

THE MAKING OF CONSERVATIVE HABITUS: THE CASE OF AN UPPER-  
MIDDLE CLASS NEIGHBORHOOD IN ANKARA

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## ABSTRACT

### THE MAKING OF CONSERVATIVE HABITUS: THE CASE OF AN UPPER- MIDDLE CLASS NEIGHBORHOOD IN ANKARA

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This study examines the transformation of the conservative fractions of middle classes following the transformation of the Islamist conservatism in Turkey. Based on an ethnographic study which was conducted in Çukurambar, it investigates the impacts of political transformation over the everyday lives of the actually existing conservative agents. The inquiry begins with triadic break with the commonsensical definitions of conservatism. Benefiting from the relational sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, it constructs an empirical definition of the bodily conservatism. Second, it interrogates the history of political struggles which impact on the making of bodily conservatism in Turkey, and introduces the concept of symbolic polarization. The concept habitus constitutes both topic and ethnographic tool of the study. Following Wacquant into the field, the study applies to the observant participation as the method for the production of the data. In the first analysis chapter, the study examines the socio-spatial transformation of Çukurambar. Following that, it focuses on the transformation of the conservative middlebrow taste by dissecting the emergence of the choice of elegant and religiously proper. Lastly, it investigates how conservative middle classes construct inner world and social world.

**Keywords:** Conservatism, Habitus, Çukurambar, Life-style, Ethnography.

## ÖZ

### MUHAFAZAKAR HABİTUSUN OLUŞUMU: ANKARA'DA BİR ORTA-ÜST SINIF MAHALLESİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de orta sınıfların muhafazakar fraksiyonlarının, AKP’nin kurulmasıyla somutlaşan İslamcı muhafazakarlıktaki değişime paralel deneyimlediği dönüşümü konu alıyor. Çukurambar’da gerçekleştirilmiş etnografik bir araştırmayı temel alan çalışma, muhafazakarlığın siyasi dönüşümünün muhafazakar failer üzerindeki etkilerini inceliyor. Çalışma ilk olarak muhafazakarlığa dair üç yaygın kanaatten kopuyor. Pierre Bourdieu’nün ilişkisel sosyolısından yararlanan çalışma bedensel muhafazakarlığın ampirik tanımını geliştiriyor. Bunu takiben, Türkiye’de bedensel muhafazakarlığın teşkiline etki eden siyasi mücadeleler tarihi inceleniyor ve sembolik kutuplaşma kavramı tanıtılıyor. Habitus kavramı çalışmanın hem konusunu hem de yöntemsel aracını teşkil ediyor. Wacquant’ın saha deneyimini takiben gözlemci katılımcılık veri üretme yöntemi olarak kullanılıyor. Çalışma ilk analiz bölümünde Çukurambar’ın sosyo-mekansal dönüşümünü inceliyor. Bunu takiben, zarif ve dinen makbul tercihin oluşumu tartışılarak muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin geçirdiği dönüşüm tartışılıyor. Çalışma son olarak, muhafazakar orta sınıfların mevcut nesnel koşullarda içsel dünyalarını ve toplumsal dünyayı nasıl inşa ettiklerini inceliyor.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Muhafazakarlık, Habitus, Çukurambar, Hayat Tarzı, Etnografi.

To My Family

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
AP	Justice Party
BBP	Grand Union Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democrat Party
DT	Deep History
EU	European Union
FP	Virtue Party
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party
METU	Middle East Technical University
MGH	National Outlook Movement
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MNP	National Order Party
MSP	National Salvation Party
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
RP	Welfare Party
YMM	National Struggle Anew
YMMD	The Association of National Struggle Anew

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Two decades ago, the founders of Justice and Development Party (AKP) were the members of Islamist Welfare Party (RP) which occupied a semi-legitimate position in the political field of Turkey. The source of legitimacy for Islamist parties was the democratic support which led to the establishment of strong ties of political representation from 1970s on. The exact period for the rise of Islamist politics was 1990s when RP was perceived as a strong threat to the established political order. However, even when the electoral success of the party reached peak, the triadic opposition against secular state, capitalist market economy, and modern social life that Islamist parties developed ended up with being closed down. For the reformist wing of RP, February 28<sup>th</sup> military intervention in 1997, which collapsed the coalition government that they were partner, was the last disappointment. To bring an end to such vicious circle, the reformist wing founded AKP in 2001. The founders of the party declared that they have changed implying that they were no more Islamist. They defined their new political position as ‘conservative democracy’, which implied that they defended no more the triadic opposition to the established political order.

In the eve of 2002 general elections, the severe economic crisis and rigid political antagonism had generated social turmoil. The general elections in 2002 created revolutionary impacts on the political field as the parties which were previously represented in the parliament could not pass the election threshold. Under these conditions, the still ongoing single-party rule of AKP commenced as soon as it joined the game of the political field. During the first period of AKP rule, the steps that were taken for accession to the European Union (EU), economic growth, and democratization were perceived as the concrete signals of change. Until the Gezi Event occurred in the late May 2013, the general consensus was that AKP represented the political change.

The change was not limited to the political field. There were signals of change among the sympathizers of Islamist politics. One of these signals was the differentiation of conservative life-style. The generalized ascetic, solidarist, and opponent Islamist stance weakened as differentiation among conservative groups became visible. The conservative middlebrow taste, which is at peace with bourgeois culture, emerged in this process. It is the same period in which gecekondü houses were replaced by the high-rise luxury buildings in Çukurambar and the old gecekondü neighborhood became the podium for the emergent conservative middlebrow taste.

While he was a university student in the late 1990s, Eren was used to join the ‘headscarf ban protests’ every week following the Friday prayer. As an Islamist activist, he saw the oppression over the conservative people as a sign of the morally decayed social order which was generated by the political parties of the existing order, the admirers of the Western Club. Two decades later, today, religion is still at the center of his life as the compass of even minute details of everyday life. Thus, for Eren, religion means more than observing religious duties strictly and reading Quran regularly. He keeps improving his religious knowledge by participating into religious talks and minds his children’s religious education. However, there are changing aspects in his life, as well. The activist utopianism seems to have evaporated. Instead of forming an Islamic alternative social order, he now defends the gradual transformation of the existing social order through the instruments of democratic politics. The ‘just order’ of the RP seems like a nice but non-realist old dream as he desires economic stability for his business. His practical life also changed in this period. He moved to Çukurambar, a neighborhood of attraction for the conservative middle classes, five years ago. In the new neighborhood, he acquired new habits such as having brunch with his family and friends at weekends. When I remind him of the critics of ‘Muslim bourgeois’ he grimaces by saying that the critics are the fruit of bad intention because, conservatives’ active participation into the social life means nothing but the normalization of Turkey.

Based on an ethnographic research conducted in Çukurambar between November 2012 and June 2013, this study investigates the transformation of everyday life strategies and taste of conservative middle classes in parallel to the transformation of politics and physical space. More broadly, this study can be seen as a part of increasing academic curiosity about conservatism in the last three decades of Turkey. It can be argued that conservatism has been among the most studied topics in Turkey especially after the increasing political power of the Islamist Welfare Party. The main focus of these studies can be described as Islamist politics, alternative institutions, alternative urban life, and tension with the secular state. Among the topics of research are Islamist parties (Çakır, 1994; Ayata, 1996; Gülalp, 1999), radical movements (Erkilet, 2005; Irzik, 1998), religious communities (Mardin, 1989; Ayata, 1991; Atay, 1996) religious bureaucracy (Gözaydın, 2008; Kara, 2005), religious education (Akşit, 1991; Rutz, 1999), publication (Ayata-Güneş, 1991; Acar, 1991; Kentel, 2005), intellectuals (Meeker, 1991; Dağı, 2004; Taşkın, 2007), Islamist women (Demir, 1998; Saktanber, 2005), veiling and commodification (Göle, 1996; Yashin, 2002; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008); conservative bourgeoisie (Göle, 1997; Yankaya, 2014), hotels (Bilici, 2000), fashion (White, 1999; Gökarıksel and Secor, 2009; Sandıkçı and Ger, 2010), entrepreneurship (Adas, 2006; Cengiz, 2013), solidarity organizations (Kadıoğlu, 2005) and provincial culture (Bora, 2005; Çiğdem, 2001). Following the establishment of AKP, a new field of research emerged in order to investigate the transformation of Islamism and its political and social impacts (Çavdar, 2013; Şen, 2010; Eligür, 2010; Tuğal, 2009; Özbudun and Hale, 2009; Genel and Karaosmanoğlu, 2006).

Informed by such rich academic production, this study was inspired especially by two ethnographic studies. The first one is Saktanber's *Living Islam*. Based on a field research which was conducted in a secluded middle class site of Ankara, Saktanber (2002a) interrogates the invention of an Islamic way of life over the experiences and discourse of women. Placing it into a broader historical and social reality, she indicates the core of Islamic way of life as the intermingling of faith and taste (She emphasizes this argument in a more compact form in her examination of

conservative youth [Saktanber, 2002b]). Being inspired by its research techniques, questions, and main findings, this study can be seen as the manly counterpart of *Living Islam* as it sheds light rather on the manly conservative way of life within middle classes.

The second and more recent source of inspiration is Tuğal's *Passive Revolution*. Based on an ethnographic research which was conducted in Sultanbeyli, a working class Islamist district of Istanbul, Tuğal (2009) investigates the absorbtion of Islamism into the capitalist system over the everyday life practices of Islamists. Dissecting the tracks of the political transformation that occurred following the establishment of AKP over the everyday life of working class Islamists, he evaluates the absorbtion of Islamism into the capitalist system as the unification of the political society and civil society. Being inspired by its research techniques and the depth of the arguments, this study can be seen as the middle class counterpart of *Passive Revolution* as it examines the reconstruction of the conservative middlebrow taste as a result of the unification of the market for the symbolic goods. Despite the fact that this study was written as a latent dialogue with these two previous studies, it diverges from them in terms of the theoretical approach adopted.

This study is based on the analytical method developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Being inspired by Bachelard's epistemological view that "scientific knowledge proceeds, not by filling a void, but by breaking with 'spontaneous knowledge' that is already there" (Wacquant and Akçaoğlu, 2017: 42), this approach starts the sociological study of a research object by shedding light on its established everyday and scholastic definitions. As the first step of this approach, I break with both everyday and scholastic commonsensical uses of conservatism so that I do not fall into the trap of spontaneous sociology. For this purpose, I first clarify the reason why I use conservatism instead of Islamism by breaking with the commonsensical separation between two concepts. Second, I break with the scholastic meaning of conservatism as an ideology or way of thinking. Lastly, I break with the center-periphery analysis,

the dominant intellectual source for the sociological meaning of conservatism in Turkey's academic field.

### **1.1 The Blurry Separation of Islamism and Conservatism Reconsidered**

Islamism is a specific form that conservative vision and division of the world gained in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Muslim societies which were confronted with the experience or threat of colonialism. Having its roots in the idea of Islamic renewalism that was first developed by Ahmad Faruqi al-Sirhindi (1563-1624), a Naqshbandi Sufi from India (Mardin, 1991a), the concept first emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as an anti-colonialist political strategy implying the ideal of the unification of all Muslims from India to Africa under the common khalifa (Karpat, 2001). In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Islamism is still a loose concept that is far from being an ideology. In the works of early representatives, such as Jamal-al-din-al Afghani and his disciple Mohammad Abduh, inspired by a renewalist religious perspective, Islamism is a double quest to find a formula to save the state by strengthening it and generate an Islamic renaissance by proposing a proper form of interaction between Islam and modern sciences (Mardin, 1991b).

The concept acquired an ideological character only after the World War I within the emergent nation states through the political entrepreneurship: two primary examples are the establishment of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, and the Jammat-i Islami of Pakistan by Abul Ala Maududi in 1941 (Roy, 1994: 35). In the new period, Islamist opposition is not only against to non-Muslim colonial powers but also to the internal conditions such as the emergent non-Islamic governments, institutions, and culture. Being sometimes called as political Islam, Islamism in this period referred to pure political quest for “an Islamic order - a religious state, sharia law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities” (Bayar, 2013: 4) through “the social and political re-reading of Quran” (Roy, 1994: 40). As Tibi (2012) argues, religious revivalism is no more the center of Islamism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century; religion is rather the symbolic source in reference to which the

empirical political order is forged. The task of Islamism is to “transform Islamic universalism into political internationalism that seeks to replace existing secular order of sovereign nation states with an Islamist one” (ibid: 32). Such political perspective appealed to the loose cultural opposition of people as a “counter attack against European and American values such as individualism, materialistic consumerism, independence of women, sexual liberty, religious and moral relativism, and pop culture” (Lapidus, 2002: 823). It must be asserted, however, that despite the strong aspiration of internationalism, Islamism followed unique and plural paths in each country with inspirations from the experiences and perspectives of the Islamists from other countries.

In the case of Turkey, the trajectory of Islamism commenced as being one of the mainstream prescriptions of bureaucrats and intellectuals to save the Ottoman state and to build a brand-new nation, which became the technique of governmentality during the reign of Abdulhamid II. After the 1908 revolution, it became the institutionalized collective oppositional movement against the ruling reformist government. Following the foundation of republic in 1923, Islamism lost its legitimacy as a forbidden and repressed political movement. The single-party regime of the early republican period is also the period for the germination of a harsh oppositional repertoire of Islamism which was forged by the experts through cultural production, such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and his periodical *Büyük Doğu*.

From 1950 to 1970, Islamism is the partner of a latent conservative coalition under the roof of central-right parties. The first autonomous Islamist party was established by the name of National Order Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. Despite being integrated into the political system, Islamist parties have also put a critical distance to the existing order, its institutions, and culture. Against the morally decayed existing order which was generated by the imitators of the Western countries, Islamist parties aimed to establish the ‘just order’, a corporatist and paternalist national order under the guidance of Koran and prophet (Çakır, 1990). The harsh triadic opposition against secular state, capitalist market economy, and

modern social life led Islamist parties to be closed down by the Constitutional Court. AKP was found to bring an end to such vicious circle in 2001 by recognizing officially the fundamental principles of the republican regime. The ex-members of the Islamist party declared that they were no more Islamist. They defined their new position as conservative democracy which they thought closer to the central-right rather than Islamism.

It is this critical moment, the establishment of AKP by the ex-members of an Islamist party as the representative of conservative democracy, when the separation of Islamism and conservatism became a practical necessity to determine the political position of AKP. In its official publications, the position of the party is defined as brand new implying that it is distinct from both Islamist parties and the corrupt conservative central right parties: it is a party which accepts market economy, defends the secular character of the regime and democratic structure of the political system, and takes lessons from the mistakes of the central right parties (Akdoğan, 2004). Despite the fact that AKP occupied a brand new position in the political field of Turkey, I argue that the new position is not a product of the shift from Islamism to conservatism but rather a shift within conservatism. In other words, the separation of Islamism and conservatism is a folk separation.

One part of the confusion in separating Islamism from conservatism is unique to Turkey. The meaning of conservatism as distinct from Islamism is the product of the generalization of the central-right political experience as the whole reality of the conservatism. Before AKP was established, the concept of 'conservative' used to imply the parties in the right and their voter base which is composed of the republican-friendly non-Islamist religious people. In other words, the concept of conservatism was the state's principle of division within the conservative population, which implied the legitimate political position of the non-Islamist conservatives. Thus, the establishment of AKP is basically the product of a shift from non-legitimate conservatism to the legitimate conservatism.

The second source of confusion springs from the misconception of conservatism as a reaction against change. Such commonsensical definition leads one to think that Islamism as a demand for (sometimes revolutionary) change is incompatible with the conservatism as the defense of the old regime. The confusion gets even more complicated when one examines Islamism with Küçükömer's (2009) perspective which overturns the established political positionings by classifying the established republican conservatism as right and the opposing grassroots movements that demands changing the established order as left. In Küçükömer's perspective, there is no doubt that Islamism as a solidarist grassroots movement is left. However, such perspective is quite problematical since it confuses the political strategy with the political position. In other words, the conservative political strategies that a political agent applies to keep being dominant do not make the agent conservative since the conservative strategies such as non-democratic or oppressive techniques of government are not necessarily the part of conservatism. Conservative or revolutionary political strategies are rather the product of practical and symbolic struggles within the political field and any agent may apply to them any time regarding the changing power balance. What makes a political agent conservative lies in the objective relations of the political field and the agent's subjective political construction of the social world.

In contrast to the commonsensical belief, conservatism is not a monolithic vision. As Heywood (1992) notes, it emerged in different forms within different conditions of various countries. Moreover, it acquired new forms, such as authoritarianism, paternalism, liberalism, and recently neo-conservatism, within the historical trajectory of political struggles. What these different forms of conservatism share in different moments of history is a pessimistic criticism against the radical individualism of the enlightenment-based political path.

The same criticism lies at the basis of the political principles of Islamism, as well. If Islamist opposition is examined within the relations of political field (or in relation with the principles it opposes), it can easily be seen that Islamism shares many of the

basic tenets of conservatism even when it demands revolutionary change in the established order. I argue that Islamism is a conservative vision within which the basic tenets of conservatism acquired a specific form in a constant motion. Therefore, I claim that the establishment of AKP is a shift from a form of conservatism to another: from a de Maistrean authoritarian conservatism that was based on an orthodox interpretation of religion with strong solidarist tendencies and revolutionary targets to Burkean libertarian conservatism within which the basic tenets of conservatism compromised with the classical economic liberalism (which is sometimes called as neo-conservatism). Therefore, when I use the concept of conservatism in the following pages of this study, I do not refer to a political vision that is distinct from Islamism but a vision that encompasses Islamism. In the next section, I explicate the basic tenets of conservatism by breaking with its commonsensical definition as a way of thinking.

## **1.2 From Ideas to Dispositions: The Conservatism of Conservative Agents**

Conservative ideology as a part of the reality of conservatism came into existence under specific conditions of social turmoil during the age of great transformations. The birth of nation state, rise of capitalism, the embodiment of enlightenment philosophy in the emergent social order and state, and accompanying urbanization, secularization, and individualization can be described as the social conditions as a reaction to which conservative thought emerged (Nisbet, 1952; 2006). Like all other ideologies, conservative ideology is a way of thinking which manipulates the given social reality in order to establish a new social order by means of representations that are made of ideas. The conservative ideology rests on an anxious and pessimistic critique of the emergent state of society which was organized in the light of the principles of enlightenment philosophy. The core of the conservative ideology can be described as an organismic vision of society within which dead, living, and unborn are connected harmoniously by means of the volunteer obedience of the imperfect individual to the protective authority and wisdom of traditional institutions against the harmful impacts of bright future dreams under the guidance of reason (Lee, 2014;

Fein, 2011; Beneton, 2011; Brennan and Hamlin, 2004; Scruton, 2001; Müller, 1997; Kirk, 1995). These main principles of conservative thought unfold in the pages of founding figures' works as in the following,

... From Magna Carta to the Declaration of Rights, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity, ... [t]his policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection; or rather the happy effect of following the nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it (Burke, 2009: 33).

As might be expected, the object of the pessimistic critique changed within the historical trajectory: the 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalist conservatism criticized the universalist nationalism by refusing the equal participation of all citizens; in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, revolutionary conservatism (Nationalist Socialism) emerged as a critique of all forms of rationalism; and when the cold war ended with the victory of capitalist camp, liberal conservatism came into existence as a critique of the cultural problems of modernity (Habermas, 1989; Heywood, 1992; Bora, 1998). Despite the fact that the content of conservative ideology changed with reference to changing social conditions, Mannheim (1999) argued that its everlasting trait was the form of thinking that prioritize concrete and given against the speculative and possible. As might be expected from the writer of 'Ideology and Utopia' (1966), conservative form of thinking emerged as a specific temporal relation with the social world that anchored in the centrality of the past against the future orientation of socialism and present orientation of liberalism.

One needs to keep in mind that the descriptive analysis of conservative thinking is based on the conservative philosophy which ignores the power relations that impacted on its formation. The conservative thinking emerged not only as a reaction to but also within the great transformations. The critiques of the founding fathers of conservative ideology (such as Burke, de Maistre, and de Bonald) are not only a

philosophical reaction to the weakness of enlightenment philosophy but also an inevitable philosophical refusal of the emergent power relations that located the privileged stratum of the ancient regime (such as aristocracy and clergy) to the dominated position in the field of power of the new regime. Therefore, conservative ideology's defense of the inheritance of privileges as a natural right against the principle of equality is not only a philosophical discussion about the virtues of privileges but also a quest of a philosophical justification of conservative political position.

Another point that the students of conservatism should be attentive about is the widespread threat of scholastic reason. Apart from the conservatism as a specific form of thinking or as a set of ideas, there are concrete conservative agents in the social space whose conservatism are not restricted to conservatism as a political ideology. The difficulty in the sociological study of conservatism is the widespread misapprehension of conservative political ideology as the basis of the mostly unconscious 'conservative attitude' in different fields of the social space. Despite the fact that the ideological ground constitutes a significant portion of the reality of conservatism, restricting the study of conservatism to conservative ideas leads to the scholastic reason which reduces the examination of conservatism to the logical conditions of possibility. This scholastic fallacy is so settled that conservatism as a form of thought is now a realized definition in the mind of the researcher. Taking the intellectual discourse and political acts as the only legitimate unit for the analysis of conservatism treats the conservative representations of the social world as the whole social reality of conservatism.

Moreover, by generalizing the logic of the conservative positions in the field of cultural production and political field as the common logic of conservatives in the social space, it identifies the conservative agent with conservative thinker and assumes that conservatives establish essentially intellectual ties with the social world. Since the conservative figure of the scholastic reason is a contemplative agent, her social existence reflects as a quest of meaning. Defining conservative attitudes as a

form of ‘natural conservatism’, as Kekes (1998) does, just like the universal rational actor of the enlightenment philosophy, the conservative philosophy constructs an abstract conservative individual who is assumed to act compatible with the conservative ideology: “[t]o be conservative ... is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss” (Oakeshott, 1991: 408). The problem in this definition is that it establishes a forced homology between the abstract conservative individual and the conservative ideology and generalizes it as the template to understand the concrete conservative individuals. Fabricating the social world through meaning, the conservative philosophy takes the conservatism of the conservative individual for granted and attributes logical reasons to their conservatism while the question of the social conditions that make an individual conservative remains unanswered (even unquestioned). Actually, the product of scholastic reason is the construction of a spontaneous ideal-typical conservatism which is not a methodological instrument to compare the reality in Weberian sense but rather the commonsensical reality of the conservative philosophy.

In spite of restricting it to a given set of ideas that are assumed to be shared by conservatives, the sociology of the really existing conservatism has to analyze the holistic social reality of conservatives which is not restricted to conservative ideas. The researcher’s quest for the meaning of the ‘conservative meaning’ is a double-sided investigation which has to analyze both the objective social conditions such as the distribution of the forms of capital that make an individual conservative and individual’s subjective stylization of her conservatism from a specific position in a specific social space. For a holistic social analysis of conservatism, I am going to benefit from the conceptual tools developed by Pierre Bourdieu. However, before explicating the inner logic of his relational sociology and its merits for the study of conservatism, I will concentrate on the center-periphery analysis, the source of academic commonsense about the meaning of conservatism in Turkey.

### **1.3 From Center Periphery Analysis to Relational Sociology**

Since it was published in 1973, Şerif Mardin's center-periphery analysis has provided a new perspective for sociological, historical, and political studies in Turkey. Among the merits of Mardin's approach is to present a historically informed structuralist analysis of the political culture, which is capable of explaining the remainders of empire within the republic. However, the same perspective also constitutes the basis of an academic common sense about the source of conservatism in Turkey. Having become the doxic vision of the academic field as to the social source of conservatism, center-periphery analysis leads to the formation of a scholastic duality within which conservatism is covertly defined as the natural politics of the civil society. Especially after its conservative translation into the political field as the social nature of the democratic politics in Turkey, center-periphery analysis constituted the commonsensical source of the political reality.

The inspiration for Mardin's analysis is Edward Shils, the late representative of Chicago school. In his article, Shils (1961) applies to the 'center-periphery' division in order to construct an ideal-typical template of modern society. In Shils' perspective, center and periphery refers to two adversary value zones: while center is composed of the values of those who govern, periphery is made of the value system of those who are governed. In the pre-modern society, he argues, periphery is so distant from the center that it is almost out of the society. The modernization process, on the other hand, is the process of convergence between the adversary value zones through the expansion of center's values over the periphery. Briefly, Shils argues that modern society is the one in which the values of the center are generalized through the modern institutions such as education and media.

For Mardin, Shils' perspective has no significance beyond being a useful theoretical framework for his Weberian research project on the peculiarities of Turkey. Looking at the modernization process in Turkey through the theoretical lenses developed by Shils, Mardin (1973) argues that modernization in Turkey was experienced in an

opposite direction: in spite of diminishing the distance between center and periphery, both Ottoman and republican modernization processes reproduced it. During the classical age of the Ottoman Empire, the source of the center-periphery division lied in the social divisions such as ruling/ruled and peasant/citizen. The center was mainly composed of the sultan and palace bureaucracy, the ruling authority, who were free from paying taxes. In addition to those who constituted the center, were those who established an intellectual relation with the world through their mastery in Persian and Arabic languages. On the other hand, periphery was composed of local gentry and peasants who were obliged to pay taxes. Another property of the periphery was the dominance of ethnic and religious primordial communities.

According to Mardin, during the period of Ottoman reformism modern institutions did not diminish the distance because of some structural limits. For example, the number of new schools was limited and they were mostly built in the big cities. In this way, new schools became the reproduction mechanism of the Westernized bureaucrats while madrasa education kept being the mainstream education in the provinces. It impacted on the media literacy, as well. Those who read newspaper were composed of the graduates of the new schools. In addition to that, the distance between center and periphery even increased because those who had their education in the new schools despised the culture of the periphery as backward.

The republican revolution, according to Mardin, was a possibility to overturn this division. However, it failed since it could not create a peasant movement just as the case in China or Russia. In spite of overturning the social conditions that created the division, the republican cadre tried to establish unification through an ideology of nation. Moreover, when Democrat Party (DP) came to power in 1950 as the representative of the periphery, in contrast to the Western experience, the culture of periphery has found a possibility of generalization in Turkey. As a result, the source of the failure in the generalization of the center values during the modernization of Turkey, according to Mardin, was the 'bureaucratic code' that prioritized the empowerment of the center. Looking at the political future of Turkey from the early

1970s, Mardin argued that it was highly likely to witness a strong tension between the two value systems. On the one side, there was political and military bureaucracy and their secular cultural code which was represented politically by Republican People's Party (CHP); on the other side, there was civil society gathered around Islam and their 'conservative cultural code' which was represented by DP and its followers.

Mardin's perspective has merits such as going beyond the substantialist approaches that perceive the unifying power of religion as an essential religious property. He rather explains this unifying power as a cultural structure that emerged through political struggles within specific historical conditions. Despite its merits, however, Mardin's center-periphery analysis embodies a number of limits. First of all, Mardin imprisons the social peculiarity to the culture and takes the power relations into account only secondarily so long as they have cultural results. Similar to the modernization theory, power relations, for Mardin, imply the division between the ruling and the ruled. Even the economic power becomes the part of the analysis only when it contributes to this division. From Mardin's perspective, center and periphery are two separate and monolithic blocks of values which are culturally determined. Power struggles and resulting differentiation within each block are seen as blurry spots of historical process. For example, since he could not perceive the autonomous power of the cultural capital free from the will of the sultan, Mardin presents the strong opposition within the Ottoman bureaucracy as a mystery of history. Nevertheless, in these blurry spots, culture lends a hand to him as the black box of the practice.

Second, Mardin's historical analysis attributes rational logic to the ended social action in parallel with the results it created (*opus operatum*). As a consequence, it misses the social practice's logic in action (*modus operandi*). For example, Mardin insists on seeing continuity in the present tension between center and periphery rather than dissecting the structural transformation that was experienced in the center following the republican revolution (such as the changing mixture of the forms of

capital at the hand of the center). This insistence concretizes in the centrality of the bureaucratic code as the main source of the tension in both Ottoman and republican modernization processes. According to Mardin, it is the strategy of establishing authority through force and the despising attitudes against the culture of the periphery that prevent bureaucratic culture to establish cultural ties with Islam and concrete ties with peasants. This insistence on the continuity leads him to apply to the outdated power schema of ruling/ruled division by ignoring the social differentiation that comes out of the differentiation of power through the emergence of autonomous fields.

Third, Mardin converts the cultural difference between center and periphery into the basis of political conflict by assuming that the political attribute of the groups is given rather than being constructed. For Mardin, emphasizing the conflicting cultural values of center and periphery is enough to explain the political conflict. However, he forgets that social and cultural differentiations are not destined to lead to the political conflict. Reducing the political struggles to the cultural differences, he ignores the political entrepreneurship and group-making. What is more significant, however, is the symbolic violence that Mardin's analysis leads through the sharp divisions between the two adverse blocks. It is especially problematical that Mardin uses the concept of civil society in an extremely loose way that excludes the voters of CHP. It seems that civil society implies the ruled. If it is so, however, one may rightly ask "does not the voter-base of CHP form a part of civil society?" or "do all the voters of CHP rule the country by forming a huge bureaucratic class?" Similar questions can be asked about the identification of periphery with Islam. Here again one can ask "is there a monopoly of periphery over Islam?" or "is there a monolithic interpretation of Islam in Turkey?" Mardin's analysis is not strong enough to provide satisfactory answers to these practical questions just because it is a product of the scholastic reason which forces empirical reality to take the shape of the theoretical logic on paper.

Mardin's cultural structuralism leads to a distorted definition of conservatism as the natural ideology of a distorted civil society (periphery). Against the scholastic duality of Mardin's center-periphery analysis, this study applies to the relational sociology developed by Pierre Bourdieu. The conceptual tools of relational sociology (such as capital, field, habitus, social space, and symbolic power) replace the outdated theoretical framework of center-periphery analysis. The dualistic power conception (ruling/ruled) of center-periphery analysis may be applied to examine the classical age of Ottoman Empire. However, since the modernization process refers to the differentiation of power, it is not possible to speak about a dualistic social world within which each one of the two blocks is separated from the other with clear borders and monolithic structure. What lies behind the so-called modernization process is the declining control of the Sultan over the forms of capital (such as symbolic capital, military capital, economic capital, religious capital, and bureaucratic capital) that were intensified within the palace, and the emergence (or flourishing) of autonomous fields. Thus, the political reality of the social world which is formed by the multiple centers of power cannot be reduced to the conflict between the two blocks (ruling/ruled). It is rather made of the struggles both within each field and among the fields. Therefore, insisting on the continuity of the center-periphery relations within a differentiated society implies nothing other than the generalization of the previous form of power relations to understand the current political struggles.

Despite its limits, the fact that power struggles during the Ottoman modernization process occurred between the reformist hand and conservative hand of the bureaucracy lends credibility to Mardin's argument that center-periphery conflict is triggered by the bureaucratic code. When the reformists won the struggle, the source and the form of the mainstream opposition was religious. The reason why the opposition was identified with Islam is not only that it constituted the source of individuals' doxic relation to the social world. The religion-based opposition is also a product of religious, political, and cultural entrepreneurship.

Lastly, the rule of DP did not generalize the values of periphery. However, it created significant results that Mardin did not mention. First of all, it softened the secular-nationalist culture programme of the single-party regime by opening space for conservative institutions in education and culture. As a result, the weakened conservative hand of the bureaucracy gained strength and the struggle between the conservative and reformist hands of the bureaucracy re-inflamed. Briefly, conservative politics gained symbolic capital (or legitimacy) in this period and this constituted the primary social conditions for the institutionalization and expansion of the conservative culture.

What is more significant than the rule of DP, however, is the emergence of the political field following the transition into the multi-party democracy period. The roots of the political field expand to the political struggles within the bureaucratic field during the Ottoman reformism. Among the legacy of the early politicization is the oppressive relations of competition which became the general form of the relations in the political field. In addition to that, the target of the previous political struggles, the ideal of the state-centered social world by means of controlling the bureaucracy, became the stake of the political struggles. As a result, the state-centered political vision, which Mardin named as the bureaucratic code, is nothing other than the ‘political habitus’ that was imprinted into the history of political struggles and the bodies of the agents as the proper logic of the politics. Briefly, it is the divisions, positions and the struggles of the political field that impact on the trajectory of conservatism, especially by triggering the symbolic polarization in the social space. I will elaborate on this discussion in the third chapter. Before this, however, in the next chapter I will focus on the theoretical approach and tools I will apply along the study.

#### **1.4 Plan of Chapters**

In the following chapter, I examine the relational sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. I start by shedding light on the epistemological roots, the impact of historical rationalism,

which constituted the basis for his sociology. Then, I examine the inner logic of the core principles and key conceptual tools such as social space, capital, field, habitus, and symbolic power by emphasizing that they emerged as a theory in action, a theory in dialogue with empirical necessities. Following that, I explain the merits and capacity of the examined conceptual tools in the sociological construction of the social world. I also discuss the limits and critiques of Pierre Bourdieu's structuralist constructivism. In the last two sections, I discuss the possibilities that Pierre Bourdieu's sociology provides in the study of conservatism and physical space.

In the third chapter, I historicize the social space through the conceptual tools that I examined in the previous chapter. I concentrate on the political field and dissect the struggles which shape not only the divisions, positions, and visions in the political field but also lead to the emergence of symbolic polarization, the mechanism of the social reproduction of the political divisions.

In the fourth chapter, I explain the methodology of the study. I start discussion by clarifying the emergence of the curiosity through the participant objectification. I discuss the difficulty of entering in the field and the way I solved it by changing the method from in-depth interview to ethnography. I explain Loic Wacquant's observant participation and the possibilities it can open in the sociological study of conservatism. Lastly, I focus on the research acts and the process of data production.

In the fifth chapter, I examine the social production and transformation of Çukurambar. I delve into the transformation of physical space by paying a specific attention to the dynamics that made the old gecekondü neighborhood middle class and conservative. I focus especially on the intensification of the political capital, municipality's renewal of the neighborhood plan to allow for high-rise buildings, the increasing interest of contractors as the factors that changed the physical space and the resident profile. Lastly, I discuss the role of symbolic power in making Çukurambar conservative despite the fact that half of the residents vote for secular parties.

The transformation of physical space implies the changing conditions of social existence. In the sixth chapter, I examine the transformation of taste in the new conditions. First, I explain what is new about the conservative middle class life-style with reference to changing political conditions. Then, I shed light on the acquisition of conservative dispositions by the dwellers of the neighborhood and focus on the formation of the ‘choice of elegant and religiously proper.’ I emphasize the role of the ‘unification of the market for symbolic goods’ in the reconstruction of the conservative middlebrow taste. Lastly, I discuss the religion-based homologous choices by examining the consumption patterns.

In the seventh chapter, I investigate the subjective construction of conservatism by focusing on the vision of self and social world. I examine the role of the critiques of cultural alienation over the conservative middlebrow taste. I argue that the primary impact of the critiques is the puritanisation of the inner world through the increasing expenditure of cultural labor to acquire a refined religious culture. I also examine the conservative vision of the social world by paying a special attention to the homology between the conservative cultural and political production and the mental schemata of conservative agents.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CONSERVATISM AS A RESEARCH OBJECT

#### 2.1 The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and Construction of Research Object

From his early works on the uprooting of peasantry in Algeria to his latest study on the state, the oeuvre of Pierre Bourdieu<sup>1</sup> can be described as a program of research object construction which is anchored in the central question of ‘social conditions of possibility’<sup>2</sup>. During his higher education in Ecole Normale Supérieure, Bourdieu acquired his central philosophical dispositions or his secondary (scholastic) habitus. Against the dominant branch of ‘philosophy of consciousness’ which was under the strong impact of the ideas of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, he oriented himself to the dominated philosophical branch of ‘historical epistemology’ (or the philosophy of concept) the prominent representatives of which were Bachelard, Canguilhem and Koyre (Bourdieu, 2008a). Against the commonsensical tendency to see the concept as given and stable, the historical epistemology shed light on the historical conditions for the production of concepts and the emergence of epistemological breaks. His doctoral research on ‘The Temporal Structures of Affective Life’ under the supervision of Canguilhem has never finished mostly because of his compulsory military service in Algeria where his academic trajectory transformed from philosophy to sociology.

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<sup>1</sup> The oeuvre of Pierre Bourdieu comprises of 36 books and more than 350 articles.

<sup>2</sup> “... [M]y entire scientific enterprise is based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped, providing only that one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but in order to build it up as a ‘special case of what is possible’, as Bachelard puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a world of finite possible configurations.” For a detailed discussion, see: Bourdieu, P. 1991a. “First Lecture. Social Space and Symbolic Space: Introduction to a Japanese Reading of Distinction.” *Poetics Today* 12(4): 627-638.

Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theory developed as a 'theory in action' which started with ethnographic study of 'Work and Workers in Algeria' (Bourdieu, 2004) and was revised in the following years in the light of new fieldworks. In Algeria, he faced the central sociological problem of that period: transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist economy. Criticizing modernization theory for reducing social transformations to the change of personality, structural-Marxists for reducing economic agents to the mere reflection of economic structures, and cultural anthropologists for reducing the culture to the black box of obstacles before the development, Bourdieu (1979) argued that the ambiguity of the transition sprang from the discrepancy between the economic world and the economic dispositions of the uprooted peasants of Kabyle. The basis of the discrepancy was the 'cleft habitus' or the acquisition of the ethos of the traditional order which did not match with the demands of the capitalist ethic. In addition to that, the expectation of a working class revolution out of this discrepancy was a naive scholastic vision which replaced the agents of theory with the agents of the lived world. He argued that the revolutionary political character was not a given attribute of working class. It was rather a possibility under specific social conditions that arms agents with rationalist 'dispositions toward future'. Acquired the traditional dispositions which rested on the conservation of the given mode of relations against the possible threats of the future, the uprooted peasants of Kabyle was a resigned political group rather than being revolutionary.

Bourdieu's studies on Algeria constituted, on the one hand, the starting point for his cross-Mediterranean research program on kinship, gender, and power; and on the other hand constituted the basis for the construction of his sociological theory which was strengthened by various researches on education, legitimate culture, language, religion, law, economy and state. The more his fieldwork experience enriched, the more his 'conceptual tool kit' strengthened as a response to the necessities of research object construction. Starting with the theory of habitus in 1963, he added the concept of 'capital' to his conceptual tool kit in 1964. He introduced the concept of 'field' in 1971 and used his generic concept 'social space' for the first time in 1976. In 1980s, he enriched his theoretical framework with another generic concept of

‘symbolic power’. From the beginning onwards, he was loyal to the principle of ‘reflexivity’ in the construction of research object (Wacquant, 2002; Swartz, 1997; Calhoun et. al., 1993). The detailed analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s oeuvre in terms of themes and main discussions is beyond the limit of this study. Yet I will focus on the main tenets of his sociological theory and his peculiar contributions to sociology literature.

## **2.2 The Inner Logic of Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociological Theory**

Pierre Bourdieu’s is a ‘symbolic revolution’ that overturned the schemata of vision and division in the academic field by overcoming the established antinomies such as subject/object, structure/agent, body/mind, history/reason, material/symbolic, theory/research, and subjectivism (such as ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and existentialism) and objectivism (such as cultural, linguistic, and social structuralisms). His ‘genetic structuralism’ played a significant role in the overcoming of these dualities by emphasizing the correspondence between social structures and mental structures.<sup>3</sup> Especially the concept of ‘habitus’ as the internalization of the external world in the form of cognitive schema and the generative capacity of invention within the limits of the structural constraints led him to shed light on both power struggles and relations of meaning as inseparable and equally legitimate object of sociology. Moreover, by unfolding the function of symbolic systems (such as language, myth, religion, art, and science) other than communication and objectification, Bourdieu’s theory of ‘symbolic power’ pointed out the function of symbolic systems as the instrument of power in the constitution of the relations of domination (Bourdieu, 1991b).

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<sup>3</sup> The correspondence of social structures and mental structures is a prominent argument of Durkheim and Mauss. For a detailed discussion about the argument see: Durkheim, E. & Mauss, M. 1963. *Primitive Classification*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. For a social critique of Kant’s *a priori* categories of mind, see: Durkheim, E. 1976. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, especially pp. 9-23. To compare Bourdieu’s view on the correspondence of social structures and mental structures with Durkheim, see: Bourdieu, P. 1996a. *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1-6.

The fundamental principles of his ‘sociological craft’ can be framed as rationalist epistemology, reflexive methodology, epistemological vigilance as sociological habitus, historicist conception of action, and agonistic vision of social life (or ontology)<sup>4</sup>. Like Condorcet, Comte, Durkheim, Mauss, and Levi-Strauss, Pierre Bourdieu can be classified as ‘historical rationalist’. In contrast to the ‘logical absolutism’ which endows the mind with universal *a priori* categories (the prominent representative of which was Immanuel Kant) or relativism which rests on the illusion of the view from nowhere (as exemplified by postmodern theory), the rationalist epistemology rests on the view of ‘historical reason’ which structured the emergence of the ‘scientific field’ in which “statements about the world that aspire to universality are constructed” (Bourdieu, 2000: 106). For Bourdieu, epistemology is “a question of understanding our instruments of knowledge in order to know the effect that these instruments produce on our objects; and we have to know our object in order to know in what way it obeys a specific logic, opposed to that of the instruments of knowledge that we apply to it” (Bourdieu, 2014: 90).

The emphasis on the historicity of the reason is a warning about the unwanted effects of the scientific field against which sociologists should be armed with ‘methodological reflexivity’. It is “a systematic exploration of the ‘social and intellectual unconscious’ that is composed of the effects of social origin, position in the scientific field, and scholarly bias which transform the world as a text to be deciphered” (Wacquant, 1992: 40). Reflexivity is a methodological work for the unfolding of the ‘unthought categories of thought’ so that the scientific practice can be realized on the level of consciousness.

Once armed with methodological reflexivity against the unwanted effects of scientific field, sociologists need to be armed with ‘epistemological vigilance’ that needs to be internalized as a mental habit against the possible distortions of social world within which sociologists exist like the other agents they analyze.

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<sup>4</sup> In framing the fundamental principles of Bourdieu’s sociology, I benefited from my class notes that I took in Loic Wacquant’s *Practice and Symbolic Power in Bourdieu* during the spring semester of 2015 at UC Berkeley.

“Sociologists do not stand outside the social world they analyze, or look down on it from above; they are themselves agents in the social process. What enables them – to some extent – to analyze this process ... is quite simply the scientific method, but not a fundamental difference in their position from that of other social agents” (Bourdieu et. al., 1991: ix). Familiarity with the social world and sharing the ordinary language with the other agents are epistemological obstacles that may lead to spontaneous sociology, the understanding of social life generated by those who are part of it. Scientific sociology should perform an epistemological break with the commonsensical pre-notions to construct the research object in such a way that refuses to limit the reality of social relations to surface level inter-subjective relations and takes social conditions and positions into account (ibid.: 18). The theoretical construction of the research object that made possible the epistemological break with the commonsensical reality of the social world is nothing other than a model of reality that needs to be tested empirically with methods that are consistent with the theoretical question. The research process is not composed of successive phases but rather observation, hypothesis, experimentation, and theory are present in each phase of epistemological acts (break, construction, and application).

Once sociologists distanced themselves from the commonsensical world through the object construction, the logic of practice can be examined within the relationality of social conditions and positions which is beyond the motivations and intentions of individual subjects and free from the scholarly bias. Every agent perceives and acts in the social world with unconscious presuppositions which are the product of specific position in the social space. Therefore, there is no substantial truth of social action; it is neither the product of the conscious subject nor the result of the structural constraints. Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ focuses on the ‘logic of the practice in action’ (modus operandi) rather than the practice as an end product (opus operatum).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For a detailed analysis of Bourdieu’s theory of practice see: Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of the Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Bourdieu, P. (1990a) *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.; Bourdieu, P. (1998) *Practical Reason*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Overcoming various kinds of substantialisms, the ‘historicist conception of action’ examines the encounter of two histories: the history embodied in the agent through the acquisition of a specific ‘sense of practice’, the internalization of social conditions of existence, and the history objectified in things or in the external world. On the other hand, the external world which is internalized by the agent is highly structured by the unequal distribution of the forms of power (or capital) and this is the main source of agony in the social world.

The struggle in the social world, however, is not only between the dominant and dominated poles of social space but rather the general form of social life. Bourdieu’s ‘sociology of domination’ is the examination of the differentiation of power in autonomous microcosms or fields within which there is a constant struggle to get the monopoly over the specific capital of the field. However, struggle is not restricted to the internal domain of separate fields; the dominant agents of each field confront each other in the ‘field of power’ to gain the dominant position in the division of the labor of domination (Wacquant, 1993a). In addition to that, struggles are not only competitions around the material resources; there are also symbolic struggles to produce and impose the legitimate representation of the social world.

In the light of the basic framework summarized above, it can be argued that what lies at the center of Bourdieu’s ‘acts of research’ is the historicization of the subject and the object of research. Apart from being a separate discipline, history is a vital instrument of denaturalization and defatalization of what is seemingly the nature and social fate of the research object. Sharing Durkheim’s (1982) argument that ‘unconscious is history’ Bourdieu applies to historicization to release the historical constraints inserted into the unconscious by history. By shedding the light of historicization over the scientific field, the instruments of knowledge of the sociologist, and social space, he frees the construction of research object from unconsciousness so that sociology can unfold the historical reality. However, freeing the instruments of knowledge and object construction from the constraints of history does not automatically lead to social reality. In contrast to commonsensical scientific

presuppositions that social reality is self-evident, transparent, and reachable through senses, the scientific study of social reality requires the construction of theoretical model which is a necessary break “from the phenomenal resemblances in order to construct deep analogies, and this break with apparent relations presupposes the construction of new relations among the appearances” (Bourdieu et.al., 1991: 57).

A theoretical model once constructed for the analysis of a specific research object can be applied in the analysis of different social forms since “sociology is the art of thinking phenomenally different things as similar in their structure and functioning and of transferring that which has been established about a constructed object, say the religious field, to a whole series of new objects, the artistic and political field and so on” (Bourdieu, 1990b: 191). Lastly, the task of sociologist while constructing the object is “to reconstitute the totality from which one can discover the unity of the subjective awareness that the individual has of the social system and of the objective structure of that system” (Bourdieu, 2008b: 94). Below is a short discussion about Bourdieu’s theoretical construction of social world and his main conceptual tools of construction.

### **2.3 Social World Constructed: Topological Social Space and Homologous Symbolic Space**

[T]he truth of the social world is at stake in the struggles between agents who are unequally equipped to reach an absolute, i.e., self-fulfilling vision (Bourdieu, 1989: 22).

As a theoretical model of social world, social space is a topology of positions based on the unequal distribution of power or forms of capital. The positions made out of different volume and compositions of capital are the social conditions within which agents exist. The external conditions within which agents exist have an objective structure free from the will and consciousness of agents, just like the symbolic systems that structuralists examined. Different from structuralists, Bourdieu argues that the reality of the social world is not limited to the functions of structures, and

similar to what constructivists argued, social reality is also a construction of individual representations.

However, construction of the social world does not occur in a vacuum but rather it is limited by the social conditions since social structures are internalized as mental structures which function as the logical instruments for the production of the representation of the social world. In this way, existing in structured positions, agents structure the social world through the cognitive schemata which was structured by social positions through the internalization of social conditions. The resulting vision of the social world may seem to imply reproduction as an inevitable fate. However, despite the fact that there is a strong link between mental structures and social structures, the individual representation of the social world is not closed to change. On the contrary, there are widespread individual and collective ‘symbolic struggles’ to preserve or transform the existing social world by preserving or transforming the representation of it. The peculiarity of Bourdieu’s ‘structuralist constructivism’ lies in the transformation of objectivism and subjectivism into inseparable moments of the construction of social space and thus overcoming of the seemingly incompatible duality of these perspectives.

### **2.3.1 The Objectivist Moment of Object Construction**

The objectivist moment is based on the historicization of the social space so that it will not be constructed as a social vacuum that is composed of the instantaneous encounters of interchangeable individuals. Therefore, the first act of the objectivist moment is to detect the “underlying immanent regularities of social world” with the help of the concept of capital which is “the history accumulated ... [in the form of] force inscribed in objective or subjective structures (Bourdieu, 1986: 241).” Thus, in the objectivist moment, social space is a topology of power which is not reduced to economic capital. By pluralizing the concept of capital (and thus Marx) Bourdieu can develop ‘a general science of economy of practices’ which is not restricted to economic theory.

The pluralization of capital reflects a significant shift in the apprehension of power from the model of mercantile exchange which is oriented to profit maximization to 'system of differences' in the social space. Thus, forms of capital can be pluralized as much as there are regular autonomous powers that impact on the differentiation of a position from the others. Except economic capital, there are especially three other forms of capital that impact on the constitution of social positions in advanced societies: cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital. Cultural capital is a form of power that is acquired to the extent that agents establish ties with cultural products and institutions. It is 'embodied' as a form of disposition and expressed most clearly through the 'linguistic competence'. Cultural capital is also 'objectified' in the owned cultural properties such as books, paintings, and instruments and 'institutionalized' in the certificates one gets. Social capital, on the other hand, is an actual or potential resource that is acquired with the membership to a group such as family. Lastly, symbolic capital is any form of capital that is recognized as legitimate. Different from all other forms, symbolic capital accumulates as the perception of others and is not owned by the agents.

The peculiarity of the objectivist moment is not only restricted to the pluralization of power. Bourdieu makes his peculiar contribution in the objectivist moment by introducing his generic concept 'field' which further historicize power and social space. Like social space and capital, field is an abstract tool of object construction to shed light on the historical process of the 'diversification of power' and its impacts on social world. By developing the concept of field Bourdieu "focuses on the process that Durkheim, Weber, and Marx described, that is, how societies, as they advance over time, differentiate into separate and autonomous spheres..." (Bourdieu, 2014: 201). For Bourdieu, at the core of the process of differentiation lays the formation and transformation of the dynastic state. Emerged as the concentration of various species of capital, the formation of dynastic state led to the totalization of various

forms of capital<sup>6</sup> in one center and this generated “a kind of meta-capital, that is, a capital with the particular property of exercising power over capital. ... The state, then, as holder of a meta-capital, is a field within which agents struggle to possess a capital that gives power over the other fields” (Bourdieu, 2014: 197). The differentiation of power, on the other hand, emerged as a part of state construction with king’s delegation of signature and seal to persons of competence (such as jurists and clerics) or with the emergence of the legal (bureaucratic) principle against dynastic principle. Thus, the process of diversification of power is the result of the ‘division of the labor of domination’ which led to the autonomization of fields with the delegation of dynastic power which composed of the totalization of various forms of capital in the person of king.

Far from being “a seamless totality integrated by systemic functions, a common culture, crisscrossing conflicts, or an overarching authority” that the notion of society implies, social space is “an ensemble of relatively autonomous spheres of play that cannot be collapsed under a societal logic, be it that of capitalism, modernity, or postmodernity” (Wacquant, 1992: 16-17). As a relatively autonomous microcosm of a specific form of capital, each field is the locus of the specific logic that derive from the structure of game, the general form of relation among the agents who, thanks to the acquisition of relevant form of capital, are magnetized to the field with the ‘feel for the game’. As might be expected each game is open to only those agents who are gravitated to the ‘illusio’ of the field by sensing that game is worth investing. Sharing of the doxic feel for the game, however, does not imply that game is played under equal conditions. The game is rather a power struggle among different positions from which agents develop differing strategies to conserve or transform the existing power relations in order to preserve or seize the monopoly over the properties of the field and impose the legitimate rules of the game. To grasp the logic of the game within a

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<sup>6</sup> The first form of capital in the formation of dynastic state was symbolic capital, basically the fundamental belief in that ‘king is king’. Following symbolic capital, the capital of physical force (formation of armies) and economic capital (collection of taxes) played a major role. For a more detailed discussion, see: *ibid.* pp. 190-206.

field, one can think of the struggle among the positions of magician, priest, and prophet to get the monopoly over the legitimate definition and goods of religion (Bourdieu, 1991c).

Despite the fact that all fields share the common structural properties such as game, struggle, positions, strategies, *illusio*, and interest (Bourdieu, 1994; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), each field has a relative value compared to other fields. Therefore, social space is composed of the forms of power some of which are more powerful than the others. The determination of the relative value of each field is the product of the confrontation among the dominant agents and institutions of each field in the ‘field of power’. Just like other fields, field of power is a gaming space where the stake of struggle is no more the accumulation of or monopoly over a specific form of capital but rather to dictate the dominant principle of domination and thus set the ‘division of labor of domination’ (Bourdieu, 1996a; Wacquant, 1993a). These confrontations in the field of power among the dominant agents of different fields (and thus capital) “... can take the form of real face-to-face encounters (as with “palace wars” or armed struggles between temporal and spiritual power holders) or symbolic confrontations (such as those in the Middle Ages in which what was at stake was the precedence of *oratores* [religious capital] over *bellatores* [military capital], or the struggles played out over the nineteenth century, and still today, in which what is at stake is the preeminence of merit over heredity or gifts)” (Bourdieu, 1996a: 265).

The struggle in the field of power is not only restricted to the seizure of the dominant position since the power as a brute force is not complete so long as its arbitrary nature of foundation was not misrecognized as legitimate. Thus, another stake in the struggles of the field of power is to dictate the ‘legitimate principle of legitimation’ by justifying the existing arbitrary power relations as necessary or natural. One may observe a correspondence between the holders of the dominant capital and their strategy of ‘sociodicy’ which contributes to the reproduction of the existing state of power relations: while aristocrats presented the ties with land and blood as a

prerequisite of being in the dominant position, new bourgeois presented merits as the primary condition of being dominant (Bourdieu, 2014). Hence, in contrast to the widespread misapprehension, the reason of why reproduction is one of the most recurrent themes in Bourdieu's sociology is not that he sees it as an inevitable social fate but rather because reproduction is the most recurrent outcome of the power struggles. Even when the subversive strategies of the dominated positions succeeded to overturn the existing power relations, the struggle continues with the transformation of subversive strategies into conservative strategies so that the dominant position could be preserved.

### **2.3.2 The Subjectivist Moment of Object Construction**

Having constructed the structural regularities of social space by breaking with the pre-notions in the objectivist moment, Bourdieu experiences a second break with objectivism so that he could reintroduce what was excluded in the objectivist moment: the individual representations and visions of the world. The constructivist moment of object construction is mainly based on the inclusion of perception of social world to the analysis of the reality of the social world. The perception of the social world, however, is not free from the structural constraints of the world. As the concept of 'point of view' implies, the view of the world, according to Bourdieu, is a view from a specific point, that is, from a specific position. If the social position is the primary variant of the perception of the world it is because, being exposed to the lasting influences of specific social conditions, agents internalize the external world as a 'system of disposition' or as habitus: "the structures characterizing a determinate class of conditions of existence produce the structures of habitus, which in their turn are the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences" (Bourdieu, 1990a: 54). Hence, the agent of the social world is not the universal subject of phenomenology and ethnomethodology, and the construction of the social world is not a conscious process as the variants of finalist theory (such as rational action theory) assume: agent constructs the world with the complicity of structures.

Agent knows the world because the world is in the agent. As a body, agent is situated to a place where she is subjected to a process of socialization which rests on the inscription of the social order in her body through the inevitable confrontations and affective relations with the social environment. Thus, agent learns bodily. However, the corporeal comprehension of the world does not imply a Foucauldian normalization process through the disciplining of the institutions; it rather implies a process of an unnoticed social pedagogy that springs from being exposed to the ordinary order of the things (Bourdieu, 2000). Since the internalization of the external world is nothing other than the embodiment of the ‘history objectified in things’, one of the primary functions of the habitus is the production of the commonsense or the doxic relation with the world which helps agent to take the familiar world for granted.

Providing the bodily instruments of the perception, habitus arms the agent with the ‘practical knowledge’ or the anticipation of the forthcoming future and thus plays a central role in the production of practices. The invisible imprint of habitus over the individual practices is the ‘amor fati’ or the love of the occupied position which produces the most visible effect by ‘stylizing’ the seemingly unrelated realms of practices. As a schema of appreciation (or taste) habitus “continuously transforms necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences, and without any mechanical determination, it generates the set of ‘choices’ constituting life-styles, which derive their meaning, i.e., their value, from their position in a system of oppositions and correlations” (Bourdieu, 1984: 175). Therefore, habitus is the unitary principle of the diverse practices such as the choice of the furniture, preferences of friendship, selection of food, choices of favorite sport or music, and support of political party which are conditioned by the similar social conditions.

However, the distinctive function of habitus is not limited to the generation of ‘stylistic affinity’, it also classifies the practices and works of others and thus generates the ‘sense of place’ (or the sense of what is for me) as much as the ‘sense of the place of others’ (or what is not for me) in the social space. Briefly, habitus

produces classifiable practices and works, and classifies the practices and works of others by perceiving them as a 'system of distinctive signs' which are expressed most clearly by the pairs of adjectives such as heavy/light, bright/dull. "Taste is the practical operator of the transmutation of things into distinct and distinctive signs, of continuous distributions into discontinuous oppositions; it raises the differences inscribed in the physical order of bodies to the symbolic order of significant distinctions" (Bourdieu, 1984: 174-5).

Therefore, thanks to the habitus, the perceived world or the world constructed by the agent is nothing other than the social space or its fundamental principle of the distribution of the forms of capital translated as a homologous 'symbolic space'. In other words, functioning as a mechanism of 'social classification', habitus translates the differences among various positions, which in essence spring from the unequal distribution of power, as a system of symbolic differences. The direct outcome of this translation is the misrecognition of the differences of power as symbolic differences and the resulting exertion of 'symbolic violence' through the recognition of the arbitrary state of power relations as the natural state of the social world. Thus, in contrast to 'mechanistic theories' of the social world (such as Althusserian Marxism) the recognition of the domination is not the outcome of the institutions' conscious work of imposition but rather of the misrecognition of the world.

Even though the homology between the position/disposition and structure/construction is strong, the social world is still vague and indeterminate. The fact that social world presents itself to the agent as highly structured does not mean that it cannot be constructed other than how it presents itself. Because, "[t]he categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the names, the words which construct social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence of the political struggle ..." (Bourdieu, 1989: 20-1). The positions of the social space which are occupied by individuals and groups in the social world constitute the basis for the generation of oppositional (or differential) relations. However, the content of these oppositional relations can be defined in

various ways. The same group can be called as working class, ethnic group, or religious group. Therefore, the identity of the groups is not a substantial component of the reality of the group; rather the legitimate definition of the identity of a group is at stake in the symbolic struggles. Bourdieu's is especially a critique of variations of Marxism which treat the 'classes on paper' as the real classes. Thus classes are not the given occupiers of the positions but rather they can be constructed as the outcome of a purely political work (Wacquant, 2013a; Swartz, 2013).

Despite the semantic elasticity which makes the various constructions of the world possible, symbolic struggles tend to reproduce the objective unequal distribution of power as the symbolic order of the social world. This is simply because each construction of the world does not have the same capacity to produce 'belief' in the constructed world. The social authority of the making of the world by means of the words, that is 'symbolic power', is the derivative of symbolic capital which was acquired in the previous struggles. Making of the dominant narrative of history is a good case to illustrate how symbolic power functions. Like the social world, history has a semantic elasticity, that is, a historical event can be interpreted in various forms. A peasant revolt can be interpreted as an emancipatory social movement or as treason to the dominant political power. Becoming the dominant narrative does not spring from the inner logic of the discourse but rather from the symbolic capital of the agent who utters the discourse.

Lastly, Bourdieu emphasizes the role of state, the central bank of symbolic credit, in the functioning of symbolic power. By 'codifying' a symbolic capital, state transforms a specific symbolic capital into the general power (Bourdieu, 1990c: 76-86). For instance, the foundation of an Islamic republic in Iran is nothing but the codification of the symbolic capital of religious leaders. Even though, the symbolic power tends to reproduce the existing order, Bourdieu's sociology is not incapable of explaining revolutionary changes. On the contrary, symbolic revolution or the revolutionary re-construction of the world is one of the central themes in his examination of the field of cultural production.

## 2.4 Critiques of Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology and Critique of Critiques

Anchored in a program of research object construction, Bourdieu's is an attempt to produce a "post-positivist sociology of cultural domination" (Wacquant, 1993b). In contrast to what Vandenberghe (1999) argues, the core of his theoretical action is not to synthesize Marx, Durkheim, and Weber and thus enable a 'corrective intervention' to the classical sociology. Despite this judgement is one of the possible interpretations of Bourdieu's opus operatum, it would be inconsistent to assess the sociologist of *modus operandi* over the reception of his end product. Moreover, Bourdieu's uses of classical sociology rests on the pluralization of Marx over the concept of capital, structuralization of Weber over the concept of field, and politicization of Durkheim over the issue of the correspondence of social structures and mental structures; thus his intervention to classical sociology is radical rather than being corrective.<sup>7</sup>

To satisfy the consumers of theoretical theory who can be content only after the detection of the imprints of other theories over the examined theory, Bourdieu's oeuvre can be seen as the sociologization of Ernst Cassirer's 'philosophy of symbolic forms'.<sup>8</sup> However, it would be totally misleading to call Bourdieu as the follower of

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<sup>7</sup> For an elaborated analysis of Bourdieu's relation with classical sociology, see: Brubaker, R. (1985) Rethinking Classical Sociology: The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 14(6), pp.745-775. For an analysis over the relation of Bourdieu's thinking with Durkheim, see: Wacquant, L. (2011) Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and its Cracks. in Susan S. & Turner, B. S. [ed] *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays*, London: Anthem Press, pp. 91-110. For a self analysis over his relation with Weber, see: Bourdieu, P., Schultheis, F., and Pfeuffer, A. (2011) With Weber Against Weber: In Conversation with Pierre Bourdieu, in Susan S. & Turner, B. S. [ed] *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays*, London: Anthem Press, pp. 111-214. For a discussion about the relation of Bourdieu with Marx, see: Fowler, B. (2011) Pierre Bourdieu: Unorthodox Marxist? in Susan S. & Turner, B. S. [ed] *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays*, London: Anthem Press, pp. 33-58.

<sup>8</sup> The four volume of 'The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms' is basically the examination of the symbolic systems such as language, myth, religion, art, and science, over their function of 'objectification' in the constitution of the reality of human being. Pierre Bourdieu's oeuvre can be seen as the extended sociological analysis of these four symbolic forms. For a compact summary of Cassirer's arguments, see: Cassirer, E. (1944) *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, New Haven: Yale University Press. For a discussion that gives place to the relation of Bourdieu with Ernst Cassirer, see: Vandenberghe, F. (2001) From Structuralism to Culturalism:

Cassirer; he rather thinks with Cassirer against Cassirer. His relations with other thinkers are restricted to the pragmatic adaptation of conceptual tools as the condition of logical possibility for the analysis of social conditions of possibility. Therefore, Cassirer's symbolic forms as the mechanisms of the objectification of reality is further developed by Bourdieu to include power dimension so that he could shed light on the specific contribution that symbolic systems make to the constitution of relations of domination.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory is not a finished project that claims to endow the readers with the truth of the social world. It developed as a theory in action and still needs to be further developed within the new processes of object construction. Like many other theories, Bourdieu's theory has both merits and limitations. Since I tried to explain its merits in detail above, I will focus now on the limitations of and critiques on his theory. The critiques concentrate on the theory of habitus. From Marxism to cultural structuralism, various approaches agree on the restrictions that the concept of habitus leads by making 'homo-habitus' as the agent of social space which is almost destined to reproduction and thus enable no convincing perspective about the possibility of social change (Buroway, 2012; Swiddler, 2001). The variations of this critique spring mostly from the misapprehension of habitus as the only operator of social action and being closed to transformation. However, the emergence of action in Bourdieu's theory is the product of confrontation of agent who is armed with habitus with a situation.

What Bourdieu argues is clearly that as long as the conditions in which habitus was acquired match with the conditions of the situations of the external world, habitus generates reproductive practices. However, in cases of the disjuncture between habitus and situation, such was the case of Turkish migrants in Germany or the uprooted peasants of Kabyle in Algeria, habitus transposes to generate suitable

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Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 4(4), pp. 479-497.

practices with the new situation. The adaptation to new conditions, Bourdieu argues, is never perfect since the agent cannot throw away easily ‘the person of yesterday’ which was inscribed to her body. Thus, the product of the disjuncture is a ‘cleft habitus’ which generates change within the limits of structural constraints.

It must be asserted that agent is not imprisoned to one habitus; as long as the social conditions of existence change she has secondary or tertiary habitus (Wacquant, 2016). However, what never changes and thus functions as a structural constraint even within turmoil of change Bourdieu argues, is the fundamental position of the ‘primary habitus’ which was acquired in the early socialization period. Therefore, the critique of habitus as the obstacle of social change has no ground in Bourdieu’s theory. Nevertheless, this explanation may not satisfy the critiques since what they criticize seem to be the absence of a perspective of change that takes conscious subject as the center rather than the function of habitus as a reproduction mechanism. In Bourdieu’s dispositional theory, consciousness (in the sense of class consciousness) is not a given property of agent but it is rather a possibility. The historical rationalism keeps Bourdieu away from the scholastic illusion that the logical possibility of change on paper can transform the world. Therefore, the task of sociology is not to change the world but to contribute to its transformation by shedding light on the obstacles before the transformation.

As Wacquant (1993b: 137) highlighted, what seems to be more problematic about Bourdieu’s theory of habitus is the details of the complicity between structures and habitus. What are the social conditions of possibility for the collapse of the complicity between habitus and structure without a change in the social conditions of existence? He seems to have ignored the possibilities that rational communication (in the sense of Habermas) can generate in the transformation of relations of domination. In addition to that, despite the merits of his theory to explicate the social conditions that generate dominated positions, the absence of attention to the analysis of dominated culture is another limitation. Similarly, he seems to have ignored the oppositional capacity of dominated cultures. Despite its limitations, Bourdieu’s is

one of the most inspiring contemporary theories for the social scientists all around the world. It should be remembered that the limitations listed above are not the natural obstacles of Bourdieu's theory; they are rather challenges for social scientists to contribute to the development or critique of his structuralist-constructivism.

## **2.5 Re-Considering Conservatism with Bourdieu**

The difficulty in the sociological study of conservatism is the fuzziness of the concept. What makes it even more difficult is the scholastic tendency of bringing an intelligible explanation by excluding the fuzziness of the concept. 'Conservatism as an ideology or a way of thinking' is the commonsensical site of research within which the partial reality of the concept is treated as the totality of the reality at the cost of covering over the murky reality of the concept. This study interrogates conservatism beyond its ideological posture by applying to the relational approach which implies "shifting the unit of analysis to the relations of force and meaning surrounding the folk category, including the social determinations that gave rise to its emergence in social life" (Medvetz: 2012: 35).

The merit of the relational approach for this study is that it provides the link between the conservatism as the product of experts (or entrepreneurs) from different fields and its consumers (conservative agents) in the social space by taking the acquisition of the dispositions into account. In other words, it relates the conservative politics, philosophy, periodicals, newspapers, literature, and other conservative cultural products with the conservatism of the lived world. A relational inquisition on conservatism does not satisfy with a definition of the concept on paper so long as it is not related to the conservatism of the actually existing conservatives. As Medvetz noted, "the relational definition of a concept does not promise a better definition but rather an empirical definition of it" (Medvetz: 2012: 36).

As I discussed in the introduction, the previous efforts of empiricization of conservatism in Turkey anchored in a religious affinity between conservative parties and people. Seeing religion as the central bank of conservative values, this

perspective perceived the so-called ‘religious cultural code’ as the main dynamic that makes an individual conservative. The main problem in this latent cultural structuralism which is the commonsensical academic vision in Turkey is the assumption that the source of the conservative values (or the practical conservatism of the conservative individuals) is textual or scriptural.

However, I argue that conservatism is a form that principles of social vision and division (such as gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religious affiliation) take through the symbolic entrepreneurship of experts from various fields. The principles of social vision and division are basically the socially produced symbolic frameworks about how to relate the world, such as the proper ways of manly/womanly or Islamic/Christian perception and action. “Their sociological significance” lies in their potential “to pattern the social space through the formation of habitus” (Wacquant and Akçaoğlu, 2017: 45). In other words, forming what a man/woman is and how a man/woman perceives the world implies broader social formation such as the formation of family, division of familial labor, interior design of house, and participation to social life.

The ‘conservative form’ emerged as the orthodox re-construction of the doxic values that the principles of social vision and division had in the ancient regime. In other words, conservative form is a pessimistic critique of the differentiated society within which the doxic definition of the principles of social vision and division lost legitimacy. Thus, the conservative form is not constructed in a void. It emerged as a part of the practical and symbolic struggles of the social world during the great transformations. Once emerged within the dominated social position of the emergent differentiated society, the conservative form is not destined to remain as dominated. It can be the legitimate form depending on the trajectory of the struggles.

There is no substantial and universal source of conservative social vision and division. The strong relation between religion and conservatism lies in the symbolic potential that religion provides for the conservative objectification of the social

relations. However, unless the religious, political and cultural experts apply to them, the religious symbolic tools do not construct conservatism by themselves. To put it more clearly, if conservatism in Turkey is strongly related to Islam, it is not only because the inner logic of Islam requires so but also because the religious experts forge the doxic character of everyday life, or because the political agents applies to religious tools while making the political groups or because the cultural entrepreneurs (such as writers and artists) applies to Islamic sources in the making of their cultural products. As there is no substantial source, there is no monolithic conservative form. There are multiple conservative forms of the principles of social vision and division, and the legitimate definition of the conservative form is at stake in the symbolic struggles among the conservative entrepreneurs.

Once a conservative form was given to the principles of social vision and division, these symbolic products may generate concrete results. Being acquired in family, school, mosque, and political party or association as a set of disposition, these symbolic products can make an individual and the social conditions she lives in conservative. In other words, once being acquired as a set of disposition, these symbolic products become the mental schemata through which the agent perceives and acts in a conservative manner.

## **2.6 Walking with Bourdieu in the Streets of Çukurambar**

It is not common to classify Bourdieu as an urban sociologist. However, it can be argued that physical space has always been among his durable (even if latent) objects of research. This durable interest rests on the homology between social space, physical space, and symbolic space: “[t]he structure of social space ... manifests itself, in the most diverse contexts, in the form of spatial oppositions, inhabited (or appropriated) space as a sort of spontaneous metaphor of social space” (Bourdieu, 1996b: 13). Moreover, the social structures which are incorporated into physical space transform into being mental structure, principle of vision and division (Bourdieu, 1996b: 15).

Despite the significance of physical space in the inner logic of Bourdieu's theory, it is not possible to speak about a strong Bourdeuian branch in urban sociology. As Painter (2000) argues, one of the reasons of why Bourdieu is referred rarely in the study of physical space is the strong identification of his studies with anthropology, education, and cultural studies. Yet, there are significant studies that show the potential of Bourdieu's conceptual tools for urban sociology. Among them are Wacquant's (2008) studies on advanced urban marginalization, Rosenlund's (2009) research on the socioeconomic and cultural change in a Norwegian periphery by adapting the inner logic of *Distinction*, and Fogle's (2011) theoretical inquiry that interrogates the potential that Bourdieu's topological sociology has for the study of physical space. Apart from these studies which test the potential of Bourdieu's theory for the study of physical space, the common tendency is the partial appropriation of the relational conceptual tools (such as forms of capital) especially in the studies on gentrification (Rosenlund, 2017).

As Savage (2011) argues, there is a 'lost urban sociology' in the oeuvre of Pierre Bourdieu. While Savage found the source of inspiration for the study of physical space in the theory of fields, Wacquant (2017b, forthcoming) points out the potential of his early studies by arguing that his cross-Mediterranean researches on Algeria and Béarn

establish that all social and mental structures have spatial correlates and conditions of possibility; that social distance and power relations are both expressed and reinforced by spatial distance; and that propinquity to the center of accumulation of capital (economic, military, or cultural) is a key determinant of the force and velocity of social change. Indeed these early studies suggest that state power (colonial in Algeria, central in France) is wielded through the control and penetration of space, the organization of settlements (via complementary processes of concentration and dispersal), the geographic distribution of symbolic authorities, and the regulation of physical mobility, according to the rudimentary formula:

power → physical space → social structure and relations → practice  
and subjectivity.

It is the merit of Bourdieu's sociology to examine the physical space in relation with social space and symbolic space. It is this broader perspective that enables this study to relate the spatial transformation in Çukurambar with the accompanying social and symbolic transformations. This perspective is promising especially in contemporary Turkey where the cities became a huge construction site as the economic development and political power are highly dependent on the expansion of construction sector (Bora, 2016; Yeşilbağ, 2016; Geray, 2009). It must be emphasized that the function of the construction of buildings is not limited to stimulation of economic development. What is constructed is not only buildings but also the conservative ideal of the new Turkey, a conservative dream of economic development, technical modernization, and cultural conservatism. The merit of Bourdieu's analytic method to investigate the current socio-spatial turmoil in Turkey is that it reminds the researcher that the production of physical space is related to the production of social conditions. Moreover, it helps researcher to trace the impact that socio-spatial transformation has over the individuals by providing the necessary tools to dissect the transformation of taste.

## CHAPTER 3

### POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND SYMBOLIC POLARIZATION: THE SOURCES OF BODILY CONSERVATISM

#### 3.1 Introduction

It is beyond the scope and purpose of this study to present a full-fledged examination of the historical roots of current conservatism in Turkey. My aim in this chapter is rather to dissect the historical link between the political struggles and the bodily conservatism in order to shed light on how the foundation of AKP impacted on the transformation of bodily conservatism. To historicize conservatism in a way different than the ‘center-periphery analysis’, I benefit from Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical tools which I examined in the previous chapter. I start the examination by detecting the ‘legitimacy crisis’ that conservative politics experienced following the foundation of republican regime. I argue that breaking with Islamist movement, AKP came into existence as a part of the quest for a legitimate form of conservatism. Second, I examine the relational construction of AKP’s conservative democracy by placing it into the political field of Turkey. I investigate the construction of conservative democracy by focusing on the confrontation of political agents with the principles of division in the political field. Third, I inquire into the impact of the transformation of political conservatism on the bodily conservatism by introducing the concept of ‘symbolic polarization’, the mechanism of the social reproduction of the political divisions. Having emerged as an unintended consequence of republican revolutions, I argue that symbolic polarization played a significant role in the formation of the conservative habitus. I especially emphasize the collapse of collective orthodoxy following the foundation of AKP, which opened the way for the emergence of a conservative middlebrow taste that is at peace with bourgeoisie culture.

### **3.2 Political Legitimacy Crisis and Transformation of Conservatism in Turkey**

The roots of the current conservatism in Turkey can be traced back to the period of Ottoman reformism. As Mardin (1991b) notes, two separate forms can be dissected for the early conservatism: working class conservatism and intellectual conservatism. Despite the fact that both forms of conservatism diverge from one another, they both spring from the confrontation with the reforms. Emerging as a response to the inefficiency of the dynasty-based division of labor of domination, reforms were, at the beginning, technical tool to revitalize the Ottoman state by re-organizing the bureaucracy (Zürcher, 2004). The basic result of the reforms was the expansion of the bureaucratic field with the emergent offices and institutions. The more the number of new institutions increased the more the scope of the power diminished for the agents of the old bureaucratic structure. The reform institutions did not only diminish the range of ulema authority but also threatened their social reproduction (Bein, 2011: 7). Especially the low-ranking ulema- müftis, imams, madrasa teachers, and other local authorities in the religious hierarchy- perceived the rise of the secular bureaucracy and the indifference of high-ranking ulema regarding the reforms as an infidelity against Islam (Lewis, 2002). Like Sufi monasteries, the low-ranking ulema played a great role in the inculcation of the religious schema of perception in the everyday life of Muslims and contributed to the making of doxic vision of the social world by forging the religious and national affiliations among the residents of the small towns and the Muslim neighborhoods of the capital and other big cities.

The ties of interaction between low-ranking ulema and Muslim laity contributed to the expansion of anti-reformist opposition within the larger social space. For the reaya, the source of opposition was not the bureaucratic re-organization but rather the social implications of the reforms. Beyond being technical tool, reforms became political tool to generate an Ottoman nation from diverse religious and ethnic communities through the principle of equality so that the further dismantling of the empire could be prevented (Somel, 2001). However, while the equality-led reforms were appreciated by the non-Muslim communities, Muslims of Anatolia opposed

them (İnalçık, 2014). As Keyder (1997: 36) argues, the declining economic role of Muslim population within the rising capitalism played a great role in the formation of a reactionary attitude against the reforms. The legal, economic, and bureaucratic transformations triggered the collapse of religious affiliation-based Ottoman social classification system, which is known as ‘millet system’. “*Millet* does not denote a nation, (nor an ethnicity) but a form of social organisation, based on religion, a state of mind, and the subjects’ mutual consideration of one another” (Ortaylı, 2004: 18). Apart from taxes, it regulated occupation, neighborhood, and even clothes of agents living in the Ottoman social world (Quataert, 2002; Ortaylı, 2004). Thus, religion was not only a set of rules of salvation but also a significant source of social classification. Since the *millet system* rested on the dominant position of Muslims, what Anatolian Muslims saw in the reforms was not equality but privileges given to non-Muslims. Thus, it can be argued that religiously forged anti-reformism constituted the main ground of working class conservatism.

In contrast to working class conservatism, intellectual conservatism was not directly against reforms. It emerged within the struggles of the bureaucratic field among the second generation reformist bureaucrats, namely Young Ottomans. Their conservatism rested on their critique of emulative and superficial character of Tanzimat reforms. In other words, intellectual conservatism appeared as a quest of synthesis between Islamic civilization and Western civilization (Mardin, 1996). As Kara (1994) notes, intellectual conservatives inspired secularists as much as Islamist conservatives. The formula of synthesist thinking lied in their argument that everything that can be classified as Western had their roots in Islamic civilization (Çetinsaya, 2001: 57). According to this formula, the demand for parliament and constitution was not the signal of infidelity since similar institutions had been part of the Islamic civilization in the past. It can be argued that Young Ottomans demanded a reform in the orthodox way of Islamic thinking which dominated the religious and political institutions. Their perspective was shared by religious and cultural entrepreneurs during the second constitutional period. For example, a significant amount of high-ranking ulema and influential Islamist intellectuals such as Mehmed

Akif Ersoy and Eşref Edip Fergan agreed with the reformist Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) rule about the necessity of a madrasa reform (Bein, 2011). The reformist perspective of conservative intellectuals diminished when the oppression of CUP increased following the conservative revolt of the 31 March Incident.

The diminished reformist perspective of intellectual conservatism disappeared strictly in the early republican period. The foundation of a new state and change of the regime have constituted a convenient condition to construct a new field of power within which rules of the game were set by republicans. Republican revolutions can be seen as a three-tiered secularization project (Berkes, 1998). The first dimension was the secularization of state, which implied the disqualification of Ottoman dynasty and ulema from the field of power. The second dimension was the secularization of symbolic systems, which implied the purification of language, rationalization of religion and invention of a new ‘Turkish’ history. Lastly, the third dimension was the secularization of social space and symbolic space, which implied the reorganization of the distribution of the forms of capital and resulting positions in the social space and position-takings (or lifestyles) in the symbolic space.

The logic of secularizing revolutions rested on the strict control of state over all forms of capital. The concept of ‘national’ functioned like the central bank of symbolic capital; whenever it referred to a form of power, such as national economy, national culture, national education, and national history, it implied the plan, control, and approval of state and thus granted legitimacy. The legitimate use of power, on the other hand, required being harmonious with the secular rule by embodying the vision of state in the form of lifestyle, most particularly in the form of speech and clothing (Çınar, 2005). Thus, the quest of a rational and secular social space led to the emergence of an implicit social classification of the republican bureaucracy which rested on the division between modern citizens and backward people.

Under the strict control of secular state on the social world, two previous forms of conservatism lost their legitimacy. Intellectual conservatism muted and its reformist

perspective evaporated. Despite losing its legitimacy, working class conservatism did not disappear. However, its anti-reformism transformed fast into anti-secularism. As the old forms of conservatism became illegitimate, the peculiar conditions of early republican period gave birth to a new form of legitimate conservatism. Since the strong political oppression prevented the development of ideological opposition, the ‘republican-friendly conservatism’ focused on the conservative interpretation of modernity. The new conservative figures – such as Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, and Peyami Safa - were neither an old member of ulema nor Islamist intellectual; they were rather secular. Their main problem was to establish the link of republic with Turkish and Islamic culture. Therefore, this intellectual movement did not produce a conservative critique of the new regime but rather tried to produce a conservative meaning of it (İrem, 2002; Bora, 2017).

The republican-friendly conservatism did not remain only as an intellectual movement but also evolved into a political vision with the establishment of Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP). What lied at the basis of the republican-friendly conservatism of DP was the production of a conservative definition of secularism and the defense of liberal economy against the state-controlled economy politics of CHP (Ahmad, 2006: 124). Against the three-tiered transformative political project of CHP, DP developed two-dimensional definition of secularism as the guarantee of freedom of thought and faith, and also the principle that prevents the political uses of religion (Karpas, 2008). The fact that state is secular, according to this view, does not prevent it from establishing peaceful relations with the conservative culture and people. The political practice that this legitimate conservative vision generated along the ten years of DP rule between 1950 and 1960 can be called as the politics of ‘symbolic correction’. The conservative antidote of the early republican secularization project was found in expanding the scope of the ‘conservative hand of the state’. What is more significant is that the rule of DP ended the strict secular control over the social space, and the previously muted religious

and cultural entrepreneurs found the proper conditions to forge the future form of conservatism (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009; Ahmad, 2006).

The republican-friendly conservatism remained as the dominant conservative form for a long time. However, its dominance was challenged especially after the emergence of Islamist conservatism. Founded in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP) came into existence as a consequence of the collapse of implicit conservative coalition under the roof of DP and Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP). Having Mehmet Zahit Kotku, the leader of the Naqshbandi İskender Paşa Community, among its founders, the social basis of the party resembles to that of the late Ottoman period working class conservatism. Defining itself as the only national party compared to other parties of the given decayed political order, MNP emphasized the heavy industrialization move and moral development as its distinctive character (Çakır, 2002). Compared to the mainstream conservatism of DP and AP tradition, MNP was openly distant to secularism. It was critical about democracy and against Turkey's membership to European Economic Community.

However, what distinguished it most from the mainstream conservative parties was rather its national program of moral economy which was later formulated as the program of 'just order' (Bora, 2017: 476). It can be seen as the third way of Islamism against communism and capitalism. In contrast to communism and capitalism which take either political or economic power as the center of the social order, the just order places justice as the center of the social order (Erbakan, 2014). Examined carefully, just order's justice implies the 'heavenly justice' that was inspired by the scriptural sources and civilization of Islam. In other words, just order implies the order that God asks from believers to establish on the earth. As it was the case all along the history of Islamic civilization, it was the responsibility of the state to establish the just order. The primary task of the state to make the just order real is to end the oppression over its citizens. However, the source of the oppression is not only the emulative secular state but also the capitalist world order that feeds Zionism

(Erbakan, 2014). Therefore, just order is the name of the state-controlled national economic model which is based on the principle of collective production and distribution against the capitalist oppressions.

The Islamist conservatism has remained as a minor party with low social support. Despite its low vote shares, National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP - the new name of the Islamist party after MNP was closed by the military intervention in 1971) played an active role in the foundation of 'Nationalist Front' coalition governments along 1970s. In the following decades, Islamist parties gained momentum in parallel to two transformations in the social space. The first is the transformation of the economic field following the integration into capitalist market system. The more Turkey integrated into capitalist system, the more the affinity between the Islamist parties and the losers of the new economic system, such as the unemployed masses, increased (Bora, 2017). What transformed this affinity into the relation of political representation is the political labor that Islamist entrepreneurs spent especially in the gecekondu neighborhoods of the metropolitan cities (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 8). The second, on the other hand, is the transformation of the state following the transition into the multi-party democracy. From the mid-1940s on, the founding republican cadres lost their monopoly over the field of power. As a result, a conservative faction emerged and strengthened within the bureaucracy especially following 1970s (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 8; Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 158).

During the DP rule, the state turned into being a stake of the political struggles between seculars and conservatives. In other words, conservatism became a legitimate vision of the social world just like secularism, with the impact of strong political representation ties. The military coup in 1960 aimed to damage the legitimacy of the conservative politics but ended up with re-drawing the borders of republican-friendly conservatism which defined the position of central right parties. Distancing itself from the official secularism and capitalism, Islamist conservatism

kept being categorized as a threat to the republican order. That is why Islamist parties were closed many times by the Constitutional Court.

However, the struggle against the rising leftist movement along two decades until 1980 coup led to a significant unintended consequence for the growing popularity of Islamist conservatism (Şen, 2010). Turkish-Islam Synthesis as the antidote of rising left and new formula of the ‘republican-friendly conservatism’ became the dominant vision of the state to be inculcated in schools (Şen, 2010). The new vision of the state led to the establishment of an affinity between the political messages of Islamist party and the demands of political audience. When the coalition governments turned out to be a source of political crises in the early 1990s, this affinity helped Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) to rise fast and become popular. However, the increasing popularity did not solve the legitimacy crisis of Islamist conservatism. Even after becoming the big partner of the coalition government following the 1995 elections, the political support of RP did not stop military to intervene and overthrow the government. As might be expected the process of military intervention ended up with the closing of RP. Moreover, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP) which replaced the closed RP was also closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001. The 28 February military memorandum and the following process have become a turning point for the younger generations of Islamist conservatives who thought that the political life of Islamist parties was destined to anchor in a vicious circle. AKP came into existence as a part of the quest for a legitimate conservative position. The process of the construction of the legitimate conservative position can be examined by placing AKP into the political field.

### **3.3 The Properties of Political Field in Turkey and the Construction of AKP**

From the outline of the historical process above, one can discern the structural properties of the political field within which AKP was constructed. The full-fledged political field in Turkey emerged in 1946 following the transition into multi-party democracy within the structural constraints of previous political struggles during the

periods of Ottoman and early republican reformism. As I explained earlier, the antecedent struggles of the contemporary politics emerged in the period of Ottoman reformism as the struggle for monopoly over the bureaucratic capital. What was at stake in these early political struggles was the control of the state. Thus, state as the target of political struggles transformed different political positions into variants of *statism* which inscribed into the bodies of the political entrepreneurs as the *political habitus*.

Another gift of the previous struggles is the *oppressive competition* which was inherited from the rules of CUP and CHP. Even when DP replaced CHP in 1950, the impacts of these structural properties could be observed over the emergent political field. The rule and politics of DP was statist and oppressive as much as those of CHP. Another structural property of the political field is its *heteronomous* character as the gift of military interventions. The impacts of military interventions over the political field are the reorganization of the hierarchies among the political positions, the determination of rules of entrance such as election threshold, and the determination of the legitimate principles of division among political positions.

The principles of political division are the legacy of power struggles that transformed into being the *doxa* of the political field, which function by demarcating the legitimate politics. The first of these principles in the political field of Turkey is ‘secularism’ which constituted the source of legitimacy for the closure of conservative parties. Like the closure of the two oppositional parties of the early republican period, *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* and *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, it was the principle of secularism that impacted on the closing of DP in 1960 and Islamist parties from 1971 till 2001.

The second principle of political division is the ‘economic liberalism’ (or anti-communism) which emerged following the end of Second World War and gained power in the struggle against the leftist political movement by determining the legitimate extent of relation with the left. Resisted by the leftist movement along 60s

and 70s, this principle became a doxa of the political field especially after the consecration of the 1980 military coup.

The third principle of the political division is the ‘unitary state’ principle against the growing Kurdish issue, which functioned as the source of legitimacy for the closing of Kurdish parties from 1990 on. The impacts these principles of division generated are not only the products of the imposition of bureaucratic institutions; these structural constraints are also internalized as political disposition in the process of political socialization. That is why, even when there is no external intervention, political agents’ positions, interests, and strategies in the political field are compatible with these structural constraints. The social magic behind the electoral and political success of AKP rule lies in the compatible construction of conservative democrat position with these three principles of division in the political field.

Defining its political position as ‘conservative democracy’ AKP forged a bond with the historical trajectory and ideational sources of conservatism which are not limited to Turkey. In this way, AKP could re-define the Islamist political divisions such as ‘Islamic me/secular others’, ‘Islamic regime/democratic politics’, and ‘just order/market order’ in a reconciliatory way. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the founder of the Party, argues AKP aims to overcome the local obstacles by linking with universal values: “[b]ased on our own tradition of thinking, AKP aims to reproduce our local and entrenched system of values within the universal conservative standards” (Akdoğan, 2004: 12-13). Invented in harmony with the structural constraints of the political field, conservative democrat position separates AKP from the Islamist political tradition. On the other hand, the emphasis on the universal properties of conservatism distinguishes it from other conservative parties positioned in the central-right.

What is more significant is that the symbolic construction of conservative democracy formed the basis for concrete political actions. Since the new political position required conservative entrepreneurs to act in a new manner which is not compatible

with the political dispositions that were acquired in the political socialization within the Islamist parties, it led to the emergence of *cleft habitus* as the source and reproduction mechanism of conservative democrat position. In this way, the strategy of being recognized as the legitimate agent of the political field by compromising with the structural constraints of it transformed habitus from being a reproductive mechanism to the mechanism of the production of the new. The cleft habitus does not imply the discarding of the internalized political dispositions in the early socialization process within the family, primary social circles, school, and political parties. It rather implies the forced-softening of the early dispositions upon confronting with the official habitus of the state as the external world especially after they came into power. One of the most concrete and clear example of new political actions that cleft habitus produces is that the members of AKP quit the Islamist strategy of Islamizing the official positions by taking off shoes in the office or not wearing tie (Tuğal, 2009). The confrontation of the conservative cleft habitus with the official habitus also leads to the increasing religiosity in the official habitus. The horizon of official religiosity enlarged from the Friday prayer to the recitation of Koran by the Prime Minister in religious rituals.

If AKP succeeded to construct conservative democracy as a concrete position in the political field, it could be possible by virtue of the structural transformation of the political field following the 2002 elections which can be compared only to military interventions in terms of the impacts it created. As all five parties which occupied the seats of the parliament in the previous elections, could not get enough votes to pass the election threshold in 2002, the political field collapsed in Turkey. It implies that all the tendencies, positions, relations, and dynamism in the political field, which accumulated in twenty years following the 1980 coup, have disappeared. AKP could come to power alone in 2002 elections as 54% of the total votes could not be represented in the parliament. In this way, AKP did not need to struggle against other conservative parties but became the only representative of conservatism in the parliament. As a result, AKP spent all of its energy to be recognized as the legitimate agent of the political field. As I explained earlier, AKP had declared that it

recognized the three principles of the political field but it had to struggle politically and symbolically to be recognized as legitimate.

In the first five years of its rule, AKP succeeded in repairing the damages of the 2001 economic crisis. It could be possible by being loyal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement which further strengthened Turkey's integration into neo-liberal global economic order. In the same period, the AKP government took considerable steps about Turkey's Europe Union membership process. All these steps were not among the political repertoire of a classical Islamist party and thus helped AKP to enhance its social support and keep its power. However, AKP experienced the main difficulty about the principle of secularism. On the one hand, the spokesman of the Party expressed that they recognized the secularism as legitimate; on the other hand they struggled to change the legitimate definition of secularism. Against the sectarian definition of secularism that implied the purification of public space from the religious symbols AKP defined secularism as the neutrality of the state towards various religious communities as the assurance of the freedom of thought and faith (Akdoğan, 2004). AKP's position in terms of secularism was different from the Islamist parties but it was also different from the official definition. The divergence from the official definition led to the tension especially during the presidency elections in 2007. AKP's campaign during the elections which focused on the religiosity of their candidate ended up with the closure case of constitutional court in 2008. The court decided not to close the Party but issued a warning. The victory out of the court process was mostly by virtue of its symbolic capital which was accumulated as a part of strong social support about its political and economic administration. In this way, the legitimacy of AKP's secularism definition was approved officially.

To keep away from the dangerous water of the secularism tension, AKP placed Kurdish issue at the center of the political debate in 2010. In contrast to the security-based official politics, AKP started the Kurdish opening process arguing that the solution of the problem was not in guns but in political dialogue. Despite its

significant divergence from the official position, AKP shared its sensitivity about the principle of ‘unitary state’ by naming the process as the project of national unity and fraternity. As a result, AKP’s position in the political field rested on the redefinition of the official principles. The symbolic struggles on the redefinition of the basic political principles did not only determine the position of AKP but also the position of other parties as a part of their response to AKP’s new definitions. Against AKP, CHP kept its sensitivity about secularism with little changes, remained distant to the Kurdish opening process and hoped to challenge AKP by presenting an alternative liberal economic policy. On the other hand, National Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) challenged AKP by constructing a nationalist conservative position over the critique of the opening process. Lastly, Peoples’ Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP) challenged AKP by constructing a leftist democratic position in the political field. The relations among the positions can be seen in the table below.




Figure 3.1 The Political Field and Positions During AKP Rule

The construction of conservative democracy rested on the redefinition of the main principles of the political field. The novelty of the emergent political position was not limited to the political field. The compromise of Islamist conservatism with the main principles of the political field triggered the re-formation of conservative habitus in an unusual manner.

### **3.4 The Social Reproduction of the Political Divisions: The Symbolic Polarization**

The examination of the historical trajectory of political divisions within all its relationality that constitute its reality reveals a homology between the transformations in the political field and those in the social space. In other words, the history of the political divisions is not restricted into the history of the relations among the political agents. Emerged as pure political products, the divisions of the political field have also generated impacts for larger social space by creating ‘symbolic polarization’. The concept refers to the symbolic struggles to produce the legitimate definition of social world through the formation of opposing habituses, the conflictual schematas of perception, appreciation, and action. The symbolic polarization came into existence as an unintended consequence of the early republican revolutions which were made in the name of an ‘object nation’<sup>9</sup> that was expected to emerge in the future as an outcome of the transformation of existing people and culture of Turkey. The practical logic of revolutions was to generate ‘a new representation of Turkey’ which functioned like a ‘future template’ at the present in the shaping of existing social conditions to create a new nation. The new representation of Turkey was inscribed into the physical space through the republican architecture (Bozdoğan, 2001). The republican revolutionaries had in their mind an idea of a new nation which fitted well with the necessities of modern times. To keep

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<sup>9</sup> I use the concept of ‘object nation’ with reference to Bourdieu’s (2008) concept of ‘object class’. He used the concept to refer to the common property of dominated classes who are “dominated even in the production of their self-image and therefore their social identity, do not speak, they are spoken” (Bourdieu, 2008: 197). “... [T]he dominated have to reckon with an objective truth of their class that they have not made, with the class for others, that is imposed on them as an essence, a destiny, *fatum*, that is, with the force of what is said with authority” (Bourdieu, 2008: 198).

pace with modern times, the revolutionary prescription for the people of Turkey was to change their mind or to generalize the view of revolutionary cadres as the view of nation.

Briefly speaking, republican revolutions can be seen as ‘an attempt of symbolic revolution’ which aimed to overturn the existing schemata of perception, appreciation, action and thinking with new ones through the state-led transformations and replacements in the symbolic systems. As the capacity of religious capital was diminished through the secularization of education and law, and the border of religious field narrowed down through abolishing the privileges of Islamic theologians, ulema, and prohibiting the Sufi monasteries, *religion* was expected to be an individual matter of conscience that regulates the individual labor for the other worldly salvation. In this way, recently invented ‘Turkish identity’ was expected to be the legitimate individual and collective identity in this-worldly affairs. The content of the new identity was supported by the official Turkish *history* thesis which expanded the national genealogy to the pre-Islamic Turkish history and even to the ancient civilizations of Anatolia by creating a new national *myth*. In addition, a symbolic barrier was built with the acceptance of Latin *alphabet* to purify citizens’ schema of self-perception from the unwanted impacts of Ottoman past. Turkish nation as the new collective identity was glorified by the national *art*. Lastly, the only legitimate guide for the new nation was set as *science*.

The new nation on paper turned into being a concrete collective identity as new generations acquired and internalized the template of new Turkey representation as a secondary (scholastic) habitus in the schools. However, the transformation of representation into a reality was not smooth. When the state confronted with resistance, such as Şeyh Sait Revolt and Menemen Incident, it penalized the oppositional movements. Against the strict control of the state over the social world, oppositions remained silent. What was opposed was the intervention of the state to the commonsensical order of everyday life (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 2000). In contrast to common belief, oppositions did not rest on a scholastic interpretation of Islam;

common complaints from the revolutionary regulations were especially about the legitimate physical appearance in the public space and the transformation of the structure of relations between sexes (Çınar, 2005). The clearance of religious symbols from the public space and the restriction of the religious life into the private space transformed the traditional body into a stigma. The republic did not only demolish the old regime but also stigmatized the embodied dispositions that sprang from the objective social conditions of villages and poor neighborhoods as the yoke of the tradition. Despite the fact that the logic of revolutions was to emancipate the citizens from the burdens of the old regime, they led to the transformation of traditional body into a prison of unhappy consciousness which continuously reminded that she is the improper citizen of the new regime. Considering that the eighty per cent of the population lived in rural areas during the early republican period, the stigma settled mostly in the peasant's body.

The transformation of the body with reference to the 'Western gaze' was already an ongoing tendency among the urban upper classes since the Ottoman modernization period (Şeni, 1995). However, for the peasants who lived both physically and symbolically away from cities, body was the part of life that comes without saying and thus goes without saying. The republican revolutions endowed the peasants, like many other poor urban dwellers, with an unhappy consciousness of their body which is faulty. The republican cadres were aiming to construct a civilized nation of citizens who clothe like civilized men and women. To reach this goal, Hat Law in 1925 codified the break of men from the uncivilized past by replacing fez with hat. As the founding father of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, declared men were going to wear "[b]oots or shoes on [their] feet, trousers on [their] legs, shirts and tie, jacket and waistcoat- and of course, to complete these, a cover with a brim on [their] heads" (Çınar, 2005: 68). The clothing of women was not codified by law but unveiling of women was supported discursively.

Among many other regulations, those that target the bodies of the citizens formed the basis for opposition against the new order. As Lewis (2002: 554-5) notes, the ban of

fez and headscarf generated more resistance than the abolition of Caliphate and Sharia. As might be predicted, the complaints were about the incompatibility of the new regulations with the Muslim identity. Among the complaining groups were the old members of ulema, devotees of Sufi orders, conservative entrepreneurs of the field of cultural production, conservative politicians, and freelance Muslims (especially peasants and artisans) who fabricated the conservative symbolic block. Once flourished under these social conditions, conservative symbolic block took new shapes under the impact of conservative entrepreneurs from political field, religious field, bureaucratic field, and the field of cultural production.

Conservatism remained as an unnamed quality of the symbolic block for a long time. It was not based on a scholastic interpretation of Islam but rather rested on commonsensical religious dispositions in giving order to the social world from the arrangement of marriages to the proper place of sexes in private and public spaces. As Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009: 25) notes “... when faced with uncertainty, turbulence, and instability ... the masses sought solace in going back to their roots and clinging on to traditions, customs, and mores all of which are cloaked in religion.” The legitimate definition of the conservatism of the symbolic block has always been shaped by conservative agents from different fields. The content and form of conservatism forged by Said-i Nursi, Democrat Party, and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was different than each other. Thus, conservatism of the symbolic block was a product of collective fabrication of separate agents. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the history of republican period shows that the trajectory of conservative symbolic block goes in parallel with struggles in the political field.

Until the end of the single-party regime in 1950, conservative symbolic block remained as a germ in the form of loose solidarity ties. The unhappy consciousness of the emerging social conditions among various groups of conservative opposition led to a shared distance against the new regime, which constituted the basis for a future affinity of the dispersed silent opposition with the conservative political entrepreneurs (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 2000). The unnamed conservatism of the

unhappy conservatives transformed into a legitimate political identity in the multi-party democracy period. Conservative symbolic block gained a visible character in this period. The dominant position of conservative parties in the political field did not automatically lead to the disappearance of conservative stigma from the social world. However, the emergence of ‘the conservative hand of the state’, which was mostly composed of Imam Hatip Schools and the reformed Religious Affairs Administration, made the accumulation of symbolic capital possible for conservative entrepreneurs, which strengthened the symbolic struggles to reverse the stigma by leading to the construction of a ‘counter-object nation’ in a conservative form.

In the multi-party democracy period, the conservative symbolic block enlarged as the conservative hand of the state grew more and more with the increasing number of Imam Hatip Schools, mosques, and religious experts, and the ties of political representation between conservative parties and religious communities opened more spaces for conservatives in the bureaucracy. In addition to those emerging associations of conservative thought and culture (such as *Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği*, *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, *Yeniden Milli Mücadele Derneği* and *İlim Yayma Cemiyeti*) expanded especially among university students against the rising leftist student movement (Bora, 2017: 395-400). Moreover, the first Islamist party entered to the political field and succeeded to gain the votes of gecekondu dwellers. When Turkish Islamic Synthesis became the legitimate view of the state in the post-1980 coup period, conservative entrepreneurs had more possibilities of investment in economy, politics, cultural production, education, media and social services (such as hospitals, student dormitories and non-official solidarity networks).

### **3.4.1 Islamist Conservatism and Rising Collective Orthodoxy**

The developments presented above both enlarged the borders and changed the content and form of the conservatism of the symbolic block. Especially among the followers of the Islamist conservatism, commonsensical religious dispositions were replaced with the scholastic interpretation of Islam under the guidance of Koran and

hadiths. Correspondingly, parallel institutions which were responsive to Islamic principles were invented no later than the mid of 1990s. Interest free Islamic banking, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD), conservative TV channels, newspapers, and publishers (of various Islamic books and magazines), private prep schools, institutions of veiling fashion, housing estates, holiday resorts, restaurants and cafes are among the well-known parallel institutions of the Islamist conservative block.

Despite their increasing political, economic, and social power, Islamist conservatives kept being the ‘suspicious friend’ of the state. In the struggle against communism they were friend but they were still a threat in terms of the principle of secularism. The official perception of threat generated constraining impacts over the social life of Islamist conservatives. For instance, following the military memorandum of February 28<sup>th</sup>, restrictive regulations were put in force about the university education of Imam Hatip graduates, university entrance of headscarfed students, and conservative entrepreneurs especially in economy, education, media, and religion (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014).

Conservatives’ controversial relations with the state along the republican history and increasing state oppression as a reaction to the rising political power of Islamist party in 1990s led to the emergence of close-knit social life which functioned like a repression mechanism of the existing social differences among conservatives to accentuate the cultural unity springing from religiosity. “The strength of religiosity [was] also demonstrated by their calling themselves ‘conscious Muslims’ (*şuurlu Müslümanlar*), as distinct from false (i.e., secular) Muslims” (Saktanber, 2002: 59). The intensive social life of the conservative block was especially based on the family and neighborhood relations. The form of relations was shaped highly by an Islamic discourse acquired in family, Imam Hatip Schools, Koran courses, religious communities and kept alive in the regular religious talks. In parallel with the Islamic discourse, an intensive sensitivity was displayed in the separation of sexes in social life. Unless they are husband and wife, grown up men and women were stimulated to

socialize separately. The same sensitivity was seen in the uses of the private space when non-relative guests visited the conservative house: men and women gathered in separate rooms (Saktanber, 2002: 59).

Another sensitive issue was the upbringing of children. Since there was a common distrust against the compulsory education of the state, families tended to enroll their children to non-official religion courses of various religious communities to make sure that their children would have as proper Islamic education as secular education. Daughters were inculcated to veil as soon as they reach puberty. Compared to the past, daughters were stimulated in an increasing extent to continue to higher education and work in the professional sector as long as they did not neglect their main missions of being a faithful wife and mother. As soon as their children completed their education and had a salaried job (especially in case of sons) families stimulated their children to get married and most of the time played an active role in the arrangement of the marriages.

Having socialized within the symbolic block and acquired the conservative categories of perception, appreciation, action and thinking, conservative agents became introverted when they had to leave the familiar microcosm to be a part of the wider social world. The social source of the introverted character of conservatives was not essentially related to their conservatism. It was rather based on the schema of social classification that divided the social world into conservative and secular positions. The habitus of the conservative block did not only generate the conservative life-style but also classified the secular acts, works, and taste. From the conservative block, secular life-style was seen as religiously improper and full of threats for conscious Muslims. Introverted conservative character and resulting abstention from the parts of the social life that were identified with secularism was the product of conservative habitus. The impurity of the social world, uncertainty of the border between the conservative and secular positions, fast expansion of Islamist party among working classes, and state's politics of stigmatization led *asceticism* to be the general form of conservative life-styles. As a result, regardless of the

composition and volume of the capital one has, the conspicuous presentation of wealth was seen as a non-conservative way of life.

### **3.4.2 The Rule of AKP and the Collapse of Collective Orthodoxy**

Following the rule of AKP, state's pressure over the conservative symbolic block ended. Moreover, with the strong support of conservative government, the symbolic struggles managed to soften the stigma. In addition to that, the 'new Turkey representation' of the conservative government transformed the 'counter-object nation' into a reality in action. Under the new circumstances, the close-knit ties of conservative block loosened and existing social differences among conservatives became visible. White (2013: 83) describes the emergent differentiation among conservatives as the individualization of Islamic identity, which paved the way for the experience of faith-based life-styles in the public sphere. In parallel with the emergent tendency, asceticism lost its character of being the general form of conservative life-style and identified with working classes while conservative fractions of middle classes engaged in a hard work of inventing a new conservative life-style which is as much proper with religion as social position.

Living proper with the social position led to a change in the social conditions of existence which reflected on the new form that 'conservative taste' gained. The conservative fractions of upper middle classes did not hesitate to move into the luxury sites in the most favorite neighborhoods of cities. With them, they carried the scholastic sensitivity of taking Koran, hadiths, and Sunnah as the guide of every single detail of practical life such as upbringing of children, separation of sexes, and selection of spouse, which produced the form of new conservative lifestyle. They stylized their house (furniture), clothes (especially veiling in the case of women), and bodies in a manner they were not used to. The introverted conservative character has disappeared fast as they felt comfortable in presenting their selves in wider social world. All these fast transformations could be possible with the long-standing strong conservative single-party rule which created the feeling of safety among

conservatives by compensating the unjust treatment of state by removing the barriers against conservative entrepreneurs in various fields. However, it did not mean that the transformation was smooth. It was on the contrary tense. Conservative fractions of middle classes and their unusual life-styles have been target of criticisms. On the one hand, orthodox conservatives criticized the new life-style as a form of alienation from the essential conservatism. On the other hand, seculars saw the emerging life-style as insincere compared to the previous conservative political demands of purely moral social world. It was such tension and conservative strategies to bring an end to it by finding a perfect balance between middle class position and conservatism that fabricated the center of the social life in Çukurambar, one of the favorite neighborhoods of middle class conservatives in Ankara.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I tried to link the political struggles with the social space over the symbolic polarization in a historically informed way. The history of the present conservatism in Turkey has been built over the previous political struggles descending from the period of Ottoman reformism. The early political struggles transform into being the principles of division in the political field of Turkey. Shaping the borders of the legitimate politics, the principles of political division constituted the objective conditions for the construction of the conservative democracy of AKP. The political divisions and the struggles around them generated competing principles of social vision and division in the social space: symbolic polarization. In other words, the symbolic formation of gender, religious affinity, and national affinity through the political entrepreneurship lead to the making of conservative habitus, the mechanism which transforms specific social structure into conservative mental structure. The construction of conservative democracy by AKP does not imply only a political change but also a social change through the formation of conservative habitus which functioned as a mechanism for the production of the new in Çukurambar rather than being the so-called mechanism of reproduction.

## CHAPTER 4

### METHODOLOGY

This study examines the transformation of conservative middlebrow taste in the case of Çukurambar. It explores the research topic in a specific historical context in which conservative political position underwent a great transformation following the foundation AKP by the reformist wing of the Islamist RP. The spokesman of the new party announced that they left the rigid Islamist opposition against the secular state and capitalist economy. Defining their new political position as ‘conservative democrat’, the representatives of the new party promised to keep their reformist position in bringing solution to Turkey’s longstanding problems. The promise of change gave its results in the first general elections that AKP participated, and the new party came into the rule. In the following period under the rule of AKP, transformations were not limited to political changes. Among the salient social changes was the unusual life-style of the conservative fractions of middle classes, which became visible in the early period of AKP rule. Previously being the symbol of the Islamist opposition against the secular state, the veiled woman has transformed into being the pioneer of a new conservative taste under the rule of a reformist conservative government. The generalized ascetic modesty of dark colored simple conservative style gained a new form in the hands of middle classes: colorful designs, elegant lines, and stylish combinations are the most visible features of the new conservative taste. Yet the transformation of the middlebrow conservative taste was not limited to clothing of women. From house decoration to the choice of car and leisure activities, the transformation expanded into various realms of conservative social life.

The process of transformation gained a more visible character in Çukurambar, an old gecekondu neighborhood, located in the southwest of Ankara at the juncture of important highways. Commencing in the early 1990s, the pace of transformation in the neighborhood fastened in the following decade and gecekondu houses were

replaced by high-rise luxury apartment blocks. As the working class population of the *gecekondu* houses left the neighborhood, the new buildings attracted especially the conservative fractions of middle classes. The changing demography reflected on the streets of the neighborhood and the social life was highly shaped by the mushrooming conservative-friendly cafes, restaurants, gyms, and cultural centers. Therefore, I chose Çukurambar, which can be seen as the middlebrow conservative taste incorporated in the built environment, as the site of the fieldwork.

As it can be inferred from the long description above, this study investigates the relation between the foundation of AKP and reconstruction of the middlebrow conservative taste by asking ‘what is the impact of the recently constructed ‘conservative democrat’ position in the political field on the emergent conservative middle class life-style?’ The examination of the relation between politics and taste requires the *triadic historicization* of political field, social space, and conservative taste. The historicization of the political field enables us to explain the transformations in the conservative position following the foundation of AKP. The historicization of the social space, on the other hand, helps us to see the transformations emerged in the social world following the rule of AKP. The historicization of the middlebrow conservative taste, the transformation of which is the central research object of this study, is the historicization of the agents by focusing on the acquisition of conservative dispositions. The function of the triple historicization is the scientific construction of social conditions within which middle class conservative agents exist. It provides us with a wide scene of relations between individual choices and social conditions, a scene of *conservative habitus*.

Constructing the wider social conditions as the precondition of the inquiry of the research question does not move us away from the research object. On the contrary, it provides us with a more detailed view of it by placing the unit of analysis (middle class conservative individuals) into the social conditions within which they exist so that we can ask more specific questions about the research object. Another merit of the ‘structural constructivist’ approach is the examination of the taste by going

beyond the surface-level analysis of specific individual choices through the socio-analysis of the choices, which enables us to detect what makes the specific individual choices conservative and middle class. In this way, more specific questions can be asked to explain the research object. Listed sequentially, the primary question over which the others are constructed is ‘what makes an individual conservative?’ This primary question is followed by a more specific question that relates conservatism with middle class social position: ‘what is distinctively middle class about the middlebrow conservative taste?’ Once the content and form of the specifically conservative middle class relation with the world is questioned, the role of politics can be questioned in the process of transformation: ‘what is the impact of the foundation and rule of a reformist conservative party on conservative middle classes’ re-construction of their life-style?’ After explicating the social conditions that made possible the new middlebrow conservative taste, it still waits to be explained ‘what is the form and content of the new middlebrow conservative taste?’ Lastly, ‘once triggered by political transformation, what is the impact of new middlebrow conservative life-style on the content of political choice?’

#### **4.1 Participant Objectivation: The Emergence of a Curiosity and the Selection of Research Field**

It seems that Weber’s (1949) separation of methodological subjectivity/objectivity is so embedded in the social sciences that the emergence of a sociological curiosity is seen as a subjective matter which is free from social conditionings. However, as the starting point of a study, the emergence of a curiosity is also a part of the historicity of the social conditions of the research topic that we are engaged in. The integration of the subjective relation with the research object into the analysis, namely *participant objectivation*, is basically the objectivation of the researcher and the acts of objectivations including the social conditions that make them possible. “It aims at objectivizing the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti-scientific subjectivism, is one of the genuine conditions of scientific objectivity” (Bourdieu, 2003: 282). Another merit of the

participant objectivation is the scientific vigilance against the unwanted impacts of researcher's social origin, position and trajectory in social space, position and related point of view in the academic field which she treats unconsciously as the point of view of the unit of analysis. Thus, I will briefly elaborate on the social conditions that led to the emergence of my curiosity and to the specific manner I objectify the research object.

I was born and raised in a working class neighborhood of Tekirdağ, a small coastal town in Thrace. I grew up as the second and last child of a tailor father and a housewife mother. I acquired republican dispositions<sup>10</sup> under the strong impact of my civil engineer uncle, who was the only educated person of my family. The practical logic of these political dispositions was composed of the love of Atatürk (the founder of the Republic), the political support of Kara Oğlan (the nick name of Bülent Ecevit who was the leader of Democratic Left Party at that time), and strong commitment to the principles of Republic. In addition to republican dispositions, I have also acquired religious dispositions from family and secondary circles of socialization, such as friendship and neighboring. Going to Friday and tarawih prayers, and fasting in Ramadan were the inseparable part of socialization with my friends in the street, which helped me a lot in gaining access to the field.

I kept this commonsensical vision of Turkey until I left Tekirdağ for my undergraduate education in Istanbul. I attended to Public Relations and Advertising Department of Istanbul University. In fact, my curiosity about conservatism emerged during my undergraduate years. The students of the department were generally composed of the children of upper middle class families from big cities with secular outlook, and children of lower middle class and working class families from cities and small towns with Islamist or socialist outlook. I had my best friends among

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<sup>10</sup> Republicanism is rather a middle class political position in Turkey. The social conditions that make a working class boy republican were also related to city I lived. Settled mostly by the people who migrated from Balkans after the foundation of the republic, Tekirdağ was one of the cities where republican principles were political common sense.

Islamist students<sup>11</sup>. On the other hand, I had a curiosity about the subject of consumption during my education in the department, which later impacted on my decision to study sociology in graduate school.

I studied sociology in the graduate school at Middle East Technical University (METU), the cultural center of the strongest oppositional politics in Turkey. I wrote an MA thesis titled as ‘The Mallification of Urban Life in Ankara’ which started as a critical study but ended up with being an ethno-methodological study under the strong influences of Max Weber and Georg Simmel. My curiosity about conservatism gained a specific character upon political developments in the country, towards the end of my graduate studies. When Abdullah Gül was declared to be the candidate of AKP in the approaching presidential election in 2007, secular groups arranged protests under the name of ‘Republic Demonstrations’. The protests blew up upon the declarations of AKP representatives, which promoted the candidacy of Abdullah Gül since the new president needed to be religious. The protests emerged as the defense of secularism and opposition against the candidacy of Abdullah Gül. In an interview, Professor Sencer Ayata (2007), who was my advisor at that time, argued that the protesting groups were the emerging new middle classes of Turkey. He argued that professional sector of Turkish economy was composed of well educated, secular people who supported Republic Demonstrations to show their unhappiness with AKP rule. Although such description fitted well with the protester profile, I was suspicious of the identification of professional sector with secular groups. The curiosity on the conservative fraction of middle classes turned out to be a research topic of my PhD dissertation.

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<sup>11</sup> If I had a chance to choose my friendship group at that time, I would prefer to remain alone. However, there were the conditions of possibility to be friends with Islamists at that time. First, I had affinity with them in terms of social class background. The same affinity would make me friend with socialists, as well. However, knowing the violent intervention of state to the leftists, all families advised their children to keep away from leftist politics in the post-1980 coup period. Therefore, I had an internalized fear of socialist politics at that time. On the other hand, I had learnt that my only possibility for a better life was education. Thus I minded courses. However, socialist groups were critical against the education system and they were spending most of their time for political issues rather than attending to the courses. As a result, I became friend with Islamists.

My suspicion was triggered by the transformation in a nearby neighborhood. While living in Yüzüncü Yıl, a neighborhood mostly settled by METU students, I witnessed the rapid transformation of Çukurambar, an old *gecekondu* neighborhood which is located just a few blocks away from my house. The transformation in Çukurambar had already started in the early 1990s but the destiny of the neighborhood changed sharply after AKP came into rule in Turkey. One of the first acts of AKP was to forbid members of parliament to live in the housing of parliament, arguing that representatives of nation should live within the nation. The previously built cooperative houses for the ex-Islamist party members transformed Çukurambar into a center of gravity especially for the conservative parliamentary members who were looking for a new house. Members of the parliament were followed by bureaucrats, and conservative laymen. The intensification of political and economic capital attracted lifestyle entrepreneurs; famous cafes and restaurants competed with each other to open a branch in the neighborhood. As a result, Çukurambar has been the center for a conservative social life which is at peace with bourgeois culture. Such development led me to choose Çukurambar as the site of the field research.

#### **4.2 The Pains of Entering the Field and Determination of the Research Method**

Despite it is just within walking distance to my house, my entrance to the field in Çukurambar was painful. I started discovering the neighborhood in the spring of 2012. At the beginning, my plan was to conduct in-depth interviews which were going to be supported by a short questionnaire form about informants' consumption patterns. In the summer of 2012, I started visiting Çukurambar more often; I walked in the streets and spent time in the cafes and restaurants by observing people and culture of the neighborhood. In addition to observation, I was also trying to find contacts in the neighborhood. At last, I could find a couple of contacts in the fall of 2012 with the help of my friends. However, all of contacts I could find refused to be part of my research. When I asked my first contacts the reason of their refusal, they all agreed that my research topic was a *touchy subject*. My efforts to ensure that it

was a scientific research and their private information would be kept safely yielded no results.

My absolute failure in entering the field along six months led me to lose my self-confidence. It was almost November and I could have realized no improvement in my research. What is worse, I was about to give up studying on Çukurambar. What inspired me about changing research method rather than the research field or topic was a lucky coincidence. While walking back home in a side street of Çukurambar on a November evening I saw Sufiyane, a cultural center for Islamic arts and literature, where my field research started in real terms. Opened in 2011, Sufiyane exhibits and sells works of Islamic art such as calligraphy (*hat*), ornamentation (*tezhip*), and plaques (*levha*). Apart from that, various courses are held in Sufiyane from paper marbling (*Ebru*) to calligraphy and ney. Moreover, Sufiyane regularly organizes *Mesnevi Talks*, which is open to public. When I saw Sufiyane that evening, I knew just a little about works of art exhibited. The corner of book shelves was full of religious books most of which I saw for the first time. In the same way, I had never been interested in Islamic arts including ney, the course of which I was enrolled that evening.

From November 2012 on, I did not only take ney courses but also became a regular participant of *Mesnevi Talks* along eight months. In this way, I found myself within the conservative middle class social circle, which I had strived to access for the previous six months. Following my entrance to the field, I did not only have the opportunity to contact the people whom I planned to interview but also to observe and acquire the bodily and discursive instruments of being a competent conservative. That is why I decided to change my research method from in-depth interview to ethnography following my entrance to the field.

### 4.3 Conservative Habitus as a Research Topic and Tool

The necessity to apply ethnography as a research method emerged as an unintended consequence of the confrontation with the research object. As I explained above, the religious dispositions that I acquired during my childhood helped me to be good friends with conservatives during university education. However, within the conservative social circle I had always been *a friendly social democrat* who remained distant to purely conservative activities such as religious talks, and did not pray except Fridays. When I came to Ankara to study sociology as a graduate student, I found myself in a new planet: an intellectual social circle, which I had to spend a lot of labor to keep up with. When I confronted conservatives in Çukurambar nine years later I left my conservative friends in İstanbul, my familiarity with the conservatives and conservative culture had weakened. That is why my first day in both ney course and Mesnevi Talks was stressful. My stress increased even further with the fear of doing or saying something wrong which could end up with rejection from the field. To overcome this difficulty I started keeping field notes. My purpose was to find a solution to the problem of stress by detecting my weaknesses. The general source of my weakness I detected in the first day of keeping field notes was the tension which leads me to make mistakes.

What made me tense was first of all my ambivalence when I was confronted with a new situation and had no idea about the proper way of acting. For instance, the first day I went to Mesnevi Talks, I realized that the seminar room was furnished with carpet. Concomitantly, I saw a shoe cupboard and a box of galoshes in a corner. Should I take my shoes off or wear galosh before entering in? In the same way, after entering in the room, should I greet the other participants by saying ‘selamünaleyküm’ and sit on the sofa or should I also shake their hands and introduce myself? Similar simple ambivalences were the most recurrent feelings of my first days in the field.

Another source of tension was my body. It was not only my casual clothing style that differed me from other participants who preferred mainly classical style but also the techniques of the body that the other participants shared while listening to the hoca during his presentation. The seminar room was furnished with traditional sofas which require a special technique of sitting to make oneself comfortable along the session. All participants except me sat in a cross-legged position, which is painful if one's muscles are not trained for it. In addition to that, many of the participants listened to the hoca in a specific reverence, by bending the head down and closing eyes while I was looking directly at the hoca as if I was in a classroom.

Another source of problem for me was that I was devoid of the practical knowledge and language of conservatism that organized the everyday life of conservatives. What I had armed myself before entering the field was the scholastic knowledge of conservatism on the paper: philosophical, historical, and sociological studies on conservatism. All of these studies generally inform the readers about the social conditions in which conservatives exist but what is rarely studied is how conservatives live in these conditions. The first day I went to Mesnevi Talks, after greeting everyone and sitting on the sofa I thought that I had better to meet people before the hoca came in. Thus I turned to the person who sits by me by greeting him saying 'good morning'. Before he replied back to my greetings I realized an expression of surprise in his face. Weeks later I found out the reason; he had woke up five hours ago for the morning prayer that is why he was surprised to hear 'good morning' while he was waiting for the noon prayer.

A few days later, while I was reading my notes I realized that what I described as my weaknesses was also the definition of a *competent conservative* mirrored by the weaknesses of my body. The vital point was that the observed features about the middle class conservatives could have never been reached through in-depth interviews. Hence, on seeing the limits of in-depth interviews, I decided to redesign my research as an ethnographic inquiry which is a "... social research based on the close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and space,

in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon so as to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think, feel the way they do” (Wacquant, 2003: 5). Following the redesign, I decided to change my instrumental usage of ney course and Mesnevi Talks. In other words, I quit considering these two activities as the possibility of contacting conservative middle classes, with whom I would conduct interviews. Rather, I started to conceive them as the essential components of my research particularly for grasping better the *actually existing* middle class conservatives. As a result, the field notes written to find a solution to my field tension transformed into being a field diary with more structured notes on what I hear, observe, and feel.



Figure 4.1 Apprentice Neyzen Aksu

Changing the method led me to take these two activities more seriously. I spent more time and energy to learn to play ney. Concomitantly, I listened to the Mesnevi Talks in a more attentive way as it formed one of the sources of conservative discourse on religion and politics. Such attitude change helped me to solve the problem of field tension in a couple of weeks. The more the others felt familiar with me and the more I felt familiar with conservative culture, the more I felt comfortable in the field. This time, it was not only my weaknesses in the field but also the domains I felt skillful have been the object of analysis. In spite of limiting the examination of the research

object to interviews, I decided to eliminate my distance to the conservative culture and conservative people examined, by trying to learn to play ney and what Mesnevi is about. By taking these two activities seriously, I could be the part of, in real sense of the word, the social circle I examined. My eagerness in these two activities was appreciated by other participants and I started socializing with them. By socializing in cafes, restaurants, mosques, and offices I did not only observe the practical conservative middle class social life, I also observed my participation to that life. In this way, conservative habitus turned out to be both topic and tool of my research.

Descending from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the concept of *habitus* has been one of the recurrent themes of the philosophical trajectory from scholastic philosophy of middle ages to phenomenology of Husserl, Schutz, and Merleau-Ponty. Despite the fact that it was referred in the works of the classical sociologists such as Durkheim, Weber, and Veblen, the complete sociologization of the concept was realized by Bourdieu who has given a central place to the habitus among the conceptual tools of his *science of practice* (Wacquant, 2016). Constituting a central position in his dispositional philosophy of action, habitus is a "system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting, and thinking, or a system of long-lasting (rather than permanent) schemes or schemata or structures of perception, conception, and action" (Bourdieu, 2005: 43). Habitus is acquired through the internalization of external conditions as a mental structure which functions as a guide in responding to the confrontations with the external world. It does not produce action by itself but leaves its stamp as the style or practical unity of action. Wacquant (2011: 85-86) lists four distinctive properties of habitus: (1) it is acquired through socialization and education, (2) it functions as the mechanism of practical mastery beneath consciousness and discourse, (3) it varies depending on social position and trajectory, (4) it is malleable and transmissible.

In his revisit to his study on the racial domination in American black ghetto, Wacquant (2004) makes a radical contribution by taking Bourdieu's theoretical tool as both empirical case and technique of ethnographic inquiry. Wacquant's

ethnography on the American black ghetto could be possible only after he enrolled to a boxing gym in a black neighborhood. Once enrolled as an attempt of gaining access to the social life of the black ghetto, he was seduced by the illusion of the gym, which dragged him from being an apprentice pugilist in the gym to the professional boxing ring. After completing his study on black ghetto, Wacquant made a reflexive return to the gym to examine the fabrication of the pugilistic habitus over his experience of being an apprentice pugilist.

On the one hand, I open the black box of the pugilistic habitus by disclosing the cognitive categories, bodily skills, and desires which together define the competence and aptitude specific to the boxer. On the other hand, I deploy habitus as a methodological device, that is, I place myself in the local vortex of action in order to acquire through practice, in real time, the dispositions of the boxer with the aim of elucidating the magnetism proper to the pugilistic cosmos (Wacquant, 2011: 87).

For Wacquant (2014a: 4), “[t]he apprenticeship of sociologist is a methodological template to mirror the apprenticeship undergone by the empirical subjects of the study; the former is mined to dig deeper into the latter and to excavate its inner logic and subterranean properties...” Habitus as an ethnographic device resembles to participant observation. However, while participant observation emphasizes the significance of observation from native’s perspective, habitus takes participation as the center of ethnographic inquiry to be observed reflexively. Therefore, it can be called as *observant participation*. In addition to that, the subjective experience of participation is not applied to produce a non-scientific subjective narrative of the native’s peculiarity but rather to dissect the objectivity of the embodied knowledge from within. Thus, observant participation requires *going native but armed with theoretical and methodological tools* so that investigator will not be lost in the native cosmos.

The observant participation promises new possibilities for ethnographic studies. Even though it is a new method, it inspired various sociological and anthropological studies. The common property of the inspired studies is that they generally focus on

the examination of artistic or sportive habitus, the dispositions of which can be acquired through the individual experience of the investigator, such as pugilistic habitus, habitus of capoeira, and habitus of ballet. This tendency springs from the distinctive strength of the technique to arm the researcher with specific tools in the examination of embodied knowledge of the cosmos of a specific artistic or sportive branch. What is common to the given and the other microcosms (such as professions) is that they are all subfields within which being a competent agent requires experiencing objective conditions (such as specific pedagogy) and acquiring objective dispositions (such as specific cognitive schemata, bodily skills, and desires). The successful application in the microcosms does not imply that the method cannot be applied in more complex empirical subjects of study, such as conservatism.

It is clear that being a competent conservative is not similar to being a competent pugilist. In a similar vein, examining conservative habitus is different than the examination of pugilistic habitus. The source of the complexity in the study of conservative habitus is that it is multi-layered. In other words, conservative dispositions are acquired in primary, secondary, and tertiary habitus. The primary habitus refers to dispositions acquired in the early familial socialization period such as gender, ethnicity, religious identity, and class. Being open to change, the primary dispositions are mostly durable and basis for the acquisition of the secondary (scholastic) habitus, which is the product of the pedagogical labor anchored in schools. The tertiary habitus, on the other hand, refers to the dispositions that were acquired in the specialized institutions such as boxing gym and ney course.

The difficulty in studying the conservative habitus in Turkey is that it is forged in all layers given above. In other words, descending from the primary dispositions acquired in the family, conservative habitus is forged by schools, political parties, religious orders (which function as pedagogical institutions like school), and cultural associations and productions. Therefore, the dissection of conservative habitus requires the support of methods other than the observant participation. Especially in

the mapping of the dispositions acquired across time, I applied to in-depth interviews which focused on the social trajectory of the respondents. In addition to that, I examined the newspapers, periodicals, books, and TV programs that the respondents preferred so that I could get a deeper vision about the content of the conservative taste. Throughout eight months I was in the field, I spent approximately three hours every morning to scan the conservative newspapers. In this way, I could familiarize with the conservative agenda which became the subject of the conversations of the daily confrontations in the field. Following the first two months in the field, I spent more time for Yeni Şafak and Star which were the two most preferred newspapers among the respondents. I also followed the historical periodical Derin Tarih, the political periodical Büyük Doğu (the old issues of which were distributed by Star) and life-style periodicals (Ala, Enda, Aysha, and Tuba).

Despite its limits in the examination of conservative habitus, observant participation has specific merits in the examination of complex empirical subjects. First of all, as an ethnographic tool it focuses on the embodied knowledge of the empirical subject. Compared to the discursive limits of the in-depth interview, observant participation provides investigator to experience non-said reality of the empirical subject. What distinguishes it from participant observation is the examination of the objective cognitive and bodily structures in relation with social structures. Even in the examination of complex empirical subjects like conservatism, the full-fledged dispositional acquisition of which is not possible, observant participation helps the investigator to experience the reality of conservatives, which is not made up only of conservatism. It also helps the researcher to gain access to the field easily. Relating people through common interest fastens the recognition of the researcher into the field, which opens the gate of the everyday life reality of the empirical subject to the investigator. What is more, observant participation does not promise to present easy answers to the research question but contributes to the construction of research object by helping researcher to develop research questions which could not be asked by applying different methods.

#### 4.4 Research Acts and the Production of Data

In contrast to the academic commonsense, data is not out there waiting to be collected by the researcher; it is rather the product of research acts that commence on asking a question to an empirical subject. What gives the scientific character of the research acts is not the academic title of the researcher but the *epistemological vigilance* that guide her to “know where [her] problems come from, pose [her] own questions, forge robust analytic constructs instead of borrowing the soft and spongy notions of common sense (including scholarly common sense), methodically question [her] methods, and adopt a proactive stance when it comes to data production” (Wacquant and Akçaoğlu, 2017: 41).

As I explained above, the empirical source of my research question was the transformation in the political field of Turkey following the foundation of AKP and concurrent transformations in the conservative fractions of middle classes. In spite of giving fast answers to the research question by establishing analytical ties between the discursive formation of conservative democrat position and surface-level (visible) transformations in the conservative middle class life-style, I constructed the research object in the light of Pierre Bourdieu’s structuralist constructivism.

By historicizing the social space and political field I could dissect the *actually existing relations* between political field and conservative taste. By taking the distribution of the forms of capital at the center of the research object construction, I could avoid from the conventional tendency which transforms the social scientific research to a quest of the exceptionalism of Turkey’s modernization in comparison with the (ambiguous) Western experience.<sup>12</sup> Concurrently, in parallel with the construction of the object I applied to observant participation as the method which was supported with the in-depth interviews.

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<sup>12</sup> For the pioneering examples of this approach, see: Mardin, Ş. (2005) ‘Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes.’ *Turkish Studies* 6 (2), pp. 145-165 and Göle, N. (1996) *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.

As I explained earlier, my fieldwork started in real sense after I was enrolled to the ney course and followed Mesnevi Talks in Sufiyane. However, participating to these two activities meant nothing without the approval of other participants. Each session of Mesnevi Talks begins with an exciting activity: tefe'ül fortune. Sitting by the side of a special edition of a large-sized Mesnevi in a special hardcover, hoca tells the tefe'ül fortune of each participant one by one. This activity is also a chance for hoca to greet each participant and meet the new participants like me. When it was my turn in the tefe'ül fortune, hoca told me that he saw me for the first time. "If you had come earlier, I would recognize you from your hair style" he said and smiled. He was right, because I was the only one in the room who got his hair spiky. He was surprised even further after he learnt my name, hometown, and occupation. Except me, most of the participants had been named in Arabic. I was also the only participant who was from Thrace, the stronghold of the secular politics in Turkey. However, what surprised him most was that I was a research assistant at METU. "It is the first time I see a METU student in Mesnevi Talks" he said surprisingly.

Upon that I told about my research on the new social life and life-style in Çukurambar and I thought it would be helpful for me to participate to the Mesnevi talks in order to grasp the social life and culture in the neighborhood better, if it was not going to be a problem for him and the other participants. "Let's see" he said by opening a random page from Mesnevi and putting his finger on a random sentence in the opened page with closed eyes. Then he opened his eyes and read the randomly selected sentence loudly: "Those are the devotees whose silence expresses a lot." Then he turned to me and said "your thesis is going to be an extensive study" meaning he approved my participation.

In the following days and weeks, I became a regular participant of Mesnevi Talks and of the social circle of the participants. When the weekly sessions ended, we kept talking on religion and politics in the cafes of the neighborhood. We also met during the weekdays to visit the historical and religious places of the city such as the Mosque of Hacı Bayram Veli and the Taceddin Monastery. As soon as I returned back

to home from the field, I took notes in my field diary. One month later than the entrance to the field I started conducting in-depth interviews. I designed the question set as a kind of oral history to get the three generational trajectories of the respondents. I mainly focused on the private property ownership, occupation, education, relations of religion, political affiliation, marriage, and child-rearing patterns among the generations. The questions about the intra-generational trajectory were followed by the questions about Çukurambar from the reason of moving to the neighborhood to the social life in the neighborhood. These questions were followed by the ones related to recent political developments such as the War in Syria and the Kurdish opening process. Last part was composed of the questions about the consumption patterns.

It was an extensive question set which is good for researcher but not for the respondent. Despite the fact that I conducted two pilot interviews to test the duration and how good the questions work, the interviews longed more than I tested. In the interviews with the older generations it did not cause any problem but the younger generations were busy and had less time. In some cases, I had to visit a respondent three times to complete the interview. Some of the questions, especially those on the relations with the opposite sex, caused trouble. A respondent rejected to answer the question ‘how would you react if your daughter had a boyfriend?’ He argued that it is not the right way to know people over fictive situations. I tested the same question in the following interviews and I did not encounter the same reaction. Another problem was to ask too many questions about the past of the respondents in an interview on their present life-style. In many cases, I had to explain them why I needed to ask these questions. The biggest problem of the research was that the social circle I was engaged was a manly circle. The Mesnevi Talks was a man-only activity. On the other hand, ney course had been arranged as one hour one to one lesson, which restricted my socialization capacity. Yet, I could meet the other students with the help of the tutor. Luckily, many students of the ney course were women and some of them accepted to be part of my research. I conducted interviews with women in Sufiyane, in the public space. Like many of the men, their time was limited and I had

to skip in some cases some of the relatively less important questions. In the end, I conducted totally thirty-two interviews five of which could not be completed. Within the twenty-seven completed interviews, six were conducted with women. Despite the fact that I applied these six interviews a lot, this study produced more data on the manly conservatism. To protect the privacy of my informants I used pseudonyms in the following pages. The general profile of the informants can be seen in Appendix II.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF ÇUKURAMBAR

#### 5.1 Introduction

Physical space has been one of the earliest curiosities of sociologists. That is one of the reasons of why the first official sociology department of the world, Chicago School, is famous with being pioneer in urban sociology. What came out of the early studies of Chicago School is an attempt to produce an ideal typical definition of the city by delving into the social morphology (such as population density) which structures the form that physical space gains (Savage and Warde, 1993). From the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards, physical space became a new field of study within Marxism. It was especially Henri Lefebvre who opened a new path within Marxism by examining the physical space in relation with the capitalist mode of production. What was new in Henri Lefebvre, compared to Chicago School, was the focus on the production of space rather than taking it for granted. Lefebvre's studies elucidated the function of physical space in the system of social reproduction (Katznelson, 1992).

The debate of social reproduction evolved into new research programs in the studies of neo-Marxist researchers, such as David Harvey and early Manuel Castells, who were influenced highly by Lefebvre. Focusing on the process of capital accumulation, Harvey uncovered the role of the land economy as the second circuit of capital accumulation while Castells shed light on the dimension of the space as the unit of collective consumption (Katznelson, 1992). Though the Marxist researchers opened a new path in urban sociology, their contribution remained restricted to the examination of physical space in relation with the capitalist economy and thus failed to examine it in relation with broader power struggles.

Applying the conceptual repertoire of Bourdieu's topological sociology, Wacquant (2014b and 2017) aims to open a new path within urban sociology, which makes the examination of the physical space in relation with power struggles. According to him, physical space is the incorporated form of the struggles in the social space and symbolic space. In this perspective, city is the homologous triadic space within which forms of capital accumulate, concentrate, and differentiate. In other words, the struggles in the social space among different forms of capital to determine the relative value of each form of capital incorporate in the built environment. It is such perspective that provides the necessary conceptual tools to illuminate the process of production and transformation of Çukurambar.

In this chapter, I begin the examination by contextualizing Çukurambar within the neoliberal transformations that changed the landscape of Ankara in the last three decades. Then, I shed light on the transformation of Çukurambar from a gecekondu neighborhood to a luxurious and popular upper-middle class neighborhood. Third, I explore in detail the factors that impact on the making of physical space middle class. I underline the role of the intensification of political capital, symbolic capital, and economic capital in this process of transformation. Lastly, I examine the making of Çukurambar conservative by focusing on the role of symbolic power.

## **5.2 Contextualizing Çukurambar: The Neoliberalization of Physical Space in Ankara**

Being a modest town of petty trade and agricultural production in the Central Anatolia, the destiny of Ankara changed sharply after being the center of national liberation movement in 1920. Following the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Ankara became the capital of Turkey. For the founding cadre, Ankara was more than a capital city; it was rather 'the fitting room of the new regime' (Cantek, 2006) or the 'cradle of Turkish modernism' (Erman, 2001). Thus, the building of Ankara symbolized the building of a modern nation for the new regime. Such symbolic significance required the strong control and planning of the state in the production of

the physical space. Having lasted until 1980s, the period of planned urban development generated two main forms of socio-spatial organization: “the construction of apartments by the small contractors [for urban middle classes] and the self-help *gecekondu*s of the squatters dominated the urbanization process in Turkish cities up until 1980s” (Batuman, 2013a: 586). These two main methods of socio-spatial organization went through a crisis starting from 1970s. First of all, the accelerating flow of migrants from rural areas generated pressure over the urban land. The estimated number of *gecekondu* houses in Ankara rised from 70.000 in 1960 to 240.000 in 1980 (Batuman, 2013a: 586). Second, the small contractor-based housing sector collapsed following the rising inflation and the shortage of available land in the city center and its immediate surroundings. As a result, the socio-spatial organization which accommodated the urban landscape with apartments and *gecekondu*s weakened.

Like the rest of the big cities of Turkey, a new period of socio-spatial organization has started in Ankara from 1980s on. In the new period, the form of the socio-spatial organization in Ankara was shaped especially by the rising two forces of urban politics: neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism. As a sociological concept, neoliberalism is a market-conforming state crafting (Wacquant, 2012). It rests on the “articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third” (Wacquant, 2012: 71). In other words, neoliberalism does not imply the retrenchment of the state in favor of the market but rather entails the reengineering of the state in the form of ‘Centaur-state’.

...that acts very differently at the two ends of the class structure and puts its considerable disciplinary capacity on the social, penal, and cultural front at the service of commodification. The state practices *laissez-faire* at the top, at the level of the circulation of capital and the production of inequality, but it turns interventionist and intrusive when it comes to managing the consequences of inequality at the bottom, for the life spaces and life chances of precarious fractions of the postindustrial working class (Wacquant, 2013b: 9).

The construction of market-conforming state generates impacts over urban politics. As Erman (2016) notes, neoliberalism re-structures the urban space by mainly reorganizing the institutional core, tasks and functions of local governments in such a way to stimulate capital accumulation through partnerships with private sector. The partnership of public and private sectors take the form of the coalition of urban bureaucracy with developers, land owners, advisors, professionals, and media in order to create economic growth through the uses of the urban space (Güzey, 2014). In the case of Ankara, the neoliberalization of urban policies led to transformation basically in four spheres: the increasing power and control of greater municipality over the urban space, the increasing role of large development firms in the production of urban space, the accelerating speed of suburbanization, and marketization of real estate sector.

As Geniş (2007) notes, the period of planned urban development ended but state's involvement into urban land market did not decrease. Rather, its mode of intervention has changed. The financial budget and authority regarding the urban policy were transferred in a great extent to the metropolitan municipalities following the administrative and legal reforms in the early 1980s (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008). All of these neoliberal reforms "granted the municipalities the power to undertake major urban projects overriding the existing checks, controls, and regulations in the legal system" (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008: 14). In addition to the rising power and authority of municipalities, TOKI, the Housing Development Administration, emerged as another strong agent of urban policies especially following the rule of AKP. In the first period of AKP rule, TOKI was assigned with the authority to "freely expropriate, plan, and redevelop areas" (Batuman, 2013a: 587) free from the control of bureaucratic institutions. Between 2003 and 2010, TOKI built more than 61.000 housing units in Ankara (Batuman, 2013a: 587).

The rising power of municipalities and TOKI was accompanied with the increasing role of large scale development firms in the production of urban space as the role of small contractors diminished. The collaboration of bureaucracy and developers

incorporated in three-tiered urban regeneration projects: “the development of the hitherto undeveloped land on the fringes ..., the renewal of the public spaces and historic sites in the urban core ..., [and] the evacuation and redevelopment of squatter areas” (Batuman, 2013a: 588). The urban regeneration process accelerated the suburbanization tendency with the mushrooming gated communities and luxury sites in the south-west axes of Ankara (Güzey, 2014). The new socio-spatial organization promised its upper and middle class residents the joys of a commodified heaven. The renewal of public spaces and historic sites, on the other hand, constituted one of the major instruments for the conservative municipality to reconstruct the collective identity in a conservative manner with the help of the built environment. While the redevelopment of squatter areas has generated new zones of urban rent for the developers, it has also uprooted gecekondu residents from their neighborhoods where they used to live. Briefly, the urban regeneration period in the last three decades of Ankara inscribed the logic of neoliberalism into the production of physical space: while the urban regeneration projects provided new sources of investment for upper classes, and spatial possibilities for the making of middle class distinction, it led working classes and precariats to face the disciplinary hand of the urban bureaucracy when they resisted against the urban transformation projects.

As I contended earlier, neoliberalization in Ankara, as it was in the whole country, went hand in hand with the rising political power of Islamist conservatism. The 1994 local elections was a significant corner stone in the rise of Islamist conservatism as RP won elections in some of the big cities including Ankara (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president of Turkey, became the mayor of İstanbul in the same year from RP). The experience in the local governments paved the way later for the rule of AKP. The election success of RP had rested on its opposition against the established order. Including an anti-capitalist discourse, Islamist opposition gained recognition among the gecekondu residents, the absolute losers of the neoliberal transformation.

In contrast to RP experience, AKP emerged not as an opposition against the established order but rather as the demand of reform within the existing order. The

shift of political axis was felt most concretely in the economic vision of the new party. The Islamist anti-capitalist opposition was replaced with the promise of capitalist development in the program of AKP. In the discourse of the new party, “the traditional Islamic teachings [functioned no more] as an anti-capitalist praise to poverty [but rather] turned into means of producing consent to the existing economic order” (Batuman 2013b: 4). Following the rule of AKP in 2002, neoliberal transformation gained momentum in Turkey and like many other big cities, Ankara turned into being a huge site of construction. As Çavuşoğlu and Strutz (2014) note, urban transformation projects have been the major source for the political and economic strategy of AKP to remain in power. As an old gecekondu neighborhood, Çukurambar underwent a great transformation in this period: an upper-middle class neighborhood emerged as old gecekondus were replaced by high-rise luxury buildings. Moreover, among the new residents of Çukurambar were conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and developers who played a significant role in the transformation of the neighborhood in which they lived.

### **5.3 Transformation of Çukurambar: From Village to Gecekondu Neighborhood and Further**

On the road to Sufiyane, a center for Islamic fine-arts and culture in Çukurambar, where Mesnevi Talks are held regularly on every Saturday morning, I ran into İbrahim who is the most regular and thus most respected participant of the talks. He is a retired high bureaucrat in his late fifties. İbrahim was born and raised in Çukurambar while it was still a gecekondu neighborhood. As we were heading toward Sufiyane, I pointed out him with admiration the blossoming pink branches of cherry trees that leaned out of the high fences of a lonely gecekondu house which was squeezed within the jam of luxury high residences. He said:

At this time of the year while I was a kid, Çukurambar was used to be like a field of spring flowers. I am not exaggerating when I say field. There were really fields in the place of the buildings that we see now, and we and our neighbors were used to plant wheat. It may sound like a tale for you but in the place of the road we walk now there was used to be a path and it was not

surprising to see cows, sheep, or donkeys walking slowly to the meadow where they were used to be out at grass.

When İbrahim was a kid, Çukurambar was composed of gecekondus built by the former generation of migrant families from the villages of the cities in central Anatolia and Black Sea regions. İbrahim's parents were used to living in the villages of a central Anatolian city. In the mid of 1960s, agricultural economy was in a crisis which endangered the reproduction of rural social relations in Turkey. In the same period, the collective quest for an alternative social existence commenced among peasants to overcome the crisis. There were two common paths for a better future dream of Anatolian peasants: migration to Germany or the big cities of Turkey. In the case of İbrahim's family, most of the men from the village migrated to Germany to save their lives by working in the factories as a worker. İbrahim's father, Ahmet, was an exception. He stayed in the village since the familial division of labor required him as the youngest son to look after his old parents. During his stay in the village, his parents arranged a marriage for him with a distant relative from the neighboring village. Upon their village burnt up in the late 1960s, he had to leave the village with his wife and parents.

He did not hesitate to determine the route when they had to leave the village. He came directly to Çukurambar where his relatives and fellow villagers had settled earlier. The second day they arrived to Çukurambar, they bought a small piece of land from the resident peasants and built their gecekondus just as their fellow villagers did when they migrated. When they completed the construction of their house at the end of the third day, it was a single-storey, separate house that composed of two rooms and a toilet in the front-garden. Like all gecekondus, the construction of the house has never ended; whenever they succeeded to save money they fortified their house and added a new room or rarely a new storey especially in the case of having many children. The process of adaptation to the new environment was not too difficult as the organization of the physical space, and structure and tempo of the social life made them feel like they are not too far from their village. Actually, their feeling of 'living in the borders of the familiar world' had concrete foundations. On

the city plan of Ankara municipality in 1960s, Çukurambar was seen as a village on the verge of Balgat neighborhood which had been the field for Daniel Lerner's (1958) Turkey case in his examination of modernization process in the Middle East.

When Lerner conducted the first five interviews of his study in the summer of 1950, just on the eve of transition into multi-party democracy in Turkey, Balgat was still a village composed of fifty houses. His interviewer Tosun B. described Balgat as a 'gray barren' that does not resemble to any other villages he saw all around the country. Despite it is just eight kilometers away from the city center, Ulus, Balgat seemed isolated from the capital since there was no direct transportation just because there was no road. Balgati peasants were living on by farming and could not imagine any other way of life. Their only link with the outside world was the only radio of the village in the house of the chief who collected the villagers at his home in the evenings to listen to the news and to share his views about what he has just heard. The chief whose views easily transformed into the collective view of the village without questioning was like the embodied state in the village. He was an ex-soldier and strong admirer of Atatürk, who placed 'duty to the nation' at the center of his life. In contrast to the chief, the only grocer of Balgat was seduced by the shining city life and was even ready to live in the US by leaving the village if he had a chance. In 1950, the grocer was a heretical figure in the village.



Figure 5.1 School girls in front of Balgat Village School in 1949.

When Lerner revisited Balgat in 1954, he found a completely different settlement. Actually, whole country had changed as the single-party regime ended in 1950 and after Democrat Party came to power. The number of houses in Balgat reached to five hundred and it transformed into being a neighborhood of the greater Ankara municipality. Balgatis had a road that connects them to the city and regular bus service to the city center three times a day. They also had a school and a health-care center in their neighborhood. The pure water and electricity were about to arrive. Moreover, many of the households had their own radio. Social life has also changed as most of the ex-peasants sold their lands and became worker in the factories or bureaucratic institutions of the city. All these developments were enough for Balgatis, including the chief, to support DP. Everybody seemed content about the change in their lives but still the chief complained from the indifference of younger generations about duty to the nation and their never ending interest in new consumption patterns. The heretical grocer of Balgat had passed away without seeing

the great transformation of his village but he reincarnated in the younger generations including the grandchildren of the chief.

The pace of development in Çukurambar was not as rapid as Balgat. Different than many other cases, gecekondus were built on private land rather than public land but they were still unauthorized. It was the main reason why they had to struggle for public facilities. For this reason they established a neighborhood association in the early 1960s and put pressure over the bureaucracy for the demands of pure water, sewage system and electricity. Another product of the neighborhood association was the opening of a primary school and a health center in the late 1960s. The infrastructure of Çukurambar was completed in 1987 with the coming of the sewage system. Until the introduction of public facilities, gecekondu residents walked in the muddy roads of the village, carried water from the common fountain of the village to their houses, lighted their rooms in evenings with gas lamps, heated their houses in the winter by lighting coal in stoves and breathed the coal smoke coming out of the chimneys.

These difficult conditions of existence forced gecekondu dwellers to use their houses multi-functional, which required the heavy labor to transform the order of the house in different times of the day or the season. The division of familial labor rested on the division of sexes which was homologous with the spatial division between public and private. The anonymous world outside the neighborhood was the world of work and thus of men while the familiar world of the neighborhood was an extension of house which was a perfect product of women labor. Men left the house and neighborhood early in the morning to go to their work in the city. They were workers in the bureaucracy, factories, or in the streets as vendors. Women woke up even earlier to prepare breakfast for their nuclear or extended family. The labor of the women was not restricted to the chores of the house. Each chore required the transformation of the house homologous with the logic of the chore. Most of the time, the living room functioned as kitchen, bedroom of children and bathroom (in the winter). While looking after children and elderly, doing the house chores,

working in the fields and neighboring with the fellow villagers women labor did not only function in the reproduction of the manly labor but also in the fabrication of solidarity ties among the neighbors, which created a safe social life within the gecekondur neighborhood.

The period between 1967 and 1974 was the most intensive period of migration waves, which led to the growth of population and enlargement of the city. As a result of this process, Çukurambar was swallowed by the growing city and became a neighborhood of Çankaya district in 1972 (Köroğlu and Ercoşkun, 2006). In this period, Çukurambar was no more a village but the city seemed still far from the neighborhood as the pace of the transformation was still slow. İbrahim maintains that:

When I was a kid, I and my friends from the neighborhood were used to counting the number of the cars passing from the Eskişehir Highway by sitting at the top of a high hill. At the end of the three hours, the total number of the cars was most of the times less than fifty.

The first time that İbrahim realized their neighborhood is getting closer to the city was upon the rumors that the leaders of two right wing parties bought land from Balgat. The rumors turned out to be real in time as Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist National Outlook Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*, MGH), built a house in Balgat and Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, bought a land to build the headquarter of the party in Balgat. These developments led Çukurambar to transform into being the stronghold of the ‘nationalist front’ during the political polarization of 1970s. The older generations tended to support Süleyman Demirel’s Justice Party or Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party while younger generations, like İbrahim, supported Alparslan Türkeş’ Nationalist Movement Party.

In this way, as the city absorbed the physical space of Çukurambar, the content of political relations transformed from being functional to ethical. For a long time,

politics was a pragmatic tool for gecekondu residents to bring the public facilities to the neighborhood and prevent any possible punitive regulation of state about their unauthorized houses. After getting closer to the city, politics implied an ethical preference about the clash between left and right. For İbrahim, it was not surprising that the residents of the neighborhood tended to support the right-wing parties since the (Sunni) ‘Muslim’ of Islamists and ‘Türk’ of nationalists sounded more familiar than the ‘comrade’ of communists.

When our parents (the older generations) first settled to Çukurambar, the first thing they did together was to repair the existing mosque of the village. I remember that mosque very well; it was a mosque in the gecekondu style. I remember that Erbakan and other political figures from right-wing parties came and prayed in that mosque with us.

İbrahim thought that right-wing parties represented the authentic (yerli) politics for the Turkish nation and thus most of the neighbors felt the right-wing party discourse closer to their own thinking.

The critical point in the transformation of the physical space of Çukurambar was the state’s perception of gecekondu neighborhoods. From 1948 onwards, the state saw gecekondu neighborhoods as a non-urban form of settlement that needs to be improved and transformed. As the wave of migration fastened, the number of migrants increased, and the borders of gecekondu neighborhoods expanded, gecekondu neighborhoods transformed into being a potential source of political capital. It impacted on the softening of the official strategy against gecekondu neighborhoods: local governments were put in charge to provide infrastructure services to gecekondu neighborhoods in 1963, and amnesty laws turned out to be the general principle for the authorization of non-authorized houses. Until 1980, the official vision in gecekondu improvement plans implied the betterment of the living conditions of gecekondu residents as well as the improvement in the housing conditions. In the post-1980 period which was shaped by liberal economy politics, improvement plans were replaced by transformation projects which have focused on

the rent and neglected the social dimension of gecekondu neighborhoods. As a result, the rent-based transformation of gecekondu neighborhoods led gecekondu residents to be the voluntary migrants from the transformed neighborhood as they could afford to buy two or more houses in the peripheral gecekondu neighborhoods of the city with their share in the transformation project. It was the case of Çukurambar in the post-1980 period.

The Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara prepared a new city plan in 1982, which projected the decentralization of urban population into the west axes where Çukurambar located. Following that an improvement plan was prepared for Çukurambar in 1984, which projected lower population density for the neighborhood with 1/1000 scale. However, Çukurambar improvement plan was revised in 1993 with 1/5000 scale, which attracted the attention of urban transformation industry (Köroğlu and Ercoşkun, 2006). In the following period, the transformation process accelerated. The demolished one-story gecekondu houses were replaced with multi-story apartment blocks and the profile of the neighborhood residents changed as the new apartments attracted to the middle classes while gecekondu residents moved to the peripheral districts such as Sincan.

#### **5.4 Making Çukurambar Middle Class**

Niyazi is a retired academician and an ex-member of the parliament in his mid-60s. He was born and raised in a peasant family in a village of an Eastern Anatolian city. He was the only kid who continued to education further than primary school in the village. He left his village in an early age to go to the İmam Hatip School in the city. He further continued to his education in the Theology Faculty of a university in Istanbul. As he worked as a preacher in the mosques of İstanbul, he has also completed his PhD on theology. In 1990s he was an active member of rising Welfare Party and he was elected as a member of parliament in 1995 elections. In this period of his life he saw Çukurambar for the first time. The representatives of the party had established a cooperative association under the leadership of a representative who

was used to work as a contractor. When his friends took him to Çukurambar where the site of the cooperative would be built he saw a gecekondur neighborhood.

There were a few apartment blocks around but it was dominantly a gecekondur neighborhood which has not had a road yet. The paths that the residents were used to walk were muddy in the winter and dusty in the summer. If you had seen this neighborhood in 1997 with me, you would never imagine the present state that it reached in a decade.

When Niyazi first saw the neighborhood in 1997, the transformation of Çukurambar had already commenced but its population was still less than five thousand. The cooperative houses were completed in 2001 and a significant number of high level party members had house in Çukurambar. Many of them saw the cooperative as an instrument of investment and did not think to live in the neighborhood at the beginning. However, the destiny of Çukurambar changed sharply after AKP came into power in 2002. Until then, members of parliament were used to living in the parliament housing located in Oran. Before the elections, AKP had promised to start “a new period in which the national will would be at the center of the politics rather than the arbitrary decisions of the alienated political nobility”. To symbolize the beginning of the new period, AKP government decided to leave the parliament housing arguing that the representatives of the nation should live within the nation. Following that, Çukurambar has been the new destination for some of the AKP members who already had a house in the neighborhood. The existence of a group of parliamentary representative transformed the neighborhood into a center of attraction for the others who were looking for a new house. In a short time, the number of the members of parliament (including the politicians from the parties other than AKP) increased in a significant extent.

What made Çukurambar attractive was not only a group of resident parliamentary representatives. Once being a village and later a gecekondur neighborhood in the periphery of the city, Çukurambar gained a central location as the city grew more and more. Being an intersection point of the main arterial roads such as Konya Highway

and Eskişehir Highway, Çukurambar is just five kilometers away from the city center (Kızılay) and the parliament. However, still the residence of parliamentary representatives played a functional role in the rapid transformation of the neighborhood. The Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara worked to improve the conditions of the neighborhood more than ever before. In addition to that, municipality increased the limit of maximum floors in the buildings of the neighborhood which further attracted the attention of contractors and paved the way for increasing population density as the limit of floor for the new high-rise buildings was twenty nine. Compared to the first apartment blocks of the neighborhood which had maximum ten floors, the new high-rise buildings led to an enormous population density. As of 2016, the population of the neighborhood reached to 17.500 and it is expected to further increase as there are still buildings under construction (Gülbudak, 2016).

The impact of contractors was not only restricted to the rising density of population, they also impacted on the determination of the profile of the new comers. The new high-rise blocks had some structural elements which attracted only middle and upper classes. The new sites were designed luxuriously reminding of hotels. The entrance was controlled by security guards; once one passed the security check as the recognized resident or guest of the site, she parked her car to the multi-story parking garage at the basement of each block. Once one steps in the building, she is welcomed in the lobby. The interior design of the common areas makes one feel like that the building has no function but an aesthetical reason to exist: obsessive care of cleanness and radius lightening system makes one inevitably think that she lives a good life. One may feel like that the new high-rise blocks were designed to make their residences to feel like they are great. That is why the smallest apartment included four rooms (3+1) while most of the houses had five or more rooms.

The greatness that the houses make their residents feel springs not only from the covered physical space and the number of rooms but also from the budget that the residents can afford for a house. While the cheapest house in the old buildings of the

neighborhood is around 180.000\$, the most expensive apartment in the new high-rise buildings is approximately 450.000\$ which is extraordinarily high compared to the average price for an apartment with similar qualities in other middle class neighborhoods of the city. As a result, except the members of the parliament, the new comers of the neighborhood were high bureaucrats, high executives of the big companies, high earner professionals (such as doctors and lawyers), and company owners. Alongside being a residential unit, Çukurambar is also on the verge of becoming a central business district. As may be predicted, the lionizing sector in the neighborhood is the construction sector. They did not only build the high-rise luxurious buildings in the neighborhood but they also moved their offices and houses to the buildings they built. The interest of the constructors to the neighborhood was not a coincidence since Çukurambar enabled them to acquire the social capital which can easily be translated into bureaucratic and economic capital.




Figure 5.2 Remnant gecekondu



Figure 5.3 Çukurambar after transformation

Adem is a young contractor in his forties, who lives and works in Çukurambar similar to many of his colleagues do. He was born and raised in a notable family of a Central Anatolian city. After completing his university education, he started to work as a contractor in his hometown just like his grandfather and father. Adem moved to Ankara just after AKP came into power.

My father was an effective member of the party in my hometown at that time. We thought that it could be the right time to drum up business. We thought we could increase the turnover if we succeeded to win public tenders. So I moved to Ankara and opened an office here.

Adem's expectations turned out to be real as he succeeded to win a couple of public tenders. He was used to building apartment blocks which brought him lots of money while he lived in his hometown but now he builds dams and tunnels in various regions of the country, which bring him much more money. After having the experience of managing big projects, Adem focused his all energy on public tenders.

For now I quit building apartment blocks. Actually, the construction of an apartment or a dam makes no difference for a contractor. However, once you are interested in tenders you have to spend most of your energy in running after the bureaucrats, which you do not need in the construction of a simple apartment block. Honestly speaking, to win a tender is not only about the technical and economic qualification of a company; you need strong political support, as well. The political support does not make you the winner of a tender but it may open the gates when you are confronted with obstacles.

Especially after the head-quarter of AKP moved to Söğütözü, a district just one kilometer away from Çukurambar, in 2007 the political significance of the neighborhood further increased. From that time onwards, it has been more likely to meet the high bureaucrats and significant politicians of AKP in the ordinary interactions of daily life. It was in this period when Adem decided to move his office and later his house to the neighborhood. Now his next-door neighbor is a member of parliament from 'his party'. He goes to Friday prayer in one of the mosques of the neighborhood where he gets the chance of meeting the politicians, and has lunch or

coffee in the favorite restaurants or cafes of the conservative politicians. The making of Çukurambar is the product of the wedding of conservative political capital and contractors' quest for rent, which is crystallized in the spatial intersection of the social trajectories of Niyazi and Adem. Just as the allocation of the public land to the poor impacted on the Islamization of the physical space in the case of Sultanbeyli (Tuğal, 2009), the patronage relations between conservative local and central government and contractors during the urban transformation projects paved the way for the construction of high-rise luxurious buildings in Çukurambar. It functioned as a mechanism of voluntary exclusion for gecekondu residents and of invitation for middle classes.

### **5.5 Symbolic Power and Making Çukurambar Conservative**

Çukurambar has been identified as a conservative neighborhood for the last decade. Conservatism of the neighborhood is not similar to conservative faces of the city such as Hamamönü and Hacı Bayram Veli Mosque square which appeared after the urban transformation and restoration projects through the allocation of renovated houses to Islamic waqfs and associations. The logic of making the physical space conservative in these two cases rested on clothing the history in a conservative fashion by attributing the present functions of Islamic associations a historically essential role. A similar path was observed in gecekondu neighborhoods where Islamist entrepreneurs were invited by the local government with the promise of free land (Tuğal, 2009).

However, the inner logic of making Çukurambar conservative is distinct from both cases. Since the space in Çukurambar was profitable, it was not possible for the local government to allocate the land and invite conservative entrepreneurs. In spite of that, the Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara contributed to the process by naming the main street of the neighborhood after Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the leader of the ultra-conservative nationalist Grand Unity Party (GUP). Moreover, the municipality transformed the status of green areas and later determined these places as the

construction sites of mosques. In this way, the conservative hand of the state supported the process indirectly by increasing the number of mosques in the neighborhood. The increasing density of mosques does not make a neighborhood conservative automatically but because the new legal regulations that were enacted in 2013 forbid the trade of liquor within one hundred meters reach of a mosque, it supports the emergence of conservative-friendly environment in the neighborhood.

Despite the roles of municipality and state, the conservative identity of the neighborhood was rather the product of market dynamics within which the intensification of the conservative political capital played two-fold functions in making Çukurambar conservative. First, those who saw an interest or a future for herself in conservative politics were seduced by the neighborhood. Second, the symbolic capital of the conservative politicians led mainstream cafes, restaurants, and super markets to be re-organized in a conservative-friendly manner. Some of the restaurants prepared an alcohol-free menu and added a prayer room for Çukurambar branch while some super markets removed the alcohol section. Similarly, conservative-friendly cafes opened branch in the neighborhood with alcohol-free cocktails and water pipes in their menu while alcohol selling places such as clubs tended to leave the neighborhood. In this way, conservatism turned out to be the legitimate life-style of the neighborhood even though its residents are not composed of only conservatives.

The political profile of the neighborhood residents can be better understood by examining the election results. According to the latest general election results (on November 1<sup>st</sup> 2015) the secular, social democrat CHP ranks first with more than 46% of vote share in the neighborhood. The vote share of the ruling conservative AKP, on the other hand, was 29% while the other nationalist conservative MHP could take more than 16% of the votes. The lowest political support was given to the pro-Kurdish, leftist HDP with less than 6% of the vote share. As can be easily seen from the vote shares of the parties, the conservative representation of the neighborhood is not a direct reflection of its social morphology.

When one calls a neighborhood conservative, it generally implies that the neighborhood is settled by conservatives. However, as the election results above shows clearly, Çukurambar is not a neighborhood that was settled only by conservatives. What makes it conservative is rather the symbolic power of conservative residents, which defines the identity of the neighborhood and in parallel with its identity, how its residents are expected to act and what the essential meaning of their actions is. Symbolic power is the gentle form of power that springs from social position and produces impact without constraints; it is "... the capacity for consequential categorization, the ability to make the world, to preserve or change it, by fashioning and diffusing symbolic frames, collective instruments of cognitive construction of reality" (Wacquant and Akçaoğlu, 2017).

In the case of Çukurambar, it refers to the misrecognition of entrepreneurs (restaurant, café, and supermarket owners) to see the conservative parliamentary members as the only group of residents, which leads them to reconstruct their investments with the conservative categories of perception. It is the conservatives' definition about what Çukurambar is and how its residents act that is generalized despite the fact that conservatives have never produced a definition. Conservatism in Çukurambar is the product of the 'entrepreneur's eye' which built the physical space in conformity with the conservative taste and thus attracted conservative people to the neighborhood.

The conservative-friendly structuration of the life-style institutions does not automatically produce a pure conservative atmosphere. Like many other centers of social life in the city, various people socialize in the cafes and restaurants of Çukurambar. However, the conservative-friendly environment makes conservatives feel familiar. That is the reason why Çukurambar attracts conservative middle classes from all around Ankara. Cemre is a head-scarfed university student in her early twenties. She was used to meeting her friends in Bahçeli or Gazi Osman Paşa but recently they started meeting in Çukurambar:

I have always felt as a stranger wherever I am in the popular public spaces. I have never lived a bad incident but when I caught someone looking at me I thought she was criticizing me. Maybe there is nothing like that but why I want to share this feeling is to explain that I am nervous in public spaces. Let me put it better, think of your first day in the university. You are like a fish out of the water. This is my feeling when I am in the popular public spaces. But here is different, I feel more comfortable here.

What makes Cemre and her friends to feel comfortable is the reversal of the symbolic struggles between conservatives and seculars. It implies the transformation of the conservatives' feeling like a stranger into feeling like at home. This transformation makes also the reconstruction of conservative life-style possible for middle classes.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

The trajectory of Çukurambar was similar to many of gecekondu neighborhoods which were constructed by the migrants from the villages and towns of provincial cities in the periphery of the big cities. However, the destiny of Çukurambar changed sharply after the conservative AKP came into rule. The previously built cooperative houses by the politicians of the ex-Islamist party transformed the neighborhood into a center of attraction for the members of parliament who had to look for a new house since the ruling AKP closed the housing campus of the parliament. The intensification of the political capital in the neighborhood impacted first on the quality of the service that municipality provides. Moreover, the municipality revised the plan of the neighborhood in a more profitable way. This move transformed the neighborhood into source of profit in the eye of the contractors.

In sum, the wedding of conservative political capital and contractors' quest for profit transformed Çukurambar into a middle class neighborhood. The intensified political capital led the neighborhood to be recognized as conservative with the help of the symbolic power of the dominant conservative position in the political field.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE MIDDLEBROW CONSERVATIVE TASTE: THE CHOICE OF ELEGANT AND RELIGIOUSLY PROPER

#### 6.1 Introduction

Once being a socio-spatial product of the convergence between the spatial intensification of conservative political capital and contractors' quest for rent, the new social conditions of existence in Çukurambar led to the re-construction of the middlebrow conservative taste. It is such taste which made Çukurambar a well-known conservative neighborhood all around Turkey. Previously, conservative taste had been identified with an oppositional culture against the existing order in Turkey. However, following AKP rule, anchored in Çukurambar, an unusual conservative life-style became visible. What was unusual was the conspicuous presentation of middle class social position in the public space. While the headscarf was formerly the symbol of a solidarist political opposition against the established order (including secular state, modern social world, and capitalist economy), it transformed into being a distinctive property of the emergent middlebrow conservative life-style. Veiled in colorful, stylish, and elegantly combined dresses conservative women who lived in luxury houses, drove top model cars and socialized in high class places have been the symbol of the new conservative taste. From that time onwards, the middlebrow conservative taste has been among the hot issues of the public debate in Turkey. In this chapter, I focus on the social conditions that made the new conservative taste possible.

#### 6.2 Bourdieu and Sociologization of Taste

Taste is the general form of agent's relation with realities and fictions of the world. It consists of conscious or unconscious pleasures that an agent has from a wide range of realms including the so called ordinary parts of social life such as food, clothing, and spouse and friends, and the so called sacred realms of social life such as art,

literature, and politics. Taste has long been one of the top issues of philosophical agenda. Among the countless philosophical works, it was Immanuel Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgement* that constituted the main source for the sociological challenge against the philosophy of aesthetics. Kant defined aesthetics as the product of mental categories. Thus, judgements like the good, the beautiful, the sublime, and the agreeable are the pure products of cognitive processes. As a logical possibility, Kant saw aesthetics as a product of distant or isolated mind from the needs or necessities of the world. Thus, for him, taste implied the pleasures of the soul rather than the body of the universal subject of the enlightenment. Pierre Bourdieu's *Distinction* is the sociologization of Kant through the social critique of the critique of judgement. Shifting the research question from the logical conditions of the possibility to the social conditions of the possibility of taste, Bourdieu sheds light on the social roots that extend to the consciously preferred pleasures. In this way, he shows the difference between ordinary pleasures of body and sublime pleasures of soul is not a product of the difference of consciousness. He rather argues that taste, including the sublime pleasures of the soul, is the product of determinate social conditions.

By dissolving the antinomy between the ordinary usage of culture and the culture in the anthropological sense, Bourdieu develops a theory of 'dispositional agent' against the established theory of the 'subject of reason.' Rather than considering taste as the product of a specific mental relation with the world, Bourdieu's dispositional theory points out the specific social conditions which make the specific mental relation with the world possible. Briefly, he aims to show that taste is the socially acquired dispositions of the body rather than the judgements of the given categories of the mind.

At the basis of this theory, lies the constitution of the social conditions of existence as a result of the unequal distribution of the forms of capital. Being born in a specific social position, agent sets a specifically cognitive relation with the world by internalizing the external conditions of existence in the form of dispositions. Thus,

agent does not invent what she likes by thinking about merits and limits of the things; rather she acquires specific dispositions toward specific realities or fictions by being socialized in specific social conditions. Taste is not only the principle of a socially acquired elective affinity toward the things, works, and representations, Bourdieu contends. It is also a mechanism of the social classification that perceives the world by dividing the things into what is for me and what is not for me. Thus Bourdieu (1984: 190) argues that “[t]aste, a class culture turned into nature, that is, embodied, helps to shape the class body. It is an incorporated principle of classification which governs all forms of incorporation, choosing and modifying everything that the body ingests and digests and assimilates, physiologically and psychologically.”

The marginal sociological intervention of Bourdieu produces an extended definition of taste to be examined by taking power relations into account. In this way, this sociological perspective takes the taste out of the restricted borders of aesthetics and gives equal value to the choice of food and music in the examination of taste. By focusing on the social conditions within which the ways of relating to the world are acquired in the form of dispositions, Bourdieu points out the role played by forms of capital in the constitution of taste: “[t]he manner in which culture has been acquired lives on in the manner of using it” (Bourdieu, 1984: 2). Therefore, the interest into a work of art is not a love in the first sight but the implementation of the acquired disposition. Thus, Kantian aesthetics in Bourdieu’s perspective is just one of the possible forms of the taste, the ‘taste of luxury (or liberty),’ which is distinct in terms of being distant from the needs and thus unavailable to be acquired by all but available only to the cultural nobility.

The sociological examination of taste underlines the role played by social origin and education in the acquisition of the taste: “the eye is a product of history reproduced by education (Bourdieu, 1984: 3). Being exposed to specific social conditions in family, primary social circles, and school, the agent gains the symbolic competence of the world she lives in. The product of such unconscious social pedagogy is the ‘practical sense’ that guides the agent into the proper action when she confronts the

external world. The choice of food, the table manners, the choice of clothing, the manner of speech, the choice of spouse, the favorite sport, and many other choices that she makes are the concrete products of the sense of practice. What is common in the various and seemingly irrelevant choices that an agent makes is the 'style' that bears the trace of the social conditions of existence. The more agents are exposed to similar social conditions, the more they share similar life-style. Consequently, the classification of the things, works, and representations leads to a social classification of agents in terms of their life-styles. Thus, taste appears to be a marker of class or class fraction in Bourdieu's framework.

The resulting social space in such perspective is the site of never-ending symbolic struggles that emerged with the misrecognition of the existing social differentiation as symbolic differentiation of life-styles. Thus, those who listen to arabesque music are in a symbolic struggle with those who listen to classical music to define the legitimate meaning of music. What is crucial in these symbolic struggles is that the trajectory of the struggle has nothing to do with the intrinsic quality of the preferred genres. Rather, the victorious side is determined by the power of the social position from which the disposition to a specific genre of music is acquired.

The central argument of *Distinction* that there is a homology between social position and life-style which is composed of consistent choices has been the main target of critiques. Many of the critiques emphasized the lack of the purely coherent life-styles of classes or class fractions. It was these critiques that created the debate of omnivorous taste. In their study on musical taste, Peterson and Simkus (1992) argued that upper class musical competence in the US is not restricted to what Bourdieu called the highbrow culture. Thus, they used the concept of 'omnivore' to describe the lack of homology between the musical taste of upper classes and their social position. The concept of omnivore culture has been one of the most recurrent themes of the studies on taste which was inspired by Bourdieu. Van Rees et al. (1999) presented similar findings in terms of the heterogeneous reading habits in the Netherlands. Sullivan and Gerro (2007) detected a similar tendency of

‘voraciousness’ in terms of the leisure activities in England. In their extensive study which adopts Bourdieu’s *Distinction* into England, Bennett et al. (2009) found the tendencies of omnivorousness in different realms of cultural consumption from food to musical taste. Similarly, Swidler (2001) emphasizes the heterogeneity of the repertoire of cultural practice in the formation of the emotional ties between couples. Lamont (1992) makes a similar point in her comparative study on the US and France by explicating the heterogeneity of the moral repertoire of the upper classes in the formation of social boundaries.

The choice of elegant and religiously proper could be analyzed as an example of omnivorous taste as conservative middle classes have common choices with the secular middle classes. However, while elucidating the inconsistency among the choices, the omnivorous debate neglects to examine the social conditions that make the inconsistency possible. Moreover, the problems of the omnivorous debate are not restricted to that. What seems to be common about the omnivorous debate is the misapprehension about the logic of Bourdieu’s research project. First of all, the analysis in *Distinction* is about a specific social space in a specific point of history. In other words, the findings of the study are not universal.

Second, the focus of *Distinction* is not the consumption patterns. It rather focuses on the historical construction of social space by taking power relations into account. Therefore, adaptation of Bourdieu’s research program first of all requires the construction of social space by detecting the main principles of social division which differentiate social positions. Otherwise, taking economic and cultural capital as the default principles of social division is nothing other than the example of spontaneous sociology. As there is no social space and positions constructed how can it be possible to discuss about the omnivorousness?

Third, social space is not stable. On the contrary, there is a constant transformation in the social space resulting from the never ending struggles in the fields which may impact on social positions and taste by triggering the process of re-construction. This

is the case for the emergence of the ‘choice of elegant and religiously proper’. It emerged in novel social conditions which appeared as a response to the transformations in the political field following the invention and domination of the conservative democrat position. Confrontation with novel social conditions led conservative middle classes to replace the ascetic distance to the existing social world with the distant integration. The conservative criticism of the capitalist market system, modern social relations and secular state lost power and significance following the rule of conservative AKP. When the conservative quest for an alternative social order (namely just order) weakened, the preponderance of strong community life over individual preferences ended. The reflection of these transformations on the lives of individual conservatives appeared as the reconstruction of the conservative life-style. They moved to a new house in a new neighborhood; they preferred modern furniture while decorating their new houses with conservative details such as hanging on the calligraphic plaques on which the names of Allah is written in Arabic; they had new neighbors and socialized in a new manner; they developed a new definition of beauty which reflected on the new manner of clothing; and they developed a new manner of leisure time.

In the following sections, I do not satisfy with the detailed analysis of the choices that make up the middlebrow conservative taste. I also examine the social conditions which make it possible. In this regard, in the coming section, I aim to elucidate the distinctive character of novel social conditions that incorporated in Çukurambar by comparing it to *Akevler Kooperatifi*, a puritan middle class organization that emerged in the late 1960s. Following that, I examine the familial ties of my informants to detect the primary conservative dispositions. I also explore the social differentiation within the conservative middle classes by focusing on their diversified social trajectories. Lastly, I analyse in detail the re-construction of middlebrow conservative taste.

### **6.3 What is New about the Conservatism of Middle Classes?**

The conservative fractions of middle classes are not an emergent segment of the social world in Turkey. On the contrary, they were the basis and the early supporters of Islamist politics. As they struggled in the political field they translated the political capital into other forms of capital, especially into the symbolic capital which endowed them with recognition or legitimacy in a secular order. Their quest for an autonomous conservative physical space is the product of this period. The parallel between the rise of the Islamist politics and the quest for a puritan conservative physical space can be observed clearly over the case of Akevler Kooperatifi.

Akevler Kooperatifi emerged in 1967 as a quest for a properly Islamic way of life in business, private life, and social relations. Süleyman Karagülle, the founder of the cooperative, explains the aim of the cooperative as the unity of those who can live together on the same spatial unit in business as well as social life.

First, we bought a land [in İzmir] and started building apartment blocks. We grew further as more people wanted to join us. Then we researched about what type of business we can run. Our main principle in all of the details of this process was to be proper in terms of the principles of Islam (Erboğa, 2013).

The experience of cooperative and the quest for a properly Islamic way of life led Karagülle to develop the National Outlook Movement's celebrated theory of 'just order'. It was basically the explication of the structure and principles of the sole perfect and durable economic theory of Islam in comparison with the imperfect and nondurable economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism (Karagülle, 1969).

The theory of just order has transformed into being the economic program of MGH parties. From the late 1980s on, the theory of just order turned out to be a concrete economic practice, an alternative economic model to existing international capitalist market system. Despite its durable quality on paper, the system of collective

investment and collective income has collapsed in the late 1990s, and the idea of just order lost its political attraction. The still ongoing practical impact of the theory of just order is restricted to the invention of the interest-free banking. However, the quest for a properly Islamic way of life kept its attraction for middle classes that is why a few apartment blocks turned into being a separate neighborhood in İzmir and the idea of Islamic cooperative expanded into many other Anatolian cities.

In the early 2000s, MGH parties' promise of a properly Islamic state and society lost its persuasiveness as such radical promise led Supreme Court to close the Islamist parties since they were considered as a threat to secular order. Emerged as a reaction to this vicious circle, AKP stopped insisting on an alternative economic system and thus Islamic opposition was absorbed by the capitalist system. In parallel with this transformation, the holistic quest for an Islamic way of life lost its attraction for the conservative fractions of middle classes, especially for those who shared the illusion of the capitalist market game in the economic field. Conservative fractions of middle classes kept their quest for an Islamic way of life in a more individualized content and form. In spite of changing the whole system by replacing the existing institutions with the Islamic alternatives they now try to change the human resource of the system. There is a market system with conservative capitalists. Çukurambar is a perfect concrete example of the new period, a conservative neighborhood which is the product of market dynamics. It would be highly unlikely for a stranger to describe the neighborhood as conservative. If I had to choose a symbol to describe the market-based spatial organization of middle class conservatism, I would straight away choose the mosque that squeezed between high-rise apartment blocks.



Figure 6.1 The mosque in the jam of high-rise buildings in Çukurambar.

Source: <http://www.panoramio.com/photo/108692266>

Akevler Kooperatifi in the late 1960s was the product of a quest to re-construct the socio-spatial conditions of Medina Islam during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad. It would be naïve to see this quest as the common quest of all Muslims. It was clearly a product of the middle-brow religious taste of conservative middle classes who criticized both official Islam (of schools and mosques) and commonsensical Islam (of family) against which they developed an orthodox interpretation of Islam not only to uncover the essential meaning of it but also to take this essential meaning as the compass of practical life.

The curiosity about the essential meaning of Islam, the willingness to spend labor and time in order to learn Islam from the original sources in the original language, and the excitement to construct a physical space and community life in the light of Islamic principles require agents to be free from the thorns of the practical life. That is the reason why it is a specific quest of the conservative middle classes. What made such kind of a heretical quest possible in this specific period of time was the uncertainty of the political trajectory of the country that sprang from the clash between right and left along 1970s. It has also emerged as a critique of the official

Islam that is why the Akevler community built prayer rooms on the top of each block. The resulting puritan community life in Akevler rested on the unity of the residents in terms of the similarity of the source from which they acquired their religious capital: Most of the residents were the devotees of the determinate branches of Nur Community. The emerging microcosm of Akevler rested on the codification of every single detail of social life from business to childcare in the light of orthodox Islam. The collective orthodoxy as the general form of social life was reproduced through the regular religious talks on various themes from the life of Prophet Muhammad to the writings of Said-i Nursi.

While Akevler was an isolation of the community life from the religiously impure relations of the wider social world, the market-based spatial organization of middle class conservatism in Çukurambar is based on the coexistence of conservatives with non-conservatives. Thus collective orthodoxy of Akevler is replaced by individual orthodoxy in Çukurambar while the ties with various religious collectivities kept its significance. As the conservative identity of Çukurambar emerged in parallel with the rise of AKP, alternative social order was not in their agenda. They did not try to invent religiously proper economic system but rather they worked in the existing economic system as conscious Muslims. They kept their money in interest-free banking and donated some part of their profit to religious communities or foundations. Thus, the previous conservative generations' skeptical view about the capitalist market system weakened as the younger generations see the positive sides of the system: the profits of the market provide them to invest in religious charity.

Eren is an urban planner and the owner of a planning company in his late forties. He is a regular participant of Mesnevi Talks and a loyal devotee of a Naqshibandi community. He is also a strong admirer of Islamic arts. Following the end of a weekly session of Mesnevi Talks which had focused on the critique of contemporary Muslims about neglecting religious sophistication while running after money, Eren and I kept discussing about the same issue in a nearby café. Eren saw the critique as vital but he was not sure about the way of solution. At this point, I asked him

whether it would be the case if ‘just order’ of MGH parties had been established. Upon my question Eren reacted by reversing the criticism.

I share the critiques about the contemporary situation of Muslims. I can even agree with the exaggerated critique that we Muslims sometimes mind money more than enough. However, I am not sure if the economic system is the source of our problems. On the contrary, look at the rising power of conservative segments of population. Look at our waqfs, number of schools, and number of students. I think the nation today have good sources to reach Islam more than ever. And all these happened in the existing economic system.

However, despite the common agreement on the virtues of the market system, there are still strong critical voices against the impure dimensions of it. The critiques are heard more frequently and more sharply from the religious experts such as imams or theology professors whose practical life is distant from the virtues of the market. Yusuf is an imam in one of the mosques in Çukurambar, where I went frequently for Friday prayers during my field study. He is famous with his strong rhetoric and impressive sermons that is why his is the most crowded mosque of the neighborhood. Following the end of a prayer I went to his small room within the mosque to meet him. As we speak about my research, the second imam (vaiz) of the mosque came in by asking what to do with the posters in his hand. Yusuf put the posters on his desk and examined them carefully. Posters were about the religious events of the following weeks. One of the posters made him angry. “How can I hang it on the door of the mosque?” he asked. I looked at the poster carefully. It was about an exhibition of manuscript Korans. While I was looking for a clue to understand what made him angry, he pointed out the bottom line that introduces the sponsoring companies. “Look at that, this is a bank that makes money from interest” he complained by pointing out the sponsoring bank. “Doesn’t it imply that I approve a religiously improper act if I hang it on?” he asked. “But, isn’t it a good event?” I replied with a new question. “You are right” he said, “that is why I will hang it on by cutting the bottom line of sponsoring companies.”

The relation between capitalist market system and Muslims keeps being a controversial issue within conservative circles. However, it seems to have lost power to divide conservatives into two distinct political positions, as it was the case in the past. Therefore, their varied views do not differentiate Eren and Yusuf politically. On the contrary, Eren and Yusuf keep being good friends; at least Eren enjoys listening to the sermons of Yusuf. Moreover, they see each other as the supporter of the common cause. The just order of MGH parties was a discursive formation which did not reply to the practical necessities of conservative middle classes when it turned into being a reality in action while capitalist market system helped them to accumulate capital and gain strength despite its problems with some of the central principles of Islam.

The transition from MGH parties to AKP did not come into existence as the critique of MGH's discursive formation. It was rather the product of the implosion of the conservative political libido which demanded collective orthodoxy. Although it lost its mobilization capacity, the discursive formation of Islamism keeps its significance for conservative middle classes in a new form. Many of them agree with the critiques that the world which is a site of exam for Muslims is not an ideal world; it is impure and dangerous. Being born in this world as a subject of Allah, Muslims are supposed to struggle against any form of evil including sinful capitalism as a part of their service to Allah. However, the method of struggle, at least among middle classes, is no more a revolutionary change. For them, *the great jihad*, the struggle of individual Muslim against her *nafs* is a more valuable method. Rather than struggling against the evil world, they struggle against the evil within the world. The changing perspective does not imply isolation from the world; they participate to social life actively but armed with Islamic belief and knowledge which are supposed to generate proper set of practices in all domains of social life to gain the consent of Allah.

The replacement of collective orthodoxy with individual orthodoxy could be possible especially after AKP came into power, which implied the end of controversial

relations with the state for conservatives. The collective orthodoxy had first of all emerged as an opposition against the state. The longstanding rule of AKP and its conservative politics which ended the unfair treatment of the state against conservatives, such as the headscarf ban, reversed the relations between conservatives and state. The rise of the budget of Religious Affairs Administration (from one billion Turkish Liras (TL) to six billion TL)<sup>13</sup> and the increasing number of Imam Hatip Schools (from 450 to 1149)<sup>14</sup> and mosques (from 76 thousand to 85 thousand)<sup>15</sup> during the thirteen years of AKP rule symbolizes the strengthening conservative hand of the state.

The AKP rule has also provided non-official conservative circles such as Sufi orders, waqfs, and associations to gain power by simply reducing the pressure of state over them. Changing form of relations between the state and conservatives during AKP rule constituted the objective conditions for the collapse of collective orthodoxy and diminishing Islamist opposition against the state. However, the collapse of collective orthodoxy and diminishing opposition against the state do not imply that the conservative demand for socio-political change ended. Rather, the ideal of 'conservative Turkey' kept its significance as a political objective to be realized in the future with the bureaucratic resources of conservative government. As a result, collective orthodoxy against the state transformed into being a collective effervescence around AKP which projected Turkey as the leader of Muslim countries earlier ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Once seen as a bureaucratic machine of social alienation, the state was now conceived by conservatives as the central bank of national culture. Thus, the new form conservatism gained in parallel with the

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<sup>13</sup> For the detailed statistics of Religious Affairs Administration budget, see: <<http://t24.com.tr/haber/diyanete-57-milyar-tl-lik-butce-yetmedi-yedek-odenecek-istenecek,306501>> (last visited on 07.15.2016).

<sup>14</sup> For the detailed statistics about İmam Hatip Schools, see: <<http://egitimsen.org.tr/2015-2016-egitim-ogretim-istatistikleri/>> (last visited on 07.15.2016).

<sup>15</sup> For the number of mosques in Turkey, see: <<https://www.emlakwebtv.com/turkiye-cami-sayisi/47736>> (last visited on 07.17.2016).

position of AKP in the political field is the product of the wedding of market system with the representation of nation as Ottoman community.

The symbolic construction of a new conservative position in the political field and the new representation of nation did not lead directly to social change as a response to external constraints. Rather, the transformations in the political field generated new social conditions. Social change emerged as a result of the confrontation of the agents of the history with these new social conditions. Below is a section on the history of the acquisition of conservative dispositions which went under transformation and gained a new form when confronting the new social conditions.

#### **6.4 The Familial Ties and the Primary Conservative Dispositions**

Conservatism is not the product of a contemplative process. In other words, what makes an individual conservative is not a contemplative questioning or a quest of the essential meaning of the world but a set of dispositions the practical products of which are classified as conservative. Thus, rather than being a specific way of thinking, as Mannheim (1992) argues, conservatism is a specific way of relating to the world under specific social conditions. The social position within which the conservative dispositions are acquired is the product of the unequal distribution of the forms of capital. Briefly, conservatism is a product of the power struggles.

In the case of Turkey, conservatism is the dominated and excluded position in the emergent 'field of power' of the republican Turkey. Conservatives, on the other hand, are the unhappy citizens of the new regime, whose body and mind were settled by the stigma of the backwardness. The anonymous crowd of the stigmatized and socially excluded unhappy citizens constituted the social basis for the fabrication of various conservative political groups by the dominated agents of the republican field of power and the sympathizers of the old regime. Therefore, the form and content of the conservatism of the actually existing individual conservatives are shaped by the power relations and transmitted by the ties of political representation.

Once emerged as a dominated position, however, conservatism is not destined to remain as the dominated position. It takes new forms and contents with reference to the trajectory of the struggles in the political field. Last but not least, the form and content of the conservatism was also shaped by the struggles among the conservative entrepreneurs to produce the legitimate definition of conservatism. There are conservatisms which attract different classes or class fractions. For instance, while radical Islamism, as a form of conservatism, generally attracted working classes, the republican-friendly conservatism of the central right parties attracted middle classes.

Above, I briefly explained the theoretical framework for the constitution and transmission of the form and content of conservatism in Turkey. However, the explanation above still leaves the question unanswered: what makes an individual conservative? Once the conservative political group is formed, especially family functions as the mechanism of social reproduction by inculcating the primary conservative dispositions. The present middle class conservatives living in Çukurambar are either children or grandchildren of the stigmatized unhappy citizens of the early republic. The family ties of the current residents of the neighborhood are not unique.

However, the common dimension that almost all families share is their still strong ties with the provinces (taşra). Most of the residents or their parents were born in villages, towns, or cities of Anatolia where the waves of reformation reached weakly since the Ottoman modernization period. Thus, the impact of the republican revolutions in provinces is restricted to the transformations in the local bureaucracy. When the enforced transformation move of the republic through education and law reached to provinces, the social structure was based on the principles of organization of the old regime. Since the agents of the provinces perceived the republican revolutions as the bureaucratic mechanism of social correction against the existing order, they developed the 'silent opposition' against the revolutions by keeping intact the content and form of the unregulated realms of the social life. The product of the silent opposition was the *skepticism* against republican revolutions, which was

acquired as the primary conservative disposition by the grandparents of the conservative middle classes. In the multi-party democracy period, the skeptical eye led to the establishment of the political representation ties with the conservative parties.

In this way, the silent conservative opposition gained a voice. As a result, the critique of republican revolutions, support for conservative parties and their discursive repertoire, and the high sensitivity about the punctuality of prayers constitute the fundamental dispositions that conservative middle classes acquired within their family circles regardless of the social differentiation among their grandparents. This primary set of conservative dispositions enriched following the emergence of conservative positions in various fields. Especially conservative newspapers and religious magazines which honed the schemata of perception, appreciation, and action to a great extent and played a functional role in the constitution of conservative commonsense and language have been inseparable parts of conservative taste.

Eren remembers his grandfather as a silent man who was in the landed gentry of a provincial city in Eastern Anatolia. Eren maintains that;

My memories about my grandfather are limited to a short period of time in his old age. He had transferred all business to his sons and devoted all of his time to religion. He would wake up early in the morning before the morning azan and go to the mosque. During the time until the noon prayer, he would read Koran in a silent room, then keep busy with the repairs of the house or the works of the garden. Following that, he would read his newspaper and go to the mosque again for noon prayer. In the summer, noon prayers were the meeting time with his friends. As a group of old men they would sit in the garden of the mosque and speak about the religious issues and political agenda of the country. It was like a cycle that repeats everyday unless he was busy with other things.

While listening to the answers of Eren to my questions, I realized that the primary conservative dispositions are not only composed of the easily observable preferences.

After he described his grandfather as a silent man, I asked him to explain further what ‘silent man’ means.

He would not speak unless it is necessary” he explained. “I mean he would not speak just to speak. When the family gathered around the dinner table he would not ask about the details of what we did that day. He would just ask about the significant issues, like business. Comparing to contemporary parents, he was silent. Today, when parents come home in the evening, it is like a bombardment of questions about the day of the children: what they did today, how the school was, which subjects they learned, what they did with their friends in the breaks. I don’t think that my grandfather has ever asked similar questions to his children and grandchildren. He was a man of his time.

Months later, while re-reading the decipherment of my conversation with Eren, I realized that what he described as ‘silent man’ was the proper conservative man: a man who is distant from the razzle-dazzle of the everyday life and almost disinterested in any issues of the world except religion. Similar descriptions of grandfather are the recurrent pattern of all interviews: quiet, harmless, devoutly religious, and simple-hearted. When it comes to describing grandmother, adjectives that are used to describe grandfather reversed sharply, except being religiously devout: talkative, warm, affectionate, and concerned.

In contrast to conservative man, properly conservative woman is expected to be deeply interested in worldly affairs, especially those relating to the microcosm of the family. The social dimension of conservative woman reveals even in her relation with religion. In contrast to man’s quest for seclusion while reading Koran, woman gathered with other women to recite Koran. It is this content of woman’s role in the division of familial labor that led her to play central role in the transmission of conservative dispositions. Seen naturally responsible in child-rearing, it was mother who first introduced the world to the child and she introduced the world in a conservative fashion by inculcating a religious schemata of classification based on the separation of good deeds and sins. “If I can live a religiously proper life and if I am a good mother today” speaks Zeynep, a head-scarfed housewife in her forties, “it is because my mother taught me very early what good deed is and what sin is.”

One may find similar roles of father and mother in non-conservative families as well. However, what is distinctively conservative in the traditional division of familial labor is the strong belief that the existing roles of father and mother are natural and necessary. It is also the same belief that led male domination to be kept even when the material conditions of the familial division of labor changed following women's increasing role in the economic division of labor. Thus, it is not surprising to see that younger conservative middle class families reproduce the roles of grandfather and grandmother in a different form.

Another common feature in the far familial ties, which produces impact in the formation of present middle class conservatism, is the form of marriage. Many of the respondents said that their grandparents and parents made arranged marriages. It was especially the dominant form of marriage in the villages, towns and provincial cities where the socio-spatial organization rested on the separation of sexes. Despite the fact that the contemporary socio-spatial organization within which conservative middle classes exist does not rest on the separation sexes, Merve prefers arranged marriage since she thinks that the period of flirt leads couples to consume the excitement of the relationship. That is why, according to her, many of the marriages end up with divorce. It was a similar reason why Hasan has never had a girlfriend before he made an arranged marriage. "Of course, I fell in love many times. But I have never had a girlfriend. It was like an attempt to stop a flood of my nafs. I think it is an exam. Maybe I did not experience the flirt relations but I prefer to appear in this way before Allah when I die."

What is crucial here for the comprehension of the distinctive aspect of conservatism in Turkey is the preponderance of religious orthodoxy in the formation of relations with the world. Conservatism in Europe and the US is based on a belief in the secular wisdom of the historical social institutions such as family, state, and religion. It is basically the preference of the existing form of social institutions, the functioning of which was approved by history, against the non-tried new forms. The main principle of loyalty to the old social institutions in the case of Turkey, however, is not limited

their tested functioning. It is also related to the feature of the old social institutions that they are religiously proper. Therefore, it is the religious functioning that makes the old social institutions valuable for conservatives in Turkey. It is one of these social institutions, family, which transmits one of the primary conservative dispositions that the foundation of a family needs to be religiously proper. That is the reason why arranged marriage keeps functioning for conservative middle classes.

The other two factors that are common for the far family ties are the prevalence of extended family and the family members' low level of education. Extended family practically implies the coexistence of both younger and older generations of a family under the same roof. This coexistence is also the solution to the problem of the distribution of family wealth. The logic behind the extended family in Turkey is the distribution of the majority of the family wealth among sons in return of which sons (especially the older one) recognize the authority of the father and mother as long as they are alive and provide health care in the old age. Extended family provides the social conditions for the strong solidarity ties among the family members.

Many of the conservative middle class families are 'conditional extended families': in case of sickness parents become the permanent part of the household. That is one of the reasons why Adem moved to Çukurambar: "My current house in Çukurambar is 180 square meters. That is what I need because my mother lives with us and we frequently have visitors from family members and fellow townsmen." The strong solidarity ties among the family members, for Adem, are rather a distinctive conservative sensitivity.

In our block, almost each household has older parents or relatives as the permanent member of family. Do you know why? Because we are sensitive to solidarity ties. Conservatives mind family and neighboring relations because of religious principles. If you examine the other segments of population you cannot find the same sensitivity. I always greet people by saying 'es-selamu aleykum' (peace be upon you), I greeted one of our neighbors in the elevator in the same way yesterday. He looked at me weirdly and kept quiet. You cannot see these impolite manners in conservatives.

The incident that Adem experienced in the elevator is not a sign of low sensitivity about solidarity but a form of symbolic struggle about the right manner of greeting between conservatives and seculars. In addition to that, it would be fierce to describe the non-conservative groups insensitive about solidarity. However, Adem could be right if he had defined conservatives as more experienced in solidarity issues since the conservative NGOs monopolized the realm of social services especially after the weakening of the welfare state in Turkey.

In contrast to other factors, education impacts on the present state of middle class conservatism in a reverse manner. Most of their grandparents are primary school graduates. The rate of schooling increases in their parents: there are university graduates especially among fathers, even though they are minority. However, compared to the education level of their children, they are far behind. The majority of conservative middle classes are university graduates. The gap between the generations in terms of education is the main factor for the changing form of conservatism. The more the education level increases, the more the primary conservative dispositions that were acquired in the family lead to a more scholastic relation with the religion, which establishes a critical stance against the transmitted religious knowledge and practices.

The critiques are based on the quality of the transmitted religious knowledge as the product of oral culture which advises the regular observance of worships and the separation of good deed and sin. The ‘middle-brow Islam’ prevalent among the younger generations of conservative middle classes rests on the view that the message of Islam is not only limited to the call of worship to Allah. For most of my respondents, like Hasan, the message of Islam is about developing a perfect morality out of the religion, which will be the guide of Muslim in every realm of the social world.

I grew up as a son of a poor family in a gecekonu. Our economic conditions were not good but still I feel myself lucky since I learned the basic principles of Islam in my family. What my family taught me was the religious oral culture. I

define this religious tendency as passive Islam which is prevalent among the poor just because they have limited choices. But now I live in a capitalist society. I have to make more choices, which means that I have to live Islam actively. The responsibility of the Muslim before Allah is not limited to observing worships. As a Muslim, I am responsible even while drinking my tea. This responsibility leads us to an active relation with Islam in order to develop a perfect morality.

What Hasan describes as ‘active Islam’ is the middle-brow Islam of conservative middle classes. The active dimension implies the enlargement of the space of possible choices compared to their parents’ ‘choice of necessity.’ It also reflects the process of the reconstruction of the conservative taste. The middle class conservative taste is distinctive because of its intellectual relation with the original sources of Islam. As Hasan described above, the definition of Muslim and Muslim way of life is no more restricted to the transmitted oral culture. Basically, the middle class definition of Muslim rests on an intellectual questioning of the Islamic oral culture and the expansion of the intellectual definition of Muslim to the realms of social life which traditional religious culture left untouched.

The meaning of Muslim, for conservative middle classes, is no more limited to the regular observance of worships and obedience to Islamic principles in the central ‘rites of passage’ such as circumcision, marriage, and naming the children. The concept of Muslim no more implies an agent who follows Islamic rules in ritual events, but rather implies an agent who constructs even the smallest details of every aspect of social life in compliance with the original sources of Islam. Therefore, Hasan does not exaggerate when he said that he minds being a proper Muslim even while sipping a cup of tea. Despite its similarity on paper to the middle class asceticism of Akevler community’s ‘conscious Muslims’, the puritan quest of the middle-brow Islam led to the emergence of a more flexible conservative taste just because the application of the symbolically reconstructed meaning of Muslim to the practical life occurs not in ideal conditions but in the existing conditions.

Since it is the topic of the next section I will not elaborate on the confrontation of middle class conservatives with the existing conditions here. However, it needs to be noted that the increasing tendency of puritanism in parallel with the increasing level of education is a tendency against the commonsensical presupposition that the more the education level increases the more the people are secular. What is significant here is that the content of the education is not stable; rather it is at stake in the struggles of the field of power. As the conservative political position gained power especially in the last four decades of Turkey, it reflected on the content of education as well. Moreover, the university education is not all about courses. As I discuss in the next chapter, it is the socialization during the university education which is one of the significant sources for middle classes to acquire the puritan dispositions.

### **6.5 Pathways to Conservative Middle Classes**

Despite the common properties of the familial ties, the social position of conservative middle classes is a product of different pathways. It is possible to examine their pathways within three categories: first comers, new comers, and late comers. The first comers are men and women who were born into a conservative upper-middle class family and thus inherited the social position. Occupying the same social position with their family does not imply that the first comers did not spend labor to preserve their position. Most of the time, their parents had already translated the land-based economic capital of the previous generation into a professional economic capital through higher education. By having a professional occupation such as lawyer, doctor, and engineer they also translated the rural form of economic capital into urban form. However, they did not lose their rural roots. On the contrary, coming from the landed gentry provided them to be among the well-known figures of the provincial city, which was easily translated into political capital by occupying influential positions in the local branches of central right parties of the time.

Briefly, the first-comers were born into the families with urbanized economic capital and high symbolic capital which could easily be translated into political capital when

necessary. Like their parents, they had higher education but in the bigger universities of large cities. Their department in the university was mostly the same with their father. Thus, when they graduated they worked in the same sector with their fathers but this time in metropolitan cities.

Adem was born in an upper middle class family as a son of an engineer father and housewife mother in a provincial city. Like his father he became engineer and worked in the same sector. However, when he took the family company over, he decided to move the center to Ankara where he enlarged the capacity of the company by diversifying the field of operation. He also benefited from the political capital of his family in the process of enlargement.

Even before the university exam, I knew I would be an engineer. Working in the construction sector is like a family tradition for us. When I took the company over, our profit was already good in my hometown. But while I was a university student, I realized that we could make more money in a big city. I shared my opinion with my father and grandfather by asking if not now, when? I was thinking that everything was ready for us to expand the company. My father was an influential figure in the local branch of AKP and this could help us to work in the construction business of public sector.

The new-comers, on the other hand are men and women who were born in working class families but realized upward mobility through higher education. Their parents migrated from rural areas to big cities with nothing but the hopes for a better future. The new-comers made their parents' hopes real by moving up the ladder of social hierarchy through education. Having no power being transmitted by the family but siblings and parents who expect help in order to live on, new-comers preferred the departments such as engineering, business administration, and political science which promise high income upon graduation. Having no educated role-model in their family, they planned their career by themselves, which generally ended up with the administrative positions in high bureaucracy.

İbrahim was born in a working class family in a gecekondu like his three other siblings. His father was a worker in a state institution while his mother was a housewife. Despite all disadvantaged conditions, he succeeded to climb up in the social hierarchy.

When my children complain about the difficulty of courses in the school, I smile. They do not know what is difficult. When I enrolled to a university, it was an event in the neighborhood. There were only a few children who went to university in my neighborhood. Moreover, it was also a miracle that I graduated because there was a severe political conflict between left and right in those years. However, I reap the fruits of intensive labor now. My wife and I earn enough to provide our children good conditions so that they do not experience the same difficulties.

In addition to education, marriage also contributed to the upward social mobility of the new-comers. Hatice was also born in a working class family in a city of Black Sea region where they migrated to Ankara while she was a child. She graduated from the university as a primary school teacher but she could not find a job.

After graduation I got married and started wearing headscarf. However, it was the period of late 1990s and it was forbidden to work in the public sector with headscarf. Thus, I could never become a teacher for which I am qualified. Thanks to my husband, I opened this store (a clothing store for veiled women) where I make both money and friendships which I call as the ‘sisterhood of headscarf’.

Late-comers are the men and women who were born in a family within the secular fraction of middle classes. Like their parents, they grew up in big cities and had good education. Like the first-comers, their social trajectory was shaped highly by the familial power. They followed their parents while planning their career. What caused them to be transferred to the conservative position was (with their own terms) the good fortune which may come out of bad fortune. Hüseyin is an entrepreneur in his early forties. As soon as he graduated from the economics department of a private university, he started working in their family company. When their family company went bankrupt in the economic crisis of 2001, he thought he lost everything:

Human soul is like water. It takes the shape of whatever you put it in. So I took the shape of my friends. Upon the economic failure, I started drinking alcohol in order to forget what I lost. I also started gambling because of the same reason. I had lost all my hope for the future. In that time of deep depression, one of our neighbors invited me to pray in the mosque. From that time on, I started to take religion seriously. In this process of religious enlightenment I quit my bad habits. I did everything to improve my religious knowledge: I read whatever I found; I participated to religious talks of various organizations. At last, with the help of Allah I founded a new company and made a fresh start.

Following different social trajectories impacted on the form of conservatism, as well. The conservatism of the first-comers can be defined as traditionalism since they minded following the same religious and political path with their family. If there is a familial tie with a specific Sufi order in the province, it was kept and reproduced in the big city. The traditionalism of the first-comers can be observed in the division of familial labor as well. The traditional homology between the separations of man/woman and public space/private space was reproduced especially about the issue of woman's participation to labor market. Women do not work in a salaried job but it does not mean that they are invisible in the public space. On the contrary, women spend time outside the house more than ever. They participate to the activities of conservative charity associations; take active role in the women's branch of political parties; participate to religious talks; go to the women only courses of Islamic and traditional arts such as paper marbling (*ebru*), ney, and calligraphy; spend time in the shopping malls by shopping around and also go to the women only gyms. Thus, familial division of labor continued in a more flexible form. Flexibility can also be observed in a broad realm from child-rearing to body aesthetics and choices of food, which will be analysed in more detail in the next section.

The form of conservatism among the new-comers, however, is more puritan compared to the conservatism of their parents. It is hard to find continuity in religious patterns between the generations. There is rather a marginal break from the oral culture-based working class Islam. The tracks of education which opened for them the gates of the upward mobility can be found in their relation to religion. They are the exact agents of 'scholastic Islam without school' which is based on the

replacement of the commonsensical Islamic belief, knowledge, and practices with the ‘exactly Islamic alternatives’ with reference to the original sources (basically Koran, Sunnah and hadiths). The tendency of questioning the traditional Islamic knowledge impacts on the division of familial labor as well. In contrast to first-comers, new-comer women are the active agents of the labor market. It is also a necessity for them to keep their upper middle class position. Thus flexibility of the traditional roles of man and woman is more visible among the new-comer women but with an emphasis on the ‘conscious flexibility’ which implies that the agents are aware of their religious duties and flexibility of traditional roles is religiously proper.

The form of conservatism among the late-comers on the other hand, is more blurred compared to conservatism of previous two groups. The late-comers are either the most puritans or the softest conservatives. The form of conservatism changes depending on the transformation they experienced after they started living in a religiously proper way. Barış is a civil engineer in his late forties. He was born in a secular middle class family. His father is a strong admirer of Atatürk, and so he is. Barış experienced a conservative transformation as a response to a marriage crisis which ended up with divorce. From that time on, Barış prays regularly and tries to improve his religious knowledge as a freelance Muslim (meaning having no ties with a Sufi order). The transformation he experienced, however, did not lead him to break all his ties with his secular life. He still sees his secular relatives and friends. He also made his second marriage with a foreign woman who converted into a Muslim. He seems proud when he explains that he does not force his wife to wear headscarf:

Islam is a religion of peace. You really feel the peace in your heart; it is first of all a victory against your nafs, which could be possible only with the love of Allah. I would really like my wife to feel the same thing. But she should want it herself. Otherwise it is not valuable. Before starting a pious life, I lived long years without minding religion as I do now. How can I expect my wife to be a pious Muslim just in one year?

In contrast to Barış, Hüseyin’s transformation was sharp. He cut all of his ties with his parents and relatives since they criticized his conservative transformation and

marriage with a head-scarfed woman. Although he started living in a new social environment, Hüseyin did not completely lose his secular taste. “I still love some of the TV serials, it is now too old but I think ‘Married with Children’ is a cult. I am still a fan of Robert De Niro and I still support Fenerbahçe.” As it can be seen from the two cases, the form of conservatism among the late-comers is based on their reaction to secular social capital they accumulated before they went under a conservative transformation. The more they distance themselves from their old social environment, the more puritan is their religious attitude and relation with the world.

What comes out of the examination of the differences within conservative middle classes is the central role of the ‘social trajectory’ in the formation of different relations with religion. It is especially significant in the context of Turkey where the analysis of the differences among conservative groups is anchored to the surface level examinations which are destined to underline the role of the differentiation in terms of the interpretation of Islam. The surface level analysis leaves the central question unanswered: what makes the differentiation of the religious interpretation possible?

If I had not conducted an ethnographic research, I would spontaneously answer the question as social position. However, the examination above shows that the form of conservatism among the agents from the same social position is different. The source of the symbolic differentiation among the conservatives is the differentiation of social trajectories which lead to the same arrival point from different departures. The differentiation of the inherited composition and volume of the capital leads to the formation of different sets of disposition within different social trajectories. What is common in the examined three social trajectories is the central role of the ‘relation with religion’ in shaping the form of conservatism.

It is significant at this point to underline that it is not religion in itself that shapes the form of middle class conservatism but ‘agent’s relation with religion’. In other words, the original sources of Islam are equally influential on the discursive

formation of all forms of conservatism. The main factor is rather the belonging to a religious group (a specific form of social capital) over which the original sources are related in a specific way. An examination to understand why religion plays the central role requires constructing the religious field, dissecting its properties and agents, and then placing it within the field of power so that we could conceive the relative weight of the religious capital compared to other forms of capital. However, it is a unique topic and thus beyond the purpose of this study. Lastly, it would be quite difficult to observe the social differentiation within the conservative middle classes if I had not examined their social trajectories. It is highly likely for a superficial external gaze to see the common properties of conservative lifestyle since the fundamental division in the symbolic space of Turkey is between conservative and secular life-styles.

## **6.6 The Choice of Elegant and Religiously Proper**

The examination of the social trajectories of conservative middle classes above has shown that especially four forms of capital played a central role for them to occupy their current social position: economic, cultural, political, and religious. The composition and volume of these four forms of capital changed with regard to the social trajectory followed. However, there were structural similarities among conservative middle classes that made them neighbor in Çukurambar. Regardless of the social trajectory, each household had at least ten thousand TL monthly income. The lowest level was widespread especially among new-comers. Household income increased among first-comers and late-comers with the impact of their real estate property. Similarly, they have all graduated at least from university. They have also supported the same political party (AKP). Many of them were either devotees or sympathizers of various religious orders or associations.

Another common property among all conservative agents from different social trajectories was the central position of religious capital in giving a conservative form to the composition of capital. The role of religious capital was even sharper among

those agents who had political ties with the previous Islamist parties which demanded the Islamization of the social world. As I explained earlier, the impact of this ‘collective political orthodoxy’ on the conservative individuals was the repression of the social position with an ascetic position-taking. In other words, loyalty to the Islamist politics hid the tracks of social position under the cloak of asceticism as the general form of the conservative life-style.

The impact of asceticism continued until the end of 1990s when the reformist fractions within the Islamist party gained power. It was a period of time within which Adem, like most of other residents of Çukurambar, lived his childhood.

Like today, my family was in a good condition in the economic sense while I was a child. Everybody would know that I was a son of a rich family but there was no difference between me and my poorer friends in terms of physical appearance. We would all clothe similarly. It was the same at high school as well. There was only one thing that reminded me I was a child of a rich family: I had a second trouser to wear in the school.

Asceticism as a mechanism of the repression of social differentiation among the conservatives weakened as AKP ended the Islamist opposition against capitalist market system, modern social world, and secular state. The impact of this political transformation on the individual conservatives was the recognition of the existing world as legitimate. The impact of the transformation can easily be observed over the comparison of Adem’s childhood with his own children.

My number two (meaning his second child) is now a high school student. He wears different clothes everyday. I do not criticize him, however, because this is not special to him. All of his friends, even the poorer ones, are like him. Don’t go too far away, my number three (a baby) is just like a princess. Her mother clothes her like she is a young lady when we go out.

Comparing it to the ‘poverty within the wealth’ during his childhood, Adem sees the current condition as a sign of economic development within which the contribution of ruling AKP is gigantic.

AKP rule does not only imply the integration of an anti-systemic political movement to capitalist market system but also imply the integration of conservative individuals into 'the market for symbolic goods'. In other words, the transformations that conservative politics underwent led to the 'unification of the market for symbolic goods' in Turkey. What changed as a result of the integration into the capitalist system was not only the economic perspective of an oppositional political movement but also the conservative values that opposed capitalist values. As the quest for an alternative economic order lost its political attraction and the official discourse of AKP affirmed capitalist development model, the strong shields of Islamist conservatism weakened. The objective conditions for the integration into capitalism were completed by the subjective affirmation of capitalism by conservative individuals.

The positive sides of capitalist economy and the joys of being a consumer in the market covered over the old criticisms that defined capitalism as the 'factory of sins.' What was once rejected started to be appreciated as the collapse of asceticism opened a new space for possible actions, appreciations and thinking. The future expectations of conservatives changed sharply. The market-based scale of life satisfaction expanded especially among conservative middle classes: living in a luxury house, driving top model cars, wearing stylish, and socializing in high class places took an important place within the future expectations of conservatives. The ascetic rejection of the present with the hope of a puritan social world in the future was replaced with enjoying the life in a conservative manner. Therefore, the unification of the market for the symbolic goods does not imply the total absorption of conservative taste into the capitalist market dynamics but rather the adaptation of the market conditions to the conservative taste as conservatism was politically dominant. Briefly, the confrontation of market system and conservative middle classes led to the reconstruction of the middlebrow conservative taste in a new form which can be called as the 'choice of elegant and religiously proper.'

### **6.6.1 The Unification of the Market for Symbolic Goods and Women's Conservative Fashion Magazines**

The immediate impact of the reconstruction of the middlebrow conservative taste is the redefinition of the 'good conservative'. The new definition was about the full integration into the capitalist system as a consumer while still protecting religious sensitivities. Thus, the process of reconstruction did not take place in a void. The previously acquired conservative dispositions, especially the central role of the religious dispositions, kept being functional. The process of the reconstruction was rather composed of the confrontation of the conservative dispositions with new realms of the social life which conservatives had previously rejected.

The symbolic redefinition of the 'good conservative' was basically the product of the new relations with the economic goods. The choice of house and its decoration, (especially in the case of women) the clothing of body and its presentation, the choice of the socialization in the leisure time, and the choice of children's schools are the most visible realms of conservatives' changing relations with the economic goods. In parallel with the choices of economic goods, the conservative definition of luxury, beauty, joy, and responsibility changed. As a result, being a good conservative has no more required establishing an ascetic relation with the world. To put it differently, being a good consumer is no more an obstacle to be a good conservative, as long as she is a religiously proper consumer.

The new middlebrow conservative taste is not a generic invention but rather the adaptation of the mainstream middlebrow taste in a religiously proper way. The process of adaptation, however, is a reciprocal relation between the entrepreneurs of the mainstream middlebrow life-style and conservative individuals. Therefore, the reconstruction of the middlebrow conservative taste is based on a double recognition. On the one hand, conservative individuals were recognized as the legitimate agents of the social world, as a gift of the dominant conservative position in the political field. For instance, veiling fashion stopped being a product of determinate

entrepreneurs (such as Tekbir Giyim) as the mainstream brands or stores take the conservative population into consideration while planning their product mix. On the other hand, as I explained earlier, conservative individuals recognized the existing world as legitimate so long as it was given a religiously proper form. For instance, conservative women are among the customers of mainstream clothing brands or stores but creating a *stylish conservative combination* requires an extra labor of complementing the mainstream products with the *structurally peculiar elements* of veiling fashion such as topcoat and headscarf.

The gift of the double recognition is the emergence of ‘specialized conservative taste entrepreneurs’ who impacted a lot on the shape of the conservative individuals’ middlebrow taste. Among the many others, conservative women’s fashion magazines are the well-known examples. First appeared in 2011 with *Ala*, which was inspired by Emel Magazine, a Muslim life-style magazine published in England since 2003 (Sağır, 2016: 283), the number of conservative fashion magazines reached to four in 2013, during my field study (the others are Aysha, Enda, and Şems-i Tuba). Compared to Islamist women’s magazines of the previous decades which are mainly composed of religious advices to Muslim women, the new magazines give tips to *ladies* about conservative style in various realms: refined religious culture, stories from Ottoman history, beauty (such as make up, detox, facial rejuvenation and keeping fit), stylish clothing combinations, house decoration, manners for young ladies in business society, and table, recipes from Ottoman cuisine, a slice of conservative women politicians’ life, childrearing, travel, holiday, arts and literature.

Reading the texts of these magazines, one can figure out that the advices of the conservative life-style entrepreneurs target the betterment of the individual morality. Compared to the old Islamist women magazines’ target of collective morality, individualization is one of the peculiar aspects of the middlebrow conservative taste. This tendency can be observed even in the narratives on the Ottoman Empire which had earlier been the symbolic source for the construction of collective political entity. In her short article on the merits of reading Koran, Horal (2013: 36-37) exemplifies

the power of the Koran over Osman Gazi whose sincere respect to Koran led him to found a great empire that lasted 623 years. If it is so ‘why don’t we all become Osman?’ she asks and advises the reader to ‘found her own empire by respecting Koran, just like Osman Gazi.’

We can move even further. Let’s uncase the Koran and read it frequently. We should purify our souls in such a way that we can conceive the secret meaning of Koran ... We should not be satisfied by reading Koran, we should live it. We should become one with Koran (Horal, 2013: 36-37).

Once purified their soul with Koran and become their own emperor, conservative ladies have still concerns with their bodies. For instance, young ladies need to create special clothing combinations for the iftars they were invited. Thus they are advised to select loose and modest clothes but they had better not to neglect season’s trends: “[e]specially the combinations with two pieces in the same color are the top trends of this season” (Ekiz, 2013a: 72). They also need to be careful about the table manners. First of all, they have to make sure that their hands are clean and their physical appearance is smooth. They should not forget to recite *basmala* at the beginning and thank Allah at the end of the dinner. If iftar is held in our house, we need to pay attention to the harmony of tableware. It would be a good idea to decorate the table with a bouquet of flowers or a few candles. Whatever you offer in the dinner, iftars are remembered with cheerful talks. That is why the elegancy, sincerity and decency of words are more important than the taste of the served food (Kurtoğlu, 2013: 102).

As it is the month of Ramadan, weekends can be used as a chance of visiting holy places with a short road trip plans. Depending on the place of residence, route may change but among the most popular destinations are the tombs of Eyüp Sultan, Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi and Taptuk Emre. “It is a great happiness if we can visit the spiritual architects [of our lives] and benefit from their life stories and spirit” (Pınarbaşı, 2013: 120-123). While living a peaceful Ramadan, conservative ladies may benefit from shopping campaigns before the festival. However, before going to shopping, they had better to know the trends of the new season. “For me, the

harmony of blue and green is a summer classic. Combining a blue shirt with a green skirt makes you feel the relief of the colors of water around the clock, which is a kind of spiritual detox” (Aslan, 2013: 94). In the new season “we have been witnessing the flirt of femininity with masculinity in the collections which appeal to women who mind being elegant and feeling comfortable. In the new season, coats keep their irreplaceable place with their asymmetric form. We will witness how long a blazer can stretch. ... As we are about to welcome the fall, do not neglect to reveal the elegant woman in your soul” (Ekiz, 2013b: 57).



Figure 6.2 The middlebrow conservative taste embodied.<sup>16</sup>

After benefiting from the virtues of the Ramadan month as a good Muslim, why don't you reward yourself in the festival with a holiday in Kos Island or what about discovering far geographies such as Thailand? Especially the examination of the travel sections of these magazines remind the reader that the reconstruction of the

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<sup>16</sup> Sources for the illustration 6.2 <[http://www.alatesettur.com/Gamze-Polat-Payet-Ceket-Tafta-Etek-Takimi-Fusya\\_157502.html](http://www.alatesettur.com/Gamze-Polat-Payet-Ceket-Tafta-Etek-Takimi-Fusya_157502.html)> and <[http://www.alatesettur.com/Minel-Ask-Afife-Elbise-Indigo\\_157919.html](http://www.alatesettur.com/Minel-Ask-Afife-Elbise-Indigo_157919.html)>

middlebrow conservative taste is based on the previously acquired conservative dispositions. In Thailand “[monks] enter in their temple, where they light candle and incense, by taking off their shoes. Everywhere is full of monks with their orange attire. Their seamless attire reminds me of the attire of our pilgrims. By the way, a monk appears by the side of us and asks why we are always smiling. I answer by saying that the source of peace is in Islam” (Kayacan, 2012: 89).

The tendency of placing Islam at the center of every attempt of innovation in the conservative taste can be observed in the conservative house decoration as well. Known as the architect of conservative middle and upper classes, Şafak Çak explains the demand of his conservative customers as the harmony of the traditional style which was inspired by Ottoman history with technology. These demands, he continues, led to the innovative designs in house decoration such as the elevated prayer rug, air conditioner that sprays rose water, and television that broadcast only Kaaba around the clock (Çak, 2013: 63). The same tendency can be seen in women’s beauty sector in which conservative entrepreneurs invented the halal cosmetics which is based on the production of cosmetic goods in a religiously proper way. Islamic rock or Islamic techno are the examples in the music. Similar examples can be found in every subfield of the field of cultural production.

The tracks of the ‘elegant and religiously proper’ are not restricted to the pages of conservative women magazines. It is the principle that guides the preferences of conservative middle classes in various realms. Despite the role of conservative entrepreneurs in giving form to what is elegant and religiously proper, the principle of middlebrow conservative taste is not the product of their entrepreneurship. It is rather the product of specific social conditions (which I explained in detail above) that embodied as the schema of perception, appreciation and action in conservative individuals. It is the conservative eye that sees the world in a specific way, likes the way she perceives, and acts accordingly. Nevertheless, the form that the taste of ‘elegant and religiously proper’ took in the hands of the conservative entrepreneurs attracted the conservative middle classes to a certain extent.

Hatice runs a clothing store for veiled women. Her store is full of shirts, skirts, coats, jackets, toilettes and headscarves with various colors and styles. Her customers, whom she calls as sisters, look for dresses for various events from graduation ceremony to mevlüt (Islamic memorial service). When I asked her how she selects the dresses to be sold in her store, she told embarrassedly that she followed *Ala* magazine and conservative fashion web sites. It was the recurrent attitude of women who shared their interest in conservative fashion magazines like a confession. It is the timid attitude of an apprentice consumer of the middlebrow conservative taste which is still under construction. Theirs is timidity from the negative critiques of the others, such as being called as ‘light Muslims’. Against the critiques, conservative women tried to set a balance between religion and consumption.

The reconstruction of the middlebrow conservative taste has never implied the reducing impact of religion over the conservatives. On the contrary, their religious ties strengthened further as a protective shield against the possible critiques. Despite the partly fierce critiques, the process of the reconstruction of middlebrow conservative taste continued. Hatice thinks that the interest to new conservative fashion is especially strong among young women who are under the impact of the TV serials they are watching. “Including my own daughters, younger generations want to have what they see on the TV screen. When I assist them during their shopping, I frequently hear the same sentences ‘I am looking for the head-scarf that I saw on Feyza in the previous episode of *Huzur Sokağı*’ (a TV serial adopted by a famous conservative novel).”

Hatice sees nothing to criticize about younger generations’ life-style. “How can we criticize them just because they have more choices than we had when we were young? They wear elegant and colorful dresses and they are very strong in their beliefs. I speak very strict because I know from my own daughters.” Hatice describes the new conservative life-style as ‘flexible’:

They [her children] are spending more time out of home compared to my youth. They are going to school; taking various courses, going to cinema, shopping around in shopping malls. Their life is more flexible than ours because the country developed a lot and provides them with more opportunities. On the other hand, their flexibility is also related to us, families. As we grew up, we spent more time at home because our parents asked so. I raise my children with the same values that my parents raised me. But I apply different methods since I had more education than my parents. I do not apply to oppression to make my children to respect my advices. But I can control them. Yes, they are spending much time out of home but there is now mobile phone, I can reach them whenever I want. What is more important is that I trust my children; I know that they will not make me upset because they had a good family education. They learned that it is a big sin to lie at parents. Each evening in my house, I and my children have a table talk. I listen and learn what they did along the day. We share our happiness and troubles. They are more flexible because we are more flexible against them. But of course, my daughters come to home earlier than my sons. The flexibility does not mean that we sacrifice our values.

### **6.6.2 The Religion-Based Homologous Choices**

What Hatice described as flexibility is nothing but the ability of producing conservative form out of capitalist market relations and modern social life within which conservatives have recently been recognized as legitimate agents. In contrast to the critiques, it is the religious dispositions which guided the making of the emergent form of middlebrow conservative taste. It would be wrong, however, to imagine that the process of construction was the product of fully conscious conservative agents who decided the emergent form by selecting the religiously proper alternatives among the possible choices. It is rather the 'religion-based homology' that made the emergent form of conservative taste religiously proper. The first impact of the primary conservative dispositions that were acquired in the family is the 'choice of friend'. The children who grew up in conservative families become easily friend with the children of other conservative families. In this way, the secondary social environment transforms into being an extended primary social environment for conservatives. Based on the shared values, the conservative social capital leads to the quest of the same values in seemingly unrelated realms of social life such as art, literature, fashion, furniture and leisure time activities.

Burhan was born into a conservative family in a provincial town of Black Sea region. He is now a young entrepreneur in his late thirties who runs his own company in software sector. Different from many other cases, his migration to Ankara was totally a fresh start since he had neither relatives nor friends when he first came to the city.

After graduating from university [in Istanbul], I started applying to jobs. A company, located in Ankara, responded to my application in a short time. Ankara was entirely a new planet for me. After I moved to the city I had a new social environment. I met people who are completely different from me. I see my first years in Ankara as a social experience which helped me to be a good judge of character. While meeting different people I realized that I met myself. I found out that I like to be friend and to spend time with religiously informed people who can contribute my moral development.

In contrast to Burhan's experience, the general pattern of conservative social trajectory rests on socialization within similar social environments. In other words, what Burhan calls as 'social experience' is not a part of conservative individuals' social trajectory. Therefore, the choice of religiously informed people as good friend does not rest on concrete friendship relations with other people. The selection of good friend among the conservatives is rather an unconscious disposition which is acquired through socialization within a conservative social environment. It is these socialization processes within which the practical knowledge about the people who are like me and who are not like me is acquired as a schema of social classification. In other words, having socialized in a conservative environment leads agent to acquire conservative dispositions which makes her good friend with religiously informed people. However, the impact of the acquired conservative dispositions is not limited to making an individual conservative and leading her to have pleasure in socializing with conservative people. It also provides the agent to have a commonsensical idea about the others, who are not conservative.

Like Burhan, Merve also describes her good friends as religious people. However, different from Burhan, she has always been in the conservative circle. Even when she left her family for her university education in Ankara, she kept this conservative

circle by staying in a dormitory of a conservative association. “The common quality of the people with whom I get along with is religiosity. However, when I start a new friendship I do not know if she is religious or not. I do not choose my friends only among the head-scarfed girls. I have good friends among the girls who do not wear headscarf but they are all religious like me.” Merve keeps her distance from those with whom she feels out of place. When I asked her to explain further what disturbs her most about personal relations, she emphasizes the usage of improper language. “The jokes the others make do not make me laugh. They sometimes speak in the manner that I never speak and use words that I never use.”

Speaking religiously proper language and showing high interest to the conversations about religious issues are among the conservative dispositions which are acquired within the family and religious education, and shared by all conservatives as a symbolic barrier. Like many other respondents, Adem emphasizes the importance of proper language in the continuity of social relations. “I can get along with people who are like me. But it does not mean that I do not contact the others. I can spend time with people who have opposite views as long as they speak respectfully to my national and religious values.”

Social capital (family, relatives, friendship and conservative circles like school and religious orders) is the primary factor that generates homology among the seemingly unrelated choices of conservatives. Hence it impacts to a significant extent on the making of the ‘taste of elegant and religiously proper’ which is the generative principle of middlebrow conservative life-style. The religion-based primary conservative dispositions which were acquired in the family produces its first impact in the choice of good friend from the religious people. The collectivity of religious people leads to the emergence of religiously proper social environment which generates the *conservative commonsense* in the sense of Durkheimian *collective conscience* which functions as an unconscious mechanism of conformity to the common values. The unconscious quest for conformity with the common

conservative values generates its products in the emergence of religiously proper language, gender roles, child-rearing, clothing and politics.

Constituting the main borders of the conservative life-style, the form and content of the ‘choice of the religiously proper’ is honed by education. On the one hand, (both official and non-official) education enriches the content of commonsense by introducing a cultural repertoire which is composed of conservative works of art, literature and philosophy. In this way, education provides the *instruments of commonsensical conservative thinking* about social world. As a result, once acquired the primary conservative dispositions in the family and socialized in a religiously proper social environment, the relation of the conservative agent expands to a larger world through the ‘objectified conservative culture’. Especially, the dispositions about the choice of favorite writers, books, intellectuals and arts are acquired in the school. The works of Mevlana, Mehmed Akif and Necip Fazıl are among the most referred cultural sources in shaping the conservative agent’s relations to the larger and anonymous social world. For Burhan, Mehmed Akif Ersoy is a significant guide in various realms of social life. “I take Mehmed Akif as an example in terms of his moral virtues, and of his strong nationalism and religiosity. I mind him so much that when I make a bad thing I feel like he pats me on my back and asks: son, are you sure that you are in the right path?”

On the other hand, education functions as a mechanism of social differentiation among conservatives depending on the form and length of schooling. Many members of conservative middle classes went to public schools (including Imam Hatip schools) especially up to university. However, most of them prefer to enroll their children to private collages which are loyal to conservative values<sup>17</sup>. Enrolling children to Imam Hatip schools is not widespread among conservative middle classes. Another factor about social differentiation is the length of education. All of

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<sup>17</sup> In contrast to the commonsensical view that conservatives are the unhappy consumers or the losers of the capitalist market system, market provides new opportunities (such as private education) to conservatives in order to reproduce their social position, which they did not have previously.

the respondents are either student in or graduate from an undergraduate program. Moreover, the duration of schooling tends to increase among the younger generations up to PhD degree. In this way, the private collages and increasing duration of schooling attribute to the conservative dispositions the middlebrow character and thus differentiate the conservative middle classes from the conservative working classes. The gift of the lengthened education is the emergence of intellectual curiosity about the religion and the instruments of thinking to satisfy this curiosity. The impact of the intellectual relation with the religion can be observed from the definition of the good Muslim.

All of the informants agreed that observing the rules of Islam is not enough to be a good Muslim. The common definition of the good Muslim is rather the perfect human being (*insan-ı Kamil*) which can be reached only after a laborious process of a Sufistic relation with the world. Many of them think that they have to study a lot to reach the goal of being a perfect human being. However, what is more valuable for them is the process of becoming a perfect human being. Burhan conceives it as a process of moral development: “Rumi searched for the love along his life. We do not know if he has ever found it. But it is a fact that he knew very well how to search for it. It was this search what made him Rumi.” It is this refined ‘relations of religion’ which lead conservative middle classes to take five principles of Islam for granted and to develop a Sufistic definition of Muslim with reference to the sources of highbrow Islam. Hasan performs five times daily prayer regularly. He also observes the other principles of Islam precisely. However, he thinks that he still has a long way to go in order to be a good Muslim: “The basic principles are not enough to make a person a good Muslim. As the name implies, they are the fundamental principles that each Muslim has to observe. To be a good Muslim requires an effort more than that.”

Like many other informants, Hasan learned Arabic when he was a university student. He can read and understand Koran from the original language. Every night he reads at least a couple of pages from the Koran. In addition, he spends more time

nowadays on his research about the philosophy of Al Ghazali. He has recently downloaded a hadiths application to his smart phone and uses the little breaks in the work as an opportunity to read hadiths. Moreover, he participates into religious talks regularly. He learned to play ney but he could not improve his skills. Nevertheless, he succeeded to influence her wife to take a ney course and she plays for him in the evenings.

It would be a great reductionism, however, to assume that education introduces only purely conservative culture. It would be equally wrong to think that conservative agents are solely interested in conservative culture. Education introduces to the mainstream objectified culture as well. That is why Hasan is proud of reading the full list of world classics and became an admirer of Tolstoy. He also follows contemporary Turkish literature. He has recently read Reha Çamuroğlu's book titled *İsmail* which is about the famous war between Sultan Selim I and Shah İsmail. The middlebrow conservative taste of literature expands into a wide spectrum of books and writers. However, it is possible to draw the general lines of the middle brow conservative literature taste by focusing on the common favorite writers and genres. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Mehmed Akif Ersoy, Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi and Yunus Emre are among the common favorite writers. The common favorite genres, on the other hand, are romantic novels (especially of İskender Pala), historical novels (such as the books of Mustafa Necati Sepetçioğlu) and political investigations that apply to conspiracy theories especially on the republican period (such as the books of Yalçın Küçük and Şamil Tayyar).

Education also plays a role in the provision of contact with secular institutions and people. However, the most intensive contact with the secular culture is provided by media. Conservative middle classes watch conservative channels such as Kanal A, Ülke TV, and Kanal 7 especially for news bulletin. However, when it comes to TV serials they watch the mainstream serials in the mainstream channels such as Kanal D, Star, and ATV. The common favorite TV serials are Kurtlar Vadisi, Seksenler and Huzur Sokağı. These three favorite serials might be considered in conformity with

the conservative commonsense since they represent the social life free from the privacy of personal relations.

Apart from that, conservative middle classes are not incurious about the mainstream TV serials such as *Aşk-ı Memnu*, *Kuzey Güney* and *Muhteşem Yüzyıl*; even though they watch them with critical eyes. When the broadcast of *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* turned out to be a crisis especially after the prime minister of the period Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized it as representing the Ottoman history in a false way, especially in terms of the life in harem, many of the conservatives stopped following it. Hatice speaks that she was impressed by the project at the beginning but later stopped watching because it does not conform to the national and religious values:

The serial is broadcasted all around the world and foreign people are learning Ottoman history from it. I think this fact should be taken into consideration while creating the project and it should be based on the historical facts. The audience may demand to watch the plots of harem but you should be loyal to the history. I think it is a responsibility and prime minister is right to criticize the serial.

In addition to local TV serials, they also watch famous foreign productions such as *Prison Break*, *Breaking Bad* and *Spartacus*. The significance of the media, especially the TV serials, stems from the fact that conservative middle classes are influenced by the representation of middle class social position in these productions and use them as a template while reconstructing the middle class conservative taste in such a way that will help them to present their social position in a similar manner. The homology between the representation of the middle class social position in the media and the reconstruction of the middlebrow conservative taste can be observed from the consumption patterns and favorite brands.

Especially the younger generations prefer modern furniture instead of classical in their houses. The most common furniture brands are IKEA, Rapsody and Bellona. When it comes to the choice of car, SUV models of various brands are the most common preference. Men's clothing repertoire is composed of brands such as Sarar,

Zara, Polo, Mavi Jeans, Burberry, Armani and Lacoste while women prefer Seçil, Mango, Tüzün, Zara, İpekyol, Fabrika and H&M. Especially women pay attention to their physical appearance and mind keeping fit by attending various exercise activities such as pilates and yoga in women only gyms. Men enjoy watching football league and play football. They are also interested in basketball, box, and kick box.

The favorite holiday destinations expand from the European cities to the cities of East Asia. In addition, they also have at least one week of summer vacation in a Mediterranean coastal town of Turkey. However, the holy lands keep their irreplaceable quality of being the most favorite destination. That is why the Umrah visits are the most exciting travel. When it comes to the music choices, the common favorite genres are religious hymns (especially by Ahmet Özhan and Mehmet Emin Ay), Turkish folk music and Turkish art music. However, the spectrum of choices enlarges especially among the younger generations; pop, arabesque, rock and soul music are among the favorite genres of conservative youth. The conservative timidity is observed in expressing the favorite singer as well. It is the recurrent phrase to express interest in the mainstream popular music: “I listen to Tarkan too.” Compared to the choice of music, the choice of newspaper is more stable. They prefer to read conservative newspapers such as Yeni Şafak, Sabah, Star, Zaman, Yeni Çağ and Milli Gazete. However, many of them also check the news in Hürriyet.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

To sum up, the ‘choice of elegant and religiously proper’ is based on the primary conservative dispositions that are acquired in family and larger social environment. Leading to the emergence of conservative common sense, the conservative social capital constitutes the basis for the emergence of homologous choices in various realms which are religiously proper. Education hones the common form and content of conservative taste but it is also the principle of social differentiation among conservatives. Depending on the form and duration of schooling, education generates

the middlebrow character of conservative taste by inculcating an intellectual curiosity about religion and instruments of thinking to satisfy this curiosity. In this way, the 'refined relations of religion' emerge among conservative middle classes, which can be observed directly from their relation with the objectified conservative culture (such as books and works of art). However, the purely religiously proper choices in consistency with the acquired conservative dispositions are not all about the reality of middlebrow conservative taste.

The life of the conservative agents is not free from the impacts of the larger social world. Here again education and especially the mainstream media provide contact with the larger social world. What comes out of this contact is conservative middle classes' perception of the media representation of the middle class social position. The media representation of middle class provided the conservative middle classes the necessary instruments of the re-construction of the conservative taste. What is crucial here is that the process of reconstruction did not immediately begin following the contact with the mainstream media. The history of the contact is older than the recent re-construction process. In other words, the contact with the mainstream media did not trigger automatically the re-construction of conservative taste. It has just armed the conservative middle classes with the symbolic instruments of the re-construction of the middlebrow conservative taste.

The process of re-construction could be possible only after the transformations in the political field of Turkey. The construction of the 'conservative democrat position' in the political field by the reformist wing of the Islamist party led to the collapse of the politics of collective orthodoxy with the integration into capitalist market system. This transformation is not a milestone for conservative individuals' relation with the capitalist market. On the contrary, they have been either entrepreneur or consumer in the market for a long time. What happened rather was the collapse of the mechanism of repression before the presentation of middle class social position in the public space following the collapse of collective orthodoxy.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONSERVATISM CONSTRUCTED: THE CONSERVATIVE VISION OF SELF AND SOCIAL WORLD

#### 7.1 Introduction

The middlebrow conservative taste did not emerge in a smooth atmosphere. The new conservative life-style drew fire from both conservative and secular circles. The conspicuous consumption patterns of the conservative middle classes were criticized as a form of alienation to the national culture. The counter strategy of the conservative middle classes was not to terminate the flexible character of their practical life but to develop a more puritan inner-world. To prove that they are not alienated to the national culture, they spent more time and energy in advancing their religious sophistication. The puritan inner-world reflected on the political representation of the social world as well. From a conservative perspective, social world is composed of the cultural unity of its dwellers among whom the oppositions are planted by the invisible hands of the external enemies.

In light of these preliminary remarks, this chapter investigates how structurally positioned conservative agents construct the representation of their inner world and social world.

#### 7.2 The Tension of the External World and the Construction of the Puritan Inner World

The middlebrow conservative taste has been the target of political critiques since the early period of AKP rule. For political opponents, the new conservative consumption patterns mirrored the essence of the social change which AKP claimed to represent: the making of a conservative bourgeoisie which is alienated to the national culture. According to Mehmet Bekaroğlu, an ex-member of parliament from the Islamist Welfare Party, the middlebrow conservative taste also symbolized the collapse of the

solidarist Islamism as the headscarf which was formerly the symbol of victimization became the symbol of conspicuous consumption:

What I want to point out is a contradiction that incorporates in the confrontation of two headscarfed women. The first one is a poor woman who is waiting in the cold of the bus station for the public bus. Wearing expensive boot and headscarf, the second woman drives a luxury car and does not mind the first woman. ... Is not the justice the basic principle of our religion? Where is the justice in this confrontation (Hürriyet, 2009).

The critiques against the middlebrow conservative taste were not limited to the case above. From excessive consumption to the conservative women's fashion, the critiques focused on the danger of alienation from society and religion. During my field study in Çukurambar, in the Ramadan month of 2013, these critiques were expressed more frequently within the conservative circles, including columnists, religious bureaucrats and politicians. What was on the firing line was especially the emerging middlebrow conservative taste of having iftar in luxury hotels. The critiques agreed on that the new pattern was not consistent with the purpose of the Ramadan. According to Hayrettin Karaman (2013), one of the prominent columnists of Çukurambar residents, "among the benefits of fasting is to experience the conditions of poor so that we can understand them better and be motivated to help them. However, the open-buffet iftars in luxury hotels do not serve to the purpose of fasting:

Even though there is not even one poor in the world, the luxury iftar is a waste; it is a murder against nature, an offense against the right of the future generations. Besides, the number of those who are starving is much more than those who are well-to-do. Don't we know that stuffing like we have just escaped from famine conforms neither Islamic morality nor conscience of humanity? ... When it comes to the Islamic morality and the Sunnah of our moral guide, his advice is clear: Do not waste the water even when you perform ablution on the side of a river.

The same point of view was expressed by Mehmet Görmez (2013), the head of the Religious Affairs Administration, who invited believers to share their iftar tables with their family and neighbors:

The month of Ramadan is an opportunity for change; thus do not waste this chance by transforming the iftar tables into the tables of waste. Do not forget that wealth is not the source of status among the believers.”

The same invitation was repeated by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2013) who requested from the citizens “to serve a cup of soup to poor and share their tables with their neighbors in spite of going to iftars in the luxury hotels.” The critiques did not only spring from outside of the neighborhood but also echoed within the neighborhood. Mesnevi Talks functions like a corrective pedagogy by bringing critiques about the religiously improper acts of Muslims. The title of the weekly meetings in Sufiyane derives not from a programmatic discussion on Mesnevi but from the guidance of it in shaping the trajectory of the talks. Commencing with a brief passage from Mesnevi, Hoca underlines the lessons to be taken by the contemporary Muslims. One of the central issues that Muslims need to be careful about is the exam with money:

Today, everybody became capitalist; everybody is spending time to make more money. When I look at the eyes of people I see the signs of Euro and Dollar. For many, the only concern is the amount of money in their wallet but only a small minority minds the heart (the center of belief). What is worse, they do not question whether their path is religiously forbidden or not. In this neighborhood, everybody tries to live Islam in a good way but most of the time they forget it while running after wealth, luxury and higher status. Wealth is not forbidden in Islam but if wealth covers over the truth you need to put it aside. Therefore, you should put a distance with the commodities. If you are using the commodities there is no problem but if the commodities are using you there is a great problem. Don't forget that when you die Allah will not ask the amount of money you accumulated or the brand of jean you were used to wearing.

During the eight months of my field study in Çukurambar, I sensed a strong tension in all of my conversations with the residents of the neighborhood. Almost all of the

participants needed to explain that they are not the person that I thought: “if you want to interview with the ‘conservative consumerists’ you are talking to wrong person”. At the beginning, I took these warnings serious and asked my respondents who the *conservative consumerists* are and how I can reach them. However, nobody knew them. In time, I realized that the conservative consumerist was the specter of Çukurambar, a stigma to be rejected and reversed. Thus the tension around the conservative consumerism signals the center of symbolic struggles within which the religiously proper representation of the middle class conservatism which is not alien to national culture is constructed.

The counter strategy of the conservative middle classes against the critique of cultural alienation is the appropriation of the critique. The variants of the ‘cultural alienation’ complaints were the recurrent critiques in every conversation I engaged about the problems of the neighborhood. All of the respondents agreed that it was a vital problem. Zeynep calls herself as a critical conservative. She is distant to popular culture that is why she removed the TV set from her home. In this way, she broke one of the idols in her life and started managing her time more efficiently. In spite of being a slave of the TV she spends more time with her family and finds even more time to satisfy her curiosity about Islamic culture. Her critical standpoint incorporates in her clothing style: just like the older generations she prefers to wear dark-colored topcoats and headscarves which were combined with a simple bag. When I asked her the problems in the neighborhood life, Zeynep complained about the new life-style that she observed especially among the *nouveau-riche* conservative women:

The problem lies in the human culture of the neighborhood. Some of the residents seem to fail digesting their high status. This is especially common among the *nouveau-riche* younger women. They are too arrogant because they lost the conservative modesty. They mind the material world and live a bourgeoisie life. Their only concern is their bags, shoes and headscarves. When they care about the others it is just for comparison. What is bigger problem is that our daughters feel like they have to follow these arrogant women. I

sometimes miss my old neighborhood in Keçiören where there was no such problem.

By appropriating the critique that was directed to the neighborhood, the conservative middle class residents refuse it. In other words, they imply that they are in the side of those who developed the critique because just like the critics they have a strong Muslim substance in their *self* which can easily be proved by their expenditure of the religious labor for the acquisition of the refined Islamic culture. Hüseyin is a restaurant manager in his mid-forties. Like many others, he does not hesitate to complain about the cultural alienation in his neighborhood. According to him, the only way to resist against alienation is to develop consciousness by constantly educating one's self:

Actually, the society we live in is not an ideal society. On the contrary, it is the society of nafs in which mind guides nafs. To live in the light of Islamic values in such a society you need to know more than you should pray five times in a day. For this, you have to keep educating yourself. We had better know that it is not a hobby but a must to keep our values.

Hüseyin thinks that the problem of alienation is strictly related to the low quality of religious education in the schools. Although he thinks that there are significant betterments in the education policy of the state during the AKP rule, its impacts will be seen only in the future. Until that day, he thinks, Muslims have to find the ways to educate themselves. Moreover, low quality of religious education is not an excuse for a Muslim to be negligent in her religious duties.

Such perspective is not unique to Hüseyin. While reading my field notes, I saw that the same perspective is shared by many others. For the residents of Çukurambar, education is a necessary instrument to protect the *Muslim inner world* from the alienating impacts of social life. In this perspective, education does not imply an institutionalized program of inculcation but rather, a flexible inculcation of plural sources. Participating into the religious talks, reading original sources, investigating the products of Islamic high culture and engaging in the activities of Sufi

communities are the examples of this flexible education. For the residents of Çukurambar, Mesnevi Talks was also a source of religious education which protects Muslims from the alienating impacts of social life by inculcating the ‘anthropology of Muslim inner world’.

### **7.3 Educating the Muslim Inner World**

Taking refuge in it to arm themselves with the Islamic knowledge against the possible threats of social life, conservative middle classes find their ‘inner world’ in Mesnevi Talks. Aiming to develop a critique of the contemporary Muslims in terms of their engagement into the modern and secular social life, Mesnevi Talks presents an ontological and epistemological repertoire about the exact reality of the social world and the exact task of the Muslims through the guidance of Mevlana. Referring to original sources and products of Islamic high culture, the discussions in the Mesnevi Talks construct an ‘abstract Muslim’ which functions as the template for the collective representation of the conservative middle class position.

To prevent any misapprehensions I have to contend that the anthropology I am engaged here is not an intended product of Mesnevi Talks. It is rather an unintended consequence which I realized after I analyzed my field notes. The discussion below does not present a complete, detailed and deep explanation as it is not my purpose to develop a scholastic anthropology from an ethnographic study. Rather, I aim to delve into it so long as it became part of the reality of the neighborhood as the commonsensical framework about the task of the Muslim in the world.

Muslim comes to the world as the subject of Allah who is the creator of the universe. Her life in this world is nothing but a game since the real life is in the other world. Thus the temporary world we live in is a site of exam in which the stake is to gain the consent of Allah. Gifted with the life, Muslim lives with a metaphysical debt to Allah. The gift of life cannot be repaid with an equal counter gift. In spite of that Muslims are expected to pay their debt back by living properly and being ready to

the exam which can be given at any moment. Being a proper Muslim does not only require being meticulous in fulfilling the pillars of Islam and faith. The life of Muslim is also a struggle with her own nafs. In other words, while being strict in performing the worships, Muslim also needs to keep away from the *haram* (religiously forbidden). Therefore, the task of being a proper Muslim is not only an issue about faith but also about practices (*amel*). She needs to keep the division between *halal* and *haram* in her mind and to stay in the circle of halal even in the smallest details of the everyday life. Thus, the harmony among speech, heart, mind, and practice is vital for being a good Muslim: if you speak well, you become good. As may be inferred, salvation is not the result of a simple calculation in this understanding. Salvation is rather unknowable; it is the hope that grows hand in hand with the fear of Allah in the heart of Muslim.

I heard plenty of stories that imply there is no guarantee of salvation even for those who are strict in performing all domains of the worship. In one of these stories, a religious man comes into the presence of Allah after he died and Allah asks him if he prefers to be judged with the mercy or justice. Trusting his worships a lot, the man preferred to be judged with the justice. At the end, Allah sent him to the hell. Being regretful with his mistake, the man begged for the mercy of Allah and only then he could reach to the salvation.

As it was emphasized in the story above that there is no previous sign of being elected in Islam. It requires a life-long religious labor which fuses into the other types of labor in all fields of social world in order to gain the consent of Allah. The source of the ‘spirit of the Islamism’, the quest for the religiously proper action in all fields of social world, is the uncertainty of salvation. Therefore, in spite of seeking the equivalent of Protestant Ethic within Islam by forcing the empirical reality to fit in the Weberian perspective, it would be more fruitful to focus on the ‘spirit of Islamism’, as one of the possible perspectives that Islam can generate, so that we can understand and explain the conditions within which Islamism becomes the equivalent of ‘the religiously proper’. The finding of this study, that the ‘uncertainty of

salvation' was one of the most recurrent themes of the Mesnevi Talks, implies that the more the frequency of religious inculcation increases the more Muslims become 'conscious Muslims'. It is also the reason why all of my respondents agreed on the significance of religious education as the solution to the problem of cultural alienation.

Neither the reality of Islam can be restricted with the brief explanations above nor can the emergence of Islamism be reduced to the uncertainty of salvation. Despite being incomplete, however, the brief description above is significant in terms of being the basic religious perspective of my respondents. Similarly, the uncertainty of salvation was one of the most central features of Islam, the consciousness of which could detain Muslims from the cultural alienation, according to my respondents. The magic of education lies in its potential to remind Muslims the basic principles of Islam in a complex world within which Muslims come up against the danger of being lost within the flow of everyday rush. Taking the games of the temporary world too serious, Muslim may confuse the truth of Allah with the truth of game. Falling into the trap of conformism, Muslim may ignore not only her individual religious tasks but also her responsibility in a larger collective life. Arrogance is one of the forms of ignorance and it is quite common among the wealthy. It is also one of the reasons why there is only a low sensitivity about the needy Muslim brothers and sisters in the far geographies of the world.

Starting from her family Muslim is expected to set religiously proper relations in her social life. When confronting injustice in the community she lives in, Muslim is expected to refuse it at least with her heart. Therefore, education is expected to keep Muslims awake both about their individual and collective tasks. Raising consciousness about the religious duties, education helps Muslims to realize the tracks of Allah in the earth. However, unless the education was completed with the sincere religious practice the problem of alienation will not be solved. Therefore, when Muslim stops hurrying in the presence of Allah and starts praying two rakat

slowly in ten minutes, supporting her worship with teheccüd (night) prayers, then it will be possible to speak about the ‘conscious Muslims’ in the real sense.

The abstract ideal Muslim that I described very briefly above became a role-model for the residents of the neighborhood. When I asked “how do you answer the question of who I am?” the answer of the majority was “the subject of Allah”. All respondents avoided from defining themselves as the master of religious issues; they rather saw themselves as the students of religious culture since there are still a lot to learn. Many of them expressed their purpose of life as being a ‘perfect human being’ (kamil insan) at the end of the long way of still ongoing education. The perfect human being, an expression that is uttered by those who are interested in Sufi culture, is the refined middlebrow form of the abstract Muslim that I described above.

From the over-emphasis on religion in the presentation of self, one may assume that they devote their all-time to religion just like dervishes. However, they are rather the admirers of the dervish life from the business world. They spend most of their time at work and they are aware of the fact that their works are among the factors that shape their inner world inevitably. Many of them are successful in their works. They think that it is this success that misleads others to see them as alienated while they mind their religious tasks more than the economic success. The source of this misapprehension, according to them, is their fulfillment of the natural requirements of the business life such as wearing elegant and minding bodily aesthetics. The dialogue below exemplifies the balance that conservative middle classes set among religion, business and consumption.

Hayrettin is a restaurant manager in his mid-forties. He first attracted my attention with his smart clothing style. He was going to fitness at least twice a week which helped him to keep his body fit. He liked to wear slim-fit suits just like his favorite football player Nicolas Anelka, who played for his team Fenerbahçe in the past. Most of the time, Hayrettin and I went to the same mosque for the Friday Prayer. In one of

those Fridays, while heading to a restaurant for lunch following the end of the prayer, we were talking about the historical mosques of Ankara. He was fond of the mosque of Hacı Bayram Veli and that is why he went there every Sunday for the Morning Prayer. Upon my interest to his Sunday ritual, he invited me to join him for the next time.

Two days later, early in the morning, Hayrettin took me from home and we went together to the mosque of Hacı Bayram Veli for the Morning Prayer. It was still dark and streets were empty. The city seemed sleeping until we arrived to the mosque. Despite the fact that we arrived half an hour earlier than the morning azan, the mosque was almost full of with a crowd of men from every age who were listening the Koran chant (tilavet) of a young imam. At the end of the prayer, Hayrettin asked “how do you feel?” while heading toward his favorite patisserie for breakfast.

A: I was impressed by the voice of the young imam and the architecture of the mosque.

H: I agree. For me, it is impressive to pray in this monumental mosque by tasting the meaning of the worship. Those who see Sunday as the day of extra-sleep and of shopping mall visit do not even know what they miss.

A: So you will not go to shopping mall today after leaving me [smiling].

H: [He smiles], No. But, of course, I go to shopping malls only when I need to go and I am sure that I go less frequently than those who think that I am addicted to consumption. I really work hard and when I have time I prefer to use it by reading one more page of Koran or by learning one more hadiths rather than wasting it in the malls.

A: As far as I know, the critiques about the consumerism are not only limited to shopping mall visits; they rather question the relation between being a good Muslim and excessive consumption.

H: I am also critical about excessive consumption and it is forbidden in our religion. But I think we need to define what excessive consumption is. As a part of my job, I have to be smart and clean so I mind wearing well. I also drive an expensive car in parallel with my income. This is not excessive consumption. This is what my life requires. Actually, wealth is not forbidden in our religion so long as you make and spend it by remaining within the halal circle. So, there is no obstacle before being both a good Muslim and wealthy.

A: I suppose the critiques imply the Muslims' conspicuous exhibition of wealth by ignoring the poor.

H: If a Muslim is doing this I suspect his (her) religious education. This is unacceptable and disturbs me, as well. I think it is a problem of arrogance which is common among the wealthy. There is a recurrent question among Muslims that whether the exam with poverty or with wealth is harder than the other. Seeing the expansion of arrogance in current society, I can say that the exam with the wealth is harder since the rise of the wealth goes hand in hand with the increasing responsibility. If you are not well educated you can easily be an arrogant person. You can personally forget your responsibility against the poor. Thanks to Allah, there are many good people who care about helping the poor. You know, like many of my friends, I donate regularly to a waqf which gives scholarships to university students. Therefore, I think it is normal that there are problems in social life because we are living in a period of social change. The good side of the problem is that we know the solution: better religious education.

Two decades ago, the current residents of Çukurambar were used to seeing moral decay as the most significant social problem which could only be solved by morally

transforming the established order. Today, they still see the decay of morality among the most important social problems. However, the source of decay changed from the collective life to the insufficient religious education of the inner world. Once distanced as the evil economic system, it is rare today to hear complaints about capitalism. What is rather in the firing line is the capitalist spirit of individual consumerists. Therefore, it is vital to educate the individual inner world in a religiously proper way.

When I was in the field, there was a famous debate among the conservative columnists, which questioned whether Islamism was dead or not. Focusing on the discursive and political repertoire of AKP government along its ten years of rule, one side argued that Islamism integrated into the order during the AKP rule while the other side argued that AKP was never an Islamist party. What I rather saw in the field was that the middle class readers of this debate changed in the last decade. They lost their belief into the necessity of a revolutionary change in the existing society. They rather think that society can change if the individuals living in it change their inner world. It is certain that their political vision changed but their Islamist dispositions did not evaporate. At least in the case of middle classes, collective political libido was replaced with the individual cultural libido as they minded educating the Muslim inner world with a refined religious culture. The demand of collective orthodoxy against the established order evolved into the demand of puritan individuals within a complex society as AKP was the political agent in charge to generate the social change.

#### **7.4 The Conservative Vision of the Social World: The Cultural Unity and Invisible Enemies**

Since most of my respondents were busy people, many of the interviews were interrupted with reasons concerning the business or family affairs. The interview with Eren was among the most interrupted ones. He was always busy with phone calls, random guests, and constantly developing business agenda. Eren was a kind

man who minded my research a lot. Thus when our interview was interrupted he felt embarrassed against me. To compensate the interruption when he had to leave the room he called his secretary and asked her to serve me tea and snacks. What attracted my attention was that he addressed to her secretary as ‘my sister’ (bacım). I also realized that when he requested something from his employees, in spite of using the word ‘please’ (lütfen), he used to utter the phrase of ‘if it does not put you in trouble’ (sana zahmet olmazsa) which is generally used in non-professional domains of social life. When I shared my bewilderment about the language he used toward his employees, he told me that he sees them as a part of his family.

Eren’s view of unity exemplifies clearly the conservative vision of the social world which is based on the attribution of a cultural unity to the groups (from the smallest to the largest) that a conservative agent is a member. Such perspective becomes clearer in the description of the social world they live in. In the eye of a conservative, social world is the site of civilizations that are made of states, nations and religions. Individual, on the other hand, is the representative of a history which came out of the relations among the given central agents of the world. Seen as the black-box of the unshakable structures of the world, history is also perceived as the source of the collective spirit (the cultural substance) that is shared by all. The conservative history is the history of glories and conflicts, a history of great men and great states, that was internalized as a mental schema to perceive the current external world. In other words, the selectively structured history of states, prophets, sultans, nations, warriors, politicians and writers restructures the given world in a conservative fashion as the continuity of the selected history.

For the residents of Çukurambar, thus, the reality of the external world that they are a part of is not only composed of the visible traits such as the anonymous crowd of differentiated individuals who are strange to one another but also of invisible features such as culture that make all individuals familiar to one another: man and woman who are by default expected to be loyal to religion and state. In other words, the reality of the external world is made of the constant flow of Turkish-Islamic

civilization within which the current social life is just a moment. From a conservative point of view, Turkish-Islamic civilization is the central bank of the values that generate 'we' from the anonymous crowd of the social world. Being born in Anatolia where Ottoman Empire once rose and expanded to the three continents, every anonymous individual in the society, regardless of class, ethnic, and religious divisions, is by default the inheritor of a common cause: rising the flag of Islam in Turkish land against its old enemies. It can be easily seen that the conservative vision of social world rests not only on the cultural unity of the anonymous individuals but also on the unity of the state with the people in the form of nation. In other words, the conservative agent sees the state as the writer of nation's history which she internalized as a mental schema. That is why the conservative 'we' may concurrently refer to both people and state.

Samim is an ex-member of parliament in his early sixties. He was an active member of Islamist parties from the outset in his hometown. At the end, he was elected as the Member of Parliament from AKP. He is no more in the parliament and thus has time to satisfy his curiosity about the history of Islam and Ottoman Empire. Like many others, whenever it came to historical issues he used to utter 'we' implying both the Ottoman state and his current political party:

We visited Bosnia frequently following the end of the war. I will tell you an incident that made me cry in one of my visits to Bosnia. While walking on the street, a Bosnian man recognized me from a speech I made in the parliament that he watched from the Parliament TV (Meclis TV). Can you believe that? An ordinary Bosnian man watches our parliament and recognizes me. Do you know why? Because, we provided peace, justice and tolerance which they miss today. It is also the reason why Libyans showed an enthusiastic reaction to the speech of Davutoğlu (Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time) in Benghazi following the collapse of Kaddafi regime. We have a great inheritance in our old lands.

Listening to the political analysis of Samim and others, I realized that the state that a conservative agent identifies herself is not the empirical state that exists currently. It is rather the state that existed in a specific historical period and took damages as a result of external and internal attacks. It is clearly the Ottoman state before the

reformism movement commenced with the Tanzimat Edict in 1839. The period following the reformation process is seen as the period of the weakening of the state in parallel with the increasing cultural alienation. Samim thinks that the history is full of the accomplishments of 'Turkish nation'. He emphasizes that the great nations of our own age are those which have strong state. Therefore, to be great again, he argues, Turkish nation needs to have a strong state, as it was in the past. The state-centered social vision of conservatism anchors in the belief that the stronger the state, the higher the social welfare. The economic and cultural development of the society is considered dependent on a strong state. The great figures in philosophy, sciences, arts and architecture are also perceived as the consequences of a powerful state. Whichever the problems that conservatives faced, their solution was the powerful state. Thus, in the eye of a conservative, state is not a completed entity but an entity to be constructed within political struggles.

### **7.5 The Acquisition of the State-Centered Social Vision: The Role of Political Socialization and Periodicals**

One of the recurrent themes of the students of the conservative ideology is the central place of 'loyalty to the state' as the distinctive quality of conservatism. What is absent in this ideal-typical description of conservative ideology is the basic question of 'what is the source of the loyalty to the state?' In other words, the craft of sociology is incomplete unless the acquisition of the 'state category' as a mental schema is clarified. The state category that shaped conservative middle classes' vision of social world was acquired within the process of political socialization. It can easily be detected in the social trajectory of older generations.

They were born into conservative families in the provincial cities but acquisition of the conservative social vision took place in the later process during the university education when they became members of conservative student societies. It is this period that they found themselves at the center of both physical and symbolic struggles between left and right. Apart from the physical struggles, they have armed

themselves with a political repertoire by contacting conservative cultural products such as periodicals so that they can strengthen their hand in the symbolic struggles. The new political repertoire they acquired in the university was not far from what they learned in family and school but deeper and specialized: a critical perspective on the modern history of Turkey in which (starting from the Tanzimat period) reforms and revolutions harmed the national culture and state. The socialist movement at that time was a new threat against which national culture and state had to be protected. The student societies, periodicals and political institutions of that time did not survive long; they were all closed down within the process of political turmoil that ended up with the 1980 military coup. However, the social vision and division of that period have lasted as the political disposition of conservative agents who established or became sympathizers of new institutions. Thus whenever there is a debate within conservative circles, the older generations go back to the political culture of 1970s to shed light on the exact conservative political manners or the way of thinking.

Mustafa is a retired lawyer in his late sixties. He grew up as an admirer of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, just like his father. When he was a university student he was a member of 'The Association of National Struggle Anew' (*Yeniden Milli Mücadele Derneği*, YMMD). When he left the association upon emerging differences of opinion, he was a sympathizer of MHP. After a while he thought that Necmettin Erbakan was the real spokesperson of national politics and he became an active supporter of National Outlook Movement. Until a recent past he was a loyal reader of *Milli Gazete* which he stopped reading because of personal reasons. When I met him in 2013 he was calling himself as a sympathizer of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rather than AKP since he thought that Erdoğan was the only man who has been doing something about 'the national cause' in the party. When Gezi Events occurred in the late May of 2013, Mustafa was sure about the invisible reality behind the events.

When I was a Mücadeleci (a member of the YMMD) in the university years, I made good readings. When I put my Mücadeleci lenses on I can see everything very clearly. If you want to understand what is happening in the political world you should ask "what is the interest of Jews in this event?" This is the basic

question that you can apply in every part of the world since the world is ruled by the Jews. It works well in Turkey as well. If you want to understand the radical changes in Turkish history since the Tanzimat Edict, ask this question. If you investigate the Gezi well enough you will encounter the Mason Lodges behind the surface level explanations.

When Mustafa shared his memories about YMMD, we had spontaneously come together as a small group to talk about the emerging Gezi Events following the end of a Mesnevi Talks session. Mustafa's analysis was approved by the other participants and two older men complained that YMMD was a short-lived organization. It was the first time I heard about YMMD and everybody except me was aware of it. Mustafa was surprised to hear that I was not aware of it and advised me to investigate it so that I can understand the yesterday of the current conservatism. Luckily, I reached the online copies of YMMD's weekly magazine *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* (National Struggle Anew, YMM).<sup>18</sup>

While reading it I felt like reading a Turkish-Islamist version of *Büyük Doğu*. Published first in 1970, the wording and content of YMM was almost the same as *Büyük Doğu* but the focus was no more restricted to the Islamist opposition against the republican revolutions. The focus of YMM was rather the political struggle against the rising leftist movements. Introducing itself as the periodical of the 'national cause' which is loyal to faith, morality, culture, history, and national interests, YMM aims to generate a 'scholarly right' in order to protect the national ideology from the attacks of non-national (and thus alienating) ideologies of left. Having lasted two years, the direct impact of YMM was short. However, the significance of the YMM lied in the fact that it was one of the agents in the field of cultural production which produced conservative vision and division of the world under the circumstances of right-left conflict in Turkey. What is more significant is that the ideas on the papers of YMM were quite similar to my informants' ideas in their mind. Therefore, reading the old issues of YMM made me feel like reading the

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<sup>18</sup> Online copies of the issues of *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* can be reached through the given blog: <http://mucadeleci.blogspot.com.tr/2015/03/ymm-dergi-pdfleri.html>

extended and refined versions of the decipherments of my conversations and interviews in Çukurambar.

What I found on the pages of YMM is the construction of a scholarly conservative vision and division of the social world by applying two symbolic systems (history and religion). In the conservative vision of YMM, the history of the present or the genealogy of the rise of leftist movements in Turkey commence in Ottoman Empire's period of regression. The main agent of this process was the 'international Zionism' which separated the unity of state and nation by dividing the nation into two. Penetrating into the nation through Mason Lodges, Zionism found collaborators not only among the non-Muslim nations but also within Muslims who converted into Mason but kept their identity. Among the centers of treason were the non-Sunni Sufi Orders, such as Bektashism and Melamism, but especially the Committee of Union and Progress, the members of which fought against Abdülhamid II and demolished the empire from within.

What is worse, they managed to rule the country even after the nation's War of Independence. Especially through the education policies their rule accelerated the division of the nation by inculcating non-national culture in the schools. In this way, new generations grew up distant to the national culture and became the human resource of the leftist movements. On the other hand, 'scholarly right' is defined as the ideological activity that takes the basic laws to which universe and life are liable as the guide. The basic laws refer nothing other than the truth of Islam. Thus, scholarly right is the natural ideology of the believers. Its aim is to protect believers from the damages of cultural imperialism and to attribute consciousness to the religious ties of the believer.

The state-centered conservative vision glares in the pages of YMM. In this perspective, the first problem which is the basis of the variety of social problems is the question of state. The history is the mirror of the virtues of Turkish nation but these virtues have no meaning unless the political leaders realize them. Therefore,

with more concrete terms, conservatism's question of state refers to the distance of ruling cadre from the nation. It is the task of conservative politics to annihilate this harmful distance and enable the unity of the nation and the state:

If Turkish history is examined well enough, one can see that the nation could exhibit its high capabilities under the good and powerful rule. Even under the most unexpected times the nation has shown its virtues so long as the ruling cadre found the methods for the soldier-nation, the sword of Islam, to reveal the energy that is hidden in its spirit which is made of bravery and virtue. The task of the ruling cadre is to know the merits of Turkish nation such as being religious, kind, patient, loyal, clever and disciplined. This is the first step of the primary resonance that has to emerge between the nation and ruling cadre (YMM, 1971: 3).

The significance of YMM lies not only in its generation of conservative vision and division of the social world which was acquired by the people I met in Çukurambar, but also in the fact that the same vision and division is reproduced by the current periodicals such as *Derin Tarih* (Deep History, DT) which the conservative middle classes follow passionately. When I was in the field almost all of my informants were not only the loyal followers of DT but also thankful to it since it uncovered the unknown facts about recent history.

Mustafa once told me that what made DT distinctive was its success to attract not only conservative readers but also those non-conservative people who are interested in history. Mustafa may be right since during one year that I regularly followed, DT was among the fast sold out periodicals. Different from YMM, the focus of DT was to repair the damaged historical memory of the nation. It reflected on the motto of DT: 'all you know will remain in the history (bildiğiniz her şey tarih olacak).' In 2013, the main focus of DT was to correct the common mistakes about the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. Among the main topics were 'understanding the Sultan Abdülhamid', 'CHP and dictatorship', 'did we give caliphate away to England?', and 'treaty of Lausanne and Kurds.'

DT is a completely different genre than YMM. It is a politically autonomous conservative periodical that investigates purely history. Different from *Büyük Doğu* and YMM, DT was not in a direct political struggle but it followed the historical vision of the former political periodicals. The conservative division between ‘friend and enemy’ lies at the core of this historical vision. With reference to the glorious periods of Ottoman Empire, the merits and capabilities of the unity of the nation and state is emphasized, and the role of the invisible enemies in demolishing this unity is underlined. This vision incorporates clearly in the books that DT presents its readers as a gift: ‘How Zionists Demolished Ottoman Empire’, ‘The Tragedy of the Last Khalifa’, and ‘I am not a Traitor: The First Declaration of Sultan Vahdettin After Leaving Istanbul.’

The detailed analysis of the given periodicals is not the subject of this study. The reason why I referred to and described briefly them is that these periodicals are one of the sources where conservative vision and division of the social world is produced (and reproduced). This symbolic product becomes the mental schema through which the readers perceive the social world. Among many other conservative periodicals, I focused on the given three just because they were referred frequently by my informants in the conversations and interviews. I have to contend that there are other genres and cultural products that function in the same manner but I could not examine them here.

Especially, the conspirasque historical investigation is another genre that is influential among conservatives. It is a genre that claims to present concrete examples to ‘invisible enemies’ of Turkish nation. When I was in the field, Mustafa Yılmaz’s ‘Dul Kadının Oğulları: Tapınağın Türk Şövalyeleri’ was one of the most popular books among my informants. Claiming to have deciphered the Masonic symbols hidden in the building of Turkish Parliament, the book was seen as the proof about the impact of Masons over Turkey. Similar conspirasque approaches were appropriated especially when conservatives had to confront with strong political opposition.

For İbrahim, the conspirasque approach was the way of thinking. Whenever there is a hot political debate, he used to begin his words by saying ‘ask the question reversely.’ In this way, he invited his friends to see the invisible dimension of the events. He believed that the visible dimension was the one that we were allowed to know. For him, the merit was to know the invisible dimension and asking questions reversely was his method to do so. According to him, for instance, Gezi could never be an environmentalist protest. Behind the visible scene, there must be some actors who were disturbed by the unexpected stable economic development of Turkey. He thought that during the rule of AKP Turkey became a world-wide political play-maker and it disturbed the power groups. Thus, the protests could only be the surface-level reality that hides the interests of great play-makers over Turkey.

To sum up the argument in this section, the conservative social vision is built over the primary dispositions acquired in the family. In other words, the political socialization is the secondary habitus within which the contact with the cultural products ends up with the extension of the borders of primary dispositions. Produced by the entrepreneurs of the field of cultural production within a political struggle by giving a specific form to the history, the conservative vision and division of the world was acquired as a mental schema by the agents. When this mental schema functioned, the social world was perceived as a site of the everlasting conflicts among the civilizations which is made of states, nations, religions and political leaders. The individuals living in the same society are perceived as a cultural unity that springs from sharing the same history which informs not only about the glories of the nation but also the common enemies. Therefore, the state must be powerful not only to protect the nation from the enemies but also to inculcate the national culture in order to strengthen the unity.

## **7.6 The Social Vision in Action: The Current Political Issues and the Conservative View**

The conservative social vision and division that I explained above is made up of the general structure of a mental schema. In order to comprehend how it functions, I asked questions concerning the current political issues. All of my informants had voted for AKP in every election from 2002 on. They had previously voted for Islamist parties as well as MHP, and Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP). When I asked them to select another party that they could vote for, many of them chose MHP since it was represented in the parliament. Other parties that they saw themselves close were the Felicity Party from which AKP had departed, and the Grand Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*, BBP). They have never even imagined voting for CHP and HDP.

They are definitely content with their political preference since they think there are a lot of reasons to vote for AKP. First of all, there are objective facts such as the progress that Turkey made within ten years of AKP rule. Compared to economic and political crises of coalition periods, they think the stable development of the country is the common good which convinces floating voters to vote for AKP. The previous bad economic administration of the country had led to the great devaluations of Turkish Lira (TL) and many entrepreneurs had gone bankrupt. Compared to the economic turmoil of 1990s, the conservatives see the basic success of AKP in the economy. For them, the throwing of six zeros from TL, the low inflation and stable exchange rates are the symbols of good economy. For the older generations, the only good periods in the recent past of Turkey that can be compared to the current AKP rule are DP and ANAP rules.

There are also specifically conservative reasons to appreciate AKP. First of all, AKP rule represents the re-unification of the state with the national culture. A conservative agent used to see the state as the bureaucratic machine of alienation which keep functioning as a secret government even while conservative parties are in power

since the beginning of Westernization period. The symbol of this unification is the rising numbers of mosques, Imam Hatip Schools, and Theology Faculties. Secondly, and the most importantly, AKP is considered as the provider of recognition for conservative citizens in social life. The problem of cultural alienation implies not only a conservative critique of republican cultural politics but also a conservative protest against being labeled as backward. During the period I was in the field, I have always heard complaints from my informants about the secular pressures they experienced in the social life before AKP came into power. Hatice could never be a teacher even though she was qualified since she was headscarfed. Burhan told me that he was excluded by his old colleagues since he read *Yeni Şafak*. Eren thought that the professors in the university practiced double standards against conservative students while grading the exams. Mustafa told that his wife was looked with an evil eye when she was in Kızılay (the city center) since she wore in a conservative manner. Samim explains the betterment in the social life of conservatives by comparing today with the past:

In the past, you could see no conservative in the Southern shores during the heyday season. The biases were so strong that we would go to the seaside in September. Even in the last days of the season, we were not used to see conservative families in the seaside. In one of our family holidays in 1980s, I saw a conservative couple getting out of their top model car. I thought immediately that they were tourists from Arabic countries. When I heard they spoke Turkish I felt ashamed of myself. I realized that I was thinking like the seculars as if conservative families could not have holiday or drive good cars. Compared to those days we came a long way. Thanks to Allah, today we used to see headscarfed women driving top model cars.

The process of gaining recognition in the social life is named as normalization. Many think that the process of normalization is the gift of AKP rule. Thus, they conceive AKP as an insurance of normalization. The process of normalization refers also to the end of the reproduction crisis of conservatives. The reproduction crisis implies the conflict between conservative families and public schools in terms of the legitimate culture to be inculcated to the younger generations. The collective fear of conservative families was their children to forget the national culture through the

inculcation of a rival culture in schools. The conservative fear of cultural alienation through education seems to have evaporated within ten years of AKP rule. Nevertheless, conservative middle classes prefer enrolling their children to private colleges arguing that the changing structure of education will come to fruition in the future.

The strong link between conservatives and AKP reflects on the political discourse as well. I saw a strong parallelism between the official discourse of AKP and political discourse of conservative middle classes. In other words, even the distant sympathizers of AKP expressed their ideas on the current policies as if they were the member of the party.

When I was in the field, the most discussed political topic was Turkey's new perspective in foreign affairs. Resting on the idea of being the leader of the Muslim nations which had been previously ruled by Ottoman Empire, the new perspective promotes government to have active role in the region. All of my informants supported the new perspective passionately. For them, the idea of 'the leader Turkey' was not only rational but also natural since the Muslim nations of the region have been considering Turkey as the leader.

Hatice tells her husband's memories in African countries where people appreciate the help of Turks and she interprets it as a sign of the longing for the justice of Ottoman Empire. Samim thinks that the new perspective was a necessity and in a short period of time it made Turkey the leader of Muslim nations. To prove his view he shows the congratulation messages sent by his friends from Muslim countries following the 'one minute event', the influential critique that Tayyip Erdoğan developed against Israel's president Shimon Peres in Davos. Eren thinks that it is a task for a Muslim who lives in Turkey to support this politics since it may lead Turkey to become a global power. Burhan thinks that the leadership of Turkey is the only way for the principle of self-determination to be active in other Muslim nations since the other potential leader countries except Turkey are colonialist. İbrahim read Ahmet

Davutoğlu's book titled as 'Stratejik Derinlik' (Strategical Depth) and thinks that it is a source of inspiration:

Theoretically, it is a great book and I agree with the general argument of the book that Turkey is a country with a strong imperial tradition and large hinterland. Muslims of other countries still consider us as the leader. But as Necip Fazıl has written in one of his poems, while the other nations try to go to the Mars, we lost our bright history in our pocket. It is a great book that reminds us our historical politics but I am not sure if the other powers and the old-fashioned (monşer) bureaucrats allow it. The old-fashioned bureaucrats know only one policy: wait and see. We cannot isolate ourselves from the region and the world. We need to be active.

The same parallelism with the official discourse can be seen about the war in Syria. They see the war as a result of the non-democratic rule of Esad regime. The only solution is the victory of the opposition and the reflection of the national will to the political administration of the country. They approve Turkey's intervention to the war by supporting the opposition because Turkey cannot remain passive while the borders in the region are re-shaped. In addition, intervention is also what Turkey's strategic interests require. The intervention may end up with the strengthened leadership of Turkey in the region by leading to the isolation of Israel and Iran from the region. Many of them do not wish Turkey to declare war against Syria since it would be the war of two Muslim nations.

When it comes to internal affairs, the biggest problem for the conservatives is cultural. 'Biases' that prevent social cohesion, 'alienation' that damages national culture and state from within, and 'moral decay' that reflects on the ignorance of the religious duties in a Muslim society are the derivatives of the most referred cultural problems. Burhan complains about the early republican revolutions which destroyed the contact with authentic resources. For him, especially the changing of the alphabet is a great mistake which destroyed the cultural memory of the nation. He complains that if his grandfather had written a letter to him in Arabic, he would not be able to read it today.

Hasan is worried about 'ideological barriers'. He complains about the uncertainty about a possible change in the political rule. If AKP loses an election in the future he is worried about living another February 28 process. Therefore, he wishes the country to have professional political institutions which are not dependent on the personal decisions. Zeynep thinks that the media culture is a secret threat that distances people from the national culture and prevents the emergence of social cohesion. Mustafa complains about the ignorance about the religious practices among the people who call themselves Muslim. Referring to a research he argues that only ten per cent of the population in Turkey prays regularly. He claims that all social problems are based on this ignorance. The only solution, according to him, is to have a good education system which leads to religious consciousness.

Kurdish issue is also seen as a derivative of cultural problems that was triggered by republican policies. They think that Kurds and Turks have been living together as religious brothers and sisters for centuries. Many of them think that the problem is actually artificial or the result of a game of foreign powers to divide Turkey. As the previous efforts of Turkey showed, they argue, applying to military power in the solution of the problem is not enough. They rather argue that the problem can be solved forever only if government can provide peaceful conditions in the Kurdish cities. Therefore, they support the government's Kurdish opening process. Fatih is a young entrepreneur in tourism sector. Previously, he was on the side of military-based solution but he changed his mind after he visited the Eastern cities:

The Majority of my good friends live in Diyarbakır. Therefore, I visit the city frequently. After seeing this beautiful city, the life of people, and their sincere friendship I cannot support the military-based solution. When I was in the high-school, my social circle was quite tough in this issue. Now I am startled when I remember my old ideas. If my old friends could go to Diyarbakır, they would see that these people are good and have strong faith. They share the same belief with us. Of course, the terrorists will be punished but the civil citizens deserve the top quality service as much as us. I believe that the day we took service to the back of the beyond will be the last day of terror in the region.

The parallelism with the official discourse of AKP does not imply that conservative middle classes have no critique about the party. Especially older generation is worried about the future of the cause. They think that except Erdoğan, there is no 'man of the cause' in the party. Most of the party members, they complain, mind money more than the cause. As these critiques imply, conservative middle classes are loyal to Erdoğan more than the party. They are sure about that he is the best leader they have ever seen. They respect Menderes, Erbakan and Özal as well. However, for them, Erdoğan was not only a good leader but a hero of Turkey and pride of Muslim world. Thus, having met him was among the most valuable memories of my informants. Samim thinks that the special love against Erdoğan springs from his social origin which makes him close to everybody:

He was born in Kasımpaşa as a son of a poor family. He went to Imam Hatip School, played soccer, and sympathized with Sufi orders. He was a worker who had dreams for his country and he made his dreams real. Today, everybody looks at his life story and finds something close to their lives.

Despite the strong belief in the leadership of Erdoğan, conservative middle classes see the current situation of Turkey far from the ideal. Their ideal society mirrored in the golden age during the life time of prophet Mohammad and the glorious past of the Ottoman Empire. What made these periods ideal were the common values that were shared by all. Despite the bright future dreams, they all agreed that the current society was away from these ideals. It is this distance which triggers them to keep loyal to Erdoğan as he is the leader of the cause.

## **7.7 Conclusion**

The field study reveals that Islamist ethical opposition against capitalism seems to have evaporated in Çukurambar. The remaining low oppositional voices do not criticize capitalism itself but rather the improper integration of Muslims into capitalism. In other words, the critical focus is on the balance between economy and religion which Muslims need to set in a right manner. A proper Muslim needs to pay

attention to keep in the halal circle while making and consuming the wealth. In addition to that, going too far in consumption and exhibition of the wealth may lead to alienation from the national culture.

The strategy of conservative middle classes against the critiques of alienation is to appropriate the critiques. Spending time and energy in the acquisition of the refined religious culture, conservative middle classes educate their inner world in a puritan manner so that they can live free from the threat of alienation. The basic function of the education of the Muslim inner world is the reminder of the central principle that this world is actually a setting of exam. Since the exam can be given any time, Muslim always needs to be prepared for it as there is no guarantee of salvation.

The conservative social vision, on the other hand, rests on the cultural unity of those who are the common inheritors of the same civilization. Conservative middle classes perceive the world through a mythic lens which is made of the glorious past of Ottoman Empire and the golden age of the Islamic civilization during the lifetime of the prophet Mohammad. When a conservative looks at the differences such as social class, ethnicity, and religious sect she sees the unity of national culture. The conservative vision of unity is not only made of ties among individuals but also between individuals and the state. The state-centered social vision is acquired within a specific political socialization process as a secondary habitus. In other words, the political repertoire in the pages of conservative cultural products such as periodicals become the mental schema through which social world is perceived in a conservative manner.

This specific vision leads to the emergence of a homology between conservative middle classes and AKP. From the new foreign affairs perspective to the war in Syria and Kurdish opening process, they follow the official vision of the government. At the basis of the loyalty to AKP lies the solution that the party brings to the conflict of family and school which threatens the familial reproduction strategies of conservatives. What is stronger than loyalty to AKP is the loyalty to Erdoğan.

Despite the long way Turkey made under his leadership, they think that they are still away from living in an ideal society.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

In this study, I examined how the transformation of Islamist conservatism following the foundation of AKP impacted on the conservative fractions of middle classes. The basic research question was empiricized through an ethnographic study that was conducted in Çukurambar, an old gecekondur neighborhood that transformed fast into an upper-middle class neighborhood during the rule of AKP. Indeed this study can be considered as a part and product of the academic curiosity on the transformation of conservative life-style in Turkey. Rather than focusing on a specific aspect of the emergent life-style such as fashion or house decoration, I aimed to examine the subject within the relationality it emerged. At the very beginning of the study, before my broad academic curiosity was formulated into a research question, I thought that the reconstruction of Islamist conservatism went parallel to the reconstruction of cities and bodies. Thus, I focused especially on the triadic relationality among politics, physical space and taste.

Çukurambar was a perfect microcosm to comprehend the triadic relationality. The transformation of the old gecekondur neighborhood accelerated especially after the flow of conservative politicians and bureaucrats following the closing of parliamentary housing in 2002. As the old gecekondus were replaced with the high-rise luxury sites, the neighborhood became a center of attraction for the conservative fractions of middle classes. The reconstruction of the physical space in the neighborhood went hand in hand with the reconstruction of the conservative middlebrow taste which is at peace with bourgeois culture.

I applied to the sociological theory developed by Pierre Bourdieu to comprehend the relations among political, spatial and bodily forms of conservatism. I especially benefited from the concept of habitus. Through the concept of habitus, I tried to elucidate the generative mechanism of political and spatial transformation. The

conservative habitus did not only trigger the transformation in the given realms but also underwent transformation within the vortex of social change. By disclosing the making of conservative habitus through the analysis of the acquired dispositions, I tried to reveal the homology between social structures and mental structures. In line with this purpose, I started the analysis by examining the emergent social conditions of existence in Çukurambar. Afterwards, I tried to dissect the impact of the new social conditions of existence over the dispositions by discussing the reconstruction of the conservative middlebrow taste. Following that I examined the impacts of the structural transformations over the representations of inner world and social world.

As the first step of Bourdieu's analytic method I broke with both everyday and academic commonsenses concerning conservatism. First, I focused on the blurry separation between Islamism and conservatism, and argued that the separation practically functioned to distinguish the legitimate form of conservatism (such as center-right parties) from the non-legitimate conservatism (such as National Outlook parties). Second, I broke with the identification of conservatism with ideology or a way of thinking. I argued that conservative ideology is a significant dimension of the reality of conservatism. However, treating conservative ideology as the whole reality of conservatism leads to the scholastic reason which identifies conservative agent with conservative philosopher. In this way, the possibility to investigate the practical logic of conservatism evaporates. Lastly, I broke with the center-periphery analysis, the conventional approach to understand conservatism in Turkey. I argue that Mardin's cultural structuralism treats conservatism as the natural ideology of the periphery. Therefore, far from presenting a theoretical model for the inquiries on conservatism, such a dualistic vision constitutes obstacles before the investigations on conservatism in Turkey.

The triadic break is not an arbitrary research act but rather a necessary step to refuse the prefabricated definitions of conservatism as a research object. As I contended earlier, I applied to Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical tools in order to construct conservatism as a research object. Thinking that this study examines the practical

logic of the conservatism of the actually existing conservative individuals, it can be better understood why I chose Bourdieu's relational sociology as the theoretical framework of the study. After the detailed examination of the logic and instruments of Bourdieu's theory, I developed a dispositional definition of conservatism. I argued that conservatism is a form that principles of social vision and division (such as gender, nationality and religious affiliation) take through the symbolic entrepreneurship of the experts from various fields. Through such a dispositional definition, conservatism is freed from the ideational cage of the scholastic definitions. The fact that the conservative principles of vision and division are open to change paves the way for the establishment of links between the conservative cultural production and cultural consumption of conservative agents in the social space. Along the study, I shed light on how the conservative symbolic entrepreneurship forged the conservative habitus through fashion magazines, historical periodicals and political organizations.

The principles of conservative vision and division are not shaped in void. The practical reality of conservatism emerges under structural constraints. To dissect the structural constraints which impact on the formation of conservative habitus, I historicized the political field and the impacts of the political struggles over social space. The reason why I historicized the political field is to examine the social conditions in which the foundation of AKP and the reconstruction of conservative middlebrow taste became possible.

In the historical examination, I argue that the roots of current conservatism in Turkey trace back to two early forms of conservatism that emerged in the late Ottoman period. Working class conservatism and intellectual conservatism of the late Ottoman period experienced a break following the foundation of republic. I argue that the two early forms of conservatism muted in the early republican period upon the revolutionary changes and strict bureaucratic control over the social space. To put it briefly, the new power structure of the early republican period implied a legitimacy crisis for conservatism. As a result, the new social conditions led to the invention of

republican-friendly conservatism which incorporated most clearly in the foundation of DP. The legitimacy crisis recurred following the rise of Islamist conservatism. The three-tiered opposition of Islamist parties against secularism, capitalism and modern social life ended up with the closing of parties and banning of leader cadres. I argue that AKP was found to bring an end to the legitimacy crisis of Islamist conservatism. The leading party cadre aimed to construct a new position in the political field by producing a new political representation named as conservative democracy. The new political position was based on the compromise with three basic principles of division of the political field, namely secularism, economic liberalism and unitary state. The compromise does not imply an absolute conformity to these principles. On the contrary, one of the main political fronts of the new party was to redefine these three principles in a conservative manner. The new conservative party and its struggles in the political field did not solely produce political results. The struggles of the new party have also generated impacts over the social space by forging the symbolic polarization.

Emerging as an unintended consequence of the early republican revolutions, symbolic polarization refers to the co-existence of two conflictual formations of symbolic systems. It is forged by mainly political, religious and cultural entrepreneurs. For example, political entrepreneurs take the symbolic polarization into account while establishing a new party or constructing a new representation of nation or people. The size and legitimacy of each block is shaped in accordance with the trajectory of practical and symbolic struggles. It did not constitute the basis for the differentiation of political preferences. Rather, it has generated two politicized symbolic blocks. Leading to the formation of the politically orthodox symbolic blocks, symbolic polarization has destroyed the possibility of rational communication between the two blocks. As a result, symbolic affinity has played the major role in the making of political preferences. In other words, political preferences have been shaped in advance of the actual political issues.

The construction of AKP in conformity with the basic principles of political field led to significant transformation in the conservative symbolic block. Especially the perfect integration into capitalism led to the collapse of collective orthodoxy which had emerged during the opposition of Islamist conservatives against the established order. The collapse of collective orthodoxy implied the dismantling of the close-knit conservative social life which had founded on the negation of the social differentiation. In this way, previously repressed middle class position has found new spaces of expression. It was no longer seen as improper to exhibit the wealth in the social life. It was in this period that the conservative middlebrow taste was reconstructed. The new taste was not only incorporated in the physical space of Çukurambar but also represented in the social life of the neighborhood.

While I was living in Yüzüncü Yıl, a neighborhood only a few blocks away from Çukurambar, I observed the fast transformation of the old gecekondu neighborhood into an upper-middle class neighborhood. The transformation of the neighborhood was not only limited to the physical space. What made Çukurambar a well-known neighborhood in Ankara was rather its changing resident profile. I started hearing more frequently about the neighborhood especially after a considerable amount of members of the parliament from AKP moved to the neighborhood following the closing of the parliamentary housing in Oran. The number of the politicians in the neighborhood increased even more after the headquarters of AKP moved to Söğütözü, a district just two kilometers away from Çukurambar. When the landscape of the neighborhood started changing with the high-rise luxury buildings, it has become well-known as the center of the emergent conservative middle class life-style.

Despite the fact that the neighborhood is just a few blocks away from my home, my entrance to the field has become a crisis. At the beginning, my intention was to conduct in-depth interviews. However, all the contacts I could reach through my friends refused to be interviewed arguing that my research is a touchy subject. My failure to get access to the field lasted six months. Along six months, I tried every

possible gate keepers: I asked the help of the headman and imams of the neighborhood; I met real estate agents hoping they could introduce me with their clients; I visited the cafes and restaurants of the neighborhood so frequently that I made friends with the waitresses. However, all of my efforts ended up with an absolute disappointment. As I was about to give up trying, I saw Sufiyane, a center of Islamic culture, in a side street of Çukurambar. It was such a lucky coincidence that I had recently finished reading Loïc Wacquant's *Body & Soul* hoping that it could inspire me about finding new methods to gain access to the field. While studying the racial domination Wacquant had gained access to the black ghetto of Chicago by enrolling to a boxing gym. Thus, when I saw Sufiyane I thought that it could be the equivalent of the boxing gym for my research. That is why I enrolled to reed-flute course and decided to join in the Mesnevi Talks in Sufiyane.

My first days in the field were stressful mostly because I was devoid of the bodily techniques and practical knowledge of conservatism. To cope with the field tension I started taking field notes. While reading my notes I realized that what I described as my weaknesses were also the definition of a *competent conservative* mirrored by the weaknesses of my body. What was vital was that the observed features about the practical reality of conservatism could never be reached through in-depth interviews. Thus on seeing the limits of in-depth interviews, I decided to redesign my research as an ethnographic inquiry. I benefited especially from the ethnographic technique of observant participation which rests on the apprenticeship of the researcher about the examined dispositions. In the following days, I realized that the investigation of conservative habitus is not similar to pugilistic habitus just because conservative habitus is multi-layered. In other words, playing reed-flute and joining in Mesnevi Talks could provide only a little source to understand what magnetise agents to being conservative. Therefore, I decided to support observant participation with in-depth interviews and content analysis of the newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, and TV serials that my informants preferred. In this way, the additional methods turned my research into an ethnographic study of conservative distinction. It does not only elucidate the symbolic borders that distinguish conservative middle classes from

the others but also investigate the inner logic of these symbolic borders by focusing on the acquisition of conservative dispositions and their function in producing distinguishing actions.

The field research lasted eight months during which I had the chance of socializing with my informants in mosques, restaurants, cafes and offices in Çukurambar. In addition to observant participation, I conducted thirty-two in-depth interviews. Along eight months, I spent almost three hours everyday to read conservative newspapers. I spent my evenings by reading my informants' favorite magazines, periodicals and books. When I left the field at the end of the eighth month, I had a whole bunch of data at my hand. I tried to produce triadic analysis out of the data. First, I focused on the transformation of the physical space in Çukurambar from village to gecekondu neighborhood, and later to upper-middle class neighborhood. The transformation of the physical space also implies the transformation of social conditions within which the current residents of the neighborhood exist. Second, I focused on the transformation of conservative middlebrow taste in parallel with the socio-spatial transformation by introducing the choice of elegant and religiously proper. Lastly, I focused on how conservative middle classes construct the representation of their inner world and the social world in which they live in.

At the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Çukurambar was a village in which peasants thought they were too far away from the city. The change in Çukurambar commenced with the flow of migrants from the rural areas of nearby towns and cities. Çukurambar remained as a village made of gecekondu houses until the city center expanded in such a way to include Çukurambar as a neighborhood. From the early 1990s on, Çukurambar has been in the middle of the city and concomitantly socio-spatial transformation has started. The pace of transformation changed in the late 1990s when a prominent member of RP built cooperative apartment houses in the neighborhood. These cooperative apartments have been the new address for a considerable number of conservative parliament members following the closing of parliamentary housing during the rule of AKP. Following the intensification of the

political capital, the plan of the neighborhood was renewed. The new plan paved the way for the high-rise buildings and this attracted the developers. The new luxury houses pushed Çukurambar over the top of the property market. At the end, the high real estate prices changed the profile of residents in the neighborhood: the old gecekondü residents were replaced with the upper-middle classes.

The transformation of Çukurambar is not limited to the high-rise buildings and their middle class residents. Following the socio-spatial transformation, Çukurambar earned the reputation of conservative neighborhood. Conservatism of the neighborhood is not the direct reflection of its social morphology as more than half of the population vote for secular-left parties. I argue that the conservative identity of the neighborhood is the product of symbolic power built over the symbolic capital of the conservative politicians who live in the neighborhood. The social life of the neighborhood was constructed in a conservative-friendly manner as the super markets, restaurants and cafes were designed with a conservative sensitivity.

The conservative fractions of middle classes played the major role in the transformation of Çukurambar, and the conservative-friendly social environment triggered the re-construction of conservative middlebrow taste. Çukurambar is not the first socio-spatial organization of conservative middle classes. However, while the previous conservative middle class neighborhoods were built on the quest of seclusion, the residents of Çukurambar needed seclusion mostly for their inner world as the generalized ascetic, solidarist and opponent Islamist stance weakened. The collapse of collective orthodoxy implied the weakening of the symbolic barriers before the unification of the market for symbolic goods. In this way, the conservative middlebrow taste was reconstructed not only within the capitalist market relations but also in compatible form with market values. As the concept of re-construction implies, the new conservative middlebrow taste was built on the previously acquired conservative dispositions. The 'choice of elegant and religiously proper' incorporates in the aestheticization of the body, decoration of house, leisure activities and favorite

holiday destinations. However, it incorporates in a full-fledged way in the physical space and social life of Çukurambar.

The re-construction of conservative middle class taste was not free from critiques. The critical voices from both secular and conservative circles agreed that the new taste signalled the alienation from the national culture. Against the critiques the strategy of conservative middle classes was to appropriate the critique and show that they stand with the critics by spending a considerable amount of time to learn about the high Islamic culture. This tendency leads to the construction of puritan inner world. When it comes to the vision of the external world, conservative middle classes see cultural unity within the anonymous social world. The source of the cultural unity is the inheritance of Ottoman civilization. Thus, they perceive social world as the unity of those who share the same national culture regardless of the difference of ethnicity or social class. The conservative perception of unity is not composed only of individuals but also state. The state-centered vision of the social world is not the given property of the conservative mind but rather it is acquired especially within the process of political socialization.

This study is based on an ethnographic study conducted in Çukurambar but it is not only a story of Çukurambar. I think that the findings of this study can be observed in other places which share similar social conditions with Çukurambar. However, it should not be forgotten that this study is not the whole story of conservatism in Turkey. It should be kept in mind that there are various reactions against the transformation of Islamist conservatism and what I examined is just one of them, the one which is an emergent tendency.

It should be also kept in mind that the ethnographic research which is the basis of the study was conducted between November 2012 and June 2013. When I was in the field, it was possible to hear about conservative democracy. However, especially after the Gezi Event, the concept evaporated fast mostly because the position of AKP shifted from conservative democracy to conservative authoritarianism in the political

field. It is early to analyze the impact of the recent shift over the conservative middlebrow taste. Apart from the recent political turmoil, Çukurambar keeps growing as there are still buildings under construction. It can be argued that the ‘choice of elegant and religiously proper’ will be durable so long as the conservatism of the ruling AKP is not re-constructed in opposition to capitalism and capitalist values. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the conservative middlebrow taste is still open to change as the conservative representation of ‘new Turkey’, the template to shape the object nation, is the motor of the political and social change in Turkey.

At the beginning of this study I was inspired especially by Ayşe Saktanber’s *Living Islam* and Cihan Tuğal’s *Passive Revolution*. If I had to answer the question of what is new in my study compared to these two early studies, I would underline two points. First of all, the conservative middle classes mind being ‘conscious Muslim’ as Saktanber examined two decades ago. However, the secluded or introverted conservative social life seems to have weakened. In other words, the center of the conservative identity exceeded the private space as conservatism turned into being the legitimate identity under the rule of AKP. Second, it wouldn’t be complete to explain the examined transformation as passive revolution or absorption into capitalism. In terms of the conservative middle classes, the process of transformation could be explained rather as symbolic revolution as it overturned the conservative cognitive schemata especially regarding the presentation of (middle class) social position in the everyday life.

Lastly, to keep the focus of the study still I had to restrict some of the secondary discussions into a compact form. This is especially the case for the arguments in the historical chapter. For example, I sincerely believe the potency of the concept of ‘symbolic polarization’ to study politics in Turkey but it still needs to be further elaborated. Similarly, the critique of the variants of Protestant Ethic-based narratives on Muslim entrepreneurship deserves to be detailed in further studies.

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## A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

### MUHAFAZAKAR HABİTUSUN OLUŞUMU: ANKARA'DA BİR ÜST ORTA SINIF MAHALLESİ ÖRNEĞİ

Bu çalışma, İslamcı muhafazakarlığın AKP'nin kurulmasıyla geçirdiği dönüşümün muhafazakar orta sınıflar üzerindeki etkilerini inceliyor. Bu çalışmanın bu konudaki ilk araştırma olmadığını belirtmeliyiz. Özellikle 1990'lardan itibaren, muhafazakar hayat tarzındaki dönüşümler sosyal bilimler alanında yapılan araştırmalar içinde önemli bir yer ediniyor. Bu tez, geride kalan yirmi yıllık zaman diliminde üretilen öncü çalışmaların birikimi üzerine inşa edildi. Çalışmanın amacı, muhafazakar orta sınıf hayat tarzındaki dönüşümü tikel bir alana, örneğin moda, odaklanıp açıklamaktansa muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin geçirdiği dönüşümü bütünlüklü olarak incelemektir. Bu doğrultuda, çalışma Pierre Bourdieu sosyolojisini kuramsal rehber edinir ve araştırma nesnesini üç aşamalı bir süreç içinde inşa eder. Çalışma, hem gündelik dildeki hem de akademik üretimdeki muhafazakarlığa dair yaygın kanaatlerden koparak incelemeye başlar.

Kısaca, İslamcılık ve muhafazakarlık arasındaki bulanık ayrım yeniden ele alınır, Şerif Mardin'in merkez-çevre analizinin yerine muhafakarlığın ilişkisel sosyolojinin araçlarıyla incelenmesi önerilir ve son olarak muhafazakarlığı fikirler üzerinden anlamak yerine eğilimler üzerinden ele alınmanın sunabileceği imkanlar tartışılır. Bu üçlü kopuşun ardından, muhafazakarlık kuramsal olarak yeniden inşa edilir. Çalışma, bir ideoloji ya da düşünce tarzı olarak muhafazakarlık tanımının yerine muhafazakarlığı toplumsal tasavvur ve ayrım ilkelerinin sembolik girişimcilerin üretimlerinin etkisiyle büründüğü ve değişime açık form olarak tanımlıyor. Çalışma boyunca da, bu tanımla paralel olarak siyasetçilerin, modacıların, yazarların ve din adamlarının üretimleriyle, sıradan muhafazakarların hayat tarzı arasındaki etkileşim yansıtılıyor. Tarihsel bölümde siyaset alanındaki ilişkilere odaklanarak, Türkiye'deki çağdaş muhafazakarlığı biçimlendiren yapısal kısıtlılıklar (yani sembolik kutuplaşmayı) inceleniyor. Çukurambar'da gerçekleştirilen etnografik araştırmanın

sonucundaysa bu yapısal kısıtlılıklar içinde muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisini yeniden biçimlendiren toplumsal etkenler, bu süreç içinde muhafazakar beğenin büründüğü yeni form ve bu dönüşümün siyasi sonuçları inceleniyor. Özetin de özetini yapmak gerekirse, siyasi mücadeleler içinde üretilen temsillerin mekanı ve beğenileri biçimlendirerek toplumsal değişimi nasıl tetiklediği inceleniyor.

Muhafazakar Habitusun Oluşumu başlıklı bu doktora tezi, muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin geçirdiği dönüşümü konu alıyor. Bundan yirmi yıl önce İslamcı RP yükselişyken, muhafazakarlar arası farklılaşma makbul değildi. İslamcı muhafazakarlık da mevcut düzene karşı İslami bir alternatif arayışı ve dayanışmacı bir muhalefet biçimiydi. Yirmi yıl sonra bugün İslamcı muhalefet çekiciliğini yitirdi, İslamcı Refah Partisi'nin içinde yetişen reformist genç kuşakların kurduğu AKP düzenle bütünleşti. Aynı dönemde muhafazakarlar arasında farklılaşma daha önce hiç olmadığı kadar görünür oldu. Özellikle orta sınıf muhafazakarlar arasında tesettür, din ve vicdan özgürlüğünün sembolünden, burjuva kültürüyle barışık muhafazakar beğenin sembolüne dönüştü. Cuma Namazı sonrası türban yasağını protesto için polise direnen muhafazakarlar yerini Çukurambar'ı yeni muhafazakar beğenin podyumuna çeviren zarif muhafazakar kadın ve erkeklere bıraktı. Bu çalışma, muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin sözünü ettiğimiz bu değişimini iki boyutlu bir şekilde ele alıyor: Bir taraftan bu beğeniye mümkün kılan nesnel koşulları sorgularken diğer taraftan bu nesnel koşullar içinde var olan muhafazakar faillerin inşa ettikleri içsel dünya ve toplumsal dünya temsillerini ele alıyor. Başka bir deyişle, bu çalışma ele aldığı orta sınıf muhafazakar beğenisinin toplumsal gerçekliğini iki boyutlu olarak inceliyor. İlk olarak bu gerçekliği üreten toplumsal yapılara ve bu yapılar içinde muhafazakar beğenin büründüğü biçime ışık tutuyor. İkinci olarak ise muhafazakar bireylerin mevcut koşullar içinde inşa ettikleri içsel dünya ve toplumsal dünya temsillerini ele alıyor.

Muhafazakar Habitusun Oluşumu, alanında yapılmış ilk çalışma değil. En başından itibaren çalışma, bu alanda yapılmış iki öncül araştırmayla diyalog halinde kurgulandı. Bunlardan ilki Ayşe Saktanber'in Living Islam adlı çalışması. Giddens'in *yaşam siyaseti (life politics)* kavramını temel alan feminist bir yaklaşımı, Mardin'in Türkiye

anlatısı üzerine inşa eden bu çalışma, özellikle kadın muhafazakarlığına ışık tuttu. Benim çalışmam ise Saktanber'in boş bıraktığı erkek muhafazakarlığını ele alıyor. İkinci öncül çalışma ise Cihan Tuğal'ın Pasif Devrim'i. Sultanbeyli'de gerçekleştirilmiş etnografik bir araştırmaya dayanan bu çalışma ise işçi sınıfı İslamcı muhafazakarlığının düzenle bütünleşmesini konu alıyordu. Benim çalışmam ise orta sınıf muhafazakarlığının düzenle bütünleşmesini ve bu bütünleşmenin doğurduğu değişimi inceliyor.

Çalışma, incelediğimiz muhafazakar orta sınıf beğeninin somutlaştığı sembol mahallerlerden biri olan Çukurambar'da gerçekleştirilmiş etnografik araştırmanın verilerine dayanıyor. Bundan yirmi yıl önce Çukurambar baskın bir şekilde hala bir gecekondu mahallesi idi. 1990'ların başından itibaren mahallede başlayan düşük yoğunluklu kentsel dönüşüm 2000'lerin başından, özellikle de AKP'nin iktidara gelişini takiben hızlandı. 2002'de yapılan genel seçimlerden tek başına iktidar olarak çıkan AKP, ilk iş olarak Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin (TBMM) Oran'da bulunan lojmanını kapattı. Bu yeni muhafazakar iktidara göre milletin vekilleri milletin içinde yaşamalıydı. Lojmanlardan çıkan iktidar partisi vekillerinin önemli bir kısmı için yeni adres Çukurambar oldu. Daha Refah Partisi döneminde partili bir mütahit tarafından inşa edilmiş kooperatif evleri yeni adres arayan muhafazakar vekiller için bir miktatsız vazifesi gördü: Mahalle kısa sürede muhafazakar vekillerin ve bürokratların gözdesi haline dönüştü. Bu ilgi, mahallenin gecekondu kimliğinden hızla uzaklaşmasıyla neticelendi: El yordamıyla inşa edilmiş müstakil, tek katlı, bahçeli gecekondu evlerinin yerini hızla çok katlı, lüks residanslar aldı. Bunu takiben mahalledeki küçük esnaf da hızla hem ulusal hem de küresel işletmelerle yer değiştirdi. Plazalar, rezidanslar, restoranlar, kafeler, pastaneler, spor salonları ve kültür merkezleri etrafında yeni bir muhafazakar sosyal hayat ve bu hayatın ürünü yeni bir muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisi filizlendi. AKP genel merkezinin Söğütözü'ne taşınmasıyla Çukurambar'daki siyasi sermaye yoğunlaşması daha da pekişti. Siyasetçileri ve bürokratları takip eden orta sınıfların muhafazakar fraksiyonlarıyla birlikte Çukurambar burjuva kültürüyle barışık muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin podyumuna dönüştü. Sözünü ettiğimiz bu mekansal ve toplumsal

dönüşüm, Çukurambar'ın çalışmanın dayandığı ampirik araştırma için merkez olarak seçilmesinde etkili oldu.

Başlangıçta amacımız Çukurambar'da ikamet eden ailelerle derinlemesine mülakatlar yapmaktı. Fakat neredeyse altı ay süren sahaya girme çabaları sonuç vermedi. Arkadaşlar vasıtasıyla irtibat kurulan mahalle sakinleri bir yabancıyla hassas konular üzerinde konuşmayı güvenilir bulmadılar. Araştırmanın krize girdiği dönemde Sufiyane'yi keşfettim. Sufiyane, 2011 yılında açılmış bir İslami kültür ve sanat merkezi. Bu merkezde ney kursuna yazılmak ve Mesnevi Sohbetleri'ne katılmak suretiyle sahaya gerçek anlamda giriş yapabildim. Sufiyane etrafında oluşan sosyal çevrenin parçası olduktan sonra araştırdığım konuyu derinlemesine mülakatlar yoluyla incelemenin kısıtlı bir imkan sunacağını fark ettim. Çünkü derinlemesine mülakat analiz birimiyle mesafeli ve bir kereye mahsus ilişki kurulmasına dayanır. Mülakatları yöntem repertuarımdan çıkarmamakla birlikte araştırmanın merkezine Loic Wacquant'ın gözlemci katılımcılığını koydum. İsminin de ima ettiği gibi gözlemci katılımcılık katılımlı gözlemlerle benzerlik taşımaktadır. Fakat, katılımlı gözlem analiz biriminin kendine özgü perspektifini kavrayabilmek için gözlemi merkez alırken, gözlemci katılımcılıkta merkezde düşününsel bir şekilde gözlemlenmek üzere katılım yer alır. Gözlemci katılımcılıkta araştırmacı çalışmanın ampirik öznelileriyle aynı koşulları deneyimlemek suretiyle araştırma nesnesinin bedenselleşmiş içsel mantığını inceler. Bu araştırma bağlamında gözlemci katılımcılık, makbul muhafazakarlığı tanımlayan bilişsel şemaları, bedensel becerileri ve arzuları deneyimlemek suretiyle incelemeyi ifade ediyor. Her ne kadar, ney kursu ve Mesnevi Sohbetleri orta sınıf muhafazakarlığını deneyimlemek için imkan sunsa da muhafazakar habitusu içselleştirmek suretiyle incelemek bu iki etkinliğe katılmak suretiyle mümkün değildir. Her şeyden önce muhafazakarlık çok katmanlı bir olgudur. Bir başka deyişle muhafazakar habitus Wacquant'ın incelediği boksör habitusundan bir hayli farklıdır. Çünkü bir insanı boksöre dönüştüren etmenler temel itibarıyla boks salonu etrafında yoğunlaşırken, muhafazakar habitusun yoğunlaştığı merkez tek değildir. Aile, okul, dini cemaatler, siyasi partiler ve kültür ve düşünce dernekleri muhafazakar habitusu biçimlendiren merkezler

arasındadır. Özellikle erken sosyalleşme döneminde (temel olarak ailede) edinilmiş eğilimleri araştırma öznelinin yerine geçmek suretiyle deneyimlemek mümkün değildir. Fakat yine de bu kısıtlılık, gözlemci katılımcılığın muhafazakarlığı araştırmak için uygun bir metod olmadığı anlamına gelmez. Bu kısıtlılığının yanında, araştırmacının girmesinin zor olduğu alanlara girişi kolaylaştırması gözlemci katılımcılığın en önemli meziyetidir. Gözlemci katılımcılığın muhafazakar habitusu incelemekteki kısıtlılığını gidermek için araştırmanın yöntem repertuarını genişlettim. Etnografik gözlemlerin yanında derinlemesine mülakatlar yaptım. Böylelikle erken sosyalleşme döneminde edinilen başat muhafazakar eğilimlere mülakatlar yoluyla ulaşmaya çalıştım. Aynı şekilde, muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisini tam teşekküllü biçimde inceleyebilmek için araştırma öznelinin okuduğu kitapları, gazeteleri, dergileri düzenli bir şekilde takip ettim ve okudum. Böylelikle, muhafazakarlığın mülakatlarla ulaşılamayacak gündelik hayat deneyimine katılma ve gözlemeleme fırsatım oldu.

Sahada üretilmiş verilerin yorumlanmasına geçmeden önce, araştırmaya dair meraktan, soru formunun düzenlenmesine, verilerin üretilmesine ve yorumlanmasına kadar her aşamada etkili olan teorik arka plana değinmek istiyorum. Bu çalışma, Pierre Bourdieu'nün yapısalcı inşacı sosyolojik yaklaşımını temel alıyor. Bourdieu'nün bilimsel sosyoloji olarak adlandırdığı bu yaklaşım temel olarak üç araştırma ediminden oluşuyor: yaygın kanaatlerden kopuş, araştırma nesnesinin bilimsel inşası ve uygulama. Bu yaklaşımın araştırma üzerindeki en temel etkisi şu oldu: incelenen muhafazakar orta sınıf beğeninin muhafazakarlığını ve orta sınıflığını verili olarak kabul etmek yerine inşa etmek gerekti. Bu oldukça zahmetli oldu çünkü muhafazakarlığın hem gündelik dildeki hem de akademi alanındaki verili tanımlarından kopmayı gerektirdi. Bunun yerine muhafazakarlık tarihselleştirmek suretiyle yeniden inşa edildi. Böylelikle, muhafazakarlığın evrensel kitabi tanımlarıyla hareket etmek yerine, sınırları belirli bir toplumsal dünyada verilen iktidar mücadelelerine ve bu mücadelelerin toplumsal izdüşümlerine odaklanarak Türkiye'de muhafazakarların gerçekten de var olan muhafazakarlığının mantığını inceledim. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'de muhafazakarlığın teşkilinde sembolik

sistemlerin (özellikle din ve dilin) oynadığı role ve cumhuriyet devrimlerinin tasarlanmamış sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan sembolik kutuplaşmaya işaret ettim. Böylelikle bugünkü muhafazakarlığın kaynağı olarak, eski düzenin sabit fikirlerini bilinç-dışı yollarla bedenselleştirmiş faillerin cumhuriyet devrimleri karşısında edindikleri mutsuz bilince işaret ettim. Buna ek olarak, muhafazakarlığın bu ilk halinin özellikle siyasi temsil ilişkilerinin kurulmasıyla birlikte sürekli yeniden biçimlendirildiğinin altını çizdim.

Muhafazakarlığı habitus üzerinden, yani zihinsel yapılara dönüşmüş toplumsal yapılar üzerinden, incelemek Türkiye'nin akademik alanındaki muhafazakarlıkla ilgili başlıca üç yaygın kanaatten kopuşu ifade eder. Bu üç yaygın kanaat sırasıyla şunlardır: İslamcılığı muhafazakarlıktan ayrı bir siyasi konum olarak ele alan görüş; muhafazakarlığı siyasi ideoloji ya da düşünce biçimiyle özdeşleştiren görüş ve son olarak Türkiye'de muhafazakarlığın sivil toplumun doğal ideolojisi olduğunu ima eden merkez-çevre ayrımı. Türkiye'de İslamcılığı muhafazakarlıktan ayırma eğilimi büyük bir oranda merkez sağ partileri Milli Görüş partilerinden ayırma ihtiyacına dayanır. Bir tarafta kurulu düzenin temel ilkeleriyle barışık merkez sağ partiler diğer tarafta ise kurulu düzenin laiklik, piyasa ekonomisi ve modern toplumsal hayat gibi ilkeleriyle mesafeli Milli Görüş partileri yer alır. İslamcılığın yukarıda sözünü ettiğimiz kurulu düzenin ilkelerine karşı muhalefeti Milli Görüş partilerinin kapanmasıyla sonuçlandığı için, genel eğilim İslamcılığın merkez sağ siyaset ile özdeşleşmiş muhafazakarlıktan daha sert bir ideoloji olduğu yönündedir. Dolayısıyla, bu ayırım esas olarak devlet gözünde meşru muhafazakarlık ve meşru olmayan muhafazakarlık ayrımını ifade eder. Bu ayırımdaki temel sorun İslamcılığın muhafazakarlığın sınırlarını aşmasından ziyade, Türkiye'de merkez sağ siyasetin muhafazakarlığın karşılığı olarak genelleşmesidir. Oysaki muhafazakarlık farklı tarihsel-toplumsal koşullarda farklı biçimlere bürünebilmektedir. İslamcılık da muhafazakarlığın Müslüman toplumlarda 19. Yüzyıldan itibaren büründüğü ve sürekli değişim halindeki formlardan biridir. Dolayısıyla, AKP'nin kurulmasıyla yaşanan siyasi değişimin karşılığı İslamcılıktan muhafazakarlığa geçişten ziyade muhafazakarlığın farklı formları arasındaki bir hareketlilikten ibarettir. Bir başka

deyişle bu çalışma AKP'nin, İslam'ın ortodoks bir siyasi yorumuna demirlemiş, dayanışmacı ve devrimci bir muhalif hareketten, kurulu düzenle (özellikle de kapitalizmle) bütünleşmiş, evrimci bir muhafazakarlığa geçişin ürünü olduğunu ileri sürüyor.

AKP'nin kuruluşuna zemin hazırlayan dönüşümü muhafazakarlık içi bir değişim olarak nitelendirdikten sonra muhafazakarlığın sosyolojik bir tanımını yapmak daha büyük bir önem kazanır. Her ne kadar muhafazakar ideoloji muhafazakarlığın gerçekliğinin zeminini teşkil etse de onun tam karşılığı değildir. Muhafazakarlığı bir ideoloji ya da düşünce biçimiyle özdeşleştirmenin sorunlarından biri analizin skolastik akla hapsolmasıdır. Muhafazakarlığı muhafazakar felsefe ya da siyaset üzerinden anlama gayreti toplumsal uzamdaki muhafazakarlığı kendi gerçekliği içerisinde açıklamak yerine ona felsefi bir anlam atfetmekle neticelenir. Oysaki muhafazakar bireylerin muhafazakarlığı düşünsel ya da entellektüel bir çabanın ürünü değildir. Çoğu muhafazakar için muhafazakarlık, sosyalleşme süreçlerinde edinilmiş eğilimlerin ürünüdür. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma gündelik hayattaki muhafazakarlığı fikirler ya da ideolojiler üzerinden anlamak yerine eğilimler üzerinden kavramayı öneriyor.

Muhafazakarlığı eğilimler üzerinden incelemek, bir ideoloji, kültürel üretim ya da düşünce biçimi olarak muhafazakarlığın reddedilmesini gerektirmez. Tam tersine bedensel muhafazakarlıkla, siyasi, kültürel ve akademik üretim vasıtasıyla somutlaşmış muhafazakar düşünceler arasındaki ilişkilerin izini sürmek suretiyle 'bir düşünce tarzı ya da ideoloji' olarak muhafazakarlık tanımının üzerine yapışmış bulanıklıktan kurtulma fırsatı verir. Bir kavramın ilişkisel tanımını geliştirmek onun mümkün olan en iyi tanımını üretmeyi vaad etmez; fakat kavramın ampirik tanımını geliştirmeyi mümkün kılar. Türkiye'de muhafazakarlığın daha önce geliştirilmiş ampirik tanımı temel olarak muhafazakar partiler ve bireyler arasındaki dini benzeşime vurgu yaparlar. Dini muhafazakar değerlerin merkez bankası olarak gören bu yaklaşım, 'dini kültürel kodu' bir insanı muhafazakar kılan temel mekanizma olarak kabul eder. Türkiyenin akademik alanındaki yaygın kanaati ifade eden bu

örtük kültürel yapısalcı yaklaşımdaki temel sorun bireyleri muhafazakar olarak sınıflandıran değerlerin kaynağı olarak kutsal kaynakları görmesidir.

Bu çalışmanın, yaygın muhafazakarlık kavrayışına cevaben geliştirdiği ampirik tanıma göre muhafazakarlık farklı alanlardan uzmanların sembolik girişimciliği neticesinde (toplumsal cinsiyet, etnisite, ulusal ve dini aidiyetler gibi) ‘toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım’ (social vision and division) ilkelerinin büründüğü form olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım ilkeleri temel olarak dünyayla ilişki kurmanın sembolik çerçevelerini ifade eder. Örneğin kadın veya erkek olarak toplumsal dünyayla ilişki kurmak sözünü ettiğimiz sembolik çerçevelerin ürünüdür. Nitekim, bir tasavvur ve ayırım ilkesi olarak kadınlık veya erkeklik toplumsal olarak üretilir ve sembolik girişimciler tarafından sürekli yeniden biçimlendirilir.

Muhafazakarlık toplumsal cinsiyet, dini ve ulusal aidiyet ilkelerinin aldığı sürekli değişime ve yeniden biçimlendirilmeye açık formdur. Yaygın olarak muhafazakarlığın tanımı olarak kabul edilen siyasi, kültürel ve akademik üretim sözünü ettiğimiz toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım ilkelerini biçimlendiren etmenlerdir. Muhafazakarlığın gerçeğinin parçası olmakla birlikte, tek başlarına muhafazakarlığı tanımlama kapasiteleri yoktur. Buna ek olarak, toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım ilkelerinin biçimlendirilmesi geniş bir toplumsallığın biçimlendirilmesini ifade eder. Örneğin, toplumsal dünyayla bir kadın ya da erkek olarak nasıl ilişki kurulması gerektiğini biçimlendirmek ailenin teşkilini, aile içi iş bölümünü, ev dekorasyonunu ve toplumsal hayata katılmayı biçimlendirir. Muhafazakarlığın bedensel kaynaklarını ifade eden toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım ilkelerinin verili olmadığını ve toplumsal uzamda verilen iktidar mücadelelerinin tarihsel bir ürünü olduğunu vurgulamalıyız. Dolayısıyla, bireysel gibi görünen bedensel muhafazakarlığın geniş toplumsal ilişkiler ağının ürünü olduğu unutulmamalı. Aynı şekilde, bedensel muhafazakarlığın aldığı formun evrensel bir nitelik taşımadığını da vurgulamalıyız. Toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım ilkelerinin büründüğü muhafazakar form spesifik bir toplumsal uzamda verilen çeşitli iktidar mücadelelerinin güzergahına göre biçimlenir. Dolayısıyla, bedensel muhafazakarlığın evrensel olarak sahip olduğu bir tözden söz

etmek mümkün değildir. Toplumsal tasavvur ve ayırım ilkelerine belirli bir form vermek somut sonuçlar üretir. Ailede, okulda, camide, siyasi partilerde veya kültürel derneklerde edinilen eğilimler seti, bu sembolik ürünler, toplumsal koşulları muhafazakar bir biçimde şekillendirmek suretiyle bireyleri muhafazakar kılabilir. Başka bir deyişle, eğilimler seti olarak içselleştirilmiş bu sembolik ürünler zihinsel şemalara dönüşmek suretiyle algıları ve eylemleri muhafazakar biçimde şekillendirir.

Muhafazakarlığı eğilimler üzerinden kavramak Türkiye'nin akademi alanında yerleşik merkez-çevre yaklaşımına da alternatif sunar. Merkez-çevre yaklaşımında muhafazakarlık çevrenin doğal ideolojisini ima eder. İktidar ilişkilerini yönetenler ve yönetilenler karşıtlığına hapseden bu kültürel yapısalcı yaklaşım, sermaye türlerinin çoğullaşmasıyla paralel gelişen toplumsal farklılaşmayı kavramakta zorluk çeker. Netice olarak bu yaklaşım muhafazakarlığı kültürel değerler üzerinden tanımlar. Bu çalışma, muhafazakarlığı ikililik üzerine kurulmuş bir iktidar yapısının yol açtığı muhalif değerler üzerinden anlamaya çalışmak yerine, ilişkisel sosyolojinin rehberliğinde muhafazakarlığın iktidar ilişkileri ve sembolik mücadeleler içinde kazandığı anlamın gündelik hayattaki karşılığını inceliyor.

Muhafazakarlığa dair yaygın kanaatlerden kopulduktan sonra bir sonraki adımda muhafazakarlığın ilişkisel sosyolojinin sunduğu kuramsal araçlarla inşa edilmesi yer alıyor. Bu araştırmanın merkezinde yer alan Pierre Bourdieu sosyolojisi Cezayir'deki erken dönem çalışmalarından en güncel eseri "Devlet Üzerine"ye kadar 'imkanın toplumsal koşulları'na demirlemiş bir araştırma nesnesi inşa etme programıdır. Bourdieu sosyolojisinin temel meziyeti, özne/nesne, yapı/fail, beden/zihin, tarih/akıl, maddi/sembolik, teori/araştırma ve öznelcilik/nesnelcilik gibi sosyal bilimlerde kökleşmiş ikililikleri tasviye etmesi suretiyle gerçekleştirdiği sembolik devrimdir. Bourdieu sosyolojisine biçim veren bir diğer temel özellik de Durkheim sosyolojisinin temel ilkelerinden biri olan toplumsal yapılarla zihinsel yapılar arasındaki eş mantıklılığı habitus kavramı vasıtasıyla araştırma gündeminin ayrılmaz bir parçası kılmasıdır.

Kısaca ifade etmek gerekirse Bourdieu sosyolojisinde araştırma nesnesi inşa etme süreci temel olarak iki uğraktan oluşur: nesnelci uğrak ve öznelci uğrak. Nesnelci uğraktaki temel amaç toplumsal dünyayı biçimlendiren düzenlilikleri ya da toplumsal yapıları tespit etmektir. Bir başka deyişle, çeşitli sermaye türlerinin eşitsiz dağılımıyla biçimlenmiş konumları tespit ederek topolojik bir toplumsal uzam inşa etmektir. Sermaye türlerinin eşitsiz dağılımıyla oluşmuş konumlar aynı zamanda faillerin içinde var oldukları toplumsal koşulların tespit edilmesini ima eder. Nesnelci uğrak adında da ima edildiği gibi içinde var olan failin niyeti veya iradesine bağlı olmaksızın işlev gösteren sermaye türleri, alanlar, konumlar ve diğer yapısal unsurların tespit edilmesine dayanır. Nesnel yapıların tespiti, öznelci uğrak için de hayati önemdedir. Nitekim, nesnelci uğrakta inşa edilen konumları işgal eden faillerin yaşadıkları toplumsal dünyaya dair temsilleri boşlukta oluşmaz. Nesnel yapılarda somutlaşan toplumsallık erken sosyalleşme döneminden itibaren bilişsel şema olarak içselleştirilir. Böylelikle, failin içinde yaşadığı toplumsal dünyaya dair inşa ettiği temsiller (düşünceler, duygular, fikirler) içinde yaşadığı nesnel koşullardan kopuk değildir. Nesnel koşullar ve öznel temsiller arasındaki eş mantıklılığı kuran mekanizma habitustur. Kısaca bilişsel kategori(ler) olarak içselleştirilmiş dış dünyayı ifade eden habitus iki şekilde işlev görür: İlk olarak dış dünyadaki failleri, eylemleri ve ürünleri algılar ve sınıflandırır; ikinci olarak ise bu algıyla uyumlu tercihler üretir. Siyasi tercihlerden, eş seçimine ya da mobilya tercihinine kadar birbiriyle ilişkisiz gibi görülen alanlardaki stil benzerliği habitusun toplumsal eylem üzerindeki izidir. Bir başka deyişle habitus hayat tarzının üretici mekanizmasıdır. Dolayısıyla, habitusun temel meziyeti toplumsal uzam, bilişsel (zihinsel) kategoriler ve sembolik uzam arasında eş mantıklılık kurmasıdır.

Bu kuramsal yaklaşım ışığında orta sınıfların muhafazakar fraksiyonlarının habitusunu incelemek önce nesnel koşulların teşkilini ardından bu nesnel koşullar içinde faillerin toplumsal dünyayı nasıl inşa ettiklerini ele almayı gerektirir. Bu doğrultuda çalışma, muhafazakar habitusu incelemeye önce mevcut muhafazakarlığın teşkilini mümkün kılan nesnel koşulları inceleyerek başlıyor. Bu amaç doğrultusunda siyasi mücadelelere odaklanarak toplumsal uzamın dönüşümü

ve bu dönüşümün mevcut muhafazakarlığa ve muhafazakarlara etkileri tartışılıyor. Siyaset alanı üzerinden toplumsal uzamı tarihselleştirmekti amaç İslamcı muhafazakarlıktaki kırılmayı ve bunun muhafazakar orta sınıflar üzerindeki etkilerini inceleyebilmek.

İslamcılık 19. yüzyılda Osmanlı topraklarında ilk ortaya çıktığında bir dini yenileşme hareketi ve aynı zamanda da zayıflayan devleti kurtarmaya dair muhafazakar bir reçeteydi. 20. yüzyılın başına gelindiğinde temel olarak iki forma bütünlüştü: işçi sınıfı muhafazakarlığı ve entellektüel muhafazakarlık. Cumhuriyetin ilanıyla birlikte iktidar mücadelelerinin değişen seyri ve toplumsal uzam üzerinde kurulan katı bir devletçi kontrolün etkisiyle bu Osmanlı döneminden kalan iki muhafazakarlık formu önce sessizleşti ardından meşruiyetini yitirdi. Bu özellikle entellektüel muhafazakarlık için geçerliydi. İşçi sınıfı muhafazakarlığı kabuğuna çekildi fakat ortadan kaybolmadı. Erken Cumhuriyet devrimlerinin ve buna paralel yürüyen sıkı devlet kontrolünün muhafazakarlık açısından en önemli sonuçlarından biri ‘cumhuriyetle barışık bir muhafazakarlık’ formunun icat edilmesidir. İlk olarak entellektüel alanda ortaya çıkan bu form siyaset alanına da Demokrat Parti (DP) aracılığıyla sirayet etti.

1970’e kadar DP ve onu takip eden merkez sağ partiler İslamcı muhafazakarları da kapsayan bir tür muhafazakar çatı partisi vazifesi gördü. 1970’te Milli Görüş Hareketi müstakil bir siyasi hareket olarak ortaya çıktıktan sonra merkez sağ partiler çatısı altındaki gıyabi muhafazakar koalisyon dağıldı ve merkez sağ partilerin müesses nizamla barışık muhafazakarlığının yanında İslamcı muhafazakarlık müesses nizamın meşru olmayan muhafazakarlık türü olarak ortaya çıktı. Milli Görüş partilerinin laiklik, kapitalist piyasa ekonomisi ve modern toplumsal hayat karşısında takındığı eleştirel tutum partilerin kapatılmasını ve lider kadrolara siyasi yasak getirilmesini beraberinde getirdi. Böylelikle muhafazakarlığın erken Cumhuriyet döneminde deneyimlediği meşruiyet krizi tekrar etti. İslamcı muhafazakarlık 1990’larda yükselişe geçtiğinde ve 1995 genel seçimlerinden birinci çıkarak koalisyon hükümetinin parçası olduğunda dahi sözünü ettiğimiz meşruiyet krizi

çözömlenmedi. 28 Şubat 1997'deki askeri müdahalenin ardından Refah Partisi ve ardılı Fazilet Partisi kapatılınca parti içindeki reformist genç kuşaklar bu kısır döngüden kurtulmanın yolunu müesses nizamla barışık (meşru) bir muhafazakar konum inşa etmekte buldular.

AKP İslamcı muhafazakarlığın sözünü ettiğimiz meşruiyet krizine çare arayışı olarak 2001'de kuruldu. Milli Görüş gömleğini çıkararak yeni partinin kurucu kadroları yeni siyasi konumlarını muhafazakar demokrasi olarak tanımladılar. Kağıt üzerinde inşa edilen bu yeni siyasi konum pratikte Türkiye'nin siyaset alanındaki üç temel ayırım ilkesiyle uzlaşmacı bir etkileşimin ürünü olarak ortaya çıktı. Bu üç temel ayırım ilkesi laiklik, piyasa ekonomisi ve üniter devlet ilkelerinden oluşur. Muhafazakar demokrasi bu üç temel ayırım ilkesinin olduğu gibi benimsenmesini ifade etmiyordu. Daha ziyade bu üç ilkeyle muhafazakar bir biçimde etkileşime geçmenin yeni bir formülüne dayanıyordu. Bu yeni muhafazakar formül, İslamcı muhafazakarlığın katı ve devrimci muhalif tutumundan bir hayli farklıydı. Muhafazakar demokrasi bu üç ilkeye karşı uzlaşmacı ve reformist bir strateji izlemenin ürünüydü. Her ne kadar resmi laiklik tanımını esnetme girişimleri yeni bir kapatma davasıyla karşılaşmalarına sebep olduysa da piyasa ekonomisiyle kusursuz bütünleşmeleri onları Milli Görüş partilerinin karşılaştığı sondan kurtardı.

AKP'nin temsil ettiği bu yeni siyasi konumun etkileri siyaset alanıyla sınırlı kalmadı. Bu yeni muhafazakar konumun toplumsal uzamdaki en önemli etkisi İslamcı muhafazakarlar arasındaki kolektif sofuluğun (collective orthodoxy) yıkılması oldu. Kolektif sofuluğun Milli Görüş sempatizanı orta sınıflar için ürettiği sonuç özellikle sınıf temelli toplumsal farklılıkların bastırılması ve böylelikle sınıfsal konumun toplumsal hayatta sergilenmemesini salık veren bir nevi çileci tutumun benimsenmesiydi. Bir başka deyişle, AKP öncesi muhafazakar orta sınıflarda kapitalizmle kurulan ilişki sermaye birikimi hususunda yoğunlaşmış fakat sermayenin tüketim kalıpları vasıtasıyla sergilenmesi hususunda neredeyse antikapitalist ahlaki bir tutum takınılıyordu. AKP iktidarında Milli Görüş partilerine özgü mesafeli kapitalizmin bırakılmasının temel etkisi kapitalizm karşıtı ahlaki

tutumun buharlaşması oldu. AKP'nin erken dönemindeki reformist muhafazakarlığı orta sınıfların muhafazakar fraksiyonları üzerinde ciddi dönüşümler yaratmakla birlikte erken Cumhuriyet dönemi devrimlerinin tasarlanmayan sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan sembolik kutuplaşmayı gideremedi. Laik orta sınıfların hayat tarzlarından da etkilenen muhafazakar beğeni güçlenen muhafazakar siyasi iktidarla birlikte meşru beğeni olma yolunda mesafe kat etti. Bununla birlikte hayat tarzları arasındaki mesafeli etkileşime rağmen toplumsal uzamda birbiriyle çatışmalı iki sembolik düzen varlığını korudu.

Muhafazakar orta sınıf beğeniye mümkün kılan toplumsal koşulları incelemeye fiziksel uzam, mekan, üzerinden başladım. Bu bölümde Çukurambar'ın köyden başlayıp gecekondulu mahallesine, son olarak da lüks sitelere uzanan dönüşümünü sermaye türlerinin dağılımı üzerinden inceledim. Daha Refah Partisi döneminde bir grup millet vekilinin mahallede kurduğu kooperatifin AKP iktidarında meclis lojmanlarının kapanmasıyla birlikte mahalleyi muhafazakar politikacılar için nasıl bir çekim merkezine dönüştürdüğüne değindim. Mahalledeki muhafazakar siyasi sermaye yoğunlaşmasının etkilerinden biri mahallede yerel yönetimlerin izin verdiği maksimum kat sayısının yükseltilmesi oldu. Bu da mahalleyi rant arayışındaki mütahitlerin gözünde cazip kıldı. Böylelikle ancak orta-üst sınıfların daire satın alabileceği otuz katlı lüks sitelerin yapımı başladı. Çukurambar mekanın piyasa odaklı muhafazakarlaşmasının erken örneklerinden biridir ve mütahitlerin rant arayışıyla muhafazakar siyasi sermayenin yoğunlaşmasının ürünüdür. Çukurambar, özellikle AKP genel merkezinin Söğütözü'ne taşınmasının ardından muhafazakar orta sınıflar için bir çekim merkezine dönüştü fakat yine de şu anda mahallede ikamet eden nüfusu muhafazakar olarak sınıflandırmak mümkün değil. Hatta mahalle baskın olarak CHP seçmenleri tarafından ikamet ediliyor. Fakat buna rağmen Çukurambar bir muhafazakar mahalle olarak biliniyor. Bunda ana akım marketlerin, kafelerin, restoranların işletmelerini mahallede yaşayan muhafazakar siyasetçilerin etkisiyle muhafazakar-dostu olarak düzenlemelerinin payı büyük. Normalde alkol servis edilen restoranlarda alkollü ürünlerin menüden çıkarılması, marketlerde alkollü ürünler reyonunun kaldırılması ve kafelerin muhafazakar beğeniyle paralel

olarak düzenlenmesi mekanın muhafazakar siyasetçilerin sembolik iktidarının etkisiyle dönüştürülmesine örnek olarak verilebilir.

Çukurambar'ın dönüşümünü açıkladıktan sonra, bir sonraki bölümde muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin dönüşümünü inceliyorum. Öncelikle, orta sınıfların muhafazakar fraksiyonunu ve geçirdiği dönüşümü yakından tanıyabilmek için kısaca Akevler Kooperatifini inceliyorum. Akevlerdeki sosyal hayata damgasını vuran kolektif sofuluğun AKP'nin kurulmasıyla birlikte yerini bireysel sofuluğa bıraktığını ileri sürüyorum. Hemen ardından muhafazakar orta sınıfların aileden edindikleri başat muhafazakar eğilimleri tespit ediyorum: sevap-günah ayırımına dayanan toplumsal sınıflandırma sistemi, kadın ve erkek rollerinin ayrımı ve buna paralel özel alan ve kamusal alan kullanımı, muhafazakar dil ve ibadetlere sıkı sıkıya bağlılık erken dönemde edinilen muhafazakar eğilimler arasındadır. Bu ortak eğilimlere rağmen muhafazakar orta sınıflar yek pare bir grup değildir. Grup içindeki farklılaşmalar özellikle faillerin sosyal güzergahları incelendiğinde belirginleşir. Buna göre muhafazakar orta sınıf konumu aileden edinenler, eğitim yoluyla yükselenler ve sonradan muhafazakarlaşanlar grup içindeki üç aksi oluşturur. Muhafakar orta sınıf beğenisinin doğurgan ilkesi 'zarif ve dinen makbul' aileden edinilen eğilimler üzerinde inşa edilir. İlk olarak, aileden edinilen dindarlık, dindar bir sosyal çevre ediniminde işlev gösterir. Bu sosyalleşme, din temelli muhafazakar yaygın kanaatleri üretir ve bunlarla uyumlu yaşamayı telkin eder. Fakat, eğitim devreye girdiğinde orta sınıfların muhafazakarlığı incelikli bir hal alır. Bu kez daha geniş bir dünyayla muhafazakar bir ilişki kurmanın entellektüel araçları edinilir. Bu incelikli muhafazakarlık muhafazakar kültürel üretimle kurulan ilişkinin sağlamlığına paralel olarak sürer. Eğitim, muhafazakarları seküler kültürle de tanıştırır. Fakat bu konuda asıl kaynak medyadır. Muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisi medyadaki orta sınıf temsillerinden edinilmiş sembolik araçlarla yeniden inşa edilir. Fakat burada unutulmaması gereken nokta, muhafazakarların dönüşüm için gerekli olan potansiyeli daha önceden beri taşımalarına rağmen bu ancak siyaset alanındaki dönüşümün ardından mümkün olmuştur. AKP'nin düzenle bütünleşmesi

muhafazakar orta sınıflar arasındaki kolektif sofuluđu ve ileciliđi ortadan kaldırır. Yeni beđeni toplumsal konum ve dinle uyumlu bir Őekilde inŐa edilir.

Muhafazakar orta sınıf beđenisi pürüzsüz bir atmosferde ortaya ıkmadı. Tam tersine, belirginleŐmeye baŐladığı ilk dönemlerden itibaren hem laik kesimin hem de muhafazakar kesimin eleŐtiri oklarının hedefi oldu. Her iki kesimden eleŐtirel seslerin ortak kanaati, bu yeni beđenin milli kùltürden yabancılaŐmayı ifade etmesiydi. Bu eleŐtirilerin ürettiđi gerilim, ukurambar'daki saha araŐtırmamın baŐından itibaren hissediliyordu. AraŐtırma kapsamında görüŐtüđüm herkes kendisinin tüketim düŐkünü olmadığını söyleyerek söze baŐlıyordu. Dahası hiç kimsenin etrafında tüketimci muhafazakar da bulunmyordu. Fakat yine de herkes ađız birliđi etmiŐçesine mahallede kök salmış tüketimci muhafazakarlardan Őikayet ediyordu. Zamanla anladım ki, tüketimci muhafazakarlar ukurambar'ın hayaleti, tüketimci muhafazakarlık ise sembolik mücadeleler aracılıđıyla ters çevrilmeye alıŐılan damgaydı. Muhafazakarların sözünü ettiđim bu yabancılaŐma damgasıyla baŐ etme stratejileri öncelikle kendilerine yöneltilmiş eleŐtirileri sahiplenmekten geçiyordu. Onlara göre de milli kùltüre yabancılaŐma en büyük toplumsal sorunlar arsındaydı ve bununla baŐ etmenin yolu da eğitimden geçiyordu. Dini sohbetler, yüksek İslam kùltürünün orjinal kaynaklarından okumalar, cemaat etkinlikleri sözünü ettiđimiz eğitim faaliyetinin unsurları arasında görülebilir.

Mesnevi Sohbetleri de bu etkinlerin içindedir. Mesnevi Sohbetleri'nin tasarlanmamıŐ sonucu soyut bir Müslüman portresi izmesidir: Hiç bir zaman geri ödeyemeyeceđi hayat borcuyla dünyaya gelen Müslüman borcunu sınav günü gelene kadar hayatını Allah rızasını kazanacak Őekilde yaŐayarak ödemeye alıŐır. Bunun için ibadetlerine sıkı sıkıya sarılmak dıŐında inancını kalbiyle, ameliyle ve diliyle bütünlüklü bir Őekilde yaŐamalıdır. Fakat ne olursa olsun, Müslüman için kurtuluŐun öncü bir iŐareti yoktur; Allah'ın huzuruna ıkana kadar kurtuluŐ belirsizdir: hem korkunun hem de ümidin kaynađıdır. KurtuluŐun belirsiz olduđunun bilinci bir taraftan ibadetlere sıkı sıkıya sarılmayı teŐvik ederken diđer taraftan toplumsal sorumlulukları hatırlatarak Müslümanı kibirden korur. Sözünü ettiđimiz bu soyut Müslüman somut Müslüman

için bir rol-modelidir. Fakat yine de somut Müslümanın hayatı saf dini uğraşla dolu değildir. Özellikle muhafazakar orta sınıflar dervişane bir hayatın iş dünyasındaki hayranları olarak görülebilir. Benliğin eğitiminin temel işlevi iş, din ve tüketim arasındaki doğru dengenin bulunmasıdır.

Puritenleşmiş içsel dünyadan dış dünyaya baktıklarında muhafazakar orta sınıflar anonim bireyler kalabalığında ortak bir tarihe ve onun ürettiği kolektif ruhu paylaşmaya dayanan bir kültürel birlik görür. Başka bir deyişle, dış dünyanın mevcut gerçekliği Türk-İslam medeniyetinin kesintisiz akışının bir ürünü olarak görülür. Böylelikle, aynı medeniyet etrafında toplanmak birbirinden kopuk gibi görünen bireylerden muhafazakar bir biz üreten sihirli ifade eder. Bu muhafazakar biz sadece bireylerden müteşekkil değildir, aynı zamanda bireyler kadar devletin de dahil olduğu bir bizdir. Burada sözünü ettiğimiz devlet merkezli dünya görüşü muhafazakar zihnin verili bir niteliği değildir. O, daha ziyade belirli bir siyasi sosyalleşmenin ve muhafazakar kültürel üretimle girilen ilişkinin bir parçası olarak içselleştirilir. Dolayısıyla, devlet ve vatandaş ilişkisi birbirinden kopuk olarak görülmez, bir bütünün parçasıdır. Muhafazakar orta sınıflar için AKP iktidarı devlet ve vatandaş arasında daha önce kopmuş olan ilişkileri yeniden birleştirir. Bu inanç, aynı zamanda, muhafazakar orta sınıflar ve AKP arasındaki yüksek sadakatin de kaynağıdır.

Bu çalışma Çukurambar'da gerçekleştirilmiş bir etnografik çalışmaya dayanmakla birlikte yekpare bir Çukurambar incelemesi değildir. Çukurambar'la benzer toplumsal koşulları paylaşan başka sosyo-mekansal örgütlenmelerde benzer bulgulara rastlamak mümkündür. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın sonuçları Çukurambar sınırlarıyla kısıtlı değildir. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışmanın Türkiye'deki muhafazakarlığın bütünlüklü bir incelemesi olmadığı unutulmamalıdır. İslamcı muhafazakarlığın geçirdiği dönüşüme karşı geliştirilen farklı muhafazakar tepkiler olduğu unutulmamalıdır.

Bu çalışmaya temel olan etnografik araştırmanın Kasım 2012 ve Haziran 2013 arasında yürütüldüğü de unutulmamalıdır. Araştırmanın yapıldığı dönemde muhafazakar demokrasi görüşmeciler arasında hala sihirli bir kavramdı. Fakat özellikle Gezi Olayları'ndan sonra kavram büyüsünü yitirdi. Muhafazakar söylemdeki bu değişimin kaynağında AKP'nin siyaset alanındaki konumunun muhafazakar reformizmden otoriter muhafazakarlığa kayması bulunur. Siyaset alanındaki bu kaymanın muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisi üzerindeki etkisini incelemek için henüz erken. Fakat, son dönemdeki sert siyasi çalkantılara rağmen Çukurambar yeni inşaatlarla büyümeye devam ediyor. AKP kapitalizm ve kapitalist değerler karşısı bir konumu inşa etmediği sürece, muhafazakar orta sınıfların beğenisini simgeleyen 'zarif ve dinen makbul tercih'in kalıcı olacağını söyleyebiliriz. Fakat yine de muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin değişime açık olduğunun altını çizmeliyiz. Özellikle AKP iktidarının son döneminde nesne ulusu biçimlendiren muhafazakar şablon olarak işlev gösteren 'yeni Türkiye' temsilinin hem siyasi hem de toplumsal dönüşümün motoru olduğunu düşündüğümüzde muhafazakar orta sınıf beğenisinin gelecekte uğrayabileceği olası kırılmaların sürpriz olmayacağını belirtelim.

Çalışmanın başında da belirtildiği gibi, araştırmanın iki temel esin kaynağı bulunuyor: Ayşe Saktanber'in Living Islam adlı çalışması ve Cihan Tuğal'in Pasif Devrim başlıklı çalışması. Eğer bu çalışmayı sözünü ettiğimiz iki öncül çalışmayla karşılaştırmak ve bu çalışmaya özgü noktaları vurgulamak zorunda olsaydım iki noktanın altını çizerdim. İlk olarak, Saktanber'in yaklaşık yirmi yıl önce incelediği gibi muhafazakar orta sınıfların 'şuurlu Müslüman' olmaları ısrarları sürüyor. Fakat bugün muhafazakar orta sınıfların yalıtılmış, içe kapalı toplumsal hayatları zayıflamış gibi gözüküyor. Bir başka deyişle, AKP iktidarında muhafazakarlık meşru kimliğe dönüşürken, muhafazakar kimliğin merkezi de özel alanı aşmış durumda. İkinci olarak, bu çalışmada incelenen dönüşümü pasif devrim ya da kapitalizmle bütünleşme üzerinden açıklamak mümkün değildir. Özellikle muhafazakar orta sınıflar açısından, incelen dönüşüm muhafazakar bilişsel şemaları (özellikle de orta sınıf konumunun toplumsal hayatta sunulmasını ilgilendiren zihinsel kategorileri) alt

üst ettiđi için bir sembolik devrimden söz etmek daha doğru olabilir. Ayrıca yaşanan dönüşüm sadece muhafazakarların düzenle bütünleşmesinden ibaret değildir. Muhafazakarlarla birlikte toplumsal uzamın da deđiştii unutulmamalı.

Çalışmanın odak noktasını korumak amacıyla aslında kendi başına çok mühim olan bazı konuları daraltarak tartışmak zorunda kaldım. Özellikle Türkiye'deki mevcut muhafazakarlığın tarihsel kökenlerini konu alan üçüncü bölümdeki bazı tespitler çok daha derinlemesine tartışılabilir. Örneğın 'sembolik kutuplaşma' kavramı Türkiye'deki siyaset araştırmaları için yeni ve kapsamlı bir potansiyel sunabilir fakat öncelikle bu çalışmada yapılandırılan daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenmeye ve sınanmaya muhtaç. Bununla birlikte, Bourdieu sosyolojisinin kuramsal araçlarını tarihsel analizin merkezine yerleştirmek Türkiye üzerine yapılan tarihsel araştırmalar için yeni tartışma patikaları açabilir. Her ne kadar çalışmanın içinde açık bir şekilde belirtilmemiş olsa da Türkiye'deki mevcut muhafazakarlığı tarihselleştirme girişimi kuramsal bir çerçeveden bakıldığında Türkiye'nin iktidar alanı, siyaset alanı ve toplumsal uzam arasındaki ilişkiselliđi yansıtmaya çabasıdır. Yine tarihsel analiz içinde tartışmaya açılan bir başka ilişkisellik de siyasi temsiller, fiziksel uzam ve beğeni arasındaki ilişkiselliklerdir. İlişkisel sosyolojinin sunduđu kuramsal araçlara tarihsel incelemede başvurmak, akademik alandaki mevcut yaygın kanaatlerden kopuş için imkan sunabilir.

Daha ayrıntılı bir tartışmayı hak eden başka bir husus da Türkiye özelinde muhafazakar girişimciliğın toplumsal kaynağı olarak tartışılan Protestan Etiđi tezidir. Bu çalışma Weber'in meşhur tezinin adeta evrensel bir kategoriymişçesine neredeyse hiç dokunulmadan olduđu gibi Türkiye'ye uyarlanmasını eleştiriyor. Fakat yine de bu eleştirinin köklenmesi için girişimcilik üzerine yapılan araştırmalarla test edilmesi gerekiyor. Yine bu çalışma kapsamında geliştirilen argümanlardan biri olan, Protestan Etiđi'ndeki çalışma disiplini ve öte dünyada kurtuluşa erme arasında kurulan ilişkiden farklı olarak İslam'da kurtuluşun belirsizliđi öğretisinin toplumsal hayatın en küçük ayrıntılarında dahi 'şuurlu Müslüman' olmayı teşvik ettiđi tespiti de daha detaylı incelenmeyi gerektiriyor.

Çalışma kapsamında yine yeterince tartışılmayan fakat başından itibaren araştırmının ampirik gündemiyle paralel yürüyen ve çalışmaya dair sürekli motivasyon üreten bir diğer husus da çalışmanın kuramsal boyutuyla ilgilidir. Çalışmanın kuramsal omurgasını teşkil eden habitus kavramı tamamen pragmatik gerekçelerle tercih edildi. Bu çalışma kapsamında habitus muhafazakarlığın fikirlerle, kültürel üretimle ve ideolojiyle özdeşleşmiş tanımından kopup eğilimsel (bedensel) bir muhafazakarlık tanımı geliştirebilmeye imkan sundu. Fakat bu pratik işlevinin dışında yeterince tartışılmayan konulardan biri, muhafazakar habitusun bir yeniden üretim mekanizması olarak değil yeniye üreten bir mekanizma olarak işlev göstermesidir.

Habitusun toplumsal değişimi açıklamaya engel teşkil ettiğini öne süren eleştiriler düşünüldüğünde bu tespit başlı başına detaylandırılmayı gerektiren bir önemdedir. Habitusu yekpare bir yapı olarak gören yaygın kanaatlerin aksine bu bilişsel mekanizmanın çoğul ve kimi zaman da parçalı ya da yarı (cleft) nitelikler taşıdığını vurgulamak gerekir. Özellikle faillerin erken sosyalleşme döneminde içselleştirdiği eğilimlerle uyumsuz bir toplumsal çevreyle karşılaşma anında bir eğilim krizi olarak beliren yarı habitus çoğu zaman toplumsal değişimi tetikleyen bir mekanizma olarak işlev gösterir. Cezayir'in topraksızlaştırılmış köylülerinin, Almanya'ya işçi olarak göç eden Türk işçilerin ve hatta Fransa'nın yalıtılmış bir kasabasından Paris'in en prestijli üniversitesine yol alan Pierre Bourdieu'nün toplumsal güzergahı yarı habitusun ürettiği toplumsal değişim için birer örnektir. Aynı şekilde, Milli Görüş sempatizanı muhafazakar orta sınıfların içinde sosyalleştikleri kolektif sofuluktan Çukurambar'a geliş sonrası deneyimledikleri sofuluğun bireyselleşmesi yarı habitusun tetiklediği değişime örnektir. Her ne kadar bu çalışma kapsamında yeterince ayrıntılı tartışılmasalar da burada tekrar hatırlattığımız önemli konular bu tezin tetikleyeceği yeni araştırma programları arasında yer alabilirler.

## B. THE SURVEY FORM

### 1. Profil ve Bireysel Kimlik

Kısaca hayatınızı anlatır mısınız? Nerede ve ne zaman doğdunuz? Kaç kardeşiniz? Hangi okullardan mezun oldunuz? Medeni durumunuz? Çocuğunuz var mı? Mesleğiniz? Aylık kazancınız? Yabancı dil biliyor musunuz? Herhangi bir STK'ya üye misiniz?

Varsayalım ki tamamen yabancı bir ortamdasınız. Kendinizi nasıl tanıtırınız? (Örneğin, Müslümanım, Türküm, laikim, dindarım, solcuyum ya da muhafazakârım).

Çoğu insan toplumun çeşitli sınıflardan ve gruplardan oluştuğunu düşünüyor, siz kendinizi grup içinde nerede görüyorsunuz? Diğer sınıflar kimlerden oluşuyor?

Örnek aldığımız, benzemek istediğiniz insanlar var mı? Niçin bu insanları örnek alırsınız?

Kaç yıldır bu mahallede yaşıyorsunuz? Daha önce nerede yaşadınız? Burada yaşadığımız süre içinde mahalle değişti mi?

Bu mahallede ev almaya veya kiralamaya nasıl karar verdiniz? Kimler etkili oldu? Mahallenin hangi özellikleri sizi cezbetti?

### 2. Kökler- Aile ve Çocukluk

Sizden büyük anne ve büyük babanızı kısaca anlatmanızı istesem nasıl anlatırsınız? Örneğin, nerede yaşıyorlardı, ne iş yapıyorlardı? Öne çıkan özellikleri nelerdir? Onlardan etkilendiniz mi?

Biraz babanızdan bahsedebilir misiniz? Nerede, ne zaman doğdu, hangi okullardan mezun oldu? Mesleği nedir? Babanızın öne çıkan özellikleri nelerdir, nasıl bir karakteri vardı?

Anneniz nerede ve ne zaman doğdu, hangi okullardan mezun oldu? Nasıl bir insandı, nasıl bir karakteri vardı? Mesleği neydi?

Anne ve babanızın evlilik hikâyesini anlatır mısınız? Kaç yaşında evlenmişler? Sizce ilişkileri nasıldır?

Biraz çocukluğunuzdan bahsedebilir misiniz? Büyüdüğünüz evi (evleri) anlatır mısınız? (Size mi aitti? Kaç odası vardı? Evde kaç kişi yaşardı? Mobilyaları ve diğer eşyayı hatırlıyor musunuz?)

Çocukluk mahallenizden (köyünüzden) bahseder misiniz? Zamanınızın çoğu nerede geçerdi? Mahalle arkadaşlarınız var mıydı? Ne oyunlar oynardınız? (Kız erkek beraber mi oynardınız?) Mahallede yaşayan insanların ortak özellikleri var mıydı? Komşuluk ilişkileri nasıldı?

Şimdi geriye dönüp baktığınızda anne-babanızın size aktardıkları en önemli değerler nelerdi? Büyüyünce ne olmanızı isterlerdi?

Ailenizle ne sıklıkta görüşürsünüz?

### **3. Eğitim**

Biraz eğitim hayatınızdan söz edebilir miyiz? Hangi okullarda okudunuz? Öğrenciyken ne olmayı hayal ederdiniz? Örnek aldığınız insanlar var mıydı? Üniversite sınavı için dershaneye gittiniz mi? Dershaneyi seçerken nelere dikkat ettiniz?

Hangi üniversitede okudunuz? Bölümünüz neydi? Neden bu bölümü tercih ettiniz? Tercihinizde etkili olan insanlar oldu mu? Öğrencilik hayatınız nasıldı? Dersler dışında neler yapardınız? Kimlerle arkadaşlık ettiniz? Okul dışı (Siyasi de) faaliyetlere katıldınız mı?

### **4. İş**

Biraz iş hayatınızdan söz edebilir miyiz? Mezun olur olmaz iş bulabildiniz mi? İlk işinize nasıl girdiniz? İş bulmanızda yardım edenler oldu mu? Şu an çalıştığınız işe kadar kaç iş değiştirdiniz?

Normal bir iş gününde nelerle uğraşırsınız? Haftada kaç gün, günde kaç saat çalışıyorsunuz? Şirkette kaç kişi çalışıyor? Nasıl bir çalışma ortamı var? Mesleki hedefleriniz var mı?

İş arkadaşlarınızla iş dışında zaman geçirir misiniz? Neler yaparsınız, nerelere gidersiniz?

Aldığınız maaşın yeterli olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Keşke başka bir işte çalışsaydım dediğiniz oluyor mu? Ne iş yapmak isterdiniz? Şu an iş arıyor olsanız, çalışacağınız işte hangi özellikleri ararsınız?

## **5. Başarı**

Sizin için başarı ne anlam ifade ediyor? Sizce başarılı olabilmek için bir insan neler yapmalıdır? Sizce bir insanın başarılı olup olmadığını neye bakarak anlayabiliriz? Sizce Türkiye’de başarı timsali olarak gösterilebilecek insanlar var mı? Kendinizi başarılı buluyor musunuz?

## **6. Evlilik**

Sizce ideal eş kimdir, anlatır mısınız? Evlilikten beklentiniz neydi?

Eşinizle nasıl tanıştınız? Evlenmeye nasıl karar verdiniz? Eşinizin hangi özellikleri sizi etkiledi? Biraz evlilik sürecinizi anlatır mısınız? (Nişan, nikah, düğün)

Sizce iyi bir aile kurmanın şartları nelerdir, eşlerin sorumlulukları nelerdir?

## **7. Çocuk Yetiştirme**

Biraz da çocuklarınızdan bahsedelim, kaç çocuğunuz var? İsimlerini nasıl koydunuz? Kendi yetiştirme sürecinizle çocuklarınızınkini karşılaştırdığınızda ne gibi farklılıklar görüyorsunuz? İdeal çocuk nasıl eğitilmelidir? Kız ve erkek çocukların eğitimi farklı mıdır? Sizce bir anne-babanın çocuklarıyla iletişimi nasıl olmalıdır? Çocuklarınızı büyütürken onlara en sık verdiğiniz öğüt neydi? Çocuklarınızı gönderdiğiniz okulları neye göre seçtiniz? Çocuklarınızı kurslara gönderdiniz mi? Çocuklarınızı büyütürken kitap, dergi, film tavsiye ettiniz mi? Çocuğunuzun sevgilisi olsa (olduğunda) nasıl

tepki verirsiniz (verirdiniz)? Çocuklarınız çalışıyor mu? Çocuklarınızla ilgili hayalleriniz, dilekleriniz neler?

## **8. Din**

Kendinizi dini konularda bilgili bir insan olarak görür müsünüz? Temel din eğitiminizi nereden aldınız (aileden, okuldan, Kuran kursu)? Çocukken camiye gittiniz mi? İlk camiye gittiğiniz günü anlatır mısınız? Kimlerle birlikteydiniz, neler hissettiniz? Daha sonra dini konularda fikir aldığınız ya da sohbetler yaptığınız birileri oldu mu? Din konusunda uzman gördüğünüz, örnek aldığınız kişiler var mı? Dini konularda bilgi edinmek için takip ettiğiniz yayınlar var mı? Sizce çocuklara din eğitimi nasıl verilmeli?

Dini nasıl yaşıyorsunuz (vecibeleri yerine getiriyor musunuz, dini toplantı ve etkinliklere katılıyor musunuz, toplumla ilişkilerini dini kurallara göre mi düzenliyorsunuz?)

Sizden “iyi bir Müslüman”ı tarif etmeniz istense, nelerden söz edersiniz? Sizce dinin insanlara en önemli mesajı nedir? Ne sıklıkta camiye gidersiniz? Gittiğiniz camiyi neye göre seçersiniz?

## **9. Gündelik Hayat**

Sıradan bir gününüzü anlatır mısınız? Hoş vakit geçirmek, eğlenmek için ne yaparsınız? Hobileriniz nelerdir? Gezmeye çıktığınızda en çok nereye gidersiniz? Komşularınızla, akrabalarınızla, arkadaşlarınızla düzenlediğiniz etkinlikler olur mu? Kimlerle vakit geçirmekten hoşlanırsınız, kimlerden uzak durursunuz? Neden? Sizin için kutlanmaya değer günler var mıdır?

## **10. Siyaset**

Sizce Türkiye'nin en büyük sorunu(ları) ne(ler)dir? Sizce bu sorunlar nasıl çözülebilir? Nasıl bir toplumda yaşamak istersiniz? Böyle bir toplumda en önemli değer sizce nedir (eşitlik, dindarlık, özgürlük)? Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Türkiye'yi kıyasladığınızda ilk farklılıklar neler? Benzerlikler var mı? Varsa, neler? Hayatınız

boyunca ülkedeki durumu iyi olarak tanımlayabileceğiniz bir dönem oldu mu? Neden? Bazıları Türkiye'nin eski Osmanlı sınırlarında aktif (bölgesel lider) olması gerektiğini söylüyor. Siz ne düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce Türkiye diğer Müslüman toplumlar için bir örnek midir? Evetse hangi özellikleriyle? Bugünlerde Türkiye'nin Suriye'yle savaşıma olasılığı gündemde; siz böyle bir olasılıkla ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz? Kendinizi hangi siyasi görüşe yakın hissediyorsunuz? Siyasi görüşünüzün oluşmasında neler etkili oldu (aile, eğitim, arkadaşlar)? Aktif olarak siyasete katıldınız mı? Daha önce hangi partilere oy verdiniz?

### **11. Mülkiyet ve Tüketim Kalıpları**

Şimdi sayacaklarımdan sahip olduklarınızı belirtir misiniz?

(Ev, yazlık, arsa, araba, bulaşık makinesi, kurutma makinesi, LCD TV, akıllı telefon, jakuzi)

Evinizdeki mobilyaları nereden aldınız? Mobilya seçerken neye dikkat ettiniz? Mobilyanızı kaç yıl kullanmayı düşünürsünüz? Ev dekorasyonu sizin için önemli midir? Nelere dikkat edersiniz? Sizce kadına ve erkeğe uygun giyim tarzları var mıdır? Ne tarz kıyafetleri tercih edersiniz? Kıyafet alışverişinizde tercih ettiğiniz markalar ya da mağazalar var mıdır? Ne sıklıkta kıyafet alışverişi yaparsınız? Kıyafet alışverişi yaparken takip ettiğiniz dergiler ya da kişiler var mı? Mutfak alışverişinizi nereden yaparsınız? Hayat tarzınızda, tüketim alışkanlıklarınızda, giyiminizde geride kalan yıllarda bir değişiklik oldu mu?

### **12. Hayat Tarzı**

İlgilendiğiniz bir sanat dalı oldu mu?

Edebiyatla ilgilenir misiniz? Ne tür kitaplar okursunuz? En son hangi kitabı okudunuz? Okuyup çok etkilendiğiniz ve başkalarına da tavsiye ettiğiniz kitaplar, dergiler ve yazarlar var mıdır? Bu eserlerde ya da yazarda sizi etkileyen unsur nedir?

En beğendiğiniz müzik türü nedir? Hayranı olduğunuz şarkıcılar var mıdır? Yerli müzik-yabancı müzik ayrımı yapar mısınız? Son zamanlarda en çok dinlediğiniz

albüm nedir (ya da şimdiye dek dinledikleriniz arasında üzerinizde en büyük etki bırakan albümler hangileridir?) Gün içinde dinlediğiniz radyo ya da müzik kanalı var mıdır? Bir enstrüman çalabiliyor musunuz (ya da çalmak ister miydiniz)?

Sinemayı takip eder misiniz? Ne tür filmlerden hoşlanırsınız? Yerli film ve yabancı film arasında tercih yapar mısınız? Son dönemde (ya da şimdiye dek) izleyip etkilendiğiniz filmler hangileridir? Film izlerken yönetmenine dikkat eder misiniz? Filmlerini takip ettiğiniz yönetmenler var mıdır?

Tiyatroya gider misiniz? Beğendiğiniz oyun ya da oyuncular var mıdır?

Sürekli takip ettiğiniz gazete(ler) var mı? Niçin bu gazeteyi okursunuz? Onu diğer gazetelerden ayıran özellikler var mı? Takip ettiğiniz köşe yazarları var mı? Niçin bu yazar(lar)ı etkileyici buluyorsunuz?

Ne sıklıkta televizyon izlersiniz? En çok takip ettiğiniz kanallar hangileridir? Müdavimi olduğunuz televizyon programları var mıdır? Haber bültenini hangi kanaldan izlersiniz?

Spor yapar mısınız? Ya da şimdiye dek hangi sporlarla uğraştınız? Hangi sporlar ilginizi çekiyor?

İnternette zaman geçirir misiniz? En çok ziyaret ettiğiniz siteler hangileridir?

Seyahat etmeyi sever misiniz? Yurt dışında bir ülkeyi ziyaret ettiniz mi? (Yada nereleri en çok görmek istersiniz?)

Tatil yapar mısınız? Evetse, tatilinizi nasıl geçirirsiniz?

Aile olarak dışarıya yemek yemeye çıkar mısınız? Nerelere, ne sıklıkta gidersiniz?

Evinizde en çok pişen yemekler hangileridir? Yemeğe misafir geldiğinde pişirmeyi tercih ettiğiniz yemekler var mı? Neler?

Arkadaşlık ettiğiniz kişilerde ne gibi özellikler arasınız? Mezhebi, etnik kökeni, hayat tarzı sizin için önemli midir?

### C. LIST OF INFORMANTS

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age</b>
Adem	Contractor	University	46
Barış	Civil Engineer	University	47
Burhan	Computer Engineer	University	37
Cemre	Student	University	21
Eren	Urban Planner	University	48
Hasan	Bureaucrat	University	39
Hatice	Store Owner	University	51
Hayrettin	Restaurant Owner	University	44
Hüseyin	Bureaucrat	University	39
İbrahim	Bureaucrat	University	58
Merve	Student	University	20
Mustafa	Lawyer	University	64
Niyazi	Academician (Ex-MP)	University	64
Samim	Ex-MP	University	62
Yusuf	Imam	University	42
Zeynep	Housewife	High School	42

## D. CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Akçaoğlu, Aksu  
Nationality: Turkish (TC)  
Date and Place of Birth: 02 January 1982, Tekirdağ  
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### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU, Sociology	2008
BS	Istanbul University, Public Relations	2004
High School	Tuğlacılar High School, Tekirdağ	1998

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2007- 2017	METU Sociology Department	Research Assistant

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Beginner French, Beginner German

### PUBLICATIONS

1. Akçaoğlu, A., 2017. "Practice and Symbolic Power in Pierre Bourdieu: The View from Berkeley," *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 17(1): 37-51. (with Loic Wacquant)
2. Akçaoğlu, A. 2014. "Zwischen Anstand und Glamour," *KULTURAUUSTAUSCH* 4:59-61.
3. Akçaoğlu, A. 2010. "Neue Einkaufszentren und urbanes Leben in Ankara", *Geographische Rundschau* (1): 34-39.
4. Akçaoğlu, A., 2009 "The Shopping Mall: The Enchanted Part of a Disenchanted City- The Case of Ankamall/Ankara," J. Pink (ed.), *Muslim Societies in the Age of Mass Consumption: Politics, Culture and Identity between the Local and the Global*, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp.: 53-73.

## E. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Akçaoğlu  
Adı : Aksu  
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : “The Making of Conservative Habitus: The Case of an Upper-Middle Class Neighborhood”

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**