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TURKEY'S CHANGING DISCOURSES OF STRATEGY:  
A CRITICAL REALIST ANALYSIS

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JULY 2016

METU 2016

TURKEY'S CHANGING DISCOURSES OF STRATEGY:  
A CRITICAL REALIST ANALYSIS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

HASAN YÜKSELEN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JULY 2016



Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## ABSTRACT

### TURKEY'S CHANGING DISCOURSES OF STRATEGY: A CRITICAL REALIST ANALYSIS

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July 2016, 286 pages

This dissertation analyzes Turkey's changing discourses of security strategy since the foundation of the Republic. The concept of strategy, which is classically analyzed through the *level of analysis* distinction, is handled through employing the *ontological depth* concept of critical realism. To reach an historical and sociological analysis, the concept of strategy, which is conceived as an agential attribute, is analyzed within the dynamic interaction of agent and structure. In this way, agential and ideational aspects of strategy, conceived as *ends* that was tended to be forgotten or neglected in favor of material aspects conceived as *means*, can be analyzed from a dialectical perspective. In other words, this dissertation incorporates the evolution of strategy within the dialectics of agent-structure in which agency intentionally strives to overcome the constraining effects of structure through emancipatory strategies. In Turkish Foreign Policy, agency showed no hesitancy to formulate strategies and represent them through discourses. However, *what is spoken* – discourses – about strategy could not always be realized in outcomes as *what is actualized*. This dissertation seeks an explanation to the source of incongruence between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized*. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature on critical realist analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy by incorporating the concept of strategy and strategic discourse within this framework.

Key Words: Strategy, Strategic Discourse, Ontological Depth, Critical Realism, Turkish Foreign Policy

## ÖZ

### TÜRKİYE’NİN DEĞİŞEN STRATEJİ SÖYLEMLERİ: ELEŞTİREL GERÇEKÇİ BİR ANALİZ

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Tez Yöneticisi: Prof.Dr.Faruk Yalvaç

Temmuz 2016, 286 sayfa

Bu tez, Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan bu yana Türkiye’nin değişen güvenlik stratejisi söylemlerini analiz etmektedir. Klasik olarak *analiz düzeyi* yöntemi ile analiz edilen strateji kavramı, eleştirel gerçekçiliğin *ontolojik derinlik* kavramı ile ele alınmaktadır. Faile ait bir yetenek olarak tanımlanan strateji kavramı, fail ve yapının dinamik etkileşimi çerçevesinde analiz edilmekle kavramın tarihsel ve sosyolojik bir analizine ulaşmak amaçlanmaktadır. Böylece, stratejinin *araçlar* olarak tanımlanan *materyal* taraflarının lehine, failin göz ardı edilen veya unutulmuş stratejinin *amaçlarını* oluşturan *edimsel* ve *düşünsel* tarafları da diyalektik bir bakış açısıyla analizlere dahil edilmesi mümkün olabilecektir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu tez stratejinin evrimini, failin özgürleştirici stratejileri aşmaya çalıştığı yapının kısıtlayıcı etkilerini fail-yapı diyalektiği içerisinde konumlandırmaktadır. Türk Dış Politikasında, fail stratejinin oluşturulması ve onun söyleme dökülmesinde tereddüt etmemiştir. Fakat strateji hakkında *söylenen* her zaman *gerçeşende* sonuç olarak gerçekleştirilememiştir. Dolayısıyla bu tez, *söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasındaki uyumsuzluğa bir açıklama bulma girişimindedir. Bu tez mevcut literatüre Türk Dış Politikasının eleştirel gerçekçi bir analizine, özellikle strateji ve stratejik söylem kavramlarını dahil ederek katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Strateji, Strateji Söylem, Ontolojik Derinlik, Eleştirel Gerçekçilik, Türk Dış Politikası



To my wife Sevil and my daughter Melis

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writing process of a doctoral dissertation is probably the most painstaking part of Ph.D. education, but at the same time, this process is the most teaching one. During this process, a PhD candidate begins a journey in which encounters with several feelings; sadness, passion, desperation, fear, nervousness, happiness, enthusiasm, tension, eagerness, to count a few of them. Nevertheless, recalling Weber's words, "science is a vacation"; thus, experiencing such complex and rapidly fluctuating feelings is not surprising. But, all these feelings leave their place to a sense of triumph when the writing process comes to the end. Writing process probably is the most challenging part of this vacation, and without people around you, it would be more challenging than it is. Though writing is generally accepted as a lonely process; in fact, apart from times you just write, there are peoples around you who deserve special thanks. Their encouragement, instigation, backing and support stands as the facilitator of that process. What is left to my side in this process is just to write the text you are reading. Writing is quite painful, pouring the thoughts on paper, expressing the thought in a readable manner, and keeping a coherent text from the first sentence to the last sentence. Irrespective of how well you researched the issue, organizing a dissertation in terms of its structure and giving a shape to the knowledge you collected in the process through your insight make writing quite challenging. Despite its challenging nature, I found the key from a Nobel Winner Author Jose Saramago, who expressed "Writing is my job. It's the work I do, what I build. I don't believe in inspiration. I don't even know what that is. What I know is that I have to decide to sit down at my desk, and inspiration isn't going to push me there. The first condition for writing is sitting—then writing." When I read these words, somehow I got enlightened: writing needs sitting, without sitting you can't write. After reaching this awareness, what is left was a trigger. At this point, my Advisor Professor Dr. Faruk Yalvaç played the most significant role who stated in an email in late September 2015 that "How your writing is going on? We

should go over what you had written so far and determine the road-ahead. It would be good if you manage to finish your first draft by January 2016.” These words, in the absence to submit concrete work done, except for some draft of about 30 pages, had played the role of trigger. What I have learned in the process is that apart from research, building a research question, shaping knowledge, creating a dissertation structure; sitting for writing, focusing on creating and a trigger stands as important as the research itself. That’s why, this dissertation couldn’t have been finalized without the distinct contribution of my advisor. He further supported me throughout the process of research and writing by not hesitating to trust, guide, criticize, encourage, motivate, and give insight. I would like to express my gratitude to him for all these contributions.

In this vacation, Professor Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı also played an outstanding role who recommended, advised, and encouraged me to study with Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç. If I had not taken this advice, probably I would not have studied International Relations Theory in depth and an important part of my scholarly maturation process would have been lacking. In fact, as my Master of Science Advisor, Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, thought me the practice of IR, while Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç taught me how to think theoretically. And in my dissertation, in the light of these experiences and study, I tried to combine and merge practice and theory.

Apart from my distinguished professors, I would like to thank to Mehmet Muştu without whom, this vacation would not have started. I met with him in 1998 when he was lecturing on Management and Organization class. I am not sure whether everyone has ever met with persons who had changed a lot in one’s life, but I feel myself one of the lucky and special ones meeting him. Years before, he touched my life and caused the emergence of academic part of my character on which this dissertation is founded upon. In fact, he stands as the one who sparked my will to build an academic career and instigated this journey. I see our interaction from the perspective of being and becoming. Though I have an academic side, the emergence of this side was initiated with an interaction that was followed with Prof. Bağcı and Prof. Yalvaç in time. What he did was uncovering my academic side by raising my awareness and self-consciousness.

A dissertation does not mature in a vacuum. It needs to be discussed with friends who are eager to contribute with insight and to facilitate to find the correct answers to your unresolved questions in mind. Emre Demir and Mehmet Şahin, my colleagues from PhD program are the ones who fulfilled this need. I am sure we will continue to cooperate in the future to produce outstanding academic works either together or separately but we will always keep in touch.

Dr.Gökçe Vanlı stands as the one who made this dissertation more readable by helping me on proof-reading and eliminating language mistakes. Without her assistance, this dissertation would be distractive with its narrative style. But, she smoothed the flow of narration and eliminated mistakes that distract attention from what is discussed in the dissertation. I am very grateful to her for her efforts to make this dissertation more academic, which raise the value of this dissertation.

Distinguished members of the jury who, with their dedication, strived to eliminate the mistakes in this dissertation by their critiques, opening questions, contributive remarks, and positive support deserve very special thanks.

And my family. Probably throughout my vacation they were the most affected ones from that process. For them, this vacation was not easy, but they never hesitated to give their support. There were times I sat to study and my daughter Melis, with her cuteness and sweetness, approached and sat on my desk to attract me. Even though she was distracting me, her love made my study hours more memorable. But I should confess that this dissertation came about from the times I stole from my wife Sevil and my daughter Melis. I hope they understand me. Dedication of this dissertation to them is far less from their dedication to support me. I they weren't in my life, probably this dissertation will come about earlier, but without a meaning for us. Finally, my parents and brother, who never stopped believing in me to achieve my goals and their uninterrupted, unilateral support in every sense, cannot be appreciated with words. I am very lucky to have such an affectionate family.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Every inquiry is seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to being as it is. This cognizant seeking can take form of ‘investigating’ in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character. Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something is somehow a questioning of something. So in addition to what is asked about, an inquiry has *that which is interrogated*. In investigative questions – that is, in questions which specifically theoretical – what is asked about is determined and conceptualized. Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also *that which is to be found by asking*; this is what is really intended: with this inquiry reaches its goal.<sup>1</sup>

The concept of ‘security’ is treated as one of the key and central concepts of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) and, consequently, of academic studies on it. In accordance, the debates in different periods and respective foreign policy discourses by the elites highlighted differing aspects of decisions of foreign policy. Regarding foreign policy decisions, if understood as transmission of thought into actions, it can also be claimed that foreign policy decisions inherently consist of strategy. Security strategy – strategy relevant to security realm – is also an indispensable part of Turkish Foreign Policy. In fact, foreign policy as implementation of strategy – *praxis* of agent (Turkey) – within the context of security, which is formulated dialectically with structure and its effects – causal forces – carry on both thought and action. What is highlighted here is the process of how perception of agent shapes the security strategy. Security is accepted as “a relative concept,”<sup>2</sup> but it should also be treated as a reflective one, since agency is an indispensable part of security. This reflexivity stems from perception of agents. But, perception does not occur in a vacuum, in the

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York, Harper&Row, 1962), 24.

<sup>2</sup> Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 105.



absence of external inputs. On the contrary, strategy formulation takes place within a structured context, in which agency introduces its awareness, consciousness and subjectivity to the process of strategy formulation and conduct of it. The reason for highlighting this relationship stems from the fact that strategy from its formulation to its representation and conduct takes place within the dialectical process of agent and structure. Agency through its encounter with structure and reading of the situation creates a picture of the situation that consists of constraints and enablers stemming from both structure and attributes of agents. As the outcome of this encounter, a thought in the mind of agent appears that would be poured into strategy formulation. Agency, rather than just pouring into action the strategy, prefers to represent its strategy through discourse. Then conduct of strategy follows this representation process. Shortly, it can be illustrated as the process of;

**Table.1 The Process of Strategy within Agent-Structure Dialectics**

Agency		Structure
<b>Thought</b>	Agency tries to portray the spatio-temporal conditions of the context through its consciousness in order to alter the undesired conditions of the existing situation.	Dialectically shapes the thought in line with agential capacity to act consciously. However, structure cannot be conceived and be known comprehensively. But, the nature of context and agency’s consciousness determine the level of awareness of the agency
<b>Strategy</b>	Agency identifies <i>ends</i> and allocates <i>means</i> in line with the needs of structure	Structure and its specific context either constrains or enables both <i>means</i> and <i>ends</i> .
<b>Discours</b>	Agency represents strategy with discourse in order to make known its strategy either explicitly or implicitly depending on its preferences.	Structure, with its unobservable generative mechanisms that is beyond the conceptions of agency distorts <i>what is spoken</i> .
<b>Action</b>	Agency operationalizes strategy as conduct.	Structure and its causal forces together with other agential strategies either constrain or enable strategy to produce outcomes. Unobservable generative mechanisms that is beyond the conceptions of agency causes the (in)congruence between what is spoken and what is actualized.

What is illustrated in the table highlights the process of strategy that emerges within dialectical interaction of agency and structure. This argument is based on the assumption that strategy is an agential and ideational endeavor that was defined,

designed, formulated to overcome the undesired effects of present and existing structure and to create new conditions in the future. Hence, strategy emerges within a historical process affected from the past experiences. It is a decision to change present conditions to reach better ones in the future. Hence, it can be argued that since states constitute the agents of international politics “strategy is what states make of it.”<sup>3</sup> Here, strategy can be conceived as a process of projecting thought beyond spatio-temporal conditions of the present. Or, in other words, strategy is process of moving thought beyond existing space and time. The words of Mustafa Kemal, “they will go, as they came” in his correspondence with Sultan Vahdettin before initiating the National Struggle, exemplifies this *future* and *change*-oriented nature of strategy. But what is important, considering the basic argument of this dissertation, is the question of how strategy is represented in discourses. Focusing on discursive aspect of strategy as agential action brings about the need to take into account the role of discourses as the politics of representation. In the case of TFP, several discourses gained significance reflecting security strategy in their respective periods.

There is vast literature on Turkish Foreign Policy that focuses on security related issues. In order to clarify and locate the contribution of this dissertation in a proper place, and on a proper discussion, the question of “how existing literature handled the issue of discourse of security strategy and strategy itself” will be shortly discussed. In fact, aforementioned discussion of strategy process provides a context for the argument that will be developed in this dissertation.

The main determinants of strategic discourse of Turkey are analyzed from differing perspectives, in line with the existing theories of International Relations. Adopting a categorization in line with the existing theories may not provide a complete picture of the state of the literature. However, the categorization of the existing studies, in line with the fundamental difference of this dissertation in terms of philosophy of science, will utilize in revealing the gaps of past studies and will ease locating this study in the literature. This attempt to locate this dissertation within

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<sup>3</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System,” *International Relations* 26, no.2 (2012): 166.

existing literature also facilitates the understanding of its contribution to the literature.

The dissertation adopts the approach and the categorization developed by Yalvaç, given his studies is also based on meta-theoretical divergence from existing literature which is based on positivism and post-positivism.<sup>4</sup> Existing literature is based on mainly three contending philosophies of science, which are positivist accounts consisting of realism and liberalism, post-positivist and post-structural accounts encompassing constructivism and post-modernism and, critical realism covering historical materialism and historical sociological approaches. What differs and what converges among them, in terms of meta-theory, is the fact that each diverges or converges by their respective approach to epistemology, ontology and methodology, as the main components of meta-theory.

In other words, since meta-theory is about the formulation of theories that enables to explain subject-matter that is under scrutiny, each theory adopts a meta-theoretical position in explaining reality. However, what is accepted as *reality* depends on their respective epistemological, ontological and methodological assumptions. Adoption of a categorization in these terms relies on the fact that critical realism is not an IR theory but a *philosophy of science* with its own ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments that differ considerably from positivism and post-positivism.<sup>5</sup> Otherwise, a categorization based on theories would bring about a misleading start for the literature review.

Analyzing “Strategic Discourses of Turkish Foreign Policy” is inherently laden with some difficulties due to the nature of the problem that is to be answered in this study. From conceptual approach, each of the concepts – strategy, discourse and foreign policy – included into the phrase, has its own literature and debates. Nevertheless, aforementioned discussion on approaching contextual inputs, regarding strategy, had provided some sense to locate the discussion on strategy process; the materialization of thought – an idea – into discourse and action.

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<sup>4</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis,” *Turkish Studies* 15, no.1 (2014): 117-138.

<sup>5</sup> Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, “International Relations and Social Science,” in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27.

Positivist approaches to security strategy in Turkish Foreign Policy consist of realism and liberalism. Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in Turkey followed a similar trait with that of IR discipline in which positivism maintained its primary position labeled as mainstream.<sup>6</sup> From the early years of the study of Turkish Foreign Policy, positivism and its banner theory of realism is adopted as the main theoretical approach in analyses. Even this adoption of a realist framework brought about a reaction that the main critics are to be channeled towards this way of analysis.<sup>7</sup> These critics substantiated their arguments to answer what made realist analysis as the mainstream in tackling with foreign policy issues. To clarify what aspects are being criticized, the basic tenets of realist arguments should also be laid down.

Realists mainly focus on the concept of power which is thought as the main currency of international relations. The concept of power and arguments based on it were furnished further by the role of geography and its effects on politics. Realism adopts basically state-centric, atomistic, rationalist, power-oriented and security-focused understanding that excludes social aspects of states but highlights security through military as a visible aspect of it. However, reduction of seeking security to military means brings about an understanding of strategy formulated only by *means* but ignoring the true meaning of strategy, its context, and factors generates security concerns. What is ignored actually constitute the *ends* in strategy. In fact, it is a natural outcome of positivist conception of security.

Positivist understanding of science is based primarily on the separation of objects and subjects, facts and values. Borrowing from Adorno, who states that “all reification is forgetting,”<sup>8</sup> security is generalized and reified at the end to take into account only tangible elements of power while excluding intangible ones. Exclusion in that sense brings about a study of security and strategy which focuses merely on *means*, since it adopts a given perspective of the state without consisting of social aspects of reality and, hence, agential *ends* in it. The case for Turkish Foreign Policy

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<sup>6</sup> Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy”, 119.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O.Keohane (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), 204-254.

<sup>8</sup> Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 107.

analyses on strategy and study of them in Turkish IR discipline do not deviate from this attitude.<sup>9</sup>

Literature on the realist analysis of security and strategy in Turkish case constitutes main part of the existing literature. But, the realist account is widely discussed and criticized by the scholars arguing that realism is accepted as the only game in town due to the unique “geopolitical location”<sup>10</sup> of Turkey to the extent arguing the existence of “geopolitics dogma.”<sup>11</sup> Taking geopolitics and realist analysis of it at the center of analysis resulted in formulation of security strategy only in terms of *means* available to run for *ends* that are determined by the anarchic nature of international system. Excluding *ends* in strategy formulation process inevitably brings about an understanding of strategy that is formulated upon available *means*. The shortage of *means* to overcome perceived threats has tried to be subsidized through allocating *balance of power politics* that was granted by geography, since geopolitical location is treated as a remedy to the shortage of *means*. This trade-off rather than agential preference, stemmed from the inability to determine the true agential preferences based on agential subjectivity and will. The allocated meaning to geography of Turkey that later was treated as remedy stemmed from the differing stakes and conflicting interests of powerful actors that Turkey was entangled with. This process, while allowed the trade-off of filling out shortage of *means* through balance of power politics thanks to geography, at the same time, severely limited the formulation of agential *ends*. The outcome of this process was *ahistoric*, *problem-solving*, and *event-driven* understanding of developments,<sup>12</sup> which has constantly running the risk of losing consciousness or developing a false-consciousness. In fact, a more visible outcome, from a wider perspective, is the reproduction of the structure that constrained and enabled the freedom of action of agent.

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<sup>9</sup> Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy”, 119; İlhan Uzgel, “Türk Dış Politikası Yazımında Siyaset, Ayrışma ve Dönüşüm,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 4, no.13 (2007): 113-128.; Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma,” in *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?: Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis*, ed. Stefano Guzzini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 151-173.

<sup>10</sup> Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical framework and Traditional Inputs,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no.4 (1999): 152.

<sup>11</sup> Bilgin, “Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma”, 151-173.

<sup>12</sup> Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy”, 119.

Within the realist tradition, *event driven*<sup>13</sup> and issue specific analysis of foreign policy constitutes the bulk of the literature. They exhibit the characteristics of how developments on certain subject-matters created advantageous or disadvantageous positions and incorporate concrete policy recommendations to handle the issues that would further the national interests of Turkey.<sup>14</sup> But structural factors are mainly disregarded except for neorealist contributions that posit agency within international political system.<sup>15</sup> For example, nationalism<sup>16</sup> and modernization<sup>17</sup> are discussed widely, but, their interrelated aspects with strategy are either neglected or not approached to give a comprehensive explanation to strategy. It can be suggested that the source of this lack of comprehensive approach stemmed from the philosophy of science adopted in these studies.

Realists, depending on the internalization of shortage of *means*, attribute meaning to *geography*, which gives the opportunity to extract leverage to further national interests<sup>18</sup> either in terms of *means* or in terms of defining *ends* in strategy, rather than focusing on how available *means* at disposal can be increased to be allocated in future strategies. In other words, *means* is treated as given, and analysis is developed upon existing *means*, not upon the potential ones which require a will to overcome constraining powers of structure. In fact, this is not surprising within the realist mindset. It can also be viewed as a remedy of agential shortages – *means* – that is tried to be overcome through structural factors – geography - on which other agents attain their agential meaning. Mustafa Aydın underlines this fact by arguing that “geopolitical location has enabled to play potentially higher role in world

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<sup>13</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 10<sup>th</sup> ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2014).

<sup>14</sup> İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika* (Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> Meliha Benli Altunışık and Lenore G.Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP,” *Turkish Studies* 12, no.4 (2011): 569-587.

<sup>16</sup> Reşat Kasaba, “Dreams of Empire, Dreams of Nations,” in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Moderns World*, ed. W.Esherick et.al. (Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield, 2006), 198-228.; Sezgi Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane'den Vatan'a* (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2011).

<sup>17</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 21<sup>st</sup> ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi yayınları, 2015); İsmail Cem, *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi*, 28<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015).

<sup>18</sup> Mustafa Aydın, “Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding Security in Turkey,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3, no.2 (2003): 163-184.

politics.”<sup>19</sup> Another reason is the nature of perceived threats that were accepted as exceeding the national resources and threatening the survival of the country, thus leaving *balance of power politics* only option to ensure survival and preserve territorial integrity.<sup>20</sup> In a similar vein, the changing nature of international system was utilized to explain systemic changes and the changing nature of threats brings about foreign policy changes. While Haluk Ülman<sup>21</sup> constitutes an early example of this approach, Sabri Sayarı argued how disappearing Soviet threat with the end of the Cold War opened new opportunities and challenges in surrounding regions, and addressed how this multi-regional involvement created a challenge for Turkish Foreign Policy.<sup>22</sup>

What realist tradition brought about is the equation of strategy on satisfaction of national interests, which is defined, somehow narrowly, as survival. From strategy perspective, survival is accepted as the ultimate *end* that should be furthered through power resources – *means*. Focusing on national interests, mostly defined through realist mindset, brings about reification and reduction of agential attributes to define *ends* as survival which eliminates subjectivity and reflexivity in *ends*. Thus, social and historical aspects of strategy automatically have been disregarded in favor of rationality based calculations that highlight material – *means*-oriented – aspects of strategy.

Analysis based on liberalism follows a similar pattern with realism, only differing in terms of replacing *power* perspective with *choice* perspective. Liberalism and its forefront concepts such as democratization, Europeanization, globalization, ‘trading state’ were also utilized to discuss the Turkish Foreign Policy and its changing security discourse. Özlem Terzi utilized the concept of ‘Europeanization’

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<sup>19</sup> Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy”, 152.

<sup>20</sup> Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014).

<sup>21</sup> Haluk Ülman, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-I,” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 23, no.3 (1968): 241-273.

<sup>22</sup> Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi Regionalism,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no.1 (2000): 169-182.

to discuss whether the term is capable to explain foreign policy shift of Turkey.<sup>23</sup> For her, Europeanization leads to a domestic change through socialization and a collective learning process, resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities.<sup>24</sup> Here, it should also be underlined that there is similarity with Constructivist approach, since rather than a ‘logic of consequences’ in which cost-benefit calculations play a primary role, a ‘logic of appropriateness’ is preferred due to the quest to get belonged to a new society and its norms. Fuat Keyman argues the democratization, modernity and European integration processes create the conditions for sustainable foreign policy.<sup>25</sup> Ayşe Zarakol also constitutes how identity preference brought about peace with the West after long years of struggle.<sup>26</sup> And it is argued that in the process of Europeanization, civil-military relations and its role in the policy-making faced changes. Ziya Öniş also utilizes the concept of Europeanization and its role in democratization to argue whether the process transforms political parties while handling security related issues.<sup>27</sup>

Another concept was used to explain is the concept of “trading state”<sup>28</sup>, by which Kirişçi argues that growing trade relations result in resolving security problems by building a positive atmosphere to overcome the erosion of confidence and brings about a need to adapt foreign policy strategy to growing trade relations.<sup>29</sup> By using this concept, the author tries to fill a gap in the literature which argues that

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<sup>23</sup> Özlem Terzi, *The Influence of European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).

<sup>24</sup> Pınar Bilgin, “Securing Turkey through Western Oriented Foreign Policy,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 105-125.

<sup>25</sup> Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity, and Democracy: In Search of Viable Domestic Policy for a Sustainable Foreign Policy,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 7-27.

<sup>26</sup> Ayşe Zarakol, *After the Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

<sup>27</sup> Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” *Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans* 9, no.3 (2007): 247-261.

<sup>28</sup> Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

<sup>29</sup> Kemal Kirişçi and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no.5 (2011): 705-724.



economic factors can also have an important role in shaping foreign policy and its transformation.<sup>30</sup>

Globalization also stands close to liberal connotations since it enlarged the room for actors other than state. Thus, with globalization, the classical way of handling security issues does not fulfill security needs of states or decrease states' susceptibility to widening plethora of threats. The outcome is emergence of new security discourses.<sup>31</sup> With respect to globalization, its interrelation with domestic politics to formulate viable foreign policy through democracy<sup>32</sup> can also be categorized among liberal thought since it adopts 'inside looking outside' approach.

Post-positivist Approaches consist of constructivism, post-structuralism and critical theory. Constructivism has gained significance in studies on Turkish Foreign Policy. Constructivists utilize identity in explaining change and transformation of foreign policy and strategy. In other words, how Turkish identity is constructed in time and what factors have contributed to its change within an inter-subjective process constitutes the crux of this approach. Taking *subjectness* of agency to the forefront gives the impression that constructivism addresses the question of change in *ends*. But, what is missing is the explanation of how the structure beneath this inter-subjective process leads to the emergence of construction of *ends*, which requires, at the end, scrutinizing ontological depth of this process. Nevertheless, studies on the evolution of strategic culture and the identity of Turkish Foreign Policy through the process of *otherization* have provided considerable perspective and explanation regarding the change in *ends*.

Among the scholars that utilized constructivist approach, Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu<sup>33</sup>, Umut Uzer<sup>34</sup>, Çiğdem Üstün<sup>35</sup>, Zaynep Dağı<sup>36</sup> and Bahar Rumelili<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 29-57.

<sup>31</sup> Pınar Bilgin, "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005):175–201.

<sup>32</sup> E.Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, Modernity, and Democracy: In Search of a Viable Domestic Polity for a Sustainable Turkish Foreign Policy," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 7-27.

<sup>33</sup> Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (London: Routledge, 2003).

<sup>34</sup> Umut Uzer, *Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy: The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus* (New York, I.B. Tauris, 2011).

can be cited. Ümit Cizre<sup>38</sup> attributed constructivism to analyze how identity led to reformulation or re-conceptualization of foreign policy. With regards to the process of *otherization* and constructing identity within an inter-subjective process which was also affected by historical experiences leading to transformation of foreign policy and strategy were discussed by Kıvaç Coş and Pınar Bilgin. Their contribution has underlined the interrelation of strategic culture on inter-subjective process with the case study focusing on Stalin's Demands and Turkey's participation in the Western bloc covering the period of 1919-1945.<sup>39</sup>

Historical experiences, which are conceived with the concept of *strategic culture*, constitute an important part of the literature. Ali Karaosmanoğlu's work, titled as *the Evolution of the National Security Culture* stands as one of the early works addressing how *realpolitik* culture emerged in Turkey. He argues evolution of security culture in Turkey, rather than being an *ex nihilo* conceptualization, has evolved within a process of interaction with the developments in international politics. Hence, it can be claimed that agency has produced this culture not through domestic sociological factors but, through international interaction. Pınar Bilgin seems to address the need to overcome "threats as given"<sup>40</sup> approach and underlines the need to explain "what makes these threats?" She underlines the interrelation between non-material and material insecurities and tries to combine them within the framework of identity and interests, following the work of Bill McSweeney.<sup>41</sup> In this

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<sup>35</sup> Çiğdem Üstün, *Turkey and European Security and Defense Policy: Compatibility and Security Cultures in a Globalized World* (New York, I.B. Tauris, 2010).

<sup>36</sup> Zeynep Dağı, "Ulusal Kimliğin İnşası ve Dış Politika," *Demokrasi Platformu* 2, no.5 (2005), 57-71.

<sup>37</sup> Bahar Rumelili, "Impacting the Greek-Turkish Conflicts: The EU is What We Make of It," in *The European Union and Border Conflicts*, ed. Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 94-128.; Bahar Rumelili, "Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek-Turkish Relations," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no.1, (2007): 105-126.

<sup>38</sup> Ümit Cizre, "Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 57, no2, (2003): 213-229.

<sup>39</sup> Kıvaç Coş and Pınar Bilgin, "Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the "Soviet Other" in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919-1945," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010): 43-60.

<sup>40</sup> Bilgin, "Securing Turkey through Western Oriented Foreign Policy", 107.

<sup>41</sup> Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

way, she criticizes the reduction of “identity choice” of western orientation to a mere “Cold War policy preference,” which leads to a paralysis in the explanation and understanding of Western oriented foreign policy. In short, constructivist approaches try to capture the evolution of *ends* in strategy, but as they adopt a flat ontology through inter-subjective process, they miss to take into account the structure within which the inter-subjective process took place.

Academic debates on Turkish Foreign Policy from post-structuralist perspective revolve around language and its role in creating discourses of security. To illustrate, borrowing from Lerna Yanık, “when policy makers say that “country X is a bridge,” or “is positioned at a crossroads,” they are not simply using some vivid language to make their statement. Rather, they are combining a discursive practice, with a geopolitical imagination/representation, and also, with an international function and identity, they are aspiring to play and become.”<sup>42</sup> Apart from Yanık, Bilgin also wrote on how discourse on security is capable of explaining change in foreign policy. She claims that not the growing literature on securitization/de-securitization provides adequate explanation but ‘security-speak’ does so.<sup>43</sup> Yanık’s argumentation is based on the representation of geography and building exceptionalism through speech-acts.<sup>44</sup>

From the perspective of critical theory, the studies on the subject are mostly provided by Pınar Bilgin. But, before underlining her basic arguments, Kemal Çiftçi should also be cited since his work stands as one of the contributions in terms of the interrelation of power-knowledge. For Çiftçi, the production of discourse that can be seen as the knowledge of geography is directly related with power. In this sense, he underlines Cox’s argument that the production of knowledge reflects the power of the producer of that knowledge.<sup>45</sup> In terms of strategy, power/knowledge relations,

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<sup>42</sup> Lerna K. Yanık, “The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: “Bridging” Turkey's Location, Role and Identity after the End of the Cold War,” *Geopolitics* 14, no.3, (2009):533.

<sup>43</sup> Pınar Bilgin, “Making Turkey’s Transformation Possible: Claiming ‘Security-Speak’ – not Desecuritization!,” *Southern European and Black Sea Studies* 7, no.4, (2007), 555-571.

<sup>44</sup> Lerna K. Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘exceptionalism’: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 80-89.

<sup>45</sup> Kemal Çiftçi, *Tarih, Kimlik ve Eleştirel Kuram Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikası* (Ankara: Siyasal, 2010).

particularly, the loss of consciousness, awareness and hence, loss of subjectivity lead to formulate *ends* that are imposed by structure to agency. In other words, through power/knowledge relations agency loses its subjectivity to formulate agential *ends* and strategy. Emancipatory intent of critical theory concentrates on getting aware of the constraints of structure on agency, for the sake of ensuring agency. This body of literature is particularly explanatory when considered together with strategic culture,<sup>46</sup> particularly, with the construction of fears<sup>47</sup> that will be discussed in subsequent chapters of dissertation.

Bilgin's works represent probably the most fierce critique of existing literature regarding on the obsession of adopting geopolitics as the main determinant of Turkish Foreign Policy.<sup>48</sup> Her starting point of argumentation depends on the literature on critical geopolitics, and utilized in criticism of geopolitical obsession. She argues that geopolitics is also part of discourse and in this way, states legitimize foreign policy actions and domestic politics as well.<sup>49</sup>

Apart from positivist and post-positivist approaches discussed so far, critical realist analysis was introduced by Faruk Yalvaç to the literature which offers new outlooks to the analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy. Faruk Yalvaç's work offers a different perspective to the "relation between social structures and foreign policy strategies."<sup>50</sup> His analysis focuses on how social structures shape strategy. Particularly, for the last period in Turkish Foreign Policy, Yalvaç provided a critical realist analysis of the realist concept of 'strategic depth' which is widely discussed and viewed as the main driver of Turkish Foreign Policy in the last decade. The

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<sup>46</sup> Aydın, "Securitization of History and Geography", 163-184.

<sup>47</sup> Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-I", 245.

<sup>48</sup> Pınar Bilgin, "Turkey's Geopolitics Dogma", 151-173.

<sup>49</sup> Pınar Bilgin, "A Return to 'Civilizational Geopolitics' in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era," *Geopolitics* 9, no.2 (Summer 2004): 269-291; Bilgin, "Turkey's Geopolitics Dogma", 151-173.; Pınar Bilgin, "Inventing Middle East? The Making of Regions through Security Discourses," in *The Middle East in a Globalized World*, ed. B.U. Utvik and K. S. Vikør, (Bergen: Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies 2000): 10-37.; P. Bilgin, 'Whose Middle East? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security', *International Relations* 18, no.1 (2004): 17-33.; Pınar Bilgin, "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography: The Uses of 'Geopolitical Truths' in Turkey," *Political Geography* 26, no.7 (2007): 748-749.

<sup>50</sup> Yalvaç, "Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis", 127.

concept of ‘ontological depth’ from critical realism and Yalvaç’s invention of ‘hegemonic depth’ from Gramsci’s works provide a considerably fresh insight to the analysis of foreign policy, since the study attempts to develop a social theory of foreign policy. In this sense, this work contributed to the literature by challenging positivist and state-centric approaches that dominate the literature.<sup>51</sup> In other words, the article attempted to provide an alternative explanation based on scientific realism to problem-solving approaches based on positivism. Historical Sociological understanding of strategy, unlike positivist theories, focuses on ‘how *ends* are formulated?’ From this perspective, studying only the *means* in strategy formulation means to adopt *ahistorical, apolitical, and material* outlook. But historical sociology argues that the behaviors of the state which are the reflection of strategy are not determined by anarchy, but emerge from historical structures in which agency operates.

To summarize, regarding the discussion of the role of strategy in foreign policy actions, there are, three contending views emanating from their respective philosophy of science. One strand of thought, based on statist ontology and positivist epistemology focuses on *means*. The other one, relativist epistemology and ontology, criticizes independent existence of reality since its conceptualization reflects the subjective view. And the last one suggests experiences and utterances do not exhaust reality. Thus, beyond *what is actualized*, the *unobservable social structures* have causal powers to alter the observed reality – *what is actualized*.

This dissertation has a claim to contribute to the literature by explaining how unobservable social structures might alter what is represented by discourse. In different periods, differing discourses emerged to represent the strategy that was articulated in their respective periods. Strategy formulation, emerged out of the process mentioned above, reflected their unique conditions of their respective time. That’s why, it is argued that strategy as an agential act, rather than just emerging out of agent’s rational calculations, was determined to a large extent by the constraining and enabling forces of the structure that the agent operated in. But, agent does not operate in structure without ignoring or disregarding the constraining and enabling forces; on the contrary, agents always get into interaction with structure to formulate

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<sup>51</sup> Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth”, 165-180.

a strategy that is capable to realize the intentions incorporated in *ends*. Different from the literature that concentrates on *means*, here, the formulation of *ends* takes place within dialectical relations with available *means*. Hence, it is argued that strategy neither is merely constituted by available *means*, nor *ends*. Adopting a dialectical approach to strategy incorporating both *means* and *ends*, and positing strategy formulation into an agent-structure context provide the analysis of strategy as a *positioned-practice* – praxis – within its historical and sociological context.

Discourse, as an act of representation of strategy, is located at the center of analysis in this dissertation. What discourses highlighted, in line with the role of discourses regarding the politics of representation, showed some changes and ruptures taking place in the general course of Turkish Foreign Policy. But, to what extent change in the discourses matched with the change in foreign policy course and security strategy that was pursued in time, remained not studied comprehensively revealing the reasons of the mismatch between discourse and its actualization. But this does not mean studies that revolve around discourse analysis did not provide valuable insights in explaining and understanding TFP.<sup>52</sup> Due to discourse analysis focuses on *what is spoken*, changes in discourses act as if a change takes place in the course of strategy and its implementation. However, structure beneath *what is actualized* and *what is spoken* resists change to take place. Hence, even though discourses give the impression of a change, structure might push for the continuity. What is the case in this incongruence between them can be shortly stated that there is an inconsistency between *representation* and *operationalization* of foreign policy actions. Explaining what caused the inconsistency and (in)congruence is the main concern of this dissertation together with the question of “which factors determine strategic discourse of Turkey?”

“We have historical responsibilities” as a discourse that is produced to highlight changing foreign policy of Turkey of the Justice and Development Party stands as an important discourse to illustrate the above mentioned inconsistency. JDP after coming to power in 2002, while blaming the foreign policy of previous governments for their inactive and mostly reactive foreign policy on the one hand,

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<sup>52</sup> Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’: Discourse of Liminality and Hybridity in the post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy”, 80-89.

produced the rhetoric to highlight their more active and assertive foreign policy. The intention was to move Turkey in a position that determines or, at least, takes place in the course of developments primarily at the regional level and, if possible, at the global level. Discourse, taken from regional perspective, implies the elder, wise, virtuous and powerful subject that is capable and, beyond, carries the responsibility to watch over the interests of the inhabitants of the ex-Ottoman soils in which inhabitant societies are both the target of plotting policies of great powers and they lack required *means* to overcome their plots. In a sense, they are treated as objects that could not go beyond being the pawns of great powers. The articulation of discourse in such a way, on the one hand, puts inhabitants of post-Ottoman soils to an inferior position (as objects) incapable to defend their interests, on the other hand, locates Turkey in a superior and equal level with great powers (as subject). Turkey, with the discourse, claims its agential capabilities while, not granting the same attributes to the inhabitants. However, when it comes to reality on the ground, whether this discourse is accepted leading to a confirmation both by the surrounding regions and great powers remains to be studied. At first glance, the developments take place does not confirm the changes in the discourses, since both societies in those regions and great powers do not consent to power and policies of Turkey. So what causes hindering the realization of this discourse on the ground? An early answer, which will be the main argument of this dissertation, is that structures may not allow changes as in the discourses of strategy. Thus, while discourse points out change and differences compared with the previous ones, structures might ensure continuity. This concludes that *articulation* of discourse in foreign policy and *operationalization* of intent revealed with discourse rarely match. So explanation needs to focus on ‘differences in continuity’.

Explaining ‘differences in continuity’ through structures brings about a need to focus on reality beyond *what is spoken* and *what is actualized*. This requirement stems from the fact that *what is spoken* does not fit with *what is actualized* due to the *unintended consequences* of structures. Joseph argues, following Foucault’s words, that “archaeology also reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and

processes),”<sup>53</sup> non-discursive elements are not exhausted in discourse, but exists along with it. Joseph’s argument points to a need to look beyond discourse since uncovering discourse falls behind in grasping reality. *What is spoken* – discourse – emerges from the contexts and material practices that both enables and constraints intent in the discourse.<sup>54</sup> Going beyond discourse requires delving into depth of it. Critical realism’s stratified approach to reality has the potential to explain the main research question put forward. In this regard, critical realism offers “a powerful alternative to postmodern and discourse-reductive approaches to the social world.”<sup>55</sup> Foucault by making the distinction between discursive and non-discursive domains clear gets closer to Critical realism’s basic premises. The awareness of what is pointed out in discourse may conflict with what is experienced led Joseph to argue that “It is the moment where the insights of the structuralist position – an emphasis on underlying structure – intersects with a more materialist recognition that discourse operates alongside other social practices.”<sup>56</sup> These arguments provide the ground to make suggestion that Foucault, too, does not reduce reality to discourse. Distinguishing discourse and its context led to a suggestion that there is a need to explain the relationship between underlying social structure of discourse and discourse itself, since analyzing discourse fell short of explaining differences and continuity. But answering the question of “what differs between discourse analysis and critical realist analysis of discourse?” requires getting closer to basic premises of critical realism. As Joseph argues, “the critical realist project would seem, therefore, to offer a powerful alternative to postmodern and discourse reductive approaches to the social world.”<sup>57</sup>

Scientific realism as philosophy of science argues that there is reality beyond *what is observed* and *what is spoken*.<sup>58</sup> *Reality*, beyond *what is observed* and

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<sup>53</sup> Jonathan Joseph, “Foucault and Reality,” *Capital & Class* 82 (2004): 46.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 146-147.

<sup>55</sup> Jonathan Joseph, *Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction* (Routledge: New York, 2004), 3.

<sup>56</sup> Joseph, “Foucault and Reality”, 147.

<sup>57</sup> Joseph and Roberts, *Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction*, 3.

<sup>58</sup> Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, *Scientific Realism and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9.



knowledge of it, is explained by Bhaskar, through the concept of *transitive* and *intransitive* objects of knowledge.<sup>59</sup> But the key point is the fact that intransitive objects of knowledge are immune from discursive formations.<sup>60</sup> Hence, suggesting that structures remain in the domain of intransitive, since knowledge about them may not fully cover their attributes will not be wrong. Conception of structures and attributes contained in that conception determines the causal capabilities. The attributes of structures that remain outside of the conception can be thought to result in the emergence of *unintended consequences*. What is more important is the fact that “intransitive world resists our thoughts, or at least our actions from being whatever.”<sup>61</sup> To be more clear, “there are some constraints on our transitive, or metaphorical truths, set by the nature of the intransitive ontological reality beyond our descriptions.”<sup>62</sup> In other words, it is possible to argue that discourses at the domain of transitive are constrained by the structures at the domain of intransitive which are also immune from discursive construction because, the descriptions as conceptual constructs, even discursive ones, remain at the domain of transitive whereas structures remain at the domain of intransitive.

Critical realism presupposes the layered nature of reality which is composed of *empirical*, *actual* and *real*. Structures in that conception remain at the level of *real*.<sup>63</sup> Though they cannot be observed their effects are felt in actions. The generative nature of structures is argued to be taken into account in analyzing discourses of actions of agency. Taking into account the *unobservables* might paralyze ones that believe in the primacy of positivism and its Humean understanding of causation. However, if structures as *unobservables* have the generative of emergent properties that trigger the *actual* and allow the *empirical*, then they deserve to be studied.

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<sup>59</sup> Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science* (London: Verso, 1975), 22.

<sup>60</sup> Joseph, “Foucault and Reality”, 144.

<sup>61</sup> Milja Kurki, *Causation in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 165.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>63</sup> Bhaskar, *A Realist theory of Science*, 13-15.

In this context, Chapter Two of the dissertation as a theoretical framework is concerned with exploring ‘why’ and ‘how’ intentions uttered in discourses as reflections of security strategy could not have been actualized in actions. To explain this inconsistency, theoretical framework will be laid out. In this way, the subsequent chapters that focus on discourses of respective periods of Turkey’s security strategy will be discussed in the framework drawn in that chapter. The selected discourse is assumed to reflect the general character of the respective period, without claiming to be exhaustive in portraying the general character of the respective period, since similar and important other rhetoric can be put forward. Since, the major concern is to explain the inconsistency between discourse and action; discourses are selected through the author’s subjectivity. In this context, the dissertation will provide an outlook based on the argument that “the meta-theoretical perspective provided by critical realism supports a structural, emergent, complex and ontological approach to the analysis of TFP that is conspicuously missing in the analysis of TFP.”<sup>64</sup>

The periods and respective selected discourses will be as outlined below. What the chart tells us is that, in each period discourse of security strategy contains *means* and *ends* that were constitutive of strategy. “How far the intended strategy has accomplished its end?” and “what hindered their actualization?” will be discussed in line with the conceptual framework suggested above.

**Table.2 The Selected Discourses of Strategy in their Respective Periods.**

Period	Discourse of Security Strategy	Strategy	Concepts
1919-1923	“Independence or Death!”	‘End’: Survival, Existence ‘Means’: Force and Diplomacy	“Independence”
1923-1939	“Peace at home, peace in the world”	‘Ends’: Development, Ensuring Existence ‘Means’: Diplomacy, Power Accumulation	“Equal member of civilized world.”
1939-1945	“Turkey cannot think to preserve her unity and survival by allying either politically or militarily by one or group of states.”	‘Ends’: Avoiding Destruction ‘Means’: Non-belligerency,	“Active neutrality” “Alliances” “Balance of Power”

<sup>64</sup> Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis”, 117.

**Table.2 The Selected Discourses of Strategy in their Respective Periods (continued)**

Period	Discourse of Security Strategy	Strategy	Concepts
1945-1980	“A new world order is to be build; Turkey will take its place in that”	‘Ends’: Resisting Hegemony, Ensuring Agency ‘Means’: Manipulating Balance of Power in bi-polarity	“Balance of Power” “Disassociation”
1980-2002	“From the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall”	‘Ends’: Reassertion of Regional Power through ethnic bonds ‘Means’: Utilizing both geopolitical flux and identity (historical bonds?)	“Turkic World”
2002-2015	“We Have Historical Responsibilities.”	‘Ends’: Reassertion of Regional/Global Power ‘Means’: Utilizing history and geography for power accumulation	“Neo-Ottomanism” “Central State”

In line with the selected discourses that were summarized in table.2 will be shortly introduced in the subsequent paragraphs. In this way it is intended to provide a general outlook of the dissertation and to inform what is expecting the reader in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation.

The first period covers the years of 1919-1922 (Chapter Three) of the National Struggle, in which the basic motivation and the desired *end* were to acquire the independence and to initiate the state-building of the new republic from the remnants of collapsed empire. These years stand as the considerable rupture with the imperial past on the way of building a republican state. However, the legacies of the imperial past continued to affect the evolution of the foundation of the new state though transformation from an empire to a nation-state can be considered as the major rupture with the past. The major discourse that reflects the desired *end* was “independence or death!” The discourse reflected the available and utilized *means* – death – incorporating the use of force element of strategy to achieve the desired *end* – independence incorporating the diplomacy that was directed to convert the victories as outcomes on the field into the realization of the political outcome. In that period, Turkey imposed its agency by both taking into account the structure that pushed for rupture and creating the choice that ensured survival. And, discourse reflected agential aspects of strategy by formulating its own *end* that could not be

overcome by the structure, which imposed the partition of the empire by the victors of the First World War.

The second period (1923-1938), Chapter Four, which started with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, in which period the strategic *end* defined as the ensure the existence and development of the new republic as a modern state. The discourse of “Peace at home, peace in the world” was dedicated, with the awareness of new born state’s limits, to ensure the acceptance of Turkey as an equal member of the international system, even though the great powers of the time approached this will with suspicion. The foreign policy of the time intended not to provoke but to exploit the frictions between the key players. This period, to a degree, carried on some isolationist approach to the developments taking place in the world where the resentment of Versailles Treaty drove Germany to rise as a spoiler of the balance of power. Strategic discourse of the time can be accepted as agential, even though structure has been taken into account. From this perspective, TFP showed continuity in its essence but by using different *means* that had the potential to get the *end* of the strategy.

After interwar years, the third period (Chapter Five) covers the years of Second World War in which the basic motivation on Turkey’s side was to avoid destruction that might have ruined all the gains of interwar years. Moving from this motivation, Turkey sought non-alignment with either party, being aware of the fact that any commitment might provoke the other side. The discourse of the period which is originally states that “Turkey cannot think to preserve her unity and survival by allying either politically or militarily by one or group of states” was intentionally shortened to “Turkey cannot think to preserve its security by forging alliances” which represented the will to refrain from any commitments. However, as the structural forces imposed to align, and as the parties sought to take part on their side, Turkey, towards the end of the war preferred to align with the Allied States. Uncertainty that characterized quick fluctuations during the war, led Turkey to behave very cautiously. Caution emanated from the will to preserve the survival, or refraining from any provocative act which led to the formulation of strategy that founded upon caution. However, neutrality was not a kind of total neutrality that blocked any involvement, on the contrary, structural dynamics imposed to act

implicitly with the Allied States. Let alone, neutrality in the war context, provided security to the Allied Powers rather than Germany. Hence, Turkey, though behaved cautiously, as the uncertainty dissolved within the course of war turned out be the one that favors one side. For that reason, although discourse represented a complete neutrality, structure imposed agency to adopt an active neutrality in the war. Nevertheless, the nature of the strategy though evolved into activism continued to be basically an agential one.

The years of the Cold War expanding from 1945 to 1980 (Chapter Six) for TFP carried the effects of bipolar nature of the respective period. Turkey while managed not to involve in the Second World War, at the same time felt the need to align with the Western Camp in order to ensure its sovereignty that was threatened with the demands of Stalin in the early years. Turkey's awareness of its inability to challenge the Soviet Russia pushed Turkey to take place in the West and obliged her to follow alliance policies in which her agential stance was discarded for the sake of Western political stance towards the East. In this period, Turkey was faced with a structure imposing its own policies leaving little room for maneuver and agency. In other words, even though there were efforts to surpass structure, structure was not allowed agency. The Cyprus question showed a break at least in discourse. With resentment of the Alliance policies on the question that is considered to carry on potentially severe results on sovereignty and security of the state, Turkey produced the discourse of strategy that "A new world order is to be build; Turkey will take its place in that" pointing the possible break with the alliance. The discourse of strategy was statement of strategic *end* that was formulated to resist that hegemony that was not taking into account Turkey's security concerns, to ensure agency which was constrained by limits imposed by the structure was deemed to be eased and, to search for new alternatives that is capable to increase strategic choices. Even though, discourse of strategy carried agential aspects, it could not manage to reflect a change in strategy which led to inconsistency between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized*. In other words, change in discourse did not reflect change in strategy.

The years after the end of the Cold War (1980-2002), Chapter Seven, were perceived as an opportunity since the constraints of bipolarity suspended and hence the room for agency was expanded. Turkey considered the suspension of bipolarity,

with which she was exhausted, as an opportunity on the road to become a regional power. The *end* of strategy was formulated as the assertion of her regional power status in the surrounding regions consisting of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans where relatives of Turks were residing in. Particularly, the Turkic World pointing out the population lives under the control of the Soviet Russia was considered, on the one hand, needing the hands of Turkey to deal with the uncertainty of the new situation, and on the other hand, on Turkish side they perceived as the *means* to assert regional power status in the international system. Strategy formulated as the reassertion of regional power status was deemed to be achieved through the *means* of utilizing geopolitical flux, and identity (historical bonds). The discourse of strategy of the respective period was expressed as the “Turkic World from the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall”. However, the enthusiasm of Turkey was faced with reality of being deficient in terms of power assets that were available at disposal, hampering the fulfillment of *end*. In that period, after a period of enthusiasm the disillusionment took place. Again, Turkey faced the inconsistency between the strategy and its discourse was not compatible with the realities on the ground. The primary reason of that inconsistency was the unintended consequences of the structure, which had shown longer effects than its perception. In short, this period showed continuity even though differences in discourse were the case.

The years of 2002- 2015, Chapter Eight, experienced another change in discourse which found expression as “We have historical responsibilities.” Strategic *end* in that period was formulated to gain regional and, if possible, global power status. The *means* to be employed were the utilization of history and geography stretching ex-Ottoman soils by using the concepts such as *central state*, *strategic depth*. This period showed awareness of both its own limitations, and structure’s fading away constraints and limitations. Hence, agency perceived structure as losing its constraining and determining power and as allowing agency. The developments in the aftermath of Arab Spring were perceived as an opportunity on the desired *end*, but structure reasserted its existence by constraining the developments that was favoring Turkey’s agency in those regions. This period showed that the discourse of strategy and strategy – *what is spoken* and *what is actualized* – are in constant flux not allowing in reaching a conclusion for that period. While the years of 2007-2010

showed Turkey as a rising power to assert her agency on the ground, the developments took place after 2011 showed the inability of Turkey to alter the structure, due to limits on power and agency. In short, due to flux, the results of that period, in terms of whether an inconsistency exists, has not emerged yet. But, it is possible, for the time being, to claim that irrespective of discursive change or differences in discourse, continuity is more identifiable rather than a change.

In this context, this dissertation provides a cumulative analysis of the strategic discourses of the Republican period (1919-2015) and the respective strategies that created these discourses. In terms of temporality, the developments that are taking place beyond 2015 are beyond the scope of this study. In other words, rather than having a prospective analysis, a retrospective analysis is the main concern of this study. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework and its analytical model on strategy and discourse that is argued and tested through retrospective discourses have a promising potential to be applied in prospective strategy formulation efforts.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1. ONTOLOGICAL DEPTH OF STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

Strategy as the main focus of this dissertation is basically defined as the match of *means* and *ends*. However, as will be discussed in subsequent parts of this chapter, when strategy is analyzed through the lens of positivism, it brings about reification of *ends*, focus on *means*. In this dissertation a differing perspective which takes a dialectical approach of *means* and *ends* to the forefront will be adopted. In this way, it is intended to focus on both *ends* and *means* and their inter-relations. It is considered that this will provide a comprehensive outlook that takes into account the sociological and historical evolution of strategy.

Taking *ends* and its interrelatedness with *means*, into account needs to look beyond *means* which is imposed with positivist epistemology. Taking ontology to the forefront or giving priority to ontology brings about the need to handle the issue from a comprehensive philosophy of science. It means what makes strategy possible. Critical realism, a version of scientific realism utilized in social sciences, is argued to provide a philosophy of science approach that is capable to analyze strategy in a more comprehensive perspective encompassing *means*, *ends* and their interrelationship. This argument will be substantiated in the discussions of the following parts of this chapter organized through the titles of *Structure, Agency and Strategy*, *Strategic Discourse* and *Sources of Incongruence*. The reason to adopt such a structural framework and organization stems from the several benefits inherent in that choice. First of all, it provides a systematic organization that will ease academic discussion of the topic. Secondly, maintaining structural unity throughout the dissertation offers a coherent discussion deemed to facilitate tracking the argumentation put forward in the dissertation.



Before entering into the discussion of proposed structure, providing a general outlook from the perspective of philosophy of science will assist building a foundation to further build up discussions and argumentation. To achieve this goal, firstly, how giving priority to ontology will change the outlook in handling the topic will be discussed. Following these introductory notes on ontology, its difference in handling of and discussing ontology compared to positivism and post-modernism will be substantiated in order to clarify critical realism and its potential contributions. The rationale behind this structural build up is based on the understanding that strategy is both a historical and sociological concept that should be treated within a process, and viewed as a concept that is not rigid and unchanging. On the contrary, it is suggested here, strategy is a living and changing concept, but change in it occurs within considerably longer spans of time, which gives strategy a character of endurance and resistance. Nevertheless, positing it within a historical process, in which and by which changes occur, needs to handle it within a context of agent-structure debate. This attempt gives the opportunity to observe and analyze change and fluctuations within the dialectics of agential attributes (strategy) and structural constraints. For that reason, structure, its perception by agency, reflection of that perception in strategy formulation, agential conduct within structured context, its representation in discourse and seeking whether there is a mismatch between discourse and strategy constitutes the basic research question of this dissertation.

For Turkish Foreign Policy, strategy has been an indispensable part of the evolution of that policy and its actions. However, strategy is not formulated without taking into account what is going on in the structure. On the contrary, strategy in Turkish Foreign Policy has always been formulated interactively with the structured context in order to accomplish its goals and intents. Its representation is based on both aspirations and content consisting of goals and intent. Discourse in that representation generally has reflected some certain aspects of strategy in their respective period. But, the achievement of strategy was not always possible given that constraining factors emerging from deeper layer of structure, albeit in different forms and with differing causal powers. Consequently, strategy leads to certain discourses but strategic outcome as an aspect of *what is actualized* is not always congruent with the discourse – *what is spoken*. In fact, (in)congruence, treated and

claimed in this dissertation is closely related with, and is a matter of causation as will be discussed below. But, this treatment of causation differs from the causation that is adopted by positivism and post-modernism.

### 2.1.1. Giving Priority to Ontology

Ontology, shortly, is the study of *what exists* irrespective of its material or ideational nature.<sup>1</sup> What exists refers to *being*, what is there and what is thinkable. Ontology questions the nature and attributes of what is accepted as real, how they are treated as *beings* and why. Asking ‘why’ questions leads to taking into consideration whether what is accepted as *being* and rejection of labeling as *being* carries on political choices. That’s why Zizek argues that “Politics is the terrain of competing ontologies. Politics is about competing visions of how the world is and how it should be. Every ontology is political.”<sup>2</sup> Then making ontological choices leads one to determine what is taken to be real. And, in a similar vein, what is omitted is also a part of one’s political choices. The process of making choices on what is taken as real, at the same time, inherently, carries on discarding the variables and factors that are capable to determine the nature of outcomes. As will be discussed in the subsequent parts, the positivist perspective that neglects mechanisms that are capable of bringing about an event, and eventually leads not to take into account some causal factors, not observable but effective ones in bringing about outcomes. This process is seen as reification. In a way, a process of reification ends in forgetting; an argument that can be reinforced by the statements of Ken Booth, following Adorno’s words “all reification is forgetting”, and all forgetting, as a political choice, follows Coxian syllogism that “all forgetting is for someone and some purpose.”<sup>3</sup> If politics is basically accepted as the capacity to make choices, then the ontological differences lie at the heart of the politics.<sup>4</sup> Hence, “If there were no ontological differences, there

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<sup>1</sup> Jonathan Joseph, “Philosophy in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Approach,” *Millennium* 35, no.2 (2007): p.354.

<sup>2</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London: Verso, 1999), 158.

<sup>3</sup> Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 185.

<sup>4</sup> Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.

would be no politics.”<sup>5</sup> Robert Cox argues that that “ontology lies at the beginning of any enquiry.”<sup>6</sup> For that reason, to acquire the *knowledge of being* (epistemology) what is accepted as *being* (ontology) should be clarified. Otherwise, political nature of any inquiry cannot be understood to reveal the political stakes in it. Strategy formulation, which is agential in nature encompasses political choices, thus, it is basically a political process. What is forgotten, in turn, ends in focusing on what is to be secured and what is to be protected beyond just a matter of abstract philosophizing.<sup>7</sup>

Yet, it should also be noted that strategy is not formulated irrespective of other agents who have their own stakes, intents, and goals in a structured context. Hence, in strategy formulation, the act of taking into account the context inevitably shapes that formulation and the realization of it. This line of argument supports the suggestion that in explaining strategy as ontologically existing, the factors within that formulation and forces beneath the context have the potential to provide deeper and comprehending explanation to the concept of strategy. “In fact, social action [conceived as strategy] would be impossible, and probably unnecessary, without some underlying social ontology.”<sup>8</sup>

Epistemology as the process of acquiring the *knowledge of being* refers to ‘how we know what we know’. In that sense, any inquiry consist of ontological (being) and epistemological (knowledge of being) assumptions. Even though, epistemological considerations are well concentrated on, the ontological ones are either neglected or considered implicitly. This resulted primarily from the hegemony of positivism on social sciences which concentrate primarily on epistemological questions as it is the case for mainstream theories of IR. Wight underlines that “Every theory of knowledge must logically presuppose a theory of what the world is

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>6</sup>Robert W. Cox, “Realism, Positivism and Historicism”, in *Approaches to World Order*, ed. Robert W.Cox and Timothy J.Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 144.

<sup>7</sup> Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 187.

<sup>8</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 5.

like (ontology), for knowledge (epistemology) to be possible.”<sup>9</sup> This assertion of privileging ontology over epistemology, or in Wight’s words “putting ontological matters at the heart of analysis reverses a long-standing dogma of traditional IR scholarship. Under the influence of a broadly conceived positivist account of science epistemology has been privileged over ontology.”<sup>10</sup> From IR Theory perspective, theoretical considerations and their utilization of ontology and epistemology led to a wide variety of debates and constituted quite a large amount of attention in the literature in which positivism is widely criticized.<sup>11</sup> Irrespective of ontological or epistemological assumptions, every theory of knowledge, “all philosophies, cognitive discourses and practical activities presuppose a realism – in the sense of some ontology or general account of the world – of one kind or another.”<sup>12</sup> Even though epistemological concerns gain primacy, ontological questions accompany it, irrespective of the intent of the researcher. But giving priority to ontological questions has the potential to offer new perspectives on the well studied topics as well.

How these new perspectives can be acquired apart from being one of the main concerns of this dissertation, it is suggested that it can provide wider and deeper understanding of the phenomena that is studied. The rationale behind this suggestion is the growing number of studies on the philosophy of science that takes ontology to forefront of epistemology.<sup>13</sup> Giving priority to ontological matters in the analysis has the potential to turn the focus from long-standing dogma of mainstream IR scholarship that is conceived through positivist account of science which privileges

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<sup>9</sup> Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, “Scientific Realism and International Relations”, in *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, ed. Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9.

<sup>10</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 2.

<sup>11</sup> Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

<sup>12</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 26.

<sup>13</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Critical Realism, International Relations Theory and Marxism”, in *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, 168-169.

epistemology over ontology to a conception of science that privileges ontology over epistemology.<sup>14</sup>

Utilization of this understanding in strategic discourses of foreign policy has the potential to delve into the underlying structures of discourses. In that sense this search for deeper understanding has the potential to go beyond mainstream discourse analysis to reveal why (in)congruence between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized* occurs. Looking for answers to the questions put forward brings about the need to explain the benefits of focusing on critical realism and what can be gained in analysis by that focus. Then, laying out the differences of critical realism from positivism and post-positivism stands out as a need for explanation.

### **2.1.2. Differing Readings of Ontology vis-à-vis Positivism and Post Modernism**

Within IR theory, positivism is widely accepted as a method, but rather than being a method, it is basically a philosophy of science and has an understanding of ontology in itself.<sup>15</sup> Positivist philosophy, similar to critical realism accepts the existence of reality “out there” and suggests that the knowledge of this reality can be acquired through the methodology of observation, and in turn, making predictions can be possible through this process.<sup>16</sup> In other words, while within positivist approaches epistemological concerns take priority, for critical realism, ontological concerns gain primacy and replace it. It is actually about giving priority to *what exists* instead of how one gets the *knowledge of what exists*. In other words, critical realism, rather than focusing on ‘what is knowledge’, focuses on ‘what’s knowledge’ should be acquired. The ontological questions drive critical realism to reveal the mechanisms, structures, inter-relations that brought about *what is observable*. In that sense, critical realism focuses on pre-conditions of knowledge.

From IR perspective, one of the results of positivist philosophy is getting knowledge of states as the basic unit of analysis. Positivists, rather than focusing on

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<sup>14</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 2.

<sup>15</sup> Joseph, “Philosophy in International Relations”, 349.

<sup>16</sup> George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 11, 21.

what causes the recurrence of states' behavior, focuses merely on repetitive behaviors of states to reach and identify law-like regularities. But for critical realism, this endeavor is accepted as an act that reifies underlying mechanisms, by disregarding them, or merely as an act of focusing on *what exists* rather than *what causes this existence*. In order not to fall into the trap of reification, critical realism "posits the existence of unobservable structures and generative mechanisms"<sup>17</sup> at the center of analysis, since it stands as an "attempt to specify explanations that make sense of the deep underlying structures and mechanisms that make experience possible."<sup>18</sup> The rationale behind this shift is closely related with the dissatisfaction with the covering law model of science, as Bhaskar underlines it.<sup>19</sup> The covering law model of science, as positivism has adopted or imposed, is neither encompassing nor sufficient for scientific endeavors, motivated to reveal the real causes of actualization of recurring events. For critical realism,

What marks scientific knowledge out from other forms of knowledge is that it attempts to go beyond appearances and provide explanations at a deeper level of understanding? This implies that the scientist believes that there is a world beyond the appearances that helps explain those appearances. Hence, empiricist theories of science are always going to be found wanting.<sup>20</sup>

Critical realism also differs from post-modernist understanding of ontology. Critical realism supposes and suggests a reality beyond what is accepted by post-structural theories of IR, which consists of language practices, discourses, hermeneutics, and constructivist understandings. For post-modernists, reality is nothing beyond what is spoken; it is constructed through discourse and language games. In their articulation of reality, subjectivity plays the primary role. However, articulation of knowledge is not immune from power-knowledge relations.<sup>21</sup> But,

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<sup>17</sup> Joseph, "Philosophy in International Relations", 346.

<sup>18</sup> Wight and Joseph, "Scientific Realism and International Relations", 9.

<sup>19</sup> Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, 148-163.

<sup>20</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 18.

<sup>21</sup> Richard Devetak, "Post-structuralism" in *Theories of International Relations*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., ed. Scott Burchill et.al., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 184-190.

ontologically, post-positivists point out the inter-subjective nature of reality which is transmitted through subjects in accordance with power relations. Power relations depend on the strict construction of binary oppositions in which a silencing of inferior one is constructed through discourses. “The discursive representation of reality in the world is, for postmodernism, an integral part of the relations of power that are present in all human societies.”<sup>22</sup> The solutions proposed are the deconstruction of concepts and, the adoption of a genealogical stance in order to understand the depth of that conception and its articulation.

Post-modernist approaches adopt a relativist epistemology, contrary to positivists’ objectivist epistemology. Their ontological claims depend on the topic under scrutiny. In short, they do adopt relativism in ontology as in epistemological claims. But here again, in line with epistemological claims, ontology, the study of *being*, is shaped with the lens of epistemological concerns. The language practices through which meaning is transmitted between subjects shape the reality. In a sense, outside of *what is spoken*, no room is left to reality. As Campbell stated “there is nothing outside of discourse”<sup>23</sup> becomes the motto of post-modernists. But for critical realism, reality cannot be exhausted either by our experiences or by our speech. Joseph and Wight emphasized this idea by stating that “whereas the former define the world in terms of our experience of it, the latter define in terms of our theories and/or linguistic conventions.”<sup>24</sup> In line with Bhaskar, Patomâki and Wight argue that “anthropocentrism is problematic, tying, as it does, existence to its being experienced or being spoken...yet “to be” means more than to be experienced and to be spoken.”<sup>25</sup> Then, beyond *what spoken* and *what is observed* there are causal mechanisms that make *what is spoken* and *what is observed* possible.

In fact, both positivists and post-modernists trace two opposite sides of the same error represented by Waever as the opposites of the same arrow namely,

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<sup>22</sup> George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 30.

<sup>23</sup> David Campbell, “International Engagements: the Politics of North American International Relations,” *Political Theory* 29, no.3 (2001): 432-448.

<sup>24</sup> Wight and Joseph, “Scientific Realism and International Relations”, 9.

<sup>25</sup> Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no.2 (2002): 217.

rationalism and reflectivism.<sup>26</sup> Wight also criticizes the continuation of debates on the similar epistemological grounds by stating that “both give an epistemological category an ontological task.”<sup>27</sup> Bhaskar pointed out this process as an “epistemic fallacy”<sup>28</sup> in which epistemological arguments are transformed into ontological ones.<sup>29</sup> This fallacy is explained by Yalvaç as, “the question of what exists is not the same as the question of what can be known or what can be observed.”<sup>30</sup> The second error, pointed out by Wight, is concerned with the belief that “the possibility of being experienced or the possibility of being conceptualized, and/or talked about, is an essential feature of reality.” For him, “this assumption is unwarranted” since “there is no reason to assume that all of existence might be susceptible to human cognition.”<sup>31</sup>

To sum up, critical realism assumes the existence of reality beyond common observations, experiences, and discourse. In that sense, it differs ontologically from both positivist approaches that limit reality ontologically on to observables, and from post-modernist approaches that limit ontology only to discourse. Different from these two approaches, critical realism has an ontological commitment that accepts the reality beyond *what is spoken* and *what is observed*. In this vein, it proposes an alternative philosophy of science that is deemed to dig into the reality that is beyond *what is observed* and *what is spoken*. The concept of *ontological depth*, in turn, focuses on reality, that is omitted either by positivism with a focus on *what is actualized* or by post-modernism with a focus on *what is spoken*. Before discussing the concept of ontological depth, it is preferable to look at critical realism and its potential contributions closely.

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<sup>26</sup> Ole Weaver, “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, 165-169.

<sup>27</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 28.

<sup>28</sup> Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science* (London: Verso, 1997), 36-38.

<sup>29</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 28.

<sup>30</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Critical Realism, IR Theory and Marxism”, in *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, 170.

<sup>31</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 28.



### 2.1.3. Critical Realism and Its Potential Contributions

What is to be underlined is the fact that CR is not a theory, but a philosophy of science.<sup>32</sup> In that sense, it is regarded as “philosophical position.”<sup>33</sup> Its primary goal is to argue that the *social* can be studied scientifically as it is the case for *nature*. But, it is deemed to develop a radical social science methodology.<sup>34</sup> Critical realism introduces a solution to the question of whether scientific study of the society is possible. Hence, critical realism stands as a new breakthrough to positivist and post-positivist debate, by introducing not being positivist but scientific in the study of international relations.<sup>35</sup>

Critical realism, as a philosophy of science, accepts the existence of a ‘reality beyond us’ which stands as the basic assumption.<sup>36</sup> For critical realism the goal of science is to reveal that reality. But reality is accepted to be stratified, differentiated and structured.<sup>37</sup> This understanding is labeled also as ontological realism.<sup>38</sup> This means the ontological assumption of critical realism differs from both positivism and post-modernism. The understanding of ontology in each philosophy of science has discussed in the previous section.

The stratification of reality is distinguished through the layers of *empirical*, *actual*, and *real* which means reality has an ‘ontological depth’. From the perspective of this dissertation, the validity and contribution of critical realism will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. This distinction refers different layers of reality that the *empirical* (that which is experienced), the *actual* (for example, foreign policy

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<sup>32</sup> Joseph, “Philosophy in International Relations”, 346.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 345.

<sup>34</sup> FarukYalvaç, “Eleştirel Gerçekçilik: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kavramında Post-Positivizm Sonrası Aşama,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 6, no.24 (2010): 5.

<sup>35</sup> FarukYalvaç, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisindeki Temel Tartışmalar ve Eleştirel Gerçekçilik”, in *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Post-Modern Analizler-1*, ed., Tayyar Arı (Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık, 2012), 6.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>37</sup> Wight and Joseph, “Scientific Realism and International Relations”, 9-12.

<sup>38</sup> Yalvaç, “Eleştirel Gerçekçilik...”, 5.

events) and the *real* (underlying powers and mechanisms that produce foreign policy events).<sup>39</sup> In that sense, critical realist ontology embraces;

**Structures** (those intransitive properties that give an object a particular identity)

**Generative mechanisms** (those powers possessed through the structure of an object which may or may not be exercised in open, or contingent, conditions with other objects)

**Practices** (those actions and social relationships in the transitive realm of a particular object which are, themselves, partly determined by, but not reduced to structures and mechanisms of the object in question)<sup>40</sup>

The question of how structures, as generative mechanisms, have the potential to produce effects on practices is explained through the concept of emergence. Emergence locates political processes within a “stratified and differentiated totality of social relations”<sup>41</sup> without reducing them to any one level of social reality.<sup>42</sup> Emergence occurs in conjunction of aspects or variables. But what has emerged with its new properties, is irreducible to inputs and variables that paved the way to that emergence. Hence, different from mainstream theories of IR which take epistemological focus to the forefront, critical realist analysis to avoid reductionism carries on structural, but not reductionist approach to stratified nature of social reality.<sup>43</sup>

Before discussing the interrelationship between these three layers, it is useful to introduce *transitive* and *intransitive* domains of reality. Critical realism argues the separation of transitive and intransitive objects of knowledge. Intransitive objects refer to the objects that exist, even though the consciousness about them may not lead to the knowledge of them by the human beings.<sup>44</sup> Transitive objects of science,

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<sup>39</sup> Bhaskar, *A Realist theory of Science*, 13-15.

<sup>40</sup> Jonathan Joseph and John Michael Roberts, ed., *Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 2.

<sup>41</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis,” *Turkish Studies* 15, no.1 (2014),:127.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>43</sup> David Leon, “Reductionism, Emergence and Explanation in International Relations Theory,” in *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, 31-50.

<sup>44</sup> Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, 22.

on the other hand, refer to the knowledge gathered through the inquiry of *beings* which are in the range of our consciousness. It points out that the theories, rules, methods and procedures were utilized to get the knowledge of them. The distinction of these two realms leads to the fact that “the world should not be conflated with our experience of it.”<sup>45</sup> In other words, knowledge is somehow a light put over the beings in darkness, but what is seen with the help of light does not mean to enlighten everything, or assists to see everything. For that reason, looking into the depth of *what is observed*, apart from being a true scientific process, it enables one to explain *what is observed* as the result of deeper causal mechanisms, which makes observation possible through emergence. That’s why critical realism perceives reduction of the intransitive object to the transitive knowledge we have of it as a problem.<sup>46</sup> In other words, beyond *what is observed* and *what is spoken*, there is another layer of reality which interacts with the discourse even to the extent to generate the incongruence between them. In fact, what is accepted as the basic fault in International Relations is its narrowed approach to the empirical, thus, leading to focus on events, but not on generative mechanisms that bring about those events.<sup>47</sup> It is argued that the adoption of ‘flat ontology’ instead of ‘ontological depth’ is guilty of such reductionism.<sup>48</sup> One of the ramifications of this approach is to adopt an *eventist* approach to Turkish Foreign Policy.<sup>49</sup>

Focusing on transitive objects of knowledge creates analysis of strategy that remains at the level of *empirical*. This leads to de-stratification ontologically and de-historicization of knowledge<sup>50</sup> on strategy and its evolution. However, from critical realism, looking at the mechanisms and taking into account their causal mechanisms paves the way to analyze strategy both historically and sociologically. Strategy is shaped by agency, but at the same time, it is either enabled or constrained by

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<sup>45</sup> Andrew Sayer, *Realism and Social Science* (London: Sage, 2000), 11.

<sup>46</sup> Yalvaç, “Eleştirel Gerçekçilik...”, 10.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>48</sup> Wight and Joseph, *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, 10.

<sup>49</sup> Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy”, 120.

<sup>50</sup> Yalvaç, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisindeki Temel Tartışmalar ve Eleştirel Gerçekçilik”, 9.

structure. In formulating strategy, the importance of transitive domain refers to the cultural and historical substantial reality since it consists of and tied with the concepts of action, time, space and concepts.<sup>51</sup> In that sense, strategy as an agential action, encompassing *means* and *ends*, can be observed or can be represented through discourses at the level of *empirical*, but mechanisms beneath it might challenge their actualization due to the causal effects of the structures. This takes place dialectically at the level of *real* with *actual* and *empirical* implications.

## **2.2. STRUCTURE: The Context Agency Operates In**

### **2.2.1. Agent-Structure Debate and Structure from Critical Realist Perspective**

In order to get a clearer picture of strategy, clarification of agent-structure debate from the lens of critical realism cannot be disregarded. Agent-structure debate is widely discussed in the IR literature,<sup>52</sup> but the for the sake of saving space, it will not be summarized in here; however analyzing much closely will provide the outlook to the issue. First of all, it should be underlined that agent-structure discussion tended to be subsumed under the guise of Level of Analysis problem in the literature.<sup>53</sup> Discussions on the subject, by a distinction based on Weberian and Durkheimian approach, which can be summarized as by following Berger's distinction, the former takes 'man creates society', the latter takes 'society creates man' approach.<sup>54</sup> But from critical realist perspective, instead of explaining the issue based on binary oppositions that reify the other, handling the debate dialectically in which both society and agency have the potential to change each other in process both enables dialectical analysis, and hence, facilitates to refrain from reification. In this way,

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<sup>51</sup> Yalvaç, "Eleştirel Gerçekçilik...", 11.

<sup>52</sup> Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations," *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 335-370.; David Dessler, "What's at stake in the Agent-Structure Problem," *International Organization* 43, no.3 (1989): 441-473.; Audie Klotz, "Moving Beyond the Agent-Structure Debate", *International Studies Review* 8 (2006): 355-381.

<sup>53</sup> Patomaki and Wight, "After Postpositivism?", 230; Yalvaç, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisindeki Temel Tartışmalar ve Eleştirel Gerçekçilik", 20-23.

<sup>54</sup> David Harvey, "Agency and Community: A Critical Realist Paradigm," *Journal for the Theory of Social Science* 32, no.2 (2002): 166-168.

reductionism can also be refrained, since “the agent-structure problem is not about the relative proportions of agential versus structural factors determining social outcomes, but about constructing theoretical accounts able to guide empirical research that can do justice to the chosen theoretical elements.”<sup>55</sup>

Asking ontological questions ‘what is meant by structure?’ and ‘what is meant by agency?’ is a good starting point in discussing the problem at hand meaningfully, since the aim of inquiry is not parsimony but explanatory depth to the topic.<sup>56</sup> Marx’s words, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past”<sup>57</sup> is probably a widely used quotation in agents-structure debate. It directs attention to the dialectical nature of agents-structure that is constantly shaped by each other.

Structure, in this context, refers to pre-existing forces that underlie the agency, with its power to alter, and to be altered.

Some ontological limitations on a possible naturalism may be immediately derived from these emergent social properties, on the assumption (to be vindicated below) that society is *sui generis* real:

1. Social structures, unlike natural structures do not exist independently of the activities they govern.
2. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity.
3. Social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time invariant).<sup>58</sup>

Bhaskar’s definition of structure, and particularly its attributes, is bound with agency. These dependencies make the structure a blurred concept but, *real* with *real*

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<sup>55</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 101; See also Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 17, no.3 (1991): 393.

<sup>56</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 122.

<sup>57</sup> Robert C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: Norton, 1978), 595.

<sup>58</sup> Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of Contemporary Human Sciences* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 38.

effects. Harvey rephrases these three features of structure as; *activity dependent*, *concept dependent*, and *spatio-temporally dependent*.<sup>59</sup>

Being activity-dependent means, structure brings about its effects depending on the activities of agents. Where there is no activity, there is no structural effect either constraining or enabling. But it should also be noted that it operates in an intermingled way with other features of structure. While it provides the institutional base for activity, in the absence of true definition of structure and its causal powers structure might bring about counterproductive effects on agency. What the structure is like, what are the attributes and power should be clarified by agents through concepts. Otherwise, in formulating strategy, the proper *means* cannot be allocated to desired *ends*. Spatio-temporal dependency refers to the situation in which the action is conceived and decided to be actualized. The factors of time and space whenever are missed, wherever they are misconceived, and however they are misjudged, the outcome of the strategic move will not meet the desired *ends*. The referents of time and space dictate irreversible evolution of structure. It means structure does not stand as given, but continuously evolving, or in other words, structures cannot be conceived as *being* but ones that are constantly *becoming*.<sup>60</sup> In that sense, while, the former refers to a rigid and static conceptualization, the latter refers to a continuous and dynamic conceptualization which requires interaction, and which stands against reification.

### 2.2.2. Exploring Structure and Structural Forces in Context

It is argued that structures are *concept*, *activity* and *spatio-temporal dependent* on agency's conduct. In addition, strategy as an agential attribute operates in structures. Structures are also *context dependent* which means in different contexts structures have differing effects on agents that shape their behavior. It involves temporality, space and subject matter that agents are deemed to alter the conditions

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<sup>59</sup> Harvey, "Agency and Community", 170.

<sup>60</sup> On *being* and *becoming* see Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32.; Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsneas, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Routledge, 2002), 95-114; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York, Harper&Row, 1962).

that preexisting agents. Subject matter, as being related with the context, refers to the issue that by employing strategy it is deemed to improve the initial conditions, or to extract benefits, or to realize intended outcomes. In other words, the effects of structure emerge in respective context, in which with the intentions of agents that is tried to be altered by strategy. Within the scope of this dissertation, subject matter is the formulation of strategy that is tailored to realize some pre-determined goals in foreign policy.

The states as agents operating in international relations are bound up with a number of structural forces. Those can be identified as the *international political system*, *international economy* and *geography* that states reside. While all of them enable state behaviors, they also constrain them. Before discussing their effects on strategy, it should be noted that their true nature cannot be grasped, which means that there is always an incongruence between the essence and the appearance of them, depending on the perspective of agents. Otherwise, as Marx noted, "...all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided."<sup>61</sup> States in formulating their strategies are devoting a subjective and specified meaning to the structure, and through this attainment of meaning which found expression on concepts, and deviating within time, give shape to their strategies. As discussed above, attained meaning does not exhaust the nature of reality, but being neglected or disregarded aspects of that reality might exist due to the subjective nature of conceptions. Nevertheless, with conceptualization of structure, agents define, shape and formulate their strategies.

Within the context of strategy that is formulated for foreign policy actions, states abstract the structure in line with the context of the respective and relevant time. International political system, in which states operate in and being part of it, have considerable effects on state behavior. But here, rather than a reductionist approach that focuses on power, it is deemed to take into account material as well as ideational aspects of the structure. The transformation of empire into a nation state emanates from and is based on the dialectics of agent and structure. International political system carried out this transformation in time, in which it is witnessed that the basic polity turned out from being empire to nation-state. Though discussion of

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<sup>61</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital* (London Lawrence&Wishart, 1966), 3:797, chap.48.

this transformation is out of scope, it has produced effects on the nature of politics together with international economic system. For that reason, for strategy in Turkish Foreign Policy, evolution should be handled in the context that incorporates subjective understanding of the structure. Since basic discussion of this dissertation begins with portrayal of the rupture between empire and republic, with reasons and outcomes, the interplay of agents with structure and their effects should be treated as the context, in which strategy is aimed to alter the pace of developments and gained its meaning within the context of Turkish Foreign Policy.

Change in international political system brought about considerable effects on the Ottoman Empire and its domestic political system. Nationalism, parallel with growing national sentiments that flourished and grew in Europe, had infiltrated in the imperial territories and had attracted growing adherents among society.<sup>62</sup> Of course, the effects of nationalism had escalated in parallel with the decreasing power of the empire, due to the changing nature of international economy. As Gellner argued, “transition to industrialization era brought about transition to nationalism era.”<sup>63</sup> Given the empire could not have provided an attractive identity, such as being part of the Ottoman Empire which was deemed to be created with Young Ottomans, the Ottoman society inevitably had found itself in search for new identity and prospective future. In a way, the changes in international political system and economy brought about *nationalism* and *structural weakness* in which the two nourished each other.

Geography, as a third structural factor, not only triggered the evolution and change in politics and economy with the discovery of the new world and pour of wealth from the new world into Europe, it also altered the perception of space. From agential aspect, as will be discussed in the next chapter, geography played an important role in the evolution of *nationalism*, *structural weakness*, and *territorial retreat*. What is more important from the perspective of ontological depth is the fact that it caused the emergence of balance of power politics in pursuing and formulating

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<sup>62</sup> Reşat Kasaba, “Dreams of Empire, Dreams of Nations,” in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Moderns World*, ed. Joseph W.Esherick et.al., (Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield, 2006), 198-228.

<sup>63</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 118; Ernest Gellner, *Uluslar ve Ulusçuluk* (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 2008), 11.



strategy at the level of empirical. The arguments laid down so far are illustrated at the table below.

**Table 3 Ontological Depth of Structures**

<b>Real (structure)</b>	<b>International Political System</b> Transformation from Empire to nation-state	<b>International Economy</b> Industrialization, changing routes and nature of trade	<b>Geography</b> Discovery and changing importance of space
<b>Actual (conceptualization)</b>	Nationalism/democracy	Structural weakness	Territorial retreat
<b>Empirical</b>	Balance of power politics		
<b>Strategy</b>	Puzzlement in ends	Erosion of means	Changing perception of space

From strategy perspective, strategy within the period of rupture that will be discussed in the next chapter faced some erosion in terms of its elements – *means*, *ends*, and *space*. Geography gains importance with respect to the fact that, every strategy needs a space that it will gain meaning. In other words, without space as a terrain, the components of strategy lose their meaning. Where to apply *means* and from where to identify *ends* only gain meaning if an answer can be found to in where – *space* – to conduct strategy. Changing perception of space, within the dialectics of politics and economy, also dialectically affects the elements of *means* and *ends*. These arguments will be clarified in subsequent chapters.

**2.3. AGENCY AND STRATEGY: Perception of Structure and Expression in Strategy**

**2.3.1. Agency**

Agents, on the other hand, have the features of *consciousness*, *reflexivity*, *intentionality*, *cognition* and *emotionality*.<sup>64</sup> These features are quite different to the extent that, they deserve to be studied ontologically distinct from structures. Depending on distinctiveness, the features of agents cannot be reduced to the ones

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<sup>64</sup> Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Agent Structure Problem in International Relations: a Scientific Realist Contribution”, *Review of International Studies* 34, (2008): 117.

possessed by structures.<sup>65</sup> Agents formulate strategies by using these attributes when encountered with a situation. The situation is perceived by agents using cognition and to some extent emotions. Later, subjectivity combined with cognition brings about a reading of context in which counter actions, driven by intentionality and self consciousness, either extract benefits, or transform the situation to decrease the loss. But, self-consciousness or awareness of the context is a key to challenge the possible constraining and enabling forces of structures. Without being aware of constraints, the emancipation by overcoming them is not possible. It is also inherently a key to be political. And it requires an understanding of the context.

A dialectical grasp of our socially conditioned roles and the equally necessary limits and possibilities that constitute our present provides us with the opportunity for making a conscious and intelligent choice. In this manner does knowledge of necessity usher in the beginnings of real freedom.<sup>66</sup>

In this context, being political is not a sin, but being unconscious is a sin towards society, since one steals, controls or grasps the agency of society that has the potential to produce robust strategies that are capable to change the undesired conditions being lived in. Questioning of the structure for the aim to alter it inevitably brings in cognition. Cognition is treated here as the building block of reflexivity and subjectivity.<sup>67</sup>

Reading of being concept-dependent, activity-dependent, and spatio-temporal dependent structures, is utmost important in formulating robust strategies to cope with emerging situations. Any loss in those competencies in reading structures might end in formulation of wrong strategies that could bring about reproduction of the structure at deeper (unobservable) level and, at the same time, loss of position at the surface (observable) level. Even though strategies, as conscious acts, are formulated at the surface level,<sup>68</sup> and the reading of structure by the agent occurs at the same

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<sup>65</sup> Yalvaç, “Critical Realism, International Relations Theory and Marxism”, 172.

<sup>66</sup> Bertell Olmann, *Dance of Dialectics: Steps in Marx’s Method* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 20.

<sup>67</sup> Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 138-151; 198-219.

<sup>68</sup> Joseph, “Philosophy and International Relations”, 358.

level, the intentionality of agent might not realize the desired outcomes – *ends* – irrespective of existence of available *means* at disposal. The positioned practices of agents defined to alter the situation get lost when self-consciousness and subjectivity are lost. Then,

...it is easy to see that both society and human praxis possess a *dual character*. Society is both the ever-present *condition* (material cause) and the continually reproduced *outcome* of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is conscious *production*, and (normally unconscious) *reproduction* of the conditions of production, that is society. One could refer to the former as the *duality of structure*, and the latter as the *duality of praxis*.<sup>69</sup>

The duality of structure is the result of dynamic interaction of agents among themselves, and their interaction with the underlying structure. The duality both in structure and praxis arises from the ontological distinction based on different attributes of both structures and agents, and the outcomes emerge from their interactive progression. The positioned practices – ‘praxis’, or ‘situated activity’ – are the result of dynamic interaction of agents and structures, in which agents possess the *power to act*, and structures the *power to impose* some kind of authority.

Ontological depth of strategic discourse consists of the concepts of strategy, discourse, and their ontological depth. Ontology, as the conception of *being* and the depth referring to stratified nature of *being*, brings about the need take into account different layers of reality. In fact, explaining ontological depth of strategic discourse is a complex endeavor which aims to resolve complex relationship between concepts. Before answering the questions of “how strategy is formulated?” and “how strategy can be explained?” the questions of “why strategy is needed?” or “what pushes agents to formulate a strategy?” should be scrutinized. Otherwise, the former questions cannot be founded on a context in which they gain a detailed and encompassing explanation. The aim is to provide a background in explaining ontological depth of strategy and its representation through discourse. But, what will be the crux of explanation is to reach a historical and sociological explanation.

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<sup>69</sup> Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of Contemporary Human Sciences*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 33-35.

Strategy throughout this dissertation is treated as an agential attribute. However, strategy as a social and historical concept evolves spatio-temporally, in which process, differing meanings is attained on it. Meaning attainment is closely related with the context and structure of that context. Agents, with their competencies, to extract the subjective meaning of the context renovate their positioned practices. This adaptation does not occur in a vacuum; on the contrary, as will be discussed below, it requires a subjective reading of the structure. In a way, agents with their *knowledgeability* produce a portrayal of the structure and its causal powers depending on the operated context. In that sense, “the knowledgeability of agents is central to the ways in which the causal powers of social structures are exercised.”<sup>70</sup> The structural forces that have been filtered through subjectivity of agents not only affect the formulation by attaining differing rationale in strategy, but they also cause the emergence of differences in respective periods. For example, reading of geography does not present a fixed understanding, but a fluctuated understanding, while some basics remained unchanged. In fact, when considered within time arrow, being (what is there) faces some changes. That’s why Heidegger’s understanding of *being* within temporality has relevance with strategy.<sup>71</sup> But, at the same time, it requires comprehensive portrayal of *being*, even though it is due to the nature of structure, as discussed above, which is activity-dependent. But, without *being*, it is not possible to understand *becoming* which requires an understanding of the process and context.

Why strategy is needed? In fact, strategy requires a social context, in which it is formulated. Strategy in international relations is related with the foreign policy of states. States through their foreign policies try to achieve some certain goals, but for the sake of focus, strategy in this dissertation is built upon the context of security. The need for security then paved the way for formulation of strategy to achieve determined or intended goals. In other words, it can be claimed that, the need for strategy at a deeper level of reality is related with the need for security.

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<sup>70</sup> John Scott, “Where is Social Structure?,” in *After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism*, ed., José Lopez and Garry Potter (London: The Athlone Press, 2001), 84.

<sup>71</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (New York, Harper&Row, 1962).

### 2.3.2. Security and Strategy

The concept of security is accepted as a slippery and illusive concept, due to the approaches adopted in analyzing it reflect the theoretical stands, and their approaches to the conceptualization of security. Nevertheless, security is generally accepted as a *need* for human beings, since human beings desire to preserve their well-being and lives.<sup>72</sup> The states as organized and social clusters of human beings do not change the essence, but the way the need for security is scrutinized and the way of preserving security in an organized, but social form might change.

The understanding of security in the context of this dissertation, though there is a vast literature on the topic, is different from that of mainstream approaches. Traditional and mainstream approaches handle security based on statist ontology and positivist epistemology which generate an “understanding of world politics that is reified and unreflective.”<sup>73</sup> It is reified through a statist, atomistic and rigid ontology, and it is unreflective through adopting object/subject differentiation.<sup>74</sup> But, the approach adopted in this dissertation supposes security through a sociological and historical perspective, as it is the case for strategy. This choice is a result of the presumption that *being political* is derived from *being sociological*. However, the mainstream approaches to security are criticized for being apolitical, ahistorical, and reductionist which are derived from, but apart from, being reified and unreflective. In such an understanding, then how security is formulated is reduced to the overarching concept of survival. The search for survival as the *ultimate end* is accepted as the result of atomistic and rigid ontological conception of states operating in the international system, which is anarchical, and hence, leaving no other options, but imposing the sameness in functionality of states.

Such a conception of security is not innocent in terms of its imposition of some certain way of thinking, which also has consequences in formulating and exercising strategy. Recalling that giving priority to ontology – as the terrain of politics – over epistemology – as the knowledge of *being* – encompass being

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<sup>72</sup> Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 95-110, 149-182.

<sup>73</sup> Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 103.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

*political* inherently. Then, the concept of security should be treated from being historical and sociological perspective. From critical realist angle, the mainstream theories based on positivist understanding imposed the ways to *know*. Hence, if *knowing* is accepted as an agential competency, the mainstream and traditional ways of *knowing* result in loss of agency. In other words, “it makes other ways of knowing – and other ways of being – illegitimate.”<sup>75</sup>

It has several *reasons* and *ramifications*, the two, being inter-related and intermingled. In terms of reasons, Coxian syllogism explains this assertion that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”<sup>76</sup> It imposes on states to formulate security and strategy within certain and limited framework in which, analysts found themselves to “give pre-arranged answers to pre-defined questions.”<sup>77</sup> In other words, “[even though] politics is the arena for emancipation, and therefore of potential freedom; theory is not to be separate from practice, but an integral part of it (*praxis*).”<sup>78</sup> Traditional approaches to security by imposing the way to get *knowledge of being*, inevitably, detach *subject* from *object* for the sake of objectivism. In such a situation, subject loses its *subjectness*, by losing its subjectivity. Loss of subjectivity, in fact, is the loss of agency on knowledge production which will provide the necessary knowledge to free subject from its mental cages; but, traditional theories impose to think within certain limits. In terms of *praxis*, without capability to have knowledge, agency on practice gets lost accordingly. Behind this argumentation, *instrumental rationality* attached to the way of knowledge production plays the primary role in that process. From the perspective of instrumental reason, strategic *ends* are “treated as normative questions that are not susceptible to rational arbitration.”<sup>79</sup> The consequence of instrumental rationality is ‘progressive reification of consciousness,’ that brings about loss of subjectivity in defining security stakes of nation.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>76</sup> Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 207.

<sup>77</sup> Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 89.

<sup>78</sup> Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 45.

<sup>79</sup> Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 60.

Recalling that consciousness is one of the key features of agency in its relations with structure, which is activity, concept, and spatio-temporal dependent, in the absence of consciousness no room is left to agency to transform the situation. Without consciousness, neither reflexivity, nor cognition and intentionality might produce an effect on structure, except the reproduction of the structure and order. From social perspective, in circumstances and conditions in which all ways of knowing is constrained, and hence, agents' ability to choose, then it is no exaggeration to suggest that in such a society the "individual is an illusion."<sup>80</sup> But, production of a structure, that might provide a wider area of movement to agent, requires a substantive rationality, since the latter, in terms of strategy formulation is concerned with *ends*, not simply with *means*.<sup>81</sup>

Security, within the light of discussions pursued so far, is treated as a *need*, not only for survival, but for determining its own destiny. In that sense, security is 'living' not merely 'being alive.'<sup>82</sup> Which is also stands as an answer to the second question of "what pushes agents to formulate a strategy". The need for security, as a structural factor, leads agents to acquire desired conditions. In other words, to live accepted as the freedom to make choice for a purpose, for a goal, which also means being political, is embedded with a 'how to do it' study. An act for security requires and relies on strategy, to achieve certain goals, or to reach intended levels of security conditions.

The question of "What makes strategy possible?" while providing the focus on topic, also asserts that, in order to understand strategy, the international relations that make strategy possible should be comprehended. This primary question also highlights the pathways to the questions of "how strategy is formulated" and "how strategy can be explained". Regarding the second question, "how strategy can be explained," it is possible to claim that the way of formulation of strategy clarifies the way of explanation of strategy.

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<sup>80</sup> Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London Verso, 1979), 154.

<sup>81</sup> Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 41.

<sup>82</sup> Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 107.

In this context, strategy, in the simplest terms, is defined as the match of *means* and *ends*. But, the nature of this match, composed of *means* and *ends*, emerges from a context, which differs through the spatio-temporality inherent in the specific cases. Being bounded up with space and time inherently brings about the need to think, and hence, elaborate on strategy within sociological and historical context. Furthermore, the conception of international relations as context paves the way for the articulation of explanations based on agency versus structure. But to have an explanation of strategy, from critical realist perspective, is a move to going beyond defining strategy only in terms of *means*, in which *ends* are reified.

Traditionally, focus on *means*, or reduction of strategy to *means* is the result of underlying mechanisms of the definition of security parallel with the mainstream assumption that the international system is anarchic – given and reified conception – which gives *ends* a uniformed conception.<sup>83</sup> Uniformed conception is reflected in the literature with metaphors of ‘billiard-balls’ mostly as a result of atomistic conception of states. However, since the states, in nature, differ, then their *ends* differ in line with that possessed nature.

Explaining “what makes strategy possible” is coalesced with “how strategy is formulated,” the former looking the dynamics inherent in the structure, the latter examining the agency. Then, strategy is a problem that can be solved in agent-structure debate, in order to reveal historical and sociological nature of strategy. From critical realist perspective, it is argued that strategy is formulated in the *transitive* domain since agency operates at the level of empirical. And the structure, having underlying mechanisms either to constrain or enable agents both in formulating and actualizing that strategy, constitutes the domain of *intransitive*. Then it can be claimed that strategy as a “category of praxis”<sup>84</sup> has an ontological depth that requires taking into account the context in which it is formulated. This provides the ground in answering the questions of ‘what makes strategy possible’ and ‘how strategy is formulated,’ since in order to explain strategy, the international relations

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<sup>83</sup> Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 129-130.

<sup>84</sup> Frederic Merand and Amelie, Forget, “Strategy: Strategizing about Strategy”, in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed., Rebecca Adler-Nissen (New York: Routledge, 2013), 94.



that make strategy possible should be analyzed. But, here, context should not be seen as something static, but rather as something dynamic and constantly evolving. Taking strategy as category of praxis, leads one to take into account dialectics of agent and structure, which are ontologically distinct, but having power on each other.

Strategy in traditional approaches due to atomistic conception of states mainly focus on *means* rather than *ends* in its formulation. The definitions of strategy vary in the literature. Clausewitz defined strategy as the “continuation of policy by other means.”<sup>85</sup> Writing in the Clausewitzian tradition, Basil Liddell Hart defines strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”<sup>86</sup> One of the recent scholars on strategy Colin S.Gray defined it as “the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political purposes.”<sup>87</sup> Bernard Brodie, one of the Cold War strategists who suggested strategy is a science, – but a positivist one – in terms of “applied science”, defined strategy as “being devoted to discovering how the resources of the nation, material and human, can be developed and utilized for the end of maximizing the total effectiveness of the nation in war.”<sup>88</sup> All of the definitions, cited here, have incorporated the *ends* in their conceptions, but, at the same time, they reflected uniqueness of *ends* that are conceived in terms of winning a war due to the anarchic nature of international relations, and war conceived as the instrument to assure the survival in those wars. In other words, even though *ends* have been incorporated in their definitions, asserting that *ends drive means*, unfortunately, due to their assumptions were based on positivist epistemology and statist ontology, their incorporation has ended in *means drives ends*. Similarly, Buzan argues that in formulating strategy, two factors play a prominent role; the first one is the nature and the political structure of international relations, and the second one is the nature of prevailing technologies available to the political actors within it. Since the first factor is reified through anarchy, the only factor to be studied or to be scrutinized is technology of military power. In other words, as stated above, *ends* are reified through the concept of anarchy – a given *end*

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<sup>85</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997), 22.

<sup>86</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber, 1967), 335.

<sup>87</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1.

<sup>88</sup> Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” *World Politics* 1, no.4 (1949): 476.

– in favor of *means*, and thus, the study of strategy is reduced in the study of *means*.<sup>89</sup>

But Aron emphasizes, in line with Clausewitz, that “political ends are diverse, but cannot be reduced to the will for power.”<sup>90</sup> In fact, from the traditional perspective, the conception of strategy is based on instrumental rationality which takes game-theory approaches to the middle of discussions, while disregarding constructivist approaches which are inter-subjective but, again reductionist. Rationalist and constructivist approaches even though diverge in knowledge production, due to their epistemological positions, produce similar outcomes. The former posit reason at the heart of analysis, the latter posit culture instead of reason. But constructivist assumptions on anarchy do not produce a different result but a differed explanation. Rather than accepting anarchy as a given, constructivists explain, through inter-subjective processes, how anarchy becomes a given. Nevertheless, the concept of strategic culture if handled from a critical realist perspective has the potential to explain historical evolution of the way of agents’ reading of structures. Hence, rejection of uniformity of *ends* requires the question of “what matters in formulation of *ends*.” Depending on substantive rationality, agents might get the knowledge of intransitive domain where structures reside with their generative mechanisms and causal powers. However, substantive rationality does not guarantee the knowledge of the intransitive, since the knowledge of intransitive is bound up with agents’ awareness of it, and their ability to abstract what exist actually. In short, formulation of *ends* as mentioned above requires looking at the interplay between agent and structure.

Agential attributes discussed above consist of *consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, cognition and, emotionality*. Agents, when taking part in international relations, in fact, come across with different situations. But, each case carries its specific characteristics along with the specific and unique context, its specific code of conduct of international relations, differing actors with their diverging stakes. In

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<sup>89</sup> Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 129

<sup>90</sup> Muriell Cozette, “Realistic Realism?: American Political Realism, Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on the Problem of Means and Ends in International Politics,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27,no.3 (2010): 440.

other words, agents produce a reading of the context which is embedded in structure. Strategy is a move to replace the undesired circumstances with desired ones, in which agents have the potential for their self-realizations and freedom to make choice, rather than being in conditions that dictates their acts, lead them to a determined future. But, agents' intention and will to change the existing with the anticipated occurs without having a comprehension, since agents cannot grasp the true nature of the context and structure beforehand. In fact, what agent has imagined may not coincide with the encountered situation. This interaction brings about and reveals the dialectical relationship between agent and structure in formulating strategy which cannot be separated, despite they are ontologically different. Recalling that structures are activity, concept, and spatio-temporal dependent on agents, explains and underlines the process of strategy formulation.

In preceding parts, it is argued that, strategy is a *situated activity, positioned practice*, or *praxis*, which takes place within a context. In strategy formulation, agents conceive the context through interpretation, to produce some possible futures. Conceptualization is basically a 'political process'<sup>91</sup>. Concepts do not appear in a vacuum, but in a political process, in which agents bring their subjectivity and strategic culture, both of which are historical and sociological. Subjectivity plays the crucial role in formulating strategy, due to its role in formulating *ends*. Being subjective is political.<sup>92</sup> And, "If subjectivity is no longer present at the receiving end, then it is also no longer present at the exercising end."<sup>93</sup> It should also be noted here that subjectivity also inherently brings about arbitrary interpretations of involved structures.<sup>94</sup> But, the incongruence of *what is actualized* and *what is spoken* also emerges from arbitrariness of conceptions. Because, agents read the context reflexively at the domain of transitive and *unobservables* existing in the intransitive domain do not reveal themselves with bareness, but always with some distortions.

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<sup>91</sup>R.B.J.Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 128.

<sup>92</sup> Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing Political Back In* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 7.

<sup>93</sup> Jonathan Joseph, "Foucault and Reality," *Capital & Class* 82 (2004): 152.

<sup>94</sup> William Outhwaite, "Realism and Social Science," in *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, Margaret Archers and Roy Bhaskar et al. (London: Routledge, 1998), 283.

The level of distortion is function of agents' ability to perceive, grasp and portray the reality beyond *what is actualized*. Distortion is an effect emerging from the two ontologically real layers of reality, which is also underlined by Marx. He asserts that "all science would be superfluous if the forms of appearance of things are directly coincided with their essence."<sup>95</sup> Then agents try to capture and portray the reality through their cognition, to reach even to distorted ones. They infer from appearances through abstraction to capture *what actually exist* beneath and beyond their sight. But, the process of cognition is bound with their consciousness in and of context, which provides the reflexivity as well. Intentionality, the will to change, the will to self-realization is a product of matching *means* and *ends*, since the process of strategizing is a process of subjectivity. To continue to be subjective requires continuing to think subjectively, in order to avoid transforming into an *object*. In other words, wrong conceptualization ends in materialization (*objectification*) of subjects.

For agents, who has the power to act, which is an essential feature of agents, in the world are derived from their *social positioning*, and '*social positionality*'<sup>96</sup> is internally related with agency. Positioning comes before, and is internal to *situated activity*, since positioning occurs with a reading of context. While agents position themselves, they firstly read the situation through cognition, then builds pros and cons, stakes and goals of the situation, then, decides to take some possible actions to realize the desired outcomes. In such a context, "human activity is seen as consisting in the transformation by efficient (intentional) causes of pre-given material (natural and social) causes."<sup>97</sup> To be clearer, agents elaborate the material causes that are useable and at disposal for getting desired *ends*. For that reason, strategy is *situational, positional* and *dispositional* in essence.<sup>98</sup>

If strategy is conceived as practices that found expression in action, as implementation and operationalization of thought, then it can be claimed that what

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<sup>95</sup> Marx, *Capital*, 3:797, chap.48.

<sup>96</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 113.

<sup>97</sup> Margaret Archer, "Realism and Morphogenesis," in *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, Margaret Archers and Roy Bhaskar et al. (London: Routledge, 1998), 370.

<sup>98</sup> Merand and Forget, "Strategy: Strategizing about Strategy", 98-99.

has been thought may not always be realized in a context, since strategy faces counter moves of other strategizers. In other words, in strategic context, each agent comes into play with differing and rival strategies. In such a situation, a strategy of an agent is bound not only to the effectiveness of other agents who have stakes in, but also, to the structure that is capable to enable and constrain the outcomes of agents. In this context, structural contexts are ‘products-in-process’ as well as ‘processes-in-production’.<sup>99</sup>

If strategy is accepted as a historical and sociological phenomenon, then what is the role of *strategic culture* in agents’ way of strategizing? Strategic culture simply, is the effects of past experiences on the present. It actually draws attention to internal dynamics of agents. Culture plays a crucial role in filtering choices and decisions on strategy. But, taking strategic culture into account in that process should not be reduced to inter-subjective reading, as constructivists adopt. On the contrary, “agential phenomena cannot be fully understood by exclusive reference to their internal dynamics; they have to be seen as conditioned by circumstances inherited from the past, as well as driven by beliefs about potential futures.”<sup>100</sup> Strategic culture, as a filter, through which the past that shapes the present and the future, should also be examined as a structural factor, since it unintentionally has effects on agents and their strategy. Asking a question of “what caused the Ottoman State to adopt balance of power politics?” cannot be explained merely through taking into account, military backwardness, *structural weakness* that led to play parties to each other. But, it should be seen as an emerged outcome with dialectics of internal dysfunction and nature of international relations.

#### **2.4. DISCOURSE: The Representation of Strategy**

Discourse is related with the representation of reality, but in line with the primary concern of this dissertation, it is related with the representation of strategy. It is deemed in this section to give answer to the question of “how strategy is represented?” Incorporating discourse in strategy is an attempt to examine the

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<sup>99</sup> Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, 112.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

relationship between strategy and discourse, mainly by focusing on its representation with speech.

By strategic discourse it is meant the discourse that is conceived as strategic.<sup>101</sup> In representation, it is aimed to create and eventually circulate important and vital aspects of strategy to provide coherent set of meaning.<sup>102</sup> It has social aspects, since meaning has the potential to carry differing points to the receivers depending on the receiver's subjectivity to grasp the meaning in discourse. In other words, there are inherently political and social elements within discourse. Given that discourse is accepted as instable due to being "liable to slip and slide"<sup>103</sup>, the meaning may alter easily within process. To prevent instability, the aspects of strategy incorporated in discourse should be chosen and be reflected with utmost care for the sake of not conveying wrong messages to receivers. Logically, this brings about the need for containment and exclusion of certain parts of strategy to be represented in discourse.<sup>104</sup> So, discourse has political consequences, since wording of *what is incorporated* and *what is omitted* reflects politics of meaning attached to words, as representation.<sup>105</sup> Making your strategy known in discourse can be seen as a political act that represents what you think and how you will act.<sup>106</sup> In other words, with discourse the agent provides the knowledge of social reality that is produced by its subjectivity. But, the choice in discourse has "political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another."<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>Michael J. Shapiro, "Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of Security Policy in the Video Age," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, (1990): 331.

<sup>102</sup>Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, "Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of the Cuban Problem, 1960-1994," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 25, no.2 (1996): 373.

<sup>103</sup>Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no.2 (1999): 242.

<sup>104</sup> Shapiro, "Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy", 332.

<sup>105</sup> David Campbell, *Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 7-8.

<sup>106</sup> George, *Discourse of Global Politics*, 191.

<sup>107</sup> David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1992), 4.

For strategy, discourse is an important and indivisible part of what is intended to do in international relations. But, it should also be noted that

Representations do not imitate reality but are practices through which things take on meaning and value; to the extent that a representation is regarded as realistic, it is because it is so familiar it operates transparently...photography is one of the representational practices that has become so naturalized.<sup>108</sup>

Hence, apart from how one will realize, how one's intention made known has effects on deeper level of reality.

It has been discussed that strategy as an agential act takes place at the domain of transitive, and even though "discourse may be important part of this reality [*at transitive level*]...it is necessary to look at how it interacts with non-discursive social structures and causal mechanisms and how the relationship between all takes an organized form."<sup>109</sup> Nevertheless, discourse as a "system of signification"<sup>110</sup> has causal effects to trigger generative mechanisms to alter or to reinforce articulated strategy. In fact, discourse "recontextualizes social practice by representing it in particular ways."<sup>111</sup> This representation might attract parties involved in the process.

Agential acts of one side might be either consented by other involved strategizers, if they convicted that their interests will not be challenged, or, if other agents' stakes and interest are perceived to be undermined they might put forward pre-emptive or preventive counter acts. In that situation, the outcome will be determined inter-subjectively, but due to the effects produced by the underlying mechanisms – structure. Porpora's concept of "emergent materiality", explains the causality beyond conception and actions, which concept points out to generative mechanisms with "an ontologically objective and socially consequential existence,

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<sup>108</sup> Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), xi.

<sup>109</sup> Joseph and Roberts, *Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction*, 3.

<sup>110</sup> Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no.2 (1999): 231-236.

<sup>111</sup> Benjamin Banta, "Analyzing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no.2 (2012): 394.

whether or not any actors are aware of them.”<sup>112</sup> In other words, irrespective of agential awareness of structural factors existing beneath *what is actualized*, these structural factors have emergent powers to alter *what is spoken*. Then, from critical realist perspective, in tailoring discourse of strategy, the conceptualization of intransitive domain should also be taken into account. Otherwise, if the conceptualization of a discourse is unfitted with the intent of formulated strategy, then discourse carries the risk of being counter-productive. Even though, intransitive domain of reality is immune from power knowledge relations,<sup>113</sup> it has the power to produce undesired outcomes, or *unintended consequences*.

As the agent produces discourse in a process that consists of perception of structure and attainment of special meaning to discourse in line with the formulated strategy. But, beyond agential attribution of meaning to discourse, it has also effects on other strategizers, who perceive the attached meaning to discourse and shape their counter-acts along with this perception. But, it should be noted, at this point, that, beyond inter-subjective construction of meaning, its interplay with structure should also be taken into account. Because, the discourse, as it is the case for strategy, operates at the domain of intransitive. And different contexts have the potential to bring about differing outcomes.

Discourse can be regarded as operating in three contexts, thus, producing differing results and serving differing goals. Three contexts, in which discourse is circulated, are; *international*, in which other parties receive and produce their own strategies, *national*, in which through discourse a set of meaning is conveyed to society in order to create a common sense, and *specific subject*, through which the meaning of particular discourse may alter and, hence, might trigger reactions to that discourse. As will be discussed in the next Chapter, the discourse of “Independence or Death!” may not create feelings, perceptions, and meaning when said within the context of a football game.

When handled within the context of structure and particularly related to geography, discourse represents social construction of space, somehow attaching

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<sup>112</sup> Douglas V.Porpora, “Cultural Rules and Material Relations,” *Sociological Theory* 11, no.2 (1993): 222.

<sup>113</sup> Joseph, “Foucault and Reality”, 144.



meaning to geography. As in the case of discourse of “my home”, the discourse of *vatan* incorporates attainment of special meaning and priority that is to be secured and protected due to belonging to someone or to a society. In the context of geography, it is also social in the sense that it assigns special importance to geography beyond being just a piece of land. While it represents, at the national level, the soils to be lived on, at the same time, it creates room for geopolitics which gained importance in Turkish Foreign Policy in the aftermath of Second World War. Different discourses emerged in different periods with differing attached meanings cause to disseminate and circulate diverse impressions in the minds of receivers. Nevertheless, whatever was incorporated in discourse, it is the reflection of agential perception of structure and formulated strategy in respective periods.

## **2.5. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE: Causation and Incongruence between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized***

This part, ‘sources of incongruence’, is devoted to argue the sources of incongruence between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*. Though, with strategy, a purposeful change in the structure is deemed and intended, the generative mechanisms irrespective of discourse and strategy might produce unintended consequences at the end. But, if considered within a process, continuity and change can be detected with their reasons. In other words, by examination of different periods which have their own prominent discourse, though altered in time, differences in continuity might also be the case. Then, it becomes possible to argue that, irrespective of change in discourses and strategy, the structure may not allow a change in the general track of foreign policy. But these arguments should be based on scientific and systematic study of the respective periods. For the sake of analytical coherence, in this part, the discussion of causation is deemed to provide the basics in how to understand the dynamics of sources of incongruence.

Clarifying causation in critical realism is considered to help the understanding of how causal mechanisms have the potential to bring about observed outcomes. Before delving into the critical realist understanding of causation, it should be noted that “ontological and epistemological commitments generally influence, if not

determine, scholar's approach to cause."<sup>114</sup> Adopting a critical realist philosophy in analyzing strategy, taking ontology forefront of epistemology, then shifting the understanding of causation compatible to the adopted philosophy of science is inevitable. Because the understanding of cause within both positivist and post-modernist thought is not compatible, due to their adoption of *flat ontology*.<sup>115</sup>

Positivists follow an understanding of causation derived from Hume, who explained causation with "constant conjunctions of events."<sup>116</sup> Hume's understanding refers the causal conjunction between two variables, in which effect is produced from a cause. Or put it differently, if A occurs then B occurs. This parsimonious version of causation is aimed to develop covering law model through constructing regularities. But, this understanding is widely criticized as it is based on mechanical understanding. In fact, International Relations theory and social sciences borrowed it from natural sciences. However, the regularities as in natural sciences are hardly found in social sciences. The primary reason that hampers regularities in social sciences is that the unit of analysis in social sciences is not *things* but the *social*, which carries on open system features and dynamics, compared to natural sciences.<sup>117</sup> Another point is the motivation to predict the occurrences in advance. But, events in social systems, even though some general causes might be detected, might not follow a general pattern, or occur with sameness, due to its actualization rely, not only, on the observed variables, but also, on the underlying mechanisms that allow their realization. Then reaching law like regularities in social systems seems an empty endeavor.

But for critical realism what is important is to get the knowledge of generative mechanisms that enable the observation of events. As noted by Kurki,

For realists what is important is in tracking causal connections is not identification of law-like regularities of empirical observables but, rather,

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<sup>114</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2.

<sup>115</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 167.

<sup>116</sup> Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*, 3; David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature* (New York: Dover Publications, 2003), 3.

<sup>117</sup> Patomaki and Wight, "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism", 228-229.

the description of the real properties, structures and generative mechanisms that underlie the actualization of events and their empirical observation.<sup>118</sup>

Causation also depends on the ontological distinction between causes and events as the empirical facets of causes.<sup>119</sup> For critical realism, this distinction provides the ground to escape from Humean problem of studying only observables.<sup>120</sup> It allows taking into account *unobservables* that have real causal powers to bring about events at the level of *empirical*.

Another question that should be put forward is “why constant conjunctions do not work in the realm of social” and “what the importance of causal mechanism logic is so important for the study of strategies.” Regarding the first question what marks the basic difference between natural and social sciences is the agency involved in social world.<sup>121</sup> In other words, social sciences try to get knowledge of agents and their social context.<sup>122</sup> Agency, operating in social context, with its perception and subjective mind has the capability to interpret the environment and develop suitable actions to increase its stakes from it. Though existence of other agents and their respective resources at their disposal do not allow them to reach pre-deemed results and outcomes, nevertheless, their subjectivity provide them to tackle with other agents. In that sense, the composition of agents in different contexts determine the correlation of possible actions as X and Y and their scope in terms of realization, in which situation agents, on the one hand, perceive the context and goals of other agents, at the same time, they, as being shaped by this context, gains the ability to change the structure.<sup>123</sup> Structures, too, have their own causal powers to alter the actions of agents operating in contexts. Structures pre-exist agents and this pre-existent conditions for agents are capable of making difference on the intentional

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<sup>118</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 166.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 170.

<sup>121</sup> Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*, 4.

<sup>122</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 168.

<sup>123</sup> Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*, 4-5.

actions of agents.<sup>124</sup> Then, merely taking into account or, making analysis through *observables* does not exhaust causal powers of mechanisms, since they constitute the features of an open system. Identifying mechanisms and processes that have the potential to transform behavior and discourse, the two can be seen as actions that determine the outcomes, should be explained in order to gain thorough understanding of the inconsistencies emerging from their interaction.<sup>125</sup> Then the question is “what mediates *what is spoken* and *what is actualized*.” Mediation arises from emergence, which is a result of interaction among agents and with structures, which interactions and structures carry on the power as both enablers and constraints.

From the perspective of *transitive* and *intransitive* distinction of critical realism, *intransitive* domains of knowledge resist our thought and intentional actions of agents. Then, *what emerged* is the result of interaction between *transitive* domain and *intransitive* domain of knowledge. Critical realist understanding of causation seeks the linkages within ontologically deeper levels in order to explain the emergence.<sup>126</sup> As underlined by Patomaki, critical realism seeks “all encompassing but non-regularity-deterministic conception of causation.”<sup>127</sup> And this requires the elimination of reductionism in causation, both adopted by rationalists and relativists due to their epistemological positions that take flat ontology in their analysis.<sup>128</sup>

Regarding the second question, the importance of studying causal mechanism for the concept of strategy emerges from the inconsistency between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*. Since strategy is agential, and discourse of strategy is the representation of that intentional move forward, the actualization or realization of the goals (*ends*) depend not only on the existence of available *means*, but also, on the causal powers that are possessed by structures.

For the sake of clarification, following Kurki, based on Aristotelian causation, will provide comprehensive understanding of causation parallel with critical realist

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<sup>124</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 176.

<sup>125</sup> Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*, 6-11.

<sup>126</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 179.

<sup>127</sup> Heikki Patomaki, “How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no.1 (1996): 105-133.

<sup>128</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 194-196.

understanding. Agent-structure debate as discussed above should also be handled within the perspective of causation. For Bhaskar structures have a number of features that; they do not exist independent from the activities they govern, do not exist independently of agents' conceptions of what they are, and they are relatively enduring.<sup>129</sup> Agents, on the other hand, "are not independent but deeply related with structures through their social context."<sup>130</sup> Bhaskar's point that structures depend on the agential conceptualization make structures also subjective understanding, even though ontologically they are objective. One of the sources of inconsistency arises from this subjective conceptualization, since they depend on somehow agential abstraction on the way of acquiring the knowledge of structures.

Kurki, following Aristoteles, divides cause firstly into two categories which are constitutive or *intrinsic causes* and active or *extrinsic causes*. While the former refers to "which is within thing is being caused", the latter refers to "which is not within the being, but which lends an influence or activity to the producing of something." *Intrinsic causes* also have two sub categories which are, *material causes* and *formal causes*. Material causes have ontological primacy since nothing in the world can exist without materiality." But this materiality should not be reduced only to *things*. Though *ideas* are not things, they have material existence.<sup>131</sup> In short, ideas refer to conceptualizations out of which something gains its being. *Formal causes* refer to something which shapes or defines the matter. In that sense, it is related with existing effects through which something is designed. It is summarized with 'according to' phrase which constitutes the underlying features of agents' actions. In terms of *extrinsic causes*, it also has two subcategories which are; *efficient causes* and *final causes*. *Efficient cause* refers to primary movers, triggers, or sources of change. In that sense, rather than guiding things, they simply actualize things through activating interactions of form and matter. Hence, *efficient cause* is inconceivable without relationship and interaction with other causes, since it is actualized through the running of *material, formal* and, *final* causes. It shortly refers to 'by which' the

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<sup>129</sup> Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science*, 124-125

<sup>130</sup> Kurki, *Causation in International Relations*, 211.

<sup>131</sup> Joseph, "Philosophy in International Relations", 354.

final cause can be fulfilled by using the *material* and *formal* cause. The *final cause* refers to the *ends* and purposes – ‘for the sake of’. It is closely associated with *efficient* cause. But it should be underlined that those causes do not work in isolation, but interactively. That’s why critical realist understanding of this categorization is in line with stratified nature of reality. Finally, in this categorization of causes, while agents possess the efficient and final causes, the structure carries on material and formal causes.

In summary, in formulating strategy, strategy emerges from a dialectical interaction of *means* and *ends*, in which agents formulate actions – ‘by which’ (efficient cause upon the choice of material cause are built) – by employing the resources at disposal – *means* – to achieve *ends* (formal cause) in accordance with the conception of structure and its formal cause.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **1919-1923: “Independence or Death!”**

#### **3.1. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT**

The years between 1919-1923, was the period that the legacies of imperial past were solved through both by use of force and diplomacy. Whatever the ‘means’ was used, the ‘end’ was to transform a dying empire into a young republic, with all ramifications of the past carried out into the future. In that sense, it can be argued that Turkish Foreign Policy strategy is based on revisionism, but based on realism as well.

Within this transition context the friction between the past and the desired future has constantly been felt, to the extent that this friction is labeled as a ‘structural factor’. But, the causal powers that led to this friction have changed over time and showed fluctuations through different periods. Which factors either constrained or accelerated the effects of that structural factor are determined by differing factors along with the character of the respective period. But, to portray the context of 1919-1923, the international state of affairs and its determining features should be abstracted both from the perspective of objectivity – general picture of international relations consisting of politics, economy and geography of the time consisting political and economic aspects – and subjectivity – a reading of that picture through the eyes of passing away empire and yet born republic.

Legacies of the imperial past can be categorized into two main factors which are; ambitions of rivals consisting the Western and Russian expansionism, and internal dysfunction of the state that ends in inability to produce counter actions to rivals’ ambitions. The adversaries, at the time, consist of great powers as France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungarian Empire and their ambitions to maximize their portions while being careful not to upset the European balance of

power.<sup>1</sup> Due to the intertwined nature of these factors the Ottoman State while, on the one hand, faced inability to cope with them in a proper way to provide a solution that could save its survival, on the other hand, tried to use them to play for time by employing the balance of power politics. The situation can be characterized as a walk on the edge of a cliff with two deep valleys on both sides. The inability of the Ottoman state to cope with or deter the ambitions of the adversaries, which are more powerful comparatively, pushed Ottomans to face hard choices embedded with considerable high trade-offs. Regarding these intermingling factors, the inability to cope with adversaries was the result of internal dysfunction of the state, which shortly demonstrated that the domestic administration was outdated. The primary objective at the time was reorganizing the state apparatus in order to reach the level of modern adversaries. But, the adversaries' stakes on the Ottoman State and their awareness of the situation that a breakthrough in a positive direction could lead to losing leverage to impose the outcomes. Hence, they preferred to intervene in reorganization efforts in order to block the positive outcomes. The Ottoman governors were aware of the inability to cope with them stemming from internal dysfunction. The only solution left at hand was to use the conflicting stakes of adversaries by balance of power politics to gain time.<sup>2</sup>

Late Ottoman years, particularly the 19<sup>th</sup> century, at the international level witnessed prominent events. Developments such as; the 1789 French Revolution and the subsequent rise of nationalism; 1815 the Congress of Vienna and establishment of a balance in Europe, but the rise of 'Eastern Question'; the rise of capitalist imperialism and colonialism as an outcome of geographical discoveries and change in trade routes; and industrialization in Europe and its effects on introduction of new weaponry into wars had played decisive role on the Ottoman State.

The changing nature of the structure of international political system, international economy and geography produced considerable effects on the Ottoman Empire. Economically, while the Ottoman Empire that was regarded as truly,

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<sup>1</sup> Marian Kent, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Frank Cass, 1996), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2015), 18-28.



following Fernand Braudel, ‘world economy’ in itself, meaning that lands of the empire “were not only political unit but, in part due to *paxottomana*, formed an area in which inter-regional trade was facilitated by relative security”<sup>3</sup>, had begun to lose its prominent position beginning from the late 16<sup>th</sup> century. Within the intermingling effects of these changing structural forces the Ottoman State, falling behind of these developments, found itself in a position that the great powers of Europe have aspirations on, but at the same time, the fear of a sudden dissolution of the empire might dramatically alter the balance of power by creating a power vacuum that would be filled to the advantage of the pioneer of that dissolution. This fear, while providing a context that can be utilized to gain time to foster the renewal of the state, also hampered the process since the Great Powers would not allow the realization of reorganization. In fact, the whole process can be summarized with three concepts, which are; the *structural weakness*, *the rise of nationalism* and, *gradual retreat* in Europe.

The mentioned factors in fact are ensembles of the developments at the ontological level of *real* that was reflected at the level of *actual*. All of them are outcomes changing the nature of developments at the level of *real*, creating considerable but not ignorable factors that shaped the developments of strategies of the Ottoman Empire. Looking at the nature of these factors has the potential to widen the understanding of the nature of strategy formulated in respective period.

*Structural weakness*, has both sociological roots that have seeds in 1683 Battle of Vienna from the date, as Ranke pointed out “the Ottomans ceased to be feared, and began themselves to fear”<sup>4</sup> and systemic roots encompassing international, economic, financial, political, scientific, cultural, social and, military aspects. Sociological roots are derivative of weaknesses stemming from systemic roots in which, The Ottomans fall behind developments that took place in Europe almost in all the cited spheres. Systemic factors also should be seen from the perspective that the Ottoman State from the outset was an anti-systemic empire that challenged Europe until the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. From that time, Ottoman Foreign

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<sup>3</sup> Surayya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 14-15.

<sup>4</sup> Leopold Von Ranke, *The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires* (London: Whittaker, 1975), 1.

Policy had been driven by mainly survival concerns, losing its expansionist vigor.<sup>5</sup> Expansionism was blocked in the East through Portuguese naval supremacy and eventual stabilization of borders with Iran in 1639. Then, in the West, it was blocked with the Battle of Vienna which led the Ottomans to realize that the empire reached its natural borders. Considered with the structural factors of geography, expansionism turned out to be a constraining factor of Ottomans that has founded its *raison d'état* on the notion of *Ghaza* –expansionism to disseminate Islam on the world. This outreach with deficiency in military prowess was in contradiction with the anti-systemic nature of the power of the Ottoman Empire. The inability to adapt to the new technologies in warfare capability had undermined expansionist ambition on which the Ottoman rise was founded.<sup>6</sup> Paul Kennedy's thesis that imperial stretch brings about the need for military prowess, but the need for military when becomes unsustainable then undermines the empire explains also the case for the Ottoman State.<sup>7</sup> The subsequent developments leading to the decline of the empire in comparison with European Powers from the West and Russia from the North caused gradual acceleration of their advances. The fear of Russian expansionism appeared decisively with the 1774 Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*, by which Russia gained access to the Black Sea and took protectorate of Orthodox Population residing in the empire. For Ottomans, ambitions of Austria-Hungary were coincided with Russian ambitions of controlling Balkans and reaching warm seas, rising as a balancing factor to slow down Russian expansion. The Russian threat to the Straits was regarded as a

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<sup>5</sup> Jakub J.Grygiel, *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 95.

<sup>6</sup> Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and A Greater Middle East* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 36.

<sup>7</sup> There are two contending explanations on imperial decline; one has focusing on *Profit Squeeze – Leading Sector Decline*, and the other on *National Spending – Imperial Overstretch*. Regarding Imperial Overstretch see, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); Robert Gilpin, *Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); and on the Profit Squeeze see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and W.R. Thompson, "Long Waves, Technological Innovation, and Relative Decline," *International Organization* 44 (1990): 201-233. In terms of its relation with geography see, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995); Karen Barkey, "Changing Modalities of Empire: A Comparative Study of Ottoman and Habsburg Decline," in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World*, ed., Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayalı and Eric Van Young, (Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 167-197.

challenge to Britain. Though diverging interests were a factor to be exploited, it nevertheless, constituted a way out from that imbroglio for the Ottomans.

But, it should also be noted that *structural weakness* in military terms does not constitute the only factor, on the contrary, the rise of nationalism in Europe after the French Revolution arose another factor that affected both of the Austria-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, which can be seen as anti-systemic actors due to their imperial structures. The rise of nationalism brought about the forces of dismantling the imperial structures into nation-states. The unifications of Italy and Germany in 1870 were in essence anti-systemic in nature though they were the result of nationalism, posing a direct threat to the European balance of power. The balance of power in Europe was set up in 1815 Congress of Vienna, and refined in 1856 Congress of Paris, and 1878 Congress of Berlin. All of them have direct effects on the Ottomans. In Vienna, Ottoman State and societies living in possessed territories were conceived as ‘Eastern Question,’<sup>8</sup> in Paris with the fear of Russia upsetting the balance of power, Ottomans received as an equal member of European Concert; and in Berlin, both to block Germany and Russia, with diminished hopes on Ottoman state to block Russian expansion, Britain agreed on gradual dissolution of the empire. Furthermore, rising Germany and waning France caused Britain to search for the new alignments to balance Bismarck Germany. Moscow perceived as a balancer that was capable to play such a role. The rapprochement between London and Moscow was pointing out a considerable change in Britain’s Foreign Policy towards Ottoman State in which Palmerstone’s doctrine<sup>9</sup> of preservation of Ottoman territorial integrity was replaced by Gladstone’s dismantlement. With the Berlin settlement, Ottoman existence in the Balkans ended and Ottoman State downgraded to a Middle Eastern country.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966); J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study of European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940); Paul C.Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: the Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974).

<sup>9</sup> Palmerstone doctrine was based on the belief that Ottomans should reform themselves but to the extent not posing a threat to Britain’s interests. See. Kemal Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012), 106-107.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

In fact, Britain's withdrawal of support to the Ottomans can be seen as the realization of efforts to keep Ottomans alive – sick men of Europe – to block Russian expansion can be counter-productive for Britain interests. The flow of history for the Ottomans, the outset of empire, became more faster from 1878 onwards. 1878 marked the process of decline transformed into a process of dissolution.<sup>11</sup> For the European Great Powers, from the Berlin settlement and onwards, the 'Eastern Question' gained priority in their agenda with a consideration of not upsetting the European balance of power.<sup>12</sup>

The rise of nationalism, on the other hand, coupled with *structural weakness*, has brought about effects within the empire among non-Muslim population. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century with *structural weakness* of the state, both in terms of administration to rebuild the state-society relations to ensure loyalty and military weakness to suppress revolts with force ended in gradual dissolution of the empire and loss of control on the population. In fact, basically, the Ottoman administrative system has been getting out of date and the State could not have managed to renovate itself to provide societies with a bright future. The *millet* system,<sup>13</sup> developed to manage heterogeneity of the population was based on religious differences, but with the penetration of nationalism it returned to be outdated. Combined with capitulations, particularly among non-Muslim populations who gained dual citizenship and eventually managed to stay out of imperial jurisdiction, in time eroded state-society relations and empire's authority over society. In fact, the millet system that was getting out of date with the rise of nationalism, and capitulations that gave rise to a capitalist class out of state authority “were most consequential in undermining the authority of the Ottoman state and hastening its end.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Memalik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), 29.

<sup>12</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 22.

<sup>13</sup> İlber Ortaylı, “The Ottoman *Millet* System and Its Social Dimensions”, in *Ottoman Studies*, İlber Ortaylı, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 15-22.

<sup>14</sup> Faroz Ahmad, “Late Ottoman Empire”, in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, 22.

Economically, the situation also worsened ending in a bankrupt in 1881<sup>15</sup> and creating leverage in the hands of Great Powers to impose policies in line with their interests, particularly through capitulations. In a way, Ottomans could not have managed to renovate itself economically to counter the forces of imperial capitalism. In the economic sense, the Ottoman state remained anti-systemic in nature.

Geographically, within the interrelated developments of politics and economy, and their actual outcomes as *structural weakness* and nationalism, the empire experienced gradual *territorial retreat*. Territorial losses as the results of nationalism and *structural weakness* also changed the perception of space. Nationalism, too, faced a considerable change with territorial retreat, in which process, the meaning attributed to nationalism in society and state evolved from one that is to be controlled, into a factor that is to be endowed with in order to enhance the consciousness of society. This issue will further be discussed in the section of agency, but it should be noted that there is a transformation of perception and conception of nationalism within the context of *structural weakness* and territorial retreat.

Even though, several reform processes<sup>16</sup> were put in effort, none of them brought about the desired outcome. In fact, all reforms in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were aimed to regain strength but, were being carried out within the notion of “defensive modernization”<sup>17</sup> or “defensive developmentalism.”<sup>18</sup> Defensive modernization was thought to reform internal dysfunction to renovate mighty military, economic structure to supply military and, state-society relations to prevent further dismemberment of the empire. Reform processes with these considerations aimed to challenge structural factors. But, given that once nationalist break-ups in place,

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<sup>15</sup> In terms of economic decline, foreign debt and consequential bankrupt see Emine Kıray, *Osmanlı'da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar* (İstanbul, İletişimYayınları, 1993).

<sup>16</sup> Regarding the reform processes in Ottoman State see, Erik Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 9-133; Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 197-297.

<sup>17</sup> Jung and Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads*, 39; Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 26.

<sup>18</sup> James L.Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 73-87.

changing the clock back was not that easy. Hence, all reforms intermingled with foreign plotting caused the ill-born of the reforms and could not have managed the revival of the Ottoman State. Furthermore, particularly, 1856 *Islahat Fermanı*, a reform process initiated with end of Paris Conference brought about the rise of capitalist Christian class. Hence, reform processes initiated a split in state-society relations.<sup>19</sup> In time and “gradually, military and political power and economic strength were polarized between two distinct sectors of the Ottoman society: the predominantly Muslim military/bureaucratic elite and the emerging Christian bourgeoisie.<sup>20</sup> But, among the elites that support modernization movements, a loss of hope was observed in overcoming *structural weakness* in all segments of the state. Fuad Pasha’s statement that “we can avoid destruction only if we have as much money as England, as much enlightened knowledge as France, and as many soldiers as Russia”<sup>21</sup> proves the hopeless attempts to renovate.

But, the Ottoman State and her intellectuals particularly known as Community of Union and Progress – CUP (*İttihatve Terakki Cemiyeti*) emerged within the context of *structural weakness* and nationalism. The balance of power politics that helped the survival through the long 19<sup>th</sup> century became difficult to exploit, since the Europe was also divided into two camps; France, Russia, and later Britain on the one side, and Germany and Austria on the other.<sup>22</sup> In such a polarization, with the leadership of CUP, and rejection of Britain and France to carry the burden in the upcoming war, alliance with Germany and Austria remained the only option. Though, different authors elaborate on the entrance into the First World War on the same side with Germany from different perspectives, CUP had abolished one of the basic rules of Ottoman diplomacy that “the empire should not join a war between the European Powers unless its own territories were directly involved.”<sup>23</sup> Allying with Germany was also an understanding of the “best defense is a good

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<sup>19</sup> Karpaz, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 35.

<sup>20</sup> Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 39.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted in Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 31.

<sup>22</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 24.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 27; Sönmezoğlu, *İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası*, 43-52.

offense.”<sup>24</sup> But, the outcome of the World War was a defeat and the subsequent imposition of Treaty of Sevres, in August 1920, that amputated remained soils of the Empire and economic and political sanctions that would downgrade the survival to only existence.<sup>25</sup> In fact, with the Treaty of Sevres, the West believed in that the Eastern Question was solved.<sup>26</sup>

### 3.2. AGENCY AND STRATEGY:

Imperial legacies and structure have direct bearing upon the formulation of strategy on the way of founding a new republic. In fact, structural three factors, *structural weakness*, *nationalism* and *territorial retreat* had shaped the foreign policy strategy and its formulation between 1919 and 1923. The effects of these factors at the empirical level observed with balance of power politics. Particularly while *structural weakness* and nationalism can be seen as a cause, geography was used as a remedy to overcome them. For the sake of clarity, geography, though not conceived from geopolitical perspective, is used within the mindset of geopolitics. In terms of results, *structural weakness*, though ontologically can be seen from the perspective of *actual*, its emergent result was to use of the balance of power politics as a tool in foreign policy to ensure survival which was implemented through utilizing geography as a *means* in strategy. The latter factor, the rise of nationalism, found its effects on shaking the basis of political structure where nation-states outdated empires. The remedy to overcome all of these factors was to put into place reform processes to overcome *structural weakness* and rebuild the loyalty of heterogeneous society. It was deemed in this way that the *territorial retreat* would be stalled.

The *structural weakness* as an outcome of international political and economic structure, but a *real* one, was recognized after the Battle of Vienna in 1683. But, the growing effects of it, as observed during the Wars in 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, evolved gradually to a degree to pose detrimental inputs in preserving the

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<sup>24</sup> Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 15.

<sup>25</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 1: 118-138

<sup>26</sup> Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study of International Relations*; Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: the Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*.

empire. From agential perspective, since structure both consists of constraining and enabling forces in itself, the options were hindered by it, and at the same time, given the nature of international politics of the time, it enabled to pursue the balance of power policies. In other words, from strategy formulation perspective, *structural weakness* limited the nature of *means* at disposal to employ and utilize, leaving the balance of power politics as the only option and as a remedy to be employed to compensate for the shortage of *means*. However, balancing which is based on utilizing *means* that was not owned but gained from the contextual dynamics, particularly thanks to the meaning attained on geography by external powers, inherently had the potential to create new vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities limit strategy and borrowing *means* might end up disastrous, once the structure disappears or the lender withdraws as the stakes of it disappears with contextual change. The latter one was observed in Britain's doctrinal change towards the Ottoman State, from supporting territorial integrity to dismantlement – Palmerstone and Gladstone. To put it more bluntly, *structural weakness* ended in loss of *means*. In this change of policy, the fate of straits became more clarified in the eyes of British and trade off on straits became acceptable since the nature of imminent threat coming from Germany was felt more seriously.

The rise of nationalism, as the other structural factor, emanated from the changing international political system, threatened the nature of empire to the extent that, once heterogeneity was strength, it turned out to be a major factor that shook state-society relations of the empire. Apart from religious differences, being an empire constituted to be anti-systemic in nature when nationalism and nationalist feelings to acquire independence disseminated in time. In other words, highlighting nationalism as the core structural factor is the result of interaction with Europe and coupled with structural weakness, it transformed anti-systemic character of the Ottoman Empire from religion-oriented to political structure-oriented one. This conflicting nature of nationalism with imperial political structures brought about the need to reform. But, before discussing the effects of reform in that process, the effects of nationalism in strategy formulation should be laid down.

From the perspective of strategy formulation, nationalism brought about the confusion in and loss of *ends*. How this happened can be discussed through taking



into account the nature of political structure of empires. Logically, empires desire to surmount the challenges to their survivals by renovating themselves. However, empires which are founded upon heterogeneity cannot resolve their internal tensions with becoming nation-states which are founded upon homogeneity. The outcome of this tension can be observed in the loss of *ends*, since empires tend to preserve their existence, and adaptation to homogeneity means to give up imperial status by self-esteem. In such a situation, consciousness disappears, which is not a point to be criticized. Consciousness, as a major factor in determining *ends*, which is also constrained by structure both internally and externally, needs to be reacquired to prevent confusion in *ends*. In such a situation, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the only option left was to reform for the sake of bringing the good old days back.

Reform attempts were designed and initiated to overcome vulnerabilities emanating from the structure. To overcome structural weakness, reform attempts at the beginning focused primarily on the military sector, but later, as the reforms could not have restored military power to keep the empire united, it turned out to be focusing on, particularly within 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, to restore the loyalty of citizens that began to split with the feelings of nationalism. However, reforms could not have managed to return the pace of developments. Furthermore, coupled with structural weakness, they created the circumstances that allow great powers to finger in. Capitulations accelerated the process and unintentionally served foreign powers rather than imperial institutions.

The paradoxical, interactive, and reproductive developments of three structural factors that constrain the formulation of agential *ends*, together with the loss of consciousness, accelerated the process of dismantlement. In such a situation, different intellectual views emerged with the hope to stop the loss. These were *Ottomanism*, *Islamism*, and *Turkism*. One of the late Ottoman intellectuals, Yusuf Akçura evaluated them in an article published in Egypt, as three ways of policy.<sup>27</sup> Akçura's article rather than being a beforehand attempt to lay down possible futures, it was an evaluation of the situation and was providing possible solutions for the upcoming dismantlement. Nevertheless, the article lays down advantages and

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<sup>27</sup> Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976); M.Hakan Yavuz, "Nationalism and Islam: Yusuf Akçura and Üç Tarz-I Siyaset," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 4, no.2 (1993).

disadvantages of intellectual solutions without reaching a decisive opt for a choice. In fact, these intellectual solutions were observed within historical developments taking place in the respective times. *Ottomanism* emerged as a response and mostly as a hope to build a kind of nationalism to rebuild the loyalty of diverse religious and ethnic population of the empire. But, it could not have produced the desired renovation. With the growing split of non-Muslim population particularly in the Balkans, *Islamism* gained significance and carried imprint on Abdulhamit's policies, particularly aimed to ensure Arab populations' loyalty. *Turkism* or pan-Turanism emerged as a result of a reaction to both losses in Balkans and in the Arab continent. The intellectual efforts of Young Turks accelerated the pace of acquiescence among the remaining population. In fact, all intellectual movements were a reaction to developments that took place rather than being pre-emptive attempts to restore state-society relations. They were attempts to raise the consciousness of agency of the empire, but, they were reactionary and could not have restored the agency. Consequently, within dialectics of structural weakness, nationalism, and, territorial retreat reform processes and intellectual movements were far from renovating or overcoming structural shortfalls and forces inherent in it. What has emerged in such a situation was the inability to form a productive strategy since puzzlement in *ends* was coupled with dispersion and erosion of *means*.

From the perspective of agency, the circumstances can be portrayed as encompassing dynamics discussed so far. Then the question arises as: "how have these intermingled dynamics been resolved to produce an agential strategy to survive?" Providing an explanation to this question will provide the outlook to the question of formulation of a survival strategy. Ottomans' entry into the First World War, though a wide literature exists, should be read from the perspective that while, it was decision to trigger final dissolution of the empire, and it was also a decision, though ironically, that triggered a way-out strategy. The statements of Kemal Karpat support this claim, but the "how" aspect of this claim will be discussed in the proceeding part.

Even though the First World War ended with the absolute defeat and dissolution of Ottoman Empire, ironically this situation saved Turks from the burdens of sustaining out of date imperial order and paved the way for

hopes of real modernization, independence and citizenship. ... Hence, defeat in the First World War was a disguised victory.<sup>28</sup>

Regarding the “how” question, the developments that took place in the First World War should be taken into account, particularly, the war in Gallipoli in 1915. Ottomans during the First World War fought in different fronts and all of them had affected the ongoing evolution of the events, but among them, the war in Gallipoli stands out and deserves to be treated as unique, apart from being one of the few victories in the war, in terms of its consequential developments. It is widely discussed that the *entente* powers initiated the attack in Dardanelles Strait, to ensure early surrender of the Ottoman State by capturing the capital Istanbul, and to open the sea ways to supply Russia fighting with Germany at the Eastern Europe Front. But, the unexpected resistance of Ottomans, not only prolonged the war more than two years, but it also blocked the supply to Russia through straits and the Black Sea<sup>29</sup>. One of the eventual outcomes was the outbreak of Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 in Russia<sup>30</sup> and Russia’s early leave from the war with Brest-Litovsk Treaty signed in March 1918. The prominent effects of Bolshevik Revolution would be seen in the War of Independence. As it will be discussed in proceeding parts of this chapter, the primary effect was related with the other structural factor – *structural weakness* – or from the perspective of components of strategy it had paramount effect on allocating *means*.

Within such a context, upon the clause existing in the Mudros Armistice, that reads “the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the allies,”<sup>31</sup> Britain, France and Italy began to occupy designated parts of Anatolia which were agreed before the signature of Treaty of Sevres. Among the Turkish society, there were signals of resistance from

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<sup>28</sup> Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 153.

<sup>29</sup> Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*, (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 8-9.

<sup>30</sup> Even though it is not possible to argue that direct and determinate correlation between the Bolshevik Revolution the Gallipoli War, it is accepted, among scholars and in literature, that the Gallipoli War and prolongation of the First World War have indirectly produced the outcome or, at least, shortened the period of revolution. On this issue see Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 1 52.

<sup>31</sup> Full text of the armistice can be found in Gwynne Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918: A lost Opportunity: The Armistice Negotiations of Mudros,” *Middle Eastern Studies*8 (1972): 340-1.

the beginning of armistice, but they turned out to be armed resistance with the Greek Occupation of İzmir on 15<sup>th</sup> May 1919. Before the Greek occupation with the hopes envisaged on Wilson Principles and the 12<sup>th</sup> article of that declaration, both the Capital and the society refrained from turning resistance into an armed conflict.<sup>32</sup> But, some associative engagements began to appear under the banner of ‘Defense of Rights’ (*Müdafaa-I Hukuk*) in different parts of remaining Ottoman territories. But as Churchill also recognized, the Greek occupation was “an unfortunate step that triggered national resistance.”<sup>33</sup> From mid-1919, the locally sparkling but uncoordinated resistive movements converted into an organized movement with the efforts of Mustafa Kemal through a series of congresses.

Nationalism, while before the partition of the Ottoman Empire was one of the structural factors that accelerated the decline of the empire, after a point, it paradoxically, turned out to be the driving force of resistance. At this point, a dialectical interplay within a process between *territorialization of nation* and *nationalization of territory* took place.<sup>34</sup> In fact, Turkey experienced both of these processes. With the de-territorialization in the Ottoman Europe, a considerable number of migrations took place from Europe to Anatolia, with growing national sentiments and mass migration towards Anatolia brought about the nationalization of territory. Within these demographic exchanges, Anatolia homogenized leading to feed up national sentiments. As noted by Durgun, the concept of *vatan – national territories*, has matured within the process of transition from empire to nation-state. In fact, *vatan* is the concept that emerged within the process of imperial dissolutions that was ended in the First World War.<sup>35</sup> In this respect, it is argued that the transition from empire to nation-state should not be conceived as a linear process but, one in which both polity – empire and nation state – existed and transformed each other dialectically.<sup>36</sup> In this process, space and meaning attained to that space by

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<sup>32</sup> Bülent Gökay, *Emperyalizm ile Bolşevizm Arasında Türkiye* (İstanbul, Agora Kitaplığı, 2006), 57

<sup>33</sup> Quoted in Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Sezgi Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane'den Vatan'a* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 47.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

society evolved in, with the effects of “patrimonial crises”<sup>37</sup>, to a one that understanding of soils that belongs to Sultan, into the soils owned by society. And being a nation that evolved into a cause that worth dying is appreciated and welcomed.<sup>38</sup> This transformation is basically the outcome of structural changes. For Turkey, the *ghaza* ideology, which was inherently imperialist and expansionist, left its place to an ideology of *defense of vatan*, which was inherently *revisionist* at the beginning, but as will be discussed in the upcoming chapters turned out to be *status quoist* once independence was acquired.<sup>39</sup>

Observed transformation in the meaning attained to space, was the emergent result of the process of dialectical relationship between *territorial retreat* and *nationalism*. Territorial retreat triggered with growing nationalism, particularly the loss of European portions of imperial borders, paradoxically brought about the transformation of Turkic national consciousness into a political movement.<sup>40</sup>

Within such a context, Mustafa Kemal, who gained fame within the War of Gallipoli, began to obtain social support from the after his appointment to Samsun. Attracting the required support from society and reaffirming the motivation, and the will to resist dismantlement, Mustafa Kemal conducted a series of congresses within Anatolia to reach a determined objective. Interaction with society paralleled the efforts of congresses in order to ensure reliable, continuing and firm support from society. It was, in other words, a process of explaining his policies and strategy and taking approval for them through public discussion. In fact, from the perspective of strategy, these efforts can be considered within the context of formulation of *end*.

Mustafa Kemal’s formulation of strategy basically depended upon; first, portrayal of the situation and definition of structural factors, then secondly, formulation of way-out strategy, thirdly the approval of society, and finally conduct of strategy. But, it should also be underlined that strategy is generally based upon

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<sup>37</sup> Çağlar Keyder, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Gerileyişi ve Çöküşü”, in *Memalik-i Osmaniye’den Avrupa Birliği’ne*, ed. Çağlar Keyder (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), 23.

<sup>38</sup> Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane’den Vatan’a*, 86.

<sup>39</sup> For the discussion on the transformation of *Ghaza* ideology into defense of *Vatan* ideology see *Ibid.*, 75-114.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

both realities and a number of assumptions. Incorporating assumptions inherently carry the risk of destroying the analysis as the assumptions might get altered through the *unobservables*, existing but not taken into account. Consequently, distorted factors, in time, might lead to hamper the realization of strategy. In other words, strategic analysis and calculations, if not realized, have the potential to produce *unintended consequences*, since risks might empower the developments at the point of bifurcation, producing either a positive outcome, or worsening the situation dramatically.

In terms of portrayal of the situation, Mustafa Kemal was aware of structural forces; structural weakness of the state, growing nationalist sentiments that made sustaining imperial structure impossible, and the geographical value of Anatolia on where stakes of great powers were not resolved completely yet. But, for him, what was important was to transform these weaknesses to power bases to produce a way-out or survival strategy. In other words, what structure produced as loss of *ends* and loss of *means* had to be overcome, otherwise the survival of a nation would have been an empty endeavor. Structural forces constrained strategic options quite extensively. In such a situation, portraying the circumstances carried more importance than before in history.

Structure, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, both enables and constrains agential actions. Awareness of the structural forces, in strategy formulation, facilitates defining available options. In that sense, structures as concept, activity and spatio-temporal dependent bear causal effects on agents. Enduring structural forces, as discussed, were *structural weakness*, *nationalism* and *geography*. For agents, portrayal of the structural forces through reflexivity has the potential to allow formulating a way out strategy. Activity dependency meant agents' activity should be in line with the existing structural forces. And their conceptualization, through abstraction, permits complete portrayal of the situation in which strategy will operate. And finally, spatio-temporal dependency dictated that this conceptualization should carry out the special circumstances of the respective time and space. In a sense, conceptualizations should be time and space sensitive, and should reflect the realities of its specific circumstances. Otherwise, strategy cannot embark upon with structure to produce desired outcomes.

From this perspective, Mustafa Kemal was aware of the fact that the occupation of İzmir triggered the emergence of strong national sentiments.<sup>41</sup> From strategy perspective, society was not only getting aware of its weaknesses in determining *end*, but also growing will to be downgraded to only *existence*, rather than *living* as a sovereign state, with the eventual signing of Sevres Treaty.<sup>42</sup> The will of society to resist the conditions of survival laid down by great powers were getting stronger, and this was a sign of society which wants to determine its own *end*. But, how to surpass the *structural weakness*, which led to loss of *means*, in the struggle to resist remained unanswered at the time. The historical solution to it was use of balance of power politics, but whether it would allow allocating *means* in line with the *end* was of question.

Depending on that portrayal, strategy formulation, as *dispositional*, *situational* and *positional* process, was reflected the subjective conceptualization of the time. Situation imposed that the sustaining imperial structure became impossible, and dismantlement became inevitable. Dispositionally, there were very limited power resources to employ in *means*. But, given coherence within Allied Forces was diminishing due to disagreements on gains, the use of balance of power politics emerged as tool that can be utilized in overcoming shortage of *means*, thanks to geography as a structural factor that eases the use of balancing. In terms of positioned practice, positional element of strategy should be formulated in line with the factors emerging from dialectics of agent and structure. No strategy can ensure success that is disengaged from the structure.

In terms of dispositional element of strategy, Bolshevik Revolution which took place in Russia in 1917 was recognized as one of the factors that would ease the allocation of *means*. The Bolshevik revolution can be seen as an event that brought about two major effects in strategy formulation. One of them was related with the perception of the situation that provided to see what had been cloaked. The second one was related with the management of it. Regarding the first one, Russia's move to

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<sup>41</sup> Matthew Smith Anderson, *Doğu Sorunu: 1774-1923 Uluslararası İlişkiler Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul:Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), 373.

<sup>42</sup> For Ken Booth 'security is not merely existence – being alive – but living.' See Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 107.

disclose secret treaties<sup>43</sup> that were signed among the allied powers led Mustafa Kemal to understand the situation more comprehensively leaving no suspicion on the West's intentions.<sup>44</sup> Particularly, it provided the ground to perceive differences among the Allied Powers and the subsequent divergence of interests emanating from the respective gains from the partition that were agreed before the signature of Sévres Treaty.

Regarding the second one, managements of the situation, articulating positioned practice, the revolution raised the hopes for whether a common ground could be formed with Russia to transmit power resources needed in allocating *means*. Compounded with the diminished power of Russia, Turks achieved to convert “the hereditary enemy into an ally”<sup>45</sup> at least for the period of National Struggle between 1919 and 1923. This conversion though can be seen as an emergent result of struggle to gain leverages on Turkey that had a history throughout 19<sup>th</sup> century, nevertheless, it provided once more to manipulate one side against the other. In fact, the balance of power politics was again at place to overcome structural weakness. But what differed from the imperial past was that balancing was employed towards to allocate *means* to ensure *ends*, rather than gaining time; not playing for time, but for the outcome of strategy. However, this balance of power politics was not free of concessions; even it was regarded as a play between imperialism and Bolshevism.<sup>46</sup> The signing of 1921 Moscow Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty, which ensured Russian assistance, was regarded as the first treaty that was not imposed by use of force,<sup>47</sup> on the other hand, it represented the growing rapprochement between two countries and was born out from rivalry between Russia and Britain.<sup>48</sup>

Regarding overcoming the shortfall of *means* in strategy, Mustafa Kemal reached the awareness that Entente powers did not want another war to impose the

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<sup>43</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2015), 477-478.

<sup>44</sup> Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*(İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 63.

<sup>45</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 28.

<sup>46</sup> Gökay, *Emperyalizm ile Bolşevizm Arasında Türkiye*.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 154.

<sup>48</sup> On the reasons and factors that facilitated cooperation see Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1: 161-162.



terms of the Sévres Treaty. Furthermore, the disagreements surfaced in March 1921 London Conferences brought about an outcome to undermine the coherence among them. In the aftermath of the conference, Italy and France signed agreements with Ankara, in the end, eventually; the only great power that remained at the opposite side was Britain and its proxy Greece. Britain also had considerable problems within the country. The fact that a new war with Turkey did not find public support was tying the hands of Britain, leading to pursue a moderate approach to Ankara. The change in focus of Britain was also the case that, with the growing value of oil, the political focus turned into to keep Mosul and Middle East at hand.<sup>49</sup>

Within such context, Mustafa Kemal defined the conduct of strategy, on the ground, based on two interrelated components, the use of force and diplomacy. In other words, strategy was to be applied in two fronts – war and diplomacy. This two-pillared strategy was based on the recognition that the only way to survival can be assured by both the use of force and diplomacy. This two-pillared strategy was also acknowledged by Roderik Davison, “victory cannot be gained in the absence of coherent foreign policy apart from military operations.”<sup>50</sup> But, two pillars did not operate separately, but interactively to the extent that the achievement on the ground should be transmitted into political outcomes by using diplomacy. The dialectical relationship between the two had produced outcomes that exceeded the separate use of them. In that sense, Mustafa Kemal’s strategy resembles Clausewitz’s formulation that “war is continuation of politics by other means”, but unlike Clausewitz’s, his strategy pursued in a parallel manner.

Regarding the *end*, it became obvious that unless nationalism, a structural factor that led to dismantlement of the empire, was articulated in formulation of *end*, the survival strategy would be spoiled. With the recognition that nationalism can be the driving force and motivation of the National Struggle, adoption and utilization of nationalism left to be the only solution. In fact, the primary ideological background of the National Struggle was the continuation of intellectual debates that took place in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Finally, nationalism gained support among

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>50</sup> Roderik H. Davison, “Turkish Foreign Policy from Mudros to Lausanne”, in *The Diplomats: 1919-1939*, ed., Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1994), 173.

society, in which process, with dissolution, heterogeneity left its place to a considerable homogeneity.<sup>51</sup> The remaining heterogeneous parts of the society tried to be bound through civic definition of nationalism<sup>52</sup> in line with the thought of Ziya Gökalp<sup>53</sup> who was accepted as the official ideologue of CUP and unofficial ideologue of Kemalists.<sup>54</sup>

From the perspective of history, adoption of nationalism<sup>55</sup> was getting aware of the structural forces and the determination of agency through reflexivity. Though this was not a conscious act, but an emergent result of the trauma of occupation, it left the imprint on Turkish strategic culture,<sup>56</sup> which would have effects in the upcoming years known as *Sevres-phobia*.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, nationalism, in terms of determining a subjective ‘end’ provided the ground.<sup>58</sup>

On the side of use of force, *means* required, particularly in the material sense, were transferred from Russia. The use of balance of power politics though was the case once more, it, nevertheless, by employing them to a clear *end*, brought about the result of stopping further territorial retreat. While the achievements in the Eastern Front and as a result, the signature of Gümrü Treaty provided stability and resolved tensions, it also brought about the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 16 March 1921. The significance of the date was that the day was also the anniversary of the occupation of Istanbul by Britain. The Moscow Treaty, on the diplomatic side

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<sup>51</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 69.

<sup>52</sup> Based on distinction of Ernest Renan, civic nationalism rejects ethnic bonds as the primary feature of nationalism, but common history and will to live together.

<sup>53</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2001).

<sup>54</sup> Kerem Ünüvar, “Ziya Gökalp”, in *Milliyetçilik*, ed. Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 30.

<sup>55</sup> Çağlar Keyder, “Bir Milliyetçilik Tarihi ve Coğrafyası,” in *Memalik'i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*, 73-97.

<sup>56</sup> Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

<sup>57</sup> On how the “Sèvres Syndrome” affected Turkish Foreign Policy, on the tendency on conspiracy theories, and on the origins of this syndrome see, Michelangelo Guida, “The Sèvres Syndrome and ‘Komplo’ Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press”, *Turkish Studies* 9, no.1 (2008), 37-52.

<sup>58</sup> Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane'den Vatan'a* provides a good account of the interplay of politics, geography and nationalism of Turkey.

pushed Britain to soften its stance for the sake of keeping a relatively strong country at the south of Bolshevism.<sup>59</sup> For Ankara, the stabilization of Eastern Front provided the opportunity to focus on Western Front where the main threat exists to the unity of the Anatolia.

In the beginning of 1921, the accords reached with France, not only diplomatically led to a split at the Western bloc, but it also led to the withdrawal of France in October 1921, which brought about an outcome as leaving a considerable military supply to Turkish Nationalists.<sup>60</sup> The closure of Southern Front increased force concentration to the Western Front where the imbroglio of occupation would be solved. But, application of the use of force in step-by-step manner transformed diffused forces to a concentrated whole that would determine the fate of the use of force pillar of the strategy. Nevertheless, concentration of forces demanded a period of time that should be fostered by diplomacy at the same time. In 1922, the Sakarya Battle and eventual military confrontations with Greek Forces determined the evolution of strategic outcome, at least, in military terms. The use of force that was used to weaken the Greek Forces, thus representing a defensive character, turned out be an offensive one from Sakarya Battle onwards. On 26 August 1922, determining offensive on Greeks had started and forced Greeks to leave İzmir on 11 September 1922.

In terms of the second pillar of strategy, diplomacy was used along with the battles on the ground. From the perspective of Mustafa Kemal, the primary objective was to divide Western camp up in order to gain a space for employing diplomacy. Thanks to disagreements among Entente powers, the required space for diplomacy was easily acquired, which was important and significant to further the advantages gained in the field. The outcome was achieving to reach the 1921 Ankara Agreement with France, which stabilized the southern borders. Disagreements also decreased the level of needs in *means* particularly to defeat Greek forces on Western Anatolia. Diplomacy in that sense facilitated the concentration of power that brought about the victory.

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<sup>59</sup> Gökay, *Emperyalizm ile Bolşevizm Arasında Türkiye*, 170.

<sup>60</sup> Selahi Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, 4th ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014), 37.

Diplomacy in that period was perceived as a *mean* that would not only facilitate the realization of *end*, but also, a leverage that would provide the supply of *means*. Using diplomacy in realization of *end* was based on a two track approach, one is related with getting the political outcomes of the use of force process, and the other one is related with the convey of correct messages that Ankara government and its use of force was not constitute an anti-systemic character. Especially, the second one was important for both limiting the desired *end* to independence, and interrelatedly, for not raising suspicion of great powers on Turkish intentions that could lead them to surmount the disagreements that had already began to appear among them. On the contrary, diplomacy was directed to create space for further maneuvering and to deepen disagreements among them. This was coupled with the use of diplomacy that was tailored not to put forward demands more than realizable. Hence, diplomacy and the resources of *means* were not at the point to impose conditions that was unacceptable for great powers. Ambitious demands were laden with the risk of increasing the dependency on Russia. And this was not deemed, since independence for Mustafa Kemal was to tear down as much dependencies as possible of the past, neither to add new ones, nor to replace the existing ones. In other words, irrespective of military achievements reached on the field, a cautious approach was observed. The basic determining factor to act in this way was the realization of the fact that there were no margins to alter the allocation of *means* on the field. Hence, strategy progressed on a very thin edge of calculations. For that reason, in diplomatic conducts, a line of caution was observed without any further elasticity. Demands, as desired *ends*, were defined very cautiously by letting very limited fall-back position in diplomatic bargains.

Consequently, the diplomatic outcome of Lausanne Treaty, signed on July 1923, was gained through the cautious blend of the use of force and supportive diplomacy, which was observed throughout the National Struggle. The caution, limited margins to step back, and clearly articulated frameworks were primary drivers in defining the demands that would provide independence in the conference.

### 3.3. STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE: How strategy is represented?

Representation of strategy was summarized in the discourse of “independence or death!” but this discourse rather than being an immediate representation, emerged within the sociological and historical process. The structural factors that were discussed in the previous parts, by bearing causal powers also paved the emergence of discourse as it was the case for strategy. But discourse, rather than operating at the domain of intransitive, is related with the transitive domain. Structure has causal powers either to constrain the discourse leading to incongruence between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*, or to enable agent to realize *what is spoken*. Hence, it is possible to argue that the source of (in)congruence is related with the agent’s capability to abstract through conceptualization the structure and formulation of strategy that is not conflicting with that structure. The discourse of strategy, as it is the case for strategy formulation, should be compatible with the structural forces. Otherwise, *what is spoken* might produce different results than what is deemed and conducted. The articulation of discourse should reflect the features of strategy, neither less, not more.

Agency, its formulation of strategy and the conduct of that strategy during National Struggle were discussed in the previous section. To reveal the extent of compliance between strategy and its discourse, the evolution of that discourse should be examined. The formation of discourse parallel with formulation of strategy evolved within a historical process. And to illustrate this evolution, Mustafa Kemal’s efforts to take the approval of the society through Congresses and its interplay with the use of force and diplomacy should be laid down.

Starting from 19 May 1919, Mustafa Kemal, in formulating *end* which cannot be seen as abstract attempts alien to the dynamics of society, presented the imagined strategy to society in order to get the approval of it, and to increase the level of adoption through public discussion. Early formulations of strategic *end* introduced with Amasya Declaration (*Amasya Tamimi*) on 22 June 1919, which highlighted the dangers facing society that reduces survival to a mere existence without agency. The clauses incorporated into the declaration pointed out both the reflective reading of the situation and a roadmap that called for to convene two congresses in Erzurum and Sivas, and solution to ensure survival and independence. The clause of “the integrity

of the country, and the independence of the nation are in danger”<sup>61</sup>, did not only provide, though very abstractly, the subjective reading of the situation, but it also pointed out, apart from territorial integrity, the imminent threat to sovereignty that the nation faced. Another clause pointed out that “The central government is unable to discharge the duties for which it is responsible. As a result, the nation is regarded as nonexistent.”<sup>62</sup> This clause gives the early signs of transformation of an empire to a nation-state and the will of a society should be put in effort. Finally, parallel with this clause, which accused Istanbul Government and underlined the frustration and loss of hope to that government, the clause that reads “only the will and dedication of the nation can save independence of the nation”<sup>63</sup> paved the way how to formulate the solution to acquire the independence in that long struggle. Highlighting the will and decision of the nation represents the only solution to break the imbroglio, and the source of power to jailbreak. In that sense, from the perspective of strategic discourse, the sentences incorporated into that declaration, not only provides the situation from a discursive approach, but also lays down basic tenets of future strategy, and how the desired *end* would be achieved in the future. Particularly emphasis had been put on ‘independence’ and ‘the will of nation’ while not only utilized the structural forces, but it also declared that, from the beginning, the ultimate *end* in strategy was to gain independence.

After the declaration of basic tenets of strategy, which also declares start of the action phase of National Struggle, the periods of Congresses represents the approval phase of that strategy in the eyes of society through attendance of trusted delegates from the provinces to those congresses. The Erzurum Congress, held on 23 July 1919, though was accepted as a regional one compared to Sivas Congress; nevertheless, exceeded regional character and, thus, laid down National Struggle strategy in a more clarified manner. The clause of “the territorial integrity and indivisibility of the homeland must be protected” represented a basic transformation of highlighting danger into a firm decisiveness to eliminate that danger. And with the

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<sup>61</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 247.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

clause stating that “the nation would resist foreign occupation and inference” it declared the use of force component of strategy. Then, from strategy perspective, it can be claimed that within limited time span, transformation of diagnosis of the situation into measures to eliminate danger to independence was declared in Erzurum Congress. The way-ahead measures to form a nation-state, or to grasp the fate of the nation, were introduced with the clause that declared “a provisional government would be formed if the government in Istanbul is incapable of maintaining the nation's independence and unity.” And regarding the use of force dimension of strategy, with respect to *means*, the consolidation of national forces was employed and reflected in the sentence that “the aim is to consolidate the national forces into a ruling factor and to establish the will of the nation as the sovereign power.” Furthermore, related with the question of acquiring *means*, the options discussed in the congress, was eliminated with the clause that “the nation shall not accept the status of a mandate or a protectorate.” Another importance of disregarding the options of mandate or protectorate represents the will to national sovereignty without any restrictions such as capitulations put into power after the signing of Sevres Treaty.

The Sivas Congress, held between 4-11 September 1919, is accepted a congress that enlarge the decisions of Erzurum Congress to cover all Anatolia. Most notably, the declaration of total national resistance against all kinds of occupation or intervention, and the terms that “in case, the Istanbul Government was faced with foreign interference or imposition, and was obliged to depart any part of the country, all kinds of decisions and measures would be taken by the Chamber of Representatives to ensure independence and integrity of the territory.” In fact, the Sivas Congress, and this line of announcement declares the resistance by force irrespective of the decisions of the Istanbul Government.

The second important point is related with the way of acquiring foreign support. The point of view on this issue was reflected in the statement that “with reservation of national independence and territorial integrity, it is welcomed the scientific, industrial and economic assistance of any states.” The announced reservation reflects the will to keep independence at any respect, and the limits adopted in trade-off between *structural weakness* and nature of assistance to

overcome shortage of *means*. In this way, any assistance that might bring about any kind of vulnerability in the future having the potential to undermine the Struggle or, the fate of the new state was rejected. In a sense, it is deemed to build a balance between the need for *means* and provisional *ends*. Here, one can find the concern over not losing subjectivity in determining *ends*. Excessive reliance in that struggle was considered to hamper the fate of the overall strategy. It was also reflected in another sentence, with hope and expectation, that “it is expected from the Entente Powers to abandon the considerations on partition of the country and to reach a just and rightful decision that respect our rights on these soils.” In fact, this expectation can be handled from two perspectives; one, that a hesitation still endured on the way to acquire independence, and the other, that it announced, in case the independence of a nation were not taken into account then, national resistance will follow at any expense, reflecting the decisiveness for independence.

In line with the period of congresses, Chamber of Representatives convened in Istanbul on 12 January 1920, and voted for the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) on 28 January. The Pact declared that “the whole of those parts whether within or outside the said armistice lines which are inhabited by Ottoman Muslim majority...form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance.” In the National Pact, though clear demarcation of borders was left vague, it, nevertheless, through underlining the Muslim majority in announcement, it clarified the extent of National Struggle. Furthermore, the provision, “in order to develop in every field, the country should be independent and free; all restrictions on political, judicial and financial development will be removed” cited in the National Pact pointed out that apart from territorial integrity to the extent to be acquired by the *means* at disposal by use of force, an indispensable component of sovereignty that hampered for years with the name of capitulations, was declared to be nullified in that struggle. It was a declaration pointing out that independence should be obtained without any restrictions or privileges which provide leverage to foreign countries to intervene and, thus, hamper the development of the country. The removal of capitulations in that sense was considered as an indispensable part of independence. In other words, it reflected the consciousness of structural factors that paved the way of emergence of *structural weakness*. While, on the one hand, the Chamber of



Representatives was aware of the weakness and requirements in *means* to ensure *ends*, on the other hand, it had been that awareness leading to conclude the assistance should also be utilized in overcoming the prevailing structural factor.

In terms of representation of strategy, “what is incorporated in it?”, “to what extent strategy was reflected in discourse?” and “whether discourse was in line with the formulated strategy?” should also be discussed to reveal the interplay between strategy and discourse and to move onto examining the source of (in)congruence between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*. The discourse of “Independence or Death!” highlights the ultimate *end* of strategy. By the words of independence and death it is explained to what expense the determined *end* would be strived for, reflecting the *means* dimension of strategy. Choosing independence as *end* at the expense of being alive, apart from being a hard choice, in which all *means* at disposal would be employed, on the other hand, it represents decisiveness to acquire *end* as independence. In strategy, recalling Ken Booth’s syllogism, survival as *living* without any restrictions was preferred instead of *being alive*. Within this context, it can be argued that in representation, both *means* and *ends* were incorporated in the discourse of strategy. Strategy in that sense, though it was based on some sort of abstraction of structure and agential practice operating in that structure, two pillars of *means*, the use of force and diplomacy, was not reflected in discourse both mentioning a threatening discourse and revealing the future practice of strategy in struggle to achieve independence. Hence, with some degree of vagueness existed in discourse, in line with the agential abstraction of the structure. But, what was represented in discourse reflects respective strategy, though in a manner of preferred vagueness. In conclusion, the discourse of strategy was compatible with strategy, given that discourse rather than being explanatory utterances, was subjective representation of strategy that hesitated to use a threatening language.

#### **3.4. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE:**

With the interplay of structure and agent, the former referring to *structural weakness*, nationalism and geography, the latter, to a strategy that was tailored to overcome structural forces with the goal of creating an alternative to partition. Strategic outcome of the period of 1919-1923 was the gaining of independence,

which was achieved through the use of force and diplomacy; the two were utilized to convert the achievements on the ground to the political outcomes. The strategic *end* defined as independence was expressed in the discourse of “independence or death”. The representation of strategy within this discourse was not conflicted with the strategy in nature. Therefore, based on agential and subjective reading of the structure, the way-out strategy was created encompassing a subjective *end* that was not disregarding the forces of structure and the policies of the adversaries.

Examining the sources of (in)congruence inherently bears two interrelated aspects, *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*. The latter one precedes the former one, since discourse takes place before reality reaches the level that can be observed. The incongruence between them, from the perspective of critical realism, emanates from the intransitive domain – structure. Due to constraining and enabling causal powers of structure on agents, irrespective of agents’ intents in formulating strategy if not abstracted comprehensively, structure has potential forces to bring about incongruence. Before delving into the discussion on the sources of incongruence, *what is actualized* should be explained briefly.

The observed strategic outcome of the National Struggle was independence which was obtained through the Lausanne Treaty signed on 24 July 1923. The Lausanne Treaty indicates that the *end state* of strategy was achieved through employing of *means*. *Means* in that process, as discussed, were the use of force and diplomacy and their interactive harmonization to overcome structural forces leading to the emergence of independence. The process bear transformation of *Sevres* conditions into *Lausanne* conditions, which indicates, abstractly, the transformation of partition of the country into the independence of that country. Here it is not deemed to discuss the details of Lausanne Treaty which is widely discussed in the literature.<sup>64</sup> But, from the perspective of this dissertation, the outcome of the Treaty is important since it signifies the strategic outcome of the National Struggle period. In the literature, even though there is wide discussion whether it has managed to bring about the desired outcomes,<sup>65</sup> for the sake of simplicity, it can be accepted that

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<sup>64</sup> Sevtap Demirci, *Belgelerle Lozan: Taktik-Stratejik-Diplomatik Mücadele* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2011).

<sup>65</sup> Mustafa Budak, *İdealden Gerçeğe: Misak-ı Milli'den Lozan'a Dış Politika* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002).

independence was obtained irrespective of some shortfalls and with unresolved problems which were postponed to the later period. However, the *ends* of strategy were managed to be realized, particularly, the independence and annihilation of capitulations that hampered the reform process of Ottoman period to renovate and to adapt changing conditions of the respective context.

Regarding the interrelation of discourse and strategic outcome, basically there is no incongruence between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized*. In the process, within which dialectics of structure and agent took place, the outcome was managed to be realized, through correct reading of the structure and formulation of a compatible strategy that takes into account the context and structure. Structural forces, as discussed above; *structural weakness* and nationalism, incorporated in strategy from a subjective understanding, but not in an alienated manner, then success emerged from suitable match of strategy and context operated within. Given that structure endures considerably longer than it is conceived, revealing continuities and differences should also be discussed. Though independence exemplifies a rupture from the imperial past, ruptures may transform continuities to future forms. But before discussing continuities and differences, visiting how structural forces had been overcome should be discussed.

*Structural weakness* that undermines *means* in strategy could not have been overcome by relying merely on national resources, and the effects of shortage in acquiring *means* inevitably brought about the use of balance of power politics as a remedy. But, since dangers inherent to balancing were obvious, such as loss of *ends* in the process and consequently undermining agency in strategy, use of the balance of power politics to increase available *means* were approached very cautiously. Awareness on using resources that were not owned might brought about dissolving strategy from the very beginning, or in time, led to the careful use of it. In the process, rather than excessive use of balancing, the optimum use of it is adopted as the main operation rule in transmitting *means* into *ends*. Even this cautious approach might be considered as a factor on the way of realization of territorial goals that were foreseen in the National Pact. Hence, the suitable match of *means* and *ends* constantly was observed, reevaluated and, reflected in conduct of strategy in the process, with the fear of further insistence that might be found threatening by Entente

powers. In other words, balancing was utilized not to further agitate the Entente Powers and particularly Britain, with a consideration that any agitation might trigger another process in which they might enter into a process of erasing political differences among themselves. It can be argued that caution was the buzzword while not conceding from independence and limitations on independence.

Nationalism can be regarded as one of the main dynamics that triggered the process of dismantlement. But, nationalism can also be thought as an unintended consequence of Ottoman policies of the time. As argued by Karpaz, Ottomans by aligning with France in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, though this alignment was directed to balance the Habsburgs in the West, from the perspective of history, the Ottomans helped the emergence of nation-state as the main polity in the new Europe.<sup>66</sup> And eventual rise of nationalism in Europe together with the process of industrialization affected the fate of the empire. Combined with *structural weakness*, nationalism compelled the Turks to adapt and adopt nationalism. Faroz Ahmad's words summarize that process and he claims that with the rise of nationalism and eventual demands of independence by Christian Community, in fact, the Ottomans found themselves in a position to suppress the eruption of nationalist movements, almost throughout of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but, in the end, the Ottomans embraced and adopted nationalism to found a nation-state.<sup>67</sup> In other words, structure left agency with two choices; either to adapt, or to disappear. And a choice on adaptation, transforming structural factor into an impetus for survival, which is regarded as the Westernization in some part of the literature was adopted.

There are arguments claiming that Westernization and Western oriented foreign policy were seen as the only option to survive in the international system as sovereign state.<sup>68</sup> Even though, Westernization is widely used interchangeably with modernization, the term modernization reflects the policies of Turkey more comprehensively, since the latter incorporates and keeps identity within it, while the former gives the impression that identity is disregarded or lost in time. But

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<sup>66</sup> Karpaz, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 25.

<sup>67</sup> Faroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 13<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014), 36.

<sup>68</sup> Ayşe Zarakol, *After the Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 143.

subjectivity, as an agential attribute was to be protected. Ziya Gökalp's thoughts clarify this argument. For Gökalp, culture and civilization as concepts are conceived encompassing a differing perspective. Civilization was accepted as universal not belonging to any nation, but should be adopted to survive, whereas, culture refers to identical features of a nation, that constitutes and provides to be a nation, which granted equal importance for survival. Civilization should not be adopted at the expense of Turkish culture. Otherwise, subjectivity is to be lost, downgrading agency to object, since adoption of civilization might lead to cultural assimilation. Pragmatism can be seen in Gökalp's thoughts<sup>69</sup> that would affect the developments in pursuing strategy, particularly using balance of power politics.

In conclusion, it can be argued that, modernization, or (if used interchangeably) westernization, unlike the imperial past, was not defensive in character, but turned out to be an integrative one, which would be effective in the upcoming years of Turkey. It can be argued that *defensive modernization* left its place to an *integrative modernization*, in which anti-systemic nature of imperial past abandoned exemplifying rupture, and systemic character gained significance, but, at the same time, a subjective one replaced pursuing its own *end*. Then, it is possible to argue that defensive modernization was transformed into integrative modernization. But, the 1919-1923 period should be seen as a period when early signals of integrative modernization had emerged.

From the perspective of history that bears continuities and resists to reified views and analysis, the differences and similarities between Ottoman Empire and Turkey have the potential to explain how strategy fit into the structure. But, it should also be kept mind that differences were created not to challenging the structure, but to adapt to it, in order to preserve the survival of the nation. Basically, the Ottoman State and Turkey have both differences and similarities. Their primary difference is in the nature of the state. While the former was an empire, the latter is a republican state being founded upon the former, but, at the same time, ended it, and hence, suppressed the imperial aspirations. In that sense, Turkey was born not as anti-systemic in nature, which stopped the aspirations of Great Powers and not agitated to suppress the foundation of the state and the recognition of it. Adopting a systemic

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<sup>69</sup> Keyder, *Memalik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*, 77.

stance and incorporating it into newly founded state was a conscious act that was aimed to widen a room for living.

It can be put forward as a counter argument that a will to suspend capitulations that grant wide privileges to owners of them can be conceived as an anti-systemic move. But, awareness on the detrimental effects of capitulations that when structural weakness became apparent, they might turn into an accelerating factor of that weakness, which, in the end, might bring about a qualitative change by shaking the normal evolution of progress, caused placing the abolition of capitulations as an *end* in strategy. Even though capitulations were granted to France first on reciprocal basis, when combined with *structural weakness*, they had produced detrimental effects on the Ottoman economy and the state-society relations. When reciprocity left its place to unilateralism, it granted semi-colonial leverages to great powers. Consequently, “powers no longer considered the Capitulations as a unilateral grant to be revoked unilaterally by the donor.”<sup>70</sup>

Within it, some sort of quantity-quality transformation exists. Reaching to the bifurcation point, capitulations have the potential to produce considerable change which is beyond imagination when looked through the pace of flat ontological perspective, not taking into account stratified nature of reality. Within such a case, if agency through strategy employs subjectivity, it might alter the pace to produce positive outcomes. In that process, employing *means* to suspend capitulations even at first glance might be seen as anti-systemic in nature, if insisted on and represented as a demand to live within existing conditions of the system, as an equal member of civilized world, it might alter the pace that gave primary conditions to evolve into a truly sovereign state which was reflected in the discourse of independence.

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<sup>70</sup> Faroz Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire”, in *Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, 21.

## CHAPTER 4

### 1923-1939 “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”

#### 4.1. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

The years of 1923-1939<sup>1</sup> can be regarded as the period of resettlement of long-standing and challenging problems of the new republic after gaining independence. These years, on the one hand, were reconstruction years within the country through a series of reforms that aimed to ensure survival, and on the other hand, internationally acted as the resolution of remaining issues that could not have been settled in the Lausanne Conference. Defining the structural changes within this period is deemed as a foundation upon which the arguments will be constructed within the scope of theoretical framework put forward in first chapter. It is argued that the structure is composed of *international political system*, *global economy*, and *geography*.

International relations of that period were primarily focused on the conflict of the *revisionist* and *status quoist* that emerged aftermath of the First World War and its primary Peace Treaty of Versailles. Given that the terms of the Versailles Treaty were too strict to apply, the international relations of the time inevitably was left fragile peace that in case a spoiler would arise, the established peace would have get ruined very quickly with devastating outcomes. Germany, imposed with heavy sanctions, from the beginning searched the ways to alter its conditions and revise the treaty to broaden the space for itself. Distrust with the established world order in the aftermath of the World War by Entente Powers was actually showing an inherent dilemma. The post war order was demanding continued, firm and decisive imposition by power, but also, the Entente powers were behind the level of these qualifications

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<sup>1</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2015), 223-262.

that required for decisiveness, since they too eroded in war period, and peace demands from societies were limiting their room for allocation of extra resources to keep functioning of the established order. In such a context, from the beginning Germany had began to appear as a spoiler in Europe, together with Italy, with the rise of fascism.

Compounded with the rise of Bolshevism and subsequent Communism in Russia, Europe found itself in the growing effects of Bolshevism and Fascism that from the beginning had begun to shake the foundations of the post-War order. What is more challenging was the fact that in post-War Europe Entente powers also exercised a decline that can be called as 'war-fatigue.' Europe, while losing central status in the international relations, and was steadily transforming into a periphery, or secondary status with the rise of the United States, Entente Powers' ability to control the flow of events, eventually making it impossible to maintain balance of power in the continent. The United States, though intervened in European affairs unwillingly, was eager to return to its classical isolationist policy, conceived as staying away from the European politics unless a direct threat emanated to its interests. Britain, as the victor of the First World War, was far from exerting order, or to suppress revisionist tendencies in the continent, by merely relying on its own power. Thus, Britain preferred appeasement policy, rather than an aggressive stance against spoiler Germany and Italy. In a sense, applying balance of power politics for preservation of international order was the policy of the time. But, revisionist tendencies, one of which can be regarded as the Turkish National Struggle to nullify the terms of Sevres Treaty, appeared from the beginning.

Global economy, parallel with international political system faced similar challenges of post-war dynamics. The preservation of the established international political order while requiring pour of resources, irrespective of victory, the war economy heavily diminished the working economy of European Powers. Apart from the devastating effects on infrastructure, the demographic losses further undermined international economy leading to the great depression of 1929. As it was the case for states, societies and economic structures experienced war fatigue in post-war years. Socially, as it was also reflected in international relations theory with liberalism, liberal thought and peace seeking efforts gained significance in that period. But,



accompanied with lack of power, economy to sustain political power and keep war machinery applicable narrowed the available options for politics in solving clash of interests, but instead, increased the value of diplomatic means. The foundation of the League of Nations can also be considered within this context in which diplomacy gained primacy over use of force.

Turkey, in this context, is the first country that tore down the conditions imposed by the victors to defeated nations. Though this was basically a revisionist stance, at the same time, being aware of its limits, Turkey refrained from giving an impression that it was anti-systemic in nature. The nations, conceived as the spoilers, that tried to undermine and eventually revise the imposed treaties began to appear in the post-war years. Entente powers' lack of capability to suppress revisionist tendencies provided Turkey the ground to pursue some "relative autonomy"<sup>2</sup> in foreign relations. But whether structural forces – *structural weakness, nationalism* and *geography*– were at play should also be discussed within such a context.

The structural weakness, as a structural factor, had endured within the period of 1923-1939. However, post-war weakness of Entente Powers led to the removal of exercised pressure to a degree letting some sort of space for maneuver in foreign policy. The context provided 'relative autonomy' to middle power states<sup>3</sup> in pursuing foreign policy, creating opportunities and giving them an option not to align with the Great Powers of the time. This relative autonomy broadened and enforced thanks to the Great Depression of 1929, though it had brought about effects in the strategy of Turkey. This meant a change of direction in foreign policy. Turkey before 1929 had pursued a considerably distant foreign policy against the West. As will be discussed in the next section, as a consequence of lack of power to subvert, the "fear of the West"<sup>4</sup> has been replaced by rapprochement with the West.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 1: 257.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 256.

<sup>4</sup> Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-I", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 23, no.3 (1968): 244.

<sup>5</sup> Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-II", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 27, no.1 (1972): 16.

Though not discussed explicitly in depth in Baskin Oran's book which refrains to construct a theoretical account, the concept of 'relative autonomy' bears explanatory tools when considered within ontological depth of strategy, particularly when analyzed with the concept of *structural weakness*. *Structural weakness* highlights comparative understanding of power and its utilization in strategy formulation. When considered within binary opposition, the compared part of the binary, or the other, the structural weakness both quantitatively and qualitatively points out the fact that as one part decreases the other part gains comparative increase irrespective of any change in power accumulation. Turkey's post-war situation resembles to that suggestion that the decrease in power of great powers thanks to they were war-fatigue, the structural weakness of Turkey, comparatively, decreased leading to more space for maneuver or ability to stay away from ongoing political debates.

In that period, Turkey's structural weakness endured, but as the power of Entente Powers eroded, the structural conditions evolved thereby allowing Turkey to pursue its own strategy. This comparative decline of European powers with the effects of suffering international economy and subsequent inability of allocation of resources to war machine, and awaiting problems that had primacy, brought about the fact that the effects of structural weakness not stood as the primary driver of strategy. But, complete ignorance of this structural factor could revive to produce devastating results if adventurist foreign policy would have been adopted.

Regarding nationalism, the First World War ended the period of empires leading to the rise of nation-states as the main polity.<sup>6</sup> In that sense, nationalism paved the way for the rise of nation-states. In the Turkish context, compounded with structural weakness and territorial retreat, nationalism stimulated the driving force of the Independence War. Nationalism while in the period of Independence War was the thrust of *territorialization of the nation*, parallel with proclamation of the Republic was transformed into propeller of *nationalization of the territory*.<sup>7</sup> In other

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<sup>6</sup> Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990), 162-163.

<sup>7</sup> In terms of difference between 'territorialization of nation' and 'nationalization of territory' see Sezgi Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane'den Vatan'a* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 47.

words, nationalism in that period turned out to be a notion to preserve survival, not a notion to acquire survival and sovereignty.

Geography, in this context, dialectically was in interaction with *structural weakness* and nationalism. When considered with nationalism, it highlights the dynamics of how geography shaped nationalism and how nationalism shaped the geography. In fact, these questions are both political and constructive. It is political if nationalism is accepted as a notion “primarily political”<sup>8</sup>, and it is constructive if considered within the scope of “cultural construct”.<sup>9</sup> It is political in the sense that through nationalism and adoption of national stance in the National Struggle, Turkey achieved to become a nation-state from the remnants of an empire. Its constructive nature emanates from the nation-building process in which becoming a nation required a rupture with the imperial past with all the inherited institutions and symbols. In that period, a nation-state in the European sense was both aimed and thrived for, which consisted of the renovation of the state apparatus. It marked a revolutionary stance, though it was criticized in terms that modernization was equated with Westernization.

After the Lausanne Treaty, geography of Turkey changed considerably both qualitatively and quantitatively by becoming neighbors with powerful states of Europe.<sup>10</sup> In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, though Britain, France, Italy and Russia were neighbors, the nature of that neighborhood was *de facto*, rather than being *de jure*. Britain had stakes and existence in the Middle East and exercised rule in Cyprus, but sovereign rights remained to be on the Ottoman Empire. Though the Aegean Islands were transferred temporarily to Italian jurisdiction with Uchy Agreement in 1912, in case Greece might intend to occupy the islands during the Balkan Wars, unfortunately, after the First World War the sovereign rights over the islands were transferred to Italy. Within the imperial period, though European powers were not directly neighboring Turkey, after the Lausanne Treaty, the territories of the new State became neighbors with the European powers. In the east

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<sup>8</sup> John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).

<sup>9</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1993).

<sup>10</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 10<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2015), 59.

and littoral in Black Sea with the Soviets; through Cyprus and Iraq mandate with Britain; through Syria mandate with France; and through Islands in the Aegean Sea with Italy, Turkey became neighbors. What complicated the situation further was the fact that bilateral tensions were not resolved in Lausanne but postponed to the early years of the Republic. These factors while contributed and gave rise to strategic importance of the geography of the new Republic, it also dictated to pursue realist foreign policy that constrained severely to make any mistake and to pursue an adventurist foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> Haluk Ülman underlines the growing importance of geography with the proclamation of the Republic. His analysis on geography highlights three points: neighborhood with the Soviet Union, the Straits where the sovereign rights with the Lausanne Treaty were quite limited, and the Middle East as an important geography for competing blocs.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, though different authors highlighted differing aspects of geography,<sup>13</sup> they reached a consensus on its role in the foreign policy of the new Republic. Furthermore, the need to reconstruct and consolidate the newly born state required considerably peaceful environment. Yet, diverging interests of the European powers with limited power resources to impose their respective interests, made it possible to apply balance of power politics as will be discussed in depth in the next section.

To get a clear understanding about the context, the unsettled issues of the Lausanne Treaty should be addressed in order to explain how they affected the post-Independence War foreign policy. The postponed and unsettled problems were the Mosul question with Britain, the partition of the Ottoman debts and Hatay question with France, population exchange with Greece and, the status of the Straits that was agreed on in Lausanne. All of these questions have direct effects on the internal reconstruction and the fate of the state.

Mosul question, despite heavy discussions carried out in the conference could not be solved. Britain captured the Mosul province after the Mudros Armistice,

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ülman, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-I”, 256.

<sup>13</sup> Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 3-6. Kalaycıoğlu provides an account on whether geography of Turkey is ‘Bless or Curse.’

though it had read the armies would have stayed at the points when the Armistice got into power. Having created a *de facto* situation, Britain claimed the rights of Mosul in the conference. Turkey, with the National Pact declared the Muslim populated areas that were under the control of the Ottoman Army when Armistice got into power were indispensable parts of the new Republic. Due to diverging views, the Mosul question in the conference constituted the crux of the discussions between Turkey and Britain and, finally, postponed to the aftermath of the conference to be resolved by bilateral talks. If no outcome could be managed, the question would be solved by the mediation of League of Nations. The importance of the question further exacerbated with the internal Kurdish Question that will be discussed from the scope of strategy in the next section.

With France, the two questions that remained unsettled were primarily the partition of the Ottoman debts among the post-Ottoman states and the Hatay question as the city left out of the new borders of Turkey, even though it was a part of the National Pact. The question of the Ottoman debts, through negotiations were settled, but the amounts took over by Turkey had the potential to shake the reconstruction period economically and to contribute the process of reproduction of structural weakness that could have negative ramifications on the economic development of the new state. The motivation to overcome economic dependence with undertaking huge amount of debts, when coincided with the Great Depression of 1929, stalled the pace of economic development.

The primary issue with Greece was the population exchange that was settled between the two countries. Population exchange, though demographically might have been regarded beneficial for both parties on the way of nation-building process; in fact, it had several economic, social and political ramifications. But population exchange brought about the loss of talented people, artisans and, traders that were needed in the reconstruction period. Compounded with “loss of population in war”, it hampered state-building process economically, but eased nation-building process.

The Straits as the place to where international rivalry had long been focused on, particularly by Britain and France, continued to be one of the sources of discontent on Turkey. The Lausanne Treaty had built an international status that restricted the sovereign rights of Turkey on the Straits considerably. The clauses of

the Treaty dictated de-militarization of the straits, foundation of International Commission to regulate and control the passages. These regulations were seen by Turkey as attempts to build sovereign entities that was out of sovereign jurisdiction of the new Republic.<sup>14</sup> Proposal to attain a separate flag to the commission was perceived by Turkey as an attempt to build a tiny state within its borders.<sup>15</sup> The issue of the Straits continued to be a source of discontent, as France and Britain insisted on keeping their embassies in Istanbul, although the capital of the new Republic had been moved to Ankara. Turkey interpreted the location of embassies and the existence of Commission as foreign powers' reinstatement of old habits to keep leverage to interfere with internal relations of the new republic. And, if Turkey had not moved the Capital, Turkey would have been threatened by foreign warships, which would keep Turkey under continued military threat or concern.<sup>16</sup>

#### **4.2. AGENCY AND STRATEGY:**

From the onset of the Turkish Republic in 1923 to 1939 strategy formulation demonstrated coalescence with the forces of structure and context. The nature of structure and context were discussed in the previous section, here its effects on strategy formulation will be discussed in detail addressing agential read of structure and emergent strategy within the related context, given that strategy as an agential action is designed to overcome prevailing forces of the structure that constrains agency. Ontologically, *international political system*, *international economy* and *geography* produce direct effect at the level of *empirical* – “what is observed”. Since structures are *activity*, *concept* and *spatio-temporal dependent*, agential reading and formulation of strategy, which is based on that reading as portrayal of the situation and conditions, determine the nature of strategy as well. Moving from this argumentation, before outlaying the nature of strategy, the portrayal of the situation is required depending on the variables discussed in the previous section.

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<sup>14</sup> Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1973[1995]), 147-149.

<sup>15</sup> Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 62; Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*, 161-162.

<sup>16</sup> Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*, 152.

Structural weakness as an enduring structural factor continued both to constrain and enable foreign policy options that are at disposal. Activity, concept and spatio-temporal dependent nature of structures, requires to be taken into account by the agents to avoid constraining effects and to utilize enabling forces of structures. In terms of structural weakness, on agential side, “the republic inherited war-ravaged territory with scant human resources, and devastated economic infrastructure due to the Balkan War, World War I, and the War of Liberation.”<sup>17</sup> Within such conditions, from the beginning, Turkey with the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was involved in a massive and comprehensive reconstruction process. Awareness of structural weakness led Mustafa Kemal to seek conditions that could provide a relatively stable environment to apply reforms that were designed to facilitate the development of Turkey. The primary objective of Atatürk was to raise Turkey to “the level of modern civilization” and restore the power of the state after a reconstruction period. This objective needed a considerably peaceful environment in order to waste limited power to adventurist policies.

The model for the realization of reconstruction was considered best applicable when was undertaken by a top-down manner, since among the society the need for modernization impulses were limited to initiate the reform and reconstruction process. Thus, similar to understanding and executing modernization in the Ottoman period, Mustafa Kemal followed top-down imposition of reforms. And similarly, the Kemalist reforms were designed and implemented to defend the state apparatus against external and internal threats.<sup>18</sup> In a sense, policy of isolationism that represented the primary characteristic of that period was adopted in foreign policy. Indeed, as a war-ravaged country Turkey had no other options than staying away from adventurist policies, but to concentrate on internal reconstruction. To be clear, awareness of structural weakness imposed to be hesitant and cautious approach in foreign policy, except for focusing on resolving postponed issues from the Lausanne Treaty. There were scarce resources that could be allocated to foreign policy operations other than preserving gains of the National Struggle. Consequently,

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<sup>17</sup> Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands*, 47.

<sup>18</sup> Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and A Greater Middle East* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 60.

and logically, focusing on internal reconstruction gained primacy, and isolationism was considered as the strategy that could ease this motivation. Though it is argued that foreign policy took a secondary role due to the focus on internal reconstruction<sup>19</sup>, actually, isolationism in foreign policy as an agential choice provided required conditions for consolidation and reconstruction. In that sense isolationism was a conscious and agential choice.

Nationalism, as the main driving force of the Independence War, from the proclamation of the Republic turned out to be a driving force for reconstruction. This could only be achieved through converging society's considerations towards a desired common future. In that sense, nationalism was utilized for the nation-building process, and hence, it was considered that becoming a nation-state required creating a common sense and ideal among society. Crafting a nation was not an easy transformation of the society that experienced and coming from an imperial past. For that reason transition from empire to nation-state was basically a transition that was based on the forces of nationalism. Transformation of society that was primarily related with nation-building process firstly needed renunciation of imperial past and renovation of the state to the conditions of homogeneity out of heterogeneity of the past. But within this process, the Independence War served as a cornerstone in building a common memory and experience, thus constituted a building block on the way of becoming a nation. To be clear, nationalism served liberation within the National Struggle period. But, it needed to be directed to gain 'complete independence' in all aspects in that period. Otherwise, dependency in any sort, particularly economic ones that had created experience of capitulations that transformed Ottoman Empire into a semi-colonized society, had to be refrained in the future of new republic. Even though the Independence War was against the Western European Powers, it was not against the Western understanding of the state.<sup>20</sup> Thus, adoption of the western style nation-state was not in friction with the nature of the strategy that was pursued in the war. Within discourse of "we will defeat imperialism" it was not intended a total rejection of Western economic and political

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<sup>19</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013 ), 41.

<sup>20</sup> Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-II", 2.



ideology, but it was elimination of economic and political superiority of the West on the territories of the new Republic.<sup>21</sup> In fact, acquiring the ‘complete independence’ gained primacy that was initiated and incorporated in strategic *end* of that period. In short, nationalism was treated as a driving force, but the related context was transformed. It can be suggested that nationalism in character within changing contexts transformed from being an *offensive* one into a *defensive* one. The offensive utilization brought about the independence, and the defensive one was directed to gain full independence, particularly directed towards getting rid of *structural weakness*. Spatio-temporal character of structure that attains different meanings surfaced in that period.

Geography, the third structural factor that is incorporated in this analysis played a significant role in that period. The significance of geography, as the space that strategy was applied on, the meaning attained in line with the structure, and the context of the period, corresponded with the state of the international political system and economy of the time. In the period of transition, it was argued that gradual retreat brought about both concentration of geography within limited lands which sociologically created the caution of not to lose remaining but inherited parts of the empire, and, also facilitation of the growth of impulses to nation-building and state-building that left imprint in that period. Furthermore, interrelated with international politics, the nature of neighbors and their numbers had changed as was discussed in the previous part.

In terms of geography and its effects on foreign policy strategy, as long as cooperation could be sustained the geographical proximity provided important positive outcomes and benefits. The advantages or disadvantages of geographical proximity were determined by the nature of cooperative and conflicting relations with the respective states, and with the nature of interaction. Thus, employing geography as a *means* in strategy was heavily depended upon the nature of the international relations. As relations deteriorated with one of the international powers, geographical insecurity increased. The feeling of geographical insecurity in fact was shaped by the past experiences and formed a culture of (in)security. This was closely related with the territorial retreat and *Sevrésphobia*. *Sevrésphobia* is defined as the

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 3.

“conviction and belief that external world and their internal collaborators are trying to weaken and divide Turkey.”<sup>22</sup> In fact, stemming from the past experiences this concept refers to non-material and material interaction in conception of security in Turkey from constructivist aspect of foreign policy tradition,<sup>23</sup> referring to one of the basic drivers of strategic culture.

Geography as material context, heavily compounded with the social and historical, has influenced both the evolution and formulation of *ends* and allocation of *means*. In terms of *ends*, preservation of territorial integrity and not losing territory heavily influenced, if not determined by, geography as a structural factor. In fact, territorial retreat brought about a strategic culture that focused on preservation of territorial integrity. Beyond transformation of meaning attained to geography in that way, the meaning attained to the geography of Turkey was not transformed with the Turkey’s transformation from empire to nation. Geography still was thought of as the target of foreign powers and their plotting, which in the end paved the emergence of some further caution with respect to territorial integrity. Of course, this factor was corresponded with the strategic culture that was conceived as *Sévresphobia*.

All those factors emanating from structure contributed, if not determined, the formulation of strategy. In that period, strategic goal was identified as the preservation of territorial integrity and to create conditions that allowed internal reconstruction of the new republic on the way to decreasing *structural weakness* of the country. In fact, these objectives constituted the *end* of strategy. But, it should also be noted that in that period a number of objectives accompanied this overarching goal. If *end* was defined as ensuring existence and survival, the security concern was directed towards preserving independence and, if possible, furthering that in a comprehensive manner. In that sense, frustrated with capitulations and as disagreements over the annihilation of capitulations even threatened the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the meaning attained to economics and sovereignty

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<sup>22</sup> Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *The Middle East Journal* 52, no.1, (1998): 43; Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no.4, (1999): 167.

<sup>23</sup> On the interaction of non-material and material aspects of security understanding of Turkey see, Pınar Bilgin, “Securing Turkey through Western Oriented Foreign Policy”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40, (2009): 105-125.

related issues like jurisdiction of all citizens without any reservations constituted the crux of the eagerness in independence in all aspects. Consequently, not allowing any erosion of sovereignty in any aspect, and consolidation of state power was incorporated in strategic *end*. Realization of that *end* in the eyes of the decision makers of the time that was represented somehow authoritatively by Mustafa Kemal required considerably stable international relations. From another perspective, the need for stable international relations could be seen as the expression of some fear that would be expressed in the words of Mustafa Kemal as “we have a lot of internal projects on hold awaiting the establishment of peace. As long as there is no peace, we will not be able to tackle them. Nor can we wait very long, because [left unaddressed] they could one day lead to upheavals.”<sup>24</sup>

The factors emerging from the structure that found expression mentioned in the strategic *end* should be discussed to reveal whether an agential choice was incorporated in it. Answering to this question in fact is an outcome of dialectics of agent and structure, since structure is activity, concept and spatio-temporal dependent. From the outlook of agency, awareness of structure and context in terms of what actually is happening; consciousness in defining *ends* – reflection of agential read of structure into identification of *ends*; finally, cognition both resolving the dialectical relationship between structure and *end*, and employing *means* to realize that formulated *end* plays significant role in strategy formulation, since strategy is a *situated activity* that were designed to overcome the impositions of structure.

In the reconstruction years of the Republic, the awareness of structure and context reflected in Mustafa Kemal’s words cited above. Structural weakness stood as a factor that endured, but at the same time, should have been overcome or at least to be decreased to a manageable degree by adopting a policy that would ensure that objective. Striving for realization of reconstruction was needed taking into account the context of the time. Existence of more severe international problems that threatened international peace – the rise of Germany and Italy as spoilers – shifted the focus of European powers away from Turkey. But, on the other hand, deteriorating international security inherently posed threats to Turkey, the immediate

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<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 20.

one being Italy and later on, Germany. The changing nature of international security and the rise of Italian and German threats will further be elaborated in the subsequent parts, but for the sake of coherence, it should be stated that deteriorating international security not only affected European powers, but also created immediate threats that had to be tackled by aligning to new conditions. Nevertheless, awareness of context and structure facilitated the formulation of agential strategy.

In terms of reconstruction, nationalism, as was mentioned above, constituted the driving force of the nation-building and state-building processes. The forces of nationalism while during the National Struggle directed for acquiring independence, in the early Republican years, they were directed to create a nation-state through ‘nationalization of territory.’ Hence, nationalism, crafting a nation-state based on civic nationalism, was conceived as the driving force of assuring the intended *end* in strategy. In fact, this was not a painless endeavor, but a process with highly challenging developments. The challenge originated from the transition from empire to nation-state and destruction of the Sévres Treaty imposed by powerful European States. In other words, while nationalism was related with the domestic renunciation of the imperial impulses that long existed in society, it was also directly related with Europe’s acceptance and treatment of Turkey as a peaceful nation-state that gave up its past imperial aspirations. Regarding the constructivist explanation of that transition process were addressed by scholars,<sup>25</sup> it can be said that suspicion on other, was the case for Turkey as well as on Europeans.

Finally geography was also discussed both in the section of structure and portrayal of the situation. From the perspective of agency, while geography represented the territories that had to be defended at all expense, it also created the opportunities that could be utilized as *means* in strategy formulation. In other words, geography was one of the sources of both threats and remedy to those threats. As discussed above, geography transformed considerably with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and eventually Turkey became in different ways neighbors of the great powers in a differed way and context. But here, geography will be discussed from the angle of resource, of either enabling balance of power politics or

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<sup>25</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

constraining any adventurist policy, since surrounded with powerful neighbors, and instabilities that potentially could spill over Turkey.

From the perspective of strategy, and particularly in terms of *means*, geography shaped the nature of strategy by enabling balance of power politics when affliction of *means* was felt to conduct robust and result-taking strategies. Furthermore, geography apart from allowing for balancing if needed, it facilitated the allocation of required *means* in actualization of strategy and determination of *ends* in it. This means geography provided both material and ideational context through which strategy was formulated and conducted on and through. Geography materially affected the *means* and ideationally influenced the nature of *ends*. Insecurity complex, as one of the main drivers of strategic culture, was constructed within historical and sociological context, and hence, further exacerbated the nature of strategy. The hesitancy and caution grew up in time with severe experiences that left imprints on society. In the early years of Turkey, the mood of the society reflected with the concept of “fear from the West”.<sup>26</sup>

This fear was not an empty mood or psychology that emerged from nothing, but on the contrary, there were powerful reasons that created such a fear such as the experience of *territorial retreat*. Furthermore, another factor that fuelled up this fear was the remaining unresolved problems waiting to be addressed to open the doors of normalization. But remaining problems, particularly the issues that strained the relations with the Western Powers, exacerbated both the formulation of *end* leaving adoption of “isolationism” nearly the only option and pursuing a foreign policy that lacked multi-dimensionality that did not correspond with what geography dictated. In other words, when relations were strained, both with the West and with the East, while this binary contradiction allowed balance of power politics, it also certainly limited the available.

What is argued here can be seen in bilateral relations with the Soviets. Relations with the Soviet Union continued to be beneficial as long as Turkey’s relations with the West were cooled off and based on some sort of fear. In that process, Turkish Foreign Policy was formulated and conducted on the principle of

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<sup>26</sup> Ülman, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-I”, 244.

not agitating the Soviets. Hence, caution was preserved in relations.<sup>27</sup> This caution also emerged from the need to preserve balance of power politics as an option to balance the international relations particularly when internal resources as *means* that could be allocated in strategy were limited.

1921 and 1925 Treaties with the Soviet Union proved the considerations suggested. While March 1921 Treaty provided security in the East, and thus opportunity to focus on the Western front during the Independence War<sup>28</sup>, 1925 Treaty provided security within the circumstances in which Turkey was faced by internal-external combination of threats. During while Turkey was dealing to suppress the Sheikh Said Rebellion and trying to settle Mosul question in the south, keeping stable relations with the Soviets helped to decrease uncertainty and concerns over territorial integrity. In fact, the balance of power politics that was utilized in relations with Britain and Russia during the late Ottoman period and became one of basic foreign policy tools worked to sustain the territorial integrity although the incorporation of Mosul could not have been achieved.

The conduct of strategy that was conceived with the term of isolationism incorporated *ends* and *means*. Strategic *end* was defined as preservation of territorial integrity and decreasing the level of structural weakness. The need for considerably stable environment was required to realize that *end*. Stable international relations perceived as the *means* to achieve the determined *ends*.

The components of strategy in conduct, which are *situational*, *positional* and, *dispositional* elements, were reflected in. In terms of *situational*, contextually structured international relations were taken into account by agency. The nature of international relations and economy were subjectively read as was discussed in the portrayal of the situation. Determination of *ends* reflected agency in strategy formulation process. In that process, given that international system was continued to be globally fragile, from the perspective of Turkey's international relations, the existence of unresolved problems imposed Turkey to seek some level of

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<sup>27</sup> Kivanç Coş and Pınar Bilgin, "Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the 'Soviet Other' in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-1945," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, (2010): 43-60.

<sup>28</sup> Erik J.Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 160; Jung and Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads*, 65.

normalization of relations with the West, by settling the remained issues and not provoking them to gain new enmities. For that reason, Turkey being aware its need for peace and stability tried to establish constructive relations. Furthermore, given the effects of the Great Depression on economic development was obvious and stumbling, and the pace of reconstruction period was not produced desired outcomes,<sup>29</sup> the urgency in seeking the normalization of relations felt more seriously. Because it affected the *dispositional* component of strategy – means. As *structural weakness* endured and efforts to overcome it could not produce desired outcomes, or at least when compared with upcoming crises in international political system, it fell well behind the dictated level of needed economic recovery particularly in terms of industrialization, the dispositional element of strategy could not be recovered.

Positional component of strategy points out to *positioned-practice – praxis* – of agency. How agency defines the contextually structured environment and reflects it in conduct of strategy is incorporated in praxis. Awareness is the key to cognition which binds portrayal of the situation with the formulation and conduct of strategy. In other words, awareness and cognition as agential attributes bind *situational* component of strategy to *positional* and *dispositional* components of strategy. In realization of the *end*, within this period as the application of strategy into context, diplomacy as foreign policy tool preferred primarily and in situations where more active foreign policy was required, employing balance of power politics to overcome shortage of *means* was preferred.

Diplomacy matches to isolationist side of foreign policy in the course of resolution of unsettled issues on the way of normalization. Pragmatism matches with balance of power politics, though without exact fit, in the problems which require more assertive stance. Assertiveness applied when the circumstances evolve in which gains exceeds losses to realize *ends*. Annexation of Hatay province into Turkey exemplifies the territorial growth with pragmatism that emerged out of pragmatic use of balance of power. The combination of pragmatism and balance of power politics, or the incorporation of the former into the latter emerged from the policy of refraining adventurism. In other words, the balance of power politics is applied

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<sup>29</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 185-198.

implicitly, instead of explicit and overt use of it. Pragmatism can be argued was existing due to this implicit use of balancing in furthering gains, or revising restrictive clauses of the Lausanne Treaty, as barely seen in the issue of the status of the Straits with Montreux Convention signed in 1936.

Regarding the conduct of strategy, a closer look at the *empirical* level of the developments took place might add new outlooks in explanation. In this period, *what is actualized* begin with developments that took place in the aftermath of Lausanne Treaty and proclamation of the Turkish Republic, as the two events marked the rupture with the past. The proclamation of the Turkish Republic was the final step towards abandoning the patrimonial identity of the Empire, and was the key event in a series of political and cultural reforms implemented during the fifteen years of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's presidency.<sup>30</sup> Between 1923 and 1939 the primary focus was the internal reconstruction, but the Great Depression of 1929 while constituted an economic breaking point, the foreign policy that took shape after the 1930's marked a change in foreign policy orientation. In fact, between 1923 and 1930, Turkey strived to resolve the remaining unsettled issues from Lausanne, with the aim of creating a positive climate to build constructive relations with the West.<sup>31</sup>

The outcome of the Great Depression for Turkish Foreign Policy was Turkey's return to the West.<sup>32</sup> This reorientation of foreign policy was managed through two interrelated developments: the first one was the normalization of relations, and the second one was the changing nature of international political system that steadily approached to a devastating war. Within changing international political system, from the perspective of Turkey, it exhibited three diverging outlooks and groupings which were Britain and France, Germany and Italy, and the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup> Each of these groups carried out differing interest; thus meaning attained to them from agential perspective differed in formulating strategy. Baskın Oran argues that the strategy formulated by Atatürk and conducted by Tevfik Rüştü

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<sup>30</sup> Jung and Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads*, 60.

<sup>31</sup> Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-II", 14.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*,16.

<sup>33</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:253.



Aras<sup>34</sup> followed differing approaches to these divergent states.<sup>35</sup> With Britain and France, immediate resolution of existing problems; abstaining from having too close relations with Germany and Italy and resisting threats emanating from Italian ambitions; and with the Soviets given that it did not pose any direct threat in that period, maintaining good relations and, if needed, utilizing it as a balancer against the first and second group of states were the general lines of foreign policy.<sup>36</sup> As can be easily grasped, the first thing was to achieve normalization within this context in order either to broaden the area of maneuver, or to build closer relations with the West.

For the sake of normalization of relations with the West, from earlier on Turkey took steps, but the normalization of relations that were laden with old stereotypes was not an easy endeavor. Immediately and urgently needed to be addressed was the topic of resolving of Mosul question which had the potential to ruin benefits already had achieved. In fact, Mosul question was closely related with the internal cohesion of the country, due to the interrelation constructed with the Kurdish Question.<sup>37</sup> Turkey, despite the fact that Mosul was part of the National Pact, felt the need to give concessions to stop interference with the Kurdish question. Giving up rights over on Mosul was accepted as the remedy to stop Britain's provocation of Kurds, which was led to an upheaval in 1925 with the Sheik Said rebellion.<sup>38</sup> For that reason, seeking an explanation merely on one factor that was based on oil interests seems very limited and reductionist.<sup>39</sup>

Regarding the Ottoman debts that were taken over with the Lausanne Treaty and France as the primary provider, also turned out to be a one of the major factors

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<sup>34</sup> For a detailed understanding of Atatürk's Foreign Policy from the words of Minister of Foreign Affairs of that period see, Tefik Rüşti Aras, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003).

<sup>35</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1: 253.

<sup>36</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1: 251-252.

<sup>37</sup> Mim Kemal Öke, *Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1995).

<sup>38</sup> Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion: 1880-1925* (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1989)

<sup>39</sup> Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etmenler-I", 248.

that had to be settled in the post-war period. In fact, taking over the debts was argued to be a new and a big price that were accepted for the sake of normalization of relations with France.<sup>40</sup> Seeking normalization in external relations was thought to be the cost that should be paid for concentrating on internal reconstruction. Though diplomacy was the primary tool in the settlement period for the sake of reconstruction, the mentioned trade-offs were not out of charge, but they were made in exchange of high concessions.

The exchange of population with Greece was also accepted for the sake of normalization. The primary motivation stemmed from the deteriorating situation in the Balkans where Bulgaria demonstrated revisionist tendencies. In fact, concessions on population exchange were the result of not bilateral relations, but deteriorating international political system which showed direct bearing upon Turkey due to the geographical proximity. Moreover, the stereotypes of the Balkan Wars were still fresh in minds of governing elite who directly participated in and witnessed the loss of territory when alliance among the Balkan states would also have detrimental effects.

These concessions brought about, somehow paradoxically, the reproduction of structural weakness that was long strived to overcome. In other words, reproduction of structural weakness, apart from resulted in fueling the endurance of structural forces, probably the worst was the agential choice on giving concessions was made when awareness and consciousness were not totally lost. But, as the unsettled issues of Lausanne were resolved through diplomacy, the doubt and mistrust against the West began to disappear, being replaced by closer relations.<sup>41</sup> In that sense, the settlement resolved mistrust or at least decreased its effects to a manageable level. In that process, the pragmatism became the motto that would be utilized when suitable and beneficial conditions appeared to make foreign policy actions.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 249.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 251.

### 4.3. STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE: How strategy is represented?

The strategy of this period was represented in the discourse of “Peace at home; peace in the world”. Discourses, rather than being mere utterances and plain words, incorporate and carry signs of respective historical and sociological process. Discourse of that period emerged out of dialectical interplay of structure and agency, and this feature reflects the motivation to overcome what structure imposed on agency. Agential strategy and its representation in discourse reflected the need for a peaceful environment, both international and domestic. In a way, it pointed out the intermingled nature of domestic and international, agency and structure. It was discussed in previous two chapters that discourse operates at the domain of transitive while structures are at the domain of intransitive. Through conceptualization which is subjective by being agential and dependent upon agent’s awareness, discourse is directly related with the representation of strategy operating at the transitive level within structured context consisting of intransitive. Hence, the question of whether discourse reflects strategy thoroughly and accurately depends on agent’s capability to abstract structure, formulate a corresponded strategy, and represent that strategy in words. In this section, building upon previous two sections, the evolution of discourse within a process consisting of reading of structure and formulation of agency and representation of it in words will be discussed. The formation of discourse emerged within historical and sociological process and out of the forces and needs imposed by them.

The discourse of “peace at home; peace in the world” represents inherently the need for peace to achieve internal reconstruction and the need to stay away from the deteriorating security in Europe. Domestic reconstruction process resembled reform process of the late Ottoman Empire in terms of attempts to overcome *structural weakness*, but there is a major difference that rather than foreign involvement, agential choice played a more significant role in that process. And within reform processes, as agential preferences took major role any conditions that would provide avenue for foreign involvement was tried to be constrained.

Articulation of discourse was designed in line with the *end* in strategy that was formulated as overcoming structural weakness. One of the structural features that heavily affected Turkish Foreign Policy was tried to be solved in two domains.

Nationalism as the other structural force reinvigorated the will to overcome structural weakness by focusing on economic reconstruction. In other words, nationalism and economic development as two interrelated, but not separate, processes tried to be reconciled in that period. Frankly, the discourse while pointing out the need for economic development, at the same time, disguised the real intent. At this point, discourse of this period diverged from the 'Independence or Death' discourse in terms of their respective ambiguity. Given that 'fear from the West' was based on Western ambivalence and distrust towards the West was based on the strategic culture shaped by *Sevrésphobia*, it brought about a consideration aimed at refraining from further conflicts, and discursively not causing any sort of *otherization* became one of the factors to disguise the real nature of strategic *end*.

The nature of strategic *end* was primarily related with domestic politics where, in the National Struggle period it was directly related with the international politics. This major difference that shaped the nature of strategy might led to refraining from conveying clear messages to international audience. Indeed, the message conveyed with the demand of peace implied that Turkey in that period would avoid assertive and revisionist policies. Secondly, another difference was related with the use of balance of power politics. While it was for compensating shortage of *means*, in that period, the use of balance of power politics was employed hesitantly except a number of foreign policy issues. Instead of compensating for the disposal of *means* due the shortages in the National Struggle period, at this period the primary motivation was to assure national accumulation of power resources that if needed in the future could be used in strategy formulation. Allocating national *means* to national *ends* was the motivation, since employing *means* that were not owned bore the danger of abstaining in *means* was regarded equal to abstaining in *ends*, hence, agency.

Though the primary motivation of that period was a focus on internal reconstruction as an *end*, normalization of international relations was not excluded, but on the contrary, it was accepted as an indispensable part of reconstruction. In other words, while internal outlook privileged, the inter-related and dialectical nature of inside/outside was not underestimated. In fact, the discourse articulated to reflect this interrelated nature of reconstruction period. Furthermore, pacific nature of

discourse can be regarded as the continuation of intent on domestic reforms put into force and rejection of the imperial past.

Rejection of imperial past and normalization of relations with the West basically and directly were related with each other. This does not mean excluding other factors on the side of the West, since they too sought normalization when faced with the turmoil of upcoming war. Nevertheless, “Mustafa Kemal’s clear rejection of pan-Islamist and pan-Turanist ideas, which were ideological outlook of former Ottoman governments, facilitated the integration of a territorially based Turkish nation-state into the post-War order.”<sup>42</sup> Renunciation of imperial impulses can be seen as the rejection of anti-systemic orientation of foreign policy. Awareness of structural weakness was also reflected in discourse with the words of “we know our limits.”<sup>43</sup> The apparent outcome of that awareness was “Atatürk’s renunciation of imperialism abroad, then, was a direct function of his pursuit of ‘peace at home’ – the promotion of cohesive national identity to forestall civil upheavals and deny foreign powers opportunities to fish in muddy waters.”<sup>44</sup> From that perspective, such awareness was reflected in the need to block, or at least, to limit the venues to interfere internal affairs of the new Republic. However, at the same time, while being careful not to provoke the West for the sake of not giving a chance to interfere, the intended normalization of relations was reflected in discourse, by not targeting or incorporating any provocative discourse.

In this context, within discourse not incorporating and reflecting anti-Western stance seems as an agential preference.<sup>45</sup> And for that reason, it refrained from to being a provoking discourse, but it was an accommodating one depending on and seeking for the normalization in the process. Hence, it can be suggested that discourse abstained to disseminate message of being an ‘other’ for Europe. Probably reformists thought that their society was backward, but in essence not different from

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<sup>42</sup> Jung and Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads*, 66.

<sup>43</sup> Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, 18.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>45</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Memalik-i Osmaniye’den Avrupa Birliği’ne*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), 92.

the West.<sup>46</sup> On the question of whether this discourse emerged from an agential choice Bilgin suggests that due to ambivalence of Europe against non-Western others led to seek rapprochement with the West.<sup>47</sup> Actually, by being an indispensable part of the European history and diplomacy, either by warfare, or diplomacy Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire is basically a European country, though for Europe, Turks is being represented as the “permanent other.”<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, domestic reform process which was symbolized with the six arrows incorporated discursively the renunciation of the imperial past. For Mustafa Aydın, the three strains of the Ottoman past, which were *pan-Ottomanism*, *pan-Islamism*, and *pan-Turanism*, had intellectually emerged as the remedy to save the Ottoman Empire from collapse, but continued to be inherently imperial. The imperial *Ottomanism* was rejected with *republicanism*, *pan-Islamism* with *secularism*, and *pan-Turanism* with *nationalism*.<sup>49</sup> In practice this rupture was represented by appointing the Grand National Assembly as the “sole rightful representative of the nation,” which discursively highlighted the rupture between the past by handing sovereignty from Sultan over to society. In a similar vein, the ideology of expansionism was renounced in favor of peaceful foreign policy. Before ending this section, a number of points need to be discussed in order to explain the nature of rupture with the past, and reorientation towards the Republic. These are nationalism at discursive level, and the symbolism which accompanied the discourse.

Introduction of nationalism and meaning attained to it have differed considerably as discussed in the previous sections. Here, the discursive aspect of nationalism will be discussed. The introduction of Turkish nationalism with six arrows inherently did not consist of imperial ambitions and this feature gave it a defensive character aiming to build internal cohesion in the country. In fact, the concept of ‘Turkness’ was conceived of and further articulated with an effort to disguise the reality of inherited diversity and heterogeneity and to represent the

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Bilgin, “Securing Turkey through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy”, 114.

<sup>48</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, “The Permanent ‘Other’: Turkey and the Question of European Identity”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18, no.4 (2007): 110.

<sup>49</sup> Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy”, 172.

remaining population of the country with homogeneity.<sup>50</sup> Apart from building internal cohesion, and thus being defensive in character, internationally it carried out similar feature by representing the nation indivisible whole. Hence, in Turkish nationalism it was rare to see signs of anti-Westernism and locality,<sup>51</sup> the former was considered a threat to security, and the latter a threat to the internal cohesion of the country. For that reason, nationalism was conceived as a civic nationalism to overcome heterogeneity, melting differences in a pot. It foresaw a kind of nationalism based on common citizenship and did not extend its aims beyond the national borders.<sup>52</sup> Since Turkish nationalism was articulated for social mobilization, in the processes of either social control, or modernization, it represented qualitatively pragmatic and functional in nature. And nationalism as a control and mobilization tool, and correspondingly with its functional and pragmatist nature, brought about the tendency to produce the content of discourse in line with the goals.<sup>53</sup> The goal inherent in discourse and incorporated in it were extracted from the *ends* of strategy and reflected in discourse.

Symbolism used in the early republican years deserves to be addressed. Among symbolism representing reconstruction the choice of place for the capital of the new republic is self-explanatory. Although making Ankara the capital city of the new Republic though might not be thought at the level of discourse, it symbolically represented the rupture with the imperial past. Ankara was declared as the capital with a consideration that it represented a fresh and a new start rather than Istanbul as the symbol of the spoiled and old imperial mindset.<sup>54</sup> New nation-state project was represented in a place that was not laden with historical, social, and symbolic weight, but conceived of as a detached, discrete and revolutionary place in the middle of

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<sup>50</sup> Keyder, “Bir Türk Milliyetçilik Tarihi ve Coğrafyası”, in *Memalik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*, 81.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>52</sup> Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2000), 76.

<sup>53</sup> Keyder, “Bir Türk Milliyetçilik Tarihi ve Coğrafyası”, in *Memalik-i Osmaniye'den Avrupa Birliği'ne*, 91.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

steppe, a geography that can be conceived with nothingness.<sup>55</sup> But this relocation of the capital to represent the rupture was not immune from producing outcomes for the future of social and political life of Turkey. This rejection of geography, among several outcomes most fundamentally shook the identity and led to an eventual identity crisis, and produced a feeling of temporary existence rather than permanency.<sup>56</sup> It can be suggested that this meant the society living on the territories of the New Republic felt ever threatened, which should also be thought within the scope of strategic culture that was mainly shaped by *Sevrésphobia*.

Similar symbolism also existed within national anthem that correlated with nationalism, particularly with the nationalization of territory. In the aftermath of independence, it was argued that the conception of nationalism transformed *territorialization of nation* into *nationalization of territory*.<sup>57</sup> In that process, the territory of the National Pact was conceived as the lands that deserve to be died for. In the national anthem, the conception of nationalism was also represented both symbolically and discursively, articulating both the costs paid with lives and readiness to give more lives for the defense of that lands, and representing preservation of territory and sovereignty as a cause.<sup>58</sup> These two examples of symbolic representation explains, or at least highlights how nationalism with symbols was treated as the tool of mobilization for the sake of *end* incorporated in the strategy of the time.

#### 4.4. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE

In this section, it is deemed to discuss whether an incongruence between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken* exists, and if it exists how this incongruence emerged. In the previous sections, after providing a discussion of the structured context, how agency perceived that structure and dialectically how strategy was formulated by agency were explained. Agency in the strategy formulation process,

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>57</sup> Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane'den Vatan'a*, 25-48.

<sup>58</sup> Keyder, "Bir Türk Milliyetçilik Tarihi ve Coğrafyası", 88.



due to uncertainty embedded within international political context, faced challenges that had to be overcome. Since primary objective was to focus on internal reconstruction and consolidation of the new republic born out of imperial past needed considerably peaceful environment, hence, the strategy formulation of that period focused on normalization with the West by settling down the issues postponed in the Lausanne, preservation of collaborative relations with Russia, in case it was needed for balancing since shortage of *means* continued, preservation of territorial integrity despite threatening conditions began to emerge both firstly with Britain and then with Italy, and initiation of industrialization along with domestic reforms to overcome enduring structural weakness that constrains foreign policy options. The realization of that strategic *ends* were inherently, due to structural factors, bound up with preservation of peaceful environment. Hence, the discourse articulated in that period with the words of “peace at home; peace in the world” represented the need for peace both domestically and internationally. Considered within this context, it can be argued that the discourse of this period shows basically agential characteristics. However, whether *what is spoken* coalesced with *what is actualized* demands further elaboration.

Examination of incongruence between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*, as two interrelated aspects, need to be pursued within a process in which the latter precedes the former. Discourse as a speech and an act of representation makes known what is intended with strategy that is formulated by the agency within the structured context. But, since strategy depends on subjectivity of agent, and its ability to see, get aware, abstract, conceptualize and put into identification of *ends*, strategy and discourse are produced and reflect the respective spatio-temporal conditions which gave articulation of them. Hence, since knowledge of structures, as intransitive domain, is not possible without distortions, then fluctuations between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken* are imminent. Otherwise, an endeavor of discussing sources of incongruence would be nonsense. To critically explore the sources of incongruence, pursuing a discussion on *what is actualized* would facilitate definition of, if exists, the incongruence and sources of it.

In terms of *what is actualized*, Turkey from the beginning started a process of normalization and achieved this normalization despite some concessions granted in

exchange of that normalization. But, motivation to overcome structural weakness and not applying the balance of power politics continued to play a significant role. On the way of industrialization, due to the unexpected Great Depression of 1929, the expected levels of development could not be achieved, but a certain level of economic independence was managed to be sustained, at least in this period Turkey refrained from applying for foreign debts. But, when the re-payment process of the Ottoman debts started, as a complicating factor, economic initiatives and steps to overcome structural weakness was further hampered. The outcome of these developments was irrespective of efforts to overcome structural weakness to prosper economically, due to structural factors, hence the expected results could not be received. This inevitably brought about endurance of structural weakness, as the self reliance could not be achieved.

After the 1930's as international political system began to approach war, and thereby, the need to ensure security by forging alliances become inevitable, the hopes to overcome structural weakness began to wane. However, preserving security through forging alliances began to appear as an option, but with hesitation, since the wider ones demand wider political commitments. As a country suffering from resources – *means* – the best option was regarded to keep alliances regional which did not demand excessive commitments. Regional alliances while began to be forged among comparatively similar level of states, though they were founded with a consideration to suppress tensions and possible instabilities from the source, and thus, they remained affordable for participating countries, but at the same time, open to outside disturbance by major powers meddling. In other words, regional alliances as politically more sustainable, they were more open to major power interference. Thus, as international political system steadily approached the war, the fragility of those alliances become visible and short-lived, since regional states were far from ensuring security through their own powers and they were open changing their minds with the pressures applied on any of them. The outcome of alliances for Turkey were beneficial, since they managed to keep threats away from Turkish borders, or at least suppress a possible spill over to Turkey, as it was case for the Sadabat Pact of 1937. The Sadabat Pact played significant role in suppressing Kurdish issue at the regional level, before becoming a threat to Turkish security. But, as threats began to be fiercer

with the rise of Italy and Germany as spoiler, and their acts went beyond discourse, the regional alliances through which Turkey sought to ‘secure places’<sup>59</sup> brought about the need to forge alliances with the Great Powers of Europe. In fact, the changing nature of international system reinforced Turkey’s Western orientation.<sup>60</sup> Finally in October 1939 Turkey signed Tripartite Treaty with France and Britain, which was reciprocally founded to put parties under firm commitments in the face of an upcoming war.

Regarding *what is actualized* it can be argued that, in this period, efforts to overcome structural weakness constituted the crux of the formulated strategy. However, as international political system and international economy began to deteriorate, the desired outcomes to build self-reliant economy could not be achieved. But, agential choice to forge alliances to overcome security deficits produced positive outcomes and a belt of peace around Turkey could be sustained, although the existence of politically incommensurable parties involved into the politics around Turkey.

In dealing with diverse political issues and each potentially having dynamics to disturb relations, diplomacy gained primacy in that period similar to the National Struggle period. But, the other component of strategy – use of force – was downgraded, since in terms of capabilities to be utilized was limited and any involvement in international relations by last remaining *means* would have the potential to ruin every achievement that were realized until that time. It was observed that, except for the Montreaux Convention, the balance of power politics, as an instrument of transforming *means* that were not owned, began to be excluded in foreign policy. Instead, taking part in alliances began to be adopted though this preference had many potential negative outcomes on the agency. This point is mentioned, but not discussed theoretically in depth, by Baskın Oran with the words of ‘the shift from relative autonomy’.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Mustafa Aydın, “Securitization of History and Geography”, 172.

<sup>60</sup> Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy”, 172.

<sup>61</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:498.

Regarding the discourse and strategic outcome of that period, it is not observed an open incongruence, but slight divergence on the will to preserve self-reliance and non-aligned foreign policy, due to the structural forces at work. Divergence began to emerge from the mid 1930's as the need to preserve security by participating alliance became apparent. Particularly, it became inevitable when the normalization of relations with the West reached to produce the ground to align, and as the attempts to overcome structural weakness could not have produced desired outcomes in the face of deteriorating international political system. Although what was incorporated in discourse, demanding peace both in international and domestic environment was achieved, but as the threats become evident the search for alliances came to be observed. Alliances, though forged with the consideration to alleviate security concerns, remained to be defensive in nature, hence not demonstrating divergence in peace-seeking. From that perspective, agential preferences continued to exist despite the existence of pressures to deviate from it. Hence, within discourse the awareness of structural forces were incorporated rather implicitly. Instead of overt expression of the need for peace that was actually emanating from existing structural weakness and the need to overcome it, preference was made discursively to cloak the interrelation between structural weakness and peaceful environment.

Structural weakness that undermined *means* in strategy formulation, even though tried to be surpassed, continued to be effective given that overcoming it needed a longer span of time and firmer acts to overcome it. Nevertheless, irrespective of structural weakness, agency in strategy formulation was secured in that period. Nationalism on the other hand, as discussed above, though not incorporated within discourse, it was employed to serve for the sake of overcoming *structural weakness* and ensuring complete independence in that period. Unlike from the period of the National Struggle, it was directed towards achievement of that *end*. However, as structural factors worked to distract and undermine the efforts, nationalism continued to be effective in preserving agency.

In the previous chapter, regarding the modernization, it was suggested that *defensive modernization* transformed into an *integrative modernization* by giving up anti-systemic character of the state. After the proclamation of the Republic, integrative modernization continued to be the game in town. The intellectual debates

put forward to save the empire from dissolution were discussed above. The Six Arrows of Republican Social Party and its implementation in governmental policies further lessened the effects of irredentist and imperialist intellectual outlooks in domestic politics, by introducing Republicanism against *Ottomanism*, Secularism against Islamism and Nationalism against *Turanism*. Domestically the renunciation of imperial impulses and efforts to build a modern country in the sense of Western Civilization brought about a corresponding need to build peaceful relations in foreign relations. This need produced practical results by initiating a normalization process with the West by resolving remaining issues postponed in Lausanne. Normalization was not born solely out from the domestic needs and motivations, international political system played a significant role of the catalyst in the process as another devastating war became inevitable. Hence, it can be argued that the threat perception of the time facilitated and reinforced the process of integrative modernization. The primary motivation in pursuing integrative modernization was to keep subjectivity and agency at hand, and acting very cautiously not to lose these competencies. This caution led to conceptualization of that period with the term of ‘relative autonomy’.

## CHAPTER 5

### 1939-1945 “Turkey Cannot Assure Its Security through Forging Alliances”

#### 5. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

The main issue of this period was the Second World War. But the political, economic and diplomatic outcomes within the process extended to cover pre and post war dynamics. In fact, the Second World War represented a breaking point in world history, but in terms of its results, while some positive outcomes were observed, the basic dynamics showed continuities with the previous periods. For Turkish Foreign Policy, the years of the Second World War, which actually had begun to be shaped in the late 1930's, triggered the emergence of reorientation in the course of security and foreign policy,<sup>1</sup> though the discourse particularly between 1939 and 1945 was represented the opposite. To reveal how strategy is formulated within this period, the structure adopted in the previous chapters will be followed to keep coherence within the dissertation.

Strategy and discourse within this period reflected both specific conditions of the respective period and general effects emanating from the structure. In other words, both structure and context were at play in the formulation of strategy and its discourse. Within the strata of *real*, it has already been argued that *international political system*, *international economy* and *geography* have causal powers to determine the flow of events, either constraining or enabling agents. Structural weakness, nationalism and consideration of territorial integrity sustained to effect the formulation of strategy. But given the specific nature of the international political system corresponded with a major war gained primacy and significance compared to international economy and geography. It is not meant here that politics superseded

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<sup>1</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2015), 393-484.

economics and geography, but it added further meanings and dynamics in their conceptualization and their respective roles in formulating strategy.

International political system, as mentioned above, with a major war that shook the existing post-World war system produced major shifts both in terms of the nature of the international order and the number of powers that sustained that order. The outcomes of Paris Peace Conference that was accepted to end the war in Europe waned and developments right after the peace accords began to ruin the established order, in which the nationalities problem had been resolved.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Western Powers accepted the First World War as the war that ends all wars.<sup>3</sup> However, rather than resolving tensions in Europe, Versailles Treaty postponed the tensions by adding new ones to trigger a bigger earthquake that expanded war of Europe over the World. In that sense, the Second World War is the continuation of the first one in an expanded form, with more severe devastations, with higher costs both humanitarian and material terms to be paid for peace, and cruelty and violence. Basically, the Second World War emerged from the complications created by the end of the First World War, and the peace established by the victors. Germany rising as the spoiler, together with Japan and Italy, become part of that revisionist tendency of the international order and finally triggered the eruption of war.

Turkey, after Independence War, as was discussed in the previous chapters, pursued an isolationist policy that was formulated to stay away tensions that could bear devastating outcomes. Between 1923 and 1939, Turkish Foreign Policy focused on internal reconstruction and power accumulation that was dedicated to an objective of ensuring security by self-reliance. But compounded with *structural weakness*, for Turkey capability to ensure security with its own *means* steadily began to disappear as the nature and scope of threats began to challenge basic objective of Turkey, defined with the concept of territorial integrity. The consideration of self-reliance and self-preservation was thought to be eroded when faced with major threats.

Within international political system, the Italian threat and measures taken to ensure security were discussed in previous chapter. Germany was not identified as an

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<sup>2</sup> Baskın Oran ed., *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 1:400.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

immediate threat, thanks to geographical proximity were not allowing such a perception. Nevertheless, as the international system got closer to disruption, the effects were felt, despite lacking directness and immediateness.

Nationalism as an outcome of the changing nature of international political system in that period reached a radical level with the frustration and imposition of heavy burdens on the losing states, which brought about radicalization of nationalism which was conceived as fascism. Nourished by fascism, particularly Italy and Germany from the beginning sought the revision of the post First World War conditions, first hesitantly, then overtly, by the use of force. The lack of power to enforce provisions of the peace treaties by victors led to emergence of alliances to aggregate decisiveness to keep the established order working. But, the order was not reinforced with power at disposal and in the absence of any intention to allocate the use of force, to maintain international balance and peace the only option remained was the appeasement policy against the revisionist states. It was compounded and was reinforced with the defensive alliances. Institutionally, the League of Nations, could not manage to prevent revisionist tendencies, when the war was steadily becoming inescapable.

The ramifications of the changing international political system on Turkey were felt ostensibly, while the world was approaching the war. With the start of the war both the Allies and Germany sought Turkey's entrance into the war on their side. Both sides endowed concessions to persuade Turkey to take part in that war. In other words, to face the pressures, Turkey needed to resist by pursuing cautious balance between the warring parties. Even though, normalization with the West was achieved in the previous period, this normalization was dedicated to construct peaceful environment needed for the reconstruction of the country, not to revive expansionist tendencies, or to recapture lost territories, or to ally with one side to further their interests. There were differing interests, hence driving motivations, in seeking and eventually extracting benefits from this normalization. While Turkey's primary objective was to stay away and not to experience devastating effects of war, the Allied powers' objective was to stretch operational area to split the focus and forces of Axis Powers.



International economy, as the other structural factor and its *actual* level outcome, the structural weakness, continued to exist comparatively. International economy had not fully recovered after the Great Depression, but the Second World War had further exacerbated the situation with war economy. The states applied for neo-mercantilist policies through which they could protect national markets with several instruments including tariff walls and similar applications, at the same time, they also tried to infiltrate in new international markets through the use of force and other type of sanctions.<sup>4</sup> This adventurism to gain new markets brought about the growth of national sentiments as well. Due to the outlook of international economy, it can be considered that in the absence of great powers capable of suppressing the revisionist tendencies, instead, applying for appeasement policy, was the outcome of that process. As will be observed, two world wars while eroded Europe as the political center of the world, they had also paved the way for the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union to rise as the two super powers of the post-Second World War order. In other words, Europe went into war that would erode its predominant position, thus, would downgrade the continent to secondary position. Within war years, economy exhibited the features of war conditions in which raw materials and industry were directed towards to produce and maintain war machines of warring states, rather than increasing the welfare of the society. From a wider perspective, war extracted and consumed more than what had been produced, leaving yet recovering international economy to lesser conditions.

Turkey within such an international economy, by being the producer of raw materials, was treated as a country with whom the relations should be kept at certain levels to guarantee the flow of materials. Hence, it can be suggested that deterioration of relations that could hamper economic interests was refrained by both the Allied and the Axis powers. Economic stakes of foreign powers, while providing a bargaining bid in favor of Turkey, their stakes and interests did not allow to pursue a strict and decisive stance *vis-a-vis* Turkey. Nevertheless, each party sought ways to block flow of materials to the other side by building alliances with firm commitments.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 1:401.

Geography gained significance as the meaning attained to Turkish territories had changed considerably. Both the Allied and the Axis powers tried to attract Turkey to take part on their side, in order either to block expansion of war towards the Middle East or, to get divide the front and the forces allocated to each front. Particularly, German policy of *Lebensraum*, expansion into the new soils to raise power and resources, made geography inescapably the major factor of the war. Turkey within these circumstances felt the uncertainty as neither side gained supremacy to change dynamics and outcomes of the War. Furthermore, provoking any side could hamper all the gains that were achieved in the past.

## **5.2. AGENCY AND STRATEGY**

Within this context, agential choice of Turkey was to stay outside of the Second World War. The primary objective of that strategy was “the preservation of Turkey for Turks.”<sup>5</sup> If considered within the perspective of strategy, apart from having incorporated as *end* in strategy, it also revealed *end* was defined from the agential perspective. The argument put forward here will be substantiated through theoretical framework laid out. Structurally, international political system faced one of the major challenges of history. In line with this challenge, Turkey’s place in international economy and the meaning attained to the geography of Turkey demonstrated both challenges and opportunities. In substantiating the argument, the agential read of the structure and context will be discussed in order to draw the picture of how the context and structure were portrayed by the agency.

The portrayal of the situation inherently took in account three structural forces within their particular context. In terms of structural weakness, demonstrating considerably a persistent character which rooted in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century of Ottoman Empire, it endured to make the effects observable. Even though, attempts to overcome, or at least to decrease its effects on foreign policy strategy were carried out, the outcomes, again, due to inherent structural factors, were far from being realized of that intent. Thus, Turkey recognized that within the context of the Second

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<sup>5</sup> Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 38.

World War, it was inevitable to tackle with the war conditions that were inherited from the past with existing shortfalls.

In the late 1930's, economically, the desired reconstruction and development could not be managed but a problem of economic dependence became apparent particularly to Germany.<sup>6</sup> Self-reliance in economic sphere could not be realized, but at least, an agential awareness that that Turkish economy could not carry the burden of total war while fighting with great powers of Europe was observed. As Deringil pointed out, inability to acquire complete economic independence brought about to focus more strictly on political independence in foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> The awareness of the enduring structural weakness, imposing to be and act more cautiously, was also effective in determining *ends* in strategy. Particularly, the determined *end* should not create deterioration of that weakness that could sever the dependency of Turkey. In that sense, preservation, at least politically, of the relative autonomy should be taken as the bottom line in formulation of strategic *end*. Subjectivity, despite structural imposition on eroding that subjectivity was apparent, it was strived to be sustained. International dynamics, the flow of events, and uncertainty embedded within the rapid changing international system led Turkey to refrain from any commitments that could constrain agency. For that reason, the formulation of *ends* was channeled to assure agency in foreign policy.

The shortfalls of *means* that could assure survival against the war machines of either Allied or Axis attrition had also implications on the determination of that *end* in strategy. Shortfalls in *means*, as resources that can be allocated to achieve the *ends* were incorporated in strategy consisting of both economic and military dimensions. Economically, in the previous section, it was argued that measures taken to recover war-ravaged economy of the new republic could not have managed to produce the desired outcomes. Particularly, measures to develop national industry could not have been achieved due to the absence of capital accumulation, the negative conditions created by the 1929 Great Depression, and Turkey's initiation of repayment of the

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<sup>6</sup> Particularly the 'clearing' agreements which are based on repayment of imported goods through export of goods instead of Money created dependency on bilateral trade which constrains freedom of trade of supplier. On this issue see Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014), 23.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

inherited Ottoman Debts. Apart from general unfavorable state of the economy, the industry specialized on military equipment that was needed more urgently in the face of upcoming war created a shortage of *means*. The inability to construct self-reliance, in time, economically brought about dependence on great powers. Preservation of the military readiness began to be heavily depended upon the extraordinary measures covering foreign debts, credits, and contracts.<sup>8</sup> In such a situation, while as Germany, Britain too began to use deficiency in *means* and economic underdevelopment as a leverage to extract political concessions. Their pragmatism to anchoring Turkey brought about erosion of agency, which actually gained importance more than before. Even, they threatened Turkey, with not supplying required industrial materials in the post-War period. In fact, Turkey faced a hard choice that consisted of either to lose agency by aligning with one of the blocs, or to be left alone in the post-war period. In other words, political economy of the state was laden with severe ramifications on agency.

The military readiness of Turkish Armed Forces was well behind the required level to ensure defense of the country, particularly in the face of upcoming total war. Furthermore, this lack of readiness was further complicated existing anxieties, given that strategic culture that was crystallized with territorial retreat. Within total war, it is not easy to separate a country's readiness into civilian and military sectors, since the power of one is depended heavily upon the other. In fact, Turkey was far from being prepared in both segments. Industrialization could not yield outcomes to ensure self-reliance and technology was lacking in the improvement of warfare equipment. Furthermore, the socially war-fatigue country was away from waging a total war with all shortcomings and an ill-equipped army. Armament policy still was going on, but it was still far from the desired level of ambition. One of the most visible deficiencies of armed forces was its lack of power projection capability within the limited time spans. It stemmed from lack of mobilization in the absence of motorized units. Compared with Germany, who had introduced *blitzkrieg* into warfare, lack of mobilization constituted a critical problem that eventually shaped the defense policy and strategy of the time. Substantial immobility, meant ground forces could not be deployed within short period of time, leaving military deployment

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 28.

defensive in character.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, it exacerbated economy of the country with extra loans on the budget, since the absence of capability to project existing power to a threatened point required to build defense in all fronts without taking the risk of abstaining and to keep higher number of soldiers under arms.<sup>10</sup>

Answering the question of “how these integrated and intermingled dynamics were resolved to produce an agential strategy?” leads to the formulation of strategy. The formulation of strategy took place within distorted and blurred circumstances because of uncertainty embedded within it. The ramifications of the distorted and blurred conditions had been felt directly upon the process of strategy formulation. In this process, the primary objective was to stay away from commitments that could attract devastating reaction of the other side. As Hale noted, this objective stemmed from the understanding of “saving the country from a return to death and destruction of war.”<sup>11</sup> That the “watchword or caution”<sup>12</sup> gained significance in this period, and that “gaining time”<sup>13</sup> was adopted as the driving consideration within prevailing uncertainty had contributed to the formulation of *end*. Thus, commitments leaving no room for maneuver were refrained to allow flexibility in future foreign policy actions and to keep pragmatism at hand. Otherwise, in the eyes of decision makers, firm commitments had the potential to produce undesired outcomes ranging from losing flexibility to losing agency.

Prevailing uncertainty in international relations, and eagerness to preserve agency led to the formulation of *end* that refrained commitments to either side. In terms of *means*, whether the state of *means* of the time contributed to definition of such *end* should be clarified. In fact, the nature of military and economy as *means*, as discussed above, was far from supporting an *end* except staying away of war and taking defensive measures to ensure survival, preserve territorial integrity, protect sovereignty, and keep agency, all of which were also questionable compared to war

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<sup>9</sup> Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy: 1934-1942”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no.3 (1995): 498; for wider picture of military buildup see 498-502.

<sup>10</sup> Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 32.

<sup>11</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 56.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

machines of the revisionists. Consequently, it would not be wrong to suggest that shortfalls of *means* had contributed to an *end* that refrained from any firm commitments. But, the reality on the ground demonstrated real divergence with the Tripartite Treaty signed with Britain and France in June 1939. Though it was designed to counter primarily the Italian Threat, it eventually turned out to be a defensive one.<sup>14</sup> The alliance treaty with Britain and France can be viewed from the perspective of growing need to enhance security in the face of growing threats. Alliance policy can be seen basically as a remedy to subsidize shortfalls of *means* by building extra measures to ensure security. In the 1930s Turkey initiated a number of alliances to block possible spill over of instabilities which posed threats to Turkey's security. In this way, security concerns were tried to be halted to a manageable level. But the 'defensive alliances'<sup>15</sup> tailored as assurance measures were not considered to be adequate particularly after the German invasion of Poland in 1939, which demonstrated Turkey that defensive measures might not guarantee to stop a possible German attack. Agential deduction from the developments taking place had led Turkey to conclude that "Turkey had to make sure that if it could not stay out of the war, then it was at least on the winning side."<sup>16</sup> This objective was inherently adopted to decrease uncertainty and not to provoke any warring side.

The practical outcome of these considerations was conceived with the terms of "neutrality," "active neutrality,"<sup>17</sup> "non-belligerency," and "cautious balance"<sup>18</sup>. Each of these concepts highlighted one common point, which was *neutrality*. Adjectives added to the concepts signified agential nature of neutrality policy with slight differences. With the concept of 'cautious balance', it was meant "aiding the

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<sup>14</sup> Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain, and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1979), 40-44.

<sup>15</sup> Metin Tamkoç, "Turkey's Quest for Security through Defensive Alliances," *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Yılığ* 2 (1961), 1-39.

<sup>16</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p.47.

<sup>17</sup> Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>18</sup> John M. Vanderlippe, "A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II," *Historian* 64, no.1 (2001).

Allies as much as possible without provoking a German Attack.”<sup>19</sup> Non-belligerency referred the will to stay out of war. As Oran pointed out, during the war Turkey was not neutral but non-belligerent, and this non-belligerency was in favor of the Allied Powers, in which Britain constituted the crux.<sup>20</sup> And finally, ‘active neutrality’ was inherently embedded with a policy of ‘wait and see’. Maintaining patience was considered to halt uncertainty<sup>21</sup> as the development of events would decrease it and eventually would ease the anticipation. That’s why basically neutrality policy is accepted as somehow a “policy of waiting.”<sup>22</sup> Hence, while caution highlights unprovocative intent with timid and hesitant approach, with the term of active agential preference is reflected encompassing awareness, cognition and intent to actively pursue a policy which serves national interests, and implicitly declaring the part favored. What is more important within these conceptions is the fact that each gave credit to agency irrespective of how complicated the situation was.

In this context, strategy formulation is founded upon the portrayal of situation both in terms of *ends* and *means*. Strategy, as agential outlook and correspondent action, is discussed to carry the elements within as *situational*, *positional* and *dispositional*. Regarding *situational* aspect of strategy, the international political system was quite challenging with inherent uncertainty and violence that threatened the survival of Turkey or, at least, with the risk of downgrading Turkey to a pawn by losing attributes of agency within international rivalry, in which conflicting interests were tried to be satisfied through the use of force. *Structural weakness* as an enduring structural factor continued to play a significant role although directly threatening developments had not taken place. But the changing composition of alliances, particularly Non-Aggression Pact, signed between Russia and Germany, both diplomatically and politically constrained the options of Turkey. The outward result of this accord was the imposition of seeking alliance with the West, and the loss of a ‘friendly Russia’ that contributed both in *means* and broadened policy

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>20</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:393.

<sup>21</sup> Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 48.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

options in the past. Though this treaty was perceived as a nightmare that left Turkey between fires, the normalization period with the West to a degree decreased total isolation of Turkey.

*Positional* element of strategy referring to agential – Turkey’s – *positioned practices* derived from the rapidly changing nature of developments. Strategy was determined within the dialectics of structured context and agency. From the mid 1930’s Turkey felt the upcoming war, and in line with this read of the situation, tried to ensure security. As mentioned above, dispositional element of strategy *means* was away to ensure security militarily by relying on national resources. Despite the attempts to increase military readiness to defend the territory, these attempts remained to be limited and the need for foreign aid remained in place. In that process, Germany’s assertiveness increased in time as Britain pursued appeasement policy and the League of Nations’ efforts to prevent war in Europe was behind to be effective in deterring German and Japan aspirations. The third stage of German Foreign Policy of erasing the Versailles order, namely the *Lebensraum* policy, triggered anxieties in Turkey and caused seeking of accommodation with the West.<sup>23</sup> In other words, during the war a constant re-evaluation of the situation shaped evolution of the strategic policy in the face of ongoing uncertainty, showing fluctuations as the progress of war showed rapid fluctuations.

The policy of isolationism that had historical roots, was formulated to focus on internal reconstruction; thus, overcoming the shortage of *means*. Otherwise, any transfer of borrowed *means* could hamper the formulation of strategy, asserting to become just objects of the policies of other subjects and their agency. Nevertheless, complicating nature of international relations, approaching war and equivalently getting more visible and graver threats pushed Turkey to determine a fallback position and to seek alignments.

Within this context, conduct of strategy demonstrating the agential inputs derived from the portrayal of the situation and formulation of strategy that is capable of realizing the *ends* in strategy. Two objectives that were incorporated in strategy of

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<sup>23</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol ed., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 10<sup>th</sup> ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2015), 137.



Turkey in the War were; not to enter into war, and to prevent an occupation.<sup>24</sup> These *ends* of strategy were detailed within security realm. The three objectives that were determined to ensure security were; “to strengthen military position in Thrace and the Dardanelles by removing de-militarization restrictions contained in Lausanne Treaty; to build up and modernize its armed forces; and to reach an accommodation and, if possible, a defensive alliance with Britain and France while preserving the entente with Moscow.”<sup>25</sup> Thanks to the normalization period of the 1923-1939 years, the rapprochement provided the ground to forge a defensive alliance with France and Britain in October 1939.<sup>26</sup> Apart from, going into alliance relations with the West, Turkey to keep upcoming war away from its territory forged regional alliances. One of them was the Balkan Pact signed in 1934, which served two objectives; first to keep threat and turmoil as far as possible away from Turkish borders, if not achieved, to assure a common response to aggressor<sup>27</sup> and not to allow the Balkans as “the ground for the ambitions of great powers.”<sup>28</sup> But, it could not produced desired outcomes as in the late 1930’s Yugoslavia and Romania drifted to German orbit<sup>29</sup> and Italy attacked Greece in 1940, despite the existence of Greek reservations that mutual assistance foreseen in the pact would not oblige Greece to enter a war with Italy.

While defensive regional alliances considered and forged before the war were waned, the most effective and challenging developments on Turkish foreign policy took place in the first year of the war, which put Turkey into a difficult position; the first one was the quick defeat of France in June 1940, party of the Tripartite Treaty, and the signature of Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact in 23 August 1939. The sudden withdrawal of France at the beginning of war in June 1940, gave Turkey a

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<sup>24</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:387.

<sup>25</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 47.

<sup>26</sup> According to the Tripartite Treaty Turkey underwent defensive commitments. One of them is to enter into war, in case war expanded into Mediterranean. See Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:425-428.

<sup>27</sup> Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy”, 489.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.; For a wider discussion see Mustafa Türkeş, “Balkan Pact and Its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States 1930-34”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 30, no.1 (1994): 123-144.

<sup>29</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 46.

way-out not to realize the commitments existing in the Tripartite Alliance Treaty. The surrender of France on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June, in Turkey, reinforced the belief that Turkey should refrain from any commitments in Europe, and caused domestic critiques that Turkey behaved too quickly to enter into commitments.<sup>30</sup> But, Russo-German Pact created a horror of occupation from Germany that advanced very quickly in Europe and the Soviets with whom relations deteriorated day by day. But, known as ‘Poland syndrome’, a fear to be occupied by Russia and Germany was halted with German attack on Russia in June 1941.<sup>31</sup> This pact, together with the rumors in Turkey, was believed to be forged with the efforts of German ambassador in Turkey Von Papen with the goal of putting Turkey into further uncertainty, pushing Turkey to make a choice, and eventually pressuring to pursue a pro-German stance.<sup>32</sup> In this way, Von Papen thought a pro-German Turkey would facilitate a German assault on Britain in the Middle East.<sup>33</sup>

Consequently, within these challenging circumstances, for the sake of preservation of agency, Turkey behaved very cautiously and tried to refrain from entering into the war. “For İnönü, caution meant weighing all of the potential effects of every decision before making any commitment to the Great Powers, Allied or Axis. Balance did not equal neutrality, but rather a recognition that Turkish interests would be served best by a balance of power in Europe, through the Great Powers would each serve as a check on the ambitions of the others.”<sup>34</sup> Within changing conditions, Turkey decided not to realize the commitments enlisted in the Tripartite Treaty with the excuse of the required military equipment by promised Britain was not handed over, and the sudden surrender of France, the absence of one of the signatory parties, was considered as an excuse to halt the provisional commitments, defined as entering into war to defend the being attacked party.<sup>35</sup> This consideration

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<sup>30</sup> Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 108-115.

<sup>31</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:388.

<sup>32</sup> Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 85-86, 91.

<sup>33</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 60.

<sup>34</sup> Vanderlippe, “A Cautious Balance”, 63-80.

<sup>35</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:394.

was welcome by Foreign Secretary of Britain Lord Halifax, who appreciated Turkey's decision not to join the war. It was also pointed out in a military report that "if Turkey joined the war, and was attacked by Germany, then Hitler's armies could conquer the country in 16 weeks. In effect, a belligerent Turkey would be more of liability than an asset for Britain."<sup>36</sup>

Strategy as positioned practice drove the policy of Turkey in the war. In essence, while Turkey strived to preserve agency in *ends*, the major powers too tried to adjust their policies in respect to the developments of war, hence, their approaches too showed fluctuations. In the shortfall of *means*, the *dispositional* element of strategy, Turkey employed geography as a remedy to that shortage of *means*. In other words, Turkey within the condition of the World War was also attributed its geography as a *mean* to achieve *ends* in strategy. Turkey's geographic position meant vital importance for its powerful friends.<sup>37</sup> By pointing out that the occupation of Turkey, bearing geostrategic importance, might change the dynamics in favor of the country occupied, thus, non-belligerency basically served the Allied interests, by not dividing the force in supporting Turkey against an aggression.<sup>38</sup> This consideration, as mentioned above, was appreciated by Halifax and Britain, though when the developments in war began to change in favor of the Allied Powers, demands on use of airbases, and Turkey's join into war on their side began to be aired, while the demands on Turkey's belligerency was supported by Germany.

From a broader perspective, Turkey advocated the view that its neutrality was not a complete neutrality, but a kind of neutrality that served the Allied interests by not giving an excuse to Germany to attack the Middle East, henceforth, blocking German expansion into the Middle East.<sup>39</sup> But weak messages conveyed to allies, by not undergoing further commitments, and constantly watching national interests, can be perceived as a factor that causing the questioning of reliability that had already started to be questioned almost at the very beginning of the war. Nevertheless,

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<sup>36</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 60.

<sup>37</sup> Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 51.

<sup>38</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:395.

<sup>39</sup> Vanderlippe, "A Cautious Balance", 71.

Turkey by staying out of war, basically managed not only to refrain from destructive effects of war, but it also facilitated the interests of Allied Powers even at the expense of harsh critiques of both sides due to the balance of power politics apart from applying geography as a *mean*. From agency-structure perspective, though agency preferred neutrality during the war, the structure imposed to take side. Nevertheless, the awareness of the uncertainty of the conditions paved the way for formulating a strategy that refrained from committing to one side.

### 5.3. STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE

Representation of strategy in discourse found its expression in the words of “Turkey cannot assure its security through forging political or military combinations.”<sup>40</sup> For the sake of simplicity, the excerpt was shortened as “Turkey cannot assure its security through forging alliances” by being loyal to its original meaning. The evolution of discourse reflects agential intent of the strategy that was put into action as staying away from warfare and not provoking to get occupied, thus, experiencing devastation. This intent emerged with the effect of strategic culture, and historical and sociological inputs played a significant role in articulation of that discourse. Keeping in mind that strategy rather than being a conception deriving merely from the rational calculations of the respective conditions and being poured into action from those rationalist accounts, but on the contrary, strategy is the reflection of thought into action that was born out underlying historical and sociological circumstances. The historical inputs emerged from the experiences of the past, in which Turkey was continuously in war, and at the end, experienced devastations in several accounts. Hence, within the light of historical experiences, Turkey after becoming a republican chose not to enter into war except for outward national interests and security was threatened. This understanding at a deeper level was the emerged outcome of structural weakness, a will not to experience further territorial loss, and to preserve well-being of the state from emerging security threats. Sociologically, as a result of strategic culture underlined with *Sévresphobia*, Turkey approached foreign relations with suspicion and caution, since it believed foreign

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<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:439, from *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Volume XII, Doc.No.161.

powers sought the grounds to meddle into the politics of state, and to try to subvert agency, through transforming being subject into an object that could be used in realization of their national interests. Hence, Turkey during the Second World War, refrained from provocative acts that could bring devastation to the country and ruin the gains achieved in the past 15 years of the new Republic.

Despite such considerations, as the structural weakness was enduring, Turkey realized that the security of the country cannot be assured by relying on national capabilities, particularly in terms of military defensive. Inevitably, Turkey in the 1930's firstly sought defensive regional alliances for secure places with a calculation of keeping threat away as far as possible from the borders, but as the threats become more severe, security through regional alliances left its place to wider alliances. Though, politically, the reality was to seek security guarantees through alliances, the discourse in order to preserve room for agency and space for political maneuver refrained from undertaking firm commitments, though the Tripartite Treaty stood as an exception. It can be argued that hopes to ensure security through alliances waned with the surrender of France. Eventually, Turkey returned back to its old game, balancing.

Strategy in this period was formulated with an agential read of the situation through subjectivity. The preservation of agency in structured context that was becoming more uncertain and dynamic was watched with caution. As *end* of strategy was defined as not joining the war, and recognition that security of country could not be ensured by relying on dispositional element of strategy – national *means* constituted the crux of the mismatch between *ends* and *means*. This basic cognition and awareness led to forging and participating into alliances at the beginning of war, but two developments as mentioned above, France's early surrender, and Russo-German Pact caused to realize that alliances might not give desired security guarantees and halt security concerns. In fact, the articulation of discourse emerged from disappointment out of the fact that alliance with the West might not ensure security.

What is incorporated into discourse, and the emergence of discourse was the realization by agency that Turkey should refrain from alliances and commitments in order to ensure security and preserve agency. In other words, the shifting approach to

alliances, as a *means* to achieve security of Turkey, emerged out of this disappointment. The outcome of this disappointment was to change the track of policy which constituted the transition from aligning to active neutrality in the war, irrespective of demands and benefits offered by either Britain or Germany. Both the Allied powers and the Axis powers offered territorial gains<sup>41</sup> to persuade Turkey joining the war on their side. But, discourse that Turkey cannot ensure its security by participating in any kind of alliance compositions was the realization that any participation would provoke an attack on Turkey, which would be devastating in any case. This meant any attack would require another reconstruction period which was not manageable for Turkey, and would further hamper structural weakness that would produce loss of agency in the post-war period. This shifting nature of policy or constant adjustment of strategy in line with the developments taking place during the war was recognized by William Hale as well. William Hale argues that “to say that Turkey was neutral during the war also disguises important shifts in its policies between 1939 and 1945, which were largely caused by changing Turkish perceptions of which side would win the war.”<sup>42</sup> This recalls the objective of Turkey that it had to be refrained to take side, or at least would have take part on the on the winning side.

The shifts can be summarized as; early encounter and eagerness to forge alliance with the West; staying away and becoming non-belligerent to see the course of the war as uncertainty would decrease; and participating on the side of the West as it would be the winning side. William Hale analyzes the shift in Turkish active neutrality under titles of “shifting fortunes and policies: October 1939-June 1941; walking the tightrope: June 1941-December 1942; allied ascendancy: November 1942-May 1945.”<sup>43</sup> The discourse chosen to explain this period in fact reflects the nature of strategy that was adopted between September 1940 and December 1943, The Second Cairo Conference. After the Cairo Conference, Turkey, though conditioned with the transfer of military equipment to Turkey, on principle accepted to join the war on the side of the Allied Powers. And finally, in order not to become isolated in the post-war period, declared war on Germany on 1945.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 1: 440.

<sup>42</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 76.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 57-75.

The other two factors of structure, nationalism and geography, also played significant role in the articulation of the discourse as it was the case for formulation of strategy. It was argued, in the previous two chapters, that nationalism basically transformed into a driving force of strategy. It evolved from the driving force of liberation into the driving force of reconstruction between 1923 and 1939. Nationalism in the Second World War exhibited signs of being the driving force of agency. But, this time, historical and sociological roots became motivation for protecting the country to avoid destruction and to keep the dynamics of development at hand. The discourse of “the preservation of Turkey for Turks”<sup>44</sup> explains the role of nationalism during the Second World War. And this nationalist sentiment emerged from the inviolability of Turkey and its territorial integrity. It means geography as a structural factor was incorporated in discourse, with an apparent nationalist view. Furthermore, as underlined by Weisband, “during the war, İnönü regarded this right and the preservation of Turkish boundaries as the basic tenets and principal objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy.”<sup>45</sup> In this context, it can be argued that the structural factors continued to affect Turkish Foreign Policy and its strategy in the war. And both nationalism as the driving force and geography as to be protected ground were incorporated in the discourse of strategy.

#### **5.4. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE**

Following theoretical framework put forward in the first chapter, this section is devoted to analyze whether an incongruence between *what is spoken* and what is observed’ emerged due to the factors not foreseen and conceptualized by agency. The analysis of incongruence, within a process, requires a discussion of laying down the basic tenets of both *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*. But for the sake of simplicity, the discussion will start with laying out *what is spoken* because speech precedes observation of the respective period under scrutiny. It has been argued that discourse as an act of representation of strategy emerges from subjectivity of agent and its pour into formulation of strategy. Here, discourse is treated as an act of

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<sup>44</sup> Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, 38.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

making known *what is intended* with strategy consisting of both overt parts and covered parts of the strategy. The nature of discourse, in reflecting strategy, is depended upon the agents' considerations, intent and decision on how far the content of the strategy is to be made known, or cloaked. During the Second World War, strategy basically remained constant, but, its application in policy showed some fluctuations. But, the chosen discourse is considered not representing and reflecting such fluctuations. This was the result of the chosen discourse was emerged out of its specific spatio-temporal conditions, in which early eagerness to forge alliance with the West waned, but a will to preserve neutrality emerged.

Answering *what is actualized* requires a summary of developments during the war, in terms of highlighting intents at the beginning of war, major developments during the war, and particularly the outcomes. As it was discussed, Turkey started the war years with inherited policy of isolationism and embedded pragmatism. But pragmatism was used as long as the circumstances had allowed as in the case of demanding the modification of the existing state of the issues including territorial expansion as in the case of Hatay, or revision of international agreements to eliminate constraining clauses as in Montreux Convention. As the upcoming war became inevitable and threat perceptions created fear, and as the *structural weakness* caused loss of confidence in ability to defend the country, Turkey with improving relations with the West, after the normalization period, started to seek alliances that could protect the country and guarantee security. İnönü's perception of the Tripartite Treaty with Britain, can be explained with the words that "in case of war being together with Britain's, and if they enter into war staying out of war as much as possible...Turkey is not alone now, its situation is guaranteed by the most credible insurance company of the World."<sup>46</sup> But hopes and positive considerations that the alliance with the West would guarantee the security turned out to be a disappointment with the surrender of France and turned out to be a nightmare with the Russo-German Pact. Turkey at this point realized as the uncertainty prevailed, undertaking commitments through alliances might complicate security concerns, and rather than halting them, might add new ones.

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<sup>46</sup> Quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 102, from Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977), 36.



Disappointment might be seen as the factor that paved the emergence of refinement of the ways to realize the strategic *end*. In fact, the shocking and sudden change in dynamics while created anxiety, at the same time, led to adaptation to the new conditions. Turkey's position showed fluctuations during the war, at the beginning, Turkey tried to build constructive relations between the Soviets and Britain.<sup>47</sup> But, hopes to accommodate Britain and Soviets waned with the Non-Aggression pact signed between the Soviets and Germany, eventually with this development Turkey strived to prevent double encroachment and occupation like Poland (September 1939) and Iran (August 1941). However, the calculations of Turkey rarely matched with reality, since Turkey with its inability to alter the course of events could only produce reactive policies, or remain out of developments as much as possible until the fog on war dissolves.

One of the major reasons to pursue a neutral policy was directly related with structural weakness, enduring and recalcitrant structural determinant of Turkey. Living with it, experiencing continuous shortfall of *means* in formulating an agential strategy, brought about a formulation of strategic *end* that fitted to *means* at disposal, or to employ *means* that were not owned, but provided through the meaning attributed to Turkey's geography. Translation of this dynamic into practice was the balance of power politics which became unavoidable.

Balance of power politics, as a traditional tool at disposal that saved Turkey within several situations in the absence of *means* being allocated to pursue an assertive strategy, once more worked. Furthermore, apart from the discrepancies between the Allied and the Axis Powers, discrepancies within the blocs facilitated the employment of balancing to agential *ends*. Use of discrepancies to extract political outcomes was furthered by using the shortages of *means*.<sup>48</sup> Though during the war anxiety endured, and due to giving priority to internal reconstruction, the readiness of the armed forces was neglected or, preferentially, was given secondary

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<sup>47</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1: 393; Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003), 29.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 394.

importance which made it incapable of ensuring the protection of the country. But this weakness contributed not to be target of aggression of major powers as well.<sup>49</sup>

Applying for balance of power politics represents the continuation with the past experiences, which was being used as a remedy to structural weakness and its practical effects. This led to the conclusion that, for Roderic Davison, the republican foreign policy, in terms of style and implementation, demonstrates continuity with the imperial foreign policy, particularly; this was the case for balance of power politics.<sup>50</sup> For that reason, Davison suggested that sometimes Kemal by using foreign powers against each other gave the impression that he was one of the brilliant students of Ottoman diplomats.<sup>51</sup> Weisband, Weber, and Deringil conclude that Turkish diplomats in their relations with the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers behaved very cautiously by observing national interests.<sup>52</sup>

Whether transformation of, at least in conception, ‘relative autonomy’ and ‘active neutrality’ was agential? ‘Active neutrality’ conceptually implies that agential choice was incorporated in the foreign policy. But, from the other side of the coin, the policy highlights inability to be neutral, but being imposed by the forces of structure to choose one side implicitly. Even at the discursive level the agency tried to disguise inability to preserve neutrality by aligning with one side and presenting it as an agential choice. Hence, Turkey gave the impression that despite the changing dynamics of international relations, had the capability to make choice and, hence, to keep agency on behalf. But it is also argued that ‘active neutrality’ was a strategy that was imposed by weakness.<sup>53</sup> This argument reflects the conditions of the time, but for the sake of clarity, it can be argued that it emerged from the structural determinant of structural weakness. If structural weakness comparatively was not

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Roderic Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne”, in *The Diplomats: 1919-1945*, ed. Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 173.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 173-174.

<sup>52</sup> Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*; Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral*; Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality*.

<sup>53</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 66.

severe enough to employ *means* in strategy, then pursuing a neutrality policy that favors one side would not be the case. In strategy, the shortage of *means* to obtain the *end* was apparent, and agency, though tried to be preserved, began to disappear when the war approached to end.

In terms of structural weakness, when the war ended, Turkey, though not participated in war, experienced a considerable transformation.<sup>54</sup> The structural weakness that Turkey strived to overcome during the Republican era came affront with considerable effects constraining its future foreign policy strategy. This result emerged from the economic developments of the war years. Industrial production which doubled in the years of 1932-1939 with the *etatist* plans and economic policies, in 1945 dropped to 20 percent, just above of the 1932 level.<sup>55</sup> The outcome of economic deterioration and the inability to realize industrialization was the emergence of societal impulses to align with the West, to ensure development through integration which would be offered by the West in the Cold War conditions.

Turkey almost pursued not relations with the states, but relations with the war, in which realization of strategic *end* – staying out of war – drove the nature of policy. In fact, in practice, it was a policy that was constantly and immediately adjusted to produce quick responses to fluctuations of the war. Aydemir underlined this fact by pointing out that İnönü, was cautious and attentive to gain time by close watch of events and evaluations to adjust the policy from hour to hour.<sup>56</sup> In this way Turkey managed to realize the *end* that was determined at the beginning of the war. But, isolationism, active neutrality, balance of power politics, whatever the connotation given to the policy of the time, at the end, led to the emergence of new problems that should be tackled in the post-war period. Briefly, while the Soviets estranged, the Americans embraced Turkey.<sup>57</sup> Given that the international political system began to experience one of the major and deep changes, and the World was

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<sup>54</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:388.

<sup>55</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Devlet ve Sınıflar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1989), 92.

<sup>56</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976), 157-158.

<sup>57</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:398.

on the eve of an ideological divide, compounded with this dichotomous position, and internal developments, Turkey found itself in a position that it started to lose agency.

Transformation of foreign policy orientation is conceived with the terms of “relative autonomy” and “active neutrality”. The 1939 represents the turning point in that transformation. But, Bilgin argues that Foreign Policy showed an explicit Western turn as early as in the 1920’s.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, the Western turn is suggested as an instrument to overcome the West’s attitude towards the non-Western others.<sup>59</sup> Hence, the Foreign Policy crafted to locate Turkey in the West was accepted as a response to the insecurities perceived from the West.<sup>60</sup> Bilgin’s argument is built upon the understanding of the Western ambivalence that was suggested as “the West was a source of both inspiration and insecurity”<sup>61</sup> that evolved from the fear to safe-heaven. In fact, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, the replacement of ‘fear from the West’ with ‘fear from the Soviets’ had played significant role in seeking the alliance relations with the West. But, Bilgin explains the Western turn of Turkish Foreign Policy through the material and non-material aspects of security concerns,<sup>62</sup> that were borrowed from the understanding of securitization.<sup>63</sup> She suggests that “...when Turkey’s western orientation is reduced from being an identity choice (Foreign Policy) to mere Cold War policy preference (foreign policy), it becomes difficult to understand its enduring centrality for Turkey’s international relations.”<sup>64</sup> From a wider perspective, both the identity choice to be accepted as the equal member of the Western civilization and the policy preference imposed by the conditions of the Cold War international political system reflect certain aspects of the reality. But, while, the former refers to deeper level of reality, the latter refers to

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<sup>58</sup> Bilgin, “Securing Turkey through Western-oriented Foreign Policy,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40 (2009): 114.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>63</sup> Ole Weaver, “Securitization and De-securitization,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46-86.

<sup>64</sup> Bilgin, “Securing Turkey through Western-oriented Foreign Policy”, 120.

empirical level of reality. Though, “Turkey’s western oriented Foreign Policy...was a crucial aspect of its search for security in the face of European/International Society that had, in the past, refused equal treatment to the Ottoman Empire”<sup>65</sup>, the demands of Stalin from Turkey also played a significant role in orientation of the Foreign Policy.

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 121.

## CHAPTER 6

### 1945-1980 “A New World Is To Be Built; Turkey Will Take Its Place In”

#### 6.1. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

The Cold War, the prominent event, and the period mentioned with the Super Power rivalry was the determining feature of the period examined in this chapter. This period is generally mentioned with bi-polarity in which, the World was divided into two camps with each bloc representing strict uniformity. The Cold War period carries on a number of unique features that determined the nature of international relations of the time. For Turkish Foreign Policy, the Cold War Period, in the aftermath of the Second World War, was another challenging period. The understanding of the contextual and structural dynamics of that period, in line with the method maintained so far in the dissertation, will ease the explanation of the respective conditions of strategy formulation. Then, providing short discussions on the nature of international political system, international economy, and the changing meaning of geography in the eyes of both the super powers and Turkey is considered to be substantial to situate the agency and its strategy upon an explanatory basis.

The end of the Second World War and the rise of the US and the Soviet Union as the superpowers capable to dictate their respective interests with variety of instruments existing at their disposal made international political system more stable, but, at the same time, more constraining for the middle and small sized powers. Turkey is accepted generally as middle-size power.<sup>1</sup> Here it is not intended to discuss and to provide an in-depth analysis of the politics of the early Cold War years, but for the sake of understanding the context, some underlying dynamics will be introduced. In the aftermath of the Second World War that ended with devastation of

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<sup>1</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 1: 29-33.

Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union as states not experiencing the devastation as European powers did, arose as the superpowers on the periphery of the continent. The rift between the superpowers began with the discussion on the post-war policies and the interests that lied beyond their borders. Though the United States did not want to be involved in European politics, the acts of the Soviet Union, particularly, in the Eastern Europe and Iran somehow provoked the US involvement with a series of initiatives to protect the post-War peace. However, as the tensions could not be solved, the rifts on the nature of the post-war order ended up with the delineation of rivals along the political lines.

The rift between the Soviet Union and the United States became apparent within the conference series that were held to decide upon the post-War international order. However, as the Second World War began to wane, the contending views surfaced which became apparent in the Yalta Conference held on 4-11 February 1945 and Potsdam Conference on 17 July-2 August 1945, in which the World became divided. In those Conferences, the Soviet demands on renewing the Montreux Convention were aired without reaching concrete outcomes. Nevertheless, for Turkey, the stance of the Soviet Union and the Allied Powers became clearer, causing the increase in security concerns of Turkey. Within this context, the result of the delineation of the World into two camps constrained the area of maneuver of the states which were far from ensuring their own security, but to seek security through collective defense.

Both of the blocs introduced several economic, military and political institutions that would constrain the other through imposing institutional bonds with obligations. The United States, though at the beginning was in favor of continuation of its isolationist policy that was defined as not to involve European politics, as the Soviet Union's post-war policies was perceived as detrimental to the US interests and as the European powers were far from to ensure their own security against the Soviet Union, the United States decided to change the isolationist policy and to involve with a number of pre-determined objectives. The European countries devastated in the war were open to communist transition as their economy was destructed and people suffered. Their military were also behind protecting their countries, resisting any possible military attack. These factors made them prone to

the Soviet infiltration. Hence, the United States decided to aide their developments to ensure prosperity in order to block any possible communist revolution from inside, to ensure the recovery that would foster the ability to resist the Soviet Union and the reinvigoration of working markets to assure export for the US industry. To facilitate and coordinate these objectives in the economic sphere, institutions, like International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) together with Marshall Plan (1947) were introduced. They were complemented by military blocs in line with the containment policy, in which NATO became the cornerstone of them. The Truman Doctrine, which was articulated to ensure keeping Greece and Turkey on the Western camp, offered military and economic aid to resolve their initial needs. Consequently, until mid-1950's, the World exhibited a divided nature with firm lines, in which, two Superpowers raised their commitments on their spheres of influence. However, after mid 1950's, the smoothening of relations began to be observed, which brought about the détente between the blocs, as both blocs understood their limits, and as the centripetal tendencies arose seeking a third way apart from following the bloc politics. The context of international political system became more open, as the effects of globalization became visible, as the recovery from the Second World War became apparent, as the existence of nuclear weapons ensured mutual assured destruction, and as the experience of the Cuban Missile Crises led the Superpowers to behave more cautiously. All these developments exemplified a change in the international political system which allowed following a differing course of foreign policies for the middle-sized powers like Turkey.

It was argued in the previous chapters that nationalism as an emerging feature of international political system shaped the course of events both at the international and domestic level. In the Cold War period, nationalism left its place to democracy as a remedy to counter the communist infiltration, which was seen as a threat that had to be eradicated collectively. The United States discursively promoted democracy with the hope of creating a common front against communism, since the Western World constituted the “free World” which should be protected against the communist infiltration and its attempts to transform the free-states into the satellites of the Soviet Union. Turkey, too, in line with the international developments initiated



democratic multi-party elections in 1946 and, eventually, Democrat Party, in 1950, won the elections and took the government of the Republic. In the following years, constituting a working democracy became one of the conditionality of the European Community and later European Union which would constitute one of strategic *ends* for Turkey. Turkey was considered being part of Europe, institutionally as a symbol of the resolution of centuries-long divergences and the consent of renunciation of its anti-systemic character, leading to overcome old stereotypes.

International economy, as recovery of Europe was achieved through the multilateral arrangements that were based on the principles of capitalism and further accelerated with globalization, while allowing economic growth of the countries like Turkey, this growth was further facilitated the integration into the global economy. However, as the integration into global economy deepened, the ability to act independently gradually disappeared. In a sense, it created complex interdependence among countries, in which, unilateral acts were constrained by the nature of the system. Hence, agency that once was constrained with structural weakness began to be constrained through the vulnerabilities created by interdependencies. Turkey's enduring and being strived to overcome feature, the structural weakness, continued to play a significant role, as the international economy both experienced devastation, and also a period of recovery in the aftermath of the war. For Turkey, though not having experienced devastation but suffered economically parallel with international economy, the only option seemed viable was to integrate international economy to find revenues and *means* to be used in national economic development that could not be achieved in the past years.

Economic development and industrialization, as a remedy to overcome structural weakness, was bound up with building constructive relations with the West. The basis for a breakthrough was actually managed in the past years with achievement of a level of normalization of relations with the European powers. This normalization while facilitated the economic integration into the international economy in the post-war period, it also helped to attract Western assistance both in security and economic realms, though both of them brought about and introduced new constraints on agency.

## 6.2. AGENCY AND STRATEGY

Within this structured context, Turkey's strategy showed both continuation and divergence with the strategy pursued in the Second World War. The continuation was imposed by the structure and showed effects on agency, particularly, emanating from the strategic culture that shaped preferences and emerging from the security concerns that had historical and sociological roots. But, at the same time, as Turkey realized that the structure and its preferences, being part of the Western alliance, were constraining its agency, it tried to find ways to partly dissociate from the West. This trial of dissociation from the West became apparent, particularly, after the Cyprus Question with Turkey's losing ground on the question that was emanated from the disappointment and frustration created with the unmet expectations from the Allied states. As the pace of the Cold War, in terms of fierce confrontation, began to disappear, the quest to find the ways of rapprochement, on which the hopes increased with the denounce of the Soviet demands on Turkey, facilitated the reevaluation of the strategy that had been formulated at the beginning of the Cold War. To substantiate the answer of what made strategy in that period the theoretical framework will be applied here.

Strategy formulation at the beginning of the Cold War was based on the portrayal of the situation in the aftermath of the Second World War, which bore legacies on strategy. The portrayal of the situation, agential read of the structured context brought about strategy. It was argued that structure is *activity*, *concept* and *spatio-temporal* dependent, and strategy as an agential attribute emerges out from these intermingling dynamics.

In terms of international political system, the Second World War marked the victory of democracy over fascism, but initiated another war of democracy versus communism between The United States and Soviet Union. Within this changing international political system and, particularly, the rise of Soviet Union as a threatening factor to Turkey caused the initiation of seeking for alignments since *means* to halt security concerns were considered to be inadequate. This inadequacy stemmed from the recognition that structural weakness proportionally fell well behind the resurgent Russia. Turkey perceived the revival of the Soviet Union equivalent to the revival of The 'Old Eastern Question' from its grave, pointing out

to the Russian resurgence with imperial ambitions.<sup>2</sup> In such a situation, the “fear from the West” replaced with the “fear from the East (Soviets)” leading to seek ways of balancing the Soviets. The transformation of the ‘friendly’ Soviets into a state that began to be feared occurred after the talks that took place between the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov and Selim Sarper, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

In the Molotov-Sarper talks, on 7 June 1945, after the denunciation of Treaty of Friendship with Turkey in March 1945, Molotov put forward demands on Turkey in return for the renewal of the Friendship Treaty which included; a new regime on the straits that is to be negotiated solely between Turkey and the Soviet Union, that would provide free passage to Soviet Warships while prohibiting non-littoral states, allocation of Soviet bases to protect the Straits, and the return of the Eastern Provinces, Kars and Ardahan that had been left to Turkey with the 1921 Treaty.<sup>4</sup> These demands were perceived as the demands of Stalin which marked the end of the ‘friendship’.<sup>5</sup> Among them, the most dangerous one that was perceived to be detrimental for Turkey’s security was the establishment of the Soviet bases on the Straits. If allowed, it had the potential to transform Turkey into a satellite of the Soviet Union, and this was the intent of the Soviets as it was applied to the Eastern European countries.<sup>6</sup>

Turkey, faced with security threat emanating from the Soviets, realized that its *means* to preserve its characteristic foreign policy that focused on the “territorial

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<sup>2</sup> Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 255. Quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 78; See also Kıvanç Coş and Pınar Bilgin, “Stalin’s Demands: Constructions of the ‘Soviet Other’ in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-1945”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, (6, 2010), pp.43-60.

<sup>3</sup> Coş and Bilgin, “Stalin’s Demands: Constructions of the ‘Soviet Other’ in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1919-1945”, 43-60.

<sup>4</sup> Suat A. Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri: 1920-1964*, (Ankara: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), 269-271.

<sup>5</sup> Ferenc Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: John Hophkins University, 1971), 35; Kamurân Gürün, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri: 1920-1953* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 206.

<sup>6</sup> Hale, “Turkish Foreign Policy...”, 80.

integrity, status quo and hard-won victory of 1923” were challenged.<sup>7</sup> In fact, it was the strategic *end* that was challenged. It created the fear that pushed Turkey to seek the alliance to compensate for the shortage of *means* that was tailored to ensure the strategic *end*. The resurgent Russia and the perception of its intentions, which were triggered with the developments that took place both in the Balkans and Transcaucasia pushed Turkey to reconsider its old policies. Furthermore, the *means* to be allocated for a possible conflict dramatically changed in nature with the nuclear weapons.

This point was also underlined, later, by Nikita Khrushchev who blamed Stalin by stating that he “succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans.”<sup>8</sup> The fear from the Soviets was also underlined by Necmettin Sadak, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed that the Soviets “after the occupation of the Dardanelles, the Soviet Union would demand a Communist Government at Ankara and would impose one on Turkey.”<sup>9</sup>

The recognition that *means* at disposal were inadequate to deter the Soviet threat was the trigger of ‘assertive integrationist’<sup>10</sup> foreign policy under the Democrat Party rule throughout the 1950’s. It can be argued that activity-dependent nature of structure brought about the need to find out a solution to the shortfalls of *means*. *Structural weakness* as an enduring factor, which further got complicated with the failure to realize the expected economic development, continued to follow the same track at the beginning of the Cold War period.<sup>11</sup> Particularly, in terms of industrialization, though there was a move forward with baby steps, at least, a pace on the process was not abandoned. In that period, one of the basic features that marked this period was the abandonment of the eagerness in industrialization.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Erik Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 200-201.

<sup>8</sup> Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West since World War II,” in *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 45. Quoted in Hale, “Turkish Foreign Policy”, 87.

<sup>9</sup> Necmettin Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets.” *Foreign Affairs* 27 (1949): 460.

<sup>10</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 72.

<sup>11</sup> Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2009*, 21<sup>st</sup> ed. (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2015), 95-109.

<sup>12</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 488.

Instead, sectors that fuel consumption and agricultural production were applauded.<sup>13</sup> This was actually a preferred outcome of the need to align with the West, practically, as it turned out to be the economic policy of liberalization.

The outcome of the adoption of such an economic policy was the growing foreign debts and, eventually, giving up the agency to regulate the national financial system, depending on the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund.<sup>14</sup> After 1958, with the first stand-by treaty that was signed with the IMF, Turkey began to lose its agency in the economic sphere. But, the political outcomes of this process were inevitable, since, till the Ottoman period structural weakness either undermined the formulation of strategy or constrained the options available, or compelled to apply for the balance of power politics as a remedy for the shortage of *means* in strategy.

Hence, the lost-agency compounded with the deterioration of structural weakness began to bring about political outcomes. As becoming dependent on the West, both economically and militarily, Turkey, in turn, sought ways to overcome them. In fact, “the end of the [Second World] War had brought about a dramatic change in Turkey’s strategic environment, which made the continuation of neutrality, or uninvolved dependence on the balance of power to maintain Turkey’s security, a defunct option.”<sup>15</sup> But, as the Soviet threat remained on the table, the security assurances from the West were far from guaranteeing the security which left Turkey to manage the crisis alone without firm assistance from the West.<sup>16</sup> Both Britain and the US supported Turkey to display a firm stance on not giving any concessions against the Soviet Demands.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, in the absence of assistance, their discursive support only revealed the political interests over the Straits. In other

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 487-491; Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye’nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 223-234.

<sup>14</sup> Emine Kıray, “Turkish Debt and Conditionality in Historical Perspective: A Comparison of the 1980’s with the 1860’s,” in *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability*, ed. Torun Arıcalı and Dani Rodrik (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1990), 234-269.

<sup>15</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 87.

<sup>16</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, (Ankara: Odtü Yayıncılık, 2001), 5.

<sup>17</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 80.

words, the competition on the Turkish Straits continued to be on the agenda of the great powers, the US replacing Great Britain against Soviet Union.

The perception of the West's reluctance to provide firm commitment on Turkey's security, in case of an aggression coming from the Soviet Union, was a disappointment. Nevertheless, Turkey's seeking for the Western support not lost pace, but was accelerated starting from 1946, and reached at a further level with the Democrat Party government after 1950's. The rationale behind this assertive integration was the feeling of being encircled with unfriendly states, most of them as the satellites of the Soviets and acting like Soviet proxy.

In other words, while the West introduced the policy of containment,<sup>18</sup> a similar feeling of containment had arisen in Turkey. The policy to participate actively in alliances with high commitments was suggested to stand as the most important foreign policy change compared to the 1920's.<sup>19</sup> For Turkey, this change in foreign policy orientation, particularly forging institutional alliances with reciprocal commitments, was a hard choice.<sup>20</sup> But, rather than explaining and convincing the society that Turkey needed the West for its security, it was hard to convince the West that they needed Turkey.<sup>21</sup> Turkey, as a country that refrain to enter into alliance relationship with the third parties, without having a strong domestic resistance, took part in the Western alliance and NATO.<sup>22</sup> The membership of NATO Alliance took place after the widely discussed participation into Korean War in 1950. In fact, the Korean War was a decision to convince the West, and to halt doubts on Turkey as a valuable partner for the European security. The US recognized Turkey's value in containing the Soviet Union from the South, by building pacts constituting 'northern tier', but the membership was realized with the suspension of Britain's veto on Turkey's participation to NATO. The accession to

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<sup>18</sup> George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, 25, no.4 (1947): 566-582. It is accepted that the US pursued a policy of containment following Kennan's argument, which found practical effects in building a chain of multilateral and bilateral alliances encircling Soviet Territory.

<sup>19</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 87.

<sup>20</sup> Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West since World War II", 46.

<sup>21</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 87.

<sup>22</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 494.

NATO, decreased the security concerns by attracting obligatory commitment for the protection of Turkish territories, and it would also mean for Turkey the approval of being part of the Western world which was strived for by adopting economic liberalization and bloc politics. It was the outcome of the ideological divide and meaning attained to the Western norms, and the experience and path adopted so far. Integrative modernization and becoming European was not questioned in the society which led to the participation of Turkey into the Western Alliance. Furthermore, Turkey's accession to NATO was seen as a symbol that confirmed the 'Europeanness' of Turkey by the West.<sup>23</sup>

In terms of formulation of strategy which bears *situational*, *dispositional* and *positional* elements reflected the condition of the time that emerged from the dialectics of agent and structure. *Situational* element of strategy which emerged from the recognition that preserving territorial integrity of the country, faced with the Soviet demands, was accessing the *means* available at the time. It was quest for security in a changing security environment, and an agential conclusion that dictated to adapt to the new security environment. If bloc politics was not that fierce, and Stalin's demands were not on the table, whether Turkey would choose to give up old policy of balance of power to substitute the shortage of *means* and to overcome structural weakness is a question that cannot be answered. But, recognizing that the mood of the time emerged from the structural factors that compelled to seek alignment, it can be suggested that a divergence from the old policy would not be the case, if the Soviet demands were not on the table. But, pragmatism as to extract benefits by not undertaking commitments for the security of the West would be preferred for the sake of preserving security and agency.

Turkey though experienced a rupture from its imperial past, both of the periods covering 1923-1938 and 1939-1945 demonstrated a considerable uniformity in their essence. In these periods, while Turkey tried to build constructive relations with the West and refrained from attempts that might provoke Soviets, it also preferred to preserve any acts that could strain its agency in foreign policy by entering into commitments through alliances. Then situational element of strategy reflected the spatio-temporal conditions, and the will to preserve territorial integrity

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<sup>23</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 35.

brought about the need to seek alignments which constituted the activity dependent aspect of agential choice. Concept dependency practically showed itself with the recognition of inability to protect the country, faced with the Soviet might and intent to turn the states into its satellites.

Having emerged from the portrayal of the situation, formulation of strategy, bearing in spatio-temporal, activity and concept-dependent nature of agential choice initiated the divergence that led to the erosion of agency. Menderes, the prime minister of the time, was against the neutrality in foreign policy and he showed no elasticity in that consideration.<sup>24</sup> This constitutes *positional* element – positioned practice – of the strategy of the time, which was designed on reciprocal terms, in exchange of the Western security commitments, Turkey would contribute extensively to Western security. For the Western powers, Turkey was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”<sup>25</sup> The West also recognized the puzzle that Turkey fell into, to the extent that Turkey’s old game of balance of power politics could not be played within the new security environment. What remained was to adopt the new game which was to enter into alliances with firm commitments.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the US recognized that Turkey potentially could serve the interests of the West in the Middle East, since Turkey was accepted as the “seismograph of the Middle East.”<sup>27</sup> And, this consideration gained a new pace with the Arab-Israel conflict, when Turkey recognized Israel, albeit wrongly, as an opportunity to raise its leadership in the Middle East. This gained a new momentum with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 which was perceived by Turkey as an opportunity to construct of common interests of Turkey and the US in the Middle East<sup>28</sup>, since it was accepted as the US’s second

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>25</sup> George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Hoover Institution, 1972), 56.

<sup>26</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 87

<sup>27</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, 37.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 99 and 132-133.



bear of responsibility to support Turkey, after the Truman Doctrine, in terms of military and economic assistance.<sup>29</sup>

While Turkey meant a valuable ally in the Western security calculations during the Cold War, it also meant for Turkey to constitute *dispositional* element of strategy. Dispositionally, Turkey, emerging from structural weakness, in terms of *means*, was away to ensure the strategic *end*, formulated as the preservation of territorial integrity. This discrepancy between *means* and *ends* brought about seeking alliances to compensate for this shortage. In other words, the alliances were accepted as the remedy and they were converted into *means*. But, it can be viewed as a departure from the policy of not employing *means* that were not owned. Historically, the balance of power politics, though was employed in the absence of *means*, the price for agency was not high as being part of an alliance, since the alliances constrain available political options more than the balance of power politics.

Within this context, the conduct of strategy reflected the portrayal of situation and the formulation of strategy that was in line with the conditions, given and perceived. However, though formulated within the dialectics of structure and agency, the developments both within the international political system, and the recognition that alliance politics were far from observing national interests and contributing to the security of Turkey, which in time, correspondingly underwent change, particularly, with the question of Cyprus.<sup>30</sup> From that time, strategy of Turkey exhibited a divergence from the defined strategy, and the new strategy was defined in line with the changes that took place.

In the aftermath of the Molotov-Sarper Talk and the Soviet demands, İnönü recognized the inability to ensure territorial integrity and sought the way to overcome security concerns. İnönü intended to realize three objectives to halt security concerns; prevention of the support to Soviet Demands that would be provided by the US and Western European Powers, assurance of the flow of financial and military support to deter any Soviet military assault, and construction of an effective alliance

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>30</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler: Kıbrıs Ege ve Diğer Sorunlar* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000); Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçerisinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri: 1821-1993* (Ankara: Ümit yayınları, 1993); İsmail Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya I, Strateji-Yunanistan-Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 2004).

as a *means* to ensure security against the Soviets.<sup>31</sup> The meaning of these objectives was to give up subjectivity of agency, though they were defined and reflected agential preferences, which emerged out of dialectical reading of the structured context. The realization of these objectives was bound up with the undertaking necessary domestic steps to facilitate the integration of Turkey into the Western system that was emerging. This decision found expression on 1 November 1945, when İnönü declared that the reform process would be initiated to adapt the political system in line with the emerging world order of capitalism and democracy.<sup>32</sup> The words of İnönü were the early signals of departure from the existing single party regime, which would gain a new pace with the Menderes government.

Haluk Gerger argued that the decision of transition to multi-party system was a move for creating an image crafted to adapt the developments taking place in the World, in the democracy field. The next step, the liberalization of economy, was complementing the transition to capitalism. Finally and eventually, these were the steps to move Turkey into the US orbit in foreign policy.<sup>33</sup> In fact, for Gerger, within the adaptive moves, beyond consistency, there was an organic totality.<sup>34</sup> The outcome of these changes was the installation of an economic structure that lifted the barriers to import, thus, causing substantial increase in imports, which in turn, leading to the rise of balance of payment deficit. In fact, this was a more severe outcome which would become a chronic problem that the sustainment of the balance of payment deficit would need an ongoing foreign investment and credits. It had replaced the economy, which was characterized by being closed, protectionist, and designed for not giving balance of payment deficits.<sup>35</sup> This shift was summarized with the words of a “different trial of integration”.<sup>36</sup> The general policy of the period,

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<sup>31</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 81.

<sup>32</sup> Faroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (London: Oneworld, 2014), 99.

<sup>33</sup> Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası: Soğuk Savaştan Yeni Dünya Düzenine* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012), 48,

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 96.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 95-108.

later, was criticized by İsmail Cem suggesting that “to activate weak economy, the foreigner’s money; to guarantee the weak governments, (including the flow of economic aid) the foreign protectorate were sought.”<sup>37</sup> Retrospectively, the economic policy of the time, though resulted in an increase of economic growth, brought about a deterioration of structural weakness, a factor leading to the loss of agency and limiting the agential area of political maneuver.

However, decisions to integrate into the West were the result of calculation that national resources and *means* at disposal were inadequate to ensure security.<sup>38</sup> Protecting itself was not viable, as structural weakness endured while becoming more apparent with the introduction of nuclear weapons. Hence, the neutrality, either active or passive ones, became non-sustainable, as the *means* at disposal were well behind to assure such protection by relying on the national resources. Inevitably, Turkey was faced with the choice of taking part in one of the blocs. The fact that the “Western alliance paid reasonable respect to independence for small or medium sized states, whereas Soviet communism did not”<sup>39</sup> and allowed more rooms for agency favoring the West was perceived as a better choice. However, the course of events proved the opposite, becoming economically dependent on the West followed by being politically constrained, which became evident with the Cyprus Crisis.

Before discussing the effects of Cyprus Question, a number of points that marked the nature of alliance policies and how far eagerness was at play in the strategy should be clarified. After accession to NATO, bilaterally, Turkey signed military aid agreement in 1954, which brought about practical effects two years later with the deployment of U-2 high altitude reconnaissance planes at the İncirlik Air Base,<sup>40</sup> and installed equipment to collect information on the Soviet Union along the

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<sup>37</sup> İsmail Cem, *Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007), 333.

<sup>38</sup> Haluk Gerger argues that the Soviet Threat was exaggerated and does not explain the causality of integration into the West, on the contrary, beyond the Soviet threat there were several internal and external causes of this orientation, such as creation of anti-communist propaganda that was sociologically created the atmosphere of an exaggerated communist threat and positive mood in society to integrate into the West for the sake of realization development in all spheres. See Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politliği*, 58-71.

<sup>39</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 79.

<sup>40</sup> Selin Bölme, *İncirlik Üssü: ABD’nin Üs Politikası ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012).

Black Sea Region. In 1959, the bilateral military relations reached another level with the agreement on the deployment of Jupiter Nuclear Missiles on the Turkish Territory, which became operational in spring 1962. Although, technologically, their deterrence capability was questionable; the deployment on Turkish soils made Turkey one of the figures of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the superpowers were on the brink of nuclear confrontation. The removal of the missiles at the end of Cuban Missile crisis decreased the level of tension, replacing it with a new one emerging between Washington and Ankara. Nevertheless, before deployment of missiles, in December 1957, Bulganin threatened Turkey by stating that “the countries accepting the deployment of missiles on their soils would be counter-strike targets.”<sup>41</sup> It meant that the closer relations with the United States, rather than halting security concerns of Turkey, were adding new ones, thus, downgrading the strategic calculations that paved the way for going into alliance relations with the West.

Furthermore, the regional alliances contributed to the loss of trust to Turkey in its immediate surrounding particularly in the Middle East. By initiating the Baghdad pact in 1955, after the Balkan Pact in 1954, Turkey actively took part in regional alliances designed to contain the Soviet Union. In this way, Turkey assumed the role of being a *bridge* between the West and the Middle East, which was directed towards the Arab nationalist movements led by Nasser of Egypt. The 1955 Baghdad Pact was criticized for being “unnecessary, inefficient and harmful to parties”; rather than protecting the Western interests in the region, beyond eroding, it had contributed and facilitated the relations of the regional states with the Soviet Union, triggered the revival of radical ideologies in the region, and converted Turkey’s image into the pawn of the Western Powers.<sup>42</sup> The critiques put forward here, in fact, reflect the reality which proves that the regional alliances once formulated to contribute to the security of Turkey, at the time, stood as a sign of eroding prestige of Turkey in the eyes of the Middle Eastern states harming the agency and ability to define agential strategic *ends* emerging from the agential read of structure.

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<sup>41</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 516.

<sup>42</sup> Kemal Karpaz, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012), 202; First appeared in Kemal Karpaz, “Turkish Arab-Israel Relations”, in *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), 108-134.

Furthermore, the eagerness to play an active role for the Western Alliance and to pursue bloc politics was continued irrespective of the note dated 30 May 1953, shortly after the Stalin's death. The note included the suspension of territorial demands and re-evaluation of the views on the Straits.<sup>43</sup> However, Turkey perceived suspension of territorial demands as a positive step, but, not enough to rebuild the trust between countries.<sup>44</sup> Beyond accepting it "with satisfaction", the step was perceived inadequate to build constructive relations.<sup>45</sup> Though, in time, a smoothening of relations was observed marked with the planned but not actualized official visit of Menderes to Moscow in 1960 due to coup de etat, Turkey perceived that the Soviet initiatives were taken with the intention of neutralization (referred as "Finladization") of Turkey.<sup>46</sup> From the perspective of strategy, the developments discussed so far showed the early signals of how the strategic calculations of Turkey were outdated with the developments taking place and proved the misreading of the structure in formulation of strategy which, in time, eroded agency and subjectivity of Turkey.

Eventually, the final blow to Turkey's strategic calculations to follow bloc politics came with the Cyprus Question. The question came to the agenda in the immediate aftermath of signature of the Balkan Pact, when Greece applied to resolve the question of Cyprus in the United Nations in 1955. Turkey, not to strain relations with the West, preferred a 'postponement diplomacy' on the issue, but, as the events became threatening to the existence of Turkish population in the island, Turkey began to take diplomatic steps tailored for not losing ground in the issue.<sup>47</sup> Though misconceived by the decision makers at the beginning, "Cyprus Question began to be one of the basic determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy since mid-1950's."<sup>48</sup> In the meantime, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963 showed the reluctance of the US to

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<sup>43</sup> For a wider account of the Soviet nota see Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 511-514.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 513.

<sup>45</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p.89

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 134.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

protect Turkey in case of a possible Soviet aggression, since, without informing Turkey, the US, during the negotiations, and the Soviet Union agreed on the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, with the excuse that they had already become technologically outdated. And in the Cyprus Question, İnönü's determination to protect the lives of Turks inhabiting on the island brought about the diplomatic crisis of 'Johnson Letter',<sup>49</sup> which was written in a 'patronizing style.'<sup>50</sup> These two events, occurring within two years, beyond the realization that the US might provide a protection against the Soviets, only if it was to its advantage,<sup>51</sup> also caused disappointment in Turkey. The social dynamics also moved from the disappointment, which ended up with several protests against the American existence in Turkish soils which called for withdrawal.<sup>52</sup> As the cooling off the US-Turkish relations became apparent, the Soviets initiated the moves of heating up relations. Even, the Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, on 5 January 1965, told in Turkish Grand National Assembly that "a shadow had been cast over Turkish-Soviet relations for some time since World War II and acknowledged that inappropriate and incorrect statements made in the Soviet Union had played a negative part. After noting these were incorrect statements and such events should be a thing of the past."<sup>53</sup> The statements of Podgorny were perceived in Turkey as "an indirect admission of Soviet responsibility for strains in their relations" and eventually "paved the way for an improvement."<sup>54</sup> When considered within the changing context, the disappointment with the West was eased with the rapprochement with the East, which provided the opportunity to diverge from the miscalculated strategy.

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<sup>49</sup> Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü was published in "Document: President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü," *Middle East Journal* 20, no.3 (1966): 386-393.

<sup>50</sup> Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no.3 (1993): 517.

<sup>51</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler: Kıbrıs, Ege ve Diğer Sorunlar* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000), 90, and for a wider discussion, 89-202.

<sup>52</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, "NATO and Turkey," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), 20.

<sup>53</sup> Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West since World War II", 56.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

From the perspective of strategy, the developments took place, marked that the formulated *end* of strategy, and the allocated *means* to that *end*, through forging alliances, were proved to become inconsistent. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a sign of agency and subjectivity had not been lost completely, and whenever faced with developments which were detrimental to its vital interests of the country, agency gets into play to defend them, irrespective of how far it would be detrimental to the relations and on the course of pursued foreign policy. In other words, it can be claimed that when vital national interests were accepted to be threatened, agency became unpredictable, and in the eyes of the parties involved, it might be conceived as irrationality.

The smoothening of relations with the Soviets and strains emerging with Washington due the Cyprus Question, Turkey re-evaluated the strategy followed until that time. Though discursively and empirically, a divergence in strategy was foreseen, how far it could be managed and realized constitutes a question. In the proceeding part, whether the articulated discourse matched with the change in strategy, in reality will be discussed. And, in the part of sources of incongruence, the causes of inability to diverge completely from the West will be discussed.

### **6.3. STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE: How strategy is represented?**

The rationale behind choosing a discourse that did not reflect the uniformity of the period at hand, but one that reflects the divergence from the onset of the period stems from the need to explain how far structure was effective on agency. In fact, strategy formulated in the aftermath of the Second World War does not fit to the discourse chosen here, but discourse reflects the response to the changing dynamics and the felt need to adapt strategy to the changing conditions. Furthermore, the disappointments with the strategy and the alliance relations were incorporated within it. For that reason, the discourse that “a new world is to be built and Turkey will take its place in it”<sup>55</sup> is chosen as it represents the motivation for the change in foreign policy and regaining agency in the Cold War conditions.

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<sup>55</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 1:677; *Milliyet*, 16 April 1964.

In order to understand the significance of the discourse, the early symbolic events and discourses will be discussed in line with the strategy formulated and conducted until early 1960's. The beginning of the Cold War and Turkey's foreign policy orientation towards the *assertive integrationism* into the West is accepted as the turning point of deep structural changes in Turkish Foreign Policy.<sup>56</sup> The integration into the West and fulfillment of the awaited security pretention from the West, symbolically, came with the Missouri, the American warship which visited Istanbul with an excuse of bringing the funeral of Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Münir Ertegün, on 5 April 1946, and anchored in Istanbul Strait. The symbolic importance of this visit stems from the fact that it took place after the Soviet demands from Turkey. With the visit paid, the US, not only gained opportunity to draw Turkey into the Western camp by giving a strong glimpse Turkey expected at the time, but also, disseminated a message to the Soviets that the status of the Straits could not be changed without approval of the Washington.<sup>57</sup> This visit, rather than attracting strong opposition in the society, in which national sentiments were high enough to protest the event, was instead welcome. Even, the political figure, İnönü, who was well-known with his cautious policies and firm stances against undertaking commitments that could strain the agency in the future, apart from welcoming it, with his discourse, calmed any possible protests. İnönü, stated "the American ships, the nearer to us, the better for us."<sup>58</sup> In fact, this statement highlighted, apart from the positive perception, the eagerness to enter into the alliance relations with the US, and happiness on bidding security to Washington. In fact, these words of İnönü, upon the visit of Missouri, pointed out how Turkey felt desperate against the threat of the Soviet Union. In other words, as the 'fear from the West' had been replaced with the 'fear from the East', the United States was perceived as "a perfect Savior."<sup>59</sup> In fact, the discourses exemplified, here, displayed the perception, mode of thought and the discursive representation of strategic

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<sup>56</sup> Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası*, 40.

<sup>57</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 524-525.

<sup>58</sup> *Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 296 quoted in Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 493.

<sup>59</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 493.



calculations of the time. The interesting part of the discussion of this period stems from the point that as the international relations underwent a considerable change and, in line with it, Turkish Foreign Policy did as well, as the trust to the Western protection eroded in time and became to be perceived as detrimental to agency. The representation of change in words shows how discourse might represent opposite direction in content. This case shows, shaped by strategic culture, how emotionality overrides subjective rationality in the process, consisting of; portrayal, formulation and conduct of strategy.

Baskin Oran argues that in international relations, questioning the respective period is an empty endeavor, because perceptions play a determining role. In fact his argumentation recalls constructivist understanding, and in line with this assumption – perceptions drives outcomes –that Turkey had perceived subjectively a great threat to its security.<sup>60</sup> Even though, causality of perception has explanatory power in international relations, underestimating the structural factors brings about the reduction of deeper level of causality into inter-subjective construction of reality, which is refrained in this dissertation.

The birth of the new discourse in that period was the result of disappointment and frustration with the US, and agential decisiveness in protecting the country. In the early 1960's, as the Cuban Missile Crisis had shown, Turkey perceived that alliance with the US might not fulfill security expectations and desired protection, unless the interests of the US were not threatened. Even public opinion began to change irrespective of the government opinion. The removal of Jupiter missiles without informing Turkey was accepted by the society as a sign of sacrificing national interests for the interests of great powers.<sup>61</sup> The final blow, the loss of confidence against the alliance policy, came with the Johnson Letter in which it was stated that the equipment supplied to Turkey could not be used for obtaining national interests.<sup>62</sup> As the relations with the US cooled off, the search for disassociation from the West, to enlarge area to pursue national policies in line with the agential *ends*,

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 496.

<sup>61</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 136; Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 675.

<sup>62</sup> “Document: President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü”, p.387; Bölükbaşı, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, 505-525.

began to appear in Turkish Foreign Policy, and hence at the same time, the discourse began to exhibit fluctuations from the early discourse. In this context, given that the relations with the Soviet Union were not so distant, so İnönü's once declared policy of regarding the US and its international political order as a *means* to ensure preservation of Turkey's territorial integrity, turned out to be one that could be neglected by reorienting Turkish Foreign Policy.

The strategy incorporated in discourse can be conceived as the disassociation with the West, as it was implemented in the mid 1940's against the Soviet Union, and as it was implemented in the 1920's. The desire to change the strategy emerged out of the recognition that following the alliance politics constrained agency and the will on observing national interests. This intent to redefine *ends*, and reasserting agency in foreign policy led to the discourse that "a new world is to be built, and Turkey will take its place in that order." The clarification of what was incorporated in that discourse has the potential to give hints about whether strategy showed divergence from the formulated one.

At first glance, "a new world is to be built" means for Turkey, the alliance with the West led by the US did not stand as the only option, pointing out that participating into an alliance other than the West might serve the *ends*, as the Western alliance did until that time. The second part of the discourse – "...Turkey will take its place in it" – highlights Turkey's self-confidence on its valuable contributions for any sort of alliance relations and meaning attained to its geography, and underlines the ability to exert agency to change the track of foreign policy. In fact, behind the words, implicitly, Turkey threatened the US and the West; if its interests were not recognized and respected, it might change side, thus, undermining the security and strategy of the US in the Cold War. Furthermore, it was implied that the US needed Turkey more than Turkey needed the US. But, this is totally an assumption, probably based on the international security, that Washington might felt threatened by Turkey's choice, since Turkey's possible participation into the Eastern bloc would have given a message to the World that the Western norms and civilization were not strong enough to keep the alliance coherent and how far they were shaky when the interests of particular nations would be sacrificed for the sake of interests of the bloc. Though it might be an exaggeration, being impossible to be

proved, nevertheless, in the discourse, there was inherently a very smooth and implicit threatening mood.

The practical applications of the strategy change or attempts for such a change were observed in the policies of that era. For example, Turkey, to renew the pace of industrialization from the beginning of 1967, as the relations with the Soviet Union heated up, began to get assistance. A more important point is that, the industrial investments, particularly heavy industry such as metallurgy that were once rejected by the West, were initiated and managed to be realized with the loans accepted from the Northern neighbor. The positive outcome of that strategy was twofold; these industrial facilities were steps, though inadequate, to overcome enduring structural weakness and to relieve dependence on the West.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, as the relations with the Soviets improved, they were neutralized on the Cyprus Question. During the 1967 Arab-Israel conflict, Turkey not allowed the use of air bases for combat and logistic purposes, which was repeated during 1973 conflict.<sup>64</sup> Demirel explained the situation by giving example of US Ambassador's visit in 1967, where, he told that "the American Ambassador entered from the door and before taking seat asked 'Are you changing Axis?'"<sup>65</sup> In fact, the question of the ambassador highlights both being surprised, the need to get approval of that suspicion and surprise, and reflection of being disturbed due to the heating up relations with the Soviet Union. Later on, Ecevit Government improved a new "national security and foreign policy" doctrine in 1978 which consisted of firstly, diversification of armament and resistance to dependence on a single source; and secondly, building up security belts around Turkey.<sup>66</sup> In that security doctrine, it was predicted that the threat emanated from the West, referring particularly to Greece, rather than the north (Soviets).<sup>67</sup> This shift in policy and threat perception facilitated and initiated a strategy that foresaw a reduction of over-dependence on the US,

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<sup>63</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 674.

<sup>64</sup> Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West since World War II", 56-57.

<sup>65</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 676; A similar question will be directed again to Turkey in JDP government period, as it will be discussed in Chapter 8.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 674.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

development of its own defence industry, and the initiative to “establish an atmosphere of mutual confidence in our relations with the neighboring countries.”<sup>68</sup> The outward meaning of that policy was to ensure self-reliance and a return to policy of ‘peace at home, and peace in the world’.

To summarize, as the détente in world politics triggered the change in structure of the international political system, the constraints on states were removed as an unintended consequence, thus, leaving more room for agency on the way of seeking to realize national interests. Discourse changed as the strategy began to show fluctuations and attempts of disassociation from the West. But, in discourse with the words of the new world order, it was not intended to take part explicitly with the Soviet Union. It was probably implied that Turkey would not go into alliance commitments and obligations which constrain the policy of options of small states like Turkey. It can be suggested that the referent of ‘new world order’ was Third World Movement which was preferred as non-alignment, given the fact that it allowed more agency than alliance in any kind. Hence, with the statement of İnönü, as an old figure of foreign policy and master of balance of power politics, most probably intentionally, it was left vague the referent of ‘new world order’ to raise suspicion and create uncertainty in Washington’s policy calculations as it was supported by the words of ambassador. The intended uncertainty further exacerbated within a situation that relations with Moscow was improved.

In that period, as the structure of the international political system underwent a change, and Turkey’s national interests were openly tested in Cyprus Island, discourse of Turkey followed a similar process and highlighted the divergence of strategy that was defined in mid-1940’s. This section is devoted to answer the question of “how changing discourse can be explained?” In seeking explanation, in line with International Relations theories, a number of ways seem possible.

Shortly, in realist terms, as the interests were challenged, the policy had changed as a rational response. But, from the perspective of this dissertation, the explanation might be reached by taking into account the dialectics of structure and agency. It was discussed in the first chapter that *territorial retreat*, at the level of

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<sup>68</sup> Bülent Ecevit, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” in *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance*, ed. Jonathan Alford (London, Gower, for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), 138.

*actual*, combined with *nationalism* brought about a strategic culture that became very cautious on territorial integrity. The possible loss of Cyprus, though not owned by Turkey at the time but by Britain, triggered both structural impulses to protect the Turks inhabiting on the island that were sociologically codified into society, and flared up nationalist sentiments and impulses to prevent any further territorial loss. In fact, nationalism emerging out of agential encounter with international political system, and territorial anxiety emerging from the structure of geography, which factors were repressed with the strategic *end* formulated at the beginning of the period and reinforced with political economical policies through the adoption of capitalism and democracy were challenged with twofold trigger. One is the loss of territory inhabited by Turks, and the other was the gradual loss of agency through the constraints imposed by the structure.

The revival of nationalist sentiments existing in the society emerged through two way initiator of the process. On the one hand, as the disappointment with the West became apparent both in society and among the political elite of the time, the positive approach to democracy left its place to nationalism. On the other hand, the Cyprus conflicts that threatened the relatives of Turkey, and the West's reluctance to find solutions to inter-communal conflicts, or supporting one side's claims while disregarding the other one caused the revival of nationalism. In other words, the specific conditions in Turkey empowered nationalism to the extent of eroding democracy, a process which was further inflamed with the developments in Cyprus Island. To be blunt, as democracy eroded, nationalism revived. In fact, as an elite preference, democracy was praised both to flatten the West and to create an image that Turks was a European nation adopting the Western norms, and in the end, to give an impression that Turkey deserved to be protected against communists and to ease emerging tensions within the society in the World War conditions. Discourse, within this context, reflected nationalism instead of democracy and agency. Given the developments took place and the US hesitancy to resolve the Cyprus Question without taking into account the stakes of Turkey, the incorporation of nationalist sentiments and agency within the discourse was not a surprise, since Turkey also

faced with a series of military coups between 1960 and 1980, raised the political effectiveness of the military.<sup>69</sup>

Regarding the traditional policy of balance of power, discourse reflected a return to old policies that seemed obsolete at the beginning of the Cold War. Here, the geography and meaning attained to it by great powers, and awareness of that meaning by Turkey released the revival of agency to eliminate constraining factors that were reinforced by the alliance politics. Here, one can observe also the revival of pragmatism as well, which was driven by the agency and national interest defined through nationalism and strategic culture. But, on the other hand, the discourse pointed out not to give up alliance policy, but to replace the partner – the other subject of the process. But, replacing the partner was intentionally left vague for the sake of not provoking the US that is capable to harm the interest of Turkey.

#### **6.4. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE:**

In this section, the focal point of discussion is dedicated to reveal whether an incongruence between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized* exists, and if so, how the structural dynamics led to this incongruence. So far, in this chapter, first the structured context has been laid down, which was followed by agential read, formulation of strategy and conduct of strategy. In this period, the selected discourse reflected the changing nature of strategy and course of foreign policy, though structured context has not underwent a substantial change except for smoothening between the superpowers, even this smoothening brought about suitable conditions to alterations.

The crux of change for Turkish Foreign Policy in that period was the changing threat perception, replacing the ‘fear from the West’ with ‘fear of the Soviets’. It was discussed that, the Stalin’s demands brought about ‘the fear of Soviets’ which led to the formulation of strategy that bore divergence from the strategy pursued between 1923 and 1945. In these periods, Turkey strived for acquiring complete independence in all spheres of state and refrained from any sort

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<sup>69</sup> Ümit Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: the Case of Turkey,” *The Middle East Journal* 57, no.2, (2003): 213-229; Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: Hurst&Company, 2003).

of alliance relations that could constrain agency, but, instead, preferred the balance of power politics to overcome shortage of *means* that emerged out of the enduring structural weakness. However, the nature of international political system and state of international economy not allowed more room for agency when the threat perception severely undermined the agential attributes to formulate *ends*. This was the outcome of strategic culture that primarily focused on territorial integrity and preservation of security together with their emergent effects on agency that undermined the awareness to portray the situation – structured context. But, Stalin’s demands created a puzzlement of *ends* on agency bringing about the alliance as the only game in town.

Explaining “why the ‘fear of the East (Soviets)’ triggered the emergence of such a strategy?” will facilitate the understanding of changing discourse and the incongruence which emerged out of the process. Basically, the *end* has not changed, but the *means* employed to acquire that *end* has changed dramatically, which led to employing alliance relations and commitments to acquire security assistance to overcome shortage of *means* in the face of the Soviet threat. From the perspective of Ankara, the will to preserve agency, being one of the historically basic driving force behind foreign policy decisions, played a significant role in that choice. Furthermore, though constructive and collaborative relations helped Turkey during the Independence War and its aftermath, as Russia began to be appear as a power, its ambitions grew in parallel. The effect on the Turkish side was the revival of suspicion on Russia, particularly, which became apparent with territorial demands of Stalin. In fact, Stalin made the mistake to provoke the most sensitive point of Turkey by giving the impression that the Soviets wanted to undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey, of which Turkey is quite jealous. The outcome of that process was seeking alliance with the West and particularly with the US.

Consequently, the “Atlantic Turkey”, the conception of the policy of early Cold War years, particularly after the NATO membership, marked a major and significant abandonment of Kemalist foreign policy principle of “cautious neutralism.”<sup>70</sup> In the conception of cautious neutralism, there was the strategy of overcoming structural weakness and gaining complete independence, whereas, by

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<sup>70</sup> Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 234.

forging alliance relations with the West, “Turkey abandoned the principle of complete independence that was identified by Atatürk.”<sup>71</sup> The outcome was a strategy that was pursued in the 1950’s and in the early 1960’s, in which, “Turkey’s commitment to and engagement with the western alliance was at its height.”<sup>72</sup>

Why was Turkey so eager to forge alliance with the West? The answer to that question is directly related with structural forces operating at the level of *real* – geography, politics, and economy. The outcome of geography, at the level of *actual*, was the fear of experiencing another territorial retreat when faced with the Soviet territorial demands. From the perspective of politics, the international relations of the time introduced the concept of democracy replacing nationalism. Democracy undermined the effectiveness and causality of nationalism in strategy formulation, but it was the price to be paid for alliance with the US and security guarantees that would be provided to Turkey. The economy and the actual outcome of it was the structural weakness which further deteriorated during the Second World War, and the society began to demand prosperity and new openings. In other words, social dynamics pressured for change, which, at the level of *empirical*, was observed with the adoption of democracy by multi-party elections which resulted in change of government that was ready to fulfill the demands of the society. For the state, structural weakness played also a significant role; therefore, despite efforts to overcome structural weakness, the results were far from realization of this intent.

The structural weakness facing Turkey, at the time, was also determining since, the Soviet Union was perceived as an incommensurable power with national power resources at disposal. In fact, such a perception, which sociologically brought about the exaggeration of the threat, caused the transformation of security concern into fear and direct threat that could not be deterred with national *means*. The horror of the total war and the mechanized warfare of the Second World War replaced with the nuclear war, which bore potentially the annihilation of a state, rather than just downgrading security (living) to survival (being alive). In other words, with the effects of strategic culture, structural weakness as supplier of *means* made apparent

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<sup>71</sup> Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, 129.

<sup>72</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 88.



this weakness to the extent of seeking alliance as the sole option to counterbalance the threat to territorial integrity of Turkey. The observed outcome of that fear was throttling of integrative modernization even at the expense of giving up agency. Though integrative modernization as a remedy to structural weakness began to surface with the foundation of republic, replacing defensive modernization, preserving agency and subjectness in ensuing modernization were carefully watched out. At the end, as Karpat pointed out, “at no times in history was the westernization of Turkey so intensive and one-sided as in the period after WWII, and this was thanks to the pressure coming from the Soviet Union.”<sup>73</sup>

Though such considerations and factors were at play to change the perception of agency and awareness, the outcome was far from realizing the intended goals of strategy. As the alliance politics became the game in town, the agency had little space to pursue its own policies, at times when national interests and alliance interests were conflicted. In fact, “the cold war structure left little opening for Turkey to seek an expansion of its interests other than through pro-Western regional alliance structures such as the Baghdad Pact and the Balkan Pact.”<sup>74</sup> The observed outcome, in terms of regional alliances, was the fact that once they had built to realize national interest and to raise security of Turkey, it turned out to be the ones that serve for the Western interests. To be clear, regional alliances that were forged before the Second World War, were primarily agential, and were to keep away instabilities and threats as far away as possible to Turkey. But, with the Cold War, they were designed to realize the Western interests, defined within the lines of the policy of containment, though Turkey was part of it. But, they contributed to the erosion of prestige of Turkey in the eyes of the regional states, reaching to a level of labeling Turkey as a pawn of the US, as it was the case for Baghdad Pact. And Balkan Pact facilitated the eruption of Cyprus Question as Greece applied to the United Nations in the aftermath of signing of the pact. While, the former served for undermining prestige of Turkey, the latter served for the loss of time in Cyprus Question and led to the ‘diplomacy of

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<sup>73</sup> Kemal Karpat, “Introduction,” in *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), 4.

<sup>74</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization*, 73.

postponement.’ In short, while Turkey was serving to the strategy of containment, it was also contained to pursue its own national interests.

Within this context, in which, agency was constrained to a great extent and national interest were severely threatened, a new discourse emerged as discussed in the previous part. The disillusionment with the alliance politics brought about a new discourse, but how far the renewed discourse was in line with the strategy of the time, or whether the changing discourse reflected a change in strategy is a question that should be examined. In terms of *what is actualized*, the formulated strategy realized the *end* of Turkey – the preservation of territorial integrity –, but later, as the integration to the Western alliance gained pace, the structural dynamics began to deteriorate. Structural weakness and the solution to overcome it through industrialization were not approached positively by the West, leading to the deterioration of structural weakness and adding new dimensions to the weakness, such as creating an economy that could be survived with the loans provided by the West. And in terms of geography, the territorial integrity, though any occupation did not occur, allowing use of bases for alliance interests both constrained and undermined agency on the territory. But as the awareness on the fact that agency was severely constrained through the alliance politics, discourse of balance of power politics emerged to overcome loss of agency and to give a new direction to strategy.

*What is actualized*, however, does not coalesce with the discourse. In terms of *what is actualized*, the degree of integration into the West, the signature of treaties and bonds constructed through them diverge with the discourse. If the West is considered as two tiers, defense cooperation treaties with the US and the EU accession efforts emerged as proofs of contradicting strategy with the discourse.

A new impetus was gained in bilateral relations with the US with the signing of Defence Cooperation Agreement in July 1969. But, this treaty was based on the consideration of separating commitments to the US and NATO, in which Turkey “sought to ensure that all joint defence activities were conducted within the limits of NATO commitments.”<sup>75</sup> But later on, upon the Turkey’s intervention to forge peace on Cyprus Island, the US applied an arms-embargo that led to the suspension of the

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<sup>75</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 107.

agreement in 1975. This ‘partial disengagement’<sup>76</sup> from the West, particularly from the US, was directed to realize the strategy of remaining in NATO, but, at the same time, avoiding from the commitments to support the US in the Middle East – as it was realized through not allowing air bases in Arab-Israel conflicts of 1967 and 1973 – which might push Turkey into the position of a US satellite.<sup>77</sup> In that period, the relations with the Soviet Union improved to that extent that the Soviets provided loans to Turkey for several industrial projects whose loans reached to the level that by the end of 1970’s, Turkey received relatively higher level of economic assistance from the Soviet Union among the Third World Countries except for Cuba.<sup>78</sup> The signature of “Declaration on the Principles of Good Neighborly Relations” marked the rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara, and hence, Ankara’s overcoming of ‘fear of the Soviets’. The comment that can be suggested upon these developments could be; as the relations with the Soviet Union had been improved, the room for agency enlarged and the possibility to return to traditional policy of balancing became employable. However, as the relations with the European Economic Community were furthered with Ankara Agreement of 1963, the attempts of Ankara was far from realizing total disengagement from the West, but for regaining agency. Developing relations with Europe was attempted to diversify partners to overcome the constraining factor. In terms of relations with the US, the signature of ‘Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement’ in 1980, after resolving tensions of Cyprus intervention, marked the will to redesign the nature of cooperation, but not complete disassociation.

But from a wider perspective, the discourse of that period not completely matched with the strategy, nevertheless, thanks to the crisis in Cyprus, attempts to regain agency were realized considerably. However, if awareness of agency in reading structure was more comprehensive, the room for agency might have been extended well before. For that reason, one of the critiques of the period was that “Turkey was insufficiently sensitive to the shift in the Soviet Policy, in the aftermath

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>78</sup> Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West since World War II”, 57.

of the Death of Stalin, and should have made more effort to defuse its confrontation with the USSR after Khrushchev came to power.”<sup>79</sup> The critique of William Hale deserves credit since Turkey’s decision to align with the West primarily emerged from the conditions triggered, particularly, with Stalin’s demands, which, in the end brought about employment of alliance as a remedy to compensate for the shortage of *means*. If rapprochement could have been achieved, then, the conditions that constrained agency and factors that played as catalyst in deterioration of *structural weakness* might have been overcome.

Nevertheless, the years between 1960’s and 1980’s were accepted as the years of ‘decisive foreign policy’ in which Turkey demonstrated ‘relative autonomy’ in foreign policy.<sup>80</sup> Similar line of argument was put forward also by Hale arguing that “Turkey’s disengagement from western alliance during the 1970’s was, at best, very partial, hesitant and uncertain.”<sup>81</sup> In other words, due to two main dynamics at play which are disappointment from the West on the Cyprus issue and correspondingly the realization that pursuing bloc policies constrain agency, and changing nature of international political system that showed smoothening, Turkish Foreign Policy transformed into a more autonomous one.

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<sup>79</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 102.

<sup>80</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 673.

<sup>81</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 118.

## CHAPTER 7

### 1980-2002 “The Turkic World; from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China”

#### 7.1. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

In this period, though the Cold War conditions prevailed, its repressive effects began to wane. The détente period had ended with the Reagan Administration (1981-1989), and the new phase of engagement started, but as the superpowers began to tackle with the crisis in Iran in 1979, Iran-Iraq War between 1980-1988 and Afghanistan War between 1979-1988, their ability to impose bloc politics and to constrain disappeared as well. This period for Turkish Foreign Policy was signified not only as a period of re-engagement with the US, but also, as a period of searching for new contours, and openings. The nature of international political system, international economy, the meaning attained to geography changed the context of international relations and Turkish Foreign Policy.

International political system in that period experienced one of the basic transformations in history, in which bi-polarity was replaced with unipolarity. In transformation of international political system, under Reagan’s presidency, the US had started the Second Cold War with Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and continued to apply Carter’s ‘Green Belt’ doctrine that was designed by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, which foresaw containment of the Soviets by moderate Islam. But, in 1985, Gorbachev became the president of the Soviet Union, with such goals of reforming political processes, developing better relations with the West, thus, giving a new impetus to rapprochement and improving the Soviet economy that showed stagnation at the time. In changing the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union, the assumption that “the United States would not deliberately

attack the Soviet Union”<sup>1</sup> played a significant role in Gorbachev’s decision. In other words, rather than confrontation with the US and the West, a rapprochement and accommodation in relations was preferred to focus on internal reconstruction. After reaching accommodative agreements with the US and the West, the peace expectations flourished, but, the policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* rather than reforming the Soviet Union, caused the acceleration of the process of dissolution. In other words, Moscow’s efforts to build prospective relations with the West brought about peace at the expense of dissolution.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 marked the beginning or emergence of new instabilities and ambiguities in the World, particularly in the geography of the Communist states. In fact, the demise of the Soviet Union was equivalent to systemic transformation that brought about differing dynamics that states and society were not accustomed to. David Campbell portrays the end of bi-polar rivalry as the “erasure of certainty”<sup>2</sup> from global politics. For Turkey, as certainty was removed from the international political system leaving its place to uncertainty, the primary outcome was the removal of the Soviet threat that pushed Turkey to construct alliance relationship with the West.

International economy and its effects on politics transformed considerably with globalization. Globalization, an outcome of knowledge and communication revolutions, brought about dissemination of knowledge within a shortened period of time. The liberalization of trade intensified trade relations among nations and began to create a positive atmosphere to overcome foreign policy problems, as the economic interdependencies motivated states to resolve their problems through diplomacy. As democracy gained significance in the World and communism started to leave its place to multi-party democracy, the states that adopted the Western norms began to increase. This positive atmosphere led to the conceptions of that new period described as “the End of History,”<sup>3</sup> which argued that with the dissolution of

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus, “Reagan and the Russians: American Policy toward the Soviet Union,” in *Eagle resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, Donald S. Rothchild (California: Little and Brown, 1987), 235.

<sup>2</sup> David Campbell, *Writing Security: The United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 18.

<sup>3</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

the Soviet Union, Western norms such as liberal economics and democracy gained primacy in the world. And it was argued that as the states adopt democracy war as an instrument to resolve international problems would began disappear, the arguments that were put forward with “Democratic Peace Theory”.

From the perspective of economy, the primary feature of this period was that the globalization gained a new impetus with the communication revolutions, and liberalization of trade. For the states to benefit from new markets, adapting to the forces of globalization, entering into competitive business sectors, giving priority to exports and the construction of politically stable relations with other countries became inevitable. Turkey, too, as a sign of adaptation to the changing conditions and to attract finance and investment adopted an export-oriented development model and gave up the import substitution system. In fact, between 1962 and 1979, Turkey, by adopting the import substitution system and applying the development plans, achieved considerable level of industrialization. The average GNP growth rates in that period reached 6.5 percent.<sup>4</sup> But, the period between 1981-1988 could not have demonstrated the same level of success, when the average percentage of growth decreased to 4.9, and between 1989-1997 it fell to 4,3 percent. Starting from 1980, as Turkey adopted an export-oriented development model which required integration into international markets through liberalization, the hopes waned away as the economic policy changed. Rather than improving economic stability, this, unfortunately, increased economic fragility. In the previous period, it was argued that the attempts to overcome structural weakness could not manage to realize a considerable success. On the contrary, starting from 1950’s, Turkish economy, while was demonstrating enlargement and growth, in fact, was becoming dependent on foreign loans and debts to keep the economy functioning. The outcome of this process for strategy was gradually deteriorating the nature of structural weakness as a structural outcome constituting a ground for allocating *means*. Starting from the 1980’s, Özal’s economic policy aimed at “mounting economic gloom”<sup>5</sup> which foresaw creating a new economy based on exports rather than internal consumption.

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<sup>4</sup> Korkot Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2009*, 21<sup>st</sup> ed. (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2015), 229.

<sup>5</sup> Faroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, (London: Oneworld, 2014), 146-147.

With the transformation of the economic development model, “Turkey was thrown open to the capitalist world and globalization.”<sup>6</sup> Similar line of argument was kept by Oran describing foreign policy of that period as being “in seizure of globalization.”<sup>7</sup> In that period, though a substantial economic growth was observed, this was mainly achieved not through adopting suitable and correct economic policies, but through the achievement on gaining the support of international financial assistance to fund the balance of payment deficits.<sup>8</sup> Between 1981-1990, foreign debts tripled while more risk was posited by the fact that the short term debts increased more than 4,5 times, and internal debts increased 21 times.<sup>9</sup> The positive atmosphere to find loans to manage economic stability was the result of Özal’s foreign policy preference of pursuing a pro-American foreign policy.<sup>10</sup> In terms of structural weakness, starting from the 1980’s, Turkey’s economic performance exhibited growing economic dependency, thus, undermining the attempts to overcome structural weakness.

Geography, as a structural factor, also transformed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The primary outcome was the removal of both the repressive powers of bi-polarity and the Soviet Union from communist states. But, the suspension of repressive forces released the transformative dynamics to bring about change. In Europe, apart from the Eastern Europe’s transition to democracy, the dismantlement of Yugoslavia brought about new instabilities and turmoil into the Balkan region. In the Middle East, Iraq occupied Kuwait, which added new instabilities to the region. And the Caucasus and Central Asia, which were once members of the Soviet Union, entered into the new period as independent states. But, all these developments introduced new instabilities to the international security. The significance of these developments was the fact that, those three regions – the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans – were either a part of the Ottoman Empire in the past, or were religiously, linguistically, and ethnically close to Turkey. Furthermore, these three

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<sup>6</sup> Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 147.

<sup>7</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 2:9-33.

<sup>8</sup> Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 162.

<sup>9</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2:25-26.

<sup>10</sup> Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 163.



regions, and instabilities within them closely affected Turkey in the post-Cold War period. The instabilities surrounding Turkey were reflected within the words of Minister of Defence, Hikmet Sami Türk, who stated that;

Geographic destiny placed Turkey in the virtual epicenter of a ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East encircling us. Rather than isolating ourselves from the pressing conflicts at our doorstep, Turkey decided to assume a pivotal role in promoting regional peace, stability, and cooperation in contributing to vital efforts to end human suffering and conflict.<sup>11</sup>

His words bear significance in terms of showing the perception of Turkey in the post-Cold War environment that underlines the instability and the need to approach and handle them with an active foreign policy. In other words, the political elite of the time, perceived instability, uncertainty, and volatility of the post-Cold War environment, as both causing threats and also offering new opportunities to pursue an active and assertive foreign policy.

## **7.2. AGENCY AND STRATEGY**

Within this structured context, strategy in that period mostly was shaped by the international dynamics and the response was articulated by Turkey to the changing dynamics. In that sense, as the structure showed a major systemic change by transforming from bipolarity into uni-polarity, Turkish Foreign Policy was deeply affected from this transformation. The reason for covering the period between 1980-2002 within this period stems from the need to keep an agential outlook. Even though, the end of the Cold War took place in 1991, from the perspective of Turkish Foreign Policy, the major transformations began to take place with the military coup of 1980.

The period between 1962 and 1979 can be described as a period in which Turkey returned to exhibit considerably more relative autonomy, as the alliance relations with the West and, particularly, with the US created disappointment. The fear from the Soviets had waned away leaving its place to a perception that the

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<sup>11</sup> Pınar Bilgin, “A Return of Geopolitics in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Geopolitics* 9, no.2 (2004): 282.

alliance relations had eroding ramifications to national interests, and did not contribute to overcome structural weakness, but caused further polarization in the society. The outcome of this process was the increase of nationalism, and, in turn, a partial disengagement with the West. In fact, as anti-communism triggered seeking alliance with the West, anti-Americanism that emerged mainly in the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis and Cyprus Question caused distancing from the alliance relations. The state of international relations also eased this disengagement, since the atmosphere of the Détente began to appear with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The strategy of Turkish Foreign Policy faced a reformulation in that period, starting with the government change in 1983. Özal's government from 1983 indicated significant changes and divergence from the strategy of 1962-1979. The Soviet dismantlement brought about another significant change in which the basic dynamics of the international political system have been transformed. In this section, the articulation of strategy will be discussed in line with the formulation put forward and followed in the previous chapters. After the discussion on the agential read of the structured context, the pour of inputs into strategy will be discussed that will be followed by the conduct of strategy.

In terms of portrayal of the situation, Turkey perceived this period from the perspective of encompassing; first, along with the developments that took place within the country and, secondly, through the emerging dynamics of the international political system and international economy. As mentioned above, after experiencing a military coup in 1980 and the elections taking place in 1983, Turkey changed the foreign policy track of the country. But, this argument needs to be substantiated through the discussion that will be provided henceforth. The discussion on how agency had read the structured context will be held in line with *activity*, *concept* and *spatio-temporal* dependent nature of the structure.

Spatio-temporal dependent nature of the structure carried two interrelated aspects within; one was the internal military coup, and the other was the international developments, which were the Gorbachev's signal of a remarkable change from the 1985 and the end of Cold War. In the late 1970's, Turkey experienced internal instability and friction within the society for several reasons, mainly, revolving around the contending views of the rightists and the leftists. The military coup, held

on 12 September 1980, brought stability back to the country, but “the conservative philosophy and worldview of the military regime promoted strong pro-American and pro-NATO policies.”<sup>12</sup> The outcome of this process was the divergence in the course of the foreign policy that was pursued until that time, when compared with the period between 1962-1979. If the pre-coup period was described as a divided society, the military tried to overcome this division by introducing and promoting the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.<sup>13</sup> The Americans perceived the coup positively since it brought stability back to the country. A stable Turkey, in the region of instability – the Middle East –, was in the best interest of Washington. Furthermore, the promotion of strong pro-American and pro-NATO policies was perceived as an attempt to keep Turkey on the track of alliance politics, given that the coup in Iran in 1979 caused the loss of one of the American partners in the region. Hence, Washington was eager to support first the military regime and then its successors. The interesting point was the fact that the new synthesis introduced to the society was not conflicting with the ‘green belt’ strategy of the US, which was pursued against Moscow, but complementing it. It can be suggested that Turkey, again, sacrificed its national interests for the interests of the great powers, or at best, aligned its strategy to the US strategy with the hope of extracting benefits from that alignment. However, the relations between Washington and Ankara were not eased completely, in the eyes of Washington. For example, the Americans were dissatisfied with Turkey’s unwillingness to allow for unlimited access to the air bases in Turkey, particularly, for the American troops stationed in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the 1983 as an independent state was not welcome.<sup>15</sup> Although existing strains in bilateral

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<sup>12</sup> Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkey and the Western Alliance,” in *Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol A. Yeşilada (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 220; Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” *Adelphi Papers* 164 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

<sup>13</sup> İlhan Uzgel, “Türk İslam Sentezi,” in Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2:22; Bozkurt Güvenç et.al., *Türk-İslam Sentezi* (İstanbul: Sarmal, 1994).

<sup>14</sup> Sezer, “Turkey and the Western Alliance”, 222.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

relations were at place, the relations with the US showed improvement to label those bilateral relations as “enhanced partnership.”<sup>16</sup>

In 1983, when Özal won the elections and became the prime minister of Turkey, the internal circumstances were on his side. Özal was also one of the promoters of the Turk-Islam Synthesis and was eager to build close relations with Washington. Özal was accepted as having a “mindset of merchant,”<sup>17</sup> and this mindset found expression in the policies adopted in different domains. It was believed that Özal was a leader mainly “driven by functionalist imperatives of an essentially liberalist agenda” and one who believed in “liberalism’s focus on unleashing individual ambition.”<sup>18</sup> He believed in “freer environment in which the individual can be much more active, productive, and creative.”<sup>19</sup> He regarded “material appetite (the ‘profit motive’) as the engine of national development, and the business entrepreneurship as the template for successful interaction with the outside world.”<sup>20</sup> Reflecting his vision, he also stated, in June 1992, that “Turkey’s prime objective during the ten years ahead of us [is] to become one of [world’s] ten or fifteen leading nations...[to] enter into the first ranks of the first-class nations.”<sup>21</sup> What he meant was the reflection of his vision which highlighted to combine the economic aspirations with foreign policy desires, “to enhance Turkey’s ‘power and standing’, ‘its influence’, its ability to ‘play determinative role both in our region and in world politics’ and hence, to make Turkey a ‘great nation’.”<sup>22</sup> In short, he introduced ambition into the foreign policy and strategy.

His ambitions aroused not only from his vision, but also, from the changing dynamics of the world. The events in Iran and Afghanistan and the military’s

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<sup>16</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2: 230.

<sup>17</sup> Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 60.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 62

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 62-63.

Islamization policy to reconcile the divide existing within society and the goal to curtail “Iran-inspired Islam and Soviet-inspired communism”<sup>23</sup> facilitated the suitable circumstance for Özal. Özal, too, continued this policy to the extent that his vision was described as “neo-Ottomanism”.

Özal’s vision to enhance Turkey and to integrate into the world economy<sup>24</sup> was driven in line with his portrayal of the situation. His strategy to make Turkey a ‘regional power’ can be suggested as a strategic *end* in itself. But, whether *means* at disposal were matching with the ambitious goal was questionable, since Turkey strived in the republican period to overcome enduring and persistent structural weakness. Though, in different periods, attempts were made, they either deteriorated by increasing dependency or were not successful enough to eliminate this structural factor. Leaving Turkey to the forces of globalization, through liberal policies, while created considerable economic growth, it also created recurring series of economic crises. In short, from the activity-dependent nature of structure, though, once more, *structural weakness* was attempted to overcome, but unfortunately, it did not produce desired outcomes to feed strategic vision of Özal.

With the end of the Cold War, probably, the primary effect of it on Turkey was the removal of the fear that emerged from the Soviet neighbor. But, rather than threats were disappearing, actually, they were being replaced with the new ones as uncertainty. But, this fear had both internal and external ramifications for Turkey. With regards the former one, Turkey feared to become a communist, and for the latter, Turkey feared to be occupied by the Soviet and to be turned into a satellite. Both of them were removed from the agenda of Turkey with the Soviet demise. One of the influential scholars argued that “in the first place it freed the Turkish Psyche from an almost pathological obsession, the danger of communism, which had been the result of internal and external cultivation.”<sup>25</sup> Within these lines, he pointed out the perceived ideological fear that had the potential to change the regime within

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<sup>23</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 112.

<sup>24</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 265-273.

<sup>25</sup> Sina Akşin, *Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic* (London: Hurst&Company, 2007), 293.

Turkey, probably, more than the military threat posed by Moscow, and underlined it was somehow exaggerated to construct a perception, in turn, facilitating the alliance with the US. In a similar vein, the friction within the society once more created the circumstances in the post-1980's leading to realign with the US. Furthermore, as the relations with the European Community were not embracing, for the Turkish policy makers, the only solution left was to seek new grounds of cooperation with Washington. What makes Washington attractive was the fact of not putting forward any conditionality on human rights, which were severely damaged under the rule of military junta.

But, the removal of threat, leaving its place to instabilities, and the loss of strategic importance attained to Turkey, particularly, to its geography and meaning attained to that geography by the West, created uncertainty whether Turkey would be able to keep that importance in the eyes of the West. In other words, instability not only emerged in the geography surrounding Turkey, but it also emerged within Turkey with regards to its post-Cold War identity, importance and the track that would be adopted to adapt to the changing international political system. In fact, what would be the role of Turkey in the changing international political system created anxiety in Ankara.

The first impression and considerations were that Turkey would lose its strategic importance. And, as the strategic importance attained to Turkey decreased, it was thought that Turkey's relations with the West would also be affected by that. This consideration was basically based on the fact that as the Soviet threat had disappeared, "the main cause of Turkey's attachment to the western alliance had effectively ended."<sup>26</sup> In this context, Turkey, though, experienced some puzzlement in the post-Cold War environment, entered into a phase of re-defining its strategic importance. In fact, the instabilities in the surrounding regions both gave precept for redefining its strategy in accordance with the change and initiated the fear of whether the emerging instabilities might spill over into Turkey, thus, threatening its security.

In the previous chapters, Turkey was to overcome different fears emerging from the security environment that was shaped by the international political system and its place in it. In the founding years, the 'fear from the West' had shaped the

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<sup>26</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy* (New York, Routledge, 2013), 135.

strategy, whereas with the Second World War, it was replaced with the ‘fear from the Soviets’. These fears had effectively contributed, if not determined, to the formulation of strategy. Once more, fear, mostly emerging from structural weakness, reiterated itself in line with the context. In the post-Cold War environment, it can be suggested that the ‘fear of abandonment’ and ‘fear of spillover’ emerged, which shaped the formulation of strategy. Due to the strategic culture inherent to Turkey and society, each period with different contexts, triggered the emergence of some kind of fears that needed to be tackled with.

In this context, the formulation of strategy contained the emerging need to adapt to the changing and transforming conditions which can be summarized with the terms of confusion, uncertainty, instability, ambiguity, anxiety and, paradoxically, ambition. Turkey perceived the new environment as both bearing opportunities and threats that gave rise to both ambition and anxiety. What was more complicating was the fact that *means* that could be allocated to ambitious *ends* were far from being adequate, and more importantly, the mental preparedness that provided inputs to cognition was behind to foresee the situation and to take proactive steps.

In formulating strategy, Turkey, as it was mentioned above, faced confusion, as Turkey was not prepared to that systemic change. But Özal’s vision and its ability to utilize post-coup internal conditions brought about some euphoria which was dedicated to create new connotations and conceptions regarding the role of Turkey in the post-Cold War. Among them, ‘regional power’, ‘multi-regionalism’, ‘active foreign policy’, ‘Turkic World’ can be cited. What was in common among them was the fact that each of these concepts inherently carried out some ambitions within.

In different occasions, Özal highlighted these new conceptions in his statements. Regarding multi-regionalism;

In the balances of future...we will hold two cards. One is the card we with the Western countries, and the other card we hold with these Islamic and Arab countries. Turkey is obliged to carry both these cards. Its weight in the West is commensurate to its Weight in the East. The greater our weight in the East, the greater it will be in the West as well.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture*, 64.

And regarding ambitions and active foreign policy;

The greatest opportunity presented to our nation in 400 years. ... Truly it is the kind of extraordinary chance and blessing that is made available to a nation or country once in several centuries. ... If we fail to pass through the “gates of desire” [*hâcet kapıları*] that have opened to in front of us today ... we may never receive such an opportunity again.<sup>28</sup>

His words highlighted how Turkey would adapt to new security environment, at least, at the level of vision. But whether his vision could be realized is another question that will be addressed in the subsequent parts.

Regarding Turkey’s post-Cold War role, different scholars put forward differing perspectives mainly accepting the fact that Turkey’s strategic importance had not waned but gained a new impetus. Debating on the Turkey’s role, different scholars agreed on this fact, but differed in terms how this would be managed. But, at the same time, different analyses which questioned the role of Turkey, whether it would be “bridge or barrier”<sup>29</sup> or, more positively highlighting its “pivotal role”<sup>30</sup> were published. Paul Henze, argued that the new choices which emerged out of dissolution were “not contradictory or competitive, [but] they are complementary.” He further claimed that as Western Europe and the US approached Turkey as an “integral component,” they would benefit from this approach and would find ways to “maximize its relations with the Middle East and Central Asia.”<sup>31</sup> In a similar vein, it was considered that Turkey’s activism outside Europe was thought to be a factor that increased the strategic value of Turkey in the post-Cold War environment. Ziya Öniş, suggested a similar line of thought by arguing that “Turkey should look simultaneously to both the East and the West,” and accepted that “Islam constitutes

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>29</sup> Ian O.Lesser, “Köprü mü Engel mi? Soğuk Savaşın Ardından Türkiye ve Batı,” in *Türkiye’nin Yeni Jeopolitik Konumu: Balkanlar’dan Batı Çin’e*, ed. Ian O.Lesser and Graham E.Fuller (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınevi, 2000), 125-180.

<sup>30</sup> Zbigniew Brezezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York Basic Books, 1997), 41.

<sup>31</sup> Paul Henze, “Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century”, *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, ed.Graham Fuller and Ian O.Lesser (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 2.



an important part of its cultural heritage.”<sup>32</sup> But, Öniş pointed out the need to pursue a multiregional foreign policy and incorporate Islam as a facilitator in the new strategy. The perception of Turkey’s role in that new dynamics is generally accepted as not losing its ground but gaining a new impetus. It was also pointed out that Turkey should redefine its historical and geographical heritage to develop a strategy that could bring about the intended outcomes.

As the strategic *end* was defined as to become a ‘regional power’ by pursuing an active foreign policy, it was considered that it required the redefinition of identity.<sup>33</sup> The rationale behind this argument was the suggestion that the material and ideational context of the post-Cold War were not compatible with the “authoritarian and isolationist nationalism” but, it required the reinterpretation of it, due to Turkey was facing its “historical and cultural responsibilities” existing in the surrounding regions.<sup>34</sup> In fact, Özal’s foreign policy was regarded as an attempt to revive bonds with the surrounding geocultural periphery, thus, to gain power resources that could be articulated as *means* in foreign policy strategy.<sup>35</sup> Cengiz Çandar, an influential journalist of the time, argued that “Turkey now had no choice but to adopt a neo-Ottoman ‘cosmopolitanism’ and embrace its ‘imperial mission’: ‘either shrinkage or expansion; history and geopolitics do not appear of munificent as to permit a third alternative.’”<sup>36</sup>

In formulation of strategy, the *situational* element emerged through the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The new situation was embedded with ambiguity, uncertainty, and instability, and on the other hand, with opportunities if converted into power resources as enhancer of *means* that can be allocated in pursuing nationally-determined strategic *ends*. The basic consideration in the aftermath of the Soviet demise was that Turkey would lose its strategic importance in the eyes of the

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<sup>32</sup> Ziya Öniş, “Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity,” *Middle East Journal* 49 (1995): 48-49.

<sup>33</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 117.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>36</sup> Cengiz Çandar, “21.Yüzyıla Doğru Türkiye: Tarih ve Jeopolitiğin İntikamı,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 31-34, quoted in Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture*, 81.

West, and thus, the flow of the required assistance to overcome structural weakness and security concerns would be in jeopardy. However, the internal developments in the political sphere, while prepared conditions to adapt into new challenges, they also brought about a portrayal of the situation, through which a strategy that Turkey could use to adapt into new dynamics emerged.

*Positional* element emerged within this context, arguing that in order to keep Turkey's importance in the eyes of the West, and to ensure prosperity from the new conditions and a national strategy that was compatible with the dynamics of the structure was required to be developed. The positioned practice of Turkey was shaped primarily with the sudden change of the international political system. While maintaining strategic importance and getting new avenues to ensure Turkey to become regional power were deemed essential, to block any spillover of instabilities were also deemed as necessary to adapt to the new conditions emerging out of systemic change. For that reason, Turkey found itself in a position to redefine its national identity. Turkish-Islam synthesis, introduced in the aftermath of the coup, prepared the ground to be utilized in the ideational adaptation – discussion of neo-Ottomanism – to new circumstances and in the articulation of discourse of ‘from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China’.<sup>37</sup> But redefinition of identity did not occur in a vacuum, but was influenced by both internal and external factors.

It was argued in the previous chapters that Turkey pursued an ‘integrationist modernization’ in order to improve its relations with the West to become a developed country. But, the relations with the European Community (EC) did not produce desired level of integration which was marked with the refusal to accept Turkey's membership in 1987. Pınar Bilgin argued that when faced with the disappointment from the European Union, as the accession to the EC was rejected in 1987, Turkey felt betrayed with this rejection which opened the discussion of Turkey's identity in the post-Cold War era. The disappointment with the EC pushed Turkey to seek a way of “(re)locating Turkey” in world affairs through changing geographic focus. Thus, de-emphasizing ‘Europeanness’ but appraising the ties with the ‘Turkic World,’<sup>38</sup> in

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<sup>37</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, p.2: 33: M.Hakan Yavuz, “Değişen Türk Kimliği ve Neo-Osmanlıcılığın Yükselişi,” in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, ed. Şaban Çalı, İhsan Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001), 35-64.

<sup>38</sup> Bilgin, “A Return of Geopolitics in the Mediterranean?,” 282-283.

order to attract the West and repair Turkey's importance in the eyes of Europeans, was observed.

In terms of relocation of Turkey, whether this need was emerged from an agential read or was it the only option left due to the structure eliminated other alternatives should also be discussed. In other words, it was a question of whether it was based on agential preferences or structural constraints. The early answer to these questions is that the both seems plausible, since the ideal of westernization get stacked, thus, pushed Turkey for seeking alternatives, and agency perceived the new security environment in which no major threat was existing, but more manageable ones, thus, a need to adopt activism to resolve them was inevitable. Furthermore, it was thought that as the instabilities could be eliminated, then, the each once resolved would contribute to the power and standing of the country.

In fact, in formulation of strategic *end*, apart from the changing international political system, geography also played a significant role in *praxis*. The power vacuum created behind the demise opened new geographies that could be reached, since formidable blocking was perceived as not existing anymore. As discussed in the previous chapters, either 'fear from the West' or 'fear from the Soviets' pushed Turkey to seek counterbalancing them through forging implicit or explicit alliances. But, they were basically threats that could not be eliminated with the available resources, since structural weakness heavily hampered the allocation of *means* to pursue adventurist foreign policy strategies. But, the Soviet demise, while eliminated the Soviet threat, it had also left behind comparatively weaker states than Turkey and they needed Turkey's assistance either to build bonds with the West, or to attract Turkey to invest in them, to ease their economic growth and to integrate into international markets.

Geography, in that sense, provided the material context on which ideational contributions might provide both the *ends* and, in turn, *means* to achieve those *ends*. Ideational aspect emerged out of the material context was to integrate, particularly, the newly emerged states to Turkey, through activism and multi-regionalism adopted in foreign policy. In other words, once proper interactions and integration might be fostered, in the process, the involved parties would benefit from the process in increasing their *means* at disposal. What was meant here can be illustrated with the

Turkish interest in Caspian hydrocarbon reserves and their import to international markets via Turkey. Transfer of oil and gas required, first and foremost, to build close and trustful relations to produce agreements. Then, as transfer of energy to Western markets started, then, their integration into international economy would be achieved and Turkey also would benefit from the revenues of this transition. In other words, Turkey might serve as a country that provides geopolitical pluralism to the Caucasian and Central Asian newly emerged states, and in this way, raise the intensity and stakes in bilateral relations with the West.

It has been mentioned about the fact that the ‘fear from the Soviet’ was replaced with the ‘fear of spillover’ which mainly emanated from the geographical proximity to new instabilities. As this instability mainly emerged from weaker states, Turkey’s capability to play the role of stabilizer was considered to increase and they were treated from the perspective that the activism in foreign policy adopted by Turkey might facilitate the makeup of stability, thus, eliminating the sources of ambiguity and decreasing the any possibility of possible spillover in the future.

But, whether this ambitious strategic *ends* were defined in line with the persistent structural factor of structural weakness still needs to be discussed. When the Cold War ended, the structural weakness was not eliminated, despite some positive steps were taken to ensure economic growth of Turkey. But, Özal’s economic policy, export-oriented economic growth model and liberalization of markets, gave a new impetus to Turkish economy, but as the economic growth was observed, the rate of inflation and balance of payment deficits accompanied that growth. Thus, the formulated *end* was out of reach of *means* at disposal. It was thought that the activism in foreign policy would bring new *means* in the process through the achievements of that activism. In fact, strategy, in that period, rather than being defined in line with the *means* attainable, was defined with wishful thinking based on the assumption that *means* automatically would be available as the process proceeded. In other words, the nature of economy characterized with persistent *structural weakness* was behind to ensure success of the defined *ends*. From the perspective of *dispositional* element of strategy, Turkey formulated a strategy that negates *means* to be allocated to *ends*. Hence, *means* were behind *ends* that were defined to pursue new activism or fulfill the requirements of new conceptions.

At this point, the past experiences revived using the balance of power politics to compensate for the shortage of *means*. But, this time, balancing was applied in the absence of a major threat. Continuation and intensification of relations with the US, which needed Turkey to realize its national interests in the regions surrounding Turkey, proposed “enhanced partnership”<sup>39</sup> which brought about collaboration efforts with Washington. Thus, while this collaboration was facilitating the conditions to realize strategic *ends*, and employing *means* emanating from that partnership which, besides material aspects, the partnership only discursively produced positive outcomes in the eyes of the newly-independent post-Soviet states. The closer relations with Washington meant source of overcoming shortage of *means*.

The conduct of strategy, in that period, reflected the portrayal of the situation that was mainly driven by the vision of Özal, and domestic facilitators emerged out of the military coup. It was mentioned that Özal, beginning from 1983, initiated a series of reforms that aimed to intensify integration into the West and globalized economy through liberalization. When the Cold War ended, Turkey began to get involved in regional instabilities which were a consequence of shifting to activism in foreign policy. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait offered the opportunity to realize different goals of Özal consisting of; preventing and eradicating PKK terrorism in its source, unstable northern Iraq; demonstrating Turkey’s geostrategic importance to the West; becoming a central player in the Allied coalition.<sup>40</sup> The consideration in getting involved in the Gulf War made the changing mindset in Turkish Foreign Policy evident.<sup>41</sup> In fact, Turkey was the first nation in the region that denounced Iraq’s invasion, declared full support to the UN sanctions, and made the blockade working by shutting down Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. Özal believed that the new activism

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<sup>39</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2: 230.

<sup>40</sup> Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The challenges of Multi Regionalism,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no.1 (2000): 171.

<sup>41</sup> Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no.1 (2000): 210.

in Turkish Foreign Policy “will consolidate its own Western identity”<sup>42</sup> which was severely hampered with the rejection by EC.

Özal’s involvement in the crisis was driven by several strategic security considerations. As discussed in the portrayal of the situation, he believed that new instabilities should be resolved before it might spillover into Turkey. Moving from this assumption, he preferred the involvement through which, the Saddam regime would be toppled creating a chance for the settlement of a democratic regime in Iraq which eventually could work for the settlement with Kurds. Furthermore, a restoration of Baghdad’s control in the north might prevent the gain of safe-havens by PKK terrorists and, eventually, preventing them to conduct terrorist activities in Turkey.<sup>43</sup> To achieve these considerations, Özal opted for intervention which assumed opening of a second front in the North, and occupation of Mosul as well. But, the resignations of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Bozer, Minister of Defence, Safa Giray and Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay showed the opposition to his policy of involvement. Eventually, as the US did not topple Saddam in 1991, but constrained its power in northern Iraq, the “hopes proved unfounded.”<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, in the absence of internal settlement with the Kurds, as Hale underlined, the “western policy effectively left a power vacuum in northeastern Iraq that strengthened rather than weakened the PKK.”<sup>45</sup> In the absence of strict control and settlement in northern Iraq, PKK continued to conduct terrorist activities in Turkey. The ongoing effectiveness of PKK brought about several ramifications consisting of economic losses, anxiety in society and, in the end, the revival of *Sèvres syndrome*. From the perspective of strategy, what was more challenging was the fact that the *ends* defined as preventing the spillover of instabilities into Turkey could not be realized. In the Gulf War, the intent was to change long-standing policy of non-interventionism and caution into the “assertive activism,”<sup>46</sup> crafted to reinvent Turkey’s role in the

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 213.

<sup>43</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 161.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”, 170.

international political system and to consolidate its “status as a western stronghold in the Middle East.”<sup>47</sup> But, this argument can be criticized on the fact that Turkey’s involvement into Iraq was primarily driven by PKK terrorism which used the northern Iraq for the attacks in Turkey.<sup>48</sup> In other words, it can be claimed that the quest for involvement was the outcome, a clear example and, a proof of the ‘fear of spillover’. Although the intended involvement into Iraq could not be realized, the expulsion of Öcalan, the leader of PKK Terrorist Organization from Syria, and his eventual trial in Turkey, were perceived as a sign of effectiveness in pursuing an active foreign policy rather than a reactive one.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, it eased the *Sèvres Syndrome* in Turkey.

Involvement into the surrounding regions was not limited to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia also constituted the crux of the strategy, which regions were the geographies that Turkey could attract new resources to allocate as *means* in future strategies. In fact, the historical, cultural, ethnic and religious bonds with the newly-independent states of the regions were accepted as the assets that can be utilized in expanding the regional influence of Ankara through active foreign policy. Furthermore, these regions were accepted as the geographies that constituted an indispensable part of multi-regionalism in foreign policy.

The sudden demise of the Soviet Union led to the suspension of restrictive policies of Moscow on the newly-independent states which were actively discouraged to construct bilateral relations. It also meant that the “sudden rediscovery of almost forgotten peoples of Turkic origin led to inflated hopes and unrealistic expectations on the part of Turkish officials.”<sup>50</sup> This was also in line with the strategy to bolster the international status of Turkey. As was mentioned above, in formulation of strategy, Turkey, without having adequate resources at disposal, got involved in the region with a consideration that *means* to realize *ends* would flourish in the process. Turkey believed that as the relations became intensified, Turkey’s

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<sup>47</sup> Eric Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), 318.

<sup>48</sup> Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”, 171.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

<sup>50</sup> Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), 3.

aspirations to become a regional power would enhance, while constraining the efforts to restore the influence of Russia and Iran on them, and offering new markets that supported the export-oriented growth strategy.<sup>51</sup> Ankara's eagerness to develop close relations and the hope Turkic Republics would adopt its political and economic model – a Muslim country with pluralist democracy and capitalist economy – were also praised and encouraged by the West, since any growth of Iranian influence in the region was perceived with suspicion. The hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian littoral states further increased the eagerness with the expectation to become an energy-hub by hosting the transfer of energy resources to international markets via Turkey.<sup>52</sup> Ankara approached these regions with high expectations, which assumed that as the interaction and integration intensified and as they became integrated into the West, Turkey would benefit from this integration economically, strategically, and politically.

But, the developments in the regions, as sources of instability,<sup>53</sup> proved the 'fear of spillover,' rather than the realization of the expectations. Particularly, the ethnic tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which led to the occupation of Nagorna Karabakh in 1992, showed the limits of Turkey in resolving instabilities by pursuing an active foreign policy. Hence, caution once more became evident with the considerations of not providing a precept for involving the PKK separatist movement active in Turkey at the time.<sup>54</sup> But Turkey, though did not get involved in regional conflicts, initiated the regional multilateral institution, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), to facilitate the cooperation among the member states, in June 1992.

Another example that caused disappointment was the 'Turkic Summit' held in Ankara in 1992 with exaggerated expectations and an ambitious agenda. It was

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<sup>51</sup> Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey, The Caucasia and Central Asia", in *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1994), 180.

<sup>52</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2:278-282.

<sup>53</sup> Hasan Yükselen, "Actors in South Caucasus: Stability Providers or Instability Exploiters" (Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2004).

<sup>54</sup> Svante Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorna Karabakh: A Delicate Balance," *Middle Eastern Studies* (January 1998): 51-72.



referred by Demirel during his Central Asian tour as the ‘Turkic commonwealth’ or the ‘Association of Independent Turkic States’, in which, Turkey would not explicitly be dominated by<sup>55</sup> but implicitly would be the leader of these institutions. However, the outcome of the summit cooled off the expectations with the consideration that any pan-Turkist Programme had the potential to create serious problems with Moscow.<sup>56</sup>

The expectations could not be realized since the *means* available were far from realizing the *ends* defined at time. Among the factors; the absence of common borders, limited resources, the Russian presence and realization that Moscow still continued to be effective on them, and finally the reluctance of newly-independent states to become dependent on Turkey, replacing the new one with an old one, caused hopes to wane.<sup>57</sup> When Turkey realized that the expectations exceeded the realities of the country, the reluctance became evident in foreign policy. Furthermore, as *structural weakness* revived with the economic crisis of 1994, economic *means* that could be allocated to activism, automatically, decreased leaving its place to self-criticism that *means* were overestimated and the strategy, to engage to the region, was based on the assumptions that collapsed soon. Thus, wrong assumptions and the analysis based on them inevitably brought about the collapse of the strategy.

### **7.3. STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE: How strategy is represented**

The selected discourse is considered to represent the general euphoria which emerged with the Soviet dismantlement. Strategy and its representation in discourse emerged from the dialectical interaction of agent and the structured context. It is argued that the formulation of strategy emerged from the portrayal of the situation that consisted of agential read of the structured context through consciousness, subjectivity and cognition to reach *ends* that intended to be realized in due course. When the Cold-War ended, the developments leading to the formulation of strategy

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<sup>55</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 223.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”, 175.

did not occur in a vacuum or in an isolated environment. On the contrary, Turkey, as the relations with Europe had not produced desired outcomes to allow further integration into the European structures, found itself to redefine its identity and the foreign policy strategy. The positive aspect of the relations with the EEC was that the rejection came not after dissolution, but before, thus, giving time to re-evaluate the strategic orientation of Turkey. Özal's vision to follow an active foreign policy, either with Europe or without Europe, which did not mean complete disassociation from the West, pragmatically, introduced activism and strategy to get involved in politics in surrounding regions actively.

Discourse of this period, reflecting euphoria in Turkish Foreign Policy, was represented in the discourse of “the Turkic World; from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.”<sup>58</sup> Though it was not originated in Turkey, it soon was adopted and used as a discourse by Demirel. The discourse, which was articulated by Özal, was that “The next century, the 21st century, will be the century of Turks.”<sup>59</sup> What was incorporated within discourse will be discussed to reveal the relationship between the strategy and its representation in discourse.

At first sight, discourse of strategy articulated in that period referred basically to geography and history: the former by expanding the ambitions of agent that might be source of *means* and *ends*, and the latter highlighting what is to be employed in realizing the *ends* of strategy. Geographically, discourse covers a vast land of territory that was mostly inhabited by people who were almost forgotten, but, were remembered as the suppressive forces which disappeared with the Soviet demise, and with whom Turkey had historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic bonds. Incorporation of history recalled the revival of the neo-Ottoman imperial ideals that were removed from the Turkish security and foreign policy culture with the foundation of the republic as caution and refrain from adventurism in foreign policy were denounced.

Geography, further, referred to the dynamics that emerged out of the Soviet dissolution mainly cited with the terms of instability, uncertainty and ambiguity. In

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<sup>58</sup> Discourse of that period was first used by Henry Kissinger, see Gün Kut, “Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararası Ortam”, in *Bağımsızlığın İlk Yılları*, ed.B.E Behar et al. (Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), 13.

<sup>59</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 122.

articulation of discourse, the historical and sociological inputs played a significant role as the main driving forces, but, since strategy was not defensive, but assertive, (not offensive) in character, it emerged out of mainly structural changes and agential strategic response formulated to adapt to these changes. As the sociological aspect stems from the strategic culture, the existence of fears, constant but only changing in nature, contributed to the articulation of both strategy and discourse. As Özal considered that the possible spillover of instabilities could not be prevented by being reactive, cautious, passive, but on the contrary, active, assertive, and proactive. Thus, he primarily focused on geography from where threats were perceived in foreign policy formulation. And, together with strategy, discourse highlighted and made known the transformation of foreign policy which became more assertive, active, and multi-regional. Implicitly, it further incorporated the ambitions by declaring implicitly the referred geography as the ‘Turkish sphere of interest’ that was intended to be transformed into a ‘Turkish sphere of influence’ as the *means* attainable in realization of that ‘end’.

If geography is accepted as the material context, the ideational aspect – *ends* of strategy – becomes apparent with the representation of strategy in discourse. Ideas, whether coming from agential inspiration or structural imposition underline the need for change, and recognition of that need by agency. If agency was not aware of change, irrespective of how far structurally was imposed, does not cause the emergence of discourse. From that perspective, “in response to the demise of bipolarity and the increasing influence of globalization this new discourse emphasized the need for a change in Turkish Foreign Policy.”<sup>60</sup> And discourse, as agency being involved in the process, inevitably carries the subjectivity of agency. In a similar vein, as strategy emerges from the imagination and being represented in discourse, ideational aspect would be attached to material context. In that sense, discourse does not bear on threatening or defensive elements in itself, but visionary ones. But, on the other hand, as geography, the material context that was aimed or that formed the subject matter of strategy, was perceived as the one that had been under the territorial control of the Soviet Union, then, it can be claimed that the

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<sup>60</sup> Maliha Benli Altunışık, “Geopolitical Representation of Turkey’s Cuspness: Discourse and Practice,” in *The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations*, ed. Marc Herzog and Philip Robins (New York: Routledge, 2014), 33.

threatening elements were implicitly incorporated within the discourse. The fears of Central Asian leaders not to provoke Moscow by adopting a ‘pan-Turkist Programme’ in Turkic Summit in 1992 proved these arguments. Hence, in that case, being visionary might be perceived as threatening by the ones who had stakes in that geography. Nevertheless, discourse provided new openings for Turkish Foreign Policy.

Apart from geography, discourse also incorporated Turkic ethnicity within. As discussed before, Turkish Foreign Policy was driven by cautious isolationism and refrained from any sort of adventurism. From the foundation, nationalism was thought within the borders of Turkish territory, and did not expand beyond. The articulated discourse exhibits divergence in that sense as well, by foreseeing a kind of unity under the leadership of Turkey. It further tried to be reinforced by incorporation of the neo-Ottoman elements and its cosmopolitanism that embraced differing religious and ethnic identities. Inherently, it had two aspects; one was to embrace internal differences emanated by the PKK separatist and terrorist movement, and, somehow paradoxically, the other was to smoothen the ethnic nationalism to embrace other states and identities outside of Turkey.

It was argued that *means* at disposal were far from realization of the *ends* in discourse. Hence, the question of whether discourse underwent a change in line with the inability to realize the discourse arises. In fact, both in formulation of strategy and in articulation of discourse incorporating a vision that exceeds the actual borders of Turkey, beyond being ambitious project, was basically ambitious in terms of *means* that could be allocated in it, and if not realized, potentially this ambition might ruin confidence and create a new identity crisis. As the realization of discourse and strategy was beyond national resources, a redefinition of discourse emerged. And in time, the ‘Turkic world’ conception, later, evolved into the conception of ‘Eurasia’, the latter implicitly cloaked direct representation of ethnicity in discourse, and at the same time, broadened the reach of imagination further. The word Eurasia was argued to give the impression of “retaining ‘European’ orientation and embracing the ‘Asian’ dimension.”<sup>61</sup> Thus, refraining from visionary and assertive

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<sup>61</sup> Pinar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma”, in *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?: Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis*, ed. Stefano Guzzini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 169.

discourses that might irritate powers who had conflicting interests with Turkey was observed.

Incorporation of geography explicitly in discourse – directly referring to a piece of geography, rather than merely strategic *ends* – can be seen as the first instance in foreign policy, so far discussed in this dissertation. Explanation of historical and sociological sources of this divergence from traditional discourses might provide insights regarding the course of Turkish Foreign Policy. As the relations with the EU were behind the realization of expectations of building closer and institutional binds with, the discourse that attained geography began to be used. In fact, ‘we hold two cards’ discourse, beyond the intention in pursuing multi-regional foreign policy, it also highlighted the sense of exclusion from the West. The outcome of the process was the representation of Turkish geography either, constituting *bridge* or *crossroads of continents*. But, beyond discursive representations, it entailed imagination with an international function and identity aspired to be played and to become.<sup>62</sup> In fact, in line with redefinition of identity and in process of (re)locating of Turkey in the post-Cold war international system, Turkey began to attain ‘exceptional’ meaning to its geography, through discourses of ‘liminality’ and ‘hybridity’.<sup>63</sup>

#### **7.4. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE:**

Whether an incongruence between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized* exists, if so, what made this incongruence to emerge will be discussed in this part. In formulation of strategy, the dynamics of structured context significantly marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The developments took place before the dissolution, particularly internal ones, prepared the ground for the emergence of discourse, together with formulation of strategy. The Soviet dissolution, marked the removal of the Soviet threat and bi-polar confrontation from the international political system which created more autonomous circumstances in which strategy

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<sup>62</sup> Lerna Yanık, “The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: ‘Bridging Turkey’s Location, Role and Identity after the End of the Cold War,” *Geopolitics* 14 (2009): 533.

<sup>63</sup> Lerna Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’: Discourse of Liminality and Hybridity in the post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 80-89.

can be conducted. But, as the conduct phase of strategy was put into place, together with the events taking place, the internal developments hampered the realization of the *ends*. This constitutes *what is actualized* part of the process in which *what is spoken* faced with the reality on the ground. The formulation of strategy that lacked *means* to realize the *ends*, further exacerbated the outcome leading to a crisis of identity which was fueled with the economic crisis that constrained *means* at disposal.

In terms of *what is actualized*, the primary changes came with the military coup of 1980, and Özal's election as the Prime Minister in 1983. From the beginning, Özal adopted radical policies to adapt Turkey to the changing dynamics of the international political system and international economy. The introduction of Turkish-Islam synthesis in the aftermath of the military coup facilitated ideational foundations of the post-Cold War policies. In fact, with premiership, Özal began to challenge evidently the Republican paradigm.<sup>64</sup> Its primary reform was to change the economic model for development from the import-substitution to the export-oriented growth model by adopting economic liberalization and integration into world markets. In this way, he envisioned to employ forces of globalization to extract economic benefits and infiltrate into new markets. If diversification of markets was achieved, which was actually realized, it could contribute to overcome both *structural weakness* and dependency on the European markets.<sup>65</sup> Özal's economic policy was based on ensuring continuous flow of foreign exchange that was lacking compared to previous periods. But, economic policies could not manage to produce desired results and could not eliminate the stock of foreign debts, but increased the potential of a new economic crisis. In short, though he transformed economic policy, the expectations could not be met. Hence, *structural weakness* as an enduring structural factor continued to affect the available *means* for strategy.

Economic sphere does not constitute the only domain that Özal pushed for change. Foreign policy constituted one of the major domain in which a change or eagerness to a change was observed. He believed that the cautious approach, which

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<sup>64</sup> Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture*, 76.

<sup>65</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2: 25.

was watched out closely in Turkish Foreign Policy, was reproducing the structure that brought about fears, in one kind or another. It was only changing the adjective added to the fear, but the reality of *fear* was standing as one of the constants. In the absence of a powerful challenger, as Russia, Britain, Germany or the Soviet Union in their respective periods and contexts, what causes the fears was considered to be eliminated. This elimination which meant needing further *means* at disposal required Özal to adopt a more active foreign policy. This consideration was basically based on the fact that it could manage only the context of international political system, not constrain severely the formulation and conduct of strategy. In other words, it was dependent on the emergence of suitable conditions to allow or facilitate such jail-breaking acts. But, the detection of suitable conditions, if not capable to create ones, depends on vision and subjective reading of the structured context. The end of the Cold-War, and the eventual suspension of imposing and constraining forces provided such a condition to bring agency back in. In other words, agential strategy in this period was basically designed to alter the structural forces that continuously blossom in different modes. In this way, it was aimed to produce conditions that might allow formulating and pursuing more agential and nationalist strategies.

It was discussed that the new security environment was characterized with the terms of instability, uncertainty and ambiguity. The new instabilities surrounding Turkey triggered the ‘fear of spillover’, which was further underpinned with the PKK terrorism which emerged as a separatist movement that threatened territorial integrity of Turkey. Instabilities surrounding Turkey were perceived as the dynamics that might spillover into Turkey. The recipe to tackle with them was to adopt a more active and assertive foreign policy in that period. In that sense, isolationism was perceived as the policy that might facilitate the spillover into Turkey and to reproduce the structure that brought about them.

Moving from such consideration, Özal government sought actively to get involved into the Gulf War and instabilities in the Middle East. There were two basic strategic objectives in this involvement; one, as discussed, if Iraq’s transition to democracy could be managed, the PKK terrorism based on the northern Iraq might be prevented; and the other one, as Turkey participates in the allied coalition, it would provide a chance in reshaping the future of Iraq. But, the internal opposition

did not allow for such adventurism, hence, Turkey, rather than benefiting from the Gulf War, faced economic losses. Most importantly, as the power vacuum left in the northern Iraq was facilitated through the operation of Northern Watch, PKK strengthened its footage in the region and continued to conduct terrorist activities in Turkey.

The significance of PKK terrorism was that it caused the revival of *Sèvres syndrome* as the elimination of PKK could not be achieved. Furthermore, as the desired outcomes from the strategy could not be realized, it left its place to the dismay and loss of confidence eradicating the euphoria which emerged in the aftermath of 1991. As *means* at disposal were quite behind the *ends* defined in this period, and worsened with the series of economic crisis between 1994 and 2001, the subsequent identity crisis on what should be the course of foreign policy and its strategy emerged. The mismatch between *means* and *ends* was underlined by Türkmen arguing that “Turkey has developed certain strategic mission concepts that go beyond its economic and political reach.”<sup>66</sup> As the realization of *ends* could not be achieved, rather than leading to reconfiguration and reformulation of strategy, it had nourished the ‘national security syndrome,’<sup>67</sup> the articulation of defensive reflexes and, the securitization<sup>68</sup> of many of the international problems.

Behind the renewed national security syndrome, apart from negative mood of failure to realize strategy, was the fear of ‘territorial retreat’ that was revitalized with the PKK terrorism and separatism.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, partnership with the US that was thought to be the source of *means* which could be allocated for national interests did not produce the desired outcomes, but caused economic losses in Iraq, and the

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<sup>66</sup> İter Türkmen, “Güvenlik, Ekonomi ve DışPolitika”, *Foreign Policy*, (March-April 2001), p.61, quoted in Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: the Challenge of Globalization,” *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005): 194.

<sup>67</sup> Mesut Yılmaz used this connotation to point out as the failure of strategy had created the defensive reflexes and process of securitization. See Pınar Bilgin, “Making Turkey’s Transformation Possible: Claiming ‘Security-speak’ – not De-securitization,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7, no.4 (2007): 556.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 555-571.

<sup>69</sup> When considered within the context of deteriorating international relations of Turkey different strategic choices emerged that carried the imprint of territorial retreat. See Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 ½ War Strategy,” *Perceptions* 1 (1996).



deterioration of relations due to the suspicion on whether the US approached reluctantly towards the situation in the northern Iraq.

The course of strategy in the Middle East, defined as to prevent PKK to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkey, could not remove one of the sources of anxiety and continued to affect the foreign policy of Turkey. The improving relations with the post-Soviet states, which were perceived as part of the geography as material context through which Turkey would reinvent its strategic importance in the eyes of the West, and would facilitate these newly-independent states' integration into the West, did not bring about the desired outcomes. The early ambitions, after the understanding that Russian influence was still evident in the region, gave its place to realities and outcomes that were behind the intentions. The 'Turkic world' that was deemed to play a significant role on the way of making Turkey a regional power, due to overestimation of the dynamics, and due to the ends driven primarily by ethnic bonds, proved the fact that in the absence of available *means* ambitious strategy had not a chance to be realized. The expectations represented in the discourse were far from the realization of *ends* due to realities on the ground. Soon, euphoria left its place to realities, mostly emanating from the enduring structural factor, structural weakness, which was further deteriorated with the series of economic crisis between 1994 and 2001.

The source of this incongruence might be explained in several ways. But, from the perspective of agency, it can be suggested that the misconception, due to false-consciousness and cognition which were created with euphoria mainly through the publications arguing that Turkey would and should play more active role in the region, played the most significant role. In terms of *what is actualized* and *what is spoken*, the incongruence between them emerged from the fact that the definition of *ends* were not in line with the available existing *means*. Overestimation of *means*, due to loss of consciousness in the process, together with bold leadership, unfortunately brought about incongruence. On the other hand, the realization of ambitious *ends* requires a disposal of *means* that can be allocated to such strategic missions contributed to comprehend the agential limits and abilities.

In terms of modernization, this period signified the growing pace of 'integrative modernization'. In fact, globalization and economy's opening to global

markets and building interdependencies moved the level of integration to a further level. It can, even, be suggested that integrative modernization reached to a level that cannot be reversed, unless, a radical dissociation with high tradeoffs were envisaged. As a consequence of that process, Turkish Foreign Policy in this period was described as ‘foreign policy in the axis of West and globalization.’<sup>70</sup>

Lastly, one of the basic emerging features of this period was the attainment of meaning to geography. In the previous part, how geography entered into discourse and representation was discussed. Incorporating geography and history into discourse and strategy was begun to be observed in this period, which will be renewed with Justice and Development Party winning the elections in 2002. What was observed regarding geography was the fact that due to the Ottoman experience which left a bold imprint on strategic culture with ‘territorial retreat’, geography has been transformed into an ambitious ‘territorial reach’. But, another structural factor, *structural weakness*, has not allowed the expansion of influence out of the borders of Turkey. Instead, a period of “political zigzags”<sup>71</sup> between 1993 and 2002, or an identity crisis in the aftermath of failed strategy were experienced, leading to the emergence of the confusion in Turkey’s role in the international political system, in which contending views of foreign policy<sup>72</sup> direction were flourished.

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<sup>70</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 2: 7, 201.

<sup>71</sup> Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernization: A History* (New Haven& London: Yale University Press, 2010), 356-359.

<sup>72</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 135.

## CHAPTER 8

### 2002 – 2015 “We Have Historical Responsibilities”

#### 8.1. STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

This period, while on the one hand, kept the post-Cold War dynamics in itself, on the other hand, began to be mentioned and characterized with the changing characteristics particularly with the 9/11 events that introduced terrorism as a global phenomenon. The primary feature of the developments in the aftermath of 9/11 was the introduction of identity politics to international political system.<sup>1</sup> While international political system encountered new dynamics, Turkey experienced an election with the rise of “conservative democratic” party to power in November 2002. The Party’s intellectual roots have both moved on and incorporated Islamic tradition and discourse in its policies. The meaning of these two developments, one at the global level, and one at the domestic level, transformed the formulation of strategy away from a *threat-oriented* one into an *identity-oriented* one, which will constitute the discussion point of this chapter. Before arguing how agency responded to changes taking place at the international political level and domestic level, to facilitate comprehension of formulation of strategy, a shorter introduction will be provided covering the structured context of the period encompassing international political system, global economy and geography.

International political system continued to demonstrate post-Cold War dynamics in which the US sustained its primacy, but new discussions emerged pointing out international political system as transforming into a multi-polar one with the rise of newly emerging powers on the periphery of the world. But, the major

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<sup>1</sup> Meliah Benli Altunışık, “Turkey’s Cuspness: Discourse and Practices,” in *The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations*, ed. Marc Herzog and Philip Robbins (London, Routledge, 2004), 33.

event that shook the world was the 9/11 attack. The significance of 9/11 was the fact that the thesis of “Clash of Civilization” turned out to be reality in the aftermath, which as mentioned above introduced and carried out identity politics to a global scale. But identity, rather than defined in terms of narrowed conceptions, was defined from a wider perspective of civilizations. The 9/11 attacks were perceived as attacks to the West’s basic civilization-based identity conducted by the radical Islam. The West considered and conceived it as the challenge that of the West was encountered in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It was regarded as a challenge that was believed to be consolidated, gained primacy and uniqueness with the demise of communism. The reactions consisted of inauguration of Article 5 of NATO Treaty, for the first time in alliance history, to counter the attacks and eradicate radical Islam from the geographies it had emerged. Soon, the declared ‘war on terror’ found practice in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the West, the growing “Islamophobia” fueled the legitimacy of wars. The immediate outcome of the process, particularly with the Iraq War, was the growing need to identify the possible role and stance of Turkey, that should be conceived encompassing the answers for what would be the kind, scope, ground for cooperation in that process.

Apart from 9/11 attacks and its political outcome, Europe has experienced a considerable transformation by enlarging both the NATO and the EU to integrate post-communist Eastern Europe. Enlargement meant to expand the borders of the West into the territories which had been accepted as the Soviet sphere of influence. Enlargement reached to the extent to be perceived as a threat by Moscow, though with the ‘near abroad’ policy Moscow declared that geographies that were defined as Russia’s vital interest would be challenged. Nevertheless, the expansion of the West was furthered by ‘colored revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space, whose success reversed soon with the efforts of Moscow leaving them into instability as in Georgia and Ukraine, thanks to Russian restoration and reassertion of great power status under the leadership of Putin, and the revenues extracted from energy exports.

Another notable series of developments began to affect Arab states starting from early 2011, with the rise of democratic movements to topple authoritarian leaders. But, as the democratic revolutions spilled over Syria, and as the conflicts prolonged and as the human suffering reached enormous levels, the ‘Arab Spring’

turned out to be an ‘Arab turmoil’, erasing the hopes of the democratic transitions of the authoritarian states. The Arab spring has a lot of aspects that affects Turkey beyond bordering instability. But, it will be addressed in the part of conduct of strategy.

The characteristics of global economy can be summarized with the intensification of globalization. Though the crisis emanating from Russia in 1998, and crisis of 2008 emanating from the US have challenged the emerging markets and powers to a great extent and slowed their growth, with the intensification of trade, and interdependencies, they have also provided opportunities to further the growth of their economies. Turkey started this period relatively disadvantageous position, but, Özal’s policy of liberalization leading to intensified integration into global economy had resulted in the built of industry and economy that can bring foreign direct investment and flow of foreign exchange that can facilitate recovery thanks to the export-oriented model. Though, his economic policies could not produce the desired outcomes to establish a working free market economy, they at least planted the seeds to be employed in the upcoming years, if balance of payment deficits can be decreased to manageable levels. Turkey experienced several economic crises, and lastly due to the fragility of the banking system in 2001, had underwent economic structural modifications. And the fruits of these policies led to the smooth passage of 2008 economic crisis which emerged due to the malfunction of banking system and immediate and sudden melt-down in the US.

Regarding geography, the third structure which plays ontologically significant role in terms of its causality in outcomes also underwent considerable change in this period. Particularly, as the Iraq War in 2003 and the Arab Spring and finally Syria in 2011 showed, the mentioned events were neighboring Turkey with having potential ramifications on Turkey’s future. As the international politics began to revolve around the geographies surrounding Turkey, the fear of spillover in fact continued to keep its relevance.

Within this structured context, politically and geographically, the 9/11 event and eventual ‘war on terror’ 2001 onwards, and Arab spring starting from 2011 onwards; and economically, the 2008 global economic crisis, brought about important challenges to Turkey. Turkey welcomed change with considerably

disadvantageous internal circumstances. By the late 1990's, Turkey entered into an impasse of "political instability, clientalism, corruption, and a drastic loss of societal trust." "A radical reconstruction of Turkish politics" was needed if the country was to deal effectively with both economic problems and cultural transformation."<sup>2</sup> The post-Cold War years until 2002 were regarded as the "Lost decade" by the AKP government and pointed out that to produce robust reactions and responses, Turkey should enter a period of restoration.<sup>3</sup> AKP managed to win 2002 election with a significant majority in the parliament and ended the period of coalition governments in Turkish Politics with the hopes that single party government would bring stability to the country. The primary outcome of this parliamentary majority and stable single party government was in favor and advantage of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who, compared to his predecessors, was on the way to implement his policies in all areas including foreign policy. His focus from early days of government was to give utmost importance to economy and implement policies that would ensure recovery and restoration from the cracked economy which had emerged out of the 2001 economic crisis. The meaning of it was to overcome enduring '*structural weakness*' which was further deteriorated with economic crises.

## 8.2. AGENCY AND STRATEGY

It was mentioned that in 2002, the general outlook of the country was not portraying bright futures in which, political discontent continued, economic crisis were not recovered yet, and foreign policy issues were awaiting responses and solutions in the immediate term. The formulation of strategy in that period took place within the structured context that was shortly introduced to facilitate the understanding and discussion on formulation of strategy which is based on first portrayal of the situation.

Despite the existence of urgent foreign policy issues, as in the other domains of politics that should be addressed with proper and effective way, the portrayal of

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<sup>2</sup> Fuat E.Keyman and Ziya Öniş, "Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery: Paradoxes of Turkish Experience," *Globalizations* 4, no.2 (2007): 212-213.

<sup>3</sup> Murat Yeşiltaş, "Turkey's Quest for a 'New International Order': The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration," *Perceptions* 19, no.4 (2014): 43-76.

the situation had not driven merely by the motive of producing reactive policies to those demanding challenges. Instead, the intention to create circumstances in which an agential strategy can be conducted was at place, while at the same time dealing with urgent issues in a proper way. Before deepening the discussion, it should be noted that as it was argued, and sustained as a framework throughout the dissertation, structures have causal forces on agency, since they are *activity, concept* and *spatio-temporal* dependent.

Agency in portraying the situation deems to reach a reading and picture of the context upon which a strategy is to be produced capable to handle the challenges of the context and capable to alter it. In order to formulate an outcome-producer strategy, agency puts consciousness into effect by reading of context and, hence, raising its situational awareness, needs to apply reflexivity emerged out of subjectivity and agential intents and, brings in its cognition based on rational reflection of *ends* and *means*.

‘The Bermuda triangle’ metaphor was used (again) to describe urgent foreign policy problems that should be handled when AKP came to power.<sup>4</sup> This metaphorical description points out the nature of the situation that AKP was born in. But what differed from the immediate post-Cold War period, Bermuda triangle metaphor was used at the time to describe volatile, instable and uncertain nature of regions surrounding Turkey. In AKP period; however, it was used to describe urgent foreign policy challenges that waited to be addressed. These challenges were consisted of Cyprus Question in which resolution got primary conditionality on the EU process of Turkey, the EU process that was somehow frozen due to conditionality embedded within the process and locked with the resolution process of Cyprus Question, and finally the upcoming Iraq War through which it was deemed toppling down the Saddam Regime and demands from Turkey to actively participate in War. Each of the questions had inherently potential ramifications either to deteriorate security concerns of Turkey or provide new openings to pursue a more constructive foreign policy in their aftermath. The metaphor used to describe the situation has substantially differed from the prior one in the sense that the space

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<sup>4</sup> Gürkan Zengin, *Hoca: Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Etkisi* (İstanbul, İnkilap Kitabevi, 2010), 115-135.

covered by the triangle had dramatically narrowed due to mismanagement or, at least, hesitance to pursue assertive foreign policy in the previous coalition governments. More importantly, besides being urgent challenges, room for mismanagement had dramatically disappeared. In other words, mismanagement in the early 1990's, left no chance for mismanagement in the early 2000's.

Despite awaiting foreign policy issues and challenges that should be addressed immediately by the AKP government, there was also an advantageous position that relieved Turkey. The absence of an outright threat or perception of such a security concern equivalent to threatening survival of the country was in fact an advantage that can be utilized in dealing with minor challenges emanating from mismanagement. This "relatively threat-free period...marked by the absence of major external threat"<sup>5</sup> that in the past imposed to seek alliance to counter the threat, in the absence of *means* to balance, as it was the case during the early years of the republic, during the Second World War and, in the early years of Cold War, widened the scope of options. The absence of outright threat perception had provided the ground to seek strategy alternatives that could bring agency back in politics and facilitate attempts to overcome enduring structural weakness of Turkey. It is not meant, here, total disappearance of threats to Turkey, but it is suggested that the perceived threats or political challenges which were securitized were potentially within the limits of *means* at disposal. Then the major determinant of securitization of security concerns resulted from the loss of confidence in agency, and its belief that they could be managed if approached from the right perspective. The loss of confidence and ongoing *habitus* of securitization basically emerged from the effects of strategic culture embedded in Turkey's social dynamics. Then, the question is regarded not as a question of *means* but as a question of *ends* in strategy that is capable to adapt the new conditions of the international political system. Here, asking a question of "what is the source of mismanagement and the lost decade?" will lead to seek an explanation for the contemporary period in Turkish Foreign Policy, and the basic driving causal forces in formulation of strategy.

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<sup>5</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 172.



It was argued that agents are *activity, concept* and *spatio-temporal* dependent on structures which constitute the basis for the explanation for the source of mismanagement and the basis for formulation of strategy. When AKP came to power, moving from the assumption the absence of strategy that is capable to adapt agency (Turkey) to structure, the questioning of agency and structure have started. Structure has, shortly, defined as carrying the characteristics that consists of; international political system emerged out of the Soviet demise, global economy underlined with the forces of globalization, and geography on which, the attained meaning on it with changing dynamics of politics and economy has experienced change. The answer provided by the AKP government to mismanagement of foreign policy is considered as a result of absence of agency or, at least, not reflecting agency into the process of strategy formulation process, due to ambiguity existing in self-perception.

Inability of reflecting subjectivity in formulation of *ends* in the eyes of the AKP created the impression that the problem of mismanagement or misuse of *means* to achieve *ends* in foreign policy was the crux of the problem. Here the *ends*, with the misjudgment of *means* of the country and excessive focus on structural forces, bring about false-consciousness, a factor that furthers the constraining forces of structure. The solution provided to the process was firstly, overcoming imbroglio of urgent foreign policy issues, and secondly, with the relief gained with the resolution of them that is deemed to provide more room for agency, adopting a new agential focus on *ends*. The how question of this process is put forward by Ahmet Davutoğlu, first, an academic and the author of ‘Strategic Depth’<sup>6</sup>, then foreign policy advisor of the AKP government, Minister of Foreign Affairs and finally the Prime Minister. Before discussing how AKP produced an answer to the question of mismanagement that is responsible for ‘lost decade’, broadening the scope that AKP was born in would be fruitful in understanding the policies of the period.

Structural weakness, as a persistent and enduring factor, continued to play a significant and determining role in strategy formulation. The series of economic crises which ended with 2001 crisis, further decreased economic viability of Turkey and, on the contrary, showed how fragile it was. After a series of attempts and

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<sup>6</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik* (İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2001).

structural adjustments to establish functioning economy, the economy began to show signs of restructuring and recovering from 2002 onwards. AKP, after coming to power, rather than changing the track of economic policies of the previous governments, strictly implemented restructuring of economic stability programs designed by Kemal Derviş, and perceived economic achievements as the primary factor in the continuation of credit in the eyes of society. In fact, the steady increase in Gross Domestic Products rates affirmed this trend. But, at the same time, similar to Özal's economic policies, AKP too, initiated another wave of economic liberalization and integration into the global economy and diversification of trade partners which showed its effectiveness with growing volume of exports.

As structural weakness, in that sense, was perceived as a factor that deteriorated with the economic policies of previous coalition governments<sup>7</sup>, AKP gave primacy to economic restructuring to overcome structural weakness. In that focus, AKP considered that economic restructuring should be compounded with domestic restructuring which initiated another wave of reform process including democratic consolidation. Initiating a new impetus to EU process was considered as an instrument, which, on the one hand, a process that facilitates democratic consolidation, and on the other hand, a source of credibility in the international political system that have benefits both economically and politically.

In the case of nationalism, as the securitization of foreign policy issues reached at a level to be labeled as “national security syndrome,” nationalist sentiments reached at a level that feeds securitization of foreign policy. It was also a reflection of strategic culture that inherently contains *Sèvres Syndrome*. As the securitization as a concept began to be used to define foreign policy character, nationalism began to be used to define the mood of the society and its perception of foreign policy. It was also observed that, as discussed in previous chapters, nationalism and democracy replaced each other in accordance with the nature of security perceptions. As democratic consolidation and integration into the West gained pace, nationalist discourses began to disappear or, as the fear or suspicion gained primacy emerging from security perceptions, nationalism gained significance

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<sup>7</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 263-283.

in discourse. Hence, AKP, well aware of this dynamic within society, pushed for democratization within society which in the end would bring about de-securitization of foreign policy.

In terms of geography, *gradual retreat* or, *fear of loss of territory*, somehow existed in the society and among the elite of the state. The inability to overcome structural weakness, and the eventual rise of nationalism brought about the growing suspicion on whether a territorial retreat would be experienced once again. This was particularly caused by the PKK terrorism in the 1990's, but with the capture of PKK Leader Öcalan in 1999, this fear lost its significance, but suspicion continued as the PKK existence in Northern Iraq was preserved. Nevertheless, territorial retreat, as a structural factor, preserved its existence. The outcome of this existence was the emergence of highly securitized, defensive and, reactive foreign policy. AKP Governments from the beginning, moved from the need to attain different meaning to geography and to remove securitized understanding of geography. It was considered that as de-securitization of foreign policy could be managed, the solution of foreign policy issues could be managed more effectively.

Formulation of Strategy emerged out of this structured context, which was considered by agency that the mismanagement caused the 'lost decade'. Ahmet Davutoğlu, when appointed as Foreign Policy Advisor of AKP government, began to implement the 'strategic depth' doctrine in foreign policy actions.<sup>8</sup> Strategic Depth can be regarded as an attempt to find a solution to mismanagement in the eyes of government, and for Davutoğlu, it was an attempt to relocate Turkey in world affairs from an agential perspective. In his book, Davutoğlu sought the answer of "what should be the basis for Turkish Foreign Policy" that is emerging out of agential understanding. In fact, from a broader perspective, 'Strategic Depth' is regarded as a geopolitical text.<sup>9</sup> And criticisms, revolved around this fact, argue that it reproduces

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<sup>8</sup> Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges," *Turkish Studies* 11, no.1 (2010): 103-123; Burhanettin Duran and Kemal İnat, "AKP Dış Politikası: Teori ve Uygulama," *Demokrasi Platformu* 1, no.4 (2005).

<sup>9</sup> Murat Yeşiltaş, "Türkiye'yi Stratejileştirmek: Stratejik Derinlik'te Jeopolitik Muhayyile," in *Stratejik Zihniyet: Kuramdan Eyleme Ahmet Davutoğlu ve Stratejik Derinlik*, ed. Talha Köse, Ahmet Okumuş, and Burhanettin Duran (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2014), 90; Baskın Oran ed., *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 3:133 claims it as a "typical IR Realist theory book" or in p.136 as interesting "Realism and Romanticism Synthesis"; Alexander Morinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no.6 (2006): 945-964.

‘strategic location-oriented’ and realism-based foreign policy perception.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, despite criticisms and its geopolitics-oriented nature, *strategic depth* can also be perceived as an attempt to fill the gap of theoretical basis for Turkish Foreign Policy. Davutoğlu argues that one of the basic vulnerabilities of Turkish Foreign Policy is the lack of theory that directs strategic and tactic moves within a “coherent theoretical framework.”<sup>11</sup>

In articulating a theoretical framework for Turkish Foreign Policy, which is also a framework for strategy, Davutoğlu, moving from a focus on agency, underlines self-perception of an agent determining the nature of *ends* in strategy. Davutoğlu’s basic argument is that Turkey should redefine its agency depending on its self-perception<sup>12</sup> (self-cognizance). For him, self-cognizance is politically important, since it raises the level of consciousness and awareness. In the absence of consciousness, or false-consciousness due to loss of self-cognizance, subjectivity would not be reflected in strategic *ends*. In other words, when subjectivity in agency emanating from self-cognizance could not be reflected in strategy, apart from effectiveness, the agential dimension of strategy might blur leading to puzzlement in *ends*. Hence, the *ends* incorporated in strategy either might not reflect agency, or the intent in realizing *ends* might be counter-productive, or might lead to the reproduction of structured context that agent operates in.

Davutoğlu, moving from self-cognizance, which is based on an ontological understanding and comprehension of self – *being* – in the respective spatio-temporal context, argues that, agent should operate in *space*, in which it has historical comprehension of that *space*. This suggestion points out the need to regain strategic mentality that would revitalize agency in *ends*, and power resources – *means* –

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<sup>10</sup> İlhan Uzgel, “Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele,” in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, ed. İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), 362.

<sup>11</sup> Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 47.

<sup>12</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Medeniyetlerin Ben-İdraki,” *Divan Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* 2, no.4 (1997): 1-53.; On the difference between ‘self-perception’ and ‘self-cognizance’ see Yeşiltaş, “Turkey’s Quest for a ‘New International Order’: The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration”, 43-76. Though Davutoğlu prefers the concept of *self-perception* instead of *self-cognizance* and Yeşiltaş follows Davutoğlu’s preference, the concept of *self-cognizance* is preferred in this discussion. Behind this preference, the rationale that agency and its cognition were incorporated and reflected in the concept.

emerging from this agential revitalization of *ends*. “Strategic mentality emerges out of identity consciousness that was shaped and reshaped within the historical process, and exhibits continuity beyond political fluctuations.”<sup>13</sup> Davutoğlu perceives close relationship with *agential consciousness* and *strategic mentality*, and out of this close relationship, he asserts the relationship between mentality and strategy lies at the intersection of *perception of space* based on geographical inputs, and *perception of time* based on historical inputs.<sup>14</sup> What is significant is the fact that, although some periods of confusion in agential consciousness might be experienced, thanks to agential attributes that endure relatively long periods of time, agency could revitalize its attributes and characteristics when the suitable conditions allow for this emergence. From another perspective, agency should emancipate from the structural constraints imposed on agency. Otherwise, Davutoğlu suggests that for the “mentality (agency) that sees itself an area of influence of others it is not possible to produce an area of influence of its own.”<sup>15</sup> Definition of such an area means strategic direction<sup>16</sup> that seeks *space* for agency by incorporating agency in formulation of *ends*.

From the perspective of strategy which consists of *situational*, *positional*, and *dispositional* elements, AKP period has introduced the reinterpretation of these elements. Regarding the *situational* element, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey found itself psychologically and strategically unprepared in a regional and global expansion of scale.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits and the disappointment created with the EU process triggered the revival of historically continuous structural forces.<sup>18</sup> In other words, the disappointment created by the EU, the disappointment created with inability to assert foreign policy strategy in the previous period, and disappointment created by the PKK terrorism triggered

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<sup>13</sup> Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 29.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

the revival of national sentiments and revival of agential attributes that was previously suppressed by the will to become part of the Western World. From another perspective, relations with the EU and the West, as turned out to be disillusionment, in fact, caused the emergence of a stronger pulse of regaining agency.

It should also be noted that strategy basically has not developed as a reaction to any kind of particular and definite arising threat or the perception of that threat that needed to produce reactions to eliminate it. In other words, in this period, the portrayal of the situation – situational component of strategy – has not emanated from the international political system, but instead, internal dynamics have created the need for strategy. It is obvious that, the crisis of identity that was mentioned in the previous chapter to adapt to the conditions of the post-Cold War environment played a significant role in bringing about the need for a robust strategy. The inability to adapt to the post-Cold War international environment which further gained a different character with the 9/11 attacks internationally pushed for the re-definition of identity and strategy. Furthermore, domestic failures particularly in the economic sphere fastened the process. Finally, with AKP, agency felt the need to renovate itself in line with the changing structure.

The quest for renovation and adaptation started with the introduction of *strategic depth* doctrine which relocated *positioned practice* of agent. The absence of a major threat, as mentioned above, eased this process, since aligning for counter balancing was not the case at the time. Instead, domestic factors, the will to restore power of Turkey played the primary role. In such a situation, different from the previous periods, the fear of territorial retreat and its subsequent defensive reflexes were not at play in the process. But, the meaning attained to geography emerged out of agential read of the structure. Here, the primacy of *ends* plays a determining role in perceiving space.

Geography again was an indispensable component of *means* in this period. However, with a major difference in meaning attained to it. Geography, or the geographic position of Turkey, was not employed for the balance of power politics. There was an apparent shift in this understanding replacing an ability emerging from the meaning attained to the Turkey's geography, with the meaning attained by the

agency to its own geography. In other words, treating geography as a *mean* did not change, but the agency behind this treatment has changed. Perceiving geography as an asset for strategy, rather than vulnerability, vocally began to be used in this period. The outcome of this motivation has found expression in connotations and conceptions of geography.

In the past, moving from meaning attained to geopolitical significance of Turkey by other subjects, the connotations and conceptions like *bridge* were widely used. But, in this period, rather than highlighting the geography that links continents, or links the East with the West, the concept of *central country* was introduced to increase the meaning of Turkish territory. Particularly, the introduction of concept of *Afro-Eurasia* and Turkey as a *central country* was the expression of changing agential perception of Turkish geography. In other words, instead of *bridge* narrative which is accepted as peripheral, *centrality* narrative is preferred to highlight agency. *Centrality* though is not identical with Turkey in international politics, the uniqueness of Turkey and its centrality stemming from geographical neighboring three continents. And Davutoğlu suggested that “a central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner,”<sup>19</sup> pointing out to the need to redefine the threats, and the ways to tackle with them. This changing perception of threats is connected with agency and assertiveness of agency by stating that “assertive nations define [security] threats according to their strategies, while non-assertive and submissive nations shape their fragile strategies according to their definitions of threats.”<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, agency inhabiting on such a piece of geography, cannot reduce Turkey to a unified character, and identity, thus, multi-regional foreign policy becomes inevitable, since Turkey by its geographical position and historical links imposes it.

Highlighting historical links brings the identity question into discussion. In defining identity, it is argued that by discovering and reinterpreting Turkish history and identity, it is possible to raise Turkey to the level of regional power that allows pursuing its own agential policies for national interests and common interests of

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<sup>19</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An assessment of 2007,” *Insight Turkey* 10, no.1 (2008), 78.

<sup>20</sup> Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 62.

humanity. In that sense, it incorporates the normative aspect into the foreign policy. But, it can be argued that *normativeness* can gain ground as the partners give equal importance to it, rather than pursuing realist and interest based policies. Normative aspects of foreign policy found expression with the concept of civilization. Turkey as an agent rather than merely a part of Western civilization also bears distinct features from the Western civilizations. Furthermore, civilization is accepted as a concept that links *being* to strategy.<sup>21</sup>

Building such a link is the result of growing aspiration to gain agency and the will to eliminate structural constraints. But, incorporating civilization inevitably has several ramifications for strategy and foreign policy. The primary practical outcome is the treatment of geography and history, the two distinct factors that give distinctiveness to agency. Multi-regionalism and multi-dimensional foreign policy discourses emanate from this treatment. From the beginning, AKP strived for diversification of relations, and involvement in regional politics not as a follower of Western policies, but for adding agential aspects in bilateral relations. But it is argued that with multi dimensionality, it is not deemed to return to the balance of power politics, particularly, by improving relations with global actors. Instead, it is argued that “Turkey’s relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition.”<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, it should also be noted that multi-dimensional and multi-regional foreign policy however is suggested not constitute new conceptions, but re-interpretation of foreign policy implementations that was used in the past.<sup>23</sup> In that sense, through self-cognizance, new connotations with a renewed understanding were added to both *means* and *ends* that are deemed to produce a more comprehensive understanding and strategy.

The second important ramification of incorporating civilization into discourse<sup>24</sup> pushed Turkey, apart from agential comprehension, a normative aspect that is designed to foster inter-civilizational dialogue between Islam and the West.

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<sup>21</sup> Ahmet Okumuş, “Kavramların Stratejisi, Stratejinin Kavramları,” in *Stratejik Zihniyet*, 33.

<sup>22</sup> Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision”, 82.

<sup>23</sup> Uzgel, “Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, 360.

<sup>24</sup> Burhanettin Duran, “Understanding the AK Party’s Identity Politics: A Civilizational Discourse and its Limitations,” *Insight Turkey* 15, no.1 (2013): 91-109.



This gained importance, particularly, in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, and was articulated as a response to eliminate the fears of clash of civilizations. In other words, a messianic mission was depicted to Turkey. The outcome of such a mission, though was not directed against any possible global divide along civilizational lines, was also perceived as a dissident voice and revival of anti-systemic character<sup>25</sup> that also found expression with the conception of neo-Ottomanism. Nevertheless, the basic and traditional tenets, “the desire to join the EU, to enhance relations with the United States, and to increase regional cooperation,”<sup>26</sup> were not excluded proving that multi-regional and multi-dimensional foreign policy is not exclusionary but complimentary. What is tried to be incorporated was the agential definition of *ends* in improving relations.

But whether agential *ends* are in line with *means* of the country is a crucial point and dispositional aspect of strategy, since realization of *ends* requires compatible *means* at disposal. In other words, how the question of *means* would be resolved has constituted the crux of the strategy. In the previous periods, the shortage of *means* due to enduring structural weakness, and the way to overcome the shortage was to employ the balance of power politics as a remedy. In *strategic depth*, the question of *means* is accepted as a question of agential *ends*, rather than merely the extension of material resources at disposal. In other words, historical understanding that gives not primacy to material conditions, but to the comprehension of *being* in time and space was applauded on the way of agential strategy. Hence, as long as agency could define its own *ends*, by taking into account both structural constraints together with the ways to overcome such constraints through agential *ends*, the *means* would be available in the process.

Allocation of *means* that was at disposal was accepted as a question of *ends*. Unawareness of what is owned in terms of *means*, besides wrong choices of strategic *ends*, is a question of agency. Hence, Davutoğlu suggested, by departing from agential *ends*, Turkey can discover its power resources that were not yet available to be employed in strategy. To put it more bluntly, the misuse or unawareness of *means*

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<sup>25</sup> Yeşiltaş, “Turkey’s Quest for a New International Order”, 68-69.

<sup>26</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 150.

in the previous periods, particularly in the ‘lost decade’ led the country to play a lesser role than it deserved and is capable of to playing. Recognition or assumption that Turkey’s potential exceeds actual political effectiveness can be observed in Davutoğlu, which led to the motivation and aspirations to revitalize the potentials of the country to move to a political stage that deserved.

Hence, the re-evaluation of *means* at disposal in line with *ends* might open new opportunities to Turkey. Particularly, Davutoğlu considered and highlighted the soft power of the country, which is already at disposal thanks to historical and geographic depth, and urged to employ them in the interests of both Turkey and states inhabiting in the surrounding region. In other words, change in strategy brought about change in the nature of *means*. Traditional habit of being in a situation that foreign policy issues highly securitized and in parallel the hard power assets was thought as remedy and *means* to solve them was downgraded. Instead, a new understanding of foreign policy is welcomed that give primacy to not hard power assets, but to soft power ones. Tarık Oğuzlu underlines the correlation between the degree of securitization and the nature of power by arguing that the de-securitization might change power assets from material to ideational ones, in which soft power and diplomacy gain primacy.<sup>27</sup> Here, not material definition of *means*, but ideational aspect of *means* has been highlighted. It also provides an answer to ‘how soft power becomes relevant in strategy.’ Furthermore, it can be suggested that attributing a different meaning to agency provides the ground to compensate for hard power assets. The nature of soft power is accepted to be closely related with vision in foreign policy. Being intangible in nature, and being attainable as long as a vision, awareness and will exists, and being not self-existing as material assets do, then agency plays a primary role in allocating soft power means to foreign policy actions.

Agency is accepted as having a determining role in strategy in Davutoğlu’s formulation of strategy. He, furthermore, argued that “Turkey should seek a role of major power capable to activate and utilize its own power resources” pointing out the need to revitalize the potentials of the country with a different understanding compared to the previous implementations of foreign policy. In fact, the

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<sup>27</sup> Tarık Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.1 (2007): 81.

transformation from hard power-oriented foreign policy to a soft power-oriented foreign policy requires a process, in which both realization of agential attributes and actualization of it through the de-securitization plays a paramount role.<sup>28</sup>

In terms of conduct of strategy, AKP after coming to power, focused on a number of urgent issues awaiting solutions. Firstly, there was an economic crisis that worsened structural weakness and also a need for domestic restructuring. Secondly, urgent foreign policy questions exacerbated the domestic conditions. Thirdly, taking over highly securitized foreign policy constituted another issue that should be tackled with a fresh outlook.

In the economic sphere, as mentioned above, AKP preferred the continuation of economic stability programs to restore the economy of the country. In fact, within a short period of time, Turkey managed to realize visible economic progress. The inflation rates decreased from more than 70 percent to 9.3 in 2004, and thereafter sailed around 10 percent. And the annual growth in GDP exhibited average 6.9 between 2002 and 2007 giving an impression that Turkey entered into a sustainable economic growth. Although, the 2008 global economic crisis affected Turkey, given that it was primarily exogenously originated and required measures were already taken in the banking sector, the detrimental effects of crisis were felt quite limitedly. At least, Turkey recovered from the crisis within a short period of time, as the numbers of GDP growth demonstrated 8.1 percent in 2010.<sup>29</sup> Growing economic stability and overcoming economic fragility of the country provided the ground for foreign policy actions, apart from constituting one of the soft power resources. Most importantly, economic success has rebuilt self-confidence and caused the elimination of fears of enduring structural weakness could not be overcome. On the contrary, hopes whether Turkey can become among the top ten global economies which found expression in 2023 goals began to be aired.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>29</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, (New York, Routledge, 2013), 153; See also Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 3:60; For a wider account see also 52-70.

<sup>30</sup> 2023 Goals constitutes one the rare common points all political parties agree on with slight differences in numbers. AKP in 2011 elections set the goals for 2023 centennial of the Republic of Turkey.

Urgent foreign policy challenges awaiting solutions tried to be solved with a new impetus. Cyprus Question, EU membership process and upcoming Iraq War were the most significant ones at the time. Cyprus question and EU membership process were closely related, since the EU determined the resolution of the Cyprus question as conditionality in front of Turkey's possible future membership process. Together with a pro-active policy in Annan Plan, Turkey introduced a reform process to remove the barriers in front of Copenhagen Criteria. In Cyprus, while Turkey supported the resolution on the basis of Annan Plan, Greek Cypriots rejected the resolution of the question removing a barrier and perception that a resolution of the question in the island emanates from Turkey's reluctance to reach any solution thus, stalling the process of resolution. Getting rid of one of the conditionality, Turkey gave a new impetus to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria both in terms of economics and reform process to install EU standards to its domestic structure.

Enthusiasm in the EU membership process can be seen from the perspective of facilitating the modernization process in the country. In fact, it reflects the continuation of the integration into the West and the global economy which was initiated by Özal.<sup>31</sup> But, what is more striking is the fact that the European integration was perceived as key to domestic processes of modernization<sup>32</sup> directed towards overcoming structural weakness and democratization aimed to calm down security syndrome that was fueled by nationalism. In other words, EU membership process was perceived as an instrument to overcome structural forces of nationalism and structural weakness.

Upcoming Iraq War was the most significant issue that could strain relations with the United States, undermine security, worsen economy, and the political perception of Turkey in the region. The initial consideration was to bandwagon with the United States in the war to gain influence in the future of Iraq.<sup>33</sup> But when motion that allows for stationing of forces on Turkish soil was rejected on 1 March 2003, the

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<sup>31</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 156.

<sup>32</sup> Burhanettin Duran, "JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation," in *Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the Ak Parti*, ed.M. Hakan Yavuz (The University of Utah Press, 2006), 293.

<sup>33</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 168.

relations with the United States were strained.<sup>34</sup> In fact, the crisis of 1 March motion is accepted as the second most important crisis in bilateral relations after the Johnson Letter. The relations further deteriorated with the 4 July 2003 *Süleymaniye Incident* where Turkish Special Forces stationed in Northern Iraq were captured in a humiliating way.<sup>35</sup> Behind this deterioration of relations, diverging perception of each other played an important role, since the United States assumed Turkey would allow stationing of forces in its soils and would approve of the opening of the northern front in the Iraq War. But, while Turkey, by rejecting such an imposition based on its will declared its agency, it also faced immediate outcomes of this confrontation.

The most immediate outcome of the Iraq War was reanimation of PKK terrorism in Turkey. As the war in Iraq continued with unexpected insurgency against the United States, the domestic order could not be restored within a short period of time. The authority vacuum in northern Iraq provided a safe-heaven for PKK terrorism. Furthermore, strained relations prevented Turkey's unilateral pre-emptive operations against the PKK terrorist camps stationed in the region. Strained relations were resolved with the administration change in the United States, and with the comprehension that bilateral relations should be restored. When in November 2007, Turkey and the United States agreed on intelligence sharing against the PKK terrorism, it was also a sign of improving relations and overcoming of past strains.

The most significant part of the new strategy of Turkey under the AKP period was the introduction of 'zero-problems with neighbors' policy at the regional level and 'Alliance of Civilizations' at the global level both of which aimed the de-securitization of Turkish Foreign Policy and subsequent facilitation of integration both at the regional level and global level. The 'Zero problems with neighbors' policy was articulated to create a regional environment that could facilitate internal reconstruction which could provide the mechanisms for power accumulation to be employed in the future strategy, and foreign policy acts. In this way, it is deemed that a secure regional environment could facilitate to overcome the security syndrome of

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<sup>34</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası* (İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2008)

<sup>35</sup> Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 3:277-278.

the country, and improve relations, in the end, that might create the integration to eliminate securitized approach to clash of interests and provide the ground common interests. Between 2002 and 2011, several attempts to resolve the questions with regional states were undertaken though this process was stalled by realist and interest based approaches. In fact, what these attempts showed was that such a policy required a reciprocal willingness to solve the questions. Unless one of the parties refrained from showing the will to solve the questions, unilateral attempts could not go beyond romantic endeavors.

At the global level, the policy of Alliance of Civilizations together with Spanish Government articulated as an initiative to overcome the division, prejudices, misconceptions, and misperceptions between the Western and Islamic civilizations.<sup>36</sup> Turkey supported this initiative due to a number of factors. Firstly, it was an initiative that was against ‘Clash of Civilizations’ which began to be outspoken in the aftermath of 9/11 and Madrid Terrorist attacks. Secondly, it was basically in line with the changing agential perception of world politics, in which for global peace *otherization* through religious, ethnic or civilizational lines should be eliminated, but an understanding global peace to be replaced.<sup>37</sup> Thirdly, AKP perceived this initiative as an opportunity to increase the role of Turkey at the global level.<sup>38</sup> Even the European integration of Turkey was represented as a proof and opportunity to overcome inter-civilizational divide in the world. However, irrespective of benevolence incorporated in, the realities on the ground were far from realizing it.

In conduct of strategy, it would be no exaggeration to claim that the Arab spring and particularly crisis in Syria constituted the litmus test of the *strategic depth* doctrine whereas 2008 economic crisis was the test of effectiveness of AKP’s economic policies. The latter one has not affected the country compared to other economies on the globe. But, the former one constituted the real litmus test that caused the questioning of the foreign policy under AKP government. In the beginning, Turkey refrained from taking part in the developments taking place with

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<sup>36</sup> Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era,” *Turkish Studies* 10, no.1 (2009): 11-12.

<sup>37</sup> Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, *Küresel Barış Vizyonu* (İstanbul: Meydan Yayıncılık, 2012)

<sup>38</sup> Yeşiltaş, “Turkey’s Quest for a ‘New International Order’”, 43-75.

the Arab Spring, but, a within short period of time normativeness, if not pragmatism, gained primacy in the conduct of foreign policy. The Arab Spring in the post-Ottoman territories was seen as an opportunity to increase the power, effectiveness and determining role of the country. And, it is argued that since these territories were part of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey should be involved in the resolution of them.<sup>39</sup> But, when the revolts spilled over into Syria and as the continuation of the crisis stalled the spring, then, the *realpolitik mindset* gained primacy in time. Early entanglement into the process turned out to be a major issue that threatens the security of Turkey, since instability in Syria caused the revival of terrorism in Turkey.

### **8.3. STRATEGY AND DISCOURSE: How strategy is represented?**

The representation of the strategy reflected the changing nature of agential self-cognizance. From a wider perspective, AKP period took place within the post-Cold War conditions in which certainty and its suppressive effects disappeared. AKP came to power when the inherited enduring structural forces were at place with their apparent effects. Structural weakness could not be overcome, but deteriorated with the 2001 economic crisis. Nationalism and *Sévres-phobia* continued to affect the mood of the society and considered foreign plotting as a factor that works to dismantle Turkey. In this respect, territorial retreat with foreign policy challenges was perceived as a remaining threat to territorial integrity of Turkey. When AKP came to power, as mentioned above, conditions were quite embarrassing. The nature of the structured context, as perceived by the agency under the AKP government, was reflecting the signs of mishandling the situation, and as a remedy, a change in strategy might reverse structural forces, or they might be overcome to produce positive outcomes for Turkey. Furthermore, the absence of a direct major threat acted as a facilitator of renewed understanding in strategy. What is needed was to formulate an agential strategy and conduct of it. In this way, negative outcomes – reproduction of the structure – of the lost decade might be eroded, and Turkey might

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<sup>39</sup> Gürkan Zengin, *Kavga: Arap Baharı'nda Türk Dış Politikası: 2010-2013* (İstanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 2013).

get into a path that posits a place for it in the world that is deserved – the production of a new structured context.

In terms of representation of strategy, “what is incorporated in it?”, “to what extent is strategy reflected in discourse?” and “whether discourse is in line with the formulated strategy?” will be discussed to examine the interplay between strategy and discourse. Discourse of “we have historical responsibilities” is chosen with a consideration that it represents the strategy formulated by the AKP government, and *strategic depth* in particular. The words constituting discourse gives several hints about the strategy and its representation, though, strategy and its elements have not been reflected explicitly in discourse. Discourse can be divided into three constituting parts which are; we, history and responsibility. The first component – “we” – refers to agency and its self-confidence to formulate a strategy and pursue it along the *means* available. “History,” as the second component when coalesced with “responsibilities” directs the attention to interplay between historical self-cognizance with the agential awareness of history and responsibilities attributed to the agency. And finally, “responsibility” refers to the mission awaiting to be fulfilled to realize certain and common goals.

Assuming responsibility by agency that is claimed to emanate from history is an assertive act. Whether such a responsibility would be given to agency by other actors inhabiting in the geography is questionable, since a role of leadership might be demanded but, whether other parties are willing to give such a role to Turkey is contentious. Nevertheless, Turkey, under the AKP government, assumed such a role with the assumption of its *means* and attributes are in line with the demanded role. In fact, a discourse of self-attaining responsibility inevitably requires the recognition of such responsibility belonging to the agent that claimed to have.

Another aspect of discourse, particularly, assumed responsibility, when put into a social context in which different actors coexist with Turkey, they implicitly downgraded to an inferior position that they could not manage to improve relations between each other and with actors out of the region. Turkey by articulating such a discourse claims and declares the capability to resolve tensions and contentious issues existing with third parties, particularly with major powers. While, such a claim brings about a mediation role that would be conducted by Turkey into the forefront,



at the same time, moves Turkey to the level of major power politics. The policy of Alliance of Civilizations proves this argument, since the project is rather than being intra or inter-regional issue, is basically related with the resolution of inter-civilizational divide through the mediation and contribution of Turkey. Erdoğan's statement that "Istanbul is not only a center combining continents but also a central symbol combining and synthesizing the civilizations"<sup>40</sup> confirms the argument put forward.

Claiming such a mediation<sup>41</sup> role both regionally and globally gives Turkey the role of regional power with global ambitions or, in Davutoğlu's words, "Turkey's aim is to intervene consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power."<sup>42</sup> In line with the agential *end*, it was discussed that the nature of employed *means* transformed from a *hard power-oriented* one to a *soft power-oriented* one. In this transformation, rather than *what is lacked* – material *means* emanating from structural weakness, *what is at hand* – ideational *means* emanating from past experience – was employed in strategy. Democracy in that sense was accepted as the most important soft power asset.<sup>43</sup> Apart from the mediation role to enhance the international role of Turkey, Turkey's economic development pace, liberal democratic tradition, and constructive relations with the West facilitated the representation as a model to be attracted by the societies claimed to have responsibility. But, as will be discussed in the next section, the Arab Spring brought about contradictions in foreign policy strategy.

In discussing what is incorporated in discourse, the geographical aspect that strategic depth doctrine founded upon should be examined. It was argued in the

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<sup>40</sup> Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party's Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no.1 (2010): 86.

<sup>41</sup> André Barrinha, "The Ambitious Insulator: Revisiting Turkey's Position in Regional Security Complex Theory," *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no.2 (2014): 165-182; Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Geopolitical Representation of Turkey's Cuspness: Discourse and Practice," in *The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations*, ed. Marc Herzog and Philip Robins (New York: Routledge, 2014), 38.

<sup>42</sup> Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", 83.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

previous part that the surrounding region of Turkey, geographical aspect of the strategy, was accepted as the geography upon which and by which the ambitions of strategy would be realized. At first glance, any open and explicit reference to geography does not exist in discourse. But assuming historical responsibility implicitly contains both a designated geography that history gives meaning to, and, a vague area that is deemed to be placed when responsibilities were realized. Hence, it can be claimed that geography implicitly was incorporated into the discourse both at the regional level and global level; the former representing the actual operational geography of the strategy, and the latter, the aimed geography.

Despite geography constitutes one of the building blocks of discourse, unlike from the previous periods, reference to geography in terms of “Turkey’s strategic importance” was not observed in Erdoğan and Gül’s discourses.<sup>44</sup> On the contrary, as in the discourse under scrutiny, reference to strategic importance and strategy does not exist, either. However, as discussed above, geography or space is an indispensable part of strategy, irrespective of representation of it in discourse. The question of what is the source of such a claim brings the questions of “to what extent is strategy reflected in discourse?” and “whether discourse is in line with the formulated strategy?”

The formulated strategy emerged through the self-cognizance of agent and portrayal of the structured context in which the agent operates in. The *end* was to adapt to the conditions of the structure with well crafted strategy that could bring about global power status in the end. Crafting a discourse that gives a messianic mission to Turkey in its conduct of foreign policy is basically in line with the strategy. To what extent it has been achieved is another question that will be discussed in the next section. But, strategy that eliminates the *bridge* metaphor, but highlights the *central country* discourse inevitably facilitates the conception of such a discourse. Not referring to a particular threat, since through de-securitization threat-oriented foreign policy was left, shows consistency between the strategy and discourse. Incorporation of geography and history into discourse as in strategy strengthens the consistency and facilitates to claim that discourse, even though in a vague manner, is in line with strategy.

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<sup>44</sup> Uzgel, “Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, 368.

#### 8.4. SOURCES OF INCONGRUENCE:

Sources of (in)congruence between strategy and discourse – *what is actualized* and *what is spoken* – are the discussion point of this section. In examining incongruence, the interplay between *what is actualized* and *what is spoken* will be taken into account. The structured context of this period mostly resembles to the previous period – post-Cold War conditions –, but with new added features in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks which made the discussion of clash of civilizations more vocal. In this structured context, in which the major threats to security waned away but uncertainties prevailed, fresh outlooks needed to manage them became inevitable competencies.

AKP governments, after 2002 onwards, claimed to introduce new outlooks by bringing agency back in strategy formulation. In articulating a new foreign policy outlook, AKP and Davutoğlu accused predecessor governments of being incapable of formulating a strategy that is suitable to adapt to the new conditions of the post-Cold War, even accusing of their policy with the discourse of the ‘lost decade’. Davutoğlu attempted with his *strategic depth* doctrine to overcome the mismanagement of the previous governments to produce a strategy emanating from the country’s agential perspective and to overcome identity crisis were observed in the ‘lost decade’. Hence it is claimed that AKP’s approach goes beyond identity politics of Turkish Politics.<sup>45</sup> But, there are also debates regarding the identity transformation in AKP period.<sup>46</sup>

Such an understanding of the question of identity in Turkish Foreign Policy transformed from a western oriented one to a more comprehensive connotation including the Eastern dimension one. In this process of identity formation, recalling that an identity crisis was experienced in the 1990’s, agency was paid utmost importance with historical understanding of this process. In that sense, foreign policy practice of AKP period resembles to Özal’s practice.<sup>47</sup> Both of them have

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<sup>45</sup> Duran, “JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation”, 289.

<sup>46</sup> Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and the Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9, no.3 (2007): 247-261.

<sup>47</sup> Uzgel, *Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele*”, p.357.

incorporated geography and history in strategy, while in AKP's foreign policy, there is a more broadened perspective and a firmly-incorporated agency.

Geography began to be treated from a different perspective after the Cold War. While, in the previous periods, the significance of geography emanated from the meaning attained to it as a *means* that can be employed in balance of power politics thanks to importance attained on Turkey's geography, it has gained more agential perspective with the end of the Cold War. But the major difference between the 1991-2002 period and 2002 onwards was the incorporation of agential subjectivity to geography. The discourse of 'Turkic World; from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China' was, also, referring to geography as the discourse of 'we have historical responsibilities'. But one main difference should be underlined here. The 'Turkic World' discourse and strategy did not originate in and emerge out of the agency of Turkey, rather it was widely discussed in Western circles to attain a new meaning to Turkey's geography. Nevertheless, it had gained adherents in Turkey and within a short period of time was embraced and employed in strategy. But, 'strategic depth' doctrine emerged out of agential comprehension of the need to produce an agential strategy that is capable to ensure agency and that allows to pursue national interests of the country.

Moving from *being*, as having ontologically distinct characteristics and not defined from the impositions of security concerns and threats, thus reducing identity choices or experiences to preserve national unity and territorial integrity, an understanding taking ontologically distinct aspects of *being* into forefront created the ground for formulation of *ends*. In Davutoğlu's formulation of *ends*, which would lead to move Turkey to the level of major power, the needed *means* were to be utilized in the process and power resources that would be extracted within its historical and geographical depth. In that sense, agency strives to relocate Turkey as a regional power with global ambitions.

Particularly, in surrounding regions where uncertainty and instability prevailed, this uncertainty and instability reached to a degree that threatening Turkey with possible spill over, and thus, increasing the need for hard power assets. The securitization of issues and the increasing need for hard power resources which was structurally lacked in Turkey due to enduring and persistent *structural weakness*

brought about mismanagement. But Davutoğlu claimed that when strategic thinking and strategic outlook were to be changed, challenging security concerns might be resolved without pouring much of the resources of the country. In short, for him, due to losing agential awareness and subjectivity leading to a “confused and directionless foreign policy” and “lack of long-term strategic thinking”<sup>48</sup> observed in several subject matters, and most strikingly were observed within the case of the relations with the Middle East.<sup>49</sup>

The significance of the Middle East stemmed from firstly with the issue of PKK terrorism in the aftermath of Iraq War of 2003, and then again Bush Administration’s way of handling the issues in the Middle East. Turkey, too, mismanaged the relations with the Middle Eastern countries and followed a distant foreign policy with them as in the cases of Iran and Syria. Attempts to reconcile relations with the Middle Eastern Countries<sup>50</sup> caused the emergence of the questioning of Turkey’s western-oriented foreign policy.<sup>51</sup> Given that AKP was born out of Islamic roots and still carry on the same features, though it defined itself with conservative democracy, active foreign policy and involvement into the Middle East politics by the AKP raised the doubt of whether this involvement signals a shift in Turkey’s state identity.<sup>52</sup>

Although debates on Turkey’s foreign policy orientation emerged, in fact, these debates stem from mis-conception of *strategic depth* which foresees a multi-dimensional and multi-regional foreign policy. In fact, by involving into the surrounding regions, Turkey is deemed to provide security beyond the borders of Turkey; thus, decreasing the need for hard power assets. Davutoğlu’s words, underline this understanding, which state that “Turkey to overcome defensive reflexes should formulate defence of the country beyond the boundaries of the state,

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<sup>48</sup> Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 32.

<sup>49</sup> Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of New Geographic Imagination,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.4 (2007): 471-488.

<sup>50</sup> Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no.4 (2007), 102.

<sup>51</sup> Tarık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?,” *Turkish Studies* 9, no.1 (2008): 3-20.

<sup>52</sup> Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East”, 103-104.

and it is impossible to think and plan defence of the country within the actual borders.”<sup>53</sup> And it was an outcome of an attempt of “government led de-securitization”<sup>54</sup> period which facilitated the soft power assets and understanding that “The Turkish source of power, in contrast, lies in its historical and geographical richness combined with tactful strategic planning.”<sup>55</sup> Here, Davutoğlu claimed that strategy should reflect agential subjectivity which produces *positioned practice* within structured context. He believed that *strategic consciousness* should depend on *history*, while *strategic planning* should depend on the realities of the *time*.<sup>56</sup> Writing within the critical realist tradition, Faruk Yalvaç summarizes this understanding with the syllogism that “strategy is what states make of it”<sup>57</sup>, thus highlights that strategy is basically an agential attribute that is defined within structured context.

Apart from government led de-securitization, government led modernization accompanied the process crafted to overcome *structural weakness*. It has already been discussed that Turkey recovered economically even though it did not reach to level of effectively supporting of *means* in strategy. The ideal of ‘reaching to the level of contemporary civilization’ which was already defined by Atatürk, has gained a different connotation. ‘Reaching to the level of contemporary civilization’ as an ideal kept its primacy in AKP’s political practice. What differs was that modernization was not equated with westernization, and gained a more comprehensive, but blurred, understanding. The alliance of civilizations proves this argument that in AKP’s perspective and understanding of the Islamic civilization, Islam have also contributions to the level of contemporary civilization. Within this context, relations with the EU and intensification of the process, apart from being an attempt to give a new impetus to modernization process, by changing the discourse from joining the “the contemporary civilization” to the process of Turkey’s modernization and eventual participation into the EU was argued that it would

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<sup>53</sup> Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 41.

<sup>54</sup> Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”, 88.

<sup>55</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 152.

<sup>56</sup> Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 61.

<sup>57</sup> Faruk Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System,” *International Relations* 26, no.2 (2012): 166-169.

facilitate the “Alliance of Civilizations.”<sup>58</sup> Thus, giving a message to Western counterparts, Turkey’s membership has the potential to overcome inter-civilizational divide that began to be voiced more openly in the aftermath of 9/11 events.

Within historiography of Turkey, modernization was conceived first in a defensive character, then in an integrative one, depending on the threats perceived and relations improved. One of the AKP’s objectives in preserving modernization process is to follow the process without giving an impression of “assimilative integration’ into the West. Moving from this objective, to keep agency forefront and to reinforce it, foreign policy was defined with the terms: multi-regional and multi-directional. Though the foreign policy in this period was mentioned with the multi-directional foreign policy, Uzgel argued that, in fact, it is more correct to label this period as the re-definition process of dependency to the global system.<sup>59</sup> Similar, but a more academic critique to this period was also provided by Faruk Yalvaç, arguing that the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine ontologically furthered ‘hegemonic depth’ of Turkey as an *unintended consequence* of the process.<sup>60</sup> It can also be accepted as the unintended consequence of integrationist modernization process gained a new impetus with AKP government.

Activism and involvement in regional policies on the ground, first, with the policy of zero-problems with neighbors, then, with renewed involvement in the process of the Arab Spring was the transformation of *what is spoken* – discourse – into practice. At the global level, the discourse of “the globe is bigger than five,” pointing out to the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and resentment with their policies, policy and discourse of “Alliance of Civilizations” reflect the quest for new global role. However, whether the discourse of the strategy “we have historical responsibilities” met with outcomes of the strategy brings about the need to question of what the source of (in)congruence between strategy and discourse is.

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<sup>58</sup> Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 193.

<sup>59</sup> Uzgel, “Dış Politkada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, p.379.

<sup>60</sup> Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth?”, 165-180.

It can be claimed that Turkish Foreign Policy encountered two tests during the AKP period; the first is the 2008 economic crisis, and the second one was the Arab Spring and particularly the crisis in Syria. The importance of 2008 economic crisis stemmed from its direct correlation with the *structural weakness* which through years hampered the outcomes of strategy or constrained the ability to determine agential *ends*. Economically, the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was the transformation years of Turkish economy,<sup>61</sup> and hopes increased with the recovering of economy and reduced fragility to economic crisis. Furthermore, as the test of 2008 crisis<sup>62</sup> showed, the quick recovery increased the hopes on whether structural weakness might be overcome. In short, it can be claimed that Turkey managed to overcome the crisis and its effects which demonstrates the success. But, since soft power was the primary *means* employed to realize the *ends* of strategy, the main test of strategy came with the Syria crisis. What is more complicating is the fact that the Arab Spring and Syria crisis were also testing the applicability of the ‘zero-problems with neighbors’ policy.

Until the Arab uprisings taking place, a considerable effort poured to the process of normalizing the relations with the neighbors, though positive political outcomes could not be gained in each case. Nevertheless, economic interdependencies with the Middle Eastern countries began to create a positive perception of Turkey, as an economically prosperous, democratic, and Muslim country managed to build close relations with the West. However, the Arab Uprisings put Turkey into a dilemma of interests and ethics,<sup>63</sup> in which, on the one hand, to maintain close relations and mutual interests Turkey should refrain to involve the revolts, based on a *Westphalian* understanding of state sovereignty, or on the other hand, should involve and support democracy and the societies instead of governments risking to jeopardize the relations with those states. However, based on the assumption that Turkey’s most important source of soft power and popularity

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<sup>61</sup> Oran, *TürkDışPolitikası*, 3:61.

<sup>62</sup> Ziya Öniş, “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era,” *Turkish Studies* 13, no.2 (2012): 135-152.

<sup>63</sup> Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East,” *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no.2 (2014): 208.



among the Middle Eastern society is its democratic values, then hesitancy to support the democratic demands of societies might turn out to be an eradicating factor of the existing source of soft power. Hence, between the choice of governments and societies, Turkey favored the latter one. This preference when encountered prolonged internal conflicts in Syria, and the West's hesitancy to intervene into civil war, and as the prolonged civil war caused the involvement of extra-regional powers with their respective stakes, thus, reintroducing *realpolitik* to the region, caused the emergence of diffusion of hopes for democracy. Furthermore, the prolonged civil war created a power vacuum that provided a safe heaven for terrorism, as in the case of DAESH, that spilled over into neighboring countries. The outcome of this process for Turkish foreign policy is the return of *realpolitik*-oriented considerations that bring hard power assets into the fore. In other words, Turkey faced the dilemma of hard power vs. soft power, interest and power politics vs. ethics and normativeness, and global-focused vs. region focused politics. The Arab Spring caused the downgrading of scale to regional politics, despite its aspirations in global politics. Within such a situation, the discourse of 'splendid isolation' to underline isolated and diverging perspective regarding the region has emerged, somehow negating *central country* discourse. In short, the Arab spring and the developments that took place in Syria deeply affected the conduct of strategy which can be explained as structure severely hampered the *ends* of an agential strategy and inevitably *means* by making soft power irrelevant. Dilemmas facing strategy were explained by arguing that geopolitically fragile environment surrounding Turkey facilitated the involvement and overextension of its foreign policy,<sup>64</sup> but, this overextension and multi-involvement meant differing and diverse security dynamics that could not be controlled directly. The most dangerous aspect of this process is the fact that they have the potential to shake the conduct of strategy. In consequence, overextension and multi-involvement that were conceived as "dangerously overreaching"<sup>65</sup> triggered the risk of hampering the strategy from its roots.

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<sup>64</sup> Maliha Benli Altunışık, "Making Sense of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," *Turkish Studies* 12, no.4 (2011): 581-584.

<sup>65</sup> Morton Abramowitz and Henry Barkey, "Turkey's Transformation: The AKP Sees big," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no.6 (2009): 127.

## CHAPTER 9

### CONCLUSION

This dissertation argued that Turkey's changing discourse of strategy showed *differences in continuity* depending on the fluctuations took place in the structure that agency operated in. In fact, the differences in continuity also constitutes a discourse in which, while the term of *differences* refers to agency, the term of *continuity* refers to the structure. But, what is more striking, is the fact that, as in the case of strategy and its discourse, the discourse of *differences in continuity* underlines the constantly evolving and dialectically interacting nature of agent and structure. In other words, it is argued that while agent formulates a strategy, which can be conceived as something that has emerged, as being, out of the interaction with the structure, in fact, when decided to be conducted, it cannot always possible to realize what is intended in the strategy. Then it is possible to argue that strategy also experiences a process of becoming. The research question of this dissertation, put forward, was the "which factors determine strategic discourse of Turkey?" seeking an answer and explanation to the question of being and becoming inevitably needed to take into account the historical sociological context of the strategy. Furthermore, as *what is actualized* may not be in line with *what is spoken*, then another question was put forward as to explain the question of "what is the source of the incongruence between them?" how the question was answered in this dissertation will be discussed below, but, to be short, answering these questions needed to change the philosophy of science in handling the questions. For that reason, this dissertation adopted critical realism as the philosophy of science.

The concept of strategy, consisting of *means* and *ends*, is treated in this dissertation not as a rigid concept, but as a historically and sociologically evolving and determined one. Strategy as an agential attribute does not being formulated in a vacuum that is reified from its historical and sociological context. Strategy is treated

as an agential attribute that is employed or formulated to change what is unacceptable for agency. From a wider perspective, it is intended to scrutinize “what makes strategy possible?” or “what kind of factors prevents realization of strategy?” These questions direct the focus to the interplay between agents and structure.

Approaching strategy from the agent-structure perspective, while on the one hand, situates the strategy in a social context, on the other hand, eliminates reductionist and reified analysis of the concept. But, agent-structure debate is not handled from the perspective of *flat ontology*, on the contrary, by adopting a critical realist perspective, it is suggested that *ontological depth* of strategy can provide a different perspective which takes historical and sociological understanding into account. In inter-relationship between strategy as an agential attribute and structure as having either constraining or enabling forces, the realization of the *ends* through the available *means* is bound up with the structured context. And approaching the process of strategy from the dialectics of agent and structure provides historical and social understanding and explanation of the *strategy* concept. It is argued that strategy is shaped within a process, in which, agency and structure were in dialectical relationship.

The dialectical nature of strategy, when analyzed from the critical realist perspective, highlights that what is deemed may not be in line with the realization of *ends* of strategy, since agency is *activity*, *concept* and *spatio-temporal* dependent on structures. Nevertheless, irrespective of causal powers of the structures, agents have the competencies to alter the structure or, at least, to formulate the ones that could be in line with the realities of the structured context. It is obvious that, apart from the attributes and causal powers of structures, as long as agency can preserve its subjectivity, awareness and cognition, it has also the capability to produce a structure that is in line with its *ends*, rather than merely reproducing it. In other words, cited competencies build interconnection and interaction of *situational* component of strategy to *positional* (praxis) and *dispositional* (means) component of strategy. But, it should be noted here that the ability to alter structures depends not only on subjective portrayal of the situation, but also, on the formulation and conduct of strategies that are along with the realities of the context. In other words, *positioned*

*practice – praxis* – of agents that found expression in strategy should be formulated dialectically.

Once strategy was formulated by agents, their representation with discourse constitutes one of the indispensable parts of the strategy that was examined in this dissertation. The question of “how strategy is represented?” is addressed throughout the dissertation by taking into account dialectical relationship between agency and structure. As in the case of strategy, discourses, too, are either constrained or enabled with agency. In articulating discourse, agency as in the case of determining *ends* behaves within a structured context that was taken into account dialectically in the process of strategy formulation. Discourses, too, stand as an act of agents that were designed to disseminate certain messages to receivers. But, agents behave selectively in representing strategy in discourse, thus, it can be claimed that discourse not always represents strategy in an exhaustive manner. Some aspects of strategy are either incorporated or intentionally refrained to be represented in discourses. This selectivity means discourse incorporates certain parts of strategy that was deemed to be made known. Nevertheless, if discourse is analyzed with a closer outlook to reveal what is omitted and what is incorporated, a more comprehensive explanation of discourse with its sociological aspects can be obtained. In this analysis, which requires critical realist analysis of discourse, the analysis of discourse should not be confined to *flat ontology*, but a deeper level of understanding that approach the discourse from an *ontological depth* perspective. Though any act of incorporation and omission of certain parts of strategy in representation is an agential choice, structural context also plays a determining role. In other words, the content represented in discourse reflects the features that are shaped in a dialectical process in which agents and context interact.

Discourses as an act of representation reflects the nature of strategy. In line with the main argument of this dissertation, as it is the case for strategy, discourse is shaped by and reflects the respective historical and sociological conditions that cause emergence of it. Context specificity of discourse emanates from the spatio-temporal unique conditions of the respective period. In other words, the content of discourse is in line with content of strategy. But, *what is actualized* might demonstrate (in)congruence with *what is spoken*. Providing an explanation to (in)congruence

between *what is spoken* and *what is actualized* led to handle the causal powers of structures on agency and agency's competencies to formulate *ends*-realizing strategies. Acquiring the knowledge of structure at the *intransitive* domain is not possible without some distortions, depending on the agent's capability of abstraction and awareness, then, (in)congruence between 'what is spoken and *what is actualized* becomes inevitable.

Before entering the discussion of the (in)congruence, the structural factors should be discussed to reveal their interplay with agency and its strategy. The argumentation is based upon three basic structures that heavily affect the formulation of strategy, namely; *international political system*, *global economy*, and *geography*. Respective effects of these structures, at the level of *actual*, were conceived as *nationalism*, *structural weakness*, and *territorial retreat*. Each of these factors, with their causal forces, led to the emergence of differing effects on strategy depending on the context.

Nationalism and national sentiments existing in society differed along with the developments taking place in international politics. While the primary effects of nationalism were observed in the transformation from empire to nation-state which brought about the puzzlement of *ends*, but, as the transformation achieved, nationalism turned out to be one of the main driving forces that feed agential formulation of *ends*. Structural weakness, the most notable and significant factor that shaped other structural forces, had determined the nature of *means* at disposal that can be employed in strategy. Particularly, at times when faced with major threats, and depending on the recognition of the shortage of *means*, *structural weakness* has, either led to the balance of power politics or the alliance policy to compensate its agency eroding causal forces. In other words, due to the enduring and persistent character of this factor, and although several attempts were made, but, could not have managed to overcome it, in the end, led to apply for balancing and alliances as remedy for it. Territorial retreat, which was experienced several times in the Ottoman period, was transferred to the republic period and sociologically, when compounded with strategic culture, has considerably affected the nature of threat perception triggering the emergence of *fears* in different sorts. What is more striking, is the fact that, all of these factors, rather than having determinacy in relevant areas, were in

constant dialectical interaction to produce cumulative effects more than they do separately.

In Turkish Foreign Policy strategy and its representation through discourses, structural factors continued to play a determining role though some fluctuations were observed. In other words, strategic discourse showed differences in line with the agential intents, but, when the constraining powers of structure were at place, differences in discourse – *what is spoken* – were incongruence with the strategic outcomes – *what is actualized*. The evolution of strategic discourse in line with strategy showed differences as well. Regarding the questions of “what are the enduring elements of strategy?” and “which factors mainly contributed or determined the formulation of strategy?” can be answered by looking into the agential perception of threat, in which agency and structure were at play.

The enduring elements of strategy consisting of *means* and *ends* were shaped within the process in which structural factors have causality. Shortage of *means* mainly emerging from the structural weakness that also found meaning in its specific context continued to play a determining role in the formulation of strategy. Context is also interactively shaped by geography and the international political system as a producer of threats. Agential perception of threat is closely related with the ability to determine agential *ends* rather than being imposed to determine *ends* in strategy. What is meant here is the fact that there is a close correlation between threat perception and strategy, particularly at times, when the structural weakness and subsequent shortage of *means* were at play. In situations, when major threats exist, particularly, the ones that are exceeding the available *means* at disposal, caused seeking ways of compensation through other *means* that can be allocated, thanks to meaning attained to geography of Turkey. Utilizing the balance of power politics and the alliances were, in that sense, the ways of compensation for shortage of *means*. In a way, agency provides *means* that were not owned, but emerged out of the meaning attained to geography. The nature of threats, major or manageable, have led agency to seek other alternatives than *means* at disposal. At times, particularly with the end of the Cold War, when the major threats were disappeared, agency sought ways to overcome structural weakness. Even, euphoric quest for removing or overcoming structural factors were observed, as it was the case in Özal’s policy. It might be

argued that Turkey lost its subjectivity and consciousness at times of major threats, due to its strategic culture. However, it would not be fair to discuss agency was operating with false consciousness, instead, strategic culture was at play in limiting options to refrain adventurism and to act with caution.

The foundation years of Turkey (1919-1923), followed basically a revisionist strategy that aimed the transformation of the empire into a nation-state and the survival of it. But later on, assertiveness and revisionism left its place to isolationism between 1923 and 1938. In that period, though a major threat was not at place until the mid-1930's, 'fear from the West' and quest for overcoming *structural weakness* that is considered to provide room for agency led to pursue an isolationist policy. But, as the international environment get deteriorated, isolationism left its place to balancing. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the 'fear from the Soviets' as a major threat, replacing the 'fear from the West,' appeared which was also fueled with Stalin's territorial demands. Upon the recognition that balancing as the old game was not adequate to alleviate the Soviet threat, undertaking alliance commitments were employed as a remedy to balancing. Hence, the alliances can be treated as a form of balancing with formal and multi-lateral commitments, or it can be labeled as balancing through alliances.

Being part of an alliance, with its firm and binding commitments, was perceived as a policy that further constrains agency. Particularly, with the Johnson Letter, Turkey recognized how far alliances might be detrimental to national interests and agency. Experiencing such a crisis with the United States led to search for ways to allow for more agency, thus, the ways to dissociate from the West. In other words, return to balancing was observed as the relations with the Soviet Union improved. However, this inclination was reversed with Özal, whose policy was to rebuild close relations with the US without losing agency. In fact, Özal's policy was formulated to benefit from the descending bipolar confrontation that removed suppressive effects from the smaller states. The quest for the new international role, and agency through introducing a new strategy that was designed to create Turkish sphere of influence and to prevent any possible spill over instabilities and uncertainties into Turkey by adopting an active foreign policy signaled also the quest for agency. However, as the strategic *end* that was well behind the available *means* could not have produced

intended outcomes. And finally, with AKP government, agency gained primacy in strategy formulation. Consequently, it can be argued that as the major threats disappeared, agency attempted to overcome its shortage of *means* by formulating different strategies, as it was the case in the periods of 1923-1938 and 1980-2015.

Periods in which activism revived, relations with neighbors also gained a new impetus on the way of reconciliation of differences. In a sense, the attempt to create a peaceful environment was first adopted in Atatürk period through the discourse of “peace at home; peace abroad” and is rearticulated when the international political system allowed. Although, search for activism in surrounding regions in the Özal period, with an objective to halt uncertainty and prevent spillover of instabilities into Turkey, was adopted, what is intended could not be realized. Again the introduction of “zero-problems with neighbors” policy can be seen as a continuation of traditional “peace at home; peace abroad” policy with a renewed discourse, basically preserving the basic tenets. What has triggered to adopt a pacific environment seeking policy might be seen as an outcome of structural weakness. As the *means* were not adequate to be assertive, than trying to build a peaceful environment automatically indicates a lesser need for *means*. In other words, a stable international environment and relations were treated as *means* that was crafted to acquire the *end* defined as overcoming structural weakness that would in turn support the content of future strategies. However, it should also be noted that pacifying foreign policy has not meant total disregard of activism. On the contrary, while pursuing a pacifist foreign policy strategy, whenever conditions allowed, or matured enough, a kind of pragmatism and activism was observed as in the case of Hatay province, and during the Arab Spring. Hence, activism and pragmatism were not totally disregarded depending on the context. It can be suggested that when agential awareness is not lost, hesitation does not occur in taking actions.

Reference to geography in strategy and discourse should also be discussed since one of the structural forces taken into account is geography. Geography constitutes a distinct feature of strategy by providing space – material context – on which strategy operates. Strategy foresees a conceived space and context that bears features of time in it – spatio-temporal dependency. But agency formulates strategy – ideational aspect originating from agency – that is capable to exceed contemporary



spatio-temporal conditions for desired, intended and anticipated conditions in the future. Hence geography can be characterized with *janus-faced* nature, in which past and future dialectically interacts in the present and through subjectivity in the mind of strategy maker.

In Turkish Foreign Policy, reference to geography become more visible at times where agency gained more significance and major threats disappeared considerably. Hence, with reference to geography, discourse can be separated into two categories; *threat-oriented* and *vision-oriented*. The primary distinguishing factor between these two categories can be founded upon the originator of the respective concept. Threat-oriented discourses can be seen as structure originated ones, since threat perception of agency does not occur in a vacuum, but from the dialectics of structure and agency. On the other hand, vision-oriented discourses mainly emerge out of agential vision that takes into account structure. In the context of Turkish Foreign Policy, given that *territorial retreat* was caused by growing nationalism in imperial territories and structural weakness caused by the incapability to alter or suppress the course of events, these two dynamics caused to the mergence of isolationist and reactive strategies. But, whenever threat perception decreased in the absence of major threats, an impulse to regain agency emerged that is leading to vision of *territorial reach* by building closer relations with states inhabiting in the post-Ottoman territories. This transformation from *threat-oriented* to *vision-oriented* strategies and discourses signifies the overcoming of *fears* leaving its place to *hopes* actually. Nevertheless, structural weakness as a factor that undermines *means* employable to strategy hampered the realization of *ends* in strategy.

This visionary strategy was compounded with the discourse of responsibility as in the case of Özal's and AKP's discourses. Reference to historical and cultural responsibilities began to be reflected in discourse with Özal government. What has changed with AKP government can be seen as an attempt to attain more significant importance and a deeper meaning to the historical and geographical understanding of Turkey. Responsibility as a discourse emerged, at times, when apprehension of agency grew. Consequently, it can be argued that although Turkey experienced a rupture by transition to nation-state, imperial vision that gives feeling and mission of

responsibility to the country has not disappeared. Whenever constraints on agency diffused, the impulses to regain agency in post-imperial geography revived.

In this context, this dissertation has several contributions to the literature. First of all, the concept of strategy was not discussed within the framework of critical realism. The ontological depth provided both to locate the concept of strategy within agent-structure debate, which provided to move beyond reified and reductionist analysis and to seek explanation and knowledge on the concept by giving priority to ontology. In short, the first contribution of this dissertation to the literature is on the domain of International Relations (IR) Theory. The second contribution can be accepted as historical and sociological analysis of changing discourses and strategy of Turkish Foreign Policy. In fact, all the events mentioned in this dissertation already were widely discussed in the literature by employing different IR theories, but, what is missing is the complete analysis of strategic discourses that took place within a wider time span. In that sense, this dissertation focuses on *longue durée*. What this analysis has provided can be seen as a contribution of picturing general outlook of the strategic course of Turkish Foreign Policy. And third major contribution can be seen as the merge of the first and the second contribution. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature on critical realist analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy by incorporating the concept of strategy and strategic discourse within this framework.

The major critique that can be directed to this dissertation is its focus on a wide span of time. But, this was an intended choice emanating from the consideration that without providing a general picture, more specified studies may not be located into the big picture. During the writing process, one of the major shortfalls and anxiety was whether the literature on the respective periods was covered and reflected in the analysis. The answer can be given to this question can be no. In fact, if the future studies focuses on the original sources in depth, critiques and supportive arguments can be found, which in the end will contribute to the literature.

**Table.4 The General Outlook of Turkey’s Changing Discourses of Strategy**

Periods	Discourse of Strategy	Strategy	Concepts	Source of Strategy	A/S – outcome (the interaction of agency and structure)	The Sources of (In)congruence <i>what is spoken / what is actualized</i>	Nature of Strategy
1919-1923	“Independence or Death!”	‘End’: Survival, Existence ‘Means’: Force and Diplomacy (exploitation of BoP)	“Independence” of “balance power”	Agency: Surviving as a nation state (a radical end since it is a rupture from being an empire to a nation-state <b>Structure:</b> Partition of an empire by victors.	Structure pushed for rupture, but choice has been created. Discourse of strategy and strategy is agential, structure surpassed by both taking it into account and imposing agency	Congruent	Threat-Oriented
1923-1939	“Peace at home, peace in the world”	‘Ends’: Development, Ensuring Existence ‘Means’: Diplomacy, Power Accumulation	“Equal member of civilized world” “isolationism”	Agency: Following agential end formulated in previous period <b>Structure:</b> Acceptance of agency due to focusing on rising immediate spoiler (Germany)	Exploiting structure’s incapacity to deal with agency for the sake of ensuring structures existence Discourse of strategy and strategy is agential Structure surpassed by agential awareness of its limitations, avoided provoking it	Congruent	Vision Oriented
1939-1945	“Turkey cannot think to preserve her unity and survival by allying either politically or militarily by one or group of states.”	‘Ends’: Avoiding Destruction ‘Means’: Non-belligerency,	“Active neutrality” “Alliances” “Balance Power”	Agency: keeping agency at hand and avoiding destruction which might end in losing agency <b>Structure:</b> while allowed balance of power politics, at the same time structural constraints become more visible	Although agency strived for not losing agency, structure imposed its limitations on agency. Nevertheless, discourse and strategy was agential, though waning of agency began to be realized. Strategic outcome was achieved when considered within the context of avoiding destruction.	Incongruent	Threat-oriented
1945-1980	“A new world order is to be built; Turkey will take its place in that”	‘Ends’: Resisting Hegemony, Ensuring Agency, Search for new alternatives ‘Means’: Manipulating Balance of Power in bi-polarity	“Balance Power” “Disassociation”	Agency: getting aware its inability, fettered with oblige to follow alliance policies, not being taken into account. <b>Structure:</b> imposing own policies but not taking into account agential demands	Agency tried to surpass structure, but structure has not allowed agency Change in discourse of strategy doesn’t reflect change in strategy Structure imposed its existence by restraining its strategic choice	Incongruent	Threat-oriented
1980-2002	“From the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall”	‘Ends’: Reassertion of Regional Power through ethnic bonds ‘Means’: Utilizing both geopolitical flux and identity (historical bonds?)	“Turk World” “Regional power”	Agency: seeing structure as fading away, hence re-trying agency <b>Structure:</b> its effects continue even though perception of structure may change	Agency (as exhausted with) sees end of bi-polarity as an opportunity but its resource disposal (means) doesn’t allow to pursue its ends Structural effects continue to affect agency since its continuity is longer than its perception Discourse of strategy and strategy doesn’t fit due to unintended consequences of structure	Incongruent	Vision Oriented
2002-2015	“We Have Historical Responsibilities.”	‘Ends’: Reassertion of Regional/Global Power ‘Means’: Utilizing history and geography for power accumulation	“Neo-Ottomanism” “Central State”	Agency: seeing agency as to be enhanced through internal re-organization <b>Structure:</b> losing its restraining power	Agential awareness of both its own limitations and structure’s lost its determining and restraining power Structure allows agency to the extent that its reproduction is followed. Otherwise structure reasserts its existence Discourse of strategy and strategy is in constant flux, the result has not emerged.	Incongruent	Vision Oriented

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## APPENDICES

### A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez Türkiye'nin değişen güvenlik stratejisi söylemlerini analiz etmektedir. Tezin temel araştırma sorusu "Türkiye'nin değişen güvenlik söylemlerini hangi faktörler belirlemektedir?" şeklinde belirlenmiştir. Bu soruya cevap aranırken var olan literatürden farklı olarak eleştirel gerçekçilikten faydalanılmıştır. Bir Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi olmayan fakat teorilerin oluşmasına imkan veren bir bilim felsefesi olan eleştirel gerçekçiliğin benimsenmesinde, tezin ortaya koyduğu soruyu açıklama noktasında sağlayabileceği faydalar temel belirleyici olmuştur. Ana akım teorilerin üzerine kurulmuş olduğu ve gerçekliği gerçekleştiren ile sınırlayan pozitivism ve bu yaklaşımı eleştiren post-modernizm aslında farklı epistemolojik temellere hareket etmekle birlikte, ontolojik olarak yüzeysel bir anlayış kabul ederek birbirlerine yaklaşmaktadır. Eleştirel gerçekçilik ise nesnelliği ontolojik seçimlerde aramakta, epistemolojik olarak öznel olabilmektedir. Bu farklılık, eleştirel gerçekçiliğe *gerçekleşen* ve *söylenenleri* irdeleme imkanı vermektedir. Eleştirel gerçekçilik ve onun temel varsayımı olan ontolojiye atfedilen önem sayesinde *strateji* kavramının oluşumu ve *söylem* yoluyla temsili konularını, stratejiyi ve söylemi ortaya çıkaran mekanizmaları irdeleme imkanı vermektedir.

Bu tez Türk dış politikasındaki güvenlik stratejisini söylemler yoluyla irdelemektedir. Ana akım teoriler ve onların yaklaşımları *güvenlik stratejisini* ve onun söylemsel temsilinde *yatay ontoloji* kullanarak, strateji ve onun *söylemini* ortaya çıkaran *gözlemlenmeyen* mekanizmalarını göz ardı etmektedirler. Eleştirel gerçekçilikten faydalanılarak ve bu sayede ontolojiye öncelik verilmesi ve *ontolojik derinlik* kavramının kullanılması yoluyla stratejinin değişen söylemlerinin daha kapsamlı bir analizinin mümkün olabileceği iddia edilmektedir. Böylece, stratejinin *araçlar* olarak tanımlanan *materyal* taraflarının lehine, failin göz ardı edilen veya unutulmuş stratejinin *amaçlarını* oluşturan *edimsel* ve *düşünsel* tarafları da diyalektik

bir bakış açısıyla analizlere dahil edilmesi mümkün olabilecektir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu tez stratejinin evrimini, failin özgürleştirici stratejiler ile aşmaya çalıştığı yapının kısıtlayıcı etkilerini fail-yapı diyalektiği içerisine konumlandırmaktadır. Bu da kaçınılmaz olarak stratejinin *tarihsel* ve *sosyolojik* bir anlayışla ele alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Türk dış politikasında *fail*, stratejinin oluşturulması ve onun söyleme dökülmesinde tereddüt etmemiştir. Fakat strateji hakkında *söylenen* her zaman *gerçekleşende* sonuç olarak gerçekleştirilememiştir. Dolayısıyla bu tez, *söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasındaki uyumsuzluğa bir açıklama bulma girişimindedir. Bu tezde, fail her ne kadar strateji oluştursa da, failin içinde bulunduğu yapının, oluşturulan stratejilerin gerçekleştirilmesini ya engelleyebildiği ya da hiç değilse temsilinden farklı sonuçların ortaya çıkmasına neden olabildiği, eleştirel gerçekçilikten faydalanılarak açıklanmaktadır.

Bu tezde strateji, *amaç* ve *araçların* uyumunun ötesinde, failin bir yeteneği olarak *düşünceden harekete* devam eden bir süreç içerisinde incelenmektedir. Strateji oluşumunda fail, öncelikle içerisinde bulunduğu yapıyla etkileşime girmektedir. Bu etkileşim esnasında failin, yapının kısıtlayıcı ve kolaylaştırıcı etkilerini öznel olarak değerlendirmesi ile başlayan *düşünsel* bir süreç söz konusudur. Stratejik düşüncenin oluşumu, failin yapmak istedikleri ve niyetleri ile yönlendirilen fakat yapının kısıtlayıcı ve kolaylaştırıcı etkileri ile şekillenen diyalektik bir süreç içerisinde yürümektedir. Bu noktada, failin öznelliğinde farkındalık ve bilinç stratejinin, yapının nedensel güçleri ile uyumlu oluşturulmasında belirleyici bir role sahiptir. Bu etkileşim sonucunda fail, *amaçları* ve bu amaçları gerçekleştirmek için kullanabilceği *araçları* içeren bir strateji oluşturur. Strateji süreci bu noktadan sonra stratejinin *söylem* yoluyla temsili süreci takip eder. Söylem, stratejinin failin seçimi doğrultusunda içerik ve kapsam olarak bilinir hale getirilmesi sürecidir. Aslında fail, söylemi belirlerken de seçici davranmakta ve stratejinin belirli noktalarının bilinmesine müsaade etmektedir. Bu seçimde, fail tarafından kullanılan söylemin diğer failer üzerinde yaratacağı etkiler de göz önünde bulundurulur. Amacını aşan söylemler, diğer failer üzerinde tepkisel sonuçları tetikleyerek, oluşturulan stratejinin başarıya ulaşmasına engel olabilmektedir. Kısacası, *söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasında bir *uyumsuzluk* oluşabilmektedir. *Söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasındaki uyumsuzluğun nereden kaynaklandığının açıklanması da bu tezin temel

amaçlarındandır. Bu noktayı detaylandırmadan önce strateji sürecinde *düşünsel*, *belirlenimsel* ve *söylemsel* süreçlerden sonra stratejinin eyleme döküldüğü *edimsel* sürece de bakmak gerekmektedir.

Stratejinin eyleme dökülmesi edimsel süreci ifade etmektedir. Eylem esnasında diğer süreçlerde olduğu gibi fail ile yapı sürekli olarak bir etkileşim içerisinde. Bu etkileşim, fail tarafından düşünülen, belirlenen ve söylenen stratejinin her zaman belirlendiği ve söylendiği şekilde gerçekleşmesini engelleyebilmektedir. Bu etkileşimden ortaya çıkan *gerçekleşen*, *söylenen* ile yapının etkilerinden dolayı bir uyumsuzluk gösterebilmektedir. Kısacası *gerçekleşen* stratejinin sonuçları *söylenenden* farklı şekilde tezahür edebilmektedir. Bu durum, *söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasındaki uyumsuzluk, bu tezin ortaya koymayı ve *ontolojik derinlik* kavramı ile açıklamayı iddia ettiği noktalardan bir tanesidir.

Tezin bütününde, strateji oluşturma sürecini yansıtan bir yapı benimsenmiştir. Bu kapsamda öncelikle *Yapı ve Bağlam* başlığı altında incelenen dönemin belirlenen yapısal faktörlerinin nasıl şekillendiği anlatılmıştır. Bu inceleme, ilgili dönemin *uluslararası siyasal sistem*, *uluslararası ekonomi* ve *coğrafya* üzerinde yarattığı değişim çerçevesinde yürütülmektedir. Sonrasında *Fail ve Strateji* başlığı altında, failin yapıyı ne şekilde okuduğu ve bu öznel okumasını stratejiye ne şekilde yansıttığı tartışılmıştır. Buradaki amaç, fail tarafından oluşturulan stratejinin yapıya *edimsel*, *kavramsal* ve *mekan-zamansal* bir şekilde bağımlı olduğu varsayımından hareket edildiğini ortaya koymaktır. Fail oluşturduğu stratejiyi yapının siyasal sistem, ekonomi ve coğrafya düzlemlerindeki öznel okumasına göre oluşturulduğu ve bunun yanında diyalektik bir etkileşim çerçevesinde *amaçlarını* ve *amaçları* gerçekleştirecek *araçları* tanımladığı iddia edilmektedir. Fail sonrasında, stratejinin üç faktörü çerçevesinde, o duruma ve bağlama özel stratejisini oluşturmaktadır. Bu üç faktör *durumsal*, *edimsel* ve *araçsal* olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Durumsal faktör, stratejinin failin yapı ile olan etkileşimi sonucunda nasıl bir strateji oluşturması gerektiği konusunda faile ışık tutmaktadır. Araçsal faktör, failin belirlediği durumu değiştirebilmek için ne gibi *araçlara* ihtiyaç duyduğunu ve belirlediği *amaçları* gerçekleştirmek için hangi *araçları* kullanması gerektiği ile ilgilidir. Son olarak edimsel faktör, stratejinin uygulanmasına yön verecek hangi eylemleri yapması gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Edimsel faktör esasında sürecin bir hasılası olan



failin konumlanmasını ve o noktadan sonra atacağı adımları anlatmakta ve bu yönüyle *praxis* olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Dikkat edilmesi gereken nokta, gerek yapının okunması esnasında gerekse stratejinin oluşturulması esnasında, fail hem öznel hem de yapı ile sürekli bir diyalektik etkileşim içerisinde. Bu diyalektik etkileşim stratejinin tarihsel ve sosyolojik bir analizini gerektirdiği kadar bu analizi mümkün de kılmaktadır. Fail strateji belirledikten sonra *Söylem* başlığı altında stratejinin söylem yoluyla nasıl temsil edildiği tartışılmakta, belirlenen stratejinin hangi boyutta ve kapsamda söylemde yer bulduğu, söylemin belirlenmesinde hangi faktörlerin etkili olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Söylem saptanırken, ilgili dönemin genel özelliklerini yansıtacak söylemler belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Her ne kadar, her bir dönem için farklı söylemler ortaya koyulabilecekse de, seçilen söylem, ilgili dönemi ve dönemin stratejisini en iyi şekilde yansıtacak şekilde tamamen yazarın özneliği çerçevesinde seçilmiştir. Kısacası, bu bölümde stratejinin söylem yoluyla nasıl temsil edildiği tartışması yürütülmektedir. Ayrıca bu bölüm bir sonraki bölüme zemin hazırlamaktadır. Bu noktadan sonra, *Uyumsuzluğun Kaynakları* bölümünde *söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasındaki farkın, yapının hangi nedensel güçlerinden kaynaklandığı açıklanmaktadır. Her dönemin kendi içerisinde bir sonuç bölümü niteliği taşıyan bu kısımda, failin belirlediği stratejinin ve onun söyleminin yapı tarafından ne derecede gerçekleştirilebildiğini irdelemektedir. Burada özellikle gerçekleşenin söylenen ile her zaman uyuşmadığı ve yapının gerçekleşen ile söylenen arasındaki farkın temel belirleyicisi olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, failin belirlediği stratejinin gerçekleştirilmesini yapısal faktörler engelleyebilmektedir. Bu şekilde de yapı kendisini yeniden üretebilmektedir. Tezin bütünü açısından bakıldığında, süreklilikteki farklılıkların anlaşılması açısından yapıların ne kadar güçlü olduğunu ortaya koyma açısından bir takım çıkarımlar yapılmasına bölüm sonunda yer alan bu tartışmalar imkan tanımaktadır. Bu şekilde oluşturulan teorik altyapı, empirik olarak Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk dış politikasına uyarlanarak, tezin devam eden bölümlerinde takip edilmektedir. Bu durum, tezin yapısal bütünlüğünün sağlanmasının yanında, teorik çerçeve bölümünde ortaya konan kavramsal ve teorik yaklaşımın çeşitli dönemlere uygulanmasına ve çıkarımlar yapılmasına müsaade etmektedir.

Tezin teorik çerçevesini takip eden bölümde, Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nin kuruluş yılları (1919-1923) incelenmektedir. Bu dönemin temel özellikleri, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dağılmasında yapısal faktörlerin ne şekilde etkiler yarattığı bu bölümde irdelenmektedir. Yapı ve Bağlam bölümünde uluslararası siyasal sistemde meydana gelen değişim milliyetçilik akımlarını ortaya çıkardığı, imparatorluktan ulus devlete geçiş sürecini hızlandırdığı, uluslararası ekonomik yapıda meydana gelen değişimler sonucunda, uluslararası ekonomideki payı düşen imparatorluk oluşturabileceği stratejik *amaçlara* atayabileceği *araçlarını* kaybetmiştir. Coğrafya açısından bakıldığında, kaynakları azalan ve milliyetçilik ile *amaç* belirleme noktasında kafası karışan imparatorluğun gideren coğrafi geri çekilme ile karşı karşıya kaldığı görülmüştür. Sonuçta, stratejik açıdan milliyetçilik *amaçlarda* muğlaklığa, ekonomi *araçların* erimesine ve göreceli zayıflığın ortaya çıkmasına, coğrafya ise *geri çekilme* yoluyla gerek *amaçsal* gerekse *araçsal* olarak küçülmeyi beraberinde getirmiştir. Sürekli geri çekilme ve milliyetçilik stratejik kültürü de etkilemiş ve Sevr Sendromu olarak adlandırılan bir olgunun ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuştur. Ayrıca araçsal yetersizlik olarak kendini gösteren göreceli zayıflık daha fazla geri çekilmeme üzerine kurulan stratejik amaçların gerçekleştirilmesini sağlayacak araçların coğrafyaya atfedilen önem sayesinde güçler dengesi politikasını göreceli özerkliğin bertaraf edecek bir araç olarak ortaya çıkarmıştır. Böyle bir durumda, Mustafa Kemal önderliğinde yine failin bilinçli ve farkında tercihleri doğrultusunda güçler dengesi Kuruluş Savaşı yıllarında kullanılmıştır. Ancak, güçler dengesi egemenliği kısıtlayacak ödünler verilmeden uygulanmaya çalışılmıştır. Stratejinin iki ayağını oluşturan savaş ve diplomasi birlikte kullanılmıştır. Bu dönemde stratejik amaç milliyetçiliğin yıktığı devleti, yine milliyetçilikten faydalanarak ve imparatorluktan ulus devlete geçişi sağlayarak yeni bir devlet kurulması olarak belirlemiştir. Rusya her ne kadar, imparatorluğun yıkılmasındaki temel faktörlerden biri olsa da bu dönemde güçler dengesinin temel ayaklarından bir tanesi oluşturmuş ve amacı gerçekleştirecek araçların transferinde belirleyici bir rolü olmuştur. Bunun yanında diplomasi İtilaf Devletlerinin kendi içlerindeki farklılıkların derinleştirilmesi ve cephede kazanılan zaferlerin politik sonuçlara dönüştürülmesinde etkin olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu dönemin hakim söylemi “Ya İstiklal Ya Ölüm!” şeklinde belirlenmiştir. Buradaki temel stratejik *amaç* istiklal ile ifade edilmiş, *araçlar* ise

ölümü göze alan toplum olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu söylem, stratejik *amacın* ötesine geçen ya da itilaf devletlerinin arasındaki görüş ayrılıklarını aşmasını neden olabilecek provokasyonu içeren emperyalist bir içerik ihtiva etmemektedir. Aksine, *araçlar* ile uyumlu bir *amacı* içeren strateji söylem yoluyla temsil edilmiştir. Bu nedenle, fail stratejisini yapısal faktörleri göz önünde bulundurarak belirlediği için söylenen ile gerçekleşen arasında bir uyumsuzluk ortaya çıkmamıştır.

Cumhuriyetin kuruluşunu takip eden yıllar (1923-1938), failin kendi görece zayıflığının, diğer büyük güçlerin cumhuriyet coğrafyasına atfettikleri önemin, aynı zamanda, uluslararası siyasal sistemde temel kırılma noktasının olduğunun göstergesidir. Bu bağlamda fail, stratejisini belirlerken araçlardaki eksikliğin, milliyetçiliğin yeni cumhuriyetin daha fazla güçlenmesi için bir araç olarak kullanılabilirliğinin farkında olarak, stratejik amacı yeniden inşa olarak belirlemiştir. Uluslararası siyasal sistemdeki kırılmalardan ve gerilimlerden uzak kalmak ve içerisinde bulunduğu zayıflığın yeni bir savaş aracı olarak destekleyebilecek düzeyde olmaması nedeniyle, fail stratejisini gerek iç gerekse dış barışın devam ettirilmesi üzerine kurmuştur. Bu stratejinin temsilinde “Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh” söylemi kullanılmıştır. Bu dönemde, oluşturulan strateji istenen başarıyı belirli ölçülerde gerçekleştirebilmiş ve doğrudan bir gerginliğin tarafı olmamaya özen göstermiştir. Fail, önleyici tedbir olarak da bölgesel ittifaklara başvurmuş ve bu şekilde gerek Ortadoğu’dan, gerekse Balkanlar’dan gelebilecek tehditleri önlemeye çalışmıştır. Ayrıca, Lozan’dan arta kalan sorunların da çatışmaya veya gerginliğe varmadan çözümünü yoluna gitmiştir. Ancak, özellikle 1930’ların ikinci yarısından itibaren yeniden inşayı temin edecek ve görece zayıflığın aşılmasına imkan tanıyacak güvenlik ortamı sağlanamamıştır. Sonuçta da, *gerçekleşen* ile *söylenen* arasındaki uyumsuzluk yapısal faktörlerden dolayı ön plana çıkmaya başlamıştır. Siyasal sistemin etkileri kendisini güvenliğinin var olan *araçlar* ile sağlanamayacağı algısından dolayı, görece zayıflık 1929 dünya ekonomik bunalımının etkileri neticesinde ve coğrafya da kendisini yeniden bir geri çekilme yaşamamak amacıyla giderek batıya yaklaştığı, bölgesel ittifakların yetersiz kalmaya başlamasıyla, büyük güçler ile ittifak arayışında kendini göstermiştir. Ancak sonuç olarak, söylenen ile gerçekleşene arasında, failin yapısal faktörlerin farkında olması

nedeniyle çok büyük bir uyumsuzluğun ortaya çıkmasını engellemiştir. Kısacası söylenen büyük ölçüde gerçekleşen ile uyum içerisindedir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1945) dördüncü bölümde tartışılmaktadır. Bu dönemin temel özellikleri, büyük bir yıkım getiren İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın yaşanmış olmasıdır. Bu dönemde *stratejik amaç* coğrafi olarak yeniden bir geri çekilme yaşamamak ve savaşın yıkımından uzak kalabilmektir. Olası bir savaş durumu, giderek daha inatçı hale gelen ve stratejinin temel unsurlarından araçları besleyen görece zayıflığın daha da kökleşmesine neden olabilecektir. Ancak, fail tarafından belirlenen amacın sağlanmasında var olan araçların yetersiz olduğu gerçeğiyle, bölgesel olan ittifakların büyük güçlerle teşmil edilmesi süreci başlamıştır. Ancak, Türkiye'nin Fransa ve İngiltere ile imzaladığı Üçlü İttifak, Fransa'nın Almanya'dan aldığı ani yenilgi ile bir hayal kırıklığına neden olmuştur. Bunun yanında, Almanya'nın Rusya ile Saldırımsızlık Anlaşması imzalaması Türkiye'nin savaşın getirdiği belirsizlikleri tam olarak algılamadan çok erken bir şekilde ittifak girişiminde bulunarak kendisini yükümlülük altına aldığı noktada eleştirilere neden olmuştur. Bunun üzerine İnönü önderliğindeki karar alıcı kadro, belirsizliğin azalmasını beklemeyi amaçlayan bir denge siyaseti gütmeye başlamışlardır. Bu durum, yıkımdan korunmak ve geçmiş dönemlerin kazanımlarını korumak şeklinde oluşturulan stratejik amacın gerçekleşmesi için belirsizliğin ortadan kalkmasını bekleyen ve zaman kazanmayı amaçlayan bir politika olarak kendini göstermiştir. Savaşın belirsizliği, sürekli değişen dengeler, ülkesini olası bir işgalden korumak için yeterli araçlardan mahrum bir ülkenin, kaçınılmaz olarak aşırı bir ihtiyat ile stratejisini belirlemek, aslında failin bilinçli ve öznel bir tercihi olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır. Bu dönemde, savaşın ilk anlarında ortaya çıkan ittifak siyaseti yerini ihtiyat ve denge siyasetine bırakmıştır. Bu seçimde, görece zayıflık, milliyetçilik ve diğer güçlerin savaşa kendi yanlarında katılmaları için Türkiye'nin coğrafyasına atfettikleri önemin de belirleyiciliği olmuştur. Bu dönemin stratejisi "Türkiye güvenliğini herhangi bir siyasi ve askeri ittifaklara üye olarak sağlamayı düşünemez." şeklinde temsil edilen söylemde kendisini göstermiştir. Söylenen bu şekilde belirlenmiş olmasına rağmen, gerçekleşen esasında aktif tarafsızlık ile söylenenden farklılık göstermiştir. Çünkü, belirsizliği yok etmeye çalışan ihtiyat, yapının zorlamasıyla faili tarafsız kalmaya itmekle aslında Müttefik Devletlerinin

çıkarlarına hizmet eden bir sonuç ortaya çıkarmıştır. Zira, aktif tarafsızlık Almanya'nın başını çektiği eksen ülkelerinden ziyade savaşın Ortadoğu bölgesine yayılmasını engelleyerek Müttefik Devletlerin çıkarlarına daha fazla katkı sağlamıştır. Sonuçta da belirsizliğin azalması ve kazanan tarafın daha belirgin hale gelmesiyle ve yapı zorlayıcı nedenleriyle Müttefik Devletler lehinde savaşa dahil olmuştur. Kısacası, gerçekleşende yapısal nedenlerden dolayı söylenenden farklılık ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu uyumsuzluğun nedenleri arasında temel belirleyici görece zayıflık olmasına rağmen, fail kendi stratejik amacını gerçekleştirmeyi başarmış ve savaşın yıkımında uzak kalmayı başarmıştır. Ancak, uluslararası siyasi sistemde tehditlerin daha belirgin olarak ortaya çıkması ve görece zayıflığın kendisini daha açık bir şekilde kendini göstermesi nedeniyle fail olması yetisinin aşınmaya başladığını görmeye başlamıştır.

Soğuk Savaş yılları (1945-1980) uluslararası siyasi sistemin iki kutuplu yapısının etkilerini ülkeler üzerinde onların fail olma yetilerini kısıtlama noktasında bütün gücüyle gösterdiği bir dönem olarak ele alınmıştır. Türkiye'nin stratejisini belirleyen temel faktör Stalin'in Türkiye'den taleplerini oluşturmuştur. Bu talepler Türkiye'nin üzerinde büyük bir hassasiyet gösterdiği egemenlik haklarının aşındırılmasını ve bir şekilde Sovyetlerin uydusu haline getirecek adımlar olarak algılanmıştır. Yapısal faktörlerden coğrafyanın bir sonucu olarak, Sovyetler Birliği'ne Boğazlardan üs verilmesi ve doğu illerinin Sovyetlere terk edilmesi, yeniden bir geri çekilme anlamına geldiğinden, Türkiye, yapının etkisiyle durumu tam anlamıyla doğru olarak okuma ve stratejisine entegre edilmesi noktasında fail olma yetisini, öznelliğini ve durumsal farkındalığını yitirdiği bir süreç ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu durumda, Türkiye toprak bütünlüğünü korumak amacıyla ister istemez kendisini ittifaklar sistemine dahil olmak zorunda hissetmiştir. Kaldı ki, araçların temel sağlayıcısı olan görece zayıflık kendisini en açık bir şekilde göstermeye devam etmektedir. Bunun sonucunda, toprak bütünlüğünün sağlanması olarak belirlenen *stratejik amacı* gerçekleştirmek için, fail olma yetisini aşındıracak olan Batı ile ittifak yoluna gitmiştir. Bunun sonucunda blok siyasetini takip etmek, Türkiye'nin kendi çıkarlarını ve siyasetini takip etme yetisini büyük oranda ortadan kaldırmıştır. Bu durum kendisini açık olarak Kıbrıs'ta meydana gelen olaylara müdahil olamama ve kendi isteklerinin ABD tarafından göz ardı edilmesiyle

göstermiştir. Kısacası blok siyaseti ve çıkarları ulusal çıkarları ve siyaseti engelleyen bir faktör olmuştur. Ancak, özellikle Johnson mektubu ile durumun farkına açık olarak varan Türkiye stratejisini değiştirme yoluna giderek Batı ittifak sisteminden ayrılma yollarını veya en azından uzaklaşma yollarını aramıştır. Bu döneme damgasını vuran söylem İnönü'nün “Yeni bir dünya kurulur Türkiye orada yerini alır.” sözü şeklinde kendini göstermiştir. Bu söylemde, yeni bir dünya ile Türkiye için seçeneğin sadece Batı'dan ibaret olmadığı, gerek Doğu bloğunun gerekse ve özellikle o dönemde güç kazanan Bağlantısızlar Hareketi'nin de önemli bir seçenek olarak görüldüğü söyleme ithal edilmiştir. “Türkiye orada yerini alır.” ifadesiyle ise, bir yandan Türkiye'nin fail olma yetilerini tamamen yitirmediği, diğer yandan Türkiye'nin, artık uygulanamaz hale geldiği düşünülen dange siyasetini tekrar gündeme alabileceği söyleme dahil edilmiştir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, söylem hegemonyanın ve yapının kısıtlayıcı etkilerini ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik ortaya atılan bir söylemdir. Ancak, *söylenen* bu şekilde üretilmesine ve failin yetilerini tekrar kazanmasını amaçlamasına rağmen, gerçekleşen *söylenenden* farklılık göstermiştir. Yapısal faktörler gerçekleşende çok büyük değişimlerin gerçekleştirilmesine müsaade etmemiştir. Ancak, şunu da belirtmek gerekir ki, fail o dönemde artan fakındalığı ile kendisine daha geniş bir siyasi alan yaratmaya çalışmıştır. Kısacası söylemdeki değişim, stratejide amaçlanan değişimin gözlenmesi ile yapısal nedenlerden dolayı uyumsuzluk göstermiştir.

Yedinci Bölümde tartışılan ve Soğuk Savaş yıllarını içeren dönem 1980-2002 yıllarını kapsar bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Bu seçimdeki temel sebep, Soğuk Savaş 1991 yılında bitmesine rağmen, fail olan Türkiye açısından asıl değişimin 1980 darbesiyle başlaması ve Özal Hükümeti ile birlikte asıl değişimlerin yaşanmaya başlamasıdır. Bu dönemde iç siyasette yaşananların etkisiyle Dünya ile tekrar bir entegrasyona gidilmesi süreci başlamıştır. Özellikle bu dönemde, uluslararası siyasal sistemde iki kutuplu sistemin etkilerinin azalması ve küreselleşme olgusunu kendisini daha açık bir şekilde uluslararası ekonomik yapıda hissettirmesi ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi, fail tarafından bölgesel güç olma yolunda fırsat olarak algılanmış, uluslararası ticaretten alınan payın artırılmaya çalışılması görece zafiyetin etkilerinin azaltılması için bir fırsat olabilceği düşünülmüştür. Özellikle, Sovyetlerin dağılması, Sovyet etkisinin baskın olduğu

bölgelerden bu baskının kalkmasına ve istikrarsızlık ve belirsizlik şeklindeki dinamiklerin serbest kalmasına sebep olmuştur. Türk dış politikası bu dönemde gerek ortaya çıkan istikrarsızlık ve belirsizliklerin Türkiye'ye sirayet etmesini engellemek gerekse bu bölgelerde etkin olarak bölgesel güç olma yolunda adımlar atmaya stratejik bir amaç olarak belirlemiştir. Kısacası, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki Alman tehdidi ya da Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki Sovyet tehdidi ile mukayese edildiğinde, bir yandan bu denli büyük bir tehdit algısı ile karşı karşıya kalınmamış, diğer yandan ortaya çıkan belirsizlik ve istikrarsızlıkların mevcut araçlar ile yok edilebileceği düşünülmüştür. Böyle bir ortamda, bölgesel güç olma yolunda Türkiye sahip olduğu kimliksel, tarihsel ve etnik bağları bir araç olarak algılamış ve amacın gerçekleştirilmesini istemiştir. Bu dönemde, "Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrasında rolü ne olacak?" sorusu ve Batı için önemini yeniden üretmek için "Adriyatik'ten Çin Seddi'ne Türk Dünyası" söylemini stratejinin temsilinden kullanmıştır. Bu söylem her ne kadar, Türkiye menşeli olmamasına rağmen çok kısa sürede kabul görmüş ve sahiplenilmiştir. Söylem içerik olarak gerçekleştirilmek istenen amacı ve araçları ihtiva etmektedir. Türk Dünyası söylemi ile Türkiye etnik bağları ve ortaya çıkan jeopolitik boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamış bu şekilde de bölgesel bir güç haline geleceğini düşünmüştür. Araç olarak ise yine sağlayacağı etki ile Türk varlığının olduğu bölgelerden güç devşirebileceğini ve bu devşirilen gücü stratejinin aracı olarak kullanmayı hesaplamıştır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, var olan araçlar ile değil, etnik bağlar haricinde süreç içerisinde kazanılacak araçlar ile amacı gerçekleştirilmeye çalışmıştır. Söylemin bir diğer özelliği belirli bir coğrafi bölgeye yapılan atıf ve kendisinin üzerinde ikamet etmediği bir coğrafyanın stratejiye ithal edilmesidir. Bu yönüyle mevcut sınırları aşan ve *mekansal geri çekilmenin* yerini alan bir *mekansal ileri açılma* söylemde kendisini arka planda göstermektedir. Bu yönüyle de emperyal dürtüler söyleme ithal edilmiş 2002 sonrasında kendisini tekrar gösterecek olan bir genişleme ihtiyacı, güvenliği sınırların ötesinden sağlama ihtiyacı ve coğrafyanın söyleme dahil edilme ihtiyacı kendisini göstermeye başlamıştır. Ancak *söylenen* bu şekilde olmasına rağmen gerek *araçlar* belirlenen *amacı* gerçekleştirilmeye yeterli kalamamış gerekse Sovyet ardılı Türk Cumhuriyetleri bu konuda yeterince istekli davranmamış ve ayrıca Sovyetlerin dağılmasının Sovyet etkisinin o bölgelerden silinmesi anlamına gelmediği görülmeye başlanmıştır. Sonuçta, *gerçekleşen*

*söylenenden* farklı tezahür etmiş, görelî zayıflığını aşmayan Türkiye *araçlarını* aşan hedefler ve *amaçlar* ile yola çıktığından, fail olma isteği yapısal faktörlerin tam olarak dikkate alınmaması nedeniyle stratejik amacında gerçekleştirilememesini beraberinde getirmiştir.

Tezin Sekizinci Bölümü son dönem Türk Dış Politikasını 2002 yılından günümüze kadar olan süreci kapsayacak şekilde incelemektedir. Bu dönemin temel özelliği stratejinin dünyadaki gelişmelerden ziyade içeride Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin 2002 seçimlerinde iktidara gelmesi, *Stratejik Derinlik* Kitabının yazarı Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun dış politika yapım sürecine doğrudan etkisinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu dönemin dış politikasının yeterince başarılı olamamasında Türkiye'nin kendi potansiyelini bir fail olarak yeterince idrak edememesinden kaynaklandığını iddia ederek, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında doğru amaçlar belirlenemediği için bir dizi ekonomik krizlerle ülkenin karşı karşıya bırakıldığını ve bu nedenle bu dönemi *kayıp on yıl* diyerek reddetmektedir. 2002 yılında itibaren iktidara gelen AKP önceliğini ekonomik kalkınmaya ve kısa vadeli dış politika sorunlarının çözümüne vermiştir. Bu kapsamda bir yandan AB ile üyelik sürecine hız verilmiş ve bu şekilde demokratikleşme adımları atılmış, diğer yandan Kıbrıs Müzakereleri ile sorunun çözümüne yönelik önemli adımlar atılmıştır. Asıl kriz olan Irak'ta ise 1 Mart Tezkeresinin Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde kabul edilmemesi sonucunda ABD ile yeni bir kriz sürecine girilmiştir. Bu dönemin stratejisinin belirlenmesinde daha önceki iktidarları *kayıp on yılın* sorumlusu olarak gören iktidar, Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun kitabından esinlenen yeni bir dış politika doktrini ortaya atmıştır. Bu kapsamda özellikle failin fail olma – ben-idraki – özneliğinin ön plana çıkarıldığı, sahip olduğu potansiyelin doğru okunması ile yeni açılımların yapılabilceği iddiası ortaya atılmıştır. Bunun sonucunda stratejik amaç olarak Türkiye'nin küresel iddiaları olan bölgesel bir güç haline getirilmesi belirlenmiştir. Görelî zayıflığın farkında olan AKP iktidarı gayri safî milli hasılanın (GSMH) hızla artırılmasını, dış ticaretin ve ihracatın genişletilmesini amaçlayan ekonomik politikalar ile araçlarını artırmaya çalışmıştır. Ayrıca, bu dönemde *Osmanlı Bakiyesi* ülkeler ve bölgeler ile ilişkiler geliştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bunun yanında “Komşularla Sıfır Sorun Politikası” ile Türkiye'nin etrafında bir güvenlik çemberi oluşturmanın yanında görelî zayıflığın aşılması için ikili ilişkilerin geliştirilerek



ekonomik ilişkiler için yeni alanlar açılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu politikaya yön veren temel değerlendirme olarak, Türkiye'nin çevresinde yapının sunduğu imkanlarından faydalanma düşüncesi kendini göstermiştir. Bu doğrultuda Davutoğlu, Türkiye'nin coğrafi ve tarihi derinliklerinden faydalanması gerektiği iddia ederek, Osmanlı bakiyesi topraklardaki ülkeler ile iyi ilişkilerin geliştirilemesi ile eksik olan sert güç unsurları yerine yumuşak güç unsurlarını devreye sokabileceğini öngörmüştür. Diğer bir ifadeyle sıfır sorun politikasının sonucunda yumuşak güç süreci içerisinde yumuşak güç unsurlarının devreye girmesi ile stratejik araçlardaki eksikliğini ikame edebileceği bir strateji kurmaya çalışmıştır. Bu dönemde, stratejinin temsilinde “Tarihi sorumluluklarımız var.” söylemi kullanılmıştır. Söylem içerik olarak esas itibarıyla, faili ön planı çıkaran, ona sorumluluk atfeden ve sorumluluğu tarihten aldığı iddia eden bir söylemdir. Bu şekilde, Türkiye kendisini Osmanlı bakiyesi ülkelerin üstünde bir yerde konumlandırmış, onlara karşı sorumluluğu olduğunu kendisine atfederek aynı zamanda büyük güçler ile eşit bir düzleme yerleştirmiştir. Bu söylemi, her ne kadar Davutoğlu kabul etmese de *Neo-Osmanlılık* eleştirilerinin hedefi haline gelmiştir. Bu yönüyle de emperyal bir vizyon içerdiği ifade edilmiştir. Söyleme daha yakından bakıldığında içeriğinin Özal döneminde olduğu şekilde tarihe, coğrafyaya atıf yaptığı ve bu yönüyle mekansal olarak bir ileri açılma vizyonu barındırdığı görülmektedir. Kısacası, coğrafya, Türkiye'nin üzerinde bulunduğu coğrafyaya yönelen doğrudan tehdit algılamasının ortadan kaybolması ile birlikte yeni coğrafyalara ulaşmayı gündeme getirdiği görülmektedir. Bu yönüyle de yapının kısıtları imkanlara devşirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu dönemin stratejisini özetleyen söylem ve onun dayandığı strateji *gerçekleşen* noktasında iki temel sınama ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bunlardan birincisi görece zayıflığı sınavan 2008 Ekonomik Krizi, diğeri ise stratejinin yumuşak güç üzerine kurulu olan araçlarını sınavan Arap Baharı süreci olmuştur. Bunlardan ilkinin Türkiye görece olarak daha az kayıpla atlattığıdır. Ancak Arap Baharı süreci ve sonucunda Suriye Krizi yumuşak güç odaklı araçları ilgisiz kılarak Türkiye'nin stratejisini araçsal olarak eksik bırakmış, yerine *realpolitik* odaklı politikaları tekrar gündeme taşımıştır. Türkiye, sert güç kullanmak istememesi veya bunu yapmaya cesaret edememesi sonucunda stratejisinin *amaçlarını* gerçekleştirilmesinden uzaklaşmaya başlamıştır. Nihayetinde *Söylenen* ile *gerçekleşen* arasındaki fark giderek açılmaya başlamıştır. Bu farkın oluşmasında

yapısal faktörlerin tekrar devreye girerek failin ortaya koyduğu ve uygulamaya çalıştığı stratejiyi ve bu stratejinin araçlarını ilgisiz kılması belirleyici olmuştur.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez Türkiye'nin değişen stratejik söylemlerini fail-yapı diyalektiği çerçevesinde analiz etmektedir. Daha geniş bir zaman dilimi perspektifinden bakıldığında, süreklilikteki değişimi analiz etmeye ve bu değişim ya da sürekliliğin ne gibi faktörlerden kaynaklandığını bu tez eleştirel gerçekçilikten faydalarak açıklama getirmektedir. Süreklilikteki değişim kavramı da bu tezin temelini oluşturan yapı-fail diyalektiğini yansıtmaktadır. Süreklilik kavramı ile yapının değişime direnen, kendisini çeşitli şekillerde yeniden üreten ve faili kısıtlayan özellikleri anlatılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Değişim kavramı ise fail tarafından içinde bulunduğu yapısal faktörleri değiştirmeye, yapıyı farklı şekilde üretmeye ve yapının kısıtlayıcı güçlerini ortadan kaldırmaya çalıştığı bir süreci ifade etmektedir. Türk dış politikasında, daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi, faile daha geniş bir alan kazandıracak bir strateji oluşturmada tereddüt edilmemiştir. Kısacası sürekli olarak bir değişim ve daha fazla güvenlik peşinde koşulmuştur. Ancak, failin içinde bulunduğu yapı oluşturulan özgürleştirici stratejilerin gerçekleştirilmesini bir şekilde engellemeye çalışmıştır.

Bu tezin Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Politikası literatürüne çeşitli katkıları bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi strateji kavramının eleştirel gerçekçilik, bilim felsefesi çerçevesinde incelenmiş olmasıdır. Strateji ve onun temsili olan söylemin yapı-fail diyalektiği çerçevesinde ve ontolojik derinlik kavramından faydalanılarak tartışılması teorik bir katkı olma iddiasındadır. Kısacası tezin ikinci bölümünde ortaya konan teorik çerçeve, strateji kavramının tarihsel ve sosyolojik bir anlayışla analizini mümkün kılan bir çerçevedir. Tezin ikinci önemli katkısı, Türk dış politikasını söylemler yoluyla analiz etmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Her ne kadar, bu tezde ortaya konulan teorik çerçevenin empirik olarak uygulaması olan dönemlerin her birinde çok geniş bir literatür olmasına rağmen, bu dönemlerin stratejilerinin hakim söylemler yoluyla incelenmesi bir katkı niteliğindedir. Ayrıca, stratejinin Cumhuriyet döneminde gösterdiği süreklilikteki değişim konusu da önemli bir katkı olarak görülebilir. Tezin üçüncü büyük katkısı da aslında birinci ve ikinci katkının ortak paydasından ön plana çıkan katkıdır. Türk dış politikası analizine eleştirel gerçekçilik çerçevesinde yaklaşılması, özellikle de Türk dış

politikasında yer alan strateji kavramının eleştirel gerçekçi analizi önemli bir katkı niteliğindedir.

## B. CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

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### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Ph.D.	METU, International Relations, Ankara	2016
MS	METU, International Relations, Ankara	2004
BS	Air Force Academy, Industrial Engineering, Istanbul	1999
High School	Işıklar Military High School, Bursa	1995

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2008-Present	HQ Turkish General Staff, Ankara	Senior Analyst, Acting Head of Branch
1999-2008	Turkish Air Forces	Analyst

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Fluent English,

### PUBLICATIONS

1. Yükselen, Hasan. “Kompleksite Kuramı ve Diyalektik.” In *Tarihsel Materyalizm ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, edited by Faruk Yalvaç (forthcoming).
2. Yükselen, Hasan. “Complexity Theory: Is It Dialectical?” METU IR Conference, 2014.

### HOBBIES

Tennis, LEGO, Philosophy

### C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

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#### YAZARIN

Soyadı : YÜKSELEN

Adı : Hasan

Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

**TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Turkey's Changing Discourses of Strategy: A Critical Realist Analysis**

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