

NATURE AND THE HUMAN STANDPOINT
IN KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

NATURE AND THE HUMAN STANDPOINT IN KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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This study aims to explicate what “nature” means after Kant’s Copernican Revolution. First of all, a presentation of the active contribution of the subject to the experience of nature, within the context of *Critique of Pure Reason*, will be offered. After discussing the regulative status of the principle of causality (the Second Analogy of Experience) and delineating nature as an *a priori* concept, the question why pure reason inevitably falls into contradiction with itself will be our central concern. The third antinomy of pure reason, i.e. the conflict between mechanism of nature and human freedom, will be discussed as a case. The source of antinomies will be found in the duality of cognitive powers, and the standpoint that arises from this heterogeneity will be presented as the human standpoint. The idea of the human standpoint will be characterized as both the core and the outcome of Kant’s critical philosophy. Then, the antinomy between the mechanical and teleological conceptions of nature, namely the antinomy of teleological judgment will be presented. After an analysis of the debates surrounding Kant’s solution to the antinomy, his solution will be identified as one that applies the concept of an intuitive understanding. Through an immanent critique, the solution will be presented as one that transgresses the boundaries of critical

philosophy. Finally, the implications of the failure of solution for the critical system will be discussed.

Keywords: Kant, nature, human standpoint, mechanism, teleology.

ÖZ

KANT'IN ELEŞTİREL FELSEFESİNDE

DOĞA VE İNSAN PERSPEKTİFİ

Kireççi, Mert

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışma Kant'ın Kopernikçi devriminin sonucu olan “doğa” kavramının içeriğini açıklamayı hedeflemektedir. Öncelikle, öznenin doğa deneyimine olan etkin katkısı *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* bağlamında serimlenecektir. Nedensellik ilkesinin (İkinci Deneyim Analojisi) düzenleyici bir ilke olduğu savlandıktan ve *a priori* bir kavram olarak “doğa”nın sınırları çizildikten sonra saf aklın neden kaçınılmaz olarak kendisiyle çelişkiye düştüğü sorgulanacaktır. Saf aklın üçüncü antinomisi, yani doğanın mekanizması ile insan özgürlüğü arasındaki çatışma, bağlamında antinomilerin kaynağının insanın bilişsel yetilerindeki ikilik olduğu gösterilerek bu ikilikten doğan insan perspektifi düşüncesine değinilecektir. İnsan perspektifi Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinin hem temeli hem de sonucu olarak ırıladıktan sonra doğanın mekanizması ile erekselliği düşünceleri arasındaki çatışma ele alınacaktır. Ereksel yargı antinomisi ve çözümü konusundaki tartışmalar irdelendikten sonra Kant'ın çözümünün görüsel bir anlama yetisine başvurduğu gösterilecektir. İçkin bir eleştiri sonucunda çözümün eleştirel felsefenin sınırlarını ihlal ettiği gösterilmeye çalışılacak ve antinominin çözümsüzlüğünün eleştirel felsefe açısından sonuçları değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Kant, doğa, insan perspektifi, mekanizma, teleoloji.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Kant's Copernican Revolution and his critical philosophy, marks a turning point in the history of philosophy. The idea that the knowing subject actively contributes to the formation of knowledge transformed philosophy. Kant tried to uncover the whole range of such cognitive contributions of the subject with a critical analysis of cognitive powers and their relation to the formation of human experience. Following the example of Kant, philosophers turned their attention to determining the conditions of human knowledge. Post-Kantian thought offered alternatives to Kant's analysis of cognitive conditions. The effects of history, culture, language, social structures, economic systems and gender have been gradually interpreted and incorporated as factors into theories of human cognition. The concept of theory-ladenness of human experience is considered as one of the main assumptions of social sciences. The implications of the Copernican Turn for social sciences and human experience had been enthusiastically pursued. However, Kant's transcendental idealism and the implications of his thought regarding our experience of "nature" are often neglected and dismissed.

In the Kantian sense, we are producing the experience of an orderly and lawful "nature". The idea of nature has its roots in our cognitive powers and understanding "nature", in this systematic and lawful sense, is a distinctly human capacity. It is our attempt to grasp the diversity of empirical experience by applying concepts. Kant's conception of nature however, has also difficulties that require clarification. Kant's transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves allows us to form two concepts of nature. The first is the concept of "nature as appearance" and the second is the idea of "nature in itself". Kant patently limits human knowledge to the field of appearances and consequently to the concept of phenomenal nature. Yet the

principles of the phenomenal sense of nature presents conflicts of reason which need resolution.

In terms of Kant's critical philosophy, the mechanistic view of nature is the result of a distinctly human capacity that arises from the *a priori* concept of causality. However, there are two conflicts of human reason which emerge from this conception of nature, namely the third antinomy of pure reason (or the antinomy of mechanism and freedom) and the antinomy of teleological judgment (the conflict of mechanism and purposiveness of nature). If human beings are active in the formation of "nature", why are there conflicts regarding our own way of conceiving? If we are active in the formation of our experience of nature, why do we fall into conflicts regarding our very own product? The answers of these questions will be sought out in the course of this study.

The source of these conflicts will be found in the peculiar features of human cognition. Critical philosophy detects two distinct sources of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding. The conditions of givenness and the conditions of thought are separate in human cognition. The discursivity of our knowledge that arises from this heterogeneity will be identified as "the human standpoint". However, it should be noted that the human standpoint is not equivalent to the concept of human nature. The human standpoint will be shown to be a direct result of Kant's critical philosophy and his pursuit of *a priori* capabilities of human reason. The human standpoint therefore will be presented as the answer of Kant's initial question "How are *synthetic a priori* judgments possible?"

The aim of this endeavor consists in clarifying the conceptions of nature in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)* and in the *Critique of Judgment (CJ)* with a particular focus on the two antinomies arising from our contribution to the experience of "nature", their solutions and implications in Kant's critical philosophy. Accordingly, in the second chapter, the content of the concept of nature and the *a priori* conditions of its exhibition will be analyzed in order to understand the activity of human mind in

the experience of “nature”. Transcendental ideality of spatio-temporality of nature will be crucial in understanding the contribution of sensibility. Transcendental apperception and categories will be presented as the conditions of our experience of nature. The role and status of the principle of causality will also be discussed with regard to “the Second Analogy” of experience. The results of this discussion will figure especially in the debate regarding the antinomy of teleological judgment.

The third chapter aims to understand the problem of antinomies and detect their source as the human standpoint. The contribution of cognitive faculties to conflicts of reason, the method of discerning their misuse and ways of harmonizing them in these conflicts will be exemplified in the third antinomy of pure reason which concerns the tension between mechanism and freedom. In order to fulfill these aims, the distinction of phenomena and noumena and the relation of this distinction to the human standpoint will be discussed. This discussion will enable us to characterize the critical project as a philosophy of the human standpoint.

The fourth chapter will focus on the problems of the antinomy of teleological judgment and its consequences for the critical project. Kant aims to unify his critical project into a system by fixing the gulf between nature and freedom in *The Critique of Judgment*. In order to overcome this gap, he asserts that we must judge nature to be so organized as to allow for the realization of human freedom. Another problem to be solved in *The Critique of Judgment* is the contingency and necessity implied in the concept of empirical laws. While principles and concepts of the human understanding determine the *a priori* laws of nature, it is not capable of determining the contingent content of our experience. In the extension of our empirical knowledge however, we have to assume that nature involves necessary products even though it is not us who determine them. In order to justify the systematicity of human knowledge and to fix the gulf between nature and freedom, Kant presents reflective teleological judgment as a regulative principle. However, it presents us with an antinomy between the principles of mechanism and teleology. Kant’s solution to the antinomy is highly controversial. The debates regarding his solution will be presented and the problems of his solution

will be analyzed in a systematic fashion in order to evaluate its consequences for Kant's critical philosophy. The main concern will be to present an immanent critique by discussing if the solution measures up to the problems that it was meant to solve. Kantian scholars offer two interpretations of his solution. According to the first of these, Kant relegates the principle of mechanism of nature to a regulative principle. The second view asserts that the solution consists in the reference to an intuitive understanding. I will argue that although the principle of mechanism of nature was regulative even in the context of *Critique of Pure Reason*, this does not resolve the antinomy and that Kant's solution depends on the concept of an intuitive understanding. As the solution of the antinomy of teleological judgment presents a deviation from Kant's general procedure of resolving antinomies with reference to the human standpoint, I claim that his solution disrupts the basic principles of the Copernican turn and fails to solve the problems it addresses.

CHAPTER 2

NATURE AS A PHENOMENON

In this chapter, Kant's Copernican Revolution (or the Copernican turn) and its implications for our experience of nature will be presented. The Copernican turn is the claim that human beings are not just passive observers of nature and that human mind has *a priori* structures or forms that it bestows upon its contents. However, Kant has to justify the objectivity of these *a priori* forms in order to claim that the experience of nature as a rule-governed unity is not just imaginary, but on the contrary, empirically real. The objective enabling conditions of nature and knowledge lie in two distinct cognitive powers of the human mind, which are sensibility and understanding. Sensibility gives us spatio-temporal intuitions and understanding organizes the given objects according to *a priori* concepts. Among these *a priori* concepts, the concept of cause and the principle of its *a priori* application (the second analogy of experience) will be the focal point of discussion as they enable us to conceive nature mechanistically. Establishing the *a priori* origin of the concept of nature, understanding the contribution of human mind to experience and evaluating the status of the principle of causality within the framework of *Critique of Pure Reason* will provide a groundwork for understanding Kant's concept of nature as a phenomenon. In this way, Kant also prepares the ground for claiming the legitimacy of the Newtonian mechanistic science.

2.1 The Copernican Turn

The main problem of *Critique of Pure Reason*¹ is the failure of metaphysics to achieve the kind of success and progress achieved by the sciences. Kant aims to detect the

¹ All citations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* will follow the page numbers of the Akademie edition. The paginations of the first and second editions will be referred to as A and B respectively, as is customary and the references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* will be given as in-text citations. The translation used is: Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by N. Kemp Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. (Hereafter *CPR*).

distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge and inquire whether the same kind of success is possible for metaphysics. A decision has to come out of this inquiry concerning the question whether metaphysics will be “on the secure path of a science” (B xiv) or it will remain as a battlefield of contradictory dogmatic assertions.

In order to provide an answer, the critical project intends to delineate the limits of human knowledge. Before attempting at metaphysical knowledge, human reason must be subjected to a criticism. In this sense, criticism is the opposite of dogmatism which intends to arrive at knowledge by way of *a priori* concepts “without having first investigated in what way and by what right reason has come into possession of these concepts” (B xxxv). Kant, on the other hand, proposes to analyze the capability of human reason for knowledge by discerning the conditions for knowledge to arise.

Kant characterizes the success of exact sciences by their use of synthetic *a priori* judgments. All judgments are relations between a subject and a predicate (A6/B10). If the predicate is already implied in the subject, then this judgment is analytic or explicative, and does not extend our cognitions in any way. “All bodies are extended” is the classical example Kant uses to exemplify analytic judgments. The predicate of extension is already contained in the concept of a body. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, combine predicates to the subject which were not contained in the concept of it. Therefore, they are ampliative and they do extend our knowledge. “All bodies are heavy” is Kant’s example of a synthetic judgment. In this example the predicate “weight” is connected with the concept of “body”. *A priori* judgments on the other hand, display necessity and strict universality (B4) whereas *a posteriori* judgments are only concerned with singular and contingent experiential content. While the *a priori/a posteriori* distinction is a distinction regarding the source of knowledge, the analytic/synthetic distinction is a distinction regarding the kinds of judgment. Kant takes the question “How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?” as “the proper problem of pure reason” (B19).

Kant, in formulating the problem of synthetic *a priori* judgments, also intends to address the problem of causality that Hume’s empiricism left us with. Hume thought that the source of all knowledge lies in our impressions gained experientially through

sensation. Yet he could not locate a simple impression of necessary connection and claimed that necessary connection comes from a mental habit arising out of the repeated succession of representations. We can speak of necessity in the relations of ideas, while for matters of fact we have to rely on experience. Other than association and habit we have no philosophical ground for supposing necessary connection. Hume's challenge on causality undermines the very presupposition of all natural sciences, namely, that nature is an orderly unity working through the law of causality. Kant however, undertakes Hume's challenge.

Based on the distinction of knowledge as regards to its source and kind, Kant concludes that the proposition that "everything which happens has its cause" is a synthetic yet *a priori* judgment. (A9/B13). It has universality and necessity and extends our knowledge (combines the concept of cause with the concept of that which happens). Moreover, it cannot be derived from experience as experience teaches us only what is temporal and contingent. He maintains that an empirical derivation of the concept would only give us "merely a subjective necessity" (B5) if not make the concept meaningless altogether. If necessary connection (causality) cannot be found in experience, its ground must be sought in human understanding. It is, as will be shown, the condition of having a coherent experience and this means that regarding its source, it is *a priori*. The problem of metaphysics, the problem of causality, and the possibility of an experience of nature based on this causality rest on the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. In order to account for *a priori* (universal and necessary) knowledge, Kant thinks that we must question our main epistemological presuppositions. How can *a priori* knowledge agree with its object?

According to the traditional concept of knowledge, a proposition should reflect the state of objects which are totally independent of the observer. Kant claims that we cannot have any certainty and universality if knowledge consists in the agreement of propositions with observer-independent objects. He proposes a shift in perspective, known as Kant's Copernican Revolution or the Copernican Turn. This shift of perspective resembles Copernicus' shift from a geocentric model of the universe to a heliocentric one. Up until Copernicus "astronomers assumed that their observer is

passive and provides objective records of the actual motions of heavenly bodies”². What Copernicus’ hypothesis shows is that the observer’s position effects the observations. Accordingly, Kant proposes to assume that objects conform to our modes of knowing rather than the other way around, and to see whether we can explain the possibility of *a priori* knowledge on this ground.

Instead of assuming that mind must conform to mind-independent objects, Kant aims to discern the contribution of the cognizer to the act of knowledge. It should be noted that in his analysis of knowledge Kant employs the term “judgment” instead of proposition. Judgment is an act of the subject and, accordingly, Kant asserts that knowledge is likewise an act, conforming to the hypothesis of the Copernican turn. Accordingly, he asserts that although knowledge begins with experience, experience it is not the only source of knowledge. The constitution of human mind and the *a priori* principles therein, already determine experience. The rules and conditions of experience lie in the constitution of our cognitive powers that are prior to experience. This means that objects of experience are organized according to the constitution of human reason.

The critical examination of the human powers of *a priori* cognition is “a special science which can be entitled the Critique of Pure Reason” (A10/B24). The result of this critique will be “transcendental knowledge” as Kant entitles it. Transcendental knowledge is a kind of knowledge “which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*” (A11-2/B25). Kant’s transcendental philosophy is an attempt to demonstrate the *a priori* capabilities of human cognition or the contributions it makes to knowledge. Kant therefore clearly defines his object of enquiry as “not the nature of things . . . but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of things” (A12-3/B26).

Another assumption is required upon this revolution: the transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. The objects of experience which

² Robinson, *How is Nature Possible? Kant’s Project in the First Critique*, pp. 33-4.

conform to our representational power are called appearances. Since reason determines the form of possible experience, what we know are things as determined by the constitution of human reason and not as they are in themselves. Our knowledge of objects is limited to appearances or phenomena which are human reason's necessary and universal constructions according to laws. Although Kant admits that there must be something that appears, it remains unknowable for us. Things as they are in themselves are out of the limits of our knowledge, and the thing in itself is only a limiting concept that is intended to serve to determine the limit our knowledge. This distinction is not an ontological but an epistemological one or, in other words, appearances do not constitute an ontological domain.

2.2 Two Stems of Knowledge: Sensibility and Understanding

The Copernican turn implies that the possibility of nature (as appearance) rests on the cognitive powers of the human mind. Kant will claim that reason is the law-giver of nature, the lawful and systematic unity which we experience. In a sense, human reason through its acts of cognition turns the matter of its perceptions into a phenomenal sense of nature. By synthesizing the appearances, it unites them into a systematic and an objective whole. The contribution of human reason to the construction of nature is two-fold. This contribution is based on "two stems of human knowledge" which are sensibility and understanding. (A15/B29). The sensibility is the receptive side of human cognitive powers, and the objects of cognition are given through sensibility. The understanding, on the other hand, is the spontaneous or active side of human cognition. While the former supplies the *a priori* forms of intuition, the latter supplies the *a priori* pure concepts that are the conditions of possibility of experience.

Although Kant admits that understanding and sensibility may "spring from a common . . . root", he insists that even if that were the case, such a common basis is unknown to us (A15/B29). The distinct contribution and heterogeneity of these two powers of human mind is crucial to understanding and interpreting all the problems of Kantian philosophy. The main tension of *CPR* and the critical project arises from the dichotomy of givenness and synthesis (spontaneity). While the Copernican turn implies that we are active in the formation of experience and knowledge; sensibility (or receptivity)

entails our passive reception of representations of the objects of experience. The transcendental distinction (as an epistemological distinction), the antinomies of pure reason (which are unavoidable illusions of human reason) and the solutions of the antinomies (critical examinations which do not remove the illusions) all rest on the heterogeneity of these two cognitive powers and their unity in human experience.

2.2.1 Conditions of Givenness

Sensibility is the human mind's capacity for being affected by objects and receiving representations of them. Kant entitles the science of the principles of *a priori* sensibility as Transcendental Aesthetic (A21/B35). The aim of Transcendental Aesthetic is to show the distinct contribution of human sensibility to the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Sensibility is the source of intuitions through which the subject is in "immediate relation" to objects. (A19/B33). The object that is given through sensibility is an appearance, which Kant defines as "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition" (A19-20/B33-4). Appearances are undetermined in the sense that they can be given prior to an act of thinking that organizes and determines their contents according to concepts. Even before such determination through concepts, appearances are already given form by sensibility. Although the matter of appearances is given *a posteriori*, their form lies "*a priori* in the mind" (A20/B34). Since objects (as appearances) conform to our mode of knowledge the forms of sensibility are the conditions under which appearances are given. Therefore, they are also the forms of all appearances. The *a priori* forms of sensibility are space and time. Appearances are intuited as spatial and temporal due to these forms inherent in human sensibility. In order to claim that they are the conditions for appearances, it must be shown that intuitions of space and time are universal and necessary, and prior to and independent of empirical intuitions of appearances. In other words, they must be shown to be *a priori* and pure intuitions.

2.2.1.1 Space

In the first part of the Transcendental Aesthetic, which is devoted to the form of space, Kant mainly argues against Newton and Leibniz, as the proponents of the views that

space is real and that space is a relation among things, respectively. Against them, Kant claims that space is a form of human sensibility and is part of “the subjective constitution of our mind” (A23/B38). Space is the form of outer sense which gives us objects “as outside us” (B37/A22).

Transcendental Aesthetic includes two exhibitions of space, namely the metaphysical and the transcendental exhibitions. With the metaphysical exposition of space, Kant intends to exhibit the necessary and *a priori* character of the representation of space. Space cannot be empirically “derived from outer experience” (A23/B38). It cannot be empirical since it is a condition for there to be outer appearances (A23/B38). Space cannot be considered as the relation of existing outer things either since it is through space that spatial relations are possible. It is therefore “the condition of the possibility of appearances” (A24/B39). These characteristics of the intuition of space shows that it is a pure intuition. As a pure intuition, it is prior to the intuition of empirical objects or of appearances. It is the condition whereby we come to have empirical data organized spatially. It is impossible to represent the absence of space, while on the other hand it is possible to intuit space as devoid of objects (A24/B38). Moreover, the space so presupposed, is necessarily intuited as a single and infinite space. Relations between parts of space presuppose the single space containing all the parts that can have relations. Even if we were to represent different spaces we necessarily intuit them as contained as parts of a single space which is not made of parts but on the contrary given as a whole. This point allows Kant to distinguish the contribution of sensibility from understanding. Space is not a concept but a distinct type of givenness. Concepts are the common characteristics of different representations. Whereas different representations are contained *under* concepts, in the instance of space, every spatial representation is contained *within* the representation of space as a part of the same single and infinite space (B39-40).

Transcendental exposition, on the other hand, aims to exhibit space as a condition of synthetic *a priori* knowledge and show how it enables cognition. Geometry is the science of space and the synthetic *a priori* propositions of geometry are possible only if space is a pure intuition. The reason for this is that “from a mere concept no

proposition can be obtained which go beyond the concept” (B41). Kant on several occasions points out that for synthesis of two concepts, a third mediating thing is needed. Between two concepts, in the case of geometry, space as pure intuition, is the medium which makes the synthesis possible.

2.2.1.2 Time

The second part of Transcendental Aesthetic, deals with the form of inner sense or time. With the metaphysical exposition of time, Kant intends to exhibit the *apriority* of time. The assertions of the metaphysical exposition are similar to that of space. “Time is not an empirical concept” (B46/A30) because it cannot be derived from experience. On the contrary, all experience presupposes time and without this form of sensibility we would not be able to represent duration, simultaneity and succession. Time must be presupposed in order to grasp empirical intuitions as coexistent or successive in time.

Time is a necessarily an *a priori* representation since it is impossible to represent the absence of time while it is possible “to think time as void of appearances” (A31/B46). The pure intuition of time is intuited as an infinitely given, single time preceding all temporal representations. Different times are all part of a single intuition of time. This would not be possible if it were a concept. Kant thinks that time necessarily “has only one dimension” and that “different times are not simultaneous but successive” (B47/A31). Since pure intuition of time is unlimited, the determinations of time are given as limitations of the original representation of time. Temporally determinate representations can be given in empirical representations but infinitude of time cannot be grasped through empirical representations.

The transcendental exposition of time has great implications. Key concepts of physics like alteration and motion, depend upon the representation of time. Change in time (alteration) and change in space (motion) presupposes time since “only in time can two contradictorily opposed predicates meet in one and the same object, namely, one after the other” (A32/B49). It is obvious that the concept of causality likewise requires the condition of time. The causal relation between a cause and its effect is only possible

in time. The cause should be invariably represented as being prior to the effect. However, it also includes the *a priori* concept of causality which is pure understanding's contribution to our experience. Yet the requirement of the condition of time shows that conditions of givenness precede conditions of thought in Kant's theory of knowledge.

2.2.1.3 Transcendental Ideality of Spatio-temporality of Nature

The central argument of Transcendental Aesthetic is that our spatio-temporal experience of nature stems from the subjective constitution of the subject. Even though sensibility is passive and receptive (affective) the *a priori* forms therein organize appearances spatio-temporally. These forms are not the conditions of the existence of objects but only the conditions of the appearances as perceived by the human subject. Therefore, spatio-temporal empirical intuitions are not things in themselves but only appearances (A49/B66). These *a priori* forms of appearances are "peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being" (A42/B59). Kant is explicit on this point: "It is, therefore, solely from *the human standpoint*³ that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc." (A26/B42). We can readily see that the spatiality of nature is dependent upon the human subject. Although we perceive a spatial nature we cannot know whether nature is also spatial in itself or not. Since space is the "special condition" of our sensibility, we have no way of knowing whether "other thinking beings . . . are bound by the same conditions as those which limit our intuition and which for us are universally valid" (A27/B43). Although space is objectively valid for us, it is transcendently ideal.

The transcendental ideality of space means that as a form of human sensibility, it does not have objective validity for things in themselves but it is objectively valid for appearances. It is an enabling condition of knowledge (transcendental) for human beings and not a real entity independent of our mode of intuition (ideality). It does not inhere in things or it is not their intrinsic property but only the form of our sensibility, dependent on our subjective (yet objective in the sense that it is shared and universal)

³ Emphasis added.

constitution. It has objective validity for human beings since Kant asserts that the constitution of human mind is uniform in all human beings. If we remove the limitation of the condition of its objective validity, which is the cognitive power of the human subject, “it is nothing at all” (A28/B44). In other words, while space is empirically real, that is valid for all appearances, it is transcendently ideal.

By the thesis of ideality of space Kant redefines the primary and secondary qualities which Descartes and Locke were preoccupied with. The pre-Kantian metaphysical conception shared by the rationalist philosophers, as well as an empiricist like Locke, was that primary qualities are spatial determinations and properties of external things while secondary qualities, like color, are only changes of the senses of the perceiver. Although with the thesis of the ideality of space Kant makes space a form of intuition, there is still a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Though the intuition of space has its source in the faculty of sensibility of the subject, it is “objective and *a priori*” (B44/A28) in the sense that the shared constitution of our sensibility makes it objective. “Sensations of colors, sounds and heat” still belong “merely to the subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility” (B44/A28), in the sense that their perception may show difference in particular subjects or even for the same subject under different conditions. The differences of the body heat of two persons or even the change of body heat in a single person, shape different perceptions of heat. The differences in the functioning of visual or auditory mechanisms can likewise affect the manner of our impressions. In other words, while both primary and secondary qualities are dependent upon the human sensibility, primary qualities (of space) are objective for every human being while secondary qualities are only subjective. Although Kant has been accused of removing the difference between primary and secondary qualities, he still keeps the distinction, however on a different basis.

Even in Transcendental Aesthetic we can see that the nature we perceive is not nature as it is in itself. Our spatio-temporal perception of nature is dependent upon the *a priori* forms of sensibility. Transcendental ideality of time and space requires that the spatio-temporality of nature is likewise is transcendently ideal; i.e. the spatio-temporality

of nature is empirically real and objectively valid only for appearances. All appearances conform to these formal conditions. Nature, as the sum total of all appearances, is spatio-temporal only under the limitation of human sensibility. Whether it may be such or not in itself, we cannot have any knowledge. Therefore, this distinction of a thing as it is in itself from as it appears is primarily on epistemological grounds. The act of knowledge conditions its objects and the inner constitution of objects, prior to this determination, are unknowable for us. Any knowledge we could have, would be already determined by the act of knowledge. Objects are only encountered as already determined by this constitution and it is impossible to have knowledge of objects as things-in-themselves.

Through Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant distinguishes his philosophy from idealists in general and Leibniz in particular. Kant sums up the philosophy of Leibniz as one that claims that sensible objects are confused representations and the difference between sensible things and ideas is one of clarity and distinctness. Kant, contra Leibniz, insists that the distinction between the sensible (objects given through sensibility) and the intelligible (the thought of objects under the concepts and the possibility of thinking about possible but not given objects) is a transcendental distinction. Kant tells us that the difference between the sensible and the intelligible “is not logical but different in terms of origin and content” (B61/A44).

The representation of time and space as pure intuitions serves two points. It establishes the heterogeneity of the two elements of knowledge (thereby distinguishes Kant from traditional idealists) and it is the first step of solving the problem of synthetic *a priori* judgments. Pure *a priori* intuitions of space and time provide the basis of connecting concepts synthetically. The second stem of *a priori* knowledge is the human understanding.

2.2.2 Conditions of Thought

The second source of human knowledge is understanding. While sensibility supplies the *a priori* forms of intuition, understanding supplies the *a priori* concepts which constitute the forms of thought. The contribution of these two elements to knowledge

however, is utterly distinct. Understanding cannot provide intuitions, and senses cannot think (A51/B75). Still knowledge becomes possible only by the harmonized contribution of these two sources of knowledge. Kant tells us that “neither concepts without intuitions in some way corresponding to them, nor intuitions without concepts, can yield knowledge” (A50/B74) and that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (B75/A51).

Kant aims to locate and enumerate the pure and *a priori* concepts of understanding, which enable cognition in the first part of Transcendental Logic. He distinguishes transcendental logic from general logic, which is concerned with the rules (and forms) of thought. General logic does not distinguish the source of the concepts involved in a proposition (whether they are of empirical or *a priori* origin). Transcendental logic, as Kant envisions it, aims to show how can concepts “relate *a priori* to objects of experience” (B81/A56). It is concerned with the conditions of thinking an object *a priori*. In this sense, “transcendental signifies, such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment” (B80-1/A56). The Transcendental Logic is divided into two main parts, namely, Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. The concepts and principles of the understanding constitute the content of the Transcendental Analytic. The pure concepts do not rely on experience and on the contrary they make it possible. If these “principles without which no object can be thought” (B87/A62) are used without reference to sensible intuitions dialectic arises. Dialectic is the logic of illusion and Transcendental Dialectic aims to show the impossibility of extending knowledge only through pure concepts and thereupon to guard “against sophistical illusions” (A64/B88). Transcendental Analytic is further divided into two sections one of which is reserved for the pure concepts of the understanding and the other for the principles of the understanding.

2.2.2.1 From Judgments to Pure Concepts

Understanding does not give us any objects but only the forms of thought applicable to them. Unlike intuitions, concepts are not in immediate relation to the objects. Since human cognition requires concepts, our knowledge is mediated through concepts which help us bring “various representations under one common representation”

(A68/B93). Our knowledge therefore is “not intuitive but discursive” (A68/B93). Kant finds the clue to the discovery of the pure concepts of the understanding in judgments. Since “understanding is a power of knowing by means of concepts” and “to know by means of concepts is to judge”, the main function of judgments turns out to be giving unity to the content of our thoughts⁴. Kant thinks that if the “functions of unity in judgments” (A69/B94) could be discovered; the pure concepts could be likewise discovered. What Kant has in mind in this endeavor is that the logical forms of judgment are “wholly independent of the particular nature of the objects judged”⁵ and since they are only forms which are free of matter, they can enable us to find the pure concepts that make such judgments possible. This line of reasoning which provides the clue for deducing the pure concepts of the understanding from the table of judgments is later referred to, by Kant, as the “metaphysical deduction” in the second edition of *CPR* (B150).

The Table of Judgments in A70/B95 gives a complete list of types of judgments. The table of judgments is a table of the logical forms of thought, which indicate types of subject-predicate relations and relations of judgments (hypothetical and disjunctive judgments). The table of judgments is divided into the four groups of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, each having three moments under it.

Every judgement takes one moment from each group. Thus a judgement may be universal, affirmative, categorical and assertoric (‘all crows are black’); or singular, negative, disjunctive and problematic (‘That bird might be neither a crow nor a raven’); and so on⁶.

From the table of judgments Kant deduces the pure concepts of the understanding which apply *a priori* to all possible objects of experience and that supply the conditions for thinking an object. The pure concepts of the understanding are entitled categories after the fashion of Aristotle. There are twelve categories under the four headings of

⁴ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*. Vol. I, p. 248.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁶ Gardner, *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 86.

quantity, quality, relation and modality and each corresponds to the twelve kinds of judgments. They are the objectifying conditions of which logical judgments are merely the expressions. Kant further divides the categories into two groups; the mathematical and the dynamical ones. The mathematical categories are “concerned with objects of intuition”, while the dynamical categories are concerned with “the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to the understanding” (B111). The category of causality and dependence (cause and effect) under the heading of “relation” and the principle of its application will be especially relevant to understand the mechanism of nature. However, we need to understand how concepts relate *a priori* to all objects of intuition first.

Deduction is concerned with the question of right (*quid juris*) and aims to prove the legal claim of an action. A deduction is therefore the justification of a claim. Transcendental deduction aims to prove by what right we can claim the *a priori* relation of concepts to objects. The question of right and the need for a transcendental deduction arises out of the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding. Since “appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding” (A90/B122) the claim that categories relate *a priori* to objects have to be justified or deduced. By proving the objective validity of “subjective conditions of thought” (A89/B122), Kant aims to prove the universal applicability of the *a priori* (universal and necessary) concept of causality to all appearances. Kant’s strategy of deduction of pure concepts is to justify the *a priori* claim of categories by proving “that by their means alone an object can be thought” (A97). This can only be justified if the categories can be shown to be the conditions of possible experience. Only in this way can they relate *a priori* to objects and have objective reality.

There are two versions of Transcendental Deduction. Kant felt the need to rewrite the section for the second edition published in 1787. The deduction of the first edition is referred to as A Deduction and the version of it in the second edition as the B Deduction within Kantian scholarship. The differences between the A and B deductions will not be discussed in this study since the concern is the unity and mechanism of nature and in this respect they have the same claims regarding nature.

The rewritten B Deduction follows a similar path to the A Deduction, in the sense that it tries to establish “the unity of the manifold” *a priori* so that the unity of nature would be given *a priori* and as not being possible to derive from particular experiences. Accordingly, they will be treated in a single stroke and the focus will be the common grounds of both.

2.2.2.2 The Role of Imagination

The distinctness of sensibility and understanding is a common concern for both deductions as Kant wants to maintain their heterogeneity throughout his critical philosophy. However, a mediating faculty/power is needed in order to show the possibility of their relation. Imagination is the faculty/power which unites the manifold of intuitions and therefore enables the application of concepts to intuitions. Kant’s theory of perception involves imagination as necessarily an active faculty/power which is in agreement with the Copernican Turn. The core idea of the Copernican turn is the activity of the knowing subject in the “act” of cognition. Although intuitions can be given “prior to all thought” (B132) even this givenness requires an activity of the imagination since “the combination of a manifold” (an empirical intuition) can never be given through the senses but only as an “act of spontaneity” (B129-30). The pure passivity of sensibility and the pure activity of the understanding are thus brought into relation by the power of imagination.

Kant explains perception of an object through a threefold synthesis of imagination in the A Deduction. These syntheses of imagination are apprehension, reproduction and recognition in a concept. Although we have seen that sensibility provides us with intuitions, as a passive faculty, it cannot present the manifold of intuitions “as a manifold, that is as contained in one idea, without the help of an active synthesis”⁷. Through the synthesis of apprehension, the manifold of intuition is “held together” (A99) and combined into a single object. Every moment we receive ever anew impressions of an object yet we do not think it to be a different object at each moment. This is due to an act of our mind according to Kant. The synthesis of reproduction

⁷ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*. Vol. I, p. 359.

enables us to conceive the object as identical although it is subject to time. Kant gives the example of an imaginary drawn line to illustrate his point. In order for this imaginary line to be given, the acts that make it up must stand together in time in a connection for otherwise “if I were to drop out of thought the preceding representations . . . and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained” (A102). The synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction work together and are “inseparably connected”⁸.

However, these two acts are not enough to base causality on, as causality also requires a rule regarding the time order of appearances. The cause must always precede the effect. Reproduction “must, therefore conform to a rule” (A121). Even this is not enough since that rule may be a subjective one (the rule of association). Predicates must be combined in the object “no matter what the state of the subject may be” (B142). Accordingly, the last synthesis is the synthesis of recognition in a concept, which would provide objective rules for apprehending intuitions. Since knowledge is knowledge of objects, the object must be thought according to rules which are given by concepts. The condition for concepts to apply as rules to objects, the objects must be related through a ground or an act. This act is the transcendental apperception.

2.2.2.3 Self-Consciousness

Transcendental apperception is the ground of the claim that it is the subject which turns its perceptions into an orderly experience of nature. Apperception means consciousness of self. All objects are objects with regard to a knowing subject. All unifying acts of concepts are possible if there is a unifying act which supplies the ground of unity. In order for us to think diversity under concepts so as to unify experience; the objects have to be given as objects for the same subject. “The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the *a priori* ground of all concepts” where concepts are to be understood as unifying acts (A107). With this act of mind, appearances “can stand alongside in one experience” (A108). Since “I think” must be able to “accompany all representations” (B131), the pure apperception has an *a priori*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

relation to all intuitions. In order for experience to be, the representations should be related to other such (possible) representations and representations can only stand in relation in so far as they are representations of someone (The formal “I” of apperception). The unity of apperception “precedes all data of intuitions (A 107) and by this “act of spontaneity” all representations can become my representations and stand in connection.

Although the move of basing the unity of the objects of experience and of nature on self-consciousness seems idealistic and Cartesian, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is very distinct and peculiar. Kant claims that the knowledge of the subject is not immediately given, on the contrary “inner experience is itself possible only mediately” (B 277) as opposed to the thesis of idealism. The given empirical self-consciousness, is aware of itself as subject to determinations of time. “Pure apperception” on the other hand, is transcendental which means that it is only thought as an enabling condition of empirical apperception and never as given.

Through the consciousness of its unity in the process of perceiving the object, the subject becomes conscious of its own activity as identical in all instances. Therefore, it is intrinsically tied to the consciousness of objects and is possible only through consciousness of the unifying act which brings the manifold together. Since what we have knowledge of are not things-in-themselves but only representations that are determined by the form of inner sense (time), what we encounter in ourselves as a self is only an empirical self that is conditioned by time. The subjective unity of consciousness depends on “objective combination” that is empirically given. In this sense only “the original unity of consciousness” is “objectively valid” and the empirical unity of apperception “is merely derived from the former” and has “subjective validity” (B140). To put it simply; although the unifying act of transcendental apperception is universal the empirical self-consciousness (ourselves) is not universal.

Transcendental Idealism, with the distinction of empirical and transcendental apperception, can claim both that experience of nature is dependent upon transcendental apperception and that this experience is objective and not merely a

fiction of an empirical self. Thus what it amounts to say is that instances of the subject and experience of objects have to be unified in a single consciousness in order to be referred to as identical in all instances (synthetic unity).

2.2.2.4 Self-consciousness and Nature

Synthesis of imagination and transcendental apperception enable us to form a synthetic unity of appearances for which all pure concepts will be applicable. The synthetic unity provides us with the idea of “unity” of nature and the *a priori* applicability of concepts to this synthetic unity allows us to justify that the concept of causality is valid for all appearances and therefore justify the idea that there is a mechanism of nature. Transcendental apperception by supplying the fundamental unifying act of holding appearances together, allows us to regard “objects of all possible experience” as nature (A114). It is clear that what we refer to as nature is not a thing-in-itself and that what we know is nature only as appearance. Kant explicitly states that “nature is not a thing in itself, but merely an aggregate of appearances” (A114). However, as can easily be seen, this “sum” or “aggregate” cannot be given in a single intuition. The unity of all appearances (nature) is an *a priori* concept.

Kant further claims that understanding as the condition of lawfulness and orderliness of appearances is “the lawgiver of nature” (A126). Through the unity of apperception, the pure concepts become valid for all appearances. As all syntheses are “subject to the categories” and “since experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are the conditions of the possibility of experience” (B161). Without the understanding, nature “that is, synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules, would not exist at all” (A126-7). Categories by serving as necessary rules for all appearances, prescribe their rules to nature. They provide “the laws of the combination” of appearances and through prescribing laws to nature, make nature possible (B 159-60). Moreover, we know that there is only one nature (A125) and this unity cannot be derived from experience. “This unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an *a priori* certain unity of the connection of appearances” (A125). In other words, the order and lawfulness of nature is the organization of the human mind. We perceive nature in an orderly manner, according

to rules given by concepts. In Kant's words: "[T]he order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce" (A125).

Transcendental apperception makes it possible that appearances stand together in one consciousness thereby being capable of being related. Only through the unifying acts and law-giving acts of human mind is nature, as the sum total of connected appearances in a lawful framework, is possible. Human reason is the condition of possibility of a lawful, orderly totality that is to be called "nature". Natural laws are universal conditions and as such their source must be *a priori*. The conception of nature as having a causal mechanism therefore depends on our concepts and transcendental apperception. The concept of "a cause is nothing but a synthesis . . . according to concepts" (A112).

The idea that there would not be nature without the consciousness of the knowing subject seems to be a bold claim; however, Kant defines nature in terms of appearances. Nature in itself is not determined by the human understanding. Human reason grasps the data/matter of sensibility and conceives it through unifying/ordering acts of the mind. If, according to the Copernican turn, the perceiver is to be a factor in the act of cognition, it is necessary that the knowing subject knows the objects according to the constitution of its own cognitive power. Our cognitive apparatus is such that we conceive an orderly unity. Actually, for a finite being with finite sensibility there is no other way of conceiving "nature". We cannot arrive at the unity of nature through combining our experiences. Experience is limited by the conditions of time and space and the spatio-temporally represented unity that is called nature in its totality could not be given to us (as a whole) in intuition. It is clear that an experience of nature would not be possible for us without the consciousness of "the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge" (A108). Therefore, when Kant tells us that transcendental apperception is a condition for us to comprehend nature he is also saying that our empirical self-consciousness is also given by the same unifying act that gives us "nature" as object. To form an "object", the unifying act of consciousness is needed.

As natural appearances “do not exist themselves but only relatively to the subject”, the natural laws “do not exist in the appearances but only relatively to this same being” (B164). This is in complete accordance with the Copernican turn. If the lawfulness of appearances would likewise be induced from experience, the said lawfulness would be contingent. But human being orders and unites the appearances in a lawful way by referring them to the transcendental apperception, that is by keeping the appearances together and ordering them according to rules. Nature, in its phenomenal sense, “is dependent upon . . . categories as the original ground of its necessary conformity to law” (B165).

However, this point brings with it complications regarding empirical laws of nature. Since causality is a pure concept that is necessarily displayed in the connection of appearances, what we know through this is that whatever happens will have a cause. Yet we do not know what will cause what *a priori*. We need empirical experience to determine the causes and observe the effects. We know through categories “nature in general” (B165) that is “its conformity to law of all appearances in space and time”. The empirical laws (which will be Kant’s concern in *Critique of Judgment*) “cannot in their specific character be derived from the categories, although they are one and all subject to them” (B165). However, all empirical laws of nature are determinations of *a priori* laws given to nature by human understanding. (A126).

2.3 Time and Conceptuality: Schematism

Before exploring the principle of causality, the relation between a concept and an intuition has to be shown. It is obvious that an object corresponding to the category of cause cannot be given in intuition. We can never point to an object and say “this is causality”. The subsumption of appearances under concepts requires another cognitive power. The power of judgment (*Urteilkraft*) is concerned with the application of concepts. It subsumes given representations under rules. Schematism of Categories explains how we subsume particular instances under categories. Kant introduces the transcendental schema which makes the subsumption of objects under concepts possible. There must be a third thing, “which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category and on the other hand with the appearance” which would mediate their

relation (A138/B177). This schema should in part be “intellectual” and in part “sensible” (A138/B177). These qualities Kant finds in the form of inner sense that is time. Kant claims as follows:

application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category (A139/B178).

Since categories are applicable only to appearances the categories are related to the form of inner sense. The forms of sensibility present the conditions for appearances and therefore the condition for the application of concepts. “This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the concept of the understanding is restricted” is the schema of a concept (A140/B179). Schematism is the process of the understanding applying schemata. The schema is a “rule of synthesis of the imagination” (A141/B180) and is distinguished from the image in the sense that no exact image of the categories can be exhibited. The schemata are “never completely congruent with” concepts. (A142/B181). They are the rules of imagination in determining sensibility and since they are the enabling conditions they are “transcendental” in this sense. Kant refers to a schema as “a transcendental product of imagination” (A142/B181). The function of the schemata is to “realise the categories” and “limit them to conditions which lie outside the understanding” that is, limit their use to sensibility. By applying the schema, the appearances become phenomena or “sensible concepts” (A146/B187).

All schemata are related to the form of inner sense in some manner. They are “nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules” (A145/B184). With regard to the categories of quantity they represent time-series; with regard to the categories of quality they represent time-content; with regard to the categories of relation they represent “time-order” and lastly with regard to the categories of modality they represent “the scope of time in respect of all possible objects” (A145/B184). Since causality is a category of relation (it is the relation of cause and effect), the schema of causality concerns the time-order of appearances. According to the schema of cause,

whenever something is posited another always follows. “It consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule” (A144/B183). In other words, although succession is the *conditio sine qua non*, a rule is also needed. If a pencil falls to the ground and the perception of the sound of thunder follows, although the pertinent perceptions are successive, they do not follow a rule: thunder does not always follow.

What concerns us is the applicability of causality to all appearances and understanding the mechanism of nature. Accordingly, the focus of this study is restricted to causality and Kant’s explanations for each schema of each category will not be discussed. Regardless, it should not be thought that each schema works independently. It is evident that without the categories of quantity and their schematic application as magnitude, the unity of an object would not be given for “the schema of magnitude is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object” (A145/B184). Without being able to refer to an object as identical in the time-series we would not be able to posit something as a cause. Also according to the schema of reality, the cause is likewise represented as being in time. And as the concept of a causal law implies necessity, the schema for the category of necessity/contingency must be applied for the causal relation.

2.4 Analogies of Experience

In order to understand the principle of mechanism in nature, we will have to refer to analogies of experience which are synthetic *a priori* principles regarding categories of relation. The second part of Transcendental Analytic investigates principles of pure understanding which are synthetic *a priori* judgments that follow from the categories and that are the basis of “all other modes of knowledge” (A136/B175). Kant distinguishes between two kinds of principles in the understanding, namely the mathematical and the dynamical. Mathematical principles are concerned with intuition while dynamical principles deal with the existence of objects. While the former are unconditionally necessary, the latter are also necessary but only under the conditions, that is, they are necessary “mediately and indirectly” (B161/B200). Since the mathematical principles are concerned with intuitions they have intuitive certainty.

The dynamical principles, on the other hand, are concerned with concepts of relation which mean that they have certainty through concepts or in other words, a discursive certainty (A161-2/B201).

The mathematical principles demonstrate the *a priori* validity of mathematical synthetic *a priori* principles and are related to the categories of quantity and quality. The dynamical principles, on the other hand, are related to categories of relation and modality and constitute the synthetic *a priori* principles of natural science. Kant's reason for this distinction is the different modes of combination exemplified therein. In mathematical principles, the combined elements are homogeneous while the dynamical principles allow us to combine heterogeneous elements. (B201 footnote a). Since the principle of causality is a category of relation Kant places it under dynamical principles and investigates it under the title of "analogies of experience" which are related to categories of relation.

According to Kant, analogy means two different things in philosophy and mathematics. While mathematical analogy is concerned "with the equality of two quantitative" relations, the philosophical analogy concerns qualitative relations (A179/B222). Analogies of experience justify the combination of "appearances only according to what is no more than an analogy with the logical and universal unity of concepts" (A181/B224). In other words, the combination of cause and effect is analogous to that of hypothetical judgments. Paton thinks that analogies are entitled so because they are analogues of the pure categories⁹. In his words:

When we, for example, say that effect is to cause as the melting of wax is to x, we do so only in virtue of the schema of necessary succession; and in so doing we treat the relation of the necessarily succeeding to the necessarily preceding as analogous to the consequent and ground which is thought in the pure category¹⁰.

⁹ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*. Vol. II, p. 182.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-2.

The common principle of analogies of experience is that “experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B218) as experience is “a synthesis of perceptions” (B 218). “The aim of analogies is to provide “an objective time-order as opposed to subjective succession of events which would prove Hume right”¹¹. The need for an objective time-order is Kant’s way of distinguishing his theory from that of empiricists, which he thinks leads to skepticism. We should be able to assert that the cause “objectively” precedes the effect. It must be thinkable that:

objects, as opposed to our representations are in time. If I am to think ‘the sound of thunder occurred after the flash of lightning’, then I need to be able to think more than just that a certain succession of representations occurred¹².

The relation of objects to objective time has *a priori* principles or rules. Since principles of relation concern the existence of thing and since what we determine through *a priori* concepts is not the existence of things but only their relations; the analogies of experience (or dynamical principles in general) can yield “only regulative principles” (A179/B222). The analogy gives us the rule of relation and tells us where to look for. In other words, the principle regulates the understanding in its search for a determinate cause. It does not constitute the sought for member but only tells us that there is one. Put in causal terms what we know is just the causal relation. The principle of causality tells us to look for a cause and that there must be one. However, it does not automatically give us (or constitute) the cause. Analogies are therefore principles to regulate the empirical use of understanding. There are three analogies which are correlates of the three relational categories of substance/accident, cause/effect and community. Accordingly, three analogies are the three dynamical relations of “inherence, consequence and composition” (A215/B262). In order to understand the order of nature, we have to understand how we order our perceptions “objectively” so that they yield a lawful nature.

¹¹ Gardner, *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 111.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

2.4.1 First Analogy

Since time is the form of inner sense, all appearances are subject to time as representations of the subject. We perceive every change and relation of simultaneity and succession of appearances as in time. However, the time “in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change” (B224-5). Time “is itself the unchanging framework to which all the change is referred”¹³. Since time is not an appearance it “cannot by itself be perceived” (B225).

In the field of appearances, the substratum serves as the permanent which represent time and serves as the permanent to establish an objective time-order. This is the application of the relational category of substance-accident. To be able to refer to change, we must presuppose something, “a ground which exists at all times” (B225), and since time is not an appearance, substance serves as the referent point of objective time-order. Of time, we claim that it does not change but all change takes place in it. Consequently “all existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of existence of that which remains and persists” (A183/B227). Since substance is the appearance which serves as the representation of time, we claim that all change takes place in the substance and it does not change. So Kant asserts that throughout all change “substance remains and only the accidents change” (A184/B227) and that this is a law of nature. All change takes place in a substance as its determination. Kant makes an exception for the category of substance as being not a relation by itself but as “the condition of relations” (A187/B230). Alteration on this account is possible only for what can persist (substance) through change. Substance, on this account, is what enables the perception of change and therefore it is the basis of causality.

2.4.2 Second Analogy

Causality depends upon the change of perceptions. However, Hume can also grant this. What Kant needs to show is that it is not just perceptual succession according to a subjective necessity (habit) but according to an objective rule or law. Perceptions of cause and effect are related or “connected in time” (B233). Still it is not enough that

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

two perceptions are combined but they must also be combined in a specific order. Namely, the effect (consequent) should always follow the cause and the objective time-order should be irreversible. The second analogy therefore tries to show both the objectivity of causality and its *a priori* status as a pure concept of the subject of the Copernican turn. For Kant combination and synthesis (or the unifying acts) always require spontaneity and cannot be given simply by the passive matter of the sense. Yet we must be able to show “the combination of the manifold” is not arbitrary or whimsical. Kant grants that appearances are already “generated in the mind successively” (A190/B235) and that objects of experience are only possible under this necessary rule of succession. Yet for the time-order to be necessary, the object itself (the appearance) must supply the rule of apprehension of successive representations (A191/B236). Appearances,

in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can be represented as an object distinct from them only if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold. The object is *that* in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension (A191/B236).

Although seeming complex at first sight, what Kant tries to do is to distinguish his theory from Hume’s. Causality must be object-based (even though those objects are appearances and not things-in-themselves) and if it were purely subjective what could only be claimed was that representations follow one another. Kant gives as an example of the rule which provides an irreversible order of succession by a ship moving down stream. The perception of the size of the ship should get smaller as it moves away. If it got larger, the ship would be moving up the stream towards the perceiver. Conversely a house could be perceived starting from different parts each time and in a different order. The main difference is that the movement of a ship is an event. Kant tells us that we would not be able to perceive an event “unless it is preceded by an appearance which does not contain in itself this” change of states (A191/B237). The example of the perception of the house is an instance of subjective succession, where the rule of successive perceptions is not prescribed by the object itself. However, this subjective

succession has to be derived from an objective succession as making it possible. To clarify his position Kant contrasts his views with his predecessors in broad terms. If the rule of succession would be derived from observations, it would be empirical and contingent. Therefore, it cannot be arrived at by induction. The rule of necessary succession must be *a priori* and for synthetic *a priori* judgments to be possible it must be a condition for our experience.

Objects are related to each other according to an *a priori* rule. In the case of events, the apprehension rests on a preceding state which makes it necessary that the subsequent state follows. In order to perceive such a relation, we have to be able to “ascribe a certain determinate position in time” for each thing and event. (B223/A198). Events and things stand in time relation in respect of preceding states. (B223/A198). Kant links the necessity of the time-order to the form of time. “The preceding time necessarily determines the succeeding” (A199/B244). The role of understanding, then he infers, is to “carry the time-order over into appearances and their existence” (A199/B244-5). The relation of cause and effect is irreversible and necessary. Although the order of representations in an event,

refers us to some preceding state as a correlate of the event which is given; and though this correlate, is indeed, indeterminate, it none the less stands in a determining relation to the event as its consequence, connecting the event in necessary relation with itself in the time-series (A199/B244).

In other words; the cause may not always be given directly. It may be indeterminate what the cause is. But even then, we are able to assert that it follows from another preceding event. This time-order is objective. Kant expresses it in two ways: “The order is determined in the object, or to speak more correctly, is an order of successive synthesis that determines an object” (B246/A201).

Kant’s move might seem circular. He thinks that the time-order must be objective and that the rule for succession must be found in the object of representation, however what gives an object in the first place is the unifying (synthesizing) acts of imagination and understanding. What Kant comes to say is that the unifying acts are objectifying acts,

they relate appearances according to *a priori* rules. Causality is valid for all appearances because it gives the rule for the order of appearances and makes experience of them possible. All laws of natural science can be said to depend upon this synthetic *a priori* principle that whatever happens must have a cause.

2.4.3 Third Analogy

The third analogy is concerned with the category of community. Regarding the time-order, it is concerned with coexistence. By an example Kant gives, the perception of the moon and earth may mutually follow one another. This is the relation of reciprocity or community. For Kant it is obvious that this relation of coexistence or community cannot be based on experience since in experience the perceptions follow one another and are never at the same in the same subject. To claim the objective existence of objects as coexistent, we need the category of community. The category of community allows us to represent different things as substances mutually determining each other. This is the basis of reciprocal interaction.

The category of community combines the categories of substance and causality. Therefore, it is the idea of substances mutually causing determinations in each other. From the individual perception of things of nature, we would not be able to form their continuous unity:

Without community each perception of an appearance in space is broken off from every other, and the chain of empirical representations, that is, experience would have to begin entirely anew with each new object (A213-4/B260).

Objects of our experience as appearances “stand in community of apperception” and are “represented as coexisting in connection with each other” and they “constitute a whole” (A214/B260). This subjective community is not just fictitious but has an objective basis. The perception of each thing depends and determines other perceptions. In other words, although the relationality of appearances is a necessary concept of the understanding, the objects themselves are represented as coexisting and forming an objective “community of substances” (A214/B261).

Taken together the three analogies explain the unity and mechanism of nature. By nature, Kant understands, “the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws” (A216/B263). The unity of the world-whole (nature) (A218/B265, footnote a) thus reflects the category of community determined in time while its mechanism depends upon the category of causality. We think nature as a community of substances interrelatedly determining (causing) each other.

2.5 Nature as Phenomenon

The initial question of this study was “How is understanding of nature possible after the Copernican turn?” After presenting Kant’s theory of the *a priori* conditions of knowledge it is now easier to see how nature is possible for the subject of the Copernican turn. Nature is the unitary and lawful sum of all appearances, and appearances are subject to the cognitive constitution of the perceiver. Nature, as an appearance, is spatio-temporal only on the condition of human sensibility and has a causal mechanism only on the condition of human understanding. In other words, we do not arrive at the unity or lawfulness of nature through adding particular natural things in order to make a whole. The implication of the Copernican Turn and *Critique of Pure Reason* is that nature is an *a priori* concept, which is exhibited (becomes sensible) in experience. Claiming that the possibility of nature is *a priori* is to say that nature is possible for human reason and that reason is the lawgiver of nature. The condition of our experience of empirical nature turns out to be *a priori* concepts and intuitions.

The possibility of nature is linked to the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. In order to account for the *a priori* character of our cognition, Kant tries to determine the conditions of possibility of knowledge. The conditions are pure forms of sensibility, transcendental syntheses of the imagination, transcendental apperception and pure concepts of the understanding. The *a priori* intuitions and concepts are the enabling conditions of experience. Due to the fact that they make experience possible, they are valid of all objects of experience which is exactly what objective validity (therefore empirical reality) is. Synthetic *a priori* judgments and nature are possible because the

perceiving subject has *a priori* structures in its cognitive powers which it imposes on the matter. But all this is only valid of nature as it appears or nature as it is known by human beings. We have no knowledge of the real possibility of nature as it is in itself, or of the possibility of its non-sensible substrate.

Although the human cognitive capacities make experience possible, by supplying the form of experience, this is merely a possible experience and matter (sensation) of experience is likewise needed in order to refer to something as actual. The activity of the cognizer is limited to determining the order of matter, that is, to give form to it. The Copernican turn therefore does not claim that we “create” things, or that we are responsible from the existence of things, but only that we “determine” them as regards to their form. The first would be an act of intuitive understanding which would be able to directly intuit its conceptions without the mediation of a sensibility. Such an understanding would thus give its objects to itself simply by their concepts. Human cognitive powers, on the other hand, are such that, the given matter must be subjected to unifying acts in order to be understood. The activity of our understanding consists not in providing itself an intuition to itself given that our understanding is only discursive. This indicates that our understanding cannot be source of the existence of objects that it determines in a conceptual manner. Thus “existence” is not a concept or a predicate. “In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is to be found” (A225/B272).

As for the mechanism of nature, empirical observations of causal relations are not enough to justify the proposition that “all appearances stand in causal connection”. In contemporary terms, the problem of induction seems to be the Achilles’ heel of empiricism. To establish something which is true of all appearances regardless of their mode of existence, we must presuppose *a priori* conditions in and by which all appearances are conditioned. It is obvious that causality depends on the condition of time. Without time, there would be no time-order. From the Kantian standpoint, time is not an entity but only a form of human sensibility.

Kant seems to be reducing the mechanism of nature and the principle of causality to regulative principles. However, he later on seems to say the exact opposite: “In

Transcendental Analytic we said that dynamical principles are regulative. Yet they are constitutive in respect of experience possible *a priori*.” (A664/B692). However, these claims are not contradictory. It is my contention that causality is constitutive of experience yet also regulative in the sense that it is not constitutive of objects. What is meant by this is exemplified in the analogies of experience where Kant contrasts the dynamical and mathematical principles. The mathematical principles constitute or construct their objects. Analogies, on the other hand, are principles of relations and they construct relations. These relations are necessary for experience yet they do not determine the sides of the relations directly. What we know through the principle of relation is that whatever happens must have a cause. Then again, the cause may not be immediately given and it is up to us to find the cause. In this sense, the principle of causality regulates or directs the human understanding toward the path of finding the cause, therefore it is regulative. As for the principle of the mechanism of nature (causality of efficient causes) it should be said that it is not equivalent to the principle of causality since the latter principle does not define any specific types of causes. Since the cause is left indeterminate by the principle of causality, the principle that guides us toward finding efficient causes can only be regulative. The status of the principle of mechanism will further be discussed in connection with the antinomy of teleological judgment.

The conclusion to be drawn from *Critique of Pure Reason* is that nature is an *a priori* concept. We could not arrive at unity, totality and necessity of nature empirically. Thus the synthetic unity should be *a priori*. Still we are left with conflicts of judgment which stem from a mechanical conception of nature. If causality strictly determines all appearances, how can actions of human beings be considered as free? If nature as a phenomenon depends on the construction and organization of the knowing subject how can the same subject consider itself to be free? How can the human reason fall into conflict regarding its own construction? The answer to these questions requires a further analysis of the heterogeneity of cognitive powers and the discursivity of human knowledge.

CHAPTER 3

MECHANISM, FREEDOM AND THE HUMAN STANDPOINT

This chapter will focus on the third antinomy of pure reason, i.e. the antinomy between the mechanism of nature and human freedom. To understand Kant's "solution" to the antinomy will require an explanation of his thoughts regarding the distinction between phenomena and noumena. His derivation of transcendental ideas will help define the "idea" of nature as against the concept of nature previously defined. Finally, the distinguishing feature of his transcendental idealism will be found in the heterogeneity of human cognitive powers which is required for the question of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. This exhibition will show what "the human standpoint" consists in, how it is arrived at through the critical project and its contribution to the antinomy regarding the mechanism of nature and its role in providing a solution.

3.1 The Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena

Kantian scholars seem to be divided on the nature of the distinction of phenomena and noumena. While some claim that it reflects a dualistic ontology (referred to as the two-worlds view) others claim that it is only an epistemological distinction based on the heterogeneity of cognitive powers (referred to as the dual-aspect view)¹⁴. According to the two-worlds view, the conclusion to be drawn from the thesis of the transcendental ideality of space and time is that things-in-themselves are non-spatial and atemporal objects. On this account, Kant's transcendental idealism is interpreted as distinguishing two ontological domains of spatio-temporal and non-spatio-temporal objects¹⁵. Accordingly, the concept of phenomenon is thought as referring to the former set of objects while noumenon is to the latter. The epistemological dual-aspect

¹⁴ See Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, pp. 333-5 for a defense of the two-worlds view. See Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 6-19 for a defense of the epistemological dual-aspect view.

¹⁵ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, p. 334.

reading on the other hand, insists that the distinction is not an ontological one “between two ontologically distinct sets of entities”¹⁶ and that it merely consist in two epistemological standpoints. Although due to the *a priori* conditions of sensibility we represent things spatio-temporally, the *a priori* forms of thought of pure understanding enable us to abstract from these conditions and therefore form non-contradictory concepts of objects which cannot be given in intuition. On this account, the concept of phenomena entails objects which are given in intuition while noumenon refers only to intelligible objects.

This study will follow the epistemological dual-aspect reading of transcendental idealism. The section that is commonly referred to as Phenomena and Noumena was rewritten by Kant for the second edition of *CPR*. In the first edition there are passages that would strongly support the idea of a two-worlds interpretation of Kant’s philosophy (See A249-53). However, Kant’s careful rephrasing of the section in B edition clearly shows that he wants to avoid ontological distinctions. The concern of Kant’s transcendental idealism is “not the nature of things . . . but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of things” (A12-3/B26). Moreover, he explicitly states that the presumptions of ontological assertions should be replaced by an analysis of cognitive powers (See A247/B303). Additionally, the “transcendental” distinction explicitly refers to “conditions of possibility of knowledge” and it loses its meaning if interpreted as a metaphysical distinction as the two-worlds interpretation considers it. It should not be forgotten that Kant’s whole endeavor was to analyze human mind’s capabilities therefore provide a criticism in order to determine the limits of knowledge. Lastly, as we will see at the end of this chapter the transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves is not congruent with the distinction of phenomena and noumena. Although the thing in itself is a noumenal concept, there are other noumenal concepts.

Kant finds the ground of the distinction of phenomena and noumena in application of concepts. There are two possible types of employment for concepts, namely the

¹⁶ Allison, *Transcendental Idealism*, p. 16.

transcendental and the empirical employment (A238/B298). Empirical employment consists in applying categories to objects of experience, that is, appearances. In their transcendental employment, on the other hand, concepts are applied “to things in general and in themselves” (A238/B298), that is, to objects that cannot be given in intuition or in other words, they are the ways in which we think the non-sensible.

The rightful application of categories is to appearances. In this context, our objects are phenomena or the sensible objects of experience. “Appearance” was previously defined by Kant as “the undetermined object of empirical intuition” (A20/B34). Phenomenon, on the other hand, is an appearance determined by the categories. However, even if not applied to appearances, the forms of thought still enable us to “think” objects of which we have no intuition. We can “think” objects as they might be in themselves. However, this would indicate merely their logical possibility as objects of thought but not their real possibility as objects of possible experience. These objects, which cannot be given but can only be objects of thought, Kant entitles as the intelligible object or noumena. As H.J. Paton states:

In their transcendental use concepts are applied . . . to things as they are in themselves and as they can be grasped by understanding without the aid of sense. Such objects are called “noumena”, that is, understandable or intelligible (and not sensible objects)¹⁷.

Although Kant’s acceptance of the existence of things in themselves has ontological implications, this does not mean that there are ontologically two distinct things since phenomena or things as they appear to us are only representations, that is, they do not constitute by themselves an ontological domain. We can understand the distinction between phenomena and noumena as having a basis in the duality of human cognitive powers. Phenomenon is the concept of an object which can be given in intuition. We can determine phenomena with pure concepts of the understanding thereby have knowledge of them. Noumenon, on the other hand, is the concept of an object which can only be thought but not given. Since such a conception does not refer to conditions

¹⁷ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*. Vol. II, p. 439.

of sensibility and since knowledge can only emerge from the combination of the two conditions of knowledge, we cannot have knowledge of noumena. Therefore, the distinction of phenomena and noumena refer to the sensible (knowable) and the intelligible (yet unknowable) respectively.

There are two senses of noumenon, namely the negative and the positive. Noumenon is “not an object of our sensible intuition” (B307). This is its negative characterization as not being determinable or knowable by us. Since categories do not have meaning beyond their application to intuition, in order to understand noumenon in the positive sense, a postulation of an intuition of a different kind than the sensible human intuition is required (B 308). We do not know the possibility of another understanding that is different than ours. However, since the conditions of thought and the conditions of givenness are separate for our cognition, we can conceive an understanding that does not have a similar limitation of sensibility.

In the positive sense noumenon is “an object of a non-sensible intuition” (B307). In this sense, it is thought that a conceivable understanding with a non-sensible intuition might know things as they are in themselves without the mediation of the senses. It is obvious that what is meant by this is beyond human cognitive powers. Kant often uses the example of a conceivable understanding with non-sensible intuition in which conditions of givenness and thought are not differentiated, in order to emphasize the peculiarity of human understanding. This non-sensible intuition is also referred to as intellectual intuition or intuitive understanding in which there is no differentiation between the possibility of an object and its actuality.

Therefore, the concept of noumenon is an abstraction and the representation of an object in general. In its negative use, it is only an indeterminate concept. In its positive sense, it may be a determinate concept for an intuitive understanding but not for us who have a discursive understanding bound by the conditions of sensibility¹⁸.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 452-3.

In order to ascertain what the concept of noumenon entails we cannot make use of categories since they are only valid of given objects and if the conditions of givenness are removed, there does not remain an object for us to apply them to. In other words, determining the concept of noumenon is beyond the *a priori* capability of understanding. The limit of *a priori* capability of understanding is to determine “the form of a possible experience in general” (B303/A246). Therefore, its rightful application is its empirical employment in ordering appearances. Determining the true nature of things-in-themselves (what they are independent of human understanding and sensibility) is an impossibility. Therefore, Kant asserts that our knowledge is restricted to appearances and we have no *a priori* way of knowing what things are in themselves. Consequently, ontological claims are baseless and should give their way to a critical analysis of the contribution of cognitive powers in the formation of knowledge:

. . . the proud name of an Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply . . . synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things in general . . . must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding (A247/B303).

Noumenon in human knowledge is to be taken “only in a negative sense” according to Kant (B309). However, the concept of noumenon has a use for human understanding: the function of limiting. It serves to “limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge” so that it is not “extended to thing in themselves” (A254/B310). We see that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon does not reflect a distinction between two ontologically distinct domains but only the limits of human cognition. What the concept of noumenon negatively shows is that “understanding is not limited through sensibility” yet the same understanding sets limits to itself through the concept of noumena (A256/B312-3). It is already seen that the source of the limiting concept is the understanding and the concept of noumena is not taken from an ontologically distinct kind of objects. It is a distinction of understanding in the process of distinguishing its rightful domain. What the concept of noumena is saying is that “our kind of intuition does not extend to all things, but only to objects of the senses . . . and that a place remains open for some other kind of intuition, and so for things as its

objects” (A286/B342-3). Kant is therefore limiting only human knowledge and not all possible knowledge.

3.2 The Dialectic of Reason

Transcendental Dialectic is concerned with transcendental illusion, which is an illusion that is caused by extending principles of understanding beyond experience. Transcendental illusion differs from logical illusion. Logical illusions arise from “lack of attention to the logical rule” (A296/B353). Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, continues even after the mistake is realized through criticism, which entails distinguishing the source regarding human cognitive powers. In transcendental illusion, the conditions of sensibility which are subjective conditions, are mistaken for “objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves” (A297/B353). In other words, they consist in accepting the conditions of givenness (or sensibility) as conditions of existence of things which gives rise to ontological assertions.

The aim of transcendental dialectic is therefore, not eliminating errors but only to show their sources and exposing the nature of illusions. Transcendental illusions are “natural” and “inevitable” (A298/B354). The tendency to such illusions is “inseparable from human reason” (A298/B354) because it is the human standpoint itself which produces these illusions. “Transcendental illusion is precisely that our ideas appear to give us knowledge of . . . transcendent objects, when in fact they do not”¹⁹. Pure reason infers transcendental ideas from concepts of the understanding and then treats them as being capable of yielding *a priori* knowledge.

3.3 Reason

Kant characterizes reason as the highest cognitive power. He tells us that the journey of knowledge begins with sensibility, passes through the understanding and finally ends in reason. Reason is a different source of concepts and principles than that of understanding. Kant refers to reason as a faculty/power of principles. Principles of reason are synthetic cognitions “derived from concepts” (A301/B357).

¹⁹ Rohlf, “The Ideas of Pure Reason”, p. 194.

Kant asserts that the type of principles that reason seeks are altogether different than that of understanding. The knowledge acquired through understanding is discursive knowledge, which is mediated through concepts. Understanding needs intuitions to apply its concepts to. What this entails is that the knowledge acquired through understanding “does not depend on thought alone” (A302/B358). Reason, on the other hand, aims to arrive at knowledge only through principles without the use of intuition and independently of the conditions of sensibility. While understanding unites the manifold, reason is the cognitive power which unites the rules of understanding according to principles (A302/B359). “Reason is then a higher-order faculty that aims to unify judgments of the understanding under more universal principles”²⁰. Therefore, application of reason is not to experience but to understanding.

Moreover, the unity of reason is altogether different from that of the unity of understanding. Kant claims that understanding does not even have a concept of the kind of unity that reason is after. While understanding is limited by conditions of sensibility, reason seeks unlimited or absolute principles. Reason seeks absolute universality while the universality of a rule of understanding is only comparatively so:

The law of causality is Kant’s favorite example of a rule of the understanding. . . . The law of causality is not absolutely universal, Kant says, because our knowledge of this law derives from reflection on the conditions of possible human experience, which is limited by our forms of intuition. As a result, we know only that the law of causality is universally true of human experience, but not whether it applies more universally to things in themselves beyond the limits of possible human experience²¹.

3.3.1 The Principle of Reason

The function of reason is to reduce the manifold of knowledge to fewest principles as possible in order to achieve unity. The principles of reason therefore aim at unity of the rules of the understanding. They do not determine appearances. The principles of

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

reason merely organize the principles of understanding and are subjective. This way of organizing does not have objective validity. Since it is “merely a subjective law for the orderly management of the possession of our understanding”, Kant entitles such subjective principles of reason as “maxims” (A306/B363). The immediate object of reason is not appearances but only concepts and judgments (A306/B363).

In its logical employment, the principle of reason is to find the condition of conditions which would itself be unconditioned. However, there is in reason another principle that arises out of this logical principle. Reason assumes that “if a conditioned is given . . . the whole series of conditions . . . is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection” (A307-8/B364). This principle cannot be a principle of the understanding because it is related to a synthesis which understanding is incapable of. Kant tells us that “the conditioned is analytically related to some condition but not to the unconditioned” (A308/B364) and therefore this principle is a synthetic principle of reason. However, this principle cannot become part of an empirical employment and it is a transcendent principle in that it transcends the limits of a possible experience. The “whole” series of conditions up to the unconditioned cannot not be given in experience. Understanding on the other hand, has immanent principles, that is, they are capable of being exhibited in a possible experience.

3.3.2 The Ideas of Pure Reason

Kant claims that reason arrives at its concepts by inference (A310/B366). The concepts of reason are transcendental ideas. Kant begins his treatment of ideas by showing its roots in Plato’s thought. He thinks that Plato used:

the expression “idea” in such a way . . . to have meant by it something which not only can never be borrowed from the sense but far surpasses even the concepts of the understanding . . . inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with that is coincident with it (A313/B370).

Although Kant refers to Plato as the originator of the meaning of “idea”, it should be noted that Kant does not envisage an ontologically distinct world of ideas. On the contrary, he thinks that ideas are productions of pure reason which strives to achieve

completeness and unity of knowledge. “Kant also denies that our ideas govern the structure of the sensible world, as Platonic ideas were supposed to do and as Kant holds that our categories and forms of intuition do”²².

Kant thinks that Plato’s ideas also admit of the teleology of nature, that is, the conceivability of nature and particulars from their ideas regarded as ends. Although he greatly admires the use of Platonic ideas in matters of “morality, legislation and religion” (A318/B375), he finds their proper use in morality where experience cannot give us rules for it. What we “ought” to do can never be inferred from what “is”. In Kant’s words, “in respect of moral laws” experience is “the mother of illusion” (A318/B375).

Kant deduces transcendental ideas from reason’s logical use, much like the metaphysical deduction of the categories. However, he claims that it is not an objective deduction but only a subjective derivation (A336/B393). The reason is that they do not have any relation to an object of possible experience. Therefore, there is no way to provide an *object*-ive deduction of these ideas.

Pure reason is a faculty of inferences. The logical form of inference is that of syllogism. The major premise of the syllogism is given through the understanding as a rule. The minor premise is a judgment, that is, subsumption of something under the rule of the major premise. Conclusion of a syllogism is known “*a priori* through reason” (A304-5/B360-1). Pure reason always seeks ever higher conditions by which all the rest can be deduced *a priori*. Therefore, a syllogism “is extended . . . by a prosyllogism”²³. In other words, reason seeks for a condition which conditions the major premise by ascending to higher conditions.

Although “Caius is mortal” is a judgment which can be put forth by the understanding, in a syllogism it is derived from the major premise of “All human beings are mortal” and the minor premise of “Caius is a human being”. The major premise, as regards its quantity, is a universal judgment valid for all human beings. In Michael Rohlf’s

²² *Ibid.*, p. 202.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

example of prosyllogism²⁴ the major premise is extended to its conditions by adding two premises (“All animals are mortal” and “All humans are animals”) so that the major premise becomes a conclusion of a previous syllogism. Kant’s transition from prosyllogisms to transcendental ideas is obscure and has been the subject of endless debates regarding both his method of derivation and his intentions. What he seems to be doing is to make the transition from the logical form of a judgment to a category and from the category to the idea. Moving from the universal judgment to the category, Kant tells us that “in the synthesis of intuitions we have corresponding to this the *allness* (*universitas*) or *totality* of conditions” (A322/B379). Henry E. Allison thinks that since category operates “at the level of transcendental logic or the synthesis of intuitions”, the totality of conditions for the predicate means “the complete collection of x’s . . . falling under the concept ‘human’” or *all* human beings²⁵.

Kant next tells us that “transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of the *totality* of the *conditions* for any given conditioned” (A322/B379). From there he infers that either the totality of conditions can be possible by the unconditioned or the totality itself can be unconditioned. “A pure concept of reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned” (A322/B379). In order to survey the series of conditions, reason assumes them “as completed and as given in their totality” (A332/B388). While categories of understanding deal with the “synthetic unity of representations”, transcendental ideas “are concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general” (B391/A334). Kant further refines the totality that reason seeks as an absolute totality. By absolute he means what is “valid without restriction” by contrasting it to “what is valid comparatively” (A326/B382). This seems to be a better characterization of what transcendental ideas entail. Transcendental ideas claim to determine their object without the aid of experience or as it is in itself, without the restriction of conditions of givenness.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²⁵ Allison, *Transcendental Idealism*, p. 316.

There are three transcendental ideas of pure reason which are based on the three relational categories of substance, cause/effect and community. The first is the idea of soul which is the inference of the absolute unity of the thinking subject and its substantiality. The second idea, which is the idea of a world-whole, is related to the category of causality. As the “series of the conditions of appearance” (A334/B391) or cause-effect relations cannot be synthesized indefinitely, reason infers the absolute unity these conditions as the idea of a world-whole. The third transcendental idea is the idea of God. Reason in its attempt to find an unconditioned ground which conditions all objects, arrives at the idea of God as “the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought” (A334/B391). The first idea is the object of psychology, the second of cosmology and the third of theology. There are three kinds of dialectical inferences that are based on these three classes of ideas. The dialectical inferences regarding soul are paralogisms. Ideal of pure reason is the dialectical illusion arising out of the idea of God. Antinomies are concerned with dialectical inferences arising out of the cosmological idea of the world (as the sum-total of all appearances).

3.3.3 Cosmological Ideas and the Third Antinomy

In the following, our concern will be focused on the way in which Kant treats cosmological ideas and the antinomies of pure reason. Cosmological ideas are the transcendental ideas which are concerned with “absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances” (A407-8/B434). In this context, Kant subtly introduces the “idea” of nature without clearly explaining its relation to the concept of nature.

Kant tells us in the system of cosmological ideas that “reason does not generate any concept” and that “transcendental concepts can issue only from the understanding” (A408-9/B435). Transcendental concepts extend the use of concepts of the understanding beyond possible experience. Cosmological ideas are extensions of the concept of nature which is a concept of the understanding. The transition from the concept of nature to the idea of nature requires clarification. It is hard to distinguish the two since nature as a concept seems to display all the characteristics of an idea. Ideas “unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole” (A326-7/B383). They are concepts “to which no corresponding object

can be given in sense-experience” (A327/B383). Thus, Kant tells us that “the absolute whole of all appearances . . . is only an idea” (A328/B384). Nature as a concept of understanding (the sum of all appearances) also can never be given in its totality in experience.

Kant both in the “Transcendental Analytic” and in the *Critique of Judgment* refers to nature as a concept of the understanding. The unity of nature depends on the synthetic unity of the manifold and transcendental apperception. Given Kant’s refinements in the Dialectic, we may conclude that nature as a concept of the understanding has only a “comparative universality”. However, transcendental ideas aim at “absolute totality”. While concepts of the understanding are valid for all human experience, ideas claim validity without this restricting condition (i.e., human experience). For the idea of nature to be “valid without restriction” (A326/B382), it must be thought as unconditioned, that is, with its own ground. When nature is thought unconditionally, it is thought as free from of the conditions of sensibility. Thus, Kant upholds that all reason can do “is to free a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience” (A409/B485). Therefore, what the idea of nature entails is “nature in itself”.

In the introduction to the antinomies Kant further defines nature. He distinguishes world and nature, which are sometimes used in the same sense although they signify different things. World “signifies the mathematical sum-total of all appearances and totality of their synthesis” (A418/B446). Nature signifies the same world “viewed as a dynamical whole” (A418/B446). In other words, world signifies magnitude while nature signifies “the unity in the existence of appearances” (A419/B447).

According to the refinement of the idea of nature above, in antinomies there are transcendent claims about “nature in itself”. There are four antinomies of pure reason. In the first pair of antinomies, the assertions about “nature in itself” are based on mathematical concepts and in the last pair on dynamical concepts. The principle that Kant follows in solutions will be to undermine the transcendental realist claims by invoking the transcendental distinction between phenomena and noumena.

The type of dialectical inference that is referred to as antinomy is a hypothetical syllogism which has “as its content the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the [field of] appearance” (A406/B433). Antinomies are concerned with the cosmical concepts. They are “seemingly” contradictory claims which are neither provable nor deniable.

Antinomies rest on what Kant calls as antithetic assertions. An antithetic is the conflict of dogmatic assertions which are neither provable nor deniable (A420-1/B448). The sides of the conflict are thesis and antithesis. Each side of the antinomy is defensible yet they are unable to prove that the opposite assertion is invalid. Kant characterizes the position of the antitheses as that of empiricism and the theses as dogmatism since the latter presuppose (without prior criticism of cognitive powers) intelligible beginnings. While the transcendental dialectic, through showing their sources, aims to render them harmless, they are unavoidable and continue to deceive us even when their illusory nature is exposed.

The conflicting assertions of the antinomies are directed to ascending in the series of appearances up to the unconditioned. The totality that reason seeks is concerned with the condition of appearances “in so far as these conditions constitute a series” (A416/B443). Completing the synthesis of conditions require either an unconditioned first member of the series or an infinite regress in the series. These two kinds of regress are exemplified in the theses and antitheses of the antinomies respectively.

Kant’s method for laying bare the conflict is the skeptical method which he conceives as allowing the conflict of assertions in order to detect the source of conflict. He insists that this is a method aiming for certainty and which is completely different from skepticism. The skeptical method is essential for transcendental philosophy (A424/B452). The reason for this is that transcendental philosophy aims at distinguishing sources of knowledge and error. Since transcendental assertions “lay claim to insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experiences”, “what is erroneous in them can never be detected by means of any experience” (A425/B453). This is exactly the reason why they cannot be refuted or confirmed. The critique then aims to discern (*krinein*) their source. There are four antinomies of pure reason. The

third antinomy is related to the relational category of causality. The category of causality “presents a series of causes of a given effect” (A414/B441-2). The cosmological idea corresponding to causality is “absolute completeness in the Origination of an appearance” (A415/B443).

The thesis of the third antinomy asserts that other than the causality of nature there is another causality which is that of freedom. The proof of the thesis rests on the thought that the series of causes could not go on indefinitely. If that were so, the completeness of the series would not be possible. Therefore, there must be an initial cause which is undetermined by any other condition. This causality which is needed to complete the series is transcendental freedom which posits a cause with “absolute spontaneity”.

The antithesis is that there is no freedom and everything happens through causality of laws of nature. The proof of the antithesis is that assuming freedom disrupts the unity of experience by presupposing a beginning which cannot be given in experience. In order for this free cause to effect subsequent states, it must have a preceding state in time in which it has no causal relation. This however, is against the mechanism of nature and such an unconditioned cause cannot be given. Therefore, freedom is an illusion which prevents understanding from seeking a cause. In the observations of the antithesis, we encounter the argument that even if there is freedom, it cannot constitute a part of the series of appearances. Assuming freedom in nature disrupts the very idea of nature. If freedom were to be accepted, “that connection of appearances determining one another with necessity according to universal laws, which we entitle nature . . . would almost entirely disappear” (A451/B479). In other words, freedom and nature are irreconcilable according to the antithesis.

Pure reason has a practical interest in the thesis of the antinomy. Practical interest of reason is that we are “summoned to action” and to be able to act, we must assume freedom (A475/B503). Kant always has this practical interest in view. If the antithesis is granted, “moral ideas and principles lose all validity” (A468/B496). However, reason also has a speculative interest in the assertion of the antithesis. Understanding is encouraged to expand its knowledge on the basis of natural laws. “There is no

necessity to leave the chain of the natural order and resort to ideas, the objects of which are not known, because . . . they can never be given” (A469/B497).

3.4 The Solution of the Third Antinomy: Nature and Freedom Reconciled

For Kant, only transcendental idealism provides solutions for the antinomies of pure reason. In transcendental idealism, objects are treated as appearances as opposed to transcendental realism, which claims that the objects we cognize are things in themselves. Although the solutions of the antinomies all depend on transcendental idealism, their solution differ depending on the types of syntheses they aim at. As Kant had shown in “Transcendental Analytic” the mathematical and the dynamical categories are different with regard to the syntheses they enable. They are the syntheses of homogeneous and heterogeneous things respectively. Since antinomies result from transcendent application of categories the same distinction with regard to types of syntheses are applicable to them. In mathematical synthesis of appearances “no other than a sensible condition is admissible”, that is to say, none that is not itself a part of the series (A530/B558). In dynamical series, however, as they concern the synthesis of heterogeneous elements, “a heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series, but purely intelligible . . . can be allowed” (A530/B558). Accordingly, Kant divides antinomies into two groups of mathematical and dynamical antinomies.

The mathematical antinomies (which are concerned with the beginning and the limit of the world and the completeness of divisibility) are resolved by claiming that assertions of both the theses and the antitheses are false since they take the world as a thing in itself. Conversely, dynamical antinomies allow of being resolved “to the satisfaction of both parties” (A530/B558) as the opposing judgments may be thought of as both being true. As the third antinomy of pure reason is concerned with the dynamical concept of causality, it is a dynamical antinomy. Therefore, in the solution of the third antinomy Kant intends to reconcile the practical and speculative interests of reason. Freedom can be allowed although not as an appearance or as part of the series of appearances but as an intelligible cause therefore fulfilling the practical interest of reason. And since this assumption causes no disruption to the synthesis of appearances according to laws, understanding may still continue its business of

empirical synthesis as the unconditioned is never to be met with in experience. It does not interrupt the “continuity of the empirical regress” to the causal conditions (A531/B559, footnote a). In this way, unconditioned could be thought as “prior to appearances” (A531/B559) yet still not be given. In other words, the conditions of givenness and thought can be applied in different contexts.

Kant defines the cosmological meaning of freedom as “the power of beginning a state spontaneously” (A533/B561). Since the chain of causes cannot be pursued indefinitely, reason in order to arrive at totality, infers the idea of freedom as capable of starting a series of events spontaneously. The solution of the third antinomy therefore turns on the issue of the compatibility of mechanism of nature and the concept of freedom. Is it possible to assert that there are free actions if all world of sense, including human beings, is conditioned by the law of causality? The problem is, in Kant’s words, “whether [freedom] can exist along with the universality of the natural law of causality” (A536/B564). Or is it possible to say that “in *one and the same* event, in different relations” both mechanism of nature and freedom can be found? (A536/B564)²⁶. The *different relations* consist in the two different standpoints of phenomena and noumena. *One and the same* thing can be considered as regards its intelligible and phenomenal (sensible or empirical) character. In its intelligible character the cause can be considered free while in its effect might be regarded as an appearance, bound by the conditions of sensibility.

The subject is viewed in its intelligible character in the first sense and in its empirical character in the second sense. This distinction rests on the distinction of noumena and phenomena which depended on the heterogeneity of cognitive powers or in other words, the difference of conditions of givenness and conditions of thought. It may be granted that since the intelligible cause is outside the series of appearances, an event may be viewed as free in its intelligible cause while determined according to causality in respect of appearances.

²⁶ Emphasis added.

Acts are only observable in their empirical character or in their conformity to the world of sense. In other words, freedom in its intelligible aspect is thought noumenally. Considered as something as it is in itself it is free from the condition of time and of causality. Therefore “no action begins in this active being itself . . . but we may . . . say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world” (A541/B569).

Claiming this would not be contradictory to the law that whatever happens must have a cause. Events in phenomenal world still need causes to begin. Freedom and mechanism of nature is compatible on the view that freedom may be thought as the intelligible character of the action while the mechanism of nature refers to its empirical character.

Since freedom is not something which *is* or can be given it should not be thought under conditions of givenness. What the solution of the third antinomy claims is that freedom is only an idea, which does not rest on experience and which cannot be given in experience. Accordingly, the two kinds of causality (the causality through freedom and the causality of nature) can be thought as “at least not incompatible” (A558/B586).

Kant concludes that freedom cannot be accepted on the premise of transcendental realism. “Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of every event” (A536/B564). If transcendental idealism is assumed, on the other hand, it could be claimed that appearances as representations can have a ground other than the sensible since they are viewed as representations only. On this view, it is conceivable that an intelligible cause which is not itself an appearance may determine appearances.

This solution allows Kant to represent another order of things; that is freedom and morality. Morality (practical use of reason) involves the thought that something “ought to have happened”. The causality and mechanism of nature do not exclude freedom, for we are capable of acting “independently of those natural causes” (A534/B562). This is due to the fact that we regard our person as capable of acting freely. As Kant says, “the action is ascribed to the agent’s intelligible character” (A585/B583). Kant’s following remark on the solution of the antinomy is essential for it claims that the

admittance of freedom does not entail its knowledge or existence but only its intelligibility:

The reader should be careful to observe that in what has been said our intention has not been to establish the reality of freedom as one of the faculties which contain the cause of appearances of our sensible world. For that enquiry, as it does not deal with concepts alone, would not have been transcendental. And further, it could not have been successful, since we can never infer from experience anything which cannot be thought in accordance with the laws of experience (A557-8/B585-6).

The lesson to be drawn from the antinomies is that the ideas do not represent things as they are. The totality of conditions cannot be achieved by ideas. The conditions of appearances are always given through the regressive synthesis. In the series of subordinated causes “prior to [the] regress [causes] can have no existence in themselves as self-subsistent series of things” (A506/B534). If the claim of transcendental realism is dropped, then all that is left for ideas are to serve as regulative principles.

On accepting this view, since the totality of the series cannot be given as an object, the achievement of this totality remains as a “task” or “problem” for understanding. (A498/B526 and A508/B536 respectively). Accordingly, the ideas of reason regulate understanding in this task of completing the synthesis. The regulative principle of reason guides the understanding to continue in the process of synthesis as far as possible without ever coming to a completion. What this principle requires is the “greatest possible continuation and extension of experience” (A509/B537). Opposed to this characterization of regulative would be a constitutive principle of reason which would be the assertion that totality of conditions is given in the object.

What the solution of the third antinomy of pure reason and the regulative principle of reason show us is that although the concept of causality is constitutive of experience (and regulative for extension of knowledge), applied to the things in themselves it does not admit of knowledge but only of contradictions. Consequently, while we must

continue to look for those (indeterminate) causes of things in the field of appearances and continue the synthesis of series of causes we must never assume causality to reflect “nature as it is in itself”. As a dynamical principle it is constitutive of *human experience* yet it is not constitutive of “things”.

3.5 The Human Standpoint

As we have seen the antinomies result from an illegitimate extension of pure concepts. Such transcendent use goes beyond the limits of possible experience. Kant’s critical philosophy on the other hand, by distinguishing the elements of knowledge and showing the conflicts arising from the illegitimate extension of their principles, urges us to restrict knowledge claims to possible experience. Although human mind is capable of objective knowledge, such knowledge always stays within the limits of the human standpoint. Kant’s first reference to “the human standpoint” is in “Transcendental Aesthetic” where he claims that “solely from the human standpoint we can speak of space” (A26/B42). The term embodies the basic tenets of the Copernican turn and transcendental idealism. In Béatrice Longuenesse’s characterization the human standpoint is

that standpoint on the world which, according to Kant, is proper to human beings as opposed to non-rational animals, on the one hand, and to what a divine understanding might be, on the other hand”²⁷.

Kant frequently characterizes the peculiarity of the human standpoint in contrast to a conceivable understanding that is not bound by the conditions of sensibility. In this context, an intuitive understanding is thought as one in which conditions of sensibility and thought are not separate. The heterogeneity of the passive character of sensibility and active character of understanding is peculiar to the human standpoint. Consequently, human beings are not capable of apprehending things the way they are. What is given as conditioned by sensibility is processed by conditions of thought. Only through their combination cognition becomes possible for us. Henry E. Allison refers to this distinction of cognitive powers and the cognition arising out of this duality as

²⁷ Longuenesse, *Kant on the Human Standpoint*, p. 3.

“discursivity thesis”²⁸. Allison’s characterization of “discursivity thesis” converges with Longuenesse’s focus on “the human standpoint” in that they both refer to the heterogeneity of cognitive powers and its importance in Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant realizes his initial aim of showing the limits of human knowledge by displaying its discursive character and using the concept of an intuitive understanding as a limiting concept. In this sense, the reference to the concept of an intuitive understanding has the function of showing the finitude of human mind and the limits of its knowledge. The point of view of transcendental idealism is more sharply reflected in the phrase “the human standpoint” as it only determines the conditions of human knowledge and refrains from extending these conditions to all possible knowledge.

It should be noted that the human standpoint does not refer to a single way of looking at things. The human standpoint consists in our limitation to consider objects from a “two-fold standpoint” due to our cognitive powers. We can consider objects either phenomenally or noumenally. Phenomenal and noumenal interpretations, however, have their bounds. The phenomenal way of conceiving is bound to possible experience. The noumenal or intelligible perspective on the other hand, does not yield knowledge. Nevertheless, regulative principles of reason and morality require the noumenal perspective. According to Allison, this is what distinguishes Kant from his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. While empiricists reduce cognition to sensations, rationalists reduce sensations to confused ideas or imperfect forms of cognition that has as its basis in rational ideas²⁹. Kant refrains from such reductions and affirms two distinct elements of knowledge. Based on this description of the human standpoint, the argument of the present section can be presented in its whole. The dialectic of reason arises out of the confusion of two distinct cognitive powers. Transcendental idealism or critical philosophy consists in distinguishing (*krinein*) the two elements of knowledge thereby showing the limits of knowledge and sources of confusion.

²⁸ Allison, *Transcendental Idealism*, p. xiv.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

On this reading, the concept of noumena is not congruent with the thing in itself as an ontological concept. Although the distinction of appearance and the thing in itself, is partly an ontological one (as it assumes that there must be something that appears) the phenomena/noumena distinction is purely epistemological. The thing in itself is surely a noumenal concept, however it is not the only one. Freedom, likewise, is an intelligible (noumenal) concept and no “existence” is implied in the concept of freedom. Kant is very explicit on this point and moreover he claims that if he were to attempt to prove “existence” of freedom he would surely fail in this endeavour.

The transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves or the two-fold standpoint of the phenomenal and noumenal, the conflicts of reason and their solution all depend on the duality of human cognitive capabilities. However, the human standpoint itself is the outcome of Kant’s initial question of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. The insight into the condition of the human standpoint is not empirically given but is an achievement of Kant’s critical project. It should not be merely thought as human nature or what is merely empirical. Kant’s enquiry consists in criticizing reason in order to determine its capability for *a priori* knowledge. The heterogeneity of elements and the limits of human reason are “demonstrated from principles, and not merely arrived at by conjecture” (A761/B789). It is the result of Kant’s initial question: How must our cognitive powers be arranged in order for us to have synthetic *a priori* knowledge?

In other words, Kant exhibits the relation of human cognitive powers through the question of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. If we have to merely assert their limits and content through particular experiences, it would be anthropology or psychology but not transcendental philosophy. He, on the other hand, derives or deduces them transcendently by asking the question of what must be the case (the conditions) in order for us to have knowledge.

Antinomies both arise out of and are solvable by the distinction of cognitive powers or with reference to the human standpoint. In the solutions of antinomies, Kant identifies the source of conflict as the ontological commitment (or the transcendental realist claim) of the arguments and undermines such claims with reference to the

human standpoint that signifies only an epistemological standpoint incapable of determining things in themselves. Kant's philosophy of human standpoint therefore, consists in refraining from transcendental realist claims and accepting the finitude and limitation of human knowledge.

The application of transcendental idealism in the solution of the third antinomy shows that the mechanism of nature is also dependent on the constitution of human reason. Nature as such need not be mechanical; it is the human understanding which synthesizes and combines it in such an order as to yield a causally-ordered and an interrelated concept of nature, that is, a mechanically understood nature. Kant's novelty is in introducing mechanism of nature also as the result of human standpoint. Only by justifying the mechanism of nature with regard to our cognitive powers, that is, by undermining its ontological status and asserting its epistemological status is Kant able to claim that the mechanism of nature and freedom are compatible, or at least not incompatible. Although within the context of *CPR*, Kant is able to show that we can think freedom without contradiction he still needs to justify that freedom is realizable within nature. Kant tackles this issue in the *Critique of Judgment*.

CHAPTER 4

MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY

This chapter's focus will be the antinomy of teleological judgment. The antinomy has a notorious reputation regarding its complexity and consequences. There is no agreement even what the antinomy consists in, much less its solution. For these reasons, in the first half, a summary of Kant's view of teleology will be given. The second half will deal critically with the problems of the antinomy. These problems include locating the antinomy and identifying its solution. On the surface, judging natural objects with regard to the conflicting principles of mechanism and purposiveness constitute the content of the antinomy. However, it has a deeper source and outreaching implications. The necessity and systematicity of empirical laws and consequently the understandability of nature is at stake. The idea that practical human freedom is realizable within nature would also be threatened if the solution of the antinomy fails. My claim is that Kant's method of resolving the antinomy goes beyond the limits set by *Critique of Pure Reason* and contravenes his philosophy of the human standpoint.

4.1 The Aim of the *Critique of Judgment*³⁰

In *CPR*, Kant undertook the task of determining the limits of *a priori* knowledge. He arrived at the conclusion that understanding prescribes *a priori* laws to nature. He determined the function of reason as providing regulative principles which guide the understanding in its search for empirical knowledge. He justified the regulative principle of freedom which enables reason to determinate the will practically. However, the third antinomy of pure reason and the subsequent moral theory of the *Critique of Practical Reason* creates a gulf between nature and freedom. We represent

³⁰ All references to the *Critique of Judgment* will be according to the Akademie edition pagination. However, the translation used is Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing, 1987. Hereafter, *CJ*. All references to *CJ* will be given as in-text citations.

ourselves as part of the lawful unity of appearances, that we call nature, through our understanding. Our reason however, presents us with a moral order (kingdom of ends) of which we are a part of. We thereby treat nature and freedom “just as if they were two different worlds” (*CJ*, Ak. 176). In order for us to think that freedom is realizable within nature, we must also be able to think a ground that unites the supersensible (therefore unknowable) substrate of nature and the practically assumed supersensible character of freedom (*CJ*, Ak. 176). In other words, we must be able to think that nature is so organized as to allow human purposes to be realized within it. In the *Critique of Judgment*, in order to fix the “gulf” between nature (the world of phenomena) and freedom Kant presents the power/faculty of judgment (*Urteilkraft*) as the power that mediates understanding and reason. As a mediator, the power of judgment is linked both to cognition and the power of desire (which reason has the capacity to determine). The question Kant asks is whether this power of judgment has *a priori* principles of its own and if so, then whether they are regulative or constitutive principles. Accordingly, *CJ* examines two kinds of judgment which are based on subjective principles, namely, the aesthetic and teleological judgments.

Kant defines the power/faculty of judgment “as the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal” (*CJ*, Ak. 179). He introduces a division regarding the manner of subsumption. If the universal is given prior to the particular, the resulting judgment is determinative. If, on the other hand, the particular is given and the power of judgment has to find the universal to think the particular, the judgment is reflective (*CJ*, Ak. 179). This distinction addresses the problem of the status of empirical laws, which is one of the main problems of *CJ*. In *CPR*, understanding was described as providing the *a priori* laws of nature however, it only provides the forms of thinking and there are many aspects of nature that are left undetermined. Kant tells us that even though the territory of empirical concepts is nature, they do not legislate *a priori* and they are contingent (*CJ*, Ak. 174). Therefore, the concept of “empirical law” seems to indicate a contradiction for Kant. The concept of law implies necessity while “empirical” implies contingency. Kant thinks that these laws “may indeed be contingent as far as *our* understanding can see; still if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature does require)” they must be considered necessary by some

principle “even though we do not know this principle” (*CJ*, Ak. 180). He asserts that this principle is to be found in reflective judgment as a law that the power of judgment gives to itself. The subject perceiving an order and lawfulness in seemingly contingent aspects of nature which it cannot explain, applies this principle which “refers the natural thing to the uncognizable supersensible” (*CJ*, Ak. 169). However, is to be used “for cognizing nature only in relation” to the subject (*CJ*, Ak. 169).

The power of judgment is not a power that is capable of determining nature *a priori*. In other words, reflective judgment supplies principles “for reflection rather than determination” (*CJ*, Ak. 180). Since understanding determines *a priori* but is unable to determine the particular completely, in order to account for empirical laws Kant thinks that we must conceive them “*as if* they too had been given by an understanding (even though not ours)” (*CJ*, Ak. 180). Although we cannot claim to have knowledge of such an understanding, we are in a sense, forced to think in this way in order to account for the systematicity of laws of nature. This is only a regulative idea for reflective judgment. By this principle “judgment gives a law only to itself, not to nature” (*CJ*, Ak. 180).

The principle of reflective judgment (purposiveness), which is used in aesthetic and teleological judgments, requires definition. Kant defines purpose as a concept which is the basis of an object’s actuality (*CJ*, Ak. 180). “A thing’s harmony with that character of things which is possible only through purposes is called the *purposiveness* of its form” (*CJ*, Ak. 180). The distinction between purpose and purposiveness allows Kant to put forward the purposiveness without a purpose that is characteristic of aesthetic judgments. Teleological judgment, however, deals with the purposiveness of nature and its empirical laws. With the concept of purposiveness of nature, “we present nature as if an understanding contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws” (*CJ*, Ak. 180-1). In other words, purposiveness of nature entails the idea that even if we judge the form of natural things and their relations to be contingent, we must presuppose the necessity and systematicity of natural laws. In order to do so, we need to conceive an understanding which necessitates them. However, Kant stresses that we do not need to assume such an understanding since the

principle of purposiveness is not determinative but only reflective (*CJ*, Ak. 180). We apply the principle solely for reflection on nature in order to conceive the empirical laws as necessary (*CJ*, Ak. 181).

Kant asserts that the principle of formal purposiveness of nature tells us “how we ought to judge” and the necessity implied shows that it is not derivable from experience (*CJ*, Ak. 182). It therefore, needs a transcendental deduction. Universal laws depend on the categories and they are the conditions for us to cognize nature. “All change has its cause” (*CJ*, Ak. 183) (the principle of causality) is a necessary and universal law of nature. However, “objects of empirical cognition are still . . . determinable in all sorts of additional ways” (*CJ*, Ak. 183). In the case of empirical laws, we must be able to think that even though we cannot know the law *a priori*, nature is lawfully ordered. In other words, we have to be able to assume lawfulness even in what we cannot determine *a priori* (i.e., the empirical). This principle is “the principle of purposiveness for our cognitive power” (*CJ*, Ak. 184). It is not a concept of nature or of freedom; therefore, Kant posits it as a principle of judgment. Since it does not attribute anything to the object but is only a principle for judgment’s reflection on particulars, Kant calls it as a subjective principle or a maxim (*CJ*, Ak. 184). It is a requirement for our cognitive power in order to have a coherent experience. This line of reasoning constitutes the transcendental justification of the principle of judgment. What the power of judgment presupposes through this principle is the “harmony of nature with our cognitive power” (*CJ*, Ak. 185).

Although we make the assumption that nature has an order that is discoverable or by us, Kant admits that it is thinkable that the diversity of nature “might still be so great that it would be impossible for our understanding to discover in nature an order it could grasp” (*CJ*, Ak. 185). Since we know discursively through concepts by reducing diversity to identity, in order to assume what we encounter is reducible, we have to make a necessary assumption. The reducibility of particulars to concepts does not reflect how nature is but only how we think. In other words, the formal purposiveness of nature refers only to our cognitive powers and therefore, it is a subjective principle. However, if we judge that it is the form of an object which requires “a prior concept”

of it we make an objective use of this principle (*CJ*, Ak. 192) and it constitutes the basis of teleological judgments.

4.2 The Role of Teleological Judgment: Objective Purposiveness

In teleological judgments, the natural products to be subsumed under the concept of a purpose must be given. Kant asserts that teleological judgment is not a special power but “only reflective judgment as such proceeding according to concepts” (*CJ*, Ak. 194). Its peculiarity, as opposed to aesthetic reflective judgments, consists in judging by the concept of purpose although it is not a determinative but reflective judgment. Kant further defines purpose as “the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause (the real basis of its possibility)” (*CJ*, Ak. 219-20). Purposiveness then, is “the causality that a concept has with regard to its object” (*CJ*, Ak. 220).

If the exhibition of a concept in a particular takes place through nature, the judgment is concerned with the technic of nature, which is characterized by Kant as “nature’s power to produce in terms of purposes” (*CJ*, Ak. 390-1). In such a judgment a natural object is judged as nature’s product or as a natural purpose. In such representations of objective purposiveness, judgment aims to “orient itself” in the diversity of nature by “attributing to nature, on the analogy of a purpose, a concern . . . for our cognitive power” (*CJ*, Ak. 193).

Subjective purposiveness is a transcendental principle that allows us to conceive nature as being commensurate with our cognitive powers and to think that empirical laws can be connected into a system of nature. However, Kant upholds that we have no such *a priori* basis for assuming that nature has objective purposes in its natural products. The concept of purpose is not analytically related to the concept of nature. Yet we have reasons to introduce teleological judgments into our inquiries. The mechanism of nature is not sufficient for us to understand certain natural phenomena. Kant’s main case for this is organisms. The relation between anatomical parts of a bird allows it to fly and Kant insists that the anatomical constitution of such an animal would have to be thought as contingent if it is to be thought as based solely on the mechanism of

nature. “Nature, considered as a mechanism, could have structured itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting on” this configuration (*CJ*, Ak. 360). In such cases we seek the object’s cause in a purpose therefore going “beyond the concept of nature” (*CJ*, Ak. 360).

In teleological judgments we judge the objects “by analogy with the causality in terms of purposes” (*CJ*, Ak. 360). Kant however, expounds that the causality of purposes (*nexus finalis*) does not produce knowledge. Teleological judgments are not determinative but reflective judgments that are based on the faculty/power of judgment. However, they allow us to “bring nature’s appearances under rules in those cases where the causal laws of nature’s mere mechanism are not sufficient to allow us to do so” (*CJ*, Ak. 360). In teleological judgments, we judge with an analogy to our own power of producing objects according to concepts. Art (*tekhne*) is our mode of producing according to concepts. When we think that a natural object is possible only by being based on a prior concept of it (and that its form cannot be accidental), we judge nature as having a technic, that is, as having a capacity to produce things according to concepts. “If . . . we did not attribute to it such a way of operating; we would have to present its causality as blind mechanism” (*CJ*, Ak. 360). However, we cannot attribute the intentionality of design to nature which would then make it a constitutive principle of nature. In Kant’s words: “we only borrow this causality from ourselves” (*CJ*, Ak. 361).

Kant characterizes teleological judgment as real (material, as opposed to formal) and intrinsic (as opposed to relative or extrinsic) objective purposiveness. In distinguishing formal and material objective purposiveness his aim is to characterize teleology as having a content “not easily explained in reference merely to our own internal constitution and conceptual projections”³¹.

Material objective purposiveness can either be intrinsic or relative. Teleology is concerned with natural objects, which cannot be known *a priori*, in a cause-effect relation. This cause-effect relation needs to be such that we cannot account for it only

³¹ Wicks, *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant on Judgment*, p. 189.

on the basis of mechanism³². We also need to consider the concept of the effect as an “underlying condition under which the cause itself “can produce that effect” (*CJ*, Ak. 367). In other words, the effect must be thought as being produced according to an idea. In this relation of cause and effect, the effect can either be the purpose or it can be a means for another purpose. The former kind of purposiveness is intrinsic purposiveness and the latter is “usefulness (for human beings) or benefit (for any other creature)” (*CJ*, Ak. 367).

We can envision purposive relations within the biosphere or an ecosystem. However, thinking that an animal exists for the purpose of being eaten by another is not teleological thinking proper. *Only if* the existence of the predator is an intrinsic purpose can we speak of such teleology. This line of reasoning guards us against anthropocentrism. Human beings, due to their freedom, can “consider all natural things beneficial” (*CJ*, Ak. 368). However, the only way to claim that all natural things exist for the sake of human beings would be only possible under the condition that human being is a purpose of nature. “This . . . we can never tell by merely examining nature” (*CJ*, Ak. 368).

Kant further defines what teleology entails through refining the relation of cause and effect in an object considered as a natural purpose. A teleological judgment claims that “a thing is possible only as a purpose” and cannot have brought about accidentally through mechanism (*CJ*, Ak. 369-70). Yet this definition also fits the effect of human actions. To consider natural purposes Kant thinks that we need to think “that a thing exists as a natural purpose if it is both cause and effect of itself” (*CJ*, Ak. 370). He claims that a tree can be considered both as a cause and effect of itself in three senses. A particular tree, in causing the existence of another tree, is thought as cause and effect of itself with regard to its species. Kant has “growth” in mind, in the second sense of cause-effect relation. A tree, in this process, combines all material it processes according to its own form. In the third sense, he considers a tree as having such an

³² Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, p. 332.

organic unity that there is a “mutual dependence between the preservation of one part and that of the others” (*CJ*, Ak. 371).

The proper objects of teleological judgments are organisms. In organisms the possibility of parts depends on the idea of the whole (*CJ*, Ak. 373). To distinguish this kind of part-whole relation in nature from human products, Kant uses the example of a watch. Although all parts of a watch depend on the idea of the whole, parts do not produce other parts; the final cause is outside the watch in human beings; and the watch is not self-subsisting in the sense that it does not repair itself. Kant’s comparison builds on the distinction of living things and inanimate matter. Through this example Kant establishes the limit of the causality of mechanism and its insufficiency for explaining organisms. While machines have a motive force, organisms have a formative force that enables them to produce (and reproduce), sustain and heal themselves.

The peculiarity of self-organization of nature offers two analogies. However, neither of them is accurate according to Kant. The first is the analogy of art. Kant thinks that “we say far too little if we call this an analogue of art, for in that case we think of an artist (a rational being) apart from nature. Rather, nature organizes itself” (*CJ*, Ak. 374). If we think organisms with an analogy of life however, there are only two explanations which are *hylozoism* (the conception of a living matter) and the soul (as an alien principle to nature). Kant asserts that neither options make nature more understandable and concludes that the “organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality known to us” (*CJ*, Ak. 375).

The material, intrinsic and objective purposiveness of organisms is not a constitutive principle of understanding or of reason. Kant allows it only as a regulative principle for reflective judgment (*CJ*, Ak. 375). He characterizes it as “a remote analogy with our own causality in terms of purposes” that we use “to guide our investigation of organized objects and to meditate regarding their supreme basis” (*CJ*, Ak. 375). This shows that natural purposiveness has two functions. It is meant to be a regulative principle for mainly biological sciences. The second function is that of reflecting on the supersensible ground of nature. Kant with these considerations limits the use of

regulative principle of purposiveness to organisms. Its objects are inexplicable by simply referring to the mechanism of nature.

The objective reality of the concept is given through beings which are organisms. Therefore, the principle must be based on experience. However, Kant thinks that the principle still claims universality and necessity and “must be based on some *a priori* principle” (*CJ*, Ak. 376). He redefines organisms as the “product of nature . . . in which everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means” (*CJ*, Ak. 376). Since in organisms, every organ is thought to have a function regarding the whole, this idea is necessary (*CJ*, Ak. 376). Nevertheless, in the investigation of natural phenomena, the principle of causality cannot be given up. We would then be left “without any experience whatsoever” (*CJ*, Ak. 376).

Kant previously propounded that external objective purposiveness cannot be justified and we cannot regard natural things which are beneficial for other organisms as purposes. To claim that something is a purpose of nature we would have to know the final purpose of nature (*CJ*, Ak. 378). This, in turn, requires us to refer to the supersensible because “the purpose of the existence of nature itself must be sought beyond nature” (*CJ*, Ak. 378). Such a line of reasoning however, goes beyond the limits of our knowledge. Therefore, we cannot have “a categorical purpose” (*CJ*, Ak. 379) because we do not know why anything should have to exist. Nonetheless, since the possibility of a purposive product is based on an idea and since reason demands the unconditioned, the idea is expanded to encompass all nature (*CJ*, Ak. 377).

This leads to the idea of nature as a system of purposes. In this idea, the mechanism of nature is subordinated to the final causality. As an idea, it has only a regulative function of a subjective principle (maxim). The expression of its maxim is as follows: “Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing is gratuitous” (*CJ*, Ak. 379). Although we cannot know any natural thing (including human beings) to be a final purpose of nature, the maxim allows us to consider the interrelation of nature in terms of the concept of nature. This serves as a guiding principle for extending natural science “without detracting from the principle of mechanism in the causality of nature” (*CJ*, Ak. 379). Under the idea of the systematic unity of purposiveness, Kant

thinks that we are “entitled” to “judge products as belonging to a system of purposes even if . . . they do not require us” (*CJ*, Ak. 380-1). The systematicity of nature refers us to its supersensible basis as the ground that makes such systematicity possible thereby allowing us to consider that teleological judgments are not valid for only “certain species of natural beings, but just as much for the whole of nature as a system” (*CJ*, Ak. 381). Paul Guyer thinks that one of Kant’s reason for extending the concept is the idea of a purposive designer:

His assumption must be that insofar as we conceive of a purposive designer for anything in nature at all, we must conceive of it as unitary, so we must conceive of it as a purposive designer for all of nature: for its non-organic as well as its organic parts³³.

Although Kant later pursues the implications of the supersensible basis, he thinks that introducing teleology to natural science is not equivalent to introducing the idea of God. The idea of God makes the purposiveness in nature understandable yet the same principle is used to prove God which results in a vicious cycle. Moreover, it would be a foreign principle to natural science. Nevertheless, Kant depicts the conception of purpose of nature as an indigenous or inherent principle of natural science. “Even before we inquire into the cause of nature itself, we find that nature contains” purposive products (*CJ*, Ak. 382).

Accordingly, Kant tries to limit the use of teleological judgment. On the one hand, it is used in theology and metaphysics. On the other hand, it is an integral part of natural science. Nonetheless, it is only a regulative principle to be used when natural objects are not explainable through mechanism. In other words, natural purposes should have to be conceived as cognizable only with reference to purposes, only within “special class of its objects” (*CJ*, Ak. 382). Kant refers to the principle of teleology as a method to be used in the course of investigation of nature (*CJ*, Ak. 383). The expression “natural purpose” he claims, helps to keep the idea of god from interfering with physical-mechanical explanations. He frequently stresses the regulative use of

³³ Guyer, “Kant’s Teleological Conception of Philosophy and its Development”, p. 89.

purposiveness to prevent a confusion of the principle with an ontological claim, that nature is in itself purposive. However, it is likewise true of the mechanism of nature: “necessity in the [causal] connection concerns nothing but the connection of our concepts, and does not concern the character of things” (*CJ*, Ak. 384).

4.3 The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment

The introduction of teleology presents an antinomy. However, it is not an antinomy regarding determinative judgments. In determinative judgments the law, which the given is subsumed under, is given by the understanding. When the universal is not given, judgment subsumes the given according to its own principles. The antinomy is concerned with reflective judgments, which are principles of the power of judgment rather than laws of understanding. In the antinomy of teleological judgment there are two conflicting maxims of the power of judgment. “If two conflicting maxims both have their basis in the nature of our cognitive powers, then this dialectic may be called a natural one” (*CJ*, Ak. 386).

Kant tells us that judgment does not need maxims for universal laws in determinative judgments. Particular, empirical laws on the other hand require maxims as their universal principle is not given. The two conflicting maxims of judgment are the mechanism and purposiveness of nature. The first of these maxims is given *a priori* by understanding (*CJ*, Ak. 386). For teleology on the other hand, an experience of organisms is required.

The first maxim is the thesis of the antinomy. The thesis claims that “all production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws” (*CJ*, Ak. 387). The antithesis upholds that “some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws. (Judging them requires a quite different causal law- viz., that of final causes” (*CJ*, Ak. 387).

Kant, first of all, stresses that they are not determinative judgments that evaluate the possibility of things. They are not claims about whether natural products are *possible* through mechanism or not. They are concerned with the possibility of our *judgments*:

whether we can *judge* things only with regard to the principle of mechanism or do we need the principle of teleology as well. Were they determinative, the antinomy would be an antinomy of reason. In its determinative version the thesis would claim “All production of material things is possible in terms of merely mechanical laws” and the antithesis would assert that “Some production of material things is not possible in terms of merely mechanical laws” (*CJ*, Ak. 387).

Kant insists that if they are taken only as reflective judgments, they do not cancel each other. The first maxim, then, is only taken to say that we “ought always to reflect” on natural events with the principle of mechanism of nature (*CJ*, Ak. 387). Without this principle “we can have no cognition of nature at all” (*CJ*, Ak. 387). The second maxim, does not assert that natural things are not possible without final causes. If human reason follows solely the principle of mechanism it “will never be able to discover the slightest basis for what is specific in a natural purpose” (*CJ*, Ak. 388). Nature, in itself, can proceed according to a different principle that serves as the common ground of both. It is only human reason, which cannot reconcile the two into a single principle.

Kant asserts that, we can have no insight into the possibility of nature because the principle of this possibility “lies in the supersensible” (*CJ*, Ak. 388). For this same reason, we cannot claim that organisms are not possible through the mechanism of nature without ever requiring final causes. Human reason, in order to account for the necessity of empirical laws, reflects on them based on the maxim of the antithesis without claiming its objective reality. Kant thinks that “the semblance of an antinomy” arises only if we take reflective maxims as determinative judgments (*CJ*, Ak. 389). If the assertions were taken as determinative judgments, their opposition would be irreconcilable as “they are incompatible and annul each other” (*CJ*, Ak. 391). Also the antinomy arising out of their contradiction would then have to be considered as an antinomy of reason (*CJ*, Ak. 387).

4.4 Kant’s Views on Teleology

In order to distinguish his position on teleology, Kant first of all analyzes dogmatic theories of teleology. He thinks that the technic of nature can either be considered as

intentional or unintentional. There are four possible theories arising from dogmatic (assertive without prior criticism of cognitive powers) interpretations of purposiveness. Idealistic interpretation considers purposiveness as nature's unintentional technic. This means that nature does not have purposes but we mistakenly attribute purposes to nature: purposes are ideal and not real. Idealistic interpretation has two forms which are *casualistic*³⁴ and *fatalistic*. For Kant, Epicurus and Democritus represent the *casualistic* interpretation which claims that the natural forms arise out of the motion of lifeless matter. Kant attributes the *fatalistic* interpretation to Spinoza. Fatalistic interpretation is the claim that the seemingly purposive connections stem from a supersensible basis although they are not the intentions of an understanding but are only necessary connections in the nature of original being. The realistic interpretation, which claims that the technic of nature is intentional and real, has two forms. The first of these is the physical interpretation which attributes purposes to living matter (*hylozoism*). The second is the hyperphysical interpretation which attributes the intentions to an "intelligent being" which is the cause of the universe (*CJ*, Ak. 392). This is the view of theism.

Kant thinks that all four possible interpretations are unsuitable for his critical system. He thinks that *casualistic* interpretation of teleology explains nothing and relies on "blind chance" of mechanism. Although Kant admits that Spinoza's system provides the unity behind the forms by envisioning them as inhering in a substance, he thinks that Spinoza disregards contingency. Kant holds that the unity of purpose "cannot be thought unless the natural forms are also contingent" (*CJ*, Ak. 393). The reason for this is that natural forms are given by empirical experience and are not known *a priori*. Therefore, there always has to be a seemingly contingent element for us in order to inquire into purposes. Without that contingent element we would be judging natural objects as necessary and hence based on a mechanism of nature. However, Spinoza's system does not even allow that since the relation between natural things and substance

³⁴ The German original "Kasualität" is translated as "casualistic" by Werner S. Pluhar. Paul Guyer, on the other hand, translates it as "accidentality" (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge UP, 2000).

is not a causal relation but implies merely subsistence of accidents in necessary being (*CJ*, Ak. 393). This exclusion of causal relation also eliminates intentions thereby depriving “the original basis of natural things of all understanding” (*CJ*, Ak. 393). As teleology entails the idea that it is concepts which enable the production of forms and since concepts refer to an understanding, for Kant the concept of purpose specifically refers to “a cause that has understanding” (*CJ*, Ak. 393).

Kant disregards *hylozoism* since he thinks that the concept of living matter is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, he thinks this alternative presents only a vicious cycle. We acquire the concept of life from experience of organisms. To derive the purposiveness of organisms from the life of matter therefore, ends up referring to organisms in order to explain the latter. In other words, the ground of explanation requires what it needs to explain. Among these alternatives Kant obviously favors theism. Theism, according to Kant, has the advantage of “rescuing” purposiveness from idealism and accounting for intentional causality. However, he thinks that theism too, falls short of an explanation since we can have no determinate judgement proving that purposive arrangements of nature could not have arisen only through mechanism.

What “the character and limits of cognitive powers” forces us is to judge natural purposes “in terms of a supreme understanding as cause of the world” (*CJ*, Ak. 395). Although this seems as equivalent to theism, Kant defends that it does not entail a determinative and dogmatic assertion but only a reflective principle which we are “absolutely incapable of justifying” objectively (*CJ*, Ak. 395).

Although we can claim the objective reality of the mechanism of nature and causality through purposes in human productions (*CJ*, Ak. 397) we cannot assert the objective reality of natural purposes. Causality of final causes and an intelligent being outside nature, cannot be given through experience and we cannot claim their objective reality. Nor they are “required to make experience possible” (*CJ*, Ak. 397). Even if we could, Kant tells that the concept of a natural product loses its meaning since natural objects are then displayed not as products of nature but as products of a divine being.

Accordingly, Kant asserts that the maxim of teleological judgment does not establish anything about the object but only is concerned with the cognitive power and limitations of the judging subject. He limits its transcendent extension to the whole nature on the grounds that “the whole of nature is not given us as organized” (*CJ*, Ak. 398). Still as a regulative principle it is useful for judging organisms. What all this amounts to is that when we try to understand organisms, we cannot help but think through the concept of purpose. The representation of purpose necessarily involves the concept of contingency. The contingency of forms and empirical laws require the application of teleological maxim. Kant thinks that through teleological judgments, we represent as “the world as a whole” as contingent (*CJ*, Ak. 398). Accounting for this contingency leads to the idea that “this whole depends on and has its origin in a being that exists apart from the world and . . . is moreover intelligent” (398). In this context teleology becomes a theological principle.

However, Kant tries to keep his critical system apart from theology. Teleology does not prove the existence of an intelligent world cause. For Kant what it proves however, is that due to the limitation of our cognitive powers “we are absolutely unable to form a concept of [how] such a world is possible except by thinking of it as brought about by a supreme cause that acts intentionally” (*CJ*, Ak. 399). What Kant claims then, is that our cognitive powers are such that we are unable to grasp organisms unless we connect their concept with a purpose and conceive an intelligent cause of the world.

4.5 The Peculiarity of Human Cognition

Kant insists that if teleology is critically limited, it is “perfectly satisfactory for all speculative and practical uses of our reason from every *human* point of view” (*CJ*, Ak. 400). This way of thinking is attached “inescapably to the human race” (*CJ*, Ak. 401). We cannot however, prove it to be necessary for all beings. It merely shows the limitation of human cognitive powers. Kant propounds that not even “another Newton” could explain how even a single blade of grass is possible without referring to any intention (*CJ*, Ak. 400). After saying this he concedes that still it is impossible for us to judge that “there simply could not be in nature a hidden basis adequate to make

organized beings possible without an underlying intention (but through the mere mechanism of nature)” (*CJ*, Ak. 400).

Kant explains his point by reference to regulative ideas. Although understanding can judge only with regard to what is given, reason has a tendency to aim at completeness. In this endeavor, it applies its ideas transcendentally while they are only meant for regulative use. Understanding “restricts the validity of those ideas of reason to just the subject, yet in a universal way, i.e. for all subjects of our species” (*CJ*, Ak. 401). So when we apply a regulative principle we do not make a knowledge claim but only judge “in accordance with the subjective conditions for exercising [our] cognitive powers, conditions that attach necessarily to our (i.e. human) nature” (*CJ*, Ak. 403). Judgments that arise from this viewpoint are not constitutive and determinative. Kant’s basic point is that although the idea of an intelligent world cause can be employed regulatively, it does not give us any determinate knowledge. We cannot assert either its possibility or actuality. Understanding this point requires the consideration of modal concepts.

In *CPR*, Kant analyzes modal concepts and concludes that modal categories (possibility, actuality and necessity) add no content to a concept but they “only express the relation of the concept to the faculty of knowledge” (*CPR*, A219/B266). They require the distinction of sensibility and understanding, presuppose possible experience and refer to the specific ways in which representations are related to conditions of experience. Possibility implies that the concept of an object “agrees with the formal conditions of experience” therefore involves “the conditions of intuition” (A218/B265). Actuality consists in either having a perception of an object or having a connection with the perception of another object³⁵. Therefore, possibility implies possibility of being given in intuition while actuality additionally requires something that is given. The modal category of necessity also implies existence of an object and as existence is not derivable from a concept but requires perception, “the necessity of

³⁵ Kant has magnetism in mind when he claims that actuality “does not . . . demand immediate *perception*” (A225/B272). Therefore, he allows “a connection of the object with some actual perception” (A225/B272).

existence can never be known from concepts, but always only from connection with that which is perceived” (A227/B279). With these “Postulates of Empirical Thought” in mind Kant asserts that “the distinction between possible and actual things holds merely subjectively, for human understanding” (*CJ*, Ak. 402). Since conditions of givenness and thought are separate from the human standpoint, we necessarily distinguish actuality and possibility. Accordingly, the idea of an intelligent cause (or God) cannot even imply its possibility as it cannot be given to intuition. It is “for human understanding an unattainable problematic concept” (*CJ*, Ak. 402). However, there is an interesting conclusion of this depiction of the human standpoint.

When we conceive an intuitive understanding for which there is no distinction between actuality and possibility; “such a being could have no presentation whatever of the possibility that some objects might not exist after all” for its representations would be actual (*CJ*, Ak. 403). Since it is not bound by separate conditions of givenness, whatever it represents is given to its intellectual intuition through this act. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that, the intelligent cause that Kant envisions cannot know nature either as mechanical or as purposive. Mechanism of nature requires the actuality of external objects that causally (therefore, necessarily) determine each other. An intuitive understanding can have no representation of actuality as it requires givenness of an object through sensibility. Moreover, it cannot even intuit externality since space is characterized as a pure form of human sensibility in Kant’s philosophy. As it turns out, for an intuitive understanding modal concepts can have no meaning as they require sensibility. In other words, since nature involves modal concepts and forms of sensibility, both mechanical and purposive conceptions of nature are possible only from a human standpoint.

Kant concludes that the distinction between mechanism and technic of nature rests on our cognitive apparatus. “Unless we had the kind of understanding that has to proceed from the universal to the particular, we would find no distinction between” them (*CJ*, Ak. 404). Human understanding “has to proceed from the universal to the particular” (*CJ*, Ak. 404). While the universal is given by the understanding, the particular is given

through sensibility. Therefore, judgment through its regulative principles tries to account for the particular in order to subsume it under a universal.

The idea of purposiveness is different from ideas of pure reason because it is the extension of a principle of judgment. “In this respect this idea is distinguished from all others” (*CJ*, Ak. 405). In general, the object of ideas cannot be given in experience. Although the purpose is only an idea an object is given as a natural purpose. Its objects are given in experience (organisms) yet “we cannot even determinately judge” (*CJ*, Ak. 405). Kant invokes the idea of another understanding that is different than the human understanding to overcome the difficulties arising from the antinomy of teleological judgment.

Since we cannot derive the particular from the universal, we have to subsume it under a universal to arrive at cognition. Kant asserts that to conceive the possibility of harmony between our cognitive powers we have to conceive an understanding which can see the “harmony between the [particular] natural laws and our judgment as necessary” (*CJ*, Ak. 407).

The human understanding in the case of empirical laws and natural products has to “wait until the subsumption of the empirical intuition under the concept provides . . . determination” (*CJ*, Ak. 407). In other words, we conceive the parts first and grasp the whole only after subsumption under a concept. The imagined problematic intuitive understanding, however, can theoretically conceive the whole without starting from the part. Therefore, there would be no contingency for such an understanding.

Kant claims that we cannot represent the whole “by having the whole contain the basis that makes the connection of parts possible” (*CJ*, Ak. 407). When we try to represent that the parts depend on the whole, we think that both the whole and the parts are made possible by a representation. This representation is the concept of purpose. Therefore, Kant claims that the conception of final causes are the result of our limited capacity for representing wholes. In mechanical representation of a whole, the whole is thought as being a “product of its parts” (*CJ*, Ak. 408). Our representation of a purpose does not rule out the possibility that organisms are possible through mechanism. We cannot

claim the inconceivability of this simply with reference to our understanding. Kant's conception of causality through purposes is based on an intuitive understanding. Although we can only represent nature as appearance, we can still think nature "as a thing in itself . . . and . . . this thing in itself as based on a corresponding intellectual intuition" (*CJ*, Ak. 409). In this picture, we neither know the supersensible basis of nature, nor its originator.

Kant accepts that starting an explanation from an intelligent cause does not explain anything for we have no knowledge regarding its acts and ideas (*CJ*, Ak. 410). Starting from empirical products of nature and explaining their purposiveness with "appeal to cause that acts according to purposes" is again of no use as it leads to transcendent claims "where our cognition of nature cannot follow us and where reason is seduced to poetic raving" (*CJ*, Ak. 410). Yet investigation into organisms requires the principle of purposiveness as a heuristic principle. The mechanism and teleology of nature cannot be reconciled if they are taken as constitutive principles of nature (*CJ*, Ak. 411). They must "be linked in a single higher principle and flow from it together, since otherwise we could not consistently use both in considering nature" (*CJ*, Ak. 412). Since both maxims refer to nature and nature must have a supersensible basis, they can only be reconciled in the supersensible. However, we do not have a determinate concept of the supersensible.

All then left for us to do is to explain natural objects through mechanism and apply teleology where mechanism does not provide sufficient explanation. Although what Kant points to is a transcendent principle as the ground of their reconciliation, he asserts that "we still cannot reconcile the two principles in an explanation of the same natural product" (*CJ*, Ak. 413). And since without the principle of mechanism "we could not judge . . . a product to be a product of nature at all" (*CJ*, Ak. 413) he offers to subordinate the principle of mechanism under the principle of purposiveness. In this sense, the purposive products are still possible through mechanism although the mechanism is only to be considered as the means of a *telos* that is unknown for us. The conclusion he arrives is that the common basis of mechanism and teleology may be thought of as the supersensible substrate of nature although we have no knowledge of

it. Even though “our (human) reason cannot fuse these two ways of conceiving how such objects are possible”, we can judge that they are “based . . . on a supreme understanding” (*CJ*, Ak. 414).

4.6 The Solution of the Antinomy: Review of the Debates

The antinomy of teleological judgment is highly problematic and controversial. There are discussions about what exactly the antinomy is, and what exactly the solution is. Kant presents the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomy in *CJ*, Ak. 387. However, he gives both regulative and determinative versions of each. If the antinomy were a conflict between the determinative form of the assertions, the resulting antinomy would be an antinomy of pure reason and not of judgment. The contradiction should be between the regulative forms if the antinomy is to be an antinomy of reflective judgment. However, the question then becomes “are the maxims of judgment contradictory?” Robert Butts claims that “as regulative principles, they cannot logically conflict”³⁶. If the antinomy is located in the conflicting maxims they must be actually conflicting and the conflict must be resolved. If they are not contradictory, then there is no antinomy of teleological judgment. Even after the antinomy is defined as the conflict of maxims, therefore being properly an antinomy of reflective judgment, it is not altogether clear what the solution of the antinomy is. The first type of solution considers that the antinomy is resolved by appeal to the two maxims’ status as regulative principles. The second type of solution considers the appeal to intuitive understanding as the proper solution of the antinomy.

The solution of regulative principles is put forward mainly by Robert Butts in his *Kant and the Double Government Methodology*. He thinks that determinative versions of the assertions would conflict and Kant averts contradiction by relegating the principles of mechanism and teleology to regulative principles. If this is true and if both maxims are merely regulative principles, there would be no real antinomy. Still Butts claims that:

³⁶ Butts, *Kant and the Double Government Methodology*, p. 272.

Kant's discussion of the dialectical clash between teleology and mechanism in *Critique of Judgement* pits one regulative principle against another. That, for Kant, the teleology/mechanism issue is one concerning the preferred methodological employment³⁷.

Since different methodologies can be pursued accordingly, Butts thinks this solves the problem. Moreover, Butts claims that the principle of mechanism was a regulative principle even in the context of *CPR*³⁸ and his claim has been considered as controversial. Aside from the dispute about relegating the principle of mechanism to a regulative principle there still remains the question of whether the regulative status of mechanism would solve the antinomy or not.

Werner S. Pluhar disagrees with Butts in the context of the status of the principle of mechanism. Pluhar asserts that “the principle of necessary efficient (mechanical) causality [is] legislated to nature by our understanding and hence is constitutive and determinative, not regulative”³⁹. He thinks that the regulative principle of mechanism is only invoked with regard to cases where it is concerned with sufficiency or insufficiency of its explanatory power⁴⁰. He also claims that a contradiction between “a necessary mechanism and a contingent teleological principle . . . cannot be resolved by turning the two into maxims”⁴¹. The problem lies in that we judge something as both necessary and as contingent since teleology also requires mechanism. Judging so will involve a contradiction in terms. So Pluhar takes Kant to be saying that “it must be at least possible that the “necessity” is not in fact a necessity or that the “contingency” is not in fact a contingency”⁴². Pluhar locates the solution in the appeal to an intuitive understanding for which the contingency is not objective.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

³⁹ Pluhar, “Translator’s Introduction” in Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. xc.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xc.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. xc.

⁴² *Ibid.*, xci, footnote 94.

Pluhar is correct in that relegating the principle of mechanism to a regulative principle actually does not resolve the antinomy because it is actually concerned with our apprehension of necessity and contingency. However, I agree with Butts in that the principle of mechanism was a regulative principle all along, although this does not resolve the antinomy.

The second analogy of experience explained in the first section of this study and Kant's solution to the third antinomy of pure reason can be shown as proofs of this view. The second analogy of experience justifies the principle of causality and justifies its *a priori* application. However, it leaves the concept of cause undetermined. The principle of causality is constitutive for experience; the principle of mechanism is not since second analogy does not define types of causes. Actually, the third antinomy of pure reason was able to be solved due to this indeterminateness. Angelica Nuzzo claims that "For Kant . . . causality is not coextensive with mechanism"⁴³. There are at least three kinds of causality: causality of mechanism (of efficient causes), causality through freedom and causality of final causes⁴⁴.

Kant's main difference is his conception of mechanism. Nuzzo, considers Laplace as an example of pre-Kantian conception of mechanism⁴⁵. According to Laplace: "it is always . . . possible to find the term that constitutes the first principle or cause" and "it is always . . . necessary to start from that first principle or cause in order to explain all the intermediary terms of the causal chain"⁴⁶. However, in the Kantian conception of mechanism "we must always start from an actual, empirically given perception" and search for its cause or condition⁴⁷. The possibility of arriving at a first cause in the realm of appearances is not possible. This conception of causality allows room for freedom and teleology. Causes are not given but it is the task of human understanding to find. Kant in *CPR*, limits mechanical causality to appearances.

⁴³ Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, pp. 343-4.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

The defense for the constitutive status of the principle of mechanism is based on a distinction of several senses of mechanism. Henry Allison asserts that mechanism in Kant has at least two meanings prior to the *Critique of Judgment* and still yet acquires another meaning in its context⁴⁸. In its first meaning “it refers to causality by means of interaction between moving particles in space”⁴⁹. The second meaning is the mechanism of nature described in *Critique of Practical Reason* which describes “all necessity of events in time according to natural law”⁵⁰. In its first sense Allison asserts that it is contrasted with psychological explanations. In the second sense, it is “contrasted with transcendental freedom”⁵¹. In the context of *CJ*, Allison believes that it refers to the “explanation of wholes solely in terms of the causal interaction of their component parts”⁵². Mechanism in the last sense refers to the limitation of our cognitive powers in explaining organisms and therefore displays an “extended sense . . . characterized purely in negative terms” as what “operates non-purposively”⁵³. Therefore, Allison insists that the regulative principle of mechanism and the constitutive mechanism of nature signify different meanings.

I think it is not necessary to distinguish several senses of mechanism in order to save the constitutive role of the principle of causality. Even if the principle of mechanism is thought of as regulative, this does no harm to the Second Analogy since it does not specify the type of cause. Moreover, as it was claimed in the first chapter, the Second Analogy states that we have to construct relations in order to have experience at all. It does not constitute “objects” but only “relations of objects”. We cannot claim to know things unless we have determined a cause for them. Causality in this sense, is constitutive for knowledge yet it is not constitutive of objects. Objects are given to us even if we cannot determine a cause for them. When Kant says causality is constitutive

⁴⁸ Allison, “Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment”, pp. 220-1.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

for experience it should also be held in mind that he regards experience as a kind of empirical knowledge. Causality therefore is constitutive for knowledge (and experience; even in contemporary sense of the term).

Actually Kant's conception of mechanism in this way also allows for and explains the past mistakes of human beings. It sure took a while for human beings to determine the cause of thunder as electricity. The ancients must have specified a cause for thunder since causality is constitutive for our experience. They used purposive relations by referring the natural phenomena to gods in order to establish a coherent experience. If Kant actually claims that the constitution of human reason is universal and unchangeable (and he does) he should have constructed his theory accordingly and obviously he did. However, Pluhar's point is right with relation to the solution of the teleological antinomy. Taking mechanism as a regulative principle does not resolve the antinomy because we still cannot solve the problem of contingency/necessity of empirical laws on that account.

The other candidate for the solution of the antinomy is the appeal to an intuitive understanding. Pluhar asserts that Kant unites the supersensible substrate of appearances and reason that deals "with the 'world' of appearance as it ought to be and also tell us about the supersensible conditions of making it so"⁵⁴. In other words, *Critique of Judgment* is supposed to unite the references to the supersensible of different cognitive powers. Pluhar thinks that the thought that conflicting judgments are only maxims has led many commentators to suppose that Kant's solution to the antinomy consists in showing that the conflicting judgments are regulative principles⁵⁵. Pluhar disagrees that is the solution since Kant tells that they are regulative principles in the section entitled "preliminary to the solution". Still he agrees with Butts' claim that regulative principles cannot logically conflict. Pluhar thinks that in the strict sense of contradiction Butts is right and that if they did involve a contradiction "it could not be solved"⁵⁶. However, he thinks that the antinomy and its

⁵⁴ Pluhar, "Translator's Introduction" in Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. lxxxviii.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. lxxxix.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. lxxxix, footnote 90.

solution involve “the *threat* of a contradiction” between two ways of judging “in the *very same* context”⁵⁷. We cannot judge a thing to be necessary and contingent at the same time. The solution therefore appeals to the supersensible. Pluhar sees a common ground for Kant’s solution to “all” antinomies: “by invoking the supersensible”⁵⁸.

Kant’s reference to the supersensible comes right after he emphasizes the uniqueness of the human standpoint and that is the point Pluhar stresses: “Our human understanding has the peculiarity of determining the universal while leaving the particular contingent”⁵⁹. This brings in the discussion of an intuitive understanding in which conditions of givenness and thought are not separate. Such an understanding, for the determination of particulars, would not require “a harmony between itself and some other, separate cognitive power (an imagination dealing with a passive intuition)”⁶⁰. For such an understanding “nature in itself would simply *be* the intellectual (supersensible) intuition of this intuitive understanding” and it would not cognize it as produced⁶¹.

For Pluhar, the solution to the antinomy lies in the contrast between human reason and an intellectual understanding. This contrast allows us to treat the antinomy as a dialectical illusion “for us” but we can also think that it is not “objectively” a contradiction since we can conceive that for an intuitive understanding, what we judge to be as contingent might also be necessary. We think that the contingency “as in fact being a necessity legislated by an intuitive understanding”⁶². In Pluhar’s formulation “we have recourse to the idea of a supersensible intuition as necessitating the particular”⁶³.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. lxxxix, footnote 90.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xci.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xci.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xcii.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. xcii.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. xciii.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. xciv.

There are also problems with this solution. Angelica Nuzzo also seems to support the solution by appeal to an intuitive understanding yet she sees its dangers. Nuzzo thinks that what is

at stake is the distinction between the notion of an understanding that thinks intuitively, that is, differently than our human understanding, and the notion of an architectonic understanding as the ontological ground of nature's organized forms. The former is a limit idea that confirms and reinforces the perspective of transcendental philosophy; the latter is the dogmatic notion that brings philosophy back to metaphysics⁶⁴.

She believes that Kant's transcendental philosophy "reframes these issues in a thoroughly new way because it makes them dependent on the peculiarity of the human cognitive faculty"⁶⁵. The reason for this is that, Kant's remark which claims an intuitive understanding would not conceive its objects as contingent and therefore would not conceive natural purposes as the product of an other intelligence. The concept of natural purposes therefore belongs specifically to human reason. Nuzzo believes that the possibility of thinking an intuitive understanding rests in the heterogeneity of our cognitive powers. Understanding is capable of applying the forms of thought in abstraction from the confines of sensibility therefore producing (not knowledge) but ideas. According to her, "so formulated, the possibility of thinking of an intuitive understanding is the highest act of transcendental philosophy and the seal of its closure"⁶⁶. Moreover, she contends that the intuitive understanding "is not a transcendent idea but a confirmation of the limiting condition of the discursive character of human thinking"⁶⁷. In another words, Nuzzo claims that the antinomy of teleological judgment properly restricts the conception of an intuitive understanding within the confines of human reason. In this sense, Kant's characterization of teleology

⁶⁴ Nuzzo, "Kritik der Urteilskraft §§76 77: Reflective Judgment and the Limits of Transcendental Philosophy", p. 159.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

is in line with the Copernican turn in that the principle lies not in nature but is brought about by the human judgment. Yet this characterization is not enough to solve the antinomy and Kant's solution fails for four main reason.

Firstly, he appeals to an intuitive understanding because it is "an understanding for which no antinomy and no dialectic arise"⁶⁸. How could the reference to an intuitive understanding solve the antinomy *for us*, who are clearly faced with an antinomy? We obviously do not have an understanding which is capable of resolving the antinomy. We have no insight into its solution except we can imagine an understanding having no problems in representing everything as necessary. Still Kant seems to claim that in the teleological antinomy, the assertions of both the thesis and the antithesis are true. The problem is whether they might be thought as true for an intuitive understanding or *for us*. The projected intuitive understanding, although it is a conception of the human standpoint as Nuzzo's analysis shows, it still does not resolve the antinomy *for us*.

Secondly, the conception of an intuitive understanding has highly problematic consequences. An intuitive understanding is thought as one that is free of the conditions of sensibility. However, this would have awkward consequences regarding what this understanding can conceive. As we have previously seen, the modal concepts would have no meaning for an intuitive understanding. It should not be able to represent any necessity or contingency whatsoever for possibility and actuality are valid concepts only from the human standpoint. Therefore, it cannot conceive either the mechanism or purposiveness of nature. We do not have a firm basis for supposing that it could represent another ground which makes both conceptions of nature possible. As Nuzzo is aware, in the intuitive understanding "the universal would not be a concept but an intuition"⁶⁹. We also saw that Pluhar makes a similar observation. We have no basis for assuming that an understanding without intuitions of space and time and therefore, without synthesis of apprehension can apprehend its objects as

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

distinct from itself. Robert Wicks in his guide to the *Critique of Judgment* makes a brilliant point with regard to this idea and is able to derive its consequences.

. . . One can ask what the relationship between God's thoughts and God's being happens to be, for if the natural purposes that God actualizes are not distinct from God, this would move us in the direction of hylozoism or pantheism, since the natural purposes in nature would be the manifestations of God's very own thoughts (i.e., God's substance) and the sharp distinction between nature and God would start to dissolve. So, despite his efforts to develop the theistic alternative, Kant's reasoning suggests that a more consistent analysis would locate the teleological ground of natural purposes within nature itself, conceived somehow as the embodiment and presence of a divine intelligence⁷⁰.

Thirdly, as a concept of the human mind, an intuitive understanding is problematic. We cannot know even if it is possible or actual as modal concepts involve conditions of sensibility. It is hard to see how it can be thought of as necessitating the contingent when it is only a problematic regulative idea. A problematic concept of it is not enough for us to think that. Without assuming its possibility or actuality or without determining it in some manner we cannot appeal to an intuitive understanding as necessitating anything for we do not even know if it is possible much less that it exists. As Nuzzo feared, we must also think it as an actual being for without assuming its actuality merely the concept of it is not enough to solve the antinomy and would not allow us to represent it as legislating to nature. We therefore, fall back to the kind of metaphysical claims that Kant advised against.

Lastly, although it is difficult to see how an intuitive understanding solves the antinomy, Kant's solution of the intuitive understanding goes against his philosophy of the human standpoint. He believes himself to have solved the antinomy however, not through the powers of human cognition (the human standpoint) but through an understanding which is conceivable from a human standpoint. Up until the antinomy of teleological judgment, Kant insisted on that antinomies arise from the constitution

⁷⁰ Wicks, *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant on Judgment*, p. 227.

of human mind and are resolvable (although not eliminable) by our own cognitive powers. The solution of the antinomy of teleological judgment therefore, seems to tread on the claims of his critical philosophy which always kept the antagonism of human cognitive powers in view.

4.7 The Kantian Antinomies and the Human Standpoint

As we have seen the solutions of the third antinomy of pure reason and the antinomy of teleological judgment is utterly different. Kant nonetheless thinks that there is actually a similarity both in source and “solution” of the antinomies even if they are related to different cognitive aspects of the knowing subject. Each cognitive power has different principles. Yet reason requires the unconditioned for each of them. There are three kinds of antinomy that are related to three cognitive powers of understanding, judgment and reason. For Kant, they

all . . . are still alike inasmuch as they force reason to abandon the otherwise very natural presupposition that objects of sense are things in themselves and force reason to regard them instead as mere appearances that are based on an intelligible substrate (something supersensible, the concept of which is only an idea and precludes cognition proper) (*CJ*, Ak. 344).

Kant claims that antinomies “compel us against our will to look beyond the sensible to the supersensible” (*CJ*, Ak. 341). Antinomies are unavoidable if “we do not rely on [the assumption of] a supersensible substrate for the given objects [and take the latter] as appearances” (*CJ*, Ak. 345). The three kinds of antinomies regarding three cognitive powers leads to three ideas of the supersensible. For the power of understanding this is the idea of supersensible as the substrate of nature. Faculty of judgment leads to “the idea of the same supersensible as the principle of nature’s subjective purposiveness for our cognitive power” (*CJ*, Ak. 346). The third idea is “the same supersensible as the principle of the purposes of freedom and of the harmony of theses purposes with nature in the moral sphere” (*CJ*, Ak. 346). In other words; although the solutions of the antinomies depend on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, in these solutions a relation to the supersensible is always implied. In other words,

Kant shows the transcendental distinction as the key to the solution of the antinomies. There can be also a negative reading of these passages: the antinomies refer to the human understanding and the human standpoint. Wicks makes a similar point when he says:

Kant's resolution of . . . tension will reside in distinguishing different ways that the world appears to us relative to the mental faculties we have. For the faculty of understanding, all material things admit of a mechanical analysis; for the faculty of judgment, some admit of a teleological analysis⁷¹.

In his "solution" Kant insistently reiterates that purposes require understanding. This was the primary reason for his rejection of Spinoza's system. In his final comments on teleology, he admits that we think the supersensible cause of existence as one having an understanding although only by analogy to a human understanding (*CJ*, Ak. 483-5). We do not have any knowledge of this projected cause, its properties, its aims or purposes. Guyer stresses the same point when he explains Kant thought as the claim that "we can only conceive of an intelligence in analogy with our own"⁷².

Butts summarizes Kant's position as one that claims: "It is because we look designedly at nature that we come to see it as exhibiting design"⁷³. It is human beings which introduce the concept of purposes to nature. "It is our urge to understand nature that imputes design as a principle of understandability"⁷⁴. Butts thinks that the crucial point of Kant's argument is that

it is because we are literally designers of the objects we will study—remember, we construct the objects of possible experience—that some features of nature come to be estimated by us as designed⁷⁵.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁷² Guyer, "Kant's Teleological Conception of Philosophy and its Development", p. 85.

⁷³ Butts, *Kant and the Double Government Methodology*, p. 276.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

The upshot of Kant's argument is that human beings cannot conceive the world's possibility other than envisioning an understanding which is similar in its active part but yet not limited by sensibility's passivity. Unless one is committed to the theistic worldview it is difficult to accept Kant's arguments which claim that the conception of an intelligent world cause is satisfactory for "human standpoint". It should be noted that he conceives the human standpoint to be unchangeable, universal and valid for "every human being" or "for the human race". His point is that teleology and mechanism do not reflect the principles of "nature itself" but are only perspectives of the human standpoint. Although the idea that reflective teleological judgments on nature depend on the constitution of human cognitive powers seems to comply with the Copernican turn, it presents many dangers.

The teleological conception of nature is Kant's way of fixing the gap between the mechanism of nature and freedom. Kant believes that we must judge nature to be organized (by an intuitive understanding) in such a way that human freedom can be realized in phenomenal nature. Moreover, the systematicity of empirical laws is also at stake as we have no way of representing their contingency and necessity at the same time unless we resolve the antinomy of teleological judgment. However, resolving the antinomy by reference to an intuitive understanding goes against Kant's philosophy of "the human standpoint". Kant claims in *CPR* that dialectic arises from human cognitive powers and is to be solved with a critical examination of the same powers. The systematicity and unity of the critical enterprise is threatened by the alleged solution of the antinomy of teleological judgment as the gulf between nature and freedom remains as distant as ever since the solution is not a proper solution *for* human understanding. Furthermore, if the systematicity of empirical natural laws is based on an intuitive understanding, then, all the positive contribution of the Copernican turn would be lost as human knowledge would be necessitated by an intuitive understanding. As it turns out the antinomy of teleological judgment is irresolvable within the bounds of critical philosophy. Although we aim to reduce diversity of nature to identity through our concepts, accepting the limitation of our knowledge of nature is the wiser alternative. We are presented with a diversity so great that it is "impossible for our understanding to discover in nature an order it could grasp" (*CJ*, Ak. 185).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study emerged from the question of what nature meant after Kant's Copernican Turn. Kant's Copernican Revolution is the idea that human beings are not just passive observers of nature but on the contrary, that the human understanding makes active contributions to the world that it experiences. Even if one takes the Copernican turn as granted, there still remains the question of why we become confused with regard to our own representations. In other words, why does the mechanical conception of nature lead human reason to conflicts? And what does this imply for our cognitive powers?

To evaluate our active contribution to our experience of nature, Kant's analysis of our cognitive powers had to be presented. Chapter 2 focused on Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic of *Critique of Pure Reason*. The former dealing with the conditions of human sensibility and the latter with the conditions of thought show the extent and limit of our cognitive apparatus. In Transcendental Aesthetics, theses of transcendental ideality of space and time showed us that human cognition is restricted to appearances and that we are incapable of representing things as they are. The transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves showed us that the spatio-temporality of nature is due to the form of human sensibility. We represent nature spatio-temporally and nature in itself need not be spatio-temporal.

Transcendental Analytic, on the other hand, presents the forms of thought which allow us to think the objects of intuition. Categories, which are pure concepts of the understanding, are not derivable from experience. Yet we are able to relate our concepts to objects of experience in an *a priori* fashion. Without categories, we would not be able to form the concept of an object. Among categories, the primary concern of this study was the concept of causality since it is the basis which enables us to conceive nature as rule-governed. With this unifying act of human mind we are able to organize phenomena. Another crucial aspect, which allowed us to see that nature is

an *a priori* concept, is the transcendental apperception. The diversity we find in our intuitions is so great that it is impossible for us to comprehend a unity based on this diversity. However, on the basis of the Copernican turn, treating the content of our knowledge only as representations, we are able to claim that they stand together in an act of human mind, which is the transcendental apperception. It enables us to unify the experience of appearances and refer to their sum as nature. It was important to note that our empirical selves are likewise given through this unifying act of human mind and that we are capable of representing ourselves as identical only through the unity of objects. This showed us Kant's difference from Cartesianism and traditional idealism.

The most important part of the second chapter was the subject-matter of Analogies of Experience. Here we found out the regulative status of the Second Analogy of experience which is concerned with causality. We saw that even though we have to presuppose a cause for whatever happens, the cause is indeterminate and cannot be known *a priori*. In Kant's philosophy, the conditions of givenness precede the conditions of thought. In other words, an object or event might be given to sensibility but we may not be able to detect the cause. Mathematical principles of understanding are constitutive of objects. However, the dynamical principles, which are related to categories of relation and modality, provide us with regulative principles for empirical use of our understanding. With the category of causality, we construct the relations of objects but do not construct objects. We know *a priori* that whatever happens must have a cause and this principle regulates our search for the cause.

By the theses of transcendental ideality of space and time, *a priori* application of categories to all experience and the transcendental apperception that enables us to conceive nature, we have seen that it is through our *a priori* capabilities that we form a concept of nature and that it is not possible to arrive at such a concept through induction. In these senses, we contribute to our experience of nature. However, our contribution is limited in the sense that we do not produce the matter of objects of intuition. Restricting our contribution to form enables Kant to steer away from other idealist positions. Moreover, the experience of our empirical selves is not immediate

but also given to us by the same act that gives us nature. In other words, we are not the cause of the existence of things or nature. Our contribution is only limited to determining the form of appearances and our experience. Nature in itself and its possibility is beyond the limits of our cognition.

The third chapter focused on the third antinomy of pure reason, which is a conflict between the mechanism of nature and human freedom. If we are to claim that every event is conditioned by a cause, we have no philosophical grounds for justifying human freedom. Kant's solution of this conflict is based on his distinction of phenomena and noumena. Kant construes human cognition on the basis of two separate cognitive powers. Phenomena are the objects of sensible intuition. Understanding is able to think objects, which are not given, without contradiction. The concept of such intelligible objects is noumenon. The distinction of phenomena and noumena are based on the heterogeneity of the passive character of sensibility and active character of understanding. With this distinction Kant was able to assert that we can think freedom without contradiction. Yet he had to concede that we can have no knowledge of it. What this meant to say is that we can consider ourselves as free from an intelligible standpoint, whereas we can consider the effect of our actions as determined by the laws of nature. Freedom is not an object of sense which means that it does not have to be thought according to the conditions of sensibility. The twofold standpoint that we are able to assume is the human standpoint. The human standpoint was presented as the essence of Kant's critical philosophy.

In the third chapter, we characterized Kant's philosophy of the human standpoint as arising from the question of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. Kant does not merely take the human standpoint for granted but deduces it from the problem of objective knowledge. This was important in the sense that it distinguishes his enterprise from anthropology or psychology and enables us to comprehend it as strictly transcendental in the sense that it lays bare the conditions for us to have knowledge. We also touched upon the problematic concept of an intuitive understanding which Kant uses to stress the heterogeneity in our cognitive powers. An intuitive understanding is a concept that is arrived at by abstraction from human cognition. The

distinctness between the passivity of sensibility and activity of understanding enables us to conceive an understanding which is free of the limitations of sensibility. However, the resulting conception of such an understanding is merely derived from our own understanding and we have no grounds for claiming the existence of such an understanding. It serves merely to stress the finitude of human knowledge by accentuating the limiting condition of sensibility.

In the fourth chapter, we have observed Kant's analysis of teleological conception of nature. Kant makes his case for the use of purposive concepts in the investigation of organisms by claiming that we cannot account for organisms simply by the mechanism of nature. With the introduction of purposiveness of nature Kant intends to form a system of nature thereby justifying the idea that human freedom is realizable within mechanical nature. Another reason for his appeal to a purposiveness of nature was to account for empirical laws of nature.

The expression "empirical law" implies a contradiction for Kant. "Law" implies necessity while "empirical" implies contingency. In order to account for the contingency in our knowledge and in order to claim that nature has an order discoverable by us (even where we cannot expressly cognize such an order) he resorted to an intuitive understanding. His claim was that we can conceive the contingent as necessary if we think it as being necessitated by another understanding than ours. However, such a conception is against the basic claim of the Copernican turn: whatever knowledge we have should be necessitated by our own understanding. The problematic aspect of this assumption was revealed more fully in the antinomy of teleological judgment.

We saw that the principle of mechanism and the purposiveness of nature (teleology) presented an antinomy for us. Kant appealed to a conceivable understanding for which there is no antinomy. There is no antinomy for an intuitive understanding for it does not have separate conditions of knowledge (sensibility and understanding) which it has to reconcile. The reference to an intuitive understanding does not resolve the conflicting judgments for several reasons.

First of all, imagining an antinomy-free understanding would not resolve the antinomy for us unless we are that intuitive understanding. This is exactly the way German idealism interpreted Kant's solution⁷⁶. Since we are not able to judge of one and the same thing to be contingent and necessary at the same time, the antinomy is left intact *for us*. We found out that Kant's solution to the antinomy is far from satisfactory and moreover it goes against his philosophy of the human standpoint.

Secondly, we saw that the intelligent cause that Kant envisions is highly problematic. Whatever it thinks must be actual since it is thought of as not being bound by sensibility. Since actuality and possibility are distinctions which have their basis in human mind, the distinction is not applicable to an intuitive understanding. Therefore, Kant asserts that it does not represent any contingency. However, it should also not be able to represent necessity either and modal concepts should have no meaning for an intuitive understanding. This means that it cannot represent mechanism or teleology of nature. Resorting to a principle of generation that would be the basis of our mechanical and teleological explanations is still not enough to resolve the conflict of two maxims since we cannot even conceive what such a principle might be. Moreover, we have no reason to suppose that an intuitive understanding can distinguish its objects since synthesis of apprehension is the act of human reason which is faced with a diversity or manifold, given through the sensibility, to be united. Nature need not be spatio-temporal and natural things need not be even differentiated (that is, represented as distinct objects) for such an understanding. It is the synthesis of apprehension which enables us to perceive distinct objects. It is doubtful that an intuitive understanding can even conceive of nature. Kant seems to overlook his explication in the deductions in his conception of an intuitive understanding.

Thirdly, an intuitive understanding is a concept of human mind. In treating it as necessitating the contingent we thereby treat it not as merely a concept but as a being. Merely the concept of such an understanding is not enough to solve the antinomy unless its actuality or reality is likewise granted. However, we cannot even establish

⁷⁶ See Nuzzo, "Kritik der Urteilskraft §§76 77: Reflective Judgment and the Limits of Transcendental Philosophy", p. 149 and footnote 20.

the possibility of such an understanding as it does not conform to conditions of our sensibility. The only use such a limiting concept of an intuitive understanding may have within critical philosophy is to discern the limits and finitude of human understanding. Any other use would be transcendent. Kant's solution then, goes beyond the limits he had drawn. In his attempt at a solution he oversteps the limits of knowledge. There is a fine line between extending knowledge through a regulative use of a concept and a transcendent use. In his attempt to extend human knowledge to all of nature, Kant seems to pass that boundary. Still we might interpret it as exemplifying the finitude of human knowledge and the impossibility of grasping the whole of nature.

Fourthly, we have seen that antinomies should be solved by reference to the human standpoint. The essence of transcendental philosophy was characterized as based on the claim that all our knowledge and confusions should have their roots in our cognitive powers, including their solutions. If we bring in an intuitive understanding to solve the problem that emerges from the constitution of our own reason, we betray the Copernican turn. Kant claims that we can conceive the unity of nature "as if" an understanding "is the basis of the unity of what is diverse" in it (Kant, *CJ*, Ak. 180). In such a conception we think that the necessity of empirical laws can be thought of as being necessitated by another understanding. While it is true that we cannot determine the whole extent of phenomenal nature *a priori*, rendering the intuitive understanding the condition of necessity in nature is against the assumption of the Copernican turn. Whatever we perceive should be necessitated by our cognitive powers alone. Although Kant shows that we cannot fully determine the particulars and that we are unable to know particular aspects of nature *a priori* due to the discursive character of our knowledge, he fails to solve the antinomy by human cognitive powers.

The failure of the solution of the antinomy threatens the critical system. It means that Kant's fails to fix the gap between nature and freedom and justify the systematicity of empirical laws. To account for the understandability of nature and systematicity of its laws (its reducibility to principles and concepts) he assumes a problematic understanding. Kant first draws the limits to human reason and knowledge, and then

in his quest to make nature understandable through concepts of understanding, falls victim to the pretensions of reason by overstepping the limits he has set.

If we cannot properly legislate *a priori*, or are incapable of comprehending the necessity of the contingent, we might as well accept that our knowledge is finite or that nature displays such a great diversity that is beyond our powers of representation. The reducibility of particulars to concepts does not reflect how nature is but only how we think. The conception of nature (as appearance) as a law-governed unity is a distinctly human capacity. The heterogeneity between our cognitive powers produces a confusion with regard to diversity and identity. We need a representation of identity (concepts) to conceive diversity and vice versa. We represent difference and diversity as what cannot be subsumed under a concept. In order to preserve the positive contribution of Copernican turn, the teleological antinomy should be grasped as unresolvable and can be seen as another implication of the limitation of human sensibility which has to distinguish possibility and actuality, therefore the contingent and the necessary.

In *CJ*, Ak. 185, Kant admits that it is possible to think that diversity of nature might be so great that we may not understand it. However, he later on equates such an idea with superstition and asserts that nature should be understandable by us (*CJ*, Ak. 294). The failure of the solution of teleological antinomy however, shows that although we know by reducing diversity to identity through concepts (discursively), we cannot grasp nature in its whole extent. The subject of the Copernican turn perceives and arranges the diversity in an orderly fashion, that is, it turns the manifold into a *cosmos*. Nature in itself may very well be a *chaos*. Instead of imposing understandability by reducing diversity to identity, we might as well leave nature in itself as an enigma.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Kant'ın Kopernikçi Devrimi ve eleştirel felsefesi, felsefe tarihinde bir dönüm noktasıdır. Bilen öznenin bilme sürecine katkıda bulunduğu ve yalnızca pasif bir alımlayıcı olmadığı düşüncesi felsefeyi geri dönülmez bir biçimde dönüştürmüştür. Kant öznenin bilme edimine olan katkısını bilişsel yetilerin eleştirel bir analizini yaparak ve bu yetilerin insan deneyimindeki kurucu rollerini araştırarak ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmıştır. Bu düşünsel devrimin izinden giden filozoflar bilme sürecini koşullayan diğer koşulları da belirleme çabasına odaklanmışlardır. Kant-sonrası düşünce Kant'ın öne sürdüğü bilişsel koşullara alternatif koşullar sunmaktadır. Tarihin, kültürün, dilin, sosyal yapıların, ekonomik sistemlerin ve cinsiyetin bilişsel süreçlerdeki etkisi günümüz bilgi kuramlarının bir parçası haline gelmiştir. İnsan deneyiminin kuram-yüklü olduğu düşüncesi sosyal bilimlerin temel varsayımlarından biridir. Kopernikçi devrimin sosyal bilimler açısından sonuçları büyük bir hevesle incelenmiş olsa da Kant'ın aşkınsal idealizmi ve düşüncesinin “doğa” deneyimimize ilişkin sonuçları sıklıkla gözardı edilmekte ve yok sayılmaktadır.

Bu çalışma Kopernikçi devrimin bir sonucu olan aşkınsal felsefe bağlamında “doğa”nın ne anlama geldiğini araştırmak amacıyla doğmuştur. Kantçı anlamda düzenli ve yasal bir “doğa” deneyimini oluşturan öznenin kendisidir. Doğa fikrinin kökleri bilişsel yetilerimizdedir ve sistematik ve yasal bir “doğa” anlayışı insana özgü bir anlama biçimidir. Bu fikir empirik deneyimin çeşitliliğini kavramlar yoluyla indirgeyerek kavrama çabamızın bir sonucudur. Bu şekilde özetlenebilecek Kant'ın doğa kavrayışının açıklamaya ihtiyaç duyan bazı zorlukları da vardır. Kant'ın görüngüler ve kendinde-şeyler arasında yaptığı aşkınsal ayrım iki farklı doğa kavramı kurmamıza olanak verir. Bunların ilki “görünüş olarak doğa” kavramıyken ikincisi ise “kendinde doğa” idesidir. Kant insan bilgisini görünüşler alanıyla yani görüngüsel doğa kavramıyla sınırlar. Ancak ilginç olan öznenin kendi ürettiği kavramlardan

birinin yine aynı özne için çelişkiler ve çatışmalar sunmasıdır. Görüngüsel anlamdaki doğa kavramı akli çözülmesi gereken çatışkılara itmektedir.

Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesine göre mekanistik doğa anlayışı insanın bilme yetisinde yatan *a priori* nedensellik kavramına dayanmaktadır. Bu doğa kavrayışı ise iki çatışkı (antinomi) ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bunların ilki özgürlük ve mekanizma arasındaki antinomi yani saf aklın üçüncü antinomisidir. İkincisi ise ereksel yargı antinomisi yani mekanistik ve ereksel yargılar arasındaki antinomidir. Eğer insan “doğa” deneyiminin oluşmasında etkin bir rol oynuyorsa kendi kavrama biçimlerimiz arasındaki çatışma nasıl olanaklıdır? “Doğa” deneyimimiz bizim ürünümüz ise kendi ürünümüz karşısında neden çelişkili fikirler üretiyoruz? Bu çalışmada bu sorulara yanıt aranmıştır.

Bu çatışmaların kaynağı insan bilişsel yetilerinin kendine özgü farklılıklarında yatmaktadır. Eleştirel felsefe insan bilgisi için iki farklı kaynak belirlemektedir; duyusallık ve anlama yetisi. Verililiğin ve düşünmenin koşullarının farklı türde olması insan bilişselliği açısından belirleyicidir. Bilişsel yetiler arasındaki bu ayrılık ve bu ayrılığa dayanan gidimli (diskursif) bilgi Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinin temelinde yatan “insan perspektifi”nin temelini oluşturmaktadır. İnsan perspektifi kavramı insan doğası kavramı ile aynı içeriğe sahip olarak düşünülmemelidir. Bu perspektifin Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinin yani insan aklının *a priori* becerilerini belirleme arayışının doğrudan bir ürünü olduğu ve “sentetik *a priori* yargılar nasıl olanaklıdır?” sorusuna verdiği yanıtı bağlı olduğu çalışma içerisinde serimlenmeye çalışılmıştır.

Bu bilgiler ışığında çalışmanın temel amacının Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* ve *Yargı Gücünün Eleştirisi* adlı eserlerindeki “doğa” kavrayışını açık kılmak, “doğa”nın deneyimini ve bilgisini olanaklı kılan koşullardan doğan iki antinomiye odaklanarak bunların çözümlerinin Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesi açısından sonuçlarına değinmek olduğu söylenebilir. Bu tasarı doğrultusunda tez üç temel bölüme ayrılmıştır. “Görüngü Olarak Doğa” adlı ikinci bölümde doğa kavramının içeriği ve doğa deneyiminin *a priori* koşulları serimlenerek doğa deneyiminin oluşmasında insan zihninin etkinliğinin ölçüsü anlaşılacak istenmektedir. “Mekanizma, Özgürlük ve İnsan Perspektifi” adlı üçüncü bölüm doğanın nedensel bir mekanizması olduğu

düşüncesi ile insanın özgür olduğunu fikri arasındaki çatışmayı Kant'ın nasıl çözdüğü incelemekte ve çözüm yönteminden hareketle insan perspektifi düşüncesini eleştirel felsefenin özü olarak sunmaya gayret etmektedir. “Mekanizm ve Teleoloji” adlı dördüncü bölüm ise doğanın mekanizması ile ereksel olarak düşünülmesi arasındaki çatışmaya, yani ereksel yargı antinomisine, odaklanarak Kant'ın bu çelişkiye önerdiği çözümü eleştirel olarak incelemekte ve aşkınsal felsefe ile insan perspektifi düşüncesi açısından sonuçlarını irdelemektedir.

Bu taslağa uygun olarak öncelikle aşkınsal felsefe bağlamında öznenin doğa deneyimine etkin katkısını değerlendirebilmek için Kant'ın bilişsel yetileri analizinin serimlenmesi gerekiyordu. Bu amaçla ikinci bölüm Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin “Aşkınsal Estetik” ve “Aşkınsal Analitik” bölümlerine odaklandı. Bu bölümlerin ilki insan duyusallığının koşullarını ele alırken ikincisi ise düşüncenin koşullarını ele alarak bilişsel araçlarımızın erimini ve sınırını göstermeyi amaçlar. “Aşkınsal Estetik”in temel savı uzam ve zamanın insan duyusallığının saf formları olan saf görümler (*Anschauung, intuition*) olduğu yani uzam ve zamanın aşkınsal idealliği savıdır. Kant'a göre uzam ve zaman deneyimden türetilemez ve aksine tüm deneyimimiz bu formları varsayar. Uzam ve zamanın kavramsal olarak tanımlamaz ve ancak “görülebilir”. Bu formlar olmaksızın bir deneyim tasarlayamayız ve kavramsal olmayan tasarımlama biçimleri olmalarından hareketle Kant bu formları anlama yetisinden farklı bir bilgi koşulu olarak yani duyusallığın formları olarak ıralamaktadır. Bilginin koşulu olmaları “aşkınsal” olmaları ve insan duyusallığından bağımsız olarak nesnel için özellikleri olmamaları (reel değil ideal olmaları) “Aşkınsal Estetik” bağlamında duyusallığın doğa deneyimine katkısını betimlememizi sağlar. Kant insan bilgisinin duyusallık yoluyla verilen görünüşler ile sınırlı olduğunu ve şeylerin duyularımızdan bağımsız olarak sahip olabilecekleri özelliklerin tarafımızdan bilinmeyeceğini iddia etmektedir. Bu bağlamda yapılan görünüşler ile kendinde-şeyler arasındaki aşkınsal ayrımın sonucu doğanın uzamsal-zamansal oluşunun insanın duyusallığının saf formlarına dayandığı ve doğanın kendiliğine ilişkin bir bilgimiz olamayacağıdır. Doğayı zorunlulukla, nesnel ve evrensel olarak, uzamsal-zamansal formda tasarımılasak da kendinde-doğa uzamsal-zamansal olmak zorunda değildir. Doğanın uzamsal-zamansallığının aşkınsal idealliği düşüncesi, insan

duyusallığının doğa deneyimine katkısını anlamak açısından önem arz etse de “doğa” kavramsallaştırmasına nasıl vardığımızı anlatmamakta, yalnızca doğanın “görüsünün” olanağını temellendirmektedir. “Aşkınsal Analitik” ise görü nesnelere düşünmemize ve kavramsallaştırmamıza olanak veren düşünmenin formlarını serimler.

“Aşkınsal Analitik”in doğa tasarımı ile ilgili sonuçlarının serimlenmesinde aşkınsal tamalgı (*Apperzeption, apperception*) ve saf anlama yetisinin kavramları olan kategorilere odaklanılmıştır. Anlama yetisinin kategorileri ve aşkınsal imgelemin sentezleri doğa deneyiminin düşünsel koşullarını oluşturmaktadır. Kant “Aşkınsal Analitik”te kategorilerin, yani anlama yetisinin saf kavramlarının, deneyimden türetilebilir olmadıklarını ve deneyimin koşulları olduklarını iddia etmektedir. Bu kavramlar deneyim nesnelereyle *a priori* olarak ilişkilenebilir yani “nesne” düşüncesini kurmaktadır. Kategoriler olmaksızın bir nesne kavramı oluşturamamız olanaklı değildir.

“Doğa”nın *a priori* bir kavram olduğunu görmemizi sağlayan bir diğer önemli bilişsel öge aşkınsal tamalgıdır. Görülerimizde karşılaştığımız çeşitlilik öylesine muazzamdır ki bu çeşitlilik temelinde bir birlik görmemiz olanaksızdır. Ancak Kopernikçi devrim temelinde, bilgimizin içeriğini tasarımlar olarak ele alarak, tüm bu çeşitliliğin insan zihninin içeriği olarak bir arada durmasını sağlayanın aşkınsal tamalgı olduğunu söylemektedir bize Kant. Aşkınsal tamalgı görüşlerin deneyimini birleştirmemizi ve görüşlerin bütünlüğünü “doğa” olarak tasarımlamamızı sağlamaktadır. Ancak empirik öznelerin de insan zihninin bu birleştirici edimi yoluyla verili olduğunu ve kendimizi özdeş olarak tasarımlamamızın nesnelere tekil ve özdeş olarak tasarımlamamızdan geçtiğini belirtmek Kant’ın Kartezyen felsefe ve geleneksel idealizmden farkını ortaya koymak adına önemlidir.

Kategoriler arasında bu çalışmanın asıl ilgisi nedensellik kavramı olmuştur ve ikinci bölümün en önemli kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Nedensellik ilkesinin rolü ve bir ilke olarak statüsü ise “İkinci Deneyim Analogisi” bağlamında tartışılmış ve bu tartışmanın sonuçları özellikle ereksel yargı çatışmasının değerlendirilmesi açısından önemli olmuştur. Nedensellik kavramı doğayı yasalı olarak kavrayışımızın temelidir.

Hume'un felsefesinde yalın bir izlenimi bulunamayan nedensellik sorunsal hale getirilmiş, Kant ise nedenselliğin asla deneyimden türetilmeyeceğini ve deneyimi olanaklı kılan *a priori* saf bir kavram olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Kant *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin "İkinci Deneyim Analogisi" adlı bölümünde ise nedensellik kavramının içsel deneyimin formu olan zaman bağlamında ifadesini irdelemektedir. İnsan zihninin bu birleştirici edimi yoluyla görüngüleri kurallı bir zaman-dizisi olarak tasarımıdır. Bu zaman-dizisi ilişkisinde neden daima sonuçtan önce gelecek ve sonucu zorunlu kılacak şekilde tasarımılanmaktadır. Ancak Kant'ın felsefesinde verililiğin koşulları düşünmenin koşullarından önce gelmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, bir nesne veya olay duyusallığa verilmiş olsa da nedeni tespit edemeyebiliriz. Her olayın bir nedeni olduğu ilkesi evrensel ve nesnel bir ilke olsa da nedenler *a priori* olarak verili değildir. Neyin nedeninin ne olduğunu bulmak yine anlama yetisinin empirik kullanımına düşen bir görevdir. Bu bağlamda nedensellik ve mekanizma ilkelerinin rolü tartışılabilir.

Kant kategorileri matematiksel ve dinamik kategoriler olarak ikiye ayırmaktadır. Bu çalışma için önemli olan ilişki ve modal (kipsel) kategoriler dinamik kategoriler sınıfında yer almaktadır. Bu ayrıma göre Kant matematiksel kategorilerin kurucu ilkeler (*constitutive principles*) yani nesnelere kuran ilkeler verdiklerini, dinamik kategorilerin ise deneyimi kuran değil düzenleyen ilkeler (*regulative principles*) sunduklarını söylemektedir. Anlama yetisinin matematiksel ilkeleri nesnelere kuran ancak ilişki ve kip kategorileriyle ilintili dinamik ilkeler ise anlama yetisinin empirik kullanımını düzenleyici ilkelerdir. Ancak Kant *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin "Transandantal Diyalektik" kısmında ise bu ilkeleri daha önce düzenleyici ilkeler olarak ıralamışsa da yine de kurucu ilkeler olduklarını iddia etmektedir. Bu çelişik görünen iki ifadenin nedenini anlamak ve bir çelişik arz etmediğini göstermek çalışma açısından önemliydi. Bu amaçla "İkinci Analogi" ilkesinin "neden"i kurmadığını ancak nedeni bulma sürecimizi "düzenleyen" bir ilke olduğunu göstererek hem nedensellik ilkesinin hem de doğanın mekanizması ilkesinin birer düzenleyici ilke olduğu ikinci bölümde gösterilmeye çalışıldı. Nedensellik kategorisiyle nesnelere değil nesnelere arası ilişkiler kurmaktayız. Bu bağlamda "İkinci Deneyim Analogisi" her olayı bir nedeni olduğunu söylemekle birlikte "neden"i belirlenmemiş olarak bırakır. *A priori* olarak her ne oluyorsa bir nedeni olması gerektiğini biliriz ancak nedenin kendisi doğrudan

verili olmayabileceğini için bu ilke bizim bir neden tespit etme sürecimizi düzenlemektedir. Kısacası nedensellik deneyim ve bilgi açısından kurucu bir öge olmakla birlikte, nesnelere kurmamakta ve nesnelere arası ilişki kurma sürecinde anlama yetisine yöne vermektedir. Bu bağlamda hem kurucu hem de düzenleyici bir ilke olduğu söylenebilir. Mekanizm ise daha spesifik bir ilkedir ve İkinci Analoji nedenleri belirsiz bırakmış olduğu için mekanizm ilkesi düzenleyici bir ilkedir. Nedensellik ve ona dayanan doğanın mekanizması ilkesi ile ilgili varılan bu sonuç çalışmanın ilerleyen bölümlerinde, özellikle de ereksel yargı antinomisinin çözümünün değerlendirilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır.

Bu bilgiler ışığında aşkınsal idealizmde uzam ve zamanın aşkınsal idealliği, kategorilerin *a priori* olarak tüm deneyim için geçerli olması ve aşkınsal tamalgının birarada “doğa” kavramını oluşturmamızı sağladığı görüldü ve doğa kavramına doğal şeyleri tek tek birbirine ekleyerek tümevarım yoluyla varmamızın olanaklı olmadığı sonucuna varıldı. Ancak Kopernikçi devrimin öznesinin etkin kurucusu olduğu deneyime katkısı yalnızca görüşlerin ve deneyimin formu belirlemek ile sınırlıdır yani görü nesnelere maddesini üretmez. Bu katkının yalnız form ile sınırlı tutulması Kant’ı diğer idealist konumlardan uzaklaştırmaktadır. Kısacası Kant’ın eleştirel felsefesi çerçevesinde “doğa” denilen kurallı ve yasal bir bütünlük tasarlayabiliyor olmamızın kaynağının bilişsel yetelerimiz olduğu gösterilerek “görüngü olarak doğa” kavramı içeriklendirilmeye çalışıldı. Doğanın kendisi ve nasıl olanaklı olduğunun bilgisinin ise aşkınsal idealizme göre bilginin sınırları dışında kaldığı görüldü.

Kurucu öznenin kendi tasarımı hakkında nasıl çelişkili yargılar üretebildiği sorusu üçüncü bölümün ana motivasyonunu oluşturdu. Bu bağlamda doğanın mekanizması ve özgürlük düşüncesi arasındaki görünürdeki çelişkiyi (saf aklın üçüncü antinomisini) ve Kant’ın bu soruna çözüm önerisini ele almak gerekiyordu. Eğer her olayın bir (etkin) neden tarafından koşullandığı ileri sürülürse insan özgürlüğünü temellendirecek felsefi bir zemin kalmaz. Kant’ın bu soruna çözümü görüngü ve *noumenon* arasında yaptığı ayrımaya dayanmaktadır. Antinomilerin kaynağını ve çözümünü anlamak amacıyla görüngü (fenomen) ve *noumenon* arasındaki ayrım, bu

ayrımın insanın bakış açısı düşüncesiyle ilişkisi tartışıldı ve bu tartışma Kant'ın eleştirel projesini insan perspektifi felsefesi olarak ıralamamıza olanak sağladı.

Kant insan bilgisini iki farklı bilişsel güç etrafında kavrar. Görüngüler duyuşal görünün nesnelere dir. Anlama yetisi ise verili olmayan nesnelere çelişkisiz düşünebilir. Anlama yetisinin düşünebildiği ancak verili olamayan nesnelere Kant *noumenon* adı altında kavramsallaştırır. Böylelikle, görüngü ve *noumenon* ayrımı duyuşallığın edilgen karakteri ile anlama yetkisinin etkin karakteri arasındaki farklılıkta temellenmektedir. Bu ayrım yoluyla Kant özgürlüğü çelişkisiz olarak düşünebileceğimizi iddia eder. Düşünülebilir bir bakış açısından kendimizi özgür olarak değerlendirebileceğimiz gibi edimlerimizin etkilerinin ise doğa yasaları tarafından belirlendiği savunmaya devam edebiliriz. Özgürlüğün duyuşal bir nesne olmaması duyuşallığın koşullarına tabi olmadan düşünülebileceğini göstermektedir. Ancak bu yorumun tutarlılığını korumak adına Kant özgürlüğün bilgisinin olanaklı olmadığını kabul etmek durumunda kalır. Antinominin kaynağının ise duyuşal koşullar ile düşünsel koşulların birbirine karıştırılmasına dayandığını savlar. Yalnızca düşünsel olanı duyuşallığın koşuluna indirgemek veyahut duyuşallığın koşuluna tabi olarak verili olanın kendinde-şey imiş gibi düşünülmesi antinomilere yol açmaktadır. Görüngü ve *noumenon*'u ayıran eleştirel felsefe ise bu çelişkilerden kaçınma olanağı sunmakta ve insan aklının iddialarını disipline etmektedir. Görüngüsel ve *noumenal* yorumlama biçimleri ikili bir perspektif sunmakta, bu ikili perspektif ise insan perspektifi kavramının içeriğini oluşturmaktadır.

Bu analizler sonucunda bilişsel yetilerin ayrılığına dayanan insan perspektifi düşüncesinin sentetik *a priori* yargıların olanağı sorusundan türetildiği ve bu düşüncenin Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinin özü olduğu gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Kant insan perspektifi düşüncesini verili kabul etmemekte aksine nesnel bilgi sorunundan türetmektedir. Bu onun felsefesini empirik verililiklerle iş gören antropoloji ve psikolojiden ayırmak açısından ve bilgiye sahip olmamızın koşullarını ortaya çıkartması anlamında aşkınsal felsefe olarak ıralamak açısından önemlidir. İnsan perspektifi kavramıyla yakından ilintili sorunsal bir kavram olan görüsel anlama yetisine (*intuitive understanding*) de bu bölümde kısaca değinildi ve Kant'ın bu

kavramı bilişsel güçlerin ayrılığını vurgulamak üzere kullandığının altı çizildi. Görüsel anlama yetisi insan bilişinin koşullarından yapılan bir soyutlamayla ulaşılan bir kavramdır. Duyusallığın edilgenliği ve anlama yetisinin etkinliğinin farklılığı duyusallığın koşullarından bağımsız bir anlama yetisi düşüncesine izin verir. Ancak Kant'a göre bu tür bir anlama yetisi kavramı yalnızca kendi anlama yetimizden türetilen bir kavramdır ve böyle bir anlama yetisinin varlığını öne sürmek için bir zeminimiz yoktur. Bu kavramın asıl işlevi duyusallığın koşullarını vurgulayarak insan bilgisinin sınırlılığının altını çizmektir. Özgürlük ve görüsel anlama yetisi kavramlarını bu şekilde betimledikten sonra ise çalışmanın bu kısma kadar varılan tüm sonuçlarını ilgilendiren bir soruna yani ereksel yargı sorununa yönelindi.

Kant özgürlüğün çelişkisiz olarak düşünülebildiğini göstermiş olsa da insan özgürlüğünün mekanik doğa içerisinde gerçekleştirilebileceğini de göstermesi gerekiyordu. Bu amaçla *Yargı Gücünün Eleştirisi* adlı yapıtında doğa ve özgürlük arasındaki uçurumu aşarak eleştirel projesini bir sistemde birleştirmeyi amaçlar. Bu uçurumu aşmak için önerisi doğanın insan özgürlüğünün gerçekleşmesine uygun bir yapılanması olduğu yargısıyla hareket etmemiz gerektiğidir. *Yargı Gücünün Eleştirisi*'nin çözmeyi amaçladığı bir başka sorun ise empirik yasalar sorunudur. İnsanın anlama yetisinin ilke ve kavramları doğayı *a priori* olarak belirlememize ve kurmamıza olanak verse de deneyimizin olumsal içeriğini belirleme gücünden yoksundur. Yine de Kant empirik bilgimizi genişletirken insan deneyiminin olumsal içeriğinin zorunlu olduğunu varsaymamız gerektiğini, aksi takdirde doğal nesne ve ilişkilerin zorunluluğunun bilgisini arayamacağımızı ileri sürmektedir. İşte bu nedenlerden ötürü, insan bilgisinin sistematik yapısını temellendirmek ve doğa ile özgürlük arasındaki uçurumu kapatmak amacıyla Kant reflektif ereksel yargıyı deneyimi düzenleyici bir ilke olarak sunar. Ancak bu ilkenin ortaya konması sonucunda doğanın mekanizması ilkesi ile doğanın erekselliği ilkesi arasında bir çatışkı ortaya çıkar. Kant'ın bu antinomiye sunuşu ve çözme girişimi ise bir hayli tartışmalı yönler içermektedir.

Dördüncü bölüm içerisinde ereksel yargı antinomisinin çözümüne ilişkin tartışmalar ve sorunlar sistematik bir biçimde analiz edilmekte ve Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesi

açısından sonuçları değerlendirilmektedir. Asıl amaç çözümün çözmeyi vadettiği sorunları çözüp çözemediğini anlamak üzere içkin bir eleştiri sunmak yani Kant'ın felsefesini kendi ortaya koyduğu ölçütlere uygunluğu bakımından değerlendirmektir.

Bu plana uygun olarak öncelikle Kant'ın ereksel doğa tasarımının temelleri incelendi. Kant ereksel kavramların kullanımını savunmak üzere organizmaları örnek vermektedir. Kant'a göre organizmaların özellikleri yalnızca doğanın mekanizması ile açıklamaz. Bir organizmadaki her organın bir işleve yarıyor olması Kant'ın bunu iddia etmesindeki temel nedenlerden biridir. Çünkü organ ve organizma arasındaki parça-bütün ilişkisi Kant'a göre farklı bir yorum gerektirmektedir. Kant canlıların birer işlev gören organlara sahip oldukları gözleminden hareketle parçadan bütüne giden mekanik açıklamaların yetersiz kalacağını, bütünden-parçaya giden bir ilişki içerisinde kavranmaları gerektiğini yani sanki canlıların kavramları oluşlarından önce geliyormuş ve organlar yaradıkları işe uygunluk amacıyla varolmuşlar gibi yargıda bulunmamız gerektiğini iddia etmektedir. Kant'a göre araştırmalarımıza bu ilkeyle yön vermeden doğanın bazı yönleri bizim için anlaşılmaz kalacaktır. Doğanın erekselliği düşüncesiyle Kant aynı zamanda başka sorunları da çözmek istemektedir. Doğanın erekselliği fikri ile mekanik doğa içerisinde insan özgürlüğünün gerçekleştirilebilir olduğu bir doğa sistemi kurmak amaçlanmaktadır. Doğanın erekselliği fikrinin çözmeyi amaçladığı bir diğer sorun ise doğanın empirik yasaları sorunudur.

“Empirik yasa” terimi Kant için bir çelişkiyi ifade eder. “Yasa” zorunluluğu imlerken “empirik” ise olumsuzluğu imlemektedir. Bilgimizdeki olumsal ögenin hesabını verebilmek ve doğanın tarafımızdan keşfedilebilir bir düzeni (böyle bir düzeni göremediğimizde dahi) olduğunu iddia etmek üzere görüsel bir anlama yetisine başvurur. Kant'ın bu konudaki temel savı eğer olumsal olarak kavradığımız bir nesne veya olayın bir başka anlama yetisinin zorunluluğuna tabi olduğunu düşünürsek olumsal olanın ardında bir zorunluluk olduğu düşüncesine vararak doğayı düşünmemiz için gerekli olan zorunluluk kavramını koruyabileceğimizdir. Ancak böylesi bir düşünce Kopernikçi devrimin temel savına aykırıdır. Kopernikçi devrime göre ne olursa olsun bilgimizi zorunlu kılanın kendi anlama yetimiz olması

gerekmektedir. Kant'ın savının sorunsal yönü ereksel yargı antinomisinde daha net görülebilmektedir.

Doğayı hem mekanizma ilkesine göre hem de ereksellik ilkesine göre yargılamak bizim için bir antinomi oluşturmaktadır. Kant uzmanları antinominin *Yargı Gücünün Eleştirisi*'nde nasıl çözülmüş olduğuna dair iki temel farklı yorum getirmektedir. Bunların ilkinde göre Kant antinomiye doğanın mekanizması ilkesini deneyimi kuran bir ilke olmaktan çıkartıp deneyimi düzenleyen bir ilke konumuna indirgeyerek çözmektedir. İkinci görüşe göre ise Kant'ın önerdiği asıl çözüm görüsel bir anlama yetisine gönderme yapmaktadır. Dördüncü bölüm içerisinde doğanın mekanizması ilkesinin *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* bağlamında dahi düzenleyici bir ilke olduğunu iddiası desteklenmiş ancak bu ilkenin düzenleyici bir ilke olmasının antinomiye çözmediği gösterilerek Kant'ın asıl çözümünün görüsel bir anlama yetisi kavramına dayandığını serimlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Kant antinomilere düşmeyecek, düşünülebilir bir tür anlama yetisine başvurmaktadır. Görüsel anlama yetisi için bir antinomi söz konusu olamaz çünkü bağdaştırmak zorunda olacağı duyusallık ve anlama yetisi gibi iki farklı bilgi kaynağı ve koşuluna sahip olmayan bir anlama yetisi olarak düşünülmektedir. Böyle bir anlama yetisine başvurmak yargılar arasındaki bu çatışmayı çözmeyeceğinin nedenleri çalışmanın son kısmında irdelenmiştir.

Öncelikle, antinomisiz bir anlama yetkisi tasarlamak biz bu anlama yetisinin kendisi olmadığı sürece antinomiye çözemeyiz. Alman idealizmi de Kant'ın çözümünü görüsel bir anlama yetisi gibi yargılayabildiğimiz düşüncesi olarak yorumlamıştır⁷⁷. Bir ve aynı şeyin aynı zamanda hem olumsal hem de zorunlu olduğu yargısına varmamız olanaksız olduğu için antinomi *bizim için* çözülmemiş olarak kalmaktadır. Kant'ın antinomiye önerdiği çözüm tatmin edici olmaktan uzak olduğu gibi insan perspektifi felsefesine de aykırıdır.

İkincileyin, görüsel anlama yetisi kavramı oldukça sorunsaldır. Görüsel anlama yetisinin düşündükleri aynı zamanda gerçek olarak kendisine verili olmalıdır çünkü

⁷⁷ Bkz: Nuzzo, "Kritik der Urteilskraft §§76 77: Reflective Judgment and the Limits of Transcendental Philosophy", p. 149 ve dipnot 20.

duyusallıkla sınırlı değildir. Gerçeklik ve olanaklılık ise *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nde kavramın içeriğine bir şey katmayan ve yalnızca duyusallık ile anlama yetisinin ilişki biçimlerine dayanan kavramlar olarak tanımlandığı için bu ayırım görüsel anlama yetisine uygulanabilir değildir. Bu nedenle Kant böyle bir anlama yetisi için bir şeyin olanaklılığının anlamsız olduğunu (çünkü her düşündüğü gerçek olarak verilir ona) iddia etmektedir. Ancak aynı nedenle zorunluluğu da tasarımılayamamalıdır ve modal (kipsel) kavramların böyle bir anlama yetisi için hiçbir anlamı olmamalıdır. Böyle bakıldığında ne doğanın mekanizmasını ne de erekselliğini tasarımılayabilir. Doğanın hem mekanizması hem de erekselliği insan perspektifinin kavramlarıdır. Görüsel anlama yetisinde her ikisine temel olabilecek başka bir oluşum ilkesi olabileceğini savlamak da iki ilke arasındaki çatışmayı bizim için çözemez çünkü böyle bir ilkenin ne olabileceğini dahi tasarımılamamız olanaklı değildir. Dahası görüsel anlama yetisinin nesnelere birbirlerinden ve kendisinde ayırabileceği dahi şüphelidir çünkü görüde kavrayış sentezi (*Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung, synthesis of apprehension in intuition*) duyusallık tarafından kendisine birleştireceği bir çokluk ve çeşitlilik verili olan insan aklının bir edimidir. Böylesi bir anlama yetisinin doğayı uzamsal-zamansal kavraması ve hatta doğal şeyleri birbirinden ayırık nesnelere tasarımılaması bile zorunlu değildir. Birbirinden ayrı ve seçik nesnelere tasarımılayabilmemiz aklın sentezleyici yani birleştirici etkinliği yoluyla. Bu bağlamda görüsel bir anlama yetisinin bir “doğa” tasarımılayabileceği bile şüphelidir. Kant görüsel anlama yetisini düşünürken aşkınsal analitikteki analizlerini gözardı etmektedir.

Üçüncüleyin, görüsel anlama yetisi insan zihninin bir kavramıdır. Bir varlık olarak düşünmeden yalnızca bir kavram olarak olumsal zorunlu kıldığını düşünmek olanaklı değildir. Gerçekliğini varsaymadan yalnızca kavramıyla antinomiye çözüme kavuşturamayız. Ancak bunu yapmamız da olanaklı değil çünkü böyle bir anlama yetisinin olanaklılığını bile ileri süremeyiz. Bunun nedeni Kant'ın olanaklılığın, “Empirik Deneyimin Postülatları” bağlamında, modal (kipsel) bir kavram olarak nesnenin içeriğine birşey katmadığını ve yalnızca bilme yetilerinin ilişkisini imlediğini ileri sürmesidir. Olanaklılık bir nesnenin deneyimde verilebileceğini yani duyusallığın ve düşünmenin koşullarına aynı anda tabi olabileceği düşüncesidir. Bu tanıma göre

görüşel anlama yetisi ne kendisi için ne de bizim için duyusallığa verili olamayacağı için olanaklılığından dahi bahsetmemiz mümkün değildir. Bu kavramın eleştirel felsefe içerisindeki yegâne meşru işlevi insanın anlama yetisinin sonluluğunu ve sınırlılığını gösterecek sınırlayıcı bir kavram olarak kullanımımızdır. Başka bir tür kullanım “aşkın” bir kullanım olacaktır. Öyleyse Kant’ın çözümü felsefeye kendi çizdiği sınırların dışına taşmakta, bilginin sınırlarını aşmaktadır. Bilgiyi genişletmek üzere bir kavramın düzenleyici ide olarak kullanılması ile aşkın kullanımı arasında ince bir sınır vardır ki Kant’ın bu sınırı geçtiği görülmektedir.

Dördüncü olarak ise, Kant’ın antinomilerin insan zihninin yapısından kaynaklandığı ve yine oradan hareketle çözülmesi gerektiği düşüncesi antinominin çözümüyle bağdaşmamaktadır. Kopernikçi devrim ve insan perspektifi düşüncesi bilginin olduğu kadar yanlıgılarımız ve karşılamalarımızın da hem kaynağını hem de çözümlerini kendi bilme yetilerimizde bulmalıdır. Eğer kendi aklımızın yapısından kaynaklı (olumsallık ve zorunluluk sorunu) bir sorunu çözmek üzere görüşel bir anlama yetisine başvurursak Kopernikçi devrime ihanet etmiş oluruz. Kant doğanın birliğini kavramamız için çokluk ve çeşitliliğin temeli bir anlama yetisiymiş gibi düşünmemiz gerektiğini söylemektedir (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. 180). Empirik yasaların zorunluluğunun bir başka anlama yetisi tarafından kurulduğu düşüncesi insan perspektifi açısından olanaklı bir düşünme biçimi olsa da, eleştirel felsefe açısından çelişkilidir. Görüşel anlamda doğayı *a priori* olarak belirlememizin olanaklı olmadığı doğru olsa da, başka bir anlama yetisini zorunluluğun koşulu kılmak Kopernikçi devrimin varsayımına aykırıdır. Algımızın tüm zorunluluğu bilişsel gücümüze dayanmalıdır. Kant tekileri tümüyle belirleyemediğimizi ve bilginin gidimli (diskursif) karakteri nedeniyle doğanın nesnel ve zorunlu olarak bilemediğimiz yönleri olduğunu yani antinominin zihnimizden kaynaklandığı gösterse de çözümü insan zihninde bulamıyor görünmektedir.

Çalışmanın sonucunda ereksel yargı antinomisinin çözümünün Kant’ın diğer antinomi çözümlerinde yaptığı gibi insan perspektifine dayanmadığını gösterilerek Kopernikçi devrimin temel ilkelerine aykırı olduğu ve çözmeyi amaçladığı sorunlara

vadettiği çözümleri sunamadığını yargısına varılmıştır. Antinominin çözümündeki başarısızlık ise tüm eleştirel sistemi tehdit etmektedir. Doğa ve özgürlük arasındaki uçurumu gidermek, doğanın anlaşılabilirliği ve yasalarının sistematikliğini (yani ilkeler ve kavramlara indirgenebilirliğini) temellendirmek için Kant sorunsal bir anlama yetisi varsayar. Önce insan aklı ve bilgisine sınırlar çizer sonra ise doğanın insan aklı tarafından kavranabileceğini temellendirmek üzere çizdiği sınırları aşar.

Olumsalın zorunluluğunu kavrayamıyor isek bilginizin sınırını kabul edebilir yani doğanın tasarımlama gücümüzün ötesinde bir çokluk ve çeşitlilik sunduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Tekillerin kavramlara indirgenebilirliği doğanın nasıl olduğunu değil bizim nasıl düşündüğümüzü göstermektedir. Yasalı bir birlik olarak doğa kavrayışı insana özgü bir anlayıştır. Ancak bilişsel yetilerimizdeki ayrılık bizi çokluk ve özdeşliğe dair karmaşaya düşürmektedir. Çokluğu kavramak için özdeşliğe (kavramlara) ve özdeşliği kavramak için çokluğa ihtiyaç duyarız. Fark ve çeşitliliği kavrama tabi kılınamayan olarak tasarlarız. Kopernikçi devrimin pozitif katkısını korumak üzere ereksel yargı antinomisinin çözümsüz olduğu yani olanaklı ile gerçek, olumsal ile zorunlu ayırmak zorunda olan insan bilgisinin sınırlarını imleyen bir sorun olarak kaldığı çalışmanın sonucu olarak ileri sürülmektedir.

Kant doğanın çeşitliliğinin anlamamıza olanak vermeyecek kadar muazzam olduğunu düşünülebileceğimizi de söyler (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. 185). Ancak daha sonra doğanın akıl tarafından bilinemeyebileceği düşüncesini bir batıl inanç olarak niteleyip insan aklının doğayı anlayabileceğini savunur. Ereksel yargı antinomisinin çözümsüzlüğü ise çokluğu özdeşliğe indirgeyerek yani kavramlar yoluyla (diskursif) edindiğimiz bilginin doğanın bütününe kavramamıza yetmediğini göstermektedir. Kopernikçi devrimin öznesi çeşitlilik ve çokluğu organize ederek bir *kozmos*'a dönüştürür. Doğa ise kendinde pekala *kaos* olabilir. Çeşitliliği özdeşliğe indirgeyerek anlaşılabilirliği dayatmak yerine kendinde doğayı bir gizem olarak da bırakabiliriz.

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Kireççi
Adı : Mert
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Nature and the Human Standpoint in Kant's Critical Philosophy

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: