

TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEMANDS
THROUGH BALLOT BOX:
FROM *LOS INDIGNADOS* TO *PODEMOS*

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ABSTRACT

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After 2008 crisis, alternative remedies and resistance against this age's predominant neoliberal policies have been sought in many states and societies. Europeans harshly encountered with the crisis and governments' and the EU's crisis management policies raised multilateral and multilevel struggles like: the Pots and Pans Revolution in Iceland (2009), the *Geração à Rasca* in Portugal (2011), the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece (2010), and *los Indignados* (15M) in Spain (2011). These movements had worldwide repercussions. Spain's struggle fueled the emergence of a political party, differently from others.

Several academic studies have been performed on the Spanish movement and the party (*Podemos*) established in the aftermath of the movement from various perspectives. This thesis focuses on the tensions arising from the transformation of social and political demands of the *los Indignados* movement into the institutional politics. The study addresses to movement's and party's populist characters, impact of economic crisis on lives of Spanish people, inextricability of politics and economics, politicization and strengthening of economic demands, their reflections on elections, and liberal democracy. Accordingly, an analysis within the context of institutionalization of *los Indignados* movement and its demands by a political party, *Podemos*, has been

conducted on the basis of the tensions. In consequence, the thesis argues that despite the tensions, which *Podemos* is at the center and criticisms raised against *Podemos*, it is the main denominator of the new political stage in Spain opened by *los Indignados* and its existence and attitude within the Spanish and European politics should not be disregarded because of its potential for future struggles.

Keywords: *los Indignados* (15M), *Podemos*, global economic crisis, representative democracy, direct democracy

ÖZ

TOPLUMSAL VE SİYASİ TALEPLERİN SANDIK ARACILIĞIYLA DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: LOS INDIGNADOS'TAN PODEMOS'A

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2008 küresel krizinin ardından pek çok devlet ve toplumda çağımızın baskın neoliberal politikalarına karşı direniş yolları ve alternatif çareler aranmıştır. Krizle ve gerek hükümetlerin gerekse Avrupa Birliği'nin kriz yönetim politikalarıyla çok sert bir şekilde karşılaşan Avrupalılardan çok taraflı ve çok düzeyli mücadeleler yükselmiştir. İzlanda'daki Tencere Tava Devrimi (2009), Portekiz'deki *Geração à Rasca* (2011), Yunanistan'daki Öfkeli Vatandaşlar Hareketi (2010) ve İspanya'daki *los Indignados* (15M) hareketi (2011) bazı örneklerdir. Bu hareketler Avrupa'da ve Atlantik ötesinde oldukça ses getirmiştir. İspanya'daki mücadele ise diğerlerinden farklı olarak bir siyasi partinin oluşumunu körüklemiştir.

Hem İspanyol hareketi hem de hareketin ardından kurulan parti (*Podemos*) üzerine farklı bakış açılarından birçok akademik çalışma yapılmaktadır. Bu tez ise *los Indignados* hareketinin toplumsal ve siyasal taleplerinin kurumsal siyasete aktarılmasından kaynaklanan gerilimlere odaklanmaktadır. Araştırma, söz konusu hareketin ve partinin karakteri, ekonomik krizin İspanyol insanın hayatına etkisi, siyasetin ve ekonominin birbirinden ayrılmazlığı, ekonomik taleplerin politikleştirilmesi ve güçlendirilmesi, seçimlere yansımaları ve liberal demokrasi

konuları çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, *los Indignados* hareketinin ve taleplerinin bir siyasi parti, *Podemos*, tarafından kurumsallaştırılması bağlamında gerilimlere dayanan bir analiz yapılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez *Podemos*'un merkezde yer aldığı ve *Podemos*'a karşı dile getirilen gerilimlere rağmen partinin, İspanya'da *los Indignados* tarafından açılan yeni siyasi evrenin ana paydası olduğunu ve İspanyol ile Avrupa siyasetleri içerisindeki varlığının ve tutumunun gelecekteki mücadeleler için taşıdığı potansiyelden ötürü göz ardı edilmemesi gerektiğini iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *los Indignados* (15M), *Podemos*, küresel ekonomik kriz, temsili demokrasi, doğrudan demokrasi

*A mi familia amorosa y
A los pueblos indignados del mundo*

[To my loving family, and
to the indignant peoples of the world]

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

15M	15 mayo (May 15)
15O	15 octubre (October 15)
19J	19 junio (June 19)
ADESOR	Asociación Nacional de Desempleados (National Association of the Unemployed)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
C's (Cs)	Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía (Citizens-Party of the Citizenry)
DRY	Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now)
EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
EFSF	European Financial Stability Fund
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FED	Federal Reserve System
GJM	Global Justice Movement
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IU	Izquierda Unida (United Left)
JSF	Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth Without Future)

MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NSMs	New Social Movements
OWS	Occupy Wall Street
PAH	Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform for those Affected by Mortgages)
PASOK	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)
PP	Partido Popular (People's Party)
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero de España (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party)
SME	Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
Syriza	The Coalition of the Radical Left
Troika	Decision group formed by the EC, the ECB and the IMF
UKIP	The United Kingdom Independence Party
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, a new political process has come in sight in the world politics. The crisis has been considered as one of the most significant in the history of capitalism since the 1929 Great Depression. After a long time in the history of capitalism, it has been witnessed a global uprising surge in 2010s. In several states and societies, people simultaneously encountered with the crisis, and both national governments' and the European Union's policies of crisis management in no uncertain terms. They embarked on quests to create/offer alternatives, to find remedies or to resist the dominant neoliberal policies of this age. In the Western world, and particularly in Southern Europe, the new forms of mobilization have emerged and accordingly the new political forces like social organizations, citizens' platforms, and political parties have emerged, alongside the worldwide repercussions of them. Both right and left political formations – populist or radical, conservative or autonomous, authoritarian or libertarian, democratic socialist or national democratic – have put a firm stamp on European politics, especially in Southern Europe as well as in transatlantic countries following the 2008 economic crisis.

The Pots and Pans Revolution in Iceland (2009), the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece (2010), the Portuguese *Geração à Rasca* (2011), and the Spanish *los Indignados* (15M¹) movement (2011) are some concrete examples of the multilateral and multilevel struggles which occurred in Europe. The case of Greece together with the rise of anti-austerity party of Syriza, which “surprisingly” came into power even though having a socialist line and dissenter of the existing

¹ The movement of *los Indignados* or *el movimiento 15M* happened on the very eve of the local and regional elections in Spain in 2011, and 15M refers to the abbreviation of the Spanish *15 Mayo*.

system, has become the most obvious example that left and leftist discourses have recently given a new impulse to Europe. Syriza's challenge with the austerity measures of the European Union and Troika, formed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its endeavor to keep Greece on her feet have recently become central matters in the academic and non-academic studies. On the other hand, the Spanish resistance against the austerity measures, which recommends heavy neoliberal practices under the control of Troika, gave rise to several types of issue-oriented movements focusing on the evictions, unemployment rates, corruption, precarious work conditions, two-party system, and in general life conditions of ordinary people. *Los Indignados* was a reaction movement having idiosyncratic practices and emerging within the framework of the 2008 global financial crisis for the first time in Europe. Emergence of *Podemos* as a political party upon the rise of *los Indignados* movement brought together the question of the degree of organic relations between the movement and the political party. This new political entity of Spain was claimed to arise from the social movement (*los Indignados*) happened in May 2011, and has become popular with the results of the European Parliament elections of 2014. It won about 8 % of the total votes and obtained five seats in the European Parliament. There were so many debates like that *Podemos* is defined as a populist party rather than a radical leftist party, or it has common points with Syriza in terms of economy program in general. Among these debates, its position against the austerity policies and its so-called success that was achieved in local and general elections of Spain in May and in December 2015 have made *Podemos* the research object of this study.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relation between a "populist" movement and a "populist" political party in the case of Spain, and to explore the tensions arising from the transformation of social and political demands of the *los Indignados* movement since embracing and translating the demands of ordinary people (protesters) into mainstream political system would be bounded to contradictions or challenges in the Spanish example. In this respect, the purpose

has become to answer the interrelated questions: “How is it asserted that a political party has evolved out of a populist movement by adopting and translating the demands of ordinary people within current mainstream politics, and what are the related tensions on the grounds of the organic relations between the movement and the party in the case of Spain?”. Accordingly, an analysis within the context of institutionalization of *los Indignados* movement and its demands by a political party, *Podemos*, will be conducted on the basis of the tensions arising out of the transformation of the social and political demands of a populist movement.

More precisely, in this thesis, the relationship between the social reactions and the political structure will be conveyed within the case of Spain. This relation is questioned in line with the institutionalization process of a movement by a political party through transferring the social and political demands of the *los Indignados* movement. The movement is different from, for instance, other European movements even if all seem to reveal against the country-specific financial crises and austerity measures. The reason is that the changing political atmosphere appeared with the movement somehow turned into a political regime crisis, and the struggle of Spanish people fueled the emergence of *Podemos*. However, in other examples the course of the politics was distinct from Spain. There were not political will/desire in Portugal and Greece which was to form a new political party as in Spain, but to support and sustain the existing ones. In addition, in Iceland the Citizen’s Movement was formed with the spark of the Pots and Pans Revolution of 2009 but it was ephemeral and dissolved in 2012. Besides, the movements caused the existing governments to resign in Iceland, Portugal, and Greece. Yet, the government change in Spain could be possible with the early general elections held in November, 2011 – six months after the outbreak of the movement.

In terms of the uniqueness of *Podemos*, this party is assessed on a similar ground with the political parties which are identified as Eurosceptic, populist, anti-austerity parties of Europe. It is compared with the examples of Syriza of Greece,

the UKIP of Britain, the Five Star Movement of Italy, and the Front National of France. However, it is different from them since Syriza, UKIP, and the Front National are deep-rooted and not the parties established after a social uprising as in the example of *Podemos*. The differentiating point of the Italian and Spanish cases is constituted over the way and style of their appearances. The anti-austerity mobilization of Italy has been predominated by the established political actors. Thus, the Five Star Movement established in 2009 has not an organic relation with the anti-austerity movement in Italy. The party directly defines itself as populist – movement, not a party – even though it has an anti-establishment viewpoint in parallel with the anti-austerity understanding. In addition, a right-wing position is attributed to it. On the other hand, *Podemos* which has been established after the anti-austerity mobilization, *los Indignados*, of Spain has an organic linkage with the movement. It never directly defines itself as populist although it is criticized for being populist, and even if it has major populist features, it has mainly a left-wing tendency differently from the Italian case.

It is crucial to state that even if this Spanish case is a relatively new subject in both political science and social movements literature, it has been examined and studied academically several times and continues to be examined and studied from different perspectives. For instance, the Spanish movement *los Indignados* is studied in terms of its organizational style through online channels like social media together with development of the new technologies in information and communication (ICTs). Its interactions with other contemporary movements such as the Occupy Wall Street Movement², the Arab Spring, etc. are another focus of subject within the framework of transnational networks. The movement is also handled on the grounds of its mobilization practices like sit-ins, occupation, *acampadas* (camp-sites), alongside its rejections and demands stemmed from the economic woes aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis. On the other hand, the *Podemos* party is also assessed in terms of its digital organizational style as

² The Occupy Wall Street Movement in the U.S. is the starting place of the universal surge of Occupy movements, and relatively a late reaction to the global economic crisis of 2008.

well as approached or criticized because of its ideological position, its attitudes and its policy proposals towards the issues of existing politics of Spain and Europe – i.e. austerity measures, unemployment, etc. In addition, it is heavily examined at the heart of election practices, its so-called “success”, and its impact on the Spanish political life in the literature.

At this point, it should be indicated that this thesis focuses on the institutionalization/bureaucratization of the demands of *los Indignados* movement and the emergent tensions related with this institutionalization. The title of the thesis demonstrates the focus on the transformation of social and political demands evidently as well. These demands manifested in 2011 by a number of the *los Indignados* protesters/activists are naturally concerning the sociopolitical, political, and economic life of the country. The core of this study is centering upon the rebranding of the demands of the streets to the demands of a political party – *Podemos*, and through this channel, the transformation of them into the institutional politics. In the middle of the demands of the movements, an emphasis on “real” democracy existed. Namely, these demands were reflected on the placards with the message of the fact that the protesters are not represented by the existing politicians, and what they have is not the real democracy. The politicians were thought as the collaborator of the banks and financial system, and the current system was regarded as corrupted. Most importantly, *los Indignados* movement rejected the representation of the movement by any political party or trade union – that is, embracement of it by political institutions. This is because, the most crucial demand of the movement is perceived as the direct representation, that is, the demand of direct/participatory democracy. From the point of the relation between the movement and the party, there is an attempt of transition or transformation from the movement to the party. Yet, this transition anywhere in the world like in Spain is not that easy. There are various dynamics like territorial, national or global circumstances, which shapes the transformation process, and these do not have to be same or similar. Accordingly, the case of Spain is handled concerning its potential in this thesis.

For this thesis, primary sources like the founding manifesto and economy programme of *Podemos*, the manifesto of *los Indignados* movement, which propounds its demands, the discourses of the protesters through secondary sources but including direct interviews, and the statements of party officials are used in the scope of analysis. The secondary sources mainly utilized include various books, academic articles, newspaper reports, online columns, blog posts, and videos (documentary, seminar and opinion records, etc.).

The thesis is structured as follows: Firstly, the opening chapter will include a compact literature review of the social movements. It has a critical comprehension to the categorization of the New Social Movements. The classification of “old” and “new” social movements is considered as insignificant and the movements should be perceived within the context of spatiotemporal, which they are in mobility. In addition, this chapter adopts an approach which splits the social movements into century-based waves based on the accumulative change of social movements, since the focus of this thesis will tend towards the third wave social movements to address *los Indignados* movement of Spain. This chapter will provide an insight on the 2008 global economic crisis and its reflections on Spain as the spark of a social movement as well. Within the scope of the scientific understanding of inextricability of economics and politics, the Spanish case will be assessed in the direction of the fact that the social unrest and its reflection as the political distrust happens when the ruling power puts its hands in the pocket of the people. That is, it is argued here that the social indignation can become a driver which turns an economic crisis into a political one. This chapter will also cover the matter of democracy in social movements along with the demands of the movement, *los Indignados*, related with democracy. Firstly, the liberal democracy and its crisis will be presented; later, the disenchantment of the movements about the representative democracy and their creation of alternative politics will be given place.

The third chapter will give information about the course of events throughout the protest days of 2011, in a way to cause the emergence of *los Indignados* movement. The reasons, mechanisms, components, mobilization forms, rejections, demands, and leading actors and organizers of the movement will be presented. So who *los Indignados* are and the pre- and post-processes of the movement together with the populist nature of the movement will be explained in detail. This chapter also will also give place to the political party, *Podemos* and its populist character. This part will make reference to the time and the way which *Podemos* established, and the dynamics causing the party to be established. The interrelation with *los Indignados* movement, the party's practices in the direction of democratic motions, its populist political position depending on the understanding of people versus elites, and its participatory democracy practices and electoral experiences in order to be able to conduct an analysis over the tensions that it has encountered within the representative system relied on ballot box and elections will be covered as well.

The following chapter, the fourth one, will demonstrate and examine the tensions that *Podemos* has come across, both within the party and with its grassroots, as a political actor in Spanish politics. In the first place, the tensions arising from *los Indignados'* and *Podemos'*s desire and practices of participatory democracy will be elaborated. In the second place, the tensions stemming from the political stance of *Podemos* within the scope of anti-establishment and anti-elites understanding will be given place. Thirdly and lastly, the tensions which the electoral "success" of *Podemos* creates will be demonstrated.

The thesis will argue that the transformation of social and political demands of *los Indignados* through *Podemos* may have caused some tensions, contradictions and challenges; however, despite the tensions which *Podemos* is at the center and criticisms raised against *Podemos*, it is the main denominator of the new political stage in Spain opened by *los Indignados* as discussed in the Conclusion part. Thus, this thesis will argue that the existence and attitude of

Podemos within the Spanish and European politics should not be disregarded because of its potential for future struggles.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING A MOVEMENT WITHIN ITS OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Social movements as a dynamic field preserves its dynamism and keeps to influence the social, political and economic lives of societies even being changed from age to age. For this reason, it is needed to look at it in order to understand today's social developments. Democracy, as the prominent value of today's states and societies, always is one of the central concerns of the social movements. The emerging mobilizations struggle for or within the notion democracy. In this day and age, the contemporary mobilizations brought many countries away political consequences, and Spain has become one of the examples. The economic, social, and political developments in Spain have caused a widely known movement and political party. Herein, it is regarded significant to give a brief place to the social movements' literature since the political party, *Podemos*, cannot be considered and studied independent from *los Indignados* movement, and this movement can be understood better within the social movements' literature. The reason is that *Podemos* has been established with a manifesto borrowed/adapted from the basic documents of *los Indignados*, and it has a preponderating emphasis and reference on the movement. Furthermore, an approach, which foresees a classification for the social movements according to the time and space they emerge, is adopted in this thesis.

By the way, in order to be able to understand and interpret the movement, touching loosely on the 2008 global economic crisis and its reflections on Spain due to the fact that it is considered as the triggering factor of the movement is thought significant. That is to say, the impact of the crisis on numerous states and societies, and these states' own crisis management styles together with the

instructions by/of the regional and supranational powers, the EU, IMF, or Troika for instance, have become one of the underlying causes of the wave of protests happened in the western world from European countries to the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the U.S. Hence, it is coherent to demonstrate how Spain interprets the crisis within its economic and political structure based on the occurrence of *los Indignados* movement. Besides, it is also noteworthy, in order to explain and analyze where the demands of *los Indignados* have been moved through a political party, *Podemos* over their perceptions of democracy, to draw a framework on the notion of democracy – substantially liberal democracy – and the association of it between movements and mainstream politics through parties. Overall, in the second chapter of this thesis, a compact review of the social movements' literature, the 2008 global economic crisis, its impact on Spain, and the demand of real democracy will be given place within the framework of *los Indignados* movement and the *Podemos* party in Spain.

2.1. Social movements' literature

Doubtlessly, the social movements have taken place in the community life since the old times, and those represented/introduced various resistance types, revolts, riots and conflicts for years. Still the world testifies the social movement practices today with the increasing demands and claims mostly for a variety of basic rights. Here the question is, as some scholars suggested, that do we really live in a “movement society” or “a movement world” (Snow, 2013: 588)? Thus, what the definition of social movements is, how the historicity of social movements slips by, and how the waves of social movement mobilizations, that is, the protest waves of social unrest are categorized emerge as important questions to be answered.

Even if a single notion of social movements may not able to be directly formed and defined, the grounds that the social movements are commonized facilitate to make a general and flexible definition: *Social movements are the collective actions where women and men sharing common hope, feelings and*

interests, act together and include conscious, planned and purposeful protests (Atvur, 2014: 15). As many scholars such as David A. Snow, Jonathan Christiansen etc. agree, an exact consensus on a common definition is not easily reached. But yet, Snow (2013: 588) explains that;

“Social movements and related phenomena, such as protest demonstrations and revolutions, are collective actions through which aggrieved collectivities give voice publicly to various grievances and press relevant authorities to attend to the associated claims and/or demands.”

The nature of collective action, however, is defined differently in different authors. Freeman and Johnson (1999) describe a social movement somewhere in between a stable political party or interest group and an unorganized, fleeting and trendy mass (quoted in Christiansen, 2011: 15). For some others, social movements can be thought of as informal social entities, that is, a set of individuals and/or groups with reference to the mechanisms which are attributed to the concept of a social movement by della Porta (Christiansen, 2011: 5, 15). Regarding the “mechanisms” of social movements, della Porta and Diani (2006: 20) put forth three mechanisms which are *“being involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; being linked by dense informal networks; and sharing a distinct collective identity”*. Therefore, *“social movements are defined as informal networks based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual issues through the frequent use of various forms of protest”* (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a: 8).

The other definitions in the literature from worldwide known scholars such as Sidney Tarrow, Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, and Charles Tilly have steered the social movement literature. According to Tarrow, social movements are the “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarity, and sustained interaction with a common opponent and authorities”. He also emphasizes that political, cultural and international changes are inevitable when the purpose is “change” in various struggles of various people, even though the movements in which the ordinary people play big role in success or fail (Atvur,

2014: 16). Along those lines, Goodwin and Jasper attributes similar features to the social movements like being “collective, organized, sustained, non-institutional challenge to authority, power holders, or cultural beliefs and practices” (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a: 8). Furthermore, Tilly asserts that social movements, which are a distinctive political complex dating back to the late 18th century, combine three elements. These are;

1. a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities (*campaign*),
2. employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (the variable ensemble of performances is called the *social movement repertoire*),
3. participants' concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (they are called them *WUNC displays*) (Tilly & Wood, 2016: 4; also in Flesher Fominaya, 2014a: 8-9; and Tilly, 2015: 170).

With reference to all of these definitions, Flesher Fominaya (2014a: 7) puts it all in simple terms that “*social movements are one of the main ways in which people collectively give voice to their grievances and concerns, and demand that something be done about them – or take extra-institutional action to change them directly*”.

Beyond the definitions, one thing is certain that the social movements, their characteristics and contents are learned through experience due to the dynamic nature of society itself – regardless of its type. In consideration of this situation, it is possible to encounter with social movements in numerous societies like authoritarian or democratic ones. Social movements can be local, national or international according to their purposes. They may differentiate as to their quests

such as revolutionizing the system, or hindering the change. However, there have several common characteristics – or it can be called as “similarities” or “commonalities” – among social movements despite their different dimensions of their manifestly political, ideological, or organized character (Christiansen, 2011: 4). Snow (2013: 589) indicates certain similarities, for example, all movements are change-oriented; they are challengers to or defenders of the system or authority whatever their characteristics are – political, cultural, or religious; they are collective and organizational enterprises; and they typically display temporal continuity. Herewith, the characteristics composing most of the social movements’ definitions can be itemized as follows:

- *collective or joint* action
- some *extra-institutional* or *non-institutional* collective action
- *change-oriented* goals or claims, or resistance to change
- a *target* towards which these claims are directed
- some degree of *organization*
- some degree of *temporal continuity*
- some degree of *shared solidarity* and/or *collective identity* (Flesher Fominaya, 2014a: 8)

Consequently, although there are numerous definitions which regard social movements from different perspectives and there are numerous commonalities and differentiated characteristics of social movements, it cannot be ignored that each movement which aims to create a change in the particular area of struggle and constitutes a collective consciousness puts the action in the center (Atvur, 2014: 16). Thus, the action appears to be a unique common feature of the social movements.

Together with the historical change; the aims, actors, organizational forms, and struggle methods have been differentiated in line with the goals of the social struggle. According to Atvur (2014: 14, 15), these differentiated struggles are called as waves of social movements and these waves symbolize a process which

enduringly proceeds with the accumulation of the previous wave, instead of alternating to each other. It is claimed that the transformation within the social movements' aims and of their participants creates social movement waves, and these waves are marked as workers' struggles, new social movements (NSMs), and global social movements.

Table 1. Social Movement Waves

<i>Social Movement Waves</i>	First Wave Social Movements	Second Wave Social Movements	Third Wave Social Movements
Historical Context	19 th – 20 th centuries	Middle of 20 th century (1968) – End of 20 th century	21 st century –
Scope	Workers movement	New social movements (specific struggles)	Trans-national struggles & global social movements
Main Actors	Proletariat	Excluded groups	Excluded groups + proletariat + middle class (diversity)
Organization	Central organization, hierarchical order	Loose and horizontal organization	Networked organization
Purpose of Struggle	Power grab (ultimate aim is the proletarian revolution)	Right and reform demands on the specific struggle issues	Questioning of neoliberalism, the demand of direct and deliberative democracy
Method of Struggle	Strike, mass demonstration, march, occupation	Mass demonstration, petition, sit-in protest	In addition to the previous ones, demonstrations containing theatrical and musical components

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Outcome	Reforms improving the economic, social and political status, social-democrat political parties' accession to power, putting the revolutionary struggle on the back burner	Women's rights, minority rights, ecological rights, national and international gains on protection of environment, new legislative regulations	The (wave of) movement still goes on; concretization of the proposals in line with the pursuit of alternative system will give shape to the outcomes of the movement.
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Source: The table is taken from Atvur (2014: 35).

As of the 19th century that modern social sciences began to develop, more systematic analyses related to social movements have started to emerge (Çetinkaya, 2015: 27). The working class struggles in 1830 and 1848 were organized against the systems that were dominated by the nobles and royalty itself; and the French King Louise Philippe's governance by merely depending on the bourgeoisie respectively (Sander, 2009: 185-6), and the 1871 Paris Commune experience still maintain their importance and impact; the proletariat struggles were classified as the first wave of the social movements (Atvur, 2014: 16). Although the then elites perceived these movements as the frightening blowups, they were actually organized by the people who claimed their rights (Çetinkaya, 2015: 33).

However, these "proletariat" movements were interrupted by the World War I. Even though the focus was shifted towards national interest from class interest due to the war, as of the second half of the 20th century the social movements gained a new impulse due to a series of developments. Atvur (2014: 18) mentions the association between the second wave of the social movements, also called the new social movements (NSMs), and the transition from industrial society to post-industrial society. The transition to post-industrial society resulted

in the regression of the classical proletariat and new forms of social protest emerged because of the penetration of capitalist relations of production in the areas of the social life (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987: 80). By means of these newly emerging protest forms, the NSMs, instead of the attempts to grab the power directly, focused on the issues such as culture, identity, qualified life together with the radical reform suggestions and struggled in order to obtain education opportunity, occupational safety, and health services (Atvur, 2014: 19).

The 1968 is thought as the turning point for the NSMs, that is, this year betokened the advent of the NSMs (Çetinkaya, 2015: 60; Kornetis, 2013: 417). In fact, according to Arrighi et. al. (2004: 88), what actually institutionalized the NSMs was the 1968. The principal of the common aspects of the movements named as new social movements and rose in the political scene after 1968 is to sustain the struggle different from the past experience and in a different context, and this difference is related with the novelty of the movement and how it self-describes within the society (Topal Demiroğlu, 2014: 135-136). That is, the newness of the NSMs is derived from the differentiated aspects of the “old” workers’ struggles (Atvur, 2014: 21). According to Claus Offe (1985: 824, 828-9, 832), in contrast to the old paradigm that dwelt mostly on the themes of economic growth and societal security, the new paradigm emphasizes peace, environment and human rights. While the old one is related to freedom and material/substantial progress, the new deliberates over individual autonomy and identity; and there are also organizational and hierarchical differences between them (quoted also in Çetinkaya, 2015: 45). However, the new social movements include the dynamics of old movements such as being economic interest-centric and those aiming at influencing/grabbing the political power alongside its main concentration on cultural issues and common identities, and on the other side they are flexible compared to the old, without having a center and are collectivized by the local reactions (Topal Demiroğlu, 2014: 136; Atvur, 2014: 21).

Today the above mentioned purposes, which compose social movements, or this post-1968 tradition survives. For instance, the anti-globalization movements against the international financial institutions or the protests during the Arab Spring or Gezi Park Protests did not have only one center; and regardless of their starting points, they intended to influence the political power rather than grabbing the power; and, they have brought on local, country-based or regional reactions. But today, the question that Jean Cohen inquired in 1985 for the contemporary social movements is still valid: “what is *new* about new social movements, for today especially after the 2008 crisis which the world and particularly Europe encountered and highly influenced?” (Flesher Fominaya & Cox, 2013: 21). Nevertheless, it is clear that there is not a sharp contrast between the old and new social movements. The fact that the NSMs supplant the old ones is just a prejudice since the proletariat struggles conducted the new and various identities and demands to reflect themselves in line with the changes in relations of production and social structure. Therefore, the NSMs actually lean on the accumulation of the old social movements and the renewed circumstances verify the social movements within the changing system (Çetinkaya, 2015: 44; Atvur, 2014: 21-22).

Çetinkaya (2015: 12) highlights that the Arab Spring became a striking response to the approaches and comments, which did not ascribe resistance, rebellion, and revolution to the Middle Eastern (and North African) (MENA) societies, so much so that it provided the inspiration for many subsequent movements and protests like *los Indignados* (15M) movement in *Puerto del Sol* and the Occupy movements in the West. He also stresses that the imaginary distinction between the East and the West began to disappear with this third wave in 2011, the classification of “old” and “new” social movements has been made needless. Moreover, it is so easy to detect many of the criteria that are used to classify and distinguish the social movements, in so-called both old and new social movements. Namely, the phenomena and cases tested and discussed through the social movement history like reasons, aims, actors, actions, mechanisms, and

organizational understandings are not completely new inventions and are only the way of thinking once again in different times (Çetinkaya, 2015: 60). Consequently, both the fact that different phases of social movements history are considered with an integrated approach and the post-1990 new trends demonstrate the insignificance of the classification of social movements as “old” and “new” (Çetinkaya, 2015: 12-13; 52).

Considering the social movements of the 21st century as the third wave of the social movements or the *new* NSMs as characterized by some scholars, it is argued that under the changing conditions, the variety of the social movements will increase and start to have a global trait (Atvur, 2014: 22). The point that Atvur (2014: 22) quotes from Antony Mcgrew (2005: 22) is significant in this respect: the technological innovations combining the world and facilitating the capital mobility, movement of goods and services, and movement of workers have brought about encountering and interaction of different cultures and thus the possibility of influence of local on global and the vice versa has been augmented. The social movements, which are vested with growing problems, reflections of the changing global system and questioning the system, have been stimulated because of the precarious work conditions, troubles arising from migratory issues, increasing consumerism and the deepening injustice and inequality in the world (Atvur, 2014: 22).

What distinguishes the 21st century movements from the NSMs is their global interactions and anti-systemic potentials, and their common ground is their ability to create defiance to the hegemony that the global system caused (quoted from James Petras in Atvur, 2014: 23). Those movements are prevalently considered as “anti-globalization movements” but what they oppose to is the neoliberal globalization rather than the phenomenon of globalization itself, and they are in search of liberation from the neoliberal contagion; therefore, defining them as “alter-globalization (alternative) or alter-mundialization movements” would be more appropriate (Çetinkaya, 2015: 60; Atvur, 2014: 23). To put it more

explicitly, the proletariat and precariat who get hurt from the neoliberal system; the youth and students who think they are left futureless; those whose vested rights are cut; sufferers of urban transformation and ecological destruction; immigrants, refugees, peasants who are forgotten in suburbs; and those fighting with patriarchy have not had difficulty to unite their diversifying demands in street in this day and age (Çetinkaya, 2015: 13). The two starting points of the 21st century's globalized movements were the 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) protests and the World Social Forum which was born in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001 as an alternative to the economy-based summits or ministerial conferences of the WTO at the beginning of the 21st century (Atvur, 2014: 24; Yıldırım, 2013a: 122). This recent wave of movement was called as Global Justice Movement (GJM) (Flesher Fominaya; 2014a: 52). According to Klein (quoted in Çetinkaya, 2015: 62), the main feature of the movement was that people tried to recapture the common by fighting against the squares, schools, the system of education, and agriculture commoditized by the market and indexed to the economic parameters. Namely, the common spirit they share is to reclaim the commonalities (Dirlik, 2015: 80).

In other respects, while the NSMs transformed the participant profile of the proletariat movement, the movements of 21st century have extended the common struggle opportunities of the NSMs with the networking structure (Atvur, 2014: 24). Concisely, the inequalities that the capitalist system deepens through the neoliberal policies have introduced the third wave of the social movements which began to gain practice of global action by expanding the alignment of the second wave social movements (Atvur, 2014: 36). At this juncture, it can be claimed that the social movements are evolved in continuity. The underlying reason of today's globalized movements can be based on Wallerstein's (2004: 67-68; 73) understanding: Since the workers of the anti-systemic movement was composed of the men who belonged to the dominant ethnic group of a country until the mid-20th century, women and ethnic, linguistic, religious groups or minorities were obliged to set up their own organizations. These groups, even though they were part of the anti-systemic struggle, at the same time began to compete with labour

organizations and become dissident to them. The movements that started to ignore or even fight the others while they struggled for their own demands were not able to reach the purposes like changing the society and controlling the state. However, “*this gap between the social struggles has started to be narrowed with the axis of anti-neoliberalism.*” (Atvur, 2014: 19).

From this point of view, today’s demonstrations – especially revealed after 2008 and in 2011 – are to prove this quotation, and common feelings in some degree have been reflected on a common enemy called neoliberalism, independently of categorizations based on dynamics of the movements but with regard to the spirit of the time. In other words, under the circumstances that neoliberalism is perceived as the hegemonic project of globalization, it becomes more likely to encounter with the rising resistance against globalization as a political and cultural process (Atvur, 2014: 23). Çetinkaya (2015: 61) also stresses out that while the differentiation and bifurcation were discussed in the post-1968 period, here and now the movement of movements is the matter in question because of the fact that the contemporary movements flow towards the same river.

Should the need arise to touch on the fact that local movements become globalized through their voices over their nation-states, it can be said that the reason why considerable amount of today’s global movements feature the local scale movements which run campaign against nation-states is that neoliberal globalization has not abolished them. While the nation-states abdicate responsibility on certain social functions and leave them to the market’s mercy, they go from strength to strength on the issues of security, administration and law and legislation; and they become less democratic and less accountable whilst reforming and messing with daily lives of people. This means that the nation-states turn into the implementer of neoliberal policies at the local levels. This situation causes the social movements to act against the nation-states’ practice of neoliberalism and their apparatuses together with international/supranational representatives of neoliberalism, which have an even impact on nation-states at a

global level. Those who form the social movements and carry them from local/national to global level suffer from the policies of similar international institutions. This situation composes common denominator for them. For this reason, many movements struggle against the nation-states to a large extent while they are building global struggle and solidarity opportunities. Herein, these movements are trans-local as well as transnational. On the other hand, supports or collaboration messages from various social movements, activists, academic circles, and craftsmen or artists from all corners of the world also demonstrate the global connections of the 21st century's movements such as anti-austerity movements in Europe, the Occupy Wall Street Movement or the Gezi Park Protests (Çetinkaya, 2015: 70; Atvur, 2014: 26, 33; Dirlik, 2014: 89, 90).

Besides agreeing with Çetinkaya about the distinction of social movements in terms of old and new paradigms, the social movements should be perceived and adopted as collective actions that are appearances of the discontents in society (not only at the national level but also globally) triggered by various drivers such as authoritarian rule, financial difficulties, and economic crisis; evolved constantly in spatiotemporal context that the movements are in a mobility; and have influences to a great extent from time to time and from place to place such as the diffusion of Occupy movements around the Western world thanks to the accumulation coming from the past or surrounding experiences. Depending on this description, the contemporary discussions on social movements are not supposed to be made through the clear-cut classifications or differentiations, but they should be tackled pursuant to the spirits of time and space, that is temporality and spatiality factor. As many other cases, the social movements cannot be handled time-independently and non-spatially as well (Çetinkaya, 2015: 49). As Saraçoğlu (2014) suggests, in order to be able to understand a social movement, the following steps should be considered initially:

1. where the movement is placed within the political/social history of its society;

2. where it is situated in the existing social/class relations;
3. whether it has the capacity to affect the course/way of the existing social structure, or not.

For this reason, this thesis focuses on one of the social movements of the 21st century, where the post-2008 movements are not mainly perceived within the framework of the “new” social movements or the “new” new social movements but as a part of a wave of social movements categorized with only a time frame. Namely, which is intended here is that the time frame is the current century (21st) and this century’s movements can be accepted as the third wave of the social movements when they can be categorized with a century-based approach within the history of the social movements.

Regarding the analysis, “where the movement is placed within the political/social history of its society” (Saraçoğlu: 2014) is adopted as the first step of analysis of the relation between *los Indignados* movement and *Podemos* party within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, it is favourable to refer to the political, economic and social environment of Spain which highly influenced from the 2008 global economic crisis. To mention on this triggering crisis is also important in order to understand the atmosphere.

2.2. The global economic crisis and its reflections on Spain as the spark of a social movement

As the 2008 global economic crisis³ apparently lighted the fuse for the uprisings all over the world, here it is necessary to touch briefly on the causes and consequences of the crisis, as well as its reflections on Europe which occurred as the Eurozone crisis later. It is also crucial to demonstrate how the crisis was reflected within the Spain’s economic and political structure since *los Indignados* (15M) movement and the *Podemos* party have appeared as a consequence in such a period.

³ In reference to the global crisis, the concepts of “economic” and “financial” – as the attributive adjective – are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.

The global crisis or recession is the economic decline that started with the U.S.'s deadlocked mortgage system in December 2007. It took the global form because of the bankruptcies of many of the American and European banks and financial institutions, and a sharp downward turn resulted in September 2008 (Cop, 2013: 1; Boundless, 2016; Tayfur, 2013: 202-4). This crisis was described as an enormous economic recession of the history of capitalism since the 1929 Great Depression (Akçay & Güngen, 2016: 22). Several countries felt the severe impact of the crisis at varying degrees. Accordingly, the political powers have been shocked around the world. Nevertheless, the question of whether this traumatic energy would turn into a constituent will is still unanswered (Akçay, 2014) even so many communities raised their voices cyclically and in waves.

Regarding the causes and effects, the crisis did not appear in one night and many reasons lie behind. The main cause of the crisis is often cited as the bursting of housing bubble in the U.S. This incident hit the real estate prices in the U.S. and vitiated the global financial institutions. According to the Levin-Coburn Report⁴, “high risk lending, financial system contaminated with toxic mortgages, the failure of regulatory organs, overblown credit ratings, and undisclosed conflicts of interest related with the Wall Street firms, and the despised public confidence in the markets” underlay the crisis (Boundless, 2016; U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations). The level of relation between the financial market of the U.S. and European states, the importance of domestic factor that emphasizes the high probability to be influenced from the crisis owing to their own macroeconomic problems, and the dependency on foreign trade have formed the junctions of American crisis and the crisis in Europe (Akçay & Güngen, 2016: 108-9).

Concerning the crisis management, the international institutions like the Federal Reserve System (FED), the IMF, Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

⁴ This is the colloquial of the report on the 2008 financial crisis named Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse. It was prepared at the helm of two United States Senators, Carl Levin and Tom Coburn, on April 13, 2011.

and the ECB, the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) etc. proposed and put into practice the austerity measures and bailout packages. These measures have been the tightening of the public expenditures, the reduction of wages and the restrictions of social rights of labour like elimination of health or education programs (Akçay, 2016). The bailout packages have sought to rescue the banks by extending credits to them or by nationalizing them as was in the case of Iceland. The Icelandic government took the control of the banks Glitnir and Landsbanki with the backing of IMF (Picciotto, 2011: 285-287). At this point, Akçay (2014) stress out the policies which caused the crisis have been identically used to overcome it.

This created insanity because similar prescriptions were given with the hope of taking different results. Even though it seems that the crisis hits the both economic and political systems and the change happens overnight, that is not the case. There are numerous underlying dynamics and reasons for this “seemingly” overnight change to happen. It is true that the crisis limited the room of maneuver given to the political actors. This situation at the end brings the idea of alternative politics which can abruptly arise and diminish (Akçay, 2014).

This global downturn has brought about many consequences at international level, on regional scales and within the nations states. These results that have had a lasting effect, also display economic, political, and social essences. It is quite apparent that the global political instability has been depended on the global financial crisis, and in many developing countries effects of the economic weakness were observed on the governance of the states (Boundless, 2016). The scholars who observed how the politics were, have been and are influenced after the financial crises draw a conclusion that governing has become more difficult in the aftermath of the crises throughout the history (Funke et. al., 2015). In the same vein, the political atmosphere and the developments experienced after the 2008 global economic crisis verify this proposition. The voting rates/shares of the existing governments fell down, and the parliaments became to tend to fragment

or polarize. There was an increase in the anti-government demonstrations, strikes, and political turmoil. In this atmosphere, the opposition parties had the chance to increase their votes, and new and alternative political parties have been formed or the old but becoming introverted ones have been resuscitated as it was the case in Iceland, Greece, Spain, etc. (Funke et. al., 2015). As Davies (2015) pointed out, “*whichever government was in power when the crisis hit, whether left or right, was booted out and replaced by a government of the opposite political persuasion*”. For this reason, the statesmanship that is the legislation and execution processes has become more challenging with the existence of the social indignation and dissident political parties as the extension of this indignation.

Starting from this point of view, what drove the European peoples to raise their voices to fight for their lives and to fight against the “arbitrary” political practices of the political powers was the endeavor to make ordinary people pick up the cost of the crisis. However, the political powers are the collaborators of the dominant economic powers and banks – which are the ones in charge of the crisis. The crisis essentially stemmed from the crash of the speculative profit methods of the finance capital, but hundreds of thousands of people/citizens who earn their living with their elbow grease, and those who are unemployed, students, or pensioners were announced as the responsible or guilty, or more precisely chosen as victims, as long as the austerity measures were enforced in the contagious European countries one after the other (Cop, 2013: 2; Vivas, 2016).

At this point, it is doubtless that as of 2008, the notion of “crisis” has been stuck in people’s minds once again, especially in Western world. In 2009, the call for an early election was witnessed in Iceland while there were two more years for the next elections because of the discontent of the people and the mass protests against the government’s economy policies. Similar scenarios or events were happened all around the world such as in France during the Presidency of Sarkozy and his policies; and against the Prime Minister of Latvia, Ivars Godmanis. Even in Russia, communists organized protests against the government’s economic

practices; and in China, there were also oppositions because of the fact that the decrease of foreign trade, export rates etc. affected the inner economy of the country like the increase of unemployment (Boundless, 2016). As the most striking example, the Greeks carried out a massive general strike in opposition to the bailouts for the banks and imposed austerity measures in 2010. There were also protests and demonstrations in the east labelled as the Arab Spring in the literature even if they were not directly associated with the economic circumstances but the need of democratization of the eastern societies. Moreover, there are also approaches advocating that these uprisings provided the inspirations for many subsequent movements and protests like *los Indignados* in *Puerto del Sol* and the Occupy movements in the West in 2011 (Çetinkaya, 2015: 12). As it is known, the year of 2011 became the climax in terms of the social movements of the 21st century since that year witnessed numerous cause celebre protests and demonstrations. Consequently, here it is possible to claim that the developments happened in the world and particularly in the Southern Europe have essentially progressed under the influences of the economic crisis (Lisi, 2014: 281, 286; Akçay, 2016).

The Southern European (Eurozone) states which were amenable to the crisis and exposed to the austerity measures and bailout packages of Troika were also called as PIGS (PIIGS) countries – Portugal, Italy, Ireland (the only one that is not southern), Greece, and Spain (Schmidt, 2012). Since Greece was one of the deeply affected states from the crisis, and gave birth to the rip-roaring anti-austerity protests, and owing to the dominant political actor's, the anti-austerity political party Syriza's, election victory, the developments happened in Spain at about the same time were associated with the Greek case (Cop, 2013: 2). So much so that *Podemos* and Syriza were thought as the coplanar⁵. However, the course of

⁵ As the focus here is the state-specific crisis of Spain in the meaning of economic, social, and then political, the correlation or the comparison between the Spain and Greece in terms of their economic and political environment and their peoples' reactions is not within the scope and extent of this thesis, but can be the subject of another study.

events in Spain was not the same. In Greece, the center-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) government of Yorgo Papandreu was obliged to withdraw from the power due to the public indignation arising from its radical austerity measures (Cop, 2013: 2; Durmaz, 2015: 59-61). Though, Mariano Rajoy's government (*Partido Popular* (PP) – People's Party) came into power in Spain with the results of early general elections of November 2011 six months after the *los Indignados* movement emerged, and not with a resignation scenario of former Prime Minister, Zapatero. Thus, Rajoy started to implement the austerity measures, has remained in office since then, and is still incumbent although the country experienced several severe political fluctuations until the last year.

However, it would be precise to address what happened in Greece and Spain in economic terms. On the one hand, the states' interventions on the banking systems by restructuring their capitals and keeping them under control conducted the increase of the public debts. On the other hand, the existence of cheap credits paved the way for the debt rise of the public sector in Greece and of the private sector in Spain. The unsustainable economic growths redounded on credit expansion and the swelling of the prices of real estate in Spain, and excessive public expenditures and increase of the credit volume in Greece (Ergin, 2013: 21-22; 24)⁶.

The 2008 global crisis's subjective dimension in terms of Spain is that *los Indignados* movement revealed and shed light on *the mutation of common sense* (Toscano, 2015). Also the newly-established political party, *Podemos* has been approached as being associated with the movement on the grounds of anti-austerity stances of both the movement and the party. Here the movement is described as such: "*The Indignados is a social movement response to the global economic crisis and the approaches taken by the European Union and the Spanish*

⁶ For a more detailed study about the debt crisis in the EU (namely the Eurozone crisis) and the austerity measures, please see Ergin, N. E. (2013). *Avrupa Birliği'nde Borç Krizi: Krize karşı alınan tedbirlerin değerlendirilmesi*. (Published Master's Thesis). Ankara University, Ankara, Türkiye.

government to handle it in general” (Castañeda, 2012: 309). This approach demonstrates that before discussing the movement and *Podemos*, it is meaningful to understand the economic and political reflections of the economic crisis on Spain, and how the demands of the movement are shaped by the economic crisis.

To be more precise, in terms of the Spanish economy, even if the crisis differed on some points by the other European countries, it was a debt crisis for the country and it had massive political implications both in internal and external politics of the country. Namely, the crisis in Spain was of burst of housing bubble in parallel with the international financial crisis and subsequent crisis of banking sector (Akçay & Güngen, 2016: 146). However, the debt crisis for Spain indicates the ones of private sectors like construction, of SMEs, or of people to the banks such as commercial, housing credits, and not mainly the national debt of the state to the international financial institutions. Firstly, the loss of sinking banks related with the real estate sector’s collapse was transferred to the public sector. Secondly, the most destructive dimension of the crisis was the enormous increase of the unemployment rate. Thirdly and lastly, the socio-political crisis in line with the socio-economic tribulations took its final form (Akçay, 2016). As a result, a set of radical left and right parties have emerged among the new political formations that tried, have tried and are trying to impose the effects of the crisis upon mainstream political forces for the sake of challenging the power. Apart from *Podemos* in Spain, the parties like Syriza, the Five Star Movement, the Front National, and the UKIP had already raised their voices respectively in Greece, Italy, France and Britain across Europe (Torreblanca, 2015a:12). And Spain was in the hopper. Herewith, it is needed to overview how Spain experienced the times of crisis and the recovery policies and practices, which eventually created opposition and resistance.

What Spain experienced was naturally an eye-opener because until 2008, it had become indebted under a controlled manner and did not have budget deficit (Cop, 2013: 2-3). Moreover, Spain was the Europe’s fifth largest economy and

thirteenth of the world (Akçadağ Alagöz, 2012). However, the country at first as a national state, and later as a member state of the European Union experienced certain political and economic transformations during the times of crisis, as in many countries. The regional governments of the 17 autonomous communities of the country found themselves under a huge debt burden owing to the high-priced investments they made before 2008 (Cop, 2013: 4).

Before 2008, the Spanish economy was a success story and was able to provide its stability through the instrumentality of being part of the Eurozone and the circulation of Euro in 2002. Nevertheless, this stability did not last long because the recovery of the construction sector thanks to Euro and the demand boom for the mortgage loans between 2002-2008 became unsustainable not long after and caused the real estate bubble to burst in Spain (Akçay & Güngen, 2016: 146; Akçadağ Alagöz, 2012). In a nutshell, the “Spanish miracle” joined the choir invisible because of the investment increases and the concomitant financialization of the perpetual and high appreciation in the housing sector and accordingly the consumption growth and precarious employment (Tayfur, 2013: 208-9). Of course, all these developments, by hook or by crook, is related with the global economic conditions. Namely, before the 2008 (mortgage) crisis blew up in the US and affected the global economy, the price bubble in housing caused the extreme numbers of construction enterprises and the supply of housing to arise all over the world; however, together with the credit squeeze in the international banking sector, this extreme production felt down. Thus, it can be said that the bubble was burst and the banking sector which is clinging to the housing sector in Spain became upside down (Stobart, 2014b). More clearly, the debts of the construction firms to the banks began to go bankrupt, and the banks that could not get the money back got into the soup and the situation turned into a cycle among the sectors. Briefly, although Spain had a relatively strong economy, it was not able to escape from dragging into the collapse in the real estate sector (Cop, 2013: 4). As a consequence, the related unemployment and recession in the Spanish economy have been experienced. So, the Spanish people felt the outcomes deeply.

Accordingly, the malfunction of the capitalist financial system in Spain led to discomfort in the socioeconomic conditions of the country, and paved the way for the social indignation.

With respect to the employment, budget and salary cuts was realized in Spain while the global and European economies were on the rack in 2011. According to the OECD data, the unemployment rate reached 22% and the young unemployment rate was at 47% (Puig, 2011: 1-2). These rates were valid in some degree since May 2010. For instance, according to the *Eurostat* data, the unemployment rate arrived at a historic point with the percentage of 50.5 among the youth under the age of 25 years in February 2012 (Antentas, 2015). Moreover, there was scarcity of job opportunities, the living standards were not good enough and the cost of living was high. These developments which are the parts of a catastrophic tale of economic conditions brought the political trials and tribulations in its wake such as people have regarded the political elites as the responsible of this retrogressive situation (Schiffrin & Kircher-Allen, 2012: 109-110). Here, there is another reason of the social indignation among the Spanish people.

In terms of political transformations that the country has undergone, the crisis in Spain firstly resulted in the government change, and *Partido Popular* (PP) took over the state's rule from the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party - PSOE) (Akçadağ Alagöz, 2012). However, nothing has changed in the political and economic environment of the country; and this center-right government implemented even harsher policies to bailout the financial sector. At this point, the trade unions and ordinary citizens accused the PP of breaking its words uttered pre-electoral process, and of regarding and using the crisis as an opportunity to interrupt the public services, to speed up the privatizations, and to seize the rights of the workforce (Cop, 2013: 4). In the second place, the emergence of a nationwide protest surges *el movimiento de los Indignados* (the movement of Indignants) in its original name – also called *el*

movimiento de 15M (the movement of 15 May) – in 2011 which had become a cause celebre as a social transformation which has deeply affected the politics of the country.

More importantly, and in the eyes of the indignant people of Spain, the intimacy that is between the mainstream political parties and the banks, their endeavor in order to have each other's back, the impact of the big sectors and companies on policies and welfare services of the government, revealing the financial and administrative or rather political corruptions, and the independence deficiency in the judicial system were confronted with a deep and absolute rejection by the public (Bellver, 2012: 113; Stobart, 2014b). The never-ending problem of Spain on corruption scandals included the King's daughter and son-in-law; tax evasion by the former finance minister, Rodrigo Rato from the PP government, and money laundering actions of many regional politicians under the PP; the former treasurer of PP, Luis Bárcenas was jailed corruption; and the PSOE was also claimed to be involved in corruption (Antentas, 2016: 121; Torreblanca, 2015a: 11; Zabala, 2015; Akçay & Güngen, 2016: 150). Spanish population overwhelmingly believed that corruption is widespread both in the political and economic spheres and at all levels of local, regional, national and even European governance in 2011 (Hughes, 2011: 409). Hereby, the reaction against the corrupted political environment which represents the political atrophy and the essence of this situation was argued by Rodríguez (quoted in Stobart, 2014b) that "*the crisis is of an essentially political nature*". So, the social indignation made the economic crisis into a political crisis in Spain. In other words, it can be observed in the Spanish case that the economic recession and its management or mismanagement somehow turned into a political crisis via the driving force of society and its indignation. Romenada points that "*As if Marx were right, chaos in the economic infrastructure is causing growing disorder in the political superstructure. Thus we are seeing ... a generalised crisis in political distrust ...*" (quoted in Stobart, 2014b). Based on this and of course the Marxist thought, it is obvious that when the political power, namely the state, puts its hands in the pocket

of the citizens without their consent, namely the social contract, a social unrest or a social indignation appears, as it was the case in Spain.

As Wood (1981) points out, politics cannot be considered independently of economics, and the economic grievances/crises are reflected as the political grievances/crises by the people in question. The concrete example here can be the fact that *los Indignados* movement, as Hardt and Negri (quoted in Yıldırım, 2013: 152) remark, marshal the protest against the social inequality and aggression against the financial hegemony; the discontent about the issues of social services like environment, health, shelter (housing), and transportation; and the critics of existing paths of political life like representation, electoral procedures etc. For this reason, the mostly spoken reason behind the political and social unrest in Spain is the economic factors, crisis and its results.

In sum, the austerity measures imposed and implemented in Spain, the corruption scandals, and high unemployment rates are only some of the political reflections of the crisis on the country basis, and the economic deterioration in the country in a word led the subsequent process. Along with this process, one of the conclusions of the study of Funke et. al (2015) is confirmed once more: “*Financial crises do not only trigger political protest at the polls, but also in the streets*”. The great political discontent of both the European and world’s peoples derives from the retrogressive economic developments and their repercussions on socioeconomic lives of the peoples. Those peoples have lost their confidence in the existing political, economic and social order; become more dissenting than before and even rejected the established political parties and the system that they affiliated; and raised their voices with the demands to have better life conditions and fundamentally the demand of real democracy. Here, it is plausible to analyze the conditions of democracy in which these people live and intend to realize their demands.

2.3. Liberal democracy and its crisis

Democracy is a contested concept as of the rise of the notion in Ancient Greece. The origin of democracy, *demos* and *kratos* concepts have been transformed with numerous adjuncts throughout the political science history such as representative, participatory, direct, radical, liberal, deliberative, organizational, etc. (Ercan & Gagnon, 2014: 5). Nevertheless, it needs to indicate in general – which is also embedded within the framework of today’s liberal system, “*democracy is defined as a specific method of decision making in which elected representatives are accountable to the citizens through regular elections*” (della Porta, 2013: 181).

The ways in which the demands of a social movement can be transformed into actual policies are bound with the characteristics of the current political system. The movement in question can be generally described as one of the 21st century’s social movements, particularly those generated with the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis and in parallel with the Eurozone (European debt) crisis. From this point of view, since the main case of this study is *los Indignados* movement of Spain, and the political atmosphere it happened is the part of liberal democracy which is hegemonic in Europe, this study is to question the limits of liberal democracy and the problem of representation associated with it in the case of Spain. Put it differently, this thesis focuses on the existing representative and liberal democracy, but within its limits or repercussions vis-à-vis the demands of going beyond it through social movement for the case of Spain.

By the same token, the question can also be associated with the famous approach to democracy by Abraham Lincoln: is the democracy “*of the people, by the people or for the people*”? (Bellamy, 2012: 64). It can be set forth that of the people connotes citizen representation, by the people denotes political participation, and for the people means governing effectiveness in the political system. While the mainstream thought is that democracy in Europe is of the people and mainly depends on representation both in nation-states and at European level

together with the supranational mechanism of representation of European states in the EU, aftermath of the economic turmoil, European people spilled out into the streets by claiming that democracy is and should be by the people. For this reason, as della Porta (2015a: 164) underscores, the issue of representativeness restricts self-expression of people and the decision-making processes and constrains them within patterns like representative elections and institutions. However, the ideal type of democracy for states and societies is thought to be of, by and for the people since the power and sovereignty are attached to citizenry/people as a whole. At this juncture, what is intended with the representation is fundamentally a system in which representatives elected for a designated period and they are supposed to have electoral accountability to the represented citizens to make decisions through standardized procedures (della Porta, 2013: 181). Here, one of the striking European samples occurs to be the Spanish *Indignados* movement, due to its initiator platform *Democracia Real Ya!* (Real Democracy Now), whose demands are related with real democracy as the actual system of politics is clearly criticized for failing democracy. Thus, the Spanish example can be construed as a case of crisis of democracy as reflected in a series of social unrest embodied in *los Indignados* movement.

To get back to the issue of democracy and its asserted crisis, what is generally understood from today's liberal democracy is the form of representative democracy operating under the rationale of classical liberalism in modern Western societies; marking the universal suffrage and electoral competition between political parties to get the ruling power, and indicating the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens (The Free Dictionary). To put it another way, the representative democracy depends on the idea that the general will is pointed out thoroughly and directly the electoral processes; it coincides with the will which the electorate, that is the public, exhibit at the time of elections; and all the political and legislative activities appear at the time of elections (Yılmaz, 2017: 46). It is also referred with the term of bourgeois democracy alongside Western democracy, connotatively implying its functioning under capitalism. It

seems that ordinary people have certain freedoms, but who are free to benefit from democracy are the bourgeoisie, who own the means of production. However, the ordinary people, the proletariat, and in contemporary literature the precariat are subordinated to bourgeoisie since they are obliged to sell their labour power to the bourgeoisie in order to survive. Indeed, democracy is implicitly ascribed to the interests of the bourgeois class that uses the mechanisms which are the governance and representation of societies to serve themselves (Wright, 2012). Moreover, democracy is boiled down to four or five-year elections and simply putting votes into the ballot box for the lower classes. More clearly, today what is perceived from and questioned about liberal or bourgeois democracy is “which and whose democracy it is”: obviously a democracy for the minority, which is propertied and rich (Wright, 2012). In addition, this questioning brings claims and arguments of the fact that democracy is in crisis. To the extent that people question actual politics and claim their rights, which are deprived as a result of a perceived, malfunctioning of the system and actors that represent them.

And as for the crisis of democracy, there is a profound literature leaning the crisis on the following grounding factors: high levels of opposition, discontent with politics, and of distrust/mistrust in politicians and governments; the reflections of this circumstances on the membership numbers of political parties; trials and tribulations about i.e. regulatory agencies’, international/transnational institutions’ or central banks’ electoral accountability; transparency problems about governance of and by these organizations/bodies; and more importantly the repercussions of them on representation as failure or ineffectiveness of democracy (cited from different scholars in Ercan & Gagnon, 2014: 1). In a word, dissatisfaction with democracy among the modern societies is growing (Krastev, 2007: 57). Della Porta (2015a: 153) bases the reason that the crisis, happened in 2010s, in fact emerged as a crisis of democracy even more than a financial one on the attachment of public institutions, namely the state, to the free market vision, instead of taking responsibility for ensuring welfare to some extent which covers rights to health, education, housing and employment. The situation has come to

such a point that Western-type (American) liberal democracy has been consubstantiated with the 2008 global financial crisis, mismanagement and criminality of Wall Street, heavy income disparity, two-party “democratic” systems of the U.S. and the other western world countries, and the biased mass media; and it is not untroubled anymore and become like communism that it confronts (Gubin, 2013: 822).

The underlying reason of this crisis is considered as the explosion of social inequalities even in advanced democracies:

“social inequality impedes democratization and undermines democracy under two conditions: first, the crystallization of continuous differences... into everyday categorical differences by race, gender, class, ethnicity, religion and similar broad groupings, second, the direct translation of those categorical difference into public policies.” (Tilly, 2007: 110, cited in della porta, 2015a: 152).

Consequently, the trust of those exposed these categorical discriminations in liberal institutions reduces, and this causes delegitimation of the political institutions correlated with the neoliberal way of statecraft of the modern societies (della Porta, 2015a: 152). Wendy Brown (2003) states that neoliberalism does not mean only a group of economic policies which is about maximizing profits, facilitating free trade, and challenging welfarism; however, rather it includes a social analysis extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action along with its focus on market economy. And accordingly, the political implications of neoliberal rationality in terms of liberal democracy are manifested over the social life and institutions. At the end of the day, the neoliberal system drags the social life into inequalities and a crisis of legitimacy of current political powers.

Brown (2003) also regards democracy as a code word, which indicates a state and subjects organized by market rationality. From this point of view, Brown (2003) puts forth that the crisis of liberal democracy is pertinent to the modest ethical gap between economy and polity which liberalism has stipulated over the last two centuries. Ultimately, each and every aspect of social and political life

becomes stuck in economic calculation since it is highlighted that the market rationality of neoliberalism does not recognize any culture or country but administrators or ruling class can be superseded (Brown, 2003). The fate of ordinary people has been left to the mercy of international money markets, transnational corporations, traders etc. and national politicians who act in concert with them (Tormey, 2014: 107). Thus, this logic brings forth the crisis of democracy which today's indignant peoples of the world have boosted.

On the other hand, Tormey (2014: 105-6) predicates the democracy crisis, namely that of representation crisis, on four measures: voter turnout, party membership, trust in politics or politicians, and interest in politics. There are reluctant voters; decline of party membership which makes political parties get closer to business circles with the aim of getting financial support; and like a vicious circle, political parties start to seem to less care about the citizens and this leads to declining trust in politicians and indifferent citizens to politics. Therefore, the meaning of politician which is supposed to "serve", has been experienced a semantic loss and become a by word for incompetence, selfishness, narcissism. At the end, the representative democracy that goes around politicians, elections and parliaments has found itself in crisis (Tormey, 2014: 106). A "mismanaged life" initially has depoliticized the social and economic powers, and reduced political citizenship to an extraordinary level of passivity and political listlessness. Then, the neoliberal model of citizenry has been created, which would indeed exist as a public but with an out of public-mindedness (Brown, 2003). Lastly, this neoliberal era and the contested injustice that it has produced related with austerity, migration, and climate change or so on have generated the exhaustion and crisis of existing representative democracy.

The crises of economy, representative democracy, and thereby legitimation of existing political powers happened in Western states are also associated with the emergence and rise of populist anti-politics (Tormey, 2014: 106; Caiani, 2013: 1136). It is considered that the emergence of populism depends on several factors;

namely socioeconomic conditions, political factors, and the presence of a charismatic leader, and most importantly the political factors with regard to the discontent with and distrust of people for liberal democracy and representative system are thought as the driver for the development of populism (Taggart, 2004: 276-7; Caiani, 2013: 1136). Populism is also put at the heart of the conflict which is rather the clash between the liberal rationalism embodied by EU institutions than the clash of democratic principles, and the populist revolt against the unaccountability of the elites (Krastev, 2007: 61-62). Concordantly, populism is understood “*as a pathological form, pseudo- and post-democratic, produced by the corruption of democratic ideals*” (Mudde, 2004: 541; Caiani, 2013: 1136). It is undeniable that populist parties have impact on the democratic system and as Dahrendorf (2003: 156, cited in Krastev, 2007: 59) emphasizes *one’s populism is another’s democracy and vice versa*. Thus, populism can be considered as anti-liberal not antidemocratic (Krastev, 2007: 60).

Besides the perspectives above, there are also several works regarding the relation between populism and democracy in the literature. For instance, the study of Abts and Rummens (2007) provides a comparative analysis of the logics of populism and democracy. Abts and Rummens (2007: 405-7) state the interpretations of some scholars who see populism as a threat to democracy, regard the relationship between them as ambiguous, understand it as a strategy, or consider it as a means to reveal and amend the gaps in the representative democratic system. They also underscores that they accept populism not as a continuous phenomenon with democracy, but as a dangerous threat in terms of democracy by its nature (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 405-7). Given briefly place to these approaches is reasonable in terms of understanding the crisis of democracy. For this reason, since populism is a feature of representative politics (Taggart, 2004: 269) and can be studied and analyzed within the context of the crisis of democracy and legitimacy, and the relation with the contemporary social movements; populism and the populist characters of *los Indignados* movement and *Podemos* party are one of the focuses of this study.

Before mentioning the relationship between democracy and social movements, and when the issue-based movements are considered, one should indicate that today's crises on the bases of individual issues differentiate from the past's systemic crisis, as Warren underlines as follows:

“the broad legitimation pressures show up not as a general system crisis, but rather issue by issue and policy by policy, in protests over airport expansion, medical coverage, poverty issues, changes in regulation of genetically-modified organisms, forest management, struggles over neighbourhood development, energy pricing, and so on. So rather than general system crisis, we have something like pluralized governability, driven by functional incapacities of government agencies, as well as overlapping or competing jurisdictions, or failures to anticipate spillover consequences and linkages among issues.” (Warren 2009: 7, cited in Ercan & Gagnon, 2014: 7-8).

This demonstrates the globosity of problems and related demands, which form the basis for social movements, global or local, and it is needed to touch on the approaches of today's movements to the issue of democracy and representation.

2.3.1. Social movements and conception of democracy

As della Porta (2013: 191; 2015b: 767, 771) states, even though social movement literature/studies had rarely a central concern for the issue of democracy in social movements before, along with the increase of social movements which put democracy in the center of their philosophy and praxis, the number of studies on the relationship between democracy and social movements and democracy *in* social movements have grown in the last twenty years. In this direction, della Porta (2013: 181, 192) underlines that social movements are always – both in the proletariat movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, in the new social movements of the late 1960s and of 1970s, and in the contemporary movements as of 1999 Seattle protests – concerned with democracy, they remind the governors or executives of the states of their accountability, and moreover, find out, develop, and practice new alternative conceptions of democracy in many cases. It is also known that there is an inverse proportion between the decline of

conventional ways or forms of representation and increase of the usage of protests as the representation tool. It has been empirically demonstrated that the protesters and the social movement organizations set a premium on democratic functioning, mobilize among themselves and each other to put pressure on decision-makers, to open public spaces, to issue demands and to formulate and raise counter-knowledge (della Porta, 2013: 181; 2015b: 768).

Bottomore (1993: 30) stated decades ago that:

“maybe the striking characteristic of the last twenty years is the heterogeneous social movements’ ways of becoming an adopted part of political life in the western democracies; and to some extent providing models for the movements in the countries that do not have de facto opportunity to utter criticism, unrest and opposition through formal political institutions”.

However, this statement is currently proved to be invalid, and especially within 10 years, because the rise and transformation of social movements not only in Europe or in the west, but also in the east, in the Arab world were simultaneously witnessed. Together with this transformation, it has been demonstrated that the movements create their own opportunities, air their grievances and transform their demands to the formal political institutions like the Spanish case. Thus, it can be claimed that this transformation brings the changing conceptions of democracy in its wake in line with the activism of the social movement instances.

Considering the democracy-related claims of the contemporary movements, as for Tormey (2014: 108), the key point is the “contesting injustice” and questioning the existing (representative) democratic system over it. People combatting injustice become encouraged to undertake more responsibility in this direction, and start to fight with the politics and politicians of the representative governing apparatus and to seek new or alternative channels for more participation. Namely, they emphasize the significance of extra-electoral forms of accountability when the electoral accountability of the elected representatives has been granted privileged over the power of control (della Porta, 2013: 181-2).

The represented is getting more ignored and indignant, thinks that they are less represented by the representatives, and they become more decisive to paddle their own canoe (Tormey, 2014: 110). Or, as Sitrin stresses (2014: 247), they even do not feel unrepresented and they feel that they cannot be represented. Thus, they propose alternative forms of democracy mainly pertaining to the participatory democracy, referring to “*an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organization of collective decision making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labeled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy*” (Kitschelt, 1993: 15; also cited in della Porta, 2013: 182; 2015b: 771; Andretta, 2013: 495). Herein, the masses think that the political authorities are unable to meet the required promises of the democratic governance and lack of providing new assurances, and mistrust about the institutions of democracy spread out (della Porta, 2015a: 153). Correspondingly, the party-based political representation has been considered to be exhausted, and the social movements adopt a meta-political critique to representative democracy by alternating new forms as well as directing demands to the decision-makers (Tormey, 2014: 110; Offe, 1985: 818).

At the end of the day, the protesters composing the social movements keep to criticize the deficiencies of the political system grounded in liberal representative democracy. As seen from the placards or slogans used during the protests, they speak out that the existing political system does not represent them. By the way, they also regard themselves as the sufferers from both social and political inequalities more than any other corrupt political elites or economically privileged cliques. In addition, they anticipate eliminating the collusion of between the political and financial classes, to increase the leverage influencing the power for the sake of change and to provide a direct citizen participation (della Porta, 2015a: 153, 155).

In terms of demands of a social movement, it is also a burning matter that social movements do not only call for increasing transparency and demand more electoral accountability; they also ask for more participation from past to present (della Porta, 2013: 182). For this reason, to touch on the participatory and/or deliberative democracy versus representation issue in social movements' literature at large and in terms of the demands of the case study of this thesis, *los Indignados* movement, would be pertinent.

2.3.2. Demands in a social movement: representation vs. participation

As stated above, the representative democracies are criticized and challenged since institutional decision making is predominantly controlled by the representatives consisting of professional politicians, and it does not include citizen's opinions with full, collective and inclusive reasoning about the problems and their solutions (Andretta, 2013: 495; Polletta, 2013: 1396). Therefore, societies in movement ask for participatory democracy, and even direct democracy with a maximum of equal participation. In this context, participatory democracy is the form which pertains to nonhierarchical, decentralized, and consensus oriented decision making (Polletta, 2013: 1396). Direct democracy refers to, likewise, the form of collective decision making which is directly exercised by the people (Doerr, 2013: 200). Deliberative democracy relates to the decisional processes in which a communicative process based on reason is able to transform individual preferences, leading to decisions oriented for the sake of the public good under conditions of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency (della Porta, 2013: 182-3).⁷

For Crouch (2004), the most challenged issues are the representative conceptions of democracy on the grounds of the neoliberal (or post-democratic)

⁷ Here, it is relevant to state that since participation is an immanent value of deliberative democracy and is needed as a practical mechanism for direct democracy, these concepts are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.

developments that regard the people or citizens as only electors like the customers or consumers of the corrupted world system (cited in della Porta, 2015a: 154). At this point, according to della Porta (2015a: 164), criticisms of representative democracy have pushed not towards anti-politics, but rather towards calls for more participation and deliberation in the neoliberal era. Representative democracy concentrates on the electoral processes and gives the right to speak and make decisions to a determined representative clique, and this situation affects the functioning of democracy on a sound basis. Besides, deliberative democracy foresees formation or transformation of preferences during the consensual decision-making processes with the aim of reaching a common understanding for the public good since people may have different standpoints but they confront with common difficulties (della Porta, 2013: 182-3). Yet representative democracy functions only with aggregation by way of votes or negotiation without paying with regard to the desires or demands of losing parties or minorities and by imposing the preferences of majorities to the whole society (della Porta, 2013: 182-3). Hence, involvement of people in politics should be beyond limited elections, and opportunities more than those available, to participate in decision making processes for instance, should be supplied for the ordinary people, who are claimed to be rightful owner of sovereignty, from the viewpoint of participatory democracy (della Porta, 2013: 182). The participatory democracy is extolled that much in and by social movement organizations, there are also approaches that remark the inefficiencies and/or vulnerabilities of participatory democracy, as it will be discussed in light of the Spanish case in Chapter 4.

Overall, it can be seen that the contemporary social movements, and *los Indignados* movement within the scope of this thesis, have learned from past experiences in terms of participation and deliberation. Thus, the ways of struggles to create alternative politics and retake democracy within the protest camps of *los Indignados* (15M) were not new. In other respects, the contemporary social movements, as it was before, are endeavoring to get over the classic dilemma between representative and direct democracy through practicing some forms of

deliberative democracy (Andretta, 2013: 495). They draw the separated spheres of social, political, cultural and economic lives by governments together in Europe like in Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, and in the east Russia or in the overseas countries like Americas or the U.S. in order to be able to find alternative ways to survive within this corrupted system and (re)establish real democracy (Sitrin, 2014: 250).

At this juncture, the question is that the demands of a movement are institutionalized by means of a political party, which is the core mechanism of representative system, on the representation basis even though the voice of the movement is in line with not being represented enough or misrepresented, and rejections over the established institutions in the Spanish example. In accordance with this problematic, in the next chapter, the Spanish case will be looked at more closely and in the fourth one, the social and political demands, mainly the real democracy demand of the Spanish people and its integration into the current political system by the newly-established party will be analyzed on the basis of the organic linkage between *los Indignados* movement and political party of *Podemos*.

CHAPTER 3

FROM *LOS INDIGNADOS* TO *PODEMOS*: EMERGENCE OF A POPULIST MOVEMENT

As in history, there are times in the 21st century when people rise up in arms and raise their voices in order to introduce that something is wrong in their lives and there should be *change* (Stiglitz, 2012: 1). In this day and age, an increase in the number of the social movement instances all over the world spreading from region to region have been witnessed and experienced like from the Global Justice Movements (GJM), actually popularized at the end of 20th century-in 1999, to anti-austerity movements or from the Arab Spring to the Occupy Movements. Besides these world-shaking social movements, numerous movements which made themselves heard have emerged at the regional or territorial scales. These movements, which are just like tidal waves, have been discussed, examined and studied academically. One of these aforementioned movements found its way into the stage of history in 2011 in Spain as *los Indignados* (15M) movement. This movement happening on the very eve of the local and regional elections had a broad repercussion not only in Spain but also in Europe in terms of its values that it fights for and fights against. Afterwards, *Podemos* which is claimed to evolve out of this movement and one of the newly-established political parties of the country, achieved a relative “success” in the European Parliament in 2014.

Accordingly, in this chapter, firstly the movement of *los Indignados* will be addressed as a movement which the economic crisis caused. What happened on May 15, 2011 in Spain; what the reasons of the huge rage and indignation were; how the participants of *los Indignados* movement became so indignant; and what happened on the following days will be conveyed. Secondly, how a political formation was emerged from the movement and its main features will be

discussed. In other words, a reference to the newly-established political party, *Podemos* will be made – which is claimed that it arose from *los Indignados* movement or the movement transformed into the political party. In addition, the party's economic and political stance in the new four-party system of Spain will be shown up together with its populist character.

3.1. What happened on May 15, 2011 and who are “*los Indignados*”?

On May 15, 2011 before the local and regional elections, some groups brought about common demonstrations in many cities of the country, tens of thousands people took to the streets, and it was transformed into a protest surge within a year in Spain. Accordingly, *los Indignados* movement has become behind some reasons, components/mechanisms, issues raised/opposed, actions and joint demands with its prominent actors and organizers presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Dynamics of *los Indignados*

<p>ORGANIZERS/ ACTORS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DRY • JSF • PAH • No Les Votes • experienced/actively committed and young local activists
<p>MECHANISMS/ COMPONENTS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • newly-established town and neighbourhood assemblies
<p>REASONS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the quasi bipartisan (two-party) and extortive political system by the financial powers • the dominance of banks/economic powers and the collaboration of political powers, • corruption • the increasing rates of unemployment • precarious work conditions • politics of economic crisis
<p>ACTIONS/ MOBILIZATION FORMS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • demonstrations • sit-ins • campsites • assemblies, committees • digital platforms, new technologies, social networks, and social media creating open space for discussions
<p>JOINT DEMANDS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • advanced society which includes equality, solidarity, freedom of culture, welfare and people's happiness • the right to decent housing, employment, education, and health • direct political participation/participatory democracy

Table 2 (Cont'd)

<p>ISSUES RAISED/OPPOSED</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • anti-evictions • inequality • injustices • unemployment • cutbacks • creation of a consumerist society • wasting resources • destroying planet • enriching and empowering a few/minority • privatizations or closures of public services (health care, education, etc.)
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With regard to the reasons of the movement, people were opposed to the two-party political system, politics of economic crisis, and the increasing rates of unemployment and precarious work conditions in Spain. There were three main grievances, according to Taibo (2011), which are the rejection of the existing political parties, the criticism of financial markets and institutions imposing their interests on the government policies, that is the subjugation of politics to economics and the anger and unhappiness about unemployment (conveying by Puig, 2011: 3). As Castañeda (2012: 310) indicates, the underlying reason of people’s opposition in Spain is that they did not envisage any alternative between a neoliberal and conservative right and a neoliberalized left that are respectively *Partido Popular* (People’s Party – PP) and *Partido Socialista Obrero de España* (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party – PSOE). Esther Vivas emphasizes in an interview that the movement had two-fold criticism: one targets the economic and financial powers and the other targets the politicians. And this was reflected on the slogans and posters during the demonstrations with the motto of “*¡No somos mercancías en manos de políticos y/ni banqueros!*” [“We are not merchandise/goods/commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers!”] (Divès, 2011; Flesher Fominaya, 2015: 142; Stobart, 2014a; Antentas, 2015: 138, 143;

Vivas, 2016; Bellver, 2012: 113; Romanos, 2012: 203, 205; Martin & Raboso, 2012: 120). Again Vivas (2016) underlines that this movement changed the way that the Spanish people read the crisis and how they interpret it; argued that the banks were the responsible for the economic collapse and the political class was their collaborator; and introduced the ordinary citizens or participants as the victims, rather than the responsible or guilty, of an age of corruption.

There are many other conspicuous slogans that the protesters used such as “*¡No nos representan!*” [“They do not represent us!”], “*¡Los culpables deben pagar por la crisis!*” [“The guilty ones should pay for the crisis!”], “*¡Lo llaman democracia y no le es!*” [“They call it democracy, and it isn’t!”] which reflected the political and economic unrest in the country (Stobart, 2014a; Bellver, 2012: 113; Antentas, 2015: 146; Hughes, 2011: 408). According to Antentas (2015: 146; 2016: 111), the slogan *¡No nos representan!* is the best expression of the instinctive rejection of the extortive political system by the financial power. The absence of flags and the rejections of political parties, trade unions, their symbols or acronyms explains the sense of the slogan as well (Tejerina & Perugorria, 2012: 97). Two of the protesters of *los Indignados* explain the meaning of the slogan like that “*It is possible that we didn’t have a concrete idea of what we wanted, but we knew perfectly well what we didn’t want: to pay the consequences of a crisis that we didn’t cause*” (Martin & Raboso, 2012: 120). Stobart (2014a) also indicates that that slogan was referred to the Spain’s bureaucratic unions which can simply be conceived as the EU and hereby Troika. However, of course there are those who consider the slogan was only a criticism towards the countries’ two mainstream right and left political parties, respectively PP and PSOE, and did not include the other parties besides those who think it was a criticism of all the parliamentary system in the country (Antentas, 2015: 146). In any case, here it is possible to see the anti-establishment and anti-elites stance of the movement which contributes to its populist characteristics.

At the end of the day, the action in Spain turned into the 15M movement is called as *los Indignados* – which is used as “*the Outraged*” in the English literature – movement by the media inspiring by the title of the pamphlet and using its commercial success, “*Indignez-vous!*” which was written as the activist manifesto by Stéphane Hessel (Castañeda, 2012: 309-10; Puig, 2011: 3; Antentas, 2015: 140; Yıldırım: 2013b, 152-3). However, Castañeda (2012: 310) adds that some have gotten annoyed of the fact that this term “*indignado/a*” does not capture the spirit, that is the proactive nature, of the movement and prefer to use other names. Flesher Fominaya (2015: 160) supports this circumstance in her article with this explanation: “*activists refer to themselves as 15-M, arguing both that ‘indignant’ does not even begin to describe their anger, and that it overlooks other emotional responses, such as hope and solidarity*”.

As for the mobilization practices together with the organizers/actors of the movement, *los Indignados* actually took action through the digital platforms. The new technologies, the social networks, social media that the young are masters like Facebook, Twitter and particularly *Tuenti* which is used commonly in Spain played a key role for the demonstrations (Stiglitz, 2012: 1-2). Vivas also refers to the importance of the social networks and the Internet on the grounds that they became an open space for discussions, created and increased political awareness, and ultimately helped in organizing and in rapidly spreading the demonstrations (Divès, 2011). The essential digital platform was *Democracia Real Ya!* (DRY) which was the organizer of the protests on May 15, 2011 with a manifesto that is a call for just a single day of simultaneous mobilizations in various cities of the country (Peterson et. al., 2015: 296; Bellver, 2012: 113; Antentas, 2015: 138). This platform had a website⁸ framing the action and developing the sense of common identity, solidarity and purpose among the participants of *los Indignados* movement (Hughes, 2011: 409).

⁸ See the manifesto, available at <http://www.democraciarealya.es/manifiesto-comun/manifiesto-english/>

There are other significant organizations/collectives which are organizing online as well, such as *Juventud Sin Futuro* (JSF) – protesting the precariousness and commercialization of education, *No les Votes* – an electoral boycott campaign rejecting the two-party system and calling to vote for alternative parties; and they altogether called for a *#SpanishRevolution* (Castañeda, 2012: 310; Hughes, 2011: 408; Puig, 2011: 2; Romanos, 2012: 206). Different forms of mobilization practices occurred during the protests, for instance some protesters marched with the “reclaim the streets” type activity and blocked traffic with the sit-down protests (Romanos, 2012: 203).

Betimes this wave of demonstrations was, of course, met by repression on the part of the authorities through police forces, and thousands of protesters decided to stay at the *Puerta del Sol* – the central square of Madrid – with the aim of backing up the detainees and going on the demonstrations especially after the police tried to dismantle the camp on the second night (May 16); by the way the impact of the mobilization increased (Puig, 2011: 2; Romanos, 2012: 203; Yıldırım, 2013b: 152). Within a few days the occupation and the camps in the *Puerta del Sol* square, called as *acampadasol* [living camp at the Sun Square], spread across more than 70 Spanish cities, notably Barcelona’s *Plaça de Catalunya*, with the demand of real democracy, which are not only Spain’s large cities but also medium-sized cities and small towns (Stobart, 2014a; Calvo, 2012: 236; Antentas, 2015: 138; Charnock et. al., 2012: 4). Everybody was shouting the slogan all together, “*The people together will never be defeated!*” (Bellver, 2012: 114). Romanos (2012: 203) conveys that from this *acampada* initiative diverse assemblies and committees – as the example of actions of the movement – emerged for the sake of working to maintain the camps, and to make the official authorities aware of injustice pertinent to the economic crisis and to find out and offer alternatives for current social problems in the public life (Alvarez, 2012:127).

The website named after the banner “*toma la plaza*”⁹ [“take the square”] kept tabs on what was happening at the squares. Through this online communication channel, the number of the participants of the demonstrations as protesters and those remaining in the campsites increased. In addition, the effect of police violence on May 17 caused some groups of people to be more indignant and some others to feel empathy with *los Indignados* and sympathize with them. On the fifth day of the demonstrations May 20, an example of civil disobedience was occurred that Spain had never experienced in its recent history and 25,000 people actively participated in (Romanos, 2012: 203). The campsite in the *Puerta del Sol* square, in Madrid lasted until about the middle of June even though the decreasing numbers of participants. The activists decided to reduce the camp at the end of May at first because of a lot of structural difficulties. Then towards the midst of June, on June 7 they reached a consensus to leave *Sol* and on June 12, 2011 campers wished *Sol*, the original camp, a fond farewell (Calvo, 2012: 241). One of the campers, Endika who works for the Legal Affairs committee, describes the camp as only a tool, not the goal and another, Álvaro from the Thinking work group emphasizes that they have recovered the public space, the “*plaza*” (square) for its initial purpose: a place of exchange, where people can meet anybody¹⁰.

Roughly speaking about the above mentioned assemblies as being the main component of the movement and the sample of mechanisms of activism, they were composed of the participants who gathered daily, and discussed and tried to solve lots of political or politicized issues. To put them in figures, there were 140 assemblies with more than 40,000 participants and more than 25 commissions, 10 work groups and 41 subgroups and they suggested more than 12,500 proposals in total¹¹. They discussed social injustice, corruption, electoral policies and the

⁹ <https://tomalaplaza.net/>

¹⁰ From *Claves para entender el movimiento 15-M*, documentary directed by Adriano Morán in 2011: minutes 42:35, 44:53-45:09; 46:36-46:45; 51:43-51:46; & 51:46-51:53.

¹¹ *ibid*: minutes 46:13-46:29.

excesses of capitalism as well as sought the meaning and goals of participation as issue-based forums (Calvo, 2012: 236). Hughes (2011: 412) emphasizes the deliberative assemblies as one of the most significant protest forms of *los Indignados* alongside the protest camps which have a long tradition in Spain. Alvarez (2012: 127-140) focuses on the neighborhood and town assemblies in detail. She gives place to the organization and coordination of the assemblies and the operational problems that they had encountered. As it may be predicted, the endeavor to reach unanimous consensus while making decision on a particular issue caused problems in a multi-participant forum and the duration of the sections of the assemblies strung out and became arduous (Alvarez, 2012: 128). Nevertheless, they were beneficial in terms of the informing people on injustices and raising social awareness, and both encouraging people to participate in democratic environments and enhancing level of participation in such democratic platforms. In other words, this exercise, which can be considered as the characteristic of the mechanisms/components of the movement, brings about true democracy and enhancing active citizenship (Bellver, 2012: 117). Furthermore, it can be said that this almost direct democracy practice of the movement also characterizes *los Indignados* as the populist social movement.

Los Indignados movement did not appear overnight and while referring to what made it *los Indignados*, it is extremely important to touch on the groups and organizations which had been aware of the existing social problems and organized, resisted and raised their voices against the injustices that they witnessed or experienced one-to-one until May 15, 2011. There are pre- and post-15M processes in the social and political environments of Spain that certainly show a transformation from a cycle to a new one in the history of social movements (Alberich Nistal, 2012: 79). Namely, *los Indignados* movement is not a spontaneous movement and the effect of the protest waves could not have reached to such level without the endeavor of these groups and organizations. And it will be appropriate to refer to these groups and organizations as the prominent actors of the movement. Some of these groups and organizations which set the stage for

what was to happen on May 15 and were active much before *los Indignados* movement are *Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca* – PAH [Platform of those Affected by Mortgages], *Asociación Nacional de Desempleados* – ADESOR [National Association of the Unemployed], *Attac España*, *Intermon-Oxfam*, *Estado del Malestar* [State of Discontent/“Malfare” State], *No Les Votes* [Don’t Vote For Them], *Juventud Sin Futuro* – JSF [Youth Without Future]. *Estado del Malestar*, *No Les Votes*, *JSF* are the ones that organized protests before May 15. For instance, the first one organized flash mobs on each Friday evening from the beginning of 2011. The second demanded new mechanism which will increase the citizen participation in the decision-making processes and encouraged people not to vote for the existing political parties; and the last one was active since early 2011 and organized great protests in April in different parts of the country (Romanos, 2012: 204-7; Antentas, 2015: 140; Puig, 2011: 2). These were the signals of the start of change in Spanish social and political life. The fact that *los Indignados* was made up of various types of protests made by various groups of people demonstrates its feature as an umbrella movement for diverse mobilizations depending on economic, political and relatedly social issues (Bellver, 2012: 114). The Platform for the People Affected by Mortgages (PAH) will be handled at the upcoming pages in detail since it is one of the most influent grassroots movements in Spain during both pre- and post-15M processes.

Actually, the Spanish state and society experienced a great protest cycle in the new millennium with the anti-globalization and anti-Aznar’s government – against the conservative government of José María Aznar – mobilizations. The specific initiatives laying the foundations of the upsurge in 2011 in a sense were the emergence of *V de Vivienda*¹² [H for Housing] in 2006 – a movement for the right to decent housing, the anti-Bologna University reforms mobilizations by students in 2008, cyber activist mobilizations against the *Ley Sinde* [Sinde Law] on the Internet regulation and seeking “free culture” of the Internet in 2010, the

¹² It was inspired from the movie ‘V for Vendetta’.

creation and development of the PAH in 2009 (Antentas, 2015: 138-9; Delclós, 2013; Flesher Fominaya, 2015: 157). The Spanish cities turned into scenes for plenty of demonstrations organized by these initiatives. The protests held on March 13, 2004 and known as the Madrid Spring against the bomb attacks causing the deaths of 192 people and injuring about 2000, and the series of sit-ins organized by *V de Vivienda* in favor of access to decent housing are only two examples of these demonstrations. The mobilization organized against the Iraq War on February 15, 2003 is an example as a significant movement which is called arising from so-called Global Justice Movement (Romanos, 2012: 207-8). The general strike of university students in March 2011 is another important preceding essay that rising against labor precariousness, the rate of unemployment, budget cuts in education and the Bologna reforms (Tejerina & Perugorría, 2012: 96). Juan Luis Sánchez, working for an online newspaper, conveys from a protest day of *los Indignados* that “*This erupts from a movement with a thousand voices where many different movements come together*”¹³. Put it differently, while there is shift in the emphasis of the compared to this past activism, *los Indignados* movement brought people who are uncomfortable with the economic and political atmosphere of the country together.

Hereby, it can be said that *los Indignados* movement is the symbol of cumulativeness, and just like a volcanic explosion. And what about the lavas following right after the explosion? The tides of protests happening during the ongoing process may be considered as lavas such as 19J¹⁴, 15O¹⁵ or the actions of the PAH. By inspiring from Antentas (2016: 114), it may be asserted that both the day of the 15M and the post-15M process caused cracks in the walls of the current

¹³ From *Claves para entender el movimiento 15-M*, documentary directed by Adriano Morán in 2011: minutes 2:52-3:00.

¹⁴ Abbreviation for the protests held on June 19, 2011 by the 15M movement against the signature of “Euro Pact”.

¹⁵ Abbreviation for the anti-globalization demonstrations of October 15, 2011 held internationally against the dominant financial institutions of the world.

political system of Spain. *Los indignados* manifested themselves secondly on June 19 against the Euro Pact which originated a plan envisaging measures in order to stabilize the crisis and Eurozone in 2011 (Antentas, 2015: 145; EC official website, 2015; Arcos, 2011). The neighborhood and town assemblies managed to organize the demonstration although the majority of the activists living in the campsites left their daily activism; and the demonstration became the first major event aftermath of *los Indignados* (Alvarez, 2012: 129). There were obvious differentiations and improvements between the two dates as mobilizations qualitatively and quantitatively according to Antentas (2015: 145, 149). However, it can conveniently be stated that *los Indignados* is the peak and founding event of the new period but the aftermaths were unstable and discontinuous owing to the leaps forwards and backwards (Antentas, 2015: 153).

As for the movement's own spirit, there was a claim about the soul of *los Indignados* movement in 2011 (Taibo, 2012: 155-8; Calvo, 2012: 245-7; Antentas, 2015: 151-2). As regards this twofold soul of the movement, there are both moderate soul and a radical one that is inclined to a libertarian way of thinking and acting. The radical tone of the movement can be considered within its disruptive nature related with the challenge of the electoral process through the occupation of public sphere. And for both the radical and the moderate tones, it is obvious that the movement was diverse and plural in terms of its "anti-systemic" or "anti-establishment" nature according to Antentas since it is improper to attribute characteristics deprived of thought, creativity, and debates to the movement because of its strong emotional side. Consequently, there is not a clear-cut divergence between these two souls and both have common points and grey zones. Thus, those who had hopes of change within the system and those who had hopes of change of the system coexisted in the movement. (Antentas, 2015: 151-2). Calvo seizes these souls in terms of participants. There were two kind of activists in the movement which are "actively committed" activists and "occasional participants". The active ones were the hardcore of the movement who had a more leftist orientation and spent their time and energy in the campsite or meetings day

and night while the occasional participants were described as those attending more or less to some of the assemblies held on a daily basis (Calvo, 2012: 247).

Form this point of view, on the nature of the movement and of the mass, that is to say what kind of a movement it is, and the profile of *los Indignados* protesters, there are various empirical researches, observations and opinions that describe the movement as a young women and men but not adolescent and not student movement, as movement with a left-wing orientation, as a gender-balanced social movement, or as a movement of highly educated and qualified but unemployed people, as a middle-class households' movement, overall as an anti-system movement (Tejerina & Perugorría, 2012: 95, 102; Calvo, 2012: 240-245; Antentas, 2015: 147-148). And who were/are they and what did/do they want? Yıldırım (2013b: 154) indicates the response of this question lies behind the introductory sentence of the manifestos declared by the platforms, "*We, the ordinary people*". They were the indignant generation who had a strong educational background with uncertain future perspectives and without guarantee of access to the labor market (Calvo, 2012: 244; Antentas, 2015: 147). The numerical information from the two big cities of the country is that 40,000 protesters in Madrid and 80,000 in Barcelona mobilized within a period of one month against the injustice in policies of the Spanish government and for the sake of actual democracy (Charnock et.al., 2012: 3). From the participants' perspective, they were/are not militants or activists; they just identify themselves as "*members of a community of persons*" while constructing their collective identity within the framework of the notion of "we" and refraining from using the term *people* (Tejerina & Perugorría, 2012: 102). The anti-political feelings of the movement and its members, which move beyond the ideologies, can also be understood from their discourses related with and against the politics, politicians and political parties following their economic grievances (Rendueles & Sola, 2015). Overall, the anti-political and anti-establishment soul of the movement and its identification of itself as the members of a community of persons – namely the

fact that it takes the elites on, explicitly demonstrate the populist orientation of *los Indignados*.

Following the intensive demonstrations of *los Indignados*, even though there was notable decline in the neighborhood assemblies and the destiny of social resistance in the country was full of ups and downs in the aftermath of June, 2011, there were, of course, successful actions, initiatives and campaigns formed by those sharing and claiming common feelings, ideals, trajectory, political culture and life-standards such as particularly the PAH, the so-called *Mareas* (tides), the platforms against privatization of public services like the *Canal de Isabel* platform and the working groups of *Sol* (Antentas, 2016: 114; Alvarez, 2012: 131). The first two of these, the PAH and the *Mareas*, had a clearest mobilization success. The *Plataforma de Afectados por las Hipotecas* (PAH) formed in 2009 is one of the most significant working groups and platforms playing active role during the pre- and post-15M processes. This platform was composed as a movement of not only families threatened with eviction, but also voluntaries fighting against the evictions, that the banks had been hold it over people who could not pay their mortgages, and fighting for the right to decent housing (Antentas, 2015: 155; 2016: 114; Alvarez, 2012: 131). The mobilizations for the right to housing actually started and developed under the name of *V de Vivienda*, which was active with their protests before 15M period. Herewith, the PAH platform made a range of social demands visible in the general sense such as stop all evictions, fund social housing, repeal the retrospective payments additionally getting from evicted people (Stobart, 2014a).

Whereas the evictions were not regarded as noteworthy stories before May 2011, together with *los Indignados* upsurge, the effect of the protests against evictions increased so that between May and August 2011 the number of the encumbered evictions was about one hundred even if it could not reach an enough level since the number of the evictions are many times more (Valenzuela, 2012: 136). Yet, these small but efficacious victories brought the platform a social and

moral legitimacy with the support of 90% of Spanish people in spite of oppressive institutional blockade by Spain's authorities (Antentas, 2016: 115; Delclós, 2013). Accordingly, while *los Indignados* movement led the PAH to spread country-wide, the actions of this platform also helped the impact of *los Indignados* movement last despite the intermittent aspects. One of the activists of the PAH, Elvi Mármol, uttered in 2013 that “*the PAH today is Spain's most important social movement, but it is neither perfect nor a panacea to all of the country's ills*” (Delclós, 2013). This demonstrates not only the interaction, but also the existence of continuity between the social movements in Spain.

Regarding the *Mareas*, the other major indicator of the continuity of the Spanish mobilization, despite the fact that the impact of the street protests ebbed in the post-15M process, they are the protest tides existing in social life of Spain spreading over the streets for the sake of defence of the public services i.e. education and health care systems (Zelik, 2015; Posadistas Hoy, 2015). It is obvious the ascent of these tides in the aftermath of the 15M which mobilized on the public service issues and the most influent rebellion was held in the health sector by *Marea Blanca* [the White Tide] opposing the cutbacks and privatizations in the public health services and becoming national in 2013 by halting the privatization of 6 hospitals and 27 health centers in Madrid (Antentas, 2016: 115; Posadistas Hoy, 2015; Gavroche, 2013). There are other color protest tides; each represents opposition against an injustice or deficiency or defense of a right. For instance, the *amarilla* [yellow] marea opposes library closures, the *azul* [blue] one opposes the privatization of water, the *verde* [green] one defends public education, the *negra* [black] specializes against the cutbacks, the *roja* [red] against unemployment etc. (Gavroche, 2013; Posadistas Hoy, 2015). Accordingly, *los Indignados* movement turned into another social movement acting like an integrating instrument between the countries' other social movement organizations like *mareas* despite its declining effect so that it has taken a step further (Alberich Nistal, 2012: 91).

On the other hand, *los Indignados* movement had both an international exposure and an international resonance alongside its country-based efficacy and should be figured in the wave of global indignation marked the year of 2011 together with the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street (Antentas, 2015: 137). In other words, the regional and global/transnational impacts both of and on this movement are obvious in addition to its influence on domestic politics. Since the mobilizations associate their own problems with the ones in different places, they are inspiringly influencing each other (Yıldırım, 2015: 993). For example, *los Indignados* movement was influenced by the Arab Uprisings especially the occupation of Tahrir square in Egypt, by the anti-austerity demonstrations in Greece and, in return, in Greece the protesters called themselves as *indignados* by emulating the Spanish demonstrators, by financial crisis protests held between the 2009-2011 in Iceland referred also Pots and Pans Revolution, and by the Portuguese mobilizations known as *Geração à Rasca* [Desperate Generation or Generation in Trouble] (Flesher Fominaya, 2015: 158; Hughes, 2011: 413). Occupy Wall Street, sprung out in Zuccotti Park, New York on September 17, 2011, should also be regarded as another indicator of the worldwide impact of *los Indignados* movement since both of the movements are the actions of reappearance in the city centers of the new social movements that developed the gathering practices together with the anti-globalization movement (Yıldırım, 2013b: 157; Juris & Razsa, 2012; Gautney, 2013). Furthermore, some of *los Indignados* activists expressed that their basic goal was to extend the resistance from Spain to other places, teach what they were learning there to others, and get the whole world to rise up (Romanos, 2012: 216).

Antentas (2015: 137) makes a point on copying one another of the mobilizations all over the world; they did not emerge as each other's copies, that is, *los Indignados* movement did not imitate the Arab Spring mobilizations or the Occupy Wall Street was not replicated from *los Indignados*. Each one mobilized and claimed or defended rights within their own framework of regional dynamics and in the direction of their own internal dynamics. The protesters express that the

events happened in Tunisia or Egypt were a catalyzer as well. And this shows us that these movements build implicitly or explicitly bridges between the Middle East and the Western world in the context of the revolutions or revolutionary actions or demonstrations. (Schiffrin & Kircher-Allen, 2012: 110-111).

In other respects, an idea on the connections between the Arab Spring and *los Indignados* movement exists. Tomás Alberich Nistal (2012: 80) does not believe in their linkage and asserts that these movements can only be painted with the same brush as long as they coincide in terms of formal aspects such as occupying squares and their demands for a better and extensive democracy. On the contrary, the reality of the Arab societies' fight for the sake of minimum democracy and brutal treatments to the citizens by the Arab states is the evidence of the difference between the mobilizations.

More specifically and in an international sense, the most concrete reflection of the broad impact of the Spanish 15M movement can be observed on the anti-globalization demonstrations of October 15, 2011 held internationally against the dominant financial institutions of the world. This day of non-violent protests in front of the banks and stock exchanges in more than around 950 cities in 82 countries under the common slogan of "*United for Global Change!*", summarizing the international indignation, is also called as "Anti-Banks Day" (Tejerrina & Perugorria, 2012: 98; Carrion, 2011; Antentas & Vivas, 2011). The tie between the 15M and 15O demonstrates the link between local or regional and global level mobilizations as the protest practices are recurred like taking to the streets, occupying and making themselves heard. Moreover, *los Indignados* movement contributed to launching street mobilizations against the European Parliament in addition the contribution to the 15O protests (Antentas, 2016: 114; Calvo, 2012: 238-239; Alberich Nistal, 2012: 80). Many of *los Indignados* protesters were aware of the *importance of thinking and acting globally* and kept in touch with many countries in order to raise the resistance (Tejerina & Perugorria's interview to Miguel Arana, 2012: 104). Ultimately, the 15O is the

proof that the activists who said their basic goal is to reach to some other places and to convey what they learned there achieved their objective, and accordingly also the strong bond with *los Indignados*.

Whether *los Indignados* movement exemplifies a continuity or a rupture among the other social mobilizations, it is obvious that *los Indignados* changed the way of thinking and acting of thousands Spanish people on society, on politics, on economics, on solidarity and so on causing a “new social climate” to be created (Alberich Nistal, 2012: 91). Put it differently, this movement was not only a campaign against the policies of Spanish state, but also a movement globally challenging and shaking Spain at its economic and political core (Antentas, 2015: 142). However, as the time goes by, it is also clear that the visibility of the movement has already diminished. Even if the first anniversary of the 15 May happened relatively pretty lively in terms of demonstrations, both the impact and the number of participants gradually decreased until *Podemos* “perpetuated” the visibility of the movement to a certain extent by claiming that it came evolved out of *los Indignados*.

Many people celebrated the first anniversary in 2012 through mass occupations of public spheres in metropolises like especially Madrid and Barcelona. However, the movement suffered from particular internal problems, for example, prominent members were thought as attempting to be articulated with the political system that the protesters rejected first and foremost. The movement acted in unison with trade unions for the first time, became quite visible in the international media and stayed valid on May 15, 2012. Here, there were arguments envisaging the existence of the movement vogue and fad without real substance, and the future of it is not long-lasting whereas some others regards that the movement is a noteworthy break for the existing political culture of the country (Calvo, 2012: 239; Castañeda, 2012: 319). Regarding this situation, Antentas (2015: 155) shares the result of a survey on the perception and sympathy of people

about the movement and on the second anniversary in May, 2013, the “awareness impact”, the dissemination of a particular world perspective was at the rate of 78%.

Moreover, in March, 2013 the *Citizen’s Re-Action Taskforce*, shaped by *los Indignados*, organized protests in Spain for about a week against the EU Summit held in Brussels. When it comes to 2014, Spain among many other countries put support behind the call for protest, titled May of Solidarity, by the entity of Alter Summit trying to marshal the European organizations together during the week of 15-24 May 2014 before the elections for the European Parliament. In the same year, the agency of the movements arrived at the level of political party organizations: *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos* (Yıldırım, 2015: 995-997). The voting rate of *Podemos*, seen as the reflection of *los Indignados* in Spain and officially launched in January 2014, in the elections of the European Parliament made the possible connection between a social movement and a political party the research subject of this study. Yet, it can also be claimed that in spite of all these things, revealing of a questionable relationship between the movement and the party in terms of the integration with the mainstream political system was inevitable.

From another perspective, regarding the shelf life and the short-term and long-term effects of *los Indignados* movement, it can be seen from the replies of Spanish people in the flash interviews, conversations or questionnaires, which were made while the events remain fresh that the confidence in the success and lastingness of the movement is high. However, the sustainability of the movement within about six years has been interrupted. In fact, there is an understanding that the transformation of the movement and its social and political demands into institutional politics by *Podemos* both through a structured organization and through the ballot box, which is the most mature shape of the bourgeois democracy, indicates that the populist character of the movement pushes ahead with a populist party. At this point, it is necessary to explain *Podemos* in order to understand the organic linkage between the party and the movement and to find

out the answers to the questions: what kind of a political party is *Podemos*, when and how was it established, what are the dynamics causing it to be established, and how did a social movement turned into a political party as claimed.

3.2. *Podemos* and its populist character

Podemos is relatively a new party of the Spanish political landscape and it is frequently referred as being the reflection of the *Indignados* (15M) movement on the stage of practical politics even though the movement defines itself as a non-party and non-violent citizens' movement; and the participants had discourses in this direction like being from neither right nor left.

In spite of the anti-political discourses and evaluations by many *los Indignados* activists and specialists or social scientists, even if it is true that a political party is an authority “within the real politics” and does not tally with the norms of horizontal politics (Uzunoglu, 2015), Spain woke up to the morning of January 17, 2014 when a new political formation, *Podemos* (*We can*) party showed up in a small theater in Madrid (Rendueles & Sola, 2015). It was officially registered and founded on March 11, 2014 (Farmakis, 2014; the Local, 2014). Herewith a new party-grassroots, composed of various groups organized under *Podemos*, emerged in Madrid with the purpose of launching a candidacy to the European Parliament, that is, the increasing acting of the mobilizations has reached an effect at the political party level (Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Yıldırım, 2015: 997).

It is to the point to find out the ilk of the political party, its emergent dynamics and its experience within “realpolitik”. In that, analyzing and finding out, and thereby handling the (organic) relation of a political party (*Podemos*) with a social movement (*los Indignados* (15M) movement), depends on the founding dynamics and the populist character of the party which it carries from the movement of *los Indignados*. At that point, it should be noted that notwithstanding *Podemos* frames the demands of people at the institutional political level, it does not have a program of social and political transformation as the socialist parties

have; thus, this situation contributes its populist character. Hereby, giving place to the anti-elite stance of *Podemos*, its electoral practices within the framework of conveying the social and political demands of the streets, and its experience of somehow participatory democracy through online channels is significant in terms of understanding its populist character – even though this character causes some tensions which will be discussed in the following chapter.

3.2.1. People versus elites

During the establishing process of *Podemos*, there was initially the meeting of well-known personalities and intellectuals such as Juan Carlos Monedero (resigned in April 2015), Carolina Bescansa, Íñigo Errejón, and Bibiana Medialdea, and activists like from *Juventud Sin Futuro* (Youth Without Future), student associations etc. centering around Pablo Iglesias¹⁶ – who was elected as general secretary in October 2014 during the Vistalegre congress (Toscano, 2015). This implies that the establishment of the party is not the result of workers' or the left's reorganization. These founding cadre consist of the young scientists, a group of political science professors from the University of Complutense in Madrid, who are coming from the left tradition like from *Chavismo* (Chavism), the Black movement, *Izquierda Anticapitalista* (Anti-capitalist Left) – which is a Marxist group and the non-parliamentary political organization working as a confederation, also known as *Anticapitalistas* – youth movements of the Spanish Communist Party and Eurocommunism (Sabado, 2015; Antentas, 2016: 124; Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Benlisoy, 2014; Stobart, 2014d; Dolan, 2015; Toscano, 2015; Iglesias, 2015: 18; Navarro, 2015). Based on this – many of its senior figures and members come from left organizations and parties, it is obvious that *Podemos* is ideologically – unquestionably – a left-wing party (Torreblanca, 2015a: 10; Antentas, 2016: 124; Dolan, 2015). While some progressive leftists praised the

¹⁶ Political theorist and the face of the party. He has also been known with his TV programs, *La Tuerka* and *Fort Apache* (Hawes, 2015; Tas, 2015; the Local, 2014). Meanwhile, *La Tuerka* is a program which directs criticisms about problems of the country like corruption, austerity, bailouts, banking fraud, housing crisis, social inequality etc. (Flesher Fominaya, 2014b).

party at the beginning, some other leftists vilified it for dividing the left alongside the right-wing formations that reflected the party as anti-system (Flesher Fominaya, 2014b). However, it has firstly criticized the quasi bipartisan politics by acting in a populist manner rather than a total rejection of the system (Yıldırım, 2015: 997).

Within the context of the European level and national politics, *Podemos* situates itself against the austerity measures in principle in addition to being against the caste while the center right and left parties were losing their plausibility which have alternately implemented the austerity policies imposed by Troika composed of the EC, ECB and IMF (Benlisoy, 2014). What *Podemos* proposes against the austerity measures, which are/were implemented by the political instrument, the *Partido Popular*, with the finance capital's contribution such as the reduction of salaries and public expenditures (Navarro, 2015), was explained by Iglesias such that;

“The Marxist criticism of neoliberalism causes major problems at the level of practical politics. Our strategical preference has been to pursue a discourse based on reacquiring sovereignty within the framework of Europe, social rights, and even human rights and to embrace a neo-Keynesian approach” (quoted in Boratav, 2015).

Since the party's programme – which essentially covers anti-austerity politics, written by the professors of economics, Vicenç Navarro and Juan Torres López – remains in a Keynesian framework, the party limits itself to a radical redistribution of wealth (Sabado, 2015; Külebi, 2015; Navarro, 2015; Stobart, 2015a; Toscano, 2015). On the other hand, this programme is introduced as the analysis of the reasons of the crisis, which is the combination of the financial, economic and political crisis – so to say the regime crisis, by its authors rather than a future budget of a possible *Podemos* government (Navarro, 2015). According to this analysis, the current crisis is basically because of “underconsumption” stemming from the neoliberalism's spreading socio-economic inequalities in parallel with the views of Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman (Stobart, 2015a). The economy programme proposed decreasing the working

hours per week and the retirement age; sought the gender equality in the labour; suggested bringing down the tax fraud; highlighted the need of developing the public banks; and above all aimed at reversing the austerity policies imposed by Troika and carried out by the PP and the PSOE (Navarro, 2015). The party also puts forward a clear-cut state intervention, arrangement on minimum and maximum wage legislation, opening up new employment opportunities for the unemployed, reforms for the housing market, and a freeze about firings in profit-making companies (Nagel, 2014; Weisbrot, 2015). Nevertheless, *Podemos*'s approach to continental politics that is far from a Marxist criticism and its stance about left-right division, that is the central balance of the political scene, in internal politics have not changed the fact that constituency stays essentially leftist (Rendueles & Sola, 2015). Briefly stated the advocacy of *Podemos* despite its weaknesses, it carries the banner for the rejection of austerity, the idea of a constituent process with a constituent assembly, popular sovereignty, and a movement exterior to the system, against the caste (Sabado, 2015).

In this respect, it is also argued that *Podemos* is a populist party since it has inspired from the Latin American national popular movements like Chavismo, besides its main inspiration, Greece's Syriza, notable example of left and leftist discourses gaining a new momentum during the times of crisis and austerity in Europe (Torreblanca, 2015a: 10; Torreblanca, 2015b: 25-31; Toscano, 2015). It is well-known that the relations and intimacy of *Podemos*'s cadre with the leftist powers – their consultancy to Latin American governments – like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela (Boratav, 2015; Nagel, 2014; Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Tas, 2015). It is claimed that the conscious and deliberate discourses of *Podemos* about the class politics, use of traditional bourgeois-liberal conceptualizations, abstention of the left-right dichotomy, and emphasis of “the people against the caste” makes it a populist, even a pragmatist populist, party rather than a radical leftist party (Külebi, 2015; Toscano, 2015; Stobart, 2015b). Namely, it has a populist logic that divides the political space as “the people” versus “the elites”

(Rendueles & Sola, 2015) and this populist discourse is not a theoretical commitment of Iglesias but an expedient strategy (Toscano, 2015).

Considering what *Podemos* stands for, the utterances of the party leaders in principle are oriented to social, environmental, and democratic devastation of neoliberalism and liberal democracy that the upper classes of the society manage to control thoroughly over political, economic and social life and legitimize this stance (Torreblanca, 2015a: 10). It is claimed that *Podemos* was arisen so as to reclaim sovereignty and democracy against the oligarchic caste by serving under the popular unity and citizenship understanding (Errejón, 2014). Iglesias tries to criticize the Spanish crisis without using the term of *capitalism* on account of the fact that “*Just a few people who have the high political and institutional imagination/fantasy can say that capitalism is a problem. A word like ‘capitalism’ cannot represent what a social movement embracing hundreds of thousands protests.*” However, Boratav (2015) expostulates *Podemos* and its leader’s, Iglesias’, narratives and describes its opposition as “*weird*”. For this reason, capitalists, finance capital, capital are not at the target of *Podemos*’s struggle but “they, superiors, elites, (sometimes) caste” are (Boratav, 2015). On the other hand, this attitude of the party – adopting the discourse of “de-ideologization” as well – is perceived as *Podemos*’s communication strategy, and this strategy is effective since the party introduces itself not relying on ideology but on common sense with the idea of eliminating left-right axis (Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Carlin, 2015). Namely, it is argued that the party has deliberately refrained from the discourse of class politics, any left-wing references, and taking a clear stance about ideological issues (Külebi, 2015; Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Stobart, 2014c; Tas, 2015).

The endeavor of going beyond the classical divisions between left and right and of reframing politics between *la casta* (the caste) and the people is also comprehended as the novelty of *Podemos*. *Podemos* tries to invigorate the struggle of “those below against those at the top” since it regards the troubles of the country

as happening due to the gap between the people and the elites. In addition, it looks for changing radically the post-Franco regime (Torreblanca, 2015a: 11; Sabado, 2015; Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Dolan, 2015). Iglesias (2015: 15) himself states that change was/has been no longer possible within the atmosphere of the embodiment of the political pattern as the dichotomy of left and right. In other words, both *los Indignados* movement and *Podemos* view their country as suffering from turmoil between money and politics, and the framework of *el pueblo versus la casta* (the people vs. the caste) has been mobilizing that much people (Stobart, 2014c). The caste here is composed of politicians, the media, powerful sectors of the market and big corporations, speculators and some preferential groups and is defined as the enemy which *Podemos*'s partisans or supporters position themselves against (Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Stobart, 2014d). Antentas (2016: 124) defines this novelty as a “podemization” process with its new style impacting the party competition dynamics in the country's political landscape. There are also those who associate the “success” of *Podemos* to its approach, its language that it redefines class struggle between the ordinary people (*la gente normal*) and those at the top (Navarro, 2015).

3.2.2. Experience of participatory democracy through online channels

Podemos pursues the policy to solve each problem by asking or consulting people; thus, it uses the new technology channels intensively (Tas, 2015; Rendueles & Sola, 2015). The political base, namely the grassroots of the party are armed with the new technology tools in order to reach people, convey the party's messages and inform the potential voters easily. This attitude is called “propaganda” but they claim that this is the way of direct participation of people into the decision-making processes – even characterizes the participation campaign of the party (Carlin, 2015).

With this innovative practice, *Podemos* differs from the traditional politics. The social networks are the prominent channels for its participatory understanding, and the number of its members is the proof of this understanding.

At the beginning of 2015, that is in its first year after established, about 300,000 people were signed up its website (Carlin, 2015; Tsavkko Garcia, 2015).

Podemos uses many online channels or networks for both its party-level organization and decisions regarding the general politics over Spain. The participation in discussions are conducted through its official website, forums and Appgree, the smartphone application, as well as the mostly known social media like Twitter, Facebook or Reddit as the young protesters of *los Indignados* movement used (Carlin, 2015). This online democracy has provided/provides its members the right to participate in intra-party debates, and to vote on drafts and resolutions through internet for the policies that party would follow and for the selection of candidates to the elections, for instance (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015; Rendueles & Sola, 2015). To have the right to access and attend the debates and decision-making processes, the only thing that each person – whether s/he is a member of *Podemos* or not – has to have is an email account and a voting code (Dolan, 2015).

What is more, Eduardo Maura, the international representative of *Podemos*, explains this participatory phenomenon with the hacker logic (Dolan, 2015). With this logic, he underlies that;

“To create a branch you only need a Facebook account, an email and a meeting. No membership, no fees. So, in the first two months we got more than 300 branches, not only in different places but also branches that had to do with specific fields, like education, culture, the environment.” (Dolan, 2015).

In addition, again according to Maura, this logic of proliferation through online democracy helped *Podemos* to enhance the participatory practices which are essential for a real democratic party besides to expand these practices. It is claimed that *Podemos* uses this kind of a process to draw more people in politics and to give people opportunity of decision-making power alongside the ones who are ready to engage or already engaged in politics as well. This practice also viewed as the perfect solution for participation for the people who are working and

having family and do not have enough time and energy to engage in politics in terms of its compatibility without excluding any other (Dolan, 2015).

The participatory democracy that *Podemos* tried to implement and the contemporary communication means made it horizontal and moved it away from traditional vertical parties in organizational sense (Tas, 2015). In other words, the party has a new internal organization differently from other parties with the broad online participation in its discussions and debates as an intra-party decision-making practice for its internal constitution and leadership elections (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015). This endeavor of *Podemos* made the claim of real democracy, namely the call for democracy, its central strategy since it searches the ways to redefine democracy by including different forms of participation (Navarro, 2015).

Podemos charts a new path out by embracing the participatory democracy logic of *los Indignados* movement; however, this promising innovation embodies some risks and contradictions in itself like cyber threats and as Rendueles and Sola (2015) indicates voting through online channels does not mean the voters have a real decision-making power. Moreover, tensions arising from the implementation of participatory democracy regarding the relationship of *los Indignados* and *Podemos* depend very much on the practical difficulties and the achievement of this online direct process properly. It is overtly clear that the party model of *Podemos* is no different from the traditional ones with its secretary general, executives and committees like for elections.

3.2.3. Electoral processes of *Podemos*

It is also worth noting that the mentioned success of *Podemos* is judged from the electoral practices of such a young party. So, these practices should be given place in order to be able to understand the organic linkage between *los Indignados* and *Podemos* and to conduct an analysis over the tensions generated from the populist character of *Podemos*, i.e. representative vs. participatory democracy (that is, over elections and ballot box as the embodiment of elections)

is one of these tensions. The table below demonstrates the general, local, regional and European level elections that *Podemos* took part in since it established; their results in terms of the voting rates and number of seats received by *Podemos* as well as the other four parties which are considered to be chief with regard to Spanish politics – two mainstream parties, a renascent right-wing party aftermath of *los Indignados*, and one of the strongest representatives of left (far-left) in Spain; and leaders/candidates of these parties.

Table 3. Elections and *Podemos*¹⁷

ELECTIONS				RESULTS	
DATE	TYPE	PARTY/ALLIANCE	CANDIDATE/ LEADER	VOTE S (%)	NUMBE R OF SEATS
May 25, 2014	EUROPEAN PARLIAMEN T	PARTIDO POPULAR (PP)	Miguel Arias Cañete	26,09	16
		PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE)	Elena Valenciano	23,01	14
		COALICIÓN LA IZQUIERDA PLURAL (IP)	Cayo Lara	10,03	6
		PODEMOS	<i>Pablo Iglesias Turrión</i>	7,98	5
		CIUDADANOS- PARTIDO DE LA CIUDADANÍA (C's)	Javier Nart	3,16	2
May 24, 2015	LOCAL	PARTIDO POPULAR (PP)	Mariano Rajoy	27,05	22.750
		PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE)	Pedro Sánchez	25,02	20.818
		IZQUIERDA UNIDA (IU)	Alberto Garzón	4,46	2.029
		PODEMOS	-	-	-
		CIUDADANOS- PARTIDO DE LA CIUDADANÍA (C's)	Albert Rivera	6,55	1.527

¹⁷ This table shows the results of elections which *Podemos* directly took place after its establishment. It includes also the electoral performances of two main political parties of Spain, PP and PSOE, and the relatively new party, *Ciudadanos* just like *Podemos*. IU is also demonstrated depending on its place in the left politics of Spain.

Table 3 (Cont'd)

May 24, 2015	REGIONAL	PARTIDO POPULAR (PP)	Mariano Rajoy	30,4	281
		PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE)	Pedro Sánchez	24,8	227
		IZQUIERDA UNIDA (IU)	Alberto Garzón	4,2	9
		PODEMOS	Pablo Iglesias Turrión	14,2	118
		CIUDADANOS-PARTIDO DE LA CIUDADANÍA (C's)	Albert Rivera	10	56
December 20, 2015	GENERAL	PARTIDO POPULAR (PP)	Mariano Rajoy	28,71	123
		PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE)	Pedro Sánchez	22	90
		CIUDADANOS-PARTIDO DE LA CIUDADANÍA (C's)	Albert Rivera	13,94	40
		PODEMOS	Pablo Iglesias Turrión	20,7	69
		UNIDAD POPULAR: IZQUIERDA UNIDA, UNIDAD POPULAR EN COMÚN (IU-UPeC)	Alberto Garzón	3,68	2

Table 3 (Cont'd)

June 26, 2016	GENERAL	PARTIDO POPULAR (PP)	Mariano Rajoy	33,01	137
		PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE)	Pedro Sánchez	22,63	85
		<i>UNIDOS PODEMOS</i> ¹⁸	<i>Pablo Iglesias Turrión & Alberto Garzón</i>	<i>21,2</i>	<i>71</i>
		CIUDADANOS-PARTIDO DE LA CIUDADANÍA (C's)	Albert Rivera	13,06	32

Source: The data is received from the official websites of the Spanish government, the Ministry of Interior (available at <http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/>); from the Official Bulletins of State prepared by Central Electoral Board (available at <http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/elecciones>); and from the newspaper *El Confidencial*'s website (available at <http://www.elconfidencial.com/elecciones-municipales-y-autonomicas/resultados-4/>).

When the party's electoral practices since its establishment are examined more closely, the elections of the European Parliament on May 25, 2014 were the first, so to say, ordeal of *Podemos*, and its results caused a small earthquake in the political scene (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 7). Namely, this was construed as the first token of the so-called bipartisan system's depreciation and the supra-Spanish nation echo of the social unrest against austerity and antidemocratic political practices since 2011 at the European level (Yıldırım, 2015: 998; Antentas, 2016: 123; Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Stobart, 2014c). *Podemos* supported by many activists, authors and political scientists of the world over won 7,9% of the total votes by mobilizing more than 1,2 million voters; and obtained 5 of 54 seats of Spain in the European Parliament. It was also brought forward that *Podemos* used the discourse related to the legacy of the 15M and shook the political atmosphere at its core (Yıldırım, 2015: 998; Antentas, 2016: 123; Nagel, 2014; Torreblanca, 2015a: 10; Flesher Fominaya, 2014b; The Guardian, 2015; Errejón, 2014; Podemos Assembly, 2014: 8). Consequently, this major surprise of *Podemos*'s rise

has consolidated the hopes of change on the way to the Spanish general elections and caused the party to gain a considerable amount of rates in the opinion polls (Torreblanca, 2015a: 10).

Herewith, electoral competition became one of *Podemos*'s main strategies and it focalized on the general elections which were going to be held in December 20, 2015. The party regarded the electoral process at the epicenter of political confrontation providing an opportunity to cope with the existing crisis in a constitutive and public manner rather than oligarchic one (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 5, 10). It was also criticized due to its desire of winning elections with the argument of “the essential thing for Iglesias is to win the general elections, but such victories cannot provide social transformations alone” by Alberto Garzón (Watson, 2015). Moreover, it is currently criticized for having two-souls by Juan Carlos Monedero who was one of the founder of party but resigned later. He attributes both a soul of “*indignación social*” (social indignation) and a soul of “party politics” and “political marketing” emphasizing that the problematic issue is the concentration only on political soul and oblivion of the other one, and the party has started to be seen that it desires to replace them (Toscano, 2015). However, within the period from *Podemos*'s European victory to the Spain's general elections, the voting rates of the party in the opinion polls were undulating and at the end the election results were unsatisfactory; however, there is one thing which is satisfactory that the meteoric entrance of *Podemos* as a political actor into the Spain's political life created a tremendous impression in the political system of the country (Antentas, 2016: 124; Rendueles & Sola, 2015).

The second electoral experience of *Podemos* en route to December 2015, and the first for Ciudadanos¹⁸ which is characterized as the “*Podemos* of the right”

¹⁸ It is a new political alternative finding place itself again in Spanish politics after the 15M – with a “15-M style”, and addressing the middle classes and conservative working class influenced by the crisis with a neoliberal agenda and a rhetoric against (a centralist response to) the Catalan issue, and encouraged by business circles (Antentas, 2016: 124; Toscano, 2015; Flesher Fominaya, 2014b).

or “right-wing *Podemos*”, was the local and regional elections held simultaneously on May 24, 2015 (Antentas, 2016: 124-5; Iglesias, 2015: 21). *Podemos* decided not to take directly/officially part in the local contest with the party label, but supported the grassroots candidates who were close to them making use of their media presence and with their communicative skills under the citizen platform, *Ganemos (Let’s Win)*¹⁹ formed in order to stand for the local elections (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 15; Rodon & Hierro, 2016: 345-6; the Local, 2014; Tas, 2015). However, in the regional/autonomous elections, the party put up its candidates for the regional parliaments of 13 autonomous communities by attributing a privileged importance to them. They built consensus on the fact that these elections must be utilized to show the rising power of the party, to make it a force of people’s opposition to the 1978 regime²⁰ and the caste, and the “success” of *Podemos* on May 25, 2014 was not achieved incidentally (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 13-15).

In terms of the electoral performance, even if the polls reflected that *Podemos* was losing its freshness during the period from January to May 2015, it was considered that the party kept the winds of change alive in the political system (Antentas, 2016: 124-5). The local and regional elections caused a political fragmentation in the country rather than the domination of one political party (The Guardian, 2015). *Podemos* had a breakthrough in its first experience within the national borders although the voting rates in 13 regions were behind the mainstream parties of the country – PP and PSOE – with percentages ranging from about 8 to 20% (Antentas, 2016: 125). In that, in the local elections, the electoral success of the local coalitions supported by *Podemos* was striking. Such an important and abrupt success by the “candidacies for change” and “popular unity” in major cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz, La Coruña and Zaragoza led to

¹⁹ There were also variations of coalitions in different regions and municipalities called *Ahora Madrid (Madrid Now)*, *Barcelona en Comú (Barcelona in Common)*, *Las Mareas Ciudadanas (Waves of Citizens)* in Galicia, etc. (Rodon & Hierro, 2016: 346-7).

²⁰ The year in which the Spanish Constitution was approved gave its name to the current regime of Spain.

a shift in the political environment in the country just as Iglesias emphasized by saying “*The big cities are the big engine of change in Spain*” (Sabado, 2015; Antentas, 2016: 125; Minder, 2015; Rodon & Hierro, 2016: 347).

The process/period of political instability, which is also reflection of the crisis of the de facto bipartisanship, beginning with the results of European Parliamentary elections in the country acquired a new dimension with the establishments of new political parties, first *Podemos* then *Ciudadanos*, and their running for election (Sabado, 2015; Antentas, 2016: 124). Put it differently, the political phase started with *los Indignados* movement and escalating with the European elections’ results was specified with the regime crisis, that is the exhaustion of the social and political system, generating the major unrest about traditional party-system and on the financial institutions (Antentas, 2016: 123; Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Iglesias, 2015: 10). The political landscape which was converted into de facto bipartisan (two-party) system in recent decades evolved into a quadripartite (four-party) political order. The two new political parties got involved in the system which were established subsequent to *los Indignados* movement. At this point, the question of to what extent they “politicize” the demands of *los Indignados* and the need of explaining it in the direction of transformation the protesters’ exclamations on social and political spheres, and mainly democracy, come to sight.

Furthermore, these parties claimed that they have come up from below – though not structurally they are – and took part in the general elections. This claim is also conveniently brought forward by the Political Secretary of *Podemos* in that way *Podemos* was born from above not from below (Errejón, 2014). In addition, it is expressed that these parties formed cracks in the system in December, 2015 (Sabado, 2015). As Rendueles and Sola (2015) claims, even if the establishment of new political parties, particularly of *Podemos*, was not the immediate cause of what was happening in the country like abdication of King Juan Carlos or resignation of the leader of PSOE; but it accelerated this process of Spanish

political regime crisis. On the other hand, the tradition of the Spanish people which is punishing one of the two mainstream parties by supporting the other one in the elections, that is, the situation of being alternative to other forming a safeguards system shared among these parties has been changed with this new political environment (Rendueles & Sola, 2015; Podemos Assembly, 2014: 7).

On the December 20, 2015 *Podemos* came in third with 20,7% of the votes and outdistanced *Ciudadanos* taking about 14% of total votes; and it was very close to the PSOE and not far behind the PP that obtained 22% and 28,7% respectively, and whose total percentage was 50,7% compared to 73% in the previous general elections of 2011 (Antentas, 2016: 125). This demonstrates that even though the de facto bipartisanship in the political system was not completely disposed of – it was surely broken down, a political instability and a governability crisis emerged, which carried the country away to firstly coalition seeking and then to an early election (Vivas, 2016). For this early election, *Podemos* went to the polls with the *Izquierda Unida*²¹, under the coalition named *Unidos Podemos* with the purpose of overtaking the PSOE. However, this leftist coalition fell behind the PSOE by taking the rate of 21,2% compared to 22,6%. Namely, this unification could not reach the total of two parties' votes (Deniz, 2016). Whether the results are of the impact of the Brexit referendum held in Britain a few days before or not can be discussed at another level. Yet in the repeated elections held on June 26, 2016, the PP increased its voting rates to 33%; nevertheless, this rate was also inadequate to form a government (Antentas, 2016: 125-6).

As a whole, criticism can be directed at *Podemos* on different points, issues from various perspectives. On the one hand, it can be claimed that it is a left-wing populist project which abandoned the close ties with the legacy of the 15M by adopted a hierarchically structural party organization. On the other hand, it can be asserted that the establishment of a non-caste formation, *Ciudadanos* caused

²¹ It is a left-wing political coalition that was formed a few weeks before the 1986 general elections, and became a party that had played the role of the third party for many years in the Spanish party system (Ramiro Fernández, 2002: 5; Rodon & Hierro, 2016: 345).

Podemos turn away from its populist and sometimes right-wing inclines and approximated it rather to the left (Toscano, 2015). The reason is that it is obvious what *Podemos* opposes, but it is vague what it exactly defends. Namely, it is against the austerity measures and expresses cancellation of public debts, the taxation of the wealthy and enhancement of social rights etc., but it does not question how these demands will be implemented, and this causes its ideological position to be ambiguous (Akçay, 2016). Namely, the populist soul of the party is still perceived here. Thus, it is quite relevant considering a comparison between the demands of *los Indignados* and those transformed and translated into mainstream politics by *Podemos* in order to understand their relation. Nevertheless, at the end, even though *Podemos* was not able to beat the mainstream political parties in its second chance, whether it has a populist character or not, it can be claimed that it has become the pioneer of the political process that forced the two main parties to create a coalition – which both of them were not budge an inch to form during the previous period after the 2015 elections – or the leader of *Partido Popular*, Rajoy, to form a minority government (Euronews, 2016; The Spain Report, 2016), and leader of the visibility of the regime crisis that the economic and political difficulties experienced in the country engendered.

The emergence of *Podemos* originates hopes and new perspectives as well as questions, responsibilities and difficulties – which can be assessed as tensions arising from the populist character of the party, and will be tackled in the following chapter – whilst paving a possible way to storm the existing order (Errejón, 2014). Before the elections in June, 26 2017, the leader of PP, Rajoy declared that he could not form a government, a possible position of government partnership emerged for *Podemos*. However, the party rejected to form a coalition government with the PSOE's program which foresaw to maintain the austerity measures and categorically objected to the Catalan independence. Also, it did not support the minority government which the PSOE tried to form together with the C's (Özdemir, 2017: 244). Put it differently, this new-born party led Spain to move

into a deepened regime crisis, namely contributed to deepening this crisis of political regime (Toscano, 2015), causing political instability and uncertainty for a long while until the Prime Minister Rajoy formed the government on October 29, 2016. It opened up a window for an alternative left, introduced lessons about political communication, and set old and new activists up on a common ground (Toscano, 2015). Briefly, despite all of the contradictions and challenges within the party and its relations with the realpolitik, *Podemos* has initiated an unexpected political opportunity for the country and reinforced a new stage opened up by *los Indignados* movement with unforeseeable impacts (Rendueles & Sola, 2015).

Hereby the burning question that has to be answered is “How is it asserted that a political party has become the extension of a populist movement, namely it has evolved out of the movement by adopting and translating the demands of ordinary people in the platform of existing political system, and what are the related tensions on the grounds of the linkage between the movement and the party, and the ones that the party encountered later on?”. Seeing that one of the main principles of *los Indignados* movement or activists is to keep the existing political establishments away at the beginning, three years after the birth of the movement how can this demand be associated to *Podemos*? Accordingly, the next chapter will include an analysis within the context of institutionalization of *los Indignados* movement and its demands by a political party, *Podemos*, on the basis of the discussion of tensions brought about by the transformation of a populist movement.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEMANDS: TENSIONS

Since the “claim” of populist character of *Podemos* stems from how it identifies politics and how it introduces itself within this politics, this character reveals some major tension points as of the foundation of the party in 2014. The difficulties and issues that *Podemos* encounters in the Spanish politics generate these tension grounds. Accordingly, this chapter presents these tensions under three subtitles arising out from the transformation of social and political demands of *los Indignados* by the institutionalization attempts of *Podemos*. These tensions come in view both within the party and between the party and its own grassroots. Namely, they include the desire and practice of participatory democracy by *los Indignados* and by *Podemos* and its intra-party equilibrium, the position of *Podemos* against the current political establishment and elites, and the effectiveness of *Podemos* during the election processes.

4.1. Desire and practice of participatory democracy by *Los Indignados* and by *Podemos* and the intra-party equilibrium of *Podemos*

The common idea or perception is the fact that *los Indignados* movement is a response to the existing political and institutional system because of its links with the global and regional economic policies which stem from global neoliberalism in addition to the dominant liberal world order over politics, and accordingly due to the global economic crisis and the European Union’s approaches and Spanish government’s political practices. To the extent that people lost their confidence in the existing political parties and even repudiated them, particularly the two main parties, PSOE and PP that were dominating the political life in Spain for three decades, were closely associated with the major corrupt

economic and financial powers (Castañeda, 2012: 310; Antentas, 2015: 145; Navarro, 2015). For this reason, *los Indignados* movement is identified as an anti-political mobilization on the grounds that this movement did not have any relation with the political parties and included young individuals inexperienced about politics, public issues, social mobilizations etc. (Castañeda, 2012: 310). Moreover, both the protesters themselves and their manifesto, declared by the platform of *Democracia Real Ya!* on the very first days, corroborated this idea. The emphasis on democracy is not necessarily associated with politics embodied in a political party:

“Democracy belongs to the people (demos = people, krátos = government) which means that government is made of every one of us. However, in Spain most of the political class does not even listen to us. Politicians should be bringing our voice to the institutions, facilitating the political participation of citizens through direct channels that provide the greatest benefit to the wider society, not to get rich and prosper at our expense, attending only to the dictatorship of major economic powers and holding them in power through a bipartidism headed by the immovable acronym PP & PSOE.” (Democracia Real Ya, 2011).

It is open and shut that the focus of the movement on democracy is based on the demand of facilitation of the political participation of citizens through direct channels in conjunction with the demand of getting rid of economic woes and financial dominance of neoliberal system. The protesters also narrate forthrightly their exclamation and affirmation about the existing representative democracy:

“They say we should create a political party. But people gathering in assemblies are already a form of democracy. It’s not mandatory to create a political party.”¹

They reflect their unrest and discontent related with the political parties which are one of the practical tools of the representative system as follows:

“The political parties are not doing anything for us, so we are going to do it on our own.”²

¹ From *Claves para entender el movimiento 15-M*, documentary directed by Adriano Morán in 2011: minutes 27:22-27:33.

² *ibid*: minutes 27:34-27:40.

The emphasis on “*We do on our own*” demonstrates how much *los Indignados* place importance on the direct participation in social, political and economic spheres. Such a contention also expresses that some of the protesters (indignados) have clear ideologies, some are apolitical but they all are indignant about the political, economic and social situation around them (Democracia Real Ya, 2011).

Los Indignados protesters were also reflecting both their disenchantment against the failure of representative system and their demand for a change in the understanding of democracy with many other slogans, and above all with the one “*¡No nos representan!*” [“They do not represent us!”]. Therewithal, one of the protesters of *los Indignados* explicates the demand of real democracy as a process and addresses the constituent organizer’s, *Democracia Real Ya!*, importance:

“The force of the slogan. Democracia Real Ya!, as with other slogans, like “they say we have democracy and we don’t” – is to reflect that we do not live in a democracy, but in a “dictatorship” of the corporations... Now, in the movement, we have begun the process of discussing what democracy is. Democracia Real Ya! has opened a space for so many people who were frustrated with what we have – but what it means – it is still not clear.” (from an interview conducted by Sitrin in 2012 – Sitrin, 2014: 249).

The central demand of the movement – as in other countries of Europe – seems to end up “the crisis” and to prevent people paying for the consequences of the contemporary crisis of capitalism that they did not cause since the movement loomed out of firstly the economic crisis, later of the political crisis that Spain faced with, and lastly of a system crisis. However, when focusing on how to deal with this clear problem, the initial answer, and correspondingly demand covering other demands, becomes to create democracy and concomitantly to figure out what and how to get and make for the sake of reaching real democracy by speaking and deliberating within assembly-like organizations (Sitrin, 2014: 249-250).

It is also possible to observe that *los Indignados*, as other contemporary social movements in Tahrir Square, in Syntagma Square or in Zucotti Park, displayed how to actualize its demands on top of occasions of protests in practical

ways. The movement has become an important example putting the demands into practice in the occupied squares, notably in *Puerta del Sol*, such as transforming the squares into public spaces by setting up *acampadas*, developing solidarity networks for those socially injured, establishing horizontal decision-making mechanism through assemblies, and forming an alternative and totally unique living space. Namely, the movement operated by means of an assembly-based participatory democracy. They encompassed diverse citizens affected from the neoliberal policies, namely the austerity measures, with an understanding of radical inclusivity and equality. Thus and so, no fences or walls existed, which would overshadow the publicity and transparency in terms of participatory and deliberative democracy (della Porta, 2015b: 774; Stobart, 2015b). This circumstance demonstrates how enthusiastic *los Indignados* was about their desires and demands.

At the very point, *Podemos* organized to embrace and actualize the demands and claims, and to find out alternatives to the systemic crisis like economic, social and regime crisis of the movement by using the similar actions with the movement though it seems contradictory with the wishes of protesters. For instance, as for the demands *Podemos* claims, the quasi-election bulletin Manifesto of *Podemos* accentuating propagating democracy to a greater extent were prepared from the basic documents in which *los Indignados* voice and call for “real democracy” as noted above (Tas, 2015; the Socialist Network, 2014). The title of this founding manifesto of the party – *Mover ficha: convertir la indignación en cambio político* [Making a move: turning indignation into political change] – is the major indicator that it has attempted to turn the movement and its demands into a political project as well (Dolan, 2015). In this manifesto, the party proposed a candidacy depending on *the sovereignty of peoples and their right to decide their future freely and in solidarity* within the context of “real democracy”. Correspondingly, it intended to confront with the governments in the service of 1% minority, en route to the parliamentary elections of the European Union. It underscored the demand to get a greater generosity from representatives, to

provide a greater horizontality and transparency, to turn back to the republican values of public virtue and social justice, and to gain the recognition of plurinational and pluricultural reality. The party also expressed the desire of people to make their own decisions and come up with their own questions (the Socialist Network, 2014). Based on these statements, it can be deduced that *Podemos* has been translating the social and political demands of *los Indignados* into concrete platforms with its participatory democracy perspective. It is clear that there is a tension related with the discourses of *los Indignados* about being non-party and from neither right nor left. However, it is also obvious that *Podemos* places importance on the participatory democracy and its attempts on this issue can be seen explicitly.

Speaking of which, for both the participatory experience through assemblies in *los Indignados* movement and *Podemos*'s participative practices under the auspices of the conception of horizontality, it is normal to have been run across the general operational problems of participatory democracy. These problems can be expressed like that consensus decision making takes time – which can be thought as time-consuming endeavor; coordination problems occur when the participatory group increases in size under a decentralized administration and it creates funding problems (Polletta, 2013: 1396; Doerr, 2013: 200). These inefficiencies can drag the participatory groups to bureaucratize or collapse. Political pragmatists, who seek a centralized structure, prefer to be institutionalized while purists refuse to be institutionalized.

On the other hand, it is also argued that the vulnerability of this type of democracy causes a “tyranny of structurelessness” since participatory democracy does not present any mechanism to put accountability at leaders’ or agents’ feet, who would informally compose a clique to rule freely (Polletta, 2013: 1396-7). Hereby, it is possible to claim that as much as *Podemos* has approved itself with the assertion of establishing a participative formula (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 16), it has an organized structure like other political parties for the sake of taking

place in the mainstream politics and institutions trying to get to first base of elections, and has already casted a pall over desire and demand of *los Indignados* movement. Namely, the tension regarding the desire and actions of *Podemos* about participatory democracy and its functionality can be perceivable evidently. The fact that *Podemos* was centralized and hierarchically organized under a general secretary does not seem compatible with the decentralized and leaderless structure of *los Indignados* and subsequent movements (Külebi, 2015). Put it differently, it can be claimed that *Podemos* could not internalize and practice the demands and suggestions of the movement since the movement were refraining from the institutional formations of current political system and desire a hierarchically structural organization under a leader.

As Sevinç (2017) indicates, those in the squares have had their polity selection with the park forums and assemblies which are smaller units, citizens participate in administration or governance. They showed the way for how a participative democracy – in which everybody can live as what s/he understands from living decently – could be established peacefully (Sevinç, 2017). Accordingly, the participatory practice of *los Indignados* during both protests in 2011 and afterwards through the PAH and *Mareas*, created the dynamics of horizontality, transparency, and self-activity within the movement. *Podemos* embraced many of *los Indignados*' experiences and practices among these but after being organized, it has “hegemonized” the movement/s and the social and political spheres have been inverted (Tas, 2015). Thus, it can be said that *Podemos* could not achieve, or could achieve to some extent, to integrate such form of decision making into its own structure and understanding of politics. Correspondingly, it can be claimed that when these dynamics were deployed in an institutional political project, the struggle from below has been interrupted (Stobart, 2015b), and could not be adopted in a mainstream understanding of politics.

This endeavor of *Podemos* for demand transfer can be observed in the narratives of the party's members, officials and grassroots as well. In a meeting in Madrid, the party's grassroots were shouting slogans by referring to a participative democracy such as:

“We're going to throw out the political and economic mafia, the sleaze merchants, and we're going to reclaim Madrid for its people,”; “we're going to put an end to the austericide”; and “the old way of doing politics and we're going to create a participative democracy.” (Carlin, 2015).

And after, one of the party officials, Jesús Montero, laid stress on participative democracy and stated the plans of *Podemos* to provide everyone to have a direct participation on decisions and policy determination processes (Carlin, 2015). In the meantime, *Podemos* has an intra-party participative democracy practice and has already been using a participatory mechanism consisting of online debate forums as well as social media channels while deciding any policy, choosing officials for the internal party positions, or lobbying for social issues like public health, poverty, education etc. (Carlin, 2015; Tsavkko Garcia, 2015; Tas, 2015). While it is considered that the party provides a form of contemporary deliberative democracy through forming digital democracy, this participative democracy endeavor causes the party move away from traditional parties which are organizationally vertical, and steers it into a horizontal party structure (Hawes, 2015; Tas, 2015; Tsavkko Garcia, 2015). However, it is still controversial to what extent this intra-party democracy serves to the demands of *los Indignados* because it is clear that the real and participative democracy exclamation of the movement is and should not be limited within a particular institution or organization. In other respects, since the voters in the Citizens Assembly of the *Podemos* were not only the activists or members of the party and there were the sympathizers or supporters who spare time to register and vote and are not committed party grassroots, a lack of symmetry among them has been occurred. This situation creates a dilemma/tension for the party and its relation with the movement as well (Rendueles & Sola, 2015). Despite all, the endeavor of *Podemos* justifies the potential of the party to transform the existing political

atmosphere – even if total change requires a further attempt like revolution, and maybe is not regarded as primary objective – in spite of the systemic constraints of the liberal representative democracy.

4.2. The position of *Podemos* against the current political establishment and elites

The contemporary social movements are rejecting power over, hierarchy, and representational democracy – ideologically and by default – once more and new landscapes of autonomy and freedom are being opened by mass horizontal assemblies this time (Sitrin, 2014: 245). In a country-specific example, *los Indignados* spread throughout Spain in 2011 by rejecting the existing representational democracy. To put it differently, the anti-political character of *los Indignados* movement stemmed from its refusal of any type banners from political parties, unions, or organizations during the protests. Most of the protesters indeed were hostile, rather than indifferent, to any element of representative democracy and even those who were there for the traditional organizations' representation were summoned to leave the squares. It was obvious that most of them demanded more than representation (Flesher Fominaya, 2015: 144; Stobart, 2015b).

Three years later *Podemos* has been constituted from this street indignation and its local circles of discontented people with the aim of conveying this unrest into a political project, that is to say with the goal of turning the movement into a more structured political organization (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015; Cancela-Kieffer, 2015) although some 15-M activists who contradicts the rise of a new political party exist alongside others who supports a new party (Flesher Fominaya, 2014b). It is obvious that this political party would not have been possible without the climate of rejection and objection which the movement created against the existing corrupted system (Errejón, 2014). For this reason, *Podemos* took its form within an organic linkage among the street or park forums which *los Indignados* organized the denial of the fact that the existing politicians or political system did not represent them (Yıldız, 2015: 294). As a natural consequence, the fact that

Podemos “introduces” itself as a party derived from *los Indignados* movement has brought criticisms towards the institutionalization of the movement with it. On top of it, the most common criticism is that the strength of the movement would be absorbed by being trapped within the institutional identity of the political structure of the party; or the direct democracy discourse (as one of the demands of the movement) would be extinguished within the institutions of this political structure (Özdemir, 2017: 245). At this point, transferring demands of the movement into institutional politics through party politics of (neo)liberal era, which *los Indignados* has refused from the beginning, has become a matter among the rhetoric of a “second transition” in Spain against the blunt election-oriented representative system (Tormey, 2014: 110).

Having looked at the contemporary social movements in general with regard to being institutionalized and bureaucratized, Yıldırım (2013b: 153) states that the organizing experiences (especially placing importance on meaning rather than structure) become apparent in 2000s. Yıldırım (2013b: 153) attributes this finding to the fact that *los Indignados* movement defines itself as the grassroots mobilization of the anti-party and anti-violence citizens. He frames that the activists or participants of the movement stand aloof from the forms of politics formulated as vertical hierarchies and membership-based, that is, the desire is to stop the politics being the playground of specialized elites (Yıldırım, 2013b: 153).

In brief, *los Indignados* movement identifies and places itself in an anti-political, anti-establishment and anti-elite position, and *Podemos* is not different at all in this respect. These anti-establishment and populist manners or rather characters refer to some tensions in terms of the maneuver rooms in the liberal democratic system. While the protesters of *los Indignados* movement were keeping away from the existing political formations, they embraced and claimed democracy above the dichotomy of left and right as well. Thus, regarding the ideological position of *los Indignados*, Antentas (2015: 145) emphasizes that some components of the movement use the discourse of *ni de izquierdas ni de derechas*

(neither left nor right). He, however, claims that this is not about the aim of ending ideologies since there is a confusion on the meaning of the notion “left” due to the austerity measures applied during the PSOE government under Zapatero’s prime ministry (Antentas, 2015: 145). Rendueles and Sola (2015) also points out the image of left which is often associated with the old regime’s establishments like the PSOE, and trade unions. The same discourse of not being appertained to neither left nor right is valid for *Podemos* as well: “*We’re neither left wing nor right wing*”. The number two of the party, Iñigo Errejón, also highlights this argument in furtherance the Iglesias’s statements related to refrainment from the discourse of class politics, and usage of any left-wing references:

“Left and right are just metaphors, names, and are not eternal. We represent a common-sense approach contained in a transverse and popular identity, in opposition to the oligarchy.” (Carlin, 2015).

Iglesias has already declared that he does not aspire the party to be perceived as from the left or right, but rather as one which can actually win power (the Local, 2014). From this point of view, it is argued that *Podemos* has contributed to pave the way for invigorating democracy but not within the framework of traditional left-right discourse (Hawes, 2015). Hereby, the populist characters of the movement and the party reveal apparently once more.

On the other hand, the weak relation of *los Indignados* movement with the trade unions are assessed in terms of the anti-politics characteristic of the movement which Antentas (2016: 117) describes as anti-union dimension of it. The unions were also thought as a part of the institutionalized system of labor relations and consequently of the political system because the values of neoliberal world system have penetrated into them by eroding the classes and politicization of societies (Antentas, 2016: 117). Ultimately, the movement underlined the pluralistic democracy, and direct participation and consensus rather than de facto bipartisanship, and class antagonism based on the conventional/traditional axes of right and left (Rendueles & Sola, 2015). Eventually, *Podemos* takes a stand against the existing representative political system including the representative democracy

within trade unions (Tas, 2015). For this reason, it is possible to draw an analogy between the demands and claims of “real” democracy of both the movement and the party over institutionalized trade unions.

Along with the economic and regime crisis in Spain, the representative institutions have been judged with a considerable extent of stigmatization of corruption. They have been also presented as being unable to represent the citizens and labelled as the tool of kidnapping of democracy by both financial powers of national states and international organizations, first and foremost the IMF and the EU (della Porta, 2015a: 154). *Podemos*, on the other hand, has accused the representative democracy for kidnapping democracy (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 11). Therefore, liberal democracy is shown as not only eroded by the neoliberal order of the market, but also abused by the elites, caste, and executives of liberal representative democracy (della Porta, 2015a: 154). The demands or claims of both the movement and the party over the rejections of corrupt representative institutions overlap here either.

The relation between *Podemos* and *los Indignados* can also be looked from the criticisms about shift of the party’s radicalism and Monedero’s resignation from the party as well. As mentioned above, *Podemos* has toned down both in its way of doing politics and in its program although it acted in a more radical manner at the beginning. For instance, the ideas of a “basic universal income” for every citizen and of “citizens’ audit” for the public debt, which took place in the manifesto for the EP elections, are missed out in the party’s economic plan for the people (Toscano, 2015; Scarpetta, 2014; Hawes, 2015). It can be claimed that this change signifies that *Podemos* has started to getting more integrated into the liberal democratic system as a point that the tensions arising from its populist character bring out. Moreover, Monedero resigned on the grounds that the party has begun to substitute party politics and political marketing for the social indignation. He also warned against the jeopardy of becoming what or who the party is against, and losing the intercourse with the indignant circles (Toscano, 2015).

Despite all of the criticisms and rejections about today's liberal representative democracy, *Podemos* as being a political organism of the current order has embraced the movement – even if some spokesmen of the party have counter arguments like not being the party of the movement – with the plea of coming from the streets and the claim of adopting a horizontal ideology differently from other traditional parties (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015). Regarding the discussion about being party of *los Indignados* or any other movement, firstly the Political Secretary of *Podemos* Errejón (2016) advocates that “*We are not the party of 15M – mainly because any party that claimed to be the party of 15M would be a fraud.*” On the other hand, he had expressed, in his 2011 published study, the possibility of a new radical democratic project which can be formulated as a result of the crisis of representation and put forward the possibility/need of the expansion of the movement's base with “*a large dose of flexibility, ideological secularism, and political intelligence*” (Stobart, 2015b). This shift in discourse demonstrates that the priority of Errejón was to set up an institutional project over the Spanish indignation, and the party has not come from below or streets. Moreover, one of the party representatives among others, Eduardo Maura, indicated the need of separation between the party and the movement after a while, and this statement symbolizes that to what extent *Podemos* has been able to represent the prominent demands of *los Indignados* by making it be institutionalized:

“No party should be the party of social movements because institutional politics have a different pace. The pace is so different that you oblige movements to adapt to it. If you do this, you are going to kill them.” (Dolan, 2015).

Since *Podemos* takes the political elites and establishment on, or at least uses discourses and acts in this direction, it is criticized that *Podemos* has resembled to those it dissents even though it utters it is different from the others. Such kind of comments also shows the tension that it encounters within itself in terms of its political position.

What is more, it is asserted what *Podemos* wants is briefly to bring about a change in the political culture of both Spain and Europe, and to introduce transparency and participative democracy to all institutions (the Local, 2014) even as *los Indignados* movement among other contesting initiatives has objected to the basic components of the representative democracy which are the monopoly of power in the hands of 1% minority, the lack of transparency and the secrecy and concealment about what and how particular policies are conducted and processes/institutions work (Tormey, 2014: 110). It is obvious, as Krastev (2007: 63) claims, that “*the real clash is between elites that are becoming ever more suspicious of democracy and angry publics that are becoming ever more hostile to liberalism*”. And it is also clear that *Podemos* lays claims to this clash with the rhetoric of *el pueblo versus la casta* [the people versus the cast].

In sum, what these angry and resentful protesters demand is not to seek power for themselves; but to punish politicians, remind them of their duties and obligations, and make people impact on and close to the decision-making processes without overturning democracy. That is, their ways to voice their noise and resonance, and to engage directly on the streets and in the squares are already considered as the form of democracy and intrinsic to democracy (Tormey, 2014: 110-111). Thus, the question is how to challenge the representative democracy which is of, by and for politicians (Tormey, 2014: 111) by translating the rejections and objections about representation issue and the demands on more participatory polity into the already corrupted political system in Spain. At this point, it is significant not to regard *Podemos* as pragmatist and beneficiary of the path that *los Indignados* has opened, and to take the potential that *Podemos* has towards transforming this system in should not be ignored. Concisely, whether *Podemos* is or has become the party of *los Indignados* or not, what it brings about or want to do is to bring a breath of fresh air in the name of transforming and changing the corrupted system.

4.3. “Effectiveness” of *Podemos* during the election processes

Podemos, its linkage with *los Indignados*, and the challenges or tensions arising within the political system should also be tackled on the grounds of its electoral experiences because the party has been criticized in terms of its election “successes” since its foundation in 2014 – this is because, *Podemos* took to the stage of politics by making considerable influence. One of the mentioned criticisms is that *Podemos* has articulated the *los Indignados* movement to the existing representative system whose most important feature is to concentrate on the electoral processes (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015). In the meanwhile, the understanding of horizontality and its maintenance would be one of the supreme challenges of the party while it embarked to supply a parliamentary presence (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015). Here, it can be asserted to a certain extent that *Podemos* is no more different from the conventional parties with a general secretary and his team, for instance only two people prepared the economic programme of the party instead of an assembly, in spite of its usage of the terminology of *los Indignados* and endeavor of adapting the participatory logic of the movement to the party (Watson, 2015). This practice that only two people prepared the program demonstrates a tension and does not fit the claim of both a populist party and a populist movement which do not accept hierarchy and demand direct democracy. Moreover, this fact symbolizes that the *Podemos* chose to stay within the limits of liberal democracy as well. Consequently, *Podemos* failed to show the potential to realize the ideals of the movement and translate/integrate demands of people into its action through participatory/deliberative processes.

As it is known, one of the channels that the representative democracy operates is to aggregate votes. For this reason, the way of transferring demands of *los Indignados* into Spain’s current institutional politics by *Podemos* through the ballot box brings forth the crucial problematic with regard to the participative democracy on the one hand; and remaining within the system of liberal democracy on the other hand. As McAdam and Tarrow (2010: 533) point out, the conceptions

of social movements and elections have a reciprocal relationship so that social movements may affect the outcomes of elections and may provide changes in public policies. The results of Spain's municipal and general elections in May and November of 2011 respectively with the effect of *los Indignados* can be set as an example. At the same time, the election results may influence the motivations of peoples to challenge the undesirable outcomes or to adopt and further the desirable winning side (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010: 533). At some point, the social movements, turning or being transformed into political parties, may become challengers in elections in time ((Heaney, 2013: 226). In the Spanish case, which has evidential value on the organic linkage between *los Indignados* and *Podemos*, *Podemos* seems a challenger to the system with its dissident position. However, it can be asserted that *Podemos* could not shine neither to achieve to integrate and function on the basis of a new understanding of democracy as put forth by the movement; nor to carry the demands of the movement (regarding austerity measures, employment, etc.) into its own programme, which was bounded with the limits of liberal democracy and ballot box. Yet, it should be given it credit for the influence which it creates within both Spanish and European politics.

In other respects, to participate in the electoral processes as challengers under an organized party might lead the movements to be soften their positions. The reason is that they may be instrumentalized for the sake of numerical support that they would provide in order to win elections in liberal democratic societies in which majorities preferences are coin of the realm (Heaney, 2013: 227-8). In the Spanish case, it is apparent to a certain extent that *Podemos* is desirous of the votes of *los Indignados* while seeming to adopt the demands of the movement in its founding manifesto – in a way being able to be accepted normally. Namely, the endeavor is to transform the politically indignant majority into electorate majority subsequent to translate the demands into political arena corrupted by political and economic elites. This situation can also be observed in the so-called populist discourses of *Podemos* and its spokespersons who moderate their programme and harmonize their speeches to reach out to broader electorates. This point is signed

even in their first party manifesto relying on the rhetoric of candidacy for the EP elections which comprises the social, political and economic grievances of the protesters putting into words in the squares (Tsavkko Garcia, 2015; the Socialist Network, 2015). For example, Iglesias in the first public event of the party in Barcelona at the end of 2014 expressed by eliminating the left-right axis and moving towards the center that “*Power doesn’t fear the left, only the people*” – as the indicator of the *Podemos*’s populism (Hawes, 2015; Carlin, 2015; Rendueles & Sola, 2015). He means power, namely the political elites, can be overcome with the preferences of people altogether, and shows his desire for getting their votes. Or, the number two of the party Errejón, argued in the documentary prepared for the election campaign that if the party does not win the elections, an electoral program fit for nothing (Torres, 2016). The desire of winning elections of *Podemos* can be beheld from the statements of Errejón as following;

“If we win the elections, that’s when the party will really kick off. Then we’ll be playing in the Champions League...” (Carlin, 2015).

As a result, it is possible to encounter with the criticism that the radical democratic soul of *los Indignados* has been sacrificed for the sake of “electoral war machine” which Errejón praises to the skies (Toscano, 2015; Rendueles & Sola, 2015). This electoral crusade has absorbed the demands of *los Indignados*, and this can be seen in the election manifesto of the party, which is in the style of Ikea catalog, for the general elections in 2016 (Burgen, 2016). Nominately, *Podemos* seems to criticize humorously the existing policies of the country with the relations between financial powers; however, primarily the style of the manifesto demonstrates that it is standing within the forms of what it criticizes or opposes. In the second place, the content of the manifesto refers to the high taxes and public spending about health and education. It commits to keep unemployment rate down to 11%, decrease the redundant public spending, increase the taxes and get more from the high-income earners and corporations (Burgen, 2016). Even if these seem to be in line with the demands of *los Indignados*, this content is also the indicator that *Podemos* prefers or has to prefer to some extent to stay and

confines itself to maneuver within the boundaries of the current liberal system. In addition, the insistence of *Podemos* about the participation of people was the connection of it with the movement. However, now the political space, which has already been disseized by the establishment and market and both the movement and the party tried to recreate, seems to be sacrificed by the electoral wars during the election processes of the party (Rendueles & Sola, 2015). Under any circumstances, the endeavor of *Podemos* to cope with the political establishment and elites in Spain, to make a stride for the social, economic and political problems and grievances of people, and to transform the corrupted system of the country ought not to be underestimated. This is because, a war can sometimes be won by using the enemy's weapons – which are electorate and elections for this case, and it is not feasible to dogmatize the party as self-seeker, pragmatist and worthless.

In other respects, Alberto Garzón from IU also criticized Pablo Iglesias, accordingly *Podemos*, to be essentially eager to win the general elections in 2015, and underlined that if the elections are exclusively targeted and relied on, the peoples/citizens will become demobilized and this is enormously contradictory for the left ideology (Watson, 2015). The party is also adopting an understanding that the left ideology cannot be the solution for the 21st century's problems alone and the political goal of *Podemos* is to carry on together with the social movements (Tas, 2015). That is to say, the party would – at least, Iglesias declared it should – be articulated with civil society and social movements, by relying on the numerical strength or support of them in the elections (Toscano, 2015). It can be claimed that this circumstance demonstrates how it depends particularly on its association with *los Indignados* in an attempt to win elections. However, it can also be claimed that *Podemos* can provide a transformation and find remedies to injustices and social, economic and political problems through the channels that the general will of the Spanish people paved the way within the existing system. The party itself also foresees that the existing systemic crisis is able to be coped up with in a constitutive and public manner in preference to oligarchic one in their official documents (Podemos Assembly, 2014: 5, 10).

At the end, it can be put forth that energies of *los Indignados* protesters were consumed by the electoral activity due to the instilment of expectation to governmental change. It is also possible to claim that this desire and the party's appetite towards winning elections by using the movement have caused the movement to be disappeared. It is true that today, *los Indignados* movement is no longer what it once was after engaging with elections, which is bourgeois democracy's weapon, under the auspices of a political party. Namely, the protesters of the movement did not show the same desires with *Podemos* when their political preferences were asked, and many of those who have composed the grassroots of the mainstream political parties have kept voting for their parties. Yet, it is obvious that questioning the effectiveness of *Podemos* during the elections – local/municipal or general that it took place – over the lastingness of *los Indignados* movement and the electoral preferences of the protesters would mean to ignore the potential of *Podemos*. *Podemos* continues to transfer the demands of people more or less within the election processes and it maybe could not be as effective as the mainstream political parties, which commit stability and/or more comprehensive program for systemic change. However, such a transformation or transition in Spain or anywhere in the world is not that easy, and depends on various dynamics like territorial, national or global circumstances and on the social, political and socio-economic conditions within the state itself as well. Whatever happens, the preferences of Spanish people, whether they are activists/protesters of the social movements like *los Indignados* or not, during the elections would have been affected from those dynamics, and the fact that *Podemos* have persuaded those people to vote for itself is a success in any case.

In addition to the above-mentioned tensions, some overall comments on the relational positions of *Podemos* and *los Indignados* movement can also be made. For instance, during one of the internet discussion among the protesters, it was asked that “*are we simply reformists that want patches in our country to cover a system that is full of holes or do we really want a revolution, a real change to the system?*” (Hughes, 2011: 413). To this respect, it is convenient to question

how come a political party integrated into the lopsided political system, which protesters (*los Indignados*) remonstrated, and how it has become the “representative” of the protesters providing that those who went out on May 15, 2011 demanded a real change or transformation which would improve their life conditions. Of course, there were reformists among *los Indignados* who sought to change the electoral system of the country and provide more transparency in politics as well as the ones who were more radical and quested to have an anti-political and anti-systemic inclination (Hughes, 2011: 413). However, existence of the radicals within the movement is not enough to acknowledge that the movement and the party are on separate bases.

To summarize, on the one hand, for the protesters who were of the opinion that *los Indignados* movement had already finished, the emergent energy of the movement should be transferred into institutional politics for the sake of maintaining the effect. However, they also ambivalently put forth that the movement is not over but has evolved; the most horizontal party, *Podemos* embodies the spirit of the movement; and there is not any contradiction between the progressive political party and the strong social movements (Flesher Fominaya, 2014b). On the other hand, those advocating a radical and anti-system direction and positioning themselves against *Podemos* claimed that *los Indignados* movement was imagining a new form of direct/participative democracy and people from below should not have come under the influence of party politics; *Podemos* was/has been/is not different from any other political formations as a populist party and did/does not say anything new but only the new face of the old IU; and it depends on the politics of charismatic leadership. It seems that they may not be considered as wrong because using or interpreting the movement with political party jargon betrayed the spirit of the movement, which proposed an alternative to the representative system, and the party has mainly relied on the figure of Iglesias. What Iglesias and the *Podemos* team did, has been to turn the demands of street into a campaign wisely and precisely, and by the way develop their political expertise in practice (Flesher Fominaya, 2014b).

The fact that *Podemos* endeavors to come up with solutions and suggestions to the social and political problems, issues, demands and claims stemming from the system itself by using the systemic practices can be read as its heavy reliance on conventional bourgeois-liberal conceptualizations. The existing tensions here have caused many comments and criticisms come to light. Correspondingly, Yuval Noah Harari (2016: 267) claims that:

“As of 2016, there is no serious alternative to the liberal package of individualism, human rights, democracy and a free market. The social protests that swept the Western world in 2011 – such as Occupy Wall Street and the Spanish 15-M movement – have absolutely nothing against democracy, individualism and human rights, or even against the basic principles of free-market economics.”

This approach can be evaluated as the epiphany of the tensions. However, there is the fact that such a social movement, *los Indignados*, and a political party, *Podemos*, has both the claims and the concrete endeavors to change or transform the system in which Spain, Europe, the whole world and/or humanity be in general; and also it tries to find solutions to the systemic problems. For this reason, even the attempts of *los Indignados* and/or *Podemos* could not result in success totally, or the commitments could not be fully carried out within the framework of certain constraints of the dominant (neo)liberal system of the world does not legitimize the aforementioned types of criticisms in any case. Accordingly, as soon as a party tries to conduct its politics within the limits of the liberal representative system - even if it is structured with an understanding of participatory/deliberative democracy, giving it credit for its potential towards changing or transforming the system with its founding claims if it was in power should not be disregarded.

To conclude, Sitrin (2014: 256) among others argues that the contemporary and autonomous social movements clearly state that they neither desire to grab state power nor want to change the state itself; and in a similar vein, they do not demand changes coming from state apparatus. Depending on these arguments, it is possible to make out inferentially that the demand of change – specifically change in their democratic life – of *los Indignados* should have been put into

practice by its own and without being transferred into mainstream politics as the *Podemos* did through ballot box. Namely, it can be claimed that *Podemos* could not achieve to adapt the practices and policy-making, which *los Indignados* supposed, to the institutional politics due to the limits of liberal democracy. For the demands of change related with the democracy notion can be seized on Kitschelt's (1993:24) reference on dominant actors of three democratic decision modes as individual legislators (liberal democracy), mass parties (organized democracy³), and individual citizens and social movements (direct democracy).

In terms of this reference, if *Podemos* is a party constituted from a social movement, namely a party of *los Indignados*, and if it can be described as a mass party; then it means that when it seeks to transfer the direct democracy demand of individual citizens and social movements into a mass party – main body of organized democracy, the movement itself becomes obsolete. Krastev (2007: 59) notes that the ordinary citizens experienced transnational democracies as regimes are not able to change policies but rather to change governments as voters of the liberal system. Hence, transformation of *los Indignados* into voters has given rise to *Podemos* become a symbol of hope for the transformation of the system while becoming of divergence between the movement and its own because *Podemos* has a political attitude and as long as this attitude exists in politics, there is hope for the future (Özdemir, 2017: 254). Consequently, *Podemos* has triggered an unheralded political atmosphere, which has been introduced by *los Indignados* movement as a new stage for the Spanish politics, and inspired improbable effects in Spain, in spite of the whole tensions, contradictions and challenges within the party itself, among its relations with the realpolitik and with the movement.

³ Kitschelt (1993: 19) refers the liberal and organizational conceptions of democracy on the ground of the distinction between majoritarian and consensus mode of democratic decision-making.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

When people have a beef with something related to their life conditions, they create mobilization or group action. This action grows and turns into a social movement. What happened in the world after 2008, and particularly in Europe against the financial powers, demonstrates the reaction of discontent and annoyed people against economic crises, corruption allegations, policies regarding the education system or health services etc. as the social movement instances. There were many European examples which are cause celebre, but the subject of this thesis, the case of Spain, differs from its peers in terms of the relation between the Spanish movement and an anti-austerity political party established after the movement. The general view is that this relation is obvious since without the movement, the *Podemos* party would not show up. Actually, without the will of people against the austerity practices and their alternative, radical or reformist will of democracy, the course of events would not be happened as they did. Thus, without the economic problems and crisis, the will of *los Indignados* movement would not appear in Spain, and the will forming *Podemos* would not be a follow-up.

This thesis has tackled the relations between the mass movements, which means social movements and the political organizations as a critical subject over the example of Spain. The masses or grassroots are the foremost constituent for the political formations like parties in order to establish a political base, and creating or having a relational proximity is essential. For this reason, this thesis has focused on the relationship between *los Indignados* and *Podemos*, and the tensions/contradictions revealing due to this relation in Spain, accepted as a unique case in Europe. This thesis has also illuminated to what extent the *Podemos* party

could realize its goals within the limits of bourgeois democracy. The specificity of this case is the populist nature and practices of the movement and the party. Thus, the mentioned tensions have been observed over this populist character with its reflections on political stance and practical experiences of *Podemos*.

Regarding the sequence of the expressing of the case, in this thesis, the institutionalization/bureaucratization of *los Indignados* movement through the endeavor of transformation of its demands into mainstream politics by *Podemos* was examined. In order to understand both the movement and the party, firstly the social movements' literature was looked at. Secondly, the 2008 global economic crisis and the response of Spanish society to it were taken into account to be able to see the place of *los Indignados* movement within the social and political history of Spanish society. In the third place, the liberal democracy system in which the movement and the party emerged was mentioned in order to provide an insight for the analysis. Then, the movement and the party were approached in detail in the following chapter. The populist characters of the movement and the party within the framework of their anti-establishment stances and experiences and practices of participatory democracy were brought to light. Lastly, the tensions arising from the populist nature of both the movement and the party under main three subtitles covering the political positions of them, the practices of participatory democracy, and the electoral "success" of the will of this social and political indignation were examined.

The demand related with direct/participatory democracy was perceived as the contradictory point in terms of the relation between *los Indignados* and *Podemos*. The protesters of the movement proposed different democracy visions and they even practiced them during their mobilization practices. They practiced participatory democracy through a transparent commune-like experience and they transformed the squares that they had occupied into public spheres. They experienced a more direct democracy in their meetings and assemblies which were open to discussion and deliberation. They tried to reach a collective solidarity and

provide common goods for everyone. Soon enough, this alternative democracy vision was adopted by *Podemos* while it was organizing its structure. However, the contradiction here appears that when the movement started out, it regarded the existing democracy and representation as problematic, and reacted with the slogans of “*¡No nos representan!*” [They Don’t Represent Us!], and “*¡Lo llaman democracia y no le es!*” [“They call it democracy, and it isn’t!”] from the squares of Spain. Also, the movement had desire to create its own alternative politics. Thus, the initiatives of *Podemos* to embrace the demands, notably regarding the real democracy, and translate them into the institutional politics generated a paradox about the will of *los Indignados* movement. In any case, the social movement of *los Indignados* built the circumstances on the road of *Podemos*’s presence by changing the perceptions about the democracy and creating the collective claims and demands related the daily individual social, political, and economic needs and wishes. The protesters have reproduced/regenerated the commons and thereby the social power, and *Podemos*’s stance or its ability to stand within the Spanish politics effectively is eminently contingent on this social power consolidated by the movement.

In conclusion, when the position of *Podemos* is considered within the current mainstream politics even though it has a dissident stance, it can be seen that it has been integrated/articulated into the power politics of the era. Namely, even if a new understanding for a participatory democracy model thanks to new technology looks like to be adopted at the beginning, *Podemos* has been obliged to prefer staying within the limits of liberal democracy and could not achieve functioning a different and new vision of democracy properly. Nevertheless, there is an open door cracked by *los Indignados*, and *Podemos* has gone through this door and bends over backwards to sustain the struggle. Herewith, the attitude of *Podemos* within the Spanish politics as well as the European politics carries the potential of hope for future struggles.

For further research, the problems, contradictions or tensions coming out of transformation of social movements into political formations – as were in the example of *los Indignados* and its transformation into the political party, *Podemos* – and the ones stemming from acting within the boundaries of institutional political structure can be handled and the ways to overcome these problems can be looked for. “What are the lessons and new problematics taken from the case of Spain” can be the key question for such a study. A comparative study can also be conducted with other various examples because the relational issue of social movements and political formations/organizations is still a crucial matter in different societies, particularly under the crisis conditions.

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APPENDICES

A.TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Tarihte olduğu gibi 21. yüzyılda da insanların hayatlarında bir şeylerin yanlış gittiğini ve değişmesi/değiştirilmesi gerektiğini göstermek için başkaldırıp seslerini yükselttiği zamanlar olmaktadır (Stiglitz, 2012). Günümüzde de 20. yüzyılın sonunda (1999'da) popülerleşen Küresel Adalet Hareketinden kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı hareketlere ya da Arap Baharı'ndan İşgal Et Hareketlerine bölgeden bölgeye yayılan tüm dünyada toplumsal hareketler örneklerinin sayısında bir artışa şahit olunmaktadır. Bu dünyayı sarsan toplumsal hareketlerin dışında bölgesel ya da ülkesel ölçekte de sayısız hareket sesini duyurmaktadır. Med-cezir şeklinde cereyan eden bu hareketler akademik olarak çokça kez incelenip tartışılmaktadır. Söz konusu hareketler, Avrupa'da 2008 küresel ekonomik krizinin ardından daha belirgin hale gelmişlerdir.

Daha açık ifade etmek gerekirse, dünyayı ve Avrupa'yı sert bir şekilde sarsan 2008 küresel ekonomik krizinin ardından dünya siyasetinde yeni bir siyasi süreç başlamış bulunmaktadır. Bu kriz, 1929 Büyük Buhran'ından beri kapitalizm tarihinde rastlanılan en önemli kriz olarak değerlendirilmektedir (Akçay & Güngen, 2016). Bu krizle birlikte kapitalizm tarihinde uzun bir aradan sonra, özellikle 2010'lu yıllarda küresel bir ayaklanma dalgasına şahit olunmuştur. Pek çok devlette ve toplumda insanlar eş zamanlı olarak krizden etkilenmiş ve gerek ulusal hükümetlerinin gerekse de Avrupa Birliği'nin kriz yönetimi politikalarına çok net bir şekilde maruz kalmışlardır. Dolayısıyla, çağımızın baskın neoliberal politikalarına direnmenin, çareler bulmanın ve alternatifler yaratmanın yollarını aramışlardır. Batı dünyasında özellikle de Güney Avrupa'da yeni hareketlilik/eylemlilik biçimleri ortaya çıkmış ve toplumsal örgütler, vatandaş platformları ve siyasi partiler gibi formlarda yeni siyasi güçler doğmuş, dünya

çapında yankı bulmuşlardır. Popülist ya da radikal, muhafazakâr ya da otonom, otoriter ya da liberter, demokratik sosyalist ya da nasyonal demokrat fark etmeksizin hem sağ hem de sol siyasi oluşumlar Güney Avrupa başta olmak üzere Avrupa siyasetine damgasını vurmuştur ve 2008 ekonomik krizi sonrasında transatlantik ülkelerde de etkili olmuştur.

İzlanda'daki Tencere Tava Devrimi (2009), Yunanistan'daki Öfkeli Vatandaşlar Hareketi (2010), Portekiz'deki *Geração à Rasca* [Çaresiz Kuşak] (2011), ve İspanya'daki *los Indignados* (15M¹) [Öfkeliler] hareketi (2011) Avrupa'da yaşanan çok taraflı ve çok düzeyli mücadelelerin veya ayaklanmaların bazı örnekleridir. Yunanistan örneği, sosyalist bir çizgiye sahip ve mevcut sisteme muhalif olmasına rağmen “sürpriz” bir şekilde iktidara gelen kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı parti, Syriza'nın yükselişi ile birlikte son zamanlarda Avrupa'ya yeni bir soluk getiren solun ve sol söylemlerin en belirgin örneği haline gelmiştir (Torreblanca, 2015a; Torreblanca, 2015b; Toscano, 2015). Syriza'nın, Avrupa Komisyonu, Avrupa Merkez Bankası ve Uluslararası Para Fonu'ndan oluşan Troyka ile Avrupa Birliği'nin tasarruf önlemleri ile başa çıkması ve Yunanistan'ı kendi ayakları üzerinde tutma çabası son zamanlarda akademik ve akademik olmayan çalışmalarda ana konular haline gelmiştir. Öte yandan, söz konusu hareketlerden İspanya'da 2011 yılında ortaya çıkan *los Indignados* hareketi, ülkede yapılan yerel ve bölgesel seçimlerin hemen öncesinde sözcüleri arifesinde ortaya çıkmış tarih sahnesinde yerini almıştır. Troyka'nın kontrolü altında İspanya'ya ağır neoliberal uygulamalar öneren tasarruf önlemlerine karşı İspanyol direnişi; (evlerden) tahliyeler, işsizlik oranları, yolsuzluk, güvencesiz çalışma koşulları, iki partili sistem ve genel olarak sıradan halkın yaşam kalitesi ve şartları gibi konulara odaklanan sorun odaklı çeşitli hareketlere sebep olmuştur. *Los Indignados* (Öfkeliler) hareketi adını alan bu direniş, Avrupa'da ilk defa 2008 küresel finansal krizi çerçevesinde ortaya çıkan ve kendine özgü pratikleri olan bir

¹ *Los Indignados* ya da 15M hareketi 2011'de İspanya'daki yerel ve bölgesel seçimlerin arifesinde ortaya çıkmıştır ve İspanyolca 15 Mayıs anlamına gelen *15 Mayo*'nun kısaltmasına işaret etmektedir.

tepki hareketi olmuştur. Bu özelliğiyle İspanya’da da Avrupa’da da karşısında savaştığı ve uğruna mücadele ettiği değerler bakımından geniş yankı bulmuştur. Söz konusu bu öfke, bir şekilde Avrupalı çağdaşlarından farklı olarak İspanya’da yeni bir siyasi partinin, *Podemos*’un, oluşumunu körüklemiştir. Bu partinin varlığı ise hareket ile bütünleştiği ölçüde farklılık yaratmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, İspanya’nın bu yeni siyasi oluşumunun Mayıs 2011’de ortaya çıkan toplumsal hareketinden (*los Indignados*) doğduğu ileri sürülmüştür ve 2014 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçim sonuçları ile adından söz ettirmiştir. 1,2 milyondan fazla seçmeni mobilize ederek toplam oyların %7,9’unu alarak Avrupa Parlamentosu’nda beş koltuğun sahibi olmuştur. Ayrıca, 15M hareketinin mirasıyla ilgili söylemler kullandığı ve siyasi atmosferi çekirdeğinden sarstığı da ileri sürülmüştür (Yıldırım, 2015; Antentas, 2016; Nagel, 2014; Torreblanca, 2015a; Flesher Fominaya, 2014; The Guardian, 2015; Errejón, 2014; Podemos Assembly, 2014). Sonuç olarak, İspanya genel seçimlerine güdülen yolda *Podemos*’un bu sürpriz yükselişi değişim umutlarını güçlendirmiş ve partinin kamuoyu yoklamalarında kayda değer bir oran elde etmesine yol açmıştır (Torreblanca, 2015a). Ayrıca, *Podemos* ile ilgili partinin radikal bir sol partiden ziyade popülist bir parti olarak tanımlandığı ya da genel anlamda ekonomi programı açısından Syriza ile ortak yönlerinin bulunduğu gibi birçok tartışma bulunmaktadır (Cop, 2013). Bu tartışmaların arasında, partinin tasarruf politikalarına yönelik konumu ile Mayıs ve Aralık 2015 İspanya yerel ve genel seçimlerinde elde ettiği ileri sürülen başarısı *Podemos*’u bu çalışmanın araştırma nesnesi haline getirmiştir.

Kısaca ifade etmek gerekirse insanlar, yaşam koşullarıyla ilişkili olarak herhangi bir şeyden memnun olmadıklarında ve değiştirilmesi gerektiğini düşündüklerinde hareketler ya da grup eylemleri yaratırlar. Bu eylemler zamanla büyür ve toplumsal bir harekete dönüşür. 2008’den sonra da finansal güçlere karşı dünyada ve bilhassa Avrupa’da yaşananlar, toplumsal hareketler örnekleri olarak buldukları/yaşadıkları ortamdan memnun olmayan, huzursuz ve kızgın insanların tepkilerini gözler önüne sermektedir. Avrupa’da 2010’larda büyük yankı uyandırmış birçok örnek bulunmaktadır ama bu çalışmanın konusu,

İspanyol hareketi ile hareketin ardından kurulan kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı siyasi parti arasındaki organik ilişki bakımından çağdaşlarından ayrılan İspanya örneğidir. İspanya örneği ile ilgili genel düşünce, *los Indignados* hareketi olmadan *Podemos*'un da ortaya çıkamayacak olmasından ötürü aralarındaki bu ilişkinin aşikâr olduğudur. Aslında tasarruf önlemlerine karşı ortaya koyulan idare ve insanların alternatif ya da reformist demokrasi iradeleri olmadan olayların gelişimi de bu şekilde olmayacaktı, İspanya'da. Bu nedenle, ekonomik problemler ve kriz olmadan *los Indignados* hareketinin iradesi İspanya'da zuhur etmeyecek ve devamında *Podemos*'u kuran irade doğmayacaktı.

Bu çalışma, *Podemos* partisinin kendisine koyduğu hedefleri ne ölçüde gerçekleştirip gerçekleştirmediğini aydınlatmaktadır çünkü esas mesele, toplumsal hareketlere dayanan siyasi partilerin bir farklılık arz ettiğidir ve bu partilerin mevcut liberal demokrasi olarak tanımlanan kurumsal yapı içerisinde çeşitli çelişkilerle karşılaştığı da kaçınılmaz bir gerçektir. Ancak, burada iddia bu çelişkili durumun değişip dönüşebileceğidir ve mevcut sistemin sınırlılıkları aşılabilir niteliktedir. Bu yüzden, İspanya örneği ilginç bir deneyimdir ve bu çalışma, bu ilginç deneyimi bugüne kadar yazılıp çizilenler üzerinden değerlendirmektedir. İspanya örneği için özgül özelliklere sahip *los Indignados* hareketi ile karşı karşıyayız ve çalışmanın amacı da bu özgül durum içerisinde olayların akışını gözlemleyebilmektir. Ayrıca, bu hareketin özgüllüğünün popülist niteliğinin altında yattığının da altı çizilmelidir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma yalnızca ana akım siyasete giren bir toplumsal harekete değil aynı zamanda popülist bir harekete de odaklanmaktadır. Diğer yandan, çalışmanın odağı olarak *Podemos*'un siyaseti tanımlama ve kendisini bu siyaset içinde yerleştirme şekli de yani *Podemos*'un siyasi pozisyonu da son derece önemlidir. Zira hareketin *Podemos*'a da yansıyan popülist karakteri, İzlanda hariç olmak üzere ve Yunanistan dışında (çünkü Syriza örneği herhangi bir toplumsal hareketten ileri gelmemiştir) bugüne kadar başka hiçbir ülkede gözlemlenemeyecek belirli gerilimler yaratmakta ya da mevcut gerilimlerin ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmaktadır. Nitekim İspanya örneği diğerlerinin içinde en önemli örnektir ve bu çalışma da de *los Indignados* hareketi

ile *Podemos* partisi arasında cereyan eden organik ilişkiden kaynaklı gerilimlere bakmaktadır.

Bir kez daha vurgulamak gerekirse bu çalışma, toplumsal hareketler anlamına gelen kitle hareketleri ile siyasi örgütler arasındaki ilişkiyi İspanya örneği üzerinden eleştirel bir konu olarak ele almaktadır. Kitleler ya da tabanlar, partiler gibi siyasi oluşumlar için siyasi bir taban oluşturmak adına en önemli bileşenlerdir ve bu kitlelerle ilişkisel bir yakınlık kurmak da son derece önemlidir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma İspanya'daki *los Indignados* ve *Podemos* arasındaki ilişkiye ve Avrupa'da benzersiz bir örnek olarak kabul edilen bu ilişki yüzünden ortaya çıkan gerilimlere/çelişiklere odaklanmaktadır.

Daha iyi ifadeyle, bu çalışmada toplumsal tepkiler ile siyasi yapı arasında ilişki İspanya örneği bağlamında aktarılmaktadır. Bu ilişki, çağdaşlarından farklı olarak İspanya'nın *los Indignados* hareketinin ve *Podemos* partisinin benzersizliğine dayanarak hareketin toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasi taleplerinin aktarılması aracılığıyla bir hareketin bir siyasi parti tarafından kurumsallaştırılması süreci doğrultusunda sorgulanmaktadır. Örneğin bu hareket, hepsi ülkelere özgü finansal krizlere ve tasarruf önlemlerine karşı ortaya çıkmış gibi görünse de diğer Avrupalı hareketlerden farklıdır. Bu durumun sebebi, İspanya'daki hareket ile vücut bulan değişen siyasi atmosferin bir şekilde siyasi bir rejim krizine dönüşmesi ve İspanyol insanının mücadelesinin *Podemos*'un oluşumunu körüklemesidir. Fakat diğer örneklerde siyasetin gidişatı İspanya'dan farklı seyretmiştir. Portekiz'de ve Yunanistan'da İspanya'da olduğu gibi yeni bir siyasi partinin kurulmasını tetikleyen herhangi bir siyasi irade/arzu olmamıştır ancak mevcut olan iradelerin desteklenmesi ve sürdürülmesi söz konusu olmuştur. Bununla beraber, İzlanda'da 2009 Tencere Tava Devrimi'nin kıvılcımı ile Vatandaş Hareketi kurulmuştur ancak kısa ömürlü olmuş ve 2012 yılında feshedilmiştir, kısacası *Podemos* gibi bir sürekliliğe sahip olamamıştır. Ayrıca İzlanda'da, Portekiz'de ve Yunanistan'da hareketler mevcut hükümetlerin istifasına sebep olmuşlardır. Fakat İspanya'daki hükümet değişimi, hareketin

patlak vermesinden altı ay sonra Kasım 2011’de yapılan erken genel seçimlerle mümkün olabilmiştir. Yani, hareket mevcut hükümetin istifasını sağlayamamış yalnızca erken seçimlere gidilmesini zorlayabilmiştir.

Podemos’un benzersizliği açısından ise, bu partinin Avrupa’nın Avrupa şüpheci, popülist, kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı partileri olarak tanımlanan siyasi partileri ile benzer bir zeminde değerlendirilmesi ele alınabilir. Parti, Yunanistan’ın Syriza’sı, Birleşik Krallık’ın UKIP’i (Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi), İtalya’nın Beş Yıldız Hareketi ve Fransa’nın Ulusal Cephe’si örnekleri ile karşılaştırılmaktadır (Torreblanca, 2015a; Sitrin, 2014). Ancak, *Podemos* bu örneklerden farklıdır çünkü Syriza, UKIP ve Ulusal Cephe köklü partilerdir ve *Podemos* örneğinde olduğu gibi herhangi bir toplumsal kalkışmanın ardından kurulan partiler değildir. İtalyan ve İspanyol örneklerinin farklılaştığı nokta ise ortaya çıkış yolları ve tarzları üzerinden kurulmaktadır. İtalya’nın kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı hareketine yerleşik/kurulu siyasi aktörler egemen olmuşlardır; bir başka deyişle hareket üzerinde nüfuzlarını kullanabilmişlerdir. Bu nedenle, 2009 yılından kurulan Beş Yıldız Hareketi İtalya’daki kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı hareket ile herhangi bir organik ilişkiye sahip değildir. Bu parti, kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı anlayışla paralel olarak düzen karşıtı bir bakış açısına sahip olmasına rağmen kendisini doğrudan popülist olarak tanımlamaktadır – hatta parti yerine hareket nitelendirmesinde bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca partiye sağcı bir konum da atfedilmektedir. Diğer taraftan, İspanya’nın kemer sıkma politikaları karşıtı hareketi *los Indignados*’un ardından kurulan *Podemos* söz konusu hareket ile organik bir bağa sahiptir. Popülist olmakla eleştirilmesine rağmen kendisini hiçbir zaman doğrudan popülist olarak tanımlamamaktadır ve hatta önemli ve belirgin popülist özelliklere sahip olsa bile İtalya örneğinden farklı olarak temelde sol görüş eğilimine sahiptir.

İspanya örneğinin, hem siyaset bilimi hem de toplumsal hareketler literatüründe görece yeni bir konu olsa da akademik olarak çokça kez incelenip çalışılmış olduğunu ve farklı perspektiflerden incelenmeye ve çalışılmaya devam

ettiğini belirtmek gerekmektedir. Örnek vermek gerekirse, İspanyol hareketi *los Indignados*, bilişim ve iletişim teknolojilerindeki (BİT) yeni teknolojilerin gelişmesi ile birlikte sosyal medya gibi çevrimiçi kanallar aracılığıyla örgütlenme tarzı bakımından çalışılmaktadır. Hareketin, Wall Street’i İşgal Et², Arap Baharı vb. diğer çağdaş hareketlerle etkileşimleri, uluslar ötesi ağlar çerçevesinde başka bir çalışma odağı olmuştur. Hareket, 2008 küresel ekonomik krizinden ardından gelen ekonomik sıkıntılardan kaynaklanan toplumsal ve politik reddiyelerin ve taleplerin yanı sıra oturma eylemleri, protesto kampları gibi eylem pratikleri nedeniyle de ele alınmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, *Podemos* partisi ideolojik konumu, İspanya ve Avrupa’daki mevcut siyaset meselelerine –örneğin, tasarruf önlemleri, güvencesiz çalışma koşulları, işsizlik, konut krizi vs. – yönelik tutumları ve politika önerileri nedeniyle değerlendirilip eleştirilmesinin yanında dijital örgütsel tarzı bakımdan da değerlendirilmektedir (Stiglitz, 2012; Peterson et. al., 2015; Bellver, 2012; Antentas, 2015). İlaveten, bu parti literatürde seçim pratiklerinin göbeğinde sözde “başarısı” ve İspanya’nın siyasi yaşamına etkisi ile de ciddi ölçüde incelenmektedir.

Bu noktada, bu çalışmanın *los Indignados* hareketinin taleplerinin kurumsallaştırılmasına/bürokratikleştirilmesine ve bu kurumsallaşmaya bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan gerilimlere odaklandığı belirtilmelidir. Çalışmanın ana başlığı da toplumsal ve siyasi taleplerin dönüşümü odağını açık bir şekilde işaret etmektedir. 2011 yılında bir dizi *los Indignados* protestocusu/aktivisti tarafından dışa vurulan bu talepler doğal olarak ülkenin sosyopolitik, siyasi ve ekonomik hayatına ilişkin talepler olmuşlardır. Bu çalışmanın özü, sokağın taleplerinin bir siyasi partinin, *Podemos*’un, taleplerine yönelik olarak yeniden markalaştırılmasına/etiketlenmesine ve bu kanalla taleplerin kurumsal siyasette yer alacak şekilde transfer edilmesine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Hareketin taleplerinin merkezinde ise, gerçek demokrasi hususunda bir vurgu bulunmaktadır (Stobart, 2014; Calvo, 2012; Antentas, 2015; Charnock et. al., 2012). Şöyle ki bu talepler,

² ABD’deki Wall Street’i İşgal Et Hareketi, evrensel İşgal Et eylemleri dalgasının başladığı yerdir ve 2008 küresel ekonomik krizine yönelik görece geç kalınmış bir tepkidir.

protestocuların mevcut siyasetçiler tarafından temsil edilmediği ve sahip oldukları temsil sisteminin gerçek demokrasi olmadığı mesajları ile dolu olan pankartlarda yansıtılmaktaydı. Siyasetçiler, protestocular tarafından bankaların ve finansal sistemin işbirlikçisi olarak düşünülüyor ve mevcut sistem yozlaşmış olarak değerlendiriliyordu. Daha da önemlisi, *los Indignados* hareketi, hareketin herhangi bir siyasi parti ya da sendika tarafından temsil edilmesini – yani siyasi kurumların hareketi sahiplenmesini – reddetmekteydi. Bu nedenle, hareketin en önemli talebi doğrudan temsil yani doğrudan/katılımcı demokrasi talebi olarak algılanmaktadır. Hareket ve parti arasındaki ilişki açısından ise hareketten partiye bir geçiş veya dönüşüm girişimi bulunmaktadır. Ancak bu geçiş İspanya gibi dünyanın hiçbir yerinde o kadar kolay değildir. Dönüşüm sürecini şekillendiren bölgesel, ulusal ya da küresel koşullara bağlı çok çeşitli dinamikler bulunmaktadır ve bunlar birbiri ile aynı veya benzer olmak durumunda değildir. Dolayısıyla, İspanya örneği bu çalışmada sahip olduğu potansiyel ile de ele alınmaktadır.

Bu noktada, siyasi parti *Podemos*, *los Indignados* hareketinden bağımsız düşünülemez olduğundan ve çalışılmayacağından ve hareket de toplumsal hareketler literatürü içerisinde daha iyi anlaşılabilir olduğundan toplumsal hareketler literatürüne kısa bir yer vermek önemli görülmektedir. Bunun sebebi, *Podemos*'un *los Indignados*'un temel dokümanlarından ödünç alınan/adapte edilen bir manifesto ile kurulmuş olması ve bu manifestonun harekete ağırlıklı bir vurgusunun ve referansının bulunmasıdır (Tas, 2015; the Socialist Network, 2014). Dahası, bu çalışmada toplumsal hareketlere yönelik olarak ortaya çıktıkları zamana ve mekâna göre yapılan bir tür sınıflandırmayı öngören bir yaklaşım benimsenmektedir.

Bu münasebetle, hareketi anlayabilmek ve yorumlayabilmek için, hareketin tetikleyici unsuru olarak düşünüldüğünden 2008 küresel ekonomik krizine ve İspanya üzerindeki yansımalarına genel hatlarıyla değinmek de önemli görülmektedir. Bir başka ifadeyle, krizin sayısız devlet ve toplum üzerindeki etkisi ve bölgesel ile uluslar üstü güçlerin, örneğin AB, UPF (IMF) ya da Troyka'nın,

yönlendirmeleri ile birlikte bu devletlerin kendi kriz yönetim tarzları, Avrupa ülkelerinden ABD'deki Wall Street'i İşgal Et Hareketine kadar batı dünyasında yaşanan protesto dalgalarının altında yatan nedenlerden biri haline gelmiştir (Antentas, 2015; Yıldırım, 2013; Juris & Razsa, 2012; Gautney, 2013). Bu yüzden, İspanya'nın, *los Indignados* hareketinin vuku bulmasına dayanan kendi ekonomik ve siyasi yapısı içerisinde krizi nasıl okuduğunu ya da yorumladığını göstermek de uygun düşmektedir. Ayrıca, *los Indignados* hareketinin taleplerinin siyasi bir parti, *Podemos*, aracılığıyla ana akım siyasete aktarılırken demokrasi algıları üzerinden nereye taşındığını açıklamak ve analiz etmek için de demokrasi – esasen liberal demokrasi – kavramı konusunda ve demokrasinin hareketler-partiler ilişkisi üzerinden ana akım siyasetle arasındaki ilişkisi üzerine bir çerçeve çizmek de kayda değerdir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada liberal demokrasi kavramına, demokrasi krizine ve toplumsal hareketlerle demokrasi arasındaki bağa yer verilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, hem hareketi hem de partiyi anlamak üzere ilk olarak derli toplu bir toplumsal hareketler literatürü taraması içeren bu çalışma Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler kategorizasyonunu eleştirel olarak kavramaktadır. Çalışmada, “eski” ve “yeni” toplumsal hareketler sınıflandırmasının önemsiz olduğu ve hareketlerin eylem halinde buldukları zaman-mekânsal bağlamda ele alınması gerektiği düşünülmektedir (Çetinkaya, 2015). Ayrıca, toplumsal hareketleri sahip oldukları birikimsel değişime dayanarak içinde buldukları yüzyıla göre dalgalara ayıran bir yaklaşım benimsenmektedir (Atvur, 2014). Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın odağı İspanya'nın *los Indignados* hareketine işaret etmek üzere üçüncü dalga toplumsal hareketlere yönelmektedir. Ekonominin ve siyasetin birbirinden ayrılmazlığı bilimsel anlayışı çerçevesinde İspanya örneği 2008 küresel krizi ve İspanya'ya yansımaları, daha doğrusu İspanya toplumunun krize yönelik tepkisi/cevabı, bağlamında ele alınmaktadır çünkü toplumsal huzursuzluk ve siyasi güvensizlik şeklindeki yansıması iktidar güçlerinin dolaylı ya da doğrudan ellerini sıradan insanların cebine sokması ile ortaya çıkmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, toplumsal öfkenin ekonomik krizi siyasi bir krize dönüştüren

itici bir güç haline gelebileceği ileri sürülmektedir. Toplumsal hareketlerdeki demokrasi meselesi/algısı da *los Indignados* hareketinin demokrasiye ilişkin talepleri ile birlikte ele alınmaktadır çünkü liberal demokrasi ve bu liberal demokrasinin krizi de huzursuzluklarını dile getirmek için ortaya çıkan hareketlere içkindir. Söz konusu hareketler, temsili demokrasi olarak yansıma bulan liberal demokrasiye inancını yitirmiştir ve alternatif siyasetler üretmeye çalışmaktadır.

Çalışma; nedenleri, mekanizmaları, bileşenleri, eylem şekilleri, reddiyeleri, talepleri ve önde gelen aktörleri ve örgütleyicileri ile birlikte *los Indignados* hareketinin ortaya çıkmasına yol açan protestolar hakkında detaylı bilgi vermektedir. *Los Indignados* öncesi ve sonrası süreçleri hareketin popülist doğası ile açıklamaktadır. Ayrıca, görece yeni kurulmuş siyasi parti *Podemos* ve onun popülist karakterine de detaylı bir şekilde yer vermektedir. Partinin kuruluş dinamiklerine, kurulduğu zamana ve düzene referansta bulunmaktadır. *Podemos* partisinin *los Indignados* hareketi ile karşılıklı ilişkisi, partinin demokrasiye ilişkin istekleri, talepleri doğrultusundaki pratikleri, seçkinlere karşı sıradan halk anlayışına dayanan popülist siyasi konumu ve katılımcı demokrasi pratikleri ile seçim deneyimleri de sandığa ve seçimlere dayanan temsili demokrasi sistemi içerisinde karşılaşılan gerilimler üzerine bir analiz yapabilmek adına ele alınmaktadır. Ezcümle, hareketin ve partinin popülist nitelikleri düzen karşıtı tavırları ve alternatif katılımcı demokrasi deneyimleri ve pratikleri çerçevesinde ortaya çıkarılmaktadır.

Ortaya çıkan bu gerilimler, İspanya siyasetinde politik bir aktör olarak *Podemos*'un hem parti içerisinde hem de kendi tabanı ile arasında karşılaştığı gerilimlerdir çünkü *Podemos*'un popülist niteliğe haiz olduğu iddiası partinin siyaseti ve kendisini bu siyaset içinde nasıl tanımlandığından kaynaklanmaktadır. Partinin bu karakteri de partinin 2014'te kuruluşundan beri önemli gerilim noktalarının ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmaktadır. *Podemos*'un İspanya siyasetinde karşı karşıya kaldığı zorluklar ve sorunlar, bu gerilim alanlarını yaratmaktadır. Bu gerilimler temelde *los Indignados* hareketinin sosyal ve siyasi taleplerinin

Podemos'un kurumsallaştırma girişimleri aracılığıyla dönüştürülmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla gerilimler, *los Indignados* hareketinin ve *Podemos*'un katılımcı demokrasi arzusu ve pratikleri, *Podemos*'un parti içi dengesi ve dinamikleri, yine *Podemos*'un düzen ve seçkinler karşıtı anlayışı bağlamında partinin siyasi konumu/duruşu ve bu sosyal ve siyasal iradenin seçim "başarısı" iddiası ve bu başarının seçim süreçleri sırasındaki etkililiği başlıkları altında incelenmektedir.

Doğrudan/katılımcı demokrasiye ilişkin talep *los Indignados* ve *Podemos* arasındaki ilişki bakımından çelişkili olarak algılanmaktadır. Hareketin protestocuları farklı demokrasi vizyonları önermiş ve hatta kendi eylem pratikleri boyunca bunları uygulamışlardır. Katılımcı demokrasiyi, komün benzeri saydam bir deneyim aracılığıyla sokaklarda, meydanlarda, parklarda uygulamış ve bu işgal ettikleri meydanları "yeniden" kamusal alanlara dönüştürmüşlerdir. Tartışmaya ve müzakereye açık toplantılarında ve meclislerinde daha doğrudan bir demokrasi deneyimlemişlerdir. Kolektif bir dayanışmaya ulaşmaya çalışmış ve herkes için kamu menfaati gözetmişlerdir. Çok geçmeden bu alternatif demokrasi vizyonu, örgütlenmesi esnasında *Podemos* tarafından benimsenmiştir (Navarro, 2015). Ancak, burada bir çelişki/gerilim ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hareketin filizlendiği dönemde mevcut demokrasi ve temsil bir sorunsal olarak değerlendirilmekteydi ve "*Bizi Temsil Etmiyorlar!*", "*Adına Demokrasi Diyorlar Ama Bu Demokrasi Değil!*" gibi sloganlarla İspanya meydanlarından toplumsal bir tepki yükselmekteydi (Stobart, 2014; Bellver, 2012; Antentas, 2015; Hughes, 2011). Ayrıca, hareket kendine ait alternatif siyasetler üretme arzusu içindeydi. Bu nedenle, *Podemos*'un başta gerçek demokrasi talebi olmak üzere hareketin taleplerini sahiplenme ve kurumsal siyasete dâhil etme girişimleri *los Indignados* hareketinin iradesi ile arasında bir paradoksa yol açmaktadır (Tas, 2015; the Socialist Network, 2014). Hâlihazırda karşı olunan bir sisteme dâhil edilmek, hareketin temsili demokrasiye yönelttiği eleştirilerle çelişir gözükmektedir. Ancak her ne olursa olsun, *los Indignados* toplumsal hareketi, demokrasi konusundaki algıları değiştirerek ve günlük bireysel toplumsal, siyasi ve ekonomik ihtiyaçlarla

ve isteklerle alakalı kolektif iddialar ve talepler yaratarak *Podemos*'un varlığına giden yoldaki koşulları belirlemiştir. Protestocular ortak varlıkları dolayısıyla da toplumsal gücü yeniden üretmiştir ve *Podemos*'un İspanya siyasetindeki duruşu ve etkin bir şekilde ayakta kalma kabiliyeti, hareket tarafından güçlendirilen bu toplumsal güce fazlasıyla bağımlıdır.

Sonuç olarak, muhalif bir duruşa sahip olmasına rağmen mevcut ana akım siyaset içerisinde *Podemos*'un konumu düşünüldüğünde partinin, çağın iktidar siyasetine bütünleştiği/eklemlendiği görülebilir. Şöyle ki en başta yeni teknoloji sayesinde yeni bir katılımcı demokrasi modeli anlayışı benimsenmiş gibi görünse de *Podemos*, liberal demokrasinin sınırları içerisinde kalmayı tercih etmek zorunda bırakılmıştır ve farklı ve yeni bir demokrasi vizyonunu uygun bir şekilde işlevsel hale getirmeyi başaramamıştır. Ama yine de *los Indignados* tarafından aralanan açık bir kapı bulunmaktadır. *Podemos* da bu kapıdan geçmiştir ve mücadeleyi sürdürmek için varını yoğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Kısacası, *Podemos*'un merkezinde olduğu gerilimlere ve kendisine yöneltilen eleştirilere rağmen *los Indignados* tarafından İspanya'da açılan yeni siyasi sahnenin ana paydası olduğu ileri sürülebilmektedir. Böylelikle, *Podemos*'un Avrupa siyasetindeki yanısıra İspanya siyasetindeki tutumu ilerideki mücadeleler için bir umut, bir potansiyel taşımaktadır.

B.TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : BEDİR

Adı : NURDAN SELAY

Bölümü : AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI (EUS)

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEMANDS THROUGH BALLOT BOX: FROM *LOS INDIGNADOS* TO *PODEMOS*

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

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