

#### **4. Imperial Foreign Policy**

In one sense, Putin, in the first years of his presidency, has tried to cope with economic problems of Russia. In the meanwhile, however, he was also expected by the people to make Russia a major player in international affairs again after the failures of 1990s. Economic recovery driven by the energy sector boosted the Russian prestige in international arena.<sup>327</sup> Russia can be called an important player in the world politics again and finally it gets the pivotal role under Putin. Therefore, Russian people have gained their self confidence in the aftermath of the disastrous years of Yeltsin. “Putin’s ambition for Russia followed the conventional model of strong state that was strong internally and externally.”<sup>328</sup>

Unlike the Soviet times, Putin’s policies are not designed within the framework of an ideology and his pragmatist approaches support this inclination. Policies of Putin are generally dual track. His orientation is considered as satisfactory from two different dimensions of Russian political society. While his modern and Western reformer face please the Russian liberals, his conservative and nationalist discourse charm the post-Soviet elites who admire Soviet flamboyant years.<sup>329</sup>

Nikolay Kozhanov mentions that there is a perception about Putin as “a hardliner whose tense relations with the West are supposedly the product of an ex-

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<sup>327</sup> <http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20080228/100269538.html> Access Date: January 10, 2016

<sup>328</sup> Aglaya Snetkov (2015) *Russia’s Security Policy Under Putin: A critical Perspective*, New York: Routledge, p. 44

<sup>329</sup> Andrei Grachev (2005) “Putin’s Foreign Policy Choices” in Alex Pravda (eds.) *Putin in Perspective: Essays in Honour of Archie Brown*, New York: Oxford University Press (255- 273) p. 261

KGB officer still seeking revanche for the Soviet defeat in the Cold War.”<sup>330</sup> He always supports the presence of Russia in strategic areas against the United States, and supports multi-polar world order to deter U.S hegemony. Since, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S has gained a major role and there is no challenging power to it. Some Russian authors support the idea that Russia as “the center of universe” should expand its sphere of influence and as a *Heartland*, it should stand against the Western dominated world order.<sup>331</sup>

For some Russians, Putin is the major policy-maker who has a capability to fulfill the longing for the previous glorious days of the Soviet Union. He does not hesitate to face geopolitical rivalries when he tries to ensure the revival of Russia. Thus, his *Realpolitik* is generally accused of being imperialistic. Strategic location of Russia makes it a player both in Europe and Asia. Russia’s geographical dimension provides it the opportunity to establish multi-regional ties. It has a connection with different power centers so it is a multi regional Eurasian power.<sup>332</sup>

One of the explicit features of Putin is “his attempts to establish not only a strong and self-confident Russia domestically, but also a strong leader of the area, or the re-builder of Greater Russia.”<sup>333</sup> Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) borders are the *near abroad* of Russia. This space is national priority of Russia so it has a privilege. The CIS is a mechanism of reintegration between Russia and other post-Soviet countries. In this way, Russian predominance in Eurasia can be structured and the American containment policy can be prevented. Former Soviet territory was seen as a backyard by Moscow. In addition, Putin’s inner circle whose

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<sup>330</sup> Nikolay Kozhanov (2012) “Russian Foreign Policy After Putin’s Return”, *The Washington Institute* <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russian-foreign-policy-after-putins-return>  
Access Date: January 10, 2016

<sup>331</sup> Alexander Dugin (2010) *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım* (Translated by Vügar İmanov), İstanbul: Küre Yayınları

<sup>332</sup> Natalia Morozova (2009) “Geopolitics, Eurasianism, and Russian Foreign Policy under Putin” *Geopolitics* Volume: 14 Issue: 4, (667-686), p. 670

<sup>333</sup> Bertil Nygren (2008) *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards CIS Countries*, Oxon: Routledge, p. 22

past is generally based on defense apparatuses of the state, wants to make near abroad a bastion of Russian influence.<sup>334</sup>

The ex-Soviet area is an inviolable phenomenon for Putin and he attributes great importance to this zone. He is a conservative leader in foreign policy. The pro status quo character of Putin opens door for harsh policies so the world places a particular significance to him. He was declared as the Person of the Year in 2007 by the Time Magazine.<sup>335</sup> Especially, in that region, Putin does not hesitate to pursue interventionist policy and does not refrain to use force.

Just a couple of weeks after he was appointed as Prime Minister, Second Chechen War started in August 1999. It was the first time that Putin's war prone manner was witnessed throughout the world. Russian military campaign in Chechnya was started under the guise of stopping insurgency in Dagestan. For Kremlin, it was a security threat to territorial integrity of Russia and its national interests. The stability in Caucasus was in danger and the region was one of the strategic priorities of Russia.<sup>336</sup>

The attacks of Russian military were ruthless. Violations of human rights in the region caught world's attention. The operation was criticized harshly of being cruel.<sup>337</sup> The European Court of Human Rights considered Russia responsible for casualties in Chechnya in 2005.<sup>338</sup> It was the starting point of Putin's all acts of vigilantism in international issues and it was not the last. Combats in the Caucasus have continued for about a year. Yet, the instability in the region still continues.

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<sup>334</sup> Andrei Grachev (2005) Op.cit. p. 267

<sup>335</sup>[http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753\\_1690757\\_00.html](http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1690757_00.html) Access Date: January 15, 2016

<sup>336</sup> Simone Ispa-Landa, "Russian Preferred Self-Image and the Two Chechen Wars", *Demokratizatsiya* [http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/11-2\\_Ispa-Landa.PDF](http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/11-2_Ispa-Landa.PDF) Access Date: February 25, 2016

<sup>337</sup> Human Rights Watch Report (April 2002) "Last Seen...: Continued 'Disappearances' in Chechnya", Volume: 14 No: 3 (D) <https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/r/russia/chech0402.pdf> Access Date: February 25, 2016

<sup>338</sup><http://www.usak.org.tr/tr/yayinlar/usak-haberleri/rusya-nin-insan-haklari-sorunu-kuzey-kafkasya> Access Date: February 25, 2016

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center brought a *détente period* between the U.S. and Russia. Putin's support to *war on terror* and Bush administration in case of intervention to Afghanistan made two countries closer. Also, Putin's opportunistic choice which focuses to take advantage of pre-emptive policy of the U.S. against terrorism in terms of Chechen case opened doors for rapprochement between two powers. The reason is that, this policy was utilized by Russia to obscure its human rights violations, lack of democracy or restrictions on media which are generally criticized by the Western states.<sup>339</sup> However, the relations between them became tense when the U.S. considered the cancellation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

After the 9/11, security oriented policies of America became more intense and its international relations changed shape irrevocably. In December 2001, under the Bush administration, the United States sent a note to Russia about withdrawal of the U.S. after six months from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) which was signed in 1972 to prohibit construction of new missile defense systems. Due to possible threats that would come from North Korea, Iraq and Iran, the U.S. withdrew from the Treaty unilaterally.<sup>340</sup> It met a brutal response from Putin and bilateral relations were relaxed because it was an outstanding issue and concerns of Moscow over the subject were really high; "there are still more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with Russia and the United States accounting for over 95 percent."<sup>341</sup> The crisis reminded a rivalry between the two major world powers during the Cold War which frightened the world.

In the following years, America declared deployment of defense systems in Eastern Europe, a region where the former Soviet allies existed. The American decision for installation of radar systems in Czech Republic and Poland was welcomed by these countries. Putin warned that the plan could enflame a second

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<sup>339</sup> Bobo Lo (2003) Vladimir Putin and Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, London: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 127-129

<sup>340</sup> Ahmet Öztürk (2009), "Rusya – Gürcistan Krizi: Yerel Bir Çatışma, Küresel Yansımalar", *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları*, Volume: 4 Number: 7 (1-27) p. 17

<sup>341</sup> Ivo Daalder and Jan Ludal (November/December 2008), "The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume: 87 Number: 6 (79-95), p. 82

Cold War. It escalated an arms race and brought a new split in Europe.<sup>342</sup> In Kremlin's perspective, it was a deterrence policy against Russia. On the contrary, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that it only aimed for defense and no country was on the target.<sup>343</sup> Despite agreements among the U.S., Poland and Czech Republic were sorted out, the deployment of shield system was cancelled in Obama's term.

Another concerning issue for Putin was the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the U.S. after September 11. Saddam regime got toppled and a loyal administration to the U.S was planted. The energy resources were confiscated by the Americans which changed the energy policies in the world. Not only was the energy market shaken but also U.S. influence in the Middle East was ensured. Putin said "Russia believes the only way out of the situation is to immediately end military action and re-start the process of political solution within the framework of the U.N. Security Council."<sup>344</sup> Russia defended the Iraqi case generally in a different way as compared to the U.S.

The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through post-Soviet countries and Eastern Europe also alarmed Russia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was troubled with domestic issues so its response to NATO enlargement was not sufficient when NATO succeeded to make new allies. However, under Putin's administration, NATO influence in Russia's *backyard* was objected even if it results with escalation of tensions. NATO's movement toward Russian border lines has urged it to aggression. Today's unstable Georgia and Ukraine cases would be labeled as products of that rivalry.

Russia has a Slavic Orthodox character which makes the other Slavic and Orthodox countries to feel that Russia is there to support them in international politics. It is not surprising because they share the same ethnicity and religion.

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<sup>342</sup> Luke Harding (2007) "Russia Threatening New Cold War over Missile Defence", *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/11/usa.topstories3> Access Date: January 11, 2016

<sup>343</sup> Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (2008) USAK Gürcistan Krizi Değerlendirme Raporu, p.22

<sup>344</sup>Jill Dougherty (2003) "Putin Warned on Iraq War", *CNN* <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/03/28/sprj.irq.putin/> Access Date: January 13, 2016

Serbian population, with their Slavic background and the same religious origins with Russians, is an ally of Russia in Balkans.<sup>345</sup> Serbia is a strategic country in terms of Russian political gains because it is like a tool of Russia in the region. The significance of Serbian role increases when Russian sphere of influence is constituted in Balkans. For this reason, Russia attempted to stop independence of Kosovo from Serbia.

Russian efforts were not enough to prevent secession; hence Kosovo became an independent state in 2008. The independence process caused disputes between Russia and Western powers. Putin asserted that “a unilateral declaration of independence and support for that process from other members of the international community would be an illegal and immoral solution.”<sup>346</sup> The concern of Kremlin was the possible destabilization of Balkans and encouragement of separatist movements. The failure in this issue had driven Russia to offensive policies against Western allies.

In 2008, the same year when Kosovo gained independence, the August War was broke out between Russia and Georgia. Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, the center of South Ossetia, was initiated on 7<sup>th</sup> of August with the target of restoring order in the country. The following day, Russia entered to South Ossetia and then Abkhazia. President Medvedev asserted that “women, children and the elderly people were dying in South Ossetia, and most of them were citizens of the Russian Federation. Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.”<sup>347</sup>

Russia defended its action as being a humanitarian intervention. Alexey Pushkov, Chairman of International Affairs Committee of the State Duma, states that

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<sup>345</sup> Ingmar Oldberg (2010) *Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev*, Occasional UI Papers No: 1, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, p. 11

<sup>346</sup> Oleg Shchedrov (2008) “Putin Urges West not to Back Kosovo Independence”, *Reuters*, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-kosovo-putin-idUKL1867734520080118> Access Date: January 13, 2016

<sup>347</sup> Jim Nichol (2008) *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S Interests*, CRS Report for Congress, p. 7 <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112446.pdf> Access Date: January 13, 2016

“in Georgia in 2008, Russia used military force because Russian citizens were at risk.”<sup>348</sup> Russians who live outside the motherland are potential instrument in Russian foreign policy. They are always utilized in order to justify Russian interference. This operation can be seen as a response to Kosovo issue. In addition to this, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries as a revenge from the West which has turned a blind eye in Kosovo’s secession process.

In the last years of Putin’s Premiership, Middle East witnessed the protests against absolute leaders, and in favor of democratic regimes in the name of Arab Spring. However, protests in Syria later transformed into a civil war between opponents and Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad. He and his father Hafez al-Assad were close allies of the Soviets and Russia. Also, Syria, as the one of sole partners of Russia in the Middle East, has strategic importance in Mediterranean basin. Russia has a military base which is located in Tartus port, Syria.<sup>349</sup> Therefore, Russia puts its support behind the Assad regime and defends its permanence with all its power. On the contrary, America and Western countries have sided with the opposition forces whose aim is the toppling of the Assad regime. Since 2011, Syria has become a struggle area among the world’s major powers.

As understood from such examples, Putin’s policies are mainly based on nationalism. Casualties in Chechen War, enlargement of the U.S-led NATO to Russian borders, military bases of America in Central Asia, Colored Revolutions in Soviet successor states, the project of American defense system in Europe, August War in Georgia, and attacks of Chechen radicals are effective regarding to raise Russian nationalism.<sup>350</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Alexey Pushkov (2012) Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin: The Making of an Independent Center of Power, Chatham House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/130612summary.pdf> Access Date: January 10, 2016

<sup>349</sup> Halit Mammadov (2014) Rus Dış Politikasında Stratejik-Zihinsel Süreklilik ve Putin’in Dış Politika Doktrini, Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi İnceleme Araştırma Dizisi Yayın No:16, Ankara: SFN Televizyon, Tanıtım, Tasarım, Yayıncılık, p. 67

<sup>350</sup> Anıl Çiçek (2014) “Autocracy in Russia: A Fate, A Necessity or the Will of Russia People?”, *International Journal of Russian Studies*, Issues No: 3/2 [http://www.ijors.net/issue3\\_2\\_2014/articles/cicek.html](http://www.ijors.net/issue3_2_2014/articles/cicek.html) Access Date: January 8, 2016

Putin's main aim is to preserve Russian interests and to make it an imperial power. The Soviet nostalgia at home and abroad has reemerged in his term. Ethnocentric dimension or Slavic discourse is centered on the foreign policy. The aggrandizement of Russia and its people is always in the agenda of Putin. Anıl Çiçek names it as neo-Official Nationalism and underlines that "this neo-Official Nationalism is based on Orthodoxy, autocracy, and national pride and is strengthened by an Eurasianist and, to a certain extent, Slavophile influence."<sup>351</sup>

To sum up, Putin faced many different international issues during his long term leadership. In each case, his aim was to increase Russian influence all over the world. Also, Putin tried to triumph against the U.S which is Russia's long standing rival. His guiding principle was to secure Russian national interests via various ways such as energy, religion, Russian ethnicity, threat or using force. Furthermore, he did not avoid expressing the nostalgia of the Soviet greatness in this process. It should be mentioned that Putin is a successful leader in terms of making Russia a pivotal country in the world politics again.

Russia has been experiencing a great change under the Putin regime regarding economic, political, social and cultural life. Putin's type of rule is really different from previous terms. Yeltsin was engaged in dealing with many unforeseen issues because his office term started right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This period was hard because it brought loss of prestige, and powers for Russian citizens were curtailed. Putin's charismatic and strong leadership capabilities play an important role in his popularity among the Russians. His most impressive slogan is to provide order. Putin's direction to authoritarianism and centralization are seen as the reason of stability in the country. The feeling of obedience is a familiar concept for Russian people who have been experiencing it since Tsarist times.

Lastly, Putin may portray himself as a democratic leader however in practice he is autocratic. "Mr. Yeltsin took mistaken steps in the right direction—towards

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

democracy. Mr. Putin has taken correct steps in the wrong direction—towards an authoritarian petro-state.”<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>352</sup> <http://www.economist.com/node/7161380> Access Date: January 9, 2016

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

This chapter is the conclusion part of our thesis. In this chapter, first the previous chapters of the thesis will be summarized, then Stalinism, as one of the most important examples of totalitarian regimes, and Putinism which is an authoritarian regime are compared and contrasted.

Totalitarian systems rest on the personality cult of a single leader. The state and the ruling party are amalgamated under this one powerful ruler. The most important decisions as well as relatively trivial ones are made by an unquestionable authority. We would observe total subjugation of the system. The hegemony of the leader is absolute in totalitarian administrations.

Ideology is influential in these systems. It is applied first of all to motivate the elites of the regime. Also, ideology is a beneficial concept to mobilize the society. It is generally used in order to shape the minds of individuals. The goal is to create an environment with certain “prescriptive behavior patterns”.<sup>353</sup> The aim is to make citizens in parallel with regime privileges. Propaganda becomes a part of this process.

As Gadshiev emphasizes, “the goal of the totalitarian system is to fragmentize and atomize the society; to eliminate all social attachments and inherited ties that root the human being in traditional structures.”<sup>354</sup> Society is at the target in

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<sup>353</sup> Gino Germani (1978) *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*, New Jersey: Transaction Books, p. 8

<sup>354</sup> Kamaludin Gadshiev (2004) “Reflections on Russian Totalitarianism” in Hans Maier *Totalitarianism and Political Religion Volume I: Concepts for Comparison of Dictatorship* Translated by Jodi Btuhn, New York: Routledge (53-57) p. 54

totalitarianism. Cultural domain is repressed together with ideological desires. Social structure is intervened by media apparatuses. The object of the regime is to form a new human being who is harmonized with regime policies.

Violence against vast majority of the society is a common practice in totalitarianism. The regime opponents are suppressed and fear is widespread among citizens. In this way, alternative figures to the absolute leader are annihilated as well. If the regime faces a resistance, it is more likely to terrorize society for the survivability of the system. In addition, “terror was more than a ‘social prophylactic’: it was a cultural-revolutionary attack upon existing ways of life.”<sup>355</sup> Violence is used to bring about radical change for the people.

Another characteristic of totalitarianism is command economy. The system exercises power over economic issues. Free market economy is eliminated by the administration. The main actor in economy is the state which controls every aspect of economic life. The applied model is central planning that is based on the whole control of economy via state apparatuses.

Stalinism, as a totalitarian rule, had no tolerance to other types of opinions. Stalin was an undisputable leader and his hegemony was absolute. The developments in the Party administration reveal the situation clearly: between 1930-1939, there was “drastic reduction” in the number of Politburo plenary meetings from eighty-five in 1930 to two in 1939.<sup>356</sup> It reflects one man dominance on the system. Collective leadership, relatively performed in Lenin’s era, was transformed into undemocratic and totalitarian control.

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<sup>355</sup> Jörg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel (2009) “The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror: National Socialist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union as Multiethnic Empires” (Translated by Barry Haneberg) in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (eds.) *Beyond Totalitarianism Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (180-227) p. 208

<sup>356</sup> Nicolas Werth (2004) “Stalin’s System during the 1930s” in Henry Rousso (eds.) *Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared*, (English-language edition edited and introduced by Richard J. Golsan, Translated by Lucy B. Golsan, Thomas C. Hilde, and Peter S. Rogers) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (29-55) p. 39

The socialist revolution in Tsarist Russia resulted in a radical break in the Russian society aiming a total social transformation.<sup>357</sup> The new regime tried to create the *new Soviet man*. The new ways of life were imposed upon the Soviet population. Stalin used indoctrination through education and different propaganda apparatuses.

The world witnessed several bloody policies when Stalin was in power. Especially, in 1930s, he used various tactics against the Soviet citizens and his own loyal clique. Labor camps were the place of repression and famine. The Great Purges resulted in many deaths and caused the loss of Soviet intelligentsia. He eliminated the opponents through different Show Trials.

Stalin focused on a system which was named as revolution from above, including policies such as collectivization, dekulakization, command economy, and accelerated industrialization.<sup>358</sup> Moreover, he paid attention to strategic sectors which refers to war industry. For Stalin, weaponization was a significant policy in the atmosphere of the Cold War.

As for authoritarian regimes, personalization of the system is an inevitable concept, since the leader is the driving force in such systems. The ruler performs like an energizer because each policy and the elite circle are based on his powerful leadership. This centralization prevents democratic tendencies in the system.

The second characteristic of authoritarianism is limited pluralism in society, although alternative decisions in the real sense of the term would not take place where the power is centralized in hands of the absolute leader. The civil society and the media are repressed and freedom of thought is restricted. As a result, the dissenters are eliminated easily.

Under these conditions, the authoritarian rulers look for legitimacy because such undemocratic systems may build a conducive environment for demonstrations

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<sup>357</sup> Lewis H. Siegelbaum (1992) *Soviet State and Society Between Revolutions: 1918-1929*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 8

<sup>358</sup> Nicolas Werth (2004) "Strategies of Violence in the Stalinist USSR" in Henry Rousso (eds.) *Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared*, (English-language edition edited and introduced by Richard J. Golsan, Translated by Lucy B. Golsan, Thomas C. Hilde, and Peter S. Rogers) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (73-95) p. 73

and revolts. They have a potential for the outbreak of dangerous movements of opponents. Thus, some activities of opponents are allowed. However, the system is pseudo democracy because of restricted freedom atmosphere in the political arena.

Authoritarianism has its own economic model. Rather than central planning, it tries to supervise the economy and economic processes. We cannot talk about a total grip of the authoritarian regimes over the economy and even if market economy is on the agenda it is under the hegemony of the authoritarian leader.

In the past twenty years, we observed one of the biggest rollbacks of democracy in Russia. The democratic experiment after the dissolution of the Soviet Union lasted for a short period because of shifting to autocracy. Putin administration stimulated this process so today's Russian political system would be labeled most properly as authoritarian through centralization, decline in political and civil rights, domination of state on media and economic issues.<sup>359</sup>

Putin controlled Russian political space with authoritarian discourse. He created an atmosphere of limited freedom. Loyal parties and faithful figures occupied the system which was based on former members of security services. In addition, the emphasis on the Russian culture and placing importance on charismatic leadership played a role in this process. Therefore, "Russia's political culture should be described as more authoritarian-collectivist than liberal-democratic. Many experts emphasize the extreme heterogeneity of Russia's political and cultural spectrum, the existence of a whole series of different sub-cultures having disparate value-ideas."<sup>360</sup>

The printed and visual media was shaped by Putin. Media owners who had critical views were repressed and some properties of them were confiscated. Some of the media owners ever had to escape from the country. Putin constructed a propaganda system with the help of such a controlled media. In this system, only pro-regime civil society organizations were permitted to function whilst foreign funded organizations were faced with repressive policies.

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<sup>359</sup> Thomas Ambrosio (2009) Op. cit. p. 4

<sup>360</sup> Kamaludin Gadshiev (2004) Op. cit. p. 54

Russian economy, facing a radical break after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and being shaken by a privatization period, experienced a recovery era thanks to the rising prices in the energy sector. Support for Putin rule increased under such an economic environment. The populist policies pleased the newly emerged middle class.

The booming economy resulted in the formulation of an imperial discourse in foreign policy. The belligerent attitudes of Putin affected world politics. He acted like a war hawk in the case of the Chechen problem and Georgian issue with the aim of being a super power in the world. Furthermore, the Soviet nostalgia motivated him. Putin defended Russian sphere of influence harshly. He tried to break American domination which was formed after the end of the Cold War and strived to become a hegemon on world affairs.

When we compare Stalinism and Putinism, we realize some similarities and differences. Although Stalinism is associated with totalitarianism and Putinism is associated with authoritarianism, we can find some converging points in both of these systems.

Stalin and Putin both used certain methods to keep the system functioning and to keep their rule intact by creating a personality cult, by using ideology, by controlling the media and state institutions, and finally by controlling the economy.

First of all, both of these leaders created a personality cult around their names.

“Stalin gradually defeated actual and potential contenders within the Soviet leadership and eventually subordinated key institutions within the Soviet political system to his personal authority.”<sup>361</sup> His regime was one man rule. The total domination on Communist Party and also on the state was definite. The system was controlled firmly. He was the top decision maker in each step of administration. He was the only man to decide policies of the country after the death of Lenin. Stalin’s

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<sup>361</sup> Milan W. Svoblik (2012) *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 53

personality cult was really effective in this process. He was idolized together with various policies mentioned in the previous chapters.

As for Putin, first of all “he characterized the collapse of the Soviet Union as a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.”<sup>362</sup> He attached a major importance to Soviet time and mentioned that period with a deep nostalgia. The magnificence of Soviet era caused glorification of the past year. In addition, Stalin and Stalin’s era were used in positive terms as in politics. Putin tried to rehabilitate Stalin and his memory with the help of various ways. Since “the golden myth of Stalinism became a gold mine for Putin’s kleptocracy.”<sup>363</sup>

Putin tried to resurrect Stalin’s cult of personality in Russia. Stalin had a victory over fascism and defended the motherland in the ‘Great Patriotic War’. Therefore, it was hoped that people would be more likely to forget atrocities and the totalitarian rule of Stalin. “The message to the Russian people is clear: Just as Stalin did, Putin will take whatever steps he deems necessary to defend the country. There may be collateral damage, but trust him. It’s for the good of Russia.”<sup>364</sup> For Russians, the price they paid for Putin’s authoritarian rule is worthwhile because he accomplished to rehabilitate the great Russia.

As Putin rehabilitated Russia as a world power he became the hero of the modern Russian state. This was an important factor for him to create his own personality cult similar to Stalin. Putin “loves to be photographed grappling with Siberian tigers, riding horses without a shirt or pumping iron with Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev leading to high levels of coverage in the international press.”<sup>365</sup> They are some postures that demonstrate Putin’s macho personality cult. The bossy

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<sup>362</sup> Thomas Sherlock (2016) “Russian Politics and the Soviet Past: Reassessing Stalin and Stalinism under Vladimir Putin”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (45-59) Volume: 49 Issue: 1 p. 46

<sup>363</sup> Dina Khapaeva (2016) “Triumphant Memory of the Perpetrators: Putin's Politics of Re-Stalinization”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume: 49 Issue: 1 (61-73) p. 68

<sup>364</sup>Hannah Thoburn (2016) “For Putin For Stalin”, *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/25/for-putin-for-stalin-russia-propaganda/> Access Date: March 14, 2016

<sup>365</sup> Taras Kuzio (2016) “Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Russia: Introduction to the Special Issue”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume: 49 Issue: 1 (1-11) p. 3

attitudes of Putin pave the way for restrictions in the country. Actually, it represents the authoritarian system of Russia.

Secondly, ideology and the aim of creating a new society within this framework is another point of comparison.

Stalin was aware of the significance of education system in terms of disseminating the ideology of the regime. It had a major role in the context of the indoctrination process because the state had a chance to influence each individual from childhood to adolescence. The Soviets were able to use that mechanism successfully. In this way, they could disseminate the official ideology and shape it by personalization of Stalin. In other words, “the original party ideology was thus transformed according to Stalin’s own dictates into the highly personalized new version of Soviet ideology.”<sup>366</sup>

On the contrary, Putin could not apply such a total indoctrination system under the post-Soviet conditions. Although Putin’s capability was limited for a total control, he had capacity to affect society and decisions. Furthermore, in the authoritarian Russian system, there was no scope for ideological directions. Putin and his *Silovik* team sought to mobilize society with populist policies rather than ideological perspectives.

Third point is related to the tight control of the media by both leaders.

In the Stalinist system, there was no room for independent media and freedom of thought and expression. As a communist country, whole media assets belonged to the state. Therefore, a monopoly of the state in this sector brought about a partisan publishing policy and released information which was not outside the scope of official ideology. The media was used as one of the indoctrination sources in the Soviet Union. *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* were the cornerstones of the propaganda machine. Soviet society was tried to be influenced with these agents. There was no tolerance to the opponents and different ideas. “Stalin perceived any kind of

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<sup>366</sup> Robert C. Tucker (1986) “The Dictator and Totalitarianism” in Barbara Kellerman (eds.) *Political Leadership: A Source Book*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press (49-57) p. 52

opposition or disagreement as a sign of disloyalty, which he interpreted as criminal.”<sup>367</sup>

Putin abolished free mass media by elimination of dissidents through a strict grip. After Putin’s tight control, the self-censorship mechanism was applied in the media sector. As Hale points out “surveys have showed that as many as 89 percent of all Russian citizens regard television as their primary source of political information.”<sup>368</sup> Thus, especially television is an important instrument as a propaganda machine to manipulate the society. Minds of people were brought under control. Citizens were repressed in order to make them accept government policies.

Fourthly, Stalinism and Putinism both had strict control over the state institutions.

The leadership of Stalin was an undisputable phenomenon. Being appointed as the Secretary General enormously increased his authority. He created his own loyal team of elites. Stalin’s total grip was not only on the Party but also on other state apparatuses which were subjugated by the absolute leader. The institutions and cadre of them were shaped by Stalin whose instructions were unquestionable.

Terror was a control mechanism for Stalin. In this way, he shaped the society and eliminated potential opposition figures. Collectivization, industrialization, camps and purges terrorized the Soviet population. All of them were influential elements in the framework of social and political perspectives. Svoblik mentions that

Stalin’s purges transformed the Communist Party from an ideological organization of elites and intellectuals whose primary political interest was the promotion of communism into a party in which power rested in the hands of people of low-class origins whose primary, personal loyalty was to Stalin.<sup>369</sup>

In Putin’s era a firm federal grip was established over local leaders. Security network and disciplined party were highly influential in the context of ensuring

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<sup>367</sup> Karen L. Ryan (2009) *Stalin in Russian Satire: 1917-1991*, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, p. 16

<sup>368</sup> Henry E. Hale (2010) *Op. cit.* p. 37

<sup>369</sup> Milan W. Svoblik (2009) “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Volume: 53 Number: 2 (477–494) p. 483

control over state apparatuses, bureaucracy, parliament and Russian intelligentsia. The great number of former members of security and military officers were positioned in different state agencies. They made Putin's control on both central and local units easier. However, it remains moderate to a certain extent when it is compared with Stalin's totalitarian regime which was full of suppression, misery and terror.

In the case of Putin too, there was obviously a harsh political manner. "Putin's rule rested on a number of bases, including oil and gas wealth, coercion, corruption, and his own personal charisma."<sup>370</sup> However, we cannot talk about terrorism of the regime against opponents and society. As an example of authoritarian systems, Putinism used various restrictions on Russian people instead of terrorism. They would be evaluated as a precaution of his rule in order to guarantee the survival of administration.

Finally, economic system shows some differences between Stalinism and Putinism.

The command economic model was applied under Stalinism. Wintrobe underlines that "the command economy is the most common type of model used to analyze Communist economic systems, systems which replace market forces with a central planning system."<sup>371</sup> Stalin applied command economy with a communist vision. The state was a dominant figure which did not allow free entrepreneurship.

In comparison with Stalin, Putin permitted market economy but it was under the influence of the state. Its hegemony was appreciable in economic sectors. The governing party was used in this process when the wealth was distributed and loyal clan to Kremlin was created. "United Russia helped maintain elite cohesion during the 2000s by providing elites with regularized access to spoils and careers."<sup>372</sup> Party and its cadre were utilized when the economy was subjugated by Putin.

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<sup>370</sup> Sean Cannady, Paul Kubicek (2014) Op. cit. p. 5

<sup>371</sup> Ronald Wintrobe (1998) *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 134

<sup>372</sup> Ora John Reuter and Rostislav Turovsky (2014) "Dominant Party Rule and Legislative Leadership in Authoritarian Regimes", *Party Politics*, Volume: 20 Number: 5 (663-374) p. 672

In conclusion, we place Stalinism in totalitarian regime typology because of his ruling system. In addition, we name Putinism as one of authoritarian administrations due to the dynamics of his type of rule. Although they have different positions within the matrix of regime classification we realize that there are some similar dimensions where they are compared and contrasted with each other.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: TURKISH SUMMARY

#### 1. Giriş

Bu tez, Stalin'in Sovyetler Birliği dönemindeki totaliter yönetimi ile Putin'in modern dönem Rusya'sında ortaya çıkan otoriter rejimi kıyaslamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın argümanı olarak, söz konusu iki sistem belli farklılıklar gösterse de, Stalin'in totaliter rejiminin ve Putin'in otoriter yönetiminin, kökleri Rus tarihine dayanan bazı benzerliklere sahip olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

Çalışmamızda, (1) totalitarizmin karakteristik özelliklerinin neler olduğu ve diğer demokratik olmayan rejimlerden hangi yönleriyle ayrıldığı, (2) Stalinizmin ne olduğu ve hangi anlamda totaliter sistemlerle uyum içerisinde olduğu, (3) otoriterliği nasıl tanımlamamız gerektiği ve otoriter rejimler ile totaliter sistemlerin hangi yönleriyle birbiriyle benzeştiği ve birbirinden ayrıştığı, (4) Putin yönetimini neden otoriter olarak adlandırdığımız ve hangi politikaların onu otoriter kıldığı gibi sorulara cevap bulmaya çalışacağız.

Bu tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm giriş bölümü olmakla beraber son bölüm sonuç kısmını kapsamaktadır. İkinci bölümde, teorik bir altyapı oluşturmak adına totalitarizme ve onun karakteristik özelliklerine değinilecektir. Bu özellikler arasında araştırmacılarca ve bilim insanlarınca ortak kabul görmüş olanlar kendisine yer bulacaktır. Ortaya koyduğumuz örnekler genellikle Stalin döneminden seçilecektir. Üçüncü bölümde, Stalin tarafından oluşturulan sistem ele alınacaktır. Onun politikalarının hangi manada totaliter sistemler ile uyduğu ortaya konmaya çalışılacaktır.

Dördüncü bölüm ise otoriter sistemlere ve onun karakteristik özelliklerine odaklanmaktadır. Böylece teorik bir çerçeve çizilmeye çalışılacaktır. Otoriter sistemlerin farklı tanımlamalarına yer verilecek ve farklı araştırmacıların bakış açısından faydalanacaktır. Beşinci bölüm, Putin iktidarına ve onun döneminde sergilenen baskıcı politikalara yer vermektedir. Putin'in otoriter rejiminin göstergeleri kabul edilen tutumlara değinilmeye çalışılacaktır. Putin'in birinci ve ikinci başkanlık dönemleri ile bir geçiş periyodu olan başbakanlık dönemi tezimizde

kendine yer bulmakla beraber 2012 yılında başlayan ve şu an içinde bulunduğumuz üçüncü başkanlık dönemine değinilmeyecektir. Çünkü son başkanlık dönemi hem devam eden bir süreçtir hem de şu an için bu döneme dair yorum getirmek erken olabilir.

Rus tarihinde yaşanan farklı dönemler birbiriyle ilişki içerisindedir. Bu sebeple, Çarlık döneminin Sovyet rejimi üzerinde etkisi olduğu gibi, günümüz Rusya'sı da kökleri Sovyet Birliğine kadar giden gelenekler ve alışkanlıklar ile şekillenmiştir. Bunlar, sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik alanlarda görülmekle beraber özellikle politik alanda göze çarpmaktadır.

## **2. Totalitarizmin Karakteristik Özellikleri**

Totalitarizm, basitçe, insanların hayatlarını mutlak otoritesi altında zapt eden ve onların hayatlarını yönlendiren bir rejim olarak açıklanabilir. Totalitarizm, insanlık üzerinde oluşturulan yoğun baskı ve sistem üzerinde tesis ettiği sıkı kontrol ile diğer otokrat rejimlerden ayrılmaktadır. Totalitarizm kelimesi, ilk olarak İtalyan faşist lider Benito Mussolini tarafından 1925 yılında bir konuşmada kullanılmış ve sonrasında popüler hale gelmiştir.

Totalitarizmde temel aktör olarak lider yer almaktadır. Totalitarizm ve diktatörlük arasında esas farkı totaliter liderce oluşturulan güç tekeli oluşturmaktadır. Lider tüm süreçlerde merkezi bir konumda bulunur ve önemsiz konularda dahi son karar mercii kendisidir. Bu sebeptendir ki, totaliter organizasyonun üyelerince getirilen eleştiriler kabul edilemez bir durumdur. Lider sorgulanamaz bir konumdadır ve en önemli şey onun iradesidir.

Totaliter hareketlerde, devlet ve partinin bütünleşmesi ortak özelliklerden biridir fakat parti devletten büyük bir organizasyon halini alır. Parti elitleri devlet aygıtlarında çeşitli roller üstlenir ve bürokratik pozisyonlar sadece parti üyelerine ve sempatizanlarına açıktır.

İdeolojiler, totaliter rejimlerde insanları harekete geçirmek için etkili bir unsurdur. Buna ek olarak, ideolojik yönlendirme bir meşruiyet kaynağı olarak da kullanılmaktadır. Rejimin meşrulaştırılması ideoloji aracılığıyla sağlanmaktadır.

Totalitarizm, yeniden bir inşa sürecine odaklanmaktadır ve hayali bir dünya yaratır. Bu kapsamda, baskı ve şiddet önemli bir araçtır. Eski rejime ait yapılar tasfiye edilir ve toplum üzerinde baskı oluşturulur. Korku ortamı yaratılmaya çalışılır. Halbuki terör terörü doğurmaktadır ve sonuç terör ortamının artmasıdır.

Totalitarizmin bir diğer özelliği de toplumu ve sosyal hayatı dönüştürme çabasıdır. Totaliter hareketler, kültürel, toplumsal ve psikolojik anlamda insan doğasında bir dönüşümü hedeflemektedir. Rejim, ideolojik olarak kitleleri şekillendirmek ister. Bu süreçte, propaganda ve fikir aşılama önemli araçlar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu nedenle, eğitim sistemi kritik bir yer tutmaktadır.

Merkezi ekonomi, totaliter rejimlerde genellikle ortak bir özellik olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu rejimlerde, serbest ekonomiden bahsetmek mümkün değildir çünkü neredeyse tüm mülkiyet sistemi devlet kontrolünde bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu planlı ekonomik sistemde, özel sektöre kendi politikalarını yaratma imkanı tanınmamaktadır. Sağlanan mutlak kontrol neticesinde esas egemen rejimdir.

### **3. Stalin ve Stalinizm**

Aslında, Stalin'in totaliter rejiminin kökleri Rus tarihinde yatmaktadır. Devrimden sonra, Lenin iktidara gelmiştir ve politik atmosfer hayli disipline edilerek bir kontrol mekanizması kurulmuştur. Tüm gücün bir elde toplanması ve muhaliflerin tasfiyesi demokratik olmayan bir ortam yaratmıştır. Fakat Stalin yaşamın tüm noktalarına nüfuz edecek şekilde bütün sistemi kendisine tabi kılmıştır.

Stalin, 1922 yılında Komünist Parti Genel Sekreteri olarak atanmış ve sonrasında Parti'nin yönetici kademesinde ön plana çıkmıştır. Stalin'in Genel Sekreterlik konumu, Parti'nin üyelik politikasını sıkıca kontrol etme konusunda kendisine olanak tanımıştır. Parti organizasyonu, muhalifleri elemine etmek ve yönetim aygıtlarını kontrol etmek için kullanılmıştır. Stalin tek parti diktatörlüğünü, totaliter bir rejime dönüştürmüştür. Tek adam olarak hareket etmiş ve kişisel bir kültür yaratmıştır.

Stalin, Sovyetler Birliği'nin sosyal dinamiklerine müdahale etmiştir. Disiplin, baskı, manipülasyon ve propaganda ile şekillendirilen *Yeni Sovyet İnsanı* yaratmayı hedeflemiştir. Sosyalist öğretisi Sovyet halkına empoze edilmiştir. Devrimci ruh,

birçok konuda bir köşe taşı halini almıştır. Bu süreçte de rejimin öğretileriyle donatılmış bir eğitim sistemi kritik rol oynamıştır.

*Homo Sovieticus*'un yaratılması için, baskı ve şiddete ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. Stalin iktidarının en önemli karakteristik özelliklerinden biri de terördür. Terör odaklı politikalar, rejim karşıtlarının ortadan kaldırılmasını ve potansiyel tehditlerin yok edilmesini hedeflemiştir. Muhalifler, Büyük Temizlik ve Moskova Duruşmaları (Show Trials/Moscow Trials) boyunca tutuklanmış, sürgün edilmiş ve öldürülmüştür.

Stalin rejiminin bir diğer amacı da, komünist ideoloji doğrultusunda ekonomik yapıda radikal bir değişim yaratmaktır. Ekonomik hayat tüm yönleriyle devlet ve onun organlarınca kontrol edilmiştir. Bunun bir örneği olan tarımsal kollektivizasyon (collectivization) korkunç sonuçlar ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu politikaya rağmen, üretim, düşük seviyede kalmış ve hedeflenen başarı oranları yakalanamamıştır. Varlıklı çiftçiler (*kulaks*) bir sınıf olarak görülmüş ve ortadan kaldırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu nedenle, söz konusu politika Sovyetler Birliği'nde bir sınıf çatışmasını hatırlatmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, birçok insan açlık sebebiyle ölmüş ve Stalin rejiminin zor kullanmaları neticesinde hayatını kaybetmiş veya öldürülmüştür.

Aynı zamanda, Stalin döneminde beş yıllık planlar da uygulanmıştır. Bu kapsamda, Sovyet ekonomisini geri kalmışlıktan, makineli sisteme dönüştürmek amaçlanmıştır. Endüstrileşme politikası ile ağır metal ve savunma sanayisini geliştirmeye yönelik uygulamalar Stalin tarafından hayata geçirilmiştir. Stalin'in tüm bu politikaları tepeden inmecei devrimler olarak adlandırılmaktadır.

#### **4. Otoriterliğin Karakteristik Özellikleri**

Otoriter sistemler, ideolojisi olmayan kısıtlı çoğulculuğa, gücü elinde tutan bir lider ya da gruba, ekonomi üzerinde hakimiyeti olan bir mekanizmaya ve meşruiyete ihtiyaç duyan yönetici bir sınıfa sahip rejimlerdir.

Otoriterlik, totaliter ve demokratik rejimler ile çelişen bir sistem olarak konumlandırılabilir. Diğer taraftan ise otoriter sistemler, demokrasi ve totaliter rejimler ile benzer karakteristik özellikleri de taşımaktadır.

Bu sistemlerde, liderin otoritesi mutlak ve genellikle sistemin şahsileştirilmesi uygulamaya konur. Fakat bu durum totaliter yönetimler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda daha düşük bir seviyede kalmaktadır. Yönetim kadrosu için liderin iradesi temel prensipleri oluşturmaktadır. Bu sistemlerde, liderin esas çekincelerinden biri de sadakattir. Rejim için tehdit oluşturan bu durum, yozlaşmanın yönetici kesim arasında yayılması ve bu tabakaya bazı tavizler verilerek aşılabilir. Bu sebeple, liderler himaye etmeyi ve baskıyı aynı zamanda kullanmaktadır.

Otoriter liderler, kendi görüşleri ve anlayışları çerçevesinde sosyal hayatı etkilemeye çabalamaktadır. Buna rağmen, tamamıyla yeni bir sosyal hayat ve değerler bütünü yaratılması amaçlanmaz.

Otoriter rejimler eleştiriyi tolere edemez fakat onun kudreti bütünüyle bir itaat ortamı yaratılmasında yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu sebeptendir ki görece bir özgürlük ortamı mevcuttur.

Medya, kitlelerin manipülasyonu konusunda önemli bir araç olarak yer tutmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, yönetim taraftarı sivil toplum örgütleri desteklenmekte ve muhalif organizasyonlar genellikle baskı altına alınmaktadır. Otoriter hükümetlerin esas çekincesi bu sınırlı çoğulcu ortamda mevcut güçlerini korumaktır.

Otoriter liderler, oluşturdukları imtiyazlı partileri için meşruiyet arayışı içinde bulunmaktadır. Seçimler, genel olarak, sisteme gelebilecek muhtemel müdahaleleri önlemek amacıyla kullanılmaktadır. Bu durum, ayrıca rejim tipinin maskelenmesi anlamında önem arz etmektedir. Bir diğer ifade ile demokrasi imajının yaratılmasına hizmet eder durumdadır. Bu nedenle, seçimler ve çok partili düzen, toplumda olabilecek huzursuzlukları ve muhalif hareketleri minimize ederek, istikrar ortamının yaratılmasında etken konumdadır.

Otoriter sistemlerde bir ideolojinin olmayışı, insanların harekete geçirilmesi bakımından sıkıntı yaratmaktadır. Bu sebeple, otoriter yöneticiler bir toplumun ortak paydaları olan vatanseverlik, sosyal adalet ve ekonomik kalkınma gibi alanlara atflar yaparak tabanını genişletmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Politik hegemonya ve ekonomi arasındaki ilişkiyi göz ardı etmek gerçekçi olmayan bir tutum olacaktır. Bağımsız ekonomik aktörler politik alanda bir özgürlük

ortamı yaratabilmektedir. Onlar, otoriter sisteme alternatif ve bu sistemden bağımsız bir hareket talep etme potansiyeli göstermektedir. Herhangi bir muhtemel ekonomik rakibin önlenmesi için sistemde ortaya çıkan varlık ve refah tek bir lider eliyle dağıtılmalıdır.

Bu çerçevede, enerji ve savunma sanayileri gibi stratejik sektörler devlet ya da liderce idare edilir. Bu sektörler, alternatif olarak lidere sadık işadamlarınca da yönetilebilir. Sonuç olarak, otoriter sistemin istikrarı açısından ekonominin kilit role sahip olduğu söylenebilir.

## 5. Putin ve Putinizm

Boris Yeltsin dönemi, farklı gruplar arasında güç çatışmasıyla geçmiştir. Sovyetler Birliği sonrasında rejimin konsolidasyonu ise Putin döneminde sağlanmıştır. Putin'in daha otoriter ve merkezîyetçi bir yapıya doğru giden adımları, ülkede istikrarın kaynağı olarak görülmektedir. Putin'in karizmatik ve güçlü liderliği, Rus halkı arasındaki popülerliğinde etkili bir rol oynamaktadır.

Genel olarak kabul edilir ki Putin günümüz Rusya'sında en güçlü kişidir. Rusya gerçek anlamda bir demokrasi değildir çünkü Putin tarafından demokratik değerlere yapılan atıf sadece görünürde kalmaktadır. Putin, Rusya'da yapay bir demokratik ortam yaratmaktadır.

Partiler arası demokratik bir yarışın önlenmesi rejimin ana hedeflerinden biri olmuştur. Bu sistemde temel aktör, en güçlü organizasyon olan Birleşik Rusya Partisidir. Hareket, Putin'in mutlak kontrolü altında yer almaktadır. Aynı zamanda Putin, merkezi federal gücün yereldeki yöneticiler üzerinde artırılmasını ve sistem içerisinde yer alan başkanın otoritesinin sağlamaştırılmasını amaçlamaktadır. Putin *oligarkların* gücünü de ortadan kaldırmaya çalışmaktadır. Ortaya çıkan boşluğun ise kendi elince yaratılan ve bir politik elit grup olan *Slovikler*ce doldurulmasını amaçlamaktadır. Söz konusu grup, eski güvenlik güçleri üyelerini ve istihbarat servisi elemanlarını kapsamaktadır.

Putin rejiminin önemli özelliklerinden biri de basın üzerinde oluşturulan kontrol mekanizmasıdır. Medya kuruluşları üzerinde kurulan baskı ve güç kullanımı yoluyla medya sektöründe yaşanan el değiştirmeler, Putin tarafından sıklıkla

başvurulan yöntemlerden biridir. Günümüz Rusya'sında basın araçları genellikle Putin rejimine sadık iş adamlarınca yönetilmektedir. Gazetecilerin sebepsiz yere tutuklanmaları ve medya üzerinde kurulan vesayet, bu sektörün sıkıca kontrol altına alınmasına neden olmuştur. Bu kapsamda, basın organları, Putin'in siyasi anlamda propaganda aracı haline gelmiştir. Medyanın toplum için bir bilgi kaynağı olmasının önü tıkanmış ve hükümet taraftarı yayınlar baskın hale gelmiştir.

Putin'in otoriter sistemi, kültürel alanında olduğu gibi sivil toplum üzerinde de bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu baskıcı atmosfer, Rus halkı için aşına olunan bir ortam yaratmıştır çünkü toplumun politik kültürü Çarlık dönemi ve Sovyetler Birliği periyodu boyunca şekillendirilmiştir. Modern Rusya, aynen geçmiş dönemlerde de görüldüğü gibi, kişisel özgürlük alanlarını sıkı bir denetim altında tutmaktadır. Rus toplumu için, otoriter yönetim anlayışı, kökleri geçmişe dayanan bir sistemdir ve yönetsel bir miras özelliği taşımaktadır.

Sivil toplum, devletin faaliyetlerinin takip edilmesinde ve hükümet programının halk tarafından izlenmesinde etkin bir konumdadır. Bu karakteristik özellik göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, demokrasilerde sivil toplumun kritik bir role sahip olduğu yadsınmaz. Bununla beraber, Putin, özgürlük ortamını zayıflatmakta ve bu alanda devletin sahip olduğu rolü artırmaya çalışmaktadır.

Olağanüstü güçlere sahip bir başkanlık sistemi arzusu ve tepeden inme bir anlayışla toplumu dizayn etme çabası yönetim kademesinde keyfi tutumlara sebebiyet vermektedir. Bu grup tarafından, sivil toplum örgütleri, kendi rejimlerine birer tehdit olarak da algılanmaktadır. Sadece yönetim sistemine sadık olan sivil toplum örgütlerinin faaliyetlerine müsaade edilmektedir. Bu patronvari (bossy) ortamda, birçok sivil toplum örgütü etkin olarak faaliyet gösterememektedir. Bu örgütler parçalanmış bir hal almakta ve etkili olamayan birer organizasyona dönüşmektedir.

Sovyet sistemi yıkıma uğramış bir ekonomiyi kendisinden sonra gelen döneme miras bırakmıştır. Bu nedenle, reformlar ve özelleştirmeler, dönemin bürokrasinin en yoğun gündemini oluşturmuştur. Rusya, Sovyetler Birliği'nin

dağılmasından sonra bir kaos içine girmiş ve bir bilinmezlik durumu ortaya çıkmıştır çünkü sistem büyük bir değişim içerisine girmiştir.

Enerji sektörü, günümüz Rusya'sında kilit bir yer tutmaktadır. 2000li yılların başında, petrol ürünleri fiyatlarında artış yaşanmaya başlamıştır. Bu da Rus ekonomisine bir büyüme ivmesi kazandırmıştır. Doğal kaynaklardan elde edilen gelir, Rus ekonomisi içerisinde önemli bir paya sahiptir.

Petrol ve gaz ürünleri piyasasında yaşanan fiyat artışları enerji zengini Rusya'ya refah getirmiştir. Bu nedenle, toplum içinde bir zenginlik artışı gözlenmiştir. Bunun neticesinde ortaya çıkan Putin'in popülist politikaları kendisine büyük bir popülarite kazandırmıştır. Putin'in 2000 yılından bugüne iktidarda olduğu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, bu politikaların önemi gözler önüne serilmektedir. Bununla beraber, yükselişte olan ekonomik göstergeler, 2008 dünya ekonomik kriziyle birlikte akamete uğramıştır. Enerji piyasasında görülen fiyat düşüşleri, Rus ekonomisini olumsuz olarak etkilemiştir.

Rus ekonomik modeli, devlet öncülüğünde oluşturulan kapitalist bir sistemdir. Bir diğer deyişle, devlet ekonomide kilit bir konum işgal etmektedir. Rusya'nın en büyük gaz şirketi Gazprom devletin otoritesi altında faaliyetlerine devam etmektedir. Enerji sektöründeki kontrol, büyük anlamda devlet eliyle sağlanmaktadır.

Örneğin, Mihail Hodorkovski'nin holding grubu Yukos, Rusya'da en büyük petrol şirketi konumundayken, bu gruba devlet tarafından el konulmuş ve Hodorkovski 2003 yılında tutuklanmıştır. Bu durum, Rusya'da mülkiyet hakkının göz ardı edilebilir olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Aynı zamanda, hükümet organlarınca devlet yararına ekonomiye yön verilmeye çalışılabileceğini ve keyfi tutumlar sergilenebileceğini gözler önüne sermiştir.

Rusya, ekonomik anlamda bir süper güç olarak, uluslararası alanda emperyal arzularla şekillenen saldırgan politikalar takip etmeye başlamıştır. Büyük oranda enerji sektörüne dayanan ekonomi, uluslararası politikalarda etkili bir silah olarak kullanılmaktadır. Böylece, Rusya uluslararası alanda önemli bir aktör olarak

anılmaya başlamıştır. Putin'in yönetimi altındaki Rusya, yeniden merkezi bir konuma gelmiştir.

Putin, Rusya'nın stratejik alanlardaki mevcudiyetini savunmakta ve çok kutuplu bir dünya düzenini destekleyerek, uluslararası politikadaki Amerikan ağırlığını kırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu sınırları Rusya'nın yakın çevresini oluşturmaktadır ve bu alan, Rusya için ulusal öncelikler arasında yer almaktadır. Bu bölgede statükoyu korumak, Putin yönetimi için büyük önem arz etmektedir. Putin'in dış politikada muhafazakar bir tutum sergilediğinin başka bir örneğini de Çeçen sorununda görmek mümkündür.

11 Eylül'de Dünya Ticaret Merkezine yapılan saldırılar, Amerika ve Rusya arasında bir yumuşama dönemini de beraberinde getirmiştir. Örneğin, Putin, Bush yönetimince oluşturulan teröre karşı savaş (war on terör) doktrinini desteklemiştir. Bununla beraber, Birleşik Devletlerin Anti-Balistik Füze Antlaşmasından çekilmesi ve Amerika'nın yeni radar sistemlerini Avrupa'ya yerleştirmeye çalışılması iki güç arasında tansiyonu yükseltmiştir. Ayrıca, Amerika tarafından Irak'ın işgali de Putin yönetiminin endişelerini büyük oranda artırmıştır.

NATO'nun Doğu Avrupa'ya ve eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerine doğru genişleme politikası Moskova'nın bir diğer çekincesini oluşturmaktadır. Bugün, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna hala istikrarsız bir durum içerisinde yer alıyorsa, NATO ve Rusya arasındaki çekişmenin bunda etkisi büyüktür.

Balkan coğrafyası, Batı devletleri ve Rusya arasında bir diğer çekişme alanını teşkil etmektedir. Bu kapsamda, Kosova'nın Sırbistan'dan ayrılarak bağımsızlığını kazanması Rusya tarafından önlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Moskova'nın bu konudaki başarısızlığı ve Kosova'nın bağımsızlığını önleyememesi, onu Batı ülkelerine karşı daha saldırgan politikalar izlemeye sevk etmiştir. Rusya ve Gürcistan arasındaki Ağustos Savaşı, Kosova kriziyle aynı dönemde 2008 yılında patlak vermiştir. Rusya, Gürcistan'a olan hareketini insani bir müdahale olarak yorumlamaktadır. Ülke dışında yer alan Rus diasporası, Rusya'nın dış politikasında bir enstrüman olarak kullanılmıştır. Rusya, Güney Osetya ve Abhazya'yı birer bağımsız devlet olarak

tanımıdır. Bu durum, Kosova krizine karşı geliştirilen bir tepki ve misilleme olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Son olarak, Putin'in esas amacı Rus çıkarlarını korumak ve onu emperyal bir güç konumuna getirmektir. Putin iktidarında, Sovyet dönemine duyulan özlem, bir politika malzemesi haline getirilmiştir. Şunu da söylemek gerekir ki, Putin, Rusya'yı yeniden bir dünya gücü yapma konusunda başarılı olmuş bir liderdir.

## 6. Sonuç

Stalin ve Putin dönemlerini karşılaştırdığımızda birbirinden ayrılan ve birbirine benzeyen yönler olduğunu görmekteyiz.

İlk olarak, her iki lider de kişisel bir kült yaratma noktasında birbirine benzemektedir.

Stalin rejimi, bir tek adam iktidarı örneğini teşkil etmektedir. Komünist Parti ve devlet üzerinde mutlak bir hakimiyet göze çarpmaktadır. Sistem sıkı bir denetim altında tutulmuştur. Putin, Sovyetler Birliği dönemine ayrı bir önem atfederek, onu özlemlerle anmaktadır. Rusya içerisinde Stalin'in lider kültü yeniden canlandırılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Putin de Stalin gibi Rusya'yı bir dünya gücü yapma eğilimi göstermekte ve günümüz Rusya'sının kahramanı olmaya çalışmaktadır. Onun karizmatik liderliği, sistemin merkezileşmesine ve gücün tek elde toplanmasına sebep olmaktadır.

İkinci olarak, ideolojik manipülasyon ve bu doğrultuda yeni bir toplum yaratma güdüsü bir diğer karşılaştırma konusudur.

Stalin rejimi döneminde toplum üzerinde dayatılan bir ideolojik sistemin varlığından bahsedilebilmektedir. Bu vesileyle, *Yeni Sovyet İnsanı* adı altında, insanlığı yeniden şekillendirmek hedeflenmiştir. Diğer taraftan, Putin yönetiminin bir ideolojisi bulunmamaktadır. Ayrıca, Putin iktidarında, yeni bir toplum yaratılması ve tekrardan kültürel bir inşa süreci görülmemektedir. Otoriter bir lider olarak, bu alandaki kabiliyetleri totaliter yönetim anlayışı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda kısıtlı kalmaktadır.

Üçüncü mukayese noktası ise basın yayın organlarının her iki lider tarafından da sıkı bir denetim altında tutulduğu gerçeğidir.

Stalinist sistemde bağımsız medya kuruluşlarına yer olmadığı aşikardır. Ayrıca düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğünden bahsetmek de olanaksızdır. Komünist bir rejim olarak Stalinizmde tüm medya araçları devlete aittir. Putinizme baktığımızda ise, özgür basın kuruluşlarının, muhalif görüşlerin sıkı denetimi sayesinde ortadan kaldırıldığını söylemek mümkündür. Bu sayede, basın yayın organlarının kitlelerin manipülasyonu için birer propaganda aracı haline geldiğini görmekteyiz. Sonuç olarak ifade etmek gerekir ki, her iki lider de bu alanı kendi çıkarları için kullanmışlardır.

Dördüncü karşılaştırma alanı da rejim üzerinde kurulan hegemonyadır. Stalinist ve Putinist sistemler devlet aygıtları üzerinde sıkı bir denetim sağlayarak, kontrol mekanizmaları oluşturmuşlardır.

Devlet tarafından yaratılan terör, Stalin döneminde görülen kontrol mekanizmalarından biridir. Muhtemel muhalif görüş ve kişiler bu vesileyle ortadan kaldırılmış ve topluma şekil verme çabası içine girilmiştir. Putin iktidarında ise, devletin topluma ve muhaliflere karşı terör odaklı politikalarından bahsedemesek de baskıcı ve özgürlük alanlarını yadsıyan bir rejimin kurulmasının hedeflendiği rahatlıkla söylenebilmektedir.

Son olarak, Stalinist ve Putinist yönetim anlayışlarının ekonomik anlamda farklılık arz ettiğini söyleyebiliriz.

Stalin'in komünist ekonomisi doğası gereği kontrol ve merkezi planlama odaklı bir yaklaşım sergilemiştir. Bunun aksine, Putinist sistemde serbest piyasa ekonomisine olanak tanınmaktadır. Fakat ekonomik sistem ağırlıklı olarak devlet kontrolü altında tutulmaktadır. Bir diğer deyişle, çeşitli müdahaleler neticesinde bu alandaki devlet etkisi rahatlıkla hissedilebilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, yönetim anlayışı nedeniyle Stalinizmi totaliter rejim tipolojileri arasına yerleştirmekteyiz. Buna ek olarak, Putin iktidarı tarafından ortaya konan politikalar sebebiyle de söz konusu sistemi otoriter olarak adlandırmaktayız. Her iki yönetim biçimi, rejim sınıflandırmasında farklı konumlara sahip olsalar da, yaptığımız karşılaştırma sonucu benzer dinamiklere sahip olduklarını da

gözlemlemiş olduk. Çalışmamızda, Rusya'nın tarihsel geçmişi içerisinde şekillenen politik kültürünün de bu noktada kritik bir role sahip olduğunu değerlendirmekteyiz.

## Appendix B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

|                                |                                     |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü        | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü           | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü      | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
|                                | <input type="checkbox"/>            |

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Yengil

Adı : Onur

Bölümü : Eurasian Studies

**TEZİN ADI:** TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A  
COMPARISON OF STALINISM AND PUTINISM

**TEZİN TÜRÜ :** Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**