

AN ONTOLOGICAL INQUIRY ON THE
POTENTIALS OF CRITICALITY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PROGRAM
IN ARCHITECTURE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY
SİNAN CEM KIZIL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARCHITECTURE
IN
ARCHITECTURE

SEPTEMBER 2017

Approval of the thesis:

**AN ONTOLOGICAL INQUIRY ON
POTENTIALS OF CRITICALITY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
PROGRAM IN ARCHITECTURE**

submitted by **SİNAN CEM KIZIL** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Architecture in Department of Architecture, Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Gülbin Dural Ünver
Dean, Graduate School of **Natural and Applied Sciences**

Prof. Dr. T. Elvan Altan
Head of Department, **Architecture**

Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın
Supervisor, **Architecture Dept., METU**

Examining Committee Members:

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ela Alanyalı Aral
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Berin F. Gür
Architecture Dept., TED University

Assist. Prof. Dr. İpek Gürsel Dino
Architecture Dept., METU

Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur Yüncü
Architecture Dept., TED University

Date: 22.09.2017

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Sinan Cem Kızıl

Signature:

ABSTRACT

AN ONTOLOGICAL INQUIRY ON POTENTIALS OF CRITICALITY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PROGRAM IN ARCHITECTURE

Kızıl, Sinan Cem
M.Arch., Department of Architecture
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın

September 2017, 80 pages

The relation between architecture and social change is one of the key themes in historical discourse of architectural theory. The tradition of criticality has been consolidated after enlightenment and it caused distrust towards norms of architecture. Even though this tradition of criticality eventually turns to its roots and criticises the ideals of enlightenment in postmodern discourses, it is clear that namely postmodern architectures still subjected to criticism similar to their modernist predecessors. In this thesis, the core problem of the modern-postmodern loop that leads discourse to the post-critical position will be put as subject-object relationship mainly articulated by Descartes, Kant and Hegel in enlightenment. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's ontological thesis rhizome will be introduced to overcome inherently modernist distinction of "subject" and "object" that is constantly reproduced in modern-postmodern duality. Thus, this thesis aims to materialize an architectural theory actively interpreting political production of social structures within space with the term *minor politics*. Furthermore, using the same philosophical attitude, the concept of the program will be inspected as a philosophical concept. For doing this, a partial history of the program will be mentioned to illustrate different conceptualizations of it. This inquiry aims to free up the idea of the program by reinterpreting it within the ontology of rhizome in order to theorize programmatic strategies that are socially engaged with *minor experiences*.

Keywords: rhizome, modern-postmodern duality, critical theory, minor politics, program

ÖZ

MİMARLIKTA ELEŞTİRELLİĞİN POTANSİYELİ VE PROGRAMIN KAVRAMSALLAŞMASININ VAROLUŞBİLİMSEL BİR SORGUSU

Kızıl, Sinan Cem
Yüksek Lisans., Mimarlık Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın

Eylül 2017, 80 sayfa

Mimarlık ve sosyal değişim arasındaki ilişki mimari kuramın tarihsel söylemindeki ana temalardan biridir. Aydınlanmadan sonra konsolide olan eleştirel gelenek, mimaride de normlara olan güveni sarstı. Bu eleştirel gelenek postmodern söylemlerde, köklerine bakıp, aydınlanmanın ideallerini eleştirmeye başladıysa da postmodern mimarilerin hala modernist öncüllerine benzeyen eleştirilere maruz kaldıkları açıktır. Bu tezde, söylemi post-eleştirel konuma götüren modern-postmodern döngüsünün temel problemi, başta Descartes, Kant ve Hegel tarafından ifade edilen, özne-nesne ilişkisi olarak ele alınacaktır. Gilles Deleuze ve Felix Guattari'nin ontolojik tezi köksap, modern-postmodern ikiliğinde sürekli olarak tekrar üretilen -ve aslında modernist olan- özne ve nesnenin üstesinden gelmek üzere kullanılacaktır. Bunu yaparak bu tez, mekan ve içinde var olan sosyal yapıların siyasal üretimini, minör politika terimi ile aktif olarak yorumlamayı amaçlar. Ayrıca, aynı felsefe tutumunu kullanarak, program kavramı felsefi bir *kavram* olarak ele alınacaktır. Tez, bunu yapmak için, programın farklı kavramsallaşmalarının kısmi bir tarihinden söz eder. Bu araştırma, minör deneyimlerle bağlanmış program stratejilerinin teorisini kurmak için program fikrini köksap ontolojisi içinde yeniden yorumlayarak serbest bırakmayı amaçlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: köksap, modern-postmodern ikiliği, eleştirel kuram, minör politika, program

To the memory of Mualla Kızıl

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to many people who helped me during my studies. First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın for his guidance, patience and valuable insights in the course of this research. I would also want to thank him for his encouragement and academic guidance throughout my graduate studies.

I would also like to thank to members of the examining committee, Prof. Dr. Berin F. Gür, Assist. Prof. Dr. İpek Gürsel Dino, Assist. Prof. Dr. Ela Alanyalı Aral, and Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur Yüncü for their inspiring critics and valuable discussions. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Hilde Heynen for her critics and comments in KU Leuven for the duration of a semester.

I would like to express my special thanks to friends who have somehow connected to this thesis in various ways. In that sense, I am indebted to Dicle Kumaraslan for many conversations we had about the ideas in this thesis. Without her and inspiring conversations we had, this thesis would never have been accomplished. Moreover, I am also thankful to Mustafacan Kutsal, Sonat Özcivanoğlu, Caner Arıkboğa and Mustafa Çağatay Karakan for the endless discussions we had about art, philosophy and science. Besides their friendship and continuous support, their enthusiasm and eagerness have motivated me the most. In addition to them, I need to thank all the other friends that I cannot list here, but they have expanded my understanding of the world even in the most casual conversations.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family. Without their endless love and support, this research would not be completed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	v
ÖZ	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION: READING THE MAP	1
2. THE CRITICALITY OF ARCHITECTURE	7
2.1 Architecture and social change	7
2.2 Modern-Postmodern Parasitism	11
2.3 Status of Architecture	14
2.4 Subject or Subjectification	20
2.5 Free Subjectivities in Architecture	25
3. THE CONCEPT OF PROGRAM	35
3.1 Open and Closed Concept	36
3.2 The Concept of Program	39
3.3 Emergence of a Program	42
3.4 Invention and Diagram	45
3.5 Program as the experience	48
3.6 Program and the Reproduction of the Status quo	54
3.7 Cartography of the Concept	61

4. CONCLUSION: PROGRAMMING MINOR EXPERIENCES.....	67
BIBLIOGRAPHY	77

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 3.1 The diagram of the concept of cogito.....	38
Figure 3.2 The Plan of the Rem Koolhaas' proposal for Parc de la Villette.....	49
Figure 3.3 The diagram of Bernard Tschumi's proposal for Parc de la Villette.....	51
Figure 3.4 The diagram of concept of program.....	61
Figure 4.1 The plan of the T House by Sou Fujimoto.....	68
Figure 4.2 The inside view of the T House by Sou Fujimoto.....	68
Figure 4.3 Model of the concept, Spiral House by Sou Fujimoto.....	69
Figure 4.4 The Insect House by Santiago Cirugeda.....	70
Figure 4.5 Scaffolding by Santiago Cirugeda.....	71

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: READING THE MAP

This thesis provides a theoretical inquiry of the forms of ideas concerning the critical aspect of architecture and the concept of program in order to provide a framework for effective political praxis. This inquiry adopts a specific ontology -the theory of rhizome- as a theoretical and methodological reference. Thus, each narrative, each bibliographic entry, in the thesis, is treated as separate maps, which are connecting ideas and going beyond themselves to connect other maps. In that manner, the totality of text will consider itself as a rhizome, a product of the cartographic activity. This introduction will provide the information on how to read that map.

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari reconsider the term cartography and dispatch it from its historical meanings that are referring to specific and systematic methodologies of map making. For them, a rhizome should be mapped not to be traced since maps allow creative interpretations while tracing is a rigid representation. The difference between the map and a tracing is the creative potentials they hold. “Tracing” implies a static and structural relationship between elements while “mapping” is making new and possible connections between elements visible. A map is a diagram that can recreate its own meaning with new connections between ideas.¹

The cartographic activity that produces the body of this thesis sees each bibliographic entry as a different map, which is proposing collections of ideas. Those ideas and their

¹ Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari. “Introduction: Rhizome”, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, trans. by Brian Massumi. Originally published in 1980 by Les Éditions de Minuit, p. 12.

connections are points and trajectories on a map. Even though some of those papers/chapters/passages are organizing the ideas by structuring them, it would be a mistake to say that they are tracings and they are representing a rigid meaning. They are already rhizomes, as they get connected into larger discourse from multiple points and stimulating new connections to different ideas. The cartographic activity producing this thesis is the selection and combination of points across maps. Acknowledging the status of being a map, the form of the thesis, which adopts a rhizomatic organization of ideas, becomes a diagram, a creative agent. Thus, the form becomes an example of the ontological critique, which is articulated in this work. At the end, a new, a rhizomatic map is produced by process of selecting points and drawing new trajectories between them.

This cartographic activity produces two consecutive layers of mappings of the architectural theory, which are engaging with the theory from different angles. Each half proposes the same line of argument -the ontological critique- from a different perspective. Titles of subchapters are “themes” rather than indicators of structural position. So, subchapters can be read in any order within the chapter.

The ontological critique consists of four stages in both halves; 1-discusses *rhizome* as opposed to dominant structures of thought to replace them; 2-introduces *segmentarity* to illustrate complexities in hierarchies; 3-introduces the process of *subjectification* contra to the subject and 4-articulates the potential of *minor politics* as a resistance to the reproduction of status-quo. Segmentarity, subjectification and minor politics are taken as key terms in the theory of rhizome to in order provide a political and critical framework for both theory and praxis of architecture.

Problematizations motivating the lines are; 1-the modern-postmodern duality reproducing the same meaning of human and causing absence of an effective criticality and 2-the historical conceptualizations of the program and their lack of political and critical aspects. In the first map, the term *minor* critique is proposed as a theoretical standpoint for emancipatory practice. The second map, in that sense, is also a *minor* critique of the concept of program.

Each half defines its problematization as the energy that drives the line. But the line is never straight; it splits, intersects and joins to another. Consequently, two chapters connect to each other when they get superimposed. In that sense, two chapters exist simultaneously and side by side. The first map is a layer that becomes the background for the second in the places where the line is mutated to split, intersect or join. The line gets elaborated in both chapters separately; for example, *rhizome* becomes an alternative to object-subject duality and to the closed concepts of the mind in two chapters respectively. Background relationship is constructed by the bibliographic entries and the mutations, splits and intersections they introduce along the line. Splits and intersections are connected when two maps are superimposed. So, chapters and subchapters are referencing with each other. Ramification on lines implies new references between points on two maps when they are read in reference to the other.

Besides from its methodological interpretation -the “cartographic activity” as we have adopted- the theory of rhizome also provides an analytical model for thought that rearranges the categories knowledge. Consequently, bibliographic entries in this thesis can be attained to distinct domains of knowledge ranging from the aesthetics, positive sciences, philosophy, and political and social theories. Consistency is sustained by the internal connections that become visible when two layers are put on top of each other.

Branching on the line is controlled by reducing some of the historical categories of the theory of architecture from the scope of work for the sake of limiting ever-growing lines of connection and provides internal consistency as a thesis. Main theoretical *milieus* that are creating the background-foreground relationship between two maps by branching the line can be roughly mentioned within following frameworks for ideas: 1-status of architecture in professional and public spheres in terms of its meaning; 2-modern and postmodern antagonism and their glitches in contemporary position of theory/praxis; 3-how “self-aware” subject is defined; 3-architecture and its definition of the subject; 4-political position of architecture and architect; 5-the theory of rhizome as a systematic methodology; 6-experience of architecture. However, this is not a listing that proposes a sequence that frameworks will be visited in a specific

order. Rather, there are zones in each map where those frameworks -and related bibliography- produce denser mutations.

In order to provide a better understanding of the map, how four stages of the line got interpreted in each chapter will be further elaborated in the respectful introductions to chapters. However, the main bibliographic route can be provided here to create a better understanding of how two different map relates to each other. The first map starts with two sets of meanings that have attained to architecture. Hilde Heynen's² and Arota Isozaki's³ texts will provide the main concepts concerning the architecture's role in the social change; thus, the genealogy of the architectural crisis will be articulated. Then, the conditions of the crisis -modern-postmodern dualism- will be put. Construction of the subject outside the philosophical notion of object/subject distinction will be put. In that sense, sociological and psychological understanding of the rhizomatic notion of subjectivity will be visited to understand "reproduction of the same". Architecture's role in the construction of subjectivities will be articulated and minoritarian critique will be proposed as a political position. The second map starts with distinguishing rhizomatic and structural thought with examples of *open* and *closed* concepts. It will define the concept of program in modern and postmodern design methodologies and will trace the genealogy of the idea. In that sense, it connects to Heynen and Isozaki's notions. Modernist and postmodernist notions of the architecture get reflected onto second chapter's review of the historical concept of program. From the review, a diagram of the concept will be generated to materialize potentials of the concept. Lastly, through the diagram that is drawn, the *open* concept will be recognized as the possible tool for a *minor* praxis. Through that, in the conclusion, this thesis aims to free up the idea of the program by reinterpreting it within

² Hilde Heynen, "Space as Receptor, Instrument or Stage: Notes on the Interaction Between Spatial and Social Constellations", *International Planning Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3-4, pp. 342-357.

³ Arota Isozaki. "Introduction: A Map of Crisis" in Kojin Karatani's *Architecture as Metaphor*. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1995, pp. vii-xiv.

the ontology of rhizome to theorize critical programmatic strategies that are socially engaged with *minor experiences*.

Even though the connections are obvious and almost emerging naturally, a collection of related works is reduced from the scope of this work. Avant-gardes with their inventiveness in aesthetics, Metabolists with their biological model, Lefebvre's critique of everyday life and form of urban, Phenomenological expansion of subject or detailed analysis of the Deconstruction are few of the exempted themes that can be linked to the arguments of the thesis. In that sense, the form of the thesis aims to recognize those, and many other, by becoming a creative map, a diagram. Selected examples of design projects have been used to imply the possibility of the emergence of a specific quality. They are treated as "possible worlds". So, the proof is not pursued in the quantity of related examples, instead, examples signify the possibility of the specific quality in the subjected example to re-emerge.

CHAPTER 2

THE CRITICALITY OF ARCHITECTURE

The following half of this thesis, the first map, problematizes the status of the critical architecture in terms of theory/praxis reciprocity. In order to crystallize the contemporary position, first, two different narratives of architecture made by Hilde Heynen and Arota Isozaki will be mentioned. Then, the crisis of emancipatory critical thinking will be mentioned in relation to the modern and postmodern reactions in terms of their philosophical backgrounds recreating the object-subject duality. Consequently, we will put two major problematics of criticality in theory. From that point on, the ontological argument of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari -the theory of rhizome- will be introduced to overcome those two problems that are continuously reproduced in modern and postmodern loop signifying philosophical distinction between subject and object. Four stages of the line will be interpreted as follows: 1- *rhizome* replaces the object-subject distinction; 2- *segmentarity* relates with experience and senses; 3- *subjectification* replaces the understanding of the subject; 4- *minor politics* establishes a critical position.

2.1 Architecture and social change

Architecture and its place in the social strata, moreover, the extent of this place, constitutes the body of the architectural theory. Hilde Heynen differentiates three

conceptions of architecture in relation with social strata, looking at different epistemological and ontological approaches laid on different disciplines varying from anthropology to cultural geography, to social sciences. The first conception is “architecture as a receptor” -which sees the architecture just as an outcome of social processes; the second one is “architecture as an instrument” -which sees it as an apparatus for change in the social, cultural or political domains; and the last one is “architecture as a stage” -which focuses on reciprocity of architecture and social phenomena.⁴ Each of those conceptions and their extents, subsequent arguments based on those conceptions, have critical positions with each other and all three of them are constructed upon a unique subject-object understanding.⁵

Arota Isozaki provides a different reading of the theory in the introduction he wrote for Kojin Karatani’s *Architecture as a Metaphor*⁶. Isozaki says that Vitruvius’ *Ten Books on Architecture* constituted the norm for architecture and it is treated as a technic in the west. World travel, the possibility of different norms in different cultures, the archaeological evidence about different classic architectures and, generally, advancements in the enlightenment caused distrust towards *Ten Books on Architecture* in the 18th century. Norms and criteria of “good” architecture have been abolished. The

⁴ Heynen. Op. cit.

⁵ Before going further, we need to clarify the extend of the concept “subject” and why it is significant for the architecture and other disciplines. Subject/object relationship references the ways, human as an organism became aware of itself and the world. Duality of the division of the world into the “self-knowing subject” and the “perceived world” has ontological and epistemological implications - dialectics, idealism, universality, identity logic etc. in the works of Kant and Hegel. While those implications have been rethought progressively, the idea of what makes an organism a subject also has been rethought. The term “subject-object relationship” in this thesis refers to the concept of “a mind and the world it reflects onto” which makes the object world a passive background for to be affected by the subject. Thus, even though the genesis of subject has been re-examined within the fields like psychology -invention of subconscious-, social theory -concept of “interpellation” for example- or phenomenology -in form of senses-, each definition of the subject, inescapably, produces outcomes that only have meaning inside the duality, resulting an analysis that is valid only within its limits.

⁶ Isozaki. Op. cit.

discipline of architecture gained a new status as an art form. Every architecture becomes a project with their own consistent set of tools and theory, just to fill emptied the throne of Vitruvius.⁷ Rationalism fused the departure from previous norms and started the tradition of critique after enlightenment. Kant's three critiques of reason and Marx's critique of ideology have been emphasized as the first examples of this tradition by Ole W. Fischer. This critical tradition, historically, created the backbone of western theory in modernity.⁸

Isozaki illustrates another crisis of architecture after the disappearance of the Vitruvius as a reference. Following the general acceptance of architecture as an art form, institutionalization of art by the state caused another shift in the conception of architecture. Becoming a state institution, art became oppressive and limiting as Isozaki puts. In reaction to architecture deprived of its social agenda in the name of the status of art, utopian projects started to appear, problematizing the relationship between the social and built spheres. Utopias have been created. The relation between architecture and human, therefore the progression of civilization is reinterpreted and projected onto future. Isozaki says that, in order to realize utopian projects, architecture has been reinvented as a "construction" in contrast to the conceptualization of architecture as an "art".⁹ In the name of functionalism backed up by rationalism, many architects have adopted necessity driven methodologies. Instrumentalization of architecture -which is resulted from the critical position that architects take- hints the first *modernist* tendencies referring to rationalism, functionalism and universalism rooted back to enlightenment philosophy.

According to Hannah Arendt, Hobbes's philosophy of result started to replace Aristo's philosophy of cause in the enlightenment. Progression in natural sciences consolidated

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ole W. Fischer. "Architecture, Capitalism and Criticality", in *Architectural Theory*, edited by. C. Greig Crysler, Stephen Cairns and Hilde Heynen. London: SAGE Publications, 2012, pp. 56-69.

⁹ Isozaki. Op. cit.

the confidence in rationalism.¹⁰ With the tradition of criticality, rationalism and consequently instrumental reason rooted in the enlightenment, the modernist idea of architecture that aims to intervene social codes has been flourished. Architecture is turned into a machine for living.¹¹ It became a subject derived from an object, that has total control over subjects -users- through utilities, functions and/or programs it hosts. Furthermore, not only the philosophical concepts but also the scientific knowledge based on those concepts –including sociology and psychology besides construction techniques and material sciences- played a crucial role in the processes of design in modernist interventions.

Isozaki marks the 1960s as the saturation point; instrumental architecture has been seen as a failure because it has reached its goals without changing the social order. Architect's utopias have been realized with “constructions” but the social sphere stayed indifferent to it. The belief towards instrumental reason and modernist ideals have been dissolved. Isozaki calls it the dissolution of the grand narrative¹²; the impossibility of fulfillment of the history and the original utopia¹³. Criticality that has produced the instrumental reason -and modernist interventions- in the first hand, after, has started to dig those concepts themselves. Furthermore, departure from the modernist theories not only occurred in the field of architecture; governments also started to pass their duty of creating public service and recreation to the private companies, the neoliberal policies have spread and became dominant.¹⁴

¹⁰ Hannah Arendt. “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern”, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought. New York: The Viking Press, 1961, p. 76.

¹¹ Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture. London: J. Rodker, 1931.

¹² Isozaki. Op. cit.

¹³ Manfredo Tafuri. “Ideology and Utopia”, Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988, pp. 50-78.

¹⁴ Andy Merrifield. “Old Urban Questions Revisited (and Reconstituted)”, The New Urban Question, London: Pluto Press, 2014, pp. 11-26.

2.2 Modern-Postmodern Parasitism

The dissolution of the Grand Narrative and departure from the modernist policies in architecture should be clarified in terms of their heterogeneous nature and their relation with post-modernism in order to understand the change in the critical role of architecture after the crisis. Modernist interventions have been criticized for their limited understanding of philosophical concepts about modernity. Sarah Williams Goldhagen criticizes international style exhibition in Museum of Modern Arts for its underlying stylistic understanding of modern¹⁵; Reyner Banham attacks to false functionalism in those works and praises more genuine functionalist architects like Buckminster Fuller.¹⁶ The immense difference between the designed and lived conditions in architecture -like in the colonial interventions in Algiers¹⁷, in the construction of the new capital, Brasilia or in the immense housing complex, Pruitt-Igoe- exemplifies the reductionist analysis of the user/subject -the element of human- and object/architecture -complex social environment he or she placed in.

Failures or problems on those cases are caused by miscalculations about social and individual architectural interactions in numerous domains. Those spaces were built as instruments, strictly resting upon the sociological and philosophical understanding of the “subject” constructed in enlightenment, which has become inherently totalizing in the name of being universal.

¹⁵ Sarah Williams Goldhagen. “Something to Talk About: Modernism, Discourse, Style,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 64, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 144-167.

¹⁶ Reyner Banham. “Conclusion: Functionalism and Technology”, Theory and Design in the First Machine Age. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983, pp. 320-330.

¹⁷ André Loeckx and Tom Avermaete. “‘Architecture ou Révolution’. Critical Moderns and the Search for a New Urbanity in 1950s Algiers”, in Tom Avermaete et al. (eds.), Colonial Modern. Aesthetics of the Past, Rebellions for the Future. London: Black Dog, 2010, pp. 170-187.

Failures of modernist ideologies created new echoes of their critical aspect: the postmodern architecture, the criticism of all kinds of ideologies -not only capitalism-, and lastly, the criticism of the criticality itself. Dissolution of the grand narrative created a need to re-conceptualize architecture and its role in the social strata. Architecture has become a stage, an amalgam of receptor and instrument as Heynen puts¹⁸ which is focusing on the realm between subject and object, highlighting priority of experience and reciprocal relationship between the social and built spheres including diverse interpretations.

However, Maurizio Ferraris mark the years 1979 and 1980, years of Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition*¹⁹ and Habermas's conference on modernism²⁰ respectively, as the introduction of the term postmodernism into the philosophy after its appearance in disciplines like literature and architecture as reactions to their modern predecessors. He says that modernism and postmodernism have a parasitic relationship. Rather than an idea of overcoming the modernism -which contradicts with the postmodernist denial of universalist and idealist claims of enlightenment-, Ferraris says that, postmodernism constructs itself within modernism and modernism constructs itself within postmodernism. Furthermore, he argues that the deconstruction of modernism was already underway when it is first started to be developed.²¹ Modernism's constant self-criticism gains a statue of stand-alone theory named postmodernism as its tools of negation and critic became more articulated and dense. Modernism and postmodernism justify themselves as ostracizing the other part.²² According to

¹⁸ Hilde Heynen, "Space as Receptor, Instrument or Stage: Notes on the Interaction Between Spatial and Social Constellations", *International Planning Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3-4, p. 354.

¹⁹ Jean-François Lyotard. *The Postmodern Condition*. London: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington, Brian Massumi. Originally published in 1979 by Les Éditions de Minuit.

²⁰ Jürgen Habermas. "Modernity – An Incomplete Project", *Anti-Aesthetic*, edited by Hal Foster. Washington: Bay Press, 1983, pp. 3-15. Originally delivered in 1980, Frankfurt when Habermas was awarded the Theodor W. Adorno prize.

²¹ Maurizio Ferraris. Trans. Anna Taraboletti Segre. "Postmodernism and the Deconstruction of Modernism", *Design Issues*, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, 1988, pp. 12-24.

²² *Ibid.* p.23

Ferraris, there is no conceptual difference between Adorno and Derrida, the only change is in the cultural backgrounds since both of them are using the same tools, criticality.²³

Ferraris's resolutions on how modern/postmodern duality -or alternative- has been constructed allow us to contemplate on bedrocks of that philosophical topos. From the perspective of the subject-object understanding we have mentioned, we see the modern and the postmodern as two articulations of the same principal duality of subject and object. Because, as Ferraris highlighted, postmodernism appears as a meta-historical force, always immanent within the modernism from the start. Ferraris says that "one must accept (and the modernists are the first who should do so) that postmodernism is not an enormous departure from modernism, but rather a capillary system of revisions and transformations."²⁴ However, those transformations or different postmodernisms, even though they are attacking the subject/object construct rooted in the enlightenment, are not replacing the duality between human and the world, hence cannot eradicate the clear distinction between subject and object.

Ferraris points out the circularity of critical positions that modernisms and postmodernisms did take to define their position and puts it as a historical pattern that is also visible in dialectics/sophistry distinction in Ancient Greece and rationalism/irrationalism alternative in the 20th century.²⁵ Ferraris conceptualizes the relation between modern and postmodern as a co-dependent one. Modernism constructs and postmodernism deconstructs the form of ideas. Postmodernism in that sense, 1-signifies the dissolution of the Grand Narrative because it canalizes the criticality towards its own roots, 2-it does not propose an actual departure because it legitimizes itself as a reaction to modernism, becoming another signifier of the

²³ Ibid. p.18

²⁴ Ibid. p.19

²⁵ Ibid. p. 22

existence of modernist thought. This, as we will see, produces a circular²⁶ self-criticism eradicating Marxian concepts of political and social engagement from discourse.

2.3 Status of Architecture

Ferraris's remarks on terms *postmodernity* and *modernity* and parasitic mode of their existence indicate two major aspects of modernism-postmodernism relation that can be carried over to architecture and its critical capacity.

First one is the asymmetry and ambiguity in philosophical and architectural discourses in terms of criticality towards modernist ideals. Like postmodern reactions in philosophy, postmodern reactions in architecture also questioned the Hegelian notions of subject and object. The conception of space as a stage emerges, which poses a spectrum between the instrument and receptor. This creates different architectures that are prioritizing different ways of reciprocity with social strata. Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre focus on the departure from modernist policies and emergence of the populist architecture theorized by Denise Scott Brown and Robert Venturi as a reaction to modernist architecture guided by welfare states.²⁷ They say that even though the populist theory is aimed to dismantle modernist architectural theories, they just “shifted the focus from one architectural object to another, leaving the basic modernist presuppositions untouched.”²⁸ Tzonis and Lefaivre criticize populist architecture because of undermining modernist welfare architecture and not putting anything in its

²⁶ Circle indicates a loop stripped out of its mutations as opposed to spiral. Circular represents a self-critical stance engaged with its own criticality instead of criticism of social power. Spiral, on the other hand, represents a self-critical stance, which is constructive in terms of political praxis.

²⁷ Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre. “In the Name of The People”, *Forum*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1976, pp. 5-9 and 27-33.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 7

place. While denouncing the themes of “universality” and “common identity” and praising the individual differences and subjective values, populist architecture greatly ignored the class formations and the dependency of the user in socioeconomic spheres and fetishism of the architectural image.²⁹ Furthermore, Tzonis and Lefaire argue that the populist architecture seems like a natural successor to modern architecture because of the theoretical status of populism as a belief system -not a theory- that consists of unverified hypothesis born out of the reaction towards modern policies³⁰. Here, the problem appears as a theoretical gap; postmodern criticism towards the subject-object relationship of modernist interventions -critics of elitism, reductionism etc.- have never been fully replaced, instead, it proposed new ways to draw boundaries between subject and object. As a result, populist critique has reconstructed the same subject/user and object/architecture, by reducing architecture into formal gestures in a “well-serviced supermarket.”³¹

Postmodern architectures linking to the postmodern literature for the sake of wider theoretical base also have been criticized because of their reductionist methods and lack of sensitivity in their interpretations even though they aimed to reconfigure the modernist status of the user/subject. Mary McLeod made an analysis of Derrida’s *deconstruction* and Foucault’s *heterotopia* as two main philosophical influences in post-structuralist architecture. She argues that both views are fundamentally lacking the perspective of women, children and old people while claiming that they are dealing with the “other” –sensitivities that modernist project has ignored.³² For the *deconstruction*; “search for other” tries to create a negation or criticism by formal operations while planning to gain political power by becoming a cultural sign or -as McLeod puts- “through revealing the disintegration of that sign.”³³ Here otherness is

²⁹ Ibid. p. 29

³⁰ Ibid. p. 27

³¹ Ibid.

³² Mary McLeod. “Everyday and ‘Other’ Spaces”, in D. Coleman, E. Danze, C. Henderson (eds.), Architecture and Feminism, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996, pp. 1-37.

³³ Ibid. p.5

preserved within the object -form as a language- “refusing any reality outside the object.”³⁴ On the other hand, for the “Heterotopia”; search for the “other” continues in the form of the “other place” which subverts the existing set of social relations with its marginal and unusual nature. McLeod criticises the notion of heterotopia because of its ignorance towards everyday spaces, which are the heterotopias for women, children, old, or colonial -for the real and undisclosed other.³⁵ The separation between everyday space and heterotopic space is constructed by the status of the object through the eyes of the subject, which are deemed to be reductionist. McLeod’s criticism shows that the status of the subject -women in her case- is extremely neglected. McLeod also gives examples from other architects and theorists -Situationist, Independent Group, Venturi/Brown, Jane Jacobs, and lastly Henri Lefebvre and Michel de Certeau- who focused on the “other” -the everyday life- more successful than post-structuralist discourses in architecture. They recognized a previously unexplored topos as the locus of their theory.³⁶

To summarize, postmodern architecture -in a sense of being reactionary to modernist ideals of universality, identity, and utopia- loses its critical and operative edge, by reproducing same theoretical glitches with modernism. Being confined in modernist object-subject distinction eventually leads fetishization of architecture as an image -like in the populist case-, or preserves an eternal place for the “other” -for the undisclosed- in the search for otherness -like in the post-structuralist case. Every “boundary” drawn in search for a better definition of subject/user, ultimately falls short to escape its own limit. In other words; it constructs the conception of “space as a stage” as a spectrum resulted from the transposition of conceptions instrument and receptor -not by the union of object and subject-, by keeping subject-object distinction intact.

³⁴ Ibid. p.3

³⁵ Ibid. p.10

³⁶ Ibid.

The second effect of the modern-postmodern duality in architecture is the dissolution of criticality or the emergence of post-critical and post-theoretical positions. Almost parallel with the McLeod's distinction of *heterotopia* and *deconstruction*, Ole W. Fischer defines two intermingled postmodern critical approaches, revolving around Michael Hays' "critical theory" and Peter Eisenman's "critical practice" -according to what they are critical to.³⁷ First one "[...] opposes reification, mediation and fetishization of architectural objects, and searches for strategies designed to evade the pressure of visual commodification of the 'late capitalist' culture industry" benefiting from Marxist and Psychoanalytic tradition while the latter is endorsing the idea of autonomy of architecture from the external forces like society, historical context or functionality and criticizes previous modes of meaning-making by delegitimizing them via post-structuralist tools like *deconstruction*.³⁸

In the absence of a grand narrative to follow, the belief towards criticism diminished as they are turned into norms of the capitalist mode of production. Fischer recognizes the post-structuralist theories and architectural formalism as the major fields that have undermined neo-Marxist "critical theory". According to him, they have caused a commitment in extreme linguistic analogy in the name of "critical practice" and thus, it leads the practice into "postmodern relativity of everything goes" in 80's and 90's. Post-criticality addresses the loss of sensorial, aesthetic, performative and emotional qualities, which are seemed to be undervalued under the post-structuralist linguistic influence of critical practice.³⁹ On the other hand, it condemns the critical theory as an ineffective tool for liberation, resistance and change. The post-critical main concern is "to solve, not to problematize", consequently, it reverses the roles of theory and

³⁷ Fischer. Op. cit.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 58

³⁹ Ibid. "Critical practice" is used for the linguistic analogy mainly articulated by Eisenmann and his linguistic interpretation of autonomy -borrowed from Tafuri- that paradoxically produces inner-architecture criticism focused on architecture's form language, instead of Tafuri's model for social negation.

practice.⁴⁰ In the name of recovering the sensorial, aesthetic and social aspects of architecture, ideological critique -both in forms of critical theory and critical practice - seems to be removed from the process of design. However, its claims on serving to social in a much better way are still in question. This position cannot escape from being an instrument of power mechanisms. State apparatuses and institutions define the problem to solve in order to reproduce power hierarchies in the age of post-truth⁴¹. Post-criticality stays at the more passive end of the space as a stage spectrum. Pier Vittorio Aureli says that the more inventive architecture gets in order to recover from the urban crises, the more it becomes another force to sustain capitalist exploitation around the globe.⁴²

The question still lingers; can we theorize a meaningful and constructive architectural criticality in the postmodern age we are in? Fischer's suggestion is seeking "a political, spatial and disciplinary sense that interprets the contiguity of architecture with society, culture, media, technology, economy and production".⁴³ The contiguity of architecture to social strata -all the fields that social is produced and social production takes place - is already a question itself which is primarily concerning the subject and its object world in realms of the philosophy, sociology, psychology, politics, economy and many other. Post-structuralist efforts to "decentering the subject" specifically focus on the places where human activity, mind, experience, and the world of objects meet -in search for new boundaries of the concept. This kind of analysis of the subject and object is evident in the works of Gilles Deleuze and his collaborations with Felix Guattari.⁴⁴ In all the different topics they have covered, Deleuze and Guattari put the *difference* as the ontology of things; one exists by changing, by differentiating.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 62

⁴¹ Oxford dictionary defines post-truth as following: Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.

⁴² Pier Vittorio Aureli. "The Theology of Tabula Rasa: Walter Benjamin and Architecture in The Age of Precarity", *Log*, No.27, February 2013, pp. 111-127.

⁴³ Fischer. Op. cit. p. 68

⁴⁴ Bogard. Op. cit. p. 58

Expanding this view onto different topics, they have produced a meta-theory -rhizome- where they talk about processes rather than states and they have produced categorizations based on differentiations rather than common identities. Their systematic thinking allows us to materialize a perspective outside the modern/postmodern parasitism, providing us tools of constructing a new sense to the subject/object duality.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Manuel DeLanda provides a very clear definition of Deleuze's world of analysis in order to stretch his ideas onto the different fields of scientists or analytical philosophers of science. He says that the observed object should be seen through the processes it undergoes. The observed object only materializes at the intersection of different processes. DeLanda proposes a mapping of "relevant ways that object can change" as the dimensions of the "analysis space" or relations of exteriority. With this, the three-dimensional space that the object is placed in gets replaced with a multi-dimensional space that processes are grasped effortlessly, time and space switch sides. DeLanda's project is also important because of its ability to provide a systematic understanding of "Deleuze's world" which allows us to make new problematizations of the phenomena using a new epistemological organization. For more, see Manuel DeLanda. "Introduction: Deleuze's World", Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London: Continuum, 2002, pp. 1-9. If we switch our focus to desires in social scale to desires in molecular and cosmic scale, with two contemporary and popular examples of re-problematizations, we can illustrate what is really meant by the "new epistemological organization". Jeremy England in his lab, problematizes the inorganic origins of life from the perspective of desires -thermodynamic laws in that scale. He argues that molecules, which are energized by the sunlight, start to change their geometry in time and start to radiate this energy much more slowly. Using the energy in more efficient way, eventually allows them to make more bounds with surroundings. Replication and growth -the signs of a living thing- occurs also in the molecular scale. As those molecules eventually form the proteins, from the multiplicity of thermodynamic forces of life, Darwinian forces of life emerges. See; Jeremy L. England, "Statistical Physics of Self-replication." The Journal of Chemical Physics, No. 139, 121923, 2013, doi: 10.1063/1.4818538 and Nikolay Perunov, Robert A. Marsland, and Jeremy L. England. For more, see <https://www.englishlab.com> -retrieved in 15 August. - The second example is Ahmad Farag Ali and Saurya Das' problematization of nature of the universe. They propose a model in which all universe understood without a need to theorization of beginning and an end. What they mathematically proposed is the set of conversions that gets rid of big bang theory and dark matter, seeing age of universe *infinite* and attaining finite size to it. Analysis space where size of the universe is infinite and its age is finite -beginning from Big Bang- switches places with an analysis space where age of the universe is

Ontology of Deleuze and Guattari provides multiple concepts to picture a critical theory in order to overcome the current condition of “critical” in postmodern. Firstly, the asymmetry and ambiguity between architectural and philosophical domains -the problematic between modern project of subject (and object) and reactions to it which are articulating the same duality again-; and secondly, the lack of critical theoretical position -trying to stimulate opposition, negation or resistance in capitalist urban conditions- will be rethought with the ontology of difference.

2.4 Subject or Subjectification

The ontology of difference, as articulated by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*, is a project aimed to abolish Hegelian themes of identity/identical and contradiction/negative. He states that “for difference implies the negative, and allows itself to lead to a contradiction, only to the extent that its subordination to the ‘identical’ is maintained. The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation.”⁴⁶ Similar to Isozaki’s remarks on how classical notions challenged in the enlightenment through a critical approach towards norms, Deleuze says that “modern thought born of the failure of representation” -classical representations of human, art, architecture and so on. Therefore, it ended up constructing different representational structures. He suggests that we must replace the representational thought which reduces the status of things into the sameness with the thought of “difference in itself”.⁴⁷ In other words, the difference itself becomes the reference point. The time itself, gains a new status in the analytical model. In this new model,

infinite. For more, see, Ahmed F. Ali and Saurya Das. “Cosmology from Quantum Potential”, *Physics Letters B*, No. 741, 2015, pp. 276–279.

⁴⁶ Gilles Deleuze. “Preface”, *Difference and Repetition*, London: Continuum, 2001, trans. by Paul Patton. Originally published in 1968 by Presses Universitaires de France. pp. xix-xxii.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

reality cannot be expressed without indicating the change in it - the “difference in itself”.

This analytical model proposed in theory of rhizome allows new understandings for problems of subjectivity or object/subject distinction. William Bogard in his 1998 article, gathers some sociological markers from both Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative works. He mainly discusses the subject with the terms segmentarity and sense, which he sees foundational for a social and sociological theory to build upon.⁴⁸ Bogard summarizes Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of the *subjectification* as the reversal of the Hegelian subject and says: “Where traditional sociology studies the formation of societies in terms of norms, values, organization, and control, etc., Deleuze and Guattari develop an esoteric language of quanta, flows, diagrammatic forms, and assemblages”⁴⁹ which sees the subjectivity as a constant process of becoming.

The organism, for example, becomes an insufficient concept, rather it is an assemblage, “that transfers, amplifies, or dissipates energy flows”.⁵⁰ Deleuze and Guattari see the subject, the one who says “I”, through changes it affiliated with and relations it is connected. The subject -what “I” signifies-, thus, turns into an illusion, a surface effect of the heterogeneous relationship between different bodies that are constructing the organism. “The subject is not *the* body, but a composition (and effect) of bodies -a variable collection of organs, membranes, nerves, and physiochemical processes, but also tools, means of nourishment and shelter and transport, the materials of production and consumption, etc.-a collection that, somehow, makes sense”⁵¹ says Bogard. Here, besides the “difference in itself”, the concept of repetition also plays an important role. Deleuze says that repetition is not confined with the “repetition of the

⁴⁸ William Bogard. “Sense and Segmentarity: Some Markers of a Deleuzian-Guattarian Sociology”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1998, pp. 53.

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 68

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 67

⁵¹ Ibid.

same”⁵², rather it is understood as a genetic operation which drives mutation and the difference.⁵³

The process of subjectification is repetitions and mutations of the actualizations of the assemblage’s desires including the language -which is the repetition and mutations of the specialized and complex combinatory relations between various oral tissue. The subjectivity -the ability to say “I”- has been seen as an emergent aspect of being an assemblage. There is no subject, but there is a continuous process of *subjectification*; the totality and continuity of relations between organs and interactions they participate in organic and inorganic forms.

Ontology of difference also serves as the political momentum of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. They claim that assemblages are desiring mechanisms that are capable of making creative connections in order to actualize their desires and add that “desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled, desire. The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them.”⁵⁴

Event or experience continuously gives shape to the subject with repetitions in parts of the assemblage that experience is divided into. It may be the reoccurring theme of the signifying power of money or repetition of a specific combination of bodily movements, the impulses, the state of body, or it may be the “hearing repeating mottos of propaganda”. Subjectification is the pure becoming, whose conditions have been organized by repetitions and representations -which always contains mutations. All the compartmentalization of the experience are called *segmentarities* and those are

⁵² Circle as opposed to spiral.

⁵³ Gilles Deleuze. “Difference in Itself”, Difference and Repetition, London: Continuum, 2001, pp. 28-69.

⁵⁴ Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari. “Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine”, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, trans. by Brian Massumi. Originally published in 1980 by Les Éditions de Minuit, p. 399.

constructed by states, institutions, capital -regulators of social interaction- which are assemblages on their own, manipulating desires by coding segmentarities in order to reproduce social hierarchies.⁵⁵ Especially Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* (the two companion volumes under the subtitle Capitalism and Schizophrenia) problematize this state of desires as their political bedrock. They praise the idea of freeing up desires from the oedipalized *signifying regimes of power, rigid representational systems* of capitalism. External forces- the which are organizing the everyday life by breaking, connecting and amplifying flows, are called *forces of subjectification*. They produce subjectivities by socially coding the bodies and constructing their desires, controlling their mutations. Quite similar to Louis Althusser, there exists a production of social within social⁵⁶; but in addition to that, creative capacity of an organism and the inventiveness in life making as the true social negation is seen possible. Because, creativity -of alloplastic stratum⁵⁷- is an ontological necessity. In that sense, we should understand this political approach no different than their ontology of things. All the categorizations and propositions that are in the search for unifying representational power based on similarity rather than difference, reproduces *forces of subjectification*. The process of subjectification is a dictation to desires and creative connections that the assemblage can make. "Subject is a coherent

⁵⁵ Ibid. "Micropolitics and Segmentarity", pp. 208-231.

⁵⁶ Althusser coined the terms Ideological State Apparatuses and Repressive State Apparatuses in order to explain the reproduction of social hierarchies. Those apparatuses get involve with life by interpellation, turning humans into individuals, subjects. Subjectivity is seen as a social construct not an essential part of being human. For more, see Louis Althusser. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)", first Published in *La Pensée*, 1970, retrieved from *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

⁵⁷ Transposition of the analysis space of the observed phenomena in order to capture timely processes - as DeLanda also clarified- results in new categorizations, like stratum or -plural- strata. Stratum consists of the processes that gave rise to stable structures -organic strata, geologic strata, alloplastic strata etc. "There is a third major grouping of strata, defined less by a human essence than, once again, by a new distribution of content and expression. Form of content becomes "alloplastic" rather than "homoplastic"; in other words, it brings about modifications in the external world." For more, see Deleuze & Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 60.

organization of forces that has organized itself toward a creative end,”⁵⁸ says Stanford Kwinter in an interview; the process of subjectification, then, is constant rerouting of those subjective forces.

Besides *segmentarity*, reconceptualization of the *sense* and experience in the ontology of difference is another important aspect for Bogard as we have stated. Sense occurs continuously between percepts and affects. Percepts are impersonal perceptible forces exterior to the body and; affects are pre-personal reactions of the body as an assemblage. Andrew Conio summarizes affects as; “Waves of affect ripple through our bodies” and add that “we become part of the world through affects, and our relationships with others are affectual. Affects do not arise from subjects but instead pass through them.”⁵⁹ The body is an assemblage of organs and things -the hand, mouth, a tattoo or a room- that percepts pass through and affect are the change those percepts made on their way in “the incorporeal surface”⁶⁰ between them. Bogard says “problems of social structure and power become matters of how flows of desire, down to the most molecular levels, are segmented, rechannelled, and reconnected.”⁶¹

Conio compares two different models: one is Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work following the traces of phenomenology, and the other is Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblages.⁶² Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of percepts and affects, sees consciousness as a subset of organic life, “organic life imprisons life, not sustains it” with the *process of subjectification*⁶³ In contrast to the phenomenological vision of Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is not bounded by a singular and unique meaning attained

⁵⁸ Simone Brott. Architecture for Free Subjectivity Deleuze and Guattari at the Horizon of Real. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011, p. 28.

⁵⁹ Andrew Conio. “From Flesh to House”, Architectural Theory Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009, p. 135.

⁶⁰ “[...] The problem of the subject, and thus of the constitution of society, is first a problem of how the sense of bodies is produced through the assembly of desiring-machines. The subject, we could say, is the actualization of desire on the incorporeal surface of bodies.” For more, see Bogard. Op cit. p. 52.

⁶¹ Bogard. Op. cit. p. 54

⁶² Conio. Op. cit. p. 136

⁶³ Ibid. p. 139

to flesh.⁶⁴ Because meanings are social constructs as Bogard pointed out as: “truth of relativity and rather than relativity of truth.”⁶⁵ Even though Conio sees Merleau-Ponty’s intention significant, because of the efforts to carry the concept of being from mind to flesh in various ways, expanding the vision of phenomenological discourse in the meantime. he adds that the theory of assemblages provides much-elaborated analysis in the name of dismantling subject-object duality.⁶⁶ Because, within the ontology of difference, subject/object distinction gets resolved by reversing the timeless categorizations of subject/object with the in-between phenomena -effect- which is immanent to time. The sense -percepts and affects- appears as the absolute reality. Segmentarities in the senses constructs meanings and, consequently, social structures. Therefore, the political activity and aesthetics get repositioned in the everyday life, instead of having a privileged position that only accessible through a specialized activity. Political action is proposed as a “semiotic” and “a-signifying” forms of meaning-making in everyday life against the rigid representational systems of capitalism aimed to control mutations. Hence, politics became an issue of mutation or to be precisely put, issue of creativity, which is being kept under the control of the *forces of subjectification*.

2.5 Free Subjectivities in Architecture

Even though, Deleuze and Guattari do not mention about architecture in their collaborations as much as Derrida and Foucault, the concept of subjectification made it into the architectural discourse on several occasions as Simone Brott reviewed in her

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Bogard. Op. cit. p. 73

⁶⁶ Conio. Op. cit. p. 135

work.⁶⁷ Translation of their ideas to architectural theory was also different than their contemporaries as Simone Brott brings out. Firstly, she investigates the history of *A Thousand Plateaus* in the United States after the lack of attention it got in France. On the contrary, in United States, those ideas found an audience among underground circles. American architects' previous encounters with European theorists -mainly Foucault and Derrida- formed a welcoming audience in United States. Only the individual essays -which are also included in *A Thousand Plateaus*- have been circulated in architectural debates in faculties until the book is fully translated in 1987.⁶⁸ Architectural theorist Stanford Kwinter tells to Simone Brott in his interview that: "Deleuze's entire enterprise is describing the ways in which matter becomes subject and multiplying the possibilities for the matter to become subject."⁶⁹ However, in contrast with the 80s discussions in academia, the architectural interest in the 90s shifted to ideas about virtuality, computation and detached from Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the subjectification.⁷⁰

Simone Brott's research also shows a dialogue between Guattari and generations of Japanese architects who are focused on the process of subjectification in relation to architecture. In the context of Japan, different generations of architects from post-WWII period to 80s showed different reactions to the writings of Deleuze and Guattari. This interest, according to Brott, eventually lead a shift to Deleuze and Guattari's sociological understanding of subjectification in architectural circles. Guattari's personal travels to Japan and his interest in the architecture -as an a-signifying form of media which is capable of producing new meanings out of itself- ended up with a generation of Japanese architects embracing the Guattari's *ethico-aesthetic* project which is planned to help create subjectivities freed from the forces of

⁶⁷ Brott reads architectural theory with theory of "impersonal effects" derived from the Deleuze and Guattari's affect-percept model. For doing this she provides an history of earlier attempts to devour them into architectural discussions. For more, see Brott. Op. cit.

⁶⁸ Ibid. "Introduction: Subjectivization", pp.1-13.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 28

⁷⁰ Ibid. "Introduction: Subjectivization", pp. 1-13.

subjectification.⁷¹ Brott says that Deleuzo-Guattarian theories only became fluent in the Japanese architectural discussions after postmodernist ideas have been properly established, even though the translations of both Deleuze's and Guattari's first writings have appeared coeval to translations of the modernist and postmodernist western writings which are originally older.⁷²

In one of the speeches that Guattari delivered in Tokyo, which is named as "The Postmodern Impasse"⁷³, he describes postmodernism as "nothing but the last gasp of modernism; nothing, that is, but a reaction to and, in a certain way, a mirror of the formalist abuses and reductions of modernism from which, in the end, it is no different."⁷⁴ Brott points out the acceptance of the theory of affects and precepts in the Japanese architects and says that they were "at war with modernist objectivization and its accessory – postmodern restitution of subjectivity".⁷⁵ What has been done here is the different categorization of the theory, different than a title of modernist and postmodernist, which also coincides with the Ferraris' argument of modernism/postmodernism mutuality.⁷⁶ Deleuze and Guattari's new conception of the subject, on that note, should be understood as replacement of grand narrative rather than the just destruction of it. Replacement, however, is not with a "grand" one as Isozaki noticed. It proposes a narrative of changes, a narrative of creative possibilities.

The first problem of architecture as we put, the problem arose from the ambiguity of architecture as an object or subject and asymmetry between architecture and philosophy can be resolved in that sense. Pure formal plays that are resulting an absence of a political statement or meaning-making that finds its extreme in the "non-

⁷¹ Ibid. "Guattari and Japanese New Wave", pp. 75-95.

⁷² Ibid. p. 79

⁷³ This paper was originally delivered in a conference in Tokyo in 1985. Text retrieved from Felix Guattari. "The Postmodern Impasse", The Guattari Reader, edited by Gary Genosko. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 109-113.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 109

⁷⁵ Brott. Op. cit. p. 79

⁷⁶ Ferraris. Op. cit. pp. 12-24.

meaning”⁷⁷ are limiting the architecture’s role in *subjectification*. In theory of rhizome, architecture becomes more than a formal gesture -like in the populist case- or more than a cultural sign confined in the meaning world -like in the post-structuralist case. Within the ontology of difference, space stripped out of its status as an object becomes part of the subject with the constant process of becoming, thus the conception of space as a stage materializes without any need to the transposition of the aspects, receptor, and instrument onto a spectrum.

Ian Tucker tries to convey this kind of user-architecture relation with the term concept of “spatialization of experience”.⁷⁸ His interpretation of the psychological state of the subject and space is not about “how we live in space” but rather “how we live as space”⁷⁹. *Spatialization of experience*, in that sense, verbally captures the *processes* rather than *states*, while staying outside of the limited understanding of space as a stage

⁷⁷ Derrida, in the letter he wrote for to be presented in October 1989 conference in a panel “Postmodernism and Beyond: Architecture as the Critical Art of Contemporary Culture” mentions *absence of a meaning* and the concept of void and acknowledges them as a strategy for negation. For more, see Jacques Derrida and Hilary P. Hanel. “A Letter to Eisenmann”, *Assemblage*, No. 12, 1990, pp. 6-13.

⁷⁸ Here the term spatialization is used without its connotation in Henri Lefebvre. He proposes a triad of “representations of space, representational space and practiced space” to conceptualize production of space and the spatialization. Many parallels between Lefebvre and theory of rhizome can be drawn like the Lefebvre’s aim of constructing a unitary theory for the urban that seeks to fill the gap between “physical”, “mental” and “social” realms. Here, Lefebvre inserts “social” as a new dimension to its analysis space. Dialectic object/subject schema turns into a triad, that allowing him to produce an authentic analysis. However, it is obvious that a comprehensive inspection on fundamental concepts in Lefebvre’s work -like dialectic, space or social- should be made in order to create a compelling synthesis between Lefebvre and Deleuze and Guattari. Accordingly, Lefebvre’s work will be excluded from the extend of this thesis. For more, see Henri Lefebvre. *Production of space*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith, originally published by Editions Anthropos in 1974. Ian Tucker’s usage, on the other hand, aims to problematize the situation in “Deleuze’s world”, as DeLanda puts. For more on it, see Ian Tucker. “Everyday Spaces of Mental Distress: The Spatial Habituation of Home”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 28, 2010, pp. 526-538.

⁷⁹ Ian Tucker. Op. cit. p. 529

between receptor and instrument. Space is a stage because, in it, there is a constant creation of experience with the mixture organic and inorganic bodies.

Architecture can be evaluated by its ability to form new relations with the users. The public bench placed on the façade of Palazzo Rucellai (1451) by Leon Battista Alberti and many other examples from Florence exemplifies new everyday experiences formed in their own historical context.⁸⁰ Bernard Tschumi's comments on architecture and user can be helpful to clarify Tucker's conceptualization. In his work, *Architecture and Disjunction*, Tschumi says that architecture and user continuously violate each other. There are always contradictions between the intended use and real use of architecture. He specifically prefers the word violence in order to emphasize the realness of the reciprocity of architecture and user.⁸¹ *Spatialization of experience*, on the other hand, emphasizes the same relation by valuing it as an emergent and creative event. Tschumi's understanding fits to the conception of space as a stage but it positions the human and architectural subjects into different realms. This means that they exist without any reference to the experience or the event happening within the analysis space. As Bogard and Brott also pointed out, namely "postmodern" or "deconstructivist" theories -like Tschumi's in that case- still works within the Hegelian notion of the subject seeing space as external to the individual. Decentering the subject in a Deleuzian-Guattarian sense, sees subject as a constant becoming produced by "entire field of subject production, including registers as diverse as architectural, social, cinematic, physical, perceptual, and political."⁸²

The concept, "*spatialization of experience*" also helps us to articulate on the second problem we have stated -the dissolution of criticality- through excavating the spatial aspects of *forces of subjectification* and positioning a critical axis that is meaningful

⁸⁰ Yvonne Elet. "Seats of Power: The Outdoor Benches of Early Modern Florence", Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 61, No. 4, Dec. 2002, pp. 444-469.

⁸¹ Bernard Tschumi. "Violence of Architecture", Architecture and Disjunction, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 121-138.

⁸² Brott. Op. cit. p. 118

and sensitive as opposed to post-critical arguments. Transfer of the ontological thesis to the political realm is not tortuous. In the *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari have put three fields that the creative production takes places; philosophy, art and science.⁸³ However, all three fields of creative production have their distinct way of looking at the chaos -all matter- and putting its contents together.⁸⁴

Philosophy creates *concepts* laid onto a *plane of immanence*; science creates *functions* understood in a reference system; and art creates a *bloc of sensations* with *percepts* and *affects*.⁸⁵ Politics, on the contrary, is distinguished from those three because it is not reserved for specialized activities, rather it is the everyday life itself against the *forces of subjectification*. Their analysis and the critique of capitalism as a regime that converges differences with representational systems leads us to materialize a political activity which is no different than the life itself. The forces of subjectification that reproduce social hierarchies surround life, because of that, creation means resistance by the means of life-making, pure becoming.⁸⁶

This search for inventiveness and new becomings carries a danger of being part of the capitalist coding machine, because, it only becomes a real resistance when it is expressing a *minoritarian* characteristic. *Minority* here, however, does not coincide with the minority identity, which is a segmentarity in the larger molar content, already coded by the capitalist operations. Notion of *minor* is a product of becomings of human. Deleuze and Guattari draw on multiple becomings like becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal etc.⁸⁷

⁸³ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. *What is Philosophy?* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, originally published in 1991 by Les Éditions de Minuit.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 208

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 110

⁸⁷ Deleuze & Guattari. "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible" *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 232-309.

Why are there so many becomings of man, but no becoming-man? First, because man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian. When we say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the determination of a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white-man, adult-male, etc. Majority implies a state of domination, not the reverse.⁸⁸

Nicholas Thoburn describes this kind of an arrangement of subjective experiences as the politics of infinite possibilities of interactions. *Minority* exist in the *cramped spaces* which makes *minor* a creation, not an identity.⁸⁹ It escapes from representations to not being absorbed by them. Eduardo Pellejero, following a similar Marxist track, argues that minor-becomings, born out of cramped situations, are able to escape from the power relations for a time even though they probably will be absorbed again.⁹⁰ Pellejero also reconsiders the idea of emancipation in Deleuzian thought. With the three impossibilities, as Pellejero says, the impossibility of fulfillment of the History in present and future and lastly impossibility of recognition of history in the past, minor politics sees revolution as a line of transformation rather than the end of the history.⁹¹

Systematic transfer of the ontology of difference and the social production of the subject to the scale of social aggregates also requires the reconsideration of elements of praxis. He proposes a theoretical symmetry between Deleuzian-Guattarian concept *minority* and Marxian concept *social class*.⁹²

Thoburn says that “[*minorities*] lack the ready-made structures of history, narrative, and tradition, that would enable the easy passage of a demarcated autonomous identity

⁸⁸ Ibid. 291

⁸⁹ Nicholas Thoburn. “Introduction The grandeur of Marx”, Deleuze Marx and Politics. London: Routledge, 2003, p. 1.

⁹⁰ Eduardo Pellejero. "Minor Marxism: An Approach to a New Political Praxis." Deleuze Studies, 3 (Supplement), 2009 pp. 102-118.

⁹¹ Ibid. pp. 105-106

⁹² Ibid. p. 103

through a culture.”⁹³ and adds that they are only understood within referenced to “a particular set of identities, relations, practices, and languages, and *what one does* with this situation.”⁹⁴ Minor politics, the creative act engaged with real social situations, *detrterritorializes* major forms and creates a zone of freedom until it is contained in another major form *-reterritorialized*. The possibility of *minor critique*, allows architecture to reconfigure itself as one of the *forces of subjectification* embed in *spatialization of experience*. There surfaces the *minoritarian* critique of architecture, more precisely, the critique of the three domains of knowledge of architecture produced together in the form of both theory and praxis.

The three domains subjected to *minoritarian* critique can be listed as; 1-architectural concepts -abstract identities of spaces and design methodologies 2-architectural functions -construction techniques and their reflections on form 3-architectural sensations -dominant aesthetic relations, style, parallel to three categories of creative production; philosophy, science and art. However, rather than a total critique of all three, critical position should be able to change its focus case to case in order to take advantage of existing social constructs to stimulate *minor experiences*.

Contemporary status of the criticality of architecture⁹⁵ - or “lack of urge to problematize” as Aureli says⁹⁶- can be recovered. However, what Ole W. Fischer proposed towards a new architectural criticality should be expanded with the theoretical framework freed from the subject-object duality reoccurring in modern/postmodern discourses; in order to break free from “the loop of the established academic machine of the ‘critical’, ‘post-critical’, ‘post-theoretical’ or, quite simply, cynical, affirmative camps” he avoids⁹⁷.

⁹³ Thoburn. Op. cit. “Minor Politics” p. 19

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 22

⁹⁵ Fischer. Op. cit. p. 68

⁹⁶ Aureli. Op. cit.

⁹⁷ Fischer. Op. cit. p. 68 68

Fischer's remarks on the potential criticality, which is constructive and making no distinction between theory and praxis, aesthetics and politics, meaning and performance, can be reinterpreted with *minor politics*. We should revisit Tafuri's statement as Fischer did, and repurpose it as follows; "there cannot exist a class political economy, but only a [*minor*] criticism of political economy, so too there cannot be founded a class aesthetic, art, or architecture, but only a [*minor*] criticism of the aesthetic, of art, of architecture, of the city itself."⁹⁸

⁹⁸ This quote has been taken from Manfredo Tafuri. In the original text, Tafuri proposes the *class* criticism of social constructs -including art and aesthetics. In its reuse in here, however, [*minor*] has replaced the [*class*] in original text, in order to indicate new conceptualizations of the social phenomena and construction of emancipatory theory/praxis. For more, see Manfredo Tafuri. Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988, p. 179.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONCEPT OF PROGRAM

This half of the thesis problematizes the concept of program by borrowing Deleuze and Guattari's ontological framework -rhizome- and their understanding of *conceptualization* as a philosophical activity whose goal is to invent new meanings of concepts.⁹⁹ With this, the *minor critique* of the concept of program and the construction of a framework for the *minor* program are aimed. Parallel to Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of the concept in *What is Philosophy*, the program is to be understood by its heterogeneous components and fluid borders, highlighting the variations of the meanings rather than a totalitarian one that limits the thought. To achieve that, a diagram¹⁰⁰ of the concept of program will be made in reference to a methodology that Deleuze and Guattari have used for their diagram of *cogito*. Using Anthony Vidler's review of program and Christopher Alexander, Peter Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas and Bernard Tschumi's conceptualizations, the diagram of the concept will be drawn. Different compositions of program's components will be exemplified in those architect's methodologies in order to produce a *minor critique* of it.

⁹⁹ Deleuze & Guattari. "Introduction: The Question Then...", *What is Philosophy?* pp. 1-12.

¹⁰⁰ For Deleuze and Guattari, a diagram is another map, another rhizome. Because, its meaning is always changing; it creates new meanings of itself; goes beyond itself and make new connections. Diagram is the mapping of components. "The rhizome is altogether different, a *map and not a tracing*. Make a map, not a tracing." Map is distinguished from tracing by its capacity to experiment in different realities. "The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious." For more, see Deleuze & Guattari. "Introduction: Rhizome", *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 12

Concerning the reproduction of status-quo by urban arrangement of forms and functions, this chapter to locate entry points to the *concept of program* from the places where it is socially engaged with minor experiences -allowing free subjectivities to be constructed. Four main stages of the argument line are interpreted as follows: 1- *rhizome* constructs the idea of concept; 2-*segmentarity* relates with the meaning of form and function; 3- *subjectification* mode changes from *discipline* to *control*; 4- *minor politics* gets connected to *minor becomings* through spatialization of experience.

3.1 Open and Closed Concept

The program is an extremely wide and ambiguous term that it may be referring to the client's brief, a function, an event, a sequence or a diagram. However, in order to extract new potentials of it, the idea of the program itself -as a *concept* of thought- rather than a specific definition of it will become the starting point of this inquiry. The epistemological connections to the study of rhizome¹⁰¹ -looking at the dissolving borders of the *program* instead of homogenizing it- will help us to rethink its role in the design process.

We have already mentioned the three different fields -philosophy, science and art- that creative production takes place as theorized by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy*. *Concept* -as the product of philosophy- gains new meaning within their understanding. Parallel to their analysis of social, geological or biological phenomena, they highlight the absence of rigid borders and existence of the zones that two namely different things dissolve into each other. A *concept* composes from different components -which are concepts themselves- but not in a structural or static fashion. Rather, those components have zones of indiscernibility between them. The concept is

¹⁰¹ For Deleuze and Guattari, the mapping operation, cartography, is their epistemology under different names each functioning as plateaus to think on; "rhizomatics = schizoanalysis = stratoanalysis = pragmatics = micropolitics." For more, see Ibid. p. 2.

a union totalizing its components, but at the same time, it is a fragmentary. “Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it.”¹⁰² *Concept* materializes and just after that, falls back into chaos, but to be reformulated again. Deleuze and Guattari aim to redefine *concept*, extracting opinions and order of reasons out of it that obscures variations and potentials.

They say that the Cartesian concept, *cogito*- I think 'therefore' I am-, has three components; doubting, thinking, being. “The components are presented here as verbs, but this is not a rule. It is sufficient that there are variations.”¹⁰³ Each of them has their zones of indiscernibility with another and all of them condenses the point “I” creating I' (doubting), I" (thinking), and I''' (being). Deleuze and Guattari opens up to sentence as “Myself who doubts, I think, I am, I am a thinking thing.” The concept is only an opinion if it is not containing the inseparable variations that make it a concept.¹⁰⁴ A free concept “can set itself up on a plane of immanence to which it belongs that which takes it back to the open sea.”¹⁰⁵ However, as constructed by Descartes, *cogito* presents a *closed concept* as it claims stability by presumptions about what subject is.¹⁰⁶ (Figure 3.1)

¹⁰² Deleuze & Guattari. “What is Concept?” in What is Philosophy? p. 16

¹⁰³ Ibid. “What is Concept?” pp. 15-34

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. “Conclusion: From Chaos to the Brain” p. 208

¹⁰⁶ Descartes is one of the key thinkers that have articulated subject/object duality in first the first place.




Figure 3.1: The diagram of the concept of *cogito*. Source: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 25, originally published in 1991 by Les Éditions de Minuit.

What Deleuze and Guattari are offering is a way of conceptualization aimed to invent new meanings. As opposed to the *closed concept* -which is static and excluding variations within, because of the opinions and presumptions obscuring it-; the *open concept* that does not require bridges to reach out other concepts. They say that only this kind of conceptualization allows us to go beyond previous experiences and imagine up the new possibilities.

3.2 The Concept of Program

Like all the other *concepts*, *the program* also has a history¹⁰⁷ that allows us to materialize its components. Anthony Vidler provides a historical perspective to the concept of program.¹⁰⁸ He turns to Banham's criticism of the false functionalism¹⁰⁹ in early modernist theories. Vidler says that, as opposed to "Louis Sullivan's empty jingle, form follows function"¹¹⁰, Banham proposes form as the program and vice versa.¹¹¹ Program -from the Banham's perspective- should be constructed with a deeper relation with science, which he thinks that all the fields previously left to tradition - "aesthetics of perception, human response (visual, psychological, biological), technologies of the environment, and the like"¹¹²- will be translated to complex set of data.

Vidler highlights the specific distinction between Banham's and Koolhaas' reviews of architecture later on for the purpose of describing the contemporary status of the theory of program. He says that, in the new century, architecture and the idea of program are reviewed by Koolhaas in a technology and culture magazine *Wired* instead of an academic journal. Contrary to Banham, "for Koolhaas, science offers no solutions, only knowledge; solutions are the province of the global managers of power and

¹⁰⁷ "In short, we say that every concept always has a *history*, even though this history zigzags, though it passes, if need be, through other problems or onto different planes. In any concept, there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which corresponded to other problems and presupposed other planes." For more see, Deleuze & Guattari. "What is Concept?" in What is Philosophy? pp. 15-34.

¹⁰⁸ Anthony Vidler. "Toward a Theory of the Architectural Program", October, Vol. 6, Autumn, 2003, pp. 59-74.

¹⁰⁹ Reyner Banham. "Conclusion: Functionalism and Technology", Theory and Design in the First Machine Age, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983, pp. 320-330.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Vidler. Op. cit. p.73

¹¹² Ibid.

markets.”¹¹³ Vidler’s criticism is apparent. Koolhaas uses data just as a framing tool in order to understand “present” in his *Wired* review; he does not aim a social change with the idea of the program. Vidler proposes a return to Banham’s configuration of the program as a scientific method in the age of digitalization which immense amounts of data are available for an architect to design.¹¹⁴

Lines between components of the concept of program can be extracted from Vidler’s historical review. The concept of the architectural program has three major components: form, function and social. Those three are grasped in different intensities and relations throughout the history in order to be used as statements and opinions.

Social passes through both form and function in two different phases, first, in the form of “social which designs” -the production of architecture driven by designing machine- and second, in the form of “social which is lived” -the experience of architecture. The program, thus, always understood as the specific relationship between form and function within social phenomena. Both form and function condense at point(s) “social” -which has two phases- where the meaning of form and meaning of the function is being constructed two times at the horizons of each other. The zones of indiscernibility laid out between components. We can mention six different zones, in which form, function and two phases of social relates to each other. In the following part, we will approach to the program considering different structures made out of its components.

For example, Vidler highlights Banham’s *conceptualization* of program as the one that both phases of social are got synchronized with the help of scientific method.¹¹⁵ In other words, Banham inserts a new element -the idea of a science that can cover all the domains that human experience is divided- to stabilize the zones of indiscernibility between the form, function and phases of social. As a result, he merges two phases of social into one, reducing the status of experience into a matter of scientific calculation

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Vidler. Op. cit.

or arrangement of data made in the first phase. Vidler summarizes Banham's perspective as "a truly scientific program for architecture."¹¹⁶ Banham constructs a closed concept of the program, whose flows have been stabilized by the presumption of the possibility of a science that can completely cover all human experience. In Banham's conceptualization, the program can only be connected to other phenomena as much as the width of bridges that have been built by science.

On the other hand, open concept of program is the social construction of the meaning of form and function in the widest sense. There is no separate meaning of form and meaning of function. Their genesis lies in their togetherness; there are only variations laid on the zone of indiscernibility between the form and function -form of function and function of form. Because of that, neither form nor function can be grasped solely, the totality of the program always escapes from the mind by being divided into smaller programs that have their own social form-function articulation. The kitchen is a program as much as the house. Or, who can say that Koolhaas' "Euro Space" does not contain any of his "Art Space"?¹¹⁷ They all have their own trajectory inside the concept of program. But each of those programs also consists of smaller articulations in form and function. The *concept* is a viral thought that jumps between categories - architectural, sculptural, digital etc.- and reproduces itself in every form-function articulation -if so, is it possible to mention about something like "the program of the door" or "program of the door handle"?

An architectural program consists of smaller programs, but in the meantime, it is also one of the many programs that are forming cities and the whole urban sphere. Somehow, the meaning of form and function is different than the direct sum of their components. A house has a different meaning than a pile of bricks, pipes, timber, and glass. Formalization of the meaning of form and function as an emergent aspect of a

¹¹⁶ Vidler. Op. cit. p.73

¹¹⁷ Rem Koolhaas. "Delirious No More", *Wired Magazine*, June 2003. Retrieved from web - <https://www.wired.com/2003/06/i-ny/> on 10 August, 2017.

multiplicity of smaller forms and functions, brings out a crucial analysis in terms of methodological implications of the idea of program.

3.3 Emergence of a Program

Emergent potentials of smaller forms and functions directly related with the indeterminacy of program. We have mentioned the two different phases of social in the concept of program, which are “design and construction” and “experience and event”. Since they are at the horizons of the each other, in those two different articulations of the form-function, there exist an indeterminacy or limited control on the experience that is spatialized -which Banham tried to overcome by introducing “truly scientific method”, as we have covered. This indeterminacy is one of the key elements that historically created the stage, instrument and receptor notions of architecture at the first place and created a need for the concept of program as a design methodology. Each methodology stabilizes the *concept*, giving a structure to it - highlighting specific kind of social production of form-function and reducing the variations. This is the very sign of the *closed concept*. However, even they are closed they have capable to explored important aspects of the concept.

Two points in the social plane that form and function condense at stay at horizons of each other. In other words, the potential of the space cannot be predicted beforehand. This specific aspect resulted from the emergent potentials, is a methodological problematic for architectural praxis. In that sense, emergent possibilities that program held is the core question for Christopher Alexander.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Ülkü Özten, in her PhD, analyses four different generations of theorists involved with *Design Methods* journal and distinguishes two different design methodologies that are trying to conceptualize program as an active participant to design process. The first one is *analysis-synthesis* and the second one is *conjecture-refutation*. *Analysis-synthesis* method -very basically- implies a design strategy that is based on 1-scientific data derived from analysis and 2-synthesis of form with the results of analysis,

Christopher Alexander provides an analysis of design processes in his 1964 book. Benefiting heavily from the set theory, he proposes an analytical approach to the design process. He says that in the growing complexity and difficulty of contemporary design problems, designer becomes less and less capable of grasping the situation intuitively. So, the relation between context and form of architecture should be systematically put down.¹¹⁹ For him, the design consists of “problem definition” and organization of “solutions to those problems”. Alexander states that every problem definition made by architect demands an inventive solution. Furthermore, he proposes a definition for the program as the organization of the problems and the composition of inventions. Translating the set theory to the architectural design process, he says that “The crucial quality of shape, no matter of what kind, lies in its organization, and when we think of it this way we call it form.”¹²⁰ Alexander specifically aims to conceptualize a design process that is rational and systematic, so the organization of solutions to problems becomes the diagram of architecture.¹²¹ Qualities of the architectural form -both aesthetic and functional- emerge from the organization and diagram itself. Emergence is seen as a matter of composition.¹²²

One year later, in 1965, Alexander, wrote about the program again, but from a different perspective with analyzing a different scale. Using the set theory again, he

on the other hand, *conjecture-analysis* -following the Popperian idea of ever refutable nature of scientific knowledge- proposes a design idea which will be constantly reshaped -of course using the advantage of digital tools which turns design process into a dynamic system in which meaning of form and function can be tested before construction. For more see, Ülkü Özten, Reconsidering Architectural Program Within the Framework of Conjectures and Refutations: The Design Studies Journal, an unpublished PhD thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, February 2014.

¹¹⁹ Christopher Alexander. Notes on The Synthesis of The Form, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964.

¹²⁰ Ibid. p. 134

¹²¹ Christopher Alexander is one of the first-generation *Design Methods* architects who understood the design process as a linear structure composed of analysis and synthesis. Evaluation is only available as a post-design activity, not as an active part of the design process. For more, see Ülkü Özten. Op. cit.

¹²² Alexander. Op. cit.

differentiates designed and naturally developed cities. He proposes an organizational study of elements in the city and provides a critic of the modern urban planning and design. Alexander says that, in a city that have been built over a long time, components of the city are organized “naturally”. In contrast to that, in a city that is designed by a planner or an architect, this organization of components is more linear and strict, in a tree -arborescent- scheme. In the “natural” cities, occasionally a junction point occurs between two or more elements, which turned into a different kind of space like no other. Alexander argues that the problem with “artificial” cities is this absence of the complex juxtapositions. In the “artificial” cities, programs in the city are organized in a tree model and this limits the ways of different programs in the city coming together. Analysing various modernist city plans -like Chandigarh (1951), Greater London plan (1943), and Brasilia (1960)- he pointed out the specific limitations of the tree scheme with its rigid and hierarchical organization and he argues that the natural cities are in the shape of semi-lattice.¹²³

The difference between the “natural” and the “artificial” is directly related to the emergent capacities in Alexander’s case. His argument on how the new experience emerges from the connection of two small programmatic elements is highlighting what modernist city has lacked in the name of productivity. In the end, architectural strata - the built environment- extensively manipulating the social relations through reproducing the hierarchy and/or centralization of architectural machines in the urban organization.¹²⁴

Alexander’s 1964 work focuses on the systematization of the design process with the complex mapping of the problem definitions, and his 1965 work criticises the rigid and limited organization of modern planning. In both of them, he expands the concept by looking it from a structural perspective and materializes the emergent nature of the program as it is composed of a heterogeneous distribution of smaller components that

¹²³ Christopher Alexander. “City is not a Tree”, Architectural Forum, Vol 122, No 1, April 1965, pp. 58-62.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

have their own form and function.¹²⁵ The cartesian sum of the components cannot express the totality since the emergence of the meaning is a matter of composition.

3.4 Invention and Diagram

Systematization of the design process, like in Alexander's *Notes on the Synthesis of the Form*, and the conceptualization of the program as a scientific design methodology, like Banham has proposed, has been overthrown in the postmodern discourses as Vidler pointed out.¹²⁶ However, Alexander's remarks on the importance of the emergent capacities -as compositional effects- have been revisited and rethought in post-modern discourses with different *conceptualizations* of the program. This kind of reconceptualization is evident in Koolhaas, Tschumi and Eisenmann's cases. Vidler emphasizes a new theorization of the program by those architects by using diagrams for the form making purposes.¹²⁷ Even though their approaches to design and experience of architecture problematize different conditions, a common theorization of the diagram is present in their design practice and writings.

¹²⁵ We should note that, it may be incomplete to say that the semi-lattice is the way cities naturally develop as Alexander have covered. The point is, semi-lattice is a composition that is produced inside the set theory, in which connectivity and relations of elements are defined with specific mathematical operators -like union, intersection, being a member or being a subset etc.- that do not easily allow to define more complex forms and structures found in the nature. Kojin Karatani -in *Architecture as Metaphor*- says that semi-lattice is only a two or more tree diagrams overlapped which is much simpler than what nature produces which makes it an insufficient formalization. Karatani suggests that, Deleuze and Guattari's *rhizome* -as the radicalized version of semi-lattice- is more complex method of formalization. For more see, Kojin Karatani. "Natural Numbers" and "Natural Intelligence" in *Architecture as Metaphor*. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1995, pp. 47-57 and 73-79.

¹²⁶ Vidler. Op. cit.

¹²⁷ Vidler. Op. cit.

Robert E. Somol, in the introduction he wrote on Eisenman's *Diagram Diaries*, mentions the common idea of diagram as/of program in Alexander's *Notes on the Synthesis of Form* and Eisenman's work. He states that, from the opposite position of Alexander, Eisenman uses the diagram as an open-ended abstraction to be unfolded in experience.¹²⁸ On the contrary, in Alexander's case, as we have covered, the diagram is the organization of the problem definition, which constructs a program and form-function relation. Alexander proposes diagram as an emergent solution to a set of problems, while Eisenman proposes them as precursors of emergent experiences. Role of invention changes from producing diagram to experiencing the diagram. Eisenman mainly pursues emergence in the experience through the negation of modern meaning-making, which he sees as a linguistic phenomena¹²⁹ as we have discussed in subchapter *Status of Architecture*.

Eisenman sees the diagram as a generative tool, which has exploded once again in the wake of digitalized design processes after its classical and modernist interpretations.¹³⁰ In order to replace the classical and modernist notions of the diagram, Eisenman uses Deleuze's reading of diagram as the interpretation of the new. Taking advantage of Deleuzian-Guattarian ontology -the theory of rhizome-, Eisenman valorizes the idea of the diagram, which is stripped out of its structural mechanisms.¹³¹ For him, diagram becomes a mapping of forces and points -a cartography¹³²- a creative motor for the

¹²⁸ Robert E. Somol. "Dummy Text, or the Diagrammatic Basis of Contemporary Architecture," in Peter Eisenman, *Diagram Diaries*, New York: Universe, 1999, pp. 6-25.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Peter Eisenman. "Diagram: An Original Scene of Writing" in *Diagram Diaries*, New York: Universe, 1999, pp. 26-35.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² In order to provide bedrock for his hypothesis, Eisenman refers to an echo of the theory of rhizome concerning diagrams, yet we cannot say that he fully adopted it as an ontological standpoint which contains many other concepts as we have discussed. In the example of design diagrams, theory of rhizome partly embraced by the Eisenman's theory to be instrumentalized by his form-making strategies as the theory sets the idea of diagram free from the historical meanings of it developed since classical ages. Diagram becomes a tool for *Deconstruction*. For more, see Ibid.

possible form. The diagram forms structures but it can also resist structuring via abstract links and connections that it can virtually materialize, allowing new and creative compositions to be constructed.¹³³ Furthermore, digital tools allowed translating diagrams into buildable forms that somehow changing the idea of the diagram as well as its relation with built form.¹³⁴

Even though the diagrammatic link to Alexander's program of architecture is evident, Eisenman's conceptualization of program is completely different. In his essay *Post-functionalism*, he dismisses functionalism -including projects aiming its revival- as a residue of the humanist tradition.¹³⁵ Function in Eisenman's theorization has nothing to do with form and vice-versa. Unlike Banham and Alexander, Eisenman's conception opens up a new understanding of function by seeing it as a social construct -a cultural obligation rather than universal need.¹³⁶ He reverses the functionalist structure by prioritizing form over function. As he sees meaning-making as a linguistic operation, form language constructs the function. The function becomes a derivative of form language. So, he withdraws from the invention of function in order to theorize autonomous processes of form making and focuses on the experience of the form - social construction of the meaning of form.¹³⁷

¹³³ Ibid. p. 28

¹³⁴ Anthony Vidler also provides an extended summary and a critic of the status of diagram in the classical, modernist and contemporary architecture in his paper *Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern Representation*. In a similar fashion to his pre-cited work *Toward a Theory of Architectural Program*, he illustrates the differences in ideology, epistemology and theory in the examples from Palladio to Le Corbusier, Eisenman and Greg Lynn. For more, see Vidler. *Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern Representation*", *Representations*, No. 72, Autumn 2000, pp. 1-20.

¹³⁵ Peter Eisenman "Post-functionalism", *Oppositions*, No. 6, Fall 1976, Reprint, pp. 234-239.

¹³⁶ Ibid. p.239

¹³⁷ Ibid.

3.5 Program as the experience

Similar to Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas and Bernard Tschumi developed their own diagrammatic understandings. However, they aim to generate new social meanings for both form and function in contrast to Eisenman. Despite they share the same postmodern reactionary base¹³⁸ and the same emphasis on the emergence; Koolhaas and Tschumi had different diagrammatic methodologies leading up to two different interpretations of the program as design strategies.

Both Rem Koolhaas and Bernard Tschumi provided a programmatic analysis of New York City in their books *Delirious New York* (1978)¹³⁹ and *Manhattan Transcripts* (1981)¹⁴⁰ respectively. The major similarity between their *conceptualization* of the program is their understanding of the experience -the second phase of social that form and function have been articulated. The ultra-high density and the emergence of the new city experience inspired different strategies that can be called programmatic experimentations.

Koolhaas' analysis can be described as the archaeology of the experience in the metropolis. Almost like a journalist, he tells stories of architecture and the city, exploring their role in the new culture of metropolitan life. Programs in his stories appear as the curation of intersections in the articulations of form and function in both phases of social. This curation of intersections allows him to conceptualize the abstract

¹³⁸ What we have refer as “postmodern reactionary base” is the partial negation of terms of enlightenment. An example of this, the postmodern effort to overcome object-subject distinction, has been problematized in the chapter *Subject or Subjectification*. Also, their downfall -creating the loop of criticism of criticality, which eventually loses its social engagement for the sake of inner-theoretical discussions-, has been clarified.

¹³⁹ Rem Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, New York: Monacelli Press, 1994. First published in 1978.

¹⁴⁰ Bernard Tschumi, *Manhattan Transcripts*, New York: Academy Editions, 1994, First Published in 1981.

programs that are reappeared in his 2003 *Wired* editorial, in which he makes updated and expanded review of the abstract programs emerged from the new and interconnected, “web society”. In *S,M,L,XL* (1995), he says that “office building is the first totally abstract program, it does not demand a particular architecture, its only function is to let its occupants exist.”¹⁴¹

Furthermore, he says that: “a mutated architecture [of the new age] no longer obsessively committed to form making but to creation of conditions, fabrication of content -scriptwriting by tectonic means.”¹⁴² In that sense, by identifying the abstract program and role of architecture in contemporary cities, Rem Koolhaas’ *conceptualization* of program separates the function and form from each other.¹⁴³ This allows him to draw new aspect for the program as the diagram. Koolhaas did experiment on emergent capacities that the program holds by proposing new diagrammatic relations between functions in his design proposals.

OMA’s design proposal for the Parc de la Villette aims to maximize interactions between different programs by dividing them into strips and placing them side-by-side. (Figure 3.2) Considering the small lot and numerous functional requirements stated in the design brief -which are leaving almost no place to fit a proper park inside- OMA has proposed a diagram which connects programs by horizontally stacking them and maximizing their shared borders.¹⁴⁴ The aim is to create the “maximum length of ‘borders’ between the maximum number of programmatic components and will

¹⁴¹ Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau. *S,M,L,XL*, New York: Monacelli Press, 1998, p 337.

¹⁴² Ibid. p. 665, words added by the author.

¹⁴³ In the interview Koolhaas gave for the *Praxis Magazine*, he strictly declares form and function indifferent to each other. We should note that, in the interview, he uses the word “program”, instead of “function”. However, what is connotated by the word “program” is clearly the “function” as we have elaborated in this thesis. For more, see Rem Koolhaas and Bernard Tschumi. “2 Architects 10 Questions on Program Rem Koolhaas +Bernard Tschumi”, *Praxis*, eds. Amanda Reeser Lawrence and Ashley Schafer, No: 8, May 2010, pp. 6-15.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. “Congestion Without Matter: Parc de la Villette, Paris France, Competition 1982” pp. 894-939

thereby guarantee the maximum permeability of each programmatic band and - through this interference -the maximum number of programmatic mutations.”¹⁴⁵



Figure 3.2 The Plan of the Rem Koolhaas’ proposal for Parc de la Villette. Source: Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau. *S,M,L,XL*, New York: Monacelli Press, 1998, p 933.

Tschumi, on the other hand, approaches the experience of architecture from a different angle and provides scripts, sequences, diagrams of New York city experiences, in the *Manhattan Transcripts*. He illustrates four different scripts taking place in four different spaces in Manhattan by diagramming the experience.¹⁴⁶ For Tschumi, the content is movements, architectural elements and their constant relation in respect to time. His focus is the disjunctions: difference between the designed and the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 921

¹⁴⁶ Which are the park, the street, the tower and the block with their accompanying event that is mapped and diagrammed. For more see, Bernard Tschumi, *Op. cit.*

experienced architecture. All the four stories in *Manhattan Transcripts* diagrammatizes the events that are violating the intended use of the program. He says “The *Transcripts* are about a set of disjunctions among use, form, and social values.”¹⁴⁷ Disjunction becomes a strategy to generate new uses. “This strategy takes the form of a systematic exploration of one or more themes: for example, frames and sequences in the case of the *Transcripts*, and superposition and repetition in *La Villette*.”¹⁴⁸ Similar to Eisenman, he uses a linguistic analogy in architectural form disassociating it from the function, but in contrast, he aims an emergent possibility for function, by strategizing disjunctions between programs. Superposition in *La Villette*, for example, relies on the different layers of programmatic elements in which different functions are ordered by different formal strategies -*folies* as functional points, lines as movements, and surfaces as greenery. (Figure 3.3) In total, superimposed programs encourage disjunctions and new uses, by creating various qualities between elements and different rates of transferability between programs.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. “Introduction”, p. 7

¹⁴⁸ Bernard Tschumi. “Disjunctions”, *Perspecta*, Vol. 23, 1987, p. 115.




Figure 3.3: The diagram of Bernard Tschumi's proposal for Parc de la Villette. Source: Bernard Tschumi. "Disjunctions", *Perspecta*, Vol. 23, 1987, p. 114.

Diagram, appears as the program because it actively interprets the relationship between the form and function. The content of diagram - functions, materials, forces and everything that have been highlighted by the architect for the construction of program-gets translated into the form of the architecture.

Vidler, following the traces of diagram in the history of architecture, refers to this kind of architectures as diagrams of diagrams. The forms derived from diagrams in this age are not architectural objects but diagrams of diagrams, constructed with the advanced

technological means and new digitalized construction methods.¹⁴⁹ Emergent capacities that program held, gets limited even though the central idea is reworked many times during design -as opposed to Alexander's systematic workflow. Diagram turns into a static reference to be exactly built, instead of being a machine for new meanings. The creative potential of diagram gets diminished by the architect, clients and even builders since they take diagram as an absolute reference to be exactly built.

Koolhaas and Tschumi, as opposed to Eisenman, does not abolish the role of function in design and they intervene form-function structures with their own strategies based on their conceptualizations. For Koolhaas and Tschumi, there is no pre-existing relationship between the form and function. Their relation has been put as the strategy of the diagram aiming to govern the experience -in the zone between form-function and second phase of social. So, the design focuses on the experience rather than the analysis concerning the first phase of social in Alexander's programming. They introduce an exterior element, design diagram, that resonates with form-function and their experience. It does not govern all the relationships as *science* does, instead, it governs the relationship between form and function around design ideas concerning emergent experiences.

Even though the diagram becomes free to strategize on any aspect of the experience of the building by changing, it would be misleading to say that the concept is *open* and free of structuration. In the subchapter, *Status of Architecture*, we have mentioned the formal fetishization of -Eisenman-inspired- "critical practice" and instrumentalization of post-critical position by power structures. The idea of diagram presented by Koolhaas and Tschumi contains major presumptions concerning the *spatialization of experience*, which can be seen as the limits of the inventiveness of program. The central idea of design that produces the diagram gives up on its critical edge; because it assumes a limit to the certain level of social and political engagement. The theory - which eventually caused the emergence of post-critical and post-theoretical discourses as we have noted- legitimizes itself by declaring function totally indifferent to form by

¹⁴⁹ Vidler. "Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern Representation"

diagramming their relationship as the program. Diagram becomes a transcendental element once more, which is introduced by an authority -the architect- who has only one consistent strategy left after the *dissolution of the Grand Narrative*. This is just the abstraction of the social engagement -*the interaction*- in the cases of Parc de la Villette. It escapes from the functional dependency but in the meantime, abandons the possibility of “another” experience, leaving the profound decisions of function to the other assemblages.

3.6 Program and the Reproduction of the Status quo

What defines the function of architecture, or makes it a passive background of experiences is the social order itself. Or rather we should say the *segmentarities* in social constructs. We have mentioned the term segmentarity as “all the compartmentalization of the experience” and we have mentioned various domains - psychological, sociological, political, spatial, bureaucratic etc.- that those segmentarities have been laid on.

Segmentarities are the compositions, which can create binarity, linearity or circularity in all experience. For Deleuze and Guattari those three types of segmentarities can be supple, allowing diffusion between segments, or can be rigid, strictly implying their order. Suppleness is a molecular -or micropolitical- characteristic as opposed to molar -macropolitical- characteristic of the rigidity. The term micropolitics does not indicate a scale; rather it indicates the mode of change in the content. Macropolitics works with the lines, borders, segments and it controls mutations -lines of flight- by segmenting the experience, while micropolitics works with the flows and sees flexible and mutating relations. Suppleness does not always mean freedom. In their analysis, they argue that the suppleness is the primary characteristic of fascist ideas spreading in

micropolitical level.¹⁵⁰ Fascism is a micropolitical phenomenon since it resonates in each individual with “microfascisms” and becomes a flow of *masses*¹⁵¹.

Deleuze and Guattari mention four errors concerning the supple and rigid distinction. First, the distinction does not indicate being bad or good for social formation; both can be harmful. Second, the effects of micropolitics are not limited by the boundaries of an individual -on a psychological level-; rather it affects the social form but through different processes than macropolitics¹⁵². Third, the distinction is not about the scale, even though micropolitics operates in smaller groups, it is coextensive with macropolitics. Fourth and lastly, they are related, as they are coextensive; they always boost or cut each other.¹⁵³ The social plane is constructed with overlapping supple and rigid segmentarities and mutations -lines of flight.

There is no distinction of “good” and “bad” between supple and rigid, instead, there are dangers of each other. Rigid segmentarities can provide a social status such defined that one may be afraid of losing it. On the other hand, supple segmentarities can create an illusion of complete apprehension of the social phenomena by creating miniature rigidities or pave the way to microfascisms. Stabilization of the mutations -lines of flight- happening simultaneously in both supple and rigid compositions may lead to a totalitarian state. Lines of flight may lose their power to invent and it can lead to a cancerous passion for abolition.¹⁵⁴ In the absence of categories good and bad, critical

¹⁵⁰ Deleuze & Guattari. “1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity”, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 208-231

¹⁵¹ The term *mass* is differentiated from the Marxist notion of *class* by being a micropolitical definition. *Masses* works within molecular notion that can be irreducible to larger molar segmentarity of *classes*. Furthermore, this understanding is at the heart of the theorization of *minor politics*.

¹⁵² Here, Deleuze & Guattari crystalizes two perspectives called microhistory and macrohistory in respect to their envisioned systems of references. Microhistory deals with *masses, flows, mutations, connections, and accelerations* while macrohistory sees history in reference to *classes, segments, resonance, and accumulation*. For more, see *Ibid.* p. 221

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 215

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

architecture needs to constantly strategize its position according to the related form of segmentation and subjectification.

The direct connection between supple-rigid and architectural form and function may seem obvious at first sight - a linear organization of bureaucratic institutions, for example, provides rigid spatial segmentarity- in the form of open and divided spaces, but a further explanation of segmentarities should be made for the clarifying the role of architecture in reproducing power relations.

The analogy between the idea of supple/rigid segmentarities and spatial characteristics¹⁵⁵ -in terms of flexibility in movement and interaction- should be expanded to clarify errors that Deleuze and Guattari mentioned. Kim Doweey and Kenn Fischer made an analysis of plan schemes of primary schools which are categorized according to their pedagogical standpoint.¹⁵⁶ Teacher-centric pedagogies require traditional classrooms with a specific relation in-between, including staff room and administration. However, student-centric contemporary pedagogies require more open spaces or convertible spaces. The first outcome of their analysis is the transformation of the spatial sequences into spatial networks and appearance of open spaces. Doweey and Fischer categorize open spaces in those examples as streetspace, commons, convertible, open etc. by considering their role in the network of spaces. However, their analysis of schools with traditional classrooms, schools with adaptable spaces and schools prioritizing open spaces, brings out specific characteristics of formation of function. In the search for *smooth* spaces, stressing connectivity and creative flows to support new pedagogies, the traditional regime of discipline is replaced with the

¹⁵⁵ We should note that the connection between space and segmentarities has already been drawn by Deleuze & Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* as *smooth* and *striated* spaces. Words *smooth* and *striated* are conceptually symmetrical to *supple* and *rigid*, as they are different expressions of the same tool to be used for the analysis in different domains. Naturally, those are the concepts mainly adopted by the architects and writers of architecture. For more, see Deleuze & Guattari. "1440: The Smooth and the Striated", *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 474-500

¹⁵⁶ Kim Dovey and Kenn Fisher. "Designing for Adaptation: The School as Sociospatial Assemblage", *The Journal of Architecture*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 43-63.

regime of control.¹⁵⁷ Dovey and Fischer have located new formations of “retreat spaces” and “closures” for new power practices, as open spaces become more dominant in plan schemes with changing pedagogies.¹⁵⁸ As Deleuze and Guattari also pointed out, suppleness and rigidity do not stop each other. In the example of Dovey and Fischer, a resonance center substitutes the geometrico-homogenous space of the rigid segmentarity of the traditional school. They say, “one panoptic regime replaced by another.”¹⁵⁹

Suppleness is created only to be caught up by a resonance center. The suppleness of the experience, in that sense, can be the force of capitalist *subjectification* as much as the rigidity of the experience. Understanding the way those chambers of resonance are being constructed with advanced technological networks can bring us closer to a more general understanding of how form and function are reproducing status quo by withdrawing from a genuine social engagement. For Deleuze, new techno-social assemblages with the computers - instead of the less advanced machines of factory-, the passwords defining accessibility of information multiplying the individual across electronic systems -instead of signature that marks social position and the individual-, the perpetual training -as opposed to school-, and the machines of surveillance -instead of machines of discipline and punishment- are few of the examples that show the new formation of institutes in societies of control.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Society of discipline and society of control are the two notions first theorized by Michel Foucault in his book *Discipline and Punish*. Later on, Gilles Deleuze revisited the concept on his essay *Postscript on the Societies of Control*. The main distinction between the societies of discipline and control is the mode of subjectification; in other words, how norms of the society are dictated. Disciplinary training of 17th and 18th centuries have turned into surveillance systems and techno-social assemblages in 20th century. For more, see Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York: Random House, trans. by Alan Sheridan, 1995 originally published in 1975 by Editions Gallimard and Gilles Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, *October*, Vol. 59, Winter 1992, pp. 3-7.

¹⁵⁸ Dovey & Fischer. Op. cit.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 60

¹⁶⁰ Deleuze. “Postscript on the Societies of Control”

Office as the first totally abstract program -as Koolhaas defined- can be a good example of how an open space that does not require any specific architectural form, functions with the concordant resonance fields that one enters -with their computers and passwords, permissions etc. Even the new formation of staff room in Dovey and Fischer's analysis of schools is can be expelled and replaced by software's monitoring computer activities and closed-circuit television -an assemblage of lenses, microphones, wires, monitors, in short, by a surveillance machine.

Mutations start to get controlled by the "similarity in differentiation". Foucault and Deleuze's predictions about the emergence of societies of control already became real in form of global urbanization. Andy Merrifield defines this global form of urbanization as neo-Haussmannization¹⁶¹: producing boulevards across geographies for flows of finance and energy in addition to vehicles; and deploying new means of control, like surveillance.¹⁶² Capital is moving freely around the globe because it is not material anymore. It is always finding new ways of exploitation, it accumulates and it leaves, becoming attractors of flows.¹⁶³ For Deleuze, this new and enhanced form of transaction expresses the difference between discipline and control societies. Instead of representing a specific amount of gold in the reserve -as in the disciplinary society-, the control relates to floating rates of exchange.¹⁶⁴ So, the problem of the socially engaged architectural program should be understood within the segmentarities it operates through the whole urban tissue.

The function is taken away from architecture; offices were just the start as Koolhaas recognizes, now resonance centers and administrations are filling the form with

¹⁶¹ Haussmannization, refers to the rebuilding of Paris by Baron Haussmann upon the request from Napoleon III. For Merrifield, Haussmann's Paris reshaped the public space to be more committed to existing power relations and economic and thus ideologic reproduction of them with boulevards and peripheries it created. For more, see Andy Merrifield. The New Urban Question, London: Pluto Press, 2014.

¹⁶² Ibid. p. 29

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Deleuze. "Postscript on the Societies of Control", p. 5

function. The architecture alone is not a producer of the meaning of function, rather its place in the global urban network -which is electronic, geographic, economic etc.- defines the function. Architecture is never alone while hosting a specific function. Rather its relation with whole urban defines the experience and meaning of the function. For that reason, suppleness -molecularity- does not always lead to free constructions of subjectivity, since it resonates within larger molar -and rigid- power systems. “The more molar the aggregates become, the more molecular become their elements and the relations between their elements: molecular man for molar humanity.”¹⁶⁵

The common use of the term minority -as opposed to Deleuzian-Guattarian concept *minor*- shows this kind of molecular characteristics. It references to a molecular organization that turns into minority identity, which already resonates within the larger molar system global forces. On the other hand, the Deleuzian-Guattarian *minor* is a line of flight in supple and rigid. It is capable to lend -reterritorialize- on an undiscovered place.

David Harvey approaches to a similar phenomenon -segmentarities concerning residential areas- from the perspective of class antagonism. He aims to provide a Marxian account for the theory of residential differentiation in order to provide a framework for the question of if similar people like to live close to each other or they become similar as they live closer.¹⁶⁶ Even though Harvey’s methodology cannot be fully adopted by our argument without an in-depth analysis because of the distinct ontological standpoints that praxis is based upon, his observations on how social hierarchy is reproduced through arrangement of capitalist tools for the sake of the social differentiation -or molecularization- is crucial for us to materialize how everyday lives of people in distinct geographies have been constructed. The capitalist construction and differentiation of everyday life -including meaning, values, habits

¹⁶⁵ Deleuze & Guattari. “1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity”, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 208-231

¹⁶⁶ David Harvey. “Class Structure and the Theory of Residential Differentiation”, *The Urban Experience*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 109-124.

etc.- or as we say *subjectification*, occurs on the lines; 1-the division of labour and specialization of function, 2-consumption patterns, and life-style, 3-authority relations, manipulated projections of ideological and political consciousness, and 4-barriers to mobility chances, as Harvey puts.¹⁶⁷ For him, residential and social differentiation obscures existing class duality and reproduces power structures. In his essay, he says that the systematic molecularization of society, especially the proletariat, is obscuring the relation between capital and labour. We will consider those aspects as the domains that experiences are segmented to bring flows of desires under control. Within the Merrifield's notion of global-urban, those four lines are the global regulators of resonances to be concordant; machines of "similarity in differentiation".

The concept of program, with all of its components and in-between zones, is need to be freed from all the presupposition about itself to be able to invent new relations between its components. Even though post-modern theories expanded the idea and changed its internal composition -by expanding the emergent potentials-, we can say that it is limiting the inventive capacity of form-function relationship by providing an independent place just for the form. The problem should be clearly put: independence of the form have run parallel with the abolishment of the function. The function is treated as a fixed and dependent aspect of the program. Meaning of function -in both design and experience- gets stabilized because the function is external to design; it is pre-decided. Only "the interaction" is abstract enough to be considered as a legitimate strategy under the dictations of modern programs of society -like Koolhaas' Euro Space, Art Space, Home Space, Secure Space, Blog Space etc.¹⁶⁸ This stabilization is the result of the indifferent position that the architect takes towards the segmentarities that architecture is spatially hosting. The segmentarities that architectural function emerges from can be called as "form of function"¹⁶⁹. The function is governed by the

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 117

¹⁶⁸ Koolhaas. "Delirious No More"

¹⁶⁹ This notion itself also brings its couple, function of form. If we use the same rhetoric, this would be the segmentarities in aesthetic domain -referencing how the experience of the form is structured with the cultural constructs. The notion itself is already problematized by the term "fetishization". At this

spatial and electronic position of the architecture in the global network and the assemblage of security units, administration, sign tags, computers.

Minor critique of the concept of the program requires an active interpretation of forces segmenting the spatialization of experience both from inside and outside. Because, as Harvey also acknowledges, forces constructing social and functional differentiation and *subjectification*, divided into multiple layers of social strata without spatial constraints, like the construction of public opinions, the creation of consumption patterns, authority relations and spatial accessibility patterns. A *minor* position for program indicates an intervention to segmentarities in the search for new functions as well as new forms in the *cramped situation* of *concept of program*.

3.7 Cartography of the Concept

After clarifying the major historical structures of the program and the current mode of reproduction of status quo, a mapping of the *concept of program*, parallel to the mapping of the *concept of cogito* presented in *What is Philosophy?*¹⁷⁰ (Figure 3.1) can be made and all the different positions mentioned above can be read within. (Figure 3.4) The diagram of the concept will help us to illustrate historical meanings of the program that are forming structures by prioritizing one or more elements of the concept over others. In the diagram of the concept we will see all the possible relations between components and inventions of the architects that are converting the idea into design methodologies. From that point on, means of *minoritarian* critic will be further elaborated in the conclusion.

point -since the term segmentarity already contains organizations of perceptive judgement- area between form and function becomes blurrier. The form is an assemblage of smaller functions and forms; and the function is an assemblage of smaller forms and functions.

¹⁷⁰ Deleuze & Guattari. "What is Concept?", *What is Philosophy?* pp. 15-34.




Figure 3.4: The diagram of the concept of program. Source: Produced by the author.

The diagram shows all the main components of the concept of program as we have reviewed before. Form (F), function (*f*), and two phases of social (S') and (S'') are indicated as points. Thus, the concept and relations between components become visible in the diagram. Light-dashed lines, (B) and (D) are indicating stabilizing machines. (B) is science put by Banham. (D) is the diagram as a design methodology concerning form and function visible in Alexander, Eisenman, Koolhaas and Tschumi.

Each different conceptualizations of the program propose different intensities and different order of relations between components. (S') and (S'') are the two phases of social -vanishing points at horizons- that form (F) and function (*f*) condense at - production of the meaning of form and function in the design and experience respectively. All bold lines (for example [S'-F]) are zones of indiscernibility, including all the variations, curves, interpretations, and statements concerning related components. The zone [F-*f*] indicates all the relations between form and function. [S'-S''] is the social phenomena, the constant circulation of flows. Here design intervenes

the experience and experience intervene the design. It is the reproduction of social order. (S') and (S'') -points that the meaning and form and function have been created- stays at the each other's horizon because between them, there is always the complexity concerning the social flows. The line between them goes beyond them and converges at some point since there are varieties of forces that are affecting design and experience without in reference to the other.

Banham places the point (B) -the science- as an exterior reference point situated at the top of the diagram that all the components have been understood via their distance to it. In reaction to "form follows function" -which makes [S'-F] a derivative of [S'-f]. Banham creates the third horizon (B) besides (S') and (S''), as a place where [S'-S''] is computable. In the diagram, (B) implies a geometric order that distances become straight lines. From the point (B) each zone of indiscernibility becomes flat. The idea of subjective science stabilizes the concept. The program is understood with straight lines, which are calculable, as opposed to curves laid on the zones. Science geometrically solves the problem of inconsistency of the variable distance between (S') and (S'') - while imposing its own structuration and closure of components.

Alexander looks to (S'') from (S') and uses the data retrieved from the analysis to systematically produce a diagram in [F-f]. A diagram (D) is projected to [F-f] from the point (S') since it is an inventive solution to a specific set of problems defined by the architect himself. It does not require a place on the horizon; rather it is placed on [F-f] as a planar or volumetric entity¹⁷¹. It is not an overarching vanishing point but a mechanism connecting both form and function. In Alexander, (D) appears as the specifically ordered design methodology that is relating form and function as the outcome of linear analysis and synthesis phases. Alexander invents an internal force at point S' that closes concept by prioritizing problem definition and structuring it. Geometrically, (S') imposes a division of curve [S'-S''] into straight lines and deals

¹⁷¹ Diagram in [F-f] always extradimensional to [F-f] because it is capable of creating new meanings of itself as Alexander put as "inventiveness" and Eisenman borrows from Deleuze. So, it is not a curve but multiplicity of curves between form and function.

with recognizable pieces -defines the problem- and projects a diagram onto [F-f] - structures the solution.

Eisenman reverses Alexander's diagram. Now (D) is projected from (S'') instead of (S') because it aims to intervene the experience of the designed space in relation to its meaning(s) that are historically constructed. Emergence is sought in experience. Eisenman does not try to calculate [S'-S''] instead he assumes that there is an underlying structure -a straight plane- of the language as the only place that meanings have been produced. Amorphous [S'-S''] is unfolded on the plane of language. (D) aims negation¹⁷² through the *deconstruction* of [S'-S''] but doing this, it also turns [F-f] into [F-F'], denoting function as derivative of form. The function is another articulation of form since it is a social construct.

In Tschumi and Koolhaas, the attitude is slightly different even though the idea of the diagram as a projection of (S'') onto [F-f] is preserved. Their diagram treats form and function separately. Both Koolhaas and Tschumi see diagrams as a representation of experience -not an outcome of analysis and synthesis and not solely focused on the emancipation of the form. Diagram freely interprets the relation between form and mostly pre-decided function, prioritizing experience.

The modern also had its diagrams of this kind. Le Corbusier's five points of architecture¹⁷³ can be seen as a pseudo-scientific diagram – a planar entity situated between [F-f] and Banham's point at the top. In Le Corbusier, diagram manifests itself as a set of values based on universal norms -which are problematically defined by the architect himself. Five points of architecture is a diagrammatic thought because it becomes bedrock, a philosophy, for the design and which will be translated into different forms in different projects. Postmodern diagram of the form and function, on the other hand, is changing with each project, providing architect a zone to speculate on the experience and relation of form and function in the diagram.

¹⁷² Derrida and Hanel. "A Letter to Eisenmann", *Assemblage*, No. 12, 1990, pp. 6-13.

¹⁷³ Le Corbusier. Op. cit.

Koolhaas and Tschumi's interpretations of point (D) indicate a structural dependency between the components of the program. Because the diagram is only a strategy to re-relate form with the existing function. In that sense, Koolhaas and Tschumi's diagrams stabilize [S'-f] and [f-S'] and present *closed concepts*.

The program being a *closed concept* is the result of an internal arrangement that limits the inventiveness of the concept by structuring its components. Every presumption about how its components are related results a structural organization; by limiting, channeling, merging, disjoining the flows. A free concept becomes a sign of the creative act since it leads way to new meanings of itself. For inventiveness in life making is seen as a political activity against the normative *becoming-human* or *subjectification*, program as an open concept can be emancipatory design methodology in terms of its potential role in *minor becomings*.

The idea of the program stripped out of its inventiveness only becomes a background for experiences until we cannot distinguish whether the architecture is affecting the experience or not. Experience spatializes hardly referencing to architecture. Architecture that does not intervene *majoritarian* segmentarities only reproduces them.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION: PROGRAMMING *MINOR* EXPERIENCES

Real social engagement for the idea of the program is only possible through being part of minor becomings, by being an active participant in the subjectification process governed by the segmentarities that design will host. In that sense, the program should be implying its minor characteristics over segmentarities. The question is not about being rigid or supple in terms of plan schemes, rather it is about how architecture becomes a part of the experiences and how it provides a *minoritarian* critique of the segmentarities by the construction of habits, relations, lines of flight and free subjectivities. However, a prescription for *minor* experience would be paradoxical to notion itself. Instead, we will propose an idea of the program that is free of its structural burdens that are stabilizing it and limiting its relation with function by benefiting from the diagram and the possible readings of all the components.

Concerning the forces of societies of the control, *minor* praxis is only possible through reorganizing habitual processes -that are intermingled with various assemblages- to make way to new life-making processes. Within the diagram of the concept, we have materialized the static constructions of the idea of program. All the theories of the program we have covered imply a priority of an element. This prioritization can be easily seen in the example of science that governs relations, but it can be also hidden by a projected diagram of design which prioritizes the point it is projected from $-(S')$ or (S'') .

Static reading of the diagram -which is structuring elements- are products of presumptions about how social and form/function relates. Those predeterminations - even though some of them producing unique design diagrams each time as methodology- themselves are the *major*-itarian meanings of the program. *Minoritarian* meanings, on the other hand, should be understood as emergent ones that are creating niches for *minor*-becomings. Architecture, consequently, becomes a strategy that is disrupting the forces of similarity in difference to create those niches to participate in *minor* experiences. So, a *minor* program, strategizes how components of the idea is structured. Instead of being projected from points (S') or (S''). Instead of production of the design diagram according to architect or experience, diagram should be projected from a point that changes its position on the line [S'-S'']. In other words, design diagram that is projected to [F- f] should invent how form and function relates with social by being a inventive operation against specific social condition on the site of building. This way, instead of predetermined set of relations between architect, form, function and user, each time a new composition of components is produced in respect to forces that are governing the subjectification that case. Strategizing the form and function relation in that sense requires an analysis of local forces of subjectification, so, diagram is projected from somewhere between (S') and (S'') changing its place to each instance.

Since the (S') and (S'') has been connected to each other with variety of social forces affecting different scales of social assemblages -between teacher and student, between family members, between a neighbourhood and repressive apparatuses or between an officer and a citizen- the design diagram can be projected from/against variety of points on the line concerning variety of social arrangements.


Consequently, *minor* program or *minor* experience may have infinite meanings. However even the scales are distinct, they all aim to distort assemblages of control that segmenting everyday life. The *minor* program should aim to override global segmentarities by strategies derived from the local analysis of global forces dictating similarity in differentiation. *Minor program* focuses on the uniqueness of the

differentiation. It is an ironic gesture -like a space that has no surveillance or a school that students are administrating- that emerges from the creative separation and reconnection of flows with the architectural redistribution of segmentarities.

The diagram of the concept, allows us to grasp how a theoretical understanding of political social engagement is possible with the emergent and in-situ architectural strategies of form and function. However, as we have said, there are multiple scales of resonances that are concerning the spatialization of social organizations. So, like the theory, praxis is also possible in those different scales. Before concluding, four instances of house projects from two different studios will be mentioned in terms of their organizations of everyday life to exemplify this difference in scale and to convey extent of the tools of the *minor program*. The main point that is emphasized in those examples will be their fluid reading of the specific social constructs and the position taken by form and function against it.

Sou Fujimoto's concepts, T House (2005) and Spiral House (2007), are examples of a split from the notion of family. However, the spatialization strategies of T House - which defines a singular and open space- and Spiral House -proposing set of consecutive spaces- are different from each other, both are aiming to construct unique experiences for their inhabitants, morphing internal relationality of the house. T House (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) organizes the rates of independency of the spaces. Fujimoto defines it as "a place for manifold interactions."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ Sou Fujimoto. "Separation and Connection", Primitive Future, Tokyo: INAX Publishing, 2008, pp. 32-47.



Figures 4.1 and 4.2: The plan and inside view of the T House by Fujimoto. Source: Sou Fujimoto. *Primitive Future*, Tokyo: INAX Publishing, 2008, p. 45 and 47.

The term interaction here is not considered as the essence of social to be exploited by urban condition, on the contrary, it is programmed interaction. Space becomes an active participant in the process of subjectification by overriding representations of the concept of house and house life. Framing each interaction with the form, space actively strategizes form of interaction with its spatial segmentarity. Plan scheme provides semi-open spaces connected to each other. The form of function and the function of form relates each other as a programmatic aspect. The form invades the relation between inner functions while controlling the rate of fluidity throughout the space.

Spiral House forces its rigid segmentarity in experience. (Figure 4.3) Spaces are juxtaposed to have a corridor like the composition in the shape of a spiral. However, the relationality is far from being linear. “Something far actually alongside,” says Fujimoto referring to the combination of different modes of accessibility.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. “Gürü - Gürü”, pp. 90-99



Figure 4.3: Model of the concept, Spiral House. Source: Sou Fujimoto. Primitive Future, Tokyo: INAX Publishing, 2008, p. 99.

Spiral does not create linearity but becomes a tool for strategizing new relations with the introduction of openings into spiraling wall. Both T House and Spiral House reclaim their role of inventing new experiences by being *minor critiques* of the concept of the house. House is rethought as a singular space in which fluidity is controlled in two different forms. It should not be understood as they are preserving an idea of specific lifestyle. Instead, they propose a fusion between user and architecture to allow the emergence of the new and unknown experiences in terms of habit making and minor relations between spaces.



Figure 4.4: Insect House, Seville, 2001. Source: Santiago Cirugeda. Recetas Urbanas, retrieved from the web - <http://www.recetasurbanas.net/index1.php?idioma=eng&ref=1&id=0005> on 15 August 2017.

Santiago Cirugeda provides a different account for the invention of the program. He distributes the suppleness in a rate that it becomes able to escape from chambers of resonance. In the project called “Insect House: Tick’s Stratagem” (2001). Cirugeda designs a movable shelter attached to trees in order to help the neighborhood resisting against to the demolition of trees.¹⁷⁶ Here program is not offering a singular unit with a static place but multiple units that are capable to stationing anywhere that is strategically advantageous. (Figure 4.4) The form and the function relate to each other in a specific way that they escape and reroute segmentarities. Insect House designed

¹⁷⁶ Santiago Cirugeda. “Insect House: Tick’s Stratagem”, built project of design studio Recetas Urbanas, Seville, 2001. Retrieved from web - <http://www.recetasurbanas.net/index1.php?idioma=eng&ref=1&id=0005> on 15 August 2017.

to be part of the urban resistance. A unit has storage space and sheltered bed. Architecture and human become a part of the urban resistance. Architecture directly becomes part of the occupation, instead of just being occupied.



Figure 4.5: Scaffolding, Seville, 1998. Source: Santiago Cirugeda. *Recetas Urbanas*, retrieved from the web - <http://www.recetasurbanas.net/index1.php?idioma=eng&ref=1&id=0003> on 15 August 2017.

Another project of Cirugeda, which is called “Scaffolding” (1998), proposes a similar approach towards the invention of form and function. (Figure 4.5) Scaffolding is a “semi-legal” extension attached to a blind façade of an apartment block.

It is a temporary shelter for few months. Instead of orthographic drawings to convey form and function of the building, Cirugeda gives a recipe for taking advantage of

bureaucracy.¹⁷⁷ The diagram -as defined by a sequence of tactics to trick control mechanisms- invents form and function by creatively engaging legal mechanisms and rerouting segmentarities. The process includes; arranging legal documents construct a deck to paint -or renovate- a wall; not ticking specific boxes in documents to mislead authorities; making modifications on deck to make it a shelter; lastly, waiting until authorities notice.

In contrast to T House and Spiral House, Insect House claims *minoritarian* characteristics by being multiple and fluid. In order to escape from forces of global urban, it radicalizes suppleness for the program of a house. The program as a design methodology invades function again by participating in *minor* becomings. The design itself becomes another resonance center by creating a *minor* “family” living in the same house but in different places. Scaffolding provides another *minor* program that form and function materialize through glitches in the segmentarities governing urban form; it is legal and illegal: a house and a deck to paint a wall. While Fujimoto’s works present a *minor critique of a concept*, Cirugeda’s works present a *minor critique of a technic*.

Those instances exemplify *minor programs* with creative compositions of form and function engaged with social meanings of the house. However, a *minor* gesture can always be reabsorbed into the majority and lose its power to negate. Capital can create a minority out of *minor* by mass-producing T House and create a network of representations to be marketed. Or, Insect House can become impossible to build because of new machines of control. Global forces of capital are invasive and inventive. Therefore, the concept of program should be able to construct itself in each instance by taking another *minor* position to grant spaces for experiences freed from

¹⁷⁷ Santiago Cirugeda. “Scaffolding”, built project of design studio Recetas Urbanas, Seville, 2001. retrieved from web - <http://www.recetasurbanas.net/index1.php?idioma=eng&ref=1&id=0003> on 15 August 2017.

the *forces of subjectification*. Forces of subjectification are laid onto a plane that constructs complexity between and points (S') and (S'').

To conclude, the diagram of the idea allows us to consider the program as a self-inventing idea. Instead of a predetermined priority of components to derive a design methodology, lack of structure is proposed as the inventive potential.

Historical compositions of the components of the program are structures that give a specific meaning to the concept. However, in order to produce a *minor* critique of architecture, new meanings of it should be invented. In order to create “a machine for minor experiences” out of the concept of program, we need to invent it progressively. Every instance of architectural design is subjected to different types of segmentarities on (S') and (S''). Drawing the diagram of the concept we have located the previous and politically ineffective notions of the program. The concept of program should be freed up from its historical structures to be invented again in each design project. In that sense, the free concept of program includes both Fujimoto and Cirugeda's work under the same terms of the programming minor experiences, since their forms and functions link themselves to the specific points on the line [S'-S''] instead of points (S') and (S'').

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)", first Published in *La Pensée*, 1970, retrieved from *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

Arendt, Hannah. *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought*. New York: The Viking Press, 1961.

Aureli, Pier Vittorio. "The Theology of Tabula Rasa: Walter Benjamin and Architecture in The Age of Precarity", *Log*, No.27, February, 2013, pp. 111-127.

Banham, Reyner. *Theory and Design in the First Machine Age*. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983.

Bogard, William. "Sense and Segmentarity: Some Markers of a Deleuzian-Guattarian Sociology", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March, 1998, pp. 52-74.

Brott, Simone. *Architecture for Free Subjectivity Deleuze and Guattari at the Horizon of Real*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011.

Cirugeda, Santiago. "Insect House: Tick's Stratagem" and "Scaffolding", built projects of design studio "Recetas Urbanas", Seville, 2001. retrieved from web - <http://www.recetasurbanas.net> on 15 August 2017.

Conio, Andrew. "From Flesh to House", *Architectural Theory Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009, p. 135.

DeLanda, Manuel. *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, London: Continuum, 2002.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*, London: Continuum, 2001, trans. by Paul Patton. Originally published in 1968 by Presses Universitaires de France.

Deleuze, Gilles. "Postscript on the Societies of Control", *October*, Vol. 59, Winter 1992, pp. 3-7.

Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, trans. by Brian Massumi. Originally published in 1980 by Les Éditions de Minuit.

Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix. *What is Philosophy?* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, originally published in 1991 by Les Éditions de Minuit.

Derrida, Jacques and Hanel, Hilary P. "A Letter to Eisenmann", *Assemblage*, No. 12, 1990, pp. 6-13.

Dovey, Kim and Fisher, Kenn. "Designing for Adaptation: The School as Sociospatial Assemblage", *The Journal of Architecture*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 43-63.

Eisenman, Peter. *Diagram Diaries*, New York: Universe, 1999, pp. 26-35.

Eisenman, Peter. "Post-functionalism", *Oppositions*, No. 6, Fall 1976, Reprint, pp. 234-239.

Ferraris, Maurizio. Trans. Anna Taraboletti Segre. "Postmodernism and the Deconstruction of Modernism", *Design Issues*, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, 1988, pp. 12-24.

Fischer, Ole W. "Architecture, Capitalism and Criticality", *Architectural Theory*, edited by C. Greig Crysler, Stephen Cairns and Hilde Heynen. London: SAGE Publications, 2012, pp. 56-69.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York: Random House, trans. by Alan Sheridan, 1995 originally published in 1975 by Editions Gallimard

Fujimoto, Sou. *Primitive Future*, Tokyo: INAX Publishing, 2008.

Goldhagen, Sarah Williams. "Something to Talk About: Modernism, Discourse, Style," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, Vol. 64, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 144-167.

Guattari, Felix. "The Postmodern Impasse", *The Guattari Reader* edited by Gary Genosko. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 109-113.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity – An Incomplete Project", *Anti-Aesthetic*, edited by Hal Foster. Washington: Bay Press, 1983, pp. 3-15. Originally delivered in 1980, Frankfurt when Habermas was awarded the Theodor W. Adorno prize.

David Harvey. "Class Structure and the Theory of Residential Differentiation", *The Urban Experience*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 109-124.

Heynen, Hilde. "Space as Receptor, Instrument or Stage: Notes on the Interaction Between Spatial and Social Constellations", *International Planning Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3-4, pp. 342-357

Karatani, Kojin. *Architecture as Metaphor*. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995.

Koolhaas, Rem. *Delirious New York*, New York: Monacelli Press, 1994. First published in 1978.

Koolhaas, Rem. "Delirious No More", *Wired Magazine*, June 2003. retrieved from web - <https://www.wired.com/2003/06/i-ny/> on 10 August, 2017.

Koolhaas, Rem and Mau, Bruce. *S,M,L,XL*, New York: Monacelli Press, 1998.

Koolhaas, Rem and Tschumi, Bernard. "2 Architects 10 Questions on Program Rem Koolhaas +Bernard Tschumi", *Praxis*, eds. Amanda Reeser Lawrence and Ashley Schafer, No: 8, May 2010, pp. 6-15.

Le Corbusier. *Towards a New Architecture*. London: J. Rodker, 1931.

Lefebvre, Henri. *Production of Space*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith, originally published by Editions Anthropos in 1974.

Loeckx, André and Avermaete, Tom. "'Architecture ou Révolution'. Critical Moderns and the Search for a New Urbanity in 1950s Algiers", in Tom Avermaete et al. (eds.), *Colonial Modern: Aesthetics of the Past, Rebellions for the Future*. London: Black Dog, 2010, pp. 170-187.

Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition*. London: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington, Brian Massumi. Originally published in 1979 by Les Éditions de Minuit.

Merrifield, Andy. *The New Urban Question*, London: Pluto Press, 2014.

McLeod, Mary. "Everyday and 'Other' Spaces", in D. Coleman, E. Danze, C. Henderson (eds.), *Architecture and Feminism*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996, pp. 1-37.

Merrifield, Andy. *The New Urban Question*, London: Pluto Press, 2014.

Özten, Ülkü, *Reconsidering Architectural Program Within the Framework of Conjectures and Refutations: The Design Studies Journal*, an unpublished PhD thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, February 2014.

Pellejero, Eduardo. "Minor Marxism: An Approach to a New Political Praxis." *Deleuze Studies*, 3 (Supplement), 2009 pp. 102-118.

Tafuri, Manfredo. *Architecture and Utopia; Design and Capitalist Development*. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988, pp. 50-78.

Thoburn, Nicholas. *Deleuze Marx and Politics*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Bernard Tschumi. *Architecture and Disjunction*, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996.

Tschumi, Bernard. *Manhattan Transcripts*, New York: Academy Editions, 1994, First Published in 1981.

Tschumi, Bernard. "Disjunctions", *Perspecta*, Vol. 23, 1987, p. 115.

Tucker, Ian. "Everyday Spaces of Mental Distress: The Spatial Habituation of Home", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 28, 2010, pp. 526- 538.

Tzonis, Alexander and Lefaivre, Liane. "In the Name of The People", *Forum*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1976, pp. 5-9 and 27-33.

Vidler, Anthony. "Toward a Theory of the Architectural Program", *October*, Vol. 6, Autumn, 2003, pp. 59-74.

Vidler, Anthony. "Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern Representation", *Representations*, No. 72, Autumn, 2000, pp. 1-20.