

MONGOLIA AS THE REGIONAL MEDIATOR IN NORTHEAST ASIA:
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT

MONGOLIA AS THE REGIONAL MEDIATOR IN NORTHEAST ASIA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

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Northeast Asia is one of the most conflict prone regions in the world, which desperately lacks a successful conflict resolution mechanism. As there would be a high possibility of military conflict at any given moments, an immediate talk between the conflicting parties is necessary. While a great number of scholarly articles have been written about the conflict resolution possibilities in the region, there are not many independent studies on this issue with a focus on Mongolia neither in Mongolian nor in English. Thus this thesis aims to contribute to the literature and analyze the prospects of Mongolia for becoming a regional

intermediary in the Northeast Asian region within the scope of Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue, which was initially started by the Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj to settle the issue of kidnapped Japanese people by North Korea between the North Korean and Japanese governments in September 2007 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

Keywords: regional mediator, conflict resolution, Mongolia

ÖZ

MOĞOLİSTAN'IN KUZEYDOĞU ASYA'DA BÖLGESELE ARABULUCULUK ROLÜ: OLASILIKLAR VE SORUNLAR

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Kuzeydoğu Asya başarılı bir çatışma çözümü gerektiren, dünyanın çatışmaya meyilli bölgelerinden biridir. Bölgede heran çatışma çıkma olasılığı olduğu için mümkün olan en kısa zamanda çatışan tarafların biraraya getirilmesi önemlidir. Bu bölgedeki çatışma olasılıkları üzerine literatürde çok sayıda makale yazılmış ise de İngilizce ya da Moğolca yazılmış, bu tez konusuna özgü, bağımsız bir araştırma henüz yazılmamıştır. Bu yüzden bu tez çalışması literature kendi katkısını yapmayı amaçlar. Aynı zamanda Moğolistan Cumhurbaşkanı Elbegdorj tarafından, Japonya

vatandaşlarının Kuzey Kore’ce kaçırılması sonrası Japonya ve Kuzey Kore arasında ortaya çıkan gerginliğin çözümlü yolunda bir adım olarak başlatılan Ulanbator Diyalogu kapsamında, Moğolistan’ın bölgede arabulucu ÷lke haline gelmesinin olanaklarını da analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: bölgesel arabulucu, çatışma çözümlü, Moğolistan

“The impulse to try to solve problems by use of force is out of date and old-fashioned. Since we are now all so interdependent, the appropriate solution is to engage in dialogue – it’s something to which we can all contribute”

His Holiness the Dalai Lama

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEM	Asian-Europe Meeting Summit
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CEI	Central European Initiative
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapon States
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UBD	Ulaanbaatar Dialogue
UN	United Nations
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
TURKPA	Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Speaking Countries

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Subject in Question

Mongolia is a sparsely populated, developing country, which has a vast territory in the Northeast Asian region with a small state pursuing peaceful foreign relations with all countries around the world. However, the country, which once had founded the largest contiguous land empire, was under the control of China and Russia during much of the 18th and 19th century until it secured its independence with the Mongolian revolution in 1921 first from China and then in 1990 from Russia with a peaceful revolution of the Mongolian people, which brought a democratic regime into the country. Thereby Mongolia ended its long lasted stance from the Soviet camp in which it had to follow the Soviet ideology, positions and stand against not only the Western camp but also the communist China, as the Chinese-Soviet-Russian tension grew gradually from 1960s onward.

Compared to other countries in the Northeast Asian region especially to its two strong neighbors, Mongolia has lesser impact on the regional military, economy, and political

affairs. Although Mongolia lacks the capabilities to influence the regional economic and political affairs, regional stability, integration and the order, it has the potential to establish a dialogue mechanism between countries in conflict for a more secure region, such as between North Korea and South Korea and Japan. Creating a permanent dialogue between those conflict prone countries especially in this very critical moment of a high possibility of military conflict in the region is very crucial.

Mongolia remains the only country for North Korea to have constant stable relations, especially when North Korea and China has problematic relations time to time while China doesn't want any regime collapse or the unification of two Koreas in the region. Russia on the other hand does not take any clear stand on any side considering President Putin's current relations with the Trump administration, which may change every moment ahead. In these regards, Mongolia becomes the only country, which does not pose any threat or at least has no political self-interest towards North Korea, as it does not have any intentions to change the regional status quo or influence the regional power structure not only due to its lack of necessary capabilities economically and militarily but also due to its de-nuclearisation policy (Mongolia declares itself as a nuclear weapon free zone which requires Mongolia to remain neutral in its foreign policy). On the top of that, Mongolia has friendly foreign relations with all the Northeast Asian countries regardless of their political regime and these strongly established historical relations are still prevalent today in many spheres. Surprisingly those relations are growing progressively and rapidly at an unprecedented rate with each of Northeast Asian countries thanks to its friendly foreign policy.

Mongolia has stepped up its visibility in promoting the cooperation and peace in the region especially since mid-2000s, starting with the conference organized by the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies ‘Security Perspectives of Central and Northeast Asia: Ulaanbaatar as a New Helsinki’.¹ This led to so called “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue,” an institutional mechanism, which was initially started to facilitate a peaceful solution to the regional security issues between the conflicting states by the Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj under “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asia Security Initiative (UBD)” in 2013.

The U.S and other regional countries such as South Korea and Japan all are ready and open to any negotiations at anytime with North Korea regarding the nuclear warheads that North Korea is continuously testing since earlier this year; but North Korea is still silent against the proposed talks with the regional countries such as South Korea.² There is not even any direct hotline or communication tool between the two Koreas, which makes it extremely difficult even to invite North Korea to the talks.³ Both Koreas are in such a complicated communication crises, that South Korea proposes negotiation offer through television channels’ news conferences. Therefore, it is vital to create a stable and reliable communication between the two Koreas as the first step. After solving the

¹ For more details of ‘Ulaanbaatar’s Dialogue’ visit;
https://www.un.int/mongolia/sites/www.un.int/files/Mongolia/ulaanbaatar_dialogue.pdf

² Brandon Morse, North Korea Silent on South Korean offer for Military Peace Talks, July 20, 2017, Retrieved from <https://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/07/20/north-korea-silent-on-south-korean-offer-for-military-peace-talks/>

³ Huyng Jin Kim & Kim Tong Hyung, AP Explains: What’s Behind North Korean Silence to Talks offer, AP, July 21, 2017, Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/f98e0065af2c4a35a7ae3007ecdd7ffe>

communication issue, then it is possible to create a dialogue gradually between the two Koreas. And it is the role that Mongolia wants to play for communicating and mediating through its institutionalized mechanism not only between the two Koreas but also between other major regional powers such as Japan.

Then there is the question that should be asked beforehand, which is why Mongolia would and/or should become a regional mediator or what is the reason for playing such a role between regional powers along with the advantages and benefits such a role would provide for Mongolia. First of all, there is the possibility of a massive influx of millions of refugees from North Korea, which firstly would influence China and then Mongolia and possibly Russia as well (North Korea and Russia share only around 23 km of borders while North Korea and China share 1415 km).⁴ Since a massive influx of refugees can influence the socio-economic stability in Mongolia and China, both countries would not want any regime collapse that would lead to a massive influx of millions of refugees into their countries. Second of all, it is vital for small states like Mongolia to keep its presence in international community actively and to protect its national security through diplomacy and soft power as small states lack military and economic capabilities to do so. Therefore, taking the initiative and becoming the frontrunner in mediating between the conflicting states and further contributing to the regional stability becomes Mongolia's foreign policy priority. Fortunately, the current foreign policy of Mongolia as the so-called 'third neighbor' policy favors the respective initiative for mediating in the region. The 'third neighbor' policy, which allows Mongolia

⁴ Griffiths and Wang, Is China Reinforcing its Border with North Korea?, CNN, July 26, 2017, Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/25/asia/china-north-korea-border/index.html>

to balance its foreign relations with its two powerful neighbors, creates opportunities to take the initiative in leading regional mediation between the intra-national conflicts in the region.

The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether there are any possibilities for Mongolia to become a permanent regional intermediary state within the so called 'Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue' in Northeast Asia between the conflicting states such as South Korea, Japan and North Korea. Thus the respective set of research questions read as follows: Is there any case in international relations history, in which small states successfully mediated between conflicting states? What are the comparative advantages Mongolia has over other regional players such as China, which is the closest ally of North Korea, for the mediation between conflicting states? What roles can Mongolia play as a mediator between the existing intra-national conflicts? What initiatives have been made by Mongolia so far to create such institutionalized mechanism for peaceful resolution to the regional conflict as a conflict resolution in the Northeast Asian region?

1.2 Methodology

The sources of the thesis consist of primary sources such as the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia and the Head Office of the President, which hosts the official policies, bilateral and multilateral agreements, declarations, and speeches of the officials as well. As secondary sources, not only the literature review of the relevant books and articles in English, Mongolian and Russian are included but also

media such as online news and articles are used as the secondary sources of the thesis. As a methodology, this thesis applies nomothetic case study approach, which attempts to make generalizations from the compared and analyzed case studies.⁵ In this thesis, two case studies will be analyzed and compared, which are the cases of Austria and Finland. For being more systematic, I will apply ‘structured and focused comparison’ method for the cases above. The structured and focused method would help me to make the comparison more systematic while focusing on certain events or topics, which contribute to the subject of the thesis.⁶ Thus a set of general structured and standardized questions, which are in line with the objective of the thesis, will be asked for each case. And these structured and standardized set of questions will be applied equally to the all above-mentioned cases, as the case studies will be joined later by the additional cases in Chapter IV, in which Mongolian case of ‘Ulaanbaatar’s Dialogue’ will be analyzed. I have chosen this method for the comparison of the cases because it would help me to get focused and prevents from lengthy and unnecessary details as well.

The main three requirements of this method are the identification of class or subclass of the events, a well-defined objective and strategy of the research and finally variables of theoretical interest of purposes of explanation, which provide the leverages for policymakers to influence the outcomes. For the first requirement, the Helsinki Accords or the Helsinki Final Act for the case of Finland, and Central European Initiative (CEI),

⁵ Cone, J. D, "Idiographic, nomothetic, and related perspectives in behavioral assessment." In: R. O. Nelson & S. C. Hayes: *Conceptual foundations of behavioral assessment* (pp. 111–128). New York: Guilford.

⁶ George, Alexander L, and Andrew Bennett. *The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005, 67-69

which is a regional dialogue facilitator organization, in which Austria become one of the founding members and finally Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue for the case of Mongolia will be analyzed. For the second requirement, as stated above the objective of this research is to analyze the possibilities of being an intermediary state between the regional countries such as Japan, South Korea, and North Korea within the framework of Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue. As for the research strategy of the thesis, all the available and accessible information sources are included, but are not limited to, books and online articles and news. And for the third requirement, the possibilities and prospects for such mechanisms like the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue to promote peace and cooperation in the region will contribute to the researchers and scholars focusing on the Northeast Asian security or two Koreas' unification process. It is such an important topic nowadays for all the players who are involved in the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula, as the situation in Korean Peninsula deteriorates.

1.3 Selection of the Cases

Austrian and Finnish cases have been selected for the cases to be studied due to their different outcomes (successful and failed) in mediating, facilitating and finally opening up peaceful cooperation between the regional and global powers. Even though these cases had similar settings in terms of their political and cultural and historical background, they produced two different outcomes. Moreover, the main reason to select those cases is to analyze the mediating process from the small states' perspective, which at the same time pursue friendly and in some cases neutral foreign policies. Both Austria and Finland were

and are still small states in terms of their capabilities to make an impact on a global or regional socio-economic and political system. Even though the selections are not the ideal ones, they provide an in-depth understanding of the distinctiveness of these two mediations, which, I assume, can help prepare the necessary ground to evaluate the possibilities of Mongolia's intermediary within the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue in the Northeast Asia from the perspective of a small state.

1.4 Outline and the Main Argument of the Thesis

The thesis starts with an introductory chapter, in which the case studies, the methodological approach and strategies for the research are discussed. In the second chapter of the thesis, international mediation and a historical review of the intermediary states will be discussed. This chapter will also look into when and how states mediate in regional conflicts as a third party. The third chapter discusses the case studies from Austria and Finland respectively in which standardized and structured general questions will be asked. In the fourth chapter, the case of Mongolia within the scope of Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue as an intermediary state in the Northeast Asian region will be discussed. And finally in the fifth chapter of the thesis, the main findings from the research will be discussed as the conclusion.

1.5 Limitations of the Thesis and Further issues

The main limitation of the thesis, in my opinion, is the constraints of the sources, as this specific subject on the case of Mongolia is not studied and analyzed enough. Thus the research of the thesis heavily relies on literature reviews of the related academic books and online articles and online media news as well.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

2.1 What is Mediation?

The mediation is one of the conflict resolution processes, which designed to help the disputants of the conflicts without applying physical force or authority of law. The mediation can be an offer from a third party, which can be an individual, an organization or a state, to the disputants or vice versa for a help to change the conflicting parties' perceptions or behaviors.⁷ The mediators can be then not only states but also individuals, groups and international organizations. However, mediators, who mediate between the disputants with the hope of changing or influencing the disputants' perception or behavior, do not, or, as by its nature of the intermediary, cannot provide or

⁷ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004
Retrieved from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med-intractable-conflict>

impose any solution to the disputing parties.⁸ As mentioned above, mediation is a process in which a mediator mediates between disputants ‘voluntarily’ as the mediation is based on solely on volunteering not on force or any authority law. Since the mediation is based on volunteering, the outcome of the mediation will be legally non-binding, which makes it distinct from other peaceful external intervention for a conflict management.⁹

It is possible to list the main characteristics of a mediator, which are listed as follows:

1. Mediation is offered to the third party by the disputants at their own efforts when they failed to reach a consensus;
2. Mediation involves a third party involvement, which can be an individual, group or an organization;
3. Mediation is non-coercive, non-violent and non-binding;
4. Mediator mediates to influence, affect, resolve or modify the conflict. Mediator’s overriding interest is to reduce the violence and reach a peaceful outcome;
5. Mediators come to the mediation with their resources, ideas, knowledge and prestige, which are used to contribute to the resolution of the conflict;
6. Mediation is based on a voluntary principal. This implies disputants have the right to accept the mediation or reject or withdraw from the mediation;

⁸ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004.

⁹ Jacob Bercovitch & Su-Mi Lee, *Mediating International Conflict: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies*, Retrieved from http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol8_1/Bercovitch.html

7. Mediation is based on an ad-hoc basis only, which means once the mediation finishes, the mediator of the mediation departs from the conflict.¹⁰

In addition to the list above, the mediation not only offered from disputants' side but also it can be offered from a third party's side.¹¹ A third party intervention to the disputants is not limited to individuals, groups and organizations but also states do intervene actively and effectively.¹²

However, there are some scholars such as Leonard Riskin, who developed the model of "evaluative mediation" in which disputants seek mediators to solve their disputing issues or technical problems.¹³ It is believed that the disputants are desperately in need of direction, which would be provided by the mediators. According to this model, the mediators are believed to have all the necessary qualifications for the direction or technical problems that the disputants need. The model of facilitative mediator, on the other hand, views the disputants as rationale actors who are capable of solving their problems and are well aware of the situation than the mediator.¹⁴ This model takes the mediator more as a communicator between the disputants. These two models represent one of the big debates in the academic literature of mediation, which circles around

¹⁰ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

¹¹ Wall et al, Mediation, Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3, June 2001, p373

¹² Thomas Princen, Introduction: Intermediaries in International Conflicts, in *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, p6

¹³ Douglas Noll, A Theory of Mediation, *Dispute Resolution Journal*, February 2001, p4

¹⁴ Douglas Noll, p5

whether evaluative mediator model belong in the definition of mediation or not.¹⁵ For this thesis, the model of facilitative mediation is adopted, as the acceptance of the mediator within the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue or any other possible dialogue or talks with North Korea would completely depend on North Korea's or Kim Jong Un's decision to accept any dialogue with the regional and non-regional players (such as the U.S). So far the U.S¹⁶ and the South Korea¹⁷ have shown their willingness officially to set up a dialogue with North Korea, whereas Japan have not openly called North Korea for any talks but the Japanese Government officially expressed that Japan is ready for a dialogue with North Korea.¹⁸

Mediation as one of the conflict resolution techniques for conflict management is considered the most promising peaceful approach for the conflict management than other possible peaceful and non-peaceful conflict management strategies such as use or threat of use of force.¹⁹ Arbitration is another alternative which is different from mediation, as the dispute or conflict is submitted, by an agreement signed by the disputants, to the

¹⁵ Douglas Noll, p6

¹⁶ Nicole Gauette and Luara Koran, Tillerson says US is willing to talks to North Korea, CNN, August 2, 2017, Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/01/politics/tillerson-north-korea-us/index.html>

¹⁷ Krishnadev Calamur, Will North Korea Accept the South's Offer of Talks?, The Atlantic, July 17, 2017, Available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/korea-talks/533838/>

¹⁸ Japan Announces News Sanctions on North Korean after Satellite Launch, Channel News Asia, February 10, 2016, Available at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/japan-announces-new-sanctions-on-north-korea-after-satellite-lau-8177996>

¹⁹ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

arbitrators, who will make a final legally binding decision for the dispute or conflict.²⁰ Therefore, it is safe to say, that mediation is a process, which is done voluntarily by a third party with the hope of changing or influencing the disputants attitude towards the ongoing conflicts in a peaceful manner without imposing or suggesting any resolution from the mediator's side. However, since the mediation is based on volunteering as a principal, the final outcomes of the mediation would also be legally non-binding.²¹ In order to do so, the mediator applies soft methods such as the process of information exchange and social influence other than the hard ones such as violence or authority law.

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Since the World War II, 1334 mediation between 333 disputing states and civil conflicts took place according to the report by 'International Conflict Management Dataset'.²³ This is the number of mediations, in which state-led mediations, the most common type of mediation, took place in international conflict arena. If we add those mediations to the numbers above that are, by its security requirements, secret and confidential, no doubt to say, mediation by far considered one of the most applied method of conflict resolution for conflict management in international conflicts. The whole mediation process, from the venue (where it will take place) to the date of the mediation is considered confidential to

²⁰ 'What is Arbitration' World Intellectual Property Organization, Retrieved from <http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/what-is-arb.html>

²¹ Jacob Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee, Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies, International Journal of Peaces Studies, Retrieved from http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol8_1/Bercovitch.html

²² Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

²³ Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, Volume 2, Issue 1, April 2013, p78

all the parties participating to the mediation process. Thus the security measures and the secrecy of the mediation process makes it difficult for the researchers to study and investigate the mediation processes.²⁴ The mediations that are known to the public are those of the formal ones, whereas it is still unknown that how many of mediations are informal or behind the scenes.

The most common mediations are ‘state-led’ mediations, in which the state plays the intermediary role between the disputants. The first mediation in the history dates back to 209 B.C between Aetolian League and Macedonia to settle the Macedonian war by the Greek city-states.²⁵ Until the 20th century, intermediary states acted differently than those contemporary understanding of mediators. Mediation and intermediary states were conducted only by the great powers or by concerts of powers in conferences or congresses in Europe not voluntarily but coercively, where other related parties to the mediation process were excluded if the great powers were involved.²⁶ Today it is not only the great powers that mediate in international conflicts but individuals, groups, international organizations and small states do mediate. Since our focus is on states especially on small states, it is the intention of this chapter to examine the peculiarities of an intermediary state. The following section make an introduction to the examination of an intermediary state through the section of ‘International Mediation’, since the state-led mediation takes place at the international level not at domestic level.

²⁴ For more details about the ‘International Mediation’, visit; <https://www.questia.com/library/politics-and-government/international-relations/international-mediation>

²⁵ Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, Volume 2, Issue 1, April 2013, p78

²⁶ Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, Intermediaries in International Conflict, Princeton, 1951, p6

2.2 International Mediation and Intermediary States as Third Parties

International mediation is a mediation process used to settle conflicts in international relations. In general, it is possible to talk about different levels and types of mediation. Mediations can be divided into two main levels: domestic and international. Any disputes that take place within one country become a domestic mediation, whereas international mediation involves more than two different countries. The third party intervention or in our case ‘intermediary state’ was not relevant in the context of international politics and security of the Cold War period.²⁷ The U.S and the Soviet Union had bilateral relations, which left little room for the third party interventions such as the European powers or regional powers such as China and Japan.²⁸ However, when it comes to the regional or civil conflicts, intermediary states were and are still surprisingly prevalent today. For instance, state intermediary can be widely seen in the border and inter-communal disputes in Asia, Africa and Latin America.²⁹

Intermediary states, those that are including big and small states, private individuals, corporations and international organizations, are offered to mediate or take the role of the mediator at the regional level in a peaceful manner with the aim of the settlement of the

²⁷Thomas Princen, p13

²⁸ Thomas Princen, p13

²⁹ Thomas Princen, p18

conflict. It is possible to make distinction between mediators. There are four different kinds of mediators as follows: individuals, international organizations, regional governmental organizations and states.³⁰

It is also possible to divide the types of mediators into two general categories, which are: state and non-state mediators or so-called official and non-official mediators.³¹ One of the fundamental differences of state as a mediator from other non-state mediator or non-state intermediary is the influence of its public opinion, domestic politics and more importantly its capability to use power over the disputants. Mediators' capability to use power or threat over the disputants is an example of a classical form of intervention by great powers such as the interventions of Nixon-Kissinger and Jimmy Carter's mediation in the Middle East in 1970s.³² In addition to that official mediators are mandated to do the mediation. Depending on the conflict, mediator can choose from the two very different roles as an intermediary state and those are dialogue facilitation and problem solving.³³

One of the other significant differences of states as mediators is states' considerable amount of material resources, its management and importantly the official representatives or leaders, who are officially mandated to do so. Official mediation of the state is often

³⁰ Molly M. Melin, p78

³¹ Hans Giessmann and Oliver Wils, Conflict Parties' Interests in Mediation, Berghof Policy Brief 01, September 2009, p3

³² Thomas Princen, p14

³³ Hans Giessmann & Oliver Wils, p3

conducted by the leaders, politicians or official representatives of the mediating states.³⁴ When it comes to the factors that influence the mediation to get accepted by the disputants is the regime type.³⁵ The type of regime or the form of the government of the respective mediating state is one of the important factors, which influence whether it is accepted or offered to do the mediation as an intermediary state. Intermediary states are more likely to be accepted or offered an intermediary role if the intermediary state is a democratic state.³⁶ For the disputants part, it can be said the same. The more democratic the disputants are, the more chances for mediators to be accepted as the mediator for their conflict. For instance, Turkey's motivation to ask for the American and British mediators on the incident of Gaza-bound flotilla as an intermediary state can be given as an example.³⁷

2.3 Why Do States Mediate?

In the first place, it would be logical to cover the question of why states mediate before going through all the details. It would also contribute to analyze the mediation motivations of Mongolia within the scope of Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue. The disputants' willingness and motivation is more important than the mediators' in terms of successful mediation, but it is worth analyzing the motivations of the intermediary state as well.

³⁴ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

³⁵ Molly M. Melin, p84

³⁶ Molly M. Melin, p85

³⁷ Molly M. Melin, p9

States would want to mediate when they feel their interests are threatened. States choose to mediate especially when there is a conflict affecting their regional security and stability.³⁸ If we are to analyze Mongolia's possibilities for becoming a regional intermediary state in the region, the question of what small state means becomes important. And defining a small state would also explain the reasoning for choosing the cases from Austria and Finland, which will be analyzed in the next chapter. Therefore, before analyzing the motives of a small state for intervening as a mediator, the definition of a small state should be analyzed in the first place.

Currently there is no universal consensus for the definition of a small state in the literature. According to the traditionalist view of a small state in international security studies, small states:

- are not capable of protecting themselves in the event of violence,
- have no or very limited impact and/or influence in the games that are being played,
- have a limited range of actions.

These traditionalist way of defining small states leads us concentrate on material resources especially on military capabilities' of the states, which limits further understanding of the small states' challenges, opportunities and contributions of small

³⁸ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

states. Given the fact that most of the small states lack military powers.³⁹ Even though economic and human resources are included in material resources, military becomes the priority for the states' survival.⁴⁰

A quantifiable measure of state power is not an ideal way to define state capabilities.⁴¹ Any small state can be bigger in some specific relations but also can be considered weak in another relations.⁴² For instance, Ukraine would be considered a big state in relation to Moldova but it would be small state in relation to Russia. Finland would be considered a big state in relation to the Baltic States such as Latvia or Estonia but for NATO, it would be considered a small state.

Small states are always weaker in an asymmetric relationship and are unable to change the nature of their relationship to great powers.⁴³ For instance, any consequences of the US leaving NATO or Russia leaving the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would have more impact than, for instance, Sweden leaving NATO or Kyrgyzstan leaving the SCO. Therefore, small state is not an absolute but a comparative concept. Even though it is possible to define small states by their material resources; there is no such clear-cut line in the definitions of small states. But it is possible to make the categorization of small

³⁹ Wivel et al, *Setting the Scene, Small States and international security*, 2014, p7

⁴⁰ Wivel et al, p7

⁴¹ Wivel et al, p8

⁴² Wivel et al, p9

⁴³ Wivel et al, p9

states, which are as follows: microstate, small states in developed world and small states in the developing world. ⁴⁴

Due to its security problems, for instance, lack of military capabilities or vulnerability to external invasion or violence, or political and economic vulnerabilities, which oftentimes provide an opportunity for an aggressor state to control through political and economic leverages, small states have to protect their national security and interest (or at least minimize the risks) by taking part in international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconstruction or stabilization. ⁴⁵ By focusing on these initiatives, small states would be able to specialize on some capabilities necessary for bargaining in international partnership for example.

2.4 When Do States Mediate? When Do Disputants Seek Intermediary States?

States do take up the role of mediator only after careful strategic calculations. The strategic calculations or the level of potential benefits from the mediation can be the final deciding factor for whether states take the role of a mediator or not. It is said that if mediating increases the potential benefits of the mediating state, and then it is more likely that the state offer or accept the mediation. The potential benefits can be material or non-material resources such as reputation or power. ⁴⁶ From the perspective of a mediating

⁴⁴ Wivel et al, p8

⁴⁵ Wivel et al, p36

⁴⁶ Molly M. Melin, p4

state, therefore, both its direct and indirect interests are the concluding factors for deciding whether to become a mediator or not.

One of the common but unspoken assumptions about the mediator is that they are apolitical; who do not have any interests in the mediation. But in fact mediators have their own interest and their interests fundamentally differ from each other, which can potentially separate the mediators in two different categories. The two kinds of mediators are ‘principal mediator’ and ‘neutral mediator’. A principal mediator is a mediator, who does have both direct and indirect interests in the disputed issues, whereas a neutral mediator has no interests either direct or indirect interests in the disputed issues.⁴⁷ It is crucial both for the mediating states and disputants to distinguish the interests as the different third party interests that can lead to different resolutions.⁴⁸ As Mongolia primarily is concerned with the regional security, within the Ulaanbaatar’s Dialogue, it is involved in the mediation process not as a neutral mediator as it has a indirect interest in the dispute, which involves North Korea’s all kinds of nuclear weapon use and tests including inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). But Mongolia can also be involved in the mediation as a principal mediator because of its indirect interest in the dispute. This issue will be discussed further in the Chapter IV.

On the other hand, from the perspective of the disputants whether to offer a mediator role to a third party or accept the mediator for their conflict, depends on the outcomes. One of the possible ways to explain the deciding factors for requesting or accepting any mediator

⁴⁷ Thomas Princen, p20

⁴⁸ Thomas Princen, p18

state or not for the disputants is to explain it by the ‘expectancy theory’. According to the expectancy theory, people behave in a certain manner regarding the outcomes of the behavior, which is likely to result in a preferred outcome states. In another words, motivation of a person, who is about to select one behavior from a larger set of behaviors, will result in the attainment of various outcomes weighted by the person’s desirability of the outcome.⁴⁹ If it is applied to mediation, the disputants seek mediation or an intermediary state only to the extent to its own ‘net outcomes’. Net-outcome refers to each disputants’ expected or calculated outcomes rather than its joint outcome from the mediation process, which at the same time to be greater than the current interaction.⁵⁰ If disputants’ expected net-outcome or the potential net-outcome from the mediation increases or the expected cost decreases, it is more likely that the disputants would ask for or accept mediation. If the expected cost increases, it is more likely to decrease the disputants’ willingness to apply for an intermediary state. On the other hand, if the net-outcome of the opponent’s raises, it is assumed that the other side’s net-outcome would decrease. Hence, disputants’ motivation to seek mediation would decrease if there is any factor that increases the other side’s net-outcome.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Richard L. Oliver, Expectancy Theory Predictions of Salesmen’s Performance, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. XI, August 1974, p243, Retrieved from [https://archive.ama.org/archive/ResourceLibrary/JournalofMarketingResearch\(JMR\)/documents/5002013.pdf](https://archive.ama.org/archive/ResourceLibrary/JournalofMarketingResearch(JMR)/documents/5002013.pdf)

⁵⁰ James A. Wall et al, Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development, SAGE Social Science Collection p374

⁵¹ James A. Wall et al, p374

There is no precise theory of mediation developed so far even the literature written on mediation is so vast.⁵² However, there have been ongoing works on developing theories for mediation or at least applying other applicable theories from international conflicts and security studies but there has not been any consensus on the theoretical side.

However, it is possible to list the main conditions for a successful mediation for an intermediary state. The conditions are as follows:

1. Mediator state becomes a successful mediator, only when it has legitimate leaders, who have considerable control over its territory.
2. Mediation would be effective if there are no sections or fractions in each community, which are committed to the continuation of violence.
3. No super power or major power involvement in the mediation process as major powers do possess direct interests.
4. Mediator's role requires not only material resources but also requires non-material resources such as commitment, persistence and experience. Plus higher the prestige of a mediator, the more it is likely to be succeed.
5. In-depth understanding of the psychology of the disputant such as their feelings and grievances.
6. The timing of the mediation is vital. Thus the mediation should take place at the ripe moment, when the disputant feel exhausted and hurt or when they do not wish to accept further losses and prepared for a settlement.

⁵² Douglas Noll, A Theory of Mediation, Dispute Resolution Journal, February 2001, p1

7. As the conflicts are complex and multi-layered, an in-depth analysis, and knowledge of the conflict becomes one of the most important prerequisites of successful mediation in international conflicts.⁵³

It can be concluded that all conflicting parties make their own calculations of net-outcome from the mediation in the first place before considering any mediation. However, the mediation is more likely to succeed when the dispute reached an escalatory stage.⁵⁴ Because in the escalatory stage, conflict disputants start perceiving the third party intervention as helping them to gain some vital advantages over the dispute such as:

1. Enhancement of the legitimacy of disputants' policies and actions,
2. Indirect international recognition,
3. Relieving international pressure,
4. Generating political, technical and financial support,
5. Buying time to regain strength,
6. Gaining political initiative.⁵⁵

Thus, the timing of the mediation should be offered accordingly as it influence the effectiveness of the mediation. But for the conflicting parties, they start seeking third party intervention when they cannot win the war and the additional conflict becomes

⁵³ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

⁵⁴ Siniver, Power, Impartiality and Timing, p806

⁵⁵ Hans Giessmann & Oliver Wils, Conflict Parties' Interests in Mediation, Berghof Policy Brief 01, September 2009,p4

counterproductive and costly, or when they lack international support or civilian casualties increases, or when mobilization of their force cannot be guaranteed.⁵⁶

2.5 How Do States Mediate?

Mediation involves at least two different parties interacting and disputing with each other over a certain issue or issues to an extent, where it finally necessitates a third party involvement in the dispute with a role of mediating between them voluntarily. The process of the mediation from the mediator's side, as we discussed before, starts with a strategic calculation of the mediator state on its benefits from the mediation. A state decides whether to intermeditate between the disputants after its decision based on its strategic calculations. The role of an intermediary can be offered from the disputing parties or it can be offered from non-disputant state to mediate between the disputants. The process of the mediation from the disputants' side starts with calculating the net-outcome from the mediation. In short, higher the net-outcome, the bigger the chances for the disputants seek for a mediator's help.

Mediation process involves two different inter-dependent processes:

1. A request from the disputants to an intermediary state/states to mediate between them or vice versa,

⁵⁶Hans Giessmann & Oliver Wils, p6

2. An acceptance to mediate from the intermediary state to the disputants or vice versa.

There are other factors other than the expected outcome and benefits, which foster mediation to occur. One of the relevant factors to the intermediary state is the norm that enclosed in culture. According to the cultural efficacy theory, most of the countries from Asia such as China, Korea, Japan, Thailand and Turkey, are eager to use mediation as they have witnessed disputes being handled by mediation. In the U.S, on the contrary, a third party intervention, as a solution for the dispute is not common.⁵⁷ Cultural aspect of the mediation, in terms of accepting or offering mediation, cannot predict the whole story.⁵⁸ For instance, the Chinese norm as potential hypothesis, which is based on the Confucian philosophy, for requesting a third party for an intervention for the disputes cannot be true for the Chinese, who lacks an access to the court for their disputes to be solved. Thus, it is advised to trace down on each specific society whether the norms are embedded in their culture.

2.6 The Process of Mediation & Strategy

The objective of any mediation is to resolve the conflict or at least to show a willingness to do so.⁵⁹ To reach these objectives, mediators apply certain strategies, which differ

⁵⁷ James A. Wall et al, p372

⁵⁸ James A. Wall et al, p373

⁵⁹ Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

from each other in terms of their strategic behavior. A mediator's choice of strategic behavior is built upon the specific context of the conflict and the level of its involvement in the conflict. According to Touval and Zartman, three are different types of strategic behaviors in terms of the mediator's involvement ranging from the lowest to the highest that are: communication-facilitation strategy, procedural formulation strategy and manipulation or directive strategy.

Table No 1 ⁶⁰

Types of Strategies	Mediator's level of involvement	Tactics	Advantages	Disadvantages
Communication Facilitation	Lowest	-Make contacts with the disputants -Gain the trust of the disputants -Be neutral & avoid taking any stands -Organize an interaction between	-Clear communication, which can be one of the main important factor for successful conflict resolution	-Less control for the mediator, which can extend the mediation process

⁶⁰ Table showing tactics, advantages and disadvantages for each type of strategies

		<p>the disputants</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Provide the missing information -Identify the interests & problems -Create a framework for mutual understanding -Offer positive evaluation -Facilitate an efficient and a meaningful communication 		
Procedural- Formulative	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Select the venue for the talks -Create the protocols -Propose the procedures of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Keep the mediation process to the point and focused, which can lead to quick resolution 	

		<p>talks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Control timing, pace, agenda and form of the talks -Remind the common interests of the disputants 		
Manipulative or Directive	Highest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Influence disputant's expectations -Take the responsibility for the concession -Make a proposal -Provide the necessary information & filter the information -Reward disputant concession -Press the disputants to be flexible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Provides the chance to control the mediation process for mediator -the dispute can be solved quickly as disputants start refrain from losing more control to the mediator 	<p>No freedom for disputants to have control over their disputes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Disputants may withdraw from the mediation if the mediator press them too much

		-Offer resources -Threatening withdrawal -Offer to verify compliance with agreement		
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Directive strategies can be the most effective from those mentioned strategies in terms of conflicts, especially where the military involved.⁶¹ Even though the ‘communication facilitation’ strategy is the most applied; it is the least effective in terms of successful resolution.⁶² Beside the mediator’s strategic behavior, the structure of the mediator’s intervention and the bargaining structure, which change depending on the mediator’s interests, are as important as the respective strategies mentioned above. Depending on the mediator’s differences in their interests, it is possible to categorize two distinct mediator types, which are the principal mediator and neutral mediator.⁶³ Since Mongolia has indirect interests to the regional dispute, it is considered ‘a principal mediator’, thus, focusing on the principal mediator’s mediation intervention structure in this chapter would be accurate.

⁶¹ Jacob Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee, Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies, International Journal of Peace Studies, Retrieved from http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol8_1/Bercovitch.html

⁶² Bercovitch, Jacob. "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2004

⁶³ Thomas Princen, p19




Figure 1⁶⁴

2.6.1 Principal Mediator

A three-way bargaining can be created as a structure for the principal mediator's intervention, which involves three different dynamics.⁶⁵ These dynamics can happen all at the same time or one of them each independently to reach a deal. The different possible dynamics are as follows:

1. Direct bilateral bargain or side deals, which happens only between one of the disputants,
2. Parallel bilateral bargain or coalition, which happens between one disputant and the mediator to compel the other disputant for a deal,
3. Circular three way bargain, which includes all.

The first version leads to the second version. In the first one the mediator directly bargains with one of the disputant. As a result, there can be a coalition between the

⁶⁴ For more details of 'Principal Mediator' see Thomas Princen, p24

⁶⁵ Thomas Princen, p23

mediator and one of the disputants, which can then pressure the other disputant to make a deal. In the circular three way bargaining structure, the mediator first makes a deal with one of the disputants, who will then make a deal with the other disputant and finally the last disputant who made a deal with the other disputant makes a deal with the mediator. ⁶⁶ The main characteristic of this bargaining structure is the three-way bargaining as the mediator only concerned with side deals, coalitions and circular bargaining.⁶⁷ However, it is worth noting that the mediator only mediates between the disputants if it only has an indirect interest in the disputed issue of the disputants. ⁶⁸ The most significant effect of these structures is it changes the weight and the consequences of the outcomes, as the objective of entire mediation process is to rearrange the payoffs. ⁶⁹

⁶⁶Thomas Princen, p23

⁶⁷Thomas Princen, p24

⁶⁸Thomas Princen, p23

⁶⁹Thomas Princen, p25

CHPATER III

THE CASE STUDIES: AUSTRIA AND FINLAND

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the case of Austrian mediation request for the Vietnam War between the U.S and North Korea and the case of Finland's Helsinki Act will be briefly analyzed. As the structured and standardized question for the two cases, these two questions will be asked for each of these cases respectively:

1. What are the conditions for successful or failed mediation?
2. What are the common backgrounds of these cases as a mediator state?

3.2 Austria

3.2.1 Austrian Foreign Policy

Austria is a federal republic in central Europe landlocked between the Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy. The population of Austria is around 8.7 million and has one of the highest living standards in the world. Austria joined the United Nations in 1955 and the European Union in 1995.⁷⁰ Even though Austria became a member of the EU in 1995; Austria played a special role not only between superpowers but also between superpowers and non-aligned nations during the Cold War. As a neutral state, it was able to host very important meetings such as the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in 1961, Carter -Brezhnev meeting in 1979 and Conventional Force Reduction Talks, which took place in 1989 in Vienna.⁷¹

Austria pursued a neutral foreign policy, which can be characterized as a small state strategy between 1955 till 1989.⁷² As one of the inevitable consequences of real politics, pursuing a neutral foreign policy has always been influenced by the neighboring countries and superpowers.⁷³ In April 1955, Austria obliged itself to everlasting neutrality with the Moscow Memorandum, which was negotiated between Austrian and Soviet delegations in Moscow. As a result, the Soviet Union signed the Austrian 'State Treaty', which recognized the Austrian independence by the Soviets.⁷⁴ And by October 1955, the Austrian Parliament passed the Austrian constitutional law on its neutrality and

⁷⁰ For more details about Austria 'Facts and Figures', visit; <http://www.austria.org/overview>

⁷¹ Austrian-American Relations from Cold War to Post Cold War, Retrieved from <http://www.austria.org/new-page-2/>

⁷² Yoshikazy Hirose, Austria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p212

⁷³ Oliver Rathkolb, International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality post 1945, Dmokraiezentrum Wien, p1

⁷⁴ The Austrian neutrality and its foreign policy, Retrieved from <http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/en/knowledge/timelines/the-austrian-neutrality-and-its-foreign-policy.html>

the Declaration of Permanent Neutrality officially entered into force by November 1955. Finally its allies recognized Austrian neutrality by the 6th December 1955.⁷⁵ Both superpowers used Austrian neutrality more as a communication place, where the two can meet for talks.⁷⁶ Since that time Austria could be able to host meetings between the East and the West.

The adoption of a neutral foreign policy in Austria created a platform, where the participants are regarded as equals. In this platform, Austria hosted many international conferences and negotiations and even became home to the headquarters of some international organizations.⁷⁷ For instance, the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are located in Vienna, just to mention few.

The Austrian neutral foreign policy from 1955 to 1980s can be considered as an active neutral foreign policy until when the two superpowers' relations started to break down. On the other hand the post-1980s Austrian foreign policy can be considered as a realistic neutral foreign policy.⁷⁸ As Austria can no longer benefit from the improving

⁷⁵ The Austrian neutrality and its foreign policy, Retrieved from <http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/en/knowledge/timelines/the-austrian-neutrality-and-its-foreign-policy.html>

⁷⁶ Oliver Rathkolb, International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality post 1945, p3, Demokratiezentrum Wien

⁷⁷ Yoshikazu Hirose, Austria's Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p212

⁷⁸ Yoshikazu Hirose, p213

relations of the two superpowers as they started to deteriorate from the middle of the 1980s. Since more than 50 per cent of the economic relations of Austria was with the member countries of the European Commission, a new interpretation of its neutrality did not meet any objection in the Austrian politics, which led to its becoming a member of the European Commission in 1989.⁷⁹

With the new interpretation for its neutrality, Austria has seen a dramatic change; for example, Austria allowed the U.S led alliance's war materials to pass over its territory during the Gulf War. Austria became a European Union member in 1995 with the two thirds of a 'yes' vote from the public referendum.⁸⁰ Thus, the integration to the Western Europe became a priority for the Austrian foreign politics.⁸¹

3.2.2 Austria As A Mediator between the U.S and North Vietnam in the Vietnam War

Vietnam War was one of the manifestations of the Cold War between the U.S and the Soviet Union in which around 2 million Vietnamese civilians have died.⁸² There were five different third party (both communist and non-communist states) proposals for the peace talks, which were all denied or disregarded till the U.S and North Korea accepted

⁷⁹ Yoshikazu Hirose, p213

⁸⁰ Yoshikazu Hirose, p214

⁸¹ Yoshikazu Hirose, p214

⁸² Vietnam War 1954-1975, Ronald H. Spector, Encyclopedia Britannica, For more details visit; <https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War>

France as their mediator for the peace talks.⁸³ Austria was one of the countries along with Finland, Sweden and Switzerland that proposed to mediate between the U.S and the North Korea.⁸⁴

Austria practices an interesting strategy for establishing diplomatic relations with divided countries such as the South and North Vietnam. It was common practice for Austria to choose the non-communist side of the divided territory to maintain its diplomatic relations. For example, Austria recognized South Korea and established diplomatic relations with it in 1962 whereas it did not establish any diplomatic relations with North Korea, which was criticized by the Soviet Union.⁸⁵ Austria expressed its willingness to mediate between the U.S and North Korea, issuing an official statement along with a press release on 13th of March in 1968 on *Wiener Zeitung* regarding the Austria's willingness to mediate for Vietnam War after receiving North Vietnamese delegation in Vienna.⁸⁶ North Vietnamese ambassador Mr. Hoang Luong to Budapest, Hungary wanted to visit Vienna to update the government of Austria on their latest developments in the war and to state that his country would not accept any talks regarding ceasefire unless the U.S troops withdraw from South Vietnam. North Vietnamese delegation in Budapest informed the Austrian government clearly through the Hungarian government that the

⁸³ Vietnam War Peace Talks, Retrieved from <http://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/vietnam-war-peace-talks/>

⁸⁴ Wolfgang Mueller and Maximilian Graf, An Austrian mediation in Vietnam? The superpowers, neutrality and Kurt Waldheim's good offices, p130

⁸⁵ Wolfgang Mueller & Maximilian Graf, p130

⁸⁶ Wolfgang Mueller & Maximilian Graf, p132

North Vietnamese government is not interested in Austria's mediation in the Vietnam War.⁸⁷

Austrian side was aware of the fact that the U.S and the North Vietnamese had direct contacts and finally North Vietnam accepted the U.S offer for negotiations but both sides could not reach an agreement on choosing the place where the negotiation talks would take place. The U.S was in favor of choosing between Switzerland and Sweden, whereas North Vietnam was in favor of Cambodia. The U.S didn't accept Cambodia as the mediation place because they had not established any diplomatic relations with Cambodia. The North Vietnam didn't accept Switzerland as it had a bad experience in Switzerland earlier regarding the negotiations. In addition to these mediation places, the Soviet side offered Poland, which was not accepted by the U.S as it also had a bad experience from the Korean War in which the U.S was bombarded with endless negotiations as it took place in the communist side of the country (North Korea).⁸⁸

After the rejection of Vienna as a mediation place by the North Vietnamese, Soviet Union had offered Paris for the Vietnam War negotiations. The U.S was offering Vienna along with other 14 cities as a mediation place to North Vietnam.⁸⁹ Paris had diplomatic relations with North Vietnam unlike Austria, which still had no intention to establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. North Vietnamese side was well informed

⁸⁷ Wolfgang Mueller & Maximilian Graf, p131

⁸⁸ Wolfgang Mueller & Maximilian Graf, p134

⁸⁹ Wolfgang Mueller & Maximilian Graf, p135

about the Austria's position on establishing diplomatic relations.⁹⁰ From the beginning of the 1968, Austria strived to be accepted as a mediator between the U.S and the North Vietnam. Austrian Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Kurt Waldheim led the Austrian initiative to organize mediation and did all the necessary meetings with the involved parties and/or countries such as both disputant sides and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and the U.S were all in favor of Austria regarding the mediation even though the U.S did not want many countries to be involved as a candidate for the mediation.⁹¹

3.2.3 Lessons learned from Austrian Case

One of the biggest reasons for losing the opportunity to host the mediation in its own country was that Austria had no diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. On top of that Austria had expressed North Vietnam that it would not consider establishing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in its meetings with North Vietnamese delegations. Thus, having a diplomatic relations with the disputant countries are vital to be considered as a mediator. But it can be concluded that pursuing a neutral foreign policy is the main factor to be considered to become a possible mediator in the first place. The plus for Austria was its location. Austria is located in between the two blocs like Switzerland, which provides a convenient place geo-strategically for the two blocks. Another very important factor for influencing the decisions of the disputants are the previous experiences of disputants regarding the mediator states and other candidate mediators. In terms of communication, a potential mediator state should inform the disputant sides

⁹⁰ Wolfgang Mueller & Maximilian Graf, p135

⁹¹ Wolfgang Mueller and Maximilian Graf, p134

proportionately even on their visits to other involved parties of the dispute. As in the case of Austria, even though Austria did inform all the involved sides of the Vietnam War including the Soviet Union about its willingness to mediate, it didn't inform or at least mention in their meetings with the U.S about their visit to Moscow.⁹² Therefore, it is better for the mediators to inform all the involved sides of the dispute about their moves proportionately from the beginning in order not to make them suspicious about their intentions, in which even tiny suspicious act of the mediator can lead to misperceptions. But considering other successful mediations that Austria mediated (for instance, Kennedy and Khrushchev meeting), it has not only built an extensive mediation experience for itself but also it has built an international reputation for Austria in terms of mediation and peaceful resolution. This had allowed Austria to become a regional dialogue facilitator and further strengthen the security in the region. Austria is one of the founders of Central European Initiative (CEI), which aims at supporting European integration through cooperation between its members and other EU members.⁹³ CEI was founded in 1989 and has 18 member states of which are mainly from the Balkans. The Balkans is home to one of the highest numbers of different ethnic groups and has seen several tragic ethnic conflicts in Europe, which was successfully resolved through internationally supported peacekeeping operations. While the past tragic conflicts resolved; there is always the possibility of a potential conflict in the region as it has one of the highest multi-ethnic settings. Regional stability is one of the main concerns for the Austrian economic prosperity; thus, it took the initiative to create an institutional mechanism to prevent such potential danger of conflicts in the region.

⁹² Wolfgang Mueller and Maximilian Graf, p132

⁹³ For more details of 'Mission and Objectives of Central European Initiative', visit; <http://www.cei.int/content/mission-objectives>

3.3 Finland

3.3.1 Finish Foreign Policy

Finland is one of the five Nordic countries with representative democracy and is located in the Northern Europe bordering only with Russia (1309 km) and Sweden (545 km) with access to the Baltic Sea. The population of Finland is around 5.5 million and has one of the highest per capita income countries within Europe.⁹⁴ Finland was part of Sweden from 12th to 19th century and an autonomous grand duchy of the Russian Empire from 1809 till 1917. It has secured its independence during the WWII from the Soviet Union with the help of the Nazi Germany by allowing German troops to pass through its territory to the Soviet Union.⁹⁵ Finland became a UN member in 1955⁹⁶ and a EU member in 1995.⁹⁷

During the Cold War Finland was a neutral country as its neighbor Sweden. It pursued a neutral foreign policy since the end of the World War II with the treaty it established with the USSR ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’ in 1948 in which Finland is obliged not to join any military alliance against the USSR and not to allow its

⁹⁴ The World Factbook, CIA, Europea: Finland, Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fi.html>

⁹⁵ U.S Relations with Finland, Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3238.htm>

⁹⁶ EU member countries in brief, Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en

⁹⁷ Finland in EU, Retrieved from <http://www.finlandun.org/public/default.aspx?nodeid=35893&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>

territory to be used for an attack against the USSR.⁹⁸ Like Austria's neutrality, which was bound to its Constitution, Austrian State Treaty 1955 and Moscow Memorandum 1955, Finland's neutrality was not confirmed by any international or national law, or at least by a pledge but by the bilateral treaty signed by Finland and USSR so-called 'Treaty Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance' in 1948.⁹⁹ Finnish neutral foreign policy during the Cold War period was an active peace policy, which was shaped by its neighboring countries and the Russification policy of the Russian Empire as well as the Cold War confrontation of the two great powers.¹⁰⁰ Finnish active peace policy means taking more initiatives for international peace and security at least in the region, by using its neutrality as a third party intervention in international or regional peace building process.¹⁰¹ Finnish neutral foreign policy like the Austrian one was compatible with the current prevailing power structure, whereas Swedish neutral foreign policy was to challenge the status quo and criticize the superpower condominium.¹⁰² Thus, Finnish foreign policy was designed to promote stability and cooperation between Finland and other countries from both blocks. Further Finnish Prime Minister Mr. Urho Kekkonen proposed the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 1961, with the aim of strengthening the Finnish role as a third party and gaining a greater recognition of Finland's neutral

⁹⁸ Neutral European countries: Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Retrieved from <http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/national-security/neutral-status/neutral-countries/>

⁹⁹ Neutral European countries: Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Retrieved from <http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/national-security/neutral-status/neutral-countries/>

¹⁰⁰ Janie Leatherman, Catalyzing Peaceful Change.From Cold War to Democratic Peace: Third Parties, Peaceful Change and the OSCE, p 79

¹⁰¹ Janie Leatherman, p 78

¹⁰² Janie Leatherman , p 78

foreign policy in the West.¹⁰³ Another step for Finland's further promotion of its neutrality and third party assistance was to play an active role in the UN, for instance, in the UN disarmament negotiations, which helped Finland get a seat on the Security Council in 1969.¹⁰⁴

3.3.2 Helsinki Final Act of 1975

Helsinki became an international mediation and negotiation place officially in 1975 by hosting a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This conference, in which 35 states participated, is one of the most spectacular gatherings of world leaders since the 1815 Congress of Vienna.¹⁰⁵ With the West German's *Ostpolitik* and France's rapprochement policy, the current Finnish policy as a watchdog in the Baltic Sea and in the region as a whole was seen inadequate as the depolarization process in Europe intensified and the East-West direct bilateral security conferences and negotiations started to take place without the involvement of a third party. Especially the exclusion of non-bloc states made the Finnish policy makers to rethink about their approach to make their country more involved in the debates that were taking place between the superpowers.¹⁰⁶ Thus, Finnish government started to search for opportunities for bridge building between the two blocks. Firstly, the Finnish officials decided to improve country's relations with the East mainly with the Soviet Union first and then the West in order to fully integrate

¹⁰³ Janie Leatherman, p 80

¹⁰⁴ Janie Leatherman, p 80

¹⁰⁵ Erwan Fouere, The OSCE marks 40 years since the Helsinki Final Act: Its principles are more valid than ever, 2015, p 2

¹⁰⁶ Janie Leatherman, p86

into the West. Secondly they decided to host the CSCE in Helsinki.¹⁰⁷ Hosting the CSCE on its territory could be used as a platform where Finland can gain legitimate acceptance of its neutral foreign policy. Finland throughout the 1960s and 1970s had avoided taking any stance or any sides, which would displease the Soviet Union.

Finland started to take more roles in the UN peacekeeping operations such as the one in Cyprus and the Middle East and cooperate more with other Nordic countries without risking its neutral foreign policy.¹⁰⁸ Eventually Finland had built its identity as a small neutral state, which was eager to build a dialogue between superpowers. The first step toward hosting the conference was to draft a memorandum of invitation to all potential parties to the conference. However, Finnish officials faced a challenge, which was suspicion from its Western counterparts whether the issuance of the invitation was an independent initiative or as a result of pressure from the Soviets. Since it was the Soviets who had proposed to host the European Security Conference in Finland, to the Prime Minister Mr. Kekkonen. Soviets wanted to make borders in the West secure as it had a new confrontation in the East with the People's Republic of China.¹⁰⁹ It was actually not only Finland, which received a proposition from the Soviets to host the conference, but also Austria had expressed its interest to host the conference.

¹⁰⁷ Janie Leatherman, p 87

¹⁰⁸ Teemu Palosaari, Still a Physician rather than a Judge? The Post-Cold War Foreign and Security Policy of Finland, p 360

¹⁰⁹ Janie Leatherman, p 90

The Soviets had issued a memorandum to all the involved parties in Europe and also to the U.S and Canada about the security conference. In this situation, Finland had to move fast if she really wanted to host the conference but Western states had the suspicion that the Finland is dependent on the Soviets. In order to make things clear, the then Finnish Prime Minister Mr. Kekkonen paid an official visit first to Paris to meet with the then French President Charles de Gaulle in 1969. After gaining his support, in February 1969, an official visit of Finnish Foreign Minister Mr. Ahti Karjalainen was paid to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰ One of the main advantages that the Finland had for hosting the conference were not only its well balanced and friendly relations with all the European countries including both sides of Germany but also its sense of common identity with both disputants.¹¹¹ Another very important plus of Finland was its ability to sense the sensitivity of the political context regarding the German issue. Finland not only had all the necessary resources, skills, information and knowledge but also had the ability to cope with the politically sensitive issues, which provided a comparative advantage to Finland over other potential neutral countries that were willing to host the conference in their countries.

3.3.3 Lessons learned from Finnish Case

Finland had successfully hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with the participation of 35 states on 1st of August 1975 in its capital Helsinki and had

¹¹⁰ Janie Leatherman, p 89

¹¹¹ Janie Leatherman, p 88

played an active role for the preparation of the conference since the late 1960s. The outcome of the conference was the ‘Helsinki Final Act’, which covered a wide range of global issues and had a great influence on the U.S-Soviet relations.¹¹² Finland strived to host the conference at home as it would help Finland’s neutral foreign policy to be accepted by the major powers and further help guarantee its national security. Finland overcame the biggest obstacle in hosting the conference at home, which was the distrust of Western countries, especially after the issuance of the Soviet memorandum about organizing the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. On top of that it was not a secret that Soviets were in favor of Finland for hosting the conference. So the question that need to be asked is why did Soviets choose Finland as the dialogue place? First of all, Finland was a neutral state, which strived to pursue a neutral foreign policy and had an equal friendly diplomatic relations with all the European states including the two Germanies. Second of all, it had all the mediation resources such as necessary skills, information and the knowledge. Finally, Finland was fully aware of the political sensitive issues and that’s why the preparation of the conference was devoted not to escalate the politically sensitive issues. Overall Finland filled the gap of leadership.

3.3 Conclusion

Both Austria and Finland played active roles in mediation and dialogue building between the great powers and both pursued a neutral foreign policy during the Cold War. They are

¹¹² The Centennial Story of Finland Part 7: Developing Welfare Services and Hosting Major Helsinki Conference 1967-1977, The Embassy of Finland, Washington D.C, Retrieved from <http://www.finland.org/Public/default.aspx?contentid=363876&culture=en-US>

still considered neutral states today.¹¹³ Even though the Austrian case was about the mediation role between the U.S and North Vietnam while the Finnish case was about hosting the conference, both cases enable us an in-depth look into the third party intervention process. As a third party, states can organize and host all kinds of third party intervention in diverse forms.

It is worth noting that Finland had a direct border with the Soviet Union, whereas Austria had borders with the Soviet satellite states, which can imply that the Finland felt the Soviet threat more than Austria did. Even though both countries had the same motivations for intervening as a third party, the immediate threat they had from the Soviet Union was at different levels. While both countries had all the necessary skills, knowledge and information for mediating and hosting conferences; they did not have diplomatic relations with every country. One of the biggest reasons for Austria losing the opportunity to host the mediation between the U.S and North Vietnam was it had no diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. Furthermore Austria from the beginning did not inform the involved parties about their official state visits to other involved states such as Soviets. A deeper review indicates that transparency in communication is vital for the potential mediator, in which all the involved parties, both directly and indirectly must be communicated and informed. In contrast, Finland had diplomatic relations with both sides of Germany.¹¹⁴ Plus Finland overcame the challenge posed by the Soviet memorandum, which raised suspicion from its Western counterparts. Finland did this by paying equally balanced

¹¹³ Neutral European countries: Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Retrieved from <http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/national-security/neutral-status/neutral-countries/>

¹¹⁴ Janie Leatherman, p100

official visits to all the relevant states and gained the support for hosting the conference. Additionally Finland invited all the related parties, not only the super powers and their allies, but also all neutral and non-aligned European countries so that the conference can be more inclusive. More importantly such a move helped it to keep its identity as a neutral state.

CHAPTER IV

MONGOLIA'S OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME THE REGIONAL INTERMEDIARY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ULAANBAATAR DIALOGUE

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Mongolia's mediation possibilities in the Northeast Asian region within the scope of its initiative called 'Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue' will be analyzed. Mongolia, which has a vast territory in the Northeast Asian Region, is a small and sparsely populated, developing country. It pursues a peaceful foreign policy but it is sandwiched between the two powerful countries, both of which possess nuclear weapons. Compared to other countries, Mongolia has less impact on the regional affairs with its economy, military strategy or politics. The Northeast Asian region has more conflicts, disputes and unsolved problems compared to other regions, so the region has been facing the need to solve the pressing issues. Mongolia has been making new initiatives to contribute to the regional security, however it is a small state with limited resources, to work as an intermediary between the regional countries and to create a safety dialogue mechanism in the region through diplomatic channels.

Nonetheless, Mongolia has many advantages for the mediator role and further creates dialogues between disputants. The country has been introducing various initiatives to the regional and non-regional countries in the recent decades. Initiatives such as mediations and dialogue facilitations has been launched by the Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia in 2013 at the VII. Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracy in Ulaanbaatar.¹¹⁵

4.2 History of the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue

Mongolia has been taking initiatives since 1980s to mediate and create a regional dialogue on security issues, in which involved Asian states were called for an all-Asian convention on prohibiting the use of force to prevent future conflicts between regional countries.¹¹⁶ Then from 2000s, Mongolia started officially to launch its willingness to be the regional mediator by organizing a conference on regional security issues such as 'The Security Perspectives of Central and Northeast Asia: Ulaanbaatar as the New Helsinki', which was organized by the Mongolian Strategic Studies in 2008.¹¹⁷ Finally after studying the possibilities for organizing dialogue between the regional states, Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj officially announced the Mongolia's initiative in the region as 'The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue' at the VII. Ministerial Conference of the Community of

¹¹⁵ For the full text of 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations' visit <https://www.un.int/mongolia/mongolia/ulaanbaatar-dialogue>

¹¹⁶ For the full text of 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations', visit; <https://www.un.int/mongolia/mongolia/ulaanbaatar-dialogue>

¹¹⁷ For the full text of 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations', visit; <https://www.un.int/mongolia/mongolia/ulaanbaatar-dialogue>

Democracy on April 29th of 2013. Since that time, Mongolia has organized various conferences, symposiums, forums and meetings actively, which involves the regional players. In the following section, the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue's objectives, structures and all the conferences, symposiums, forums and meetings, which were organized by the Government of Mongolia and Ministry Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, will be analyzed as an initial step towards building regional dialogue around 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue'.

4.2.1 The Objectives and the Structure of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue

Northeast Asia is one of the significant regions in the world in terms of its future development not only in terms of the gigantic economies of China, Japan and South Korea but also for the future development militarily.¹¹⁸ In the region, there is Russia and China, as members of the UN Security Council, economically developed countries such as Japan, South Korea, and conflict prone regions such as the Korean Peninsula, which all highlight how complex the region is. Many issues including the island disputes, border disputes, national minority problems, and distortion of the past are still hot and overly debated issues in this region. Northeast Asia is a vital space for the USA. The US defense policy core in the Northeast Asia is to ban the nuclear weapons that North Korea is developing as well as to keep its cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Peace and friendly relations have not been established in the region till today due to the above-mentioned issues. Therefore, it is required to hold various dialogues to ensure the security in the region as soon as possible.

¹¹⁸ Enkhbayar.N, "Future of Mongolia in Northeast Asia", Strategic studies, 2006, No 1, p 6

According to the official document of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, it is aimed to achieve short and long term goals, which finally form the formal institutionalized mechanism of dialogue and consultation in the Northeast Asia. In the short term, the following goals are set forth: confidence building and mutual trust building. Ulaanbaatar Dialogue starts its initiatives on diminishing the deeply rooted mistrust among the regional states through open discussions and forums. Thus it would help preventing and reducing the military tensions in the region. Open discussions to all the involved states of the region such as forums, meetings and conferences can help achieve the goal of confidence building. On top of that, intercultural events can also help building not only confidence but also mutual trust between regional states. Once these short term goals achieved, it is foreseen to reach a level of institutionalised mechanism of the Ulaanbaatar's dialogue with the interested regional and non-regional players such as the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the US.

This long-term objective defined by the Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj focuses on the removal of the suspicions that are prevalent between hostile states such as North Korea and other regional countries, which became chronic in the region, through negotiations, taking measures to strengthen the mutual trust and creating a mechanism for the Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security. As a result, issues on ensuring peace and stability in the region will be discussed on the basis of mutual trust and implemented in reality.¹¹⁹ The Strategic Studies Institute of Mongolia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia had successfully organized regular meetings with the purpose of introducing

¹¹⁹ "Remark on the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security", Strategic studies, 2013, No 4, p 114

this initiative to the relevant parties, involving them and implementing it in reality. In addition to these goals, studying and understanding the positions of the regional countries and other powerful states, which are involved in the regional issues, will be the fundamental condition to successfully hold the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue.

The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue focuses on the following areas:

- traditional security issues
- non-traditional security issues
- energy connectivity
- infrastructure development
- environmental protection

The above-mentioned prioritized areas will be discussed in the following structure: Track 1, Track 1.5 and Track 2.¹²⁰ The 'Track 1' discussions consist of high level of officials such as diplomats and government delegates and this structure provides the opportunity for the officials to express their views and to justify their positions and more importantly it helps avoid overlapping with other forms of dialogues, whereas the Track 1.5 and 2 consist of officials, experts and academics to discuss the issues under the Chatham House rule. (The Chatham House rule is a system for organizing discussion, in which the participants are free to use any information received without revealing the source of the

¹²⁰ Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, Introduction, p10

information that they used during the debates or discussions).¹²¹ This helps achieving mutual understanding of the participants and confidence building as well.

4.2.2 Steps taken for the Creation of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security

Since the official launching of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue by the Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj in 2013, several steps had been taken by the Government of Mongolia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the scope of Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue. The following events in the forms of symposiums, forums, conferences and meetings have been organized so far.

4.2.2.1 The Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians' Forum

This forum was successfully organized in Ulaanbaatar on November 24-25, 2013 for the first time within the scope of the initiative under the theme of "Roles of the Women Parliamentarians to Promote Peace and Development through Education".¹²²

In his opening speech, Parliament Speaker Enkhbold Zandakhuu said that 11 women were elected as parliamentarians in 2012 as a result of the regular parliamentary election of Mongolia. It was the highest index in the election results of the last 20 years since Mongolia's transition into democratic political system. A Parliament member Batchimeg

¹²¹ For more details of 'Chatham House Rule', visit https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule?gclid=COT3z_TA5NUCFUIq0wodA50MnQ

¹²² For more details of 'International conference on Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security', visit: http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3393%3A2014-06-10-06-45-41&catid=43%3A2009-12-20-21-55-03&Itemid=62&lang=mn

M. stated: “Well-being of our families and children and the peaceful situation of our country are very important for us (women) regardless of the nationality, religion and belief.” She underlined that high-level involvement of mothers and women in the politics and decision making, which affects the life quality and the progresses.¹²³

To analyze the results of the Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians, the initiator MP Batchimeg stated: “We have discussed the education, gender equality, family and children. The representatives mentioned about the prospects for the next meeting, so I hope that the second forum will be held soon”. The attendees noted that they have heard many interesting reports within a short period of time and even agreed on many issues.¹²⁴ It was the first official forum arranged within the scope of the Ulaanbaatar dialogue and was attended by the representatives from Mongolia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the UN. The forum brought all the related regional players except for Japan. But in terms of the outcome of the forum, it was a success.

4.2.2.2 The International Conference ‘The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security’

The international conference ‘The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on the Northeast Asian Security’ was successfully organized in Ulaanbaatar on June 17-18, 2014. Mongolia for the first time organized a conference attended by the representatives from nine countries within

¹²³ For more details of ‘Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians’ Forum’, visit; <http://www.mminfo.mn/content/52304.shtml?alias=politics>

¹²⁴ For more details of ‘Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians’ Forum was held successfully’, visit; <http://time.mn/index.php?module=news-detail&id=38123>

the scope of UBD. The opening ceremony of the conference was attended by MP and a member of the Policy Council of Strategic Researches Institute Batchimeg. The participation of the Mongolian President Elbegdorj raised the significance of the event.¹²⁵

The results of the conference can be summarized as follows:

1. The conference attendees analyzed that Mongolia has a full possibility to arrange a dialogue on the Northeast Asian security. Besides, the meeting laid a foundation to set up a network of researchers and scholars who support the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue.
2. Four sub-meetings held within the scope of the conference, which was attended by the representatives of Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, the US, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. The attendees exchanged views on the Northeast Asian security risks, economic and infrastructure cooperation, and strengthening of the mutual trust. It contributed in clarifying countries' position and reaching a mutual understanding. However, most of the representatives mentioned that the regional security is in an unstable and inextricable situation. They also underlined that time and efforts are required to solve those issues. For instance, in his report, Director of the Chinese International Studies Institute, Tsui Sin said: "There is no other region except the Northeast Asia which the situation reached to the level of the Cold War. Misunderstandings still exist between North and South Korea, South Korea and

¹²⁵ "Remark of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security", Strategic studies, 2013, No 4, part 114

Japan, Russia and Japan, as well as China and the USA. A senior researcher of the Japanese International Studies, Seichiro Takagi criticized that China has been pursuing aggressive policies in reality, however, he emphasized that China was eager to settle the territorial disputes by a way of reaching mutual negotiations. The representatives highlighted that the regional economic integration has been a “dream” due to the complicated regional security environment.

3. The participants underlined that the regional countries have further cooperation opportunities beyond the existing economic, political and social sectors. For example, North Korea has great economic resources and opportunities. If those opportunities were used correctly, development and progresses could be achieved.

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This event attended by the scholars and researchers from nine different countries, was a big step to reflect the recommendations of the researchers on how to settle the pressing issues of regional security, to strengthen mutual trust, and to create an unofficial diplomatic dialogue on deepening their cooperation.¹²⁷

4.2.2.3 An Expert-level Meeting on the Northeast Asian Energy

¹²⁶ International conference on Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security, Strategic studies, 2014, No 2, p 135

¹²⁷ International conference on Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security, Strategic studies, 2014, No 2, p 136

The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue was organized for the second time in Ulaanbaatar at the initiative of Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj. This meeting was attended by around 30 regional researchers from various energy studies and research institutions.¹²⁸

Mongolia has been pursuing the policy to make its contribution in solving the regional pressing issues in terms of developing friendly relations with all the Northeast Asian countries. Within the scope of this policy, the Strategic Studies Institute, Energy and Economic Institute and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia successfully arranged an expert-level meeting of the Northeast Asian countries entitled “Energy ties” in Ulaanbaatar on March 17-18, 2015. Representatives from five countries and more than 100 delegates from Mongolian institutions were present at the event and exchanged opinions on creating energy ties within the Northeast Asia. Presence of the representatives from the International Energy Agency and the Asian Development Bank promoted the significance of the meeting.¹²⁹

Mongolia declared itself as the nuclear weapon free zone. It makes an important contribution towards not only ensuring the security through the political and diplomatic means but also strengthening the transparency and stability in Northeast Asia and reducing the international nuclear weapons. Mongolia has no weapons, especially for mass destruction. This situation meets the interest of the neighboring countries and its ‘third neighbors’, which is a term used for its new foreign policy aimed to balance its two

¹²⁸ Ulaanbaatar Dialogue - Energy issues <http://mongolianeconomy.mn/mn/e/7532>

¹²⁹ З.Тэлмүүн, “ Монгол Улсын цөмийн зэвсэггүй статусын туршлагыг Зүүн Хойд Азид дэлгэрүүлэх боломжийн тухай ” Стратегийн судалгаа, 2015, №1, 42-р тал

gigantic neighbors. A nuclear weapon free zone prevents the possibility to use the territory of Mongolia against any use, transport, development and disposal of nuclear weapon on the territory of Mongolia. And prevents the territory of Mongolia to become the target of nuclear weapons considering Russia, China and North Korea.

The Northeast Asian countries, the UN and ASEAN forums and non-alignment movements and other international communities highly value the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia and make efforts to implement it. Establishment of the nuclear weapon free zone has attracted enormous amount of interest from the international communities and Mongolia expressed its willingness to informally cooperate with other countries as a result of having sufficient experiences.¹³⁰

4.2.2.4 The Northeast Asian Youth Symposium

The Government of Mongolia and the Ministry of Population Development and Social Welfare of Mongolia proclaimed 2015 as the Year for Supporting the Youth Development under the slogan ‘Youth Involvement in the Development of Mongolia’. One of the major activities planned for the Year for Supporting the Youth Development is the 13th General Assembly of Asian Youth Council arranged on May 18-21, 2015 under the theme “One Asia 2015: Youth involvement in Sustainable Development”.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Telmuun.Z, Opportunities to proliferate the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia in Northeast Asia, strategic studies, 2015, No 1, p 50

¹³¹ For more details of ‘Asian Youth Forum in Mongolia’, visit; <http://www.myf.mn/n/q7jy>

The event was jointly organized by the Government of Mongolia, Asian Youth Council and the Mongolian Youth Federation.¹³² The assembly was attended by a total of 600 guests including policy makers, researchers, guests and representatives from 23 countries. The Northeast Asian Youth Symposium and Investors and Businessmen Youth Forum were respectively organized during this event.¹³³

The Northeast Asian Youth Symposium concluded that young people should start implementing the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, which was first initiated by the Mongolian President. The attendees raised issues on the improvement of the cooperation between young people of different countries in ensuring the sustainable development of the region, increasing the possibilities of young people to get more educated, defining the pressing issues of the region's youth, making initiatives in solving those urgent problems such as climate change, youth rights, as well as political and economic stability. This symposium was significant in terms of letting the Northeast Asian youth understand about the ideas of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, to expand the cooperation between the Northeast Asian youth, to increase the involvement of young people for the regional security, and to make a declaration of the cooperation of Northeast Asian youth. It was attended by the representatives from Mongolia, China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea.¹³⁴

¹³² For more details of 'Asian Youth Forum in Mongolia', visit; <http://www.myf.mn/n/q7jy>

¹³³ For more details 'Asian Youth Forum in Mongolia', visit; <http://www.myf.mn/n/q7jy>

¹³⁴ Khongorzul.Ch: "Asian youth will hold a forum in Mongolia" <http://mnb.mn/i/52000>

4.2.2.5 The ASEM Summit in Mongolia

The Singaporean and French leaders initiated the Asian-Europe Meeting Summit in 1994. The First ASEM Summit was held in 1996 on Bangkok, Thailand.¹³⁵ ASEM is an event aiming to promote the cooperation between the Asian and European countries on the basis of mutual respect and equal partnership principle. ASEM has a total of 53 members including 27 members of the European Union, 10 members of the ASEAN, along with Australia, South Korea, China, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Norway, Russia, Pakistan, Croatia, Switzerland, New Zealand, India, Japan, European Commission and ASEAN Secretariat.¹³⁶

ASEM is a free platform for the decision makers, policy developers, experts, scholars, civil society figures and businessmen to exchange their views on various fields such as politics, economy and culture. There is no covenant confirming the mechanism and organizational structure with regular operations.¹³⁷

ASEM is regulated by:

- Summit meeting,
- Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers,

¹³⁵ For more details of 'ASEM & Mongolia', visit; <http://www.ikon.mn/n/bgn>

¹³⁶ For more details of 'About the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)', visit; <http://www.aseminfoboard.org/about>

¹³⁷ ASEM Summit Meeting will be held in Mongolia in 2016
<http://www.parliament.mn/news/open/categories/30/pages/16309>

- Regular meetings of the Finance, Economy, Environment, Culture and Labor Ministers,
- Meetings of senior officers and moderators.

Besides, decision makers, researchers, businessmen and civil society representatives freely express their positions; exchange their opinions and develop cooperation.¹³⁸

Mongolia was selected as the host of the 12th ASEM Summit Meeting at the previous Summit Meeting held in Milan, Italy. In his interview to the media after the decision to host the meeting in Ulaanbaatar in July 2016, Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj said: “It was a great and historical event. It shows that Mongolia’s prestige has reached a high level by gaining the right to organize this summit meeting. A total of 53 countries will join this meeting; the representatives of the 43 of them will be Presidents and Prime Ministers. It is a great responsibility to host this summit meeting in 2016, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of ASEM”. Besides, in his interview, former Prime Minister Bold said: “As a result of successfully hosting this summit meeting, Mongolia’s prestige will increase among the world countries”.¹³⁹

During this summit meeting, which gathered state heads, decision makers, researchers and experts of the world countries, Mongolia focused more on holding meetings with the state heads and high-ranking officials of the regional countries, to introduce Mongolia’s initiative on regional security, ‘The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue’, and to create an intergovernmental dialogue mechanism by expanding its scope. This summit meeting

¹³⁸ For more details of ‘ASEM&Mongolia’, visit; <http://www.ikon.mn/n/bgn>

¹³⁹ For more details of ‘ASEM&Mongolia’, visit; <http://www.ikon.mn/n/bgn>

would also give possibility to promote the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on the Northeast Asian Security to the representatives from other countries in order to receive their support as well.

4.2.3 The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Annual Conferences

The annual conferences of the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue began to be held in Ulaanbaatar since its official announcement in 2014 by the Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj. The annual conferences are co-organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia with the Institute for Strategic Studies under the directive of National Security Council of Mongolia.

The first annual conference of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue took place in Ulaanbaatar from June 17-18 in 2014. Scholars, experts and academics from 10 Northeast Asia and other major country's academics in the region, such as two Korea, China, Russia, Japan, UK, Germany, Netherlands and the U.S, participated. The participants of the conference had exchanged their views on the Northeast Asian security risks, economic cooperation and regional confidence building.¹⁴⁰ As one of its kind in the region, it was an important meeting in terms of building the networks between the academics and scholars, who focus on Northeast Asia.

¹⁴⁰ Mongolia's Institute for Strategic Studies, Retrieved from <http://www.iss.gov.mn/?q=node/466>

The 2nd annual meeting of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on the Northeast Asian Security took place in Ulaanbaatar from 23-24 June in 2015. This time the participants of the conference were mainly peace activists and experts coming from China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea, Russia and the U.S. The 2nd annual conference of the Ulaanbaatar's Dialogue highlighted the importance of creating a dialogue not only between all the 'Six Party Talks' member states but also between civil societies from the region.¹⁴¹ Throughout the conference following topics were discussed the creation of the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ), the replacement of Korean War armistice, the permanent peace treaty and so on.

The 3rd annual meeting of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, which took place in 2016, is significant in terms of its importance, as it brought the official delegates from North and South Korea for the first time since its official launch in 2013. In this annual conference, as many as 150 delegates from the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, the US, the UK, Australia, Germany, India and the UN as well as other international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Freidrich Ebert Foundation, had participated and discussed the regional security, economic cooperation and infrastructure connectivity along with environmental protection.¹⁴² Besides the conference, other series of important meetings had been held simultaneously such as 'the Northeast Asian Women Parliamentarians Conference', 'Northeast Asian City Mayors'

¹⁴¹ Launch of Ulaanbaatar Process for Dialogue in Northeast Asia, Retrieved from http://www.gppac.net/news/-/asset_publisher/fHv91YcOz0CI/content/launch-of-ulaanbaatar-process-for-dialogue-in-northeast-asia/

¹⁴² Ulaanbaatar Dialogue conference on Northeast Asian Security Concluded, Odonchimeg, Voice of Mongolia, 2016, Retrieved from <http://www.vom.mn/en/p/15977>

Forum’, ‘Northeast Asian Youth Symposium’ and ‘The Energy Connectivity Workshop’.

¹⁴³ In terms of building confidence and mutual trust between the Northeast Asian countries, 2016 annual conference was an important step in the creating of institutionalized mechanism of dialogue.

The most recent annual international conference of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue took place in Ulaanbaatar from 15-16 June in 2017, in which over 150 delegates from China, Russia, Japan, the two Koreas, Germany, France, Canada, the US, and international and regional organizations such as the UN and EU have participated. ¹⁴⁴ The agenda of the conference can be grouped under two plenary sessions: ‘The Paradigm Changes of the Security Environment in the Northeast Asia’ and ‘The Path Forward: Improving Current Security Situation in the Northeast Asia’. ¹⁴⁵ The conference brought the two Koreas and the US under one roof since North Korea’s ICBM testing took place at the same time. This was possible as the tensions between North Korea and the US were not that intense as it became more intensified from mid-July onward.

4.3. The Rationale of Mongolia to Become an Intermediary State within the Framework of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue

¹⁴³ Annual ‘Ulaanbaatar Dialogue’ Conference on Northeast Asian Security concluded, Xinhua, 2016, Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2016-06/18/content_38691236.htm

¹⁴⁴ Fourth Ulaanbaatar Dialogue being held, 2017, Retrieved from <http://montsame.mn/en/read/10532>

¹⁴⁵ Fourth Ulaanbaatar Dialogue being held, 2017, Retrieved from <http://montsame.mn/en/read/10532>

Mongolia had redesigned its foreign policy and pursued a peaceful one since 1990 in connection with the collapse of the socialist system and with the new circumstances of international relations. It is very important for Mongolia, a country which is sandwiched and landlocked between two powerful countries, to correctly design and plan its foreign policy, to expand its friendly relations and cooperation with other countries and to contribute towards regional integration attempts. However, resources of small countries are limited. Therefore, expressing and protecting its national interests through the political and diplomatic channels by using its advantages is vital for a small state like Mongolia, as we have seen in Chapter II.

The weakness of a small state, like Mongolia, means that it cannot pose a danger to its neighboring countries and is unable to create an impact on the policies of its neighboring countries in the region.¹⁴⁶ According to Alan K. Henrickson the virtual expansibility is the most appropriate strategy for a small country, which cannot protect itself by means of force. Many small states achieve success in protecting their national interests based on their intellectual resource and outreach capacity not through the country's territorial size.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, it is important to decide on what methods shall be used to pursue a soft power policy. Alan Henrickson, who studied the foreign policy of small states, divided small state's foreign policy into six different types as follows:

- Silent diplomatic policy, which follows the foreign policies of the super powers,

¹⁴⁶ Mashbat.O, "Opportunities of Mongolia to become an intermediary on the Regional Security", Strategic studies, 2009, No 2, p 7

¹⁴⁷ Mashbat, p 7

- Counter diplomatic policy or strictly keeping its position, whatever happens, such as Cuba and North Korea,
- Group of diplomatic policies or setting up a powerful regional institution such as the ASEAN and coordinating policies within powerful institutions like the UN,
- Special diplomatic policy or raising a special issue on the international agenda and resolutely try to solve the issue, for instance, Canada's initiative on the elimination of the underground mining,
- Business diplomatic policy or acting like a business entity to gain more economic benefits
- Preventive and meditative diplomatic actions in which states make efforts to solve any disputes prior to using military force.¹⁴⁸

The silent and counter diplomatic policies are not suitable for the interest and power of Mongolia and such policies may expose Mongolia to danger, especially if we consider Mongolia's geographical location, which is sandwiched between the two big powerful nuclear countries. On the other hand the intermediary or the preventive diplomatic policy is very convenient for the interest and foreign policy of Mongolia. It may provide opportunities for Mongolia to raise its prestige and strengthen its independence and sovereignty through diplomatic channels.

¹⁴⁸ Mashbat.O, "Opportunities of Mongolia to become an intermediary on the Regional Security", Strategic studies, 2009, No 2, p 9

4.4 The Resources and Advantages of Mongolia to be Considered as a Potential Regional Mediator

4.4.1. Political System of Mongolia

The Constitution of Mongolia, which was approved in 1992, states that Mongolia is an independent and sovereign parliamentary representative democratic republic. Securing democracy, justice, freedom, equality, national unity and respecting the rule of law are the fundamental priorities of the Mongolian state.¹⁴⁹

Mongolia adopted its new constitution in 1990 in order to establish a humanitarian and civil democratic society with a multi-sector economy meeting the common approach of the global economy and its peculiarities. It provided the country the opportunities to benefit from open markets and to establish relations with other countries while ensuring its independence and security through political and diplomatic means. It is stated in the Constitution of Mongolia to involve in efforts through using its own resources to make peace not only in its own country but also in the region.

One of the most important characteristics for an intermediary state for settling any kinds of disputes is its political system as a democratic country.⁴ Therefore, Mongolia is considered as a strong candidate to become an intermediary state between the regional disputant states thanks to its political system and its peaceful foreign policy and the

¹⁴⁹ To see the full text of 'Constitution of Mongolia, Chapter One, Part 1, 1992', visit; http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_117392.pdf

initiatives implemented so far in terms of mediation in the region. The Concept of the National Security of Mongolia reads as follows:

“Mongolia’s foreign policy and its position at international level are aimed at increasing its contribution to solve the international pressing issues, to expand its foreign relations to implement the national development policy and promote its benefits.”¹⁵⁰

4.4.2 The Neutral Position of Mongolia

As a buffer country between two powerful states, Mongolia pursues a neutral position in any issues related to its neighbors and do not take any side of its neighbors. The Concept of National Security of Mongolia states that “Mongolia has two neighboring countries ... thus it pursues the principle of a balanced relationship in its foreign policy” and “if not encroached its fundamental interest, it will not take side regarding the disputes between the two neighboring countries and rather pursue a neutral policy on the respective issues”. In another words, “balanced relationship” translates into “being neutral between its two neighbors regarding any issue, which relates to the interests of its two neighbors”.¹⁵¹

The unfavorable Mongolian geographical position in terms of geo-strategy has always resulted in Mongolia’s own loss when it comes to make a choice between China and

¹⁵⁰ To see the full text of ‘Foreign policy concept of Mongolia’, visit; <http://www.legalinfo.mn/annex/details/3362?lawid=6340>

¹⁵¹ Mashbat.O, “Opportunities of Mongolia to become an intermediary on the Regional Security”, Strategic studies, 2009, No 2, p 11

Russia. Thus, pursuing a neutral foreign policy and position towards its two neighbors is a must for Mongolia considering its historical and geo-strategical background.¹⁵²

The independence of Mongolia depends largely on the balance of these two neighboring countries. The Mongolian history shows that the independence and sovereignty of Mongolia becomes dependent on its neighbors when the balance between Russian and Chinese power changes.¹⁵³ The ultimate objective of Mongolia is to pursue a policy, which keeps and further strengthens the existing balanced relationship that it established with both of its two neighbors because its independence is very much dependent on this. The imbalance of the existing power structure between Russia and China endangers Mongolia, as the country may easily become a war zone between them. For instance, a few decades ago in its recent history, the Mongolian People's Republic aligned with the USSR against China, as a result of which Mongolia was not able to establish any diplomatic relations with China's allies. Therefore, the balanced relationship has become the main foreign policy priority for Mongolia to keep the existing balance of the powers.

This balanced relationship could be explained as being neutral between those neighboring countries. In order to strengthen its independence, Mongolia must pay more attention to keep and strengthen the balance of these two countries' powers. For Ulaanbaatar, keeping the balance translates into, firstly, not to take position on any disputes between Russia and China; secondly, being neutral for the disputed issues of its two neighbors. Mongolia has a neutral and non-alignment status, which was declared at 70th session of the UN

¹⁵² Mashbat, p 11

¹⁵³ Mashbat.O, p 11

General Assembly by the President of Mongolia in 2015. Mongolia is the member of Non-Alignment Movement and implements non-alignment policy in its foreign relations. Non-alignment policy means, in this sense, being apart from any military or political coalition even including its neighboring countries and their allies.¹⁵⁴

4.4.3. The Nuclear Weapon Free Status of Mongolia

One of the major factors to ensure Mongolia`s neutral status regarding its two neighbors through the political and diplomatic means was to become a nuclear weapon free zone. The former Mongolian President, Mr. Ochirbat Punsalmaa declared Mongolia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) at the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 1992.

Punsalmaa said the following quote at the 47th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in 1992, as the President of Mongolia: “I declared the territory of Mongolia as a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in order to ensure its independence, territorial integrity and border inviolability through the political and diplomatic means”. This initiative was approved under the UN General Assembly’s 53rd Congress and by the five states with nuclear weapons. These later were transformed into a Declaration.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Tunurchuluun.G, “Analyzing the first foreign policy concept for 1994: Four Do’s approach of the modern foreign policy of Mongolia” scientific conference for the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the first concept of the foreign policy of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 2014, p 20

¹⁵⁵ Ochirbat.P, speech for the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the first concept of the foreign policy of Mongolia, minutes of the scientific conference for the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the first concept of the foreign policy of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 2014, p 24

The UN highlighted the importance of the support of five nuclear weapon states (NWS) in strengthening the security of Mongolia for its initiative to become nuclear-weapon-free-zone. In order to take the above approval, the Parliament of Mongolia adopted the Law on Nuclear Weapon Free Status (NWFZ) in February 2000.¹⁵⁶

Mongolia had officially reflected its nuclear weapon free status in its domestic legislations and has been making its contribution to decrease the numbers of nuclear weapon warheads on the regional and international levels. As stated in the Concept of National Security of Mongolia, the country bears an obligation to take part in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, mass destruction weapons, disarmament as well as combating the organized crimes and international terrorisms in cooperation with the UN and other international organizations activities.¹⁵⁷

NWFZ was an important step, which prevented the possible use of the Mongolian territory by its neighboring countries and other regional and non-regional countries against each other. It further prevents Mongolia from becoming the target of nuclear weapons during the escalation. The UN and the international community highly valued the contribution of Mongolia not only to ensure its security but also to strengthen transparency and stability in the region. In this context, the status of the Mongolian NWFZ has attracted much more interest from the international community.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Tuvshintugs.A, “Opportunities to set up multilateral mechanism on Northeast Asian security, Mongolia”, Strategy studies, 2005, No 4, p 47

¹⁵⁷ To see the full text of ‘Foreign policy concept of Mongolia, 2011, Chapter 2, article 13’, visit http://www.mfa.gov.mn/?page_id=26263&lang=en

¹⁵⁸ Telmuun.Z, Opportunities to proliferate the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia in Northeast Asia, strategic studies, 2015, No 1, p 44

In his speech at the Nuclear Disarmament Summit of the UN General Assembly held in September 2013, the Mongolian President Elbegdorj said: “Mongolia declared its territory as a nuclear weapon free zone 20 years before and has been trying to use this status as a mechanism for the regional conflict resolution. This status of Mongolia, thanks to its determined policy, has been confirmed with the approval of its national legislation in 2000 with a wide range support from the international community.” The group of 5 countries with nuclear weapons recognized the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia in September 2012 and declared not to take any step against this status of Mongolia. These five states pledged not to force Mongolia by using their nuclear weapon warheads and not to involve Mongolia in geopolitical competition. They assured to respect its status, and ensured the territorial integrity and stability of Mongolia. This move of Mongolia to NWFZ set a great example for the international community and for other small states in that a small state like Mongolia can play an important role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁹

The nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia has been highly valued on the international stage and by the regional countries. Both from regional and non-regional international organization such as the UN, ASEAN and non-alignment movements, Mongolia’s effort in the non-proliferation and the NFWZ are supported.¹⁶⁰ Such support from the

¹⁵⁹ Mongolian President attends the Summit of the UN General Assembly on Nuclear Weapon Disarmament, <http://www.president.mn/content/3566>

¹⁶⁰ Telmuun.Z, Opportunities to proliferate the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia in Northeast Asia, strategic studies, 2015, No 1, p 50

international community give more encouragements to Mongolia to continue its efforts in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce the nuclear weapons in the region.

4.4.4. Mongolia Actively Takes Part in the International Peacekeeping Operations

Mongolia joined the United Nations in 1961. It bears an obligation like the UN's other member countries to contribute to international peacekeeping and security. Under the Security Council's resolution, every member state of the UN is required to provide armed forces and assistance to the international peacekeeping if it is called to do so. As a full member of the UN and the international community, Mongolia has been pursuing a policy to make its contribution to ensure the worldwide peacekeeping and security. One of the methods to implement this policy is to take part in the UN peacekeeping operations in various conflict areas.¹⁶¹

Mongolia has been participating in the UN peacekeeping operations since 2003 and dispatched a total of 8564 officers, lieutenants and contracted soldiers for the past 11 years. Mongolian military personnel and peacekeepers have attended the UN peacekeeping operations as military observers and peacekeepers in conflict areas such as Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Georgia, Chad, Sierra-Leone, Iraq and Kosovo.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Speech by Mongolian Prime Minister Batbold.S at the plenary meeting of the Mongolian Parliament on the activities and measures taken within the scope of dispatching the military teams of Mongolia to the UN and international peacekeeping and other activities, <http://www.mfa.gov.mn/>

¹⁶² For more details of 'Participation of the Mongolian armed forces in the peacekeeping activities done in foreign countries', visit; <http://www.gsmaf.gov.mn/index.php?id=70>

The dispatching of military forces to the international peacekeeping operations is significant for Mongolia for a variety of reasons: to actively implement its obligation for the UN and the international community, to contribute to the international peacekeeping activity, to promote the peacekeeping goal of its foreign policy, to strengthen the capacity of the Mongolian armed forces, to enhance the professional readiness of the military personnel, and to solve their social issues in terms of providing employment opportunities for the contracted soldiers.¹⁶³

For a small country having a population of just over three million, Mongolia's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations (listed as the top 26th country in terms of number of soldiers that are being sent to the UN peacekeeping missions) is very considerable. The number of soldiers from Mongolia participating in the UN peacekeeping missions shows how active is Mongolia in international peacekeeping and security area.

4.4.5. Mongolia is One of the Few Countries Having Friendly Relations with North Korea (DPRK)

Mongolia established diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) on October 15, 1948 and the two countries mutually opened embassies in 1951. However, North Korea closed its embassy in Ulaanbaatar in August

¹⁶³ For more details of 'Participation of the Mongolian armed forces in the peacekeeping activities done in foreign countries', visit; <http://www.gsmaf.gov.mn/index.php?id=70>

1999 and attached its embassy to Beijing due to unknown reasons. But later North Korea reopened its embassy in Ulaanbaatar in August 2004.¹⁶⁴

North Korea had officially declared itself as a socialist country. Surprisingly, North Korea has established diplomatic relations with 164 countries in total around the world.¹⁶⁵ But it develops secure and friendly relations with only countries such as Vietnam, Laos, China, Russia, Cambodia and Burma as well as Mongolia. North Korea is always at the center of the world attention as it poses threat to international community with its nuclear weapons. So, already established friendly relationship of Mongolia and North Korea provides many advantages for the country to become a regional intermediary state between conflicting parties such as North and South Korea.

Mongolia is the second country, which recognized North Korean independence after the Korean War. Mongolia has been still keeping its positive attitude in terms of its foreign policy towards North Korea while Mongolia has transitioned into the democratic system. The Ministry of Mongolian Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bold considers that Mongolia could be a bridge and an intermediary state for North Korea to reach a mutual understanding with other countries in the region.¹⁶⁶ A clear example of this is the successful organization of

¹⁶⁴ Reference on the relations between Mongolia and DPRK,
http://www.monembdprk.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=36&Itemid=56

¹⁶⁵ Daniel Wertz et al, DPRK Diplomatic Relations, Retrieved from
https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/issue-briefs/DPRK_Diplo_Relations_August2016.pdf

¹⁶⁶ Mongolia is the only trustworthy country for DPRK and South Korea,
<http://www.assa.mn/content/17891.shtml?a=politics>

the meetings of North Korean and Japanese representatives in Ulaanbaatar in 2007 and 2012, which was organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia.

The main reason for the unfavorable relations between North Korea and Japan is that Japan colonized the Korean Peninsula for 35 years until August 15, 1945. Later on during the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea kidnapped some Japanese citizens to make them work as spies. Today the parents and relatives of the kidnapped Japanese citizens have still demanded that North Korea to return their children and relatives back. Unfortunately, most of the kidnapped people died in North Korea. There are lots of unresolved issues such as war compensation, kidnapped people's fate and the nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea¹⁶⁷.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been paying close attention to solve not only the nuclear weapons problem but also the kidnapped people's issue, which made Mongolia prominent candidate for an intermediary role. Within the scope of its strategic partnership with Japan, Mongolia may need to render support to Japan to solve its kidnapped citizens' issues. Mongolia do need not to explicitly support the position of either party for the kidnapped citizens problem while pursues a neutral policy on this issue in line with the friendly relations and cooperation with both North Korea and Japan. Mongolia has an opportunity to arrange a meeting for North Korea and Japan in Ulaanbaatar in order to provide a chance for those countries to discuss the issue.¹⁶⁸ Mongolia had organized a

¹⁶⁷ Ulaanbaatar – meeting point of DPRK and Japan, <http://politics.news.mn/content/125739.shtml>

¹⁶⁸ Oyunjargal.Ch and Narangarvuu.A, “Issues of Japanese citizens kidnapped by DPRK”, Strategic studies, 2013, No, p 62

number of meetings in Ulaanbaatar under the auspices of the Mongolian President as an intermediary between those two.

Mongolia has been developing close relations with North Korea in the recent years. The top level state visit of the Mongolian President Mr. Elbegdorj to North Korea in 2013 was organized within the scope of the 65th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Mongolia and North Korea. During this high level official visit, President Mr. Elbegdorj gave a lecture at the North Korean University. The President Mr. Elbegdorj talked about freedom, law and human rights, which have never been mentioned before in that university. He also discussed the implementation of the transitional model of Mongolia and gave an example of Mongolia for the chance of Pyongyang to give freedom to its people. Neither the professors nor the students asked any questions because this raised a very sore point. But surprisingly at the end of his lecture he was applauded for a long time.¹⁶⁹

The news articles about the Mongolian President's high level visit to North Korea were published in the newspapers of South Korea and North Korea, which underlined the lecture of the Mongolian President at the Kim Il Sung University. As analyzed above Mongolia has acquired the trust of North Korea and has the potential to act as an intermediary state to improve North Korea relations with other regional countries. The visit is also an important manifestation of the friendly relations and cooperation between Mongolia and North Korea and it confirms that Mongolia has an opportunity to work as

¹⁶⁹ Bars. B, 'Mongolia dancing tango with Pyongyang', July 22, 2017, Retrieved from <http://politics.news.mn/content/185253.shtml>

an intermediary. It could be said that Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia, has become a major hub of North Korea to hold meetings and dialogues with other countries.

4.4.6. Mongolia Developing Friendly Relations with Regional Countries

Mongolia has no disputes regarding its territory with its neighbors and agreed on its border lines through bilateral and trilateral treaties with China and Russia. Mongolia is the only country having no territorial disputes in the region. If Mongolia had a dispute with one of its neighboring countries, it cannot be considered an intermediary state because having territorial dispute translates into a non-neutral policy outcome. Thus Mongolia has no dispute with the regional countries regarding its territory and past history and further develops friendly relations with all the countries around the world. Mongolia has no hostile enemy in the Central and Northeast Asian region. Therefore, Mongolia's foreign relations towards regional countries can be considered as friendly and peaceful.¹⁷⁰ But having friendly relations towards the regional countries implies two different meanings for Mongolia. Firstly, it implies that it is a small state's survival strategy, in which any possible disputes are foreseen and have been included in its efforts to solve any issue that might get out of its control.¹⁷¹ Secondly, it translates into accepting any different kinds of political view without criticizing or condemning. Thus, Mongolia shall not criticize or condemn any acts that North Korea takes unless it threatens Mongolia's national interest and security.

¹⁷⁰ Mashbat.O, p 28

¹⁷¹ Mashbat. O, p 28

4.4.7. The International Recognition of Mongolia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Mongolia was recognized by the member countries of the Standing Committees of the UN Security Council as a nuclear weapon free zone. Mongolia has also gained experiences through its membership in the Community of Democratic Countries. Mongolia has no territorial disputes with its Northeast Asian or other neighboring regional countries.

The North Korean and Japanese intergovernmental negotiation meetings were organized in Ulaanbaatar in 2008 and 2012.¹⁷² These initiatives taken by Mongolia raised its prestige on the international stage. Mongolia is a small developing state in the Northeast Asian region. It is of crucial importance for Mongolia, which is sandwiched between two powerful countries and being a small landlocked country, to accurately design its foreign policy, to expand its friendly relations and cooperation with other countries. The resources of a small country are limited compared to other countries. Mongolia cannot ensure its security with its own military and technical means and powers. Therefore, it is the best for Mongolia to use its diplomatic channels in order to protect its national interest and security.

Mongolia pursues a democratic, open and multilateral foreign policy and carries a neutral position in the international disputes while actively taking part for a nuclear free world and involved in international peacekeeping activities. The advantages of Mongolia to be

¹⁷² Lkhagvaa.B, "Position of Mongolia to the Korean Peninsula issue and recommendation of the research work on the multilateral cooperation of Northeast Asia", strategic studies, 2013, No 3, p 16

considered as an intermediary state are as follows: close relations with North Korea, having no conflict or dispute with the other regional countries, and international recognition and support from international organizations. All of these are the advantages of Mongolia for becoming the mediator in the regional disputes. (Shown on the Table 1)

4.5 Possibilities of Mongolia to become An Intermediary in Tables

Table No 2 ¹⁷³"

No	Criteria	Standards for an Intermediary State	Actual Condition of Mongolia
1	Geographic location	To be geographically close to the countries holding negotiations and not to be involved in the disputes of the conflicted countries	Mongolia has borders with the Northeast Asian countries – Russia and China overland, while it considers South Korea and Japan as its third neighbors and develops friendly relations and cooperation with North Korea.
2	Political regime and condition	The democratic political system prevents Mongolia from any	Mongolia transitioned into a market economy and democratic system in 1990. Mongolia's

¹⁷³ Table combining the findings from the Chapter 1 with Chapter IV

		ideological splits. It promotes pluralism. Besides, a democratic system enables the regime to approach the problem from different angles.	democracy is reflected in detail in the Constitution of Mongolia, which was adopted in 1992.
3	The relevant country's position on the international stage	As observed from the international practical experiences, many neutral countries become intermediaries. (e.g.:Switzerland, Austria, Finland) This prevents the country from complying with either party in the case of a dispute between two countries.	Mongolia is a neutral country and declared not to participate in any military coalition. Besides, Mongolia has a nuclear weapon free status and is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.
4	The relevant country's prestige, impact and experience on the	The countries, which desire to become an intermediary, must have been recognized by	Mongolia's nuclear weapons free status is highly valued by the international community including the Northeast Asian

	international stage	other countries, and need to be experienced in the intermediation processes.	countries, the UN and ASEAN regional forums and non-alignment movements. This encourages Mongolia to become a regional intermediary state on security issues especially regarding the Korean Peninsula's security issues.
5	The relevant country needs to consider the fact that when and where it could become an intermediary.	The relevant country needs to study in detail on the strategic significance of becoming an intermediary. The benefits include having the prestige of a peacekeeper, determining the impact to be exerted as a result of the final results of the negotiations, changing the unfavorable condition, and keeping	As a result of creating a mechanism for the dialogue on the Northeast Asian security and taking active part in promoting regional security, Mongolia will have opportunities to improve regional security, contribution to its own security and raise its prestige. The right moment to mediate is before the tensions escalate or when the disputant's expected net-outcome becomes greater than the current situation. Thus it is about understanding the disputant's behavior

		the favorable condition and status.	correctly.
6	Contribution towards international security and peacekeeping activity	Needs to make its contribution and render support to the regional and international security issues	Mongolia has been taking part in the UN peacekeeping operations since 2003 in various conflict areas such as Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Afghanistan. This is an evidence that Mongolia actively fulfills its obligations for the UN and other international organizations, makes its contribution to the international peacekeeping activity and implements the peaceful objective of its foreign policy.
7	Having no direct interest on the relevant issue	Not to have any direct interest on the relevant issue in order not to prioritize its own country's interest during the solution of the bilateral or multilateral	Mongolia develops friendly relations with the Northeast Asian countries and renders support to approach the problems without imposing its own interests. But Mongolia does have an indirect interests in

		disputes.	the tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Thus it makes Mongolia ‘a principal mediator.’
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4.5.1 The Prospects for Mongolia to become a Regional Intermediary within the Scope of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue

A successful implementation of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue lies in Mongolia’s capability to lead the dialogue in a peaceful way for solving the pressing issues of the region, which would not only contribute to the regional security but also to its international reputation. Holding a successful mediation and further establishing an institutionalized mechanism for dialogue requires not only the necessary resources that have been mentioned in the previous chapters such as negotiating skills, knowledge and information but also leadership skills as well. Non-material resources such as commitment, persistence and experience are necessary tools for Mongolia as well.

The main purpose of a regional security system is to improve cooperation primarily on security related issues among the member countries. Cooperation does not necessarily translate into the national interests of different countries but rather into building a mutual security system in the region while preventing any disputes and tensions within. The system, which is established on the basis of cooperation of the regional countries, is not limited to military, political and economic cooperation but also cooperation on culture and environment as well. The main way to develop the cooperation is through a dialogue,

where the positions of different states come closer to each other without any distortion and bias.¹⁷⁴

During his visit to Mongolia in 2002, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized that contribution not only by powerful states but also by small states are important to ensure peace and security in the world.¹⁷⁵ This was an encouragement for Mongolia to keep its initiative continue forward. Mongolia, on that account, has been focusing on setting up the mechanism of a security dialogue between regional countries by relying on its resources and using the mediation activities in various forms such as meetings, conferences and forums.

4.5.2 The Northeast Asian Security System

In order to set up the Northeast Asian security system, it is needed to select the types of mechanism and its structure. Depending on the system goals and roles of the countries taking place. The goals of the Northeast Asian security system on the basis of cooperation among regional states is as follows:¹⁷⁶

- Ensuring peace, stability and security in the region,
- Preventing presumable disputes and solving the tensions by a peaceful means,

¹⁷⁴ Bor.J, “Security system of the Northeast Asian security system and Mongolia”, Strategic studies, 1999, No 2, p 14

¹⁷⁵ Tuvshintugs.A, “Possibilities to create multilateral mechanism of Northeast Asian security”, Strategic studies, 2005, No 4, p 45

¹⁷⁶ Bor.J, ““Northeast Asian security system and Mongolia”, Strategic studies, 1999, No 2, p 14

- Reaching a mutual understanding through regular communications and dialogues and strengthening the mutual trust between regional countries,
- Creating a favorable condition to develop and expand the economic, political and humanitarian cooperation in the region,
- Controlling the armament, promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- De-escalating the current tensions in the Korean Peninsula.

Some researchers suggest that the influential regional countries are required to effectively ensure the security of the Northeast Asia.¹⁷⁷ Russia and China exist in the region as the main powers, however, if more advantages were given to one of them on the regional security issue, it may affect the interest of other countries such as South Korea and Japan which would possibly create a fear of domination in the region and this may make the region even more imbalanced. Additionally, compared to the 1993 initiative of Kazakhstan ‘Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia’ (CICA), to promote peace, security and cooperation in the region, the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue has an advantage as the CICA does not include Japan and North Korea. CICA consists of 26 member states, which includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Isreal, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Russia, Tajikstan, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, Uzbekistan and Vietnam as well as 14 observer states including Belarus, Indonesia, Japan, Loas, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, the US, and organizations such as the OSCE, International Organization for Migration,

¹⁷⁷ Bor.J, p 15

the League of Arab States and Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Speaking Countries (TURKPA).¹⁷⁸ CICA is more inclusive than the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue as it extends to non-regional countries, which has the potential danger of minimising the focus of the cooperation on the Northeast Asian security issues. In any event, the CICA currently works on confidence building between Asian countries rather than creating a dialogue mechanism for addressing regional security issues in the Northeast Asia.

China and South Korea sought to avoid choosing Japan to play the security role in the region as the two countries were both colonized by Japan. But Japan ultimately shares with China an interest in maintaining the current status quo in the Korean Peninsula, as Japan would lose its leading economic superiority in the region if the Korean unification takes place.¹⁷⁹ South Korean Presidents led initiatives and proposals for the unification of Korea but the nuclear weapon issue, which has not been solved yet, is the main obstacle to solve the issue.¹⁸⁰ It is clear that neither Russia nor China will allow the US, which has a strategic interest in the region, to be involved in the regional security issues. Chinese President Xi Jinping said the following quote in 2014 at the 4th Summit meeting of CICA in Shanghai: “Asia should oppose beefing up a military alliance targeted at a third party, and any attempt to dominate regional security affairs or infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of other countries and the security problems in Asia should eventually be solved by the Asians themselves through cooperation”.¹⁸¹ This implies that

¹⁷⁸ For more details of ‘CICA’, visit; http://www.cica-china.org/eng/gyyx_1/zyxjj/

¹⁷⁹ Bor. J, p 15

¹⁸⁰ Khaisandai.L, “Development policy of Mongolia and obligation of Northeast Asia”, Strategic studies, 2009, No 1, p 135

¹⁸¹ Avinash Godbole, China’s Strategy under President Xi Jinping, Strategic Analysis, 2015, p 300

China is willing to transform the CICA into a regional security framework, which would be governed by China and possibly Russia. First of all, this would mean any involvement of non-regional state as a mediator in the regional security issues would not be tolerated and second of all this may increase Mongolia's prospects to become a regional mediator as Mongolia keeps its neutral positions in the respective issues regarding the Korean Peninsula.

It will become an important question to decide what country will play a vital role to ensure the security of the Northeast Asian region. Mongolia is considered as one of the potential candidates as a mediator. However, there is the possibility that the US may demand Mongolia to cut its relations with North Korea as a result of its intensified isolation strategy.¹⁸² The US already started applying this strategy; for instance, the German government was asked to cut ties with North Korea.¹⁸³ This is the worst possible scenario for Mongolia. Indeed this may also be not a clever move by the US as it would lose one of the one possible way of approaching to North Korea.¹⁸⁴

Mongolia aims to strengthen its position in this conflict prone region by promoting the bilateral and multilateral relations and cooperation in all ways as well as ensuring the

¹⁸² Julian Dierkes, North Korea Turmoil=Mongolian International Relations Role, Mongolian Focus, 2017, <http://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2017/trump-foreign-policy-north-korea-mongolian-role/>

¹⁸³ Julian Dierkes, North Korea Turmoil=Mongolian International Relations Role, Mongolian Focus, 2017, <http://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2017/trump-foreign-policy-north-korea-mongolian-role/>

¹⁸⁴ Julian Dierkes

regional security and facilitating the regional integration.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, Mongolia has taken a number of initiatives since 1980 for the establishment of a mechanism for the Northeast Asian Dialogue on security by using its advantage as having traditional friendly relations with all Northeast Asian countries. More than anything, having steady and friendly relations with North Korea is one of the major deciding factors whether Mongolia becomes a mediator between North Korea and others. Mongolia and North Korea established a diplomatic relations in 1948 and signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1986 and 2002.¹⁸⁶ Mongolia had helped North Korea during the Korean War of 1950-1953 and Mongolia still cooperates with North Korea on humanitarian issues such as food aid and employing North Korean workers in Mongolia for construction and factory works.¹⁸⁷ Mongolia has private sector investments in North Korea, especially in oil and gas onshore exploration operations and it further wants to benefit from North Korean access to the sea.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, it can be said that Mongolia and North Korea enjoys a friendly and a win-win relationship.

Hitherto, Mongolia has already implemented some of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue's objectives through its practices as follows:

¹⁸⁵ Khaisandai.L, "Development policy of Mongolia and obligation of Northeast Asia", Strategic studies, 2009, No 1, p 134

¹⁸⁶ Mongolia, North Korea sign friendship treaty, Asian Political News, 2002, Kyodo, Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20071026011320/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2002_August_12/ai_90297096

¹⁸⁷ Tania Branigan, Mongolia's special relationship with North Korea pays economic dividends, The Guardian, 2013, Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/25/mongolia-north-korea-special-relationship>

¹⁸⁸ Tania Branigan, Mongolia's special relationship with North Korea pays economic dividends, The Guardian, 2013, Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/25/mongolia-north-korea-special-relationship>

1. The Government of Mongolia made a proposal on the creation of an institutionalized mechanism of dialogue on the Northeast Asian security at the government level during the 55th forum of the UN General Assembly. Mongolian Foreign Affairs Minister sent an official letter on the above proposal to the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Northeast Asian countries.¹⁸⁹
2. The Institute of Strategy and George Marshall Center – European Center for Security Studies organized a scientific conference entitled “Current situation and Prospects for the Central and Northeast Asian Security: Ulaanbaatar – New Helsinki” in Ulaanbaatar on April 20-21, 2009. Objective of this conference was to discuss the geostrategic peculiarities of Mongolia connecting Central Asia and Northeast Asia, as well as Mongolia’s actual contribution towards international security. This conference was attended by more than 70 Mongolian Parliament and government members, over 40 scholars from 23 countries such as Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Canada, the USA and Turkey, foreign ambassadors and diplomatic officials to Mongolia. The conference attendees discussed the case of Mongolia with its neutral and peaceful foreign policy and the prospects for it to become the center of regional cooperation. The conference analyzed the security challenges facing Central and Northeast Asia, the European experiences in establishing security mechanisms, and the formation of a mechanism as Dialogue on Central and Northeast Asian Security. The participants also aimed at determining the obligations and position of Mongolia for the development of the

¹⁸⁹Dagvajamts.G, “Mongolia and relations of its neighbors and partners”, editor, PhD. Sandag.U, 2004, Ulaanbaatar, p 23

regional cooperation.¹⁹⁰ In 2007, Mongolia acted as an intermediary for the normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan. This made it clear that it is possible for the country to mediate the disputed issues and provided the necessary experiences for Mongolia for mediating between the regional states.

3. Mongolian President Elbegdorj made an official initiative to launch the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security on April 29, 2013 at the 7th Conference of Ministers of the Community of Democratic Countries.¹⁹¹ As a result, the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on the Northeast Asian Security was successfully organized for the first time in Ulaanbaatar on June 17-18th in 2014. Researchers and representatives exchanged views on the pressing regional issues and reached an agreement to annually organize this conference.
4. Mongolian Foreign Affairs Minister Mr. Bold Luvsanvandan visited the Beijing International Institute during his official visit to China on January 16-21, 2014 with the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister. He prepared a report entitled “Joint Force for Peace and Future” regarding the current situation of the relations between Mongolia and China and the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue initiated by the Mongolian President Elbegdorj.¹⁹²

In his report, he said “Mongolia has been an active initiator for many years to set up a mechanism of the dialogue on the regional security. Mongolian President’s initiative on

¹⁹⁰ International scientific conference entitled “Current situation and prospect of Central and Northeast Asia: Ulaanbaatar – New Helsinki”, <http://iss.gov.mn/?q=mn/node/44>

¹⁹¹ “Remark on the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security”, Strategic studies, 2013, No 4, p 144

¹⁹² Ganchimeg, Making progress to the Ulaanbaatar Declaration”, Baabar.mn, January 22, 2014, <http://ganchimeg.niitelch.mn/content/5818.shtml>

the Northeast Asian security is a long-term objective focused on ensuring the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”¹⁹³ The main objective of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue is to establish the mechanism for the dialogue on regional security in Northeast Asia. That’s why it includes multilateral issues such as economic cooperation, environment, global warming, human safety, cyber safety and cosmic security issues. Mongolia will make efforts to continue the consultative meeting of North Korea and Japan. The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue will include six Northeast Asian countries - Russia, China, Mongolia, Japan, North Korea and South Korea in the first turn and will gradually involve other issues which are considered important for regional countries, along with security issues. Minister Bold informed that Mongolia would pay more attention to strengthen the mutual trust with North Korea relying on its comparative advantage. The policy and initiative by Mongolia could be seen from this statement.¹⁹⁴

4.6 Mongolia`s Methods for An Intermediary Role

In terms of its neutral policy, Ulaanbaatar has opportunities to act as an intermediary under two versions to settle bilateral and multilateral disputes; a) arranging meetings – inactive intermediary, b) connecting the disputed parties – active intermediary.¹⁹⁵

4.6.1 Arranging Meetings – Inactive Intermediary

¹⁹³ Ganchimeg, Making progress to the Ulaanbaatar Declaration”, Baabar.mn, January 22, 2014, Retrieved from <http://ganchimeg.niitlelch.mn/content/5818.shtml>

¹⁹⁴ Ganchimeg, Making progress to the Ulaanbaatar Declaration”, Baabar.mn, January 22, 2014, Retrieved from <http://ganchimeg.niitlelch.mn/content/5818.shtml>

¹⁹⁵ Mashbat.O, p 30

This version aims at arranging bilateral dialogues in Ulaanbaatar if the disputed parties want to do so. Therefore, this version could be formulated in a way that the mediator only supports organizing meetings and discussions between the disputants.

This may be the best way to start a security initiative. Organizing a regional security dialogue is an indicator for the active participation of Ulaanbaatar in the international relations. As a result, the prestige of Mongolia will increase and it may make valuable contributions to the regional security by a peaceful way. On other hand, Mongolia will be exempted from complying with either party and expressing its position on the regionally disputed issues.¹⁹⁶

A clear example for Ulaanbaatar becoming an intermediary point is the meeting of the representatives from North Korea and Japan. The first meeting of North Korea and Japan was held in Ulaanbaatar on September 5-6, 2007 in order to restore their relations. 15 Japanese and 9 North Korean delegations attended it. They had softened their relations and made efforts to settle some issues.¹⁹⁷

After this event, the first meeting of the working group for restoration of the diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea was held in closed form in Ulaanbaatar on

¹⁹⁶ Mashbat. O, p 31

¹⁹⁷ Oyuntsetseg, 'Meeting point of DPRK and Japan – Ulaanbaatar', November 16, 2012, News.mn, Retrieved from <http://politics.news.mn/content/125739.shtml>

March 17, 2012. The second meeting of the working group was organized in Ulaanbaatar on September 5-6, 2012 and the following issues were discussed:

1. Restoration of the bilateral diplomatic relations including the compensation related to the past tragic stories,
2. The issues, which are not completely resolved including the Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea.

The two countries could not reach any particular solution on the unresolved issues such as the Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea. However the parties decided to sincerely discuss on the issues of interest and expressed their wish to work on the compensation issues as well as other unsolved issues under the Pyongyang Declaration. They also declared to increase efforts for restoration of the bilateral diplomatic relations. Besides, they discussed and agreed to conduct particular operations in order to fulfill the above goals.¹⁹⁸

As a result of the successfully organizing these regular meetings in Ulaanbaatar, the Japanese citizens kidnapped in North Korea met their families in Ulaanbaatar in March 2013. This was a clear example of the successful organization of the meeting of North Korea and Japanese representatives.

As part of its neutral positions and policies towards the regional countries, Mongolia managed a meeting of the representatives of North Korea and the USA in its capital city Ulaanbaatar on May 23, 2014. At the meeting, the North Korea's high-ranking officials

¹⁹⁸ For more details of 'The second meeting of the working group for restoration of the diplomatic relations between Japan and DPRK', visit; Japanese Embassy in Mongolia <http://www.mn.emb-japan.go.jp/news/mn295.html>

in charge of the nuclear weapons met two senior diplomats who were retired from the US State Department and exchanged their views on the restoration of the Six Party Talks¹⁹⁹, which was ceased in 2009 by the North Korean side. Ulaanbaatar has been making efforts to encourage Pyongyang to develop normal relations with the countries that is in dispute with and to conduct economic reforms. As a result, Mongolia developed a secondary strategy to change the position of Pyongyang, which is likely to give a new chance to the US who failed in implementing its policy towards North Korea.²⁰⁰

Choosing Ulaanbaatar not Beijing to make negotiations on the sore subjects of Northeast Asia is related to Mongolia's friendly relations with all the regional countries and its pursuit of a multilateral foreign policy.²⁰¹ As it has been concluded in the previous chapters that having diplomatic relations with the disputant countries is one of the basic requirements for mediating between them. Mongolian President's efforts also made valuable contributions to keep the relations at a high level. On top of that, as it has been discussed in the Chapter III, disputants' previous experiences regarding the venue of the mediation plays an important role in accepting and choosing the mediators. For instance, North Vietnam didn't accept Geneva, Switzerland as a mediation venue as it had a bad experience . Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia has been a good mediation venue for North Korea considering all of the above-mentioned meetings and talks with the Japanese and the US officials. While having good experiences in the meetings and talks in Ulaanbaatar may

¹⁹⁹ Six-Party-Talks was a series of multilateral negotiations, which was started and hosted by China since 2003 till 2009 and attended by China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia & the U.S.

²⁰⁰ Bars, 'Mongolia dancing tango with Pyongyang', July 22, 2014, News.mn, Retrieved from <http://politics.news.mn/content/185253.shtml>

²⁰¹ Ganchimeg, 'Making progress to the Ulaanbaatar Declaration', Baabar.mn, January 22, 2014, Retrieved from <http://ganchimeg.niitlech.mn/content/5818.shtml>

not be the sole deciding factor for Pyongyang to consider Ulaanbaatar as a mediation venue, it is an influential factor for accepting Mongolia as its mediator.

4.6.2 Active Intermediary for the Dialogue on Security Issues

The principal and active intermediary methods to propose the mediation, dispute settlement and decision making ways to the disputed parties. Being an intermediary among the powerful states for the strengthening of the mutual trust is an invaluable chance for Mongolia to advance its prestige and to increase the number of its international supporters regardless of reaching any results.²⁰²

In recent years, Mongolia has been considered as the country, which is able to act as an intermediary to reconcile South and North Korea. It is the result of Mongolia's peaceful foreign policy, neutral position, security initiatives and friendly relations with both South and North Korea. What country does not make war with North Korea and does not lose its position? What is the country, which is trusted by North Korea? Mongolia is the sole country, which develops friendly relations with both South Korea and North Korea.²⁰³

Charles Armstrong, professor of Korean Studies at the Columbia University, said, "Mongolia has expressed that it could be a trustworthy intermediary for the Korean

²⁰² Mashbat.O, p 32

²⁰³ David L. Caprara, Moon & Park, 'Mongolia: Potential mediator between the Koreas and proponent of peace in Northeast Asia', January 20, 2015, Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-mongolia-north-korea-caprara-moon-park>

Peninsula issue. Perhaps, Mongolia is the sole country which is trusted by both DPK and South Korea”. He believes that Mongolia could play an important role to reconcile DPK with the world countries.²⁰⁴

As mentioned above, Mongolia has become an outlet for North Korea, which does not have so favorable relations with most of the countries, to have discussions with other countries. In other words, Mongolia has become a bridge to connect North Korea with other countries.

One of the main objectives of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on the Northeast Asian Security is not to raise the regionally “sore” subjects –e.g. Korean Peninsula nuclear weapon issue but conducive to settle this issue, strengthen the mutual trust and compound the cooperation possibilities.²⁰⁵ Over and above whether accepting Mongolia’s offer as its mediator would depend on North Korea and its own perceived interests from the talks and mediations with other disputants, as North Korea is overly protective about its independence.

If Mongolia becomes a mediator in one of the most complicated regions in the world, Northeast Asia, the country will have the opportunity to settle many issues successfully only with the condition of not mentioning any possibilities of North Korean regime collapse or non-proliferation of its nuclear weapons. If Mongolia becomes an

²⁰⁴ ‘Mongolia – sole country to be trusted by North Korea and South Korea’, October 28, 2013, Assa.mn Retrieved from <http://www.assa.mn/content/17891.shtml?a=politics>

²⁰⁵ “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security was held successfully”, Strategic studies, 2014, No 2, p 136

intermediary in North Korea and conflicting parties, it may make a valuable contribution to the improvement of the regional security. As well, Mongolia may bring the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue into a new stage and provide opportunities to cooperate with other countries and settle the issues through meetings and discussions. Ulaanbaatar, however, must remain attentive at any politically sensitive issue. As it has been discussed in the previous chapters, being politically sensitive to the issues of the disputants prior and during the mediation becomes vital for a successful mediation.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzed Mongolia's prospects for becoming a regional mediator in Northeast Asia within the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue with the following research questions: Is there any case in international relations history, in which small states successfully mediated between conflicting states? What are the comparative advantages of Mongolia over other regional players such as China? What initiatives have been taken so far to create such institutionalized mechanism for peaceful resolution of the regional conflicts?

In Chapter I, a general introduction to the thesis topic has been provided. In this chapter, the content of the thesis, research strategy methods and the thesis sources have been discussed.

In Chapter II 'International Mediation', the following questions have been discussed: What is mediation? When do states mediate? How do states mediate? Why do states mediate? When do disputants seek intermediary? It concluded that small states (e.g. Mongolia) mediate because: first of all, being a small country, they lack the military

capabilities to protect their national interest and national security; second, small states do have tactics to survive, which is their soft power, more precisely mediation capabilities between great powers and finally small states strive to keep their presence in international relations by fostering their reputation through international mediation by mediating between the conflicting states/parties. The main findings from the this chapter in relation to the thesis topic are:

1. Mongolia is considered as a principal mediator as it has an indirect interest in the conflict, which is the Korean Peninsula issue and potential regime collapse of North Korea. This would mean a great influx of refugees to Mongolia. And as a principal mediator it creates a three way bargaining structure, in which the mediator bargains with all sides separately; thus the mediation becomes a three way bargaining. Especially, nowadays, given the circumstances, North Korea and the US or North Korea and South Korea don't seem to have many prospects in sitting at one table to discuss nuclear weapon issue. This implies that the North Korean net-outcome from the potential negotiation is still smaller than its expectation or the expected cost from the mediation is still higher for North Korea because it still has not replied to or accepted any offer for talks with the US, South Korea or Japan. In these circumstances, the best way to communicate the disputant, as the principal mediator theory suggests, is to exchange information, clarify the perceptions and intentions of each disputants and more importantly identify the main interests of each disputants. Then it would be easier for the mediator to communicate smoothly and then finally bargain with each disputant.

2. Disputants seek mediators when the expected net-outcome rises. Or when the expected cost from the mediation decreases it is more likely that the disputant seeks a third party intervention for the conflict. North Korea would not accept any third party intervention until the condition gets favorable for it to take the maximum amount of advantage from the disputant states. For now the expected net-outcome of North Korea from any possible mediation is not at the level of negotiation even with all the tensions escalate at an unprecedented rate.
3. Finally, if Mongolia succeeds in mediating between North Korea and other involved states, then the results would be mostly advantageous for Mongolia as it solves potential security issues including the North Korean refugees and receives international reputation in mediation, which further helps Mongolia to keep its strong presence in international relations to protect its national interests and national security. Plus a successful mediation between the US and the North Korea would enhance Mongolia's strategic importance to the US.

In Chapter III, the cases from Austria and Finland have been discussed with the same standardized and structured questions with each of the cases. The structured and standardized questions are as follows: What are the conditions for successful and failed mediation? What are the common backgrounds of these cases as mediator states? The conditions for a failed or successful mediation offer in the first place were neutral foreign policy, diplomatic relations with the disputant countries, geographical location, inclusive and in some cases, transparent communication not only with the disputants but also with the involved parties/states. The common background for the successful mediation

includes the resources of the mediators such as the material and non-material resources including knowledge, experiences, skills and leadership, sensitiveness to complicated political issues and commitment. Along with the questions dedicated for the cases in this chapter, one of the main research questions of the thesis, which was about the small states' role in mediating in international relations, can be concluded that small states do mediate in international relations effectively. It is more likely that in contemporary international politics, small states and NGOs tend to mediate more often than great powers.

In Chapter IV, Mongolia's possibilities of becoming a regional mediator in the Northeast Asia within the scope of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue have been discussed. In the first place, the chapter gives a detailed account of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, which includes its history, objectives and structures. Then the complementing organizations have been discussed, which were organized by the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Mongolia within the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue with the intention to prepare a common ground and warm up the influencers instead of directly setting up the dialogue with any prior preparations and notifications. Mongolia's possibilities of becoming a regional mediator within the scope of Ulaanbaatar Dialogue have been discussed on the basis of the criteria that have been concluded from the previous chapters. These include the follows: Mongolia's diplomatic relations with North Korea and other involved states, its neutral position, NWFZ status, international recognition and its geographical location. Finally, other factors from a point of political and geo-strategical perspective have been discussed, which intended to answer the research question of Mongolia's comparative advantage over other regional

states to become a regional mediator. It is concluded that both Mongolia's geographical location and its general regional political agenda are in favor of Mongolia's side.

Finally, as an overall conclusion, Mongolia has high likelihood to become the regional mediator between the regional and (to some extent) non-regional states on the Northeast Asian security issues. However, it is worth noting that the U.S involvement in the talks about the complex regional security issues with North Korea do not only depends on North Korea but also China. Whereas in the case of North and South Korea, the North Korea would play more role independently. As the expectancy theory suggests, North Korea would not be sitting on the table with the US or South Korea and Japan, if its expected net-outcome does not increase from the potential mediation or its expected cost from the mediation does not decrease. But it must be Mongolia to take the leadership in mediating between them when the moment comes. As recent annual international conference on Ulaanbaatar Dialogue shows, Mongolia is still committed to mediate and create the institutionalized mechanism of dialogue in the Northeast Asia.

All the forums, symposiums, meetings and conferences within the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue have the multiplier effect, which eventually help to achieve the main objective of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue to build an institutionalized mechanism of dialogue in the Northeast Asian region. The issue in the region is not something that can be resolved in a day, weeks or months; they need to be taken step by step. In similar way, the institutionalized mechanism of dialogue should be taken step by step. And it can be positively said that Mongolia is already on the right road to success considering all the

successful mediations between hostile states such as North Korea and Japan and North Korea and the US. Last but not least, Mongolia should refrain from highlighting the division lines between the disputants and keep organizing meetings as much as its resources and capabilities allow.

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