

INDEBTMENT AS POWER APPARATUS

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **INDEBTMENT AS POWER APPARATUS**

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The thesis analyzes the constitution of indebted subject from the perspective of Michel Foucault's conceptualization of power. The peculiarity of Foucauldian subjectification and power analyses is the action-centric comprehension of the processes. In literature, interpretation of Foucault is mostly accompanied with cultural or sexual subjectivity. Herein, through the definition of materialism, Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Karl Marx are used for the exposition of non-cultural and material subjectivity. This subjectivity is about indebted subjects. Ontological and epistemological statements on the indebtedment and indebted subject are not enough for defining the operation of indebtedment as power apparatus. That is why, the main theme of this text goes beyond the theoretical basis. History of indebtedment, discontinuities between various periods, and the present situation of material indebtedment is also attempted to be exposed. Text's main purpose pursues that, through the exposition of how indebtedment operates, how possible resistance against the fate of indebted subject can be constituted in everyday life struggle.

**Keywords:** Indebtment, Foucault, Power, Action, Materialism.

## ÖZ

### BİR İKTİDAR AYGITI OLARAK BORÇLANDIRMA

Kabalay, Berkay

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Bu tez borçlandırılmış öznenin kuruluşunu Michel Foucault'nun iktidar kavramsallaştırması perspektifi üzerinden incelemektedir. Foucaultcu özneleşme ve iktidar analizlerinin biricikliği eylem-merkezli bir işleyiş üstünedir. Literatürde, Foucault'nun bu şekilde yorumlanması, çoğu zaman, kültürel ve cinsel öznelliklerle beraber gitmiştir. Burada, materyalizm tanımı üzerinden, Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche ve Karl Marx kültürel olmayan ve maddi özneliğin açığa çıkarılması için kullanılmıştır. Bu öznellik borçlandırılmış özne hakkındadır. Borçlandırma ve borçlandırılmış özne üstüne olan ontolojik ve epistemolojik açıklamalar, borçlandırmanın bir iktidar aygıtı olarak nasıl işlediğini açıklamak için yeterli değildir. Bu sebeple, bu metnin ana izleği teorik bir temelin ötesine geçer. Yani aynı zamanda borçlandırmanın tarihi, farklı dönemler arasındaki süreksizlikler ve maddi borçlandırmanın güncel durumu da açığa çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Metnin ana amacı ise, borçlandırmanın işleyişini ifşa etme üzerinden, günlük hayatta borçlandırılmış öznenin kaderine nasıl direnilebileceğine ilişkin bir başlangıç oluşturmayı umar.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Borçlandırma, Foucault, İktidar, Eylem, Materyalizm.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In everyday life, being indebted has always been accompanied with a necessity against the lender. From a moral or quantitative perspective, the political function of this necessity becomes covered. This is because, the bond in which emerges with this necessity can help to constitute a compassionate union between various people. Family, love, friendship, and community can be the example of this type of union. On the other hand, quantitative perspective, by reducing the relations into numbers and data, ignores the experience of the indebted subject. The debt-relation becomes nothing but simple transaction of the numbers.

Hence understanding the political effects of indebtment should not be based on these two positions. Instead, it should refer to compulsion, consent, struggle, and sanction. In this text, I am trying to expose the political characteristic of indebtment. I believe that, the nodal point of the current flow of the capital and neo-liberal policies rely on the concept of indebtment. Namely, capitalism today expresses itself through debt, debtor, and lender. Subjects are subjected through this realization of the capital. Thus indebtment is a central notion for understanding the domination of and resistance against capitalism today. Main problems and questions of this text are based on this practical attitude. How indebtment operates? How the reproduction of indebtment as power apparatus is ensured? What are the discontinuities in the history of indebtment and what is the main characteristic of the debt today? These are main questions which this text attempts to answer.

For the discussion of these questions, text is separated into two chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 2: The Concept of Power) starts with the ontological and epistemological bases of the text. Michel Foucault's interpretation of power is the

foundation of these statements. That is why, firstly, I am starting with the criticism of power as privilege. On the other hand, through Foucauldian theory, power is defined with actions, processes, and operations. The historical shift towards the latter definition of power can be seen in the theoretical fracture in which Foucault has been located. For defining this fracture, I tried to show what is not (Section 2.1: The Theoretical Fracture). Two methodologies for referencing power are criticized for this negative definition of the power. These are agent-based and structure-based methodologies. This criticism stems from the definition of materialism within this text. This is because, both of agent and structure are used as a unhistorical explanations. Against the dichotomy between these two notions, Foucauldian theory replaces actions (Section 2.2: Peculiarities of Foucauldian Theory). In this situation action becomes the center concept for defining social and political interactions. Whole narration can be told through the operation of action. Thus, there are not actions between various realities, instead there are realities in which actions flow through. Centering action within the theoretical sphere makes the notion of agent and structure inadequate. That is why, substitution of these concepts are necessary. Actually Foucault gives the replacement of the agent as the subject. However, which reality will replace the structure is absent. That is why, through the reference to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Maurizio Lazzarato's notion of social machine is used instead of structure. Machine and subject refers that, beings are not prior to the action. There are neither machines nor subjects before the action. Instead, actions constitute them through its operation. Such an understanding helps us to overcome logocentric and unhistorical imagination of the social and political theory.

By the definition of power through action, the history of indebtment is investigated within the lens of action in the third section (Section 2.3: An Example of Subject: Indebted Subject). By the help of anthropological researches, this section starts with the questions of 'what are the main approaches on the reality of debt', 'what is money', and 'the relation between slavery and indebted subject' are discussed. However, history of the indebtment is not only about Ancient ages. As it is said, our problematization is also about the contemporary reality of the indebtment. That is why, I am referring three important discontinuities from the Ancient ages in the

problematization of debt, debtor, and lender. These are birth of biopolitics in late-18<sup>th</sup> century, appearance of welfare state in early-20<sup>th</sup> century, and neoliberal hegemony after 1970s. In this section, only the problems such as liberal governmentality, market, civil society, and biopolitics are discussed in a way in which how they affected the discontinuity on the indebtedment.

Second chapter (Chapter 3: The Phenomenon of Indebtedment in Present) starts with the theoretical link between Kantian and Foucauldian presents and between Marxian and Foucauldian materialisms. Thus, by the general form of the materialism, this introduction encloses the similarities between Foucault, Nietzsche, and Marx. After these theoretical statements, for analytical purposes, indebtedment in present is divided into two phenomena: On the one hand economic indebtedment and on the other hand cultural indebtedment. In the first section, the economic indebtedment is investigated (Section 3.1: Economic Indebtedment). Herein, I am completing the discontinuities within the history of indebtedment through referencing welfare state and neoliberalism. Also contemporary debt-situation in world and Turkey also is interpreted for how indebtedment operates in present. In the second section cultural indebtedment is exposed through referencing the difference of Nietzschean eternal debt and other primordial debt theories (Section 3.2: Cultural Indebtedment). By this distinction, I tried to underline how particular morality is developed for ensuring the reproduction of debt-relations. Hence, this distinction, also, refers to the differentiation of ethics from morality as well.

This text's premises reject any dictation of policies for overcoming the debt-machines. This is because, it does not recognize the 'intellectual's capability to declare absolute truth on a problem. However, even though there is not a direct action agenda, text's goal is about the creation of counter-movement against the domination of the lender. I hope that, the reality of this text will open a path for further practical and theoretical engagements.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONCEPT OF POWER

It could be argued that the concept of power is the central conundrum in the political science. Even though it seems like a clear concept, there are enormous debates on what it is, from which sources it emerges, and how it is practiced. From Ancient Greece to Marxism and from scholasticism to liberalism we have been encountered with these debates. This chapter will focus on the debates on power from the viewpoint of Foucault.

There is a strong tendency towards the conceptualization of power through possession which is also related with party programs<sup>1</sup> (see Rose, 1996: 37). For instance anarchist and Marxist debates on the problem of state (Newman, 2001: 77) or Weber's reference to the state's monopoly on force (Weber, 2007: 38-40) are remarks of how strong this tendency is. Even its etymological root, *potestas*, had referred to the privilege of the magistrates in Ancient Rome (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 376). Only those who had articulated to the state had possessed the power. This understanding of power has been maintained in modern era. Besides the mentioned names (anarchists, Marx, and Weber), it can be traced among liberal stream of the contract thinkers as well (Lemke, 2002: 51). Moreover, everyday life is not exempted from this tendency. When one utters the power, it refers the ruling party or leader that had come *into* power. In other words, power is related with the possession of a location. This location is not void, in which any possibilities could proliferate. On the contrary, it is always pre-determined.

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<sup>1</sup> This text is not about the historical adventure of the concept of power or interpretation of conventional understanding of power. The concept of power in this chapter is used for crystallization of ontological, epistemological, and methodological background of text through Foucauldian theory. Instead of the history of power, my main question is on the characteristics of Foucauldian interpretation of power. Thus, conventional understanding of power will only be briefly schematized.

The main problem with this approach is the power's dependency to the concept of state<sup>2</sup>. Another problem comes out with the definition of the state. Has it been still with the first dawn of societies? Even, etymologically, the concept of 'state' has been in circulation since the end of medieval era (d'Entrèves, 1967). Thus, without any further explanation, it is hard to extend the state to the whole history of humanity. Even though Weberian interpretation of state can be limited with bureaucratic mechanism, we can extend the examples of state towards pre-modern eras (proto-bureaucratic mechanisms). Connately Foucault states that big armies, justice apparatuses, and bureaucracy can be traced back before 16<sup>th</sup> century too<sup>3</sup> (Foucault, 2009: 247). However this conceptualization is always accompanied with the state's central and privileged role on possession of power<sup>4</sup>. Hence, with the definition above, the concept of power is limited to the definite political institutions (Foucault, 2001d: 123). It is possible to criticize these statements by marking the concept of *patria potestas*<sup>5</sup>. This concept remarks that, power was not limited with 'state' in Ancient Rome. It could be found within the family too (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 108 and Graeber, 2011: 201). Moreover Marxist theory, as an instance of power through possession, also stresses the power in the private life. For avoiding these criticisms, the definition of state has to be extended. According to Pierre Clastres, the state can be defined as a distinction between the ruler and the ruled (Clastres, 1989). Then, when the power through possession is related with the state it refers more than political, territorial, and executive institution. It contains all of those which contain any hierarchical schema. Hence the concept of state in this text describes unidirectional and from-top-to-down practice of power (May, 1994). Therefore one may call this is not even a practice of power; but rather a practice of domination.

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<sup>2</sup> State is used as the major example of a pre-determined location.

<sup>3</sup> Foucault underlines a discontinuity on understanding of state since 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries. This discontinuity will be elaborated within the discussion of *raison d'état* later.

<sup>4</sup> Weber's reference to modern-state as the sole example of monopoly on force is not related with this statement. This is because; a manor and its lord have the proto-bureaucratic mechanisms. Hence within the boundaries of fief the state (manor or lord) has still have privilege on the power.

<sup>5</sup> Mot-a-mot translation of this Latin concept is the power of the father. It refers to the father's power on his household.

It is possible to define this type of power by considering together both possession and state: power as privilege. Privilege refers on the one hand to the specificity of an institution or person, and on the other hand the possession of a place. Eventually, criticisms towards the power as privilege can be summarized with two elements: its limitation of the space of power and its unidirectional practice. The former simply refers to ignoring the power in some social situations. This error has been partly avoided above<sup>6</sup>. However for stressing this error, Foucault differentiates a specific type of space: *milieu*. The concept of milieu is borrowed from biology and history of science (especially through the influences of Georges Canguilhem). It is defined with uncertainty and non-hierarchical positioning (Foucault, 2009: 20). Thus the content, characteristics, and ‘coordinate’ of the space of power are not predetermined. For instance fetishizing of voting process and parliaments is an example of this tendency. When the location of power is limited to the parliament and this space is specified by the election of the selected (voting processes), the rules and participants of the power has become predetermined. On the other hand the latter stems from the first one. This is because unidirectional practice necessitates pre-determined locations and rules. The power as privilege transforms the object of power into automaton. It becomes a puppet within the hands of the privileged. From an historical perspective, it has no significance for the privileged as a rock in Vesuvius for the people of Pompeii; except unconventional ‘incidents’<sup>7</sup>. Then the object of power has no role in society; it is only affected. For instance the figure of God is an obvious figure of the power as privilege. Man has impact on neither God nor the world that is shaped by God. It simply obeys. Another example can be found in the definition of nation or state in totalitarian regimes. One simply has no significance against it. Eventually with the

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<sup>6</sup> Reference to the *patria potestas* and the etymological emergence of the concept of state are both counter-claims against this criticism.

<sup>7</sup> The Roman city of Pompeii had been built in the foothills of Vesuvius volcano. Probably volcano as a whole had played important role in everyday life of Pompeii. However, single rocks had showed their significance only as ashes and rock shots when it had erupted in 79 AD.



unidirectional practice of the power as privilege, the society has been defined as if it consists of masters and slaves<sup>8</sup>.

To what extent the ineffectiveness of the objects of power is valid in historical situation? At first glance it is true that there was (or has been) historical existence of slavery. However, had the historical realization of this society consist of the power as privilege? For instance according to Croix, the class wars in Ancient Greek world can be conceptualized as the wars between citizens and slaves (De Ste. Croix, 1981). Then even in a slave society there was reciprocal interactions. Namely material reality of the slavery is not as passive as the theoretical conceptualization of constant dependent slave. Moreover is it possible to believe today the citizens have not any possibility to affect nations-states? Is it necessary to seize any position for constituting a relation with the institutions? If these answers are negative then power as privilege is based on nothing but hypothetical situation.

The non-historical quality of the power as privilege pushes towards a new conceptualization of power. I believe that, Foucault's conceptualization of power has this capacity. Contrary to power as privilege, this type of power can be conceptualized as the power as action. There is also a theoretical reason behind the usage of the concept of action. It is for avoidance of any implication of agent and of structure. In this chapter, I will firstly start with Foucault's theoretical position. Secondly I will try to show the Foucauldian alternative to structure and agent for showing the theoretical possibility of power as action. Lastly, an historical instance of subject, debtor, will be explained.

## **2.1 The Theoretical Fracture**

Locating the Foucault's theoretical position is the main attempt of this section. This attempt is also related with the question of how Foucault has been interpreted. Criticisms towards the power as privilege are also related with this text's ontological

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<sup>8</sup> However this statement does not refer either Hegel or Nietzsche. It only stresses the dependence of the latter to the former.

background. There are neither things as such nor unidirectional relations. Rather there is reciprocal relationality. Likewise, statements are related with each other too (i.e. Foucault, 1998d: 304). Then it is impossible to locate Foucault without finding out what he is against and what his roots are.

Some theoreticians define Foucault as postmodern (Best and Kellner, 1991) or poststructuralist (May, 2006 and Newman, 2001); others as conservative (Habermas, 1990 and Best and Kellner, 1991: 69), structuralist (Piaget, 1970 and Pettit, 1977), or the last barrage of bourgeoisie (Sartre, 1966). Apparently the former classifications are more common. What is the meaning of these positions? First of all, it is quite hard to define postmodernism, poststructuralism, or even structuralism without reference to couple of names (Descombes, 1998: 77). There are similarities but also considerable amount of dissimilarities between those names such as Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, and so on. Then these positions can be conceptualized as if they are umbrella concepts. There is no theoretical unity within them. However, this statement is not a total rejection of the usage of these positions. In the end, it is possible to assert that there are common attitudes, such as criticism of entity-centric point of views, myth of progress, universal emancipation, and so on. However, in this text I will locate Foucault by referencing not to any of these positions. Rather, he will be located by his rejection of agent and structure (Springer, 2012: 140). This is because, labeling Foucault within a term (poststructuralism or postmodernism) will modify his position as a meta-narrative. Thus the eclectic character of Foucauldian problematization will become ignored. Foucault's differentiation from agent-based and structure-based theorizations will open space for action-based theory.

Before advancing the criticism of agent and structure, I have to mention the location of Foucault's rejection of these two concepts. Agency and structure has been conceptualized as entities in political science and sociology (Game, 1998: 57). Even before the age of Machiavelli and of Comte, or the genesis of these two 'sciences', there had been this entity-based conceptualization of society. However, it is possible to set a major discontinuity in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. This discontinuity manifested itself with an emergence of a theoretical crisis. This crisis can be identified with the loss of faith to universal concepts. Megill (1987) sets the beginning as Nietzsche or

Berlin (1999) as German Romanticism's response towards this crisis. However, by referring to mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, I am in fact stressing Karl Marx. Along with Marx, another important figure is Nietzsche. The reason behind pointing Marx and Nietzsche as the beginning is the definition of materialism within this text. It is common to mention Marx with materialism; but maybe it is quite unusual putting Nietzsche within this position. However it is possible to describe a materialistic theory in which can Nietzsche be easily fit. For this conceptualization of materialism, I am influenced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's definition. According to them, idealism and materialism are two contradictory theories on the conceptual character of the real world<sup>9</sup> (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 87 and 91). While former is based on the ultimate reality or entity-based conceptualization of the reality, the latter stresses the reciprocal interactions, contingency, and historical character. As the criticism of the power as privilege above, idealism is based on hypothetical and non-historical position. Then, what does being historical means? I believe that, it is related with neither German historicism nor the myth of progress. Rather, it is the reciprocal constitution of self and the *milieu*. Namely, it is making theory and practice univocal. For instance Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* (Marx and Engels, 1978c) and Nietzsche's reference to the activity are the affirmation of the unity of theory and practice (Deleuze, 1983 and Nietzsche, 1968). Hence, the emergence of materialism, as understood within the problem of this text, is a response to 19<sup>th</sup> century's theoretical crisis. Apparently, materialistic response had created a fracture in the theoretical space of political science and sociology. The fracture caused the rupture from the entities. Then the answer on the location of Foucault is this fracture<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> From the perspective of deciding the character of reality, there is a dichotomy between materialism and idealism. Thus I will not add different contrasts either of materialism or idealism.

<sup>10</sup> I have to elaborate what the concepts of rupture and of fracture are. By rupture I refer to the Foucauldian discontinuity (Foucault, 2005 and 2013). Thus, historical process and change are not understood as linear evolution in this text. On the other hand, it is defined with the difference. However, I prefer the concept of rupture instead of discontinuity. This is because; the concept of rupture emphasizes the political struggle. Then rupture is a type of action. On the other hand fracture is a position. By it I refer to non-determined *milieu*. It is the crack, error, and fault on the smooth plane. Already mentioned materialistic fracture has appeared on the smooth plane of the agent. Hence, by locating Foucault in the fracture stresses the Foucauldian rupture from the agent-based ontology.

Let's put aside Foucault's relations with Marx and Nietzsche on the basis of materialism for further parts of this text. As it is stated, I will define Foucault's location firstly with his rejection of agent and structure. This is because fracture itself cannot be described without what it had ripped. Main characteristic of fracture is its actuality and contingency. However this is also why it cannot be defined with a meaning as such. Thus, first of all, it is a critical position. As it is stated, there is no possibility of universality. This statement does not mean that finding a common ground with different selves is impossible. Rather it only claims that a theoretical position or a reality cannot contain every social space as whole. The materialistic fracture is not exempted from this. Therefore its emergence, necessarily, does not eliminate the entity-based agent and structure. In the following I will describe what are the rejected theoretical positions of agent and then of structure.

Entity-based agent mostly refers to liberalism and methodological individualism. Before these theoretical positions it is a necessity to discuss mid-20<sup>th</sup> century's French thought. According to Descombes, this moment can be described with the last days of the domination of humanism and of phenomenology (Descombes, 1998: 81). May summarizes these two thoughts with three principles: "[A] consciousness transparent to itself; voluntary self-determination; and the constitution of its own experience" (May, 1994: 76 *et seq.*). Hence, those two presuppose an ontological essence for agent which is transcendent. Apparently, Foucault's contrast with humanistic essence is more obvious with his declaration of the death of human (Foucault, 2005: 373). Even though early texts of Foucault contain phenomenological tendencies, it will not be misleading to describe Foucault's effort against both of humanism and of phenomenology. Pettit states that, Foucault's anti-phenomenology is manifested with "the rejection of subjective consciousness" (Pettit, 1977: 69). The descriptive adjective of 'subjective' in phenomenology is the synonym of agent in this text. The difference between the agent and the subject is the following section's problem; thus it will not be elaborated here. However it is possible to say that subjective consciousness refers to the exemption of subject from its *milieu* or the atomization of the agent (May, 2006: 17). On the other hand, from *The Order of Things* to *The History of Sexuality* Foucault attempted to show the

subject's embedment into social conditions. A view from the materialistic position rejects any transcendent or external qualities that incorporated to the subject. Subject is defined with which the space it has located. This criticism of phenomenology is also valid for humanism too (Best and Kellner, 1991: 20). Humanism is based on core-subject. The self, who is connected to any substance, is Foucault's one of the main rejections (Foucault, 1997a: 276). From the standpoint of humanism, this self (agent) refers to a hypothetical man who lives in declarations. However, it is quite hard to detect it in society. It only appears when we act as if this core is embedded to the living subject. That is why human rights appeared within historical context and still change with the struggles of subjects. For instance liberal interpretation of human rights tends to conceptualize 'human' as universal in every space-time combination (for an early criticism of liberal interpretation see Marx, 1978b). On the other hand, it is impossible to assert the 'human' of the "1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" and contemporary interpretation of the subject of human rights (Rancière, 2004).

Besides humanism and phenomenology; liberalism and methodological individualism are other popular examples of entity-based agency. Liberalism can be traced back to social contract thinkers and English empiricism. According to Foucault, liberalism is a type of government which is based on naturalism<sup>11</sup> (Foucault, 2008b: 61-62). This naturalism presupposes "irreducible and non-transferable" core (Foucault, 2008b: 271-272). Moreover naturalism perceives the state of nature as human's core is freely practiced. However, the state of nature and the construction of social and political societies through contract are non-historical. They are completely hypothetical situations. Hence the liberal individual, even though it is defined as *liber*, is pre-determined by those designated natural rights. However formal these definitions could be<sup>12</sup>, they certainly will ignore possible future subject articulations. This is because, they will always be predetermined. On the other hand, methodological individualism is not a type of government like liberalism. Rather it is a social and political methodology as some thinkers

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<sup>11</sup> Foucault's interpretation of liberalism will be mentioned later as well.

<sup>12</sup> For instance Locke's life, liberty, and property are quite formal.

differentiate methodological individualism from atomism (Levine, Sober, and Wright, 1987: 70). However, the main axis of the interpretation of methodological individualism in text is its interpretation of the relations between whole and parts. Thus, from this axis they can be used as synonyms. This is because, according to Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) the difference between the methodological individualism and atomism is on the quality of the relations between individuals. While former recognizes the obtained knowledge from inter-individual relations, the latter does not. Thus, from the axis of the relations between whole and part, this difference is insignificant.

According to Levine, Sober, and Wright methodological individualism can be described with two main elements: “reducibility of social explanations to individual explanations” and “explanatory importance of relations among individuals” (Levine, Sober, and Wright, 1987: 71). Namely, this position asserts that social phenomena can be explained by the nature of the individuals. For instance, when the history of power relations interpreted with methodological individualism, it will not be more than the chronological juxtaposition of leaders, rulers, important figures, and so on. The analogy of the rock on the Vesuvius is still valid for this situation. As in the Brecht’s poem of “*Fragen eines lesenden Arbeiters*”<sup>13</sup> where are the real subjects of the history? Besides the agents (leaders) endowed with the rational capacity, methodological individualism ignores the subjects that are defined with their environment. Then, rationality is the key concept for understanding methodological individualism as the peculiarity of this position is defined by the agent’s capability to act rationally. Namely, the nature of the individuals is based on mere rationalism (Levine, Sober, and Wright, 1987: 82).

Along with the agent there is another entity: structure. The position which approaches structure as an entity will be structuralism in this text. As it is stated, defining structuralism is quite difficult. It might be a good idea to start with a briefing on the possible definition. As the equation of atomism and methodological individualism; holism and structuralism are seen as if they are synonyms. This is

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<sup>13</sup> Questions from a Worker Who Reads

because, from the axis of reducibility and relations between the whole and parts, these two do not differ much. Then what is structuralism<sup>14</sup>? According to Piaget, structuralism can be interpreted by referencing three aspects of the structure: “wholeness, transformation, and self-regulation” (Piaget, 1970: 5). Wholeness refers to the reducibility of the individuals to the structures. Namely, every act or belief of one can be explained through the structure. Thus, the parts are defined with commonality. Moreover, the whole is always more than the aggregation of parts, therefore it is the real being of the social world. Without this surplus, the social phenomenon cannot be understood. Transformation, contrary to mainstream critics, refers to diachronic changes. Structuralism always contains the change, even it happens in long duration. Finally the self-regulation refers to the absence of any outside point beyond the structure. According to Piaget, this rejection of outside also refers to the closed structures (Piaget, 1970: 14). Then, how can we locate emancipation in the structuralism? The criticism of outside can be interpreted as the rejection of any idealization (as in Foucault). However, individuals too have no capability to open a new path. This is because; they have already been pre-determined. Eventually, structural entity locks the individual into the cage of history. For instance, Ferdinand de Saussure (1983), an important figure for structuralism, separates *langue* and *parole*. Through this distinction, de Saussure ensures the ineffectiveness of the individual. The general rules and norms (*langue*) are completely independent from everyday speech of individuals (*parole*).

Hence structuralism makes the individual appendage of operative structure systems. Another example of the limitation of individual can be seen in Emile Durkheim<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> It is the refusing the existence of the part (subject, agent, individual, and so on) at all. However any utterance, whatever the weight of the part, emphasizes the existence of part. Then, it will be a paradox when one declares the lack of part. Hence, mere structuralism is a hypothetical theory for schematization which nobody strictly defends. That is why forthcoming thinkers will be mentioned by vulgarization. I will not assert that, their theoretical positions will be properly described. This is because, the problematization of this text is not about their position either. Rather it is about the criticism of mere (not-material, not-real, or hypothetical) structuralism or entity-based structure. However this ‘hypothetical’ conceptualization of structuralism is different from previous criticisms toward non-historicity. ‘Hypothetical structuralism’ will not be used for explanation. It will rather be used for the description of the Foucault’s position. Namely, this section does not attempt to constitute any reality.

<sup>15</sup> See 14<sup>th</sup> footnote.

(see Piaget, 1970: 8). Durkheim's anthropological interpretations are based on the identification of pre-civilized societies in which strict codes and exclusion anomalies (Durkheim, 2005a: 111). Without the existence of the anomaly or the fracture within the society, it is hard to notice any space where individual is not the appendage of structures. Moreover Durkheim's statement on the "social facts as things" stresses the impotency of individual too (Durkheim, 2005b: 43-44). It is true that there are realities beyond the individuals, however one drifts towards idealism insofar as these realities are interpreted as such. The holistic base behind the Durkheim's principle (social facts as things) makes the individual dispensable (see Durkheim, 1966). This gesture raises questions on the capacity of freedom of the individual. This is because individual is embedded into the structural 'grand plan'. This plan always refers to an entity and to mediums. Herein the entity is the structure, while mediums have always been a kind of *intelligentsia* (from shamans to researchers). Hence it is important to notice that the entity-based structures are always related with entity-based agents (and vice versa) who possess the knowledge of processing 'grand plan'. Eventually the problem of the capacity of freedom is articulated to the bondage (or theoretical slavery above) of the individual.

Up to now, I tried to underline the entity-based agency and structuralism which are completely distinct from Foucauldian theory. However there is another position which criticizes both of these entities. This position can be identified as the attempt to compromise agent and structure. The absence of complete rupture from entity-based and unidirectional realizations differentiates this search for a middle-point from Foucault. Instead of constitution of a different perspective (for instance action-based), these thinkers tried to avoid the problem of one-sided nature of entity-based theories by merging agency and structures<sup>16</sup>. For instance Pierre Bourdieu attempts to overcome the problem of free will and mechanical reaction by the coexistence of "internalization of externality and externalization of internality" (Bourdieu, 2013: 72-73). Anthony Giddens' solution is the conceptualization of a situation which structure is both the result and the medium of the subject (Giddens, 1986: 25).

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<sup>16</sup> This text is not about the compromise between agent and structure. Thus I will interpret these thinkers briefly and their theoretical capacities will be vulgarized too.



Finally Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's suggestion is imagination of three moments in the relations between agent and structure: externalization, objectification, and internalization (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 149). Apparently these three solutions have common points. These commonalities are the reasons of main problems of merging agent and structure. Herein the relations between agent and structure are conceptualized as dialectical. Namely, different moments are juxtaposed for the coexistence of these two. At one moment the agent possess the capacity to effect the structure and at another moment vice versa. Therefore, the problems of the acceptance of agent and structure as entities are not solved. These attempts only historicize the relations of the entities. The problem of entity can be seen in Berger and Luckmann's imagination of deserted island for the agents' effects (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 79) or Bourdieu and Giddens' silence on the practical level. On the other hand, Foucault criticizes any attempt for finding a solution which is especially based on dialectical conceptualization (Foucault, 1997a: 256). According to Foucault, dialectical logic searches for homogeneity. Namely, it does not free itself from the spectre of entity. However, he suggests strategic logic which rejects any attempt of unification (Foucault, 2008b: 42). By the reference to strategic model, Foucault tries to conserve proliferation of new perspectives and heterogeneity. That is why he uses problematization over finding/dictating any solution. Problematization consists both of materialistic and of non-foundationalist efforts. According to Foucault, "problematizing the problem" is referencing to acts, practices, and thoughts on the problem (Foucault, 1997b: 114 and Revel, 2008: 109-111).

Consequently, this section has been completely devoted to the Foucault's rejection of agent and of structure. Namely, there has been a negative interpretation of Foucault which stresses what he is not. However Foucauldian theory is not defined with its constant 'hammer blows'. Rather it has positive or constitutive aspects. In forthcoming chapter, I will try to show the main concept of Foucauldian theory: action.

## 2.2 Peculiarities of Foucauldian Theory

After the question of where is Foucauldian theory located; it is the time for the interpretation of its peculiarities. As it is said, defining the location necessitates what Foucauldian theory is not or where the fracture has emerged. Thus, I started with the ‘negative’ interpretation of entity-based agent and entity-based structure. In this section, I will try to interpret ‘positive’ concept creation and theorization of Foucault. This ‘positive’ production will expose the peculiarities of Foucauldian theory. However, there are some serious difficulties for this attempt. Firstly there is periodization of Foucault into three periods: briefly they are related with knowledge (60s), power (70s), and ethics (80s) (Best and Kellner, 1991: 59). Even though there are related with same problems (Foucault 1997a: 262 and Foucault 1997b: 116), creating a single and analytical interpretation from these three periods is quite hard. This is because, there are conceptual and theoretical shifts between these moments. Secondly, because of Foucault’s understanding of theory, his interviews and lessons play crucial role in his intellectual adventure (Deleuze, 2006: 115). Moreover there are *Collège de France* lessons. These texts usually, even though their temporal location has pattern with concurrent period of Foucault, problematize different problems than his books. Hence it is quite hard to interpret Foucauldian theory with either chronological theme or conceptual theme. However, I believe that, there is a concept which can function as an anchor point for our own problematization. This concept is power as conduct of conducts, or more specifically action. Hence firstly, we will start with the Foucault’s ‘substitute’ concepts of agent (subject) and of structure (machine<sup>17</sup>) for opening a space for action. After, in the light of the myth of Oedipus<sup>18</sup>, we will explain the two links within the Foucauldian theory: subject-

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<sup>17</sup> I am aware that Foucault does not use the concept of machine. Rather he uses mechanisms, apparatuses, *dispositifs*, and so on. However beside of these concepts I will refer to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s conceptualization of machine through Maurizio Lazzarato’s interpretation. This is because, as Lazzarato, I believe that the concept of machine links the problem of power to the problem of indebtedment.

<sup>18</sup> The interpretation of this myth does not refer to constitution of a foundational base for our theory. Instead I will use this myth as a simple schematization of Foucauldian peculiarities.

power and subject-truth. By this, peculiarities of the Foucauldian theory, in particular power, will be explained.

As it is said, the problem with the power as privilege is an entity-based and unidirectional theorization. This is related with the spectre of the One (or the Being). The One, whether it refers to agent or to structure, always haunts the theoretical space in social and political sciences (Game, 1998: 57). This is because, its circulation in the theoretical level sets shield against any criticism. This criticism-proof nature of the One is created after a certain process. Firstly, the One constitutes the Beginning point. Secondly, once the Beginning had acknowledged, the One universalizes itself through this point. Thus, the One's self-referential gesture protects it from any criticism. For instance, the existence of the mere rational agents is ensured by the rational capacity of the agent itself. By the self-reference, rational agent declares itself as if it has hierarchical superiority over all other beings. Moreover the spectre of the One is related with the hierarchical and non-historical conceptualization of agent and the state. As it is mentioned, rupture from this spectre has been appeared with the materialism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This attitude (rupture) is also maintained by Foucault. There are two main rupture from Beings in Foucauldian theory (Davidson, 2001). First there is the rupture from the Cartesian Subject for subjectivity (May, 2006: 3). And second there is the rupture from structure for the machine. I will start with the former.

Foucault's interpretation of the madness is based on the criticism of the precedence of the sane and the insane over the gesture that divides them (Foucault, 2008a: xxviii). Neither the sane nor the insane is endowed with any emancipatory category<sup>19</sup> as such in Foucault. This is because emancipatory category, mostly, functions as the assignation of a prophet. On the other hand the concept of agent presupposes the precedence of the rational Being (Game, 1998: 58). It is possible to track down the

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<sup>19</sup> Emancipatory category does not simply contrast with the domination. It refers to the capacity to think or to have reason. This is because, emancipation from something necessitates creation of a new thing. New things are the results of those capacities. This term is used for underlining the chains of the 'emancipatory' categories. These chains are the dependence of the particular emancipated-agent to the Universal emancipated-agent. It will be clearer after the criticism of Descartes's interpretation of the sane.

appearance of agent as the One in Descartes. Descartes is known with his meditations towards the overcoming the doubt in the rational subject<sup>20</sup>. According to Foucault, agent appears with the Cartesian gesture differentiates madness from the dream (Foucault, 2008a: 45). Both madness and dream are the flaws in the process of meditation. The doubt as foundation of the agent does not process during these moments (Foucault, 2008a: 138-139). Then one, who is mad or dreamer, is excluded from the agency. However before the contemplation there were neither agency nor mad/dreamer. As Megill states, Foucault maintains a tradition which is the difference of “the Same and the Other” (Megill, 1987: 204). Namely things do not exist in themselves, rather they can only becoming by their relationships with the Other<sup>21</sup>. Then the existence of agency prior to mad/dreamer will be nonsensical and non-historical. For instance, in *History of Madness*, Foucault constantly returns to the discontinuity in the meaning of the sane and the insane. From the strict changes in those meanings, it is apparent that, any subject who had lived during the late middle age (esoteric existence of the mad) or the renaissance (ship of fools) would not understand any concept of classical episteme<sup>22</sup> (Foucault, 2008a: 6 and 66). There were neither pathological insane nor rational sane before the emergence of confinement, of asylum, of clinic, and of anthropocentric realization of the world. Then, after the social transformation of the episteme those subjectivities had appeared. However, Cartesian meditations had inverted this historical current. Namely agent<sup>23</sup> retroactively created his position in the pre-meditation moment. It conceptualized itself as the precursor of the sane and the insane. However, Foucault underlines the discontinuity in the meanings of things (both of objects and of subjects) against the privileged consciousness of this Cartesian agent (Foucault,

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<sup>20</sup> For conceptual consistency within the text, I will refer the Cartesian subject as agent.

<sup>21</sup> The ontological distinction between Being (*Être*) and becoming (*devenir*) is crucial for this statement. Briefly former refers to the constant unity, while latter refers to active multitude.

<sup>22</sup> In this text, instead of Foucault’s triad on the history (see Foucault, 2005), I will distinguish 2 episteme: classical episteme (from late-16<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> century) and modern episteme (from 18<sup>th</sup> century to early-20<sup>th</sup> century) (as Best and Kellner, 1991: 37). This is because, the discontinuity within this text’s problems fit more properly to latter schema.

<sup>23</sup> This agent is symbolized as the meditating Descartes. Thus, the rupture is not simply embodied in a single agent – Descartes. It is the result of social activity.

1998d: 299-300). In other words, he tries to expose this retroactive effect as a strict change in the meaning of the subject.

By the gesture of the meditation, Descartes constitutes a distinction between thinking subject and the subject who is excluded from the think (Foucault, 2008a: 45). However, this dichotomy is not between the agent and the mad/dreamer. Rather, it bears a political function by drawing a line between the agent and the mad. Before elaborating this political function, the differentiation of the mad and the dreamer should be shown. According to Descartes, mad differs from the dreamer because of error (Foucault, 2008a: 240). The dreamer has capability to wake up and to realize its irrationality. On the other hand, the error in the mad cannot be evaded. The mad is bounded with its irrationality and unawareness. The political function of the differentiation between the sane and the insane appears with the mad person's position in the society: a pariah, a marginal, or an outcast (Foucault, 2008a: 79). The mad is excluded from the societies' four main functions: economy, reproduction of society, language, and ludic activities (Foucault, 1998a: 336). Mad cannot work, sexually reproduce, utter significant speeches, or attend social games. Then the mad represents the profane other of the society. It represents a taboo, which is unclean and should be confined away from society. Hence, entity-based conceptualization of the agent is defined with the political segregation. Agent is merged with its diabolical other. The direct consequence of the sacred conceptualization of the agent does not separate from the constitution of the profane agent. Eventually, when Descartes had tried to liberate the agent, he actually constituted it as a prisoner. Then, Foucault's criticism towards Descartes contains the possible resistance from the mad or the outcast.

The capability to resist of the mad has not been bestowed to it. The mad does not possess the resistance as such. Similarly, this statement is valid for interpreting women, homosexual, proletariat, and so on. However rejection of social changes realized by them through resistance would be quite ignorant. It is important that one should be aware of the resistance against exploitation, oppression, totalization, and normalization is not rejected at all. Some groups are more likely to be exploited, oppressed, totalized, and normalized. Their capability to resist stems from this

reality, but not vice versa. As it is said, while Cartesian subject equated with the resistance as such, it is bounded with an ideal figure. This ideal figure, within this text, has been called as agent. On the other hand, from a Foucauldian perspective, the concept of subject overcomes the theoretical and practical errors of agent. Then what is subject? Interpreting the history of the concept of subject is quite impossible within the limits of this text. However it is possible to mention characteristics of the subject. Firstly subject is not defined with its essence, but rather with its *milieu*. Thus it ambiguous, undetermined, and contingent insofar as its relations with its own 'environment' had performed. This is the second characteristics. Third and lastly subject is defined with the lack or absence of identification and of representation<sup>24</sup>. Thus there is no *individual*. Subject can be dismantled within itself. By referencing Deleuze and Guattari, Lazzarato refers the subject as the 'dividual' (Lazzarato, 2014a: 155). The 'dividual' can be divided through data gathering, statistics, technicization, and quantification. Even though these actions are related with modern era, 'dividual' is not common to contemporary world. For instance interpreting the subject as the serf, head of household, man, brother, and so on refers to its partition to various subjectivities. These remarkably related three characteristics do not refer subject as Special. Namely the unclarity of the subject is not a specificity which emancipates the subject from every generalization attempts. Even the inquiry on the subject (for instance indebted subject for this text) rejects any imagination of subject as Special. Hence by these characteristics, I am stressing the intractability of the attempt to represent and identify the subject. The impossibility to identify millions of people as the national subjectivity does not exclude the presence of the national subjectivities. To sum up, subject differs from agent by its ambiguity. Thus on the contrary of agent it has the capability to reject its designated name. For instance Cartesian subject (agent) as sane cannot reject the meaning of being sane. However sanity's meaning has always been undetermined. The determination of its meaning operates through social struggles. At one point of history its meaning can be exclude homosexuality and femininity. On the other hand, along with the recognition of the

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<sup>24</sup> Herein the interpretation of the subject quite resembles Slavoj Zizek's definition of the subject (see Zizek, 2009). However contrast with Zizek, I use this definition against Cartesian subject. I believe that, the limits of this text prevent any effort on similarities and dissimilarities between Zizek's and Foucault's subjectivities through Cartesian subject.

fracture within the sanity's meaning, homosexual and feminine can resist. Hence this example returns us to the link between resistance as such in agency and enclosure of the agent.

As it is said, alongside the 'substitution' of the agent with subject, there is also the replacement of structure with machines. These two attempts do not separated at all. They are quite related with the rejection of hitherto idealism and foundationalism. Therefore they are linked with materialism. As it is said this materialist link can be found between Foucault and Nietzsche. Moreover, I believe that, Nietzschean ontology and history has quite influential or Foucault (Best and Kellner, 1991: 35 and Descombes, 1998: 112). Thus interpretation of Nietzschean influence on Foucault will lead the way towards the concept of machine and the meaning of poststructuralism.

According to Megill, Foucault's interaction with Nietzsche appears on the level of aestheticism: Locating the experience of the one in art or discourse; instead of in things (Megill, 1987: 2). On the contrary, I found the common point between Nietzsche and Foucault in materialism. Materialism in this text refers to the rejection of non-historical and foundational entities and beginnings. It does not stress the distinction between concrete matter (material) and product of the mind (idea). Namely, as it is said, the separation of materialism and idealism is not located on the characteristics of the thing. Rather this separation is on the root of the things. Thus, in this text, materialism and idealism differ things are whether rooted in Being or becoming. Then the intersection point of Foucault and Nietzsche is the contrast against the essence (Newman, 2001: 88 and Deleuze, 2006: 4). This point is where their materialistic commonality is located. For stressing the materialism in Nietzsche and Foucault, we can start with the understanding of history. Idealistic approach towards the history presupposes the pre-determination of the agent by any structural core<sup>25</sup>. This interpretation of the history can be seen in progressive narratives. For instance, white European men's self-justification of the colonialism has been the

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<sup>25</sup> God, race, sexuality, and so on.

mark of this type of narrative. Except Nietzsche's position<sup>26</sup>, it is possible to track down the core in history in the circular narrative: An Ancient Greek farmer's interpretation of the time<sup>27</sup> through the abduction myth of Persephone<sup>28</sup>. These examples stress the difference between idealism and materialism within this text. Whether they are concrete matter (men) or not (God), Being-centric and pre-determined concepts (i.e. agent and structure) are non-historical. On the other hand Foucault, through Nietzsche's influence, asserts the contingency in history (May, 2006: 11). This contingency stems from neither core nor foundation. The environment where the materialistic things (i.e. subject) proliferate is void or gap. This gap, by not pre-determining the product, opens a path for multitude and contingent construction of the things (Foucault, 2008a: 180). I believe that this constitutive gap is used by Foucault through the influences of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's view on history is based on the rejection of any entity-based or idealistic goal (Nietzsche, 1968: 546 and Megill, 1987: 183). According to Deleuze this view could be seen as "the referring back of all things and any kind of origin to values, but also the referring back of these values to something which is, as it were, their origin and determines their value" (Deleuze, 1983: 2). This means that, everything is based on produced value in historical process, instead of mechanical necessities (Nietzsche, 1968: 337-338). Then, these values are not pre-determined by any god-like will. Rather they stem from the constitutive gap by ensuring the value-production (contingency). In Nietzsche's words, history consists of interpretations, instead of facts (Nietzsche, 1968: 267 and 291). That is why, I identify Nietzsche as materialist in this text. He criticizes any attempt to refer a non-historical Being. He believes that, the idealistic (entity-based) meaning of the history is not real (Nietzsche, 1968: 14).

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<sup>26</sup> Nietzsche also conceptualizes the history with circularity. However, his differences from other circular theories will be elaborated later.

<sup>27</sup> Herein the circularity resembles Pierre Bourdieu's interpretation of agrarian calendar (see Bourdieu, 2013).

<sup>28</sup> Persephone is the kidnapped daughter of Demeter, the goddess of agriculture. During winter Persephone resides in underworld. When she travels back to the earth, the joy of her mother causes the spring. At the end of summer Persephone returns to underworld. With the sorrow of her daughter, Demeter causes the fall. This circular process has neither end nor beginning. Rather it repeats its movement every year.



Then how is value-based history conceptualized? First of all, Deleuze locates Nietzsche contrary to Hegelian dialectics, which is the negation of the negation (Deleuze, 1983: 9 and Nietzsche, 2008). Valuation does not refer to annihilation within the history. On the other hand, Nietzsche's value-based historical theory is the eternal recurrence (Nietzsche, 1968: 330). However, if this recurrence is neither Being nor negation, what it is? Nietzschean eternal recurrence is the constant return of the difference (Deleuze, 1983: 9). According to Foucault, this is the Nietzschean positioning against the origins and teleology and affirmation of the contingency (Foucault, 1998c: 370 and 381). In other words, it is the Nietzschean distinction between the *ursprung* (origin) and *entstehung* (becoming) (Nietzsche, 2007a and Foucault, 1998c: 370). Eventually, the undetermined contingency of the history and invention of the historical subjects are the basis of Foucauldian and Nietzschean views of history. Maybe a criticism can rise against this conceptualization of the history. If the history is completely free from structuralist mechanism, is it not returning to the agent or even worse to nihilism? On the one hand, the rejection of the entities contains the criticism of the agent. As it is said earlier, in practice structure and agent is not different at all. On the other hand, this historical interpretation is not based on complete chance, there is also some kind of necessity. This necessity can be explained by Deleuze's allegory of dice throwing: One throw dices without determining which combination will be occurred. However, when one decides to throw the dice, necessarily, a combination will occur (Deleuze, 1968: 25-27). The necessity of the history refers this situation. This necessity will be shown as the machine against the structure.

To sum up, a reference to Deleuze will be help us to understand the historical view of Foucault:

“Behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it was all the more important each time to describe the curtain, or the base, since there was nothing either behind or beneath it” (Deleuze, 2006: 54).

Then, Foucault calls to the idealistic structures (history) as this: The king is naked (Foucault, 1998c: 378). The contingent articulations, discontinuities, and historicity make any attempt to find a foundation inadequate. As in the story in the last pages of

Kafka's *The Trial*, there is neither the door nor the wall. However, gatekeeper's statements and the wide open door prevent any passing. Any claim on the Being of door's dividing line is non-historical. On the other hand, it functions as if the line is. Hence, non-historical agent and its preconditions (structures) are not there when their function is exposed and tested. Foucault's interpretation of the history uncovers this reality. I believe that, this gesture of Foucault stresses nothing but the formalist quality of his materialistic view. This formalism is different than liberal formalism which is, basically, equalizing idealization<sup>29</sup>. It refers to the rejection of to determine or to presuppose any a priori Being. Formal history is a 'shell' which does not directly determine its own content. As it is said, history hangs on the void with an undetermined content. Thus it is impossible to assert any materialistic view without its formal quality. What gives the formal quality to this historical and ontological position? Actually there are two elements. First one is subjectivity which is mentioned above. The second one is the machine which is the replacement of structure.

It is true that Foucault does not use the concept of machine. However he uses various concepts such as *dispositif*, apparatus, mechanism, and *episteme* with historical institutions (discipline, psychiatry, state, and so on). I believe that, while Foucault investigated the institutes on how they operate, he deliberately left the conceptualization of these institutions in general. Namely, even though he refers to the ambiguous content, he does not name the form. This silence caused to his interpellation as structuralist. For instance some thinkers call Foucault as the theoretician of structuralism without structures (Piaget, 1979: 128 and Olssen, 2004: 459). This position is defined by the Foucault's so-called rejections of history, of genesis, of functions, of subject, and of universality (Piaget, 1979: 134-135 and Olssen, 2004: 466). I believe that, there is no need for further explanation of why these rejections described as so-called. The important point is how we can define this

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<sup>29</sup> This equalizing idealization can be seen in the myth of equality of opportunities. For instance, according to this formal statement; handicapped persons, women, and minorities have equal capability to reach social forces along with white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant (WASP) men (in the case of US) or Sunni men (in the case of Turkey). On the other hand, in the society, their formal equalization as the human does not ensure the equality.

unnamed Foucauldian form. I decide to borrow the concept of machine from Deleuze, Guattari, and Lazzarato for naming the Foucauldian substitute of structure.

For separating Foucault from structuralism Deleuze refers to the distinction between diagram and structure. While the latter refers pyramidal and hierarchic (unidirectional) juxtaposition of things, the former refers to the transversal and undetermined networks (Deleuze, 2006: 35). Similarly Todd May stresses the network system in Foucault on the contrary of any binary model or circle (May, 1994: 10-11). Diagram is a form which its content is undetermined and ambiguous. On the contrary of structure, diagram does not require the base. It seems like hanged onto the platform, rather than rising from the foundation. Even though diagram is located in the contrary of structure, it is not quite the whole situation. Diagram is the way of how machine operates. Namely machine is not equal to diagram, and diagram is not in the same comparison level (Lazzarato, 2014b). That is why, the replacement of structure is not diagram, but machine. Hence machine ensures the existence of an undetermined void where new possibilities and discontinuities can proliferate (Foucault, 1998b: 271-275). For instance the pathological mad related with the diagram of psychiatric machine in modern episteme cannot be foreseen from the classical episteme and its confinement mechanisms (see Foucault, 2005 and Foucault, 2008a). Moreover, the existence of pathological mad is not in a path-dependent relationship with classical episteme. I am not only referring the rejection of any transcendent determination schema. Also immanent change is not determined with certain goals. Hence realization of new subjects and machines do not necessitate their inevitableness.

This criticism of structure through machine can be located in the criticism of linguistic turn which shaped structuralism. As it is said, de Saussure's linguistics assertions (especially *langue*) endowed discursive elements a central role (Lazzarato, 2014b: 17). Namely language achieved privilege for the constitution of subject and of structure. Moreover according to Megill, Foucault also relies on the constitutive role of language (Megill, 1987: 50-51). However Saussurean *langue* always presupposes a grammar form which encircles the subject's resistance. For instance Ludwig Wittgenstein uses the analogy of chess game for elaborating grammar (as

cited in Laclau, 2000: 283-284). The rules of chess game do not determine the strategies you play. It only shapes the space of the game. Similarly grammar does not cause path-dependency. Rather it only refers to the limits of language. However the form in linguistic structuralism is different than the usage of form in this text. Machine and subject as form are amorphous. The limits of form do not constitute a distinct shape. For instance, if we return to the analogy of chess game, the form does not even shape the space of the game. It only necessitates the existence of a game. Thus, the rules of the games is located as content. That is why in *The Order of Things* Foucault interpreted the grammar as a phenomenon of certain episteme. Hence Foucault differentiates itself from linguistic assumptions of structuralism. In his third period, the usage of aesthetics, self, and ethics makes this rupture clearer. However before the weight shift (three periods of Foucault), Foucault refers that its 'object' of inquiry consists both of discursive and non-discursive elements (Foucault, 2005 and Foucault, 2013). Subject and machine are not always affected by discursive phenomena, but rather non-discursive ones also plays role in the constitution. For instance one of the main problems of this text, debt, does not refer to discourse. In most cases it is embedded into a paper<sup>30</sup>. Thus its relations to the subject are not located in the discursive level. Similarly social norms such as appearance, diet, and customs are not discursive too. Lazzarato refers to asignifying semiotics for explaining these non-discursive elements (Lazzarato, 2014b: 39-40). Machines, mostly, appeal to the subjects through asignifiers. Signifying semiotics is not the sole constituent of the subject.

Asignifiers do not require transmitting a meaning to the subject. Subject, even though it is unaware of the process, can be processed within the machine. For instance Lazzarato gives the example of driving (Lazzarato, 2014b: 89). Usually the driver is not aware of the mechanical processes within the car. Moreover sometimes it is unaware of its acts for driving too. Despite of this the car moves to the desired location. This is a crucial example for understanding the machine and asignifiers. The expansion of machines in everyday life goes along with the expansion of technological machinery. However let us leave this discussion to the later chapters.

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<sup>30</sup> Herein I refer to the money.

Different examples can be given from market, banking systems, juridical procedures, and psychiatric mechanisms. These machines' interactions with subjects are free from the "subjects who convey them" (Lazzarato, 2014b: 80). However this statement is not the rejection of the any effect on machine by the subject. Subject has capability to resist any machine without the 'knowledge' on the machine. We should not expect the worker (subject) has to be aware of neoliberal production. Moreover the worker should not be 'repressed' by its inaccessibility to the 'knowledge' of neoliberalism in general. As neoliberal production machines operate without the awareness of worker, it can be antagonized by workers without any enlightenment too.

Asignifying semiotics, because of the absence of signifying process, is also rejects any representation schema. The absence of representation ensures asymmetry and difference between subjects (ambiguity of subject) and automatization of machine operations (against power as possession and structure) (Lazzarato, 2014b: 86-87). Representation has been always related with the language. For stressing the error within representation and identification, we should underline the inadequacy of language as sole constituent. That is why Lazzarato underlines the criticism of the line from de Saussure to Jacques Lacan through Mikhail Bakhtin's fracture. According to Bakhtin, the one does not learn the language by grammar rules, but rather through everyday interactions or speech genres (as cited in Lazzarato, 2014b: 192). Namely the subject is constituted in the Real, instead of the Symbolic<sup>31</sup>. For showing the constitution of subject in the Real materially, Lazzarato, through Guattari's influences, refer to Daniel Stern's *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (Lazzarato, 2014b: 101 *et seq.*). In this book, Stern investigates the subjectivity of infant which shows the pre-language and pre-verbal communication, self-realization, and perceiving the world.

Eventually, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the interpretation of subject and machine from a Foucauldian perspective causes naming Foucault as

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<sup>31</sup> Herein I used to concepts of Real and Symbolic in Lacanian sense. While the former refers to the pre-language era which cannot be interpreted, the latter is the presence of language and culture. The subject is constituted after entering the Symbolic.

poststructuralist. I am not using this label for Foucault. First of all, it is quite hard to define the structuralism. For instance some defines poststructuralism as an attempt to destabilize hierarchies and presuppositions (Belsey, 2002 and Springer, 2012). It is true that, this definition does not exclude a type of structure or an anchor point for comparison (Springer, 2012: 139 and Newman, 2001: 14). That is why poststructuralism can be seen as the radicalization of structuralism. Namely poststructuralist critic extends the rejection of agent in structuralism towards the structure itself. Its etymology also shows this link. The prefix of “post-” always describes the antecedent concept. Then, it is neither rejection nor connivance. Total rejection of the structuralism would be expressed with the prefixes of “a-” or “anti-”. Hence I completely agree with the definition of poststructuralism, its link with structuralism, and its resemblance of Foucault. However second problem hinders such a labeling. Naming Foucault as poststructuralist has not any function for this text. Moreover, this label will block any other influences on Foucault. For instance through materialism I am trying to link Foucault and Marx. I believe that the enclosure within the concept of poststructuralism will prevent various articulations of Foucault.

Up to now, we have been elaborated subject and machine against agent and structure. However, as it is implied, subject and machine do not exist as such. They are present insofar as there are interactions. Actually neither subject nor machine is the center in Foucauldian theory. But rather it is action-based theory. For instance when the subject is mentioned, I underlined the subject’s position within *milieu*. This environment always modifies a relational and interactional space. Also diagrams, which machines operate through, are defined with the interactional links. The main characteristic of a diagram is the links between things. Otherwise, it cannot be separated from pyramidal (up-to-down) or reversed-pyramidal (down-to-up) schemas. I believe that, before passing to elaboration of action we should summarize the Foucauldian criticism of subjectification (constitution of subject) processes (Lazzarato, 2014b: 56-57). Firstly, against structuralism, collective relations are the main constituent, instead of general rules. Herein the concept of collectivity refers to the variety of actions in the constitution process. Secondly, on the contrary of

phenomenology, the collectivity does not refer to intersubjectivity. This is because, subjects are not the sole elements of interactions; but rather machine-machine and machine-subject interactions also exist. Thirdly, neither machine nor subject is in the center of constitution process. As Foucault's interpretation of madness, the action (gesture that divides the sane and the insane) has precedence over machine and subject. Fourth and lastly, there are not bases (privileged machine or subject) which constitute other machines and subjects. This statement can be interpreted as the criticism of Marxist (economic base) and Freudian (unconsciousness as base) positions (Balibar, 1992). Similarly Deleuze implies this conclusion through the concept of immanence too. By the immanence, Deleuze stresses the differentiation of Foucault from any Marxist pyramidal model. This is because, immanent cause refers to realization through its own effect (Deleuze, 2006: 27 and 37). Namely the cause is not *imposed* to machine or subject; but rather it is appeared with the machine or subject's own relations. However, I believe that, these statements do not conclude with the criticism of Marxism entirely. Marxist theory is not dependent to pyramidal model. In different situations urban plebs and peasantry can be constituted as proletariat. However, I will leave the discussion of Marxism to next chapters.

Hence, Foucauldian theory relies on action<sup>32</sup>. Thus Foucault changes the questions of who (agent) and what (structure) with the question of how (action). There is also the concept of action in various positions (especially in liberalism). However their approach to action is always one-sided. That is why action only appears as epiphenomena in them. One-sided action refers to the 'absence' of the other. Namely action is defined with one side. Thus these positions dictate homogeneity by ignoring the activity of the other. On the other hand, as Deleuze states, main reason behind of Foucault's objections against the "Cogito" and "the Spirit of the Age" are on their homogenous nature (Deleuze, 2006: 4 and 14). Homogeneity always hinders the proliferation of new possibilities. On the other hand action needs reciprocity, rather than mere dictation. Reciprocity presumes the activity of the other. Hence, difference of Foucault from those one-sided or pseudo-relational theories can be allegorized as

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<sup>32</sup> It is interesting that, even though Megill locates Foucault within linguistic turn, he states that action-based theorization is the main characteristics of Foucault (Megill, 1987: 184).

the things between actions, instead of actions between things. Action does not head on and come from the thing, rather it acts upon to other actions (Foucault, 2001b: 341). Hence, location of the ‘thing’ is not presupposed. It is defined with the void. Void differs from the *nihilo*. For instance, for stressing this difference, Lazzarato defines the action as “*causa sui et non ex nihilo*” (Lazzarato, 2014b: 216). Namely action is the reason of itself, but it is not meaningless. These actions, as net-like, capillary, and infinite, form nodal points where they came across (Foucault, 1980d: 98). The ‘thing’ is constituted within this point. This thing is the subject (Deleuze, 2006: 4 and Best and Kellner, 1991: 41). As it is implied, within this text subject is similar to Nietzschean appearance of the superman after the death of human, who it is neither God (structure) nor human (agent) (Deleuze, 2006: 130 and 132). Hence the product of the action is not an entity too. That is why, subject always recalls the *process* of subjectification (Revel, 2008: 128).

When we mentioned the subject in the beginning of this section, the error of the identification is stressed. Along with this error, subject is also defined with its distinction from absolute freedom. These peculiarities of subject are the results of action-based theory. This is because making the action center acknowledges the other. Thus other prevents both of identification and messianic agent. For underlining the fracture within the subject Foucault uses the French word of *assujettissement*. Likewise the two face of the Janus, *assujettissement* describes the two co-functions of the subjects as: On the one hand being subject to something and on the other hand being subject against the object. Subject, therefore, is both the practitioner of and exposed to the action. However subject is not the sole product of the actions. Within the nodal points, machines are also constituted. Some criticisms can be raised at this point. Machines are defined as the *milieu* of subjects, however herein they are located between actions. Thus how can we redefine the link between machines and subjects? I believe that, this question stems from imagination of this theoretical position as undividable. Neither machine nor subject refers to an *atom*. They can be segmented to their parts. Within the nodal point there are capillary connections. Namely there are various nodal points inside the subject and machine. For instance banking system (as machine) had constituted by various actions. These actions and



their capillaries also constituted subjects (i.e. indebted subject) and machines (i.e. credit cards) inside the banking system. Moreover, indebted subject is not only located within the banking system machine. It can be found in the different social and political machines which are distinct from banking system. Let us give another example for segmenting the subject. Different actions can constitute a national subject (i.e. Turkish). Same actions and their capillaries constitute various machines (i.e. state, native language, and so on)<sup>33</sup> and subjects (i.e. regional subjects) in the national subjectivity. Hence visualization of the links between action, subject, and machine should be free from Euclidian geometry.

At this point, due to linking machine and action, our position echoes performativity theories of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Judith Butler. However I will not refer to performativity within Foucauldian theory. Concept of performativity is used by John L. Austin through the distinction between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts (Austin, 1962). On the one hand, the former refers to the description of a situation: The apple is green. On the other hand, the latter refers to the performative change or constitution of a reality. For instance command from the superior activates the subordinate. Thus performativity is related with the “social obligation” of the object of perlocutionary act. However, Lazzarato stresses that, Austin leaves this conceptualization behind (Lazzarato, 2014b: 171). This is because, Austin realizes that every speech act implies an obligation. There is no link between green and apple. For instance apple is “*vert*” in French and “*yeşil*” in Turkish, or it can be named with different letter combinations in English. However declaring the apple as green constitutes a link between signifier and signified. Thus there is no sign as such; but rather only sign through action. Moreover Foucault uses the concept of *parrhesia* against the performativity (in Foucault’s *The Government of Self and Others* as cited in Lazzarato, 2014b: 173, 230, and 234). According to Nancy Luxon, *parrhesia* refers to speaking the truth without any game, coercion, or persuasion (Luxon, 2004: 465). However it is also related with the constitution of ethical position of oneself. In the third period, Foucault substituted the concept of non-

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<sup>33</sup> I completely accept that this process (from national subject to state and language) can operate conversely.

discursive elements with ethical practices. Then how can we differentiate *parrhesia* from performativity? While performativity refers to institutionalized and determined conditions; *parrhesia* stresses ambiguous, indeterminate, and unspecified interaction. Thus performativity hinders the productivity capacities of subject (Lazzarato, 2014b: 174). It is true that, Laclau and Mouffe's definition of performativity consists of non-discursive elements and production capacity of the subject (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 82). However references to Wittgenstein's grammatical limits contrast with the conceptualization of *parrhesia*. Moreover, I believe that, Foucault's usage of concept of enunciation, in his early periods, is not against usage of *parrhesia*. Enunciation also refers to the absence of grammar or similar predetermined rules (Saussurean *langue*). Thus for stressing the criticism of linguistic structuralism, the concept of *parrhesia* should be used for the performativity. At this point Luxon underlined criticisms towards Foucault on his grant of absolute freedom to the *parrhesiastes* (the one who use *parrhesia*) (30<sup>th</sup> endnote at Luxon, 2004: 487). However I believe that, these criticisms ignore the characteristics of relations between machines and subjects. Subjects have capacity to create ruptures from machines. Otherwise this position could not be differed from linguistic structuralism. This rupture is conceptualized as counter-conduct, limit-attitude, techniques of self, *ethos*, and art of existence in different periods. The incompleteness of the project of *History of Sexuality* had prevented Foucault's attempts to giving consistency to these concepts. However unforeseen actions, which are related with unseen subjects and machines within the void, ensure the rupture<sup>34</sup> from its own environment.

In the beginning of this chapter we started with the criticism of power as possession. I believe that, after interpretation of subject, machine, and action, we can look into the concept of power in Foucault. I found Foucault's interpretation of the Myth of Oedipus (in Foucault, 2001c) quite important for further elaboration of power. Because of that, I will interpret what Foucault understands from this myth for further elaboration of his peculiarity. Unlike Freud's triad of father, mother, and son, in this interpretation our important figures are shepherds (slaves), gods, and king. Let us

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<sup>34</sup> Maybe we should refer to the concept of *catharsis* in Antonio Gramsci in here. However deific meaning of this concept prevented the usage of *catharsis* at all.

describe these figures. In this interpretation King Oedipus is a figure who searches the truth. It is not the search for the truth of suspicious events (plagues, homicides, and so on); rather the truth is the truth of the Oedipus's self. During this survey on the self, Oedipus encounters with shepherds and gods. Shepherds are witnesses of the main events. They possess their own truth through their subjective gaze. Gods on the other hand have divine prophecies on the main events. They possess their own truth by their accessibility to things in themselves and their control on the history. From these explanations, it is possible to see that shepherds represent the agent, while gods are depicted through the structure (Foucault, 2001c). From the standpoint of gods, agents are bounded with the universal prophecies. There is neither void that rupture can proliferate nor outside point. No agent is exempted from its dictated fate. From the standpoint of shepherds, however, the nature of the agents shapes their own subjective consciousness (as in phenomenology). They and their realities are exempt from any structural effects (society or analogically gods). However, the main protagonist of the myth is neither god nor shepherd. It is the king Oedipus. Foucault describes Oedipus as who knows and governs. Therefore he is the only authority to confirm the truth (Foucault, 2001c: 17, 24, 26, and 29). This authority is justified by the reference to the ancient tyrants<sup>35</sup>. When Oedipus interacts with gods and shepherds, he decides whether they are the possessor of truth or not. The prophecies of the gods and the memories of the witnesses have been still for long times. Their existence did not prevent the Oedipus's seizure of the kingship. Thus they were meaningless, ineffective, and non-historical. When the Oedipus became king, he interacted with gods and shepherds, and as a result he has constituted his own self. However, Oedipus does not simply verify the truths of gods and of shepherds; but constitutes his truth after interactions. Only after that ineffective and non-historical prophecies and memories become historical. That is why Oedipus loses his right to govern after his self is constructed<sup>36</sup>. To sum up, what this myth allegorizes is the subject's differentiation from the agent and the structure through conceptualization

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<sup>35</sup> Ancient tyrants had differed from ordinary legitimization system of the polis. They legitimized themselves, and by doing so the truth of the society, through their own will (Foucault, 2001c).

<sup>36</sup> As he had created its truth as non-eligible to govern.

of power. While shepherds and gods represent the agents and structures, Oedipus remains as the allegory of the subject. Subject is constituted through the constitution of the truth of itself. It is located in the nodal points of different actions and its truth is the results of those actions. Oedipus, as subject, neither had rational nature<sup>37</sup> nor bounded with universal structures<sup>38</sup>. Eventually, Oedipus goes through the subjectification process by the actions that are directed from all sides. His self is constituted as prince, king, son, and former leader by the action.

The myth of Oedipus described what are explained about the action and subject so far. However, myth also opens space for the object of this chapter: power. There are two main links within the myth. These are subject-power and subject-truth<sup>39</sup>. Therefore, Oedipus drives us to the peculiarity of the Foucauldian theory. It is the relationships between action, subject, truth, and power; namely the power as action as it is stated in the introduction of this chapter. I will start with the first link: subject-power.

Main type of action is power in Foucault. This action-based theorization is similar to Nietzschean will and power. In above we have avoided the nihilist interpretation of Nietzsche (and Foucault) by referring the constitutive void as not completely rejection of any possibility of becoming. Then instead of ignoring the constitutive quality of nature, they explain what it means. According to Nietzsche things are ensemble of the forces (Deleuze, 1983: 40). I believe that those forces are similar to Foucauldian subject: societies are the ensemble of the subjects (see Megill, 1987: 191 and Deleuze, 2006: 27 and 70). For instance, Nietzschean forces are described with their activity, as Foucauldian subjects. In Nietzsche's words the existence is action (Nietzsche, 1968: 96). However, as we have already seen, these subjects are different from the agent by the precedence of the action over them. Likewise, will to power has precedence over the forces in Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1968: 366). Moreover, the action has been described as the action over the action. Namely, the

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<sup>37</sup> He has not the rational consciousness of the events –exclusion from the family and patricide–.

<sup>38</sup> He became king even though his 'fate' prevents him.

<sup>39</sup> These links are the results of the main elements of the myth: King, King's truth, and King's right to govern.

thing that acts is nothing but the action itself. Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche is similar. According to him will to power is willed by nothing but will itself (Deleuze, 1983: 49 and Nietzsche, 1968: 148). Hence, it is obvious that it is impossible to conceptualize Foucauldian power without referencing to Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's influences are not enough to show the importance of the power in the ontological level of Foucauldian theory. However, further interpretations on the link between subject and power will show. As it is said, one of the main suppositions of this text is the power as action. Then the characteristics of action, which are shown above, are valid for power too. Foucault states that, power is neither place/thing that can be possessed nor hierarchical dictation. Rather it is capillary interactions which are performed by and upon subjects (Foucault, 1980a: 213). Power is the ensemble of the actions (Foucault, 2001b: 337). Therefore, rather than any unidirectional hierarchy, it comes from and goes to everywhere. Moreover, this statement underlines that power is not a substance; but is a *mechanism* (Foucault, 2009: 2). The second point of Foucault's criticism towards hitherto power analyses is their dependence to the negative function of power. This negative function represents prohibition, forbiddance, repression, inhibition, and so on (Read 2003 and Best and Kellner, 1991: 48). Foucault criticizes this position through the criticism of Reich's repression model (Foucault, 1997c: 284). This model locates power against the freedom. Thus, power only refers to the action from mighty to the weak. Hence, negative function of power always calls the unidirectional hierarchy to reality. In contrast Foucault stresses the positive function of the power (Deleuze, 2006: 71). This refers to the production of the subject, with its desires, pleasures, and truths (Foucault, 1980c: 119). In other words, referencing to the positive function of the power underlines the power's connection to the ways of life. Hence, it is about constitution, incitement, intensification, seduction, production, and so on (Foucault, 1978: 4 and 11). If we turn our attention to Reich's model, what is seen is Father's compulsion to do, instead of "*Non-du-Père*"<sup>40</sup>. However, it is important to be aware

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<sup>40</sup> By this concept I refer to the repressive function of the superego and Father in Freudian psychoanalysis (see *The Ego and Id* and *Civilization and Its Discontents*). Freudian superego operates through social manners, morality, and so on. Thus it necessitates the repression of the savagery (*id*). When the child had entered to the family (and culture), social rules appear as prohibitions. Herein

of that referencing the power with its positive function does not determine its content<sup>41</sup>. Rather, it is only rupture from the negative function which presupposes an ontological hierarchy<sup>42</sup>. For instance universal equation of sovereignty and power falls into this ontological trap. As Foucault said, we cannot generalize the type of power as sovereignty or exploitation. Rather it can be understood with its equation to the conduct (Foucault, 2009: 200). The universal power-sovereignty schema is an illusion which stems from non-historical presuppositions (see Balibar, 1992: 50).

The undetermined content of the power can be seen in Foucault's historical investigation of the types of power. It is important to be aware of periodization of the types of power differs in each text of Foucault. This is because, Foucault's search for discontinuity changes the time periods of transitions<sup>43</sup>. For this text, first I will start with the two games of the power. After, I will pass to the distinction between juridical power and normalization<sup>44</sup>. Main problem of this vulgar schematization of the Foucault's historical texts is the governing problem. Foucault refers to two ancient stories as games for describing (not explaining) the possible solutions for governing: shepherd-flock and city-citizen (Foucault, 2001a: 311). The game of shepherd-flock arises from the legacy of the Fertile Crescent's god-kings (Egyptian, Assyrian, Hebrew, and other Mesopotamian societies) (Foucault, 2001a: 300 and Foucault, 2009: 123 *et seq.*). Figure of shepherd represents the god-king whom knows every details of the particular member of its flock (Foucault, 2001a: 209). Then, it knows what every 'cattle' needs, desires, fears, and knows. In short it has knowledge on what the cattle is. Shepherd uses the technologies of conscience and confession for maintaining its own authority. Those technologies ensure the unconditional obedience by producing the sense of guilt (Nietzsche, 2008: 35 *et*

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father, as a symbolic figure, appears as the root of these rules. Reich's model stems from this presupposition.

<sup>41</sup> Power, like history, is a formal concept. It does not pre-determine its own content.

<sup>42</sup> Namely, it presupposes either agent or structure.

<sup>43</sup> Each different object of research necessitates different ruptures or discontinuity moments. Since history is not linear plane which can be cut into pieces universally.

<sup>44</sup> In next chapter, we will expand the discussion of this historical change.

seq.). At the same time the sense of duty is produced for the shepherd. Shepherd's duties are based on salvation, kindness, devotedness, and keeping watch on (Foucault, 2001a: 305). The game of city-citizen, however, is based on the Ancient Greece's legacy (Foucault, 2001a: 306-307). In this game, power does not function for the knowledge on the 'cattle', rather for the conservation of the unity. Citizens are not herded as if they are slaves. Actually they are perceived as free. However, if we remember Socratic interpretation of the political freedom, those citizens are only free within the city<sup>45</sup>. Thus, within this game, power manifests itself as generalization, aggregation, and totalization. Hence while shepherd-flock refers to the governing through individualizing power; city-citizen refers to the governing through totalizing power. This difference can be traced with an etymological investigation. For instance the concept of politics derives from Ancient Greek word of "*politiká*", which refers to the affairs related to polis (city-state). On the other hand, politics in Turkish is "*siyaset*". This concept derives from Arabic root of "*sws*". This root also refers to the stableman. Thus "*siyaset*" is related with the salvation and everyday life of particular 'horses'. Foucault underlines that, in Ancient Greek, the allegory of ship and captain is used for referring the politics (Foucault, 2009: 122-123). On the contrary of shepherd-flock game, captain does not govern its crew, but rather its ship.

According to Foucault, games of shepherd-flock and of city-citizen have been combined after leaving behind the threshold of the modernity (Foucault, 1995: 199 and Foucault, 2011a: 211). The game of shepherd-flock is related with the pastorate. Pastorate has been referring to the "*art of governing men*" (italic within the text; Foucault, 2009: 165). The rising interest on the population after 17<sup>th</sup> century echoes the return of the pastoral governing problem. The game of city-citizen, however, is related with the republicanism debates since 16<sup>th</sup> century. Questions like what is common between citizens, is the 'city' simple aggregation of citizens and their wills, and who is citizen are the results of the contemporary problems of this game. The merge between these games has appeared with the emergence of classical episteme (16<sup>th</sup> century). This process is concurrent with the appearance of

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<sup>45</sup> This interpretation can be seen in Plato (1997).

governmentality and the shift from juridical power to normalization (Read, 2003: 85). From this change towards today, we experienced three types of power: Sovereignty (theatrical brute force), discipline (body and surveillance), and biopolitics (norm) (Foucault, 1995 and Gambetti, 2012: 25-26). Moreover, these three types have been accompanied with three particular machines too. These are juridical mechanism (binary distinction between permitted and prohibited), disciplinary mechanism (surveillance and correction), and security dispositif (calculation of costs) (Foucault, 2009: 5-6).

Let me briefly elaborate the wedding between two games. Firstly we have to start from the bottom: Who is the threshold of the modernity<sup>46</sup>? Contrary to mainstream approaches, Foucault locates Machiavelli as the last threshold for modern age (Foucault, 1991: 89-90). From a mainstream perspective, Machiavelli is interpreted as the beginning of political science (see Skinner, 2001). On the other hand, Foucault believes that the relation of the Machiavellian prince with its properties has transcendent nature (Foucault, 2009: 65 and Agtaş, 2013: 154). Moreover, its problem is about governing of territory, but not “people, individuals, or groups” (Foucault, 2009: 121). The problems of new episteme can be traced back in the anti-Machiavellian literature. This is because, these problems were not about preserving the possessions of the prince, but rather was about controlling circulations and movements (Foucault, 2009: 65 and Virilio, 2006). The shift from Machiavelli to anti-Machiavellian literature is remarked by the presence of the *raison d'état* (Foucault, 1991: 97). *Raison d'état* refers to theoretical positioning which presupposes the existence of the rational principles of the state. State which is distinct from prince and subjects (second meaning of subject) appeared with *raison d'état*. Appearance of the state was the attempt to secure the rights of the kingdoms against the universal church. However, within the historical process, it transformed into the sovereignty of the territorial states against each other (Foucault, 2008b: 3-4). Then, this theoretical positioning represents the game of city-citizen. However, *raison d'état* was not the only product of the early-modern era. The problem of

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<sup>46</sup> Herein I do not refer to the modern episteme. Rather threshold of modernity is the threshold of classical episteme.



governing is not common to the sovereign alone. It is also related with governing the self and the family too (Foucault, 1991: 87 and 91). These problems are related with the emergence of the police (*polizeiwissenschaft*) (Foucault, 1991: 92 and Foucault, 1995: 222). Police mechanism was about developing and preserving the internal forces within a state. Namely it was related with human activity (Foucault, 2009: 319-322). This effort had manifested itself with the proceedings against the idler, insane, old, patient, and beggar. They are confined in huge buildings<sup>47</sup> for preventing the idleness and for compulsory labor (Foucault, 2008a: 62-66 and Foucault, 1995: 198 *et seq.*). At this point juridical type of power was more significant than normalization. However police mechanism implied the individualizing aspect of the shepherd-flock game. Authority of the juridical type had been shaken by the rise of the individualization. The togetherness of the *raison d'état* and police mechanism was degraded in late-17<sup>th</sup> and early-18<sup>th</sup> centuries. The discontinuity was caused by the appearance of the “anatomy-politics of human body”, namely discipline (Foucault, 1978: 139 and Foucault, 1995: 208). Discipline is mostly described with the architectural form of panopticon (Foucault, 1995: 197-200). Panopticon consists of two circles: inner and outer. Outer circle consists of segregated cells, while inner circle is a tower which is connected to the outer. Individuals are completely visible from the tower and their movements are determined. Thus, they are open to anonymous, omnipresent, omniscient gaze/power. Hence, they play the game of shepherd-flock with one who stands in tower. Panopticon had spread all over the societal institutions such as schools, prisons, asylums, hospitals, factories, and so on (Foucault, 1995). During the practice of the disciplinary mechanisms (in late-18<sup>th</sup> century), another thing appeared in Western Europe: civil society (Agtaş, 2013: 36 and 226). Civil society appeared with the new problems of government which are related with effective and economic government (Foucault, 2008b: 292 *et seq.*). Within the civil society, disciplinary mechanisms had combined with the biopolitics (Foucault, 2008b: 21). Biopolitics had appeared with the ‘discovery’ of the population (Foucault, 1978: 25 and Foucault, 1991: 98). Then new problems of government were about the government of the population. Hence, individuals were

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<sup>47</sup> These architectural and social phenomena are conceptualized as Great Confinement by Foucault (Foucault, 1995).

approached as if they are species for overcoming those problems. This was the return of the city-citizen game. The concept of biopolitics is the subject of the third section of this text; therefore we can finish our historical story at this point.

Eventually, this historical narrative tries to manifest the change from the juridical type of power to the normalization<sup>48</sup> (Foucault, 1978: 86 and 89). Hence, this narrative shows the type of power differs along with the historical process. At this point we can confront with two possible criticisms on Foucault's historical investigation. Firstly, it is possible to direct criticism to the Foucault's connivance of the juridical power's role today. Foucault's periodization, however, is not complete rejection of the antecedent type. Then from Foucauldian point of view, it is hard to say that juridical type of power has withered away. For instance, Foucault's practical experience GIP<sup>49</sup> had consisted both of the problem of rationalization and the problem of law. This is because the prisoner as the subject is related with these two problems. On the one hand, it is defined by the legal structure, and on the other hand its exclusion is related with the ethics and the normal. Hence when interpreting Foucault's historical schema, we have to consider it as a triangle. Every type of power is located in the corner of the triangle. The social reality drifts between these corners, and the name of the era (sovereignty, discipline, or biopolitics) is defined with the reality's approximation to any corner. Thus, they are not distinctly separated, but rather we can trace 'past' elements within the 'present'. Secondly, another criticism can be directed towards the structuralist tendency in Foucault, which is mentioned earlier. This criticism is based on the Foucault's research objects as structure-like institutions (juridical system, sexuality, and so on). However, in Foucauldian methodology there is not the determination of the macro-powers over the micro-powers (Foucault, 2001c: 65). It has been already mentioned as the criticism of hierarchical and pyramidal imagination of the power. That is why these institutions are conceptualized machines, which are linked to the actions. As it is said, machines can consist of different subjectivities and machines within

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<sup>48</sup> Namely, from law-based understanding of power to the rationalization process.

<sup>49</sup> It is the Information Group on the Prisons. In 70s Foucault had played a part in this group for the political struggle of the prisoners.

themselves. For instance the confinement of the mad (Foucault, 2008a: 125 and Foucault, 1998a: 338) and the control over the child-sexuality (Foucault, 1978: 27 *et seq.*) were two mechanisms within the disciplinary, sexual, and familial machines. These mechanisms were not dictated by the monarchy or the bourgeoisie. On the other hand different subjects (i.e. modern parenthood) and mechanisms (i.e. nuclear family) within the disciplinary, sexual, and familial machines were the real reason behind for the change (Foucault, 1991: 90-91). Hence, power is always defined with the action in Foucault. As Deleuze says: “An ‘age’ does not pre-exist the statements which express it” (Deleuze, 2006: 48).

Besides of the criticisms on the Foucault historical analysis; Foucault can be criticized by his conceptualization of power as inevitable and inescapable entity. Actually we mentioned the rejection of entity-based action, however we should stress this within the concept of power. For instance, Megill stresses the role of nostalgia and its effect on Foucault. This effect is the absence of the any vision of liberation (Megill, 1987: 197). However, when Foucault mentions power he does not refer to its omnipresent nature. Foucault states that: “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978: 95). Thus, according to him power is always accompanied with the resistance, and vice versa. Power is conduct on the conduct, and resistance against it is the counter-conduct (Foucault, 2009: 201). Because of ‘things’ are between actions, the games between conducts and counter-conducts are unending. Hence, as there is no freedom (resistance) as such, power is not based on ontological foundation. Power and resistance do not stem from human nature (i.e. Hobbesian or Lockean human nature) or transcendent Being (i.e. God or progressive history). Then neither power is Evil nor resistance is Good, instead they are the results of various actions. Actually this aspect is noticed by Megill. After his criticism towards Foucault, he stresses the constant struggle in Foucauldian theory (Megill, 1987: 198). Hence freedom is a type of action as power (Foucault, 1997c: 282 and 292). It refers to denouncing, speaking out, exposing, and reversing the games of power (Foucault, 2008a: 214). Therefore through resistance limits are transgressed, new ways are found, and new strategies are created. What are the meanings of these processes? Apparently these processes refer to the subjectification

processes (Foucault, 1978: 11). Namely subject is also constituted through the resistance, therefore subjectification is not equated to the power.

Besides of the problem of the resistance, another problem appears with Foucault's statements on negative function of power. To what extent it is possible to declare the validity of the positive function of power, while there have been still genocides, ethnic cleansings, and totalitarian regimes? Foucault does not ignore the bloody conflicts are mere negativity. For opening a theoretical space for those, he differentiates power from domination (Foucault, 1997c: 283). While the practice of power is on the subjects, domination is on the slaves. This is because the subject is also related with the practice of freedom. Namely it has the space for creating new strategies. Slave, however, is enclosed by the domination. It has not any space for the new strategies or games of power. Therefore its reality (its truths, desires, and so on) is enforced through brute force<sup>50</sup>. Hence, the criticism of Foucault on fetishizing the power is irrelevant. This criticism stems from the confusion of power and domination. He does not reject the 'hard' times of the rulers which subjects transform into slaves. However these times are exempted the problem of power.

At this point, before passing the next link in the myth of Oedipus, we have to mention a conceptual shift within Foucauldian theory. In his early periods, Foucault refers to the war model (strategy based) for the power-actions and resistance-actions against annihilation and consensus models (Foucault, 1980d: 90 and 98). The war model refers to the continuous creation of new strategies, new ways, new technologies, and new governments (Newman, 2001: 78 and 80). In Deleuze's words, Foucault's schematization of power does not refer to the properties. Rather it is based on "dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, and functionings" (Deleuze, 2006: 25). This strategy-based understanding of power has been seen in the Foucauldian history. When Foucault criticized the structuralists, he referred his investigation of power through history as battles, rather than relying on the general

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<sup>50</sup> This supposition of Foucault can be seen in his evasion from the concepts of fascism and totalitarianism. He believes that, these conceptualizations of the contemporary political situation vulgarize the reality. Slavery and domination are exceptional instances within political arena. This point can be seen in his difference from Hannah Arendt, even though they had similar quest (Agamben, 1998).

language (Foucault, 2001d: 116). Hence, the difference of the strategic model is the rejection of any entity-based Meaning which universally justifies everything. However this model is gradually substituted with the biopolitical model with the *College de France* lessons in '75-'76 (*Society Must be Defended*) and '77-'78 (*Security, Territory, Population*). This shift is caused by the change in Foucault's problems. At that moment, Foucault started to problematize the governing the self, family, and state. Thus instead of direct conflicts, he started to underline the problem of government. However both positions consist of action-based theorization. The reason behind of explaining this shift is trying to expose the inconsistency of the attempt to summarize history of power.

The first link that stem from the myth of Oedipus has been explained so far. From now on, the object of analysis is the second link: subject-truth. The task of this section was set as the explanation of the concept of power in Foucault. However, finalizing the link between subject and power does not conclude the problem of the power. The theoretical circle of the power can only be closed by its relation with the truth (Deleuze, 2006: 82). That is why the second link from the myth is as important as the first one for locating the concept of power. The ontological (rejection of foundations) and methodological (rejection of non-historical approaches) explanations until now remarked the possible epistemological suppositions of Foucault. Namely, the problem of knowledge has been already latently interpreted. For instance, Foucault's criticism on the agent is based on the problem of epistemology. He said that: "the political question (...) is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself" (Foucault, 2001d: 133). Likewise, Deleuze underlines that, the problem of power in Foucault is about production of truth, instead of repression and ideology (Deleuze, 2006: 27). Thus, the epistemological problem of the Foucault is rejection of the nature or the core that is embedded in the agent. That is why, I will not further elaborate the main elements of Foucauldian epistemology. It is impossible to differentiate it from the ontological elements.

Regimes of truth specify what is true (sayable and performable) and untrue (unsayable and non-performable) in a society (Foucault, 2011a: 50). They are

different from mere linguistic sentences, and they are constituted through action (Foucault, 1978: 6; Foucault, 2005; Foucault, 2013; and Deleuze, 2006: 63). Thus, they are the instances of what Foucault calls as *dispositif* during his early periods. *Dispositif* distinguishes what can be said, known, and acted from what cannot be (Foucault, 2011b: 121) Moreover, *dispositif* remarks the materialistic quality of Foucault. This is because, this concept underlines the importance of the institutions along with discourses (Revel, 2008: 41). Hence, truth regimes are not simply mere discourses, they also consist of concrete institutions (Foucault, 2005). That is why truth regimes are related with the machines. For instance psychology, by referencing the distinction between sane and insane, constitutes a truth regime. This truth regime functions for the legitimization of the psychiatric machine. As it is said, the insane is not supposed to know the knowledge of this machine. However psychiatric machine does not exist as such. There are various subjectivities within them (psychiatrists, academicians, journalists, political figures, and so on). Their articulation within the psychiatric machine is directly related with the problem of knowing. Thus truth regime of the machine operates for mobilizing them for the machine. Moreover truth regime is also related with the subjects. Let me use the same example. The way of constitution of the insane (who is it, what is its position in everyday life, and so on) is also legitimized through the truth regime. Similarly insane have not necessarily know its own truth. It is the pre-defined insane insofar as its constitution as the insane within the social machine is known by various subjects and machines. The important point in these examples is the truth regimes' retroactive constitution of their own origins<sup>51</sup>. Thus, their operation within the societal machine proceeds as if they are entities. However, Foucault's search for regimes of truth and *dispositif* remarks that "truth is inseparable from the procedure establishing it" (Deleuze, 2006: 63).

Then, what is true and untrue is not presupposed as any idealistic attempt. Foucault's conceptualization of truth completely contrasts with Platonic idea and contemplation. Thus truth is not hidden or esoteric knowledge that keeps its core out of reality

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<sup>51</sup> Every episteme presents itself as if it is perpetual. For instance the link between capitalism, democracy, and liberalism and the emergence of the market instinctively cannot be interrogated in everyday life (Polanyi, 2001).

(Deleuze, 2006: 53 and Foucault, 1978: 17)<sup>52</sup>. Truth forces to act, to believe, and to confess. Foucault underlines the historical reality of the institution of confession: subject has been forced to confess the truth about itself. Truth operates through confession by making subject to produce the truth through its own confession (Foucault, 2011b: 141). As in the myth of Oedipus, the truth does not operate without the subject. However, I believe that there is a tricky part in this interpretation. This is because, when the capacity to determinate the truth is given to the subject, its differentiation from the agent withers away. As a result, the center of the Foucauldian theory, which is action, is ignored. Truth procedures as an agent expect this confession as if subject has the capability to purely self-produce the self. However, the constitutive action latently operates in here. Let us use the example of the religious confession process. The speaker of confession enters into relation with the listener of confession. Before this reciprocal relation their subjects have not been named, but only represent void which subject can proliferate. When the confession starts, the action from the speaker produces the listener subject as the priest. In return the 'gaze' from the priest produces the speaker as the sinner. Before those gestures, there was neither priest nor sinner. However, the mentioned trick covers this role of the action and imagines hypothetical self-construction. As in the situation within the games of power, those actions are not pre-determined fates. Namely, sinner is not the object of the priest. This is not only because of the capability to lie. Action from sinner ensures this too. Namely, the production of the priest through the acts from the sinner has concrete and material reality. Also the sinner interrogates the priest on 'what does priest expect from sinner' and 'what does priest is'. Priest is forced to confess itself metaphorically too. As the sinner does not know its truth before the action from the priest; the priest too does not know its truth until sinner's interrogation. This game between them can last forever until someone is satisfied with its produced truth and subjectivity. For every action towards the other will produce a gap in the self.

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<sup>52</sup> Foucault's criticism of mainstream understanding of Victorian sexuality in the beginning of *The History of Sexuality I* (1978) is an example of this statement.

As the power, truth is not defined as evil. Foucault's investigation on the truth mostly misunderstood as if he condemns it. However, resisting subjects have capability to constitute their own truth. It is true that, these concepts had slightly changed with the third period of Foucault. In late-70s and early-80s, Foucault started to investigate techniques of self, arts of existence, and ethical positioning. These new concepts appeared as the Good ethics against the Evil truth. However, I believe that, truth and ethics are not conceptualized as contrasting concepts. Instead the weight shift from truth to ethics is caused by the change the problematization in Foucault<sup>53</sup>. However this was not a complete rupture in Foucauldian terminology. This is because the concept of truth is still used in his third period, and there is a synonym of ethics in early periods. This synonymous concept is limit. Limit echoes Wittgenstein's grammar and Saussure's *langue*. However limit is not confinement of the subject within synchronic moments. Rather, it is always mentioned as historically processing limit-attitude. Limit-attitude is the differentiation of the subject from what it is. Foucault, by referencing to Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Artaud or to madness, points out what this differentiation from self is. Sometimes the truth of the subject is produced through the actions of other and is conducted upon the self. The mad, as it is stated, produced by the reference to its lack of reason. Limit-attitude is mad person's counter-strategy against its self which is defined with this lack. Hence, limit-attitude contrasts with religious or Kantian specification of the limit. It is the transgressing, going beyond, carrying out, and exceeding (Foucault, 1997d: 315). The literature's (i.e. Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Artaud) creation of the new languages, writing techniques, words, and grammars are the examples of early-Foucault (Foucault, 1998a: 339). As it is said especially in his third period, Foucault gave his main interest on the examples of new ways of life. Creation of new ways of life is always related with the reflection on the present. For instance, Foucault refers to Kant for the development of this reflection (Foucault, 1997d: 305). Even though Foucault's interpretation of Kant on present is the problem of the beginning of the third chapter; we will slightly mention it here too. Reflexing subject tries to understand what it is and why it is. However, this is not a simple contemplation. It

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<sup>53</sup> Actually main shift in this period was from power to ethics (see Foucault, 1988).



brings out new material creations and changes the order of the things. This constant criticism and creation is called as the *ethos* by Foucault (Foucault, 1997d: 309).

Then we can link the concept of *ethos* within limit-attitudes. *Ethos* is way of being, taking care of the self, and ensemble of behaviors (Foucault, 1997c: 286 and Foucault, 1988: 19). Hence *ethos* is nothing but ethics. Foucault distinguishes ethics (actuality) from the morality (mere contemplation). While the latter refers to the unidirectional and hierarchical dictation of the rules, the former relies on the action (Foucault, 2008a: 138 and Foucault, 1997a: 254 and 259)<sup>54</sup>. As truth and power, ethics is not free from governing and problematizing the self. For instance Foucault gives the examples from Ancient Greece for this governmentality: art of life (*tekhnê tou biou*) (Foucault, 1997a: 259 and Foucault, 1986: 43 *et seq.*). This means that ethics underlines the approaching the self as if it is a work of art. Maybe Megill's mentioned location of the Foucault in aesthetics derives from here. However, this does not refer to the idealistic nature of Foucault. On the other hand, ethics is neither narcissistic interest on self nor mere contemplation: it is related with criticism and action. Then, why Foucault emphasizes this aesthetic view? According to him, aesthetics, by excluding the normal, opens infinite possibilities and techniques (Foucault, 1997a: 254). Then, ethics appears as rupture from the self. However, this rupture brings out the production of the new subject. Therefore, it is not only negative, but also positive. This positivity can also be seen in Foucault's interpretation of the basis of Ancient Greek philosophy. According to Foucault, Ancient Greece had overflowed with two principles: "know thyself" and "take care of yourself" (Foucault, 1988: 22). By referencing the rise of Christian morality and Cartesian subject, he asserts that, the former principle imagined as the main principle of Ancient Greece. However these two principles cannot be separated. The examples from Plato to Roman Stoics expose that the one take care itself through knowing itself (Foucault, 1988: 23-27). It is important to underline that, this usage of knowing does not contrast with our statements on the machine and knowledge. Knowing itself does not refer to finding the universal Truth of the self. Instead, it refers to "what is

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<sup>54</sup> The difference between ethics and morality will be elaborated with the problem of cultural indebtedment.

the plateau on which I shall find my identity” (Foucault, 1988: 25)? In other words it is about to locate the self within its *milieu*. For instance we gave the example of worker who does not need to know the production machine for its resistance. However even though worker does not necessarily know this machine, it completely knows its plateau in working space. By knowing this location, the worker can practice on itself. This is because, there is not subject insofar as its environment is knowable and existing.

Consequently, the peculiarity of the Foucauldian theory appears with the rejection of entity. He substitutes the entity with the action and the void *lieu*. Those actions intersect in this *lieu* where the subject has been proliferated. Mentioned four different procedures common to subject. These are power, resistance, truth, and ethics. All of them produced by the action which produces the subject too. As it is said power is resistance and truth is ethics. Moreover, it can be asserted that, all of these procedures are equal. Namely power/resistance is truth/ethics. That is why, Foucault stresses that all of his three periods have common problematic. Next chapter will be exemplification and historicization of the theoretical positioning so far. Moreover, by the example of the indebted subject, we will return to our main problem: indebtedment.

### **2.3 An Example of Subject: Indebted Subject**

Foucauldian theoretical base from previous sections shows that subject is located in the intersection point of different action-powers. Namely, subject is process; thus it always implies subjectivity. However, any as mentioned earlier, subject is not individual. Rather it echoes the notion of ‘dividual’. For instance, Nietzsche is not *a* subject. Mad, author, philosopher, academic, male, heterosexual, and German Nietzsche represent different subjectivities within the same subject. Thus, one is not located in sole intersection point. It is always located in various nodal points. Hence in this text, mostly, I will ignore the variety of subjectivities because of the difficulty to grasp the whole social world. Herein indebted subject will be the main type of subjectivity. Moreover, indebted subject will not be interpreted from a normative perspective. It will not represent the absolute freedom from capitalism, exploitation,

oppression, and so on. Then, the question on the indebted subject is not about whether is good or evil. On the other hand, questions on the indebted subject are how it is constructed and which machines operate with it. Thus, in this section I will start with the actions which constitute this type of subject. Later, I will try to understand the discontinuity in indebted subject for clarifying which mechanisms have been operating. However, the examination of ‘present’ indebted subject will be elaborated in next chapter. Thus, this section will not close the problem of indebted subject.

First of all, the conceptual preference should be explained. Why this subject is characterized with indebtedment instead of simply calling it as debtor? The relation of debt is mostly described as the relation between debtor and lender (Graeber, 2011 and Douglas, 2016). In this schema, either debtor borrows money from lender or lender receives the promise to repay from the debtor. This is an apparent exchange. However, from the perspective of the indebted subject, action is passively positioned between two types of agent. It is true that this passivity does not refer to inertia. For instance, Graeber’s conceptualization of the debt certainly has inter-relational characteristics. Namely he criticizes any hypothetical and non-historical theorization. However, herein the concept of passivity refers to the discussion of agent, structure, and action in the light of Foucauldian theory. Foucault had differentiated from thinkers whom do not centralize action<sup>55</sup>. For elaborating this passivity, we can restate our formula on action for the debt: debt is not between debtor and lender; rather the indebted subject is between different types of debt-actions. There is no indebted, debtor, or lender before the relation of the debt. It is true that there are different kind of subjects exist before this action. They can be serf, pauper, bankrupted, and so on. Namely they can desperately need for money for surviving. On the other hand, they can be rich loan-sharks whom already in a debt-relation with other subjects. In spite of these realities, their relations between them constructed as between two indebted subjects insofar as the debt-action had occurred between them. Hence, indebted subjects are constituted if only debt-actions had practiced.

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<sup>55</sup> The examples of Bourdieu, Giddens, Berger, and Luckmann had been given in previous sections.

The conceptualization of indebted subject, however, can lead a crucial misunderstanding. This is because; this concept can be imagined as if it ignores the figures of pawnbroker, usurer, or loan-shark. Firstly, this misunderstanding stems from the fault localization of debt-action in a geometrical space. Two-dimensional imagination of this phenomenon concludes with the creation of sole indebted subject. Namely, in this situation three elements are considered: two actions and centered subject. However, the process of constitutive actions does not end in the subject's central location. Subject does not represent the terminus. It is only a moment which is intersected by multi-dimensional actions. In other words, this space is infinite by measurements and dimensions. The sole subject is not located in the center; because it is impossible to identify the center point of infinity. Thus, indebted subject is not only debtor, but consists of lender too. Second aspect of this misunderstanding is caused by the etymology of indebtment. The prefix of "in-" gives the meaning of within and into to the concept of debt. Thus, etymologically it stresses the being in a situation of debt. However, herein this concept does not refer only to the debtor. It contains the lender too. Otherwise, the debt-action would be concluded with sole subject or agent. The appearance of agent reverses the action-based and non-foundationalist theoretical gesture. Therefore, using the indebted subject for referring only the debtor is an oxymoron statement. Debtor is not slave in the indebtment, as well as, lender is not exempt from the effects of debt-action. They are co-created with the same action. Hence, debt-action constitutes both of them as subjects; not agents. For instance, debtor has capability to overcome debt-actions. It can find way outs, legal gaps, and arena against indebtment. Therefore, it is not a negative agent; which is completely dependent to other. On the other hand, lender's self is constituted by the debt-actions too. It encounters with new strategies, institutions, and legal codes against the indebtment. Therefore, it is not a positive agent; which exists *per se*. Hence the concept of indebted subject refers both of debtor and lender. However, for the matter of clarity, sometimes notions of debtor and of lender will be used too. This is because, debt-action, likewise all actions, is not symmetrical. An asymmetric characteristic of this action reflects on the constituted subjects too. When the matter necessitates stressing this asymmetry, for preventing any misunderstanding, these concepts will be used as well.

### 2.3.1 Indebtmnt in Pre-Modern Times

After remarking some possible problems on the concept of indebtment, we can pass to the investigation of the action which constitutes indebted subjects. When the indebtment have appeared in the social life? This question is quite hard to answer. It necessitates both anthropological study and somewhat hypothetical reasoning. Hence, it goes beyond the limits of this text. However, Graeber's schematization can help to summarize this problem. Graeber mentions two theoretical positioning in the literature for answering the question of the genesis of debt. These are primordial debt theory and money as the debt theory (Graeber, 2011: 120-136). Firstly, there is primordial debt theory. Primordial debt theory represents what we have been criticizing in the ontological level. It presupposes a distinct outside point beyond the reality, which it has been conceptualized as idealism. This outside point is, generally, represented as the ancestors in the beginning (Gauchet, 2011). Ancestors are considered the reason behind of living in present. It is true that biologically, everyone owes its life to its ancestor's reproduction. However, this biological debt has not been considered in everyday life. Especially if we talk about beginnings, namely tribal/egalitarian communities<sup>56</sup>, the reproduction was not a debt at all. It was inevitable 'magic' of the woman (Canetti, 2012). On the other hand, crucial debt that is owed to ancestors has been the moral one. Primordial debt theorists conceptualize this moral debt as if it cannot be paid (Graeber, 2011: 21). We can elaborate these suppositions with historical instances. For instance, in ancient tribal/egalitarian communities' rites of passage; engraving, incising, and carving the body for the symbolization of community's moral codes shows the importance of the moral debt<sup>57</sup> over the biological one (Canetti, 2012 and Eliade, 2012). They harmed their biological existence for showing the respect to the morality. Lack of the traces of

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<sup>56</sup> By the concept of tribal/egalitarian community, I refer to the pre-state era communities. By Clastres's words, these societies are defined with the absolute distinction of action to rule (*potestas*) and source of the rule (*auctoritas*) (Clastres, 1989). This can be seen in the distinction between community's world and spirit world. Namely, these communities are defined with the strict equality and lack of any chieftdom.

<sup>57</sup> Herein the concept of morality refers to the every aspect within related community. It is used as the ancient generalization of culture, religion, economy, and politics. In these tribal/egalitarian communities there was no specialization of these areas.

these rites refers to difference from the community. Apart from that, sacrifice of the body for ancestor is another example. Thus, even the total biological existence could be stigmatized with the moral debt to ancestors. Herein, there is no difference between moral debt and morality. This is because; morality was the heritage of the ancestors and without it the community would be collapsed and without community persons were meaningless (Gauchet, 2011). Then, the community<sup>58</sup> exists by the ancestors' reflections on this world. Namely, community owes its existence to ancestors and it will never be able to pay this debt until death. Maybe one can criticize these statements by referencing the difficulty to differentiate body (biological) from soul (moral) in these communities. Hence we should other examples. Besides of ancient tribal communities, primordial debt can be seen in Abrahamic religious communities too<sup>59</sup> (Graeber, 2011: 286). For instance the link between debt and sin in Christianity is the most evident example. The genesis of the human is a sin that is conducted by Adam and Eve. Human is, immanently, guilty for being exist. The debt had been interiorized in itself (Lazzarato, 2012: 78). That is why; it has to sacrifice compensation of its guilt. However, a Christian is not a pagan, so it cannot sacrifice another living creature, especially human. At this point, Christian world view relies on Jesus the Redeemer. He sacrifices itself for the sins/debts of the human. Even though the redemption of Jesus had occurred; the infinite debt within the human still lasts until the Judgment Day (Lazzarato, 2012: 78). On the other hand, Islamic world view lacks of this redeemer figure. That is why; it had to codify the economic redemption as a pillar of Islam<sup>60</sup>. Hence, primordial debt theory is based on a deific gesture which embeds the debt into the being. Graeber asserts that, Nietzsche is another figure of this position (Graeber, 2011: 76-77). In *On the Genealogy of Morality* Nietzsche refers that kind of

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<sup>58</sup> It is quite hard to mention an individual in these communities (Canetti, 2012). Thus, this expression consists of both of individual and society as their modern distinction.

<sup>59</sup> Graber, in his book of *Debt*, also gives examples from other religious communities such as India and China. However, they pass beyond my intellectual awareness. Thus I will not use examples from these communities. Hence, this connivance is not about an ethnocentric point of view. Rather it is the result of my incompetence.

<sup>60</sup> Herein I mention *zakat*, compulsory charity to paupers. However, economic redemption is not about primordial debt. Thus, we will return to this topic later.

indebtment. However, contrary to Graeber, I believe that Nietzsche is not similar to other primordial debt theorists. This difference is caused by the distinction between idealism and materialistic aspects of ideational things. Namely, Nietzsche's investigation of idealistic primordial debt is not based on the existence of any foundational Being. Rather it only stresses the materialistic effects of the 'unreal' things that are imagined as if real. However, we have to end this discussion now. This is because; primordial debt theory will be elaborated in next chapter as cultural indebtment. For now it is adequate to being aware of criticisms on the primordial debt theory stems from the criticism of idealism which is conducted in previous chapters.

Secondly, there is money as debt theory. On the contrary of first theorization, this is not self-explanatory. This is because; debt is not clarified by any definite concept. Rather, it is referred with another vague concept: money. Then, the explanation of money will expose the link between itself and debt. Then, what is money; or, more properly, how money processes? Precisely, answering this question goes beyond the limits of this text too. However, a brief interpretation will clear up both how indebtment processes and how the indebted had constituted. There are two main answers to the question on money. On the one hand, there is liberal<sup>61</sup> story of the money: money is commodity and is used with exchange value (Graeber, 2011: 73). This interpretation can be seen in Adam Smith's definition of market (Smith, 2007). In the market individuals wish to exchange their products and services in the light of self-desires by their reasons. This exchange relation needs a medium, which is money (Douglas, 2016: 63-65). Similarly most influential thinkers for neoliberalism such as Ludwig von Mises, Carl Menger, and so on maintain this presupposition (Douglas, 2016: 64). However conceptualization of money as the simple medium for exchange covers the asymmetry created by itself. Parts of the exchange are rarely equal. Thus, exchange does not consist of mere willingness. There are always force, exploitation, and deception (Lazzarato, 2012: 75). Then this medium is not blameless. Money always represents unequal exchange. Money's representation of

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<sup>61</sup> In this text, generally, liberalism is not reduced to the capitalism, and vice versa. However, this interpretation of money includes both of them.

inequality is not only based on its quantity, rather qualitatively the difference between social forces shows this inequality too. In forthcoming paragraphs we will call this function of money as debt. Herein, we can only mark the absence of the reality of debt in Smith, von Mises, Menger, and so on. The connivance of the debt (whether is deliberate or not) is a necessity for conceptualizing the money as mere medium. Otherwise, the symmetrical and voluntary exchange within the market would be impossible to contemplate. Moreover the theorization of money as mere medium is supported by an unhistorical story<sup>62</sup>. This story is the myth of barter. According to the story, once upon a time societies were unaware of the concept of money. Within these societies, exchanges for needs had been resolved by barter. For instance, one member of the society had been producing barley (for production of beer) and another one had been producing wheat (for production of bread). However, they had to own both of these products for sustaining the life. Thus they decided to swap their surplus products for the other ones. However, at one point, usage of these products/commodities became complicated because of the growth of societies. This growth caused the proliferation of different products and needs. Proliferation complicated the exchange of various commodities. Moreover, commodities which had been used for bartering also had been used to different needs: nutrition, raw material for tools, and so on. Hence, these societies required an ‘imaginary’, namely non-vital (not about nutrition, raw material, and so on), medium. That is why virtual money has been created (Graeber, 2011: 40-45). Within a mainstream approach, this creation has been marked with the invention of ‘money’ by Lydian, Chinese, and Indian civilizations circa 600 and 500 BCE (Graeber 2011: 212). Eventually, the transition from barter to ‘money’ has been told like this. However, this story has not been verified within the history by anyone (Graeber, 2011: 75 and Douglas, 2016: 72). Graeber states that, this unhistorical story has been released into circulation by Adam Smith. Smith asserts that, American indigenous people are the examples of the barter system. However, Graeber questions the ‘references’ of Adam Smith. He asserts that Smith has not access to any information on the economic structure of these communities. On the other hand, a couple decades later, Lewis Henry

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<sup>62</sup> Likewise every idealist theory.



Morgan's research on Iroquois put forward the opposite: Those indigenous people had not been using the barter system at all (Graeber, 2011: 29). Unfortunately, instead of Morgan's field study, Smith's contemplation on a hypothetical and unhistorical narrative has been dominated. Even the introduction books for high schools maintain this story.

Then, why the barter myth has been maintained? I believe that, it is not only an attempt to fill the theoretical gap of absence of the peaceful 'money'. However, as it is said, money function in the circulation is much more than that. I believe that, peaceful barter societies are not about the past. They are utopic goals for today. Smith's example on invisible hand<sup>63</sup> echoes the American indigenous societies' hunter, leather man, and so on. As in the peaceful exchange between hunter and leather man; the 18<sup>th</sup> century's Brit butcher, brewer, and baker realizes the peaceful exchange. Hence, I believe that, barter myth is an essential narrative for referring the peaceful capability of free market, namely capitalism. However, I am aware of 18<sup>th</sup> century's British was more complex than American societies at the same time. This complexity was solved by the appearance of money. Thus, the small difference between those two examples is: The exchange in the latter is ensured by the money. However social life has never relied on any peaceful, non-political, and egalitarian exchange. But rather it is based on asymmetrical relations (Lazzarato, 2012: 11). Then, if money is not related with barter what it really is? The answer lies down in the second interpretation of money, namely money as debt.

Hence on the other hand, there is the conceptualization of money as IOU<sup>64</sup> (Graeber, 2011: 73-74 and Douglas, 2016: 75). In other words, money is simply an acknowledgment of the debt. It is interesting that this link can be seen etymologically in Turkish<sup>65</sup>. *Borç* (debt) is derived from Sogdian<sup>66</sup> word of *pwrç* or Avestan<sup>67</sup> word

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<sup>63</sup> According to Smith butcher, brewer, and baker sells their goods for their own interests. However, the invisible hand of the free market makes everyone profit. This is because, in the end they were achieved their needed commodities (see Smith, 2007).

<sup>64</sup> IOU is the abbreviation of "I Owe You". It is a document of the acknowledgement of and promise to pay the debt.

<sup>65</sup> See <https://www.etimolojiturkce.com/kelime/bor%C3%A7> (last access August 2017).

of *pārati*. Both of them mean borrowing or lending. However, similarly the word of money (*para* in Turkish and *pāra* in Avestan) has been also derived from same root. Besides of this etymological similarity, we can return to our topic. Money as debt relies on heterodox money theory which is represented by André Orléan and Michel Aglietta within French Regulation School (Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1043-1044 and Lazzarato, 2014a: 64-65). This theorization, along with some interpretations on Marxist money theory<sup>68</sup>, distinguishes money as two types: Money as capital and money as commodity. While the latter refers to egalitarian exchange, the former is based on money as debt. Money has been extracted from the commons for affirming their debts to rulers. Similarly credit is a promise which guarantees the affirmation of debt in future when the debt-money will be circulated (Lazzarato, 2012: 45). Hence when the one passes the money, he accepts that he owes the other one. It is true that, difficult to see this function of money at contemporary complexity. Some people can assert that, we are using the money for buying commodities, goods, or services. Namely the payment is not related with indebtedment, but rather is about satisfying the labor. However this contemplation presupposes the equal relation between producer and consumer. It ignores political asymmetry between worker (both producer and sometimes consumer) and capitalist<sup>69</sup>. In Graeber's words, the virtual aspect of money still maintains the indebtedment today (Graeber, 2011: 40 and 46). This virtual aspect, namely debt, can be understood as the content of money. For instance, form of money can appear as slave, coinage, bond, bill, tax, rent, or wage. On the other hand, its content resembles the debt. Whichever currency (coin, social, and so on) can be used as exchange, where there is money there is debt. How can we understand this virtual aspect? Asymmetrical power relations as conduct on conduct are the marks of the existence of debt-relations. Debt constitutes a promise (Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1042). This promise is about repayment. Thus debt is always accompanied with the future

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<sup>66</sup> An extinct language which belongs to Indo-European language family.

<sup>67</sup> Ancient Persian language.

<sup>68</sup> The interpretation of Marxist notions on indebtedment, we have to wait for the next chapter.

<sup>69</sup> Contemporary situation and debt-relations of capitalist and workers will be interpreted in next chapter.

actions. It shapes the subject's future. On the one hand the debtor can give up its leisure time (i.e. lifelong wage-labor), its freedom (i.e. debt bondage), or its future expenses (i.e. austerity policies). On the other hand the lender is endowed for interest which will raise its asymmetrical force over others. Hence indebtment effects the potential and possible through conducting the one's future (Lazzarato, 2014a: 20). The potential and possible of the one, because of its indeterminacy, provides which subjectivity process in which the subject will flow. Thus debt-actions' effects on the future are not only constitutes the one as indebted subject, but rather they act upon its future subjectivities too. Because of the political asymmetry in debt-action, we should stress this effect on the potential and possible as the maintaining the indebted subject through ages. I believe that, even though there are crucial ruptures in indebtment, I will be able to show the continuity of debt-actions. It is important to underline that, these statements are not directly related with the condemnation of debt and money. This is because, the asymmetrical relations between debtor and lender do not constitute the former as slaves or somewhat voodoo dolls. The indebted subject is only *conducted* by the debt-action (Lazzarato, 2012: 9 and 31). These relations also contain the capability to resist, counter-conducts, finding new ways, and rejections. I believe that, our historical interpretation of indebtment will also expose former and possible escape routes.

Hence, money has not been created by 7<sup>th</sup> BCE century's civilizations. This misunderstanding is caused by the confusion of money and coinage (Graeber, 2011: 212-213). Coinage is only a form of the money. As in the barter theory, money did not appear at one specific moment of history. On the other hand, 'the creation of Eve'<sup>70</sup> had accompanied with the genesis of the money. However, we have already criticized this foundationalist statement within the primordial debt theory. Then what is the difference between primordial debt and the money as debt? The former refers to everlasting debt as idea in which can be found in the genesis of humanity. In

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<sup>70</sup> I refer to the hypothetical genesis of the 'other' which is different from the 'self'. This reference stresses that, an action had occurred and it had constituted two different subjects. Thus, it is a moment where our theoretical infinite schema (action-subject-action: A-S-A) had been appeared. I use this hypothetical moment as an example because, it is impossible to locate the real historical moment. Lack of historical sources prevents any of these attempts.

Graeber's words, it is "the recognition of an absolute debt" (Graeber, 2011: 136). This debt as idea is between the one and Structure (God, ancestors, or society). On the other hand, the latter refers to reciprocal relation between two sides of debt. Thus it is a type of action between different humans (Graeber, 2011: 122). Hence, money as debt differentiates itself from primordial debt by referring the "network of dyadic relations" (Graeber, 2011: 136). Secondly we have to underline the distinction between money as debt and liberal theories again. Actions are not always simultaneous as well as not symmetrical. At these situations, action constitutes the subject as if it owes the other products of action. Namely, the subject is constituted by the 'incomplete'<sup>71</sup> action (Graeber, 2011: 121). As it is said, debt-action always includes the promise to pay, therefore it refers to the future liability. When the exchange had occurred, the promise had implied. It is possible that, this 'future' can refer to couple of seconds later. However using credit cards, buying state bonds, depositing money, obtaining credit, and pawning shows that, this 'incomplete' has played crucial roles since the emergence of the money. Then there is not a situation which two traders exchange their goods simultaneously. On the contrary, there is a distance between these two actions. First action, for instance when an Anatolian ancient community delivered the obsidian or lumber to Mesopotamian city-state, the latter's trader constituted as the one who owes something. On the other hand, second action, when the latter's trader delivered the metalworking product it constitute itself as if not indebted subject. Another example: When an Ancient Greek farmer obtained credit from a usurer, he transformed into indebted subject. The reciprocity in the action will only be completed with its payment of his debt to the lender. However, this payment would erase the indebted subjectivity. Hence, this incomplete quality of the action causes exception from equality that is imagined by liberal theorists (Graeber, 2011: 120). This is because, every debt-action constitutes unequal obligation against the other.

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<sup>71</sup> This does not mean that, action still goes on. Actually, all actions always go on. However, by incomplete action, I mean that, it forces the subject to forthcoming feedback. Actually the promise of this feedback is a performative utterance, namely an action, too. However, the latancy of this promise within the money forces to use of the concept of incomplete. However this concept will be inside the quote and quote; this is because, it is exceptional.

I believe that, this inequality is the mark of an attempt for the debt that cannot be paid. Graeber asserts that, infinite debt is related with the primordial debt theory (Graeber, 2011: 62 and 120). Firstly, infinite debt reminds the unhistorical myth. I believe that, this criticism is caused by, social interactions' results. Even if the results are countless, they are not inaccessible as ideas. This is because, being inaccessible means being undefined. As we have already mentioned in previous sections, this undefined characteristic is used by self-justification of any Being-centric view or idealism. However, from a materialistic perspective, referencing an ideational concept does not mean that these concepts are real. Also rejecting ideal concepts does not mean that ideational concepts are ineffective. That is why ideational and ideal concepts should be differentiated. While the latter refers to acknowledgement of transcended reality, the former refers to the material effects of those concepts as if they are real even though they are not. Thus, using the concept of infinite debt does not mean that it is actually real. It only refers that it affects the material world. Secondly, Graeber believes that debt is defined with the trust to repayment (Graeber, 2011: 328). Debt-action is a declaration of promise to repayment and of trust to this promise. Otherwise, interaction would be ceased to exist. This is because, the lender would not lend and the reciprocity would be no longer. Then debt, as a reciprocal action, would not exist without trust. However, what if the lender does not need to trust, but only need to debtor has to act as if there is a trust? Namely, the social obligation for return the trust can be useful for the social and political sanctions. Then, beforehand of trust, debt is mainly defined with the moral obligation (Lazzarato, 2012: 29-30). Similarly, Douglas stresses the etymological root of debt. Latin verb of *debere* means to be obliged (Douglas, 2016: 5). Mentioned 'incompleteness' in action causes this obligation. The asymmetrical link between two types of indebted subject is ensured by this obligation. Namely, one who is obliged accepts the superiority of the one who is owed. The one who is owed does not need to trust. The existence of obligation within the moral code of society is enough for the constitution of asymmetry. However, we have to consider that, this obligation, at last, stems from the trust itself. The social obligation on the indebted subject who owes is the not disappointing the other one's trust. Hence other one should not need to trust, instead society ensures as if there is a trust. For the preservation of society,

not the subjects, but the social actions have to process as if there is a trust. That is why Graeber finds the trust in the center of the debt. However, I believe that, one who is owed to can benefit from this trust by not trusting the one who owes. This is where the concept of pawn appears in debt/money link (Douglas, 2016: 22 and Graeber, 2011: 154 *et seq.*). For securing the trust, the lender can expect a material guarantee. Hence, after any fault on the trust, lender can seize the holdings, goods, family, and even itself of the debtor by not trusting him at the beginning. That is why, I believe, obligation is more crucial for debt, even though it is stem from the trust. Moreover, debt cannot be paid can ideationally exist in money as IOU theory.

Eventually, we have two different interpretations on what money is. Douglas summarizes these two as barter-to-commodity and gift-to-credit (Douglas, 2016: 76). The process of gift-to-credit is what we have been called money is IOU or debt. However the moment of transformation from gift to credit is an illusion. Likewise relationship between money as commodity and barter, there is credit insofar as there is gift and vice versa. So far we have tried to understand when the indebtment appeared in social life and we try to equate it with the emergence of money. Thus we located the indebtment in the genesis of society. However, it is impossible to locate this moment materially. Even though, this impossibility should not lead us to connivance of the historical process at all. That is why, we have to give historical examples on the link between debt and money and appearance of the indebtment. First of all, a quotation from Robert Cassel can remind this text's approach to historical phenomena:

“If it is in fact forbidden to make use of a past that contradicts the demands of historical methodology, it does appear legitimate to me to pose questions of this historical material that historians themselves have not necessarily raised, and to revive it from the point of view of new categories (...) (Castel, 2003: xix)”.

Then, I am aware of the inadequacy of not using any historical methodology. However, within the limits of this text it is impossible to maintain any historical methods. Main goal of this chapter is the problematization of the indebtment and indebted subject. That is why I will only re-read historical narratives according to text's problem.

Tribal/egalitarian communities have been defined with their strict structural boundaries (Clastres, 1989 and Canetti, 2012). Any member of community should have to follow the way of the community. Otherwise, the worst thing will be happened to it: Banishment. This is the worst thing, because the alterity of the banished would prevent its acceptance by other communities too. Thus, it would be transformed into a wild animal that did not belong to any community. These strict codes which prevented any alterity can be defined as the rituals. Then, rituals operated in the every aspect of life within tribal/egalitarian communities (Clastres, 1989 and Canetti, 2012). For instance, the totem of the community, as a ritual, had been accepted as the 'mother' of the community (Canetti, 2012: 111-116). Thus every community also represented as different species and their rituals are strictly separated from each other. This distinctiveness and strict codes of communities had created problems on the exchange between different societies. This is because, communities had codified each other with absolute alterity. Maybe one can criticize this positioning as the rarity of the exchange in these societies. In the end, their population was too few and there were plenty of inhabited areas with plenty of resources. Thus they do not need to exchange for surviving. However, exchange between them could not be only the exchange of the goods and humans. Rather encountering while migration also refers to an exchange: spatial exchange. Moreover, first agricultural villages also needed the exchange of different goods such as precious materials, agricultural products, weapons, and so on. Thus the social interaction was much more interactive than imagined (Sahlins, 1972). Then how these communities had developed a solution to problem of exchange? The solution was enlarging the domination of the rituals to the space of inter-communal relations. Hence the exchange was not free, symmetrical, and simultaneous exchange as barter. Rather it had cut into different phases of rituals. This exchange ritual can be called as gift (Mauss, 2002). For the process of gift ritual Graeber gives an example from the Icelandic saga of Egil (Graeber, 2011: 118). When Egil's friend Einar gave a god-like shield as a gift to Egil, Egil was frustrated and took the road for killing Einar. This is because, as the result of their ritual games, Egil had to give a similar gift to Einar. However, impossibility to find such a gift, transformed Egil into indebted subject. Namely, Egil is asymmetrically transformed into indebted subject. This

degradation was the main reason behind of the anger of Egil: The ritual should be concluded, otherwise he would be imposed sanction because of the fault to the implemented trust. When Egil could not manage to find Einar, he returned to his home for composing a god-like poem for Einar. Besides of this myth, Graeber gives examples from Achaeans (Greek mainland), Maoris (New Zealand), and some North American communities (Kwakiutl, Tlingit, and Haida) too (Graeber, 2011: 117). In the same way, after the appearance of first chieftains<sup>72</sup>, chiefs had tried to give gifts to other community members. These gifts were mostly magnificent precious metals and lavish banquets. By this exchange, chiefs had tried to transform other community members into the indebted subjects. This is because, typical community members usually had not access resources to return those gifts. Most of tribal/egalitarian communities were aware of this problem. That is why they tried to prevent every attempt to gift exchange within the society, likewise their prevention of warrior's force and chief's words (Clastres, 1989). Similarly, Graeber quotes an experience of Peter Freuchen's experience in a Greenlandic community (Graeber, 2011: 119). When a walrus hunter shared meat with, Freuchen thanked back to him. This behavior insulted the walrus hunter and he insulted back to Freuchen. This is because, the walrus hunter thought that Freuchen implied the desire of becoming-chief of the walrus hunter. The thankfulness referred the precious gift that was given to Freuchen. This thanking broke the ritual which forbids the gift exchange within community. Namely, it 'undermined' the ritual against asymmetry.

Until now we have only gave examples of gift within the same community. On the contrary of this situation, gift exchanges with other communities were not limited because of authority problem. In these communities there were not coinage, therefore they misinterpreted as pre-money communities. However, they only had not the coin. Another form of money had still operated in them. The existence of this money can be exposed by the presence of debt. Graeber uses the term of human economy for describing the economic life in these communities. Human economies are operated by social currencies, namely humans and animals. Thus, the form of money in tribal/egalitarian communities was the social currency. However, even though we

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<sup>72</sup> The dissolution of tribal/egalitarian communities.



described it with humans and animals, the currency was mainly the exchange of the females<sup>73</sup>. The usage of women as currency is another historical phenomenon against the hypothetical symmetric exchange. This is because, communal exchange has also included rape, humiliation, and torture from the beginning, namely the inequality (Graeber, 2011: 128). That is why controlling the subjectivity of women has been one of the most important issue: They have been the ‘capital’. When two communities had encountered they had two options. They either fight to death or develop peaceful gift exchange. If those communities do not need many goods from each other, the gift exchange had been ensured by the exchange of women as social currency. This type of gift exchange is marriage. Marriage was the most common type of using women as currency. Moreover, it has been, relatively, most symmetrical one. In the process of marriage when the bride had given to groom, the family of the groom became indebted. This marriage action constituted two different indebted subjects which consist of different weights. Groom’s family as indebted subject had to complete the ritual by giving their counter-gift which is usually bride-price (Graeber, 2011: 131). Bride-price was the compensation of the indebtedment and the fault within it would be concluded with sanction.

Another example of debt via gift within the human economies can be seen in blood-feuds. Examples from Nuer (in Sudan) and Lele (in Congo) show that, when a member community is killed by another community’s member, the former became indebted to the latter. This situation could only be solved by giving the gift (or social currency) to latter. The blood of the victim was the first gift which is given to the other community. Thus, other community should compensate this indebtedness. Otherwise, as a sanction, they would be transformed into killable persons. Namely, killing them would not face any juridical, magical, or debt-related sanctions. The counter-gift of the community can be the killer or another human, especially a woman (Graeber, 2011: 134-141). In this situation, the role of gifted woman is different from the bride. Bride has the protection of marital bounds. However gifted woman, whether after blood-feud or simply another debt, cannot benefit from this

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<sup>73</sup> I am aware of matrilocal marriages which the groom is exchanged. However, these types of marriage have been quite rare. Thus, I ignored this historical fact.

type of protection. Moreover the fate of this woman could be created by kidnapping her within a conflict. In those situations, this women had been transformed into village-woman (Graeber, 2011: 141 and 147). At this situation we cannot mention the woman as the indebted subject. She became slave after this degradation. This moment, which is the enslavement of the indebted subject, also refers to the emergence of prostitution and of patriarchal honor against this possibility<sup>74</sup>.

Of course women were not the only examples of enslaved indebted subject, namely debt peon. Atlantic slave trade showed instances from men too. Those men were necessary for the production in the Americas where the labor force was lack. However we cannot use similarity between gift and debt from the viewpoint of enslaved person. This is because, if we remember the situation as gift, constituted subjects were either communities or other persons. One who had transformed into the gift loses its humanity. Namely it is objectified by being gift (Graeber, 2011: 116). In slave trade, the debt-action was between European traders and local African merchants elites (Graeber, 2011: 150). These merchants kidnapped African indigenous people and sold them in the harbors. By selling these social currencies, merchants acquired Western luxuries, clothes, weapons, and so on<sup>75</sup>. Hence, African merchant had problems on securing the debt-action. This is because slave trader cannot stop by the same port again. Apparently, even though this problem, slave traders by their asymmetrical capabilities forced merchants into pawnship<sup>76</sup>. This means that, the merchant gave one of its children to the slave trader as pawn (Graeber, 2011: 154). However, it is important to consider that these pawns were different than slaves. I believe that, they only used for preventing any collaboration between slaves and merchants. Apparently pawnship was not an exceptional event in

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<sup>74</sup> It is important to stress that, even though we narrate these events as chronologically, in fact they were not. For the matter of clarity, they have been juxtaposed as if they have been chronological. Moreover, I used the theoretical positioning of Gerda Lerner (the problem of unequal property and enslavement) for stressing the hypothetical moment which prostitution had emerged (Lerner, 1986).

<sup>75</sup> This process have been named as Triangular Trade: A European ship with capital gets slaves from Africa, trade them in America for goods, and transport the goods back to Europe for acquiring capital. It is interesting that, this process perfectly fits to Marxist infinite schema of Money-Production-Money.

<sup>76</sup> Same situation, which is interest payment to debtor by lender, can be seen within the relationship between capitalist and worker. I will elaborate this aspect in next chapter.

Triangular Trade. For instance, by referencing to Michael Hudson, Douglas stresses the etymological bond between offspring and interest (Douglas, 2016: 37). Greek “*tókos*”, Sumerian “*máš*”, and Latin “*foenus*” mean both of offspring and interest. The ‘incompleteness’ of the debt-action causes the need for guarantee. However, this guarantee is not for only the capital debt. Rather it involves the interest too. The asymmetry between the indebted subjects leads to the exploitation of the debtor by lender (or the contrary in some situations). This exploitation is the usury which seizing the calculated interest or surplus value. The interest rate becomes unbearable when, in Douglas’s words, the debt deflation had occurred (Douglas, 2016: 36-38). For instance, within the Atlantic slave trade, when the supply of slaves became less than total debt, the debt deflation occurred. The dangers of debt deflation lead the lender to take guarantee. This is because, the debtor would ignore the repayment of interest or the capital at all. Hence the link between offspring and interest appears like this. The pawns have been transformed into debt-slaves insofar as the debt-action has been faulted. Thus there is a thin line between the pawn and slave. For instance, Graeber states that, the first ever recorded word of freedom is the Sumerian “*amargi*”, which means returning to the mother (Graeber, 2011: 65). Thus, whether pawn or slave, the end of the debt-action means freedom or returning to the home.

Eventually, indebted subject is different from the slave. However, it has been threatened with the degradation to slavery. Pawnship has been most important threat for enslavement through indebtedment. With these conclusions we can pass to the problem of indebtedment in the first city-states of Fertile Crescent. The social currency was still in these times. However, different kinds of commodities were used as currency too. For instance barley was the most common currency (Childe, 2009: 110-111). As the function of the credit cards in contemporary world, the needed amount of barley for exchange was not transported everywhere. Barley was used as a common medium between different commodities. The value of commodities was calculated by the reference to their barley-values. After this note, we can return the space of Fertile Crescent. Graeber divides the Fertile Crescent into two main spaces (Graeber, 2011). On the one hand, there were city-states in Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates basins which will be called as core. This space was the more complex one

with their city-cultures, temples, high-ideological systems, active commercial life, and so on. On the other hand, there were peripheral communities in deserts, small oases, and so on. These communities were mainly created by the exodus from center. The narrative of money and of indebtedness in Fertile Crescent can be interpreted by this spatial distinction. Graeber refers to most known resources for example: The Old and New Testaments. Biblical sources<sup>77</sup>, constantly, refers to moral crisis in the core (Graeber, 2011: 177). The exodus from Egypt and Babylon is narrated with the condemnation of those core civilizations. Prostitution, decadence, and debauchery characterize the core societies. Moreover, this condemnation is not only common to their everyday life. The religious activities in core are also related with these 'dishonorable' actions. In Mesopotamian temples, which were also the heart of city and everyday life<sup>78</sup>, there were priestesses (hierodules) which were assigned for prostitution<sup>79</sup>. This ritual had symbolized the creation of world and fertility by sexual intercourse with god (*hieros gamos*) (Eliade, 2012: 78-95 and Lerner, 1986: 239 *et seq.*). Apparently the existence of priestess, hierodules, prostitutes, married women, and slave women had created the problem of identification of women in everyday life. For finding solutions to this problem, plenty of law codes had created. Most important ones are related with the veiling of women which are not occupying prostitution. Graeber gives examples from Assyrian Law Code between 1400 and 1100 BCE (Graeber, 2011: 184). In spite of these regulations, the status on the women in core was still important. Daily, political, and religious lives had overflowed by the women's presence (Graeber, 2011: 178). For instance, there were quite important women rulers, which was lack in the periphery: Semiramis, Baranamtarra, Shagshag, Nefertiti, Hatshepsut, and so on. Also there are plenty of

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<sup>77</sup> Biblical stories are the stories of the periphery. For instance, De Ste. Croix asserts that, in New Testament the mentioned urban areas such as Nazareth, Capernaum, Nain, Chorazin, Bethsaida, Sychar, Ephraim, Arimathea and Bethlehem were far from being a polis. They were located in the countryside (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 425-433).

<sup>78</sup> Those temples were not only about worshipping gods. They were used as palace, storehouse, school, shop, and so on. Moreover, architecturally they had built on the center or heart of the city (Childe, 2009: 105-129).

<sup>79</sup> I am aware of Lerner's criticism of confusing the hierodule and the enslaved commercial prostitute (Lerner, 1986: 239). However, I do not locate the hierodule on the genesis of prostitution. I am only referring the problem of identification of *different* status of women.

cuneiform tablets which show the business women discuss job-related issues via correspondence (Barber, 1994: 164). However, pawnship had still haunted the freedom of women. Constant wars between different city-states and invasions of nomads created dangerous environment in rural areas. However, entire city-state system in the core was based on the rural areas around the cities (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 9-18). The decrease in rural production, however, affected the rural areas more than the cities. This is because; main function of city administrations was withdrawing the surplus from rural areas<sup>80</sup>. Namely, the decrease in production did not affect the goods which flow to the city. It affected the goods which remained to the farmer. Moreover, even rare peace times did not help the farmer at all. Natural events such as drought, insect invasion, bad flooding of rivers, fire, and so on created the decrease in production too. Besides of rural farmers, artisans and merchants in the cities were affected by similar natural, social, and political events. In these situations, for sustaining the life, one needed to borrow money from lender. These actions constituted two indebted subjects. However, most of times, the fail in the production cannot be recovered. Thus, the harshness of the debt, namely interest rate had raised. The mentioned debt deflation had been occurred in these times. The consequences of the fault of debt have been more serious within the debt deflation. The field or means of production (such as animals, tools, and so on) firstly had declared as 'mortgaged' and later were seized by the lender. Moreover, even if this was not enough for compensation of debt or the debtor simply had not any place or means, transforming family members to pawn had reappeared. By the institution of pawnship, lenders achieved the capability to enslave the indebted one's family and even itself (Graeber, 2011: 180). The enslaved women had encountered with prostitution in this situation as well. Before the enslavement, the indebted subject had capability to play resistance and power games. In the core, these games had appeared within two situations. On the one hand indebted subjects created huge rebellions. We know that these rebellions were highly effective because they shaped the political framework in Fertile Crescent. Periodically, the social conflicts, which were caused by indebted subjects, were evaded by amnesties (Graeber, 2011: 65). These debt

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<sup>80</sup> This situation will be described as the being indebted by the state later, namely tax.

amnesties even found themselves place in the mythic world view. They were occurred insomuch frequent that, they became the symbol of the last judgment and recreation of life. For instance in Babylonia, likewise the creation of world by Marduk, redemption from old sins (amnesty) was followed by new beginning (Graeber, 2011: 216-217).

Apparently these amnesties were not useful for some people. That is why indebted subjects found another way for resisting: Exodus (Graeber, 2011: 183). The hatred of the core had stem from the memories of exodus. If those people could not manage to escape to periphery, they would have been transformed into pawns and later slaves (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 164). Thus no wonder the denunciation of core in Biblical texts is based on the prostitution. This is because, this enslavement mostly related with the women. Moreover, probably that is why the veiling took root in periphery, instead of core. Those people's main fear was the enslavement of 'their' women. Thus they were sensitive on the matter of the symbols of prostitution. Actually, this fear was not about the fate of the slave, rather it was about the violation of sacred patriarchal honor (Graeber, 2011: 129). The scare of enslavement of women had caused the exclusion of women from the everyday life. In periphery women had lost their capability to rule, to be businesswomen, and even to freely traveling. They were enclosed within the household. Thus, the difference between woman and the objects of household (such as animals or slaves) had been eroded. I believe that, the possession of the household objects had reflected on the appropriation of the women at this moment<sup>81</sup>. Moreover, the latter (women) was more important because, the 'contamination' of the latter had direct effect on the honor of the possessor. Thus, patriarchal honor has been more important than properties. Peripheral possessor of women, probably, concerned with the condition of women more often<sup>82</sup>, because they tried to differentiate their women from the women in the core. The woman in

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<sup>81</sup> I am not locating the genesis of the patriarchy in the peripheral Fertile Crescent. Moreover, I am not ignoring the authority on the women in core. However, there is a reason behind of why the women had been relatively erased from the everyday life of periphery. Herein, I am only trying to understand this phenomenon.

<sup>82</sup> In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault underlined the link between the frequency of texts on sexuality and concern over sexuality. Similarly, I believe that, frequency on the condition of women in periphery refers to extreme concern over the women.

the core was the stereotype of the prostitute. Thus any similarity would be contaminated the honor of the possessor.

The fate of the indebted subject can be seen in Ancient Greek and Roman worlds. Apparently, instead of Fertile Crescent's core, the fear of the periphery reflected on these worlds (Graeber, 2011: 190). The closure of women in household, prevention of their presence in agora, and even veiling them were the examples of this influence. However, these Ancient worlds' solution to the problem of indebtedment was different from the core. Instead of periodical amnesties, Greek solution (and later Roman too) was to limit or to forbid the debt peonage at all (Graeber, 2011: 187). For instance Athenian Solon's reforms in 595/594 BCE forbid any type of pawnship and debt peonage. Similarly in Sparta, King Agis IV tried to use same prohibition in 243/242 BCE (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 137 and 215). Also, besides of usage of law enforcement another periphery had been constituted for indebted subjects too. This periphery was the colonies all around the Mediterranean (Graeber, 2011: 187). Greek city-states had encouraged to colonization. I believe that, that is why there is not a counter-literature against the core in Ancient Greece. Colonists were deliberately sent to the periphery for preventing debt peonage. In spite of these attempts for prevention of debt peons, Ancient Greek texts overflow with the examples of debt peonage and child-pawns. For instance, even in Aristotle's texts (which refer to approximately 300 years later of Solon's reforms) we can encounter with the enslavement of the poor because of indebtedment (as cited in Graeber, 2011: 187). Similarly, approximately within same years, there were plenty of examples for giving kids to lenders as pawn (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 163). However, the enslavement of the indebted subject was an exception in Ancient Greece. The political and social world view was based on polis and citizens in Ancient Greece (De Ste. Croix, 1981). The citizens of polis had been defined with their freedom<sup>83</sup>. Citizen, insofar as located in its polis, cannot be treated as unfree people. Thus he was different from the household objects. However indebtedment was a huge exception within the very basis of Greek politics. This is because, if any citizen had faulted the debt, he would have transformed to slave. The

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<sup>83</sup> Women and children were not considered as free. Moreover, until the last days of Greek hegemony, the pauper was not free too.

danger of enslavement had shaped the impetus of giving support. The demagogues and tyrants had leaned on this fear of the Greek low classes. Thus instead of referring to the law codes, they had independently acted (Foucault, 2001c). That is why most of the extant texts condemn the democracy of the low classes in Ancient Greece (De Ste. Croix, 1981). They create a second exception which is exemption from the law. It is quite clear that, exemption from the citizenship was not a problem for thinkers of Ancient Greek world. This is because, the degradation of the citizen was not the main problem of them. On the other hand, exemption from law codes had direct effects on them as a form of tyranny. That is why, Greek thinker, who mostly belong to the elites, developed their hatred against the democracy.

This narrative on Ancient Greek world, more or less, was similar to Ancient Roman experience. In the early days of Roman Republic, there were harsh punishments for faulting the debt-action. For instance in the “Law of Twelve Tablets”, one of the most brutal punishment of fault of debt was cutting the debtor’s body into pieces and distributing the pieces to lenders (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 165). However, these harsh punishments had encountered with large social and political struggles. The subjects of these struggles were the *plebeii* (the exploited class) who were majorly under the risks of debt peonage. These counter-conducts were quite powerful. For instance, during *Secessio Plebis*<sup>84</sup>, indebted plebeians had refused to conscript against oncoming invaders and they left the city for re-settling at Mons Sacer. That is why *patricii* (the ruler class) tried to find different solutions (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 335). The solution was the imitation of Ancient Greek experience. Roman patricians tried to abolish debt-peons circa 326 BCE (Graeber, 2011: 403). Apparently the abolition did not work well in Ancient Rome too. This is because, as the rise of the tyrants in Ancient Greek world, the promises of redistribution of lands and abolishing debt-peonage had been used as promise. Demagogic and popular movements used these promises for legitimizing their rules. Most apparent examples in Roman world were declaration of dictatorships and emperors (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 327-409).

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<sup>84</sup> Occurred between 495 BC-493 BC.



Eventually, the exception of the indebted subject was exception from citizenship in Ancient Greek and Rome. I believe that, this exceptional status still goes on in contemporary societies. However, this problem will be elaborated in next chapter. Besides of this, there was a second exception in Ancient societies (from Fertile Crescent to Rome). Even though we mentioned the crucial role of the indebted subject, the presence of it was quite rare. Thus, indebted subject did not play the main role in antagonisms within these societies. On the contrary, for instance, Weber found the main antagonism in antiquity between different status groups. Different status groups referred the lifestyles of the subject, instead of the mode of production. Namely, he found the antagonism between lenders and indebted subjects by the threat of degradation of status of the indebted (as cited in De Ste. Croix, 1981: 89). On the other hand, De Ste. Croix stresses that, main social problem is not about the ways of life or status (as citizen transforming to slave or being still citizen). The social problem is about withdrawing the surplus value: In which portion the ruler class will extort the production and in which portion the exploited class will keep (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 68). Thus the antagonism is not between status groups, rather is between classes which have been distinguished by appropriating the surplus value. If any subject is conceptualized as the exploited class, it should have the subject of the direct exploitation. Moreover, by the method of this exploitation, this class also gives its characteristics to the mode of production (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 51). Hence if the main antagonism in those societies was between lender and indebted subjects, the indebted subject would have been the main producer of the surplus value. However, this was not true. This is because, the main antagonism was between slaves and slave-owner citizens. These societies were characterized by the rural production. The rise of the Fertile Crescent's core was the result of the aqueducts on and floods of Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates. The Greek cities had appeared with their surplus production of olive oil. Similarly the main girder of Rome was the blood and wheat of the Latin peasantry. Hence, cities in those societies desperately needed the rural production. In the rural production, free peasantry was a rare occasion. The production was operated mostly by huge slave population or sometimes by

*angaria*<sup>85</sup>. That is why Marx also described these societies as slave societies. This is because, surplus value had been produced by slaves and the exploitation of them named the mode of production. Hence, the ruling classes' main goal was exploiting the production of slaves, not the indebted subjects (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 52 and 112). Similarly Graeber underlines the base of the Roman law. Roman law was created on the fundamental notion of *dominium*. This concept refers to the property and home. The subject of the law (citizen) had absolute control over its *dominium*. However, this concept had been derived from the practice of slavery and possession of household objects (Graeber, 2011: 199-200). Hence the foundation of the Roman law was nothing but the slavery. Eventually, the second exception of the indebted subject in these societies was its rareness. I believe that, since the beginning of modern era, this second exception has faded away. Today the main antagonism occurs between debtor and lender. However, before passing to this change in the exceptional quality of the indebted subject, we have to add couple points to historical narrative

Several remarks were lack in the historical narrative. This was caused by the lack of historical methodology within the text. Main goal of this text was not the exposition of the history of debt. Rather, this historical narrative was used for the description of debt was neither common to one era nor universal foundation. Moreover, it could be narrated by completely different axis. Any attempt to expose the history of debt should consider this perspectivism. However, the goals of this text limit such an extensive investigation. Thus, these remarks only find themselves a place herein. Firstly, there is a difference between two types of indebtment: debt-within-amity<sup>86</sup> and debt-within-alterity. I believe that, money or debt's symmetrical exchange appears in the former situation. For instance, when any kin or traveller borrowed a horseshoe bat for reinforcing its horse's shoe; we encounter with debt-within-amity. This is a situation which is mostly<sup>87</sup> practiced as equal and voluntarily. After this

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<sup>85</sup> It refers to the compulsory service in Roman law.

<sup>86</sup> Douglas calls debt-within-amity as close-to-home debt (Douglas, 2016: 9). However I believe that debt-within-amity is much more appropriate than Douglas's suggestion. This is because; this type of debt has not been limited to home or community. Rather, it can be practiced with friend or at least acquaintance.

<sup>87</sup> If there is neither *angaria* nor any other force.

borrowing process, usually, lender does not expect more than returning the horseshoe bat. Then obligation on the indebted subject (debtor) does not force the subject to change. Hence, debt-within-amity is about neither power nor resistance. This is because, we cannot even mention any constitution of the subject after the process. If only the borrowed commodity has been damaged, the appearance of the indebted subject can occur. So far, this peaceful exchange has been ignored. The usage of the concept of indebtedment has always referred to the debt-within-alterity. That is why debt was defined with force and asymmetry. However the existence of debt-within-amity stresses an important point. It shows that indebtedment is not an a priori concept. Its content and meaning can change; namely they are not fixed. Moreover, our historical investigation of debt and of money showed that there is not a moment where humanity forgot its 'altruistic' ideals for more 'barbaric' ones, as Jean Jacques Rousseau defined in *Discourse on Inequality*. Debt-within-amity is not nostalgia of forgotten golden ages. It has been existed after the appearance of state. We are still borrowing commodities and money as a debt-within-amity situation. However, I am not promoting the debt-within-amity situation as if a Good deed. It is simply a type of action, which is exterior to this text. Thus, the idealization of future and peaceful debt-within-amity society is exempted from this text too. This contemplation would be an unnecessary attempt. There were not any society where debt-within-amity was the sole debt type. At the same time, this normative imagination also revives the Being-centric theorization. This is because; these hypothetical and unhistorical societies are imagined as if they possess mere emancipation. Hence, historical instances on the coexistence of these two types of debt remember the non-foundational ontology of this text.

Second point that is lack in the historical narrative is the emergence of the state. As it is mentioned, the concept of state within this text has been used by Clastres's understanding (Clastres, 1989). The appearance of the state is the dissolution of the difference between *auctoritas* and *potestas*. Namely the right to rule becomes representable within the society. This rupture in the political sphere creates distinction between rulers and ruled people<sup>88</sup>. This process did not happened in one

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<sup>88</sup> The lack of state has been characterized as the presence of tribal/egalitarian communities.

night. It had contained long struggles. One of these struggles has been the monopolization of the control of money (Douglas, 2016: 80). For instance the link between monopoly and money can be found in Ancient Greek language. There was an etymological connection between *nomisma* (money) and *nomos* (law) (Lazzarato, 2014b: 240). Thus it is impossible to mention money as debt without the state. Let us think a person who needs money. It should borrow debt from someone. After this action, all sides of this relation are constructed as indebted subjects. In reality, the lend money belongs to whom (Douglas, 2016: 78)? Does every lender have the capability to create or implement money? The answer can be given by an example from Graeber (Graeber, 2011: 320). Hernan Cortes, the conqueror of Aztec Empire, had achieved quite fame and wealth in 16<sup>th</sup> century. However, because of his indebtedment, he lost his wealth before his death. On the other hand, his king, Charles V was the debtor at the same time. However his end was not remarked with bankruptcy. Only one, who has monopolized the creation and implementation, circulates the money. Lender only lends the money of the monopolizing institution. The creation of coinage was directly related to this attempt to monopolize. Gold or silver has been hard to acquire in comparison with barley and their mines has been controlled by monopoly. That is why states have stamped their IOU's on the circulated coin (Douglas, 2016: 84). They represent that they have the monopoly for creating or implementing the money. For instance, by referencing to Philip Grierson, Graeber stresses the appearance of debt-within-alterity with early legal practices (Graeber, 2011: 60). Similarly the codifications of Germanic law circa 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> centuries are the examples of the appearance of coin. I believe that, these codifications had represented the struggle for the monopolization of usage of force (likewise Weber's definition of state). Thus this monopolization or the appearance of state had accompanied with the monopolization of money. For instance, Foucault refers to the penetration of the Roman law (monopolized by state) to the Germanic law, and vice versa, in the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries (Foucault, 2001c: 36). The unification of the penal system cannot be separated from the unification of money. Namely, emergence of the state goes along with the monopolization of the money. Hence, state has been the main lender above all other lenders. This is ensured by three functions. Actually these three elements used as indirect and collective forms of

exploitation by De Ste. Croix. However, they have been operated by state. These three functions are taxation, military conscription, and *angaria* (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 206). Firstly, as Marx had stressed, most of times tax has been used for the withdrawing the surplus value for the ruler classes (as cited in De Ste. Croix, 1981: 206). Tax breaks on the ruling classes, the small differences between the rates of tax brackets, interest payment, and usage of taxed money for the ruling classes needs are the examples of the tax as the mean of ruling class. Besides of this phenomenon, tax also stresses the monopolization by the state. Only the state can retrieve its IOUs from one who had not been ‘voluntarily’ indebted<sup>89</sup> (Douglas, 2016: 84-85). This is ensured by tax. Tax is the mean to retrieve IOU from all subjects insofar as the taxation is controlled by the ruling class. This problem will be discussed in the section of material debt. Secondly, there is military conscription. For instance in Turkey there is compulsory military service for every male citizen. In war times, as well as all historical instances, all male citizens can be drafted against the enemy. Only state has this exception. Thus whether it is a peace time or not, every citizen owes state for its security. Thus, they have to compensate their debt when the state had demanded. Thirdly, there is *angaria*. *Angaria* had been forcibly working for the state. For instance aqueducts, huge roads, magnificent structures, and production in the slave-less farms of the ruling classes<sup>90</sup> had been maintained by the *angaria*. It is true that *angaria* have been forbidden since the beginning of modern era. However could the latent force to work be the example of an *angaria*? This question is not related with our current problem. Thus I will return to this question in next chapter.

### **2.3.2 Discontinuities of the Modern Indebtment**

To sum up, debt-action so far has been characterized as unequal, incomplete, and non-voluntary exchange relation. The constituted subject after the debt-action, which is indebted subject, had exceptional character. This character was defined with its exception from citizenship system (as in Ancient Greece and Rome) and from the main antagonism. Besides of that as well as every subjectivity, it is the exception of

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<sup>89</sup> As it is mentioned, another specificity of the state is its capability to create new IOUs.

<sup>90</sup> Examples can be given as Mesopotamian aqueducts, Roman road network, Egyptian pyramids, and production in Western medieval era.

hypothetical structure and agent too. For instance Graeber refers indebted subject as it is neither slave nor master (Graeber, 2011: 156). This means that, indebted subject is not the object or the subject of domination. Rather, it is the subject of power and resistance games. Namely it is located in the nodal points of different debt-actions. Its typical exception which stems from the subjectivity is still after the modern age. Similarly, the constitution of modern political and social life in the light of citizenship has caused the maintenance of the first exception too. Even though the indebted subject has not been exposed to banishment, there are other ways to exclusion of him from the citizenship. Lastly, the second exception has changed. In contemporary societies, indebted subject is located in the center of main antagonism. However, this contemporary phenomenon is the subject of the next chapter. Herein only the rupture that caused this change is important. At one moment, debtor lost the 'promised lands' behinds the webs of the lender. Processing dispositif on itself had completely changed. Hence, we have to locate this fracture before understanding what indebted subject today is.

I believe that, there are 3 moments which can be designated as the fracture. Even though all of them represent important thresholds, they cannot be separated from the rupture process. Thus, we are not searching for the Real and only fracture in the history. Rather the fracture occurs with layered rupture processes. All of these ruptures represent another layer. Otherwise, trying to extort the Real and only fracture would be reference to Being-based history. Hence, historical discontinuities are the results of different action-events. Moreover, I believe that three moments<sup>91</sup> are not the only factors of the discontinuity. These are what I have been aware of from the perspective of this text. Hence, how can we name these moments? The first moment is the birth of biopolitics. This moment can be traced back to late 18<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> I use the concept of moment by not referencing to any situation which is described as *stasis*. Rather, moment refers to ongoing process. This can be the process of subjectification. Hence, moment cannot be separated from event. For instance, let us think an event: 1789 French Revolution. In this event the year 1789 refers to the beginning point. However, where can we put the end of this event? Is it the dissolution of the French monarchy (1792), end of the Reign of Terror (1794), beginning of the First Empire (1799), or the fall of the Napoleon (1815)? Even we can extend the end of this event/moment to the collapse of USSR in 1991, by referencing to the end of revolutionary movements or of 'history'. Therefore, it is impossible to locate when the event/moment has ended. This is because, it is a process.

century. The second moment is the appearance of welfare state and proliferation of the fordism. And the third moment is the hegemony of neoliberalism after 1970s. All of these three moments have direct effects on the indebted subject. Thus, I will try to underline the two centuries of the rupture in the reality of the indebted subject. I believe that, its peculiarity in contemporary world and its centered position in political and social struggle cannot be understood without this process. However, in this section, only the first moment, which is biopolitics, interests us. This is because the problematization of the present indebted subject will be in the next chapter.

Our theoretical stance derives from Foucauldian understanding of biopolitics. However biopolitics has different meanings besides of him. Etymologically biopolitics consists of *bios* (humanly life in Ancient Greece) and *politiká* (government issues within the polis). Hence three main elements characterize biopolitics: life, governing, and sovereign. However, there are various possibilities to articulate these three variables. First of all we can look for the articulation between life and politics<sup>92</sup>. Thomas Lemke's interpretation of biopolitics refers this articulation to investigate. He starts with the definition of biopolitics from what it is not. According to Lemke, two main positioning has been misunderstood as biopolitics. These are nature as the base of politics and nature as the object of politics (Lemke, 2011: 3). This dichotomy has been named as misunderstanding because, both of them imagine the relationship between the natural and the political as hierarchical and transcendent. However, Lemke stresses ambiguity, fragility, and fluidity of the line between natural and political (Lemke, 2011: 4). Hence we can start to investigate these two positions. On the one hand nature as the base of politics limits the politics within the natural laws. Lemke finds the starting point of this theory within the *Lebensphilosophie* (life-philosophy) of 19<sup>th</sup> century. This philosophical positioning can be summarized with its counter-positioning against the rising dangers of modern life (Lemke, 2011: 9). 19<sup>th</sup> century had brought not only inventions and optimism for future. Moreover, it had accompanied the pollution, death, poverty in cities, and more destructive war machines (Berman, 1988). German

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<sup>92</sup> Herein politics consists of governing and sovereign. We will elaborate the distinction between them later.

philosophers such as Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dilthey, besides of the general effects of 19<sup>th</sup> century, had been influenced by their societies' 'spirit' too. This 'spirit' was related with German fear against the French imperialism, which can be seen since Johann Gottlieb Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*. This fear stressed that, alien concepts such as rationalization, civilization, and mechanization had threatened the German people and their *Kultur* (culture). This degeneration had eroded the health (both mental and physical), life style, and future generations of the German states. No wonder, within this social world, such German thinkers developed the ideas such as "reevaluation of life" and "normative criterion of the healthy" life (Lemke, 2011: 8-9). Even Nietzsche, when he condemns being German and natural facts, relies on the living healthy, diets, and temperance (Nietzsche, 2007b). However, life-philosophy never stood still where it was only against French imperialism and alienation by new scientific discoveries. For instance, Giorgio Agamben gives examples from Nazis on the domination of nature over the politics. A regulation on the decision of which life has not value and unworthy to live passed in 1940's Nazi Germany (Agamben, 1998: 140). Thus by the decision of euthanasia<sup>93</sup> approximately 60,000 people had been killed until the end of war. Thus, by referencing to poor life (such as genetic diseases, disabilities, homosexuality, and so on) one of the most political decisions had been made on the people: Ending the life of the subject. Apparently, this first position has the precedence of the biological laws over the politics (Lemke, 2011: 10). Namely, politics is predetermined by this laws and main political goal is achieving the potential within them.

On the other hand, the second position is nature as the object of politics<sup>94</sup>. This positioning, instead of finding biological and natural laws, relocates the life as the new object of politics (Lemke, 2011: 23). However, this does not mean the change in the object of politics. Rather it is the enlargement of the politics to the space of biology. For instance environmentalist green movements and discussions on

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<sup>93</sup> The legal regulation and Nazi doctors underlined the euthanasia. However, apparently, the situation was more than euthanasia. Those, who were codified with the poor life, were mostly used as test subjects (Agamben, 1998: 154 *et seq.*).

<sup>94</sup> I will only mention briefly to this problem because, it is slightly irrelevant with our indebted subject. Moreover, my intellectual background is inadequate for further discussion of this topic.



bioethics are the examples of this positioning. Moreover, Agamben gives the example on the change of the meaning of death after technological advancements. Death had been defined with “the stopping of the heartbeat and the cessation of breathing” (Agamben, 1998: 161). However, life-support technology has changed this definition. Even though all life functions has ceased, one can live with the life-support unit as overcomatose. Thus, with new technological innovation, a concept which is brain dead has appeared (Agamben, 1998: 160 and 162). At this situation, the biological nature becomes the object of political. This is because, some legal decisions (such as when the victim had died, should the life-support be ceased, or should the organs be harvested for transplantation). Hence, this second position refers to the precedence of the politics over the life. In other words, with the new technological innovations, politics enlarges its boundaries against the non-political levels.

Eventually those two positions define what biopolitics is not. According to Lemke, two Foucauldian criticisms can be directed against these points (Lemke, 2011: 33-34). Firstly, the first position considers the nature with its constant laws. However humans’ understanding of nature changes with the historical process by their capability of *tekhnê*. Maybe it is stating the obvious or a cliché, but we can give the example of the lightning. Will it be true when one equates the interpretation of lightening of an Ancient Greek and 19<sup>th</sup> century’s Brit? Also flying had been unnatural until Wright Brothers’ invention of aircraft. Another example can be given by Egon Friedell. Friedell states that rigid (because of lack of humidity), open, endless, and standing sea constituted the Ancient Egyptian envision with the idea of eternity and mystery (Friedell, 2011: 14). However, it is impossible assert same view on the sea in contemporary Egyptian. Then this criticism of Foucault is about non-historical imagination of nature. This first criticism can be directed to Agamben too. According to Agamben, biopolitics has been the one of the characteristics of the politics since the beginning of societies<sup>95</sup> (Agamben, 1998). He asserts that, the difference between *zōē* and *bios* has been continuous (Agamben, 1998: 184). In Ancient Greece, the former referred to the biological life, while the latter to the

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<sup>95</sup> The other one is exception.

political life. Actually, in Aristotle, this was between the mere life and good life. Agamben asserts that politics has been interested on the bare life or biological nature of the humans. The politicization of bare life has been exemplified from Roman rituals to human rights as a historical continuity. According to Zeynep Gambetti, Agamben un-historicizes the bare life through the identification of the power on the bare life with power itself (Gambetti, 2012: 22-23). Namely, power as the constant of history which decides on the life and death ensures the continuity in history. However, there are plenty of Foucauldian examples against this statement. For instance, displacing the notion of representation at the end of classical era by historical time and classification (evolution) (Foucault, 2005: 79 and 136 *et seq.*), humans' transformation from political animal to the animal which is politicized through its living being (Foucault, 1978: 143), transformation of sexuality from controlling the pleasure to the confession (Foucault, 1986 and 1990), transformation of the mad from confinement to being medical object (Foucault, 2006), and lastly the transformation process of penal system through king's sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics (Foucault, 1995). Thus against the Agamben's constant within the history, Foucault suggests discontinuities. Secondly, the second position considers the politics as if it is constant. It presupposes that politics has been the same types of relations. With the appearance of new technological innovations, politics enlarges its scope towards new areas. However, politics does not consist of predetermined, definite, and universal rules. Rather it is related with games of power and of resistance. Thus, it constantly changes how it operates. For instance the discovery of the population did not lead to enlargement of defined politics through the population. Instead, the meaning and processing of the politics has been changed in consideration of the population. Rather than an enlargement, there is reforming, reshaping, and reconstruction of the politics. Eventually, as we mentioned, the line between two elements of biopolitics (life and politics) is ambiguous. Likewise the process of subjectification, it constantly changes.

We began our investigation of biopolitics from what it is not. This is because, according to Lemke, Foucault's definition of biopolitics is inconsistent (Lemke, 2011: 34-47). In *The History of Sexuality* it is defined as the new type of sovereignty,

in *Society Must Be Defended* as the fascism, and in *The Birth of Biopolitics* as the new type of governing. From our topic the second one is not important<sup>96</sup>. Hence, in the former biopolitics is “focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and morality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity (...)” (Foucault, 1978: 139). In the latter, similarly, biopolitics is defined with the governing the population and its problems such as health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, and race (Foucault, 2008b: 317). Then, on the contrary of Lemke, I do not believe that new type of sovereignty and of governing are different. This is because; both of them are related with politics; namely with power and resistance.

Foucault conceptualizes government different from mainstream understanding. Generally when one utters government, it refers to the ruling party and the executive branch of the state. However the notion of government<sup>97</sup> in Foucault refers to an exercise, especially conduct on the conducts (Foucault, 2008b). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri state that, the problem of government differentiates itself from the problem of production (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 18). Namely, they criticize Foucault for ignoring the positive function of power. It is true that, government echoes the domination on the subject. Thus, by referencing to Deleuze, they prefer the concept of control. Deleuze differentiates the control societies from disciplinary societies by referencing the ambiguity of the boundaries of space (Deleuze, 1992). Then Deleuze’s reference to control societies is on the criticism of walled space of the individualizing discipline processes. However, I believe that, government consists of more types than discipline. Government as a conduct on the conducts or as an action refers to overcome some criticisms on Foucault. Power is also defined with these two peculiarities, however this notion had been criticized by the absence of state

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<sup>96</sup> The reason behind this will be appear with the further elaboration of biopolitics. Biopolitics does not refer to the domination. Rather it is related with power and resistance. Thus it is impossible to define it with fascist domination. Moreover, on the contrary of Lemke, I believe that in *Society Must Be Defended* main attempt is not equating biopolitics and fascism. Rather, its definition is consistent with other two (see Foucault, 2003).

<sup>97</sup> There are two concepts which create confusion: government and governmentality. Foucault’s usage of these concepts is not overt as well. I will use the concept of government by reference to conduct on conduct and power, while the governmentality by as a general type of government which appeared with modern era.

machine. It is true that, as a machine or even as a subject, state has crucial weight on the power games. The criticism about the absence of state in Foucauldian power concluded with the accusation of Foucault for not undermining the state's authority. Actually, state has always been in Foucault's interpretation of various machines and subjectivities. Considering these criticisms and exposing the latently present state analysis, Foucault linked the interpretation of subjectivity and state through the notion of government (Lemke, 2002: 50). That is why, even though it echoes the power, I am using the concept of government within historical narrative.

Hence government is not a dictation on the subjects, rather it allows action and conducts over them. Thus, instead of Hardt and Negri, I believe that, government also stresses the positive function of power. Then government is also a type of control mechanism. The control mechanism (in Deleuze) and government operates through the subjectivity processes. For instance a Turkish person, whether it has been constituted after the resistance against monarchy and imperialism or for suppressing different nationalities (such as Laz, Kurd, Armenian, and so on), has to obey the ordinary role of its subjectivity. Another example: A heterosexual man has to perform the rituals of its subjectivity which is marrying with opposite sex and reproducing. Hence, the possible space of the conducts of one is controlled through its subjectivity. Even though this control is not alike mechanistic domination, power and resistance actions still process for supervising one through subjectivity. Therefore, control mechanism is about the past, the present, and the future of the subject. Let us consider this mechanism for indebted person: Its past is insignificant for its responsibility, its present is driven by the attempt of paying the debt, and its future is also determined by the whether it can pay (it still tries to pay the debt) or not (it bears the social, political, and economic consequences). The usage of concept of control by Deleuze, Hardt, and Negri refers to government of the indebted man as well. The human, who exists in the control society, is not enclosed, but rather is indebted (Deleuze, 1992: 6). On the governing of the future conducts, Lazzarato states that; "[t]he debtor is "free", but his actions, his behavior, are confined to the limits defined by the debt he has entered into." (Lazzarato, 2012: 31). Thus, the

subject of the government is not the object of domination. Rather it is free subject like all of those have been exposed to the action.

Moreover, as the discontinuities in the power apparatus, the type of the government changes from one society to another. However, it has been present in every society as undetermined framework-action<sup>98</sup>. It has crucial function in every society, because societies cannot identify with themselves. The constituted subject (in this situation, the society) always defined with impossibility. It will never be able to achieve its total identification. Otherwise, the difference between the agent and subject would be disappeared. The process of subjectification is never-ending. Thus, subject cannot declare the ontological and epistemological peace within itself. That is why every society, as a type of collective subject, encounters with the risk of disintegration (Castel, 2003: xix-xx). Castel calls these risks as the social question and he asserts that every society tries to overcome it (Castel, 2003: 3). Hence, when the members of society abandon the act of as if society is total, the social question emerges. For preventing the dissolution of the society, government of the subject occurs. By problematizing the social question, societies develop the mechanisms of government. Foucault's discussion of governmentality shows that, main difference in government occurred in the 16<sup>th</sup> century (see Foucault, 1991 and Foucault, 2009). However governmentality has not been still as same to contemporary times. Instead there are various fractures within the understanding of governmentality too. For instance, during 18<sup>th</sup> century, in Western societies, the social question had occurred as the population. Biopolitics, as a type of government and of governmentality, has appeared after the problematization of the question of population. It was the transformation from the just to the utile or from the right to the normal (Lemke, 2011: 39 and Foucault, 2008b: 31-32 and 45). However, before 18<sup>th</sup> century, governmentality had also defined with other types such as sovereignty or discipline. We will elaborate these types later.

Besides of government other constituent part of politics is the sovereignty. Sovereignty has been conceptualized as common to the state. For instance, first one

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<sup>98</sup> This is because, in the end, it is the political action.

who used this word, Jean Bodin, defines sovereignty as the “absolute and perpetual power” of the sovereign<sup>99</sup>. This sovereign has been either the commonwealth (or nation for our societies) or the king (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 114). Thus, sovereignty is embedded into the executive branch of the state (especially nation-state). However, as it is stated, state is not the only political being<sup>100</sup>. I believe that, we can define sovereignty clearly by referencing the usage of force. For instance, the father of the Ancient Roman family can use its force on his household (*patria potestas*). However, this example still echoes the Weber’s reference on the monopoly of usage of force. Thus, it is still state-centric. Then another example can be given from the political protests, such as Chartist Movement in 19<sup>th</sup> century’s Britain. This movement was practiced by those whom demand universal vote. Not only their violent struggles, but their presence too practiced force on the rulers. By this force, they exercised sovereignty and they conducted the crown, the parliament, and the privileged bourgeoisie. This control was changed the past as unjust, present as the change towards general vote, and future as the fear of masses. Then sovereignty cannot be separated from the government too. In fact, as we said earlier, it is a type of governmentality after all. Likewise, Foucault defines governmentality as controlling the self, the society, and the state (Foucault, 1991: 93). The sovereignty can also be founded in the self, society, and state. However, even though sovereignty can be interpreted as type of governmentality, it also differentiates itself from governmentality at some point. Sovereignty can be defined as a formal and sacred rule of the government. Namely, instead of conducting the conducts, sovereignty can be defined as the principle behind which gives the capability to act. Herein I consider this differentiation of sovereignty from governmentality through the difference between *potestas* and *auctoritas*. Eventually, so far we have discussed to Lemke’s statement on the inconsistency of Foucauldian definition of biopolitics. On the contrary of Lemke, I found consistency between these two definitions. Hence, by the reference to biopolitics, I am underlining the change in way of using the mechanisms of government and the justification of this practice. For historicizing what we have

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<sup>99</sup> It is in Chapter VIII of the First Book of the Commonwealth. See [http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin\\_1.txt](http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin_1.txt) (last access August 2017).

<sup>100</sup> See the beginning of this chapter and the discussion of *patria potestas*.

mentioned until now, we have to return to the history of government, governmentality, or power in Foucault again.

The early-17<sup>th</sup> century's elements such as *raison d'état*, police mechanism, and mercantilism had been challenged in the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. Beforehand the criticism of mercantilism, police mechanism and *raison d'état* had encountered with direct opposition. Apparently these Western societies had problematized the indefinite power of police state and the erosion of the distinction between *raison d'état* and *raison de monarchie*. Namely, arbitrariness of the absolute monarchs and the drift of the police mechanisms towards domination had been the main reasons behind the criticisms. For instance, when Montesquieu wrote *Persian Letters* in 1721, through the criticism of oriental despotism, he remarked those two phenomena in France. This antagonism between the transcendent authority (*raison d'état* and police mechanism) and revolutionary opposition (from Humanists to the liberals) is conceptualized as the crisis of modernism (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 94). Hardt and Negri state that, these two moments had been interior to modernism and this antagonism was inevitable. The revolutionary opposition is important for us, because it had created the fracture within the 17<sup>th</sup> century's control mechanisms. Foucault stresses two main oppositions against two elements of the early-17<sup>th</sup> century in late-17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. These are theology and law (Foucault, 2008b: 7). For our topic, only the opposition from the law is important. The opposition from the law had also appeared within two streams, which were natural law and natural rights. On the one hand, natural law is the belief on the existence of transcendent rules which can be discovered by human intellect (Denk, 2011: 104-105). Thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf had been used the natural laws against the authority of church and of recently appeared monarchs. However, their reference point had been derived from the secularization of medieval thought (Denk, 2011). Even their intellectual roots Salamanca School which has been defined with humanist Catholicism. On the other hand, there were the natural right theorists. Natural right theorists can be identified within the junction point of nation-state's sovereignty and contract theories. Natural right theories were both related with power and resistance as well. For instance, the moral justification of the actions had

been eroded since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The substitution had been the difference between the true and false. Namely justification had transformed to the epistemological matter (Foucault, 2008b: 18). This erosion had been also related with the transformation from the right-based visualization of society to the norm-based one (Lemke, 2011: 39). I believe that, natural right theories had maintained this tendency. Maybe one can criticize by referencing the usage of law terminology in contract theories such as contract, right, law, and so on. However, I do not insist on these theories were purified from the right-based visualization at all. Rather, we have to interpret the epistemological justification and normalization within these theories. All of these theories start with a definition of state of nature and human nature (Atalay and Albayrak, 2012: 110). For instance Thomas Hobbes defines it with the insecurity and war (Hobbes, 1998: 82-106), while John Locke with life, liberty, health, and property (Locke, 1982: 3-15). It is obvious that, these definitions of nature are not related with normalization process. This is because, they are common to pre-societal era. On the other hand, they form the necessity of entering into the contract. In Hobbes the need for security necessitates to transfer the right to kill to the sovereign. While in Locke, the rise in the population causes the problem on properties and the conflicts which stem from this problem necessitates the contract. Apparently, even though they refer a juridical category, justification of the contracts had been made through the definition of true and false. What is this definition of true and false instead of moral or juridical rationalization/justification<sup>101</sup>? The moral or juridical rationalization was about the wisdom. Namely the contemplation on the problem was the way to find a solution (i.e. contemplation on God, idea, virtue, and so on). However, the rationalization through the true and false was about “calculation of force, relations, wealth, and factors of strength” (Foucault, 2008b: 311). This calculation has been conducted by the simple juxtaposition of these elements by the principle of utile. Namely, the most utile one is codified as the truest one. Similarly, after the calculation, contract theoreticians referred the obligation to enter into the contract. Thus, Foucault underlines that the legal framework was used because it was the most efficient system or the economy for them (Foucault, 2008b: 321). Hence, we

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<sup>101</sup> It is important to stress that, instead of the notion of ‘truth’, herein we are using the ‘true’.



examined the epistemological justification of the contract theories. The second aspect of the fracture was normalization. For referring the normalization we have to differentiate Locke from other contract theoreticians, especially from Hobbes. The calculation of the true and false in the light of the utile had been abandoned by Hobbes after the constitution of political sovereign. However in Locke, with the emergence of civil society, we encounter this calculation in the post-contract society. This appearance of the principle of utile leads us to the normalization.

The concept of utility is important for understanding the inadequacy of *raison d'état* and police. The change in the justification mechanism, which is from juridical to utility, deepened the problem of these two. Juridical justification was conducted within the space of law, however where can we measure the utility? If the parliament or the court is not the location of justification, where was the new place in early-18<sup>th</sup> century? Foucault asserts that this place was the market (Foucault, 2008b: 30-32). Before 17<sup>th</sup> century, the ruler's capability to rule had been legitimized by its fairness<sup>102</sup>. However, this requirement had been changed. For stressing this change, Foucault refers to the change within the market. Before the 18<sup>th</sup> century prices in the market had been strictly regulated by the ruler. These regulations were mostly about the price fixation for prevention of any extortion and inflation<sup>103</sup>. The main reason behind this regulation was ensuring the nutrition for workers. However, with the 18<sup>th</sup> century this understanding which was based on justice and laws had changed. Of course we do not refer a strict change, however prices became different from the notion just. With this change, prices had determined by their *value*. The appearance of the value leads us to the freedom of the market (Foucault, 2008b). This freedom, however, is also distinct from contemporary globalization. Rather it represents itself with decreasing the custom walls within same nation. However, huge custom walls

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<sup>102</sup> Of course we ignore the tyrannical force of the ruler. It is apparent that, any ruler could be rule without referencing justice by brute force. However, we should remember that, our historical narratives do not enclose the theoretical perspectives on the same phenomenon. These statements do not represent the ultimate and sole truth of the history. Not only similar ones but also contradictory phenomena co-exist within the same moment. We only try to 'abstract' one perspective, because inadequacy of intellect. It is impossible to cover all of those perspectives. Thus, I do not insist on the 'reality' of my interpretation. I only circulate another truth game on this topic.

<sup>103</sup> This phenomenon is not common to Western experience. For instance, same regulations had existed in pre-modern era in Islamic geography. They were called in Ottoman as "*narh*".

between nations had been still. For instance scholars within German city-states had been criticized their princes for not revoking the custom walls within the German geography. They thought that, these walls prevented the development of Germany against Britain and France. Eventually, these references to the ‘freedom’ had been nothing but the emergence of liberalism.

In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault profoundly discusses liberalism. However, our topic was the biopolitics as the new type of governmentality. When liberalism had appeared? As I said, there is not sole theoretical and practical reality in the social world. Instead akin and distinct realities concurrently exist. Liberalism and biopolitics represent concurrent existence of two similar government practices. On the one hand, biopolitics refers to the problem of governing the population, while on the other hand, liberalism refer to the problem of governing the economic subjects in the space of sovereignty (Foucault, 2008b: 294). These two problems cannot be separated. Problem of the population was about its efficiency (public health, demographics, and so on). Similarly, economic subjects were also defined with efficiency and their problems were caused by the antagonism between efficiency and justice. Hence, problem of liberalism is also related with the problem of biopolitics. With this notice, we can pass to the investigation of liberalism.

Locke’s problem, when searching solution to the subject whom lives both in political community and market, was limiting the governing (Foucault, 2008b: 102 and 283). That is why, we differentiated Locke from Hobbes. Similarly liberalism, on the contrary of *raison d’état* and police, appeared with the attempt to decrease the ruler’s government (Foucault, 2008b: 27). Then it was some kind of ‘resistance’ against the ‘power’ of the monarch. However, our ontological non-foundationalist understanding rejects any a priori categorization of good and evil. Namely we do not accept the constant moral determinations. As it is said, there are not good resistance and evil power. Liberalism only reshaped the type of governmentality, but not opened a path towards mere freedom. This process of reshaping can be seen with the appearance of 3 new pillars of governmentality: the link between true and market, utility and efficiency, and belief on unlimited economic development (Foucault, 2008b: 61). As it is mentioned, first two ones are related with the prices’ equilibration in the market.

This equilibration will cause maximum benefit to state, society, and individuals. Thus, when these benefit sensible, the ruler became legitimized. On the other hand, belief on unlimited economic development refers to the criticism of mercantilism. Mercantilism was an economic view based on gold and human accumulation (Foucault, 2008b: 5 and Foucault, 2009: 337). Possibility to accumulate those had ensured by the geographical discoveries. Firstly, colonization of unsettled areas provided empty spaces where the surplus population can be threw into. Otherwise, this population growth without technological advancement<sup>104</sup> would be concluded with either biological or social disaster<sup>105</sup>. Secondly, American precious metals (gold and silver) and slave trade ensured the gold accumulation. European conquerors' first job in the Americas was seizing the precious metals and mines. We are not referring only the old and new mines, even beauties of the cities had been dismantled (Galeano, 1997). Mercantilist perspective, however, was based on the acknowledgment of the limited precious metals. Thus they considered the enrichment as zero-sum game (Foucault, 2008b: 54). That is why they started to enslaving indigenous people for expeditiously exploit the present sources. Heavy working conditions caused the death of millions and moreover lack of manpower opened a path for the Trade Triangle. In the late-18<sup>th</sup> century mercantilism lost its dominant position. Maybe it was appeared with the un-justification of rulers by the high inflation. For instance, Spain was the most affected nation from the inflation. This is because, it was the main haven of the flow of American precious metals. Graeber states that, even in England prices had increased 500% between 1500 and 1650 (Graeber, 2011: 309). We can see the denunciation of mercantilism in Adam Smith and other political economists' texts (Foucault, 2008b). These texts uttered the infinity of economic development. Maybe one can refer to the emergence of state bonds for stressing the infinity, instead of the change in the understanding of economic machine. State bonds appeared with the belief on limited precious metals. Even though metal is limited it was impossible to extract all of them in particular

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<sup>104</sup> This technological advancement refers to the sanitation and urban architecture.

<sup>105</sup> This is not common to Western world. However, we can give our examples from there: Appearance of Black Death after the population growth of Medieval Renaissance (Pirenne, 2014) and the social problem of fiefless lords which led to the Crusades.

moment. Thus nations started to give IOUs on the precious metal which lies beneath the earth (Douglas, 2016: 111 and Graeber, 2011: 342 *et seq.*). However, those political economists did not rely on the state bonds. Rather they referred some kind of requirement for the appearance of infinite development. This requirement had materialized in Smith's invisible hand, namely reciprocal enrichment (Foucault, 2008b: 53). Invisible hand refers to equilibrium of the market by itself. However, this equilibrium is the result of the selfish acts of the agents. Agents, while acting selfish, trade their goods. However, in the end, every agent acquires its needs. Thus the reciprocal enrichment appears in the market. If any obstacle (such as state and its regulations) hinders this process, the enrichment disappears.

Thus the pillars of the liberalism can operate insofar as there is freedom. Actually this is evident in the etymological meaning of liberalism: Freedom. Justice can be stem from God or ancestral rights. On the other hand, liberal utility stems from freedom. It is not only the market's freedom, rather is subjects', societies' (especially bourgeoisie's freedom from ancient boundaries and worker's demands), and states' (in international area as sovereign states) freedom too. However, there is nothing like freedom as such. It is not a priori or transcendent category. Liberalism's understanding of freedom coincides with Berlin's negative freedom (Berlin, 2002). It means that, liberal freedom is defined by being free from something. Hannah Arendt, similarly, defines freedom in general with this negative function (Arendt, 1998). Freedom is being free from the labor and protector chains. For instance De Ste. Croix refers to the etymological meaning of freedom in Ancient Greece (De Ste. Croix, 1981: 114-116). The concept of "*eleutheros*" referred to both free and gentleman person. The opposite of this concept, "*aneleutheros*" referred to who works for other people. However, as Arendt's interpretation of the fate of Jew, being free from the chains (negatively) also refers to being free from protection too (Arendt, 1973: 291). Liberal subject had been thrown into the dangers of being unprotected. During 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries (approximately liberal era) the main aspect of this danger, except wars, plagues, and so on, had been the poverty. Foucault's archive works on these eras reflect the problematization of the problem of poverty (Foucault, 1995 and 2008a). For instance, in England, religious (such as Quakers and Methodists) and

secular (such as 1692 The Society for the Reform of Manners and 1802 The Society for the Suppression of Vice) communities' main goal was finding solution to this problem (Foucault, 2001c: 60-63). In France, however, there was *letter de cachet* which is the demand for operating the police mechanism from communities, families, or individuals (Foucault, 2001c: 65-67). Similarly Robert Castel interprets these times as the problematization of poverty too. The freedom from the protections of proximity (family, relatives, fellow countrymen, local church, local seigneur, and so on) and being thrown into the cities had created poor masses (Castel, 2003: 9-47). Moreover, besides the creation of different institutions, societies tried to establish security measures. There are great numbers of texts and regulations on the banishment, execution, and confinement of vagabonds, idlers, beggars, homeless, and unemployed (Castel, 2003: 66-69). Moreover, the penal system around these subjectivities has been used for creating distance between proletariat and non-proletarianised people. For instance, Foucault refers that the moral code such as "good worker, father, husband, and citizen" had been circularized within the working class after 18<sup>th</sup> century (Foucault and Simon, 1991: 33). This was the marriage between petty bourgeoisie and proletariat and proletariat's connivance on the non-proletarianised people<sup>106</sup>. This petty bourgeoisie's moral barrier had codified the non-proletarianised subjects as immoral, marginal, dangerous, mob, and so on (Foucault, 1980b: 15)<sup>107</sup>. Apparently government of the market cannot be separated from governing prisons, pauper, psychiatric institutions, prisons, and so on (Foucault, 2008b: 35). Freedom of market and security measures for maintain it (police, army, individual-based ontology, and so on) was common to every aspect of social reality. Hence, the dangers and security measures cannot be separate from liberal freedom. Liberalism is both the producer and the consumer of freedom (Foucault, 2008b: 63-64). The relations between security and freedom are the Gordian knot of the

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<sup>106</sup> This process mainly occurred in civil society, especially with general literacy and general education campaigns (Foucault, 1980b: 20).

<sup>107</sup> Moreover this morality has been also used by ruling classes from another angle. The marginalized non-proletarianised people, as profiled by the penal system, can only work with cooperation with ruling classes. Namely, they become the temporary work force (for lowering the wages), police force (see Marx, 1972), and strikebreaker. Thus, this morality constituted a win-win situation for ruling classes (Foucault and Simon: 30-31).

liberalism. Besides of the previous examples, we can look for American Revolution as well. The main reason behind of this revolution was the tariffs on the colonies. Boston Tea Party symbolizes this reason as the beginning of revolution. However, after shortly from the independence, this open-border policy trade was renounced. Thus, citizens of USA run into new customs wall (Foucault, 2008b: 64). Similarly, free market in Europe was ensured by the huge customs walls, regulations, legislations, and orders. German cameralist texts overflow with these instances. Moreover, the very basis of liberalism, free labor, had been also accompanied by unfree labor. Castel states that, in England regulations such as 1349 Status of Workers, 1563 Statue of Artisans, Elizabethan Poor Laws, 1662 Settlement Act, and 1795 Speenhamland Act had stressed the compulsory working for urban plebs (Castel, 2003: 108-112). For landless peasants, *angaria* returned as the rent for the landlord. Even for workers, it had appeared as the payment in money (wage-systems, taxes, cuts, and so on), instead of payment in labor (Castel, 2003: 121)<sup>108</sup>. The presence of slaves in USA and reappearance of serves in Eastern Europe can be added too (Graeber, 2011: 350)<sup>109</sup>. Moreover, for the dilemma between security and freedom we can give contemporary examples too: The fear of terror in contemporary world. Ongoing state of emergency in Turkey and France, establishment of Secretary of Homeland Security in USA after 2001, and ongoing debates on monitoring electronic devices are results of the dilemma between security and freedom. Besides of terror, international organizations such as World Bank, IMF, OECD, and so on also on the one hand promote free global circulation of the capital and on the other hand create legal, political, and economic limits for it. Lastly we can give an example from indebtment. While being indebted has been promoted for the enrichment of capital, banks and people are limited by regulations for the size of credits (Douglas, 2016: 87 *et seq.*). Eventually liberalism has accompanied new problem: Security. The solution against this problem was also related with the concept of utility. The calculation of the cost of events determines if it is in the dimension of security or of

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<sup>108</sup> It is interesting that, for the workers' movement in 19<sup>th</sup> century, wage-labor was the residue of feudal tutelage (as cited in Castel, 2003: xiii).

<sup>109</sup> The proliferation of the sweatshops in contemporary world is also an example.

freedom (Foucault, 2008b: 65 and 68). Then, liberal calculation of cost tries to overcome the problem between individual interests and between collective and individual interests. For instance, to what extent the indebtedness is tolerable? It is tolerable insofar as the danger of social conflicts between debtor and lender is not visible. When the calculated danger appears, being indebted drifts to the dimension of security. Namely, it is no longer about the freedom to being indebted.

The dilemma between security and freedom is not the only consequence of the liberal governmentality. Another consequence is, obviously, the appearance of new mechanisms to control, constraint, and coercion (Foucault, 2008b: 67). There are three new procedures. I will name them as panopticon, civil society, and engineering. Hence, biopolitics which latently haunts these paragraphs will be uncovered with these three. Firstly, there is panopticon<sup>110</sup>. As it is mentioned it was the architectural realization of the disciplinary society. Panopticon represents the individualization within a space. Namely, it was the re-enactment of the shepherd-flock game in the modern era. Thus, normally it should be distinct from biopolitics. However, we should remember that, Foucault uses biopolitics as both the totalized game of the population and the power on life (Foucault, 1978: 135-145 and Gambetti, 2012: 27). As we said, Foucault defines the modern age as the merge between shepherd-flock and city-citizen games. Thus, the former usage of biopolitics is in an intricate relationship with disciplinary. The latter usage of biopolitics refers to the merged processes of particularization and totalization. We have been used the concept of biopolitics as the latter. Thus the segregated subject of the panopticon is also the subject of biopolitics insofar as “his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault, 1978: 143). The gaze from the invisible power space constantly evaluates and reevaluates the subject. Subject’s conducts has been conducted by this gaze. Thus its existence has been always at stake.

Secondly, there is civil society. It is true that, panopticon is defined with enclosure and confinement of the individualized subjects. The weight of the panopticon as a power apparatus had been decreased by mid-18<sup>th</sup> century. This is because, the liberal

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<sup>110</sup> Panopticon had been described in the previous section.

insistence on the freedom had affected all apparatuses. The appearance of the civil society realized after this demand. What is civil society? To understand this, we have to locate it within the social and political space. *Homo economicus* appeared as the ‘official’ subject of the liberalism. This subject is defined with its reason. This reason ensured the calculation of the utile by this subject. Namely, *homo economicus* refers to a rational sovereign who has absolute control over its own choices, actions, and utilities (Lazzarato, 2014b: 96). When we differentiated Locke from Hobbes and we stressed the normalization in liberalism, we had slightly entered the concept of civil society (Foucault, 2008b: 283). The problem in Locke was acquiring the harmony between market’s free subject and state’s submitted subject<sup>111</sup>. The solution had been related with the dilemma of freedom and security. The harmony can only be realized with the rational calculation of general utile. The result of the calculation has been the civil society. Agtaş states that, before the appearance of civil society or desire to control everyday life without political force, the collective body (society) had been state itself (Agtaş, 2013: 214). The withdrawal of the state refers to the more effective control and governing within the boundaries of liberal discourse. Hence, Locke’s problematization was beyond finding the harmony. It was the power game, which is an attempt to find new ways. As Hegel noticed, civil society is more than the compromise of the particularity of the members and totality of the state (Hegel, 2003: 220-227). It is the space of education which prepares the individuals to the integration with State’s Spirit (Atalay and Albayrak, 2012: 122-123). I believe that, we can rename the State’s Spirit as normal for our text. Then within the civil society, subjects are evaluated by their proximity to the normality. Actually, civil society represents the intersection of particularization and totalization processes. Subjects, their health, biological existence as species, general security are located collectively within this space. However, their supervision on normality operates one by one. For instance, a conscientious objector had faulted its debt to its nation, only it confronts with the sanction of anomaly. I believe that normalization is one of the reasons behind that indebted subject had become the main figure of political struggle.

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<sup>111</sup> Similarly, the penal reformists such as Cesare Beccaria, Jacques Pierre Brissot, Louis-Michel le Peletier, Joseph Michel Antoine Servan, and so on appeared at the same ‘moment’ with an analogous problem (Agtaş, 2013: 208).



Freedom, risk, and security within the space of civil society made the constituents of lifestyle of the indebted subject as normal. Thus, as we will see in next chapter, the control on the normalization had become the constitution of indebted subject.

And lastly there is engineering. Paul Virilio states that the fortress is common the modern era (Virilio, 2006: 36). He refers to the fortress as the “great immobile machines”. As every machine, this machine operates for the control. This control is the prolongation of the latent state of siege (Virilio, 2006: 36). Namely, Virilio refers to the spatial control of the bourgeoisie. In 18<sup>th</sup> century cities had tried to block the flow from the rural areas (Castel, 2003: 108-112). The main reason was the preservation of the wealth. It is true that sacred property rights had functioned for production. However, when social struggles had transformed into bloody conflicts; the ideational property rights withered away. Thus, the material fortress set spatial difference between wealth and poverty. Moreover, spatial difference is not common to the boundary between urban and rural areas. It is also located within the city as the city planning. Standardization of the housing, creation of boulevards, demolition of dead ends, segregation of city land according to rent, and real estate manipulation are related with this the creation a difference within the city<sup>112</sup> (Berman, 1988 and Virilio, 2006: 43 *et seq.*). Why this new regulation of the space is distinct from the past experiences? This is because; the regulator has been born after the threshold of modernity: engineer (Virilio, 2006: 37). The calculation, natural and ontological justification through positivism, standardization of the measurements, and geometrical precision had constituted the engineer subject. The engineer has been the creator of great immobile machines which prevents the rapid flow of every social movement. By walls it has prevented repositioning and redistribution of urban rent; while by boulevards it has bounded the urban citizen with the domination of fast vehicles (Berman, 1988). No wonder Saint-Simon had found the future in the brain and hands of the engineer. However, late-19<sup>th</sup> and early-20<sup>th</sup> centuries remembered us that, the spatial engineering cannot be separated from social engineering. As the protection of urban rent; the racial rent can be protected by calculation, positivist methodology, and so on.

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<sup>112</sup> It is a late-example however George-Eugène Haussmann’s recreation of Paris is an example.

Eventually, what are the significances of this historical process from the perspective of indebted subject? In general, the peculiarity of the governmentality, which can be simply named as the emergence of statistics, has effects on what the indebted subject is. Statistics is an attempt of centralization which is about truth-constructing, knowledge gathering, quantification, and depersonalization (Yılmaz, 2012: 151-152). It simply transforms the subject into numbers and disintegrates them to various data groups. As Zafer Yılmaz implies, the processing of statistics is accompanied with de-politicization of the social problem (Yılmaz, 2012). Debt-action which constitutes indebted subject has been based on political asymmetry. The power games between lender and debtor has been approached as a political problem. Amnesties, civil wars, new constitutions, exoduses, and debt-peonage stress the distinction between ruler and ruled. De-politicization of the indebted subject covers the political hierarchy of capital and the latent exclusion within the 'free' civil society. The debt-action is not simply a variable which refers to the condition of economy or the legitimacy of the policies. The effects of statistics are related with governmentality as general. However, with biopolitics and its object (population), de-politicization of debt-action had become more apparent. There are no the notion of population before the biopolitics (Foucault, 2009: 277-278). Government, even in *raison d'état* and police, had not been related with the quantified biological aspects of the people. A figure in 16<sup>th</sup> century, Giovanni Botero, conceptualizes the 'government' as the domination on people and expanding state's rule (as cited in Foucault, 2009: 238). In *polizeiwissenschaft* literature, the interest on necessities of life, health, and circulation remarked early traces of population (Foucault, 2009: 323-325). However, in these two moments, there were residues of medieval subjection, but no population. As it is stated, population only appeared with biopolitical lens towards the society. Population de-politicizes the habitants of the civil society. Even though civil society is defined with right-system, the people dwelled into have become anonymous under the health and welfare statistics. Similarly, indebted subject, even in the most 'political' space of liberalism (civil society) cannot process counter-conduct against the indebtedment. Its subjectivity in the eye of lender is not political within civil society. Rather it is about repayment, economic development, consumption, and wages. Namely, the condition of the indebted subject appeared as a technical matter

under a specific scientific knowledge (see Foucault, 2009: 350). Hence the biopolitical rupture transformed the indebtedness into quantitative and scientific relation. The de-politicized character of this relation will be more apparent with Marx's criticism of capitalism which will be elaborated in next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE PHENOMENON OF INDEBTMENT IN PRESENT

The situation of indebtment and indebted subject in present has not been elaborated so far. However, the problem of this text is not only the historical and theoretical interpretation of indebtment. Rather, the political capacity of indebted subject and the effects of the transformation in the mode of production are crucial to demonstrate too. I am not asserting that, I will show the Truth (with capital T) of the contemporary indebtment. The political interpretation of a present phenomenon creates some problems about the function of the writer<sup>113</sup>, normativity, and truth procedures. That is why, before elaboration of the indebtment in present, I have to stress these problems.

Weber underlines the rise of ‘impersonal’ [social] scientist in early-20<sup>th</sup> century (Weber, 1958: 137). This emergence refers that, the social scientist is ‘liberated’ from any subjectivist idea within the world of cold statistics. I do not reject any quantitative methodology. Instead I am referring that even statistics has not their meaning as such. Even they do not exempt from the presuppositions of the social scientist<sup>114</sup> (Weber, 1958: 143). Hence the scientist should not attempt to overcome the problem of subjectivity. Rather, as Weber puts it, it should simply disenchant the world (Weber, 1958, 155). Namely scientist should be ‘free’ from any idea like foundations. Then as Foucault states, the role of intellectual should be not the claim

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<sup>113</sup> Herein I am not referring to structuralist and linguistic debate on the role of writer in a text. Rather, by using the notion of writer, I am trying to underline the problem of intellectuality. This problem is about the conceptualization of intellectual as a prophet who possesses the Truth of the phenomena. Hence, I will try to draw a line between the interpretation of indebtment in text and asserting the Truth of the indebtment.

<sup>114</sup> For instance according to World Bank, OECD, and IMF data indebtment and neoliberal policies have been accompanied with the decline of poverty. However, different data sets expose different results (see Federici, 1990; Cleaver, 1990; and Hudson, 2012). Thus statistics show different realities insofar as the scientist decided to use different variables.

of the Truth (either positivist or idealist). Rather it should be about exposing, interpreting, transforming, trespassing, unsettling, and re-conceptualizing the material world (see Foucault, 2011a). Hence, in the light of this positioning, we should mention two important matters: On the one hand Immanuel Kant's reference to present and on the other hand Karl Marx's reference to materialism.

Foucault states that there had been three different interpretations of present until Immanuel Kant's presence (Foucault, 1997d: 304-305). Firstly, there is setting the present into an age which comes from the past. Second one is the hermeneutic and fatidic interpretation for the future. And last one is the present as a threshold of the future. Foucault exemplifies these three interpretations by Plato, Augustine of Hippo, and Giambattista Vico. On the contrary of these three examples, I believe that, Foucault stresses the distinctiveness of the 'writer' from the present when interpreting it. Namely, these three symbolic figures had interpreted their presents as if they are external to the moment. They assumed a role for themselves such as redeeming the people by their interpretation on their present. On the other hand, Kant refers to rupture and discontinuity in the present as an action or *ethos* which he was experiencing too (Foucault, 1997d). Hence, Kant's reflection on its own present is related with the goals of this text and the role of the writer. My attempt to interpret the indebtedness in present is not about leading the indebted figures, showing a definite way against indebtedness, or declaring the Truth of the indebtedness. On the other hand I am asking a different question: How can I reflect my own present by the phenomenon of indebtedness? As it is said, the writer in this text is not located in an external/transcendent and objective point. Likewise, Kant's interpretation of the enlightenment was not from an outside point.

Kant describes enlightenment as an attitude which is the emancipation from immaturity (Kant, 2006: 17). Namely this attitude is the "courage" to use one's intellect. The courage can be seen in Kantian distinction of public and private spheres. On the contrary of most of enlightenment thinkers, Kant defines public with freedom, while private with obedience (Kant, 2006: 19). Hence, this new attitude is related with critical approach towards the phenomena of the present. As Kant's 'latent' reprimand to the religious powers of absolute monarch, Frederick II; critical

approach on present should reflect irreconcilable attitude towards what has been given as such. This interpretive position, however, is not locating the writer in the domain of normative theorization. Critical attitude is an immanent criticism, which is defined with the formal rejection of what present is defined. Namely, even though it is defined as an *ethos*, it is distinct from any morality. It does not dictate any way of life; but only refers to constant criticism and constant creation of new perspectives as a formal *ethos* (Foucault, 1997d: 315 *et seq.*). Hence, main attempt of the writer of this text is critical interpretation of indebtedness. I do not assert that indebtedness is the sole element of contemporary society or the only way to interpret it is displayed in text. Instead, as Kant, Weber, and Foucault's statements, I tried to expose what has been covered in the discourse of indebtedness within the limits of my perspective.

It is important to stress that, this critical approach towards the present is not contemplation. Instead, it is directly relate with the material reality. Hence, we have to close the circle of materialism by linking Karl Marx and Michel Foucault (see Balibar, 1992: 50). Marx's theoretical position is defined as historical materialism (or dialectical materialism). For opening a space for this position, besides of idealism, he also criticizes previous types of materialisms. For instance, Ludwig Feuerbach's "atheist" materialism is based on anthro-philosophical definition of human. However this definition relies on the "sensuousness" of the human. Thus Marx criticizes this Feuerbachian position as: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism –that of Feuerbach included– is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity, practice*, nor subjectively" (Marx, 1978c: 143)<sup>115</sup>. Hence he starts with the criticism of contemplation for the action. As our differentiation of ideational and idealistic things, Marx does not reject the abstractions at all. Instead he refers to the material effects of the abstraction (Read, 2003: 63). Herein Marxian historical materialism quite resembles the materialism which is claimed within Foucauldian theory. However this usage of similar concept (action) does not end the attempt to approximate these two theories. I believe that, we can use Jason Read's schematization for further statements. According to Read, there are three main

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<sup>115</sup> The emphasis is in original text.

differences between Foucault and Marx. These are the importance of macro and micro level analyses, the distinction between antagonism and agonism, and the role of elements within the subjectification process (Read, 2003: 89-90).

Firstly, it is possible to find both macro and micro methodology in Foucault and Marx. However, I believe that, this is not a dissimilarity between them. Most of times while Foucault mostly interpreted as micro-analyst, Marx is as macro-analyst (Olssen, 2004: 458). As it is said before, Foucault used various concepts such as *episteme* and governmentality. These concepts were used for to stressing the macro-level in Foucauldian theory. On the other hand interpretation of Marxian theory is always accompanied with the base-superstructure model. This architectural model refers to the determination of the superstructure (state, culture, law, and so on) by base (mode of production). Hence Marxian theory constitutes a hierarchical model (Olssen, 2004: 457). The hierarchic and deterministic visualization of the things has been criticized for its economic determinism. Even though there are various attempts to overcome economic determinism in Marxism<sup>116</sup>, I believe that, such a determinism was absent in Marx and Engels too. For instance Mark Olssen refers to Friedrich Engels's letter to Joseph Bloch on this matter: "According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the *production and reproduction of real life*. (...). Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase" (as cited in Olssen, 2004: 455)<sup>117</sup>. Hence we should not interpret Marx's methodology as hierarchic and universal macro-model. For instance, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* Marx stresses a different model (see Marx, 1972). The milestones of the emperorship of Napoleon III (r. 1852-1870) had been erected by *lumpenproletariat*, reactionary peasantry, and militarist army. Conceptualization of base-superstructure model as economic determinism could not explained this process. Especially workers against worker movements, strikebreakers, bourgeoisie which prefers dictatorship can only be

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<sup>116</sup> Herein I am referring to attempts such as relative autonomy, overdetermination, hegemony, and so on. However, discussion of these concepts goes beyond the limits of this text.

<sup>117</sup> Emphasis is mine.

interpreted by the “determination” of superstructure. Besides of this, Marx’s references to Asiatic mode of production (especially along with his letters on India and the *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*; see Read, 2003: 56) also form counter-example to his universal macro-analysis. Thus it is impossible to assert the absence of micro-analyses, anomalies, and determination of the superstructure in Marx’s theorization.

Secondly, while Foucault is mentioned with the plurality of subjectivities, interpretations of Marx refer to the dichotomous antagonism. For instance Marx, himself, asserts that history is the antagonist clashes between “oppressor and oppressed” classes (Marx, 1978a: 474). First of all, Marx historicizes the process of subjectification. He named these classes as bourgeoisie and proletariat for capitalist mode of production. In other modes of production their names differ. On the other hand, his main criticism is on liberal political-economy thinkers (such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and so on) for their conceptualization of labor (subject) as idealistic and non-historical. This criticism can be seen in the interpretation of primitive accumulation<sup>118</sup>. As it is said earlier, liberalism of 18<sup>th</sup> century relied on human nature. References to this nature had ensured the legitimization of the appearance of capitalist mode of production. This is because, those liberal thinkers conceptualized capitalism as natural. On the other hand, from a Marxist perspective, two things had been occurred before the capitalism (De Angelis, 2001: 1). In Marx’s words these were: “On the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of subsistence (...); on the other hand, free workers, the sellers of their own labour-power, and therefore the sellers of labour” (Marx, 1992: 874). There is a complex, ambiguous, and undetermined relation between subjects of the capitalism and capitalism itself. While there is the necessity of constituted subjects for appearance of capitalism, these subjects are also the results of the capitalist mode of production. The mode of production does not only refer to the production of goods and commodities, instead it is also about the production of subject. This non-linear but historical process is stressed by Jason Read through Marx’s *Grundrisse*:

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<sup>118</sup> I am aware of the debates on the meaning of primitive accumulation and its historical scope since the distinction between Lenin’s and Luxemburg’s interpretations (see De Angelis, 2001). However these debates are not related with our current attempt.



“Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object” (as cited in Read, 2003: 50). Hence Marx’s subject is defined within its *milieu*. Capitalist mode of production as machine and proletariat and bourgeoisie as subjects are meaningful with their relations. In this interpretation, primitive accumulation refers to the gesture which divides the subjects (likewise sane and insane in Foucauldian theory). As Foucault, Marx interprets the process of primitive accumulation (approximately between 15<sup>th</sup> century and 19<sup>th</sup> century) with three moments: violence, law, and normalization (Read, 2003: 36). I believe that these moments echo Foucauldian triad of sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics. This is because, Marx also defines these moments with blood, police mechanism, hostility against idleness, normalization, and naturalization (Read, 2003: 24-36). Hence gesture of primitive accumulation created both subjects and their environment. However, these subjects (proletariat and bourgeoisie) are not predetermined by this gesture. They are also the results of the mode of production (machine). Namely, there is the priority of the mode of production over the class struggle (Read, 2003: 5). This statement drives to the explanation of why we have been used two subjectivities (proletariat and bourgeoisie), while rejecting antagonistic dichotomy in Marx. Same gesture of primitive accumulation did not only separate the bourgeoisie and proletariat. For instance in the *History of Madness*, same gesture interpreted through the creation of sane and insane. These two subjectivities in Marx refer to the subjectification process within the machine of capitalist production. Even though, in some moments they are related capitalist machine, there are different subjectivities within Marx too: Peasantry, “bureaucracy”, intellectuals, subjects of Asiatic mode of production, and so on. Hence it is quite hard to interpret Marxian history as if it is predetermined by two classes (Read, 2003: 26).

Third and lastly, there is the Marxian reference to the mode of production as the only factor for subjectification. Actually this dissimilarity between Marx and Foucault is slightly mentioned in the second one. At this point, the difference is not quite distinct as mainstream approaches claimed. First of all, through linking production with subjectification, it is possible to assert that Marxian subjectivity goes beyond the exploitation model. According to Read, especially in *Grundrisse*, Marx’s

interpretation of change in the modes of production can be interpreted as power games (Read, 2003: 36). Similarly, Balibar stresses Marx's interests on the practices of power (Balibar, 1992: 45). Hence subject is not only defined with its exploitation. Rather it is also constituted through power relations. Free worker is completely different from the slave in Marx. Its subjectivity (second meaning of subject) to the bourgeoisie is ensured by this freedom. As concepts of formal subsumption and real subsumption underline, Marx refers to the variety of the links between proletariat and bourgeoisie<sup>119</sup> (Read, 2003: 105). However, besides of this point, I have to accept that, all of these links are related with mode of production. Subjectivities such as proletariat/bourgeoisie, women/men, citizen/peasant, and so on are the results of economic production machines. This does not refer to economic determinism in Marx. Instead, it refers to the externality of the subjectification to the subject (Balibar, 1992: 53). Namely, Foucauldian reference to ethics, technologies of self, and arts of existence is absent in Marx. The subject has auxiliary role in the subjectification process.

Hence, within three elements, I tried to show that dissimilarities between Marx and Foucault can be reconcilable. To sum up, it is possible to underline their similarities as: Centering the problem of subjectivity and referencing heterogeneity and undetermination of the space of power (Read, 2003: 87 and 153). Within the light of these similarities, we can assert that Marx and Foucault can be located within the same materialistic attempt. This is because their investigation of subjectivity and power is based on historical and material reality. They refer to these concepts as *ensemble* of relations, instead of pure "object of thought" (Read, 2003: 31). This main attempt of two thinkers conducts me for interpretation of them within the same materialistic position. This position, also, cannot be separated from the investigation of their present. Both Marx and Foucault, through their materialistic gaze towards the history, tried to expose the pseudo-naturalisms in their own present. The interpretation of the past helped them to articulate different practical movements. In the end, their historical interests helped them to interpret the present. As Marx hoped,

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<sup>119</sup> There are various examples on everyday life which is beyond the walls of the factory (Read, 2003: 84-85).

this was not an abstract interpretation (Marx, 1978c: 145). Rather it practically changed the world. That is why, in this chapter, I will try to interpret the present of the debt. This interpretation has not grand assertions such as changing the world, understanding the Truth of present, or prophecies on future. Instead it is only a perspective.

### **3.1 Economic Indebtmnt**

In previous section, 3 important moments are remarked for underlining the discontinuity in the concept of indebtment. These can be named as liberalism, welfare state, and neoliberalism. The emergence of biopolitics and civil society and their link to the liberalism has been mentioned. Herein, I would like to interpret the other two moments.

#### **3.1.1 Welfare State and Fordism**

Where is the beginning point of fordist production and Keynesian welfare policies? The opening of Henry Ford's first automobile factory in the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, implementation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal policies at 1933, or the establishment of Bretton-Woods system at 1944 can be referred as the beginning point. However, as Bob Jessop underlined, all of them would be accompanied with various problems (Jessop, 1992: 55-59). This is because, Fordism and welfare state are ideal types which have never been fully realized within an economy. Although our theoretical statements above showed that, a machine cannot encircle the whole of action processes, subjectivities, and other machines in a moment. Even though Fordist production and welfare state machines were not the only operating machines in early-20<sup>th</sup> century, they were the main types. With the lens of indebtment, I would like to interpret this period by the production and reproduction of the machines and subject, namely of the capital and labor power within Marxist jargon (Jessop, 1996: 166).

The main shift in general production machine (or mode of production), from late-19<sup>th</sup> century to early-20<sup>th</sup> century, was from manufacture to machinofacture (Dikmen,

2011: 35). This shift refers to the change in the means of production. While manufacture is based on tools, the machinofacture is operated by technical machines<sup>120</sup>. Namely, the latter is not the extension of the worker, but vice versa (Lazzarato, 2014b: 81). This distinction can be found in Marx too. Marx states that, tool is limited with human, while technical machine goes beyond the control of the one's capabilities and skills (as cited in Read, 2003: 116). Tool cannot produce without one and tool's capabilities are embedded into its owner's. That is why, tools necessitate long apprenticeship for giving one necessary skills (Dikmen, 2011: 32). Every production process in manufacture has its own secrets, traditions, and way of doings. This esoteric knowledge is transferred to the pupil by master. The transfer also constructs the pupil as artisan or craftsman. Namely, pupil acquires a skill. Being skilled refers to one's capability to understand and control the production process. For instance, when a blacksmith produces ironwork, it completely aware of the process of production, its speed, duration, inputs, and outputs. Hence blacksmith dominates the tool. On the other hand, machinofacture refers completely different process. Dikmen remarks three aspects of technical machine. It is a force which external to the worker, it operates within the limits of its design, and it continuously repeats same motions (Dikmen, 2011: 33-34). Then herein, the "learning process" concerns the technical machine, not the worker. This is because, the productive movements are acted by the technical machine. The design of the technical machine contains the transferred the skill. Hence there are no more blacksmiths, tailors, carpenters, tanners, and so on. Rather there are only workers. These workers have no control over the production processes and the technical machines. Rather, they had been transformed to the appendages of the technical machines (Dikmen, 2011: 37 and Read, 2003: 119). Moreover, they do not constitute skilled labor, but only semi-skilled and unskilled labor. Within the machinofacture, the production process is simple, standardized, and deskilled. The skills, capabilities, and abilities of the worker do not affect the production process.

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<sup>120</sup> Lazzarato refers to the distinction between technical machine and social machine (Lazzarato, 2014a: 173). I believe that, this distinction can help us to overcome the ambiguity between machines which are related with subjects and other machines and which are about commodity production. When I am using the notion of machine I am referring to the social machine. On the other hand, the notion of technical machine will be used for referring the other.

Which actions caused the shift towards the technical machines? The processes of disciplinary standardization and the utility principle in liberal governmentality were also the main factors for this shift. The episteme of the mid- and late-19<sup>th</sup> century shaped the subjects and machines as finding the most beneficial and profitable way of production runs through intensification of labor processes (Read, 2003: 95 and Castel, 2003: 305). Thus standardization, homogenization, and division of labor and creation of large scale working spheres were concluded with the appearance of machinofacture. The scientific method had set in the production processes. In late-19<sup>th</sup> century Frederick Taylor, who is a pioneer figure for scientific production methods, had started to measure the production process for finding most efficient way<sup>121</sup>. These measurements was related the standardization of the time (Dikmen, 2011: 108). Standardization of time refers to division of time to equal parts such as seconds, minutes, and hours. By ensuring the precision in mechanical watch (in approximately mid-19<sup>th</sup> century), human has been conducted with an external force. The one should obey the objectivity of periods of time. This process is similar to worker's position within the machinery. Taylor's scientific method is an attempt to enhance this control over to worker for increasing the efficiency of work. The measurements of Taylor refer to measuring the time of specific works by a chronometer. He, through observation, found the most scientific and objective methods of how specific works should be done efficiently (Dikmen, 2011: 91). Herein the efficiency refers to the intensification and simplification of the work. Maybe one can criticize that, finding best way to the produce is not common to this era. For instance, even in early-liberal times, it can be found in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Smith also underlined the "intensification" of the work (example of pin factory) through division of labor (see Smith, 2007). However Dikmen refers to the difference with between Taylor and Smith: While Smith refers to the productivity, Taylor uses the concept of efficiency (Dikmen, 2011: 98). The peculiarity of the efficiency stems from its reliance on process management. Smith's workers in factory are not located in the ongoing mechanical process. Their capabilities determine the process of production. They produce through tools. On the other hand,

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<sup>121</sup> His "magnum opus", *The Principles of Scientific Management*, was published in 1911.

Taylor's workers are conducted by a process. Hence, the result of the late-19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries' utile production differs from previous inventions. Machinofacture is common to these times.

Besides of the time, the standardization of the space is also crucial for machinofacture (Castel, 2003: 300-316). Taylor 'discovered' that, immobilization of the worker in a specific location increases the productivity too. The efficiency loss when worker moved beside the productive action. Taylor's discovery on the standardization of space reached its peak with the mechanical repetition of the assembly line. Assembly line refers to a mechanism which the raw materials stream in a line for fabrication. Workers are located in particular points of this line. Every worker performs a simplified and divided work in its own point. For instance same worker tightens a screw of car doors for hours. Moreover, the stream of the line cannot be controlled by worker either. It should keep pace the determined speed of the technical machine. Worker can neither decide the breaks nor lose its attention. This 'confinement' of the worker in a particular point along the line is interpreted as one of the most disciplinary order by Hardt and Negri (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 251). This is because, technical machine conducts the particular movements of the subject's body<sup>122</sup>. In the movie of *Modern Times*, Charlie Chaplin's desperation against the gears and the line is can be a good visual example of the discipline over worker. Besides of the discipline of the worker's body, spatial standardization can be seen in the capacities of the factories. Fordism cannot be separated from large-scale factories. This is because, the cost of the assembly line necessitates the mass production (Dikmen, 2011: 125-126 and Jessop, 1996: 167). After the production a surplus value or profit should be acquired. Thus a factory should produce as much as it can for profit. This necessity transformed the space of production as large-scale. Factories are constituted as huge complexes. For instance the production of car was not only limited with the whole production process of itself. Moreover, the large-scale complex of car production consists of related-productions such as about steel, glasses, plastics, and so on.

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<sup>122</sup> This existence of disciplinary mechanism in the heart of biopolitical episteme exemplifies the rejection of linear juxtaposition.

In this narrative, debt-actions towards technical machines are absent. I believe that, the constitutive role of indebtedness in technical machines can be seen in capitalist production process. According to Marx, capitalist production is the endless continuation of the “money-commodity-money” process (M-C-M’) (Graziani, 1997: 26; Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1042; and Peter, 2017). This process refers that, capital (technical machines and labor) is purchased by the money. Commodity can be produced through this purchased capital. Namely surplus value can appear at this moment. In the last moment, commodity is sold for re-acquiring the money with surplus value (M’). This process proceeds infinitely. However, it also exposes the debt-action towards the technical machine. It is true that, in Marx, money is mostly conceptualized as commodity (Peter, 2017: 431). However as Augusto Graziani underlined, we should separate two moments in this capitalist process: Production (between capitalists and proletariat) and circulation (between capitalists) (Graziani, 1997: 26 and 29). In the production process, the wages of workers and the costs of technical machines are paid. These payments are realized by the money. It is possible to assert that, money in production process is nothing but credit (Graziani, 1997: 30 and Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1042)<sup>123</sup>. This stems from the capitalists necessity to use credit for investment. Before the banking system, there is no capitalist production system. The wages of workers and costs of technical machines should be taken as a credit before the appearance of commodity. Hence, within a capitalist economy, the surplus process is linked to the presence of debt-actions. The technical machines within capitalism, thus, are constructed through indebtedness. The peculiarity of fordist machine is based on the large amounts of debts and productions. Moreover, I believe that, the pawnship of the worker to the machine is more visible in fordism. Graziani states that, if money were a commodity during production, the whole process should be appeared as employing a commodity (money) for acquiring the labor (Graziani, 1997: 31). However labor is used for the production of the commodity. This capability of the labor, within fordist machine, is not central as Marx hoped in 19<sup>th</sup> century. Main production is not caused by worker’s

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<sup>123</sup> According to Graziani, money in circulation phase appears as exchange medium. However, our interpretation of money, which can be seen in previous chapter, is based on money as IOU. I believe that, the money relation in circulation phase is not exempt from unequal relation and credits (i.e. consumer credits for everyday life spending).

actions. Rather the skill to produce is embedded into the technical machine. Worker appears only as its appendage (Dikmen, 2011: 37). From a pure theoretical perspective, commodity and capital flows to capitalist by technical machine while the renovation and maintenance of the machine is ensured by capitalist. The debt-action towards to and comes from capitalist and technical machine is guaranteed by giving the worker as a pawn to the latter. As previous examples of pawnship, worker's relationship with technical machine, in spite of exceptional situations such as luddism and strikes, are not about power relations. On the other hand worker is completely dependent to the technical machine as a domination relation. That is why, within factory and through the lens of indebted technical machine, worker appears as pawn. I am not stating that worker is the modern slave. There is also a situation which worker appeared as an indebted subject (within power and resistance relations). For understanding the indebted subject in fordism, we should pass to the interpretation of welfare state, wage, and tax.

Besides of machines, subjects are affected by debt-actions too. Mass production within fordist machine has no meaning without mass consumption. Products cannot conclude with profit without consumption. Thus Fordism goes beyond the limits of factory for controlling the worker (Jessop, 1992: 47). This control is about governing the free time of the worker (Harvey, 2010: 148). Free time of the worker drives us to understanding the change in employment forms in late-19<sup>th</sup> and early-20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Robert Castel differentiates three different labor forms in capitalist and industrial societies: Proletarian condition, working condition, and wage-earning condition (Castel, 2003: 303). Proletarian condition refers to deskilled worker who has no access to any protective social apparatuses. As Marx stressed, they "have nothing to lose but their chains" (Marx, 1978a: 500). Beforehand the late-19<sup>th</sup> century, these masses had not access to any property. They worked for their biological reproduction (nutrition, breeding, and so on). Moreover, citizenship or being the member of a political society had been defined with the property. For instance in France and England, right to vote was accompanied with the presence of property which can be taxed. Castel names this situation as the patrimonial property (Castel, 2003: 228 and 336). This is because, access to the property which ensures social security is related



with inheritance. Proletariat had completely excluded from it. However, workers strengthened their counter-conduct against the capital during 19<sup>th</sup> century. This rise of the workers' movement caused the fear of the masses<sup>124</sup>. According to Castel, this dilemma between patrimonial property and radical workers' movements had been overcome by the appearance of welfare state<sup>125</sup> (Castel, 2003: 247). Herein, the concept of welfare state refers more than post-1929 and after Second World War policies. It refers to a new type of social reproduction which accompanied with social security of the state (Jessop, 1996:166). Hence welfare state is the appearance of pension, healthcare, accident benefits, wages, paid-vacations, and limited working times. Its existence in the social reality also caused the transformation from proletarian condition to the working conditions. Third labor form, which is wage-earning condition, appeared with the rise of white collars, bourgeois wage earners, and professionals (Castel, 2003: 327). The transformation from the first to the second can be visible. However how can we refer to the passage from the second to the third? The appearance of skilled labor in wage-earning condition drives us to define it with the neoliberalism. However, Joseph Schumpeter, in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, underlined the distinction between managers and capital-owners. This book was published in 1942. Moreover, Castel states that, the proportion of wage earners had risen from 49% to 83% between 1931 and 1975 (Castel, 2003: 327). Hence, these phenomenon and Schumpeter's observation creates an inconsistency within our periodization of fordist era (approximately between late-19<sup>th</sup> century and late-70s). However, these periods are not total pillars which represent the Truth of their times or disallow fractures. For instance, at the same time with Castel's periodization for employment forms, we can use Foucauldian periodization of sovereignty, discipline, security. This periodization would locate the transformation from discipline to security at the end of Second World War (Lazzarato, 2014a: 88). This distinction would be more appropriate for shift towards

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<sup>124</sup> This fear also caused the rise of elite theory in late-19<sup>th</sup> and early-20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Thus it was not a simple conflict, rather it effected every aspect of social and political theory: From early figure of Auguste Comte to thinkers such as Gustave Le Bon, Vilfredo Pareto, and Gaetano Mosca.

<sup>125</sup> I am aware of different welfare state (American, North European, and so on) and social security models (Bismarckian and British). However they are not related with the problem of this text. Thus, I will not explain them.

wage-earning condition. However we have to underline that both of these periodization, even though we can refer to beginning points, cannot be juxtaposed linearly. There are fordist elements in neoliberal era as well as vice versa. For instance sweatshop echoes proletarian conditions, but it common to wage-earners 'era'. Similarly, skilled labor (which is related with wage-earners) can be found in proletarian and working conditions as engineers, technicians, scientists, and so on. Hence fordist machine can be related with both of working and wage-earning conditions.

Fordism cannot be separated from the appearance of social security system, which is welfare state. In 20<sup>th</sup> century, state became the guarantee of social security which is no longer related with property (Castel, 2003: 248 and 270). Namely through social insurance, state ensured the overcoming the uncertainty of the risks. This change refers to abandoning the patrimonial property. Hence political, economic, and social acceptance of the one's into the society started to operate beyond the inheritance. The new element for this process is wage. As it is said, continuation of fordism was based on mass consumption too. Thus workers should have free time and adequate income for consuming what had been produced. This necessity can found its expression in Henry Ford's main employment principle: 8 hours and 5 dollars per day (Harvey, 2010: 147). Rising wages ensured the mass consumption. Moreover, welfare state became the guarantee of the full employment (Jessop, 1992: 48). Thus every unskilled and semi-skilled worker had been guaranteed by the state. Also syndicates, through control over their members and keeping the wages up by collective conventions had ensured the mass consumption too. Hence fordist machine is defined with the compromise between capital, labor, and state (Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1044). I believe that, this fordist wage system is related with the indebtedment of the workers. This is because, after replacing the property-based with wage-based system in social security, social status of the one had specified by wages (Castel, 2003: 336-342). Underpaid workers, for sustaining their status<sup>126</sup>, obeyed this disciplinary indebtedment (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 256). This is because, as debt-

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<sup>126</sup> They experienced the risk of proletarianization. Even though welfare state tried to overcome this risk, the people in the fringes of society cannot be eliminated at all.

action is based on future actions (repayment and so on), the low wages also linked to the future. Castel states that, the continuum of growth in fordist production was understood as the emergence of wage-equality in future (Castel, 2003: 343-344). Thus, worker is constituted as indebted for future actions. Actually, the whole wage system is based on indebtedment. As Marx stated, the wage of the labor has been paid after the production process of worker (as cited in Graziani, 1997: 36). When the one works in a production process, it is related with an action (production). This action constitutes the one as worker. Besides of production-action, there is also a debt-action. This is because, the unequal and incomplete relation between worker and capitalist refer to constitution of these two as indebted subjects. Worker *lends* its labor power to the capitalist. On the other hand, after the production process, it acquires its labor-credit with interest. However the interest is not more than the value of labor power, on the contrary it is fewer. This is because, capitalist seizes the surplus value (from this perspective the interest of the labor-credit). Thus capitalist appropriates the interest of the worker from the lens of debt-action. That is why wage system is related with the indebtedness of the worker. Herein, I should remind that, indebtedment does not refer mere Evil. It is not a moral category. Namely, interpretation of wage system as indebtedment does not refer to condemnation of this system at all. Moreover, mainstream interpretation of debt, which is between Evil lender and Good debtor, is not relevant for our position too. In this narrative of wage, lender is worker while debtor is capitalist. However debtor exploits and controls the lender. Thus, action-based schematization of indebtedment is more adequate, when all sides of debt-action are defined as indebted subject.

Besides of wage-system, taxes within the fordist machine can also be interpreted as the example of indebtedment. The indebtedment can be seen within the taxation relation between the one and welfare state. There were not much tax capacity in pre-modern states, because of the limits of state apparatus (bureaucracy) and absence of the demands on state's social security (Kiser and Karceski, 2017: 77). Thus, tax is mainly the 'discovery' of 19<sup>th</sup> century. When Marx interprets the exploitation of French peasantry, he underlines the usage of tax for appropriation of surplus value as a mechanism of ruler classes. De Ste. Croix quotes from *The Class Struggles in*

*France*: “The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through *mortgages* and *usury*; the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the *State taxes*” (as cited in De Ste. Croix, 1981: 206). According to Kiser and Karceski, tax is not simply the tool of ruling classes. They can use for the workers too. That is why, they locate the emergence of the importance of taxation in 19<sup>th</sup> century by the link between democratization and income tax (Kiser and Karceski, 2017: 79). The struggle from early-bureaucratic organizations (from the period of *raison d'état* and police mechanism) was based on the right to control the tax mechanism. That is why, taxation also constitutes the justification and legitimization of the capitalist state (Jessop, 2015: 90-91). I believe that, previous tax examples in medieval era and before are not related with the indebtedment. Only when modern state collects tax, it enters a debt-base contract relation with its citizens (Kiser and Karceski, 2017: 82). This is because, tax are collected in modern state by the promise of returning to the citizens as services, infrastructures, and security. Hence when the one gives its tax, it is constituted as indebted subject. It lends money to the state within an incomplete and asymmetrical relation. The interest of tax will return when this incomplete action has completed. As it is said, this is also unequal action between state and one. This is because, one has not capability to collect taxes. However, within the social security and social guarantee system of welfare state, indebtedment of the tax payers are not about degrading the political, social, and economic status of them. Instead, the interest of the tax-credit can return as various benefits, employment, and services. Moreover, through the mechanisms of syndicates and representational democracy, tax payer has also partial control over the tax-credit. On the other hand, indebtedment through taxation will be completely different in neoliberal era.

I believe that, mentioned indebtedment mechanisms in welfare state (wage and tax) cannot be separated from rent. This is because, the monopoly of regulation of tax and wages refer to the notion of rent. However, rent in welfare state is completely different from Ancien Regime, liberalism, and neoliberalism. In one of his interviews, Lazzarato underlines that Keynesian welfare state was an attempt to cut the rentier on properties by bourgeoisie (Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1044). However, within fordist machine the rent transformed to the wage-rent and tax-rent.

Through these apparatuses, subjects are constituted as the indebted subject. Their possible free time activities are conducted by their wages and taxes. Control over the free time of the worker refers to the constitution of the worker. This is because, one's beliefs, ways of life, interests, and so on is determined within its free time. One can improve its language skills, participate sports games, learn musical instrument, or visit a cultural space (museum, theatre, and so on). However, these 'capabilities' are determined by its economic and cultural accumulation. It can be conducted to work extra time in its free time, buy standardized commodities like everyone else, or disciplined through social organizations (church, community meetings, syndicates, and so on). Even though, this is not a one-sided determination of the one's subjectivity. Debt-action and other actions only conduct the one within its free time. Counter-conducts of the one can appear as the creation of new activities (such as worker forums, syndicates, football matches, subcultures –i.e. jazz, punk, metal–, and so on). However, counter-conducts within fordism and welfare state are not criminalized at all. The indebtedment and rent within this era was also related with the protective chains of the state. On the other hand, this situation has been completely changed with the crisis of fordism and welfare state and emergence of neoliberalism.

### **3.1.2 Neoliberal Policies and Financialization**

The crisis of fordism and welfare state had become undeniable in 70s. Rising war expenses of US in Vietnam, oil crisis caused by OPEC's political decisions, counter-conducts against machines and subjectivities of the fordist model of capitalism (worker and student movements all over the Western world), and decreasing profit rate had necessitated a transformation in the capitalist mode of production. Fordism conveyed this crisis interiorly, both in subjectivity and production levels. Mass production and mass consumption of fordism and large-scale economies created paradoxes which damaged the fordism and welfare state at all (Dikmen, 2011: 130-134 and Harvey, 2010: 165-170). This is because, rigidity of fordism and cost of changing the assembly line obliged inciting the consumption. Even though there was a need for consumption, both production and consumption had been standardized. Namely, diversity of products was quite hardly to maintenance. Standardized commodities had filled whole consumers and the consumption cannot be provoked

anymore. Fordist mass production prepared its own fall through this path. This standardization was common to subjectivity level too. Disciplining by state apparatuses and syndicates (disciplining sexuality, political positioning, and *ethos*), lifelong guarantee for waged-working (or lifelong indebtedment), predetermination of *milieu* through mass housing, and standardization of ways of life became unbearable at some point (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 280 and Sennett, 1998). Hence, present and possible resistances conducted the capitalist machine and its subjects to change. Main breaking point can be located in abandoning the Bretton-Woods system, gold standard, and pegged exchange rates at 1971 (Hardt and Negri, 2012: 272-273 and Charbonneau and Hansen, 2014: 1043). This is because, this moment was the representation of the collapse of post-WW2 American hegemony. It refers to a new type of hegemony which was named as empire by Hardt and Negri. However, instead of using the notions of them, I will simply refer to the transformation of the early 70s as the emergence of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the last moment in which indebtedment is the constituent of main social distinction. The social distinction cannot be set between workers and bourgeoisie anymore. Instead it has gone beyond the walls of factory (Read, 2003: 14 and Lazzarato, 2014b: 33). The social distinction is between debtor and lender. Contemporary seizure of surplus value of indebted subjects and subprime crisis can only be understood through the lens of neoliberalism. However, before passing interpretation of neoliberalism, we should look into the process of its appearance. Hence, firstly, I will start with Foucault's interpretation of ordoliberalism.

At the end of Second World War, under the shade of the horror of Nazism, West Germany faced with the question of state<sup>127</sup>. This question was how to constitute a state which is far from unlimited German experience (Foucault, 2008b: 111). Thus their problem was different from 18<sup>th</sup> century's liberals. This is because, liberals' problems were on limiting the excessive government through market, but not

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<sup>127</sup> Foucault's interpretation of Nazi regime is not based on the extreme state. Rather he underlines leader (*Führer*) and nation (*Volk*) and the link between them (party) (see Foucault, 2008b). However, even though I agree with Foucault, for interpreting ordoliberals, I will maintain their criticism of Nazis through the criticism of state.

constituting the state by market<sup>128</sup>. When ordoliberalists discussed the possible solutions on West Germany's problems in the journal of *Ordo*, the state-machine had completely failed. Hence there was only one problem: How a state can be both legitimate and cooperate with market? They developed the policy of social interventionism (*gesellschaftspolitik*), which is about ensuring the competition through the state's involvement to the social (Foucault, 2008b: 159-160). Regulations of state (constitution of different machines by the state) and subjects embedded into the state are the guarantee of the competition in market. I believe that, this reference in ordoliberalists completely influenced neoliberalism. Before the hegemonic era of neoliberalism (post-70s), precursor figures such as Friedrich Hayek and Michael Oakeshott had also underlined the role of state. For instance Oakeshott defines state (civil association) as a framework which individuals freely achieve their purposes (Oakeshott, 1991: 184). Namely, freedom and 'equality' of individuals depend on the regulation of states. This definition is completely different from liberal governmentality. It is true that, main fear of 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries' liberals was the presence of state. However, even though there was such a scare, they had to rely on state apparatus too. Suppressing political and social demands, disciplining everyday activities of worker, maintaining the condition of wage-labor, and governing poverty necessitated state regulations in 19<sup>th</sup> century as well. Then social interventionism can be found in liberal era too. As Lazzarato stresses, capitalism (and thus liberal governmentality in 19<sup>th</sup> century) cannot be separated from state mechanism (Lazzarato, 2012 and Lazzarato, 2014a). Hence which point differentiates liberal understanding of state from the neoliberal one? How can we underline the extension of state's dependency to capital in neoliberal era? These questions will be appeared with the change in the notion of indebtedment.

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<sup>128</sup> Various thinkers from Max Weber to Michael Mann (see *The Autonomous Power of the State*) and Theda Skocpol (see *Bringing the State Back In*) have been underlined the autonomy of the state from the social. However, I believe that, neoliberalism has been accompanied with the erosion of this autonomy. Herein I do not reject the peculiarity of state which can be referred as the monopoly on usage of force. On the other hand, with neoliberalism, state is no longer a machine related to capitalism. Instead, it became a machine within capitalism. Thus, it will not be an exaggeration to declare the end of state in Schmidian sense in which defined with its political autonomy (see Lazzarato, 2014a). I believe that, our further interpretation will expose this withdraw of the autonomy of state in neoliberalism.

We can start with the differentiation of neoliberalism from liberalism, briefly. Firstly, while liberalism is based on the free market, neoliberalism relies on competition (Foucault, 2008b: 118). This change is the denunciation of naïve naturalism which presumes liberal market as universal. Instead, neoliberal position is the awareness of the necessity to use various machines for spreading the rule of capital. It is impossible to find *laissez-faire* market society within neoliberalism. Neoliberal mechanism has to cooperate or to conduct the state. Second difference is on subjectivity. *Homo economicus* of neoliberalism goes beyond the liberal one. Foucault underlines the rise of entrepreneur and human-capital (Foucault, 2008b: 147 and 219). Human capital is the transformation of subject to commodity. Namely it refers to evaluation of the one by its accumulated value. The one should be the boss of itself and try to make profit, as an executive of a company (Lazzarato, 2014a: 13). That is why, the subject of neoliberalism, in general, is defined as the entrepreneur subject. Hence *homo economicus* of 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries should produces, competes with, and develops itself, instead of the one (18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries' *homo economicus*) who calculates its needs for exchange (Foucault, 2008b: 225-226). Within the same stream, the meaning of wage had also changed. For instance Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker conceptualizes wage as an income, instead of a price for labor power (as cited in Foucault, 2008b: 221-223). Namely, the way to make indebted through wage is also changed. It is no more absent-interest of the labor. Instead wage is debt-money for the worker. Mentioned formula of Marxist financial production (M-M') is valid for worker. The worker should get the credit-wage for creating a surplus value (which it can sell for more credit-wage) within itself. Last difference between liberalism and neoliberalism is the latter's dependency to the government through community (Rose, 1996: 61). Social aid from the community has replaced the social guarantee of the state (see Castel, 2003). The subject within neoliberalism is defined with its sub-group or community. For instance, as we will see in new risk management, the categorization of the people operates through its sexuality, race, religion, and so on.

Neoliberalism's differentiation from liberalism, actually, implies what neoliberalism is. However it does not compose a proper definition. It is true that, conceptualizing



neoliberalism properly is quite hard. For instance, Simon Springer refers four main interpretations of neoliberalism: Ideological hegemonic project, policy, state form, and governmentality (Springer, 2012: 135-136). Likewise Springer, I believe that, these 4 interpretations cannot be separated. Hence we should define it as: Neoliberalism consists of both machines (state form) and subjects (ideological hegemonic project) in which is reproduced by various actions (policy) for governing machines and subjects (governmentality). In the light of this definition, for this text's problematization, neoliberalism can be used as a type of government and control of indebted subject through financialization<sup>129</sup>. I am going to interpret financialization firstly, and later we will search the meaning of being indebted in neoliberalism.

First and foremost, I have to underline Lazzarato's criticism on Graeber (Lazzarato, 2014a: 63 and 103-105). According to Graeber's circular historical schema, the change in 70s refer to entrance of virtual money era (Graeber, 2011: 368). This era is defined with 'peaceful' empire<sup>130</sup>. Moreover this era refers to the hegemony of the money as debt over money as commodity. However, Lazzarato stresses that, the change is more than simple hegemonic shift. Instead, financialization refers to the absolute precedence of the money as capital over every aspect of life. Hence financialization refers to displacing fordist industrial model for anti-productive accumulation. Actually, as it is implied earlier, capitalism has never been existed as a production model (Lazzarato, 2014a: 47, 116, and 182). Instead it has always been related with appropriation, confiscation, dispossession, and expropriation<sup>131</sup>. Deregulations, freedoms, and flows of capital exist insofar as they help to these functions. The very basis of capitalism, which is liberal interpretation (Lockean) of property, does not rely on production. In tribal/egalitarian communities, villages, cities, and even in nations there are production models which are not related with

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<sup>129</sup> It is impossible to grasp neoliberalism with all aspects within this text. That is why, some important concepts such as governance, total quality management, and so on will not be mentioned.

<sup>130</sup> By the notion of peaceful, I believe that, Graeber does not stress Kantian perpetual peace or end of the history. Instead, as *Pax Romana* represents, it is about interiorizing the global conflicts to the same global empire (see Hardt and Negri, 2012).

<sup>131</sup> I believe that, Goethe's *Faust* is a quite important example for the destructive characteristics of capital. For similar interpretation see Berman, 1988.

property. Thus production is free from property. Hardt and Negri conceptualize the production without property as the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2013). Rights on water, forest, meadow, city, public places, and so on are the examples of the commons in contemporary era. However, even these rights are threatened by enlargement of capital. For instance, in Turkey through ‘urgent expropriation’, which is a legal mechanism, state seizes the water and forest rights of villages (Kaya, 2011). The decision on urgent expropriation was 6 in 80s, while it became 105 in 2000s (Kaya, 2011: 200). It is an example of appropriation of commons in neoliberalism. This expropriation, seizure, or appropriation refers to the appearance of property. Property is the result of encirclement and of exclusion of the others. This exclusion can stem from private actors or state (Hardt and Negri, 2013: 82). However these alternatives do not change the positioning of property as exclusion. Hence, liberalism and neoliberalism which are based on property can also be interpreted by anti-production and appropriation. Another issue on anti-production, besides of property, can be seen in the transformation of employment and ‘production’ forms. For instance, Castells and Aoyama interpret the data on employment forms in G-7 countries between 1920 and 1990. They refer to the decrease of manufacture employment and rise in service employment after 70s (Castells and Aoyama, 1994: 11 and 14). This tendency is coherent with discussion of post-fordism. The rigidity problem of fordism has been solved by flexible accumulation, rising information and communication technologies, and brand economies (Jessop, 1992: 65; Jessop, 1996: 170-173; and Harvey, 2010: 165-170). Hence, modern neoliberal economy is defined with the ‘production’ of non-productive elements. For instance Ömer Laçiner underlines that 50% of the total GNP of world is based on indebtment through credits, bonds, and so on (Laçiner, 2015).

How can we define these changes through the scope of indebtment? Financialization refers to fictitious money and credit which transforms the future incomes into tradable assets (Jessop, 2015: 97 and Hudson, 2012: 2-3). Namely, main profit within financialization stems from taking credit from the future. Thus it is the representation of Marxist formula of M-M’ (Lazzarato, 2014a: 115). As it is mentioned earlier, typical capitalist production in Marx is an infinite process of Money-Commodity-

Money with surplus value (M-C-M'). However this is a productive model. In finance capitalism there is no need for the production of commodity. Money acquires surplus value through credit at all. Namely, rentier status of the money or interest of the debt ensures the surplus. As Michael Hudson states, interest has become a type of rent (Hudson, 2012: 1). In truth, as it is said, interest has always been rent and capitalism has always been related with credit. Herein let me give examples from the history of capitalism. Marx's interpretation of primitive accumulation and its examples (i.e. enclosure movement in 16<sup>th</sup> century's England) stresses this role of capitalism. Similarly Lenin's interpretation of capitalist models in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* underlines the role of force in capitalism<sup>132</sup>. According to Suzanne de Brunhoff, accumulated wealth in late-19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in Western Europe stemmed from financial capital (as cited in Lazzarato, 2014a: 187)<sup>133</sup>. Hence capitalism has always been rentier economy. However, fordism represented an anomaly in capitalist mode of production, even though it is related with indebtedment and rent to some extent (Lazzarato, 2014a: 14). While fordism refers to the precedence of industry and production over finance, at the same time, welfare state and Keynesianism refers to averting the rentier. Mentioned social insurance, redistribution of wealth, workers' rights, social welfare, and mass consumption tried to erase the burden of indebtedment of subjects (see Rose, 1996: 48). This peculiarity of fordism, Keynesianism, and welfare state also shapes the difference between ordoliberalism and neoliberalism. Ordoliberalism has been located within fordist era (after Second World War). Thus they also underlined the production (industrial capitalism) over appropriation (financial capitalism). Moreover, their definition of state's role, as the notion of *social* interventionism implies, also refer to improving the conditions of workers (Lazzarato, 2014a: 91 and 193). State helps to improve human capital of them. On the other hand, in neoliberalism, human capital is an apparatus for direct indebtedment. Competition between workers helps to lower the wages, appearance of internship, and so on. This

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<sup>132</sup> For a similar statement see Lazzarato, 2014a.

<sup>133</sup> Apparently total wealth's 20% in France and 40% in Britain extracted from financial relations within foreign colonies. These rates do not even include the effect of internal financial relations. For empirical data, Lazzarato refers to: Berger, S. (2003). *Notre Première Mondialisation*. Paris: Seuil.

understanding is similar to 19<sup>th</sup> century's understanding of reserve masses of unemployed.

The financialization can also be seen in rising debt levels. For instance French administrative regions and departments' total debt has risen 50% since 2001 (Lazzarato, 2012: 17). This rise is the result of subprime crisis of 2008. While the crisis is the result of indebtment policies and financialization, the solution to crisis has been rising debt levels. Another example can be seen in US. Total debt of US has become \$51 trillion, while its GDP is only \$14 trillion (Lazzarato, 2012: 112). Hence, the surplus, which can be seen in the difference between debt and GDP, is created by non-productive financial unequal transitions. The situation is not different in world at all. According to Institute of International Finance, global debt became 327% of total GDP by being \$217 trillion in 2017<sup>134</sup>. These numbers are only related with total debt levels. However, in particular, there are special cases of household indebtment and national debt. In US and UK, the ratio of household debt to disposable income became 120% and 140% (Lazzarato, 2012: 19). The difference between household debt and income causes private bankruptcies and appropriation by secure credits (i.e. mortgage). Namely it causes re-enacting of primitive accumulation. Apparently there are more than 2 million people in Turkey who have faced with legal consequences<sup>135</sup>. In US, according to 2009 Consumer Report, half of indebted person, who cannot pay its credit card debt, use more credit for its basic needs (see The Debt Resisters' Operations Manual-DROM<sup>136</sup>). The national debt is a specific form of indebtment too. In Europe the ratio of state debts to GDP was 90,5% at 2012 (Lazzarato, 2014a: 190). In particular, the interest payment of national debt in France was €50 billion at 2007 (before subprime crisis) (Lazzarato, 2012: 18). State debts are higher in developed countries. As Douglas underlined, these countries cannot bankrupt through indebtment, because they are not trying to acquire foreign currencies for paying debts (Douglas, 2016: 14-15 and 94-96). On the other hand,

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<sup>134</sup> See <https://www.iif.com/publication/global-debt-monitor/global-debt-monitor-june-2017> (last access August 2017).

<sup>135</sup> See <http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/beyanat/57a98813eaf5c> (last access August 2017).

<sup>136</sup> It is the manual of Strike Debt organization. The text is available in <http://strikedebt.org/drom/> (last access August 2017).

other countries are not protected with such a privilege. Undeveloped or developing countries have been forced to become more indebted. This is because, the development in financialization is defined with indebtment. For instance, for adapting this trend, the debt level of Turkey had been risen from approximately \$9.5 billion (33 billion TL) to \$852 billion (3 trillion TL)<sup>137</sup>.

Public debt is a specific form because it constitutes all living and future subjects as indebted subject (Lazzarato, 2012: 7-8). This is because, through the tax mechanism the burden of debt has been nationalized. That is why, contemporary social and political distinction is understood within indebtment. In the end, every subject, insofar as it is a citizen, transforms to indebted subject. Hence, as it is said earlier, tax in neoliberalism functions for strengthening debt-actions. Tax is not about redistribution, but it ensures the return of money with surplus value to oligarchic creditors (Lazzarato, 2014a: 8 and 28). Thus it is nothing but rent. Through the socialization of public debts and rising interests, the wealth of nations and indebted subjects is appropriated. The subprime crisis of 2008 is accompanied with the rise of tax levels (Kiser and Karceski, 2017: 85). This is because, bankrupted nations and indebted subjects are forced to use austerity policies. Austerity policies refer to decreasing the expenditures. Namely already destructed social security systems are completely vanished. However, reducing the expenses is not enough to overcome the crisis. Thus through debt restructuring, new credits for the repayment of previous has been implemented. Hence austerity policies are attempts of privatizations of commons and improving the hegemony of financialization (Lazzarato, 2012: 28 and 114 and Hudson, 2012: 6). Actually this is more apparent in tax system. While tax burden of normal and indebted citizens has been raised, creditors benefits from tax havens. For instance James Henry, through its own methodology, estimates that, there are approximately \$21 to 32\$ trillion wealth 'hoarded' in offshores at 2010 (Henry, 2012: 5). Creditors become the refugees in these areas by becoming exempt from taxation. Thus, while they transform into lenders by appropriation national wealth, they avoid from international indebtment as well. A Turkish creditor, if there

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<sup>137</sup> This data is taken from Hakan Özyıldız, see <http://www.hakanozyildiz.com/2017/02/borcluyum-kederliyim-her-ne-desen-haklsn.html> (last access August 2017).

were no tax havens, would become a debtor in global scale. However, by taking advantage of the freedom of capital's movement and the right of privacy, it can transform its burden to indebted subjects. Besides of austerity policies, state's subsidies to financial sector also extend the intensity of indebtedment. After the subprime crisis, while austerity policies are imposed upon ordinary citizens, financial sector (which is the main reason of crisis) has been rewarded by bailout packages, wage rises, subsidiaries, and debt guarantees (see DROM). For instance some numbers on Turkish experience can give examples. The debt guarantees, which are given by Treasury (and so taxes of citizens), on State Economic Enterprises and municipalities is \$12.4 billion, on financial sector (through legal regulation of Public-Private Partnership) is \$123,5 billion, and on banks is approximately \$34-\$40 billion (120-140 billion TL)<sup>138</sup>. We should consider that total income is predicted as approximately 600 billion TL in 2017 Budget.

The situation in machine-level is the appearance of financial economy. From now on, we should investigate neoliberalism from the level of subject. As it is said, neoliberalism is accompanied with a new type of subject: Entrepreneur. However, entrepreneur subject is defined with ruling, governing, being the patron of the self. Thus its ambiguous character could be catastrophic consequences for neoliberalism. That is why, a counter-subject or the other face of Janus has embedded into capitalism. This subject is the indebted subject (Lazzarato, 2014b: 9). We gave examples from indebted subject through all ages. However, as the reference to three fractures implied, present indebted subject is the main producer of surplus value. There are two phenomena which is apparent in the government of indebted subject today. Firstly, there is the change within the understanding of risk. The notion of risk had appeared in 15<sup>th</sup> century's maritime trade. However its modern characteristics such as being mundane and being related with probabilities have appeared in 17<sup>th</sup> century's statistical revolution (Yılmaz, 2012: 53). Hence modern risk is rebased on quantification, objectification, and standardization of possibilities and probabilities. Risk represents opportunity to improve and development if it is well calculated.

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<sup>138</sup> The data is taken from Hakan Özyıldız, see <http://www.hakanozyildiz.com/2017/05/daha-ne-kadar-hazine-garantisi-verilecek.html> (last access August 2017).

Moreover, its hegemony in social world is also related with calculation and control of the dangerous masses. Risk had been defined as an anomaly until neoliberal era (O'Malley, 1996: 203). With neoliberalism, risk becomes an ordinary aspect of everyday life. Maybe, this situation stems from Ulrich Beck's interpretation of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries uncontrollable risks (see Yılmaz, 2012: 24). The fear of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), technological catastrophes (i.e. explosions in nuclear power stations), and environmental disasters (i.e. global warming) has bring the danger of "apocalypse" into the life. With the appearance of risk in everyday life, three peculiarities of risk have appeared: partition, financialization, and individualization (Yılmaz, 2012: 277).

Partition refers to categorization of risk groups. As in the disciplinary machine, subjects become the object of risk (was the object of knowledge in discipline society) within groups such as racial, cultural, religious, class-based, and sexual backgrounds. The partition, as discipline, can be seen in penal machine (O'Malley, 1996: 190). The matter of crime in neoliberalism is no more about correction. Instead it is about avoiding and controlling the future by identification of most risky groups. Thus, it goes beyond the wall of prison and controls the risk groups in everyday life. For instance racial profiling in US, is the most apparent example of new risk management. Also rising ghettoization and emergence of Neighborhood Watch are also related with risk groups (Ağtaş, 2013). Besides of partition, there is financialization of the risk. Herein I am not going to repeat the meaning of financialization in neoliberalism. Briefly, it is possible to say that, financialization of the risk refers to cost-profit calculation. Thus risk government is about finding and realization of the most profitable risk. Indebted subject should consider possible risks for getting a credit. If it is profitable, risks of the being indebted should be confronted. Lastly, there is individualization of the risk. As it is said, entrepreneur subject is defined with being boss of oneself. This refers that risks and possible costs are transferred to the subject from state and financial sector (Lazzarato, 2014b: 53). The indebted subject is left alone with itself for overcoming the consequences of unprofitable risks. This is not about bearing the results of one's actions. Instead, most of times, indebted subject faces with the cost of machines and other subject's risks.

Public debt levels, unemployment because of anti-production, uncontrollable risks, flexible labor market (intermittent workers, precarity, absence of benefits, internships, informal work places, contract employee, and so on), and appropriation of commons are not the consequences of the subject's risks. For instance massive unemployment and precarity has become main aspects of neoliberalism. Castel states that, unemployment rate in France had risen to 12% population in the beginning 90s with 3.5 million people<sup>139</sup> (Castel, 2003: 379). Also along with re-emergence of private insurance (against social insurance), employment became intermittent and temporal. Castel, by referencing ANPE's (*Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi* – National Employment Agency) research, states that only 22% of 2.5 million unemployed person at 1986 found a job until 1988 (Castel, 2003: 388). Hence, through individualization of risks, subject does not only become the boss of itself. Rather, it is cursed with the costs of capital. Namely individualization is the mechanism for transferring the loss of financial sector to the people. Moreover, indebted subject become segregated, separated, isolated, and atomized vis-à-vis this mechanism.

Second phenomenon on the government of indebted subject can be seen in the retreat of democracy. When neoliberalism and financialization is interpreted as rentier, we underlined seizure of surplus value (interest) by financial elites<sup>140</sup> through cutting social benefits and loans (i.e. personal, mortgage, student, and national credits) (Hudson, 2012: 1 and 5). Financial flow, managing important institutions, and accumulation processes are completely in these elite's control (Jessop, 2015: 97). Some experts, who are free from supervision through election, decide the financial policy. This policy has direct effects on the condition of indebted subject. Moreover, the subject should undertake the cost of the policy as well. For instance, human capital and being indebted for self-development has been prompted by elites in some global institutions (see post-90s World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes; as cited in Yılmaz, 2012: 312-313). As Hudson underlines, for the first time in

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<sup>139</sup> In early-70s the number of unemployed people was 300.000.

<sup>140</sup> By the term of financial elites, I am relying on Henry's estimation of the control of 30% of total wealth of world by approximately 100.000 people (.001% of population) (Henry, 2012: 40).



history, indebted subjects are conducted as if they become rich through indebtedment (Hudson, 2012: 12). Subject is directed towards the credit. Actually it is more than a simple direction: It is force to being indebted (Hudson, 2012: 8). If any subject (except new rentier class) denies becoming indebted, it cannot add ‘surplus value’ to its own human capital. Hence, it will be crushed by the competition in the market. Indebted subject should program all of its future and leisure for following the know-hows of financial elite, for providing more surplus value (interest) for them. Anti-democratic, technocratic, and elitist tendency in neoliberalism also help to ensure social consensus and averts possible criticisms on indebtedment by the monopoly on knowledge production (universities), communication (journalists), and democracy (Rose, 1996: 39 and 52; O’Malley, 1996: 194; and Lazzarato, 2014b: 141-148). Through universities, objective, natural, and efficient Truth of the indebtedment process and indebted subject is produced. The ‘technical’ inadequacy of indebted subject is silenced by this Truth. Moreover, this truth procedure is accompanied with the creation of neoliberal expert. Namely, the knowledge production in university, also, is the reproduction of the neoliberal elite-subject. Media machine and its journalist subjects function for limiting the political, economic, and social debates within a predetermined schema (see Lazzarato, 2014b). Same names, figures, and groups discuss same ‘problems’ for finding the same solution. In contemporary era, it is impossible to constitute the debates in *Ekklēsia*<sup>141</sup>. As we mentioned in first chapter, there was usage of *parrhesia* in Ancient Greek democracy. Namely, people have capability to speak every matter. Topics of social, economic, and political debates cannot be pre-determined. Instead, citizens can bring every matter and can utilize it within a game of truth. However, the limitation within media machine refers to absence of the right to speak every matter. Besides of *parrhesia*, the notion of *isegoria* is also absent in contemporary world. Namely, the problem is not only being able to speak what one wants. Instead everyone has one equal right to speak (*isegoria*). Media is an exclusive space where right to speak is blocked. Normal citizen (especially indebted subject) has only right to watch ongoing debates and

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<sup>141</sup> The location where all male citizens had gathered for discussion of the matters of polis in Ancient Greece.

solutions. Its experience, which is being indebted, cannot be transferable either as signifiers or language. Hence indebted subject, in fact, is reduced to solitude.

The absence of *parrhesia* and *isegoria* drive us to the monopoly on democracy. This is because, these two aspects were the main pillars of the democracy of Ancient Greece (Ağaoğulları, 2011: 47-48). Even though Greek democracy was deficient because of its positioning against women, slaves, and poor, *parrhesia* and *isegoria* are constituent of any democracy. Their absence is related with the absence of supervision of government processes. Hundreds years of struggle on parliaments has been an attempt to supervision. It is true that, this supervision was defined nobility (Ancien Regime) or tax (liberal). However democratic attempts from 17<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century (from Jacobins to Suffragettes) opened the space of parliament to the masses<sup>142</sup>. That is why, new mechanism constituted for the supervision of ‘*Noblesse d’épée*’ or ‘*Noblesse de robe*’<sup>143</sup>. Some national, international, and supra-national institutions such as central banks, IMF, World Bank, OECD, and European Union represent the new supervision machines. It is true that, symbols, calculations, and definitions within economy necessitate some technical knowledge. However, counter-reaction against the consequences of indebtedment policies is not about truth games within economy. That is why, for maintaining indebtedment strategies, people should be removed from giving counter-conduct against central bank. As Lazzarato states, independence of central bank is being free from people (Lazzarato, 2012: 18). Its dependency to requirements of the flow of capital and to neoliberal machine has been maintained<sup>144</sup>. Institutions such as IMF, World Bank, and OECD are also free from the indebted subject’s actions too. These institutions dictate policies and impose sanctions of countries by threatening through governing the capital flow<sup>145</sup> out of countries. Lastly, EU is another example for the erosion of democracy at some

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<sup>142</sup> Herein, I am ignoring possible dangers of the tyranny of majority.

<sup>143</sup> These are French notion for referring aristocracy and high-bourgeoisie in Ancien Regime.

<sup>144</sup> I am not suggesting that, elected people or state has to full control over financial policy. Instead I am underlining the absence of right to speak on the effects of economic policy.

<sup>145</sup> It is possible to rephrase it as “the capital flow’s government on these institutions (...)”.

extent<sup>146</sup>. The European Central Bank has control over the monetary policies of member states. However, its positioning during the debt crisis showed that, it is an apparatus for some nations (especially Germany) for controlling other members (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and so on). Leading countries to indebtedment and limiting the usage of monetary policies by these countries, The European Central Bank had one of the reasons of debt crisis. Moreover, when the crisis had occurred, austerity policies and formation of pro-EU (pro-indebtedment policies) technocratic governments (as executive branches) were dictated too<sup>147</sup>. Hence, the indebtedment and subprime crisis has been accompanied with the retreat of democratic and egalitarian aspects (Lazzarato, 2014a: 86).

Eventually we have seen the condition of indebted subject today. According to Lazzarato, typical figure of contemporary indebted subject is the American students (Charbonneau and Hansen, 2013: 145). In other words, the micro-staging of indebtedment occurs in American universities. Young American people should go to universities for acquiring a position within neoliberal machine. Adding the surplus value to the subject necessitates this education process. However, profit-based private universities transform this obligation to a financialization process. Namely American universities are the model of appropriating surplus value without production. At 2012, total debt level of students became \$1 trillion, which is more than any other household debt in US. Similarly every graduated student is burdened with approximately \$27.000 debt (see DROM). This debt constitutes a control over the person. One should obey the employment forms of neoliberalism, even though it is related with unemployment and precarity. Same fate is common to indebted subject. Through various control mechanisms (fear of poverty, Debt Collection Agencies, legal apparatuses, credit scores, and so on) subject's present and future is conducted. Moreover, the indebtedment of the subject refers to the accumulation, appropriation, and seizure of the wealth today. Hence, from the perspective of both Marxist subject/mode of production and Foucauldian subject/action, it is possible to

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<sup>146</sup> I am not relying on anti-EU policy. However I only refer to necessity to democratize EU more.

<sup>147</sup> Dictation within EU is not common to economic policies. Irish Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, which held at 2008 and 2009, is an example of anti-democratic tendencies. When Ireland rejected the proposal in 2008, the threats from other members and EU lead to the approval at 2009.

assert that, contemporary era (neoliberalism and subprime crisis) can be interpreted as the constitution of indebted subject through debt-actions.

### **3.2 Cultural Indebtmnt**

David Graeber, in his book of *Debt*, refers two traps in 20<sup>th</sup> century: Market and state (Graeber, 2011: 71). These two ‘imagined’ places are the two sides on indebtment. In the terminology of this text, while former refers to economic indebtment, the latter is the cultural indebtment. In this section I am going to interpret the cultural indebtment. Firstly we will start with the defense of Nietzschean infinite debt against Graeber’s criticism of primordial debt theory. Secondly, within this stream we will interpret social bonds as indebtment. Lastly, a distinction between ethos and morality will be set. However, I have to take short this section. This is because, the discussion of cultural indebtment and mentioned structure of the section needs more space. Extensive discussion of “perspectives on what is social”, “Hegelian distinction of morality and ethics”, “Kantian critiques”, and “debates on nationalism and racism” will be excluded. The sociological, philosophical, and political backgrounds of these issues cannot be fit in one section. That is why, the cultural indebtment in this text will be an attempt to open a space as resistance against indebtment as power apparatus. I believe that, this resistance can be found in ethos. As it will be elaborated, through ethics, one can counter-conduct against both economic and cultural indebtment.

If we return to our topic, Graeber’s criticism of primordial debt, as it is said, is based on the *idea*, Being, or Entity based conceptualization of history. Locating the primordial debt in the beginning point of history is the determination of whole social and political realities through debt. Moreover, as nationalist and religious examples indicate, this debt that can never be paid operates for the legitimization of the obedience. It forces the domination over power and resistance games. This is because, one cannot overcome the limits of the cultural debt insofar as it is related with duty and obligation. In the situation of the acknowledgement of cultural debt, one’s whole existence is dependent to the debt. I believe that, this statement can be

seen in the mythos of original sin<sup>148</sup>. According to this mythos, the expulsion from the heaven had stigmatized the humanity with the sin of Adam and Eve. Their *disobedience* to the word of God resulted with the inheritance of original sins for generations. Human cannot be freed from this sin until the end of times. Thus, subject is overwhelmed by the obligation and debt to God and its obedience is ensured. The impossibility to pay back the debt legitimizes some mechanisms for controlling the subject. Most important one is the sacrifice. Graeber states that the phenomenon of sacrifice is an “interest payment” for the debt to ancestors or gods (Graeber, 2011: 57). Namely it is the periodical reminder of the debt to the God. Payment of the interest cannot be separated from the acknowledgment of the debt at all. Sacrifice is used for nationalism as well. Sacrificing the existence of oneself for state, nation, and motherland is the payment to the lender. Hence primordial debt’s presence in the theoretical level is the mechanism of domination attempts.

Even though I agree with Graeber on the matter of primordial debt, Nietzsche is differentiated from other primordial debt theories, such as religions, nationalism, statism, and so on. This difference can be seen the distinction of idealism and materialist aspects of ideational things in this text. The historical and ontological impossibility of infinite debt do not refer to its non-existence in social and political space. There are infinite debt theories that operate within society as if they are true and real. That is why, study on the phenomenon of infinite debt is not about idealism per se. One can maintain materialist view of history while interpreting this phenomenon. Similarly, in this text, the existence of indebtment from the beginning of society is stressed. There is indebtment in the very basis of social relations because social machines constitute the characteristics of themselves as this. Namely, the situation of indebtment can be interpreted since tribal/egalitarian communities not because of the a priori nature of the debt. But rather, it stems from the constitution of relations through specific meanings of duty and responsibility.

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<sup>148</sup> It is true that, there are various interpretations of original sin in monotheist religions. A considerable amount of these interpretations rejects the transfer of the sin. However, for clearing the meaning of primordial debt, I will refer to Romans 5:12, Corinthians 15:22, and Psalms 51:5. Respectively these are “Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned”, “for as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ”, and “Indeed, I was born guilty, a sinner when my mother conceived me”.

Moreover, debt-actions are not continuous, instead there are shifts, discontinuities, and fractures within themselves. Eventually, I believe that, Nietzsche's reference to the infinite debt can be understood from this perspective. Similarly, along with his materialist positioning, Lazzarato's interpretation of contemporary indebtedness is based on universal and infinite debt (Lazzarato, 2012: 78 and Lazzarato, 2014a: 63-72).

How can society imagine itself through the indebtedness links? It is true that, the difference within the society necessitates some bonds and links for being operable. It has been an important question for sociology and political science. For answering this question, Nietzsche states that, the pledge of the one to the society is the re-enactment of debtor-creditor games (Nietzsche, 2008: 46). Thus debt performs an important role for ensuring and maintaining the social unity. There are various statements on how societies conceive themselves as one in particular moments, even though the identification is impossible. There is not a sole answer which contains entire reasons. However networks of indebtedness can be asserted as a way in which societal pseudo-identification is set. Deniz Yüksek states that indebtedness as the center of social relations is going beyond the most mainstream model in sociology: Durkheimian social solidarity (Yüksek, 2010: 7). However, I have some questions on this statement. This is because, division of labor in organic solidarity echoes the division of the duties and responsibilities. Subjects' positions within division of labor are about their indebtedness. The moral obligation to work of lower classes exposes this effect. Only those whom have nothing have to work because of cultural forces. Vagabonds, loafers, and idlers perform an important crime against society: Not paying their debt on the matter of security (Castel, 2003: 149-150). On the other hand, the idleness of the upper classes is not understood as the breach of the Law of indebtedness. This is because, they are already the representatives of the debtor (God, state, or nation). Hence, I believe that, the division of labor within society and the discourse of solidarity can be interpreted as the central role of indebtedness on the unification of society.

Similarly we can find the latent presence of indebtedness in Benedict Anderson. Anderson conceptualizes nations as the "imagined political communities" (Anderson,

2006: 6). It is true that we have been referred social institutions as the result of constitutive actions. However, resemblance of Anderson with indebtedment is not about this, but rather it can be found in the continuity between family, clan, and nation. These social and political institutions by referencing naturalness, hide behind the sacred mask of disinterestedness (Anderson, 2006: 143). Through this mask, the members of these institutions are conducted for the omission of past differences (i.e. past assimilation policies) and for reminding of the main pillar of society. This pillar is nothing but the indebtedment. The nature as disinterestedness ensures the sacrifice of the one for family, clan, or nation (Anderson, 2006: 144). These institutions do not 'expect' anything for the protection of their members, so members should sacrifice themselves for them. References such as dying for the motherland, profane traitor, obedience to state's interests, national unification, and so on in nation-state constantly remarks the indebtedment to natural, 'disinterested', and unselfish state. The monuments for whom died for motherland and remembrance ceremonies remind the infinite debt that cannot be unpaid. Yüksekseker finds a similar tendency between indebtedment and Turkish society. By referencing J. B. White, she underlines the exploitative and governmental effects on women which are covered with the debt as moral obligation (Yükseker, 2010: 11). These effects can be named as the labor of maternity, housewife, and informal worker and as the commodity of household which can be exposed to violence. However, these debt-actions ensure the unitary between household/community and women. The social and political space of the women is determined through indebtedment. Being indebted to nation can also be traced in Turkish society. One is born as being indebted to Turkish State, its nation, and its martyrs. What is the meaning of defining the citizenship through indebtedment? This means that, citizen does not possess any political or social rights, instead, it is endowed with duties (Yükseker, 2010: 13-14). As Arendt noticed when she examined the fate of the Jew in Nazi regime, political and social rights constitutes a protected environment for who has possessed them. The 'citizenship' through the duties constitutes the subject who can be sacrificed without any consent. Both moral and legal obligations on the compulsory military service in Turkey expose this sacrifice. Even though, particular citizens has not responsibility on quasi civil war ongoing for nearly 30 years or the link between radical Islamists in Syria with

Turkish government; every citizen should sacrifice itself. This sacrifice is not only about dying in the conflicts, moreover bearing the security measures, unlawful governmental decrees, and state of emergency are also about it.

The constitution of society through indebtedment is not common to modern era. Even though nation-state has quite a few examples for the debt-actions as the constituents of an 'identical' society, we can trace it back in tribal/egalitarian communities as well. As it is said earlier, rites of passage in these communities refer to incising the Law of community to one's body. This Law is based on being indebted to the ancestors. Marcel Gauchet refers that, debt to ancestor as a mechanism was an attempt to prevent ruler/ruled distinction within the same community (Gauchet, 2011: 35). These communities tried to prevent the appearance of difference within the community by exclusion of the asymmetrical relation. Hence, herein, we are returning to Pierre Clastres's definition of state in *Society against the State*. Distinction of classes (class as within a Marxist terminology) through indebtedment can be found with the appearance of the state. State's appearance in the political and social scene was the most important rupture in the history of cultural indebtedment<sup>149</sup>. This is because, the lender found itself or its representation within the society. The whole defiance against the appearance of chief, namely the lender within society, was crushed by this gesture. Maybe some criticisms can be raised against these statements. Herein the notion of state is conceptualized as the differentiation of ruler and ruled. Thus, this definition echoes the interpretation of history with compact state. Different state examples as empire, nation-state, city-state, and so on is erased. However my attempt is not about ignoring the whole fractures within the history of state. The narration of this history is quite impossible in here. Thus, by defining the state as the appearance of Marxist classes, I am only trying to underline a specific, undetermined form of the state. In previous chapters the notion of state also referred through nation-state or proto-bureaucracy. Hence, the usage of state in this chapter,

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<sup>149</sup> For instance Lazzarato states that, even the infinite debt itself is the result of the fall of these tribal/egalitarian communities (Lazzarato, 2012: 77). I believe that, if Clastres used the terminology of indebtedment, he would put a similar conclusion. However, I would not like to assert praise to and nostalgia for these communities. Obedience, duty, and obligation were still in them. Thus, even though there was a dramatic change in the characteristics of indebtedment, the infinite debt can be traced in them as well.



only operates for stressing the asymmetrical debt-actions of cultural indebtedment. Eventually, state situates the lender within the society (Gauchet, 2011: 48). The exterior founder of society, who was the totem-mother of the community, internalized as a personality (God) or a representative (prophet). Thus, infinite debt tends to be possessed by pure material subjectivities. This means that, the latent duty and obligation schema transformed into overt servitude to the lender.

At this point we have to return to Nietzschean interpretation of indebtedment. As our statements, Nietzsche underlines the prevention of forgetfulness through blood, violence, ferocity, agony, and brutality (Nietzsche, 2008: 36-38). The formation of memory is an attempt to standardize and oppress the one under the burden of debt. This burden of debt is the Law as debt to ancestors (Nietzsche, 2008: 60). Thus our interpretation of constitutive debt is common to Nietzschean theory too. The appearance of the Law is quite important, because the whole system of just and unjust appears with the presence of Law. Before the Law there is not any crime<sup>150</sup>. As Derrida says, justice and responsibility within the Law goes beyond the present subject and living in the present (Derrida, 2006: xviii-xix). The appearance of justice is related with the debt to ancestors (whether totem or martyr of the nations). The Law relies on the lender's gaze from the past and its representative's sanctions in the present. Hence, that is why, transgression of Law is direct assault to the lender (Nietzsche, 2008: 46). The anger towards the guilty in all societies stems from betrayal to the debt or to the very basis of society. There are also etymological links in Indo-European languages<sup>151</sup> for this phenomenon. For instance Nietzsche refers to etymological link in German: *Schuld* (guilt) and *Schulden* (debt) (Nietzsche, 2008: 39). Also the word of 'shall' in English exemplifies this link: The root of 'shall', which is 'sceal' referred to owe and obligation, while its cognate 'scyld' referred to guilt<sup>152</sup>. How societies found a way in which the debt secured through the exclusion of guilt on the case of cultural indebtedment? Most important mechanism, I believe

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<sup>150</sup> I believe that, most crucial defense of this statement can be seen in some texts of Kafka, especially through the allegory of door in *The Trial* and the allegory of castle in *The Castle*.

<sup>151</sup> I am not aware of any link between guilt and debt in other language families.

<sup>152</sup> See <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=shall> (last access August 2017).

that, is the development of the notion of duty against any betrayal. Actually the interpretation of duty is lack in Nietzsche's genealogy. However, his references to transformation from Antiquity towards monotheism<sup>153</sup> echo the duty. This is because, debtor's bad conscience, which is directing enmity, hatred, and cruelty inwards, refers to the internalization of duty (see Nietzsche, 2008: 57 and 63). The right to punishment of lender as the consequence of transgression of Law, has been conducted by the debtor itself in some cases since the monotheism. However, this latent reference to duty is not enough for understanding the force and obligation within cultural indebtedment. I believe that, Giorgio Agamben's genealogy on duty can show how debt is linked to the duty.

According to Agamben, there was a machine of *leitourgia* (liturgy) in Ancient Greece which was about the public obligation (Agamben, 2013: xi and 1). Liturgy was contributing cultural (theatre or games), architectural (construction of public buildings), and other similar aspects of the city. Thus the function of liturgical duty was completely related with the political and social life of the polis. It is true that, being indebted to the city, likewise tribal/egalitarian communities, was related with the distinction of ruler and ruled. It can be seen in compulsory military service in the times of war and in political service by draw. However this indebtedment can be found in another shape as well. It is the economic indebtedment of the lower classes of Ancient Greece<sup>154</sup> which already mentioned. The political, social, and economic strains on these lower classes were tried to be balanced through the duty of ruler classes to serve for commons. This duty was nothing but liturgy. Even though the weight of sanctions was not equal between these two classes, typical lender figures (rulers) were also endowed with the debt, duty, and obligation. The whole reality of the liturgy has completely changed with its divergence from the duty as political obligation. Agamben exemplifies this change through the translation of Hebrew texts into Ancient Greek and the literature of early Christianity. For instance, as a precursor text, Clement's letter to Corinthians (approximately in late-1<sup>st</sup> century)

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<sup>153</sup> Nietzsche sometimes refers to Hebrew priest and in other times to Christianity for the rule of slavery. Even in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Socrates appears as the main figure of transformation. Herein, for stressing the withering away of difference (*Dionysus*), I uses the notion of monotheism.

<sup>154</sup> Herein, I am completely aware the connivance of the slaves and women.

manifests the apparent change: The notion of liturgy becomes related with lifelong duty as serving to God by being “object of a canon and rule” (Agamben, 2013: 11). Herein the reference to rule resembles the Law of the tribal/egalitarian communities. However, main distinction is the representation of the Law within society. This is because, liturgy cannot be separated from hierarchical<sup>155</sup> juxtaposition of people within the society. Liturgy, as a religious activity, can only be performed through priests. These priests differ from the Ancient Greek administrators. This is because, priests are the representatives of the main, eternal, and universal Lender: the God. Administrator’s role, even though polis represented a foundational lender, was political. This role acknowledges the political nature (being related to power and resistance) of social difference. However, God and its representatives transform the difference into an ontological and transcendent aspect. Hence a specific role of the duty becomes more apparent with the religious liturgy. This specific role is the reference to duty as more than simple debt obligation to the lender. Duty is also the privilege for the representative of the lender. This privilege can be found in the concept of *officium*. This concept is about holding an office and possessing authority. In Christian literature, *officium* stressed both liturgy (duty) and Divine Office (Agamben, 2013). Thus duty has two different meanings for different parts of society. Even though the God is the main lender, cleric and aristocratic elites have capability to become lender through the representation of the God. Therefore their duties used against debtors for obedience and control through indebtedment. These statements can be used against Douglas’s criticisms on the link between debt and duty. According to Douglas, while debt can be transferable to other people, duty is cannot (Douglas, 2016: 12). Thus he suggests that debt is not a duty, and vice versa. However, the *officium* or the representation of the lender through duty exposes that, duty is also transferable. Duty as transferable and privilege is not common to past eras, rather it is still valid in today. As well as the capitalists inversion of debtor-lender relation (appropriates the interest as a debtor), charismatic leaders and bureaucratic/oligarchic elites also reverse the effects of duty. These subjects take advantage of the duty as privilege. For instance, decisions on the enemies of state

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<sup>155</sup> It is important to remember that the concept of hierarchy derives from *hierárkhēs*, the rule of the high priest.

and on who will irrigate the homeland with its blood are authorized by these representatives<sup>156</sup>. Namely, even though theoretically they are the debtor towards God, state, and nation, they collect the cultural debts of masses as if they are real lender. In fact, from a materialist perspective, they are the real lender, however the materialist effect of ideational things (God, state, and nation) covers the identity of the lender.

I believe that, the narrative of representative deific the duty and constitution of the society through indebtedment to the Law can be referred as the distinction between ethics and morality. Hence, by referencing the difference of morality from ethics, I will try to refer cultural indebtedment as power mechanism and counter-conduct against it. Every debt constitutes a specific morality (Lazzarato, 2012: 30). This morality both operates and legitimizes the cultural indebtedment. Moreover, with the appearance of the morality we can link Marxian and Nietzschean theories. Even though we have been referred the link between Foucault-Nietzsche and Foucault-Marx, last link has been absent. For instance, Marx underlines the importance of the appearance of moral judgment in every debt-action in his text of *Comments on James Mill* (as cited in Lazzarato, 2012: 55-60). Thus our interpretation of morality will close our theoretical circle as well.

Morality and ethics are used as synonyms in most of times. This stems from Latin translation of Ancient Greek ethos: Mores. However, even though Romans preferred such a translation, we have to be aware of two different terms in Ancient Greece which are related with ethos. For instance Thomas Corts refers to confusion in translating the concepts of “ἔθος” and “ἦθος” to contemporary languages (Corts, 1968: 201). Both of these concepts are translated as whether ethos or mores. However, in Ancient Greece, their meanings were different. While the former refers to neutral behaviors, customs, and habits; the latter is based on “have to be” and “ought to be” along with social sanction (Corts, 1968: 202 and Sattler, 1947: 55). Thus, in this text, former will be called as ethics (way of life or ethos), and the latter as morality (sanction, punishment, and codification). However, even though we

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<sup>156</sup> As mentioned earlier, giving historical examples for these aspects of indebtedment is not possible because of the limits of this text.

separated ethics from morality, they are not unrelated at all. As William Sattler puts it, ethics contain the morality (Sattler, 1947: 55). Namely some ways of life has the authority to punish who does not obey to them. These types of ethics achieve their authority through some power games. It is obvious that, they rely on the Law and function for political exclusion and subordination. In these situations, ethos can no longer be named as ethos. By referencing sanctions and Law, it becomes nothing but morality.

Hence the interpretation of habits and ways of life cannot be limited to normative codes, but according to Foucault, we should investigate the subjectification forms, relations with the self, arts of existence, techniques of the self, and making the life as an oeuvre by oneself (Davidson, 2005: 126 and Foucault, 1990: 10-11). Thus the narration of history does not only depend on conducting through debt-actions. But rather it contains counter conducts against debt as well. The framework of morality interprets the subjectivity process through rules, principles, axioms in which are “recommended” to the subjects through various social and political institutions (family, community, civil society, and so on). On the other hand, it is only a one part of subjectivity. Namely, as it is mentioned earlier, subjectivity is directly related with power actions. However, new types of subjectivities are also proliferated through resistance or counter-conduct. This is possible through the ethos. According to Foucault, ethos is the “[...] form of relation to self that enables an individual to fashion himself into a subject [...]” (Foucault, 1990: 251). Thus it is the self-constitution and taking care of oneself, instead of forbidding through the *Non-du-Père*. Foucault derives the ethical activity directly from the experience of Ancient Greek ethos (Davidson, 2005 and Foucault, 1986). The peculiarity of ethics in Ancient Greece was not based on the universal law to obey, instead it is about style of conduct and type of existence. One converts the self, becomes what it is not, and creates new ways through ethos. Hence the cultural indebtedment, duty, and obligation are simply rejected within an ethical action. One simply transgresses the Law of the lender by referencing its own acts. Maybe Foucauldian ethics can be criticized through the praise of self. However the reference to self is not about the egoism and narcissistic admiration of the self. If we remember the myth of Narcissus, he was

contemplating and admiring alone at the riverfront. Modern ego and narcissism are based on the solitude. However, Foucauldian care of the self is a social practice (Foucault, 1986: 51 and Davidson, 2005: 135-140). Subject constitutes itself within the social and political reality. I believe that, Foucault as a figure of activist can show the social aspect of ethos. GIP (*Groupe d'information sur les prisons*), the struggle of homosexuality, and actions against the some police-based events in Europe (oppression on Polish Solidarity and the crackdown on left in FRG and Italy between 60s and 70s) expose the social characteristics of ethical positioning. As Derrida states, ethics are “to learn to life” by oneself (Derrida, 2006: xvii). However the reference to self is only about freedom from the Law, but not solitude.

Similar distinction between ethics and morality can also be found through the interpretation of Nietzschean distinction of master and slave moralities. Even though both of them called as moralities in Nietzsche, master morality is ethos within the terminology of this text. The master in Nietzsche creates values through its activity and action (Nietzsche, 2008: 11 and 21). Thus master is defined with affirmation of life, of happiness, and freedom. This is because, freedom is nothing but deciding the values of oneself (Nietzsche, 2008: 37). From the perspective of master, the good is not a transcendent category. But rather it is constituted through actions on the life of oneself. On the other hand, emergence of the monotheist priest reverses this process. Compassionate or pastoral security of the Law uses the mask of sacredness for equating the justice and revenge. According to Nietzsche, because of the misery, hatred, and envy of the priest, the starting point is no more the action and goodness. Instead, priest's starting point is the condemned evil of the Law (Nietzsche, 2008: 22 and 31). Thus it is the Decalogue's language of “thou shalt not”. Hence priest starts with the negation of life and of human. Living human is bounded with the indebtedness towards the God. That is why, until the last amnesty in Judgment Day, the subject is burdened with the cost of the debt (deific duty, obligation, and sacrifice). Actually this change with monotheism is also apparent in the meaning of duty. According to Agamben, the notion of duty in early Stoics and Cicero was about finding the appropriate attitude (Agamben, 2013: 67 and 75). Namely duty was about conducting and governing the life. It is not presupposed before the action. Thus duty

was related with ethical action. On the other hand, with the monotheist Law, duty became evaluated through the goodness of the Law (Agamben, 2013: 68). Namely it possessed a deific and transcendent status. Thus through this duty, subject became dominated by cultural indebtedment.

The appearance of duty and morality as the cultural indebtedment had been maintained through Immanuel Kant. Kant is an important figure for our interpretation of cultural indebtedment. This is because, I believe that, the confusion between morality and ethics (dissolving the ethos within the mores) is caused by Kantian equation of virtue and duty: In other words, Kant's reference to 'what one is' and 'what should one be' as synonyms. For understanding this equation, through the interpretation of Agamben, it is possible to refer a distinction between Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality. On the one hand, Aristotle's distinction between potential and act is a way in which towards the ethics. Hence action necessitates the possession of the potential. The passage from potential to act, in Aristotle, is achieved through the habit (Agamben, 2013: 92). Namely, habit is the realization of the potential through movement. It is nothing but an activity. However, this activity is also about not realizing the activity, in other words, it is also about non-potential (Agamben, 2013: 94). Hence our habits are not only about how we act, but rather the rejection of how we should act is the habit as well. Therefore actions from and towards the subjects also consist of non-acting. Rejections, denials, or disdaining can be the example of this type of action. However, these are not concluded with a situation of inertia. Instead they refer to performing an action negatively. For instance, fugitives perform most important examples of negative actions. Rejection of the indebtedment to motherland and to state is an action which constitutes the fugitive/traitor subjectivities. Hence, the renounce of duty and obligation can be called as habit within Aristotelian theorization. How can we locate ethics within this schema? Ethics in Aristotle, apparently, is manifested with a specific form of habit. Ethics is the perfection of potential, namely it is the decision to realize the potential in best way (Agamben, 2013: 99). In this definition, subject is not embedded to Law through debt. On the contrary, subject's virtues, ways of life, and choices designate what is good and proper. Thus Aristotle refers to the virtue of the one, instead of duties. On the other hand, Kant maintains

the monotheist project through the notion duty as obedience to law and the command of “you must” (Agamben, 2013: 90 and 112). In Kant, deific duty is defined with the obedience to a priori Law. Human freedom can only be achieved through this submission. In the situation of freedom, Kant is located in the exact opposite position of Nietzsche. This is because, one achieves its freedom through universal maxim in Kant. This also contrasts with the Foucauldian ethics. Even though both of them referred the limits of the one, Kant suggested limiting by the universal standards, while Foucault stressed the transgression of so-called universalities (Bernauer and Mahon, 2005: 149-150). Besides of these antagonisms, the interesting point is how Kant is able to use freedom with the limits of universality. This dilemma between freedom and obedience to universal Law is overcome by referencing the *internalization* of the Law. According to Kant, this Law can be perceived by one’s intellect. Thus this obedience is not externally forced, but rather it is internal (see Agamben, 2013: 115). Maintaining the monotheist project can be exposed in this statement. As Nietzsche underlined, monotheist slave morality is based on internalization of guilt, debt, resentment, and hatred. Through this internalization, the subjectivity of the indebted subject can be sustained. Only when this subject acknowledged the deific duty and obligation towards representatives, it can be the indebted subject.

Hence, in this section, I tried to underline how the sense of duty and obligation is formed through cultural indebtedment. The formation of duty and obligation refers to the constitution of the cultural debtor. Moral codes and laws are the operative rules of the maintenance of this type of debtor. This function also affects the economic debtor. This is because, the payment, pawnship, and the interest are legitimized through the duty of the debtor and its obligation to the lender. Similarly, the organization of Debt Collective stresses the role of these mechanisms for the continuation of debtors as neo-serves (see DROM). Thus one should develop counter-conduct as the ethos against the lender and indebtedment machines. This counter-conduct, on the first hand, is nothing but the rejection of unjust debt. From the ethical perspective of the debtor, the consent in the debt agreement is a hoax. Debtor, by social, political, and economic exclusion, is forced to enter the



asymmetric relation of indebtedness. The effects of this relation are about deepening the asymmetry between debtor and lender. Thus one should reject the indebtedness by the goodness according to its own existence and actions. However, further interpretation of how can such an ethos be developed and of which historical moments exemplify the counter-conduct in cultural sphere go beyond the limits of this text. That is why, only the beginning of these possible debates is included the boundaries of this section.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

The process of writing this thesis is accompanied with a coup d'état, continuous state of emergency, and political purges. Reactionary domination in political and social arena and suppressed resistance against the contemporary rule created some difficulties for the legitimacy of this text. In this conclusion chapter, I would like to stress these difficulties and my future expectations on the problematization (both theoretical and practical) of indebtedment.

First difficulty was about being misunderstood as political philosopher or a contemplator whom is located in his ivory tower. I believe that, French theory, on the contrary of mainstream understanding, cannot be separable from practical struggle in everyday life. Thus it is not based on theoretical contemplation on the problems. Instead, problems stem from the material and historical phenomena. Likewise, the problematization of indebtedment is the result of being indebted to family, community, nation, banks, state, and so on. Theoretical (ontological and epistemological) bases of the indebtedment only prevent running amok towards the uncertain. The experience of statist socialism showed that, mere action is towards the complete destruction and negation of the things. However criticism, rejection, declining, or dismissing is not enough for politicizing the indebtedment. Within the last section, I tried to open a path for such a positive and productive possibility by differentiating ethics from morality. The struggle against the lender should constitute alliances between different ways of life without the medium of intellectual. The operation of machinic debt does not depend on the knowledge on the indebtedment. Instead the interaction on the consequences and experiences of the indebtedment constitute how it is operating. Thus a text on the indebtedment is dependent to the practical struggle about the debt.

Second difficulty is about the function of the subject of indebtment. There is absence of quite important problematizations of indebtment in this text. For instance flows of capital and their relation to the authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and fascism through the debt-actions are not interpreted enough. Moreover how morality operates as a machine for prompting, inducing, and provoking the desires and affections of the people for policing the indebted subject is also absent. I believe that, there is a special link between the rise of AKP's authoritarianism, neoliberal policies (indebtment), and neo-fascist social imagination. Especially the experience of the last year necessitates interpreting this link from the lens of indebtment. However, lack of time and my inadequacies prevented such an attempt. I hope that, the struggle of this text will not be limited with the theory, history, and the present of the indebtment. Instead, I hope that, further articulations into this text will try to expose the rule of AKP as well.

Consequently this thesis, immanently, is an absent project on the theorization and practice of the counter-conduct on the indebtment. Even though the format of the text hinders to the reference on how we should practice such a resistance against the lender, the latent goal of the text is giving a meaning to indebtment with the lens of political revolution. Thus, it is important to stress that, the future of the debtor is not based on the ontological and epistemological meaning of the indebtment. But rather it is based on the social and political interactions and actions against the lender. It is not important that what debtor is, but the crucial point is how the debtor is policed and politicized.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

#### BİR İKTİDAR AYGITI OLARAK BORÇLANDIRMA

Borçlandırmayı bir iktidar aygıtı olarak ele almak, öncelikle, iktidarın nasıl işlediğine ilişkin bir soruyu beraberinde getirir. Michel Foucault'nun iktidar kavramsallaştırması üzerinden yapılacak bir iktidar anlatısı, artık iktidarın ne olduğuna ilişkin değil, iktidarın nasıl işlediğine ilişkindir. Bu amaçla bir iktidar aygıtı olarak borçlandırma kesinlikle bir imtiyaza işaret etmez. O halde iktidarın işleyişi önceden belirlenmiş bir mekâna (meclis, devlet vb.) ya da kişiye (kral, parti vb.) işaret etmez. İktidar elde edilebilir bir şey değildir, sadece akar, işler ve hareket eder. Bu sebeple bir mekândan ziyade bir çevreye (*milieu*) sahiptir. Çevreye sahip bir iktidar tek-yönlü (yukarıdan aşağıya) ve piramitsel bir veçheye dayanmak yerine, önceden belirlenmemişlik ve yeniliğe gebelik üzerine kurulur. Ancak bu sayede, iktidarın akışı içindeki hiyerarşi yenilebilir ve sıradan öznelere karşı-iktidar ve direniş imkânı için bir fırsat verilebilir.

Foucault üzerinden yapılan bu iktidar tanımlaması aslında bu metnin ontolojik ve epistemolojik temellerine işaret eder. Bu temeller tek bir pozisyonla, materyalizmle, ifade edilebilir. Elbette materyalizmin ne olduğuna ve ne olmadığına ilişkin çok geniş bir literatür mevcut. Ancak metnin çerçevesinde materyalizm, spesifik bir bakış üzerinden, idealizmle olan karşıtlıkla tanımlanır. Spesifik bakıştan kasıt, şeylerin başlangıçlarına ilişkin bir yorumdur. O halde, idealizm başlangıç ve kökenlere evrensellik, tümellik ve tarih-dışılık üzerinden yaklaşır. Yani başlangıçtaki Varlık inzivaya çekilerek yapılan bir akıl yürütme ile bulunur ve bu noktadan

tümdengelim aracılığıyla şeylerin bütün manzarası sıralanır. Tam tersine materyalizm, şeylerin başlangıçlarının tarih içinde, herhangi bir zorunlu nedensellik olmadan (rastlantı ile) ve sosyo-politik çatışmaların ardından oluştuğu üstüne kuruludur. Bu sebeple tarihsel değişim, ampirik araştırma ve şeylerden teoriye doğru yol alma (tümevarım) metotlarıyla işlenir. Metindeki bu materyalizm anlayışına göre, modern materyalizm iki temel isim üzerinde yükselir: Friedrich Nietzsche ve Karl Marx. Söz konusu ikilinin sosyal ve siyasal duruşları, Varlık-temelli idealizmde bir çatlak yaratmayı sağlar. İşte Foucault'nun iktidar analizi bu çatlağın içinde durur.

Öncelikle bu çatlağın nerede oluştuğuna bakmak gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Çatlak ajan-yapı ikiliğinin tam göbeğinde oluşmuştur. Ajan ve yapı iki farklı Varlık-temelli ve idealist inceleme örneği gösterirler. Ajan fenomenolojik ve öznel bir bilince işaret eder. Yani kendi üstüne katlanmış, kendiyle özdeşleşmesi için hiçbir engel bulunmayan ve kendi deneyimi ile bütün dünyayı kurabilen bir bilinç. Bunun yanı sıra metodolojik bireycilik de bir başka ajan örneğidir. Bu metodolojik temel işaret eder ki, bütün sosyal olgular atomik bir bireye indirgenerek açıklanabilir. Öte yandan yapı, Varlık-temelli ajanın tam karşısında yer alır. Yapıdan anlaşılan, bütünün şeylerin basit bir toplamından daha fazlası olduğudur. Burada bireyler yapının birer eklentisi konumundadırlar ve yapı tarafından güdüdürler. Ancak ne ajanın ne de yapının Tanrısal egemenlikleri herhangi bir tarihsel örnekte bulanamaz. Tarihsel etkileşim bu iki kavramın açıklayamayacağı kadar dallanıp budaklanmış durumdadır. Ancak ajan ve yapının reddi, teorik bir reddiyeden öte, siyasal mahiyete sahiptir. Söz konusu ajan ve yapı Varlıklarına başvuran herhangi bir otorite, kendini mutlak anlamda meşrulaştırabilir. Bu mutlak meşruluk da siyasal direnişin askıya alınmasına eşlik eder.

O halde çatlak söz konusu ikiliği yerle bir etmiştir. Bu ikilik, metin çerçevesinde, yerini yeni bir kavram setine bırakır. Bu kavramlardan ilki öznedir. Özne Kartezyen Ajan'ın maskesi düşürüldüğünde ortaya çıkar. Foucault delilik incelemesinde, modern anlamda ajanın kuruluş alametlerinden olan Descartes'in meditasyonlarına bolca gönderme yapar.

Descartes'e göre rüya ve delilik modern ajanlıktan dışlanmanın iki örneğidir. Çünkü bu iki konum, şüphenin bittiği yer olan kendinden eminliğe sahip değildirler. Üstelik deli, tam da hiçbir zaman bu eminliğe haiz olamayacağından, sosyal, politik ve dilsel anlamda toplumdaki dışlanmıştır. Ancak Foucault'nun incelemesi bize gösterir ki, ne deli ne de akıllı ajan, onları ikiye ayıran bir eylemden önce yer alırlar. Delilik ve akıllılık, tarihin çeşitli dönemlerinde farklı bir biçimde tanımlanmışlar ve bu tanım geçişleri ancak tarihsel kopuşlar aracılığıyla söz konusu olmuştur. O halde öznelere tanımlayan şey, eylemler tarafından kurulmalarıdır. Metnin teorik arka planındaki ikinci kavram ise sosyal makinedir. Makine kavramı Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari ve Maurizio Lazzarato'nun kavramsallaştırmalarından ortaya çıkar. Yapının tam tersine, makine diyagramatik olmasıyla tanımlanır. Yani makine herhangi bir Temel'e sahip değildir ve havada asılı bir biçimde durur. Bu sayede hiyerarşik ve tek-yönlü olmak yerine ağ şeklinde ve belirlenmemişlik içindeki akışlardan oluşur. O halde makinenin bu bağımsızlığı, onu dilin egemenliğinden de sıyrır. Dil her zaman bir temele (gramer, işaret veya sembol) dayanır. Bu temel bütün imgelerin sadece bir kısmını oluşturur. Beden, arzu, duygulanım, jest, mimik, homurdanma gibi farklı imgeler herhangi bir referans ve işaret sistemine dayanmazlar. Onlar dilin ötesinde ve öncesinde bulunurlar. Makine bu söylemsel olmayan şeylerin akış ve etkilerini de içerir.

Üçüncü kavramımız metnin en temel kavramı: eylem. Makine ve öznenin ajan/yapı ikiliğinden bir farkı da, artık incelemenin temelinde olmamalarıdır. Eylem olmadan ne makine vardır ne de özne. Bu sebeple artık özne-özne, makine-makine ve özne-makine arasında yol alan eylemlerden bahsedemeyiz. Teorik anlamda olan şey eylem-eylem etkileşimi arasında özne ve makinelerin olmasıdır. Eylemler, çeşitli noktalarda kesişirler. Kesişilen bu noktalarda, eylemlerin sebep olduğu çöküntü ve vadilerde özneler ve makineler oluşurlar. Yani eylemler bir nevi özne ve makineleri kat ederler, tam tersi değil. Bu açıklama tam da Foucault'nun "eylem üstünde eylem" olarak yaptığı iktidar tanımlamasına denk gelmektedir. İşte bu nedenle,

metnin teorik arka planı tam anlamıyla Foucault'ya dayanmakta ve eylem kavramı çerçevesinde Foucaultcu teorinin tartışmasını da yapmaktadır.

Foucault literatürünü tartışma amaçlı bir ana hat, Foucault'nun Oedipus mitine düştüğü şerh üzerinden kurulabilir. Oedipus üstüne olan bu yorum, Kral Oedipus'un tanrısal kehanetlere (yapı) ve kölelerin öznel tecrübelerine (ajan) rağmen kendi gerçeğini araması ve etkilemesinin açığa çıkarılmasıdır. Bu açığa çıkarma, Foucault'da temel olduğunu düşündüğüm iki hatta işaret eder: bir yanda özne-iktidar ve öteki yanda özne-gerçek. Özne-iktidar hattı, Foucault'nun özgül iktidar yorumunun altını çizer. Bu yorum ilk olarak iktidarın sadece negatif yani baskıcı, ket vurucu, yasaklayıcı ve engelleyici olmadığı; tam tersine iktidarın pozitif yani üretici, kısıktıcı ve teşvik edici olduğudur. İkinci olarak iktidar sorunsalının tarihselleştirilmesi üzerinden, kopuş ve kırılmaların sebep olduğu değişimleri gösterir. Son olarak da, direniş ve iktidarın birbirlerinden ayrılamayacak kadar iç içe girdiğine işaret edip, iktidarın süreç olarak işlediği her yerde direnişin de olmak zorunda olduğunun altını çizerek, yeni imkânlarla olanak açar. İkinci hat ise özne-gerçek hattıdır. Foucault'ya göre gerçek önceden verilmiş evrensel bir yasa olmaktan ziyade, çeşitli sosyal ve politik etkileşimlerin ardından kurulur. Bu sebeple gerçek, bilgiyi değil de bir süreci imler. Kişinin gerçeğinin oluşması, kişinin kendisi, öteki ve makineler ile girdiği ilişkinin bir sonucudur. Aynı iktidarın direnişe bağlanması gibi, bu noktada Foucault gerçeği etiğe bağlar. Kişinin etik varoluşu, mevcut gerçek oyunlarının altüst edilmesi ve yeni yaşam biçimlerinin tecrübe edilmesi ile ilgilidir. Etiğin mevcudiyeti, öznenin ve makinenin olanın ötesine geçebilmesini sağlar.

Metnin teorik temeli ve bu temel üstünden gerçekleştirdiği Foucault tartışması bu şekilde özetlenebilir. Borçlandırmanın sorunsallaştırılması bu tartışmalar çerçevesinde şekillenmektedir. Bu yüzden klasik bir borçluluk anlayışının ötesine geçmekteyiz. Borç artık borçlu ve alacaklı arasındaki bir ilişki değildir. Tam tersine borçlandırılmış özneler (borçlu ya da alacaklı) ya da borca ilişkin makineler (banka, kredi, para vb.) borç-eylemlerin akışı sonucunda kurulurlar. Peki borç-eylemler nasıl işlerler? Bu konuda iki temel

yaklaşım bulunmaktadır. Birincisi ilkel borç teorisi iken ikincisi borç olarak para teorisidir. İlkel borç teorisi ideal, hipotetik ve tarih-dışı bir başlangıca işaret eder. Bu başlangıca göre, şeylerin manzarası epi-fenomen varlıkların ana Varlık'a duyduğu borç tarafından oluşturulur. Aslında burada kültürel bir borçtan bahsetmekteyiz. Bir topluluğun, toplumun ya da herhangi bir şeyin varoluş nedeni bu Varlık'ın verdiği ve hiçbir zaman ödenemeyecek olan borçtan ibarettir. Siyasal antropolojinin devletin ve yönetici sınıfın oluşumuna ilişkin tezlerine göz atarsak, siyasal ve sosyal hiyerarşinin kuruluşu, bu ilkel borcun yaptırımının toplum içinde temsil edilmesine bağlıdır. Bu borca ilişkin her temsil yöneticinin oluşması ve borç yükümlülüğünün bir ayrıcalığa dönüşmesine ilişkindir. O halde tarihsel veriler ilkel borcun bir Başlangıç'a sahip olmadığı ve belli mücadeleler sonucunda kurulduğunu gösterir. Peki bu mücadeleyi Varlık'a referansta bulamıyorsak nerede bulabiliriz?

İkinci yaklaşım olan borç olarak para bu noktada devreye girer. Ancak bu yaklaşımın işlevini anlamak için paranın nasıl işlediğini anlamamız gerekmektedir. Paranın işleyişi konusunda da iki farklı teori bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilkinin liberal para teorisi olarak adlandıracağım. Liberal para teorisine göre para bir metadır ve alışveriş ile değişim aracı olarak kullanılır. Paranın bu biçimde akışını meşrulaştırmak amacıyla tarih-dışı bir hikâyeye başvurulur. Bu hikâye takas hikâyesidir. Öyle bir tarihsel an hayal edilir ki, insanlar kendi ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda ürettiklerini değiş-tokuş aracılığıyla paylaşırlar. Ancak toplumların büyümesi ve ilişkilerin karmaşıklaşması sonucu bu değiş-tokuş işlevsiz hale gelmeye başlar. İşte tam da bu anda, barışçıl takasın anısı para tarafından sürdürülür. İlginç olan, herhangi bir ampirik çalışmanın takasın varlığına ilişkin bir kanıt bulamamasıdır. Amerikan yerlilerinden Afrika'daki kabilelere ve Amazon topluluklarından Aborjinlere kadar takasın biçiminde temel ve barışçıl bir etkileşim söz konusu değildir. O halde bu bizi paranın işleyişi hakkındaki ikinci teoriye götürür. Bu teori heterodoks para teorisidir. Paranın Marksist ve Fransız Düzenleme Okulu tarafından yorumlanması bu teori içinde yer alır. Buna göre para iki biçimde



işler; kapital olarak ve meta olarak. İkinci işleyişi, birincil ilişkilerde bolca görülen bir değişim ilişkisidir. İlk işleyişi ise borç yaratma ve borcun tanınmasını göstermeye yarar. Paranın akışı, o halde, borcun tanınması (*IOU*) demektir. Bu şekilde bir tanım, ilk teoride eksik olan bazı önemli noktaların altını çizer. Paranın olduğu bir ilişki asimetrik bir ilişki olduğundan ötürü zor, sömürü, çatışma ve hileyi beraberinde getirir. Buna ek olarak, para ilişkisinde borcun verilmesi ve faizin alınması arasında zamansal bir boşluk bulunur. Bu sayede paranın akışı geleceğe yönelik bir eylem halini alır. Borçlandırılmış öznenin geleceğini şekillendirir. Bu şekillendirme, zamansal boşluğun beraberinde getirdiği ahlaki zorunluluk ve yaptırım düzeneğinden kaynaklanır. Borçlu her zaman için yaptırımın bu kanlı tehdidinin gölgesi altındadır.

Paranın işleyişini borca bağladığımız bu konum tamamen tarihsel ve materyalist bir anlayıştan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu anlayışa göre tarihsel süreçte para farklı formlara bürünmektedir. Örneğin liberal para teorisinin yaslandığı Lidyalıların parayı keşfi hikâyesi sadece paranın formunun sikke formunu almasına ilişkindir. Ancak farklı para formlarının incelenmesi, bize heterodoks para teorisinin geçerliliğini gösterir. En eski para formlarından biri sosyal paradır. Bir insan ekonomisinde, yani değişim ilişkisinin canlılar üstünden yapıldığı bir ekonomide, para canlıların ta kendileridir. Eşitlikçi-kandaş topluluklarda grup içi ve gruplar arası etkileşim, sosyal para aracılığıyla sağlanır. Örneğin evlenme, kan davası ve çatışma gibi temel etkileşimlerin parası genel olarak insanlar, özel olarak da kadınlardır. Bu ilişkilerde kadınlar rehin verilerek, borçlandırma ilişkisinin teminatını oluştururlar. Günümüzde borçlanmanın tanınması için teminat olarak alacaklıya para verilir. Söz konusu paranın teminat olarak işlevi ancak alacaklı bu para aracılığıyla farklı bir etkileşime girdiğinde sona erer. Benzer biçimde kadın örneğin evlilikte alınacak çeyiz ve barışçıl bir etkileşimin teminatı olarak bir paradır.

Sosyal paranın varlığı ve kadının varoluş biçiminin problemi Mezopotamya uygarlıklarında da görülebilir. Bu metinde Mezopotamya'ya borçlandırma

üzerinden bakış, coğrafyayı merkez (nehir havzalarındaki kalabalık şehirler) ve çevre (vaha ve dere kenarlarındaki köyler) olmak üzere ikiye ayırır. Merkezde borçlandırma hızlı bir biçimde borç köleliğine doğru yol almış ve borçlandırılmış özne köle statüsüne düşürülmüştür. Sosyal para olarak kadının fahişeliğe itilmesi ve kadın bedeni/kıyafeti üstüne siyasi eylemin şekillenmesi bu borç köleliğinin yaygınlaşmasının sonucudur. Borçlandırılmış ve ardından köleleştirilmiş kadın, modern öncesi dönemdeki borçlandırılmış öznenin en tipik figürüdür. Öyle ki, merkeze karşı çevrenin şekillenmesinin en önemli sorunlarından biri borçlandırılmış kadının yarattığı sorundur. Dönemin çevrede oluşan yazılı kaynaklarında en çok dikkat çeken nokta, merkezdeki ahlaksızlık ve fahişelik üstüne olan vurgudur. Çevrenin fiziksel oluşumunun ya da gelişiminin merkezden kaçan borçlandırılmış özneler olduğu savunulabilir. Ancak problematiğin kadın üstünden kurulması, kadının borçlandırılmasının dönemdeki başatlığına işaret eder. Borç köleliği ve kadının 'korunması' sorunu, Mezopotamya'dan olduğu gibi Antik dünyaya (Yunan ve Roma) taşınmıştır. Ancak Antik borçlandırmaya ilişkin iktidar ve direniş akışları dönemsel aflardan ziyade, borç köleliğinin yasaklanmasına ilişkin hukuki çabalar etrafında şekillenmiştir. İster eşitlikçi/kandaş topluluklardan, ister Mezopotamya'dan, istersek de Antik dünyadan bahsedelim; genel anlamda borçlandırma konusunda bu dönemler günümüzden oldukça farklıdır. Eğer De Ste. Croix'in analizini takip edersek, bir dönemde hangi iktidar ilişkisinin temel olduğunu ancak artı ürüne el koyma mücadelesinde hangi öznelerin rol aldığını keşfederek bulabiliriz. Yukarıdaki tarihsel anlatının da ima ettiği gibi, borçlandırılmış özne aslında bu ilişkide geri planda kalmaktadır. Bu toplumların temel sorunu kölelik ve köle emeği üzerinden artı ürün yaratmadır. Borçlandırma sorunu bile sadece rehinin ve borçlandırılmış öznenin köleleşmesi problemi üstünedir. Ancak günümüzde artı ürün doğrudan borçlandırılmış özne üzerinden üretilir ve bu öznenin köleleştirilmesi geri plandadır. Herhangi bir öznellik değişimi yaşamamış olan borçlandırılmış özne günümüzde temel rol oynar.

Borca ilişkin bu tarihsel kopuşu anlamak için üç farklı ana işaret etmek gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Bu anlar biyopolitika ile liberalizmin doğuşu, refah devleti ile fordizmin doğuşu ve neoliberalizm ile finansallaşmanın doğuşudur. O halde ilk kırılma anıyla başlayalım; biyopolitika. Thomas Lemke'nin ileri sürdüğü gibi, biyopolitika ne doğal yasanın siyaset üzerinde egemenliği ne de siyasetin doğa üzerinde egemenliğidir. Bunların dışında, biyopolitika, siyasetin konusu ve ilgisinin değişmesine ve yeni bir siyasi problemin doğmasına ilişkindir. Bu yeni siyasi problem 18.yy'ın sonunda ortaya çıkmış nüfus problemidir. Nüfus siyasi anlamda nasıl problem edinilir? Bu sorunun cevabı için, Foucault'da biyopolitikanın hem yeni bir egemenlik biçimi hem de yeni bir yönetme biçimi olarak tanımlandığının altını çizmemiz gerekir. Biyopolitika çerçevesinde siyasi eylem hem egemenlik hem de yönetim açısından düşünülebilir. Yönetim Foucault'ya yönelik devleti göz ardı etme eleştirisine verilmiş kavramsal bir cevaptır. Çünkü devlet aklı ve devletin doğuşu, yönetimsellik çerçevesinde özgül ve temel bir yönetimin doğmasına işaret eder. Ancak yönetim devlet tarafından belli tutumların dikte edilmesi demek değildir. Sadece toplumları bir arada tutan bağın dağılmasına sebep olabilecek sosyal problemin sürdürülebilmesini sağlayan tutumlar üstüne tutumlardan ibarettir. Üstelik yönetim sadece devlete özgü de değildir. Devletin yönetiminin yanı sıra benliğin, ailenin ve topluluğun yönetilmesini de kapsar. Egemenlik ise güç kullanımı ve bu kullanımın meşru kılınmasına ilişkindir. Ancak aynı yönetim gibi, egemenlik de sadece devlete özgü değildir. Sosyal hareketler ve aile içi güç kullanımı egemenliğin devlet dışı varlığına işaret ederler. O halde, toparlarsak, yönetim iktidar iken (*potestas*), egemenlik onu kullanma hakkı veren otoritedir (*auctoritas*). Biyopolitika ve nüfus yeni problemler olarak, hem iktidarın hem de iktidara meşruluğu veren otoritenin değişimi ile ortaya çıkmışlardır.

Bu ortaya çıkışın ilk belirgin hali 18.yy'da devlet aklı ve polis bilimine yönelik eleştirilerdir. Bu eleştirilerden bizim için önemli olan pozisyon doğal hak ve sözleşme teorileridir. Bu iki konum, bir insan doğasına ve doğal duruma işaret ederek, devlet aklının otoriterliğine karşı bir direniş imkânı

yaratmaya çabalar. Bu referanslardan öte eylemlerin ve yönetimlerin meşrulaştırılması konusunda farklı bir ilke ve mekân yaratırlar. Yeni ilke eski bilgeliğin ve devlet hakkında bilgi üretiminin yerine geçen yarar ilkesidir. Yeni mekân ise, bu yarar ilkesinin test edileceği pazar ve sivil toplumdur. O halde bu noktada, hukuki bir çerçeveden ekonomik bir hesaplama ve normallik değerlendirmesine bir geçiş söz konusudur. Biyopolitika ile eşzamanlı olarak, bağlantılı bir yönetim anlayışı da, bu normallik ve ekonomiklikten doğar: liberalizm. Bu metindeki liberalizm, Foucault'nun yorumlarına paralel olarak, siyasi ideoloji olarak değil de bir yönetim tarzı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Liberalizm insanın ve piyasanın negatif özgürlüğünün yanı sıra, bu özgürlüğü kontrol altına almaya ilişkin güvenlik mekanizmalarının kaynaştığı bir yönetim tarzıdır. Doğal haklara ve piyasanın serbestliğine yapılan vurguların yanı sıra, yüzyıllar boyunca gezgin, aylak ve çapulculara yönelik adli ve kolluğa ilişkin düzenlemeler güvenlik ve özgürlüğün bir aradalığına ilişkin önemli tarihsel örnekler oluştururlar.

Biyopolitika ve liberalizmin bu dönemde yarattıkları kırılma borçlandırılmış öznenin varoluş biçimini de etkiler. Borçlandırma, değişikliklere paralel olarak, piyasa içinde bir fayda/zarar problemi olarak ele alınmaya başlanmış ve kapitalist üretim tarzının ve parasal rant biçiminin yayılmasıyla beraber artı ürün üretimindeki temel konumuna yerleşmeye başlamıştır. Üstelik borcun istatistikî bir veriye indirgenmesi onun siyasi yönünü de örtbas etmiştir. Modern öncesi dönemde kaçış (*exodus*) üzerinden temel bir politik problem olarak tanımlanmış borçlandırma, artık ekonomik ve sayısal bir konudur. Üstelik antik dönemin borç kölelerinin kamusal alanda yer bulabilmek için verdiği kanlı mücadele de, hak temelli bir biçimsel hukuk meselesine indirgenmiştir.

Modern borçlandırmanın serüvenindeki ikinci kopuş refah devleti ve fordizm ile ilgilidir. Bu kopuş ile kastedilen ana nokta, genel üretim makinesinde gerçekleşen bir değişikliktir. 19.yy'ın ikinci yarısında aletle yapılan üretimden teknik makine ile yapılan üretime geçilmesi, genel üretim makinesi ya da üretim biçiminde gerçekleşen bir kaymaya işaret eder. Alet insanın

elindeki, belli başlı yetenek isteyen, bir araç iken; teknik makine insana dışsal ve insan kontrolünün ötesindedir. Bu sebeple teknik makine insanı kendi uzvu haline getirir. Aynı zamanda zamansal ve mekânsal anlamda bir standardizasyonu mümkün kılar. Fordizm bu standardizasyonun kitle üretimi ve montaj hattı aracılığıyla en yüksek noktaya ulaşmasıdır.

Bu dönemde iki farklı ve temel borçlanma ilişkisinin altı çizilebilir. Bunlardan ilki, teknik makine ile kapitalist arasında gerçekleşir. Teknik makinenin olduğu bir üretim sürecinde, üretim asıl olarak teknik makineye gömülü durumdaki emek tarafından sağlanır. Marksist üretim formülünden (M-C-M' yani para-meta-artı değerli para) yola çıkarak, teknik makinenin üretimi için öncelikle paraya, daha spesifik olarak borç-eyleme ihtiyacı vardır. Teknik makineye bakımı ve satın alınması için kapitalist tarafından verilen borç, üretimin sağladığı artı değerle geri alınır. Bu borç ilişkisinde işçi, teknik makineye bağlanmış bir borç-kölesi ya da rehin durumundadır. Üretim sürecinde makinenin bir eklentisi konumundayken, sadece teknik makinenin üretiminin garantisini sağlar. Bir ikinci borç ilişkisi ise kapitalist ve işçi arasında kurulur. İstihdam biçimindeki değişim ve ücretli işçiliğin doğuşu bu yeni ilişkinin temelidir. Buna göre işçi kendi emek gücünü kapitaliste borç olarak verir. Kapitalist ise, üretimin ardından, bu borcu 'faiziyle' beraber ücret olarak işçiye geri öder. Bu ilişkide ilginç olan nokta, borçlunun alacaklıyı sömürmesi ve artı değere borçlunun el koymasındadır. Ancak borçlandırmaya ilişkin temelli bir yaklaşım ne borçluyu kutsal ne de alacaklıyı mundar olarak kabul eder. Borç-eylemin hangi tarafa bir avantaj sağlayacağını sadece toplumsal ve siyasal mücadele belirler, yoksa tarafların öznellikleri değil.

Maaş üzerinden borçlandırmaya benzer bir durum, sosyal devletin işlemlerini sağlayan en önemli unsurlardan birinde de bulunabilir: vergi. Modern bürokrasi ve devletin üstünde yükseldiği verginin özgüllüğü, söz konusu kaynağın hizmet olarak halka geri dönmesi zorunluluğudur. Bu sebeple vergiyi halkın devlete verdiği bir borç olarak düşünebiliriz. Ancak devletin söz konusu kaynağı nasıl kullanacağına ilişkin halk kontrolü dolaylıdır. Bu

kontrol hem temsili demokrasi aracılığıyla yapılmasından hem de bürokrasinin uzmanlık çerçevesinde kurulmasından dolayı dolaylıdır. Bu sebeple devlet ve halk arasındaki bu borç ilişkisi bir sömürüye dönme ihtimalini her zaman içinde taşır. Aynı ücretten kaynaklı borç-eylemde olduğu gibi, borçlu alacaklıyı borçlandırma üzerinden sömürebilir. Hem maaş hem de vergide söz konusu sömürü her zaman borçlandırılmış özne üzerindeki kontrolü beraberinde getirir. Çünkü işçinin ya da halkın artı üründen mahkûm bırakılması onun boş zamanını ve geleceğini etkilemektedir.

Borçlandırmanın anlatısında son kopuş neoliberalizmin ve finansallaşmanın siyasal ve sosyal arenaya dâhil olmaya başladığı 70'lerin sonunda yer alır. 70'lerdeki fordist katılık krizine karşı geliştirilen cevap ordoliberaler ve yeni sağın piyasa rekabetini devletin koruması gerektiği ve rekabetin özgürlükle beraber krizin sonunu getireceğine ilişkin inancının üstünde yükselir. O halde neoliberalizmin liberalizmden bariz farkları vardır. Bu farkların ilki liberal doğallık ve *laissez-faire* kavramlarının eleştirisidir. Neoliberaler için piyasanın özgürlüğünün doğal olarak üretime yansıtacağı inancı naif bir hayaldir. Devletin piyasadaki rekabeti koruması için bir rol alması gerekir. İkinci fark neoliberalizmin *homo economicus* tipini daha da radikallemesi ve insan-kapital ile girişimci özne figürlerine eklememesinden kaynaklanır.

Neoliberalizm hiçbir şekilde finansallaşma sürecinden ayrılamaz. Finansallaşma üretim karşıtı bir birikime işaret eder. Yani Marksist üretim şeması olan M-C-M' üçlüsünün M-M' ikilisine dönmesidir. Artı değer maddi bir üretimden ziyade rant ve borçlandırma aracılığıyla sağlanır. Aslında fordist dönemin kendine özgürlüğü dışında, kapitalizm her zaman üretim karşıtı bir ekonomik sistem olagelmiştir. El koyma, kamulaştırma, haczetme ve çitleme kapitalizmin tarihinin en önemli eylemleridir. Ancak finansallaşma, borç üzerinden büyüme gerçekleştirilmesinin ve kurgusal paranın dolaşımının zirve yapmasına işaret eder. Bu sebeple hem bireysel hem de ulusal anlamda borç oranlarının üretim oranlarını geçmesi finansallaşma çerçevesinde belirgin hale gelir. Finansallaşma aracılığıyla borçlandırma

sadece makineye ilişkin değil, özneye de ilişkindir. Örneğin girişimci öznenin risk bağlamında sürekli kendini geliştirmeye ve bunun için de hem zamansal hem de maddi anlamda borç almaya teşvik edilmesi, borçlandırılmış öznenin borç-eylem tarafından kontrolünü gittikçe arttırır. Üstelik bilgi, medya ve demokrasi anlamında mevcut kapitalist akışın bir tekel inşa etmesi, borçlandırılmış öznenin olağan yollardan (üniversite, gazete ve meclis) bir direniş imkânı yaratmasını engeller.

Metnin içinde yer alan kültürel borçlandırma bölümü bu direniş sorunu üzerinden anlaşılmalıdır. Çünkü metnin sınırları kültürel borçlandırmayı yani devleti, vatani, toplumu ve aileyi yoğun biçimde incelemeyi engellemektedir. Bu sebeple kültürel borçlandırma olası bir direniş imkânı için girizgâh olmaktan ibarettir. Her borçlandırma ilişkisi ahlaki bir görev bilinci, zorunluluk ve yaptırımı beraberinde getirir. Yani Nietzsche'nin deyimiyle borç, suçluluk duygusu ve kara vicdan ile el ele gider. Kültürel borçlandırmayı anlamak için yapmamız gereken bu görev ve sorumluluk bilinçlerinin nasıl değiştiğini incelemektir. İnanıyorum ki, Giorgio Agamben'in liturji kavramının değişimine ilişkin yorumları bize görevin borçlandırma çerçevesinde siyasal işlevini gösterebilir. Liturji Antik Yunan'da zengin kesimin sosyal bir yükümlülüğü iken, Hıristiyanlık ile beraber Tanrısal bir hiyerarşinin her kesime biçtiği bir role dönüşmüştür. Bu hiyerarşi, söz konusu yükümlülüğü ters çevirir ve toplumun üst kesimlerine imtiyaz sağlar. Hiyerarşi üstünden bir konum elde etmek, Tanrısal yasaya bağlılığa ilişkin görev, sorumluluk ve yaptırımı siyasal anlamda yönetici sınıfın eline vermek demektir. Demek ki, burada da siyasal antropolojinin devletin oluşumuna ilişkin tezine geri dönmüş oluyoruz.

Peki, söz konusu Yasa ne anlama gelmektedir? Literatürde, Antik Yunancadan yapılan çevirilerde yapılan temel bir yanlışta işaret edilmektedir. Antik Yunancada farklı olan ancak her ikisi de günümüze *ethos* olarak çevrilen iki kavram vardır. Bunlardan ilki nötr bir biçimde davranış, alışkanlık ve âdete işaret ederken; ikincisi “olması gereken” ve “yapılması gereken” şeyleri vurgular. Bu iki kavramın ilkinin etik, ikincisini ise ahlak

olarak kavramsallaştırabiliriz. O halde etik bir yaşam biçimi belirlemeye ilişkin iken, ahlak yasa ve yaptırıma ilişkin olur. Borçlandırmanın arkasındaki görev ve sorumluluğu yerle bir etmek için, ahlaki yasanın ötesinde etik bir varoluş kipi belirlenmesi gerektiğini düşünmekteyim. Ancak bu etik tutumun ne olacağının evrensel bir cevabını verebilmek imkânsızdır. Metnin etik tutum aracılığıyla altını çizmeye çalıştığı nokta, mevcut düzene yönelik saldırının yeni olanakların altını çizmeden yapılması anlamsızdır. Eleştiri, yaşama ilişkin bir yenilik getirilmeden yapılamaz. O halde borçlandırmanın işleyişinin ötesinde, borçlandırmaya direnişin anlatisını yapacak bir metin, herhangi bir kaçış çizgisi ve yeni bir etik belirtmeden her zaman eksik olacaktır.



## B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Kabalay  
Adı : Berkay  
Bölümü : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : Indebtmnt as Power Apparatus

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**