

EXPERT VIEWS AND LOCAL RESPONSES TOWARDS IRAQI TURKMEN  
HUMANITARIAN REFUGEES IN ANKARA, TURKEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ÇİĞDEM MANAP KIRMIZIGÜL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

OCTOBER 2017



Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Songül Sallan Gül (SDU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Nilay Çabuk Kaya (Ankara Uni., SOC) \_\_\_\_\_



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Name, Last name : ıđdem Manap Kırmızıđül

Signature :

## ABSTRACT

### EXPERT VIEWS AND LOCAL RESPONSES TOWARDS IRAQI TURKMEN HUMANITARIAN REFUGEES IN ANKARA, TURKEY

Manap Kırmızıgül, Çiğdem

Ph.D., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu

October 2017, 212 pages

This dissertation is based on the stories and perceptions of the local people about the refugees in their daily relationships in Ankara. With an aim to reveal the local people's perspective about the refugees, the fieldwork of this study was carried out in Abidinpaşa District, where the population of Iraqi Turkmens is concentrated in Ankara. The local people's perspectives about the refugees are analyzed based on Simmel's concept of "stranger", and relying on Park's "marginal man", Siu's "sojourner", and Bauman's "stranger". Related to the official discourse produced about refugees in Turkey, the local people consider the refugees as temporary and assume that they will go back to their country when the conflict is over there. The concept of "consanguinity", which facilitates the acceptance of the Iraqi Turkmens by the local people, is harmed since these people's stay in Turkey extends. Thus, this study focuses on the processes of transformation of the Iraqi Turkmens into "strangers" and their marginalization in the eyes of the local people. The definition of the refugees as "stranger" and/or "guest" leads to the crystallization of the division between "us" and "them", and sets various borders between the two groups in many ways.

**Keywords:** Refugees, Iraqi Turkmen, international migration, Other, stranger

## ÖZ

### UZMANLARIN VE HALKIN GÖZÜNDEN IRAKLI TÜRKMEN MÜLTECİLER: ANKARA ÖRNEĞİ

Manap Kırmızıgül, Çiğdem

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu

Ekim 2017, 212 sayfa

Bu tez, yerel halkın Ankara'daki günlük ilişkilerinde mültecilere yönelik hikayeleri ve algıları üzerine kurulmuştur. Yerel halkın mültecilere yönelik bakış açılarını ortaya koymayı amaçlayan bu araştırmanın saha çalışması Ankara'da Iraklı Türkmen nüfusunun yoğun olduğu Abidinpaşa Mahallesi'nde yapılmıştır. Yerel halkın mültecilere bakışı Simmel'in "yabancı" kavramından yola çıkılarak Park'ın "marjinal adam", Siu'nun 'misafir' ve Bauman'ın "yabancı" kavramları temel alınarak analiz edilmiştir. Türkiye'de resmi söylemin de etkisiyle yerel halk mültecileri geçici olarak görmekte ülkelerinde çatışmalı ortam sona erdiğinde geri döneceklerini farzetmektedir. Iraklı Türkmenlerin yerel halk tarafından kabulünü kolaylaştıran "soydaşlık" kavramı bu kişilerin Türkiye'deki kalış süresi uzadıkça zedelenmeye başlamıştır. Çalışma yerel halkın gözünde Iraklı Türkmenlerin "yabancı"ya dönüşme ve marjinalleştirilme süreçlerine odaklanmaktadır. Mültecilerin "yabancı" ve/veya "misafir" olarak olarak tanımlanması "biz" ve "onlar" ayrımını daha belirgin hale getirerek iki topluluk arasına pek çok konuda sınır çizilmesine neden olmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Mülteciler, Iraklı Türkmenler, uluslararası göç, Öteki, yabancı

To my lovely sons, Rüzgar Miran and Civan Toprak

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Sibel Kalaycıođlu for her guidance, criticisms and encouragement. I am very grateful to the examining committee members, Songül Sallan Gül, Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör, Helga Rittersberger Tılıç and Nilay Çabuk Kaya for their comments and suggestions.

My sincere thanks go to Professor Hüseyin Gül because of his thoughtful help and close manner. I would like to thank Özlem Kahya Nizam for her help in analyzing the field work.

I should also gratefully acknowledge my friends and colleagues, Burcu, Atakan, Yasemin, Zeynep Ceren, Mehtap, Aksu, Elif, Reco, Özgür, Ekin, Şahin, Eren and Gizem for their friendship, sincerity and support. I would like to thank Sündüs Aydın and Nagehan Güçlü for their kindness and help in all kinds of paperwork. I also owe thanks to dear Gülşah and Ümit for their time and efforts in thesis process.

I am grateful to my mentor and my friend Zülal for her support, comments, patience and motivation during my thesis process. I owe special thanks to my dear friends Sinan, Ömer, Latife and Aynur for their friendship and support during my study.

I also want to thank my great big family: my dear mother, my brother Semih, my sister Didem, my mother in-law Zekiye, my father in-law Neşati, my brother in-law Kemal Murat, my sister in-laws Nazan, Hülya, Sevil, my nephews and nieces Alp, Çınar, Lizge, Lorin, Roni and Renas for their continuous motivation, contribution, understanding and support.

I also would like to thank to my dear husband Ali for standing by me at every moment, offering all kinds of support and sharing all the stress with me. Finally, big thanks goes to my lovely sons Rüzgar Miran and Civan Toprak for their smiles that make my life so beautiful.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION .....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	xi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. READING THE STRANGER IN THE AGE OF MIGRATION.....	9
3. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE RESEARCH PROCESS .....	27
3.1 The Research Question and its Significance .....	27
3.2. Method of Study .....	28
3.3 Describing the Field.....	33
3.4 Definition of Basic Concepts.....	34
3.4.1 Refugee .....	36
3.4.2 Asylum seeker .....	37
3.4.3 Conditional refugee .....	38
3.4.4 Subsidiary Protection Status.....	39
3.4.5 Temporary Protection Status .....	39
3.4.6 Humanitarian Residence Permit.....	41
4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REFUGEE RELATED POLICIES IN THE WORLD AND TURKEY.....	43
4.1 The Transformation Of The Refugee Policies In The World.....	44
4.2 Asylum Policy of Turkey .....	51
4.2.1 The Period of 1923-1950: Settlement Policies of the Early State Formation Period and Population Exchange .....	52
4.2.2 The Period of 1950-1980: The Migration Boom.....	55

4.2.3 The period of 1980- 2000: The politicization of migration, questions of identity and citizenship .....	56
4.2.4 The Period after 2000 .....	60
4.3 Historical Background of Iraqi Refugees in Turkey .....	61
4.4 Statistics and Location of Refugees in Turkey.....	67
4.5 Refugee Studies in the World and Turkey .....	77
4.5.1 Discussion on Refugee Studies in the World .....	78
4.5.2 Refugee Studies in Turkey .....	84
5. LOCAL RESPONSES TOWARDS IRAQI TURKMEN IN ANKARA .....	93
5.1 Factors Affecting Refugee Acceptance .....	94
5.2 Cultural differences, language barrier, and different lifestyles .....	98
5.3 Limits of Hospitality: Refugee as Demanding/Dependence Person .....	108
5.4 Refugee as a “Traitor” .....	112
5.5 Refugee as a Problem: from Our Guest to Trouble.....	118
5.6 Residence Time of the Refugees .....	126
5.7 Refugee as Economic Competitor.....	129
5.8 From Our Guest to Other/Stranger.....	140
6. EXPERT VIEWS TOWARDS REFUGEES .....	148
6.1 Activity Areas of the Interviewed Institutions .....	148
6.2 Expert’s Comments on Refugees’ Situation in Turkey.....	152
6.3 Experts’ Comments of Turkey’s Asylum Policy .....	157
6.4. The Problems Emerged in the Activities Conducted and Services Provided for the Refugees .....	163
6.5 Activities of Related Institutions for the Host Society.....	166
7. CONCLUSION.....	169
REFERENCES.....	176
APPENDICES	
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS for LOCAL PEOPLE.....	188
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS for INSTITUTIONS.....	191
APPENDIX C: CURRICULUM VITAE.....	192
APPENDIX D: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	194

APPENDIX E: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU..... 212

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AI</b>	Amnesty International
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>ASAM</b>	Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants
<b>IRO</b>	The International Refugee Organization
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization of Migration
<b>ISIS</b>	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<b>HRDF</b>	The Human Resource Development Foundation
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>1951 Convention</b>	Convention relating to the status of refugees
<b>1967 Protocol</b>	Protocol relating to the status of refugees
<b>1994 Regulation</b>	Regulation No 94/6169 of 30 November 1994 on the procedures and principles related to population movements and aliens arriving in Turkey either as individuals or in groups wishing to seek asylum either from Turkey or requesting residence permits in order to seek asylum from another country
<b>LFIP</b>	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
<b>DGMM</b>	Directorate General Management of Migration
<b>AFAD</b>	Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
<b>DGMM</b>	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The concept of migration, which can be basically defined as either individual or mass displacement, has always played an important role in the global agenda, and shaped the distribution of world population, socio-economic structure, and cultural development throughout history. Migration, especially mass migration, is a social phenomenon that affects the social order and policies of countries. Besides the voluntary mass migration to the industrialized countries to pursue economic or other benefits (Castles&Miller, 2013), refugees of forced migration movements have to leave their countries because of domestic strife or violence. Especially with the humanitarian crises that have occurred since the 1980s, with, the number of the refugees who sought asylum from another country has considerably increased worldwide, and political instabilities, conflicts, and violence have led to mass migration movements (Castles&Miller, 2013: 11). Since the last years of the Cold War, due to the civil wars in Afghanistan after its invasion by the Soviet Union and later by the United States of America, Afghanistan has been at the top of the emigrating countries in the world, and one of the main refugee sources of the world. More than half of the refugees/asylum seekers in the world in 2014, that is, 55% of them were from Afghanistan, Somali, Iraq, and Sudan, the four countries where people had to flee civil war or conflicts (UNDESA, 2016). However, the Syrian refugees who sought asylum from other countries at the sixth year of the Syrian Crisis outnumbered the Afghan refugees, who were the largest refugee population under the authority of the UNHCR.

Since the growth of the number of international migrants worldwide had surpassed that of the world's population, the migrants comprised 3.3% of the whole population in 2015 while it was only up 2.8% in 2000 (UNDESA, 2016:21). The total number of

forcibly displaced people worldwide reached 65.3 million by 2015. 21.3 million of them are refugees while 10 million of them are stateless people. 53 % of refugees worldwide come from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Somali. Following these countries, Iraq is one of the countries that generate dense migrations. According to the official data of the UNHCR, there are 3.022.164 people who are displaced inside Iraq, and 1.226.305 people who are displaced and living in temporary settlements. The UNHCR estimated that in 2016 the total number of refugees who need resettlement would be almost 1.153.300. In contrast, the total number of resettlement places that the states offered in 2014 was only 105.200. In 2014, approximately 73.000 refugees were resettled through the UNHCR and the remaining were resettled directly by the states (Amnesty International, 2015:87). As it is evident in the given statistical data, the number of the resettled refugees is considerably less than the refugees who still wait for resettlement. It means that the refugees have been/will be waiting in their first asylum country for long years. Those refugees who wait for resettlement are neither free to go back to their origin country nor allowed to start a life in their first asylum country. This uncertainty and temporariness of their situation affects their relationship with the host community. As a result of this ambiguity, the two communities cannot integrate with one another and lead different lives in the same places. In today's world there are more than 65 million forcibly displaced people, and quite a minority of them could get the status of a refugee or be accepted by the community in which they are settled.

Cultural identities, the most important factor that served the foundation of the nation-states in the 20th century, have become the fundamental reason for the conflicting approaches and the means for domination rather than a mediator since the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. The mobility in the Middle East at the beginning of the 21st century turned into uprisings for freedom against dictatorial regimes and mass revolts. These uprisings, known as the "Arab Spring", have led to mass massacres and mass migration movements. While the Arab Spring was successful in the place where it started, that is, Tunisia, it turned into a civil war in Syria, where opponent groups had conflicts. The Civil War in Syria has still not ended on by March 15, 2011, and it triggered the biggest refugee crisis after World

War II in human history (Bulut and et al., 2016:3018). The Syrians who fled the civil war in their country crossed the borders in masses and reached the neighbor countries. As a result of global interests and regional conflicts, Turkey has become a host country for refugees rather than a transit country –although politically unwilling and legally holding onto its position as a transit country. Especially it became inevitable for Turkey after 2011 when there was a probability for only one third of the Syrian and Iraqi refugees to be resettled in a third country and the circumstances for their return to their origin countries were not adequate yet. The main aim of this thesis is to define this transition that Turkey has gone through during the global migration period via sociological theories. The migration movement to Turkey after 2011, following the humanitarian crises in Syria and Iraq, required the reconstruction of immigration policy. To fulfill this requirement, Foreigners and International Protection Law No. 6458 was enacted on April 11, 2013. However, this Law does not considerably differ from the previous laws and regulations on defining the status of a refugee. The Law in question accepts the immigrants of European origin as refugee after their application for international protection in Turkey, and the immigrants of non-European origin as conditional refugee under international protection until they are resettled in a third country.

In this study the concept of refugee will be used to refer to all asylum seekers in Turkey without considering their origin countries, their reasons of migration, and their specified status. In the national and international legislations, refugee and asylum seeker have various definitions. As Çorabatır&Alagöz emphasize (2015:2), “individuals become refugees because of the circumstances in their countries no matter which names or statuses the states provide them with”. Within the light of this idea, “guests”, disregarding such categories given by public institutions as “under temporary protection”, “conditional refugee”, “secondary protection status”, “refugees”, “asylum seekers” and “humanitarian residence permit” and Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), this study will refer to the Iraqis with humanitarian residence permit, the Syrians under temporary protection, and asylum seekers, those who apply for individual status in Turkey and are accepted as “mandate” refugee by the United Nations as refugee. In this thesis, the word

“refugee” indicates refugees/asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somali, and other countries, and the Syrian citizens under temporary protection status in Turkey.

According to the data by the UNHCR, there are 131,440 Iraqi refugees in Turkey as of January 2017. 52,052 of them are children under 18, and 4383 of them are elder people over 60. The biggest Iraqi refugee/asylum seeker population in the world is in Turkey. For the first time, Turkey became the country, which hosted the highest number of refugees in the world in 2014, and this is still valid. In a report published by the AFAD in 2013, it is stated, “there is no accurate information on the total number of Syrian refugees living in Turkey” (AFAD, 2013). It is possible to state this for other refugee groups-the Iraqis, Afghans, Iranians, and Somalis, etc. in Turkey, as well. For, the statistics provided by the UNHCR and AFAD only concerns the registered refugees, and the number of unregistered refugees is not known. The refugees who flee armed conflict and instability in their country mostly prefer to go to their neighbor country as their first asylum country. The migration to a third country is only possible for a limited minority of refugees. While some refugees prefer to return their origin countries after the conflicting situation ends, some of them may keep staying in their first asylum country.

The earliest mass migration of the Iraqi refugees, who are the second largest refugee population in Turkey after the Syrians, was during the 1990s. In 1988, 100.000 Iraqi people came to Turkey after the Halabja Massacre; 500.000 came after the Gulf War in 1991. During both migration movements, the majority of the refugees were Iraqi Kurdish people, and they returned their countries within 6-12 months. The number of the Iraqi refugees in Turkey was 21.947 in 2014, and it reached 118.605 in 2015 after the mass migration of the Iraqis who crossed the Turkish border as they fled the conflicts in their country. This Iraqi mass migration movement to Turkey in 2015 was not the first in Turkey’s history. The refugees from Iraq are not a homogenous group, and they have various religious and ethnic codes. One of the factors that play

an important role in the acceptance of the Iraqi Turkmen<sup>1</sup> group, the subject of this study, by the host society is that they are of Turkish origin. Most of the Iraqi Turkmen refugees who came to Turkey after 2014 reside in Turkey with “humanitarian residence permit”. As of February 2017, according to the official data of Provincial Migration Management Center, there are 30.903 Iraqi Turkmen refugees registered in Ankara. As of the same date, there are 800 people in the refugee status in Ankara. Most of the people in the refugee status are of Somalis, Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi origin. As a result of the interviews with the NGOs, it is assumed that the number of the Iraqi refugees in Ankara is higher than the registered number. According to the official data of Provincial Migration Management Center, there are 130.000 foreigners in Ankara in the refugee status, the Iraqis with humanitarian residence permit, and the Syrians under temporary protection status. The statuses of the Iraqi refugees in Turkey vary. While some of these Iraqi refugees who came before 2014 are included in international protection process, those who came after this date are given humanitarian residence permit. Thus, some refugees were not included under international protection. Exclusion from international protection causes loss of many rights. As a result, basic services such as work permit and health services may become problematic.

The changing dimensions of the migration process in the world have become too complex to identify the situation of the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Turkey and to interpret their identification process. While the migration was labor migration in the 1950s and forced migration in the 1990s, there has been a political dimension added to this process since the 2000s. This process of migration has changed the situations of both the refugees and the countries where they migrate. Within the framework of macro migration policies, the geopolitical and strategic positions of the countries have included Turkey as a host country –as de facto though not de jure- during the politicized migration process. While this process of migration situates Turkey towards the center, historical and ethnic contexts have politicized Turkey’s migration

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<sup>1</sup> Iraq is made up of different ethnic –Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens- and religious groups –Sunnis and Shiites. For further information, see İ. Sirkeci (2005) “War in Iraq: Environment of Insecurity and International Migration” *International Migration*, Vol. 43, No.4, pp.197-214.

dynamics after the 1990s. The Iraqi refugees, who are the second largest refugee population in Turkey after the Syrians, also gain new dynamics in terms of their settlement in Turkey and their relationship with the host society where they settled down. Before 1990, there were not intensive migrations to Turkey by the Iraqi Turkmen but individual migrations. However, the Civil War in Syria after 2011 and Turkey's claim in Syrian political area have increased the numerical ratio and visibility of the refugees in Turkey. The high number of the Syrian refugees, their poverty, their tendency to become permanent residents despite their temporary appearance have started to determine the perception of the other refugees in Turkey, as well. This process also necessitates the study of the relationship between the refugee groups and the host society in Turkey from the viewpoint of social sciences. Although the refugees are identified as "temporary" by the public institutions, it is necessary to conduct such researches on the perception of the refugees by the host society, and how they identify the refugees in order to enable the refugees who will stay for long years in the country to live with basic human rights and to develop a more democratic social perspective. It is expected that the Iraqi Turkmen who live in Turkey with temporary residence permit will return their countries when the conflict is over there. However, it is a well-known fact that the longer they stay, the unlikelier it becomes for them to go back. The integration policies in Turkey, which mainly deal with the Syrian refugees but concern all other refugee groups, emphasize this idea of temporariness, and do not go beyond the question whether "to integrate them or send them back". Together with the emphasis on their temporariness, this brings about a suspension of the refugees' lives for an uncertain period of time. The aim of this study is to reveal the host society's perception of the Iraqi Turkmen who live in the same neighborhood with them and how they identify these refugees. This thesis is concerned with refugees and their impact on the host community. It focuses on the refugees' reception in Ankara, not by the UNHCR or the government, but by the local people. This thesis is based on stories and perceptions of the hosts about the refugees in their day-to-day relations in Ankara. This study aims to make a modest contribution to the existing body of knowledge on refugees in Turkey. The thesis relies on fieldwork observations; formal and informal meetings with the hosts

and the NGOs; situational reports and the hosts' correspondence to the UNHCR and its implementing partners (IPs), and their local MP, as well as personal experience. The time frame for the observation is slightly over a year, including input from two recent five-month field visits. Purposeful sampling was used for the fieldwork of this study. The refugee flow to Turkey after 2011 also emerged quite unexpectedly, and the number of the refugees increased to an unpredicted level. Although the government and the local people expected the conflict to end in short time and the refugees to return their countries, the refugee flow continued. While Turkey financed a few of the refugee camps where the refugee population lived, the refugees who lived outside the camps had to take care of their own urgent needs such as shelter and food in order to survive. Moreover, since these camps were specifically built for the Syrian refugees, other refugee groups could not benefit from them except a very limited number of Iraqi refugees. This usually caused the refugees, who had to come without any money or assets, to settle down in the poor neighborhoods of the cities. These districts were often slums, which were in the process of urban transformation, and sometimes, old neighborhoods where the lower income group lived. The refugees, who run away due to the lack of safety of life from the living conditions that have changed as a result of war and conflict, lead to social transformation in all the countries where they go and densely settle in particular, including their first asylum country. At the end of the interviews with the Iraqi Turkmen associations, it is confirmed that the Iraqi Turkmen refugees densely live in Abidinpaşa District in Ankara, and these interviews played a key role in determining the choice of the district for the fieldwork of this study. The original data in this thesis came from semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted at individual, local, national, and international levels. In total, I conducted 25 interviews, 15 with the inhabitants of Abidinpaşa, 6 with the representatives of the NGOs (from ASAM, Iraqi Turks Cultural and Fraternal Association and Türkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation) and 4 with the representatives of the INGOs from the IOM, the Amnesty International, and the UNHCR. The interviews within the scope of the fieldwork were conducted from March to September 2016.

Following this introductory chapter, the following chapter two will describe the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. The first chapter is titled “Reading the Stranger in the Age of Migration”. In this chapter, the concept of the stranger will be analyzed within the framework of Simmel’s stranger, Park’s marginal man, Siu’s sojourner, and Bauman’s concept of stranger. The next chapter consists of five parts, namely, “The Transformation of the Refugee Policies in the World”, “Asylum Policy of Turkey”, “Historical Background of Iraqi Refugees in Turkey”, “Statistics and Location of Refugees in Turkey”, “Refugee Studies in the World and Turkey”. The fourth chapter is on methodology, and it will present the methodology employed in this thesis together with the challenges experienced during the field research. The findings of the fieldwork will be examined in the fifth and sixth chapters. The thesis will be completed with a conclusion chapter, in which the whole process of research, its findings, and suggestions will be included.

## CHAPTER 2

### READING THE STRANGER IN THE AGE OF MIGRATION

In this part of the study, I will try to analyze the local community's hospitality towards and hostility against refugees and of the distinction between "us" and "them". For these analyses, I will use the concept of "the stranger", which is theorized from different perspectives and attributed with different names and characteristics by various philosophers.

In the literature on 'the stranger', Simmel has the certain authority in defining the sociology of strangerhood. It is possible to say that the basis of Park's 'marginal man' (1928), Siu's 'the sojourner' (1952) and Bauman's stranger are the Simmelian stranger.

In his classical essay, "The Stranger", Simmel (1950: 402) distinguished the 'stranger' as 'somebody who comes today and stays tomorrow' from the 'wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow'. Baker (2001) considers the idea that "none is a stranger" to a stranger, put forward in Simmel's essay "The Stranger", as paradoxical and he adds, "but, it is still most probable that you can most easily tell about and share your personal or collective problems with a stranger". Simmel's stranger (1950: 402), as the potential wanderer, always has a potential to go away:

"The stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going."

Simmel highlights "constructed otherness" categorically "rather than about some natural condition". Otherness is constructed in the "contemporary cultural and cognitive sense". He emphasizes that the stranger is understood and experienced as in his society. Simmel searches for "more subtle degrees of differentiation and

discrimination by distinguishing the stranger from other classical categories". The stranger is not "experienced by the host society simply as lower or excluded; rather, he/she is sensed to be different in some more fundamental way, even while he/she remains in some important sense a member of the wider society itself". Simmel's understanding of negation becomes more closely associated with postmodern ideas of otherness with the stranger concept (Alexander, 2004: 88). Simmel (1950: 402) defines the stranger as an individual who "is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself."

According to Simmel, public interaction approaches differ based on the distance between two individuals in society. Simmel puts that what shapes the unique relationship with the stranger is the special ratio between nearness and remoteness.

"The unity of nearness and remoteness involved in every human relation is organized, in the phenomenon of the stranger, in a way which may be most briefly formulated by saying that in the relationship to him, distance means that he, who is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is actually near. For, to be a stranger is naturally a very positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction. The inhabitants of Sirius are not really strangers to us, at least not in any social logically relevant sense: they do not exist for us at all; they are beyond far and near" (Simmel, 1950: 402).

Simmel defines the "stranger" as both an insider and an outsider.

"The stranger, like the poor and like sundry "inner enemies," is an element of the group itself. His position as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it" (Simmel, 1950: 402).

Refugees, like Simmel's stranger, are an incontrovertible element of the society. The stranger of Simmel (1950: 403) "is by nature no "owner of soil". According to him, "soil not only in the physical, but also in the figurative sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least in an ideal point of the social environment. Although in more intimate relations, he may develop all kinds of charm and significance, as long as he is considered a stranger in the eyes of the other, he is not an "owner of soil". Refugees, like Simmel's stranger, are no more "owner of soil" in the first asylum countries or transit countries. Their temporary position does

not allow them to be settled. Simmel's (1950: 407) stranger is "near and far at the same time". He argues that the stranger is not completely a distant object by emphasizing 'nearness'. He accepts that some basic sense of connection is established with the host society because the stranger is not only far but near (Alexander, 2004: 90). Simmel indicates that "a stranger's dual remoteness and nearness has a further effect: in giving a community a sense of the more abstracted nature of the relation between it and those beyond its geographic and cultural borders, the stranger's ambiguous presence highlights the general qualities shared by all individuals" (Sarat et. All, 2010: 4). Simmel suggests that the stranger has dual remoteness and nearness. Although the stranger is near or like us, he/she is not one of us.

"The stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people" (Simmel, 1950: 406).

The sense of shared human nature makes us close to others. On the other side, connecting with others on the basis of shared humanity may influence the realization that there is nothing personal about this bond. Community is shaped on the basis something other than hereditary characteristics (Rumford, 2013). Simmel's stranger is near and far, general and specific, inside and outside of the host community, at the same time. Strangeness is socially produced by the influence of emotions such as fear, hostility, or hospitality.

"As a group member, rather, he is near and far at the same time, as is characteristic of relations founded only on generally human commonness. But between nearness and distance, there arises a specific tension when the consciousness that only the quite general is common, stresses that which is not common. In the case of the person who is a stranger to the country, the city, the race, etc., however, this non-common element is once more nothing individual, but merely the strangeness of origin, which is or could be common to many strangers. For this reason, strangers are not really conceived as individuals, but as strangers of a particular type: the element of distance is no less general in regard to them than the element of nearness" (Simmel, 1950: 407).

Participating into a group physically does not mean that you are a member of that group. It might sometimes take years to become a member of a group, or mostly you fail to become one.

“In spite of being inorganically appended to it, the stranger is yet an organic member of the group. Its uniform life includes the specific conditions of this element. Only we do not know how to designate the peculiar unity of this position other than by saying that it is composed of certain measures of nearness and distance. Although some quantities of them characterize all relationships, a special proportion and reciprocal tension produce the particular, formal relation to the "stranger.”” (Simmel, 1950: 408).

While being a refugee leads to becoming an organic part of the community, it also requires long years –sometimes some generations – and tedious procedures to be an inorganic part of the society.

Similar to Simmel’s stranger, Park’s marginal man is a person who joins in a group/community after its formulation. Park’s (1928: 892) marginal man is “a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused”. According to Marotta (2017) “the marginal man has a divided self because an internal conflict rages between the old self, link to his primary group, and the new self, associated with the host group.” For refugees, the state of the divided self entails both the obscurity of not being a real part of the host community and hopelessness about the possibility of not being able to return to their origin country. According to Park, the marginal man lives in two different societies neither of which he belongs to. This dual life is what refugees also experience. Like Park’s marginal man, refugees live at the borders of both countries when they leave their country.

According to Park, the marginal man was one whose personal philosophy evidenced consciousness of a conflict in his natural loyalties, of an effort to achieve an inner harmony and consistency and a struggle to maintain his integrity. In this sense, marginality was a socio-psychological problem as well as one of structural integration. The individual involved was to a large degree acculturated to the perspective of both his membership groups and cultural heritages. Often, despite any possibility for structural integration in either culture, he might have difficulty achieving a state of socio-psychological integration free of conflict (Kasinsky, 1976: 146). Out of the conflicts among races, nationalities, ethnicities, or cultures evolve new people and new cultures. Park (1964: 375-6) describes the “marginal man”;

“is a personality type that arises at a time and a place where, out of the conflict of races and cultures, new societies, new peoples and cultures are coming into existence. The fate which condemns him to live, at the same time, in two worlds is the same which compels him to assume, in relation to the worlds in which he lives, the role of cosmopolitan and a stranger.”

Park’s “marginal man” is a minimal social product to be assimilated sooner or later. In other words, assimilation is an inevitable process for the “marginal man”.

“The marginal man is an incidental product of a process of acculturation, such as inevitably ensues when people of different cultures and different races come together to carry on a common life” (Park, 1964: 376).

Park uses the terms of native and alien people instead of the concept of host society and stranger (Park, 1928: 885). Migration is not “to be identified with mere movement. It involves, at the very least, change of residence and the breaking of home ties” (Park, 1928: 886-887).

“Migration as a social phenomenon must be studied not merely in its grosser effects, as manifested in changes in custom and in the mores, but it may be envisaged in its subjective aspects as manifested in the changed type of personality which it produces” (Park, 1928: 887).

According to Park, migration is a process that leads to assimilation, and the host society assimilates the alien group:

“In the long run, however, peoples and races that live together, sharing in the same economy, inevitably interbreed, and in this way if in no other, the relations which were merely cooperative and economic become social and cultural. When migration leads to conquest, either economic or political, assimilation is inevitable. The conquering peoples impose their culture and their standards upon the conquered, and there follows a period of cultural endosmosis” (Park, 1928: 891).

Marginal man as “a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused” is both non-assimilated and assimilated (Park, 1928: 892). In his study “The Chinese Laundryman: A Study of Social Isolation”, Siu states that he does not support Park’s argument about the inevitable assimilation of the “marginal man” and by taking up Simmel’s concept of the “stranger”, he theorizes upon another social type, “sojourner”.

Unlike Park’s marginal man, Siu’s sojourner is not assimilated by the host society but isolates himself from this society. Siu used the term “sojourner” as a new concept of the “stranger”, apart from the well-known terms of the “stranger” from Simmel and the “marginal man” from Park. Siu created the term “sojourner” in order to

describe Chinese laundryman who immigrated to America from China. In other words, the "sojourner" is a deviant type of the sociological form of the "stranger," someone who adheres to the culture of his/her own ethnic group and tends to live in isolation, hindering his/her assimilation to the host society in which he/she resides, often for many years. The sojourn is designed by the sojourner as "a "job" which is to be finished in the shortest possible time." He visits his homeland every few years as an option to that end (Siu, 1952: 34). It is possible to compare "sojourner" and "marginal man". Even if both of them is a type of Simmel's stranger, the sojourner, as a deviant type, is different from the marginal man in many aspects. In contrast to the bicultural complex of the marginal man, the main characteristic of the sojourner is that he adheres strictly to the cultural heritage of his own ethnic group. Siu's sojourner is unwilling to regulate himself as a permanent resident in the country of his sojourn. According to Siu, "both the marginal man and the sojourner are types of stranger - in Simmel's sense, products of the cultural frontier". Even so, in many instances, "the sojourner has something in common with the marginal man". Siu's sojourner is a kind of stranger "who spends many years of his lifetime in a foreign country without being assimilated by it" (Siu, 1952: 34). Siu's sojourner not only denies being assimilated but he is also unwilling to be assimilated. On one hand, sojourner is the person who denies assimilation; on the other hand, he finds it easier to live in his own ethnic group since he does not think that he is ever going to be accepted by the host society. The characterization of the sojourner given by Simmel is not that of the man "who comes today and goes tomorrow but rather of the man who comes today and stays tomorrow". Although the sojourner "plans to get through with the job in the shortest possible time, yet he soon finds himself in a dilemma as to whether to stay abroad or to return home" (Siu, 1952: 35).

Sojourner has no desire "for full participation in the social life of his temporary land. He tends to see himself as an outsider and feels content as a spectator in many of the community affairs". He is an individual just "to the people of his own ethnic group or to a social circle related to his job" (Siu, 1952: 35). Sojourner is inclined "to meet his/her countrymen and to maintain his/her own ethnic culture in private life, whatever activities the sojourner may participate in, in the community at large".

Their closest friends are “people of his ethnic group, and they host one another at their homes”. They have almost identical “pride and desires, hopes and dreams, prejudices and dilemmas”. They share their judgments about the host country. It is possible to see effect of their homeland cultural heritage in their life style such as food habits (Siu, 1952: 37). It is not possible for refugees who start to live in another country for a certain reason to instantly quit their ways of living specific to their native countries. It is observed that they tend to preserve their habits of the homeland country in the host country. For example, keeping their eating habits is not limited at home; they open their own bakeries or restaurants so that they could keep their eating habits outside home. In brief, Siu’s ‘sojourner’ as a deviant type of Simmel’s stranger is a person who “clings to the culture of his own ethnic group” and who “is unwilling to organize himself as a permanent resident in the country”. In other words, ‘sojourner’ is a person “who spends many years of his life time in a foreign country without being assimilated by it”. Unlike Park’s “margial man”, he has no desire for full participation in the community life of his adopted land”. Therefore, he is not interested in language, culture, and life style of the host society and he tends to be isolated. According to Siu (1952, s. 35-37) “sojourner cannot be assimilated more precisely he does not want to be assimilated”. Siu’s sojourner creates a home away from home in order not to be assimilated.

Yang asserts that Siu “has often been mistakenly seen as an advocate of the voluntary sojourning thesis”. As a matter of fact, Siu examines both voluntary and involuntary elements as “determinants of the Chinese sojourning orientation”. In Siu’s opinion, “sojourning was partly voluntary, since many Chinese immigrants did intend eventually to return to their homeland because of economic considerations and cultural influences. More importantly, however, sojourning was also involuntary, since it was a forced reaction to racism and unfair treatment” (Yang, 2000: 243). In his book “The Chinese Laundryman: A Study of Social Isolation”, Siu argues that the immigrant gradually acquires sojourner's attitudes (1987: 119), and the process of the sojourner's adaptation is one of "contact, conflict, accommodation, and isolation" (1987: 3). In sojourning, "isolation and nonassimilation are obviously not entirely his own choice" (Siu, 1987: 20). Sojourning is a result of racist rejection and a

"solution to a race problem," and the isolation of the sojourner "may be considered as a form of accommodation" (Siu, 1987: 295). Yang emphasizes that although this part of his argument has been ignored by some scholars, especially non-Asians, Siu mentions involuntary factors as forces leading to Chinese sojourning and isolation (Yang, 2000: 244). According to Siu, sojourner "has more conflict among themselves than with the general public, because they live in a world of isolation. They fight prejudice and discrimination with sojourner attitudes and with patriotism" (Siu, 1987: 226). As a matter of course, legal exclusion has played a part in producing Chinese isolation –especially on first Chinese immigrant generation- in US (Siu, 1987: 194). The sojourning orientation of the Chinese migrants is formed by "homeland-attachment traditions of Chinese, the gender division of labor in families split across national borders, the bachelor's society in the Chinese immigrant community, and white racism in the US". Sojourning is not a uniquely Chinese immigrant tendency: "the sojourning hypothesis also describes the practice of many other immigrant groups" (Yang, 2000: 251).

Despite variations, the majority of migrants experience sojourning process from an individual standpoint, when similar large social changes are arise. Migrants come to target country "with hope, uncertainty, and ambivalence". They expect to have better living conditions in their new country than in their home country; they mostly have economic, social, and emotional ties with their homeland. Especially the first-generation migrants experience the sojourning orientation. At the beginning, few are permanent settlers; many of them have thoughts of return.

According to Yang, reasons for sojourning may include "personal considerations, such as personal health, the family's wishes, retirement and the desire to die in the homeland, and feelings of insecurity; conditions in the host country, such as host treatment of immigrants, employment opportunities, availability of welfare support, racial/ethnic relations, and pressure from ethnic group members; and conditions in the home country, such as economic hardship, political turmoil and instability, natural disasters, quality of life, and acceptance at home". The tendency of sojourning decelerates the integration process into the host society. However,

sojourning does not mean “equivalent to unassimilability”. Indeed sojourning process is “an integral part of the adaptation process for many migrants”. In the process of time, settlement is accepted as the most appropriate and functional option for many immigrants. Socioeconomic success, formation of a family or unification of family members, overcome language barriers, loss of close ties with relatives in the homeland, and an advanced social environment in the host country can attract migrants of settlement. Migrants' decision to settle permanently can be affected by changing economic and political conditions in the homeland. Moreover, “transnationalism is arising as a new method and strategy of adaptation and a new life style for a growing number of migrants” (Yang, 2000: 252). Siu approaches migration process not from the individual perspective, but from that of the social and cultural aspects. He defines “the migration movement as a movement within the framework of complex network structures which have their own reality, over and above national and cultural borders”. By this way, he locates himself right in the center of the present discussion on migration, which is attached to the concepts of globalization, transnationalism, and transmigration (Merz-Benz, 2010: 89).

For Park, the immigrant is a “marginal man” who tries to live between two cultures in “both of which he is more or less a stranger”. It is no easy to clarify with this mode the situation of Chinese laundry workers in US. Thereby, Siu uses the concept of the sojourner to describe his research object. In his new land, the sojourner is not disposed to participate the social life. Actually, “his activities tend to be limited to his own interests”, especially his job (Merz-Benz, 2010: 91-92).

According to Yang (2000), Siu’s “sojourner” is one of the very significant and influential concepts in the study of early Chinese migration to America and of Chinese Americans. Siu uses the concept of sojourner in his dissertation, entitled *The Chinese Laundryman* and completed at the University of Chicago in 1953. He defines the sojourner as a migrant who “clings to the culture of his own group” and who “is unwilling to organize himself as a permanent resident in the country of his sojourn”. Unlike the marginal man the sojourner does not “seek status in the society of the dominant group”. The sojourner “spends many years of his life-time in a

foreign country without being assimilated by it" (Yang, 2000: 235). Siu's sojourner is a particular sociological type of stranger that can be deliberately distinguished from the well-known "marginal man" concept of Park. Different from the marginal man, the sojourner does not feel himself stuck between two cultures. On the contrary, he lives with his own people in the host country and becomes part of a culturally homogenous group. The sojourner "is socially isolated and would like, when he has finished his job and achieved success, to return to his home country as soon as possible" (Merz-Benz, 2010: 89).

As noted by Yang (2000: 244), "the concept of sojourner is not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon". With the publication of Siu's study on the sojourner, the term was gradually used to refer to the Chinese, and it is assumed that the sojourner's characteristics reflect some features peculiar to Chinese immigrants. Yang emphasizes that the characteristics of sojourner are very common among first-generation migrants, whether easterner or westerner and whether old or new. Sojourning "is a global phenomenon." First-generation migrants usually feel ambivalent about their homeland, and it is quite understandable that they might experience such ambivalence. The sense of sojourning remains among the immigrants until the second generation follows up the first one. Thus, sojourning can be considered as a phase prior to settlement, a migration at trial that lasts for quite a long time, and an adaptation to the new environment (Yang, 2000:247-248).

According to Bauman (1997:18), strangers "are the people who do not fit the cognitive, moral, or aesthetic map of the world" and "all societies produce stranger". In his works, the modern stranger is identified as a person, who is "socially distant yet physically close" (Bauman, 1993:152). Bauman (1997:18) identifies modern strangers as follows:

"...the typical modern strangers were the waste of the state's ordering zeal. What the modern strangers did not fit was the vision of order. When you draw dividing lines and set apart the so divided, everything that blurs the lines and spans the divisions undermines the work and mangles its products".

Bauman uses the concept of the stranger as a metaphor and appropriates this usage to refer to such groups as the "new poor", who constitute a fundamental part of the

contemporary societies, but who fail to enjoy the opportunities that their consumption society offers (Karakayalı, 2006: 325). Bauman is one of the prominent social thinkers who have powerful influence in developing a social theory of strangerhood. Bauman is interested in “the constitution and treatment of the social and cultural other in the west, especially those who have been excluded from an increasingly globalized and mass consumer society” in “Work, Consumerism and the New Poor” (1998a) and “Globalization: The Human Consequences” (1998b) (Marotta, 2000: 122). According to Bauman (1997:30), the future of the stranger is only possible in the postmodern state. Besides, strangers are an essential element in postmodern state.

“It is not just that we need the strangers around, because, due to the way we are culturally shaped, we would miss precious life- enhancing values in a uniform, monotonous and homogeneous world; more than that: such a world without a difference could not, by any stretch of the imagination, evolve out of the way in which our lives are shaped and carried on. The question is no longer how to get rid of the strangers and the strange once and for all, or declare human variety but a momentary inconvenience, but how to live with alterity: daily and permanently. Whatever realistic strategy of coping with the unknown, the uncertain and the confusing can be thought of : it needs to start from recognizing this fact.”

Bauman (1997:30) sees “a genuine emancipatory chance in postmodernity, the chance of laying down arms, suspending border skirmishes waged to keep the stranger away, taking apart the daily erected mini-Berlin walls meant to maintain distance and separate”. And he adds, “this chance does not lie in the celebration of born-again ethnicity and ingenuine or invented tribal tradition: but in bringing to its conclusion the ‘disembedding’ work of modernity, through focusing on the right to choose one’s identity as the sole universality of the citizen/human, on the ultimate, inalienable individual responsibility for the choice - and through laying bare the complex state - or tribe-managed mechanisms aimed at depriving the individual of that freedom of choice and that responsibility. The chance of human togetherness depends on the rights of the stranger, not on the question who - the state or tribe - is entitled to decide who the strangers are.”

Bauman notes that “identity seems to be one of the most universal human needs” (Bauman, 1992:679). Bauman states that we live in a nomadic world, and thus, new comers make previous residents more localized.

“We live today in a nomadic world, in the universe of migration - of commodities and, increasingly, of people. Variegated provenance of inanimate constituents of life-worlds, as well as of a growing fraction of newcomers (of varying degree of strangeness) among the human ones, brings into relief the nomadic character of life itself; its territorial uprootedness and weakened dependence on hereditary determinants” (Bauman, 1992:693).

According to Marotta (2002:42), although Bauman identifies that the notion of the stranger is to strengthen social and cultural boundaries; his writings also indicate that this is not always the case. Boundaries become porous and unstable, when the stranger represents the cultural Other. The most important thing that holds together new communities' members is classified as 'culture'. The exclusion of strangers in these communities is “verbalized in terms of incompatibility or unmixability of cultures” (Bauman, 1993:17). Boundaries are still being built to exclude strangers. Bauman indicates that “paradoxically new exclusivist communities use the same language that was connected to the inclusivist cultural discourse” (Marotta, 2002:39-41).

For Bauman, postmodern nomads are different from modern nomads. According to Marotta (2002:38), Bauman argues that at the macro level “premodern and modern societies can be understood in terms of their need to establish an order or structure and thus alleviate the 'slimy' or the stranger that threatens the stability and coherence of this social order”. The flexibility and fluidity of postmodern world naturally affects the human character as well as the wanderer.

“Postmodern nomads, unlike prototypically modern, protestant 'pilgrims through life', wander between unconnected places. It is on this point that they differ - not in the concern with establishing and preserving their identities, a concern which they share with their pilgrim ancestors” (Bauman, 1992:693).

From Bauman's standpoint (1991:15), modernity “is about the production of order” and this search for order is related to the “suppression and exclusion of strangers”. From the perspective of the will-to-order, the Other or the stranger “epitomizes chaos and thus is a potential threat to the stable and fixed boundaries modernity has established” (Marotta, 2002:39).

According to Bauman, the postmodern stranger is also homeless. He is here for the time being but he can leave at any time.

“In the native world-view, the essence of stranger is homelessness . Unlike an alien or foreigner, the stranger is not simply a new comer, a person temporarily out of place. He is an eternal wanderer., homeless always and everywhere, without hope of ever arriving” (Bauman, 1991:79).

In “Thinking Sociologically”, Bauman remarks that a stranger is an individual we know a little of, a person who is “bound to come time and again, uninvited, into my field of vision”. He also indicates that “if we didn’t know anything about them, they wouldn’t be strangers, but “nobodies” (Bauman, 1990:54-55). Bauman argues that as we “note their presence”, and know very little about them, it is not quite easy “to make sense of them”. “They are, as it were, neither close nor distant. Neither a part of us nor a part of them.” For this reason, they evoke such feelings of confusion and anxiety in us (Bauman, 1990:55). We do not know how we treat these people, because we can not define them exactly. These people are neither enemy nor friends. “With enemies we fight, friends we like and help; but what about people who are neither? Or who can be both?” (Bauman, 1990:56).

In Bauman’s text, the concept of “social distance” takes an important place. Distance is an element, which is influenced by practical intent and purpose rather than physical, objective, or psychological product. Binaries such as here/there, near/far, or inside/outside etc. determine the closeness and human distances that surround individuals (Bauman, 1999:xxiii). Bauman uses Alfred Schutz’s approach in “phenomenology”. According to this phenomenological approach, when one person is considered as center, all other people are grouped within the scale of a social distance to that person. The proximity of another person to the center at the scale means that he/she becomes special for the person at the center while their remoteness from the center situates people within the category of general. People get closer to us as much as we know them and they become distanced as much as we do not know them (Bauman, 1995). Those who we know about are close while those who we have lack of sufficient knowledge about or who cannot be placed in our cognitive map are distant. The correlation between knowledge and distance constitutes a map the closest point of which has our most private ones, the remotest point of which has our most anonymous ones, and the middle point of which has foreigners in it (Bauman, 1993). Bauman provides a framing for otherings in social life with his evaluation

about the social distance. In its simplest form, he describes these groupings as “us and them”. “Us” is a form of unity that includes “reciprocal emotional flow”, “reciprocal trust”, “mutual bonding”, “solidarity”, and “love and compassion” among the members of a group who feel commitment and trust towards one another and who resemble one another. “Them” means enmity, or any form of unity, which is the binary opposition of “us” (Bauman, 2001).

“The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is sometimes presented in sociology as one between an in-group and out-group. These opposites are inseparable, for there cannot be one without the other. They sediment, as it were, in our map of the world on the two poles of an antagonistic relationship and this makes the two groups ‘real’ to their perspective members and provides for the inner unity and coherence they are imagined to possess” (Bauman, 2001:30).

Bauman (2001) explains how an ‘us and them’ idea underlies the construction of a collective identity and the ways in which the stranger plays an important role in this construction process in “Thinking Sociologically” (Marotta, 2002:42).

According to Bauman (1991:14), like other dichotomies, the dichotomy between us and them is crucial for the practice and the vision of the social order.

“In dichotomies crucial for the practice and the vision of the social order, the differentiating power hides as a rule behind one of the members of the opposition. The second member is but the other of the firsts, the opposite (degraded, suppressed, exiled) side of the first and its creation. Thus abnormality is the other of the norm, deviation the other of law-abiding, illness the other of health, barbarity the other of civilisation, animal the other of the human, woman the other of man, stranger the other of the native, enemy the other of friend, ‘them’ the other of ‘us’, insanity the other of reason, foreigner the other of the state subject, but the dependence is not symmetrical. The second side depends on the first for its contrived and enforced isolation. The first depends on the second for its self-assertion.”

The stranger can be defined 'socially distant yet physically close' within cognitive space. The stranger not only destroys the categories of enemy and friend in our minds but also any behavioral codes related to these categories (Bauman, 1993). Bauman borrows the concept of the stranger from Simmel’s sociology. According to Simmel (1950), what generates the stranger are the fact that he is far from and independent of “any given point in space”, the existence of a group to provide this, and this group’s closeness-remoteness to the stranger. The status of the stranger is at risk when the social map is looked at from the perspectives of “us” and “them”. The stranger’s presence “threatens socialization” and blurs “the distinction between

friend and enemy”. In one sense, the stranger is “neither friend nor enemy or he can be both”, and thus, he stands out as “impossible to classify” (Bauman, 1991). With his uninvited arrival and stay, the stranger challenges “territorial and functional separation” and risks the safety of the boundary line. Although he might be considered as an enemy in appearance, he demands “responsibility”, which is a feature of friendship (Bauman, 1991). The stranger is an ambivalent element in complex modern city life. According to Bauman (2003), the presence of the stranger in the city adds an amount of ambivalence to vital activities of all provincial residents. Bauman (1991:60) states:

“The stranger disturbs the resonance between physical and psychical distance: he is physically close while remaining spiritually remote. He brings into the inner circle of proximity the kind of difference and otherness that are anticipated and tolerated only at a distance – where they can be either dismissed as irrelevant or repelled as hostile... His presence is a challenge to the reliability of orthodox and the universal tools of order making.”

To live with the stranger always brings about ambivalence to the host society. However, to live as the stranger in a society similarly brings about ambivalence for the stranger. In Bauman’s (1991) words, “to be a stranger means to be able to live perpetual ambivalence, a vicarious life of dissimulation”.

Order and ambivalence are two important points in Bauman’s evaluation and explanation of modernity and postmodernity. Bauman explores “how the stranger comes to symbolize the very ambivalence that the ordering impulse is attempting to destroy”. Strangers, thus, threaten the borderlines that the process of ordering demands to impose constancy and predictability on the social world (Marotta, 2002: 42).

Most people lose control of their lives. In Bauman’s words, “the less people control and can control their lives and their life-founding identities, the more they will perceive others as slimy, and the more frantically they will try to disentangle, detach themselves from the strangers they experience as an enveloping, suffocating, sucking-in, form- less substance” (Bauman, 1997:28). Bauman (1997:17) indicates that strangers “befog and eclipse the boundary lines which ought to be clearly seen”. He (1997:18) declares two strategies in order to manage successfully with strangers:

'anthropophagie' and 'anthropoemic'. Indeed, the anthropophagie strategy is the assimilation process. It seeks to transform the stranger into someone indistinguishable from the larger group through devouring them, swallowing them up. On the contrary, an anthropoemic strategy aims to vomit out strangers, expatriate them to the outer limits of a physical or psychological territory, or incarceration through concrete as well as invisible means.

Bauman (1991:94) defines the privatization of strangerhood as a phenomenon with these worlds: "...the mode of 'being a stranger' is experienced, to a varying degree, by all and every member of contemporary society with its extreme division of labour and separation of functionally separated spheres".

Bauman (2002:113) also describes people who live in refugee camps as such: "They are neither settled nor on the move, they are neither sedentary nor nomads".

Mead's (1934) social self theory is based on these concepts: 'self,' 'me,' and 'I'. His theory examines how the self is constructed. The social self, for Mead, is emerges from social interactions through observing and interacting with other people, responding to the way in which others think about oneself, and adopting others' opinions and feelings about oneself. According to Mead, there are three main activities to develop the self: language, play, and games. Mead notes that identities are created through agreement, disagreement, and negotiation with others in the society. Identities or social selves are characteristically formed through inclusive and exclusive parts.

Diken (1998:135) emphasizes that the category of the stranger is not an essentialist category because there are degrees of strangeness. He explains that those 'unwanted strangers are more strangers than others'. According to Diken, there are degrees of strangeness. Some types of strangers are "selected out to condense and concretize the undesirable sides of the stranger-in-general as unambivalent images". He underlines that the concept of guest has started to be used for immigrant and which consequences it has as follows:

“...category of guests was one used for decades to define the immigrant, something that perhaps also explains a deep and (un)conscious desire in the immigration debate, that is, a desire to see the stranger as a guest: “guest worker”” (Diken, 1998:135).

According to Karakayalı (2006:324), in the 20th century, the most paradigmatic example of the stranger was the migrant worker who performs unqualified, manual labor. In the 21st century, this figure “seems to be increasingly replaced by the refugee who is kept in closely scrutinized asylums, or the illegal immigrant who hides in containers in commercial ships or who crosses borders, crawling under barbed wires in the dark”. The case of “guest workers” is actually considerably important in order to perceive the situation of strangers in modern society. The relation of the stranger to dirt as almost universal consensus “seems to be all the more emphasized in the 20th century, overshadowing all other attributes of strangers, such as mobility and neutrality” (Karakayalı, 2006:324).

Within the scope of refugee studies, “labeling”, Burnett states (2013:2), “can have the effect of creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ and designating an identifying mark that can essentially create and/or compound the feeling of being an ‘other’”. Apart from the legal distinction, the feeling of ‘otherness’ is most obviously experienced by refugees and the host society. ‘The Othering process’ aims to create an identity based upon a perception, particularly characterized by difference, affecting their social identities both internally and externally (Burnett, 2013:4). ‘They’ can be defined as ‘not we’, or negation of ‘we’, mostly distinguished by color or other physical distinction or by language’ (Burnett, 2013:18).

Karakayalı (2006:315) asserts that “there is an asymmetrical distribution of tasks between strangers and “native” members of a group in the process of refugee identity construction. Strangers are often excluded from those domains of activity that are open to “native” members while they tend to be active in those domains that other members are either unable or unwilling to participate”.

The stranger’s presence in the host society is not the only reason for othering of the stranger in case of migration. Migration policy is also equally effective in the migration process. Gupta and Gerguson (1992:17) explain that migration policy is directly related to the othering process, and they state: “the area of immigration and

immigration law is one practical area where the politics of space and the politics of otherness link up very directly”.

Agamben (1998:85) underlines that sovereign ban divides the individuals in the bios (the political life) such as the citizens, and individuals resigned to ‘bare life’, a life without rights such as the refugees. According to him, “every time refugees represent not individual cases but -as happens more and more often today- a mass phenomenon”.

In this part of the study, the stranger concept of Simmel and Bauman; Siu’s sojourner and Park’s marginal man were examined in order to understand the relationship between the host society and refugees. I will try to describe methodology of the thesis in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE RESEARCH PROCESS

#### 3.1 The Research Question and its Significance

The purpose of this study is to investigate host society's responses towards refugees living in Abidinpaşa District. Since the majority of refugees settled in Abidinpaşa are Iraqi Turkmens, it can be generally assumed that their acceptance by the host community will be easier because of their consanguinity compared to other refugees. However this research is aimed at testing this assumption and tried to analyse the possible dynamics between the host and the refugee community.

With regard to this main aim, the guiding questions for the research are:

- 1) How does the host society construct the refugee identity?
- 2) Which factors are effective in determining the acceptance of the refugees by the host society?
- 3) In which circumstances does the host society experience conflicts of interest with the refugee group?
- 4) How is the co-existence of the host society and the refugee group shaped?

Although the number of researches on the refugees in Turkey has increased after the Civil War in Syria, the number of researches that aim to search out the othering of the refugees by the local community who use the concepts of “us” and “them” is quite rare. Therefore, in order to find solutions to this particular problem, it is immensely necessary to direct academic research into examining the daily relationship between the host society and the refugee group and the dynamics that form the basis of such relationship. Also, following the Syrian refugee flow, which started in 2011 and continued intermittently since then, the researches in Turkey have

been focused on the Syrian refugees and neglected all refugees from other countries. The researches on the Iraqi refugees, the second biggest refugee group in Turkey, are quite rare.

### **3.2. Method of Study**

This study uses a qualitative research method. The original data in this thesis was gathered from semi-structured in-depth interviews, conducted with local people and some NGO representatives of national and international organisations. In total, I conducted 25 interviews: 15 with inhabitants of Abidinpaşa, 10 with the representatives of the NGOs and the INGOs (from ASAM, IOM, Amnesty International, UNHCR, and Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies). Also, interviews were held with the representatives of Iraqi Turks Cultural and Fraternal Organisation, Türkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation, and Mamak Turkmen House. I decided to interview NGO representatives in order to learn about general problems of refugees living in Ankara.

I accessed all my respondents using a snowball technique. At first I learned about the Abidinpaşa District from my inquiry from various refugee NGOs that there is a majority of immigrants living in this neighbourhood. Then, through a lawyer friend of mine I access some families who accepted and trusted me as a friend. With their help I managed to reach to other respondents and completed 15 interviews. To understand the effects of refugee influx to Ankara and the reflections of the local people this field study is conducted in the Abidinpaşa during a period of six months.

The population of the study is Iraqi Turkmen settled in Turkey. The Iraqi people are the second biggest refugee group following the Syrians. This group coming from Iraq to Turkey as a result of a forced migration is not homogenous. Among them are Christians, Yazidis, and Turkmen. According to the official data provided by Provincial Directorate of Immigration Administration, there are 30,903 registered Iraqi Turkmen refugees as of February 2017.

The main limitation in this study is that the data on the population of the Iraqi Turkmen refugees received from public institutions and non-governmental organizations do not match. The fact that the population distribution of the Iraqi Turkmen refugees in Turkey and Ankara is not known precisely prevents the possibility of searching for answers to the questions of whether the sample represents the whole.

This work is the product of field research I have carried out in different times within 6 months, combining in-depth interviews and individual observations. This research is based upon 15 recorded (voice recording and note taking) and many unrecorded interviews that were conducted at different times at Abidinpaşa and 10 recorded interviews that were conducted at five different NGOs and INGOs. Also, there are unrecorded interviews with the representatives of Iraqi Turks Cultural and Fraternal Association and Türkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation, and Mamak Turkmen House, conducted in order to receive general information about the Iraqi Turkmens in Ankara.

The field study was completed from March to September 2016 within a period of 6 months. I spent a lot of time in the community with the local inhabitants. During the interviews, most of the time was spent in the neighborhood real estate agencies, bakeries, or the houses of the interviewees, and we also held small talk with the locals. Besides the interviews taken place at the interviewees' houses, we also joined women's coffee table chats. In two different real estate agencies in the neighbourhood, we had informal conversations in addition to the interviews. Interviewing was one of the effective methods I used during my data collection. I did not interview anyone on the street or in the community, neither did I base my interview on sample, but it was rather purposive. This is to make sure that the people who were engaged were the right people to interview considering the pressure of time constraint. The interview questions were grouped under two categories for local people and for the representatives of the NGOs and INGOs. Individual observation and participation was based on visits to the local community and to ASAM who is implementing partner (IP) of UNHCR. Before I started my fieldwork, secondary data

was one of the methods I thought of using since a number of studies had gone on about refugees in general and refugees in Turkey. I did not take photographs indiscriminately and tape record without obtaining prior permission. I also tried to preserve the anonymity of my informants. The reported experiences of people of the host community and of the people with whom refugees interact in their efforts to make a living (the NGOs' and INGOs' staff, traders etc.) illustrate the complex interplay between personal networks, livelihoods, and broader relations between the refugee and host populations.

All of the official data in the report was obtained from AFAD, DGMM and UNHCR. It must be kept in mind, though, that the data changes constantly. It is quite difficult to reach the numeric data about the Iraqi Turkmen refugees. The records of the refugees from Iraq are kept as a whole by the official authorities. Therefore, the data on the Iraqi Turkmens was obtained from Mamak Turkmen House. An expert from Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies stated that it is quite unlikely to obtain any specific numbers concerning the Iraqi Turkmens.

The study also draws on the rich discussion that took place between practitioners, academics, policy makers, and Syrian refugees during the "Workshop for Social Coordination, Planning and Psychosocial Support for the Syrian Citizens under Temporary Protection in Turkey"<sup>2</sup> held in Ankara just prior to writing. Working as a rapporteur in one of the groups in the Workshop gave me the opportunity to understand the approach of the official authorities, the NGOs and INGOs towards the refugees. Although the workshop focused on the adaptation of the Syrian refugees, it is important to affect the other refugee groups, as well.

In order to make the greatest possible contribution to the field of refugee studies and refugee-host literature in particular, I chose to pursue a qualitative, single case study method for my research. The various methods I used included individual interviews and general observations of the situation in Ankara, made by spending time with

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<sup>2</sup> Türkiye'de Geçici Koruma Altında Bulunan Suriye Vatandaşlarına Yönelik Psikososyal Destek ve Sosyal Uyum Koordinasyon ve Planlama Çalışmayı

various NGOs and individuals working with the refugees and the host communities. I focus on both the host government's refugee policies and host community's opinion.

The socio-demographic qualities of the people, interviewed within the scope of this study, are seen in the two tables below.

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of local interviewees

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Education Level</b>	<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Job</b>	<b>Residence time in the neighborhood</b>
<b>H1</b>	F	41	High School	Married	Housewife	36 years
<b>H2</b>	F	64	High School	Widow	Nurse (Retired)	23 years
<b>H3</b>	M	47	High School	Married	Estate Agent	25 years
<b>H4</b>	M	49	Primary School	Married	Shop Owner (Dried nuts and fruits)	20 years
<b>H5</b>	M	47	High School	Married	Baker	35 years
<b>H6</b>	M	63	High School	Single	Retired (Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation)	20 years
<b>H7</b>	F	38	Primary School	Widow	Salesperson in a bakery	6 years
<b>H8</b>	M	54	University drop out	Widow	Estate Agent	54 years
<b>H9</b>	M	35	High School	Married	Repairman	22 years
<b>H10</b>	F	33	High School	Married	Housewife	18 years
<b>H11</b>	F	42	Primary School	Married	Housewife	27 years
<b>H12</b>	F	38	High School	Single	Seamstress	35 years
<b>H13</b>	M	25	High School	Single	Student	17 years
<b>H14</b>	M	29	High School	Widow	Salesman	29 years
<b>H15</b>	F	24	High School	Single	Student	12 years

Out of the local interviewees are 7 female and 8 male people. 3 of them are graduates of primary school; 11 of them are of high school; and 1 of them is a college dropout. 7 of them are married; 4 of them are widow; and 4 are single. Almost all of the interviewees lived in the neighborhood for the most of their lives.

Table 2. Socio-demographic characteristics and organizational position of representative of the NGOs and INGOs

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Education Level</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Years of professional experience</b>
<b>E1</b>	F	Undergraduate degree	Senior Protection Assistant	UNHCR	7 years
<b>E2</b>	M	Undergraduate degree	Refugee Rights Coordinator	Amnesty International	8 years
<b>E3</b>	F	PhD	Senior Project Manager	IOM	12 years
<b>E4</b>	M	Graduate degree	General Coordinator	ASAM	11 years
<b>E5</b>	M	Undergraduate degree	Lawyer	ASAM	7 months
<b>E6</b>	F	Undergraduate degree	Psychologist	ASAM	2 years
<b>E7</b>	F	Undergraduate degree	Social Worker (Registration Unit)	ASAM	5 months
<b>E8</b>	F	Undergraduate degree	Registration Unit Coordinator	ASAM	2 years
<b>E9</b>	M	Graduate degree	Middle East Expert	Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies	8 years
<b>E10</b>	M	Graduate degree	Emergency Program Coordinator/ Psychosocial Officer	IOM	5 years

In-depth interviews were held with 10 people from five different organizations that run studies about the refugees. 5 of them are male, and the other five are female. Almost all of them are college graduates. The interviewees have been working at these organizations for long years. Their positions and expertise are various. That is particularly preferred in order to be able to look at the subject from different professional perspectives.

### 3.3 Describing the Field

A number of reasons motivate the choice of Abidinpaşa as a case study. Ankara had not been among the settlements of the refugees in Turkey since 2011. Until then, the refugees had been sent to the satellite towns where they would be settled after registered at UNHCR. Temporary protection status was given to the Syrian refugees who came as victims of the Syrian Civil War. On the other hand, humanitarian residence permit was granted to the refugees from Iraq, running away from ISIS due to the conflicting atmosphere in their countries after 2014. The most distinguishing case about these refugees compared to other refugee groups is that they had to settle in a satellite town because of the status given to them. As a result of this, there was quite a limited number of refugees, who left the town where they were settled without permit before 2011, but the Syrian refugees after 2011 and Iraqi refugees after 2014 started to live particularly in the districts of Altındağ and Mamak. The neighborhood of Abidinpaşa, where this study was held, has become one of the neighborhoods in Ankara, hosting the highest Iraqi Turkmen population especially after the Iraqi refugee of 2014.




Figure 1: Map of Abidinpaşa

Source: [www.haritamap.com](http://www.haritamap.com)

Abidinpaşa is a neighborhood in the district of Mamak in Ankara. It takes its name from its governor Abidin Pasha, who was appointed there in 1883. Abidin Pasha was an Ottoman statesman and poet. He was the father of Ahmed Dino of Preveza, one of the prominent people in Albania, and the grandfather of the well-known painter Abidin Dino. The governor particularly chose Abidinpaşa as the neighborhood where the air was purest, and had a manor house built there for him. Under the authority of Çankaya Municipality, the manor house is now used by Ankarılılar Association, and put under protection by Manor Houses, Cultural, and Natural Heritage Preservation Board. Tıp Fakültesi Street, which starts at Dikimevi Intersection, is the main artery of the neighborhood. The ground floors of the apartments that are all situated along the main road are generally shops. Among these shops are food stores or boutiques as well as repair shops, hardware stores, or real estate agencies. The local people mostly use these shops for their needs. Both residents and shop owners are local. There are wide pavements in streets and a lot of parks in the neighborhood. Abidinpaşa offers a good reflection about Turkey's internal and international migratory dynamics. Located 4 km. from the old town (Ulus) and 5 km from the city center (Kızılay Square), Abidinpaşa is one of the oldest districts in Ankara. Abidinpaşa's demographic transformation affects the local population's perceptions of the newcomers.

### **3.4 Definition of Basic Concepts**

In this part of the study, the basic concepts used in the thesis will be defined. For the definitions concerning the status of the refugees, both international and national migration legislation will be referred to. Turkey's refugee system has a dual structure. Temporary protection status was collectively given to the Syrian refugees who came after 2011. The refugees coming from other countries have to apply for international protection individually. In addition to this, similar to the case of the Syrian refugees, the Iraqi refugees who collectively came to the borders after 2013 received humanitarian residence permit. The refugees with temporary protection

status and humanitarian residence permit do not have international protection. In order to get international protection, the Syrian and Iraqi refugees also need to apply individually. There are three different international protection categories within the Turkish refugee legislation: “refugee”, “conditional refugee”, and “secondary protection status”. According to the Turkish refugee legislation, only refugees who seek asylum because of the persecutions in Europe are defined as “refugee”. This article enabled the countries to limit their liabilities that would occur within the scope of the Geneva Convention in 1951. The limitation in question was abolished with the 1967 Protocol, but Turkey still holds this geographical limitation. It means that the individuals who come to Turkey from non-European countries and whose application for international protection is accepted are labeled as “conditional refugee” during the period that they wait for their transfer to another country. The secondary protection status, which is the third category of international protection, is given to the people who are not asylum seekers but still need protection since they cannot go back to their native countries because of death penalty, torture, or armed conflicts. “Permanent solution” refers to the three different solutions, defined by the UNHCR for voluntary repatriation to country of origin, local integration in the host country, and resettlement to third country. “Resettlement” means resettling the refugees who are victims of violence and torture, women and girls under the risk, and people who have serious health problems in a country where they could benefit from human rights. At the same time, it also refers to the transfer of conditional refugees who are not particularly in these vulnerable situations to a third country since the dual asylum policy does not allow a long-term settlement. Resettlement is one of the safe ways of legal acceptance for refugees. Therefore, this method plays an important role in protecting refugees and it works an effective tool to share the responsibility of refugee population at an international scale.

The asylum policies of the states are crucial in determining the local people’s acceptance of and adaptation to the refugee group. Turkey’s asylum policy is also effective in shaping the way that native people define the refugees and how treat them.

### 3.4.1 Refugee

Refugees have been described in various forms through the human history. Generally, the term indicates a person who seeks asylum in a foreign country because of war and violence, or out of fear of persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group" (Wenk, 1968:62). The 1951 Refugee Convention defined refugees as someone who

"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".

LFIP, which is the main asylum law of Turkey, defines refugee as

"a person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process."

In the official legislation of Turkey's asylum policy, the definition of the refugee has a "geographic limitation", emphasizing that a refugee is someone who seeks asylum "as a result of events occurring in European countries". Thus, only foreigners coming from Europe are considered as refugees, and other people coming from non-European countries are given statuses of conditional refugee, secondary protection status, temporary protection status, or humanitarian residence permit.

People can be refugees in three ways: individual refugees, prima facie refugees, refugee sur-plus. When people go out of their countries to another country and seek asylum there, they are considered as individual refugee. After they are interviewed for their status either at UNHCR or in the country where they seek asylum, they either get the status of refugee or rejected. Prima facie refugees are about mass population movements. Since UNHCR or the host countries cannot interview every asylum seeker individually, they accept everyone as a refugee at first. It is because

the reason for the people to leave their countries is obvious. For example, it might be because of war. The refugees coming from middle and south Iraq after the Iraqi War and refugees coming from Syria after the Syrian crises to Turkey are examples to this type of refugee status. The third category concerns people who leave their country to study at another country or to travel as a tourist. Later, they might seek asylum from the countries that they have been and live there as refugees because the conditions in their native countries change. This status is called refugee sur-plus.<sup>3</sup>

The concepts of refugee and asylum seeker might be often confused. In the international literature, if a person gets the asylum right in a country, he/she is labeled as refugee, and a person who wants to be accepted as a refugee in a country and applies for the refugee status is labeled as asylum seeker. In Turkey's policy, there is no category for asylum seekers in LFIP. Instead of asylum seeker, there is the concept of conditional refugee. However, UNHCR still uses refugee and asylum seeker in the official data about Turkey. This thesis uses the term refugees to refer to those who have fled persecution or conflict, regardless of the fact whether they have been recognized as such.

### **3.4.2 Asylum seeker**

An asylum-seeker is a person who declares he/she is a refugee, but whose argument has not yet been completely evaluated. There is no capacity to manage individual asylum interviews for everyone who crosses the border during mass refugee movements. Since it is obvious why people leave their countries, there is usually no need for individual asylum interviews under these circumstances. In these situations, such groups are usually named "prima facie" refugees. Asylum seekers, as a specified group of refugees, consist of individuals who have applied for asylum or refugee status but have not yet received a final decision (UNHCR, 2010). The term

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<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Family and Social Policies (2014) Refakatsiz Çocuklara Yönelik Hizmet Sunumu Eğitim Programı Eğitim Kaynak Dökümanı  
[http://cocukhizmetleri.aile.gov.tr/data/552bb0a4369dc57140fda44f/egitimkaynak\\_08122014.pdf](http://cocukhizmetleri.aile.gov.tr/data/552bb0a4369dc57140fda44f/egitimkaynak_08122014.pdf)

of asylum seeker is generally used to refer to individuals who wait for the result of their applications for refugee status, which is still under evaluation, either by the government or UNHCR. Although their status is not officially resolved yet, the refugees are not forced to go back to their native countries, and their rights should be defended. Turkey still keeps the principle of geographical limitation, set by the Convention of 1951. For this reason, Turkey gives conditional refugee status to the refugees coming from non-European countries and allows them to stay in the country temporarily until they are transferred to a third county as it is regulated by LFIP, which was dated in 2014 and numbered 6458. These people are accepted as refugees. Foreigners who seek international protection apply for the statuses of either refugee or conditional refugee when they come to Turkey. These individuals are named as “international protection applicants” until they officially receive their statuses.

### **3.4.3 Conditional refugee**

In Turkey’s asylum policy, instead of “asylum seeker”, “conditional refugees” is used to refer to these refugees. In LFIP, conditional refugee is defined as

“a person who as a result of events occurring outside European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country”.

### **3.4.4 Subsidiary Protection Status**

According to LFIP:

“A foreigner or a stateless person, who neither could be qualified as a refugee nor as a conditional refugee, shall nevertheless be granted subsidiary protection upon the status determination because if returned to the country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence would: a) be sentenced to death or face the execution of the death penalty; b) face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; c) face serious threat to himself or herself by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or nationwide armed conflict; and therefore is unable or for the reason of such threat is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence” .

Individuals who receive either refugee or conditional refugee statuses are also given an identity document with a foreigner identity number to be valid for three years. On the other hand, those who receive subsidiary protection status are given an identity document with a foreigner identity number to be valid only for one year. These identity documents are used as work permit and it is stated in the document as such. These individuals are not also required to receive any work permit.

### **3.4.5 Temporary Protection Status**

In the period of the 1990s, temporary protection of refugees (TP) surprisingly gained an increase, responding to forced migration, as it also seemed to displace the refugee regime that was based on the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its following 1967 Protocol. Since it is not a new concept, temporary protection had its various versions, which were codified in the African refugee convention in 1969. The convention was held when during mass flows of migration from Southeast Asia emerged twenty years ago and became a platform to have an intense debate on the perspective of flight from the Civil Wars in Central American during the 1980s. However, a more comprehensive arrangement of TP with an international level has been neither easily nor instantly reached. "Temporary protection" as a term might

refer to various practices, yet it is possible to use the concept with its generally accepted outlines rather than focusing on its specifics. For this reason, what is at the center of our exploration here is to search whether temporary protection can be or should be formalized either at the universal or regional context (Fitzpatrick, 2000: 279).

Turkey's "temporary protection" regime is particularly validated for the refugees from Syria, and it provides them with the legal permit to stay in the country together with basic human rights and services. The "temporary protection" status is granted in various forms: a prima facie, group-basis, people with Syrian nationalities, and stateless Palestinians who come from Syria. DGMM registers and decides over the status of the refugees, as it is the responsible authority to judge whether the refugees can be considered under the "temporary protection" regime, which relies on the Article 91 of the LFIP and the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) dated on October 22, 2014. Temporary protection is defined in LFI as such:

"Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection".

Temporary protection concerns the following categories of people, modeled within the scope of an official policy on temporary protection: (1) individuals who flee either international or internal armed conflict and whose lives, physical integrity, and liberty are threatened if they are to be returned to their homelands; (2) individuals who go through similar risks due to an internal strife or violence in their society of origins; (3) individuals who escape genocidal violence or persecution pursued by non-state actors, and who are not given the right of protection that they are granted by the 1951 Refugee Convention in their own states (4) individuals who flee natural disasters of severe scales that compromise their physical safety in their own countries (Fitzpatrick, 2000: 294).

For those who are under temporary protection, their employers undertake the application for work permit. Also, in order to employ these individuals who are under temporary protection in seasonal farming or animal husbandry works, they

should also get work permit waiver. To receive work permit waiver to work in seasonal farming or animal husbandry works, foreigners go to the Provincial Directorate of the city where they are settled under temporary document and apply for the work permit waiver by submitting their temporary protection identity document/ foreigner credentials document.<sup>4</sup>

### **3.4.6 Humanitarian Residence Permit**

Humanitarian residence permit is the document that certifies foreigners are legally settled in Turkey. The processing of residence permit is regulated by the articles between 19-49, titled “Residence” of the second section of 6458 Foreigners and International Protection Law. There are six types of residence permit for foreigners, regulated by LFPI: short-term residence permit, family residence permit, student residence permit, long-term residence permit, humanitarian residence permit, victim of human trafficking residence permit. After 2013, humanitarian residence permit was granted to the Iraqi refugees who collectively came to settle in Turkey. The circumstances under which humanitarian residence permit can be given are described in LFPI as follows:

“Under the following cases, upon approval of the Ministry, a humanitarian residence permit with a maximum duration of one year at a time may be granted and renewed by the governorates without seeking the conditions for other types of residence permits: a) where the best interest of the child is of concern; b) where, notwithstanding a removal decision or ban on entering Turkey, foreigners cannot be removed from Turkey or their departure from Turkey is not reasonable or possible; c) in the absence of a removal decision in respect of the foreigner pursuant to Article 55; ç) where there is a judicial appeal against the actions carried out pursuant to Articles 53, 72 and 77; d) throughout the removal actions of the applicant to the first country of asylum or a safe third country; e) in cases when foreigners should be allowed to enter into and stay in Turkey, due to emergency or in view of the protection of the national interests as well as reasons of public order and security, in the absence of the possibility to obtain one of the other types of residence permits

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<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzinlerine Dair Uygulama Rehberi <http://www.calismaizni.gov.tr/media/1035/gkkuygulama.pdf>

due to their situation that precludes granting a residence permit; f) in extraordinary circumstances”.

Foreigners with humanitarian residence permit may also apply for another form residence permit that they qualify for except long-term residence permit within the validity of their permit.

Individuals who apply for an extension of their residence permit are given an application document, which requires no payment. This document gives the right to the foreigner to stay in Turkey until his/her application for extension is resolved although their permit is already due and to go abroad and come back to the country without having to wait for the extension of their residence permit.

In the next chapter, the transformation of refugee policy in the world and in Turkey will be explained, fundamental statistics about the refugees in Turkey will be given, and researches about refugees in the world and in Turkey will be mentioned.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REFUGEE RELATED POLICIES IN THE WORLD AND TURKEY**

The approaches of the host society towards the acceptance of refugees cannot be considered as independent of international and national refugee regimes. It is the state that regulates laws and rules to define who is part of it and who is excluded from its territory. In order to analyze the experience of asylum seekers, it is crucial to examine the processes of exclusion and inclusion. The state's policies concerning immigration and refugees as well as its decisions about them play an important role in shaping the public perception of refugees, particularly through its influence on the media (Borri et al, 2014: 22). The asylum policy of the country where refugees settle down is highly crucial for both the adaptation of the refugees and the host community. For this reason, in the first part of this chapter the historical transformation of the perception of refugees in the world and Turkey will be evaluated with reference to refugee policies. The basis of the modern refugee system is not independent of capitalist economic structure both politically and economically. Asylum policies of the states evolve based on the political and economic conjuncture. After addressing the birth and development of the asylum policy in the world and Turkey's asylum policy, the historical background of Iraqi refugees in Turkey will be explored. Following the statistics and locations of refugees in Turkey, refugee studies in the world and Turkey will be included.

## **4.1 The Transformation Of The Refugee Policies In The World**

### **4.1.1 A Brief Migration History of World**

At the present time there are 244 million international migrants in the world. According to the UN data, nowadays there are more than 60 million displaced people, either fleeing wars or other violation of human rights, and more than 20 million refugees in the world. More than half of the refugees are children under 18. 86% of refugees or displaced people in the world usually live in developing countries.<sup>5</sup>

The earliest large-scale population movement in the world was the transportation of 9-11 million people as slaves from Africa to America between the years of 1470 and 1870. After that, there was a larger migration movement between 1820 and 1930 as a consequence of the imperialist attitudes of European countries. England, Spain, Portugal, Dutch, and France established colonies in order to create new settlements for their increasing population, and 55 to 60 million European migrated to overseas countries. Also, the United States of America was the main target country for that migration wave (Boyle et al., 1998:25). As a result of this international migration wave, European immigrants led to the establishment of such new countries as Canada, the United States of America, Australia, and New Zealand. In these newly established countries, the host society became the minority group following this intense migration wave. Within the same period, there was also a second migration wave to another direction. During this second migration wave, in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries European traders shipped slaves from North Africa to South Africa, the Caribbean Islands, and especially to Brazil (Weiner, 1995: 17). The following international migration wave was during the liquidation of the empires after World War I. The liquidation of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires led to the establishment of new states in the central, east, and south Europe. When these states

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<sup>5</sup> UN International Migration Report 2015  
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015.pdf>

decided to form homogenous society acting upon a forced migration policy that they adopted due to the influence of nationalism, there occurred a large scale of refugee movements.

The 1920s witnessed processes of large population exchanges in many parts of the world. Migration movements of the period included Belarusians fleeing the Russian Revolution and its consequential civil war, and the Jews fleeing the Nazi persecution in the 1930s (Weiner, 1995: 18). The next migration movement was during the birth of new independent countries in Asia, Middle East, and Africa after World War II. Since most of these new countries were ethnically divided and had authoritarian political regimes, there occurred inevitable violence that led to millions of refugees. The fifth wave of international migration movement was in the same period due to economical reasons.

Migration predominantly took the form of work force or brain drain from underdeveloped countries to developed countries with the influence of the development policies employed after World War II. In this period, Europe, North, and Central America were among the main regions of migration. In the 1950s and 1960s, Western Europe, the United States of America, and Middle East countries that produce oil started to demand guest workers in order to make their economy more efficient. From 1945 to the early 1970s, three essential forms of migration developed, resulting in new and ethnically various populations that settled in industrially advanced countries: migration of workers particularly from the margins of Europe to Western Europe by means of 'guest worker systems'; migration of 'colonial workers' back to their colonial powers; and lastly permanent migration to the continents of North America and Oceania, initially from Europe and later from the countries in Asia and Latin America (Castles&Miller, 2013). Although migrant workers were at first brought to work temporarily, most of the migrant workers especially in Europe and America settled down in these countries (Weiner, 1995: 19-20).

It is in the 1960s that the reason of migration started to change radically. Since the 1960s, millions of people have crossed international borders to escape conflict and disorder in their home countries, and with them they have brought problems for their

asylum countries. How the host countries responded to these mass migration movements of refugees have differed to a great extent even among states or between single governments throughout time. Some of them have received refugees with such generosity that they offered them with the assistance they might need as well as guaranteed their safety. Some other governments have tried to block refugees' entrance to their countries, or they have not treated them properly by putting restrictions on their movements and even risking their safety (Jacobsen, 1996: 655).

As a result of the change in migration's characteristics and the transformation of forced migration into mass migration, there have also been some changes in international refugee regimes. The international order has gone through two major developments since the 1980s, which have greatly affected the international refugee system. The first one was the growth of neoliberal hegemony in the world, which had a considerable effect on the countries that received migration. Parallel to the changes in the economic system, transformed through the recent neo-liberal attitudes, migration policies also changed. The second development occurred at the end of the Cold War years, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During this period, Eastern Europe was among the regions that generated one of the highest populations of refugees in the world (Ünlüer, 2015). Western countries, on the other hand, designed a similar outline to employ restrictive reforms in their migration policies that limited access of the asylum seekers and economic migrants to their countries (Lavenex: 1999; 20-21). Such precautions even led western countries to implement more restrictive policies by the end of the 1980s during which xenophobia increased to a great extent, and they altered visa requirements and issued a list of countries that require visas from them. They gradually added new countries to their list throughout time. The earliest form of the list for visa requirements also included countries that generated refugees. (Sztucki, 1999: 72). Neo-liberal economic regime shaped modern refugee system to answer the needs of the international order. For this purpose, the asylum seeker status as a temporary refugee status has also been added to the refugee system. Therefore, the decision of the host country has become effective during the procedures in determining the status of the refugee rather than the statement of the person who applies for the refugee status. As

stated by Sallan-Gül (2002: 83), migrations from undeveloped countries to developed ones during the 1970s transgressed the boundaries of the agreements among countries on external immigration, and the problem of the illegal immigrants gradually gained more importance. The economic and political crises after the second half of the 1970s and during the 1980s caused economic limitations and increase in unemployment, which as a consequence increased oppositions to the new migrations. Racism and fanatical nationalistic movements gained force in many European countries, especially in Germany, and xenophobia increased.

A large scale of migration in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is mass migration. These can be examples to recent mass migrations: Mozambican refugees, fleeing the civil war of 1977-1992 in their countries to Rwanda and Tanzania, almost 10 million Bengali refugees who ran away from the Bangladesh Liberation War at 1971 to cross the Indian border, Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees who left their countries due to the Vietnam War, Iranian refugees who had to leave after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, 6 million Afghan refugees who escaped from the Soviet-Afghan War which took more than nine years between December 1979 and February 1989, Kurdish refugees who settled in Turkey and Iran from Iraq after the Gulf War (2 August 1990 - 28 February 1991) which continued over seven months, more than two million Bosnian people who were displaced after the Bosnian war (1992-1999), and over one million people who were displaced as a result of the Darfur crisis in Sudan. Among the events that led to the mass migration movements during the 20<sup>th</sup> century are political changes in Central European countries, the regime shift in Iran during the 1980s, the reunification of East Germany and West Germany, the ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia, and conflicts in North Iraq. The most recent refugee movement in the world occurred after more than 4 million Syrian people who fled the Syrian Civil War which started in 2011 sought asylum in their neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

#### **4.1.2 Historical Development of Asylum Policy in the World**

Refugees have always been part of human history; however, they have been denied the required protection or rights until the League of Nations created an international forum to determine the responsibility of all international community concerning the status of refugees (Feller, 2001:130). The League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) was established in 1921 under the direction of Fridthof Nansen. He created “Nansen Passport” which is a refugee travel document (Torpey, 2000:128). The refugee policies issued by HCR are considered to be the first example of international refugee regime. Initially, it was designed to be valid for a certain period of time to resolve the conflicts generated by Russian refugees. Later, the League of Nations provided administrative support for HCR, but HCR still depended on non-governmental organizations to employ its staff and to provide supplies. It was the first case that a refugee problem was turned into an international issue, yet the new regime’s success was mainly flawed since the League of Nations lacked two crucial world powers of the day in its organization: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. As the refugee issue was regarded as a temporary and specific problem at the time, there was no demand for universalizing the solutions to the problem. With no need to define general characteristics of who is accepted a refugee, HCR depended on a category-oriented approach, categorizing refugees according to their group affiliation and origins (Barnett, 2002: 242). Also, the refugee problem was regarded as an issue that could be resolved through mutual negotiations among countries. The United Nations’ “1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees” and “1938 Convention concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany” are the first international conventions in the refugee regime. However, a few countries signed both conventions. In addition, these conventions treated refugees as a community or group rather than individuals. Another element that these two conventions also share is that they guaranteed instant support and safe environment for refugees and aimed for an international legal regulation concerning refugees.

A number of institutions were established between 1921 and 1946 during the period of the League of Nations to undertake either partly or completely the deeds of the High Commissioner for Refugees: the Nansen International Office for Refugees (1931-1938), the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany (1933-1938), the Office of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees (1939-1946) and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (1938-1947) (Jaeger, 2001: 727). The International Refugee Organization (IRO), founded in 1947, preceded UNHCR to resolve the refugee issues in Europe following the Second World War, it was valid by June 30, 1950 (Feller, 2001:130).

The international refugee regime centers around the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as the primary agency and around the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees as the primary international law (Kelly, 2001: 303-304). UNHCR started to function on January 1, 1951. At the onset of UNHCR's establishment, they only had to find solutions for almost one million refugees who left their countries to flee Nazism or communism in Europe. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted on July 28, 1951 and came into force on April 22, 1954. UNHCR's work principally included legislations about guaranteeing access to and facilitating integration of the refugees in accordance with the 1951 Convention. The 1951 Convention was and has been the first and only instrument with a universal character that binds refugee protection. Indeed, the Convention was a channel of addressing the issue of the refugee status rather than offering any solutions for refugees or searching into the causes of their problem. Although it depended upon human rights principles, it determined the liabilities of the states rather than of the individuals. The 1951 Convention brought about a major contribution of globalizing the definition of refugee - a person who flees their country due to a justifiable fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, and association with a particular social or political group. To accompany the 1951 Convention, a protocol was issued in 1967 to abolish geographical and time limitation and preserve the universalist character of this definition (Feller, 2001:130-131).

The 1951 Refugee Convention is the key legal document of today's international refugee protection. The 1951 Convention defined refugees as

“any person who (as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and) owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

The principle of non-refoulement in the 1951 Convention is highly important in terms of refugee rights. In Article 33 (1), the principle states that:

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

The aim of non-refoulement principle is to protect displaced people who are seeking asylum in foreign territory from all forms of human rights violations in asylum countries. In general, three long-term or “durable” solutions are advocated for refugees: voluntary repatriation, local integration into the country of asylum and resettlement to third countries (Ferris, 1998: 13-14). Due to the increase in refugee movements in the world, a majority of refugee people experienced severe problems since they were not defined as refugees within the scope of the 1951 Convention which had geographical and time limitation. For this reason, the 1967 Protocol was signed. With this protocol, the words “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and ...”, and the words “a result of such events”, were omitted from the 1951 Convention. Also, the phrase “geographic limitation” was omitted from the sentence that considers “the events that took place in Europe”. Together, the Convention and the UNHCR provide the legal and institutional basis for defining who is a refugee and what this status means in international law (Castles, 2004: 876). The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol constitute the basis of asylum policy in the world.

## 4.2 Asylum Policy of Turkey

Turkey's asylum policy has been shaped through refugee movements that have emerged throughout time. During the period of the new Republic between the years of 1922 and 1945, almost 1.185.000 people came to Turkey from Greece, the Balkans, and Germany; between the years of 1988 and 2000, approximately 900.000 people came from Iraq, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These are among the most palpable examples of Turkey's history of migration (DGMM, 2016:23). The table below presents the most concrete examples of migration flows to Turkey. All these migration flows are among the movements that have affected Turkey's asylum policy.

Table 3. The most concrete examples of migration flows to Turkey

1922-1938	384 thousand people came from Greece	Population exchange
1923-1945	800 thousand people came from the Balkans	The Settlement Agreement
1933-1945	800 people came from Germany	Jews escaping from Nazi Germany
1988	51.542 people came from Iraq	The Halabja Massacre
1989	345 thousand people came from Bulgaria	Turks escaping from the assimilation policies of Bulgarian government
1991	467.489 people came from Iraq	The Gulf War I
1992-1998	20 thousand people came from Bosnia	The Bosnian War
1999	17.746 people came from Kosovo	The Kosovo War
2001	10.500 people came from Macedonia	The Macedonian Civil War
2011- 2017	2.992.567 people came from Syria to Turkey	The domestic turmoil

Source: Table created by the author with data from DGMM and UNHCR

Although the parties of the convention rely on the 1951 Geneva Convention as their fundamental legislation, they prefer to make amendments depending on the period in which they encounter refugee crisis, or on the population of the refugees. A number of paradigmatic shifts since the early 20th century and especially the Syrian refugee crisis have initiated a process of revisionism with regards to Turkey's international migration policies.

The table below displays the major legal instrument of Turkey's asylum policy.

Table 4. The Major Legal Instrument of Turkey Asylum Policy

<b>Major Law</b>	<b>Major Policy Components</b>
Law on Settlement (1934)	Tool for the construction of the nation-state
Turkish Law on Foreigners (1950)	To regulate the conditions for the residency and settlement of foreigners
Passport Law (1950)	To define unauthorised entry or exit to the country
1994 Regulation	To handle the large inflows of refugee from the Middle East
LFIP (2013)	To provide management of legal migration and irregular migration

In the next four parts of the study, in parallel to political, economical, and social transformations, Turkey's experience about international migration will be analyzed in four periods: the early years of the Republic (1923- 1950), the period from 1950 to 1980, the period from 1980 to 2010, and finally the period from 2010 onwards.

#### **4.2.1 The Period of 1923-1950: Settlement Policies of the Early State Formation Period and Population Exchange**

In this period, nation-building concerns determined the nature of emigration and immigration flows in the country as the departure of non-Muslims and arrivals of Turks and Muslims dominated the flows (İçduygu&Aksel, 2013:185). Two main aims of the nation states are "to control population movements, and to the very production of the 'people' as a political community taking precedence over class

divisions” (Balibar, 1991a:48). At the basis of a nation-state are such objective elements as an ethnic identity, a shared history, a national anthem, a land for which their ancestors sacrificed their lives, a national economy, and fundamental rights and duties shared by all. After World War I, empires started to dissolve, and nation-states were replaced them. As Smith (1988: 129) also notes, “few states are full nation-states”. Most of these nation-states included various ethnic groups in their lands. These new nation-states aimed to create a homogeneous population through population exchange. Under the influence of the same movement, Turkey also attempted to create a homogeneous nation-state. As a result of population exchange agreements, signed during this period, 1.3 million Turkish and Muslim people came to Turkey, and almost 3 million non-Turkish and non-Muslim people left the country (İçduygu et al., 2008). In this period, the most notable function of migration was to homogenize the population in terms of ethnicity and religion, and to build a nation as the most significant element of a nation-state. Turkey’s asylum policies, formed during the process of nation-state formation, still have its influence on its contemporary asylum policy. The Law on Settlement is the major piece of legislation governing immigration into Turkey.

Although the Law on Settlement of 1934 no. 2510 in Turkey identifies types of immigrants such as immigrant, free immigrant, individual immigrant, and collective immigrant, revisions based on ethnicities are still prescribed. According to Soykan (2010:6) this law “was one of the major developments of the Turkish Republic for construction of the national identity in policy. For the aim of assimilating non-Turkish elements, the right to freedom of movement within the country for citizens was violated. The non-Turkish population dispersed in the country to be absorbed by the Turkish population”. The Law remarkably restricts the right of immigration to Turkey to be inclusive only of people from "Turkish descent and culture". In the same manner, the Turkish law of the same period had put strict restrictions on employment opportunities for the non-nationals whereas it had employed a positively discriminating attitude towards people who were non-nationals but of “Turkish descent and culture” (Avcı& Kirişçi, 2006: 149). The Turkish Law on Foreigners is the chief legal instrument that authorizes the residential and working

statuses of foreigners who immigrate to Turkey. According to this instrument, foreigner people must apply for a residence permit to their local police office after they go through a specified investigation (İçduygu&Sert, 2009:3). For those foreigners outside the scope of the Law on Settlement, the Passport Law No. 5682 of 1950 and the Law Regarding Residence and Travel of Foreign Subjects in Turkey No. 5683<sup>6</sup>(Residence Law) are valid for their processes. Any acts of unauthorized entry to or exit from Turkey are identified as an offence by the 1950 Passport Law. For this reason, if any foreigner is caught by the Turkish police or gendarmerie while attempting to pass the borders without any official permission or legal documents, he/she is directly taken into custody and loses the right to apply for asylum (Soykan, 2010:11).

In this period, the Law on Settlement is the main regulation that sets the conditions for who can immigrate to, settle down, and get refugee status from the country. As part of the new Republic's nation-building project, the law demonstratively gave preference to immigrants and refugees of Turkish descent and culture. People "with such backgrounds are permitted to stay in the country on an unofficial basis, settle, work, and acquire Turkish citizenship once they have resided in Turkey for five years without any interruptions" (İçduygu&Sert, 2009:4). The Turkish Republic had no specific refugee policy from 1923 until the 1950s. The main feature of migration during this period is that the Turkish people in the Balkans were settled in Turkey while the non-Turkish population in Turkey was asked to leave the country. After the World War II, however, a bipolar power structure was created, and the UN was established. All these developments transformed the international refugee regime, similarly affecting Turkey's own asylum policies (Latif, 2002:20). Although Turkey's asylum policy changed, the emphasis on "Turkish descent and culture", stated by the Law on Settlement, has preserved its significance for long years. The Law on Settlement remained in force until 2006.

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<sup>6</sup> Pasport Law No. 5682 and Residence Law No. 5683 was published on the Official Gazette dated July 24, 1950.

#### **4.2.2 The Period of 1950-1980: The Migration Boom**

In this period, the migration movements were migration from village to city due to rapid urbanization, labor migration to abroad, and cognate migration. Main characteristic of international migration is labor emigration from Turkey to Europe. In order to rebuild the European economy after the World War II, Germany, Belgium, Austria, France undertook a serious development plan. The recovery attempts of these countries brought about the need for a considerable amount of work force from other countries. The migration of the Turkish citizens to compensate the lack of labor force in the markets of the West European countries started in the early years of the 1960s. The Turkish workers' migration to West Europe continued until 1974. During this era, international migrations from Turkey to abroad were regulated by the Turkish state itself as in the previous era. Those immigrants, who were defined as "guest worker" in Europe, later settled down in these countries, received through various statutes. After 1974, the need for labor force moved towards North Africa, Middle East, and the Gulf region countries, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was more observed in the Russian Federation and Central Asia countries.

This period was the era when Turkey outstood as a country that could provide labor migration and when it produced its policies on labor migration. Migration policies of Turkey "focused on the economic gains from emigration flows: labor migration to Europe was seen as a tool for reducing unemployment, obtaining remittances and acquiring skills" (İçduygu&Aksel, 2013:185-186). However, it was during this period that 200.000 Turkish people from Bulgaria sought asylum from Turkey in 1950 and 1951. The migrations of this period to Turkey complied with the definition of "Turkish descent and culture" as stated by the 1934 Law on Settlement as in the previous period.

It was also in this period that Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention. The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention is the fundamental instrument on international refugee order. Turkey is among few countries that signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and

its 1967 Protocol, which means that Turkey still holds the given statement of “geographical limitations”, and provides protection only for European immigrants. Turkey as all other signatories of the 1951 Convention, accepted a geographical and time reservation concerning refugees. However, with the 1967 Protocol, only Turkey kept the geographical and time reservation in its definition of refugee, denying non-Europeans the status of refugee, while almost all other participants of the 1951 Convention removed this particular reservation (Latif, 2002:20). According to Soykan (2010:9), with the geographical limitation, it seems that “the initial hostility towards non-Turkish populations in favor of nation building process has still been preserved”.

#### **4.2.3 The period of 1980- 2000: The politicization of migration, questions of identity and citizenship**

As it has been covered so far, three main legislative instruments were effective concerning the refugee movements to Turkey until the 1980s: the Law on Settlement (1934), the Turkish Law on Foreigners (1950), and the Passport Law (1950). These laws were at the basis of Turkey’s refugee and asylum seeker policies until the 1990s.

The period after 1980 is the era when Turkey’s status and refugee profile changed in terms of international migration. Starting in the early 1980s, “Turkey was faced with flows of immigrants with different national, ethnic and religious backgrounds: regular and irregular labor migrants, transit migrants, asylum seekers and refugees” (İçduygu&Aksel, 2013:185-186). In the 1980s, the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was especially influential in international refugee movements to Turkey. In addition to this, political developments in Central European countries and the shift of regime in Iran in the 1980s also played an important role in shaping these movements. Also, the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and conflicts in North Iraq led to the large-scale migration movements to Turkey.

Such factors are effective in determining why Turkey has become an immigrant receiving country since the 1980s: Turkey's respectively liberal border policies compared to those of Europe, flexible border legislations adopted to improve tourism, liberalization of local economy as a response to globalization, and opening its doors to international capital and product flow. As a result of all these factors, Turkey was the "target country" during that time especially for people who were of "Turkish descent and culture". However, due to Turkey's asylum policy, which does not regard non-European foreigners as refugees, it has become a "transit country" for the non-European immigrants. In the 1980s and early 1990s, any noticeable policy concern on emigration and immigration issues was absent from politics" (İçduygu&Aksel, 2013:185-186).

Again, it was within the same era that a considerable number of people migrated to Europe in order to seek asylum after the coup in 1980. As a source country through labor migration in the previous period, Turkey once more became a source country for Europe through its refugees. The cognate immigrants, characterizing the former era's migration, were then replaced by transit immigrants who aimed to go to another country, labor immigrants who want to work there, and refugees (Kirişçi, 2007; İçduygu, 2012). At the beginning of this period, Turkey opened its doors to Bulgarian Turks. The Turkish community living as a minority group in Bulgaria received the status of refugee in 1989 since they were of "Turkish descent and culture". 300,000 Turks and Pomaks sought shelter from Turkey after they were expelled by the Bulgarian government. After there was a shift of regime in Bulgaria in 1990, one third of these refugees left for Bulgaria while the rest of them stayed in Turkey and even acquired Turkish citizenship (İçduygu&Sert, 2009:4).

Similarly, Turkey granted temporary asylum to approximately 20.000 Bosnians who fled the conflicts that occurred between the years of 1992 and 1995 in the former Yugoslavia. After the Dayton Peace Agreement was adopted, many of these Bosnian refugees have returned to their country. Similarly, around 18,000 Kosovars took shelter in Turkey in 1998 and 1999 fleeing the ethnic conflicts in their homeland. Most of these immigrants later went back to their countries after the conflict lost its

intensity (İçduygu&Sert, 2009:5). Turkey did not approve of the application for refugee status by people who escaped various internal conflicts in Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Kosovo and sought asylum in Turkey. Although their homeland countries were among the members of the Council of Europe, these people were only given permission to stay in the country under the status of guest, which was a legally ambiguous status. It is possible to claim that Turkey has benefited from the geographical limitation and is still using it as a means to reserve its national identity as well as to deny access to non-Turkish immigrants (Soykan, 2010:9). During the same period, Iraqi refugees crossed the borders of Turkey in flows after the Halabja Massacre of 1988 and the Gulf War of 1991. For this mass migration, the majority of which consisted of Kurdish refugees, Turkish policy offered a choice either for repatriation and/or resettlement. Both mass migration flows were considered as possible threats to national security (Avcı& Kirişci, 2006:151).

Although Turkey's asylum policy significantly changed after the World War II, it still remained a function of the state policy to reject immigrants who were not of "Turkish descent or culture". During the Cold War, Turkey received refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet Union. During their stay in Turkey, the refugees had all the rights provided within the scope of the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, only a very small number of them were allowed to stay on in Turkey. Most of them were resettled out of Turkey (Avcı& Kirişci, 2006:151). However, Turkey had to implement a stricter policy since the number of attempts to enter illegally into Turkey increased as well as that of asylum seekers who were rejected by the country. In order to manage asylum policy, Turkey issued new tough regulations in 1994 (Avcı& Kirişci, 2006:154). The 1994 Asylum Regulation became the legal instrument to govern the non-European refugees in Turkey, granting them with temporary asylum while they wait for resettlement in a third country (Latif, 2002:23-24).

As Turkey still holds the geographical limitation, stated within the scope of the 1951 Geneva Convention, such terms as 'refugee' and 'asylum seeker' have different

definitions in the international refugee law and the 1994 Asylum Regulation.

According to the 1951 Geneva Convention;

“refugee is an individual who owing to ‘well founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion, race, religion, nationality or membership in a particular social group, is outside his/her country of nationality and is unable or, as a result of such fear, unwilling to return to it’”.

In the 1994 Asylum Regulation of Turkey, the term “refugee” is used to refer to a foreigner or stateless European person who is identified as a refugee within the scope of the Geneva Convention while an asylum seeker refers to a foreigner or stateless non-European person who is recognized as an asylum seeker by a resolution of the Ministry of Interior upon complying with the same criteria of the Geneva Convention (Soykan, 2010:10). İçduygu and Aksel (2013:185-186) explain Turkey’s attitude towards international migration after the mid-1990s as: “from the mid-1990s until recent times, the Turkish state’s position regarding international migration has broken away from the approach of “ignorance and neglect” that dominated the 1980s and early 1990s: both emigration and immigration related issues have gained importance on the public policy-making agenda”.

The 2000s have been the years when migration is synonymously used with the concept of “security” in the world. The fact that the phenomenon of migration is almost always addressed with reference to the discourse of security has been frequently reflected through the literature on migration (Koslowski 2000; 2001; Weiner and Teitelbaum, 2001; Sirkeci 2007; 2009; Paçacı Elitok, 2013). As the number of the irregular migrants increased, the precautions to stop migration also expanded and the phenomenon of migration is expressed through new phrases such as “securization of migration”. Koser (2005:3) claims that “irregular migration constitutes a real or perceived threat to state security and human security”. He also (2005:10) adds, “in political and media discourses, irregular migration is often described as constituting a threat to state sovereignty”. In the 2000s, international migration movements started to increase and vary. Castles and Miller (2013:10-13) argue that there are six main general tendencies of international migration: the globalization of migration, the acceleration of migration, the differentiation of migration, the feminization of migration, the growing politicization of migration, and

the proliferation of migration transition. After the nation-states started to include migration within their international security policies, migration became a political issue. This particularly brought about negative consequences within the context of the host society due to the state policies regarding the acceptance of refugees.

#### **4.2.4 The Period after 2000**

While the status of the refugees who entered into Turkey before 2013 was governed according to the 1994 Regulation (with a few amendments to some of its articles), there occurred a need to make a revision after the Syrian crisis after 2011. Corresponding to this need, The Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was issued on April 11, 2013. With the LFIP, Turkey accepts foreigners of European origin as refugee after the evaluations of their application for international protection, and considers foreigners of non-European origin as conditional refugee who are under international protection until they are resettled in a third country. The demands of all applicants are processed within the scopes of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the LFIP. The LFIP is a cornerstone in determining Turkey's liabilities under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol. According to the Articles 61, 62, and 63 of the LFIP, foreigners who apply for international protection from Turkey are given one of statuses of "refugee, conditional refugee or subsidiary protection" after their applications are positively evaluated by the Directorate General Management of Migration. Apart from these three statuses, "temporary protection status" or "humanitarian residence permit" are given to mass immigrants such as the Syrian or Iraqi refugees who collectively crossed the Turkish border.

Since there was no opportunity to process all the applications of the Syrian refugees for international protection individually, all the Syrians fleeing the Civil War in Syria to Turkey were taken under "temporary protection". For this reason, the number of the Syrian refugees under Turkey's international protection is not included in either the application data of the DGMM (Directorate General Management of Migration)

or the UNHCR. As a result of the evaluation of the application for international protection, although the applicant does not qualify for the criteria stated in the 1951 Geneva Convention, he or she is neither sent back to their homeland nor deported from the country; on the contrary, the person is permitted to stay in Turkey with the status of “subsidiary protection” and receives international protection if upon the case of his or her return the applicant should have a capital punishment or death penalty, be exposed to torture, or inhumane or humiliating treatment or punishment, or face severe threat to the individual’s safety as a result of promiscuous violence due to international or domestic armed conflicts (DGMM, 2015). Temporary protection is an urgent and temporary precaution issued by the Cabinet to regulate such mass migration movements that makes it difficult to work individual application mechanism for international protection effectively. According to the international law standards, there are three basic criteria: open door policy without any discrimination concerning religion, ethnicity, or race, non-refoulement principle, and addressing the basic needs and access to rights.

#### **4.3 Historical Background of Iraqi Refugees in Turkey**

Iraqi refugees constitute the majority of the population that came to Turkey as part of the refugee flows after 1980. Today, the Iraqi refugees have the highest number of population among other refugee groups in Turkey.<sup>7</sup> The Iraqis migrated to Turkey for various reasons- at times individually or collectively. With the Convention signed between Iraq and Turkey in 1932, the two countries mutually granted privileges to the other country’s citizens in terms of settlement and work permit. In addition, as a consequence of the “Protocol on Education, Teaching, and Culture”, annexed to the “Friendship and Good Neighborhood Treaty” of 1946, the diplomas issued by the Iraqi schools became valid in Turkey, and the Iraqis and particularly the Turkmens

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<sup>7</sup> Since the Syrian refugees have “temporary protection status”, they are not under international protection and their numbers are not reflected in the data on Turkey by the UNHCR. According to the data on Turkey by the UNHCR, the highest number of refugee population in Turkey belongs to the Iraqi.

started to come to Turkey (Duman, 2010: 7). Between 1950 and 1970, the intensification of Arab nationalism in Iraq disturbed the non-Arab peoples in the country. The policy of Arab nationalism increased its effect when the Baas Party started to rule the country in 1978. The policy of Arabization and the pressure on the Kurdish, Turkmen, and Assyrian minorities in Iraq led to the increase in the migration from the country (Danış, 2009). The first reason why the Iraqi refugees, who came to Turkey for various reasons, collectively left their countries was the Halabja Massacre. After the Halabja Massacre of 1988, 100.000 Iraqi sought asylum from Turkey. However, Turkey did not grant the right of shelter for these refugees, the majority of whom were Kurdish people. At the end of one year, most of these people returned to Iraq. The second event that caused a mass migration for the Iraqi after the Halabja Massacre was the Gulf War. 500.000 Iraqi sought asylum from Turkey and almost a million Iraqi people asked for shelter from Iran after the Gulf War of 1991. The Turkish government at first refused to open its doors for this second wave of migration from Iraq. The first important reason for this attitude was the high number of the immigrant population, and the other reason was the majority of them was Kurdish. However, with the influence of international public opinion, the Iraqi immigrants were accepted in the country and settled in temporary camps at the regions close to the border. This mass refugee crisis was resolved when a project, which aimed at creating a “safe area” at the north of the 36th Parallel for the refugees and thus keeping those who escaped to Turkey within the borders of Iraq, was successfully realized in two months. Those who came six months after the mass migration had to return to their countries (Danış, 2009: 16-18). After this mass migration flow, the migration from Iraq persistently continued though in small sizes in the 1990s. The main factor that led to the migration during this period was the devastating effects of the embargos after the Gulf War of 1991 on economy and society. After the fall of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, the migration, which used to continue systematically but in small numbers, started to slow down (Danış, 2009: 16-18). Therefore, the Iraqi refugees have entered the agenda of Turkey and the world since the 1990s during the war with Iran, Saddam’s attacks on the Kurds, Turkmens, and other ethnic minorities, and two Gulf Wars (Sirkeci, 2006: 37). The

third big migration movement from Iraq to Turkey was when the Iraqi people sought asylum from Turkey, fleeing the conflict environment in their country as well as the attacks of ISIS after 2013. The number of the Iraqi refugees in Turkey was 16.254 in 2013, and it rose to 21.947 in 2014 and to 118.605 in 2015. By the end of 2016, the number of the Iraqi refugees in Turkey reached 128.110.

The Iraqi Turkmens started to come to Turkey in the 1960s. However, the density of their migration increased during the period of the Baas rule after the Gulf War of the 1990s. The period after 2003, when the U.S. liquidated the Baas rule, brought about a political vacuum in which people faced conflicts and tensions due to ethnic discriminations. This also caused the Turkmens to migrate in flows to Turkey for the second time. The third migration flow was during and after 2013. After 2013, the Iraqi people who fled ISIS in Iraq collectively migrated to Turkey.

The Iraqis as individually arriving asylum seekers have been the biggest group in Turkey since 2008. There was a dramatic increase in the number of the Iraqi refugees in Turkey after the Syrian Civil War. Some part of the Iraqis lived in Syria because of the conflicts and chaos in their homelands, and the Civil War in Syria also affected the Iraqis who settled down there. Thus, they left Syria and came to Turkey. In addition to this, the Iraqis fleeing the conflict environment and ISIS in their country have started a mass migration to Turkey since 2014. Approximately 50.000 Yazidi Iraqis have arrived at the Turkish border, fleeing the capture of Mosul by ISIS and the atrocities that the group targeted on the Yazidi population in Iraq in June 2014. During this period, the Turkish Government allowed these refugees to cross the border to reach safety in Turkey. Migrations from Iraq continued at an increasing speed due to the worsening security situation after this event in Iraq<sup>8</sup>.

The Directorate General Management of Migration posted the Circular No. 2014/23 and dated on 21.08.2014, and announced to issue “Foreigner Identity Card” for the Iraqis and grant them residence permit after that. With this Circular, the application for international protection has been actually suspended. As the Iraqis have not included in either international protection regime or temporary protection regime,

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/treatment-specific-nationalities>

their access to basic rights has been limited. Seventeen NGOs published a statement on this subject in January 2015, and their title was “Refugees from Iraq can not access health services!” Following this, almost within a month, the Ministry of the Interior put up a new circular titled “Work and Transactions about Foreigners of Iraqi Origin” on February 12, 2015. The Circular emphasizes that the Iraqi people living in Turkey had difficulties accessing such services as health, education, or employment, and this Circular has been published to make a revision considering these needs. Another point that the circular well underlines is that the Iraqis do not have “temporary protection status”. In the Circular, three different transactions are prescribed for the Iraqis who sought asylum from Turkey: i) convenience for those who volunteer to return their country, ii) granting “humanitarian residence permit” issued by the Law No. 6458 to those who cannot go back to their country, iii) accepting “application for international protection” issued by the Law No. 6458 (as a conditional refugee). The Second Circular removes the former decision of denying Iraqi nationals the access to apply for “international protection”, but keeps it as an “alternative” for people to decide. The Circular also maintains that Iraqis may apply for “international protection”; at the same time, they are also offered the alternative of applying for a “humanitarian residence permit” according to the Article 46 of the LFIP. Although “humanitarian residence permit” under the LFIP does not grant an international protection status, it still permits stay in the country and gives the right to choose your place of residence. On the other hand, those who apply for “international protection” or those who receive this status are not free to move on their will, and they are bound to settle in the region that the DGMM assigns to them. From May 2014 to the issue of the Circular, the health expenses of the Iraqis with Foreigner Identity Cards were not covered either by the Prime Ministry of Disaster and Emergency Management or the Social Security Institution since they were not included in international or temporary protection regimes. Only their emergency health services were covered. With this Circular, the Iraqis, who apply for international protection, are to be given “International Protection Applicant Identity Cards”, with which they could be registered in the Social Security Institution and could receive full health services coverage. Again, this Circular made it possible for

the Iraqi students who want to enroll in Turkey to register officially. “Humanitarian residence holders” are granted with a health care coverage that does not include medication costs, and compared to “international protection” applicants<sup>9</sup>; they receive a more affordable coverage. It is essential that humanitarian residence holders take care of their own expenses. All three choices offered to the Iraqis via the Circular, “voluntary repatriation”, “humanitarian residence permit”, and “application for international protection” bring about various rights and duties. These rights and duties were regulated by the Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). The Circular facilitates the access of the Iraqi refugees to health and education services. However, it does not suggest any solution to the biggest problem of the Iraqi refugees, which is the ambiguity of their status.




Figure 2. The Number of Iraqi Refugees/Asylum Seekers by Years

Source: Table created by the author with the data from the UNHCR

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/treatment-specific-nationalities>

It is clear on the table that the number of the Iraqi refugees has increased between the years of 2012 and 2017. This number increased almost five times in 2015 compared to 2014 after which the Iraqi people collectively escaped from ISIS and migrated to Turkey. The number of the Iraqi refugees keeps increasing after that year.

According to the data of the UNHCR, there are 133.632 Iraqi refugees in Turkey as of March 2017. In the UNHCR data, most of the Iraqi refugees are recorded under “humanitarian residence permit”. 102.245 of these people are registered as asylum seekers, 31.387 of them are seen as refugees. As of February 2017, according to the official data provided by the Provincial Directorate of Migration, there are 77.916 Syrians and 30.903 Iraqi-Turkmens registered in Ankara. Again, as of the same date, there are 800 people residing in Ankara with the status of refugee. Most of these people who have refugee status are of Somalian, Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi origins. However, it is assumed that the number of refugees in Ankara is higher than the number of refugees who are registered as such. According to the official data provided by the Provincial Directorate of Migration, there are approximately 130.000 foreigners residing in Ankara, including those with the refugee status, the Iraqis under humanitarian residence permit, and the Syrians under temporary protection.

As is the case with all Iraqi refugees, the status of the Iraqi Turkmen refugees still holds its ambiguity due to Turkey’s periodically changing attitude towards the Turks outside Turkey. Since the foundation of the Republic, “Turks living out of the country” have been considered in a hierarchy, and despite the emphasis on the “Turkish descent and culture”, some groups have been appreciated for their Turkishness more than others. The “acceptability hierarchy”, which is inherited from the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, and which has always been a slippery concept, has been shaped through Turkey’s changing foreign policy priorities. After the attempts to homogenize the nation at the early period of the Republic and to populate Anatolia with Turkish and Muslim groups were successful, the priorities have changed. Particularly, following the acceptance of the Bulgarian and Iraqi refugees based on the “consanguinity” at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the foreigners of “Turkish origin”, who wanted to settle down in Turkey, have gradually

been dealt with precaution (Danış&Parla, 2009:136). In his thesis, Beden (2011) discusses the case of the Turkmens living in Iraq between the years of 1926-2001 within the framework of the Turkish-Iraqi relations. Political relations between Turkey and Iraq are examined, and the position of the Turkmens has been analyzed. Iraqi governments carried out a policy of dissolving the Turkmen population within the Arab community. Thus, Turkey's interest in the Turkmens was indirectly undermined. Turkey considered the pressure on the Turkmens as an internal affair of Iraq, and Turkey could only appeal to the Iraqi government for giving cultural rights to the Turkmen population.

#### **4.4 Statistics and Location of Refugees in Turkey**

Mass migration movements caused by the conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, or any other parts of the world require statistical analyses of these events. However, relying solely on statistical analyses fails to explain what refugees go through in their origin and host countries. Most of the refugees who came to Turkey after 2011 had to move to more than one country while fleeing war or conflict environments. For example, the Syrians who ran away from the war first changed places in their country to find a safer settlement, but later they had to leave the country as the strife reached to those safe places. Similarly, the Afghan refugees, whose origin country was Iran, migrated to Iran two or three generations ago, fleeing the war in Afghanistan, and within a couple of years they migrated to Turkey. Therefore, in this part of the thesis, statistical data on the refugees' condition in Turkey will be provided in order to interpret the whole picture.

Table 5. Registered Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey by Age and Origin Countries

Country of Origin / Age	0-4	5-11	12-17	18-59	60+	Total
<b>Iraq</b>	12.957	24.513	15.718	76.053	4.391	133.632
<b>Afghanistan</b>	8.926	16.325	11.716	90.230	1.734	128.931
<b>Iran</b>	1.451	2.705	1.850	25.652	422	32.080
<b>Somali</b>	196	415	417	2481	89	3598
<b>Others</b>	518	817	501	6476	238	8550
<b>Total</b>	24.048	44.775	30.202	200.892	6874	306.791

Source: Table created by the author with the data from the UNHCR (March 2017)

The UNHCR does not reflect the statistical data on the Syrians in Turkey since they are under temporary protection status. The statistics of the Syrian refugees are separately kept. In this study, the statistics of the Syrian refugees will also be presented separately in order not to cloud the visibility of other refugees. According to the statistics of the UNHCR, there are 306.791 refugees registered as of March 2017, excluding the Syrians. 99.025 of these refugees, who comprise around 35% of the total, are children under 18, and 74.977 of these children are at their school age.

The highest number of refugee population belongs to the Iraqi with 133.632 people, followed by the Afghan refugees whose number is 128.931. After ISIS took power of some territories in Iraq in June 2014, the inhabitants of these places first migrated to Syria, later transiting to Turkey, and this caused a considerable increase in the number of the Iraqi refugees as of this date. Among the Iraqi refugees there are several groups of various ethnicities and religions such as Turkmens, Yazidis, and Christians. “Temporary protection status” was granted to the Iraqis who crossed the Turkish border as a mass. They could either apply for “international protection” (the regular asylum procedures) or seek “humanitarian residence permits”. Due to the conflict environment of the region in 2014, an increase was also observed in the number of the Iranian and Afghan refugees. When the applications of the Afghan refugees were evaluated, it was seen that Iran was the origin country for most of

them. A majority of the applicants were Afghan people, who had lived in Iran for long years, or who lived there as second or third generation. A great majority of the Afghan refugees who came from Iran lived there unregistered and without any benefits of either national or international protection. The UNHCR assumed that these people benefited from the rights of national and international protection in Iran, and thus they should be or are given the right to move to a third country. Upon reevaluating the increase in the number of the Afghan refugees and considering such assumption, the registration of the Afghan refugees and their process of settling down in a third country was temporarily suspended for six months on May 6, 2013, excluding sensitive and disadvantaged application files. However, it is observed that this act of suspension has not ended after six months, and it still continues as of the research date of this study. The UNHCR has still not put the Afghan refugees to the process of determining their status as refugee; in cooperation with the ASAM, it registers the Afghan refugees by collecting basic information about them, and makes them settle in a satellite city; however, it does not provide any specific date concerning their approval as a refugee. As a working partner of the UNHCR, the ASAM holds the first registration account of all refugees other than the Syrians, directs them to a satellite city, and provides them with a date of interview for the status of refugee at the UNHCR.

Table 6. Increase of the Number of Refugees/Asylum Seekers by Years

<b>Country of Origin/Year</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Iraq</b>	16.254	21.947	118.605	128.110
<b>Afghanistan</b>	9.545	10.052	94.030	122.386
<b>Iran</b>	7.751	9.836	24.001	30.762

Source: Table created by the author with the data from the UNHCR.

As aforementioned, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of the refugees who came from Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan to Turkey since 2015. As a consequence

of the increasing conflicts in the Middle East in mid-2014, people had to leave their homes to migrate to safer places and as a neighbor country Turkey received several migration flows. The number of the Iraqi refugees in 2015 increased five times compared to the previous year, and the number of the Afghan refugees increased nine times compared to the previous year.




Figure 3: Number of Irregular Migration by Years

Source: Graph created by the author with the data from the Directorate General of Migration Management

There has been an increase in the number of irregular migration since mid-2013. In the years of 2014 and 2015, this increase reached to a dramatic level.




Figure 4. Distribution of Foreign Applicants of International Protection in 2016 by Their Nationality

Source: Ankara Directorate of Migration Management

It is seen that Iraqi refugees are at the top of the list of the foreigners who applied for international protection in 2016 when the distribution of the refugees' origin countries is observed. Afghan and Iranian refugees follow Iraqi refugees in the list.




Figure 5. Number of International Protection Application by Years

Source: Graph created by the author with the data from the Directorate General of Migration Management

As it is seen in the graph above, the number of people, who applied for international protection, has had a rapid increase since 2011. The number of applications, which doubled in 2011 compared to the previous year, has reached 64.232. While the Syrian refugees received “temporary protection status”, the Iraqi refugees, granted with “humanitarian residence permit”, also have the right to apply for international protection.

The origin country of the refugees, or/and their ethnic identity, and asylum policy of host country play an important role in defining their acceptance and life standards in the host country. Turkey is the only country that holds the geographical and time restriction of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Turkey only provides immigrants of European origin with the refugee status since it signed the Geneva Convention with geographical restriction. Therefore, it only accepts people coming from European countries as refugees. For this reason, immigrants of non-European origins are given

the statuses of “conditional refugee”, “secondary protection”, “temporary protection”, or “humanitarian residence permit”. These statuses identify the rights and liabilities of the refugees, shape their lives in Turkey, and play a key role in the process of the asylum process.




Figure 6. Number of Foreigners with Residence Permit in Turkey by Years

Source: Ankara Directorate of Migration Management

In the table above, the number of the foreigners with residence permit living in Turkey between 2005 and 2016 is given. This number started to increase after 2009. It was 313.692 in 2013 and raised 461.217 in 2016. There are six types of residence as identified by the Article 30 of the LFIP No. 6458: short-term residence permit, family residence permit, student residence permit, long-term residence permit, humanitarian residence permit, victim of human trafficking residence permit. The numbers in the table include all these types of permits.




Figure 7. Foreigners with Residence Permit Living in Turkey in 2016 (Top-Ten Country)

Source: Ankara Directorate of Migration Management<sup>10</sup>

When the top-ten list of the countries from where the foreigners came to Turkey in 2016 is analyzed, the Iraqis are at the top with the number of 55.983 people, the Syrians are the second with 48.738 people, and the Azeris come as the third with 39.184 people.

<sup>10</sup> This table includes all the following residence permits: short-term, family, student, and humanitarian residence permits.




Figure 8. Foreigners with Other Types of Residence Permits Living in Turkey in 2016

Source: Graph created by the author with the data from the Directorate General of Migration Management

Out of 35.930 foreigners who lived in Turkey in 2016 with long-term, humanitarian, and victim of human trafficking residence permits rather than short-term, family, student, and work permits, 15.092 people are Iraqi at the top of the list; 5.102 people are Azeri at the second top; 3.951 people are Kazakh at the third top.




Figure 9. Distribution of Cities of Residence for Foreigners with Residence Permit Living in Turkey (Top-Ten City)

Source: Graph created by the author with the data from the Directorate General of Migration Management

The total number of foreigners living in Turkey with residence permit is 569.693. When the distribution of this number by the cities is analyzed, Ankara comes after Istanbul, which is at the top. Ankara is followed by Antalya, Bursa, İzmir, Mersin, Gaziantep, Sakarya and Muğla. The table presents the top-ten city. Besides these cities, there are foreigners living in all other cities of Turkey with residence permit.

#### **4.5 Refugee Studies in the World and Turkey**

As I have mentioned above, since the Second World War, refugees have become subject of studies from several disciplines including psychology, history, political science, and sociology. These disciplines have discussed the issue through their own theoretical and conceptual frameworks. As King (2012: 9) stated, three ‘core groups’ dominated the study of migration in the past and they still do so to some extent: temporary labor migrants, settler-migrants, and refugees. In this part of the study, I draw on contributions from sociology and other social sciences literatures that have contributed to the refugee studies and host community relations. By this way, the purpose is to develop a synthesis of the ‘best available’ understanding of the linkage between refugee and host community. I will briefly summarize case studies from different parts of the world and Turkey.

The literature on refugee studies has mostly covered the situation of refugees; however, the emphasis has recently shifted towards analyzing the relationship between refugee groups and their host community as well as the effects of the refugees on host communities. These recent studies identify how host communities have been affected by the unexpected presence of the refugees in their country. The migration influx and refugees’ presence in the host community might bring about both negative and positive consequences. Therefore, it is crucial to examine not only how the presence of refugees affects the host population, but also to consider the total influence of them on the nature of the relationship between the refugees and host community (Berry, 2008:1).

Walton (2012:2) lists a number of reasons of hostility and conflicts in refugee-affected area. One of these reasons is that refugees benefit from humanitarian agencies and some services such as water, food, health, and education etc. more than the host population. The second reason is that, in some contexts, the presence of refugees may have a negative economic impact on the host communities. The third reason is that the level of environmental degradation is increased. The fourth reason is that, on social or cultural grounds, the host population may be opponent to the

presence of refugees. And the last reason is that refugees may be seen to pose a threat to the security of host communities by harboring fighters or by increasing criminality.

There is a widely accepted typology of international migration, which consists of six main types of migrants 1) permanent settlers, 2) temporary contract workers, 3) temporary professional employees, 4) clandestine or illegal workers, 5) asylum seekers and refugees (Appleyard, 1995). İçduygu (2000: 358) added another category, that is, transit migrants, “who are the people who come to a country of destination with the intention of going to and staying in another country”. Although Turkey still preserves its status as a transit country, it has become a host country since 2011. Most of the Iraqi and Syrian refugees are still not under international protection, and they are given residence permit statuses under contemporary protection status.

#### **4.5.1 Discussion on Refugee Studies in the World**

The effect of using income-generating programs to improve the economic security of refugees and host community is not very well established. Although there are some success stories, Jacobsen (2002:95) notes that transferring capital and credit into refugee communities can have negative unintended implications. In some cases, improvements in the living conditions of refugees can lead to increased displeasure by the host community.

In some other cases, unequal distribution of resources causes displeasure between refugees and host community. In a case study from Guinea, Konyndykis (2005) highlights that the traditional model of refugee assistance largely neglects the host community. He observes a fundamental inequity between the qualities of services available to the refugees and host community. While the poor Guineans have little food, low-quality health care and under-resourced schools in nearby villages,

humanitarian agencies supply extensive support to refugees. This has caused displeasure between two populations, leading to violence on a number of occasions.

Healey (2014:614-615) notes that refugees are commonly one of the most economically and socially excluded groups in host countries. The integration policy contains in itself different elements of exclusion, yet relatively limited research has examined what integration means for the refugees themselves. In her case study from the UK, Healey explains that employment is explored as one of key areas to support integration. Her fieldwork is based on interviewing with a group of twenty-six Tamil refugees and nineteen people who worked with refugees in the UK. This study aims to analyze refugee perceptions of integration “through the notion of gratitude as understood within a framework of hospitality”. In this study, the author explores what gratitude meant for the participants in terms of what the host community had given them: safety and education. For a refugee, entering into the market not only means that he will economically survive but also that he will get the chance to pay his debts to the host community through paying his taxes.

In a study of the Krisan Refugee Camp in Western Ghana, Agblorti (2011a:81) argues that there is a tension and conflict between host community and refugees as a consequence of misinformation. This study clarifies the issue of assistance to refugees and its implications for refugee-host relations. Refugee-host relations may be influenced positively or negatively by such assistance. Host society is more welcoming towards the refugees if they are contented with the assistances they are provided with for hosting the refugee community; otherwise, refugee-host relations might be more difficult to manage.

In another case study of the Buduburam Refugee Camp and its surrounding area in Ghana, Agblorti (2011:18) emphasizes that the relationship between the host population and the camp administration is one of the most important factors in determining refugee-host relations. In this case, the host community blamed the camp administration for diverting resources unfairly from the host community. According to Agblorti, the camp administration’s relationship with the host

population needs to be evaluated and taken into consideration. In addition to that, more information regarding the issue of local integration should be given to refugees.

Some studies especially from rural areas focus on refugee-host populations' relations from the point of environmental degradation of refugee-affected areas. As an example to such type of case studies, Berry (2008:15-17) examines the effects of environmental degradation on the refugee-host relationship in Northwestern Tanzania. Berry's research has shown that the environmental degradation in the "refugee-affected areas" of Northwestern Tanzania has created problems between the refugees and the host communities. Although she does not claim that environmental degradation is necessarily ever the most significant variable in shaping both the impact that the refugees have on the hosts and the overall refugee-host relationship, it is certainly one of a number of significant variables. Based on her fieldwork data, she argues that the environmental degradation in the refugee-affected areas of Northwestern Tanzania has created problems between the refugees and the local communities.

Martin (2005) argues in his case study of the Bonga Camp in Ethiopia that the host communities accused the refugees of depleting such natural resources as land, forests, and wildlife. The host people also complained that the refugees stole their crops and water, ruined their channels of irrigation, and spoilt their conventional grazing lands.

Aukot (2003:73) examines the implications of the refugee presence for host communities in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. His study is based on stories and perceptions of the hosts to the refugees in their day-to-day relations. It is foreseen that good refugee-host relations improve refugees' enjoyment of their rights under the international conventions and increase the level of local integration.

The host governments' refugee policies are one of the key factors of refugees' ability to maintain livelihoods. Refugees are considered as illegal migrants with few rights and little protection in many host countries. Refugees' lack of freedom of movement causes low self-sufficiency and high level of economic and social isolation (Jacobsen 2002). Ikanda (2008) and Agblorti (2011) emphasize host governments' role of

refugees' social integration. According to them, host governments' position should be clear towards local integration; socio-economic conditions should be improving refugee-affected areas, and refugees should be supported for the full integration instead of being confined in camps.

In another case study from Guinea, Lawrie (2003:575) argues that refugees are often discussed in terms of the problems they are seen through in the eyes of host population/government. This attitude caused deterioration of refugee-host relations in Guinea. Restoration of a good asylum environment is essential in an attempt to realize the rights and safety of many vulnerable people. The purpose of Lawrie's case study is to explain how hostility towards refugees in Guinea developed as well as to establish whether it could have been avoided or reduced.

Chaulia (2003) emphasizes in his study the changing structure of asylum with specific discussion on ideology and economic policy of state in postcolonial Tanzania. He examines the bases of colonial immigration policy, identifies the evolution of independent Tanzania's 'open door' policy in relation to the foundational ethics of the postcolonial state, and describes the transformed attitudes since the early 1990s in conjunction with economic reforms and liberalization. At the end of the study, Chaulia asks "How can this trend of Tanzanian alienation from refugees be arrested and turned back to approximate the accommodating attitude of the Nyerere years?".

Bakewell (2000), in his case study of Angolans in Zambia, analyzes how villagers and the government and international community perceive the movement of rural people across the border into Angola. This study presents a case study of the predicted repatriation of refugees who cross the border from Zambia into Angola. Various methods were employed such as semi-structured interviews with major informants, collecting personal life histories, accounts relating the former movements and other related data; structured interviews with the adults of the villages; observations undertaken as a participant; and methods based on participatory rural appraisal. This study, which analyzes the cross border movement as migration, displays that the process of migration should be explained with reference to a wider

historical and socio-economic framework in which the region is set rather than only as a particular refugee phenomenon. For the Angolans and Zambians who live near the border, there are several factors that have facilitated the Angolans' integration with the Zambians such as their fragile relationship with the state, their shared ethnicity which has a similar pattern of movement and the lack of population density in the region. Also, most of them predict that living in Angola in its peaceful times will be better for them. Thus, those who prefer to move voluntarily migrated similar to those immigrants who leave their countries to survive in rural Africa.

Fargues and Fandrich's (2012) study aims to provide a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings in the Southern Mediterranean. They analyze European and Arab state migration policies. The study is based on "the most recent statistical data gathered directly from the competent offices in European Member States; from policy documents emanating from the European Union and concerned States; and from first-hand accounts from surveys conducted in Spring 2012 by scholars in six Arab countries (within Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon)". According to authors, the Arab States and Turkey face their own unique political and social challenges because of open borders policy for Syrian refugees. However, Syrian refugees experience exile differently depending upon which country they reside in. They emphasize that refugees are grouped into camps, and the Turkish language presents a barrier for native Arabic speakers in Turkey.

In a case study of the Sembakounya camp, Kola camp in Western Guinea, Andrews (2003) focuses on relations between refugee and host population. The study focuses on interactions between the refugee population and host population and the factors that play a role in the management, resolution, or continuation of refugee/host hostilities. The author also discusses the ways in which the different groups portray each other in order to construct both commonalities and divisions.

Dryden-Peterson & Hovil's (2003) study aims to explore local integration as a durable approach to the extended refugee situation in Uganda. Considering the case of protracted refugees, international community and host governments should deal with the integration of refugees and the host communities. Dryden-Peterson & Hovil

argue that there is still a need to develop a literature on the methods to quantify different levels of integration between refugee and host communities. Although the effects of refugees on host community have been theoretically recognized and discussed, there has not been any adequate amount of academic research on what the refugee presence costs or what benefits it provides for the host population from a country-specific perspective. The researchers confirm that one of the most important reasons for the lack of research on this particular subject is the idea of dispute over what the word 'integration' means in the first place.

Serato's (2014) study aims to explore the needs of refugees from Syria residing in Jordan by looking at both official data and perceptions of the situation from the perspective of the refugees themselves. Lifestyles and traditions of the refugees in Syria, as a reflection of their identities as well as their social roles, have been changing in accordance with the altering living conditions in Jordan. As a result, refugees have started to confront high levels of emotional and psychological pressure. Some refugee families told that they have become stronger and developed better interpersonal communications through these difficult times; on the other hand, most of them talked about their weakened familial bonds as well as constant feelings of anxiety and stress.

In her study about immigration detention policy in Australia, Tazreiter (2002) seeks answers to the following questions: "Why has the arrival of asylum seekers in the last decade in particular caused increased anxiety and resulted in harsh detention practices?" and moreover, "what is the historical relationship of detention practices in Australia which render contemporary practices acceptable?". The refugees had already arrived in Australia without having any authorization for it since the mid-1970s; however, the Australian government started the practice of detention for most of the refugees in 1989. Tazreiter also notes that the Australian state's decision of immigration detention has developed more as a reaction rather than part of a well-organized plan. By creating a social distance towards the refugees, the Australians emphasize the status of refugees as "strangers". Despite the fact that the host community perceived refugees as strangers in their psychological realm, they are

considered as migrants and processed to be so in the official grounds. The concept of strangers and what creates the social distance between them and the natives may result from various techniques. With the power of the modern state to force legislations, they reach a new order to classify, divide, and create strict boundaries between concrete and conceptual units. However, regulated through its presence, the state's keen interest in maintaining order is threatened by the stranger. Social distance may be produced through setting a physical distance via containment of refugees in remote locations, but at the same time through psychological distance by publically displaying some groups or individuals as enemies.

According to Jacobsen (1996: 656), although there is a growing body of literature on refugee theory, it still has a specific refugee-centric approach towards developed countries. This is why it only deals with the refugees themselves, rather than how the refugee movements have affected the host states and their societies.

#### **4.5.2 Refugee Studies in Turkey**

The refugee issues in Turkey, in particular, the impacts of refugee presence on the host communities, do not attract the attention that it deserves especially before the Syrian refugee influx. However, this is not to say that the field has not been explored.

Some valuable authors have made their contributions to the refugee situation and their impact on the host population in Turkey, and the prominent authors among them are İcduygu&Deniz (2009), İçduygu (2015), Avcı&Kirisçi (2006), Bahadır Dinçer et al. (2013), Kirişçi (2014), Kirişçi&Ferris (2015), Cagaptay (2014), Göktuna Yaylacı&Karakus (2015), Erdoğan (2014), Özer et al. (2013), Özden (2013) and Tunc (2015) among others. The academic contributions of some of these authors will be considered as part of the literature review for this thesis. A major issue in the recent literature on the migratory phenomena in Turkey has centered on the situation of refugees, especially, the Syrian refugees. Some case studies of specific refugee situations and their impact on host communities are reviewed and applied in the context of relationship between host population and refugee in Turkey.

As Konyndykyis' study, Kirişçi and Ferris' (2015:6-7) study on Syrian refugees in Turkey emphasizes the effects of traditional model of refuge assistance on refugee and host community relationship. They noted that large numbers of refugees' presence has mixed economic consequences, especially, in border cities. Turkish government spends large sums for the maintenance of the refugee camps as well as for health and other services, for both camp and urban refugees. This increases resentment among host community who feel that this particularly undermines their own access to health services while health personnel complain about increased workload. Host community complains about increasing prices in general and especially about housing by the reason of the presence of large number of refugees outside the camps. The presence of refugees leads to a number of problems in the labor market. Lots of refugees work in the informal sector for lower wages than local people receive. This situation causes both exploitation of Syrian refugees and resentment of local workers in the informal economy. The authors argue that the presence of the Syrian refugees is "deeply affecting Turkey economically, socially and politically. This is inevitably also adversely affecting the country's ability to provide protection and assistance to the refugees".

Dinçer and et al. (201:35), in their study on the Syrian refugees in Turkey, describe the needs of urban refugees who do not have a chance to receive financial support from the government. Some part of them receives financial assistance for their rental payments as well as food needs from the NGOs (Dinçer and et al., 2013:17-18). According to the researcher, as emphasized in the previous studies, the economic and social day-to-day lives are affected by the presence of Syrian refugees in refugee hosting areas. Resentment and complaints of local people are increasingly being raised in this respect and these will need to be addressed if social peace and harmony is to be maintained in these towns and cities.

Orhan&Şenyücel Gündoğar's (2015:10) study focuses on social and economic effects of the Syrian refugees on Turkey and Turkish politics, security, and public services. They conducted four different field studies in Adana, Osmaniye, Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mersin, and Kahramanmaraş during a period of three

months. In order to see the impacts of the refugee influx on Turkey, they interviewed with the NGOs, local authorities, community leaders, academics, members of chambers of commerce and industry, local citizens, and the Syrian refugees in these provinces. In the light of the interviews with the local people, the authors noted that the local people assume that the Syrian refugee workers take away job opportunities from them.

Another study aims to present a comprehensive and detailed picture of the refugee camps in Turkey. It consists of both official camp data and field study based on the opinions of the Syrian refugees. The authors conducted surveys with 400 refugees from four camps to offer a more comprehensive account of the camps. The field covers four refugee camps in four different cities: Nizip Tent City, Öncüpınar Container City, Ceylanpınar Tent City, and Süleyman Şah Tent City (Güçer et al, 2013:8).

Kahya Nizam and Sallan Gül's (2013) study aims to identify how refugee system and satellite city application are perceived by the bureaucrats of the institutions which directly or indirectly deal with the refugees in Isparta through a series of interviews and how these people rationalize their explanations about asylum. Their study particularly evaluates the bureaucratic perspectives on the asylum process; assistance, support, and services concerning Turkey's asylum policy, satellite city application, and refugees.

Memiş's (2015) study, which presents the results of his interviews with 400 locals in Kilis, aims to find out the effects of the Syrian refugees on the socio-economic texture of Kilis. However, it is possible to state that this study has a biased language, which others the Syrian refugees. Besides such questions as "Are all Syrian refugees war weary?" "Is it right that the Syrians could travel around as freely as a Turkish citizen?" "Are free-travelling Syrians harming the local people?", at the suggestions part of the study, there are such statements as "the fact that the Syrians could live without any restrictions as a native brings about some problems", and "it will be proper to send all refugees to the present camps or to the new ones to be built with or without their approval through some legal regulations".

Oğuz (2015)'s study analyzes the local people's perception of refugees and the intercultural relationship between the locals and the refugees in Gaziantep. Within the light of his observations and informal interviews during his research, Oğuz states that the density of intercultural meetings does not necessarily mean that there is also an intercultural interaction with the same density in terms of quality. He also adds that the locals perceive refugees as "uncanny strangers" in daily life; they ignore the refugees, or feel uncomfortable with their presence. According to Oğuz, this is a reflection of the state's strategy against forced migration and asylum in daily life.

Erdogan's (2014) study, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" found out that host populations are particularly concerned by rising rent and housing costs; unemployment and economic competition; competition from new, Syrian-owned businesses; and the poor living and social conditions of the Syrians, who are forced into more visible roles like working as street vendors and begging, which negatively influenced the host populations' opinions of the general Syrian population.

Kahraman and Kahya Nizam's (2016) study, which took place in Istiklal Neighborhood of Şahinbey District, Gaziantep, searches into the mutual life/future expectations of the poor locals and poor refugees and/or foreigners residing there. Also, in their study, they analyze the risks concerning the lack of not only the citizenship rights but also the refugee rights, and the experience of being a "stranger" as well as the states of vulnerability in urban places.

Another study (Ünal, 2014) searches into the perception of "the other" through an analysis of the comments made to the news titled "tension with the Syrians", published on two of the most frequently visited news websites in Turkey.

Frantz (2003) examines the refugee situation in Turkey in her study. This study searches into the development of Turkey's asylum procedures. She claims that many areas need strengthening, including, most importantly, the issue of preventing refoulement. She examines both national and international sources of asylum policies with a consideration of the effects of these laws on the experience of the refugees.

She also provides statistics and demographic information about Turkey's refugee population.

Kap's (2014) study "Syrian Refugees: Turkey's Prospective Citizens" presents statistical knowledge on the Syrian refugees in Turkey, explains Turkey's asylum policy, and emphasizes that the Syrian refugees are not there for temporarily but permanently.

Cengiz's (2015) study, on the other hand, aims to identify the locals' perception of the refugees in Kilis. In the results and suggestions parts of the study, the researcher clearly expresses his concern for the increasing number of the Syrians living in Kilis, and informs that the Syrians will outnumber the local population unless any precaution is taken.

Akkaya's (2013) study, "Syrian Refugees' Perception of the Turkish Language" aims to display how the Syrian refugees perceive the Turkish language by using metaphors. For this aim, 52 Syrian refugees with knowledge of A2 level Turkish were asked to fill in the blanks of such sentences: "Turkish is like..., because..." In order to analyze the data, the study used content analysis technique. It is concluded that the majority of the participants with a percentage of 96,2 has come up with positive metaphors about Turkish while 3,8 % of them has responded with negative metaphors.

Boyras (2015), in his study, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey as an Example of Migrant Problem" aims to draw attention on the migrants and refugees who are forced to migrate because of wars, civil wars, and political oppression in their countries in the context of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. The study first presents general statistical data on the refugees in Turkey, and then the statistical data on the refugees living in Akçakale Tent City. It continues with explaining the effects of the refugee movement on Akçakale. These effects are generally identified as negative and listed such as: Social and Economic Problems, Safety Problems, Political Problems, and Cultural Problems. After that part, the researcher states that although the effects of the Syrian and Iraqi refugees are "mostly negative", there are "some positive effects" since

some sectors developed thanks to the refugees. There are some definitions used in the study such as “unemployed, unskilled, and uncontrolled Syrian refugees”.

Canyurt (2015)’s study, titled “Syrian Refugees after Events in Syria: Risks in Turkey”, notes that the presence of a massive population of Syrian refugees in Turkey causes several risks. Some of these risks stated in the study are: a prospective war between Syria and Turkey, and the possibility of instigating strife between the Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey. The study also includes the problems faced by the Syrian refugees as well as criticism of the government because of the troubles caused by the legislation. The researcher states that the refugee camps are built in the regions that are close to the border, which poses great risks for the safety of the refugees. The researcher also underlines that this is “problematic for the safety of the local people, as well”. The author notes that it is observed that the refugees also have negative effects on the Turkish social structure. He particularly argues that the Turks have started to practice polygamy as the Syrians influenced them. It is mentioned that the second wives are usually Syrian. The researcher asserts that there are 6000 unemployed and “ready to be seduced” young men in the camp in Ceylanpinar according to the statistics of a research.

In her thesis, “The Integration of Iraqi Turkomans in Ankara after the 1980s”, Demirel (2010) examines “the integration process of Iraqi Turkmens living in Ankara and how social networks effect these processes”.

Devlet’s (2015) thesis “aims to unpack the politics of immigration policy making in Turkey via putting the spotlight particularly on the 2000s”. She presents that this thesis “tried to not only unpack the essence of mainstreaming of migration into the discipline of international relations in the Turkish context but also to mark the complementary dimension of the politics of immigration policy making in Turkey, given the rising importance and acknowledgement of the issue with its cross-cutting nature of diverse disciplines.”

In her thesis (2013), Gökalp Aras tried to describe “the implications of the EU’s immigration and asylum policy with a special focus on irregular migration for Turkey by adopting a multi-level and multi-sited approach.”

“Report on Yazidi Refugees”, prepared by Çorabatır and Alagöz (2015), analyzes the living conditions of Iraqi Yazidi refugees in Şırnak, Siirt, Batman, and Diyarbakır, and the reasons why these people piled up at the Bulgarian border. The report was organized by the Asylum and Migration Research Center (IGAM) within the scope of the Activist Support of the European Union Civil Society Program for Turkey. The aim of this report is to collect data on to determine the situation of the Yazidi refugees who came to Turkey in the summer months of 2014. The aim is to find out their numbers, distribution of their population by age and sex, their living spaces and conditions, the institutions and organizations who assist them, and their future plans, which is crucial for their legal status.

When the literature on the refugees in Turkey is analyzed, it is observed that there are some studies and reports organized by the official institutions besides academic studies. In Turkey, the official authorities, media, and local community use a variety of concepts to address refugees as: our religion fellows, our compatriots, refugees, immigrants, guests, Syrian under temporary protection, neighbors, asylum seekers, Syrian migrant, illegal migrant, etc. It is also observed that the same institution might use different concepts to refer to the refugee throughout time. The researches by the Prime Ministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) sometimes address the Syrians as refugee and sometimes as “our guest”. The title of the research by the AFAD in 2013 was “Syrian Refugees in Turkey” while it published another study titled “Syrian Guests in Turkey” in 2014. There are some studies based on the results of a survey, conducted by the AFAD among the Syrian refugees in Turkey. One of these studies aims to collect information about the demographic, educational, and socio-economic status such as the housing and health conditions of the Syrian refugees in Turkey (AFAD, 2013). Another study identifies demographic details (age, education, marital status, and monthly income), the effects of civil war on the lives, sheltering and basic needs, health conditions, and adaptation to the life in Turkey of Syrian women (AFAD, 2014a). Another study is based on the official data about the refugee camps in Turkey such as number of the camps in the provinces, and the number of Syrians, the camp management system, and its establishment process, services provided at the camps, and services provided outside

of the camps. In this study the Syrian refugees are identified as the Syrian guests (AFAD, 2014). After a year, at the introduction part of the study titled “Syrian Guests in Turkey” (2014), published by the Prime Ministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), it is noted, “Syrians entering Turkey due to the domestic unrest are sheltered under the status of Temporary Protection with an open door policy. Even though their status is temporary protection, we perceive them as our guests and treat them this way.” One of the most important public institutions in Turkey, which has the responsibility over the Syrian refugees, defines the Syrians as “guests” not “refugees”. Similarly, the study titled “Syrian Women in Turkey” published in 2014 by the Prime Ministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), addresses Syrian refugee women as “our female guest”. The concept of refugee was used 9 times while “guest” (female guest, Syrian guest) was used 374 times in this study. In the Circular dated on 09.09.2013 by the AFAD, the issue No. 2013/8 refers to the Syrian refugees as Syrian guests, the whole text of the Circular addresses them as the citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic and Syrian guests. Based on this Circular, the Ministry of Health published a statement numbered 78004154/010.6 to be delivered to Turkey Public Hospitals Authority Public Hospitals Association General Secretaries, and the statement’s subject referred to the Syrians as Syrian refugees while the statement itself mentioned them as Syrians. In the studies organized by the Prime Ministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), the reason why the refugees are usually referred as “guest” may be the consequence of the distinction between “us” and “others”. Every time the concept of guest is used, it emphasizes the temporariness of the status of the refugees. Refugee is most certainly not as temporary as a guest. Thus, it is possible to observe the effects of both methodological nationalism<sup>11</sup> and normative nationalism<sup>12</sup> in the studies organized by the AFAD.

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<sup>11</sup> Wimmer and Schiller (2003:577) described methodological natinalism as follows: “methodological nationalism is the naturalization of the nation state by the social sciences. Scholars who share this intellectual orientation assume that the host countries are the natural units for comp arative studies, equate society with the nation-state, and conflate national interests with the purposes of social science.

In this part of the study, asylum policy in Turkey and the world, historical background of Iraqi refugees in Turkey, statistics about and location of the refugees in Turkey, and a literature review on refugee studies have been covered. In the next chapter, the interviews with the host society will be evaluated as part of the case study of this thesis.

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Methodological nationalism reflects and reinforces the identification that many scholars maintain with their own nation-states.”

<sup>12</sup> According to Beck and Sznaider (2010:384) “a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors.”

## CHAPTER 5

### LOCAL RESPONSES TOWARDS IRAQI TURKMEN IN ANKARA

In this chapter the relationship between refugee and host community will be analyzed. While I evaluate the experiences of host community through their own accounts, I will handle the refugees through the recounts of the locals and representatives of the institutions, which work on the refugee issue in Ankara. Certainly, it was necessary to listen to the experiences of the refugees from themselves; however, since it is a study subject all on its own, and there must be another network in order to reach them, it necessitated the limitation of this study in this manner.

With an aim to reveal the locals' viewpoint upon the refugees, this study was conducted in Abidinpaşa district in Ankara. Abidinpaşa seems to be one of the districts in Ankara where a large number of refugees live. According to the data of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) in the year 2016, the population of Abidinpaşa is 13.357. As the sample group of this study and the second biggest refugee group living in Ankara, the Iraqi refugees are the most prevalent refugee group in this district. According to the information acquired from the neighborhood mukhtar, the Iraqi refugees, who leave their own country and directly come to Turkey borders due to the fact that ISIS bombed or captured the places where they lived, comprise almost half of the neighborhood's population. In the observations made during this study, it was spotted that the existence of the refugee group in this neighborhood has become considerably visible. It was observed that in almost every building in this neighborhood at least one Iraqi family lives. The signboards of the shops, kept by the refugees like bakeries, groceries, and coffeehouses, are written in Arabic language. Due to the high number of the Syrian refugees living in the nearby districts, some of the inhabitants of this neighborhood call all of these refugees as Syrians, and some of

them discriminate between the Syrians and Iraqi Turkmens, and some others use the expression ‘immigrants’.

### **5.1 Factors Affecting Refugee Acceptance**

Refugees become part of the country where they migrate as soon as they come there. It is naturally possible that it turns out to be negative for them. For the very reason, the states use many kinds of preventive strategies in order to make it difficult for the refugees to cross their borders. It is because once the borders are crossed, repatriation becomes impossible. The facts that the refugees have not been subsisted since the very beginning in a certain country, and they have been accepted there later as a consequence of a necessity, and they have been momentarily residing for an undetermined period of time especially in a transition country like Turkey make the refugees’ lives more and more difficult, which have already been so in all circumstances. On the other hand, such a condition of transience originating from the refugees’ unstable circumstances also influences the host society’s acceptance of the refugees.

Especially in the forced migrations, the connection with homeland is necessarily and abruptly broken off. Such a forced migration is a fact that changes all the order of life of the refugees, who cannot think of any return; who need some parameters beyond their powers for returning; or who will never be able to return to their homeland when they finish with the host country, as is the case with the voluntary migrations. The refugees in the transition countries wait for being placed in a third country while the refugees in the borderline regions mostly think of returning to their homeland. Such a situation of waiting negatively affects the refugees’ conditions to make a good life for themselves in the host country. The fact that the residence time of the refugees in Turkey is not predictable, and the transience situation depending upon the fact that Turkey does not accept any non-European refugees, and the consequential ambivalence concerning these facts, all make it difficult for the host society to give consent, and the refugee group to adapt itself to it.

Many factors prevail for a host society to accept the refugees. Economic factors, such as employment rates and wage levels, social factors such as the presence of anti-foreigner sentiment, and political factors such as politicians' discourse and media, determine host communities' attitudes toward refugees. It is possible to state that local community's manner of discourse and acceptance is influenced by the discourses of political parties and media. On the basis of the field observations, it can be noticed that host society now presents some cooperation/solidarity, and then some hate speech and xenophobia.

The meaning that the host society ascribes to the term "refugees" influences the way in which the host community perceives refugees, and therefore the way in which it responds to them. This meaning is influenced by cultural, historical, and religious factors. Islam in particular has strong positive traditions concerning offering temporary refuge or asylum from political persecution (Jacobsen, 1996: 668). In 1989, the notion "cognate" had a great role in the acceptance of the Turks coming from Bulgaria. In Turkey the notion "religious fellowship" in the acceptance of the Syrians, and the ones "religious fellowship" and "cognate" in the acceptance of the Iraqi Turkmens have great impacts upon society. As Kunz states, "[r]esearch on the acceptance or rejection of migrants suggests that ethnic affinity appears to be a strong predictor of acceptance" (1981). It was observed that the neighborhood residents treat the Iraqi Turkmens more sympathetically than the Syrians, and use the notion "our cognate" frequently. Some interviewees describe the Syrians as irresponsible, lazy, and constantly needy people, and the Iraqi Turkmens as hard-working and respectful ones.

"Turkmens are honorable and hard working people. People coming from Syria ask for alms, but Turkmens work even if for peanuts. Begging is not a behavior befitting for Turkmens' dignity, because they are honorable and proud-hearted people. They work and turn an honest penny and earn their keep." (H9, M, 35)

Sometimes psychological fears cause negative beliefs about refugees. Some authors link negative beliefs about refugees with the sense of loss of control and fear of being overwhelmed, which results from mass influxes. When refugees are believed to be responsible for social problems, hostility towards them may override the welcome stemming from ethnic or religious attitudes. Many host communities link refugees

with increased crime and violence (Jacobsen, 1996:670). In the acceptance of the Iraqi Turkmens, “being a person ethnically having Turkish roots” had a great impact. However, as long as the refugees’ residence time extends more than it has been supposed to be, the host society begins to label these people as “stormy petrels in the neighborhood”, ones “who have become a party to the resources”, “who do not like working” and “who laze around”. In due course, the notion “consanguinity” started to be bruised, which paved the way for the acceptance in the beginning. The Iraqi Turkmens, who were seen in the beginning as war wearies, and approved easily in the neighborhood as they are ethnically descendants of Turks, started to be seen as people “creating social unrest” and “living without working” in the process of time. The reasons for the refugees to leave their own land have an impact on the practices for the host society to accept or reject them. Beliefs about the motivations of refugees influence the host community’s receptiveness in the same way that the concept of the “deserving poor” creates support for welfare policies in industrialized societies. If refugees are thought to be opportunistic, in other words, if they leave their homes for economic reasons, and not because their lives are in danger, the host society is less likely to sympathize with them. Conversely, “deserving refugees” are more likely to be welcomed, helped, and supported by those who believe there is a real danger in their own country (Jacobsen, 1996: 670). Some of the interviewees charge the Iraqi Turkmens with escaping their own countries instead of staying and fighting for their own land and others show “pity” and “hospitality” on them just for the same reasons – because of their escaping the war – and see no harm for them to stay in Turkey “until the war in their land ends”.

The attitude of host community towards the refugees is influenced by the discourses of media and the government’s refugee policies. “Humanitarian residence permit” is given to the Iraqi refugees who have come to Turkey after 2013 – without considering if they cross the border all together or individually. That the local community constantly emphasizes the transience of the refugees in the course of the interviews is the result of the facts that government representatives call the refugees as “our guest”, and the transience of “temporary protection status” given to the Syrians composing the biggest population of refugees in Turkey is underlined on all

occasions, and another transient and temporary status, the “humanitarian residence permit” is given to the Iraqis being the second biggest population of refugees. The interviewees do not have a clear and detailed idea about all these statuses, and they see all refugees as more or less in the same position, though they see some of them closer to themselves than the rest with regard to the religious fellowship or consanguinity. However, the emphasis on the notion of “guest”, and discourses in this direction made by government agencies and media in parallel with it, aroused some feeling of transience about the case of refugees in the local community. The local community’s prospect is for all the refugees to return to their homelands after the armed conflicts end there. On the other side “the response of local communities to refugees is important both because the community can assist refugees directly, and because the community’s response is likely to influence the government’s refugee policies. Where social receptiveness is high there is less likely to be political resistance to policies that assist refugees. However, a community’s response by no means guarantees a matching government one” (Jacobsen, 1996: 670). Bordering refugees can be approved by host society more easily because of some conformability between their cultures. Most border communities share their ethnic and kin ties, raising the possibility of receiving and helping refugees across the border (Jacobsen, 1996:669). Some interviewees have a certain idea in regard with desired and undesired refugees. Iraqis who are cognates precede Syrians who are religious fellows in terms of ranking.

“I think Syrians must not come here, they are troublesome people; they are clouded, mentally depressed, and incapable ones. Why do they have such problems? The first reason of it is economic distress. Or else, of course they are human beings too.” (H5, M, 47)

When host society faces multiple groups of refugees, it can show some different approaches towards each one of these groups. For example, Iraqi Turkmens’ inclusion by way of consanguinity can cause an exclusion of the Syrians despite religious fellowship. This is why some of the interviewees call Iraqi Turkmens as “hard working” and “trying hard for earning their bread”, and Syrians as “lazy”, “not liking to work”, and “accustomed to ask for alms”. On the other hand, since Syrian refugees are the biggest population of refugees coming to Turkey, and they still seem

unlikely to go back after six years though they are supposed to return to their homeland when the war ends, the visibility of Iraqi Turkmens diminished. Iraqi Turkmens, called as cognates, became less approvable than the former cognate immigrants, just because they came to Turkey in the same period with Syrians. And this fact reminds Daniş's (2009: 142) notion of "futile consanguinity". Daniş suggests that even though almost all Iraqi Turkmens coming to Turkey before the years 1989/1991 were naturalized, the ones coming in the 2000s had very big difficulties even in getting residence permit<sup>13</sup>, let alone entering into the process of naturalization.

## **5.2 Cultural differences, language barrier, and different lifestyles**

Migrants "cannot be perceived as a homogenous bloc, they differ according to class, education, skills, ethnicity, religion, country of origin, generation/age, migrant status (asylum seeker, refugee, illegal or legal), citizenship, gender, age, and so forth. What seems to be important to stress is that the so-called 'migrant' populations are also stratified by class. In such a sense, antagonisms among the migrants as well as among 'migrants/foreigners' and the natives exist" (Rittersberger-Tılıç&Erdemir, 2008:49). Almost all the interviewees talk about refugees as Syrians, Arabs, or Turkmens. In other words, by making reference to the refugees' country or ethnical identity, they come up with generalizations in this way, but very few of them pay regard to the differences among these people. As Stein (1981: 323) says, "there is a tendency to see all refugees from a country as a homogeneous group, but this rarely accurate". Host society tends to make reference to the people coming from the same country with only one name. Such discourses as "Arabs are hard working", "Syrians like to get anything without making an effort and they are lazy", "Iraqis resemble us

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<sup>13</sup> Residence permit is a document which certificates the aliens' legal residence in Turkey. According to the second chapter of No 6458 Law of Foreigners and International Protection, and under the title "Residence", residence permit procedures are settled between the articles 19 and 49. In LFPI, six types residence permit are settled for the foreigners: short-term residence permit, family residence permit, student residence permit, long-term residence permit, humanitarian residence permit, victim of human trafficking residence permit. Humanitarian residence permit has been given to Iraqis coming to Turkey collectively after 2013.

but Syrians are very different from us” can be given as examples of such a tendency to generalize. This fact can be clearly seen in the expressions of a 38 year-old female interviewee. This interviewee calls Iraqi Turkmens as Arabs, and Syrian refugees as Syrians.

“Most of them are working, they are fitting into society and they are setting in their way, and such people are usually Arabs, but Syrians are not so; Syrians are nondescript people; they are irregular; they like to beg; they are free-riding ones; they want to get anything without making any effort, but Arabs want to work for getting anything they need. But Syrians are not so by any means; all the Syrians are free-riders; they want our state to nourish them as if our state has to nourish them; I mean, it cannot nourish us either, how can it do it for you? They must have regular jobs and fend for themselves. But they really do not work, Syrians do not work, Arabs work but Syrians do not.” (H7, F, 38)

In terms of the observations and interviews in the neighborhood, like the one with Siu’s “sojourner”, it is possible to say that also the Iraqi Turkmens tend to keep away from any social interaction with the host society in the public space. Interaction with host society is usually limited with work life and commerce. As regard to commerce, it is noticed that the refugee group sets up its own shop, and minimizes such interaction. Nonworking male adults usually spend their time at home, and when they go out, they spend time in the coffeehouses kept by people who are in the same ethnical group with them. Women and children spend a time of the day in a big park in the neighborhood, and also there they prefer coming in contact with people of the same ethnical group. Still, when examining the socialization ways of men and women, it is seen that women develop a relationship of neighborliness with the host society rather than men. For, the processes of domestic reproduction are usually under the domination of women, and the experience of migration does not create any big alteration on women’s domestic roles. However, male adults seem to have lost the position of the person who earns a living for the family because of not being able to get involved in the labor market. It is observed that all female interviewees from local community know their refugee neighbors more or less, and have knowledge about their past and present lives. Men interact with each other rather on the matters of business and commerce. Still, this fact shows that women spend relatively more time together, and men live their lives rarely interacting with each other. Some of the interviewees remarked that a part of the former residents moved to

another neighborhood because of the increasing population of the refugees. It is known that one of the interviewees in this study moved from the neighborhood with the whole family before the study is completed. A 41 year-old female interviewee explains this case in this way:

“They are undesired people hereabouts now. Every ten steps you cross someone who is not a native of Abidinpaşa. There are a terrible number of immigrants hereabouts. People cannot help but escape from here.” (H1, F, 41)

The same interviewee does not complain about living together with the refugees, but complains about the government’s indifference and imposing the entire burden upon them.

“When government opened the door, it had to act by counting on all the results. It had to take responsibility upon itself, not upon us.” (H1, F, 41)

Aukot (2003: 75) claims that refugee influx creates a complex series of problems including severe pressure on social services and infrastructure for the host population. The hosts find themselves in contact with refugees who fled their countries because of wars. An interviewee speaks about refugees by calling them as “poor fellows” on one hand, and by stigmatizing the same people as “terrorists” on the other. A tendency to take all people coming from the same country as ones showing the same characteristics is noticed in the discourses of a 47 year-old, high school graduate male interviewee. This person feels more sympathy towards the Iraqi refugees than to the other refugee groups, just because of their Turkish ethnical roots.

“Iraqis are same with us, because they are Turkmens; they are more decent than us. I am not closely acquainted with Syrians, but Syrians are poor fellows; they are coming out of war; 15-20 % of them are terrorists.” (H5, M, 47)

Differences in culture, language, and lifestyle cause negative reactions from the local communities. Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar (2015:16) identify the other social effects of the refugees in Turkey as increase in polygamy, higher divorce rates because of polygamy, women and child abuse, social and sectarian polarization, and irregular urbanization. It is a source of worry for local people – especially women – that Turkish men will or may leave their wives, and marry female refugees.

“Their women seem normal ones, but they try to marry Turkish men in order to stay here, I know many of such women, and there are so many families broken up now.” (H7, F, 38)

Refugees are criticized by host society because of their way of life. Local people who have substantially left traditional family structure and lived in the form of elementary families feel uncomfortable about refugees' living in large families. Refugees' main characteristics as most emphasized by the local people are that "they make too much noise because of their living in large families with many children", and "they cannot fit in the life of apartment buildings":

"They make too much noise. I say Emine, you must take care of the kids, but she constantly sleeps because she is pregnant. I said, well, you must take care of the kids. My flat is downstairs, and when they rush around that terrace, it is impossible to stay in my flat, but I tolerate it. When I tell it to her, she feels offended. One day she cried, I said, "do not cry Emine, I will tell it also if you do the same thing tomorrow. Whoever does it, even if the locals do, I will still tell it." (H2, F, 64)

Many people in the neighborhood attribute refugees' philoprogenitiveness to their insouciance.

"If they were not that insouciant, they would not have so many kids. She says to my nephew, "go, tell your aunt; let her buy me some baklava, because I am pregnant." (H2, F, 64)

A 35 year-old female interviewee underlines the fact that those people are asylum seekers, and she remarks that she feels uncomfortable about their insouciance:

"I feel uncomfortable; we feel uncomfortable about the fact that although they take refuge in our country, they behave insouciant so much, and they look at us so sharply – about everything, you name it." (H7, F, 38)

Some interviewees liken the present situation of the refugees to that of the Turks 40 years ago.

"There is only one complaint about the Turkmens: the flats are very crowded; so, there is too much noise. I mean, they cannot fit in the life of apartment buildings; they are living now just as we were 40 years ago." (H9, M, 35)

"Our cultures resemble each other, but, let me put it this way, they are such people as if they were just coming out of our life in the slums 40 years ago. In every family there are 4 kids, even the 20 year-old young people have these." (H8, M, 54)

Another interviewee, who is a real estate agent in the neighborhood, states that the pet peeve about the refugees in the locals is their living in very large family and creating too much noise. He adds that they cannot be criticized in terms of any other matter by any means:

"What should I say to such people? There are complaints from the occupants. They say their kids make too much noise, so what can I do about this? Should we throw

out all these people? There is not any complaint about it; there is not any complaint about their decency. Because all of them, even male ones walk outside with the head bent. As yet I have seen only one quarrel hereabouts between them, and that one was in the market, just between each other. Except that one, I have never heard about any quarrel between them and our Turkish locals.” (H8, M, 54)

He also pleads in the face of the complaints by locals about refugees’ living in multiple families within only one flat:

“If we ourselves were forced to settle into another country, god forbid, if I was the first one to have settled there – so, in this case, where should my friends or relatives stay when they would come there too? Then, they would naturally stay in my flat. A family unavoidably becomes two, three families here now. And when they find a flat for just their own family to live, they go out and settle into there.” (H8, M, 54)

Many refugees living in cities prefer low quality suburbs and neighborhoods because this means lower rents. Multiple families live together in the same house in dire conditions (Orhan&Senyuçel Gündoğar, 2015:16). Local people who are also poor themselves worry that their poverty will increase because of the refugees’ coming to live among them.

“Now, at first we said they are Turkmens; we said they are our brothers and sisters; we approved them; we placed them here, and we rented out houses to them, but now any householders, real estate agents, occupants, and neighbors do not want to rent out houses to them. I mean they do not want refugees to live with them in the same apartment building. Why so? It is because they live very crowdedly. When they first came to us, they did not act honestly, and they said, “brother, we are just two people, and they are just two people, too”, and they did not tell us about such things. We thought they were only four people, just a family like our Turkish families. They came here as a group of 8-10 people. Then, his brother came together with his brother’s wife, and their kids- all of them fleeing from the war. They also settled into the same house; so, the number of the household rose to 15 people, and this fact began to trouble us.” (H3, M, 47)

The same person first gets angry with the refugees because they did not act honestly about the number of the people who would live in the house, and he then empathizes with them and grants them right as the interview progresses:

“Think now, if a war breaks out here, and we flee from our country, go and settle into Iraq, and then our brother, sister, and parents flee too, where should they settle? Where to go? What is there in that country? You are there. So, they naturally have to take refuge in your house because you are there.” (H3, M, 47)

Furthermore, he adds, the fact that multiple families live in the same house carries on till the newcomer family comes through:

“What they first do is to look for a house for this newcomer family to live by itself. I mean they do not want to live in the same house with them either. After staying a few days together, they familiarize them with the neighborhood, and they start to look for a rental house for them, even they find it before long. If not, they find one for themselves, and give them the one they are living.” (H3, M, 47)

A male interviewee emphasizes their contentedness and honorableness as a response to the fact that the refugees are criticized widely in many respects:

“Well, these people are really honorable ones; I mean they do not want to beg or anything so. They do not want to get anything more than their basic needs, for example a refrigerator. I present a second one to the people I like, but they say no, we must give it to the people who need it. So, they are such character-wise people.” (H8, M, 54)

Cultural differences, language barrier, and different lifestyles make social integration more challenging. And such differences are frequently referred to in the interviews with the locals. One of the female interviewees states that male refugees show behaviors to their own wives and Turkish women differently, and she says that she feels uncomfortable about this fact by these words:

“There is absolutely a difference as regard to good breeding. Does not good breeding range far? It includes so many things: cleaning, human relations. They do not make a fuss over any woman-to-woman relations; they do not let their women out, but they like chattering away with us, and they look at us by licking their lips. They should let their women out to our houses, so we can sit and have a chat with them. If they do it, they send also their kids after her to let him know about what we do together. What are we supposed to do? Humph, you know!” (H1, F, 41)

Refugees’ “progenitiveness” and “going on to have children” are attributed to their lack of education. It follows such general criticisms as “I earn your keep” and “my government earns your keep”:

“Education matters; it comes first. Their women give birth to their seventh baby when they are just 31 years old, and they do not care at all. And their husbands only say: “I want to have twins, god willing!” I said to them, “I earn your keep, you idiots!” I said: “I have only one child, and I could not dare to have a second child even in my present good state, though I have good relatives and friends to help me to take care, and I am well off, and what about you? They are carefree, pal, they say, “God granted him/her to us”.” (H1, F, 47)

One of the male interviewees talks about polygamy, and he says that male refugees go on looking for a second or third wife even in Turkey.

“Polygamy still prevails among them. They still look for a second or third wife. There are male refugees settling and living here with two wives.” (H9, M, 35)

Among the interviewees, an idea rules that polygamy prevails among refugees:

“The refugee, who has come here has two wives, the one whom I know and call my brother, and with whom I am very close, has two wives, and he has 5 children from one, and 4 from the other, and he was naturally forced to bring both of them here together with him.” (H8, M, 54)

One the interviewees marks that he tells anyone to be a refugee by his/her clothing. He says there have never happened so many changes since refugees’ coming into the neighborhood:

“Honestly, there are not many changes in our neighborhood. There has just happened some visual change here as they dress differently from us. So, we tell them by their clothing. We feel uncomfortable because they become to be taken as beggars.” (H6, M, 63)

Another male interviewee who gets to know and makes friends with many refugees in the neighborhood thinks that there is not any resemblance between him and the refugees. He tells that the female refugees do not come to welcome a male guest and flees to another room when a male guest comes to their home.

“In my opinion, they have no resemblance to me. As regard to their lifestyle, the head of the family does not go out of the house in general. When they do, they only take a short stroll, and that is it. 90 % of the female refugees do not go out. Sometimes we pay a visit to them, and even I have not still seen the face of wives of some refugees with whom I am very close. When a male guest pays a visit to them, their wives go to another room, I mean they are living self-enclosed.” (H8, M, 54)

Also, he tells that they have no resemblance in terms of eating and drinking habits:

“We think their culture resembles ours because they are Muslims too, but they do not know our white bean stew with meat or boiled meatballs. All they cook is rice with chicken. And they cook their famous stuffed meatballs. Also, they cook their own bread as flat as a pancake.” (H8, M, 54)

This interviewee states that after the refugees came to their neighborhood, they have not changed their culture and eating and drinking habits, and also remarks that as regard to clothing, they wear more “modern” clothes now in comparison with the period when they first came there.

“I notice a very high difference, I mean, some 50 % difference, between the former and present times in regard to the dressing styles of female refugees whom I have seen at the stores. I mean they have started to become modern ones. They are still veiled, but when they first came here, they wore topcoats flowing down to their feet, and now they wear jeans; so, I can say, they improve themselves.” (H8, M, 54)

“Adopting a linguistic profile on the us-them distinction”, it is possible to say that “they (Others) are those who cannot speak our language” (Duszak, 2002:1). Such discourses of the interviewees as “we cannot understand what they tell us”, “it is uncertain if they swear or tell a good thing”, “we got tired of hearing people talking in Arabic language everywhere”, etc. exhibit “distinction between us and them” on the basis of language. Unity of language as one of the basic elements of nationalism manifests itself in the expressions of the interviewees as the following:

“My son gets angry about it. He feels uncomfortable; he can never get his head round about it; he curses behind their backs. He says he cannot understand what they tell, and they irritate him. I advise him to learn their language, but he says, “Well, I do not care, let them go back to their homeland”. He does not like them, I do not know why, he cannot.” (H1, F, 41)

The same interviewee feels uncomfortable with not understanding what Iraqi Turkmens speak, and he doubts that they constantly use bad language about him.

“I cannot walk in the streets just because of the crowd. They look at my face, and say something. I am sure they say some bad things, but I still cannot understand!” (H1, F, 41)

In Iraqi Turkmens’ common-ethnicity based “us” relationship with local community, some language-based process of disintegration and marginalization is started by local community. An ethnically grounded expectation from the Turkmens to speak Turkish language can be a reason of disintegration in common life experience when this expectation cannot be met. The fact that Iraqi Turkmens speak in Arabic language can frustrate locals, and such negative feelings can turn into some relationships and practices of exclusion towards them. Language barrier can cause for these two groups not understanding or misunderstanding each other in the daily interactions. Such a case can create some anger in local community, and cause for them to doubt that refugees use bad language against themselves. The fact that despite being cognates the two groups do not speak the same language poses an obstacle for them to become socially integrated and increases a potential for them to be in conflict.

Another interviewee consorting with a refugee as one of his best friends states that there have not been too many changes in their lives since the refugees came into their neighborhood, and only the neighborhood has got more crowded:

“Anything in our daily lives neither increased nor decreased after they came here. We are still going on our routines. Only difference is that when I sit here, I see 10 people walking, and I can tell 8 of them are Turkmens. I mean our quarter got crowded a little more, that is all. Except this, they do no harm.” (H8, M, 54)

Even if there are some issues between the locals and refugees, both sides have developed some mechanisms that help keep social peace. The fact that there have not been many social issues thus far shows the capacity of receiving and guest communities in dealing with social problems (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2015:16). When the locals have a trouble with their refugee neighbor, they deal with the real estate agent who rented out the flat to refugees and see no harm to call him/her to account for. On the other hand, sometimes the refugees can be charged with a crime with which they have no concern.

“The other day someone came to me and said, “Why did you rent out the flat to such people, brother, one of them cheeked up to my daughter”. Then, we realized that it was just a slander because the person he accused of cheeking up to her daughter does not speak Turkish, and if he accused his brother, I would probably think he was right because his brother speaks Turkish. I even told him to leave the house. I told him they said such things about them, and the boy said to me that he talked to them, and then they apologized to them. They said there happened just a misunderstanding. I do not know if he told the truth or not.” (H3, M, 47)

However, the refugees may also bring with them some immediate or potential economic benefits. The increased demand for housing, for example, will provide benefit for the real estate market, but hurt the economically weaker segments of the native population, whose rents will go up and who will experience greater difficulty in finding affordable housing. Shopkeepers may benefit from the presence of western and international aid organizations, but the inflation of prices for consumer goods and food will hurt the local population (Benard, 1986: 622-623). The real estate agents seem to be pleased with the dynamism within the real estate market resulted by the refugees’ coming. Also, the house owners seem to be so to rent out their houses to the refugees because almost every interviewee points out that the refugees pay rent in good time at all hazards. The refugees pay their rents absolutely in good time even if it costs them to spend less money for their other needs, even not to turn on their gas-fired heater in winter. And this positions the refugees as eligible people for being tenants. In addition to that, according to the information acquired by the

real estate agents and other people in the neighborhood, the refugees pay over the odds for the houses they rent.

“If I myself would have a house to rent out now, I swear I would rent it out to the refugees, because I cannot deal with the Turks. The Iraqis pay regularly.” (H1, F, 41)

“Well, may God be my witness, they even did not turn out the gas-fired heater in winter, they slept in the cold, but they paid their rent, they paid their electric and water bills regularly.” (H8, M, 54)

Some shopkeepers can make use of the fragile situation of the refugees for earning more money and show behaviors to the refugees in such a way that they never will do to the locals.

“The other day a real estate agent rented a house for sale out to a Turkmen, just for the house not to stay empty. A week later this agent brought a client there to sell it. Then, the tenant said to him that he did not tell him that the house was for sale. I mean, he is certainly right, that Turkmen is right. When the house owner walked up to him, he punched him and they ended up in police station. So, they may get into such problems.” (H3, M, 47)

A person's ideas about the matter whether refugees are exposed to discrimination or not have several characteristics in common with his/her other ideas about the refugees. The people who empathize with the refugees and develop relatively better relations with them seem to think that the refugees are exposed to discrimination.

“Of course they are exposed to discrimination. I often hear that whatever they do, the locals say, never mind, they are just Syrians. What else would you expect them to do? I know some events in which the refugees are thrown out of the shops. The locals can have problems with their kids; I mean their kids are ill-assorted a little, maybe just because of the cultural differences.” (H4, M, 49)

The locals who do not have any contact with the refugees seem to think that the refugees are at ease a lot in the neighborhood. Other locals who are in good contact with them seem to think that everybody considers the refugees in the same way as theirs, and they do not experience any problems with them.

“They are at ease a lot; I mean they are at ease a lot in terms of living in a place like here. Nobody tells them to go and move away from here. And they do not fail in respect for the locals here, may God be my witness. Both male and female refugees live in gregariousness all the while.” (H8, M, 54)

The local community gets angry with the refugees settled in the neighborhood on one hand, and has pity on them on the other. It emphasizes on the Iraqi Turkmens' being descendant of Turkish race on one hand, and underlines the cultural differences. It

both complains about their living crowdedly in their flats, and wants to rent their houses out to them because they do not delay paying rents in good time. Moreover, it puts them in a lower position than theirs because it resembles their life style to the one they (Turkish people) themselves were living forty years ago, by referring to their different dressing style. Both the ones who handle the subject the most temperately and the ones who make remarks the most intemperately discriminate between “us” and “them”. The process for the Iraqi Turkmens to be culturally disintegrated arises out of the subject of family and female refugees’ social position in domestic life, with regard to gender above all, and such disintegration extends over some process of marginalization, even consisting of discrimination and denunciation of the refugees as potential criminals. Especially the Turkmens’ polygamy, dressing habits, practices to subordinate women, male-dominated family relationships based upon honor and veiling, and their viewpoints about the Turkish women become a very important matter of criticism for the host society.

### **5.3 Limits of Hospitality: Refugee as Demanding/Dependence Person**

The main foundations providing assistance to the Iraqi Turkmens in the neighborhood are Grey Wolves<sup>14</sup> and Iraqi Turkmens Association. Except these associations, there are people who individually help the refugees in the neighborhood and who enlist from their acquaintances for the refugees. But such an enlisting does not include providing any means of living for the refugees to live on their lives, but rather giving them some furniture, clothes, etc. for once only; or provisions or monetary assistance regularly. This fact subjects the refugees in the neighborhood to charities and local community/benefactors. In addition to that, sometimes the host society thinks that subsidies which must be given to themselves are unfairly supplied to refugees, and such a fact causes a potential tension between the two groups.

In the study of Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç, the gradation of the needs of the people who migrate from country to town in Turkey is respectively as follows:

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<sup>14</sup> Grey Wolves is a Turkish nationalist organization, youth wings of the The Nationalist Movement Party.

shelter, regular income, and a better share in health and educational opportunities (Kalaycıoğlu&Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2000: 526). It would not be wrong to say that this gradation is valid not only for rural-to-urban internal migrations, but also for forced external migrations. It has been recorded that as to sheltering, which is the most important need, the refugees mostly live in houses under bad conditions by paying over the odds for them, and whoever comes there first places the relatives coming after them into their houses, and these relatives immediately look for a house for themselves as soon as they come there. As is the case with almost all processes of migration, the refugees try to survive by solidarity and to accommodate themselves to these surroundings where they have just come. In other words, “unity and solidarity are a principle defense against deteriorating wages or the worsening of the economic situation of migrant families” (Kalaycıoğlu&Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2000: 540). As living in multiple families is one of the ways for the refugees to cope with the situation they are in, the locals feel uncomfortable about refugees’ living crowdedly, making noise, cohabitating in multiple families in the same flat. The refugees taking shelter in Turkey settle in the cities where their family members or relatives coming before them are living. These people mostly live together in the beginning of their migration. Domestic solidarity experienced in the processes of rural-to-urban migration manifests itself in the international forced migration, too. As Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç point out (2000: 539), “the welfare-providing role of the family of origin is significant, especially with migration.” Family as one of the basic forms of solidarity in Turkey’s welfare regime eases the state’s burden by stepping in the process of solving such problems as unemployment and poverty caused by migration. After solving the problem of shelter in the city where they come, the refugees first try to find a job for themselves. To get the services of health and education are secondary needs for them.

When it comes to the Iraqi Turkmens, public formal solidarity is replaced by ‘charity’ based upon Islam as a form of informal solidarity, and the way of cooperation which conservative ideologies, especially such structures as Grey Wolves, build by means of some discourses like ‘religious fellowship’ and ‘consanguinity’, and in the perspective of a community-based comprehension of

society. All the interviewees call anything that they are doing for the refugees as charity, not solidarity. Solidarity is rather a way of relationship between the equals, and the local community does not take the refugees as their equals. Many interviewees put the refugees as lower people than themselves in different ways: some of them consider the refugees as people who escape from the civil war in their homeland on par with treason; some call the kids of refugees as wild ones; some accuse them of still carrying on having kids in a country where they live as guests, and others refer to their maladaptation in the life of apartment buildings. Though we call this state of living together as solidarity, it has been seen here is the limit of solidarity. The limit of solidarity brings the limit of hospitality with it. Almost all interviewees point out that the Iraqi refugees live from hand to mouth by the subsidies given by the local community, but the local community cannot afford to do it constantly.

“We feel responsible. Because they live next door to me, or they live downstairs, very close all around me. We have nothing to give them anymore. We have already given everything to them as much as we could. I mean it! I myself do not have two different quilts for summer and winter. I have only one quilt, and I just use it for both seasons. It is because I gave one to them; I had to. They came here in the dead of winter. The inhabitants of that next building you see are all refugees. They live by the subsidies provided by the neighbors. Of course we are together; they survived on our helps. I mean in the beginning. And now, other people help them, and we try to lend assistance, too. We mediate other people to help them, and people who are well off send some things refugees need.” (H1, F, 41)

One of the interviewees describes the refugees with whom he is living in the same building and in contact as neighbors:

“They are really living from hand to mouth by the helps of other people. They try to work as often as they find a job. They beg on the streets. They have many kids, and they go on to have another ones. It is said that they did not work in their homeland, either. So, they want to go on that way here, too.” (H2, F, 64)

Almost all interviewees – including the ones who say refugees must move away from their neighborhood and live in the refugee camps – tell that they individually help the refugees as much as they can:

“So we gave them our oven, and we bought another one for ourselves.” (H4, M, 49)

“They do not take care of these people over there, but people here are helpful. I say I have neither a second pillow nor a second quilt at home; I gave those things to them.” (H1, F, 41)

All the interviewees point out that this does not work by such individual helps, they themselves live from hand to mouth, and the government has to deal with this matter:

“We already help them as much as we can afford it. But, we can do this only by giving them some second hand furniture, food, like pasta, etc. We cannot do anything more than such things, because we barely fend for ourselves. Except this, I do not know how, but the government has to help them, because individual helps cannot suffice.” (H8, M, 54)

Although it is an advantage for the refugees that the newcomers settle into the same neighborhood or places close to each other, the host society can take it as an unsettling situation:

“They must have talked among themselves: we must not go to the same country altogether because it would be bad for us, they would not hold with all of us, we must go to different countries separately, but it seems that they did not do it this way. Many of them want to come here or be close to this neighborhood because all their brothers/sisters and relatives are living here; so, if they go and settle in Keçiören, they may feel out of it, I mean they feel safe here. But, the locals here get tired of them now, of their overcrowding and noise.” (H3, M, 47)

Uneasiness about refugees’ being a party to the sources of the country is one of the important factors that constitute the local community’s point of view about them. According to a part of the interviewees, firstly the needs of fellow-citizens must be met, and the ones of the refugees must come after that. Most of the interviewees do not want the refugees to acquire citizenship because they pay regard to a probability that when the refugees acquire it, they will share and share alike upon the sources. Since they think that the sources, which have already been limited, come short with the Turkish citizens themselves, so it would be a pointless thing to share them with the refugees.

“I do not want to become unemployed either, and I do not want them to get a job which I probably will get. I do not want to stand for them to be saturated in our so many hungry fellow citizens’ presence; I do not know how many people here they are, but their number will increase in the future, and each of them will cheat our kids of their rights just they are doing of ours.” (H13, M, 25)

The host society reacts against the refugees to be a party to the sources like employment, education, health, or to avail themselves of the social benefits. Such discourses as “our state cannot take care of us”, “we can barely fend for ourselves” are the results of this reaction. A part of the interviewees implies that the refugees have claims more than adequate, and says that “government must not permit them to

live where they wish, but it must set a certain place for them to live”, and another part draws the line at solidarity with an expression, “in the end, there is a limit to hospitality also”.

#### **5.4 Refugee as a “Traitor”**

Many interviewees criticize refugees’ preference to “escape” from their homeland rather than staying and defending it, and reckon as treason for the male ones to behave so. In order to understand the reason of such a criticism towards male refugees, it can be useful to ground on Connell’s “hegemonic masculinity” concept. In his book *Masculinities*, Connell (2005:37) argues that there is not one masculinity, but many different masculinities, and each is associated with different positions of power. He says that “we must also recognize the relation between the different kinds of masculinity: relations of alliance, dominance and subordination”. Hegemonic masculinity is “not a fixed character type, always and everywhere the same. It is rather the masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations, a position always contestable” (Connell, 2005:76).

The discourse that escaping the war is a shameful act is often used not only by men, but also women. A 42 year-old female interviewee accuses refugees of “escaping the war” with these words:

“If they are strong enough to come here and have children while my brothers are still fighting, so they can stay there and fight for their homeland. We do not want aliens in our homeland anymore.” (H11, F, 42)

The masculine discourse cited above humiliating/despising the people escaping the war intertwines with the nationalist one by emphasizing the words “our homeland”.

Hegemonic masculinities express “widespread ideals, fantasies, and desires” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005: 838). The concept of hegemonic masculinity emphasizes on the masculine idealizations of gender roles. Though this concept is limited by some cultural, historical, and social assumptions, it also excludes a lot of men because of stressing on the ideal type. Normative or dominant masculinity sets

standards for the ways to behave, think, or act. On the other hand, “hegemonic masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it” (Connel, 2005:837).

“We do not want any young male refugees, we can approve of only old people, female ones, and children. Young male ones should go and participate in their own independence war over there.” (H9, M, 35)

According to the idea of normative or dominant masculinity in the interviewees’ minds, the one thing for an ideal male within a state of war is not leaving his own homeland and fighting for it even if it were at the cost of his life. The refugees in Turkey – especially the male ones – deviated from the norm of the ideal male because of “their leaving and escaping their own homeland”, as the interviewees’ saying goes:

“The war is going on there, we see it, the government should build camps somewhere near the borderline, and gather women and children and protect them there. This is the human duty for us, all right! But it is a problem to welcome the male ones who are so alive and kicking as to protect their own homeland and people but prefer to escape like traitors.” (H12, F, 38)

The concepts “us” and “them” are described based upon the concepts “patriot” and “traitor”, and “them” is seen as the lowermost because of being “traitor”. Here, nationalism stands out as the satisfaction of the dominant group again, and by means of such discourses as treason and escaping the war, hegemonic masculinity comes out as intertwined with nationalism, on the other hand. As Montes (2013:472) argues, “like any other type of socially constructed paradigm, the construction of masculinity reflects specific structures, such as class, ethnicity, and race”. Here, the specific structures in the description of masculinity made by host society are the war and the men who escaped it. The interviewees set symbolic boundaries between the refugees – especially the male ones - and themselves by applying such expressions as “we” would fight for our homeland, “we” would sacrifice our lives, “we” would not escape the war, but “they” escaped it, “they” turned traitors against their homeland. Thus, they idealize themselves and marginalize and exclude the others, and they reconstruct the distinction between “us” and “them” by means of a masculine and nationalist discourse this time. They emphasize the necessity for the male people to stay in their homeland and fight for it

by such discourses as “I would defend my own homeland if it were at the cost of my life”, “my husband says, if such a case happened to us, he would stay here and fight after sending me and our kids to a secure place abroad”.

The male refugees are announced to be traitors and marginalized, and both their nationalism and their masculinities are criticized because they do not perform the gender roles – fighting, defending the homeland, not escaping - they are expected to do though they are quite alive and kicking. And it is possible to say that some female interviewees masculinize women, too, by saying “we” would stay and fight, “as a woman I” would fight, and they accuse the male refugees of “lagging behind even a woman”. Here again, distinction between “us” and “them” is constructed upon the traditional gender roles, and when it comes to defense of homeland men are positioned above women.

“The ‘self’ cannot be realized until otherness is defined through an oppositional relationship. National identity is an essentially shared product of social interaction able to construct differences between us and them” (Kozisek, 20016:9). By means of a discourse of nationalism intertwined with masculinity, the interviewees discriminate between “us” and “them” and marginalize the refugees, and construct the discourse ‘defend homeland’ as one of the most important factors of the nationalist discourse by way of reproduction. The concepts like the unity of language, unity of history, unity of culture and national identity as the main elements of nationalism and nation state are still mostly applied so as to refresh the point “us and them”.

“This land is our land, we have brought it into this present state just by ourselves; our own martyrs lay in the ground. People, who leave and escape their own homeland, and who turn traitor against it, have nothing to do with our country.” (H14, M, 29)

Some interviewees marginalized the refugees by stigmatizing them as “traitors”. At this point, the distinction between “us” and “them” appears in the form of being a patriot or a traitor. “Them” are criticized through a masculine and nationalist language as people leaving their own homeland and turning traitors against it.

“People who do not fight for their own homeland will not lift a finger for us.” (H10, F, 33)

“Turkey needs enlightened people, not bigots. We will not let them rout our country. Those people, who are corrupted and traitors, who do not pay taxes, and all of whom are ISIS militants, will not bring any benefit to our country. They should go back to their fatherland and try to become martyrs for the sake of it.” (H13, M, 25)

It is very interesting here that the interviewees boast of their ancestral glories, not their own ones, and criticize the refugees via them. Nationalism is accompanied by a fanaticism, which assumes others inferior, and boasts only of its own history and ancestors. These people, who have never lived within the conditions of war, criticize the people who escape the war, on the assumption that they would never leave their homeland and defend it if a war were to break up in their own country.

“They should defend their motherland just as my ancestors did many years ago. They should lay down their own lives if needed.” (H10, F, 33)

According Wimmer and Schiller (2003:583), nationalist discourse aims to “make a fetish of national territory, a sanctuary that deserves to be defended with the blood of the people”. Also, in some interviewees’ discourses, an expression “territory worth to be defended at the cost of people’s blood” stands out. Women also use this discourse, according to which usually men are evaluated. In such discourses, it seems that the host society members marginalize the refugees by referring to the common heritage.

“We welcome our guests with great pleasure, but they should go back in due course. They have never made any effort for anything after all. You know they have escaped the war. This is a territory, which had been soaked in blood of our ancestors; we have been making a constant struggle all our lives. They should just be our guests, nothing else.” (H15, F, 24)

On the other hand, some interviewees figure that the refugees left their fatherland because of the war, and paid no attention neither for the people remained there nor for national unity. It is possible to make a sense out of these discourses that people who left their own country in the wartime do not think about the people remained there, and damage the common feelings of unity and solidarity among the pre-conditions to be a unified nation.

“They turned their backs on their own homeland, families, and past in the wartime, and stabbed their own people and motherland in the back. I will not let such people dishonor the blood shed by my own ancestors who had become martyrs. I will not let such traitors become Turkish citizens.” (H9, M, 35)

Refugees who are supposed to turn traitors against their homeland are stigmatized as “broken reeds” and regarded as people who cannot bring any benefit to Turkey.

Keeping faith with a country is defined as sacrificing one's life for it if needed. And this discourse is based upon the acts performed not by the interviewees themselves, but by their ancestors, like many other nationalist discourses are. Glorious historical memories can be viewed as one of the defining elements of "us". At the same time, in these discourses it is criticized that the current resources which have never been sufficient for the country's own citizens are shared by the refugees:

"Because my ancestors sacrificed their lives for this country. And these people left their own homeland and came here, but they should go back to fight for it, they should make their own history. They should rather die in their own country by becoming martyrs, than on the Aegean or Mediterranean shores here." (H5, M, 47)

"I wonder how such people who are not of help to their own country would be of help to our own. As if our own country was in good conditions! Our government should provide for us in the first place, it should take care of them after coming through this." (H12, F, 38)

As some interviewees say that if a war breaks out in their own country they would escape it, too; most of them disapprove of refugees' leaving their own homeland and coming here. A female interviewee points out that she herself would escape it for the sake of her kid, but her husband would stay and fight here. Yet, at the same time, she also empathizes with the refugees by referring to the confusion in the region:

"We would not escape the war, because we are nationalist people; we would fight for our homeland, and we would do it at the cost of our own lives, but they say this is not our war. Because that region is highly complicated, you know, there are Shiites; there are ISIS sympathizers and militants; there are Kurds; there are PYD sympathizers in that region. What I cannot understand at all is this: what is Russia doing over there? What is China doing over there? I mean, I naturally would not be there in these conditions. So, what are these doing over there, am I wrong? Germany has its own interests over there, and Russia has always had its own quest for warm water ports, but what is China doing over there? What benefit does it dream to derive from that region? I would not go there in these conditions." (H3, M, 47)

According to Aukot (2003: 75), "the hosts' anxiety towards the refugees can be posed in terms of a series of questions: Why do some people flee while others who are in similar situations choose to stay? What makes "aliens" special compared to other nationals who opt not to flee despite facing the same circumstances?" Another interviewee describes the refugees with the following words:

"I dub them the ones who turn traitors against their homeland and come here. That is all. Because if such a thing happened to me, I would never leave my homeland; I mean I would rather die in my own homeland, I would never leave it." (H7, F, 38)

On the other hand, some interviewees tolerate the refugees to flee from the relentless war environment and allow for them to live in Turkey until the war ends, but they add they would never leave their own country themselves under no circumstances; they would prefer to die by fighting rather than becoming refugees abroad. As people who are more tolerant than the ones announcing the refugees, who escape the war as “traitors”, these interviewees refer to leaving homeland in the wartime as “taking the easy way out”, to put it mildly. Besides, the frequently-used expression “becoming refugees” proves that it is a disrespectable status, it contains a viewpoint taking to become a refugee as a hard and undesired position, and it can empathize with the refugees in the neighborhood. These interviewees who are more tolerant than the others allow for the refugees to live in Turkey in certain circumstances. For some of them, the refugees must live in certain places, not all over the country; and for others, they must live here only as guests and go back in due time. The fact that their speeches usually begin moderately and always end with some “but”’s reveals the distinction between “us” and “them”, settled in their minds. Anyone who is a refugee is always a stranger, and he/she can never be a member of any community expressed as “us”. Even the Iraqi Turkmens who are rather in a higher position in terms of refugees’ ranking because of being descendants of Muslim and Turk groups over there can never be definitely “us” in the eyes of the local community. So, they are other guests who are expected to go back to their homeland like the other refugees:

“These people escaped the war and took refuge in our country. It is a duty for our government to fix them up in a certain place assigned just for them, not all over Turkey; to fulfill all their needs; even to provide a safe zone in the cross border if possible, and to reserve them over there by fulfilling all their needs, and finally to help them go back to their homeland when the war ends.” (H14, M, 29)

Identifying the three discursive strategies, introduced by Lynn and Lea (2003:446) as ‘the differentiation of the other’, ‘the differentiation of the self’, and the ‘enemy in our midst’, has allowed us an opportunity to examine how local people construct their argumentative positions, and the rhetorical devices that they use to do so. Such a discourse as “they turned traitors against their own homeland” can be given as an example for the first discursive strategy, and one as “we would defend our homeland, we would never escape the war, as different people from them” for the second one,

and another as “they will cause another trouble to us, like the Kurds do” for the last one.

### **5. 5 Refugee as a Problem: from Our Guest to Trouble**

Martin (2005:331) claims that refugee flows are “generally the result of conflict but can also be a cause of conflict”. This fact can be seen in Turkey not as a serious conflict, but as uneasiness among the local community. The Iraqi refugees are the people who escaped the war in their country, and crossed the border of Turkey. It is observed that as these people are defined as “our guest”, “our religious fellows”, “our cognates” in the beginning, they often come into being regarded by the local community as “burdens” or as people wearing out their welcome as long as their in-country period lengthens. It is observed that there never happened any serious physical conflict between the refugees and local people in the neighborhood where our field research was made except some trivial problems, but still some interviewees are of the opinion that the crime rates have increased, or they feel anxious that they will increase in the future because of the refugees’ existence in the neighborhood.

Focusing on “differences develops an awareness of self, which in turn cultivates an awareness of ‘Other’. It encourages a sense of identity; of ‘us and them’”(Lynn&Lea, 2003:427). Defining the refugees based on their differences necessarily leads the local community to discriminate between “us and them”. The difference between “us and them” is obviously emphasized regardless of the subject matter or the interviewee’s viewpoint – positive or negative - about the refugees in the neighborhood. By emphasizing these differences, a discrimination is made between “us and them” on one hand, and the refugees are criminalized and stigmatized on the other.

Some interviewees define the refugees as “trouble makers”, “bores”, “problem people”, etc. Most of them think that the crime rates, which they believe to have already increased much due to the refugees’ existence there, will increase much more in the future.

“I want a Turkey, which firstly takes care of its own citizens, and I do not want any people who cause trouble to Turkish people.” (H7, F, 38)

“Our country has overmuch difficulties and troubles. I think Turkey did its part abundantly.” (H15, F, 24)

Some interviewees worry about the possibility of some social and cultural troubles to emerge:

“Why do not we care about the fact that our human qualities undergo some changes? Cannot we train people as ones of good qualities? If we cannot make certain social, cultural, and educational standards obligatory for these people, then we will face a much worse community in the near future.” (H12, F, 38)

Some interviewees worry about having troubles in the health sector. The interviewees have no idea whether refugees have a right to employ health services or not, and this ignorance makes the situation more threatening.

“The population of the mass we call refugees increases day by day, so the problems in health sector increase, too. We do not know to what extent they benefit from the health service, and they constantly and disproportionably go on having kids, and there are many and many problems in the health sector, caused by this fact into the bargain.” (H15, F, 24)

Another possibility unsettling the interviewees is that the refugees may cause the country to regress. Such an idea is based on their opinion that the refugees are socially and culturally in a lower position than the host society. The fact that the refugees have too many children and constantly go on having other ones is among the main subjects for which they are always criticized. It is clearly seen here too that the refugees are implicitly humiliated, as is the case with many interviewees' discourses:

“We need changes to improve our country, not to downgrade it. We talk about a people who have had other 50.000 kids in a foreign country where they came as refugees.” (H3, M, 47)

The ones who complain they cannot go out in their own quarter due to the refugees attribute this case mostly to the refugees' self indulgence, and occasionally to the fact that the state has conferred “overmuch” rights to them. And it is seen as an injustice towards its own people that the state helps the refugees and confers them some rights.

“I do not want any refugees in this country. And I believe most of our people agree with me; I do not want refugees because they go around begging. They take the

easiest way out even though they are offered employment opportunities. They still disturb us though our state subsidizes them so much. We cannot use now public transport vehicles like bus and metro just because of them.” (H9, M, 35)

“We cannot walk around on the streets now just because of them, and they walk around freely, both male and female refugees do it so. We ourselves cannot benefit our state’s opportunities, but they can. Yes, I have become a guest in my own fatherland. It is hard for me to enumerate the injustices caused by them, including their quarrels, their peeping at the women by sitting in the coffee houses all day long. They are not like Turkish citizens.” (H10, F, 33)

According to Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar (2015:17), “the most serious security threat is a risk of violent mass reaction, caused by the provocations capitalizing on displeasure towards” refugees. Such a question, “In some cities/neighborhoods, the local people lashed out against the refugees on the ground that they committed some crimes and disturbed the current order. Are you informed about these events? What do you think about them?” was just responded with a sentence beginning the words, “Yes, indeed, but in return they...”. And here a 38 year-old female interviewee who is a widow gives an answer to an unspecific question by bringing it back to the Syrians. Yet, it is noticed that she also calls the Iraqis living in the neighborhood the Syrians.

“We heard about such a case: two Syrians speaking Arabic in a collective taxi were heard by my friend’s husband who was there too, and who understands Arabic language, saying that Turkish people were so honorable, - sorry to say such things – so sensitive, so merciful, so tender-hearted as to grant their wives to them if we wished it. So my friend’s husband heard such words, and he told them to the collective taxi personnel; he told them what those refugees said about them, and they took those refugees off the taxi and beat them on account of the fact that we gave them bread; we welcomed them warmly. How can they think about us such things? I mean it served them right. I said if I was there, I would not only beat them, I would certainly kill them – how could they dare to have designs on my honor? They came and lived in my homeland under favor of my state, and how could they dare to say such things? And they themselves fled from their own country just to protect their honor. I felt sorry for them till I heard about this case. I was working in Site Yıldız then; many Syrians lived there, too, and I felt very sorry for them. I do not give any help to them because I heard about such a case, and I will never, by any means, because they have such designs on our honor, and on top it all, they try to take away everything to which we have a right, so enough is enough. I mean I do not want Syrians here anymore. I do not want them, by any means.” (H7, F, 38)

Some interviewees use such discourses as “overcrowding of the neighborhood”, “insouciance of the refugees”, and “refugees’ walking around on the streets freely” and express that they are troubled with them. It is observed that though no female

interviewees reported to be exposed to abuse by any refugee, some hearsay that male refugees' abuse of the Turkish women prevail among them. A 41 year-old and married female interviewee tells about some events that she "heard here and there", with her own words:

"We are exposed to some negative things as women; so, I heard about them here and there. I mean the male refugees are said to tag after Turkish girls and women, to disturb them on the phone, to go to their houses. I mean some events took place about which I myself heard." (H1, F, 41)

Another matter that interviewees underline is the one that the refugees, who come here and are forced to living in the neighborhoods where the low-incomers are living, pose problems not for the wealthy people, but only for those low-incomer inhabitants with whom they are living together:

"Nothing happens to the wealthy people, because the poor people, the low-incomers have to put up with them." (H15, F, 24)

The local people's attitude towards the refugees takes a form according to such concepts as "indulgence" and "tolerance", in their own words. There is prominently a social distance between the refugees and local people. The current state seems rather as one in which the host society tolerates the refugees than one in which they are living together peacefully. The members of the host society seem rather to put up with a necessity than to have an intimacy while becoming neighbors and co-workers with the refugees, marrying them, and sending their children to the same schools with the refugees' children. Most of the interviewees see the refugees as responsible for any case of theft, etc. occurred in the neighborhood. Some say that the crime rates have increased since the refugees came there, and others say that there will occur much bigger problems in the neighborhood in the next years. According to some interviewees, there can occur some problems both at the present and future time due to the fact that the refugees do not go to school. And other interviewees think it is an injustice to the children of the host society that the refugees benefit from the educational opportunities and they do not want the refugees' children to become rivals to their own children in the labor market in the future.

Predominantly, negative portrayals have presented the asylum-seekers as a threat to the stability of society: a challenge to 'Turkish cultural distinctiveness' and therefore,

by implication, a ‘serious social problem’ (Lynn&Lea, 2003:426). Joly also noted that the refugees are increasingly presented not as people in need of protection but as people who are a threat, not as people who have a problem, but as people who are a problem (Joly, 1992: 65). Some interviewees from the local community say that they do their best to help the refugees on one hand; they add that the refugees make difficulties to the society with which they are living, on the other. In the words of a host community interviewee:

“Well, we are nice to them as best as we can because I feel sorry for them, but some of them are really disgusting people; they are irresponsible ones; they like to beg; they behave as if they are hungry; then they regard anything with disfavor. For example, in the simplest term, I sell them bread. They throw the bread in my face if it is a little bent. They say to me to give them a smoother one. They should remember they could not find even a bent one where they came from. If they treat even bread with disfavor, then what are they doing here? You cannot help but get angry with them. And you have to keep his mouth shut. You still feel sorry for them and give them bread, but they even treat bread with disfavor. They do it just because the bread is a little bent. I really get angry at it. They should remember the place where they came from. Then, they should thank for finding that bread. They are really uncouth ones. I do not like the Syrians by any means. I do not want them.” (H7, F, 38)

One of the local people sees the refugees as ‘problem people’ who should be isolated. (Marfleet, 2006:211).

“Our state must do something right away; it must do something in consideration not only of itself but also of its own people. It must make room for the refugees. For example, it must build a village for them instead of building palaces or parks by investing billions of liras in them; it must settle them somewhere. It must do what Atatürk did back in the days. I mean Atatürk brought the Kurds here back in the days; he gave them a region, for all someone knows; he gave them an identity and settled them somewhere. Our state can do the same thing now. I mean it should not settle the Syrians among us. There are so many endeavors in the construction sector; it should find places for them to live thereabouts; it should do something; it should not put them among us on the streets. We do not have to live with them. We really do not because very bad things happen then.” (H7, F, 38)

Likewise, another interviewee emphasizes that the refugees’ residence period is transient, and they must go back or be camped; that is to say, they must be isolated.

“I think they must be camped. I mean we must receive them temporarily, but you never know what the future brings.” (H4, M, 49)

There are rumors among the local people that the refugees disturb law and order. However, this is not a correct opinion. The number of criminal actions in which

refugees are directly involved is very low, and, in most cases, the refugees are the victims. (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2015:7-9)

“Honestly, there is nothing different now. A few shoplifting cases happened recently. They always accuse the Syrians of such cases. Shoplifting cases increased here. The perpetrator was a Syrian, who robbed the shop opposite to ours, and they caught him, but the cops did nothing to him though they caught him; they set him free after a detention of just 10 minutes.” (H7, F, 38)

The fact that the refugees live together in the ghettos is a challenge to the integration process. This situation may cause security problems in the future. The challenging living conditions and lack of educational opportunities for the Syrian refugees might worsen certain social issues in the long term. (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2015:7-9)

It is seen that the fact of feeling uneasy about the other party does not only pertain to the host community.

“They have been here for a year or two. They feel uneasy about us, but they like us to approach them, to show them friendship, to talk to them and to behave them good-humoredly.” (H2, F, 64)

“In fact they are friendly people, not brutal ones. Whichever approach we show to them, they do the same to us.” (H2, F, 64)

Another fear of the local community is the population of the refugees to outnumber theirs in the course of time; so, a real estate agent in the neighborhood tells the reason why the local people do not want the refugees with these words:

“Grey Wolves help them. Someone from the Grey Wolves mediated for them to rent a house the other day. Now, the local people do not want them in their apartment buildings anymore. They are afraid of them. They doubt if the male refugees peep at their wives and daughters and disturb them, or if they rob their house. The population of Kilis is, let us say, 50.000, and some say 70.000 Turkmens are also living there. So, the foreign people’s population outnumbered that of the local people over there. Now, when they became the majority, they would certainly cause trouble to you.” (H3, M, 47)

The overpopulation of the refugees bothers the local community. Such overpopulation has some various influences on them. The first one of these influences is that locals cannot find places for themselves in common use areas as they could before, since the Turkmens use these areas belonging to the locals much more than them. And the second one is that the Turkmens are living in overcrowded families. Due to all these factors, the locals’ viewpoint about the Turkmens, which has been rather positive compared to the Syrians in the beginning, has become negative in the course of time. Such a position of the Turkmens as to be the common

users of the areas and sources belonging to the local community now reduces them to become a negative element in the eyes of the local community, and the local people begin to attribute the same negative epithets and descriptions to them this time, as they always do to the Syrians.

“They adopt this place. Now, look! It is the Amphitheater Park over there; its name is Amphitheatre; it has no other name. The Iraqis living in the same building with us are said to be from the Farhad tribe. One day I said to the girl (our Iraqi neighbour), ‘Ciren, which park do you go now? So, I will go there with my children too.’ She said, ‘To Farhad Park, sister.’ ‘What Farhad Park?’ I asked her and added, ‘there is no park here by that name.’ ‘There is, sister,’ she answered, and described it, ‘we name it as Farhad Park, its name is Farhad Park from now on.’ Even the local people of Abidinpaşa name it as Farhad Park now, you bet. Besides, they name Abidinpaşa as Farhadpaşa now. Soon we will have to pack our bags and leave our own quarter, my dear, when push comes to shove.” (H1, F, 41)

In relation to the use of areas, disintegration between the host society and refugee group stands out. Some common areas have been divided into two parts as ‘the areas which the refugees use’ and ‘the areas which the host society uses’. Other areas have been used by both groups at different hours of the day separately. The following words, belonging to a 64 year-old female interviewee, can be cited as an example of the former group:

“Our people do not go to the park up there, only the other people go there.” (H2, F, 64)

An interviewee tried to explain the refugees’ population increase (referring to the Syrians whose population in this neighborhood is lower, but who are living in the surrounding neighborhoods) by identifying it with the Kurdish question:

“Everyone is a Turk who feels himself/herself a Turk. But no Syrian feels himself/herself a Turk. Later on, there will emerge an Arabic question in this country, just like the Kurdish question did, and they will band together and compose a minority group in one region like the Kurds did. So, their population is numerically sufficient for it already now, and then they will lay claim to autonomy, and they will try to split the country.” (H7, F, 38)

Another worry expressed by the interviewees is that the refugees have become the majority in some neighborhoods. “To become stranger and become minority in one’s own homeland” is an undesirable and frightening state for the host society.

“Because our state does the necessary things for them. Our living conditions have already been very difficult. They should go back to their homeland and come in useful there when the war ends. We had not obtained our territory so easily. So, they

should come in useful for their own homeland. Now, we are having a very hard time making ends meet because of them. We hear people talking in Arabic everywhere. We have become strangers in our own homeland.” (H9, M, 35)

In addition to that, some interviewees have a worry for themselves to be treated like second-class citizens because of the overpopulation of the refugees in their country. For these interviewees, it is only the Turkish people who must have a privileged position and benefit from the current resources in Turkey.

“Now, enough is enough! I lost my ancestors in the war, and my father is a war veteran. Now, I am a do-not-know-which-class citizen, and those people who unashamedly escaped the war and came here are first-class-citizens; so, now, it is time we considered our government policy.” (H14, M, 29)

“With all due respect, we are the true residents of Turkey, but I really cannot understand why they are cared much more than us.” (H3, M, 47)

“...A group or groups who have control over the state and its resources develop a feeling of satisfaction, because they believe that their national unit, i.e., ethnic, regional or religious group identity, or culture, and the political unit, the state are congruent.”(Khan, 2005:37). Here the interviewee is anxious about the influence of the dominant group in which he himself is included, to be shaken when the refugees who are “others” and “strangers” to him cease to be a “minority”. The source of this anxiety is the probability of the decrease of the satisfaction of the dominant group, which the nationalist movement created. “The satisfaction of the dominant groups leads to the creation of an overarching nationalist ideology that demands homogeneity and one-ness. On the other hand, the anger of the non-dominant groups engenders nationalist movements that reject the official ideology of the one-ness of the nation and demand recognition for their particular identities.” (Khan, 2005:37-38).

Though, in the beginning, there emerged an understanding of “us” towards the Iraqi Turkmens based on consanguinity, such a situation has had a transformation due to some experiences or reasons in the course of time.

## 5.6 Residence Time of the Refugees

The presence of the refugees on the Turkish territory, temporarily accepted as the beginning of the crisis, has become permanent. The permanent nature of the situation affects both the host community and the refugees' reactions and psychology (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2015:7-9). As long as the residence time of the refugees from whom have been expected to go back home when the war ends lengthens out, the host society's hospitality towards them in the beginning has been gradually substituted by some approaches changing between displeasure and hostility. Almost all the interviewees want the refugees to go back home. As a reason for this wish, some refer to the refugees' welfare; some the cultural difference; and others the local people's welfare. A 64 year-old female interviewee wants the refugees to go back home and thinks that such an attitude would be for both groups' benefits.

“So we want them to go back home. We miss our good old times, and we feel uneasy; we have on our conscience. We want them to go back home; we want them to be happy in their homeland. Everybody is happy at home. So, where should I go after this age?” (H2, F, 64)

Also, a 63 year-old male interviewee is of the opinion that the refugees should go back home. He thinks this would be the best solution for them.

“Well, it is the best solution for them to go back home. We wish them to go back home right away.” (H6, M, 63)

A 40 year-old female interviewee wants the refugees to go back home by referring to the transience of the rights to grant. And she gives the cultural difference as a justification for this:

“Temporary residence, work permit, etc. can be given to them. But, I am of the opinion that they should go back home when their homeland becomes safe. Their culture does not comply with ours.” (H11, F, 42)

As almost all the interviewees are of the opinion that the refugees should go back home, most of them despair of the probability of their going back home. Some of them think that their residence time will extend because they do not suppose the war will end before long. And the other ones think that they will not go back home

because they are living higher in Turkey than in their own homeland. The number of the interviewees who think the refugees will not go back home even though the war ends is quite high.

“Of course, they will not go back home. They will not, my friend, why should they? You know why? Because they tell about how the living conditions are over there. So, they think they are living a life of luxury here. They think it is like Europe here; this is why they adopt Turkey so much, and most of them do not want to go back home. Their parents and relatives, and their friends call them back, and they say no, and they do not go back home, why is it so? Because they like it here a lot. Most of their women do not want to go back because the standards of living are better here than the ones over there; they think these standards here are more modern ones.” (H1, F, 41)

Some interviewees feel themselves to be obliged to make friends with the refugees than to become hostile towards them because they do not suppose these people will go back home.

“For one thing, these people who came here will not go back, my dear. Therefore, I feel obliged to live with them on good terms. If I become hostile towards them, it will be worse then. So, I prefer to be on good terms with them.” (H1, F, 41)

The local community is of the opinion that the refugees will not go back to their homeland because of their status and residence time’s uncertainty in Turkey.

“We cannot estimate how long they will stay here. Some of them may go back home if their country gets better, but not all of them, by any means. Because we talk to some of them, and we see they never plan to go back.” (H4, M, 49)

According to Keely, “under current international practice regarding refugees, the “preferred durable solution” is repatriation, not settlement in the place of first asylum or resettlement in other countries”. (Keely, 1996: 1058) The solution preferred by not only national and international regimes of asylum but also the host community seems to be for the refugees to go back home. Many interviewees stated that they want refugees to go back home, and some of them said that the border gates to Europe should be opened for them to go there.

“We do not want them to stay here; we also have a hard time making ends meet. Everybody should stay in their own homeland, and keep away from turning traitors against it.” (H5, M, 47)

The interviewee who talked so goes on and categorizes the contents of the concept “us” as some people who use their loaf and help to the refugees and as others:

“Such people, as we, who use their loaf, help them, but others say the refugees should not come here; they say we also have a hard time making ends meet here as local people.” (H5, M, 47)

According to some interviewees, the solution for the refugees’ sustained residence time here is to send them to Europe. An alternative for the refugees to live in Turkey lifelong seems impossible to the local community. The local community frequently emphasizes that the refugees are troublesome people. Another discourse similar to the one “Nothing happens to the wealthy people, but only we poor people have the troubles caused by them” is encountered in the shape of the one “Turkey has had enough of them, now it is Europe’s turn to have to put up with them”.

“You know what Turkey should do? It should open the border gates to Europe and send them there; I mean Europe does not want them; so, they always get stuck in Turkey.” (H4, M, 49)

“Our state should open the border gates to Europe for the refugees to flee there. It should open the border gates and send the Syrians to Europe. There is no other way. So, they should go to Europe. It should open the border gates. They should leave Turkey now. We must shut the border gates and reject anyone who wants to come here, and we must open the other border gates and send the refugees here to Europe. So, we have had enough of them. Now, it is Europe’s turn to have to put up with them. We must open the border gates. They have already been fugitives; they would voluntarily go out, I think some ten thousand refugees would go out a day then, bro.” (H5, M, 47)

And there are other interviewees who adopt the refugees that have already come here to date, but who want the state to work to prevent more people to come.

“You know what Turkey should do? I do not say they should go back; I do not want such a thing. We got mixed too much to retreat now in this matter. And they settled in our country; many of them have stayed here. So, I think our state should not let more people come here anymore. Or if it lets them in, then it should send them to Europe, do not you think so? Then, it can open all border gates under these conditions.” (H1, F, 41)

The local community generally thinks the refugees will not go back - even if the war ends. As a solution, it considers that the refugees should be “sent to Europe”, and the state should not let more people come to Turkey anymore.

## **5.7 Refugee as Economic Competitor**

It is possible to handle the subject in terms of economy in two ways within the regions where refugees have populously settled: One of them is the supposition that the refugees invigorated the economy and will do the same in the labor market, and the other is the one that the refugees damaged the national economy and caused the wages to reduce in the labor market. According to Jacobsen (2002:95), “when refugees are allowed to gain access to resources and freedom of movement, and can work alongside their hosts to pursue productive lives, they would be less dependent on aid and better able to overcome the sources of tension and conflict in their host communities”. But, we cannot say such a state is valid for Turkey. The refugees are seen by the employers as low-cost labor. They are forced to sweat, and criticized by the host community for bearing the market.

The refugees are never really welcomed by the host society, which considers them as competitors for jobs, housing, and services; their living conditions must not be too good, or this will cause problems domestically vis-à-vis the host population, and it will attract more refugees and decrease the likelihood of subsidies. On the other hand, one does not wish to appear inhospitable or insensitive (Benard, 1986: 621). The host society members attribute the already existing problems in Turkey like unemployment, etc. to the refugees.

The refugees do the works, which the host society members do not want to, and they consequently become underclass. Balibar offers the concept of “the institutional racialization of manual labor’ in order to explain that this fact resulted from “the idea of a difference in nature between individuals” (Balibar, 1991: 210). On the other hand, the refugees, sweating in the jobs that are not preferred much, are seen by the native people as a threat to strip them of their jobs. As the refugees are seen by the native people as rivals to them, and as low-cost labor by the employers when they get into the labor market, they are labeled as “lazy and demanding people” when they cannot get into it.

“I do not want them to come and live high in our country. There are already too many unemployed people here. Our young population will become unemployed as long as the refugees stay here and work for lower prices.” (H14, M, 29)

When individuals are outside the two major roles of production and reproduction, marginalization occurs. Marginalization process includes “a subordinacy encompassing experiences of stigma, loss of subjectivity, a range of material handicaps and subjection to substantial state intervention” (Lacroix, 2004:154,162). The fact that work permits are legally given to the refugees but the initiative is given to the employers makes it difficult for the refugees to get into the labor market. It is observed that the refugees in the neighborhood, especially the male ones, are outside production. The male adults fallen outside the business life usually spend all their time by watching TV at home or sitting in the coffee houses. Since the sexist division of labor causes women to go out by imposing on them such duties as shopping, etc. to meet the basic needs of the house, women have more visibility than men in the public space. There is hardly an interaction between the male adults of the local people and refugee people in the neighborhood. The female refugees and locals are in contact with each other more than the male ones. One of the reasons for this fact is that the male adults cannot get into the labor market and such a situation affects all their social relationships negatively.

“Women are naturally in contact with each other more than men. All the female refugees can speak Turkish and English also, my dear.” (H1, F, 41)

Not only in the border towns heavily populated with the refugees, but also in Ankara “especially small business owners prefer to hire illegal workers” (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2005:7). The refugees are forced to sweat in the hard works without any social security. This fact created by the employers availing themselves of the refugees’ fragile state also causes the wages to decrease in the labor market.

“Because we have a serious unemployment problem. Even if they are employed, our native people, I mean Turkish citizens here work for a salary of 500 TL, but the refugees for 100 TL. They discovered this fact just now and even most of them cannot be paid by any means.” (H1, F, 41)

The refugees who mostly sweat in the hard works cannot be paid at times.

“Our local business owners do not pay them; they make them work and do not pay them; they give them forged money. My opposite neighbor said they gave them a dude note of 50 TL. So, he received it, and went shopping. What is the world coming

to! They find day works; they find some day labors, or the job they find is one very far away. They come and go, work for only three days, and then sit at home all day during the next five days, my dear. Some of them cannot be paid; others get paid but just a very low wage.” (H1, F, 41)

“But there are at least 10-15 people living in each house, and 6-7 of them are women, and 6-7 are men. If we suppose almost all of them are working, and each working individual of a household earns a wage of 50 TL per day, they can make ends meet somehow. But, it is still difficult for them to be able to do this, it is really difficult because the government does not help them.” (H1, F, 41)

“An open market is set up here each Saturday. Three refugees work on the stand there, just before our shop.” (H8, M, 54)

One of the interviewees underlines that the main point is not that the refugees cause the wages to decrease, but the local people do not want to work for those already low wages. He adds, the local people prefer to be unemployed than to work for such low wages.

“Yes, they work for very low wages. For example, they give to a pvc window craftsman 1500 TL as monthly wage; so, our local craftsmen do not accept such an offer; they prefer to be unemployed than working for such a wage. But, the refugees are still forced to work heartily for very low prices in order to pay the rent and carfares, to buy food and cigarettes. So, they can pay their rents so regularly in this way. And they are said to receive financial supports regularly, too.” (H3, M, 47)

“They can work, but if a Turk gets paid 50 TL, they get paid only 20 TL. I mean the business owners make them work for lower prices.” (H4, M, 49)

“Maybe they have qualified workmen among them. I mean such people can work in some certain qualified jobs if they can receive work permits. But, unfortunately, there is still a serious problem of unemployment in our country.” (H6, M, 63)

In her thesis, Kahya (2014) defines the labor force of the refugees working illegally without any work permit by such concepts as “unfollowed labor”, “uncollected labor”, and “deficient labor”. An “unfollowed labor” results from the case in which the business owners do not pay the salaries to the refugees partly or wholly for a variety of reasons. The fact that the refugees’ labors become “unfollowed labor”; that is to say, they cannot be followed legally causes usually for the business owners to avail themselves of this fact, and to exploit the refugees. The refugees rather settle to work overtime, putting up with the business owners’ arbitrary behaviors, and even the probability of not getting paid than being unemployed. Since they cannot get into the working life legally, they keep quiet about all the negative attitudes to which they are exposed in the working place. Otherwise, there arises a risk to become

unemployed for them. It is not certain to them if they will have a job the next day. The refugees' labor, which has the risk to disappear the next day, is a "noncumulative labor" in this sense. The refugees, feeling obliged to do whatever the employers want them to do, work without having any such rights as work permit, social security, which Turkish citizens already demand/have. Viewed from this aspect, it is a choice, which considerably lowers the cost, for the employers to make the refugees work. Under such employment conditions, the refugees' labor is a "deficient labor", which can never equal to the value of human labor.

The Iraqi Turkmens seem to have constituted their own economy by setting up their own shops in the neighborhood. Orhan and Senyucel Gündoğar (2015:7-9) point out that such businesses contribute to production related to the smaller businesses on one hand. Yet, they also add that since most of these small shops are unregistered, and they do not meet legal responsibilities, they result in losses in tax revenues. Both situations cause unfair competition. Some interviewees feel uneasy about the refugees' setting up their own coffee houses and bakeries, etc., and others do not make an issue of this case. The interviewees who have face-to-face contacts with the refugees (like neighborliness, friendship or business relationship) think about this matter as positively as they do about many other matters.

"Go to the backstreet over there, and you can see at least 10 shops they are keeping. They set up their own bakeries, barbershops, and there is a coffee house over there, which they are keeping. Nowadays, we see many things become strange; Çiçin is nothing compared to our neighborhood." (H1, F, 41)

"As soon as they come here, they first of all start to look for a job. For example, one of them sets up a coffee house here, another one a bakery, and a Turkmen sells legumes just in the corner, and some of them rent shops and keep them; one of them works as a car seller; other ones work in some private companies." (H3, M, 47)

Like many refugee hosting areas in the world, the infrastructure for refugee remittance transfer is in place in Abidinpaşa. The Iraqi refugees have established unofficial banking and money transfer systems.

"Now they set up their own banks, coffees houses, restaurants, and markets in their way. They keep their bank in such a way: they have salaries coming from their homeland, and they set up something of an exchange office just on this street you see. They conduct the money traffic by means of that office. They go to the coffee houses which their countrymen keep." (H8, M, 54)

One of the economical changes occurred there is the increase of the rental prices. There has been an increase in rental prices in Abidinpaşa. The most significant effect of the refugee population in neighborhood is an increase in rental prices. The increase is an advantage and a gain for the homeowners, whereas it is yet another burden for those low income local people who rent. Homeowners prefer to rent their properties to refugees in some cases, because “they can offer higher rent payments” and “they pay their rents in due course” (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2015:17).

“There also happens to be that they rent out a flat to the refugees at a price of 600-700 TL though it is worth only 300 TL. Even though the flat is stove-heated and in quite terrible and ramshackle-like conditions, and there is a base station on top of it. Besides all these, they rent out a flat that is only worth for 150-200 TL at a price of 500 TL, do you understand this? And the refugees naturally do not have any idea about its prime cost, and they rent it. In each building there is at least one refugee family.” (H1, F, 41)

“For the refugees, the extreme increase of the rental prices, not being able to find a house to rent, sweating without any insurance because of exploitation of labor force; and for us, feeling strangers in our own country – so, there is an urgent need to find solutions for these problems, or else they should be sent back to their country.” (H4, M, 49)

In the sense that the refugees come and are right beside it, the host society already being poor is afraid of being obliged to compete with them in order to obtain the opportunities of education, sheltering, employment, which it takes as its principal rights.

“I think it is very unfair to us that we try to study and claw our way out of something by struggling with so many hardships and financial difficulties while they just come here and get into the universities which they wish to, without taking any exam, and while they are exempt from a lot of obligations which are imposed upon us. We are a poor family; therefore, I work in the summer, and I go to school in the school time. So, I could not get into a good university just because of this. As we cannot even get any nonrecourse fellowship, they can get it without taking any exam. There are really very serious wrongdoings against us. I mean as if it were us who are in fact refugees here, not them.” (H14, M, 29)

Two subjects mainly underlined in the interviews are the local people’s current poverty and the outlays exerted for the refugees.

“We should firstly take care of our own poor, homeless, and unemployed brothers and sisters. We must give priority to our own citizens, our own poverty-stricken fellows. So, if we exerted those outlays for our own poor people, there would be no poor, homeless, or unemployed one among Turkish people.” (H5, M, 47)

There are some rumors spreading around, which claim that the government grants the refugees flats, jobs, and a right to get into universities without taking any exam, and some locals believe in these rumors. And it gives rise to a belief among them that they cheat them of their own rights.

“As our state lays a tax on its own citizens for any house sales, it gives to the refugees flats built by TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey). As it rises for its own citizens, so many difficulties in terms of studying in universities, it gives to the refugees a right to get into them directly, without taking any exam. Why does it give priority to them as we lay down our lives for our homeland?” (H11, F, 42)

Some interviewees think that the refugees can easily get into the business life and universities without taking any exam<sup>15</sup>.

“There are numerous unemployed people in my country, but they employ the refugees. We have had so many difficulties together with our families for so many years in order to study in the schools, get into universities and finish them, we have worked so hard for all these, but they just give the refugees a right to get into universities without taking any exam. We need to gain scholarships, and the state requires us to refund them, but it does not do it to the refugees. There are ten thousands of homeless people in my county, but the state gives housing rights to them. Who are the refugees here now? Us, or them? We must debate on this matter, if you like.” (H13, M, 25)

A probability for the refugees to cease to be the minority in the future carries on existing in the back of the local people’s mind, and such an idea scares them.

“This is not an innocent situation. It seems to be a project to shape the society. It is quite obvious that as our own people are still hungry, we do not have an economy strong enough to satisfy also those people fleeing from their own country. If we try to see the future ten or twenty years later, we can see our own people will become refugees in its fatherland. Because they are not standing as idle as they are, but they are breeding like rabbits.” (H9, M, 35)

Some interviewees talk about some possibilities of becoming unemployed, being starved, and homeless just because of the refugees, and they state that consequently they do not want them here.

“The labor market has disrupted, and unemployment has increased here now. For example, the refugees do a work at a price of 700 TL, which we normally do at 1000 TL. So, the labor market becomes upset in this way. And thereby, the local people

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<sup>15</sup> Just as the other foreign students, also the Iraqi Turkmens can get into universities in Turkey either by using undergraduate transfer suggested within the scope of some specific conditions, or by taking exams prepared for all the foreign students.

here cannot earn its keep anymore. We will become starved and homeless just because of the refugees.” (H13, M, 25)

Some local people who do not want to be in contact with the refugees both fear that their children would probably not find good educational and business opportunities just because of the refugees, and consider that their children’s marrying the refugees would be a risky thing.

“I do not trust in anyone of them. If one day a war breaks up in Turkey, they will be the first ones to damage the country. Besides I do not want our children to marry them sometime or other.” (H14, M, 29)

The fact that the adult male refugees fall outside the business life and spend most of their times at home or in the coffee houses causes the local people to complain about it by saying “they enjoy themselves, and we are forced to feed them”. Consequently, the refugees are stigmatized as “people who are lazy, who do not want to work, who beg” in point of the division of labor. As a result of the sexist division of labor, the female refugees go on doing the housework expected from them, caring for the children and elderly, the male ones in return cannot go on performing the role expected from them to earn a living for the family. This causes these people’s honor and status in society to decrease. Similarly, again, as a result of the sexist division of labor, doing things such as grocery shopping, bringing kids to the park is carried out by the female refugees, and this makes it easier for them to be visible in the public space, and to be in contact with the female locals. Another result of the same division of labor is that the male refugees are categorized according to their positions in labor, but for the ones who could not get into labor, only the coffee houses remain as public space. Since the female refugees spend much time in public space, it becomes easier and quicker for them to learn Turkish language.

### **5.7.1 Acceptability of the Refugee Child Labor**

By the accounts of the interviewees, the adult male refugees, who have sons, do not work, and it is these male children who are the breadwinners. When it comes to the refugee children, it is possible to say that there is obviously acceptability for the child

labor among the local people. It is considered normal for the 10-12 year-old male children to work; so, some of those boys work in the industrial zones like OSTİM, GİMAT, and other ones are employed in the neighborhood – for example, in the barber shops, in the market stalls, etc. Yet, it is not observed that the female children are working anywhere. Most of the refugee children – especially the male ones - cannot go to school because they have to deal with breadwinning.

By legislation, the refugee children who are at the age of primary education can go to public school. Yet, despite this legislation, the schooling rate of the refugee children in Turkey is around 10 %. The most important reason for the rates of schooling to be so low is the language barrier. Another reason is social exclusion and discrimination to which they are exposed in the schools. To add that, there is also another reason of the lowness of access to school, that is, that though public schools are free, the other expenses like school uniform, stationery equipment, etc. impose a serious financial burden on the refugee families who have already been making their living by scarce resources. Access to school remains in the background because of financial impossibilities. Another problem for reaching out some children is that the educators in the schools have little experience about taking care of the children who have gone through a war trauma.

There is a study center in the neighborhood, which is constituted by the Municipality of Mamak: Anfi Information House. This center offers a studies center and library service to 10-12 year-old students. According to an interviewee who is a teacher in this Information House, also the refugee students can use of this center, provided that they are registered in a mainstream school. Since this interviewee stated that he could not give an interview any longer without having permission from the Coordinator of Information House, we could not get more information about the interaction between the refugee children and the other children, both of whom use this study center.

Since the official data usually give the number of only the Syrian students, we could not reach any official data about the Iraqi children's access to school. Some Syrian schools are opened both in the refugee camps and outside the camps in some cities because they are more populous than the other refugees. In the district including the

neighborhood, where our field study was made, two schools are used as Syrian Schools half of the day. Yet, there are no such works done for neither the Iraqi nor other refugees. The following interviewee's statements seem to be valid for the Syrian refugees. As it has been remarked before, it is seen that the local people now refer to all the refugees while talking about the refugees; they call all of them as the Syrians, and then discriminate between the Syrians and Iraqis. It is also seen that some interviewees are not informed about the children's access to school in their neighborhood, and all they know about the matter consists of the information they get from media.

“They have already started to take education; they take education now; our state gives free education to them in their own language, as much as we hear on TV nowadays.” (H6, M, 63)

Moreover, it is seen that some interviewees – especially the female ones – are informed only about the matter if the refugee neighbors' kids go to school, but not about the reasons why these kids do not go to school, or their parents do not send them to school. Again, the reasons why the refugees do not send their kids to school are codified rather as cultural ones by these interviewees.

“They came here but take no education. There are three families here, but only one kid among them goes to school. A girl among them is said to go to school in their country, but she does not here. And they do not let her go out; so, she sits at home all day long with her head covered.” (H2, F, 64)

It is observed that as the male children work outside and support the family economy, the female ones cover their heads at an early age and sit at home and help the housewife at the domestic works.

“Some of them send the kids to school. But, they usually do not. My opposite neighbors have six children; four of them are at the school age, but only one of them goes to school.” (H1, F, 41)

An interviewee, who calls all the refugees in the neighborhood as the Syrians, thinks that the refugees are regularly “subsidized”. The same interviewee sometimes discriminates between the Syrian and Iraqi refugees at different parts of the interview, and positions the Syrians under the Iraqis within this discrimination. So, she calls these people as the Syrians when he intends to cast aspersions on the refugees.

“As much as I know, they do not have much trouble, and as we know they are subsidized, but they say they are not. Some of them cannot have resources to send their kids to school; all their children are neither fish nor fowl. They just roam around, and beg; besides the cases of robbery have increased hereabouts. Everyone accuses the Syrians of such things; wherever a case of robbery happens, everyone accuses them of these things.” (H7, F, 38)

She wants the refugee kids to go to school so that they may become less visible on the streets. In that case, those kids who go to school may both spend less time on the streets and learn some basic manners. This interviewee does not fancy that the refugee children will have a future as educated people.

“Most of them do not go to school. There are a lot of Syrian kids hereabouts who do not go to school. Of course, they had better send them to school; so, in that case they would have a kind of a regular life at least, they would learn some things about life now that they came here; it would be reasonable for them to go to school. I mean they are really very uncivilized just because they do not go to school. Yet, if they go to school, they may get their bearings; they may get their acts together; they may act less uncivilized. They come out at passersby, as it were, but if they went to school, they would have a regular life; they would have jobs; they would not spend time on the streets so much. I mean they come out at passersby as it were, just because they spend so much time on the streets.” (H7, F, 38)

She remarks that the refugee kids in the neighborhood ceaselessly get in the shops and demand something, and put him in an awkward position as an employee.

“These kids ceaselessly come and demand something: “Please give this to me, please give that to me”. So, we are just employees. I cannot give them anything because I do not own the shop. So, you have pity on them, but I am up against the wall in any case. Thus, I clear them out of the shop, and they come again and come out at us this time. So, we really have many troubles with them as shopkeepers.” (H7, F, 38)

As previously mentioned, “only the refugees who have a passport or residence permit can attend public schools. In addition to this, there is a language barrier for refugee students who attend government schools” (Orhan&Senyuçel Gündoğar, 2015:20). It is not known how many refugees living in the neighborhood have passports or how many of them have residence permit. Another reason for their kids not to go to school is that some of the refugee families do not have any certificates of residence. In addition to all these, some refugee children in the interviews point that they dropped out of school because the host community’s children disturbed them.

“They send their kids to school. But, I think the refugee kids have troubles in school too, because of their own language. These kids came from a foreign country, in the end. And I do not think the kids in the school leave them alone. So, they like to tease

them in any case. I heard some cases like this from some refugee kids. So, they do not go to school just because the other kids disturb them.” (H3, M, 47)

Child labor is one of the most important social issues caused by the large refugee populations. The majority of the children outside the camps do not have any access to education. One of the major reasons for this is the inability of the Turkish government and the NGOs to offer convenient education for the refugee children. Another major factor is that parents often prefer their children to work instead of sending them to school. The economic and social vulnerability of many families results in a rise of child labor. Many refugee children are working in organized industrial sites (OSTİM, GİMAT), barbershop, district bazaar etc., or selling goods on the street, or begging in public (Orhan&Senyucel Gündoğar, 2015:17). One or two kids at most out of each family attend school, and even in some families no kids attend school. One of the most important reasons of this fact is the language barrier, and another one is the financial impossibilities. Most of the male kids work and financially contribute to the family budget, and consequently they cannot attend school.

“Among the refugees no father of a family works. They do not work even if they are young. I have a fellow by the name of Turki. He is younger than me. He has five kids, and three of them are boys. These three boys work, and their father sits at home. The ones who have daughters are obliged to work. One of these boys is just 10-12 years old, and he works as a barber apprentice here. There are many of them who work in GİMAT, OSTİM, Siteler, and in the marketplace. They go and return on foot, poor fellows. They work at the cost of 30-35 TL in the jobs, which Turks do at the cost of 100 TL because they are helpless; there is nothing else to do for them; and they cannot find other jobs.” (H8, M, 54)

The male refugee children can get into labor market more easily than the adult ones. One of the reasons for this fact is that the male refugee children can do many jobs that are not seen fit to the adult ones, and they can work at a lower price than the adult ones. For example, a barbershop keeper sees a person at a young age more fit for sweeping the place after a haircut and running errands. On the other hand, for the interviewees, it is an undesirable state that the refugees can have an easier access to education rather than Turkish citizens. Education as one of the main requirements for the poor citizens to get a good job is too valued for them to share with the refugees who may probably be rivals to them in the future.

“As it is really unfair that as we try to have education and get somewhere within so many difficulties and financial impossibilities, they can just come here and get into universities they prefer the most, even without taking any exam as people who are exempt from so many obligations.” (H13, M, 25)

On the other hand, some emphasis in a nationalist discourse stands out as it underlines that education is a right for the fellow citizens.

“As my own kid tries to have education in so many difficulties, their conditions are better than ours, and this case upsets me too much. Besides, no European country easily confers citizenship to us, but we do it for them so readily, I do not understand why we do it so.” (H11, F, 42)

As regard to child labor, the distinction between “us” and “them” is not remarked in the opinions of local community. Any such discourses as “we send our kids to school, but they do not” and “we do not force our kids work, but they do” are not remarked also. No thorough questioning is observed within the host society as to the facts that the refugee children do not attend school and work as child labor; on the contrary, it is observed that this fact is acceptable for it. In fact, it can be said that here again there is an implicit distinction between “us” and “them”. What is unacceptable for the local children is taken as acceptable and natural for the refugee children.

### **5.8 From Our Guest to Other/Stranger**

As regard to the refugees who came to Turkey, the ones coming from Syria and Iraq are expected to return home when the wars end, and the ones coming from other countries to be settled into a third country. “Guest” is an epithet frequently used for the refugees in Turkey, especially since 2011. As mentioned in theory chapter of this study, in the definition of Sui, the “guest” is someone who “clings to the culture of his own ethnic group” and who “is unwilling to organize himself as a permanent resident in the country”, whereas the reason to use the concept of “guest” for the refugees in Turkey is that the host country wishes to see them as temporary residents. Public enterprises’ discourse of “guest” seems to be adopted by the host society, too.

In the interviews, there frequently stands out an emphasis made on the refugees' being transient guests.

“One who comes as a guest goes as a guest, too. We should rather provide this opportunity for our own people; instead we grant a flat to anyone who comes here as a guest.” (H5, M, 47)

“As we as a nation are people who like to entertain guests and wish to comfort them. But, we are not supposed to register our houses on them with a title deed just in order to comfort them. The state should primarily look after its own citizens.” (H10, F, 33)

Although Siu's (1952: 35) “sojourner” “plans to get through with the job in the shortest possible time, yet, he soon finds himself in a dilemma as to whether to stay abroad or to return home”. For the refugees this dilemma takes the form of one whether to stay in Turkey or illegally cross over into Europe because any possibility for them to return home is very low.

People construct their social identities on the basis of various socially and culturally relevant parameters. These include ethnicity, nationality, professional status, and expertise, gender, age, as well as ideology and style of living. The sense of belonging to a group fulfills the human desire for solidarity, rapport, safety, or psychological comfort that comes from sharing things with other people. However, by aligning with some, we also detach ourselves from others. This, in turn, may generate feelings of anxiety, distance, or even hostility to the alien (Duszak,2002:2). The refugees in the neighborhood resemble the local people on the basis of ethnicity (being descendant of Turkish race) and religiosity (Muslimism). Even though the local people consider these resemblances as a starting point, their talking point finally turns back again to the differences. It seems that though they are descendants of Turkish race, those refugees' being the Iraqis, not Turks, and speaking Arabic, not Turkish, and living in that way, overshadow their being descendants of Turkish race and Muslims. The local people prefer putting the refugees as needy-indigent and temporary guests in a lower position than theirs; instead, they position them as their equals and neighbors. Defining the refugees as stranger and/or guest makes the perception about “us” and “them” more explicit, and leads to draw a line between these two communities in some respects. The local people helping the refugees whom they position as lower people take themselves as right holders to talk about

them since they see themselves as high position people in this unequal relationship which can be defined as helping/helped ones. As a result of this positioning, the refugees are expected to be “respectful”, “trouble-free”, and “uncomplaining” people. For many interviewees, it is not “acceptable” for the refugees to have babies in a foreign country where they take refuge, for the male refugees to walk so freely on the streets, and for the children to make noise at home. Consequently, as needy-indigent guests, they have to show a maximum effort in order to keep a low profile.

Refugees are usually seen by the local community as a homogenous group, and the main difference distinguishing this group from the local community is presented in the shape of coming from a different country/not being native of this place. Thus, the refugees are envisioned as “Other”, different from the local community. The refugees are constantly compared with the local community (for example, family structure, number of children, food habits, hygiene, etc.), and consequently the refugee identity is constructed on the basis of its differences from the host society. As the refugees are envisioned as “Other”, different from the local community, their hierarchical position is seen according to the facts that they escaped their country, and it is not their own country where they are living now, and their life style is different from the local community’s one. In a world where nation state is almost the only truth, and many rights are grounded on citizenship, the refugees are positioned by the host society as “Other”, as incomplete, incorrect, and underdeveloped.

“So it seems the lifestyle here is different from the one over there. For example, they hang out the laundry on the street. And their kids pee in public. I mean they are doing such kind of incompatibilities. All our similarity with them is our skin colors. Our cultures are different.” (H4, M, 49)

In another envisioning of the refugees, the refugees are seen rather as war wearies and violence victims than as sources of problems, as displaced “Others”. Some interviewees empathize with the refugees in this respect, too, and give them the right to escape the war.

“If we were them, we would escape, too. If I were single, I would not escape, but I have a kid. My husband says he would stay here in that case, but he says I could escape if I wished. And I say I would escape only because of my kid, nothing else.” (H1, F, 41)

“It is a pity, of course such a thing can happen to any one of us. I really think over what we would do if it happened to us.” (H2, F, 64)

The refugee is envisioned as undesirable “Other” by people who believe the crime rates increased/may increase because would refugees came and settled into the neighborhood.

“Of course the neighborhood is in full of uneasiness, and mark my words, these people will give in with the lapse of time. Robberies and rapes will happen in the end; you see, these kids are growing up.” (H1, F, 41)

“Our populous but financially limited nation does not have two pennies to rub together to spend for these refugees anymore, and in addition to that, as we do not have any common cultural and historical background with these overpopulated refugees, they always stir up troubles against our own citizens in the neighborhoods where they are living, and they always feel free to commit crimes into the bargain.” (H11, F, 42)

Refugees taken as low-cost labor are seen by the employers as “preferred”, but “competitors” by the workers. Refugees are always seen as “Others” by different – positive or negative – approaches and positions. Though there is a religious unity in the case with the Syrians, and there are both religious and ethnical unities in the case with the Iraqi Turkmens, the local community defines the refugees as culturally deficient/different, and economically disadvantageous, poor, and needy-indigent people. The local people consider whatever they do for the refugees as poor relief, not solidarity. Solidarity is a sort of relationship between the equals. Yet, the relationship between the local community and refugees is not considered as one between the equals, and the refugees are always seen as lower people than the local people.

Refugees as strangers sweat in the jobs which the native members of the society do not prefer, and avail themselves of the common use areas at the hours disfavored by the native people, and live in the houses not preferred by them with rack rents. On the other hand, many people among the local community take them as potential perpetrators of the actual crimes committed. They think/claim that crimes rates increased (robberies, etc.), and beggars increased in number, and divorce rates increased/may increase. Furthermore, all these problems are connected to them after the refugees’ arrival in the neighborhood.

Refugee as a stranger is “near and far at the same time” to host society. Refugees rent houses from the host society, do shopping with them, and work in their working places. Though they cannot always establish neighbor relations, there is a necessity for these two communities to establish a relationship at a minimum, and it is observed that they did it. The situation of the refugees is as Simmel’s “stranger”, “who come today stay tomorrow” in Turkey. It is not certain how long these people whose position is often emphasized as temporary, and who are expected to return home, will stay in Turkey. Like Simmel’s “stranger”, the refugees in Turkey have a temporary position in the society, which welcomes them. “Humanitarian residence permit” granted to the Iraqi refugees is a temporary status. Again, “temporary protection status” granted to the Syrian refugees is another one given to them, assuming that they will return home when the confusion in their homeland ends. The other refugees, who are neither Syrian nor Iraqi, wait for being transferred and settled into a third country. The fact that all these people wait for an undetermined period of time causes a perception of transience to emerge. As a result, this uncertainty of their situation does not only make these refugees potential “wanderers”, but also makes them people “who [go] tomorrow”. Therefore, refugee becomes “somebody who comes today and must go tomorrow but stays tomorrow”. The identity construction of refugees as ones expected to go tomorrow is structured within the frame of this expectation.

Simmel’s “stranger” is part of the society, and once he/she is defined, he/she cannot be declared null and void anymore. Like Simmel’s “stranger”, also refugees become part of the society, which they come into. Although the host society does not call them asylum seekers, refugees, or guests; it does not give them a temporary protected status of asylum seekers, or refugees; or it does not subject them to humanitarian residence permit, there occurs no change considering the fact that each refugee group or individual refugee has already become part of the social and economical life in that region. Being a stranger somewhere is not only a result of a person’s individual characteristics. It is also a reflection of the distinction between “us” and “them”, which the host society socially constructed. Once a person became a refugee – especially via refugee flows – he/she begins to be labeled rather as a stereotype, part

of a community who came from a foreign country (the Iraqis, Syrians, Iranians, etc.) than as an individual in the eyes of the host community.

Simmel (1950:407) described the stranger as “near and far at the same time”. The refugees living in Turkey over three million in number are “near and far at the same time” to the host society at different levels. Though such concepts as the unity of religion and consanguinity seem to determinate the extent of the distance, it is not possible to say that the Iraqi Turkmens are completely included in it. Just like all other urban refugees, as the Iraqi Turkmens live with the local people in the same neighborhood; they shop at the same market, take their kids to the same park, and some of these kids go to the same school, it is observed at the same time that they live their lives without being in contact with each other. As there is always an anxiety at the back of the host society’s mind that it may have been in the same situation with the refugees and consequently an empathy/intimacy towards them, the host society still feels itself distanced from this new community whose culture and language are different from its own despite the unity of religion and consanguinity.

Like many other refugee groups in Turkey, the Turkmens could not entirely penetrate into/could not have permission to penetrate into the Turkish society either, and any possibility for them to return home has gone away also just because the war has not ended in their country, yet. They are perceived as “the people who come today and stay tomorrow” by the local people of this country where they have just come, and where they are living now, and they will go on living for an indeterminate period of time. Neither which country they will go – whether it will be their homeland or a third country– nor when they will go is certain yet. The fact that the refugees do not want to be assimilated, and they want to live a life in the world of their own does not stem only from themselves, but also from the negative attitude of the host society who does not want to embrace them. It is inevitable for the refugees who are far away from their fatherland and who cannot entirely comply with the host society, to make a life for themselves similar to the one in their own homeland in which they used to live together with the people like them.

In his book *Stigma*, Goffman (1963) describes three types of stigma: bodily deformities, bad personal character, and tribal stigma. Tribal stigma is connected with race/ethnicity, nation, or religion. Stigmatization is made in two categories for the refugees in Turkey: First of them is naming them as the Syrians, Iranians, Afghans in reference to their origin country and nationality, or as the Turkmens, Arabs in reference to their ethnical identity. This type of stigmatization can be assumed as examples of the category of tribal stigma. The second is the host society's attribution for the refugees such bad personal characteristics as "being traitors", "being apt to commit crimes", and "being underdeveloped". Goffman makes reference rather to physically deformed people, ex-mental patients, drug addicts, and prostitutes, as "stigmatized people". But, now that millions of people have to leave their native countries, it would not be wrong to define the refugees as "stigmatized people". A refugee is a person who does not resemble the host society with regard to his/her appearance, ethnical identity, or cultural characteristics, and someone who is often distinguished as "different" at first glance.

Stigma is formed out of what the society sees "normal" in their mind and makes categorizations accordingly. Stigma is what the society actually produces, and shapes the social identity of people who later turn into stigmatized people. In the neighborhoods, where the refugee population is dense, "citizen" is the one who is "normal", but the refugee is the one who is "not normal", or who is the "stranger". Goffman mentions two experiences that the stigmatized people have; that is, they are "discredited and discreditable". According to Goffman, using "social identity" is more proper instead of "social status" since the social identity includes all characteristics, too; and it is better to define person this way. Traditionally, the citizenship idea implies two main features: legal status and a normative conception of social membership, substantive equality, and inclusion (Kalu, 2009:11). The difference of the refugees is made more apparent by means of emphasizing the resemblances with the local people in compliance with being a nation-state despite all differences in it. The cultures, language, religion, or/and lifestyle of the refugee community are different from the ones of the host society, and these differences will not change even after many years. Migration is not always, by any means, a one-off

event, which ends in settlement, but an ongoing process that is re-evaluated several times over the life-course (King, 2012:30). Outcomer (regardless of being a refugee or an immigrant) is a person who will not be able to dispose of being evaluated by the host society in reference to its differences for his/her entire lifetime.

## CHAPTER 6

### EXPERT VIEWS TOWARDS REFUGEES

Within the scope of this study, in-depth interviews were made with 10 different people from 5 different NGOs/INGO. The institutions where these interviews were made were UNHCR, Amnesty International, ASAM, IOM, and Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies. Though the activities made by these NGOs in Turkey are different from each other, the common ground for this study is the activities undertaken by the refugees. UNHCR and ASAM among these institutions are the ones, which directly work on the refugees. Though the other NGOs/INGO have different fields of study, at least one of their principal focus points is the refugees.

#### 6.1 Activity Areas of the Interviewed Institutions

In this chapter of the study, the NGOs' emergence processes, purposes, activities organized for the refugees, and field experiences are analyzed on the basis of the authentic documents and statements of the interviewees.

UNHCR Turkey was established in 1960 upon Turkey's invitation. Its central office is located in Ankara. Later on, field offices were opened in İstanbul, Van, and Gaziantep. Besides, there are mobile groups in Hatay, Urfa, and İzmir. Different units work in the central office in Ankara. These are such ones as recording unit, unit of the refugees' status determination, documentation unit of resettlement and permanent solutions, and policy-making unit. Apart from these units, there are also administrative units like programming, administration, and purchasing departments. All refugees in Turkey come under UNHCR. Except the Syrian refugees, all refugees' enrollment and refugees' status determination processes are made by UNHCR. The Syrian refugees' enrollments, camping, and service rendering

processes are made by DGMM. After UNHCR finishes the enrollment and refugees' status determination processes, it also works for finding permanent solutions. There are three permanent solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration. Local integration among them is not valid for the refugees who come from the non-European countries since Turkey maintains the geographical limitation in the Contract of 1951, and consequently the processes of resettlement to a third country are mainly fulfilled there. Resettlement for the Syrians is undertaken together with DGMM. The role of UNHCR especially with respect to the Syrians since 2014 has rather focused on actively supporting DGMM and rendering institutional and legal support on the matter of second legislation in the making. UNHCR cooperates with several state institutions. It cooperated with Aliens Police between the years 2005-2014 as to the asylum procedures; and with DGMM after 2014. In addition to these, it also cooperates with all the state institutions providing services for the refugees like the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, AFAD, Ministry of Health, and Turkish Red Crescent. UNHCR has some practice partners in the cities outside of the seven cities where central and field offices and mobile groups are located. These are ASAM and HRDF. In the southeastern cities it cooperates with the operational partners, and national and international NGOs. It cooperates with all the UN organizations when it is necessary.

The Association for Solidarity with the Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) was established as an NGO to assist the refugees and asylum-seekers living in Turkey. When half a million people came to Turkey from Iraq during the Gulf War I in 1991, both Turkish authorities and international institutions had serious troubles about administrating such a massive migration. In that period, there was no legislation in Turkey in order to regulate this matter. Due to this legal gap in the area, a group of academicians established ASAM with the UN's contribution. As of the date of January 7, 2013, ASAM has enrolled all the refugees except the Syrians when they have just come to the country, and directed those people to a satellite town. After fulfilling the enrollment process, it schedules an appointment to those people to identify their refugee status in UNHCR.

Along with the enrollment processes, some services are provided for the refugees in the centers named “multi service center” in Nevşehir, Kayseri, Sakarya, Yalova, Gaziantep, Adana, İzmir, İstanbul, and Ankara. In these multi service support centers, some various services like psychosocial supports, health supports, legal supports, several social benefits, and training supports are provided for the refugees. Besides, there is an ASAM team of 18 people, called emergency response team, which distributes UN’s winter aid materials with trucks and pick-ups. Amnesty International is a non-governmental organization, which was established in 1961, and has carried on its works about human rights since then. Amnesty International operates in 216 countries and regions. Amnesty International Turkey Office was officially established in 2002. Its central office is located in İstanbul. It has another office in Ankara in which Human Rights Training Project and Refugee Rights Campaign are carried on. As an organization that operates on many issues concerning human rights, one of the main subjects, on which Amnesty International focuses, is to protect the rights of the refugees and immigrants.

“Such works are also performed here as to resettle the disadvantaged groups in other countries which the refugees settle for. Those groups stay in the countries like Turkey, which does not settle for refugees and cannot receive them due to various reasons, or their geographical locations. It means that since the non-European refugees cannot get a refugee status in Turkey, still some of them need to rid of this abeyance and this suspension, and to be protected internationally, and get a status as soon as possible. Several campaigns are run in order to resettle them in Europe, the USA, and other countries, which receive refugees. Of course, it is also important for them to gain access to some place in order to do these things. Today we ceaselessly make reports about Europe, and it is not possible for the refugees to gain access to those countries when they shut the doors to them. It is necessary to keep those doors open continually, and to provide the physical conditions for everyone to use the asylum right, included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It goes for all states, and we run campaigns for not only Europe, but also for Turkey and other countries to open the doors for the refugees who come to their borders seeking asylum.” (E2, M)

Amnesty International’s focal point about the refugees is to struggle for them in order not to be sent back to the countries where they may be oppressed from the one where they take refuge. Another focal point is to run campaigns for them to avail themselves of basic human rights in the countries where they take refuge. Besides, other works are performed to resettle the disadvantageous groups in the countries, which settle for refugees, who live in the countries like Turkey, which does not settle

for refugees, or cannot receive them due to various reasons, or their geographical locations. Campaigns are run for the border gates to be opened to the people who come to the borders of Europe, Turkey, and all the other countries that receive refugees. In addition to that, there are works on the limited availability of individual sample cases. Individual cases are usually worked upon the applications about cancelling the practices of deportation, confinement, and custody under the name of administrative detention, and enabling those people to gain access to justice.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) was established in 1951. It is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field of migration and works closely with governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental partners. IOM works in the four broad areas of migration management: migration and development, facilitating migration, regulating migration, and forced migration. IOM began its operations in Turkey during the aftermath of the first Gulf War in 1991. Their partnership was formalized in November 2004 when the Republic of Turkey was granted the member status to IOM.

IOM's main areas of activity are developing the policy of migration, supporting in the processes to form regulations, managing the migration of labor force, development policies, integration policies, and policies about health of immigrants/migration, integrated border management, struggling with human trafficking, struggling with migrant smuggling, detecting forged documents, and mixed movements of migration<sup>16</sup>. Besides, there are activities of voluntary return, resettlement, and emergency (regional response planning for the Syrians such as nonfood items distribution, school transportation, trans-boundary subsidies, etc.). The Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) was established in Ankara in 2009. Its principal object is to meet public opinion's and diplomatic circles' needs on the subject of the Middle Eastern studies. This center aims at diversifying knowledge sources about the Middle East, and directly picturing the opinions of the authorities of this region for Turkish academic and politic circles. In

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<sup>16</sup> The refugees in different categories try to arrive at a destination by using the same means and route.

accordance with these objects, ORSAM carries out works about the social, economic, and politic developments in the Middle East, and releases them to the public.

## **6.2 Expert's Comments on Refugees' Situation in Turkey**

Similar to the fact that the host society sometimes calls all the refugees as the Syrians, it is seen that authorities also give their answers to the common questions about the refugees on the basis of the Syrians. This fact is an indication of how negatively the number of the Syrian refugees affects the visibility of other refugees. It is a frequently emphasized matter in the interviews made with the authorities that the host society tends both to accept and refuse equally, and several actors have influence on these attitudes.

“You know, some cases occurred in Turkey in which some people assaulted the refugee camps and lynched the refugees, and even some cases ended up fatally. When you look at those people's background, you see they have lived as the inhabitants of the same neighborhood for many years and suddenly they happened to get into the act, and invaded their houses in order to get rid of these Syrians. These are not ordinary things; they must certainly have a reason to do these things, even though there was no direct agitation. They must have get into the act as a result of all the things they have heard and perceived about them, as a result of an explosion.” (E2, M)

“We are not such a tender-hearted society, but if the actors pull their weight, then we are not so brutal, so discriminatory, so cruel one as to be mere spectators when people in trouble die in front of our very eyes, either, and I think we are just in the midmost position between these two attitudes.” (E2, M)

It is not possible to talk about this issue from a single viewpoint while talking about the approaches towards the people coming as immigrants, especially the refugees coming in a mass migration. Approaches towards the refugees vary from region to region, or from city to city. One reason of this fact is that the refugees who live in the border cities and have come from just the opposite side of the border are not culturally much different from the host society. On the other hand, the number of the refugees in the region/city/neighborhood has an impact upon the approaches towards

these people. Another decisive aspect of the matter is the socioeconomic status of the interviewee.

“If you go to Istanbul, for example, and you ask Turkish people on the streets ‘What do you think about the Syrians?’, I am sure most of them will answer, ‘All of them beg on the streets’. Why is this so? Because all they see is just this.’ If you go to Hatay and ask the same question, you will be answered, ‘They are our neighbors. They are our brothers.’ If you go to Gaziantep, you will be answered, ‘They are our competitors in the business.’ It is important where and with whom you make an interview. The local authority’s perception, a legal Turkish person’s perception, a student’s perception, or the employers’ perception of the refugees may all be different from each other.’ (E10, M)

Political parties define the refugees in their own way, and use them as a means in order to pull votes to themselves at elections.

“Refugees were instrumentalized at the elections both by the ruling party and the opposing party. The ruling party rather made it on the basis of the sectarian standpoint: being ansar to the immigrants. Yet, when we consider the opposing parties’ approaches, we see that they handled the subject in terms of the refugees’ negative impacts on the labor market. It was the policy makers’ perception.” (E3, F)

The fact that Turkey does not receive the non-European people as refugees since it maintains the geographical limitation in the Contract of 1951 causes the refugees to be called by various names. We can see this fact in the discourses of the authorities, too.

“At the time when ASAM was established, even using the words asylum seeker or refugee was said to be dangerous. Or, I do not know how to say; this was not a frequently used, much preferred terminology at that time; so, they used to name it as the Association of Solidarity with the People who take refuge and Immigrants. Another reason for not calling the non-European people the refugees is that Turkey maintained a geographical limitation; however, the words ‘people who take refuge’ have always been used. Of course, there are both Turkey’s own regulations, and other international ones. The people who are called refugees in terms of international regulations have always been referred by Turkey as people who take refuge.” (E4, M)

“As IOM, we maintain to define all the refugees, conditional refugees, people under temporary protection, regular or irregular immigrants under the concept of ‘immigrants’.” (E3, F)

It is possible to say that the governments’ acceptance of the refugees varies by the period of time or origin country. For Turkey, whether they are descendants of Turkish race or not, and whether they are Muslims or not, are important factors which have influence on this acceptance. Yet, as Daniş and Parla (2009:135) point

out, there is also a hierarchy of acceptability between the immigrants who are descendants of Turkish race. In the establishment phase of the Republic, the Balkan immigrants were dignified since they had connections with Europe, and they were regarded as the “reminders of our lost territory” in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Turkish immigrants living in the East, especially in Arabic provinces, are hardly mentioned when it comes to the migrations in that period in general. The authorities remark that one of the most important reasons of this fact is the discourse dignifying the Balkans based on westernization tendency.

“The states have many policies. Now, both the USA and Europe, and Turkey have their own acceptable and unacceptable refugee profiles. These profiles change from time to time. They naturally stand out in everything, ranging from enrollment to decision of deportation and providing service. Now, ethnicity, religion or sect, or ethnical origin may be determinant, and then certain groups may become disadvantaged just because of the actions; yet, still those groups are always disadvantaged as victims of the discrimination interiorized by the society.” (E2, M)

For the NGOs also, there is an acceptable refugee image. Different NGOs prefer to help the refugees who come from different countries. Religion, ethnicity, etc. have influence on this preference. For example, in the neighborhood, where the field research of this study was made, the Iraqi Turkmens are helped by the Türkmeneli Association and Grey Wolves.

“In the countries where they come as refugees, they may seriously be exposed to a social discrimination, and they may have troubles in terms of getting services, too. These things can also be seen in the services provided by the non-governmental organizations. Everybody has an acceptable refugee profile in his/her mind.” (E2, M)

The Amnesty International agent remarks that the host society tends both to accept and refuse the refugees, and both to love and hate them equally. As the host society shows tolerance towards the refugees and helps them in some regions at some cases or some periods, it can hate them in another region, another case, and another period.

“Turkey is a country which can easily be agitated, be filled with hate, and be subject to hate speech and xenophobia blatantly after all, and all these happen here not only in terms of the refugees. Yet, still if some actors make their positions clear, then we can see that this society has a quite advanced possibility to include multiculturalism, to tolerate different elements in itself on the other hand, especially in the Anatolian territory.” (E2, M)

Two main actors having influence on these choices of acceptance or refusal are depicted to be governmental agencies and media.

“When we go to the smaller cities instead of the bigger ones, we can see local people there open up their houses to the people coming from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and break bread with them somehow. In fact, this is an important thing because the resources presented by the Turkish state are quite limited, but for that; even the urgent needs provided by the state like shelter and food are far from being sufficient indeed. But, these people, especially the ones coming here with a sum of money, can fulfill their needs somehow, and some of them can do this by working, and others by solidarity with the host society. So, life goes on for them in a way we can call as positive, and people are in solidarity with each other. Yet, still it does not mean there is no hate speech or xenophobia here, but when I ask myself whether it is the society or the other actors that cause these things, I think it is primarily the actors whose guilt and responsibilities are so big as to give rise to these problems. Political parties and discourses in media are very effective on this matter, and though the non-governmental organizations and trade associations seem not to have such a big influence as leaders or political objects, they also have quite serious influence on this matter of the refugees.” (E2, M)

Many predicaments and troubles happened in the regions where especially poor people are living are attributed to the refugees. The local people tend to attribute the problems like unemployment, etc. to the refugees’ arrival and settling here.

“While speaking of unemployment, everybody starts to mention the Syrians at once, as if this problem emerged here just three years ago. But, as everybody knows it, this problem called unemployment has always remained on the agenda here as a result of the choices unknown to me, which were made by Turkey at the critical junctures in its history due to its economic or political structure just as economists speak of, and it is an assessment that all the governments have always confirmed in their programs throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, but it is indeed wrong to break off its historical context and connect it only with the refugees though it has become the current issue today; so, it always ends up remaining a debatable issue.” (E2, M)

Again, increase of rental prices is related to the refugees’ arrival and settling here. On this matter, there are very few people who accuse homeowners of taking advantage of the refugees’ vulnerable states.

“Increase of rental prices, as well as such other things, is spoken of as if the only reason of it was the Syrians’ arrival and settling here. But, when considered, the main reason of it is the cunning of the homeowners. This is a much more debatable thing which belongs to, I do not know how to say, ethics or morals, I mean this debatable attitude of homeowners causes such a heavy increase of rental prices; I mean these Syrians coming here are not rich people, and those homeowners force them to pay over the odds, and they mark up rental prices also by getting people from Turkey competing against each other. When considered such a whole of petty cases, the Syrians or refugees have a rough time now.” (E2, M)

Since the government support for the refugees living outside of the camps is very little, the most part of the refugees living in the cities can survive in solidarity with the local people.

“So we say some two and a half million Syrians are living in Turkey, and the most part of them, that is to say, almost all of them are the people living outside of the camps; they are living in the neighborhoods, in the cities, and they just find themselves to have been included in a network of cooperation and solidarity, in fact. We can see it especially when we go to the smaller cities instead of bigger ones, and we can see the local people there open up their houses to the people coming from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and break bread with them somehow. In fact, this is an important thing because the resources presented by the Turkish state are quite limited, but for that; even the urgent needs provided by the state like shelter and food are far from being sufficient indeed, but these people, especially the ones coming here with a sum of money, can fulfill their needs somehow, and some of them can do this by working, and others by solidarity with host society.” (E2, M)

Yet, the supports of this kind cannot deliver any permanent solutions for the refugees in Turkey. Among the accentuated points there is also the fact that it is necessary to be helpful to the refugees to get into labor market and to become self-sufficient.

“If people can earn their own money and meet their own needs by themselves, they will get rid of leading a life as dependents. So, the main solution is to gain access to labor market, but lack of education is the biggest problem. The things which we think we fall short of are not related to our capacity, but in fact they are under obligation of the state, including gaining access to labor market and developing an education system.” (E4, M)

When it comes to refugees, a certain image emerges on people’s minds. This image causes the refugees to be labeled as beggars, dependent, and demanding people.

“Because they have a refugee image on their minds, it is an image of refugee as a person who begs, cannot speak their language, does not have any idea about anything, and who did not study in university. I mean as a human profile to which as a simple citizen you are superior in all respects. But, when you see this is not the case, you can direct all your spite, all your historical spite on them.” (E2, M)

Not only that the refugees live in a neighborhood, but also that they come and go around it for a one-off matter like being enrolled can become a problem at times. ASAM that enrolls the refugees in the register on behalf of UNHCR were obliged to change its office address for this reason, but it could not get rid of the local community’s complaints about them in its new address.

“Since it is very populous here, there are many and many complaints from the neighbors; a lot of warning letters were sent here. So, we thought we should move our office where we do our works about enrollment to another place. We made an official call to the municipal authorities, or rather the municipal authorities came to us, and they said they had a place; that is to say, an estate. We ask them to let us locate our enrollment unit, but the mayor said we should leave him out of them; so, everybody agreed with us but the mayor.” (E4, M)

As IOM representatives review the approaches of people, the government, and opposing parties towards the matter of the refugees, they remark each one of them looks at the issue from its own perspective. The local community acts in such a manner that they do not want their kids to come together with the refugees' kids. The ruling and opposing parties make different interpretations by looking from their own perspectives on the matter of the refugees at election times.

“There is a park just ahead where we go for a walk in the evenings. The side of Sancak is the place where conditional and other refugees are living. It is just a prejudice, yet still they do not want their kids to play in the same park with the refugees' kids. I know this as a simple citizen because I hear my friends who have children talking about it. They still have such a mentality. Tension is not high by the public opinion hereabouts since these people are not so visible around.” (E3, F)

“The perception could be divided into so many things: are you perceiving these people as an individual or are you perceiving them as a labor force or are you perceiving them unfortunately as a security threat?” (E10, M)

Media usually does not care about the matter of the refugees. The refugees are mentioned as “fugitive refugees”, “fugitives”, “fugitive immigrants” in the reports about the fatalities presented by media. The refugees are reported as news by being mostly linked with the concepts of victimization, poverty, or crime. That refugees are usually presented as poor people, or fugitives involved in several crimes, and troublemaker people, causes some discriminatory, xenophobic/anti-refugee discourses, which contain hate spreading among the local people. On the other hand, governmental agencies and their authorities speak of the refugees as “guests”. Guest is not a legally defined concept. The fact that refugees are mentioned in this way stresses on their transience. The concept of “guest” is adopted by the local people, too. Therefore, the local people wait for these people whom they take as guests to return home in due course.

### **6.3 Experts' Comments of Turkey's Asylum Policy**

Since the first years of the foundation of the Republic, non-Turkish citizens have been called as “foreigners” in the articles by which legislative regulations about

those people have been actualized. An IOM expert among the interviewees explains how those people are defined in the recently made legislation LFIP with these words:

“The definition of “immigrant” also changes gradually. Even though we call them immigrants across Turkey, we still call them foreigners on legal ground. Since they were perpetually called as foreigners in the former legal regulations, the concept of “foreigner” is used in LFIP also, in order to have a consistency in legislation.” (E3, F)

As to the legislation, experts remark that legal regulations are sufficient in general. Yet, it is pointed also that the fragile groups need to have a wider place in legal regulations. Another subject underlined is that though the legal regulations are sufficient on paper they are applied/interpreted in different ways in different regions.

“Regulations considerably depend on the intentions of the executives; if they enforce a very bad regulation very well, then that bad regulation can change positively. Yet, on the contrary, there are some regulations, which provide very suitable rights, but if you enforce these badly, you may have failed to provide any of them properly. Europe is the best example of this; I mean when you read the regulations on the code, they seem to be parts of very ideal systems, but when considered, the enforcements you see cause a lot of problems. Turkey had no legislation about the matter after all, I mean it had only one regulation. Some of its articles were cancelled by the state council. It was just a regulation formed to work out for a while after all, which was full of errors and mistakes, and some of its articles needed to be cancelled. They used to conduct everything by means of it, until a law was made in 2013. That law is sufficient, in my view. I mean it has formed a statute that is sufficient to meet the demands; it has formed the base line. Yet, it has been left half finished. There are many deficiencies to fill in this area, and there are also many regulations and general instructions belated to be made. I mean a quite sufficient base of regulations is at hand, and there remains only to complete them. Yet, it is important how to enforce them. If you like, you can bend them in practice; you can do it through just a word in it, but the case is usually on the contrary. When it comes to the refugees, any ambiguous expression always turns against them. We have already started to see the examples of this fact. We also see in practice of this law that in some cases such an interpretation of it is enforced that it may become restricting to gain access to basic rights and justice. As a result, there is a sufficient legislation now, and it can be developed, but what matters most is the intention and interpretation of the executives.” (E2, M)

An expert from ASAM points out that before the Directorate General of Migration Management all the processes about the refugees were performed by the Directorate General of Security, and this fact caused to emerge a viewpoint based on security.

“In regard to this field, some regulations were made in 1994, called the regulations of 1994. The Regulations of 1994 were received as legal regulations valid until the year of 2006. The relevant department on this matter in that period was Foreigners, Borders, and Refuge Department under the directorship of the Directorate General of

Security. It was the governmental institution responsible for this field. Its branches in the cities within the scope of the Directorate General of Security were Foreigners Departments. That was the case until the year of 2014. So, the Directorate General of Security was in charge of this subject till the government established a civil institution responsible for this field; that is to say, the Directorate General of Migration Management. Since the Directorate General of Security was in charge of it, a viewpoint based on security prevailed as a matter of course.” (E4, M)

Almost all the experts point out that LFIP is a sufficient and well-meaning regulation. But, it is expressed also that there are some deficiencies on some respects. For example, while deciding on which groups should be considered as fragile, LGBTI individuals were excluded. It brings some troubles with it in practical terms. It is remarked that gaining access to health services should be reorganized for another fragile group; that is to say, children.

“LFIP seems to have been prepared well-meaningly. It has some articles, which contain the people in a fragile state. When it comes to the people whom it is forbidden to deport, it is not sufficient. While deciding on which groups were fragile, they did not include, for example, the LGBTI individuals in the regulations. So, they must have made such changes then. And there are no directives on the matter. The regulations without directives can be bent arbitrarily. As a well-meaning institution can enforce this regulation in favor of the refugees, some Provincial Directorates of Migration Management seem to do it to the detriment of them. Consequently, the regulations must be developed more by means of the directives.” (E5, M)

“It is necessary that one of the fragile groups; that is to say, children can gain access to health service more easily, and also some exceptions must be made, having regard to children’s high benefits.” (E5, M)

Also, the fact that the executives do not have enough knowledge about the regulations can make problems in practice. On the other hand, the refugees do not have enough knowledge about their rights, either.

“There are not many deficiencies in terms of the regulations; some works were done to fill the gaps in the regulations over the years. Yet, when we look at the field and the practices performed, we can see there are certain ongoing problems now, and there are some difficulties about gaining access to certain services. There can be seen quite an ignorance, or a lack of knowledge among people about the question which institutions can provide what kind of services to them. We can see sometimes executives who are not enough well-supported in terms of the regulations.” (E1, F)

As the experts look positively at giving work permit in the matter of making arrangements about working in the regulations and enforcing them, they still think certain problems may emerge in practice.

“Of course illegal working prevailed too much, and the regulations about works were made too late. I mean they were barely made in the beginning of the year of 2016. Consequently, it is necessary to promote legal working, and it will militate in favor of employers, too because you cannot tell where those foreigners will go tomorrow. So, it will be especially to the employers’ benefits; it means that a legal work environment is a must.” (E1, F)

“First, work permits were given to the Syrians. Right after, other regulations were made for the applicants for international protection. In the medium term those people may gradually get their work permits. There may emerge several problems about it though. They will not have any personal credits registered in the governmental agencies; they will not get work permit in a short time, but they have their own rights on legal ground now.” (E3, F)

Yet, since getting work permit depends on employers, these rights granted to them on paper do not seem to be applicable for the present.

“Since it is not possible for them to get work permit legally, or rather it is a hard process, they usually work illegally and in unskilled labor.” (E7, F)

Also, the long waiting periods cause the refugees to have a rough time in Turkey. The refugees who firstly had to wait for a long time in order to get their identity documents then have to wait for many years this time to be resettled into a third country. This situation of being not settled or a migrant is an obstacle for the refugees to make a regular life for themselves and develop healthy relationships with the host society.

“These people’s insurances may not be active for about a year or one and half year. Because though they apply to the Directorate General of Migration Management with their pre-registration documents, the officials schedule an appointment date to them for a long time later. Also, hospitals do not admit them by their pre-registration documents, because most of these people do not have enough money; their financial situations are really bad, and hospital authorities know they cannot pay the hospital charge by any means. So, they do not admit these people who need to be treated regularly, and consequently they are wronged too much in this respect, and we are not able to do anything for them.” (E7, F)

An expert remarks that it takes some three or four years for these people to get a refugee status, and settle into a third country, and this period is really very long.

“The dates given by UNHCR cause problems indeed, and we can do nothing about them. So, should we wait till 2020? It is written as 2023 there, though they will not wait till that time, but they have to stay here at least for some 3-4 years more. They need to earn their keep here for those 3-4 years. This is a serious matter for them. To make a life for themselves here, and not just for a three or five months. They must wait for both getting a refugee status, and being received by a third country and going there.” (E7, F)

Moreover, it takes a very long time for the refugees who managed to get a refugee status to be settled into a third country due to the quotas imposed by the countries. Still, during this period, these people need to go on their living and earn their keep somehow.

“The period after the interview made for deciding on the refugee status takes very long, too. The countries have imposed quotas too hard for the refugees to come and live within the boundaries of them, and they do not want to receive them, especially after this Syria problem, and they do not want them because too many immigrants illegally entered the third countries. So, this process of resettlement takes longer now, which used to work rather easily before. After UNHCR recognized of the status of the refugee of these people, the third countries are informed about them, and they run a security check in order to find the answer to the question if these people may pose a security risk for their country or not, and they review their files by themselves again even though these people are legally recognized as refugees, and they prepare documents; they execute a series of transactions in their own migration departments as to these people’s status within their own boundaries, etc. So, I can say this period will last for a year at least even if these people think that they may die a few days later over there, and they may not have any security in Turkey, either.” (E7, F)

After being enrolled for the first time, the refugees need to get their identity cards in the cities where they are directed. After getting these identity cards, they have to get health insurance this time. But, this process to get the identity cards takes long in the cities where the refugees are populous. Also, this fact brings with it a quite long process during which they cannot benefit from the health services, or can do it only by paying the prices.

“After the refugees are enrolled, they go to the Migration Department in the cities where they are directed, and they are enrolled there, too. After they get their identity cards, their insurances are made active by the Ministry of Health. Yet, since there are too many refugees; some Provincial Directorates of Migration Management schedule appointments postdated of the year of 2017 for the registration procedures. So, how can these people’s hospital needs be met till that time? It can be met only by paying the prices, if they have enough money, of course; but if not, then they try to accelerate the registration procedures to be completed by talking with the authorities of the Migration Department especially for that file.” (E7, F)

An expert working in the unit where the refugees are enrolled for the first time tells that if they can schedule an appointment to a date only one year later for deciding on the refugee status they take it as a timely appointment.

“Unfortunately, there is nothing which takes a short time unless there is a security risk, or a very serious danger about health, maybe. But, apart from these, there are too many applications and demands. UNHCR even does not schedule an appointment to the Afghan citizens for a long while, it does this only to the Iranians,

Iraqis, Somalians, etc. The current date scheduled to a standard Iraqi family to decide on the refugee status is 2023. The one scheduled to any Iranian one is 2017-2018. If a date as soon as the last months of 2016 is scheduled, we call it a timely one.<sup>17</sup>” (E7, F)

Some appointments scheduled to decide on the refugee status are so future-dated that some refugees think these are only jokes played on them.

“There were some refugees saying you must be kidding, when the appointments scheduled for deciding on the refugee status in UNHCR are so future-dated.” (E8, F)

“If only some more convenience could be provided for gaining access to the services of education and health, and these people could find a chance to gain access to them without waiting so much. And they had better to take short of the registration procedures and give them their identity cards as immediate as possible.” (E8, F)

One of the main points in the interviews is that the system in Turkey never suffices for neither its own citizens nor the refugees living there:

“The system really does not suffice here, and as our system and mechanisms have never sufficed even for the Turkish citizens, it does not for the refugees, either. In Turkey you cannot quarter any woman in a women’s shelter at once without her demand to be quartered there, even if there is a security risk for her, because women’s shelters are too populous to receive other residents. You have already had difficulties in quartering a woman in a women’s shelter if she is a violence victim and demands to be quartered there, and besides you have more difficulty in doing it just because she is also a refugee. The Ministry of Family and Social Policies does not receive the refugee women if the violence to which they were exposed did not happen in Turkey. It took a decision for not receiving any demand for being quartered in a women’s shelter here if the violence to which the demanding women were exposed happened in another country. Now, the women in question are violence victims, and they need help. I mean they need help from an institution, which works for violence victims, and women who were exposed to violence. They want to benefit from this institution because it is organized in support of the violence victim women; so, they need it, but you cannot direct them to these places.” (E7, F)

“The point where we find no way out is the Turkish official authorities. Half of the applicant people are the ones who fall under the fragile groups; that is to say, old people, deserted women, and children. Our units are really insufficient for quartering and directing these applicants. And our institutions are insufficient for so many applicants. So, this fact leaves us without a way out.” (E8, F)

An expert remarks that the Iraqi refugees can get human residence permit, but they can do it only by renouncing international protection, and he adds that the refugees are confused about this matter:

“The Iraqi refugees can apply only for human residence permit, not for international protection. It is a procedure, which only belongs to DGMM. It is necessary to get an

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<sup>17</sup> This interview was made on the date of 17.11.2015.

appointment of interview from DGMM. They bring the documents, which DGMM requires. Yet, they have to renounce international protection for applying to it. They cannot apply both to them. Many refugees prefer applying to it because they think applying to UNHCR means going to a third country. The refugees, who want to live here, and go to their home, and return here whenever they wish to, apply for human residence permit. On the identity documents given to them by DGMM it is written that their status includes a human residence permit.” (E8, F)

A psychologist from ASAM points that despite the numerousness of the refugees, the affairs can easily be straightened by means of correct processing:

“There are too many applicants, and the trouble is not that we cannot have an interview with them. There is a problem about processing. You can get round to them somehow. We cannot give good support to each one of them. But, if the problems are noticed correctly and processing is made suitably, their problems can be solved easily.” (E6, F)

Cooperation among the institutions can make things easier and serve to solve the problems effectively.

“Foreigners Department Manager in Kayseri even did not shake my hand when we went there for the first time. But, he called me up three months later and asked for help. He noticed we are useful.” (E6, F)

“You are nobody once you go out of your homeland even if you hate it. And in that case, you hand over the most important decisions about yourself to other people. You are obliged to demand your basic rights from other people, then.” (E6, F)

He depicts the facts that the refugees must demand even their basic rights, and they have so many difficulties because they are not the citizens of the country where they are living,

#### **6.4. The Problems Emerged in the Activities Conducted and Services Provided for the Refugees**

The overpopulation of the Syrian refugees causes other refugee groups to become less visible. This case can cause the services provided to the other refugee groups to be hindered. The most heavily populated one among these groups is the Iraqi refugees, who are also the main subject of this study.

“Since the Syrians have a dense population of 2,7 million people, the people in the other groups seem to stay in the background. But, we mention another seriously

dense population of 300.000 people now. There is a wrong impression that there are only Syrians here, and all the services and resources are provided for them; so, this is totally wrong. Again, both the governmental agencies and national/international organizations handle the subject rather as specific to the Syrians. Besides, it is necessary to meet the other groups' needs to be protected and gain access to the services – and rights also – equally; so, it is necessary to be attentive to these things.” (E1, F)

Since they are so populous, any talk about the refugees ends up with the Syrian refugees.

“When Turkey’s current agenda is considered, even if we talk about all these categories in a legal context, all the talks end up with Syria because they are so populous and the subject is multilayered. Migration is very troublesome for the academic discussions since even though they are so populous, we talk about foreigners and immigrants who have many fragile issues with regard to a point which we call as status scale. The present political climate causes us to concentrate upon Syria crisis. But if we discuss the subject of migration only on the line of Syria, it will bring a serious risk with it because if we should talk about an extensive and human rights-focused migration policy, we should focus on other refugees, as well.” (E3, F)

The Syria crisis affected not only the Syrian refugees, but also the Iraqis who lived in Syria. As the Iraqis who ran from ISIS were added to them, the migration from Iraq to Turkey gained intensity.

“When the term from 2013 to November 2015 is considered, we know that in the busiest period after UNHCR was established, since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, 4685 refugees applied for the office in a day. It is because the crises were continuing in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and the Syria crisis affected not only the Syrians, but also the Iraqis who lived in Syria since there were 1.5 million Iraqis in Syria. When an internal disturbance broke up in Syria, some of those people returned to Iraq, but they returned again to Syria because the activities of ISIS increased in Iraq, as well, and this time they came to Turkey because they could not return to Syria.” (E4, M)

One of the biggest problems of the refugees in Turkey is that they could not have any suitable working conditions. Although there seems no obstacle for the refugees to work according to legal regulations, in practice many refugees are either unemployed, or they sweat in some unsuitable working conditions. This fact affects the lives of all refugees. These people, who cannot work, or who sweat as unskilled laborer, cannot find a healthy solution to the problem of shelter due to their financial difficulties. Also, their kids cannot attend school due to the same reason. All of these affect their relationships with the host society. The host society can label as people “whose children do not attend school”, or “who do not like to work”.

“Shelter is one of the biggest problems because it does not matter for them indeed to gain access to some services and not to other; all of these must be considered as a whole since bad shelter conditions cause bad health conditions at the same time. Consequently, all these needs arise altogether. Likewise, malnutrition causes health problems. Poverty is a thing which has a direct impact on education; so, refugee children cannot attend school because they have to work. I mean we should consider it as a spiral, yet we can call health and shelter as an urgent need, and it is requisite also to meet the other needs because any process to solve these problems can go wrong when there is no possibility to work for the refugees, and that reality we called poverty affects all of them; so, all these stimulate each other.” (E2, M)

“Refugees live everywhere together with us; that is to say, the host society and especially shelter is a very serious problem. It may become a problem to find a livable house, and even if they find one, they have to pay rack rent for it. They have really big families; so, home owners do not want to hire out their houses to them due to their overcrowded families.” (E1, F)

Language barrier causes several problems for the refugees at every stages of the period during which they stay in Turkey. Language barrier as an element complicating the access to the resources also makes for them difficult to make contact with the host society.

“There happens a problem based on language barrier; so, they go to hospital and cannot make themselves understood. There are no translators in the Migration Departments in the cities, especially in the smaller ones, and they are in search of students who study in the Arabic and Persian language departments in the universities, and would volunteer to be translators for them. There are translators in the departments in our cities, but they can help only to the people who apply to these departments. We have difficulty to provide the service of elbow interpreting for each one of refugees. So, language barrier can become a problem by itself in terms of gaining access to resources.” (E7, F)

“We must make some middle- and long-term plans, ours always remains as temporary solutions. The refugees here will not return home even if the war over there ends, and it takes at least some 15-20 years for Syria to come through after all. So, strictly speaking, I do not think these people who will have been living here for 5-6 or 10 years then, and who will have set in their own way here then, and who will want to return home after so many years spent here. But, no long-term policies are developed here now; I mean about neither education nor access is developed concerning social services. Camps are not solutions, either; people do not want to live in the camps even though the conditions of the camps have the highest standards in the world, and they go to the cities to spend their lives. They prefer this to the camps even if they live in worse conditions there because they want their own family togetherness and privacy, and they prefer to live outside in worse conditions.” (E4, M)

It is pointed that some long-term solutions must be put into force in case the refugee people will permanently stay here, and the short term ones do not remedy the situation.

## 6.5 Activities of Related Institutions for the Host Society

In the course of the interviews, it was asked to the executives of the institutions if they work through the host society. It was confirmed that they work through the host society very little.

“DGMM has its own units like international protection, foreigners, and harmonization departments. The harmonization department’s field of study is in fact a two-layer one; it aims at adapting the host community and immigrant/refugee people each other somehow. They have not been able to undertake any serious activities till now, but they hold some training courses for the refugee women by means of the provincial directorates’ officials, corporation, officials of the women’s studies units within the municipalities, or religious affairs administration in the cities; several activities of harmonization are made in those units in the cities, but there are no systematical works of harmonization throughout Turkey.” (E1, F)

“In our visits to the field we hardly get in contact with the host community. Since our information field is on the refugees; we do not gather information by its perspective. Yet, it depends on the region, the people of the region, and the numbers of them. I mean the fact that 5 refugees live in a region where 10000 people live do not pose any serious problem, and it does not come to our attention; so, in that case everybody tries to help them somehow, but we can observe that in the cities where the resources are limited or conservatism relatively prevails, the host communities get tensed up and some misunderstandings occur between two groups due to not being able to speak the same language and communicate with each other.” (E1, F)

ASAM recruits personnel to work to strengthen the relationships between the host society and refugees. But, since this work has just begun at the date when the interview was made there is no knowledge about its results, yet.

“In the multiple support centers we recruited personnel to do some activities to strengthen the communication between the Turkish society called ‘peace building officer’ and refugees.” (E4, M)

In the regions where the population of refugees is dense, the local people feel free to attribute any trouble happened to the refugees.

“For example, in Kilis where the local people’s population is 100.000, there are 120.000 Syrians. Now, even though people say refugees invigorate the economy, etc. in many places they have already begun to open their own markets, barber shops, shopping places, coffee houses, etc. by themselves. So, the local people attribute several troubles to which they are exposed, including increase in the rental prices, to the refugees, and there happened some serious troubles between the refugees and local people in Gaziantep and Hatay.” (E4, M)

On the other hand, the host society considers the fact that public relief is provided for the refugees as a defraudation committed against itself. An NGO official, who tells that the local people reproach them because of the public relief provided to refugees, adds that many problems are attributed to the refugees in the cities where the population of refugees is dense.

“We provide shopping cards or public relief for the refugees – for example, food, etc. The local people always reproach us for providing such things to the refugees but not to them.” (E4, M)

In the regions where especially the population of the refugees is dense, it has been recorded that the host society can react to the refugee group. It is remarked by various experts that the local people attribute such problems as unemployment, increase in the rental prices to the refugees, and this fact creates a tension between the two groups.

“So, there is a social tension here. Now, both the refugees and host society must make an effort to accommodate themselves to each other. I mean integration or conformity requires a reciprocal effort, and it is called social cohesion now, but it used to be called harmonization, and integration before. So, we will probably organize some activities for both the local people and refugees to participate in common; they will be kind of briefing works. I mean we have begun to recruit ‘peace building officers’ to work through the necessary conditions for living together.” (E4, M)

It is pointed out that Turkey as a country, which has been hosting a big population of refugees for over five years, should try to find a sustainable solution.

“Since these people have been living here for over five years, the problem here cannot be considered as only an emergency. Nowadays, such concepts as co-existence of emergency and development have been used. So, some durable and sustainable solutions are sought both for the refugees and the host community. Here the biggest problem is employment because these people have obtained work permit now. But, the people who managed to obtain work permit are few in number since it is the employers who have to apply for the foreigners to get work permit. It is necessary to enhance the employers’ knowledge in this matter, too. There has already been an undeclared work of the Turkish citizens; so, why not another foreigner? Above all, it is especially important when the sectors in question are textile, construction, agriculture, etc.” (E3, F)

On the basis of which points the experts remark, we can say that there are not many works performed by the institutions working through the refugees in Turkey in order to adapt the refugee group with the host society. The refugees in Turkey must be considered not as temporary ‘guests’, but at least people who will stay here for many

years. Also, a farther-reaching adaptation process must be followed in respect of the refugee crisis, which has gradually increased after 2011. Considering that the crisis is really big, developing a harmonization between the host society and the refugees requires an overall approach. Within this period, there is a need for the governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to collaborate.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzes expert views and local responses towards Iraqi Turkmens in Abidinpaşa, Ankara. The research was conducted through structured in-depth interviews with local people in order to analyze their perspective and semi-structured in depth interviews with the representatives of the NGOs and INGOs. In this study the host society's construction of the refugee identity is examined within the context of hospitality and hostility of local community against refugees, and the distinction of "us" and "them". For this analysis, the concept of "stranger" is used particularly as theorized through Simmel's "stranger", Park's "marginal man", Siu's "sojourner", and Bauman's "stranger". As it is impossible to consider the approaches of the host society's acceptance of the refugees without reference to international and national refugee regimes, the historical transformation of the migration policies in Turkey is also included. The historical background of the Iraqi refugees in Turkey is explained. Following that, the statistics and locations of the refugees in Turkey are given together with the refugee studies in the world and Turkey. After briefly pointing out similar refugee studies in Turkey and the world, the findings of the fieldwork are analyzed. Throughout the study, the reasons why, or how, and when Iraqi Turkmens have been stigmatized as strangers/outsideers are analyzed.

Since Turkey still enforces the "geographical limitation" article of the 1951 Geneva Convention, it does not accept migrants of non-European origin as refugees, and only allows them to stay until they are resettled in a third country. After the Syrian Crisis, Turkey granted the Syrians who collectively crossed borders with "temporary protection status", and assumed that these people will return their countries when the war in their country is over. The belief that the Syrians will go back to their country can be observed in the concept of "guest" that is used to refer to the Syrians both by the local people and the public authorities. Similarly, the Iraqi refugees, who either

collectively or individually crossed the Turkish borders due to a conflict in their countries in the past years, were given “humanitarian residence permit”. This status also implies that these people are temporary. The process of determining the status of refugee for Afghan migrants has been suspended for the last few years. These people are first registered by the ASAM, and they are given an appointment for an interview to determine their status of refugee. For the migrants of non-European origin (Somali, Iran, Afghanistan etc.), their process of determining the status of refugee is initiated, and they are allowed to stay in Turkey until they are resettled in a third country by the UNHCR. The element of temporariness is the most obvious one in all these statuses. This causes the refugees not to start a new life in the asylum country while they long wait for returning their country or resettling in a third country, and to fail to develop a relationship with the host society.

According to this thesis study the finding suggest that three major conclusions are significant in understanding the local people’s responses towards the refugees. The first conclusion is related to the confrontation of local people and refugees in the economiss sphere in many areas. One such area of conflict in economy is the labor market. Due to poverty and lack of infrastructure most of refugee children cannot find suitable schools to attend and adults fail to get employment because of “restrictions on employment”, and they become a source for uninsured and cheap employment, and they cannot have a stable life for themselves. Additionally, adult male refugees are either excluded from the labor market, or they have to work under heavy working conditions for low wages. Refugees are seen as cheap labor by the employers; and as competitors who lower the wages by the local people. The efforts of the refugees who are in the labor market are not visible due to the insecure working conditions, and this causes the exploitation of the refugees by their employers. Most of the refugee boys have to work in order to contribute to the livelihood of their family, and thus they cannot go to school. Local people do not seriously question the problem that the refugees’ children cannot go to school or they are employed as child workers. They consider the refugees’ children’s employment as normal. When it is about the refugees, child labor is mostly accepted. On the other hand, among the local people there are many young people who attended schools,

who have some skills but still cannot find a job. Therefore, while refugees are finding jobs despite the fact that they are low paid and local youth not being able to access job even if they are trained creates a major conflict related to the labor market opportunities between two communities. The fact that the refugees settle in low incomers' neighborhood raises such statements as "we cannot support ourselves", "the state does not look after its own citizens", and "we now have to share our jobs, bread, and future with them". Also, some other examples to this discourse that reflects rage against the state and wealthy people are as follows: "The state opened its doors for these people, and the state should take care of them", or "the rich are not harmed by this situation but us".

Another area of conflict in economy is housing. After the refugees came to the neighborhood, the rental prices increased. Some homeowners who exploit the fragile situations of the refugees rent their houses for a price that is a lot higher than it is worth. Besides the fact that the refugees accept high rental prices, another reason for the homeowners to rent their houses to the refugees is that the refugees pay their rents without any delay since they fear losing their houses.

The second conclusion is related to discrimination on the basis of using language. When local people hear a foreign language, they immediately turn to an ethnocentric stand where they think that different language is inferior. The discourse of the local people such as "we hear Arabic everywhere", "we are fed up with hearing Arabic everywhere", and "they must be saying some bad things, I do not know" is based on the language of the distinction between "us" and "them". The local people discriminate and marginalize the Iraqi Turkmens because of their language. When the ethnical expectation of the neighborhood that the Iraqi Turkmens would or will speak Turkish is not fulfilled, it becomes the reason for othering/marginalization of these refugees in the common life experience. Despite the common expectation from the Iraqi Turkmens, they do not speak Turkish, and this causes their marginalization. The language barrier prevents the two groups from communicating, and leads to misunderstandings. The failure of this group to speak Turkish causes disappointment in the local people, and sometimes it may lead to the idea that they are "saying bad

things” about the local people. Since they do not speak the same language despite their consanguinity, it stands out as a block in the social integration of the two groups. Since one of the inquiries of the thesis is about the possible consanguinity between the local and Iraqi Turkmens due to an expectations of common language, namely Turkish, Arabic speaking Turkmens initiate negative responses from the local people.

The third major conclusion of the thesis is related to different identities attributed to the definition of refugee’ status in Turkey. “Guest” has been the most frequently used concept to refer to the refugees in Turkey since 2011. The reason for using the concept of “guest” to refer to the refugees in Turkey is the host country’s tendency to see them as temporary. The use of “guest” by the official institutions is also accepted by the host society. The local people also often emphasize the temporariness of the refugees and their being guests as in the discourses of the public institutions and media. With the official discourse about refugees in Turkey, the local people consider the refugees as temporary and assume that they will go back when the conflicts in their country end. The social construction of refugee is achieved through creating distinctions of “us and them”. Although there is an emphasis on the concepts such as religious fellowship or consanguinity, the discourse about differences is more dominant.

In the districts where the local people and the refugees live together, there are more of two different living practices that parallel one another rather than coexistence. Both groups prefer to contact at the possible minimum level. According to Stanley (1977: 620), the refugees’ success or failure in settling in or adapting to the country of migration depends on the approaches of the governmental and social policies of the country, migration regimes, immigrant/refugee sheltering and support programs, and lastly conveniences regarding the refugees’ physical and psychological health. It is not quite incorrect to state that the local people’s perception of the refugees in Turkey is based on the government’s policies. The statutes granted to the refugees make it easier to understand the basis of Turkey’s asylum policy, which are respectively “under temporary asylum status” given to the Syrians, who have the

highest refugee population in Turkey, “humanitarian residence permit” granted to the Iraqis, who are the second largest refugee population in Turkey, and conditional refugee, secondary protection provided for other refugee groups. Since the 1951 Geneva Convention, Turkey still enforces “geographical limitation”, it does not accept foreigners of non-European origin as refugees. If these people are Syrians who collectively crossed the Turkish border, they get the right to be “under temporary protection status”; if they are Iraqis who either collectively or individually crossed the border, they are given “humanitarian residence permit”; and refugees from other countries are allowed to stay in Turkey until they are resettled in a third country. Each of these cases signals an ambiguity or temporariness. It is assumed that the Syrians and Iraqis will return their countries when their domestic conflicts are over, and those who apply for international protection will be resettled in a third country. However, although it has already been over six years since the first Syrian group’s arrival, neither the war in Syria has ended nor a majority of the Syrian refugees have been able to go back home yet. Similarly, the Iraqi people with “humanitarian residence permit” could not return their countries since the conflict in their country has not ended yet. The sense of temporariness created for these people’s situation does not correspond to the reality of their lives. The refugees who are welcome as “our guest”, “our religious fellow” by the local people with the influence of the state policies, have become an unwanted community as their stay keeps extending. Every assistance or right given to the refugees causes a reaction especially on the part of the poor local people.

In relation to the refugees, cultural differences, language barrier, and different lifestyles are mostly emphasized issues. Especially, Turkmens’ polygamy, having many children, crowded families, clothing styles, and practices of discriminating against women, honor concept based on patriarchy, familial relationship at the framework of escape-migration, and their perspectives on the Turkish women are among the issues that they are criticized for. The host society has anxieties because of the increase in the crime rate; becoming unemployed and poorer as a result of the competition in the market; the possibility that the refugees will become a minority; the probability that their children will get married with the refugees; and the reason

that their children will have to rival the refugee students in the university entrance exams.

The people living in the origin country are also another element that determines the host society's perception of the refugees. The refugees, who escape from the conflicting conditions in their country, are described by the local people in two ways: some of the interviewees sympathize with the war-weary refugees, and some others accuse them of being traitors as they ran away from fighting in their country. Some of the interviewees told that these people had to leave their countries because they had no other chance while others claim that it was more proper for them to stay and fight the war.

As the Iraqi Turkmens have a lot in common in terms of their Turkish and Muslim identities with the host society, the acceptance of the Iraqi Turkmens by the host society is easier than that of others, but there are still conflicts between the two groups in daily life. Their acceptance at first is based on the dominant idea that they are one of "us", of Turkish and Muslim origin, but as their stay in Turkey extends, the emphasis shifts to the poverty of the local people, the increasing unemployment rate, and the idea that they do not want to share their resources with the refugees. Such statements as "We accepted them because they are Turkish, but we want them to return their country", "We hardly survive here", "Our children cannot go to university, and their children will" result from the poverty of the local neighborhood. The local people do not want the foreigners to gain the rights of citizenship with reference. Another statement such as "The state does not care for its citizens, will it care for these other people?" also creates a distinction between "us" and "them" in terms of citizenship and non-citizenship. According to this perception, the citizen "us" has to live in better conditions than the non-citizen "them". The non-citizens are guests, and they have to leave when the time comes. Also, as guests, they have to live without disturbing the host society. Although they are Turkish and Muslim, this non-citizen group still disturbs the host society with their life styles and cultural differences. The host society is upset with the big refugee families, their noisy children, laundries hung up in streets, male adults hanging out outside, families

having more children in the country where they are only guests and need assistance for living.

Although the Iraqi Turkmens were accepted due to consanguinity at the beginning and received as one of “us”, this preliminary acceptance has changed as a result of some experiences and reasons. The Iraqi Turkmens who come from the same ethnicity with the local people were closer to become one of “us” at the beginning, but throughout time they have been discriminated, marginalized, and turned into “them” by the local people due to their differences. Most local people think that the refugees are in a position inferior to them. This positioning reveals itself in different ways under different circumstances: the local people sometimes associate the refugees’ escape from the war conditions as selling their country out or being traitors to their country; they also complain about the refugees’ failure to adapt to the apartment life; they sometimes condemn the refugees for their carefree behaviors in a country where they are just guests. In each case, the distinction between “us” and “them” are emphasized through various concepts, and the refugees are criminalized and stigmatized.

As a result of the interviews with the representatives of the NGOs and INGOs, it is observed that the experts and institutions make high-level policies. However, there are hardly ever any experts or institutions to develop policies at the level of the neighborhoods. It is seen that some institutions/associations are left responsible for policy making at the level of the neighborhoods.

In this study, the relationship between refugees and host community was evaluated from the point of view of the host community. For further studies, it is recommended to analyse this relationship from the refugees’ perspective.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS for LOCAL PEOPLE

#### **Socio-demography:**

1. Gender:
2. Age:
3. Educational status:
4. Vocation:
5. Marital status:
6. Do you have children? If you have, how many children do you have?
7. Where do you work/live in Ankara? (District or neighborhood)  
How long have you been living here?

#### **Level of knowledge concerning the refugees:**

8. What do you think of refugees/asylum seekers or people under temporary protection? How do you describe these people?
9. From which countries mostly do you think people come to Turkey as asylum seekers/refugees?
10. Why do you think asylum seekers/refugees come to Turkey?
11. Do you know how many asylum seekers/refugees live in Turkey right now?
12. What types of problems do you think/see the asylum seekers/refugees in Turkey have?
13. What should be done in order to solve these problems? Which organization/s should act to solve the problems of the asylum seekers/refugees?
14. What do you know about the legal status of the asylum seekers/refugees in Turkey?
15. What do you know about the living conditions of the asylum seekers/refugees in Turkey? Do you know under which qualification they stay here; how many

years they will stay; and their rights/statuses concerning their participation in professional or educational life?

16. Are you informed about the state institutions that deal with the asylum seekers/refugees or organizations that support them?

**The conception of asylum seeker/refugee:**

17. Are you in contact with the asylum seekers/refugees? (Neighbors, tenants, or employees, etc.)

18. What does it mean to you to have asylum seekers/refugees as your neighbor?  
How are your neighborhood relationships with the asylum seekers/refugees?

19. How do people treat the asylum seekers/refugees in your own neighborhood?

20. Do you think that the asylum seekers/refugees are in any way discriminated?  
Have you witnessed any case that the asylum seekers/refugees experience any difficulty?

21. Have you had any negative experienced in relation to the asylum seekers/refugees?

22. What have changed in your neighborhood after the asylum seekers/refugees moved there?

23. What similarities/differences do you observe between you and the asylum seekers/refugees?

24. Do you know about any legal regulation in relation to the asylum seekers/refugees?

25. What do you think about the asylum seekers/refugees' participation in professional life?

26. What do you think about the participation of the asylum seekers/refugees' children in educational life?

27. Are you informed about the services provided for the asylum seekers/refugees? Do you individually help/Have you individually helped any asylum seeker/refugee?

28. Do you think asylum seekers/refugees need help? Who or which organization or institution should help them? For which reasons do you think people need to help them?
29. What should be Turkey's politics about the asylum seekers/refugees if the conflict in their countries does not resolve?
30. In some cities/neighborhoods, the local people have showed harsh reactions to asylum seekers/refugees on the grounds that they committed crimes or destroyed the existing order. Are you aware of this news? What do you think about that?

## **APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS for INSTITUTIONS**

Name of Institution:

Interview Date:

1. Post of the interviewee:

2. Period of the post of the interviewee:

3. Education of the interviewee: [University, Faculty, Department]

( ) Bachelor Degree:

( ) Master Degree:

( ) Ph.D. Degree:

4. Does your institution have any work or activity concerning refugees? What can or should be done in this regard? What institutions do you or can you cooperate with?

5. On what issues do the refugees who apply to your institution ask help for?

6. How do people perceive the refugees in Turkey? Are the refugees living in Turkey in any way positively or negatively discriminated?

7. What are the biggest problems concerning the services provided for the refugees? On what issue/s are they?

8. What kind of issues should the studies on refugees mostly pay attention to?

9. What are the areas that require urgent intervention for the refugees?

10. What do you think about Turkey's legislation on the refugees? Is it a legislation that corresponds to the needs?

## APPENDIX C: CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Manap Kırmızıgül, Çiğdem

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 7 January 1976, Ankara

Marital Status: Married

Email: cigdemmanap@yahoo.com

### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Sociology	2008
BS	Ankara University	2000
High School	Seyranbağları High School	1996

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2003- Present	METU Sociology	Research Assistant
2000-2003	Ministry of National Education	Primary School Teacher

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

## **PUBLICATIONS**

1. Manap Kırmızıgöl, Ç. 2013 “Komşudan Çok Yabancı” “Kent Üzerine Özgür Yazılar” (Ed.) Ergun C. ve diğerleri, Bağlam, İstanbul

2. Manap Kırmızıgöl, Ç. 2013 “Experiences of Asylum Seekers in Turkey”  
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## APPENDIX D: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Göç, özellikle kitlesel göç, ülkelerin sosyal düzen ve politikalarına etki eden bir sosyal fenomendir. Ekonomik veya başka kazançlar elde etmek için sanayileşmiş ülkelere (Castles&Miller, 20013) doğru göç eden göçmenlerden oluşan gönüllü göç hareketlerinden farklı olarak zorunlu göç hareketlerinde mülteciler ülkelerinde yaşanan çatışma ve şiddetten kaçarak ülkelerini terk etmek zorunda kalmaktadırlar. Özellikle 1980’li yıllardan itibaren yaşanan insani krizlerle birlikte dünya genelinde başka bir ülkeye sığınma talebinde bulunan kişilerin sayısında büyük oranda artış yaşanmış, pek çok ülkede yaşanan politik istikrarsızlıklar, çatışma ve şiddet kitlesel mülteci akınlarını beraberinde getirmiştir (Castles&Miller, 2008: 11). Dünya genelinde uluslararası göçmen sayısı dünya nüfusundan daha hızlı artış göstermektedir (UNDESA, 2016:21). Dünya genelindeki toplam zorla yerinden edilmiş kişi sayısı 2015 itibariyle 65,3 milyona erişmiştir. Bu kişilerin 21.3 milyonu mülteci, 10 milyonu ise vatansız kişilerdir. Dünyadaki mültecilerin % 53’ünü Suriyeli, Afgan ve Somalili mülteciler oluşturmaktadır. Bu ülkeleri takiben Irak da yoğun göç veren ülkeler arasındadır. BMMYK’nın resmi verilerine göre Irak içinde yerinden edilen kişi sayısı 3.022.164, geçici yerleşim yerlerindeki Iraklı sayısı ise 1.226.305’dir.

Günümüzde tüm dünyada 65 milyondan fazla zorla yerinden edilmiş insan varken bunların pek azı mülteci statüsü alabilmekte ya da yeni yerleştikleri yerlerde kabul görebilmektedir. Tüm dünyada yeniden yerleştirme yapılan mülteci sayısı yeniden yerleştirme bekleyen mülteci sayısından hayli azdır. Bu da mültecilerin ilk sığınma ülkesinde uzun yıllar beklediği/bekleyeceği anlamına gelmektedir. Yeniden yerleştirme bekleyen mülteciler ne ülkelerine geri dönebilmekte ne de ilk sığınma ülkesinde kendilerine bir hayat kurabilmektedir. Bu bekleme sürecinin getirdiği belirsizlik ve geçicilik mültecilerin ev sahibi toplulukla ilişkilerini etkilemektedir. Bu belirsizliğin bir sonucu olarak iki topluluk birbiriyle kaynaşamamakta, aynı mekanlarda farklı hayatlar yaşamaktadır.

Suriye İç Savaşı ile birlikte 2011 yılı itibariyle ülkelerindeki iç savaştan kaçan Suriyeliler kitlesel bir biçimde sınırları geçerek komşu ülkelere ulaşmışlardır. Küresel çıkarların ve bölgesel çatışmaların bir sonucu olarak Türkiye -politik olarak bunu istemiyor ve hukuki olarak transit ülke olma konumunu korumaya çalışıyor olsa da- mülteciler için bir geçiş ülkesi olmaktan çıkarak ev sahibi ülkeye dönüşmüştür. Özellikle 2011 yılı sonrası gelen Suriyeli ve Iraklı mültecilerin çok azının üçüncü bir ülkeye yerleştirilme ihtimali varken ve ülkelere geri dönme koşulları henüz oluşmamışken bu durum Türkiye için kaçınılmaz olmuştur. Suriye ve Irak'ta yaşanan iç savaşın sonucu oluşan insani krizlerle birlikte 2011 sonrası Türkiye'ye doğru yaşanan mülteci akını göç politikasının yeniden yapılandırılmasını gerekli kılmıştır. Bu gereklilik üzerine 11 Nisan 2013 tarihinde 6458 sayılı Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanununu yasalaştırılmıştır. Ancak kanun mülteci statüsü belirleme konusunda kendisinden önceki kanun ve yönetmeliklerden çok farklı değildir. Söz konusu Kanun ile Türkiye'den uluslararası koruma başvurusunda bulunan yabancıların müracaatlarının ardından yapılan değerlendirme neticesinde Avrupa'dan gelenleri mülteci statüsünde kabul etmekte, Avrupa dışından gelen yabancıları ise üçüncü ülkeye yerleştirilinceye kadar uluslararası korumaya alarak şartlı mülteci statüsünde kabul etmektedir.

BMMYK verilerine göre Ocak 2017 tarihi itibariyle Türkiye'de 131.440 Iraklı mülteci bulunmaktadır. Bu kişilerin 52.052'si 18 yaş altı çocuklar, 4383'ü ise 60 yaş üstü yaşlılardır. Tüm dünyadaki en büyük Iraklı mülteci/sığınmacı nüfusu Türkiye'de bulunmaktadır. 2014'te Türkiye ilk kez dünyada en fazla mülteciye ev sahipliği yapan ülke konumuna gelmiştir ve bu durum günümüzde de devam etmektedir. AFAD tarafından 2013 yılında yayınlanan bir raporda "Türkiye'de yaşayan Suriyeli mültecilerin sayısı hakkında kesin bilgi yok" şeklinde bir ifade kullanılmaktadır (AFAD, 2013). Bunu Türkiye'deki diğer mülteci gruplar -Iraklılar, Afganlar, İranlılar, Somaliler vd.- için de söylemek mümkündür. BMMYK ve AFAD tarafından açıklanan istatistikler yalnızca kayıtlı mültecileri kapsamakta, kayıtsız mültecilerin sayısı ise bilinmemektedir. Silahlı çatışma ve ülkelerindeki istikrarsızlıktan kaçan mültecilerin çoğu ilk sığınma yeri olarak komşu ülkeleri seçmektedir. Üçüncü ülkelere göç ise sadece küçük bir azınlık için mümkün

olmaktadır. Ülkelerindeki çatışmalı ortam sona erdikten sonra bu kişilerin bir kısmı geri dönmeyi tercih etse de bir kısmı da ilk sığınma ülkesinde kalmaya devam etmektedir.

Türkiye’de Suriyelilerden sonra en fazla nüfusa sahip olan Iraklı mültecilerin Türkiye’ye ilk toplu girişi 90’lı yıllara rastlamaktadır. 1988 yılında Halepçe Katliamı sonrası yüz bin Iraklı, 1991 Körfez Savaşı sonrasında beş yüz bin Iraklı Türkiye’ye gelmiştir. Her iki mülteci akınında da gelenlerin çoğu Iraklı Kürtlerdir ve 6-12 ay arasında ülkelerine geri dönmüşlerdir. Türkiye’de 2014 yılında 21.947 olan Iraklı mülteci sayısı 2015 yılında ülkelerinde yaşanan karışıklıktan kaçan Iraklıların toplu şekilde Türkiye sınırlarını geçmesiyle birlikte 118.605’e ulaşmıştır. Iraktan gelen mülteciler homojen bir grup olmayıp farklı dini ve etnik kodlara sahiptir. Çalışmaya konu olan Iraklı Türkmen grubunun yerel halk tarafından kabulünde “Türk soylu” olmanın etkisi büyüktür. 2014 sonrası Türkiye’ye giriş yapan Iraklı Türkmenlerin pek çoğu Türkiye’de “insani ikamet izni” kapsamında bulunmaktadır. Şubat 2017 tarihi itibariyle, İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü’nün resmi verilerine göre, Ankara’da kayıtlı 30.903 Iraklı Türkmen bulunmaktadır. Yine aynı tarih itibariyle Ankara’da mülteci statüsünde ikamet eden 800 kişi bulunmaktadır. Mülteci statüsünde bulunan bu kişilerin çoğu Somali, Afganistan, İran ve Irak uyrukludur. STK’larla yapılan görüşmeler ışığında Ankara’daki Iraklı mültecilerin gerçek sayılarının kayıt altındaki sayıdan daha yüksek olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü’nün verilerine göre mülteci statüsü verilen yabancılar, insani ikamet izni verilen Iraklı Türkmenler ve geçici koruma altındaki Suriyelilerden oluşan yaklaşık 130.000 yabancı uyruklu kişi Ankara’da ikamet etmektedir. Türkiye’deki Iraklı mültecilerin statüleri farklılık göstermektedir. Bu kişilerin bir kısmı özellikle 2014 öncesi gelen Iraklı mülteciler uluslararası koruma sürecine dahilken, 2014 sonrası gelenlere “insani ikamet izni” verilmiştir. Böylece bu kişiler uluslararası koruma dışında kalmıştır. Uluslararası korumaya dahil olmamak pek çok hak kaybına neden olmaktadır. Çalışma izni ve sağlık gibi temel hizmetlere erişim de bu sebepten sıkıntılı bir hal almaktadır.

2011 sonrası Suriye iç savaşı ve Türkiye'nin Suriye politik alanında söz sahibi olma iddiası, Türkiye'de mültecilerin sayısal oranı ve görünürlüğünü arttırmıştır. Suriyeli mültecilerin sayıca çokluğu, yoksulluğu, geçici görünmelerine rağmen kalıcılığa eğilimleri Türkiye'deki diğer mülteci gruplara bakışı da belirlemeye başlamıştır. Türkiye'de geçici ikamete tabi tutulan Iraklı Türkmenler'in ülkelerindeki karışıklık sona erdiğinde geri dönmeleri beklenmektedir. Ancak kalış süresi uzadıkça mültecilerin ülkelerine dönme ihtimalinin düştüğü bilinen bir gerçektir. Türkiye'de genel olarak Suriyeli mülteciler üzerinden tartışılan ancak diğer tüm mülteci grupları da ilgilendiren “entegrasyon politikaları” sürekli olarak bu geçicilik vurgusuna takılmaktadır. Bu geçicilik vurgusu/algısı mültecilerin yaşamlarının belirsiz bir süreyle askıya alınmasını da beraberinde getirmektedir.

Türkiye 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi'nde yer alan “coğrafi kısıtlama” maddesini halen yürürlükte tuttuğundan, Avrupa dışından gelenleri mülteci olarak kabul etmemekte, üçüncü bir ülkeye yerleştirilinceye dek ülkede kalmalarına izin vermektedir. Suriye krizi sonrası sınırlardan toplu halde geçen Suriyelilere “geçici koruma statüsü” verilmiş ve bu kişilerin de ülkelerindeki savaş bittiğinde geri dönecekleri varsayılmıştır. Suriyelilerin geri döneceklerine olan inanç hem kamu yetkilileri hem de halk tarafından onlar için kullanılan “misafir” kavramında kendini göstermektedir. Yine ülkelerindeki çatışmalar nedeniyle son bir kaç yılda Türkiye sınırlarından toplu halde ya da bireysel olarak geçen Iraklılara “insani ikamet izni” verilmiştir. Bu statünün verilmesi de bu kişilerin geçiciliğine bir göndermedir. Afganistan'dan gelen mültecilerin mülteci statüsü belirleme işlemleri son birkaç yıldır tamamen askıya alınmıştır. Afganistan'dan gelenler SGDD tarafından kayıt altına alınmakta ancak kendilerine mülteci statüsü belirleme için bir randevu verilmemektedir. Avrupa dışındaki diğer ülkelerden gelen mültecilerin (Somali, İran, Afghanistan vb.) ise mülteci statüsü belirleme süreci başlatılarak BMMYK tarafından üçüncü bir ülkeye yerleştirilinceye dek ülkede kalmalarına izin verilmektedir. Tüm bu statülerin tamamında “geçicilik” en belirgin unsurdur. Bu da mültecilerin ülkelerine dönmek ya da üçüncü bir ülkeye yerleştirilmek üzere başlayan uzun bekleyiş süresince kendilerine bir hayat kuramamalarına neden olmaktadır. Bu uzun ve belki de hiç bitmeyecek bekleyişte çocukların pek çoğu okula gidememekte, yetişkinler formal iş

hayatına giremeyerek sigortasız ve ucuz işgücü durumuna düşmekte ve bu insanlar çoğu zaman kendilerine sabit bir hayat kuramamaktadırlar.

Bu çalışmanın amacı yerel halkın aynı mahallede yaşayan Iraklı Türkmenlere bakışını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu tez BMMYK ya da hükümet tarafından değil, yerel halk tarafından Ankara'daki mülteci kabulüne odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma yerel halkın Ankara'daki günlük ilişkilerinde mültecilere yönelik hikayeleri ve algıları üzerine kurulmuştur ve Türkiye'deki mültecilere ilişkin mevcut literatüre mütevazı bir katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Türkiye'ye 2011 sonrası başlayan mülteci akını beklenmedik bir şekilde ortaya çıkmış ve sayı hiç beklenmediği kadar büyümüştür. Hükümet ve yerel halk çatışmanın kısa sürede sona ermesini ve mültecilerin ülkelerine dönmesini beklerken, mülteci akını devam etmiştir. Türkiye, ülkedeki mülteci nüfusunun çok az bir kısmının barındığı kampları finanse ederken, kamp dışında yaşayan mülteciler barınma ve yemek gibi pek çok acil ihtiyacını kendi başına sağlamak zorunda kalmıştır. Üstelik bu kamplar Suriyeli mülteciler için kurulduğundan az sayıda Iraklı mülteci dışında diğer ülkelerden gelen mülteciler bu kamplardan yararlanamamıştır. Bu durum da ülkelerindeki para ya da mal varlıklarını yanlarına alamadan gelen mültecilerin genellikle şehirlerin yoksul kenar mahallerine yerleşmesine neden olmuştur. Bu mahaller kimi zaman kentsel dönüşüm sürecinde olan gecekondu mahalleleriyken kimi zaman da alt gelir grubunun yaşadığı eski mahalleler olmuştur. Savaş ve çatışma sonucu değişen yaşam koşullarından, can güvenliği nedeniyle kaçan mülteciler ilk sığınma ülkesi de dahil olmak üzere gittikleri ülkelerde özellikle yoğun olarak yaşadıkları bölgelerde sosyal dönüşüme neden olmaktadır. Iraklı Türkmen dernekleriyle yapılan görüşmeler sonucunda Iraklı Türkmenler Ankara'da yoğun olarak Abidinpaşa Mahallesi'nde yaşadığı tespit edilmiş ve mahalle seçiminde bu görüşmeler rol oynamıştır.

Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Yerel halkın mültecilere yönelik bakış açılarını ortaya koymayı amaçlayan bu araştırma, Ankara'nın Abidinpaşa Mahallesi'nde yapılmıştır. Abidinpaşa, Ankara'da mülteci nüfusunun en kalabalık olduğu mahallelerden biridir. Mahalle Ankara'nın Mamak ilçesinde yer almaktadır.

Dikimevi kavşağından başlayan Tıp Fakültesi Caddesi semtin ana arteridir. Mahallede bulunan evler eski ve iki üç katlı apartmanlardan oluşmaktadır. Ana cadde boyunca bitişik nizamdaki bu apartmanların giriş katları genel olarak dükkanlardır. Bu dükkanlar arasında gıda, giyim vb. şeyler satan yerler olduğu gibi tamirci, nalbur, emlakçı vb. dükkanlar da bulunmaktadır. Mahalleli ihtiyaçlarını çoğunlukla bu dükkanlardan karşılamaktadır. Mahalle merkezi bir konumdadır, Ulus'a 4, Kızılay'a 5 km uzaklıktadır.

Abınpaşa Mahallesinin nüfusu TÜİK 2016 verilerine göre 13.357'dir. Araştırmanın örneklem grubunu oluşturan, Ankara'da yaşayan ikinci en büyük mülteci grup olan Iraklı mülteciler mahallede hakim mülteci gruba karşılık gelmektedir. Mahalle muhtarından alınan bilgilere göre, mahallenin nüfusunun yaklaşık yarısını Irak'ta İSİS'in yaşadıkları yeri bombalaması ya da ele geçirmesi nedeniyle kaçarak Türkiye sınırını geçen Iraklı mülteciler oluşturmaktadır. Araştırma sırasında yapılan gözlemlerde mülteci grubun mahalledeki varlığının oldukça görünür olduğu fark edilmiştir. Mahallede hemen her apartmanda en az bir Iraklı ailenin yaşamaktadır. Komşu mahallelerde yaşayan Suriyeli mültecilerin sayısının çokluğu nedeniyle, mahallelinin bir kısmı mültecilerin tamamını Suriyeliler olarak adlandırmakta, bir kısmı Suriyeliler ve Iraklı Türkmenler ayrımı yapmakta, diğer bir kısmı ise göçmenler tanımını kullanmaktadır. Bu tezdeki orijinal veriler yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmelere dayanmaktadır. Alan araştırması kapsamında Mart-Eylül 2016 tarihleri arasında 15'i yerel halk, 10'u ulusal ve uluslararası STK temsilcisi olmak üzere toplam 25 derinlemesine görüşme yapılmıştır. Görüşmeler boyunca mahalledeki emlakçılarda, fırında, görüşme yapılan kişilerin evlerinde zaman geçirilmiş, görüşmeler dışında sohbetler yapılmıştır. Evde yapılan görüşmelerde, birebir görüşmelerin dışında, kadınların biraraya geldiği kahve sohbetlerine katılmıştır. Mahalledeki iki ayrı emlakçıda yine görüşmeler dışında formal olmayan sohbetler yapılmıştır.

Bu araştırmanın en temel sınırlılığı Iraklı Türkmen sayısı hakkında kamu kurumları ya da sivil toplum örgütlerinden alınan bilgilerinin birbiriyle örtüşmüyor olmasıdır. Iraklı Türkmenlerle ilgili sayısal verilere ulaşmak oldukça güçtür. Iraktan gelen

mültecilerin kayıtları resmi makamlarca bir bütün olarak tutulmaktadır. Bu sebeple Iraklı Türkmenlere ait veriler Mamak Türkmenevi'nden edinilmiştir. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies'den görüşülen bir uzman Iraklı Türkmenlerle ilgili kesin sayılara ulaşmanın neredeyse imkansız olduğunu belirtmiştir. Iraklı Türkmen sayısının ve Türkiye'deki ve Ankara'daki nüfus dağılımının net olarak bilinmemesi, örneklemin evreni temsil edip etmediği noktasında sorulacak sorulara yanıt aranmasını engellemektedir.

Mahallelinin Iraklı Türkmenlere Suriyelilerden daha ılımlı yaklaştığı, soydaşımız kavramını sık sık kullandığı gözlemlenmiştir. Bazı görüşmeciler tarafından Suriyeliler sorumsuz, tembel ve sürekli yardım bekleyen kişiler olarak tanımlanırken; Iraklı Türkmenler çalışkan ve saygılı kişiler olarak tanımlanabilmektedir. Iraklı Türkmenler, "Türk soylu" olmaları ve müslüman kimlikleri nedeniyle yerel halkla benzeşmekte, bu sebepten Iraklı Türkmenlerin kabulü diğer mülteci gruplarına daha kolay olmaktadır. Ancak tüm bu önkabule rağmen günlük hayatta bu iki topluluk arasında çatışmalar yaşanabilmektedir. Zaman içinde başlangıçta kabulü kolaylaştıran "soydaşlık" kavramı zedelenmeye başlamıştır. Savaş mağduru olarak görülen ve "Türk soylu" olmaları nedeniyle mahallede kolayca kabul gören Iraklı Türkmenler zaman geçtikçe "toplumun huzurunu bozan" ve "çalışmadan yaşayan insanlar" olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. İlk kabulde baskın olan "biz"den, "Türk soyun"dan ve müslüman vurguları mültecilerin Türkiye'de kalış süreleri arttıkça yerel halkın yoksulluğu ve işsizlik oranlarındaki yükseklik yüzünden kaynakları paylaşmak istemek şeklinde bir duruma evrilmiştir. "Türk dedik kabul ettik ama ülkelerine dönmelerini istiyoruz", "biz zaten kendimizi zor geçindiriyoruz", "bizim çocuklarımız üniversiteye giremiyor, onlar gelip girecek" şeklinde söylemler biraz da mahalle halkının yoksulluğundan kaynaklanmaktadır. Yerel halk, ulus devlete referansla vatandaşlık bağlamında tanımlanan hakların dışardan gelenlere verilmesini istememektedir. "Devlet vatandaşına bakamıyor, bunlara mı bakacak" tarzında söylemler vatandaş-vatandaş olmayan bağlamında "biz" ve "onlar" ayrımı yaratmaktadır. Bu algıya göre vatandaş olan olan "biz", vatandaş olmayan olan "onlar"dan daha iyi koşullarda yaşamalıdır. Vatandaş olmayan "misafir"dir ve zamanı gelince gitmelidir. Ayrıca "misafir" olarak yerel halka rahatsızlık vermeden

yaşmalıdır. Türk ve müslüman da olsa vatandaş olmayan bu grup yaşam tarzları ya da kültürel farklılıklarıyla yerel halka “rahatsızlık” vermektedir. “Kalabalık aileler”, “gürültü yapan çocuklar”, “sokağa asılan çamaşırlar”, “sokakta rahatça dolaşan yetişkin erkekler”, “misafir ve yardıma muhtaç oldukları ülkede çocuk yapan aileler” yerel halk tarafından memnuniyetsizlikle karşılanmaktadır.

Ev sahibi topluluklar birden fazla mülteci grubuyla karşılaştığında her bir gruba karşı farklı yaklaşımlar geliştirebilmektedir. Iraklı Türkmenlerin soydaşlık üzerinden içerilmesi, Suriye’lilerin din birliğine rağmen dışlanmasına neden olmuştur. Görüşülenlerin bir kısmı Iraklı Türkmenleri “çalışkan”, “ekmeğini kazanmak için gayret eden kişiler” olarak tanımlarken; Suriyelileri “tembel”, “çalışmayı sevmeyen”, “dilenmeye alışık” kişiler olarak tanımlamaktadır. Diğer yandan daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye’ye gelen en büyük mülteci nüfusu olması, savaş bitince dönmeleri beklenirken altı yılın sonunda henüz böyle bir ihtimalin olmaması Iraklı Türkmenlerin görünürlüğüne azalmasına neden olmuştur. Soydaş olarak adlandırılan Iraklı Türkmenler, Suriyelilerle aynı dönemde Türkiye’ye gelmeleri yüzünden daha önceki dönemlerde yaşanan soydaş göçlerinden daha az kabul görmüşlerdir. Bu durum akla Danış’ın (2009:142) “nafile soydaşlık” kavramını getirmektedir. Danış Türkiye’ye 1989/1991 öncesinde gelmiş olan Irak Türklerinin hemen hepsi vatandaşlık almışken, özellikle 2000’lerde gelenlerin vatandaşlık bir yana, ikamet izin belgesi<sup>18</sup> bile edinmekte büyük zorluklarla karşılaştığını belirtmektedir.

Stein (1981: 323) bir ülkeden gelen tüm mültecileri homojen bir grup olarak görme eğilimi olduğunu ancak bunun nadiren doğru olduğunu belirtmektedir. Görüşmecilerin nerdeyse tamamı mültecilerden Suriyeliler, Araplar ya da Türkmenler şeklinde ülke ya da etnik kimliğe referansla söz etmekte, bu şekilde genellemeler yapmakta, ancak çok azı bu kişilerin farklılıklarını göz önünde

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<sup>18</sup> İkamet izni belgesi, yabancı uyruklu kimselerin Türkiye’de yasal olarak ikamet ettiklerini gösteren belgedir. İkamet izni işlemleri, 6458 sayılı Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanununun ikinci bölümünde “İkamet” başlığı altında, 19 ile 49’uncu maddeleri arasında düzenlenmiştir LFPI’da yabancılar için six types residence permit düzenlenmiştir: short-term residence permit, family residence permit, student residence permit, long-term residence permit, humanitarian residence permit, victim of human trafficking residence permit. 2013 sonrası Türkiye’ye toplu halde gelen Iraklılar’a humanitarian residence permit verilmiştir.

bulundurmaktadır. Yerel halk aynı ülkeden gelenleri tek bir isim altında anmaya ve genellemeler yapmaya eğilimlidir. “Araplar çalışkan, Suriyeliler hazırcı ve tembel” ya da “İraklılar bize benziyor ama Suriyeliler bizden çok farklı” gibi söylemler bu genelleme eğilimine örnek olarak gösterilebilir.

Mülteciler yaşam biçimleri nedeniyle yerel halk tarafından eleştirilmektedir. Geleneksel aile yapısını büyük oranda bırakmış ve çekirdek aile formunda yaşayan yerel halk, mültecilerin kalabalık aileler şeklinde yaşamalarından rahatsızlık duyduğunu belirtmektedir. Mültecilerin “kalabalık ve çok çocuklu oldukları için çok gürültü yapmaları” ve “apartman hayatına uyum sağlayamamaları” en çok vurgulanan özelliklerdir.

Görüşülen kişilerin “ne dedikleri anlaşılmıyor”, “küfür mü ediyorlar iyi birşey mi söylüyorlar belli değil” ve “her yerde Arapça duymaktan sıkıldık” vb. söylemleri “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımını dil üzerinden kurmaktadır. Miliyetçiliğin temel unsurlarından biri olan dil birliği görüşmecilerin ifadelerinde sıklıkla yer almaktadır. Iraklı Türkmenlerin mahalle halkıyla ortak etnisite temelli “biz” ilişkisinde, yine mahalle halkı tarafından ve dil üzerinden bir ayrışma ve marjinalleştirilme süreci başlamaktadır. Türkmenlerin Türkçe konuştuklarına, konuşacaklarına ilişkin etnik beklenti, bu beklentinin karşılanamaması sonucunda ortak yaşam deneyiminde ayrışma nedeni olabilmektedir. Iraklı Türkmenlerin Arapça konuşmaları yerli halk için bir hüsrana yaratmakta, bu olumsuz duygular onlara yönelik dışlanma ilişkisi ve pratiklerine dönüşebilmektedir. Dil engeli gündelik etkileşimlerde iki grubun birbirini anlamamasına ya da yanlış anlamasına yol açabilmektedir. Konuşulanların anlaşılabilmesi yerel halkta öfke uyandırmakta, “kötü şeyler söyledikleri” düşüncesine yol açabilmektedir. Soydaş olmalarına rağmen aynı dilin konuşulmaması iki grup arasında toplumsal bütünleşmenin önünde engel oluşturmakta, çatışma potansiyelini arttırmaktadır.

Mahalledeki Iraklı Türkmenlere yardım eden kuruluşların başında Ülkü Ocakları ve Irak Türkmenleri Derneği bulunmaktadır. Bu dernekler dışında mahallede bireysel olarak mültecilere yardım edenler ve çevresinden mülteciler için yardım toplayan kişiler vardır. Ancak bu yardımlar mültecilerin kendi kendilerini idame ettirecekleri

geçim kaynaklarını sağlamaktan çok bir kereye mahsus eşya, giysi vb. yardımlar ya da düzenli olarak erzak ya da para yardımı şeklindedir. Bu durum mahalledeki mültecileri yardım kuruluşlarına ve mahalle sakinlerine/hayırsever kişilere bağımlı kılmaktadır. Ayrıca zaman zaman yerel halk kendi hakları olan yardımların mültecilere aktığını düşünmekte , bu da iki grup arasında tansiyonun artmasına neden olmaktadır. Görüşmecilerin tamamı mülteciler için yaptıklarını dayanışma olarak değil yardımlaşma olarak tanımlamaktadır. Dayanışma daha çok eşitler arası, yurttaşlar arası bir ilişki biçimidir ve mahalle halkı mültecileri kendileriyle eşit görmemektedir.

Mültecilerin anavatanlarında yaşananlar ev sahibi topluluğun mültecilere bakış açısını etkileyen unsurlardan birisidir. Ülkelerindeki çatışmalı ortamdan kaçan mülteciler, yerel halkın gözünden iki şekilde tasvir edilmektedir: görüşmecilerin bir bölümü savaş mağduru oldukları için mültecilere hoşgörüyle yaklaşırken, diğer bir kısmı savaş koşullarında ülkelerinden ayrıldıkları için onları vatan haini olarak damgalamaktadır. Bir kısmı bu kişilerin başka şansları olmadığı için ülkelerini terk ettiklerini söylerken, bir kısmı da kendi ülkelerinde kalıp savaşmalarının daha doğru olduğunu söylemektedir. Pek çok görüşmeci, mültecileri ülkelerini savunmak yerine “kaçmayı” tercih ettikleri için eleştirmekte, özellikle erkeklerin böyle davranmasını vatana ihanet olarak nitelendirmektedir. Erkeklere yönelik bu eleştirinin sebebini anlamak için Connel’in “egemen erkelik” kavramı temel alınabilir. Connell (2005:37) “Masculinities” adlı kitabında, tek bir “erkeklik” olmadığını her biri farklı güç konumlarıyla ilişkili birçok farklı “erkeklik” olduğunu belirtmektedir. Connell’e göre farklı erkeklikler arasındaki ittifak, egemenlik ve itaat ve ilişkilerini de kabul etmemiz gerekmektedir (Connell, 2005:76). Mahallede savaştan kaçmanın utanç verici olduğu söylemi yalnız erkekler tarafından değil kadınlar tarafından da sıklıkla kullanılan bir söylemdir. Milliyetçiliğin ve ulus devletin temel unsurları olan dil birliği, tarih birliği, kültür birliği ve milli kimlik gibi kavramlar yine aynı şekilde “biz” ve “onlar” vurgusunu güçlendirmek için kullanılmaktadır. Bazı görüşmeciler mültecileri “vatan haini” olarak damgalayarak ötekileştirmişlerdir. Bu noktada “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımı vatansever olmak ve vatan haini olmak formunda karşımıza çıkmaktadır. “Onlar”, “vatanını terkeden”, “vatanını satan”, “vatan haini” olan kişiler

olarak erkeksi ve milliyetçi bir dille eleştirilir. Kendi ülkelerine ihanet ettikleri düşünülen mülteciler “güvenilmez kişiler” olarak etiketlenerek, “vatanına sırtını dönen” bu kişilerin Türkiye’ye hiçbir faydasının olmayacağı varsayılmaktadır. Bir ülkeye sadık olmak, gerekirse o ülke için canını vermek olarak ifade edilmektedir. Bazı görüşmeciler mültecilerin savaş ortamının acımasızlığından kaçmasını hoşgörmekte ve savaş bitinceye dek bu kişilerin Türkiye’de yaşamasını kabul etmekte ancak yine de kendisinin topraklarını hiçbir şartta terk etmeyeceğini, mülteci durumuna düşmektense vatanında savaşarak ölmeyi tercih edeceğini eklemektedir. Savaştan kaçanları “vatan haini” ilan edenlere göre daha ılımlı olan bu görüşmeciler tarafından savaş sırasında ülkeyi terk etmek en hafif tabirle “kolaya kaçmak” olarak ifade edilmektedir. Ayrıca sık sık kullanılan “mülteci durumuna düşmek” ifadesi bunun itibarsız bir statü olduğunu ve mülteci olmanın zor ve arzulanmayan bir durum olduğunu kabul ettiğini ve mahalledeki mültecilerle empati kurabildiğini ifade etmektedir. Diğerlerine göre daha ılımlı olan bu görüşmeciler, mültecilerin Türkiye’de kalmasını belli koşullarda kabul etmektedir. Kimisine göre mülteciler tüm ülkede değil de belli bölgelerde yaşamalıdır, kimisine göre ise sadece misafir olmalı ve zamanı gelince geri dönmelidirler. Çoğu zaman ılımlı başlayan cümlelerin hep bir ‘ama’yla bitmesi de yerel halkın kafasındaki “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımını gösterir niteliktedir. Mülteci olan kişi her zaman “yabancı”dır ve hiç bir zaman “biz” olarak ifade edilen topluluktan olmayacaktır. Mülteciler arasındaki sıralamada müslüman ve Türk soylu oldukları için üst sıralarda yer alan Iraklı Türkmenler bile hiç bir zaman yerel halkın gözünde tam olarak “biz”den olmayacaktır. Onlar da diğer mülteciler gibi geri dönmesi beklenen misafirlerdir.

Yerel halkın mültecilere karşı tutumu kendi anlatımlarından yola çıkılacak olursa “hoşgörü” “tolerans” gibi kavramlar etrafında şekillenmektedir. Mülteciler ve yerel halk arasında belirgin bir sosyal mesafe bulunmaktadır. Hali hazırdaki durum birarada yaşamaktan ziyade yerel halkın mültecileri tolere etmesi gibi görülmektedir. Mültecilerle komşu olmak, iş arkadaşı olmak, evlenmek, okulda çocukların aynı sıraları paylaşması gibi konularda bir istekten/kabulden ziyade bir zorunluluk göze çarpmaktadır. Pek çok görüşmeci mahallede yaşanan hırsızlık vb. olaylardan mültecileri sorumlu tutmaktadır. Mülteciler geldiğinden beri suç oranının arttığını

söyleyenler kadar önümüzdeki yıllarda daha büyük sorunlar yaşanacağını söyleyenler de olmuştur. Görüşmecilerin kimine göre mültecilerin okula gitmiyor olması hem bugün için hem de gelecekte bir takım sıkıntılar yaratabilir. Kimi görüşmeciler ise mültecilerin eğitim olanaklarından yararlanmasının kendi çocuklarına haksızlık olduğunu düşünmekte, bu çocukların gelecekte iş piyasasında kendi çocuklarıyla yarışabilir konuma gelmesini istememektedir.

Mülteci nüfusun fazlalığı da yerel halkta rahatsızlık uyandıran bir etken olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Nüfusun fazlalığı farklı boyutlarda etkili olmaktadır. Birincisi, yerel halkın ortak kullanım alanlarında kendilerine eskiden olduğu gibi yer bulamamalarıdır. Mahallede mekan kullanımında host society and refugee group arasında bir ayrışma göze çarpmaktadır. Ortak alanların bir kısmı “mültecilerin kullandığı alanlar” ve “host society’nin kullandığı alanlar” şeklinde ikiye ayrılmıştır. Bir kısmı ise iki grup tarafından günün farklı saatlerinde kullanılmaktadır. İkincisi ise, Iraklı Türkmenlerin kalabalık aileler şeklinde yaşamalarıdır. Buna ek olarak bazı görüşmeciler ise ülkedeki mülteci sayısının artışıyla ikinci sınıf vatandaş konumuna düşmekten korkmaktadır. Bu kişilere göre Türkiye’de ayrıcalıklı konumda olması gerekenler, mevcut imkanlardan öncelikli olarak yararlanması gerekenler yalnızca Türklerdir.

Mültecilerin yoğun olarak yerleştiği bölgelerde meseleye ekonomik olarak iki açıdan bakmak mümkündür. Bunlardan bir tanesi mültecilerin ekonomiyi canlandırdığı ve işgücü piyasasını canlandıracağı varsayımı, diğeri ise mültecilerin ülke ekonomisini zayıflattığı, işgücü piyasasında ücretleri düşürdüğü varsayımdır. İşverenler tarafından ucuz işgücü olarak görülen mülteciler, mecburiyetten çok düşük paralara çalışmak zorunda kalmakta, piyasayı düşürdükleri için yerel halk tarafından eleştirilmektedir. Türkiye’de halihazırda zaten varolan işsizlik vb. sorunlar yerel halk tarafından mültecilere maledilmektedir. Mülteciler yerel halkın yapmak istemediği işleri yapmakta ve bunun sonucu olarak “sınıfaltı” bir konuma gelmektedir. Yerel halk tarafından pek tercih edilmeyen işlerde düşük ücretlere çalışan mülteciler yine yerel halk tarafından işlerini ellerinden alacak bir tehdit unsuru gibi görülmektedir. İş piyasasına girdiklerinde yerel halk tarafından rakip olarak, işveren tarafından ise

ucuz işgücü olarak görülen mülteciler; iş piyasasına giremediklerinde ise “tembel”, “talepkar insanlar” olarak etiketlenmektedir.

Yetişkin erkeklerin iş hayatının dışında kalması, vaktinin çoğunu evde ya da kahvede geçirmesi yerel halkın “onlar evde yatıyor, biz besliyoruz” şeklinde yakınmalarına neden olmaktadır. Mülteciler “tembel, çalışmak istemeyen, dilenen” kişi olarak etiketlenmektedir. Göç deneyiminin kadınların aile içi rollerinde çok büyük bir değişiklik yaratmamış olmaması ve cinsiyetçi işbölümünün bir sonucu olarak kadınların kendilerinden beklenen ev içi işleri yapmaya, çocuk ve yaşlı bakmaya devam ederken; erkeklerin kendilerinden beklenen evi geçindirme rolünü devam ettiremiyor olması, bu kişilerin toplum içindeki statü ve saygınlıklarının daha da azalmasına neden olmaktadır. Yine cinsiyetçi işbölümünün bir sonucu olarak pazar, market alışverişi ya da çocukların parka götürülmesi gibi işlerin kadınlar tarafından yapılıyor olması, kadınların kamusal alanda daha görünür olmasına neden olmakta ve yerel halktan kadınlarla ilişki kurmalarını kolaylaştırmaktadır. Aynı işbölümünün bir sonucu olarak erkekler iş piyasası içindeki konumlarına göre tanımlanmakta ancak iş piyasasına giremeyen mülteci erkek için kamusal tek alan olarak kahveler kalmaktadır. Yine kamusal alanda kadınların daha çok vakit geçirmesi, kadınların daha kolay ve çabuk Türkçe öğrenmesini sağlamaktadır.

Mülteciler, Simmel’in “yabancı”sı gibi yerel halka “aynı zamanda hem yakın hem uzak olandır” (Simmel, 1950). Bu kişiler yerel halktan ev kiralamakta, onların dükkanlarından alışveriş yapmakta, işyerlerinde çalışmaktadır. Her zaman komşuluk ilişkileri kurulamasa da birlikte yaşayan bu iki topluluk arasında asgari bir ilişki kurulmak zorundadır ve kurulduğu da gözlenmiştir. Mültecilerin Türkiye’deki durumu, Simmel’in yabancı”sı gibi “bugün gelen ve yarın da kalandır”. Geçici oldukları sürekli olarak vurgulanan ve gitmesi beklenen bu kişilerin Türkiye’de ne kadar kalacakları belli değildir ve kendilerini karşılayan toplumun gözünde geçici bir duruma sahiptirler. Bu insanların Türkiye’deki belirsiz bekleyişleri bir geçicilik algısının oluşmasına sebep olmaktadır. Sonuç olarak durumlarındaki bu belirsizlik, kişileri sadece potansiyel “gezgin” haline getirmez; ama aynı zamanda “yarın gidecek olan” haline getirir. Bu nedenle, mülteci “bugün gelen yarın gitmesi gereken

ama yarın da kalan” bir figur haline gelmektedir. Simmel’in “yabancı”sı toplumun bir parçasıdır, bir kez tanımlandıktan sonra artık toplum için yok hükmünde olamayacaktır. Mülteciler de, Simmel’in “yabancı”sı gibi, içine girdikleri toplumun bir parçası haline gelirler. Onlara sığınmacı, mülteci ya da misafir demek; sığınmacı, mülteci, geçici koruma statüsü ya da insani ikamet izni vermek her bir mülteci grubunun ve tek tek mültecilerin artık o coğrafyadaki sosyal ve ekonomik hayatın bir parçası olduğu gerçeğini değiştiremez. Bir yerde “yabancı” olmak sadece kişinin kendi bireysel özelliklerinin bir sonucu değildir. Bu aynı zamanda yerel halkın sosyal olarak inşa ettiği “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımının yansımasıdır. Bir insan mülteci olduktan sonra –özellikle büyük mülteci akınlarında- yerel halkın gözünde bir birey olmaktan çok bir stereotip, başka bir ülkeden gelmiş insanlar topluluğunun bir parçası (Iraklılar, Suriyeliler, İranlılar vb.) olarak anılmaya başlar.

Simmel (Simmel, 1950:407) “yabancı”yı “aynı anda uzak ve yakın olan” kişi olarak tanımlar. Türkiye’de yaşayan üç milyonun üzerindeki mülteci de yerel halka farklı düzeylerde “aynı anda uzak ve yakın olan”dır. Din birliği ve soydaşlık gibi kavramlar bu uzaklığın derecesini belirler görünse de Iraklı Türkmenlerin tamamen içerildiğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Tüm diğer kent mültecileri gibi, Iraklı Türkmenler de bir yandan yerel halkla aynı mahalelerde yaşayıp aynı marketten alışveriş eder, çocuklarını aynı parka götürür, bu çocukların bir kısmı aynı okulda eğitim görürken, diğer yandan çok da birbirlerine değmeyen hayatlar yaşamaktadırlar. Yerel halkın aklının bir köşesinde hep biz de aynı durumda olabilirdik endişesi ve bunun getirdiği bir empati/yakınlık varken, diğer yandan din birliği ve soydaşlığa rağmen, dili, kültürü kendilerinden farklı olan bu yeni topluluğa kendilerini uzak hissetmektedirler.

Siu’nun “misafir”i gibi, Iraklı Türkmenlerin de kamusal alanda yerel halkla etkileşime girmekten uzak kalmaya eğilimli olduklarını söylemek mümkündür. Yerel halkla etkileşim çoğunlukla çalışma hayatı ve alışveriş ile sınırlıdır. Alışveriş konusunda da mülteci grubun kendi dükkanlarını açarak bu etkileşimi de en aza indirmeye çalıştıkları görülmektedir. Çalışmayan yetişkin erkekler genel olarak evde vakit geçirirken dışarı çıktıklarında da mahallede kendi etnik gruplarından kişiler

tarafından işletilmekte olan kahvehanelerde vakit geçirmektedir. Kadınlar ve çocuklar günün belli saatlerini mahallede bulunan büyük bir parkta geçirmekte, burda da yine kendi etnik gruplarından kişilerle görüşmeyi tercih etmektedirler. Mültecilerin asimile olmak istememesi, kendi içlerine kapanık bir hayat yaşamaları yalnızca kendilerinden kaynaklanan bir durum değil yerel halkın onları içine almayan tutumundan da kaynaklanmaktadır. Anavatanından uzak olan ancak ev sahibi topluma da tam olarak uyum sağlayamayan mültecinin kendine benzer insanlarla ülkesinde yaşadığına benzer bir hayat kurması kaçınılmazdır.

Türkiye'deki diğer pek çok mülteci grubu gibi Iraklı Türkmenler de Türk toplumuna tamamen nüfuz edememiş/ettirilmemiş ancak geldiği ülkeye dönme ihtimali de ülkelerindeki çatışma ortamının sona ermemesi nedeniyle nerdeyse ortadan kalkmış kişilerdir. Yeni geldikleri, şimdi yaşadıkları ve belirsiz bir süre daha yaşamaya devam edecekleri bu toplumdaki yerel halk tarafından “bugün gelen yarın da kalan kişi” olarak algılanırlar (Simmel,1950). Ne gidecekleri yer –ülkeleri ya da üçüncü bir ülke- ne de gidecekleri zaman henüz belli değildir.

Ulus devletin bir gereği olarak yerel halkın tüm farklılıklarına rağmen aynılığına vurgu yapılarak, mültecilerin farklılığı daha belirgin hale getirilir. Mültecilerin kültürü, dili, dini ve/veya yaşam tarzı yerel halktan farklıdır ve bu farklılık yıllar geçse de değişmeyecek olandır. Göç her zaman uzlaşma ile biten bir defaya mahsus bir olay değil, yaşam süresince birkaç kez yeniden değerlendirilen, süregiden bir süreçtir (King, 2012:30). Dışardan gelen olarak mülteci, yerel halk tarafından farklılıklarına referansla değerlendirilmekten ömür boyu kurtulamayacak olan kişidir.

Türkiye'de resmi söylemin de etkisiyle yerel halk mültecileri geçici olarak görmekte, ülkelerindeki çatışmalı ortam sona erdiğinde geri döneceklerini farzetmektedir. Mülteciler söz konusu olduğunda hep bir “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımı göze çarpmaktadır. Din kardeşliği, soydaşlık gibi kavramlar üzerinde durulsa da farklılıklara vurgu daha baskın bir söylemdir. Mültecilerin alt gelir grubunun yaşadığı mahallere yerleşmesi “biz zaten kendimize bakamıyoruz”, “devlet zaten kendi vatandaşlarına bakamıyor”, “işimizi, ekmeğimizi, geleceğimizi paylaşmak zorunda kalıyoruz” gibi söylemlere

neden olmaktadır. “Devlet kapıyı açtı, devlet baksın” ya da “zenginlere bir şey olmuyor, bütün yükü biz çekiyoruz” gibi söylemlerle devlete ve üst gelir grubundaki vatandaşlara öfke içeren söylemler de ön plana çıkmaktadır. Yerel halkla mültecilerin birlikte yaşadığı mahallerde aslında bir birlikte yaşamdan çok birbirine paralel iki ayrı yaşam pratiği göze çarpmaktadır. İki grup mümkün olan en asgari düzeyde karşılaşmayı tercih etmektedir. Stanley’e (1977: 620) göre mültecilerin, göç alan ülkeye yerleşebilmelerindeki ve uyumlarındaki başarı ya da başarısızlıkları, o ülkedeki hükümetlerin ve toplumların tutumlarına, göç politikalarına, göçmen/mültecilere yönelik yerleşme ve destek programlarına ve son olarak göçmen/mültecilerin fizik ve ruh sağlıklarına yönelik kolaylaştırıcılıklarına bağlı olmaktadır. Türkiye’de yerel halkın mültecilere bakış açısını büyük oranda belirleyen hükümet politikaları olduğunu söylemek pek yanlış olmayacaktır. Ülkedeki en büyük mülteci nüfusuna sahip Suriyelilere verilen “geçici koruma statüsü”, ikinci büyük nüfus olan Iraklılara verilen “insani ikamet izni” ve diğer gruplara verilen “şartlı mülteci”, “ikincil koruma” gibi statüler Türkiye’nin iltica politikasının özünü anlamayı kolaylaştırmaktadır. Tüm bu statülerin her biri bir belirsizliğe, bir geçiciliğe işaret etmektedir. Suriyeli ve Iraklıların ülkelerindeki çatışmalı durum sona erdiğinde geri dönecekleri, uluslararası korumaya başvuruların ise üçüncü bir ülkeye yerleştirileceği varsayılmaktadır. Ancak ilk Suriyeli kafilenin gelişinin üzerinden altı yıl geçmesine rağmen ne Suriye’deki savaş sona ermiş ne de büyük sayılarda insan ülkesine geri dönebilmiştir. Aynı şekilde “insani ikamet izni” sahibi Iraklılar da ülkelerindeki çatışmalı durum sona ermediğinden geri dönememişlerdir. Bu kişilerin durumuna dair yaratılan geçicilik hissi gerçek hayatta yansımını bulamamıştır. Yerel halkın, devlet politikalarının da etkisiyle “misafirlerimiz”, “din kardeşlerimiz”, “soydaşlarımız” söylemleriyle kucak açtığı mülteciler, ülkede kalış süreleri uzadıkça zaman zaman istenmeyen topluluklar haline gelmeye başlamıştır.

Mahalle halkı mahalleye yerleşen mültecilere bir yandan kızarken diğer yandan “merhamet” göstermekte; bir yandan Iraklı Türkmenlerin “Türk soylu” olmalarına vurgu yaparken, diğer yandan kültürel farklılıkları vurgulamakta; hem evlerde kalabalık yaşamalarından yakınmakta, hem de kirayı aksatmadıkları için evlerini

mültecilere kiraya vermek istemekte; onları kendilerinin kırk yıl önceki hallerine benzeterek, giyim kuşam konusunda farklılıklarına değinerek kendilerinden daha aşağıda bir yerde konumlandırmaktadır. Iraklı Türkmenlerin kültürel olarak ayrıştırılma süreci özellikle toplumsal cinsiyet temelinde aile ve kadının aile içi toplumsal konumu temelinde başlamakta ve bu ayrışma, ayrımcılık ve hatta suçla özdeş görülmeye kadar varan bir marjinalleştirme sürecine varmaktadır. Özellikle Türkmenlerin çok eşlilik, giyim kuşam biçimleri ve kadınlara yönelik ikincilleştirme pratikleri ile erkek ataerkilliğine dayanan namus ve kaç-göç temelindeki aile ilişkileri ve Türk kadınlara yönelik bakış açıları büyük eleştiri konusu haline gelmektedir.

Iraklı Türkmenler etnik -Türk soylu olmak- ve dinsel -müslüman olmak- bağlamlarda yerel halkla benzerlik göstermektedir. Mahalle halkı başlangıç noktası olarak bu benzerlikleri baz alsa da konuşmanın ilerleyen aşamalarında konu hep farklılıklara gelmektedir. Türk soylu olsalar da Türkiyeli değil Iraklı olmaları, Türkçe değil Arapça konuşuyor olmaları ve farklı yaşam tarzları, Türk soylu ve müslüman olmalarının önüne geçmiş görünmektedir. Mahalleli mültecileri kendileriyle eşit konumda ve komşu olarak konumlandırmaktan çok kendilerinden daha aşağıda bir konumda, yardıma muhtaç ve geçici misafirler olarak konumlandırmayı tercih etmektedirler. Mültecilerin “yabancı” ve/veya “misafir” olarak olarak tanımlanması “biz” ve “onlar” ayrımını daha belirgin hale getirerek iki topluluk arasına pek çok konuda sınır çizilmesine neden olmaktadır. Kendinden aşağıda konumlandığı kişiye yardım eden mahalleli -yardım eden/edilen şeklinde tanımlanabilecek bu eşitsiz ilişkide daha üst konumda gördüğü- kendinde söz söyleme hakkı bulmaktadır. Bu konumlandırmanın bir sonucu olarak mültecilerin “saygılı olması”, “sorun çıkarmaması”, “dert yanmaması” beklenmektedir. Görüşülen pek çok kişi için mültecilerin “sığındıkları ülkede çocuk sahibi olması”, “mülteci erkeklerin sokaklarda elini kolunu sallayarak gezmesi”, “çocukların evde gürültü yapması” kabul edilebilir şeyler değildir. Buna göre “misafir” ve “muhtaç” durumda olan bu kişiler göze batmamak için azami gayret göstermeleri beklenmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, mültecilerin mahalleye gelişiyle birlikte yerel halkta piyasadaki rekabet sonucu işsiz kalıp daha da yoksullaşmak, sosyal yardımlardan mahrum kalmak ve kiraların yükselmesi gibi ekonomik kaygıların yanısıra; suç oranının artması, tedirginlik, gerginlik gibi güvenlik kaygıları başlamıştır. Mahalleli ayrıca mültecilerin ilerde bir azınlık sorunu yaratması, çocuklarının mültecilerle evlenmesi, mülteci gençlerin üniversite sınavlarında Türk gençlerine rakip olması gibi ihtimaller yüzünden kaygı duymaktadır. Tüm bunlar göstermektedir ki iki grup arasında sosyal bütünleşmeye ihtiyaç vardır ve bunu sağlayacak olan devlet kurumları ile ulusal ve uluslararası Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının birlikte çalışmasıdır.

## APPENDIX E: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Manap Kırmızıgül

Adı : Çiğdem

Bölümü : Sosyoloji

**TEZİN ADI** : Expert Views And Local Responses Towards Iraqi Turkmen Humanitarian Refugees In Ankara, Turkey

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**