

DEVELOPING SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY ON SOUTH AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND AFRICA: A CASE STUDY ON SOUTH AFRICA

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Since World War II, the development of Southern countries has become one of the most important issues in the world agenda. As the Global South has developed, it has started to challenge the existing international system. Although the Southern countries face some challenging domestic problems, they have significant potential in the 21st century. China is the largest developing country, and it is willing to lead these Southern countries to change the existing global system to serve the interests of developing countries as well. In this respect, it deeply cooperates and collaborates with the African countries. The bilateral cooperation has been strengthening in economic, political, social and international terms within the framework of South-South cooperation. Although some claim that Chinese economic policies towards Africa are neomercantilist, in this thesis, it is claimed that, although there are some practices which could be considered neomercantilist, in general, China-Africa relations currently better fit within the South-South cooperation framework, which is seen as 'win-win' by both China and African countries. This cooperation not only serves the interests of China and African countries, but also that of other Southern countries as it challenges the traditional order, which mostly benefits the Northern countries. In this regard, the relationship between China and South Africa is an important case for South-South cooperation. It shows that an African country can have more symmetrical relations with China.

Keywords: China, South Africa, South-South Cooperation, Neomercantilism

ÖZ

ÇİN VE AFRİKA ARASINDA GELİŞEN GÜNEY-GÜNEY İŞBİRLİĞİ- GÜNEY AFRİKA ÖRNEĞİ

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İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana gelişmekte olan ülkelerin kalkınması meselesi dünya gündeminin en önemli başlıklarından birini oluşturmaktadır. Bu ülkelerin kapasiteleri arttıkça, var olan ve daha çok Kuzey ülkelerine yarar sağlayan uluslararası sistemi değiştirme istekleri de artmıştır. Gelişmekte olan Güney ülkeleri hala ciddi yerel sorunlarla karşı karşıya olmalarına rağmen, 21. yüzyıl için önemli bir potansiyel oluşturmaktadır. Dünyadaki en büyük gelişmekte olan ülke olarak Çin, küresel dünya sisteminin kendisi gibi gelişmekte olan ülkelerin çıkarlarını da gözetten bir sisteme dönüşmesi için bu ülkelere öncülük etmek istemektedir. Bu açıdan Çin, Afrika ülkeleriyle olan ilişkilerinin gelişmesine oldukça önem vermektedir. Son yıllarda Çin ve Afrika ülkeleri arasındaki ekonomik, siyasi ve toplumsal ilişkilerin gelişmesinin yanı sıra uluslararası alanda da işbirliği oldukça güçlenmiştir. Gelişen bu ilişki bazıları tarafından neomerkantalist çizgide görülürken bu tezde, bazı pratiklerin bu çerçevede düşünülebilecek olmasına rağmen geniş açıdan bakıldığında ilişkilerin iki taraf içinde 'kazan-kazan' ilişkisi çerçevesinde geliştiği, dolayısıyla Güney-Güney işbirliği çerçevesinde değerlendirilebileceği iddia edilmektedir. Bu çerçevede Çin ve Güney Afrika ilişkileri, bir Afrika ülkesinin Çin'le daha simetrik bir ilişkiye sahip olabileceğini gösteren önemli bir örnek olması açısından bu tezde incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin, Güney Afrika, Güney-Güney İşbirliği, Neomerkantalizm

“Wherever you would like to go or whatever you would like to do, never forget your dad is materially and spiritually always behind you.”

I will never forget....

To my dad...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AU	African Union
BAPA	Buenos Aires Plan of Action
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CASTEP	China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty
G33	Group of Thirty-Three
G77	Group of Seventy-Seven
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Forum on Dialogue
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce of Peoples' Republic of China
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SSC	South-South Cooperation
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TT-SSC	Task Team on South-South Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOSSC	United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation
UNSC	United Nations on Security Council
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, Harry Truman addressed the US people and declared that the US and other developed countries should assist the underdeveloped regions as they solve their problems (1949). It was in the opening of this new era that the problems of underdeveloped countries came to the world agenda for the first time. The main problem of these countries was underdevelopment. Therefore, since then, there have been many approaches suggested to help advance underdeveloped countries. In this respect, this thesis will examine the primary approaches to the development: the modernization theory and the dependency theory.

From modernization theoreticians' perspective, the way to become a developed country is to transform from traditional to modern, which basically means a country must follow the Western way of development to become a developed country. Modernization theoreticians believe that the reason behind the underdevelopment of underdeveloped countries is their domestic problems such as a lack of democracy and free market economy. In this regard, Truman's 1949 speech is crucial for modernization because he said, "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" (Shah 2011:12). The modernization theory is followed by the neoliberal theory, which is in line with the modernization theory. However, it claims that the main development agency should be the market rather than the state because the state intervention distorts the market and this negatively influences the development. It also argues that as the states integrate to the global economic system, they gain more.

The modernization theory has been challenged by the dependency theory because although the Southern countries have integrated to the international economic system, the gap between the North and the South did not close. In addition, in many

regions such as Latin America, Africa and Asia it has resulted in oppression, exploitation and social unrest. Therefore, dependency theory became an alternative perspective. Although there are differences within the school, its primary claim is that the lack of progress of underdeveloped countries was intentionally created by the developed countries. Therefore, the dependency theory says it is not a natural happening that stems from the insufficiencies of underdeveloped countries. The dependency theory is followed by the world-systems theory, which argues that the current world system has been created by the West to keep the underdeveloped countries underdeveloped, because it serves the interests of industrial countries. Therefore, the world-systems theoreticians believe that the way to development is to disconnect from developed countries, so strengthening South-South cooperation. Thus, SSC became an alternative way of development for the Southern countries. SSC mainly refers to the economic, political and social cooperation among Southern countries. It refers not only to economic cooperation by trade, investment and capacity development to support one another in closing the gap with Northern countries, but SSC is also a political cooperation within the international system for global governance, aiming to better serve the interests of developing countries.

The Bandung Conference was a turning point for developing countries because, in that conference, they began to collectively raise their voices for a more just and balanced world order. In the conference, newly independent and developing countries came together for the first time and stressed that developing countries should align with one another rather than Socialist and Capitalist blocs. It inspired many developing countries throughout the 1960s and 70s to develop South-South cooperation because they started to believe that it would strengthen their bargaining position in the global economic architecture against the unilateral movements of the North (Lechini 2006:28). However, in those years, although the Southern countries increased their international and regional activism, they were not influential in the international system due to the oil crisis, domestic problems – such as high inflation, unemployment, and foreign debt – and not having enough capacity, capability and experience to pursue effective policies in the international system (Morais de Sa e Silva 2008:3). Though this situation started to change in the 1980s, the end of the

Cold War became another turning point that paved the way for a more multipolar world in which international cooperation opportunities have blossomed. Moreover, these years witnessed the dramatic rise of the Southern countries that are now called ‘emerging powers,’ such as China, India and Brazil, and these countries have started to provide technical assistance to other developing or less developed countries. Therefore, since the mid-1990s, South-South economic cooperation, including trade, investment, financial flows and development assistance, has dramatically increased (Jha and McCawley 2011).

China has been one of the main actors among these emerging powers that strongly supports South-South cooperation while African continent hosts the largest number of developing countries. In this regard, developing relations between China and Africa are crucial, which is analyzed in the next chapter. Due to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese companies were encouraged to invest abroad. During the 1980s, China prioritized its relations with developed countries, such as Japan and the US, for technology transfer. However, in the 1990s, due to China’s rapid economic growth and increasing necessity of raw materials, China began to give priority to other developing countries, thus improving its ties with those countries as well. Moreover, due to harsh criticisms of international actors in these years because of human rights abuses in Tiananmen, China aimed to gain the support of developing countries. Therefore, Africa became a crucial destination for China for several reasons. Africa is the richest continent in terms of natural resources, which China desperately needs to pursue its economic development trend. Moreover, Africa is a reasonable market for inexpensive Chinese products. Although these products undermine the local producers, China has introduced many new products that Africans have never seen in their lives, which is expected to increase the living standards of ordinary people. Additionally, China would like to gain the support of African countries in order to work against the US and other Western countries in global affairs, particularly when they have a conflict of interests.

For African countries, China has also become an important partner for several reasons. First, China’s increasing trade provided an alternative to the existing traders,

and this trade increase contributed to the development of the continent. Secondly, large investments in various sectors, such as mineral, agriculture, construction, infrastructure and telecommunication, provide many advantages to the African countries. Thirdly, China delivers a significant amount of aid in many different forms to many different countries without proposing any political conditionality. The only condition that China proposes to sign a trade or investment agreement is the recognition of China's 'One China' policy (Mitchell 2007: 114). Although it challenges the existing traditional aid structure delivered by the Western powers, it aims to contribute to the development of the African continent by capacity development. Finally, China is one of five members in the UNSC and a crucial actor in other global organizations, such as WTO and IMF, so China could be a favorable influence in terms of making international decisions for developing or less developed countries.

Thanks to these mutual interests bilateral relations between China and African countries have been dramatically developing. However, there are also some problematic issues: (1) the increasing trade imbalance in favor of China, (2) the unsatisfactory security and environmental conditions in Chinese investments, and (3) the increase of Chinese workers in the region. Recently, the most significant issue has been the increasing trade deficit between China and African countries. Considering the increasing imbalance in trade, some claim that China is pursuing a neomercantilist policy towards Africa. From the perspective of neomercantilism, the state is the main actor and it imposes protectionist measures for imports via regulations, such as high tariffs and quotas, while encouraging export by state subsidies and currency manipulation. It considers trade to be a zero-sum game, which means if one side gains, the other side loses. However, considering China-Africa relations, although China encourages domestic companies to invest in African countries, it does not impose tariffs or quotas against the African firms to discourage the import of African products. On the contrary, China made huge efforts to increase exports from African countries to China by helping capacity development in many sectors, constructing infrastructure, delivering aid, and assisting in the enhancement of the quality of products and building brands. Moreover, China and Africa trade

relations cannot be considered a zero-sum game because both China and African countries benefit from the bilateral trade. Therefore, this study asserts that China and Africa relations currently develop within the context of South-South cooperation, which benefits both China and African countries, rather than claiming that China pursues neomercantilist policies towards Africa.

In this regard, the relationship between China and South Africa is analyzed in the last chapter in the respect that it could be an example of South-South cooperation. China and South Africa have a more balanced trade relationship as well as the potential to develop further. China and South Africa's economic cooperation dramatically increased after official recognition in 1998. Mutual trade and investment quickly developed in favor of both countries. Besides win-win economic cooperation in many sectors, China and South Africa actively cooperate within the international system. They pursue common policies within the UN, WTO, BRICS, AU and the other regional and sub-regional organizations to support the development of African continent. Therefore, China and South Africa relations could be considered an example of South-South cooperation in which both parties not only benefit from economic cooperation and collaboration, but also cooperate in the global governance system to use it in favor of all developing countries; or, in other words, for the benefit of the South.

CHAPTER 2

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND NEOMERCANTILISM

2.1 Introduction

SSC is a prominent issue within the Global South debate. Its main aim is the development of the Southern countries. In this respect, there are two mainstream development theories: modernization and dependency which will be discussed in this chapter with their main arguments. These theories fundamentally tackle different perspectives in regard to the global system and the role of the state for the development of the Global South. Afterward, SSC will be analyzed with its objectives, institutionalization and challenges. In the last part of this chapter, neomercantilism will be discussed to be able to make a comparison between two approaches to better understand China and Africa relations.

2.2 The Theoretical Approaches to the Global South

Before the Second World War, underdeveloped countries were considered 'Third World', while Communist countries were called 'Second World', and the democratic, industrialized and capitalist countries were called 'First World'. After the war, the concept of the 'Third World' changed with the concept of the 'South'. The ideas of 'Third World', 'South' and 'developing countries' were all created by the West and used in international politics (Modi 2011:1). These terms refer to countries in which the per capita income is low compared to Western countries (Rapley 1997:10). Therefore, these terms refer to countries that have similar historical and political experiences and particularly similar, poor economic conditions.

Development, which is the major aim of the South, basically means maturing into advanced countries as well as aiming to increase the living standards of Third World countries. The main theme of development was economic growth, but in time,

political, social and human development became as important as economic development (Pieterse 2010:6). There are two main theories, the modernization theory and the dependency theory, that question the global system and the role of the state in terms of the development of the Global South. Although it is difficult to generalize development due to different approaches, I will analyze it using the leading approaches.

2.2.1 Modernization Theory

The modernization theory is the initial theory taking into consideration underdeveloped and developing countries. According to this theory, the way to become a developed country is basically Westernization; in other words, Europeanization or Americanization. How the West was transformed and became developed is the natural way of modernization. It is a transformative process in which the traditional values of society change with the modern values. Therefore, it puts underdeveloped countries in a traditional position and Western countries in a developed position.

Although there are different voices within the modernization theorists, in general they focus on the deficiencies of poor countries and see that the way out of these conditions is through transformation from traditional to modern. Thus, it mainly claims that the driving force of growth is the adoption of liberal and democratic values and integration to the world capitalist system (Litonjua 2012:28). According to the modernization theory, the Third World is underdeveloped due to several reasons, such as not having enough capital, political instability, lack of education and inadequate infrastructure.

(Rapley 1997:16). In other words, it is argued that the main reason behind the Southern countries' impoverishment is the failure to accumulate wealth and function their economic and political systems. Therefore, due to this kind absence, they could not adopt the democratic and capitalist systems. Hence, it argues that the problem stems from the underdeveloped countries' domestic, economic, political and social systems (Litonjua 2012:28).

One of the most crucial theorists of the modernization theory is Walt Whitman Rostow, who proposes a development model. His model includes five stages towards modernization, which are traditional society (an agriculturally based society), precondition for takeoff (characterized by an abundance of entrepreneurial activity), the takeoff process (a period of rapid economic growth), the drive to maturity (economic development slows to a more stable rate), and a high mass consumption society (a period of increasing real income) (Reyes 2001). Another prominent modernization theorist, Daniel Lerner, claims that modernization was an initiative in post-war years against the expansion of communism in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In those years, the Western way of life, governance and institutions were offered to be a modern country. In his book titled *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Lerner clarifies how nations became 'Western' or 'modern'. His research includes six countries, which are Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt, from 1950 to 1951. He argues that modernization starts with migration to the cities. Then, growing population brings urbanization and the need for schools, markets for free trade, mass media, and democratic institutions. Afterward, literacy increases, mass media becomes more widespread and economic and political participation increase. Therefore, he believes that all nations could be modern (Shah 2011:1-3). Along with Rostow and Lerner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan, Gabriel A. Almond, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Everett E. Hagen are among other important modernization theorists.

After the 1980s, neoliberalism came to the fore, which is on the same line as the modernization theory. It emphasizes democracy and a free market economy but minimal state intervention in the market. Therefore, the difference between neoliberalism and the modernization theory is that the development agency is supposed to shift from the state to the market. However, the state is always located at the center of development, but it is not the only actor anymore for developments that require multilevel efforts (Pieterse 2010:7-16). From neoliberals' perspective, the operation of a free market economy will trigger economic development and will result in the improvement of living standards in underdeveloped countries. Hence, it claims that as the states trade more, they gain more and employ more people, which

facilitates their economic growth (Chichilnisky 1982:10). Therefore, neoliberalism emphasizes trade for development instead of aid given by state agencies.

Additionally, increasing globalization in those years and the collapse of the Soviet Union paved the way for the creation of new partnerships, which resulted in more integration of the Southern countries to the world economic system (Jules and Morais de Sa e Silva 2008:47). Globalization is basically defined as ‘the growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society’ (Jones 2010:4). Hence, with globalization, the communication between countries has been facilitated and policy, information, experience, knowledge and technique transfers have become easier (Modi 2011:3). Therefore, the number of transnational and international organizations has increased (Jules and Morais de Sa e Silva 2008:52). Hence, Southern countries’ access to foreign products and services has been facilitated. Moreover, considering the increasing population of most developing countries, they have started to consume and trade more than many developed countries. As they trade and cooperate more, their potential to influence global trade and the global market strengthens, which substantially influences their development (Gray and Murphy 2013). Therefore, the neoliberal theory argues that, as the Southern countries integrate into the global economy through liberalization, privatization and deregulation, (Litonjua 2012:25) they will gain more and become more developed through the influence of employment and the increasing export. However, although the Southern countries are increasingly more integrated into the global economy and have adapted to the free market, the gap between the developed and the developing countries has been expanded (Chichilnisky 2008:2). Moreover, instead of the promises of development, it has resulted in the domination, exploitation, inequality and subordination of riches over the poor people particularly in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The prosperity was shared among 20 percent of the global population while the others were suffering from poverty, chaos and insecurity (Litonjua 2012:42). Thus, the modernization theory has been challenged by the dependency theory, which questions the Western way of development.

2.2.2 Dependency Theory

The dependency theory objects to the modernization theory. It came to light in Latin America by the pioneering of Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian economist, and then was developed by Celso Furtado, Theotonio Dos Santos, F H Cardoso, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran and Immanuel Wallerstein (Chase-Dunn 2007). Although there are many differences within the school, at heart, it mainly claims that the Third World is underdeveloped because of the active policies of developed countries. In other words, contemporary underdevelopment was produced in the past and is pursued today by developed metropolitan countries. Thus, it claims that the international capitalist system, which has been expanded by developed countries, destroys underdeveloped countries and forces them to stay underdeveloped. It argues that the dominant class in capitalist societies would cooperate with the dominant classes in the Third World so as not to lose their privileged positions. Thus, the Third World's ruling class will protect such kind of dependent system (Rapley 1997:19). Therefore, Frank claims that as underdeveloped countries stay away from developed countries and weaken their economic relations, they are able to develop. Moreover, unlike the claims of the modernization theory that today's developed countries were underdeveloped in the past, Frank argues that today's developed countries were never underdeveloped but they are undeveloped (2008:258). Similarly, one of the other substantial dependency theorists, Samir Amin, claims that the North's plunder of the South's natural resources for the benefit of its wasteful society destroys all the development possibilities of the South (2011:2). He argues that the South, consisting of about 80 percent of the population, should struggle for themselves. Otherwise, the North with its humanist generosity would never construct a better world for the Southern people (2011:28). Amin believes that the "South can do without the North but the reverse is not true." Therefore, according to him, the South needs to stop believing that the North's aid is necessary for their development and free themselves from the North's bonds (2011:144). There are also some dependency theorists, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, that suggest a selective 'delinking' from the bounds of the developed countries (Hart 1983:10). Hence, according to dependency theorists,

underdevelopment is not the consequence of poor countries being poor and unable to develop; instead, it is the outcome that is intentionally created by the exploitative policies of developed countries.

The dependency theory inspired the world-systems theory. It was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein to criticize the arguments of the modernization theory. Wallerstein shares almost the same view with Andre Gunder Frank that the system has to be changed for the development of underdeveloped countries. Wallerstein argues that underdevelopment is not only related to domestic sources, but that it is also based on the world capitalist economy (Jones 2010:22). He divides the world capitalist economy into three structural regions - core, periphery, and semi-periphery. The core consists of developed countries while the periphery represents the underdeveloped countries. The semi-periphery represents the developing and industrializing countries that are positioned between the core and the periphery and balances their relations (Wallerstein 1976: 74). The world-systems theory claims that Northern countries become the 'core' of the international system by exploiting the natural resources of their colonies. As a result of this exploitation, the colonies become part of the 'periphery' part of the system. As the capitalist system has been in favor of the core countries, they continue to dominate the periphery. Thus, he emphasizes the world system structure (Wallerstein 1976: 131). In this structure, the semi-periphery countries could be like today's advanced countries, which were semi-periphery countries before. Nonetheless, the hierarchical world system does not change (Wallerstein 1976: 231-232). Therefore, the dependency theory and the world systems theory theoreticians believe that underdevelopment is mostly related to the capitalist international system (Chatterjee 2012:2).

2.3 South-South Cooperation

For many scholars and experts, SSC is an important tool for the national and regional development processes (Jules and Morais de Sa e Silva 2008:46). In recent years, the number of developing countries as global players has increased. Many of them developed their financial and technical capacity and capabilities and managed to cooperate with many other developing and underdeveloped countries. Thus, they

became substantial actors in the global economic governance. As Giddens argues, 'reverse colonization' becomes more and more widespread, which means that non-Western countries have been increasing their capability to influence even the developments in the West (2008:376). Particularly, some of them called "emerging economies," such as China, India, and Brazil, have become significant providers of development cooperation.

SSC is a concept of the post-World War II process. After the war, all sorts of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among the developing countries was labeled as SSC. Tejasvi defines SSC as "the processes, institutions, and arrangements designed to promote economic, political, and technical cooperation among the developing countries in pursuit of common development goals" (Sesay et al 2013:95).

SSC mainly refers to the economic cooperation between the Southern countries, which Southern people think will be less exploitative than the North-South cooperation. In this regard, Southern countries currently do not oppose globalization as it facilitates the economic cooperation between the Southern countries via trade, investment and financial support. They oppose the capitalist system, which forecloses their development, and global trade policies, which usually put them in a losing position. Thus, their aim is a more inclusive system rather than a total change of the system (Altinbas 2013:59). In this regard, it can be said that they are certainly against the modernization theory as it totally views the way of development as following the Western path.

Although SSC is commonly considered as referring to the economic cooperation among developing countries, it also strongly emphasizes political cooperation and the development of a global governance. In other words, it emphasizes multipolarity in the international system. Via SSC, Southern countries could collectively react to the neo-colonialism, imperialism and unilateralism (Altinbas 2013:31-37). Altinbas argues that "The more the Southern states gain power, the smaller the arena for the unilateral initiatives." In addition, the Southern countries target political cooperation against foreign interventions because it usually occurs under the influence of the US, the European Union, International Monetary

Fund and World Bank (2013:45-46), and it usually conflicts with the interests of the intervened countries. Hence, the South emphasizes the non-interference principle in the international system.

SSC not only implies governmental interaction in terms of economic and political cooperation, but also emphasizes the interaction among civil society organizations. The number of national and international actors in the system promoting SSC has substantially increased and now includes member countries, civil society organizations, the private sector and academia. The inclusion of these actors into the SSC process allows its economic and technical cooperation to be expanded to social and cultural cooperation (Tejasvi 2007:2-3).

It also needs to be emphasized that the West, or the Western-dominated institutions, strongly support SSC, which is called triangular cooperation. It is based on the idea that a Southern partner, or a group of southern peoples, cooperates with a Northern partner. While Southern partners generally seek Northern partners for financing, sometimes the reverse is also valid. Western-dominated international institutions, such as UN bodies and WB, support SSC because SSC could create more effective outcomes and become more appropriate and cost effective for Northern partners (Kumar 2008:5). However, the problem is that as the finance has come from the North in a triangular cooperation, the North usually defines the conditions according to its interests (Ekoko and Benn 2002:19). Although it seems like a disadvantage, if the Southern partner or partners were assertive in obtaining their desires, they could turn this cooperation to an advantage. Thus, triangular cooperation could also be an opportunity to strengthen SSC.

In conclusion, it can be said that increasing economic, political and cultural cooperation among Southern countries has been transforming both the traditional relations and also power balances in the international system in favor of Southern countries (Kitissou 2007:16).

2.3.1 The Objectives of South-South Cooperation

SSC mainly aims to increase the cooperation between developing countries and reduce the socio-economic gap between the North and the South. In this sense, it

strives for cooperation in specific areas, such as trade, investment, financial flows, aid, capacity development, technology transfer and technical assistance.

2.3.1.1 Trade

The elimination of trade inequalities between developed and developing countries and supporting the global cooperation between trading entities are among the most important objectives of SSC (Altinbas 2013:31). Most theories consider the international market as the "engine of growth." More international trade would be more helpful for the overall growth, particularly the growth of Southern countries as it increases employment and export (Chichilnisky 2008:10). Over the past decade, South-South trade has expanded more instantly than North-South trade (Chahoud 2007:1). Through the coalitions and the institutional mechanisms, developing countries have increased their capacity to impact the multilateral trade regimes in their own favor (Ramanzini and Viana 2012:92). In other words, the economic growth of emerging powers, such as China and India, led the commodity prices to increase, which benefits resource-rich countries. The result of increasing SSC and the saving of foreign exchange surpluses undermined the global dominance of traditional Northern economies (Palat 2009:39). Therefore, the trade regime evolves from the leadership of main trading powers to a wider involvement of emerging economies. While it creates difficulties in the negotiation processes, it more fairly reflects the interests of developed and developing countries. Thus, by increasing intra-South trade and the capacity to affect the international trade regime, the Southern countries aim to resist against Western domination and help one another's development on equal ground.

2.3.1.2 Foreign Direct Investment

Another prominent issue is the increasing flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Although the first flow started in 1970, it almost entirely stopped in the 1980s. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, a new wave of FDI flows from the South started. In the last two decades, the capital flows, particularly in FDI, formed among Southern countries have more quickly increased than North-North or North-South flows

(Rangel 2012:111). Developing countries noticed that South-South investment cooperation is more advantageous than North-South when considering several factors. First, Southern investors usually better understand the regional know-how than Northern investors. Second, developing countries use the same quality of technology, so the Southern investors, in general, have more appropriate technology for their Southern partners. Third, they have more courage to take business risks in politically unstable regions compared to Northern businesses because a significant number of Southern investors are state-owned enterprises, (Chahoud 2007:1-3) so they feel safer to take risks. In addition, the banks are more experienced in the Southern countries in terms of taking the risks of cooperating with the local banks or giving loans to developing countries. Therefore, South-South investment is very advantageous for developing countries, both for the amount of investment and the efficiency.

2.3.1.3 Financial Aid

Another advantage of SSC is a flow of immense financial aid to developing countries (Altinbas 2013:31). Recently, there has been a proliferation of aid donors called new or emerging donors that are different from the traditional OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. Thus, as there is a huge divergence between these new emerging or non-DAC donors, it creates divergence in providing development assistance as well. With the involvement of new donors, it is argued that the international aid structure has changed. There are several features of this new aid structure. First, in the new system, unlike DAC donors, the developing countries define their relationship as a 'partnership' instead of a donor-recipient relationship. Thus, the countries cooperate as equals. Second, the South's economic and technical cooperation is based on the mutual benefit that is called win-win cooperation rather than just delivering aid to one party (Simplicio 2011:20). Thus, the new donors are both donors and recipients, in contrast to the traditional ones. Third, the new emerging donors do not put forward political conditions, such as the rule of law, good governance, liberalization of the market and respecting human rights for aid delivery, as traditional Western donors do (Chahoud 2007:3). In other

words, the new type of aid is less-donor-driven, so the aid is provided with less conditionality, including know-how (Davies 2010:12). Fourth, SSC requires the establishment of commercial banks for intra-South trade. It is necessary for the existing local export-import banks and financing institutions to have the capability to finance the export and developmental projects. Therefore, when they do not have that capacity, their capabilities will be increased by financial support. Thus, it becomes very advantageous for the recipient countries as it provides new financial flows (Simplicio 2011:24). Finally, this mutual cooperation could be an opportunity to use the local currency, which would decrease dependency on Western currencies (Kumar 2008:36). However, cooperating with these new donors has also created new challenges, such as the lack of transparency and information in the agreements and a lack of conformity in the environmental and social standards.

2.3.1.4 Capacity Development

The other aim of SSC is capacity development. It refers to “improving the ability of individuals and institutions to perform effectively and efficiently” (Ekoko and Benn 2002:120). In this regard, SSC aims cooperation in knowledge and technology transfer, which is crucial for the less developed countries, as they do not have the capacity to develop their own technology. Moreover, providing technical assistance by transferring knowledge, skills and abilities via training programs, particularly in education and health sectors, is also important (Altinbas 2013:31). Instead of creating interdependency on developed countries, the current SSC aims to make developing countries self-reliant. In other words, a more developed country transfers its experience to a less developed according to the requirements via SSC (Ekoko and Benn 2002:121-122). So, it aims to make less developed countries able to follow their own way in light of the transferred technology, knowledge, and skills. To further pursue this cooperation between Southern countries, some local institutions have been established or the existing institutions have been linked to each other to coordinate more easily. Moreover, not only local institutions, but also international institutions, have been established. The capacity within the existing

institutions has been enhanced to develop the South's capacities and capabilities and to find better solutions to the common problems of the South.

2.3.2 The Institutionalization of South-South Cooperation

Institutions are crucial for developing and underdeveloped countries to raise their voices about domestic and international issues; issues which support the multipolarity in the international system. It also enables them to collectively express their interests, find solutions to their common problems and find further backers (Hurrell 2006:11). In other words, it encourages sharing interests and expressing common concerns (Tejasvi 2007:2). Thus, they obtained a better chance to organize and so become more influential in the international system. Therefore, in the new era, namely in the post-Cold War era, North and the Northern dominated institutions were not the only institutions at the center of the international system. The new emerging Global South also dramatically enhanced its capacities and capabilities, which were aimed at being transferred to the less developed areas by institutional cooperation.

The South has increased its capabilities within international organizations via coalitions. The proliferation of coalitions enabled the intensification of bilateral negotiations, which facilitated the cooperation in many areas (Ramanzini and Viana 2012:96). These active policies of developing countries redefined the power structure within international organizations. The South's coalitions brought the North to the negotiation table to discuss a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Hurrell 2013:206). Thus, as they became influential, they desired new status within the global economic system, providing them more advantageous opportunities (Hurrell 2006:3). However, they still do not have enough capability to impose their own agenda – they could only position themselves according to the North (Ramanzini and Viana:97).

In this regard, they created many international organizations and became more active within the existing international institutions. Some of the organizations created by the South are BRICS, IBSA, G22, G33, G77, the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO) and MERCOSUR. While some organizations are currently very active, some are not. They also try to be active in the existing international organizations, such as UN agencies, WTO, and G20. Some of the outstanding institutions for the SSC are UN agencies, WTO, G77, G20, IBSA and BRICS. In the next sections, I will go into the details of the structure of these institutions.

2.3.2.1 UN Agencies: UNOSSC, UNCTAD, UNDP

Referring to the significance of SSC, the General Assembly accepted 12 September as United Nations Day of South-South Cooperation, remembering the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). The General Assembly advises all UN bodies to add SSC to their agenda while making their policy and program designs and setting aside financial, technical and human resources. On 12 September 2014, UN General Secretary Ban-Ki-moon emphasized the importance of SSC by saying

Despite remarkable advances in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, progress across the South has been uneven. Extreme poverty, rampant inequality, malnutrition and vulnerability to climate and weather-related shocks persist. In the face of this stark reality, South-South and triangular cooperation offer a path to balancing growth and equity in the context of a new Global Partnership for Sustainable Development. I encourage countries of the South and all development partners to come together to share, disseminate and scale up successful development solutions and technologies.

UNOSSC

The main body for SSC within the UN system is the High-Level Committee on South-South cooperation. It is a supplementary group of the General Assembly that usually consists of UNDP representatives. It is responsible for reevaluating the advances for the implementation of decisions by the UN development system in BAPA, strengthening TCDC within the UN system, promoting new projects and policies for the further development of TCDC, ensuring financial resource availability, and assuring promotional and operational harmony (UN 2014). 192

members, UN agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are all represented in the committee. It convenes every two years to reconsider the intergovernmental technical cooperation among developing nations under the UN development system.

UNCTAD

In the 1960s, the involvement of developing countries in international trade increased the concerns for their position. Accordingly, the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was held in 1964 in Geneva and agreed to meet every four years. Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian economist, became the first Secretary General. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, several agreements were signed and UNCTAD became a significant forum for addressing the problems of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries. Developing countries experienced difficult times in the 1980s because the world economic and political system was changing and they needed to adapt, but they had many complications doing so. Therefore, UNCTAD pioneered the intensifying intergovernmental debates for macroeconomic reforms and assisted developing countries to integrate into the world trade system by giving technical assistance, increasing trade efficiency, rescheduling foreign debts and promoting SSC. Since the 1990s, international flows and investments have dramatically increased and UNCTAD made proposals for these flows to help the development of recipient countries. Additionally, it extended its analytical research to link trade, technology, investment and private development. Further, it extended its technical assistance programs covering not only trade and investment but also debt, law, and policy (UNCTAD 2013). It has 194 member states and also cooperates with WTO, International Trade Center, UNDP, IMF, and WB. Additionally, UNCTAD works on providing public and private cooperation in developing countries to help with integration into the global economy. Thus, it cooperates with civil society organizations, trade unions, business circles and academia (UNCTAD 201). It also directs the UN Capital Development Fund, financially helping developing countries

and the UN Volunteers, which consists of 6,000 volunteers from 160 different countries working on peace and development (UNCTAD 2015).

UNDP

The UNDP's objective is the elimination of poverty, inequality and exclusion. It cooperates with more than 170 countries and regions. It assists the countries in developing policies, institutional capabilities, and leadership abilities for sustainable development. It mainly links and coordinates international and domestic efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which the leaders aimed to reach in 2015, and updated in September 2015. MDGs were proposed in September 2000 for the next 15-year agenda to cope with poverty in many dimensions. They set eight universally approved objectives: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV, AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a global partnership for development (UNCTAD 2015). It also works for the post-2015 development agenda, democratic governance and building peace, climate change and risk reduction for disasters. In this regard, UNDP funds many local initiatives by assisting the countries to develop their own policies for the requirements of their country, leadership abilities and institutional capacity.

2.3.2.2 World Trade Organization

The World Trade Organization is a major forum in which the global trade rules and agreements are set and the implementation processes are controlled. The WTO aims to reduce trade obstacles, promote economic growth, agree on rules for conducting international trade, solve disputes among its members, provide solutions for unemployment, raise living standards, strengthen good governance, bolster peace and stability, assist countries to develop and provide technical cooperation to developing countries. In this regard, it includes the building of the necessary institutions and the training of officials. By organizing about 100 workshops,

seminars and conferences annually, it gives legal advice, aiming to teach countries about their legal rights, and it supports academic institutions.

When the WTO was created,¹ there were a few developing countries with the capacity to influence the decision-making process. At that time, the WTO was seen as the rich man's club where the most developed nations pursued their interests (Narlikar 2003:37). Hence, the interests of developing countries were ignored in the early times of the WTO. Now, it has 161 members and 117 of them are developing countries. Particularly, since the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the bold line between the developed and developing has been blurred and a large number of developing countries entered into the system, so they have started becoming more influential. Although the negotiation process took 8 years, the members agreed to almost all the rules and policies (Narlikar 2003:39-44). Then, the 2001 Doha Round became a key meeting for developing countries in which they collectively raised their voices on many issues (Narlikar and Tussie 2004:949) and expanded the agenda of the WTO, calling it the Doha Development Agenda. 19 to 21 topics were listed, including implementation-related issues, agriculture, food security, textiles and clothing, trade barriers, investment measures, anti-dumping, subsidies, environment, health, technology transfer and trade-related intellectual property rights. When it was launched, the ministers declared, “We seek to place developing countries’ needs and interests at the heart of the Work Program adopted in this Declaration.” Thus, although the WTO is currently criticized for its long negotiation process, indeed, it has been changing due to the changing global economic and political structures.

The WTO copes with developing countries in three ways: (1) by agreements containing special measures for the developing members, (2) through the Committee on Trade and Development focusing on developing countries and considering their trade, technology transfer and debt issues, and (3) through the Secretariat providing technical assistance. The WTO is a kind of coordination office that brings the recipient and donor countries together, as well as private sector and development offices. By doing this, it supports the “aid for trade” program, which enables countries to see what is needed and what can be done. Therefore, the donors provide aid and the

¹ It was GATT at that time established in 1948 and became WTO in 1995.

recipient countries try to solve or develop their trade-related issues. In the WTO operation, although some privileges are provided to the poor countries for their benefit, all members – no matter how weak or dominant – are subjected to the same rules, and each country has to approve the agreements to be accepted. Therefore, by setting up coalitions, developing or less developed countries have dramatically increased their bargaining power and their negotiation capacity in the WTO.

Although there are claims that developing countries try to pursue an alternative trade regime in which they establish free trade, economic arrangements and customs unions, (Modi 2011:3) they claim that, rather than changing the system, they would like to make the existing system more inclusive by pursuing active policies in the existing international system.

2.3.2.3 G77

The Group of 77 was established at the end of the first session of UNCTAD in 1964 in Geneva. Although the number of its members has increased to 134, the group has retained its name. It is the broadest intergovernmental organization representing the developing countries within the UN framework. It is a platform through which developing countries could voice their collective economic interests and develop their negotiation capacity on international issues. The highest political body is the Chairmanship, which rotates on the regional basis and is arranged every year. The South Summit is the top decision-making body of the G77. The first was held in Cuba in 2000 and the second in Qatar in 2005. It has served to initiate resolutions or decisions in the UN General Assembly and create action programs, joint declarations, and agreements on global development affairs since the first Ministerial Meeting in 1967.

Establishing an equal international trade regime is the central issue of the group's agenda (Cheru 2011:43). Moreover, it strongly promotes SSC projects through the fund of Perez-Guerrero Thrust and SSC trade through the Global System of Trade Preferences fund. The member states usually finance the other activities of the group.

2.3.2.4 G20

The Group of Twenty forum was officially established when finance ministers and Central Bank governors met on 25 September 1999 at the G7 Summit. G7 Finance Ministers lead the creation of the G20 by aiming to “broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all” (G20 2007:5). It was established as an unofficial mechanism within the framework of the Bretton Woods system to achieve international cooperation and sustainable growth, and particularly to cope with the challenges of international economic crises, such as the Asia economic crisis in 1997. Therefore, besides coping with the outcomes of economic crises, the G20 strongly supports economic growth. It is believed that economic growth will decrease unemployment and also, ultimately, poverty in the member states (Melbourne School of Government 2014). It not only aims to share and transfer experience among the member states but also transfer them to the other developing countries for global development.

Its members represent prominent developed and emerging countries from different parts of the world. It consists of 85 percent of the global GDP and 2/3 of the global population (G20 2007:8). Initially, there were 18 members, including all G7 members and Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, China, India, Australia, Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and the European Union. In 2008, Indonesia was honored to become a member of the G20. Particularly, since the 2008 economic crisis, the significance of the G20 has increased, and developing countries have had a chance to declare their common interests. Thus, the G20 increased the representation of developing countries in the international system. In other words, it closed a significant gap in the global governance structure by bringing the world’s 20 largest economies together to talk about global issues. Within G20 meetings, member states negotiate as equals without legally binding decisions.

Apart from economic growth, the G20 calls its members to fight against terrorism, exchange information, provide technical assistance, increase development, promote effective aid, create innovation within their financing systems, reduce poverty, liberalize trade, and reform the Bretton Woods institutions, IMF, and the

WB. Developing countries emphasize reform on quotas, representation and the structure of Bretton Woods institutions, which are supposed to be responsive to the changes of the global economic system. The majority of its members' insistence on reforms in the IMF and WB came up with results in 2006 that the IMF started reform on quota adjustments and representation of its low-income members (G20 2007:36-37).

The G20 jointly works with non-government organizations to be more influential via its sub-groups. The G20 subgroups are as follows: Business20 (B20), which allows the business leaders of the G20 to mirror the crucial role of the private sector; CivilSociety20 (C20), which brings the civil society representatives together; Youth20 (Y20), which seeks economic growth, job creation, sustainable development and global citizenship; Labour20 (L20), which represents the workers' interests; and Think20 (T20), which brings academics and think tanks from member countries together to provide analytical perspective to the process (G20Watch 2014).

South-South and triangular knowledge sharing is also a crucial topic for the G20 development agenda. In 2010, the leaders asked the Task Team on South-South cooperation (TT-SSC) and UNDP to advise to extend knowledge-sharing as a key development tool. A joint working paper was prepared by a group of people from OECD, UNDP, WB and TT-SSC and was included on the agenda of the G20 Development Working Group at the Cape Town meeting in 2011. The document summarized the policy recommendations and best practices in terms of the case studies.

2.3.2.5 India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum

The IBSA Dialogue Forum was launched through the acceptance of the "Brasilia Declaration" on 6 June 2003 with the participation of foreign ministers from three countries – India, Brazil, and South Africa. It was based on an idea from the 2003 G8 summit that member countries were symbolically invited to the summit, but then, "What is the use of being invited for dessert at the banquet of the powerful?" Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said. "We do not want to participate only in eating the dessert; we want to eat the main course, dessert and

then coffee," he added. After the summit, the countries decided to unite under an institutional framework called the IBSA Dialogue Forum. They announced that they are "three countries with vibrant democracies, from three regions of the developing world" (Kurtz-Phelan 2013).

It is an entirely South-South grouping devoted to sustainable development for themselves and other developing countries. Although it does not have a headquarters or a permanent secretariat, a great number of summits have been held since the establishment. The first summit was held in September 2006 in Brasilia, during which they negotiated on many global issues, such as globalization, sustainable development, UN reform, peace and security, terrorism, social development, non-proliferation, and achievement of Millennium Development Goals. They also emphasized the IBSA's willingness contributing to the SSC, which will be repeated in the coming meetings (First IBSA Summit Meeting 2006).

The main objectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum are defined as: contributing to the construction of a new international structure, collectively increasing the voice of member countries in global issues, and strengthening ties both among member countries and with the others. Therefore, it mainly aims to maximize its members' benefits within international organizations. In this regard, the WTO is the most prominent institution. In its framework, emphasis is placed on the significance of a transparent, rule-based and predictable trade system that would allow developing countries to maximize their earnings for development. The ultimate goal is to benefit from the globalization that is expected to be "a positive force for change for all people." The three nations define themselves as 'middle powers' that are pressured by developed countries, so together they aim to more strongly resist this pressure (Lechini 2007:29-30).

They prioritize the diplomatic, private sector and civil society cooperation, which allows the group to cooperate at all levels. In this regard, 14 working groups were established for expanding mutual knowledge and exploring common interests in various areas, such as agriculture, energy, environment, education, social development, defense, health, science and technology, and trade and investment.

The IBSA fund was created in 2004 and became operational in 2006, and each country currently contributes \$1 million per year to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDG), implement South-South cooperation and assist other developing countries. The fund was awarded by the MDG Awards Committee in 2010 for its contribution to SSC, and it also received the "South-South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award" in 2012 from the UN for its innovative approach. The projects are implemented in partnership with UNDP, local governments and institutions (Stuenkel 2014).

Although they cooperate on many issues, such as energy sources, information technology, and agriculture, they are natural trade rivals that all aim to export more into the European market (Lechini 2007:31). In this sense, although its future is uncertain, for today it strengthens SSC. If they deepen their relations over common interests, they will be more influential in the near future as regional democratic leaders.

2.3.2.6 BRICS

BRICS countries, which are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, have met regularly since 2009 when the first BRICS meeting was held after the 2008 economic crisis. Besides annual summits, many BRICS sub-groups are part of a secondary interaction that has held more than 50 official meetings since 2010 (Stuenkel 2013:7). After the 2008 economic crisis, the world economic system changed in such a way that the number and importance of emerging economies have crucially increased and BRICS cemented its position in the global economy. The group is important for three main reasons: (1) the crucial size of its economy, (2) the increasing economic growth rate of its member states, with which it occupies a substantial place in the world economy and the growing political demand of its members in the global governance in parallel with their economic growth (Venkatesh 2013:72). Thus, BRICS had a chance to collectively increase developing countries' voice and position itself to balance the traditionally developed powers.

BRICS countries, known as the emerging economies, pioneered the developing world in trade, investment, capital and service flows. They represent the fast-growing

developing economies. Thus, they spent a lot of effort reconstituting the global economic governance (Modi 2011:6). They emphasized win-win cooperation, mutual respect and mutual development and the non-interference principle. One of the prominent aims of BRICS is to increase the bargaining power of the member states within the existing Western-dominated institutions – basically in the IMF and the WB. Thus, they are not against the existing structure like many other Southern institutions. Contrarily, they support the reform in existing structures, such as in the UN and WTO, to better benefit the developing countries.

Currently, the BRICS growth rate has slowed down. While the Russian and Brazilian economies are in recession, the Chinese economy has been experiencing difficulty reaching the determined economic growth rate (7%) since the end of 2014 (OPEC 2015:21). Moreover, there are still many areas in which the member states fail to agree because of their different individual positions. However, "Despite some disappointments in some of the BRIC economies, led by China and India, their collective weight in global GDP and importance continues to rise," said Jim O'Neill, the former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. chief economist who coined the acronym BRIC(S) in 2001, without South Africa. According to 2012 statistics, BRICS constituted 25 percent of the world GDP and 18 percent of the global trade. Moreover, the bloc has 11 percent of the voting share in the IMF while the US has 17 percent (Iqbal and Christina de Araujo 2015: 111). Thus, this relatively new institution, compared to Western-rooted institutions, still has a limited capacity to be an alternative; however, it cannot be denied that its role has been rising within the existing international structure.

2.3.3 The Challenges of South-South Cooperation

Since 2008, the cooperation between developing countries has been dramatically augmenting. Although SSC became a substantial opportunity for developing countries, there are still some challenges.

Firstly, there is no certain internationally accepted definition of SSC, which creates difficulty in making a guideline for cooperation and defining sustainable cooperative areas between organizations or countries.

Secondly, the institutional incapability of the Southern countries and the disconnection between the existing cooperation mechanisms and institutions are the other problems. For example, there are still no effective institutions for financial flows and capital allocation (Simplicio 2011:19). There should be perpetual arrangements and mechanisms between Southern countries. However, it is clear that the South has not reached that capability yet. As a result, establishing the institutions, rules and procedures are prominent necessities for the South. Additionally, the lack of information and transparency on the agreements is another problem. In general, the agreements sign by the political leaders and officials but they do not pay much attention to the local management systems. Therefore, along with the lack of institutional capacity, the lack of information and transparency on the agreements cause some problems for the implementation of agreements (Davies 2010:12).

Thirdly, there are many differences between developing countries, such as geography, economic conditions, culture and population. Thus, it is vitally important for Southern countries to cooperate on common interests and concerns instead of focusing on or emphasizing their differences.

Fourthly, the intra-South trade has augmented via SSC; however, it could cause some environmental and social problems. For instance, the Southern trade and investments usually focus on the energy and mineral sectors, (Carvalho Resende 2013) which mainly raise the concerns of the local people and the international community. Therefore, diversifying their cooperation areas and, particularly, satisfying the local people are very crucial for sustainable relations.

Finally, there is a myth of cooperation between equals (Jules and Morais de Sa e Silva 2008:58). Nevertheless, there is a significant difference among developing countries. Namely, some are more developed than the others, or some develop faster than the others. As a result, the stronger states may dominate the weaker ones in the coming period. Indeed, the stronger states could turn themselves into colonizer states (Altinbas 2013:49). As a result, if the gap between the developing countries multiplies, it will be the defining factor for the future of South-South cooperation (Davies 2010:5). UNCTAD stated that the recent SSC trade patterns are the same as the previous South-North patterns (IMF 2010:73-138). Therefore, if these patterns

continue, SSC may not create the expected results. Then, SSC could be another tool used by the developing countries against the less-developed ones (Biygautane and Chauvin 2013:202). Although there are such kinds of challenges among Southern countries, in the current situation, it is clear that the notion of the “South” has worked and became a mobilizing symbol and ideological expression of shared developmental challenges of developing countries.

To overcome these challenges, Southern countries should work together to improve the aid effectiveness, focus on practice-policy alliances for more efficient solutions, integrate to the other international entities, process and enforce result-oriented approaches and improve transparency (TT-SSC 2011:2-4).

2.4 Neomercantilism

Neomercantilism depends on the mercantilism that was the dominant school between the 15th century and the first half of the 18th century in Europe. In these years, the world economic order, which is called mercantilism, was dominated by the European colonial empires, which were Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, England and France (Frieden 2012: 18). Adam Smith named this model the ‘mercantilist system’ in his book titled “*The Wealth of Nations*”. In this book, while he discusses the development of the capitalist system, he also strongly opposes and criticizes the mercantilist system practices. Mercantilism depends on three main principles on which all agree: (1) a national and strong state is necessary; (2) precious materials would increase the national power of the states; and (3) if the countries do not have such precious materials, the way to gain national wealth is through international trade (Smith 1977:564-565). Therefore, the preservation of the state power and controlling the economic processes are the two core aims of mercantilism. Although there are different approaches within the school, neomercantilism is based on almost the same core principles. However, the practices have changed over time with the change of international economic practices.

Mercantilism was the dominant school until the beginning of the 18th century, but then the new political and economic developments in the international system eroded the mercantilist practices. Over the course of the 19th century, most of the

states opened their market and reduced the state intervention to the economy (Frieden 2012: 22). However, after the economic depression in the 1930s and the end of Second World War, mercantilist practices started again (Schmitt 1979:94). Many countries implemented and favored protectionist measures to rebuild their destroyed economies (Cwik 2011:8). Between the 1930s and 1970s, many governments raised trade barriers, limited currency convertibility, subsidized domestic manufacturing and provided incentives for the export of products (Frieden 2012: 28-34). Therefore, neomercantilism was once again on the international agenda in those years (Coleman 1980:789), although it was challenged by the globalization after the 1970s.

2.4.1 The Main Actor ‘States’

States are the main actors in the mercantilist and neomercantilist systems. The state should have the main role in developing a strong economy. A strong state means a strong economy (Holslag 2006:135). States implement protectionist measures and tariffs, build barriers or encourage exports (Uzunidis and Laperche 2011:375). Therefore, a strong state is necessary for the mercantilist system to implement these policies. Although, according to mercantilism, states compete with each other, in the neomercantilist system, the number of firms has dramatically increased and a new kind of competitiveness has developed between the firms. However, states are a strong supporter of the big national companies, namely monopolies, doing business in the international system. The new mercantilism is in favor of industrialized countries and their monopolies as the policies serve their interests. The state’s backing accelerates the expansion of firms and their activities in the international arena. When the prices of the products disposed of in the global market are determined by the monopolies, it guarantees profit as all costs are included. Thus, it creates a trade surplus, which in turn benefits the state in terms of creating productive investments and increasing the country’s footprint in international trade (Uzunidis and Laperche 2004:336-337). However, there is also a risk for the states that these monopolies could gain too much power and start to behave as states or could force states to behave as they want (Uzunidis and Laperche 2011:375).

The other significant issue is that there is an important linkage between the obtained precious materials and the wealth or the power of the states. When mercantilism was a dominant economic system, gold and silver were considered the source of wealth for a nation state; however, in new mercantilism, having current surplus is considered the source of power. Thus, if the states do not have precious resources, they could gain them only by trading (Smith 1977:587).

2.4.2 Having Trade Surplus

The most crucial issue in the mercantilist doctrine is having current surplus (Schmitt 1979:94). According to neomercantilism, the only way to gain money in the free market is producing and selling goods or providing services to those who want to buy (Rothbard 1964:141). However, export is not the only issue; import regulations are also crucial (Schmitt 1979:94). If a country's exports exceed its imports, it will result in trade surplus. To reach this aim, the states have abolished the restrictions on exports while imposing taxes on imports. (Smith 1977: 587, 852). Thus, the key issue is integration of domestic borders and expansion abroad (Williams 1958:422). The import could be limited depending on two reasons. Firstly, if a product could be produced within the country, consumption and imports of such kind of foreign products are restricted. Secondly, if the foreign trade between some countries creates disadvantageous results, it could be limited by high customs tariffs or by imposing certain prohibitions. On the other hand, export is strongly encouraged by tax refunds, special incentive payments, trade agreements with foreign countries and having colonies (Smith 1977: 587-588). Hence, this system emphasizes the source of profit and wealth lie behind foreign trade.

However, according to mercantilism and neomercantilism, trade is considered a zero-sum-game that means if there is a winner, there is a loser as well (Gee 2009:254). Therefore, the states apply protectionist measures by aiming to protect the domestic producers and employees, and so artificially increase the competitiveness of their domestic goods (Uzunidis and Laperche 2011:389). Thus, such manipulation in trade relations aims to improve national manufacturers. Additionally, it is believed that greater export and lesser import will lead to more

employment opportunities in the domestic labour force (Schmitt 1979:94-95). It aims to exclude the competitors and maximize trade benefits by unilateral state decisions (Guerrieri and Padoan 1986). Therefore, the monopolies in the domestic economy are crucial for foreign trade. In this regard, states and business circles strongly collaborate. However, such a zero-sum game usually benefits the industrialized states as they are in advantageous positions in foreign accounts, having surplus and using their currency in trade, but it is not so for the poor economies. Therefore, if these industrialized countries aim is development in poor economies, they have to encourage imports (Uzunidis and Laperche 2004:336).

In the 1980s, it was almost impossible for the governments to pursue such strict protectionist policies. Therefore, they started to implement commercial and monetary policies (Uzunidis and Laperche 2004:339). Neomercantilist protectionist practices include pay quota practices, subsidies, tariffs and the currency manipulation (Atik 2012:14-17). While governments restrict the imports of goods and services via quota practices and tariffs, they encourage exports via subsidies. One of the most significant policies is currency manipulation (Cwik 2011:9) aiming to protect the domestic market, which leads to the further development of neomercantilism. Although in the previous century, expansionism, which was based on military power to reach precious materials, was favored, nowadays the most important way to achieve power is using currency manipulation to increase exports and limit imports (Atik 2012:14-17). The basic logic of currency manipulation is that countries keep their currency undervalued, so their products become cheaper in the international market. This increases the competitive advantage of the countries' products. If they export more than import, more job opportunities are created in the economy, which increases the domestic consumption and results in GDP growth (Cwik 2011:10).

As a result, neomercantilism basically supports the management of international economic activities by the state. Further, it aims to enhance exports while restricting imports by supporting monopolies as they protect the domestic economy and increase the wealth and the power of the nation (Uzunidis and Laperche 2004:343). Thus, neomercantilism mainly aims at self-sufficiency, avoiding external dependence and supporting the strengthening of new industries (Biber 2011:33). Additionally, it

points out monopoly profits as well as state intervention for business interests against external competitors (Guerrieri and Padoan 1986). However, it needs to be emphasized that neomercantilism is not a unified theory and that its practices can change according to the government and private sector attitudes (Gee 2009:253) and the global environment (Uzunidis and Laperche 2011:380).

2.5 Conclusion

To sum up, the development of the Global South is currently one of the most crucial issues within the world's agenda. Although modernization theorists see the way of development in Westernization, dependency theorists strongly criticize them by claiming that the Western world created an economic system that intentionally keeps the underdeveloped countries underdeveloped. Thus, they claim a systemic change within the global capitalist economic system. Further, dependency theorists claim that the Southern countries should loosen their linkages with the North and strengthen cooperation between Southern countries. Therefore, South-South cooperation is seen as a great advantage for the development of the Global South. In the last decades, the capacities of some Southern countries have dramatically developed, now called emerging economies, and they have started to transfer their experiences to the other developing and underdeveloped countries. Additionally, they created many Southern institutions and have become active within the existing Western-dominated institutions to raise their voice within the international system. Therefore, although there are still some challenges for South-South cooperation, it is seen as more advantageous than the existing North-South relations, which are considered as mercantilist and imperial. In this regard, it is highly debatable whether the emerging Southern countries would follow the same path as their Northern partners. That is, Southern countries may or may not develop mercantilist trade policies against the less developed countries as they gain power. In the neomercantilist system, the countries apply protectionist measures to trade policies to protect their own domestic market, but this measure put the underdeveloped or less developed countries in a disadvantageous position. In light of this literature, in the next chapter, I will analyze China and Africa relations. I will try to find out whether

the dynamics of China's approach to Africa can be considered within the framework of South-South cooperation, namely win-win, or if China's policies are the same as the Northern countries, namely neomercantilist.

CHAPTER 3

CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS

3.1 Introduction

China's economic and political weight in the international system has been growing (Lagerkvist 2009:121). China cooperates with many countries all over the world and the African continent is one of its crucial regions. The history of China-Africa relations goes back to the mid-1950s when the Bandung Conference became an opportunity for Chinese and African leaders to meet and initiate diplomatic relationships. In those years, China-Africa relations were dominated by ideological purposes (Men and Barton 2011:6). Thus, economic relations with Africa had been neglected by both China and the other emerging powers. In the 1990s, due to Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and pragmatism, China prioritized its economic relations with the developed countries, such as the US, Europe, and Japan for economic benefit and technological assistance (Mitchell and McGiffert 2007:4). Thus, Africa was irrelevant in this commercial nature of China's foreign policy (Taylor 1998:443).

However, since the 2000s, their relations have gained momentum. Africa became one of the most attractive regions (Carbone 2011:204), so China-Africa political, economic and social relations have substantially developed. For some, it is called the new "age of dragon" in Africa (Alden et al 2008:2). Currently, China's penetration into the region by trade, investment and aid has been growing at an enormous pace (Lagerkvist 2009:121). This engagement has been taking the attention of many countries from east to west. There are different approaches to China's engagement in Africa. While some claim that it is (neo)colonial, (neo)imperialist or (neo)mercantilist, others claim that it develops within the context of South-South cooperation, which is a win-win cooperation, namely, in benefit of both China and Africa. In this regard, Bodomo argues that while Africa benefits economically from

China, referring to Chinese aid and investments, China benefits politically from Africa (Bodomo 2009:173).

3.2 Literature Review for China-Africa Relations

According to Chris Alden, there are three possible approaches for China's existence in Africa: China as a *development partner*, an *economic competitor* or a *colonizer*. China as a *development partner* aims to transfer its experiences to Africa and create close cooperation for the development of both China and Africa. China as an *economic competitor* aims to grab Africa's rich resources without taking into consideration the necessities of African countries and respecting their concerns. According to this interpretation, African development is challenged by Chinese existence. China as a *colonizer* aims to expel the traditional Western powers in the region and partially control some African regions by cooperating with the African elites (Alden 2007:5-6).

People are divided about these different approaches. Some are totally optimistic, believing that China is a development partner in Africa. Deborah Brautigam and He Wenping are among these optimists that emphasize Chinese success in Africa. Wenping claims that, although China's growing need for resources is important for its engagement in Africa, its interests go far beyond that. China as a developing country considers sustainable development, political support and its global position, which is in favor of both China and Africa (Wenping 2007:24).

Some others are cautious about Chinese engagement; while they highlight the problematic areas, they also accept the positive outcomes of the Chinese approach. Among those who hold this view are authors Chris Alden, Johan Lagerkvist, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong. According to the outcomes of Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong's field research in Africa, the authors claim that African perspective is not as negative as the Western media has portrayed, but it is also not as positive as the Chinese resources asserted. They claim that, although the African perspective towards China is positive in general, almost all people who answered their questions still emphasize the negative side of the story (Sautman and Hairong 2009:729).

There are also some skeptical authors, such as Joshua Eisenman, Henning Melber, and Roger Southall, who highlight the negative impacts of China in the continent. They believe that China is a colonizer. Melber argues that new, emerging powers, such as China, India and Brazil, are all imperialist powers. These governments manage the export and import dynamics for their further industrialization process and target the African markets and resources (2007:8). Whereas China claims that it has made a positive change within the system regarding Africa, Melber claims that China's practices, such as giving loans, aiming for privatization, liberalization, infrastructure development and so on, are not so different than traditional donors. He emphasizes the fear of China turning into a colonial power rather than becoming a new true alternative (2008:400).

Although there are different approaches, Chinese rhetoric clearly emphasizes China's goodwill and their concern about African development. Considering China-Africa relations, Chinese leaders and officials always put emphasis on the importance of their bilateral relations and define their relations within the framework of SSC. However, China's challenge is that completely turning this rhetoric into practice is not very easy. Although most of the actors are under state control, the number has been increasing, and some of which are out of state control, particularly private companies. Private companies consider and act for their own profit, thus, the outcomes of their practices may sometimes contradict Chinese rhetoric.

3.3. Africa in China's Foreign Policy

From the 1960s onwards, China has ideologically engaged with Africa. China has supported anti-colonial movements, and after the Sino-Soviet political and ideological split, it used Africa as a battleground against the Soviet Union. Additionally, China wanted the support of Africa to be replaced with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and in 1971, China was recognized by the UN with a substantial amount of African countries' votes (Mitchell and McGiffert 2007:13-17). However, from the 1980s onwards, economic interests started to motive China's foreign policy, which inescapably influenced China's Africa policy (Kjøllestad and Welle-Strand 2010:4). Africa was rich in terms of natural resources and could have been a

significant market for Chinese products. Moreover, China aims to obtain support from African countries in the international system as their interests usually converge as developing countries. Pursuing common policies in the international system would be in favor of both China and Africa. China defines itself as the largest developing country in the world, and aims to usher in other developing countries to help with their development, as President Jiang Zemin emphasized in his speech in the opening ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). In this respect, since the 1990s, China and Africa relations have increasingly developed in economic, political and social terms.

Though China's relations with developing countries are not currently based on ideological reasons, China still sticks to Bandung's spirit. In other words, China still bases its relations with developing countries on the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' formulated in 1953 (Mitchell and McGiffert 2007:19). In June 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech at the 60th anniversary of the initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence declared that the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have effectively upheld the rights and interests of the developing world" (China.org.cn 2014) These principles are (1) mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China). Along with many other developing countries, these principles make up the core of China's Africa policies.

3.3.1 Mutual Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

This principle implies that each state is free to opt for its political, economic, social and cultural systems in its own territory and to defend their territorial integrity (Hong 2014:503). Thus, any attempt to intervene in the domestic or internal affairs of a state is considered illegitimate. The notion of sovereignty is the core of China's foreign relations (Tull 2008:118). In his speech at the 60th anniversary of the initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in June 2014, Xi Jinping emphasized 'sovereignty' as the most important characteristic of any independent

state and the assurance of its national interests. He repeated that any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country is not permitted (China.org.cn 2014).

3.3.2 Mutual Non-Aggression

The mutual non-aggression principle guarantees international peace and security. It argues that all states should avoid the use of force in their international relations, and that they should support common and collective security (Hong 2014:503). China claims that any disputes ought to be resolved via dialogue, consultation, and peaceful means. Mutual trust should be enhanced and the use of violence should be denied. China indicates that no country could be excluded from taking a role in regional and international security issues and sharing the burden as an equal partner. It emphasizes the importance of a collective stance against non-conventional security threats, such as all forms of terrorism (China.org.cn 2014).

3.3.3. Mutual Non-Interference in Internal Affairs

This principle is a guarantee to protect a state's independence and a mantle against power politics and hegemonism. It implies no state has the right to intervene in the internal and external affairs of other states, directly or indirectly (Hong 2014:503). Chinese President Hu Jintao in his speech in the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China said, "We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them" (People's Daily Online 2007). Beijing believes that the principle of non-interference is crucial for the future and sustainability of bilateral relations (Wenping 2007:33). Although China insists on non-interference, internal conflicts have been increasing in many African countries, (Boutros-Ghali 2004:376) which could damage Chinese interests or investments. Therefore, many question what China would do if this damage increases in the future.

3.3.4 Equality and Mutual Benefit

According to this principle, without looking at their political, economic and social structure or whether they are big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, all states are considered equal. Based on their national interests, all states ought to seek mutual benefit in the international system while respecting one another's interests (Hong 2014:504). Mutual benefit refers to sustainable economic and social development (Boutros-Ghali 2004:376) and emphasizes win-win cooperation to encourage states to deny the zero-sum principle and support one another's development (China.org.cn 2014). In 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited eleven African countries in four weeks to advance SSC. In these visits, instead of *aid*, Zhao stressed *cooperation* in his speeches (Brautigam 2009:53). Similarly, in 1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Vice Presidents, and the Chinese Premier visited Africa for the first time and China's policy changed from aid donation to economic cooperation for mutual benefit (Brautigam 2009:83). China grounded its relations with Africa on the principle of non-interference and equality of states. Therefore, without looking at their domestic problems, poor governance, and other issues, China currently cooperates with all African countries as equal partners on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit (Osei-Hwedie 2012:3).

3.3.5 Peaceful Co-Existence

This principle promotes that, in spite of their differences states should solve international conflicts with peaceful means and respect to one another's differences. Thus, it opposes the "uniformisation" of the world. China believes that the precondition of peaceful coexistence is economic, political and cultural diversity (Boutros-Ghali 2004:377). Xi Jinping said, "In today's world, there are 7 billion people of more than 2,500 ethnic groups who live in over 200 countries and regions and speak more than 5,000 languages. Different nations and civilizations are rich in diversity and have their own distinct features. No one is superior or inferior to others" (China.org.cn 2014). Therefore, no country should seek supremacy. China emphasizes that this diversity should be protected and not forced into conformity (Boutros-Ghali 2004:377).

China bases its foreign policy with the African countries on these core principles. However, beyond principles, it is necessary to look at the practical relations between the two regions to truly understand China-Africa relations.

3.4 China and Africa Relations beyond Principles

In the 1970s, China was an agrarian economy and had many natural resources, such as oil, gold and copper. After the 1973 oil crisis, Japan began to import oil from China in return for technology, establishing modern plantation and the export of some materials by giving concessional loans. These resource-backed concessional loans were very convenient for China as they allowed China to import technology and benefit from the expertise of Japan. By the end of 1978, they signed almost 75 agreements for financing key projects for the modernization of China and all were agreed to be paid by oil (Brautigam 2009:46-47). China clearly benefited from such relations and now aims to pursue the same pattern with the African countries. Additionally, China emphasizes that its relations with Africa are based on equality, friendship, consultation, partnership and mutual benefit (Osei-Hwedie 2012:5).

With the realization of China's economic reforms after the 1990s, (Grimm 2014:996) Africa became a crucial region for Chinese commercial interests and investment opportunities. In that time, many investors were encouraged by the government to go and invest in Africa. In addition, Africa was a favorite to gain endorsement in the international arena when Beijing's domestic and international interests conflicted with international norms (Taylor 2007:4). In this regard, African governments' support was crucial for China after Tiananmen when China was criticized harshly by international actors (Men and Barton 2011:9).

African countries had not had any strategic perspective about their relations with China, so it was usually defined in bilateral terms. However, the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 became a tangible turning point in China-Africa relations. FOCAC provided an opportunity for member states to discuss and coordinate their needs, priorities and desires for promoting continental development by regularly bringing almost all African countries together. Therefore, the establishment of FOCAC led to the institutionalization of China-Africa relations. The previous pattern had changed

and the African governments and civil society organizations had a crucial chance to be more organized (Alden 2007:77). Thus, besides providing many advantages in bilateral and regional terms, it also allowed China and the African countries to speak as one voice in international organizations (Eisenman 2007:35). FOCAC seeks mutual economic development, poverty elimination, the development of China and Africa's competitiveness in the international market, and the establishment of a new, fair and equitable world economic and political system, in which the interests of developing countries are also considered (Osei-Hwedie 2012:6). It demonstrates that China aims for a long-term cooperation with Africa. In the first FOCAC meeting, it was declared that China-Africa relations were 'free of political conditionality and would serve the interests of both China and Africa' (Alden 2007:31). The only political conditionality that China proposes is the recognition of China's 'One China' policy (Mitchell 2007: 114).

As a result, four factors are crucial for China's engagement in Africa: (1) commercial interests, which aim to provide resource security, namely energy, minerals and food, and to find new market opportunities; (2) new investment possibilities; (3) the provision of development assistant by aid; and (4) the promotion of national representation in the international system by creating strategic partnerships against the dominance of Western powers (Alden 2006:148-153). Hence, it can be claimed that China's Africa policy is directed by both its economic and political interests (Osei-Hwedie 2012:2). Although it is difficult to discretely analyze Chinese economic, political and social policies towards Africa as they are heavily connected to one another, the following part will go into the details of these tangible relations.

3.4.1 Trade

Africa is an important region for China because of its natural resources – particularly minerals and oil and as a market for cheap Chinese products, such as electronic equipment, machinery, and some vehicles (ITC Trade Map). Since the 1980s, with Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, Chinese companies have been supported both diplomatically and financially by the government to expand abroad

(Brautigam 2009:97-99). Therefore, Africa became such an outstanding region for Chinese companies that they have invested in many sectors and exported most of their products from Africa to China. As a result of China's expansion in the continent, Chinese trade with Africa has grown 18-fold between 2001 and 2015. (ITC Trade Map). Eisenman claims that five causal factors determine China and Africa trade: "China's comparative advantage in labor-intensive and capital-intensive production; Africa's abundant natural resource endowments; China's rapid economic growth; China's emphasis on infrastructure building at home and in Africa; and the emergence of economies of scale in China's shipping and light manufacturing sectors" (Eisenman 2012:793).

Therefore, it is strictly criticized to be in favor of China because, although China basically imports raw materials and minerals, it exports electronic devices, machinery, and vehicles, which causes a trade imbalance between the parties. In this sense, China took some measures to balance the trade volume. However, Eisenman argues that the unequal trade relationship between China and Africa could turn into a colonial one, which is a potential risk regarding the current structure. He criticizes China as it accuses Western powers for their trade patterns with African countries because he argues that China pursues almost the same pattern with the West while using an anti-imperialist and mutual gains rhetoric (2012:808-809). Similarly, Melber argues that China-Africa trade is a classical trade pattern, in which Africa exports raw materials in return for manufactured products from China. Thus, for him, China did not make any structural changes in the trade pattern (2008:394).

The trade impact of China in Africa is ambiguous as it changes according to the trade pattern of each country. In other words, each country's economic structure and the traded goods define the pattern of the bilateral trade relationship (Sautman and Hairong 2008:22). By increasing trade, it is supposed that the exports of goods and services would increase and this would provide more employment opportunities to the local people. However, it is difficult to say trade automatically results in development in all countries (Grimm 2014:1003) because the trade imbalance also causes some other problems.

However, it is obvious that increasing trade and Chinese exported inexpensive products benefit many people in the region and provide an alternative to the Western traders. The joint ventures with Chinese firms also enable African companies to integrate into the global trade system and enhance their standards to international or at least regional levels (Osei-Hwedie 2012:14). If the African governments adopt proper policies to protect their local market, they will benefit from this trade and enhance their companies' competitiveness in the international marketplace (Broadman 2008:1).

3.4.1.1 Resource Trade

Resource security is one of the most important reasons for China's engagement in the African continent. China has been motivated by Africa's rich energy and mineral resources since the 1990s (Osei-Hwedie 2012:1). In 1988, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) were established and started to cooperate with foreign companies by the political and financial support of the Chinese government. This paved the way for the emergence of the first Chinese multinational corporations (Alden 2007:39).

China became a net oil importer in 1993 (Grimm 2014:996). Since 2000, crude oil, Africa's top exporting product, has made up two-thirds of Africa's total export value to China (Eisenman 2012:807). China's top five import categories from sub-Saharan Africa—mineral products, base metals (including oil), precious stones and metals, wood products, and textiles and clothing—alone make up 90% of its total purchases. In fact, by 2009, nearly 80% of China's exports from Africa were metals and petroleum products. As the Chinese firms are supported by the state, they are highly competitive in the market. Thus, they are very active in grabbing the key resources in some sectors (Alden 2007:38). However, this kind of resource trade is highly criticized as being exploitative, mostly by Western sources. The other scholars claim that it is exaggerated by the West because China's involvement into the continent is still so limited when compared with the Western countries and also it is too early to come such a conclusion (Jiang 2009: 586).

Although, minerals are still the priority for China, over time the Chinese imports have been diversified. Currently, Chinese international companies invest in many sectors in Africa, and these companies are not merely energy companies so they also export other commodities to China, particularly agricultural products. As a result of the reduction in agricultural land due to the urbanization and declining number of agricultural workers in rural areas, China became a prominent basic food products importer (Henderson 2010:13). In this regard, Africa is considered a prominent region with its rich resources for both China and Africa's food security. By 2009, China put 200 agricultural projects into force and initiated 60 agricultural investment projects in Africa with the aim of increasing food security in both regions and increasing the amount of import of agricultural products to China (Cassell 2013).

3.4.1.2 Africa as a Market

Africa is not only important for resources, but it is also a crucial destination for Chinese products. It is a natural market for cheap Chinese products with its population of 975 million (Wenping 2007:26), 42.7 percent of whom live on less than \$1.90 a day (The World Bank 2016). Chinese products are cheaper than Western and South African products, particularly in terms of construction and telecommunication sectors. As the products get cheaper, more people have a chance to reach them, so it is expected that it will facilitate the economic development of the region (Corkin 2007:319).

However, Chinese enterprises are being criticized for ousting African enterprises and hindering the emergence of new African companies, as the West has done for centuries. In this scenario, Africa's traditional role would only be extended to China (Keet 2010:27). Although these Chinese products could create problems for domestic producers, some argue it could also have positive impacts on African producers. For instance, the competition in the market with Chinese companies would increase the competitive capability of the local firms in the long run, which will help them to reach the international standards. In other words, due to the competition with other companies, African firms could advance in technology and gain better labor skills. Moreover, by cooperating with Chinese companies, African

firms could gain larger scale opportunities. As a result, they could gain more at the end of the day rather than mere cooperation with regional African countries. Broadman also argues that after Chinese involvement, the capabilities of African governments have also developed in terms of dealing with problems, governance, and its regulatory system, which are problematic in many African countries due to the imperfect judicial system, weak institutions, lack of transparency and corruption (Broadman 2008:5-7).

3.4.1.3 The Rise of China-Africa Trade

As a result of increasing cooperation between China and Africa, trade has been dramatically growing in recent years. Between 2000 and 2012, the share of China-Africa trade in China's total foreign trade has increased from 2.23 percent to 5.13 per cent; the share of China's imports from Africa grew from 2.47 per cent to 6.23 per cent and the share of exports from 2.03 per cent to 4.16 per cent. However, although the percentages have increased, Africa still constitutes a small part of China's total foreign trade.

For Africa, the fluctuation is more remarkable. In the same time period, the share of China-Africa trade in Africa's total trade volume increased from 3.82 per cent to 16.13 per cent; the share of Africa's export to China rose from 3.76 per cent to 18.07 per cent and the share of Africa's imports from China went up from 3.88 per cent to 14.11 per cent (Information Office of the State Council 2013:4). In 2009, with the \$91 billion trade volume, China became Africa's largest trade partner. According to 2015 statistics, the total trade volume between China and Africa has reached \$172,9 billion,² when it was merely \$9.9 billion in 2001 (ITC Trade Map). Although the amount of trade has increased, which provided many opportunities to both sides, the increasing imbalance is raising concerns for the future of bilateral trade. According to 2016 statistics while Africa's export value to China is \$54.7billion, China's export value is \$89.8 billion, which is decreased from \$105,7

² According to Xinhua News Agency it has reached \$220 billion in 2014.

billion (ITC Trade Map). Therefore, China is trying to balance the trade volume with different strategies.

3.4.1.4 Chinese Precautions for China-Africa Trade

Currently, the most important issue regarding China and Africa trade is the widening imbalance in bilateral trade. In other words, Africa's increasing foreign trade deficit with China. Eisenman claims that while the trade balance is in favor of resource-rich and resource-exporting countries, such as Angola, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, the resource-poor countries, such as Ghana, Benin, Ethiopia and Liberia, have a trade deficit with China (Eisenman 2012:805-806). China tries to eliminate or balance this imbalance to some extent by taking some precautions. One of China's prominent attempts is the zero-tariff treatment for African products. In the 2003 FOCAC Summit, Wen Jiabao pledged a zero-tariff for exported products of less developed African countries. While in 2005, the list of zero-tariff products included 190 products, it was raised to 440 in 2006 for each country, Broadman 2008:5) and currently, 454 products are free from tariffs for the least developed African countries (Brautigam 2010). It aims to encourage African producers to export to China. Secondly, China helps Africa improve their quality of products and build brands. Thirdly, China's practice of aid for encouraging African countries for trade is very curial and effective in this regard (Information Office of the State Council 2013:5). Moreover, against the criticism about trade imbalance, it is claimed that this issue is not only found within China-Africa trade, but that exporting raw materials and importing finished products is a challenge Africa has within its trade relations with the rest of the world as well (Zhong 2015).

Another issue is that, while Chinese companies have brought new products to African people they have not seen or could not afford before, they undermined the existing suppliers (Alden 2007:49). The increasing number of Chinese small and medium enterprises offering low-cost products has had negative impacts on African businesses. Although this brings the criticism that China is hurting African-owned industries, particularly textile and plastic industries, China is trying to solve the problem. For instance, as a result of the export of cheap Chinese products, some

textile and garment factories in South Africa were closed, which increased unemployment. However, China applied a self-imposed quota for the imports of these products to South Africa (Wenping 2007:26).

The other issue for China is the poor quality of these products (Corkin 2008:8). However, Zhong Man Ying, the Director General of the West Asia & Africa Section in the Ministry of Commerce says that this is the issue of supply and demand. China exports high-quality products as well, but for now, as Africa demands or can afford primarily low-quality products, China exports only those products. However, she claims that as the middle class in African countries grows, they will demand more high-quality products in the near future (Zhong 2015).

Overall, it is clear that China is making efforts to overcome these problematic issues. However, although most of the firms operating in Africa are state-owned, there are market forces which are beyond China's control. Thus, China's ability to control the trade and activities of these firms are limited (Eisenman 2012:793). In this regard, the capacity and capability of the African governments are crucial to take measures against Chinese enterprises and products.

3.4.2 Foreign Direct Investment

China strongly encourages financial institutions and state and private enterprises to invest in Africa. Although since the 1990s, China has been interested in Africa's raw materials, it has engaged in diversifying its investments from energy and mining to other sectors in the last few years (Osei-Hwedie 2012:7). Along with energy and mining, in China's 'going global' strategy, 26 specific sectors were targeted, including agriculture, machinery, automobiles, transportation, and construction (Corkin 2007:310). Therefore, the countries in which China invests have expanded from oil producing countries, such as Sudan, Angola and Nigeria, to others, such as South Africa, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Senegal and Uganda (Broadman 2008:3). From 2009 to 2012, China's FDI in Africa increased 20.5 percent annually. More than 2,000 companies have invested in 50 African countries in different sectors, such as energy, mining, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and telecommunication (Information Office of the State Council 2013:5). According to

MOFCOM's statistics, in 2013, Chinese FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa reached \$3.1 billion and FDI stocks reached \$24 billion, which make up 7 percent of the total FDI flow to Sub-Saharan Africa (Pigato and Tang 2015:10). However, in the 2015 China-Africa Business Forum in Johannesburg, Xi Jinping declared that the total stock of Chinese investment had reached \$101 billion in 3,100 Africa-based enterprises (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China 2015).

Although there are still some problems between the parties,³ exponentially increasing Chinese investments in the region are welcomed by the African people in general. Lukas Lundin's story is very crucial in this regard. Lukas Lundin, a mining entrepreneur, drove from Cairo to Cape Town by motorcycle (three times the distance from New York to California). In the five-week-journey, Lundin drove 12,000 kilometers. 85 percent of the roads on which he traveled were no different than the roads in California, which surprised him. From the signs 'this road was constructed with the grateful assistance of the Government of the People's Republic of China' on his way, he understood how these roads had come to life (Moyo 2009:98). Therefore, such kinds of beneficial and fast investments that had not been seen before are considered very positive by the African people in general. During his visit to the African Union in 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared that China expects to achieve \$400 billion in trade volume with Africa and raise its direct investment in the continent to \$100 billion by 2020 (Kuo 2015). This increasing engagement is expected to contribute to African development.

3.4.2.1 Chinese Main Investment Sectors

Investment in African mineral sectors, particularly energy, is the most important investment for China in Africa. To decrease dependency on Middle Eastern resources, Chinese companies aim to enlarge their investments in the African energy industry. Although oil imports from Africa are significant for China as Africa consists of almost 18 percent of China's crude oil import, (EIA 2015) exporting oil to China is more significant for Africa. For example, export to China made up 49 of

³ The problems will be explained in the following parts.

percent of Angola's total oil export (EIA 2016), 86 percent of Sudan's (EIA 2014) and 43 percent of the Congo's (EIA 2014) . China's crude import depends on its bilateral relations with oil producing countries. China not only invests in oil, but it also invests in copper and cobalt in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, platinum and iron ore in South Africa, and gold and silver in Zimbabwe (Moyo 2009:105).

Agriculture is another crucial sector for China's investment in terms of food security and poverty reduction. China put great efforts into improving local farmland and water conservation. Beijing aims to increase Africa's self-reliance capacity in agriculture by building demonstration centers on agricultural technology and sending experts and technicians to train the local farmers (Information Office of the State Council 2013:8). China currently prioritizes local food security and market stability in the region. Chinese assistance and investments in the agricultural sector are an opportunity for Africa to decrease its poverty and develop this sector (Cassell 2013). However, China's handicap is that it introduces almost the same agricultural techniques to all countries. Thus, while for some countries, China's techniques have worked and even transferred to neighboring countries by trade and exchanges, for others, the methods failed due to the inappropriate techniques and lack of equipment (Brautigam 1998:19). Moreover, in some situations, although China offered appropriate techniques, they could not be implemented due to the lack of support of local governments, institutional obstacles, problems in implementation processes, and local people's rejection of new technics due to their cultural values and beliefs (Brautigam 1998:30). China already invested \$250 billion in Mozambique and expects to raise it to \$2.5 billion, and China pledged a \$5 billion investment in Angola's agricultural sector (Horta 2014). Moreover, China invested in the agricultural sectors of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia and so forth (Brautigam 1998:21).

It is estimated that Africa needs a \$900 billion infrastructure investment, hence, the Chinese interest for building or rehabilitation infrastructure is more than welcomed by Africans (Kuo 2015). Infrastructure construction is a crucial means by which China can improve people's livelihoods and reduce poverty in Africa. With

the support of the Chinese government, enterprises mostly invest in the construction of transportation, communications and electric power projects. While the Western countries usually emphasize human rights, transparency, gender, environment, participation or leadership, China focused on Africa's more urgent economic needs, such as construction and infrastructure projects (Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 2010:8). In other words, China finances high profile and prestigious infrastructure projects, such as dams, railroads, stadiums, ministry buildings, schools and hospitals, which are usually neglected by Western donors (Pehnelt 2007:10). They are built in a very short time with hundreds or thousands of Chinese laborers (Alden 2007:3). Eisenman claims that the Chinese constructed rail networks to link the resource processing areas to shipping ports, so it aims to have resources exported to China and thus help African countries reach Chinese manufactured products (Eisenman 2012:802). Even with such goals in mind, it is not only benefitting China, but it also benefits the African countries.

China also invests in the telecommunication sector in many African countries. Particularly Chinese Huawei and ZTE are the crucial telecommunication companies in Africa that provide both service and products. Currently, Huawei is invested in 40 different African countries and ZTE in 26 (Hsueh and Byron Nelson 2013:7). They have constructed a telecom network, mobile phone factory, telecommunication institute for training and improved the military telecommunication system (Corkin 2007:314). Therefore, 60 percent of the African people currently have mobile phone coverage. Mobile phone usage provides new opportunities for African people by connecting the individuals with other individuals, markets, information and services. It has benefited Africans in many ways, such as reaching medical information and medicine, selling farmers' products in different markets, learning about new agricultural technologies, and finding job opportunities in different parts of the continent (Aker and Mbiti 2010:207). However, the success of Chinese investments in Africa still depends on Africa's efforts to use them for their own benefit (Grimm 2014:1003).

3.4.2.2 Raising Concerns of Chinese Investments

Although Chinese investments are welcomed by the African people in general, there are also some rising problems. The most important problem for today is the increasing number of Chinese workers in the continent. Many Chinese companies prefer to recruit Chinese workers or bring them from China. This limits the job opportunities for local people, and so increases the dissatisfaction. Although the number of Chinese workers in each region changes according to investment sectors, the work's longevity, the capacity of the country in terms of local skills and the work permits of the host country, (Brautigam 2009:156) it is estimated that their number has reached one million in the whole continent (Rice 2011). Unlike critics, Corkin argues that the workers have come to Africa to get rich quickly; in other words, they think that they would be freer in Africa in terms of competition, contrary to in China. Therefore, they do not plan to settle in the continent. Instead, they come with the idea of gaining money and aim to return to their own cities as soon as possible (Corkin 2008:5). Additionally, although Chinese firms prefer to employ Chinese laborers because of their work discipline, resistance to hard conditions, and language advantage, it changes from country to country. In some African countries, such as in Angola, the argument is true, but in others, such as Tanzania, Kenya, Benin or Zimbabwe it is not. In such countries, as much as 80 percent of the labor force may be African nationals and they can even become managerial staff (Alden 2007:46). For example, according to Deborah Brautigam's collected data, although Chinese enterprises hired 700 Chinese and 250 local laborers for the Angola Stadium project, they hired 2,000 local people and 400 Chinese laborers for the Republic of Congo Dam project. Likewise, they hired 1,371 local laborers and 45 Chinese laborers for the Kenya Mombasa Harbor project, and 1,100 local and 5 Chinese laborers to work in the Benin textile factory (Gandolfo 2015).

The other issue is increasing concerns about the poor working conditions and labor processes in Chinese investments in the region (Henderson 2010:17). Some argue that Chinese entrepreneurs are not subjected to the same rules and labor practices as their African counterparts (Corkin 2008:8). However, most of the Chinese investments in the region are created through joint ventures with local

companies, so they are usually subject to the same processes. Additionally, although Chinese entrepreneurs are criticized for safety measures, low wages and labor laws in the working place, (Melber 2008:394) this treatment is not special to the African workers – the Chinese workers share the same working hours and payment (Gandolfo 2015).

Although China's promises are given on the state level, the promises are implemented by many actors, such as state agencies, private enterprises, provincial state agencies, institutions, and individuals (Grimm 2014:1008). Thus, there is no central state institution for implementing projects in Africa (Grimm 2014:997). So the task of the African governments and trade unions are important to prevent any abuse of African people.

3.4.2.3 African Investments in China

Not only does China invest in Africa, but African countries also invest in China. Although the amount is very limited compared to Chinese investments in Africa, as the African countries' economies develop and regular meetings progress, their scale of investment in China has an important potential to increase. South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius and Tunisia are among the first African investors in China. Before 2000, they had invested in 524 projects, but the total value of the projects was only \$530 million. Since then, African investments have consistently increased. In 2009, African investments reached \$9.9 billion, and Mauritius was the largest African investor at the time with \$8.44 billion invested (FOCAC 2011). Currently, South Africa is one of the most prominent African investors in the Chinese market. South African SAB Miller became the largest brewer in 2007; South African company Sasol is leading coal projects; South African company Naspers is leading media player development (Osei-Hwedie 2012:16). African countries' investment in China rose 44 percent from 2009 to 2012, totaling \$14.2 billion in 2012. African investors have invested in petrochemical industries, manufacturing, processing, and retailing sectors (Information Office of the State Council 2013:7). They are mostly interested in investing in coastal cities, such as Guangdong. As an example of this, they

invested in 683 projects before 2009 in Shanghai, Tianjin and Shandong (FOCAC 2011).

To conclude, although Chinese existence in Africa is criticized for causing unemployment, low labor standards and wages and undermining ecological balances, Chinese firms have invested in many sectors in Africa, such as energy, agriculture, construction and telecommunication. Chinese enterprises invested in glass, fur and the automobile in Ethiopia, sugar refineries in Mali and textiles in Uganda. They have constructed dozens of schools, hospitals, railways and tarmac roads and increased the connectivity and cooperation between different cities, thus providing many opportunities to the African peoples.

3.4.3 Chinese Aid to Africa

Since China-Africa relations were established, China has been delivering aid to African countries, although its motivations have diverged in times. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited ten African countries between 1963 and 1964 and announced eight main principles for Chinese aid to Africa in Accra, Ghana. He announced that Chinese aid would be based on the following principles: equality and mutual benefit will be a priority; China will respect the sovereignty of the host countries; loans will be non-conditional or interest free; high-quality materials will be used in projects; projects will aim at self-reliance; Chinese experts will 'wholly' transfer their expertise; and Chinese will live in the same standards as their local fellows. These principles are still crucial for China and Africa aid relations.

China was the first developing country that initiated an aid program based on its development model. However, China does not aim to impose its own model on Africa as it believes Africa should find its own way for development. Thus, China tries to assist Africa with its development experiences to find its own way. In his Africa tour in 1964, Zhou Enlai emphasized the idea of self-reliance by saying, "It is not our intention to make them dependent on us. They need to rely mainly on their own efforts" (Brautigam 2009:32-35). In this regard, the Chinese development model is very different from the existing model, namely because Western donors have pursued very active aid policies for centuries in the continent. Western countries

typically isolated rogue states and proposed much conditionality for aid delivery, so China's no-strings-attached policy allowed it to fill the gap left by Western countries (Pehnelt 2007:9).

3.4.3.1 Chinese versus Western Aid Structure

After the Cold War, the amount of traditional aid provided by Western countries to African countries dramatically decreased, while Chinese aid started to increase in those years (Alden 2006:153). Thus, it was highly welcomed by the African countries. The West and China have the same objectives for Africa, which are development, peace and security. However, China's approach has its own characteristics that are different from the West's traditional approach (Men and Barton 2011:1). While the EU supports a policy-oriented, comprehensive model including economic, political and social development by emphasizing human rights, transparency and democracy, China emphasizes South-South cooperation based on principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit (Carbone 2011:204). Therefore, the EU criticizes China for rejecting conditionality while giving aid, challenging the traditional DAC aid delivery system, undermining the debt management system and the use of 'aid' for its projects (Carbone 2011:207-208). However, standing by China, many Africans now reject criticisms of China's activities in the region (Sautman and Hairong 2008:28) and appreciate Chinese aid.

China's proposed development model has the capacity to change the rules of the game on international trade and aid structure (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008:197). China emphasizes infrastructure, expanding cooperation for individual training, providing medical assistance and concessional loans. Chinese aid is a combination of investment and trade aid (Lancaster 2007:1-2).

Aid is one of the crucial means of Chinese diplomacy, but it is still a changing process. According to challenges and opportunities, China redefines and reshapes its aid system in Africa. In this regard, China works with many different organizations. For instance, China asks its think tanks, universities and other countries having involvement in Africa, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, for help in developing its aid delivery system for Africa (Lancaster 2007:6). Chinese aid

structure not only influenced the EU's aid regime but also its approaches to the African continent. In 2007, Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was adopted, which meant that African countries were accepted as equal partners and an integral part of international society by the EU (Men and Barton 2011:5).

As a result, China challenged the international aid structure in four ways: (1) the donor-recipient paradigm was challenged by partnerships based on equality; (2) the helping recipient paradigm was challenged by mutual benefit; (3) the use of conditionality was challenged by non-interference in domestic affairs; and (4) multilateralism was challenged by China's unilateral actions based on its own experience in aid projects (Kjøllestad and Welle-Strand 2010:3).

3.4.3.2 Responsible Bodies for Aid Delivery

Chinese aid is mainly delivered by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Some other governmental bodies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Finance, are also included when necessary. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for multilateral aid packages, but major decisions and initiatives in Africa are made by the State Council, which is the highest level of authority in China. The other institutions are China Export-Import (Exim) Bank, China Development Bank, some province level enterprises as well as the provincial governments and Chinese Embassies. They mainly provide credits, loans and guarantees to Chinese investors for exporting or investing (Broadman 2008:3).

The main body for Chinese concessional loans is the Exim Bank, which was established in 1994 by the government. It aims to accelerate the export and import of Chinese products and assist firms in their offshore agreements and investments (China Exim Bank). It is used for financing projects, delivering technical assistance and training (Lancaster 2007:4). Its long term objective is increasing the competitiveness and productivity of Chinese enterprises against their international counterparts (Executive Research Associates 2009:78). Exim Bank of China lent almost \$67.2 billion to African countries between 2001 and 2010, which is more than

the World Bank's \$54.7 billion dollars. According to Fitch, 20% of Exim Bank's total business is done with Africa (Cohen 2011).

The other important body is the China-Africa Development Bank Corp, which provides a special investment fund for African countries inaugurated in the 2007 Beijing FOCAC Summit. It aims to provide assistance to small- or medium-sized Chinese-owned or Chinese joint ventured African partners. It focuses on solving three main issues for Africa's sustainable development, which are insufficient infrastructure, the absence of professional and capable personnel and funding shortage. Although it was \$1 billion at the beginning, at the 2015 Johannesburg FOCAC Summit, Xi Jinping announced an additional \$5 billion in funds and that the fund had reached \$10 billion in total (China Africa Development Fund). According to Fitch data, the China-Africa Development Fund funded more than 1,000 projects and provided 50,000 jobs in 25 African countries from its initiation in 2010 to 2011 (Cohen 2011).

Some province-level enterprises along with the provincial governments themselves are also interested in cooperation with African countries (Pehnelt 2007:2). Additionally, Chinese Embassies play important roles to initiate cooperation via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lancaster 2007:3-4). However, there is still no certain number in terms of the amount of Chinese aid – even the Chinese government may not know the exact number (Pehnelt 2007:3).

As a result, these financial institutions propose different forms of aid, such as concessional loans, debt relief and funds for trade and investment, for the development of African countries. They support the agriculture sector, trade and logistics, forestry, fishing, processing and manufacturing, and some other industries to increase people's livelihoods. These institutions use debt relief when countries cannot pay back their loans (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:221). Most recently, in the China-Africa Summit, China pledged a \$60 billion financing package including debt relief to the African countries. In 2009, China canceled the debts of 32 countries (Common Dreams 2015). In this regard, Eisenman and Kurlantzick claim that debt relief is also used by China to gain public support and popularity – namely, at first while giving debt and then when relieving it (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:221).

With all its institutions, by the end of 2013, Chinese direct investment into the region was \$26 billion, which made up 3 percent of the total investment in the continent. Therefore, it needs to be noted that, although Chinese investment in the continent has been rising dramatically, it is still far beyond the traditional investors (Chen et al 2015).

3.4.3.3 Capacity Development in Africa

Technology transfer and knowledge sharing are crucial forms of Chinese aid to the African countries as they have a very limited capacity in this sense. In 2009, the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan (CASTEP) was launched with the goal of supporting African researchers as they improve self-development for S&T capacities. S&T cooperation is important for win-win cooperation, namely for mutual benefit and sustainable development. CASTEP aims to assist African countries with policy studies, technical services, human resource development, joint research, technological demonstrations, in-kind donations and cooperation with UN institutions.

To provide technical services and guidance, China encouraged its scientists, engineers and volunteers to go to Africa. Therefore, for human resource development, China has provided training programs and workshops in Africa and is also encouraging students, researchers, S&T personnel, and all other related people to be educated in Chinese universities and research centers as well as to take short-term training educations (CASTEP 2010). From 2010 to 2012, China organized various training programs in economics, energy, agriculture, industry, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing, medicine and health care, climate change and foreign affairs and a total of 27,318 officials were involved in these training programs in China (Information Office of the State Council 2013:11). Further, according to a FOCAC document, from 2000 to 2012, 56,000 African officials participated in training programs and 30,000 were targeted between 2013 and 2015 (Tugendhat 2015:5). African countries have cooperated in 115 joint research and technology demonstration projects.

China also increased the scholarship available to Africans for training in Africa (Information Office of the State Council 2013:12). From 1956 to 2005, 15,300 African students were awarded scholarships by the Chinese government (Eisenman 2007:44). Additionally, Beijing provided a full scholarship to 18,000 African students to study in China between 2013 and 2015 (King 2014). Also, Chinese universities opened some English- or French-taught departments and the possible fields of study have expanded from language, agriculture and medicine to other disciplines, such as education, management, economy, international politics and so forth (Li 2011). Along with professional educations, according to the surveys, most of the African students also register to the Chinese language courses. In addition, due to the Chinese government's visa policy, when the international students finish their education, they have to leave China, thus, it is likely that the African students will return their countries and would contribute to their home countries' economic, political and social development. Moreover, with the demonstration centers, China aims to introduce new technological means to Africans, and transfer them for use in African development. China also provided laboratory facilities, scientific equipment and technological products (CASTEP 2010).

3.4.3.4 The Impacts of Chinese Aid

The impacts of Chinese aid in African development and economic conditions change from country to country and sector to sector (Brautigam 2009:21). China is still a developing country, and a recently achieved development breakthrough raised its credibility in the eyes of African countries. The idea is that, as China has become a development aid recipient as a developing country, it could propose more practical solutions and credible offers to the developing African countries (Brautigam 2009:11). As Keet claims, China faces similar challenges in its growing urban and rural income gap, social and geographical income disparity, environmental stresses and other handicaps that developing and underdeveloped countries face (Keet 2010:28).

Africa's growth reached to 12 percent in 2004 and fluctuated between 6 percent and 3 percent from the 2008 economic crisis to 2013 (The World Bank 2017). China-

Africa trade volume reached to \$140 billion in 2016 (ITC Trade Map 2017) while the amount of Chinese investments reached to \$4 billion in 2015 (CARI 2017). It is undeniable that Chinese aid targeting infrastructure, transportation, telecommunication, agriculture and innovation has become very influential in its aim to reach the indigent people in Africa (Lagerkvist 2009:122). Therefore, although it is impossible to say how much China influenced this economic development, it is obvious that China's influence is positive for the development trend of Africa.

As many donor countries do, besides economic interests, China also has some political and strategic interests, such as protecting the isolation of Taiwan and finding new partners and supporters in the international system (Lancaster 2007:1). In this regard, Africa is a prominent partner for China. For African countries, China is also an important partner in the international system as their interests usually converge against the Western powers. Therefore, they pursue common policies in favor of developing countries. Moreover, China become an alternative to the other traditional powers, which increased the bargaining power of the African countries.

The expansion of China-Africa relations is supposed to be turned into further development. However, in order for Chinese aid to completely be advantageous, the African domestic market needs to be reformed in terms of governance, institutionalization, trade barriers, labor market and infrastructure (Broadman 2008:7).

3.4.4 China's Emphasis on Multipolarity and Southern Cooperation

At the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992, the concept of a 'multipolar world', which promotes a fairer and more peaceful world, was officially included into Chinese foreign policy (Guerrero 2013). After the Cold War, China strongly supported a multipolar world, aiming to restrict US hegemony (Pehnelt 2007:5). It is in the interest of both China and the African countries. It is clear that with the rise of newly emerging economies, particularly with China, the unilateralist system has started to change (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008:207). The inability of the world system to meet the demands of these newly emerging powers paved the way

for the resistance and collective stance of the Global South against the traditional Northern powers (Osei-Hwedie 2012:6).

3.4.4.1 China's Emphasis on Multipolarity in the International System

The end of the Cold War heightened American supremacy and China began to support a multipolar system to reduce the US' power and influence in the world, which overlapped with the interests of the other developing countries. For some, it caused a renaissance in China's relations with developing countries (Mitchell and McGiffert 2007:18-19). Anti-hegemonism was the core of China's foreign policy and developing countries helped to pursue this policy in the international system. In this regard, China developed both a reactive and proactive agenda to resist the hegemony, and it developed linkages that are not under the Western umbrella (Taylor 2007:3). China Prime Minister Li Peng's comments in 1990 are worth quoting to show China's stance:

[The] new order of international politics means that all countries are equal, and must mutually respect one another ..regardless of their differences in political systems and ideology. No country is allowed to impose its will on other countries, seek hegemony in any region, or pursue power politics to deal with other countries. They are not allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the developing countries, or pursue power politics in the name of human rights, freedom and democracy (Taylor 1998:451).

China's position expressed here overlaps with Africa, as it has been subjected to colonial movements of hegemons for centuries. Both China and Africa believe that the post-World War II process was in favor of Western countries that ignore the interests of the small and weak states in terms of voting rights in international organizations, agricultural quotas and subsidies, trade protectionism and some technical barriers (Wenping 2007:31-32). Therefore, China and African countries support a multipolar world in which they can equally raise their voices and defend their interests. Palat argues that, although the Southern countries have adopted a united stance against the West since the Bandung Conference, SSC has never been better than in the last decades as they have gained more room to maneuver due to

their economic development (Palat 2009:51). Thus, it is argued that developing countries could restrict the Western hegemony by strengthening SSC.

3.4.4.2 Emphasis on Southern Cooperation

China aims to cooperate with developing countries and so react collectively to the unilateral policies of Western powers. Africa consists of almost half of the non-aligned countries and more than a third of UN members, and most of them support China's position against hegemony and power politics (Wenping 2007:27). Therefore, cooperation with Africa, the largest single group of votes, provides an opportunity for China to follow its interests within international organizations, as its interests usually converge against the traditional or Western bloc (Alden 2006:153). China uses its economic and political ties with Africa to gain sympathy (Taylor 1998:459) when the West criticizes China on certain issues. For instance, while the West harshly criticized China for human rights abuses in Tiananmen, the African countries were more moderate and supportive. According to Ian Taylor, the Tiananmen criticism became a turning point in China's relations with Africa (Taylor 1998:446-447) because China gave priority to its relations with the developing world. Between 1989 and 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries and Chinese aid to Africa dramatically increased in the post Tiananmen period (Taylor 1998:450).

Likewise, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), China is a reliable partner to make Africa's voice heard in the international system (Wenping 2007:28). It is important for the African countries to have support in the world system that pursues their interests, such as in WTO for the trade agreements. China pursues very active policies, not only in the UNSC, but also in other international organizations, such as other UN bodies, IMF and WB in the fields of agriculture, environmental protection, providing technical assistance and training and supporting Millennium Development Goals. However, current institutions do not meet the needs of developing countries (Osei-Hwedie 2012:6). Therefore, it is crucial for developing countries to pursue such tactical alliances within international organizations to fight for their common interests on certain issues in order to work

against the most powerful actors, such as the US and the EU (Keet 2010:30). In this regard, China and Africa supported reform in global institutions like the UNSC, IMF, and WTO.

In order to pursue common policies, China develops close cooperation with not only international organizations, but also regional and sub-regional institutions, such as the African Union, East African Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Development Bank, the West African Development Bank, and the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (Information Office of the State Council 2013:14). To illustrate, China made various contributions to the African Development Bank since becoming a member in 1985 by providing technical assistant, supporting joint analytical works and financing (Pehnelt 2007:14). In the last ten years, China provided \$2 billion funds to the African Development Bank (The Guardian 2014).

China strongly emphasizes Southern cooperation in the international system but it does not have much experience. Therefore, China is still in a process of learning how to balance its national interests with its global responsibilities and challenges (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008:207).

3.4.5 Civil Society Cooperation

For the development of SSC, civil society organizations should be included in the process, which would put the people in the center of cooperation and thus lead to the adoption of projects and programs by people (Meja 2014:92). China has currently placed great importance on developing civil society cooperation with Africa.

Firstly, China founded academic- and policy-based think tanks, such as the China International Centre for Economic and Technical Cooperation (CICETE) and the China South-South Cooperation Network, which aim to develop SSC opportunities (Meja 2014:89). Moreover, the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum was initiated in 2011 to provide a platform to exchange views of Chinese and African thinkers. With this initiation, China aimed to influence African academic elite and opinion pioneers, and it is expected to change negative outlooks about China to positive. The Chinese government and China Development Bank support the forum

as a civil dialogue mechanism (Yun 2015). In the initiation declaration, it is articulated that the forum will bring African and Chinese think tanks to:

Conduct dialogues, exchanges and discussions on African economic and political situations, China-Africa relations and other related topics so as to increase understanding, expand consensus, consolidate friendship, offer suggestions and enhance the role of China-Africa think tanks in promoting bilateral cooperation on all fronts (FOCAC 2015).

Secondly, China aims to develop society-to-society relations by teaching the Chinese language and introducing Chinese culture through Confucius Institutes. Its goal is increasing the mutual understanding about China and the other nations. The first Confucius Institute was established in 2004 and currently there are 460 all over the world (Hartig 2015). In Africa, there are 42 institutes in 29 African countries in which thousands of people have studied (Yun 2015). The institution is usually initiated as a joint venture between the Chinese and a university in the foreign country. In Africa, Confucius Institutes are the only organizations through which Africans can learn the Chinese language. Therefore, these institutions are an important tool for the Chinese soft power in Africa (Hartig 2015).

Thirdly, by enhancing purchasing power, the number of Chinese tourists has been dramatically increased and African countries have become a good option for the Chinese people. China encourages Chinese tourists to go to African countries like South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, etc (Eisenman 2007:44). The top Sub-Saharan African countries that Chinese people prefer to go to are South Africa, Kenya, Cameroon, Senegal, Angola, South Sudan, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe (How Africa 2015). Recently the number of Chinese tourists travelling all over the world has reached 100 million and the number of people going to Africa has remarkably enhanced. In this regard, although merely 2.8 percent of Chinese tourists were going to Africa in 2008, this number reached 9.4 percent in 2014 (Xinxin 2016).

Finally, Chinese institutions cooperate with African institutions in many sectors, such as educational assistance and medical treatments. In 1964, China sent its first medical team to Algeria, and since then, China has cooperated with forty-seven African countries for medical services and 15,000 doctors have gone to Africa and

treated approximately 180 million African patients (Eisenman 2007:43). Although education has not been a priority for China until recently, it has become a crucial part of Chinese cooperation with the African countries. China's education assistance or aid includes exchange students and officials, a government scholarship, joint academic projects and the provision of educational facilities. China not only constructs primary schools but also helps higher education institutions in terms of capacity development. Such kinds of educational cooperation would provide Africans not only with an opportunity to know more about China's development model, but it also would provide sustainable development in China and Africa economic and political relations (Gu 2007).

3.5 Conclusion

China believes that the cure for the conflict and instability is economic development, which is its perspective in its engagement with Africa (Brautigam 2009:21). Therefore, although ideology played an important role for the establishment of its relations with Africa, since the 1980s, economic relations have been pioneered. Particularly, the rich raw materials of Africa became significant for China's penetration into the region. Although energy still plays a crucial role for the involvement of China in Africa, other resource-based engagements, such as the cotton plantation in Tanzania, the rehabilitation of transportation infrastructure in Botswana, textile manufacturing investments in Zambia and Kenya, and the installation of telecommunication networks in Namibia, have also played an important role (Alden 2007:13). Therefore, China goes to Africa not just for natural resources but also for business in trade, construction, and industry. It links its business with aid (Brautigam 2009:310).

In terms of trade, Chinese exports could facilitate the development processes of African countries as it has grown 18-fold from 2001 to 2015. Although the trade balance is not satisfying, the increasing trade provided new employment opportunities to the local people. Moreover, the Chinese exported products benefited to the ordinary people to improve their life standards and the joint ventures with the Chinese companies allowed the local firms to jump from the traditional production

level, in which they depended on single commodity exports, to the international production chain (Broadman 2008:1). However, as China imports raw materials and exports manufactured products, the increasing trade imbalance became a prominent problem in bilateral relations. Although China has been taking some precautions and diversifying its traded products, China's trade deficit with many African countries is still a remarkable problem. In addition, while inexpensive Chinese products provide some benefits to the ordinary people, they challenge the local producers as they could not compete with the state backed Chinese firms.

In terms of investment, China is an important player in the region. It invests in many sectors such as energy and mining, agriculture, construction, transportation and telecommunication. Although there are some concerns about the Chinese investments regarding the quality of investments, increasing number of Chinese workers in the region and the poor working conditions, in general, it is highly welcomed by the local people as it provides many advantages.

As the largest developing country, China aims to assist African countries to find their own development path. In this regard, it provides many different forms of aid including technical assistance, capacity development, loans, debt relief and removal of tariffs from many different products (Alden 2007:122). Moreover, China emphasizes equality, non-interference and mutual benefit in its relations with the aid recipient countries but this challenges the existing aid system, which was established by the West. Therefore, China has been harshly criticized by the Western powers as they prioritize human rights, democracy and transparency while delivering aid. However, Chinese aid delivery system is still in a changing process that has been redefined and reshaped according to the obstacles and challenges.

Chinese existence is welcomed by many African countries because China is providing aid, investment, trade and concessionary loans. As Deborah Brautigam claimed, China is "using a very large amount of credits, at a competitive market rate, tied to Chinese machinery, equipment, and construction services, with repayment in oil or other resources. This is the essence of the 'win-win' approach." This is the kind of approach that Japan and the West proposed for China decades ago (Brautigam 2009:307-308). This kind of partnership could be a prominent opportunity for the

transformation of Africa through trade, financial flows, investment and infrastructure projects and knowledge transfer (Meja 2014:86). For Africa, China is a reliable partner with the remarkable financial capacity to support Africa in investment, technology, and finance as well as being a significant partner in the international system (Osei-Hwedie 2012:4).

Although the African countries accept the benefits of China's engagement in Africa, they also voice their concern about the increasing power of China in the region. The increasing number of Chinese workers, heavy working conditions in the Chinese investments, negative impacts of inexpensive Chinese products and the increasing environmental concerns are the main problems for the local people. Africa's disadvantage is that it has no capability to develop its institutional capacity and legal and political framework to defend its interests, and it has little budgetary allowance to allocate to development (Meja 2014:86). However, Africa is one of the world's fastest growing regions and China is the world's most crucial developing country. Thus, the two sides have great opportunities to develop economic and political relations. If African countries use the opportunity with China for their benefit, they could gain a lot, but if they fail to use the opportunity, it is obvious that some countries will lose.

Additionally, due to the problems in bilateral relations and the possibility of losing their interests, Western countries are concerned and have harshly criticized the involvement of China in Africa, and their criticism is perpetuated by dissatisfied African people (Melber 2007:8). Although Western countries criticize China, as their financial problems have continued, they have not prioritized African issues. Thus, it seems that China will be the main player in the near future in Africa for trade, market, technology, capital, and development. Therefore, Chinese engagement in Africa increased the expectations for the future, which requires structural reforms.

To conclude, Chinese industries need new energy resources and raw materials for their development; traders want new markets to export their products; governors desire to find diplomatic support to pursue Chinese interests in the international system, particularly to counter the US. Therefore, Africa as a region fits well to carry out China's aims (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:219). For Africa, Chinese

development assistance and economic cooperation in trade, investment, many different forms of aid and support in the international system as a developing partner provided a lot of opportunities. According to Meja, SSC has recently started to become crucial in global finance, trade, investment, and governance (2014:85). Although there are some problems that have to be solved, thus far China and Africa have enjoyed their South-South cooperation. China-Africa economic and trade cooperation has contributed to Africa's development, increased people's living standards and strengthened the SSC.

CHAPTER 4

CHINA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

4.1 Introduction

China and South Africa bilateral relations have been dramatically developing in recent years. Not only in terms of their political and economic partnership, but their people-to-people relations have also increasingly developed (April and Shelton 2014:2). President Mbeki declared that China-South Africa relations could be a model of South-South cooperation (Shelton 2014:17). Likewise, China's emphasis on win-win cooperation fits South Africa and China relations exceptionally well (King 2010:75). South Africa demonstrates that an African country could have a more symmetrical relation with China (Bodomo 2009:176).

The relations with China are important for South Africa for five main reasons: 1) China's support in the struggle for colonization – particularly apartheid – in South Africa, 2) providing various economic opportunities 3) backing each other in the international system to reach certain goals, 4) cooperating for the development of the African continent, 5) cooperation in BRICS. (April and Shelton 2014:1). For China, South Africa is also a strategic partner. It is an important player in the African Union (AU) and in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) assuming the role of the African continent's leader (Grimm et al 2014:16). Moreover, it is the most important economic player in the African continent. In other words, its economy is responsible for 24 percent of the continent's GDP. China considers South Africa a gateway for its access to the African continent (Carmody 2013). Thus, for some, China's South Africa strategy is actually a broadened context of China's Africa policy (Grimm et al 2014:16).

4.2. Establishing Diplomatic Relations

After 1949, China actively supported liberation movements in Africa. In those years, China politically supported and delivered aid to the African countries as they struggled with imperial powers, including South Africa (Shelton 2014:11). CCP supported the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) in South Africa (Burke et al 2008). China's continuing support to the South African Communist Party (SACP) also currently provides solid and friendly relations between the two countries (Shelton 2014:15). However, after the 1950s, apartheid government's concerns increased about Chinese activity in the country as it supported anti-colonialism, equality between the races and the liberation struggle. Thus, their official diplomatic relations stopped in 1960 and in 1976 South Africa established official relations with Taiwan (Burke et al 2008). After the apartheid regime ended in South Africa in 1994, the international diplomatic isolation ended and economic sanctions were lifted. Thus, the government had to rearrange its foreign, economic and political relations. More importantly its economy had to survive in the global competitive environment, which facilitated the development of China-South Africa relations (Grimm et al 2014:8). Therefore, within this fora, South Africa decided to recognize the People's Republic of China instead of the Republic of China in order to show its gratitude for China's support of the liberation movements for long years, to show its desire for playing a greater role in the international system, to take advantage of deepening economic relations, and because almost all countries recognize China's 'One-China Policy' (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:302). In 1998, as a result of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki's visit to China, South Africa formally recognized China. Then, with the Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao's return visit to South Africa, the relations were consolidated. In those years, both countries started gaining leading positions in their regions. Thus, after official recognition, China-South Africa economic, political, social and cultural relations immediately developed (Burke et al 2008).

4.3. China-South Africa Economic Relations

South Africa has the biggest and the most diversified economy in the African continent, (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:300) and China is the largest developing country in the world. Therefore, developing bilateral economic relations provides many advantages for both parties. Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid an official visit to six African countries in 1996, which became a turning point in that it gave economic relations priority over political solidarity in China's relations with the African continent (Shelton 2014:12).

After South Africa's recognition of China, high level official visits have substantially enhanced, paving the way for further development of economic relations. In 1999, President Nelson Mandela visited China to thank it for its support of the liberation of South Africa and to develop a win-win relationship (FOCAC 2013). In return, in 2000, President Jiang Zemin visited South Africa and the 'Pretoria Declaration on Partnership between People's Republic of China and Republic of South Africa' was signed. The parties agreed to politically support each other with regular consultation and high level cooperation and agreed to cooperate in global affairs (Shelton 2008:260).

Additionally, with the declaration, they agreed to establish the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission (BNC), which aimed to guide and coordinate state-to-state relations in bilateral and multilateral issues, such as trade, investment and global issues. In 2001, Mbeki visited China and the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission was officially established, setting a longer-term China-South Africa cooperation agenda. Four committees were established within the framework of the BNC that focus on global affairs, trade and investment, security and defense, and science and technology (Shelton 2014:17). In 2010, in the 4th plenary session of the BNC, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping declared, "The China-South Africa Bi-National Commission, a high-level mechanism guiding and coordinating the cooperation between China and South Africa in all sectors, has been improving and making distinctive achievements over the past 10 years" (Xinhua 2010).

Swiftly developing China-South Africa economic relations, particularly the trade boom, has taken the precedence (Guijin 2014:30). Both South Africa and China have

developing policies to create more symmetrical trade relations (Grimm et al 2014:19). Although there are some limitations due to South Africa's structural problems, Chinese investments have also been increasing in South Africa. Chinese companies have invested in financial, consumer electronics, construction, manufacturing, transportation and shipping, mining and metals, retail and distribution sectors in South Africa (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:312-316). Not only China's in South Africa, but South Africa's investment has also dramatically increased in China. Bodomo claims that the South African case is unique in China-Africa relations because, while Chinese companies usually invest more in the African market, in the case of South Africa, South African companies have become more successful in the Chinese market (Bodomo 2009:175). They invested in certain sectors in China, such as energy, media, beverages, manufacturing and financial sectors. Regarding responsible bodies, in China, there are several actors, such as China's Development Banks, state owned enterprises and private actors (Grimm et al 2014:7). In South Africa, two governmental bodies, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), play crucial roles for determining South African economic policies (Grimm et al 2014:10).

4.3.1 Trade

Gumede argues that one of the important foreign policy goals of South Africa is diversifying its traditional trade partners, namely European countries as their economy is in decline, and cooperating with newly emerging markets. In this respect, China is the most prominent partner for South Africa. In 2009, China became South Africa's top export destination, surpassing the US, which was in eighth place in 1998 (Fraser 2012). China mainly imports raw materials and minerals while exporting manufactured consumer products.

South Africa is a very rich country in terms of mining resources. It hosts 33 percent of the world's chromium reserves, 77 percent of its manganese reserves, 88 percent of its platinum reserves and many other elements, which makes it a strategically significant country as there are very few alternatives producing these

metals (Beeson et al 2011:1378). Therefore, 70 percent of Chinese imports from South Africa consist of these metals, such as iron ore, platinum, gold, nickel, manganese, aluminum, chromium ores, copper, zirconium and vanadium oxides. Since the 1990s, due to its two-digit economic growth, China's mineral and raw material import has increased, which has helped the South African economy gain power as it increased prices (Swanson and Sieff 2011). However, since 2008, the price of the minerals has been decreasing, which damaged the South African economy (April 2014:39). Therefore, for the future, South Africa aims to increase its mineral export to China, which is very important for South African economic development.

While importing raw materials and minerals, China mostly exports manufactured consumer products to South Africa, such as textiles, footwear, clothing, electrical appliances, plastic products, and vehicles (Beeson et al 2011:1378). Therefore, the Chinese impact on the manufacturing sector has raised the concerns of South Africa as it has the most developed sector in the region. Chinese-exported low-technology and labor-intensive products includes many items, such as textiles, garments, footwear products, furniture and plastics. Further, medium technology products requiring more skilled labor entail automotive and engineering products, such as nuclear reactors and boilers. Therefore, Chinese exports threaten both the domestic industry and negatively impact South Africa's exports. In this regard, Jenkins and Edwards, according to the result of their research, argue that half of some countries' exports – Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa for example – have been threatened by increasing Chinese exports (Jenkins and Edwards 2013:1-2).

An important debate in trade relations between China and South Africa is a possible Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was suggested by DTI in 2001 but immediately increased debates within the country. Thus, it may not be prioritized due to protests by unions and manufacturing industries. South African firms have been competing with their Chinese counterparts in textile and garments, footwear, automotive parts, steel and telecommunication industries (Davies 2008:5-6). Thus, some of these industries are vulnerable to a potential FTA; particularly, due to China's low-cost products, local industries have significant potential to face more competition. In this regard, there are different approaches. According to Tralac's

research, the overall result shows that South Africa will ultimately gain from an FTA with China (Meyer et al 2008:3-4). However, Munemo argues that the elimination of trade barriers with China by an FTA would harm the resource-based low and medium technology products, which are very labour intensive and thus provide a prominent amount of employment, which helps reduce poverty and is also an important source of tariff income (Munemo 2013:307). On the other hand, Garth Shelton argues that while an FTA between China and South Africa would provide many opportunities to South Africa – it would remove China’s market barriers and regulatory limitations to allow for further investments by South Africa, provide greater access to the Chinese market, and extend cooperation to the political and international arena – it also includes some challenges, such as causing a loss of employment, damaging adjustment costs, and also damaging some industries. Thus, he argues that there is no guarantee that the South African economy would directly benefit from an FTA (Shelton 2014:68-72).

China-South Africa trade volume peaked in 2013 at \$65 billion, but then decreased to \$46 billion in 2015.⁴ It was \$14 million in 1991 and reached \$800 million in 1998. After diplomatic relations were established, the volume dramatically increased and reached \$2 billion in 2002 and \$11.2 billion in 2007 (Beeson et al 2011:1377). In 2009, China become South Africa’s largest trading partner and, in President Zuma’s official visit to China in 2010, he upgraded their existing ‘strategic partnership’ to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ and 38 agreements were signed in many areas (Shelton 2014:12). From 2010 to 2011, the trade volume increased from \$25 billion to \$45.5 billion.⁵ South African Trade and Industry Minister Dr. Rob Davies said, “Economic cooperation and trade between South Africa and China have developed fast and has great potential” (Business Tech 2015)

⁴ ITC Trade Map Statistics. General Customs Administration of China Statistics. (According to Trade Map, South African Revenue services (SARS) statistics, the trade volume was \$28 billion in 2013 and decreased to \$23 billion in 2015.)

⁵ ITC Trade Map Statistics. General Customs Administration of China Statistics. (According to Trade Map South African Revenue services (SARS) statistics, the trade volume was about \$20 billion reached to \$26,5 billion in 2011.)

Although the total trade volume has dramatically increased in a short time, there are also some challenges. Firstly, the trade deficit between the countries has been growing. In other words, South Africa's imports are growing faster than its exports (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:308). In this regard, while the value of South Africa's exports was \$30 billion in 2015, the value of its imports was \$16 billion,⁶ which enhanced the concerns of Pretoria that this trend is not sustainable (Guijin 2014:30).

Secondly, importing labour intensive products from China negatively impacts economic growth and employment, particularly for low-income people in South Africa.

One of the most significant sectors deeply affected by Chinese competition is the textile and clothing industry. According to the South African textile union's estimations, since 2001, 800 manufacturing units and 60,000 jobs were lost in these sectors due to the loss of competition with Chinese firms (Radebe 2009). Gumede argues that competing against the flow of Chinese textile products is difficult for South African companies, as Chinese firms have been directly or indirectly supported by government subsidies. In this regard, Edward and Lawrence conducted research about the recent job losses in the South African textile and clothing industry. They argue that Department of Trade and Industry claims that the flow of Chinese products in the last three years is directly responsible for job losses in the textile and clothing industry. Although they agree that Chinese exports negatively affected the industry, they also claim that there is no certain evidence that Chinese products are directly responsible for job losses in the sector. According to their research, Chinese products are one of the reasons, but there are many other reasons for the loss of jobs in the sector (Edwards and Morris 2006:136).

To eliminate the negative impacts of Chinese products on the South African textile industry, China has taken some measures. For instance, in 2006, Pretoria and Beijing signed an agreement that was valid for two years and aimed to protect the South African textile industry from the negative impacts of the Chinese influx. It

⁶ ITC Trade Map Statistics, General Customs Administration of China Statistics. (According to Trade Map, South African Revenue services (SARS) statistics, South Africa's exports value to China was \$7,4 billion and imports value was \$17 billion in 2015.)

enabled the South African textile industry to take a breath to be modernized and restructured (Shelton 2012:11). Additionally, China signed a Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) with South Africa to send 30 students to China to educate them in the textile industry, develop their skills and provide technology transfer (Grimm et al 2014:21). Moreover, in 2011, Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa Kgalema Motlanthe paid a state visit to Beijing to achieve sustainable growth and stable trade relations. During the visit, they agreed to facilitate South African value-added exports to China. In this regard, South Africa identified the following sectors and products to be exported to China: agro-processing – wines, cereals, canned fruit and bovine meat; chemicals – butanol; plastics – polypropylene; steel – stainless steel; aluminum – alloys and coils; automotive – tooling products, shock absorbers and filters; capital equipment – mining safety equipment; manufacturing – industrial pumps (mining, agricultural as well as fuel pipelines); electro-technical – power transmission related products; paper and pulp – wood pulp and paper board (South African Government 2011). Moreover, the growing imports of electronic devices and machinery also created problems and caused a loss of jobs in the electronics sector, particularly because of the import of television sets, white goods and radios (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:309-310).

Thirdly, South Africa is concerned that China's increasing exports to the other parts of the world limit South African exports, and it has the potential to lose its market share in many products. According to Edwards and Jenkins' research, in which they aimed to show the impact of Chinese exports on South African exports to the EU, the US and Sub-Saharan Africa, almost all South African products exported to the EU and US markets and half of the products exported to the SSA market face competition with Chinese products (Jenkins and Edwards 2013:8). They proved that the largest competition between South Africa and China was in low-technology products from 2001 to 2010. South Africa lost its share in non-electrical machinery, iron and steel and their products, and vehicles in all three markets (Jenkins and Edwards 2013:18-20). However, some claim that, while the flow of Chinese products multiply, South Africa's supply to China also increases, which benefits the South African economy in development (Munemo 2013:307).

Another issue regarding China's import of raw materials and export of manufactured products, Guijin emphasizes that this kind of relationship is not special to these two countries and that it is mainly the responsibility of South Africa to diversify and restructure its economy (Guijin 2014:31). Likewise, Edwards and Jenkins argue that South Africa has a trade deficit with China, but, as it is a resource-exporting and semi-processed goods country, South Africa also has such kinds of problems with many other countries (Burke et al 2008). However, although there are some problematic areas in China and South Africa trade relations, South Africa has the potential to change the trade pattern of China-Africa trade, in which African countries currently export raw materials and import finished products, by exporting semi-finished and manufactured products to the Chinese market (Grimm et al 2014:19).

4.3.2 Foreign Direct Investment

During his visit to Beijing in 2011, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe pointed out that, "What Africa sorely needs at the moment is massive investment in infrastructure to unlock its development potential. In this regard, a strategic partner such as the People's Republic of China can play a leading role in a manner that is mutually beneficial to both our people" (Trade Mark Southern Africa 2011). After signing a \$2.5 billion investment agreement between South Africa's development bank and China's development bank during this visit, South Africa became a crucial destination for Chinese investment, consisting of one fourth of the whole Chinese investment in the continent. In spite of some structural challenges, more than 80 Chinese companies have invested in South Africa due to its market opportunities. For China, South Africa is seen as a gateway to enter into the rest of the continent (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:311). However, not only Chinese investment, but South African investment has also been dramatically increasing in China (Beeson et al 2011:1378).

Chinese companies have invested in many sectors in South Africa, such as finance, consumer electronics, construction, manufacturing, transportation and shipping, mining and metals, retail and distribution sectors (Guliwe and Mkhonta

2009:312-316). However, mining and electronic sectors are the major sectors in which China invests. Mining is the largest industrial sector in South Africa, which has various mineral resources and products that are exported to more than 87 countries. (April 2014:45) While gold, coal, diamonds, and groups of platinum elements play a crucial role for South Africa's mineral exports, chrome production and ferroalloys are the dominant products (April 2009:465). Therefore, China considers South Africa to be a mineral treasure, so it is one of the significant customers of South African mineral resources (April 2009:468). Nevertheless, China and South Africa mining agreements focus not only on investments in energy and minerals but also strives to transfer knowledge and skills (April 2014:45).

Regarding Chinese mining investments in South Africa, Chinese gold producer, Zijin Mining, purchased a 20 percent stake from South African platinum producer Ridge Mining. Sinosteel purchased a 50 percent stake of Samancor Chrome's Tubatse smelter and the Tweefontein chrome mine in South Africa (Burke et al 2008). Sinosteel also signed a joint venture with Limpopo Economic Development Enterprise (LIMDEV) to establish ASA Metals in 1996, which facilitated the export of ferrochrome to China. Additionally, Chinese steelmaker Jisco, receiving 29.1 percent of International Ferro Metals and China Minmetals Development Company, has an agreement with Mission Point and Versatex of South Africa to acquire exploration rights to invest in South Africa's ferrochrome industry (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:315).

One of the other major sectors in terms of Chinese investment is the electronic sector. Chinese consumer electronic companies, such as Hi-Sense, XOCECO, SVA, and Huawei Technologies, are the main companies investing in the South African electronic sector (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:314). Hi-Sense began to invest in the electronics sector of South Africa in 1997 and expanded its facilities in 2004. It produces electronic devices such as TVs, DVDs, VCDs, and refrigerators and exports these materials to fourteen African countries. According to Xinhua News Agency, the company's produced televisions and refrigerators have a 20 percent market share in South Africa. It currently employs 600 local people, aiming to increase to 1,200, and it provides job opportunities for 2,600 people in related

industries (New China 2015). In 2014, Chinese DY Link also announced that they will invest in the telecommunication and infrastructure sector in Eastern Cape, which is expected to create 4,500 job opportunities for the local people (SABC 2014).

Additionally, the share of Chinese construction companies, such as China Overseas Engineering Company (COVEC) and CITIC-ACRE Construction, has been growing in the South African market (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:313). In 2013, an MoU was signed between the Sebata Group, a leading South-African engineering procurement and construction management company, and Westinghouse Electric Company for the "potential construction" of new nuclear plants in South Africa (CIO 2014). Moreover, in 2015, China and South Africa nuclear energy regulators signed an agreement for constructing eight new nuclear reactors when, at the time, South Africa had only one. The deal includes licensing procedures, vendor inspections, technical support, inspector training and joint inspection, all worth \$50 billion (The Citizen 2015). Moreover, in December 2015, China and South Africa signed 26 agreements worth \$6.5 billion particularly focusing on infrastructure, through which \$2.5 billion will go to the state owned rail operator in South Africa (BBC 2015). For the manufacturing sector, Chinese multinational companies, such as First Automotive Works (FAW), SOE Shanghai Industrial and its subsidiary Shanghai Industrial Investment Corporation (SIIC), are also investing in both heavy and light manufacturing sectors in South Africa (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:315).

The other prominent sector is the financial sector. One of the most important Chinese investments in South Africa's financial sector was its purchase from South African Standard Bank in 2008. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) purchased a 20 percent share from the South African Standard Bank paying \$5.2 billion, which was one of the largest investments of China in that year (Burke et al 2008). Standard Bank is South Africa's largest banking group, having commercial existence in 18 African countries and 21 countries throughout the world (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:312). Therefore, such an investment is very useful for China to expand its share through the continent and gain necessary skills and experience (Burket et al 2008). It also creates job opportunities and improves the living conditions of the laborers (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:313). Another financial

investment by a South African bank, FirstRand Bank Limited, is its partnership with China Construction Bank (Africa Institute of South Africa 2013).

South African trade unions and some civil society groups criticize Chinese companies for undermining the basic workplace and labour rights as well as environmental standards. Similarly, Gumede argues that China buying large shares in all the strategic sectors, such as platinum, rare materials and the financial sector, could lead to another sort of colonialism, which will come not from the West but from the East. However, in its investments in South Africa, although China focused on low-cost production at the beginning, it then increased its emphasis on safety and environmental issues (April 2014:47). In this regard, Yazini argues that it is the responsibility of the South African government to take measures for the sustainable benefit of the mining sector. The government has to make planning to benefit from the sector to poverty reduction and economic growth. Additionally, it has to promote the fair distribution of benefits from the sector, so it should increase transparency, accountability and its control of revenue flows. Yazini compares South Africa with Brazil in relation with China, and argues that Brazil used its resources for its benefit and became one of the most dynamic markets in the world. Thus, South Africa, which has a lot of problems, such as mining regulations, problematic implementation processes, lack of skilled labor and infrastructure, non-involvement of civil societies in economic development, corruption, and some certain individuals' dominance on decision making processes, should work on these issues to utilize the sector for its advantage (April 2009:469-473).

In 2009, the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) was launched, which is located in Johannesburg. South Africa's Deputy Trade and Industry Minister, Elizabeth Thabethe, said the CADF would focus on cooperation in many areas, such as energy, mining, transport, agriculture, infrastructure development and information and communication technology. She also pointed out that South African authorities are looking to build new commercial relations with Chinese investment companies, supported by the CADF (IDE-JETRO).

Apart from Chinese investments in South Africa, South Africa is also a crucial investor in certain Chinese sectors. In this respect, South Africa is a special country

within the African continent because it has a remarkable amount of investments in China (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:316). By 2003, Chinese firms had invested in 98 projects worth \$160 million and, in return, South African firms had invested in 200 projects worth \$400 million in China (Shelton 2005:197). Some of the largest companies are SAB Miller Breweries, Naspers and Sasol. SABMiller has opened 50 breweries, while South African energy firm Sasol has established collaboration with Chinese coal company Shenhua in the Ningxia Hui and Shaanxi provinces (Africa Institute of South Africa 2013). SABMiller began to expand in the Chinese market in the 1990s by a joint venture with China Resources Enterprises in order to own stake in China Resources Snow Breweries, which is currently the largest brewery in China. SABMiller, with Chinese Resources, currently owns 90 breweries and produces 30 different beer brands, having 23 percent of market share (Africa Renewal 2015). It also employs more than 59,000 people (Bloomberg 2015). Naspers was a little known internet company when it entered the Chinese market with a \$32 million investment by acquiring 46.5 percent of Tencent in 2001, but now it is one of the leading internet companies in Asia. Its market capital is \$53.5 billion. According to 2014 figures, its stake in Tencent is 1,500 times bigger than its initial investment (South China Morning Post 2014). South African petrochemical giant Sasol invested in two liquefied coal projects in China and holds 50 percent of each project. The total amount invested in these projects is between \$10 and \$14 billion, and they were expected to be operational in 2013 but the procedural process has not yet been finished (Sxcoal). The company is searching for other alternatives, such as chemicals or manufacturing and marketing, for further investment in China (Bloomberg 2011). Moreover, in 1994, Kumba invested in an iron ore terminal at the Qingdao Port in China worth \$10 million (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:316) Since the agreement was signed, the company exported 9 million tons of iron ore to China. Kumba is responsible for 10 percent of total recent iron ore imports to China (Exxaro 2002).

South African assets in China are more than the Chinese assets in South Africa. In other words, while the value of Chinese assets in South Africa was about \$7.5 billion from 2011 to 2013, South Africa's value of assets has grown from \$16 billion to \$46 billion in the same time period (Simkins 2015). There are still many investment

opportunities for South African companies in China. Thus, they should be more active and dynamic to take more opportunities to expand in the Chinese market (Guijin 2014:31). Although South African trade unions and some civil society groups criticize Chinese companies' activities in South Africa, Gumede argues that South Africa needs to be more proactive. This means that Pretoria should have longer term development plans and identify some areas for Chinese investments and limit some other areas, because, he argues, currently, China could opt for whichever sector it wants for investment (Gumede) Although China is willing to further develop investment cooperation, it is difficult for Chinese firms to go into the South African market due to its strict structural challenges (Guliwe and Mkhonta 2009:311). Garth Shelton argues that, due to the structural challenges of the South African economy and trade unions, it has lost almost \$5 billion in mining investment opportunities, which means the loss of employment and economic growth opportunities (Shelton 2014:20).

4.4. Capacity Development

Science, technology, innovation and research are crucial for sustainable development. While the rest of the world more or less became successful in development by investing in these areas, the African continent was not able to catch the global community (Forje and April 2014:83). China aims to help the African continent change its destiny. Specifically in South Africa, China assists in certain areas, like mining, science, technology development and education, in order to develop its capacity for sustainable development.

China and South Africa have more than 50 agreements in science and technology, nuclear energy, education, culture and tourism (King 2010: 75). In 1997, the China-Africa Engineering Association (CAEA) was established in South Africa, focusing on the organization of exchange programs for engineering experts and scholars. In 1999, China and South Africa signed a science and technology cooperation agreement, which focused on funding raw materials, biotechnology and information communications technology (China.org.cn 2003). Protocol on China-South Africa S&T Cooperation was signed in 2003 between the two countries to develop

cooperation in many different fields, including information, communication, mining, agriculture, aerospace development, medicine and public health (Ministry of Science and Technology of People's Republic of China 2003). In 2011, the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Programme was launched aiming to expand cooperation, bilateral research, innovation activities and development partnership. Following this agreement in 2015, the parties signed an MoU on science park cooperation, focusing on business cooperation, skill development, and ICT research (AllAfrica 2015). Therefore, contrary to many African countries, due to South Africa's existing capacity, Chinese and South African science and technology development centers could have a more symmetrical relationship (Yu 2014:75).

Apart from Egypt, South Africa has the only Education Counselors in the continent. That means many Chinese students have been encouraged to attend South African universities for education. It has been successful in that, currently, there are more Chinese students in South African universities than the reverse. The Centre for Chinese Studies, which is the only one of its kind in Africa, began to function in cooperation with the University of Stellenbosch in 2004. It entails a great deal of studies about China and Africa relations and provides information covering many issues, such as investment, education, agriculture, technology, trade and aid (King 2010:75-76). When compared with the other African countries South Africa is not a crucial aid recipient. China and South Africa mostly cooperate in education and training (Yu 2014:62). China pledged to train 2000 people from 2015 to 2020 within the framework of the 5-10 Year Strategic Programme for Cooperation between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China 2015-2024, which was signed in 2014 (AllAfrica 2015).

In 2014, during President Jacob Zuma's official visit to Beijing, China and South Africa, he signed an action plan for cooperation in the agriculture sector including plant diseases for maize and apples, which are exported by South Africa to China. The president quoted that the agriculture related treaties were "affirmation that both countries stand ready to strengthen personnel and technology exchanges as well as promote agricultural capacity building through exchanging delegations." The agreements aimed to strengthen collaboration among the research institutes, colleges

and universities, exchanging experts and managing workshops to enhance agricultural capacity (Brand South Africa 2013). From 2001 to 2015 China's agricultural commodity trade increased from \$67 million to \$655 million. Since 2014, South Africa has gained a positive trade balance in agricultural product trade with China (Agricultural Business Chamber 2016).

Regarding the medical and health sectors, in 2015 during Xi Jinping's visit to South Africa, the parties signed an MoU on health and medical sciences aiming to expand cooperation on public health, the health care delivery system, education and training, establishing cooperation in health institutions and biomedical science (AllAfrica 2015). In 2014, during an official visit to Beijing, the South African Health Minister Pakishe Aaron Motsoaledi articulated that, "South Africa will learn experiences from China in contagious disease prevention and healthcare system construction, pushing forward exchange and cooperation in personnel training and medical research" (The State Council of the People's Republic of China 2014).

4.5. China-South Africa Cooperation in the International System

China and South Africa support a multipolar international system. Since the end of the Cold War, China has strongly emphasized the necessity of a multipolar system, while South Africa also began to actively voice its support after 1998. In 2000, the Mbeki-Jiang Summit was held, which initiated a new kind of SSC, and the parties synchronized their foreign policies for a more equal international system (Shelton 2014:17-21). Becoming the biggest economies in Asia and Africa as well as partners in the G20, BRICS and UN institutions, China and South Africa have many common interests in regional and global affairs. By cooperating and pursuing common policies, they believe that they can increase their bargaining power, particularly in the UN, WTO and other international organizations in favor of developing countries. Both China and South Africa aim at enhancing SSC, poverty reduction, environmental protection, the peaceful solution of regional conflicts and a more fair multilateral trade system (Guijin 2014:31).

South Africa supported the reforms in existent political and economic systems particularly in the UN and other Bretton Woods institutions for a more equal and fair

international financial system. South Africa believes that a more inclusive UN system is necessary to solve current global issues (Shelton 2014:21). Therefore, it expects that the SSC will facilitate such an inclusive system and provide a greater representation to Africa in the UNSC (April and Shelton 2014:4). On many global issues, China and South Africa take common positions. In this respect, since South Africa took up the non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2006, considering its position on many issues, such as Darfur, Zimbabwe and Myanmar, it is obvious that the two governments share the same outlook on the key features of the global system (Alden 2008). Additionally, both countries participate in UN peacekeeping operations, which increase security in Africa and open more ground for trade and investment, promoting the economic development of the continent (Shelton 2014:20).

China not only aims to develop its relations with South Africa as a strategic political ally against the West, but it also would like to take advantage of South Africa's close relations with the African countries (Gumede). South Africa appreciates China's willingness to develop bilateral relations and also supports the development of China's relations with other African countries in terms of finance, investment, infrastructure and trade (April and Shelton 2014:4). South Africa is the major promoter of Africa in the international system (Shelton 2014:10). Therefore, cooperation with China provides many advantages both to South Africa and to other developing or less developed countries in the continent. For the development of relations with African countries, China – with the support of South Africa – is currently interested in working with the AU, particularly to maintain peace and security in the continent. In the 2015 FOCAC Summit, China promised to support Agenda 2063 created by the African Union (AU), especially the ten-year implementation program. China also promised to support sub-regional organizations such as Comesa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, by human resource development and capacity building (China Daily 2016). The AU plays a pioneering role for promoting African related issues (Forje and April 2014:83). In this regard, cooperation with South Africa as the second largest economy in the continent (Africa Ranking) provides many advantages to China.

The other and most crucial organization with which China and South Africa actively cooperate is BRICS. China's support to the multipolar global system and its Global South agenda strongly overlap with South African foreign policy objectives (Beeson et al. 2011:1381). Moreover, South Africa is considered as a gateway to the African continent as it consists of 23 percent of the continent's GDP (Aalm Iqbal and Cristina de Araujo 2015: 111). Thus, China played a significant role for South Africa's membership process and after South Africa became a member of BRICS, bilateral relations substantially developed. Cooperation in BRICS provided China and South Africa a more regular, concentrated and formal process for cooperation, which is strengthened through SSC (Shelton 2014:12-13). However, the sustainability of BRICS is still in question. In this respect, the following are crucial issues for the future of BRICS: potential threats of the financial structures of BRICS economies, a financial crisis risk, environmental issues, foreign direct investments inflows, OECD's exports limiting BRICS' export capacity and BRICS countries' dependency on a single sector for growth (Shaw et al. 2007:1263). Additionally, although BRICS is a southern institution, there are big differences among the member states. To illustrate, the size of China's economy is twenty-five times bigger than the South African economy (Harrison 2015:209). Therefore, the national efforts of the member states are prominent for the sustainability of BRICS. Moreover, in the current global system, to achieve their common goals member states should focus on their common interests rather than focusing on their differences.

4.6. China-South Africa Civil Society Cooperation

South Africa, which hosts a large Chinese community, is the top destination in terms of China's cultural activities, such as student exchanges, establishing Confucius institutes and tourism. Gaining public support, business, laborers and political elites is crucially important for both Beijing and Pretoria for sustainable relations. Compared with political and economic relations, people-to-people relations are limited. However, since 2003, the countries have emphasized the importance of developing cultural and civil society relations. Therefore, they aim to develop people-to-people relations by training African professionals, sending agricultural

experts to Africa, establishing agricultural center hospitals and schools, increasing the government scholarship for African students, creating joint research programs for scholars and analysts of think tanks to collaborate, hosting African festivals and expanding tourism. These attempts are crucially important because ordinary people still have very limited knowledge about one another. Additionally, as the media is quietly influenced by Western sources, China is usually seen negatively in South African media. Thus, the public opinion is fragmented, which China aims to overcome with such kinds of activities (Guijin 2014:31-35). In this respect, in 2015, during President Xi's visit to South Africa, the parties agreed that China will found a Chinese Cultural Centre in South Africa, which will organize public-accessible, cultural events to develop cultural relations (Brand South Africa 2015).

South Africa hosts the largest Chinese population in the continent. The first Chinese came to the country in the 1870s and now this community consists of 4 generations of Chinese people (Huynh et al. 2010:289). The first wave of people came as free individuals and slaves (Harris 2007:4). Another wave started after the 1980s, in which most of the migrants were managers and professionals so they entered into trade, export-import and retail sectors. After South Africa officially recognized the People's Republic of China, another wave started but they were mostly small traders and peasants (Huynh et al. 2010:289). These last comers, whose numbers have been increasing and causing disputes, are various both in purpose and origin. Although the exact number of Chinese migrants in the region is uncertain, it is estimated to be between 100,000 to 250,000 (Harris 2007:5). However, contrary to the claims of media that China strategically sends people to settle in Africa, the majority of these newcomers decided to go to South Africa independently, mostly for better life standards (Huynh 2010:286). It is an attractive destination for those who do not have the money or skills necessary to go to North America, Europe or Australia. Therefore, contrary to the claims, Chinese immigrants in South Africa come from many different parts of China for different purposes, so they are not homogenous (Huynh 2010:291-296). Thus, rather than a strategic state decision, they have made personal decisions to migrate to South Africa with the aim of gaining more money

and returning to their own cities in China. In this regard, the important issue is that when these migrants return to their home countries in China, or when South Africa-born Chinese people travel to China, they create new networks and new opportunities between the two countries. At the very least, they increase knowledge about South Africa for the further expansion of people-to-people relations (Huynh 2010:304).

Expanding touristic exchanges is another important way to develop civil society relations. According to the China National Tourism Administration and the United Nations World Tourism Organization reports, Chinese people took 120 million trips overseas in 2015, which means that one in every ten people travelling internationally was from China. In this regard, South Africa is also an attractive destination for Chinese tourists. China currently encourages its people to travel to South Africa. However, although the numbers of Chinese tourists travelling to South Africa peaked in 2014 with 58 percent growth, it had decreased 8 percent by the end of 2015, which alarmed South Africa, so Minister of Tourism Derek Hanekom paid a three-day visit to China in April 2016 (Ministry of Tourism Republic of South Africa 2016). In 2014, South Africa eased the requirements for entrance of tourists into the country. The regulations particularly targeted tourists from China and India (Quartz Africa 2016). The new regulations were agreed to during Hanekom's three-day visit to China, and besides the two that already existed, two more visa facilitation centers were opened and five more are expected to open this year (Ministry of Tourism Republic of South Africa 2016). As a result of these regulations, South Africa expects a tourist boom from China in the coming years, which will strengthen civil society cooperation.

4.7. Conclusion

China and South Africa have many common interests as emerging powers. Both countries are mutually willing to further develop diplomatic, economic and political relations based on mutual benefit (Beeson et al. 2011:1376).

South Africa is an important partner for China due to its mineral treasure, large market and the fact that it is a good partner in the regional and global arena. In the

broader picture, China aims to help develop the African continent. In this regard, China believes that its investments in the energy sector, raw materials and local infrastructure facilitates will facilitate the development of both South Africa and the African continent. Thus, developing a relationship with South Africa is part of China's economic development strategy (Beeson et al. 2011:1371). Moreover, gaining the support of Africa's largest economy and most influential actor is an important goal of China in the international system.

For South Africa, China is also a significant partner as a source of investment, which South Africa heavily needs in order to appease social protests, and as a crucial export destination. Moreover, China is an irrevocable global partner for the global governance, reform of the current institutions in favor of developing countries and in the changing of the global power balance (Beeson et al. 2011:1381). South Africa aims to get China's support with the following issues: the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), the promotion of peace in Africa, partnership to advance a new international order, reform in the UN and the global trade system, and enhancing SSC (Shelton 2005:198-199). Regarding their capacities and capabilities, compared to the other African countries, China and South Africa have a higher capacity for symmetrical relations (King 2010:77).

By building global common policies and strengthening economic cooperation, China and South Africa have constructed a new kind of South-South cooperation, which would serve not only China and South Africa's interests, but the other developing countries' interests by readjusting the existing political and economic order in favor of developing countries (Shelton 2008:273). He Wenping claims that China-South Africa economic cooperation will not only impact the development of relations in other areas, such as technical, political and social, but that it also would be an example for the foundation of a new type of strategic partnerships in the continent (Carmody 2013:68). China's model to use loans in many African countries does not work in South Africa because it is a middle income country and has a modern economic sector with better infrastructure. Thus, China's main relation is

mutual collaboration, reconstruction, development projects and skills development (Burke et al. 2008).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 2008, it was emphasized that there are two significant developments in the global economic system: the newly emerging powers and the deeply increasing cooperation among these developing countries. Therefore, a change in the global economic governance, which was dominated by the West, and the international structure are seen as unavoidable, which brings new challenges and opportunities. Within this transformation process, the collective acts of Southern countries for a new international order and contribution to the transformation of global institutions became more prominent as the Southern countries strived to serve the interests of developing countries (Shaw et al. 2007:1268).

Since 1949, there have been many arguments about the development of underdeveloped or developing countries. In this study, two mainstream theories are discussed: the modernization theory, which is followed by the neoliberal theory, and the dependency theory, which is followed by the world system theory. From the perspective of the modernization theory, the natural way of development is through following the path paved by the West. Thus, if underdeveloped countries follow the same path and apply the same policies, they could be modern. Hence, it emphasizes that every country could be modern by applying liberal and democratic values. Therefore, according to the modernization theory, underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped because they failed to properly adopt these values due to insufficient education, cultural values and lack of capital. Since the 1980s, the neoliberal theory has fallen in line with the modernization theory, with the main difference being that the neoliberal theory emphasizes the market as the development agency instead of the state. Thus, it claims that, as Southern countries integrate into the world economic system, they will gain more. With the increasing globalization in these

years, integration of the South to the global system has been facilitated and they have started to attain more capital, as is stressed by the neoliberal theory. However, although some countries have started to gain more through integration into the system, the gap between the North and the South has not been closed.

The dependency theory challenges the modernization theory. It claims that the North intentionally keeps the South underdeveloped as it is in favor of the North's economic development. Thus, it emphasizes the capitalist economic system, which is created and expanded by the developed industrial countries to dominate Southern countries. The dependency theory inspired the worlds-system theory, according to which, the world capitalist economy is divided into three regions – core, semi-periphery, and periphery. In this system, while the core refers to the developed industrial countries, the periphery refers to the underdeveloped countries. It argues that the developed countries became the core by exploiting the periphery and that they still protect the system to assert their dominance and protect their advantages. Therefore, according to the world system theory, the system has to change for the development of the periphery, because, although there are some periphery and semi-periphery countries that could become core countries within this system, as this hierarchical system progresses, it would persistently keep the underdeveloped countries in the periphery. Thus, it asserts that the way for the South to break this chain is to delinking its ties with the North and expand cooperation with other Southern countries.

Within the last several decades, with the development of the South's capacities and capabilities, South-South cooperation has been seen as an alternative to North-South relations. SSC has been transforming since the 1950s in favor of developing countries by limiting neo-colonial relations and challenging the dominance of the North. SSC is a post-World War II concept that refers to all cooperation among the developing countries. Although it mainly refers to economic cooperation, recently, it has started to emphasize the political cooperation in the global governance structure and enhance social cooperation. Economically, SSC aims to eliminate trade inequalities between the North and the South, increase the flow of foreign direct investment and deliver aid in various forms based on mutual benefit. Through SSC,

Southern countries aim to aid one another's development and cooperate within the international system to make it more inclusive, serving the interests of developing countries as well. In this regard, Southern countries cooperate not only in international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, G20, and BRICS, but they also cooperate within regional or sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU). It also strives for civil society cooperation by adding civil society organizations, private sector and academia to the process. However, South-South learning is not intrinsically successful due to significant differences between Southern countries, power inequality, various economic and political structures, limited institutional capacity, synchronization problems within the existing Southern institutions and different domestic issues (Harrison 2015:206). Therefore, if they focus on their common interests rather than their differences, they could gain from both bilateral and international cooperation.

Among Southern countries, China is the largest developing country that is willing to develop South-South cooperation. In this regard, China's Africa policies are remarkable as the continent hosts the largest number of underdeveloped countries in the world. In relations with Africa, China sticks to five main principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. Although in the 1950s China ideologically supported Africa in its fight against colonization, since the 2000s, their economic relations have gained significant momentum. In 2000, the establishment of FOCAC became a turning point in terms of the institutionalization of China and Africa relations. It became a platform providing member states the opportunity to meet regularly and have a chance to discuss and collaborate on many global and regional issues. In the 2006 FOCAC Beijing Summit, a new partnership, called a 'strategic partnership', was developed based on mutual benefit and win-win cooperation (Brautigam 2009:1). In this regard, Alden argues that "Africa was thought as hopeless and marginal but China has indisputably been a decisive actor in putting Africa back on the map"

(Alden, 2015). After the establishment of FOCAC, China's penetration into the continent by trade, investment and aid dramatically increased.

In terms of trade, the bilateral trade between China and African countries has grown 18-fold from 2001 to 2015, reaching \$151 billion. China became an alternative to the existing traditional traders, so it has expanded African countries' maneuvering space. Moreover, by cooperating with the Chinese companies, many African companies have had an opportunity to integrate into the global trade system and develop their institutional capacities. However, China mainly imports mineral resources and exports manufactured consumer products, which brings about a significant trade deficit with many African countries. Moreover, China's exported, inexpensive manufactured products have caused some problems for local producers as they do not have the power to compete with the Chinese products in the market. China's trade effect is still ambiguous as it changes according to each country's trade pattern and the traded goods. Therefore, trade with China could be an opportunity for the African countries if they take the necessary measures and use it for their benefit.

On the other hand, Chinese investments have also dramatically increased in the region. Although at first China targeted the resource rich countries and mining sector, over time it expanded its investments in other countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya and sectors to agriculture, textile, construction, rehabilitation, tourism, telecommunication, and many others (Moyo 2009:106). Africa hosts 30 percent of the global mineral reserves. However, compared to other parts of the world, the contribution of mineral resources to the development of the African continent has been limited due to inadequate policies, strategies and regulations. However, mining could be the core of development and growth in the future of Africa (April 2009:462-475). Thus, if African countries could apply necessary precautions, Chinese investments in the mining sector will be an important opportunity for the development of the continent. China invests not only in mining, but also in the agricultural sector for food security and poverty reduction, the infrastructure sector to improve people's livelihoods, and the telecommunication sector to connect people, markets, information and services. All of China's investments provide many new opportunities to local people.

Another important issue for African countries is Chinese aid, which is given to many countries in many different forms, such as concessional loans, debt relief, funds for trade, investment and capacity development. By aid, China's goal is to improve Africa's self-reliance rather than imposing its development model on African countries. Chinese aid helps African countries develop their capacities in certain industries, such as mining, infrastructure and telecommunication, discovering new resources, and increasing the value of some products produced by African countries. China provides aid without putting forward any political conditionality, apart from accepting China's "One China" policy, which has challenged the traditional aid structure emphasizing democracy, human rights, transparency and sustainable development. Therefore, Eisenman claims that the Chinese economic, security and diplomatic policies have closed their eyes to the poor governance and corruption in the region, which could pose long-term, unintended consequences for China (Eisenman 2007:51).

China and Africa not only cooperate on economic terms but they also cooperate within the global system. They aim to collectively resist the unilateral policies of the West and create a multilateral system in which the developing countries could also raise their voices. In this regard, they emphasize South-South cooperation within international, regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the UN, WTO, BRICS, AU and ECOWAS. African countries consist of more than one third of the UN and China is one of the five permanent member states in the UN Security Council, so their collaboration is very significant for the future of developing countries. Likewise, BRICS established a new paradigm in which the Southern countries became dynamic sources for production and wealth. Therefore, cooperation with these newly emerging powers provides many advantages to the member states and the other Southern countries. However, the increasing dominance of China both in global and regional issues has caused some concerns in other developing countries. In this regard, the cooperation among African countries is prominent in both international and regional organizations to protect their interests against China.

The other important area is civil society cooperation, which was neglected before because priority was given to economic and political cooperation. However, recently,

it has been a crucial part of China's policies towards Africa. In this regard, the development of civil society cooperation exchanges from both sides has been dramatically increased by students, academicians, technical assistants and tourism. Moreover, educational and cultural activities have been supported in order to increase each country's knowledge about the other.

In light of this information, regarding the swiftly developing China and Africa economic relations, some claim that China pursues neomercantilist policies towards Africa, aiming to take advantage of its resources. In the neomercantilist system, the state is the major actor that artificially manages trade policies to preserve its domestic market and market advantages overseas. Therefore, while encouraging exports for trade surplus, states limit imports by imposing restrictions. Neomercantilism sees trade as zero-sum game, which means if one side wins, the other side must lose. After the 1980s, with the increasing globalization, it became difficult for states to impose protectionist policies, so they began to use monetary policies such as tariffs, subsidies, and currency manipulation to take advantage of foreign trade. Therefore, although in the mercantilist system, states were competing with one another through the increasing globalization, the number of firms acting in the international system has increased and states have started to both politically and economically support these national companies to expand overseas. Some claims that, in essence, China pursues neomercantilist policies in Africa because the central government protects its strong position over the economy, namely in regulation of trade, redistribution of capital and monetary policies. However, although the government is still the leading actor in the economy, according to government report and statements in 2014, market is expected to play a decisive role instead of a fundamental role in the allocation of resources. This means that Chinese government aims the market to be freer and businesses and private sector to play a more important role (Xuepeng 2014). Moreover, regarding China's Africa policies, China encourages Chinese firms to export and invest in Africa but it does not restrict imports from Africa. On the contrary, China imposed many policies and invested in many sectors to raise the amount of African imports to China. Moreover, China does not consider its trade relations with Africa a zero-sum game. On the contrary, China

calls it win-win cooperation that is based on mutual gain. Looking at it from the African perspective, although African countries recognize the problematic issues in their relations with China, in general African countries also see their economic cooperation as win-win. Moreover, although the state is dominant in the policy making process, currently the control over the state owned companies have been released and thus they have more room for maneuvering in their activities in Africa.

Therefore, in the last chapter, the relations between China and South Africa were analyzed, which could be a model of South-South cooperation in which both sides mutually gain. South Africa and China demonstrated that an African country can have a symmetrical relationship with China. China is the largest developing country in the world and South Africa is the biggest and most diversified economy in the African continent. Therefore, bilateral cooperation provides many economic advantages to both China and South Africa. Since the official diplomatic relation was established in 1998, bilateral trade and investment have been growing significantly. South Africa is a very rich country in terms of natural resources, so the increasing Chinese demand became an opportunity for the mining sector for diversifying traditional importers and for increasing the prices of mineral resources. However, China imports raw materials but exports manufactured products, which leads to trade deficit and causes some problems in the local manufacturing industry. However, China took some measures to eliminate such kinds of problems. Therefore, by taking proper measures for its trade relations with China, South Africa could change the usual trade pattern with China. Another crucial economic cooperation area in China-South Africa relations is the increasing bilateral investments. Chinese companies have mainly invested in mining and electronic sectors in South Africa, including some others such as construction, finance, and transportation. South Africa also has a significant amount of investments in Africa, as they have invested in more than 200 projects. South African investors mainly invested in breweries, media and communication and petro chemical sectors. In fact, South Africa is the only remarkable African investor in the Chinese market. So much so that South African assets in China are greater than the Chinese assets in South Africa.

China and South Africa's cooperation in international and regional organizations are also very important in terms of SSC. They strongly support a multipolar international system in which developing countries can also raise their voices. Besides cooperating in many Western dominated institutions, they also actively cooperate in Southern organizations. In this regard, in spite of its small economy compared with the other members, the inclusion of South Africa into BRIC(S) with the Chinese offering became a substantial opportunity for South Africa. It is the most important supporter and voice of the African continent in the international system. Therefore, the two countries have many common interests. In this regard, China and South Africa's bilateral and international cooperation provides many opportunities to both countries and also influence the other developing countries.

Additionally, China and South Africa emphasize the capacity development activities in South Africa and their developing civil society cooperation. China invested in science, technology and education sectors in South Africa. In addition, the people-to-people exchanges have swiftly increased through the use of educational and cultural programs. Moreover, China strongly encouraged Chinese tourists to visit South Africa and the growing Chinese population in South Africa is encouraged to visit China, which increased the limited knowledge sharing between the two countries.

In conclusion, as the Global South has developed, it has challenged the dominance of the North, which currently faces many problems, such as Eurozone economic problems, ageing or climate change. Although they have some weaknesses, such as corruption, economic obligations stemming from shortage of raw materials, oil and water, and illegalities in their economies, the emerging powers have crucial potential for the 21st century (Shaw et al. 2007:1266). China is the largest developing country that is willing to lead these emerging powers to change the existing global system to better serve the interests of developing countries. In this regard, it cooperates and collaborates with the African countries extensively. The countries' bilateral cooperation has been strengthening in economic, political, social and international terms. Rather than being seen as neomercantilist, it is seen as a 'win-win' both by China and African countries in general. In this regard, South

Africa is an important example both for South-South cooperation and for the future of China-Africa relations. It shows that an African country can have a more symmetrical relationship with China. However, the ultimate long-term impact of the South-South partnership in Africa will depend on the African countries' ability to maximize the benefits and minimize any potential risks.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

ÇİN VE AFRİKA ARASINDA GELİŞEN GÜNEY-GÜNEY İŞBİRLİĞİ- GÜNEY AFRİKA ÖRNEĞİ

İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra Harry Truman'ın ABD halkına yaptığı konuşmada ABD'nin gelişmiş teknolojisi ve endüstrisiyle gelişmemiş ülkelere yol göstermesi gerektiğini dile getirmesi yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu konuşmayla ilk defa bu ülkelerin sorunları uluslararası düzeyde gündeme gelmiştir. Dolayısıyla 1950'lerden bu yana gelişmemiş ülkelerin kalkınmasına dair bir çok yaklaşım ortaya çıkmıştır. Fakat bu tezde temel yaklaşımlardan modernleşme kuramı ve bağımlılık teorisi ele alınmıştır.

Modernleşme kuramına göre batının gelişim süreci doğal bir kalkınma sürecidir. Bu süreçleri takip eden, diğer bir deyişle liberal ve demokratik değerleri benimseyen her devlet kalkınabilir ve modern bir devlet olabilir. Dolayısıyla, modernleşme kuramına göre, eğer bir ülke kalkınamıyorsa bu ülkenin eğitim seviyesinin düşük olmasından, yeterli sermayeye sahip olmamasından ya da kültürel değerleri gibi kendi yerel sorunlarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu açıdan Truman'ın konuşması modernleşme kuramı açısından oldukça önemlidir. Modernleşme kuramını 1980'lerde neoliberal teori takip etmiştir. Benzer şekilde neoliberal teori de kalkınmanın yolunun batının demokratik, liberal değerlerini ve serbest piyasa ekonomisini benimsemek olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu teoriye göre, bir ülke dünya ekonomik sistemine ne kadar çok entegre olabilirse o kadar çok kazanım elde eder. Bu açıdan modernleşme kuramından farklı olarak neoliberal teori kalkınmanın temel biriminin devlet değil pazar olduğunu iddia eder. Fakat her ne kadar son yıllarda

gelişmekte olan ülkelerin sisteme daha çok entegre olmasıyla ekonomik kalkınma hızları artıyor olsa da Kuzey ve Güney arasındaki açık hala ciddi bir seviyededir.

Bağımlılık teorisi modernleşme kuramına karşı çıkmaktadır. Bu teoriye göre gelişmiş ülkeler kasıtlı olarak gelişmekte olan ülkelerin gelişimini sınırlandırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bağımlılık teorisi kalkınamamışlığın ülkelerin yerel sorunlarından kaynaklandığı tezini reddeder. Aksine bunun gelişmiş ülkeler tarafından kurulan ve yayılan uluslararası sistemin bir sonucu olduğunu iddia eder. Dolayısıyla bağımlılık teorisi gelişmemiş ülkelerin kalkınabilmesinin tek yolunun gelişmiş ülkelerle olan bağların gevşetilmesiyle olabileceğini savunur. Bağımlılık teorisi dünya sistemi teorisine ilham olmuştur. Bu teoriye göre dünya kapitalist sistemi merkez, yarı-çevre ve çevre olarak üçe ayrılır. Merkez ülkeler gelişmiş ülkeleri oluştururken çevre ülkeler gelişmemiş ülkeleri ve yarı çevre de gelişmekte olan ülkeleri temsil eder. Bu merkez-çevre ilişkisinde çevre ülkelerinin pozisyonu merkez ülkelere kaynak sağlamaktır. Bu teoriye göre, merkez ülkeler tarafından oluşturulan bu hiyerarşik sistem değişmedikçe çevre ülkelerin gelişmesi mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla, dünya sistemi teorisi gelişmemiş ülkelerin kalkınabilmesinin yolunun gelişmiş ülkeler tarafından kurulan bu sistemden uzaklaşması olduğunu öne sürer. Dolayısıyla bu teoriye göre, Güney ülkeleri geleneksel Kuzey ülkeleri yerine kendi aralarındaki işbirliğini arttırmalıdır.

Bu açıdan, Güney-Güney işbirliği az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler arasındaki ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyal bütün işbirliklerini içine alır. Güney-Güney işbirliğinin temel amacı ticaret, yatırım ve uluslararası yardım gibi alanlarda geliştirilen kazan-kazan ilişkisiyle Kuzey ve Güney ülkeleri arasındaki sosyo-ekonomik açığı kapatmaktır. 1980'lerden sonra Çin, Hindistan ve Brezilya gibi gelişmekte olan ülkelerin de kapasitelerini oldukça arttırmaları daha az gelişmiş ülkeler tarafından Kuzey ülkelere karşı bir alternatif olarak görülmeleri sonucunu doğurmuştur. UNCTAD'ın 2008 yılında yayınlanan raporu, son yıllarda dünya ekonomik sistemindeki en önemli gelişmeyi yeni gelişmekte olan ülkelerin ortaya çıkışı ve bunlar arasında hızlı bir şekilde artan işbirliği olarak ele almıştır. Dolayısıyla 1950'lerden itibaren Güney ülkelerinin yararına olarak gelişen Güney-Güney işbirliği, geleneksel Kuzey ülkelerinin gücünü sınırlamaktadır. Ekonomik

olarak, Güney-Güney işbirliği karşılıklı ticaretin gelişmesini ve gelişmiş ülkelerle gelişmemiş ülkeler arasındaki ticari eşitsizlikleri gidermeyi, karşılıklı yatırımların artmasını ve farklı alanlarda verilen yardımlarla daha az gelişmiş ülkelerin kalkınmasını hedeflemektedir. Siyasi olarak ise Güney ülkelerinin Birleşmiş Milletler, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü, BRICS gibi başta uluslararası kuruluşlar olmak üzere bölgesel ve yerel kuruluşlarda temsiliyetinin artırılmasını amaçlamaktadır. Aynı zamanda Güney-Güney işbirliği sivil toplum kuruluşları, özel sektör ve akademiye de sürece dahil ederek yapılan işbirliğinin toplumlar nezdinde de benimsenmesini hedeflemektedir.

Dünyadaki en büyük gelişmekte olan ülke olan Çin, Güney-Güney işbirliğini güçlü bir şekilde desteklemektedir. Bu bağlamda, Çin'in geri kalmış ülkelerin büyük bir çoğunluğunu içinde barındıran Afrika kıtası ile olan ilişkileri oldukça önem kazanmıştır. Çin-Afrika ilişkileri 1950'lere dayanmasına rağmen ilk yıllarda ilişkiler daha çok ideolojik temelli gelişmiştir. 1980'lerden sonra ise Çin uyguladığı ekonomik reformlar dolayısıyla dışa açılmaya başlamış fakat bu dönemde teknoloji transferi dolayısıyla ABD ve Japonya gibi ülkelerle ilişkilerinin geliştirilmesine önem vermiştir. Fakat hızla gelişen ekonomisi ve dolayısıyla artan hammadde ihtiyacı Çin'i oldukça zengin doğal kaynaklara sahip olan Afrika'yla daha yakın ilişkiler geliştirmeye zorlamıştır. Bu çerçevede, 2000 yılında FOCAC'ın kurulması önemli bir adım olmuştur. FOCAC ile ikili ilişkiler kurumsallaşmış, taraflar düzenli olarak bir araya gelme imkanı bulmuş ve bu da ilişkilerin daha da derinleşmesini sağlamıştır. 2006 yılında Pekin'deki FOCAC zirvesinde ise ilişkilerin iki tarafın da yararına olacak kazan-kazan işbirliğini amaçlayan 'stratejik işbirliği' düzeyine yükseltilmesi kararlaştırılmıştır. Afrika kıtası, Çin için ham madde ihtiyacının yanı sıra önemli bir pazar olması açısından da oldukça önemlidir. Çin tarafından ihraç edilen ucuz mallar yerel üreticilerin Çin'le rekabet edebilecek kapasitelerinin olmamasından dolayı çeşitli problemler ortaya çıkarsa da, Güney Afrika ve Avrupa'dan ithal edilen mallara göre daha düşük fiyatla satılan ürünler halka şimdiye kadar hiç görmedikleri ürünlerle tanışma imkanı sağlamıştır. Bunun yerel halkın yaşam kalitesini arttırdığı söylenebilir. Ayrıca, Çin'in Afrika'da başta enerji olmak üzere inşaat, tarım ve telekomünikasyon gibi bir çok sektöre yaptığı yatırımlar

ülkelerin kalkınmasına olumlu katkı sağlamaktadır. Afrika dünyadaki enerji kaynaklarının yüzde 30'una sahiptir fakat diğer ülkelerle karşılaştırıldığında bu kaynaklardan elde ettiği gelir kalkınması üzerinde beklenen etkiyi göstermemektedir. Dolayısıyla Afrika ülkeleri doğru politikalar uygulayabilirlerse Çin'in sektöre yaptığı yatırımları önemli birer fırsata dönüştürebilirler. Enerji ve mineral sektörünün yanında Çin'in inşaat sektörüne yaptığı yatırımlar ile bir çok yeni yol, okul ve hastane yapılmış, tarım sektöründe uyguladığı yeni tarım teknikleriyle Afrika'nın gıda güvenliği artırılarak yoksulluğun azaltmasına katkı sağlanmıştır. Ayrıca telekomünikasyon sektörüne yaptığı yatırımlar ile de yerli halkın denizaşırı ülkelerdeki insanlar, mallar, piyasa, ve hizmetlerle buluşturulması sağlanmış ve böylece bir çok insana yeni imkanlar sunulmuştur. Çin ayrıca bu ülkelere uzun vadeli ve düşük faizli krediler sağlarken yer yer borç affı gibi politikaları da uygulamıştır. Her ne kadar Çin'in, mevcut sistemin aksine neredeyse hiçbir siyasi önkoşul öne sürmeden verdiği krediler ve yaptığı yardımlar Batı tarafından eleştirilmesine sebep oluyorsa da Afrika ülkeleri tarafından oldukça olumlu karşılanmaktadır.

Ekonomik işbirliğinin yanında Çin ve Afrika ülkelerinin en önemli hedeflerinden biri de uluslararası sistemde Kuzey ülkelere karşı işbirliği yapmaktır. Bu bağlamda Tiananmen sonrası Batı'nın sert eleştirilerine karşı Afrika ülkelerinin görece desteği Çin ve Afrika ülkeleri arasında bir dönüm noktası olmuş ve Çin, Afrika ile olan ilişkilerin geliştirilmesine öncelik vermiştir. Çin Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik konseyinin beş daimi üyesinden birini oluştururken Afrika ülkeleri topluluğun üçte birinden fazlasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda gelişmekte olan ülkeler olarak bir çok ortak çıkara sahip bu ülkelerin Birleşmiş Milletler, DTÖ, BRICS gibi uluslararası kuruluşlarda birbirlerini desteklemesi alınan kararların sadece gelişmiş ülkelerin istekleri doğrultusunda değil gelişmekte olan ülkelerin çıkarlarını da gözetmesini sağlamıştır. Ayrıca BRICS gibi Güney ülkelerin bir araya gelerek oluşturdukları kurumlar gelişmekte olan ülkelerin düzenli olarak bir araya gelip ortak politikalar üretmesini sağlamış ve böylece diğer Batılı ülkelerin domine ettikleri kurumlarda da seslerini yükseltebilmelerini sağlamıştır.

Daha önceki yıllarda ekonomik ve siyasi işbirliğinin artırılması öncelikli hedef olduğundan toplumsal işbirliğinin artırılması konusu gölgede kalmıştır. Fakat son

yıllarda bu konu önem kazanmış ve toplumsal işbirliğini güçlendirmek amaçlı bir çok etkinlik desteklenmiştir. Bu bağlamda karşılıklı öğrenci, akademisyen, uzman ve teknik personel değişimlerine verilen destek kayda değer oranda artmış, eğitim ve kültür etkinlikleri desteklenmiş ve turizmin artması için çalışmalar yapılmıştır.

Diğer taraftan Çin ve Afrika arasındaki işbirliği hızla artarken ikili ilişkilerde bir takım sorunlar da ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Bunların başında Çin'in ham madde ithal ederken işlenmiş ürün ihraç etmesi sonucu Afrika ülkeleriyle artan ticaret açığı gelmektedir. Ayrıca Çinli firmaların yaptıkları yatırımlarda iş güvenliği, ödemeler ve çevre konularında gereken hassasiyeti göstermemesi ve bu yatırımlarda çalışmak üzere kıtaya gelen çok sayıda Çinli işçinin sebep olduğu memnuniyetsizlik de diğer sorunlar arasında gösterilebilir. Fakat son yıllarda en çok sorun oluşturan konu Afrika ülkelerinin her geçen gün artan ticaret açığıdır. Bu bağlamda, bazı teorisyenler, Çin'in Afrika ile olan, ilişkilerinde neomerkantalist politikalar izleyerek kaynaklarını sömürmeyi amaçladığı tezini ileri sürmektedir. Neomerkantalizme göre eğer bir ülke zengin doğal kaynaklara sahip değilse zenginlik elde edebilmesinin yolu uluslararası ticarettir. Bu açıdan neomerkantalizm, ihracatın teşvik edilirken ithalatın sınırlandırılması gerektiğini savunur. Bu amaçla temel birim olan devletin güçlü olması ve vergi, kota, teşvik gibi uygulamalarla yerel endüstrileri koruması ve dolayısıyla ekonomiye müdahalesi desteklenir. Neomerkantalizm, ticareti sıfır toplamlı bir oyun olarak görür. Yani bu ilişki biçiminde bir taraf kazanırken bir taraf kaybeder. Fakat bu argümanlar ışığında Çin-Afrika ilişkileri incelendiğinde, Çin ulusal şirketleri Afrika'ya yatırım yapmaya teşvik ederken, Afrika'dan gelen ürünlere herhangi bir sınırlama getirilmemiştir. Aksine Afrika'dan gelen bir çok ürünü ekstra yardımlarla teşvik etmiştir. Ayrıca, Afrika'nın mineral ve tarım sektörü gibi bir çok sektörde kapasitesinin geliştirilmesi ve ihracatının artırılması için teşvikler sağlanmış, üretilen malların kalitelerinin artırılmasına ve Afrikalı üreticilerin marka oluşturmalarına destek olunmuştur. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada, Çin'in Afrika ile olan ilişkilerinin neomerkantalist olduğu iddiasının aksine, kazan-kazan ilişkisi çerçevesinde karşılıklı yarar ilkesine dayanarak Güney-Güney işbirliği çerçevesinde geliştiği iddia edilmektedir.

Çin'in Afrika ülkeleriyle olan ilişkileri açısından Çin ve Güney Afrika ilişkileri Güney-Güney işbirliğine bir örnek teşkil etmesi açısından oldukça önemlidir. Çin'in Güney Afrika ile olan ilişkileri diğer Afrika ülkeleriyle karşılaştırıldığında daha simetrik bir yapıya sahiptir. Çin dünyanın en büyük gelişmekte olan ülkesi iken Güney Afrika Afrika'daki en büyük ve en çeşitli ekonomiyi oluşturmaktadır. Dolayısıyla ikili ekonomik işbirliği iki tarafa da bir çok avantaj sunmaktadır. 1998 yılında diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmasından sonra ikili ilişkiler hızla gelişmeye başlamıştır. Ekonomik ilişkiler bağlamında karşılıklı ticaret hızla gelişirken yatırımlar da iki tarafın menfaatine olacak şekilde hız kazanmıştır. Güney Afrika oldukça zengin doğal kaynaklara sahiptir. Bu çerçevede Çin'in halihazırda ithalat yapan ülkelere bir alternatif oluşturması ve artan bu talep dolayısıyla artan ham madde fiyatları Güney Afrika'nın kalkınmasında etkili olmuştur. Fakat Çin'in artan hammadde ithalatına karşılık işlenmiş ürün ihracatı yerel endüstriler açısından işsizlik gibi önemli sorunları beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu bağlamda bir çok fabrika kapatılırken bir çok kişi işsiz kalmıştır. Fakat Edward & Jenkins'in Güney Afrika'da son yıllardaki işsizliğin sebeplerini araştıran çalışmasının sonunda, araştırmacılar Çin'in ihracatının Güney Afrika'daki işsizliği olumsuz etkilediğini fakat tek sebep olmadığını ortaya koymuştur. Diğer önemli bir konuda artan karşılıklı yatırımlardır. Güney Afrika'nın Çin'deki yatırımlarının değeri Çin'in yatırımlarından fazladır. Bu açıdan Güney Afrika'nın Çin'de kayda değer oranda yatırımı bulunan tek Afrika ülkesi olduğu söylenebilir. Sadece ekonomik olarak değil iki ülke uluslararası alanda da işbirliği yapan iki önemli aktördür. İki ülke Birleşmiş Milletler başta olmak üzere diğer bir çok uluslararası kurumda ortak politikalar sürdürmektedir. Bu bağlamda, uluslararası sistemde Afrika kıtasının temsilcisi pozisyonunda olan Güney Afrika'nın Çin'in teklifiyle BRIC(S)'in bir üyesi olması, ikili ilişkilerin daha da güçlendirilmesini sağlamıştır. Böylece bir çok ortak çıkara sahip Çin ve Güney Afrika diğer uluslararası kurumlarda da gelişmekte olan ülkeler için daha etkili olma imkanına sahip olmuşlardır.

Sonuç olarak, 1950'lerden itibaren ideolojik olarak gelişmeye başlayan Çin-Afrika ilişkileri 2000'li yıllar sonrası ekonomik ilişkilerin öne çıktığı bir sürece evrilmiştir. Fakat hızla gelişen ikili ilişkiler belli sorunları da beraberinde getirmiştir.

Özellikle Çin'in lehine gelişen ticari ilişkiler, Çin'in Afrika ile olan ilişkisinin neomerkantalist olduğu iddialarını beraberinde getirirken, Çin ilişkilerin Güney-Güney işbirliği çerçevesinde kazan-kazan ilişkisine dayandığını idda etmektedir. Günümüz praktikleri incelendiğinde, bu tezde Çin-Afrika ilişkilerinin Güney-Güney işbirliği çerçevesinde değerlendirilmesinin daha doğru olduğu ve bunun neomerkantalist bir çizgiye evrilmemesi için Afrika ülkelerinin alacağı önlemlerin oldukça önemli olduğu idda edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda Çin ve Güney Afrika incelenmiş ve iki ülke arasında gelişen ilişkilerin Güney-Güney işbirliğine uyumlu bir örnek olduğu gösterilmiştir.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Erşan
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