

ART(S) OF BECOMING:
PERFORMATIVE ENCOUNTERS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ART

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ABSTRACT

ART(S) OF BECOMING: PERFORMATIVE ENCOUNTERS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ART

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This thesis analyses Deleuze & Guattari's notion of becoming through certain performative encounters in contemporary political art, and re-conceptualizes them as "art(s) of becoming". Art(s) of becoming are actualizations of a non-representational –minoritarian– mode of becoming and creation as well as the political actions of fleeing quanta. The theoretical aim of the study is, on the one hand, to explain how Platonic Idealism is overturned by Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and Leibniz, and on the other hand, how Cartesian dualism of mind and body is surpassed by following a Spinozistic theory of affects. In this respect, the dissertation has both theoretical and practical dimensions. Since art(s) of becoming are bodies without organs which constitute their own lines of flight through a process of minoration, the concepts of body, affect, becoming, and intensity are central to this study. For the same reason, this is an attempt to show the intersections of philosophical, political and aesthetic domains in Deleuze's theory of sensation which is part of his general practice of philosophy, that is, a quest for establishing an ontology of immanence as opposed to identitarian metaphysics.

Keywords: Deleuze & Guattari, Political Art, Performance, Becoming, Difference-in-itself.

ÖZ

OLUŞ SANAT(LAR)I: ÇAĞDAŞ POLİTİK SANATTA PERFORMATİF KARŞILAŞMALAR

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Bu tez Deleuze ve Guattari'nin oluş kavramını çağdaş politik sanattaki performatif karşılaşmalar üzerinden inceler ve bunları “oluş sanat(lar)ı” biçiminde yeniden kavramsallaştırır. Oluş sanat(lar)ı temsili olmayan –minör– bir oluş ve yaratım tarzının kendini gerçekleştirme ve uçuşan çoklukların politik eylemleridir. Çalışmanın kuramsal amacı, bir yandan, Platonik İdealizmin Deleuze'ün Nietzsche ve Leibniz okumalarıyla nasıl tersyüz edildiğinin ve diğer yandan, Kartezyen zihin-beden ikiciliğinin Spinoza'nın duygulanım teorisinin izlenilmesiyle nasıl aşıldığının açıklanmasıdır. Bu bakımdan, tezin hem kuramsal hem de pratik boyutları vardır. Oluş sanat(lar)ı bir minörleşme süreci içinde kendi kaçış çizgilerini inşa eden organsız bedenler olarak düşünülebilecekleri için; beden, duygulanım, oluş ve yeğlilik kavramları tezde merkezi önem taşımaktadır. Aynı nedenle bu çalışma felsefi, politik ve estetik alanların kesişmesini Deleuze'ün daha geniş anlamdaki içkinlik ontolojisinin bir ayağını oluşturan duyumsama kuramı içinde ortaya koyma çabasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Deleuze ve Guattari, Politik Sanat, Performans, Oluş, Kendinde-fark.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Gilles Deleuze and G. Deleuze & F. Guattari

<i>ATP</i>	<i>A Thousand Plateaus</i> (1980)
<i>B</i>	<i>Bergsonism</i> (1966)
<i>DR</i>	<i>Difference and Repetition</i> (1968)
<i>ECC</i>	<i>Essays Critical and Clinical</i> (1993)
<i>FB</i>	<i>Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation</i> (1981)
<i>K</i>	<i>Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature</i> (1975)
<i>LS</i>	<i>The Logic of Sense</i> (1969)
<i>NP</i>	<i>Nietzsche and Philosophy</i> (1962)
<i>PI</i>	<i>Pure Immanence</i> (1995)
<i>TF</i>	<i>The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque</i> (1984)
<i>TRM</i>	<i>Two Regimes of Madness</i> (1975)
<i>WP</i>	<i>What Is Philosophy?</i> (1991)

Works by Friedrich Nietzsche

<i>AC</i>	<i>The Antichrist</i> (1888)
<i>BT</i>	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i> (1872)
<i>EH</i>	<i>Ecce Homo</i> (1888)
<i>GM</i>	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals</i> (1887)
<i>TI</i>	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i> (1889)
<i>WTP</i>	<i>The Will to Power</i>
<i>Z</i>	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i> (1883-5)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introductory remark¹

Despite the advices of my colleagues on the scope and *what-ness* of a traditional philosophy dissertation, I did not intend this work to be a systematization of Deleuze's philosophy since I do not regard Deleuze as the unified author of an intellectual totality. Put differently, I did not choose to construct the chapters of this thesis as the "Ontology", "Epistemology", "Ethics", "Aesthetics" and "Politics" sections of an introductory book on Deleuze, mainly because his philosophy consists of intersections and lines where one cannot and, indeed, need not make a clear-cut distinction between ontology and ethics, aesthetics and politics. Nevertheless, betimes I mentioned the phrases "Deleuzian Aesthetics" and "Deleuze's ontology" as I believe that Deleuze's struggle for overturning Platonic Idealism, after Nietzsche and Leibniz, encompasses a large variety of arguments with aesthetic, ontological, epistemological, ethical and political outcomes (though none of these categories are constants of a philosophical system). In other words, the entailment of a process ontology, immanence or difference-in-itself, within an aesthetic view of life was the main motivation for me to reject a classical method of creating sections and sub-sections for the dissertation.

This remark is not only made for the sake of frankness, but also in terms of a need of loyalty to the subject of my study. As Deleuze and Guattari explicitly state at the

¹ Although I care about avoiding the use of sexist language, throughout the thesis, I did not change the original texts in direct quotations since Deleuze and Nietzsche refer to human-beings as "man" or "men" in most of their works. Otherwise, it seemed to me that, in some of the quotations, it would be more difficult for the reader to follow the text and grasp the intended meaning from the original phrases.

beginning of *A Thousand Plateaus*, it would be misleading to place their text into a specific, unitary context. On the contrary, the flights between very distant dates, multiplicity of matters and the apparent irrelevancy of issues is an attempt to create an *untimely* or *minor* work, a monument, and resist the principle of consistency—the formal procedure of *major* textuality. In this sense, I do not think that the apparent disjointedness of some sections of my thesis poses a problem of consistency either. On the other hand, the notions of “immanence” and “becoming” of *a* life – haecceity – are almost like an inseparable reference for all sections, which is because, at some level, becoming as the ultimate reality and the singularity of *a* life as a matter of fact is what one would discover under each stone on Deleuze and Guattari’s plateaus.

1.1.1 Terminology

Deleuzian – Guattarian terminology is consistent with these philosophers’ own understanding of repetition in that what recurs is not the same but always a variant of what occurred in their previous lines of thought. According to Shields & Vallee (2012) the concepts that Deleuze and Guattari invent are not representative names for “the identification of objects of contemplation” but “practical tools which can render the world in fresh new ways” (7-8). Deleuze & Guattari’s concepts are, in some sense, repetitions of what constantly detours. For instance, in one context, we come across the concepts of ‘minor’ and ‘major’ as expressing the tension between a minor (deviant) usage of language across overwhelming norms and rules of a major (mainstream or general use of) language; in another context, we encounter the use of concepts such as ‘rhizomatic aggregations’ and ‘arborescent structures’ to express a similar tension between unified social structures and pluralistic modes of becoming(s). In this sense, a sense of repetition is manifest throughout the conceptual discoveries of these philosophers. While Deleuze & Guattari’s central concern remains more or less the same throughout their oeuvre, they need and construct varying concepts to express this concern since concepts are constructed

in light of problems according to them; these problems are context-dependent, and it is the context that really matters and makes all the difference. For the same reason, my use of certain concepts in this dissertation will be somewhat fluid and their meaning may vary depending on the relevant context.

Therefore, instead of presenting a glossary of terms at the beginning, I chose to introduce each concept in the relevant context and illuminate them according to the utility they provide for the given context. Concepts and reconceptualization of those concepts “account for the creation of something new” (Shields & Vallee, 2012: 9). Such an understanding is parallel to what Deleuze and Guattari understand from ‘non-philosophy’ in opposition to philosophical systems, e.g. that of Plato, Descartes or Hegel.

1.2 Introducing the problem

In this dissertation, Deleuzian - Guattarian process ontology, i.e. difference in itself, will be investigated through certain performative encounters in contemporary political art, and re-conceptualized as “art(s) of becoming”. Art(s) of becoming will be regarded as actualizations of a non-representational –minoritarian– mode of creation and political action, as well as instances of desiring-assemblages. The type of desire at stake in a Deleuzian – Guattarian view of art is different from the notion of appetite which intends to satisfy a lack. When desire is experienced or regarded as a lack, one is preoccupied with the feelings of pleasure or pain in relation to the thing which is desired. However, Deleuze and Guattari follow a Spinozistic sense of the term ‘desire’ as fluid, uncut flows of affect. This kind of desire is also what Nietzsche sees behind the creation of a work of art. It is never a self-conscious subject but the aggregation and movement of unconscious forces which results in such a creation. In this respect, art emerges as a co-creation or coming together of a multiplicity of affects; desiring bodies, or whatever affects and moves a single body.

In short, it can be said that the theoretical aim of the study is to explain how Platonic Idealism is overturned by Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and Leibniz, and the need for concepts such as 'folding-unfolding', 'force', 'movement', 'speed & slowness', 'process' and 'becoming molecular', for the substitution of theories of a transcending subject with theories of the body as an affective or desiring system. Since art(s) of becoming are desiring-aggregates or bodies without organs (affects and sensations assembled upon fields of constancy, immanence) which constitute their own lines of flight through processes of minoration, the terms 'body', 'desire', 'becoming', and 'lines of flight' will be central to this study. At the same time, this work is an attempt to show the intersections of philosophical (conceptual), political and practical fields in Deleuze's theory of sensation which is part of his general practice of philosophy. In this context, art(s) of becoming are bodily processes of presence through which the immanent difference of *a* life, its haecceity or constant variations become sensible. By 'haecceity,' Deleuze understands a non-subjective individuation (or a pre-individual individuation). "A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality" without a lack, nonetheless, "the mode of individuation" at stake, here, is rather "different from that of a person" (*ATP* 261).²

Art is no more a production in which the artist—subject—is disclosed and distinguished from the work of art as the product. This is how Deleuze's ontology of difference relates to aesthetics.

At this moment, before giving a detailed summary of the chapters and sub-sections, I must explain the justification for the order of topics I preferred while organizing the chapters.

As mentioned above, in *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari state that it is the existence of a problem which necessitates the creation of a concept. Therefore,

² References to Deleuze's and Deleuze & Guattari's texts, which are abbreviated with capital letters and listed in the Abbreviations section, are given in parentheses in the following way: The abbreviation of the name of the book and page number.

I chose to reserve the second chapter for the introduction of the problem of ‘the political’ in political art. Since the specific interest of the study is limited to initiatives in theatre and performance art, as well as some social events which would count as ‘artistic becomings’ in a Deleuzian understanding of revolution, I began the second chapter with a flashback towards the historical endeavors in which artists sought to find ways to reflect political issues in their works. Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual inventions under the title of “a theory of sensation,” explained in the third chapter both afford an insight into the problems discussed in the second chapter and aid in approaching them in fresh ways. For example, a new problem identified in the reflection of social conflicts in art in light of Deleuzian concepts is the problem of the ‘re-presentation of power relations’. The details of this concern are explained in the last chapter where I presented the type of relationship Deleuze seeks to find between art and politics, and gave examples from the attempts of art(s) of becoming which try to merge art and life with a deeply rooted political intuition. These attempts seem closer to what Deleuze and Guattari imply by processes of ‘minoration’ and formation of ‘rhizomatic assemblages’.

Although in chapter three I make direct reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of art, and the Leibnizian concepts of ‘folding’ and ‘unfolding’, the general philosophy behind the theory of sensation must be sought elsewhere. Hence, in the fourth chapter, I dwelled on the ontological and epistemological outcomes of the Deleuze-Nietzsche connection. Finally, in the last chapter, having reserved the power of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual novelties, I returned to the problem of representation on the intersection of art and politics. In the last chapter, I also focused on the specific notion of ‘minoration’ or ‘becoming-minor’ since raising a minority consciousness is Deleuze’s expectation from a society yet to come.

1.3 Summary of the chapters

In the second chapter of the thesis, “Art and Life”, I have discussed the problem of the distinction between art and life, and the notion of political art within a short

history of contemporary political art. Nevertheless, since creating a spectrum of the history of art is far beyond the scope and aims of this work, I mainly focused on the aforementioned problems and some striking examples which would count as initiatives against art's self-closure—estrangement to the quotidian, that is to say, daily life and daily problems of ordinary people as well as politics in a broader sense.

While tackling these issues, I made the general statement that, starting from the Dadaists to the Situationists and even contemporary performance artists, the performers who defend the view that art must be politically laden are somewhat practitioners of the Avant-Garde turn. Therefore, I questioned whether or to what extent avant-garde tactics could provide solutions to our problems. In this respect, due to the reasons which are stated in the second and last chapters, performance art is interpreted as 'the minor of theater' and, it should be noted that, the phenomenon of performativity is regarded as an aspect of several forms of art including Kaprow's happenings, certain types of dance (e.g. Steve Paxton's contact improvisation) and theatre (e.g. Bene's critical theatre), and other art(s) of becomings (certain actions, experiments...), and not regarded as a character that is genuine of performance art.

The fact that most forms of art consist of intellectually created works which somehow appeal to the *elite* and the well-educated resulted in the discussion that art must not be separate from life and must not become institutionalized. This critique against the professionalization of art and commoditization of the artwork has some outcomes like the emergence of subgroups within the avant-garde genre. Dada is the most well-known of these critical attitudes. If the argument against elitism or high art and the institutionalization of art constitute one side of the discussions within the quest for the radicalization of art, the critique of the divisions between the positions of the viewer and the player as well as the distinction between life and the work of art constitutes the other.

Although it remains a question whether Dadaism, Avant-Garde or Neo-Avant-Garde provided satisfactory examples regarding those critiques, it is certain that art is transformed into a political endeavor and succeeded in reaching the masses through its own means. Art, being no more a royal pursuit, still has problems that divides it into poles which cannot be reconciled. Very briefly, these counter positions are resided by those who advocate the view that art must be directly political in the sense of defending a doctrine or ideology (Marxism), e.g. Brecht, Walter Benjamin, Augusto Boal, etc. and those who argue that the way art does politics must differ from the way an ideologue does so, e.g. Carmelo Bene and Adorno.

The performers who directly advocate an ideology and wish for its propagation, most of the time, cannot escape ‘demagoguery’, but, more importantly, they inevitably serve for the instrumentalisation of art.

Instrumentalisation of art is in antipodal opposition to a Deleuzian view of art(s) of becoming or difference-in-itself which is defended in this thesis. Moreover, instrumentalisation is a problematic position in that it makes art vulnerable to being abused by fascistic ideologies, e.g. this was the case in Nazi-Germany; art was degenerated for Nazi-propaganda accompanying art theft.

More importantly, it is generally Marxist artists who see no harm in the instrumental use of art; however, ironically, their political opponents, Capitalists, do the same—make use of art—to popularize consumerism. In other words, instrumentalisation of art is a common approach for these counter ideologies.

For the Art Industry, as an institution of the capitalistic world, art is both a profitable sector (Entertainment) and the primary tool for the maintenance and proliferation of consumerism. Therefore, art is constantly endangered by the Capital.

All these facts make it meaningful for the artists to seek for radical ways of creating ‘sensations’ so that their works do not become commercialized and, at the same

time, do not lose their capacity to reach people. In this context, performance art or experimental approaches play a historical role as they manage to create series of sensations which cannot be objectified or sold, unless they become recorded, documented and exhibited in a gallery. What is more, in Deleuzian terms, performance is a perfect case through which a new *presence* occurs, here and now, without subjectifying the persons of the event. On the other hand, in most forms of traditional art, painting, sculpture, theatre, etc., what the artist does is to produce a representation, narration or illustration of an already existing perception, a ready-made data. As mentioned above, representation is the main problem that Deleuze is concerned about regarding art, and representation of power relations is his specific concern.

In the third chapter, I deal with Deleuze and Guattari's theory of sensation as a combination of affects and percepts which are different from emotions and perceptions as psychic categories of individual experience. This theory is constructed, especially, in *The Logic of Sensation* and *What is Philosophy?*.

Besides comparatively investigating art and philosophy as two different modes of thinking and science as the endeavor which works on the relations of causes that takes part in the emergence of facts, *What is Philosophy?* devotes a special place to art under the concepts of percept, affect and sensation while *The Logic of Sensation* illuminates the notion of 'the logic of sensation' by taking many of Francis Bacon's works (triptychs, portraits and paintings) as cases of examination. It can be said that *The Logic of Sensation* is an early work in which one can find different versions of novel concepts with ethical and ontological connotations that occur in other Deleuze texts.

Above these notions, there are 'body without organs' and 'depersonalization'. The phenomenon of depersonalization paves the way to the discussion of immanence because the singularity of *a* life or *haecceity* is analyzed in the context of a pre-individual becoming—as in the example of 'becoming animal'. Nonetheless, regarding the broader context of the thesis, a more important conception relates to

art itself as a becoming which surpasses being turned into a representation, narration or illustration—i.e. a product—as the object of a process of reification: an art of becoming as a process enabling the emergence of a ‘new’ and ‘difference’ overcoming the cliché. Our modern ways of seeing are rendered by clichés or reproductions released by the art industry. According to Deleuze and Guattari, overcoming ‘being a product’ means overcoming the representation of power through the work of art. Whereas a work of art as a product is a completed story, an art of becoming is always an open ended becoming singular-plural (a rhizomatic mechanism of differentiation).

Since Deleuze’s attack on representational philosophy, i.e. on the submission of difference to identity, is deeply rooted in his reading of Leibniz as well, in the third chapter I also explained Deleuze’s appropriation of the outcomes of Leibniz’s four principles (identity, sufficient reason, indiscernibility and continuity), and accordingly, the emergent notions of ‘the event’, ‘folding-unfolding’ and ‘singularity’ as each of them has a crucial role in Deleuze’s theory of difference. In this context, being adopted by Deleuze, Leibniz’s argument for the perception of monads is claimed to be constituting the core of Deleuze’s own aesthetic theory. While making such a remark, I concentrated on both Deleuze’s earlier texts, *Difference and Repetition*, *The Logic of Sense*, and a later work *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*.

In addition to these issues of discussion, chapter three contains an explication of the concepts of desire, affect, emotion, and pleasure through a short reading of Deleuze’s Spinoza. In connection with Spinoza, it is underlined that in a materialistic realization of everything as forces and the striving of these forces that affect bodies, the subject becomes only a construction of these processes and does not have a being that transcends the world, which is itself an assemblage of bodies and forces. These views can also be regarded as an introduction to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche which is the main theme of chapter four.

In the theory of sensation (still in chapter three), Deleuze's renowned phrase "beginning in the middle" (*en milieu*) is introduced to the reader with reference to Bacon's paintings. Deleuze describes each of these paintings as untimely and dynamic facts of bodies which constantly struggle with themselves resisting against organization throughout a process of depersonalization and variation (mutation).

Although the sub-headings of the thesis attempt to focus on each of these conceptions separately, the inevitable transitions and jumps between topics stem from the fact that Deleuze's philosophy is built upon an all-embracing ontology (though not systematically organized) that covers a wide range of study-fields from art to politics and epistemology to ethics.

Just as it is the case in Deleuze's conception of revolution, his view of art as an untimely endeavor with no interest in historicism, is almost the factual expression or presence of difference as a moment of constant variation that happens in the now (at the moment of performance). In this understanding of artistic creation, distinctions like subject/object, artwork/artist and viewer/practitioner dissolve. While the subject becomes a constitution, perceptions and emotions cease to be personal experiences of a transcending subject and are moved to the level of sensations as in the phenomenon of a work of art witnessing its own becoming. The work of art which can stand alone is no more interested in satisfying a lack (object of pleasure). The type of desire at work here is not interrupted by moments of pleasure and pain but is a continuous flow of desiring and affecting in a Spinozistic sense.

Art or sensation is neither the transformation of one object to another (not mimicking one another) nor an inter-subjective transference of a property, but it is a continuous passage from one state to another and from that to still another on a line of constant variation as a moving/returning capacity; it is the becoming actual of an immanent – virtual – difference. According to Deleuze, the aforementioned variations become manifest in the works of artists like Bacon, Artaud and Kafka as becomings: becoming-animal, becoming-plant, becoming-woman, i.e. becoming-

Other. Together with “becoming-minor” (or under this umbrella-term) which is explained in the last chapter, these becomings expose art to a revolutionary transformation both in terms of content and form.

The type of revolutionism in question is, in Deleuze’s words, art’s way of doing politics. In practice, art does politics by “forming alliances” and raising “a minority consciousness” and all of these are themes of the last chapter.

In brief, in chapter three, I dwell on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of sensation. Under the light of their conceptual tools, it becomes easier to see the difference between representative art and art(s) of becoming. While, in the third chapter, Deleuze’s view of art is explained as a field of resonance, struggle and excess of desire, in chapter four it is reconsidered through the Nietzschean view of artistic creation as an excess of those unconscious bodily forces that affect bodies.

Thus, in the *fourth chapter*, after an overview of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics, it will be argued that representation of the same, in the Platonic sense, is not possible as there is no such thing as ‘the Same’ or Platonic Idea, but that identity is a construction of difference. In a Deleuzian ontology, whatever exists emerges from a self-differentiating transcendental field or a plane of immanence. Difference is real but virtual and it continuously differs, and hence, never coincides with itself. Therefore, what is at stake is not a subjective experience but an impersonal individuation. In other words, differentiation means the singularization of pre-individual intensities or the actualization of what virtually exists in the form of Ideas or problems.³ This is an aesthetic theory as much as an ethical view of life as a process of becoming singular-plural.

The fifth chapter contains a more concrete application of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference as it gets elaborated on in terms of themes like minoration, lines of flight,

³ The meaning of the term ‘Idea’, here, is different from the Platonic conception of an ‘Idea’ because, by ‘Idea’, Deleuze understands ‘unresolved problems’ or intensities on an immanent field which necessitate the creation of concepts for their resolution.

etc. in light of Deleuze's encounter with Bene's critique of representational theatre. Keeping in mind the interpretation of performance art as 'the minor of theatre'—without rejecting other possible ways it can go through—, which was defended in the second chapter, in Deleuzian terms, performance art, or at least some instances of it, can be regarded as art(s) of becoming.

In this chapter, the notion becoming will obtain a clearer definition within its relation Deleuze's view of time as 'pure duration' and a Spinozistic ontology of immanence. Furthermore, the problem with representational thinking will be illuminated in opposition to the mode of thinking in which we think becomings as actualizations of difference-in-itself.

This chapter will also lay out the political significance of the notion of becoming as part of a full series of becomings-other: 'becoming-woman', 'becoming-animal', 'becoming-molecular', 'becoming-imperceptible'. Becomings will be evaluated as micropolitical movements (lines) of fleeing quanta in between rigid points of macro determinations of the centralized societies.

Last but not least, we will explore the emancipatory potential of the phenomenon of performance (performativity) in art with a view to generalizing the concept of art in a way to cross the institutional borders between art and certain forms of political action and experimental art.

In this respect, through the end of chapter five, Karsten Heuer & Leanne Allison's experimental journey to Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge will be examined as a performance of the kind which is described and defended in this thesis, i.e., as an art of becoming.

If I summarize with reference to the second and last chapters, art or desire are sites of resonance, sites of struggle. The political expectance related to the monumental and untimely artwork is already virtually there. Art is about the rhizomatic becoming of multiplicities. In opposition to the tree-like structure

(arborescent), the concept of rhizome might help us to understand the logic of multiplicities, that is to say how pluralistic relations differentiate themselves from centralized ones. Whereas a tree grows out of a single, pre-determined source—a seed—and throughout its flourishing maintains its assumed metaphysical identity and centrality around a single body, rhizomes have multiple roots and bodies, and their roots are, somehow, connected to each other under the soil. While the tree represents identity, unity, order, centrality, hierarchy and so on, rhizomes are anti-hierarchical and plural bodies which are indeed symbiotic aggregates, i.e. coalitions of multiple singular bodies (*ATP* 15). A singular part of the rhizome cannot represent the others or the whole, since the connection underneath does not centralize their relation to each other. On the contrary, all bodies of a rhizome seem to have a unique being of their own and have connection to each other. Furthermore, the rhizome is always in the middle of becoming (*en milieu*), i.e. it is constantly becoming (25). In the tree, all branches are connected to and spring from a single body, and thus they cannot be considered as singular trees in isolation. In centralized societies, for instance, people are almost treated as branches of trees. They are not beings of their own because they can be represented by the tree-like (arborescent) categories of the society they belong to. However, in the rhizomatic relations there is no significant hierarchy between different persons, and thus everyone can act autonomously and speak for their own. The tree is a predictable entity, i.e. when its body dies nothing in it can survive, whereas rhizomes are always open to anew, i.e. new bodies might grow up or old ones might die, and there is no singular center of capability, determining the becoming(s) of the whole system.

Forging alliances not only in between art-societies but also alliances that go beyond is or might be possible through the coming of a new, a new consciousness. It is the consciousness that the whole world is a minority on the face of the oppression of the majority (or the strong). This is a universal (but still not totalitarian) becoming, becoming-other. Finally, it can be said that all these views are Deleuze's expectation from an art yet to come just as from a society yet to come.

CHAPTER 2

ART AND LIFE

I would like to begin this chapter with a piece by performance artist Marina Abramović. Early performances of Abramović, including the ones with her ex-cooperator Ulay, were based on a principle of “bodily endurance” under physically compelling situations, e.g. being cut by a knife, crashing against another body or a wall, lying on a melting ice bed placed over fire, fasting for twelve days, etc., and in my opinion the best example to these performances is *Rhythm 0* in 1974.



Figure 1



Figure 2

In *Rhythm 0*, Abramović offers her own body to the abuse of a room-full of spectators and these people are allowed to use instruments placed on a table including a gun, a whip, scissors and a razor (Figures 1, 2). As Goldberg (1988) reports, in the third hour of the performance, Abramović's "clothes had been cut [...] her skin slashed; a loaded gun held to her head finally caused a fight between her tormentors, bringing the proceeding to an unnerving halt" (165). After the performance Abramović expressed her feelings as follows:

What I learned was that [...] if you leave it up to the audience, they can kill you [...] I felt really violated [...] it created an aggressive atmosphere. After exactly 6 hours, as planned, I stood up and started walking toward the audience. Everyone ran away, to escape an actual confrontation (Abramović in Daneri, 2002: 29-30).

In this performance, the positions of the *player* and the *viewer* were inverted by the artist's will to objectify her own body in return for a suspension of her subjectivity. But the "inversion" makes it explicit that the position of an audience and a player, are conventional (Demaria, 2004: 300). In other words, they are not fixed, and by

changing the form of the work of art, the audience can be persuaded to take part in the event.

Through amputating the literary elements of the story (as a narration) and the artist (as a creator), and avoiding a clear and distinct beginning and end for the art-event, the process becomes a co-production of the artist and the participants. Neither the artist nor the viewers know what is going to happen before the actual event takes place. It can be further argued that the artist's body, now, becomes the work of art. In other words, demarcating the work from its creator is not as easy as it used to be in traditional forms of drama where, most of the time, the story represents an actual event happening in the world outside the sphere of play and the characters stand for actual persons. However, in performance art the art-event itself is an actual happening with no need to make reference to something outside its own reality through a relation of representation or resemblance. This critical stance against mimetic art makes performance art the minor of theatre on one hand, and an area of experiment on the other. Nevertheless, it should be questioned whether motivating the audience to step in the play is the best way of creating a field of co-creation. The aggressive atmosphere Abramović complains about and the fight emerging among the participants might be an evidence that the viewers felt a kind of pressure to join the event, and such constraints may not return with welcomed results.

Abramović's later pieces seem to have evolved into more participatory but much softer forms based on the concepts of *duration*, *silent communication* and *confrontation*, while the aspect of physical strain is loosened. For example, her most well-known work "The Artist is Present" (2011) is capable of repealing the conceptual oppositions between the player/viewer and subject/object more than her other works. Her performance has a very simple structure. It consists of the eye-contact and nonverbal communication between two bodies in a long-duration. As a result of the co-presence and silent connection between shifting couples (given that Abramović is always one of the parties), the performance is equally and simultaneously experienced by two people (Figure 3).

Just as it is impossible to objectify pain, it is impossible to objectify and represent such an experience. For the same reason, this experience cannot be split into the categories of the subject and object but enables a simple affective transmission between two bodies.



Figure 3

Why does an artist leave her secure and isolated sphere of play (as in the case of traditional theatre stage), and accept the challenge of being actually confronted with the audience who are now participants of the play?

Abramović's description of the difference between theater and performance reminds us of Deleuze's expectation from minor theatre. She argues that in performance if there is a knife and blood it is real knife and real blood, whereas in theater it is a fake knife and ketchup instead of blood. Because the reality of the lived-experience is central to performance art, most of the time, the artist's physical and mental strength, i.e. endurance, concentration and capability to cope with pain is tested during the performance. S/he offers his/her body to severe tests. In this sense, whereas, performance is an experiment, traditional forms of art seek to present a product which is well-planned before the actual staging process and thus

lose their openness to ‘molecular becomings’ as they do not have any space for the unexpected and for possible connections to be established among the co-operators of the event.

2.1 Performance as ‘the minor of theatre’

In classical theater, the existence of an omniscient narrator, i.e. the author as the producer of the text, is manifest and the text itself is an application of a major language (e.g., German, English and Greek). Furthermore, the relation—interaction—between the audience and the play has not been a major concern until the emergence of political theater. Both in political theater and performance art, however, we see minoration of language and connection of the social body to a political immediacy. Questioning whether all instances of political theater or performance succeed in establishing such a connection, and whether each of them are examples to the minor use of language is another concern, but we can, at least, argue that those experiments had such an agenda in their theoretical background. Especially, in performance art, the directness of the relation between audience and performance (or performers), and the depersonalization of the author are apparent aspects.

According to Parr (2005), performance art “interrogates the clarity of subjectivity, disarranging the clear and distinct positions that the artist, artwork, viewer, art institution and art market occupy” (25). Therefore, he says, early performance art “defined itself as the antithesis of theatre”, mainly because, “the event was never repeated the same way twice and did not have a linear structure with a clear beginning, middle and end” (25).

As Schechner states, Performance Studies analyses “practices, events, and behaviors” without assuming them to be “things” or “objects”: This shift of the focus from “thinking in terms of discrete objects and subjects towards a concern with processes, relations and happenings” enables us to see an “intersection”

between “Deleuzians and Performance Studies scholars” as both “affirm the movement and ‘liveness’ immanent to even the most apparently stable phenomena” (in Cull, 2009a: 3).

According to Reinelt (2002), the terms ‘performance’, ‘performative’ and ‘performativity’ are used in different contexts, and according to one scene, the notion of performance is used to differentiate certain “processes of performing” from traditional theatrical performances, and, in its most narrow usage, the term identifies “performance art” (201). The development of performance art can be considered within the general history of the avant-garde and anti-theater, the significance of which is to be found in “a rejection of aspects of traditional theater practice” defined by a particular emphasis on “plot, character and referentiality”—all these aspects are “Aristotelian principles of construction and Platonic notions of mimesis” (201). In this respect, the rejection of “textual sovereignty,” that is to say, “authorial or directorial authority” was a common thread to all avant-garde experiments between the 1960s and 1970s (including Living Theater, Open Theater and Grotowski’s Theater Lab.) (202). As Elin Diamond argues, the poststructuralist claims to “the death of the author” parallel the shift of focus from “authority to effect, from text to body, to the spectator’s freedom to make and transform meanings” and these are aspects of performance art as a whole (in Reinelt, 2002: 202).

The problem of lived-experience and/or presence is a much debated issue, especially by Derrida. He conceives of presence as ‘self-presence’ and establishes a series of counter arguments to the claims of presence. Nevertheless, these arguments would be relevant only if we understand presence as self-presence, i.e. as a person’s full coincidence with his/her ‘self’ at a given time. In this dissertation, for pragmatic reasons, the details of Derrida’s argument against self-presence will not be discussed in detail as by ‘presence’ I choose to understand what Deleuze understood from ‘differential-presence’.

In Deleuzian terms, ‘presence as becoming’ differs from an assumed ‘self-presence’, and hence, it is not vulnerable to the critiques against the claim to becoming present in a live-event, a performance, etc. For instance, in his article “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation,” Derrida (2000) argues against the claim to presence on stage by taking the notion of presence as self-presence (40-62). However, what Deleuze understands by presence is the becoming-free of continuous variation, not the becoming visible of a self.

In order to talk about presence, one does not have to defend a claim to personal identity, subjecthood or selfsameness. We can, very well, defend the importance of presence in a process ontology because process ontologies put ‘becoming’ in the place of a ‘subject’. “The subject is not produced [...] once and for all: it is always in the process of its own production, it is repeatedly produced, constantly performed” (Demaria, 2004: 301).

The claim to presence of the artist in a moment of artistic experience rests on the assumption of the existence of a self, *outside* her work—and this is the sense of the term criticizes in this thesis. In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze & Guattari discuss that it is not an author, an artist, a performer, etc. that is *present* in the art-event, but the whole event is *a becoming*. Understanding the non-existence of an actual author—a transcendental subject beyond the creative process—is important to see why and how differential presence differs from a claim to self-presence. Selves, subjects and identities belong to a Cartesian view of the world in which human beings are considered being capable of reaching a complete consciousness of their own mental states, wherein body and mind are believed to belong to distinct realms.

The notion of ‘presence’ is also related to the notion of ‘authenticity’. It can be claimed that the emphasis on authenticity in the sense of the uniqueness and originality of a constructive idea and its display as a completed work was the central tenet for many performance artists. Some of them went so far as to prohibit the recording of their performances, since recording a present-time event would distort

the immaterial nature of the performance occurring at the time of happening and disappearing right after this presence.

The reason why a piece had to be performed only once was first of all, that each re-enactment would render itself a fake copy of the ‘original’, and secondly, a reiteration would be a trivial attempt at repetition. The idea of originality and non-recurrence make reference to the authenticity of real-life events, because there is no ‘repetition of the same’ in life. The event in performance art is “never repeated the same way twice” and does not have “a linear structure with a clear beginning, middle and end”, and this is why performance is “the antithesis of theater”: Each event happens at a specific time and a specific place, gathering all the necessary constituents at the moment of happening (Parr, 2005: 24-26).

However, in the Seventies, many performance artists enacted their pieces in galleries and modern art museums, and hence, contradictorily, abided by art industry—at least, on the level of not rejecting the support provided by these institutions—and hence, they could not resist the commodification and enclosure of their performances by the art market.

Not only the demands of art industry but also the advancements in technology made it almost impossible for artists to hold on to the dogmatic principle of non-recurrence. In this context, Benjamin (2007) argues that mass production, or in the case of art objects, mechanical re-production, leads to the loss of the aura of the original work, and destroys the unique sacred character of the object.⁴ In the case of performance art, the aura of each piece is to be found in the original moment of enactment. Especially after the proliferation of the internet and mobile technologies, no one can totally prohibit or obstruct the recording, reproduction and

⁴ I am aware that Benjamin (2007)’s concern in his article “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” is not glorifying the concepts of ‘authenticity’ or ‘aura’, but to celebrate the propagation of political messages thanks to the advancements in the age of mechanical reproduction. However, I mentioned the situation of the aura of the work of art as a matter of fact—as expressed at the beginning of Benjamin’s article.

transmission of an artwork, which is once displayed publicly. Therefore, in the present situation, only those who can make maneuvers to cope with the phenomena of reproduction can succeed in the art world.

Marina Abramović is an exception to the case of performance artists from the Seventies. She not only revived some of her own pieces but also re-enacted masterpieces of other sensational performers including Joseph Beuys, Gina Pane and Vito Acconci. For this reason, scholars accuse Abramović of betraying the fundamental principle of performance art, that is, 'originality', or the dogma that each piece is to be performed only once. Abramović broke this dogma and stated that, even if they are re-enacted, every piece is performed with a different state of mind and body. Therefore, re-enactments are not copies or representations of their originals but new performances themselves. In Deleuzian terms, re-enacted performances are not repetitions of the same, but repetitions of difference. The uniqueness of the event or performance does not stem from the collision of an admitted self and the consciousness of that self at the specific time and space of the event.

In my opinion, the philosophical view that a re-enacted performance is not a copy of the former but a new authentic-experience is strong enough. This view is also in line with Deleuze's argument for the simulacrum as 'a becoming of its own' which will be discussed in detail, in chapter four.

Furthermore, Abramović admits adding something new to each piece according to her own perception of the revived work, and the rejection of the dogma of non-recursion shifts the emphasis from originality to 'presence'.

Authenticity does not necessitate that a work of art is constructed and performed by the same person and enacted only once. This only makes reference to the subjective origin of the piece. On the contrary, authenticity means a first-hand experience of the event. In this context, Abramović emphasizes the importance of lived-experience. At this point, we can see how her position is critical towards the

commodification of art in the consumer society. When you find yourself in an experience in which you are as active as the artist, the fixed positions of the subject and object disappear. There is no product of the performance except the co-experience of the participants. As an audience you are not anesthetized or *illusioned* anymore. The experience does not allow itself to be consumed by the viewers. Furthermore, the aspect of long-duration contributes to the establishment of a special kind of relation, a non-verbal communication between the artist as the organizer or the initiator of the event and other participants.

Even if an endurance requiring performance is repeated, as in the case of *The Lips of Thomas*, in which Abramović draws a pentagram on her own body by razor blades, it is not a repetition of the same but a repetition of difference (Figure 4).

Although the test's structure is the same, she has to overcome a different pain at a different time. Her level of experience is different, her attitude towards the performance, the audience and her own body is different. She is different. Therefore, her familiarity with the pain does not make it the same pain. In this respect, any performance provides the artist and the attendants a chance to have a new experience without a product (except documentations of the event).



Figure 4

2.1.1 Happenings

Forget all the standard art forms. Don't paint pictures, don't make poetry, don't build architecture, don't arrange dances, don't write plays, don't compose music, don't make movies, and above all, don't think you'll get a happening out of putting all these together. This idea is nothing more than what operas always did and you see it today in the far-out types of discotheques with their flashing lights and film projections. The point is to make something new, something that doesn't even remotely remind you of culture. You've got to be pretty ruthless about this, wiping out of your plans every echo of this or that story or jazz piece or painting that I can promise you will keep coming up unconsciously (Kaprow, 2009: 1).

In line with these views, in his text *Assemblages, Environments and Happenings*, Allan Kaprow (2010) argues that in modern avant-garde art it does not make sense to distinguish an artist as a dancer, a painter, a sculptor, an actor, etc. anymore, since she is just an artist. The dissolution of the boundaries between different types of plastic arts stem from the collective usage of as many means of artistic expression as possible in an assemblage. In the Happenings, Kaprow and other practitioners went further by maximizing the effect of merging various modes of creation and amplifying the “potentialities” of the “subordinate elements”—visual, tactile, manipulative—and using “*extension*” at its limits with “a free style” and emphasized the methods through which people could become participants of the events (Kaprow, 2010: 719). Accordingly, a happening is, as he states, an art event which was “presented to small, intimate gatherings of people in lofts, classrooms, gymnasiums, and some of the offbeat galleries, where a clearing was made for the activities”:

The watchers sat very close to what took place, with the artists and their friends acting along with assembled environmental constructions. The audience occasionally changed seats as in a game of musical chairs, turned around to see something behind it, or stood without seats in tight but informal clusters. Sometimes, too, the event moved in and amongst the crowd, which produced some movement on the latter's part (719).

Nevertheless, Kaprow admits that the flexibility of the techniques used in the happenings could not change the fact that “there was always an audience in one (usually static) space and show given in another” (Kaprow, 2010: 719). Therefore,

over years of work he made a list of “the rules-of-thumb” for the Happenings as follows: “A) *The line between art and life should be kept as fluid, and perhaps indistinct, as possible*” (720): A Happening aims at revealing a relation of “reciprocity” between “the man made and the ready-made [spontaneous]” since a comparison between a “masterpiece” and an object that emerges in a happening would be inapplicable (720). “B) *The source of themes, materials, actions, and the relationships between them are to be derived from any place or period except from the arts, their derivatives, and their milieu*” (720): In my opinion, this rule sounds rather Deleuzian in terms of a minoration operation applied to an existing language to give way to the emergence of a new – minor tongue – within that existing language. Accordingly, Kaprow justifies the rule with these sentences:

by avoiding the artistic modes there is the good chance that a new language will develop that has its own standards [...] let it be a distinct art which finds its way into the art category by realizing its species outside of ‘culture’ (720).

“C) *The performance of a Happening should take place over several widely spaced, sometimes moving and changing locales*”: This rule brings a natural movement to the performance and breaks its chains with “conventional theater” (Kaprow, 2010: 720). Changing locales enables each part of the Happening to stand alone “without the necessity of intensive coordination” (720). “D) *Time, which follows closely on space considerations, should be variable and discontinues*”: The objective of this rule is to break the barrier between art and life since the multiplicity of spaces in which parts of the Happening are performed distinctly invites the elements of “experienced” or “real” time and “chance”, and hence, the happening becomes a part of daily life (720-1). “E) *Happenings should be performed once only*”: Although this is a dogmatic rule for early performance art, as we have already discussed, the aim is, again, to break free from “theatrical customs” and emphasize the element of chance (721). “F) *Audiences should be eliminated entirely*. All the elements – people, space, the particular materials and character of the environment, time – can in this way be integrated” (722).

In brief, Kaprow's criteria for the Happenings indicate that it is more reasonable to value contemporary avant-garde performances as 'philosophical' experiments rather than 'aesthetic' activities and the old strict distinction between art and life is no more valid for contemporary performers (Kaprow, 2010: 722).

In terms of theatre, for instance, questions like "what does this play *mean*?" or "what happens at the *end* of the story?" are rendered invalid through such suspension operations. This is exactly the thing performance does to traditional theatre: it brings forth the performative element and dismisses the rest. The suspension of a pre-fixed meaning or of narration might be a common aspect between contemporary performance art and early Avant-garde pieces.

In his study on Carmelo Bene's theatre, Deleuze (2000) favors Bene's rejection of mimetic tradition's principles of "consistency" and "textual permanency" (240) as he advocates the same view in the broader context of his philosophy. "Process, operation, construction, arrangement – these are Deleuze's interchangeable definitions and replacements for the author and the authorial project" (Kowsar, 1986: 21). Indeed, the rejection of authorship is a common theme for contemporary French philosophy. For instance, in his text "What is an Author?" (1998) Michael Foucault describes and criticizes the 'author-function'. The concept of 'authorship' can be conceived in a broader sense exceeding the bounds of literature, that is to say, we can apply the notion of "author-function" to producers, directors, composers and artists in general as a critique of a "solid and fundamental unit of author" (205). This is, at the same time, the critique of *individualization* as "a moment [in] the history of ideas" (205). Individualization of author is connected to the problem of *authenticity* and *originality*, always tied with the notions of presence and experience in the literature on contemporary art—which has already been discussed. Hence, instead of continuing to evaluate this issue in terms of presence and non-presence, which, I believe, is a theme of discussion for Derrida, I preferred to concentrate on becoming since becomings in art dissolves the problem of self-presence. Nevertheless, becoming is the central concern of the final chapter, so I do

not go into the details of this problem here either. Yet, very briefly, it can be said that becoming is differential presence and not self-presence because any molar identity, including selves or subjects are deterritorialized through becoming.

2.2 The significance of performance and experimentalism in art

I claim that, the effect that the conception of experimental theatre has over contemporary performances today is that of a minoration of various aspects. First of all, the stage is not anymore a field of illusion. In alternative performances, the adornment, light and sound effects are rendered unnecessary. Since additional elements artificialize the work, in this attitude, the artist's body becomes both an event and the medium in and through which the artistic event takes place. It is not anymore a matter of creating an illusory space (an artificial habitat) in which a story is *presented* but that of isolating and hence freeing the event from the space and other elements of pseudo-reality. Therefore, in minor performances everything except bodies whose becomings (spasms, alterations, and affections) are to be witnessed are intentionally extracted from the event. Secondly, most of the time, the stage is not placed on a level which is different from where the audience is placed. It is as if the player is only one body among others. However, merging the stage with the audience seats and the removal of illusory elements leads to the disappearance of the distance between the audience and the work only technically. In certain performances, the closure of this distance, in return, results in a change in the characteristics of the piece as a political event. Very briefly, there is no enframed work at all. Anything is possible, including arbitrarily participating in or stepping out of the performance. In other words, the political character of the work must be sought in the unframed and participative character of the process rather than a pre-set political content (Jones in Kunst, 2002: 10). The most important point is that the artist's body is not anymore a representation but a becoming simultaneously experienced by itself and encountered by the witnesses (the

audience). These issues have been occupying the minds of theatre and performance practitioners and theorists of political art for a long time.

Presenting the plays in small theater halls is a trend for contemporary practitioners. These halls have a maximum capacity of a hundred people and there are even smaller ones in which only 30 people can be seated. The aim of preferring smaller stages is to raise the feeling of involvement and intimacy. Hence, it is also common for some theater companies to stage their plays in cafés and bars where it is possible to experience a closer contact with the players in a rather casual atmosphere (Sierz, 2000: 18-20). In this context, it should be noted that the Italian style Renaissance stage with curtains, positioned on a higher level than that of the seats, has not been the only option for theatre. For instance, traditional improvised theatre of Anatolian culture, “*orta oyunu*” is an originary version of theatre-in-the-round. Close contact with the audience, improvisation and experimentalism are common features for contemporary small-hall performances (e.g. the British in-yer-face theatre) and *orta oyunu*. The major difference is that modern experimental performances have more daring topics in terms of violence, nudity and sexuality, and the concept of body as a moving phenomenon, most of the time, constitutes the central theme of those performances.

Having explained the main features of contemporary small-hall performances, I would like refer to a recent example from Turkey: “Artık Hiçbir Şey Eskisi Gibi Olmayacak! Sil Göz Yaşlarını!”⁵ a production of *Mekan Sahne* (former *Domus Sanat*), written and directed by Şamil Yılmaz and performed by Ahmet Melih Yılmaz.

⁵ The title of the play can be translated as “From now on, nothing is going to be the same! Dash away your tears!”

2.2.1 Becoming-monster of an *apaçi*

The play does not have any stage adornments except the player. The story is told by the player himself but not in the form of a narration, i.e. the player does not tell a story but *intensively experiences* what he tells at the moment of narrating. In other words, the story goes through the player's body; he undergoes an emotional variation in present time. What does it mean to have an intensive bodily experience? In Deleuzian terms, it means that you as a subject cannot know what your body can do under the influence of the affects which, as it were, stimulate the unconscious forces of your body. In other words, this experience is neither conditioned by subjective decisions nor consciously perceived.

In the play, the light is fixed and décor is intentionally left blank. The only illusory factor is that whether, as a viewer, you choose to believe that such a thing really had happened at some time in the past or not. Apart from that, it is not an illusion that the player experiences a becoming: becoming-monster on the stage.

Mustafa is a young boy, raised in an orphanage lacking parental love and carrying its effects deep in his body. During the June 2013 riots in Turkey he lives in the Capital (Ankara) and suddenly finds himself in the middle of the events. In the first morning of the incidents, pepper gas is the only thing he can smell in the air, the floor is covered with blood, protesting people scream and bustle in the street. In the pell-mell of the events, Mustafa's path crosses with those of a young couple who call him "Avzer". In the first days of the riots they run and fight together, quickly establish a close relationship involving physical attraction, sense of belonging, togetherness and solidarity.⁶ At nights, these three rioters hug and sleep together. Eventually, Avzer begins to feel deeply connected to the couple believing that they feel the same towards him. But the couple disappears as soon as the riot subsides.

⁶ It is advisable to watch Bernardo Bertolucci's movie *The Dreamers*, 2003, as it might provide an idea about how an out of ordinary relation of three people may emerge in revolutionary times.

Were it not for the incidents, would they find and lose each-other so suddenly? Would they even talk? Mustafa (now Avzer) discovers a warm feeling; love and solidarity, for the first time in his life, and the moment he loses it, the moment the couple leaves him, his becoming-monster begins. Mustafa's becoming-monster is similar to that of "Alex" in Anthony Burgess' novel *A Clock Work Orange* (1962). The monster wants to hurt and kill. Virtually, the monster (or his "dark, inner animal") has always been there, but after Mustafa's abandonment by the couple it is actualized as a monster and not Mustafa anymore.



Figure 5

The performance begins almost in the middle of this becoming. It is hard to decide whether the monster, Mustafa or Avzer is telling the story. To my understanding, it begins amidst Mustafa's becoming-*apaçi*⁷ and ends in the middle of Avzer's becoming-monster.

⁷ The term *apaçi* has nothing to do with Native American tribes (Apaches) except that *apaçis'* hair style resemble the feathers of Apaches. On the other hand, *apaçi* is a term for modern bullies of urban life, a kind of underground culture, well-known with their hair-styles, dresses, skinny look, dances and habits such as listening a certain type of techno-arabesque-rap music out and loud. Most of them prefer to hang around in large groups, use slang, fight, dance in the street or go to night clubs and prefer to have their hair done in an extravagantly upright fashion. These youngsters (aged between 17 and 25) usually live in suburbs and belong to families who suffer from adaptation problems and low income or do not have a family at all. It should be noted that the *apaçi* style (in terms of hair and dresses) is now a world-wide phenomenon, though mostly observed in

The performance is important for at least two things that it manages to make manifest: first, in terms of acting, it is a story of a becoming-Other which obviously happens to the player's body: the spasms, shivering, trembling, sweating of Mustafa's (Ahmet Melih Yılmaz's) body are symptoms of his becoming, and second, it reminds the audience of an unmentioned fact about loneliness: touching is political. Were it not for the June 2013 riots, would Mr. Nice Guy touch the glue-sniffer, *apaçi* Mustafa? It is an event (the riot) which transforms the unexpected into something actual. The social boundaries are passed over, molar-identities dissolve and open themselves to new molecular-becomings in revolt times. Be it a Revolution, May 68, Arab Spring or Occupy Movements, an event is what initiates these differentiations, i.e., the establishment of rhizomatic alliances upon planes of immanence.

Not only in this example, but in many other experiments, performance artists open their bodies to affective transmissions with the audience witnessing or accompanying them. The interaction of bodies, i.e. the transitions of intensities among bodies is what makes touching political—which will constitute the underlying theme of this thesis through the end.

2.3 One side of the problem: art enclosed in the gallery

The spirit of our age is consumption, and shopping is the manifestation of the extreme isolation and individualization in consumer society. Imprisonment of human life into the private space is a result of late capitalism (Akkın, 2011: 2). This fact does not only affect the way we do shopping or the structure of the shopping areas. In Richard Sennett's (1992) words, mega cities' shopping malls are "dead public spaces" because they are not constructed to bring people together on a

undeveloped countries where the culture gap between technologically organized city-life and rural life is more evident. In this respect, *apaçi*-identity can be regarded as a reflection of the effects that technology (computer-based music, mobile phones, etc.) and cultural conflicts have over new-generation suburban boys.

common basis (15). On the contrary, their function is to make sure that people are physically together but remain isolated from each other. The unbreakable chain of production transforms the audiences into passive receptors and consumers in all parts of their lives from education to art. Therefore, the activities served by the entertainment industry do not provide a real alternative to consumption. In other words, it does not make a difference when one prefers going to the cinema instead of going shopping because (a) cultural activities are regarded as spare time pursuits and they simply contribute to the enrichment of private life, and (b) cultural products are not different from other commodity objects (Akkin, 2011: 2).

In his well-known essay “Culture Industry Reconsidered” Adorno (2001) states that he and Horkheimer replaced their previous term ‘mass culture’ with ‘culture industry’ as they reject the view that it refers to “something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves” (98). On the contrary, both popular art or low art and high art—generally regarded as two extremes of contemporary art—have their own place and, though being in a close relationship with the culture industry, neither of these forms can be reduced to the products of culture industry. For Adorno, low art has its significance in the fact that it is potentially a form of “resistance” and high art is important due to its contribution to our aesthetic world (99). From the perspective of culture industry, on the other hand, people are regarded as consumers or masses to be regulated, that is to say, they are regarded as not subjects but objects (99).

The cultural commodities of the industry are governed [...] by the principle of their realization as value, and not by their own specific content [...] The entire practice of culture industry transfers the profit motive naked onto cultural forms. Ever since these cultural forms first began to earn a living for their creators as commodities in the marketplace they had already possessed something of this quality [...] The autonomy of works of art [...] is tendentially eliminated by the culture industry, with or without the conscious will of those in control. The latter include both those who carry out directives as well as those who hold the power (Adorno, 2001: 99).

In this respect, performance art can be regarded as a fundamentally critical position examining the solidity of subjectivity, dissolving the pre-set positions of the artist,

artwork, spectator, art institution and art market (Parr, 2005: 25). In consumer society, personal differences are expressed or represented through the symbolic or metaphysical meanings attributed to acquired objects after a process of appropriation (Østergaard et al., 1999: 406). Works of art that have a special place because they are considered to be the products of a high culture indicate the social and cultural level of those who acquire and appropriate them in their collections. Nevertheless, it is not only the process of acquisition which transforms art objects into expressions of the singularity of their beholders. The very experience of visiting an art gallery or a museum becomes a personal expression too: The one-sided communication established between the art-lover and the exhibited item is also a process of appropriation. Therefore, the phenomenon of exhibition itself directly contributes to the commodification of the work of art. Although this effect is stronger and more obvious when the work of art is in material form, i.e. there is a concrete 'product' at the end of the creative process, even performance art cannot resist becoming an object of exhibition, as, at the end of the day, it is the documentation process and demands of galleries which determine the fate of the art-event. In other words, no matter how participatory or performative it is, a piece in an art gallery is condemned to become a product, i.e. by default it is an exhibited aesthetic object.

Today a variety of art collectives organize pirate actions in museums like Tate Modern in order to bring the financial relations between those art institutions and multinational corporations into light since those relations have an influential role on the decisions concerning which pieces will be exhibited in the museum and which will not. Although these actions are artistic in their nature, the fact that they make an *instrumental use* of the artistic means for the expression of underlying political conflicts is problematic as it has a determining role on the form, content and the place of the happening, which shifts our attention to the problem of the political in political art.

2.4 Mimesis and the problem of political art

Although Deleuze's critique of Platonic mimesis is tackled in the fourth chapter as a pillar of his ontological critique of representative philosophy, it will be useful to introduce the problem of mimesis in art also in this section since this issue is deeply connected to the avant-garde and political art, and especially in dramaturgy, to the quest for a non-mimetic mode of acting. From Plato to Rousseau, many theorists including Aristotle, St. Augustine and Diderot have argued that poetry (tragedy, theatre, etc.) is a representative or mimetic mode of art. According to Plato's account in the *Republic*, not only mimetic poetry but all forms of poetry must be excluded from the city due to their effects on the emotions of the audiences. For Plato, mimetic art (for instance, painting) consists of the replication of images (appearances) without an essence. Whereas the matter-less idea or form is the original, the material object which is constructed in accordance with that idea (being carried in the craftsman's concept) has an aspect of semblance to the original. However, the mimetic object (e.g. a painting of a material object or an image in the mirror) is a fake copy, a 'phantom', with no relation of resemblance to the original (Plato, 1991: 281). Therefore, the work of art (a simulacrum in Deleuzian terms) cannot even imitate the original. For instance, an actor in a tragedy imitates the actions of actual people in life by copying their jests and mimics, i.e. the visible expressions, when faced with certain emotional states. But the actor hides the fact that s/he, indeed, does not have such emotions. In other words, for Plato, mimesis means hiding a property by pretending not to have that property (hiding one's real personality behind a character on the stage). The problem with mimetic behavior is not only that it fails to represent the original but also the effects it has on the audience. According to Plato, poetry arouses sympathy towards the imitator's fake emotions and through this identification between the actor's emotions and the viewer's own feelings the audience becomes estranged to reality and lose their capacity to reason (or chance of attaining knowledge of the originals), and hence it is dangerous for the souls in a city (Plato, 1991: 290).

Aristotle's account of mimesis is, on the other hand, like a defense of mimetic behavior. According to his view, mimesis is a distinguishing and natural aspect of human beings as we learn to mime the behaviors of others as early as when we are infants (Aristotle, 1951: 15). Secondly, realizing the difference between a mimetic object (be it a painting or spectacle of poetry), and a real object (action, emotion, etc.) gives one a kind of pleasure and relief (15). Through realizing the causal relations of events by following the 'plot' of a tragedy, a viewer learns to distinguish between the morally good and bad traits and actions. Furthermore, the emotions of a viewer aroused by watching a tragedy are not as passionate as his/her emotions towards an incident in daily life. This distinction purges the viewer's soul and emotions which is called a state of *katharsis* (23). Aristotle argues that this identification or attachment to the emotional states of a character is actualized through mechanisms of 'pity' and 'fear'; that is to say, we feel fear when we are afraid that the misfortune of someone on the stage could actually become our own in real life, and we simply feel pity towards someone else's misfortune (Aristotle, 1951: 45).

Brecht is important for not only his place in the history of political art but also due to the methods and techniques he used and developed to brake the "hypnotic" flow of the play on the stage; namely "Gesture" and the "alienation effect" (Brecht, 1974: 136-9). He is in agreement with Plato that mimesis could be illusory and result in the passivation of the audience, and he disagrees with Aristotle's argument of purging. According to Brecht, all the illusory elements must be subtracted from the stage and the audience must be constantly reminded that what they are watching is simply a representation of the actual historical events and social conflicts out there (139). In this way, he believes, an emotional attachment between the viewers and the characters is restrained. Therefore, both the identification of the actors with their characters, and the identification of the viewers' emotional states with those of the characters on the stage must be disabled. The latter effect is a result of the success of the illusion created by the play as a whole and this is exactly what Brecht criticizes. According to Brecht, catharsis is not beneficial for the viewer but "for

the status quo, as it renders the audience passive and uncritical” (Potolsky, 2006: 85). Contrary to the generally accepted view that the success of a theatrical narration is dependent upon the degree of resemblance that the characters on the stage have to those in the quotidian, Brecht entrusts theatre with the task of representing social conflicts but not by presenting good copies, i.e. imitations, of the real characters in life. This is because the mimetic success (illusive power) of a character on the stage is dependent upon the actor’s inner – emotional – attachment to his/her role, i.e. the character. In other words, Brecht does not want the actor to live the emotions, but, through exaggerated Gestures, only show his/her position in the system of social classes defined by capitalistic relations. This, at the same time, serves for the “historicization” of the events on the stage with reference to actual social conflicts in life (Brecht, 1974: 140). For all these reasons, it can be said that Brecht’s approach to art is rather instrumental; that is to say, he wants to show the audience that the world can be changed if people intervene in the ways economic classes are constructed. In this context, it could be argued that a Brechtian theatre is extremely instrumentalist as it carries representation to its peak by disabling the chance that a player might enjoy the experiment of living his/her character on the stage, i.e. Brecht disallows an actual ‘becoming’ on the stage. On the other hand, his challenge to the passivation of the viewers through re-presentations of already existing clichés, i.e. familiar emotions oscillated by culture industry, is in line with Adorno’s critique and the avant-garde turn in general.

2.4.1 The avant-garde turn

Practitioners of the avant-garde turn focused on two problems both of which had a political concern: first, the critique of the institutionalization of art and in this context, questioning the distinction between art and life with a view to abolishing this distinction; and, second, questioning the distinct positions of the viewer as spectator and the artist as the creator of the work of art. In other words, the two fundamental principles that the avant-gardes advocating were: “the attack on the

institution of art” and “the revolutionizing of life as a whole” (Bürger, 2010: 696). Radical artist concentrated more on the former problem and hence their works gradually become a critique of the culture industry and the relations between the state, art institutions and financial supporters, that is, multinational corporations. Even today, while visiting a gallery, one can come across an intervention by an art society, such as a pirate exhibition or an immediate action protesting the gallery’s and hence the artwork’s position in the web of capitalistic relations. We can even call these cases, instances of ‘neo-Situationism,’ and such examples are not limited to the occupations of art-galleries. Indeed, the occupy movements worldwide can be counted as neo-Situationist practices too. The use of slogans which involve an ironic language and the graffiti with a sense of humor are just a few indicators of this connection. In May 68, personal creativity was “expressed in thousands of graffiti” and in the occupy movement it is expressed in “homemade signs”: of course, there are certain differences especially in the “tone” of the demonstrations in France which were more “wicked and incisive” and the ones in America which are “more naïve and earnest”, but “joy, humor, insight, irony, poetry, poignancy, community” are common features of both movements (Knabb, 2011).

Since the emergence of historical avant-garde dates back to the period around World War I, i.e. the period right before, during and after the war, we could say that avant-garde artists were disillusioned by the values and aestheticism of modern society at that time. For instance, Berlin Dadaists (1918-1923) were directly attacking the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) which was abusing art to glorify the German race. The avant-gardes considered themselves as aesthetic vanguards of the people but their viewers did not have a chance to participate in their performances; therefore the gap between the audience and the artist was fixed in early avant-garde attempts. When it comes to neo-avant-garde art, the art industry seems to have alienated this initially Dadaist reaction from its originary critical stance by a process of encompassing anti-art works within the institution of art. In other words, no matter how critical a work of art is towards the institutionalization of art, the institution appreciates it as an artwork, and, in this way, the piece becomes alienated

to its intended meaning. For instance, in one of his performances, graffiti artist Banksy situates a shopping cart into a classical Monet-painting, “Water Lilly Pond”, and places it in the gallery through piracy (Figure 6).

The trolley in the painting makes reference to the connection between shopping and ‘beauty,’ as well as the connection between shopping and artwork today. After all, collectors are consumers of art, and shopping is the most mundane reality of modern society. However, the gallery lets the subverted painting remain hanged on their wall, and does not return it to its creator. On the contrary, they sometimes even sell pirate pieces for astronomic prices. This act of the gallery, kind of, estranges the work of art to its critical nature, by rendering it primarily an art object rather than a critique of the artwork’s position in the gallery. In this way, the most radically critical items become welcomed and integrated into the circle of the art world, i.e. art industry.



Figure 6

Wherever an art world exists, it defines the boundaries of acceptable art, recognizing those who produce the work it can assimilate as artists entitled to full membership, and denying membership and its benefits to those whose work it cannot assimilate. If we look at things from a commonsense point of view, we can see that such large-scale editorial choices made by the organizations of an art world exclude many people whose work closely resembles work accepted as art. We can see, too, that art worlds frequently incorporate at a later date works they originally rejected, so that the distinction must lie not in the work but in the ability of an art world to accept it and its maker (Becker, 2008: 226-7).



Figure 7

According to Hegert (2013), it was an early prediction of the critics that “the ‘gallery-ization of graffiti’ would be its downfall”, in other words, “it would be destroyed by commercialization” since graffiti “would lose its subversive nature when co-opted by the hegemony” (para. 33). Nevertheless, as Hegert suggests, graffiti-writing is just like an animal rhizome which never comes to a total end (para. 33). As Deleuze and Guattari state you cannot get rid of an animal-rhizome, e.g. an ant rhizome, completely since the ants “form a rhizome that would rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed” (*ATP* 9). Therefore, for certain forms of art there is always a line of escape from the framing of the art industry.

2.4.2 Attempts to bring art in the street: action as an art form

Unlike the other politically laden artists, e.g. Piscator, Meyerhold and Brecht, whose motto was to show the audience that the world can be changed, the Situationist International decided to start the revolution from everyday urban life, and thus from the streets. In other words, the movement was driven by the revolutionist idea that “the world must be changed” and change must start from the present. They were critical about the view of high-art. As Guy Debord (2006) states, the Situationist movement was aiming to do away with the distinction between art and life. In this sense, their works had to be situated in casual places around the city, e.g. underground stairs, walls, pavements etc., which would naturally enable a direct encounter with the inhabitants of the city (Figure 8). Therefore, they were alert, reactive and propagative.

They regarded the suspension of instantaneous desires for the sake of a future goal as the most dangerous feature of capitalist society, and thus “no future” came to be their famous slogan. It is inevitable to lose one’s affective powers when hope is thought in terms of a future success. Therefore, Brian Massumi (2003) demarcates between hope and optimism. He does not place hope into “a wishful projection of success or even some kind of a rational calculation of outcomes”: on the contrary he says that we should place it in the *present* (210). Unlike the expectation of a revolution which is another mode of suspending life, held by the specialist activists of leftist parties, the Situationists directed their critique upon the present situation. In this way, the meaning of actions would be involved in themselves. When we are optimistic about the future we can easily get disappointed by the failure of our projections. The act of suspending decisions results in the loss of the human potential to get something we want or change that which we do not want.

In this way, individuals become integrated into the system of capitalist production and rendered manipulable by the scenes on TV or internet. Spectacles passivize the people by directing their choices and ideas. For instance, a car advertisement is a

typical spectacle which tells you several myths about that commodity object and its relation to a certain lifestyle; therefore, the chance that you can live such a life is postponed to the time when you can afford to buy that car.



Figure 8⁸

The only reason for urban people to work is first, to afford their present needs, and eventually to save money for their prospective lives (projection of the future needs). Nevertheless, capitalism not only relates objects of consumption to transcendent meanings but also causes a rise in the totality of human needs, and indeed, those needs never come to an end. One day you will be motivated to buy that object and the other day you will desire to have another, and this will never come to an end, i.e. the life that you desire will be postponed forever. The economical consequence of consumerism is to be indebted to the banks forever. Even before the emergence of credit cards, Situationists pointed to the future of consumerist societies and hence the human need for working and buying commodities were at the center of their critical attitude.

⁸ The graffiti can be translated as “under the pavement, lies the beach”.

The Situationists are also known to have inspired the May 68 demonstrations in Paris, which soon spread to many places in the world. Throughout the demonstrations, over ten million workers occupied factories, and today, for apparent reasons, there is a respectable number of research going on to question the connection between the Occupy movements and the Situationists of the Sixties.

On the other hand, although the editor of *The Situationist International Anthology* Ken Knabb (2011) argues that just like the Situationists, the Occupy movement is “leaderless” and “antihierarchical”, and no one, within the group, has “a greater say” because of the density of their contributions to the movement, in the Situationist International (1957-1972) there was a group of few professional artists who were in charge to organize the situation and the participants could be integrated only after the arrangements of the organizing group were completed: the people were regarded as participants and not co-organizers of the actions. Hence, on the contrary to their manifestations, there was a definite level of hierarchy between the artist and the participant in the actions of the Situationist International. More importantly, giving art a predefined task of politicizing the streets and other public areas means reducing the form and the content of the artistic creation to this task, and limiting the scope of the work of art with what is available in this political agenda, i.e. distancing art from its more free or autonomous realm. For these reasons, among several other reasons, situationism cannot be claimed to provide the best instances of art(s) of becomings, but it is important due to being a historical antecedent for Occupy Wall St. and other street movements.

In 2003, even before the Occupy Wall St movement, people of Germany started *Umsonst* campaigns. Their slogan was “everything for free, for everyone!” For instance, in 2005, *Berlin Umsonst* protested travelling fares by placing “Pinker Punkt” (Pink Point) signs to underground stations. The invention of the term “Pink Point” was a guerilla tactic for queering the term ‘*schwarzfahren*’ or ‘Riding Black’. Indeed “black ride” is a racist term insulting the people of color and the poor (Figure 9). Berlin Umsonst managed to shed light on this fact with their pink

point campaign. Ever since, the color pink is being used to subvert figures of oppression.



Figure 9

The Umsonst campaign also collected money from the people to provide a fund for those who had to pay fines incurred during free-ride actions, which was an instance of solidarity within the collective. With their creative and participatory nature, the Umsonst campaign is an important example to anti-hierarchical, minoritarian, and post-representational artistic creations (Kanngieser, 2011: 130). Anyone who attends these events becomes a 'constituent' of them. Nevertheless, due to their instrumental approach to art neither Situationism, nor the *Umsonst* or pirate gallery exhibitions and similar actions are perfect examples to art(s) of becomings which will be evaluated throughout this thesis.

2.5 Conclusion

An art of becoming does not necessarily emerge in the street but even if it was born in a gallery, the piece must be able to open itself to further affective encounters and spread to other segments of life. Similarly, street art must not end its journey on a collector's wall. Otherwise, neither works can provide hope for a post-representational society by making a change in people's perception of the things around them.

We can think of much better examples by non-professionals whose experiences may count as performative encounters with politics with a view to raising our consciousness about the world we live in. Nevertheless, I prefer to return to those examples in the last chapter of the thesis, after borrowing the explanatory power of the concepts which will be introduced in the next chapter on Deleuze and Guattari's theory of sensation as an aesthetic view of the word, and also those to be discovered in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche (in chapter four) as the basis of the Deleuzian ontology of difference-in-itself, and finally those in chapter five.

CHAPTER 3

A DELEUZEIAN THEORY OF SENSATION, DESIRE AND AFFECT

In the previous chapter, we have seen that the Avant-Gardes' questioning of the distinction between the positions of the viewer and the player was, at the same time, a critique of the relation between the consumer and the producer in a capitalistic society. Therefore, as long as the work of art remains a product of the art industry, it seems difficult to overcome its being a re-production or representation of our ways of seeing.

The Situationists were pioneers of the critique against the control and management of emotions through consumerism, and their political struggles resulted in the emergence of new artistic forms of political action. For our concerns here, in this chapter on Deleuzian & Guattarian aesthetics, I must dwell on the more philosophical problem of how to create an original event *in* or *through* an artistic process, which is, indeed, the main area of experiment for an art of becoming.

Regarding performance art, it can be said that—although its transformation into a form of mainstream art, by means of media and documentation techniques, causes it to be entangled by the criticisms regarding the commodification of the work of art—it still seems to have managed at least one thing, that is, merging the object and subject of the art-event and creating an a-subjective presence in each enactment with no need to distinguish between the artist and the work of art. The conceptual tools of Deleuze's theory of sensation seems to be capable of explicating this phenomenon, that is to say, overcoming the subject/object dichotomy and, instead, speaking about the sensation.

In this context, this chapter focuses on Deleuze and Guattari's theory of sensation which sheds light on the place of experimental art on the way to an art of becoming.

As Deleuzian aesthetics also depends upon a Spinozistic theory of affects, I will present an account of the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘affect’ with a short visit to *Ethics*. Before I move on to Deleuze’s larger project of overturning Platonism which is explained in light of his reading of Nietzsche in chapter four, Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz as an inseparable part of his aesthetics as well as the conception of ‘difference as such’ will be handled in this chapter too, and I will conclude the chapter by indicating the political significance of the notion of ‘monument’ for Deleuze and Guattari, as, at the end of the day, the relation between art and politics is at the center of this research on art(s) of becoming.

3.1 A theory of sensation

It should be said of all art that, in relation to the percepts or visions they give us, artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with them, they draw us into the compound (*WP* 175).

In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze & Guattari state that each concept is a multiplicity, that is to say, “there is no concept with only one component” and a concept is always a compound or a combination of several other concepts (*WP* 15). The same is true for non-conceptual multiplicities.

Whereas philosophy is the enterprise of inventing concepts, art is occupied with creating “sensations” which can stand alone. The work of art as “a block of sensations” becomes independent of the creator through “the self-positing of the created, which is preserved in itself” (*WP* 164). To put it differently, sensation “stands alone” through “the act by which the compound of created sensations is preserved in itself” (164). In this respect, we can say that Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetic theory enables us to regard the work of art or the simulacrum as a being

which frees itself from the ‘model’ as well as the creator and even the viewer or hearer.⁹

Sensations are not concepts but they are composites. A sensation is a “compound of percepts and affects” (*WP* 15). Percepts are different from “perceptions referring to an object (of reference),” in the sense that a percept is indistinguishable from the material condition of a work of art (166) whereas a perception, in the traditional sense of the term, is distinguished from the object to which it refers. This is because “sensation is not realized in the material without the material passing completely into the sensation, into the percept or affect” (166-7). Therefore, Deleuze & Guattari argue that it is hard to determine the border where in fact “the material ends and sensation begins” and, for instance, in painting, “preparation of the canvas, the track of the brush’s hair, and many other things [...] are obviously part of the sensation” (166).

According to Deleuze, who is impressed by Cézanne’s general theory of painting, “sensation” is one of the two methods to overcome illustration and narration in art. The other method is using abstract forms, as in the case of abstract art (*FB* 34).

Sensation is made possible with an appeal to Figures. The Figure is a sensible form; it has a direct effect on the nerve-system, or on the flesh. According to Cézanne, different levels of sensation, that is to say, sensible domains, cannot be comprehended rationally since a different “‘logic’ of the senses” comes into play when sensation is at stake (in *FB* 42). On the contrary, abstract form functions by mediation of the brain and hence it affects the brain. The distinction Deleuze makes between ‘the flesh’ and ‘the brain’ may sound awkward since, at first glance, it seems that there is no substantial difference between the two, i.e. they are both extended. Hence, in order to see what this distinction might imply, I prefer to

⁹ Since the importance of Deleuze’s critique of the relation of resemblance established between the copy (*simulacrum*) and the model will be explained in detail in the last section of chapter four, I did not give an account of these concepts in this section.

concentrate on the phrase “by mediation of the brain”. As I interpret it, the mediation of the brain implies a mental representation, whereas a direct effect on the nerve system does not need to be decoded by the brain or become a representation, as one of its functions.

Deleuze argues that one face of the sensation is turned toward the subject, that is to say, to “the nervous system, vital movement, ‘instinct,’ ‘temperament’” whereas “the other face” is “turned toward the object”—i.e., “the ‘fact,’ the place, the event” (*FB* 34). In this context, while describing ‘sensation’, Deleuze makes reference to phenomenologists and states that sensation is Being-in-the-World: “at one and the same time I *become* in the sensation and something *happens* through the sensation, one through the other, one in the other”:

it is the same body which, being both the subject and object, gives and receives the sensation. As a spectator, I experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed (*FB* 35).

Following this quote, it could be said that Deleuze emphasizes the moment of sensation as a *milieu* of becoming, when the construction of a subject is disabled by the unity of sensing and the sensed.

According to Deleuze, Francis Bacon is a painter who paints the sensation. It is the artist’s job; “to paint the sensation” or record the matter of fact (*FB* 35). Sensation is not an emotion, feeling or affection. In Deleuze’s words, it is closer to affect and instinct. Therefore, while expressing his views on his portrait of a screaming Pope (Figure 10), Bacon says “I wanted to paint the scream more than the horror” (in *FB* 38). That is to say, the feeling of horror is a result of the scream; however what is sensed is not horror but the scream, i.e. a force or movement. Hence, in Bacon’s paintings, the notion of “movement” can be described as “the action of invisible forces on a body,” and the account of movement is to be found in the “elasticity of the sensation” (*FB* 41). It is this aspect of elasticity which enables sensation to be read as a becoming of the two, ‘sensing’ and ‘the sensed’ or, as it were, ‘subject’ and ‘the object’.

The way Deleuze understands, for instance, the painter's relation to the canvas is, in certain respects, transmissible to the relation between the work of art and the artist in all fields of art. Although the artist is a creator of affects, she does not create them *ex nihilo*. So, regarding the relation between the artist and the work of art, it is not plausible to say that the artist is the cause of the artwork's existence in the modern sense of the notion of 'causality'. This is because the artist is not someone who transforms a raw material into a piece of art as the canvas is not an empty surface or a plane from the beginning:

The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio. Now everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work [...] the painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, clean it [...] he paints on images that are already there, in order to produce a canvas whose functioning will reverse the relations between model and copy (FB 86).

While doing this, the artist has to arrange the virtual or actual images (data), which exist beforehand. Therefore, it is the artist's job to abstain from reproducing certain 'clichés' while arranging those given images (be they virtual or actual). "A whole category of things" that Deleuze names as "clichés" consist of "photographs that are illustrations", "newspapers that are narrations", "cinema-images, television-images" as well as "psychic clichés" which are not physical: These can be thought as "ready-made perceptions, memories" and "phantasms" (FB 87).

In the *Logic of Sensation* Deleuze calls those definite forms of perception, clichés or ready-made images, and being in line with this view, in *What is Philosophy*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that "a great novelist is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters" (WP 174). This means that the work of art shall not repeat or represent already existing affections (mental images, emotions, etc.) or 'ways of seeing' but enable a becoming, and this is the generalizable code of conduct for all fields of art.



Figure 10

By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations (*WP* 167).

The most important point here is to note that contrary to the subjectivist attitude and, more specifically, to Cartesian dualism which would place perceptions and affections in the human mind, or in the conscious experience of the subject, Deleuze

and Guattari distinguish between percepts and affects on the one hand, and perceptions and affections on the other, underlining that an artwork has a being of its own, i.e., once created, it no longer depends on the subject or the creator; and furthermore, those who get involved in the artistic creation enter a process of becoming with it (in Akkın, 2016: 243). “Sensation is what is painted. What is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining *this* sensation” (FB 35).

For the very same reason, Abramović’s pieces, which were our initial examples, as well as many other unmentioned instances from experimental art, are Deleuzian becomings, because they do not aspire to re-call ready-made images of the audiences’ previous life experiences. On the contrary—instead of presenting a narration or representation of those already existing clichés—they enable series of becomings. Nevertheless, as I have discussed in the previous section, certain aspects of those examples may still pose a problem in the context of art-life connection, and commercialization.

3.1.1 Becoming-other, becoming-animal

In Deleuzian terms, through art, what becomes visible or tangible is always a becoming, a ‘becoming animal’ or a ‘becoming other’ of something or someone that was previously regarded as an individual or a human-subject. “*Affects are [...] nonhuman becomings of man, just as percepts [...] are nonhuman landscapes of nature*” (WP 169). In other words, whereas perceptions and affections remain as categories of subjective experience, “the affect goes beyond affections [and] the percept goes beyond perceptions, [and hence,] the affect is not the passage from one lived state to another but man’s nonhuman becoming” (173). By using the term ‘non-human’ Deleuze seems to indicate the withdrawal of subjective control. In this sense, what the artist does, as “a seer” or “a becomer”, is “to raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the affect” (170-1):

Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself (WP 164).

Deleuze & Guattari give the example of André Dhotel who places his novel characters in “strange plant-becomings, becoming tree or aster”: Dhotel states that “this is not the transformation of one into the other [...] but something passing from one to the other” (in WP 173). This something which passes from one body to another is sensation and it is “a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility, as if things, beasts, and persons [...] endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation” (173).

In another example from the literature, in Melville’s *Pierre; or, The Ambiguities*, the character’s experience of becoming woman depicts the moment Pierre “can no longer distinguish himself from his half-sister, Isabelle”:

Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation. This is because from the moment that the material passes into sensation, as in a Rodin sculpture, art itself lives on these zones of indetermination. They are blocs [of sensation] (WP 173).

3.1.2 De-personalization and becoming animal in Bacon’s paintings

In *The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze states that in Bacon’s paintings, the Figure ‘folds’ on itself or moves within the space it inhabits. The relation between the Figure and the place which isolates it defines a ‘matter of fact’. Following Bacon, Deleuze makes a distinction between “matters of fact” and the relations which can be comprehended by the mind (FB 2). It is, as if, a matter of fact is an event which no longer needs to be captured by the mind (brain’s mediation), and has a being of its own—without the need for a perceiving subject. The reason Bacon presents the Figure as isolated in a circle or a parallelepiped is that he does not want it to turn

into a figurative, illustrative, narrative or representative character, and emphasize its factuality (2). In other words, the aim is that the painting should act by itself, present a becoming and be avoided from being transformed into a representation or a narration.

A key aspect of the paintings is the relationships between a body, its movements (struggle) and the ‘depersonalization’ of the figures (Figure 11). “It is not I who attempt to escape from my body, it is the body that attempts to escape from itself by means of [...] in short, a spasm: the body as plexus, and its effort or waiting for a spasm” (*FB* 15). In these paintings, the bodies’ desire to escape or effort is expressed with a movement through which the figure imprisons itself and become imprisoned by it, and it is possible to regard these movements as ‘foldings and unfoldings’ of figures. Deleuze cites Beckett’s description of this effort as a journey that each body sets out to find its own “de-personalizer” [*dépeupleur*] (in *FB* 14).

The source of the movement is not ‘I’ but the ‘body’. What matters in the painting is not place but the event. The event is a body’s effort, struggle or waiting: whatever happens to the body. “The entire series of spasms in Bacon is of this type: scenes of love, of vomiting and excreting [...] in which the body attempts to escape from itself *through* one of its organs in order to rejoin the field or material structure” (*FB* 16). Similarly, the shadow owes its presence to the fact that it manages to escape from the body. In other words, a shadow is a body that has fled, and the Figure is “the deformed body that escapes from itself” (18). Deformation is the inevitable result of the body’s “relationship with the material structure” (Figure 12):

not only does the material structure curl around it, but the body must return to the material structure and dissipate into it, thereby passing through or into these prostheses-instruments [e.g. a washbasin or a mirror], which constitute passages and states that are real, physical, and effective, and which are sensations and not imaginings (*FB* 18-9).

In the same context, that is to say, in order to de-personalize the figure, what Bacon portraits in his paintings is not the face but the head. Deleuze names it as a project of discovering the head concealed by the face (Figure 13). Whereas the face is an

“organization” which covers the head, the head is “a spirit in bodily form, a corporeal and vital breath, an animal spirit. It is the animal spirit of man: a-pig-spirit, a buffalo-spirit, a dog-spirit, a bat-spirit [...]” (FB 20).




Figure 11

The kind of animality at stake, here, need not be understood in the literal sense of being turned into an actual animal. In other words, this is not a transformation but a passage to a zone of undecidability. It is, as if, one diverges from his/her determinate state (of equilibrium) which makes him/her a human being, to a molecular state.



Figure 12



Figure 13

“Traits of animality are not animal forms, but rather the spirits that haunt the wiped off parts, that pull at the head, individualizing and qualifying the head without a face” (*FB* 21). The traits are sometimes drawn like the shadow of an animal’s master, e.g., that of a dog, or sometimes the man’s shadow itself (Figure 14) “assumes an autonomous and indeterminate animal existence” (21). Therefore, according to Deleuze, what Bacon’s paintings constitute is

a zone of indiscernibility or undecidability between man and animal. Man becomes animal, but not without the animal becoming spirit at the same time, the spirit of man, the physical spirit of man (FB 21).

3.1.3 Resonance

Deleuze explains that in Bacon’s paintings we come across, either “a common figure” of two bodies or a “common fact” of two figures (*FB* 66). The reason to duplicate the figures or sensations is to create a resonance between them. To illustrate, what is depicted in a bullfight in which “man is coupled with his animal” is “the common fact of man and animal” (22), that is to say, the becoming animal of man and the simultaneous becoming spirit of the animal (Figure 15).



Figure 14

In the last instance, it is sensation which is painted, and art works through “the resonance of two sensations when they seized each other” (*FB* 67-8). “Sleeping, desire, art: these are places of confrontation and resonance, places of struggle” (69). By struggle or confrontation, here, Deleuze indicates “the couplings of diverse sensations in two bodies”: These two bodies are either “intertwined” by sleeping, “mixed together” by desire, or are made to resonate in the painting (Figure 16), in all these situations the Figure is a variable of two bodies (69).




Figure 15

In my opinion, the affective relationship between the active and passive figures which resonate can be better illustrated through the waves of the tension between two characters who enact a 'cat-dog fight' on a stage. What happens on that stage is the becoming visible of a force, a wave turning into a sensation, while the roles of the cat and the dog switches between the characters in accordance with the flow and dynamics of the fight. In this respect, couplings are necessary for the becoming, or the forces accompanying it, to come to light.



Figure 16

3.1.4 Rendering forces perceptible

The relationship that Deleuze establishes between forces, bodies, and sensations does not emerge only in the fields of painting, music or literature, but it reflects his general view of art. Accordingly, what matters in art is avoiding re-production of already existing forms in art and life, i.e. resisting mimicry and representation, and “capturing forces” instead (*FB* 57). In this respect, art is the enterprise of rendering the invisible forces that affect the body, visible through sensations (*FB* 56). The musician renders forces “sonorous” which “are not themselves sonorous” and, likewise, the painter tries to render invisible forces visible (56). For instance, Millet was criticized for depicting the “peasants who were carrying an offertory” as if they were carrying “a sack of potatoes”, but, Deleuze underlines that, what Millet aimed at was, indeed, “to paint the force of weight” or gravitation, as the weight is common to both objects (57). Similarly, Bacon does not paint a figure to create a narrative or distinctive illustration, i.e. a representation, but to make visible the forces affecting the body, and in this endeavor, we find Bacon’s importance in the history of painting (58). Because, according to Deleuze, “everything is [...] related to forces, everything is force” (59).

Right at this point, we come across Deleuze’s *Nietzscheanism* and *Spinozism*. A body is always under the influence of the forces that affect it. The Spinozistic or

Nietzschean answer to the question of what a body is; hence, never indicates a static or absolutist definition of the body. On the contrary, they understand the body as a becoming constantly affected by various forces, as a relational becoming of these forces. Therefore, Nietzsche defines the body as an affective system and Spinoza states that we cannot know what a body is unless we know what it can do.

In brief, it is the duty of non-representative art (expressed as blocs of sensation) to make the forces that affect a body become perceptible, and this is true for all fields of art. In order to make, e.g., scream visible, painting associates a screaming mouth with forces (Bacon's example), and in order to make scream audible, music tries to associate audible scream with the forces that cause it. According to Deleuze, in this example, the aim of art (music and painting) is neither to harmonize scream nor to give color to it by painting a dense sound (*FB* 60).

3.2 The problem with art industry in light of the theory of sensations

Now, turning back to the distinction we made between the products of art industry and other initiatives of art, we can argue that objects of the first category are, above all, reproductions of existing forms or clichés. When they are re-produced as art objects, these figurative images (copied paintings, photographs and newspapers) constitute modern people's "ways of seeing" (*FB* 90). Indeed, Deleuze denies the existence of a representative art because a representation cannot be a genuine work of art, whereas a simulacrum is a genuine becoming. In this respect, art is a privileged field in which affect functions as a "non-representational mode of" thinking (Deleuze, 1978). Yet, this is a point which can be fully understood after the section on Spinoza's notion of *affectus* and the discussion on Deleuze's reversed Platonism.

In his own conception of the simulacrum, Deleuze mentions a type of art which is not representative or repetitive of the Same, and the works of art in this category have a reality of their own without the need to have a relation of resemblance to an

assumed stasis. In this respect, art or sensation is both a way of overcoming Platonic Idealism and the rejection of the modern sense of the notion of causality ('the artist is the body of the artist' instead of 'the artist as the cause of the artwork'). More importantly though, art is the way of experiencing reality, *difference-in-itself*, as such. Since Deleuze's own theory of the simulacrum will be explained in the last section of Chapter four, I will not go into the details of this theme here.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari re-visit the notion of becoming-animal with reference to Daniel Mann's movie *Willard* (1972). Becoming-animal is not a loving relationship one establishes with their pets in an Oedipal family surrounding. On the contrary, as it is, becoming-animal is a matter of being taken over, which, in the case in Willard's story, results in his mother's and boss' death. In a way that overpasses humans' control, the rats multiply and capture Willard's home and work place. The multiplication of rats in a rhizomatic manner instantiate a 'becoming-molecular' as opposed to the molar and hierarchical structure of the conjugal or Oedipal family. If we are to speak of any kind of relationship between Willard and the pack of rats, it is the relation of impersonal or non-subjective affects.

Spinoza's theory of affects relates to the Deleuzian notion of becoming-molecular because affects always refer to pre-personal intensities that can be encountered in a relationship –affection– with another body. Whereas 'molar structures' follow a predetermined path of being with a view to become something stable, concrete or identical; 'molecular becomings' remain liquid, unpredictable and impersonal. Molecular becomings deterritorialize molar routes through a series of non-personal affections. They forge alliances or break and re-form other alliances on their way. So, Willard's case can count as a becoming animal (becoming-rat) or becoming molecular through his encounter with, as it were, a non-formal commune of rats at the cost of giving away his mother, business and a possible marriage—all of which count as molar structures in one's life (*ATP* 233).

Although Deleuze borrows the terms ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ from chemistry and biology, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, together with Guattari, he uses these terms for referring to entities in political and aesthetic domains. In this respect, entities like the State and social institutions such as conjugal union and education systems are well organized molar structures through which the civic life is pursued and controlled. On the other hand, molecular bodies are constructed *via* more obscure means of aggregation and, in opposition to molar masses which are “affiliated with a governing apparatus”, molecular becomings are active, dynamic and creative (Conley, 2005: 171-4).

3.3 Spinoza’s philosophy of affects

If the theory of sensation, as presented in Deleuze’s text *Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation* and in the second part of Deleuze & Guattari’s text *What is Philosophy?*, is one of the pillars of Deleuzian aesthetics, Spinoza’s notion of ‘affect’ and the Nietzschean view of the world as ‘the interplay of invisible forces’ constitute the other two. Since Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is the main theme of the fourth chapter of this thesis, I preferred to skip it here, and, instead, touched upon the Deleuze-Spinoza connection.

As it will be shown in the next chapter, Nietzsche’s affirmative philosophy of will-to-power(s) has its roots in Spinoza’s philosophy of body and emotions, or, at least, we can argue that there are certain parallelisms between their views. In this respect, both Nietzsche and Spinoza have a respectable influence over Deleuze’s own affirmative philosophy as well as his approach to art.

The notions of *conatus*, affirmation of one’s own being, and the multiplicity of forces (or *affectus*) which affect bodies, as well as the interplay of the images–ideas–of those emotions are central considerations in Spinoza’s *Ethics*. We have already stated that according to Deleuze, everything consists of forces or everything is force, and the same view is true for Nietzsche and Spinoza.

3.3.1 Desire

For Spinoza, *conatus* or the endeavor to survive or promote one's own existence is the essence of all beings. Hence, it could be said that, 'force' is the very being or essence of human beings. Spinoza understands bodies as fluid and affective processes; they are always in the middle of a becoming more, trying to become more active and increase their *conatus*.

This fundamental force, *conatus*, can be named as 'appetite' or 'desire'. There is a slight conceptual difference between the use of the notions of 'appetite' and 'desire' in Spinoza's philosophy. By the word 'desire,' Spinoza (2002) understands "appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof" (284). Accordingly, when we use the word 'desire' we indicate that it is the appetites one is conscious of, and when we call it only 'appetite' we refer to forces or instincts that one is not necessarily aware of (284). However, we must be careful to note that 'desire' and 'appetite' are not so strictly distinguished from one another since 'desire' is defined as appetite that one is *usually* conscious of; ideally humans can be conscious of all their appetites by attaining the knowledge of their causes. Spinoza's ethics is eminently epistemological because he believes that reaching the knowledge of causes which condition their actions, by considering the other individual parts of Nature together with the necessities of their own nature, is the only way for human beings to attain a unity with Nature. Short of this epistemological insight, desires "vary with man's various states, and are not infrequently so opposed to one another that a man may be drawn in different directions and know not where to turn" (311).

Following Spinoza, according to Deleuze (1997), desire is a fluid, continuous process, it is an unnamed and un-ended bodily process, and Deleuze & Guattari sometimes refer to human beings as 'desiring machines' or bodies without organs. "desire implies no lack; neither is it a natural given. It is an *agencement* of heterogeneous elements that function [...]" (189).

That is to say, the way Spinoza (and Deleuze & Guattari) understands desire is a departure from the Platonic paradigm. One does not only desire something which s/he lacks. Desire is, rather, the machinic explanation of the movement of a body without the need to postulate the existence of ‘a self’ or ‘conscious subject’. Desire is

process as opposed to structure or genesis; it is affect as opposed to sentiment; it is “*haec-eity*” (the individuality of a day, a season, a life) as opposed to subjectivity; it is an event as opposed to a thing or person. And above all, it implies the constitution of a plane of immanence or a “body without organs,” which is defined solely by zones of intensity [...] (Deleuze, 1997: 189).

The difference between desire and other emotions relates to (1) the difference between *affect* and affection, (2) active and passive states.

(1) We have seen that Deleuze makes a demarcation between *affect* and affection in his theory of sensation. Whereas, affections are personal experiences or mental states (images) of those sensible interactions among different bodies or the after-images of the effects of several forces over a body, affect is a non-personal yet singular force or intensity. The singularity of an affect stems from the fact that an affect is not something like a universal force that each body participates in; rather, a different affect, a different Desire is at stake for each body. For instance, in terms of its affects, a race-horse might be “more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox”, says Deleuze, because affects are neither traits, nor personal characteristics, but, be they active or passive, they are intensities which determine the capabilities of bodies through affecting their extensive parts (*ATP* 257).

(2) The difference between active and passive emotions is another important theme of *Ethica*. Spinoza (2002) argues that “we are passive insofar as we are a part of Nature which cannot be conceived independently of other parts” (324). Indeed, human beings are never absolutely free or active, that is to say, our actions are always determined by external or internal causes that we may or may not be aware

of. Affections are those causes which may lead to the feeling of grief in us. “Pleasure, pain, and consequently the emotions that are compounded of these or derived from them are passive emotions” (Spinoza, 2002: 307). The idea, image or memory of a sad emotion increases our grief and decreases our *conatus*. In short, all feelings which lead to a decrease in one’s vital forces are passive states. However, there are, at the same time, different types of pleasure and desire, which are related to the nature of human beings “insofar as we are active” (309).

When the mind conceives itself and its power to act, it feels pleasure [...] Now the mind necessarily regards itself when it conceives a true, that is, adequate, idea [...] But the mind does conceive adequate ideas [...] Therefore it feels pleasure, too, insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, that is, [...] insofar as it is active. Again, it is both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas that the mind endeavors to persist in its own being [...] But by *conatus* we understand desire [...] Therefore, desire is also related to us insofar as we understand, i.e., insofar as we act (Spinoza, 2002: 309).

In other words, desire as an affect, relates to an active state of the mind and the body, which is the distinction between passive emotions, affections, and affect, desire.

Just as not all states of inertia are a sign of passivity and negation, not all actions are run by active and affirmative mental or bodily states. Most of the time, the cases in which the flux of desire is cut in order to gain a certain type of pleasure, the result is a decrease in our *conatus*. Furthermore, those pleasure seeking actions passivize both their doers and their dependents (other bodies who interact with them), and the consequence is a mutual decrease in the *conatus* of those bodies who affect and are affected in turn. This is why desires always activate, affirm and increase *conatus* whereas pleasure might be passive, negative and end up with a decrease in *conatus*.

As it is stated in Deleuze’s unpublished notes on Foucault (generally known as “Desire & Pleasure”), what Foucault calls ‘pleasure’ is what Deleuze calls ‘desire’. Pleasure comes to interrupt “the immanent process of desire”, the “positivity of desire and the constitution of” the fields of “immanence” (Deleuze, 1997: 189-90). Desire is not a natural or spontaneous given. Whenever it is suspended and given a

pause for a certain time, we call it pleasure. In this context, pleasure does not necessarily have a positive connotation.

3.3.2 Affect as different from affection (*‘affectio’* and *‘affectus’*):

The powers of being affected are combined [...] To assume that there was a power of being affected which defined the power of being affected of the whole universe is quite possible since all relations are combined to infinity, but not just in any order (Deleuze, 1978).

This is almost equivalent to saying that the concept of ‘affect’ is the key to explaining our connection to the whole universe. As Seigworth (2005) explains, “affect is that moment of singularity [haecceity] where a universe pours in, flows out – an unlimited One-All, universal-singular” (160). In order to gain a better understanding of this point, we should specify, a little more, the distinction between *‘affectio’* and *‘affectus’*, but this time, as two terms generated from one term: ‘the affect’.

We can find several passages where Deleuze and Guattari shed light on this distinction, but in a lecture on Spinoza, Deleuze explicitly states the importance of avoiding a translation mistake, which was the case in some of the translations of Spinoza’s *Ethica* from Latin (Deleuze, 1978). The translators combined the terms *affectio* and *affectus* and used a single term ‘affection’ while translating them. However, disastrously enough, affection is distinct from both of these two terms. Whereas ‘affection’ (*affectio*) means emotion and hence a personal feeling, ‘affect’ (*affectus*) is pre-individual. To clarify, *affectio* (affection) is “the state of a body as it affects or is affected by another body” and *affectus* is “a body’s continuous intensive variation (as increase-diminution) in its capacity for acting” (Spinoza in Seigworth, 2005: 161-2).

Spinoza’s *affectio*, is the transitive effect undergone by a body (human or otherwise) in a system – a mobile and open system – composed of the various, innumerable forces of existing and the relations between these forces (Seigworth, 2005: 161).

Affect “cannot be converted into or delimited by the discursive, by images or representations, by consciousness or thought” as “it has its own autonomy (not only from the intellectual but from affectional-corporeal tracings as well)” (Seigworth, 2005: 161).

According to Deleuze, the more important face of this two-fold term is affect (*affectus*) as it is the bodily remainder or pre-individual intensive capacity that conditions transitions in and among bodies. I would argue that the distinction between affect and affection is similar to the distinction between becoming and being, or virtual and actual. In other words, if the virtual (intensive) capacity, becoming and affect, is one side of the coin, the actual, being and affection constitutes the other. However, for Deleuze, what matters is that affect underlies affection, becoming underlies being, and the virtual underlies the actual.

Contrary to Spinoza, Deleuze & Guattari do not emphasize the unity of reality but the multiplicity of its modifications either through percepts and affects (as in the case of art) or concepts (as in the case of philosophy) (*ATP* 254). While Deleuze may be justly criticized for overlooking the importance of the epistemological dimension of Spinoza’s ethics, which points to a unity with the one Substance (God/Nature), his appropriation of Spinoza rightly emphasizes this other neglected dimension of Spinoza’s ontology: its processual nature and the multiplicity of affects which proceed from Spinoza’s explications of the concept of *conatus*.

In the Spinozistic ontology it is important to see the relational nature of the body, and admit that we cannot talk about the essences of bodies in an Aristotelian sense. According to Spinoza, singular bodies (human beings, plants, animals, etc.—when thought distinctly) are composite beings, that is, they are composed of the affects between the variations (modes) of being (Deleuze, 2008: 13-8). Put differently, each singular thing owes its being to the being of another.

The virtual or intensive capacity that a body has “for *affecting* or being *affected*” implies that, provided that I affect something, I also open myself “up to being

affected in turn”, and ‘*affectus*’ is what enables this mutual variation in our virtual capacities (Massumi: 2003, 212).¹⁰

The virtual is not the possible. The possible is that which does not exist but might; it is modeled on the real, parasitic upon it, but is not real. It is the real minus existence. If I think of a fence that I want to build, a white picket fence, that fence is possible although not real. (One might say that it is a real thought; fair enough, but it’s only a possible.) In contrast, the virtual is real, it exists (sometimes Deleuze uses the term “subsists”), but has a wholly different character from that which we consciously experience, which Deleuze calls the “actual” (May, 2003: 148).

In other words, Spinoza conceives of affect as a moving capacity—a transition from a virtual or actual state to another (Massumi, 2003: 213). This relates to the view that a body cannot “coincide with itself”, because it is “already on the move to a *next*” and never “present to itself” (215). Deleuze adapts this fundamental insight to reveal a potential to do, act, change or create the new.

In brief, it can be said that the works of art which do not seek to give pleasure to their viewers or arouse a feeling in them by making reference to the ready-made-images already existing in the minds of the audience, are products of an uncut desire. Such an art activates the body and the image of the body (mind), raises a consciousness in those who encounter it. Indeed, with respect to this aspect of raising consciousness and activating the body and thus the mind, it is almost inevitable to recall what Brecht was aiming for with ‘the distancing effect,’ that is to say, enabling the audience to grasp the intellectual meaning of the play through their own mental powers. Nevertheless, as I will return in the last chapter, from a Deleuzian perspective, Brechtian theatre cannot escape demagoguery due to the fact

¹⁰ To avoid certain misunderstandings, we must note that Deleuze’s notion of virtual is different from the Aristotelian notion of potential. Whereas ‘potential’ is actualized and run by an innate or transcendental *telos* or a predetermined plan, ‘virtual’ is as real as the actual but it is an indeterminate Idea or a non-actualized multitude of intensities. And the only difference between the virtual and the actual is that the virtual results in the emergence of the actual by differentiating from itself. For instance, genes might be thought as the virtual constituents of actual beings. It is the genes which construct an actual organ or an actual organ is comprised of genes.

that it always involves a representation of the given conflicts existing the social field.

Philosophy thinks through concepts but art thinks through percepts and affects. As we have explained, “affects are becomings”, and hence, they are non-representational modes of thinking; this is why they cannot be exhausted in language or captured by the intellect alone (*ATP* 256).

Whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is the language of sensations. Art does not have opinions. Art undoes the triple organization of perceptions, affections and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocks of sensations that take the place of language [...] The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the affect from affections, the sensation from opinion (*WP* 176).

For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari cannot be regarded as art-critiques either. Their approach to the works of artists is rather different from that of those intellectuals who claim to shed light on the work and exhaust it by a translation of signs, i.e. by explicating what stands for what. Art is a different mode of creation, different from thinking as “[it] does not have opinions” (*WP* 176).¹¹

3.4 BwO versus organic representation of the body

Antonin Artaud is interpreted as a “forefather” of process-ontologies due to his “visceral” performances as an example of the “primarily affective basis of embodied theatre practices” (Blackman, 2011: 189). He

represents the multiple possibilities of becoming-other, where our capacity for becoming is linked to our potential connections and our

¹¹ In this context, following the Deleuzian attitude, if a piece by an artist is interpreted in this work, it is not done for the sake of reducing the openness of the piece to a closure by its conceptual meaning, but to provide a more embracing understanding of the work in addition to its perceptual correspondence which, as a whole, might be incommensurable in a logical language. Nevertheless, I agree with Massumi (2003) that there are certain forms of expressions, i.e. certain uses of language, such as humour and poetic expression that might “convey too much of the situation—[the intensity of affective experience]—in a way that actually fosters *new* experiences” (219).

capacity to multiply and intensify these connections with others; human and non-human (Massumi in Blackman, 2011: 190).

In this respect, Deleuze owes his own notion of body without organs, an “organ-less vitality” to Artaud (Blackman, 2011: 189). Both Deleuze and Guattari are “fascinated with [Artaud’s] staging of his own mania through gestural and bodily interruptions” which has been “deployed as a motif for understanding the production of the subjectivities in the context of becoming” (189). Indeed what Deleuze sees in Bacon’s paintings is *bodies without organs* too.

According to Artaud, “the body is the body / it stands alone / it has no need of organs / the body is never an organism / organisms are the enemies of bodies” (in *FB* 44). In this context, Deleuze argues that, indeed, Artaud does not criticize the notion of organs but that of organism as “organizations of organs” because he understands the body as an intensity (*FB* 44). Deleuze illustrates the “state of the body ‘before’ organic representation” with the example of an egg (*FB* 45). “No mouth, No tongue, No teeth, No larynx, No esophagus. No belly, No anus”: even if the body is living it is a nonorganic intensity: “Organism is not life, it is what imprisons life” (45).

Likewise sensation, when it acquires a body through the organism, takes on an excessive and spasmodic appearance, exceeding the bounds of organic activity. It is immediately conveyed in the flesh through the nervous wave or vital emotion (*FB* 45).

With reference to Bacon’s paintings, the Figure which is seen as flesh, body or movement is ‘a body without organs’. As explained above, dismantling “the face in favor of the head” (Figure 17) means dismantling “the organism in favor of the body” and this is why Deleuze states that the body without organs is flesh (*FB* 45).

It can be said that the deterritorialisation of the body as a BwO— which frees itself from the domination of the organization—, its becoming-movement, and its depersonalization is, simultaneously, a becoming singular. In other words, as the BwO dissolves in a molecular state, formation of a subject is disabled. But there is still a state of non-personal individuation. Singularities do not need to be grasped

mentally, rather, they are sensible facts. In this respect, the art-event, as an experiment—as a process of singularization—de-territorializes the subject while the body is now understood as a becoming, a BwO.




Figure 17

3.4.1 BwO and art(s) of becoming

According to Deleuze, “spirituality is a spirituality of the body; the spirit is the body itself, the body without organs” (*FB* 47). Right at this point, we must note that according to Spinoza (2002), spirit is the idea of the body (284).

In Deleuze’s terms, “the body without organs does not lack organs” but it just does not have an organism (*FB* 47). Bacon’s paintings indicate the possibility of becoming a BwO without being calculable in time—“in split-second adjustments”: “no organ is constant as regards either function or position [...] sex organs sprout anywhere [...] rectums open, defecate and close [...] the entire organism changes color and consistency in split-second adjustments” (Burroughs in *FB* 47). Thus, Deleuze arrives at the conclusion that the BwO can be described as “*an indeterminate organ*” too (*FB* 47). This state of indeterminacy stems from the “*temporary and provisional presence* of determinate organs”: The whole organism is in variation and the event of variation itself happens in a ‘pure duration’. For instance, “what is a mouth at one level becomes an anus at another level, or at the same level under the action of different forces,” and it is, as if, it is impossible to catch the speed of this variation (48).

When one looks at the mirror and ask oneself “who is looking at the mirror?” what one sees in the mirror is neither an essential body nor one’s self. What one sees in the mirror is a subjective representation of a singular becoming forced to be perceived as an organized unity both internally and externally according to one’s culturally encoded perceptions, memory, habit, etc. In other words, what one sees in the mirror is one’s mentally established body: the body-idea. What one sees is never one’s own subject or one’s own inside, because a body as a fluid desiring-machine cannot coincide with itself and one cannot be fully conscious of one’s own body (Massumi, 2003: 215). In this respect, the difference between what we see in the mirror as something perceptible, complete, the becoming of which is halted, and

one's body as such is the difference between a representation of a body and the body as a becoming.

Sollier describes the aforementioned hysteric presence of the body as follows:

It is no longer *my* head, but I feel myself inside *a* head, I see and I see myself inside a head; or else I do not see myself in the mirror, but I feel myself in the body that I see, and I see myself in this naked body when I am dressed (in *FB* 49).

The figure that we come across in the work of art now becomes depersonalized and turns into a witness of the event, its own becoming. Deleuze argues that, in Bacon's paintings, what happens before and after the event interrupts the figurative flow and distorts the work, but later it gives back the Figure. This is a state of "hysteresis" and in the hysteresis, "there is [...] little difference between the hysteric, the 'hystericized,' and the 'hystericizer'" (*FB* 50).

To put it differently, in Bacon's paintings the accident itself becomes durable (*FB* 134): "the form is no longer essence, but becomes accident; humankind is an accident" (135). It is not possible, anymore, to arrive at a state of equilibrium where a subject is becomes present, but the whole event is accidental.

There is neither an inside nor an outside, but only a continuous creation of space, the spatializing energy of color. By avoiding abstraction, colorism avoids both figuration and narration, and moves infinitely closer to the pure state of a pictorial "fact" which has nothing left to narrate (*FB* 134).

These considerations are not limited to painting but all forms of artistic creation. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari defend an "artisan" or "non-hylomorphic" mode of production, according to which, matter itself suggests "forms" to the artist, and hence, the artist does not impose his/her images-ideas on matter as if matter is merely a "passive", raw material (Protevi, 2005: 296). On the contrary, forms are "implicit" in matter and the role of the artist is simply "to actualize" the "potentials" provided by the matter (297). For instance, in Steve Paxton's technique of 'contact-improvisation', the dancer(s) learn to listen to the forces of gravitation affecting their bodies (Figure 18). In this case, it is the material

body, following the forces conditioning its movements, *who* offers forms to the artist.

It has been explained that, for Deleuze, the actualisation of the implicit form in the product is re-conceptualized as a passage from virtual to actual through a process of individuation, and what effects this passage is an intensive quality or “*intensity*” (Bogue, 2001: 61). As Bogue (2001) states, Deleuze borrows the notion of ‘intensity’ and the non-hylomorphic mode of ‘individuation’ from Gilbert Simondon, and hence, these terms are better explained with reference to Simondon’s considerations:¹²



Figure 18

¹² For further research on this issue, see Simondon, G. (1964). *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*. Paris: PUF.

Simondon's sample consideration is the production of 'a brick' made of 'malleable clay' with the aid of a 'wooden mould': According to the Aristotelian, hylomorphic model, mould is considered as the form and the clay as matter. Simondon, however, states that "both the clay and the mould have form and matter" but it is the clay's intensive quality or "potential energy" which makes it "capable of effecting a transformation", and the function of the mould is merely that it "puts a limit on the expanding form of the molecular organization of the clay as it fills the mould" (in Bogue, 2001: 61). It is manifest from this example that, Deleuze's model for the emergence of an actual object in accordance with the virtual Idea is rather close to the scientific explanation of the transformative power of 'potential energy'. In Deleuzian terms, the process through which the clay gains a more stable form (brick) is an 'individuation,' and hence, the becoming-brick of the clay is called an *individuation*. The relation between an intensive quality or "intensity" and individuation is thusly explained: "individuation [...] precedes the individual" because an intensity promotes the transversal relation between the virtual structure and the actual object (Bogue, 2001: 62).

a metastable substance [as in the example of the clay before it is transformed into a brick] is a difference in itself [...] and individuation is a process in which difference differentiates itself. [In other words,] a metastable substance *implicates* (enfolds within itself) difference and *explicates* (unfolds) that difference through the process of individuation (Bogue, 2001: 62).

In my opinion, the notions of 'folding', 'unfolding', and 're-folding' can provide us a clearer view of the type of becoming at stake, both in Bacon's paintings, and the example of the brick. Hence, in the next section, Deleuze's reading of Leibniz will be illuminated with a view to gain a better understanding of Deleuzian aesthetics.

3.5 Deleuze's reading of Leibniz

Deleuze's reading of Leibniz, mainly, rests upon the four famous principles that appear in Leibniz's philosophy. These are, respectively, the principles of identity (*ratio essendi*), sufficient reason (*ratio existendi*), indiscernibles (*ratio*

cognoscendi), and the law of continuity (*ratio fiendi*); and Deleuze constructs his own theory of differential mechanisms upon these principles.

If it was the case that Leibniz simply meant the logic of analytic sentences, e.g. “A is A”, by ‘the principle of identity’, it could be said that this principle does not involve anything new in comparison to the classical logic of identity. The principle, on the one hand, indicates one’s *intuitive* knowledge of the ‘essence’ which makes a thing what it is and, on the other, it indicates the *inclusiveness* of something’s concept or notion. For instance, the sentence “a triangle has three angles” is an analytic proposition and it is intuitively true because having three angles is involved in the concept of a triangle, i.e. having three angles is essential to any triangle (Smith, 2005: 128). However, the truth of the phrase “a triangle has three sides” needs a demonstration, though it will be found out that having three sides is “a logical necessity” and triangle-ness is inclusive of three sided-ness (128). Accordingly, Leibniz’s principle of identity has two aspects: first, the reciprocity or correspondence between a thing and its concept, and second, the inclusivity of that concept. The latter aspect is rather important as it underpins his second principle, which is, according to Deleuze and many other scholars, what makes Leibniz a great philosopher of novelty (129).

The principle of sufficient reason, gives us the ground or foundation which causes a thing to be specifically that thing. For Aristotle, it was enough to reach a universal definition of a *genus*, for it would be inclusive of each individual in that genus. However, for Leibniz, ‘proper names’ are also concepts, and hence, universals cannot provide the sufficient reason for the existence of a specific individual. For example, Aristotle would be satisfied by stating that “Plato and Socrates are *humans*”, but Leibniz’s novelty lies in the fact that he wants to continue till he reaches all the reasons that make Plato *this* human being and Socrates *that* human being. Therefore, he argues, for any individual thing, in addition to the *ratio essendi*, “the totality of affections and events happen to or are related to or belong to the

thing” are involved in the causes of existence for that thing (Smith, 2005: 130). In other words, whatever is predicated of a thing must be involved in its concept:

Everything that happens has a reason [...] A cause is of the order of what happens, either to change a state of things, or to produce or destroy the thing. But the principle claims that everything that happens to a thing – causations included – has a reason. If an event is called what happens to the thing, whether it undergoes the event or makes it happen, it can be said that sufficient reason is what includes the event as one of its predicates: the concept of the thing, or the notion (*TF* 41).

According to this quote, “the necessary cause” is different from “the sufficient reason” since sufficient reason “expresses the relation of the thing with its own notion, whereas causality simply expresses the relations of the thing with something else” (Smith, 2005: 132). In other words, at this level of argumentation, Leibniz is not concerned with the actual causal relations which physically affect a thing but with the reasons or events included in their concepts. Therefore, Deleuze underlines that a reason is different from a cause since reasons include “causations” and causes are the order of events that take part in the actualization of a thing (*TF* 41). Notably, Deleuze’s distinction between the virtual and the actual can be traced back to his reading of Leibniz, as he follows Leibniz’s argument that the concept of a thing virtually or implicitly carries the reasons of existence for that thing (42). The natural result of the principle of sufficient reason is that only one concept corresponds to each thing since the totality of the relations that take part in the emergence of a thing cannot be exactly the same as the totality of the relations that take part in the emergence of another (*DR* 12). This is exactly how Leibniz manages to approach proper names as concepts; all the reasons that make *that* man Socrates is or must be involved in the notion of ‘Socrates’. Hence, as Deleuze points out, Leibniz’s novelty lies in the fact that his focus shifts from “the domain of essences” to “the domain of existences” (Smith, 2005: 129-30).

There are at least two important outcomes of the principle of sufficient reason; since the entire world is expressed in our concepts, the first of these outcomes is ‘expressionism’, and since each “individual notion” expresses the world from “a

certain *point of view*”, the second outcome is ‘perspectivism’ (Smith, 2005: 132). However, it should be noted that the kind of *perspectivism* Leibniz advocates is not the same as relativism because it is the subject which is “constituted by the point of view”, and respectively, points of view “are the sufficient reason” for the constitution of subjects, and an “individual notion is the point of view through which the individual expresses the totality of the world” (133), because “if we follow the causes back and track down the effects, the entire world must be contained in the [individual] notion” (137).

In Deleuzian terms, points of view are pre-individual, virtual singularities or Ideas through which subjects or individual objects are actualized. It has been discussed that, for Deleuze, the creation of concepts is necessitated by the existence of problems. In contrast, he understands Ideas as “problems to which there is no solution” (*DR*, 168). In that respect, like Kant, he also distinguishes Ideas from concepts. While concepts are actualized beings, ideas are virtual structures, and their status of being is that of a non-being. The following quote which explains this status of non-being also reveals how Deleuze’s notion of difference circumvents a more Hegelian concept of negation:

There is a non-being, yet there is neither negative nor negation. There is a non-being which is by no means the being of the negative, but rather the being of the problematic. The symbol for this (non)-being or ?-being is %. The zero refers only to difference and its repetition (*DR* 202).

Instead of understanding the ‘virtual’ as possible and the ‘actual’ as real, Deleuze makes “a modal distinction” between the two terms as they are both real (Smith, 2005a: 7). The virtual differs from itself in actualizing the actual, i.e. it generates the actual. In other words, the virtual is the condition of the actual. “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual” (*DR* 208).

Bogue (2001) gives an example to the (non)-being of virtual Ideas by distinguishing between genes and actual animals: “just as the structure of genes bears no resemblance to the structure of an actual animal, so the structure of a virtual idea bears no resemblance to the structure of its actual embodiment” (59-60). To further

illuminate this distinction, we can refer to one of Deleuze's explanations about "the organism as biological Idea" (DR 184) in *Difference and Repetition*:

Genes express differential elements which also characterize an organism in a global manner, and play the role of distinctive points in a double process of reciprocal and complete determination; the double aspect of genes involves commanding several characteristics at once, and acting only in relation to other genes; the whole constitutes a virtuality, a potentiality; and this structure is incarnated in actual organisms, as much from the point of view of the determination of their species as from that of the differentiation of their parts, according to rhythms that are precisely called 'differential', according to comparative speeds or slownesses which measure the movement of actualisation (DR 185).

In other words, the actual parts of an organism are conditioned by the virtual structure of the genes although there is no relation of resemblance between the two.

In opposition to Aristotle, the type of difference Deleuze defends in *Difference and Repetition* is not a qualitative difference between two members of the same 'genus' or 'kind' as in the case of differentiating between a "dog" and "a cat" which are both examined under "the same category of animal", but a generative difference-in-itself (Cull, 2009b: 29-30).

In *Difference and Repetition*, "the determination of the virtual content of an Idea" is called "differentiation" and "the actualization of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts" is called "differentiation" (DR 207). Whereas differentiation is the generative process of material things, differentiation is the composition of an Idea. "Every actualization entails a differentiation of an already differential Idea" (Smith, 2005c: 154). In this context, according to Deleuze, the transcendental "accounts for the genesis of *real* experience" as "it forms an intrinsic genesis" (Smith 2005a: 8).

In Deleuze's formulation, Ideas are purely immanent; i.e. they are "ideal multiplicities defined by their elements, relations and singularities" (Smith, 2005c: 154), and they do not correspond to empirical objects, though they condition "material reality" (Smith, 2005d: 300).

In order to understand how Ideas are not transcendental but “immanent” in Deleuze’s philosophy, we must quickly return to his transcendental empiricism. According to Kant, “conditions of the knowledge of objects [...] were to be found in the [transcendental] subject” as his project consisted in discovering the *immanent* criteria of the understanding in order to denounce the “illegitimate uses of the synthesis of consciousness” (Smith, 2005e: 587-8).

However, following Hume, Deleuze rejects the existence of a subject that transcends and, in return, as part of his “transcendental empiricism”, reconstructs the notion of a virtual or “transcendental field” consisting of Ideas or “pre-individual and impersonal singularities” which are “explored empirically, that is via ‘experiments’” (Smith, 2005e: 588). Accordingly, whereas the subject is a fixed, self-identical being that transcends all empirical experience, singularities are becomings that are virtual yet real. “The virtual field [...] is immanent in the world”, i.e. “in the material processes of the world which are structured by differential Ideas or multiplicities” (Smith, 2005d: 304).

So, following Leibniz, in *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze says that he seeks “to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field that does not resemble the corresponding empirical fields” (LS 102).

If we move further through Leibniz’ line of argumentation, we arrive at a theory of perceptions which is also important for Deleuze. Leibniz distinguishes between the unconscious, ‘minute’ or, in Deleuze’s terms, ‘molecular perceptions’ – infinitely small, obscure and confused perceptions – and the ‘conscious’ or, again in Deleuze’s terms, ‘molar perceptions’—apperception. Whereas *apperception* refers to a fully conscious state of perceiving something, unconscious perception stands for a non-conscious state or a blurred consciousness (minute perceptions) (Smith, 2005: 141). Deleuze is rather interested with those situations in which we do not acquire a clear and distinct consciousness of the external stimuli. Leibniz’s example for indefinite consciousness comes from waves in the ocean. While walking in the seaside we hear the sounds of the waves, that is to say, we are conscious of them

without being able to differentiate the sound of one wave from another. In other words, although we do not know definitely which sound comes from which wave, we are conscious that the sounds come from the waves. The indefiniteness of one's consciousness as in the example of hearing the waves is called an obscure or minute perception.

A conscious perception is produced when at least two [...] minute and "virtual" perceptions enter into a differential relation that determines a singularity, that is, a conscious perception. [In the example of the sea,] at least two waves must be minutely perceived as nascent and "virtual" in order to enter into a differential relation capable of determining a third, which excels over the others and becomes conscious (Smith, 2005: 141).

The infinitely small perceptions are "like the 'differentials' of consciousness" (Smith, 2005: 133), i.e. together they combine a virtual field and when they are actualized these differentials bring about an *apperception*. According to Leibniz, the reduced "portion" of the world that I can "express clearly and distinctly" is "finite" whereas minute perceptions are infinitely small, yet it is this finite portion which "affects my *body*" so that I can know my body (133). The body is necessary because the point of view "occupies" the body (133). According to Leibniz, a point of view is

the portion or the region of the world expressed clearly by an individual in relation to the totality of the world, which it expresses obscurely in the form of minute perceptions. No two individual substances occupy the same point of view on the world because none have the same clear and distinct zone of expression on the world (133).

Another purpose which Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason serves is that it clarifies his notions of *possibility* and *impossibility*. According to Leibniz's argument from expressionism, individual concepts express the whole world from their own points of view; the existence of the world supervenes on its being expressed by those individual notions. Expressed in more Deleuzian terms, since points of view are a multiplicity of differential elements, infinite in number, the *same* world is expressed and hence constructed by a plurality. In other words, difference constructs identity and not *vice versa*. In addition, according to the

principle of identity, a true proposition; i.e. an analytic a priori sentence, cannot be contradictory since the reciprocity between the subject and the predicate in an analytic proposition is a logical necessity. For instance, the proposition “a unicorn has only one horn” is necessarily true, whereas “a double horned unicorn” is a contradiction. For the principle of identity, a proposition may be logically true but it may not indicate an actual existent. However, for the principle of sufficient reason something may be logically *possible* but *impossible*, that is to say it cannot actually exist. For instance, in itself, it was possible for me not writing this thesis but according to the actual order of the world, writing this thesis is involved in my concept, and hence, me not writing it, is “*impossible* with the rest of the actualized world” (Smith, 2005: 134). Similarly, “Caesar could not have crossed the Rubicon” or “Adam could have not sinned” as these might be the events of another possible world and they do not pose logical contradictions, whereas “a square circle” is both impossible and impossible since a square circle is not a circle—it contradicts the principle of identity (134). Therefore, Leibniz concludes, this world, which is expressed by an infinite number of individual concepts (points of view) was not only possible but also *necessary* so that it could actually exist, and hence, this is “the best of all possible worlds” as it was the only compossible one.

There corresponds to the principle of sufficient reason a third principle, that is, the reciprocal principle of indiscernibles. The principle of sufficient reason was that “for everything, there is a concept that includes everything that will happen to the thing”, but the principle of indiscernibles says “for every concept, there is one and only one thing” (Smith, 2005: 134). This reciprocity stems from the absolute necessity that in the universe there are no two things which are absolutely identical. Even if two things are identical according their inner structures, they cannot be the same due to their spatio-temporal aspects. Through this principle, both numerical difference, spatio-temporality, extension (shape, size) and movement (speed) are encompassed by conceptual differences, and substance is claimed to be individual. Accordingly, it is argued that “we have *knowledge* only by means of concepts”, and hence this principle is called “the reason of knowing” or “*ratio cognoscendi*” (135).

However, for Deleuze, the problem with this argument is that “all differences are reduced to conceptual differences”:

According to the principle of sufficient reason, there is always one concept per particular thing. According to the reciprocal principle of identity of indiscernibles, there is one and only one thing per concept. Together, these principles expound a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop the account of representation as mediation (*DR* 12).

Nonetheless, “every individual substance, or monad, envelops the infinity of predicates that constitutes the state of the world” and according to Deleuze’s appropriation of Leibniz’s principles, it is possible to construct a differential theory of Ideas since an immanent difference or multiplicity appears prior to actual existences and the principle of sufficient reason cannot be reduced to the principle of identity (Smith, 2005: 136-7). Hence, as it can be inferred from Leibniz’s second and third principles, the significance of Leibniz, for Deleuze, consists in the concepts Leibniz developed concerning “the problems of individuation” and “the theory of Ideas” (Smith, 2005: 127).

It has been explained that whereas the analyses of identity (essences) are finite, the analyses of sufficient reason (existences) are infinite. “In the domain of existences, we cannot stop ourselves, because the series are prolongable and must be prolonged, because the inclusion is not localizable” (*TF* 51). In other words, when I perform an infinite analysis and track down the effects relating to any individual thing, I realize that “*the truths of existence [...] are governed by continuity*” and, accordingly, this world is one that “realizes *the maximum of continuity for a maximum of difference*” (Smith, 2005: 137-8). To illustrate, if I analyze the individual concept of “Adam”, I have to “pass from Adam the sinner to Eve the temptress, and from Eve the temptress to the evil serpent, and from the evil serpent to the forbidden fruit, and so on” (137). And this is how the infinite is present in the concept of the finite.

Returning to the notion of ‘folding’ we can arrive at the conclusion that the universe as a differential mechanism has a capacity for creating infinite folds folded in folds. In this way, continuity and difference do not exclude one another.

3.5.1 The concept of ‘the fold’ as part of a new aesthetic paradigm

Deleuze’s approach to art, i.e. Deleuzian aesthetics, is far beyond the attempts to philosophize on art and on “the subjective experiences of the pleasure and displeasure art evokes” which we find in Kant, Schelling or Hegel (Kaiser, 2010: 203). In this context, despite the varying “methods” and “schools” within itself, the traditional paradigm of aesthetics is concerned, mainly, with “the *limits* of reason” by taking the work of art and “the subjective experiences of it as its objects” and taking “pleasure and feeling as something external” or “supplementary” to reason (203-4). Deleuze, on the other hand, approaches aesthetics as “a mode of thinking” through foldings and unfoldings rather than “a philosophical subdivision”, i.e. a philosophy of art (Rancière in Kaiser, 2010: 204).

In other words, art does philosophy but through its own means, and hence, Deleuze’s approach to art; cinema, painting, theatre, literature, etc.; must not be read as an attempt to extend philosophy to these fields but, on the contrary, as a challenge to discover the philosophy already in them (Massumi in *ATP* 518). This philosophy is, as Deleuze states, a philosophy of ‘immanent difference’. Furthermore, Deleuze’s announcement of modern aesthetics is a challenge to the traditional paradigm in that it involves a “resolution of the relation between the sensate and the intelligible” (Kaiser, 2010: 204).

As Deleuze and Guattari explain in *What is Philosophy?*, having confronted “chaos”, “art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite”, in other words, art “lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations” (Kaiser, 2010: 205).

Art [...] lives on [...] zones of indetermination. [It] needs the power of a *ground* that can dissolve forms and impose the existence of a zone in which we no longer know which is animal and which is human, because something like the triumph or monument of their nondistinction rises up (WP 173).

Kaiser (2010) argues that this notion of ‘ground’ has a changing context in Deleuze’s early and later works. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze uses “the ground” with a negative connotation as it is this *ground* (the principle of sufficient reason) with which Leibniz “relates the excess and default of difference” to “the categories of representation”, i.e. to “the identical, the similar, the analogues and the opposed” and labels difference as a maledict version of the identical (DR 263). In other words, Leibniz’s ground, “the principle of sufficient reason”, is used to subordinate difference to an “infinite analytic identity” and disallow a conception of “the difference-in-itself” (DR 264).

As Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*, in Leibniz’s account of representational thinking, “particulars are only properties or figures which are developed in the infinite universal ground” (DR 49), that is to say, “finite difference is determined in a monad as part of the world clearly expressed” and “infinitely small difference as the confused ground which underpins that clarity” (DR 48). In this picture, the particulars “refer to essences as the true determinations of a pure Self, or rather a ‘Self’ enveloped by [the infinite universal] ground” (DR 49). Therefore, the ground has a crucial role for Leibniz and Deleuze’s critique is that “infinite representation does not suffice to render the thought of difference independent of the simple analogy of essences, or the simple similarity of properties” or as he further explains, “infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity as a presupposition of representation” (DR 49).

However, in *The Fold*, Deleuze returns with a re-reading of Leibniz re-interpreting the notion of the ground and appropriating the concept of the fold to his own philosophy of difference (Kaiser, 2010: 208). This transition can be interpreted either as a change or “development” in Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, or as if

Deleuze was writing on two different aspects of the same conception; as Smith suggests, the ontological aspect (in *Difference and Repetition*) and the aesthetic aspect (in *The Fold*) (in Kaiser, 2010: 222).

In *The Fold*, Deleuze approaches the concept of ‘the ground’ (the principle of sufficient reason) as “a singular predicate” expressing the difference-in-itself in accordance with a “twofold paradox” (Kaiser, 2010: 209). On the one hand, the Leibnizian principle of difference—the system of folding and unfolding—rejects both “unilateral causality” and “a linear movement from ground to things”, i.e. it is not the case that forms or essences determine actual beings, and on the other hand, the infinitely smallest substances are inseparable and yet “really distinct”—monads are immaterial substances and hence they are inseparable, but each monad is different from the others (209). Notably, the latter aspect of Leibniz’s monads is opposed to the atomistic view of the world. As Deleuze argues in *The Fold*, unlike the atomistic and Cartesian hypotheses of “an absolute hardness” and “absolute fluidity” which is supposed to constitute the essence of matter, for Leibniz, the body is “a flexible” or “elastic” entity and does not consist of separate parts but rather ‘folds’ folded within other folds (*TF* 6).

In addition to Deleuze’s example of ‘origami,’ I would say that the brain itself consisting of a plastic structure enabling changes (foldings and un-foldings) within its folds (*gyri* and *sulci*) is a perfect example to the Leibnizian view of matter. Nevertheless, the implications of this hypothesis cannot be limited to the material structure of the world. A view of the world consisting in a single system of folds varying within itself has outcomes concerning human and non-human perception as well as systems of affectivity and sensibility. By applying the term ‘molarity’ to “human sciences” and aesthetics Deleuze detects “difference, vibration, disaggregation, deterritorialisation and metamorphosis” as “molecular activities taking place in and about molar masses” (Conley, 2005: 171).

3.6 Conclusion: the monument and its political significance

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the great work of art which stands alone, which is preserved in itself, is a ‘monument’. They underline that a monument does not commemorate a past, rather it is “a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves and that provide the event with the compound that celebrates it”: Therefore, “the monument’s action is not memory but fabulation” (*WP* 167-8). In this respect, it has nothing to do with memory or events of the past:

It confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event: the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle (*WP* 176-7).

The fact that suffering does not come to an end and revolutions cannot witness their victory does not make our struggles vain since a more profound sense of ‘success’ is hidden within revolutions, and their re-creation as blocs of sensations, in the form of a work of art—monument—, which preserves those events. Therefore, say Deleuze and Guattari, success resides “precisely in the vibrations, clinches, and openings [a revolution] gave to men and women at the moment of its making and composes in itself a monument that is always in the process of becoming” (*WP* 177).

Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of success can be explicated and re-articulated through Brian Massumi (2003)’s demarcation between hope and optimism too. The habit of equating hope with a future possibility of success reduces our affective capacity. Therefore, instead of placing hope into “a wishful projection of success or even some kind of a rational calculation of outcomes”, Massumi offers to place it in the *present* (210).

These statements are important for two specific reasons regarding this study. Firstly because they underline the significance and use of art in its engagement with the political, but secondly, and more importantly, they advocate the view that struggle, revolution and, more broadly, political actions through which people ‘resonate,’ are

works of art, that is to say, they are monumental processes which are always in becoming.

This new formulation, ‘art of becoming,’ is not only an attempt to re-solve the old problem of the art-life distinction, but it also provides a possible answer to the question “what is political-art?” or “what is it that makes art political?” Very briefly, it is the interactions of bodies, *affect*, or desire that make art political. Art is sensation, a being of pure becoming, action, aggression, and event. In this context, even touching is art and political art.

The victory of revolution is immanent and consists in the new bonds it installs between people, even if these bonds last no longer than the revolution’s fused material and quickly give way to divisions and betrayal (*WP* 177).

Touching and feeling are political actions. When bodies affect each other, when they become affected in an active manner, we come across a purely political event. ‘Touching’ is a political action, practically aiming at increasing the total *conatus* of all bodies that interact. In this sense, politics is not only done by minds. The relation between two or more bodies is itself a type of aggregation, a desiring-aggregate.

In many situations where the responses and outcomes are not given, i.e. when we do not ‘know’ what to do or how to act beforehand, bodies’ autonomous actions—which are independent from mental states—come up with creative solutions, with politically significant outcomes.

The theory of sensation, in accordance with Deleuze’s own areas of interest (painting, literature, theatre and cinema), can be traced throughout the works of Bacon, Kafka, Beckett, Godard, Bene and so on, but at the same time, by taking into account the political potentialities that *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* sheds light on, it can be examined on the planes of performance art, street art, and artistic actions as well. As part the broader scope this dissertation, I have dwelled on the case of Bacon in order to illustrate Deleuze’s theory of sensation. However, in the last chapter, I will examine Deleuze’s notion of ‘minor art’ with a detailed visit to

his encounter with Bene's non-representational theatre, and later on, in the last chapter, I will return to the point of departure of the dissertation, that is to say, experimental art or performances carrying an insight of Becoming-Other, under the title of "Art(s) of Becoming".

CHAPTER 4

DELEUZE'S NIETZSCHE

In this chapter, I will investigate, mainly, Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche as, for Deleuze, Nietzsche is a major source of inspiration for Deleuze. In particular, Deleuze's appropriation of the Nietzschean notion of the eternal return for his own conception of 'difference' will best be understood through investigating this reading. The chapter begins with Nietzsche's place in opposition to western metaphysics and continues with the explanation of his accounts of genealogy and the will to power as understood by Deleuze. Since the notion of 'body' has a special place in Nietzsche's critique, I will also touch upon this issue and then continue with the triple conceptualization of affirmation, negation and difference. Next, Nietzsche's symbolism will be examined through the myth of Theseus and will be re-interpreted in the context of Deleuze's step by step formulation of nihilism. Another important theme of the chapter will be Nietzsche's view of art in terms of forces of the unconscious and the body. The way Deleuze and Guattari understand the unconscious has to do with their notion of desire (as a mechanism which must be affirmed and freed from restraints), and the unseen forces of the body beyond the control of subjects (following Nietzsche), their conceptualization of the unconscious is in opposition to that of Freudian or psychoanalytic tradition—according to which, there is a problematic struggle between the instinctive desires or needs of individual human beings and the more rational and disciplinary principles of a progressive and civilized society (Marcuse, 1955: 4). Therefore, in this chapter, I will compare and contrast Deleuze and Guattari's account for the unconscious as a source of creativity with that of Freud and psychoanalysis. In terms of bridging between a Nietzschean, affirmative, philosophy of difference and

the work of art as a doing of this immanent difference, the chapter will close with Deleuze's project of overturning Platonism and the notion of 'simulacrum'.

4.1 An affirmative philosophy in opposition to Western metaphysics

Nietzsche is skeptical about the *foundations* of Western epistemology in general, and thus he puts the validity of the notions of "truth", "knowledge" and "method" together with the legitimacy of the claim to a fixed, ahistorical "human nature" into question (Koch, 1993: 3). According to Deleuze, "Nietzsche replaced "the ideal of knowledge, the discovery of truth, with *interpretation* and *evaluation*" (PI 65). His contribution to the critique of Enlightenment epistemology is invaluable as it is the primary condition for defending a plurality of contexts and discourses against a fixed, ahistorical, transcendental ontology of the subject (Koch, 1993: 3). As Deleuze states, "Nietzsche did not believe in the unity of the self and did not experience it" either.

Subtle relations of power and evaluation between different "selves" that conceal but also express other kinds of forces – forces of life, forces of thought – such is Nietzsche's conception, his way of living (PI 59).

In the sense that he rejects the existence of an eternal, absolute truth beyond the actual world of multiplicity, Nietzsche's philosophy is a non-philosophy and this connects his thoughts to a short list of other non-philosophers. To clarify, Nietzsche's answer to the question what good and bad consist in or what happiness is about connects his views, primarily, to Spinoza and other radical philosophers including Lucretius, Hume and Bergson.

According to Nietzsche, "everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself" is good, whereas "everything that is born of weakness" is bad, and "the feeling that power is *growing*" is happiness (AC I 2).¹³ This is the

¹³ Direct references to Nietzsche's texts, which are abbreviated with capital letters and listed in the Abbreviations section, are given in parentheses in the following way: The abbreviation of the name of the book, section number and original paragraph number.

core idea of his affirmative philosophy which praises life, vivacity (*Dionysian* drives) and joy while cursing all negative and ascetic attitudes towards life. In this respect, Nietzsche claims that humans are born with “the instinct of the strong life to preserve itself” (AC I 5).

Life itself is to my mind the instinct of growth, for durability, for an accumulation of force, for *power*: where the will to power is lacking there is decline [...] *nihilistic* values [*lack this will*] (AC I 6).

It must be stated that Nietzsche’s *affirmative* philosophy, i.e. the rejection of an essential negation, has the greatest impact on Deleuze’s construction of a practical philosophy which affirms life too. “Modes of life inspire ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living. Life *activates* thought, and thought in turn *affirms* life” (PI 66).

As Deleuze points out, before Nietzsche, Lucretius and then Spinoza wrote similar passages on the importance of affirming life. Lucretius and Spinoza eulogized the joy of life and “conceived philosophy as the power to affirm, as the practical struggle against mystifications, as the expulsion of the negative” (PI 84). Nietzsche’s concept of will to power is parallel to Spinoza’s notion of *conatus* as both terms are based on increasing one’s vital powers in life. Furthermore, both philosophers attack Christian morality due to its negation and condemnation of life for the daily sufferings of human beings. In this context, Deleuze’s notion of “a life” is part of a project of “non-philosophy,” in line with that of Nietzsche and Spinoza, aiming at freeing *difference*, a singular becoming in living, as well as freeing the unconscious from personal identity. In the case of Deleuze, non-philosophy is interested in “the construction of a plane of immanence” (Cole, 2015: 1011). For Deleuze, whereas the ‘individual’ refers to the individuality of a definite subject or an object, ‘singular’ refers to a non-personal individuation as in the case of a point of view in Leibniz’ terminology. In this respect, the indefinite article ‘a/an’ is used when referring to singularities such as *an* event, *a* life, *a* season, etc.

The philosopher as a metaphysician or a public professor “claims to be beholden to the requirements of truth and reason; but beneath the requirements of truth are forces that aren’t so reasonable at all: the state, religion, all the current values” (*PI* 69). Nevertheless, since the political outcomes of a non-philosophy in opposition to legitimate philosophies constitutes the main theme of the last chapter of this dissertation, we will skip this issue for now and return to other aspects of a Nietzschean view of the world which constitute the streams of the Nietzsche-Deleuze succession.

After pre-Socratic philosophy, life became “something that must be judged, measured, restricted, and of thought, a measure, a limit, that is exercised in the name of higher values: the Divine, the True, the Beautiful, the Good”— as the opposite of an affirmative philosophy (*PI* 70). In this context, the philosophical background of Christian morality was prepared by the Socratic tradition. According to Nietzsche, the Greeks saw suffering as the proof of the “*injustice* of existence,” but “they had not yet invented the refinement which consists in judging [existence] faulty and responsible, [because] *it is the gods who take upon themselves the responsibility for the fault*” (*NP* 19, 21). In Greeks we see an interplay of Gods and unseen forces, i.e. the Greek were not fully responsible for their actions. However, in Christianity we come up with the notion of responsibility, a full awareness and control over one’s own actions. Therefore, actions are judged according to the will of God. In modernity, the sovereignty of an external authority is rejected or underestimated, but the core idea of responsibility and punishment remains the same. This implies a rejection of the *play of chance* within human affairs (20-4). Therefore, according to Nietzsche, Socratic philosophy is only the beginning of the degeneration which reached its peak with Kantian philosophy and modern dialectics.

4.1.1 Genealogy

According to Nietzsche, although the task of the philosopher of the future must be to criticize “all the established values – that is, of values superior to life and of the principles on which they depend – and then the creation of new values, of values of life that call for another principle,” philosophers seem to be “preserver[s] of accepted values” (in *PI* 68).

The philosopher of the future is the explorer of ancient worlds, of peaks and caves, who creates only inasmuch as he recalls something that has been essentially forgotten. That forgotten something, according to Nietzsche, is the unity of life and thought (*PI* 66).

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche rejects the existence of a genuinely critical philosophy as philosophers either depend on the assumed universality of their principles which are indeed values, the value of which must be evaluated first, or derive these values from “simple facts, so-called ‘objective facts’ (the utilitarians, the ‘scholars’)” (Nietzsche in *NP* 1-2). This causes Nietzsche to assert a problem of the creation of values upon which we can evaluate phenomena, the problem of the origin and value of values.

In order to solve this problem, Nietzsche develops the “genealogy of morality” as his method, which means both “the value of origin” and “the origin of values” (*NP* 2). Genealogy “signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives”, and the values of the future are to be determined through the method of genealogy—Nietzsche’s own understanding of critical philosophy. (*NP* 2-3). Although genealogy is a critique of the value of values, it is simultaneously a positive element of creation and, hence, as a method, it is not *re-active* but *active*. In this respect, in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche contrasts the activity of the critic with *ressentiment*

critique is not a re-action of *re-sentiment* but the active expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not revenge, the natural aggression of a way of being, the divine wickedness without which perfection could not be imagined (in *NP* 3).

Most Nietzsche scholars see *negation* and *affirmation* as underlying the distinction Nietzsche makes between slave morality and master morality in the *Genealogy of Morals*.

Ressentiment generates the values of slave morality. Nietzsche calls it an “imaginary revenge” of those “who are denied the real reaction, that of the deed” (*GM* I 10). The man of resentment is only “an afterimage and counterinstance” of his enemy (*GM* I 10). On the other hand, the evaluation of the noble “acts and grows spontaneously”;

it seeks out its opposite only in order to say Yes to itself still more gratefully, still more jubilantly; and its negative concept, “base,” “mean,” “bad” is only an after-born, pale, contrasting image in relation to the positive basic concept, which is nourished through and through with life and passion: “we who are noble, good, beautiful, happy!” (*GM* I 10).

Nietzsche criticizes the anarchist, the socialist and the Christian altogether as they all condemn life for their own sufferings. Whereas the Christian sees the guilt in her own nature, the socialist sees it in society, and the same is true for the anarchist. However, Nietzsche says, in all statements of complaint and suffering there is a type of ‘pleasure,’ the pleasure stemming from the feeling of ‘revenge,’ and in the quest for revenge these moral and political positions always miss ‘life,’ since the compensation for the inequality in the world-order is to be found somewhere *beyond* life. This view is a common feature of the Christian’s longing for a posthumous life and the socialist’s postponement of life after revolution (*TI* IX 34). “Instead of linking an active life and affirmative thinking, thought gives itself the task of judging life, opposing to it supposedly higher values, measuring it against these values, restricting and condemning it” (*PI* 68).

According to Nietzsche, the only way to extricate oneself from the circle of slave morality is to throw oneself into life, the Dionysiac aspect of life, and resist the *nihilistic values* imposed upon it.

Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's account of master and slave morality in terms of active and reactive forces. The forces of "conquest and subjugation" are active forces and that of "adaptation and regulation" are reactive forces (*PI 73*). More significantly, resentment is a reactive feeling; it is not self-caused, but affected from the outside.

This interpretation, in terms of active and reactive forces, involves an understanding of Nietzsche's critique of morality in light of his critique of fundamental metaphysical concepts wherein he substitutes forces for atoms, the body as multiplicity in place of the unified subject, and the will-to-power in place of 'the will as a cause'.

4.1.2 Will to power

The notion of force is Nietzsche's substitute for the notion of an atom. The ontologically significant difference between these two notions is that every force is related to another force; this relational form of force is defined as will or "will to power" (*NP 7*). The relation between forces is either a relation of obedience or dominion. Forces "appropriate", "exploit" or "take possession of" things in which they are expressed (*NP 3*); in other words, a phenomenon or object emerges as the manifestation of the forces which take possession of it. Power is "*that which* wants in the will" not "that which the will wants". Therefore, will to power is active and affirmative; it consists in "creating and giving" (*PI 73*).

"The relation of force to force is called 'will'" (*PI 73*) and "the differential element" from which the forces at work arise is called "will to power". In other words, there is a hierarchy between these forces, which is what differentiates a force from another. In this respect, Deleuze speaks of 'the will-to-power' as the 'differential element' of force. "The origin is the difference in the origin, difference in the origin is *hierarchy*, that is to say the relation of a dominant force, of an obeyed to an

obeying will”, and hence, “hierarchy is the originary fact, the identity of difference” (NP 8).

High and low, noble and base, are not values but represent the differential element from which the value of values themselves derives [however] philosophy moves in the indifferent element of the valuable in itself or the valuable for all (NP 2).

Nietzsche (and Deleuze), on the other hand argue(s) that values are driven from subjective grounds.

According to Nietzsche, the sense of an object or a phenomenon changes according to the force which appropriates it. For the same reason, phenomena find their meanings in the determining forces. We cannot talk about the unique sense of an object; there is a plurality of senses, and thus, plurality is—or must be—a fundamental element of philosophy. The meaning of a phenomenon is established by interpretation, but meanings are never complete. It is evaluation which “determines the hierarchical ‘value’ of meanings” without “diminishing or eliminating their plurality” (PI 65).

Deleuze’s pluralism is inspired by and proceeds from this reading, according to which ‘a thing has many senses,’ and he thinks that this idea of Nietzsche is ‘philosophy’s greatest achievement’. Accordingly, he also holds that interpretation is “philosophy’s highest art”:

For the evaluation of this and that, the delicate weighing of each thing and its sense, the estimation of the forces which define the aspects of a thing and its relations with others at every instant – all this (or all that) depends on philosophy’s highest art – that of interpretation (NP 4).

It is important to note that, in this reading, evaluation and interpretation are not merely mental activities, it is the will-to-power that interprets and evaluates. “Evaluations, in essence, are not values, but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge” (NP 1). This reading enables Deleuze to define the task of the

Genealogy more distinctly as follows: “the task of genealogy is to progress from sense to value, from interpretation to evaluation” (*NP* 8).

In the construction of the world and the body as the battlefield of struggling forces, Nietzsche rejects the Cartesian and Kantian understandings of free-will and agency. He argues that the notion of a willful conscious subject, “the most ancient and enduring psychology”, is an assumption that considers all that happens as a result of the doings of a multiple of forces to be the effect of a single will (*TI VI 3*). Nietzsche thus deconstructs three fundamental notions of traditional metaphysics: the will, the spirit and the ego. He further argues that even the concept of being has emerged as a result of the projection of the concept of the ego (3). What’s more, he extends this quasi-psychological critique to the traditional conception of causality, which according to him, results from a projection of the “concept of the ego as a cause” (3).

Later he always found in things only that *which he had put into them*.
The thing itself, [...] the concept of thing is a mere reflex of the faith in
the ego as cause [...] The error of the spirit as cause mistaken for reality!
And made the very measure of reality! And called God! (*TI VI 3*).

In reality, the will cannot move or explain anything, ‘it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent’. The *ego* (subject) is “a fable, a fiction, a play on words: it has altogether ceased to think, feel, or will!” Although there are no mental causes, the world is *created* on this “allegedly empirical evidence as a world of causes, a world of will, a world of spirits” (*TI VI 3*).

Our claim to knowledge of causes is, indeed, a faith which stems from a non-factual idea, the belief in “inner facts.” “We believed ourselves to be causal in the act of willing” (*TI VI 3*). Without a doubt, it is assumed that the causes or motives of such an act—act of willing—are to be found in consciousness, and this is the foundation of the claim to freedom and responsibility. As a final step, we believe that “the ego causes the thought” (*TI VI 3*). “The conception of a consciousness (‘spirit’) as a

cause, and later also that of the ego as cause (the ‘subject’), are only afterbirths: first the causality of the will was firmly accepted as given, as *empirical*” (TI VI 3).

In brief, Nietzsche’s considerations on the traditionally accepted counter-positions of body and soul give birth to an empirical notion of subject as a multiplicity. Nietzsche puts forth his conception of subject as a multiplicity of cells, that is to say, a multiplicity of interacting, struggling forces within a body in opposition to a subject-unit or the so-called eternal, transcendental subject (WTP III 490-2). In this respect, Nietzsche’s approach to the subject has nothing to do with spirituality. On the contrary, he acknowledges that the belief in the body is always stronger than the belief in the soul as the body is one’s primary possession and the most undoubted being (WTP III 659).

4.1.3 Body

As explained above, the body consists of the unending series of struggles between various forces each desiring to dominate the others. Accordingly, through Nietzsche’s genealogical approach, the notion of a self-conscious, autonomous subject is replaced with an emergent *unconscious* as part of the body.

Nietzsche follows the way Spinoza approaches the body, that is to say, as a capability of which we are not fully conscious. When we think of the body as opposed to consciousness and spirit, we cannot explain either of these phenomena. According to Deleuze, it is an initial requirement to abandon valuing consciousness or the *ego* as a phenomenon superior to and distinct from the body. Indeed, consciousness is “the symptom of a deeper transformation and of the activities of entirely non-spiritual forces” (NP 39). Therefore, we must explain both consciousness and the body in terms of forces or dynamic quantities. In this context, we might even argue that “body is the only factor in all spiritual development” (39). Being in line with this view, Nietzsche states that “consciousness is” a “region of the ego affected by the external world” (in NP 39).

The body is, then, nothing but “quantities of force in mutual relations of tension” (Nietzsche in *NP* 40): “dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their ‘effect’ upon the same” (*WTP* III 635).

Since the body is composed of these dynamic quanta or a plurality of forces, it is “a multiple phenomenon” and its unity is “that of a multiple phenomenon, a ‘unity of domination’” (*NP* 40). In terms of quality, the dominant forces in a body are active whereas the dominated forces are reactive. In other words, ‘active’ and ‘reactive’ express “the relation of force with force” (40).

The body is capable of creating freely. It is one’s little reason which interrupts the free movement of the body. On the contrary, it is the body which constructs the “I”, that is to say, the self is what a body does. In this respect, the self has no ontological distinction to the body (*Z I*). Nietzsche does not believe that the mind is superior to the body. The body is “a plurality with one sense,” says Nietzsche, it is “a great reason” that is beyond our control, beyond consciousness whereas one’s “little reason” or “spirit” is only an instrument for the body (*Z I* 4). In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche argues that “there is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom” which means that little reason is mistaken to look down on the body which is indeed a great reason of its own.

The self [body] says to the ego, “Feel pain here!” Then the ego suffers and thinks how it might suffer no more—and that is why it is *made* to think. The self says to the ego, “Feel pleasure here!” Then the ego is pleased and thinks how it might be pleased again—and that is why it is *made* to think (*Z I* 4).

In brief, Nietzsche argues that the relation between thought and deed cannot be explained in terms of causality, it is the self (body or great reason) which determines our deeds. We feel pain and want to avoid pain but we do not know that it is the self (body) who despises the body (itself) and life too; i.e. we are wrong to claim that we freely will to die or are aware of what our body wants.

4.1.4 Affirmation, negation and difference

According to Nietzsche, *Good* and *Evil* are not transcendent values but creations of humans, they are weights to carry. Contrary to what the spirit of gravity teaches us from birth, *Zarathustra* advises us to dispose of our weights (Z III 2). Put differently, Nietzsche prescribes us to “*remain faithful to the earth*” (Z I 3) dignify the body, laughter, lightness, play and dance.

In addition to pluralism, the theme of affirmation is another major theme that Deleuze appropriates from Nietzsche. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, this theme of affirmation is quickly transformed into the theme of difference as ‘affirmation of difference’ which plays a key role in his philosophy. In this respect, Deleuze finds it crucial to contrast the Nietzschean theme of affirmation with the Hegelian conception of negation and the dialectic method built upon it.

According to Deleuze, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, “the negative” is a result of the “activity of the existence of an active force and the affirmation of its difference” (NP 9). He cites the following passage from the *Genealogy of Morals* as a basis for his reading:

The negative is a product of existence itself: the aggression necessarily linked to an active existence, the aggression of an affirmation. As for the negative concept (that is to say, negation as a concept) ‘it is only a subsequently-invented pale contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept—filled with life and passion and through’ (GM I 10 in NP 9).

In contrast, in slave morality, “revenge and *ressentiment* take the place of aggression”: “It is the triumph of ‘reaction’ over active life and of negation over affirmative thought” (PI 68). However, Deleuze then further interprets this passage to oppose Nietzschean philosophy to Hegelian dialectics. He underlines that the relation between different forces is not a dialectical relation. “In its relation with the other the force which makes itself obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it affirms its own difference and enjoys this difference” (NP 8-9). Leaving

aside the inaccuracies of Deleuze's understanding of Hegelian dialectic, his extrapolation from all this is to posit difference as the main object of affirmation (though it is open to question whether this is what Nietzsche had in mind).

4.1.5 Eternal return

Deleuze also ties the theme of the affirmation of difference to the idea of repetition. He builds his idea of repetition, i.e. repetition of *difference* on Nietzsche's conception of eternal return. The notion of 'eternal return' is most of the time interpreted as a modern version of the ancient doctrine that everything comes back, and according to the circular understanding of time, what returns is always the same. Seemingly, the circle of time, i.e. Nietzsche's argument for the eternal return brings the Same. However, Deleuze does not think so. He points out that through the end of *Zarathustra* Nietzsche makes a distinction between the yes-saying of the ass and the Dionysian affirmative Yes-saying (Z IV 1). Donkey's Yes

(Y-A, Y-A) is a false yes. He thinks that to affirm means to *carry, to burden*. The donkey is primarily a Christian animal: he carries weights of values said to be "superior to life." After the death of God, he burdens himself, he carries the weight of human values, he purports to deal with "the real as it is": he is thus the new god of the higher men. From the beginning to end, the donkey is the caricature of the betrayal of Dionysus's Yes; he affirms, but only the products of nihilism (PI 93).

Therefore, real affirmation does not bring back the products of nihilism. In other words, eternal return is selective and it only brings what can always be affirmed.

In Deleuze's reading, Nietzsche's notion of "eternal return" is the "repetition of difference". Nietzsche's return is "the being of becoming itself," i.e. it is the law of becoming (NP 24). In other words, what comes with the return varies but becoming and *differentiation* is common to all. Everything is subject to the principle of the return of difference, difference in itself. This constitutes a unity within multiplicity, that is to say, difference-in-itself is the being of becoming.

Through the notion of eternal return, unity is affirmed of multiplicity just as necessity is affirmed of chance. This can be better understood with the help of Heraclitus' fragment on time. According to Heraclitus, time—*aeon*—“is a child who plays, plays at draughts” (in *NP* 24). The correlation of chance and necessity, “many and one, of becoming and being forms” time's game (*NP* 24).

The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of *chance*, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of *necessity*. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity (*NP* 26).

In brief, Deleuze states that what returns with the eternal return is not the same but only what can, constantly, be affirmed. The rule of repetition or return is *necessary* but it is up to chance what the next throw of dice will bring. Ontologically speaking, “multiplicity is affirmed as multiplicity; becoming is affirmed as becoming”, and becoming is no more tried to be absorbed in being (*PI* 85-6).

Here it needs to be explained how eternal recurrence can be an affirmative principle when there are so many nihilistic reactive elements in the World and the doctrine *prima facie* appears to state that everything will return. As stated above, according to Deleuze's interpretation, what eternally returns is not the same but what can be affirmed. But what this means and how it is possible needs to be made clearer.

Deleuze interprets the doctrine of eternal return through a dialectical reading of nihilism, although it is not Hegelian. In Deleuze's reading, the becoming-reactive of active forces (negation) is the first phase of nihilism. In other words, the beginning of the circular movement of eternal return's time starts with the negation of active forces. However, since the circle is not completed with this first move, the movement of eternal recurrence has to end where it begins: it has to end with the re-affirmation of active forces. While what is negated is somehow also preserved in a Hegelian dialectic, in Deleuze's dialectical reading of the overcoming of nihilism, the reactive forces are not preserved. Deleuze argues that becoming-reactive, and hence reactive-forces have no being. “The lesson of the eternal is that there is no return of the negative” (*NP* 189-90). “Eternal return is the affirmation of

the being of becoming” but only affirmable, i.e. active-forces, can be affirmed by the return (*NP* 68-72).

By which means does eternal return manage to select between active and reactive forces? This is Deleuze’s question in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

We can sense an answer by looking at Nietzsche’s thoughts on Dionysus. According to Nietzsche, Dionysus’ illnesses are “great stimulants of his life” as “he grows stronger through the accidents that threaten to destroy him” (*WTP* IV 1003). This is because Dionysus does not protest the rule of existence in the universe, that is to say, eternal recurrence. “Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, creates torment, destruction, the will to annihilation” (1052), but eternal recurrence is at the same time a selective principle, the principle of becoming enabling the fall of those things which cannot be re-affirmed. According to Deleuze’s interpretation, the elimination of nihilistic values is made possible by a prior affirmation of fate and chance. Nietzsche calls this “*amor fati*” or love of fate:

The eternal return means that being is selection [...] The eternal return is the reproduction of becoming but the reproduction of becoming is also the reproduction of becoming active: child of Dionysus and Ariadne. In the eternal return being ought to belong to becoming, but the being of becoming ought to belong to a single becoming-active (*NP* 189-90).

Also in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze explains

It is not the same which returns, it is not the similar which returns; rather, the Same is the returning of that which returns, - in other words, of the Different; the similar is the returning of that which returns, - in other words, of the Dissimilar (DR 300-1).

As Nietzsche argues, the world is constituted by “a play of forces [...] at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flow-back, with tremendous years of recurrence” (*WTP* IV 1067). It has no goal or end (1062): it never ceases to exist or become—come to an end (1066). This *Dionysian* world affirms itself by eternally creating and destroying itself: it is a

becoming with “no satiety, no disgust, no weariness,” but a world that consist of will to power “*and nothing besides!*” (1067).

We have seen above that all manners of evaluation and interpretation point to different ways of being. In Nietzsche, we find an aesthetic view of the world as opposed to the moralist view and accordingly, he uses aphorism and poetry in order to interpret and evaluate phenomena. Dionysian formula of life consists in affirming even the sufferings and cruelties of life. This is the significance of tragic wisdom. “The tragic man affirms even the harshest amount of suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich, and capable of deifying to do so” (*WTP IV 1052*).

4.2 Nietzsche’s symbolism

In my opinion, the third chapter of *Pure Immanence* is a manifest expression of Nietzsche’s influence over Deleuze. In this text, Deleuze presents a careful reading of Nietzsche’s oeuvre and manages to illuminate his *symbolism* by connecting the main characters of Nietzsche’s works to his thoughts and life story. What makes this text crucial for understanding the Deleuze-Nietzsche connection is the way Deleuze interprets the most debated concepts through which he, later on, established his own philosophical concepts. However, it should be noted that Deleuze interprets Nietzsche’s key concepts in a way to make them familiar with his own reading of Nietzsche.

According to Deleuze, reading Nietzsche’s life is important to see how he himself approached his illnesses and made an affirmative use of his mental states through the end of his life (*PI 92*). If we simply assume that Nietzsche was insane in his last years, we might easily misinterpret his later writings. Therefore, in order to overcome such a misunderstanding, Deleuze shows the connections, relations and transitions between different versions of Nietzsche’s themes throughout his texts.

More importantly, understanding Nietzsche’s play with names, characters, heroes and heroines, together with their animals, is significant as he establishes a full range

of criticisms over western metaphysics by means of such symbolic narratives. In this context, the myth of Theseus has a central role in Nietzsche's symbolism because, according to Deleuze's interpretation, the last phase of the Dionysian transmutation of nihilistic values arrives with the divine coupling of Dionysus and Ariadne.

4.2.1 Theseus and Ariadne: main figures of Nietzsche's work

Theseus, son of Aegeus (the king of Athens) is an important hero for the Greeks. Carrying burdens is a task given to him almost from birth. When he arrives in Athens after a long adventurous journey, his father gives him the duty of killing the Minotaur (a being part man part bull). In mythology, it is claimed that *the labyrinth* of the Minotaur is built by the famous architect Daedalus, and thus, only the wisest humans can find the exit to the labyrinth (Hamilton, 1998: 209-23).

Indeed, long before Theseus, Aegeus sends Androgeos (son of Minos the king of Crete) to fulfill the same task; however, the Minotaur kills Androgeos. In return, Minos gives a punishment to the Athenians: every nine years, they have to sacrifice seven young girls and seven young boys by throwing them to the labyrinth of the Minotaur.

Ariadne is the daughter of Minos, but the moment she sees Theseus, she falls in love with him—her father's enemy's son. Therefore, she decides to help Theseus and asks Daedalus to teach her the exit to the labyrinth. Daedalus advises her to tie a long 'thread' to the door of the labyrinth and follow the thread on the way back. Having got Daedalus' advice, Ariadne offers to help Theseus in the labyrinth, but with the condition that he will marry her in Athens after beating the Minotaur. Theseus accepts this proposal: After killing the bull in his labyrinthine cave, he uses Ariadne's thread to find the exit. Theseus takes Ariadne to his ship, but they stop by Naxos Island, and there he leaves Ariadne. According to the myth, after being

abandoned by Theseus, Ariadne hangs herself with the same *thread*, and in her dream Dionysus (the white bull) approaches her.

According to Deleuze, the labyrinth represents knowledge and morality. At the beginning of the story, Ariadne is under the influence of Theseus and she sees the labyrinth as an obstacle against their marriage. It requires a certain type of knowledge (practical wisdom) to solve the puzzle of Daedalus. Therefore, in the eyes of the higher man (Theseus), the labyrinth is a riddle created by another higher man (the wise man—the architect), it is an obstruction to overcome, and thus it represents knowledge. In this context, knowledge becomes something attainable, a kind of wisdom which can be possessed, and for the same reason, not something philosophical, as philosophical wisdom cannot be possessed, but one is always in search for it.

However, in this opposition between the man of higher ends and the philosopher, Nietzsche, and thus Deleuze, reformulates the labyrinth as the labyrinth of life. The labyrinth, just like the circular and labyrinthine ears of Dionysus, represents eternal return. Through a Dionysiac transmutation, it becomes an affirmative, re-vital force. In other words, from a Nietzschean point of view, the labyrinth of Daedalus shall not be taken as a dungeon to deprive one of their life or a puzzle to capture the mind. Rather, the Dionysian transmutation of values enables the labyrinth to return as the labyrinth of life, a landscape of experience, the place where laughter and joy fills one's heart. The labyrinth, then, is no more the product of the higher men, the architect. It is an opportunity of experience, a way of becoming among multiple ways of becoming (*NP* 188-9). Hence, the status of this experience, the emotional outcomes of staying in the labyrinth, is up to those who savor or despise it:

Nietzsche's labyrinth is our labyrinth, the labyrinth of the human condition; to affirm human life is to value living within this labyrinth, rather than to attempt to escape from it. This is the affirmation that completes nihilism, surpassing both the religious nihilist's desperate conviction that there must be a way out, and the radical nihilist's vilification of a labyrinth from which there is no exit (White, 1990: 14).

Deleuze regards this myth as a major source of inspiration for Nietzsche. Nietzsche is rather critical about the so-called heroic aspects of Theseus. He is a cunning man, and full of *hubris*. He abandons Ariadne in the island after making use of her thread. Theseus' wit is a typical example of strategic masculine mind—the model for the higher man. Theseus is the hero, the higher man who always carries burdens. In his essay “The Mystery of Ariadne according to Nietzsche”, Deleuze argues that seriousness, heaviness, bearing burdens, “inability to laugh and play”, “contempt for the earth” and “enterprise of revenge” are common features of “the higher man” or “the sublime man” (*ECC* 99-100). Therefore, Nietzsche criticizes the higher men for not being able to dance and laugh: “the worst about you is that all of you have not learnt to dance as one must dance—dancing away over yourselves!” and he advises them to laugh: “you higher men, *learn* to laugh!” (*Z* IV 20).

In Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* there are many versions of the higher man: The last pope, the two kings, the ugliest men, the man with the leech, the voluntary beggar, the sorcerer, the wandering shadow and the soothsayer. They are all, as it were, imitations of a model, i.e. the truthful man. Nevertheless, their model is as false as themselves: “the truthful man is also a forger because he conceals his motives for willing the truth, his somber passion for condemning life” (*ECC* 101). In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche seems to appraise the higher man for his ability to “put man in the place of God, to turn man into a power of affirmation that affirms itself”, but indeed, he criticizes “the most dangerous mystification of humanism” (*ECC* 100):

The higher man claims to carry humanity to perfection, to completion. He claims to recuperate all the properties of man, to overcome alienation, to realize the total man [...] But in truth, man, even the higher man, does not know what it means to affirm (100).

Indeed, the glorified characteristics of the higher man (carrying burdens, etc.) has nothing to do with real affirmation. “To affirm is not to bear, carry, or harness oneself to that which exists, but on the contrary, to unburden, unharness, and set free that which lives” (*ECC* 100).

In this context, in the myth of *Theseus*, Dionysus the bull (the beast) is contrasted with Theseus (the hero). The personality of Theseus matches that of the higher man, and Theseus' animals, the camel and the ass are also very different from the bull in that they know "how to bear burdens" and inhabit the desert (*ECC* 100). The desert represents the desolate face of the earth and thus it symbolizes nihilism, the *reactive* mode of life. Until it reaches the peak—the phase when the last man wants to kill himself—nihilism is purely negative, it negates life for the sake of higher values which are carried by the hero (the higher men) as well as his animals, camel and donkey. Their weights are higher values of, e.g. Christianity, which negate life and thus its *multiplicity*. When God is dead, they begin to carry the "human values" (*PI* 93). On the contrary, Dionysus is the opposite of the higher man, he is "pure and multiple affirmation, the true affirmation, the affirmative will; he bears nothing, unburdens himself completely, makes everything that lives lighter" (*ECC* 102).

Indeed, the bull (*Minotaur*) is Ariadne's brother and she wants to help the man who wants to kill her brother. This is why Ariadne is initially a creature of reactive feelings—ressentiment. She is in love with Theseus and her love conditions her. She is like a spider, "a cold creature of resentment", because as Nietzsche explains in *Zarathustra*, spider is "the spirit of revenge and resentment" and its weapon is "the *thread* of morality" (*PI* 94).

Ariadne holds the thread in order to save Theseus from the labyrinth, however, Theseus abandons her—most probably because she is the enemy's daughter or he never loved her. Theseus simply wants to take advantage of Ariadne's thread. When Theseus abandons her, Ariadne wants to hang herself with the thread, the thread of morality. According to Deleuze, her act symbolizes the moment "when the will to negation breaks its alliance with the forces of reaction, abandons them and even turns against them" (*ECC* 102). This is nihilism "defeated by itself"

reactive forces, themselves denied, become active; negation is converted and becomes the thunderclap of a pure affirmation, the polemical and ludic mode of a will that affirms and enters into the service of an excess of life (102).

According to Nietzsche, “in original sin, curiosity, mendacious deception, susceptibility to seduction, lust – in short a series of pre-eminently feminine affects was considered the origin of evil [...] Thus the Aryans understand sacrilege as something masculine; while the Semites understand sin as feminine” (*BT* in *NP* 20). However, when Dionysus approaches Ariadne, she is transformed into an affirmative force. Ariadne becomes “the first feminine power, the anima, the inseparable fiancée of Dionysian affirmation” (20). Ariadne’s “femininity” is imprisoned when she is “tied up by the thread”, however, with Dionysus, she “discovers true affirmation and lightness”: When Ariadne says “Yes” to Dionysus, she becomes an “affirmative anima” transformed (*PI* 94). “Only when the hero has abandoned her, she is approached in a dream by the overhero” (*Z* II 13).

Deleuze argues that Ariadne’s thread becomes the thread of morality. It is Daedalus, the wise man, who advises Ariadne to carry the thread to help Theseus escape from the labyrinth. Therefore, the thread, being the wise man’s tool and the higher man’s savior is representative of the wise man’s knowledge. However, this type of knowledge is used to judge life and discriminate between the superior (the sublime man) and the inferior (the bull). The thread functions exactly like the unchanging Ideas of Platonic World by which the philosopher of the past sorts out the image and the simulacrum. One of Deleuze’s reasons to equate knowledge with morality—to claim that knowledge is only ‘disguise’ for morality—is that they are both judgmental. For the same reason, in *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche describes the audience with whom he wants to share his wisdom as follows

To you, the bold searchers, researchers, and whoever embarks with cunning sails on terrible seas—to you, drunk with riddles, glad of the twilight, whose soul flutes lure astray to every whirlpool, because you do not want to grope along a thread with cowardly hand; and where you can *guess*, you hate to *deduce*—to you alone I tell the riddle that I saw, the vision of the loneliest (*Z* III 1).

In this calling, Nietzsche opposes those who are drunk with the riddle to those who are “soberly tackling with problems”, who are “glad of twilight” instead of the “Platonic sunlight”, and hence, Nietzsche’s ideal audience must be

lured by flutes rather than harboring Platonic suspicions of music; not groping, with Theseus, along threads of deductions, but rather guessing and probing, with Dionysus—so must we be and so must we proceed, [...] if we are to understand him; so must we be if we are to hear the ‘voice of beauty’ (White, 1990: 13).

The thread is first used as the wise man’s tool, but then it becomes the tie on Ariadne’s neck as it is Ariadne’s ‘bad conscience’ which leads her to hang herself with the same thread. She is the bull’s sister and King Minos (Theseus’ enemy)’s daughter, this is why she is cheated and abandoned by the hero. So, with the thread, she judges and punishes ‘her own being’. However, at the same time, when one cannot stand one’s own reactive feelings anymore—when reactive forces turn against themselves—and want to end their life, another Dionysiac transmutation occurs; Ariadne passes to the last phase of nihilism by way of the same thread.

When the thread becomes the mediator of Ariadne’s affirmation of life, (rejection of nihilism), the labyrinth is simultaneously transformed: it becomes the affirmation of becoming as such. Affirming life versus judging life: this is the distinction between the act of “affirmation of ethical differentiation,” aesthetic enjoyment, and the act of a “judgmental transcendental morality,” asceticism (Fuglsang, 2007: 70). Therefore, when Ariadne is approached by Dionysus, her being is affirmed by him and, in return, she affirms Dionysus’ being. Then, the labyrinth becomes the wedding ring of Dionysus and Ariadne, “it is the ear and the Eternal Return itself that expresses what is active and affirmative” (*ECC* 106). It is the labyrinth of “life and of Being as *living* being”: the labyrinth is the overman, “the product of Dionysus and Ariadne’s union”, “the opposite of the higher man [Theseus]” (106).

4.2.2 Nihilism and nothingness

We have given an account of the myth's place in Nietzsche's critique of nihilism; however, in *Pure Immanence* Deleuze puts forth a more systematic explanation of the triumph of nihilism in five steps: 1) *Resentment*: It is a phase when everything active is blamed. Life itself is accused for inequality and suffering. 2) *Bad conscience*: When reactive forces "turn in on themselves", bad conscience occurs (*PI* 78). It means to "interiorize the fault," to say "it's my fault" (78). They even form "reactive communities," e.g. the Christian community, and they want everyone to feel guilty (78). "Christian love valorizes only the sick and desolate aspects of life": Therefore, Christ represents "an essential moment of nihilism: that of bad conscience" (95). Internalization of sin is a way of judging life. This is why, Saint Paul says, "Christ died for us, for our sins!" (95). Christianity equalizes pain and punishment, and "bad conscience" or "internalization of pain" is "the machine for manufacturing guilt" (*NP* 15). 3) *The ascetic ideal*: The will to nothingness, i.e. negation of whatever joyous, negation of life itself, is the ultimate ideal of asceticism. Ascetic values "promise salvation only to the most reactive, the weakest, the sickest forms of life. Such is the alliance between God-Nothingness and Reactive-Man" (*PI* 78). This is the phase when Judaic religion and Christianity enter the stage. However, Nietzsche argues that the philosophical background of these world views must be sought in the "degeneration of philosophy in Greece" the moment when "the great categories of our thought (the Self, the World, God, causality, finality, and so on" were introduced to the history of thought) (79). 4) *The death of God*: According to Nietzsche, substituting divine values with human values, i.e. killing God, does not change our nihilistic attitude towards life.

In this way we simply change values; "progress, happiness; utility can replace the truth, the good, or the divine," but our perspective remains the same (*PI* 71). This is why Nietzsche states that "the murderer of God is 'the ugliest of men'" (in *PI* 72). When God is dead, "auto-responsibility" takes his place and we continue to carry the "No" of nihilism (80-1).

The murderer of God committed a sad crime because his motivation was sad: he wanted to take God's place, he killed in order to "steal", he remained in the negative whilst taking on the attributes of divinity. The death of God needs time finally to find its essence and become a joyful event. Time to expel the negative, to exorcise the reactive – the time of a becoming-active. This time is the cycle of the eternal return (*NP* 190).

The replacement of "God with humanism; the ascetic ideal with the moral ideal and the ideal of knowledge" does not do away with the fact that man "burdens himself, he puts on his own harness—all in the name of heroic values, in the name of man's values" (*ECC* 101).

The higher man claims knowledge as his authority: he claims to explore the labyrinth or the forest of knowledge. But knowledge is only a disguise for morality; the thread in the labyrinth is the moral thread. Morality, in turn, is a labyrinth, a disguise for the ascetic and religious ideal. From the ascetic ideal to the moral ideal, from the moral ideal to the ideal of knowledge, it is the same enterprise that is being pursued, that of killing the bull, that is, of denying life, crushing it beneath a weight, reducing it to reactive forces (*ECC* 101).

5) *The last man and the man who wants to die*: When the will to *nothingness* has nothing left to deny, to negate, it turns against itself and "becomes the will to deny reactive life itself" (*PI* 82). This is a wish to actively destroy oneself: Beyond the last man, "there is still *the man who wants to die*" (82). Therefore, says Deleuze, there is another interpretation of Christ beyond that of Saint Paul.

Christ belongs to nihilism in a very different way. He is kind of joyful, doesn't condemn, is indifferent to guilt of any kind; he wants only to die, he seeks his own death. He is thus well ahead of Saint Paul, for he represents the ultimate stage of nihilism: that of the last man or the man who wants to die – the stage closest to Dionysian transmutation (*PI* 96).

Just as the Sun's brightness is evaluated by those who praise it or are made blind by it, *Zarathustra* seeks for the *affirmation* of his own wisdom by sharing it with people (*Z* I 1-2). However, in order to share his thoughts, *Zarathustra* has to leave his solitude in the mountains and go down and mingle in with people (*Z* I 1). Nietzsche likens *Zarathustra*'s descent to sunset as the new can only come with the annihilation of the old, this is what *Zarathustra* learns from the sun (*Z* III 3). Here annihilation does not necessarily mean to disappear but change and return

differently. In this sense, as the coming of the new day is dependent upon blacking out of the previous day, *Zarathustra*'s transmutation is dependent upon his own dissolution and return. It is the same sense which makes death an affirmative force and even a virtue (Z I 4).

Therefore, voluntary death is virtuous as long as it affirms life, as long as one learns to laugh and dance. In other words, death is an action which blesses life since man's death is pregnant to overman. "Let this be the doctrine of your virtue: "Thou shalt kill thyself! Thou shalt steal away!" (Z I 9). So, man is something which must be overcome.

According to *Zarathustra* (Nietzsche), the wise men and those who praise the ascetic life, who advise to sacrifice this world for the afterlife are not aware that God is dead (Z I 2). Therefore, they believe in nothingness and desire nothingness. They only know to carry weights which consist of heroic or ascetic values. Those who desire the afterlife, where they think they will get rid of the pains of this world, are the inventors of pain and suffering. A similar sin is at stake when the soul despises the body and wills its detriment. It is a sin against the earth, where we live (Z I 3).

4.2.3 Dionysian transmutation of values and the eternal return

The last phase of the triumph of nihilism is called a "transmutation". When the will to nothingness negates itself, the reactive life, it turns into an active critic of nihilistic forces. This is a war between aggressivity and resentment: negation finally turns "against the reactive forces and become an action that serves a higher affirmation (hence Nietzsche's saying: nihilism conquered, but conquered by itself...)" (PI 83).

What nihilism condemns and tries to deny is not so much Being [...] it is rather, multiplicity; it is rather, becoming. Nihilism considers becoming as something that *must* atone and must be absorbed into

Being, and the multiple as something unjust that must be judged and reabsorbed in the One (*PI* 84).

Obviously, Deleuze is touched by Nietzsche's critique of nihilism as he regards it as a critique of the reactive forces against becoming and/or *difference*. On the contrary, he says, the transmutation "elevates multiplicity and becoming to their highest power and makes of them objects of an affirmation," and the affirmation of the multiple means "the practical joy of the diverse" (*PI* 84). Joy is the only motivation for philosophizing (*PI* 84).

Nietzsche expresses this transmutation of values in the form of a Dionysian transmutation. Dionysus affirms Ariadne: "Eternally I am your affirmation!" and when Ariadne says "Yes" to Dionysus, she becomes the affirmation of affirmation. Therefore, the marriage of Ariadne and Dionysus, the divine couple, represents the doubling, the affirmation of the affirmation or eternal return of what can be affirmed (*PI* 85, *NP* 186-8).

DIONYSUS:

Be wise, Ariadne!...
You have little ears; you have ears like mine:
Let some wisdom into them!—
Must we not first hate oneself if we are to love oneself?...

I am thy labyrinth... (Nietzsche in Crawford, 1995: 120).

4.3 Art

We have seen that, as a mode of affirming life, Nietzsche attaches a specific importance to *art* and uses fragmental writing, poetry and symbolic narration as his philosophical tools. Against the duties with which Socratic philosophy, Christianity, Kantian philosophy or dialectics burden life, Nietzsche makes reference to the 'instinct of play' and compliments life as an *aesthetic* phenomenon. These facts make Nietzsche's method and thoughts rather relevant to our study. We have also stated that Nietzsche's notion of power as the interplay of multiple forces

is the basis of Deleuze's ontology of becoming or difference-in-itself. He reinterprets Nietzsche's project of reversing Platonism and builds his own conception of the "simulacrum" as the only reality, or being as such. Therefore, a Nietzschean ontology will carry us towards an aesthetic view of the world against the world of Ideas which transcends this world.

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's "tragic conception of art" is not a play of reactive forces. It is a "stimulant of the will to power, something that excites willing," and something that "exposes every reactive conception of art" (*NP* 102).

Nietzsche's philosophy is a kind of empiricism or experimentalism. That is to say, life is something to experience. There is a "multiplicity" of ways of life which is a thought underlying Deleuze's reception of Nietzsche: "'this is *my* way; where is yours?'"—thus I answered those who asked me 'the way'—that does not exist" (*Z* III 2).

Unlike the teachings of transcendentalists (e.g. Plato), life is something to try and learn. Values do not inhabit a transcendental world, we are to create or change them.

The tragic artist is *Dionysian* in that she "says *yes* to all that is questionable and even terrible," and hence, her selection does not indicate a pessimistic approach to the world, but, on the contrary, she "values appearance more highly than reality" (*TI* III 6). In this context, by "appearance" Nietzsche understands "reality *once more*, only selected, strengthened, corrected [...]" (6). "Art, in which precisely the *lie* is sanctified and the *will to deception* has a good conscience, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science" (*GM* III 25). Therefore, in art, a will to deception is at stake but not for the sake of negating life. On the contrary, art is interested in affirming life through the power of falsehood: "it is art which invents the lies that raise falsehood to this highest affirmative power that turns the will to deceive into something which is affirmed in the power of falsehood" (*NP* 103).

Whereas the Platonic paradigm degrades art as the contrary of truth, Nietzsche equates artists with searchers of truth and “the inventors of new possibilities of life” (NP 103). Such a conception, at the same time, criticizes the distinction of the positions of spectator and artist as what is at stake in the Nietzschean point of view is not aesthetic judgement but aesthetic creation. Even in the Aristotelian conception of art, we expect the spectacle to have an effect of *katharsis* on the audience, and, in this sense, reactive forces are at work in order to “suspend desire, instinct or will” (NP 102). However, for Nietzsche, the artist means the will to power of the artist, and the life of an artist “serves as a stimulant to the affirmation contained in the work of art itself, to the will to power of the artist as artist” (102).

4.3.1 Work of art as a phenomenon that gives birth to itself

According to Nietzsche, artistic creation occurs as a doing of the tension between the Apollonian and Dionysian drives, residing in the unconscious and at the heart of nature. Therefore, a state of constant *agony* constitutes the key factor behind all human doings including art, just as the rest of nature.

Following Nietzsche, we no longer claim that art is a product of the artist as a subject-unit. For the artists it is hard to know by which means “they achieved their best work and from which world the creative idea came to them,” and hence a good artist would not say that “it came from me, it was my hand that threw the dice” (WTP III 659). “The work of art gives birth to itself” (796).

As Kaufmann (1974) points out, for Nietzsche, “aesthetic creation is prompted by something which the artist *lacks*, by suffering rather than undisturbed good health, by ‘sickness as great stimulants of his life’ (WTP IV 1003)” (130). In the same text Nietzsche explicitly states that, for him, “it does not seem possible to be an artist and not be sick” (WTP III 811).

In Deleuze and Guattari’s works, this view of the unconscious or a-subjective bodily forces as sources of artistic creation is defended in opposition to the way

psychoanalysis approaches the notion of the ‘unconscious’, and ‘desire’ as its stimulant.

4.4 Freud and psychoanalysis *versus* schizo-analysis

According to Freud, the family has a key role in “the organization of desire”, but beyond that, the historical forces beneath instinctive behaviors in social life is explainable in terms of family and the Oedipus complex (Ross, 2005: 217). In this respect, in psychoanalysis, the conceptual strength of the notion of family cannot be reduced to Freud’s “therapeutic practice” and “bourgeois nuclear family” (217).

For Freud, the Oedipus complex lies among a variety of forces which take part in the formation of the libido. However, whereas the other forces seem to be internally generated, the Oedipus complex differs from them in that it results in the emergence of “the sense of an external prohibition” and “the triangular relation” of the child to its parents (Ross, 2005: 217). The tension between individual wishes and the imperatives of the law in civilized life mirrors the agent’s position against incestuous desire. In other words, the prohibition of the child’s incestuous libidinal act in the familial life is universalized as the prohibition of the individual’s personal will in society. The point is that, for Freud and psychoanalysis, “the family unit” is in a position of “primacy” in the explanation of social behavior (217). It should be noted that this is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari criticize. They argue that it is not the relations within the family which determine the social relations, but rather social relations that determine family relations—which is, at the same time, materialist psychiatry’s general critique of Freudian meta-psychological studies.

According to Lacan, on the other hand, the nuclear family structure need not be taken in the literary sense of the term ‘family’ and it can be replaced with “a paternal figure or structure of authority”, e.g. language as an institutional force can play the same role in the emergence of “libidinal ties” (Ross, 2005: 217-8). Therefore, a critique of psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to the Freudian conception either. In

other words, Deleuze and Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis is not limited to the problem of the primacy of the determiners of social and family relations. For them, the specific conception of desire which the Oedipus complex takes into account and justifies seems impossible to agree with.

In his text, "Four Propositions on Psychoanalysis" Deleuze develops a condensed critique of psychoanalysis in four articles. According to these propositions, psychoanalysis stifles the production of desire, impedes the formation of utterances, crushes utterances—destroys desire, and wields power or power relations (*TRM* 79-88). For our concerns in this chapter, the first of these proposition is rather important.

Deleuze argues that the way psychoanalysis choses to talk about the unconscious aims at destroying it: psychoanalysis (or at least the Freudian approach) regards the unconscious as a "counter-consciousness" and hence as an "enemy" which must be defeated, and the fact that, now, the psychoanalysts do not work only in the private space of the hospitals but in "every sector of society" including "schools and institutions", results in "a political danger" (*TRM* 79). Whereas psychoanalysis sees the production of the unconscious in terms of a "failure" by labelling it as "sublimation, desexualization, or thought", Deleuze and Guattari advocates the view that it is "desire" what is "lodged at the heart of the unconscious" (*TRM* 80). Therefore, freeing the production of the unconscious means freeing the production of desire. According to Deleuze and Guattari, in civil society, we are compelled to learn lack, culture and law which are the enemies of desire. In other words, through the cooperation of 'molar structures' of modern, centralized society and psychoanalytic theory, specifically the Oedipus complex, desire is reduced to a limited definition.

As soon as desire *assembles* something, in relation to an Outside, to a Becoming, they undo this assemblage, they break it up, showing how the assemblage refers on the one hand to a partial infantile mechanism and, to a global Oedipal structure (*TRM* 80).

In this section, for the sake of clarifying the two different paradigms of the unconscious and desire, we limit ourselves with this psychological terminology. However, in the final chapter it will be seen that the political aspect of the same problem is related to and expressible in terms of the resonance between the rigid lines of segmentarity and the free flow of quanta. That is to say, within the specific context of a critique of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari prefer to speak in terms of the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘the unconscious’, however, when it comes to the politics of desire (as in *A Thousand Plateaus*) they use the notion of ‘quantum flows’. Put differently, what Deleuze calls ‘the assemblages of desire’ or its relation to an Outside, in this section, will be re-conceptualized as a multiplicity of quantum flows (fleeing quanta) in the final chapter.

In his critique of Freud’s analyses of certain sexual acts and orientations e.g. fellatio, homosexuality, bestiality, masochism, voyeurism and masturbation, etc., as “false desires” which hide “some other desire” or indicate an infantile lack, Deleuze argues that this is an attempt to “break up the machinic assemblages of desire” or production of the unconscious (*TRM* 80-1). Furthermore, whereas Freud thinks that slips of the tongue, dreams, etc. are signifiers of the unconscious which covers the space that an “I” or Ego should “show up instead”, for Deleuze and Guattari the unconscious is not something someone can have:

The unconscious is a substance which must be created, placed, made to flow; it is a social and political space which must be won. A revolution produces the unconscious in an awesome display, and revolution is one of the few ways to do so. The unconscious has nothing to do with Freudian slips, in speech or in action (*TRM* 81).

It can be seen that Deleuze’s formulation of desire in relation to the production of the unconscious follows a Nietzschean sense of the term, and differs from the Freudian theory both in terms of its ontological status and the political outcomes of regarding desire as a creation of an assemblage folding or unfolding through series of becomings.

Desire is the system of a-signifying signs out of which unconscious flows are produced in a social-historical field. Every unfolding of desire

[...] tests the established order and sends shock waves through the social field as a whole [...] Desire is revolutionary because it is always seeking more connections (*TRM* 81).

The reason why Deleuze defines desire as a revolutionary force is that by desire he understands a body or a mass in terms of its intensive qualities, rather than a subjective or mental state. In this respect, what seeks to establish more connections is a multiplicity of affects (or fleeing lines, quanta). Since this is the theme of the last chapter, I will not give more details on the type of connections desire(s) establish with other desire(s) here.

While the Freudian approach to the unconscious as the container of crooked desires and lacks or as an obstacle against the formation of the 'I' with true desires serves for the permanence of current institutions of the society, the political danger in stifling the production of desire as such, thus, has to do with losing our potential to resist the established order, and ability to make more connections which, in return, raise the *conatus* of the whole.

In line with these critiques, Deleuze and Guattari develop the method of 'schizoanalysis'. Schizoanalysis belongs to the program of "materialist psychiatry" according to which "social and historical factors" must be taken into account while making "explanations of cognition and behavior" (Holland, 2005: 236). Nevertheless, their critique must not be understood as a total rejection of Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalysis, but on the contrary, as an attempt to "include the full scope of libidinal and semiotic factors" in the materialistic "explanations of social structure and development" as well (236). However, it should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari's notion of schizoanalysis is mainly informed by Nietzsche's "transvaluation of difference" in his critique of nihilistic and ascetic values (Holland, 2005: 236). Accordingly, the ultimate hope of schizoanalysis is "the development of productive forces beyond capitalism and expansion of Will to Power beyond nihilism" on the way to a "greater freedom rather than enduring servitude" (236).

According to schizoanalysis, the obstacle against human freedom and the cause which conditions our acceptance of servitude lies at “the heart of nuclear family” of which structure is determined “by the Oedipus complex” and “asceticism” (Holland, 2005: 236). Therefore, the significance of schizoanalysis lies in the argument that “psychic repression depends on social oppression” and not vice versa: Whereas the psychoanalytic saying claims that “the child is father to the man”, the materialistic argument of schizoanalysis is that “it is not the child who is father to the man” but “it is the boss who is father to the man, who is in turn father to the child” (236). In other words, the social relations in the capitalist system are reproduced in the nuclear family and hence coded in the psyche of the child.

4.5 The role of Apollonian and Dionysian-frenzy in artistic creation

Both in *Twilight of the Idols* and in *the Will to Power*, Nietzsche associates artistic creation with a psychological state that he calls ‘frenzy’. However, for Nietzsche, it is the body which provides this physiological condition of artistic creation. In other words, Nietzsche is careful about not describing frenzy as a psychic phenomenon relating to the mental states of an autonomous subject. On the contrary, Nietzsche views the body as an affective system) the control of which is not in the hands of the subject. It is the will, forces and instincts, e.g. sexual excitement, which result in the affective changes in a body. As an aesthetic phenomenon, the struggle between these unseen forces is expressed through the notions of the *Apollonian* and *Dionysian*.

In order to trace the role of Dionysian frenzy in art, first we must examine the place of the figure Dionysus in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

In Nietzsche’s philosophy the figure of Dionysus, in his alliance with Apollo, is initially introduced as the antithesis of Socrates, the inventor of metaphysics (*BT*), however, in later writings, Dionysus becomes the antithesis of the Crucified (Jesus), and finally, the complementary of Ariadne (or the antithesis of Theseus). Deleuze

also argues that Dionysus is, at the same time, a euphemism for Nietzsche himself addressing his love of Cosima Wagner (masked by Ariadne) and the tension between her husband Wagner (Theseus or the higher man) and Nietzsche himself (*PI* 54-63).

As Deleuze points out, Nietzsche gives special importance to the notion of the “tragic” claiming it to be his own discovery, and “opposes the tragic vision of the world” to that of “the dialectical and the Christian”: The Socratic division, Christianity and modern dialectic are three moments, resulting in the death of tragic culture the essence of which is to be found in Dionysus (*NP* 10-1).

In the *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche is still under the influence of the dialectic tradition and thus, says Deleuze, the tragic is represented as a contradiction between “primitive unity” and “individuation,” “willing and appearance” and “life and suffering” (*NP* 11). The opposition between Dionysus and Apollo reflects the same contradiction. Whereas Apollo is “the divine incarnation of the principle of individuation”, Dionysus “returns to primitive unity, he shatters the individual, [...] and absorbs him into original being” (11). In this sense, tragedy is “the reconciliation” between Apollo and Dionysus.

Dionysus’ sufferings, the sufferings of individuation, are “absorbed in the joy of original being”, whereas Apollo “develops the tragic into *drama*, who expresses the tragic in a drama,” and hence drama is “the objectivation of Dionysus beneath Apollonian form and in an Apollonian world” (*NP* 12). This is Nietzsche’s early resolution of the tragic contradiction.

However, later on, Nietzsche’s Dionysus follows a path through which he, first, becomes the antithesis of Socrates—the tragic man versus “the theoretical man,”—and, second, the true negation of Christ (Nietzsche in *NP* 14).

According to Deleuze, Dionysus is the *affirmative* God who affirms pain and “turns it into someone’s pleasure” instead of resolving it in “a higher and supernatural

pleasure” (*NP* 13). On the contrary, Socrates “opposes the idea to life, he judges life in terms of the idea” (14). However, according to Nietzsche, Socrates is yet too Greek to be the true negation of Dionysus:

While in all productive men it is instinct that it is the creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it is the instinct that becomes the critic and consciousness that becomes the creator (Nietzsche in *NP* 13).

Nietzsche’s real enemy is Christianity as it “negates aesthetic values, the only values recognized by *Birth of Tragedy*; it is nihilist in the most profound sense, whereas in the Dionysian symbol the ultimate limit of affirmation is attained” (Nietzsche in *NP* 14).

Nietzsche calls the creation of a work of art a process of “*idealizing*” because in this process one *forces* things or objects to receive the excess of his/her will and to be transformed so as to “mirror” the powers of that body (the artist) who is under the influence of “the frenzy of an overcharged and swollen will” (*TI IX* 8-9). In this respect, the eye and hence the power of vision in certain types of art, e.g., painting, sculpture and epic poetry, are dependent upon being excited by the Apollonian frenzy, however, the effect of the Dionysian state is stronger in that it excites and enhances “the whole affective system” (10). Under the influence of Dionysian frenzy, the body “discharges all its means of expression at once and drives forth simultaneously the power of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and every kind of mimicking and acting” (10).

According to Nietzsche, “the feeling of increased strength and fullness” accompanies all types of frenzy from “sexual excitement” to “frenzy of feasts” and “contests,” as well as, “the frenzy of cruelty” and that of a new coming spring (*TI IX* 8). “In this state, one enriches everything out of one’s own fullness: whatever one sees, whatever one wills, is seen swelled, taut, strong, overloaded with strength” (9).

Having run under the control of these strong affective changes, one cannot help but *transform* their surroundings, and this is what Nietzsche calls art (*TI IX 9*). Therefore, rather than being a conscious decision or doing of a subject or *ego*, art is a process of sublimation through which one's body inevitably merges with the world.

These discussions will move us to Deleuze's major concern, which is the reversal of Platonism. In light of this argument, he will put forth the concept of the simulacrum with a new significance within the broader context of his philosophy.

4.6 A critique of Socratic dialectics

The aim of Deleuze's project of appropriating the philosophies of Plato and Kant is "to replace the philosophy of identity and representation with a philosophy of difference, both as physics and a metaphysics of the simulacrum", since the simulacrum "subverts both models and copies, both essence and appearance" (Bogue, 2001: 56).

In order to overturn Platonism, the original's "primacy over copy" and the model's primacy "over image" must be denied and "the reign of simulacra" must be celebrated (*DR 66*).

4.6.1 The simulacrum and art

According to Deleuze, Plato's theory of Ideas has to do with "a will to select and to choose", i.e. "it is a question of 'making a difference,' or distinguishing the 'thing' itself from its images, the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum" (*LS 253*). The Platonic project can only be brought to light by turning back to the method of division. Deleuze claims that the actual "purpose of division [...] is [...] to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to distinguish the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic," and in this sense the Platonic dialectic is "a

dialectic of rivalry,” of “rivals and suitors” (254). Therefore, he says, the real motivation behind the Platonic division is to be sought in *The Statesman*; while the statesman claims himself to be “the inspired one,” “the true lover [of the Good]” the pretenders (the doctor, the merchant, the laborer, etc.) all come and say “I’m the shepherd of men” (254). So, the task of the division is selecting lineages in order to “screen the claims (*pretenders*) and to distinguish the true pretender (the statesman) from the false one” (254).

As stated before, in *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze & Guattari state that “the creation of a concept always occurs as the function of a problem,” and for Plato, the problem was Athenian democracy itself, the agonistic culture of rivalry (Deleuze & Guattari in Smith, 2012: 4).

The Greek invented the *agon* as a community of free men or citizens, who entered into agonistic relations of rivalry with other free men, exercising power and exerting claims over each other in a kind of generalized athleticism (Smith, 2012: 5).

For, in an imperial State a single authority (the emperor) determines all “functionaries,” but in the Greek city one has to “pose a candidacy” for a position of magistracy, and the agonistic type of human relations “permeated the entire city life.” However, as is well known, for Plato this was rather problematic (Smith, 2012: 5).

Whereas imperial States assume “the transcendent sovereignty of the State” upon which the social order is established, the Greek system presupposes “rival interests” which give rise to “the historical condition of possibility” that enabled philosophy. In imperial states it was certain people—the priests, wise men, etc.—who were possessors of wisdom, but in Greeks, “*philo-sophos*” was “the *friend* or lover of wisdom”, someone in the search for wisdom without ever being able to possess it. Therefore, Deleuze argues that the friendship implied “a jealous *distrust* of one’s rival claimants” as well as a love of wisdom (Smith, 2012: 6).

The concept of Idea enabled Plato to invent a type of transcendence “that was capable of being exercised and situated *within* the field of immanence itself. Immanence is necessary, but it must be immanent *to* something transcendent, to an ideality” (Smith, 2012: 7).

The Platonic division of the original from the copy and the copy (model) from the simulacrum (copy of the model) is achieved by the use of irony and myth. Myth constitutes the foundation of the model and model or copy is always in need of a foundation. Claims are “judged well-founded, ill-founded or unfounded” according to this story of foundation, the myth. In the case of *the Statesman*, the mythic model is a criterion of selection according to which “different men of the city participate unequally in the model” (the shepherd of men) (*LS* 255).

The Idea or foundation “possesses something in a primary way”, e.g. Idea of the Good is the source of the quality of goodness, and whatever qualified as good is good by mediation of this Idea, i.e. each good thing participates in the Good. However, the Good itself is the Unparticipated, it is pure goodness. In other words, in the Good there is no distinction between the quality of goodness and being itself. Therefore, goodness is the primary possession of the Good. On the other hand, the participated possesses the same quality only secondarily, because its essence is different from the quality in which it participates.

My example would be a bucket of white paint and wooden fences. If the fences are white, it is because they were painted with the white paint. The fences are made of wood and thus they are necessarily wooden, but they are not necessarily white as they became white only after being painted. In this sense, the white wooden fences possess the quality of whiteness secondarily. The whiteness of the white wooden fence is only a copy, an image of the whiteness of the white paint, its degree of whiteness is determined according to its *similarity* to the white paint. However, if there are some black fences which cannot be distinguished from the white fences in the dark, we can say that they have a *dissimilarity* to the white paint: they share nothing in common with the White Paint but only constitute a fake copy of the white

fences. In this respect, although white fences participate in the whiteness of the white paint and provide a model for the black fences, black fences have no resemblance to white paint. In this example, we establish a *hierarchy* between different fences with reference to their degree of whiteness.

According to Deleuze, the aim of this division or hierarchy is not “the specification of the concept of, e.g., whiteness, but “the authentication of the Idea [of White], not the determination of species but the selection of lineage” (LS 256). As the lineage goes down to the simulacra and counterfeits, e.g. black fences, we see that the simulacrum is only a false pretender as it is “built upon a [relation of] dissimilarity, implying an essential perversion or deviation,” whereas the copies (white fences) are “well-founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance” (256). Therefore, Plato’s division makes an opposition between *copies-icons* and *simulacra-phantasms*; “if copies or icons are good images [of the Ideas] and are well founded, it is because they are endowed with resemblance.” However, the relation of resemblance is an internal relation, since “it is the Idea which comprehends the relations and proportions constitutive of the internal essence” (257).

According to Smith (2012), in *Latin*, ‘simulacrum’ was the term for “statue” or “idol” which reminds us of Nietzsche’s text *Twilight of the Idols* and in *Greek* the term was used as “phantasma,” and Deleuze produces his own version of the concept of simulacrum in *Difference and Repetition* to describe “differential systems in which ‘the different is related to the different through difference itself” (3).

Deep down in the Platonic doctrine, Deleuze finds the roots of Christian philosophy. Species of images which pretend to be the copies (the simulacra) pretend to be that object, quality, etc. “under cover of an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion, ‘against the father,’ and without passing through the Idea,” and thus, theirs is an “unfounded pretension, concealing a dissimilarity which is an internal unbalance” (LS 257). However, the copy and the simulacrum are still “two halves

of a single division,” as the copy is “an image endowed with resemblance”, and the simulacrum is “an image without resemblance”

God made man in his image and resemblance. Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance while maintaining the image. We have become simulacra. We have forsaken moral existence in order to enter aesthetic existence. This remark about the catechism has the advantage of emphasizing the demonic character of the simulacrum (*LS* 257).

The “*effect* of resemblance” produced by the simulacrum is different from that of the model since it is external to the Idea. On the contrary, the simulacrum “internalizes a dissimilarity” and for the same reason, whereas the resemblance of copies derive from “a model of the Same,” the model of the simulacrum is “a model of the Other” which is the source of the “internalized dissemblance” of the simulacrum (*LS* 258).

Whereas in the production of a good copy there is “*a right opinion*,” compatible to the Idea, in the case of the simulacrum, “a sort of ironic encounter” takes the place of “a mode of knowledge”; it is “an art of encounter that is outside knowledge and opinion”. The observer cannot obtain the “dimensions, depths and distances [from the model]” that the simulacrum implies. Therefore, says Deleuze, the simulacrum “includes the differential point of view; and the observer becomes a part of the simulacrum itself”

There is in the simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited [...] a becoming always other, a becoming subversive of the depths, able to evade the equal, the limit, the Same, or the Similar: always more and less at once, but never equal (*LS* 258).

The aim of Platonism is “to impose a limit” on this becoming, to “render it similar” by ordering it in accordance with the same, and “to repress” the rebellious part of it (*LS* 258-9). In the simulacrum, however, “sameness and resemblance persists, but only as effects of the differential machinery of the simulacrum (will to power)” because “behind every mask there is not a true face, but another mask, and another mask behind that” (Smith, 2012: 16). For Deleuze, it is an illusion to assume “an originary model behind the copy, a true world behind the apparent world”, and for

the same reason, affirmation of the simulacrum makes “truth” no longer an opposition of the false world of simulacra, but the simulacrum’s act of affirming itself—this act of self-affirmation can be named as “art” too (16). Looking from this angle, Deleuze’s view of art is exactly on the same line with that of Nietzsche. To remind, according to Nietzsche, the artist “values appearance more highly than reality” and, by “appearance,” Nietzsche understands “reality *once more*, only selected, strengthened, corrected [...]” (*TI* III 6). “Art, in which precisely the *lie* is sanctified and the *will to deception* has a good conscience, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science” (*GM* III 25). Therefore, in art, a will to deception is at stake but not for the sake of negating life. On the contrary, art is interested in affirming life through the power of falsehood: “it is art which invents the lies that raise falsehood to this highest affirmative power that turns the will to deceive into something which is affirmed in the power of falsehood” (*NP* 103).

As the simulacrum now becomes the concept for the differential machinery and art is the concept for the simulacrum’s affirmation of itself, we come across Deleuze’s theory of aesthetics.

At this point, one might notice that Deleuze’s manifestations on the simulacrum not only highlight a Nietzschean atheism but also indicates the philosophical core of his own critique of the identity of the same and representational thinking in general. In the broad context of his philosophy, Deleuze advocates the view that there is nothing beyond the simulacrum. As Smith (2012) puts it, “in an inverted Platonism, *all* things are simulacra; and as simulacra, they are defined by an internal disparity” (15).

Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms; and the difficulty facing everything is to become its own simulacrum [...] The important thing, for the in-itself, is that the difference, whether small or large, be internal (Deleuze in Smith, 2012: 15).

Therefore, I would say, Deleuze builds an aggressive (but not reactive) philosophy against the self-sameness of the Ideas by emphasizing the status of the simulacrum

in terms of an ontology of “difference-in-itself.” For, in Deleuze’s account, the actual meaning of inverting Platonism means seeing the difference between copy and simulacrum “not merely as a difference of degree,” e.g. the degree of whiteness, but as “a *difference in nature*.” In other words, the inversion implies “an *affirmation* of the being of simulacra as such [, i.e.,] the simulacrum must then be given its own concept and be defined in affirmative terms” (Smith, 2012: 12).

Deleuze claims that in Aristotle we see representation as a “well-founded” but “limited and finite,” representation and it “covers over the entire domain, extending from the highest genera to the smallest species,” however, with Christianity the foundation for representation is rendered “*infinite*” (LS 259). This is the effect of Platonism over the entire domain of philosophy, and philosophy cannot free itself from the element of representation “when it embarks upon the conquest of the infinite”

[Philosophy] always pursues the same task, Iconology, and adapts it to the speculative needs of Christianity [...] Always the selection among pretenders, the exclusion of the eccentric and the divergent, in the name of a superior finality, an essential reality, or even a meaning of history (LS 260).

Deleuze’s critique of the Platonic division and the re-conceptualization of the simulacrum is specifically important for us, because indeed the simulacrum is what we define as “an art of becoming” in this dissertation. It is a becoming-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-minor or becoming-other. A proud deviation from the model or, as it were, a total rejection of the same and never an imitation.

In the *Republic* Plato wants to “eliminate art that is simulacral or phantastic, and not iconic or mimetic” because imitation as mimesis includes “a correct judgment” or “*right opinion*” of the knowledge of the Idea, which means that in the *mimetic* production there is still an internal similarity between the copy and the Idea (Smith, 2012: 15). However, modern art undermines the distinction between the copy and the simulacrum by pushing the “multiplication of images to the point where the mimetic copy changes its nature and is reversed into the simulacrum” which is the

case for Pop Art, e.g. “Warhol’s series of Campbell soup cans” (15-6). None of these soup cans is a copy of an ordinary soup can. They are all objects that stand alone or simulacra. Therefore, Deleuze says, by simulacrum we should understand “the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned” (in Smith, 2012: 6).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: ART(S) OF BECOMING(S)

In this final chapter of the thesis I will dwell on Deleuze's concept of becoming in general by re-establishing its interconnectedness to some other Deleuzian notions such as 'difference-in-itself,' 'intensity,' 'lines of flight,' 'minoration' and 'immanence'. As an intermediary section, I will make a detailed analysis of Deleuze's case study of Carmelo Bene's "*one less Hamlet*" as argued in "One Less Manifesto". This discussion, will, on the one hand, enable us to bridge the distance between theatre and performance art, and on the other, introduce the concept of 'minoration' into the context of art. Minoration will be evaluated within the broader scope of 'becomings-minor' a detailed account of which appears both in *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* and the tenth plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*. After the clarification of the notion of becoming and other key concepts that are inter-related to it, I will present an account of 'political immediacy' through Deleuze and Guattari's revolutionary conceptualizations on segmentarity, micropolitics and nomadism. Finally, I will refer to Karsten Heuer & Leanne Allison's thrilling journey to Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge accompanying a caribou herd, and approach their performance as a remarkable example of the art(s) of becomings. A plural version of the main title of the thesis is shared by this last chapter, since this is where the Deleuzian-Guattarian concept of becoming will be placed in its most relevant context, that is, in a view of art which is immediately political in terms of micropolitics, without the need to, or trying to, be political in the macropolitical sense. This title is necessarily plural, since becomings are never identical to the being of a single object, rather they must be understood as foldings, unfoldings, and re-foldings of difference-in-itself, which is a composer of multiplicity just like the way chaos - which virtually contains the universe as its

future - is a multiplicity. The thesis will close with a restatement of the political significance of art(s) of becomings as performative encounters for a society *yet to come*, as minor or molecular modes of creation according to the Deleuzian-Guattarian view of creativity and nomadic thinking.

5.1 The expansion of Deleuze's notion of difference to various fields

Deleuze's collaboration with Guattari enables a multi-dimensional critique of representational thinking by taking it from an ontological closure and expanding to the fields of art, ethics, politics, etc. One of the motivations which brought Deleuze and Guattari together to collaborate in several writing projects (mainly, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Vol. 1 Anti-Oedipus*, *Vol. 2 A Thousand Plateaus*, and finally, *What is Philosophy?*) was the fact that they were already working on at least two different branches of the same revolutionary critique of 'representational thinking'. Before writing with Deleuze, Guattari was more on the side of making a political critique of institutional psychotherapy practices carried out in state hospitals since he regarded Freudian psychoanalysis' commitment to the Oedipal triangular reductionism as a veil which hides the effects of the capitalist state on the formation of smaller units of society such as families and schools. Therefore, Guattari began his schizo-analytic practices as early as during his occupation at La Borde Clinic.¹⁴ The aim of the group therapies at La Borde was

to abolish the hierarchy between doctor and patient in favor of an interactive group dynamic that would bring the experiences of both to full expression in such a way as to produce collective critique of the power relations in society as a whole (Massumi in *ATP*, x).

According to Guattari, promoting "human relations" so that they do not "automatically fall into roles or stereotypes" and, on the contrary, "open onto fundamental relations of a metaphysical kind that *bring out* the most radical and basic alienations of madness or neurosis" was the central concern for those therapies

¹⁴ As Brian Massumi states *La Borde* was "an experimental psychiatric clinic founded by Lacanian analyst Jean Oury" ("Translator's Foreword" in *ATP* x).

(Guattari in Massumi in *ATP* x). Since a general critique of Freudian psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytical approach to the notion of the unconscious was stated in chapter four, I will not return to the details of this discussion here. However, it must be made clear that the way Deleuze understood Spinoza's concept of affect, that is to say, as a virtual capacity which cannot be grasped intellectually alone and cannot be reduced to personal emotional states, was already in line with what Guattari was doing in his psychoanalytic practices, that is, enlarging

the milieu of encounter to include affective qualities that went beyond, not only the psychically interpersonal, but also beyond the altogether too narrow realm of the human – to serve as a rather deliberate alternative to Jacques Lacan's focus upon the processes of “transference” between analyst and analysand (Seigworth, 2005: 160).

Meanwhile, Deleuze was approaching the great philosophers of Western thought from behind with the ambition of giving them monstrous children that they would not deny:

I would imagine myself approaching the [philosopher] from behind, and making him a child, who would indeed be his and would, nevertheless, be monstrous. That the child would be his was very important because the author had to say, in effect, everything I made him say. But that the child be monstrous was also a requisite because it was necessary to go through all kinds of decenterings, slidings, splittings, secret discharges which have given me much pleasure (Deleuze, 1977b: 117).

In other words, Deleuze was opening the ideas of those great philosophers (e.g., Kant and Leibniz) to *variations*, because he believed that the metaphysics of Western philosophy was poisoned by Platonic Idealism or ‘representational thinking’ and it had to be overturned.

5.1.1 Representational thinking *versus* difference-in-itself

According to Deleuze, representational thinking is “a site of transcendental illusion” which occurs in four forms—identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance—corresponding, respectively, to “thought, sensibility, the Idea and

being” (*DR* 265). Since classical philosophy rejects any kind of difference unless it is rooted in these four principles of reason, Deleuze’s task had to be freeing ‘difference as such’ from these “collars” (262).

In Kantian philosophy, identity is “grounded in a thinking subject”, and hence, the world is “represented in this subjective identity (*DR* 266). When it comes to resemblance, it is a heritage of Platonism that everything is judged according to their degree of resemblance to the supposed identical Being (original), and the same principle is carried, further, to judge the “resemblance of the (diverse) sensible to itself”:

Difference necessarily tends to be canceled in the quality which it covers, while at the same time inequality tends to be equalized within the extension in which it is distributed. [In brief,] difference is cancelled qualitatively and in extension (*DR* 266).

Indeed, as Deleuze argues, “difference is intensive, indistinguishable from depth in the form of a non-extensive and non-qualified *spatium*, the matrix of the unequal and the different” (*DR* 266). Through a third operation, “limitation and opposition”, difference is subordinated to itself:

It is in quality and extensity that intensity is inverted and appears upside down, and its power of affirming difference is betrayed by the figures of quantitative and qualitative limitation, qualitative and quantitative opposition (*DR* 266).

Finally, difference is subordinated to “the analogy of judgement”: According to Kant, “I am” is the perception of “an existence independently of any determination” (in *DR* 269), and hence, “the ultimate concepts” must be “posited as determinable” (269). “The ultimate concepts or primary and originary predicates” are recognized as determinable because they “maintain an internal relation to being” (269). In other words; “Being is analogous in relation to [the concepts] and acquires simultaneously the identity of a distributive common sense and that of an ordinal good sense” (269). Through these four illusions, difference is reduced to a ‘difference *from*’ and repetition is regarded as ‘repetition *of the same*’. In return, Deleuze understands difference as difference-in-itself, as intensity, i.e., as the being

of becoming, and repetition as the repetition of what constantly differs. Having stated the way Deleuze understands difference we can move onto the concept of becoming which is the central theme of this study.

5.2 Becoming

Although the Bergsonian understanding of time as ‘pure duration’ is an element of Deleuze’s theory of difference and becoming, in this thesis, until now, I did not mention the issue of time, as, in the fourth chapter, I preferred to draw Deleuze’s notions of difference and repetition out of his appropriation of the Nietzschean doctrine of the eternal return. Also, by illuminating the concepts of the virtual and actual in the third chapter, we gained an intuitive understanding of becoming as the becoming of difference or as a movement from virtual to actual. The specific reason for me to avoid presenting a detailed analyses of Deleuze’s reading of Bergson was the fact that, in terms of art, illuminating the Deleuze-Bergson connection is primarily a way to approach Deleuze’s views on cinema, which is a specific theme of study on its own behalf, and recently, it is being carried by many Deleuze scholars. Furthermore, in this thesis I tried to explain becoming with reference to Deleuze’s approaches to Nietzsche, Spinoza and Leibniz, which was, I believe, already a satisfactory means to see the way Deleuze re-constructed certain concepts out of his readings of these philosophers. Nevertheless, just for the sake of enabling a better understanding of the concept of becoming, in this section, I will refer to the issue of time, that is to say, Deleuze’s concept of *Aeon* or pure duration and its relation to becomings.

5.2.1 *Aeon*, *Chronos*, and the time of becoming

Deleuze differentiates between the indefinite time of the event (*Aeon*) and the time of measure (*Chronos*). Whereas *Aeon* is the pure empty form of event or the time

of haecceities, *Chronos* is the divided – calculable – time of substances and subjects. Accordingly, *Aeon* is

the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened (*ATP* 262).

This means that *Aeon* is the time of becomings, the time of the movement from virtual to actual. On the other hand, *Chronos* is

the present which alone exists. It makes of the past and future its two oriented dimensions, so that one goes always from the past to the future—but only to the degree that presents follow from one another inside partial worlds or partial systems (*LS* 77).

In brief, Deleuze's conception of time is closer to that of Bergson's 'pure duration' and hence to the ancient conception of *Aeon*. As Deleuze explains in *The Logic of Sense*,

[Aeon] is the past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract moment endlessly decomposes itself in both directions at once and forever sidesteps the present (*LS* 77).

In the fourth chapter, in our reading of Deleuze's text *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, we have seen that Deleuze rejected the existence of anything beyond multiplicity and becoming:

there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity; neither multiplicity nor becoming are appearances or illusions. But neither are there multiplicities or eternal realities which would be, in turn, like essences beyond appearance. Multiplicity is the inseparable manifestation, essential transformation and constant symptom of unity. Multiplicity is the affirmation of unity; becoming is the affirmation of being (*NP* 23-4).

In other words, Deleuze rejects both the subordination of becoming to an assumed identity of being, and the existence of a reality which transcends this world, i.e. the world of multiplicities. There is a unity which is like an all-embracing principle, that is the principle of difference, but it is not self-identical as it is not a being in the ordinary sense, but a continuous process of becoming: the becoming of difference.

When it comes to the connection of difference-in-itself (not difference *from*) to time, we should recall the relation between the virtual and the actual. “The past is connected to the present (and the future), but not connected as something that no longer exists to something that does exist (or will)”, rather “the past exists in the present, but in a different way from the way the present exists” (May, 2003: 145). This is only explicable through the existence of the virtual –as past– in the actual –as present–, and the existence of the actual –as future– in the virtual. “There is only one time [...], although there is an infinity of actual fluxes [...] that necessarily participates in the same virtual whole” (B 82).

“Difference-in-itself” is “the content of the past, which exists virtually in the present” (May, 2003: 146). In other words, the actual or present is a differentiated past or an actualized virtual, and the virtual is a *yet* undifferentiated difference; difference as such or difference-in-itself. And becoming is the actualization of virtual or differentiation of difference-in-itself. Identities are productions of a self-varying (un-identical) difference and this is how Platonism is overturned by Deleuze: At the beginning, there was no Being, no identity, but only a chaotic multiplicity, and through constant variation, difference constructed differentiated objects.

In this context, becoming is “the unfolding of difference in time and as time” and

Being as difference is virtually existent pure duration whose unfolding we can call becoming, but only on the understanding that the difference which becomes is not specific something or set of somethings, but the chaos which produces all somethings (May, 2003: 147).

To remind, Deleuze appropriates the notions of ‘folding’ and ‘unfolding’ from Leibniz. This conception is both a novelty of Leibniz’s philosophy as it is a demarcation from the Cartesian dichotomy of mind/body or subject/object, and a way to express the construction of any interiority without falling into a dualism of inside and outside.¹⁵ On the other hand, the conception of folding is neither unique

¹⁵ In *The Fold* Deleuze explains the reversal of Descartes’ *cogito* as follows: “I must have a body; it’s a moral necessity, a ‘requirement.’ And in the first place, I must have a body because an obscure

to Leibniz nor a new way of thinking as the emergence of the subject “as a folding of forces onto themselves” had already occurred in “Greek thought” (MacDonald, 2012: 72).

In *Foucault*, Deleuze explains the relation between an inside and the outside in terms of folds as follows:

the outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside (2006: 96-7).

In other words, an inside subsists in an outside; i.e. it is not something different from the outside but simply the result of the movement of an already existing outside, and this movement can be described as if something is folding on itself. However, we should be careful that the outside is “not a fixed limit,” Deleuze (2006) says (96). Therefore, it is better to think of the fold in terms of ‘a movement’ rather than an object, and in my opinion, modern physics’ approach to the ‘spacetime’ or Deleuze’s own simile of an ‘origami cosmos’ are good examples to foldings, unfoldings and refoldings of difference-in-itself:

a continuous labyrinth is not a line dissolving into independent points, as flowing sand might dissolve into grains, but resembles a sheet of paper divided into infinite folds or separated into bending movements, each one determined by the consistent or conspiring surrounding [...] A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line (*TF* 18).

object lives in me. But, right from this first argument, Leibniz’ originality is tremendous. He is not saying that only the body explains what is obscure in the mind. To the contrary, the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body. [...] But this first argument gives way to another, which seems to contradict it, and which is even more original. This time, we must have a body because our mind possesses a favored – clear and distinct – zone of expression (*TF* 97).

5.2.2 A Spinozistic ontology of becoming: 'immanence'

As a final component of becoming, we must return to Deleuze's Spinoza, once more, to see how Deleuze derives the notion of 'intensity' from Spinoza's view of latitudes and makes it a part of his ontology of immanence.

There are at least two different ways of defining a body that we learn from the philosophies of Descartes and Spinoza. You are a Cartesian if you define a body by the form, the subject or even by the organs, but you are a Spinozist if you try to define it "*only by a latitude and a longitude*" (ATP 260). Accordingly, longitude ("extensive parts") is "the sum total of material elements belonging to [a body] under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness", whereas latitude ("intensive parts") is "the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential" (256-7, 260).

There is a correspondence between extensive and intensive parts of a body. It is the intensities (degrees of power) which affect the extensive parts. That is to say, the intensive degrees of power correspond to the extensive relations of longitude. Neither longitude nor latitude are essential properties. "Speed and slowness", "movement and rest" are the relations of "unformed elements" and "molecules and particles of all kinds" and together these elements form bodies which "constitute collective assemblages" (ATP 266).

Deleuze and Guattari are thrilled not by the unity of substance in Spinoza's ontology, but by the infinity of its modifications as the whole universe is the modifications of a single substance, and to this substance Deleuze and Guattari call "a plane of immanence or univocality" or "the unique plane of life" (ATP 254).

"Compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects" determine how haecceities are formed on a plane of immanence or a plane of consistency (ATP 266). Although the content of a plane is only a haecceity and not a form, a subject or anything molar or determinate, the plane itself is consistent in that; first, it is always "a virtual

construction rather than an actual one”—and hence, it *should not be* thought as if it is something extended and perceptible—; second, a specific “speed” is at stake for any occurrence of events “upon a plane”; third, a plane is not defined by a “pre-existing subject or self”; and finally, the plane itself “is constructed precisely [, as soon as,] [“the connections and syntheses brought about between events”] are created (Stagoll, 2005: 205). Since the plane does not “precede” constructions of the events upon it, the “immanence” of a plane solely comes from these consistent characteristics inscribed to it (205). In this respect, Deleuze’s notion of immanence is opposed to the conception of transcendence.

5.3 Becoming(s)

It can be argued that in *A Thousand Plateaus* one can find explicit expressions on the connection between becomings-Other and the political significance of these movements.

The first point which needs clarification is that becoming is, in no sense, an ‘imitation,’ which is a constantly repeated remark in *ATP*. For instance, if we are talking about theatre, Deleuze and Guattari cannot be supposed to defend a mimetic acting as all forms of mimesis are representative and not generative of an actual becoming. In addition to not enabling it, resemblance “would represent an obstacle or stoppage” to becoming (*ATP* 233). Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari do not evaluate becomings, for instance, becomings-animal, in the way science or psychoanalysis classifies and interprets them. This is because such analyses, most of the time, circle around the term ‘man’ in the form of the relationships between “man and animal, man and woman, man and child, man and the elements, man and the physical and microphysical universe” (235). For Deleuze and Guattari, however, there is no such thing as a “becoming-man” since “man is the molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular” (292). What does this mean?

The movement of becoming-Other is a flow from the molar to molecular, and from majoritarian to minoritarian. Becomings begin with becoming-woman, and continues, respectively, with becoming-animal, becoming-molecular and becoming-imperceptible.

“Man is major-itarian par excellence” (*ATP* 291) since he is constituted as “a gigantic memory, through the position of the central point, its frequency (insofar as it is necessarily reproduced by each dominant point), and its resonance (insofar as all of the points tie in with it)” (293). To make this remark clearer, I must state (1) the difference between ‘a point’ and ‘a line’ as expressed in *ATP*, and (2) the notions of ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialization’.

In the context of becomings, a point means “a point of origin” whereas “a line of becoming” is without a beginning or an end; “departure” or “arrival”; but rather, it “has only a middle” (*ATP* 293). It is not possible to “break with the arborescent schema” as long as a line is composed of and limited by two distant points—i.e., a beginning and end. (293). “What constitutes arborescence is the submission of the line to the point” (293).

In order to clarify the notions of deterritorialisation (decoding) and reterritorialization (overcoding), I must state that ‘reterritorialization’ is the movement through which a molar entity such as the state apparatus integrates flying quanta or masses on a social territory, into the majoritarian rule, mode of living or system of social codes—the arborescent structure. On the other hand, ‘deterritorialisation’ is the counter-movement of those masses or becomings, through which they can escape from the rigid lines of arborescent schemas and, in turn, establish rhizomatic aggregates—their own modes of living—on lines of flight, as opposed to the model provided for them by the rigid codes.

In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari oppose the line-system of becoming to what they call “the point-system of memory” too (294). They argue that although both majorities and minorities (the child, the woman, the black) have memories, a

memory always has “a reterritorializing function”, that is to say, even if it is “a molecular memory” it functions as “a factor of integration into a majoritarian or molar system” (294). In other words, “the Memory that collects those allegedly minor memories is still a virile majoritarian agency treating them as ‘childhood memories,’ as conjugal, or colonial memories” (293). In brief, the reterritorializing function of rigid lines (the point system) must be thought as functioning with the help of memory.

On the other hand, becoming is “*an antimemory*”, that is to say, it is the movement “by which the line frees itself from the point, and renders points *indiscernible*” (ATP 294).¹⁶ However, the political strength of “a vector of deterritorialisation” comes from the fact that it is “in no way indeterminate”:

It is directly plugged into the molecular levels, and the more deterritorialized it is, the stronger is the contact: it is deterritorialisation that makes the aggregate of the molecular components “hold together” (294).

To remind, in the third chapter we have discussed Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibles as the reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason, and in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze was arguing that through the principle of indiscernibles, Leibniz was reducing all kinds of difference to conceptual differences. It is manifest that by appropriating the Leibnizian principle of indiscernibles, Deleuze constructs his own understanding of “a zone of indiscernibility” as an indeterminate state in-between (in the middle of) the simultaneous becoming of two figures, or a zone of undecidability. For this reason, according to Deleuze, indiscernibility is not followed by an identity, but on the contrary, by the fact that *a* becoming frees itself from molarization and identification. At this point, it is also important to state the distinction Deleuze and Guattari draw between the definite and indefinite articles:

The indefinite article and the indefinite pronoun are no more indeterminate than the infinitive. Or rather they are lacking a

¹⁶ *Emphasis added.*

determination only insofar as they are applied to a form that is itself indeterminate, or to a determinable subject. On the other hand, they lack nothing when they introduce haecceities, events, the individuation of which does not pass into a form and is not effected by a subject (*ATP* 264).

As we have stated with reference to Bacon's paintings, in chapter three, becomings-Other require doublings since such a becoming is only possible through the resonance between two things:

Deterritorialisation is always double, because it implies the coexistence of a major variable and a minor variable in simultaneous becoming (the two terms of a becoming do not exchange places, there is no identification between them, they are instead drawn into an asymmetrical block in which both change to the same extent, and which constitutes their zone of proximity) (*ATP* 306).

Finally, I must underline that becoming is not mimetic and doublings do not mean a mutual imitation—which is a point that we have already discussed.

“Becoming is never imitating” (*ATP* 305). To illustrate this point, Deleuze mentions a rather interesting example from Ernesto de Martino's research on tarantism rituals.¹⁷ The tarantella dance, or to correct, the shamanic ritual of tarantism relies on the belief that the bite of a tarantula is cured by the dancing performed in a state of trance, accompanied by a specific type of music. Deleuze's point is that we cannot claim that the victim of a tarantula who earnestly performs this dance is imitating a spider. On the contrary, “the victim, the patient, the person who is sick, becomes a dancing spider only to the extent that the spider itself is supposed to become a pure silhouette, pure color and pure sound to which the person dances” (*ATP* 305). Therefore, Deleuze argues, this is not an imitation but a constitution of “a block of becoming”: the ritual, the event, is “the becoming-spider of the dance, which occurs on the condition that the spider itself becomes sound and color, orchestra and painting” (305).

¹⁷ For further information tarantism rituals, see de Martino, E. (1966). *La terredu remords*. Paris: Gallimard. 142-70.

5.4 Becoming in the specific context of becomings-minor

In contrast to the general prejudice that Deleuze was an “anti-theatricalist,” his text “One Less Manifesto” proves the importance he gave to “theatrical and dramatic concepts” for his ontology of perpetual variation—difference-in-itself—as well as his “engagement with performance and performativity” as part of his aesthetic and political views (Cull, 2009a: 5).

In his program for a non-representative theater, Deleuze follows “the tradition of philosophically minded performance theory from Artaud to Grotowski” and he aims at constructing a theater that manages to establish “a non-representational relation between audience and event,” and “creates the conditions for presence.” (Cull, 2009a: 5) The rejection and removal of “the elements of power” from theatre was his “call to arms” for theatre practitioners (5).

“One Less Manifesto” is Deleuze’s most explicit discourse on his expectation from a theatre yet to be-come. In this essay, Deleuze not only investigates Bene’s play *Richard III* as a case, but also expresses his general critique of representational theatre which is in association with power due to its mimetic structure. Therefore, in his call for a free theatre, Deleuze prescribes that all the elements of power and representation of power must be removed during both the back stage processes and the actual movement on stage. This requires taking some actions to cut the mimetic flow of the play, that is to say, the play should not be a presentation of a completed text and the gestures shall not be repetitions of the movements which were previously exercised and memorized during rehearsals. On the contrary, the play should become a live-event—a process of continuous variation or a becoming—and represent nothing.

Indeed, the operation of cutting the mimetic flow of the play carries a risk of pushing it into a state of absurdity. It is also evident that such a play would be rather different from the ones we are accustomed to watch as it would not be an object of pleasure and pain, would not carry references to our read-images, definite

arguments, factors that make it entertaining or sentimental enough to create a sense of attachment. It would not be a piece of illusion, and, most probably, one would not be able to feel a kind of sympathy or connection to the characters. These are some of the possible results of avoiding a mimetic and representational structure, and I am sure that most of the viewers' reaction would be "I did not get anything from that!", and critics would exclaim "this is not art at all!" Nevertheless, when we consider, again, Deleuze's expectation from theatre or art in general, such a criticism might lose its apparent strength because the aforementioned risk is already welcomed and affirmed by many experimental artists whose attempts are in line with a Deleuzian understanding of a non-representational art of becoming.

It has been stated that the problem of representation stems from the problem of transcendence, that is to say, from the imposition of an assumed stasis—which transcends all variation—upon difference-in-itself. Hence, Deleuze is rather cautious about not putting the notion of difference in opposition to the notion of the same. Regarding difference as the opposite of sameness means to derive different from the same, however, as Todd May explains, Deleuze regards "difference-in-itself" as the source of both "derivative difference" and "sameness" (in Cull, 2009a: 5).

In line with these views, rejection of representation, and minor use of language were two important features that Deleuze and Bene were expecting from a critical theater to carry as a political practice. In order to become "a non-representative force" and enable "*a free and present variation*" theatre must (a) deduce the stable elements, and instead, (b) place everything "in perpetual variation," and finally (c) transpose everything in minor (Deleuze, 2000: 246, Cull, 2009a: 5). Such an operation involves changes both in the form and content of theatre. So, for instance, being the representations *of* power, kings and rulers must be subtracted, but the aspect of being representational must be, completely, subtracted too—because it is "the power of theater itself (the Text, the Dialogue, the Actor, the Director, The Structure)" (Deleuze, 2000: 251). This is because, for Deleuze, representation

means “the assumption and imposition of stasis upon that which perpetually differs from itself,” however, for Deleuze, “*ontological* presence as becoming”—difference-in-itself, or continuous variation, is the only thing that counts as “real” (Cull, 2009a: 5). Therefore, we can argue that Deleuze’s ontological challenge to Platonism—the imposition of transcendental Ideas or the same upon the simulacrum—underpins his aesthetic theory which applies to all forms of art including non-representative theatre and performance art.

5.4.1 Minoration

With regards to art, the concept of ‘minor’ indicates the destabilizing effect that art(s) of becoming have over the major rules and norms of society (Sauvagnargues, 2013: 95). Following Deleuze & Guattari’s work on Kafka, *Towards a Minor Literature*, we can say that there are three features through which minor art can be described. These three “relations of minoration” are “deterritorialisation of language”, the individual’s connection to a political immediacy, and “the collective assemblage of enunciation” (K 33).

Collective assemblages of enunciation are “the discursive relations of power that underlie the usage of a given language” (Bogue, 2005: 113). In this respect, “no individual user invents a language”, i.e. a minor language is already a product of a collectivity: “language is collectively produced and reproduced through social interaction”, and thus, minor writers “cannot simply speak in the name of a given minority, for that the minority is defined, structured and regulated by dominant powers it seeks to resist” (113-4). For the same reason, “minor writers necessarily must attempt to articulate the voice of *a collectivity that does not yet exist*” (114).¹⁸ This is why Deleuze argues that the task of minor art is to promote the coming of a society which does not exist yet (ECC 90).

¹⁸ *Emphasis* added.

According to Sauvagnargues, relations of minoration can be explained in terms of the following criteria:

First, the medium constitutes “a *linguistic criterion* for minority” as it is through the medium, “expressive material and literary language” that the work of art unfolds a process of minoration, secondly, “the relation between the social body, the transmitter of assemblages that brings visibilities to the work and its receiver, defines a *political criterion*”, and finally, “*a-subjective criterion*” is that the author of a minor process “must be forced into an exercise of depersonalization” so that their position is neither “a transcendent subject” nor an “omniscient narrator” (Sauvagnargues, 2013: 95). (I believe that this criterion corresponds to the emphasis on the “collective assemblage of enunciation”.)

5.4.1.1 Major and minor languages

According to Deleuze, the real concern about having major and minor languages is not a matter of deciding which language is a major one for a society who expresses themselves in two different languages, e.g. English and French. Indeed, having minor languages within a (major) language is the real issue—which is the case for unilingual societies. This is because a major language’s aspect of being major is not simply determined by its international importance, that is to say, no matter how little the number of people speaking a major language, in the world, it could still be a major language. So, says Deleuze (2000), major languages are those with “a strong homogeneous structure (standardization) and centered on invariables, constants, or universals of a phonological, syntactical, or semantic nature” (243).

Major languages are, at the same time, bearers of a nation’s culture, traditions, kingly stories, etc. With their constancy and structural homogeneity, major languages are “languages of power”, whereas minor languages are languages of “*continuous variation*—whether the considered dimension may be phonological, syntactical, semantical, or even stylistical” (Deleuze, 2000: 244). However, there

are minor usages within each language that hallows out and sweeps away the language from its formal (major) usage, e.g. “black English and all American idioms of the ghetto” (244). Therefore, a major language is always and already subjected to a process of minoration from within.

Minoration processes generate becomings-other and undermine rigid power relations through the discovery of lines of flight (by opening tiny holes in molar structures) and this is the reason we call minor and experimental initiatives in art, ‘art(s) of becoming’.

This process is almost the same as the one that theatre goes through under critical theatre’s amputation-operations. Deleuze’s well-known examples for major and minor usages of a language are the German of Goethe and that of Kafka. Just as in the example of the Anglo-Irish of John Millington Synge, in the case of Kafka, being “a Czech Jew writing in German,” the author’s own minority-status is also involved in the critical process.

Deleuze (2000) argues that the majority of linguists (e.g. Noam Chomsky) approaches language as a, naturally, “heterogeneous mixture,” but, at the same time, they say, that, the scientific study of a language requires “a homogeneous and constant subsystem,” and thus, “a dialect, a patois, a ghetto language [is] “subjected to the same rules as a standard language”—which indicates considering “the variations that affect a language [...] either as extrinsic and outside of the system or attesting to a mixture of two systems that would be homogeneous in themselves” (244-5). According to a few other linguists (e.g. William Labov), however, the aforementioned rule of constancy and homogeneity already supposes a specific usage of the language under a scientific study, that is, “a major usage treating language as a state of power, a marker of power” (245). Deleuze and linguists like Labov, who defend the latter view, claim that in every language there is “an immanent, continuous, and constant variation” which shapes the so-called homogeneous system: “here is what defines a language in its minor usage, an

enlarged color field, a black English for each language” (245). In brief, there are not major and minor languages but there are major and minor *usages* of a language.

5.5 A general critique of representational theatre

Deleuze is known to have cooperated with Italian actor, playwright and director Carmelo Bene on Bene’s version of Shakespeare’s *Richard III*. The book *Superpositions* consist of two major sections: the first part (1-81) embodies Bene’s play, *Richard III or the Horrible Night of a Man of War*, and Deleuze’s well-known manifesto for theatre, “*Un manifeste de moins*”, constitutes the second part (85-131) of the book.¹⁹

In “One Less Manifesto,” Deleuze goes into the problem of representational theatre and opposes it with a view of critical theatre—that of Bene. He approaches the problem of theatre in terms of language, minority-majority distinction, gestures, and its engagement with politics. For the sake of clarity, I would like to dwell on each of these issues separately although they are interconnected and must be approached in the light of Deleuze’s ontological point of view, that is to say, an ontology of difference-in-itself.

According to Deleuze (2000), Bene is the inventor of a novelty, that of the original idea of subtracting all the stable elements of power from theatre (242). For instance, in his play *Romeo and Juliet*, Bene does away with the character—Romeo—the result of which is the development of Mercutio who is “only a virtuality” in Shakespeare’s play (239). Similarly, Bene names his *Hamlet* as “one less Hamlet,” because, unlike many other playwrights, Bene does not create new versions of

¹⁹ This book (Bene, C. & Deleuze, G. (1979). *Superpositions*. Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris) is written in French and has not been translated to English yet. Therefore, my reading of the *Superpositions* is based on Kowsar (1986)’s translation of certain sections to be found in his own article: “Deleuze on Theatre.” However, Deleuze’s contribution to the book (the second part) was later translated to English and published as “On Less Manifesto” in Murray, T. (2000). *Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought*. University of Michigan Press, 239-57.

Shakespeare-texts by adding more stuff to the original plays or developing aspects of substantial characters. On the contrary, Bene runs amputation-operations on each play so that the viewer can testify to the construction of a character on the stage. According to Deleuze, the constitution of the character, e.g. Mercutio, on the stage is what makes Bene's theater critical: "critique is a constitution." In this respect, Bene is not an author or director who omnisciently creates the character in his text—before the actual staging process—but an operator who gives way to actual becomings:

The theater maker is no longer an author, an actor, or a director. S/he is an operator. [This operation is] the movement of subtraction, of amputation, one already covered by the other movement that gives birth to and multiplies something unexpected, like a prosthesis: the amputation of Romeo and colossal development of Mercutio, one in the other (Deleuze, 2000: 239).

In this sense, Bene's theatre is experimental; he subtracts literature, the text or a part of the text and waits for the results. The resonance between Romeo and Mercutio, their mutual becoming, is what the play presents.

In *Richard III*, Bene amputates "the entire royal and princely system": By subtracting the characters of state power, he "gives free reign to the creation of the soldier on stage, with his prosthesis, his deformities, his tumors, his malpractices, his variations" (Deleuze, 2000: 240). As Deleuze states, in mythology, the origin of a soldier is regarded to be different from that of a statesmen or a king as the soldier is considered to be a "deformed and crooked" being (240). However, in Bene's play it is Richard III who will "deform himself to amuse children and restrain mothers"; therefore, Richard III "will make himself, or rather unmake himself, according to a line of continuous variation" (240).

Deleuze considers Bene as having established alliances with Artaud, Bob Wilson, Grotowski and the Living Theater, because all these artists (or art-assemblages) adopt the idea of a non-representative theatre. By neutralizing the elements of power that "constitute or represent a system of power"—e.g. "Romeo as

representative of familial power, the Master as representative of sexual power, kings and princes as representatives of state power”—Bene releases “a new potentiality of theater, an always unbalanced, non-representative force” (Deleuze, 2000: 241-2):

Elements of power in the theatre are what insures both the coherence of the subject in question and the coherence of the representation on stage. It is both the power of what is represented and the power of theater itself. In this sense, the traditional actor enters into an ancient complicity with princes and kings, while theater is complicitous with power [...] The actual power theater is inseparable from a representation of power, even if it is a critical representation (241).

Therefore, through his critical operation, Bene changes both the *form* and the *content* of theater “which ceases to be a ‘representation’ at the same time as the actor ceases to be an actor”, or imitator (Deleuze, 2000: 241).

Bene’s plays are short because he does not want the characters to have an “Ego”: the beginning and the end of the spectacle coincides as “the play ends with the creation of the character” and “does not extend further than the process of this creation” (Deleuze, 2000: 240):

Richard III, the Servant, and Mercuzio are born only in a continuous series of metamorphoses and variations. The character is part of the totality of the scenic design including colors, lights, gestures, and words (241).

As Deleuze (2000) states, the only interesting thing is what is happening in the middle (*le milieu*) as being in the middle requires that we do not think in terms of future or past, instead, we experience “the becoming, the movement, the speed, the vortex” (242). In this context, a minor author is not interested in the beginning or end of events. S/he is “precisely that—without future or past, s/he has only a becoming, a middle (*un milieu*), by which s/he communicates with other times, with other spaces. The middle is “neither the historical nor the eternal but the untimely,” the past and the future are *history* (242). “What counts, on the other hand, is the becoming: becoming-revolutionary, and not the future or the past of the revolution” (242).

Truly great authors are *minor* ones, the *untimely* ones. It is the minor author who delivers the true masterpiece. The minor author does not interpret his or her time; no one has a fixed time, time depends on the man (Bene in Deleuze, 2002: 242).

So, Bene's attempt to approach Shakespeare as a major author is a treatment for "minorating" him. Being major is the result of a process of normalization or reterritorialization, however, becoming-minor means to save becomings from history, lives from culture, thoughts from doctrines, and graces or disgraces from dogmas (Deleuze, 2000: 243).

5.5.1 Techniques to interrupt power and representation of power

Deleuze notes that Bene's critical approach has nothing to do with avant-garde formulas; whereas those who advocate an antitheater view would try to negate theatre as an art totally, his operations are purely positive. By means of removing elements of power from language and gestures, as well as from the representation and the represented, Bene aims at releasing the free flow of becoming (Deleuze, 2000: 245). In this context, History as "the temporal marker of Power" must be amputated, just as structure, as "the totality of relations among invariants," must be subtracted. It is the major usage of language which needs constants, "the stable elements," and the text must be amputated too because it implies the hegemony of language over speech. And dialogue must be deduced too as it is the transmitter of the elements of power into speech (245).

5.5.1.1 Theatre and its language

The utterance of a word, sentence, exclamation, etc. indicates a variety of meanings depending on the context it is involved in. Therefore, the gestures and the text should be open to a process of constant variation, and the play must be resistant to "each apparatus of power capable of fixing [the meaning of the utterance, *énoncé*]"

Suppose that Lady Anne says to Richard III: “You disgust me.” It is hardly the same *énoncé* when uttered by a woman at war, a child facing a toad, or a young girl feeling a pity that is already consenting and loving [...] Lady Anne will have to move through all these variables. She will have to stand erect like a woman warrior, regress to a childlike state, and return as a young girl—as quickly as possible on a line of continuous variation (Deleuze, 2000: 246).

In order to convey “the scale of variables” through which “the *énoncé* passes,” Bene writes, with a writing that is “truly performative”: In this way, he avoids any constancy and “places language and speech in continuous variation” (Deleuze, 2000: 246). To succeed in putting language in this non-ending process of differentiation, in Bene’s plays, the players whisper, stammer or deform their dictions so that they are rendered inaudible. In semi-Leibnizian terms, this is a movement of becoming-imperceptible in order to carry conscious perception (“apperception”) back to the level of “minute” or unconscious perceptions, i.e. intensities.

As we have already explained in terms of differentiating between minor and major usages of a language, the issue is not speaking in a foreign language where the majority of the people speak in another major language, but to be a stranger in one’s own language, that is to say, to discover one’s *bilingualism* or construct a linguistic line of flight within one and the same language:

It is one and the same language that must become bilingual. It is on my own tongue that I must impose the heterogeneity of variation. It is within my own tongue that I must etch a minor usage and deduct the elements of power or majority [...] this line of variation that will make you a foreigner in *your own* language or make a foreign language your own or make your language a bilingualism immanent to your foreignness (Deleuze, 2000: 247).

Nonetheless, making one’s own language foreign to themselves is not possible without the contribution of nonlinguistic components such as “actions, passions, gestures, attitudes and objects” as language (“interior variables”) and the nonlinguistic elements (“exterior variables”) together establish a reciprocal relation, a single continuity (Deleuze, 2000: 248).

5.5.1.2 Movement on stage (gestures)

To illustrate the effect of “obstruction” on the movements of the players, Deleuze gives examples from Bene’s plays *Salomé*, *S.A.D.E.* and *Richard III*. In *Salomé*, the player is distracted by useless stage props (e.g. “the table that separates instead of supporting things”), his speech is constantly obstructed by “the apple being continuously swallowed and spit up,” and costumes keep falling off and put back, in *S.A.D.E.* the act of copulation is delayed by a “continuous series of his own metamorphoses” so that the Servant must not “*master* his role as *servant*,” and, finally, in *Richard III*, Richard keeps tottering as he is unable to balance himself and perpetually slips from the dresser that which he leans on (Deleuze, 2000: 248). According to Corrado Augias, such are the ways through which Bene brings together “a work of ‘aphasia’ on language [...] and a work of ‘obstruction’ on objects and gestures” (in Deleuze, 2000: 248).

In terms of language, the subtraction process involves pushing linguistic elements through a state of “aphasia,” and in terms of movements, it is done by creating “obstructions” to gestures. Deleuze calls this the double principle of revealing relations of power among bodies, as each body turns into an obstacle to the body of another—which can be interpreted as the becoming visible of forces affecting bodies reciprocally. It is these obstructions which place the gestures and movements into constant variation, and the same is true for language. By making language stammer, Bene’s theater frees language from “a system of dominant oppositions” (Deleuze, 2000: 248-9).

Again, in terms of gestures, Deleuze reminds the examples from *Richard III* and *S.A.D.E.*; “the gesture of Richard always vacates its own level, its own height, by a fall, a rise, or a slip: the gesture in perpetual and positive imbalance,” and in *S.A.D.E.*, the Servant undergoes metamorphoses—the impositions of her sadistic Master result in her transformation into a series of objects successively—, however, she “traverses these metamorphoses [and] she never assumes degrading poses,” and

by following her gestures, their line of variation, she evades “the domination of the Master” (Deleuze, 2000: 249).

5.5.1.3 Speed and slowness

Bene’s theatre is an art of speed, slowness and affects as “form” or “theme” is subordinated to speed, “to the variation of speed,” and “subject” or “self” is subordinated to the affect, “to the intense variation of affects” (Deleuze, 2000: 249). Consequently, unlike mimetic theater, what is enacted on the stage is never a “repetition” of the same:

What counts in variation are the relations of speed or sluggishness, the modifications of these relations as they carry the gestures and *énoncés* along a line of transformation, in accordance with variable coefficients [...] each form is deformed by modifications of speed. The result is that the same gesture or word is never repeated without obtaining different characteristics of time (249).

The substitution of the subject with the affect, and with intensities, is not only a matter of terminological shift but a change of paradigm. It removes the repetitive and representative features of theater and turns it into a live-event, presentation of a real becoming. This is, at the same time, the core difference between representational and experimental theatres.

5.5.1.4 Theatre and its relation to/way of doing politics

With the transmittal of everything on a line of flight, through continuous variation, we witness the constitution of a minor language, “a minor character on the stage, a set of minor transformation in relation to dominant forms and subjects” (Deleuze, 2000: 251-2). But what is the political outcome of this minor theater for the world outside theater?

Both Bene and Deleuze agree that theatre does not change the world or cause a revolution. Popular theatre, a theatre for everyone, aims at developing formulas to

establish a more direct communication between the audience and the artists so that art can touch the daily problems of the people—“conflicts of the individual and society, of life and history, contradictions and oppositions of all kinds that cut across a society as well as its individuals,” and become their *vanguard* by putting forward solutions to these political problems. However, as in the example of Brecht, a theater of social conflicts, at the end of the day, presents “a certain *representation of conflicts*” (Deleuze, 2000: 252).

Although manifestation of forces and oppositions is part of his theater, unlike Brecht, Bene is not a director of conflicts as his real aim is to subtract, deduct and neutralize these relations of power and eliminate the representation of, e.g., masters (Deleuze, 2000: 249).

Whereas Brecht makes use of gestures to reify conflictual social positions, Bene makes them dissolve and disappear. In Bene’s words, the perfection of Brecht’s “critical operation” is indisputable, however his critical operation was enacted only “on the text and not on the stage” (in Deleuze, 2000: 246). In this context, Bene’s critique of Brecht, popular theater and that of the avant-garde is crucial to understand Deleuze’s expectation from theater and, more generally, from art in terms of politics. However, we have already discussed the aspects of Brechtian theatre and that of the avant-garde in the first chapter. Therefore, we need not go into the details of the problem with the avant-garde regarding the connection between art, life and politics. Instead, I would like to explain why Bene and Deleuze argue that these approaches are still representative.

As Deleuze (2000) states, Brecht cannot leave the “domain of representation” because he only manages to shift the focus from “one pole of bourgeois representation to an epic pole of popular representation” (252). He wants the audience to understand the social contradictions and oppositions which are expressed through gestures, whereas a critical theatre—that of Bene—“proposes the presence of variation as a more active more and aggressive element” (252).

At his point, Deleuze's reference to the notions of "activity" and "aggressivity" is important. In the fourth chapter we have explained the distinction Nietzsche draws between resentment and aggression, that is to say, re-active feelings and active feelings. To remind, resentment had to do with a certain type of moralism, with a system of reward and punishment, accompanied by feeling miserable, betrayed or exploited. In this context, conflictual theater is moralistic and controlled by resentment. It follows a logic of slave morality, "the majority standard," in its representation of the public reaction to injustices. Nonetheless, it delays the hope about a better life to an unknown future, after revolution, and, simultaneously, it offers ready-made solutions. On the other hand, aggression is not a re-active or passive state, that is to say, it is not affected from outside but have a certain autonomy. Aggression affirms difference and life: Freeing continuous variation means to act and affirm difference-in-itself.

Presenting conflicts as such cannot save theatre from the domain of representation because the moment they become "the products" of this artistic endeavor, they are "already normalized, codified, and institutionalized" (Deleuze, 2000: 252). The same problem can be observed in other domains of art, e.g. cinema. According to Marco Montesano, "despite its conflictual appearances, [Italian cinema] is an institutional cinema because the conflict it portrays is the conflict foreseen and controlled by the institution" (in Deleuze, 2000: 253).

According to Bene's formula, then, saving art from being the official institution, an apparatus, for representing these recognizable conflicts and making it the field of "a sudden emergence of creative, unexpected, and subrepresentative variation," requires breaking free from "*majority rule*" (Deleuze, 2000: 252-3).

Through the operation of normalization any minority group can be neutralized, historicized, integrated into majority rule, and be represented in the same system. "The people" is a saying in the tongue of major language. However, Deleuze says, there is no such thing as "the people"; it is the majority rule that makes the ethnic, first, poor, then, slave, and, finally, a majority in number (Deleuze, 2000: 254-5).

On the other hand, the line of variation “does not divide masters and slaves, rich and poor,” it is “an entire regime of relations and oppositions” that makes “the master into a rich slave, and the slave into a poor master” (254).

5.5.2 Minority consciousness

According to Deleuze (2000), the creation of “a minority consciousness as a universal-becoming” is the role of an art of becoming which represents nothing (256). Consciousness-raising as a political process, and as the outcome of artistic endeavors, has nothing to do with coming up with concrete solutions to political matters. This type of a consciousness has nothing to do with intellectually interpreting the world and its events either. “It is truly a matter of consciousness-raising, even though it bears no relation to a psycho-analytic consciousness, nor to a Marxist political consciousness, nor even to a Brechtian one” (256). The point is different:

The more we attain this form of minority consciousness, [the type that I am going to explain shortly,] the less isolated we feel [...] We are our own mass, by ourselves, “the mass of my atoms” [Bene in Deleuze, 2002: 256]. A revolutionary theatre [might be] a simple loving potentiality, an element for a new becoming of consciousness (Deleuze, 2000: 256).

If not giving political recipes, if not promoting a revolution, if not treating people as social classes and organizing them according to macropolitical, rigid lines, what would be the significance of a minority consciousness? Moreover, where is the line of intersection from which political concerns will be transmitted, reciprocally, between the spheres of art and life—as if there are such distinct spheres—?

[A non-representative theater] forges alliances here and there according to the circumstances, following the lines of transformation that exceed theater and take on another form, or else that transform themselves back into theatre for another leap (Deleuze, 2000: 256).

Art(s) of becoming might take any form. They might and must exceed theater, performance art, and even political action. It is about the affective transmission

among bodies, it is the interaction and encounter of intensities which enables the establishment of alliances. And a minority-consciousness is the basis of the sense of belonging to the entire world. In order to grasp the meaning of the type of consciousness, the type of belonging, Deleuze defends here, first we need to understand his notion of “minority” beyond the specific context of minor usage of language.

5.5.2.1 Minority

Minor and major are not determined according to quantities. As Deleuze (2000) illustrates, the number of mosquitos and flies is definitely more than that of men, however, as human beings set the “standard measure” of everything, mankind is necessarily the majority—regulator of law—in the world, and hence, other kinds are “deemed to be smaller” (253). In the same context, blacks, women, Native Americans, children, etc. are minorities “in relation to the measure established by Man—white, Christian, average-male-adult-inhabitant of contemporary American or European cities,” though their number is smaller than the rest of the people in the world (253). Briefly, it is the positive privilege that a group of people have over the others which makes them the majority, and the existing power relations in the world determine the statistical, religious, ethnic, racial and biological functions of that group, though none of these categories are fixed though (Bogue, 2005: 113). However, depending on the possibility that the majority rejects “a historical or structural model of power,” this relation is always potentially reversible: “*the entire world* is minority, potentially minority, as much as it deviates from this model” (Deleuze, 2000: 253), and becoming-minor or becoming-other is the process through which a previous majority rejects their privileged position (Bogue, 2005: 113).

To render a potentiality present and actual is a completely different matter from representing a conflict [...] By shaping the form of a minority consciousness, art speaks to the strength of becoming that are of another domain than that of Power and measured representation. “Art

is not a form of power except when it ceases to be art and begins to become demagoguery” (Deleuze, 2000: 254).

Deleuze addresses several underground initiatives all of which tend to refuse approaching theatre as a *productive* process, and instead, freely present difference-in-itself. He also mentions the following approaches:

The lived theatre in which conflicts are experienced rather than represented, as in a psychodrama? The aesthetic theatre in which formalized conflicts become abstract, geometrical, and ornamental? The mystical theatre that tends to abandon representation to arrive at communal and ascetic life “beyond spectacle”? (253).

Nevertheless, Bene’s formula is still different from these directions, because a minority “already begins to become normalized when one encloses it on itself or when one encircles it in a nostalgic dance (it thereby becomes a subcomponent of the majority)” (Deleuze, 2000: 255). In other words, the point is neither an ethnic closure nor advocating an identity politics, i.e., defending minorities as identities of subgroupings within a society. Within the context Deleuze advocates, minority stands for a becoming.

To become-minority. This is a goal, a goal that concerns the entire world since the entire world is included in this goal and in this becoming inasmuch as everyone creates his or her variation of the unity of despotic measure and escapes, from one side or the other, from the system of power that is part of the majority [In this sense, e.g.,] everyone is a becoming-woman, a becoming-woman who acts as everyone’s potentiality (Deleuze, 2000: 255).

5.6 Politics, creativity and nomad thought

In one of his dialogues on cinema, which was later published as “What is the Creative Act?”, Deleuze argues that an idea or the emergence of a new idea is always “dedicated to” a certain field of study, e.g. philosophy, science, poetry, and we cannot have “an idea in general” but always come up with one upon an emergent “necessity” (*TRM* 312-3). In this respect, whereas it is the task of philosophy to invent concepts to satisfy certain necessities, scientists discover functions in accordance with their own questions. When art is at stake, Deleuze distinguishes

between different modes of expression: for instance, cinema is the task of inventing blocks of movement / duration, and painting is concerned with blocks of lines / colors etc., and these blocks are inventions of art. He further underlines that the fact that ideas, concepts, images, etc. are invented upon necessities is common for all types of creative act, and the limit of all creative disciplines is “the formation of space-times” (315). The spaces in, e.g. cinema, need not be complete. To illustrate this view, Deleuze mentions Bresson’s films in which visual spaces occur as disconnected “series of little pieces” (*TRM* 315). For example, in one frame, a “corner of a cell” is seen and then another corner occurs as part of a wall, etc. and it is “the hand” which connects these separate pieces—which means that there is no “predetermined connection” between them (315). In line with this view, he states that doing cinema “has nothing to do with invoking a story or rejecting it” (314). Merging his views on cinema with several other passages that Deleuze wrote on art in general—some of which has been discussed throughout this thesis—I can arrive at the conclusion that the function of art does not consist in story telling or presenting a predetermined connection between various ideas or images. On the contrary, the “transmission” of “order-words” or information among parties is the function of communication (*TRM* 320). Whereas communication serves for the control and persistence of an existing social-order, art is a mode of resistance against the structure and order imposed on people through the communicative apparatus (books, news, education, etc.) of molar masses (the State, family, military, etc.).

In place of representational thinking, Deleuze and Guattari place “nomad thought.” On one side, in traditional metaphysics, the focus of conceptual thinking is on the ‘interiority’ of a human being, i.e. a self or subject and their subjective experiences. On the other side, in the hermeneutical tradition, philosophy is regarded, mainly, as a linguistic activity and hence they put the emphasis on textual analysis and commentary. Deleuze, however, distances himself to any of these perspectives and shifts the focus to an unidentified ‘exteriority’, as it is within one’s encounters with an outside that philosophical novelties, new concepts, are created (Cull, 2009b: 24).

In “Nomad Thought”, Deleuze (1977a) argues that, it is only through a relationship with the outside that “legal, contractual, or institutional codes” are decoded (deterritorialized) and the world is experienced as “a dynamic flux” (146). Therefore, he thinks that being a nomad or thinking in a nomadic mode is not necessarily related to living like a migrant, rather, to opposing the settled culture and living “on the periphery” of a society (148). In other words, being a nomad has nothing to do with changing place: nomads might “stay in the same place”, but they “continually evade the codes of settled people” (149). Nomads and non-state organizations including some art-collectives have their own “intricate mechanisms of distributed governance”, and Deleuze and Guattari describe these mechanisms as a “war machine[s]” (Welchman, 2005: 603-4): ‘War machine’ is a term that Deleuze and Guattari put forth in *A Thousand Plateaus* to describe the mode of governance that societies without a State use for self-organization. It is a non-bureaucratic and fluid mode of organization found in primitive societies whose form of segmentarity is suppler in comparison to that of modern (centralized) societies whose form of segmentarity is more rigid or molar.

In this context, minor art can be thought in terms of a mode of resistance against the systems of segmentation circumfixing our lives being in direct relation to micropolitics. Major politics cannot free itself from the hands of professionals—as representatives of a major set of values—; meanwhile, opponents remain in the ghettos of the unrepresented minority, the borders of which are determined by the majority. It is only through minor political turns that lines of flight can be established and connected to other fleeing quanta or the codes (social segments) of majority can be deterritorialized (decoded).

5.6.1 Segmentarity and micropolitics

Deleuze and Guattari borrow the term ‘segmentarity’ from ethnologists, mainly from Levi Strauss, who use it to describe the social stratification of societies without a State organization. Nevertheless, they reject the common distinction drawn

between modern societies as centralized, and primitive societies as segmented since, they argue, both societies are segmented and 'centralization' is only an aspect of the type of segmentarity found in societies of State (ATP 208-11).

There are three forms of segmentation found in both of these societal forms: (i) "binary" oppositions such as "men-women," "adults-children," "those on top-those on the bottom," etc., (ii) "linear" segments which are, as it were, the episodes in our lives (e.g. the passage from family to school, from school to army or to work, etc.), and (iii) "circular" segments like one's neighborhood, one's city, one's country, etc. (ATP 208-10). These fashions of segmentation are common to both primitive and modern societies. When it comes to differentiating between two types of segmentarity corresponding to each form of society, they talk in terms of "supple" and "rigid" modes (210).

Societies of primitive or supple segmentarity are based on more mobile and molecular relations or "a polyvocal *code*" and "an itinerant *territoriality*" (ATP 209). Societies of modern and rigid segmentarity, on the other hand, tend to form molar structures such as families, schools, churches, armies, etc. The members of modern societies are overcoded or reterritorialized by these social segments. Although both societies are composed of or ordered by social, economic and racial segments, the relation between the primitive and modern societies must not be thought in terms of a historical sequence as the emergence of rigid lines coexists with that of supple lines because the possibility of molarization or reterritorialization subsists in the more molecular mode of living, just as the possibility of deterritorialisation subsists in the more rigidly structured life. In other words, "every society, and every individual, are [...] plied by both segmentarities simultaneously: one molar, the other *molecular*" (ATP 213). To illustrate, to the molar lines of religious institutions (categorizations of sins, etc.) corresponds the molecular movement of "sinfulness", and, again, to the molar lines of "legal codes" corresponds "a flow of criminality", and societies consist of the coexistence of these

struggling modes: one always try to control, punish, structure, codify, etc. and the other tries to fly, decompose or decode (*APT* 218).

Deleuze and Guattari state that “everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a *macropolitics* and a *micropolitics*” (*ATP* 213). Put differently, in each segmented line (macropolitics) there are incalculable quantum flows (realm of micro flows) (218), and “something always escapes” (217). Cautiously enough, micropolitics is not a matter of individualism or inter-individualism as the flows of quanta are not “attributable to individuals”, and in the same fashion, they cannot be overcoded by “collective signifiers” (219).

Regarded as “two systems of reference” reterritorialization of the flows (becomings-molecular) and deterritorialisation of the lines of segmentarity (molar lines) are

in inverse relation to each other, in the sense that the first eludes the second, or the second arrests the first, prevents it from flowing further; but at the same time, they are strictly complementary and coexistent, because one exists only as a function of the other; yet they are different and in direct relation to each other [...] (*ATP* 220).

Finally, the issue is also connected to the problem of representation in politics, because “segmented lines” (context of macropolitics) is defined as “the molar realm of representations” and “quantum flows” (context of micropolitics) is defined as “the molecular realm of beliefs and desires” (*ATP* 218-9). To formulate differently, the underlying principle in the aggregation of molecular masses is the inclusive logic of ‘AND’ or logic of multiplicities, whereas the logic of representation involves the exclusion of certain members from the multiplicity—it is the logic of ‘IS’ or identity.

5.6.2 Micropolitics of becoming-animal

An early motivation which led me to work on this research about a Deleuzian approach to contemporary art; especially works of art which require a performative

and experimental aspect, was realizing the explanatory potential that Deleuze & Guattari's concepts such as 'minoration', 'deterritorialisation' and 'lines of flight' held to illuminate the political field, and the problem of how to relate contemporary aesthetic phenomena to these issues without falling into representative thinking (in addition to Deleuze's powerful ontology of becoming or difference-in-itself which is a challenge to both western metaphysics and philosophy of art). We have seen that in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari shed light on the interconnectedness of macro and micro realms of politics in relation to a great variety of different fields through a rather new lexicon. In this context, one of the crucial issues which needs to be considered in terms of the resonance between rigid lines and molecular flows is our societies' relation to non-human animals and the rest of nature in the Anthropocene.²⁰ With such a perspective at hand, it is rather plausible to relate the movement of becoming-Other to that of becoming-animal, not only as a phase in the whole process of becoming (becoming-women, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular and becoming-imperceptible), but also in terms of becoming-minor since the whole animal kingdom is a minority in the face of our civilization. However, at this point, I must admit that Deleuze and Guattari's examples of 'becomings-animal' do not indicate a direct concern with the specific situation of animal minorities—though, their general conceptualization of the problem of minority is rather open to engaging such issues as well. This is because they present a pretty flexible set of conceptual tools, as it were, toy blocks, and deciding on what to do out of these blocs is up to those who need and use them.

Actually, Deleuze and Guattari judge any kind of loving relationship between humans and animals as an attempt to domesticate 'the Beast' and even mark the

²⁰ 'Anthropocene' is a recent term indicating the latest geological period of Earth which is driven by the effects civilization to the environment and, especially, to the atmosphere in the post-industrial revolution era—mainly the global climate change. The extinction of a variety animal and plant species due to the raising of the water levels of the oceans as a result of the melting of the arctic ice masses are triggered by the climatic changes in the Anthropocene Epoch. Therefore, the term 'Anthropocene' stresses human beings' dangerous relation to the Earth and to their own species all together.

people who live with dogs as ‘fools’, and hence, they favor the more monstrous kinds of animals such as snakes, lions, lizards, etc. But, in my opinion, this is not simply because Deleuze does not like dogs, even though, for him, ‘barking’ is the most stupid thing on earth. According to his line of thinking, becoming-animal, as a moment of becoming in its full range, has to do with doing away with one’s familiar human side, subject side, conscious side, Man side, etc., and; in theory, it is an ‘involuntary’ encounter with the Beast which is capable of detracting one from these more ‘human’ traits towards the level of affects or intensities. So, by losing one’s ‘manhood’ one may become woman, by losing one’s ‘humanity’ one may become animal, by fleeing from molar lines one may become molecular and only then –having crossed over the boundaries of being something– one can establish alliances with other lines of flight and become a nomadic war machine as opposed to the state apparatus of the rigid, modern society. This is why Deleuze and Guattari say “woman: we all have to become that, whether we are white, yellow, or black” (*ATP* 470).²¹

In this context, the following performance, piece, experiment, ecological activism or whatever you choose to call it, will be evaluated as a perfect instance of an art of becoming: becoming-animal or becoming-one with the world.

5.7 Be(com)ing caribou

Pro-development oilmen in the US Oval Office, along with a Republican-controlled Senate and Congress, make development of oil and gas reserves in the Alaskan portion of the Porcupine Caribou’s sacred calving grounds more likely than ever.

²¹ Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari’s examples of becoming-animal are all taken from cinema and literature (with the exception of ‘tarantism ritual’), and hence, we can even accuse them for reducing this transversal relation to writing and art. When it comes to the example of tarantella dance, it does not concern the animal counterpart of the event since tarantism is, originally, an alternative treatment method, which means that the human side of the issue is at stake and not the spider side. However, recent studies in the field of ‘interspecies collaboration’ seem promising to surmount the limitation of becoming-animal to literary fields.

But what do we really know about these caribou and how they might be affected? What hardships do they already face, and how much more, if any, stress can they handle?

That is the goal of *Being Caribou* – to go beyond the quick visits of past media coverage and arm’s length science to live life as a caribou for seven months. We will swim the same rivers, plow through the same snowdrifts, and endure the same clouds of insects, cold nights, and miles of endless travel on an annual migration. We will go deep into the life of the herd, encounter the same grizzly bears, wolves, and eagles that they do, and witness the daily struggles that lead to birth and death. And when we return from the experience seven months later, we will have a truer understanding of what’s at stake (Allison and Heuer, 2003).



Figure 19

Being Caribou is the title both of Leanne Allison’s movie and of Karsten Heuer’s book on these activists’ challenge of “tracking-on-foot a Porcupine Caribou Herd migration across the high Arctic western Yukon and eastern Alaska” (Chisholm, 2012: 1).

Regarding the scope of this thesis, I will concentrate on the more performative aspect of the experiment depending mainly on the film²² which involves extensive footages of the actual trip. In addition to the film, I will make reference to an

²² The movie *Being Caribou* is also available on the couple’s website *Necessary Journeys*: <http://www.beingcaribou.com/beingcaribou/index.html>

interview with Karsten Heuer by Jennifer Esser, and also to Heuer's post-journey book *Being Caribou*. However, much of my reading of this performance 'in terms of a Deleuzian becoming-animal' leans on Dianne Chisholm (2012)'s illuminating article "The Becoming-Animal of *Being Caribou*: Art, Ethics, Politics".

In 2003, Allison and Heuer decided to follow a Porcupine Caribou Herd through Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) on their natural route of migration, as a reaction to the political agenda of drilling oil from the region which is the habitat of a huge variety of animals, plants and also the Gwich'in – local tribes of the district.

After hearing the news about oil drilling and researching its possible outcomes for the environment, Heuer and Allison came up with the idea of migrating with the herd, that is, becoming attuned with the movement; slowness and fastness, of the herd, and definitely not simply spying on those animals like a group professional wild-life documentarists. In his book, Heuer (2005) says:

It was a classic development-versus-conservation dilemma, and it had attracted plenty of media attention [...] *But as I read and watched all of these, I realized I wasn't hearing the voice of the caribou. It was always the experts doing the talking, citing numbers and statistics that can't really be compared: Six months' worth of oil versus 27,000 years of migration. The culture of about 4,000 caribou-eating Gwich'in versus the financial benefits to a handful of company executives and shareholders. Millions of mammals and birds versus billions of barrels of oil. Nowhere was there a hint of what I'd felt out there on the tundra. Nowhere did I find the story of the caribou herd itself* (18).²³

There are at least three crucial points he makes in this quote: the imperceptibility of "the story of the caribou herd", the fact that it is always "experts" who state their *opinions* about ecological problems, and the incommensurability of the calculations of the value of the oil reserves in that land to the incalculable value of the land itself as part of a whole ecosystem – a point which does not occur on media at all. Heuer & Allison's project of migrating with the herd would replace the "scientific point

²³ *Emphasis added.*

of view with an artistic frame of vision” and, at the same time, they would probably tell the story of the migration “that the caribou herd annually endure” with a view to “add[ing] a whole other perspective to the controversial prospect of opening [ANWR] to oil and gas development” (Chisholm, 2012: 1).

In Esser (2005)’s interview, Heuer points out that it is not enough when specialists talk on behalf of the animals, hence, in a way Leanne and Karsten wanted to ‘be caribou’ so that they might have had a chance that the caribou-herd could make its own story herd.

Karsten and Allison do not make reference to Deleuze and Guattari and they call this journey “being-caribou”, but as it is rather plausible to analyze this performance terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “the becoming-animal of Man”, I will restate their experiment as a becoming, that is, be(com)ing-caribou (Chisholm, 2012: 3). In this context, ‘Man’ stands for the molar entity or the majoritarian human, and the more one moves away from Man, the more molecular s/he becomes.

Karsten and Allison’s aim was telling the story through the eyes and ears and movements of an animal” (Heuer in Esser, 2005: 38). Paralleling their reversal of the scientific vision, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari compare the scientific outlook to their own account of becoming-animal. As they state, humans’ view of animals consist in, either a series of interpretations made in terms of human-animal relations or, as in the case of the linear evolution, a manifestation of the will to classify the animals according to a man-made catalogue of characteristics or drawing genealogical trees of creation—which is part of a larger project of raising human knowledge on these realms of nature (*ATP* 235, 239). Hence, professionals pull their socks up to measure, classify and fix the animal traits as if animals are merely composed of extended –calculable– parts.

At this point, I must explain that neither Deleuze nor Guattari is engaged with an ‘anti-science’ perspective. On the contrary, as manifest in their co-authored works, as well as those they had written independently, they owe a numerous amount of

concepts to scientific developments, and for the same reason, currently, quite a number of research is carried out with the help of Deleuzian –Guattarian conceptions of time, space and so on. For instance, in addition to the fields of body-research, woman studies and queer research are nourished by the notions of ‘affect’ and ‘becoming-Other’. There are also some architectural studies on the Deleuze’s conception of the folded universe, and also research on quantum and chaos theories. These are just a few of those works inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborations. In this respect, what Deleuze and Guattari criticize is only a certain mode of doing science, doing philosophy and making art, that is, representational thinking.

Turning to our case, although Heuer himself is a biologist, the thing Allison and he did in the Arctic was not a normal scientific research but, as it were, a discovery of the metaphysics of becoming-animal (Chisholm, 2012: 1).

When Allison and Heuer arrived at the “calving grounds” where the adult caribous give birth to their infants and settle until the new members of the herd learn to move as fast as their mothers, there were times, when the two could not even move out of their tents. It was because the adult animals were rather alert to their surroundings with an instinct to protect their babies. Therefore, at the calving grounds, Allison and Heuer could not go to the bathroom for days as it would put the animals in great discomfort. Instead, they used their cups to go to bathroom and when they needed water, they had to crawl on their bellies through the river for two days and back. They could hardly speak or just whispered in their tents for 10 days, says Heuer (in Esser, 2005: 39). When it was time to follow the herd again, they had to move as fast as the herd. Hence, they travelled in “all hours of the day and night” following a rhythm of walking for up to six hours and taking a short nap for about an hour and resume walk again, and eventually they become deprived of sleep (39-40).

Since, at that time of the year in the arctic, there was daylight for 24 hours, Allison and Heuer lost their sense of time and began to live in, as it were, a ‘caribou time’.

Their sensitivity towards and attunement with the herd's lifestyle indicate the intensity of their effort to become caribou instead of putting themselves at a 'human' distance or spying on the animals like two hunters.



Figure 20

As a matter of fact, it was impossible to carry enough food while walking on foot for miles and miles long, and hence a “perpetual state of hunger” accompanied their “sleep deprivation” and dizziness (Heuer in Esser, 2005: 39). However, as they gradually lost their connection to the human way of doing things, without even realizing it, Allison and Heuer found themselves in the middle of an almost ‘shamanic state’. Now they were so adapted to the movements of the herd that they “started to have vivid dreams and visions—of where [they] would find the caribou next when [they’d] lost them”, so they began to follow those dreams and became capable of telling each other beforehand the “exact scenes” describing the place they would meet the herd again (39).

Another astonishing thing was the “thrumming” they kept feeling rather than hearing:

There was also a vibration in the landscape, and it wasn't from the hooves; it was more like a singing through the landscape. You felt it more than you heard it. We would hear it when the caribou were in large

groups. It was subtle first, but as the layers of our lives dropped away, our senses were sharpened. We started to tune in this sound—which I call thrumming—and we had lost the caribou, and we would find them. It was really a magical development in the trip (Heuer in Esser, 2005: 39).

After the trip -five months on foot with the caribou- when Leanne and Karsten decided to lobby on behalf of the herd against the oil and gas exploration in the ANWR by presenting their story to the representatives in the Congress in D.C., also in Ottawa and several other places in Canada, they encountered the impossibility of communicating their point in just five or ten minutes spared for them (Esser, 2005: 41).

In my opinion, it is not only the shortage of time which resulted in the disparity between their experience and the realm of major politics. Their case was a becoming, incommensurable with the codes of macropolitics. As Chisholm (2012) underlines, “the idea of becoming-animal is [...] political in that the being (human or animal) that undergoes a process of ‘becoming-animal’ also undergoes a ‘becoming-minor’ or ‘minorization’” (3). Like every becoming, becoming-caribou is a fleeing from the rigid lines of segmentarity. In terms of a Deleuze-Guattarian critique of representative politics, this point is rather crucial as it is a manifest expression of the impossibility of intruding into the way things are organized by the State apparatus. However, this impossibility is not the end of the story or a negation of the value of Allison and Heuer’s becomings-caribou.

As we have discussed with reference to the thousand plateaus, there are always many lines of escape and something always flees (*ATP* 217). In other words, there is always the chance that you can defend a case through the micropolitical mechanisms, that is to say, through establishing rhizomatic assemblages (instead of becoming beaten by the will to destruction). One can always choose to follow the underground paths and forge alliances with other lines of flight.

In addition to the emphasis it puts on this particular fact, Allison and Heuer’s experiment is invaluable in itself as a long-durational performance challenging the

limits and transversality of humanity and animality, and this is what an art of becoming is about.

5.8 Concluding remarks

The meaning of all of these is, then, freeing multiplicities. In a multiplicity one can imagine anything; an orchid, a fly, a dream, a dog, a buzzing, a dance, a love, *ad infinitum*, that is to say, "... + x + y + z + a + ..." (Massumi in *ATP* xiii):

A) One day, a sleeping dog sees, in her dream, a buzzing fly around a dancing orchid and she falls in love with the fly, B) a cheerfully dancing fly dreams of frightening an orchid but is eventually swallowed by a dog passing by. In the cases, A and B, the multiplicity remains 'intensive' as each of its members have a relation to each other. Now, add a biologist to the multiplicity: C) "Neither orchids nor flies dream", he says, "but dogs do", and "they can also dance". In the last example, not only the members of multiplicity's relations to each other is excluded but also buzzing and love are taken out. This is because the biologist dominated the other members through an 'extensive' categorization, i.e. adding the whole *genus* of dogs, and that of flies and orchids into the multiplicity. This is what exactly happens when *masses* are turned into *classes*: 'molarization.' And for the same reason, this is what the quest for intensifying multiplicities is about: 'resisting molarization.' For Deleuze and Guattari, it is in this respect that the notion of social classes is never adequate to define the masses.

In line with these views, for Deleuze and Guattari, the expectation from art is, ultimately, the emergence of a new society with a sense of minority. Therefore, art(s) of becoming emerge from the more general idea of "becoming-Other" or "becoming-minor". Since such an ethological motivation is seated at the intersection of art, science and philosophy, the old problem of the art and life distinction is resolved in art(s) of becoming.

Minor politics is the art of constructing lines of escape from the disempowering effect of representational politics of the ruling, norm-defining majorities. Following the Deleuzian insight into the way art does politics differs from representational and major politics, I arrived at the conclusion that an art of becoming is immediately political.

In this thesis it has been discussed that political art tries to be political but, eventually, becomes representative. Even if it represents social conflicts, as in the case of Brecht, it cannot escape demagoguery and instrumentalism. However, art(s) of becomings are immediately political moments of becoming because the minoritarian movement of becoming begins by becoming-woman and continues, respectively, with becoming-animal, becoming-molecular and becoming-imperceptible. In other words, it tries to deterritorialize molar segments by molecular movements, and as a final yet never-ending step, it tries to become imperceptible, that is to say, become one with the world. The ultimate goal is, then, becoming a 'pure becoming'. Contemplating on the miseries that molarization or rigid segmentarity brought to the world, what else is there to defend other than a call for becoming molecular?

Furthermore, art(s) of becomings provide a natural solution to the more theoretical problem of how to demarcate between art, action and activism by rendering such categories unnecessary or dissolving them through the introduction of a new conception of becoming-Other.

To arrive at these conclusions which have been stated above, I have made a journey through Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual inventions and appropriations of many concepts from a variety of philosophers, all of which are, as it were, "grand-stations" in the history of philosophy.²⁴ In this journey, however, I made zig-zags

²⁴ I owe this simile of stations and grand-stations to Associated Prof. Dr. Samet Bağçe who once stated "if philosophy is a journey on a train, there are stations and grand-stations of it, and Spinoza is one of the grand-stations for sure."

instead of following a straight line. This is because I tried to keep in mind that the invention of concepts are necessitated by the existence of problems. For me, the problems at stake were concerning the relation between art and politics. Hence, first I littered them around, and then, by depending upon something like a combination of some intuitions, personal experiences (on theatre and politics), and, definitely, a variety of early readings, I decided to take my time at this or that station. In those places, I tried to borrow certain conceptual tools from some of those philosophers whom, Deleuze was approaching from behind with a wish to give them monstrous children. Having borrowed the conceptual power of these children I returned to the initial problems and concluded the thesis with a good example of becoming placed at the crossroads of politics, art and philosophy.

Following these steps, the points made in the thesis can be summarized as follows:

(1) Art or blocks of sensation, has nothing to with the transformation of an object into another—i.e., a subject or an object does not mimic another. It is not the case that an inter-subjective transference of a property is at stake either, rather it is a continuous (affective) passage from one state to another and from that to still another on a line of constant variation, as a moving capacity; it is the becoming actual of an immanent – virtual – difference. This is because, in a Deleuzian ontology, whatever exists emerges from a self-differentiating transcendental field or a plane of immanence, which is also true of art.

(2) Forging alliances not only in between art-societies but also alliances that go beyond is or might be possible through the coming of a new, a new consciousness: It is the consciousness that the whole world is a minority on the face of the oppression of the majority (or the strong). This is a universal (but still not totalitarian) becoming, becoming-other: “*the entire world* is minority, potentially minority, as much as it deviates from this model” (Deleuze, 2000: 253), and becoming-minor or becoming-other is the process through which a previous majority rejects their privileged position (Bogue, 2005: 113).

(3) Finally, it can be said that all these views are Deleuze's expectation from an art yet to come just as from a society yet to come.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Akkın, İbrahim Okan
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 6 November 1982, Kütahya
Marital Status: Single
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	METU Philosophy	2011
BA	METU Philosophy	2007
High School	Kadir Has Anatolian High School, İstanbul	2000

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2010- Present	METU Department of Philosophy	Research Assistant
2009-2010	ARÜ	Research Assistant
2009-2009	Turkish American Association	English Teacher
2008-2009	HÜ Faculty of Communication	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Basic German

PUBLICATIONS

1. Akkın, İ. O. (2011). *Radical Democracy*. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.
2. Akkın, İ. O. (2016). Problematizing the problem of participation in art and politics. In F. Sidoti, M. Icbay and H. Arslan (Eds.). *Research on Cultural Studies*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 237-249.

Appendix B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET²⁵

OLUŞ SANAT(LAR)I: ÇAĞDAŞ POLİTİK SANATTA PERFORMATİF KARŞILAŞMALAR

1. Giriş

Bu tez, çağdaş sanattaki performatif karşılaşmaları Deleuze ve Guattari'nin 'oluş' kavramı aracılığıyla inceler ve bunları 'oluş sanat(lar)ı' biçiminde yeniden kavramsallaştırır. Oluş sanat(lar)ı birer temsil değil, farkın mevcudiyet (*presence*) kazandığı öncesiz ve sonrasız azınlıklaşma (*minoration*) süreçleri ve kaçış çizgilerinin katı noktalar içinde delikler açarak uçuşa geçtikleri yaratıcı düşünme modlarıdır.

Çalışmanın kuramsal boyutu bir taraftan Deleuze'ün Nietzsche okumasından hareketle Platon'un İdealizmini nasıl tersyüz ettiğini anlamak, diğer yandan Spinozacı bir içkinlik ontolojisinin kurulumuyla, Kartezyen zihin-beden ikiciliğinin yerine özne-öncesi yeğinliklerin (*intensities*) ve çokluğun (*multiplicity*) konulduğunu göstermektir. Deleuze'ün Spinoza ve Nietzsche okumaları sayesinde edilgin duyguların yerini özgürleştirici arzu tarafından üretilen bilinçdışı alırken, beden ve kuvvet kavramları da düşüncenin merkezine taşınır.

Leibniz okumasındaysa, sonsuz bir tekliğin kendi içinde kıvrımlar (*folds*) ya da yayılmalar (*unfoldings*) üreterek -yani devamlı farklılaşarak- çokluğu yarattığı bir sürecin, Deleuze tarafından 'içerinin' ve 'dışarının' birliği olarak tasarlandığı anlaşılır. Ayrıca tam algıdan (*apperception*) farklı olan bulanık algıların (*minute*

²⁵ Bu bölümdeki alıntılar tez yazarı tarafından Türkçe'ye çevrilmiştir ve kullanılan metinler tezin Kaynakça'sında yer alan İngilizce eserlerle aynıdır.

perceptions), Deleuze'ün estetik ve politik düşüncelerinde yer alan 'moleküler-oluş' nosyonuna aktarıldığını görürüz.

Denilebilir ki bu filozofların Deleuze tarafından nasıl alımlandığının ve kendi felsefesini onların kavramlarıyla nasıl desteklediğinin ortaya konulması işine, en az tezin özgün savlarının inşası kadar önemli bir yer verilmiştir. Çünkü Deleuze yaşamının ve eserlerinin büyük bir bölümünü bu felsefecilerin kavramlarıyla Batı metafiziğinin sorunlarına nasıl yaklaşıldığını ve düşünce ufkuımıza hangi yeniliklerin kazandırıldığını gösterme ve onları yeniden yorumlama uğraşına adanmıştır.

Kendimi [bir filozofa] ucube ama yine de onun olan bir çocuk verirken hayal ederdim. Çocuğun onun olması çok önemliydi çünkü [...] ona söylediğim her şeyi söylemiş olmak zorundaydı. Ancak ucube olması da bir gereklilikti, çünkü bana büyük zevk veren bütün o merkezden çıkışlara, sapmalara, kaymalara [...] katlanması gerekiyordu (Deleuze, 1977b: 117).

Öte yandan bu metin Deleuze ve Guattari'nin *Bin Yayla* kitabında savduklarına benzer bir yaklaşımla, çoklu çalışma alanlarının bir araya geldiği ortak bir problemler kümesini inceleme fikrini esas alınarak, disiplinler-arası bir tez şeklinde kurgulandı. Başka bir deyişle söz konusu düşünürlerin külliyyatından hareketle, bir 'Deleuze ve Guattari felsefesine giriş' metni olarak tasarlanmadı.

Çalışmanın disiplinler-arası niteliğini belirleyen, çağdaş sanatın tiyatro ve performans sanatı gibi bazı dalları ile literatürde 'felsefe-olmayan' (*non-philosophy*) diye adlandırılan bir düşünme tarzının öncülerinin bir araya getirilmesi oldu. Tezin özel olarak odaklandığı konunun bir ayağını oluş-sanat ilişkisi ve sanatta karşılaşmalar sorunu (izleyici - sanatçı - sanat eseri karşılaşması) teşkil ettiği için, performatif sanat dalları ve bu alanlardaki deneysel yaklaşımlar ön plana çıkartılırken sinema tezin bağlamı dışında bırakıldı. Aynı sebeple Deleuze'ün sinema hakkında kaleme aldığı iki eser olan *Hareket-İmge* ve *Zaman-İmge* metinlerine hiç başvurulmazken, sinemayla doğrudan ilişkili olan zaman kavrayışının temellerinin atıldığı *Bergsonculuk* kitabına da diğer kaynaklara

nazaran daha az yer verildi. Bu durumun en önemli nedeni tezde bilhassa sanatçının bedeninin sanat eserine dönüştüğü bir oluşun incelenmek istenmesi ve izleyicinin bu oluşla eş-zamanlı karşılaşması -hatta sürece dâhil olması- fikrinin, sinemayı kendiliğinden konu dışı bırakmasıydı. Deleuze'ün sinemaya dair düşüncelerinin hâlihazırda başka akademik çalışmalarda zaten incelenmiş olması, bu çalışmada sinemaya fazla değinilmemesinin bir başka nedeniydi.

Diğer taraftan, sanatçı-izleyici ilişkisinin incelemeye dâhil edilmediği durumlarda, yalnızca oluşları mevcut kıldıkları ölçüde; resim sanatından, edebiyattan ve sinemadan örneklere de yer verildi. Özellikle üçüncü bölümde, duyumsama teorisi neredeyse tamamen ressam Francis Bacon'ın çalışmaları aracılığıyla aktarıldı ve tezde kullanılan resimlerin çoğu Bacon'ın eserleri arasından seçildi. Son bölümde ise *Being Caribou* filmi oluş sanatlarına uygun bir çalışma olarak incelendi ancak, tezin bağlamı gereği, filmde ziyade ona konu olan 'hayvan-oluş deneyiminin' kendisine odaklanıldı ve söz konusu deneyim temsili olmayan bir siyaset yapma tarzının iyi bir örneği olarak değerlendirildi.

Tezde kullanılan felsefi terimlerin ve süreç ontolojisinin aktarımında daha çok Deleuze'ün tek başına yazdığı eserlerden yararlanılmış olmakla birlikte, bilhassa üçüncü bölümde, Guattari ile birlikte kaleme aldıkları metinlerin sonuncusu olan *Felsefe Nedir?*'e ve son bölümde *Bin Yayla*'ya sıkça atıf yapıldı. Guattari'nin tek başına yazdığı eserlere ise doğrudan başvurulmadı. Bu yönüyle tezin felsefi boyutu 'Deleuze estetiğinde oluş kavramının incelenmesi' şeklinde değerlendirilebilir.

Tezde bir araya getirilen temel fikirler ve bunların ışığında ortaya konulan özgün savlar ise şu şekilde sıralanabilir:

Deleuze'ün ontolojisinde tüm oluşlara 'kendinde-fark' (*difference-in-itself*) olarak tanımlanan bir değişmezlik içkinlik düzlemleri üzerinde sürekli olarak farklılaşması yol açar.

Guattari'yle birlikte kaleme aldıkları *Felsefe Nedir?*'de ortaya konulan tanıma göre, sanat ya da 'duyumsama yığılımları' herhangi bir nesne, özne ya da özelliğin birinden diğerine aktarılmasıyla ilgili olmayıp; taklit, temsil ve figüratif anlatıma ihtiyaç duymayan bir oluşun mevcudiyet kazanmasıdır. Söz konusu mevcudiyet duygulanımların ya da arzunun kesintisiz akışı olarak da anlaşılabilir ve duygulanımlar bir halden başka bir hale geçerken kişisizleşen özne ya da nesne değil, organsız bedenlerdir: "Organsız beden organlardan değil, organizmadan yoksundur" (FB 47).

Beden sürekli bir başkalaşım çizgisi boyunca hareket ederken ona etkiyen içkin kuvvetlerin tesiri altındadır ve bu dönüşüm gerçek olmayan bir ideanın somut bir nesneye aktarılması değil, gücül bir farkın edimsel bir farka dönüşmesidir. Başka bir deyişle, Deleuze felsefesinde gücül ve edimsel arasında bir gerçek/gerçek olmayan hiyerarşisi yoktur: "Gücül gerçeğin değil, edimselin karşıtıdır" (DR 208).

Sanat bir 'azınlık-oluş' ya da 'öteki-oluş' deneyimidir. Sanat aracılığıyla sanat çevrelerini de aşan düzlemlere uzanarak bunlar üzerinde ittifaklar kurmak, yeninin ya da yeni bir bilincin kazanılmasına bağlıdır. Söz konusu bilinç, 'kadın-oluş,' 'havyan-oluş,' 'moleküler-oluş' ve 'ayırt edilemez-oluş' şeklindeki bir oluş dizisi içinde azınlıklaşmaktan ve majör bir yapı olan erkeğin ya da güçlünün tahakkümü karşısında "tüm dünyanın bir azınlık olduğunun ya da potansiyel olarak azınlık olabileceğinin" bilincine varmaktan müteşekkildir (Deleuze, 2000: 253). Bu, evrensel ama totaliter olmayan bir bilinçtir ve Deleuze'ün sanattan beklentisi henüz olmayan bir toplumun böyle bir bilinçle gelmesidir.

Sanat, bir tür azınlık bilinci inşa ederek, Gücün ve sınırlı temsilin dışındaki bir alana ait oluşların imkânına işaret eder. "Sanat, sanat olmaktan çıkıp demagojik olmaya başlamadıkça, bir güç biçimi değildir" (Deleuze, 2000: 254).

Öteki-oluş ve azınlık-oluş "önceden çoğunluk olan bir grubun bu ayrıcalıklı konumunu reddettiği bir süreçtir" (Bogue, 2005: 113). Oluş sanatları da, birer öteki-oluş ve azınlık-oluş biçiminde ele alındıkları kerte, dolayimsız olarak politiktir.

Buna göre ‘politik sanat’ kavramı ‘oluş sanatları’ kavramıyla ikame edildiğinde, yaşam/sanat ve sanat/siyaset gibi ikili karşıtlıkların unsuru olmayan bir sanat fikriyatı içinden düşünmeye başlayabiliriz.

2. Sanat ve Yaşam

Tezin giriş bölümünde belirtildiği üzere, Deleuze ve Guattari felsefeyi bir kavram inşa etme işi olarak görürler. Problemlerin varlığı onların çözümünde ya da aydınlatılmalarında başvurulacak olan kavramların üretilmesini gerektirir. Başka türlü ifade edersek, yeni kavramların ortaya çıkışı onlarla ilişkili sorunların varlığının bir sonucudur.

“Oluş Sanat(lar)ı” başlıklı bu tezin ana teması açısından düşünüldüğünde ele alınması gereken problemler kümesi, çağdaş politik sanat tartışmalarında sıkça rastladığımız ikili zıtlıklardan meydana gelir: Yaşam/sanat, sanat/siyaset, seyirci/oyuncu, sanatçı/sanat eseri gibi karşıt konumlar ya da -daha genel anlamda- özne/nesne ikiliği. Örneğin, sanatçıyla eserin ilişkisi Aristotelesçi hilomorfik kuramda olduğu gibi, üretici olan aktif bir özne ile bu öznenin zihnindeki biçimleri üzerine aktardığı pasif hammaddenin zıtlığı biçiminde değerlendirildiğinde, özne/nesne ikiliği aşılamaz. Hâlbuki Deleuze ham haldeki maddenin de bir formunun olduğunu, ancak sanatçının hem maddede hem de kendi zihninde gücül olarak bulunan olası biçimleri sezerek -yalnızca bir aracı olarak- devreye girdiğini ve kendi bedenini maddeyle birlikte bir oluşa sokarak, yeninin doğuşuna olanak sağladığını savunur. Buna göre sanat eserinin bir yüzü özneye, diğer yüzüyse nesneye dönüktür ve ikisinin tınlaşımı öznenin sanat nesnesini belirlemesi değil; ikili bir oluşturma (FB 34).

Duyumsamayı veren ve alan hem özne hem de nesne olan aynı bedendir. Bir izleyici olarak Ben, duyumsamayı ancak resme girerek, yani duyumsamanın ve duyumsananın birliğine ulaşarak deneyimleyebilirim (FB 35).

Deleuze'ün burada savunduğu yaklaşım bir taraftan sanatçıyla sanat eserini, diğer yandan eserle izleyiciyi tek bir beden olarak düşünmemizi sağlar.

Performans sanatı izleyicinin sürece dâhil oluşunu radikalleştirilen girişimlerle doludur. Bu nedenle ikinci bölümün başında, izleyicilerin sanat olayını başlarına gelen bir şey gibi deneyimleyebildikleri bir performans olan *Rhythm 0*'ya değinildi.

Marina Abramović'in 1974 yılında gerçekleşen bu çalışmasında sanatçının bedeni katılımcıların tercihleri doğrultusunda değerlendirebilecekleri acı ya da haz verici bir dizi nesnenin kullanımına açık hale gelirken (Goldberg, 1988: 165), performans sanatının bir nevi sosyal deney niteliği kazandığı görülür. Abramović ve katılımcılar performans anında yaşayabilecekleri duyguları önceden sezemedikleri gibi, izleyici ve sanatçı pozisyonları da geçici olarak askıya alınmış olur (Demaria, 2004: 300). Bu durum sanat-yaşam ilişkisine dair belli başlı sorunların çarpıcı biçimde ortaya konulmasına olanak verdiği için, tezin girişten sonraki ilk bölümünde gündeme getirildi. Devamında performans sanatının temsilden uzaklaşan ve özgün oluşlara imkân veren deneyimler olarak okunduğu 'tiyatronun minörü' kavramsallaştırmasına geçildi. Aynı alt bölüm içinde deneyimlerin tekrarlanamaz oluşu meselesi Deleuze'ün 'farkın tekrarı' (*repetition of difference*) kavramıyla bağdaştırıldı:

Geri gelen aynı değildir, geri gelen benzer değildir; daha ziyade, Aynı olan geri gelenin dönüşüdür, - başka bir ifadeyle, Farkın dönüşüdür; benzer olan geri gelenin dönüşüdür, - başka bir ifadeyle, Benzemez olanın (DR 300-1).

Sanatçı Allan Kaprow'un happening'leri de yukarıda bahsedilen ayrımları aşındırmaya çalışan denemeler olarak, modern Avangart kapsamında ele alındı. Ancak örnekler üzerinde durulmak yerine, sanatçının kendi metinlerinde yer alan bir takım saptamaların konuyla ilişkisi belirtildi. Kaprow'a göre sanatta alışlageldik formlara başvurmayarak "yeni bir dilin kendi standartlarını" ortaya koymasına imkân verebiliriz: "İzin verelim de bu sanat 'kültür'ün dışındaki

türdeşlerinin farkına vararak sanat kategorisi içinde kendi yerini bulabilsin” (Kaprow, 2010: 720).

Bütün bunlar sanatta deneyselliğin ve performatif öğelerin önemini tartıştığımız yeni bir alt başlıkta bir araya getirildi. Sanatla ilişkili pozisyonların tartışılmasına ek olarak, sanat eserinin kültür endüstrisinin bir ürünü haline gelmesi bağlamında; metalaşma, galerilerin sanatçıların yapıp etmeleri üzerindeki belirleyici rolü ve sanatın kurumsallaşması problemleri de incelendi.

Adorno (2001) “Kültür Endüstrisini Yeniden Düşünmek” adlı makalesinde Horkheimer’la birlikte daha önce kullandıkları ‘kitle kültürü’ kavramının yerine ‘kültür endüstrisi’ kavramını koyduklarını belirtir. Çünkü “kültür kitlelerin kendilerinden spontane biçimde doğan bir olgu değildir” (98). Aksine, ‘popüler kültür’ ve ‘yüksek sanat,’ çağdaş sanat içinde her biri ayrı bir yere sahip olan iki olgudur. Popüler sanat devrimsel bir öneme sahipken, yüksek sanat da estetik dünyamızı geliştirmesi bakımından değerlidir (99). Kültür endüstrisi ise bu iki sanat formundan farklı olarak, insanlara ‘davranışları yönlendirilebilecek bir tüketiciler sürüsü’ olarak yaklaşır. Kültürel metalar içerikleri yönünden değil, sahip oldukları değişim değeri üzerinden değerlendirilirler; çünkü endüstri kültürel biçimlere bir kâr amacı aktarır ve sanat eseri bu yolla özerkliğini yitirir (Adorno, 2001: 99).

Sanat eserinin, sanatçının ve izleyicinin endüstri içindeki konumlarını sorgulaması bakımından; performans sanatı başından bu yana eleştirel bir niteliğe sahip olmuştur. Günümüzde pek çok sanat kolektifi, büyük finansörlerin güdümündeki galerilerin sahne arkasında dönen oyunları ve sanat eserinin içeriğine yapılan müdahalelerin nedeni olan güç ilişkilerini ifşa etmek amacıyla, yaratıcı protestolar düzenlemektedir. Bu eylemlerin bazıları kayda değer bir sanatsal nitelik taşısa da, sanatın araçsallaşması sorunu bağlamında, eleştirdikleri döngünün içinde hapsolme ihtimali taşırlar. Çünkü eleştirel amaçla yapılsa dahi, güç ilişkilerinin temsilinin sanatı bağımsızlaştırmaya yetmediğini görürüz.

Öte yandan sokak sanatı ve grafiti gibi eleştirel duruşlar, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin belirttiği gibi bir 'kök-sap' modeliyle yayılırlar. Tıpkı bir hayvan köksapı gibi (örneğin, karınca yuvaları) asla tam olarak yok olmazlar: Karıncalar bir şekilde "aradan geçen zamanı telafi eder ve [yuvanın] büyük bölümü yok olsa bile" yenisini kolaylıkla inşa edebilirler (ATP 9). Bu bakımdan belli sanat formlarının kültür endüstrisinin kodlamalarından kaçmak adına açabileceği delikler her zaman vardır. Son bölümde bu durum, siyasetin 'makro' ve 'mikro' unsurlarının eşzamanlı olarak var olması bağlamında açıklanır. "Her şey politiktir, ancak her siyaset aynı anda bir makro-politika ve mikro-politikadır" (ATP 213).

Deleuze'ün sanat kuramıyla oluş kavrayışını, temsili sanata alternatif olarak okuduğumuz bu tezin bir başka özel tartışması olan 'mimesis' ve politik sanat sorunu yine üçüncü bölümde ele alındı. Bu konuya değinirken, Platon'un mimesis eleştirisiyle, Aristoteles'in *Poetika*'sından yorumlanarak üretilen 'arındırma' (*katharsis*) kavramları bir arada düşünüldü. Ek olarak, yine Avangart sanat içinde değerlendirdiğimiz Bertolt Brecht'in *Gestus* terimi ile 'yabancılaştırma efekti,' izleyicide duygular uyandırılmasına (ya da sahnede yaratılan yanılsamalar aracılığıyla izleyicinin oyun karakterleriyle bir duygusal özdeşlik ilişkisi kurmasına) karşı geliştirilen teknikler olarak açıklığa kavuşturuldu (Brecht, 1974: 136). Brecht'in eleştirisinin nedeni olan, izleyiciyi seyrettiklerini entelektüel olarak yordamaya teşvik etme arzusu, çağdaş sanata damgasını vurmuş olsa da; bu konu son bölümde -Deleuze'ün temsili tiyatro eleştirisi kapsamında- tekrar ele alınacağı için, ikinci bölümde kısa tutulmuştur.

Son olarak, sanat ve siyaseti ortak bir eylem alanı olarak değerlendiren bir dizi yaklaşıma ve Sitüasyonizm'e yer verildi. Aslında bu hareketlerin politik sanata önemli katkıları olsa da, sanatçının belirleyici bir özne olarak ön plana çıkması ve sanatın çalışma sahasının otonom niteliğini yitirerek araçsallaşması gibi problemler bu örneklerin çoğunda tam olarak aşamadığı için, yeni bir kavrayışa ihtiyaç duyulduğu tespit edildi.

3. Deleuze'ün Duyumsama Kuramı, Arzu ve Duygulanım

Aslında Deleuze, Guattari ile birlikte *Felsefe Nedir?*'de ortaya koyduğu sanat tanımını daha önce, Bacon'ın triptiklerini ve portrelerini mercek altına aldığı *Duyumsamanın Mantığı*'nda savunmuştur. Bu nedenle, üçüncü bölümde ağırlıklı olarak Bacon'ın eserleri hakkında yapılan değerlendirmeler tartışılmıştır. Bir önceki bölümde bahsedildiği gibi; duyumsama (*sensation*), duygulanım (*affect*) ve algılam (*percept*); Deleuze'ün, bireyin temsil mekanizmasına -yani beyin dolayımıyla anlaşılma- ihtiyaç duymayan bir sanat tanımı ortaya koyarken başvurduğu kavramlardır. Resim bir 'duyumsama yığılması' olarak anlaşıldığında 'anlatı,' 'temsil' ve tamamlanmış bir bütünlük olan 'illüstrasyon,' yerini tuvalin üzerinde süregiden birer oluş halindeki figürlere bırakır. Figürlerin bu özelliği sanatın bütününe aktarılacak bir dizi kavramı incelemeye dâhil etmemize yol açar. Bunlardan biri 'kişisizleştirme'dir (*de-personalization*). Yüzü başın yararına bozmak, bir insanı bir hayvanla eşlemek ve iki figürü rezonansa sokmak bir yönüyle öznenin oluşmadığı bir tekilliğin ya da özgünlüğün ifadesidir (ATP 261). Bu yönüyle figürleri kişisizleştirmek, bedeni ve bedene etkileyen kuvvetleri görünür kılmak demektir. İnsanla hayvan ortak bir olguya -tekil bir oluşa- başladığında, algı algılam düzeyine taşınmış olur. Başka bir deyişle, bir öznenin psişik süreçleri olan algılardan ve duygulardan çıkılıp -Deleuze'ün ifadesiyle- bir "ayırt edilemezlik bölgesi"ne (*zone of un-decidability*) geçilir (WP 173). Burada bahsi geçen 'ayırt edilemezlik bölgesi,' *Bin Yayla*'da 'ayırt edilemez-oluş' ve 'moleküler-oluş' kavramlarıyla anlatılan daha genel bir oluş safhasının sanat özelindeki ifadesidir.

Deleuze ve Guattari'nin sanattan bahsederken kullandıkları terimleri başka yerlerde siyasi süreçleri betimlerken de kullanmaları, onların düşüncesinde sanat ve siyasetin iç içe olduğunun bir kanıtı olarak gösterilebilir. Aynı şekilde Bacon'ın resimlerine atıfla aktarılan fikirler, sanatın başka dallarında da geçerli olan saptamalardır. Haliyle, üçüncü bölümde yapılan incelemeler yalnızca resim sanatıyla ilgili olarak düşünülmemiş ve tez boyunca ele alınan tüm eserler benzer bir terminoloji vasıtasıyla okunmuştur.

Bahsi geçen kavramsallaştırmaların ışığında ‘oluş sanatları’ ya da temsili olmayan sanat, kültür endüstrisinin ürünlerine zıt olarak hali hazırdaki klişelere başvurmeyen ve sürekli yeninin önünü açan bir üretme biçimi olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bu bağlamda sanatta Aynı’nın tekrarı değil, farkın ya da sürekli olarak kendinden farklılaşmanın tekrarı söz konusudur. Bütün bunlar duygulanımların ve arzunun akışkan bir süreç olarak anlaşıldığı Spinoza felsefesiyle doğrudan ilişkilidir.

Deleuze’ün Spinoza okumasına göre ‘arzu’ ya da ‘duygulanım’ zihinsel durumlar olan duygulardan farklı olarak, kendinde haz ya da acı verici değildir. Arzu, bir eksikliğin giderilmesine dönük istençle aynı şey değildir: “Haz, acı ve bunlardan türeyen duygular, edilgin duygulardır” (Spinoza, 2002: 307). Arzu ise zihni ve bedeni daha aktif bir hale getiren ve bilinçdışını üreten içkin bir kuvvet gibi anlaşılmalıdır. Bu yönüyle Spinoza’nın ‘*conatus*’ kavramı her bedene etkiyen çok sayıda kuvvetin ya da ‘*affect*’in olumlayıcı ve aktive edici etkisini anlatır.

Oluşları kesintiye uğratmak ve süreçten haz ve acı gibi duygular çıkarmak, duraksız bir zaman olan ‘saf süreden’ bölünebilir zamana geçmek demektir ve arzu ancak bölünebilir zaman algısı içinde bir öznenin duygu durumlarıyla ya da ihtiyaçlarıyla bağdaştırılabilir. Sanatta ve tüm oluşlarda oluşu mümkün kılan şey ise daima ortada hareket eden, yani bir sonuca ulaşmayan ya da varlığa dönüşmeyen yeğinliklerin (*intensities*) etkileşimidir. Örneğin, Steve Paxton’ın ‘kontakt doğaçlama’ tekniğinde, dansçılar değme noktalarında bedenlerine etkiyen yer çekimi kuvvetinin onları dilediği gibi şekillendirmesine izin vermeyi öğrenirler. Başka bir deyişle dans figürlerini üreten, büyük ölçüde, bedenin kendisi ya da duygulanımlardır.

Üçüncü bölümün son kısmı olan Leibniz okumasında ise Deleuze’ün Leibniz felsefesinin özgün yönü olarak değerlendirdiği ‘yeter sebep ilkesi’ni ve bununla ilişkili diğer üç ilkeyi gördük.

Leibniz'in özdeşlik ilkesi yalnızca analitik önermelerle ilgilenmeyip, özel isimleri de kapsar (örneğin, Sokrates'in kavramı onu Sokrates yapan her şeyi içerir). Yeter sebep ilkesinin özgün yönü, nedensellik değil sebeplerle ilgilenmesidir (*TF* 41-2). Bunun anlamı bir varlığın kavramında onunla ilişkili tüm dünyanın içerilmesidir. Tekil bir varlığın oluşması birbiriyle bağlantılı sonsuz sayıda olayın -tüm sebepler kümesinin- bir araya gelmesine bağlıdır (*DR* 12) ve tüm dünya onun kavramında belli bir perspektife göre ifade edilir. Bu bireysel ifadeler 'bakış açısı' denilir. Deleuze 'gücül' (*virtual*) kavramını, Leibniz felsefesinde bakış açılarını oluşturan sonsuz küçüklükteki idealardan müteşekkil olan bu çokluğa karşılık gelecek şekilde tanımlar. Edimsel (*actual*) olan her şey ontolojik anlamda varlık olmayan bu çoklukların "gücül halden aktüel hale geçişinden" meydana gelir (*DR* 202, 207) ve tam algıdan farklı olan 'bulanık bilinç' de bu sonsuz küçüklüklerin açık ve seçik olmayan bir tarzda duyumsanması anlamına gelir. Sanatçının zihnini dolduran da bulanık algılardır (*minute perceptions*). Bu bakımdan, Deleuze'ün Leibniz okuması yeni bir estetik kavrayışa yön verir.

Leibniz felsefesinin bir başka önemli kavramı da 'kıvrım'dır. Deleuze bu kavram sayesinde evreni, kendi içine kıvrılarak çukurlar ve yüzeyler yaratan bir bütün olarak tasarlar. Bu yorumda kendinde-fark, sürekli farklılaşan bir dışarıdır ve içerisi dışarının içe kıvrılmasından oluşur (Deleuze, 2006: 96-7). Bu teklik, kıvrımlar oluşturabileceği gibi, açılıp genişleyebilir ya da yeniden içe kıvrılabilir. Bu noktada, Deleuze'ün "origami evren" benzetmesi (*TF* 18), kıvrımlardan oluşan beyin örneğiyle desteklenmiştir.

4. Deleuze'ün Nietzsche'si

Bu bölümde aktarıldığı üzere Nietzsche, Batı metafiziği eleştirisini soybilim ve olumlama yaklaşımlarıyla gerçekleştirir. Ayrıca bedeni ve tüm yaşama içkin güçler savaşımını, bilincin ve özne kavramının önüne koyar. Haliyle, Deleuze'ün Leibniz okumasından hareketle; bulanık ya da moleküler algılar ve kıvrım kavramları aracılığıyla betimlenen estetik yaklaşım, Nietzsche felsefesinde; yaşamın

olumlanması, bedenın yücetilmesi, bilinçdışının özerkliği ve ona etki eden Dionysosçu esriklik gibi temalarla zenginleşir.

Nietzsche’de ‘beden’ ve ‘bilinçdışı’ kavramlarına, ‘özne’ ve ‘öz-bilinçten’ daha büyük bir önem atfedilir. Beden, birbirini tahakküm altına almaya çalışan kuvvetlerin dur durak bilmeyen çekişmesinden oluşur. Öte yandan bilinci ve egoyu bedenden bağımsız düşünemeyiz. Deleuze’ün yorumuna göre bilinç, “derinlerde yatan ve bütünüyle ruhanilikten uzak ola güçlerin edimlerinin ve dönüşümlerinin neden olduğu” bir “semptomdur” (NP 39). Bu yüzden, hem bilinci hem de bedeni dinamik niceliklerle açıklamamız gerekir. Hatta Deleuze’e göre, “beden tüm spiritüel gelişimin yegâne faktörüdür” (39). Aynı şekilde Nietzsche: “Bilinç, dış dünyadan etkilenen egonun bir bölgesidir,” demiştir (aktaran Deleuze, 2002: 39). O halde beden, karşılıklı gerilime giren niceliksel çokluklardan yani kuvvetlerden oluşur: Özü birbirleriyle kurdukları ilişkilerden ve birbirleri üzerindeki “etkilerden” ibaret olan ve “tüm diğer dinamik niceliklerle gerilim ilişkisi içinde olan dinamik nicem” (WTP III 635). Bu açıklamalardan anlaşıldığı gibi, Nietzsche’nin beden görüşü Spinoza’nın devamı niteliğindedir. Ancak bedenın bir kuvvetler çokluğu olarak okunmasından doğan önemli sonuç, öznenin de beden tarafından üretildiğinin söylenmesidir. Özne ile beden arasında ontolojik bir ayırım yoktur (Z I). Bunun da ötesinde, Nietzsche felsefesinde, sanata yön veren bilinçdışını bilincin önüne koyan bir bakış açısı vardır. “Küçük aklımız” ya da “ruh” yalnızca bedenın bir enstrümanıdır (Z I 4).

Beden egoya “Şimdi acı hisset!” der. Sonra ego acı çeker ve nasıl olup da daha fazla acı çekmeyeceğini düşünür—ve aslında böyle *düşündürülmüştür*. Beden egoya, “Şimdi haz duy!” der. Sonra ego tatmin olur ve nasıl yeniden tatmin olabileceğini düşünür—ve aslında bu şekilde *düşündürülmüştür* (Z I 4).

Kısacası Nietzsche, edimlerimizle düşüncelerimiz arasında bir nedensellik ilişkisi kurmaz: Edimlerimizi belirleyen bedenın kendisidir.

Bu görüşlerin dışında, Nietzsche’de, ahlakçı dünya tasavvurunun karşısına konulan, estetik bir dünya görüşü buluruz. Dionysosçu yaşam formülü hayatı tüm acıları ve

cefasıyla olumlama fikrine dayanır. Trajik bilgeliğin önemi de burada yatar: “Trajik insan en ağır acıları bile olumlar: Yeterince güçlü, varsıl ve ilahlaştırılmaya muktedirdir” (*WTP IV 1052*).

Nietzsche'nin sembolizmi felsefe ve edebiyatın sınırlarında dolaşan sanatsal bir esrime olarak değerlendirilebilir. O, olguları yorumlamak ve değerlendirmek için şiire ve aforizmaya başvurur. Bu nedenle, tezde, nihilizmin aşılması sorunu; bir taraftan Nietzsche düşüncesinin bütünü içinde ve diğer yandan Theseus miti özelinde ve Deleuze'ün okumasına uygun olarak aktarmaya çalışılmıştır.

Nietzsche bölümündeki tüm açıklamalar kabaca farkın olumlanması fikrine hizmet ediyor denilebilir. Bu bölümde Deleuze ve Guattari'nin düşünceleriyle ilişkilendirebileceğimiz iki husus daha vardır: Öncelikle, Deleuze'ün ‘içkin-fark’ düşüncesi, Nietzsche'nin ‘bengi dönüş’ kuramının ‘farkın dönüşü’ olarak yorumlanmasından beslenir. Nietzsche felsefesindeki bengi-dönüş kavramı genellikle her şeyin olduğu gibi tekerrür edeceği şeklindeki bir döngü biçiminde ele alınır. Ona göre dünya “güçlerin oyunudur”: “Aynı anda bir ve çok; burada yükselirken, aynı anda şurada alçalan; çok uzun yıllar boyunca geriye doğru akan bir güçler denizidir” dünya (*WTP IV 1067*). Bir “hedefi” ya da “sonu” yoktur (1062): Varlığı ya da oluşu hiçbir zaman sona ermez (1066). Bu Dionysosçu dünya, kendini ebedi olarak yıkıp yeniden yaratarak olumlar ve güç istencinden “*başka bir şeyden ibaret değildir!*” (1067).

Deleuze ise Nietzsche'nin *Zerdüşt*'ünden hareketle; olumlanamayacak hiçbir şeyin zamanın döngüsü içinde varlık kazanamayacağını ve eleyici bir ilke olan bengi dönüşün yalnızca olumlanabilir şeyleri seçeceğini savunur. Bunun aksi Nietzsche felsefesine ters düşer. Başka türlü ifade edilirse, gerçek olumlama nihilist düşüncenin ürünlerini geri getirmez: Nietzsche'nin döngüsü oluşun döngüsüdür (*NP 24*). Bengi dönüş çokluğu olumlar ve onu varlığın tekelden kurtarır (*PI 85-6*); çünkü dönüş nihilizmin ilk adımı olan etkin güçlerin tepkisel güçlere dönüşmesiyle değil, ancak bunların yeniden etkinleşmesiyle başa döner. Bu yüzden tepkisel güçler varlık kazanamaz ya da kalıcı olamaz. “Bengi dönüş oluşun

varlığının olumlanmasıdır” ancak yalnızca olumlanabilir olan, yani etkin-güçler, döngü tarafından olumlanır (NP 68-72). Şöyle de ifade edilebilir: Dionysos’u yıkmayan felaketler onu daha da güçlendirir (*WTP* IV 1003).

Bengi-dönüş varlığın seçimi anlamına gelir [...] O, oluşun ürünüdür ama [...] etkin-oluşun ürünü: Dionysos’un ve Ariadne’nin çocuğu. Bengi-dönüşte varlık oluşa tabidir, ama oluşun varlığı tekil bir etkin-oluşa ait olmak zorundadır (NP 189-90).

Nietzsche felsefesiyle ilişkilendirilebilecek ikinci husus ise, psikanalizin ve Freudcu tutumun ‘arzu’ ve ‘bilinçdışı’ kavrayışlarına getirilen eleştiridir. Psikanaliz, egoyu tutarlı hale getirmek, adına arzuyu kısırlaştırmaya çalışır ve bilinçdışını bir yanılmalara yığın gibi görüp; onu, öznenin kaplaması gerektiği yeri işgal etmekle suçlar (*TRM* 80-1). Deleuze ve Guattari ise psikanalizin ‘Oidipus karmaşası’ yorumuna karşı, arzuyu; oluşun temelinde yatan, özgür ve yaratıcı bir güç olarak savunurlar. Daha da önemlisi, Nietzsche’nin ortaya attığı sanatçı eşittir sanatçının bedeni ve o da eşittir sanatçının bilinçdışı formülasyonunu benimserler. Bu da yola getirilmeye çalışılan arzuyu politik olarak kaçış çizgileri inşa eden ve ‘moler’ değil, ‘moleküler’ bir ‘çokluk’ biçiminde okuduğumuz son bölüme bizi taşıyacak olan görüştür. Ancak Nietzsche bölümünün son alt başlığı Deleuze’ün Platoncu İdealizmi tersyüz etme projesine ayrılmıştır.

Deleuze simulakrum kavramını Nietzsche’den devraldığı bu proje içerisinde inşa eder. Platon’un *Devlet*’inde simulakrum, formlar ya da İdealar olarak bilinen asıllarla kurdukları benzeşim ilişkisine göre derecelendirilen modellere nazaran, gerçeklikten büsbütün uzaklaşmış olan kopyalara (daha doğrusu, kopyaların kopyalarına) verilen addır. Örneğin, mağarada yanan ışığın etkisiyle heykellerden duvara yansıyan gölgeler birer simulakrumdur. Heykeller bunları yapan heykeltıraşın zihnindeki formların kusurlu taşıyıcılarıdır. Yine de bu kopyalarla formlar arasında bir benzerlik ilişkisi kurulabilir. Gölgeler ise ilk formlardan bütünüyle kopuk hale gelmiş birer taklittir. Platon’a göre sanatın her dalında taklit gerçeklikten en uzak olan şeydir. Bu nedenle yanılmalara üreten sanatçıların devletten sürülmeleri gerekir.

Deleuze ise simulakrumu kopyayla arasındaki benzerlik ilişkisi dolayısıyla değerlendirmek yerine, onu oluşturan ilkenin ‘içkin-fark’ olduğunu savunmuştur. Yani sanat eseri bir temsil değil, içkin farktan türeyen ve -aynıyla arasında kurulmaya çalışılan bir temsil ya da benzerlik ilişkisine gerek duyulmaksızın- “kendi başına ayakta duran” bir edimdir (WP 164). Simulakrumun modeli “ötekinin modelidir” (LS 258).

Bu değerlendirmenin ışığında görülür ki, Deleuze felsefesi Platon’dan bu yana Batı metafiziğinin seyrini belirleyen ‘özdeşliğe’ ve ‘hakikat arayışı’na karşı bir mücadele içindedir. Farkın ancak Aynı’nın ya da durağan olanın dolayımında kavranmaya çalışıldığı temsili düşünceye meydan okurken, Deleuze’ün en büyük ilham kaynağı bu mücadeleyi daha önce kendi üslubunda vermiş olan Nietzsche olmuştur.

5. Sonuç: Oluş(lar)ın Sanat(lar)ı

Tezin son bölümünde, ağırlıklı olarak, *Bin Yayla* kitabından yararlanıldı. Bu metin Deleuze’ün Guattari’yle birlikte kaleme aldığı en önemli eserlerden biridir: İçerdiği temaların, başka düzlemlerle kurulan ilişkilerin ve referansların çoğulluğuna ek olarak, ifade biçimiyle de, çokluğun yazıya dökülmüş hali gibi değerlendirilebilir. Ayrıca Deleuze’ün külliyatını yepyeni kavramlar içinde devindirerek politik gerçekliğe dokunması bakımından, diğer eserlerden farklılaşan bir yönü vardır. Burada ele alınan temel dert yine temsili düşünceyle mücadele ve oluşların özgürleşmesi sorunudur.

Temsil sorunu bu bölümde öncelikli olarak, Deleuze’ün *Fark ve Tekrar* kitabından hareketle, farkın ‘aynıdan fark’a indirgemesine neden olan düşünme biçiminin eleştirisi kapsamında incelenmiştir. Buna göre, “aşkınsal yanılsama” dört değişik formda karşımıza çıkar: “Özdeşlik,” “zıtlık,” “analoji” ve “benzerlik” (DR 265). Düşünen özne, farkı aynıyla karşılaştırır ve onu ‘kendinde fark’ olarak göremez.

Deleuze ise farkı özne-öncesi bir içkinlik ya da yeğlilik olarak tasarlar: Ona göre, oluş varlığını ‘fark’a borçludur ve ‘tekrar’ sürekli devinen farkın dönüşüdür.

Tezin merkezinde duran oluş kavramı son bölümde daha detaylı bir tanıma kavuşur. Bu bölümde oluş, ‘oluşun zamanı’ olarak da düşünebileceğimiz Deleuze’ün zaman kavrayışı içinde ele alınır.

Deleuze Antik Yunan’a referansla, *Aion* ve *Kronos* adlı iki tür zaman kavrayışını birbirinden ayırır. Kronos bir ardışıklık olarak düşündüğümüz bölünmüş zaman algısını betimlerken, Aion saf süreye karşılık gelir. Kendinde-fark bize şimdide süregelen geçmişin içeriğini verir ve oluş aynı anda her iki yöne doğru bir değişim demektir. Yani bir taraftan geçmişe göre farklılaşan gelecek, diğer yandan geleceğe göre farklılaşan geçmiş. Süre bunların her ikisini de içeren, başlangıcın ve sonun ortasında hareket eden, bir akış ya da oluşun zamanıdır: “Her ne kadar sonsuz edimsel akış olsa da [...] zorunlu olarak aynı gücül bütünden pay alan bir tek zaman vardır” (B 82). Oluş, “farkın zamanda ve zaman olarak açılmasıdır” ve Deleuze süreyi henüz “özellikli bir şeye” dönüşmemiş olan, ama her bir şeyin kendinden türediği “kaos” biçiminde tasarlar (May, 2003: 147). Kaosun gücül bir ‘çokluk’ biçiminde düşünülmesi, Deleuze’ün Spinoza yorumundan türeyen içkinlik ontolojisiyle yakından ilişkilidir. Bu yoruma göre Spinoza felsefesinde bedenler organlardan ya da atomlardan değil, yeğliliklerin (ya da duygulanımların) aralarındaki ilişkilerden oluşur. Bir bedenin “uzamsal parçalarını” devindiren “hareket ve durağanlık, hız ve yavaşlık ilişkilerinin” toplamıdır (ATP 256-7). Bütün bunlar oluşu, moleküler düzeydeki öznel olmayan ilişkilerin ya da sürekli devinim halindeki farkın meydana getirdiğini gösterir.

Oluşlar birer taklit değil özgünlüktür. İnsan-merkezci bilim anlayışı (örneğin, psikanaliz ve lineer evrim) yaşamı genellikle insan ya da erkek dolayısıyla anlamaya çalışır. İnsan - hayvan, erkek - kadın, insan ve evren gibi (ATP 235). Deleuze ve Guattari’ye göre “erkek-oluş” diye bir şey yoktur; çünkü onların eleştirdiği çoğunlukçu düzende erkek zaten en mükemmel “moler” varlıktır (291) ve mesele bu yapıyı çokluğun yararına oluşa sokmaktır.

Deleuze, Carmelo Bene'nin oyunları üzerine yaptığı incelemede, toplumsal dönüşüme ilişkin beklentilerini tiyatrodaki uygulanan azınlıklaştırma operasyonları aracılığıyla anlatır. Bene, kendi deneysel tiyatrosunda, Shakespeare eserlerinde güç ilişkilerinin temsilcisi olan oyun karakterlerini ampute ederek ya da onları varyasyona sokarak, tiyatroyu azınlıklaştırmaya çalışır. Yazarın oyunda olup biten her şeyi baştan sona bilen bir 'otorite' olmaktan çıkıp, bir operatöre dönüşmesi, sahnede doğaçlamaya ve ön görülemez gelişmelerin doğuşuna fırsat verilmesi, kullanılan dilin bükülmesi gibi çeşitli yöntemlerle; tiyatro bir temsil sanatı olmaktan sıyrılıp, bir oluş sanatına dönüşebilir. Bütün bunlar kesinlikle bir tiyatro karşıtlığı değildir. Aksine, tiyatronun performatif yönünü ön plana çıkartmak, onu azınlıklaştırmak ve araçsallaştırmaktan kurtarmak anlamına gelir. Ancak azınlıklaşma meselesi siyasetle doğrudan ilişkili olduğu için, *Bin Yayla*'nın hem oluşlar hakkındaki bölümünde hem de 'mikro-politika' ve 'bölümlenme' (*segmentarity*) sorununun tartışıldığı kısımda yeniden gündeme gelir.

Bu nedenle son bölümde politik açıdan önem kazanan tartışma, merkeziyetçi toplumlarda devlet aygıtının kitlelerle ya da çoklukla tınlaşımaya girerek yarattığı sekmeler sorunudur. Çokluğun hayatı katı çizgiler tarafından organize edilip, makro ölçekli şemalara uydurulmaya çalışıldıkça, özgünlükler (*haecceity*) normalleşir ve katılaşır.

Merkeziyetçi toplum yapısının katı bölümlenmeleri uçuşan çoklukları sürekli olarak 'yerli-yurtlulaştırma'ya zorlarken, çokluğun onu sabitlemeye çalışan bu noktalara bağlanmadan kaçış çizgileri üzerinde ilerlemesi politik kodların çözülmesi anlamına gelir. Yerli-yurtlulaştırma (*re-territorialization*) ve yersiz-yurtsuzlaşma (*de-territorialization*) birbirinden ayrı düşünülemez bir döngü gibidir. Katı bölümlenmeler devamlı olarak çokluğu kodlamaya çalışırken (örneğin, kilisenin günahları tasnif etmesi ya da ceza infaz kurumlarının işleyişinde olduğu gibi), bir şeyler daima kaçır (günah işleyen ya da suç işleyen insanlar her zaman vardır) (*ATP* 218). Kısacası, yerli-yurtlulaştırma kurumlar ve aygıtları aracılığıyla belli bir toplumsal alanı kodlamak (*overcoding*) ve bölümlenmek anlamına gelirken,

yetersiz-yurtsuzlaştırma da çokluğun bu kodları deşifre etmesi (*decoding*) ve o alanı içeriden dönüştürmesidir.

Nokta yerine çizgi oluş, molar yerine moleküler oluş, adam yerine kadın oluş, insan yerine hayvan oluş gibi süreçlerin bütünü bu tezde yapılan okumaya göre birer 'öteki-oluş' ya da 'azınlık-oluş' kapsamına girer. Oluş sanatları da arzunun kaçışını sanat deneyimi içinde mümkün kılmaları bakımından politik içeriklidir. Bu kavramların gündelik yaşamda karşılık gelebileceği bir durumu anlatması bakımından tezin sonunda Leanne Allison ve Karsten Heuer'in ren geyiği-oluş deneyimlerini konu alan *Being Caribou* filmine yer verilmiştir.

Alaska Kutup Bölgesi Doğal Koruma Alanı (AANWR) ren geyiklerinin, boz ayıların ve daha birçok türün doğal yaşam alanıdır. Ancak Bush yönetimi doksanlı yıllarda bu bölgeyi petrol araştırmalarına açmak adına tehlikeli bir siyasi süreç başlatmıştır. Medya başlangıçta bu durumu tipik bir kalkınma - koruma karşıtlığı olarak aktarsa da, bölgede petrol çıkartılmasının bu habitatın yerlileri olan insan ve hayvan türleri için geri dönüşü olmayan sonuçları vardır.

Bu durumun ifade edilmesinde uzman değerlendirmelerinin ve sayısal analizlerin ne kadar yetersiz kaldığını fark eden Heuer ve Allison, artık binlerce yıllık göç sahaları tehdit altında olan ren geyiklerinin ve diğer türlerin sesi olmak ve olayı bir de onların dilinden anlatabilmek adına zorlu bir yolculuğa çıkmaya karar verirler. Amaçları Alaska Kutup Bölgesi'ne bir inceleme ekibi olarak gitmek değil, ren geyiklerinin yıllık göç döngüsünü bu hayvanlarla birlikte ren geyiği olarak deneyimlemektir. Başka bir deyişle ren geyikleri gibi hissedip, onlar gibi düşünecek ve onlarla aynı ortamda yaşayıp, karşı karşıya geldikleri tehlikeyi yine bu hayvanların gözünden izlemeye çalışacaklardır.

Beş ay boyunca ren geyikleriyle birlikte göç ederken, insansal zaman algılarını yitirirler. Sürekli bir açlığın ve uykusuzluğun neden olduğu halsizlik ve baş dönmelerine, hayvanların o anki konumlarına ilişkin net görüntülerden oluşan

şamanik rüyalar eşlik etmeye başlar. Bütün bunlar hayvan-oluş deneyimlerinin yalnızca dilsel olarak ifade edilebilen yönleridir.

Yolculuğun sonunda topladıkları görüntülerden ve günlük notlarından derledikleri bir raporla Beyaz Saray'a giderler. Ancak, ilk elden yaşadıkları hayvan-oluş deneyiminin temsili siyaset mekanizmasına aktarılmaz niteliği yüzünden büyük bir hayal kırıklığına uğrarlar. Öte yandan bu durum tezde Deleuze ve Guattari'nin savunduğu 'devrimsel-oluş' bağlamında ele alındığında, kesinlikle bir olumsuzlama gibi görülmemelidir. Yani Allison'ın ve Heuer'in deneyimi, yaşamın ve farkın olumlanması olgusuna mükemmel bir örnektir. Katı bölümlenmelerin çokluğu yerli-yurtlulaştırma çabasına karşı insanlıkla hayvanlığın sınırındaki bir ayırt-edilmezlik bölgesine geçiş yapan çift, bütün bir ekosistemle kurdukları ilişki sayesinde, siyaset yapmanın temsili olmayan alternatiflerine ışık tutmuştur.

Allison'ın yolculuk esnasında topladığı görüntülerden kurgulanan film ve Heuer'in bu göç deneyimi hakkında yazdığı kitap birer sanat eseri olarak elbette değerlidir, fakat asıl önemli olan, ren geyikleriyle birlikte çıktıkları bu yolculuğun kendisinin bu tezde savunulan türden bir 'oluş sanatı' olmasıdır. Temsil mekanizmasıyla yüzleşmelerinden bağımsız olarak; hayvan-oluş, azınlık-oluş ya da öteki-oluş kendinde politik birer edimdir.

Özet olarak, bu tezde Deleuze'ün içkinlik felsefesinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olan 'oluş' teriminden hareketle, 'politik sanat' kavramı 'oluş sanat(lar)ı' kavramıyla ikame edilmeye çalışılmıştır. 'Politik sanat' bizi sanat/siyaset, yaşam/sanat gibi ayrımlar üzerinden düşünmeye zorlayan bir kavramsallaştırmayken; Deleuze ve Guattari'nin oluş kavramı kendiliğinden politiktir.

Deleuze ve Guattari'ye göre felsefe bir kavram üretme işidir ve kavramlar bir düşünme alanına içerik veren problemler tarafından gerektirilirler. Bu tezin temel bağlamı açısından düşünüldüğünde, söz konusu problemler bir taraftan sanat/siyaset, sanat/yaşam gibi ayrımların sınıryken; diğer yandan özne/nesne, izleyici/izlenilen, sanatçı/sanat eseri gibi ikili pozisyonların aşındırılmasıdır.

Deneysel tiyatro, performans sanatı ve happening'ler gibi denemelerde yapılmaya çalışılan da temel olarak bahsi geçen zıtlıkların aşılmasıdır. Bir taraftan da kültür endüstrisi içinde sanatın yeri, metalaşması ve kurumsallaşması gibi sorunlar ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca Platon'un mimesis kavramı ve Aristoteles'e atfedilen *katharsis* kavramı üzerinden temsil, taklit, izleyicide duygu uyandırma gibi mefhumların sorunlu yönlerine işaret edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde, *Felsefe Nedir?* ve *Duyumsamanın Mantiği* kitaplarından hareketle ressam Francis Bacon'ın eserlerinde temsile ihtiyaç duymayan bir duyumsamalar serisi olarak sanat kuramı açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu kuramın olguları açıklamasını sağlayan bir dizi başka kavrama başvurduğu görülmüştür. Bunlar 'öteki-oluş,' 'hayvan-oluş,' 'kişisizleştirme,' 'tınlaşım,' 'kuvvetlerin görünür kılınması' ve 'organsız bedenler'dir.

Ayrıca, Deleuze'ün estetik teorisi, Spinoza'nın duygulanım kuramıyla, Leibniz'in 'kıvrım' kavramıyla ve Nietzsche'nin 'güç istenci,' 'olumlama' ve öznenin yerini bilinçdışının ya da Dionysosçu esriğin aldığı bir sanat anlayışıyla iç içe geçmiştir. Haliyle, bütün bunlar tezin mercek altına aldığı diğer başlıklar olmuştur.

Tezde yapılan tüm incelemelerin ışığında, oluş ve siyaset arasında var olduğu iddia edilen dolaylı ilişki açığa çıkartılmış ve 'oluş sanatları' adını verdiğimiz bir yaratım modelinin Deleuze ve Guattari'nin felsefesinden doğal yolla türediği gösterilmiştir.

Sanat eserini entelektüel olarak yorumlayıp, dilsel ifadelerle indirgemek yerine; sanata içkin olan felsefenin ön plana çıkartılmasını dert edinmesi bakımından, bu tezde ortaya konan yaklaşım; bir sanat felsefesi üretmekten ziyade, estetik bir dünya görüşünün savunulmasıdır.

Appendix C: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Akkın

Adı : İbrahim Okan

Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Art(s) of Becoming: Performative Encounters in Contemporary Political Art

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: