

REVEALING THE FACT: THE INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN THE  
SELF AND TIME

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## ABSTRACT

### REVEALING THE FACT: THE INSEPARABLE RELATION BETWEEN THE SELF AND TIME

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The aim of this thesis is to unfold the inseparable relation between time and the self. The claim I will put forward is that every inquiry concerning the self directly brings us face to face with time itself, and vice versa. This thesis consists of four main parts. In the first part, I shall elaborate Descartes' and Hume's accounts of the self and time. In the second part, I will concentrate on Kant's view of the self and its connection to time. In the third part, first I shall investigate how Bergson identifies "the life of consciousness" with time. In the course of this, I will attempt to demonstrate how the substantial self is disseminated over time. In the final chapter, I will fix my attention on Heidegger's interpretation of *Dasein* as temporality. My aim will consist in grasping the authentic self on the basis of time.

Keywords: Time, self, temporality, transcendence, freedom.

## ÖZ

# GERÇEĞİ İFŞA ETMEK: KENDİLİK İLE ZAMAN ARASINDAKİ AYRILMAZ İLİŞKİ

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Bu tezin amacı zaman ve kendilik arasındaki ayrılmaz ilişkiyi ifşa etmektir. Öne süreceğim iddia kendiliğe dair yapılacak her türlü araştırmanın bizi doğrudan zaman ile karşı karşıya getireceğidir. Bu tez dört ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde, Descartes ve Hume'un kendilik ve zaman anlayışları ele alınacaktır. İkinci bölümde, Kant'ın kendilik ve zaman görüşü üzerine odaklanılacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde, öncelikle Bergson'un "bilincin yaşamı" ile zamanı nasıl özdeşleştirdiği araştırılacaktır. Bunu yaparken, tözsel kendiliğin nasıl kendisini zamana yaydığı göz önüne serilecektir. Son bölümde, odak Heidegger'in *Dasein* kavramını zamansallık olarak yorumlaması olacaktır. Burada asıl amaç, Heideggerci sahil kendiliği zaman temelinde anlamak olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Zaman, kendilik, zamansallık, aşkınlık, özgürlük.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Method and Motivation .....	2
1.2. Structure of the Thesis.....	4
2. THE REAL AND THE ILLUSION: SELF AND TIME.....	7
2.1. The Missing Piece in Descartes' Account of the Self: Time.....	8
2.1.1. The Self: Existence, Continuity and Identity.....	9
2.1.1.1. The Existence of the Self .....	9
2.1.1.1.1. The Methodical Doubt.....	9
2.1.1.1.2. The Proof of the Existence of Self .....	14
2.1.1.2. Continuity and Identity of the Self.....	16
2.1.1.2.1. Time: The Missing Piece.....	16
2.1.1.2.2. The Problematic Meaning of the Term "Substance".....	17
2.1.2. The External World: Existence, Continuity and Identity .....	20
2.1.2.1. The Existence of the External World .....	20
2.1.2.2. Continuity and Identity of the External World .....	21
2.1.3. The Role of Time in the Self's Getting Access to the External World ...	22
2.1.3.1. The Problem of Accessibility.....	22
2.1.3.2. The Solution for Accessibility .....	23
2.1.3.3. Time: The Missing Piece .....	23
2.2. Hume: The Illusion of Self and Time.....	25
2.2.1. Illusion of the Self.....	25

2.2.2. The Reason That Produces the Illusion of Identity.....	28
2.2.2.1. The Operation of the Imagination .....	29
2.2.2.2. The Role of Memory .....	31
2.2.3. The Role of Time in Making Sense of the World.....	33
2.2.3.1. The Idea of Time: Inconsistency or Ingenuity? .....	33
2.2.3.2. Parallelism Established .....	35
2.2.3.3. A Discussion over the Priority of Impressions over Time .....	38
3. KANTIAN REVOLUTION: UNFOLDING THE SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF TIME.....	40
3.1. The Tripartite Structure of Self .....	41
3.1.1. Inner Sense: Self as an Appearance .....	42
3.1.1.1. Time: The Form of Inner Sense .....	42
3.1.1.2. Kant’s Response to Descartes .....	50
3.1.2. Imagination: Empirical Consciousness.....	51
3.1.2.1. Time: Formal Intuition (Time formation).....	55
3.1.2.2. Kant’s Response to Hume .....	58
3.1.3. Apperception: The Transcendental Self .....	60
3.1.3.1. The Unity of Time.....	64
3.2. The Schematism: The Centrality of Time .....	67
3.3. The <i>Noumenal</i> Self, Time and Freedom.....	69
4. BERGSON’S PURE DURATION: THE BREAKDOWN OF “THE UNITY OF SELF” .....	72
4.1. Criticism of Kant: Two Kinds of Multiplicity.....	76
4.1.1. Quantitative Multiplicity: the Multiplicity of Material Objects (Space) .	80
4.1.2. Qualitative Multiplicity: the Multiplicity of Conscious States (Time)....	81
4.2. The Theory of Duration: Real Time .....	84
4.2.1. Time is Qualitative and Heterogeneous in Nature.....	85
4.2.2. Time is Irreversible (Asymmetrical).....	86
4.2.3. Time is Life of Consciousness .....	88
4.2.4. Time is Reality (Dynamism; Mobility; Flux; and even Freedom) .....	89
4.3. The Method of Intuition .....	90
4.4. A Possible Attempt to the Solution of the Mind-Body Dualism.....	93
4.4.1. Images .....	93
4.4.2. Perception and Memory (the Past and the Present) .....	96
4.4.3. Dynamic Monism .....	99



4.5. Self, Duration, Freedom .....	99
5. THE HEIDEGGERIAN AUTHENTIC SELF AND THE HORIZON OF TIME .....	107
5.1. Heidegger’s Encounter with Descartes, Kant and Bergson.....	109
5.1.1 Heidegger’s Encounter with Descartes: The Point of Departure.....	110
5.1.2. Heidegger’s Encounter with Kant: The Shrink Back .....	112
5.1.3. Heidegger’s Encounter with Bergson: “Apotheosis” of “Life” .....	114
5.2. The Elimination of the Traditional Subject-Object Distinction .....	116
5.2.1. Giving up the Traditional “I”: <i>Dasein</i> as the Interrogator .....	116
5.2.2. Being-in-the-World.....	117
5.3. Ordinary (vulgar) Time, World-Time, and Originary Temporality .....	121
5.3.1. Ordinary Time.....	122
5.3.2. The World-Time .....	124
5.3.3. Originary Temporality .....	127
5.4. The Self, Time and Freedom .....	131
5.4.1. The Inauthentic Self: The “They-Self” [ <i>das Man</i> ] .....	132
5.4.2. The Authentic Self .....	134
5.4.3. Freedom and Transcendence .....	137
6. CONCLUSION: REVEALING THE FACT .....	140
REFERENCES.....	148
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY .....	153
B. CURRICULUM VITAE .....	169
C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU .....	170

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECHU	: <i>Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i>
DM	: <i>A Discourse on the Method</i>
MFP	: <i>Meditations on First Philosophy</i>
PWD	: <i>The Philosophical Writings of Descartes</i>
THN	: <i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i>
P	: <i>Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science</i>
Ax/Bx	: <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>
CPrR	: <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i>
CE	: <i>Creative Evolution</i>
CM	: <i>Creative Mind</i>
MM	: <i>Mind and Memory</i>
ME	: <i>Mind-Energy</i>
TFW	: <i>Time and Free Will an Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness</i>
BBP	: <i>Basic Problems of Phenomenology</i>
BT	: <i>Being and Time</i>
KPM	: <i>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</i>
IM	: <i>Introduction to Metaphysics</i>
MFL	: <i>The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic</i>

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

I know not what I appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.

— Isaac Newton, *Memoirs*

I have always been fascinated by the concept of time. For, while time seems to be a familiar “thing”, it is in fact one of the strangest. Not until recently have I realized that the concept of the self – even though it is of my very existence – is no less strange. Whenever I start meditating, even thinking for a very short while, on the themes of time and the self, I, always, feel exactly the same way as Newton did. I am finite and imperfect, while “the great ocean of truth” is almost infinite. For only the tiny portion of it seems to fall within the scope of my knowledge; whereas, the rest seems to lie beyond my reach. This is precisely the sole reason why my answer to the following question would be “yes”. Does the world really need a new study concerning time and the self? Yes, it definitely does. Due to its pervasive nature, time –as well as the self – makes itself felt everywhere not only in the outer world but also in our inner world. These two concepts at issue cover so enormous a domain that within which there must still be yet-unexplored places left, waiting for somebody to explore. Otherwise, we would already be entertaining the true nature of time and the self at this moment. Nevertheless, it is clear that, no matter how unfortunate it may sound, we cannot do it yet. Our inquiry concerning time, the self, and their relation at first brings us to the sea-shore, leaving us face to face with “the great ocean of truth” lying all undiscovered before us. For s/he who is

eager to proceed further with this inquiry, there is no other alternative except sailing in the ocean and, when necessary, diving into the depths of it, hoping to come across some yet-undiscovered places, even if they would be so tiny. In this journey, I do not, even remotely, promise to uncover the whole mystery. If I hopefully will, my whole aim is to be able to present my contribution, even if slightly, to this area of study.

This thesis aims to show that time and the self should no longer be treated in isolation as two distinct concepts; they must rather be studied in their mutual relation perhaps under the same title. The reason why I will set out to establish the truth of the claim that the self and time are in fact inseparably bound up together is this: No matter what your philosophical position is, you see that the self faces a certain set of problems. In attempting to solve this problem set, the self calls time for assistance. That is, in the absence of the linkage of time to the self, the problems can never be resolved. Thus, the theory of the self remains incomplete if it is not thought in relation to time.

### **1.1. Method and Motivation**

The primary aim of this study is neither to reveal the whole mystery concerning time and the self nor to come up necessarily with new definitions of them. Rather, it is to provide a context within which one can approach the two concepts at issue in their mutual relationship. Time (as well as the self) has a slippery nature, i.e. it seems to escape all attempts of definition, precise determination, comprehension and so on. In an attempt to understand time in its relation with the self, the aim is to make it more comprehensible and treatable. The method I will carry out in this study is as follows: If something is not fully comprehensible in isolation, the best strategy is to approach it through the mediation of more comprehensible thing. Likewise, if two things are equally less comprehensible – insofar as they are somehow related –, this time, the best strategy would be to oscillate between them until rendering the both a little more comprehensible. Even a tiny portion of knowledge about the former will expand the knowledge about the latter. Similarly, what we have learned about the latter, in turn, will contribute to expand the knowledge of the former. Then, without doubt, the more this oscillation between two concepts continues, the

more comprehensible they become. This attempt might seem like that the self is subordinated to time and treated as a tool. I should say that I am not sacrificing the self in favor of rendering time more comprehensible. It is true: the self will help us get a significant insight into the time's true nature. Sometimes, it will function as a tool to approach time from a different perspective. So, to a certain extent, I will make use of the notion of the self for achieving another aim. Nevertheless, the same holds true for time as well. As a result of getting closer to the understanding of time, I will turn back to the self and try to understand it better from a different perspective with the help of time. Every single re-treatment of one concept will definitely throw some light upon the other. For the benefit of getting closer to the understanding of each concept, the oscillation between them must carry on. In fact, the method I will carry out consists merely in understanding them in their mutual relationship.

Common sense tells us that time and the self are two distinct concepts. It is true that without trying to proceed further with the issue, one can hardly realize their being inextricably connected with one another. So, in claiming that instead of being treated in isolation as two distinct concepts they must be investigated in their mutual relationship, I might be sounding like going a little too far. Yet, I think that after entering into the details of the issue, we will see that since common sense's scope does not extend far enough; it might sometimes be deceptive. Indeed, the truth, though covered, lies somewhere out there to be uncovered. Given this, there is nothing we can do except zealously inquiring into the issue if we want to uncover the truth.

This study is about the account of the self and that of time; it is also about to what extent they are related to each other. Why have I decided to study the self, time and their relation? There are in fact so many good reasons to investigate these two concepts in detail. To start with, each of us is a human subject that we generally call by the terms like "self", "person", "mind" and so on. To understand anything about, let us say, 1- the world surrounding us, 2- our practices and productions (such as literature, art, politics, economics, philosophy and so on), 3- other selves, and 4- our interaction with them and the world, it would be better to examine the concept of "the self" first, that is, to

examine our very existence. Other than this, the reason why I am interested in the account of the self is that it is rich, as well as deep, and much more complicated than it seems to be at first sight. For example, it has a significant relation to the ideas of identity, causation, meaning, knowledge, being, transcendence, beauty, freedom and so on. That is, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ontology, aesthetics, ethics, and politics – i.e., every branch of philosophy – are connected to the idea of the self. The core idea to be kept in mind is that the concept of the self must be acknowledged to be central in every philosophy insofar as it is the human self who practices philosophy.

And the reason to study the account of time is that in the absence of which the account of the self remains imperfect, making less sense. It seems that time and the self are complementary notions without the one the other always remains not only imperfect but also incomplete. I see such an inseparable relationship between the two notions at issue that time appears to play the essential role in self's getting access to the external world, making sense of it, establishing the intersubjective order, attaining knowledge, accounting for freedom, and also grasping its inner authentic existence. Along with the self, the richness and the deepness of the concept of time makes it the center of the attraction by opening up the door of a wide and a rich realm for those who are eager to enter into the depths of it. Considering that the self – as well as time – is the center of all philosophical enterprise, the question to be asked should not be why to study the relation of these two concepts in question; it must rather be why not to study.

## **1.2. Structure of the Thesis**

Setting the Introduction and the Conclusion aside, this thesis is divided into four main chapters. In the second chapter, a rationalist René Descartes' and an empiricist David Hume's views of the self and time will be investigated. In the third chapter, a transcendental idealist Immanuel Kant's thoughts upon the issue will be searched for. In the fourth chapter, a life or process philosopher Henry L. Bergson's conception of time and the self will come to the fore. And finally, in the fifth chapter, what Martin Heidegger – in philosophy of whom we can encounter the reflections of the life philosophy, phenomenology, and even

existentialism – has said concerning the relation between the self and time will be the chief purpose. I have designed the present thesis in this way since I would like to show that no matter which philosophical doctrine you defend, the outcome will be the same: the self constantly links time to itself in order to solve the specific problem set it encounters.

Chapter 2 deals with the modern conception of the selfhood and time. I will discuss particularly the Cartesian and the Humean conception of the self, on the one hand, and how they are related to time, on the other. Section 2.1., will show that, the Cartesian self is considered as the substantial self. By his famous statement, “*Cogito ergo sum*” (“I think, therefore, I exist”), Descartes claimed to prove the existence of the inner self. Thus, he took the departure of his metaphysics from the inner self. I will show that when this idea of the self is embraced, then, one encounters the problem set such as the problem of “identity”, “continuity”, “accessibility”, and thus “transcendence”. I will argue that in the course of an attempt to solve this problem set, the function of time must be taken into account. That is, I will discuss that if time – which is specifically understood to solve the problem set at issue – is not linked to the self, the Cartesian metaphysical project collapses. In section 2.2., I will show that, on Hume’s account, the substantial self is regarded as an illusion. According to him, the self is a collection of perceptions (the bundle theory). The problem set that “the bundle theory” encounters, consists of “succession” (of sense impressions; their following one another) and “making sense of the world” (attributing meaning to these impressions). Similarly, I will seek the role that time plays in resolving this problem set. I will discuss that without getting assistance from time, the problems remain unsolved.

Chapter 3 concerns with the Kantian understanding of the self and time. If somebody is to be given credit for clearing the way in establishing the idea that time and the self must be treated and understood together and together alone, I think, this person could be no one but Immanuel Kant. By giving time a subjective character, he manifested their inseparable relation. Yet, by splitting the self up into a thinking and acting, Kant faces the set of problems including the problems of “the epistemic access”, “constitution of knowledge”,

“transcendence” and “freedom”. In this chapter, I will analyze the three aspects of the thinking (the phenomenal) self. In each aspect, I will point out a certain form of time by unfolding its role therein. In so doing, I will discuss about the ways in which the first four problems in the set can be accounted for. Later, I will inquire into the acting (the noumenal; moral; practical) self. Here, the focus will be on where time stands in Kant’s account of freedom.

Chapter 4 investigates Bergson’s theory of “duration” which accounts both for the idea of the self (consciousness) and of time. Unlike the others, in Bergson’s theory of “duration” (the true time), rather than the self, time comes to the fore. Only when the nature of time is understood, the meaning of the self can be captured. By philosophically understanding time as “duration”, the emphasis will be on its dynamism, aliveness and creativity. Bergson distinguishes “duration” from time that is spatially understood. This distinction of time thus leads him to draw a difference between an outer and an inner self accordingly. As a result of this view, the self now faces a set of problems such as the problems of “the succession” (of conscious states), “the absolute knowledge”, “the genuineness or authenticity” of the self, and “freedom”. I will discuss that the account of this set can be given only by installing oneself within “duration”, that is, by getting back into true time.

Chapter 5 begins with Heidegger’s encounter with Descartes, Kant and Bergson. In this chapter, I will explore the Heideggerian authentic self that can be grasped on the basis of time alone. In a, more or less, similar way with Bergson, Heidegger understands the self by differentiating two ways of its being: the inauthentic self and the authentic self. I will also attempt to clarify what Heidegger means by interpreting *Dasein* as temporality. By *Dasein* – the term Heidegger coined to refer to the being of the human, i.e., existence – the traditional subject-object dichotomy is eliminated. Yet, by his theory of the self, *Dasein* encounters a certain set of problems such as “the origin of time”, “the authenticity of the self”, “transcendence” and “freedom”. I will discuss that the set of these problems can be accounted for only when the meaning of Heidegger’s interpretation of *Dasein* as temporality is comprehended.



## CHAPTER 2

### THE REAL AND THE ILLUSION: SELF AND TIME

Our general inclination in thinking about the self is to think it as a thing which is taken to be the subject or the agent of all our thinking activities, i.e., inner and outer experiences. That is, the self is accepted to be an entity or a thing, namely, the *substratum* of all our experiences. This traditionally considered self is formulated by John Locke. According to Locke, “the self” is “a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and place ...” (ECHU, 318). More about the self and especially personal identity is explained by Locke in the following passage:

For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. (ECHU, 319)

As is clear, on Locke’s account – which is also what I mean when I say “the self traditionally considered” – the self is considered as a “thinking, intelligent being” that preserves its identity over time. To this self, all the experiences of it must refer at each moments of time. Nevertheless, it seems that the most convincing argument which asserts that the self is “a thinking thing”<sup>1</sup> or a substance is presented by Descartes. Then, it would not be incorrect if we say that as regards the origination of the modern conception of the self, Descartes’s argument is the most influential one in the history of philosophy.

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<sup>1</sup> In contemporary discussions, it is still held that the self is a thinking “thing”. There are scholars who think that way. Garrett, for example, defines “the self” or the person as “self-conscious mental being”. For further discussions, see Garrett, 1998, p. 5.

## 2.1. The Missing Piece in Descartes' Account of the Self: Time

I think, Descartes's metaphysical project – in *the Meditations on First Philosophy* (hereafter, the *Meditations*) – is best summarized by Cottingham in what follows:

[A] dramatic account of the voyage of discovery from universal doubt to certainty of one's own existence, and the subsequent struggle to establish the existence of God, the nature and existence of the external world, and the relation between mind and body. (1993, p. 8)

During this voyage, I will stop at the stations pointed out above – the existence of the self, of God, of the external world and the relation between the mind and the body – by trying to reveal the special role time plays therein. This is why the notion of time is of great importance for this project. Upon the theme of time, there are things that must be told immediately. To begin with, Secada (1990) argues that, according to standard view, “Cartesian temporal atoms have no duration and, hence, are indivisible” (p. 45). That is, Descartes can be said to have clearly committed to temporal atomism. According to this interpretation, he must have believed in the discontinuity of time. Nevertheless, there are some others who just think otherwise. Jean Laporte and Jean-Marie Beyssade argue that Descartes believed in the continuity of time (Secada, 1990, p. 45). Both camps have textual evidences to support their conclusions, and they can be accepted to be true to a certain extent. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that time is a very tricky theme. In this part, without attributing a specific doctrine of time to Descartes, I will agree with Secada (1990) in his claim that: “Descartes had no views on the matter [of time]” (p. 46). It seems that Descartes had not developed a doctrine of time. Yet, by appealing to textual evidences, I will try to understand in what way and to what extent Descartes's notion of time is in relation with his idea of the self.

The part that follows targets three main objectives. The first is to trace comprehensively Descartes' answer to the question what the self is by trying to understand it in terms of existence, continuity and identity. The second is to show what Descartes understands by the external world (matter; body; or extension) and how he proves the existence of it. Here, the continuity and the identity of the matter will be one of my other concern. The last one is to point out the deficiency in his metaphysical project, namely, the deficiency in his explanations of the self, the external world and of the relation between them. In the course of this part, I will

attempt to make up for this deficiency by calling the concept of time to assistance. In so doing, I will highlight the role of time in the self's getting access to the external world. This will provide us with the explanation of the passage from the consciousness of the inner self to the consciousness of the things outside us.

## **2.1.1. The Self: Existence, Continuity and Identity**

### **2.1.1.1. The Existence of the Self**

Descartes, in *A Discourse on the Method* (hereafter, the *Discourse*), – as well as in the *Meditations* – attempts to find a secure path to proceed in the right direction and establish a solid foundation upon which he can, with confidence, build his own system. To accomplish this task, Descartes realizes that he has to establish the first principle(s)<sup>2</sup> of philosophy from which all the other knowledge could proceed with certainty. I must note that if we want to get a significant insight into the first principle of his system, we must enter into the details of his method. It is a requisite to understand the method of a philosopher, in order to get an insight, particularly, into any theme in his system, and generally into his system entirely. Without seeing how, by his method, he arrived at the first principle; and why he assured himself of the truth of it, we cannot understand why it is treated by Descartes as an unshakable foundation upon which the whole system can be build. As Cottingham (1993) puts it, in *the Meditations*, Descartes tries to demonstrate how meditator passes “from the isolated subjective awareness of his own existence to knowledge of other things;” that is, “the movement outwards from self ... to the external world ...” (pp. 70-71). That is right: Cartesian system takes its departure from the inner self (inside). Only then, it can pass to the awareness of the external world (outside).

#### **2.1.1.1.1. The Methodical Doubt**

Although, Descartes, in the *Discourse*, reveals some insights into his method of doubt, indeed, this doubt finds its more comprehensive explanation in his other work: the *Meditations*. In the “Letter of Dedication” of the *Meditations*, he tells us

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<sup>2</sup> Among these principles are the existence and the immateriality of the self (the soul), the existence of God, the existence and the materiality of objects, and the clear and distinct ideas. When I use it in the singular form as in “the first principle”, what I mean always is “the existence of immaterial self (the ‘I’)”. Markie suggests that Descartes’ “general program in epistemology” rests on the idea that “all our knowledge begins with some self-evident beliefs [principles] which are not evidenced by any others but yet provide our justification for all the rest we know” (1992, p. 141).

that he “had cultivated a certain Method for the resolution of difficulties of every kind in the Sciences” (MFP, 36). Descartes had always been after the establishment of a firm and an unshakable basis in the sciences. In the *Meditations* this firm basis which he attempts to establish is particularly that of metaphysics. His main aim is to develop a method in order to demonstrate the truth of metaphysics with certainty; moreover, to remove all the obstacles for possessing the first principle of philosophy. Before the establishment of the secure foundation, Descartes points out the necessity of the destruction of “his system of beliefs in order to rebuild it on an absolutely certain epistemological foundation” (Skirry, 2008, p. 24). As regards his acceptance about any knowledge, he writes:

[I]f I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. ... for owing to the fact that *the destruction of the foundations* [emphasis added] of necessity brings with it *the downfall of the rest of the edifice* [emphasis added], I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my *former opinions* [emphasis added] rested. (MFP, 46)

Tearing down the foundations would inevitably result in the collapse of the whole building. From the passage just quoted, it follows that destruction is a prerequisite for reconstruction. Given this, the destruction of his system of former beliefs as a whole cannot happen except by means of his method of doubt. As indicated in the subtitle to the first Meditation, the first step of the method is simply to bring all the things “within the sphere of doubtful” (MFP, 45). In so doing, the aim is simply to put all knowledge to the test for distinguishing the true knowledge from false ones. That is, he attempts to “eventually discover some truth or truths that are impossible to doubt in order to render these truths absolutely certain” (Skirry, 2008, p. 24). And finally, by using these truths as first steps, he desires to construct a solid structure in metaphysics. This method, as Descartes states in the *Discourse*, consists of four precepts<sup>3</sup>. In fact, what he expresses in the first one is sufficient for our purpose:

The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not *incontrovertibly* know to be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid both *prejudice* and premature conclusions; and to include nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself to my mind so *clearly* and *distinctly*, that I would have no occasion to doubt it. (MFP, 17)

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<sup>3</sup> The first one is explained in the above quotation. The second one consists in splitting up the difficulties into so many parts for making the solution easier. The third one is to start with simpler difficulties and step by step to move on to the more complex ones. And, the final one is to enumerate all further problems without letting anything left outside (DM, 17).

On his account, the two distinguishing properties of the knowledge of true science must be “clarity” and “distinctness”. Descartes, in the “Synopsis” of the *Meditations*, restates the clarity and distinctness thesis by this: “[W]e may be assured that all things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true ...” (MFP, 42); yet, he leaves its demonstration to the fourth Meditation, and deals with it in detail there. Clarity and distinctness are definitely the conditions that will lift the knowledge (or better; a belief) to the region of indubitable and inconvertible knowledge. Concerning his method again, at the beginning of the second Meditation, Descartes makes an analogy between his method and that of Archimedes:

Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes ... to discover one thing only which is *certain and indubitable* [emphasis added]. (MFP, 50)

Once the truth of the first principle is established, it is treated by Descartes as an Archimedean point. Clearly, Descartes’ dream of rebuilding the system of metaphysics consists in starting from his Archimedean point and proceeding further accordingly.

Moreover, Descartes argues, in the *Meditations*, that we cannot trust sense perceptions. He attempts to justify this claim by an example which is known as the “dream argument”. He argues: so many times in the night, even though in fact he was lying undressed in his bed, in his dream he has found himself elsewhere that he was dressed and “seated near fire”. At those moments, he continues, it seems that he has eyes, a head, and hands, that is, what he perceives seems to be real. Nevertheless, he further says: “But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions ...” (MFP, 47). Since sense perceptions<sup>4</sup> might be deceptive, beliefs which are based on them cannot be clear and distinct. Therefore, those beliefs must be treated as doubtful according to his method. Nevertheless, even though the “dream argument” precisely casts doubt on sensory beliefs it cannot do the same thing on beliefs resting on

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<sup>4</sup> In the Part Four of the *Discourse*, Descartes states that “because our senses could also quite often mislead us without our being asleep; ... when stars or other very distant bodies appear to us much smaller than they are ... ” (pp. 33-34), we ought not to count on sense perceptions regardless of whether we are awake or asleep.

mathematical reasoning (Skirry, 2008, p. 27). Descartes is well aware of this, since, later on, we see in the *Meditations* that mathematical beliefs are not taken to be immune from the method of doubt either. Regarding this, Descartes argues that doubt can be raised even about the reliability of mathematics and geometry:

For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five ... Nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But ... how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square ... (MFP, 48)

In this passage, Descartes takes into consideration the possibility that God may be deceiving us all the time we are reasoning mathematically and geometrically. But, not only that. He also carries his doubt concerning mathematical reasoning one step further. To show this, he formulates a new and stronger argument which is known as the “evil genius” argument:

I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some *evil genius* [emphasis added] not less powerful than deceitful, has *employed his whole energies in deceiving me* [emphasis added]; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams ... (MFP, 49)

Evil genius hypothesis reveals that this method brings all beliefs, even those resting upon mathematical reasoning, within the sphere of doubt (Skirry, 2008, p. 27). In the passage just quoted, Descartes extends his distrust towards the reliability of mathematics and geometry further, and employs his method to physics, astronomy, and so on. All sensory beliefs which include beliefs about physical world, astronomy and even about mathematics and geometry must inevitably fall within the scope of the method of doubt. Although it shows the destructive aspect of Descartes’ method, we need to notice that it is not the end of the story. It is merely a prerequisite for starting from the beginning and establishing a secure structure in metaphysics. The merit of Descartes’ methodical doubt is that through this method the mind frees itself from every sort of bias it has possessed so far. It also distances itself from the senses, which can sometimes be deceptive and untrustworthy (MFP, 41). As regards the method of doubt, enough has not been said so far. On his account, this method is so ambitious in the certitude that it even overthrows that of geometry in this regard. In the Introduction to the *Meditations*, Tweyman states: “Descartes writes to Mersenne that he has discovered how to demonstrate metaphysical truths in a way which is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry ...” (1993, p. 5). At first

sight, it is quite difficult to accept the method of metaphysics as being more trustworthy than that of geometry. Tweyman elaborates the distinction between Descartes' method and that of geometry as follows:

[G]eometric-type demonstrations will always be susceptible to doubt until we know that God exists and is not a deceiver ... the *Meditations* reveals that knowledge of indubitable metaphysical principles can be had— in particular knowledge of the self in the *Cogito*, and knowledge of God—*without the need for a divine guarantee* [emphasis added] ... metaphysics is possible only if metaphysical knowledge can be had without the divine guarantee, whereas geometric-type demonstrations can be considered knowledge only after the divine guarantee is obtained. (1993, p. 8)

His method is such that by means of it we can establish the first principle of philosophy as indubitable – even though we accept that there is an evil genius who deceives us. After having established this, the following question naturally arises: What is the thing that makes the way metaphysical truths are demonstrated more evident than the way geometrical ones are? It is established that demonstrations of the first principles of metaphysics do not require the help of “a divine guarantee”. Nevertheless, to show why they are more evident than geometrical demonstrations we need to focus on the distinction between synthesis and analysis. Descartes, in the “Replies to Objections II”, explains what we should understand by synthesis:

Synthesis ... indeed clearly demonstrate its conclusions, and it employs a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, so that if one of the conclusions that follow is denied, it may at once be shown to be contained in what has gone before. Thus the reader, however hostile and obstinate, is compelled to render his assent. Yet this method is not so satisfactory as the other... (MFP, 102)

According to Tweyman, “the geometric-type method” (“demonstration”) is “deductive reasoning” (1993, p. 9). This type of demonstration is concerned with how a conclusion follows from premises. After having provided the explanation of synthesis, Descartes states that “I have used in my *Meditations* only analysis, which is the best and truest method of teaching” (MFP, 102):

Analysis shows the true way by which a thing was methodically discovered and derived, as it were effect from cause, so that, if the reader care to follow it and give sufficient attention to everything, he understands the matter no less perfectly and makes it as much his own as if he had himself discovered it. (MFP, 101)

Analytic demonstrations somehow show that the first principles of metaphysics could not be conclusions from presuppositions in a deductive argument. Rather, they “are designed to guide the mind, so that all prejudice preventing us from grasping a

first principle will be removed, and the first principles themselves can be intuited” (Tweyman, 1993, p. 10). The word “intuited” plays essential role here since, according to Descartes, the principles of metaphysics are not deductions but intuitions.

We will see the value of analysis (and of intuition) when we focus on Descartes’ following claim: in “I think, therefore, I exist”, the proposition “I exist” does not follow from the proposition “I think”. That is, the existence is not a derivation from thought, as in the deductive arguments. It is rather an intuition of the mind.

#### **2.1.1.1.2. The Proof of the Existence of Self**

Even though the discussion concerning the self permeates almost the entire *Discourse* and *Meditations*, Descartes is specifically concerned with the existence of the self in the “Part Four” of the *Discourse* and in the “Second Meditation” of the *Meditation*. In the previous section, by having acted in accordance with the methodical doubt, we had to leave aside all the opinions and beliefs we have had so far. But now, we have found ourselves stuck in a labyrinth which consists of nothing but the collection of doubtful opinions and false beliefs. As indicated earlier, the collection of these uncertain and dubitable beliefs cannot take us anywhere. The question, then, naturally arises: Is there any way out of this labyrinth? We, now, know for certain that in order to establish a secure structure in Metaphysics, what needs to be done is to seek for a first principle which must be clear and distinct. The only way out of the labyrinth is the demonstration of this first principle. The demonstration in question is the most essential point in Descartes’ metaphysical project. Its essentiality lies in that once the certainty of the existence of the “I” (“the self”; “the mind”; or “the soul”)<sup>5</sup> is established, it will function as the foundation of metaphysics – a foundation from which all knowledge proceeds and upon which everything rests. Having shown that sense perceptions might sometimes be deceptive and that people can make mistakes even in reasoning, he derives that any human being is liable to fall into error (DM, 28). This is why he rejects all the beliefs and opinions he has had so far as false. However, Descartes does not give up there; instead, he just keeps proceeding further:

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<sup>5</sup> I will use them interchangeably.



But immediately afterwards I noted that, while I was trying to think of all things being false in this way, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something; and observing this truth: *I am thinking therefore I exist*, was so secure and certain that it could not be shaken by any of the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics, I judged that I could accept it without scruple, as *the first principle of the philosophy* [emphasis added] I was seeking. (DM, 28)

Finally, Descartes states that he has found a principle which is clear and distinct, a principle the truth of which is beyond any reasonable doubt. This principle, he declares, is the proposition: “I am thinking therefore I exist”<sup>6</sup>. He further states that “I am, however, a real thing and really exist; but what thing?” (MFP, 52). To this question Descartes’s response is: “a thing which thinks”. But what is “a thing which thinks?” On Descartes account, “[i]t is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels” (MFP, 54).

But I was persuaded that there was nothing at all in the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something or merely because I thought of something. But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, whoever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something ... *I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or that I mentally conceive it* [emphasis added]. (MFP, 28)

It seems quite certain that even if there is an evil genius who employs all his effort in trying to deceive me, whenever I think, I know for certain that the assertion: “I exist”, is true. Later on, even though he concluded that he had no body, and that there is no space, the same conclusion is still held to be true: the conclusion that “from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed incontrovertibly and certainly that I myself existed ...” (DM, 29). As indicated, my being skeptical about the truth of any other things, including myself, presupposes my existence. It is correct that I might be deceived in all my opinions, and might fall into error in reasoning as well. Yet, as far as I think, there is always one thing that I can know for certain, that is: “I exist”. Descartes’s proof of the existence of the self lies in this line of thought.

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<sup>6</sup> In Latin, the proposition: “I am thinking therefore I exist”, is expressed as “*Cogito Ergo Sum*”. It is also known as “*Cogito* argument”, or just as “*Cogito*”. I must also note that this proposition is not a genuine one in the history of philosophy. In fact, it can be traced back to Augustine. See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book X, ch. 10.

It is of greatest importance (as well as a controversial point) that the first principle of philosophy – “I am thinking therefore I exist” – cannot be reduced to a form of the deductive argument (syllogism). Descartes makes this clear in his reply to the second set of objections to the *Meditations*:

When someone says, 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or exist, he does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, recognizes it *as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind* [emphasis added]. ... [I]f he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premise 'Everything which thinks is, or exists; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing. (PWD, 100)

If the *Cogito* could be reduced to a syllogistic form, the argument would run as follows:

Premise 1-	Everything which thinks exists.
Premise 2-	I think.
Conclusion:	Therefore, I exist.

First, in this syllogistic form, the conclusion “I exist” is supposed to be inferred from the first and second premises. Yet, as indicated, the premise (1) is in fact an inference from the *Cogito*. Further, in this form, existence is taken to be a derivation from thinking. Nevertheless, as Descartes manifestly expresses it in the above passage, it is not possible to think without existing. That is, in the proposition: “I am thinking therefore I exist”, “he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind ...” (McClean, 2006, p. Iv). The essential point is that we should not take the *Cogito* as consisting of two halves; the first one is “I think”, and the second is “I exist”. Instead, we must consider it as one thing (“as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind”) as in “I think therefore I exist”.

## **2.1.1.2. Continuity and Identity of the Self**

### **2.1.1.2.1. Time: The Missing Piece**

One of the most important things that must be noticed in Descartes’ philosophical project is that almost everything that could easily be accounted for in terms of time, somehow, implicitly or explicitly, is attributed to God. I will try to make this point clear to see how important time is in the identity of the self. As regards the continuity and identity issues, Descartes remarks as follows:

For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts, none of which is in any way dependent on the other; and thus *from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now* [emphasis added], unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. (MFP, 69)

Here, it can be seen that, by dividing “the span of life” in parts, he seems to defend the temporal atomism thesis. What is more important is that, he concerns himself with the problem of continuity and identity of the self and also provides a solution to it:

It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention *the nature of time* [emphasis added], that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not yet exist, so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason. (MFP, 69)

This passage is the one that Descartes for the first time takes the nature of time<sup>7</sup> into consideration. He seems well aware of the fact that the proof of the existence of the self does not suffice alone for the demonstration of the continuity of the existence of the self (and of the matter as well) on the one hand, and for that of the preservation of its identity at each moments, on the other. He finds himself obliged to give an account of this. I argue that, without taking time into consideration the account he is after can by no means be given. Nevertheless, he attempts to solve the problem differently, that is, by appealing to God and by re-interpreting the meaning of the terms “creation” and “conservation”. He clearly sees that the existence of the self in the past does not guarantee the existence of it in the present; nor does its present existence guarantee its existence in the future. Yet, by referring to the passage above, I want to argue that time must enter into Descartes’ system in order to establish the continuity and the identity of the self over time. Only then, the self can be established as a *substratum*, i.e., as the bearer of all mental states such as feelings, perceptions, experiences, thoughts and so on.

#### **2.1.1.2.2. The Problematic Meaning of the Term “Substance”**

Skirry (2008) states that according to Descartes there are two different meanings of the term “substance”; one is “the substance as the subject of properties” and the

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<sup>7</sup> However, as already indicated, we should recall that regarding time, Secada (1990) holds that “Descartes had no views on the matter, at least as far as we can ascertain” (p. 46).

other one is “the substance as something that requires nothing else for its existence”<sup>8</sup> (p. 49). From the second definition, it directly follows that the substance is the cause of its own existence. On the contrary, in the “Third Meditation” Descartes asserts that “I myself and everything else” have been created by God (MFP, 66). More important than this is that creation is not sufficient for sustaining the continuity and identity of the existence of everything created. Descartes makes it clear by arguing that my existence in the past does not lead to the conclusion that “I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant ... produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me” (MFP, 69). In short, Descartes’s solution to the problem of the continuity and identity of the self over time is to call the divine preservation<sup>9</sup> or conservation to assistance. He asserts that “I conclude so certainly that God exists, and that my existence depends entirely on Him in every moment of my life” (MFP, 73). I particularly want to shed light on this specific point for the following reason. Some may argue that the self as the substance is something that which requires nothing else for its existence, so that its continuity and identity cannot be established from outside but it could only be done so from within. They can also raise an objection to the claim that a view of time is a requisite for the demonstration of the continuity and the identity of the self over time. They might do so because by definition a substance can be in need of nothing other than itself. Nevertheless, the problematic understanding of the term “substance” makes these possible objections very fragile. I must note that these objections can be held as true insofar as “the existence of the substance” is in question. However, if what is in question is the continuity and identity of it, Descartes appeals to something apart from the (created) substance itself, i.e., to God’s preservation.

Now recall that by his method, he assured himself of the fact that the truths of metaphysics are demonstrated – unlike those of geometry – without the need for the Divine guarantee. To illustrate, he demonstrated the truth of the *Cogito* without the

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<sup>8</sup> This meaning of “substance” is identical with Spinoza’s substance as *causa sui* (“cause of itself” in Latin). Spinoza uses the term to indicate that the substance (God) is the cause of itself; the self-caused. (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 40; 219).

<sup>9</sup> This is known as God’s concurrence. In Principle 52, as Descartes states, “as for corporeal substance and mind (or created thinking substance), these can be understood to fall under this common concept: things that need only the concurrence [the power of continuous creation] of God in order to exist” (as cited in, Dickers, 2013, p. 324). If God withdraws this power, everything goes into non-existence.

need for the Divine guarantee. Nevertheless, when it comes to justify the continuity and identity of the self over time, the existence of the external world and also the interaction of the self (mind) with the body, we see that the Divine guarantee is indispensable. That the demonstrations of these are in need of the Divine guarantee tacitly assumes time. That is, the problem of identity, continuity and the interaction between the self and the external world cannot be well-justified by Descartes. There seems to be something missing in the big picture. That is, there is a gap to be filled. That is why I argue that there is a sort of weakness in Descartes' project. I think without explicitly pointing out the essentiality of time which has been implicitly assumed, this weakness cannot be remedied.

Descartes states that, "I considered that I was nourished, that I walked, that I felt, and that I thought, and I referred all these actions to the soul" (MFP, 52). From this it can be inferred that all my experiences are referred to the soul (the self). It seems that Descartes is taking the self as the bearer of all the states of consciousness. Substance is considered as "the subject in which a property, quality, or attribute must reside in order to exist ..." (Skirry, 2008, p. 51). Furthermore, there must be in Descartes's mind the idea of the self as preserving its identity over time, i.e., an idea of the self as a unity of experiences. Otherwise, his idea of the self would have consisted in particular perceptions, in other words, in discrete state of consciousness which exist in a certain moment. If he considered the self this way, he would not be saying that all my conscious states are referred to the soul. This is for certain that the self for Descartes is the self as a unity (a substance as the bearer of perceptions).

Descartes, somewhere else, puts forward the following claim: "*I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or that I mentally conceive it ...*" (MFP, 28). I have no objection at all to this claim of Descartes. Nevertheless, I think it is nothing more than saying that if I pronounce the assertion "I exist" at time  $t_1$ , I would say "I exist at time  $t_1$ "; if I pronounce it at  $t_2$ , I would say "I exist at  $t_2$ "; similarly, If I do it at  $t_3$ , I would say "I exist at  $t_3$ " and so on. Therefore, all I know is that when I say I think here and now, I know that I exist here and now; that is all. Nothing more can be added. The problem is that Descartes never provides any good explanation that can establish the necessary connection between the "I" at  $t_1$ ,  $t_2$  and  $t_3$ . His solution is to equate the concepts of creation and conservation. The identity of these "I"s (at  $t_1$ ,  $t_2$  and  $t_3$ ) must necessarily be established if the "I" is a unity (a

substance) that holds all the states of consciousness together. Even if we want to acknowledge that the identity of the self is established by God's preservation, it would still be in need of time as a condition, or perhaps as a foundation of the unity and the identity of the self. For Descartes splits up the span of life into discrete moments, he assumes that the divine preservation must be exercised on a temporal basis (i.e., in a unity of time).

## **2.1.2. The External World: Existence, Continuity and Identity**

### **2.1.2.1. The Existence of the External World**

By external world, we should understand “the existing material universe which we take to be the cause of our sensory perceptions ...” (Cottingham, 1993, p. 53). Descartes's struggle for proving the existence of the external world is essential, especially when we consider the epistemology, since it is a struggle against skepticism (as well as solipsism).

In the beginning of the “Fifth Meditation”, before examining the objects that exist outside of us, Descartes, starts inquiring their ideas in the first place. Right after having assured himself of the clarity and the distinctness of these ideas, he moves on to investigating the “active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas” (MFP, 92). That is, he tries to understand the cause of the ideas of corporeal objects. Before coming to the conclusion, he at first focuses on three possible alternatives. The first is that I, myself, is the cause of these ideas. This alternative is eliminated immediately for the reason that I am “a thing that thinks” which is distinct from material objects. Accordingly, he argues that these ideas must therefore be caused by some substance distinct from me. The second alternative is that God might be the cause of these ideas, while the third one is that some other creature (perhaps evil genius) is the source of them. Both alternatives are thrown aside just like the first one:

[S]ince God is no deceiver ... He does not communicate to me these ideas immediately and by Himself, nor yet by the intervention of some creature ... For since He has given me ... a very great inclination to believe ... that *they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects* [emphasis added], I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal objects. Hence we must allow that *corporeal things exist* [emphasis added]. (MFP, 92)

On his account, since these ideas of corporeal objects are clear and distinct, I cannot be the cause of them. Given that God is no deceiver, the conclusion Descartes derives would be that corporeal objects (of the external world) must exist. Moreover, regarding the existence of the body he argues as follows:

But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more expressly [nor more sensibly] than that I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain, which has need of food or drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst, and so on .... (MFP, 93)

#### **2.1.2.2. Continuity and Identity of the External World**

After having established the existence of the external world, Descartes faces one more problem concerning that world. This problem can simply be explained as the problem of identity. As indicated earlier, Descartes tries to account for it by the concurrence of God. To put it simply, for Descartes, the creation of matter (the external world) by God is never enough for it to sustain its existence. For the world to continue its existence – or for the matter to preserve its identity – God must constantly produce them anew; that is to say, God must unendingly conserve them:

[A]ll substances generally – ... all things which cannot exist without being created by God – are in their nature incorruptible, and that they can never cease to exist unless God, in denying to them his concurrence, reduce them to nought ... (MFP, 42)

As in the case of the problem of the identity of the self, Descartes's solution to the problem of the continuity and identity of the matter through time is to call the divine preservation or conservation to assistance. As pointed out earlier, this account assumes time. I will argue, again, that if we want to demonstrate the continuity and identity of the matter, we must take time into account. The arguments for this demonstration will run parallel to those for the demonstration of the continuity and identity of the self. This is why I will not go into details here. To put it briefly, in addition to the existence of the matter, the continuity and identity of it are established by appealing to divine conservation. Just as I discussed above, this account is problematic. It simply veils the role that time plays therein. When we lift the veil, the necessity of time in the account for the continuity and identity of the matter comes to the fore. The answer to the question of whether this particular page existing two minutes ago (the past) is the same one with the page I am looking at

now (the present), can by no means be given without assuming time. That is, the assurance of the identity of the external world lies in the notion of time.

### **2.1.3. The Role of Time in the Self's Getting Access to the External World**

As already demonstrated, the existence of the self and the external world has been proved by Descartes. Moreover, the problem of the continuity and the identity of the self and the external world are also resolved. It is important to note that the self and the external world are considered as two distinct substances. Given this, Descartes is expected to provide a third element which the self and the external world have in common. In Descartes' understanding, this third element is God (the uncreated substance), or specifically it is "divine concurrence". Nevertheless, when we analyze it in detail, we will see that even though divine preservation is indispensable in the relation between the self and the world, for making sense of this act of God, time must enter the picture.

#### **2.1.3.1. The Problem of Accessibility**

Descartes has showed that there are two distinct substances, namely, mind and matter. This leads to the problem of accessibility. This problem results from Descartes' conception of the mind and the body (matter<sup>10</sup>) as two distinct substances. From the title of the "Second Meditation" which is "Of the nature of the human mind; and that it is more easily known than the body", it can be seen that Descartes makes a distinction between the mind and the body in terms of their being known. After having assured himself of the existence of "the self", he arrives at the conclusion that the self must be distinct from the body. He expresses this conclusion in what follows:

I thereby concluded that I was a *substance* whose whole *essence* or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any material thing. Accordingly this 'I', that is to say, the Soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body; and would not stop being everything it is, even if the body were not to exist. (DM, 29)

Elsewhere, he further says, "it is certain that this I [my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it (MFP,

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<sup>10</sup> As far as the body is a mode of the extended substance, the problem of the interaction between the mind and body is no less different from the problem of the mind's interaction with the external world.



91). It is quite obvious that the self and the external world are distinct from each other. Once the departure of Cartesian metaphysics is taken from the inner self, this self encounters a problem of transcending its inner sphere to get access to the outer sphere. Therefore, the self faces a problem of getting access to the external world.

### **2.1.3.2. The Solution for Accessibility**

Even though, Descartes considers the “I” as a thinking *substance* that is distinct from the body (extended substance), there must be a certain relation between them. He does not think of their relation as in the case of the “pilot in his ship”<sup>11</sup>. He rather states that “the mind of man is really distinct from the body, and at the same time that the two are so closely joined together that they form ... a single thing” (MFP, 44). He, in *the Discourse* as well, argues that it is necessary for the soul “to be more closely joined and united with the body in order to ... compose a true man” (p. 48). These two distinct substances not only interact with each other; but, apparently, they must also be very closely united with each other to constitute a man or human.

Moreover, concerning the external world, in order to perceive, know, anticipate, and have expectations; in order to make observations, experiments and have any sort of experience; further, in order to taste, feel and love; in short, in order to live in the full sense of the word, we have to get access to the external world. We have two substances which are claimed to be distinct from each other. Yet, we also know that they must be in perpetual interaction. After what has been said so far, the question of how this is even possible naturally arises. As indicated earlier, this possibility might be established if we can find an element which two substances have in common. This element must be stretched over beneath the mind and the external world so as to assure the continuity and the identity of them; thus, it must serve as the common ground for their interaction.

### **2.1.3.3. Time: The Missing Piece**

As indicated above, when we reflect on the issue well, we shall see that there arises a gap in Descartes’ system, i.e., a gap between two distinct substances. This gap must necessarily be filled. To do this, we should put the missing piece of the puzzle

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<sup>11</sup> “A pilot in his ship” or “a pilot in a vessel”. Descartes makes use of this analogy in the “Part Five” of the *Discourse* and in the Sixth Meditation of the *Meditation*. In fact, the analogy is taken from Aristotle, *De anima*, 2. 1, 413 A 8-9.

in its place since in the absence of time, spanning the gap between the mind and the external world can by no means be possible. In other words, we can account for how the self steps over the inner sphere and reach out the outer one in terms of time alone.

Perhaps, to introduce time into Descartes' system for closing the gap might appear like a vain attempt to solve a pseudo-problem. Some may perhaps object by saying that Descartes has already proved the existence of God; and God is the guarantee of the identity of the self over time. To those who might raise objections by setting forth arguments of those kinds, my response would be this: Let it be so; yet, is not it quite certain that even if God preserves the identity of the self over time, still there must be "time" as a ground upon which the identity of the self is preserved?

In Descartes' metaphysics, God not only created the self but he also preserves its identity at each moment. It appears that, God makes use of time as a kind of horizon or the basis of his activity; otherwise, the preservation cannot be accounted for adequately. To illustrate, by divine preservation, Descartes expects us to understand a continuous interference of God with the world. To be clearer, by divine preservation, God at each moment keeps everything in existence. To get a significant insight into this act of God, i.e., to make a clear sense of it, time is crucial. Let us take a look at the issue from the perspective of divine preservation (the highest perspective) and from the perspective of ourselves and the world (the lower perspective). From the highest perspective, I think, it would not be inappropriate to say that God, as the "Self", acts on the basis of time (or time as by-product is formed as a result of His activity); so, the "Self" and time must be considered as linked even on the highest level. Even if, the linkage between time and God cannot be acknowledged since it may sound as controversial, we must, at least, acknowledge that the Cartesian self requires time as the basis of its continuous existence. Therefore, in the lower level, we can say that the Cartesian self is in a decisive relation with time. Furthermore, the same holds for the continuous existence of the objects of the external world as well. Without putting time in its place the identity of the self cannot be established; neither can the identity of the external world. By serving as a common element of the self and the world, time might provide a ground through which the self can get access to the external world.

When we take into account that time plays an essential role in the establishment of the identity of the self and in its' getting access to the external world, the essential relation between them can no longer be ignored. For in the absence of time, the view of Cartesian self would remain incomplete.

## **2.2. Hume: The Illusion of Self and Time**

As indicated at the very beginning, our general inclination about the self is to consider it as real which is thought of as the agent of all our mental states. That is, the self is accepted to be an entity, namely, the *substratum* of all our experiences. This is also what we understand by the Cartesian/Substantial self. Contrary to this, the idea of the illusion<sup>12</sup> of the self<sup>13</sup> assumes that the existence of the "I", considered as a conscious entity that is identical through time is problematic. In fact, the idea of the illusion of the self tells us that beyond the particular experiences there is nothing we can call the self. On this view, the self is a mere play of our imagination, a deceptive appearance. It is therefore a subjective experience. In other words, there exists no entity at all in the real world that corresponds to this experience. After what has been said with regard to the view of the illusion of the self, it must not be very difficult to see that this view, (which is championed by Scottish philosopher David Hume), and Cartesian/Substantial view are the two rival views of the self.

### **2.2.1. Illusion of the Self**

Actually, the root of the claim that the self is an illusion can be traced back to Buddha. However, Hume revisits this idea of self and reconsiders it comprehensively. Hume's theory of self should also be thought of as "the no-self theory", as far as the self in the traditional sense is considered. In the beginning of the discussion of personal identity in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (hereafter, the *Treatise*), Hume explicitly asserts that we can have no idea of self at all. It is, at first,

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<sup>12</sup> By illusion of the self we should not understand that the self does not exist at all, we should rather notice that it does not exist in the way we think it traditionally does. The primary idea here is that the self is not an independent simple entity existing on its own; on the contrary, it is inseparable from the succession of particular perceptions, i.e. it is reduced to or arises from the succession of perceptions.

<sup>13</sup> The self which is taken to be an illusion is the self that is traditionally considered, say, Lockean and Cartesian/Substantial self. Hume's contention is that there exists no idea of such a self that can be regarded as a thinking entity that is unchanging and permanent.

difficult to understand and accept this claim of Hume, since common sense tells us just the opposite; it clearly tells us that we have an idea of ourselves. Hume opens the section of the *Treatise* which is entitled “Of Personal Identity” with a criticism directed against those who support the view of the substantial self:

There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. (THN, 164)

After rejecting the view that we have an idea of the self, then he asks this question: “[But] from what impression could this idea be deriv’d?” (THN, 164) His response is that we can never give an answer to this question unless we fall into an apparent contradiction (THN, 164). What he thinks is that this idea of the self simply results from confusion or a mistake. In the passage that follows, the explanation of Hume’s denial of the substantial self – the real self which exists beyond the succession of discrete particular perceptions and identical to itself at every moment – can be found:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (THN, 165)

It seems that Hume’s idea is that we can never catch or be aware of any idea of self that is beyond particular perceptions. The only thing we can notice is nothing but particular perceptions. Here it is important to emphasize that for Hume all particular perceptions (impressions<sup>14</sup>), including perceptions concerning the self, are “different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider’d, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence” (THN, 164). It is quite certain that according to Hume, as Morrison expresses, “the sensation is a matter of discrete atomic impressions” (1978, p. 182). This point is essential in Hume’s rejection of the idea of the substantial self. Reasonably, one may argue that there must be a “thing” that holds variety of impressions together. Nevertheless, Hume’s idea of discrete atomic

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<sup>14</sup> Hume says: “ALL the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS”. By impression what he means are “all our sensations, passions and emotions” while by ideas he means “the faint images of these [impressions] in thinking and reasoning ...” (THN, 1).

impressions shows that each single impression can exist on its own without being in need of anything whatsoever. Therefore, they “have no need of anything [such as “the self”] to support their existence” (THN, 164).

What Hume denies is that we have an idea of the self; the self as unchanging and permanent. On Hume’s view, the self or the person must be considered as a train of mental events which are causally connected to one another. Therefore, the self, according to him, is “bundle of different perceptions”:

I may venture to affirm ... that [persons] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement. (THN, 252)

In order to support his argument that we have no idea of the self, Hume provides three basic premises. The first one is that all ideas start with impressions. That is, for every idea we must have a corresponding impression. Hume states that “all our simple ideas proceed, either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions” (THN, 164). This premise is called Hume’s “precedency principle” or thesis<sup>15</sup> because according to which “the idea of X must always be preceded by an impression of X” (Garrett, 1981, p. 342). Hume explicitly says: There must be “one impression, that gives rise to every real idea”. He further says: “But *self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference*” (THN, 251). Considering that Hume is an empiricist, it would not be difficult to understand why he uses this premise.

His second premise is that for any impression to bring about the idea of the self it must preserve its identity over time, or in Hume’s words, this premise is “that impression must continue invariably the same thro’ the whole course of our lives ...” (THN, 251). This premise is highly important for this project since, as it will be showed, it is where the inseparable connection between the self and time comes to the fore.

Finally, his third premise is that we do not have any single impression of the self that is “constant and invariable”. After posing these three premises, he gives an

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<sup>15</sup> For further information about this principle, see THN, 7; 33.

answer to the following question: “[F]rom what impression could this idea [of self] be deriv’d?” (THN, 251)

But there is *no impression constant and invariable*. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently *there is no such idea* [emphasis added]. (THN, 251)

The answer is: “there is no such idea” at all. Hume says: “I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception” (THN, 252). As a result of introspection, what encounters him is not the simple and permanent impression – that corresponds to the idea of self – but the variety of discrete particular perceptions. On Hume’s account, the self is not a particular idea to which these perceptions refer or by means of which they are united. In addition to this, when we recall the three premises he has posited, the conclusion that there is no idea of the self, really, seems to follow. If we might want to re-construct this argument in a syllogistic form, then, the argument would run as follows:

Premise 1- For every idea there must be a correspondent impression. (“Precedency principle”)

Premise 2- For one impression to be the cause of the self it must preserve its identity over time (it must be “constant and invariable”)

Premise 3- We have no impression of the self that is “constant and invariable”.

Conclusion: Therefore, there is no idea of the self.

It might be clear that, for Hume, the only things we can know are discrete atomic perceptions, i.e., impressions which are interrupted (inconstant) and variable. His claim is that, no matter how hard we try, we cannot catch any one uninterrupted and invariable impression correspondent to the simple self or a person, i.e. personal identity. As a matter of fact, Hume’s denial of personal identity explicitly consists in two theses: one is that the impressions are discrete or separate; the other is that for every idea there must be a correspondent impression. Yet, implicitly, this denial also has many things to do with the operation of the imagination, the role of the memory and, with no doubt, the view of time.

### **2.2.2. The Reason That Produces the Illusion of Identity**

According to Hume, it is thus established that “the self traditionally considered” is an illusion. But, why do almost all of us intend to think that such a self really exists? Hume asks this question himself. Why do we “ascribe an identity to these successive

perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possess of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives?" (THN, 253) Actually, this question has two main answers: the first one is that we do so due to the confusion of identity and diversity which proceeds from the operation of imagination; the other is that we do so because of the relations of resemblance and causation which memory gives rise to.

### **2.2.2.1. The Operation of the Imagination**

After the establishment of the conclusion that personal identity arises as a mistake, Hume sets out to question the reason for us to fall into such a mistake or illusion. Apparently, Hume thinks that philosophers fall into error of the idea of personal identity. On his account, the idea of such a self (identical self) results from the confusion of diversity with identity. He takes this confusion as the reason for the illusion of the self. According to Hume, as we will see soon, the operation of imagination upon sense impressions gives rise to the illusion of the self. Instead of clarifying first the reason for the mistake of personal identity, he starts with the analysis of the mistake of the identical object. Hume states that we must first account for the identity, "which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy betwixt it, and the identity of a self or person" (THN, 253):

We have a distinct idea of an object, that *remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time* [emphasis added]; and this idea we call that of *identity* [emphasis added]... We have also a distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this [is an idea] of diversity ... [T]hese two ideas of identity, and [of diversity] perfectly distinct, and even contrary, yet 'tis certain, that ... they are generally confounded with each other. *That action of the imagination*, by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects, are almost the same to the feeling ... The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu'd object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of [diversity]. (THN, 253-254)

Here we can see why Hume thinks that the illusion of the identity of an object is caused by the operation of the imagination. As a result of this operation, we mistake "the succession of related object" (diversity) for "the uninterrupted and invariable object" (identity). The important point here is that the imagination assumes the existence of the unity of time (or perhaps, forms this unity itself) at different moments in which the self is supposed to remain identical. It is evident that Hume's

idea of the illusory self is in need of time. As we will see later, it requires the idea of time because “the invariable and uninterrupted” idea, (even though it is produced as a result of an error) can only be justified by assuming time as a unity.

We should be aware of the fact that the object we consider as identical is in fact the collection of distinct perceptions. To avoid the illusion of personal identity what we need to do is to think of the self over time in the same way we think of other objects. At this point, Hume uses an argument by analogy (between the self and the object) to justify that personal identity results from the same confusion, i.e., the confusion of identity and diversity. Again, what is responsible for the confusion of the identity of the self is nothing but the same “operation of the imagination”:

The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. (THN, 259)

As in the case of objects, we should treat the self as the succession of connected discrete perceptions which are spread out over time. The reason for Hume to render “the self” fictitious, in fact, is that we mistake the idea of the self – that is invariable and uninterrupted– for the idea of closely connected variety of different objects, which are successively arranged. To justify this mistake, Hume argues as follows:

[W]e often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption: and run into the notion of a soul, and *self*, and substance, to disguise the variation. But we may farther observe, that where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine I something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation; and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables. (THN, 254)

In both cases, no matter what we are concerned with – the identity of an object or of the self – the operation of the imagination plays a central role. Therefore, this operation apparently gives rise to the confusion of the identity and diversity which, in the end, leads to the idea of “a soul, and self, and substance” that are illusory or fictitious. Thus, I would like to argue that the operation of imagination cannot be dissociated from “the unity of time”. That is, for the imagination to be able to remove the interruption and disguise the variation it must assume time; it must also relate the variation of perceptions which takes place at different moment. It is for



certain that in the process of falling into an error of self-identity, the imagination must assume time. It is important to understand whether the idea of time is prior to the mistaken idea of the self-identity or its formation is simultaneous with that of self-identity. I am certain that time cannot be formed after the illusion of the self because the production of this illusion is in need of time. No matter which supposition is true, the fact is that the idea of personal identity and time run parallel to each other.

#### **2.2.2.2. The Role of Memory**

Hume asks the question: “[B]y what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produc’d, when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person” (THN, 260). First, he re-considers the three relations of resemblance, causation, and contiguity<sup>16</sup> from which, the connection or association of ideas, and thus, the notion of personal identity proceed (THN, 260). After having said a little about it, Hume sets aside the relation of contiguity, and then moves on to discussing those of resemblance and causation. Yet, he does not enter into details as to the relations at issue without shedding some light on the role of memory. Starting from resemblance, he asks us to imagine the succession of the perceptions in the mind of a person:

[S]uppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions; 'tis evident that nothing cou'd more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its variations. For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not the frequent placing of *these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object* [emphasis added]? In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. (THN, 260-261)

When considered together with the claim that the relation of resemblance is produced by the memory, this passage perfectly explains the role of memory in the production of the illusion of the self-identity. There is in fact a very important point we need to focus on here. In contributing to the production of the illusion of the self-identity, memory must have the elements of time, that is, the ideas of the past, the

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<sup>16</sup> These are the things that hold the different perceptions together. Hume calls them “the principles of union among ideas”. See THN, 60.

present and the future. It must also have the idea of their relation. Otherwise, the identity of the self would not be a concern to us. That is, we would not be aware of the identity of the self. Therefore, the identity of the self and the unity of time seem to be inseparable.

Moreover, in the production of the illusion of the self-identity, more important part is attributed to the relation of causation:

As to causation; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. (THN, 261)

These three relations make the smooth transition from one idea to another possible for the mind. As to the resemblance, this transition happens when “our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it ...” (THN, 11). As regards the contiguity, it occurs when our imagination “run[s] along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects” (THN, 11). And finally, as to the causation, the imagination passes from one to another easily insofar as “the precedency thesis” is accepted, that is, the effect (the idea) is preceded by the cause (the impression) (THN, 7; 33).

As Garret expresses, there is “no real idea of a metaphysically substantial self”; instead it is “an idea of a bundle of perceptions that are related by resemblance and causation” (1981, p. 340), that is, produced by the memory. The value of the memory in the process of the production of the illusion should not be neglected:

As a memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. (THN, 261)

To make his account of the self a little more understandable, Hume makes use of the following analogy of theatre:

The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the {1:535} most distant

notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd. (THN, 253)

This passage is where we can clearly see that Hume's view of the self has apparently nothing to do with the view of the substantial self, i.e., the self which is represented as the bearer of all particular perceptions. In fact, this passage shows us that Hume's view is just the opposite of the substantial self. Although Hume makes an analogy between the mind and a theatre, he asks us to notice the fact that the mind should not be mistaken for a place where the play is performed; instead, it must be acknowledged to be the succession of perceptions (THN, 253). Therefore, Hume rejects the idea of the self as a container in which every perception whatsoever takes place. On his account, the self is not the "I" (soul) to which all particular perceptions must refer. Nor is it "something" that functions as a sustainer of all these perceptions.

### **2.2.3. The Role of Time in Making Sense of the World**

As already demonstrated, that the substantial self is an illusion is established by Hume. Even if he rejects the idea of substantial self, still he does not reject the self as a whole. To do such thing would not make any sense at all. For we are human selves – substantial or not – that interact with the objects alongside us and the world surrounding us all the time. To this extent, it seems that there is no problem. Nevertheless, in the account of "the illusion" of the identity of the self and of the identity of objects, there is an element which plays an essential part too. This element is time itself. In what follows, I will do attempt to show what kind of a role it plays therein.

#### **2.2.3.1. The Idea of Time: Inconsistency or Ingenuity?**

Having started to read Hume's account of time (as well as of space) presumably the first thing that strikes the reader's eye is the inconsistency or contradiction in his line of thought. Recall that Hume's denial of the idea of the self relies on his "precedency principle" – his principle that every idea is derived from or reduced to a correspondent impression. Yet, however strange this may seem, even though he argues that there is no one impression corresponding to the idea of time, he abstains from applying the same reasoning here – the reasoning that he employs in the denial of the idea of the self. He clearly avoids calling the idea of time an illusion, even

though the way we possess this idea is almost the same with the way we have the idea of the self. Instead, after having discussed the matter at length, he acknowledges the possibility of the existence of time. Taking into account what has been said so far, it seems certain that we face a manifest contradiction or inconsistency here. Why does this inconsistency arise? Consider the following two propositions: (1) “The idea of the self is an illusion”; and (2) “time exists”. Are these two propositions really compatible with each other considering “the precedence principle”? Frankly speaking, at first sight, they do not seem so. So, in order to settle the issue, we need to examine Hume’s idea of time and try to understand why this inconsistency seems to arise.

Recall that we have the concept of personal identity<sup>17</sup> as a result of the certain operation of imagination (and memory). By this operation, the succession of perceptions are taken to be in constant causal relation which leads to the illusion of personal identity, in other words, the illusion of the idea of the self. However, there is no single particular perception corresponding to the self. Therefore, there is no idea of an identical self over time. Similarly, we must have the idea of time from the succession of impressions or perceptions. Then, following the same line of thought, we must say that since there is no particular impression of time, as Hume asserts, there can be no idea of time. Therefore, the real (substantial) time must be a mere illusion, in other words, it must be fictitious. It is certain that Hume denies any view of permanent or unchangeable time which is claimed to be prior to impressions and ideas, which is to function as the measure of them all. Yet, the strange thing is that he does not claim, as in the case of the self, that the idea of time is produced as result of an illusion. Unlike the idea of self, Hume proposes that, though it is not a particular, separate, and unchanging impression, time is “the bundle of impressions” that suggests the existence of the idea of time. So far, it seems that there is an incompatibility between the idea of self and of time. This incompatibility may raise the impression that the inseparable connection between the self and time is damaged. It may seem so since the two ideas at issue do not run parallel to each other.

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<sup>17</sup> I must note that Hume does not seem quite satisfied with his claim concerning personal identity. He, in the Appendix to the *Treatise*, states that “upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent” (THN, 633).

### 2.2.3.2. Parallelism Established

Even if the self and time do not run parallel to each other and there really is an inconsistency in Hume's line of thought, it does not in fact damage my thesis entirely, perhaps, only to a certain extent. However, I will argue and also attempt to demonstrate that there is actually no inconsistency at all. My contention is that after fixing our attention on Hume's idea of time and examining it in detail, this quasi-inconsistency will soon disappear.

On the way to accomplish this, first it is important to realize the certainty of the following claim: Hume rejects that "any idea has all the characteristics we are uncritically inclined to attribute to the idea of ourselves, but he does not and could not deny that we have any such idea" (Garrett, 1981, p. 341). According to Garrett, even though it is clear that, for Hume, we do not have any idea of an individual, simple, uninterrupted, and invariable "impression of self or substance", perhaps we still do have "impressions of ourselves" (Garrett, 1981, p. 341). This is the essential claim which can demonstrate that the idea of the self and of time run parallel to each other. By virtue of this claim, Garrett (1981) tries to explain that the way Hume argues with regard to the idea of time cannot be regarded as an inconsistency. He thus attempts to make it clear that Hume does not fall into a real contradiction.

The following paragraph will be quite helpful not only for getting the understanding of how we come to have the idea of time but also for noticing the idea of the self that Hume embraces:

What would such impressions [of ourselves] be? Consider an analogous case: Hume's account of space and time. Because Hume asserts that we have ideas of space and time, yet denies that we have any distinct impressions of space or time, he is accused of violating his own "precedency" principle ... But such an accusation misconstrues Hume's principle, and thereby fails to recognize the way in which his theory of abstract ideas is meant to vindicate it. There is of course no such impression as the impression of space, but many complex impressions are impressions of spatially-arranged simple impressions, and thus have the feature of spatiality. The ideas of such complex impressions would therefore be among those one would be disposed to call up when having an abstract idea of space. Furthermore, the idea of any such impression could be made to serve as the abstract idea itself: since all impressions with spatial relations are members of the class of spatial things, the idea of any such impression may, given the appropriate disposition, serve as the particular idea representing the whole class of resembling things. Similar considerations apply in the case of time. And these considerations are sufficient, for Hume, to explain the existence of the ideas in question. (Garrett, 1981, p. 342)

In this passage, how we get “the particular idea of space” occupies so much space. This should not give rise to the impression that the course of the discussion has just shifted from time to space. There are two specific reasons for me to shed light on the idea of space. In the first place, our mind’s taking notice of the idea of space and of time works in a similar fashion. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of “the particular idea of space” can be used as a model for the explanation of time. In the second, there is another reason for placing considerable emphasis on space, which is more important than the first one:

The idea of time, being deriv’d from the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which comprehends a still greater variety than that of space, and yet is represented in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and quality. (THN, 34-35)

This is to say that while we are explaining the idea of space we are inevitably in need of impressions belonging to “the class of spatial things”, however, in the case of time we are not constrained to any specific type of impressions. This is due to the fact that any kind of impressions will suffice for the derivation of the idea of time, as far as impressions are in a continual succession. Given this, I can argue in the following way: If, for Hume, temporal impressions exhaust all types of impressions, then, spatial impressions fall within the scope of temporal ones.

Now let us speak of the parallelism between the way we get the idea of self and time. It is quite evident for Hume that we have the abstract (or general) idea of time. More importantly, it is evident that this idea exists. The question is: how do we come to have this idea? In parallel with the claim that we have “impressions of ourselves”, here we can infer that we have “impressions of time” (and space). It is certain that we do not have a particular idea of time corresponding to a particular impression; instead, we have an abstract or general idea of time which arises from various impressions which belong to the class of temporal things.

With no dispute, there is no particular impression of the self either. Nevertheless, the absence of these particular impressions cannot prevent us from coming to have the ideas of the self and time. As discussed earlier, there may very well be a certain class of impressions to which our idea of self or of time can possibly correspond. Each member of the class contributes us to have each idea. As regards the strong

relation between time and the self, I can argue in the following way: The source of the idea of the self consists in (the bundle of) individual and discrete impressions; yet, for these impressions to be taken notice by the mind as a collection, the idea of time as an empirical condition must be taken as a prerequisite. Here, we seem to encounter a mutual entailment between time and the self. Without the operation of the mind, we cannot come to have the idea of time in which impressions follow one another in a successive order. On the other hand, the idea of time is indispensable because it appears like “the mental structure” in which the self can take notice of its own self as a collection of impressions.

Time is an empirically formed “structure” which impressions entail to be able to make sense to the mind. As a matter of fact, Hume’s idea of time should better be regarded as a “vision”, an “outlook” or a “frame of mind”.<sup>18</sup>

The idea of time is not deriv’d from a particular impression mix’d up with others, and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises altogether from *the manner, in which impressions appear to the mind*, [emphasis added] without making one of the number. Five notes play’d on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho’ time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by reflection finds in itself. (THN, 36)

I think that this is the most crucial passage in Hume’s idea of time which is thus worthy of particular attention. It has already been established that the idea of time cannot be inferred from a particular impression correspondent to this idea. Rather, it is formed as a result of the combination of the variety of impressions belonging to the class of temporal things – i.e., impressions of any kind, spatial or temporal. It is true that, according to Hume, there is no particular impression from which the idea of time is derived; yet, he states that we can still refer to the variety of impressions which lets us think that we do have this idea (THN, 65). For the sake of clarity, I can briefly express how time is formed in the following way: A never-ending bombardment (the flux) of impressions upon the mind, not surprisingly, produces in the mind a “vision”, an “outlook”, – which can also be described as an “order”; a

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<sup>18</sup> Contemporary physicist N. David Mermin’s thought concerning time (and space) lies very close to that of Hume. According to him, “[s]pace and time and space-time are not properties of the world we live in but concepts we have invented to help us organize classical events” (2009, pp. 8-9). It is important to note that, it is common to contemporary physics to take space and time together as one and call it “space-time”.

“structure”; or, perhaps better, a “frame of mind” – in and through which alone impressions can make their appearances to the mind. Given this, the fact that time has an essential role in making sense of the world, must sound like a reasonable claim. It seems that time serves as to provide a “frame” for yet-meaningless impressions to turn into a meaningful form.

### **2.2.3.3. A Discussion over the Priority of Impressions over Time**

At this point, we encounter a manifest perplexity. If the problem of priority<sup>19</sup> matters, it is for certain that impressions are prior to the idea of time. Nevertheless, when we go a little deeper and take a look at the other side of the coin, we inevitably face a problematic consequence that without the existence of the idea of time no kind of impressions can make themselves apparent (or better, meaningful) to the mind. That is, the world cannot make sense to the mind. They cannot do so since, as Hume says: “The ideas of space and time are ... no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order, in which object exist ...” (THN, 39-40). This is to say that, for impressions to impress and for objects to exist they require time as a frame of mind. Thus, time appears to offer itself to us as if it is a structural/relational unity which precedes every impressions whatsoever. However, I argue that the resolution of this perplexity is in fact an easy one. No one would judge against that impressions are prior to the idea of time. Yet, if I argue that without time as a structural whole, impressions would not make any sense at all – other than producing in the mind a chaos of sensations – no one would raise an objection to this either. Consequently, for attributing any meaning to the bombardment of impressions, the mind requires time as a “vision” or, as Hume says, as “the manner or order in which objects exist”. Likewise, for having this “vision” the mind is desperately in need of the succession of impressions. Therefore, it appears that simultaneously with the affection by impressions, the mind forms a structural unity in which alone those impressions make sense to the mind. Not arguably, the essential and prior elements are impressions; nevertheless, the idea of time is indispensable for the mind to be capable of attributing meaning to those

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<sup>19</sup> It matters since in the next chapter when I discuss Kant’s view of the self and time, we will see that, unlike Hume, for Kant time is prior to any impressions or sense-data; and, he attributes a great value to this priority. For getting even a slight insight into why Kant is doing so, to discuss the priority problem to a certain extent in Hume will most probably prove highly useful.



impressions. The resolution of the perplexity at issue thus lies in the awareness of the two simultaneous processes: the affection of impression and the formation of time. The mind's being in need of time for objects to exist perfectly explains why Hume acknowledges the existence of the idea of time (and of space). I think, the clarification of the role of time and its inseparable relation to the self, unfolds the essentiality of it in making sense of the world.

Therefore, even if, there is no single uninterrupted invariable impression of self, it appears that we are in need of "impressions of ourselves". For these impressions to make sense they must be ordered in time. In other words, in order for getting the impression that I am a self-identical conscious entity, all particular impressions of me must be arranged temporally. In this sense, time must be acknowledged to be central. Notice that even if Hume claims that identity of the self is an illusion, still we are in need of this illusion to understand and interpret the world. Other than this, there is another aspect that shows us the centrality of time. It is clear that, for Hume, the self is sensually impressed. Nevertheless, the crucial point is that these impressions do not make sense to the self unless they are ordered in time. Therefore, in the illusory idea of the self and in making sense of the world, time has a special role to play. Time is inseparably linked to the self.

## CHAPTER 3

### KANTIAN REVOLUTION: UNFOLDING THE SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF TIME

In the previous chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that in Descartes' project, time, as the missing piece, must be serving as a ground for establishing both the identity of the self on the one hand, and the objects of external world, on the other. By being a common ground, it must allow the self to get access to the external world. Given this, its inseparable relation to the self becomes apparent. Nevertheless, for Hume, time is a kind of structure formed by the self, which serves as a frame in which everything must be ordered. In and through this frame alone, appearances can be taken notice by the mind. His claim is simply that time is only an abstract or general idea, which enables the chaos of the multiplicity of distinct perceptions and events to make sense to us. Similarly, on Humean account, as well as Cartesian, time is so closely connected to the notion of the self that, in the absence of time nothing can make sense to us, even our own existence. On Humean view, time seems to have no reality, as far as reality is considered to be consisted of empirical data. If Hume is understood along these lines, his view of time may perhaps be called temporal idealism. However, when we inquire into the Kantian view of time, we will see that, as far as the phenomenal world is acknowledged to be the empirical reality, his view must be called temporal realism.<sup>20</sup> Also, time as the real frame, which serves as the sensible condition of the objective world, can be thought as a unity only on the condition that it is grounded in the self.

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<sup>20</sup> Kant asserts that time is empirically real and transcendently ideal. He calls his position 'Transcendental or Critical philosophy'. Yet, when we concern ourselves with the world as they appear to us, to consider his position as temporal realism would not be inappropriate.

It is true that Kant never wrote a book in which he deals particularly with the problem of the self. Yet, the concept of the self permeates the entire *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter, the first *Critique*). There are some important points that Kant concerns himself with in the first *Critique* without which we can never get any insight into his theory of the self. To illustrate, Kant attempts to give accounts of the limit, the scope and the source of knowledge. In so doing, what he aims to achieve is to clarify to what extent, in accordance with what, or in other terms, how “I” or the self can possess knowledge. Looking for an answer to this question, he puts the emphasis on “the conditions of the possibility of experience”. In the first *Critique*, we will encounter two kinds of conditions: time and space as the sensible conditions; and the categories (pure concepts) of understanding as the intellectual ones. I will try to demonstrate that when these two kinds of conditions of the possibility of experience are considered closely and examined attentively, they can provide with us a clue to understand Kant’s view of the self.

### **3.1. The Tripartite Structure of Self**

No doubt, Kant was quite familiar with the empiricists’ and rationalists’ conceptions of the self. In the first *Critique*, he both criticizes his predecessors’ accounts and attempts to solve the problems he attributed to them. This makes Kant’s notion of the self considerably more complicated. In fact, its being complicated depends highly upon the fact that it has three layers. In trying to give an account of Kant’s theory of the self, however, commentators usually limit their investigation only to two notions, i.e., inner sense and apperception.<sup>21</sup> Unlike them, in attempting to reveal Kant’s notion of the self, I will investigate three elements, all of which together constitute the self. In the first *Critique*, Kant concentrates on three elements which are essential to this chapter, namely, inner sense, imagination and apperception. He states that they must “account for the possibility of *pure* synthetic judgments”. (A155/ B194) My strategy, thus, consists in trying to capture Kant’s account of the self by pursuing these three elements which are taken to be responsible for the objective knowledge. In the course of this pursuit, my main aim, in the first place, is to show the form we encounter the self in each aspect and moreover, (which is equally important) to understand the essential role time plays

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<sup>21</sup> See Allison, 1983, pp. 237-72; Serck-Hanssen, 2009, pp. 139-57; and Melnick, 2009, pp.111-30.

therein. Thus, this chapter will revolve around these three elements in order to reveal the three aspects of the self in their relation to time. In so doing, I will hopefully try to get a significant insight into Kant's view of the self. Let us start with inner sense as the first aspect of self.

### **3.1.1. Inner Sense: Self as an Appearance**

The general picture Kant draws in the first *Critique* makes one of the very important points clear: reality *as it is* is timeless, while reality *as it appears* is temporal. He makes a notorious distinction between the intelligible world (noumenon) and the sensible world (phenomenon)<sup>22</sup>. On his account, the human subject is capable of knowing the world owing to the contribution of his/her cognitive faculties. The independent reality, which goes beyond the scope of the subject's cognitive faculties, is simply unknown to the subject. As stated earlier, we are presented with two kinds of faculties: sensibility and its forms as space and time; and understanding and its forms as pure concepts (categories). As a sensible condition of the possibility of (the objects of) experience, time cannot bring the reality *as it is in itself* within its scope. Reality therefore can be attributed to time so long as appearances are concerned. Likewise, it will be nothing other than ideal if we concern ourselves with reality *as it is*.<sup>23</sup> Let us now see what Kant understands by time.

#### **3.1.1.1. Time: The Form of Inner Sense**

Kant treats time comprehensively in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first *Critique*, by regarding it as the "form of inner sense". At the very beginning, the association of time and inner sense must be quite clear. Nevertheless, we should investigate the way Kant treats time in this part in order to unfold its relation to inner self. There are some very important points Kant stresses as regards time in the "Transcendental Aesthetic".

To begin with, time is neither derived from experience, so it is not an empirical concept (B46); nor is it a general or pure concept (categories). Rather, it is, "a pure form of sensible intuition" (B47). Furthermore, it is given *a priori*, that is, time by

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<sup>22</sup> We should understand by *noumenon* the thing *as it is in itself*, whereas by *phenomenon* we should understand the thing *as it appears* to the human subject.

<sup>23</sup> This full paragraph finds its all meaning in Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy. For further information, see Bvxi.

being prior to all empirical intuitions underlies them all (A31). It has only one dimension – it is successive – (B47) and also it must be “given as unlimited” (B48).

Let us begin with the first one. On Kant’s account, time simply cannot be abstracted from the relations of objects of experience. If we recall Leibniz’s relational view of time, we see that Kant breaks with this view. According to this view, time is relational or relative; it is nothing other than the order among things or events.<sup>24</sup> This view also suggests that in the absence of the succession of events or things, time would never arise. Therefore, it follows from this that time cannot be prior to the appearances. Contrary to this, as indicated just above, Kant proposes that time must be *a priori*, thus, it cannot be derived from experience. Kant had always been after universality, necessity and objectivity. Something derived from experience can never provide these characteristics. Yet, common experience, he says, teaches us that time carries these features within itself. Time will be treated as the universal frame of reference (“the substrate of all change”<sup>25</sup>). If so, it could not have been derived from experience; besides, it cannot even involve any slightest empirical element whatsoever. This is basically why Kant rules out the possibility of the truth or validity of the relational view. In order for objective knowledge to arise, the first requirement is that time is an *a priori* condition, involving no admixture of empirical elements.

That time is “a pure form of sensible intuition” and its being “given as unlimited” seem to indicate the very same claim of Kant, which is that time is “a pure intuition”. In trying to make sense of this phrase people may get perplexed due to its being complicated. Taking this into account, I find it necessary to make this point clearer. As regards this, the following paragraph of the first *Critique* might prove helpful:

Now every concept must be thought as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains these *under* itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite number of representations *within* itself. It is in this latter way, however, that space [and time] is thought ... (B40)

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<sup>24</sup> Brentano, 1988, p. 113; Rundle, 2009, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> In the first “Analogy of Experience” of the first *Critique*, Kant concludes that time must be like ‘permanent referential point’ in which everything must be ordered (B225). To this point I will turn later.

By putting the emphasis upon the terms *under* and *within*, Kant points to the distinction between concept and intuition. There may be infinitely many individual representations having the common character, which make them to be put *under* the same title: a concept. Nevertheless, this procedure does not work for time, which is a “pure intuition”. To clarify the distinction at issue, Paton characterizes a concept as a general representation while characterizing an intuition as a singular representation (1936a, p. 94). A singular representation, which is given unlimited, cannot be a generalization from distinct representations of time, which are supposed to have something in common. On the contrary, every representation of time is “possible only through limitations of one single time that underlies it” (B48). All representations of time, as being limitations from the single original time, already belong to it; they are already contained *within* it. This is, they are not distinct representations (having a common character) which come together to generate a concept of time. However, in the case of time, its parts can be “represented only through limitation, the whole representation cannot be given through concepts, since they contain only partial representations ...”, therefore, all parts of time “must themselves rest on immediate intuition” (B48). As an unlimited, singular, whole representation, time is “a pure intuition”; and there is only one single time *within* which all its representations are contained.

Time’s being “pure intuition” signifies its being no concept whatsoever and its being *a priori*. More importantly, it also signifies its being one single (temporal) matrix in which every appearance must stand successively, namely, one after another. Besides these, there is another essential characteristic attributed to time by Kant, which is of great importance in regard to its relation to inner sense. This essential characteristic of time is its being “the form of appearances”. Technically speaking, if we analyze an appearance into its pieces, we find that it is made of two different elements: one is its matter and the other is its form. Sense impressions (empirical intuitions) provide matter for an appearance. Yet, the matter provided has to be ordered in a certain way. This certain way in and through which the matter of appearance is to be ordered is “the form of the appearance”. In its relation with the first aspect of time, this point will be clearer.

Since Kant's notion of the self is strongly associated with consciousness, it is necessary to bring out some important points about consciousness. According to Leibniz, "we must be conscious of many perceptions that we cannot report" (Kitcher, 1999, p. 347). His claim is that one must hear all the tiny noises of waves which constitute the noise of the ocean (Kitcher, 1999, p. 347).

To hear this noise as we do, we must hear the parts that make up this whole, that is, the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all the others, and would not be noticed if the wave which made it were by itself ... We must have some perception of each of these noises, however faint they may be; otherwise there would be no perception of a hundred thousand waves, since a hundred thousand nothings cannot make something. (Leibniz, 1982 [1765], p. 54)

On being "obscurely conscious" of something Kant agrees with Leibniz. In the following passage this fact is clear:

[W]e are not conscious that the Milky Way, when we observe it just by sight, consists of clear small stars, but through the telescope we see that. Now we conclude that since we have seen the whole Milky Way, then we must also have seen all the individual stars. For were that not the case, then we would have seen nothing.<sup>26</sup>

For Kant also, then, we are somehow, though not explicitly, conscious of something we cannot report or recall (Kitcher, 1999, p. 382). Consciousness does not seem to be a very clear concept determined by exact boundaries. Instead, it appears that there might be some activities and characteristics of which we can be obscurely or "implicitly conscious".

Having pointed out the obscure or implicit consciousness, we can now move on to the first aspect of self, namely inner sense. According to Kant, by means of inner sense, "the mind intuits itself or its inner state" (A22). That is, inner sense, as a receptive ability, is "a consciousness of what we undergo insofar as we are affected by the play of our own thoughts" (Allison, 1983, p. 260). This theory, therefore, involves self-affection. Kant's theory of inner sense particularly aims to demonstrate that the self cannot be known *as it is in itself* (as a *noumenal* self); on the contrary, it can be known only *as an appearance*. That is, we can only know our very self through self-affection, that is, as we appear to ourselves (Allison, 1983, p.

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<sup>26</sup> Immanuel, Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften, AkademieAusgabe*. 29 vols. Ed. Koniglichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin and Leibzig: Walter de Gruyter and predecessors, 1902, p. 879.

255). In fact, to know something as an appearance, we need to know it as an object; yet, without taking time into account we cannot know ourselves even as an appearance. By inner sense we cannot have the “intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is ... a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible ...” (A23). It appears that, whatever belongs to inner sense must necessarily stand in temporal relations. Otherwise, we cannot even represent our very self *as an appearance*. “Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state” (A33).

Inner sense can also be characterized as the bearer of all inner and outer experiences. The meaning of this proposition, presumably, becomes clear after the elaboration of inner and outer experiences. These two kinds of experience (sense) constitute our experiences as a whole. To illustrate, we can experience either objects or states of mind. If our experience consists of the objects outside us, namely spatial objects, then it is called outer sense. That is, “[b]y outer sense (which includes sight, hearing, etc.) we are aware of objects in space” (Paton, 1936a, p. 99). If our experience consists of states of mind such as inclinations, memories, expectations, and so on, then, it is called inner sense. Thus, “[b]y inner sense we are aware of our own states of mind in time” (Paton, 1936a, p. 99). It is worth noting that inner experiences can only be temporal but not spatial. Nevertheless, outer experiences must be both temporal and spatial, i.e., in addition to being spatially intuited, outer experiences must also be, though indirectly, temporally intuited. In this sense, objects of outer sense fall within the scope of inner sense. In other words, inner sense, though indirectly, encompasses the representations provided by outer sense. This is to say that, the second-order outer experiences are, therefore, inner experiences. What I mean by this is elaborated by Allison as follows:

[W]hat we outwardly intuit are appearances with spatial forms and properties, while what we inwardly intuit is the appearance of this very appearances, along with mental states such as feelings, in consciousness. This appearing is temporal process with the temporal properties already noted. (1983, p. 258)

This passage demonstrates that the object of inner sense is the appearance (appearing) of the spatial appearances. Accordingly, inner sense indirectly involves and includes the representations of outer sense. But still, how this could be possible requires a further clarification. The point of this clarification is precisely where time



must appear on the scene. On Kant's view, from the very beginning, time has always seemed to be inextricably bound up with the self. With respect to inner sense, for example, time is claimed to be the form of inner sense, "that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state". To put it another way, without exception, every single object of inner sense (and mediately that of outer sense) must be temporally ordered, i.e., they must be in time relations. This point is put forward by Kant in what follows:

Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space ... serves as the *a priori* condition only of outer appearances. But since all representations ... belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an *a priori* condition of all appearance whatsoever. It is the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer appearances. ... [All] appearances whatsoever, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily in time-relations. (A34/B51)

As "the form of inner sense", therefore, time, which is at the same time an "*a priori* condition of all appearance whatsoever", is responsible for every sense impression to be temporally "ordered, connected and brought into relation" (A99). This, in the end, leads to our initial proposition that inner sense, through time, is the bearer of all appearances whatsoever.

As regards the relation between inner sense – the first aspect of time – and time there is something I must say. Let us take this proposition: if "all appearances that are spatial must also be temporal, there is the additional crucial thesis that only some appearances are spatial but *all appearances are in time*" (Sherover, 1971, p. 51). That is, "[w]e can represent all spatial appearances in time; however, we cannot represent our mental states in space" (Çifteci, 2011, p. 37). To put it differently, all outer appearances can be put in time; nevertheless, my "self" and my mental states cannot be put in space. The process seems to work from the outer to inner; not the other way around.

It is important to note that in the first *Critique* Kant discusses the threefold synthesis which is (1) "the synthesis of apprehension in intuition", (2) "the synthesis of reproduction in imagination" and (3) "the synthesis of recognition in a concept" (A99-103). This threefold synthesis is crucial in elaborating Kant's tripartite structure of self. In the first synthesis the ability (of inner sense) is called

apprehension (synopsis). Notice that, unlike reproduction (synthesis) and recognition (unity), Kant does not ascribe activity to apprehension. He rather considers the first aspect of self-consciousness as the receptive ability (passivity). And this is the reason why he, in the *Anthropology*, describes it as “a consciousness of what we undergo”, instead of describing it as “a consciousness of what we are doing” (p. 161).

It seems that, insofar as we are within the scope of the theory of inner sense, we should consider the self as an appearance. Nevertheless, the self which is presented to us by inner sense cannot be considered as an appearance in the same way with outer objects. There is a small but extremely important technical difference that can easily be overlooked. This difference makes the issue very complicated. The entire complexity and obscurity lie in the view that inner sense has, unfortunately, no manifold (multiplicity of sensible data) of its own. (Allison, 1983, p. 259). That is, the contents of inner sense are presented not by itself but through outer sense. To clarify, contents of outer sense (“objects outside us”) are considered as appearances (including our body). Unlike this, there is no multiplicity (sensible data) of inner sense that can be considered as the appearance of the self (the soul) (Allison, 1983, p. 259). Therefore, the self cannot be regarded as an appearance in precisely the same way with the multiplicity of outer sense, such as an object outside us. Nevertheless, in inner sense, through time – the *a priori* condition of all appearances – the self (the mind) intuits itself “as it is affected by itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is” ( B69). Given this, it seems reasonable to regard the self, to some degree, as an appearance. Therefore, I know myself as I know an appearance. Yet, I cannot know myself as the subject; it is simply beyond the power of inner sense. Kant has seen this difficulty in attempting to explain inner sense and its form (time). He then considered it as a paradox since I can never know even my very self directly but only indirectly. That is, the self encounters itself not *as it is*, but, as it is temporally formed. As regards this, Kant remarks as follows:

[Inner sense] represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected ... we should then have to be in a passive relation ... to ourselves. (B153)

The paradox is that to know ourselves by means of inner sense we must relate to ourselves passively. How is it possible that the self is affected by or relates to itself passively? In order to make sense of this, we need to notice that there are three aspects of the self; each has a certain role to play. When we start discussing the other two, namely, transcendental power of imagination and apperception, this point will be clear. For now, we must realize that in addition to the “I” that senses or intuits itself, there is also the “I” that thinks (B55). This gives rise to the following problem: The self in the process of knowing itself must necessarily be divided into an active and a passive self. When the self performs an act upon its inner states, it puts the multiplicity of these states before itself as an object. This is why the self knows itself as inwardly affected. To put it differently, the multiplicity – in Kant’s term, a “manifold” – of sense impressions must stand in temporal relations. The active self determines (synthesizes or unifies) this multiplicity of inner states which are organized in time. In so doing, it is affected by its own activity and intuits itself as inwardly affected.

As Kant states in “the synthesis of apprehension in intuition”, all our representations are brought into relation in time which is “the form of inner sense” (A99). Inner sense is “what mind suffers (its states)” (Paton, 1936a, p. 399). I can be affected by my mental states only on the condition that they are ordered in temporal relations. Therefore, in the first aspect of the self, time has a certain role to play which is to provide the relations in and through which inner states are ordered and the self knows itself as being affected, and thus as inner sense. Therefore, in this first aspect of the self, we encounter the self as an inner sense (appearance), and accordingly, we encounter time as the form of inner sense, providing the relations in which the mental states are ordered and apprehended by the self. To put it in Kantian terms, as far as inner sense is concerned “we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by *ourselves*; in other words, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself” (B156).

Here, one must notice that unless sense-data are ordered temporally, they cannot be taken notice by the mind, which is equivalent to saying that they would perhaps be nothing for us. In the end, all this brings us to the conclusion that, in the absence of

time, since I can get no access to the experiential world, I cannot make any sense of this world. Neither can I have knowledge of my inner self as an appearance.

### 3.1.1.2. Kant's Response to Descartes

By his theory of inner sense in the "Transcendental Aesthetics", it is not difficult to realize the disagreement between Kant and Descartes concerning the theory of the self. To bring this disagreement to light, we must recall that for Descartes, there is only one indubitably certain proposition: that "I am". This "I" is accepted to be a substance, i.e., as the self *as it is*; as a real entity. Descartes has started with mental (inner) state(s) and finally by introspection he arrived at the conclusion that "'I exist". The essential point for Kant here is that Descartes has established the reality of the self (to use Kantian terms: the *noumenal* self; the self *in itself*) as a result of inquiring into the inner states. On Kant's account, the inner states alone can never provide us with such knowledge of the self.

In fact, in the "Refutation of Idealism" section, Kant directly responds to Descartes concerning his theory of the self. In the same section, Descartes's position which can be summarized with the statement: the "self (mind) is known more immediately than the body" is called problematic idealism by Kant (B274). He manifestly attacks on this position of Descartes by switching from the priority of time and inner existence to the equiprimordiality of time and space, i.e., being simultaneously conscious of the inner and outer existence<sup>27</sup>. In Kant's understanding, the awareness of the inner self which is determined in time must necessarily presuppose something which is *permanent*. This *permanent*, because it is the referential point according to which the determination of the inner self in time can be achieved, cannot find a place in the self. From this line of thought, Kant concludes that the *permanent* must be outside the self. Thus, it must serve as the warrant of the determination of the

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<sup>27</sup> That Descartes attributes a certain priority to inner existence (and by extension to time) over outer existence is clear. He simply establishes the existence of the inner self, and then proceeds further to the external existence. However, what Kant really thinks of the issue seems to be controversial. For instance, in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" time seems to have a certain priority over space. Nevertheless, in the "Refutation of Idealism" he states that there is no priority of time over space; but, instead there is simultaneous relation between the consciousness of the existence of my inner self and the consciousness of the existence of the outer objects (external world) (B276). Later on, Kant also claims that "inner experience [in time] is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer experience" (B277). Nevertheless, in the "Transcendental Schematism", without arguing in favor of time or space over the other, he restores the centrality to time again.

inner self in time (B276). Having shown the necessary existence of the *permanent* outside the inner self, Kant argues in favor of the simultaneous relation of the consciousness of the existence of the inner self with the consciousness of the existence of the outer objects. He writes: “the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me” (B276). Descartes claimed that he has proven the existence of the real self, and has taken the departure from the consciousness of the inner self that is the only indubitable principle. He later on, grounded the existence of the external world in this first indubitable principle. Unlike him, Kant has attempted to show that the awareness of the inner self simultaneously presupposes the awareness of the external world. The awareness of the existence of the inner self does not provide the knowledge of the self *as it is*.

Also recall that according to Kant, all objects of inner sense must stand in time, that is, they must be put into “a single temporal matrix”<sup>28</sup>. What is even more important is that all objects of outer sense may also be converted into a proper (inner) form which therefore can also be located in “a single temporal matrix”. After reminding us that outer and inner awareness are analogous one another, Cummins argues as follows:

[On Kant’s account], [b]y outer (perceptual) intuition one is aware of various spatial objects, but perceptual experience does not establish more than the phenomenal reality of those objects. Similarly, by inner intuition one is conscious of a sequence of mental states; but on the basis of those experiences one is not entitled to affirm the transcendental reality of such states. (1968, p. 287)

Therefore, inner and outer awareness alone do not give us the transcendental reality of objects and of the self. By introspection or meditation, “[o]ne does not apprehend one’s mental states as they are in themselves” (Cummins, 1968, p. 288).

### **3.1.2. Imagination: Empirical Consciousness**

In order to reveal the second aspect of the self, I will now deal with the transcendental power of imagination. Taking into account what this project aims to achieve, namely to establish the strong relation between the essential role of time and the self, the power of imagination plays a key role.

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<sup>28</sup> I borrowed this phrase from Phillips Cummins. See Cummins, 1968, p. 286.

Kant in the first *Critique* sets out to resolve an essential problem. The problem is formulated and attempted to be resolved in the “Transcendental Deduction”. It can be formulated as the problem of the demonstration of the way in which the categories of the understanding can be related to the objects of the senses in an *a priori* fashion (A85/B117). The problem to be resolved is, therefore, how the categories of the understanding can be applied to the objects of senses.<sup>29</sup> After having reflected carefully, one can notice that, there is, in fact, no real distinction between asking this question and asking how the self knows its object; how the self can determine the objects of experience; or perhaps, how the self can get (epistemic) access to the objects of experience. Just as in the case of Descartes, asking this question refers us back to the problem of accessibility once again. From one perspective, it can be said that there are three important elements in the Kantian world. These are: 1- unifying power (self; categories), 2- contents (multiplicity of sense-impressions; objects) and 3- structure (space and time). In struggling to give a satisfactory account for the problem just formulated, Kant at the same time suggests that for this to happen, the multiplicity of sense impressions must be incorporated into a whole, or oneness. That is, the plurality has to be organized into a unity. How can this plurality be brought together in one consciousness as unity? It is a real challenging issue for Kant. The account of this unity will be given while we are searching for how the self can get an epistemic access to the objects by receiving a constant assistance from time.

Kant highlights the role of “imagination”<sup>30</sup> in explaining how the self can possess the objective knowledge; that is, how the self can get access to its objects. Particularly, in the triune synthesis it is shown to us that the power of imagination is of great importance. In the synthesis of reproduction, Kant puts the emphasis on the imagination. Even if I inquire into each aspect in isolation, it should be kept in mind that they cannot be separated in reality; and their union alone can give us the self. As

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<sup>29</sup> Kant states: “But all thought must, directly or indirectly ... relate ultimately to intuitions ... to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us” (A19).

<sup>30</sup> It is worth noting that there are two editions of the first *Critique*, namely, “A” (the first) and “B” (the second) editions. In the “A” edition Deduction, the crucial role is attributed to the imagination, whereas, in the “B” edition, its role is oversimplified, by subordinating it to the understanding (apperception). Be that as it may, when the “Schematism” chapter is taken into account, the role of imagination can never be underestimated.

regards the first two syntheses Kant says: “The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction” (A102).

There is clearly an inseparable link between the apprehending ability of inner sense and the synthesizing activity of imagination (A102). As indicated earlier, it is a common tendency among Kant’s commentators to limit the discussions of self to inner sense and apperception. Nevertheless, when my investigation concerning the role of the power of imagination in the first *Critique* is treated along with Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination, my insistence on considering it as a particular and distinct aspect of self may sound a little more plausible. Before fixing our attention on the role of imagination in the first *Critique*, we should first understand what Kant understands by the sensibility and the understanding:

Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts). (A50/B74)

Kant later goes on to state that “these two powers [sensibility and understanding] cannot exchange their functions” (A51/B75). The necessity, therefore, concerning the unity of intuitions (ordered in inner sense) and the concepts of understanding is the consequence of both his insistence on their distinction and his claim that “only through their union can knowledge arise” (A51/B75). Kant aims at establishing the unity of sensibility and understanding by introducing the power of imagination as a mediating faculty. In so doing, for Heidegger, the power of imagination is left outside the “two fundamental sources of the mind”; that is, it remains “homeless” (KPM, 95).

Inner sense, since it cannot pass beyond the present, might be considered as a consciousness of what happens “here and now”. Kant, on the other hand, describes the power of imagination as “the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present” (B152). Imagination is therefore a power of producing a representation (an image) independent from what is given in the present experience by passing beyond (transcending) the “here and now” (Çırakman, 2010, p. 218). In comparison with inner sense, the power of transcending or going beyond what is given in “here and now” seems to indicate a different and perhaps a superior form of the self.

It is highly important to notice that imagination, as a mediating faculty, gives unity both to sensible data and “pure manifold”<sup>31</sup> of time simultaneously. In one single activity, it accomplishes two simultaneous syntheses which are interwoven. When closely investigated, it can be seen that while one of these two syntheses is an empirical (reproductive synthesis exercised on sensible given data), the other appears to be a transcendental (or productive synthesis exercised on the pure manifold of time). Kant attributes to imagination the power of operating on both sensible and pure elements (B152). Thus, having an intrinsic relation to both inner sense and to the transcendental apperception makes imagination special and, more importantly, indispensable in the tripartite structure of consciousness of the self. Its essentiality lies partly in that imagination is a sensible faculty and partly in that it is an intellectual (spontaneous) one in spite of the heterogeneity of these two faculties (A39/B178). Nevertheless, this raises the following question: How is it possible that the power of imagination, which appears to be a “homeless” faculty, has access to both sensibility and understanding? How can it become so central? This question may be answered by pointing out Kant’s claim that as the two stems of our knowledge, sensibility and understanding “perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root” (A15/B29). By taking the “A” edition of the first *Critique* seriously, Heidegger proposes that the transcendental power of imagination is the common root of sensibility and understanding as the two stems of knowledge (KPM, 95). This claim of Heidegger leads us to throw further light upon the role of imagination. Nevertheless, not until the elaboration of the empirical (reproductive) and the pure (productive) synthesis, the imagination’s having the characteristics of both stems can become certain. Kant’ calls the first synthesis the synthesis of reproduction in imagination:

When I seek to draw a line in thought ... obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first part of the line the antecedent part of the time period, or the units in the order represented) and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that flow, a complete representation would never be obtained ... (A102)

In the section 3.1.1., we have faced the problem of the relatedness of the multiplicity of particular experiences (or empirical consciousness). How these unconnected or

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<sup>31</sup> It can be described as pure relations having no admixture of empirical content.



dispersed particular experiences can be related to each other, finds an answer in the passage quoted above. Unlike inner sense, i.e., a consciousness of particular experience, imagination appears to be a consciousness of the connection of the multiplicity of particular experiences. This connection is achieved through the reproductive synthesis of imagination. In reproduction, imagination brings the past experiences into the “now” or to the present. In inner sense, when I now perceive a sensible impression, the one I perceived in the past just drops out of thought. Nevertheless, imagination constantly re-produces every single sense impression in the present moment. This power of imagination is crucial since in the course of this, imagination binds the past to the present by letting “the faint representation of time” (image of time) to spring forth. In so doing, the variety of discrete sense data is brought together and kept in connection by the imagination.<sup>32</sup> What is equally important as the emergence of the image of time is, as Woods puts it, the fact that out of a collection of impressions apprehended at any particular time (in the “here and now”), imagination produces an image (of an object) (1998, p. 212). Therefore, through the power of imagination, we become conscious of a connection of the sensible data of an object or that of an event as an image. Concerning the fact that the reproductive activity of imagination is performed on sensible or empirical data, Kant states that imagination, in this sense, must belong to sensibility (B151). However, unlike inner sense which can only be understood in terms of receptivity or affection, this activity of the imagination somehow signifies the spontaneity of the mind.

### **3.1.2.1. Time: Formal Intuition (Time formation)**

But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold [of their own] and therefore are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold. (B160)

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<sup>32</sup> The re-producing activity therefore entails remembering. When we remember, we are also aware that the past experiences follow each other in a sequence that is they remain temporally connected. The awareness of this temporal connection of my experiences over time must be regarded as a certain kind of consciousness. Although Kant does not give an account of memory and it is true that, in the first *Critique*, Kant does not say a word about it, yet when analyzed closely we can see that what is done in “the synthesis of reproduction in imagination” is not very different from accounting for memory. Consciousness of the connection of experiences over time can only be possible by virtue of the notion of memory. Imagination, as the source of the activity of remembering, presents us with the notion of memory. Paton also thinks that the reproductive activity of imagination signifies the notion of memory. (1936a, pp. 270; 375; 572).

[...] so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold, *the formal intuition* [emphasis added] gives unity of representation. (B160)

Kant distinguishes “form of intuition” which belongs to sensibility from “the formal intuition”<sup>33</sup> which is a pure product of the imagination (B160-161). In pure intuition, time is known in isolation only by way of abstraction. Yet, in formal intuition it turns into a conceivable form. That is, it appears to the subject as an image, an object, or a representation. Time gains this look through the transcendental synthesis of imagination which can be called “the time forming act” of imagination. But, before explaining this act, we should refer back to what the function of imagination is. It “is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*” (B151). That is, its function is “putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (A77/B103), which is called synthesis.

Now, let us move on to the second synthesis, which is called the transcendental or pure synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is considered to be pure because it does not involve any empirical elements. The pure synthesis of imagination is performed on the pure manifold of time as pure intuition.

As indicated earlier, in one single act, imagination accomplishes two syntheses of heterogeneous elements of knowledge, namely the synthesis of a manifold of sense impressions and the synthesis of the pure forms (pure relations), i.e., of time (and space). In this one single act, imagination connects a manifold of sense impressions so as to constitute an object. In so doing, out of the multiplicity of discrete sense impressions, imagination forms an image of an object. In the very same act, imagination exercises a pure synthesis of the manifold of time, i.e., pure form of appearances. As a result of its pure synthesis, imagination allows time to appear as an image (or perhaps as a “schema”). This act is the “time forming act” of imagination. And the pure product of this act is called “formal intuition”. When we recall that space and time, as forms of appearances, are embedded in given appearances, this twofold synthesis of imagination in question may better be understood. As regards this, Paton remarks as follows:

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<sup>33</sup> This term seems to, more or less, be the same thing with the term “schema”.

[Time (or space)] is or contains the relations (or system of relations) in which appearances stand. The content of pure intuition is these same relations, abstracted from sensible appearances, and taken together as forming one individual whole. Space and time are at once the forms of appearances and the content of pure intuition. (1936a, p. 104)

This pure content is synthesized by transcendental imagination. In the end, the content, (the pure forms) turns into a formal intuition, which is necessary for the determinate objects of experience to arise. As a result of imagination's two seemingly different syntheses in one single activity, both appearances, on the one hand, and "space and time", on the other, turn into a visible, conceivable forms for the understanding. In fact, formal intuition should better be regarded as objectification, limitation, conceptualization, or representation of original and indeterminate time (and space). It is simply a determinate, thus, conceivable part of original, single, unlimited time. Upon this Heidegger says: "[f]ormal intuition provides space [or time] (as non-objective single wholeness) an image or a view, by turning it into an explicit object for the first time" (1997, p. 94).

To elaborate, in order for imagination to establish a decisive connection between the sense impressions which are dispersed over time, it must go beyond the "here and now". The activity of connecting the multiplicity of sense impressions, therefore, must assume temporality, namely the unity of past, present, and even future. Otherwise, the synthesis of the past and the present experience would be impossible. The essential role time plays and its strong relation to the self find its true meaning in this "time-forming activity" of the transcendental power of imagination. The power of imagination, therefore, in addition to forming an image of objects, also forms temporality, that is to say, it gives unity to time.<sup>34</sup> Rosenberg explains this formation as "the representation of a succession" (2005, p. 114), by pointing out a unity in which representations follow each other in succession. The formation of temporality is a logical necessity since without it, the imagination can by no means pass beyond or transcend the present moment and exercise the pure synthesis of the past and present experiences. Nor can the particular awareness of the self arise.

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<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, by pursuing the relationship between time and the transcendental power of imagination further, arrives at the conclusion that temporality is not time in its originality. Rather, the transcendental power of imagination, which allows temporality (as the representation of the succession of 'nows') to spring forth, is original time (KPM, 123).

The self we encounter at this level cannot be described as the self which is only a passive receiver chained to the present, i.e., the “here and now”. Rather, the self might be understood as an activity that is released from its chains and thereby can transcend a certain moment (the present; the “now”). The second aspect of the self is thus a self who is conscious of the connection of particular experiences. Reproductive imagination by virtue of the productive imagination (which is responsible for the formation of temporality, i.e., of the unity of time) has the capacity of acting freely over time.<sup>35</sup> This free acting ability allows it to bring our particular past experiences into the present and to keep them in connection. This also allows imagination to establish the connection between all particular consciousnesses to each other. In the end, the self becomes conscious of its temporal character namely, conscious of its activity as being spread out over time. Recall that imagination is considered as a mediating faculty by Kant and as the root of both stems (sensibility and understanding) by Heidegger. Be that as it may, in this aspect we encounter a certain form of the self, and I suggest to call it a “partial self-consciousness” or perhaps “a half-conscious self”.<sup>36</sup>

### **3.1.2.2. Kant’s Response to Hume**

Having discussed and clarified, so far, the second aspect of Kant’s theory of the self and how we have encountered it, it is worth looking back on Hume’s notion of the self. Although, Kant’s notion of the self is different and, presumably, more advanced than Hume’s, if we rule out apperception (the understanding) and limit ourselves to this second aspect only, their understanding of the self would be very close, if not, in fact, the same thing. Now, let us recall Hume’s remark:

When I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (THN, 252)

Hume’s contention is simply that by introspection we cannot encounter a substantial self, that is, a self as the bearer of all our experiences; the real or the logical subject.

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<sup>35</sup> Here, what I would like to explain is that the time-forming (productive or pure) power of imagination is the condition of its reproductive synthesis. That is, without the formation of temporality, imagination cannot have a power to act freely over time, so that, it cannot exercise its reproductive synthesis.

<sup>36</sup> It can also be described as a “temporal consciousness”, i.e., a consciousness of one’s own temporal being.

Rather, he asserts that the self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (THN, 363). By introspection, the only thing we can catch, Hume argues, is a particular experience. Similarly, Kant remarks that “no fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances” (A107). Remaining within the scope of the imagination, Kant agrees with Hume on the view that concerning the self, the only thing we can possibly have access to is its being particular (empirical) awareness. Furthermore, this particular or individual awareness is “a representation of oneself at a certain time, but it is not a representation of oneself over time” (Keller, 1998, p. 169). It is also worth noting that because this particular consciousness of the self is “merely empirical and always changing” (A107) it must be many, i.e., there must be a plurality of the dispersed particular consciousnesses. The self, which is considered as “the perpetual flux” of the multiplicity of particular consciousness, is what Hume understands by the self. Yet, clearly, this is not the self Kant presents to us in the first *Critique*. So interpreted, in the end, we face a problem of the multiplicity of particular perceptions, which are not combined into one consciousness. On Kant’s account, this multiplicity must be brought together in one consciousness; it must be combined into a unity. Unlike Hume whose idea of the self is “the perpetual flux” of perceptions in time, Kant aims to establish the necessity of the self that abides in this “temporal flux”. As Pereboom argues, a “subject that is distinct from these perceptions cannot have a role in Hume’s picture, since for him the subject is merely a collection of perceptions” (2006, p. 155). From Kantian perspective, however, “this subject is distinct from its representations” (Pereboom, 2006, p. 155); it must simply be transcendental in character since it is what is beyond the flux of perceptions.

Consequently, it seems that the identity of the Humean self over time is remained unsolved for the reason that in his understanding, there is nothing to hold different perceptions together so as to establish the identity of the self at each moment of time. In this sense, Hume’s idea of the self – which can never give us self-identity – seems to correspond to the second aspect of the Kant’s idea, according to which, the self is an empirical consciousness or apperception interpreted as a perpetual flux of discrete perceptions. On Kantian account, Hume just failed to grasp the true

meaning of the self since he could not go beyond and above the temporal flux of perceptions.

### **3.1.3. Apperception: The Transcendental Self**

As I have said earlier, according to Hume, impressions are distinct from one another. This claim plays an important role in his idea of the self. If we look at how Kant approaches this issue, we see more or the less the same thing. He says, each appearance must have multiplicity, “and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded” (A120). From this, it follows that as regards perceptions Kant and Hume have something in common, namely, perceptions are discrete atomic elements. However, when it comes to answering whether they are something that can be combined in one single consciousness, this time Kant distances himself from Hume. Hume leaves the necessary combination of the multiplicity of perceptions untouched; nevertheless, Kant demonstrates the reason why they have to be organized into a unity; or what is the ‘thing’ that holds them together.

For Kant, the “transcendental unity of apperception” seems to occupy the most central place in the tripartite structure of consciousness – in fact it contains the other two within itself. It seems so, since the transcendental apperception is taken to be the condition of all cognition and, more importantly all recognition. In accounting for the apperception, Kant at first presents the third synthesis, that is, “the synthesis of recognition in a concept”.

The synthesis of recognition in a concept is no more than the consciousness of (the unity of) the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. The self must be aware of the reproduction of representations which follow each other. Therefore, the transition of mind from one representation to another and meanwhile its relating them together must be one conscious act which is performed by the self. Therefore, the purpose of this synthesis is to bring the synthesis of imagination to the concepts of understanding. Just like the first synthesis is inextricably related to the second synthesis, so the second synthesis is, in the same way, related to “the synthesis of recognition in a concept”. For the third synthesis, Kant gives the example of ‘the act counting’:

If in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me, have been added to one another in succession I should never know that a total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit, and so would remain ignorant of the number. For the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis. (A103)

According to Kant, “all knowledge demands a concept” and this concept must always be “something universal which serves as a rule” (A106). All temporally ordered and also successively connected (re-produced) manifolds must be brought into one representation. In the above paragraph the synthesis is unified under the concept of the number. Awareness of this unity is what Kant describes as “recognition in a concept”.

The third aspect of the self which can be regarded as “self-consciousness” is *transcendental apperception*. Unlike empirical apperception (inner sense and imagination), which always changes, *transcendental apperception*, according to Kant, presents itself as unchanging and abiding in the temporal flux, i.e., the succession of inner experiences (A107). This abiding self is presented as “original” and transcendental since it functions as an *a priori* condition of every particular consciousness, namely, the consciousness of the objects and events “here and now”. Kant states that the particular consciousness “is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject” (B133). Even if imagination synthesizes, that is, connects all the particular consciousness to each other, self-consciousness cannot be accomplished. Self-consciousness is simply the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of imagination as belonging to (referring to) the single “I” (B133). Kant asserts that the unity of consciousness “precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representations of objects is alone possible” (A107). Therefore, after the synthesis of imagination, the *transcendental apperception* furnishes the third requisite for self-consciousness, i.e., the unity of the synthesis of all particular experiences. Although the notion of apperception is obscure in the first *Critique*, to focus on its three characteristics – numerical identity, companionship with all my representations and bareness – perhaps makes it, to some degree, more understandable and clearer.

In inner sense, “the always changing empirical consciousness” cannot fix itself through time. That is, it is simply not numerically identical over time. Nevertheless, according to Kant, in order for knowledge to arise, we require one single self to

which all our particular experiences should be directed, and in which they should be unified or combined. Moreover, the numerical identity of this self must be ensured:

[T]hat all the variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general. But it must not be forgotten that the bare representation 'I', in relation to all other representations ... is transcendental consciousness. (A117a)

The numerically identical, one and single consciousness that has the power of unifying all representations thus is called *transcendental consciousness*. For Kant, "the objective unity of all empirical consciousness in one consciousness, that of original apperception, is thus the necessary condition of all possible perception" (A123). Also as a condition, it must precede all sensible data given in intuition. In this sense it is also described as "original" apperception. This original and transcendental apperception is "the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self" (A108). It is described by Kant as self-consciousness (B132).

In regard to the fact that all our representations must relate to and united in one single consciousness Kant states as follows:

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me... all the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. (B131-2)

It is clear that all my experiences in order to be considered as belonging to me must be accompanied by the single subject, 'I think'. In addition to this, as an objection to the Cartesian/rationalistic view of the real subject as a substance, i.e., as the *substratum* of all experience, Kant asserts that the subject must be purely logical<sup>37</sup> or formal; it must be bare "I". By "bareness", it seems that Kant's sole aim is, Paton asserts, "to prove that we can have no knowledge of the soul as permanent substance" (1936a, p. 407). The subject's being formal indicates its "bareness", that is, emptiness. The "I", Kant says, which must accompany all my representations, "cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation" (B133). It is therefore considered by Longuenesse, as "a mere form of thought" or "a mere form of

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<sup>37</sup>Concerning this, Allison states that the representation of the "I" is "purely intellectual". He continues: "[b]ecause of this, 'I' designates only "something in general", which is to say that it does not refer to anything at all" (1983, p. 282).



consciousness” (2008, p. 27). Its being “a mere form” or a formal subject points out that the “I” must be taken as a (logical or formal) subject but not as a predicate. To make sense of this formal self, Kant, in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason” (A), asserts: “the proposition ‘I think’ ... contains the form of each and every judgment of understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle ...” (A348/B406). In the same part, he further says that this formal self “signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality” (A351). The Kantian self, unlike the Cartesian one, has therefore nothing to do with a substantial entity. Upon this, the following remark is worth paying attention:

For in what we entitle ‘soul’, everything is in continual flux and there is nothing abiding except ... ‘the I’, which is simple solely because its representation has no content, and therefore no manifold, and for this reason seems to represent, or (to use more correct term) denote a simple object. (A381-382)

It is clear that this “I” cannot be known in a theoretical sense. It cannot be an object of knowledge. Its being complicated particularly lies in the following fact. It is neither an intuition nor a concept, yet it is only “the mere form of consciousness”<sup>38</sup>, which always accompanies them and which is, according to Kant, in a position to lift them to the level of knowledge (A382).

This “I” is a logical necessity; it is what holds different representations (content of knowledge) together. It is what brought them into a unity, without which nothing can perhaps make sense to us. In regard to its being theoretically unknown, Kant says: “it does *not* know *itself through the categories*, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so *through itself*” (A402).

Finally, the reason why Descartes and the whole rational psychology have failed in accounting for the self is found in what follows:

The unity of consciousness, which underlies the categories, is here mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object, and the category of substance is then applied to it. But this unity is only unity in *thought*, by which alone no object is given, and to which, therefore, the category of substance, which always presupposes a given *intuition*, cannot be applied. Consequently, this subject cannot be known. (B422)

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<sup>38</sup> The following quote may help us clarify what he means by this phrase: “It is only the formal condition, namely, the logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects ...” (A398).

In the first aspect of self we have encountered it as a passive receiver chained to the present moment. In the second aspect, I argued that the self was released from its chains and it became aware of its temporal character. In the final aspect, the self becomes fully conscious of its numerical identity through time. That is, it is conscious that all temporally dispersed experiences refer to one single bare “I” (to itself). In this sense, even if the logical self is not subject to time, that is, to temporality; the synthetic unity of experience (which must refer to the logical self) is in need of the unity (representation) of time. For all this connection, determination, recognition, knowledge and so on, can only be achieved on temporal basis.

It is also important to recall once again that even if we referred to a variety of selves, there is only one single self, the account of which can be given only after the investigation of the three notions, namely, inner sense, imagination and apperception – which are inseparably bound up together.

### **3.1.3.1. The Unity of Time**

Inner sense and particular consciousness (which imagination constitutes) cannot give us the entire self. Similarly, time which I have analyzed and discussed in inner sense and imagination cannot give us the unity of it, either. It must be demonstrated that time must be thought as a unity, that is, time must be united in accordance with a rule. Otherwise, neither the objective unity of empirical world nor the objective-time order can be established (Çiftçi, 2011, p. 81). That time is thought as a unity is possible when it is understood in its relation with the original apperception alone. The necessity of representing time as a unity, according to which the relations of all appearances must be ordered, is explained by Kant in the first analogy of experience. In the “Analogies of Experience” Kant speaks of three modes of time, namely, *duration*, *succession* and *co-existence*, which correspond to three rules of all relations of appearances in time (B219). These rules rest upon the necessary unity of apperception (B220).

First analogy suggests that, time must be represented as substance (something permanent) in which alone can succession and co-existence be also represented (B225). Without this permanence there can be no time relations whatsoever. Therefore, time “as the substrate of all change remains ever the same” (B225).

What does Kant mean by this? Why does time have to serve as the permanent frame?

Recall that what inner sense and the imagination can provide is particular perception (empirical apperception). This empirical apperception is neither a fixed nor an abiding self which can preserve its own identity in the flux of particular perceptions. That is to say, this is where our inner states keep changing; or better, as Heraclitus said, this is where everything is in the state of flux. In the first two aspects, therefore, appearances are related to one another merely in a subjective time-order. This kind of world which can only present subjective and arbitrary relations among appearances poses a threat to the Kantian phenomenal world which is pictured as the necessary synthetic unity of experience. This is why Kant is forced to provide a permanent “something” according to which the flux of appearances must be ordered. This permanent “something”, Kant says, is time<sup>39</sup>. In different places in the first *Critique* he several times repeats this thesis:

- 1- “Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time” (A41/B58).
- 2- “Thus the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change” (B225).
- 3- “For change does not affect time itself, but only appearances in time” (A183).

All of these three claims indicate that time must be like the *substratum* of the flux of appearances. And this claim is just the one and single requirement of the objective-time order. Therefore, it is possible for appearances to be related to one another in a universal and objective time-order, which rests on the original unity of apperception. Kant sheds more light on this point in the second analogy.

In the second analogy, the aim is to demonstrate that the relation between two states or events must not be a random, subjective relation; but instead, it must be an objective and necessary one. The succession – that two states follow one another – must be according to the relation of cause and effect (B234). This serves as a rule which tells us how to objectively determine which appearances are “those that really precede and which are those that follow” (A194/B239).

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<sup>39</sup> Compare with the “Refutation of Idealism”.

Through the concept of the relation between cause and effect, we can distinguish a subjective-time order from an objective time-order. As regards subjective succession Kant remarks as follows:

This synthesis of imagination is always successive, that is, the representations in it are always sequent upon one another. In the imagination this sequence is not in any way determined in its order, as to what must precede and what must follow, and the series of sequent representations can indifferently be taken either in backward or in forward order. (A201/B246)

If, the proposition: “when something is posited another appearance follows upon it necessarily and inevitably in time”, conforming to a rule, then, we can have an objective time-order. Otherwise, as in the above quotation, the time-order would just be a subjective one.

Universally and objectively valid time-order is possible by means of the unity of apperception, since the unity of time is grounded in the unity of apperception. This thesis and the view that time and the self are inextricably related to each other are presented in the third Paralogism of the first *Critique*.

[I]n the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself; and it comes to the same whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity, or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time. (A361)

This passage suggests that, on the one hand, the unity of oneself as a numerically identical self is grounded in the unity of time and, on the other, the unity of time is grounded in the unity of the self. That is, as long as I am conscious of myself, I must also be conscious that time is linked to me.

In the third analogy, Kant attempts to elaborate how the existence of the variety of appearances (co-existence) happens in one and the same time. Appearances coexist only if they stand in one and the same time (A211/B258). In the absence of time, each appearance is torn from the whole, thus giving rise to the synthetic unity of appearances (experience) fall apart. Concerning appearances, it is not possible to represent the absence of time, nevertheless it is quite well possible to think it as empty of appearances (A31). In other words, we can easily imagine time as “void of appearances”, yet; we can never think appearances in the absence of time. Time “cannot itself be removed” (A31). It is a universal constant.

These three analogies – by showing us what it is to be “the relation to time” (duration), “the relation in time as succession”, and “the relation in time as coexistent” – show us that the unity of time, which is grounded in the transcendental apperception, is an inevitable condition of the unity of experience (A215/B262).

### **3.2. The Schematism: The Centrality of Time**

When we take a look at the chapter on the “Schematism” in the first *Critique*, the centrality of time and its inseparable connection to the self become transparent. It has been established in the “Transcendental Deduction[s]” that even though categories and intuitions are heterogeneous, the application of the one to the other is possible (A137/B176). This is another way of saying that even though the self and the objects are accepted to be distinct elements, it is possible for the self to relate itself to its objects and possess the knowledge of it.

Even if Kant has already demonstrated how the categories can be applied to its object in two different ways both in “A” and “B” “Deduction[s]”<sup>40</sup>, he finds it necessary to demonstrate it again in the “Schematism”; yet, this time he does so in a peculiar way, i.e., in terms of time alone. Unlike, the “Deduction[s]” which aims to focus on the logical or “the formal use” of the categories in mere judgment, the “Schematism” aims to demonstrate “the real use” of them (Allison, 1983, p. 176). By this, we should understand that in the “Deduction[s]”, the function of the categories in mere judgments are demonstrated; whereas, in the “Schematism” their function in possible experience are displayed. That is, while in the former, the objective validity of the categories is justified, in the latter the objective reality of them is claimed to be established by Kant<sup>41</sup> (Allison, 1983, p. 135). Therefore, by proceeding to the “Schematism”, Kant manifests that the logical sense of an object does not suffice for his project in the first *Critique*. Rather, the real sense of an object is required. What he has been after is thus “the real use” of categories, that is,

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<sup>40</sup> Since the first *Critique* has two editions, there are two “Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding” as in first (A) edition and in second (B) edition.

<sup>41</sup> To illustrate the distinction between the objective validity and objective reality Allison makes use of a fictional concept: unicorn. On his account, in an objectively valid judgment, such as “unicorns do not exist”, the concept of unicorn does not have an objective reality; nevertheless, it functions as a predicate in the same judgement. That is, even though the concept of “unicorn” has an objective validity in the judgment in question, it cannot have an objective reality (1983, 135).

their being applicable to real object of possible experience. And, the “Schematism” chapter is where the possibility of this can be demonstrated on the basis of time.

Kant has established that the categories are “quite heterogeneous” from the objects of the senses. Yet, for knowledge to arise, their unity is a necessity. Their unity requires an “intermediary” or “a third thing” that is to serve as a common ground upon which the self can get an epistemic access to its object. Kant states that this “third thing” is a transcendental schema<sup>42</sup>. The transcendental schema, since it is homogeneous with both category and appearance i.e., it is in one sense sensible and in another intellectual, is characterized as a “mediating representation” (A138/B177).

The image of a concept can be considered as an empirical procedure of providing an image for a concept. Nevertheless, the schema of a concept is described by Kant as “the representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept” (A140/B180). When we recall the two simultaneous syntheses of imagination, the distinction can be clear. As a result of the reproductive (empirical) synthesis of imagination the image is produced. On the other hand, the schema is a pure product of the productive (pure; transcendental) synthesis of imagination. Sherover explains the universal procedure of imagination as follows:

[A Schema is] a diagrammatic procedure by means of which the abstract concept and a particular percept are brought together in the temporal form in which the percept is recognized as an object of perception. The schemata are thus nothing but *a priori determinations of time* [emphasis added] in accord with rules. (1971, p. 105)

Kant also regards the schemata as “the transcendental determinations of time” which are the products of the pure power of imagination. To clarify the issue, I will list the four schemata Kant describes, which correspond to the four categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The schema of quantity (magnitude) is “the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object”. The schema of quality is “the synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time; it is the filling of time”. The schema of relation is “the connecting of perceptions with one another at all times according to a rule of time-

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<sup>42</sup> It appears that there is a strong resemblance between “the formal intuition” and “the transcendental schema”. Indeed, they seem to be the same thing.

determination”. Finally, the schema of modality is “time itself as the correlate of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time”<sup>43</sup> (A145/B184). Following the order of the four categories, namely, quantity, quality, relation and modality, the schemata of them are concerned with the “the *time-series*, the *time-content*, the *time-order*, and lastly *the scope of time*” (A145/B184). Allison further explains what is meant by schema as “the transcendental determination of time” as follows:

A transcendental determination of time must be conceptualization of time in accordance with an *a priori* concept, which refers time to an object or objectifies it, while also providing objective reality for the concept involved. To objectify time means to represent a temporal order as an intersubjectively valid order of events or states of affairs in the phenomenal world, in contrast to a merely subjectively valid order of representations in an individual consciousness. (1983, p. 183)

In a “subjectively valid order”, the self connects its particular experiences to each other in an empirical (particular) consciousness. By “the transcendental determination of time”, the self is presented with the “intersubjectively valid order” which allows it to transcend its particular consciousness; to interact with the other selves; and, get an access to the objects within the phenomenal world. Thus, the schema displays itself as the objective time order on the basis of which the self can gain objective knowledge of the (objects) of the phenomenal world. As quite heterogeneous from objects of sense, without a schema, i.e., being put into a temporal form, categories are “empty and devoid of meaning, content, and significance (Sherover, 1971, p. 112). To possess significance and objective reality, categories must be temporalized.

### **3.3. The *Noumenal* Self, Time and Freedom**

In Kant’s understanding, the concept of freedom cannot have any objective reality. That is, in the theoretical realm, there is no place for freedom. Nevertheless, this idea does not lead Kant to claim that the practical reality of freedom cannot be accounted for. He makes a distinction between the experiential world (the world of causal necessity; the temporal world) and the intelligible world (the world of freedom; the *noumenal*, practical or the moral world). Even though, in the first *Critique* only the possibility of the freedom is discussed, in the *Critique of Practical*

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<sup>43</sup> Under the title of each of the four categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality, Kant lists three more categories. For the schemata of the total twelve categories, see A142/B182-A145/B185.

*Reason* (hereafter, the second *Critique*) the reality of freedom is acknowledged. That is, Kant claims that the account of freedom can be given in the *noumenal* world, but from a practical perspective only. Knowledge of objects is limited to the phenomenal world; knowledge must be in accordance with causal laws (laws of nature). That is, the knowledge of an object can arise as far as this object is spatiotemporally ordered and causally determined. This is why a *noumenal object* such as freedom cannot be “known”. Yet, it can actually be “thought” in its intimate connection with moral law. Kant states: “freedom is real, for this idea reveals itself through the moral law” (CPrR, 5:4). That is, instead of being governed by the natural laws, *noumena* such as immortality, freedom and God are intelligible on the basis of morality.

As far as freedom is regarded as an object of pure practical reason and is governed by the moral or practical laws of practical reason, it must be acknowledged to be real. On Kant’s account, pure practical reason furnishes the determining ground of the will (CPrR, 5:15). The moral laws are the objective principles which determine “the will of every rational being” (CPrR, 5:19). That is, practical reason gives to human self the moral laws. Since the will of the rational being is determined not by causal laws, but by moral laws, in this sense, it is taken to be autonomous. That is, it can be proven that the human self can act freely. Given this, when we focus on the *noumenal* world, Kant seems to restore freedom to human self.

The distinction of the world into a phenomenal and *noumenal* produces an effect on Kant’s idea of the self. In the second *Critique*, we encounter the *noumenal* self that is autonomous and thus can act freely:

... Kant argues that our possession of various rational capacities, including the capacity to guide our activity by various rational norms, warrants ascribing to ourselves the power to choose independently of determination by antecedent conditions. When we think of ourselves as exercising this kind of causality, namely free agency, we regard ourselves as noumena. (Reath, 2006, p. 276)

That is, the *noumenal* self is not necessarily conditioned by a cause that precedes it in the temporal order. This freedom of choosing to act independently from any antecedent event whatsoever results from the fact that the *noumenal* self is not in the temporal realm. The phenomenal world which is governed by the natural laws is a world which is grounded in “an intersubjectively valid order of time”. In such a world, there can be nothing which is exempt from time’s effect. That is, every event



must necessarily follow one another in temporal succession; they must be in a cause-effect relation. This is why the reality of freedom cannot be proven in the phenomenal realm; and this is therefore why Kant raised the reality of this concept to the *noumenal* realm. Here, it can be seen that Kantian understanding of time is the reason lying behind his conceiving the world in two aspects: as phenomenal and *noumenal*. Similarly, this idea of time also forces him to understand the self in two aspects as well, by drifting freedom outside the temporal realm.

The *noumenal* self is atemporal (moral or practical); it is a free agent that acts autonomously. Nevertheless, the effects of its free acts must necessarily fall within the phenomenal world; so that those effects must be subject to time, i.e., they must be governed by the causal laws of this world. Bergson, as we will see, criticizes Kant's view of time and his exclusion of freedom from the temporal realm. By his theory of "duration", he claims to restore freedom to the temporal world again.

## CHAPTER 4

### BERGSON'S PURE DURATION: THE BREAKDOWN OF "THE UNITY OF SELF"

Bergson's works cover a vast scope of philosophical themes. Yet, his philosophy may perhaps be called the philosophy of "duration". That is, his philosophy should be regarded as the philosophy of time and of consciousness (self), provided that in every work of his we are confronted with these notions as underlying others. I must confess that it is a highly difficult task to investigate his theory of "duration", since the discussions concerning it are always engaged with the themes of multiplicity, intuition, images (matter and mind), perception, memory, freedom and so on. It is necessary then to inquire into those themes in the course of first clearing up the misconceptions as to this theory, and then of bringing it out evidently.

In this chapter, I will inquire particularly into his idea of the self and time. I will attempt to show that through his genuine understanding of time, (to use his term: "duration") the Cartesian/Substantial self is broken into pieces. In other words, I will demonstrate that once his theory of "duration" is embraced, "the unity of the self"<sup>44</sup>, can no longer be defended. I will go on demonstrating that instead of the substantial self, Bergson presents to us a new conception of a self that finds itself when getting back into time (or perhaps integrating with time), i.e., into its inner existence. I will argue that the self does not to lose its individuality while spreading out in time. It is true that it appears to be contrary to the ordinary common sense, since from the Cartesian, Humean and even Kantian point of view (the traditional view of the self), the states of consciousness are considered to be distinct elements ("quantitative multiplicity"), which must be united to constitute the self. To get an insight into the self's getting back into time, the reader must be introduced with the following

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<sup>44</sup> Recall that, by "the unity of the self" one should understand a static self (a self traditionally understood), which is considered as the unity of the multiplicity of separate perceptions; a self which holds this multiplicity in a unity, while preserving its identity through time.

claims. First, Bergson takes the states of consciousness to be “qualitative multiplicity” (TFW, 87), and the self as “the lived flux” of these states. Moreover, “duration” (true time) is identified with reality which is pure mobility (or the uninterrupted flux) (CE, 171). I will show that, after having discussed these essential themes, this seeming paradoxical issue will stop appearing like one; and instead, it will thus be conceived as a reasonable one. In the course of writing this chapter, therefore, my chief aim is to try to show that, on a deeper (philosophical) level, Bergsonian idea of the self reveals itself by getting back into time. Once time is identified with reality, the self in a certain sense becomes one with reality as well.<sup>45</sup> This fact will therefore bring the self closer to the possibility of accounting for the absolute knowledge and freedom.

Bergson can be said to have changed the way philosophy is done, especially when he is compared to Descartes, Hume and Kant. In order to understand the way he philosophizes, I will throw a considerable light upon his main theses such as “qualitative multiplicity”, “theory of duration” and “the method of intuition”. However, I think, to begin with two highly important particular points from which Bergson distanced himself, will be highly beneficial as regards the purpose of this study.

Recall that for Hume and Kant perceptions are considered as precisely distinguishable from one another. That is, states of consciousness are treated as discrete, atomic units. Bergson completely breaks with this tradition. According to him, between two psychic states there cannot be a clear-cut boundary. This directly led to another break from the tradition. This second break is closely related to the first one. Bergson also breaks with a general habit of intellect which forces on us the

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<sup>45</sup> When I say the self will become reality itself, I am aware that I sound like claiming that Bergson is a kind of a pantheist or a monist. As a matter of fact, that is true, but to a certain extent only. I will argue in what follows that his metaphysics might be called “a dynamic monism”. Yet, I must remind the reader that on a scientific, experiential or a theoretical level, Bergson acknowledges the distinction between the mind and the body. Nevertheless, on the philosophical level, he argues in favor of their union. According to him, on the superficial level, the intellect has dominion; it operates by representations or symbols. So, it always cuts off parts out of the whole. However, the reality is mobility, process, becoming and so on. The intellect which requires representations and symbols can by no means capture the reality which is mobility. In other words, static parts are incapable of grasping the dynamic reality (whole). That makes absolute knowledge unattainable in the world of experience. Despite this, Bergson promises us the absolute knowledge. In his understanding, absolute knowledge is possible for a person only when that person is to install himself into reality (“duration”) and be united with it.

idea that there must be something behind the states of consciousness – something which holds them together. As regards this study, the distinguishing mark of Bergson is that he clearly abandoned the idea of “the unity of the self”. However, once the conclusion that psychic states are distinct from each other is established, we find ourselves face to face with the problem of bringing them together accordingly. When we look back on Cartesian, Humean and Kantian theories of the self, we see that each of them struggled to find “something” to which all the states of consciousness, i.e., sensations, emotions, feelings, perceptions, experiences, (or representations) must refer.

Descartes, for example, was quite certain that he had found this “something”. He expressed that it is the “I” (*Cogito*); the static self which preserves its identity over time. The “I” is conceived to be a/n (immaterial) substance which is distinct from external world (the material substance). This ontological distinction between the self and the external world directly led him to the epistemological problem which can be formulated by the question: how can I get the knowledge of the external world? This had caused a great trouble for Descartes, by having compelled him to tackle it for so long. Yet, the “I”, Descartes thought, provided him with at least one clear and distinct idea, i.e., a secure starting point from which he could proceed further with certainty. The “I” is also thought to be the central point to which all conscious states must refer. Descartes treated the “I” as the point from which all my knowledge is derived and upon which the truth of all propositions must rest. Cartesian ego has been simply taken as a unity which preserves its identity at each moment of time; it has been thus taken as a static self.

In a similar way with Descartes, Hume has tried to possess the self by way of introspection. Yet, he could not find a corresponding impression for the idea of the substantial self. After having realized that there is no way of proving it from empiricist perspective, Hume declared that Cartesian ego is an illusion. In Hume’s view, the self is nothing but “the bundle of perceptions” (THN, 165). As a matter of fact, it was Hume who first showed us, when the investigation goes deeper, the unity of the self is broken into pieces. With Hume, the unity of Cartesian ego is dispersed by stretching out over time. Nevertheless, he could not come up with another satisfactory account for the problem. As indicated earlier, he, later on, confessed that

his idea of the illusory self might have a problem and refrained from it (Appendix; THN, 633). The reason for him to do so was still a desire to find “something” that is to be held responsible for the discrete particular perceptions to stand together in a unified form. Hume’s attempt to demonstrate the dissolution (expansion) of the self in time then remained unaccomplished.

Kant’s problem was the same, but his solution was complicated. He shared the same attitude with Hume on the view that from an experiential perspective the substantial self – that holds discrete particular perceptions together – cannot be justified. However, this conclusion did not hold him back from carrying out his research further. At the end of his research, he had to point to a realm which is beyond space and time. The logical subject, the bare I, the transcendental self (whatever we may call it) was the necessary condition for our experiences to be brought into a unity. Like Hume, he has broken down the self in time to a certain extent. Yet, since he has been after the “the self” in which the unity of the particular states of consciousness is grounded, he did not content with this breakdown. Then, Kant can be said to have felt forced to bring back the dispersed states of consciousness into a unity. He has done so by referring them to the logical (transcendental) self. As a matter of fact, in Kant one is not encountered with a single self. He splits the self into two: the thinking and acting (moral). When we fix our attention on the acting self, we find once more that it does not fall within the temporal realm (nature). For the moral self is deeply involved with the idea of freedom, I will analyze Bergson’s response to Kant’s moral self in detail later.

The most important aspect of Bergson’s philosophy which is essential for this thesis is that we are introduced with a genuine understanding of time. By philosophically understanding time as “duration”, he releases it from its static, immobile, and fixed appearance. Instead, he restores to time its dynamic (creative), mobile, and uninterrupted nature. Moreover, this dynamic and creative understanding of time, cannot be dissociated from the self, and can be understood in terms of “the life of consciousness” (“the lived flux of one’s conscious states”) alone. In the end, as I will attempt to show, getting back into “duration” will restore to the self its freedom as well.

When we concentrate our attention on the time and the self – by touching upon the themes of multiplicity, intuition, images, perception, memory, and freedom – we will find that the unity of the self is broken down into a variety of pieces before our eyes. Then, the essential consequence which Bergson’s philosophy brings forth is that the Cartesian ego – considered as abiding in time – is dissolved in reality, that is to say, in “duration”. Metaphorically speaking, vertical self (the Cartesian self) is dissolved in time, and turns into a horizontal self (a continuous or a temporal self) – a self that is spread out in time. In consequence, instead of the idea of “the unity of self”, we will be presented with a new conception of the self as “the lived flux of experiences”.

What role does multiplicity play in understanding the true duration, self and freedom? What is the meaning of true duration? Is duration conceivable or intuitable? What is an image? Why are the relation between perception and memory, on the one hand; and the relation between the past and present, on the other hand, important? What can these relations tell us about Bergson’s metaphysics? Finally, in what form can we ever encounter the self? Answering these questions will not only present to us a clear picture of Bergson’s understanding of time, the self, and the relation between them; but it can also provide us with the possibility of freedom and absolute knowledge. Answering these questions will also unfold how “the unity of the self” simply melts down in “duration”; so that a dynamic self arises as the true sense of the term – a self that can take a glance over the reality, and can see it as *it is*. To a certain extent, therefore, with Bergson, the unaccomplished attempt of Hume (perhaps, that of Kant, too) can be said to have brought to an end, and can therefore be considered as accomplished.

#### **4.1. Criticism of Kant: Two Kinds of Multiplicity**

In the first *Critique*, the focal problem which Kant concerned himself with is to give the account of the theoretical, objective, that is to say, the scientific knowledge. By science, Kant does not understand only natural sciences, like physics, chemistry and so on. In Kant’s lifetime, the term science (*Wissenschaft*) was used to mean “any systematic body of knowledge, usually with the implication that it would be organized around first principles from which the rest of the body of knowledge might be derived” (Intro; P, xxiii). It seems that he also used the term science in that

particular meaning. I claim so, since the world of experience, according to Kant, is organized around synthetic *a priori* principles with which the rest must be in precise conformity. In the *first Critique*, he determined the boundaries of scientific knowledge. That is to say, he just restricted the domain of what we can know to a particular area, the boundaries of which is certainly determined.

One of the most important implications of Kant's *first Critique* is that we are introduced with the concept of "representations". As is clear from the previous chapter, the representations are of great importance for the *first Critique*. Representations are kinds of the constitutive elements of the entire experiential realm. In other words, representations are something through which we understand, interpret and know the world. They are shortcuts, symbols or better, condensed examples of anything we try to know. In the Kantian universe, the objects, events and the experiences are all representations. Even time is also considered as a representation, i.e., a unity of the multiplicity of pure relations, without which "the intersubjectively valid order" of events cannot be established. Perhaps, if we set aside the fact that knowledge starts with experience (B1), then for a classic rationalist who praises the value of reason (intellect) and its concepts, the way Kant pictures the universe might seem flawless. Nevertheless, the way Bergson envisages the universe is not even close to that of Kant.

It is true: on a superficial level, there are similarities between the way through which Kant and Bergson explain the concepts of temporality, continuity, succession and multiplicity. Nevertheless, on a deeper level, Bergson distances himself from Kant. In Kant, imagination plays an essential role in giving accounts of the above listed concepts. Imagination is responsible not only for (the production of) the succession of representations, but also for "the representation of the succession" (Rosenberg, 2005, p. 114). That is, by re-presenting the states of consciousness which remained in the past, namely by bringing what is in the past to the present, imagination creates our perception of succession, continuity, temporality – or perhaps (as Heidegger argues) even that of time. The thing is that, in the first place, everything must be thought of as a unity, that is, as a representation, in order for us to understand and know them. Then, since everything must be found in temporal relations, time must be thought of as representation as well. Recall again that, in the previous chapter, I

argued that in “Transcendental Logic”, Kant present time to us as a formal intuition (objectification; temporalization of time), which is, to a certain extent, equivalent to calling it a representation (B160). Therefore, it can be said that representations are key in understanding and making sense of the Kantian universe. Even though, his idea of the self is complicated, when we investigate it further, we see that the (thinking) self is also considered by Kant as a representation, “a bare representation” in which every experience of the self must be united. Otherwise, I cannot make sense of even my own states of consciousness. If we picture the universe as such, then the objective or scientific knowledge turns out to be representational and restricted knowledge.

Similar to Kant, in Bergson’s view, temporality, continuity and succession are produced by means of perception, and especially by memory. However, Bergson takes reality as mobility (movement), and goes on claiming that the intellect cuts off parts (immobilities) from the movement (CE, 171). In forming an idea of succession, it constructs the movement out of the parts which are put together. This is what it looks like at a superficial level.

Indeed, the main focus can be said to have shifted in Bergson’s philosophy. Unlike Kant, Bergson did not concern himself with the limited knowledge of science; instead, he tackled the problem of the absolute knowledge of philosophy. Bergson thought that Kant’s understanding of time, self and freedom are problematic, and on the philosophical level directed criticisms to them.

Kant’s theoretical philosophy seems to give us only the image or a representation of reality, not reality itself. On Bergson’s account, the most important thing that we need to concern ourselves with must not be the scientific knowledge alone. On the contrary, it must be the philosophical knowledge, which is absolute. However, this knowledge is not a sort of knowledge that a person can grasp by intellect or through representations. Bergson states that reality must be identified with mobility, life or “duration”. The claim that time is reality (an entire stream of life), rules out the possibility of time’s being regarded as a “representation”, which is nothing more than a simple part of the stream. In Bergsonian universe, one is encountered with time as the reality, mobility, flow and life.



Another important criticism of Bergson which is directed to Kant is about his idea of the (thinking) self. With his “qualitative multiplicity” thesis, Bergson attempts to show that the self can by no means be treated as “a bare representation”. Unlike Kant, by this multiplicity thesis, he basically undermines the representational or unified self, according to which conscious states are set alongside space as in they follow one another in a line. Bergson’s treatment of the self can be understood in a twofold manner. On a superficial level, we are faced with the superficial or static self. On a deeper level, we find the deep-seated or dynamic self. Therefore, for Bergson the self cannot be regarded as “a representation”. Instead, he regards the deeper self as dynamism, i.e., “the lived flux of conscious states”.

Yet another idea of Kant from which Bergson distances himself is that of freedom, and by extension Kant’s idea of the *noumenal* self (acting, practical, moral or intelligible self). Kant excluded freedom from the experiential realm (the realm of natural causality and of temporality). Nevertheless, he does not claim that there is no such a thing as freedom. What he did is to raise it to the realm of *noumena*. The possibility of freedom implied in the *first Critique* is carried one step further. Kant argues, in the second *Critique*, that the reality of freedom is found in the intelligible realm. The essential point is that he admits freedom’s reality but only from a practical perspective. The thing is that, according to Bergson, Kant’s views concerning both the self and freedom are necessary results of his problematic idea of time. Concerning this distorted idea of time, Bergson remarks: “Kant’s great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium” (TFW, 232). Bergson goes on arguing that Kant’s confusion of time with space then led to the confusion of the representation of the self with the self itself (TFW, 232). Kant thought that states of consciousness must be juxtaposed, that is, must be set alongside one another as in they constitute a line. Kant took this way of the arrangement as the only possible way as regards the conscious states. This idea made him claiming with confidence that freedom by no means belongs to the temporal domain, since it is also the domain of causal necessity in which freedom can have no place. Therefore, in Kant’s understanding, freedom and time do not belong to the same realm. I will show in what follows how by his idea of “duration”, and particularly by that of “qualitative multiplicity”, Bergson brings freedom back to the temporal realm and

destroys the boundary between the experiential realm (that of causal necessity) and the intelligible realm (that of freedom).

As I indicated earlier, in what follows, I, most importantly, will argue that even though the self – that is identified with reality or “duration” – becomes integrated with the reality, it still does not lose itself within reality. It rather achieves to preserve its individuality. Despite Cartesian ontological distinction between the self and the world, the knowledge of the world will become attainable by the self. I will also demonstrate that, the self’s integrity with time will then lead to its getting access even to the absolute knowledge. As a result of getting back into “duration” the self will be capable of bringing freedom back to the experiential world – unlike Kant, which is the only world. For making sense of self’s integrity with time and of Bergson’s criticisms to Kant, it will be useful to point out two different kinds of multiplicity now.

According to Bergson there are two kinds of multiplicity. One is the multiplicity of material objects, which is quantitative, and the other is that of states of consciousness, which is a qualitative one (TFW, 87). For Bergson, “duration” has nothing to do with quantity or externality; on the contrary, it is associated with quality and internality.

#### **4.1.1. Quantitative Multiplicity: the Multiplicity of Material Objects (Space)**

Let us begin with the concept of “quantitative multiplicity”. Hume and Kant treated impressions as having “discrete atomic” nature. On their account, each impression, as an individual unit, can be separated from one another. Bergson does not agree with Kant on the claim that quantifiable nature can be ascribed to all appearances, that is, to both inner and outer appearances. Kant argues in the “Axioms of Intuition” that all “[a]ll intuitions are extensive magnitudes” (A161/B202). By this argument, Kant clearly states that all appearances (particularly, outer objects of experience) are measurable, that is to say, that, they are mere quantity. By extensive magnitude, Kant understands “when the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore precedes, the representation of the whole” (A162/B203). And naturally, as is explained earlier in the previous chapter, as a result of the synthesis of the multiplicity of these discrete parts (empirical intuitions), an appearance (as a

unity) arises. This explains why he claims that the representation of the parts precedes that of the whole.

Bergson regards this measurable multiplicity as the “quantitative multiplicity”. The idea of “quantitative multiplicity” rests upon the “discrete atomic” nature of impressions. In elaboration of this idea, Bergson uses the example of number. Number, as the collection of (discrete atomic) units, is the synthesis of many which produces a homogeneous symbol. (TFW, 76) In clarifying “quantitative multiplicity”, he goes on giving the example of counting of the sheep in a flock. All look alike; they have something in common. Each is, as unit, a sheep. The sheep are individual units. They, then, occupy different places in space, in other words, they are spatially juxtaposed. This makes it easy to count them. The collection of each sheep as a unit, gives us the flock. This is why, according to Bergson, “quantitative multiplicity” must be homogeneous and spatial. Homogeneous and spatial characteristics of “quantitative multiplicity” thus allow it to be represented by a symbol, a sum: ‘23’, for example. It is beyond any dispute that extensive magnitude involves quantity and measurement. That makes it perfectly associated with space. Thinking time spatially is assimilating it to space. This is what Bergson specifically avoids. However, in Bergson’s view, this is exactly how Kant has understood time.

#### **4.1.2. Qualitative Multiplicity: the Multiplicity of Conscious States (Time)**

The way Kant argues about sensations (conscious states) runs parallel to the way he argues about outer objects. In “Anticipations of Perceptions”, Kant characterizes “the real [as] an object of sensation [that] has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree” (A166/B207). By intensive magnitude Kant understands “a degree of influence on the sense” (A166/B208). According to Bergson, the reason why Kant ascribes degree to intensities, that is to say, the reason why he claims that intensities can be higher or lesser, is a result of that we tend to look for quantifiable extensities behind intensities (Cutrofello, 2005, p. 30). Cutrofello (2005) explains the reason for this tendency as follows:

[W]hen we try to lift a heavy object we feel a different sensation from the one that we feel when we try to lift a light object, and it is our recognition of this fact that encourages us to say that one sensation of effort has a greater degree of intensity than another. (pp. 30-1)

For Bergson, to associate internal states with their external causes leads us to fall into an error of trying to “calculate, likewise, the internal states with their external causes (TFW, 71). Nevertheless, to cognize a heavier object is one thing but to feel a great amount of muscular effort is something completely different. Bergson’s claim is that all states of consciousness are qualitative in nature. That is, psychic states cannot be applied to magnitudes, or to space. If one wants to claim that they are measurable then this person must show that every single state of consciousness is a discrete unit which can be set alongside one another in a homogeneous medium (space). He therefore must also show that they can be precisely separated from one another. However, by “quantitative multiplicity” we have seen that this precise separation can be achieved only in homogeneous medium. In Bergson’s understanding, to take inner states as discrete units by claiming that they follow one another in time is a mistake. As a matter of fact, it is not an ordinary or innocent mistake. Bergson argues that “to take time as a homogeneous medium” was “Kant’s great mistake” (TFW, 232).

Bergson goes on arguing that, unlike “quantitative multiplicity”, the qualitative one is both heterogeneous and temporal. The problem of this idea lies in that it is generally considered that when heterogeneity takes place, its elements must be spatially juxtaposed. Contrary to the general conception, when it comes to “qualitative multiplicity”, we find that there is heterogeneity, but no juxtaposition. States of consciousness are crucial for Bergson’s understanding of time and the self. Since states of consciousness are unextended, they do not occupy certain space. In being so, they can only be involved with quality, whereas, they can have nothing to do with quantity (Fell, 2012, p. 15).

What Bergson means by heterogeneity of duration is difficult to understand, since it entails a paradox. In his investigation of psychological continuity, Bergson realizes that even though a state of consciousness is distinguished from another, we cannot set a clear-cut boundary between them. Fell (2012) explains this paradox as follows: “[a]lthough its [psychological continuity] elements are inseparable, they are different and diverse ...” (p. 4). It leads to the conclusion that despite their inseparability from one another, psychic states are different, not in degree but, in kind. It sounds like a paradox; that is true. Nevertheless, Bergson explicitly expects us to act contrary to common sense. According to Bergson, the intellect is incapable

of grasping this fact. This metaphysical fact can be grasped by method of intuition. Regarding this, we should not be surprised by the fact that he expects us to admit states of consciousness as being singular but not separable like atomic units. “Qualitative multiplicity” is associated with “duration”; in fact, these two terms can only be understood and expressed in terms of the other. Mullarkey (2005) defines “qualitative multiplicity” as follows: “a unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is one” (p. 37). It signifies the continuity of states of consciousness which unfold themselves in duration (TFW, 73). The idea here is simply that, “qualitative multiplicity” involves that even though conscious states are not discrete units, they do not melt into a homogeneous medium. On the contrary, each state permeates one another by preserving their individuality. Reality, for Bergson, is “the lived flux of the duration”. When one takes into account this fact, it would be easier to get an insight into his conceptions of “qualitative multiplicity” and of heterogeneity. The multiplicity at issue, then, is claimed to be heterogeneous (individualized), and temporal (continuous, progressive, and interpenetrating). As an example to “qualitative multiplicity”, Bergson gives the feeling of pity. According to him, pity happens when a person puts himself in the place of another, and feels his pain.

The increasing intensity of pity thus consists in a qualitative progress, in a transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility. (TFW, 19)

In attempting to clarify the nature of time, he always uses “qualitative multiplicity”, i.e., multiplicity of interpenetrating conscious states. For example, objects can only be conceived with respect to juxtaposition in a quantitative (an extended) medium, i.e., space. On the contrary, qualitative states of consciousness must be considered “in their concrete multiplicity, in so far as they unfold themselves in pure duration” (TFW, 73). This happens due to the fact that the reality, as identified with duration, is “a lived flux” which can by no means be interrupted, represented or symbolized in its purity.

Unlike Hume and Kant, who acknowledged each conscious state as a discrete unit, Bergson endorsed the idea of the interpenetration of one to another. This acknowledgment appears to have given him the freedom of breaking with the habit of looking for “something” to hold psychic states together. Then, it is mainly by the idea of “qualitative multiplicity” that the reader can see how the substantial self is broken into pieces by stretching over time. Since, it is easy to see that, if psychic

states are not in fact quantitative in nature, i.e., if they are not discrete units, then nothing needs to stand behind those psychic states to combine them in a unity. That they are qualitative, progressive and mobile may perhaps be the source of their being “temporal whole”. This line of thought necessarily leads to the consequence that the substantial self (the unity of the self) is dissolved in time (continuous flux), by turning into a flux itself. I am aware that it is not clear for now how this dissolution takes place in time. The steps and the transition to this conclusion will become clearer, after having introduced to the reader the account of Bergson’s idea of duration, later in this chapter.

#### **4.2. The Theory of Duration: Real Time**

In modern science, time is considered as a kind of stable or a frame of reference according to which the analysis and the measurement of motion or change take place. This conception of time suggests that time is fixed; it has a static nature, in reference to which everything moves. Recall that this conception of time is reminiscent of Kant’s representational time. Since, this conception of time assimilates it to that of space; as I stated earlier, Bergson has serious problems with it.

In *Time and Free Will*, the essential point upon which Bergson wants to throw light is then the fundamental distinction between time and space. It seems that common sense has a strong tendency to understand time in terms of space. Bergson, in *Time and Free Will*, after having shown that we mistake time for space, poses the essential question: “Is time space?” (p. 181) His answer to this question, as we will see, is of great value, for the reason that, by the answer, first, the true meaning of the self can be captured; second, the absolute knowledge can be grasped; and third, all questions concerning freedom always come back to the question whether time is space.

Bergson identifies time with process, passage or movement, i.e., with reality. He further states that the real or concrete time (“real duration”) is “regarded as a flux, or, in other words, as the very mobility of being ...” (CE, 366). Moreover, he associates it with intensity or quality. I would like to make the reader remember that the reason for my bringing forth the idea of time’s centrality (and its priority over space) when the self is concerned is this: the states of consciousness, say self, cannot

be put in space; they cannot occupy a certain place. Rather, they can unfold themselves only in time. On the other hand, it is for certain that the objects clearly occupy a certain space. We will see that, time's dissociation from quantity, externality and measurement, yet, its association with quality, internality and immeasurability (uninterrupted flux) is essential in Bergson's theory of duration.

I will clarify now some very important characteristics which Bergson attributes to time. For the sake of clarity, in what follow, I will list these characteristics of time first. However, before making that list, the reader must recall one more time that time can by no means be reduced to or understood in terms of space.

- 1- The concrete time is qualitative in nature. Moreover, it can no longer be regarded as a homogeneous medium (space); it must rather be taken as heterogeneous.
- 2- Time is irreversible (asymmetrical): it seems impossible for time to flow backwards, that is to say, from the future to the past. On the contrary, it flows forward, from the past to the future.
- 3- Time is identified with the life of consciousness ("the lived flux of one's own duration")
- 4- Time is identified with reality that is considered as dynamism, "uninterrupted flux" or mobility.

That time is qualitative, heterogeneous, irreversible and dynamic is inextricably connected to one another. Moreover, what is more important is that these characteristics of time play essential roles in giving account of the self as growth (in a process of making); of the reality as mobility; and of freedom as uncertainty (invention; creation).

#### **4.2.1. Time is Qualitative and Heterogeneous in Nature**

The idea of a homogeneous time (abstract; spatialized time) is the result of a confusion into which we fall when we take states of consciousness as discrete units. We have seen that, in his criticism of Kant, Bergson called this "Kant's great mistake" (TFW, 232). This distorted idea of time entails that conscious states are set alongside one another as in a line to constitute a multiplicity of discrete quantitative states (TFW, 90). As far as it involves discreteness, quantity or space, this can never be regarded as true time. Time, so understood, is called by Bergson, "the ghost of

space haunting the reflective consciousness” (TFW, 99). On Bergson’s account, to “project time into space”, or “to express it in terms of extensity”, are something that we must refrain from doing, if we really want to grasp the true meaning of it.

In fact, Bergson claims, psychic states “feeling, sensations, ideas, all of which permeate one another” so as to form a “qualitative multiplicity” (TFW, 89). Pure duration is defined as follows:

Pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity. (TFW, 104)

As indicated earlier, heterogeneity of “duration” is not easily conceivable, since it entails a paradox. It signifies that there is no clear-cut boundary between conscious states, while one is still distinguished from another. That is, there is diversity in spite of that each and every state interpenetrates to the other. This diversity signifies that each conscious state is different from one another, i.e., each is new. This idea of time can directly take us to the irreversibility of time.

#### **4.2.2. Time is Irreversible<sup>46</sup> (Asymmetrical)**

By the irreversibility of time what we need to understand is the novelty and the unpredictability of (the next moment of) time. In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson states that “consciousness cannot go through the same state twice ... That is why our “duration” is irreversible. We could not live over again a single moment ...” (p. 8). This idea calls to mind pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus’ famous claim: that it is not possible for the same person to step twice into the same river. This is so since, in the second time, the person would not be the same person; nor would be the river. If we want to reject the irreversibility of time, then what we need to say, more or less, must be like this:

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<sup>46</sup> “Classical physics says time is reversible because its laws hold true whether time flows forward or backward. Thermodynamics says time only flows forward, because were it to reverse, entropy of an isolated system could decrease which would violate the second law of thermodynamics... [T]ime seems irreversible because the future is more uncertain than the past. While the past can be clearly observed from observation of what transpired in a system, if calculations are unable to perfectly predict the future as well, the future will seem murkier. So the future seems always “in the making” which gives rise to an apparent forward flow of time.” See, “Time: Reversible or Irreversible?” <http://montalk.net/science/74/-time-reversible-or-irreversible>.



[T]he coming moment is a mere rearrangement of past moments, the past moments done over; ... this rearrangement certainly would not be new. But, since duration or time is not reversible ... each coming moment is new in relation to the past moments, which are still surviving, and since the past moments are still surviving, the coming moment cannot be doing them over. (Lawlor, 2003, p. 81)

To go into the detail of the discussion concerning whether time is reversible or irreversible is beyond the scope of my thesis. Nor is it among my aims. But shortly, to settle the dispute is based on answering whether the future is as certain as the past. It seems that we cannot predict the future by precise certainty. For now, the future seems to us much more uncertain than the past. Therefore, it would not be reasonable to claim that it is as equally possible that time might flow backwards as that it does forwards. Then, this can be said to strengthen the claim that time is irreversible. Keeping in mind that Bergson takes time as irreversible; let us try to understand what he means by this and just leave this dispute aside, for the experts to settle.

From Bergson's point of view, reversibility of time should be understood as the succession of discrete conscious states which are juxtaposed in space, as past instants give rise to the present ones. Nevertheless, "duration", which can only involve "qualitative multiplicity", suggests that the irreversibility of time can make sense only when the experience of something "is grasped as a whole and lived, rather than mentally spatialized and counted like so many sheep in a field" (Kreps, 2015, p. 34). That is, "the very basis of our conscious existence is ... the prolongation of the past into the present, or, in a word, duration, acting and irreversible" (CE, 20). The prolongation of past into the present means that neither the past nor the present are two separate elements (quantitative); nor does the past give rise to the present. Yet, they form a whole, a lived flux (qualitative). Once we grasp this fact, we will see that the deterministic idea of the strict cause-effect relations can vanish.

The irreversibility of time is important since if it holds true, then it opens up a way through which freedom in experiential world can be accounted. Moreover, by this claim it becomes possible that the self is not already made or pre-determined; but instead, it is growth, dynamism and change. In other words, it becomes possible that the self is developing; it is in the process of making (or being made).

### 4.2.3. Time is Life of Consciousness

The relation between the self and time constitute the main part of my thesis; in fact, it is what my thesis is. That is why I will discuss this topic later in detail; yet, I think it is necessary to provide the basics right here, where I clarify what Bergson's theory of "duration" really is.

So far, I have tried to explain comprehensively that the true time has almost nothing to do with quantity, extensity or spatiality. It most certainly involves states of consciousness which are qualitative in nature. Beneath the claim that time is "life of consciousness" lies this idea: "the lived flux of conscious states" gives us time in its originality.

Bergson clearly expresses that it is "extraordinarily difficult to think of duration in its original purity" (TFW, 106). The difficulty clearly consists in that to try to express pure mobility in terms of words or concepts – which are immobile – is contrary to the nature of duration. Then, it must be certain that this vain attempt would most certainly end in failure all the time. This is why he expect us to try to capture "duration" in its purity by means of not the intellect but the intuition. To this point I will turn soon.

Now, I want to draw the readers' attention to following paragraph which reveals the fact that time's being qualitative, heterogeneous and irreversible is inseparable from its being identified with "life of consciousness".

Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present states from its former states ... [It] forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another (TFW, 100).

As in irreversibility, to avoid separating present instants from the past ones is essential. That, later on, leads to prolong past states into present ones, by giving rise to "an organic whole" in which past states are added to present ones. It is this movement of conscious states that is regarded as our conscious life.

As Fell (2012) argues, from the above passage, the relation between the self and duration becomes quite clear (p. 21). Bergson makes use of an analogy of 'the notes of a tune' to point out the unceasing continuity of "the life of consciousness" (self)

and its relation to pure “duration”. To make use of another analogy<sup>47</sup>, duration can also be said to be a mold, “the life of consciousness” (psychological continuity; the self) is poured into. The self is assumed to let itself to “duration” by taking the shape of it. In other words, it appears that “duration” is a structure to the self, a structure in which it finds its true meaning. One would grasp the meaning of duration provided that one is, as Bergson says, a “being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space (TFW, 101). The self preserves its individuality as far as it can turn back into duration and gain its inner existence, while it is in a continuous change. In other words, I, as a self, am a temporality of the multiplicity of my conscious states, which are in a continuous change and which constitute myself as a whole. I will show soon that by getting back into duration, the self releases itself from its outer, social, or external life. This, in a certain sense, will elaborate how the self can distance itself from space and get integrated with time.

#### **4.2.4. Time is Reality (Dynamism; Mobility; Flux; and even Freedom)**

Yet another fact about “duration” is that it is identified with reality. According to Bergson, reality is not static or already made; rather it is dynamic, i.e., always in progress; it is, in other words, becoming. Real duration, which is taken as equivalent to reality, is “regarded as a flux, or, in other words, as the very mobility of being ...” (CE, 366). Here, I cannot skip ahead without quoting from Heraclitus one more time. It seems clear that they share the same vision when it comes to contemplate on reality and life. Heraclitus stated that “everything is in the state of flux”. That is, everything is in the state of constant becoming. As I pointed out earlier, he also stated that the same person cannot step twice into the same river. By this, we need to understand that nothing ever remains the same in the universe. Like Heraclitus, Bergson says; “the mobility or movement is reality itself” (CE, 171); “reality is movement”; “[w]hat is real is continual change” (CE, 328). He further says that, “a reality that creates itself gradually”, is, “an absolute duration” (CE, 385). I think, the novelty and perhaps the beauty of reality lies in conceiving it as self-creative. That is, reality creates itself; each steps it takes is something new, something unforeseen. Unpredictability of the flux of reality constantly opens up a path that has never been stepped before. So, it allows us to be encountered with a situation we have never

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<sup>47</sup> Although an analogy never suffices to make us grasp duration’s true meaning, it may still help at least to get a little insight into it.

encountered with before. Life and the universe are changing; they are progressive; they are dynamic. This side of reality is actually the source of creativity. That is, reality so understood provides the self with new opportunities; it allows the self to produce or create something new, i.e., it leads the self to innovation:

Thus our personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new added to what was before. We may go further: it is not only something new, but something unforeseeable (CE, 8).

Time, reality, personality (selfhood), change, creation, unpredictability and freedom: these are the themes that cannot be analyzed in isolation in Bergson. Each one leads to another; each one bounded up with one another.

Bergson found reality in movement and change themselves ... If change was real, novelty was real; if novelty was real, freedom was real. The immediate was flux, and the changing was ultimate ... [I]n *Creative Evolution* Bergson ... held that change means growth, growth means creation, creation means freedom. (Edman, 2005, p. xii)

As is clear, another important fact of “duration” consists in that it is inextricably related to freedom. “The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new” (CE, 14). It is deeply engaged with creation; it brings us face to face with what is new; it leads to indeterminacy, unpredictability, in other words, it is involved with future. To conceive “duration” as such, one must try to see how it is associated with freedom. I will turn to this point and clarify it later.

### **4.3. The Method of Intuition**

The method Bergson makes use of in philosophy is different than the traditional method which is “the conceptual and abstract”. As regards this Pogson remarks:

For him the reality is not to be reached by any elaborate construction of thought: it is given in immediate experience as a flux, a continuous process of becoming, to be grasped by intuition, by sympathetic insight. Concepts break up the continuous flow of reality into parts external to one another ... but they give us nothing of the life and the movement of reality ... (2000, p. vi)

Bergson’s method of intuition can be read as a response to modern science and especially to Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which attempted to secure the credibility of Newtonian deterministic/mechanistic world view. Bergson’s criticism of Kant consists in Kant’s restriction of human sensibility and understanding, that is to say,

of the scope of human knowledge, to appearances. It is a mistake, Bergson thinks, to limit how far our knowledge can extend (MM, 11). Thinking by concepts (discursive thinking) is unable to capture “the flow of life” and “the movement of reality”. Breaking up the continuity by concepts can give us nothing except an immobile representation or a frozen picture of continuous reality. Kant simply sets a limit to what we can know. Bergson finds Kant’s philosophy problematic since it restricts our knowledge to appearances by giving rise to the transcendental knowledge, which is beyond our cognitive capacities. Therefore, it declares the absolute knowledge to be unattainable by human subject. However, by the method of intuition, Bergson aims to restore to human self the possibility of absolute knowledge.

He agrees with Kant on that the intellect can by no means capture the absolute knowledge or true reality, no matter how further this investigation is carried out. Yet, this does not necessarily mean for him that the absolute knowledge is unattainable. He distinguishes the intuition from the intellect, claiming that by intuition alone the absolute knowledge is attainable.

The intellect, Bergson says “is intended to secure the perfect fitting of our body to its environment, to represent the relations of external things among themselves in short, to think matter” (CE, xix). What intellect aims at all the time is then what is useful and practical. Since it is designed to think matter, Bergson argues, the intellect feels secure among immobile and lifeless objects. Yet, the truth is that the mobility or movement is reality itself, while the immobility is appearance only (CE, 171).

[F]or movement is reality itself, and immobility is always only apparent or relative. But the intellect is meant for something altogether different ... it always starts from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality: when it tries to form an idea of movement, it does so by constructing movement out of immobilities put together. (CE, 171)

Intellect cuts parts out of the whole, parts which are immobile. It analyzes and studies these parts which can only be considered as symbols or images of the reality. Nevertheless, the cut-out parts are incapable of representing the reality, that is to say, in being images or symbols, they can have nothing to do with immobility. Intellect can by no means reach out the absolute knowledge. This is a special task that can be fulfilled by intuition alone.

This method is such that by means of which reality (duration) – within which everything is somehow interpenetrated – will unfold itself to us, so that there would be nothing left unattained. The essential thing that must be kept in mind is this: intuition is the intuition of “duration”, in the first place, and the intuition of the “other”, in the second. At first glance, this idea of “psychological endosmosis” – “a possible interpenetration of human consciousnesses” – might sound like strange; yet according to Bergson, after making necessary effort one can succeed it. According to him, intuition may perhaps open up a horizon through which one can get access into “consciousness in general” (CM, 35). To elaborate this process, he gives the example of sympathy and antipathy, which, he claims, provide us with the evidence of the existence of “the phenomena of psychological endosmosis” (CM, 35).

[I]f one places oneself directly, by an effort of intuition, in the concrete flowing of duration ... we shall find no logical reason for positing multiple and diverse durations. ... [T]here might exist no other duration than our own, as there might be no other color in the world than orange, for example. But just as a consciousness of color, which would harmonize inwardly with orange ... would perhaps even have, beneath the latter color, a presentiment of a whole spectrum in which is naturally prolonged the continuity which goes from red to yellow, so the intuition of our duration ... puts us in contact with a whole continuity of durations which we should try to follow either downwardly or upwardly: (CM, 220)

Reality is “duration”. Therefore, “the duration of myself” and that of others (including that of matters) – in being parts of reality – are parts of “the duration itself”, at the same time. Once one sets himself up in the duration, in principle, every part of reality becomes attainable<sup>48</sup>. That is, by lifting our very self upwardly we might reach out to the spirit. Likewise, as a result of moving downwardly, we might come into contact with the inert matter. This way of envisaging reality gives us a hope for the solution of mind-body (self-external world) dualism. I will try to show later that by “the theory of image”, Bergson presupposes the disappearance of dualism. Moreover, through the investigation of Bergson’s idea of perception and of memory, this presupposition gets stronger. Yet, in the above quotation, the dualism between the spirit and the matter may really seem to vanish, by opening up the

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<sup>48</sup> The problem with the explanation of the theory of duration lies in that no matter what, it requires the use of language. Unfortunately, language and intellect work the same way. They work by symbols (words) and concepts. So, when I say “parts of reality”, I am well aware that it sounds like paradoxical because the reality is a continuous flow which can by no means be broken up into parts. The reader should understand that this difficulty arises from the nature of language and the intellect. Moreover, the reader may try force himself to understand what it means to intuit reality, instead of representing it by concepts.

possibility of transition from here towards any other direction whatsoever, toward matter or spirit:

[M]y own duration is a real part of *the duration itself*. From this part, I can, as Bergson would say, “dilate” or “enlarge” and move into other durations ... even though we cannot know all durations, every single one that comes into existence must be related, as a part, to the others. *The duration* is that to which everything is related and in this sense it is absolute. (Lawlor, 2013)

To get closer to the absolute knowledge, what one needs to do, first, is to break with the habitual use of intellect, i.e., with the use we are accustomed to. Then, by the method of intuition one needs to set himself up in “the duration”. Bergson appears to expect us to get back into the reality or duration; to leave ourselves to the stream; and even, I think, he expects us, to try to be inseparable from it.<sup>49</sup> Metaphorically speaking, when we install ourselves within duration, we, like a drop in the ocean, become identical with it. If the reality, as Bergson insists, is “duration” within which everything is interpenetrated, then the self can become related to everything, without losing itself. The self can be related not only to the matter or the spirit, but it can also be related to other durations and by extension to other selves.

#### **4.4. A Possible Attempt to the Solution of the Mind-Body Dualism**

##### **4.4.1. Images**

As regards the integrity of self with reality and grasping the absolute knowledge, a solution to the mind-body distinction plays a central role. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson attempts to find a solution to the mind-body dualism. By inquiring into the problem of the mind-body distinction, he analyzes three doctrines, namely, idealism, materialism and dualism. Idealism and materialism apply the same procedure (of reduction) with one exception only. In short, idealism try to solve the problem by reducing matter to the mind, whereas, materialism reduces the mind to matter. Unlike these two doctrines, dualism takes a radical position; it denies their union and divides them by an impassable abyss. I think that Bergson’s position can be regarded as a kind of the combination of these three approaches. He acknowledges their distinction in the first place. Yet, this acknowledgment does not restrain Bergson from claiming at the same time the possibility of their union. To put it this way,

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<sup>49</sup> I know it sounds like fanciful. Yet, if reality is “the lived flux of duration” in which everything is interpenetrated; and if I, somehow, manage to place myself directly in the continuous flow of “duration”, then it would make perfect sense to claim that I can become one with reality.

Bergson wants to keep the distinction between the mind and the body. Yet, he also claims that the transition from the one to the other is quite possible, without applying any reductionist model. He leaves open the possibility of entering into “the continuous whole” and moving both upward (towards the spirit; mind); and downward (towards matter).

Considering “matter”, his position must be placed between idealism and materialism. By introducing his theory of images, he seems to provide a common ground where all kind of dualistic approaches are met. This common ground is also where all differences between idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism, and better to say, between mind and body can just vanish. According to Bergson, matter is “an aggregate of images” (MM, 9). An image, he says, is more than *a representation* as idealists calls it, yet, it is less than *a thing* as realists call it (MM, 9). By image, we should not understand then that “a physical object exists only in the human mind” (Copleston, 1994, p. 189). Neither should we understand an object exists independently of mind. The former can be taken as a response to idealism, since matter is not taken to be completely mind-dependent. The second claim can be read as a response to materialism (even to realism), since matter is not “a thing that possesses a hidden power able to produce representations in us” (Lawlor, 2003, p. 5). Theory of image suggests that a physical object is simply “what we perceive it to be” (Copleston, 1994, p. 189). When we look at the material world, we see that it is nothing more than an aggregate of images. Among all those images, Bergson distinguishes the body, and puts it at a very special place. He says “my body, an object destined to move other objects is, then a center of action” (MM, 20). My body is also considered, by Bergson, as the center of perception (MM, 39).

The important point here is that images are perceivable, and there is a special image, which, in addition to being perceivable, also perceives. Therefore, images can both be the thing that is perceived, and at the same time the thing that perceives. On the one hand, it is in a sense just an image among others, that is, an image being acted upon. On the other hand, it has the power of acting upon other images. Given this, the activity and passivity seems to dissolve into one element; the image.

Presumably, Bergson might think the mind or the subject, to a certain extent, as an image as well. Trifonova (2003) clearly states that, to avoid tackling the problem of mind-body distinction, he defines “both consciousness and the material world as



‘images’” (p. 80). If this is acknowledged to be true, mind-body dualism might disappear.<sup>50</sup>

To throw particular light on the Bergsonian solution of the mind-body distinction is important, since otherwise, the integrity of the self with time would lead us directly to idealism. This happens since if the reality cannot be shown as embracing material and mental altogether, then duration, quality, process, inner states and so on can be attached to idealism alone. To clarify, Bergson always emphasizes the difference between “time flowing” and “time flown” (TFW, 221). “Time flown” is time which is understood in terms of space. As I explained, reality is always linked with “time flowing”; with becoming; with process. The process can have no association with extensity, matter or space. If we leave the nature of reality (duration) that way, i.e., with no further explanation, it naturally gives rise to the impression that we are living in a complete idealistic universe. In other words, when the self places itself in reality (the continuous flux) – since reality seems to have nothing to do with matter and space – the self is imprisoned in this ideal reality. Nevertheless, this is not the correct picture of reality. First, I must add that by theory of image, Bergson shows that matter is not totally mind-dependent. Second, reality never excludes externality; but reality is “the uninterrupted flow of duration” in which everything is connected, including mental and material. The correct picture of reality thus frees us from the prison of idealistic universe. By Bergson’s demonstration of the possibility of the transition from mind to matter, the barrier standing before the subject appears to be broken forth and passed on, opening up the possibility of two ways passage between mind and matter. Therefore, setting oneself up in “the duration” seems like the only way to account for how the self gets access to the (external) world, the others, and reality; furthermore, the only way to account for how the self grasps the absolute knowledge.

By the theory of images, the transition between the mind and matter may perhaps be assumed, but, not well-justified yet. Nevertheless, when we investigate the concepts

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<sup>50</sup> The matter and mind seem to us to be separated insofar as matter is regarded spatially as extended, and mind as unextended. Yet, in fact, Bergson thinks that they differ only by degree. “The reality is that their difference is stated best in terms of the admixture of different rhythms of past, present and future, that is, not in terms of space but in terms of *durée*, which admits of degrees.” See Mullarkey, 1999, p. 56.

of perception and memory, we will see that the transition in question will be justified.

#### **4.4.2. Perception and Memory (the Past and the Present)**

To get a significant insight into the nature of the self and time, it would certainly be a very good strategy to understand how Bergson conceived perception and memory. To do this would in fact be like to hit two birds with one stone.

First, to reveal what perception and memory are, in addition to clarifying their relationship, will bring us closer to Bergson's understanding of the self. Second, the relation between perception and memory bears a resemblance to the relation between past and present. Therefore we might hope that this resemblance will also bring us closer to the meaning of "true duration".

The most important thing about perception is that perception "is not only an image *about* reality that may or may not be wholly representative, but a part of reality too" (MM, 44). This can be understood as a response to Kant's distinction between sensible (matter) and conceptual (mind). Kant argues that matter is an outer appearance (extended); whereas, (components of) mind is an inner appearance (unextended). From Bergson's point of view, this happens only when we think on the basis of space. Bergson's explanation of perception suggests that matter and mind are not different in kind but only in degree (Mullarkey, 1999, p. 85). We can understand this only when we start thinking in terms of true time.

In Bergson's understanding, "pure perception" is where the possibility of transition from mind to the matter lies. "Pure perception", by being "the lowest degree of mind – mind without memory –" on the one hand, and by being "a part of matter", on the other, stands between the mind and the matter (MM, 222). It is therefore in contact with both the matter and mind. This characteristic of "pure perception" can make the passage between the mind and the matter possible. In the end, if it is really possible to unite them, referring to perception would thus be inevitable.

"Pure perception", Bergson says, "occupies a certain depth of duration, so that our successive perceptions are never the real moments of things [...] but are moments of our consciousness" (MM, 69). When we recall that, "duration" is "the life of consciousness", this might make sense. Yet, the external perception, by means of memory, puts together "the instantaneous visions of the real". But the fact is that

there is no such an instantaneity (MM, 69). The reality is mobility, but “our perception manages to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real” (CE, 328). Let me put it this way: by means of memory, the external perception turns the continuous reality into a discontinuous form.

Bergson further states that, pure perceptions are qualitative, heterogeneous and successive, that is, they spread over a certain depth of duration (MM, 70). Yet, memory solidifies in each perception “enormous multiplicity of vibrations which appear to us all at once” (MM, 70). That is, along with the memory, “external perception” turns the continuous reality into a discontinuous image; then, it presents this image to us as a matter (a thing; having a hidden power of producing representations in us, as a realist claims). What Bergson asserts is that, if we manage to distinguish in “duration” this multiplicity, that is to say, if we manage to eliminate memory, then, the passage from perception to matter; from the subject to the object would be possible (MM, 70). By this, we can come to the following conclusion one more time: there is therefore no clear-cut separation between the mind and things in the experiential universe. When we look at the difference between “the perception of matter” and “matter itself”, we see that they do not differ in kind, but differ only in degree (MM, 71). If, as the theory of image suggests, matter is nothing more than “what we perceive it to be”, then, how could matter and “the perception of it” be different in kind? And, more importantly, how can anyone keep insisting that the abyss between matter and my perception of it cannot be bridged.

Perception is only one aspect of the story. In the process of demonstrating the unity between matter and mind, the role of memory cannot be neglected either. Perception and memory are so connected that there is no priority of perception over memory. Bergson states that: “The memory seems to be to the perception what the image reflected in the mirror is to the object in front of it” (ME, 147). More importantly, we see that memory is regarded by Bergson as “just the intersection of mind and matter” (MM, 13):

Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, and thus by twofold operation compels us, *de facto*, perceive matter in ourselves, whereas, *de juri*, perceive matter within matter. (MM, 73)

He goes on to say that “if there be memory, that is, the survival of past images, these images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present and may even take its place” (MM, 66). Notice that Bergson aims to show by the relation between perception and memory what Kant has shown by transcendental synthesis of imagination. By imagination, Kant gives accounts of “the representation of the succession” and of “the image of an object”. Likewise, the relation between perception and memory, in Bergson, provides explanations of both the reconstruction of the succession (and of abstract time) and of perception of matter (in a realist sense). Perception and memory achieve this by leading to the permeation of the past states into the present ones, that is, by bending the past to the present. Therefore, careful investigation of perception and memory presents to us this essential consequence: perception and memory are bound up with one another just as past prolongs into the present. This may sound like problematic or contradictory. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson deals with this contradiction which can be formulated as follows: how can the past, which has ceased to be, preserve itself? (p. 149). In accounting for this apparent contradiction, he suggests to define the present as *what is being made* instead of defining it as *that which is* (pp. 149-50):

Nothing *is* less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future. When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet, and when we think it as existing, it is already past. If, on the other hand, what you are considering is the concrete present such as it is actually lived by consciousness, we may say that this present consists, in large measure, in the immediate past. In the fraction of second which covers the briefest possible perception of light, billions of vibrations have taken place, of which the first is separated from the last by an interval which is enormously divided. Your perception, however, instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable multitude of remembered elements; in truth, *every perception is already memory* [emphasis added]. *Practically, we perceive only the past*, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future. (MM, 150)

We suppose that perception is instantaneous, yet, “it always occupies a certain duration, and involves, consequently, an effort of memory which prolongs, one into another, a plurality of moments” (MM, 34). “Pure perception” provides the important part of matter, but the rest is provided by memory and superadded to matter (MM, 73). For Bergson, by the statement: “every perception is already a memory”, it must be clear now that there is no clear-cut boundary between perception and memory, in the first place; and none between the past and the

present, in the second.<sup>51</sup> That is, in “duration” which is conceived as “the uninterrupted lived flux”, the past can no longer be separated from the present; nor what I recollect from what I perceive. When we carry out this investigation further, we will see that the inseparable relation between perception and memory will open up a way towards the possibility of freedom. Similarly, the relation between the past and the present will help us see how these two moments are engaged with the future.

#### **4.4.3. Dynamic Monism**

Can Bergson’s philosophy be considered as dualism or monism? The answer to this question must be given in a twofold sense. First, we need to look at the intellect and how it conceives the world. Second, we need to focus on intuition. On the superficial level, it would be reasonable to call his philosophy dualism. As a result of the way the intellect operates, everything is divided into two parts: as a superficial self and a deeper self, mind and body, nature and freedom, quantity and quality, mobility and immobility, static and dynamic and so on. Nevertheless, on a deeper (philosophical) level, intuition grasps the reality *as it is*, i.e., as “the uninterrupted continuity” which carries all differences within. Here, it is necessary to pay a particular attention, to the notion of “qualitative multiplicity”, which is the key notion. It is due to this notion that “the duration” can really be conceived and due to it that classical dualistic view can no more maintain its secure position.

So understood, Bergson’s philosophy can no longer be regarded as monism or dualism alone. Monism, as Parmenides first showed, denies the reality of change and movement. It is in this sense a static approach. In dualistic approach we face another trouble. That is, the interaction between the self and the world always remains as an unsolved problem. Bergson’s philosophy, on the contrary, is claimed to “[embrace] a ‘dynamic monism’ allowing for ‘qualitative diversity’” and, definitely, unity at the same time (Mullarkey, 1999, p. 261).

#### **4.5. Self, Duration, Freedom**

Bergson’s idea of self must be treated in a twofold manner. On a superficial level, we are confronted with the static self, while on a deeper level, what we are

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<sup>51</sup> According to Bergson, “pure perception, by giving us hints as to the nature of matter, allows us to take an intermediate position between realism and idealism, ... pure memory, on the other hand, by opening to us a view of what is called spirit should enable us to decide between ... materialism and spiritualism” (MM, 71).

encountered with is the deep-seated (dynamic; fundamental) self. If we want to understand how the self and time are related, we must fix our attention on the deep-seated self, even though, it is “the whole soul, in fact, which gives rise to the free decision” (TFW, 167). It may strike to a careful reader’s eye that this twofold conception of the self is clearly reminiscent of Kant’s twofold understanding of the self: the phenomenal and *noumenal*. Yet, in fact, in its purity the self is no more understood as a static self that preserves its identity over time. It is rather regarded as a dynamic self. Recall that, to grasp this fact, one needs to break with the habit of thinking in terms of space. As soon as the elements of the psychological life are regarded as juxtaposed in space as in they succeed each other in a line, we can by no means go beyond the superficial self. The Bergsonian move which we bear witness to is reminiscent of his dissociation of true duration from space. In a similar way, to get an insight into deep-seated self, the first thing to do is to give up conceiving states of consciousness on the basis of space.

In Bergson’s view, “we are pleased to split the person into two parts ... the self which feels or thinks and the self which acts ...” (TFW, 172). As regards the distinction between two aspects of the self, Bergson remarks:

[T]he one is clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-place forms without making it into public property. (TFW, 129)

One is our outer, social life, whereas, the other is our inner (psychological), individual existence (TFW, 130). The former comes into existence when the latter is projected into space. On the contrary, the latter is captured when we aware that the psychological states unfold themselves in “duration”.

Recall that the reason why Kant has failed to preserve a room for free will within nature entirely lies in his idea of time. According to this idea, every single event must be necessarily preceded by another event as its cause. In time, succession of events is causally connected. Kant states that “the causality of appearances rests on conditions of time” (A539/B567). This necessary causal relation within temporal world must result in the conclusion that freedom cannot exist within nature. This marks that necessity and freedom, by definition, are incompatible. This line of thought can be said to have led Kant to raise freedom to the domain of noumena. His conception of time thus may be said to have led him to differentiate the subject into

two aspects: and empirical and an intelligible/moral self. “[N]ow, this acting [moral] subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a condition of appearances, not of things in themselves” (A539/B567). Therefore, by having intelligible characteristic, this “subject must be considered to be free from all influence of sensibility”, whereas, its acts are able to produce effects in the temporal world (A541/B569). As far as the acts of the acting subject are fallen into the temporal world (nature), these acts therefore must be subject to the natural laws, that is, the law of natural necessity in this particular case. Even if, Kant cannot bring back freedom but only its effects to temporal world, he insists that, the acting self belongs both to the intelligible world of freedom and to the temporal world of necessity. Can this claim really be maintained, after having raised the freedom to the intelligible realm? To this question, Bergson’s response would be “a clear no”.

Bergson thinks that perhaps the most important consequence of “Kant’s great mistake” (of taking time as space) is that he turned “the genuine free self, which is indeed outside space, into a self which is supposed to be outside “duration” too, and therefore, out of the reach of our faculty of knowledge” (TFW, 233). He, on the contrary, claims to bring this free self within the reach of our knowledge.

To demonstrate how freedom is brought back to the temporal realm, he claims: states of consciousness must no longer be regarded in isolation from each other; yet, they must be considered “in their concrete multiplicity, in so far as they unfold themselves in pure duration” (TFW, 73). The deep-seated self is completely associated with quality and heterogeneity, in other words, with “duration”. According to Bergson, life of consciousness, in so far as its elements permeate one another so as to form a continuous multiplicity, is regarded as “pure duration” in which free will can become possible (TFW, 105).

The transition from superficial psychic life to the deep-seated self is essential as regards freedom. Nevertheless, what will lead us to freedom is basically to treat self as a whole person; as dynamism or growth, i.e., to see it as stretched out over “duration”. Bergson remarks that: “[W]e are free when our acts spring from our whole personality when they express it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds between the artist and his work” (TFW, 172).

This is correct that self seems to be divided into superficial (external) and deeper (inner self). The deeper self is mostly influenced by the external one. As a result, “our living and concrete self thus gets covered with an outer crust of clean-cut psychic states, which are separated from one another and consequently fixed” (TFW, 167). That is, one of these two different selves [deeper self] is “the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation” (TFW, 231). Nevertheless, Bergson goes on arguing that these two selves must constitute a whole. Considering the deep-seated self he says: “as this deeper self forms one and the same person with the superficial ego the two seem to *endure* in the same way” (TFW, 125).

The two selves might seem like different at first sight; yet, when they become the one by giving rise to the whole personality, from which our acts spring, the freedom is established clearly.

Let me explain how it happens in clear terms. The self is confronted with, all the time, a variety of successive and different states. Let us assume that it realizes two courses which are open to it. Here, the self “hesitates, deliberates and finally decides in favor of one of them” (TFW, 177). Thus, we have an active self. It also must be noted that, when the self decides in favor of one, the other always remains open, “waiting in case ‘the self’ retraces its steps in order to make use of it” (TFW, 177). This must be so, Bergson says, since when we speak of a free act, two opposite states must be equally possible (TFW, 177). Dynamism of the self is made itself felt when it passes through equally possible states. In such cases, “the self, grows, expands and changes” (TFW, 175).

Recall that “duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new” (CE, 14). “Change”, “invention”, “creation”, and “elaboration of the new” are concepts in terms of which freedom can be expressed. Recall also that, “if change was real, novelty was real; if novelty was real, freedom was real [that is] change means growth, growth means creation, creation means freedom” (Edman, 1944, p. xii). Provided that “duration” is “the life of consciousness”, freedom can also be associated with the self.

The self, Bergson states, “lives and develops by means of its very hesitations, until the free action drops from it like an over-ripe fruit” (TFW, 176).



On the one hand, in order to define consciousness and therefore freedom, Bergson proposes to differentiate between time and space, “to un-mix” them, we might say. On the other hand, through the differentiation, he defines the immediate data of consciousness as being temporal, in other words, as the duration (*la durée*). In the duration, there is no juxtaposition of events; therefore there is no mechanistic causality. It is in the duration that we can speak of the experience of freedom. (Lawlor, 2013)

The merit of the theory of “duration” then lies in that it brings the freedom back to the world of experience. That is, it restores freedom to the world of experience. It is only in “duration” that the experience of freedom can be thought of to be possible. In “duration”, what we call the cause is not completely distinct from the effect and it does not precede the effect by giving rise to it. States of consciousness are continuous in the way that they permeate one another. In fact, in “duration” we cannot speak of cause effect relationship in the traditional sense. That is, in “duration” there is no mechanistic causality or deterministic relation between psychic states. The only thing we can find out in “duration” is “the uninterrupted continuity of those states”. This continuity enables us to be able to speak of freedom in “duration”.

Therefore, it seems that free acts are not conditioned casually or externally; rather, they contribute to the growth and expansion of the self in “duration”. Thus free acts allow the self to be on the way towards the future. When we recall the relation between perception and memory, on the one hand, and the non-mechanistic successive relation among psychological states, on the other, it would be easier to see the possibility of freedom. In a likewise manner, when we recall how the past prolongs to the present, it would also be clearer to see their leading to what we call the future.

The future is related to free acts of a person. Freedom is identified with indeterminacy and uncertainty. Given this, it would not be unreasonable to associate it to the future. “Duration” may perhaps be expressed (if we must use the three moments of time) only in terms of the prolongation of the past to the present, which flows towards to the future. Similarly, the self can only be expressed in terms of interrelation of perception and memory which is associated to freedom. Notice that, even on a superficial level, the three moments of time, i.e., the past; the present; and the future, run parallel to three (constitutive) elements of the self, namely, memory,

perception and free will. However, characterizing time and self this way is a consequence of thinking in terms of quantity and externality; that is, in terms of space. Bergson would argue that in reality neither true time can be split into three discrete parts; nor can the self be divided into separate elements. Time is “the uninterrupted flux” which carries each lived flux of every single self within. As regards this, Schmidtke (1987) remarks:

*Durée* ... is *not* a metaphysical link (or point or now) between the past and the future ... The past is not stored; it continually flows through the present in a cumulative process. The future is not an object at the end of a string of presents ... Past-present-future are not three separate points or areas on a line; rather, for Bergson, the past is really memory flowing through consciousness, the present is continuous perception with its characteristic *durée*, and the future is the creation, newness and unforeseeability of experience. (p. 30)

After having considered all this, it is still possible to raise the question: why are we rarely free, then? The answer to this question can be found in a twofold idea of the self. Bergson argues that our inner individual existence is, almost all the time, under the influence of our outer, social life. We live for the society which is external to us more than we live for ourselves that is our inner existence (TFW, 231). For example, we try to find a socially accepted jobs, to act in accordance with the social norms, try not to violate social or legal rules, in other words, we try to shape ourselves in such a way that, in the end we hope to become a socially accepted and respected persons. Thus, since our individual existence is determined by what is external to us, we sooner or later lose sight of it. This happens due to the fact that one’s “life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for the external world rather than for ourselves” (TFW, 231). Therefore, what needs to be done is to “recover possession of oneself and get back into pure duration” (TFW, 232). That is true: there stand obstacles which must be overcome in order for the self to regain access to itself. They can be overcome first by breaking with our external, social life which is in fact far removed from us. Second, they can be overcome by turning back to our inner life, that is our very (individual) existence, i.e., that is, who we really are. Therefore, until we get access to our inner self and gain our whole personality, freedom will necessarily remain out of the question.

In a parallel way to the distinction between the outer (static) and inner (dynamic) self, Bergson, in the *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, makes a distinction

between the closed (static) society and the open (dynamic) society (p. 268). It is stated that the natural form of the static society is moral “obligation”<sup>52</sup>; so, it is concerned with the forms, duties and norms. Nevertheless, in the dynamic society, the key term becomes *élan vital*<sup>53</sup> (“vital impetus”). Thus, accordingly, this society is governed by dynamism, progress and creativity. Up to now, I have explained that the self can become genuine and free by way of getting back to its inner individual self (“duration”). Nevertheless, in Bergson’s understanding, the generation of a dynamic society in which freedom can be improved seems to be possible as well.

It might now seem to be clear that Bergson turned the traditional view of time and the self upside down. He does so by breaking with the idea of conceiving the states of consciousness as separate; and accordingly, breaking with the habit of thinking the self as a unity, i.e., as a synthesis of the multiplicity of distinct states of consciousness. This led him to dissociate time from space. On his account, time, as mobility, is reality itself. Taking the conscious states as qualitative (interpenetrating; continuous; or temporal), one can understand how “the unity of the self” is dissolved in the continuous flux of reality, i.e., in time. That is the declaration of the breakdown of “the unity of the self”. Bergson, presents to us a new understanding of self, a self that is continuous and temporal. This self can also be characterized as “the life of consciousness”, change or “the lived flux of one’s own experiences”. As one’s own duration, this self is a part of “the duration itself”. That is why, the genuine self is claimed to be captured only when one is installed within duration. It is in “the duration” that one can find himself; and by “duration” that one can turn to his temporal (inner) self. In so doing, one can free himself from his outer social life which is in fact external to him. And, eventually, one must find a way to get access to his inner existence which is covered by outer, social life. Inner existence can be accessed by placing us directly in true time. In Bergson’s philosophy, time is such that it occupies a central point to which all the discussions concerning the self, freedom and absolute knowledge must return. The self is temporal; the freedom can

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<sup>52</sup> The phrase “moral obligation” can be compared to Kantian term “moral duty”. For further information, see CPrR, 1999.

<sup>53</sup> This is a term coined by Bergson to refer to “creative force of life”. By this term, Bergson substitutes the Darwin’s mechanistic natural elimination of evolution, with a vitalistic evolution. Evolution, for Bergson, is not a process operated by external causes. On the contrary, it is governed by *élan vital*, which gives rise to novelty and development (CE, 2005).

be captured in time; and absolute knowledge is grasped by getting back into time. This is exactly why he notes that states of conscious “unfold themselves in pure duration” (TFW, 73). Apart from having established the inseparable relation between the time and the self, the merit of “the theory of duration” lies in that it accounts for the intuition, perception, memory, freedom, absolute knowledge, past, present and future as well.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE HEIDEGGERIAN AUTHENTIC SELF AND THE HORIZON OF TIME

It can be said that the distinguishing mark of Heidegger is that he has moved from the question of being on to the question of the constitution of “Being”. By this, he made it clear that the ontic question cannot be prior to the ontological one; on the contrary, the meaning of the beings as beings (objects; entities) can be understood on the basis of the constitution of “Being of beings”, alone<sup>54</sup>. What should we understand by this? With this, Heidegger can be said to have turned back from *Metaphysica Specialis* (theology, cosmology, psychology) to *Metaphysica Generalis* (ontology) (KPM, 8). Indeed, by having turned back to “the forgotten question” of philosophy, therefore, he also have concerned himself with the most basic ontological question, instead of ontical question (the question of beings as entities) – with which the positive sciences have been dealing.

In this chapter, I will attempt to grasp the idea of authentic self on the basis of time. In the course of this task, to elaborate the meaning of “the Being of beings” through the exploration of *Dasein* – the term Heidegger introduces to refer human existence – must be the first step. It is so, since it is *Dasein* who can give an answer to the question of the meaning of “Being”. Therefore, I will move from the meaning of “Being” (specifically from “Being-in-the-world”) to *Dasein* in the first place; then, after clarifying Heidegger’s conception of time, I will attempt to disclose the “Being” of the authentic self (*Dasein*) on the basis of time.

In the course of following this procedure, the need for the exploration of the encounter of human being with a being will make itself apparent. As Warnock (1970) stated: Heidegger wants us to notice that “a human being cannot be taken

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<sup>54</sup> Understanding the ontic-ontological distinction in Heidegger may be a trouble for the reader. Yet, this distinction seems to run parallel to the experiential-transcendental distinction in Kant. I suggest that if it is read along with the Kantian experiential-transcendental distinction, the ontic-ontological distinction will make more sense.

into account except as being an existent in the middle of a world amongst other things [‘Being-in-the-World’]”. *Dasein* means “being-there”; and by “being-there” Heidegger means “Being-in-the-World”.

In exploring the encounter of human being with a being, Heidegger touches upon the most critical point of ontology. He argues that for us to encounter a being as it is, “it [this being] must already be recognized ... in advance as a being, i.e., with respect to the constitution of its Being” (KPM, 50). In this encounter, this pre-recognition refers to pre-ontological knowledge which is treated by Heidegger as the condition for the possibility through which “a being can ... stand in opposition to a finite creature” (KPM, 50). This also signifies what is “pre-theoretical”<sup>55</sup> and pre-thematic, i.e., what comes before objectification or conceptualization of any kind. Unless the account of “pre-theoretical” can be given, then Heidegger’s entire ontological project presumably collapses straight down into its own footprint. Moreover, the term “pre-theoretical” has significant relevance to the terms “transcendence”, “horizon”, condition” and “time”. Certainly, these terms have to be brought to light; otherwise, the relation between the authentic self and time cannot be demonstrated in full detail. Yet, for the sake of not breaking the order and the fluency of the text, I will do so a little while later. As indicated earlier, Heidegger’s ontology must be distinguished from his predecessors’, whose ontology Frede named the “substance ontology” (as cited in Guignon, 1993, p. 4). Guignon explains it in the following way:

[T]he view that what is ultimately real is that which underlies properties - what "stands under" (sub-stantia) and remains continuously present throughout all change. Because of its emphasis on enduring presence, this traditional ontology is also called the "metaphysics of presence." It is found, for example, in Plato's Notion of the Forms, Aristotle's primary substances, the Creator of Christian belief, Descartes's *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, Kant's noumena, and the physical stuff presupposed by scientific naturalism. (1993, p. 4)

Up until now, this “substance ontology” has given rise to misinterpretations of “Being”. That is, it generated the problems in metaphysics, the most important of which, as Heidegger suggests, is to attempt to understand “Being” in terms of that which remains permanent, i.e., substance. To start with, Descartes interpreted two

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<sup>55</sup> It appears that for Heidegger, “pre-theoretical” means, the ‘primordial experience of life’ that we have in our lives before we reflect upon it and theorize about it” (Misal 2009, p. 30).

“Beings”: the self and the external world as substances. Hume went after that which is permanent – lying behind the succession of conscious states. He labelled the Cartesian self as an illusion since he failed to provide that which underlies conscious states. Kant also attributed to both acting self and time permanent or enduring (i.e., substantial) characters. In contrast to them, Heidegger wanted to challenge the traditional view which suggests “that reality must be thought of in terms of the idea of substance at all” (Guignon, 1993, p. 4). By this, Heidegger had no intention of having demolished the subject-object dichotomy. As Guignon remarks, neither had he any intention of having rendered the subject and the object as non-existent; what he wanted to show is rather that they are “derivative, regional ways of being for things” (1993, p. 4). They, in this sense, do not fall within the range of the lived, primordial experience of life. After this claim, we can easily see why Heidegger chose to follow the lead of process philosophers –such as Dilthey and Bergson –, the philosophy of whom is called “process [life] philosophy”. By this, what Heidegger hoped to get is explained in what follows:

Heidegger hoped to recover a more original sense of things by setting aside the view of reality we get from theorizing [or thematizing] and focusing instead on the way things show up in the flux of our everyday, prereflective activities. (Guignon, 1993, p. 5)

This “prereflective activities”, or “pre-theoretical insight”, in other words, this “primordial experience of life” is where Heidegger will take the departure of his ontology. To put it differently, he will take the departure of the ontological research (the question of “Being”) from what is pre-metaphysical. Moreover, since Heidegger treats human existence with respect to its relation to the world and others, he completely breaks with Descartes.

### **5.1. Heidegger’s Encounter with Descartes, Kant and Bergson**

Heidegger’s ideas as regards the self (being of human agency), time, and the traditional metaphysics (“substance ontology”) can be read as challenges to Descartes, Kant and Bergson on many levels. By *Dasein*, Heidegger challenges Descartes concerning the point of departure of Cartesian metaphysics. Descartes’ having taken the ego (isolated “I”) as the point of departure has been considered by Heidegger as the obstacle before the solution to the subject-object (mind-body) dichotomy. Heidegger criticizes Kant since on Heidegger’s view, Kant could have

carried out his metaphysical research further which resulted in his having failed to disclose the ontological meaning (origin) of time. In his encounter with Bergson, Heidegger challenges Bergson's treatment of what Heidegger calls world-time as the projection of pure "duration" into space (BT, 382). Heidegger also criticizes Bergson's treatment of "life as the central theme around which anything whatsoever revolves. In Heidegger's understanding, "life", as a kind of "Being", cannot exhaust the entire ontological research of "Being" on its own.

### **5.1.1 Heidegger's Encounter with Descartes: The Point of Departure**

When the purpose of this study is taken into consideration, I can say that the most important characteristic of Heidegger consists in the following statement: The problem of the epistemic access of the self to its object – resulted from Cartesian ontological distinction – is in fact not a real problem. It is certain that Heidegger has been in an evident conflict with Descartes when it comes to regarding the following three issues: the nature of the self; the problem of the access to the external world, and finally to possess the knowledge of it. Cartesian metaphysics took its departure from "the inner self". This departure immediately brought about the following questions: How can we come out of our inner realm into an external one? How can we make our way out of our inner self? This problem of Descartes resulted from envisaging the universe as split up into two (created) substances (let us set God [the uncreated substance] aside for now). In such a universe, to make the way out of inner sphere is essential; otherwise, the access to the external world, and accordingly, to the knowledge of it can by no means be attained. In the second chapter, to resolve this problem, I proposed to put the missing piece, i.e., time, into its place. So that, as the common ground of the both substances: the self and the external world, time would bridge the Cartesian rift. For the reason that Heidegger bypassed this rift by his "Being-in-the-world" thesis, he has never been in need of something such as time to bridge it. Despite this, we will see that even if Heidegger approaches the issue from a different perspective, the essentiality of time significantly makes itself felt. More importantly, his conception of self can by no means be thought of in the absence of time, either.



Recall that on Descartes' account, the self is "a thing that thinks". That is, the self is a substance whose essence is simply to think (DM, 22). By this claim, it is certain that the mind is the place wherein the essence of the self is located. Contrary to this idea, Heidegger argues that the essence of the self lies entirely in his everydayness, that is, in his everyday involvements with beings (BT, 149-50). In Heidegger's understanding, thus, the essence of the self is not located in the mind alone, rather, it unfolds in and through *Dasein's* everyday practices, i.e., in its existence (BT, 149-150). That is, the "Being" of human cannot be grasped except taking into account its "Being-in-the-World". In clarifying *Dasein's* relation to the world, Heidegger remarks:

[*Dasein*] does not ... first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but ... it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters ... any inner sphere [is not] abandoned when *Dasein* dwells alongside the entity ... but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, *Dasein* is still 'inside'... that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows. ... [T]he perceiving ... is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the *Dasein* ... remains outside, and it does so as *Dasein* [being-there]. (BT, 89)

Knowing is therefore "grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for *Dasein's* Being" (BT, 88). In Heidegger's understanding, the self does not find an insurmountable abyss which strictly separates it from the external world. Rather, what self comes across is a situation in which it finds itself thrown into the midst of beings. Instead of taking, as Descartes, the "inner self" or "the isolated 'I'", Heidegger takes *Dasein* (Being-there) as the point of departure. Therefore, neither the Cartesian problem of getting access to the external world nor that of possessing the knowledge of it arises for Heidegger.

This must also be noted that the self and the external world, in Descartes, "do not coincide with *Dasein* and the world" (BT, 87). They do not coincide since *Dasein* and the world are not considered as being completely apart from each other. Contrary to the Cartesian ontological distinction that resulted in generation of an insurmountable abyss, Heidegger argues that "Being-in-the-world" (as an essential structure) is the "constitutive state" of *Dasein* (BT, 78). According to Heidegger, Descartes interpreted "the Being of the 'world' as *res extensa*" (extended substance), an entity which is ontologically distinct from the Being of the self which Descartes interpreted as the *res cogitans* ("a thinking thing"; the self). That the thinking and

the extended substances do not coincide with *Dasein* and the world (BT, 95) evidently distances the Heideggerian fundamental ontology from the Cartesian “substance ontology”. Eventually, Heidegger’s ideas concerning the self, knowledge and the world clearly run counter to those of Descartes. This threefold dissimilarity will serve as something clearing the way to reveal the decisive relation between *Dasein* and time.

### **5.1.2. Heidegger’s Encounter with Kant: The Shrink Back**

Heidegger, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, considers the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a “Kantian project of laying the ground for metaphysics” (p. 140). On Heidegger’s account, Kant has already laid the essential problem of *Metaphysica Generalis* (Transcendental philosophy; Fundamental ontology) before us in its entirety (KPM, 121). The problem is “the finitude of human subjectivity” (KPM, 121). This problem can be worked out through an ontological inquiry alone, which Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology”. Fundamental ontology is described by Heidegger as the analysis of the finitude of *Dasein* which is “to prepare the foundation for the metaphysics which ‘belongs to human nature’” (KPM, 1). Therefore, fundamental ontology is also considered as the metaphysics of *Dasein*. To say this is, thus, to say that the problem of metaphysics is in fact the problem of the understanding of the following question: “What is the human being [self]?” (KPM, 1). In answering this question, we must be aware of the fact that Heidegger associates the “Being” of human not only with finitude but also with “transcendence” and “horizon”. Along with “time”, these three terms will help us get a significant insight into Heidegger’s conception of the self.

On Kant’s own account, as in Descartes’, the self must step over (transcend) itself in order to reach its object (KPM, 10). This is in fact the reason lying behind Kant’s having written “The Deduction(s)”. Once the categories and the objects (of senses) are acknowledged to be different; in other words, once the understanding and the sensibility are thought of to be two distinct stems of knowledge, the need for stepping over (transcendence) is inevitable. Even if transcendence is essential on Heidegger’s account of the self, he treats this term differently. Transcendence is not a characteristic attached to *Dasein* from outside; in contrast, it is constitutive of *Dasein* (Mansbach, 1991, pp. 69-70). Therefore, it is not that first *Dasein* exists, and

then manages to transcend itself; but rather, *Dasein* itself is the crossing over, since “existence originally means to cross over” (MFL, 165/211). To comprehend this, we need to look back on Kant’s transcendental power of imagination (TPI), and to understand what the thing about it is that Heidegger was not content with.

Kant’s first *Critique* has two editions: “A” and “B” editions. When it comes to the treatment of time (and perhaps of self) in the “A” edition, Heidegger accords almost completely with Kant. In the “A” edition, Kant attributes a key role to the TPI. Nevertheless, in the “B” edition, he stripped imagination of its vital properties. On Heidegger’s account, although Kant had a great chance to unfold the ontological meaning or the origin of time, he stepped back from digging deeper into the nature of it. According to Heidegger, “Kant brought the ‘possibility’ of metaphysics to [an] abyss. He saw the unknown. He had to shrink back” (KPM, 118). What was that “unknown”? Why did he shrink back? Heidegger states that TPI revealed itself to Kant as the common root of the both stems of knowledge – namely sensibility and understanding (KPM, 137), and as the original time as well (KPM, 124). This is what he saw which frightened Kant to the core. Be that as it may, on Heidegger’s account, Kant brought the possibility of metaphysics to such an abyss that there could be no turning back anymore. Thus, Heidegger refuses to step back; instead, he proceeds one step further to see “the unknown” himself. He declares TPI as being the common root of the both stems. That is why, in Heidegger, the meaning of transcendence is distinguished from Descartes’ and Kant’s conception of it. Transcendence is transformed into something constitutive of *Dasein*. Furthermore, Heidegger treats TPI as the original time. This critical move provides Heidegger with the opportunity for arguing in favor of *Dasein*’s temporality. But, I will turn to this issue later. Despite that Heidegger inherited a great deal from Kant, he accused him of not striking the finishing blow. Eventually, to have taken TPI as the common root of both stems and the original time, gave Heidegger’s investigation of time and the self completely a different direction.

I must say that, after Bergson, another serious criticism which is directed towards Kant’s treatment of time comes from Heidegger. Heidegger respects Kant for “bringing the phenomenon of time back into subject again” (BT, 45). Nevertheless, since Kant has shrunk back from the original time, Heidegger accuses him of not

going beyond the traditional conception of time. Kant could perhaps have done so, if, first, he did not accept Descartes's point of departure as quite dogmatically (if he did not start from "the inner self"), and second, if he did not shrink back, which Heidegger calls the "double effect of tradition" (BT, 45). Heidegger claims that since Kant fell prey to this "double effect of tradition", he could not work out the concept of time. Having felt prey to the "double effect of tradition", therefore, made him failing to see "the decisive connection between time and the 'I think'". Thus, this decisive relation remained hidden in the darkness (BT, 45).

### **5.1.3. Heidegger's Encounter with Bergson: "Apotheosis" of "Life"**

Even though Heidegger's and Bergson's philosophies can be said to be original in their own right; when it comes to giving philosophy a completely new direction by thinking time in a more radical manner, they have at least one crucial point in common. As in Bergson's hands, time has undergone a peculiar change in Heidegger's as well.

However, the significant resemblance between Bergson and Heidegger lies in that both have attempted to capture the true meaning of the themes to which they devoted the greatest importance – "life" for Bergson; "Being" for Heidegger – on the basis of time. Its relevance to this chapter of my thesis is that the same resemblance also throws considerable light upon the investigation of the self and its relation to time in Heidegger. Levinas states that in the absence of the Bergsonian idea of "duration" – which releases time from its homogeneous and linear character and which also signifies its ontological priority but not only psychological one – Heidegger would not have found the courage to put forward his claim that *Dasein* is temporal (1985, p. 27).

As I indicated earlier, after having broken with the traditional ontology, Heidegger followed the lead of the "movement called 'life philosophy'" (Guignon, 1993, p. 5). However, he did not completely agree with this movement. Yet, this movement received admiration from Heidegger in the sense that it avoided focusing on "psychical elements and atoms or to piece the life of the soul together, but aims rather at '*Gestalten*' and 'life as a whole'" (BT, 72). Recall that in the previous chapter, I have attempted to show that Bergson's idea of time is new and original, when it is compared to his predecessors'. Nevertheless, Heidegger, by making a

subtle distinction between three versions of time namely, the original time, world-time, and ordinary time, puts the Bergsonian idea of time under the title of “the traditional concept of time” (BT, 39) by accusing him of being one of those who has “the ordinary way of understanding it”. To understand the rationale for this accusation we need to understand the distinction between the three versions of time<sup>56</sup>.

As a result of having associated “life” with “duration”, Bergson disclosed its temporal character. It is true that “life philosophers” (Dilthey, Bergson) conceived “life” “in its aliveness”; they also determined its temporal character” (KPM, 167). Nevertheless, Heidegger’s rendering *Dasein* as temporal is not because of these alone. On Heidegger’s account, temporality of *Dasein* can only be motivated by “the problem of Being” which is the “goal of fundamental ontology” (KPM, 168). Rendering of *Dasein* as temporality can be achieved only if “the question concerning time is first opened up” (KPM, 168). By this, Heidegger must have meant, in order to reveal what lies behind temporality, we need to trace time back to its origin.

In Heidegger’s understanding, “Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in *Dasein*” (BT, 75). Instead of treating “life” as one kind of “Being”, life philosophers elevated it to the level of divinity. This apotheosis seduced them into having failed to recognize that the whole cannot be exhausted with “life”. Heidegger explicitly accused them of having limited themselves to the account for “life” alone; and in turn this account could give them only a certain kind of “Being”, not the understanding of “Being” itself. By going after “Being”, Heidegger tries to reveal the whole meaning of “Being”. We will soon see that, Heidegger’s inquiry concerning “the meaning of Being” is oriented to the inquiry concerning *Dasein*. Since *Dasein* is interpreted as temporality, the inquiry concerning *Dasein*, accordingly, will be oriented to the inquiry concerning time (original temporality). With the expectation of grasping the authentic self on the basis of time, let us now leave ourselves to the course of this interconnected, threefold inquiry.

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<sup>56</sup> I will discuss these three version of time in full detail in the section of “5.4 Ordinary (vulgar) Time, World-Time, and Original Time”.

## 5.2. The Elimination of the Traditional Subject-Object Distinction

### 5.2.1. Giving up the Traditional “I”: *Dasein* as the Interrogator

If “the forgotten question” of “Being” is the most essential question of the fundamental ontology; if the fundamental task is to bring the meaning of “Being” into light, then Heidegger asks: “In which entities is the meaning of “Being” to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure of ‘Being’ to take its departure?” (BT, 26). Of course, the answer to this question would be the human *Dasein*. Taking into account that *Dasein* has ontico-ontological priority, fundamental ontology thus simply splits up into two analyses: ontical and ontological. Let us clarify this twofold analysis. On so many levels, *Dasein* has certain priorities over other entities. First, it has ontical priority. *Dasein* is not just entity among other entities. It is “the entity” that can possess the understanding of the meaning of “Being”. Thus, fundamental ontology takes its departure from this entity; it requires the analysis of the existence of *Dasein*. In this sense, fundamental ontology is an ontical analysis.

Indeed, *Dasein*’s ontical priority lies in that it is ontological. “[T]he average understanding of Being”, Heidegger states, “*belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself*” (BT, 28). With regard to its “Being”, *Dasein* is claimed to have a certain ontological priority over other beings. The priority of *Dasein* lies in that first: “existence is thus determinative for it” (BT, 34); and second: “*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being*” (BT, 32). By being capable of possessing an understanding of “Being”, *Dasein* is pre-ontological then. Along with the first priority, this makes *Dasein* ontico-ontologically prior. Also, Heidegger argues, *Dasein* thus must be said to be “the condition for the possibility of any ontologies” (BT, 34). Therefore, *Dasein*, as human existence, is where the interrogation of the meaning of “Being” (ontological research) will start; it is the point of departure for this essential interrogation. Notice that fundamental ontology is an analysis of the conditions for the possibility of *Dasein*’s existence. It is in this sense an ontological research.

As indicated, *Dasein* is the only entity who can possess the understanding of the meaning of “Being”. By this possession, *Dasein* reveals itself as the most essential element in Heidegger’s ontological project. To put it in clearer terms, as Heidegger states, *Dasein* is the only entity “for which, in its Being, that very Being is

essentially an issue” (BT, 117). By making “its Being” an issue, it cares about both its “Being” and the “Being” of the world. That is, it is the only entity which, by unfolding its very “Being”, is capable of unfolding the “Being” of the world and of other beings as well.

The most essential point here is that *Dasein*'s possession of the understanding of “Being” requires an interrogation, which can take place only on the condition that time is demonstrated to be the ground or horizon of the interrogation in question. Moreover, in interrogating our being, we provide a basis for the understanding of being in general such as hammer, pen, keys numbers and so on (Guignon, 1993, p. 5f). McCumber's clarification of the fundamental ontological research and what we should understand by *Dasein* is worth noting:

[A]mong all our experiences and activities, there are some that manifest a feel for what Being is. Heidegger must show which these are, describe them accurately and show how they hang together in a (more or less) unified sense of Being. The set of those activities is thus the object of fundamental ontology. Heidegger's name for that set is *Dasein* .... (2011, p. 166)

If a shorter and clearer definition of *Dasein* will prove helpful, then the best way is to define it as “the human mode [way] of existence” (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005, p. 4).

Unlike Descartes, Heidegger approaches the self as it is in the midst of its everyday activities, prior to any kind of demarcation has been made between the subject and object yet . That is, in Heidegger, one can never find any “pure, external vantage point to which we can retreat in order to get a disinterested, presuppositionless angle on things” (Guignon, 1993, p. 6). From this, one can see that Heidegger's understanding of the self is completely different from that of Descartes', for whom the “I” serves as the permanent vantage point according to which everything else is arranged, and due to which the problem of the subject-object dichotomy has been taken so seriously. Heidegger throws aside the “I” of Cartesian/traditional metaphysics and substituted *Dasein* for “inner self” which is encapsulated within itself. In so doing, he wills to demonstrate how the traditional subject-object dichotomy and the problem of solipsism may be resolved.

### **5.2.2. Being-in-the-World**

By questioning *Dasein*'s “Being-in-the-world”, Heidegger expects to provide an answer to the question concerning the “who” of *Dasein* in its everydayness (BT,

169). In the course of this questioning, in addition to “Being-in-the-world”, Heidegger also concerns himself specifically with being among others (“Being-with”). When Heidegger says “Being-in-the-world”, he clearly expects us to associate this phrase with the phrase Being-with-Others (BT, 155). That is, Heidegger considers the understanding of the others and the world as inevitable steps in the course of understanding *Dasein*.

It must be clear that, as regards the subject-object dichotomy, Heidegger distances himself from traditional ontology, especially from Descartes. Clearly, Cartesian ontological distinction cannot be found in Heidegger. Even if his ruling out this distinction may perhaps be criticized as being an evasion (McCumber, 2011, p. 168), the fact is that, it is a result of the starting point of his ontology. In his fundamental ontology, not the “inner self”, but *Dasein* is the point of departure. In Heidegger’s understanding, *Dasein* is not an isolated subject struggling to get access to its objects; rather, it is already in the world among others. In this sense, it is, by definition, in advance, “transcendence”; “involvement”; or better, it is “relational” (existence). The primitive relation of us with the entities is “pre-theoretical”, i.e., it consists in “handling and using things”. That is, in everyday practices, there can be no radical distinction in kind between the subject and the object; rather, the subject and the object can be taken only as “user and used” (McCumber, 2011, p. 168). Thus, *Dasein*, as “being-there”, finds itself in the world in relation with others. Once *Dasein* is determined as the Heideggerian point of departure, the first thing one realizes is that it necessarily brings us face to face with our “Being-in-the-World”.

As regards Heidegger’s stance on the traditional subject-object distinction debate, the following statement might provide some clues: “The essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence” (BT, 42). I think, this statement of Heidegger is of greatest value for three specific reasons. First, by this, it can be showed how all the problems concerning traditional solipsism can vanish. Second, traditional subject-object distinction can be bypassed. And finally, it is in this very statement that Heidegger’s genuine understanding of the self or the “I” (*Dasein*) lies. Let us concentrate on the first two now.

1- Response to the traditional solipsism:

Anxiety individualizes *Dasein* and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*'. But this existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme



sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world. (BT, 233)

Completely different from traditional metaphysics's conception of solipsism – in which the self captures its own inner existence (inside) by certainty; yet, when it comes to prove the existence of outer world (outside) it faces a trouble<sup>57</sup> –, *Dasein*, by feeling anxiety (in the face of death), gets individualized in a positive sense such that it finds itself thrown into the world among others. Anxiety is a key term, which brings *Dasein* face to face with its individual authentic self. As I will show, in the course of capturing its authentic self, *Dasein* distances itself from the society's determinateness ("the they-self"). This seems to be what Heidegger means by "existential solipsism". Nevertheless, this does not prevent Heidegger to provide a solution to the traditional solipsism. The key idea that will overcome this solipsism lies in Heidegger's following statement: "Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein" (BT, 160). By considering "Being-with" as a constitutive element of *Dasein*, Heidegger gets rid of "any problem of solipsism, since the need to explain how the individual knows of the existence of the other individuals vanishes" (Mansbach, 1991, p. 74). The problem of the knowledge of the existence of others is then resolved by the reversal of the traditional understanding, according to which the knowledge of others must precede the fact of being with them. However, for Heidegger, Being among others precedes the knowledge of them.

2- The elimination of traditional subject-object distinction (The context of involvement):

In Heidegger, we do not come across a binary opposition between subject and object or mind and body, as we do in traditional metaphysics. Having broken with the conception of the isolated "I", Heidegger stood against traditional mind-body distinction. Instead of "inner self", he posited *Dasein* whose constitutive elements are "Being-in-the-world" and "Being-with-Others". To characterize *Dasein* as such allows of its direct and immediate relation with the world and others. This direct and

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<sup>57</sup> Descartes has faced this trouble and attempted to resolve it in the fifth Meditation. After having demonstrated the existence of non-deceiving God (a Being that is supremely perfect), he concluded that from the fact that I have clear and distinct ideas of the objects of the external world, the existence of this world must necessarily follow. That is, if non-deceiving God exists, the correspondence between the clear and distinct ideas of the external world and the external world itself is under a divine guarantee. See MFP, pp. 80-88.

immediate relation plays an essential role in the elimination of the traditional subject-object distinction.

In place of the immanent subject Heidegger proposes *Dasein* as a transcendental subject, defining it as a relational rather than a substantial entity. *Dasein* is not a substance which relates to that which is outside itself: *Dasein* is transcendence, it goes beyond its own borders. Transcendence is not simply another characteristic of the subject but is constitutive of it; it is how the subject is. (Mansbach, 1991, p. 68)

Thus, *Dasein's* being a transcendental subject signifies its “Being-in the world”. World is identified with the relational (referential) totality (BT, 160) or “the totality of the contexts of involvement” (McCumber, 2011, p. 169). The context of involvement helps us disclose the “Being” of *Dasein* to a certain extent, i.e., its being relational and absorbed in most basic daily activities:

[W]ith this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for *Dasein*-that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of *Dasein's* Being. (BT, 116)

As already pointed out, a significant insight into the “Being” of human, consists in its everyday activities (such as hammering), i.e., its existence. The “Being” of *Dasein* must be looked for in its direct, pre-theoretical encounter with entities in which *Dasein* as being in the world among others “copes with, appropriates and finally shapes. This is what [Heidegger] calls the attitude of ‘concern’ [care]” (Mansbach, 1991, p. 74). In this undisturbed and involved daily concerns with beings (entities), they are taken as unthematized (non-conceptualized) which is specifically called as “ready-to-hand”. That is, such entities are treated as equipment. Nevertheless, when this smooth relation is interrupted, entities lose their practical use or function. In such a circumstance, they are, for the first time, seen as “mere objects” which gives rise to *Dasein's* treating them thematically or conceptually. When they are stripped of their practical use, entities are no more characterized as equipment; instead, they are called “present-at-hand” (Mansbach, 1991; McCumber, 2011). When this happens, the totality of the contexts of involvement is evidently disrupted. As a result of the interruption of the smooth relation, the entities are encountered thematically (conceptually; theoretically) as “objects” distinct from the subject. This thematized engagement with the world is what gives the impression that the traditional subject-object distinction holds for.

Yet, it is clear that at the level of the immediate, pre-conceptualized relation, there is no subject-object, mind-body, intellectual-sensible or inner-outer distinction. Instead, what exists in this level is the mere involvement, in other words, *Dasein*'s being in the world in relation with others. "The world is, in this sense, constituted by the structure of the relations between *Dasein* and the other entities" (Mansbach, 1991, p. 72).

Besides the elimination of the subject-object distinction, Heidegger specifically concerns himself with the problem of the existence of the external world. In order to point out the hidden problem concerning the problem of the existence of the external world, Heidegger reminds us what Kant thought of as regards this problem. According to Kant, it is "a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general" that we still could not come up with a well-grounded and incontrovertible proof for the existence of (the objects of) the external world that would rule out skepticism (BxI). However, the "real scandal of philosophy", Heidegger argues, is not that the firm proof has not been given yet; rather, it is that such proof is still being waited for, even though the traditional subject-object distinction is acknowledged (BT, 249). To put it this way, like Descartes, Kant, in attempting to provide a proof for the problem, took the isolated "I", or "the inner self" as the point of departure. He further, considered the world as "outside of I", while having taken the "I" as "inside" (BT, 248). After having considered the world as being composed of the isolated self ("inside of me") and of the external world ("outside of me"), asking for "the cogent proof" is to ask for the impossible. In Heidegger's understanding, therefore, "the problem" with the problem of providing a secure proof for the existence of the external world is this: Once the universe is split up into "inside the self" and "outside the self", the expected proof can by no means be given. Heidegger argues that if the correct understanding of *Dasein* [as "Being-in-the-world" and "Being alongside entities within-the-world"] can be possessed, then the need for such proofs would disappear (BT, 249), since by "being-there [in the world]" *Dasein* itself is the demonstration of the proof.

### **5.3. Ordinary (vulgar) Time, World-Time, and Originary Temporality**

As regards Kant's *first Critique*, Heidegger says: if each single topic in that book was studied in detail, then it would make itself apparent that it was the

“Transcendental Schematism” part which is central for the entire book (KPM, 79). Thus, the essentiality of time in Heidegger’s overall philosophy can be easily understood from his attribution of the great significance to “Kant’s Doctrine of the Schematism”, where Kant takes “transcendental time determinations” as the conditions of the possibility of pure, *a priori* knowledge, or in Heideggerian terms, of ontological knowledge (KPM, 63). On Heidegger’s account, the ontological knowledge is grounded in the unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thinking (the self). Given this, Heidegger appreciates what Kant set out to do in the “Transcendental Schematism”. The unity in question can be succeeded through time alone. Thus, the task that Kant has undertaken in that part is essential for Heidegger’s ontological project. That’s true; as Heidegger puts it: Kant “had to shrink back” since “he saw the unknown” and it frightened him (KPM, 118). To put it in clearer terms, the fact that transcendental power of imagination is revealed itself as the common root of the both stems (KPM, 137) and as the original time as well (KPM, 124), made Kant shrink back. As I indicated earlier, here, Heidegger poses the following question: What was the reason for Kant to have shrunk back from facing “the unknown” (KPM, 116). In the course of providing an answer to this question, the essentiality of Heidegger’s distinction between the ordinary conception of time, the world-time, and the original or primordial time comes to the fore. By the clarification of this distinction, Heidegger traces time back to its origin, so that he ventures into providing us with the ontological investigation of time for the very first time.

### **5.3.1. Ordinary Time**

The most important distinction between the ordinary conception of time and original time is that whereas the ordinary time is regarded as infinite, the original time is taken as finite. The meaning of this distinction can be found in the statement that time depends on *Dasein* that is a finite creature. Notice that in Heidegger, traditional conception of time corresponds to common understanding of temporality (the succession of moments over time; the flow or stream of “nows”), yet by the term original temporality, he understands time which is primordial (original). In exploring the meaning of the time ordinarily conceived, Heidegger refers to the world-time. Referring to world-time is inevitable since the ordinary time is grounded

in the world-time. As I will discuss later, the world-time in turn is grounded in the primordial time. For the persistence and the dominion of the ordinary or traditional conception of time over centuries, Heidegger accuses of Aristotle by claiming that this conception of time “persisted from Aristotle and Bergson even later” (BT, 39). So, even Bergson who has charged his predecessors for having fallen prey to the traditional conception of time, ironically accused by Heidegger of the very same reason. But, what exactly is this ordinary conception of time Heidegger had in mind? This question can be answered in the following ways:

Thus for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of "nows" which are constantly 'present-at-hand', simultaneously passing away and coming along. Time is understood as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of "nows", as the 'course of time'. (BT, 474)

We say: *'In every "now" is now; in every "now" it is already vanishing.'* In every "now" the "now" is now and therefore it constantly has presence *as something selfsame*, even though in every "now" another may be vanishing as it comes along! Yet as *this* thing which changes, it simultaneously shows its own constant presence. (BT, 475)

In the above paragraph Heidegger points out the most striking feature of ordinary time. According to it, even if it seems like the flow of moments, there is “constant presence” in it. The “now” or “the present moment” does not change; it is permanent; it endures; it subsists; that is to say, it has a substantial character. Upon this, Heidegger notes that “even Plato, who directed his glance in this manner at time as a sequence of "nows" arising and passing away, had to call time ‘the image of eternity’” (BT, 475). It must be noticed that Heidegger really stands against the persistence of traditionally considered time – which is flowing from the future passing through the present and sinking into the past – over centuries. For him, it is only one conception of time which must be grounded in ordinary time. This view of time is also considered as continuous, irreversible, linear and as composed of the series of infinitely many “now” points. The problem of this view of time is that the three fundamental elements of time can be defined in terms of “now” (present). That is, the future (coming along) is regarded as the “not-yet-now”, the past (passing away) is taken as the “no-longer-now”, whereas, the present (present-at-hand) is directly defined as the “now” (BT, 424).

What is characteristic of the ordinary time is that it is the time which is counted (BT, 473). By referring to Aristotle’s definition as regards ordinary time, Heidegger

remarks that “[t]ime is what is counted in connection with motion which is experienced with respect to before and after”. A little earlier, he writes: “what is counted in ... a motion ... the nows – that is time” (BPP, 246). The ordinary time is also engaged with the phrase “present-at hand”. When our uninterrupted dealing with the ordinary everyday activities in a pre-theoretical level is broken, we thematize or theoretize “the ready-to-hand” and encounter them as “present-at-hand”. Thus, here we also start contemplating time. This thematization or conceptualization of time leads us to face it as “present-at-hand”.

### **5.3.2. The World-Time**

As Blattner puts it, in our everyday practices, in Heidegger’s understanding, what we encounter is not time in its originality. Rather, in daily experiences we encounter two kinds of time, namely, time as ordinarily conceived and world-time (2005, p. 316). The world-time can be characterized in terms of “ready-to-hand” entities. When we are ordinarily dealing with those entities and with the world, i.e., when we are in the pre-theoretical level, what we encounter or conceive is the world-time. Now, suppose that our dealing with daily experiences is somehow interrupted; that is, something distracted us from the work in which we have been absorbed. In such a condition, we start reflecting upon time. In this scenario, what we come up with and conceive is time as “a pure container, as the continuous medium of natural change” (Blattner, 2005, p. 316). When time is disengaged from worldly human activities, it is conceived as pure stream of “nows”, having no significance or relation to what human everyday concerns himself within the world. However, by world-time what we should understand is this: “the sequence of meaningfully articulated, everyday times” (Blattner, 2005, p. 316) on the basis of which we can arrange and measure our pre-theoretical daily works, such as waking up, having breakfast, going to work, giving a lecture, going to sleep and so on. The world-time is in this sense deeply engaged with what we are doing as “Being-in-the-world”.

Another crucial distinction between ordinary time and the world-time is that in contrast to being counted, the-world time is reckoned with. “Time-reckoning” is a phrase which Heidegger uses while discussing the-world-time. In ordinary time, a certain time (moment) is expressed by pure “nows” which is devoid of content. For example, whereas, in ordinary time, the time when we arranged to meet up is

expressed as “7 o’clock”; in the world-time, it is expressed as “when the movie starts”, “sunset”, “dinner time” and so on. Heidegger states that “before, Dasein does any thematical research, it 'reckons with time' and regulates itself *according to it* [takes time into consideration]”. Then he adds: “Dasein's way of 'reckoning with its time' ... is what makes anything like the use of clocks possible at all” (BT, 456). “Time-reckoning” is an essential term in conceiving the world-time as the origin from which the ordinary time springs forth.

Heidegger attaches to the world-time four special characteristics, according to which time must be datable, significant, spanned and public. The first two pairs Heidegger elaborates together. The problem with the ordinary time is that in it “datability” and significance are missing” (BT, 475). Heidegger states that the ordinary time covers up these two characteristics. “Datability” is missing since, to date an event depends on whether it is related to daily activities of human; in other words, it can be dated in terms of its contents. Recall that, ordinary time is characterized by Heidegger as pure sequence of “nows” or “pure succession” (BT, 475). That characteristic makes it understood independently of or disengaged from daily human practices which are full of content. Given this, the ordinary time necessarily loses all its significance and relation to human activities, and thus thought of as empty of content. These are the reasons lying behind Heidegger’s assertion that “datability” and significance are missing in ordinary time. Given what Heidegger thinks of ordinary and world-time, I think we can say that while ordinary time is conceived as “pure sequence of nows”, the world-time might very well be considered as “concrete sequence of nows” in which each “now” must refer to a worldly experience of *Dasein*. Notice that all those activities are pre-theoretical activities which are datable, significant, i.e., contentful.

The third characteristic Heidegger attaches to the world-time is that it is spanned. “The spannedness of time” is something Heidegger calls what is articulated in “characters of the meanwhile, the during, and the till-then” (BPP, 263). So, according to “the spannedness of time”, “now” is not a strictly frozen moment, but instead it is “duration”. That is, every now has a span, i.e., width (BT, 462).

Not only does the 'during' have a span; but every 'now', 'then', and 'on that former occasion' has, with its datability-structure, its own spanned character, with the width of the span varying: 'now'-in the intermission, while one is eating, in the evening, in summer; 'then'-at breakfast, when one is taking a climb, and so forth. (BT, 462)

Then, by the world-time, we also must understand that it is “inherently spanned or stretched from a before to an after” (Blattner, 2005, p. 321). That is, the “now” of world-time stretches from the no-longer-now (world-time past) to the not-yet-now (world-time present). While a person is absorbed in doing any activity in a “spanned now” (world-time “now”), she, “reaches out into the future and touches the then ... and reaches back into the past” (Blattner, 1999, p. 131). In *Dasein*’s life, therefore, “now” is not an isolated instant disengaged from before and after; on the contrary, “now” is related to *Dasein*’s completed experiences and to its projected ones.

The last characteristic of world-time is that it is public. After being made public, the time which possesses a worldly character, that is, the time “‘wherein’ entities within-the-world are encountered, we know as ‘world-time’” (BT, 471).

In the 'most intimate' Being-with-one-another of several people, they can say 'now' and say it 'together', though each of them gives a different date to the 'now' which he is saying: "now that this or that has come to pass .. ." The 'now' which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of Being-in-the-world with one another. Thus the time which any Dasein has currently interpreted and expressed has as such already been *given a public character* on the basis of that Dasein's ecstatic Being-in-the-world. (BT, 463-464)

As a matter of fact, this feature of world-time is deeply engaged with the feature of “datability”. When I say “now” “I am having a breakfast”; and you say “now” “I am having a cup of coffee” we both date world-time with respect to what we are doing at that particular “now”; and in so doing, most importantly, we both get access to and share the same “now”. Even if, each of us dates time differently, the now is shared and accessed by each one of us. “The accessibility of the now for everyone” is what Heidegger calls the publicity of time (BPP, 264). That time is shared or it takes a public character is possible only when it refers to *Dasein*’s “Being-in-the-world” (BT, 464). Therefore, instead of being “pure sequence”, “nows” of world-time must be “a sequence of datable, significant, spanned, and public nows” (Blattner, 2005, p. 319).

This conception of time, i.e., world-time, is underestimated by Bergson due to the fact that he treated it as a spatial understanding of true “duration”. Nevertheless, *Dasein* encounters the world-time as a genuine phenomenon. (BT, 374). Taking into account the significance of the world-time, Heidegger would presumably criticize



Bergson for not having grasped the essential role of this version of time in *Dasein*'s life.

Notice that, none of these two conceptions of time, namely ordinary time and world-time is originary temporality (primordial or original time). Heidegger treats ordinary time as “a levelled off [reduced] version of world-time [in a likewise manner, for him] world-time is a levelled off form of originary temporality” (Blattner, 2005, p. 319). To say this is equivalent to say that, each version of time must be grounded in originary temporality. In other words, originary temporality is the ontological condition of the other two versions of time. When we recall that *Dasein* is interpreted as temporality (BT, 38) and historical (BT, 278), the current investigation of two versions of time then leads us back to *Dasein*. Thus, if we wish to unfold the originary temporality, it is necessary to look into the structure of *Dasein*'s Being, i.e., the structure of “care”.

### 5.3.3. Originary Temporality

Time must be brought to light – and genuinely conceived – as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, *time* needs to be *explicated* *primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.* (BT, 39)

It must now be beyond any reasonable doubt that, on Heidegger's account, the meaning of “Being” can be unfolded only on temporal basis. As regards this, it can be said that time as a horizon is the condition for the possibility of the intelligibility of beings (MFL, 302). Here, it is crucial to notice the relation between the three kinds of “Being” – which Heidegger discusses through the entire *Being and Time* – and three versions of time. It would most certainly strike to the careful reader's eye that for three kinds (or modes?) of “Being”, namely, 1- being present-at-hand, 2- being ready-to-hand, and 3- Being of *Dasein* (existence), we encounter three corresponding versions of time, i.e., 1- the ordinary time, 2- the world-time, and 3- originary temporality, respectively (Blattner, 2005, p. 323). For each kind of “Being” – the elaboration of which is the chief aim in *Being and Time* –, Heidegger defines and also clarifies the deeply engaged three versions of time. I have already focused on the two of them earlier. Now is the time to fix our attention on the third and the most essential one: originary (primordial) temporality. On Heidegger's

account, primordial temporality is the ontological foundation of *Dasein*'s existence; its average everydayness; that is, its pre-thematized involvement in day-to-day activities. On the basis of original temporality alone, "the articulated structural totality of *Dasein*'s Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible" (BT, 277). Heidegger neither thinks of time as a conceptual unity nor conceives it as flux. On Heidegger's account, time is an ontological structure on the basis of which the "Being" of *Dasein* is unfolded as temporal and historical. The ontological-structural unity of *Dasein* is made up of three elements, namely, existence (being-ahead-of-itself), facticity ("Being-already-in"), and falling ("Being-alongside"). These three constitutive elements of *Dasein* is what is called ontological care-structure. This is why the "Being" of *Dasein* is considered as "Care" (BT, 157). And accordingly, the meaning of the "Being" of Care is interpreted as temporality (BT, 418). The unity of these constitutive elements is what Heidegger calls the originary temporality, which is itself an ontological structure. The structure of care, which is constituted by three specific items, are peculiarly engaged with what Heidegger calls the three ecstases of temporality, namely the past (having-been), the present and the future (BT, 377). This deep engagement is what is to reveal the inseparable connection between the "Being" of *Dasein* (the self) and time.

I have made it clear that, the ecstatic unity of time can be clarified in terms of threefold care-structure alone. The first element of this structure is existence. Recall that the statement: "*The essence of Dasein lies in its existence*" (BT, 67), is of greatest importance. By this, what Heidegger, in contrast to Descartes, means can be expressed in what follows:

Heidegger suggests that there is no role to be played by the notion of an underlying substance or a hidden essence allegedly needed to explain the outward phenomena. What makes agency possible is not some underlying substrate, not some mental substance, but is rather the way our life stories unfold against the backdrop of practices of a shared, meaningful world. (Guignon, 1993, p. 10)

The essence of the self does not lie in any pre-determined element; instead, it unfolds itself in the course of self's life story, namely in its existence. The first element of care-structure, i.e., existence, is related to the terms "understanding", "thrownness", "projection" and "being-ahead-of-itself". On the basis of these terms, Heidegger's first item of care-structure can be made clearer. Human existence can be described as "being in a world which it copes with, appropriates and finally

shapes” (Mansbach, 1991, pp. 73-74). In this concerned dealing within the world, *Dasein* finds itself thrown into a world which is made up of practically shared activities. In other words, *Dasein* finds itself in a context in which everything is socially, historically and culturally pre-determined. “Being-ahead-of-itself” always connotes “not-yet”, i.e., the future. By “being-ahead-of-itself”, Heidegger means that *Dasein* “comports [relates; projects] itself towards its potentiality-for-Being” (BT, 236). By this, we need to understand that there is “a potentiality-for-Being for *Dasein* itself, [which] has not yet become 'actual'” (BT, 236). In the concerned dealing within the world in which it has been thrown, *Dasein* projects itself upon possibilities which is “not-yet” actual. This projection or *thrown-projection* is what Heidegger relates to understanding (BT, 188; 232). In everyday existence, *Dasein*’s life story unfolds itself alongside others, while concernedly dealing with the entities within the world. In projecting itself upon possibilities, *Dasein* copes with the world by trying to understand the world and itself at the same time. Given this, we can see that the existence (understanding), as the first element of the ontological care structure, unfolds itself on the basis of one ecstasis of time, namely, the future.

The second element of the care-structure of *Dasein* is characterized as facticity. The second element can be understood in the light of the following terms: the mood (state of mind); thrownness; and “Being-already-in”. As another structural element of *Dasein*’s “Being”, the facticity can by no means be thought of independently of existence. Heidegger states that “existing is always factual. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity” (BT, 236). By getting in a certain mood such as fear or anxiety, *Dasein* is brought face to face with its facticity, i.e., with the fact that it is thrown into existence as a being-already-in. *Dasein* faces this situation as a brute fact since it is a situation which cannot be fled from authentically. Facticity refers to what is given to *Dasein* prior to any conceptualization, theoretization or objectification. “Dasein's facticity is such that *as long as* it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the ‘they's’ inauthenticity” (BT, 223). That is, *Dasein* finds itself in the middle of the pre-determinedness of society, culture and history. Facticity can be understood then as concreteness, definiteness and determinedness of life. It is my social, cultural and historical background, i.e., my “being-already-in” (the past). Heidegger states that a state of mind always brings us back to something, i.e., to some mood of having been (BT,

390). For instance, in the mode of fear, we are brought back in a certain mood in which we face what we have been afraid from. By facticity, we realize that the fact of our being thrown is not something that we have chosen freely; rather, it is something that we inherited unwillingly. Moreover, the world wherein we have been thrown is where we stuck with (Hall, 1993, p. 137). This explains why *Dasein*'s existence must be factual. It must be so, since from where *Dasein* has been thrown, it projects itself upon its possibilities. The facticity is therefore where *Dasein* takes its departure from; it is where *Dasein*'s existence is grounded. In the light of this intertwinedness between existence and facticity, we might see vividly why the two ecstases of temporality, namely, the future and the past, must be interlocked as well. Simply, from our "having-been" (the past), *Dasein* can project itself upon possibilities (the future). Unlike existence (understanding) which finds its basis on the future, facticity is unfolded on the basis of having-been.

The third constitutive element in the ontological care structure is falling. Just as existence can be expressed on the basis of the future, and facticity can be understood in terms of having been, falling can be made possible by the present (BT, 398-399). Heidegger clarifies falling in terms of Being-alongside entities which *Dasein* concerns itself with. He associates the phrase "Being-alongside" with the present. Falleness can be described as *Dasein*'s tendency to fall "away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and [to fall] into the 'world'" (BT, 220; the second bracket mine). This description can also show us that *Dasein* gets deeply absorbed in the world for the purpose of "fleeing from the anxiety of a confrontation with death" (Blattner, 2005, p. 313). In so doing, *Dasein* loses itself in "the publicness of the "they", so that it gets shaped or determined by the pre-determinedness of society, culture and history. The fallenness of *Dasein* is also linked with existence and facticity. Notice that, here the present is not only the isolated present, rather, as I discussed by the term "spanned", the present carries within itself the past and the future, which makes it a spanned or stretched present.

Thus, these three elements of care-structure make up *Dasein*'s structural whole. That is to say: *Dasein* is a structural unity. Heidegger's understanding of originary temporality runs parallel to this structural unity of *Dasein*. Instead of being

conceived as the succession of the past, the present and the future, as in ordinary time, the originary temporality is considered as an ecstatic unity:

Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession'. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been. (BT, 401)

As we now know, Heidegger calls the past, the present and the future, the ecstases of time. We must notice that the root meaning of 'ecstasis' is 'standing out' (BT, 377). Keeping that in mind, we can easily see why it is claimed that the present can reach out into the future and in a similar fashion it can reach back into the past. This going beyond itself is what Heidegger sometimes calls "the transcendence of time and transcendence of Dasein" (Dostal, 1993, p. 156). Likewise, by the term existence, Heidegger sometimes understands "ek-sistence" which means "standing out" (Siegel, 2005, p. 571). It means that *Dasein* is not the self who can be captured in a certain "now". On the contrary, "Dasein always exists in [the] three moments at once" (Siegel, 2005, p. 571), such that as thrown into the world (facticity) it is always "having-been"; as fallen among others, it is always the present; and finally, as projected upon its possibilities, (existence; understanding) *Dasein* is futural. The ecstases of time are specifically considered as "raptures" in which *Dasein* is carried away to its possibilities (BT, 387). So that, *Dasein* moves from its having-been through its present to its future. It is in virtue of this movement of *Dasein* that its "Being" as a whole – along with the "Being" of the world – is disclosed (Siegel, 2005, p. 592).

Up to this point, we have not made any distinction between the authentic/inauthentic modes of Heideggerian conception of the self. Nevertheless, my chief aim is to capture the authentic self on the basis of time. Then, we must carry out this temporal investigation of the self a little further by taking *Dasein*'s "being-towards-death" into account and must follow this phrase up penetratingly.

#### **5.4. The Self, Time and Freedom**

The difficulty in demonstrating the emergence of the authentic self and allowing of its coming to the fore consists in that *Dasein* takes its departure from the within the world. As an entity within the world among others and alongside entities (encountered within the world), *Dasein* has a relentless trouble to come back to itself

by unfolding its authentic existence. He finds itself thrown into the world amidst the other in such a way that it has already been shaped and determined by the context of social, cultural and historical inheritance. Due to this inauthentic mode of existence, *Dasein* can by no means be regarded as individualized yet, and thereby can never be treated as a (an authentic) self. Remember that Descartes has captured the *Cogito*; the “I”; or the individual self, by meditation or self-reflection; and then he took the departure from “the inside”. Unlike him, Heidegger starts from the “Being-in-the-world”, not the other way around. Yet, Heidegger attempts to convince the reader that it is possible to become an authentic self, despite that it may perhaps demand a strenuous effort of a lifetime (from the birth to the death). I shall now fix my attention upon grasping how its temporal character unfolds the authenticity of the self, in the light of the specific terms that follow: the “they” [*das Man*], “transcendence” (ecstatic horizon; temporality), “the call of conscience”, and “being-towards-death”.

#### **5.4.1. The Inauthentic Self: The “They-Self” [*das Man*]**

In the inauthentic mode of existence, what we encounter is the average everydayness of *Dasein* [“the Self of everydayness”] which is called “one” or the “they” [*das Man*]. In this inauthentic mode, *Dasein* is dominated by “averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one's Being, and accommodation” (BT, 166). In this mode, *Dasein* is not yet itself; the characteristics attributed to it by the “they” are not genuinely its own. That is, since *Dasein* is absorbed in the world and more importantly dissolved in the others, it is simply lost. Therefore, to possess its authentic existence, what *Dasein* must do first is to come back to itself, i.e., to “find itself”.

The Self of everyday *Dasein* is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self* – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]. As they-self, the particular *Dasein* has been *dispersed* into the “they”, and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of that kind of Being which we know as concerned absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us. If *Dasein* is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that the “they” itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lies closest. *Dasein* is for the sake of the “they” in an everyday manner, and the “they” itself articulates the referential context of significance. (BT, 167)

We have seen that the ontological care structure which is grounded in temporality discloses the whole “Being” of *Dasein*. The unity of this ecstatic structure has an individualizing role as far as it presents to *Dasein* the whole “Being” of it as a unity. Apart from the unity of this ecstatic structure which has an individualizing role, *Dasein* is dispersed all over the world. The average everyday *Dasein* is an entity among “Others”<sup>58</sup>. This leads to its own “Being’s getting more and more absorbed in the “Being” of others (BT, 164). Therefore, as being dispersed, the “Being” of its genuine (authentic) self is covered up and thus suppressed by the “they”. In the first item of the care-structure, i.e., in understanding (existence), by *thrown-projection* upon its potentialities, *Dasein* can understand or disclose only the “Being” of the “they”, not the “Being” of the self (itself). This is so, due to the fact that it is the publicness or “the dominion of others” which *Dasein* is delivered over (Mansbach, 1991, p. 75). In the dominion of the “they” over *Dasein*, the term fallenness has a special role to play. *Dasein* at first has “fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’” (BT, 220). This “having fallen away” can be identified with *Dasein*’s getting lost in the publicness of others. Fallenness might also be understood as fallenness into inauthenticity. As result of having fallen away from its authentic mode of existence, *Dasein* is sheltered by the “they”, so that it is disburdened of its responsibilities (BT, 165). By this disburdening, the “they” accommodates *Dasein* i.e., it gets *Dasein* levelled down to the public domain. Eventually, the “they” has the dominion over the “Being” of *Dasein*; the “they” clearly takes over. In the end, *Dasein*, as I expressed earlier, loses itself in the others by turning into “nobody”. To underscore this fact, Heidegger utters: “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (BT, 165). By this, we should understand that in everyday level “proximally and for the most part” (primarily and usually), *Dasein* is the other (an inauthentic self); in other words, no *Dasein* is an authentic self yet. Thus, the “who” or the “I” of everyday *Dasein* is not a certain self, not one’s self; neither is it a group of people nor the totality of them all. Heidegger states that the “‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [*das Man*]” (BT, 164). The effect of *das Man* is felt so significantly upon everyday

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<sup>58</sup> By “Others” Heidegger does not “mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too” (BT, 154).

*Dasein* that it “proximally and for the most part” follows up the exact same path which has already been opened up by *das Man*:

In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they [man]* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (BT, 164)

Since the acts of *Dasein* are drifted back and forth by the “they-self”, it is not possible to regard them as free acts. No matter how or upon which potentialities *Dasein* projects itself, as long as the dominion of the “they” persists, only the inauthentic mode of freedom, namely the “supposed freedom of the they-self” (BT, 321) will unfold itself.

#### **5.4.2. The Authentic Self**

On Heidegger’s account, the dimension on the basis of which the authentic selfhood – and by extension freedom – comes to the fore is transcendence which is grounded in originary temporality. Even though each of Bergson’s and Heidegger’s philosophy stands on its own foot, we must notice one essential resemblance in their philosophies as regards grasping the self in its individuality, i.e., the genuine or authentic self. As clarified in the fourth chapter, Bergson argued that our individual existence is shaped by our outer, social life. In order to regain the possession of our individuality, we must break the outer crust covered around our inner self; that is, we must break with our social, cultural life and historical inheritance by getting back into our inner self (into “pure duration”). Clearly, Heidegger does not make a distinction between the inner and outer self. Yet, in a likewise manner, Heidegger also argues that unfolding our authentic self requires to turn away from the “they”, by “hearkening” the voice coming from the depth of our inner self, i.e., “the voice of conscience”<sup>59</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> By the call, Heidegger seems to refer to the “silence”. He writes: “The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite. *Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent*” (BT, 318). Presumably, what Heidegger had in mind is that in order to escape from the paralyzing or numbing voice of the “they”, *Dasein* must hearken its inner voice, namely, “the voice of silence”.



By the phrases “Being-in-the-world” and “Being-with-others”, Heidegger has avoided the problem of the existence of the external world and the problem resulted from solipsism. Now, these phrases will cause us a trouble in grasping the individuality of the self. In traditional metaphysics, the self is grasped by introspection or self-reflection. However, when Heideggerian authentic self is at issue, we must reverse the order and start from the absorption in others. In the course of this, we encounter this question: How can *Dasein*’s absorption in the “they” can be avoided so as to provide the basis for it to turn back to itself? In Heidegger’s view, *Dasein*’s realization that it is a being inevitably marching towards its own death alone can furnish this possibility.

As being one of the key terms, “thrownness” suggests that *Dasein* has been thrown into “Being-towards-death”. In the face of this thrownness or “uncanniness”, the first and the general reaction of *Dasein* is to flee from the authentic mode of existence into the inauthentic “they-self” (BT, 399). The “at-home of publicness” and “the idle talk<sup>60</sup>” of the “they” take *Dasein* away from realizing the “uncanniness” of being “not-at home”, i.e., that of the fact that it is a “being-towards-death”.

The temporal existence of the self provides the ground through which the ownmost possibility of the self – its being towards death – is unfolded. The phenomenon of death is anchored in the structure of care, that is, in time. As being-ahead-of-itself, *Dasein* is futural; it is towards the death. One way or another, authentic or inauthentic, *Dasein* has been delivered over to its death as the most unique, individual and unshareable experience of all:

[Authenticity] describes the fulfillment of the potentiality each human being nonetheless possesses to take responsibility for itself and for the world, to win itself back out of its original loss by comporting itself “towards its being as its ownmost possibility” [death]. (Siegel, 2005, pp. 570-571)

*Dasein* “stretches along between birth [the past] and death [the future]” (BT, 445). In the course of its life time, the unique possibility that is to unfold its authentic self is the full realization of its mortality. Yet, even as regards this unique possibility, “the idle talk” of the “they” attempts to turn it into a communally shared experience. No matter what the “they” does, the fact is that “death is in each case mine” (BT, 232); that is, “nobody can die another’s death” (Mansbach, 1991, p. 76). This is the

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<sup>60</sup> The idle talk is the groundless talk of the inauthentic they-self. This talk prevents *Dasein* to hear its inner voice and disclose its authentic mode of existence. See BT, 211-214.

clearest declaration of the individualizing role of death. In the face of death alone that *Dasein* can capture “its existence in its totality and thus focuses on its own existence as it belongs to the individual *Dasein* rather than on the inauthentic ‘they’” (Mansbach, 1991, p. 77).

Anxiety has also a central part to play in the emergence of the authentic self. The mood that we get into after having realized our own mortality is anxiety. That is, anxiety is anxiety felt in the face of death. Given this, its role in revealing the authentic mode of the self cannot be investigated apart from that of death:

Anxiety makes manifest in *Dasein* its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings *Dasein* face to face with its *Being free for* ... the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the Being to which *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over. (BT, 232-232)

Anxiety felt in the face of death sets *Dasein* free to choose its authentic mode of existence. So, the inauthentic mode of “Being” is something *Dasein* is capable of stepping over. Yet, there is the third notion which has an essential role in the authenticity of the self: “the call”. As soon as *Dasein* hears (heeds) “the call of conscience”, and acts accordingly, the authentic mode of selfhood can be accomplished. After having asked “to what is one called” in the call? Heidegger responds:

To one's *own Self*. Not to what *Dasein* counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of, set about, or let itself be carried along with. The sort of *Dasein* which is understood after the manner of the 'world both for Others and for itself, gets *passed over* in this appeal; this is something of which the call to the Self takes not the slightest cognizance. And because only the *Self* of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the "*they*" collapses ... Precisely *in passing over* the "*they*" (keen as it is for public repute) the call pushes it into insignificance [Bedeutungslosigkeit]. But the Self, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgement and hiding-place, gets brought to itself by the call. (BT, 317)

As being dissolved in the “they” and hearing the voice of them (the idle talk) *Dasein* cannot hear the call coming from the depth of its very self (Mansbach, 1991, p. 82). “The call of conscience” thus has an individualizing effect such that when taken notice of, “the call”(or the voice of silence) turns *Dasein* away from the “they”, by calling it to itself so as to break the link which attaches *Dasein* to the publicness of the “they” (Mansbach, 1991, p. 82). “The call” therefore brings *Dasein* face to face with its having been thrown into the world, i.e., with its groundlessness and nullity.

Yet, Heidegger states that: *Dasein*” has been *released* from its basis, *not through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this basis* (BT, 330).

#### **5.4.3. Freedom and Transcendence**

“The call of conscience” provides *Dasein* with the opportunity of cutting loose with the “they” or its inauthentic existence, and thus with the opportunity of freedom for choosing and taking hold of its authentic self. This possibility of possessing freedom to choose its authentic self and to win itself back signifies the term “resoluteness”. *Dasein* is set free for choosing from the past, that is, among multiplicity of possibilities which has been delivered over to it throughout the history. Upon this Heidegger states that “*Dasein* may choose its hero” (BT, 437). To be more specific, by this, Heidegger means that “it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated” (BT, 437). The resolute *Dasein* stands up for its freedom for “choosing itself and taking hold of itself”. Instead of fleeing into the conformity of the “they”, *Dasein* takes the responsibility of its own life. As Siegel writes: “Whereas in the world of *das Man* no one takes responsibility, where authentic existence is achieved any single resolute individual can take responsibility for all” (2005, p. 578).

As regards the authentic selfhood, the freedom and the transcendence of the self can by no means be thought of dissociated from one another. Indeed, it is the transcendence that opens up a way for *Dasein* to possess the freedom of choosing itself. Ecstatic character of the self, i.e., its being “transcendence”, “standing out” and “being-ahead-of-itself” can be made possible on the basis of the ecstatic unity of time.

Heidegger states that transcendence finds its meaning in human finitude. In other words, it finds its meaning in the fact that human is a “being-towards-death”, i.e., temporal. That is why “transcendence” is identified with “finitude” (KPM, 64). As Kant has shown us, finite human beings do not have “an intellectual intuition” which is supposed to produce its own objects (beings), in the process of intuition. On the contrary, on Heidegger’s view, Kant’s claim is that, human beings can have only sensible (finite) intuition which is supposed to form a horizon of the transcendence through which the self encounters its objects. Or, as Heidegger puts it: “The letting-

stand-against of that which is objective and which offers itself, of the being-in-opposition-to, occurs in transcendence ...” (KPM, 74). Heidegger elaborates the formation of the horizon of the transcendence by referring to Kant’s explanation of the power of imagination. In doing so, he seeks the origin of transcendence in *Dasein*. He says: “Time provides the basis for leaping off into what is 'outside of me'...” (BT, 248). That is, original time opens up a horizon or a transcendence through which the self can take a step into what is (seemingly) outside itself. This is significantly different from the way in which Cartesian *ego* (inner self) struggles to transcend itself to get access to the external world. In Heidegger’s understanding, it is not like that first the self realizes its inner self and afterward it tries to step over itself. Rather, the self is stepping over; it is already transcendence. That is, in looking, writing, hammering, talking, acting, thinking and so on, i.e., in every mode of day-to-day activities, the self transcends itself. Transcendence is clearly indicative of the selfhood. As indicated earlier, transcendence is not a kind of addition which is attached to the self afterwards. On the contrary, it is also constitutive element of *Dasein* which it possesses beforehand:

Transcendence is rather the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. The subject transcends qua subject; it would not be a subject if it did not transcend. To be a subject means to transcend. This means that *Dasein* does not sort of exist and then occasionally achieve a crossing over outside itself, but existence originally means to cross over. *Dasein* is itself the passage across. (MFL, 165)

The ecstatic unity of originary temporality – the unity of the past, the present and the future – serves as a basis upon which the whole “Being” of *Dasein* is held together as the entire care-structure, namely existence (being-ahead-of-itself), facticity (“Being-already-in”), and falling (“Being-alongside”). Given this, *Dasein* can freely oscillate between its past and its future through its present. Then, it is certainly by virtue of this ecstatic unity of time that *Dasein* is transcendence; it is in this sense “stepping over”. Therefore, transcendence is constitutive of the authentic self and its freedom at the same time.

Therefore, time as originary temporality is an ecstatic unity of the past, the present and the future, in and through which the whole “Being” of *Dasein*, i.e., its existence, facticity and fallenness, as care-structure, is unfolded. “Being” of *Dasein* is thus best be characterized as an entity who “stretches along between birth and death [historizing]” (BT, 425). This is why Heidegger interprets *Dasein* as “temporality”

and treats it to be “historical” (BT, 278). Running parallel to Bergsonian idea of the self, thus, *Dasein* can be characterized as “happening”; as an entity that is in constant making; under construction. That is, it can be taken as an entity whose life story discloses itself “between birth and death”. As a matter of fact, the key idea here is to be “between birth and death”. This idea leads us back to “Being-ahead-of-itself” (the future) and “Being-towards-the-end”. “Being-towards-the-end” is “Being towards one's ownmost [the most genuine] potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and is not to be outstripped” (BT, 299) and also which is “not-yet”, i.e., it is “Being-towards-death”. Only by anxiety in the face of death, that *Dasein* “can develop an “*impassioned freedom towards death*,” which releases it from the illusions of the “they” (BT, 311). By the disclosure of “Being” of *Dasein* on temporal basis, thus, we can really grasp the meaning of the Heideggerian authentic self.

In the end, originary temporality, that which opens up a transcendence or horizon, discloses itself as “the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being” (MFL, 302). Finally, to highlight the decisive relation between originary temporality and *Dasein*, Heidegger argues as follows:

There is always possibility that there could be no human beings at all. After all, there was a time when there were no human beings. But strictly speaking, we cannot say there was a time when there were no human beings. At every *time*, there were and are and will be human beings, because time temporalizes itself only as long as there are human beings. There is no time in which there were no human beings, not because there are human beings from all eternity and for all eternity, but because time is not eternity, and time always temporalizes itself only at one, as human, historical *Dasein*. (IM: 88-89)

Blattner (2005) refers to this paragraph to support his “Heidegger’s temporal idealism” thesis. According to this thesis, “time depends on *Dasein* [on *Dasein*’s originary temporality]”; and most importantly, it suggests that “no *Dasein*, no time” (pp. 317-318). I think, by the paragraph just quoted, Heidegger had in mind that if there was no human self, there would definitely be no time at all as we conceive it. There would be no time, since the time as we understand it is always dependent upon human *Dasein*.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION: REVEALING THE FACT

The chief aim of this dissertation is to be able to provide a context in which the self and time are demonstrated as inseparably linked that should be understood in their mutual relationship. Even though time is always assumed in the course of the life of the self and considered as a familiar element accordingly, it is in fact a stranger to us. After a detailed investigation, the human self, that is the center of all the philosophical thinking and practices, seems to be a stranger as well. To get a significant insight into these two themes, they must be studied together. The motivation to do so is as follows: When the investigation of the self is carried out further, as I have attempted to show throughout the present study, the self reveals itself as a concept which can be understood on the basis of time alone. Therefore, this study aimed to reveal the fact that time is linked to the self such that the self can no longer be studied in isolation. Depending on which theory one embraces, the self necessarily encounters a certain set of problems. To resolve the set in question, the self inevitably finds itself intertwined with time.

In the second chapter, I have showed the inseparable link between the self and time in two rival views of the self in modern era, namely, the Cartesian substantial self and the Humean illusory self. I have demonstrated that no matter which view one embraces the problem set that encounters the self can be solved by calling time in aid alone. Descartes argued that the self is “a thing that thinks”; it is a real, substantial entity that is identical to itself at each moment of time. Other than this, it is a real entity that all my perceptions, thoughts, and so on must necessarily refer. Given this, it can also be considered as a unity. Descartes has proved the existence of the (inner) self through self-reflection (introspection). When the self is posited as a distinct entity from the external world, “the identity”, “continuity”, “accessibility”,

and even “transcendence”, enter the picture as a problem set to be resolved. I have argued that there was a missing piece in Descartes’s metaphysical project, i.e., time. And, without putting time in its place, the problem set in question cannot be solved. To start with, after having proved the existence of the real self, Descartes has declared it to be the first principle of his metaphysics. Nevertheless, when it comes to demonstrate the identity and the continuity of the self over time, he has appealed to the thesis of “the divine preservation”. I have claimed that to account for the identity and the continuity of the self by appealing to the divine preservation assumes time. To clarify, for the real self to exist through time, God must preserve it at each moment of time– or produce it anew. Descartes argues in the same way to account for the identity and the continuity of (the objects of) the external world. Yet, in this explanation, Descartes presupposes time as a basis upon which the self, as well as the external world, is preserved constantly. That is, time seems to be formed or assumed by God’s preservation activity; otherwise, the preservation over time cannot take place. Thus, as a ground of the identity and continuity of the self and the world, time unfolded itself as the common ground of them. As regards the problem of accessibility and transcendence, when the proof of the existence of the inner self is established and proceeded from within the self accordingly, the abyss between “the inner” and “the outer” comes to the fore. That is, the inner self encounters the problem of getting access to the external world. Attempting to reach the external world, the self must step over its inner sphere so as to reach the outer. This brings it face to face with the problem of transcendence. This problem can be resolved by realizing that in the process, the self somehow stretches time beneath itself and the external world as the common ground upon which the transcendence to get access to the outer realm can be accomplished. In other words, in the course of settling the problems at issue, time comes to the aid by revealing itself as the common ground. Thus, in the course of this movement, the linkage of time to the self makes itself apparent.

On the other hand, we have seen that, according to Hume, the self is a “bundle or collection of different perceptions”. That is, the Cartesian self is a mere illusion. Apparently, on Hume’s account, there is no such self beyond different particular perceptions which holds them together. There is no identical self to which all our perceptions, thoughts, and so on must refer. Like Descartes, Hume captures the self

as a way of introspection or self-reflection. Nevertheless, unlike Descartes, Hume's bundle theory suggests that the self cannot be regarded as a unity. Rather, it is thought of as temporal succession of distinct perceptions. Hume's self is, therefore, spread out over time. When the bundle theory of the self is endorsed, the problem set that the self is faced with consists of "succession" (of sense impressions; their following one another) and "making sense of the world" (attributing meaning to these impressions). The bundle theory claims that the discrete perceptions are in "perpetual flux", i.e., in temporal succession. That is, the past perceptions are followed by the present ones in inconceivable speed that mind cannot distinguish one from the other. I have explained that, on Hume's account, the reason for the incomprehensible rapidity of the succession at issue is elaborated by taking time into consideration. In this process, the imagination and memory are in perpetual cooperation with time. Without assuming time, the bundle theory of the self can never arise. Time is considered by Hume as a structure of the mind in which the self can notice itself as a succession of perceptions. Another problem that the self encounters is the problem of attributing meaning to the flux of sense impressions given to the mind. I have displayed that by serving as a frame or structure of the mind, according to which the impressions are arranged in a harmonious way, time enables the self to make sense of the world. I have interpreted the bundle theory as an attempt to stretch the unity of the self over time. For by this theory, I have demonstrated that Hume has broken the unity of the self into pieces by presenting the self as a temporal succession of discrete perceptions (conscious states). Nevertheless, even though, it was Hume who first completely released the veil over the temporal character of the self, this attempt remained unaccomplished.

In Descartes and Hume's philosophies, the temporal character of the self is assumed; yet, it is in fact, in Kant's philosophy that the temporal character of the self, as well as the subjective character of time are established. Kant makes a distinction between the phenomenal (scientific) realm and the *noumenal* (moral) realm. Accordingly, we face two different selves: the transcendental self and the moral self. The transcendental self is nothing but a necessary logical or formal subject, which is the condition of possibility for bringing the temporally-ordered manifold of experience into a unity. This theory of the self brings us face to face with the problem set including "the epistemic access", "knowledge acquisition", and "transcendence".



The self is first the unity of consciousness and second the unity of (the objects) of experience. Unity (as coherent, meaningful, non-contradictory experiences) presupposes the capacity to organize every objects and every single ongoing events temporally, i.e., to put the world properly into a temporal frame. I have demonstrated that, in this theory of the self, both the unity of the self and of the experiential world are in need of time as “an intersubjectively valid order”. We have seen that the Kantian experiential world and the idea of the self are unities, and this is why they require time. Other than this, in the self’s (epistemic) access to its objects, an obstacle has arisen. It has been clarified how time functions as common intersubjective ground for transcendence and thus getting access to objects of experience, on the one hand, and for the constitution the knowledge of them, on the other. We have also seen that, by the transcendental self, Kant could not give an account of the freedom. For, the temporal, experiential world is governed by the laws of nature, freedom is expelled from the temporal world. When we have fixed our attention on the Kantian moral self, we have realized that it is considered as a free agent by Kant. This has raised the problem of “freedom”. Since in the temporal world every event is determined causally, there can be no place for freedom or free agents. In Kant’s universe, time draws a sharp line between the world of necessity and the world of freedom. And it is because of time that freedom is expelled from the world of experience. Nevertheless, the effects of the free acts of the moral self must necessarily fall within the temporal world. This has manifested the fact that the freely acting self and the concept of freedom can make no sense to us unless they are understood in terms of time.

With Bergson, the way we understand the universe and the way we philosophize have undergone a radical change. After having inquired into his philosophy, we have seen that he has distanced himself from Descartes, Hume and Kant as regards the states of consciousness. Unlike them, especially Hume and Kant, Bergson rejects the view of discrete conscious states. Instead, he develops a thesis of “qualitative multiplicity” according to which conscious states interpenetrate each other. Since conscious states are un-extended, they cannot be separated from one another as objects in space can. This signifies continuous, progressive, interpenetrating, i.e., temporal, characteristics of the states of consciousness. This different understanding of conscious states finds its meaning in a different understanding of time, that is, the

time dissociated from space and anything related to it. As we have seen, Bergson has coined the term “duration” to clarify the meaning of true time as being, qualitative, dynamic, and creative. In searching for Bergson’s view of the self, it has turned out that without comprehending the meaning of “duration” first, to get a significant insight into his understanding of the self is impossible. Bergson clearly distinguishes between the duration (true time) and time as spatially understood. As a result, we are presented with the twofold conception of the self: the self as outer and social and the self as inner and individual. By endorsing Bergson’s view of the self, one is encountered with the problem set containing the problem of “the succession” (of conscious states), “the absolute knowledge”, “the genuineness or authenticity” of the self, and “freedom”. As I have just said, the qualitative multiplicity, which can be understood by thinking time as “duration”, provides an explanation to the problem of “the succession”. I have exhibited, in Bergson’s view, “duration” must be understood as reality, which is a continual change, mobility or the real flux. This has explained why states of consciousness permeate one another successively. Likewise, the account of absolute knowledge can be given by taking reality as real flux. The explanation of this problem is closely linked with the genuine understanding of the self (the deeper self). Bergson has claimed that one’s inner, individual self is covered by an outer crust which is formed by its outer, social self, i.e., by the effects of social, cultural, and historical inheritance of a community of which it is a part. To regain the possession of its genuine self, one must break with the outer and must get back into pure “duration”. As has been demonstrated, when the self gets access to reality which is envisaged as a flux, it can also realize that it is itself a flux or “duration” as well. In such a universe everything is resolved in pure duration; it is the lived flux of duration in which everything is related. So, accounts of the genuineness of the self and absolute knowledge could be given. As regards the problem of freedom, time comes to assistance again. With his theory of duration and radical thoughts about the evolution, he has replaced the mechanistic world in which the strict law of cause-effect relation is operating, with the vitalistic world in which everything is governed by *élan vital* (“the creative force of life”). By identifying reality as “duration” which is the dynamic, mobile, creative and thus unpredictable aspect of the life, Bergson has restored freedom to the temporal world.

In Heidegger's philosophy, the decisive relation between the self and time has come to the fore in the full sense of the word. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger analyzes two modes of the self: the inauthentic self and the authentic self. The inauthentic mode of the self indicates a self which is determined by a society's norms and its historical inheritance, cultural practices and so on. However, the authentic self signifies the individual, or better, the genuine aspect of the self. As is explained, Heidegger introduced the term *Dasein* ("Being-there") to refer to the human mode of existence. By this understanding of the self, Heidegger has avoided to tackle some problems of traditional metaphysics. Nevertheless, it has had to account for the problem set which consists of "the origin of time", "the authenticity of the self", "transcendence" and "freedom". For Heidegger, time as we conceive it in our daily experiences has never been enough. He has traced time back to its origin. Instead of understanding time as a succession of the past, the present, and the future, Heidegger has thought them in terms of their ecstatic unity, which he has called originary temporality. The original time as an ontological structure is engaged with the care structure of *Dasein* which is the unity of its existence (the future), fallenness (the present), and its facticity (the past). The ontological structure of *Dasein* is unfolded in the ecstatic unity of original time which is also an ontological structure. I have attempted to show that the structural elements of *Dasein's* "Being", namely, existence, fallenness and facticity can be exhibited as interwoven through the ecstatic unity of the past, present and the future (original time). Only by understanding *Dasein* in terms of time that we can see how it can realize itself as an individual entity whose experiences are revealed in time as interrelated. It is by virtue of this that *Dasein* is disclosed as an entity "who stretches along between birth and death" (BT, 425). This is why, Heidegger interprets *Dasein* as temporality. By the term *Dasein* and its being towards death (futural) the account of transcendence has been given. *Dasein*, as being-there (in the world) among others, and being futural is itself already transcendence. On Heidegger's account, this term is constitutive of *Dasein*. As regards the problem of freedom, I have made it clear that it is strongly linked to the authentic mode of the self. Anxiety in the face of death helps *Dasein* to hear its inner voice and realize its finitude or temporality. Then, this experience brings *Dasein* face to face with its being free towards its death. In addition to this, death as the ownmost possibility of *Dasein* which cannot be outstripped, enables it to cut its

strings attached to the inauthentic they-self. Its being temporal thus releases *Dasein* from the inauthentic mode of existence and provides it with the opportunity of the authentic mode as well as the experience of its freedom.

Our journey of revealing the fact that the self is inseparably linked to time has started with Descartes and Hume, it has continued with Kant and Bergson, and finally ended with Heidegger. In Descartes' and Hume's philosophies the self has been in focus. Through the mediation of their conceptions of the self, we have unfolded the role of time and have highlighted its relation to the self. In Descartes metaphysical project, we have demonstrated that time is the ground upon which the identity and continuity of the self (as well as those of the objects in the external world) are established. Moreover, we have seen that it is the common ground upon which the self can get access to the external world by transcending its inner sphere. In Hume's philosophy, time has showed itself as a mental structure or frame – constituted by the self – which the flux of impressions entail in order to be arranged in a successive order. Given this, time plays an essential part in making sense of the world. Furthermore, this idea of time as a mental structure is responsible for the self to notice itself as a bundle of successive perceptions. Therefore, the Human self has been regarded as an unaccomplished attempt of disseminating the self over time.

In Kantian universe, there has been a balance as to the self and time; that is, the emphasis has been upon time as well as the self. It was Kant who delineated time's subjective character first. In this part of our journey, we have faced time as a unity upon which the unity of the self, as well as (objects) experience, must be grounded. Furthermore, the self has manifested itself as the subject that brought time into a unity. From the perspective of the world of experience, the self is constantly weaving a temporal net in which it constructs the unity of the whole world and its very self at the same time.

In Bergson's universe, rather than the self, time has come to the fore. Here, time has been unconcealed as reality which is regarded as the lived flux of true duration. Here, through the mediation of time, we could get a particular insight into the understanding of the self. We have demonstrated that Bergson's idea of the self must be taken as the "life of consciousness" or "the lived flux of the self's own experiences". By this, "the unity of the self" has been dissolved into the flux of

reality. Given this, this has been construed as nothing but the declaration of the breakdown of “the unity of the self”. Therefore, we have argued that, by this claim, Bergson has accomplished the Hume’s uncompleted attempt of disseminating the self over time by establishing its being completely temporal.

In Heidegger’s understanding, *Dasein* has been considered as an entity marching towards its death. By this, its being temporal, i.e., futural has been underscored. Through the course of unfolding the “Being” of the self and regain the authentic mode of its existence, time has always accompanied the self. We have understood that the meaning of the authentic self can by no means be captured except by taking time as a horizon through which the “Being” of the self is exhibited. The self has disclosed itself as an entity which stretches over time from birth to death. So, *Dasein* as the self has been interpreted as temporality by Heidegger.

This journey, in the end, has brought us close enough to see the fact with our own eyes. It has thus helped us to reveal the fact and announce it with confidence that there is an inseparable relation between the self and time. No matter from which notion one starts philosophizing first, this notion would be in need of the other. If one starts from the self, it would assume time and link time to itself in order to get over certain problems it will face. Then, the inquiry into what the self is can be carried out on a temporal basis alone. The answer to the question: “who am I” can be given in its mutual relation with the question: “what is time?”

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezin yazılış amacı, kendilik (*self*) ve zaman kavramlarına dair tüm gizemi aydınlatmak veya bunlarla ilgili kesin ve değişmez tanımlamalar ortaya koymak değildir. Bu tezin amacı, kendilik ve zaman kavramları arasındaki ayrılmaz ilişkiyi ifşa etmektir. Kendilik ve zaman meselesi her zaman ayrı ayrı ele alınmış ve onlara dair çalışmalar bu şekilde yapılmıştır. Yapılmaya çalışılan şey; bu iki kavramın ancak birbirleri ile olan ilişkileri üzerinden anlaşılabilceğini göstermek ve bu ilişkiselliğin ortaya koyulabileceği bağlamı sağlayabilmektir. Zaman sorunu, düşünürlerin her zaman ilgisini çeken, üzerine ışık tutmaya çalıştıkları ve hakkında kuramlar geliştirmek için çabaladıkları; buna rağmen felsefe ve bilim tarihi boyunca gizemini koruyan bir sorundur. Bu gizemin aydınlatılamamasının en büyük nedeni, zamanın tanımlanmasının, belirlenmesinin ve idrakinin ardında yatan güçlüktür. Zamanın doğasından kaynaklanıyor gibi görünen bu güçlük, insanın onu kavrama çabalarını her zaman sekteye uğratmıştır. Yine de bu ele gelmez ve kalıba sığmaz oluş, zaman kavramının çağlar boyunca cazibesini koruyabilmesine engel teşkil edememiş; aksine, onun daha da cezbedici bir hale gelmesine öncülük etmiştir. İlk bakışta, kendilik kavramının zaman ile olan benzerliğini veya ilişkisini görmek pek kolay olmasa da derinlemesine incelendiğinde, bu ilişkinin açığa çıkması kaçınılmazdır. Nasıl ki, zaman üzerine yapılan araştırmalar, onun kavrama getirilmesinin zorluğunu ortaya çıkarıyorsa, kendilik üzerine yapılan araştırmalar da bu düşüncenin idrakinin aslında ne denli zor olduğunu göstermektedir. Öncelikle, zaman, her ne kadar bütün düşüncelerimizde, deneyimlerimizde, pratiklerimizde ve eylemlerimizde varsayıyor gibi görünse de, onun, belirgin hatlarla sınırlanıp açık bir şekilde ortaya konmasında bir zorluk vardır. Benzer bir şekilde, kendilik, her ne kadar bana en yakın, hatta dolaysız bir biçimde “ben” olsa da; yani, her ne kadar benim öz varoluşum olsa da, onun açık seçik bir biçimde ortaya konması ciddi

zorluk teşkil etmektedir. Bütün düşünce ve eylemlerimizde bulunduğu varsayılan; ne olduğu sorulmadıkça verili ve açık olarak kabul ettiğimiz zaman ve kendilik kavramları, yakın ve tanıdık görünse de; aslında bizden uzak ve bize yabancısıdır. Bu şaşırtıcı özellikleri, kendilik ve zaman arasında bir nevi ilişki olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu tezin asıl meselesi; zaman ve kendilik arasındaki ayrılmaz ilişkiyi göz önünde bulundurarak, bu iki kavramı birbirinden soyutlayarak ele almak yerine; bu kavramları birbirleriyle olan ilişkileri çerçevesinde araştırmaktır.

Kendilik ve zaman arasında ayrılmaz bir ilişki olduğunu iddia etmemizin asıl nedeni şu şekilde açıklanabilir: Savunduğumuz felsefi öğretisi her ne olursa olsun, kendilik kavramı belirli bir sorunlar kümesi ile karşı karşıya gelir. Bu sorunları çözme girişiminde, kendilik, zaman ile irtibat kurmak ve ondan yardım almak zorunda kalır. Bir başka şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, kendilik ve zaman arasındaki bağdaşıklık gösterilmeksizin mevzubahis sorunlar çözülemez ve dolayısıyla da kendilik üzerine yapılan çalışmaların tamamlanması mümkün olamaz. Benzer şekilde, zamana dair yapılacak herhangi bir araştırma, kendilik üzerine odaklanılmaksızın, kapsamlı bir çalışma olmaktan oldukça uzak kalacaktır.

Tezin birinci bölümü, genel olarak izlenecek yöntemi ve tezin yapısı hakkındaki açıklamaları içermektedir. Daha önce de ifade edildiği üzere, ele gelmez ve kalıba sığmaz oluşundan ötürü, zamanın tanımlanmasında, kesin olarak belirlenmesinde ve de tam olarak kavranmasında büyük bir güçlük ile karşılaşmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, kendilik ile ilişkiselliği üzerinden zamanı anlama çabası, aslında onu daha fazla kavranabilir ve elle tutulabilir hale getirmekten ibarettir. Aynı beklenti, kendilik kavramını, zaman ile olan münasebeti dolayısıyla anlamaya çalışma girişimimizde de bulunmaktadır. Hal böyle olunca, bu tezde izlenecek yöntem şu şekilde ifade edilebilir: Eğer ki, bir kavram kendi başına ele alındığında tam olarak idrak edilebilir değilse, burada yapılması gereken şey, ona, daha çok kavranabilir olan bir başka kavram dolayısıyla yaklaşmaktır. Aynı şekilde, eğer birbiriyle ilişkili olduğu varsayılan iki kavramın idrakinde güçlük yaşıyorsa, bu kez izlenecek en iyi yöntem, bu iki kavram arasında sürekli bir salınım yaparak onları daha idrak edilir ve elle tutulur hale getirmeye çabalamak olacaktır. İlk kavrama dair elde edebileceğimiz çok küçük bir bilgi kısıntısı dahi, ikinci kavramı daha çok anlamamıza katkı sağlayacaktır. Benzer olarak, ikinci kavram hakkında

öğreneceğimiz şeyler, diğer kavrama dair bilgimizi genişletecektir. Öyleyse, bu iki kavram arasındaki salınım ne kadar devam ettirilirse, her birine dair elde edeceğimiz bilgi o denli fazla olacaktır. Bu sayede, her iki kavram da daha çok ele gelir ve idrak edilir olacaktır. Bu tezde, yeri geldiğinde, kendilik kavramı üzerine odaklanılacaktır; onun ne olduğuna ilişkin veri elde edildikten sonra, zaman kavramına dönülüp, ona dair idrakimiz artırılmaya çalışılacaktır. Yeri geldiğinde ise, zaman kavramının ne olduğu üzerine bir araştırmayla başlanıp, daha sonra kendilik kavramına bir dönüş yapılacaktır ve bu kavram, zaman dolayımıyla açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır. Burada üzerinde durulması gereken en önemli husus şudur: Bu öncelik ve sonralık durumu, bir kavrama daha fazla önem atfedilmesi ve diğerine çıkarımsal olarak yaklaşılmasına neden olmayacaktır. Bu durum, her bölümde işlenecek düşünürün, kendilik ve zaman kavramlarını daha iyi ele alıp sunabilmek için gerekli olan yöntemsel bir yaklaşım olacaktır.

Bu tez, öncelikle kendilik ve zaman üzerine ve daha da önemlisi bunların ne denli bağdaşık oldukları üzerine bir çalışmadır. Kendilik, zaman ve bunlar arasındaki ilişki üzerine çalışılmanın önemi şu şekilde açık kılınabilir. Öncelikle hepimiz, “kendilik”, “ben”(I; *Ego*), “özne” (*subject*), “zihin”, veya “kişi” (*person*) olarak adlandırılan insanlarız. İçinde bulunduğumuz dünya; icraatlerimiz ve üretimlerimiz (bunlara örnek olarak edebiyat, sanat, siyaset, ekonomi, bilim ve felsefe verilebilir); diğer kendilikler; son olarak da diğer kendilikler ve dış dünya ile etkileşimimiz hakkında herhangi bir şey anlamak istiyorsak, yapılacak en iyi şey öncelikle kendiliğimiz, yani kendi varoluşumuz hakkında bir çalışma yapmaktır. Bunun dışında, kendilik kavramı çok derin olduğu kadar ilk bakışta görüldüğünden daha karmaşık, birçok meseleyi çözme konusunda umut verici ve zengin bir konudur. Örneğin, bu kavram, özdeşlik, nedensellik, anlam, bilgi, varlık, aşkınlık, güzellik, özgürlük vb. gibi meseleler ile önemli bir ilişki içerisindedir. Şöyle ki, metafizik, bilgi felsefesi, varlık felsefesi, estetik, ahlak felsefesi ve siyaset felsefesi, yani aslında felsefenin tüm dalları, kendilik düşüncesi ile ilişkilidir. Burada unutulmaması gereken asıl mevzu şudur: Felsefe yapanın, insanın kendisi olduğu kabul edildiği sürece; kendilik fikri her felsefe dalında merkezi bir öneme sahiptir.

Zaman sorununun neden üzerinde çalışılmaya değer bir konu olduğu iddiasına gelince, söylenmesi gereken şey şudur: Bu kavram olmadan, kendilik üzerine yapılacak

çalışmalar eksik kalacaktır. Kendilik ve zaman arasında öylesine bir bağ vardır ki, kendiliğin dış dünyaya erişiminde; onu anlamlandırmasında; özneler-arası (*intersubjective*) bir düzen kurmasında; özgürlüğün hesabını vermesinde ve son olarak kendi iç, sahil (*authentic*) varoluşunu idrak edişinde, zaman hayati bir öneme sahiptir. Kendilik ile birlikte, zaman kavramının derinliği ve zenginliği, zamanı adeta bir cazibe merkezi haline getirmektedir.

Tezin ikinci bölümü, geleneksel olarak kabul gören modern felsefenin kendilik kavramıyla başlamaktadır. Bu bölümün içeriğini temel olarak Descartes'çı tözsel kendilik ile Hume'cu kendilik yanılması üzerine yapılan araştırmalar oluşturmaktadır. Burada, usçu Descartes ile deneyci Hume'un seçilmesinin özel bir anlamı vardır. Bu bölümde amaçlanan şey, usçuluk ve deneycilik olarak adlandırılan iki karşıt felsefi düşüncenin önde gelen bu iki düşünürünün kendilik kavramlarının, zaman ile ayrılmaz bir münasebet içerisinde olduklarını göstermektedir.

İkinci bölümün ilk kısmında, Descartes'in kendilik anlayışı ele alınacaktır. Daha sonra, hem bu anlayıştaki hem de Descartes'in genel metafiziğindeki eksik parça olarak değerlendirilecek olan zaman kavramı işlenecektir. Descartes, kendiliğin “düşünen şey” olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Bu iddiaya göre, kendilik, zamanın her anında kendisine özdeş olan tözsel bir varlıktır. O öyle bir varlıktır ki, tüm algılarım, düşüncelerim, tasarımlarım, deneyimlerim vb. en sonunda ona yönelmek zorundadır. Bu şekilde tasarlanan kendilik, öyleyse, bir “birlik” (*unity*) olarak ele alınabilir. Descartes, bu kendilik fikrine, meditasyon – iç gözlem veya tefekkür – sonucunda ulaşmıştır. Descartes, *Meditasyonlar* adlı kitabında, şüphe yöntemiyle, neyin açık ve seçik olarak bilinebileceğini, yani tartışılmaz bilgi olarak kabul edilebileceğini ve de nelerden şüphe edilebileceğini sorgulamaya girişir. Bu yöntemiyle elde etmek istediği şey, tartışılmaz olarak, açık ve seçik bir biçimde kabul edilebilecek bir ilk ilkeye ulaşabilmektir. Descartes'a göre, felsefenin ilk ilkesi olarak kabul edilecek böyle bir ilkeye ulaşılabilirse, bundan hareketle diğer doğru bilgilere de ulaşabilmek mümkün olacaktır. Bu yöntem ile Descartes, gördüğümüzü ve bildiğimizi sandığımız her şeyin adeta bir rüyadaymışçasına, bir yanılmasadan ibaret olma ihtimali üzerine derin düşüncelere dalar. Daha sonra, “kötücül bir cin” (*evil genius*) tarafından sürekli yanıltılıyor olabileceğimiz tezi üzerinde durur. En sonunda, gördüğümüz tüm maddi dünyanın, gökyüzünün, yıldızların, kendi bedenimiz de

dâhil her şeyin gerçekte var olmayacağı bir ihtimal olarak karşımızda duruyor olsa da, kendi benliğinin var olduğu gerçeğinden asla şüphe edemeyeceği sonucuna ulaşır. Bunu da, “düşünüyorum o halde varım” (“*Cogito ergo sum*”) önermesi ile formüleştirir. Sonuç olarak, kendilik bir töz olarak kabul edilir. Dahası, Descartes, uzamı, doğası düşünmek olan kendilikten ayırır ve uzamın da ayrı bir töz olduğunu iddia eder. Tezin bu bölümünde, bu şekilde tasarlanan Descartes metafiziğinde kendiliğin, “özdeşlik”, “süreklilik”, “erişilebilirlik” ve hatta “aşkınlık” (*transcendence*) gibi bir sorun kümesiyle karşılaşacağı ve bu sorunları çözmek zorunda kalacağı açık bir şekilde görünmektedir. Buradaki temel iddia, Descartes metafiziğinde eksik bir paça bulunduğu ve bu parça yerine konulmaksızın, bu sorun kümesinin çözümünün olanaklı olmadığıdır. Bu eksik parça, zamandan başka bir şey değildir. Zamandan yardım almaksızın bu sorunların çözülemeyeceğini şu şekilde açıklayabiliriz: Öncelikle, Descartes, tözsel kendiliğin var olduğunu kanıtladıktan sonra, onu metafiziğinin ilk ilkesi olarak kabul etmiştir. Ancak, iş, bu ilk ilkenin özdeşliğini ve sürekliliğini açıklamaya geldiğinde, Descartes, “tanrı onayı” (“*divine concurrence*”) savına başvurmadan başka bir şey yapmaz. Ona göre, var olmak için zamanın her anında yaratılmaya benzer bir şeye ihtiyaç duyarız. Yani, zamanın her anında, var oluşumuzun Tanrı tarafından korunması gerekir. Benzer biçimde, Descartes, dış dünyanın özdeşliği ve sürekliliği söz konusu olduğunda da her anda Tanrı tarafından korunma tezini ileri sürer; ancak, burada gözden kaçan nokta, Descartes’in kendiliğin ve de dış dünyanın sürekli korunduğu ortak bir zemin olarak, zamanı aslında var sayıyor olduğudur. Görünen o ki, Tanrı’nın koruma edimi sonucunda zaman ortaya çıkmaktadır. Aksi takdirde, zamanda meydana gelmek zorunda olan bu edimi kavrayabilmek mümkün olmazdı. Öyleyse, zaman, kendilik ve dış dünyanın özdeşliğinin ve sürekliliğinin ortak zemini olarak kendini göstermektedir.

“Erişilebilirlik” ve “aşkınlık” sorunlarına göz attığımızda şöyle bir sonuçla karşılaşırız: Hatırlanacağı gibi, Descartes kendilik ile dış dünyanın farklı ve ayrı iki töz olduğunu ileri sürmüştü. Meditasyon sonucu elde edilen “içsel kendilik” başlangıç noktası olarak alındığı takdirde, içsel ve dışsal olan arasında bir uçurum ortaya çıkar. İçsel kendilik, doğal olarak, kendisinden ayrı olan dış dünyaya erişmede bir sorun ile karşılaşır. Dış dünyaya erişim mücadelesinde, kendilik, içsel alanını terk etmek, yani onu aşmak zorunda kalır. Dışsal olana erişebilmek için içsel

olanı terk etmek, onu “aşkınlık” problemi ile yüz yüze getirir. Bu sorun, kendiliğin bu süreçte, zamanı adeta kendisi ile dış dünyanın ortak zemini olarak tasarlayarak; yani, bu ortak zemin temelinde kendi içselliğini aşıp dış dünyaya erişebileceğini fark etmesiyle çözüme kavuşturulabilir. Basitçe ifade etmek gerekirse, söz konusu sorunları çözme sürecinde, zaman ortak bir zemin olarak kendini açığa çıkarır. Sonuç olarak, bu süreçte zamanın kendilik ile olan ilişkisi gözler önüne serilir.

Tezin ikinci bölümünün ikinci kısmında, Hume’un, Kartezyen tözsel özneye karşı çıkması; onun bir yanılısamadan başka bir şey olmadığını ileri sürmesi ayrıntılarıyla incelenmektedir. Hume’a göre kendilik, farklı algıların toplamı olarak düşünülür; buna göre kendilik “algı demeti” (*bundle of perceptions*) olarak ele alınır. Açıkça görünmektedir ki, Hume’a göre, farklı algılarımızın ötesinde olup onların bir arada olmalarının bir kaynağı olarak tasarlanabilecek bir kendilik fikrinin gerçekte bir karşılığı yoktur. Bu düşünceye göre, tüm algılarımın, düşüncelerimin, tasarımlarımın, deneyimlerimin vb. ötesinde bulunan ve bunların yönelmek zorunda olduğu, kendi kendine özdeş bir kendilik olamaz. Descartes’e benzer şekilde, Hume da kendiliği iç gözlem sonucu kavrar; ancak, yukarıdaki nedenlerden ötürü, Descartes gibi, kendiliği “birlik” olarak ele almaz. Aksine, kendilik, farklı algıların zamansal ardışıklığı olarak düşünülür. Bu anlayışa göre, Hume’cu anlamda kendilik, zamana yayılmış bir kendiliktir. Her ne kadar tözsel kendilikten farklı olsa da, bu anlayış da “ardışıklık” ve “dünyayı anlamlı kılma” gibi belirli bir sorun kümesi ile karşı karşıya kalır. Demet kuramı’na göre, birbirlerinden farklı olan algılarımız daimi bir akış, yani zamansal bir art ardalık içerisinde. Hume’a göre, her ne kadar her bir algı diğerinden farklı ve ayrık olsa da, bunlar, farklılıkları kavranamaz bir hızda aktıkları için, zihnimiz onların farklı olduklarını anlayamaz. Bu nedenle, algılardan farklı olan ve onların ötesinde bulunan bir kendilik yanılısamasıyla karşılaşırız. Hume’a göre, art ardalığın kavranamaz bu hızının sorumlusunu, ancak zamanı hesaba katarak açıklığa kavuşturabiliriz. Bu süreçte, imgelem ve hafıza daimi bir işbirliği içerisinde. Zaman olmaksızın, kendiliği bir algı demeti olarak sunmak mümkün değildir. Şöyle ki, Hume, zamanı, içerisinde öznenin kendi benliğini algıların ardışıklığı olarak fark ettiği, zihinsel bir yapı olarak tasavvur etmektedir. Bu ardışıklığın hesabı, ancak zamanı bir yapı olarak ele alıp, algıların bu yapı temelinde akış halinde oldukları anlaşıldığında verilebilir. Hume’un algı demeti kuramının çözmek zorunda olduğu bir diğer sorun ise, zihnimize verilen duyu verisi



çokluğunu anlamlı kılma sorunudur. Hume’de gördüğümüz şey, zihinsel bir çerçeve veya yapı olarak kabul edilen zaman sayesinde duyu verilerinin uyumlu bir şekilde ve düzenli bir akış halinde düzenlenebildikleridir. Zamanda belirli bir düzen halinde olmaları, kendiliğin, onları anlamlı kılmasına olanak tanır. Bu kısımda, Hume’un demet kuramı, “birlik” olarak düşünülen kendilik fikrinden vazgeçilmesi olarak anlaşılmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, bu kuram, kendiliği zamana yayma girişimi olarak yorumlanmaktadır. Burada gösterilmek istenen şey, Hume’un “birlik” olarak ele alınan kendilik algısını, onu farklı algıların zamansal art ardalığı olarak sunarak, parçalara ayırdığıdır. Şu unutulmamalıdır ki, her ne kadar, Hume kendiliğin zamansal yönünü bizlere göstermiş olsa da, bu girişim tam anlamıyla başarıya ulaşamamıştır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümü, Kant’ın kendilik ve zaman anlayışına ve bunların arasında nasıl bir ilişki olduğuna odaklanmaktadır. Eğer ki kendilik ve zaman meselesinin ayrı ayrı değil, aksine birlikte ele alınıp irdelenmesi gereken meseleler olduğu iddiasını bizlere gösterdiği için bir düşünürü hakkını teslim etmemiz gerekseydi, şüphesiz ki bu düşünür Immanuel Kant olurdu. Kant, bir yandan, zamana öznel bir özellik atfederken; bir yandan da, öznenin zamanda düzenlenmiş bir “birlik” olduğunu ileri sürerek, bu iki konunun ne denli yakın bir ilişki içerisinde olduğunu gözler önüne sermiştir. Bu bağlantı her ne kadar, Descartes ve Hume’un felsefelerinde varsayılmış olsa da, Kant felsefesinde çok açık bir şekilde ortaya konulmuştur. Kant eleştirel veya aşkınsal olarak adlandırdığı felsefesinde, fenomenal (duyulur) alan ile numenal (düşünüdür) alan arasında bir ayırım yapar. Bu ayırım sonucu, karşımıza aşkınsal ve ahlaki olmak üzere iki kendilik veya özne çıkar. Kant’ta aşkınsal özne bir “birlik” olarak kurgulandığı için, öncelikle algı, düşünce, deneyim gibi tüm zihinsel durumlarının zamansal olarak düzenlenip birliğe getirilmesi gerekmektedir. Aşkınsal özne de, bu birliğe getirmenin imkânının bir koşulu olarak bizlere sunulur. Bu anlamda, o aslında Kartezyen tözsel öznenin farklı olarak, mantıksal veya biçimsel bir özne olarak tasarlanır. Bilinç durumlarının bir arada oluşlarının imkânının koşulu olarak anlaşılan bu mantıksal kendilik fikrini iyice kavrayabilmek için, belli bir sorun kümesine cevap vermek gerekmektedir. Bu sorun kümesi, “bilgisel erişim” (*epistemic access*), “bilgi oluşumu” (*constitution of knowledge*), ve “aşkınlık” gibi sorunlardan oluşmaktadır. Kant için kendilik aynı zamanda hem bilincin birliği hem de deneyimin (nesnelinin) birliği anlamına

gelmektedir. Tutarlı, uyumlu, bağdaşık ve belirli bir anlam bütünlüğü olan “birlik” fikri, tüm nesnelere olduğu gibi tüm olayları da zamansal olarak düzenleme yeteneğini zorunlu kılar. Başka bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, böyle bir “birlik”, dünyayı uygun bir biçimde zamansal çerçeveye oturtmayı gerektirir. Tezin bu bölümünde gösterildiği gibi, bu kendilik düşüncesi, hem kendiliğin birliği hem de deneyim dünyasının birliği için “özneler arasında geçerli bir düzen” olarak zaman fikrine ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Daha önce de ifade edildiği üzere, Kant’çı deneyim dünyası ile aşkınsal kendilik birer “birlik”tir. Bu nedenden ötürü, bu iki birlik de zamana gereksinim duyarlar. Buna rağmen, kendiliğin nesnelere (bilgisel) erişiminde sorunlar ortaya çıkmaktadır. Zaman özneler arasında geçerli olan ortak bir zemin olarak tasarladığında, “ben’in kendisini aşarak duyu verilerine erişiminde karşımıza çıkan sorun ortadan kalkar. Dahası, duyu verilerine erişim sağlandığında, özne, bunlar üzerinde çeşitli işlemler yaparak bilginin oluşturulmasını sağlamaktadır.

Yine bu bölümde, Kant’ın aşkınsal özne fikrinin, özgürlük meselesine herhangi bir çözüm sunmadığını göstermiştik. Zamansal olan deneyim dünyasındaki işleyiş tam anlamıyla doğa yasaları tarafından kontrol edilip düzenlenmektedir. Doğası gereği herhangi bir neden-sonuç ilişkisi içerisinde bulunması mümkün olmayan özgürlük fikri bu nedenden dolayı, Kant tarafından, deneyim alanının dışına sürüklenmiştir; ancak bu, Kant felsefesinde özgürlük kavramının hesabının verilmediği anlamına gelmemelidir. Kant, özgürlüğü deneyim alanının dışına itse de, o kendisine numenal veya ahlaki alanda yer bulacaktır. Kant’ın ahlaki özne anlayışına baktığımız zaman, onun eylemlerin özgür faili olarak ele alındığını görürüz. İşte tam bu noktada özgürlük meselesi tekrar karşımıza çıkar. Önceden belirtildiği üzere, zamansal olarak düzenlenmiş deneyim dünyasında, her eylem ve olay neden-sonuç ilişkisi içerisinde belirlendiği için, bu alanda özgürlüğün hesabının verilmesi ve özgür faile dair bir açıklama yapılabilmesi çelişkiye neden olacaktır. Kant’çı evrende zaman, zorunluluk alanı ile özgürlük alanını çok keskin bir çizgiyle birbirinden ayırır. Özgürlük de böylelikle zamansal olmayan ahlaki alanda kendine yer bulur. Her ne kadar, özgürlük zamansal olmayan alana itilmiş olsa da, özgür öznenin eylemleri, zorunlu olarak zamansal alana düşecek ve bu eylemlerin etkileri de bu alanda hissedilecektir. Hal böyle iken, özgür eylemlerde bulunan özneyi de özgürlük

kavramını da etraflıca tartışıp anlayabilmek için zaman kavramını hesaba katmak bir zorunluluk olarak yeniden karşımıza çıkacaktır.

Dördüncü bölüme bakıldığında, Bergson ile birlikte felsefe yapma tarzının köklü bir değişim yaşadığı görülecektir. Bu değişim, onun geleneksel olarak ele alınan zaman ve kendilik anlayışını bir kenara atıp, bu iki kavramla ilgili özgün bir yaklaşım geliştirmesine olanak tanıyacaktır. Bergson'un felsefesine yakından baktığımızda, onun, zihinsel durumlar söz konusu olduğunda, Descartes, Hume ve Kant'tan çok açık bir şekilde ayrıldığı fark edilecektir. Bu düşünürlerin aksine, Bergson zihinsel durumların birbirlerinden ayrı ve farklı oldukları fikrini reddedecektir. Ayrı ve farklı anlaşılan zihinsel durumlar yerine, Bergson, onların birbirleri ile iç içe geçmiş, birbirlerine nüfuz etmiş olduklarını savunan "niteliksel çokluk" (*qualitative multiplicity*) tezini ileri sürer. Bu teze göre, bilinç durumları uzamsızdırlar (*un-extended*). Bu nedenle, zihinsel durumlar, uzamlı nesnelere mekânda birbirinden ayrılmaları gibi birbirlerinden ayrılamazlar. Bu sonuç, zihinsel durumların aslında sürekli, ilerleyen, iç içe geçmiş, yani zamansal özellikte oldukları gerçeğini güçlendirir. Sürekli ve iç içe geçmiş zihinsel durumlar düşüncesi, ancak mekândan ve onunla ilintili her şeyden ayrıştırılmış olarak anlaşılan, özgün bir zaman sezgisi ile yakalanabilir. Tezin bu bölümünde görüleceği gibi, Bergson, mekândan ayrıştırılmış gerçek zamanın niteliksel, devingen (*dynamic*) ve yaratıcı olduğunu berrak bir şekilde anlatabilmek için "süre" (*duration*) kavramını öne sürmüştür. Bergson'un kendilik düşüncesini araştırma sürecimizde, "süre" fikrini iyice anlamadan, kendilik fikrine dair herhangi bir kavrayış geliştirebilmemizin pek de mümkün olmadığı görülecektir. Bergson, net bir biçimde gerçek zaman ve mekânsal olarak anlaşılan zaman olarak iki farklı zaman anlayışını birbirinden ayırır. Bu iki farklı zaman anlayışı sonucunda, dışsal ve sosyal kendilik ile içsel ve bireysel kendilik olmak üzere iki farklı kendilik düşüncesi ile karşı karşıya kalırız. Önceki yaklaşımlara benzer bir şekilde, Bergson'un öne sürdüğü kendilik anlayışının hakkının verilebilmesi için çözülmesi gereken belirli bir sorun kümesi ile karşılaşırız. Bu sorun kümesi, "zihinsel durumların art ardalığı", "mutlak bilgi", "sahici (*genuine*) kendilik" ve "özgürlük" sorunlarından oluşmaktadır. Daha önce belirtildiği üzere, zamanı "süre" olarak düşündüğümüzde anlaşılacak olan "niteliksel çokluk" fikri, zihinsel durumların nasıl olup da art arda ve iç içe olabildiklerine yeterli bir cevap sunmaktadır. Bergson'un felsefesinde, süregelen bir değişim,

hareket ve akış olan “süre”, gerçeklik olarak kabul edilmektedir. Dışsallıktan ve niceliksellikten koparılıp ele alındığında, niteliksel bir akış olarak anlaşılan zaman, zihinsel durumların devingenliği, art ardalığı ve iç içe oluşunu açıklar görünmektedir. Yine benzer şekilde, zamanı bir akış olan gerçeklik olarak değerlendirdiğimizde, Bergson’da “mutlak bilgi”nin izahının verildiğini görebiliriz. Esasında, “mutlak bilgi” sorunu, sahici, içsel kendilik fikri ile çok yakından ilişkilidir. Bergson’a göre, kişinin içsel yani bireysel var oluşu, onun da bir üyesi olduğu topluluğun tarihsel, kültürel ve sosyal mirası ile oluşturulan dışsal (sosyal) özne tarafından etki altına alınır. Bir anlamda, içsel kendilik, dışsal kendiliğin oluşturduğu bir tabaka tarafından kaplanır. Böylelikle sahici kendilik tahakküm altına alınır ve ona nüfuz edebilmek ciddi bir çaba gerektirir. Temasımızın koptuğu içsel ve sahici varoluşumuzla yeniden temas sağlayıp onu tekrar kazanabilmek için yapmamız gereken şey, dışsallıktan tam anlamıyla sıyrılıp içsel olana yani gerçek zamana geri dönebilmektir. Bu bölümde açıklandığı gibi, kendilik, bir akış olarak tasavvur edilen gerçekliğe erişim sağladığı anda, kendisinin de aslında bir akış ve “süre” olduğunun farkına varabilecektir. Burada fark etmemiz gereken önemli bir nokta da şudur: Bu şekilde tasavvur edilen evren anlayışında, her şey, akış olan gerçekliğin içerisine düşer; başka bir deyişle, sürekli bir akış olan “süre”nin içerisinde her şey birbiriyle bağlantı halindedir. Gerçek zamana geri dönüp ona temas edebildiğimiz anda, kendi içsel sahici varoluşumuzu tüm çıplaklığıyla yakalayabileceğimiz gibi, burada her şey birbiriyle bağdaşık olduğundan “mutlak bilgi”nin imkânını da ortaya çıkarmış oluruz.

Özgürlük sorununa baktığımızda, zamanın tekrar ön plana çıktığını ve bu sorunun çözümünde kilit bir rol oynadığına şahitlik ederiz. Kant’ın zorunluluğun hüküm sürdüğü zamansal alandan özgürlüğü sürdüğünü ve onu zamansal olmayan ahlaki alanla sınırlandırdığını hatırlayalım. Bergson’un evrim ile ilgili, geleneksel anlayışın pek de kabul etmeyeceği sıra dışı düşünceleri vardır. Bu sıra dışı düşünceleri ile “süre” fikrini birleştirdiğinde, Bergson’un, içerisinde neden-sonuç ilişkisinin hüküm sürdüğü mekanik dünya görüşünü bir kenara itip, bunun yerine “yaşamsal atılım” (*élan vital*) tarafından idare edilen dirimselci (*vitalistic*) bir dünya görüşünü savunduğunu görürüz. Bergson, Kant’ın zorunluluk ve özgürlük alanları arasında yaptığı ayrımı reddeder. Katı neden-sonuç ilişkisi yerine, “yaşamsal atılım” tarafından idare edilen tek bir dirimselci dünya fikrini benimseyerek, özgürlüğün bu

alanda hesabının verilmesinin de önünü açar. Bergson, gerçekliğin zaman (“*süre*”) olarak resmedildiği; yani yaşamın devingen, sürekli, yaratıcı ve daha da önemlisi kestirilemez olan yönlerinin açığa çıktığı bu dirimselci alana, özgürlüğü geri çağırarak ona bu alanda hakkını teslim eder.

Beşinci bölümün, Heidegger’in zaman ve sahil kendilik düşünceleri arasındaki yakın bağı etraflica araştırmaktadır. Her ne kadar, Heidegger’in, *Varlık ve Zaman*’daki asıl derdi, varlık (*Being; Sein*) ve onun ufku olarak ele alınan zaman arasındaki ilişkiyi derinlemesine tartışmak olsa da, bu araştırmada, *Dasein* olarak adlandırılan insan kendiliğinin, zaman ile olan yakın münasebeti de kendini açığa çıkaracaktır. Bu anlamda, öncelikle, Heidegger’de varlıktan ne anlaşılması ve *Dasein*’in ne şekilde ele alınması gerektiği büyük bir önem arz etmektedir. Bu açıklandıktan sonra, Heidegger’in Descartes, Kant ve Bergson ile karşılaşmasına yer verilmiştir.

Heidegger’in Descartes ile karşılaşmasındaki en önemli mevzu, her iki düşünürün başlangıç noktalarının birbirlerinden farklı oluşudur. Descartes için, metafiziğin başlangıç noktası içsel kendiliktir. Buradan başlamak, Descartes için dış dünyanın var oluşunun kanıtlanması konusunda sorunlara yol açmıştır. Oysaki Heidegger, başlangıç noktasını içsel kendilikten değil, tam aksine, “dünya-da-olma”dan (*being-in-the-world*) almaktadır. Başlangıç noktası, *Dasein*’in “dünya-da-olma”ından alındığı vakit, Heidegger, dış dünyanın var olup olmaması veya ona erişmek için ne yapılması gerektiği gibi konuları kendine dert etmez. Tam da “dünya-da-olma” üzerinden ele alınan *Dasein*, tekbencilik (*solipsism*) ve dış dünyanın var oluşunu sorgulayan şüphecilik çürütülmesinin kanıtıdır.

Heidegger’in Kant ile karşılaşmasında, asıl meselenin, Kant’ın metafiziği nihai noktasına götürmesine rağmen, yüzleşmekten sakındığı ve ondan geri çekildiği kökensel zamanın (*original time*), duyarlık ve anlık yetilerinin ortak kökü olan imgelem yetisinin ta kendisi olduğu açıkça görülecektir. Heidegger, zamana dair araştırmalarını en son noktasına kadar götürerek onu kökenselliğinde yakalamaya çalışacaktır. Buradaki bir diğer önemli nokta da Kant’ın felsefenin skandalı olarak gördüğü, henüz şüpheciliği çürütecek ve dış dünyanın varlığına kesin ve sağlam bir kanıt sunulamamış olması durumunun, Heidegger tarafından yanlış bir yaklaşım olarak değerlendirileceğidir. Heidegger’e göre, felsefenin asıl skandalı, beklenen

kanıtın henüz sunulmamış olması değil, aksine geleneksel özne-nesne ikiliğinin kabul edilmesine rağmen, ısrarla bu kanıtın halen bekleniyor oluşudur. Descartes’de olduğu gibi, başlangıç noktası yalıtılmış içsel “ben” olarak alınıp, dış dünyanın ve nesnelere bundan tamamen farklı bir varlık alanı olduğu iddia edildiği vakit, geleneksel özne-nesne ikiliği ile karşılaşılır. Bu ikiliği baştan kabul edip buna yaslanan bir felsefi anlayışın, dış dünyanın var olduğunun kesin olarak bilinemeyeceğini savunan şüpheciliği alt edecek bir kanıt sunabilmesi olanak dâhilinde değildir. Descartes ile olan karşılaşmasında da anlatıldığı gibi, “dünya-da-olma” tezi ile Heidegger söz konusu sorunu ortadan kaldırdığını iddia edecektir. Şöyle ki, *Dasein* “dünya-da-olma”, ya da, “orada-olma” (*being-there*) suretiyle mevzubahis şüpheciliğin çürütülmesi için aranan kanıtın ta kendisidir.

Heidegger’in Bergson ile karşılaşmasında, bir yandan Heidegger’in yaşam felsefesinden etkilenmesi; ancak diğer yandan da, bu felsefi akımın, yaşam konusunu fazlasıyla yücelttiği için onu eleştirmesi ele alınmaktadır. Heidegger yaşam düşünürlerinden etkilenmiştir, çünkü onlar gibi, özne-nesne ikiliğini varsayan bir yaklaşım yerine, yaşam felsefesinin savunduğu gibi, her şeyi yaşamsallığında ve akışında yakalamaya çalışmıştır. Böyle ele alındığında, Heidegger “kavram-öncesi” (*pre-conceptual*) durumdan başlayıp özne ve nesneyi henüz ayrımları yapılmamış durumlarında, yani ilişkiselliklerinde anlamaktadır. Buna rağmen, Heidegger, Bergson ve diğer yaşam düşünürlerine, yaşam kavramını fazlasıyla yüceltmelerinden ve bu nedenle varlık kavramını tam olarak anlamadıklarından ötürü de eleştiri yöneltmektedir. Heidegger’ göre yaşam, sadece varlığın bir türüdür ve asla ona dair her şeyi aydınlatamaz.

Heidegger’in felsefesinde, kendilik ve zaman arasındaki ayrılmaz ilişki fazlasıyla ön plana çıkmaktadır. Heidegger, *Varlık ve Zaman*’da iki çeşit kendilik kipi ele alıp onları irdeler. Bu iki varoluş kipi, sahil (*authentic*) kendilik ve gayri-sahih (*inauthentic*) kendilik olarak adlandırılır. Kabaca, gayri-sahih kendilik, bir anlamda toplumsal normlar, tarihsel miras, kültürel pratikler ve genel kabuller tarafından biçimlendirilip belirlenen kendilik kipine işaret etmektedir. Sahih kendilik ise, bireysel, yani sahici varoluş kipine gönderme yapar. Önceden açıklandığı gibi, Heidegger, *Dasein* terimini insanın varoluş kipine işaret edebilmek için ileri sürmüştür. Bu şekilde anlaşılan kendilik fikri ile Heidegger, geleneksel metafiziğin

sorunları ile uğraşmak zorunda kalmamıştır. Yine de, bu kendilik görüşü belirli bir sorunlar kümesine çözüm getirmek zorundadır. Heidegger'in kendilik anlayışının çözmek zorunda kaldığı sorunlardan bazıları, “zamanın kökeni”, “kendiliğin sahilliği”, “aşkınlık” ve “özgürlük” olarak karşımıza çıkar. Heidegger için zaman, günlük yaşantımızda anladığımız şekliyle asla yeterli olmayacaktır. O, zamanı kökenine kadar takip etmeyi kendine dert edecektir. Zamanı, geçmiş, şimdi ve geleceğin art arda oluşu şeklinde anlamak yerine, Heidegger zamanı ekstatik (*ecstatic*) birliğinde düşünüp onu kökensel zamansallık (*originary temporality*) olarak adlandırır. Kökensel zaman, ontolojik bir yapı olarak varoluşun, düşüşün (*fallenness*) ve faktisitenin (*facticity*) bir birliği olarak, *Dasein*'in ihtimam (*care*) yapısı ile sıkı bir ilişki içersindedir. Varoluş, düşüş ve faktisite, sırasıyla gelecek, şimdi ve geçmişe karşılık gelmektedir. *Dasein*'in ontolojik yapısı, kendisi de ontolojik bir yapı olarak ele alınan kökensel zamanın ekstatik birliğinde açığa çıkar. Bu bölümde gösterildiği üzere, varoluş, düşüş ve faktisite olarak gösterilen *Dasein*'in yapısal elemanları, kökensel zamanı oluşturan geçmiş, şimdi ve geleceğin ekstatik birliği ile iç içe geçmiştir. Bu ilişki ışığında değerlendirildiğinde, *Dasein*'i ancak zaman açısından anladığımızda, onun kendisini tüm deneyimlerinin zamanda birbiriyle iç içe geçmiş bireysel bir varlık (*entity*) olarak idrak etmesi olanaklı olacaktır. Ancak bu sayede, *Dasein*, doğum ile ölüm arasında uzanan bir varlık olarak ifşa olabilir. Tam da bu nedenden ötürü, Heidegger *Dasein*'i zamansallık (*temporality*) olarak yorumlar.

*Dasein* terimi ve onun ölüme doğru oluşu yardımıyla “aşkınlık” sorunu da çözüme kavuşturulur. Orada, diğerlerinin arasında ve geleceğe doğru gidiş olarak ele alındığında *Dasein*, aşkınlığın ta kendisidir. Daha açık ifade etmek gerekirse, orada-olma, dünya-da-olma ve şimdiden çıkıp geleceğe uzanabilme sayesinde, *Dasein*, tanım olarak “ötesine geçmek”, “aşmak”, yani “aşkınlık”tır. Bu terim, *Dasein*'i *Dasein* yapan kurucu bir elemandır.

Özgürlük sorununa odaklanıldığı vakit, bu sorununun zaman ve sahil kendilik kavramları ile yakından ilintili olduğu kendini gösterecektir. Kısaca anlatmak gerekirse, ölüm karşısında duyulan kaygı, *Dasein*'in kendi iç sesini duymasına ve kendisini sonlu ve zamansal olarak idrak etmesine yardımcı olur. Bu sayede, bu deneyim *Dasein*'i kendi ölümüne doğru özgürce ilerlediği gerçekliği ile baş başa

bırakır. Üstüne üstlük, ortadan kaldırılamaz, alt edilemez, *Dasein*'a ait olan (*ownmost*) bir olanak olarak ölüm, onun, ortalama varlık fikrinin bulunduğu onlar (*das Man; the-they*) alanıyla tüm bağlarını koparıp atmasına katkı sağlayacaktır. Öyleyse, *Dasein*'in zamansal oluşu, onun bağlı bulunduğu gayri-sahih varoluş kipinden kendini kurtarmasına ve sahil varoluş kipini yeniden ele geçirmesine olanak sağlayacağı gibi, onun özgürlük deneyimini yaşamasına da imkân verecektir.

Kendilik ile zaman arasındaki ayrılmaz ilişkiyi ifşa etmek için çıktığımız yolculuk, Descartes ve Hume ile başladı, Kant ve Bergson ile devam etti ve Heidegger ile son buldu. Descartes ve Hume bölümünde odak kendilik kavramıydı. Kendilik kavramı dolayısıyla zamanın burada nasıl bir rol oynadığını aydınlatıp onun kendilik ile olan bağlantısını ortaya koyduk. Descartes'in metafizik projesinde, zamanın, üzerinde kendilik ve nesnelere ile birlikte dış dünyanın süreklilik ve özdeşliğinin tesis edildiği bir zemin olduğunu gösterdik. Daha da önemlisi, şunu da gösterdik ki zaman kendiliğin içsel alanını aşıp dış dünyaya erişmesi için de bir zemin işlevi görmektedir. Böylelikle, Descartes'in metafizik projesindeki eksik parça olarak öne sürdüğümüz zamanı, yerine koyarak bu eksikliği gidermeyi amaçladık. Hume'un felsefesinde de başlangıç noktamız, Hume'un geleneksel benlik anlayışının bir yanılısamadan ibaret olduğunu savunduğu düşüncesiydi. Burada da, bu kendilik yanılısaması dolayısıyla zamanın ne olduğunu kavrayıp, onun kendilik ile olan ilişkisini açığa çıkarmayı amaçladık. Hume, zamanın kendilik tarafından oluşturulan ve duyu verilerinin art arda düzenlenmek için gereksinim duyduğu zihinsel bir yapı veya çerçeve olduğunu savunmuştu. Bu düşünceye göre, duyu verileri çokluğunun bir düzen içerisinde alınıp zihnimize bir anlam ifade edebilmeleri için zaman kaçınılmaz olarak zihin tarafından oluşturulur. Daha da önemlisi, zihinsel bir yapı olarak anlaşılan bu zaman fikri, ayrıca, "ben" in kendisini "ardışık algılar demeti" olarak idrak etmesinden sorumlu olan şeydir de. Burada gösterdiğimiz önemli bir nokta da Hume'un, bir anlamda, "birlik" olarak ele alınan kendilik anlayışına karşı çıkması ve onu zamana yayılmış bir "şey", yani bir akış olarak ele almaya girişmesidir. Bu girişim her ne kadar Hume tarafından yarım bırakılmış olsa da, daha sonra Bergson tarafından tamamlanacaktır.

Kantçı evrende gördüğümüz şey, zaman ve kendilik arasında, başlangıç olarak açık bir öncelik olmadığı, tam tersine, Kant'ın bu iki konuyu ele alışında bir denge



kurmaya çalıştığıdır. Kantçı düşüncede her durumda, zamana olduğu kadar kendiliğe de vurgu yapılır. Ancak, zamanın öznel yönünü gözler önüne sermek bakımından Kant, felsefe tarihinde çok önemli bir yere sahiptir. Yolculuğumuzun bu bölümünde, Kant'ın zamanı, kendiliğin birliğinin olduğu kadar, deneyim dünyasının nesnelere de üzerinde temellendiği bir birlik olarak ele aldığına tanıklık ettik. Diğer yandan da, kendiliğin, zamanı birliğe getiren bir özne olduğunu da görmüş olduk. Bu karşılıklı ilişki, bu iki kavramın ne denli birbirine bağlı olduğunu ve ancak bu bağlantı temelinde anlaşılacaklarını de bizlere göstermiş oldu. Deneyim dünyası söz konusu olduğunda, Kantçı kendiliğin devamlı olarak, içerisinde bir yandan bu dünyanın birliğini, diğer yandan da, kendi birliğini oluşturabileceği zamansal bir ağ örmekte olduğunu açıkça ortaya koymaya çalıştık.

Bergson felsefesinde, kendilik kavramından ziyade, zaman daha çok ön plandadır. Burada, zaman gerçek “süre”nin kesintisiz akışı olarak ele alınan gerçeklik olarak değerlendirilir. Kendilik ile ilgili bir anlayış elde edilmek isteniyorsa, bu ancak zamanı “süre” olarak kavrayarak mümkün olabilir. Yine de, bu bölümde üzerinde durduğumuz en önemli nokta, Bergson'un, kendilik kavramının “bilincin yaşamı” veya “benliğin kendi deneyimlerinin kesintisiz akışı” olduğunu iddia etmesidir. Bu anlayışla, öncelikle kendiliğin de bir akış olduğu kabulü, onun zaman ile birlikte ele alınıp incelenmesinin en güçlü dayanaklarından biri olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bunun dışında, “birlik” olarak ele alınan kendilik fikri de gerçekliğin akışında çözülür. Felsefeye ulaşıldığında, kendiliğin, aslında bir akış olduğu iddiası, “birlik” olarak düşünülen kendilik fikrinin çözülüp ayrışmasının beyanından başka bir şey değildir. Bu bölümde, kendiliğin zamansal bir akış olduğunu göstererek, Hume'un tamamlamadığı kendiliği zamana yayma girişimini, Bergson'un nihayete erdirdiğini ortaya koyduk.

Heidegger'in düşüncesinde ise, *Dasein*, ölüme doğru olan varlık olarak değerlendirildi. Bununla, onun zamansal, yani geleceğe doğru oluşu vurgulanmak istendi. Kendiliğin varlığını ifşa etme ve sahil kendiliği yeniden kazanabilme sürecinde, zaman sürekli olarak kendiliğe eşlik etmektedir. Bu bölümde şunu açıkça ortaya koyduk: Sahil kendiliğin anlamı, kendiliğin varlığı (*Being*) bir ufuk olarak anlaşılabilir zamana serilmedikçe, tam olarak kavranamaz. *Dasein*'in bireysel varoluşunu kazanabilmesi, sahil olan yönünü yakalayabilmesi için, tüm

deneyimlerinin zamana yayılmış olduğunu ve dolayısıyla kendisinin de doğum ile ölüm arasına yayılmış bir varlık olduğunu idrak etmesi kaçınılmaz bir gerekliliktir. *Dasein*'ın bunu yapmadan, sahil kendiliğini kazanamayacağı gerçeđi, Heidegger'in onu neden zamansallık olarak yorumladığını açıkça göstermiş olur.

En sonunda, bu yolculuk bizi gerçeđi ifşa edebileceğimiz bir noktaya taşımış oldu. Bu noktaya gelebilmek, kendilik ile zaman arasında ayrılmaz bir ilişki olduğu gerçeđini açıkça görüp bu ilişkiyi gözler önüne sermek konusunda bize güven sağladı. Sonuç olarak, bu iki kavram söz konusu olduğunda, hangisinden başlarsak başlayalım, bir kavramın hakkının verilebilmesi için diğere gereksinim duyulacaktır. Hangisinden başlarsak başlayalım, belirli bir sorun kümesi ile karşılaşacak ve bu sorunların çözümü için diğerin yardımına muhtaç olunacaktır. Bu demektir ki, kendilik üzerine yapılacak her araştırma ancak zaman temelinde gerçekleştirilebilir. "Ben kimim?" sorusu da ancak "zamandan ne anlamalıyım?" sorusu ile birlikte ele alındığında aydınlatılabilir.

## B. CURRICULUM VITAE

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### EDUCATION

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2011-2012	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University Philosophy	Research Assistant
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## C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

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### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Çifteci

Adı : Volkan

Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Revealing the Fact: The Inseparable Relation between the Self and Time

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

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