

HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION: EXPERIENCES
OF IRAQI REFUGEES RESETTLED IN ARIZONA, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

VOLKAN DELİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

MAY 2018

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağatay Topal
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç (METU, SOC) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağatay Topal (METU, SOC) _____

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya (Bilgi University, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz (METU, ADM) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Reyhan Atasü Topçuoğlu (HU, Sosyal Hizmet) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Volkan DELI

Signature :

ABSTRACT

HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION: EXPERIENCES OF IRAQI REFUGEES RESETTLED IN ARIZONA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Deli, Volkan

Ph.D., Department of Sociology

Supervisor : Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağatay Topal

May 2018, 538 pages

Under the historical conditions of US-Iraq relations, this research aims at filling the gap in the literature to analyze how Iraqi refugees experience in their post-resettlement process in Arizona, USA. Rather, it also employs a multi-disciplinary analysis of forced migration under the enhanced content of the theory of humanitarian governance. For this purpose, humanitarian governance of forced migration, is taken up as an analytical entity to display how states, non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, and volunteer organizations establish an international 'humanitarian' mechanism to deal with social, economic and cultural reasons and consequences of forced migration. In this context, this research mainly selects the case of experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled in Arizona in USA in order to explain the nature of humanitarian governance as regards to the subjects of acculturation, integration, assimilation and transnationalism. The analysis of human governance manifests that US refugee admission system works with a non-profit sector: resettlement agencies, faith-based organizations, expert organizations, and volunteers. Besides, this system basically gives priority to self-sufficiency policy, thereby paving way for refugee integration by immediately involving refugees in labor market as entry-level job holders irrespective of consent and free choice of refugees. In this

sense, this study scrutinizes the relation among experiences of Iraqi refugees, self-sufficiency policy, acculturation and integration processes as a part of humanitarian governance in the context of America and puts forward that Iraqi refugees ultimately take their part as cheap-labor force by developing different acculturative strategies during their integration in Arizona.

Keywords: Forced migration, humanitarian governance, experiences of Iraqi refugees, integration, post-resettlement process

ÖZ

ZORUNLU GÖÇÜN İNSANİ YÖNETİMİ: AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ, ARIZONA EYALETİNE YERLEŞTİRİLEN IRAKLI MÜLTECİLERİN DENEYİMLERİ

Deli, Volkan

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Çağatay Topal

Mayıs 2018, 538 sayfa

Amerika ve Irak ilişkilerinin tarihsel koşulları altında, bu araştırma, Amerika'nın Arizona eyaletindeki Iraklı mültecilerin yerleştirme sonrası süreci nasıl deneyimlediklerini analiz ederek, literatürdeki boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, içeriği zenginleştirilmiş insani yönetim teorisiyle birlikte, zorunlu göçün disiplinler arası bir analizini yeniden üretmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, insani göçün zorunlu yönetimi, zorunlu göçün sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel sebep ve sonuçlarını idare edebilmek için devletlerin, sivil toplum örgütlerinin, kar amacı gütmeyen sektörlerin ve gönüllülerin nasıl bir uluslararası 'insani' mekanizma kurduklarını ortaya koymak için analitik bir birim olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu araştırma Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Arizona eyaletine yerleştirilen Iraklı mültecilerin deneyimlerini, kültürleşme, entegrasyon, asimilasyon ve uluslararası konularıyla ilişkisi bağlamında, insani yönetimin doğasını açıklamak için seçmiştir. İnsani yönetimin analizi ortaya çıkarıyor ki, Amerika'nın mülteci kabul sistemi, kar amacı gütmeyen bir sektörle: yerleştirme kuruluşlarıyla, inanç temelli kuruluşlarla, uzman kuruluşlarla, ve gönüllülerle çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu sistem temel olarak kendi-kendine yeterli olma politikasına öncelik vermektedir, ve dolayısıyla mültecileri, rızalarını ve özgür tercihlerini dikkate almaksızın, asgari

ücretli bir iş sahibi yapmak yoluyla doğrudan emek piyasasına dahil ederek, mülteci entegrasyonuna yol açmaktadır. Bu anlamda, bu çalışma, Iraklı mültecilerin deneyimleri, kendi-kendine yeterlilik politikası, kültürleşme ve entegrasyon arasındaki ilişkiyi, Amerika bağlamı içinde insani yönetimin bir parçası olarak mercek altına almakta ve Iraklı mültecilerin, ucuz emek gücü olarak rol aldıklarını ve Arizona'daki entegrasyon süreçlerinde farklı kültürleşme stratejileri geliştirdiklerini iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Zorunlu göç, insani yönetim, Iraklı mültecilerin deneyimleri, entegrasyon, yerleştirme sonrası süreç

In memory of
Hasan Sariçoban

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research, like all other scientific researches, is a result of imagination, in my context it is purely “sociological imagination”. All adults well know that imaginations usually do not come true as desired if your conditions do not work. For this research, my supervisor, Çağatay Topal, was always behind of each step of this research to fix all conditions that serve to my imagination. Beyond my words, I would like to express my gratitude to him from my heart for his guidance, support, sincerity and ‘real’ companion. From the first day of this research, he motivated and supported me and I never felt alone during all the process. I will always appreciate and remember his support and companion as a friendship rather than a supervisory relation between a professor and a student.

I would like to give special thanks to Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç and Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Okyayuz for their illuminative and constructive comments from the beginning. I should also express my deep appreciation to other jury members, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya and Assoc. Dr. Reyhan Atasü Topçuoğlu for their precious presence and contributions.

The field research of this study was conducted in Arizona, United States of America through the technical and financial support of Middle East Technical University (METU), Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit (Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri (BAP) Koordinasyon Birimi). On this opportunity, I am particularly grateful for the assistance given by METU and BAP’s worthy staff members.

From the first day of my research to the end of my doctoral dissertation, my family was always supportive and excited more than me. They were always smiling faces with me with their love and affection, I would like to express my very great thankfulness to my mother, father and sister. Besides, I would like to offer my special thanks to Simin who is my lovely better half as she was always patient and gentle against me in working systematically although we were newly betrothed.

During the field research, I was a visiting scholar for the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies (MENAS) at the University of Arizona in USA. Assistance provided by Associate Prof. Scott Lukas and MENAS secretary was greatly appreciated.

I would like to thank the following people and organizations for their assistance with the collection of my data: Nasser, Ali, Mahmoud, Iraqi refugees who were interviewed, and Arizona Department of Economic Security, Catholic Community Services, Catholic Charities Services, Refugee Focus, Tucson Refugee Ministry, International Rescue Committee, Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship, La Frontera Center Inc., Tucson Refugee Ministry, Noor Womens's Association, Iskashitaa Refugee Network.

I also wish to thank various people for their assistance, help and invaluable friendship before and after my field research: Aylin, Begüm, Dilşah, Ergün, İdil, Özgün, Mehmet, Recep, Ufuk, and Yiğit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------|
| PLAGIARISM..... | iii |
| ABSTRACT..... | iv |
| ÖZ..... | vi |
| DEDICATION..... | viii |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..... | ix |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS..... | xi |
| LIST OF SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS..... | xvi |
| CHAPTER | |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORY..... | 9 |
| 2.1. Research Question and Research Design..... | 9 |
| 2.2. Why Iraqi Refugees?..... | 12 |
| 2.3. Why Arizona ? | 17 |
| 2.4. Research Methods and Data Collection | 20 |
| 2.4.1. Ethics and Confidentiality..... | 23 |
| 2.4.2. Profile of the Iraqi Refugees | 25 |
| 2.4.3. Profile of the Agencies..... | 32 |
| 2.5. Observations and Limitations | 34 |
| 2.6. Authenticity of the Research..... | 37 |
| 2.7. Relations in the Field | 38 |
| 2.8. International Migration Theories | 58 |
| 2.8.1 Raventein’s Law..... | 62 |
| 2.8.2 The Push-Pull Theory | 63 |
| 2.8.3. Neo-Classical Economics Approach..... | 64 |
| 2.8.4 New Economics of Migration and Network Theory..... | 66 |
| 2.8.5 Dual Labor Market Theory | 68 |
| 2.8.6 World Systems Theory..... | 70 |
| 2.8.7 Migration-Development Nexus..... | 72 |
| 2.8.8 Transnationalism | 75 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 3. FORCED MIGRATION | 97 |
| 3.1. A Historical Background of Forced Human Displacement | 98 |
| 3.2. The Establishment of International Refugee Protection Regime | 104 |
| 3.3. Role of The United States of America in International Refugee Protection Regime | 107 |
| 3.4. Uneven Development, Forced Migration, and Social Transformation | 116 |
| 3.5. “New Wars”: Re-Production of Forced Displacement | 124 |
| 3.6. Humanitarian Governance of Forced Migration | 127 |
| 3.6.1. Global Governance to Humanitarian Governance | 128 |
| 3.6.2. Power and a Politics of Life in Humanitarian Governance..... | 131 |
| 3.7. Humanitarian Governance in a Neo-Liberal Context | 135 |
| 3.7.1. Neo-Liberal Conduct: Refugees to Clients | 136 |
| 3.7.2. Paternalism | 138 |
| 3.7.2.1. A Consequentialist Ethic, Competence Assumption, Supervision | 139 |
| 3.7.2.2. Responsibilization | 142 |
| 3.7.3. Networks of Faith and Philanthropy | 145 |
| 3.8. Integration, Acculturation, Assimilation and Transnationalism | 149 |
| 3.8.1. Berry’s Approach to Adaptation and Acculturation in Plural Societies | 151 |
| 3.8.1.1. Acculturation Strategies | 152 |
| 3.8.1.2. Acculturative Stress..... | 154 |
| 3.8.1.3. Acculturation Framework | 155 |
| 3.8.2. Goldlust and Richmond’s Multivariate Model of Immigrant Adaptation... | 157 |
| 3.8.2.1. Identification, Internalization and Socialization | 157 |
| 3.8.3. Kuhlman’s Economic Integration of Refugees | 158 |
| 3.8.4. Melting Pot Theory: Approaches to Assimilation..... | 159 |
| 3.8.4.1. Assimilation and Acculturation..... | 160 |
| 3.8.4.2. Accommodation vs. Assimilation | 161 |
| 3.8.4.3. Assimilation to Americanization..... | 162 |
| 3.8.5. Transnationalism and Forced Migration | 164 |
| 3.8.5.1. Transnationalism and Assimilation..... | 165 |
| 3.8.5.2. Transnational Activities and Capabilities of Refugees | 166 |
| 3.9. Operationalization of Theoretical Concepts and Arguments..... | 169 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 4. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF US-IRAQ RELATIONS..... | 182 |
| 4.1. The Place of Iraq for the United States of America | 182 |
| 4.2. The Soviet Threat & Dual Containment 1950 to 1970 | 184 |
| 4.3. Increasing of American Hegemony: 1970s to 1990s | 189 |
| 4.4. First Gulf War - Saddam as an Emerging Threat :1990s to 2000s | 191 |
| 4.4.1. First Wave of Social Transformation..... | 193 |
| 4.5. Demise of Containment towards Military Intervention:1990s to 2003 | 197 |
| 4.6. Strategic Practices and Structural Dynamics: New Wars and Second Wave of Social Transformation..... | 200 |
| 5. ANALYTICAL READINGS OF THE FIELD FINDINGS | 213 |
| 5.1.Humanitarian Governance of Refugee Resettlement System in Arizona: Non- Profit Sector | 213 |
| 5.1.1. Neo-Liberal Regulation of the Field: Transforming from Refugees to Clients | 226 |
| 5.1.2. Faith-Based Humanitarian Action | 237 |
| 5.1.3. Paternalist Aspect of Humanitarian Governance:Limits of Personal Choices and Competence Assumption..... | 243 |
| 5.1.4. Philanthropic Aspect of Humanitarian Governance: Network Functions of Voluntary Non-Profit Organizations | 250 |
| 5.1.5. Professionalism in Humanitarian Governance..... | 261 |
| 5.2. Neo-Liberal Restoration of Humanitarian Governance after 9/11..... | 269 |
| 5.3. A Politics of Refugee Lives in Humanitarian Governance | 283 |
| 5.3.1. Saved Lives: Why Iraqis Left Their Home Country? | 289 |
| 5.3.2. Living in Uncertainties: Asylum Condition of Iraqis | 300 |
| 5.3.3. American Dream: from Imagined Lives to Realities | 315 |
| 5.3.4. New Lives: Construction of Self-Sufficiency | 324 |
| 5.3.4.1. Limits of Refugee Assistance Programs: Competence Assumption and Iraqi Refugees..... | 326 |
| 5.3.4.2. Self-Sufficiency through Entry-Level Jobs: A Consequentialist Ethic and Responsibilization | 336 |
| 5.3.4.3. Responsibilization of Iraqi Refugees: Chances and Hardships of New Americans | 344 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 6. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF IRAQI REFUGEES IN ARIZONA: THREE LEVELS OF OPERATIONALIZATION..... | 365 |
| 6.1. The First Operationalization: A Model of Economic Integration | 374 |
| 6.1.1. Arizona: “Host-Related Factors” | 374 |
| 6.1.2. Social Participation and Intercultural Relations..... | 382 |
| 6.1.3. Satisfaction: Decline of Social Mobility and Lack of Social Capital | 391 |
| 6.2. The Second Operationalization: Accommodation and Assimilation | 404 |
| 6.2.1. Accommodation: Security and Safety in Arizona..... | 404 |
| 6.2.2. Accommodation: Social Contact and Social Organization among Iraqi Refugees | 409 |
| 6.3. The Third Operationalization: Berry’s Acculturation Framework for Iraqi Refugees in Arizona | 413 |
| 6.3.1 Acculturative Framework for Iraqi Refugees in Arizona..... | 413 |
| 6.3.2. Acculturative Stressor: Maintenance of Mother Tongue | 415 |
| 6.3.3. Acculturative Stressor: Cultural Identity and Cultural Distance..... | 419 |
| 6.3.4. Acculturative Strategies: Integration, Assimilation, Separation, Marginalization | 425 |
| 6.3.4.1.Impacts of Moderating Factors: Participation and Social Contact with Americans in Arizona..... | 426 |
| 6.3.4.2.Integration or Assimilation: Where Would ‘Iraqi-Americans’ Stand ? | 430 |
| 6.4. In and Out of Social Integration: Being an American Citizen? | 436 |
| 6.5. Transnational Capabilities of Refugees: Remembering the Home | 443 |
| 7. CONCLUSION | 451 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 480 |
| APPENDICES | |
| 1. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IRAQI REFUGEES..... | 504 |
| 2. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IRAQI REFUGEES..... | 506 |
| 3. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-PROFIT SECTOR: RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS..... | 511 |
| 4. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR | |

| | |
|---|-----|
| ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, REFUGEE STATE COORDINATION UNIT | 512 |
| 5. LETTER OF INFORMATION | 515 |
| 6. LETTER OF CONSENT | 517 |
| 7. ETHICS APPROVAL | 519 |
| 8. TURKISH SUMMARY-TÜRKÇE ÖZET..... | 520 |
| 9. CURRICULUM VITAE..... | 537 |
| 10. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU..... | 538 |

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|---|
| AZDES | Arizona Department of Economic Security |
| BPRM | Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration |
| EU | European Union |
| IASPF | The Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organizations |
| IDP | Internally Displaced People |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| IRO | International Refugee Organization |
| LNHCR | League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| ORR | Office of Refugee Resettlement |
| RISP-NET | Refugee Integrated Services Provider Network |
| RRP | Reception and Placement Program |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| US. | United States |
| USA | United States of America |
| USCIS | US Citizenship and Immigration Services |
| USRAP | US Refugee Admissions Program |
| VOLAG | Voluntary Agencies |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is true that, at least in the eyes of the public in the liberal democracies, the criterion regarding the morally reprehensible nature of the new enemy is satisfied in Iraq more clearly than in any other case since the American war against Hitler's Germany and its allies. But in the 'new wars', in which a state or alliance of states is directly opposed to a network of non-state actors, one is literally talking of 'perennial' war that cannot be won by military means. Nor, given the lack of anyone empowered to sign the terms of surrender, can we imagine how it would be securely established that the war had actually come to an end.

(Claus Offe, Reflections on America)

On June 16, 2015, I participated in the third-annual World Refugee Day celebration at Catalina High School in Arizona. It was a modest conference room. There were not many participants. The state representatives, a group of refugees, refugee support organizations and volunteers, all were reading the words of an American poet, Emma Lazarus, from the New Colossus on the screen:

Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free/ The wretched refuse of your teeming shore/ Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me/I lift my lamp beside the golden door! (Rumens, 2012).

At the first glance, everyone seemed to be proud of sharing this atmosphere with the words on the screen. It was an emotional moment for some and it was possible for me to feel the nationalist emphasis as the organizers focused upon the fact that US opened a golden door for many who were refused by their countries.

In fact, she wrote this poem to show her concern with “the plight of Russian-Jewish exiles fleeing the pogroms informed the direction she took in this commissioned poem” (Rumens, 2012) to demonstrate the imagination that US would be a ‘home’ for those who are “refused” by their home countries by vowing a country of freedom. It was a decided fact that a large portion of the audience was also sharing the same destiny with Russian-Jewish exiles after two centuries. They were not in their homeland since they were forced to leave their homes because of their religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, political opinion, etc. However, they were ‘saved’ and now, as a group of ‘saved’ and ‘selected’ people, they were in Arizona; they were literally behind the golden door.

On this special occasion, the meaning of the day was dominated through a kind of sublimation of generosity of US. We, the audience, witnessed the narratives of how much US was helpful and supportive for those who were oppressed and exiled by their home governments and of how much they were now free in their new home since America was a country of freedom. From representatives of the different communities to the religious leaders in agreement for a joint will for the benefit of America; they altogether emphasized this aspect of the matter by underlining how refugees enjoy freedom in America.

Following the presentations, the occasion was crowned with a symbolic citizenship ceremony. Ten refugee children between 7 and 15 years old were standing at the stage. The children were from different nationalities, ethnicities and religions. They have arrived in Arizona together with their families. They all symbolically took the citizenship oath and later they approached the presenter to receive their symbolic citizenship certificates. Some of them were saying that “God bless America” or “Thank you, America” after they received their certificate.

It was quite interesting for me to see how American ideology was working in a symbolic way in the event of the World Refugee Day. Future Americans were learning at a very young age to present their gratitude to America. They were stimulated to be aware of the fact that they were permitted to pass through the golden door. The refugee children, immigrants, and non-Americans were clearly obliged to carry all moral and spiritual values and they were expected to show their belonging to America where “huddled masses” can “breathe free”.

Indeed, this small observation of mine manifests that it is a very general thing that US, as a country of immigrants, refugees and displaced people, ideologically presents itself to be accepted as a country of freedom and opportunities. It calls to be sublimated by those as a country that gives them freedom. It generates this by producing a set of moral, spiritual and especially symbolic power. At least, this symbolic ceremony shows that being an American citizen is to accept only American citizenship, there is no room for other loyalties to either home country or any other.¹ The next generations of immigrants and refugees should undertake this great job to promote and heighten America.

At the first glance, it is clear to me that America is a multifaceted context in which different nationalities and religions come together under the above mentioned American ideology. Among this diversity, I have aimed at understanding how Iraqi refugees experience the front and back of this “golden door” in the existent policy of US. This sort of concern, by all means, necessitates the effort to dig out American refugee admission system beyond discourses of freedom and opportunities. Although many have an American dream before the golden door, the question of what happens to tempest-tossed Iraqis needs to be examined by underlying their experiences in forced migration.

The United States of America has received 3.391.232 refugees from different regions since the year of 1975. One of these regions is the Near East/South Asia and Iraq falls under the coverage of this area. The same statistics indicates that US has welcomed 469.773 refugees from this region. In this total, the exact number of Iraqi refugees is

¹ The oath indicates that American citizens support the Constitution and renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citizen.

not available since 1975 according to the data of the BPRM. The oldest cumulative data goes back to the year of October 1, 2006. If we look at the numbers between the years of October 1, 2006 and December 18, 2017, the cumulative number of Iraqi refugees and Special Immigrant Visa Holders is 160.586. Specifically, the number of Iraqi refugees in this total is 142.611 (US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration, 2017d, 2017c, 2017b: Web).

Today, more than one-third of the region of the Near East and South Asia is comprised of Iraqi refugees within the borders of America. Arizona is one of the important placement states in this regard. With its six million population, the state provides a safe hub for refugees and immigrants from different regions. Especially, it is a border state to Mexico and it has a considerable influx from Mexico as well. It does have an aging population with the median age of 35.9 and its economy is mainly based on service sector as well as some industrial production. With these characteristics, Arizona is also an important state for Iraqi refugees and has received 8.229 Iraqi refugees from since the year of 2007 (US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration, 2017c: Web). The number of Iraqi refugees placed in Arizona carries the state to the fourth rank in other ten states in America. During the year of 2015 when this research was conducted, the state received 655 Iraqi refugees after Texas, California and Michigan (2017c: Web).

Generally speaking, 8.229 Iraqi refugees were saved and chosen to be placed in Arizona in US. The main purpose of this research is to understand the plight of Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Why are they in US? Why are those people doing in Arizona? What kind of policy did bring them to US by uprooting them from their homes? Etcetera. They were in America due to various reasons that forced them to leave their home. They spent their years as asylums in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, etc. before they were resettled into America. In order to make their stories visible, within the scope of this research, in the year of 2015, thirty Iraqi refugees were surveyed to get a basic profile and another twenty-eight Iraqi refugees were interviewed in-depth and the representatives and managers of Arizona Department of Economic Security, resettlement agencies, non-governmental and non-profit organizations were interviewed in-depth as well.

On this basis, during this study, I have examined the plight of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, in US by concentrating on different aspects of the process. I will roughly underline that this research observes the process of forced migration as a historical process rather than a taken-for-granted process or a process of an innate part of international migration theories. In this regard, this research takes the concept of forced migration as an analytical part of US-Iraq relations by pointing to the theories that compile forced migration and neo-liberal development in terms of North-South division.

In doing so, this research specifies the relation between forced migration and re-production of forced migration by underlying the dynamics of this historical relation. Therefore, it goes beyond the asylum-development nexus of forced migration to be able to conceptualize the re-production of forced migration by employing the socio-political component of this process as New Wars. As an economically and politically dominant country, US and its allies have begun to use New Wars after invading Iraq in the year of 2003, meaning that a kind of identity politics have been implemented to sweep away a certain portion of societal diversity. In order to analyze the volume of 'societal devastation' in Iraq from 1990s to today, the concept of "social transformation", which is coined by Castles, is employed to find out how social transformation of Iraq has been maintained through New Wars after the year of 2003.

After explaining the re-production of forced migration in the continuity of US-Iraq relations, this research continues to explore the process of forced migration by analyzing it as a part of "global governance" in terms of reasons and results of forced migration. I put forward that rules and institutions in every stage of forced migration necessitate a global organization of governance. This allows us to understand the tasks and roles of states, international organizations, international and local legislative regulations. Rather than confining to international migration literature, this research eventually understands that global governance is a humanitarian governance of forced migration. Humanitarian governance of forced migration needs to be analyzed through roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors as well as experiences of Iraqi refugees in order to find out what happens to refugees behind the golden door of US in a neo-liberal context.

This research sets up the pre- and post-resettlement conditions of Iraqi refugees by giving their views in this process. Therefore, humanitarian governance and resettlement are partly taken together. Resettlement in a third country like US, Canada or European countries also appear one of the most important options that provide a permanent solution to the case of the uprooted. In this sense, resettlement and humanitarian action come into the same picture at the different levels of the process. As a tool of humanitarian governance, US refugee resettlement process is put into question to dispose how US policies, institutions and rules work at global and local levels simultaneously.

In that point, this treatise pursues an analysis of characteristics of humanitarian governance in a neo-liberal context by scrutinizing the case of Arizona. The relation between US Department of State, resettlement agencies, and voluntary organization are examined from different angles to figure out how state and non-state actors of humanitarian governance function in Arizona so as to form “a politics of refugee lives” in a broader sense. This study, at this point, tracks how Iraqi refugees are included in this process by drawing attention to the processes of different political constructions. Therefore, this research brings the construction of New Americans to the front since the system calls newly arrived refugees and immigrants as New Americans.

At this juncture, this research explores the refined logic of the neo-liberal conduct of humanitarian governance by pointing to the fact that Iraqi refugees, as New Americans, are obliged to adapt themselves to American system by accepting supervision, assistance and orientation from the organizations of humanitarian governance to remove their ‘dependency on the system’ in a designated time limit. In close conjunction with this logic, I present an analysis of American “self-sufficiency policy” in order to emphasize how much “humanitarian” aspect of the governance is prevailing in this process since lot of refugees experience this process in severe difficulties along with their traumatic past and vulnerabilities.

From this standpoint, this piece manifests experiences of Iraqi refugees under the impacts of US policies, institutions and organizations. It is one of the main points that

experiences of Iraqi refugees pinpoint what the system requires; a balance among “consequentialist ethic”, “competence assumption” and “responsibilization”. Roughly summarizing, US system makes them responsible for their new lives in America by requesting them to improve their competences in an individualized environment that insists on self-reliant individuals to be. At this stage, this research links what the system expects from Iraqi refugees in their processes of integration, acculturation, assimilation and transnationalism. Then, the research provides the unique characteristics of refugee integration by pointing to how the “non-profit” sector functions in humanitarian governance in Arizona. Accordingly, a contextual mapping of the non-profit sector is also produced by underlying how Iraqi refugees are constructed as “clients”, “the poor”, “the disadvantaged”, “the patient”, etc. and by showing to what extent humanitarian governance takes the form of poverty governance.

In light of these queries, this treatise introduces that refugee integration needs to be analyzed and understood by presenting the organization of humanitarian governance in a joint national and global context and by showing impacts of produced policies, rules as well as of organizations. From here, two important components of refugee integration process is crystalized under the impact of humanitarian governance in Arizona: The process of “vicious cycle of refugee integration” and of “blind spot of refugee integration”. These are argued by spotlighting how Iraqi refugees deal with difficulties in improving their ‘competences’ and skills that US refugee admission system expects.

On this ground, this study sorts out that the Iraqi refugees of Arizona improve their own acculturative strategies in order to take up their language, culture, and identity in portraying next generations. As the subjects of the first generation from 1990s to 2000s, they do not appear as New Americans in the way US system politically and discursively constructs. They become subjects of self-sufficiency policies as a labor force for American labor market so they are literally transformed from subjects of forced migration to that of economic migration. Therefore, they appear as subjects of “socioeconomic sacrifice” for next generations. They envisage their children as Iraqi-Americans who are strictly attached to their home identity, religion and culture

while moving up their social classes in US. This also means that they accept the impossibility of returning to the home although American citizenship means a freedom of travel to other countries. In other saying, they do not consider themselves as “transnational” subjects in their new lives.

All things considered, it is a clear reality that we understand better today that humanitarian governance appears in different regions of the world in order to bring assistance, support, and solidarity to alleviate the suffering of human beings as a reservoir of global attempts. It is enough to check the daily news to see problems and difficulties of Syrians and Iraqis. They are not away from us. It is not difficult to see them that we are living in the same neighborhood, district or country with refugees. When we want to support them beyond our individual capacities, then we face the reality of states, non-state actors, non-governmental organizations and voluntaries. All of them takes their positions with the motivation to support and assist refugees. This cannot be taken as a local or national position. Each of those organizations is a part of globally ‘contested’ governance; it is humanitarian governance.

In sum, this study presents an inter-disciplinary reading of the humanitarian governance of forced migration in order to analyze how state, non-state actors, and refugees build up this process in the neo-liberal context of US, in Arizona. In pursuing to an organized response to how a sociology of forced migration can be possible, this research brings the case of Iraqi refugees up for discussion so as to enhance different theoretical approaches from international migration to integration and transnationalism since this treatise purports that the plight of refugees cannot be comprehensible without a local and global analysis of humanitarian governance.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORY

2.1. Research Question and Research Design

My initial opinions began to form on this research when I was working for the branch office of a non-governmental organization for refugees in a small province in Turkey. As a social worker, I was serving to the refugees from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan by counseling them on their rights and obligations during their stay in Turkey. At that times, it had been six years since US invasion of Iraq, but there was still a large refugee population from Iraq in Turkey and their only wish was to be resettled in a third country like US, Canada, or any European country. During my vocational life, I saw that many Iraqi refugees have an American dream during their stay in Turkey. Their only motivation was to be resettled in US

For me, the operation of the system is clear that the refugees from Iraq are coming to Turkey due to various reasons like geographical proximity, social and cultural affiliations, presence of relatives and friends, etc. Turkey is the first haven for many. They are referred to the cities called “satellite city”² to stay temporarily until their asylum application is resolved. After UNHCR and Turkish authorities receive their asylum application, they start living in their “temporary” lives in Turkey until their only wish turn into a reality. This is not a case for only Turkey. There are Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Egypt, and Syria and all of the refugees is waiting for a resettlement chance to US and other Western countries.

At that time, I asked my first questions to myself, where those people were going, what those people would face, whether their American dream would be real or not, whether American system was providing them with a safe haven, and why and how America was receiving those people from Iraq. These questions were not sufficient to be a

² The satellite city is a traditional usage that indicates the cities where refugees are referred to live in Turkey.

research question unless there was a demonstrated historical and theoretical analysis of the process. Other than that, my first literature review does not say much about the aftermath of the Iraqi refugees in the post-resettlement process. Most of the debates generally concentrate on either adaptation and integration, or assimilation and transnationalism. Therefore, it is worth putting ‘everything’ in an order when it comes to experiences of the Iraqi refugees under the umbrella of forced migration.

In this sense, my doctoral thesis has become an important opportunity to realize this research. Moreover, I had some advantages to do so. During my working life, I met many Iraqi refugees who were resettled in the different states of US from Turkey and a few were my workfellows. When I was informed by some about their conditions in the US, I became aware of the fact that my contacts were mostly settled in Arizona in US as a result of my early query, it was interesting to me that Arizona has a border state to Mexico and it has a large number of Iraqi refugees in comparison with other states in America. This information was quite well, but was not sufficient to go to Arizona for a sociological research. There were still some questions in my mind and all needed to be responded before the journey. It should be the first question of why US accepts many refugees from Iraq? and then the second one of why the Arizona can be a good research site when it comes to the Iraqi refugees?

To begin with, I have reviewed the websites and documents of refugee agencies in Arizona as well as the refugee legislation of US so as to understand the general portray of asylum-seekers, asylees, and refugees in general, and Arizona in particular. Such a review has enabled me to understand how the refugee agencies run in Arizona to serve to refugees; but also to figure out the initial mapping of US refugee admission system. On the other hand, as a result of this review, it was clear to me that there was no a comprehensive study of how Iraqi refugees experience their post-resettlement process under this refugee admission system although the researchers from Arizona have completed various studies on immigrants and refugees at the level of master and doctoral levels. In another saying, little is known about experiences of Iraqi refugees who are resettled from transit countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Syria into America if we put aside the reports published by the authorities and non-profit agencies.

At this juncture, the purpose of my doctoral project becomes clear. It essentially aims to fill the gap in the literature through adopting a holistic approach towards Iraqi refugees' experiences and prospects in US after their resettlement into America. Complementary to this essential concern, this study concentrates on putting the refugee experiences into a determined conceptual and theoretical frame to be able to pursue the consequences beyond Arizona case in the context of the larger context of US. Therefore, experiences of the Iraqi refugees are examined through the content of "humanitarian governance" whose corners build up by US and EU countries. After that, the heads of integration, assimilation and transnationalism are put into question as a result of function of humanitarian governance. As a result, the ultimate purpose of the study is to find a demonstrated answer to the following research questions: How does the United States organize and formulate humanitarian governance with regards to Iraqi refugees? How does U.S respond to Iraqi refugees' needs and shape experiences of Iraqi refugees in the post-resettlement process? How do Iraqi refugees experience acculturation, integration, assimilation and transnationalism processes under reasons and consequences of humanitarian governance in their post-resettlement period?

These research questions are important to analyze US refugee admission and policy system by incorporating experiences of refugees. All questions then need to be contextualized through the case of Arizona. Therefore, resettlement agencies, non-governmental and non-profit organizations need to be analyzed as a part of humanitarian governance. Along this, I sent e-mails to refugee organizations in Arizona to arrange interviews before entering the field. Except one or two, seven organizations replied me positively. After entering the field, I had the opportunity to interview Arizona State Department of Economic Security through one of the resettlement agencies and I also interviewed an experienced volunteer for refugee organizations from Arizona State University.

In designing my research, I usually evaluated all the process through my gatekeepers and my other contacts. Having a status from the universities in America would facilitate my interviews with the agencies and refugees in the field. Therefore, before entering the field, I already started to exchange correspondences with a Prof. from the

school of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona. After the school accepted me as a visiting scholar, I went on for my field research. It was very important to be there as a visiting scholar for an American University since it promoted my field research in contacting both the non-governmental organizations and the authorities. On the other hand, it is equally worth noting that my work experience had positively contributed to the forming of the research as I already had some gatekeepers from Iraqi community³ in Arizona and they supported me a lot during my field research.

My field research has been based on four questionnaires for non-profit organizations (resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations), Iraqi refugees, and Arizona Department of Economic Security. One of the questionnaires for the refugees was a small survey to get a general profile of personal, social and economic indicators. After entering the field, I prepared the questionnaire for my interview with Refugee State Coordination at Arizona State Department of Economic Security. With the questionnaires, the field research was carried out in the cities namely, Phoenix, Tucson, Glendale and Scottsdale in Arizona. Iraqi refugees are mostly spreading to these cities and, the resettlement agencies and volunteer organizations also run in these cities in Arizona.

2.2. Why Iraqi Refugees?

Since the year of 1975, America has accepted 3.391.232 refugees from seven different regions, respectively 1.478.700 from Asia, 596.571 from Former Soviet Union, 459.773 from Near East/South Asia, 378.525 from refugees from Africa, 326.574 from Europe, 128.685 from Latin America Caribbean and 14.161 from Kosovo (US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions, 2017d).

When we tighten the statistical indicators as of the year of 2001, the numbers signal the weight of two important regions; Near East/South Asia and Africa. The former

³ According to Neuman, “a gatekeeper is someone with the formal and informal authority to control access to a site” (2007:282).

corresponds to 339.917 and the latter equals with 275.730 (US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions, 2017b). At this point, from the side of this research, Near East/South Asia numbers tell us that the situation of Iraqi needs to be clarified in comparison with other nationalities when it comes to US refugee admission numbers.

Iraq falls under the region of the Near East/ South Asia. If we go back to the year of 2001, two years before US military intervention, it is statically clear that US mainly accepted refugees from Iran and Afghanistan, that is to say; the numbers of the refugees from Iran and Afghanistan were always higher than Iraq for the region of the Near East/South Asia. The first one was Iranians, the second one was Afghans and the third one was Iraqis. As of the year of 2007, the statistics indicate that the place of Iraq has started to go up and the number of Iraqi refugees doubled other nationalities in 2008 (2017b). There were several reasons for this but it was clear that the destructive consequences of the Iraq invasion heavily came out in the year of 2007. To show some important turning points, the death of civilians signaled a tragic situation for Iraq. In February 2007, 130 people were killed due to the incident that “a bomb strikes a marker in Baghdad” and this was the “worst single bombing since 2003” and “vehicle bombs strike two villages of Yezidi Kurds and kill at least 250 people, the deadliest attack since 2003” (O’Donnell and Newland, 2008 :5).

As a result, in the year of 2007, the admission numbers of Iraqi refugees to US were on the second rank after Bhutan refugees. In the following years, the admission of Iraqi refugees to US was on the first rank except the years of 2011, 2012 and 2016 when Iraqi refugees were always the second rank (2017b). Statistically speaking, the preceding years before the invasion showed that US was not mainly involved in responding to asylum demands from Iraq in terms of resettlement. After the invasion of Iraq by US military forces in 2003, the Iraqi refugees have been on their political agenda.

As mentioned, the statistics tell that US responds to a refugee crisis in Bhutan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It does accept those refugees in the name of “humanitarian action” growing out of the formal logic of its own refugee admission program. Iraqi or

Bhutanese refugees, or other nationalities like Iran and Afghanistan are resettled in America under the same legislation regardless of their identities, religion and ethnicities, they are placed in American states as New Americans.

At this point, I will specify why this research focuses upon Iraqi refugees rather than other nationalities. First of all, the refugee arrival numbers show us that the numbers of Iraqi refugees indicate a refugee crisis and America appears as an important actor of the international protection regime and accepts Iraqi refugees more than other countries do. Following the year of 2007, the Iraqi refugees have started to go up when we look at the refugee arrivals by country of nationality between the years of 2007 and 2009; the number of Iraqi refugees increased from 1.608 in 2007 to 18.838 in 2009, corresponding to 25.3 percent of the total refugee numbers in the United States (Martin, 2010: 3). For this period, “fifty percent of refugees is under 25 years old” and “34 percent of refugees is under age 18” (2010:3).

In the years between 2009 and 2011, the number of Iraqi refugees was on the first rank up to 2011, but in 2011, the numbers of Burma and Bhutan refugees were more than Iraqi refugees and for this timeline, “refugees are, on average, younger than US native-born population” and “the median age of refugees arriving in the United States was 24 years” (Martin and Yankay, 2012: 3-4).

When it comes to the years between 2011 and 2013, the admission of Iraqi refugees was again on the first rank with the number of 19.487, that was 27.9 percent of the total in 2013. By the same year, 50 percent of the total refugee population was between the age rank of 18 and 44 (Martin and Yankay, 2014:4). The same trend continued in the years of 2014 and Iraqi refugees were on the second rank in 2015. Reportedly, “seventy-four percent of refugees admitted to the United States in 2015 were under 35 years of age” and their median age at arrival was “23 years old” (Mossaad, 2016:5).

In the total evaluation of the year based statistics, between 2006 and 2015, US has accepted more than 250.000 refugees from the Near East/ South Asia region and Iraqis are the first with the number of 126.000 and Bhutan is the second in 84.550 and Iranian is the third in 34.800 (2016:4). It is mainly clear to me that the humanitarian

governance of Iraqis need to be explained in a sociological manner with their weight in all refugee groups. The statistical data and analysis by US Homeland Security demonstrate only age, gender and marital status of refugees. A simple analysis of the available statistics shows that US meets its need for a younger population with the refugees. The median age of the refugees, as well as Iraqis, is 'working age', meaning that US do not accept the Iraqi refugees randomly; younger and single refugees are given priority to be selected by US (Martin, 2009 and Martin and Yankay, 2012). As I shall discuss in detail, age and marital status are important variables when it comes to US self-sufficiency policy in the post-resettlement period as the refugees appear as a labor force for the market.

This is one of the most important facets of the refugee admission numbers when it comes to Iraqis. However, the formal numbers do not tell much when it comes to the ethnic and religious affiliations of the refugees in US. Philip Connor from Pew Research Center shows that "nearly 425,000 Christian refugees entered US over that period, accounting for 46% of all refugee arrivals between 2002 and 2017" (Connor, 2017). Besides, it is reportedly noted that "Arabic is now the most spoken language among newly admitted refugees" (Connor, 2017). From here, hypothetically talking, US accepts Iraqi Christians more than Muslims. In other words, there is no balancing policy of admissions. There might be lot of reasons for this like smoother process of integration of Christians in US. Without sinking into this aspect of the matter, in order to contribute to the literature in general, this research also aims at understanding the situation of Iraqi refugees, Christian, Muslims, Ezidis, in terms of integration and adaptation in America in the following chapters.

Along with these important points, I come to my third point that Iraqis, either Christians or Muslims, experience different processes of the post-resettlement period in US. However, in comparison with Bhutanese and Burma refugees, they are different in many aspects. Many have lived in the relatively big cities like Bagdad or Nineveh. They are urbanized. Their general education is significantly qualified. Many have a vocation or profession in their home countries. The educated ones also have English competence. Therefore, Iraqis and Burma or Bhutanese refugees are not in the same pool. Bhutanese or Burma refugees have been placed in US after they spent their years

in the camps. Therefore, experiences of Iraqis must totally be different than other groups, that's camp refugees. Many are educated and have a profession or working culture. In this regard, hypothetically speaking, the personal characteristics of Iraqi refugees, that differentiates them from Burma and Bhutanese refugees, would enrich theoretical approaches to integration, adaptation and assimilation as a result of the practice of humanitarian governance by US. Therefore, the research find that worth investigating how they demonstrate and explain their own conditions in US under their specific conditions⁴.

Last but not least, the forced migration of the Iraqi refugees to US does not belong to only either international migration literature or forced migration literature. Iraqis are socio-politics subjects of a long historical relation between US governments and Iraq administrations. The historical conditions have paved the way for forced migration of Iraqis to other countries. As socio-politics subjects, many are forced to leave their country and resettled in different countries. In another saying, the material conditions of the history of US and Iraq relations demonstrate that “the military intervention” has been used by US to design the position of Iraq in the Middle East.

Succinctly speaking, US foreign policy determines its own place in international protection regime for different regions and it has always had a paternalist approach to control different regions and countries with discourses on human rights, humanitarianism, democracy and anti-terrorism. From here, it is always a main actor of “humanitarian governance” in its paternalist approach. Therefore, Iraq needs to be put in this theoretical aspect as a genuine case that shows that conditions and circumstances of Iraqi refugees are also stretched out to the point where an interdisciplinary analysis is required to find out their experiences.

Through the establishment of the well-functioning system of humanitarian governance, US welcomes refugees as “New Americans”, transform their offspring into Americans, and produce its humanitarian action around discourses of “a new home”. Refugees and immigrants can make their new homes in American and can

⁴ Given the fact that US system does not allow them to perform their profession or vocational skills unless they get the credentials from US authorities. In this sense, the literature on Iraqi refugees is quite weak of demonstrating how they go through all of this process. As a result, the research focuses upon this side of the matter through the analytical reading of their experiences

eventually belong and loyal to their new home, in mesh with the system of humanitarian governance of forced migration.

Looking for a new home and being a loyal citizen in this “new home” is a matter of the fact in this process. Granted that they would not feel any belonging to their home country politically and that their children would not be in a position to empower their sense of belonging to their parents’ home country as Iraqis have fled from their home countries due to their “demonized” leader and government. Whether this would be success of US humanitarian governance or it would be failure in a strict sense of the word. Where Iraqis would stand as subjects of this new process is put into question by this study.

2.3. Why Arizona?

Refugees admitted by US are placed in one of the fifty states through the selection of US Department of State. Arizona constitute a research site for my research. Before explaining the reasons of why Arizona has been selected, I will elaborate why a research is important by reference to Neuman, “a site is the context in which events or activities occur, a socially defined territory with shifting boundaries” (2007: 280). Especially, when it comes to researches on the plight of refugees, the site as a “social setting” connects the researcher to different social contexts and events like language, culture, lifestyle...etc. In this sense, he underlines that “a field research site” should be carrying three important components like “richness of data, unfamiliarity, and suitability” (2007:280). Indeed, the selection of the research necessitates the availability of these three factors during a field research. On the other hand, the researcher’s skills, feelings, race, age, gender and physical access to a site ...etc. can be other factors during a research (2007).

To begin with richness of data, unfamiliarity and suitability, I should note that Arizona is not a selection in abundance of options, but it is the observation of an existing option. As said before, my vocational position enabled me to meet the refugees and to see where they were going. For many years, I worked for an NGO for refugees as a social

worker in Turkey and I had the opportunity to have gatekeepers in Arizona and then I had the chance to concentrate on my inquiry on Arizona and Iraqi refugees. First of all, the initial results of my inquiry on Arizona were clear that the state is one of the important states in US when it is considered as a placement state for Iraqi refugees as well. Secondly, the estimate population of the state of Arizona is 6,931,071 by the year of 2016 (United States Census Bureau, 2016) with the median age of 35.9 years old (Arizona Commerce Authority, 2015a) and more than 2 million of the population are living in Phoenix and an additional 450,000 in Tucson, which are metropolitan areas (Arizona Commerce Authority, 2015b). If we take a step back, the median age of the refugees is prominently younger than that of Americans and this is quite clear that the existence of the Iraqi refugees as a labor force would be contributing to the socio-economic capacity of the state in the long term.

Considering the general social and economic situation of the state, the placement of the young refugee population is important to contribute to the state in general. In this sense, when we look at jobs done by the refugees, it is clearly congruent with what the sectorial structure of the state. The economy of the state is mainly based on real estate and rental, government, manufacturing, retail trade, retail trade and health care and social assistance. The portion of agriculture among those categories is quite low if the figures are put in comparison. With these characteristics of the state, it can be extracted that the economy of Arizona is bound by the service that serves few opportunities to those who are not good at some certain skills such as English language, computer or technique knowledge in a wider sense; that is to say, the huge number of the refugees. It is so often emphasized by some locals during the research that the economy of the state has steadily started to go down since the year of 2008 when the economic crisis crushed the US. It would be beneficial for us to see how personal income was affected by this crisis; in 2009, the level of personal income plumbed the depths and it could not keep a consistency till the year of 2014 and it still seems that there has been no glory of the old days (Arizona Indicators, 2015a) and this has also influenced employment rates negatively (Arizona Indicators, 2015b).

Secondly, the state also presents an “unfamiliar” character when it comes to the general situation of Iraqi refugees. Different than other states, Arizona is quite remarkable in the racial distribution. The enormous part of the population was made up of 5,296,416

white people by the year of 2013⁵. In addition to this data for the same year, the number of Hispanic and Latino was recorded as 2,014,711. The main group of which is Mexicans numbered as 1,813, 659 (United States Census Bureau, 2015). Growing out of having a border to Mexico, this is an important data so as to see one of the unique characteristics of Arizona; so to speak, the state receives many of Mexicans either in document or undocumented ways, so, this also makes the public opinion about illegal migrants irrespective of the existence of refugees: Iraqi refugees do not appear as “refugees” who are uprooted from their home countries; but their social and economic position switches from refugee context to immigrant context more easily and this makes our data “rich” in many other aspects.

Lastly, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration provides the fact that 141,675 Iraqi refugees have been resettled in the US since 2007⁶. Similarly, Arizona has received 8,229 Iraqi refugees since 2007 (United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2017c: Web). If we look at the statistical information in the last three years, according to Office of Refugee Resettlement’s (ORR) fiscal year report in 2015, 182,163 new arrivals were eligible for ORR refugee benefits. Iraq accounted for 18 percent of refugee admissions among 69,933 refugees in the overall total. The number of Iraqis is the second after Burma refugees. Arizona is the fourth among 10 states that have received most refugee arrivals. However, when it comes to the overall US population, Arizona and Washington are exceptions since the population of these two states are remarkably less than other refugee receiving 10 states. As the fourth state in terms of the refugee statistics, Arizona received 655 Iraqi refugees after Texas, California and Michigan according to the report in 2015 when this research was conducted (United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2017c:Web). In this regard, Arizona is a suitable place to study on Iraqi refugees in many aspects since their population has been high for years in Arizona, meaning that my gatekeepers can easily feed my research by connecting me to other Iraqi refugees.

⁵ The last census statistics.

⁶ In the proposed fiscal year report for 2016, USunderlines that more than 120,000 Iraqis have been resettled via the refugee program since 2007. The Administration’s target was 70,000 refugee arrivals in 2015. For 2016, this number has been proposed as 85,000 (United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2015). In a similar analysis, USadministration emphasizes that the number of 85,000 for 2016 has been proposed to be increased to 110,000 for 2017 (United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2016).

2.4. Research Methods and Data Collection

The field research was conducted in the state of Arizona in United States of America between the dates of 12/06/2015 and 14/07/2015 by the research support of Scientific Research Projects Center (BAP) at Middle East Technical University (METU). As explained before, the field research was conducted in the cities of Phoenix, Tucson, Glendale and Scottsdale within the borders of Arizona.

In terms of quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research, Neumann (2006) indicates the different stages of a field research. If we focus upon the quantitative sides of the research, it is significant to turn to the definition of “survey research”. He mainly shows us that a survey research mainly asks about “behavior”, “attitudes/beliefs/opinions”, and “characteristics”, “expectations”, “self-classification, knowledge. By using “a questionnaire”, a survey researcher “conceptualizes and operationalizes variables as questions” (2006: 167-168). Following this logic, my survey research has been formed in very simple understanding by just concentrating on Iraqi refugees’ characteristics, expectations and knowledge. Therefore, the survey research aimed at estimating the average socio-economic variables of the refugees. My survey questionnaire was comprised of 43 questions (see Annex 1). The first part of the survey is to know their legal status, gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, civil status, education level, language competence level. The second part of the survey is to measure their host-related conditions and factors. Therefore, the questions are formulated to learn about their work, income, region, and education in Iraq. The last part of the survey is to learn about their conditions in US right after their resettlement, their legal status, English competence, occupation, and their initial perception about US are questioned.

I have prepared my survey questionnaire in the languages of English and Arabic in order to make the process clear with the respondents. With the assistance of the association of the Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASPF, henceforth) in the city of Phoenix, I conducted my survey research with thirty Iraqi refugees. As Neuman indicates (2007: 170-171). The questions are formulated in a simple and clear language by avoiding jargons, slangs, emotional language, prestige

bias, double-barreled questions, leading question, false premises, and beliefs as real, etc. The questionnaire was formulated to gauge the social, economic and education variables at the three-levels; personal or family characteristics, considering their conditions in Iraq and US.

My survey research is to increase the quality of the analytical part of the research rather than contributing much more than the in-depth interviews. Through the survey results, I had a good opportunity to test some basics for my research. As a result, I organized my in-depth interviews by forcing the limitations in communication and coordination with the agencies and the gatekeepers that assisted me in the field. Actually, Neuman points to this by emphasizing the role of “focusing and sampling”. The former brings us to think about “a general picture” and then “focus on a few specific problems and issues” and the latter enables us to enlarge our position by “sampling people by focusing their attention on different kinds of people (old timers and newcomers, old and young, males and females, leaders and followers)” (2007: 296). In this sense, through the first remarks of the survey results, I focused my snowball strategies to be more selective on profiles of the refugees to be interviewed according to their gender, length of stay, occupational and educational level.

On this ground, as to the qualitative aspects of this research, it is important to underline that there are three field interviews namely, “unstructured”, “nondirective” and “in-depth interviews”. The field interview always necessitates “asking questions, listening, expressing interest, and recording what was said” and also “it is a joint production of a researcher and a member. Members are active participants whose insights, feelings, and cooperation are essential parts of a discussion process that reveals subjective meanings” (Neuman, 2007: 296). During my research, I employed in-depth interviews with both the agencies and the Iraqi refugees in order to explore the different facets of experiences of Iraqi refugees in the post-resettlement process as well as the knowledge and practice of the agencies in this process.

My in-depth interview questionnaire is comprised of three separate texts (see Annex 2). The first questionnaire includes forty-five questions. I interviewed twenty-eight Iraqi refugees with this first questionnaire in Arizona and the interviews lasted thirty minutes to about three hours. During the interviews, Arabic interpreter was used to

translate the dialog in Turkish. The second questionnaire (see Annex 3) contains twenty-one questions. I interviewed the directors or co-managers of seven resettlement agencies in Arizona and also I interviewed the representatives of four volunteer and professional (non-governmental organizations) in Arizona. The interviews lasted a hour to three hours. The third questionnaire (see Annex 4) is comprised of fifteen questions. I asked these questions to the two state officials from Arizona Department of Economic Security. The interview lasted a hour and forty minutes. At this juncture, Neuman's formulation of question types namely; "descriptive, structural and contrast questions" (2007:298) has led to the formation of my interview questions and so, the experiences, conditions, subjective meanings and socio-economic variables of the whole process are put into descriptive, structural and contrast questions.

Speaking of the first questionnaire of this research, I must emphasize that the questions are formulated to measure the premises of the process in which the Iraqi refugees forcibly made a decision to leave their home country and in which they stayed in a country of asylum to be resettled into US After that, I concentrated upon the resettlement process, condition, rights and obligations in Arizona in US by crystalizing the topics of access to public relief, labor market, health, education, and social and economic conditions and indicators. Lastly, I finalized my questions by focusing upon their social mobility and integration processes in US. Along with this last section of the questions, I also stressed upon their relations with Iraqis and Americans, their perception of discrimination, safety and security and marriage and other personal relations. On the other hand, I need to specify that I had a great opportunity to visit some refugees' houses to see their domestic lives and to have some observations on their daily lives.

In order to see the other facet of the process, I employed my second questionnaire so as to gauge the characteristics, roles, knowledge and practice of the resettlement agencies, of volunteer and professional (non-governmental) organizations. My main purpose is to reach a well-done mapping of all the refugee organizations with these questions. Therefore, I aimed at portraying their principles and norms in the post-resettlement process, their relation with the Department of State, their expertise areas,

their understanding of the refugee admission program with gaps and good practices, their analysis of refugee adaptation and integration processes in Arizona.

With the termination of the interviews with the refugee organizations, the remaining level is the perspective of the state officials. For this reason, I needed totally different set of the questions to be posed to the responsible of the refugee section at Arizona Department of Economic Security (AZDES). I prepared a third questionnaire comprised of fifteen questions (see Annex 4). With this interview, I aimed at the governmental aspect of the resettlement admission program in order to deploy how US paves the way for an effective humanitarian governance together with other humanitarian actors. It is not my only purpose to figure out what perspective the governmental agency has in Arizona, but also I concentrated on the policy mentality when it comes to the refugees as well as their integration process.

2.4.1. Ethics and Confidentiality

Succinctly speaking, ethics or ethical issues are the backbone of social researches in many aspects. Neuman indicates that “social research can harm a research participant in several ways: physical, psychological, and legal harm, as well as to a person’s career, reputation, or income” (2007:51). All of these potential harms need to be considered in every stage of a social research so as to keep the research ethical. Particularly, this is crucial while studying on the refugees as many of the refugees are already survivors of physical, psychological, and legal harm and they unfortunately have a traumatic background. Therefore, it is two times difficult to interview them specifically in their resettlement countries. This is difficult because in the eyes of them, the researcher may be anyone from the government and s/he may lead their deportation to their home country; the researcher may be an external or a stranger to their communities and s/he may not be culturally fit to an interview; the researcher might lead to problems for their citizenship process and their stay in US

On this ground, it is quite difficult to conduct a social research with the refugees in their permanent placement. Even if the researcher is able to conduct a research with

them, it might be harsh to get responses in a desired manner. From the side of the participants from the resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations, the situation was not different. As said before, the status of being a visiting scholar from Arizona University facilitated my contacts with the organizations. Otherwise, as a researcher from Turkey, it might be difficult to establish a rapport relation with all participants since this institutional identity strengthened my position in the field in terms of ethical concerns that Neuman underlines.

Under these circumstances, to ensure the ethics of the research, before entering the field, I applied to Human Researches Ethics Committee at METU to receive Ethics Approval (see Annex 5) to conduct my field research to avoid any potential problem in Arizona. This was very critical stage for my research since my ethics approval was always in case before the interviews. In this sense, I have prepared my questionnaires in an effort to keep “psychological harm, stress and loss of self-esteem” out of the context (Neuman, 2007). Each question is mainly based on “informed consent”; that’s the participants would never be forced or coerced to respond to the questions they did not want to answer. In order to put all of these ethical issues in a written form, I have also prepared a Letter of Information (see Annex 6) and a Letter of Consent (see Annex 7).

With the Letter of Information, the format and purpose of the research was initially made clear for each participant. Besides, the letter informs about the details of the interviews; how many questions it contains, how long the interview takes, whether the interview includes any risk, as well as the voluntary nature of responding to the questions and of participation in the research, the usage of a tape-recorder upon the participant’s permission, and the concealment or disclosure of the participants’ names and identities upon the participant’s written claim. Neuman explains “informed consent” as “a fundamental ethical principle of social research: never coerce anyone into participating: participation must be voluntary at all time” (2007: 54). For my research, the Letter of Consent is the document of “informed consent”. After each participant reads the letter of information⁷, if they agree to participate in the research, they provided their consent or not on the disclosure of their identities in my research.

⁷ Available in their mother tongue.

To ensure that all participants clearly understand and give their consent for this research. The questionnaire, the letter of information and the letter of consent have been translated into Arabic before the field research. Copies of the letters were provided to each participant and the details were made clear before the interviews were started with the assistance of the Arabic interpreters. Considering what I have clarified so far, with these ethical concerns and informed consent, I have used nick names for refugees during this research. As to other participants from the resettlement agencies and non-governmental organization, I only have employed their real names upon their informed consent. Otherwise, only their positions and organizations' name have been provided in sharing their views and opinions through the in-depth interviews.

2.4.2. Profiles of the Iraqi Refugees

During this research, the survey and the in-depth interview results present us the profile of the Iraqi refugees. Despite the fact that the survey results are important for this research, it is not a constitutive part of the analytical part. Rather, it contains a group of contributing indicators to understand the general situation of the Iraqi refugees. Most of the surveys were completed through the assistance of the IASPF as this was the only chance for to reach the refugees. In fact, the surveys were conducted with the refugees who were approaching the IASPF to benefit from English classes and other services free of charge. Therefore, it is critical to keep in view that the survey results only reflect a small part of the reality since it does not contain the refugees who have been staying in US for long years, or it does not contain the details of the diverse structure of the refugee population at first sight. However, it provides some indicators to understand the primary profile of the refugees and it is a good piloting for this research to see their age, gender, religion, education, occupation, child number, and legal status in America.

In this sense, as can be seen in the below chart of the survey results, thirty Iraqi refugees, comprised of seventeen female and thirteen male participants, were surveyed. Twenty-two participants define themselves as Muslim; seven as Christian

and one as Ezidi. Twenty-one participants are under sixty-five years old. The median age for the women is 38 years old and for the men is 51 years old.

Table 1: Overview of Profiles of the Iraqi Refugees

| No. of Participant | Gender | Religion | Age | Education | Marital Status | Children | Work in Iraq | Urban in Iraq | English Competence | Work in USA | Citizenship |
|--------------------|--------|-----------|-----|----------------|----------------|----------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---|-------------|
| 1.R | F | Muslim | 38 | Primary School | Divorced | 2 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 2.R | F | Muslim | 24 | High School | Married | 1 | Housewife | No | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 3.R | F | Muslim | 26 | High School | Married | 3 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 4.R | F | Christian | 38 | Primary School | Married | 3 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 5.R | F | Muslim | 45 | University | Married | 4 | Housewife | Yes | Average | Unemployed | No |
| 6.R | M | Muslim | 49 | High School | Married | 6 | Martial Arts Coach | Yes | Average | Entry Level Job | No |
| 7.R | F | Muslim | 41 | High School | Married | 6 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 8.R | M | Muslim | 57 | Primary School | Married | 4 | Worker | Yes | Average | Unemployed | No |
| 9.R | M | Muslim | 65 | High School | Married | 3 | Retired | Yes | Poor | Not working | No |
| 10.R | M | Christian | 54 | High School | Married | 4 | Freelancer | Yes | Average | Entry-level Job | No |
| 11.R | F | Christian | 48 | High School | Married | 4 | Hairdresser | Yes | Average | Unemployed | No |
| 12.R | M | Muslim | 50 | High School | Married | 0 | Freelancer | No | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 13.R | M | Christian | 72 | High School | Married | 1 | Selling Cars | Yes | Average | Unemployed | No |
| 14.R | F | Christian | 32 | High School | Married | 2 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Housewife | No |
| 15.R | M | Muslim | 48 | University | Married | 4 | Journalist | Yes | Good | Unemployed | No |
| 16.R | M | Christian | 64 | University | Married | 1 | Manager for INGO | Yes | Good | Working for a humanitarian organization | Yes |
| 17.R | F | Muslim | 40 | High School | Married | 3 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Housewife | No |
| 18.R | M | Muslim | 62 | High School | Divorced | 2 | Freelancer | Yes | Average | Entry Level Job | No |
| 19.R | M | Muslim | 27 | High School | Married | 0 | Selling Worker | Yes | Good | Entry Level Job | No |
| 20.R | F | Muslim | 24 | High School | Married | 0 | Housewife | Yes | Good | Entry Level Job | No |
| 21.R | F | Muslim | 54 | High School | Married | 2 | Housewife | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 22.R | F | Muslim | 31 | University | Single | 0 | Computer Engineer | Yes | Average | Unemployed | No |
| 23.R | M | Muslim | 38 | High School | Married | 3 | Freelancer | Yes | Good | Restaurant Owner | Yes |
| 24.R | F | Muslim | 57 | University | Married | 2 | Lawyer | Yes | Good | Worker for a humanitarian organization | Yes |
| 25.R | M | Ezidi | 51 | High School | Married | 4 | Freelancer | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 26.R | M | Muslim | 50 | High School | Married | 2 | Student | Yes | Good | Working for a humanitarian organization | Yes |
| 27.R | M | Muslim | 51 | University | Married | 4 | Electric Engineer | Yes | Good | Working for a humanitarian organization | No |
| 28.R | M | Christian | 74 | High School | Married | 2 | Pastor | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 29.R | M | Muslim | 36 | High School | Married | 3 | Freelancer | Yes | Poor | Unemployed | No |
| 30.R | M | Muslim | 32 | High School | Married | 1 | Freelancer | Yes | Good | Entry Level Job | No |

The indication of the median age is not contrary to the above-mentioned data provided by US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration (BPRM) since each family averagely has three children who are at the age rank of six to thirty-five. Roughly speaking, it would not be incorrect to state that there is a significant indication of young refugee numbers in total. As to the marital status, although the large number of refugees is married according to the result of the survey, it is highly crucial to underline that their children are single, and mostly at education and working age.

On the other hand, it is important to note that twenty-one participants have a high-school degree, six participants have a university degree, and only three participants have a primary school degree. If we look at the education level of the males and the females separately, eight female participants have a high school degree, three of them have a university degree and two female participants have a primary school degree. As to the males, thirteen male participants have a high school degree, three of them have a university degree and one of them has a primary school degree. In general, it can be said that US has received the refugees who are educated in comparison with other groups like Bhutan or Burma refugees. Indeed, this indicator is also underlined in the reports by the BPRM. Besides, this research also shows that the integration of the Iraqi refugees comes into existence in a more smooth process according to the results of the in-depth interviews and this is mostly attached to their education level.

When it comes to their social and economic background in Iraq, it can, at first sight, be underscored that the Iraqi refugees were doing their own business or they were unskilled workers although they were living in an urban area, mostly Baghdad. This is again important to note that US accepted the refugees who mainly lived in the urban areas and who had a work experience in their country of origin. This is also another important part of this research when it is analyzed together with the results of the in-depth interviews. As they are urbanized in comparison with other refugee groups, they are considered advantageous in their adaptation and integration processes into US system. It is also critical to note that the occupational situation of the women was different than the males even if their education level is at the same level. Accordingly,

only two women were working in their country of origin and others were housewife to the survey results.

As to the correlation between their English competence and their recent work in the US, seven male and two participants have a good level of English, meaning that they can find a job with their English level better than the entry-level jobs. Thirteen participants, of eight women, have a poor level of English and this has a huge negative influence on their participation in the social and economic life in US. When their work in US is seen in the above chart, the number of the unemployed is eighteen participants since either their language is poor or they look for another job. Twelve participants are unemployed since their language competence is poor. Six of them have an entry-level job with their average or good level of English. Four with university and high school degree and with a good level of English competence work for a humanitarian organization which is different than the entry-level jobs. In fact, this is an significant indicator of how much education level and English competence is important in finding a qualified work in US. The outcomes of the in-depth interviews also present a similar frame in details.

Lastly, it is quite essential to indicate that only four participants have a citizenship status and others do not have. This means that the majority of the participants stay in US less than five years in the legal terms. Having citizenship can be seen as indicators of integration in US because of the fact that they improve their language competence and establish their social and economic lives after lot of personal experiences. In this sense, the survey results do not demonstrate further results for the social and economic situation of those who stay longer than five years. Indeed, this is quite comprehensible since the majority arrives in US after the year of 2007 as can be seen in the statistics provided by the BPRM.

As elaborated before, the survey results provide us a good insight to see the leading characteristics of the Iraqi refugee population. However, it doesn't allow us to go into details of how the Iraqi refugees experience their post-resettlement period in America. As Seidman (2006: 9) puts forward, "at the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of

that experience”. In this regard, my main purpose is to focus upon their experiences in a broader sense so as to establish a well-structured analysis of the field. This is also to deepen my research in many aspects that the survey results do not demonstrate.

On this ground, I conducted my in-depth interview with twenty-eight Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Nine of them were also surveyed. Seven in-depth interviews were conducted in the houses of the refugees and the rest was conducted through the assistance of the IASPF. The analysis of the field findings is based on twenty-three in-depth interviews. Interviews were conducted through the Arabic interpreters once the participants had a poor and average level of English⁸. The interpreters were arranged through the assistance of the organizations and of their relatives or friends to keep the ethical and confidential aspects of the field research⁹. The results of the remaining five in-depth interviews do not demonstrate the additional contribution to the research, therefore the results are employed to reach the qualified content of the analysis. The profile of the Iraqi refugees from the in-depth interviews are reflected on the following chart:

⁸ By quoting from the participants through either interpreters or themselves, no grammar revision is considered except a few minor ones during the research. Their usage of English language is kept in a natural form.

⁹ A written application to the organization of Catholic Charities in Phoenix was done to request the assistance of the interpreter. Once all ethics procedures were completed with the relevant documents, I was provided with an Arabic interpreter.

Table 2: Profiles of the Interviewed Iraqi Refugees

| Nick Name | Age | Gender | Religion | Education | Country of Asylum | Length of stay in CoA | English Competence | Work in the U.S. | Length of residence in the U.S. |
|-----------|-----|--------|-----------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| QK | 64 | M | Christian | University | N/A | N/A | Good | Interpreter for NGO | 6 years |
| SH | 40 | F | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Poor | Unemployed | 4 years |
| O | 32 | M | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Avarege | Driver | 4 years |
| EF | 48 | M | Muslim | University | N/A | N/A | Good | Kargo worker | 2 years |
| DR | 36 | M | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Poor | Car repairment | 3 and half years |
| RZ | 73 | M | Christian | High School | TURKEY | 1 year | Poor | Not working | 2 and half years |
| MB | 47 | M | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 3 years | Poor | Carrier | 3 years |
| MH | 51 | M | Muslim | University | EGYPT | 2 years | Good | Working for NGO | 5 years |
| KJ | 36 | F | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Poor | Housekeeper | 3 years |
| H | 48 | M | Muslim | University | TURKEY | 3 years | Poor | Worker for a carpenter company | 3 years |
| JM | 50 | M | Muslim | University | N/A | N/A | Good | Working for NGO | 25 years |
| IM | 62 | M | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 7 years | Avarege | Seller for a company | 5 years |
| D | 51 | M | Ezidi | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Poor | Not working | 7 years |
| Y | 37 | F | Christian | Primary School | TURKEY | 3 years | Poor | Unemployed | 4 years |
| FD | 57 | F | Muslim | University | JORDAN | 2 years | Good | Working for NGO | 7 years |
| S | 38 | M | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 7 months | Good | Restaurant Owner | 7 years |
| B | 31 | F | Muslim | University | JORDAN | 3 years | Avarege | Unemployed | 4 years |
| MA | 48 | F | Muslim | Primary School | JORDAN | 2 years | Poor | Unemployed | 4 years |
| HA | 24 | F | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Good | Worker for a company | 4 years |
| A | 50 | M | Muslim | University | JORDAN | 1 and half years | Good | Local journalist | 12 years |
| Z | 47 | F | Muslim | High School | SYRIA | 1 year | Good | Housekeeper | 7 years |
| M | 48 | F | Muslim | High School | EGYPT | 2 years | Avarege | Housekeeper | 7 years |
| NS | 32 | M | Muslim | High School | TURKEY | 2 years | Good | Worker for a company | 4 years |

A detailed look at the chart shows that the profiles of the interviewed refugees are close to that of the surveyed ones in terms of their age, education, and religious differences. On the other hand, it is essential to underline that the refugees have been resettled in US from the different asylum countries. Thirteen refugees have been resettled from Turkey, 4 from Jordan, 2 from Egypt, 1 from Syria, and 3 from other channels like asylee status or other Arab countries. The number of the refugees from Turkey is high as I was supported by both my gate-keepers from Turkey and the organizations in Arizona.

When we examine the average length of stay in country of asylum, it can be said that it is between two and three years. It is quite critical to assess their stay in the country

of asylum to be able to demonstrate their experiences from uncertain lives to adaptation to a new country in the post-resettlement period. In terms of their language competence and their works in the US, the correlation between two variables are in close congruent with the survey results. However, it is important to underscore that the category of work in US does not reflect their current work only as well as their initial experiences. Therefore, this category presents us that their work experience starts with the entry-level jobs in Arizona irrespective of their education and occupation background. The length of residence also contributes to the process in which the refugees gain experience of adaptation and integration in Arizona.

2.4.3. Profiles of the Agencies

I interviewed fourteen persons from the eleven organizations in the provinces of Phoenix and Tucson in Arizona. The organizations are different from each other with their principles and relations with the Department of State. In this regard, the resettlement agencies serve to the refugees on the basis of a cooperative agreement with US Department of State. The organizations, under the umbrella of the head of the non-governmental organizations, do not have a cooperative agreement with the Department of State, but they manage different projects and volunteer activities to increase the capacity of the refugees in the post-resettlement area. In fact, I have analyzed these organizations in a theoretical understanding to deploy their status in this research. Succinctly speaking, each of them moves in different scopes and they have different expertise in their scope. Therefore, it is possible to state that all are the non-governmental and non-profit organizations, but their mode of running in the field is different in terms of rational, bureaucracy, structure, and staff quality.

Table 3: Profiles of the Interviewed Agencies

| | Staff & Position | Organization | Type of Organization | Province |
|------------|---|--|---|-----------------|
| 1. | Officer | Arizona Department of Economic Security | Governmental organization | Phoneix |
| 2. | Ferdinand Losson - Manager | Catholic Community Services | Resettlement agency | Tucson |
| 3. | Craig Thoresen - Director | Refugee Focus | Resettlement agency | Phoneix |
| 4. | Joanne Morales - Director | Catholic Charities Services | Resettlement agency | Phoneix |
| 5. | Nicolle Trudeau - Director | Refugee Focus | Resettlement agency | Tucson |
| 6. | The representatives - Excutive Director and Coordinator | International Rescue Committee | Resettlement agency | Phoneix |
| 7. | One of the founders (JM/50/male) and Program Director | Iraqi- American Society for Peace and Friendship | Non-governmental organization | Phoneix |
| 8. | Jacquelynn Villa-Baze | La Frontera Center Inc. | Non-governmental organization | Tucson |
| 9. | The representatives - Director and Coordinator | Tucson Refugee Ministry | Non-governmental organization | Tucson |
| 10. | The representative | Noor Women's Association | Non-governmental - Volunteer organization | Tucson |
| 11. | Barbara Eiswerth | Iskashitaa Refugee Network | Non-governmental organization | Tucson |
| 12. | Volunteer | Ph.D/Arizona Uni. | For resettlement agencies | Tucson |

As can be seen in the chart, the first one is a governmental organization and the last one is a volunteer person and the others are comprised of the resettlement agencies and the non-governmental organizations. At this point, it is important to underline that Catholic Charities Services, Catholic Community Services, Refugee Focus, Tucson Refugee Ministry define themselves as “faith-based organizations” and they produce their discourses around religious theme and faith based motivations. In fact, as shall be seen later in details of the research, this is not the contrary to the essential politics of US government, especially after 9/11 incident. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the community based organizations, that’s refugee organizations, were not available in Arizona in the year of 2015. However, it is possible to state that Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship fills this gap by gathering Iraqis together around different activities and services.

As already mentioned in ethics part of the research, the real names of the directors of some organizations are clearly provided in the research since their informed consent is received. Otherwise, only the names of the positions and tasks are used during the research.

2.5. Observations and Limitations

During the field interviews of this research, Arizona, as a site of the research, is instructive for me in many aspects. First of all, Arizona represents a unique part of the United States of America. With its proximity to Mexico, it has a diverse structure of the population. It doesn't seem a metropolitan city in regular standards. The influence of the weather, around 40-50 degrees Celsius, on people's social life is totally negative since it makes outdoor activities impossible even in the evenings. The indicators of the development of a metropolitan life are not strong in terms of transportation in easy accessibility to the organizations, institutions, malls and central points. Without having a car, it is not easily possible to move from one point to another as alternative transportations like railways were newly being built when I was in the field. In this sense, as a researcher in the summer season, I faced lot of difficulties in accessing the institutions and the refugees. The research site is full of the physical obstacles in this sense and this prevented me from reaching more refugees as two or maximum three interviews could be done on the condition that all arrangement were going well.

Secondly, Arizona does not present an alternative lifestyle to refugees or immigrants in certain provinces. As a capital city, Phoenix is not different from Tucson or Glendale for refugees. Even it is more decentralized in terms of residences, workplaces and refugee communities. The Iraqi refugees were a part of this decentralized city life. They complaint a lot about their routines from work to home and vice versa. Most of them were clearly giving a value to their relations with their close relatives and friends. However, they were living in detached houses in the different zones of the provinces and this physical distance was not culturally fit to their lives. It was interesting to me that all refugees had their own cars to overcome their daily challenges in access to relatives, friends, markets, malls, institutions and other facilities. On the other hand, it

was clear that having a car is a symbol of a form of “conspicuous consumption” by recalling Veblen. It is a way of proving their economic power in front of their families, relatives and friends while making their lives easier in Arizona. I can say that their style of attachment to daily life and social life does not contribute to my research much more than expected. It is not easy to reach them or go beyond their own networks. Therefore, it partly failed to satisfy my field research if I consider my gatekeepers’ support in this sense.

Thirdly, irrespective of living in Phoenix or Tucson, or Glendale, the Iraqi refugees are not organized for the benefit of their own communities. They mostly prefer moving in a determined social network comprised of relatives and friends. Indeed, there are several reasons for this. The main one is the lack of sense of trust and security. They do not have a strong affiliations because of the home-related factors like ethnic or religious based conflict, violence and turmoil. Many clearly explain that the ethnic and religious based discrimination among the community appears once they come together, or there are always gossips about something. As a result, it is not possible to put forward that they have a good motivation to come together to support each other or to advocate and raise their demands and rights. On other hand, as I said, the community based organizations are not available in Arizona; for instance, Tucson is smaller than Phoenix and it is easier for volunteers to organize themselves to support the refugees, but in Phoenix, it was clear that the refugee support communities were not strong enough. There are the resettlement agencies and other volunteer organizations, but it is clear that they are not motivated for this sort of organizations and activities. To me, there are several reasons for this: they cannot easily establish a trust relation, they cannot easily feel safe, and they have the main challenges to survive in Arizona and so on. In this regard, they prefer to lead an individual life by maximizing their benefits in Arizona.

On this basis, I will emphasize why this research does not refer to the issues in the context of diaspora. Highlighting the distinction between diaspora and transnationalism, Faist explains that diaspora is associated with “religious or national groups living outside an imaginary homeland” whereas transnationalism is linked to “migrants’ durable ties across countries” and “transnationally active networks, groups

and organizations” (2010: 9). Furthermore, he indicates that diaspora studies stress upon “cultural distinctiveness” that is relevant for “religious communities and nationhood”; in this sense, diaspora works with “community and “dispersal”. Besides, diaspora, in EU documents, are delineated as “networks of migrants with various legal links to the home country” and he distinguishes transnationalism from diaspora as a broader concept so it is not based on national, ethnic or religious groups, but diaspora is grounded upon “aspects of collective identity” (Faist, 2010b: 19, 21).

In this regard, this research does not focus upon the formation of collective identity for Iraqis since there is not strong indication of religious or national groups of Iraqis on the basis of common values when the context of Arizona is considered. However, I present a critique of transnationalism in terms of mobility that is manifested under the head of citizenship arguments. For both, there must be a social, economic and legal link to the home country, but as can be seen in my analysis, this is also another weak point due to various obstacles that refugees face. As a result, rather than focusing upon the production of collective identity and of an imaginary homeland, I analyze the “social formations” of Iraqi refugees by emphasizing their integration processes with a critique of transnationalism. Therefore, I do not contain the debates on identity and diaspora to find out how their individual experiences are decisive in a neo-liberal context of values, principles and procedures as well as of humanitarian organizations.

Fourthly, it was also an interesting experience for me to see their individual lives more closely by visiting their homes. Seven of the participants kindly accepted me to their homes for an interview. Their homes were totally designed through the motives of their social and cultural capital. Religious accessories is one of the important component in their homes. They were watching Arabic channels and some were gardening in their small backyards. Many were traditionally living. During our chats out of the interviews, they were suspicious of American style lives for their children. It was clear that many were afraid of their children’ future in American lifestyle. However, it was good to see that almost all of them were giving a huge importance to education for their children.

Lastly, during my interviews with both the refugees and the agencies, it was not easy to establish a rapport relation. With the assistance of the gatekeepers and the refugee organizations, I had the chance to overcome lot of difficulties in the decentralized environment of Arizona. I asked many questions and I listened to them for hours. However, there are always some untouchable subjects in my research. As a researcher, I was an external figure for the interviewees and this externality formed my research when it comes to the political subjects. In this regard, the direct questions concerning the political position of the refugees or of the agencies were not formulated during the research. Especially, the refugees who do not have their citizenship suffer from the long-term effects of their uncertain lives and it was difficult for them to express everything easily. Respecting this sort of sensitive aspects, the interviews were concluded.

2.6. Authenticity of the Research

Experiences of people who are forced to leave their homes are intensively examined and analyzed by the literature of the international migration theories and forced migration studies in terms of education, labor market and health in European context. Various scholars have also produced lot of master researches¹⁰ on the lives of immigrants in America. Regarding experiences of the refugees, it should be underscored that there is a prosperous literature that welcome us in the European context whereas it is not easily to talk about the American context in the same manner. The head of immigrants always steps forward as America has a unique place as a country of immigrants and we come across that although there are some invaluable studies initiated by Zolberg in the late 1980s, American context is still too taciturn with experiences of the refugees. In spite of the fact that there are lot of reports and report based analyses on refugees by the humanitarian organizations, a theoretical grasp of the conditions of the refugees in US is generally preoccupied with “street-level theories”; “labor migration”; “grand integration and assimilation theories” and “developing theories as transnationalism”. Besides, the migration literature does not

¹⁰ Some of them in this research: Assimilation studies by Park and Burgess (1914; 1921); *Birds of Passage* by Piore (1979); on Americanization by Ritzer (1998); *Transnationalism and Immigrants* by Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004; 2013); *American Immigration* by Erika (2006), on Race and Neo-liberalism by Soss, Fording and Schram (2011).

demonstrate a specific research on Iraqi refugees in US by focusing upon their experiences before and after the resettlement process.

In order to have a place in the literature of the migration in general, this research gives a place to the stories of the Iraqi refugees as subjects of an involuntary form of displacement by stretching out to the theory of humanitarian governance. In this regard, US refugee admission system is put into question within the theoretical premises of humanitarian governance in order to analyze experiences of the Iraqi refugees in the post-resettlement process. At the crossroads of the theories of humanitarian governance, integration, assimilation and transnationalism, this research brings experiences of the Iraqi refugees to the literature. With the analytical reading of the field findings, this research contributes to the development of the theory of humanitarian governance through the mapping of US refugee admission system as well as that of the concept of “refugee integration” with new modalities and concepts.

2.7. Relations in the Field

Having started from the city of Ankara in Turkey, I had taken a long way lasted for almost sixteen hours to live my first research experience in America. Maybe, for most of the passengers, New York was the last station to enjoy their time in the US. It became a bit different for me since, after landing at JFK airport in New York, I had to run to take my other flight which lasted almost five hours and, in the end, I was at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport at night. My trip was not finalized yet. To reach my field research’s starting point that was the city of Tucson, it was a must for me to take a shuttle from Phoenix to Tucson, which also took my two hours approximately. The shuttle was just like a small minibus moving to one small Anatolian town to another; we were four men in and an Afro-American driver took us to the city of Tucson while listening to rap music a bit loud.

At the dead of the night of June 13, when I got outside to check in at the hotel, the first thing that touched me rough was the high temperature, it was roasting. In fact, before arriving, I had already heard about the reputation of high temperatures of Arizona,

which is called as a desert climate. Even so, the reality was always different and helped me understand that the research would be overextending me in Arizona.

On June 13, this research was officially initiated in the city of Tucson in Arizona. However, I should note that I had started to organize my contacts three months before the research when I was in Turkey to wipe all uncertainties out as I was feeling apprehensive. Organizing research and appointments with the university, refugee organizations and volunteers took my three months. Many of refugee organizations provided positive feedbacks with a huge interest in my research and some of them invited me to the refugee day celebrations which were held on 16 June, 2015 in Tucson. Indeed, they gave me a sense that they would test me before the interviews. I appreciated their invitation since it would be a great chance for me to see all refugee organizations together in such an event and it would clearly open many doors for my research if I could pass the test successfully; even if all failed, I would be witnessing Tucson's refugee event on World Refugee Day, which was held on June 16, 2015.

Next morning, I was woken up by the room service. She asked my permission before cleaning the room. The service staff was 45-50 years old lady and awhile later she asked me if I am French or not. I told I am from Turkey, but it did not make sense for her as she did not know anything about my country. When I asked her where she is from, she told that she is from Mexico. In other days, I figured out that there were lot of Mexican workers in the room service work; on the contrary, those who were working for reception, kitchen or restaurant were Americans in the main. In fact, during the unfolding of my research, I have understood that this is not an exceptional situation for the hotel I accommodated. This was one of the social and economic indicators of the relation between migration and labor market in the national context of Arizona. Those who exceed a certain age limit with insufficient English knowledge from Mexico or any other sending countries are employed for entry level work including janitors, cleaners or housekeepers and so on.

To explore around, I took the road towards the university of Arizona which was, I had already checked before my research travel, located in an area close to my hotel in walking distance. There were wide asphalt roads laying straight with single-floor

American houses whose yards were full of giant cactuses under lovely sunshine and there were lot of cars in every type and size; but, no developed public transportation. After a twenty five minutes' walk, I reached the university which had a nice atmosphere with huge green areas. However, I uneasily accepted that I would have a difficult research process since I did not have a car in this wide area and I had to get either a cap or a bus; the former was too expensive and the latter was quite rare and slow.

In Tucson, my first appointment was with Prof. Scott Lukas from Middle East and Northern African Studies at the University of Arizona on 16 June, 2015. Being a short term scholar invited by the university enabled me to adapt myself into the research area easily since such an affiliated university identity was a good facilitator to knock the doors and establish a fast rapport relation. After visiting the Prof., I had to attend the refugee day celebration at Catalina High School, which was far away from my location and I called a taxi whose driver was a talkative person and asked me where I am from. I told, but he did not say much, just tried to understand where Turkey stands in the world map. His name was Dennis, 55-60 years old, from New Jersey and he was living in Tucson more than twenty years. He asked me about my trip purpose and I shortly explained by pointing to the refugee event at the school. He said that he did not know anything special about refugees in Arizona, especially in Tucson and he added in complaining manner that there are too many people in America; he does not understand why. In Canada, there are lot of huge areas, why they want to place people in there; what is wrong with animals that can live there forever. He was quite cheerful and frank person. He dropped me in front of the school and I requested him to take me back at the end of the event since it seemed to me that it would be difficult for me to find a cap easily.

A small group of people was welcoming participants in a modest atmosphere at the Catalina Magnet High School in Tucson. It was an event open to public with a purpose to increase the visibility of refugees in public. The event was mainly organized and supported by the network of refuge service providers composed of International Rescue Committee (IRC), Refugee Focus, Catholic Community Services, La Frontera Center Inc., Tucson Refugee Ministry, Arizona State Development and Economic

Security Refugee Department, the Tucson Roman Catholic Diocese and the Islamic Center of Tucson.

Excepting the representatives of these organizations, there was no a high level of participation of refugees and locals. It was a small celebration meeting. The number of the participants was low, but the topics were too much serious. All speechmakers emphasized a prominent point that America is a safe haven for those escaping from war, conflict and persecution in their home country and all refugees try to build up their future in the US; at the same time, the future of the US. It was more particularly raised that America is a binder for those who come from different social, ethnic and religious backgrounds in a culture based on solidarity and unity. Specially, the speeches of the religious figures brought this point to the front by emphasizing the virtues of helping each other in reference to religious terms.

Following the speechmakers, a part from the New Colossus by Emma Lazarus was presented by the sublimation of America as a safe and free haven. Such part read that “Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free/ The wretched refuse of your teeming shore/ Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me/I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”. After that, the oath of US citizenship was taken place in the ceremony. A group of refugee children of different social, ethnic and religious background took the oath and later, they were invited to the stage one by one; they were certificated and some of them expressed their feelings by saying that “God bless America” and “thank you, America”. It seemed to me that the oath taking ceremony of the event were considerably bearing moral and spiritual components committed to US citizenship as an ultimate target. A day later, during my interview with a representative of one of these refugee organizations, I was informed that the oath ceremony was totally symbolic one for the refugee children who attended the event. Excepting the condition of being born in the US, they would have the US citizenship if their families were approved as US citizens. Eventually, it was clear that the rising generation of refugee communities was experiencing such moral and spiritual values of what and how the US provides for them in a symbolic order at first and later the reality comes into existence. In this event, I found lot of opportunities to

meet the representatives of refugee organizations; I can say that all of them are generous and really helpful and almost all accepted my interview offer.

At the same day's evening, I had another opportunity to attend the event organized by Refugee Focus which is one of the resettlement agencies serving to refugees in Arizona. It was a good chance for me to know about the organization's activities on this sort of special days. Indeed, there were many refugees organizing the event by cooking, selling charity productions, dancing, making music and organizing some small games. But also, there were some special stands providing information regarding health insurance, employment opportunities and banking transactions. A staff member of Wells Fargo Bank was available there and this was distinctive for me as a person who organized and attended many refugee events in Turkey. I asked him what reason brought him to the event and he explained that he was there to explain to refugees who want to know how they can open a bank account or send or receive money through the banks. Indeed, the bank's participation in this sort of the event was not a simple thing; especially, when it comes to a refugee condition in the global movement of people and goods. Many of them learn how they can use their money by investing, sending or receiving, especially in their needy situation.

On the next day, I needed a taxi to get my appointment with Refugee Focus in Tucson and I had Dennis's number from the day before. He came to pick me up and before dropping me out, he showed a newspaper called Arizona Daily Star that contains the refugee event news at the high school. He told me to keep smiling that he wanted to make me aware of the news of the event to where he took me. In fact, he was interested in such news. I checked the newspaper that the news were on the first page and I told him I should buy the one which would be good for my research. He told that he had already read the newspaper, so, I could take his newspaper. The headline of the news was succinct with the statement of "With bright hopes, refugees take oath" and later, as a sub-heading, the words of Ivory Coast teen were included: "I want to fight to better my future" (Tucson, 2015). Indeed, many forms of this sentence were taken place in this research during the interviews; but, the essence of all of them was the same as having a desire or will to fight or struggle to get something better in US

No doubt, it would always be more difficult for an uprooted person, particularly for those fleeing from an insecure atmosphere of war, conflict or persecution, to have such will or desire to fight to build up their lives than others who voluntarily migrate. As the above mentioned news set, “Tucson is home to about one-fourth of Arizona’s 70,000 refugees” meaning that there are 70,000 people who left their countries involuntarily and who are living in Tucson. In Arizona, there are fortunately important refugee organizations and refugee volunteers that assist refugees not to leave them alone in their fight in having a better life. In particular, Tucson is such a place that the relation among refugee service providers is more salient than that in Phoenix.

In the following six days, my priority was to interview directors or representatives of resettlement agencies in Tucson. In terms of functionality, capacity and service diversity, resettlement agencies are different from volunteer refugee organizations since they are supposed to draw a map from reception to settlement for refugees by using a budget provided by the federal government. I could interview two resettlement agencies called Catholic Services and Refugee Focus; I could not with IRC due to their heavy workload in Tucson. On the other hand, I met and interviewed lovely representatives and directors of volunteer organizations which should be considered as unique organizations; namely, Iskashitaa Refugee Network, Noor Womens Association, Tucson Refugee Ministry, La Frontera Center and an anthropologist volunteer to refugee organizations from the University of Arizona.

The interviews with resettlement agencies were conducted in their own buildings as a result of formal appointments. On the other hand, the interviews with volunteer organizations were carried out at cafes and college cafeterias. It was quite rough to arrive at the meeting points in this huge area even if travelling by a cap. Meantime, I should note in appreciation that all of the interviewees were so hospitable to me; when I spoke of my difficulties in travelling, they took me by their car from my hotel and they dropped me out back.

Two of those helpful and kind persons, the representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry which organizes refugee support activities and trainings, took me by their cars from my hotel and offered me to conduct the interview with them at the restaurant of an

Iraqi refugee in Tucson. Upon our arrival, 55-60 years old Iraqi man welcomed us by keeping his smile. It was a small restaurant serving mainly Middle East meals and also selling cookies of Turkish brands.

When we arrived there, the restaurant was empty. The representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry asked for his wife and daughter and he told that they would also come later. It has been more than ten years that he has been living in Tucson and he had a difficulty in communication with the representatives in English and then they introduced me to him by saying that “he is from Turkey”. When he heard about my country, he told that he lived in Istanbul for a long time and added that Istanbul is the most beautiful place all over the world and he was missing Turkey too much. We started the interview with the representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry; but, showing his concern for my presence at his restaurant, he put some Turkish music from various Turkish singers and made a bit noise; it was funny and acceptable in a way. Awhile later, his wife came in and intimately hugged with one of the representatives. She was asked where her daughter was. She responded that she was sleeping since she was tired of work and she was fasting as Arizona was also hosting the month of Ramadan.

A few days later, Ms. Barbara Eiswerth, who has a PhD degree in Arid Lands Resource Management and who is the founder of Iskashitaa Refugee Network organizing a set of activities mainly including a food assistance to groups, especially refugees in need of food support, by harvesting surplus production of farmers and property owners, invited me to their office which was like country house including Barbara’s office as well. We concluded a witty interview. Barbara’s approach was good to me while speaking of teaser issues. In a point, she was lightening the volume of statements; for instance, when I was asking about the influence of Mexican migrants on refugees in Tucson, she could say by smiling that they learn and speak Spanish.

After the interview, I had a short communication with one of her assistants; she was learned that I am from Turkey and she interestedly started to talk about a group of Turks who has a cultural center in Tucson and she asked me if I know them or not. Explaining my situation, I shared my observation that there are not many of Turks in

Tucson by adding that I don't know anybody here and I haven't faced so far and I also added I do not know about such cultural center founded by Turks as well. Upon that, she shared some details that such group was a follower of a Turkish man living in the US; but, she also did not know about him and she could not remember his name and then she stopped asking me more by changing the topic.

The research was going in a well-organized manner in Tucson as all of resettlement agencies and volunteers approached my research with a large interest. After completing the interviews, I left Tucson. Before reaching Phoenix, the central area of the research, I had already googled to attain some clues about refugees in Phoenix. There were two crucial news related to the reaction of some groups of Iraqis and to the presence of Islamophobia respectively. Firstly, on June 25, 2014, a group of Iraqis gathered and marched in downtown Phoenix to show their reaction against the chaotic situation of Iraq in the hands of ISIS. Some of the protestors expressed their support to Iraq by calling the attention of the US government to Iraq's worsening situation and by emphasizing their wish of peace in Iraq (Azcentral, 2015). The common denominator of the protesting Iraqis was their refugee identity; so to speak, they have come to the US as a result of forced migration and, in a way, some were trying to keep their organized reaction against developments in Iraq. In fact, this context itself also contributed to this research's questionnaire to figure out whether Iraqi refugees are organized or not in Phoenix.

Secondly, a year later the above mentioned media appearance and a month before this research, on May 30, 2015, a group of American protestors rallied "Freedom of Speech Rally" outside the Islamic community center of Phoenix as a result of debates on Prophet Mohammad cartoon contest. The protestors explained the main reason of the gathering as a "response to the recent attack in Texas where 2 armed terrorist(s), with ties to ISIS, attempted Jihad". Such protest was not made up of one sided reaction. Muslims were also there as the other part of the demonstration and it was stated in the same news that the mosques in Phoenix are exposed to threatening letters and the event is called as "intersection of Islamophobia and (the) gun culture" (CNN, 2015). It seems so that this was not a closed or finalized discussion for Phoenix or other regions; but, it was certain that refugees are as well a part of this social atmosphere and it was

important to understand their contextual situation more closely. With regard to this, during the research, I was also informed that many refugee women who were wearing headscarf were not employed by private companies in Phoenix since most of employers had stereotypes and prejudices.

In Phoenix, I had some gatekeepers from Iraqi refugees. Being a social worker, I worked for a refugee support association in Turkey a few years ago and I had been acquainted with some Iraqis who were resettled from Turkey to Arizona. They had been already informed about my research. Having arrived in Phoenix, I called them. One of them is an Iraqi friend, who supported my research by trying to arrange some appointments with other Iraqi refugees, invited me to their home. My visit was generally after Iftar (breaking the fast after sunset) since they were working and fasting so they became too tired, his two brothers with whom I am also acquainted took me to their home by their own car. They showed me a huge hospitality. It was nice to see them having a good motivation and condition. One of them was working for a company as a driver and other was working as a seller. I asked them if they were happy in the US in comparison with Turkey where they spent more than a year. They told that everything was good in the US as they can work and their children can go to school. In Turkey, they also added that they could not find a job and their opportunities were limited.

Their home was a nice and large one with an outdoor swimming pool. The family welcomed me in a hospitality. Awhile later, my Iraqi friend appeared in his security uniform and added that he couldn't end the shift until that time. They served me cookies and tea. He had an extended family and they were living together with his father and mother in this huge home. But, the brothers had separate facilities with their own families. An Arabic TV channel was open and they were following the news from Iraq. The inside design of the house did not carry any mark of their cultural or traditional pleasures; all goods were picked according to the middle class consumption types; that's, two long couches, a big and slim television with television table, a dinner table..etc.

The father of my friend was almost 70 years old and he was asked if he was comfortable in the US. He told that he wants to go back to Iraq as he does not like living in Phoenix. His reaction was also a matter of humor for others since all of them knew about the impossibility of returning to Iraq. The children were playing the home and they were speaking English very well. This was also another funny topic for them since they were not good at speaking English.

Before starting the interviews, I explained both the purpose of the research and why I was in Phoenix. They were familiar with me from Turkey; but, it was still rough for me to establish a rapport relation with them since they were in the US and this would be most probably their first interview experience with a researcher in the US. I had the information and consent letters of the research translated in Arabic and delivered some to them. They read but they had a difficulty in understanding what a consent letter means. They did not want to sign the document despite my effort to make the role of the consent for this research. It was clear that they were feeling scary and indecisive to sign such a document. I left the documents aside and later, I interviewed my friend's brother and my friend supported me as an interpreter. They were too tired, so I was. It became too late for another interview so they dropped me out back to the hotel.

Two days later, on 23 June, 2015, I had an important appointment with an association, namely Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASPF), in Phoenix. When I was arranging my appointments in Turkey, they swiftly responded my e-mails positively by stating that they would put me in contact with some of their clients. Their organization's place was smaller than my expectation and when I came in, a volunteer was teaching English to a group of Iraqis who were at the age range of 35 and 60 years old. The writing of "We are One, Christians, Shia, and Sunni Yazidi" was on the wall. One of staff members approached me and then I introduced myself and later, I interviewed the one from the IASPF. The IASPF's support to my research was respectable. During the research, I always knocked their doors and they welcomed me in a friendly manner.

A few days later, they called me for an interview with one of their clients. When I became ready for the interview, I was surprised there was an Iraqi lady who came for

the interview and who remembered me and acted warmly. The lady was a refugee in the city of Corum when I was working there as a social worker and I had tried to assist their access to medical services since her daughter was too sick at that time. She was also astonished since she did not give any sense to my presence in the US and she added she missed Turkey a lot and she wants to go back to Turkey. Her little daughter tries to translate what her mother said in Arabic. She asked me if she could get a Turkish citizenship in case she returns to Turkey. It was difficult for me to respond to her questions and I just explained my research's purpose to her and then she told that she would like to support my research as possible as she could. She also invited me to her house; but, I could not visit due to my limited timeframe. The interview was completed in the IASPF's plain building. The warm presence of the interviewee had already affected my research identity positively in front of the staff of the IASPF. This was also new element in establishing a rapport relation with them as well.

In the following days, I contacted my friend to arrange more interviews by using my timeframe effectively. However, it was difficult for him to reach Iraqis since he has also a limited network of Iraqis and his contacts did not or could not provide positive feedbacks since all of them were working hard, so, they became tired easily with the effect of Ramadan. In some evening, he connected me to his close relatives and I had an opportunity to visit their house which was called a part of "public housing" designed by local authorities for vulnerable or needy groups including refugees, migrants and indigent Americans. Its rent and expenses were reasonable with the support of American authorities. This was not a large house, so, it might be difficult for an average Iraqi extended family to live in this sort of small house. Even so, it was emphasized that the rent of public housing was lower than other options; thereby, the father's income was enough for their subsistence. I was there for the interview with the mother of the family. It was sad to hear that the mother was always at home and she was missing Turkey since she claimed that Turkey was culturally and religiously same for them and she can go out and communicate with people comfortably. For her, living in the US did not mean anything; she added that she was there for her children's future not more. In any way, it can be said that this is a repeating theme of the research as many families state that US would provide a good future condition for their children in terms of education and employment.

I wanted to reach diverse groups and I kept sending e-mails to representatives of community members. I sent an e-mail to two persons from the Chaldean community. Both were eager to support my research. One of them told that he would go to Church and he would try to arrange some interviews for me, but he could not. Another one, who was working as an interpreter for a resettlement agency, visited me at the hotel and an interview was done during his visit. With his family, they had been forced to leave their country and they have arrived in the US with a special visa as asylee. He had a long and sad story. Because of his working for a humanitarian NGO in Iraq, he had a huge knowledge of the situation of Iraqis in the US. Speaking of his mother in Iraq and of his relatives in general, his eyes were full of longing. He was uprooted from his home land. He emphasized that he is indebted to the US that provided security, home, work and more. However, he added that his son could not get used to living here and he does not want to stay more here since he does not have any friend or social life here, he is always thinking of the days he spent in Iraq where he had acquaintances so he wants to return to Iraq.

After that, I contacted him several times to reach some Iraqis from his community; but, unfortunately, he could not support me since there was no strong network established by Iraqis as far as understood from his statements. On the other hand, he stated that all of them are working hard and if I could find some address, then we could visit them at their homes; otherwise, it would be difficult to reach Iraqis in this disorganized social network.

It was a hard time when I felt that I would not be able to reach my targeted number of interviews. I was planning to conduct at least two interviews in a day. I just focused on getting quick feedbacks to complete my interviews. However, the field had a separate dynamic imposing its own rules on me. I was trying to snowball the research by using every single opportunity. I contacted my Iraqi friend to ask if there would be another interview opportunity. Unfortunately, he responded negatively and added that it was also difficult for him as all was working hard and was returning to their home at night.

The IASPF contacted me for another interview which was conducted in their office. On that day, I met also other Iraqis who accepted to be interviewed. On Friday before on July, 4 Independence Day, I was informed that the IASPF would be having an official holiday, meaning that I would not interview the arranged contacts. Upon that, I offered to interview their clients outside the office and then I was provided with the contacts and we fixed on meeting at Starbucks coffee.

I thought that I would interview a woman interviewee in company with her interpreter friend. However, three Iraqi ladies came to the interview. All of three had different stories and backgrounds. One of them was a leading figure with whom I met at the IASPF. Two of them were good at speaking English but I never met them at the IASPF. I asked if they would like to have a drink; but the leading lady told that she was fasting and added that one of them was Christian. She asked me if I am Muslim or not. Answering their questions, I explained my research's purpose to them and I asked if possible to interview them separately since there were some confidential questions as well. However, they told that it was not problem for them so they did not feel any disturbance and they knew each other as they could talk together. I thought that it would be difficult for me to interview the ladies in this manner; but, there would be no another alternative to interview them so we started the interview.

The leading lady, who was a single woman from Iraq, was a survivor of general violence and she had lost her husband in war. She was talkative and self-reliant. She frankly expressed her thoughts and shared her comments. Other lady, a single woman with accompanying boy, had also lost her husband in a war and she was forced to leave Iraq to save her boy's life. The last one, they told me who was Christian, was married and had a family in the US.

At a certain point of the interview, they started to interrupt each other's talk and discuss the matters from different perspectives. I had a difficulty in controlling their interruptions; but, on the other hand, it was very invaluable for me to listen to them. The leading lady and single woman with her son were teasing the married lady by laughing and by saying that she is married, she does not have problem, her husband is working to make money and she does not work and she is sleeping at the home.

In fact, their lives were full of difficulties and they were showing a strong will to deal with their problems; they underlined that they have to struggle in the US. The leading lady stated that she has to be strong since she is alone and she added that she is in the US and she will succeed in standing alone. She also expressed that she was supportive for others as well; she added that she is called for help anytime when other women have problems. Unless all questions were answered, they had to leave. Actually, they told many things while discussing among themselves and I already took some notes. Before taking the others by her own car, the leading lady told me that I could call her if I needed support for my research and later they left.

I continued sitting at the yard of the coffee bar. I was making a clean copy of my notes by highlighting some crucial points. On the table behind me, a young man was sleeping with his head resting on his arms on the table. Although he was warned by the staff saying that “sir, you cannot sleep here, sir!” several times, he remained without changing his position. While organizing my notes, an American approached and asked me what I was studying, he was a bit weirdo and had fast body language. I responded by saying just sociology. He said very good, added bye and disappeared. A bit later, when I was walking towards my hotel, I saw him hanging around. He had mental problems and he was still asking something to someone. I figured out while walking that there were many homeless people who were drowsing in the shade of weak trees.

A day later, on Sunday, I would have another interview by making a home visit in a distant area from my hotel. This interview was exactly a result of good luck. I had an appointment with the director of Refugee Focus, located in Phoenix, in the last days of June. After entering the well-designed building of Refugee Focus, I provided my appointment information at the reception and I turned to sit and wait for my turn. While waiting, a man next to me asked where I am from. I answered I am from Turkey and then he fluently started talking Turkish. He was almost 65-70 years old Turkmen from Iraq. I was surprised since he was talking Turkish very well and then I asked how he learnt that. He responded that he resided in Turkey for a long time and he added that he thought I am from Turkey when he saw me for the first time as I did not look like Iraqis to him. We met there. He was also waiting for his appointment to solve his own problems. I asked him to have a drink at the end of our appointments if he would have

time and I requested him to wait for me if his interview was done before than me. He kindly accepted my offer. Meantime, my turn was ready and I was taken in.

My interview took two hours. At the end of my interview, my mind was stuck into the question of whether he was there or not. I desperately thought that I did not ask for his phone number, most probably, he would have gone so I would have missed another interview opportunity as well. I checked outside and waited there for thirty minutes but there was no trace of him. This made me upset. I was angry at myself since I could not ask for his phone number. I decided to leave and turn back to my hotel. When I was walking to the bus station, my friend persuaded me over the phone to go back to the association to ask for his phone number in their records. I thought that the association would not provide such information for me since it would be considered as opposite to the confidentiality principles of refugee organizations naturally. Nevertheless, I decided to go back to ask for the phone number. The lady working at the reception recalled me and I explained my request to her. She told me that the man you were looking for also waited for you and asked about you and later he left due to your long absence. I requested the receptionist to call him since I needed his phone number. She went inside and came back with his phone number. I called him. He was also happy with my call. We decided to meet on Sunday.

For this interview, I had to move from the city of Glendale to that of Scottsdale by the bus. After a hour and half bus travel, I arrived in the area and met with I/62/male, who is an Iraqi Turkmen. He was staying in a small house, which was a part of public housing project assisted by the federal government. When I came in, I was a bit surprised as he was watching Turkish TV channels. The wall was full of memories from Iraq and Turkey. He was a lover for Turkey, especially Istanbul. In every two sentences, he compared Arizona with Turkey. He sarcastically asked me which wind brought me to this desert and added that it was onerous for him, as an old and sick person, to live in Arizona because of the weather.

Before the interview, his permission was asked if I could use my voice recorder. He told me that he did not like this kind of things such as voice recording or camera. I just explained to him that this was for my research and there was no any other purpose and

I provided the information letter and the consent letter. Later on, he responded my questions during an hour. In continuing the interview, he interrupted and he told it was time to eat something and he just wanted me to stop the recording. Indeed, during the recording, he always felt a bit uncomfortable. He cooked and served for me. After the meal, I asked the rest questions and I took some notes unless using the tape recorder. I figured out that he started talking more frankly and he spoke of what he experienced more specifically without the tape recorder.

The interview was taken place in a candid atmosphere since my Turkish identity was easily accepted by him; but, he still had some concerns about me as he could not understand why I was doing such research in Arizona. Before leaving, I asked him if he had some relatives or friends in Arizona to put me in contact. He told me that he had a sister and he would ask for me about an interview.

After a few days, I was worn out as a result of trying to reach one place to another. After waking up in an afternoon, I checked my phone and I saw many calls from I/62/male. I got him back. Over the phone, his first question was saddening since the question was related to the tape recordings. He was inextricably worrying about my researcher identity and was connecting the tape recording issue to his security and citizenship process. Retelling the purpose of my research once again, I asked him about the possibility of an interview with his sister. He told me that it would be possible a week later, then he would take me to their house.

A week later, I called him to meet a point close to his house and then we could go to his sister's house. He wanted to take me to his home at first to ask for my help since he was in need to solve a problem with his computer. I did not object and I approached his house. He was dealing to solve his e-mail problem. He was very satisfied with my support and then I felt that we established a rapport relation. We called a cap to take his sister's house.

His sister and his sister's husband welcomed us. They were sitting in a detached house, which was a well-designed, luxury and large house. I introduced myself to them and I explained what I was doing in Arizona. She listened to me with interest. She told me

that I/62/male had already mentioned about me and she warned his brother that I might be a spy or state staff. Then I was illuminated about his concerns about all recording issues. This was funny for me and I explained them about my role and my research. His sister was in the US before him and I interviewed with his sister and his sister's husband at the same time. They came to the US following the first gulf war in pursuit of achieving high life standards and they became surplus refugees. Having worked for many years in the US, they stepped down and they had house, car and a good economic condition in Arizona; but, they were planning to move to California as they did not like the weather of Arizona. This was also a good for interview for me since they had a long experience to tell about both themselves and other Iraqis. Leaving there, a good communication and rapport relation was also left behind.

In the passing days, I were also interviewing Iraqis through the IASFP. However, it became clear for me that another institutional support would be invaluable for me to complete the research as much as expected at least. I interviewed the director of Catholic Charities, Ms. Joanne Morales and I raised my request to put me in contact with some clients. She asked me to fill out some forms and send my research documents. All of those documents were connected with confidentiality and ethical principles as a refugee organization was rightfully treating carefully. I had an ethic council decision indicating the accordance of the research with the ethical and scientific principles. A few days later, I was informed that the organization would support me by finding some contacts for me and Ms. Joanne Morales connected me to an interpreter working for their organization. He was also an Iraqi person and he had a lot information about Iraqis residing in Arizona. I requested him to connect me to some who were resettled from Turkey.

He took me to two families. We visited them at their homes. One of them was an Iraqi Yazidi family and another one was an Iraqi Christian family. Such visits were informative experiences for me. We visited a Yazidi family of five who are staying at a single-floor separate house with both a backyard and a small pool. When we were in, the kids were playing inside; there was no sofa or couch, but just floor cushion and pillows. The father was sitting on one of the cushions and there was a pocket full of medicines in front of the father. Before coming here, the interpreter informed them

about my visit and I thought that the father wanted to show his vulnerability by speaking of his difficulties since he did not know who I was although they knew the interpreter.

The inside design of the house was simple and there were no qualified house goods; the family members were watching an Arabic channel. At the backyard, they were raising some vegetables just like they did in Iraq. I was informed by them that the seeds of those vegetables were brought from Iraq such that those were more tasteful than the ones in the US. The father was sick and could not work due to his health problems. They were trying to subsist with the small assistance of social security institution. The interview was full of sad components since the situation of his relatives in Iraq was still preoccupying him. Having been exposed to threats and attacks, he added that his brother and relatives were killed and he has started to suffer from mental problems that limit his life extremely. There was no any organization or union for Yazidis in the US, but he told that they communicate with a few relatives but not with others.

After that, we got our second visit to a Christian family of three. It was an apartment house which was well designed with a living room suite, dinner table and TV. They were also watching an Arabic channel when we came in. There were Jesus Christ paintings and the cross hanging on the walls of the house. The family stayed in the city of Corum of Turkey and they were resettled from Turkey to the US. The father of the family frankly spoke of some discriminative incidents he faced in Turkey. The father was a pastor when they were in Iraq and he told his story with his eyes filled with tears that their economic situation was prosperous in Iraq; but, after the war, they lost everything and they were forced to leave their country. He was trying to learn English. Her daughter was working for one of American malls as a service staff and she was a support to her family. He also pointed the sharp dissolution of Iraqi society in parallel to what a Yazidi family told. In the past of Iraq, when he was a pastor for a church in Iraq, they were collecting money for those who were Muslims in need; so, they could live together, but the latest situation of their country was upsetting as no hope was left for Iraq according to him. He confirmed that their country is therefore the US which opened its own doors to them and he expressed that they learn English and adapt their

lives to the conditions of Arizona although their social life was, according to him, was also limited as they rarely communicate with other Iraqis.

After the interview, we got outside and I just took some steps and I heard someone calling my name. I was surprised that those people, who were Iraqi refugees from the city of Amasya of Turkey where I was working as a social worker, were next door neighbors to the family I interviewed. They did not forget me and I recalled them. During our short communication in front of their building, they spoke of their longing for Amasya and of the lovely sides of Turkey. I asked them for an interview for a day later and they kindly accepted my interview offer as a result of a pre-established rapport relation. Two days later, I could visit their home. A Christian Iraqi family of 5 were resettled from Turkey to the US, as mentioned above. The mother of the family and the kids were at home and they sincerely accepted me. Their house was also an apartment flat whose internal design was also quite similar with a living room suite, dinner table, TV, but also, Jesus Christ paintings and the cross hanging on the wall. The kids were watching an Arabic animation channel. The mother expressed that her husband was working for a security firm, that they do not go out if it is not necessary and added that she is spending her time by cooking and cleaning and by taking care of her children. She was unsatisfied with their conditions in the US and she was often expressing this by comparing their social life in Turkey where she could spend her time outside.

After completing this last interview on June 13, 2015, I got my hotel back to pack my luggage. There was a smiling receptionist whose name was similar to a Farsi name. I had seen him several times; I could not find any opportunity to ask where he was from. Before leaving the hotel I had some time and I asked him at the reception and I was informed that he was from Iraq. We had a nice conversation with him at the hotel; this was not a formal interview, but he kindly explained what he was thinking about his people and his country. He told that their own state did not recognize her peoples' right during the history; thereby most of us yearned for human rights and freedoms although we did not know what freedom or human right is. In the US, he added that he has rights and he is trying to establish his family's life and he does not believe in the melioration of Iraq in future. He had a family and he expressed that he gives a huge importance to

the future of his children in Iraq; he also told that he is teaching his children their own language and tradition and he trusts that his children would be able to keep their language and culture; but, he also underlined that their culture would disappear through generations and the next generations would be new Americans ultimately.

Before leaving Arizona on my last day, I visited Phoenix's Musical Instruments Museum (MIM) which was a huge museum composed of musical instruments from all over the world; it was like a meeting point of all musical instruments of different countries by presenting some folkloric samples of those countries as well. Approaching Turkish part of the museum, I found all Turkish musical instruments in detail. I put on a headphone to listen to the sample and saw Asik Veysel, who is a poet of Turkish folk literature, on screen. I was really proud of that and it was surprising for me to encounter a significant part of my country's culture in a distant corner of the world. I know that I can go back to my country whenever I wish and I can live my land with its own cultural values in its own place; but, here, in Phoenix, there are lot of refugees who would not go back to their countries as much as they would like to do so. This research tells the story of some of them by putting a sociological gaze.

2.8. International Migration Theories

A large immigration literature welcomes us under specific interests in social sciences in the world of 21st century. The historical evolution of migration and theorization of migration stand on a set of historical processes in which population movements have taken of its own place on the basis of economic, politic, cultural and social parameters.

As specific to the context of international migration, Douglas Massey summarizes the modern history of migratory movements in four periods: the first period, “the mercantile period” from the 1500s to 1800s, points to population movements under the impact of mercantile capitalism accompanied with “colonization and economic growth” through/in Europe and transoceanic countries such as Americas. The second period, “the industrial period” from the 1800s to 1929 is characterized by the relationship between “industrialization” and “emigration”; accordingly, a sort of “economic globalization” from Europe to the Americas, Asia and Pacific created some radical transformations in population movements. The third period, “the limited migration period” from the 1940s to 1960s, is called a limited migration period which is portrayed under the impact of “economic nationalism” with a specific emphasis on consequences of 1929 economic crisis and of the Second World War which produced refugee crisis as well. The last period, “the post-industrial migration period” started with the 1960s, places immigration on the global scale and the variety of “sending” and “receiving” countries dramatically starts to increase (2003:1-5).

Emphasizing the uniqueness of each historical period, one thing needs to be shined that controlling population movements becomes an internal interest of States when it comes to migratory movements. During the mercantilist period, with the increasing importance of the notion of the nation-state, “the control of productive (or strategically important) labor became an issue of national strategic concern. People, as labor, came to be understood as a scarce labor” (Moses, 2006:42). Following this strategic logic, competition among States formed this period by controlling both individuals’ movements and “demographic sources”, as Moses indicates, “only outward migration was restricted” (2006:43). For this period, it is important to note that “forced labor” from Africa and Asia had played an important role in the establishment of European

wealth and of the New World (2006: 43-44). What is at stake here is that migration as a part of mercantilist ideology raised as a tool of “the state’s economic policy” in a competitive age of “domestic economic growth” (2006: 44).

The liberal period, under the influence of increasing colonial exploitation in the mercantilist period, led to the accumulation of the wealth in the Western Europe and this had ultimately paved the way for industrialization. During the colonialism period, “slavery” was one of the most important motor forces of the economic structure, so to speak, as “commodities” slaves was being sold and moved to maximize economic goals of European countries. Due to developments in production with constructive conditions of “industrialization”, the weight of slaves in plantations decreased and the number of “indentured workers” started to go up, which was the founder of the huge population movements. More clearly, in Britain, the transformation of “unfree labour” into a new social class namely the “free proletariat” was a result of changing the form of production (Castles and Miller, 2009:80-4). With outcomes of the industrial revolution, “forced labour” has also taken its own place in history and these deep transformations in the organization of work and life led to mass migration movements. As a “peak of the industrial revolution”, the main period of British migration to America took place between 1800 and 1860, but also those from “Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Eastern Europe” migrated to the USA until the year of 1914 to realize their American dream (2009: 84).

Until the mid of 1970s, under the influence of the devastating outcomes of Second World War, Castles and Miller point to some important emerging characteristics in international migration by presenting; “guest worker systems”, “colonial workers”, “permanent migration to North America and Oceania”, “mass movements of European refugees”, “return migrations of former colonists to their countries of origin” and “intra-European Community free movement of workers” (2009:67).

In the post-war period, in Western Europe, deaths of men in the war, increasing rates of aging population, long-education time and the unwillingness of “indigenous workers in unskilled manual jobs” brought about a huge need for the labor force to provide and keep economic and industrial growth. These were the pull factors of

Western Europe for migratory flows. On the other hand, there were as well several push factors such as “unemployment, underdevelopment and poverty”, which forced many to migrate to Western Europe to obtain better life conditions. Especially, with reference to the analysis of “natural increases in population” and of “low levels of per capita income”, the southern European countries and the non-European countries became sending countries to Western Europe (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 25-7).

It is important to underline here considering three significant receiving countries that the migration map of Britain, France, and Germany did not follow the same path when it comes to guest worker systems. Each country has operated its own system by founding a structure in receiving foreigners. In sum, Castle and Kosack put forward, the British Government applied a systematic recruitment of European Voluntary Workers (EVWs) from refugee camps at first and later from Italy. The France Government set up the Office National d’Immigration (O.N.I.) and received foreigner from Italy in the immediate postwar years, from Spaniards in the sixties and later from Moroccans, Yugoslavs, and Turks. The German Government through recruitment offices set up by the Federal Labor Office received immigrants from Italy at the beginning and later received foreigners from Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia in the sixties (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Castles and Miller, 2009). As the prominent characteristics of guest worker systems with reference to the above-mentioned countries, it is emphasized by Castles and Miller that receiving countries implemented certain rules and policies for recruited foreigners for a long time, such as recruited foreigners did not have right to “family reunion”, “job changing”, “permanent residence” and did have a separate line from citizens when it came to “social and political rights” (2009:99-101).

In this historical frame, as a multi-faceted phenomenon, migration always has a lot of layers which need to be unfolded so as to define underlying causes and effects in a broader sense. No doubt, as many scholars theoretically point out, every single layer has its own place with a correspondence to causation, duration, and results of migration in the history. It is likely possible to speak of some backwash effects of the process in which all dynamics forming layers of the phenomenon might take a new context according to the historical premises.

If we put the flowing aspect of the phenomenon aside, it can be stated that there are certain constructive components concomitant with the phenomenon such as individuals or household/families' social and economic preferences in search of a better life standard, of more qualified work or job, of educational objectives, of a safe and secure environment to survive and of any other cultural, religious and political choices. Without being stuck into theoretical arguments, it can be roughly conceded that migration points to the changing character of residence for a significant time or duration for different purposes. Everett Lee attaches "a permanent or semipermanent change of residence" to the explanation of migration (1966:49), Stephen Castles also underlines "residence for a certain minimum period – say 6 months or a year" and very simply points to internal and international migration categories, the former refers to "a move from one area to another within one country"; the latter is a movement of "crossing the frontiers" among states (2000:269-270).

With reference to all of the above-mentioned components and more, a completed explanation of the phenomenon of migration cannot be presented as the weight of different theoretical approaches on the subject is always already there and improves in new conditions. Michael Samers indicates in pursuit of the question of "why do people migrate?" that "the causes of the particular kinds of migration" can be found in different and distinct contexts covering a wide area from "national state's restrictive migration policies" to "gender expectations and oppression from the impact of domestic violence" (2010:15). Indeed, Samers's argument carries an effort to go beyond causes of migration with an emphasis on "mobility" to begin a deeper debate on the subject and he calls our attention to the impossibility of "an overarching theory of migration" with reference to ten distinct volume of different approaches, namely; "Raventein's laws and push-pull approaches", "neo-classical economic analyses", "behaviouralist approaches", "new economics approaches", "dual labour market and labour market segmentation approaches", "social network or migrant network analysis", "transnational arguments", "gender-sensitive analyses" and "structurationist perspectives"(2010: 53).

2.8.1. Ravenstein's Laws

The laws of migration by Ravenstein manifest a statistical reading of migratory movements in the U.K. during the 1880s and produce seven core consequences. He puts forward at first that migration comes up as a result of a “short distance” movement toward “the great centers of commerce and industry”. Secondly, on the derivative basis of such a movement, migrants subsequently fills “the gaps” left by predecessors. That is to say, the “absorption” of migrants by industrial areas would lead to the decreasing of the rural population. Thirdly, “the process of dispersion” comes into existence with its “inverse” results of “absorption” at the same time. Fourthly, all migration process comes with “a compensating counter-current”. In other words, migration would create its own corner. Fifthly, “long distance migration” tends towards “commerce and industry” centers. Sixthly, “the natives of towns” less migrate than those in “the rural parts”. Lastly, “females are more migratory than males” (Ravenstein, 1885:199).

Ravenstein's approach to migration is, as can be seen, based on clear cut laws rather than a presentation of an explanatory theoretical approach. In this regard, Samers and other scholars do not avoid putting his approach into a determinist frame due to his “law-making” understanding (Samers, 2010; Kivisto and Faist, 2010). On the other hand, his approach deserves to be grasped as an initial form of analytical approach which is still applicable as it shows a migratory movement by distinguishing from “short distance” and “long one”, from poor countries to richer ones, with reference to specific features such as gender, rurality or urbanity. In addition to this, his work's influence on the push-pull model and neo-classical economic analyses leads to the formation of the patterned theoretical approaches of migration.

2.8.2. The Push-Pull Theory

In his article on a theory of migration, Everett S. Lee gives credit for Ravenstein's contribution to migration studies and explains his motive to attempt to “the development of a general schema into which a variety of spatial movements can be placed in the development of streams and counter streams”(Lee, 1966:49). As a constitutive element of the push-pull model, he defines four corners to explain

migration process; “the area of origin”, “the area of destination”, “intervening obstacles” and “personal factors” (1966:50).

He invokes a diagram comprised of three signs, plus (+), minus (-), 0 for the explanation of migration. Each origin and destination country may include countless positive and negative elements and a zero point at which migrant may remain indifferent. More specifically, “knowledge of destination area”, “the life cycle”, the capacity to overcome “intervening obstacles” and “personal choices or factors” vary from one country context to another or from one individual to another. With the contribution of all of these mentioned factors to migration processes, he underlines the changing volume of migration (Lee, 1966).

The prominent point of his approach is revolved around an understanding of the volume of migration. What is at stake here is the presence of the “diversity of areas”, that might include different factors. Therefore, the movement of immigrants from one point to another might lead to new diverse areas in a certain territory. Moreover, it might increase the diversity of settlement shaped by migratory movements. Thereby migration is essentially drawn as a process in which settlement may take place in the diversity. On the other hand, the volume of migration can be shaped through the motivation of migrants in search of better or qualified jobs, meaning that “the diversity of people” can be identified with different pursuits in a migration process although it is, at the same time, a place of discrimination as the forerunner of ghettos, and of assimilation with the disappearance of diversity. If we continue examining his approach to the volume of migration, it would be crucial to touch upon that, there are always “the intervening obstacles”, such as restrictive migration policies or personal choices, between origin and destination. These obstacles may influence one’s decision to migrate or not to do. The cross-border mobility of people is sociologically taken into consideration by linking the tendency of people to migrate or to move one area to another to the development level of one society in terms of economy, technology, communication and transportation and so on so forth. The volume of migration cannot be measured properly without a satisfactory analysis of all of those factors (Lee, 1996: 52-54).

Putting migration in a broader frame, which is currently notable for today's migration flow as well, he underlines several aspects of migration by pointing to "streams" produced through the migration process. Migrants create streams or pathways for others staying at origin area so that such pathways can be useful for others to overcome intervening obstacles when they decide to migrate. On the other hand, this is always mutually a counter stream process as well since all conditions might change or be changed negatively at origin or destination. As a result, migrant can explore different advantages of origin or destination before they could not so and they can change their decision on their journey. The similarity of conditions for origin and destination would keep the efficiency of the stream and counter stream low, but it would be high if intervening obstacles are huge and economic conditions are prosperous (Lee, 1996: 54-56).

By concluding his analysis of migration, he characterizes migrants under a set of modalities; under the determinacy of plus and minus factors, migrants tend to be selective in migration process by calculating all possible conditions, obstacles and hints from origin to destination. The destination appears as a part of the assessment in terms of its positive aspects. Therefore, migrant tends to concentrate on having more advantages or more income at the destination. In this sense, migrant eliminates his or her origin area by assessing minus point which can be overwhelming to entire community such as political expulsions; as a result, this selection process is totally "bimodal" taken into consideration by people from different perspectives. Therefore migrants tend to migrate under different conditions which might be determined by peoples' age or expectations in their life cycle or peoples' characteristics through a general assessment of plus and minus factors (Lee, 1996:56-57).

2.8.3. Neo-Classical Economics Approach

In the subsequent development of international migration in respect of economic development, Massey and his associates argue peoples' movement between the area of origin and area of destination by portraying the relation between employment opportunities and wages in terms of labor migration¹¹. More broadly, they indicate that

¹¹ Examining various empirical findings, Massey et al clarify the importance of differential factors in understanding the essential character of origin and destination, leading to cross border movement. Screening Mexico-US migration, they underscore that

“neoclassical economics focuses on differentials in wages and employment conditions between countries, and on migration costs; it generally conceives of movement as an individual decision for income maximization” (Massey et al, 1993:432). The neoclassical approach can be summarized under macro and micro theories. Under the premises of the former, “the supply of labor and demand for labor” needs to be correlated with “geographical differences” in an analytical manner. The movement of “labor from low wage to high wage countries” and the opposite movement of “capital from high to low” give us migration as a practice leading to “downward pressure on wages” in area of destination and to “upward pressure on wages in area of sending” until an “equilibrium” is organized (Massey et al,1994:701). Strictly speaking, at the center of this approach, the determinacy of labor markets in wage differentials is the main factor which stimulate international migration of labor; so, the role of governments in controlling migration flux is to “regulate labor markets” in both origin and destination countries (Massey et al, 1993: 433-434).

As to the main argument of the latter, as a result of “individual decision”, one can target to maximize his or her wage in “labor-scare countries”¹². Therefore, at the micro level, it should not be forgotten that “a cost-benefit calculation” through individuals is the motor force of migratory movement. In this regard, several factors individuals bring such as skill, education or profession can be determinants when it comes to such a calculation. Thereby “investment in human capital” is an essential guise of international migration so that the “probability of employment” in the destination might be raised with a particular reference to “individual characteristics”, “social conditions” and “technologies” that are quite effective factors in “the probability of international movement”. On the basis of a cost-benefit calculation, individuals show a tendency to migrate to destination where “expected earning” would be the best and migration would continue until expected earnings are “equalized internationally”, thereby “the differential in expected returns” and “disequilibria between labor markets” are determinant factors for both migration decision and migration size. As a

different researches evince different aspects of the matter revolved around main economic predictors such as “farm wages, agricultural productivity and illegal migration”. The incentives for migration toward US were mainly related to “the rate seasonal farm employment in the US”, “the level of US agricultural unemployment”, “US agricultural commodity prices” and “the Mexico-US wage differential” with reference to Jenkins’s analysis which summarizes that “push factors in Mexico, taken together were stronger than pull factors in the US” (Massey et al, 1994:706).

¹² At this point, Massey et al underline that the movement of “human capital” to “a human capital scarce environment” must be taken differently from “the international flux of labor” (1993:433).

result, to be able to control migration, governments apply migration policies to regulate expected earnings in destination and origin countries (Massey et al, 1993: 434-436).

In two intertwined lines of neo-classical approach, on the one hand the development of “labor market” with various wage differentials leads to international flow of labor at the macro level; on the other hand disequilibria between labor markets brings about a “cost-benefit calculation” through individuals who want to maximize “expected income” in the destination; so, diversity of human capital, which takes the form of “individual decision” to migrate, makes the way for international migration in general. At this juncture, the above-mentioned cornerstones of neo-classical approach are questioned by various scholars who advocate “the new economics of migration”. The core of their argument is predicated on the critique of “complete and well-functioning markets” of the neo-classical model (Massey et al, 1994:711).

2.8.4. New Economics of Migration and Network Theory

The new economic paradigm of migration is initially formed by Star’s work of Migration of Labor, and then improved by Massey and his associates. To put it succinctly, the nucleus of the approach is grounded upon the argumentation of the fact that international migration does not come into existence as a result of labor migration in “well-functioning market system” but rather appear as a result of “failures in other markets that threaten the material well-being of household” (Massey et al, 1994:711). In this formulation, the key point refers to a shift from the unit of the individual to that of the household. In other words, “the maximization of income” and “the minimization of risk associated with the problem of labor and other markets” are the main concerns of families and other units (Samers, 2010).

Reducing or controlling risks through households can be traced in several certain ways; some members of the household can deal with business or economic activities in the local setting and other members may be allowed to go to work in the foreign labor market (Massey et al, 1993). In the distinction of developed and developing economies, Massey defines four risk mitigant ways; “crop insurance markets”, “future

markets”, “unemployment insurance” and “capital markets”. All of those mechanisms should be taken contextually; so to speak, if no crop insurance, then families can have the proclivity to send a family member abroad as a worker who may provide remittances. The lack of risk minimizing mechanism can lead to similar outcomes. Therefore, working abroad can be most productive way “to improve income in absolute terms and increase income relative to other households” (Massey et al, 1993:438).

In terms of the formation of international protection, the new economics of migration manifests in the sense of Massey et al that families, households or other units are subjects of migration process internationally. Depending upon the context of sending countries, households might be in search of minimizing risk while increasing their absolute income by using migration. Thereby remittances may increase local economic activities and stimulate people for cross-border migration. As divorced from the equilibrium of wage differentials, the amelioration of conditions of sending countries may be expected to stop international flux of immigrants. Under these circumstances, government policies and implementation might be important since the government can change the incentives for migration by improving the insurance of markets; by forming income distribution that will change the relative deprivation of some households” (Massey et al, 1993: 439-440).

Grounding upon this insight, Massey and associates conceptualize relations among households and individuals within the scope of network theory. Such social relations among “kinship, friendship and shared community origin” play an important role in establishing bridges between migrants and non-migrants in sending and receiving countries. As a result, the probability of international migration increases as long as the information of risk and cost mitigant factors are transferred from migrant to non-migrant through such bridges. In fact, this sort of “network connections” creates a “form of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign capital” (Massey, 1993; 449). With reference to several empirical types of research¹³, Massey and associates underline that the incentives for migration are determined through information produced by “network connections” after their motivation is satisfied at a

¹³ The case of Caribbean and Latin American migrants in the US; of Mexican, Jamaican and Dominican migrants in the US (Massey et al, 1994).

certain level. More specifically, the effectiveness of network connections among migrant workers is very related to their education, sex, English knowledge, income, and wealth so on so forth. If there is a complementary relation between human capital and social ties, it can be said that these can maximize earnings or income more easily than others (Massey et al, 1993; Massey et al, 1994; Massey, 1990).

Network relations can be constitutive in two threads; “declining costs” and “declining risks”. The former refers to costs of migration met by immigrants. Social ties between origin and destination can produce a “self-perpetuation” process in which migrants are in contact with non-migrant acquaintances in the area of origin and then they can get motivated with these social ties and benefit from pathways to migrate. Therefore, “the costs of subsequent” for a set of friends and relatives” are decreased by new migrants, thereby functioning just like a “social structure” serving to a perpetuated migration for those in the area of origin. The latter, by the same token, points to the risk mitigant movement of every new migrant. When a “well developed” network of migration is available, as a source of income in the destination, a “destination job” can be acquirable for those in origin, thereby motivating them to migrate (Massey, 1993: 449).

2.8.5. Dual Labor Market Theory

Michael Piore, in the book of *Birds of Passage*, presents an analytical hypothesis of the dual labor market by dividing the market into two main sectors; “primary” and “secondary”. In the primary sector, natives work for a certain sort of jobs while migrant serves in the secondary sector. Such an approach is basically embedded in the analysis of a theory of “economic duality”, which refers to the determinant distinction between capital and labor. In this duality, the functionality of labor intensive and capital intensive methods in production will be determinant to be able to understand the fragmentation of workers as well. Therefore, the structuration of work will consequently form the need for skilled or qualified labor and further, it will stratify jobs in the band of production. For instance, the best example is “mass production” which is required to know few tasks in a certain process of production. On the other

hand, “job shop” entails a sort of flexibility with which workers have to adjust themselves to different tasks such as rebuilding machinery or equipment in the production process which is designed to respond to variable demand; as a result of this, it is not possible to shift the jobs to the secondary market. However, on the contrary, the “unskilled jobs” can be shifted in the secondary sector which meets a relatively stable demand (1979:35-39).

At this juncture, he takes his argument one step further by positioning migrants in the secondary sector because of “their temporary attachment to the labor market”. Since the existence of a dual labor market depends upon the functionality of the second sector, “unsecured sector”, which will motivate natives for their work and employ migrants for the second purpose as guarantor and hence the native labor force does avoid themselves of the role the system would be able to assign in the labor market (1979: 40-42). In other words, as Samers indicate, secondary jobs are not attractive to native workers because of low pay and poor working conditions so migrants are employed to fill out this sort of jobs (2010:65). In this regard, Massey pithily summarizes that the motor force of the development of industrial countries becomes the “recruitment of workers from developing countries” (Massey, 1990:16) and so the pull factors of receiving countries such as high wages and working conditions become relatively attractive and appear main reason for migratory movement (Massey et al, 1993: 440).

Within the scope of the dual market hypothesis, a set of critical arguments can be derived: international labor migration is analyzed as a “demand driven” process which is formed through recruitment of governments or receiving countries. In this sense, out of the determinacy of wage differentials, the “structural needs of the economy” is a constitutive part of migration and hence the influence of governments on wages or employment rates is not a part of the formation a demand which is filled by migrants since such demand can be only formed by major changes in economic organization (Massey, 1993:444).

2.8.6. World Systems Theory

As a theoretical founder of this approach, Immanuel Wallerstein declares “capitalist world-economy” as a “system” whose “spatial boundaries originally included Europe plus Iberian America” (Wallerstein, 2000:253). In fact, his focus on a historical analysis of capitalist economy is built on a target-driven conceptualization of a “world-system”, which is differentiated from “global” and “the world” in this sense (Wallerstein, 2011:xviii). Following this, he more clearly specifies a world system as “a social system” which includes a set of different actors and components such as “structures, member groups, rules of legitimation...etc.” and on the other hand, such a system stands by a “tension” being held by the “conflicting forces” so that each group aims at taking advantage of it in its own favor (2011:347).

One of the most important aspects of this process emphasized by him is that it contains “extensive division of labor” which is both “occupational and geographical” and it is likely to lead to the exploitation of labor of others for the sake of a “larger share of the surplus”. Besides this is very intertwined process in which the design of culture is required in a world economy and hence “the local (national) state structure” becomes a performer of “political pressure available to groups” thereby having “cultural homogenization” or “cultural-national identities” is to serve “the interests of key groups” (Wallerstein, 2011:348).

Building on this logic, he divides world-economies as “core-states” and “peripheral areas”. The former is strongly woven into the creation of a “strong state machinery coupled with a national culture, a phenomenon often referred to as integration” and for the latter, he employs the concept of “peripheral area” that is “the indigenous state is weak” which might be in either a “colonial” or “neo-colonial situation”. In addition to this two categories, “semiperipheral areas” should be also touched upon as areas between the core and the periphery. Those areas can be traced in the forms of core states and peripheral areas according to changing economic and geographical conditions in which they take place (2011:348-349).

In this clear-cut conceptual distinction, a world systems theory, in this regard, defines migration as a “natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations” which are inherently peculiar to the organization of “capitalist development” (Massey et al, 1993:445). More clearly, in this holistic approach, it can be said that the “system” produces peoples’ movement from peripheral areas to core-states due to outcomes of tension in the system; so to speak, the hegemonic relation or roles in system regulates or re-regulate an international division of labor all over the world and hence people move to areas which can be seen socially, politically and economically advantageous. Such a movement of people can be a part of labor migration or forced migration as distinct faces of international migration in capitalist world economy.

In this sense, as inherent in a world systems theory, there are several reasons growing out of capitalist economic order such as poverty, cheap labor condition, war, persecution and deprivation of basic freedom as Margaret Andersen and Howard Taylor indicate in the following quotation:

An international division of labor means that the need for cheap labor in some of the industrial and developing nations draws workers from poorer parts of the globe. International migration is also the result of refugees seeking asylum from war-torn parts of the world or from countries where political oppression, often against particular ethnic groups, forces some to leave (2011:220).

As one of inevitable outcomes of the relation between core-states and peripheral areas, international migration can be explained by crystalizing how capitalist world economies influence land, raw materials, labor in peripheral areas. In doing so, Massey underlines the changing mode of production, which stands on mechanization of agrarian production and destruction of traditional mode of production. He also points out that the entry of firms from core capitalist countries into developing countries applies to the employment of cheap labor with low wages and leads to both the “feminization” of workforce without providing “factory-based employment” for men and the “disappearance” of traditional production with which peasants make their lives. Along with these developments of capitalist world economy that mainly create

a mobile environment in which people become prone to migrate, at the same time capitalist mode of production produces “material” and “ideological” links between core states and peripheral areas. To make it clear, the development of “transportation and communication” facilitates the “movement of people” and the emergence of “cultural link” in the process of economic globalization leads the way in which a peripheral area can be “governed and exploited by educational or administrative mechanisms of core countries”. Moreover, in this globalization process, people experience different sort of ideological and cultural life styles and standards which are formed by dominance of core countries (Massey et al, 1993: 445-448).

2.8.7. Migration -Development Nexus

World systems theory manifests the place of international migration in a larger context comprised of core states and peripheral areas by bringing the social, economic, cultural and political aspects of capitalist economic order to front. At the last point we have left a world systems approach, globalization¹⁴ has come up as a bounding concept for the entities of ideology and economic development within the scope of international migration and thereby remarking the relation between neo-liberalism and migration although not being a theory (Samers, 2010).

Starting with 1970s, the global effects of capitalist re-structuring from poor countries to rich ones has become crystalized in labor markets of countries under the dominance of international actors such as the World Bank, the IMF and multi-national

¹⁴Mittelman points to two important definitive features of the concept of globalization in a broad literature. Accordingly, the first one is “an increase in interconnections, or interdependence, a rise in transnational flows...cross-border flows, identities and social relations” and the second one is linked to a theoretical grasp of “the compression of time and space” in terms of “social technology”, “capital accumulation” and “cultural sphere” within the scope of modernity and post-modernity. However, beyond these definitions, he presents the concept as a “historical transformation: in the economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politic, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally...in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity’s achievements” (Mittleman, 2000: 6). On the other hand, Held and his associates refer to three distinct approaches to the concept; “the hyperglobalist thesis”, “the sceptics” and “the transformationalists”. Put it succinctly, the hyperglobalist approach explains globalization by stressing upon its economic aspect as “economic globalization” which creates a set of cross-border changes in structure/organization of nation states, people or communities, production and etc. and hence it proposes that the “denationalization of economies” has led to the formation of “transnational network” of social organization in terms of “production, trade and finance”. The skeptical thesis debates on the concept as a “myth” and finds an economic grasp of globalization flawed in many senses by claiming the role of “national governments” that are still effective in “regulating international economic activity” for today. The transformationalist thesis points out “unprecedented” results of globalization so that governments have to adjust themselves. Furthermore, the environment globalization creates is formed by new patterns that societies, communities and governments are contextually and transnationally being positioned or stratified in the global order. As a result, such a globalization process is “re-engineering the power, functions and authority of national governments” (Held et al, 1999: 2-10).

corporations that circulate social and economic policies developed and proposed by the developed or powerful countries all over the world (Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes, 2013; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010). At the center of this circulation, the relation between restructuring of global capitalism and dynamics of migration is subject to “a dramatic transformation under neo-liberal globalization” and “the lack of opportunities in sending countries” and “extreme exploitation of migrant workers in origin, transit and destination countries” are underscored as characteristics of this relation. In other words, such neo-liberal globalization is revolved around “the growing monopolisation of global production” with “labor exploitation” and “environmental degradation” (Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes, 2013; 432). As a result, the discourse of “development” maintained by the pioneers of neo-liberal globalization against the enlarging gap between “developed and underdeveloped countries and the increase of social inequalities among national populaces” (Delgado Wise & Covarrubias, 2010:145).

Many scholars stress the nexus between migration and development either in a theoretical weakness or not proposing a theoretical cohort, but rather they develop their own arguments from different theoretical viewpoints (Samers, 2010; Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2010). Delgado Wise and Covarrubias underline two prominent distinctions in emphasizing such theoretical line; “the vicious circle” and “the virtuous circle”. The former finds the relation between migration and development “antithetical”, meaning that migration is not a fertilizer for development of home countries rather it is accompanied by a set of unfavorable conditions leading to more emigration. The latter points to analyses of the relation between migration and local/regional development through “remittances or migrant organizations” in a sense influenced by “ a post-Washington Consensus neo-liberal policy” and of a transnational outlook, “transnationalism from below” that the role of “migrant organizations” are considered as a potential source of “regional development” (2010: 148-149).

Put it in a different but convergent way, Hein de Haas explains the connection between migration developments by differentiating “migration optimists” from “migration pessimists”. Accordingly, the former, with a focus on a “North-South transfer of

capital”, goes back to 1950s and 1960s to show the dynamics of development in poor countries so “remittances, skills, knowledge” are believed to contribute to development of sending countries in general sense. The latter, in a structuralist shift, signals a sort of “dependency on remittances” which is a result of “the breakdown of regional economies” but such dependency is not a remark of local development for sending countries due to the absence of tendency to “invest in productive enterprises”, so, migration is taken into consideration as the very causes of further underdevelopment” (de Haas, 2006:566).

When it comes to the appraisal of such relation between migration and development, a third emphasis¹⁵ becomes possible as well as structuralist or developmentalist approaches. What is at stake here is that “remittances and productive investment” centralized by migration optimists should be grasped in its own limitations in a historical sense so as to understand the uneven direction of development for sending countries¹⁶ so the centralization of remittances in the migration development nexus remains problematic and open to critiques of international migration studies (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2010:150-151).

At this juncture, the entity of development is questioned together with “transnationalism” and “co-development”. As transnationalism will be discussed later in detail, co-development and migrant social subject can be shortly touched upon. Briefly, co-development can be seen as a form leading policies by the EU countries to support the potential or vision of migrants as “collective agents of change” (Faist, 2008:26) to contribute more to their home countries by developing the way in which “productive activities through remittances”, “education of migrants and encouragement to return their places of origin”, “involving migrants in cooperation projects”, “improving the living and working conditions of migrants” ...etc. can be encouraged and increased (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2010:153).

¹⁵ For instance, de Haas points to the responsive appearance of the “new economics of labor migration”, as already indicated above, to both approaches in the 1980s and 1990s by underlying the importance of the household as an analytical entity. His specific emphasis on Southern Morocco in different context is to show remittances for the household not for individuals in an effort to eliminate a determinist outlook (2006: 466).

¹⁶ For instance, Delgado Wise and Covarrubias present a historical reading of the flow of Mexico to the US under the implementation of neo-liberal policies; in the 1980s, remittances had a negative effect in communities of origin since the factors such as “social differentiation” and “accumulation of local resources into the hands of a given few”; in the 1990s, the trend was toward the increase of “productive investments” through “investments” (2010:150).

In the age of neo-liberal globalization, debate on migration and development is not fulfilled by international migration studies, rather the matter is, as can be seen, put into question with an array of relevant concepts by different points of view. To put such a debate into a framed context, three main argument can be picked up; firstly, as long as development is a purpose for states through migration, governance or control of migration by states comes with “security objectives” and hence this “realist” approach will be on the side of “legitimizing Western interference in less-developed regions” when it comes to discursiveness of migration – development relation. Secondly, the nexus between migration and development is an inseparable part of the relation in which receiving states intervene in sending and transit countries; so, “migration policies are characterized by deeply diverging interest between states”. Lastly, migration policies promoting development also form “the subjectivities of the people whom they target” and thereby originating a set of “beliefs”, “normative views and expectations” shared through people, IOs, NGOs and state development agencies. Thereby, the content of the migration development nexus is filled by the production of “realist biases” that also need to be unfolded by changing the way migration and development are questioned (Geiger and Pecoud, 2013:373).

2.8.8. Transnationalism

In explaining transnationalism as a theoretical approach, Jennifer Hyndman points to the importance of “post-modernist and Marxist-inspired critiques of global capitalism and flexible accumulation”, which underpins the lineament of transnational approach. In this regard, such an approach mainly demonstrates “transnational practices” as challenging against “locational politics of global/local or center/periphery positioning” on the one hand; and transnational “strategies” bring together “people of different locations – social, political, cultural”; as a result, it is important to note that such practices appear “materialist” and “discursive” respectively (2000:84).

As a progressive concept, transnationalism is separated from the categories of “internationalism” and “globalization” by emphasizing “cross-border ties, events and processes” between several national states (Faist, 2010a:1667). On the other hand, the

theoretically unfilled character of the concept, Luis Guarnizo and Michael Smith explain the complexity of transnationalism by stressing on a set of effects which refer to: “destabilizing effects of the globalization of capitalism on less industrialized areas; technological developments in transportation and communication; the universalization of human rights related to global political transformations; the reproduction of transnational migration, economic organization and politics through the development of social networks” (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998:4).

Debates on transnationalism indicate two important conceptual convergences which are named as transnationalism “from below” and “from above”. In a way, appropriate to the spirit of the post-modern formulation of identities, culture and social relations, we can understand from “the below” that the transnational organization of “ordinary people”, who have “cultural hybridity, multi-positional identities, border-crossing by marginal “others,” is potentially resistant to “control and domination “from above” by capital and the state”. In other words, “social organization at the level of the locality” becomes questionable through transnationalism from below in terms of social, cultural and economic processes in which immigrants involve (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998:5-6).

On this basis, as a conceptual coherence in its own complexity, transnationalism is also put in two main pathways; “transnational morphologies” and “transnational identities”. The first one is to argue that the basic logic appears to quest “transnational structures, contours, trajectories” and “agencies to sustain these transnational trajectories”. The second one is to concentrate on “what constitutes identity formation and identity politics in transnational social spaces”, so, the emphasis becomes apparent when it comes to transnational processes in which agencies and relations generate transnational identities as “fluid and flexible” entities embedded in “particular places at particular times” in a certain of “cross-border interconnectedness” (Brenda S.A. Yeoh et al, 2003). In a larger and similar sense, Vertovec also grasps different aspects¹⁷ of transnationalism by classifying “as a social morphology, as a type of

¹⁷ In a broader sense, the analysis of transnationalism brings us to a breaking point in migration studies, in which immigrants form their attachments or belongings out of the order subsumed by States. To concretize this with reference to one of the entities in Vertovec’s analysis, as a mode of cultural reproduction, the concept is “often associated with a fluidity of constructed styles, social institutions and everyday practices” (2009:7), when it comes along with results of migration or cross bordering activities, “processes of identity are about ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being” (Armbruste, 2002:19). On the other hand, concerning the accumulation and move of capital transnationally, the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) is emphasized by the literature;

consciousness, as a mode of cultural reproduction, as an avenue of capital, as a site of political engagement, and as a reconstruction of ‘place’ or locality” (Vertovec, 1999).

In parallel to the development of global capitalism, the focus of migration studies also adjust itself to macro and micro analyses of migratory movements with a set of conceptualizations of immigrant relations in a distinct place and time so transnational approach seems to be a result of alternative ways immigrants build up to deal with effects of neo-liberal capitalist development. In this sense, transformation of immigrants’ culture and identities in receiving countries is taken into consideration through different approaches within the scope of transnationalism. The literature itself shows that many scholars concentrate on Diasporas, especially in the US, to present transnational outcomes and to underpin their approach of transnationalism theoretically.

In this regard, the following chapters of this study shall shortly touch upon the essential conceptual developments of transnationalism with reference to a set of core approaches; namely, Randolp Bourne (1916) conceptualizes what condition requires “transnational America”; Raymond Aron (2003) expands the concept to “transnational societies” with the supremacy of inter-state relations; Nye and Keohane (1971) and Risse – Kappen (1995a, 1995b) shift the analysis to “transnational relations” by eliminating “state-centric” basis; Gupta and Ferguson (1992), Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1995 and 2006) and Levitt and Schiller (2004) employ “transnational social field” to emphasize transformation of culture, space and place; Alejandro Portes (1997, 1999, 2010 and 2013) defines “transnational communities” with reference to “the length and quality of economic, political and cultural activities of immigrants”; Thomas Faist (1998 and 2000) and Kivisto and Faist (2010) use “transnational social spaces” to indicate how “social ties, symbolic ties and social capital” work between at least two countries for immigrants.

The situation poeticized by Emma Lazarus in the year of 1883 was an open literal expression of the fact that US was a freedom promising land for those who were tired,

especially, Sklair’s argument is revolved around the term of “a transnational capitalist class” whose interests globally determine the fate of the world economy (1998). As a reflection of this on transnational processes, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and United Nations agencies appear as carriers of political activities transnationally (Vertovec, 2009:10).

poor, dehumanized, refused and forced to leave their lands. In the successive historical period, the situation hinted by Lazarus was theoretically discussed by an American leftist intellectual, Randolph Bourne, in the year of 1916. The keystone of his argument is based on an analysis of effects of migration on America and Americanism to theorize the idea of Trans-National America, in his namesake article. His discussion can be considered as a prominent theoretical start to understand the concept of “transnationalism” in its own theoretical development.

In particular, his argument carries an underlying value for this study whose focus is to understand the case of Iraqi refugees in the state of Arizona in US in terms of transnationalism in development. His article, Trans-National America mainly formulates two main ideas: the rejection of the idea of American melting point and the building-up of trans-national America.

Speaking of those who are “all foreign-born or the descendants of foreign-born” in America, he emphasizes that the distinction among them should be done “on some other ground than indigenous”. The main motivation of the “early colonists” coming to the new land was not to be “assimilated in an American melting point” but was that

They came to get freedom to live as they wanted to. They came to escape from the stifling air and chaos of the old world; they came to make their fortune in a new land. They invented no new social framework. Rather they brought over bodily the old ways to which they had been accustomed. (Burne, 1916:87)

Following the presentation of the importance of cultural heritage coming through different national generations, which make “the intelligence and the social values which mean an enhancement of the life”, America without a distinctive culture is emphasized as a “federation of cultures” (1916: 90-91). Therefore, he conceptualizes the matter of Americanism by eliminating the idea of the “melting-pot” embedded in the past of America; but, he raises that Americanism is a “changeable ideal” so that “American cultural tradition lies in the future” (1916:92). At the center of this argument, it would not be incorrect to say that he draws a distinction between

“nationalisms of twentieth-century Europe” and American nationalism. For the latter, the mission is determined to transcend all conflicts and belligerency that national patriotism led in Europe.

Standing on its “cosmopolitanism” against every sort of narrow Americanism and nationalism, he takes his argument one step further by stressing upon what a “dual citizenship” brings to an American in this sense. Thereby he underscores that an immigrant with a dual citizenship returning to his or her native land and coming back to America can have a different viewpoint, either critical or analytical in comparison, and then it can serve to “the superiority of America” in the migrant’s perception. Since he claims that

Only the American — and in this category I include the migratory alien who has lived with us and caught the pioneer spirit and a sense of new social vistas — has the chance to become that citizen of the world. America is coming to be, not a nationality but a trans-nationality, a weaving back and forth, with the other lands, of many threads of all sizes and colors (1916: 96).

According to his ultimate assessment, such trans-national ideal is the cement of cosmopolitan vision, which will unite people from different backgrounds in favor of “Beloved Community” and which will provide a sense of freedom and power for them by giving “the new spiritual citizenship.

The vision pointed by him is designed to serve to the continuous enhancement of American community without falling into a vulgar nationalism or cultural dominance. Furthermore it can be asserted that such community vision, as an open area to be shaped by the future, entrust a new spiritual citizenship which precedes what her or she is or has. Today’s developments recognize Bourne’s argument in many senses that the migratory individuals and masses continue shaping America within its own historical uniqueness. The focal point of this study contributes to such recognition that the trans-national character of America exists by banding many cultures and nationalities together and that a new spiritual citizenship still comes into existence by

a set of practices and discourses of US such in the above mentioned symbolic oath taking ceremony that can be just seen as one of these practices that refugee children encounter where they stand and what values they have in America. Despite the existence of transnational character US carries, the matter extensively needs to be argued so as to understand the side of the migratory subject.

Bourne's argument, in spite of its historical value, remains unsatisfactory in understanding the roles of constructive entities such as the state, the law and the immigration policy and so on. His argument mainly abstracts the idea of being American while underlying the logic of trans-national America by reference to the historicity of European and Anglo-Saxon nationalism. Thereby his argument is historically silent when it comes to the distinction among the terms of internal, national, international and transnational; so, it is doomed to be argued by debates on transnationalism so that the articulation of the migratory individuals to a land, such as America, can be grasped in detail.

Pointing to the distinct sides of the concept of transnationalism, that is to say: the mutual relation between "the growing concern for minorities, human rights, and the genocide convention" and "the invasion of the domestic realm of the national state", an American diplomat, Philip Jessup, put the concept in its own place in the early 1950s (Jessup: 1956 cited by Waldinger: 2013:757). Three main unities to distinguish the transnational from the international are marked by Waldinger with reference to Jessup: "the diminishing importance of territoriality", "the constraints on state sovereignty" and "the role of non-state actors" (Waldinger: 2013:758).

In the following years of 1960, transnationalism has gained a new dimension with the concept of a "transnational society" which Raymond Aron has coined so as to indicate the supremacy of the international system, so to speak the priority of inter-state relations, over the formation of a transnational society. Organizing his argument with a separation between "international systems" and "transnational society", he underscored that "international systems are the inter-state aspect of the society to which the populations, subject to distinct sovereignties, belong", but on the other hand

A transnational society reveals itself by commercial exchange, migration of persons, common beliefs, organizations that cross frontiers and, lastly, ceremonies or competitions open to the members of all units. A transnational society flourishes in proportion to the freedom of exchange, migration or communication, the strength of common beliefs, the number of non-national organizations, and the solemnity of collective memories (Aron, 2003: 105-106).

He clearly explicated that the legal basis to which a transnational society belong regulated the level of inter-individual relations rather than that of inter-state relations; but the norms applicable to this sort of relations in a transnational society were a part of the international system to which states were party. For this reason, the area of “private international law” regulating individual relations of transnational society was differed from that of “public international law”. He also touches upon that the existence of international conventions and treaties has a positive influence on the “collective interests of transnational society”; but he questions such an influence of international law on the essence of inter-state relations and responds suspiciously that the attachment of international law to the relation between “positive law” and “ideologies” does not remove the vague position of “the right of peoples to self-determination”, “the principle of nationalities” and “collective security” on the condition that it becomes up to positive law made up of the interpretation of jurists (Aron, 2003). Thereby, as Waldinger states, international relations scholars place Aron’s argument among “state-centric views” (Waldinger, 2013).

Putting the state-centric view into a critical frame, Nye and Keohane focus on “transnational relations with its two aspects called transnational interactions and organizations” to present an analysis of interstate politics by bringing its changing aspect to the front (1971). The distinguishing aspects of transnational relations in comparison with “global interactions” requires an understanding of “interstate interactions” beyond “conventional diplomatic activity” being realized among states. Thus the constitutive components of transnational relations contain the activity of “individuals and organizations”, marking the transnational. So to speak, the presence of “non-governmental actors” appears as a must for this sort of relations and so

“transnational interactions is our term to describe the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization” (1971:332).

The restrictive effects of transnational interactions and organizations on interstate politics are underlined by Nye and Keohane by pointing to two significant dimensions; “international trade and finance” and “global mass communications”. The scope in which transnational interactions and organizations function produces the following effects;

Attitude changes, international pluralism, increases in constraints on state through dependence and interdependence, increases in the ability of certain governments to influence others and the emergence of autonomous actors with private foreign policies that may deliberately oppose or impinge on state policies (1971:337).

It is clear from the viewpoint of the authors that each effect reorganizes or shapes different contexts in which states adjust themselves to new conditions or environments. Thereby it becomes to reach a generalization that the governments loses their power or sphere of influence at all. Speaking historically, the emergence of transnational organizations has significantly advanced since the beginning of the twentieth-century and has reached a point that impels states to develop their economic and politic relations by an attempt to maintain their national economies in a global level. Therewithal it still seems inconsistent to put forward the argument of “loss of control” by governments; but, “a control gap” appears as a result of transnational relations and needs to be filled by governments ambitiously (1971).

Unless falling into a narrow sense of a state centric definition of interstate relations, which are extensively shaped by the state, the role of non-governmental actors in this picture must be underlined in filling such control gap. This point is emphasized by the authors in the following sense: “a definition of politics that refers to relationships in which at least one actor consciously employs resources, both material and symbolic.... to induce other actors to behave differently than they would otherwise behave”

(1971:344). In this sense, a transnational organization such as an international firm or business enterprise, might be using or controlling such resources; a state is not necessarily a constitutive part of this scenario. That is to say, the volume of transnational relations needs to be measured in “world politics paradigm”.

To shine the value of the concept at this point, the line between imperialism and transnational relations is strictly drawn to attach “cross-national relationships” to a clear area of definitions in politics since the main purpose is to understand the effects of transnational relations not more. Specially, the characteristics and values of transnational relations are put into American context so as to underscore the effective functionality of transnational relations in US when it comes to a multinational firms, corporations and foundations, especially in the area of economy or business. But still, the important question, which can be also important for this study, remains “whether US foreign policy should seek to defend, ignore, or countervail the transnational effect of American society” (1971:347). Actually, a satisfactory response to such a question in the context of transnational relations gives us an important insight of how much governments can cooperate or succeed in “regulating” such relations rather than “controlling” them.

In the foregoing analysis of transnational society and transnational relations, “a state-centered” versus “a society-dominated” view of world politics comes to the front. Risse - Kappen, on the other hand, stresses upon another side of the matter by pointing to the way to “examine how the inter-state world interacts with the “society world” of transnational relations (1995a:5). With this underlying logic, he points out two objections; the first one is about “interdependence” and the second one is about “transnational diffusion effects of cultural values and norms”. For both, the emphasis comes up through the unsatisfactory aspect of “empirical” data when it comes to transnational effects. Thereby the inseparability of “transnational relations” from “inter-state relations” or from “sub-units of national governments” gains importance to the development of an analytical approach to understand that “success or failure of transnational coalitions, INGOs, or MNCs to achieve their goals would then depend on their ability to persuade or line up with domestic and/or governmental actors” (1995a:13).

Discussing the weight of the state in transnational relations, Risse - Kappen emphasizes the entity of “domestic structure” by giving a prominent reference to three components of that; “the state structure”, “the societal structure” and “the policy networks”. Accordingly, he derives a typology of domestic structures from the functionality of the components. For our study, it is important to note that US is defined within “society-dominated domestic structures” that “are to be expected in countries with comparatively strong social interest pressure, but decentralized and fragmented political institutions” (1995a: 24). In this regard, the easy penetration of “transnational actors and coalitions” to “the societal and political systems” would be easier, on the other hand they would use multiple channels to influence policies in this sort of society-dominated domestic structures (1995a).

It is clear that domestic structures from one form to another constitutes a basis for transnational relations and coalitions so that they might have an influence over policy making processes by states. However, this also equally signals that “international structure of governance” can limit such policy making processes in which transnational actors have an effort to make an influence. In this picture, the importance of the role of “international institutions” can be touched upon since transnational actors use such ways and channels created by international institutions so as to limit national government’s effect in policy making process (1995a).

Risse-Kappen’s discussion is important to figure out where the state stands on among these relations network. It is clear that the state is one of the constitutive actors, which locally and globally forms rules and polices contributed by transnational actors and international institutions; however, the influence zone of the state, through domestic structure and international institutions, should be paid attention so as to position the place of transnational actors appropriately in the international system. In this regard, he explains that “the interaction between structures of governance - domestic and international - on the one hand, and non-state actors, on the other, is worth studying empirically rather than engaging in fruitless debates whether states or TNAs are more important in world politics.” (1995b:313).

The point he has emphasized is revolved around an essential discussion trying to question the role of the state by deploying all actors at the transnational level. Moreover, the argument leaves a significant gap which needs to be filled empirically, at least to develop a productive understanding to grasp transnational actors in a broader sense. At this point, as Waldinger indicates, with the end of the Cold War, the increasing importance of “non-governmental organizations”, or “non-state actors”, has contributed to such debates by giving a break point; as a result, “transnational concept from law and political science” has been shifted to the “study of migration” via the science of anthropology (2013:758).

The debate brought forward by anthropologists is about “isomorphism of space, place and culture” in this transnational context. In order to overcome the understanding stemming from such an isomorphic approach, Gupta and Ferguson take into consideration “those who inhabit the borderlands” by specifying the implausibility of “the fiction of cultures as object-like phenomena” and put forward in the following way:

There are those who cross borders more or less permanently- immigrants, refugees, exiles, and expatriates. In their case, the disjuncture of place and culture is especially clear: Khmer refugees in the United States take "Khmer culture" with them in the same complicated way that Indian immigrants in England transport "Indian culture" to their new homeland. (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992:7).

From the viewpoint of our study, this point provides a clear argument of how a refugee, migrant or one as a member of transnational relations takes his or her own role when it comes to his or her cross border movement. In the specific context of this study, Arizona, the disjuncture of culture and place needs to be analyzed by stressing upon the case of Iraqi refugees since no one leaves his or her own culture; but places in a complicated way pointed out in the above quotation.

Problematizing the relation among locality, space and culture can be seen as a reflection of consequences surrounded by a set of developments in the international arena. Gupta and Ferguson's approach to the role of multinational corporations from a different view point shared by some international relation and political science theories is different that such corporations' exploitation of "the raw materials, primary good and cheap labor of the independent nation-states of the postcolonial Third World" under the "leadership of the United States" is emphasized. Additionally, on the basis of this argument, the transformation of "Fordist patterns of accumulation" to "a regime of flexible accumulation" is built on "a more sophisticated communications and information network and better means of transporting goods and people" and

Something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered any strictly bounded sense of community or locality obsolete. At the same time, it has enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount (1992:9).

The value of this analysis, it can be said that, is based on an indication of a historical development of capitalist production and accumulation with its own consequences over Third World, which lead us to understand the new forms of solidarity and identity in a transnational public sphere. In the transnational flux of commodities, culture and people, deterritorialization of spaces and identities becomes inevitable and this brings a blurred definition to such terms in an analytical sense in which "space and place can never be given". Therefore, the understanding of the sociopolitical construction of space and place is still a must (1992:17).

The contribution of anthropology to the analysis of the field as a transnational category to provide a crystalized definition of the relation among space, place, community and identity propelled the development of transnational theory as an analytical entity. As a part of a huge envisagement of this, the anthropologists Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton clearly point to migration studies so as to analyze the position and movement of migrants under the determinants growing out of the development and influence of global capitalism; as a result, they define what a social field means within

transnationalism. Before going in detail, it would be fruitful that they present their approach to international migration as a new analytical gaze whose key points can be summarized in four heads; it is based on a “historical development” of globalization, that indicates the reconfiguration of nation states in transnational processes; it keeps the importance of a “spatial perspective” as to the reconfiguring influence of global capitalism on the relations between regions and states; “regimes of power” on economies and people have to put into question to analyze transnational processes and identity; it gives importance to the analysis of “identity politics” and “multicultural debates” in relation to the reformation of global capital and transnational processes (Blanc, Basch and Glick Schiller, 1995).

In this sense, the basis of their approach to migration studies is mainly grounded upon an analysis of new patterns and components of international migration by concentrating on “immigrants” and immigrants’ attachment to their home country in “social fields” they create; in this regard, they name the subject of such social fields as “transmigrants” (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992). The understanding of a global capitalist system is, in this sense, related to the fact that the existence of the economic forces leads to a set of impacts, either positive or negative, on the stream of international migration so that the migrants’ coping mechanisms can be seen as a response to such impacts and the migrants’ cultural practices or identities can come into existence in many senses as a part of this global context of “differential power and inequality”. Therefore, it can be easily acknowledged that

The economic dislocations in both the Third World and in industrialized nations increased migration, yet made it difficult for the migrants to construct secure cultural, social or economic bases within their new settings. This vulnerability increased the likelihood that migrants would construct a transnational existence (1992:8-9).

No doubt, the construction of this new setting, might be called as a new life as well, stems from several pushing reasons including social and economic ones, especially from countries that can be considered socially and economically disadvantageous. On the other hand, confining this argument to only economic locations or attempts through

the developed countries can be misleading in understanding the political weight of international migration. Thereby, within the scope of this study, a transnational existence constructed by migrants cover those who escape from conflict and persecution in such global setting. At this juncture, it is quite reasonable to take up that the skeleton of one's transnational existence ultimately refers to his or her effort to maintain racial, ethnic and national identities by being a part of a labor force in the host country.

Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton emphasize the importance of hegemonic constructions in this transnational existence. Specially, when it comes to US setting, little is touched upon about class position of transmigrants, especially in the case of Grenadian transmigrants, but hegemonic construction of US “serves to discipline a classless public into capitalists subjects through practices of consumption, leisure and work” (1992:13-4). Coupled with this aspect of the matter, it is the fact that the immigrant realizes his or himself in a social field that is open to hegemonic constructions through both host and home countries in a global capitalist setting.

Pointing to another complementary part of the matter, the entity of social field needs to be centralized in this discussion to distinguish what a transnational social field is from other conceptualizations. Levitt and Schiller clearly draw a line between “ways of being” and “ways of becoming” by advocating “a view of society and social membership based on a concept of social field”. Attaching an “identity” to a practice or an activity separates these categories from each other; so to speak, the former refers to individuals' actual relations and practices in a social field as divorced from any attachment to any label or cultural politics and the latter directly points to practices with an identity attached to a particular group (2004:1010). In this prosperous analysis, the authors do not speak of a designated mode of way of being or belonging in a transnational social field. That is to say, one can subjectively position her or himself in relationship with his or her host and home countries. Therefore individuals can develop different level of attachments to their cross border activities by applying to ways of being and belonging.

Within the scope of transnational framework they point to important methodological shifts, transnational migration, as a process rather than an event, enables us to understand the bilateral aspects of being here and there by focusing upon “experiences of migrants” and “those who are indirectly influenced by ideas, objects...flowing across borders”. On the other hand, transnational practices, as divorced from structured orientations, can be captured as a response to “particular incidents or crises” (2004:1012-3). In fact, transnational social fields, as an alley of cross border activities between nation-states, are, already noted, embedded in power relations directed by states and migrants. What we understand from the authors is that migrants can also shape and contributed to power relations in transnational social field in which they move (2004). At this juncture, it is important to attach one thing according to their approach that some states develop new strategies by adjusting itself to this new transnational situation and abandon some under certain conditions. In doing so, states work in a different context of “laws” and “ideology of nationhood” (2004:1019).

In the development of the term of immigrant transnationalism, transnational social field, in a broader analysis of social field, explains the emergence of transmigrants as subjects of cross bordering activities between home country and host country in the setting of a global capitalist system. In the ongoing debates of transnationalism, Waldinger and Fitzgerald opens a new critical chapter, which is also important for this study, by critically bringing the argument of “two homelands” that makes transnational social field possible in a global setting. Accordingly, they presents the case of “the past century’s refugees without home or host” to distinguish “international migrants” from “transnationals” (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004:1184). In fact, as we will see later, this point deserves to be elaborated more when it comes to the understanding of immigrant transnationalism since conditions of refugees are likely to be more different than other immigrant groups; as a result, the formation of transnational relations are likely to be based on its own distinct or characteristics features in the system.

Following the previous argument, Waldinger highlights Portes’s contribution to transnationalism in terms of immigrant transnationalism as a hard approach which is embedded in the argument of “relatively few migrants met his stringent

requirements... the relatively small group of ‘transmigrants,’... the ‘transnationals’ as a new, distinct class only to shove them to the periphery of the migrant experience” (2013:759). More specifically, Portes’s departure point contains the critical apprehension of Basch, Schiller and Blanc-Szanton in the discussion of transnationalism by stressing upon the place of “technological improvements in communication and transportation”. In fact, his approach to transnationalism is intensively akin to an analysis of economic actors in the globalization age by bringing the role of migrants. What puts migrants in a different place invokes their response against globalization; as a result of this, he defines “communities that sit astride borders and that, in a very real sense, are neither here but in both places simultaneously” (Portes, 1997: 3). By defining those communities as transnational, he also keeps the emphasis on “the logic of capitalism” since transnational communities enter into “play by the interests and needs of investors and employers in the advanced countries” and he adds that it is different from “traditional patterns of immigrant adaptation” and it is a phenomenon filled out by “the dynamics of globalization itself” (1997: 4).

The argument produced by him mainly indicates some distinctions between contemporary immigration and traditional patterns in the changing logic of capitalism. In this sense, he implies that Basch, Schiller and Blanc-Szanton’s emphasis on transnational social field comprised of social relations, kinship, relatives and, social membership in a spatial field in a large sense, explains contemporary immigration as “the desperate quest of Third World peoples escaping poverty at home”; however he states “neither the poorest of the poor migrate nor is their move determined mainly by individualistic calculations of advantage”; so, he continues supporting his argument by pointing to “driving twin forces for contemporary immigration”; the first one is that “the dynamics of capitalist expansion” which requires “fresh supplies of low-wage labor” by First World economies and the second one is that “the productive investment, consumption standards and popular culture of the advanced societies penetrate peripheral countries” (1997:5).

In light of this argument, it is clear that the regulation of labor market by legislation and the development level of industries in the distinction of the central and peripheral

countries constitute important variables. Each country can manifest different sources and contexts when it comes to immigration. This is totally linked to their strategy of capitalist accumulation. With the argument of transnational communities, it becomes clear that the capacity of developed countries do not motivate many immigrants to realize their economic purposes; as a result, they actuate their social relationships in their own networks (Portes, 1997). This is also quite apparent from his economic sociology by reading economic activities of migrants having different vocational, entrepreneur skills and education background by shining their move in social network to which they feel they belong.

Thereby he gives a priority to three constructive components in the definition of “transnational communities”; “transcending national borders”, “bypassing formal, regulated international activities” and “exemplifying the significance of its meta-assumptions”. In this regard, transnational communities represents “a unique form of social embeddedness that mobilizes family and cultural ties to overcome the barriers of space and formal governmental regulation, thereby insuring a smooth flow of people, goods, and information across space” (Portes, 2010:195). Besides he points to the distinction between motivation of those who arrive in the developed world and of transnational communities by attributing a set of loyalties and attachments to the latter when it comes to their kinship, cultural or religious values (Portes, 2010).

The question of what distinguishes transnational communities from other forms of immigrant transnationalism becomes important to be responded in this sense. It should be enthusiastically noted that the term can remain blurred without qualifying the terms of “social capital”, “social institutions” and “the informal economy”. Differentiating the transnational from other forms, the international and the multinational, he concentrates on the explanation of migrants’ economic activities to empower their home country economically and politically. On the other hand, he adds so, those, “migrant workers”, who do not have capital to establish his or her self-employment can use their kin and communities to realize their purposes. Thus the usage of social capital can be promoting transnational ventures and on the other hand the development of transnational activities necessarily requires a maturation process in which migrants establish their economic power and legal security in the host societies (Portes, 2010).

It is significant to pay attention that the establishment of transnational activities more or less starts informally and then such activities need to be transformed into an institutional structure with an eye to keeping solidarity and trust relations; so, for this reason, he proposes “legal/contractual arrangements as guarantors of long distance transactions” (2010: 201-7). On the basis of the analytical findings of some research conducted such as Salvadoran transnational enterprises and Asian communities in the US, it is emphasized by him that there are always limits of transnational activities determined by the participation of migrants. Hereby it should be noted that all economic activities of migrants are not transnational; in other words, transnational activities do not cover all migrants. On the other hand, the extension of transnational activities toward the countries of origin varies from one to another; so, it is not an inclusive activity for everyone in the home countries when it comes to immigration.

In this regard, transnational communities are specified with reference to the length and quality of economic, political and cultural activities to distinguish its form as a part of contemporary migration. As Portes indicates,

Hence, the Salvadoran merchant who travels regularly back home to replenish supplies or the Dominican builder who comes periodically to New York to advertise among his compatriots is a transnational entrepreneur; the immigrant who buys one of those houses or who travels home yearly bearing gifts for his family and friends is not. (1997:17).

Portes’s main argument clearly accentuates that economic, political and socio-cultural aspects of transnationalism conducive to the formation of transnational immigrants make transnational migrant different from other forms or outcomes of contemporary migration. Succinctly, what makes transnational migration and transnational immigrants can be followed under three determinants namely “origins and resources”, “reactive and linear ethnicity” and “governments and their entrance” respectively. Accordingly, capacity and sources of immigrant communities vary from one group to another and their socio-economic mobility manifests their transnational difference qualitatively and quantitatively. In case migration process is individually processed, transnational activities are more “selective”. On the other hand, the degree of

discrimination and hostility immigrant communities face change immigrants' "adaptive strategies" as a result the transnational character of their migration process can be out of concern to confine their participation in social and economic processes of the host country (Portes, 1999: 464-469).

To take one step further, the concept of "assimilation" needs to be discussed here since, as Portes indicates, there is a strong concern for some governments, especially for America that there is an opposite relation between transnational activities and assimilation. However, such a matter is not a simple question of whether immigrants will be assimilated or not; but, it is a prominent matter which needs to be remarked by generation difference of immigrants. That is to say, the emphasis on "socio-cultural assimilation" is not for the first generation, but "the second generation" in terms of "language use", "cultural preferences", "loyalties" (Portes, 1999: 470).

Following this, Portes's argument crucially becomes relevant in many senses related to rising generations of immigrants in US. The effectiveness of Americanization leading to "cultural homogenization" is a result of "downward assimilation" which might create a "rainbow underclass" comprised of immigrant children who do not show any willingness to "accept the modest job" and who are unable to move up in the occupational ladder". Therefore, transnationalism or the importance of transnational activities are considered by Portes to deal with negative results of downward assimilation in the following statement:

Instead of being a denationalizing force conspiring against the integrity of the host society, transnational activities can actually facilitate successful adaptation by providing opportunities for economic mobility and for a vital and purposeful group life...In America, this process of acculturation carries the price of learning and introjecting one's inferior place in the social hierarchy. That sense, which along with poverty, creates the conditions for downward assimilation, is neutralized by the economic and symbolic alternatives that transnationalism makes possible (1999:472).

In fact, Portes's reading of transnationalism is woven into a future analysis of American social and economic life when it comes to migratory effects. Therefore,

transnational activities can be seen as the way which would be paved for eliminating the sense of being “inferior”. Kivisto and Faist also evaluate Portes’s approach by looking at the discussion of assimilation and downward assimilation more closely and they state that Portes’s approach in a sense is concomitant with the use of the ideal of “social fields” as long as immigrants establish their homeland relations mutually beneficial (Kivisto and Faist, 2010).

At this juncture Thomas Faist’s contribution to debates on transnationalism stands on few critical points raised by Portes. One of them is that Faist extends transnational immigrant communities by including individuals and families as well as different from Portes. Secondly, Portes’s emphasis on “transnationalism from above” and “transnationalism from below” as “interrelated” processes is critically taken into consideration since Faist did not find a theoretical approach explaining the “interrelationship”. On this basis, in search of “a theoretical position to address such connections”, Faist produces a definition of “transnational social spaces” (Kivisto and Faist, 2010).

Along with keeping a conceptual distinction between labor migrants and refugees, Faist develops his approach to transnationalism by inquiringly turning to the terms of “assimilation” and “ethnic pluralism” and underlines that “transnational spaces enlarge the range of possibilities” (Faist, 1998). By this way, he defines that transnational social spaces are “combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places” (1998:216).

Reserving his later revisions, we can note that his initial construction of transnational social space is based on “triadic relationships between groups and institutions in the host state, the sending state and migrants or refugee groups”. In order to better explain transnational social spaces, he refers to three intertwined terms; “social ties, symbolic ties and social capital”. In the realm of social ties, “shared interests, obligations, expectations and norms” come up as a transaction between people. Through symbolic ties, they share “meanings, memories, future expectations and symbols”, which are beyond face to face relations as a communication form of “the same religious belief,

language, ethnicity or nationality”. In the formed structure of social and symbolic ties, social capital functions as a aggregating mechanism for individuals so that they can form “networks and organizations through affiliations”. Faist points out that social capital can be differentiated in various forms namely “reciprocity as pattern of social exchange”, “reciprocity as a social norm”, “solidarity”. As related to this last point, he adds that transnational social space have at least three forms called “transnational exchange”, “transnational circuits” and “transnational communities”. Following the distillation of these conceptual area, he gives us a crucial argument that transnational communities “without propinquity, in which community and spatial proximity are decoupled, do not necessarily require individual persons living in two worlds simultaneously or between cultures in a total 'global village' of de-territorialized space” (Faist, 1998: 216-221).

The importance of the argumentation of transnational social spaces is, as different from Portes, Basch and Schiller’s point, to present a new type of “integration” based on “reciprocity in small groups”, “exchange in circuits” and “solidarity in communities” (Faist, 2000). In other words, it aims at revealing the basis of a “new form of ethnic community” encompassing two or more nation states (Kivisto and Faist, 2010). As already noted, transnational social spaces as forms of transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits and transnational communities are based on different resources with different characteristics. In this sense, “reciprocity” as one of the constitutive resources of transnational small groups, labor migrants or refugees, can stimulate remittances to home country. Besides transnational circuits can benefit from “instrumental reciprocity” implying the constant circulation of economic activities so that entrepreneurs take advantage of common language and friends. As to transnational communities, the cement of such communities is, as a resource, “solidarity” and functions with collective representations that is “symbolic ties”, just like Diasporas (Faist, 2000:195-196).

It is clear from Faist that a different portrait of space brings a new theoretical optic to be able to draw a line between transnational social spaces and transnational social fields. At the center of this distinction, the fragmentation of migration process from

small groups or networks to enlarged ones takes place to enrich the analysis of incorporation or adaptation of immigrants in host countries.

If we return to our starting point, Faist underlines the insufficiency of assimilation and ethnic pluralism by pointing to the possibilities of transnationalization, which prospers the theme of “adaptation”. On the other hand, “citizenship” and “culture” fall under his discussion of transnationalism. Sketching his interrelated analysis of transnationalism, we can speak of three main categories formulated as following; “assimilation with national citizenship and acculturation”, “pluralization with multicultural citizenship and cultural retention” and “transnationalization with dual state membership and transnational syncretism” (2000:201).

Generally speaking, his argument can be concluded for this part of the study by stressing upon the role of culture in relation to transnational syncretism. By discarding the essentialist understanding of culture sounded by assimilation and ethnic pluralism, immigrant culture is placed in a broader sense which can be analytically grasped in social and symbolic ties. Faist points to “modern technologies (satellite or cable TV and so on)”, “liberal state policies (polyethnic rights and so forth”, “changing emigration state policies (remittances, investment and political support)” and “immigrant capacities to mobilize resources” constitute a productive basis for “transnational syncretism of culture”. In this regard, “an understanding of culture as a whole way of immigrant lives” is proposed by him to understand transnational syncretism (2000:215-217). Thereby an analysis of migrant integration or incorporation requires a set of processes in which migrants produce meanings, interests, norms and networks to position themselves in or between their host and home countries; as a result, they build up their spaces with solidarity in order to represent themselves collectively.

CHAPTER 3

FORCED MIGRATION

Thus far, the diversity of the literature indicates voluntary motivation of immigrants who move across border with emphasis on economic factors. However, international migration needs to be discussed at the point where involuntary migration also comes into the picture as the most prominent result of forced migration taking an indispensable form of international migration. It is frequently taken into consideration to be distinguished voluntary migration from involuntary as many are forced to migrate due to man-made hazards (Kivisto and Faist, 2010; Castles, 2003a, Castles; 2006). As Castles indicates, “forced (or involuntary) migration is distinguished in analytical and policy terms from economic (or voluntary) migration” (Castles; 2006: 8). Samers also touches upon two forms of forced migration in the following words: “the migration of asylum-seekers and refugees, as recognized by international conventions, and those who are “forced” to migrate for reasons of poverty or low wages – what is commonly called “economic migration” (Samers, 2010: 11).

Before going into details, first of all, it should be noted that such definitions are not a single result of sociological or political analyses of forced migration. That is to say, forced migration stands on a set of “legal or political categories”, which are mostly determined by international refugee law. Apart from this, many scholars point to the term “migration-asylum nexus” to show the characteristics difference between economic and forced migration; so to speak, it becomes clear that many who have “mixed motivations” have “the desire to rebuild the livelihoods of their families” as a result of their forced migration (Castles, 2006:8).

Secondly, it should be properly understood that refugee and asylum-seeker categories are directly linked to the term forced migration on the basis of the legal documents of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 New York Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1950 Statutes of the of the United Nation High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and subsequent authorizations by the UN General Assembly, the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Suhrke and Zolberg, 1999:145). Lastly, there are other categories linked to forced migration, which are called “internally displaced persons (IDPs, henceforth), protracted refugee situations, returnees, development displacees, environmental displacees, disaster displacees and people-trafficking” (Castles, 2006:10-12).

3.1. Historical Background of Forced Human Displacement

A short historical reading of forced migration indicates that the category of refugee has took a long way from European wars of religion to Russian revolution until achieving its modern meaning. Going back from the twentieth century, it is necessary to underline that the phenomenon of refugee, to a certain extent, needs to be elaborated outside the modern construction of “nation, state and citizen”. Forced human displacement can be, in this sense, traced within the historical developments of three main stages; the Huguenot expulsion¹⁸ in 1685, the French revolution from 1789 to 1815 and the Russian refugee crisis following the First World War (Soguk, 1999). Similarly, Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo also classify this period under “religious persecution” so as to point to the historical origins of the word “refugee” as “having been used in 1573 in the context of granting asylum and assistance to foreigners escaping persecution” (1989:5).

It should be noted that the States did not problematize the term of refugee in political or administrative sense with reference to the Huguenot case. In other words, human displacement was also defined with a set of other categories namely “suppliant, asylee, émigré, fugitive, profugus and banished and refugee” (Soguk, 1999: 59-63). It is important to emphasize that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was also an indication of transformation of statecraft from “the absolute state” to “the modern centralizing state” (Soguk, 1999:71). At this point, it is a general argument that

¹⁸ Towards the end of the seventeenth century, in 1685, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV manifested a religious and political dissension between French Catholics and the Protestant French Huguenots. In the end, two hundred thousand and Huguenots escaped from France to the neighboring countries, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain. This is the first time that the Huguenot event was associated with the term of refugee in the recorded history of Europe

“persecution” is a clear element of this period since “the fear of persecution on account of religion” historically refers to the conditions of the Huguenots that are still “the classic type of refugees” (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo: 1989: 5).

The Huguenot case created a historical effect that led to a sort of homogenization in religious sense in the particular situation of French nationalism with the appearance of “territorial sovereign state”. The French revolution completed this process by transforming “nationalism” into the state ideology by producing “the nation-state” and “national citizen” to distinguish “foreignness” from “citizenship” (Soguk, 1999: 74-75). In the climate of the French Revolution, “émigré” came out as a new term of “opprobrium” unlike “refugee”, but the effects of the revolution were huge to differentiate the “classic type” of refugee (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo: 1989: 9).

Displaced people of the French revolution was comprised of French “aristocrats” and “royalists”, who were both called “joy émigrés”; of “petite noblesse” and of “ordinary people” and of “refractory priests” and those people, émigrés, supported France’s enemies by joining their armies. But also, they became a foreigner part of the nation state and the national citizen and they were coded as “the embodiment of dangerous foreignness...” (Soguk, 1999: 76-78). Following this, this process is also analyzed as “internalization” of results of the revolution and the governments “enacted laws prohibiting their return” and “provided grounds for claiming asylum” (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo: 1989: 9-10). As a result, the French revolution created a broader sense of the displaced human beings as the foreigners, who do not “belong to the state in their own existence” and this was at the same time the establishment of “the national territorial state” (Soguk, 1999:81). In this regard, on the one hand the sovereign state transforms the foreigner into the legal term “alien”, on the other hand it is stated by Soguk that

the notion of foreigner, as it applied to displaced people – foreigner as exile, foreigner as émigré, foreigner as refugee, foreigner as asylee, foreigner as suppliant – was invoked both in the discourses of governments and in popular discourses to point to the existence of politically distinct

identities of people being defined in territorially bounded ways (Soguk, 1999:90).

At this juncture, individual governments' approach was subject to a gradual change in Europe on the basis of the idea of the acceptance of politically distinct identities of people. As a result, the Edict of Potsdam in 1685 and the British Parliamentary Act of Naturalization in 1709 were endorsed. But also, "An Act for Establishing Regulations respecting Arriving in This Kingdom, or Resident Therein in Certain Cases" were regulated by the British Parliament as a response to the Huguenot case in 1793 (1999:91-92). Apparently, it was clear for the nineteenth century that the proliferation of alien acts in Europe was gradually taken place. "Law Relating to Foreigners, Refugees Who Will Live in France" and "The Law of Naturalization for Foreigners Residing in France" were enacted in 1832 and in 1848 respectively. With the 1832 law, it deserves the emphasis as "the earliest legislation to define the refugee by linking the identity of the refugee to a sovereign state" (1999:94).

All of these historical turning points is crystalized in the post-World War I process. Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires produced tensions and conflict. As a result, a set of "the refugee-producing conflicts" from "heterogeneous" societies to "Western European countries" forced the limits of "the nation-state". This is to mean for the nation states that "some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin" (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo: 1989: 12). It can be stated that the term of refugee was defined by a statist logic with a reference to the term of "protection" towards the end of the nineteenth century. However, until the earliest developments of the twentieth century, it would not be possible to speak of the existence of the international protection regime. Even so, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries determined the lineament of the term of the refugee with reference to both "foreignness or alienness" or "discourse of otherness and externality" and "exile and alien" as "the correlative other of the national citizen" (1999:99).

3.2. The Establishment of International Refugee Protection Regime

During the course of forced human displacement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, discourse of foreignness and then of externality is strongly harnessed to the construction of refugee. After the First World War, the weight of the terms of exile and émigré was about to decrease and then the term refugee was extensively elevated to the heart of the scope of human displacement. The crisis of Russian refugees signaled that there was no possibility of meeting the needs of the refugees in cooperation with non-governmental organizations or individual efforts of the States. This required more formalized structure of cooperation to be more effective. In 1921, the League of Nations decided forming the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR, henceforth) to respond the crisis of the refugees and the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen was assigned as the first commissioner (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo, 1989; Soguk, 1999).

During the First World War, 800,000 Russian refugees fled from revolution, the LNHCR took an active role for this period as an “intergovernmental organization addressing the refugee issue and acting on behalf of such individuals”. Therefore, this process is also a remark of “intergovernmental regimentation” (Haddad, 2008:108). In this regard, one thing to add here is that states formulated the LNHCR as a result of their cooperation to deal with this refugee “problem” within their own “sovereign territorial” borders (Soguk, 1999:109). In this sense, Soguk distinguishes his approach from other debates on the appearance of the international refugee protection regime by emphasizing the historical role of the LNHCR in two ways; first of all, he proposes that the LNHCR itself has to be understood as a “practice of statecraft” and secondly, he contends that the LNHCR mainly formed the “ontology of the refugee” prior to 1951; in other words, the LNHCR paved the way for “effective refugee regimentation”¹⁹ (1999:111).

In order to understand the preceding sides of the international refugee protection regime, the appearance of the LNHCR can be seen as a historical shift designed by the

¹⁹ The first argument demonstrably shows that the LNHCR appeared and existed as a practice of statecraft as “events of human displacement” were taken up in “state-oriented terms”; so to speak, defining “images, identities and subjectivities to support sovereign state”. Secondly, the presence of the High Commissioner for Refugees was facilitator for “the intergovernmentalization of refugee regimentation” and the way for “normalizing the refugee in statist terms” (1999:119).

logic of sovereign states. As a result of developing strategies of the States in this sense, the human displacement is moved to another stage in the twentieth century so that the discursiveness of “the sign of the refugee” became a prominent indicator of the “problematization of human displacement” and was made to indicate as a “proper object of intervention” and “intergovernmentality” was formed as a “paradigmatic strategy of intervention in the refugee problem” (1999:121).

Haddad shows that there are lot of developments determining the cornerstones of intergovernmental regimentation of refugee protection by bringing a sort of standard definitions of who will be granted refugee status and of how governments and international organizations will be assisted. Therefore, as she underlines that “the emergence of new international norms aimed at protecting and assisting refugees brought about a change in national norms by causing a shift in the interests and identities of states in regard to refugees” (2008:112). By the same token, these two features of human displacement in the twentieth century were marked by the LNHCR and then the term refugee was discursively constructed in the way that

(a)the refugee, not the exile or the émigré, as the problem-figure of statecentric governance in the twentieth century, and hence the object of corrective intervention; and (b) intergovernmentality as the effective strategy of intervention (Soguk, 1999:121).

As a leading figure of this intervention process, Nansen made various endeavors to make the case of Russian refugees visible to all actors. In 1921, there were two important conferences held in Geneva and Paris with the attendance of government and non-governmental organizations. All of these events were significant to consider the results of human displacement in the form of intergovernmentality. One of the most important developments for this period was the invention of “identity certificates” for refugees; in other sense, “documentation of a displaced person”, which was called “the Nansen passports”. As a result of several interstate discussions, the identity certificates were accepted to draw a line between refugee and citizen. On the other hand, Nansen’s endeavor contributed the development of humanitarian assistance and then international refugee regimentation was associated with other heads such as refugee

settlement, employment opportunities and emigration. In 1928, the high commissioner's functions were recommended in the way that certification of the refugees in terms of their identity, their conduct, their status in country of origin and their access to authorities or services were clearly indicated. Following Nansen's death, the scope of human displacement had been already formed and regimented with a set of significant endeavors which were comprised of conferences, arrangements, protocols and agreements (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo, 1989; Soguk, 1999; Haddad, 2008).

In the year of 1930, the League of Nations decided reorganizing the LNHCR in honor of Nansen as the Nansen International Office for Refugees (NIOFR, henceforth). The function of the NIOFR was turned to deal with the daily management of refuge issues through the intergovernmental efforts and, at the same time, was to contribute the development and adaptation of an "international convention on refugees" in 1933. With the upheaval of Nazis that triggered a new refugee flood from Germany, the League of Nations founded a new structure called the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany (HCRFG, henceforth) that lasted until 1938. After that, the HCRFG and the NIOFR were turned into a single organization namely the Office of the High Commissioner Responsible for All Refugees (OHCAR, henceforth) under the League of Nations in the year of 1938 and it would last until 1946. However, a year later, in 1947, a new refugee organization, the International Refugee Organization (IRO, henceforth) was also established (1999:147-151) in lieu of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR, henceforth).

Between the years of 1938 and 1947, the presence of two other governmental organizations should be underlined; first of all, the IGCR was established by the invitation of the United States in 1938. The IGCR's main objective was to deal with Jewish refugees and the main rhetoric of this objective remained one of "grandiose compassion and charity". Following the ending of World War II, the IGCR almost completed its role in terms of "relief work, repatriation and overseas resettlement". Secondly, from 1943 to 1947, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA, henceforth) functioned to "provide relief and rehabilitation to displaced people in the areas liberated from German occupation" (Soguk, 1999: 152-154).

During these years until 1950s, it is important to note that “the identity of international society” is formed by “the refugee issue” and this led to “the evolving identity” of international society with its organs (Haddad, 2008: 115).

The United States supported the process in which the UNRRA was not preferred to solve current problems and then the IRO was established as a new organization which was designed not to fall into problems or issues from which the UNRRA had suffered. The IRO was considered as a “temporary agency with a three-year mandate” and as a “nonpermanent specialized agency of the United Nations (UN, henceforth). As the US representative to the UN, Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement on the draft constitution of the IRO was to give priority to “order in the world” and so one of the main aims was to “reestablish of the refugee’s ties with a state” with an eye to “normalizing” the refugee situation. Although regimentation of the refugee remained the same when looking at the previous historical shifts, the IRO was uniquely based on a new strategy since the IRO’s definition of the refugee was expanded at “the individual level”(Soguk, 1999:154-159). In this regard, it deserves to be emphasized that the constitution of the IRO defined the term refugee in the following way;

the term "refugee" applies to a person who has left, or who is outside of, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, whether or not he had retained his nationality, belongs to one of the following categories: (a) victims of the Nazi or fascist regimes or of regimes which took part on their side in the second world war, or of the quisling or similar regimes which assisted them against the United Nations, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not; (b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not; (c) persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. (UN, 1948:17).

This enriched definition was a “major institutional innovation” and was an strong indicator of the development of “an individual-oriented refugee protection regime” (Zolberg, 1989:23). It is important to note that there were prominent measures in terms

of development of “a statist regimentation of human displacement”. Regarding these measures, the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, the 1936 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany and the 1938 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany can be seen the most important ones (Soguk, 1999)

At that point, Soguk grasps these measures in three senses; “temporally”, all of the measures were “cross-referential in deriving their authority from earlier measures”; “programmatically”, the measures were based on “repatriation, integration and resettlement as specific alternative solutions to the refugee problem”; and “ontologically”, the measures were of “inscribing and reinscribing the defining conditions and qualities of refugeeness”. By the year of 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, henceforth) appeared in this historical heritage and “regimentation of the refugee” would be continued to be formed under the “statist problematization or regimentation of human displacement” (Soguk, 1999:164- 165). In other words, UNHCR and the 1951 Convention were designed as “the next steps in a succession of statist regimentation and intergovernmental action in the field” by developing the standardized content of the definitions (Haddad, 2008:135).

The UNHCR was established on 14 December 1950. In comparison with the preceding institutions, the UNHCR was also considered as a temporary humanitarian organization, but its field was defined more broadly in granting refugee status to those under the arrangements of 1926, 1928, 1933, 1938, or 1939; but also those who are not able to return to their country of origin due to “a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion” (Soguk, 1999:166; UNHCR, 1951). Soguk underlines the role of UNHCR in two ways; the first one is that the UNHCR aims at formalizing an individual-oriented refugee definition rather than group-oriented one and the second one is that the UNHCR targets a refugee definition “without temporal and geographical limitations” (1999:166).

With the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the authority zone of the UNHCR was determined by narrowing the definition of the refugee with

reference to “events occurring before January 1951 in Europe” in the following statement of article 1(2);

As a result of **events occurring before 1 January 1951** and owing to well-founded fear of being **persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion**, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a **nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence** as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 1951, *bold added*).

At this juncture, Soguk analytically explicates the definition of the refugee in the Convention that there are two constant elements; “a territorially bounded national community” and “the modern citizen” in this national community with protections by State and so, on this basis, a refugee appears as “one who lacks the citizen’s unproblematic grounding within a territorial space” (1999:171). Within this context, it should not be underestimated that the Convention provided an international legal framework in which the party States will take over obligations for persons who were Europeans and who had become refugee before January 1951 (Zolberg, 1989:25).

With the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union, the UNHCR underwent a historical breaking in the year of 1956 since the world witnessed another mass exodus of people from Hungary into Australia and Yugoslavia. In this historical climate, the Convention’s time and space limitation to refugee definition was came up for discussion; on the other side, freedom movement in postcolonial Africa also contributed to these debates positively. At the end, a supplementary UN protocol on refugees was put into practice in 1967, which was omitted the statement of “ as a result of events occurring in Europe before January 1951” and the convention’s determination of refugee status and the scope of the refugee definition came up as a part of the UNHCR’s daily activities (Soguk, 1999).

Following these national developments, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Cartagena Declaration adopted by the Latin American states in 1984 adopted a broader definition of the refugee as well. Despite the presence of the definition of the refugee in a broader sense, the 1951 UN convention and the 1967 UN protocol constitute “the legal and institutional framework of refugee protection that is the modern international refugee regime” (Soguk, 1999:174).

3.3. Role of the United States of America in International Refugee Protection Regime

Within the historical development of the modern international refugee protection regime, the place of the United States (US) deserves a preliminary emphasis so as to figure out how the US has advanced its own refugee policy under the impact of these aforementioned historical conditions. At the first glance, it should be noted that the US did not categorize or formalize any definition of refugee until 1880s since the immigration policy of the US was not based on restrictive rules for migrants. In the year of 1893, the US implemented harsh prohibitions for “anarchists” and those who support the “abolition of private property”. Following this, in 1896, the Congress propounded the requirement of “all new arrivals to be literate” to decrease migration; but such requirement was vetoed by presidents of that period and lastly by Woodrow Wilson in 1917. With the upheaval of the new Soviet Regime, the US had to open a new chapter for its migration policy since many, who were against the new regime, sought for asylum all over the world. In the face of this situation, the US determined “annual admissions” and formalized “a national-origins quota”. In other saying, refugees were received with a quota system without “priority”. The US imposed the same quota policy during the ruling of the Nazis (Zolberg, 1988).

It is important to bracket the period of the post-World War II as there were two important socio-political developments, the Nazis and the Soviet regime, that produced refugees who were seeking asylum all over the world. In this historical

climate, in 1943, the United States guaranteed²⁰ the process in which the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA, henceforth) was formed as comprised of three bodies; namely, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA, henceforth) for Palestine, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA, henceforth) for Korea and the IRO to deal with refugee matter in Europe. The mandate of the IRO was to ascertain who would be recognized as refugee or not. Later on, the experience of the IRO was transferred to the UNHCR under the 1951 Convention in the “bipolar world”. In this period, the US did not implement the open door policy, but maintained its quota system “designed to keep out the very Eastern Europeans who constituted a large part of the refugees” (1988:658-661).

In the year of 1945, under the administration of President Truman, the US accepted refugees under UNRRA in giving preference for Jewish survivors and those from Eastern Europe. For this period, refugee policy was an important subject for the US to determine the parameters of international politics (Zolberg, 1988). However, it is important to note that Truman cannot lead a drastic change when it came to the admission of refugees. On the pathway of President Roosevelt, Truman applied to “the national quota for Germans and Austrians to admit refugees, but between 1946 and 1948, only 40,000 were allowed to enter the United States” (Alba and Nee, 2003: 171).

On the other side, this period’s debates clearly shows that refugee policy was already a part of ideological war that was signaled by some senators and representatives. The main themes of these debates were that US’s refugee policy was “ideological weapon against the forces of Communist tyranny”; “bringing real freedom to those who have suffered most”; and being “truth champions of freedom and aiding all those who rally to our cause”. Within these debates, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 granted asylum four hundred thousand and refugee from Eastern Europe (Skrentny, 2002:47). Following the endorsement of the Displaced Persons of 1948, President Truman raised

²⁰ Whom We Shall Welcome, the Report, says that, “UNRRA, from 1944 to mid- 1947, had a displaced persons program to which the United States contributed some \$58 million—not counting the supplies and transportation granted by the Army. From 1947 to January 1952, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which was solely concerned with refugees, received \$237 million, nearly 60 percent of its budget, from the United States. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is getting about \$250,000 from the United States in 1952-53, and is seeking to raise more funds. Congress has authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1952 up to \$50 million for Arab refugees in the Near East and up to \$45 million for Korean relief—both to be administered by UN organizations” (US government Printing Office, 1953:51).

an objection concerning the discrimination of Jewish refugees; however, “ethnic considerations” were not eliminated with this law (Alba and Nee, 2003).

Apparently, the ideological war between the US and the Soviet Socialist Republics Union (SSRU, henceforth) had a great impact on the US’s foreign policy. The US was in the process of creating its own legend as “free world” in this ideological war and positioned itself against communist states (Alba and Nee, 2003). As John Skrentny points out,

A presidential desire for open admissions for refugees from Communism was constant throughout the Cold War. Refugees then had a national-security meaning. American openness to this category of immigrants was a sign to the world audience that America respected human rights and had the superior political system (2002:47).

Another important side of this ideological war manifest the US’s “contradictions between the rhetorical stance of the United States and its treatment of racial minorities at home”. As a result of a reform movement, the McCarran-Walter Act, the Immigration Act of 1952 was passed through Congress and then “racist restrictions on naturalization” were abolished. The law did not change national origins quota system; but it brought another type of quota system for “the colonies of other nations” which was in a sense “a form of discrimination against Third World peoples” (Alba and Nee, 2003:172).

A year later after the Immigration Act of 1952, Congress endorsed the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and approximately two hundred thousand persons fleeing Communist countries were taken in by the US within the next three years. The Refugee Relief Law was designed to influence Communist countries by sending a message for “a brain drain of professionals”. In this sense, the Refugee Relief Law was worked to “inflict a psychological blow on Communism” (Alba and Nee, 2003; Skrentny, 2003; Zolberg, 1988).

After three years implementation of the Refugee Relief Act, in 1956 and 1957, the Eisenhower administration supported the Hungarian revolution that was failed; as a result of this, the US opened her doors to thirty-eight thousand Hungarians who were some of those who had to flee their home country. Eisenhower used a “parole power” to accept “special cases of non-quota immigrants” (Skrentny, 2003:48; Alba and Nee, 2003: 173). The Walter-McCarran Act regulated “the attorney general discretionary authority to parole any alien into the United States for reasons of emergency”; but during the cold war period, Eisenhower used this parole power in the field of immigration beyond its own purpose. Later on, the parole was several times put into practice to admit those from Eastern European countries and Cuba and Indochina (Zolberg, 1988:664). In 1959, the Cuban revolution produced a new refugee crisis since thousands of persons fled and the US admitted two hundred thousand persons from 1959 to 1962. During this period, the Kennedy administration improved Eisenhower’s policies concerning the case of Hungarians and the Cuban Refugee Program established by Kennedy in 1961 provided assistance of reception, resettlement, language and education support to Cuban refugees (Alba and Nee, 2003:173; Skrentny, 2003:48).

During the 1950s, along with the consequences of these historical developments, one thing deserves to be emphasized that the Truman administration did not accept to sign the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and advocated the opinion that UNHCR should not be involved in “resettlement and relief responsibilities”. As it was noted above, the US did not provide any financial assistance to the UNHCR until the year of 1955; but the UNRWA and the UNKRA were generously supported by the US (Zolberg, 1988).

When it came to the year of 1960, the US welcomed many refugees from Communist countries and those from other lands. Under these consequences of immigration, the US’s national origins system was only on paper since the system mainly was grounded upon the logic of “Nordic preference from Europe” and “cheap labor from Latin America”. This was the forerunner of the “formal abolishment of the national-origins system” that did not work in practice. On the other hand, the success of the “black civil rights movements” contributed to this process positively by changing the agenda of

the actual politics The Kennedy administration was on the side of immigration reform and racial equality was also put in their political agenda. The Kennedy bill proposed the elimination of the national-origin quotas by allocating those quotas to a group of people according to their skills, civil status and family unification needs. At the end, the main goal was to abolish the national-origin quota system, which was considered to be a source of discrimination (Skrentny, 2003:48-51).

In 1963, Kennedy was assassinated and his administration's goal was maintained by Lyndon Johnson. It is significant to underscore that this period manifested that immigration reform and racial equality were politically taken together. Johnson and Humphrey's effort to link immigration reform and black civil rights can be considered in this sense (Skrentny, 2003). As a result of all of these efforts, the Immigration Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, was put into practice. The law brought "a uniform annual quota of 20,000 for each country in the Eastern Hemisphere" and no quotas were determined for the Western Hemisphere (Alba and Nee, 2003:174). Refugees were addressed as a "statutory category within the Eastern Hemisphere" and were "granted only 6 percent of total entries" (Zolberg, 1988:668). With the implementation of the 1976 Immigration Act, the Western Hemisphere was also included in uniform county quotas (Alba and Nee, 2003:176). During these years, it should be noted that a narrow definition of refugee granted to only those who fled Communist countries was maintained (Zolberg, 1989:27). In the year of 1967, the US kept to the UN convention in search of "a worldwide asylum policy and more flexible authority in US immigration law for the admission of refugees in *reasonable numbers*" (Zolberg, 1988:670, emphasis added).

In the mid-1970s, the US expanded its own responsibility for admitting those who fled Communist countries. More specifically, following the Vietnam War, many Chinese people from Southeast Asia and those from East Asia constituted the major wave of migration. In this period, the US's admission increased from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and the US took its own place in the Geneva Convention of 1979 to alleviate and solve the crisis by considering resettlement option in cooperation with Vietnamese authorities and other Western countries. This process also brought the US to an

important stage that US refugee legislation was opened to discussion in Congress (Zolberg, 1988:672).

In addition to the developments in the USA's refugee policy during the late 1970s, another important historical shift needs to be emphasized. As already noted, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s in more liberal implementation of admissions, the USA received many Cubans who were qualified and against the Cuban revolution and formed its own foreign policy in an attempt to diminish the power of Communist revolution of Cuba. For this purpose, Cubans received by the USA settled in Miami, which was named "Little Havana". With the late 1970s, the USA revised its policy in more restrictive manner by giving priority to the admission of those who would be used against Communism as "a refugee-warrior community." (Solberg, 1989:187-189)

Following this period, in the year of 1980, the case of the Marielitos from Cuba deeply affected the USA's approach to refugee policy since Cubans were not considered as a contributing force for the USA's foreign policy. As a result, in April 1980, three thousand Cubans were put on the agenda through the USA. After that, the USA declared not to be involved in this crisis alone and sought for an international cooperation to solve the matter through the UNHCR. (Zolberg, 1989:189-190)

With these historical developments of the day, the Refugee Act of 1980 was accepted by a political consensus of left and right politicians in the US. The act was introduced as a "humanitarian and egalitarian" legislation for immigrants and refugees. The act was mainly based on three important bases; first of all, the act brought an "annual quota of 50,000" with an eye to centralizing refugee admissions; secondly, the act incorporated the United Nations definition of refugee on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a social group or political movement and lastly, the act included the admission of "asylees" – "refugees who are already in the US" (Lee, 2006:23). In other words, Brown and Scribner indicate, the Refugee Act of 1980 was the founder of "political asylum in US law" that reinforced the relation between "resettlement agencies" and "the federal government" (2014:101). In this way, the 1980 refugee act formed the current refugee admission programs namely the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP, henceforth). 3 million refugees have been

admitted by the US since 1975 under the implementation of this program. Three priorities of the program have been determined: the first priority is to cover “individually referred refugees, put forward by UNHCR, US embassies, or designated NGOs, who can be identified in any country” and it should be stressed upon that this channel for resettlement into the US has become more effective later than the 2000s. The second priority is to include “specific groups...identified by the Department of State” in consultation with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, henceforth), UNHCR, NGOs or other experts. For example, in their country of origin, Iraqis Associated with the United States Government under P2 designations are eligible for refugee processing in Iraq. The last priority is to refer to “family reunification cases” (Van Selm, 2014:515; RCUSA, web).

With the implementation of the Refugee Act of 1980, the entity of individual recognition of new arrivals brought a new political issue to the USA’s refugee policy due to the case of the “Haitian boat people” and, as a result of this, the USA accepted the Marielitos and the Haitians²¹ under the “ambiguous entrants category” and border control was also added to the USA’s agenda as a new element of foreign policy. In the late 1980s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, henceforth) kept almost four thousands and Marielitos in detentions and prisons and most of them forced the USA government to consider their cases individually (Zolberg, 1989:190).

Under these consequences, in the year of 1986, the USA accepted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) so as to control illegal migrants. The law provided a one-time amnesty for those who arrived in the USA since January 1, 1982 and so they were provided with the right to “legalize their status and eventually be eligible to become naturalized citizens”. With this law, “2,684,892 persons had legalized their status between 1989 and 1996” (Daniels, 2001:148). A quick review of the long-term efforts of the USA to prevent undocumented crossings shows the failure of the implementation of the developing immigrant laws. More specifically, Lee shows that the USA spend a huge amount of money to increase its own border security so as

²¹Daniels stresses upon that “most Haitian applicants have been evaluated as fleeing poor economic conditions, and thus not eligible under the INS definition, while almost all Cubans, regardless of their circumstances, have been favorably evaluated” (2001:225).

to control “illegal migration”, especially when it comes to the US-Mexico border during the 1990s (2006:26).

The Refugee Act of 1980 is still in force and the USA admits thousands of refugees on the basis of the implementation of the act. Even so, the implementation of the act has been always related to other aspects of immigration in a larger sense. As mentioned already, one of these related issues is always undocumented migration, which is decisive for the USA and the second one is the September 11 attacks in 2001.

From this point, it becomes important to understand the reflections of 9/11 attacks on the immigration policy of the USA. The main and prominent first outcome of the attacks was, as Lee puts forward,

The identification of a new immigrant threat and the solutions that followed borrow from and extend earlier gatekeeping efforts. In the search for the perpetrators, entire Middle Eastern and Muslim immigrant communities were vulnerable to blanket racializations as “terrorists,” “potential terrorists,” or accomplices and sympathizers. (2006:26).

In other saying, “terrorism” and “national security” would be determining factors when it comes to the presence of a new immigrant within the borders of the USA. Lee points to the absence of the formation of “formal legislation restricting the immigration from countries”. However, on the other hand, other additional regulations were put into practice to be legally restrictive in terms of terrorism and security matters (2006:27). Related to security and terrorism, the USA Patriot Act was passed on October 26, 2001 and the subsequent “Military Order” was put into practice by President Bush on November 13, 2001. With these regulations, the President has the power “to suspend the rule of law” and in particular to investigate with “the indefinite detention and trial of non-citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism” (Kaldor, 2014:98).

In this above mentioned process, the INS was also authorized to act without recognizing any order issued by an immigration judge if there is a belief that “a foreigner is a danger to the community or a flight risk”. Indeed, this practice was

criticized by immigration lawyers and the immigration services since there were “the 1.100 non-citizens held after the attacks” and they were deprived of their fundamental rights (Firestone, 2001). This sort of security implementations was increasingly maintained by the Justice Department and the INS and immigrants remained vulnerable to detention or arrest without any evidence tied to terrorism. In this historical background of the USA refugee and migration system, in favor of the replacement of the INS with the Department of Homeland Security, the US senators mainly emphasize what the USA needs in terms of better immigration system; in this sense, “intercepting terrorists” and “enforcing employment-related immigration laws” are underlined by Senator Sam Brownback. In a similar vein, we can understand from the words of another Senator Dianne Feinstein that 9/11 attack is seen as a strong indicator of the inadequacy of the INS since “potential threats to national security” need to be depicted in more secured capacity. On the same debate, Prof. Bill Ong Hing also stresses on the provision of “the expertise and the focus to collect, process, and share anti-terrorism information” by underlying the USA’s need for immigrants to revitalize their communities. Another Prof. David Martin brings a new dimension to the debate by pointing to the case of refugee admissions after 9/11 attack. He puts forward that “refugee resettlement has suffered greatly and has been slowed down perhaps more than any other part of immigration admissions” and it is advised that asylum and refugee issues need to be managed by a separate unit at a distance of security issues (US government Publishing Office:2003).

In the year of 2002, Congress endorsed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 which has took over the task of the INS with the establishment of two separate services; the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (US Department of Homeland Security) to develop a new security strategy for immigrant admissions (Lee, 2016).

At this juncture, the place of the United States of America in the international protection regime can be mainly traced into two interrelated lines; “refugee law” and “immigration laws”. The USA admits refugees on the first line; but also, often forms their presence within the borders of the USA with migration laws. Therefore, the USA’s refugee policy is juridically and politically open to be determined within the

broader chapter of immigration laws. Until the dissolution of Communism, the USA has formed its refugee policy by producing its own image as country of freedom. With the beginning of 2000s, a new threat to its “national security” was not Communism but mainly “Islamic terror” or other dictatorial states and the USA has started to form its immigration policy under two topics; anti-terrorism and preservation of national security. The USA did not revise the Refugee Act of 1980, but all of immigrants including refugees and asylums are the part of its overall immigration policy without any exception.

3.4. Uneven Development, Forced Migration, and Social Transformation

Albeit the presence of historical shifts, many scholars on international migration treat migration process as an economic entity in explicating how migratory subjects interact their own host and home countries. The theories manifest that there are different decision or motivation processes that may all be incentives for migrating from one place to another either domestically or internationally. All of these approaches can be grasped at the different micro, meso and macro levels to conceptualize different aspects of migration process. However, the bedrock of international theories is revolved around the term of “development” when it especially comes to the phenomenon of international migration as Delgado Wise and Covarrubias indicate, “the Northern perspective (i.e., that belonging to the receiving nations) is still preponderant, and the emphasis on development is still marginal” (2010:148).

At this point, it becomes important to figure out how much a strict economic gaze from the viewpoint of the scholars on development explains enough the causes and effects of a global capitalist system. In other saying, the theme of development as a particular part of capitalist accumulation cannot be disengaged from the logic and deployment of capitalism. More clearly, the term development should not be taken for granted while explaining the case of a receiving country in case of forced migration. The analysis of dominant social and political structures brings us to that of being a developed country when it comes to the transnational movements of people.

On this ground, approaches to international migration with taken for granted themes such as development, integration, self-sufficiency, neo-liberalism, national security, etc. do not allow us to understand forced migration from a very holistic standpoint. A holistic inquiry of migration necessitates a layered analysis of socio-economic structures with an eye to elucidating these taken for granted categories from the point of sending and receiving countries.

At this juncture, Boucher's three voluminous conclusions on "contemporary global policy on managing international migration" can be illuminating for our argument: the first one is that the effects of a global capitalist system leading to contemporary international migration forms are recognized without "capitalism", "transnational companies", "neo-liberal states" or "governments" as "causes of these effects"; the second is that "restrictionist immigration policies" implemented by "the conservative parts of developed states and governments" prevent "developing world legal immigration supply" from entering in and then "irregular migration, "exploitation of illegal migrants", "racism" and etc. increase; the last one is that the policies to resolve migration management problem are generally to establish legal temporary labor market policies to admit "highly skilled migrants" with the implementation of "better human rights" and to manage "remittance flows from these temporary migrants to their origin countries" (Boucher, 2008 :1461-1462).

Indeed, Boucher's emphasis on contemporary international migration points to temporary labor demand of developed countries as a part of labor migration and this is demonstrably linked to the implementation of fundamental human rights since the development or regression of rights as a result of international migration may lead to bounding consequences for all migrant population in a developed country regardless of being refugee or migrant.

Structuralist approaches to international migration allow us to grasp migration process as a historical coherence of macro and micro levels. As Samers indicates, in general, a structuralist logic considers the international migration by analyzing the relation between developed and underdeveloped countries in terms of dependency rate, production mode/capacity, labor market regulations, unemployment rates, poverty,

core/periphery relation and geographical dynamics under the evolution of global neo-liberal capitalism (Samers, 2010).

More specifically, it can be accentuated that a cross-border migration process needs to be elaborated in explaining causes and effects of forced migration with an eye to understanding all aspects of refugee lives in receiving countries. Regarding current global social transformations, Castles analyzes the place of forced migration in a broad picture by pointing to the increasing of forced migration as a result of “endemic violence” and “human rights violations” and policy-makers implement policies to attract highly skilled migrants and do not “welcome refugees or unskilled migrants”. All of these migratory movements, forced and economic migration, appear as an “an integral part of processes of global and regional economic integration” and immigrants are not only a part of process in which assimilation takes place but also they form receiving countries by bringing their own “languages, religions and cultures” (Castles, 2003a:173).

From the perspective of this study, the place of the US among these discussions is quite important in order to take into consideration forced migration in a structuralist sense. Authors such as Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes take this issue up by developing a very critical approach to the current structuring of global capitalist order with reference to the imperialist leading role of the US. At the center of these discussions, the migration-development nexus is put into question by emphasizing what underpins “uneven development” or “underdevelopment” in this capitalist structuring. Therefore, the first point that needs to be emphasized is that migration is evaluated as a result of “uneven development” and “imperialist strategies” designed to “cheapen the labor force on a global level”. In this regard, it would be fruitful for my argument to figure out that migration itself is a functioning part of the structure of the “so-called neo-liberal globalization” whose economic logic creates “social inequalities” and “asymmetries among countries” (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2011:57).

While taking this argument one step further, Delgado Wise and Covarrubias demonstrate a new theoretical attempt that aims to establish “the political economy of

migration and development” to analyze “migration as an aspect of the problems surrounding development and approaches development as a field of structural dynamics and strategic practices that take place on global, regional, national, and local levels” (2010:155). Within this structural approach, the capitalist structuring strategy led by the US is attached to three main results concerning peripheral or underdeveloped countries; first of all, “the dismantling of the national accumulation pattern” leading to “the expansion of social inequality”; secondly, “the generation of a surplus-population due to the liberalization of large contingents of their means of production and subsistence” that led to “unemployment and underemployment streaks” and “an increase in poverty and misery”; the last one is the “emergence of forced migration” as a result of “the destruction of production and subsistence means” (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2011:59).

The last point drawn by Delgado Wise and Covarrubias to point to forced migration is important for the evolution of my arguments during this study since “forced migration from peripheral to developed countries” is demonstrably attached to the functioning of “current capital restructuring”. In this restructuring strategy, as economically and technologically strong countries, the USA-EU implement “a geopolitical-imperialist strategy of economic restructuring” that brings about the position in which the developed countries use “the natural resources, economic surplus, and cheap workforce of underdeveloped nations” (Delgado Wise, 2009:795). Under these structural consequences,

beyond the predominantly legal definition employed by international organizations when referring to cases of refugees, asylum and displacement, it should be pointed out that the problem of uneven development also triggers imperial wars and socio-political conflicts with escalations of state, interethnic and religious violence, among others. This leads in turn to massive population displacements under vulnerable and highly risky circumstances. (Delgado Wise & Covarrubias, 2011:65)

At this juncture, from the view point of the political economy of development and migration, international migration is scrutinized by Delgado Wise and Covarrubias as

an indispensable cog of “the current imperialist project led by the US”. In their new approach to migration, as theoretical premises of their analysis, two concepts take its own place in the context of neo-liberal global capitalism; “uneven development” and “forced migration” (2011:63).

These two theoretical premises or concepts base this study’s arguments as well. Therefore, it is crucial to take a close look at both concepts. In this sense, “uneven development” is conceptualized as “the historical process of economic, social and political polarization” and this polarization among regions, countries and classes is mainly resulted from “capitalist accumulation, labor division, geopolitics and class struggle” in different levels; as a result, a set of negative outcomes such as social inequality, poverty and exploitation come out in the context of neo-liberal capitalism.

Under the complex and differentiating conditions of capitalist restructuring, uneven development needs to be elaborated as a source of “domestic and international flows” rather than “considering migration as a population movement derived from individual or family decisions or a phenomenon with its own dynamics, basically integrated by social networks and transnational relations” (2011:64). As related to the uneven development, the second concept, forced migration, indicate two essential characteristics;

First, there are expulsion processes resulting from a spiral of social degradation, triggered by the deprivation of means of production and subsistence, and pillaging, violence and catastrophes, jeopardizing the subsistence of large segments of the population in their places of origin... Second, there are restrictions on the mobility of the migrant workforce, which depreciate it and subject it to conditions of high vulnerability, precariousness and extreme exploitation... Under the current capitalist restructuring process and within the framework of new modes of exchange and uneven development, forced migration represents a form of human resources transference whose formation and reproduction costs are not paid by the countries of destination. (2011:65).

On this ground, it is clearly understood that forced migration cannot be considered as divorced from the general logic of capitalist restructuring process led by the US under the impact of neo-liberal capitalist policies. Therefore, forced migration belongs to the vast literature of development and migration in terms of causes and effects catalyzed by the operation of the neo-liberal globalization. Delgado Wise presents two important elements in explicating the dialectic relation between migration and development in this sense; “strategic practices” and “structural dynamics”²². The former refers to two major projects: firstly, “military force and the financial imposition of macroeconomic structural reform along the lines of the Washington or Post-Washington Consensus”; secondly, “a political project designed to transform the structural dynamics and political and institutional environments” that does prevent the development of any other alternative development strategies. The latter corresponds to the “dynamics of US imperialism” that control “the uneven development processes” at the level of financial, commercial, technological and so on (2009:799).

Once Castles explains the “hierarchical nation-state system” in “five tiers”, he puts the US on the first rank with reference to its “globally dominant power in military, economic, political and cultural affairs” and puts Iraq on the fifth and last rank by explaining “rogue states”. On the other hand, living in a rogue state is a risky thing as “the threat of bombardment or even invasion by the mighty US military machine” (Castles, 2005:214). Eventually, this structuralist analysis brings us to grasp “social transformations in less-developed countries” as a result of the impulse of the uneven development and that “forced migration is both a result and a cause of social transformation in the South” as Castles indicate (2006:24 -25).

Before setting the course of North and South division, another important concept, which is important to deepen outcomes of uneven development, is “social transformation” that simply needs to be unfolded. In his sense, social transformation is used to recognize the social and ideological limits of globalization at the different societal levels and migration is also central to social transformation processes as a part of global changes. Therefore the concept of social transformation is “a fundamental

²² From the viewpoint of this study, the regional and global relations between the US and Iraq will be elaborated under the impact of these strategic practices and structural dynamics. In this logic, the term of uneven development can be employed to understand how the US’s strategic practices and structural dynamics has led to forced migration within the context of Iraq.

shift in the way society is organized that goes beyond the continual processes of incremental social change that are always at work” and allows us to analyze “the links between human mobility and global change” (Castles, 2010:1576).

This question is prominent for this study and, as he indicates, social transformation is deeply related to “processes of globalization” and for a social transformation research, the major point can be considered as “identifying and understanding transnational processes”. Furthermore, he puts forward that such an inquiry should be focusing upon “the ways various communities and groups experience and react to such processes” (2001:22). Here it is important to underline that this study aims to focus on the structural causes of forced migration in Iraq while analyzing transnational processes of Iraqi refugees by employing social transformation concept. However, at the same time, as I shall discuss later, limits of their transnational processes will be determined due to their state of being refugee in the US. However, at this moment, it can be mainly stated by sharing his argument that social transformation needs to be understood by linking different actors such as non-governmental organizations, policy-makers or researchers in a common effort to analyze “process of change” (Castles, 2001).

Until now, the influence of global capitalist restructuring on migration-development nexus has been captured with reference to the conceptual explanation of the uneven development and forced migration. In doing so, it is highlighted that the US is recognized as the dominant global power and Iraq as a rogue state in Castles’ hierarchy.

From here, the North and South division has an important thematic place in order to figure out how Northern economic interests work in producing the conditions of forced migration, ultimately of social transformation. As parallel to the essence of the structural analysis of the relation between the uneven development and forced migration, as a specific attachment to forced migration from a sociological gaze, as he stresses, a sociology of forced migration does not stand “in isolation”; so to speak, “it has to understand itself as part of an interdisciplinary and transnational project, informed by reflection on the social, cultural and political dimensions of forced migration” (Castles, 2003b:14).

In the global order of capitalism, he points to further consequences of North and South division in terms of forced migration by putting the “new characteristics of forced migration” in the age of globalization. Accordingly, it is underlined that “conflict” and “forced migration” appear as “integral part” of such division. More concretely, he states: “the North does more to cause forced migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international political order that causes underdevelopment and conflict” (2003b:18). In this process, on the one hand the North and South division proves the dominance of Northern societies that they lead to causes of forced migration in the global order of capitalism, on the other hand forced migration brings “social transformation” in Northern countries by “contributing to the proliferation of transnational communities” (2003b:18).

In this sense, the blurred link between economic migration and forced migration is pointed by him with reference to globalization as a process of capitalist development that change and reform the network of people and goods. More clearly, globalization stands on two axes; first of all, “a system of selective inclusion and exclusion of specific areas and groups which maintains and exacerbates inequality”; as a result, “social inequality” appears “areas of growth” in the South and “areas of decline” in the North; secondly, this relation between these two areas obscures the distinction between economic migration and forced migration; that is to say, weak states refer to “failed economies, weak states and human rights abuses” and “asylum-migration nexus” appears a certain outcome of this relation and people start to leave their home countries because of different reasons that cannot totally be categorized or generalized as either economic motivation or human rights motivation (2003b:17).

In this sense, the source of forced migration needs to be revealed on the basis of how “Northern economic interests” work in this globalization process. He indicates that the North-South division produces “the efforts to prevent forced migration with international community” and, at the same time, imposes “entry restrictions” in the North and “containment” in the South. Containment means “humanitarian aid, peace-keeping missions and military intervention”. More clearly, the North takes its own role as the lead to “cause forced migration than to stop it” (2013b:18).

Following his attempt to theorize a sociology of forced migration, “the desire for mobility” is marked as an “integral part of global processes of social transformation”; in this regard, “globalization” contains the “cross-border flows of capital, commodities, cultural values, ideas and people”. Besides globalization comes up a set of factors stimulating “mobility”. These factors are like “inequality between North and South”, “the political stabilization in the South countries”, “the cultural attraction of Northern lifestyles”. In this global connection, the North uses restrictions to prevent such mobility by implementing “a politics of containment” to prevent “unwanted migrants and asylum seekers” and the South is seen as a “source of conflict, terrorism and instability” (2003a:181). At this juncture, he takes the argument one step further and puts forward that a politics of containment leads to the growth of UNHCR and the role of “major humanitarian agencies” in competition. However, the prevention of mass exodus from conflict zones was not possible through “traditional forms of humanitarian assistance”. In the 1990s, the military interventions of the international community was also to prevent or stop “mass exodus from conflict zones”; but all of this global social policy required a change in warfare (2003a:182).

3.5. “New Wars”: Reproduction of Forced Migration

It is clear from Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, and Castles that “strategic practices” and “structural dynamics” of the United States of America as “a globally dominant power in military, economic, political and cultural affairs” pave the way for a new globally unsettled area. In this sense, there are two important tools that come out in this area; humanitarian assistance and increasing role of international humanitarian organizations, and military interventions of the international community.

On the basis of the latter one, borrowing the concept of “new wars” from Mary Kaldor, Castles argues that New Wars have become dominant since the Cold War and mean that “New Wars are usually internal conflicts in less-developed countries, connected with identity struggles, ethnic divisions, problems of state formation” (2003a:183). In this broad snapshot, it is important to note that disintegrated or weak states are not a

controlling authority of the “means of violence” in New Wars; so to speak, there are “irregular forces” in many forms. As a result, forced migration, forced displacement and forced resettlement have come out as a strategic instrument of those wars by targeting some groups or communities (2003a:183).

At this point, it would better to take a close look at Kaldor’s argument of New Wars before going into details. Her main argument is revolved around the fact “about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars”. She defines the “new wave of identity politics” under the impact of globalization. This sort of identity politics is both “local and global, national as well as transnational” through “the ease of travel and improved communication” and this politics evolves through “the use of electronic media” and “global mass culture”. In this picture, New Wars are characterized by the “changed mode of warfare” and the new warfare is mainly based on the dissemination of “fear and hatred” in population to discard “everyone of a different identity” and “by instilling terror” (Kaldor, 2006:7-9).

New Wars are different from old wars in terms of actors, goals, methods and forms of finance. The actors of new wars are various groups of state and non-state actors, jihadists, warlords, and paramilitaries. The goals of new wars are taken place in “the name of identity”; that is, the main purpose is to obtain “the state for particular groups”. The method of new wars is “population displacement” by expanding “violence” against “civilians”. Lastly, the forms of finance in new wars are “part of an open globalized decentralized economy” (Kaldor, 2013:2-3). As a part of the globalization process, it is prominent to understand that New Wars come into existence in countries where authoritarian states and dictatorships begin to dissolve under the influence of social, political, and regional developments (2013:2). One of the most important results of all of this process is the appearance of forced displacement. Kaldor explains this in such a pure manner;

The strategic goal of these wars is to mobilize extremist politics based on fear and hatred. This often involves population expulsion through various means such as mass killing and forcible resettlement, as well as a range of

political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation.
(2006:9).

The overall assessment of forced displacement indicates that the numbers have been dramatically increasing over the last twenty years. Accordingly, the number of IDPs and refugees increases and shows a tendency to “be cumulative” as there is no return to home countries. Furthermore, conflicts and internal wars took place in Iraq, Somali and Pakistan prove that “forced displacement is a central methodology of new wars” (Kaldor, 2013:10). It is also demonstrably crucial to underscore that the transformation of the war in Iraq into “new wars” produced all worsening conditions of the war including “identity politics, a criminalized war economy and growing numbers of civilian casualties” under the Bush administration against Saddam Hussein (Kaldor, 2006:12).

Following the arguments made by Delgado Wise, Covarrubias, Castles, and Kaldor, the structural underlying dimensions of forced migration needs to be sorted out under the impact of the neo-liberal global order. Crystallizing the relation between development and migration, Delgado Wise and Covarrubias point to the impact of imperialist strategies led by the USA-EU over peripheral or undeveloped countries. These strategies lead to a set of structural consequences such as the dissolving of the national accumulation pattern, shrinking of labor market and subsistence means, and the growth of social inequalities and poverty; thereby leading to the uneven development in the so called “rogue” countries.

In other words, this last point allows us to explore their arguments together in the formation of global capitalist logic²³. As Castles indicates, the prevailing reasons for forced migration need to be analyzed through the elaboration of the “new wars” and the “abuse of human rights” (2003a: 189). The appearance of New Wars leads to the long-term devastating results for the undeveloped countries, especially the countries under the direct pressure of US hegemony. Social transformation of these countries also come to the forefront as an important part of this broader analysis. Roughly

²³At this juncture, Castles brings us to the concept of development through a very different channel so that “underdevelopment” and “weakening social bonds” grow out of forced migration and expands its consequences to the post-conflict area. With this point, the study of forced migration seems to be linked a central part of the sociology of development (Castles, 2003).

speaking, the imperialist strategies of US leads to the uneven development in the undeveloped countries. It takes the form of either military intervention or humanitarian aid organized by the international community. Forced displacement is used as “a methodology” of the “new wars” and of “abuse of human rights”. As a result, social transformation of societies comes out as an ultimate result of this process for not only for the countries that produce refugees, but also for the countries that admit refugees. Speaking of social transformation in Northern countries, Castles underlines “the social and cultural diversity of populations” and “the proliferation of transnational communities” and furthermore puts forward that there is a lack of sociological work on “the newer groups that arrived since the 1990s” by pointing to the increasing of “transnational communities” (2003:21).

3.6. Humanitarian Governance of Forced Migration

Castles’s argument on sociology of forced migration indicates that it is not easily possible to take up the matter either at a local level or at a national level. A sociological analysis to elucidate the matter necessitates a grasp of “global processes of social transformation” which is already underscored in relation to “the desire for mobility” (Castles, 2003a:181). No doubt, this global characteristics of forced migration is traced by Castles in the distinction of North and South. In the scope of this research, it is also emphasized that fatal reasons and consequences of uneven development on behalf of developed countries lead many rogue states to the downfall, ultimately to social transformation. As already argued, Delgado Wise, Covarrubias, Castles, and Kaldor explain different aspects of global processes of forced migration with reference to the sustainability of uneven development through strategic practices, structural dynamics, and especially new wars in specific country contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan. The North implements a strict politics of containment over the South and the South is discursively condemned to “a source of conflict, terrorism and instability” (Castles, 2003a).

At this juncture, it is important to see that the analysis of forced migration as a global phenomenon goes beyond international migration theories and requires a grasp of how

this global process is formed through the involvement of different state and non-state actors. In order to contribute to the capacity of a sociology of forced migration, I propose that humanitarian governance needs to be elaborated so as to present a tidy understanding of forced migration. More specifically, humanitarian governance is an integral part of “global processes of social transformation” in the context of forced migration, thereby allowing us to resolve reasons and consequences of forced migration together with how humanitarian governance is organized and implemented by the North.

3.6.1. Global Governance to Humanitarian Governance

When the matter is taken up in the scale of the global, the debates on governance are crystallized at some certain distinctions. The most important turnout is the difference between “governance” and “government” in the context of humanitarian governance. As an important starting point, Alexander Betts emphasizes the former is associated with the issues at the “international level” while the latter to “the domestic level” and, more specifically, the former refers to “a negotiated and contested process involving multiple actors, often with different interests and power” (2009:99).

Betts clearly explains that the first thing is that this process is “a negotiated and contested” and that the second thing is that this process contains lot of various “actors” in different capacities of power and interests. In the specific context of forced migration, he formulates these two things in the aftermath of the process of the Second World War. This is quite important historical turning point for the establishment of the international protection regime as I have already demonstrated. Succinctly speaking, with the outbreak of social and economic consequences of the war, governance has swiftly gained its “global” characteristics. The capacities of the global is comprised of “the UN system”, “the Bretton Woods Institutions”, “a host of agreements in areas such as human rights”, “the EU” ... etc. Especially, for “the global governance of forced migration”, the LNHCR and later UNHCR and the 1951 Convention have constituted the corners of the system. At this point, he also underlines that an analysis of the global governance of forced migration “is more complex than simply identifying the formal institutions that explicitly regulate the issue-area” (2009: 100-101).

Speaking from within the borders of the global governance of forced migration, governance needs to be understood as the process “is subject to the interests, ideas, and power of the range of state and non-state actors involved in” (2009:102). More critically, this process is different from “international cooperation” since it is basically grounded upon “the institutions” rather than the states. In this system, the institutions may correspond to the “behavior of states and non-state actors” in order that the institutions can be “constraining” or “constituting” all of the involved actors (2009:102-103).

At this point, it is important for us to underline that the coverage of global governance extends to the role and responsibilities of non-state actors beyond “inter-state cooperation”. That is to say, there are a lot of “non-state actors” that take place in “negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement” (2009:105). Before going into details, the involvement of state and non-state actors in the context of forced migration enables us to figure out how the state and non-state actors deal with reasons and results of forced migration. More clearly, global governance grows into “global governance of humanity”; that’s “humanitarian governance” (Barnett, 2013). In this regard, he gives us the definition of the concept in the following way:

Humanitarian governance, in this view, adopts this broad theme of global governance but trains it on the specific goal of saving the lives, reducing the suffering, and enhancing the welfare of the world’s most vulnerable and neglected population. (2013:380).

In this sense, it can be an important dispute whether humanitarian governance is totally a positive conduct or not. In fact, while Barnett and Duvall are explaining the attributes of the concept, it comes to the point that this process needs to be understood in relation to a grasp of “humanitarian intervention”, “humanitarianism”, role and responsibilities of “state and non-state actors” (Barnett, 2013:380-381). More concretely, Barnett draws three important lines: first of all, the term refers to “the specific goal of saving the lives, reducing the suffering, and enhancing the welfare of the world’s most vulnerable and neglected populations”. Secondly, the term is “concerned with more

than ‘cooperation’ – it touches on matters of moral progress... humanizing the world”. Lastly, the role of non-state actors is emphasized by the study of humanitarian governance to show how much NGOs can be active in humanitarian actions (Barnett, 2013:381).

Indeed, humanitarianism is generally defined as the effort to reduce the suffering of the oppressed and in this humanitarian action, Doctors without borders, CARE, Save the children, Oxfam, World Vision International and the UN system undertake the important responsibilities. Besides faith-based organizations in the USA and Islamic welfare societies in the Middle East are important in the humanitarian action (Barnett, 2013). In the similar way, Fassin underscores that humanitarian intervention is a “policy of nation-states” and “governments” that organize their own activities in the field or that “they delegate it to paragonovernmental agencies”. By the way, it deserves to be defined as “humanitarian government” (Fassin, 2007:508).

Humanitarianism is a concept that is taken into consideration by the different schools in order to distinguish its character as regards to politics and violence, but also to determine its borders in dealing with humanitarian issues. At this point, as pointed out before, the purpose might be considered as apolitical or political; the former is to alleviate the suffering people without touching the underlying causes of suffering while the latter is the purpose can be designed to overcome the “root causes of suffering” in consultation with States and societies. On the other hand, in the definition of humanitarianism, another content of the debates shows that the “norms and principles” should not be grasped as something having a “singular meaning” since “the specific meanings of norms” might be possible in any history of humanitarianism. Lastly, once humanitarianism is taken up together with humanitarian governance or other related action areas, it is clear that meanings and instruments might be different at the point of action. For example, to provide “the bare necessities to keep people alive” rather than stressing on “human rights”. At this stage, it is also crucial to that “humanitarianism is not opposed to violence”. That is to say, “humanitarian intervention” and “humanitarian war” are the means that are associated with humanitarianism in various ways (Barnett, 2013).

3.6.2. Power and a Politics of Life in Humanitarian Governance

Speaking of the “negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of global governance”, Betts underscores that power is always “central” to whole process (2009:119). However, in our context of forced migration, power needs to be concretized with the institutions of humanitarian governance. Barnett and Duvall’s approach to global governance is important to understand how the categories of power and domination works in the context of humanitarian governance. Accordingly, “governance” contains “the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power” (2005:2).

It is not possible to define humanitarian efforts in a politically pure frame. It needs to be understood in relation to the category of power. This requires the analysis of how power-holders act in the global level in order to achieve their targeted outcomes. They show that “power does not have a single expression or form” and underline the four forms of power: “compulsory power”, “institutional power”, “structural power” and “productive power” (2005:5). From the standpoint of this study, these categories are important to put US refugee system into the analytical frame of power relations. Each category formulates the roles and capacities of actors at different level with reference to appearance of power. In this way, they put forward that

Compulsory power exists in the direct control by one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another. Institutional power exists in actors’ indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a direct and specific, hence, mutually constituting, kind. And, productive power works through diffuse constitutive relations to produce the situated subjectivities of actors. (2005:12).

Debates on power in the context of humanitarian governance are important in several aspects. First of all, humanitarian governance is performed by both the state and non-state actors in different capacities and scales. Each actor that is involved in this type of governance is in a power relation to each other. Secondly, the non-state actors such

as resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations and refugee communities have different types of power relations; they have power in themselves and over other actors. As Barnett and Duvall clearly put forward this in the following manner:

The first dimension concerns whether power works in interactions or social constitution. One position on this dimension treats social relations as composed of the actions of pre-constituted social actors toward one another. Here, power works through behavioral relations or interactions, which, in turn, affect the ability of others to control the circumstances of their existence. In these conceptions, power nearly becomes an attribute that an actor possesses and may use knowingly as a resource to shape the actions and/or conditions of action of others. The other position consists of social relations of constitution. Here, power works through social relations that analytically precede the social or subject positions of actors and that constitute them as social beings with their respective capacities and interests. Constitutive relations cannot be reduced to the attributes, actions, or interactions of given actors. Power, accordingly, is irreducibly social. In other words, constitutive arguments examine how particular *social* relations are responsible for producing particular kinds of actors. (2005:9).

From the perspective of this study, American context provides a well-structured portrayal of different types of institutions and social relations. These institutions and social relations have power. Their power needs to be understood within the exceeding capacity of humanitarian governance through US. During my analysis, this will be presented to find out how the resettlement agencies or other organizations come into picture through their own possession of power in humanitarian governance.

Succinctly speaking, humanitarian governance contains “formal and informal institutional contexts” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). While institutional power requires “actors’ control of others in indirect ways” through “the rules and procedures” and these two or more actors can be “spatial” or “temporal”, meaning that the one has

power because of the relevant institutional arrangements rather than having “compulsory power” that has resources to use power. At this point, it is equally important to distinguish “institutional power” from “structural power” that refers to “the determination of social capacities and interests”. More specifically, institutional power encircles the interests and purposes as a result of power relations at institutional level, structural power induces different capacities of individuals and communities and “constrains some actors from recognizing their own domination” (2005: 15-19). In this regard, as Barnett and Duvall also point, structural power functions like the simple ideology of the neo-liberal hegemony on the behalf of the capitalist relations since it directly works the current structural dynamics. On the other hand, in contrary to the function of structural power, “productive power” appears “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (2005:20).

These four types of power are integral to humanitarian governance. Retuning to Castles’ emphasis on the distinction between North and South in the context of forced migration, it is possible to put forward that all types of power appear at different levels of the process of forced migration. This point is also stressed upon by Alexander Betts in the following statements;

all four forms of power will exist simultaneously in the international politics of forced migration. One of the core power dynamics within the international politics of forced migration is along North–South lines. This is because the majority of displacement takes place in the South, while few people move on from South to North. However, Barnett and Duvall’s typology is particularly useful because it highlights the multifaceted nature of power relations and the fact that North–South power relations are not reducible simply to an assessment of military or economic strength but are also influenced by factors such as institutions and ideas, which may present both an opportunity or a constraint for actors that are traditionally thought of as “weaker” actors in military or economic terms. (2009:120).

As the global governance of humanity, humanitarian governance with its power relations, institutions and actors as well as governmental relations determine the nature of humanitarian action in an effort to save the lives and alleviate the suffering. At least, the positive terms of humanitarian governance can be understood in this effort. And, it is clear to me that the basic motives of structural power and productive power are to shape the lives of people after saving them. Then, it becomes important to ask some other questions by following Fassin's concept of "a politics of life". In this regard, I propose to include the concept in explaining humanitarian governance since I put forward that the humanitarian governance of forced migration ultimately leads to a politics of refugee lives. He brings humanitarian intervention²⁴ forward as a "politics of life" in the following manner;

it takes as its object the saving of individuals, which presupposes not only risking others but also making a selection of which existences it is possible or legitimate to save... it takes as its object the defense of causes, which presupposes not only leaving other causes aside but also producing public representations of the human beings to be defended. (2007:508).

His approach to the dialectic relation between "lives to be saved" and "lives to be risked" takes to the point where we can see the political and moral aspect of the process. In this sense, he attaches "humanitarian intervention" to "a biopolitics" since it works to measure everything by improving its instruments and techniques. This comes with a kind of 'objectification', that's "the saving of individuals" (2007:501). Rather than emphasizing the political or the moral aspects underlined by Fassin, I will argue by agreeing his argument on a politics of life that a politics of life is not limited to the saving of people in disaster or conflict. After saving the lives of many people at the cost of some others' lives, the state and non-state actors act to shape their lives with rules, procedures, institutions and social relations. In fact, structural power and

²⁴ He takes the case of MSF (Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors without Borders) during the invasion of Iraq to explain how MSF functioned so as to carry out humanitarian action in Iraq. In this sense, the dichotomy is clear in terms of "lives to be saved" and "lives to be at risk" (2007). Actually, politics of life is already there in order to make a decision about the lives of people even if it is put into the process of resettlement of refugees into the USA. To give a short example, Iraqis, who were collaborating with US forces in Iraq, can be those to be saved. This very political instance shows the strong link between humanitarianism and politics. According to Fassin, "a merging of politics and humanitarianism" is also clear from how Iraq invasion was supported by the governments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since "the legitimacy of interventions was being displaced from the legal sphere (since they did not have the support of the United Nations) to the moral sphere (the defense of human rights...)" (2007:510).

productive power of social and economic patterns, and of the institutions shape the realms of welfare, education, labor market...etc. The state and non-state actors of humanitarian governance receive the inheritance of a bio-politics full of political and moral tensions and transform the inheritance into a politics of refugee lives with its own institutions, rules and procedures. A politics of refugee lives is subject to the neo-liberal conduct of humanitarian governance.

3.7. Humanitarian Governance in a Neo-Liberal Context

Delgado Wise, Covarrubias, Castles, and Kaldor provides a detailed grasp of the relation between North and South can be analyzed when it comes to causes and consequences of forced migration on behalf of the existent capitalist relations. As already demonstrated, a sociological analysis of forced migration necessitates a micro and meso-level impacts of humanitarian governance by elevating its specific power implications. From compulsory power to productive power, each actor of humanitarian governance employs a certain capacity of power in a relational area of humanitarian action. As an important phase of the argument, structural power and productive power permeate to each inch of social and economic lives of people to regulate and construct their attachment to the existent function of the system. Barnett already highlights this by referring to humanitarian governance as “the global project to shape lives, habits, dispositions, and institutions in order to improve the well-being of people” (2013:381).

When the current function of the international protection regime is taken into consideration, all mentioned power types must be taken up in relation to the neo-liberal structuring of the system. What we mean the neo-liberal logic of the system needs to be elaborated here beyond going into much details. David Harvey theoretically points to the characteristics of the neo-liberal order by underscoring “strong individual private property rights”, “the rule of law”, “the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade”, “the privatization of assets”, “competition”, deregulation”, and “the free mobility of capital between sectors, regions and countries” (2005: 65-66). In order to keep these aspects of the system sustainable, the advanced capitalist

countries, namely G8, the US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan have a constitutive role through international agreements (2005).

When the impacts of the neo-liberal administration on individuals and communities, it is important to see that

While personal and individual freedom in the marketplace is guaranteed, each individual is held responsible and accountable for his or her own actions and well-being. This principle extends into the realms of welfare, education, health care, and even pensions...Individual success or failure are interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings... (Harvey, 2005:65)

This last point is very critical for my research since it is the general logic underlying the function of power relations in the context of forced migration, especially in terms of the post-resettlement period. When it comes to US context under the impact of the neo-liberal function, Harvey's point to the areas of welfare, education, health care is generally associated with the street-level theories. Actually, the street-level theory enables us to spark a debate on the critical importance of the resettlement agencies and non-profit organization in humanitarian governance led by US

3.7.1. Neo-Liberal Conduct: Refugees to Clients

In 1980s, the main arguments of street-level theory has proved that the delivery of public services to disadvantageous portion of citizens in America is disburdened through the hand of street-level bureaucrats and street-level bureaucracies. Actually, the efforts to create this kind of structures need to be understood according to the requirements of the developing neo-liberal strategies. There are always some certain contradictions that have been discussed by American authorities at the policy level to deal with the problems of various groups.

Lipsky presents these contradictions in the demands of the welfare state that “requires social programs to ameliorate the neglect and insecurity of the economic system”. However, it is questioned by the function of the economic system in US that “the demands of citizens are open-ended while program costs must be kept within certain bonds” and “granted that street-level bureaucracies exist outside of the welfare context” (2010:183). In this sense, public services are not directly provided through governmental channels, but “street-level bureaucrats appear as “public service workers who interact directly with citizens”. By the same token, “street-level bureaucracies” take the form of “public service agencies” (2010:3). As a result, it becomes a fact that that “active governmental organizations” assign their responsibilities to some certain actors through a set of procedures and agreements to provide public services for disadvantageous groups and “street-level bureaucrats” appear in the realm of public services as a mediator between “citizens” and “secure estates” (Lipsky, 2010: 6). The delivery of public services through the street-level bureaucracies is not one-dimensional function of the system. It is totally fit to the spirit of the neo-liberalism in terms of the construction of social control. More specifically, citizens are not considered as passive receivers of this process, on the contrary, the system requires citizens who receive public benefits to behave in a certain expected way. As Lipsky explains this in the following way:

Citizens who receive public benefits interact with public agents who require certain behaviors of them. They must anticipate the requirements of these public agents and claimants must tailor their actions and develop "suitable" attitudes both toward the services they receive and toward the street-level bureaucrats themselves.(Lipsky, 2010:11).

From this standpoint, the purpose is to decrease the impact of the social and economic burden of those people over the general economic situation. Therefore, whoever receives public benefits should cooperate with street-level bureaucracies for the benefit of whole system. In case of any failure in satisfying beneficiaries, it is clear from him that there is nothing to do with them from the side of street-level organizations (2010). This last point is important to be taken up since “the social construction of a client” is central to the work of street-level bureaucracies. In fact, he defines “the processing of

people in *clients*” as “a social process” in which people from different experiences and social and individual backgrounds are transformed and “learn to treat themselves as if they were categorical entities” (2010:59, italics in original).

Within the context of humanitarian governance, I put forward that US refugee admission system is still based on the conduct of street-level bureaucrats in an identical logic. Whether or not resettlement agencies or non-profit organizations are totally interchangeable for each other is not a matter of this research. However, it is quite important that the traditional inheritance of street-level organization of public services for disadvantageous groups does not change much when it comes to a politics of refugee lives. In this portray, refugees appear as poor, workless, unskilled or deskilled individuals and they are transformed into “clients” through US system and they are expected to act in the manner US system expects. Under these circumstance, the formation of street-level organizations is to keep the neo-liberal nature of the social and economic life sustainable in the long term in US. Resettlement agencies and other non-profit organizations are ordinary parts of this system since they are actually public service providers in general and they also serve to refugees in resettlement process. Being an ordinary part of this process brings us to a comprehensive conception that I call as street-level neo-liberal conduct of humanitarian governance.

3.7.2. Paternalism

The organization of humanitarian governance is a multi-faced and multi-sectoral process. The bedrock of the process is comprised of different international humanitarian organization so as to bring a solution to the humanitarian crisis. As already underlined, the formation of actors like the state and non-state institutions come up with power types that are central to the process. In the context of the US, street-level bureaucrats have an important catalyzer role in the neo-liberalization of all of the process of humanitarian governance by transforming individuals into clients and by pushing them to behave in certain norms that are necessarily to meet the requirements of the social and economic system of US

Indeed, within the context of street-level neo-liberal conduct of humanitarian governance, it is important to underline that the system's call on "suitable attitudes" are not subject to a flexible socio-political frame. It is a policy matter in a broader sense. This policy is to alleviate human suffering, but also to shape social relations, cultures, institutions. In this regard, Barnett underlines that "humanitarian governance is a machine of intervention" and mostly its intervention works irrespective of "the consent of the people" (2012b: 486).

At this juncture, it becomes crucial to understand that the organization of humanitarian governance brings 'the best' to refugees' lives without asking their consent. No doubt, this is also integral to a politics of refugee lives. No one may not deny that such a politics includes a sort of "care" and "control" simultaneously. As he points out, "a humanitarian governance defined by this mixture of care and control points to the presence of paternalism" (Barnett, 2012b:487). From this standpoint, it is important to fertilize my conception that the street-level neo-liberal conduct of humanitarian governance is paternalistic in many aspects. He argues four dimensions of paternalism: "the tools used to restrict another actor's liberty (force vs information); the scope of the interference (wide vs narrow); the source of paternalizer's confidence (faith vs evidence); and the mechanisms of accountability (internal vs external)" (2012b:490).

It is clear from a simple understanding of paternalism that the interference is an implicit act through actors in a neutral way at the first sight. However, the objections concentrate that "intervening for the benefit of others" may not be "true motives" or may be "serving the interests of the powerful". On the other hand, it is not possible to put forward that "good intentions might not necessarily lead to good outcomes" (2012b:494).

3.7.2.1. A Consequentialist Ethic, Competence Assumption, Supervision

As already said, the interference is integral to paternalism and this is considered as an act that "violates the principle of consent". More specifically, this points needs to be deliberated as a part of an ethical issue and he also clarifies that "paternalism is based

on a forward-looking consequentialist ethic” (Barnett, 2012b: 495). What we should understand by a consequentialist ethic in humanitarian governance is at stake here. It is a debate that grows out of the nature of humanitarian action itself. It is an assumption that “the rightness of an action is determined by whether it helps to bring about a better outcome than its alternatives.” (Barnett and Weiss, 2008:44). In this sense, without further calculation of outcomes, any attempt to bring a solution to humanitarian problems is consequentialist in itself. The logic is simple in this sense that “any attempt to change structural conditions is, of course, an inescapably and deeply political exercise of power” (Stein, 2008:133). Within the general implication of humanitarian governance, what we understand is “the act of interference will improve the subject’s condition” in a consequentialist logic and in general this sort of act takes place in a paternalist norm (Barnett, 2012b:503).

Without a doubt, from US invasion of Iraq to US refugee admission programs, the impact of a consequentialist logic in paternalist policy is always in practice. In a narrower sense, the paternalism of resettlement agencies is not divorced from that of US at a macro policy level. US refugee program determines what the best is for refugees who are admitted to US and resettlement agencies implement all norms and procedures in a consequentialist logic to get positive outcomes. It is quite clear that the system do not look for refugees’ consent. On the contrary, refugees, as kind of clients, are expected to adjust their suitable behaviors as soon as possible.

As a complementary part of this process, Lawrence M. Mead employs the concept of the “competence assumption” in order to explain paternalism as one of the most important characteristics of American social policy. Indeed, Mead’s argument is important to prove the role of paternalism in the neo-liberalization of humanitarian governance when it comes to the responsibilities of resettlement agencies and non-profit organizations in the post-resettlement period.

In this sense, it is crucial to underline that paternalism is associated with a set of “supervisory policies directed toward the poor and disadvantaged” (Mead, 1998:98). Without a doubt, the development of supervisory policies in paternalism has spread in a historical period and the policies are to explain what people should do and should

not do as beneficiaries of public services. In this historical period, albeit the legislative weight of the states, “privatization and devolution” are the important components of paternalism. There had been important social problems like poverty that was waiting for a strong response from the side of government (Mead, 1998: 103, 105). From this point of view, Mead gives an explanatory definition that

Paternalism means social policies aimed at the poor that attempt to reduce poverty and other social problems by directive and supervisory problems. Programs based on these policies help the needy but also require that they meet certain behavioral requirements, which the programs enforce through close supervision. (Mead 1997:2).

In parallel to the requirements of street-level bureaucrats and to the social and economic organization of the neo-liberal context in the US, individuals who receive some certain services from the state or non-state actors are obliged to take their responsibility by acting in cooperation. In a sense, this type of paternalism necessitates a structured form of leading a life for those who are supported and supervised by the institutions apart from the traditional interpretation of social policies based on “individual efficacy”. Paternalism, in this regard, does not stand on the “competence assumption” purely. This kind of assumption corresponds to the fact that “established benefit and opportunity programs take it for granted that poor clients are as able as other people to take care of themselves”(Mead,1998:109). However, paternalistic understanding of this last point draws us to see the niceties of debates on “individual efficacy” or construction of “suitable behaviors” in return for the delivery of some certain programs for the disadvantaged. Indeed, he gives a detailed portray of what paternalistic programs aim in the following way:

Paternalistic programs do not take competence for granted; neither do they excuse the poor from all expectations, as some liberals would do. Aid is not given as an entitlement, but in return for good behavior. Neither is all aid denied, as in the traditional antigovernment policy. Paternalism aims to provide the poor with the combination of aid and structure that they seem to need. (Mead, 1998:110).

Without qualifying the place of paternalism in humanitarian governance, it is quite difficult to analyze how resettlement agencies and other organizations work in the context of the US. It is clear that refugees are the poor and the disadvantaged and that they receive supervision and public support from both the US government and resettlement agencies, and non-profit organizations. The paternalistic aspect of humanitarian governance provides a structure in which resettlement agencies and refugees meet. Supervision of resettlement agencies lasts five years for each refugee case. In return for this supervision, refugees are pushed to become “self-sufficient clients”. With these basics, paternalism contributes to the neo-liberalization of humanitarian governance in a very unique modality.

3.7.2.2. Responsibilization

Paternalism determines a structure in which the poor is supervised so as to abate the poverty and heighten the efficiency of social policies. As will be discussed in detail, refugees are not divorced from social policies in the US in this sense, it is significant to explicate the edges of this structure in paternalism. In fact, when the context is determined to be the US, I argue that “responsibilization” must be called for the backbone of paternalism in humanitarian governance. As can be seen from Nikolas Rose’s arguments, “forms of government” as “advanced liberal” contain a lot of elements. The states take their own places as “a partner”, “animator”, and “facilitator” so that they run in the environment of “multiple communities, plural identities, and cultural diversity” and he enlarges his point that

as far as organizations are concerned, privatization, marketization, consumerization have been accompanied by the increased use of techniques of accountability such as centrally set but locally managed budgets, and the practices of evaluation and auditing. (Rose, 2000: 324).

The states assign some certain responsibilities to non-state actors through agreements and rules, they are not just attached to a paternalist relation. At the same time, this relation is determined by the control of the dominant social and economic values. The

organizations like non-profit service providers or civil society organizations perform their duties on the basis of the rules to be accountable with their local budget in front of the responsible state mechanism.

At this point, Ritzer and Stillman's arguments²⁵ are clear that American society is transformed into rational entities that control social life. The metaphoric value of this transformation is quite meaningful when we adopt the supervision of the poor in the same functionality of the rationality. From the perspective of this research, it is not a matter of consuming a product, rather it is a matter of receiving and using the information of the system. The organizations, depends to the state and the economic system, work in the same pathway of rationality.

From here, I put forward that paternalism in humanitarian governance is subject to rationality of the system, transforming the function of the state with new techniques of governing. As said from the beginning, the state forms social policies to adjust the poor to meet the requirements of the system at a certain expected level. Therefore, Rose underlies in this sense:

As far as individuals are concerned, one sees a revitalization of the demand that each person should be obliged to be prudent, responsible for their own destinies, actively calculating about their futures and providing for their own security and that of their families with the assistance of a plurality of independent experts and profit-making businesses from private health insurance to private security firms. (2000:324).

Individuals have to control their lives by using options, chances and alternatives that are offered to themselves through institutions and actors in the system. In other words, refugees have to welcome "institutional and productive power" used by humanitarian governance. They have to follow the supervision of street-level bureaucracies to be prudent, self-constraint, and especially "self-sufficient" in the context of US

²⁵ From this standpoint, it should be understood that the organizations constitute only one side of this structure in governance. They are expected to adjust themselves to privatization and marketization, meaning that the organizations accept a certain extent of the McDonaldization²⁵ by standing on the "principles of efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control" (Ritzer, 1998:75). More specifically, "McDonaldization has a profound effect on the way individuals experience their world. The term describes the rationalization of society – the places and spaces where people live, work and consume..." (Ritzer and Stillman, 2003:33).

In this sense, it is important to underline that Rose give a huge importance of the term of “control” since there are “the flows and transactions between the forces and capacities of the human subject” (Rose, 2000:325). The context of humanitarian governance, already mentioned power types provide the control of social relations from institutions to states. Moreover, it is a humanitarian governance of forced migration in many aspects. Here, it is also adopt Rose’s argument on control to a politics of refugee lives by clarifying the “dispersed” character of control, not “hierarchical” (2000:325). It means that a politics of refugee lives is subject to dispersed forms of control from labor market to social relations with institutions and host communities. At this point, I will argue the dispersed character of control by involving supervisory role of non-state actors. Actually, although control is not produced in a hierarchical manner, power types employed by humanitarian governance need to be understood through “well-established hierarchies” (Barnett, 2013:388).

The re-production of dispersed control is only possible with that of power through the state and non-state actors of humanitarian governance. After individuals are pushed to the process in which they will be responsible for their acts on the behalf of the function of the overall governance. The system works with a variety of professionals, experts, social workers and organizations...etc. in the process of “responsibilization” and “the collective logics of community come into alliance with the ethos of individual autonomy characteristic of advanced forms of liberalism: choice, personal responsibility...etc.”(2000:329)This is quite parallel to the point underlined by Harvey in underscoring the general logic of neo-liberalism. Hence people totally become responsible for their own actions. As a result, Rose explains that

The aim is, once more, responsibilization: to reconstruct self-reliance in those who are excluded. But responsibilization here take a characteristic form. Within this new politics of conduct, the problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral and ethical problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and conduct themselves and their existence. (2000:334).

In parallel to the argument of humanitarian governance in the neo-liberal context, responsabilization of refugees work with the fulfillment of requirements determined by the system. This process itself is based on the logic of liberal forms of government as Rose indicates. Without “the power of experts” and “the authority of truth”, it may not be possible to “make liberal rule operable” (1993: 297). In this context, humanitarian governance in a neo-liberal context requires the authority of truth to supervise refugees and make them responsible for their own lives. The mainspring of this process is self-sufficiency as we shall see in detail.

3.7.3. Networks of Faith and Philanthropy

Humanitarian governance in a neo-liberal context like US is thus organized with the advanced techniques of governance in many aspects. Paternalism brings a kind of professionalism and expertise to the realm of social policies to deal with the issues like poverty, homelessness, illiteracy...etc. The organization of humanitarian governance with its institutions, rules and principles works with the production of the capacity of a consequentialist ethic, competence, supervision and responsabilization when it especially comes to consequences of forced migration. This ethical understanding, pushes to competence and responsabilization through supervision is viable in each stage of refugee resettlement. On the other hand, in addition to the professional and expertise function of the organization working together with the state, there are some other organizations that are organized voluntarily in order to contribute to the wellbeing of whole society. This sort of organizations can be a part of a network function in a humanitarian context and they may be serving to the disadvantaged with different motives such as faith-based action or voluntary support...etc.

This brings us to underline another characteristics of humanitarian governance as being “a network” of organizations as they come together to realize their goals (Barnett, 2013:388) either voluntarily or as a part of a network function. Ramalingam, Mendizabal and Mierop specially focus upon “network function” in a humanitarian context and they attributes six main functions to networks. First of all, it serves to the formation of community, that’s “the community building function”, individuals or

groups shares and promotes “the values and standards of a network” to increase the bonds among community members. Secondly, a network provides true information after “filtering” all information coming from the field or practice, and so filtering function becomes effective in decision making process for non-governmental organizations. Thirdly, humanitarian organizations uses “amplifying” function to relay an important message or information to society or a community and this creates two way processes so that information can be shared and feedback can be received through communication. Fourthly, “learning and facilitating” functions are always improving staff or members capacity through various activities. This can be handbooks, instructive or leading materials to increase learning capacity. Fifthly, “the investing and providing” function brings the ways to provide “the resources” that can be used to perform activities. Sixthly, networks in humanitarian contexts lead to the formation of groups and communities from different backgrounds, experiences, nationalities, education...etc. Therefore, “convening” function leads to a “systematic” and “sustainable” relationship through groups and communities (2008:2-3).

In American context, this sort of network function can adequately be understood with the concept of philanthropy. More specifically, when it comes to refugees resettled in the US, it is clear to state that there is a proliferation of discourses or statements that concentrate on help, support or giving. In fact, this kind of effort can be individualistic, but at the same time, it generally grows into a network function for a humanitarian purpose. At this point, why we turn to the concept of philanthropy can be meaningful. Payton and Moody indicate that the term of philanthropy can be explored as “voluntary action” at first; in this logic, action itself is prior to “purpose or intention”. However, the broader sense of the concept takes us to the point where we understand that a “philanthropic” action “must have a particular purpose – to achieve some vision of the public good” (2008: 28). From this point of view, it is clear to underscore that intention and action are equally important when we start talking about the characteristics of philanthropic action.

To enlarge this general definition, other critical approaches to the matter can be touched upon without going into much details. Accordingly, a philanthropic action may be serving to “relieve the suffering of others” and “to improve the quality of life

in the community”. Therefore, it is important to state that the former objective can take us to the efforts to “meet basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention” while the latter encourages us to enhance “the life – cultural, educational, recreational, etc. – of a community” (2008:28). From this standpoint, I suggest that the analysis of philanthropic actions is necessarily important to be able to figure how humanitarian governance of forced migration functions as a complementary part of the process. In this regard, I put forward that the philanthropic action of some non-governmental organization and voluntary organizations have a critical role in building communities in Arizona, US as can be seen in my analysis, faith-based organizations and women organizations try to be effective on the ground of the above mentioned two objectives. Additively, it is significant to mention that their purpose or goal is certain and determined as much their action is. They serve for their purpose by attaching themselves to a broader network of organizations to reach more refugees in their humanitarian action.

In this sense, there is no doubt to call these organizations as philanthropic structures in humanitarian context. Furthermore, Payton and Moody explain this in the following statements: “Philanthropic organizations are sometime called nonprofit, or non-for-profit, or nongovernmental (NGOs)” (2008: 29). Here, the argument brings us to draw the distinction between resettlement agencies and this type of non-profit organizations. as they indicate, nonprofit is a dominant term in the United States, but there is still distinction between the organizations funded by Federal State and the organizations that do not have a determined budget or resources from the state. As a result, they underline that

Philanthropy is about more than money; it is about mission, shared values, organization, and much else before and besides money. The impersonal and economic term *nonprofit* obscures the sector’s charitable roots, its moral dimension, and its often personal meaning; *nonprofit* reveals nothing of the positive values embodied in and promoted by philanthropic giving and serving. (2008: 30, italics in original).

This is quite crucial to understand the difference between the organizations. In fact, voluntary organizations in our research do not have resources while resettlement agencies and professional organizations have. However, as already pointed out, their motivation makes them different than others in this process. Some gives a priority to their religious identity and aims at bringing Christians together to help Christian refugees and other concentrate on women or children to involve them in social life in dignity.

From this standpoint, it is quite important to underline that there is a huge capacity of the faith-based organizations, Churches, and some refugee communities in order to support refugees. However, it needs to be explained that “philanthropic action” and “charity” are two different, but replaceable umbrella terms. The former is to establish more permanent solution to while the latter is to build up temporary solutions to public problems. However, it is clear from Payton and Moody that philanthropy is a more comprehensive term that may contain reference to the charity as required. Therefore, there is no irresolvable conflict between these concepts.

Along with the emphasis, I will bring roles for philanthropy to the front how much philanthropic action contributes to the function of power relations in responsabilization of refugees. In other words, how we can consider its roles in a politics of refugee lives in humanitarian governance concerns my research most in this sense. They concentrate on five roles for philanthropy by approaching to the matter from the point view of other theories. Accordingly, philanthropic action can provide some “services” and afford “needs” in terms of service role; can “advocate reform for particular purposes, or populations for the public good” in advocacy role; may create tools to “preserve cherished values, traditions, identities and other aspects of culture” with its cultural role; may undertake “a civic role” to “build community and generate social capital”; and may have “a vanguard role” to increase “experimentation and entrepreneurial invention” (2008: 35). From this viewpoint, I can say that philanthropic effect does not pave the way for new alternatives, its purpose is to depict a problematic area to contribute to solution process. Therefore, although they are not financially bounded and they are relatively independent organizations, they are ethically and morally bounded structures. It is not incorrect to state that many are conservatives in this sense

and their ultimate purpose is to serve to their religious or moral values in supporting refugees. Besides it should be underlined that philanthropic action's emphasis on "individual development" or finding a permanent solution to problems are not divorced from the building-up of competences or improving personal/individual skills. Therefore, it is essentially attached to the heart of the function of the systemic power relations. While reaching out people, they contribute to control of whole process, thereby becoming another important complementary part to the network function of humanitarian governance.

3.8. Integration, Acculturation, Assimilation and Transnationalism

The majority of sociological inquiries point to acculturation, adaptation and assimilation as constitutive dimensions of the matter of integration of aliens in the host community. Especially, in the contexts of Europe and the United States, the prominent theorists like Milton Gordon, Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, Hartmut Esser, Tom Kuhlman et.al scrutinize the topic of integration by propounding new variables and concepts in order to concretize the volume of integration in a broader perspective. The common denominator of their approaches is to take up the topic as a matter of social integration into the host community. Therefore, it would be incorrect to determine that their analysis is totally different from each other, on the contrary their analysis is convergent in many aspects, and over and above their approaches to integration of immigrants are complementary when it comes to their historical value.

In order to manifest the multifold attribute of the concept of integration, Castles, Korac, Vasta and Vertovec et.al analyze refugee and immigration integration in the specific context of the U.K. and report the plight of immigrants in a wider perspective. By doing so, they call our attention to the distinctive points of the concept in relation to other concepts, like assimilation, settlement, adaptation, and adjustment, that are absolutely dominant in the literature of refugee integration. In their analysis of the concept, it is critical to underscore that the concept does refer to the function of the social network in which "public officials, political decision-makers, employers, service providers, neighbors" and so forth take their place as "social players". The

concept also needs to be scrutinized as a “process”, but what sort of integration process. In this sense, they focus on the concept as “one-way process” which has some convergences with “assimilation”. Roughly speaking, “immigrants are expected to discard their culture, traditions and language” (2002: 111-113)

On the other hand, the concepts must be put otherwise; that’s “a two-way process”. More specifically, integration necessitates, to a certain degree, “adaptation”, therefore the host community is expected to allow migrants or refugees to get access to “jobs, services, and acceptance of the immigrants in social interaction”. If it is so, the integration as “a two-way process” paves the way for the “maintenance of their cultural, social identities”. In this regard, their emphasis accumulates on the term of “acculturation” when it comes to immigrants’ adjustment to different cultures or norms since immigrants undergo the process of becoming part of the new community while keeping their norms and cultural identities. Therefore, they draw our attention to the components of the process like “identity, belonging, recognition and self-respect”. At this stage, a clear-cut analysis of how immigrants and refugee groups experience integration process needs to be conducted with the “normative significance of the process” since such an analysis may represent different outcomes in varying contexts. From here, their emphasis shows that the concept of integration may be vague or inclusive when we need to present a comprehensive case of refugees in their host communities.

In the particular context of refugees, they underline that the literature employs a different set of concepts in order to explain “mutual adjustment of newcomers” by looking at the details of integration process. In this sense, they call our attention to “functional aspects of integration” since refugees’ access to social protection, social services, labor market, and other rights and services is directly related to the way with which integration becomes functional and facilitates their settlement in the host community (2002:123-124). At this juncture, it is important to touch upon Korac’s study on refugees from the former Yugoslavia in Rome in the conceptualization of “functional integration” as she indicates that refugees improve their own integration strategies under the impact of Italian policy context. It means that the integration policy may not be enough qualified to accelerate the integration of refugees in the existent

system, thereby producing gaps and challenges. Under these conditions, refugees may be in a position in which they can develop their strategies to meet these gaps. At that point, Korac points to “self-sufficiency and independence” in explaining functional integration since refugees establish “their own networks” by “actively reconstructing” their lives in the absence of “a planned reception system” (Korac, 2001).

In this sense, as can be seen in the literature of integration, it is quite difficult to distinguish the concept of integration from that of social integration since Bosswick and Heckmann indicate that social integration is also the way of the “inclusion of individuals in a system” and requires “the conscious and motivated interaction and cooperation of individuals and groups” (2006:2). Without the grasp of “acculturation, placement, interaction and identification”, it is impossible to define what social integration is exactly. Following Esser’s contribution to the literature, they also underline that acculturation or socialization refers to how individuals obtain information or cultural standards; placement points to how individuals get a social or economic position with a set of right and obligations; interaction is the way of how individuals establish social relations with each other and have friendships, romantic relationships or marriages; identification involve the process by which how individuals attach themselves to a “social system”, thereby “seeing him or herself as a part of collective body” (Esser, 2000 cited in Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006). In the following logic, the authors also underline the concept of social integration as “the inclusion and acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships and positions of a host community” (2006:11). In this frame, Bosswick and Heckmann indicate that Esser links the concept of assimilation to dimensions of social integration like cultural assimilation, structural assimilation, social assimilation and identificational assimilation (Esser, 2004 cited in Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006).

3.8.1. Berry’s Approach to Adaptation and Acculturation in Plural Societies

It is clear from the debates above that the social and economic indicators of refugees gain importance when we start talking about refugee integration. At this point, it becomes important how all of these indicators can be put in a healthy framework in

order to discuss refugee integration in host communities. To begin with, it would be important to underline John Berry's contribution to integration in relation to terms of adaptation and acculturation. As I will refer to the concept in detail later, "adaptation" is, for him, a set of "changes that take place in individuals or groups in response to environmental demands" so that they can appear with the short and long term changes (1997:13). Before giving the exact definition of the concepts of adaptation and acculturation, he demonstrates that the concept is handled to measure "cultural changes" when immigrants meet and start living among different cultures and norms, thereby leading to transformation of social and psychological condition of immigrants. From this standpoint, he displays the availability of "cultural groups" in "plural societies" by having their "relative power" and the entry of cultural groups into the acculturation process differs from each other. For instance, refugees experience this process although they have never looked for it. In fact, he underlines that the factors like "voluntariness, mobility and permanence" has a huge impact over the eventual outcome of acculturation. (1997:6-8).

His employment of the concept of plural societies is mostly associated with the concept of the "larger society" which refers to "the civic arrangement in a plural society within which all ethno cultural groups (dominant and non-dominant, indigenous and immigrant) attempt to carry out their lives" (2011:2.3). At this point, he underlines two important models: the first one is the "melting pot model" of intercultural relations and acculturation in plural societies. There is "one dominant (or mainstream) society, on the margins of which are various non-dominant(or minority) groups". The second one is "the multicultural model". There is "the larger society (rather than minorities)" that "accommodates the interests and needs of the numerous cultural groups" which are "ethno cultural groups" that are "fully incorporated into this national framework" (2013:1123).

3.8.1.1. Acculturation Strategies

Talking about acculturation strategies in this frame, individual members of cultural groups, either the dominant or the non-dominant situations, may experience the

acculturation process. At the core of this process, especially at the level of daily cultural encountering, “cultural maintenance”, “contact and participation” gain importance in gauging acculturation strategies. From this standpoint, I will point to two conditions of acculturation strategies in order to understand how integration, assimilation and marginalization work in plural societies. Berry defines these concepts by involving two basic conditions. The first one is the availability of non-dominant groups who choose how to acculturate, in this sense, individual members of cultural groups cannot wish to maintain their “cultural identity” and look for active interaction with other cultures then “assimilation” can be defined as one of these strategies. However, in case they wish to keep or advocate their original cultures and norms with avoiding interactions with others then “separation” appears one of these strategies. On the other hand, in case they both maintain their own cultures and keep their interaction with other groups then “integration” can be a strategy as well. Lastly, marginalization may be one of these strategies in case there is little possibility in both cultural maintenance and interaction with others due to discrimination (1997:9). The second one is the function of the dominant groups. In the context of cultural encounters in plural societies, the possibility of the right to choose the acculturation process is not possible in many contexts. Therefore, he highlights this point by referring to the concept of “segregation” under the impact of the dominant society as people who do not want to accept the dominant form of acculturation may lead to one of segregation (1997:10).

The function of these strategies vary from one context to another. Firstly, he underscores that an individual or group may vote for different alternatives when it comes to assimilation or integration. When one opts for separation, another one goes for integration. At the group level, this is also valid argument that the other options may be weak when group assimilation is strong. Secondly, dominant and non-dominant groups can choose these strategies politically, he examples that “if assimilation is sought by a particular ethnic group, it is an example of the “melting pot”, whereas if it is enforced as national policy, we may characterize is as a ‘pressure cooker”(1991:29). Thirdly, people can act in a flux and inconsistent manner to avoid assimilation over time, therefore they can accept “linguistic and economic assimilation” while preventing it from penetrating their daily life (1991:28-29).

3.8.1.2. Acculturative Stress

The main thing is to understand how “acculturative stress” affects cultural groups through these strategies as he states that “individual acculturation experience may vary from a great deal to little” (1991:30). From one group to another, and from one individual to another, the management of acculturation process takes the form of “stressors” or “opportunities”. There can be different factors “moderating” relationships between acculturation and stress. He defines these factors as follows:

Nature of the larger society (multicultural vs monocultural), type of acculturating group (immigrants, refugees...etc), modes of acculturation (integration, assimilation, separation or marginalization), demographic and social characteristics of individual (age, sex, status, etc.), psychological characteristics of individual (coping, attitudes, etc.) (1991:30).

All of these factors are quite significant to understand how immigrants or refugees experience acculturation process in different manners. However, at this point, it is important to underline that “prejudice”, “security”, “contact” and “similarity” have a crucial role in analyzing “intergroup relations” from the point of acculturation. Step by step, he give importance to the content of these concepts by explaining that “prejudice” refers to “personal and institutional prejudice”: the former contains “negative feelings by a person towards another person” and the latter is something which gets “conventional, but without any personal intent to harm”; “security” is revolved around “feeling of secure” so that one can be “open and accepting also of a place for those who belong to other groups”; “contact” can be understood through “personal experience” with members of host community or other groups, so that people can increase their sense of liking or hostility for others. Generally, positive outcomes can be attained through “equal status of the groups”, on the contrary negative outcomes may trigger “competition for scarce resources”; “similarity” goes with “psychological similarity” (similar beliefs, interests), “cultural similarity” (shared group characteristics, language, religion, values, norms). By increasing or accepting

similar values and interests, groups can acculturate to a plural society more smoothly (1991:24-26).

From this standpoint, if we think these four concepts with acculturation strategies, he clearly gives us a concrete argument that “in the separation or marginality modes, there is little contact, and similarity may also be perceived to be low” (1991:30). On the other hand, “when structural assimilation is present (a high degree of contact and participation) combined with a low degree of cultural assimilation (a high degree of cultural maintenance), then an outcome similar to integration is likely” (1997:12).

3.8.1.3. Acculturation Framework

At this point, he brings us to a fruitful point where we can have “acculturation framework” in which it is possible to analyze the acculturation process in a systematic way. In fact, he presents that there are different variables that work at different level when it comes to the acculturation process. The mentioned framework brings “structural and process features” together in order to explain “the central portion flowing from group acculturation through individual acculturation to adaptation is clearly a process taking place over time” (1997:15). In this regard, “acculturation” needs to be taken up through group level and individual level variables. The former is formed by “political context”, “economic situation”, and “demographics factors”. The latter is formed through age, gender, education, status, migration motivations, expectations, cultural distance, and personality in the period prior to acculturation. For instance, “society of origin” which is quite critical to understand how cultural characteristics affect acculturation process since “cultural distance” can be effective over acculturation process in different aspects. On the other hand, as already mentioned, “society of settlement” is also formed through some moderating factors like phase (length of time), acculturation strategies, coping strategies and resources, social support and societal attitudes (prejudice and discrimination) (1997:15-25).

Elaborating the acculturation framework created by Berry, Kuhlman points to the weight of the concept of adaptation to analyze the social, economic, cultural and

psychological process of immigrants in the host community. Applying to this framework, he speaks of the migrants with regards to separation, assimilation and marginalization. For instance, the migrants who are dependent on relief and who wish to keep their original identity may feel separated from the larger society or they may more or less be same as other community members in the form of assimilation (1991:6).

Differently from Berry's approach to integration as a form of adaptation in the acculturation process, Kuhlman stresses upon the importance of economic integration that needs to be defined in a clear-cut manner. Therefore, he employs the concept of integration rather than adaptation as he also points to the widespread usage of the term by institutions and policy-makers. In this sense, he also proposes a mode of integration with reference to the premises of Kunz's model of refugee movements and Goldlust & Richmond's model of immigrant adaptation particularly. In the first approach, Kunz identifies three main factors namely "home related factors", "displacement related factors", and "host-related factors". Under the first head, he also defines refugees in three categories: First of all, "majority-identified refugees" identify themselves with the nation, but not its government. Secondly, "events-alienated refugees" are "religious and racial minorities" whose "marginality was latent or suppressed but came to the fore in a sequence of events". Lastly, "exiles" do not want to wish to identify themselves with the nation due to several reasons. Under the head of "host-related factors", he also defines "cultural compatibility (language, values, tradition, religion...etc.)", "population policies (augmentative and self-sufficient)", and "social attitudes (monistic, pluralistic, and sanctuary societies) (Kunz, 1981). It is important to underline that he also refers to the priority of the function of "cultural compatibility" when it comes to the satisfactory resettlement of the refugee. More specifically, the success of the refugee integration is, for him, embedded into the process in which "the refugees find a "sufficient number of people in their new home who speak their language and share their values and who are able to anticipate and evaluate their hosts' actions" (1981:47).

3.8.2. Goldlust and Richmond's Multivariate Model of Immigrant Adaptation

In the second theoretical stance, Goldlust and Richmond form “a multivariate model of immigrant adaptation” which is based on “pre-migration characteristics and conditions” and “situational determinants in receiving society”. Standing behind pre-migration characteristics, “education and technical training”, “prior urbanization”, “demographic characteristics”, “auspices”, and “motivation” are important factors so immigrants undergo their adaptation process under the subjective and objective aspects separately. Besides, there are also underlying factors for “situational determinants in receiving society”. These are “demography”, “urbanization”, “industrialization”, “government policies”, “pluralism” and “stratification”(1974:197-199).

3.8.2.1. Identification, Internalization and Socialization

Looking at the acculturation process by migrants, the subjective aspects of the process are important to understand the volume of how much they feel integrated into the host community. At that point, they define “identification” as “the modification of the migrant’s own sense of identity and a transference of loyalty from his former country to the new”, they also explain “internalization” as “the processes of change in the attitudes and values of the migrant” which is “a component of the socialization process” and they give a definition of the “level of satisfaction of the migrant” that contains “relative comparisons with the immigrant’s situation before migration” (Goldlust and Richmond, 1974:199). In addition to this, it is important to underline the terms of “auspices of and the motivation for migration” as immigrants may always be aware of conditions through their close relatives and they can be sponsored or nominated by them (1974:199). When it comes to situational determinants, they distinguish Quebec from Ontario or Toronto during their analysis by taking into consideration the variety of situational determinants like “industrialization”, “professional and business services, cultural and recreational facilities” and “cultural pluralism” and so forth (1974:203).

3.8.3. Kuhlman's Economic Integration of Refugees

Kuhlman points to the theoretical convergence between Goldlust & Richmond and Kunz in terms of the explanation of integration. However, he combines these two theoretical approaches to establish “a comprehensive model of refugee integration”. Accordingly, the model is designed in detail in order to understand the adaptation of refugees to the host community. The top part of the model contains four basic categories namely “characteristics of refugees (demographic, socio-economic background and ethno-cultural affiliation), fight-related factors (cause of flight, type of movement, attitude to displacement), host-related factors (macro-economic situation in the host country, natural resource base of the settlement region, ethno-cultural makeup of the settlement region, social stratification in the settlement region, socio-political orientation of the host society, auspices), policies (policies of aid agencies). The middle of the model refers to “residence in host country (length of residence in the country of asylum, movements within the country of asylum). The bottom part of the model involves “adaptation (assimilation, integration, marginalization, separation)” and in the process of adaptation, “impact on refugees” and “impact on host society” take place (1991:12-15).

At this juncture, Kuhlman is concerned with this point by looking at the wider content of policies and researches that approach to the integration of refugees as “a standard of living which is acceptable in their own cultural context” and therefore he gives a definition of the integration of refugees as follows:

If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills and compatible with their cultural values; if they attain a standard of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements (standard of living is taken here as meaning not only income from economic activities, but also access to amenities such as housing, public utilities, health services, and education.); if the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have

not deteriorated due to the influx of refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly integrated. (1991:7).

From this broad definition of integration, it is clear to derive that the success of refugee integration necessitates a well-planned refugee admission program so that refugees can easily adapt themselves by picking up the best suitable option for themselves. Kuhlman's argument is revolved around the value of economic integration prior to all components of the acculturation process. In this sense, it is important to see the importance of the argument that "a standard of living" does refer to not only employment or economic activities but also housing, public utilities, health services and so forth. Therefore, all social, economic and cultural sphere must be contented in order to provide refugees with a smooth passage to new environment and then refugee may maintain their own cultural identity. In addition to this, it is also equally important to gauge how much a host community is affected by the entries of refugees. This is also very critical since the refugee integration requires a non-discriminative and equal atmosphere in which refugees establish their new lives with participation and interaction with other host community members.

3.8.4. Melting Pot Theory: Approaches to Assimilation

The melting pot theory has a historical value in relation to immigrants' integration in the United States. It has intensively been used to explain how immigrants establish a new society by carrying their own cultures to a common entity. Maddern demonstrates a good bulk of the theory by expounding the relation between Americanization and the theory itself in the following words: "the theory is most commonly used to describe the United States as a new world with a distinct new breed of people amalgamated from many various groups of immigrants. Because of this, the melting pot theory has become synonymous with the process of Americanization" (2013:1). This is very important to take this argument to a step further. For many years, many scholars

believed in the fact that the melting pot was keeping America in a state of flux through constant entry of immigrants. Therefore, it was accepted as “the symbol of the liberal and radical vision of American society”, thereby forming “the ideology of America as a land of opportunity where race, religion, and national origin should not be barrier to social mobility” (2013:1). Following results of World War I in 1914, the ideological content of America was subjected to its first shift as giving up the idea that immigrants were added-value for American society in many aspects. As a result, US restricted immigrants’ entry right after 1920s by decreasing the policy of assimilating people (2013:2).

When it comes to the diversity of American society, the theory was criticized from the different viewpoints. In this sense, hostility towards non-native communities, slavery of African Americans, and American oppression through racial and cultural prejudices are often underlined apart from assimilation. In this sense, the supremacy of English speaking whites and Protestants are accepted as representatives of the mainstream culture of America. In this picture, the melting pot is, as Maddern indicates, “a process of the fusion of cultures”, but it is “the myth the American experience has been built on” (2013:3).

3.8.4.1. Assimilation and Acculturation

Milton M. Gordon enlarges the melting pot theory in his fruitful book, *Assimilation in American Life* with reference to assimilation and acculturation processes. To him, the American culture which can be a reference point for migrants and their families is “the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins” (1964:72). Under the impact of this dominant culture, he defines a set of stages and types of assimilation, mainly “cultural or behavioral assimilation”, “structural assimilation”, “marital assimilation”, and “identificational assimilation” and so forth. What he means by cultural or behavioral assimilation is actually “acculturation” that is the first form of assimilation through the arrival of a minority group and takes place in the absence of other assimilation types (1964:77). Structural assimilation refers to “the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its

distinctive values”(1964:81) and “identificational assimilation takes place in the form of all groups merging their previous sense of peoplehood into a new and larger ethnic identity which, in some fashion, honors its multiple origins at the same time that it constitutes an entity distinct from them all” (1964:125). With these types of assimilation, the melting pot theory demonstrates that immigrants lose their cultural identities by transforming themselves into the characteristics of the dominant culture of Anglo-Saxon origins.

3.8.4.2. Accommodation vs. Assimilation

Robert E. Park’s approach to assimilation also take its own place in view of melting pot theory. He demonstrates the subject of assimilation in two orbits: “to make like” and “to take up and incorporate”. From here, it is possible to easily figure out that he stresses upon the importance of “a process” by which individuals achieve language, culture, habits of other members in society. Besides, individuals and groups are “incorporated into larger groups” (1914: 606). Along with his main arguments, we understand that he defines the socio-economic atmosphere of the United States as a suitable environment in which “aliens” can easily “assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of American life”. This argument is important since he underlines the “ease and rapid” attributes of this social and economic structure in the U.S (1914:608).

To his argument a further step so as to explain what he means by assimilation, two important concepts need to be underlined; “like-mindedness” as a “facilitating and intermingling factor” that contributes to “the national solidarity” and “loyalty” as a binding motive to build up “like-mindedness of individuals” (1914: 608-609). However, according to him, the process of assimilation is not based on the totality of similarities in a society like Americans. Rather, it is quite related to the togetherness of people who have differences to form a new compound in the strict sense of the word. By the same token, Kivisto also underlines this point by saying that “Park developed an explanation about how cultural pluralism (or multiculturalism) can coexist with

assimilation and suggested that the capacity of the United States to absorb immigrants must be understood in this light” (Kivisto, 2004: 157).

3.8.4.3. Assimilation to Americanization

At this juncture, we need to draw a line between the concepts of accommodation and assimilation in order to understand Park and Burgess’s invaluable contribution to the sociology of assimilation. Accommodation is also “a process” by which social relations are organized to reduce conflict areas and put persons and groups with different interests in a social order. Therefore, it is “adjustment” and “an organization of social relations” (Park, 1921:735). In this sense, they emphasize that accommodation may be rapid since it is a process to “a new situation” and it may change everything in a “sudden and revolutionary” way to generate “the mutation of attitudes in conversion” (1921:736-737).

Assimilation is different from accommodation in many aspects. It is also “a process” to bring on “interpenetration and fusion” so that persons or people obtain “the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups” and share their “experience and history” and ultimately they incorporate their commonalities into a “common cultural life” (1921:735). More than different in the process of accommodation, assimilation is the symbol of “growth” meaning that it takes time, processes gradually and moderately and ultimately appears as a final product of the social contact (1921: 736). There is a significant point they underline is the necessity of “a common language” since it mostly appears as “barrier to assimilation”. It is an indicator of the interrelation between “communication and assimilation” since all different groups have their own “language, universe of discourse and cultural symbols” and their unity is a “unity of experience and of orientation” (1921:737).

Their analysis of the materials on assimilation is based on three important aspects of the process. The first one is “the biological aspects of assimilation”, the second one is “the conflict and fusion of cultures” and the third one is “Americanization as a problem in assimilation”. In this sense, first of all, assimilation is not “amalgamation” which is a “biological process” that is “the fusion of races by intermarriage” since assimilation

is “limited to the fusion of cultures”. Secondly, “social contact” appears as a component of acculturation that is “sufficient for the transmission from one cultural group to another of the material elements of civilization” and “linguistic changes” need to be stressed upon since it is the strongest “medium of cultural transmission” and “the basis of unity” among people. Besides, “the intimacy of social contact” is very effective factor to ensure the “rapidity and completeness of assimilation” for example “slavery and household slavery” can be the best examples of this type of social contact (1921:737:739).

Lastly, they assess Americanization in relation to “participation of the immigrant in American life”. Therefore, they formulate the reality of social life that immigrants need “an opportunity for participation” and “the language” is the first condition for this kind of participation and also they emphasize while speaking of immigrants as following:

he needs to know how to use our institutions for his own benefit and protection. But participation, to be real, must be spontaneous and intelligent, and that means, in the long run, that the immigrant’s life in America must be related to the life he already knows. Not by the suppression of old memories, but by their incorporation in his new life is assimilation achieved. (1921:739).

This last point is critical to understand on what basis Americanization stands historically when it comes to especially the plight of immigrants in US. Park and Burgess explain that Americanization is created by participation, it is not an intellectual process that transmits “patriotism, loyalty and common sense” to people. To be able to get to Americanized, participation is the key and, for a proper quality of participation, “communication” must be established in the form of “any organized social activity”. The usage of the language becomes very critical when it comes to communication and participation. Most of the time, their emphasis on the importance of different created by language shows how individuals and groups define a specific situation in their own mentality. In other words, they link the formation of “common participation in common activities to “a common definition of the situation”. For this, the grasp of differences in language appears as a constitutive factor (1921:762-765).

However, it is not a one-sided process of communication and participation, they underline the fact that “native Americans should know the history and social life of the countries from which the immigrants come” (1921:765). Overall, this process needs to be constructed by public institutions, science and education in order to form the healthy conditions of Americanization. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of participation as only alternative way to Americanization as there are different quantitative and qualitative variables in this sense (1921:766).

3.8.5. Transnationalism and Forced Migration

Basch, Blanc and Schiller define the term of transnationalism as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” and, as regard to this, they give us the concept of “transmigrants” by pointing to the case of immigrants who “develop and maintain multiple relationships – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious and political - that span borders” (1994:8).

They mainly develop their analysis of migration in a dialectical sense so as to enlighten “the forces that shape the cultural practices and subjectivities of transmigrants” within the context of the USA as a result of labor migration. Although they confirm world system theorists in many sense, they underline that migrants cannot be defined only as “providers of labor power for capitalist production”, but also can be considered as “political and social actors”. With this second dimension of the matter, they link the term of “hegemonic construct” to daily experience of transmigrants in order to explain the transformation of social and cultural identities of immigrants (1994:11-15).

They also extract from their ethnographic researches that hegemonic construct is, first of all, a conceptualization embracing “concepts of race, ethnicity and nation” that are associated with “formal idea systems of both subalterns and dominant sectors”. With reference to Rouse, they demonstrate an example by pointing to incorporation of most immigrants in the US as “workers” regardless of their class origin. According to their analysis, this is very concerned with identity construction of immigrants since many

immigrants in their incorporation process can identify themselves different levels of these categories, race, ethnicity and nation. Secondly, they emphasize the importance of “a global perspective” so as to explicate how “hegemonic processes or forces” work together in a global capitalist order that core and peripheral countries undertake different roles²⁶ (1994:16).

From here, it is theoretically consistent to raise four premises underlined by Basch, Blanc and Schiller to determine how this research adopts transnationalism into refugee resettlement process. The first one is that “transnational migration” needs to be analyzed under the “conditions of global capitalism” and in “the context of global relations between capital and labor”. At this juncture, reasons and results of transnational migration are put into a broader picture that the second point is that transnationalism is defined as a “process” in which migrants build up “social fields that cross national boundaries” through “their daily life activities and social, economic and political relations”. Thirdly, the phenomenon of transnationalism needs to be analyzed by researchers in awareness of limits of “bounded social science concepts” that bring “physical location, culture and identity” together. Lastly, “identities and practices” of immigrants constructed by “hegemonic categories” like “race and ethnicity” are rooted in “the nation building processes of these nation-states” (1994:25).

3.8.5.1. Transnationalism and Assimilation

Regarding link between transnationalism and assimilation, Kristova and Faist are in favour of the opinion that transnationalism and assimilation are two separate processes which do not substitute for each other. The former, as “mode of connectedness”, requires a cross-border movement of immigrants in “the two worlds” or “more arenas

²⁶At this juncture, “transnationalism” and “transmigrant identity” cannot be assessed as divorced from the hegemonic construct of the role of the dominant actors of the global capitalist order. For this research, as I have already indicated in agreement with Delgado Wise and Stephen Castles, the USA’s refugee policy in particular and foreign policy in general appears as the main dominant component of hegemonic processes. In this sense, transnationalism is not solely a matter of incorporation in host community or relations with home county, but also it is a matter of how this incorporation takes place under this hegemonic construct and of how immigrants identify themselves in different levels of nation, race and class in a global perspective of things.

of social life: familial, religious, economic, political, cultural and so forth”. Yet the latter is a “mode of immigrant incorporation into a receiving society” (2010:150).

In terms of immigration studies, as I have indicated, Bourne (1916) rejects the idea of American melting point on behalf of the building-up of trans-national America. Indeed, Bourne presents this idea in order to advocate the trans-national prospect of the ideal of Americanism. America was such a country that had received many who were different cultures and national and who came to America to seek freedom. He advocated the building-up of America as a cosmopolitan structure that would be serving to Americanism in future, thereby standing against assimilation on behalf of cosmopolitan structure under the umbrella of trans-national America.

At this point, Bourne’s trans-national America did not fall under the content of assimilation but also is still open to contextual attachments as regards to current debates on transnationalism. It is fairly incontestable that America is a country of immigrants growing out of different backgrounds and stories. However, it is still impossible to speak that the ideal of trans-national America is the fullness. As Kristova and Faist indicates, its cosmopolitan structure more or less functions as “mode of connectedness” which bounds many immigrants to their countries through distinct channels of social, familial, religious and cultural bounds. If we take this argument one step further, “transnational capabilities” of refugees may be decisive in talking about the quality of mode of connectedness when it comes to the link between transnationalism and assimilation. As the existence of social and economic structures in which refugees live in the USA is not flexible in many senses, it would be substantial to touch the thin line between transnationalism and assimilation. Furthermore it can also be argued that assimilation would likely take its own place in time as long as transnational activities remain limited for a certain group of immigrants.

3.8.5.2. Transnational Activities and Capabilities of Refugees

In view of the link between transnationalism and refugee communities, a set of researches indicates that transnationalism is not an easy going process as a result of

forced migration or involuntary migration. There are important reasons for this; but, it can be mainly stated that refugees' incorporation into host communities, impossibility of returning to home, geographical proximity as well as social, cultural and financial difficulties can be considered as limits for refugees when it comes to transnationalism. From this point of view, Khalid Koser's question, "Why, in that case, have studies of transnationalism – and even of transnational migration – largely ignored asylum-seekers and refugees", is crucial to be responded in a broader sense (Koser, 2007). To respond to this question thoroughly, many scholars fix their own attention on "experiences of refugees" within the context of surrounding conditions to underline how possible it will distinguish refugees from labor migrants when speaking of the establishment of transnational links²⁷.

Al-Ali et al. points to three prevailing assumptions to accentuate how transnationalism and refugee context are not easily linked; the first one is that refugee will return to their country of origin once their home country is consolidated, the second one with reference to Portes and Rumbaut that they will be transformed in "ethnic minorities" with their integration in host countries if they do not return to their home countries and the last one is that their own governments will "disown" refugees who decide not to return (Al-Ali, Black and Koser, 2001a:617; Koser, 2002).

The scholars put these assumptions in the context of Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands and Eritrean refugees in the UK and Germany in extracting two typologies from their research, namely "transnational activities" and "the capabilities of refugees to engage in these activities". Al-Ali et al analyze economic, political, social and cultural factors to identify transnational activities with the first typology²⁸

²⁷Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black and Khalid Koser focus upon this side of transnationalism in their researches as a bundle of examples: "Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe" (Al-Ali et al, 2001a); "Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle: the Case of Iranians in the Netherlands" (Koser, 1997); "Trans-or a –national? Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands" (Al-Ali, 2002).

²⁸ "Economic factors contain financial remittances, other remittances, investments, taxes ...etc for home country and include charitable donations and donations to community organizations for host country. Political factors involve participation in election, membership of political parties for home country and political rallies, political demonstrations, mobilization of political contacts in host country. Social aspects refer to visits to friends and family, social contacts, social remittances, contributions to newspapers circulated in home country for host country and membership of social clubs, attendance at social gatherings, links with other organizations (e.g. religious and other refugee organizations), contributions to newspapers, participation in discussion groups (eg. Internet bulletin boards). Cultural dimensions relate to cultural events including visiting performers from the home country for the host country and events to promote culture (e.g. concerts, theatre, exhibitions) and education" (Al-Ali et al, 2001a : 619).

and demonstrate “transnational capabilities” with reference to “capability” and “desire” under the second typology²⁹ (2001a:619, 627).

Grounding upon these typologies, the concepts of transnational activities and transnational capabilities are productive in demonstrating this study’s main arguments. At this juncture, I argue that link between transnational activities and transnational capabilities may be contextual thereby varying one country to another. Al-Ali et al presents a structured basis in analyzing the cases of Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands and Eritrean refugees in the UK and Germany (2001a). Besides Koser’s findings in analyzing of the case of the Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in terms of transnational capabilities underline three important components of the analysis; “employment”, “legal status” and “a complex range of social factors – including gender and age” (Koser, 2007:245).

Within this scope, employment can be taken up as the most significant category when it comes to transnational capabilities of refugees, as he indicates, employment is the basic for a refugee to improve his or her financial capacity which enables them to support their families at their home countries. On the other hand, “chances of employment” are related to many other factors such as “language skills, education, professional background and experience, the transferability of qualifications, access to training, discrimination and the specific job market situation in the host country”(Koser, 2007:245).

In this sense, he speaks of “subjective factors that increases or decreases employment possibilities among refugees” (2007:245). I strongly agree with his point that these subjective factors may be various due to traumatic experiences of refugees in their home country. This is also important aspect of my research as refugees coming from Iraq unfortunately are left to overcome their feelings of “depression, insecurity or

²⁹“Economic factors indicate employment, savings access to welfare and pensions from home country, access to welfare and pensions from host country, access to information, access to banking facilities for capacity and contain financial stability in host country, economic incentives (or lack of disincentives) for remittances and investments in home country, economic stability in home country for desire. Political factors correspond to secure legal status, positive attitude of host government and population towards ethnic-national diasporas, political integration of diasporas by home government for capacity and refer to secure legal status in host country, ‘non-alienating’ circumstances of flight, positive attitude of home government towards diaspora, political stability in home country, lack of ethnic/religious discrimination in home country for desire. Social factors point to freedom of movement within host country, gender equality, successful social integration in host country, place of origin in home country for capacity and include links with family and friends in home county, links with friends and family in other host countries, integration within the diaspora in the host country, positive attitudes towards home country, desire to maintain national consciousness for desire” (Al-Ali et al, 2001a: 627).

emotional instability” in the USA system and this, as he indicates, destroys their motivation or desire to find employment and they fall into a “limbo situation of being neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’” (Koser, 2007: 245).

As we have seen the typologies Al-Ali et al. (2001a) draws, the second typology, transnational capabilities, is accounted for capacity and desire in explaining the refugees’ contribution to reconstruction of home country. In this regard, “desire” is important conceptualization in order to grasp how refugees build up these economic, political and social during their incorporation process in the host country. Theoretically speaking, I also integrate other factors namely “legal status” and “social factors such as gender and age” into my research since the USA receives refugees and grants permanent residence substituting for work permit. However, until they obtain the USA citizenship, they have to reside with permanent residence and green card for 5 years. Thus, “legal status” needs to be elaborated whether insecurity and precarity come into focus as a part of this process. In following this logic, it is also crucial to understand that the refugee population cannot be easily confined to these entities without considering their age and gender specialties. Therefore, the case of women, children or older persons might be different among the whole population. As Koser indicates with his research, many women may lose their vocational status and may be forced to do menial work or stay at home with the children in the host country (Koser, 2007). At this juncture, Al-Ali et al. do not hasten to define the refugee experiences as transnational communities within the borders of their research. There are various variables such as education, age, gender or class that the degree of “transnational engagement” can vary from one context to another. Therefore, Al-Ali et al. employ the concept of “emerging transnational activities and social field” rather than transnational communities so as to point to “evolving and changing” character of refugee experiences (2001).

3.9. Operationalization of Theoretical Concepts and Arguments

So far the theoretical concepts and arguments of this research have been expounded in a detailed manner. In accordance with the flow of the research findings, all of these

concepts and arguments will be operationalized in a theoretical coherence. The analytical parts of the research will be comprised of two main parts. The first one is the theoretical analysis of US- Iraq relations and the second one is the theoretical and analytical analysis of the field findings.

First of all, the theoretical analysis of US– Iraq relations is organized in order to explain the international relations between Iraq governments and US governments in the historical flow of the critical turnouts. In other words, the analysis of the history between these two states also brings us to grasp why Iraq is important for the sustainability of the global capitalist order led by US. This historical background is provided, I have employed the concepts and arguments of structuralist scholars in terms of international migration theories. In this sense, in parallel to concepts and arguments of Castles, Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, and Kaldor, “uneven development” of Iraq has been discussed under the social and economic impacts of the North and South division. Emphasis on “development” by international migration theories has been investigated by approaching to the matter of international migration in a holistic manner. That is to say, when it comes to the formation of historical conditions of forced migration, Delgado Wise and Covarrubias’s arguments have been made operational to explain “imperialist strategies” leading to “asymmetries among countries” and “cheap labor force” for the continuity of neo-liberal globalization” (2011:57).

In this theoretical perspective, forced migration is not separated from its historical basis when it comes to the situation of Iraq. Although the scholars from international relations and political sciences have a grasp of the well-known turnouts of the relations between these countries, I have studied this historical flow by giving a critics of development in international migration theories. Succinctly speaking, forced migration is not taken granted during my analysis. Rather, it is considered as a matter that needs to be unfolded through a political economy of forced migration. From this kind of perspective, the process in which “accumulation patterns” of Iraq were harmed through US and other developed countries has been raised by explaining the changing social structure of Iraq.

From this standpoint, uneven development processes need to be analyzed in order to demonstrate causes and consequences of forced migration as well. At that point, the theoretical tools enable me to link “forced migration” and “uneven development”. Here he provides two important concepts namely “strategic practices” and “structural dynamics”. I have employed these two important concepts in order to analyze how US has developed its strategic practices and has used structural dynamics over Iraq. With these concept, I have concentrated on how US strategically implemented a set of economic programs like containment and sanctions over Iraq in cooperation with other countries and economic allies. As complementary to its strategic practices, I have also focused upon how US canalized structural dynamics to ensure uneven development of Iraq, including financial, productive... and the use and allotment of natural resources” (2009:799).

In my analysis of this historical relation, Castles’s definition of “rogue states” has been touched upon many times in order to point to how US stands against a country like Iraq. Theoretically, Iraq is considered as a rogue state that is always open to threats or military interventions by “the mighty US military machine” (Castles, 2006). Being a rogue state is thus subject to strategic practices and structural dynamics that maintain uneven development; but Castles gives us another important concept that is “social transformation”. I formulate this historical flow of uneven development of Iraq with reference to the devastating social transformation of the country as uneven development appears as a result of North and South division. Theoretically speaking, the North always lead to forced migration by dominating social and economic relations over South.

On this ground, I have highlighted two important historical processes of social transformation of Iraq by specifying forced migration moments, namely; the First Gulf War in the year of 1991 and US invasion of Iraq in 2003. These two moments have been examined through the surrounding strategic practices and structural dynamics to understand the volume of social transformation. In other words, social transformation of Iraq has been has been taken up in an extended period of these historical relations. Castles put the term of social transformation as one of the triggers for “transnational communities” since people start leaving their countries and then they form new

communities. On the other hand, the term needs to be understood that social transformation is a result of forced migration and people are forced to leave their countries and the social composition of the countries is deeply transformed in another thing while people are moving involuntarily.

From my perspective, I have employed the concept of social transformation as a process of forced migration in the context of Iraq. In order to bolster my arguments, I have also employed the term of “new wars” from Mary Kaldor. With this concept, I argue that social transformation as a result of forced migration is motioned with New Wars. It is a process of “identity politics” and it is canalized through “fear, hatred, and terror”. Kaldor proves that it is a new form of wars and leads to the increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons as it takes the worst form of identity politics at the cost of lot of human lives.

In North and South division, social transformation of Iraq forces many people to leave their home countries due to various reasons such as security, human dignity, uncertainty, etc. They suffer from lack of social and economic opportunities, fear, hatred and terrorism. In this logic, I brings Alexander Betts’s argument to the heart of my analysis. It is the argument based on the relation between global governance and forced migration. Historical consequences of the US-Iraq relations need a comprehensive frame to be well understood and analyzed, therefore I find valuable to point to the functionality of the term.

On the basis of the operationalization of global governance, I come to the second part of the theoretical and analytical analysis of the field findings. As I mentioned, global governance comes into picture through a set of “power dynamics within the international politics of forced migration”. He shows us that power relations appear along North-South lines and then “the majority of displacement takes place in the South” (2009:120). It is a succinct summary of my argument that global governance links my analysis of the historical relations between US and Iraq to the formation of humanitarian governance.

Humanitarian governance is the bedrock of this research in two critical aspects. Firstly, I employ this concept to indicate that the analysis of global governance of humanity is directly related to that of forced migration. More clearly, the basis for global governance of humanity is rooted in the US-Iraq relations. The governance of consequences of forced migration is embedded in the proliferation of the state and non-state actors as well as of international conventions and rules. From the perspective of this research, I compile the analysis of both processes under the term of humanitarian governance. Humanitarian governance, substituted for global governance, is explained by Barnett as all efforts for “saving the lives, reducing the suffering, and enhancing the welfare of the world’s most vulnerable and neglected population” (2013:380). The organization of humanitarian governance contains various actors from the side of government, non-governmental organizations, and voluntary organizations. It is not possible to speak of a central authority to be effective through humanitarian governance and as Betts indicate, when it comes to forced migration, it is clear that the development of humanitarian governance has been triggered right after Second World War (Betts, 2009).

From here, I put forward that the neo-liberalization of humanitarian governance through 1980s is already in the process led by US and its allies. Indeed, US has already altered its own policies on the provision of public services for the poor or the disadvantaged. When we look at American context, it is generally associated with “street-level bureaucrats and street-level bureaucracies”. In order to underline how US establishes a policy-logic for delivering public services, I need to delve the functionalities of street-level bureaucrats. It is interestingly fruitful that although there are some incompatibilities in implementation, the underlying logic is firstly concord with the neo-liberalization of public services and is secondly compatible with the organization of resettlement agencies in Arizona.

Indeed, I acknowledge the term of humanitarian governance as a process in which the state authorities, non-state actors, and refugees explain their own views and experiences during my analysis. At this point, it is not incorrect to speak of a street-level neo-liberal conduct of humanitarian governance when it comes to the logic of service delivery by resettlement agencies. In order to highlight this aspect of the

process, I have used my in-depth interview questionnaires (see Annex 3 and Annex 4) with resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations and with State Refugee Coordination of Arizona Department of Economic Security. The questions are formulated to find out the particular characteristics of resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations to distinguish them from each other as well as I have interviewed AZDES in order to understand the weight of the government side.

In this sense, it is important to underline that the function and purpose of resettlement agencies are not the same as that of a non-governmental organization such as Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship or Noor Women's Association. In this regard, after placing all of them into the street-level neo-liberal background, I have enlarged the components of humanitarian governance so as to explain what kind of attributes non-profit organizations have other than resettlement agencies. After that, I have concentrated on the structures of the organizations with their staff, capacity, purpose, and views on refugee resettlement process and conditions in Arizona in general. Each question is to explore the attributes of the organizations in humanitarian governance of consequences of forced migration in the particular context of Arizona. In this sense, I have tried to condense attributes of resettlement agencies by reference to their "faith-based" as a part of humanitarian governance in the political atmosphere of the US, especially after 9/11 period.

By the same token, in order to more explore the functional characteristics of the non-profit sector in general, my questions to the resettlement agencies and other organizations are to know their responsibilities and duties in front of the federal government and other state mechanisms. Actually, I have employed the concept of "paternalism" so as to emphasize the professional relation between non-profit organizations and refugees in the form of humanitarian governance. Paternalism through non-profit organizations is argued in relation to the terms of "a consequentialist ethic, competence assumption, and supervision". This analysis is directly related to the understanding of how refugees respond to the system in return for public services and assistance they receive after the resettlement. Therefore, at first, my initial effort is to find out how the non-profit organizations approach to the

situation of refugees in general and then to explore what the non-profit organizations expect from the system in particular.

From this standpoint, the relation between the non-profit sector and refugees is delineated as a process in which the non-profit sector appears as a pool of professionals and experts. Accordingly, each organization delivers their services according to their expertise that can be for women, youth or elders. Each professional or expertise area points to a process of responsabilization for refugees. In this point, my third questionnaire (see Annex 2) is to understand Iraqi refugees' experience in the process of humanitarian governance of forced migration. From the side of Iraqi refugees, I have analyzed how all of the process of a politics of refugee lives is perceived and assessed by the refugees themselves. In this regard, I have determined a set of turning points in accordance with the theoretical flow of this research. Accordingly, their experiences of leaving their homes are put into question by discussing how their lives are saved and how much their lives are cared through instruments of humanitarian action in the global governance of humanity.

After that, I have accentuated their stay as refugees in the countries of asylum. This phase of their experiences correspond to the proliferation of humanitarian governance with its institutions, rules and procedures. Although I explain this process with reference to the roles of international organizations in humanitarian governance, I have emphasized the refugees' experiences in order to underscore "uncertainties" of the process in many aspects. A politics of refugee lives is built up through uncertainties as well. In order to explore this aspect of the process, my questions to the refugees are formulated to understand their migration from the departure to the resettled as well as their views on integration, social mobility and conditions in Arizona. Within the border of the questions, I have underline how their uncertainties affect their social, cultural and economic lives.

In consonance with the theoretical coherence of the research, I asked the questions to understand their expectations and their awareness on conditions in the post-resettlement period in US in this specific context, this query has brought me to discuss their experiences around the theme of American dream as a starting point. Their

experiences mainly indicate the presence of high expectations before they were resettled in Arizona. Indeed, as Wallerstein underline, American dream is a dream of human possibility; in our context, the refugees have to use their capacities to reach this non-existent dream. It is just an encouragement or motivation, not more. Therefore, I have taken this point up as an important sphere of refugee experience in humanitarian governance. They are chosen to be resettled in US and they have to let their expectations disappear and they have to be responsible for their lives as possible as they can regardless of impacts of their forced and traumatic past. From this standpoint, I have discussed the concepts of a consequentialist ethic, competence assumption and responsabilization from the side of the refugees in order to better evaluate the humanitarian governance of consequences of forced migration. While the American system constructs them as New Americans, how they experiences this process is analyzed with a specific focus upon the subject of New Americans.

As I have already indicated, forced migration is not a phenomenon that can be explained or argued by international migration theories or forced migration literature. It is an issue that needs to be unfolded through a multi-disciplinary approach in order to manifest the various aspects of the matter. As Castles points out, a sociology of forced migration is necessary to portray “the social, cultural and political dimensions of forced migration” in such an interdisciplinary manner (Castles, 2003b). Along with this argument, I have argued forced migration by bringing international migration theories and humanitarian governance into the same pool. At this point, I will underline that the function of humanitarian governance in Arizona, or in another neo-liberal context, is necessarily linked to the processes of integration, acculturation, assimilation and transnationalism under the consequences of forced migration. The neo-liberalization of humanitarian governance establishes a system of the state actors, refugee resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations and voluntary organizations and refugees. It can, in this regard, be stated that humanitarian governance of forced migration has a constitutive role in forming principles, rules, services and institutions in a neo-liberal logic. How the refugees respond to all of these roles, rules and services and how the organizations deal with flaws and gaps in dealing with the refugees become the issues that spread into a social, economic, cultural and legal area. Here I suggest that humanitarian governance of forced migration ultimately

draws our attention to all the processes of integration, acculturation, assimilation and transnationalism since, without an analysis of how humanitarian governance is organized at the contextual level, the integration of refugees cannot be predicated properly.

From this point of view, as mentioned earlier, the system promotes the efforts to acquire their self-sufficiency through competences in order to remove their dependency on temporary assistances and support provided by different channels. Therefore, the system simultaneously compel them to have one of offered jobs for their subsistence in Arizona. Indeed, this is the first indication of adaptation, or integration zone in a broader sense. They start to experience their lives in a different social and economic condition by becoming aware of the fact that they have to work to survive in US. In analyzing the policy of self-sufficiency and the limits of competence assumption in terms of responsabilization by paving the way for debates on acculturation, integration, assimilation, and transnationalism in this sense.

At this juncture, I start my arguments in a very orthodox way with reference to integration and assimilation debates held by Park, Burgess, Gordon and Warner. The reason of why I concentrate on these old-school researches still constitutes a basis for current discussions. With reference to the immigrant social structure of American society, many of these studies reveal problems and opportunities all immigrants had upon their arrival in US. The scholars analyzed the situation of immigrants in a very productive way so that the condition of refugees can also be enhanced by reference to the volume of the prevailing arguments. In this sense, I emphasize the contribution of Ager and Strang to the literature since they provide four levels of integration by pinpointing “markers and means”, “social connection”, “facilitators”. And “foundation” (2008). In fact, their determination of levels covers a wide area of integration since they bring up their argument from the provision of basic needs like shelter, food, education, health to that of socialization, cultural interaction, rights and citizenship. Therefore, I stress upon the weight of the social meaning of integration by reference to these indicators and more during my analysis.

The multifaceted analysis of integration takes me to bring dominant problems to light since two of them, level of English knowledge and type of work, have a decisive place in their integration process. Without having English competence, vocational mobility is not possible, meaning that they have to have an entry-level job and that they have to move in a narrow social environment. In the long term, even they are still not skilled in language and work, their socialization, self-sufficiency, personal improvement and motivation are harmed by this process. From this point, I have improved my argument by underscoring these dominant problems since US system does not a priority to solution of these problems. My interview questions to the representatives or experts of resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations and Arizona Department of Economic Security clearly state that the refugees have a safe haven and they have to work to live in US. The system does not go beyond humanitarian assistance.

This last point is crucial to understand the logic of American system. Problems that refugees face are not a matter of fact for the system. The construction of future Americans, or new citizens is a matter of fact. As Gordon indicates, the domination of Anglo-Saxon culture is a backstage phenomenon for this process. As a result of this, the place of individuality takes place in its own place with individual failures or successes in this picture. More clearly, I emphasize that refugees are not immigrants, they have personal vulnerabilities, and they are not voluntarily in America. This brings us to find out that the problems refugees face cannot be approached through individual failures or flaws. My interviews with the refugees indicate that they encounter the similar problems and suffer from personal vulnerabilities. Many have a traumatic background because of their experiences in their home country and of mistreatment and discrimination in the country of asylum. Their psycho-social indicators are incomparably different from voluntary immigrants or green-card holders.

At this point, I propose that the refugees' particular experiences need to be analyzed to determine characteristics of a social issue like the refugee integration. As Berry indicate, Iraqi refugees are also "cultural groups" and they improve their individual strategies to keep their culture and identity in their new environment. On the other hand, it is clear from Gordon, Park and Burgess's analysis of the situation of immigrants in US that Americanization and assimilation are the most component parts

of this process within the frame of “non-economic dimensions of adaptation”. At this point, I suggest that the integration of refugees needs to be picked up in two important content in order to better distinguish the conditions of refugees from that of immigrants and other groups in terms of integration. I have formulated these two ways: “economic integration of refugees” and “social integration of refugees”.

On this basis, I have investigated Kuhlman’s “economic adaptation of refugees” in order to give a basis for a qualified analysis of refugee integration. Goldlust and Richamond’s multivariate model of immigrant adaptation as an outset argument since they firstly demonstrate “situational determinants in receiving society”. Even if it is considered for immigrant motives to move from one country to another, the socio-economic conditions of receiving countries must be conceptualized so as to materialize the concept of integration. Kuhlman’s model enlarges this model by spotlighting refugee conditions in a similar logic. Therefore, his model specifically gives a place to the parameters of economic adaptation of refugees in a host country. I have employed the cornerstones of this model in order to enhance my argument on ‘economic integration of refugees’.

Within his model, the refugees are not disengaged from their particular conditions that are characterized through the pre-resettlement period. In this context, I propose that the model paves the way for arguing social participation, contact and intercultural relations through the refugees’ economic integration. As a result, I comprehend the model is a qualified context in which I bring the voices of resettlement organizations and refugees together so as to manifest a comprehensive analysis of refugee integration.

The distinguishing aspect of his model is to concentrate on refugee adaptation as a separate issue and accordingly he underlines the factors like “characteristics of refugees, fight-related factors, host-related factors, and residence in host country, adaptation (assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation)”. He does not isolate the specific conditions of refugees like fight-related factors and host-related factors so that the model provides a coherent backstage for my study when the economic adaptation of refugees is argued in detail. On the other hand, it should be

noted that the model is mainly concerned with the economic indicators of adaptation with its specific concepts. I develop my arguments in the flow of this model in many aspects and I also enhance my arguments on how the refugees explore their acculturation strategies in their social life, or in “non-economic” zones of adaptation.

For this, he takes us to “subjective” and “objective” conditions. Succinctly speaking, I have analyzed their “social mobility, vocational mobility, level of satisfaction and socialization” in US in terms of objective conditions while their subjective conditions such as gender, age and marital status, etc. are also employed so as to manifest their integration process in a holistic approach. It is quite significant that my interviews with the refugees also manifest that they often compared their objective conditions with that in their home country. From this point of view, I concentrate on their perception of security and safety in US by improving my theoretical sphere through two important concepts; “accommodation” and “acculturation”.

The social aspects of the process actually take place in Kuhlman’s model under the head of adaptation and he does not specify much. I follow Park and Burgess’s concept of “accommodation”, “social contact” and “social organization” in order to measure how the refugees adapt themselves to the social conditions of the host country. To keep my analysis of American context consistent, I have handled the term of accommodation as a bounding concept between Kuhlman and Berry so as to explain how much their economic situation is effective on their social conditions, and ultimately on their whole integration process.

This last point brings me to analyze their acculturative strategies through their prospects on their culture, language and next generations. Besides, as the volume of the psycho-social aspect of the matter is prevailing, I have employed his approach to “cultural groups” in “plural societies”. In doing so, I have adopted his “acculturative framework” in order to analyze “acculturative strategies” of the refugees. Therefore, his concepts are effectively operational for my analysis as he specifies integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization in a relational manner. In terms of the social and economic situation of the refugees in this relational aspect, I have used the

concept of “moderation factors” in order to understand their cultural limits in their relation with Americans, or American culture in general.

Under the impact of the mentioned indicators of the social and economic integration, I have argued their grasp of American citizenship in terms of transnationalism. Manifesting a critique of “transmigrants” in transnationalism, I have underscored by reference to the concepts used by Koser and Al-Ali that there are structural obstacles against refugees to become transnational individuals. They undertake a long integration process and then their loyalty home country or their relation with their home country can lead to the waning bounds individually and socially. In order to present a detailed analysis, I have focused upon my interview findings with the refugees if they wish to keep their relations alive or not under the umbrella of transnational capabilities.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF US-IRAQ RELATIONS

4.1. The Place of Iraq for the United States of America

Even if a quick historical review of Iraq - US relations points to the diplomatic and military efforts of Western countries and US in particular to keep Iraq on their side up to the present. From the Cold War to 9/11, US develops its foreign policy by looking out for its national and regional interests in the Middle East. No doubt, this foreign policy must be taken into consideration with other dynamics in the region. Therefore the underlying roots of migration movements from the East to the West must be analyzed through the analysis of this foreign policy. From the viewpoint of this study, the forced displacement of Iraqis is also one of the devastating results of the process in which Western countries and the US have a great role in determining their own political and economic policies.

As already noted, a very structuralist doctrine of international migration studies recommends us to concentrate on the relation between developed and underdeveloped countries in terms of core/periphery relation and geographical dynamics in the evolution of global neo-liberal capitalism (Samers, 2010). The historical relation between US and America shows that US paternalist approach is ultimately to determine what the best is for Iraqi people through discourse of bringing democracy. This approach is not an immediate or unexpected output of the process, on the contrary it needs to be taken up along with requirements of the neo-liberal policies. Therefore, Delgado Wise, Covarrubias, and Castles take us to the important point where North-South division can be analyzed in terms of the relation between uneven development and forced migration.

From this standpoint, as Castles indicates, US is a developed country that takes place on the first rank as “globally dominant power in military, economic, political and

cultural affairs” in the “hierarchical nation state system” while Iraqi is categorized as one of “rogue states” (2005:214). One of the most important disadvantages for rogue states can be exposed to military interventions and economic sanctions through the developed countries like the US. Especially, military intervention can be used as a tool to design rogue states according to need of the neo-liberal development. In the Middle East, US – Iraq relations can be considered as a matter of this development dialectic and the consequences of this relation has always produced forced human displacement since the hegemonic power of the coalitions led by US has led to devastating results for Iraqi people in terms of infrastructures, employment, health, education, etc. In general, this historical relation has resulted in “uneven development” in my theoretical understanding. Uneven development is one of the incentives for leaving the home for another country. Iraqis are forced to leave their countries due to various reasons like armed conflict, ethnic and religious turmoil as a result of the military interventions led by US

At this juncture, Iraq witnessed economic sanctions and containment strategies from 1950s to 1970s. In this period, there was the duality in international politics, on the one hand Soviet Regime, on the other hand US. This was a hegemonic war between these two countries through Iraq because of its rich natural resources. In the political reports and official correspondences, US does not hide its imperialist purposes over Iraq to ensure its development against the Soviet threat. Under the dictatorship of Saddam, from 1970s to 1990s, US has obtained a very critical position to increase its regional dominancy. However, towards the end of 1980s, Saddam administration did not respond to US demands in an expected manner. Moreover, US neo-liberal policies were harmed by the nationalist policies of the Ba’ath Party. As a result, US politically switched its foreign policy in a strict paternalist way in order to control the Saddam government. In the beginning of 1990s, US proved its regional hegemony by isolating Iraq through military threats during the Kuwait crisis. This process led to a refugee crisis since many people were forced to leave their countries under the cruelty of the Saddam regime and of US self –interested policies. After that, this process turned the Saddam into a cruel dictator in front of US and he was demonized through political discourses in strategic practices by US. By the year of 2003, he was removed from the administration through US military intervention. A decade later after the First Gulf

War, Iraqi people have suffered from devastating consequences of the invasion and the second and biggest wave of forced migration has slammed into Iraq and negative indicators of social transformation has begun to appear dramatically.

In this regard, the uneven development of Iraq was brought about by a group of the hegemonic countries. Theoretically speaking, North-South tension has been resolved to the detriment of Iraqi people. In other saying, “social transformations in less-developed countries” as a result of the impulse of the uneven development, and that “forced migration is both a result and a cause of social transformation in the South”(Castle, 2006:24 -25). In order to explain this process of social transformation in Iraq in a detailed manner, I will specify these historical periods by examining how forced migration is inevitably a socio-political part of US-Iraq relations.

4.2. The Soviet Threat & Dual Containment: 1950 to 1970

In the early 1950s, it is clear from the history of Iraq that there was a British dominance over the resources of Iraq and this dominance was supported by US as a part of enhanced regional policy. As taken placed in US reports, the countries played their roles “imperialist agents” producing imperialist strategies which did not produce any positive result for the development of Iraq; on the contrary it led to uneven development for Iraq and other countries in the region on behalf of the competition between two important forces, US and the Soviet Union. In the early 1950s, “United States objectives and policies with respect to the Near East by indicating” updated their own political agenda by declaring their interest in the Middle East to support the constructive roles of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Israel on the one hand, and U.K, France and US on the other hand against the Soviet Union. In this period, US used Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO, henceforth) so as to follow development in the Middle East in terms of its own security measures. During this period, first of all, US declares that “US objectives in the Middle East are not dissimilar from those of the British” (US Department of State, 1952-1954:374). Secondly, the President’s Special Assistant informs the Secretary of State with the memoranda of no.134 in 1953 about the content of their Near Eastern policy that

(1)The degree of importance which the United States attaches to the area from the point of view of our security interest, having in mind the oil resources of the area or preventing these resources from falling into the hands of the enemy....(4) The possibility of a regional economic approach to the area by the United States, Britain and France in view of the remote prospects of building viable economies in the individual states of the area. (US Department of State, 1952-1954:377).

What was coming from US policies in the early 1950s was the recognition of the “enemy” as the Soviet Union. It is clear from their documents that “oil sources” of the region were an important part of development strategies of US, Britain, and France. The interests were determined commonly and US was leading to unifying all countries in the Middle East against the Soviet threat. This was also clearly declared in the following manner:

The US wanted to be friends with all nations in the Middle East, because we believed that only through friendship could the nations of the world unite against the Soviet danger which threatened us all. (US Department of State, 1952-1954:378).

Against the “Soviet threat” recognized by US and declared by US to other countries, US formed some certain form of initiatives so as to keep its domain in the region. Therefore, when it comes to the case of Iraq in particular, it was also observed by Secretary of the State in Memorandum of Discussion at the 147th Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC, henceforth), Monday June 1, 1953 that Iraq was defined as “the Arab State most plainly concerned with the Soviet threat...Like Syria, Iraq offered good economic possibilities” (US Department of State, 1952-1954:381). Additionally, it was also underlined that Iraq makes its own national economy through the usage of the “revenues from oil sources” (US Department of State, 1952-1954). Following this, it should strongly be emphasized that there were some alternatives designed and encouraged by US in the region in order to overcome the “Soviet threat” when it comes to the years of 1954 and 1955. Those alternatives were the mutual agreements among the countries in the Near and Middle East region and Turkey was

always one of the most important countries in this regard. Within the scope of those efforts led by US, Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement for friendly cooperation in 1954 and Turkey and Iraq signed a pact of the mutual cooperation in 1955 that was known as the “Baghdad Pact”. In terms of US interests, this meant that “the construction of ‘northern tier’” that defenses against “Soviet Imperialism” (US Department of State, 1955-1957:1-5). Therefore, the Pact was the main motive of US primary interest in establishing a front to unite other countries in the region against the Soviet Union.

Whilst these development were ongoing, there appeared a new development that changed all relations in the Middle East in the direction US did not wish. This was the military coup of July 14, 1958, in Iraq. With this development, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri and its pro-Western government was overthrown and Prime Minister Nuri and Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah of Iraq were murdered during the coup (US Department of State, 1958-1960:308). Concerning the function of the new government in Iraq, US mainly reported that the new government will “maintain existing international agreements, will retain membership in the Baghdad Pact and will not nationalize the production of oil...” (US Department of State, 1958-1960: 330). Although US mainly concentrated on keeping its relations with the new government of Iraq, the prime minister Abd al-Karim Qasim, it was several times reported by the Director of Intelligence and Research and the Department of State that there was a trend of “growing Communist strength and activities in Iraq” that was, according to US, “direct threat to integrity and independence of Iraq” (US Department of State, 1958-1960: 355). For this period, the reports demonstrate the Soviet threat to the integrity of Iraq not to that of US However, it is well clear that there is a strong relation between US policy on the Middle East and the integrity of Iraq. Whatever harms the integrity of Iraq also harms US long term interests in the region. Therefore, US doesn’t avoid reporting how the Iraqi government interacts with the Soviet Union and what it does mean for US in consideration of the long term consequences.

In the political agenda of US, the Soviet domination over Iraq government was the main concern once taken together US’s interests in the region. The growth of Communist influence was considered as a threat to Iraq and the United Arab Republic

(UAR, henceforth). In this picture, US addressed the position of Qasim on the side of Communists and allied with Kurds and Iran against his government. In this political polarization, Western countries showed a tendency to take a role as “imperialist agents” in general terms. Through the consideration of Iraq under the threat of the Soviet Union, US discussed several alternatives to intervention in Iraq by putting the political channel of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president. However, it was also critical to make a decision that the Iraqis would not accept this political option and, on the other side this condition of the regime will be “more pro-UAR than the present one”. The main motivation behind US concerns about Iraq was clearly declared in this sense that “the principal Western interest in Iraq is oil” and the political effect which Nasser would possibly create “to obtain the diversion of some Iraqi oil revenue to development outside the country” (US Department of State, 1958-1960: 368-370). As a country that designs its foreign policy on the basis of “regime change” of foreign governments, US under the administration of Eisenhower put “the possibility of invading Baghdad” on the agenda, but the Eisenhower administration developed its strategy in the political atmosphere of the Cold War and US did not use the option of “military intervention” as it was thought harmful for winning friends and allies in the Middle East and this would also negatively affect “America’s reputation and capacity for global leadership”. As a result, the Eisenhower administration applied a containment strategy, that’s restrictive politics, rather than military intervention (Osgood, 2009: 5-11).

For this period, it can be underscored that the new Iraqi leadership did follow the moderate relations with US and Western powers by proving the effort to recognize “their oil interests” (2009:11). However, this did not guarantee to change the relation between Soviets and Qasim’s government on behalf of US and Western powers. Furthermore, there were trade and arms agreements signed between Iraq and Soviet Unions. This was alarming for US and U.K. as their interests might be disrupted with those developments. On the other hand, there was an appearing conflict between Nasser and Qasim since Abd al-Salam Arif, the second man to the new government in Iraq, was supporting Nasser on the behalf of the UAR. Against the increasing cooperation between Qasim and the Soviet Union, US inclined to support Nasser so as

to fight against communism more effectively by providing financial support as well (2009:11-12).

In terms of the long-term consequences, this network of relations led to a crisis in March 1959 and a group of nationalist army people, on Nasser's side, started a revolt against Qasim's regime and this deepened the crisis. As a result, Qasim radically changed the government's foreign policy by "accepting a large loan from the Soviet Union and by officially withdrawing from Iraq from the Baghdad Pact" (2009:13). With the order of Eisenhower, the NSC established an Iraqi committee to look for options in Iraq and to change the picture. There were three possible outcomes underlined during the meetings; the first one is "a communist takeover in Iraq", the second one is "Nasser's control of Iraq with the UAR's help" and the last one is "a nationalist regime not connected to Nasser, that would come to remove both the Communists and the pro-Nasser leaders" (2009:17, US Department of History, 1958-60: 496-499).

Although it was partly acceptable for US to choose Nasser's possible overtake of Iraq against the communist domination, US did not apply any of these options completely. In fact, the idea of "a nationalist government" that would be able to be controlled by US without the threat of Qasim and Nasser would be on US agenda. However, this would not be easier. During this period up to 1970s, there was also a failed assassination attempt to remove Qasim from the government within the knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, henceforth), but it also did not lead to any change once US interests were considered in the long term.

This period of US and Iraq relations can be defined as a form of "dual containment", which mainly aimed at "preventing communist encroachment while simultaneously limiting the appeal of Arab nationalism" (Osgood, 2009:8). What was lying behind this dual containment was grounded upon the "assessment of how the Qasim regime would affect the strategic and economic interests of the West" (2009:25). Therefore, it can clearly be put forward that Iraqi oil sources were the only concern of US and Western powers and US foreign policy was designed to prevent communist threat in the Middle East so as to keep their economic interests and power.

4.3. Increasing of American Hegemony: 1970s to 1990s

After the overthrow of Qasim government by an army coup in 1969, the Baath Party regime was established, headed by the president Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and party chief Saddam Hussein al-Takriti. It was clearly noted in Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassies in Iran, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on January 1972 that the relations between Iraq and Soviets had reached an important stage that US was following closely that Soviets and Iraqis had some agreements on military issues which were substantial. (US Department of History, 1969-1972). In the same year, on April 13, memorandum from the executive secretary of the department of state to the president's assistant for national security affairs speaks of "a fifteen year of Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" to strengthen relations in terms of political, economic, scientific and military fields (US Department of History, 1969-1972).

This was a signaling stage from the viewpoint of US regarding regional economic and strategic interests. Nixon and Kissinger's government found the Treaty disturbing for US interests, especially when it comes to "Western access to oil" (Kiely, 2009:44). With the developing relations of Soviets and Iraq, the regional role of Iran was much attractive to US before the past as there was the military agreement between US and Iran and US accepted providing aid to the Kurds in Northern Iraq upon the request of the Shah. This was also an attempt to win the Kurds. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war led to new developments and changes in the Middle East. During the war, the sole purpose of the Nixon government was to "diminish Soviet influence in the area". US announcement to provide military supplies and assistance for Israel led the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to "impose an oil embargo on the US and the Netherlands". In the long term effects, this caused a lift in the "spectre of Western economic stagnation" and "balance of payments crisis" in Washington. Iran was not a part of this embargo. On the other hand, the US was advancing its trades with Iran in terms of economic and military areas. In 1973, Saddam Hussein declared that Iraq would improve its relations with US in 1973. Following this, the trade capacity was gradually increased and Iraq became one of the important markets for US products as well. From 1969 to 1977, there was not much

change that Nixon government aimed at balancing the power of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (2009: 43-49).

Towards the 1990s, US ideologically reframed its foreign policy as regional equilibriums were dislocated due to the Iran-Iraq war during 1980s, regime change in Iran and victory of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In the year of 1990, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait radically affected US foreign policy in the region. Ryan explains the place of Kuwait with reference to the words of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John Kelly, that US need for net oil imports were gradually increasing and this growth might be scaled up from "42 percent in 1989 to the 50-60 percent range by the year 2000" and the main source of imports were the Persian Gulf (Ryan, 2009:58). The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf was directly related to US and Western countries' economy in many senses. In fact, in the same reference, it was noted that "the Gulf producers account for about 65-70 percent of the world's excess production capacity" (2009:58).

During this process, the ex-President Nixon's assessment on Iraq shows why US was in the Persian Gulf. First of all, Saddam Hussein was trying to control "one of the most important strategic areas in the world" and US was rightful in "defending their vital economic interests". It was very clear from Nixon's assessment that US economy was directly affected through any development growing out of the tensions in oil flows. Secondly, Saddam was the one who had weapons from his oil revenues and who would use "nuclear weapons"; therefore he had to be stopped, otherwise, the future cost would be more for young Americans. Besides, it was emphasized by Nixon that Saddam was a cruel leader, who led Kuwaitis into torture, rape, and inhumane conditions by violating international law (Nixon, 1991).

On 16 September 1990, President Bush explained that twenty-seven States were in the coalition against the invasion of Kuwait through Saddam. Among those countries, the leading ones were the United States and Saudi Arabia and all of those countries sent their armies to the Gulf region to solve this international crisis. In fact, this explanation on the coalition was a formulated message for Iraqi people to disconfirm Saddam's opinions on US since Saddam had declared that "the crisis was between Iraq and the

US and the occupation of Kuwait would be for the good of the poorer nations”. On the contrary, Bush legitimated the role of US by indicating US economic support to both Iraq and refugees escaping from Kuwait. Bush clearly explicated that “Iraq must get out of Kuwait for the sake of principle, for the sake of peace and for the sake of Iraqi people” (Bush, 1991:510-511)

The Bush administration reached a result that containment and sanctions on Iraq would not be enough to prevent such a crisis, therefore “using military force” was already put on the agenda. Indeed, there was division of opinions on the level of US administration and Powell underlined two things for the case of Kuwait; first of all, “an offense by increasing the troops in the region” and secondly, “the policy of containment and the imposition of sanctions” (Hybel and Kaufman, 2006:73).

4.4. First Gulf War - Saddam as an Emerging Threat 1990s to 2000s

All negotiations with Iraq indicated the presence of the growing tension between Baghdad and the coalition countries. Baghdad also decided not to show a sign of “compromising”. With the month of November in 1990, the Bush administration decided to “double US forces in the Gulf” despite the disagreements by Congress. During these ongoing disagreements, UN Resolution 678 called the government of Iraq to solve this crisis in cooperation with the government of Kuwait until January 1991. However, all diplomatic contacts did not serve for solving the crisis, on the contrary, the tension reached a point where the Bush administration wooed the Congress to be able to use military force against Iraq. In January 1991, Bush received support from both the public and Congress for a possible military intervention and US forces partially attacked Iraqi forces on January 16, 1991. After a brief while, it was understood that Saddam yielded. Upon this, the war was ended by US on February 28, 1991 (2006:74-81).

In the context of 1991 Gulf War, the tension among Saddam Hussein, US and coalition countries produced thousands of displaced persons and refugees. The 1991 uprising appeared in the north and south part of Iraq short after the Gulf War cease-fire. The

expansion of uprising from Basra to Karbala, Najaf and Kirkuk and other cities was huge and the Kurds were the main actor of rebellion against Saddam's regime. The revolts of March 1991 showed was against the regime's persecution as a result of several incidents such as "the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in 1987 and 1988" (HRW, 1992).

During Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq army included a diversity of "anti-government elements", so to speak, Shia Arabs and Kurdish militia were recruited in the army and their defection had an important role in this uprising. Saddam's regime responded to the revolt in a brutal manner³⁰. On March and April 1991, "nearly two million Iraqis escaped from strife-torn cities to the mountains along the northern borders, into the southern marshes, and into Turkey and Iran" (HRW, 1992).

At this stance, it is important to underline US policy towards the uprising in order to understand US response to the massacre of thousands of people by Saddam's regime. When it came to February 1991, Bush once again stressed out by using the word of the "dictator" that "that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take the matter into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside..." (Bush, 1991b). In a similar vein, Human Watch Rights reported that

"US occupation forces who were stationed only a few miles from al-Nasiriyya, Samawa, and Basra did nothing to help the rebels who rose up in these cities. Soldiers watched helplessly as Iraqi troops devastated the cities, and wounded civilians fled on foot to US bases nearby telling of the atrocities that were taking place" (HRW, 1992).

As the active role of US in the coalition against Iraq during the Gulf War was essentially related to the economic interests of US, which were linked to oil reserves of Kuwait, US foreign policy was clear when it came to a possible intervention in

³⁰ "They arrested any resistance people and hanged them from electric poles," another young man from Najaf said. "They towed their bodies behind tanks. Women and children they ran over with tanks. There were some wounded in the hospital -- they were taken away by the military and burned alive. Some of the doctors treating the wounding were executed... Many of the refugees who arrived here were from the Shiite Muslim strongholds of Najaf and Karbala and from Nasiriya, all of which, they said, had been heavily attacked by Government forces. Although Shiites represent about 55 percent of Iraq's population, the Government is dominated by clans from President Hussein's hometown of Tikrit, who are Sunni Muslims" (Kifner, 1991).

Saddam's massacre of Kurds in Iraq. US did not intervene or did not support the rebellions by leaving the matter in hands of the Iraqi people.

4.4.1. First Wave of Social Transformation

A structural analysis of U.S's foreign policy indicates that "imperialist strategies" led by US were also supported by other countries in the region of Middle East as well as by U.K and Canada. It is not incorrect or a simple deduction to claim that US imperialist strategies underpin forced migration from Iraq to other regions. If we read the relation between US and Iraq in this structural analysis and if we use the conceptual mapping of Delgado Wise and Covarrubias (2011), it is prominently explicit that Iraq experienced a drastic downsizing in its economic indicators due to the blockage and embargo of US and other region countries before and later the Gulf War. As a result, Iraqi's accumulation pattern was disrupted by external factors. To give an explanatory example at this stance, Abbas Alnasrawi points out,

The effectiveness of the embargo is reflected in the decline in Iraq's oil output from 3.3 million barrels per day in July 1990 to less than 14% of that level in subsequent months-enough to meet the needs of the local economy. The financial loss from this decline is estimated to be \$8.5 billion in 1990 and is projected to be between \$15 and \$20 billion in 1991 and 1992. (1992:344).

In addition to that the economic situation went down in the war atmosphere of the 1990s, there was also the insecure environment in which all infrastructure of Iraq was on the target list by the coalition powers. As a result, Iraq came up against a devastating decline due to the collapse of its economy, industry, buildings, and transport and telecommunication networks. In this sense, Iraq's loss of human resources was prominent during the war. Thousands of civilians and military people were killed and, as Alnasrawi adds,

The breakdown in health care delivery systems, lack of food and medicine, lack of purified water, and the destruction of power generating plants were cited as factors contributing to further deaths among Iraqi civilians, especially children. (1992:346).

Indeed, Iraq's development strategy, through the oil reserves of Kuwait, was toppled over by US and U.K's economic and military dominance over the region. Alnasrawi underlines that there were four groups of people who were victims and survivors of the war; firstly, those who were injured and traumatized in unknown numbers; secondly, those who were refugees and displaced persons, 28,000 Iraqis fled to Iran between January and late March, two million left their homes to flee to Iran and Turkey; thirdly, those were civilians who were included in the war to revive "a declining and inflation ravaged economic capable of offering only unemployment and impoverishment"; lastly, those who were dependants and relatives to soldiers who lost their lives in the war; they were also victimized and nothing was provided for them by the Iraq regime (1992).

Speaking analytically, this means that Iraq's accumulation pattern was demolished by the capitalist structuring strategy led by US and this is also associated with the "social inequality", "unemployment", "poverty and misery" and "emergence of forced migration" as a result of "destructured production and subsistence means" (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2011:59). According to Delgado Wise's analysis of the relation between migration and development, strategic practices and structural dynamics need to be well understood to be able to define US role in the global capitalist structuring (2009:709). In this regard, before and after the Gulf War, US "strategic practices" located Iraq regime in the Middle East by proving the importance of US economic interests. In this way, US employed both its "military forces and political project" to put down Saddam's regime. In terms of military forces, US was not alone against Iraq, but also Kuwait strategically represented the availability of high oil reserves for US, not more, and this was voiced by President Nixon and Bush.

Saddam's regime was suppressed by a set of strategic practices from economic blockage to social conflicts. Besides US promoted this by guaranteeing the

sustainability of the “uneven development processes” of Iraq in terms of financial, commercial and technological. At this point, it can be indicated that US structural dynamics were predicated on its military, economic and political dominance in the Middle East. At the cost of the massacre of people in the region, its structural dynamics were to eliminate any other opponent that acted against US interests.

During the 1990s, it is important to underline that Saddam’s regime endorsed a set of new laws to increase its control in the social and economic organizations. Associated with the Gulf War it is also significant to tackle with this process in order to understand how the social transformation of Iraq has taken place since the beginning of the 1990s. Saddam’s regime implemented a set of laws to regulate daily lives of people such as the closing of nightclubs, banning of alcohol consumption, amputation for theft and robbery, restrictions for women. In a sense, Saddam’s political turn was accorded to the sublimation of his tribe in particular and of tribal values in general. In 1996, Saddam’s regime endorsed a “savage act of retribution” that regulated all acts against “tribal honor” as well. Saddam’s ideology on tribal values was a part of “cultural production and information dissemination” in society. The production of “a tribal identity” was accomplished and people started themselves with their own tribes. Saddam’s tribalism was for “his Sunni domain” while Shi’ite identity was also intensively identified with tribal identity in the south part of Iraq. The clear difference between these two identities was that the former did not have to conceal itself in public as a part of the regime. Besides, in the north part of Iraq, Kurds had their own “cultural exclusiveness” and all meant that there was a fragmentation of Iraqi identity (Dawisha, 2009:236-240).

As Castles (2003a) points out, the social transformation might be a result of “endemic violence” and “human rights violations” and social transformation can be considered as either cause or effect of forced migration in a broader sense. In fact, as a part of Ba’thist ideology, along with the collapse of socio-economic infrastructures that “many educated people left the country, state institutions decayed and fragmented and the northern Kurdish region consolidated its autonomy”, Saddam’s regime headed for “identity politics (including tribalism and Islam)” (Kaldor, 2005).

As stated above, this identity politics was mainly built on the fragmentation of Iraqi identity on account of tribalism and tribal values. At this point, it is crucial to understand that 1990s have planted seeds of identity conflict in a disadvantageous manner in which Saddam's regime suppressed other identities to keep his dominance over the society. Ba'athist regime produced socio-political tensions which were not independent of the regional politics led by US and U.K. Saddam's identity politics was the beginning of "social transformation" for Iraq as there were the state regulations that were directly restricting daily lives of women in particular and people in general.

Saddam Hussein's government was several times condemned by the international community because of human rights violations in Iraq. This countrywide, or local, an indicator of human rights violations was clear that Saddam's regime implemented a set of inhuman and brutal laws over Iraqi people. According to the report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 1995,

These [amputation, branding and death] penalties violate international human rights law in many respects. First, they are cruel and inhuman punishments, prohibited under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iraq is a party. In addition, these punishments have been applied retroactively. Finally, the great expansion of offenses covered by the death penalty also eviscerates the spirit and principle of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (HRW, 1995, parenthesis added).

At this juncture, it can be asserted that Ba'athist regime followed an oppressive internal politics while pursuing its own interests against US That is to say, Saddam Hussein managed to control Iraq on behalf of Ba'athist ideology and tribalism. However, US strategic practices and structural dynamics attempted to limit Saddam's internal and external policy as US clearly recognized the existence of Saddam's regime as a threat to US interests in the region.

4.5. Demise of Containment towards Military Intervention: 1990s to 2003

With the inauguration of the Clinton administration in 1993, the “containment strategy” was kept in relation with Saddam Hussein. However, the Clinton administration also gave an emphasis the threatful presence of Ba’athist regime against US (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007: 20). During the Clinton administration, US continued implementing its “containment” policy which was designed to “compel Iraq to abide by international norms and comply with UNSC resolutions”. The administration admitted Saddam’s regime as a threat. To deal with this threat, the administration kept its containment strategy mainly based on the “authority of the United Nations”. In this regard, the administration followed three important purposes; “UN inspections to disarm Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction” (henceforth, WMD), “dismantlement of WMD programmes” and “economic sanctions to prevent Iraq rebuilding its conventional military and WMD forces” (2007: 24).

In this period, the administration did not factor in a possible military intervention or using military forces against Iraq. It was taken into consideration that Saddam’s regime would be contained in terms of the production and delivery of WMDs by Saddam’s government in the Middle East. Besides, it needs to be underlined that although the Clinton administration did not regard the use of military forces against Iraq on the basis of UNSC resolutions as both UN and USA were not in a position to have a task of removing Saddam (2007). However, Iraq Liberation Act (ILA, thereafter) signed by Bill Clinton in 1998 is a forerunner of objective possibilities in USA’s policy change towards Iraq as it is clearly stated in the act that

it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime. (Congress of US, 1998).

Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 is an essential document of the shift in US foreign policy towards Iraq. Specially, as Dodge indicates, US figured out that, after 1997, the Ba’athist regime could manage to survive under sanctions and Baghdad became a

place of organizations and conferences to conduct “the international campaign against its own isolation” but also “to create a more general Anti-American coalition” (Dodge, 2009:93). Saddam Hussein was a regional drawback for US since he did not respond to the demands of US contrary to expectations and oil was important for US imperialist strategies as US also had an effort to keep its military dominance all over the region (Moddy, 1999).

In this sense, it can be stated that American policy towards Iraq presents a historical consistency when it comes to the regional interests of US. In the Annual Report to the President and the Congress, US secretary of defense, William S. Cohen, expresses that US needs two important things in the Middle East; the first one is “access to strategic natural resources” and the second one is “expansion of free markets”. For the provision of the sustainability of these indispensable conditions, Cohen underlines that the region’s “rogue states”, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, must obey international norms to be able to provide the stability in the region. Therefore, he strongly proposes that “the threat or use of chemical and biological weapons by the region's rogue states must be deterred, further proliferation of NBC (nuclear, biological and chemicals) technologies thwarted, and terrorism successfully countered” (Cohen, 1998:12, parenthesis added).

Secretary of Defense defines Iraq as one of the rogue states. In fact, this definition of Iraq is substantially in accordance with the “hierarchical nation-state system” explained by Castles. Accordingly, US, as a “globally dominant power”, is capable of controlling Iraq with “threat of bombardment or invasion” as Castle also puts Iraq at the ends of the hierarchy by underlying its risk position as a “rogue state” (Castle, 2005). In this sense, Secretary of Defense does not hesitate on recommending to keep US military dominance over the regions on behalf of the regional ‘peace and security’ (Cohen, 1998).

In the year of 1999, the State Department published a report on “Saddam Hussein’s Iraq” and touched upon US approach to Saddam Hussein. It is important to underline that the report contains significant contradictions when it comes to how US would respond to Saddam’s regime to be able to protect its own interests in the region. Accordingly, US points to the importance of its containment strategy by showing that

Saddam's "aggression against his neighbors" and his "repression of his own people". Furthermore, the State Department clearly express that US "will use force if Saddam threatens Iraq's neighbors or coalition forces..." After a few sentences, the report underlines that a possible regime change in Iraq "must come from within Iraq, led by Iraqis" (US Department of State, 1999).

It is not incorrect to put forward that US desired a regime change in Iraq without using military force but on the other hand, the political reality of Iraq did not present any mark of regime change by Iraqi people. From this standpoint, US perceived the existence of Saddam as a significant threat to its own economic interests in the region. Although the Clinton administration kept its containment strategy with its reservation on the use of military force, there was undecided process on Saddam's regime since the Gulf War.

After the mid-1990s, this process was often put on the agenda of Congress with Congressional critiques of the Clinton administration. In general, Iraq policy of the Clinton administration was evaluated as "weak and failing" since the administration's containment policy did not work in imposing sanctions on Saddam's regime (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007:44). Congress of US, Senate, explains this by comparing the situation of Iraq in the pre-Gulf War period with that of Iraq in the later 1990s. Accordingly, Senate underlines that the embargo imposed by the Clinton administration in the 1990s curtailed the oil production of Iraq, but later UN resolutions allowed Iraq to increase their oil production³¹. Along with these developments, Iraq did not allow to be inspected if they had WMDs or not in the following years. Senate extremely criticized that Iraq did not present any transparency of having WMDs or not, and did not allow American inspectors in compliance with UNSCOM access (Congress of US, 1999).

³¹ "Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis and the Iraqi Government have really baffled the Clinton administration and, in my opinion, they have beaten the Clinton administration if you look at their objectives. I will show you. The war was in 1991. They were producing over 2 million barrels of oil per day in 1990. After the embargo, they averaged—in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, about 4- or 500,000- barrels per day. We really curtailed their production. Basically, we had the implied reward that said, if you will allow arms control inspectors—if we know that you are not building weapons of mass destruction, we will allow you to produce more oil, there won't be an embargo, but we have to know that you are not building weapons to export throughout the world." (Congress of US, 1999).

Before George W. Bush was inaugurated as President of the United States on January 2001, it was obvious for US congress that US was in need of a new long-term strategy to handle with Saddam's regime as the containment did not work in the last ten years. President George W. Bush changed the containment to the "containment-plus strategy" that was proposed by Colin Powell, Secretary of State in the beginning. However, the containment-plus strategy was not a long term solution for Bush as the debates on Iraq indicated the importance of overthrowing Saddam who was a threat to US and the regional equilibrium in the Middle East (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007).

4.6. Strategic Practices and Structural Dynamics: New Wars and Second Wave of Social Transformation

During Bush's election campaign in the year of 2000, Condoleezza Rice, who became National Security Advisor for the Bush administration, provided the ground for the necessity of a new foreign policy. Rice's points were not directly concerned with the unsatisfactory aspects of the Clinton administration. She put US foreign policy in a broader frame by pointing to the premises of "the National Interests". Accordingly, in the article of Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, she underlines the changing dynamics of the world politics as a result of the collapse of Soviet power. This situation significantly affects US position since US needs to determine its own place to determine the political equilibrium in many senses in this post-Cold War period. Under these advancing circumstances, she puts forward that American foreign policy needs to be re-established under a Republican administration by "ensuring that America can deter war, project power"; by "promoting economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system"; by "renewing strong and intimate relationships with allied who share American values"; by "dealing decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers" posing "terrorism" and "production of WMDs". Along with these premises, to her, US national interest is on a par with "humanitarian interests" or interests of the "international community". In other saying, she clearly express that US national interests are the generator of the "conditions for freedom, markets and peace" for all over the world (Rice, 2000).

From the standpoint of Rice, in this regard, Iraq was essentially symbolized a rogue state whose people and markets were ruptured from the values of the international community, whereby of U.S's national interest, under the administration of Saddam. As a result, this "isolated regime" was threatening US national interests and it was clear that there would not be change until Saddam was removed. It is important to note that the priority of US national interest to Iraq's national interest is underscored by Rice with reference to "American values" determined by the expansion of free markets for this period. To put it more explicitly, in parallel to the requirements of the global capitalist restructuring, American foreign policy has been re-formed more aggressively to prove its global power in the post-Cold War period. For this reason, the making of enemy or threat has been important to define US national interests and the toppling of this enemy or threat has been crucial to keep its global and regional interests by showing its military and economic power.

After the Bush administration came into power, the ground for a new foreign policy whose premises were also stressed upon by Rice was established, to a large extent, by a terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. The Bush administration would concentrate on abandoning "the containment-plus strategy" and the backbone of a new foreign policy was discoursed on "the new global war on terror". As a result, if there would be a response to 9/11, this response would be a starting point by overthrowing Saddam Hussein (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007).

Since Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, US systematically directed its criticisms to Saddam's government with reference to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (thereafter, UNSCRs). In 2002, President George W. Bush's speech to the United Nations General Assembly stated that Saddam Hussein had systematically violated sixteen UNSCRs over the past ten years. Indeed, Bush presented a list of violations from the year of 1990 to that of 1999³². Additionally, Bush accused Saddam's regime

³² "Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. In addition to these repeated violations, he has tried, over the past decade, to circumvent UN economic sanctions against Iraq, which are reflected in a number of other resolutions. As noted in the resolutions, Saddam Hussein was required to fulfill many obligations beyond the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to, among other things: allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; help account for missing Kuwaitis and other individuals; return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear financial liability for damage from the Gulf War; and he was required to end his repression of the Iraqi people"(Bush, 2002a).

of producing “weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons” as well as of “repressing of the Iraqi civilian population” and “imposing violence against women and children” and “torture” (Bush, 2002).

Concerning the Bush administration’s developing discourse on “the new global war on terror” Bob Woodward indicates that President Bush had a quick attempt to get down to a military intervention in Iraq with the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. The old wars plans were put on the table to be prepared against Iraq after 9/11. After that, Bush asked for the British support from the Prime Minister Tony Blair and they agreed upon the war. The last piece of the war preparation was the meeting with Saudi Arabia in 2003. Although there was no proof of WMDs by CIA in Iraq, the Bush administration declared the closure of “diplomatic window” (Woodwar, 2004).

The Bush administration consolidated its new foreign policy by stepping out in developing the “logic of the post-9/11 security paradigm” in the year of 2002. This security paradigm was transformed into the text of the “Bush doctrine”. Accordingly, Iraq was designated as a country that was “supporting terror”, that was plotting to “develop WMDs” and that was continuing to “flaunt its hostility toward America” (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007:82). In this sense, Iraq was codified as a “greatest threat after 9/11” by the Bush administration (2007:87). Vice President Dick Cheney was also on the same line with Bush when it came to linking Iraq, WMD, and al-Qaida by stating that “Iraq provided training to al-Qaida in chemical weapons development” against mainly America. The nexus of a probable military intervention was the bounding point of “Saddam’s WMDs and Islamic terrorism” (2007:101-102).

On June 2002, Bush presented why and how US had to change its foreign policy to defeat all possible threats. Accordingly, Bush pointed to the transformation of the security environment after the collapse of Soviet Union. During 1990s, he underlined that there was a “small number of rogue states” whose main common characteristics were the use of “brutal practices over their people and of their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers” and the “violation of international law and treaties” and the “rejection of human values” and the “hate for United States” and “their determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction”. Under these circumstances, it

was a must task that US had to undertake to stop these rogue states. In this sense, Bush underlined “the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security” (Bush, 2002b).

Keeping the national security of US with a preemptive action was the declaration of the changing foreign policy from the containment to the war. As Cameron G. Thies (2006) puts forward, “the cold war doctrine of containment via deterrence” was transformed by the Bush doctrine into a “preemptive action” after 9/11. On 20 March 2003, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was started and

By 27 March, US and British forces had succeeded in capturing the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, securing the southern oil fields, surrounding Basra, and had pushed within 50 miles of Baghdad. The coalition forces faced more resistance than expected, leading to some problems with securing supply lines on the road to Baghdad. But by 9 April, Hussein’s regime appeared to have collapsed in Baghdad, and most government officials had fled the city. By 14 April, US government officials were declaring that the major combat phase of the war was finished.(2006:203).

At this point, it is important to underline that the invasion of Iraq by US and U.K was not a regular instance of one of the conventional wars. As we have already underlined above with reference to Kaldor, it was in an evolving form of “new wars” as Kaldor underlines this in the following way:

Old wars are wars between states where the aim is the military capture of territory and the decisive encounter is a battle between armed forces. “New wars”, in contrast, take place in the context of failing states. They are wars fought by networks of state and non-state actors, where battles are rare and violence is directed mainly against civilians, and which are characterized by a new type of political economy that combines extremist politics and criminality. (Kaldor, 2005).

Along with the invasion of Iraq, in the analysis of New Wars, Iraq fall into identity struggles and ethnic divisions; as a result, the insurgency took place in the dissolution process of Iraq and for some groups and communities, only alternative has been forced migration to the neighboring countries as asylum seekers or to the western countries that receive them. Since the beginning of the invasion in 2003, according to the database of Iraq Body Count (2017), 838,546 civilian deaths have been recorded as a result of violence and conflict-related incidents in Iraq. In addition, as a result of ongoing violence in Iraq, by the end of the year of 2015, 4,915,827 have been forced to leave their place of residence and to move to other countries according to UNHCR's database (UNHCR, 2015).

In this historical flow of the relation between US and Iraq, forced migration, that is not taken for granted, is a crystalized historical moment to explain how the social transformation of Iraq has been triggered in the sense of Castle, Delgado Wise, and Kaldor. Rather, it is quite clear that American imperial strategies have aimed at forming and re-forming the Middle East on the ground of its own politic and economic interests when it comes to any resistance posed against US dominance in the region. In this sense, as already pointed out in the function of the North-South division that Castles indicates, US diplomatic and political efforts with reference to UN resolutions can be seen as preventive attempts to decrease forced migration from Iraq during the first Gulf war in 1991 and US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In other saying, US policy of containment of Iraq included a set of embargos and diplomatic pressures in cooperation with the international community. In this sense, US provided money, food, humanitarian aid in its containment policy; in other words, as Castle (2013b) indicates, the North used military intervention and produced forced migration instead of stopping.

In this sense, US structural basis for its own economic and regional power produces the ground on which forced migration of Iraqi people needs to be conceptualized and analyzed appropriately. It is clear that US foreign policy has taken the form of the war on terrorism in global level after the collapse of Soviet Union. The presidents of US systematically used the discourse of terror when they justified why US had to use military force against the Saddam's administration. During the years from the 1960s

and 2000s, the basis for this justification was revolved around a set of implicit intervention debates by the Congress and during those years, borrowing the concept of “uneven development” from Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, Iraq was confined to the conditions of uneven development by a set of economic embargos and sanctions. As we indicate above, Iraq suffered from unemployment, economic recession and loss of industrial and agricultural production as a result of Kuwait crisis under the pressure of the coalition countries led by US. After that, the tension between US and Saddam’s administration was not resolved since US imperialism was strictly hinged on oil reserves of the region for its economic strategies.

At this juncture, it is important to refer to the distinction between “strategic practices” and “structural dynamics” made by Delgado Wise and Covarrubias (2009). As already pointed, first of all, strategic practices are the cornerstones of a neo-liberal capitalist system grounded on the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus and goes through military force and macroeconomic reforms. To take one step further, the Washington Consensus is, in this sense, the coherence of the reforms to provide economic growth in a neoliberal state during the 1990s and it meant that US started revoking its support to statist governments through the IMF and the WB (Thorn, 2013). In this sense, it can be said that US strategies were clear that US was greedy for keeping its leadership in expanding its neo-liberal policies to less-developed or undeveloped areas of the world. The first Gulf war was the part of US strategic practices as a strong support to military force.

In a similar vein , it is also important to see that US strategic practices that aimed at applying its neo-liberal policies to Iraq were systematically maintained between the first Gulf war and 2003 Iraq invasion. On the other hand, this is to say that forced migration is dialectically inherent in those strategic practices as thousands of people from Iraq became asylum seekers as US supported or used military force to resolve the structural crises of the neo-liberal capitalist system. As Thorn (2013) indicates, before and after US invasion of Iraq, Iraq was always the target of US as the purpose was to transform Iraq into a neo-liberal capitalist system under the leadership of US

More specifically, Castles shows us the importance of the North and South division in terms of the analysis of forced migration. As already discussed, the Northern interests lead to the frequency of forced migration by imposing its own order or power over the South. This brings about both the durability of nondevelopment and social transformation of the countries in the long run. This division, as a motor force of global capitalist relations, results in “areas of growth” in the South and “areas of decline” in the North (2003b). Even in this immediate theoretical stance, it is not difficult to put forward that US pushed Iraq to areas of decline since the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the Northern countries, especially the dominance of the US, were decisive to control the international economic system by constraining the South through the different economic channels.³³ When it came to 1990s, Bello, Cunningham and Rau analyze that US considered the South as “the principal enemy” and prepared “seven scenarios of conflict – five of which saw US troops intervening in Third World countries” and US first intervention was against Iraq in 1991 as a part of the “post-Cold War” strategic purpose. Besides, Bello et al. underline for the post-Cold War period that Saddam Hussein was the first for US among these scenarios as “Islamic Fundamentalism” was taken into consideration as a strong “threat” to “the new world order” with the new enemy, Saddam Hussein (1999: 108-110).

As we underlined that this conflict produced the primary causes of forced migration during the 1990s and thousands of Iraqis left their homes to seek asylum in the neighboring countries. The re-production of forced migration as a result of the Northern strategic purposes followed the same path for US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Bello underscores the conflicts of global economic governance and political governance led by US in explaining the crisis in the North. Especially, before September 11, the belief in that American “liberal democracy was corrupted by corporate money politics” was publicly dominant and the need for reforming the economic and political system was competition between conservatives and liberals. In

³³ Bello, Cunningham and Rau underline the vulnerability of the South by pointing to the three conditions of the international economic conditions from the standpoint of US within the context of the North and South division. Firstly, US managed to control “the supply of oil and oil revenues” by the Saudis and other Arab OPEC producers to keep “the existing economic system” alive in the late 1970s although the South attempted to unify against the North, but “the interests of the oil elites” was prior to the solidarity by the South. Secondly, the “onset of recession in the industrial North” in the early 1980s led to “the drop in prices” of “raw materials” sourced from the South, meaning that the South was heavily becoming indebted to the North due to its downsizing economy. Thirdly, the Third World had “debts to American, European, and Japanese banks” which provided loans to the Southern governments. In the late 1970s, their debts increased due to “international interest rates” which were not set at fixed rates (1999:24-25).

this picture, September 11 put the Bush into power and this was a turning point for the restoration of “corporate-driven globalization” in the North (Bello, 2001).

The second one of the distinction made by Delgado Wise and Covarrubias (2009) is structural dynamics that serve for the transformation of political and institutional space in “a political project” in an attempt to prevent the “development of other alternative development strategies” (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2009). US foreign policy is clear in our above historical flow that US dealt with the Soviet threat for a long time to be able to prevent an alternative development strategy in the Middle East region, especially supported and developed by the Soviet Union. The tension between US and the Soviet Union was resolved in the 1960s in the name of the Saddam’s regime. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became to US that Saddam Hussein was the one that needed to be suppressed by the US, otherwise US regional interests would be getting down while Iraq was establishing its regional dominances and was keeping oil reserves for its own purposes. Therefore, US intervened in the regional equilibrium through the Kuwait crisis to keep its neo-liberal dominance. It was clear that US maintained the balance of structural dynamics by limiting both Saddam’s regime in particular and Iraq’s development in general; as a result, the “containment” of Iraq was made sustainable until the 2000s.

Iraq has often been defined as “rogue states” in the state documents from the point view of the secretary of defense by emphasizing the legal obligation of rouge states to obey international norms accepted by the western countries. To the US, this necessity was intensively repeated against the Saddam’s administration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The point where US was not confident about the Saddam’s administration was to proliferate discourses on national interests, national security, nuclear weapons and terrorism until US attacked Iraq. The common denominator of these discourses was to build up a “political project” which aimed at establishing a neo-liberal front against Saddam’s regime in order to prevent the development of a rogue state, such as Iraq. In this sense, it is important to underscore that the US’s political project applied a military intervention in order to save Iraqi people from the

Saddam's cruelty as well as to bring democracy to them³⁴. This sort of the political project explicitly pools a set of different elements so as to reanimate a neo-liberal strategy which would totally adaptable to new circumstances. As underlined above, this is also important to highlight how both Iraqis and asylums from Iraq took their own place in this political project since US legitimated its military and economic support to Iraq when it came to the debates on Iraq as the humanitarian assistance or intervention.

According to the report prepared by Human Rights Watch in 2004, although U.N. Security Council did not approve the invasion, US justified the invasion by stating its humanitarian characteristics less than others. However, the report demonstrates that the justification of the invasion was a failure in many senses as the Bush administration could not prove what they stated before the invasion (HRW, 2004). Although US military intervention was not humanitarian in many senses, it is quite useful to remember that this political project was formed and legitimated in the "moral sphere" as "the defense of human rights" and therefore Fassin underlines that this approach appears "a merging of politics of humanitarianism" (Fassin, 2007). Here, the political project of US produced the structural basis of forced migration while embracing its consequences in the moral sphere. From this standpoint, it is not incorrect to put forward that US paves the way for "humanitarian governance" as a part of its political project in order to restore significantly less than what it destroys. A sociological holistic analysis of forced migration takes us to that forced migration shows up as a result of the conflict of interest between the North and the South.

Looking at the structural dynamics of US in this expanding scene, we can also analyze the volume of 9/11 incident that revealed US's only motivation to continue its hegemony in the Middle East at the cost of lives of millions of people in Iraq. How the Bush administration linked 9/11 incident to the US's political project to overthrow Saddam's regime is another significant element when it comes to the effort to understand the weight of US strategic practices. September 11 was included in American structural dynamics as a theme whose roots were embedded in US approach

³⁴ Gerson clearly highlights that "when neither weapons of mass destruction nor links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda could be found to justify the twenty-first-century US war or occupation of Iraq, the articulated rationale was simply changed to exporting democracy and freedom" (2007:171)

to fundamentalist Islam as a threat in the post-Cold War period. As Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed puts forward, among the debates on the economic recessions and increasing unemployment rates in US after March 2001, September 11 was seen as an opportunity for the Bush administration to “implement an agenda designed to secure broad strategic and economic interests through the expansion and consolidation of US military influence” (2002: 240).

At this point, in order to be able to understand the material conditions of discourses on the war on terror produced by the Bush administration, the strategic importance of the Gulf needs to be explored through US energy policy as well. In this regard, right before 9/11, on May 2001, the National Energy Policy Report³⁵ by presented by Dick Cheney, the Vice-President of the US, in the name of the National Energy Policy Development Group, it was clearly stated that oil resources in the Gulf were strategically vital for US economic development as their development was largely dependent on oil imports. For the Bush administration, this is not a new topic for their broad agenda as it was clearly pointed out several times that US only concern was oil resources of Iraq³⁶, not WMDs.

Under these circumstances, it would not be easy for the Bush administration to justify the Iraq invasion as no concrete proof was found within the knowledge of the UN. This incoming historical turn, 9/11, was mainly seen as an opportunity to articulate the element of anti-terrorism to their political discourses against the Saddam’s regime. It was raised that the Saddam’s administration was “a member of an Axis of Evil that was imperiling global security” and Iraq was associated with the terrorist acts of Al-Qaeda and became a target for the Bush administration (Robertson, 2015:586). It was clear that the Bush administration instrumentalized 9/11 so as to restore the sustainability of the social and economic interests of US. During the 2000s, the Bush

³⁵ “America in the year 2001 faced the most serious energy shortage since the oil embargoes of the 1970s.... Our projected growing dependence on oil imports is a serious long-term challenge. US economic security and that of our trading partners will remain closely tied to global oil market developments.... By 2020, Gulf oil producers are projected to supply between 54 and 67 percent of the world’s oil. Thus, the global economy will almost certainly continue to depend on the supply of oil from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, particularly in the Gulf. This region will remain vital to US interests” (National Energy Policy, 2001).

³⁶ Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Defense Secretary, said on 31 May 2003: “The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil” (2003).

administration was not in a situation in which they could produce another alternative to solve the chronic problems of US economy except the invasion of Iraq.

As Wallerstein puts forward that September 11 called refers to five realities of the US, “the limits of its military power; the depth of anti-American feeling in the rest of the world; the hangover from the economic binge of the 1990s; the contradictory pressures of American nationalism; and the frailty of American civil liberties tradition” (2003:2-3). To present the well-organized analysis of 9/11, these five realities can also be assessed how the Bush administration relocated 9/11 in order to establish US structural dynamics, in another saying, American imperialism as Delgado Wise indicates. Wallerstein also underlines that these five realities are the indicators of the decline of US “hegemony” and the Bush administration tried to overcome all of those challenging aspects of structural dynamics through the invasion which was already on their agenda.

For this period, U.S.’s ambitious foreign politics aimed at adjusting the Saddam’s government to US economic interests. However, US effort to keep its hegemonic dominance over the world ended with the overcoming of Saddam. Referring to Castles’ definition of social transformation, “human mobility” from Iraq to the neighboring countries stemmed from US attempts to balance global equilibrium by designing its own strategic practices and structural dynamics. As already discussed above, especially since the year of 2006, Iraq has become a refugee-producing country due to several important reasons, most importantly to ethnic and religious divisions. US only ambition was to keep controlling the region without considering a further step in terms of social consequences. As General Ray Odierno, who was the commander of American forces in Iraq between the years of 2003 and 2010, explained this in the following words: “We came in naïve about what the problems were in Iraq; I don’t think we understood what I call the societal devastation that occurred” (2010). The invasion led to the devastating outcomes for Iraqi people. As Kaldor emphasizes, “the invasion of Iraq was not really a war; it was more like an exercise” (2006:155). The invasion caused the breaking out of all weak and bastardized aspects of the Saddam’s administration and unfortunately has paved the way for the “growing political violence” in the form of a “new war” (2006:158)

As already stated, Kaldor's argument of the new war is much related to her remark of identity politics. It is the argument that is grounded in the context of globalization. As mentioned earlier, forced migration is also linked to this context in many senses. Once Iraq is considered with its social, ethnic and economic parameters, it is not possible to mention a homogenous structure. US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor underlines this by pointing to "the Iraq population " that includes "Arab, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians" and "the religious mix consists of Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, Christians, Kurdish Yazidis, and a small number of Jews and Sabeen Mandeans". It is noted that "the regime also systematically forced the removal of ethnic minorities under its policy of "Arabizing" arable land" (US Department of State: 2003). In accordance with the argument made by Kaldor, Saddam's regime was already based on the identity politics before the invasion and the new war in Iraq changed nothing since US performed an organized military intervention in Iraq, which led to the new form of identity politics, that was mainly grounded upon the re-establishment of "Western Identity" in the context of "War on Terror" on the one hand (Kaldor, 2006); but also mobilized all elements of globalization such as "insecurity", "war economy" and "civilian casualties" (2006). The above-mentioned peoples of Iraq was tremendously affected by the invasion and the new war took place among them and many became the survivors of "extreme politics based on fear and hatred" and many were killed. As already stated, this was a part of global strategy led by US and forced displacement was an indispensable part of new wars (Kaldor, 2013).

Today, a short review of the Middle East News shows that Iraqis are still living with violence and conflict. Iraq is still a refugee-producing country and many people have to leave their homes due to compelling reasons. In this regard, my argument demonstrates that an analysis of forced migration must be contextual and historical for each country's specific condition. Forced migration is not a conceptualization taken for granted. When it comes to the case of Iraq, it is a part of the historical analysis of US and Iraq relations and it is a result of US's competitive foreign policy to keep its hegemonic power in the Middle East. My analysis points out that it becomes possible to speak of three main historical moments that mainly demonstrate the understanding of forced migration within the context of US and Iraq relations. These three have also

been three threat areas for US to be controlled and subdued as possible as it may. The first one is the Soviet threat against US interests in the Middle East. The second one is Saddam's regime against US interests in the Middle East. The last one is the Islamic terror. The two last ones are discursively interrelated and, as already explained, US discursively articulated the Islamic terror to Saddam's regime.

As we have seen, these historical moments forced Iraqis to leave their countries and seek asylum in the neighboring countries. More importantly, the social transformation of Iraq is still ongoing. As Castle (2006) indicates, "forced migration is both a result and a cause of social transformation in the South". Unfortunately, Iraqis experience forced migration as both as a cause of and a result of the huge volume of social transformation. Many leave their homes and establish new lives in the resettlement countries. In line with the historical unfolding of forced migration in the context of US and Iraq relations, the following chapters shall present the results of social transformation by looking at the particular cases of refugees in the state of Arizona in US.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYTICAL READINGS OF THE FIELD FINDINGS

5.1. “Humanitarian Governance of Refugee Resettlement System” in Arizona: Non-Profit Sector

Until this section, the historical underlying conditions of forced migration have been presented with reference to the concepts produced by international migration theorists and it is substantially correct to say that US mainly determines its neo-liberal policies or strategic and economic growth on the ground of its foreign policy against the Middle East. Here, I will start a very basic argument that the historical analysis of US policies in the Middle East does not form US role in the international protection regime primarily in spite of the fact that the Middle East has a crucial importance in many aspects. More clearly, as already explained in detail, US policies in the international protection regime have not been revolved around its own foreign policy towards the Middle East. US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration explains this in the following manner:

During its history, the USRAP has responded to changing circumstances. The end of the Cold War dramatically altered the context in which the USRAP operated. The program shifted its focus away from large groups concentrated in a few locations (primarily refugees from Vietnam, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia) and began to admit refugees representing over 50 nationalities per year. Interviews of refugees by officials from the Department of Homeland Security’s US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are often conducted in remote locations and are focused on members of populations in greatest need of third country resettlement opportunities” (United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2016).

The expansion of resettlement program by US does not mean that US only works to perform its national commitment to helping refugees by providing them a safe haven. More or less, all over the world, its foreign policy, and hence its refugee resettlement policy, have been developed as a result of ideological premises against the Soviet threat at first and later of the effort to keep its neo-liberal dominancy. I often underlined in observing the place of US in international protection regime that US welcomed many migrants and refugees throughout its own history. This historical process has been motivated and formed by different dynamics and unique conditions that have always been related to its foreign policy. Until the devastating consequences of 9/11, US mainly formed its foreign policy, thereby its migration and refugee policy, on the ground of anti-communism to prove the fact that “it is a country of freedom or democracy”. After 9/11, US did not withdraw itself from being an active dominant player of the world politics. Furthermore, US policies have become the reasons of forced migration for Iraqis as indicated in the historical relation between US and Iraq.

Along the history, when there was a humanitarian crisis all over the world, US was there either from the beginning or at the end. As a significant process of the world history for the establishment of international protection regime as well, Barnett says that “during World War II, American policy makers sought to reinvigorate a sense of international community through humanitarian action; the belief was that, by helping other, the United States and other victors would counteract the evils of fascism” (2013:384).

US policy to provide a “safe haven” for those who flee from authoritarian, repressive, cruel regimes, or poverty and conflict is also a part of the efforts to international community through humanitarian action. From this standpoint, I argue that US policy to keep humanitarian action alive is its global governance. In the words of Barnett (2013) and Barnett and Duvall (2005), we call global governance as “humanitarian governance”. Apart from the narrow and broad definitions of humanitarianism, humanitarian governance can be seen as a distinction since it contains a large context of conceptual and practical differentiation in humanitarianism. As indicated before, the place of “power” in this sort of governance types do not follow a one-dimensional route; it is quite disseminated and multi-sectorial model of humanitarianism that we

can discuss. In this regard, during my argumentation, I refer to the concept of humanitarian governance that Barnett approaches in a critical manner by showing its three characteristics: “the range of effects resulting from the organized effort to reduce human suffering”, “not inherently good, either emancipation or domination”, and “power” (Barnett, 2013; Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

With these three characteristics of humanitarian governance, US is a constructive actor of humanitarian governance when it comes to Iraqi refugees. US mobilizes a lot of actors and sources to humanitarian action in order to be effective in this area. Besides, US establishes a “network” among humanitarian actors in order to reproduce and consolidate its power. Barnett specifically underlines the term of network in explaining how organizations work together in humanitarian governance (2013). Indeed, I agree with Barnett’s point with a particular focus upon my field research in Arizona, which presents an organized and structured motion of resettlement agencies in the form of an organizational network.

Structural components of humanitarian governance can, in this sense, be traced back to the refugee act of 1980 in the US that has been articulated to humanitarian and egalitarian motives (Lee, 2006). It is clearly explained in its purpose in title 1 of the act that US recognizes its refugee assistance and admission rule as “the historic policy of the United States” and clearly underlines that US conducts “admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States”. In this sense, the law demands a strict distinction among who comes from what conditions and if any special humanitarian concern to the United States. In other saying, the law establishes an analytical link between US interests and refugee admission by determining an annual quota. In title 2, “appropriate consultation” is accepted by the law on the condition that “the proposed admission of refugees” comes from “humanitarian concerns” or “grave humanitarian concerns” or “the national interest”. More specifically, US prioritizes its “foreign policy interests” before the admission of refugees (US government Publishing Office, the Refugee Act of 1980).

Secondly, the law appoints the ORR as a responsible organ for the management of refugee admission within the Department of Health and Human Services. The Office

works with other Federal agencies to manage refugee admissions and assistances for refugees. At this juncture, the law mainly regulates conditions and considerations in title 4 that the Office is responsible for delivering resources for “employment training and placement in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as quickly as possible” and for “providing refugees with the opportunity to acquire sufficient English language” and for “insuring that cash assistance is made available to refugees in such a manner as not to discourage their economic self-sufficiency” (US government Publishing Office, the Refugee Act of 1980).

From here, my argumentation points to two important initiatives to understand US refugee admission. As a short overview, first of all, US foreign policy towards the Middle East from the Cold War period has been grounded upon a “humanitarian governance” in ‘negative terms’. Here, I agree with the point of Garnier, Sandvik and Jubilit (2006) that refugee resettlement is a part of this sort of the governance and also contributes to the process in which inhuman conditions and inequality are palliated in veiling the consequences of forced migration behind the scenes. US forms such a humanitarian governance by measuring its own national interests on the basis of its own foreign policy priorities. The limits of humanitarian assistance end up when the national interests of US start up, thereby projecting refugee admission in very restricted conditions.

In the second aspect, the logic of US system is to establish a smooth passage to be able to manage the plight of refugees cost effectively. As we shall see in detail, as a part of humanitarian governance, resettlement agencies, which are funded by the government, effectively organize all steps for refugees. It should be noted that the establishment of self-sufficiency is not divorced from the management of the process of migration. Sassen indicates, as a publicly discussed matter, “the costs of immigration” have mainly become “an area of great debate and wide-ranging estimates” (Sassen, 1998:59) under the binding nature of international conventions in terms of human rights. As a strong indication of such management, “the beginning of a displacement of government functions on to non-governmental or quasi-governmental institutions. This is most evident in the new transnational legal and regulatory regimes created in the context of economic globalization” (1998:72). In a well-organized humanitarian

governance, self-sufficiency is principally planned and performed by the resettlement agencies in the U.S as provided by the law. Refugees have to cooperate with this option, otherwise they have difficulties in adjusting themselves to all integration system. Therefore, self-sufficiency can be considered as an initial step of refugee system in US. In a similar vein, self-sufficiency constitutes a basics for my argumentation in this section to be able to analyze how Iraqi refugees manage all conditions after their traumatic migration process.

As touched upon earlier, in this historical flow of forced displacement, US has received millions of refugees from the different countries including Iraq as well. US and Iraq relations have produced human displacement from Iraq to other regions in the Middle East. According to UNHCR's statistical data, "around 70,000 Iraqi refugees have been resettled from their first countries of asylum since the end of the 1991 Gulf War" and if we examine the numbers, US has received 31,550 Iraqi refugees between the years of 1991 and 2001 (UNHCR, 2003). As a result of US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has started to produce refugees than ever before. United States Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM, henceforth), underlined this point by clarifying that the United States has been resettling Iraqis in large numbers since 2007 and different categories of Iraqi refugees have been created by the USRAP for resettlement operation (United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2017a: Web). The refugee crisis becomes a real problem all over the world. It is clear from the refugee act of US that US traditionally positions itself as a country which has been a safe haven for refugees from its establishment and it seems that US admission policy will be keeping its importance due to the increasing volume of refugee crisis all over the world.

Explaining this point more politically, US highlights its own "nation's commitment to helping refugees" in proposing the admission of higher number of refugees than the previous years. It is also often emphasized in the same reports that US undertakes the responsibility of "leading role in providing safe haven" (United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2016). In spite of the fact that the implementation of refugee admission in numbers varies from one state to another, the general policy of refugee admission does not change radically when it comes to

the role and responsibilities of resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations, non-state actors and charity organizations. US general refugee assistance system is mainly based on the services of resettlement agencies that are funded by US Department of State on the basis of a cooperative agreement. In addition to this, the function of refugee admissions and integration is linked to the social work of volunteers and civil society organizations.

Along with the role of resettlement agencies and civil society organizations, it is possible to put forward that US system is fit in the context of humanitarian governance in many aspects. Indeed, as we already underlined, humanitarianism can be considered as all efforts “to reduce suffering of the oppressed” (Barnett, 2013), and humanitarian intervention may be delegated to “para-governmental organizations” in the logic of humanitarian government (Fassin, 2007). At this juncture, it should be underlined that resettlement agencies can be considered as para-governmental organizations so that US Department of State funds them for a certain humanitarian purpose as such to help refugees start their new lives in Arizona in US. No doubt, the Department of State makes them responsible for the management of refugee resettlement at the level of states and monitor their conduct in the field. In Arizona, the officials of Department of Economic Security, explains how US system is formally linked to the function of resettlement agencies:

Initially they get resettled through the reception and placement program called RPP. That program also is operated under contract we call to cooperate by the US Department of State with nine US nongovernment agencies that they have networks across the US so those resettlement agencies that you met with in Tucson are affiliated with one of the nine national organizations that works under cooperative agreement with the US Department of State during that period they are providing them with some very essential basic services including housing and food, clothing, orientation, they help kids register for school, they help them have Social Security card, they help them apply for public benefit programs to which they are titled, they help them to get there screenings health screenings

here a number of basic services that all of that information is available at different sites...

From the point view of the official of Arizona Department of Economic Security that resettlement agencies fill a big gap in the field by assisting refugees in access to the basic rights and social services in Arizona. On the other hand, the Officials show that US refugee system stands on the shoulders of non-governmental organizations and community sources. All components of the system are motivated with humanitarian concerns, however it is also important to underline that US builds up the system in parallel to the logic of neo-liberal organization of social and economic structures. Therefore, the limits of humanitarianism need to be put its own place by scrutinizing this sort of governance of refugee admissions. The interviewee, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson touches upon this aspect of the process in the following words:

I guess that the governments do not want to support everything in social services by 1980s and especially, the state has started to abdicate its assistance in the framework of neo-liberal policies with the appearance of church based organization supporting people in need. It was put in such abdication of the state that the state has begun to share the burden of social services with such organizations by providing a grant.

From my point of view, two things need to be underlined so far that the Department of State does not conduct or undertake a direct responsibility for refugee resettlement process in the local level and the Department of State establishes a business relation with resettlement agencies to ensure that refugees get access to rights and services appropriately. Therefore, US provides the continuation of the so-called “humanitarian intervention” from pre-resettlement area to refugee admission process by establishing a global “humanitarian governance”. Borrowing the concept from Barnett, the US partially establishes “a global effort to save people, to reduce their pain, to build up global bridges to established more humanized environment with the active participation of non-governmental organizations” (Barnett, 2013).

At this point, it is important to take this argument a step further. A critical grasp of humanitarian governance shows us that it is not only related to the effort to alleviate the suffering of people but also is linked to the formation of “a global project to shape lives, habits, dispositions and institutions in order to improve the well-being of people” (Barnett, 2013). US tailors each piece of refugee admission process according to this global project so that the future American citizens or Americans can share life style in US. Therefore, it is important to understand that US forms the lives of refugees by incorporating them into their new lives by pushing them to the labor market for self-sufficiency and English competence. David Haines (2010:142) underscores this point by emphasizing by the category of “good new case”, meaning that “whether because of youth, English competence, education or economic skills, helps show that refugees are not only the dispossessed but deserving of a new life.”

US resettlement policy establishes a system from which refugees benefit as much as they can improve themselves. Therefore the system is mainly designed to contribute the production of “good cases”. Refugees are expected to be good new cases by improving their skills to be more integrated into their new lives in US. Haines indicates that “any difficult new case, whether because of age, health, education, or socioeconomic background, is a potential threat to the success of the resettlement program” (2010:142). The limit of the humanitarian governance is determined to be a good case, a good immigrant and a good American citizen in future. A good case refers to the one who is well integrated in US social and economic life by advancing his or herself. In other words, regardless of their background, coming reasons or social and cultural differences, refugees must comply with the content of the initial orientation by refugee resettlement agencies in order to organize their new lives. This is crucial in order to eliminate “the potential threat” to resettlement program as mentioned by Haines.

As I indicate, the resettlement agencies play an important role to support in this resettlement program to support refugees for a certain period of time to include them in labor market for self-sufficiency and English competence as possible as they can. After providing the basics of humanitarian assistance by US government for the best

interest of refugees, resettlement agencies encourages swift participation in the labor market.

All of these structural components show that refugees must advance themselves to eliminate their personal dependency on the system. On the other hand, I argue that these necessities release the limits of humanitarian action managed by resettlement agencies. The limits are not determined in an arbitrary manner. The limits are already there in a well-organized coherence of humanitarian steps. That is, the limits can be considered in the relation between the categories of “power” and “humanitarian governance”. As already indicated, power can be taken up in different forms when it comes to the analysis of different actors, strategies, capacities and resources. Even though the visibility of power is subtle in humanitarian governance as Barnett indicates (2013), I argue that US refugee admission system is a part of global governance with the organization of power that the Department of State and refugee resettlement organizations impose in different capacities.

With reference to Barnett and Duval’s theoretical insights, I put forward that US refugee admission system can be seen as a good instance of the function of “institutional power”. The role and responsibilities of resettlement agencies come into existence in the relation of institutional power. With an abstracted formulation of the concept,

the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains, the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly (2005: 15).

At this juncture, in my argument, while A refers to the Department of State that is a formal institution, B corresponds to resettlement agencies that are formal or informal institutions. More clearly, their relation is of the fact that A works with B agencies in procedures, rules and projections. More concretely, institutional power regulates

“cooperative agreement”³⁷ between the Department of State and resettlement agencies. It is important to underline here that the volume of power in this relation is not necessarily repressive. The relation unfolds itself through a set of “institutional arrangements” like “decisional rules, formalize lines of responsibility”. Therefore it is not possible to speak of “A’s direct effect on B” when it comes to power. However, the more important thing is to understand the relation through “socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:16). This argument is also important for my study since institutional arrangements are the core for the refugee resettlement program in US in addition to this cooperative agreement, states can also take the responsibility to produce more effective outcomes concerning the refugee resettlement program ; in other words, states are open to institutionally diffused relations and the role of resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations and charity organizations points to the “socially extended” character of refugee resettlement process in Arizona. In order to support my argument, I will turn to the words of the officials of Arizona Department of Economic Security:

The US Department of State has a particular role that was not initially included in the law but the Department of Health and Human Services the officer refugee resettlement oversees the domestic programs, states may opt the program. We can participate, we don't have to, states don't have to participate in the US refugee program if we do we have to develop a state plan. We do first we are responsible for coordinating public and private resources in refugee resettlement, the law says we have the responsibility and the authority, okay, so in the law the state coordinators have the authority to coordinate resources for refugee resettlement

The state refugee coordinator of Arizona clearly explains that their power is not direct, but in a sense, their institutional existence refers to the authority so that they mobilize all sources in order to increase the efficiency of resettlement program. In case they

³⁷ “The Department of State has cooperative agreements with nine domestic resettlement agencies to resettle refugees. While some of the agencies have religious affiliations, they are not allowed to proselytize. The standard cooperative agreement between the Department of State and each of the domestic resettlement agencies specifies the services that the agency must provide to each refugee. All together, the nine domestic resettlement agencies place refugees in about 190 communities throughout the United States. Each agency headquarters maintains contact with its local affiliated agencies to monitor the resources (e.g., interpreters who speak various languages, the size and special features of available housing, the availability of schools with special services, medical care, English classes, employment services, etc.) that each affiliate’s community can offer”(US Department of State, 2017, The Reception and Placement Program).

participate in the domestic programs for refugee resettlement, they also determine their institutional position within this relation between the Department of State and resettlement agencies.

Along with Barnett and Duvall, Lipschutz, Adler and Bernstein (2005) approach to the subject of civil society with the concepts of institutional power and productive power. From this standpoint, as we shall see later, resettlement agencies are non-governmental organizations that act as civil society organizations. Their institutional power is designed to serve for refugees in terms of humanitarian efforts. Therefore it is important to underline that Arizona Department of Economic Security and resettlement agencies bring the refugees to the attention of American community. In other saying, the role and responsibilities of these resettlement agencies can analytically be taken up in the context of productive power. As Barnett and Duvall put forward, productive power is “the constitution of all social subjects with various social power through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (2005:20). Indeed, how much their productive power is efficient in the refugee resettlement program can be discussable; but it is quite substantial that “the boundaries of all social identity” can be understood out of “binaries or hierarchical relationships” through the optic of productive power.

In this regard, the discursive production of the refugee matter can be seen important in many aspects. If we look at the statements, knowledge and discursive practices of resettlement agencies in Arizona, International Rescue Committee (henceforth, IRC) says that

The United States is a country of immigrants with a long, proud history of welcoming and supporting the most vulnerable people to rebuild their lives in America. Help us live up to that tradition and meet all our neighbors with kindness and compassion. Americans have the opportunity to help refugees in their own backyards...(International Rescue Committee, 2017: Web)

Another resettlement agency, Refugee Focus, from Arizona states that

Congregations reach out to these new Americans not only by helping them furnish their apartment and providing them with a first set of groceries, but also by making them more comfortable as they go through this monumental transition in other ways. (Refugee Focus, 2017: Web)

And another resettlement agency, Catholic Charities Community Services from Phoenix in Arizona explains that

The U.S has a proud history of welcoming those who are in need of protection against persecution, and Phoenix has played an important part of those humanitarian efforts. (Catholic Charities Community Services, 2017c: Web)

You are an important part of bringing miracles to refugees in central and northern Arizona. Your support helps refugees gain their independence and become productive members of their new communities. (Catholic Charities Community Services, 2017b: Web)

To be able to be more constructive in their communities, they often refer to their history of “welcoming those who are in need” and it is clear from their discursive practices that resettlement agencies construct their call for refugees around “help, support, new Americans, new lives...etc.” No doubt, the resettlement agencies do not abstain themselves from explaining their views on critical issues on behalf of refugees. In this sense, it is crucial to focus upon their priority that is to give a place to aid events by calling the community for helping refugees. In other words, as Adler and Bernstein indicate, “power’s productive capacity” is to “fix meanings which are necessary for global governance” through formal and informal institutions. Following this path, it is not incorrect to put forward that the resettlement agencies fix meanings to mobilize local community to support the process in which “new Americans” can easily become “productive members of their new communities”.

Indeed, institutional power and productive power are two important conceptualizations of international relations literature. In the context of refugees in Arizona in the United States, it takes the form of the discursive construction of new Americans that gets disconnected from their past for the American society. More specifically, I put forward that the organization of the refugee resettlement program is a part of US neo-liberal foreign policy. Therefore, as a part of global governance, the resettlement agencies as (international) non-governmental organizations act in the scope of humanitarian governance as the actors of the American power. In parallel to this, I will give a place to Adler and Bernstein's remark that

American power begins with social science discourse and knowledge generated in an American epistemic context, and continues with its application in practice, mainly through economics and business administration and their embeddedness in international organizations, and tacit acceptance by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors. Thus, US power depends on the diffusion of a global governance episteme, which, to be effective, must take the appearance of being scientific, technical, and universal (2005:299).

It is an American reality that the effectiveness of the non-profit organizations is an indispensable part of the delivery of public services for the poor, the disadvantaged and the socio-economically disadvantageous groups. As often touched upon, this function of the non-profit sector is in accord with the neo-liberal premises of humanitarian governance. As Salomon indicates that there is a strong presence of the non-profit sector in US, which "consists of a broad range of private organizations that are generally exempted from federal, as well as state and local, taxation on the ground that they serve some public purpose" (2002:6). The revenue sources of the non-profit sector come from "fees, governments, and philanthropy (individuals, foundations, and corporations). Accordingly, fees account for 52%, government for 38%, and philanthropy for 10% (2002:11).

In this general picture, the refugee organizations, namely resettlement agencies, voluntary and professional organizations, serve for refugees as well under their general services. In the following chapters, I will specify the structuration of this non-profit

sector by looking at their specific services, roles and responsibilities in order to understand the whole function of humanitarian governance in a neo-liberal context.

5.1.1. Neo-Liberal Regulation of the Field: Transforming from Refugees to Clients

Iraqi refugees come into the picture drawn by the above-mentioned American power system. Department of State and resettlement agencies form the process in which they start building their new lives. Actually, in the context of Arizona, resettlement agencies lead them to adjust themselves to the rules of the domestic economic life. That is, the first thing is to learn how to survive in the market as a refugee who has just been saved from conflict or war. No doubt, the fact that refugees flee from conflict, terror and war is emphasized by the resettlement agencies. Even so, the function of the resettlement agencies is not out of humanitarian governance as I indicate above in detail.

As Barnett points out, it is worth remarking that governance as a system also transforms cultures, institutions and social relations. Moreover, humanitarian governance appears as “a machine of intervention” that works through “an emancipatory ethic and the siren of humanity”. These interventions are usually constructed as the motives to serve for best interests of people without knowing whether the beneficiaries welcome or not (2012b:486). It is the same for refugees resettled into US. Before their arrival in the US, the system determines everything for them, that’s where they will live, how they will work, what kind of assistance they will receive...etc. The participation of refugees into the American system is regulated and managed by US. Department of State and it is duly implemented by the resettlement agencies. Resettlement agencies take them from the airport, provide them home, furniture, food, other basic needs and then refugees are encouraged to participate in the labor market as soon as possible. They are enrolled in the schools. They are referred to many channels to know how to ‘survive’ in US

From the global to the local, refugees as “victimized” subjects of the global governance are “saved” by US through an international humanitarian action. US admits refugees

and they start their “new lives” in US. Resettlement agencies play their role as carriers of what US system gives to refugees in the humanitarian governance. As Barnett indicates, it is such a “global project to shape lives, habit, dispositions and institutions in order to improve the well-being of people” (Barnett, 2013:381). Resettlement agencies perform their own tasks in accordance with the requirements of humanitarian governance. These agencies are, in this sense, institutions, discursive structures, and dispositions for refugees. They are the first actors the majority of refugees meet when they arrive in US. In a sense, this is a strong indicator of the fact that the resettlement agencies are superior to refugees in many aspects. They have to use the information provided by the resettlement agencies so as to improve their new pathway in US. Otherwise, they can apply to their own network to learn how they can start in their new lives in US. Transferring one culture to another makes difference for their lives in adaptation and integration, but refugees have to comply with the orientation of resettlement agencies so that they can easily find an appropriate starting point for their new life in US

Debates on humanitarian action and humanitarianism demonstrate “regulative and constitutive” dynamics of humanitarian action. However, humanitarian governance goes beyond these dynamics by pointing to the proliferation of actors, activities, and boundaries. When we talk about “regulating action to reduce suffering” or “norms and principles” attributed to “a single meaning” for humanitarian action, what is behind with these definitions is the premises of humanitarian governance, that bring us to a significant point where transformation of humanitarianism forces us to think the intertwined relation between states and humanitarian agencies in terms of the “effects of power” in their operation (Barnett, 2013; Barnett, 2005).

It is quite clear with my arguments that resettlement agencies are humanitarian agencies and they also regulate their action to reduce suffering of refugees and they are also constructive when it comes to their own norms, principles and values. As we shall see later in detail, the large number of resettlement agencies define themselves as faith-based organizations so that “faith” is also referred to Christian values in serving to “humanity”. Beyond all of these dynamics of their humanitarianism, it is a fact that resettlement agencies are indispensable actors of humanitarian governance

managed by US. They do not deal with the “root causes of suffering”, but they represent US. Department of State in serving to refugees resettled in US as we shall touch upon later, they are professional, rational and expert organizations in many sense owing to their relation to the Department of State. In this sense, they can also be seen at the center of humanitarian action as they perform their duties in a power relation. US government determines their tasks and they serve to refugees in US system.

Under the well-designed dynamics of humanitarian governance, it may be rightful that their mode of serving to refugees in Arizona can be defined in more regulative dynamics. At least, my field research demonstrates that they present themselves politically and culturally neutral when it comes to their humanitarian conduct. In another saying, they have an agreement with the Department of State, and accordingly they have to perform some certain tasks that are not mandatory for each admitted refugee. Taken together with their tasks and responsibilities, it is not incorrect to state that the resettlement agencies provide a setting for refugees who arrive in US. Later on, they regulate their access to rights and services in this setting. They use regulative dynamics for their humanitarian action basically, but they move within a multi-layer structure of humanitarianism when it comes to the structured system of US refugee admission system.

In a broader sense of the interpretation of the refugee assistance programs, the Refugee Act of 1980 and Immigration and Nationality Act of US shows that there are mainly four conditions and considerations that

- (i) make available sufficient resources for employment training and placement in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as quickly as possible, (ii) provide refugees with the opportunity to acquire sufficient English language training to enable them to become effectively resettled as quickly as possible, (iii) insure that cash assistance is made available to refugees in such a manner as not to discourage their economic self-sufficiency, in accordance with subsection (e)(2), and (iv) insure that women have the same opportunities as men to participate in training and instruction. (United States Government Publishing Office, 1980).

The rough reading of the law is clear that the self-sufficiency of refugees, that is to say their labor power for their subsistence, should not be jeopardized through the policies of resettlement assistance programs. Therefore, the resettlement agencies undertake the responsibility to manage the programs to be able to substantiate the efficiency of refugee resettlement. In other words, they are expected to act in the manner that refugees would be involved in the labor market as quickly as possible and they will domestically administer this employment process by keeping the refugee assistance program short and effective.

At this point, humanitarian assistance is limited by the federal government with the above-mentioned conditions in accordance with the neo-liberal tradition of welcoming immigrants and refugees. As we know from Massey and his associates, refugees can be seen as a cheap labor for the huge economy of US since the simple logic of the migration in general presents the fact that people who migrate or are forced to migrate aim at arriving in a developed country for better life standards and this globalization process indicates that “peripheral areas” provide the different migration forms of cheaper labor to be governed and exploited by educational or administrative mechanisms” of developed countries, or “core” countries (Massey et al, 1993). US is not out of this game when it comes to the labor of immigrants and refugees and it is clear from the law that US economy does not want to have them as burden, but they want to assist them until a certain point of humanitarian assistance.

One of the interviewees, Ferdinand Lossou from Catholic Community Service explains their function as a resettlement agency by saying that

Cooperative agreement is outline of reception and replacement service. Resettlement agency must provide for refugee. You have to do it. Know your way, design and request by the cooperative agreement, we call that core service. We pick them at the airport. We provide housing service that include furnished, coach, sofa, bed and so on. We provide safety orientation.

It is clear that the resettlement agencies undertake the responsibility of their cooperative agreement with the US Department of State and regulate their actions on this basis of the agreement without going beyond that and without questioning the root causes of suffering with reference to human rights. Indeed, this is the same for my other interviewees from the resettlement agencies that they are expected to implement what is committed by US Department of State. Another interviewee, Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix that is affiliated with Lutheran Social Services points to the function of their organization as a refugee resettlement agency in the following manner:

Refugee Focus is a division of Lutheran Social Services. We have offices in Tucson and Phoenix. The program is mostly funded by the federal government. Federal funds, some of which comes through the State office of refugee resettlement... and we do a lot of private funds and support for resettlement through churches and individuals here in Tucson and Phoenix. Our organization have several programs for homeless, elderly and disabled populations... One of those programs is refugee focus for refugees. We started to resettle refugees here in 1980. It was mostly refugees from South-East Asia. Now, the program is evolved over the years in very diverse sides of resettlement. We have 35 full-time staff...

It is quite clear from Craig's point of view that their resettlement program is a part of a huge service for other disadvantageous groups and basically it receives funds to organize the actions to help refugees in their new lives in US. When their long-term work over thirty years is assessed in terms of refugee resettlement, it is understandable that their work is a part of the well-organized agenda of US refugee admission system. He explains this that

We prepare the cases before they arrive of course. You know we get bio-sheets from the US Department of State. We prepare the apartments, maybe sometimes assistance through church groups whatever.

Every step in resettling refugees into US appears as a part of the well-coordinated relation between the US Department of State and refugee resettlement organizations. As indicated, they implement a package program according to the list of refugees provided by the Department of State. It is also underlined by the Department of State that

The standard cooperative agreement between the Department of State and each of the domestic resettlement agencies specifies the services that the agency must provide to each refugee.(United State Department of State, 2017: Web)

It is based on an agreement as indicated and their main function is to organize their regulative humanitarian action by conducting the refugee assistance programs consisted of “the reception and placement program” and “matching grant program”. At this juncture, I argue and put forward that the refugee assistance program conducted by ORR is a strong indicator of the limits of US refugee resettlement system. These limits itself are the instances of the regulative humanitarianism in the form of the neo-liberal policies. Although the resettlement agencies are non-profit organizations in their run, their form of organization is confined to a strict mentality of the contractual agreement such that they cannot move their targets beyond the point they wish. In other words, their mentality is not a business model with profit targets but their model of organization is like a business organization that they have to work with a limited budget against different needs and expectations of refugees. This is the organizational limit of the agencies that my analysis of humanitarianism in regulating action to alleviate suffering of refugees shows that they are humanitarian organizations that have “bureaucratized” structures, “specialized knowledge”, “standardized responses” and “means-ends calculations” and so on. In fact, this is the “institutionalization” of humanitarian field that was initiated in 1990s and that has become “more recognized as a field, with more donor, deliverers, and regulators of a growing sphere of action” (Barnett, 2005:725).

Following the logic of institutionalization of humanitarian field in my case, it is possible to speak of the resettlement agencies as bureaucratized and well-structured

organizations working with specialized knowledge and means-ends calculations. I believe that these organizations may be presenting a unique instances of regulative humanitarianism in this sense, especially in the case of US. For instance, one of my interviewees, the Director, Nicolle Trudeau, from Refugee Focus in Tucson in Arizona explains how their responsibility starts and gets limited on the basis of the contractual agreements in the following manner:

Our responsibility is to administer all of the contractual agreements to actually resettle refugees. We have several different contracts from the federal state and the resettlement and placement contract actually lasts for 90 days so we have that responsibility for somebody for 90 days... We have third contract which is matching grant which is really focus on employment... % 70 of our clients get into a matching grant program which is an early employment program, that is 180 days, and that is really a strong push to be able to get somebody a job

How the function of the resettlement agencies is formed by the cooperative agreements shows not only their mode of institutionalization but also their way of supporting refugees in limiting what refugees expects and seeks from the organizations in terms of humanitarian aid. Therefore it is significant to underscore what she pays attention to the majority of the refugee population with the assistance that would push them to the labor market at the end of 180 days. Moreover, the assistance is quite gradual in many aspects that the refugee resettlement organizations will provide the reception and placement for 90 days and after that a matching grant will be provided for refugees. The key issue for both is to integrate refugees in the labor market as much as it can be done.

Putting what I said so far in a theoretical cohesion, I will borrow Barnett's approach to humanitarianism in terms of "rationalization" in humanitarian organizations. With reference to the standard services of the resettlement agencies, I need to underline the rationalization of the resettlement agencies that Barnett takes the point up by saying that "a major feature of the field's (humanitarianism) rationalization" was the attempt to standardize relief activities" (2005: 729, parenthesis added). On the other hand, in

this logic of rationalization, the resettlement agencies must be accountable in front of the Department of State since they deliver all the services for refugees with the budget provided by US government. Again, in this point, we see that the State's role and responsibility is reduced through the mediation of the non-profit organizations. Barnett clarifies that "one of neo-liberalism's goals was to reduce the state's role in the delivery of public services and, instead, to rely on commercial and voluntary organizations, which were viewed as more efficient" (2005: 730).

In this understanding, the resettlement agencies undertake the responsibility to deliver some certain public services for refugees and they use the allocated budget for each refugee and this require a certain degree of accountability against the State. They are procedurally responsible for explaining how much they paid and for what. For example, when we look at report of audit by the US Department of State, Office of Inspector General, it is clear that the Office of Inspector General promulgates to review the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service's Reception and Placement Program in general if they comply with the federal laws and regulations concerning the terms and conditions of the agreements. For this, the Office of Inspector General opens a separate chapter called accountability (United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 2005).

In the neo-liberal construction of humanitarianism, the resettlement agencies appear as the organizations that carry a well-structured, bureaucratic and rationalized agenda to push all refugees to the labor market in US for a mutual interest. This sort of 'humanitarianism' for 'clients' of the resettlement agencies is mainly discussed within the street-level organizations theory. As already seen, the theory itself presents two important categories: "street-level bureaucrats" and "street-level bureaucracies". To recall swiftly what they mean, the former point to "public service workers" that bring public services to citizen or socially-economically disadvantageous groups so that the latter demonstrates the structure consisted of those bureaucrats in serving to people in different expertise areas (Lipsky, 2010). Moreover, as we know, street-level organizations play an important role to mediate the relation between the state and citizens (2010:184).

The main role of the resettlement agencies is to deliver the public services to refugees under the above-mentioned cooperative agreement. In this sense, it would be important to underline that they function in the mentality of street-level organization as street-level bureaucracies. They do not serve for only refugees. They conduct the multiple programs for several groups. The Director, Joanne Morales, from Catholic Charities in Phoenix explains this in the following manner:

Catholic Charity's refugee programs is a part of a larger social service agency, so, the refugee program is actually one of about 23 different programs or agencies that we are not a stand-alone organization that just specifies in refugee settlement which is good and bad to them. We have been resettling refugees in 1975 before the refugee act is even established and so we have a long-standing history of resettling refugees in Phoenix on we typically take on about 500 -550 refugee a year and we also have the terms of unique programs we had unaccompanied minor program were the only agency in state that has the refugee unaccompanied minor programs that were also resettling minors that are coming without biological parents...

This is also same for other resettlement agencies in Arizona. Refugee resettlement is one of the programs they conduct. The overview of the function of their roles allows us to analyze the case of refugees as right-holders for their long-term settlement in US. Regardless of their economic or educational background, they will be included in a well-structured form of services for refugees. In this, there would be no room for extra demands or expectations. Therefore, the system is designed to put US humanitarian intervention into final form by making them right-holders for public services provided by non-profit organizations.

Street-level theory shows us that street-level bureaucracies are "consistently criticized for their inability to provide responsive and appropriate service". In this sense, "inadequacy of resources", increasing "demand for services", "goal expectations for the agencies" and "non-voluntariness of clients" may be seen the challenging conditions of their work. (Lipsky, 2010: 25 - 26). Theoretically speaking, this is also

applicable in many aspects as the resettlement agencies face these challenges while delivering services to refugees. However, this point makes a difference for my argument that the resettlement agencies are already set in order to justify their position in delivering their services to refugees in the manner that is also formed by the Department of State. When I ask the refugee resettlement agencies about the challenges they face during their work, it is clarified that their basic responsibility is to meet their basic needs. Joanne Morales from Catholic Charities Services in Phoenix highlights some important difficulties in this regard:

The refugee act hasn't been updated since 1980. The same policy in effect for 30 years that supposed to apply to all refugees, and one of the things that can be a challenge is that you know economic background isn't effective for resettlement so you could have a refugee that say never used refrigerator and then you can ever be refugee who is with master's degree and it is the same services.

From here, it is understood that US refuge law has been in effect for thirty years and there is no indication of the amendments when it comes to the social, economic, cultural and educational background of refugees. That is, all refugees are in the same boat after they arrive in US. It seems that policy-makers appropriate the current legislation to manage their refugee resettlement system. It is understandable that they use the current legislation as it is perfect, but it is still relevant when it is taken together with US general approach to refugee resettlement. In order to make this point clear that Joanne Morales from Catholic Charities Services in Phoenix adds that

making sure that they understand the goal of the refugee program and and and this is a very difficult goal to explain to people because the US resettlement program as it stands right now is treated as a purely humanitarian program. The goal of the program is to provide protection to those who have no other option, so it's not designed as something that's going to give you a pathway to a better education or better economic situation and I'll get into that necessary this is okay.

From the perspective of the director of the resettlement agency, the ultimate ‘goal’ is to clarify why they are in US since their resettlement story is a part of ‘a purely humanitarian program’. From this point of view, it is not incorrect to say that refugees are not admitted to offer an American dream but the opportunity to become a good and loyal American citizens. As a street-level organization, the resettlement agencies regulate the basic humanitarian services in terms of the overall program and tell them to overcome unrealistic expectations. Therefore, the formulation of their function becomes clear that the resettlement agencies are designed to undertake the burden of the state in delivering some certain public services in the logic of the neo-liberal global governance and they are also formed and structured with the limited sources for a certain goal.

In this regard, I put forward that the neo-liberal street-level conduct of humanitarianism is to regulate the refugee resettlement field in Arizona, and in US in general. However, at this juncture, I want to point to the chronic availability of a structural challenge that surrounds all the conditions refugees have in Arizona after they arrive. This is underlined by Craig Thorsten, from Refugee Focus in Phoenix, with reference to employment and portfolio of refugees with higher education or skills:

The main challenge is certainly employment because it is always changing, it goes up and down. It has been slow but gradual steady improvement in the economy here over the past eight years. I mean you know eight years ago, that was hard, very very difficult to get jobs. Now it is easier. But it is always a challenge. In the reality, most of the jobs are unfortunately entry-level jobs and it is not because some of the refugees come with a lot of skills, language abilities so forth, they have no record of working here so they have to get started in mostly entry-level jobs. Iraqis in particular have a lot of work experience, a lot of skills, a lot speak English very well but a lot of them have start in entry-level jobs. I know that is frustrating. I really understand that. We try to get other people in community involved to get better quality of jobs, but that is difficult.

When taken together with the weight of the initial assistance provided by the resettlement agencies, employment, that's a good job and a good salary, to start a new life becomes important for refugees to keep their expectations at a certain level. However, it seems that this may not be possible for a lot of Iraqi refugees once it is considered with their particular backgrounds and reasons. It is enough to say at this point that entry-level jobs are the bottom of the social and economic mobility. They have to start over from the scratch in terms of employment. This is the most difficult side of the process for refugees.

US government doesn't provide direct service for those are vulnerable and needy but establishes "decentralized service provision" through "contracting with non-profit organizations" (Lipsky, 2010). In this logic, the resettlement agencies provide a set of structured services for refugees in "a purely humanitarian program" in Ms. Joanne Morales's statement. The government's policy of decentralization of provision of public services is an attempt to push the people to the encounters of the system, which are comprised of self-sufficiency and language competence. In another saying, employment is the backbone of the post-resettlement process. US modality of collaborating with the resettlement agencies is to integrate refugees into American community. As we shall see later, this policy itself leads a huge challenge against adaptation and integration of refugees at the macro level.

5.1.2. Faith-Based Humanitarian Action

Before US invasion of Iraq, the General Secretary of the United Methodist Church's General Board of Church and Society sent a letter to President George W. Bush to persuade his government to avoid war on Iraq by giving a place to a set of strong statements:

Your war would violate the teachings of Jesus Christ. It would violate the tenets, prayers and entreaties of your own United Methodist Church bishops... It will bring death and destruction to Baghdad, a huge city filled

with innocent civilians. It will take the lives of too many of our own sons and daughters. (Tipton, 2008: 4).

Although there was a wide bloc comprised of religious groups and leaders against the President's war plan on Iraq, the President's choice was not to listen to them. Moreover President Bush based his own opinions on his personal prayers against the moral authority of Methodist bishops and critical church leaders. In this context, President Bush had also religious references that he mainly seemed himself as a responsible person to protect America while justifying the invasion. 9/11 deeply influenced both the Bush's government and American public life. In fact, American society's attachment to their religion was gradually increased and this situation was reflected on the political discourses in the form "compassionate conservatism", which was used to show what American nation is able to do to solve others' problems (Tipton, 2008: 12-17). More specifically, President Bush was on speech in 2001 in the following way:

Government has great responsibilities, for public safety and public health, for civil rights and common schools. Yet compassion is the work of a nation, not just a government. And some needs and hurts are so deep they will only respond to a mentor's touch or a pastor's prayer. Church and charity, synagogue and mosque, lend our communities their humanity, and they will have an honored place in our plans and in our laws. Many in our country do not know the pain of poverty. But we can listen to those who do. And I can pledge our nation to a goal: When we see that wounded traveler on the road to Jericho, we will not pass to the other side. (Bush, 2001a: web)

The President pointed to the responsibilities of American nation in compassion. The nation would work for others in needy. They will pay their debt to their communities. This would be an ultimate goal for American society. After 9/11, the President's government re-structured the building blocks of American society with reference to the religion.

As Tipton indicates, the President, George Bush, signed two executive orders to strengthen “faith-based programs” that provide “social services”. One of them has been established in Health and Human Services (Bush, 2001b: web). These developments were the indicators of faith-based initiatives in America so that the government was planning to strengthen this type of initiatives for the delivery of public services. Bush announced his government’s effort in this sense by underlying:

Yet when we see social needs in America, my administration will look first to faith-based programs and community groups, which have proven their power to save and change lives. We will not fund the religious activities of any group, but when people of faith provide social services, we will not discriminate against them. (Bush, 2001b: Web)

Tipton calls President Bush’s effort to mobilize faith-based initiatives to provide social services for those in need as “social entrepreneurship”, that “combines “faith based programs and non-religious community programs into an ideal of social agency” (Tipton, 2008: 25).

In this context, I put forward that the resettlement agencies, if not all, fall under the concept of social entrepreneurship which was especially supported and strengthened by the Bush administration. In the field of my research, it is a prominent result that both resettlement agencies and some non-governmental organizations are the ones that define themselves as “faith-based organizations” in Arizona. In the neo-liberal structure of public service delivery, “social needs” of refugees in Arizona come to the attention of the resettlement agencies and they perform their duties in the form of social entrepreneurship. They are in principle supposed to keep themselves away from their religious activities in terms of proselytization as President Bush underlines above. Additionally, this point is underlined by the Department of State that “while some of the agencies have religious affiliations, they are not allowed to proselytize” (US Department of State, Reception and Replacement Program). Within the scope of my field interviews, one of my interviewees, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for years touched upon this point in the following way:

Resettlement agencies are faith based organizations; but, not religious ones; so to speak, nothing to do with religion. In the US, social services are provided by both the government and other organizations in a fragmented manner

The interviewee denotes a significant point that the resettlement agencies identify themselves with a religious character, but their activities are not grounded upon their religious character. Therefore, it is not incorrect to state that they have strong references to religion, but they do not come up with their religious activities. As we already stated, social entrepreneurship refers to a package at the same time that is supported by US government. However, it is important to recall that this sort of social entrepreneurship contains all dimensions of everyday lives of refugees. Thereupon, it is not possible to point out that resettlement agencies are fully divorced from their religious characteristics during their work. Nawyn (2006: 1515) also finds out the supportive results through her field research and emphasizes that “faith-based NGOs to be heavily involved in the religion-in-civic-life context. Their focus will be on social service provision, not religious activities, and, thus, religion will not be a central component of their work”.

Although this point is enough said, as we underline above, their services for specifically refugee resettlement are designated by US Department of State and the cooperative agreement prevent their activities from proselytizing refugees. Besides it is important to underline the delivery of social services in a fragmented manner, which is underlined by my interviewee. As Nawyn distinguishes the organizations from each other according to their mode of organization in US like “local non-profit resettlement NGOs or mutual assistance associations (MAAs), voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) and support agencies” (2006). It can be asserted that the delivery of social services can be done by these organizations, but when it comes to refugee resettlement, it is clear that voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) take the form of resettlement agencies owing to their specific relation to the State. At this juncture, it is crucial to understand what a resettlement agency presents us in their “faith-based” characteristics. If they do not have nothing to do with religious activities, I will scrutinize the concept of “faith” in

their religious references in explaining their role and responsibilities to help those who have social needs in US.

One of the resettlement agencies I pick up for my field research is Catholic Charities Community Services that work for refugees in Arizona explains their vision and mission in the following way:

We are one of the major social service agencies of the Diocese of Phoenix. Our mission of service is founded in Scripture: Jesus called upon his disciples to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, care for the sick, welcome the stranger... Catholic Charities Community Services operates within the principles of its faith tradition and our values are based on Catholic Social Teaching. While we do not provide services that are contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church, we respect the religious beliefs and values of all clients, staff and volunteers. (Catholic Charities, 2017a: Web).

Their mission and vision is clear that they organize themselves to help for those who have social needs. Besides the organization clearly explains their “faith tradition” and “values” come from “Catholic Social Teaching”. The emphasis on “faith” and “values” is the same as other organizations. More specifically, one of the resettlement agencies I have interviewed for my field research is Lutheran Social Services that also serves to refugees in Arizona and that denotes what a faith-based means:

We serve all people with an attitude of compassion and caring, recognizing and honoring our Christian heritage of God’s love in Christ for all. (Lutheran Social Services, 2017: Web).

For both Catholic Community Services and Lutheran Services, the common denominator is showing “compassion and God’s love”, and, helping people in needy without any discrimination. They serve to all in the way of their beliefs. Here, I will underline that the principles and values of faith-based resettlement agencies’ social entrepreneurship moves in accordance with the political standing of the Bush

administration against humanitarianism. I do not want to say that their construction of faith hails from a consistent political essence supported by US governments. I put forward to discuss this very political standing together with humanitarianism and faith-based organizations so as to explore how humanitarianism takes the shifting roles in my argument as well.

In this connection, Barnett discusses that “faith” appears where “the boundaries between religion and secularism in humanitarianism” disappear. Each faith-based organization attach their discourses and statements to their form of faith. That is, “each connects their actions to a version of the transcendent.” And the label “faith-based” does not allow us to see the “forms of transcendentalism” that are part of humanitarianism” (Barnett, 2012a:167). When it comes to “humanitarian action”, the political character of the effort needs to be distinguished from humanitarianism since many activities “aspire to restructure underlying social relations” which are political. But, humanitarianism brings “relief” and “it offers to save individuals but not to eliminate the underlying causes” puts people at risk. Therefore there must be a distance between politics and humanitarianism to be able to have a “humanitarian space” (Barnett, 2012a:173).

A historical overview of humanitarianism and politics shows that it is not possible to totally exclude politics from both humanitarianism and religion. Barnett indicates that “religious organizations and movements have frequently questions of social justice, the Abrahamic traditions” (Barnett, 2012a:175). But it is reality that it becomes difficult for faith-based organizations to determine the boundary between politics and humanitarian action as in the end, Barnett makes out that “all humanitarianism is faith based” (Barnett, 2012a:177).

What I argue at this juncture that some of the resettlement agencies are faith-based organizations and their relation to politics and humanitarian action is not to “eliminate underlying roots of the suffering”. In this sense, their humanitarian action is not based on the advocacy of human rights in a political effort to stand against the structures producing the suffering. Although they move within a “humanitarian space” to increase social justice in their faith tradition, it is not possible to claim that this

humanitarian space is constructed by non-political way of humanitarianism. In contrary, they are supported by US Department of State in a regular basis and they are obliged to comply with the cooperative agreement signed by the Department of State. In a sense, they are political as much as their relation to the State.

In terms of refugee resettlement process, they cannot conduct their activities without the financial support of US government. Therefore, there is a mutual relation when it comes to the Bush administration's support to this "social entrepreneurship" in delivering compassion and care for those who have social needs. It would not be an overstatement to claim that the faith-based characteristics of some resettlement agencies can, in this sense, be seen as a strengthened part of US government, especially after 9/11. Their relation to politics is not to present the missing parts of US policy in order to eliminate underlying causes of suffering or manmade hazards. But their politics is to regulate the field as US government wishes to incorporate refugees in a labor market as soon as they can.

5.1.3. Paternalist Aspect of Humanitarian Governance: Limits of Personal Choices and Competence Assumption

In the context of Arizona, it is quite clear that resettlement agencies are the main actors of refugee admission program in US. It is also equally important that a large portion of resettlement agencies are faith-based organizations. Additionally, they are "street-level bureaucracies" working in a professional and hierarchical structure comprised of experts and information holders. Most importantly, they are directly under the power effect of US administration. Therefore, my main argument is that they are purely a part of humanitarian governance, which is, as Barnett explains, "mixture of care and control pointing to the presence of paternalism" (2012b: 487).

As said before, Bush's discourses of care and control before Iraq invasion were intermixed. Similarly, the Bush administration's attack against Saddam's regime was not divorced from the spirit of this sort of paternalism. As Barnett points out, "international paternalists did not pretend that they were democrats, only that they

were more likely to represent the interests of the people than was the home-grown potentate” (2012b:502). The critical question here then appears if consent of people is provided or not. The importance of paternalism underlies here since “paternalism occurs when one actor interferes in the choices of another without her consent and on the grounds that it is in her best interest” (2012b: 503). All of this process is, as indicated before, revolved around a “consequentialist ethic” (2012b: 503).

Refugees are subordinated to information flux in the refugee admission process. They are not in a position to make a decision for their life except the decision of fleeing from their countries to another regions. Their journey from their countries to their destination countries is actually a part of this international paternalism conducted by the capitalist countries. From my field research, the argument of paternalism is important since refugees still do not make their decisions after they are resettled into US. They are survivors of the invasion for which they were never a party to decision-making process and they are the “chosen” and “admitted lucky ones” by international actors and US but still they do not have a right to make a decision for their best interest as far as they do not have enough money for the life in US.

Rather than categorizing US paternalism into refugee admission system, I will stress on the importance of humanitarian governance in these debates as regards to my research. Following Barnett’s main points on that, the “institutionalization of global liberalism” has led to the “acceptable practices of the paternalism in humanitarian governance”. That is to say, the acceptable aspects of paternalism can be taken up in relation to “the spread and deepening of liberal principle of autonomy, choice and consent” (2012b: 517).

Referring to Barnett’s theoretical construction of paternalism, resettlement agencies function as a part of this paternalism. Their “confidence” comes from their knowledge and experience. Besides faith-based paternalism applies to “preternatural commitments” in an effort to serve to “humanity” in a “belief system”. Resettlement agencies orient refugees in a paternalist manner by providing them with a pre-determined package of refugee admission program. Beyond this, there is not much to provide initially. Refugees have to live where resettlement agencies pick up for them,

they have to work at working places that resettlement agencies would arrange for them as earliest as possible and they would establish their lives in adjusting themselves to this new order.

The percentage of refugees who make their own way after they arrive in Arizona is quite small in this sense. As resettlement agencies always orient them to move in the determined setting when it comes to their best interest. For instance, during our interview, the executive director for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix stated that

Especially if they already have here a family member here, you know we gotta give them as much as we can in the shortest time possible so that we can meet our commitment to them. Now that doesn't mean that we see people for a short time, and we see people for years in some cases you know it's all dependent on the family because keeping in mind that none of the services, that we provide, are mandatory so for someone who lands in Phoenix and we had this happen on the family got off the plane, a friend from Utah heard they were coming, drove up to the airport, our family our caseworkers are there to start doing their work with them, they got that is so much and I am going to Utah with my friend, they often go in and it really is that fluid once they get to the United States in its very much to their benefit to stay with the local resettlement agency for a period of time. We're able to help them with the first month's rent and oftentimes will pay two months' rent because we work with departments that don't charge us deposit and you know just to get the health screenings and social security cards and you know just to really get grounded. It's really in their best interest to stay where they are placed. I will say out of migration rate which means how many times do they get off the plane and go somewhere else is only about 10% in Arizona.

It is clear from these words that refugees may use their own network to move to another states after they are placed in Arizona. That's, it is possible to speak of a kind of flexibility in the paternalist structure of humanitarian governance. Still, there is a room

for choice and consent that refugees would be using if they wished. However, what is underlined here is the availability of sources that will be used for refugees in case they do not stay in their assigned states and the director of IRC stresses upon “their best interest to stay where they are placed”. Besides, only 10 % of refugees can move to other states short after their arrival in Arizona. This demonstrates that the effect of the paternalist mode of refugee admission program cannot be underestimated.

In the similar sense, Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix explains this with another reason:

Sometimes we got a call from somebody in Minnesota saying I wanna come to Arizona. Will you help me? I am a refugee and I'll say I'll always say the same thing: how long you have been there? I just arrived two weeks ago. Do you have a resettlement agency that's helping you? Yes. My advice to them stay in Minneapolis. Get your health needs taken care of. Get grounded and get a job, get some money in your pocket after six months and a year, go anywhere you want.

Indeed, it is not easy for refugee resettled in US to adapt into US working life and other conditions. Therefore, their seeking for assistance may be more lasting than expected. In US system, assistance provided by State may vary from one State to another and this may be pulling factor for some refugees who seek for more assistance. However, it is not feasible for refugees to move to other states as US system overtly link them to refugee admission program for a certain period of time. Refugees have to go along with their resettlement agencies to be able to benefit from their rights and services in the refugee admission program. After all, I can say that other States do not have pull factors for Iraqi refugees who are resettled in Arizona in terms of personal choices or advantages at the destination point. Therefore, it is not possible to generalize that there is an increasing trend of second migration from one state to another for refugees according to the analysis made by resettlement agencies. Indeed, for this, the weight of US paternalist system needs to be put into question beyond other options as the majority of refugees have to accept what is offered for them by the system.

Lawrence Mead gives an important place to paternalism while discussing American social policy. Actually, his debates are fruitful for my research since he underlines the attribute of paternalism as “supervisory policies directed toward the poor or disadvantaged” (1998:98). Indeed, he points to how the system controls the poor in helping them. This is a sort of control improved by the American system in order to guarantee that the poor or the disadvantaged behave by working or studying in return for the support or aid provided by the government. That is to say, he states that “the poor need support, but they also require structure – a combination of help and hassle” (1998:108). From this standpoint, it is not hard to derive that refugees or migrants are disadvantaged groups and they seek for assistance, especially in their first times after the arrival. American social policy system treats them in the same paternalist way and here the mentioned “supervisory policies” are undertaken by resettlement agencies.

At this point, I like to underscore the functionality of the term of “the competence assumption” which connects our argument to the plight of refugees by presenting the importance of being self-sufficient. In other words, he employs the term that “established benefit and opportunity programs take it for granted that poor clients are as able as other people to take care of themselves” (1998:109). This argument is fruitful for my work as Mead puts forward the term in order to highlight the way to demonstrate the development of “self-interest” for “the poor and the non-whites” (1998). In fact, in the context of Arizona, “the poor” refers to immigrants and refugees as well and they are therefore the beneficiaries of refugee admission program. However, more importantly, they are obliged to improve themselves to be able to take care of themselves in a shortest period of time after they arrive in US. Therefore, I will propound here that they are the real subjects of the competence assumption while benefiting from the assistance provided by US government.

The neo-liberal structuration of US social policy deserves an important emphasis on paternalism. Soss, Fording and Schram demonstrate this point by referring to the “transformation of government” to “more effective manage the poor” (2011:27). Here it is significant to note that the unemployment and poverty rate of Arizona is high in comparison to other states in US. Although the rates have gone down over the two years, the last data shows that the unemployment rate is % 5.1 by 2017. This rate is

quite high by comparison with other States (United States Department of Labor, 2017). Refugees are not excluded from this labor force and they appertain to the zone of the poor when it comes to either unemployment or dependency on social assistance. For the ideal management of the poor in the US, as already touched upon, “the state’s governing capacity” uses “privatization and collaboration to enlist civil society institutions” (Soss, Fording and Schram, 2011:27). More specifically, paternalism is accompanied by neo-liberalism in poverty governance. Neo-liberalism brings the “market rules” to organize the function of paternalism. As they indicate that

The neo-liberal state is called upon to make the poor available to employers on terms set by the declining market for low-skilled labor. The state must teach the poor to conceive of themselves as market actors, and, to accomplish this goal, it must actively position its targets as actors in market relations... (2011:28).

From here, I employ the combination of two terms for my analysis. Refugees’ competence assumption appears a requirement of humanitarian governance so that the neo-liberal function of US global governance can manage its humanitarian intervention and consequences effectively. The State leads the organization of resettlement agencies in emphasizing the limits of personal choices and of refugee admission program. With reference to the importance of “transformation of the poor into subjects who chose to act in ways that comply with market imperatives and political authorities” (2011:28), we can say that the resettlement agencies fulfill their tasks for the process of “poverty governance” in the words of Soss, Fording and Schram.

No matter whether the resettlement agencies are faith-based organizations or a secular one, they have to perform their tasks in this State-led relation so as to present an effective way of refugee resettlement process. As already discussed in details, they are street-level bureaucracies with expertise areas in delivering standardized services for refugees on the basis of the same mentality whose priority is to push them to the labor market. For this purposes, the Department of State funds them and expects them to work like a professional, hierarchical and structured company.

Competence assumption in the humanitarian governance is a requirement since funds are not much to manage the poor under the high standards. Especially, for refugee admission program, there is not much systematic alternatives except the mainstream programs. In this sense, it is important to give a place to the words of the officials of Arizona Department of Economic Security. They stress upon how the system has to work when it comes to the specific needs of more vulnerable refugees:

Yes, refugees do need specific support. I think they need longer support. I think the more targeted kinds of support not always just longer more targeted. First, they need to have access to the community program because there's not enough money in the refugee specific program. If they could access better to mainstream programs I think there are a lot of good mainstream programs...We have expertise in regular settlement but we have such little money that it's hard to do so much we either need to make sure that the mainstream programs are equally capable of meeting refugees unique needs linguistically, culturally but also in response to their experiences is rapidly due to trauma and other experiences or we do need to make sure that the refugee program has more resources, longer...

It is clear from AZDES officials' explanation that the budget is limited even if there are refugees with specific needs. The mainstream programs share the burden of refugees until a certain point due to their monetary resources. Besides, it is not surprising to hear their "expertise" from the Refugee Coordinator since it is important to conduct all services within the planned standards as all the services expand in a certain period of time. From this point of view, one of my interviewees, U/32m, shares his observations by calling this process as a type of "business":

That is, such organizations (resettlement agencies) are supposed to provide such services in return of grants provided by the state. This is, in a way, business. Social service has taken the form of business in the US. Lutheran or Catholic cannot do so much profit in this way; but, the organizations such as Maximus targets profit by claiming that they are better than the

state in providing social services. However, there is no area related to religion in this sense.

In this regard, it is not incorrect to say that this process goes with the motives of a business that resettlement agencies work with the Department of State in order to make all refugees “subjects” under the market imperatives of US as Stephen Hopgood (2008:99) underlines, “the entry of firms, and the logic of business, into the arena of humanitarianism is the result” under the consequences of the neo-liberal policies.

5.1.4. Philanthropic Aspect of Humanitarian Governance: Network Functions of Voluntary Non-Profit Organizations

Until this section, I have demonstrated the main characteristics and premises of the process in which the Department of State forms the refugee admission program in close conjunction with both Arizona Department of Economic Security and the resettlement agencies. In this paternalist function of the refugee admission program, it is quite clear that “competence assumption” must be one of the ultimate parts in order that US government can guarantee the sustainability of the cost-effective function of the system in a neo-liberal logic. Refugees must not be a burden on the system. They have to be a productive part of the system under the productive power of humanitarian governance. According to the rationalized and well-structured premises of the resettlement agencies, refugees are encouraged to be “good cases” by seeking for their self-interest in the marketplace.

In this functioning of humanitarian governance in the context of Arizona, the shortages of the process stem from the system itself as slightly underlined above. The official of Arizona Department of Economic Security explains this with reference to the mentality of US system. The resettlement agencies cannot advance specific programs according to specific needs of refugees. This is essentially related to local and financial budgetary resources. As a result, borrowing the term of “the humanitarian sector” from Barnett, non-governmental organizations and voluntary charity organizations appear

to undertake some responsibilities to help refugees for the benefit of all community in the humanitarian sector of Arizona.

In highlighting the characteristic of the humanitarian sector, Barnett (2013:388) refers to “a network” function because “organizations come together to accomplish particular and well-defined outcomes”. In the context of Arizona, I clearly refer to the presence of such a network for refugees. The interviews conducted during this research indicates the partnership among the resettlement agencies, non-governmental and voluntary organizations. Along with an emphasis on the diversity of actors and norms in humanitarian governance, US system produces its alternatives to the resettlement agencies in this way. Basically, it would be incorrect to put forward that those voluntary or non-governmental organizations fill the gap of the advocacy of human rights by forcing the State to update its policies or refugee admission programs. However, as touched upon earlier, they also work to alleviate the suffering of refugees in Arizona.

From this standpoint, I demonstrate the non-governmental or voluntary organizations that run in the different orbits to be able to meet the different needs of refugees in Arizona. As underlined in the previous chapters, they are the constitutive parts of “social entrepreneurship” that is also emphasized by the Bush administration. This sort of social entrepreneurship enables religious and non-religious organizations to serve for refugees and it is ultimately for the well-being of American society.

At this juncture, Ramalingam, Mendizabal and Mierop underline the six characteristics features of “network functions in a humanitarian context”. These are namely “community-building”, “filtering”, “amplifying”, “learning and facilitating”, “investing and providing” and “convening” (2008). The second one is their philanthropic logic of working that is mainly grounded upon “voluntary giving” and “voluntary association” (Payton and Moody, 2008).

In Arizona, Tucson and Phoenix have a broad stream of non-governmental organizations and voluntary initiatives in addition to the activities of resettlement agencies. Borrowing the term of “network functions” in a humanitarian sector from Ramalingam, Mendizabal and Mierop, I will argue how their network functions in

Arizona without going into detail. It is possible to point to the existence of such a network in Arizona that Noor Women's Association, Tucson Refugee Ministry, Iskashitaa Refugee Network, and The Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship Association are the important 'institutions' of this humanitarian chain. It is also important to underscore that the biggest and most important part of this humanitarian sector is refugees themselves. Their active participation and mobilization reinforces the dynamic structure of this sort of networks.

There are in fact some challenging aspects to put all of these organizations in a pool by defining them as very connected parts of a humanitarian network. However, it is significant to see that they work for community building, bring learning and facilitating to the lives of refugees and establish a system with various expertise areas or calling for donors and fundraising activities. In Arizona, it is possible to speak of the availability of the potential network activities in many aspects. On the other hand, "philanthropy" is a certain attribute of these organizations. They cannot simply be categorized as charity organizations. It is not necessary to repeat that they are non-profit organization and work for the benefit of disadvantaged groups. To demonstrate our argument in a well-designed manner, it would be important to underline that one of the main reasons for the appearance of philanthropic voluntary organizations needs to be touched upon here. The analysis of the philanthropic aspect of these organizations allows us to find out how much they move their activities beyond the determined services of the resettlement agencies. Payton and Moody give us five roles for philanthropy, namely; "service role", "advocacy role", "cultural role", "civic role", and "vanguard role" (2008: 34-35). In the context of Arizona, the voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations appear to meet some certain needs and services in general and their main role is revolved around service role.

In this sense, to begin with, I give a place to the words of the representative of Noor Women's Association in Tucson. Indeed, the representative explains how they build community to provide information and assistance for single refugee women with minor children. To be able to underline their voluntary action, the representative explains how their organization is different from a resettlement agency:

Resettlement agency is something that work with the government. You go through the government funding. We do not get any government funding. Basically, we are approached by these agencies that get the government funding when the government funding stops. That's we come in when the refugees still have not gotten jobs or are not able to find jobs; that's we come in so we are basically in extension.

From this point, it is a prominent to mark that there is an information linkage between the resettlement agencies and volunteer organizations. Therefore, I can put forward that Noor Women's Association performs community-building activities and filtering effectively in order to enlarge its volunteer circle for single refugee women and single refugee mothers. Therefore, its priority is to assist widows and single mothers in this humanitarian linkage. In their network function, it is worthy of noting that they focus upon the vulnerable women with whom the current system does not have much to do. Therefore, the information provided by the resettlement agencies is the most important for the organization so that the organization can disseminate the information to others. The representative explains this in such a way: "Resettlement agencies know us for the last twenty years, they have a reputation.... Individuals donate us. We go to individual people not agencies."

It is a long-term run for many years and their reputation comes from their voluntary efforts. Their only financial resource is, as the representative explains, donations and their hundred members. On the other hand, despite the fact that the organization does not know how the resettlement organizations works in the humanitarian sector, they are in contact with the agencies to help refugees who have acute vulnerabilities due to the several reasons. The representative explains this in the following way;

Because these agencies that work with the government was, I really do not know, how they work because we have never dealt. We only worked with them after the government funding stopped three months or six months. Then those people who have still not gotten jobs after vocational training and lose jobs and get sick that's we really come in to have them.

As pointed out with the debates on humanitarianism and human rights advocacy, the association's main motivation is to help refugees not to advocate rights in front of the authorities. That is, as Barnett indicates, the boundary between humanitarianism and human rights need to be put on the table in the context of Arizona since many organizations insist that "they have little to do with human rights because they want to keep people alive by giving them the bare necessities" (2013: 383). From the view of point of the association, the voluntary attribute of their activities is emphasized in the following words:

So we strictly work with the resettlement agencies and since we are a volunteer organization, our thrust of helping people are single mothers, widows or divorcees who do not have a person who has incomes for their family because a lot of donations go to those people and it takes longer to get jobs, vocational training with language issues.

It is significant to underline from this standpoint that the Noor Women's Association's voluntary work is to fill a gap that is not covered by the standardized services of the resettlement agencies. The association does not know how a resettlement agency works but connects their services to the government funding directly and focuses upon the vulnerable situation of single mothers and widows who are not easily integrated into the labor market due to several reasons. It will be the same for other organizations that the association's voluntary efforts allow us to understand their approach to a social issue in a collective attempt. Actually, this is also underlined by Payton and Moody that "philanthropy is an essential tool in our collective attempts to solve public problems (2008:10). It is different from a charity event in many aspects as they run in this area for a long time and their appearance in this field comes from the fact that the system does not produce a curing mechanism for such a vulnerable group of single mothers and widows. The socio-economic basis for their philanthropic activities points to the inadequacies of the refugee admission programs as well.

In the same vein, Tucson Refugee Ministry is another circle of the humanitarian sector in Arizona. The organization has a strong link with Christians and churches. As we see with some resettlement agencies, their emphasis on religious themes is strong in their

activities. They also work for refugees after the resettlement agencies in totally voluntary form. During our interview with the executive director of the organization and the development coordinator of the organization, the importance of the role of volunteers was often emphasized. They explain that “we have volunteers. That is the main thing. We have only staff, volunteers”. Their only staff capacity is volunteers and volunteers inform each other to expand the humanitarian circle. At this point, it can be stated that the dissemination of information and knowledge contains a large participation of community members in order to canalize refugees to assistance channels. In this sense, it can be said that volunteers work as “conveners”. Ramalingam et.al explain the function of network with reference to “convening” as “bringing together individuals and groups from different nationalities, disciplines and practices” (2008:3). More importantly, the representatives point to the existence of the more systematic structure of refugee organizations in the following manner:

There is an organization called RISP-NET, Refugee Integrated Services Provider Network. We meet together every each month and usually we have a topic and somebody share with us what they do and has to with refugees.

Theoretically speaking, their network of Refugee Integrated Services Provider Network (henceforth, RISP-NET) works in a systematic and structured manner as understood and this refers to what Ramalingam et.al point to “the systematic and sustainable linkages between groups” in “convening” (2008:3). Besides, it presents a strong example of “amplification” which “can be used to disseminate a message or idea, and can also be part of two-way process of communication and feedback” (2008:2). Indeed, Tucson has an important network with the function of RISP-NET that totally presents a network function in a humanitarian context. It works with convening and amplification to build community support for refugees by bringing organizations and volunteers together and it aims at strengthening the integration and acculturation of refugees into American community with the provision of more communication and collaboration among systems; it also conducts an identification of needs and issues that impact refugees; it also brings community-wide support for

refugees; it shares information and lessons at local, regional and national level...etc. (RISP-NET, web).

Back to the function of Tucson Refugee Ministry in this network, their religious references to their work takes us to recall the faith-based structuration of some resettlement agencies that have been elaborated in the previous chapters. It is just to recall from the political motivation of the Bush administration that the religious references of this sort of social entrepreneurship traces back to American tradition as well. More specifically, the philanthropic attribute of some religious organizations can be seen in the way that, as Payton and Moody state, “We have learned about only informally and often haphazardly, from family, church and tradition” (2008:11).

I argue that this is quite valid for the organization of Tucson Refugee Ministry that has a set of Christian values and this is not surprising for US as Payton and Moody underline, “philanthropy is more at its core” on the basis of Christian teachings. On the other hand, they refer to how Americans of all sort related their reasons for “being compassionate” to “a cogent more or religious explanation” (2008:104-105). It is understandable that there is a moral response or act as long as there is a reference to Christian values in terms of philanthropy. It is the same as Tucson Refugee Ministry which works to bring help and assistance to refugees who arrive in US. The organization has Christian values and their voluntary intervention refers to a moral action in their philanthropic attribute. The representatives of the organization, explain this in the following manner:

Our main purpose is to connect Christians with newly resettled refugees who are coming to live in Tucson. So that’s what we do is to talk to churches, get education and presentations and also trainings and invite them to connect with newly arrived refugees and we ask them to make commitment of three months of working together. And then Church groups, resettlement agency and Tucson refugee ministry help one family for three months.

Tucson Refugee Ministry works donations and contributions from churches and they help refugees so as to ease the integration of refugees into American community. With this purpose, they contact the resettlement agencies and provide trainings, and strengthen the way to get more volunteers in this process. As it is clearly expressed that the organization has a strong attachment to the religious discourses and they frankly explain that they use this attachment to empower refugees through the assistance of Christians.

From the standpoint of my research, I agree with Robert D. Putman's well-done analysis that one of the main sources of this philanthropy is religion. He explains that "nearly half of all associational memberships in America are church related, half of all personal philanthropy is religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context. So how involved we are in religion today matters a lot for America's social capital" (2000:67-68). Religion as an important piece of the faith-based humanitarian action plays a crucial role in the context of immigrants' new lives in America. Putman refers this banding role of religion with the term of social capital. I will also contribute to this aspect of this social capital in terms of refugee resettlement process. The philanthropic attribute of Tucson Refugee Ministry carries and revitalizes their values and moral principle through their services for refugees. In this sense, they also perform a culture and civic role in this process. Therefore, their religion motivated humanitarian action leads to further communication or contact with people and groups from different social, cultural and religious backgrounds. It is worthy of giving importance to the function of religion in American life in the absence of human rights advocacy in the local level. However, at this point, it is important to avoid overvaluing the roles of church based organizations or faith-based organizations since, on the other side those organizations appear as a non-secular form of the neo-liberal functioning of US government. Therefore, their presence constitutes social capital which is divorced from the notion of being opposite to the underlying reason of human rights violation and inequality. Therefore, it is important to limit their role in the way Putman demonstrates:

Faith-based organizations serve civic life both directly, by providing social support to their members and social services to the wider community, and

indirectly, by nurturing civic skills, inculcating more values, encouraging altruism, and fostering civic skills recruitment among church people. (2000:82).

In this sense, Tucson Refugee Ministry is a part of church network all around Arizona. It is also a part of refugee integrated service providers' network so that they are aware of the capacity of the organization in this network to assist refugees in Tucson.

Following the philanthropic attribute of non-governmental organizations in the context of Arizona, I will open another chapter for Iskashitaa Refugee Network that belongs to a humanitarian sector. As different from other organizations, Iskashitaa Refugee Network can be seen in the form of "vanguard role" of philanthropy. To put it simply, vanguard role refers to "new forms of action" that can be innovated or created by the humanitarian sector as well. In this sense, in comparison with others in the context of Arizona, Iskashitaa appears an organization that tries an alternative form of helping refugees. Within the scope of my research interview, the founder of Iskashitaa, Barbara Eiswerth, explains their creative activities in the following way:

Iskashitaa Refugee Network was formed in 2002 and 2003. We have purposes to empower, help and integrate refugees into larger Tucson community by providing practical English, life skills, introduction to the community through in the way that local food programing, what I mean by local food programming is our first and largest project program is harvesting... We introduce fresh vegetables something, there is a great appreciation for in large quantities of refugees that work with Iskashitaa have access to large quantities of fresh food and vegetables from people's backyards and from local farmers...

The organization conducts different sort of programs which are mainly based on the harvesting and food project. Indeed, their role is also to contribute to make refugees self-sufficient by helping them improve their skills and abilities in harvesting and food preservation. It is clearly explained by the organization that "through harvesting program, refugees and other volunteers learn how to identify, access, harvest, use and

store locally grown produce, mostly from edible trees” (Iskashitaa, web). It is also same when it comes to their difference from the resettlement agencies in the following statement made by Ms. Barbara:

Our funding streams are different. They got the federal state funding. We do not. We do not follow the regulations. The agencies follow pretty closely and give intense services for three to six months and drop severely although refugees may not be self-sufficient at the end of six months.

The main concern of Iskashitaa is to contribute to the process in which refugees can be more self-sufficient and can easily be integrated into American community (Iskashitaa, web). On the other hand, it is important to underline that the organization contributes to the function of resettlement agencies by bring information and experience from their own field to the knowledge of other organizations. Ms. Barbara explains this in the following way:

We work with the resettlement agencies, Refugee Focus as well as IRC... We work with volunteers. We work to build up that network for the resettlement agencies and other working with refugees. We run a young group, hundred members to get information on family members for the refugee integrated services provider network and participate in meetings.

In terms of the network functions, Ishashitaa’s distinction in the current system contains the long-term strategies to empower refugees for their self-sufficiency. Therefore, Ishashitaa has an important task to ensure a set of learning and facilitating processes which help community members to acquire new skills and knowledge on different subjects (Ramalingam and et.al, 2008). In this regard, the organization’s expertise in American food system provides a specific tool with which refugees learn new ways of improving themselves in communication with local community. As a result, a mutual or dual learning and facilitating process takes place in the process of integration and adaptation. As we underline, the organization’s philanthropy is initially grounded upon a vanguard role, but it is equally crucial to speak of its cultural role since the organization learns about the food culture of refugees and applies for the

farming skills of refugees in this process and maps their activities according to the coherence of all the information obtained in the process.

The voluntary activities of non-governmental or non-profit organizations in Tucson displays active functions of network for refugees in a humanitarian sector. No doubt, their way of running in the field is based on the attributes of the network functionalism in many aspects. They build up community groups. They conduct learning, facilitating, information dissemination activities. Their convening and amplification methods can be diverse in several modalities. They can encourage and pave the way for creative and innovative ways for the community members. At this juncture, the critical question may be why the voluntary organizations do this so? Indeed, the answer is clear from the standpoint of refugee matter. As Payton and Moody profound readily, “voluntary philanthropic action” works for “the public good”. More specifically, it is important to under the “moral dimension of philanthropic action for the public good” (2008:59). Although the public good is a term that is open to the disputes, the philanthropic attribute of voluntary action is to “relive suffering and to improve the quality of life” (2008:60).

In the context of Tucson in Arizona, the organizations aim at helping refugees to adapt and integrate them into American community more smoothly and they do this for the public good. At this point, there is no doubt. On the other hand, it is a reality that the organizations’ action plan and motivations reflect their own vision and understanding of what the public good is for refugees, it is quite difficult to achieve a universal definition as Payton and Moody point out. And there is always a superior and inferior relation even if there is hierarchy between refugees and voluntary organizations since the organizations always implement their projects to be able to provide some benefits for their beneficiaries. Even so, in the context of Arizona, it is clear for refugees that they have to start in a new life and for this, they need information and experience in certain issues and voluntary organizations appear to complete this missing part of the process that present a huge service, as we indicate, US government does not look at specifying this sort of service roles for refugees after the resettlement agencies are done.

5.1.5. Professionalism in Humanitarian Governance

As we often underline the important role and place of the non-profit organizations in the US, this is not just to display the diversity of public services provided by those organizations for the public good. If we recall our beginning point swiftly, this is also to show the diversity of the humanitarian governance designed and managed by US government. In fact, there are many private and public actors working to contribute the development of public good in many senses.

According to Lester M. Salamon, the non-profit organizations can be understood in two broad types: “member-serving organizations” and “public-serving organizations” (2012:7). As we underline above, US hosts a broad range of the non-profit organizations that need to be distinguished from each other in terms of their function and impulses in the public sphere.

In Arizona, as regards to such a distinction among the funds and services of the non-profit organizations, it is clear from the fine results of my field findings that the diversity of humanitarian governance works through the resettlement agencies funded directly by the federal government, the voluntary non-profit organizations funded by their philanthropic efforts and other sort of the non-profit organizations with specific and professional public services funded by the local government or the State. It would not be incorrect if we say theoretically that the impulses lying behind the motivations and activities of those organizations in Arizona are different from each other’s.

Salamon gives us the four impulses for nonprofit organizations: “voluntarism, professionalism, civic activism and commercialism” (Salamon, 2012: 15). By parking the content of voluntarism, civic activism and commercialism, I will return to his definition of professionalism which seems important in the context of the non-profit sector in Arizona. He underlines that professionalism refers to “specialized, subject-matter knowledge gained through formal training and delivered by paid experts” and it is also crucial to underline that government “has certainly helped to nurture and sustain it, both by providing profession with a mechanism through which to enforce professional standards in government-funded programs” (2012:16).

Before going into some details, at this point, I will specify the role of “La Frontera Arizona” for refugees. As different as other organizations, La Frontera Arizona needs to be taken up in terms of professionalism rather than volunteering or philanthropic mode of working. The organization has a set of programs that are specifically designed to provide services for children and adults. The types of services conducted by the organization are important to figure out their professional role in the field. It ranges from inpatient/outpatient treatment to employment services and to specific prevention/diversion activities for children and adults (La Frontera, web). The supervisor for all staff of La Frontera Arizona, Jacquelynn Villa-Baze explains the background of the organization during our interview in the following way:

It is a behavioral health agency. So we have clients who have serious mental illness, substance use, major mental illness from children to elderly. I work in prevention so thirteen years ago we received a grant to offer a prevention program, parenting program specifically for refugees. Thirteen years ago it was for Russian re-unification families and Spanish speaking families for the first year and the second year we added families from former Yugoslavia. So we had a program specifically for refugees and immigrants where our staff came from the target populations. For example, I was hired to work with Spanish speaking children and another facilitator was hired to work with Spanish speaking parents. We worked with them individually and together. It was a family education program. It was mostly to prevent substance use and violence. That program lasted three years. We've got the funding. New populations arrive in Tucson. We would add them. So we have Somalia, Meskhetian Turks, Iraqi, Burundis, so whatever populations have been arriving, we've been hiring staff for those populations.

Indeed, the organization is forty-five years old with its services and mission. She emphasizes that the organization works with the refugees for thirteen years old in a specific area. Their work is important to solve adaptation problems with refugee children and refugee adults by working with them very closely. For this purpose, they

employ experienced or expert staff from the target group in order to get the effective outcomes in the process. From the viewpoint of professionalism, the theoretical line takes us to a point where “professionalism’s strategy relies on a medical model, treating beneficiaries essentially as “patients” needing some form of “treatment”, whether physical, or educational, or psychological” (Salamon, 2002:17). In fact, the supervisor of the organization, Ms. Jacquellnn Villa-Baze, explains this with reference to the definition of their organization as “a behavioral health agency” and then the organization aims at preventing violence and substance use among children and adults. In each step of this process, when it comes to refugee children and parents, the organization’s activities take place in the schools in order to contribute to the health development of the community. In doing so more different than the resettlement agencies and voluntary non-profit organizations, they use their specific strategy to reach out the refugees in Tucson. In this point, she puts their difference in the following words:

We don’t do anything like the resettlement agencies. We are non-governmental and non-profit organizations. Once a family has been here for three months, they can be referred to our program. Our facilitator will go, meet them, and invite them to natural groups, into existing group, sometimes one on one specifically for Iraqi families. We don’t get funding to work, to do any resettlement activity. Our funding comes from the Department of Health Services not the federal state.

At this juncture, I will underline two points concerning the organization’s mode of working with refugees. Firstly, the organization provides its services with a set of accepted standards that are called “CARF accredited programs” (La Frontera, 2017: Web). Secondly, the organization receives the funding from Arizona Department of Health Services. That is to say, the State agency support its services for refugees under a project as long as the organization is able to provide a standard service for refugee children and adults. In this regard, if the position of the organization is considered in front of Arizona Department of Health Services and CARF, it is right to refer to Salamon’s preoccupation of professionalism with reference to the fact that “professional style” is “therapeutic, segmented, and secular” and “professionalism

creates organizational structures that are hierarchic and segmented” and “requires the more ample and reliable resources of government and fees for support” (2002: 17).

From this standpoint, it would not be incorrect to state that the organization’s structure and services are fit into professionalism rather than voluntary or philanthropic work. They also fulfil a significant task to overcome a gap in the field of education so that refugee children can have opportunities to receive a professional support so as to overcome their personal shortages. In this regard, what task or responsibilities the organization performs is pointed by Ms. Jacquellnn Villa-Baze, from La Frontera as following:

We teach them other things that nobody else does how to parent your children here because discipline here is very different than discipline in any other countries; how to work with the schools. When the refugees come here, they take their children to the school and then they tell the teachers you are the expert, you take care of my children, teach them... here the system is different, the school wants families to be involved. So we work with them and teach them those kinds of things... how to keep the kids getting to Americanized too quickly.

It is clear from here that their ultimate goal is to take us to one of the most important aspects of humanitarian governance. As Barnett explains, it is such a “global project to shape lives, habit, dispositions and institutions in order to improve the well-being of people” (2013). In the context of Arizona, the ultimate goal is to provide the well-being of American community and this sort of non-profit organizations undertakes the responsibilities growing out of the mentioned global project so as to integrate immigrants and refugees in the American system by improving their coping strategies. Indeed, the development of US non-profit sector has a significant place in improving their prevention and community reinforcement strategies. It is not a coincidence that the non-profit organizations function in the area of community-based activities and integration activities from schooling to employment and it is a fact that their effort to improve their professionalism in integration activities is formed through the environment of human service sector in US as well.

In this pathway, Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASPF) that is a non-profit organization working with refugees is another important form of humanitarian action in Phoenix in Arizona. The organization also undertakes community-based activities to empower refugees and reinforce the process in which they integrate into America by learning and adapting themselves to the system. The presence of the organization is quite important to display the diversity of the humanitarian action so as to present another capacity of professionalism in Arizona. Such a diversity becomes more of an issue in the neo-liberal structuration of services in US. Moreover, those services take the form of human services as well. Gronbjerg elucidates the mission of nonprofits with a reference to the term of “human services field” by stating that “nonprofit entities dominate the central, traditional social service fields of family and individual counseling, residential care, and vocational rehabilitation” (2001:287).

The organization of Iraqi- American Society for Peace and Friendship is physically a small facility but socially and culturally a large entity in the city of Phoenix. Although they serve for all refugees from different backgrounds, mostly Iraqis visit the organization to receive information and trainings. Besides it is clear from the organization’s way of working that there is also a prominent effort to create an environment of solidarity among Iraqis. Their organizational structure is “hierarchical and segmented” and their style is quite “programmatically, universalistic and secular” (Salamon, 2012: 15). In this regard, the organization, which was established in 1993, works with the refugees in a hierarchical and programmatic form of professionalism so as to facilitate the integration of refugees in Phoenix. The program director of the organization explains how the organization receives fund and what sort of programs the organization conducts in the following manner:

We are a non-profit organization that is based on three years grant from the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Our program is based on three different activities: youth program, we have women program and we have job specialist.

As indicated above, the organization also receives the fund from the Federal State. The office of refugee resettlement (ORR) is a key institution of the refugee admission program and the director of the organization clearly highlights their programs in partnership with ORR. In other words, this relation between IASPF and ORR is a significant indicator of professionalism in terms of accountability, hierarchy, institutional identity, expertise and specific services. As a result, it would not be incorrect to state that the organization's programs on youth, women and employment also directly aim at empowering refugees while alleviating their vulnerabilities. Whether the organization achieves their goals or not is not at stake here; the important point deserves an emphasis that the organization's way of becoming more specific according to the challenges and issues the refugees face upon their arrival in Arizona. Thereupon, it is possible to speak of the organization's field analysis before they start in their programs.

The program director underlines their role and objectives by referring to their educational and informative activities that already take place in the logic of professionalism. Specifically talking, youth program is designed to serve to the needs of young refugees above eighteen years old while taking into consideration the requirements of US schooling system. As a traditional role and objective of nonprofits in the US, the director of the organization highlights the most critical aspects of youth program in the following manner:

Youth program focuses on educating youth upon the arrival here. Basically providing activities for them that would them to be more active within the community and build relationships with other youth from the community. A lot of them stand on the wrong path because a lot of youth come to US and they get emergent idea of freedom and we have a lot of youth that come here over eighteen which, in US school system, if you are over eighteen, you cannot register the public high school so there is a special high school sphere all take GED³⁸. GED is another program that we have to have English, writing and reading skills to be able to take high school diploma. So we have a lot of youth that come seventeen and eighteen that

³⁸ General Educational Development is a test for adults who do not have a high school diploma in US

they can go back to school. And they have to pay a year to register into a college, which is..., they get residence to be able to get financial assistance for their college expenses. We get some activities such as education and workshops so far.

The youth program managed by the organization is substantial in order to understand their “professional” efforts in the field of the refugee integration. The clarity of the program comes from their emphasis on gaps and challenges that specific groups of refugees may face upon their arrival. It is true that the challenging aspects of the process can enable them to be more specific in delivering services for refugees, but on the other side it is clear that a certain portion of their profession comes from volunteers in this sense. For instance, the director explains this in pointing to the activities of volunteers:

We do, we work with volunteers, our English teachers. So our English teacher, level one, is a volunteer. We welcome volunteers. Actually we see a lot of volunteers.

It would be important to underline that being a nonprofit organization with immigrants and refugees not only measures the organizational or project challenges but also calculates gaps and challenges that refugees or immigrants may face in different capacities or volumes from one city to another. Therefore, it may not be possible to talk about the completed professionalism of this sort of community-based organizations since the organization has a huge attempt to fill a big gap in education or services for vulnerable groups.

In a similar vein, the organization’s activities in woman program and employment refer to the existence of the significant issues for specifically refugee area. In addition the organizational challenges of the non-profit organizations, it is more importantly critical that the organizations need to be strengthened in delivering the services for specific groups. Looking at this side of the issues, I will give a place to the director’s words here:

We have a woman program that allows them to become more self-sufficient to provide for the family also because we have a lot of single women and single female that come here with their kids and upon the arrival, who they get it is shocking or it is surprising, it is not what they thought of America is gonna be. It is, you know, resettlement agencies pay for the first three months and after that under own. So the rents are really expensive here, so female, single female comes in, she has, I mean, no job that is gonna be difficult for her to get the family. So we provide different workshops, we provide financial workshops, mmm everything. We have also a job specialist program. The person, or already the staff, looks for jobs for the refugees if they are interested, so it is based on appointments and they walk in. They come if they know their store, they would help them apply or if we have connections with different departments, we can find jobs.

In fact, this short explanation of what the organization says about the plight of single refugee women, single refugee mothers or unemployed refugee individuals. The organization has a huge attempt to improve its profession on the one side and bring important services to the refugees on the other side. It is clear that the organization's mode of working cannot be confined to a set characteristics of professionalism, but the organization presents a set of services for the refugees so that they facilitate their integration in US.

Gronbjerg underlines how the most nonprofit organization changes people in their collaboration with people who receive help and assistance. It is emphasized that this is a significant difference for the nonprofit organizations than other organizations like insurance companies or health services as the ultimate objective may be to "change human behavior, values, or knowledge" (2001:291). This ultimate goal is intermingled with the objectives of humanitarian governance as we already underline. The organizations work with the refugees to increase their level of knowledge about US system. They encourage them to use this knowledge and experience to become more integrated in US system each passing day. Succinctly, US system works to strengthen the nonprofit organizations rather than producing a social policy eliminating major

problems. The system forms a defected environment in which various organizations go to different line of delivering humanitarian action. Even if professionalism is in question in the current mechanism, US system leads to the development of the segmented, hierarchic and structured forms of the community-based organizations.

5.2. Neo-Liberal Restoration of Humanitarian Governance after 9/11

At this point, this study reveals the organizational form, logic and function of the non-profit refugee organizations in the context of Arizona. It is totally compatible to state that the heightened diversity of humanitarian governance through rational, faith-based, philanthropic and professional tools is to make refugees responsible for their new lives in America in a neo-liberal context. In this well-functioning line of the system, the historical moment of September 11, 2001 needs to be evaluated in terms of consequences and impacts over the non-profit refugee organizations.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 (henceforth, 9/11) facilitated the process of revealing all foreign-policy tensions between US government and Saddam regime. Until 9/11, the Bush administration already signaled the political plans to replace the existing foreign policy called “the containment-plus strategy” with a new one whose discursive gravity was formed around “the new global war on terror” (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007). According to US government, Islamist terrorism and Saddam’s regime pose an external and fatal threat to American values and interests in the Middle East. To prevent the growth of the threats, US foreign policy and regional equivalences would be refocused. As a result, the Bush administration revised its policy by pushing the political discourses of “terrorism” and “national security” to the center (Lee, 2006). That is to say, the Bush administration spent a huge effort to keep Americans as an American society by articulating the importance of national security for the sake of US. For this purpose, refugees or migrants arriving in US from the Middle East region, that’s threatful environments, would be questioned at first. The presence of non-citizens or foreigners would go through the lens of the security investigators.

As already pointed, the Bush administration consolidated new regulations to restrict the entry of immigrants and refugees to US President Bush was provided with a set of entitlements to “suspend the rule of law” to be able to investigate or detain non-citizens (Kaldor, 2014). Moreover, the INS would be able to move without waiting the judge decision in case there was a feasible indication of the fact that a foreigner is a threat to the community (Firestone, 2001). New regulations were put into practice to eliminate “potential threats” by approaching their immigration and refugee policy as a security matter or a terror-related issue. Barkdull et.al. (2012) show the vital impacts of 9/11 terrorist attacks over immigrants and refugees by underlying the role of the PATRIOT Act. The provisions of the act has expanded the definition of “terrorist” groups with reference to individuals or groups with arms or material support that can be considered to be defined in the scope of terrorist activity or terrorism and this directly has an impact on refugee protection system.

Unfortunately, the impacts of this process have altered the context of refugee protection in US. Following the production of the policy of war on terrorism, United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants published a report in the year of 2001, stating that

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the US-led military offensive against Afghanistan that began October 7, US refugee program has come to a halt, leaving thousands of refugees overseas in dangerous limbo, straining the limited resources of agencies that resettle them, and exacerbating the decline in annual US refugee admissions for yet another year. (2001).

More specifically, the implementation of the policy statements in this report had a dramatic influence over the refugee admission statistics. It was clear from the statistics provided by the Department of State, Office of Admissions – Refugee Processing Center that US did not admit refugees in high numbers until the year of 2008 and 2009 after the events of 9/11. When we look at the admitted number of refugees in the pre-9/11 period, there was a huge difference between before and after 9/11 (US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions, 2017b: Web).

A set of academic studies shows that there was a proliferation of confusion, anxiety, sadness, discrimination and anger in many forms in the socio-political atmosphere of the post 9/11 area. Barkdull et. al.'s research, for instance, show immigrants and refugees' experience before and after 9/11 and underlines that "incidents of verbal harassment including racial slurs, were common, and many have been called "terrorists" when it comes to especially Muslims in US and also it was common that violence, xenophobia and Islamophobia took place in US (2011:144-146).

To better understand the severity of the situation, according to the report made by the American Immigration Law Foundation in the year of 2004, US government implemented a set of law enforcement actions by "interviewing roughly 100.000 people of Muslim, Arab or South Asian origin, including citizens, permanent residency, individuals legally present in the country..." Moreover, the reports give a place to the aggressive perspective of the Department of Justice that "immigration rules" would be taken up as "a primary weapon" in order to deal with terrorism. In this pathway, "more than 1,200 people, mostly Arabs and Muslims, were rounded up and detained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the days and week after 9/11" (American Immigration Law Foundation, 2004).

The impact zone of the events of 9/11 was not limited to the refugee admission numbers only. Unfortunately, the impact was huge in terms of the social, cultural, political and economic plight of immigrants and refugees, and humanitarian actors. I can state here that 9/11 has been a zone axis, or a very common factor, for the system of humanitarian action that I have explained in the previous sections. That is to say, resettlement agencies, non-profit professional organizations, and voluntary organizations and refugees have dramatically been affected by 9/11 in a negative way.

In this historical punctum, the place of refugees and humanitarian organizations was very critical since, as already touched upon, as Critelli points out as well, US government assessed and implement refugee admission program and humanitarian aid with "security concern in the war against terrorism" (2008:154). In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding here, it is important to underline that 9/11 is not a beginning point for US policies on immigrants and refugees. Therefore, it may not be correct to

put forward that immigrants and refugees are in a bed of roses in US in pre-September 11th. Without going to too much details, it may be right to remark that US government has gradually been implementing its own restrictive policies since 1990s and their main policy has been seeking to curtail immigrant and refugee right so as to use their welfare program more efficiently. In fact, the restrictive aspects of welfare reform and rigid policies on rights of immigrants and refugees are a part of neo-liberal restructuring since 1980s (Critelli, 2008).

On this ground, it is not incorrect to put forward that 9/11 is not a turning point for immigrant and refugee issues in US. However, it is a higher step of revision of immigrant and refugee policies by elevating security concerns while diminishing social and economic benefits to immigrants and refugees³⁹. Therefore, it is important from the standpoint of this research that the emphasis on the provision of the refugee admission programs in terms of duration and efficiency was brought to the front and the philanthropic and project based professional work of community based associations were also highlighted in the poisoned socio-political environment right after 9/11. All of the actors of humanitarian governance were subject to an economic and political restriction when it came to rights and services that were entitled to immigrants and refugees.

Specifying the place of 9/11 as an appearance of neo-liberal revision of humanitarian space on the basis of security-related matters, I will underline here how the Bush administration brings a dual political discourse to the game: on the one hand, as I slightly indicated above, the Bush administration was formulating a social entrepreneurship in emphasizing the importance of the participation of faith-based organizations and civil society dynamics for the good of American society. On the other hand, it is clear from the Bush government that non-citizens, immigrants, refugees and externals would be become a focal point for their security related politics and, as the Department of Justice underlines, immigration policies would be a main weapon to update their policies in the post-9/11 area.

³⁹ Concerning provisions or benefits by resettlement agencies, Barkdull et. al. indicate in their report that it was clarified with reference to the words of Shannon Dennett that there was a huge uncertainty in the resettlement process so that the smaller local resettlement agencies may have to reduce their capacities in terms of staffing and other aspects. Additionally, the hardships refugees faced upon their arrival were emphasized to be dispelled as refugees were discriminated, left undocumented and labeled as criminals (Barkdull et al:2001).

In order to be able to better understand how resettlement agencies and voluntary organizations experienced this process, it would be significant to underline my research findings at this point. In the US, one of the most important agencies, International Rescue Committee (IRC) whose executive director speaks of this process as following:

...in the year post-9/11 we resettled 22,000 refugees. The year prior to 9/11 we resettled 75,000, so just from a government's perspective, refugees first population at the shutdown as it could be controlled. 9/11 was a wake-up call for America and I think that the media has done a wonderful job of keeping us afraid and realistically I mean everybody has to fear ISIS because they are everywhere so I mean it certainly changed things.

What we understand from the comparison between the pre-9/11 and the post-9/11 is the reflection of the rigid practices over the case of Arizona. In fact, there was significant difference in refugee admission statistics after 9/11 and this had been effective over refugee admissions for a while. There were some important components of this process that we have already underlined: security concerns of the public and media effect. When we carefully look at the statements of the director, it is clear that she underlines the name of the threat: ISIS. Indeed, this is an indicator of identifying external threats to US with Islamist terrorists groups. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to state that there is a huge work to tell and differentiate Muslims from terrorist groups to save Muslim refugees specially.

Indeed, it was the first and most important effect of the post-9/11 process over refugee admission program that refugee admission numbers dramatically went down. During our interview with Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix that is affiliated with Lutheran Social Services, it was also underlined that

But it was refugee staff were just so impacted by this even more than I was and other staff; that was the first reaction then of course the refugee program after 9/11 was closed, shut down temporarily; no arrivals until we

figured out what was going on. So the short-term result of 9/11 was completely closing another program; no refugees.

By the same token, Ms. Joanne Morales from Catholic Charities in Phoenix stated that

that I started here in 2003 I know that after not to 9/11 on refugee numbers plummeted and then are just now starting to get back. I know that this obvious additional security checks in place.

It is clear from the statements of the representatives of refugee resettlement organizations that 9/11 has changed many things in the way that refugees are resettled in the host community. In this sense, the first result is the restriction of admissions, but the second one is to seed a kind of security perception in the host community that has altered people in different aspects. As the refugee resettlement organizations working with refugee communities and refugee staff, the results appear at the different level. Starting from their workplaces to host community, these organizations experienced a set of minor and major problems in refugee resettlement process.

In this regard, I will give a place to the statements of the executive director from International Rescue Committee (IRC), which is a very good example of what I mean:

There is what happened to me on the day 9/11; may be this gives a good idea what happened to me shortly thereafter so the day of 9/11. I worked with the staff similar to my staff here who were from all over the world. On the day of 9/11, I had multiple staff that had lived in other parts of the world, who said we're going to war where to sign up they wanted to go fight for the country. I also had one negative call from some persons who probably were angry long before 9/11 about refugee resettlement, who, you know, said some very bad things about CVs of the people. I had a fleet of people who called, who said can help the children of Afghanistan how to help the people of Iraq had a way you know how to get involved to help you and the work you do with refugees so even though 9/11 obviously was a horrible horrible event it didn't really affect the supporters that were

already supporting us in fact I think it made them stronger the general public we had our homework we had work to do we had to get...

In a way, the Bush administration's discourses on "war on terrorism" was partly successful since people had lost their grounds temporarily until they defined themselves in a safe place on the basis of their identities. The Bush administration and the media tried to organize everyone against a common devil namely Islamist terrorism. At the local level, it looks like that it led to the dissemination of a set of negative feeling, anger and fear among refugees themselves and host community members. For instance, JM/50/male, who is the founder of the Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix shares his experience after 9/11 with the following words: "The first place of this organization was attacked by Americans right after 9/11 since there was huge anger and they were probably my neighbors"

On the other hand, the resettlement agencies had to deal with the negative aspects of the discourse of "war on terrorism" since people needed to understand who are refugees; whether they are terrorists or not. It is questionable if the organizations succeed in overcoming this sort of perceptions or difficulties on terrorism or terrorists. However, some of them claim that 9/11 has also created some positive results so as to mobilize social dynamics in understanding refugee matter in a more humanitarian sense. For instance, one of the interviewees, Nicky Walker, a program coordinator for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix underlines that

so we would get questions about you know literally how do you know the terrorist is not coming to the refugee program, not part of our job as educators and in advocacy to help people understand what the process actually is that somebody who is going to the refugee program has to go through State Department checks in a series of the interview. FBI checks, embassy checks that sometimes take years literally and so if you are objective is to become a terrorist into to do a terrorist act you cannot go through a program more than likely that is gonna check into every single part of your background and make sure who you are and that you are not, have been not involved in a terrorist act.

This process has led to a different form of awareness raising for both Americans and refugees. With reference to the discursive structure of the post - 9/11 area, I will put forward that this process is a 'security based awareness raising' for both Americans and refugees. In another saying, in the post 9/11 climate, the resettlement agencies faced a lot of questions from people who were mainly affected by the general political environment produced by the Bush administration. It was understood from the interviews with the resettlement agencies that people were more interested in the religious and ethnic identities of refugees to understand how their country receives those people. Concerns that had not been voiced for refugees till 9/11 by American society pushed Americans to learn about refugees. It is a security based awareness raising for both Americans and refugees and it was a kind of meeting with the Other for Americans because of security alarming.

As a result, this is a process in which the resettlement agencies explained local people about how their government works when it comes to immigrant and refugee admission issue. In fact, this is not a simple process to inform people about security procedures implemented for refugees. In other words, such an information is very critical to relieve American people whose feeling of security was strictly attached to the crystallizable background of refugees by US system. Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix that is affiliated with Lutheran Social Services explains this in the following statements:

People then understood, you know, for instance okay, they learned more about refugees because of 9/11. Well it's like because everyone asking about public meetings, you know we had to go back and start meeting with churches to get their support for resettling refugees; questions would be well refugees are coming from Afghanistan coming from Iran coming from Somalia these are all the countries that you know that are terrorists and what we can get in more terrorist country. Then my response was that people who were refugees are escaping that same violence that same terrorism that were fighting they were victims just like you and I and believe me they there you know they're fighting the same terrorism like we are there they're running from that they're trying to find security so don't

let the names of countries shock you, it is kind of the political extremism that's present all over.

This is the process that discourses and messages of the government, that's components of the national policy, are conveyed to people of America through authorized actors namely refugee resettlement organizations at the local level. It is clear from the perspectives of the refugee resettlement agencies in Arizona that the resettlement agencies were in a hard situation to win the hearts and minds of people. It was done by the resettlement agencies by using a language that envisages refugees as victims and survivors of terrorism. However, the emphasis is mostly how they are victimized by terrorists and thereby needing assistance from the public and private actors. In doing so, the representatives of the refugee resettlement agencies mostly do not avoid positioning themselves as "educators" for public. They put themselves as a knowing subject in this process. They are not moderate or concessive in this sense. From this point, I will my argument a bit clear with reference to the words of Mr. Ferdinand Lossou from Catholic Services in Tucson:

We educated host community, receiving community. But, I told you earlier, before they come to the US, they are conducted background check, criminal background check and refugee is most scrutinized immigrant. If you are involved in a terrorist activism, you are banned to be admitted to the US. So, after the post 9/11, we educated community, refugee they are good people, they are not terrorist, they are here because they need protection.

In a similar vein, the importance of education or educational activities to raise awareness for American people is underlined by Ms. Joanne Morales, from Catholic Charities in Phoenix, as following:

when people when you actually sit down with someone you talk to them about it most people get it they know that they're coming here because of an urgent humanitarian rescue and they kind of get it in the air supportive overall but you do have to work with the ethnic community as well and

you have to make sure that were all doing apartment education consists critical if you have a community support you can't do it you can get that important you can't do resettlement without the community support... but again this is what makes education more important than ever with this climate and an understanding and faith communities have been of, faith-communities been very generous very generous whether their Christian Muslim they all care, my parishes support Muslim families too.

As understood from the representatives of the resettlement agencies, security based awareness raising is mainly motivated by the mission of educating public on who is refugee, why refugees are in Arizona and what refugees need or how community can support them. At this point, in order to get rid of determinism regarding security issue, it is also important to touch upon that the resettlement agencies need to speak of added values refugees make to contribute to the social and economic lives of Arizona in US. Therefore, it is important to underline the words of Ms. Joanne Morales from Catholic Charities in Phoenix:

this has partly to do with the economy as well write the economy in America was bad therefore also now we have to make sure you are also telling the story of what they bring not only what they flee but what did they bring and why they should be here and why should they stay because they're integrated because they become supporters of our community because they pay taxes because they buy houses because they grow food in all those stories have to be told as well but I think 9/11 did really remind us to tell the story of who they were and what have they fled.

It can be stated here that the resettlement agencies and other non-profit organizations underline their achievements in awareness raising in a general sense. The resettlement agencies stress upon the increasing awareness of community in refugee issues after 9/11. It was a kind of revitalization of 'American spirit'. That is to say, US showed and demonstrated its strength by starting the refugee admission program after six months cassation and this is, in a sense, an appearance of "symbolic value" meaning

that US has kept her doors open to those who are poor, flee from violence and deprivation. Mr. Craig from Refugee Focus in Phoenix explains this as following:

In a few years we're back to work so long-term in some way, I think it may people become more aware of refugees we've always the refugee program is always really strong political support because it's a very symbolic program like the Statue of Liberty give me your tour to your tired and give your poor it even though our door is only used to be open like this now is only open like for small small numbers of people but that is still open for people who flee from political and social persecution.

From this standpoint, it is not possible to generalize the socio-psychological attitudes of American people against Iraqi refugees or immigrant groups in Arizona. However, there are several clear outcomes as a result of this process that American community and refugees traumatically experienced the post 9/11 socio-political climate. The Bush administration created a common enemy as terrorism growing out from the Middle East countries. In fact, such a political discourse was more effective over Islamic communities than others since people mainly have questions in their minds about the relation between terrorism and Islam, and Muslims. Thereupon, it is often emphasized during my interviews that refugees who come from Islam countries, especially Muslim Iraqis, have a particular condition of living in US right after the tragic incident of 9/11.

For American community, it was challenging to manage their security conditions. This condition has started encouraging or forcing some of American community to recognize Muslims, in other words their 'permanent other', who is next to them in their neighborhood, schools, and workplaces. Depending on individual motivations as well, this process has led to the increasing awareness of what Islam is and of how Muslims come and live in US as I underlined before, this kind of awareness raising about Islam through Muslim immigrants and refugees was a result of the necessity of living together. They approached and asked questions about refugees in the context of the refugee admission program. The program director for the Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship Association in Phoenix summarizes this as following:

I can't speak on behalf of everyone, but personally I think it did change after 9/11 more on individuals who were aware of Islam and who were aware of us. I think the news were everywhere. Websites and social media allowed people to recognize Islam and read about that and learn more about that. I think they got knowledge rather than prejudices. It depends on how individual took it. Some were reading and learning about that it was positive even you work with a scarf at a job. I mean I personally had a lot of questions before that why you were here. I gave lot of stories. After 9/11, I know the sound was difference. Some people did not get, they did not come back to. Some people, they have more knowledge about. It depends there is positive or negative, but more positive because allowed to read and get more knowledge about Islam.

As I put forward earlier, this process is 'security based awareness raising'. In the post 9/11 environment, the organizations explained the plight of refugees in Arizona in explaining who Muslims are to people who approach and ask about Islamic groups. Therefore, the overall results show that security based awareness raising has alerted American society to know much more about how their refugee admission system works and how refugees can be distinguished from context of terrorism.

No doubt, the role of the resettlement agencies in particular and other non-profit organizations in general has been constructive to relive the negative results of 9/11. From the first day of the incident, they have attempted to keep their humanitarian work for refugees by mobilizing community actors and resources. However, the top-down process of US politics had already announced the shift of the dynamics of foreign policy before 9/11 due to the threatful presence of the Saddam government. There had already been looking alternatives in changing US paradigm for the Middle East namely "the containment-plus strategy". However, this shift of US paradigm against the Saddam regime was not sustainable and, "the new global war on terror" was put into practice by President Bush, as already underlined (Ritchie and Rogers, 2007). This top-down process is important to understand how the Bush administration linked the Saddam regime to this new shift of paradigm called "the new global war on terror" in the post - 9/11 environment. The Bush administration has pushed the theme of terror

to the daily lives of American people by pointing at the zone of immigrants and refugees as a part of a kind of externality to American society.

What is at stake here is the demolition of US traditional liberal or democratic values under the increasing weight of neoliberal governmentality. As Wendy Brown clearly points out, “neoliberal rationality has not caused but rather facilitated the dismantling of democracy during the current national security crisis” since the neo-liberal logic of the process required a cost-effective construction of practices. Besides she underlines that “the post-9/11 period has brought the ramifications of neoliberal rationality into sharp focus, largely through practices and policies that progressives assail as hypocrisies, lies, or contradictions...” (2005:47) On this ground, 9/11 cannot be taken up as a simple process of securitization on foreign policy and national security. It is a much related component of the neo-liberal governmentality that also sets the dynamics of humanitarian governance in the logic of the cost-effective policies that are not accorded with the democratic principles.

Following this neo-liberal rationality, the Bush administration pointed at the important role of faith-based and community groups to strengthen solidarity among American people in the process prior to 9/11 (Bush, 2001b). In the context of the top-down process of the global war on terror after 9/11, the Bush administration has re-emphasized the importance of the role of faith-based and community groups in the post-9/11 climate. President Bush’s talk on “key elements of his faith-based initiatives” is important to understand how the humanitarian space has been re-organized after 9/11. He mounts an argument on faith-based initiatives and volunteerism by putting the effects of 9/11. He says that “we have that obligation, to recognize the world changed for America on September the 11th, 2001... our government and your leadership must have a realistic assessment of the dangers we have faced and we will face” (Bush, 2002c: Web). He underlines their historical responsibilities to protect American people by underlining his sentences above. President Bush stresses upon this point to make his ultimate point that

Faith-based charities work daily miracles because they have idealistic volunteers. They’re guided by moral principles. They know the problems

of their own communities... They deserve the support of the rest of us. They deserve the support of foundations. They deserve the support of corporate America... Faith-based groups will never replace government when it comes to helping those in need. Yet government must recognize the power and unique contribution of faith-based groups in every part of our country” (Bush, 2002c: Web).

In light of the findings of my interviews with the non-profit organizations in the US, the post-9/11 area has altered the neo-liberal functioning of humanitarian governance as well. Therefore, I will specify the place of humanitarian governance in the context of the socio-economic consequences of 9/11. In this sense, as I already demonstrated, US political project was to strengthen the national economic structure by proving their military dominance in the world politics. Mosaddeq points to the importance of US efforts to keep their strategic and economic interests through the military influence before 9/11 (2002) and Bello also points to the strategic and economic crisis of US before 9/11 in explaining how “corporate money politics” negatively affected the general corruption of liberal values and democracy in US in this climate, the restoration of “corporate-driven globalization” in the North was realized through the channel of the post-9/11 (Bello, 2001).

At this juncture, I put forward that humanitarian governance is also an important part of the restoration of “corporate-driven globalization”. Therefore, it is not enough to preoccupy with the results of the 9/11 with securitization or national security when it comes to the plight of immigrants and refugees. Throughout US history, immigrants and refugees are irreplaceable and essential piece of American nation. As understood from my interviewees, it has a very strong “symbolic value” that comes from the spirit of “the New Colossus”. As I explained above, US accepted millions of people from different social, religious, politic and ethnic backgrounds. That may be seen as more smooth aspect of social inclusion. On time, US has altered its immigrant and refugee policy on the ground of its foreign policy. In other words, US has started to underline the external character of immigrants and refugees before American community. Under the consequences of 9/11, US has embodied its immigrant and refugee policy on the basis of its strategic and economic priorities. Iraq has been one of the catastrophic

examples of this process. Therefore, refugees in general and Iraqis in particular cannot be seen as a part of a securitization or national security matter. They are the subjects of the restored humanitarian governance that comes with the devalorization of democratic values and human dignity in many aspects. In this regard, US has explored a cost-effective construction of American community by reducing the responsibilities of the State some more and the construction of community as faith-based organizations or volunteers is a form of a cost-effective form of alleviation of human suffering. This process has been also subject to the proliferation of political discourses that are related to national security, immigrants, refugees and Islam.

My interviews with the organizations and volunteers show the immediate impression of 9/11 over their work, but on the other hand it is quite clear that their work has required a struggle with the public influence of the aforementioned discourses over American people. As Brown (2005) indicates, “progressives assail as hypocrisies, lies, or contradictions” when it comes to results of 9/11. It is logical to call this process a sort of “hypocrisy” as US government has implemented a dual politics in the area of civil society; on the one side the government encouraged a kind of social entrepreneurship by including faith-based organizations and volunteers for the public good of American society and on the other side the government harmed the democratic rights of immigrants and refugees by transforming them to the essential subjects of the labor market in the neo-liberal restoration of humanitarian governance. The post- 9/11 has re-positioned the essential dynamics of US social and economic interests in the general logic of the global capitalism. The mainspring of this process has been the policy of immigrants and refugees since September 11th, 2001. In brief, the neo-liberal restoration of humanitarian governance is another instance of “war nam nihadan⁴⁰” in US.

5.3. A Politics of Refugee Lives in Humanitarian Governance: from Iraq to Arizona

In the organization of this study, the above mentioned frame mainly demonstrates the cornerstones of humanitarian governance in a neo-liberal context of US. Here, it is

⁴⁰ It is a Persian expression that means “to murder somebody, bury his body, and then grow flowers over the body to conceal it”. Zizek uses the expression by analyzing the Arab Spring in his book of “the year of dreaming dangerously”.

clear that Iraqi refugees are the most important subject of this process; therefore their unique conditions need to be placed in humanitarian governance by explaining the details of their forced migration from Iraq to Arizona.

In the post-resettlement area, Arizona is an important instance of refugee admission program to figure out the diversity of the post-resettlement actors in an organization of humanitarian governance from different angles. Statistically talking, Arizona has been the fourth rank among the ten states who has been receives Iraqi refugees in high numbers all over US since the year of 2007. Almost 9,000 Iraqi refugees were resettled in the state of Arizona within a decade (United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2017c: Web) Besides, Arizona Department of Economic Security underlines that “since the inception of the program in 1978, over 60,000 refugees have made Arizona home” and lists the latest aggregate number of refugee arrivals for Iraqis is 12,212 since the year of 1981. Arizona receives refugees from approximately one hundred countries. Iraq is the first among those countries. After Iraq, Cuba is the second, Somali is the third and Bosnia is the fourth countries (Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2017: Web). As mentioned earlier, BPRM numbers show that 141,675 Iraqi refugees have been resettled in the US since 2007. Similarly, Arizona has received 8,229 Iraqi refugees since 2007 (United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2017c: Web).

As underlined above, after the refugees arrive in Arizona, the resettlement agencies get in, take the refugees from the airport, place them in a furnished flat, meet their basic needs, and provide a basic orientation with them on the basis of cooperation agreement with US Department of State. These are “the reception and placement program” and “matching grant program”. In addition to these, Arizona The refugee resettlement program contains “refugee cash assistance (RCA)”, “refugee medical assistance (RMA)”, “refugee health promotion”, “English language training”, “unaccompanied refugee minors (URM)”, “case management and employment services”, “refugee school impact program” and “AmeriCorps VISTA project” (Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2017:Web). However, it can clearly be underscored from this point that the nature of the assistances provided by the American authorities is temporarily a part of the system to assist refugees until they get a job.

There would be no a long-term assistance for refugees in US. What the humanitarian governance of refugee resettlement system necessitates is the “competence assumption” of refugees. They have to work and make their lives on their own without waiting for a long-term assistance from the authorities. Therefore, the timeframe of the assistances is limited to six or eight months, but not more.

It is known from my research findings that humanitarian governance of refugee resettlement system demonstrate a diversity of how US system handles with the refugees in the case of Arizona. There are various types of actors and organizations, the paternalistic, the faith-based, and the philanthropic. All of these organizations, actors, volunteer individuals look at the post-refugee resettlement process from the top and they often approach the refugees to supervise, teach, orient and educate them. In other word, they become aware of the refugees and of their positional priority against them. They are the constitutive subjects of humanitarian governance so that they contribute to the lives of refugees to affect, change, shape and transform their lifestyles, habits, social and cultural interactions, integration in to American community.

At this point, the other side of the coin indispensably draws our attention to refugee experience or refugee condition so as to give a voice of their stories and experiences in this process. Therefore, Iraqi refugees’ experiences deserve a full-dressed analysis in close conjunction with the concept of humanitarian governance. Such an analysis is important to understand the humanitarian governance of refugees under the impression of forced migration. Developing my arguments during my analysis of research findings, I have provided a historical basis for Iraq and US relations so as to find out how forced migration appears in a global context of international equilibriums. This point is important from the point of view of Castles as well since he also underlines that “forced migration is not the result of a sting of unconnected emergencies but rather an integral part of North-South relationships makes it necessary to theorize forced migration and link it to economic migration” (2003b:17). Following this, it is also underlined that “the powerful Northern states” and “the intergovernmental agencies” undertake their roles in order to prevent forced migration (2003b), or to alleviate human suffering as a result of forced migration.

To prevent the negative results of forced migration or to alleviate the suffering of people, humanitarianism surfaces with its social, political and economic attachments to forced migration. Moreover, Castles demonstrates that the fragile relation between development and humanitarianism comes with a new task of “the transformation of whole societies in order to prevent conflict and to achieve social and economic change” (2003b:19). He emphasizes this since “humanitarian action” and “military intervention” alter the social and economic structures of societies. To make the development sustainable, the transformation of whole societies is a necessity for Northern countries whose ultimate goal would be to change societies as whole through value systems and political structures (Castles, 2003b; Duffield, 2001). From this point, forced migration takes us to find out the “social and cultural diversity of populations” in Northern countries since it is a “social transformation”. Furthermore, it is the “proliferation of transnational communities” (Castles, 2003b).

At this juncture, I put forward that humanitarian governance is also much linked to the processes of development, economic growth, global capitalism or international economic and political order. Northern countries represents the social and economic hegemony over the countries that belong to “rough states”. Within the North/South distinction, forced migration appears as a form of the “asylum-migration nexus”. As a result, migrants and asylum-seekers leave their country of origin because of different reasons that may not be much competitive when it comes to the mobility of people. However, it is clear that the (re)production of forced migration leads to social transformation with the new forms of migrant and refugee communities. In this context, it is possible to state that humanitarian governance of refugees demonstrates us how a socio-economically strong state, like the US, manages the process of social transformation at the local and national level. In order to underline the link between humanitarian governance and development, it is not incorrect to state that the admission of refugees and immigrants is related to their labor recruitment process (Castles, 1998). Humanitarian governance of refugees needs to be analyzed from the viewpoints of refugees as primary subjects of individual and social transformation in their experiences.

In this regard, it is important to see refugee experiences at the limits of refugee resettlement system in order to be able to present a full-dressed analysis of how the refugees manage their adaptation and integration process in US in the beginning of the process of forced migration, refugees are unfortunately forced to make a decision to make their own way. They are forced to leave their countries as they flee from violence, conflict or war. They spend their years in living with a full of uncertainty in a country of asylum while waiting to be resettled in a safe third country. Having resettled in the US, the refugees start to live in a more structured system, but they still lead a life with uncertainties. The nature of the process of forced migration to resettlement is indispensably vulnerable to a lot of uncertainties for refugees. As put in a different way before, a paternalist construction of refugee admissions work with the decisions already made by the authorities. Therefore, it is not possible to put forward that the refugees can easily make their decisions on their new lives in US. To avoid any misunderstanding here, it is necessary to pay attention that the system does not prevent them from making a decision on their choices in the post-resettlement period. If they were able to create their socio-economic eligibility, they would be able to make a decision on their own way to choose their work, residence and education life.

At this point, my emphasis is on the pre-given conditions that surround all refugees upon their arrival in Arizona. Under these pre-given conditions, Iraqi refugees are included in a refugee admission system unless their consent is asked. The simple logic of the system is to perform a task which is thought to be as the best interest of refugees upon their arrival in a paternalist mode of the post-resettlement area (Barnet and Duvall, 2012b).

From this standpoint, I employ the concept of humanitarian governance to point to the other side of the coin: Iraqi refugees. US builds up the coherence of humanitarian governance by arraying all layers of forced migration on the ground of its own strategic and economic interests. As explained above, the paternalist, philanthropic, faith-based and volunteer structures of the process represent one of the most important strata. In this picture, another strata of humanitarian governance appears a kind of “politics of life”. In fact, Fassin calls it humanitarianism as a “politics of life” (2007:508). In

accordance with the spirit of Fassin's argument, I put forward that US decides who will be saved, who will be defended, and who will be risked in the process of humanitarian governance. In other words, he puts forward that "humanitarian intervention is also a politics of life" (2007:501). As explained above, "humanitarian intervention" led to armed conflict, natural disasters and further deficiencies as Western military interventions into another country come with its "justification and humanitarian grounds" (2007:508).

To put it more clearly, this last point made by Fassin takes us to the origins of humanitarian governance in terms of its paternalist character when it comes to military intervention in another country. Considering US invasion of Iraq as a kind of military intervention, as Kaldor indicates, "the war on terror" leads to two competing paradigms; on the one side "the American notion of cosmic struggle between good (the West) and evil (Islam), on the other side "an alternative notion based on the project of extending an internal rule of law, respect for human rights and global governance". It is equally important with the form of the war on terror that "a new war" is launched by "combinations of state and non-state actors not for reasons of state or ideology, but for identity" (2007: 15-16). Taking this argument a step further, she underlines in the case of Iraq that "think about humanitarian assistance – the assumption in old wars that you remain neutral between the sides and provide aid to the civilians. But in today's new wars you can't distinguish between civilians and combatants..." (2007:18) Since the year of 2003, US new notion of the war on terror has taken the form of a new war in Iraq. Millions of Iraqis have left their home. Even today, ethnic and sectarian clashes go on and lead to the death of thousands of civilians.

In this picture, "politics of life" will be serving to a small portion of Iraqi refugees in the hands of US. Furthermore, this process is not divorced from the general function of humanitarian governance at a global and local level. All power dynamics of humanitarian action takes the form of institutions, rules, and procedures. Resettlement is the most important option for many in this sense since the process of resettlement ultimately saves refugees from further life threatening risks by promising the citizenship opportunity in another country. However, this process does not take a way smoothly since the complicated function of humanitarian governance a politics of life

into that of refugee lives. As a result, I put forward this process as “a politics of refugee lives” since humanitarian governance establishes a gradual intervention of saving lives, choosing lives, resettling lives, etc. as a mode of incorporation from employment to education, or to Americanization.

5.3.1. Saved Lives: Why Iraqis Left Their Home Country?

Scholars studying on Iraq stress upon the long history of the country with the full of the socio-political crises and human suffering in the different periods. One of the most important scholars on Iraq, Geraldine Chatelard, demonstrates that forced migration, especially in the post-2003 process, needs to be taken up in “previous sociological and spatial dynamics in a county where large-scale forced migration movement can be traced back to” the 1920s (2009a: 4).

During my analysis of the historical duration between US and Iraq, I have often underlined the fact that the underlying reasons of forced migration need to be scrutinized in the long-history of Iraq because of its strategic and economic value for US and Western countries. Focusing upon the historical process between the Gulf War and the fall of the Ba’thist regime, she underlines that a half million Iraqis left their countries permanently between 1990 and end of 2002 due to various reasons such as economic embargo, decreasing life standards, increasing of arbitrariness, coercion and physical pressure, prevention of the return of those who had taken refuge in Iran, and assassination attempts to Shi’te political groups (the Da’wa partly) (2009a: 13-23).

From the standpoint of my research findings, it is possible to speak of this above-mentioned process by snapping the refugee experiences that belong to that period. One of my interviewees, JM/50/male underlines how he had to leave his home right after the First Gulf War in the following statements:

It was 1991. I was party to an uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein. After the regime crushed the uprising, we did not have a choice. If we stay, we will be prosecuted, maybe we will be put in the jail by the dictator regime if we stay in Iraq. So I decided to leave the country. I heard,

after the first Gulf War, United States army and the coalition army in the border of Iraq with the Saudi Arabia. So I walked to cross the desert to the border and it took seven days to the border. I found another thousands of people in the same situations. All of us young, I was 23 years old when I crossed the desert. There was thousands of young guys who left their home because we didn't want to be punished by the regime.

It is clear from JM's statement that the opponents against the regime had many difficulties when it comes to freedom of demonstration and of speech. In other word, their basic human rights were undermined by the regime and, due to physical safety and security problems, and fear of imprisonment, he left his home country. By the same token, another interviewee, I/69/male expresses his experiences as following:

I was in Iraq. For many years, I escaped from Saddam's brutality. I did not want to join the military in Iraq and I always hide at my sister's home. I never got out of the home. I had the opportunity and had managed to come to Turkey.

It is again the same theme from I.'s words that he did not want to live under the Saddam's 'brutality' and he escaped from the compulsory military service as he did not want to be a party to the crimes committed by the regime. He left the country before US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the same vein, I interviewed another Iraqi guy, A/50/male, who is already an American citizen, but he came to US as a refugee right after the First Gulf War and explains his experience in the following manner:

You know, Saddam Hussein was a president. We had more problems. Everybody. Specially, I am a Shia, Muslim. Unfortunately, economy is go worse to worse, and then no job. If you talk about anything, you will go to the jail. This is why I left my family to go to Jordan.

Although he emphasizes on the problem of security growing out of the repressive implications of the regime, he also draws another aspect of the process by point to their economic situation that was getting worse after in the early 1990s of Iraq. It is

important to underline that the demolition of the national economy under the embargo was accompanied with the repressive domestic policies by the regime. As understood from the interviewees, there were already clashing aspects of the process from the point of some Shi'a groups, Kurdish regions, and the political opponents against the regime.

The state of Iraq was economically declining and the political climate of the state did not have positive indicators for Iraqis. People started to leave Iraq as there were lot of reasons for their mobility. At this point, it is important to recall how Castles (2002b) links forced migration to development. In the early 1990s, it was clear for Iraqi people that their country would not be in a position to keep its welfare level on hand and it would be going from bad to worse. In fact, the social, economic and political reasons were intermingled in this process as the political pressure of the regime over the opponents and some other ethnic and religious groups signaled the severity of violations of human rights. It is also significant to underscore that 1990s are not the age of a new war for Iraq.

Kaldor (2007) distinguishes a new war from the old war by pointing to the process of the dissolution of the state, rather than a state-building process. Between the years of 1990 and end of 2002, it can be stated in the same pathway with Kaldor that Iraq state was in the dissolution process as the regime and the state were mingled entities. More importantly, these years witnessed the facilitation of social transformation of Iraq society under the impression of the social and ideological dynamics of globalization. In other words, this social transformation process is a forerunner of a forthcoming new war in 2000s and then new wars will deeply change Iraqis lives.

Iraq has underwent a social transformation over the years. With reference to Castles (2006), I can state that social transformation is a cause of forced migration in Iraq. Amnesty International's report on Iraq shows how Iraq has been the country that produces refugees that "about 580.000 Iraqis who came in several waves in 1975, the 1980s and in 1991" fled abroad to seek asylum in the Middle East and Western countries (AI, 1997). For this period, I will put forward through the results of my research findings that Saddam's regime took a stand against its people by imposing

the political and economic instruments of force and persecution. All of these indicators constitute the material conditions of forced migration for Iraqis for that time.

Under these circumstances, Iraqis' sense of belonging to their home country has been harmed and many left their homes. When it comes to the year of 2003, US invasion of Iraq has deeply affected everything. In the above-mentioned dynamics of social transformation, the dissolution of the regime was achieved by US. However, the appearance of the covered social and political tension has led to the devastating outcomes for Iraqis. With reference to Dawod and Bozarslan, Chatelard underlines that

the global social organization of Iraqi migration has been shaped as much by the nature of the coercion subsequent Iraqi regimes have exerted upon the society – by fragmenting the population along corporate lines based on kinship, religion, ethnicity but also ideological orientations and class, and by exerting control upon the mobilities of individuals. (Cited by Chatelard, 2009b:4).

Unfortunately, Iraq has been stuck in a vicious conflict that ethnic, religious and ideological fractions have taken their own positions to fight for their own “identities”. The ongoing social and political brutality was ended through the appearance of a new war, borrowing the term from Kaldor. It has been a bloody war that there is no one who wins the war. As Kaldor points out, “you can't win a new war. All you do if you go to war is to make the war much worse – which is what is happening in Afghanistan and Iraq” (2007:18). Moreover, I will put it simply that the (re)production of forced migration is motorized through this sort of a new war. When I completed my interviews with Iraqi refugees in Arizona in 2015, Iraq was still producing refugees and today it still produces refugees and unfortunately the war goes on with thousands of tragic events. Among my interviewees, who left their countries after US invasion of Iraq in 2003, some of them show the severity of sectarian violence in Iraq.

To be able to better understand both the situation of Iraq after US invasion and why Iraqis left their countries, I will give a place to the refugee experience at this point.

NS/32/male, who left their home country in 2011, explains why he and his family members left their country as following:

I came to Turkey because we have relatives in Turkey. These people was here before we are coming and they tell us if they need help of applying as refugees, you can come to Turkey. You can apply to Turkey and you go to third country because our country is completely destroyed, you cannot live over there. Because I am from Sunni religion and I cannot really live over there. We got threats from different people and we don't know them.

It is explicit from his statements that he and his family members did not break their communication with their relatives while they were in Turkey. Through their internal information flow, they made a decision to leave their home country. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to generalize this point when it comes to Iraqis family bonds. On the other side, it is understandable from his saying that they flee from the sectarian violence and they do not know who those people are. In the conceptualization of the new war, it can be deduced that the first incentive to move from their home to the neighboring countries is the being of vital risks that makes their lives impossible in Iraq. The source of the risk is the vicious form of a new war in Iraq following US invasion of Iraq.

By the same token, Ferris points to the seriousness of the situation in Iraq by analyzing the case of displacement and security as following:

Since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes because of fear—fear of sectarian violence, fear of coalition forces, fear of bandits and kidnappers. Many leave because they have been targeted by sectarian militias or because of explicit threats to their lives. Some leave because they cannot get medical care inside Iraq, because their children cannot go to schools, or because their businesses are no longer sustainable.(2008:1)

The age has been out of the joint for Iraq over years and years. US attack against Iraq pushed Iraqi civilians to a war without winner. The proliferation of fear and risks is in at the point where no one is able to act to give a stop to the tragic incidents. Security and safety are two inseparable element of their lives in Iraq. One of my interviewees, D/51/male, who left his home country in 2009, have been living in Arizona almost seven years with a huge longing for his home country and he has been resettled in US with his wife and children and they are of Ezidis and he explains why they were forced to leave Iraq in the following words:

ISIS, I received a lot of threats that they will kill us. I received lot of letters that they put letters, they wanted to kidnap my kids. My kids didn't go to school because of ISIS and threats. We went to Turkey to apply for UN program for refugees

They are survivors of everyday violence and trauma. The only solution for them was to escape from their country. During our interview, he often also emphasized his worries for his extended family members in Iraq. It looked like to me from his saying that he has been living his everyday with his relatives in Iraq and he was always following the news. In the similar way, the social transformation of Iraq through a new war leads to a huge uncertainty for their lives in Iraq. The origins of risk and uncertainty comes with a set of certain outcomes for Ezidis and Christians in Iraq. On the other hand, sectarian violence targets everyone in the middle of fighting for identities. The origins of risk and uncertainty result from everyday violence from ISIS, sectarian groups or any other players of dirty wars and conflicts. It is also significant to point to the fact that Iraqis have started to live with the feeling of insecurity in their everyday lives, especially after the year of 2003. To make this point concrete, I will give a place to the statements of O/32/male:

I left my country because there is no safety and when I got up and go to work, maybe I can come back, maybe I cannot come back to home because of the situation. There is no work, there is no money, Baghdad is not secure and we cannot live in Iraq. Because of these reasons, I left the country

because there is violence between religions and I left it. This reason is that I left Iraq and I came to Turkey.

In the words of O/32/male, it is clear anymore that the material conditions of forced migration make “asylum-migration nexus” visible in terms of the incentives to move beyond the borders. The lack of human rights, security, safety and rule of law brings along the demise of national economy, labor market, social life and other components of everyday life. O/32/male had to leave their home country not to live in social and economic insecurity and uncertainty; most importantly, he did want to leave his family to insecure conditions of Iraq.

In the process of social transformation as well as forced migration, gender has an important variable that needs to be underscored when it comes to the refugee experiences. Nadjé Sadig Al-Ali’s prosperous book, *Iraqi Women*, demonstrates the changing social status of Iraqi women in the historical continuum of Iraq. In the socio-political climate of the post-First Gulf War, Al-Ali underlines that the social status of Iraqi women were gradually diminished in the public life under the negative influence of economic embargo and regional politics and “social conservatism” had been gradually encouraged through the regime in 1990s. She explains this in the following manner:

Girls, especially, suffer in a climate where patriarchal values were strengthened and where the state abandoned its previous policies of social inclusion vis-à-vis women. In the midst of the inversion of moral values and cultural codes, economic hardships and political repression, more and more women and men turned to religion for comfort...not only has there been a growing trend towards religiosity by women, but women have also been subjected to increasing social pressures that expect and demand the expression of religious adherence. For women this often culminates in the question of whether to wear the *hijab* or not – the *hijab* being the most visible and obvious sign of religious adherence and supposedly good moral conduct (Al-Ali, 2007:203).

In the following years of 1990s, the plight of Iraqi women can be elucidated by pointing to the regression of the women's human rights in Iraq. In other words, between the years of the beginning of 1990s and the early 2000s, Iraqi women lost their status in the social, economic, and civil life of Iraq. With US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the general picture of the regression was replaced with a sort of uncontrollable violence against many Iraqi women. Unfortunately, Iraqi women have become a target for different groups and sects in the post-invasion period. Al-Ali underscores that Iraqi women have been under the threat by "occupation forces, Islamist militants" and other criminal groups (2007). In order to display the realities of the post-invasion period, it would be fruitful to read the following passage from Al-Ali:

In 2004, reports from several cities around Iraq stated that Islamist extremists were targeting universities by threatening and even attacking female students who were wearing Western-style fashions, setting off bombs on campuses and demanding that classes be segregated by sex. Thousands of female students decided to postpone their studies after bombs exploded in a number of universities (2007:240).

After the invasion of Iraq, the women and children have found themselves in an unavoidable violence. In the form of a new war, the collapse of the state led to the decentralization of violence in Iraq. Until the invasion, the state has a central power to impose violence against its people through the state-based apparatus. After the invasion, as Sassoon points out; "once the state had collapsed and its institutions, which were run mainly by a secular urban cadre, had disintegrated, ethnicity and tribalism took over" (2009:14). Under these conditions Iraqi women remained more vulnerable to gender-based violence and other worst forms of exploitation through a decentralized network of violence. MADRE's report draws our attention to a tragic reality that "more than 400 Iraqi women were abducted and raped within the first four months of US occupation" (2007:7) and the report also demonstrates who are at the risk through Islamic groups as well. In this sense, the report explains that

In Iraq, women, Christians, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, and intersex (LGBTTI) Iraqis have been among the Islamists'

first targets of violence. For example, the Mujahadin Shura Group vows to kill any woman seen in public without a headscarf. Mujahadin Shura listed among its reasons for opposing the January 2005 Iraqi elections the need to prevent Iraq from “becoming homosexual. (2007:8).

In light of the above-mentioned historical conditions, the reasons for the forced migration of Iraqi women are clear in many aspects. During my interviews with Iraqi women refugees in Arizona, this reality reveals itself with the similar insecurity reasons as well. One of my interviewees, B/31/female, who is a young lady and who is a computer engineer from Iraq, had to leave her country after the invasion and explained her main reason for this as following:

Because the situation in Iraq is very bad. Someone told me in a threatful manner that I should wear the hijab. So I was afraid and I left the country because I do not like to wear the hijab. I finished my bachelor’s degree and left the country and went to Jordan and stayed there for six years.

She was unfortunately forced to change her dressing or style if she wished to live in Iraq. She was at the last stage of her education and she managed to finish her university education and she made a decision to leave the country. There were also various reasons underlying her decision since she underlined that it would not be possible for her to make a good life for herself in Iraq. She was under the threats of unknown groups or Islamic militias like the rest of Iraqi women, especially widows and single women with children. There is organized logic of social repression over the women through the hand of a decentralized violence in Iraq⁴¹. Apparently, what we understand from her saying is her being subjected to a psychological violence. She was subjected to this sort violence because of she is a woman in Iraq.

A detailed inquiry of US invasion over the Iraqi women’s human rights is out of the scope of this study. However, it is important to underline that US invasion deepened the crisis on the contrary to its discourses on “liberating Iraqi people”. The Bush

⁴¹ MADRE reports that “Since the US overthrow of Iraq’s authoritarian and powerfully centralized government, the country has been overrun by networks of criminal gangs, militias, and paramilitary units, including the complex of shadowy groups that comprise the anti-US insurgency. One senior US military official estimated in October 2006 that there were more than 23 militias operating in Baghdad alone” (2007:7).

administration paved the way for the ideological struggle among various religious and radical groups. More concretely, as MADRE reports,

Violence against women is a primary weapon in the arsenal of fundamentalists of various religions, who seek to impose their political agenda on society. Often, the first salvo in a war for theocracy is a systematic attack on women and minorities who represent or demand an alternative or competing vision for society. (2007:8).

B/31/female was subjected to this sort of violence because of her being a woman in Iraq. The only way for her to resist those unknown people or groups was to flee from Iraq. By the same token, Z/47/female tells what she experienced after the invasion: “In Iraq, no safety, war. My husband died in the war. I was alone and I left my country and went to Syria and stayed there for 7 years.”

By reference to Castles’s term of social transformation as a cause of forced migration, the armed conflict, criminal gangs, militias, and paramilitary units have deeply harmed the social structure of Iraq after the invasion and Iraq has gone through a condition of a generalized violence that still paves the way for forced migration. The rate of civilian deaths has still been in an upward trend. The increasing numbers of widows and single parents become more prominent each passing day. Living as a woman with minor children or a widow means living with the full of risks of violence in Iraq. The situation of Iraq represents a case of crimes against women and children, hereby against the humanity.

The negative impacts of violence over women, children and families enable us to analyze forced migration as a stratified phenomenon rather than a process as a result of immediate decision-making. In the current situation of Iraq, women also make decisions to mitigate the possible risks of the generalized violence on their children and family members. However, although the main motivation behind their decisions is to get rid of the violence zone of Iraq and to protect their small children, they also already know that there is no hope at all for their future, job, social life in Iraq. The

first attempt is to find a shelter to get away themselves and their families from violence in escaping to the neighbor countries.

One of the interviewees, M/48/female, had to leave her home country after her husband passed away as she wishes to protect her son and to provide him with a safe and promising environment. She says that

I lost my husband in the war. I have a minor son. I was always caring about him. We were threatened as well after my husband passed away. To protect my son, I went to Dubai and stayed there for eight months.

In the short-term process, many of the women understood that it would not be possible to restore their socio-economic situation in Iraq. Even more, it would not be possible for them to keep their existing socio-economic conditions in Iraq. One of the interviewees, FD/57/female, speaks of why she and her family members left Iraq by point to the devastating impact of religious groups over their profession, work and subsistence as well:

I spent hard time before leaving Iraq, especially in 2008. I was a lawyer. I worked with an American company like a legal adviser. So they, some people from Iraq considered me like an enemy because I worked for Americans, even my work is civil work. That is I left my country. I went to Jordan and spent two years there.

Iraqi women refugees' experiences display that US invasion did not bring them any positive or progressive value. On the contrary, the fading rights and freedom of Iraqi women has been passed into a group of Islamists, the religious and the conservatives. Moreover, as MADRE reports, "the US-backed Iraqi government has largely reinforced the Islamist call to restrict women's rights and bar women from the public sphere" (2007:9). After US invasion, a new war has taken place in Iraq. In recalling the highlights made by Kaldor, New Wars are motioned by the dissemination of "fear and hatred" in population to discard "everyone of a different identity" and "by instilling terror". New Wars is to mobilize "extreme" groups to spread "fear and

hatred” among people (Kaldor, 2006:7-9). This politics of the new war has been legitimated by the occupation forced in Iraq. The social and political components of Iraq has been dissolved by giving its place to new forms of social transformation. As the interviewees point out, the origins of social transformation as a cause of forced migration are based on the production and reproduction of enemies.

At this juncture, it can be said that as a main actor of the global capitalist re-structuring, US is skillful of progressing “Northern economic interests” from “containment of the South”. Containment takes the form of humanitarian aid and military interventions in this picture (Castles, 2013b). For the case of Iraq, the asylum-migration nexus appears a result of military intervention in the form of humanitarian or liberating intervention. Under the heavy embargos of the global capitalism, Iraq has been exposed to poverty and non-development over the years. Many of Iraqis left their countries because of unemployment, poverty, political pressure and other forcing factors. With the invasion, the legally defined aspects of the material conditions of forced migration have been ready to be explored by the international protection regime. This is the legally defined standards of forced migration or the cost of being a refugee. Until the devastating results of the invasion, I put forward in following Castles’s argument (2013b) that the asylum-migration nexus has a set of the blurring links between economic migration and forced migration for the period of 1990s to 2000s. However, after the invasion, the legally defined elements of the material conditions of forced migration are prior to people’ incentives to leave the country.

5.3.2. Living in Uncertainties: Asylum Conditions of Iraqis

As shall be seen above, the interviewees end up their sentences with the emphasis that “because of that I went to Turkey, I stayed in Jordan or I lived in Egypt”. Their forced move to these countries involves a different set of the refugees’ experiences since this process is formally called as an asylum process in which they wait to be granted a refugee status and to be resettled in a third country like US, or any other Western countries. And, as Brekke (2004) indicates, this process is usually identified with uncertainties and ambivalences as far as experiences of the refugees indicate.

During my research, I interviewed Iraqi refugees who were in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and other neighboring countries to Iraq before resettled in the state of Arizona and some of them spent their years in these countries while waiting to be resettled, in other words “to be saved”, in US. It can be underlined at this point that it is difficult to generalize their experiences as they experienced their asylum process in the different context of social, cultural and economic conditions.

As my research findings indicate, Iraqi refugees fled from their home countries to the neighboring countries. They flee from violence, risks, and uncertainties to be able to reach a safe and peaceful environment. After that, they fall under the provision of the international protection regime and they wait in the hope of resettlement. It is not possible to provide how long they stay and wait in countries of asylum until they are resettled in a third country. However it can be derived from the interviewees that many spent more than two years in these countries to get a result for their asylum application. What Iraqi asylum-seekers wait after their forced migration is clearly humanitarian assistance.

To put their waiting process in the context of humanitarian governance, it can be put forward that they waited for many years in front of the door of “a safe haven” in their minds and hearts. I can state at this point that Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are not their safe havens. These countries do not have the adequate qualities of being a safe haven. However, these countries are the cells of global governance when it comes to the network of the international protection regime. In other words, I will state by harmonizing three characteristic of humanitarian governance with the context of the international protection regime in which Iraqi asylum-seekers look for a long term humanitarian assistance. First of all, Barnett already imply that there is an organized effort to alleviate human suffering in this global governance (2013); it is quite fruitful point that the constitutive humanitarian organizations of this sort of governance undertake many responsibilities to alleviate human suffering in partnership with the state and other stake holders. In this picture, the presence of UN agencies and other international non-governmental organizations need to be underlined. Specially, as Sassoon underlines, their presence in the neighboring countries of Iraq is a necessity in terms of security problems in Iraq. UN humanitarian agencies, the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations were exposed to the risk of being bombed or harmed in Iraq⁴². As a result of this, all of these humanitarian actors continued their activities in mainly Jordan, to provide humanitarian assistance for Iraqis (2009:116).

Secondly, it is emphasized that the content of humanitarian governance cannot be codified as an inherently “good, emancipation or domination” (2013); my research findings indicate that Iraqi asylum-seekers do not experience any emancipation or domination as a direct impact of this humanitarian governance; but it is clear that they attribute what is good or emancipative to the post-resettlement process. During their stay, they just reach humanitarian assistance. Lastly, it is mostly emphasized that power is an important component of humanitarian governance (2013) since there are the actors who make a decision on the “best interests of people according to their objective criteria. I will put this point very simply that the power of humanitarian governance means that of all of actors in this process since their power is formed through the international legislation of the international protection regimes and more importantly through their financial means to provide a humanitarian assistance.

With the three characteristics aspects of the humanitarian governance, the provision of the international protection regime points to a long wait, or protracted condition, and uncertainties in many aspects for Iraqi asylum-seekers. As already noted, they wait for resettlement, humanitarian assistance and support in their protracted conditions. The states, the U.N. agencies, and international non-governmental organizations appear responsible actors to make a decision on the volume of this humanitarian assistance. Discussing on waiting, Gasparini underlines that “waiting is at the crossroads not only of the present and future, but also of certainty and uncertainty. One can wait for an event, the occurrence of which is either certain (although not always determined in time) or completely uncertain” (1995:31). The point made by him is also functional in order to underline the condition of the Iraqi asylum-seekers in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan or any other countries of asylum since their waiting leads to uncertainties.

⁴² On 19 August 2003, the destruction of the UN compound led to the deaths of 23 people as well as Special Representative of the Secretary-General Sergio Vieira de Mello (Sassoon, 2009).

Within the context of the asylum-migration nexus, the material premises of the uncertainty refers to the socio-economic plight of asylum-seekers in a country of asylum. The premises can, in a sense, be defined as deprivation of some basic means – work, food, shelter...etc.- in their temporary stay in the country. In other words, the uncertainty they experience is about everything that harms their construction of a prospective life. Therefore, Iraqi asylum-seekers have a prospective perception of life and identity in a country of asylum more than integrating in the community.

In this prospective perception of life and identity, their first encounter is to contact the U.N. agencies (the UNHCR) or US authorities so as to process their asylum application. It is important to underline that there is no a certain amount of time to get a result from these organizations about their application. However, this is the most important part of the possibility of being those whose lives are to be saved in the words of Fassin. The interviewee, A/50/male, explains the difficultness of the process as following:

I stayed in Jordan a year and half. It was very difficult for me to stay in Jordan. I applied to the UN, I had to prove I was against Saddam's regime. They accepted me as a refugee.

Actually, the implementation of the international protection regime is based on a set of rules and procedures. In the specific condition of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon are not signatories to the 1951 convention (Sassoon, 2009), so UNHCR appears an important agency in delivering and regulating humanitarian assistance while regulating humanitarian and protection space in Jordan. This is also emphasized in a report that

UNHCR appeals to the international community to make a strong commitment to support countries that are shouldering the burden of hosting the refugees... From UNHCR's perspective, regardless of the formal status conferred, the most critical elements of protection for Iraqis arriving in neighboring countries and seeking refuge are access to safety and *non-refoulement*; non-penalization for illegal entry; availability of humanitarian assistance to persons with specific needs; permission for temporary stay under acceptable conditions; and the search for durable solutions, including through resettlement, until such time as conditions

permit voluntary repatriation to take place in safety and dignity (2007: 9-10).

UNHCR's basic effort is to provide a protective environment for Iraqi asylum-seekers by underlying the importance of the basic human rights. Such an effort has a universal value to save human lives from violence and persecution in Iraq. Some will be resettled in a third country to get their citizenship and to continue their lives in dignity and respect. The majority will not be resettled, and would be living in limbo. Therefore, A/50/male was right saying that he had to prove his opponent against the regime to be able to have a chance for a possible resettlement; he had to wait whether he would be recognized as a refugee status or not according to the afore-mentioned lines of the international protection regime⁴³.

Granted as a refugee by the liable institutions or organizations in a country of asylum, Iraqi refugees still have much to deal with in experiencing uncertainties with their poor conditions. UNHCR's report shows us the general situation of the neighboring countries in the following way:

Iraqis are facing the problem of dwindling resources and are finding it progressively more difficult to sustain themselves. Many have overstayed their visas and have become illegal residents, at risk of detention and deportation. Refugee households have limited access to medical treatment. Children are either unable to attend school or facilities are so overcrowded that they cannot accommodate new pupils. Some host countries allow Iraqis to enroll in private schools, but most families do not have the means to do so. Ensuring access to education is critical for displaced children, as it offers structure, stability and hope for the future, during a time of crisis, and provides protection against exploitation and abuse (2007:9).

During our interviews, they were remembering their refugee days before the resettlement by reference to their expectations after all difficulties and challenges they

⁴³ It is not a topic within the scope of this study; however, the conditions of asylum-seekers can be changed from one country to another when it comes the granting of a refugee status. For Jordan, until the year of 2007, UNHCR implemented a temporary protection regime in Jordan; after that, UNHCR changed its policy and declared that Iraqi nationals from the central and southern Iraq will be recognized as refugees on a prima facie basis (Sassoon, 2009).

faced in their home country. It may not be appropriate to state that their expectations are high and difficult to meet by the states or the actors of the international protection regime when we focus upon their main problems in a country of asylum. For instance, one of the interviewees, FD/57/female had to flee from Iraq with her family due to security reasons and as he was working with an American company in Iraq, therefore she would go through a special procedure of US visa and she was just waiting for the completion of her asylee procedures in Jordan and she explains her main challenges in the following words:

I spent two years in Jordan. Since we applied to get a permission to live in Jordan, we were waiting to get a final letter to say yes, you are eligible for two years. Jordan, it is Islam, it is a Muslim county. It is same, familiar culture. But the problem is that they didn't allow me work as a lawyer. I tried but I couldn't. Staying without work, it is super hard. And I put my daughter, of course in a private school because education in the public schools, they were not good. Then I have a son, he was studying in the University of Jordan. He got a degree in civil engineering in Iraq and he got a master degree in Jordan. Of course I had to spend money for their education. They considered them like internship students. I worked a lot in Iraq. I had money to cover all of these fees. But not for more time. Finally I got to live, we are here since 2008.

They escape from their countries with their beliefs, cultures, political views, vocational knowledge and skills, and hopes. Many of them give a priority to their religious affiliation with the countries like Jordan, Turkey and Egypt. Beyond the socio-cultural intimacy, majority of the Iraqi refugees underline that they are not allowed to perform their occupation, to work and provide their subsistence under humanitarian conditions. The lack of the material sources to meet their needs sufficiently is the basics for their uncertainties. They have to manage their conditions by using their limited sources that may be coming from their home countries. They also have to live as dependent on the support and assistances provided by the organizations because it is not possible to speak of the certainty of resettlement to a third country.

In a similar vein, many Iraqis also fled to Egypt. Although the country is a part to the Geneva Convention, it is not possible to state there is much provided for Iraqi asylum-seekers in this host country. Iraqis escaped to Egypt because of three main reasons: “being cheaper than Jordan and Syria”; “safety and distance from the locus of violence and sectarianism” and “consideration of Egypt as a transit point given the high number of non-Iraqi refugees who have been resettled from Egypt to third countries” (Sassoon, 2009: 88). While touching upon the relation between development and forced migration, I have an emphasis that the development trend of the refugee producing countries has been downsized in the historical impact of the hegemony of the global capitalism. The theme of development is much embedded into the asylum-migration nexus. Therefore, at this juncture, it is possible to put forward very briefly that Iraqi asylum-seekers cannot find a job in legal term to be able to overcome their challenges in their subsistence. As Sassoon indicate, the refugees are allowed to work in Egypt and they only find “illegal employment” in the informal economy since Egypt has “enormous development challenges and struggles with a number of socio-economic problems” (2009:88-89).

Access to a decent work is the main challenge for Iraqi asylum-seekers and refugees in a neighboring country of asylum. Unfortunately, they cannot perform their profession and they cannot find a legal place in a labor market as workers or employers. Therefore, they cannot realize themselves as self-confident individuals in their temporary stay in these countries. Therefore, beyond the scope of my research, this specific issue needs to be scrutinized in demonstrating the relation between development and forced migration in terms of social and economic indicators, and sectorial growth.

As a result, the material conditions of the uncertainties in the refugees’ lives go beyond a socio-cultural intimacy when it comes to their life-sustaining concerns. Because of that, they do not think that either Jordan or Egypt is a country to live under the given conditions. In a succinct manner, MH/47/male explains this as following:

In 2006, I started to live in Egypt. There is no job. It was a hard thing to find any job there. Egypt is a big population, a lot of people who don’t

have a job. So I used to live, my brothers and my father used to send money to support me for myself and my family. It was good days you know, living without job (laughing), just eating, drinking, going there and there to see the kids going to the school, living in peaceful environment, secure places, it was good. But, there was no future. That's why I have applied to the United Nations to be resettled in other country.

But still, the emphasis on “a peaceful and secure place” deserves to be paid attention; the Iraqi refugees spend their lives without a proper access to rights and services in the climate of the defected humanitarian assistance. The network of the humanitarian organizations do not have much to do with the defected aspects of the asylum system. In this of the humanitarian governance, Iraqis were pushed to appreciate of being in a safe place without bread and shelter. They did so because there was no any other chance.

In comparison with Jordan and Egypt and other Arab countries, my research findings have parallels with many aspects of waiting in uncertainties in a country of asylum. On the other side, it is important to underline that Turkey has a different context when it comes to socio-cultural structure and language. Besides, I should also note that my position as a researcher from Turkey makes me more familiar with the domestic context of the international protection procedures in Turkey. Turkey has been hosting Iraqi refugees over the last forty years. As already indicated, Turkey has received asylum-seekers from Iraq in the sequel of 1991 Gulf War and 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Turkey is also a part to the Geneva Convention. Since 2013, Turkey has established its own system on the ground of the domestic legislation called Law on Foreigners and International Protection. UNHCR is still in the process of status determination interviews with Iraqi asylum-seekers and looks for resettlement alternatives for those with refugee status as a part of durable solutions.

As understood from the interviews and various analyses, their coming reasons to Turkey are similar to why they go to Egypt. Specially, Turkey's geographical distance is neither too far nor too proximate to Iraq, but ensures the safety and security of Iraqi asylum-seekers. Besides, Turkey is considered as a transit zone for the majority of

asylum-seekers so that they suppose their resettlement may be in a very smooth process in comparison with other neighboring countries. In this sense, it is also worthy of noting that their own network also has a strong impact on their decisions to go to Turkey, Jordan, Egypt or any other neighboring country.

Iraqi asylum-seekers live in the urban districts of Turkey. It is significant to underline that Iraqis experience difficulties of language barrier as a main problem and then the sequent challenges appear depending on their differences and diversity in terms of religion, sect, language and culture. In fact, I will keep the names of the cities confidential as the urban context of Turkey needs to be understood from city to city without falling in generalizations and overstatements. On the other hand, it is a fact that need to be overcome that Christians and Ezidis have different experiences than Muslims when they expose their religious or ethnic identities in public. In order to demonstrate an overview of how Iraqi refugees manage to exist with their differences in Turkish community, I will give a place to the words of an Ezidi refugee from Iraq. D/51/male fled to Turkey with his family members and lived in a small province of Turkey and he expresses what he experienced in Turkey as following:

With the beginning of the year of 2007, we stayed like two years in Turkey before coming to the United States. You know, for every person who lives in his country and goes to another country as a stranger, it is difficult not easy to live in another country. And there are good people and bad people whenever you go outside of your country. You don't feel yourself comfortable because you're stranger. We always think about what will happen to us. The governor was good in that province. We didn't have any problem with them. The most difficult thing that we faced is that when you say that we are Ezidis, of Ezidis religion, nobody accepts you. We faced difficulties when people know we are Ezidis. Another difficulty, because we don't know Turkish language, they tried to use us like if you wanna buy something for one dollar, they say three, four dollars because they know you are foreigner. Even when we tried to rent a house for a good price but when the owner knows that we are Ezidis, he said no, he is not renting. I had to rent a house nobody wanted to rent, but I rented, I need a

house as I have my kids with me. Nobody can live in that house. It was in the basement full of insects and scorpions. I had to live because I have kids.

At this juncture, it is important to highlight some crucial points from his saying that he stresses upon the state of being a stranger in Turkey. In comparison with other countries, Iraqis can feel the state of being a stranger in Turkey since their language and culture are different from Turkish people and thereby it leads to more uncertainties in their daily lives. They experience discrimination and abusive attitudes because of the unfolding of their beliefs, opinions and cultures. Such an experience of facing discrimination through the locals has more and more ill-effects over Iraqi refugees since they already fled from the discriminative and insecure climate of their home country and many of them were with trauma and psychological problems; so, this sort of discriminative experiences make them more distant from the locals and they are usually stuck into their own communities or families in a limited communication with outsiders.

In their temporary stay, I can put forward that this process can be called as a failed socialization on the basis of their differences like religion and identity. And unfortunately, this sort of experiences reinforces their prospective perception of life and identity by attributing some meanings and values to the post-resettlement scope. Following this, I had an opportunity to interview the Iraqi refugee, RZ/73/male, who was a priest in Iraq and told me his days in Turkey by using the following statements:

With the year of 2012, I came to Turkey. Turkey is a beautiful place, everything is cheap. Telling honestly, Turkish people, some are racist and some are looking for a religion and sect, discrimination. We are Christians and they were looking to us very disgracefully. They didn't allow us to make any prayer, all the churches were closed in the city. I needed to pray in my house. We had a religious occasion and people came to my house to pray and I was told by the locals that I shouldn't do that again... For safety and security, it was so good, health, healthcare was good; benefits and some helps were good. I want to share something about this discrimination.

I went to a doctor, who asked my name, I told him my name, and there was a translator with me. He asked me if I was Christian. I told I was Christian. The doctor told me to be a Muslim (nasil cumle) I said we were all brothers. The doctor said yok yok yok (no no no).

During our interview, his eyes were with full of tears by talking to me about his days in Iraq and Turkey. These people were homesick and were longing for their home country. Talking about Turkey, he says that Turkish people were racist; he didn't make a generalization and sometimes he stopped to understand why I was thinking about his saying and then he was continuing frankly by giving concrete examples of his daily lives in Turkey. Failure of socialization of those who have religious and cultural differences comes from their daily lives. Rather than the fulfillment of needs for security, safety and access to services, Iraqi refugees often point to their daily life experiences. As a result of their daily interaction with the locals, they do not undergo a rehabilitative communication and they are stuck into the feeling of being a stranger to the social and cultural environment surrounding them.

Speaking theoretically, Bauman and May say that "the strangers deny the very validity of the accepted positions... After all, they come into our field of vision and social spaces – uninvited... They are, as it were, neither close nor distant and we do know exactly what to expect of them and ourselves" (2001:35). Iraqi refugees come to the field of vision of the locals in each strata of social life; and it seems so that this relation is often harmed by the prejudices or discriminative attitudes of the locals. In comparison with those who are Muslims or who are with ethnic affiliation with Turkish people, Iraqis with religious and ethnic differences put themselves in a point where they are "neither close nor distant". That is to say, this is a kind of uncertainty in their social relations since they are obliged to accord their way of being and behaviors according to demands of dominant counter, that's host community members.

When it comes to Iraqi Muslims or Turkmens, or others who identify themselves with Turkish people easily, they do not emphasize the discriminative or abusive character of social relations among the locals and themselves. DR/36/male who was an Iraqi

Turkmen in belief of Islam was longing for Turkey since he identifies himself with Turkish values, cultures and lifestyles easily. During our interview with him, he expressed his feelings more or less by slightly pointing to the difficulties in working and renting houses:

I stayed in two years in Turkey. I had my best days in Turkey; that's everything is nice there. Only they did not give work to refugees there. Working was forbidden there. There was only this situation that was not good there. Otherwise, living and people were nice. There were a lot of people who helped us a lot by saying that you were refugees, you left your country and here we would help you. In Turkey, the problems I faced were little, that's it was difficult to find a house to rent. The owners didn't give their houses to refugees. But, living there was very nice. I didn't see anything wrong there. I had money with me, I had sold everything I had in Iraq. I was meeting my family's needs with this money.

From this standpoint, I will underline one of the important aspects in their statements that they often refer to help and assistances provided by the Turkish people. One of the main problems is the lack of work and shelter as much as they wished. For instance, Turkey does not ban the foreigners' access to the labor market, but determines some criterion to be completed. However, it was understood from the interview that he actually wished to underline that refugees cannot work since they cannot find a decent job for their subsistence. Another interviewee, SH/40/female, also seems to be unaware of how the refugees get access to work in Turkey since she was not aware of that she can move to another province in case she is able to find a job with work permission:

Only the hard thing was that we couldn't work and our paperwork was on hold by the agency, we couldn't find a job anywhere because we were stucked in one place, that's the only thing.

It was clear from some interviewees that their information was missing or misleading in some aspects. They were right that the refugees' access to labor market in legal

terms is quite difficult. However, this should be seen as an indicator of how they refrain themselves in dealing with all of these difficult and challenging procedures and dealings. Their perception of temporariness in a country of origin leads them to talk about support and assistance provided by the locals in this sense. They often underscored support and assistance from the locals to show how much they appreciated. By the same token, H/48/male who is of Arab ethnicity in belief of Islam shares how much Turkish people were helpful in this regard:

I chose Turkey because, first of all, it is a Muslim country and otherwise, sounds is good, people habits are respectful and good. I will never forget my days in Turkey because of the friendship and good attitude between me and people of Turkey there. They helped us and they supported us. They came to my house, they paid for me all the furniture and all the equipment I needed in my house. Also, my daughter gave a birth there, one of my neighbors, she slept with my daughter in the hospital. In Turkey, kind of work was too hard, twelve hours, and salary and payment was very low. I am an electrical engineer and sometimes some people called to work me for electric work.

Additionally, I will point to their subsistence resources; the refugees are living in need of all basic humanitarian needs, some of them can bring their money to both the county of asylum and the country of destination and some couldn't. But the majority lives in poverty. They look for assistance and support from the local authorities in their provinces in Turkey. Their background of social and economic class has a huge impact on their dependency on external assistance or support by the state institutions or the locals. Therefore, while some interviewees state that Turkey is cheap while others put forward the opposite. In fact, this perception is completely linked to their belonging to either working or middle class. As I shall explain later, it is enough to say that the majority comes from the lower classes that can be defined in the indicators of working class. As a result, social and financial assistance is crucial for them to overcome their challenges in Turkey. Lastly, it must be highlighted that their cultural and religious dependence on Turkey is more or less a time-related issue. Those who spend more time than others show their loyalty to Turkish people even more. In this regard, I will

give a place to some part of the interview with S/38/male, who was of Arab ethnicity with the belief of Islam and who stayed only seven months in Turkey. For now, he has a Middle East restaurant in Arizona. During our interview with him at his restaurant, he expressed his feelings about Turkey in a very positive way:

I stayed seven months in Turkey. I loved this country. They helped us a lot. When I was there, I didn't speak any Turki. But after two, three months, I was speak Turkish very well. Turkey is a very good. They helped us ekmeK (bread), food. I came from Iraq to Turkey. I was a refugee. We didn't have a job, that's why they helped us. I like to go back to visit Turkey.

In case a refugee spends a reasonable time of waiting in a country of origin, it is possible to state that they just have a reference to how people helped them because of their refugee condition and not more. It is clear from my research findings that their perception of being a refugee in a country of asylum is usually identified with the lack of work, citizenship, and future with an emphasis on safety and security. As clearly understood from the words of the Iraqi refugees, they cannot establish their social life in a country of origin; no matter, it is Jordan, Egypt or Turkey. Under the implementation of humanitarian governance, the actors of humanitarianism can push the system to a certain point. After that, the refugees face a social, cultural and economic deprivation in their daily lives. The network of UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations and other organizations in the design of humanitarian governance presents a "politics of life". That is to say, the humanitarian governance creates "an object" in this process as Fassin points to "the saving of individuals" without putting "others" at risk and finding a "legitimation" to make a decision on who will be saved (2007:508).

At this point, I will enlarge this point by putting forward that humanitarian governance leads to a kind of objectification of uncertainties in a country of origin so that the network of humanitarian organizations cannot overcome the paradox of asylum-seekers and refugees who will be saved and will be left at risk. Unfortunately, the majority of these people will be living in uncertainties without having an ability of

making decisions on their own lives unquestionable. In fact, it is also possible to see this process as a part of global governance that teaches people to wait, obey, abdicate and re-shape their lives and expectations. Even so, the objective limit of their lives is therefore the uncertainty. Whenever they go out in a country of origin, they will see that there is no possibility to have a decent work, no possibility to afford their children's education forever, no possibility to have a life-sustainable assistance in a long terms and no possibility to have a future.

At this point, before concluding my arguments for this part of the study, I will refer the concept of "temporal regularity" in order to make how the objectification of uncertainties take place in the refugees' experiences. Eviatar Zerubavel explains the term of "temporal regularity" while talking how people put their daily lives in order by managing and using their time effectively. He emphasized that "temporal regularity" "allows us to have certain expectations regarding the temporal structure of our environment, it certainly helps us considerably to develop some sense of orderliness". He also adds that "temporal irregularity, on the other hand, contributes considerably to the development of uncertainty." (1981:15). In another saying, people need a sense of "orderliness" to be able to make a plan for their lives and more specifically, they need to move in a certain period of time in planning their daily lives to accord themselves to their environment as well. In this perception of temporal regularity, people come with some "expectations" and "time slots" to indicate the normalcy of our social environment" (1981:16-23).

Following this theoretical pathway, I will note that the refugees spend their years out of their home countries without any hope of returning to their home countries. On the other hand, Turkey, Egypt, or Jordan do not provide them with a citizenship with the full of access to rights and services from employment to education. They generally live in "the temporal structure of their own environment" with some expectations through the U.N. agencies, US authorities and international non-governmental organizations. That is to say, the only anticipated expectation is to have a citizenship from a Western country to be able to establish "the normalcy of their social environment". Following the theoretical frame drawn by Zerubavel, time is of course important to understand abnormal aspect of their social environment by reference to the time of their departure from their home country and to the duration of their stay in

a country of asylum, and also the time of their interview or contact with U.N agencies or US authorities. Therefore, the grasp of time with an emphasis on temporality is important to understand how refugees denominate their stay in a country of asylum.

The refugees' experiences show that the refugees live in temporal irregularities in the asylum countries when it comes to their daily lives through which they intensively experience uncertainties in terms of employment, education, livelihood and other issues related to their future prospects. Therefore, I call their process as an objectification of uncertainties in the asylum countries that Iraqi refugees have to struggle with their traumatic backgrounds without giving up until they establish a kind of temporal regularity in their future lives. For this and beyond this, as Iraqi refugee already indicated, they demand their basic human rights, that's a decent work, promising education and vocation opportunities and ultimately a citizenship.

5.3.3. American Dream: from Imagined Lives to Realities

Immanuel Wallerstein (2003:1-2) displays a possible definition of American dream in his glorious book, the Decline of American Power, in the following way:

The American dream does exist, and is internalized in most of our psyches. It is a good dream, so good which may others across the world with the same dream for themselves. What is this dream? The American dream is the dream of human possibility, of a society in which all persons may be encouraged to do their best, to achieve their most, and to have the reward of a comfortable life. It is the dream that there will be no artificial obstacles in the way of such individual fulfillment. It is the dream that the sum of such individual achievements is a great social good—a society of freedom, equality, and mutual solidarity. It is the dream that we are a beacon to a world that suffers from not being able to realize such a dream.

Wallerstein emphasizes that all these components are parts of a dream not of reality. However, such a dream exists in our soul since many believe in the existence of the

dream even though it doesn't exist in reality. It is of course not possible to say how many people realize their American dreams into realities by having a comfortable life which is full of equalities, solidarity and freedom in various level of lives of people. But still, millions of people, either forcibly or voluntarily, arrive in the American continent with expectations and hopes. That is to say, America is a "beacon to a world" for imagined lives.

From the standpoint of my research in this sense, the question is clear if "refugee resettlement as humanitarian governance" makes Iraqi refugees' American dreams come true or not. Before taking this point a step further, I need to stress upon that Garnier, Sandvik and Jubilut firstly underscore the importance of further researches and investigation on refugee resettlement as a form of humanitarian governance since "refugee resettlement as both practical and performative instrument of humanitarian governance" needs to be scrutinized beyond "its apparent benevolence and analytical and ethical aspects" (2016: 2).

Indeed, the refugees' experiences show us that many leave their American dreams to their children as they see that it is not easier for them to realize their dreams right after they arrive in Arizona. But, I agree with Wallerstein's point that many have already internalized such a dream before coming to US in this point, it is important to point to the hegemonic power of US over Iraq since the historical relations between these two countries have a huge impact on how Iraqis internalize US power.

One of the interviewees, IM/62/male, who has been in US for almost five years, can speak very limited English and explains his American dream as following:

Since my childhood, ok, I will say, I was in Kirkuk at that time. I was very young at my fifteens. Then there was a bazaar to where American sent bags of clothes as aid. That's Americans were helping our country. I was taking American shirts like cowboy shirts from there. I always had an enthusiasm inside of me to go to America. I hear about Vegas, San Francisco, California. After being a refugee, I learnt many other things about America. After coming here, in a sense, I was happy since I have

gotten rid of suffering. America has kept its doors open for us. In return, I have tried to become a good citizen here. I didn't make any mistake to my neighbors, environment.

During the interview, he often emphasized the importance of being a good citizen. He was waiting for his citizenship test when I interviewed with him. He was always speaking of how much important being a good citizen is. However, it was clear from our conversation that he was happy "in a sense" as he has a safe place and he feels good that he escaped from Iraq and America has accepted him. Therefore, his happiness was not related to that fact that he has realized or would realize his American dreams. In comparison with his situation in Turkey, he has disposed of some uncertainties in US even if he still has some uncertainties. That is to say, US offers a new living place in which he has new objective conditions so that he can find out what he can have and cannot have in the long term. In this sense, one of the most important thing he can get is an American citizenship.

If we follow the same pathway, another interviewee, Z/47/female, who has been in Arizona for a long time and who is an American citizen, has an English competence to be able to continue her daily life, but she is not perfect at speaking if we consider her long stay in Arizona. She tells me how her American dream is changed upon her arrival in Arizona in the following sense:

I have been here for seven years. Before coming here, I saw America on TVs which was nice and green, but what I saw here is different from TVs. You have to find a job and you have to help yourself here. Even though, I like Arizona. Living here is better than Iraq. The government rented for nine months for me and gave me 200 \$ for six months. Now, I am staying in a public housing.

Actually, she has also the same perspective with IM/62/male. She is thankful to America as she is in a safe place but she knows that it is difficult for her to achieve what she saw on TVs. Being a single woman in US doesn't change much for refugees. They have to struggle with all challenges and difficulties on your own after you are

assisted by the resettlement agencies for a while. More concretely, I will give another example by giving the words of another single Iraqi refugee woman, M/48/female, who has been in US for a long time and who can speak English to be able to manage her daily life not more. She shares how she awoke of her American dream as following:

I have been here for seven years. Before coming here, I thought that everything would be nice and I would have a good house, but here I found everything is complex and conditions are not good; no assistance or cash assistance was given me, they didn't give me a cash assistance. The only thing I like here is that my son is studying here. I know, America's assistance in comparison with Europe or Australia is not enough and less. It should be more and consistent. The government supported me for four months and then cut off.

It is clear that the authorities do support Iraqi refugees for a certain period of time and especially single women or single women with minor children find the assistance insufficient and they emphasize that the assistance should be more and sustainable. However, it is quite clear that the American resettlement system is not grounded upon the life-long assistance or financial support. Rather it is based on a self-sufficiency. And many women have difficulties in dealing with the complexity of conditions in their new setting in Arizona.

It is not exceptional finding for my research that single women with minor children are generally dissatisfied with the conditions in US as I will point later, they have many difficulties in access to labor market because they also have to learn English and to take of their minor children and to provide their subsistence in Arizona. Therefore, they often compare their conditions with their situation in their countries of asylum. For instance, KJ/36/female, who has been in Arizona for three years, cannot speak English and says that

I was expecting to come here for living in a house or given a house, monthly income, and feeling like living happily and safe, but it was opposite, it's more problems. After think that we gonna rest from the all of

issues we previously faced, when we came here, we faced more problems.

It would be better to live in Turkey.

After everything they faced in Iraq, they reach a safe and secure place unquestionably; but this does not solve their problems. They still see themselves in uncertainties in some aspects. They know that they have reached their destination after a long way, however they know as well that they have to struggle with the conditions to be able to minimize their uncertainties and to establish a new life and to be able to get a citizenship in Arizona. Otherwise, they know that they would not have a chance to return to either their home county or they country of asylum. Similarly, another interviewee, KJ/36/female, who is a single woman with a sick children and who has been in Arizona more than two years, cannot speak English and still speaks of Turkey in our conversation while telling her problems in Arizona:

We had friends here and asked them and they told me that America is hard to live here. You have to work and you provide income for yourself. I was expecting to come here for living in a house or given a house, monthly income, and feeling like living happily and safe, but it was opposite, it's more problems. After think that we gonna rest from the all of issues we previously faced, when we came here, we faced more problems. It would be better to live in Turkey.

Specially, single women with children who may be in need of regular treatment or assistance emphasize the importance of assistance and support provided by the state; otherwise, it is clear from their saying that they cannot manage their conditions in Arizona. It can be put forward that America in their dreams did represent everything beyond harsh conditions or high liabilities. At this juncture, I will note that the refugees, after being recommended for a third country like the US, do not have any other chance except accepting to be resettled in the designated third country. In other words, refugee resettlement as a humanitarian governance does not look for consent or choices; refugees are not asked about their resettlement country preferences. They are just supposed to comply with all of the process in which they will be submitted to a resettlement country without asking them a single question. As Barnett underlines

(2012b), this is the paternalist aspect of humanitarian governance and I put forward that this aspect again comes with the resettlement instrument since “one actor interferes in the choices of another without her consent.” As a result, each refugee has to wake from his or her American dream although s/he know what would happen to her or him in the U.S through his or her own social, friendship or kinship network.

Along with this, it is quite clear that there are some other highlights, especially women with their families. Y/37/female is one of them, who has been living with her family in Arizona for almost four years, cannot talk English despite the four years behind and she apparently says her dissatisfaction with her conditions in Arizona and she adds that

We have been here for four years. Turkey is more beautiful than here. I was shocked upon our arrival here. I thought that we would be going out. We would have friends and some fun. But, it is not. In Turkey, I had friends and we were going out. Turkey is better than here.

After four years, it was surprising for me that she still longs for her life in Turkey since she has a very limited social life in Arizona. She spends her time at home by taking care of her children while her husband was working for a security firm. She often compared her social life with that in Arizona. Apparently, she says that it is not easy for her to go out since it is relatively a big state and her perception of being a foreigner is stronger and she has a very limited English which hampers her socialization as she wishes. It is important to analyze at this point that almost all of the interviewees, males and females, identify their American dream with having pleasure and enjoyment after all of the troubles they experienced in Iraq.

In the resettlement process, it is quite significant to underline that many go through this process with the information provided by their relatives and friends in US. Moreover, they show their friends and relatives in US as a sponsor to be able to go to the same state. Along with friendship and kinship relations, they think that they can easily go through their early times in Arizona. Therefore, some of the interviewees underscore that they asked their friends and relatives about the conditions in Arizona

before their resettlement process is completed. More concretely, O/32/male, who has been in Arizona for almost three years, says that

We have all our relatives in US so I was not thinking to go to Australia or Canada. My guess before coming to Arizona that when I came to the US, I would buy a car, find a job, it was my guess because we have our relatives here, they tell us what is going on. After I learnt that I would be recommended for the US, I asked my sponsor who is one of my relatives in Arizona, and I asked him what is my right in US and he said that they provide your health insurance, and will provide you food stamp to buy food each month and you can take other rights too. I chose this city because he is in Arizona.

O/32/male, who cannot speak English despite three years behind, explains that he benefited from the information provided by his relatives and he chose to live in Arizona due to his relatives' support. In fact, as I pointed out earlier in this section, the refugees have to move in a paternalist model of resettlement process as a part of humanitarian governance; therefore it would not be possible for them to choose either their resettlement countries or their province preferences. However, US will take into consideration their proof of sponsorship to make a decision to send them to the states they wish.

Among the refugee community, solidarity is not a strong indicator. It is generally limited to their kinship relations and usually does not expand to non-kin relations. With this sort of solidarity, they try to reach the knowledge of US system so that they can estimate how much difficult their post-resettlement process may be. Following their estimation, they apply for such a solidarity to be able to stand their own feet. One of the interviewees, SH/40/female, who has been living with her family members in Arizona, speaks of the assistance provided by her nephew in Arizona:

My relative, my nephew, is already a US citizen here and he well knows Arizona. That's why I requested to come here. The reason I chose to live in a house away from others, also because we have complex apartment the

agency put us is not that safe, there is some like kind of groups that like that you know teenage groups make problems around so we decided to live in a safer place, house. As to other assistances, we got a lot of troubles because the government benefits after a month were cut for us because we rented a house. So that's different, we didn't choose the agency benefit so it is kind harder to apply for me. I didn't use the apartment they gave me; the agency gave me 4500 dollars I didn't use for the rent. I bought the furniture. The agency provided just cash assistance for me. They paid us for the rent only one month. And then I got food stamp and medical care.

It is very complex to understand from some interviews that some refugees do not know how procedures work when it comes to the details. Or, although they know they would not be able to receive financial assistance in case they refuse the reception and placement program provided by the resettlement agency, they still insist on going ahead through the information or support provided by their relatives. It seems so that their kinship relations have a huge impact on their way of making decisions. Accordingly, they can decide where to live and how to work in Arizona. As often indicated, the American system is not based on assistance or support mechanism. Therefore, many who go with their relatives' information cannot benefit from short-term assistance programs provided by the American authorities. As a result, they mainly point to the insufficient quality of assistances provided by American authorities.

No doubt, Iraqi refugees have the American dream before coming to US. Today, millions of refugees have the same dream and they are waiting to be resettled in US as Wallenstein indicate, this dream is full of human possibility with which people think that they would achieve a great success in their lives, they would realize their individual purposes and they would establish a promising future for their children. In the US, we can find millions of immigrants and refugees who have achieved their own targets in the America; but, it is difficult to put forward that the first generation of the refugees will be achieving their targets in their dreams. After they figure out American realities, many prefer to stand with their relatives to deal with challenges and problems

in their new lives for a while at least. After that, they find out their own ways in American realities.

In accordance with above, IM/62/male was fifty-eight years old when he was resettled in Arizona and he couldn't find what he imagined in Arizona. After his long suffering years in Iraq, he has reached a safe haven but it is not in his dreams. He explains this with the following sentences:

I have been for five years in Arizona. My sponsors were my siblings here. I didn't want any assistance from the resettlement agencies. But later, I didn't want to depend on my siblings and I found a job and worked. It was difficult for me. I was shocked because America in my dreams was different, in my dreams, the life was very beautiful, freedom...etc. Here, freedom is available, but you have to comply with the laws. People like me live with a narrow perspective. They don't know about the outside, that's New York, Washington, California, and Florida since going to these states is very expensive in fact. Even you cannot have a car to go to those states. You have to take a flight to go to New York, it takes six or seven hours and it costs a lot of money. We are in America but there is a long distance, so I have stayed with this narrow window. And other migrants and refugees are living with this narrow window because of their financial situation.

At this juncture, the keyword is "shocking". The American dream ends up with shocking. Shocking after lots of trauma and torments means that they will have to keep their struggle in Arizona in US as IM/62/male says that living with pleasure and enjoyment in US costs a lot and many refugees have to look at the America through their narrow windows. This is the summary of their American dreams.

This last part brings us to an important point where it is easier to see that shocking the refugees is not a coincidence in a post-resettlement area. Shocking the refugees is a part of the global governance by US. They are shocked by the system to be a good case for the resettlement process by improving and advancing their skills and abilities to be

an active part of US social and economic life. The system wants them to be a good immigrant and a good American citizen (Haines, 2010). For this, they ultimately appear as subjects tailored by the humanitarian governance in US. They are called to leave their “imagined lives” behind and to face up to American realities so that they can shape their habits, culture and life styles in their new lives to survive in their safe haven.

5.3.4. New Lives: Construction of Self-Sufficiency

The point Iraqi refugees find out tardily predicates that American dream does not exist. This genuine reality also shows that a refugee or immigrant would not establish a sustainable life for himself/herself and family members in the long run as long as s/he depends on assistance or support programs managed by the Federal Government or Department of Economic Security. Therefore, Iraqi refugees are expected to fathom how US system functions on their own despite all assistance and support programs provided by the system to them.

In a historical capture of US refugee admission program, it is not blurred to see that the system operates through non-profit and non-governmental organizations under the monitoring of the government. Therefore, as Haines points out, “no governmental program concerned with refugee adaptation after arrival” and “refugee story of building a new life was not their business” (2010:143). Yet, as already indicated, American history witnessed the multiple influxes of human communities from Soviets, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba and Southeast Asia and the system has re-adjusted itself conforming to the requirements of self-sufficiency when it comes to 1980s and the Refugee Act of 1980 has assured self-sufficiency as a state policy in US.

In essence, self-sufficiency has been never delineated by US government in the national legislation or other informal reports or documents. For all that, US system has explored a solid way of referring to self-sufficiency “as the absence of receipt of cash assistance by a household”; in other words, “it goes to the heart of public concern about whether refugees are costing anybody any money” (Haines, 2010:154). Thereupon, in

US system, the refugee admission program is mainly propelled by a set of refugee assistance programs with the intent of increasing self-sufficiency among refugees through employment. Although many refugees have a traumatic past, health problems, a large family with multiple dilemmas, they are also encouraged to be economically more sufficient by the resettlement agencies. Therefore, at this point, the system give a priority to “economically self-sufficient” refugees in the post-resettlement area rather than socially or culturally or skillfully self-sufficient ones.

It is straightforward to understand how much US system is full of complexities and challenges for a refugee who comes from different cultural, religious, economic background. In the beginning, they may be carrier of high hopes, expectations and prospects upon their arrival in US. However, they actually go into a well-designed structure of institutions, norms and principles and they have to comply with stipulated conditions before reaching their expectations and targets. Most of the time, the complexities of the system are challenging Iraqi refugees since they are expected to be active participants of labor market, educational activities, and so on. In fact, many are sick and tired individuals due to their traumatic histories, or family members, relatives, bound they had to leave behind. As a result, many feel tired in going through what US system demands from them, many get by on assistances and aid provided by the government and the non-profit organizations. Especially, single parents, elderly persons, and those with serious health problems and disabilities become more vulnerable against the system. Anyhow, many may turn into dependent individuals as “flawed consumers” in the eyes of the system in the proximity to belonging to “the underclass”. To get rid of all possible risks for the public good of American society, the philanthropic character of US policy designs all responsibilities for agencies and refugees in a clear-cut manner by limiting all assistances and support for the sake of the construction of self-sufficient refugees and future citizens.

5.3.4.1. Limits of Refugee Assistance Programs: Rethinking Competence Assumption

As occasionally indicated above, Iraqi refugees benefit from some certain assistance programs upon their arrival in US. The first one is the State Department's reception and placement program (RRP). The main rationale of the RRP is subjected to a historical transformation of program goals and targets on the basis of the revision of the national legislation. To sum this transformation up, the 1975 RRP agreement was to resettle refugees into the United States by providing reception and placement assistance and did not appertain to employment or self-sufficiency objectives. The 1979 RRP was also to involve the same objectives, but it was also not revolved around the achievement of self-sufficiency beyond initial assistances to refugees. By the 1984 RRP, "the basic program goal was to provide core services to assist refugees to self-sufficiency through employment as soon as feasible" (United States General Accounting Office, 1986:20-21).

The bedrock of the RRP agreements has thus been formed through the target of self-sufficiency. Lawfully, Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982 referred to two important points: first of all, "employable refugees should be placed in jobs as soon as possible and secondly, social service funds should focus on employment related services" (United States General Accounting Office, 1986:21). Along with the implementation of the RRP, self-sufficiency appears as "a 90-day goal" on the ground of the agreement between resettlement agencies and the State government. In other words, the refugees are assisted in their first 90 days in terms of food, shelter and cash assistance so that they can seek their self-sufficiency through employment. It is important to note here that the General Accounting Office also reports that "voluntary agencies" face difficulties in achieving such a task of self-sufficiency since refugees come from the spectrum of age, gender and diversity. Therefore, age or English competence may be problematic matters when it comes to their state of employability and this may be increasing their need for public assistance (United States General Accounting Office, 1986:24-25).

Since the beginning of 1980s, US has streamlined the refugee admission program by pointing to the refugees' self-sufficiency as an ultimate target. In Arizona, the official of Department of Economic Security, explains how much important achievement of self-sufficiency is:

states have to respond to actually pretty simple; some states say more about what you have to basically do is to assure how you gonna provide some mandatory services; how you gonna deliver social services related to case management plan; and how English language training ties to self-sufficiency because self-sufficiency is the driving force in the US refugee program, really critical. Congress really wanted to make sure that refugees are not seen as a burden that they were going to achieve self-sufficiency.

Before going into more details, I will remark here that self-sufficiency is mediated through the initial assistance plans of the refugee resettlement program. Strictly speaking, refugees have to get jobs offered by the resettlement agencies while utilizing the initial reception and replacement program. The official points up that self-sufficiency is an underlying policy to maintain a philosophy of self-sufficiency for refugees, especially those who are employable ones. Over the last thirty years, this logic of self-sufficiency has been hardened through the initial assistance programs. As underlined above, RRP is a 90-days program that is managed by Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

In addition to this, it would be important to hint at the historical development of the matching grant program which is also another component of the refugee admission program in US. The Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program is defined as an "alternative to public cash assistance" for ORR-eligible populations and also depend upon some benchmarks that are mainly concerned other assistance programs from which the refugees benefit or the refugees are already self-sufficient (United States ORR, 2014). It is again designed to make refugees and asylees "economically self-sufficient within 120 to 180 days of program eligibility" (United States ORR, 2016).

Ferdinand Lossou from Catholic Community Service in Tucson in Arizona expounds the details of both the reception and placement program and matching grant program in the following way:

The first program is reception and placement program. RPP is 90 days program, is three months program and is started when refugee arrive. When they arrive, they pick them no from the airport that the program starts for only three months. Main rationale is, I call this program, initial resettlement program. All refugee admitted by the federal government to come to United States are in rule of reception and placement program. This program is managed by the department of the state. The reception placement program is managed by the office of PRM. PRM is an office of the department of the state, US refugee admission program. PRM provides the funding, money for reception and replacement program. We provide community orientation. We provide applying orientation. We assist them to apply for food stamp. They have a health screening to be sure that they are healthy. They receive assistance to apply to social security card. We register them for English learning class and children are registered to schools. We provide transportation and financially support them for three months.

It is blazing from Mr. Ferdinand Lossou's words that RPP is very initial part of all of the post-resettlement process. Taken together what Iraqi refugees told about their American dream, this initial process betokens the beginning of realities appertaining to America. To wit, they get over their first shocking through this process and they receive orientation for afterwards. My research findings show that the Iraqi refugees experiences disparate feelings, fear, happiness, worries, longing...etc. in the shock of the first 90-days in US. Many find a reinforced way to take over responsibility of their lives so as to dispose of their high expectations in their disrupted American dream.

As indicated before, matching grant program is designed to serve for the attainment of self-sufficiency within 120 days or 180 days at most. It can expressly be accentuated that Iraqi refugees who are eligible for the matching grant program get the hang of

how US system stipulates initial assistance programs in return for self-sufficiency through employment. That is to say, Iraqi refugees, or others, have to be utilizable for the development of US system. For this purpose, it is acceptably luminous to reiterate that Iraqi refugees admit their objective conditions to make a reasonable decision to go through with the matching grant. Mr. Ferdinand Louso from Catholic Charities precisely pinpoints the extent of matching grant by looking at its goal as “early employment program”.

The second program is a matching grant which is more complicated than RRP and is early also funded by federal government. Matching grant program is early employment program funded by the department of human health services. Matching grant program is a selective program; early employment program. If you are educated because you have a master degree in science, and then you don't want to be a housekeeper, you are not in rule of matching grant; because it is early employment program. We prefer to rule you in matching grant because we want you to start working as soon as possible.

US refugee admission system does not grant a gratis assistance to Iraqi refugees in Arizona. They have to cede their labor to the labor market with the orientation of the resettlement agencies. In case they decline the job offer, they are urged to find a job as soon as possible; otherwise, it is a simple reality that they are not heeded by the system. Refugees' maneuverability is limited when it comes to their pursuit of profession or vocational skills in US. It is not complimentarily possible for them to provide their self-sufficiency through their profession or vocational expertise. On this wise, self-sufficiency through employment does not spell employment opportunities with high social mobility but rather it amounts to entry-level-payment jobs. At this point, I put forward that it is more relevant to probe self-sufficiency by dint of analysis of entry-level-jobs that are offered Iraqi refugees. Since self-sufficiency through employment does not reveal the objective conditions of how Iraqi refugees experiences their early days in Arizona; but, having an entry-level-job utters the objective conditions that Iraqi refugees have to admit.

This point is exactly verbalized by the resettlement agencies multiple times during my interviews. Mr. Ferdinand Lossou resolves how Iraqi refugees are pushed to entry-level-jobs due to their immediate needs to take care of their families and themselves by highlighting the progressive facet of labor mobility in the subsequent manner:

Why you are working now, you can look for a new that highly job on the move of your feet; because most of refugees believe that if you are physician and you were compelled to come here, they can start easily: No, you have to go to school, you have to do transcript events, it takes many many years; so meanwhile, you have to take care of yourself and your family, so you can accept any job as long as this job is suitable for you. If they do not work, it is not wrong with me or matching grant. He will receive only cash assistance for a year. Depending on case size, from eight months to a year.

Along these lines, I will stress upon that the correlation between assistance programs and self-sufficiency does not produce a sustainable socio-economic environment for Iraqi refugees in the end, that's either they have to work by improving their skills and abilities or they have to accept living in the poor conditions. It is not bona fide to advocate that the U.S refugee admission program will be functioning in support of the well-being of Iraqi refugees in case they are not involved in a labor market. Unfortunately, the resettlement agencies get a handle on problems faced by Iraqi refugees by forcing their assistance networks as the agencies often emphasize their determinate capacity of assistances for refugees. Therefore the resettlement agencies do not comprise that they actively contribute to the process in which Iraqi refugees establish their new life in Arizona. This is a pure fact that the resettlement agencies cannot change their policies even if there are refugees with severe traumatic experiences. During our interview with the executive director for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix, this point is clearly underlined to portray how the resettlement agencies can apply the assistances programs and can force their limits with the alternative volunteering actions. She says that

all organizations that can call themselves refugee resettlement agencies, all say all 99% of us have funding through the State Department, okay so the State Department gives you funding basically for the first 60 to 90 days for refugees. That's where paying for rent in the very beginning but, after that which and in this case we've been able to maneuver two months but if you're coming to California, you are probably getting one month because of the cost of living there. In Arizona we can afford to pay two months and still give them all of their housing supplies by month three, if we are able to put them on our matching grant program which is the alternative system may be we gonna working to pay up to four months sometimes five months of rent but if they're not on matching grant and they don't get a job in the third month, their cash assistance that they get through the government will not pay the rent, so in some cases we have to have donations and we have to have some emergency money and so we are getting help people you know that have run into crisis whenever we can but we don't have huge amounts of money to do that.

No doubt, the process of forced migration has a huge negative impact over the majority of the refugees. They may suffer from their traumatic past psychologically or physically. They may living with the pain of their losses in their home country. Under these conditions, Iraqi refugees represent a range of multiplicity of ethnic and religious origin, and social and economic profile. Against the multiplicity of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, the limitlessness of assistances still deserves an emphasis to be able to understand the importance of getting a job even if entry-level payment. For instance, the executive director for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix points to TANF assistance program provided by the Federal Government for the refugees who are eligible, saying that

Refugees and so refugees are eligible for the mainstream public cash assistance which is under TANF⁴⁴, the temporary assistance to needy families, so if you are a single or two parent household with children, you could qualify for TANF but the money is very very little like \$300.

⁴⁴ TANF refers to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families that provides cash for families in need (Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Web).

The Federal Government conducts some assistance programs to deal with the vulnerable refugee cases; but, the emphasis on the limits of assistance deserve to be marked since the refugees' dependency on US welfare system is a matter of analysis of vulnerability in the long-run, hereby standing on a limit of month or year with certain eligibility requirements. They may benefit from such an assistance for a certain amount of time, but yet they still need to work to be able to survive in US

Deliberating the paternalist aspect of US refugee resettlement system, I often emphasized the importance of competence assumption through the limited power of the refugees' choices in the pre- and post-resettlement process. Turning back to this point again, I will stress upon the relation between self-sufficiency and competence assumption when it comes to the limits of refugee assistance programs in Arizona. So far it is clear that all assistances are time-limited and the main logic of these programs is to encourage the refugees to work and to stand on their feet as soon as they can.

Rather than emphasizing the paternalist aspect of the humanitarian governance through the pre- and post-resettlement process, my research findings also enable me to point to the importance of competence assumption at the margins of refugee assistances program. As pointed out above, either RRP or matching grant or cash assistance programs like TANF comes into existence with the mentality of the refugees have to work not to be burden on US system. Therefore, they are placed in the labor market by offering them entry-level jobs. Particularly, Iraqi refugees are informed about their rights and obligations by the resettlement agencies upon their arrival in Arizona. In this sense, my findings show that the resettlement agencies try to be clear as much as they to avoid undue expectations. During our interview, in Phoenix, the director of Catholic Charities, Ms. Joanne Morales plainly explicates the situation in the following manner:

you also have to explain to families that you know we are gonna be careful with the resettlement funds because we need to make sure they have basic housing throughout the 90 days we need to make sure that there might be a cushion because there is no long-term thinking for refugees here. You know that all the assistance for refugees is designed to be temporary, the

expectation is that people become independent through work since a very different system than maybe some of the other countries where there is a longer-term support... My priority is always housing because I don't know how long it's going take this person to get a job and I want to make sure that they have a roof over their head and need the basic needs met first, and you kind of have to go food, shelter, and clothing. Sometimes they say where is my money, give it to me and we have to say well , you know this is the agency's money that the agency receives to cover your basic needs once you are food shelter and clothing is covered by yourself independently. I am happy to do this but we have to make sure that basic needs are met.

What I understand from her words to reinforce my argument on humanitarian governance is the appearance of the local governance of the service relations between beneficiaries and resettlement agencies. After the resettlement agencies meet the refugees' basic needs, they handle the rest of the process by providing supervision and information depending on their agreement with the Department of State. This is not an astonishing aspect of the process; on the contrary this is very internal to US way of managing poverty through a sort of paternalist network.

As Mead (1998:98) and Soss, Fording and Schram (2011), “supervisory policies” or “supervisory governance” are employed to ensure both the poor’s own good and the public good. By the same token, supervisory governance is also considered as an effective instrument in explaining the refugees’ obligations and rights in the relation of service delivery. Thereupon I also emphasize here that “supervisory policies and governance” must ascribe some priorities to the resettlement agencies therefore the basic needs are stressed upon as institutional priorities to instil the idea that the refugees must be achieving themselves more than the basic needs.

At that point, whether or not it would be possible to categorize Iraqi refugees as the poor is not a remarkable according to my research findings. It would totally be a strong viewpoint that Iraqi refugees, as the others, are one of the most disadvantaged groups in this regard. Their way of being self-sufficient individuals bring them to entry-level-

jobs so that their income will simply be at lowest levels in Arizona. The director of Catholic Charities in Phoenix, Ms. Joanne Morales underlines how the refugees experience their supervisory governance as following:

So it can be difficult for them, I think you do understand where they're coming from. I mean it's a big shock to be low income in the world's richest country. It is a big shock to come to the US and be low income. Maybe they were never low income so you have to be very patient with them in and be understanding. You cannot just be like all they are picky. You know you kind of have to, in my experience, be honest and sit down and have a conversation and say okay this is what you want what do you want what resettlement look like what what kind of house you want okay we will discuss this much...

As I already specified above, the majority of Iraqi refugees experiences their individual shocks although some are already aware of the conditions through their relatives and friends in US. The agencies have their particular conversation with refugees to be able to balance their expectations and tell them what US system expects them in this process. Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix that is affiliated with Lutheran Social Services frankly touches upon how much US system is generous when it comes to their expectations in their new lives in the U.S in the subsequent manner:

especially, in the beginning, the biggest problem with Iraqis got no has been very difficult population to resettle and and and it wasn't that they were difficult but they had expectations that were much greater than the reality; they thought they will be given homes and cars and everything and it is just not true, very high expectations... Your expectations are more, what you are given here is opportunities, you are given a chance, people are gonna give you a lot of money that they are not gonna give you only enough time to start; it is up to you what you make or not; it is gonna be your skill, your ambition your hard work, that's true for everybody in the United States. US is not real generous you have to work you have to be a participant otherwise doors are gonna close.

From this standpoint, it is decisive that Iraqi refugees are given a strong message that they have to accept their responsibility for their own self-sufficiency as one of the critical requirements in US. It should be put an emphasis that the agencies struggle with their expectations by showing the “structure” of assistances provided by the neo-liberal logic of US. Meads broaches that paternalistic programs do not ascribe a given character to competence; aid is usually provided in return for good behavior. Suffice it to say that aid and structure are given in a combination as the poor needs (1998:110). It is several times touched upon that a new type of paternalism also requires a well-done supervision so as to be able to manage poverty in a broader sense. In fact, to my argument, managing expectations is equally important when it comes to management of expectations through a supervisory role. As I underlined above, in case they do refuse to undertake a determined work for themselves, they, in a way, are drawn to limits of poverty. They just manage their conditions through assistances provided by the Federal Government or Arizona Department of Economic Security. However, this does not solve their problems in the long-term; as long as they do not prove their competence, they will not be promising immigrants in US.

Recalling Bauman’s rough emphasis on “being poor” as the one who is “a flawed consumer” for today’s world rather than “being unemployed” (2005:1), I would focalize that Iraqi refugees, who become more dependent on assistances or aid, can be classified as flawed consumers in the “country of opportunities or chances” in case they do not admit work offered by the agencies. The any upsurge of the number of refugees who are not self-sufficient shows both the failure of the refugee admission system and the necessity of the policies to manage additional poor. Talking about the latter one, refugees must be transformed into new subjects to be able to govern them within certain limits. As Barbara Cruikshank points to how the system will govern the poor by creating new subjects from the poor, who will govern themselves in determined ways (1999).

Overall, I put forward that the policy of self-sufficiency is re-produced with poverty governance in the “structure and supervision” of the neo-liberal paternalism. Refugees are informed and pushed to transform themselves in the way US refugee system desires. Therefore, it would not be correct to summarize this process self-sufficiency

through employment since it is a kind of determinism that confines refugees to economically self-sufficient subjects. However, they bring their language, religion, culture and forms of socialization to US. Therefore, my findings get me to be more factual at this point so that I put forward that self-sufficiency needs to be come to grips with how refugees are transformed in new subjects through entry-level jobs from a consequentialist ethic of humanitarian organizations to responsabilization of refugees.

5.3.4.2. Self-sufficiency through Entry-Level Jobs: a Consequentialist Ethic to Responsibilization of Refugees

In the previous sections of this study, both the refugees' expectations and the system's expectations have been accentuated sectionally. Among the debates on variety of themes and subjects, the gravity of my arguments is revolved around self-sufficiency as a motor forced of US refugee resettlement admission system. Actually, many scholars like Mahler (1995), Haines (2010), Ong (2003), Portes and Rumbaut (1944) and Sassoon (2009) resolve peculiar aspects of immigrants and refugees' lives in the United States of America. Distinguishably, their academic endeavors concentrate on the postulated priority of a social and economic entrepreneurship through immigrants or refugees while presenting a critical analysis of US socio-economic structure.

As pointed out, the fulfillment of self-sufficiency eliminates the refugees' dependency on US welfare system. The system gets out their initial attachment to the system. At this point, Haines poses a critical argument that "self-sufficiency" is "the absence of receipt of cash assistance by a household. It is a minimalist kind of governmental definition. Its advantage is that it goes to the heart of public concern about whether refugees are costing anybody any money" (2010:154). The multilateral meaning of self-sufficiency are put into practice to prove that refugees are not burden on the system, but they are rather contribution to US overall prosperity. Although self-sufficiency as a policy does not correspond to all assigned meanings in practice, one thing is absolute that the rationale of self-sufficiency is to "reduce dependency" in the historical memory of the refugee admission program.

In this sense, Haines measures the effectiveness of refugee admission program with a few variables; length of residence, employment and use of services and assistance like English training, cash assistance...etc. and he also points out that the historical development of the program is always to decline cash assistance offered for refugees since the ultimate option is to guarantee “the immediate employment”, but the dilemma is to increase the household income to avert them of falling into poor conditions and poverty (2010:157-163).

What self-sufficiency through employment or immediate employment means deserves a detailed explanation to sort out the refugees’ social and economic conditions upon their arrival in US as analyzed in details above, all initial assistance programs from 90 to 180 days hinge on a basic assumption that refugees will achieve their competence or self-sufficiency at the end of these programs. United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, reports in 1994 that “according to Federal regulations and the MGP (matching grant program) guidelines, affiliates should place employable refugees in ‘appropriate’ jobs as soon as possible, and refugee must accept entry-level jobs” (1994:3). I will stress upon the verb of ‘must’ as it shows that it is not optional. It is a requirement that the same report that US system requires to ensure the minimization of the chance to assist refugees after matching grant (1994).

At that point, what an entry-level position or job means becomes crucial in order to understand how the refugees start their new lives in US. Michael Piore’s analysis of the dynamics of the labor market through immigrants’ labor in US brings a theoretical stance of the dual-labor market although it does not contain a specific weight of refugees. Piore’s basic distinction is, as already indicated, “a primary and a secondary industry”. He stresses upon that “migrants are found in the secondary sector”. Here, what is the main features of the secondary industry may be highlighting for my argument since the secondary industry is mostly identified with “unsecure jobs”, “the bottom of the job hierarchy”, and “the low status, menial jobs” (1979: 37-40). It has been more than thirty years after Piore’s analysis of US labor market by scrutinizing the plight of immigrants. It is out of the scope of my research if his theoretical stance still keeps its importance as it was thirty years ago. However, it can still be underlined

that the attributes of entry-level positions seem to belong to the secondary sector of US labor market.

When Steven J. Gold demonstrates his analysis on Russian migrants in the US, he also underscores the availability of entry-level jobs since many new-arrivals accept this sort of jobs because of their age, poor health, limited English proficiency (2007:587). Stephanie J. Nawyn similarly emphasizes that more skilled jobs always requires being economically self-sufficient to be able to meet further education expenses to get certification in US. Therefore, the refugees are commonly offered an entry-level job that “require little skills or English language proficiency” (2010:157). Likewise, Ong refers to the situation of the Cambodian immigrants that are living in “the worst neighborhoods in Oakland and San Francisco” and they are “isolated from the wider society” with the “low-paid entry-level jobs in hotels, middle-class households, and the factories of the Silicon Valley” (2003:123).

During my interviews with representatives and volunteers of non-profit sector, the common denominator of the responses is to point to the fact that refugees can work without any requirement like specific knowledge, skill or English competence. In other words, entry-level jobs are at the “bottom of the job hierarchy” with reference to Piore’s analysis. While talking about the specific condition of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, one of my informants, Ferdinand Lossou from Catholic Community Service in Phoenix, delineates how US system pushes refugees to the labor markets as following:

Since they are here, they need basic needs. When they come here, protection is to secure them. You are safe in America. Now, in America, you need basic things to start a new life that we do. Our role is to provide basic needs, house, food and training. The goal is self-sufficiency. Once you are working if you want to be a doctor, engineer, you have to work and save money to go to school and become you want to be. US is capitalism, it is not socialism. The government takes care of you, no! Take care of yourself. They can get entry-level jobs. Entry level job which means restaurants, hotel, retailing store, nursing hall, construction, when

they are integrated, they can speak English, if they are more comfortable, then move up to the second class, they can get skilled job, they can get management job, they can make a career.

Self-sufficiency means for Iraqi refugees, and others, to take care of themselves in the capitalist conditions of US. Their upward mobility in the labor market may not be an easy achievement. Talking about the condition of the majority, their social and economic condition forces them to work and study at the same time to handle their conditions in US so that they can provide their upward mobility in the system. By the same token, U/32m, who worked as a volunteer for resettlement agencies while doing his PhD in the area of international migration, discloses the fact that entry-level positions are less paid jobs and do not require skills or education and enlarges his point with the following statements:

Resettlement agency tries to find work for them at the beginning. I observed that some of them did not want to work due to their education background, that is, a PhD holder does not want to wash dishes; in general, women work as cleaners for hotels or for nursing centers, men also do same work. Some employers, especially hotels and car wash companies, recruit refugees. But, in general, they do a back seat work which is not required of English knowledge, so, there is no need for them to communicate with clients.

From this standpoint, in addition to the findings of the previous researches, I can put forward that Iraqi refugees do not present a different cast of the total immigrant population under the conditions of US economic system. In the post-resettlement process, they are in the same boat. Without being economically self-sufficient individuals, it seems difficult for them to realize their future plans. In another saying, they start their new life at the bottom of social hierarchy in US as uprooted individuals from their home countries. The only condition for refugees to establish a future in US is to provide their willingness or enthusiasm to adapt themselves into the market place as quick as US system requires. From Arizona Department of Economic Security, the

officer summarizes how US system works to canalize the refugees into the market place as following:

I think there are good strategic approaches. There are organizations that are trying to make a lot of money by taking refugees credentials and translating them. But, to be honest, it works to some extent but the thing is most refugees are going to have to start by taking entry-level employment because they don't have any work history. What I would say is what a lot of refugees don't understand to is a lot of refugees who come from situations where yes their experience with their labor market, with their skills, with their education, with their credentials, is not competitive the way that is in US so one of the problems is for a lot of refugees is understanding that even if you have those credentials, the recredentialing itself is gonna get you in because it's competitive, you are gonna be competing with people who were trained in the US, people who were certified, people who understand the labor market here, and so helping, it is a path that help refugees understand, yes that's an opportunity, it's not a guarantee though, but it is an opportunity in the meantime, you probably you still have to try to support yourself, that is the reality of US system. US system doesn't allow you to just pursue your occupation you have to work you have to accept the first available acceptable job of offer employment under the law if you refuse you gonna lose your assistance and then you can do whatever you want...

From this point of view, Iraqi refugees, and others, will be in a position in which they will catch the first available job in order to initiate their self-sufficiency process; otherwise the reality of US system does not produce constructive alternatives for refugees. Moreover, the system teaches them to be more competitive to survive in US irrespective of their social, economic and educational backgrounds. Therefore, it is possible to put forward that the formation of self-sufficiency associates with a set of values and norms in US. That is to say, they have to prove that they are promising individuals of this competitive worlds by proving their clear occupational and credit history. They have to show that they improve themselves as good immigrants and

future citizens by taking the responsibility of their lives in US. Otherwise, as the officer from Arizona Department of Economic Security points out, “if they choose not to work for that it is just going to, they are gonna go into a black hole.”

To get rid of falling into this “black hole” of the system, there are actually the agencies that orient and supervise Iraqi refugees to find a job and follow their careers in US. At this point, as said above, the refugees may be deserving of full-assistance on career improvement. For this, the only condition is to continue a job regularly after a refugee is placed in a workplace. The report prepared by Peggy Halpern and submitted to US Department of Health and Human Services reveals some instances that a state coordinator assist the refugees or immigrants’ job upgrading by contacting the companies as long as they are good workers (2008).

As indicated above, US system finds self-sufficiency functional to reduce the refugees’ dependency on the welfare system by make them feel that they are in the country of opportunities. Considering the advancement of the market place in the US, it would not be incorrect to assert that the function of the humanitarian governance is associated with all components of the neo-liberal hegemony of US system. As a result, the rationale of the system is to make all immigrants or refugees responsible for their own lives as future citizens. Whether they would be successful or not is not a decisive point for this rationale. Whether they will be workers or not is a prominent limit for the system as the ultimate target is to effectively restrain the welfare policies to make all refugees manage themselves in the desired manner. In this regard, the Director, Nicolle Trudeau, from Refugee Focus in Tucson in Arizona, explains how their responsibility is bounded by the government’s policy of employment for self-sufficiency:

You have a 60-year-old Iraqi woman who showed up here by herself, who does not know English. Getting her to the point where she can work a job and take care of herself is a huge cultural challenge, a physical challenge, a mental challenge. However, in the eyes of the government she is a playable person who does not qualify for the next 5 to 10 years for benefits... They (refugees) expect us to take care of them, but we cannot. We are told that this person has to get a job (*parenthesis added*).

Although placing refugees in entry-level positions is a policy for the system, it is not possible to state that the system is good at eliminating all challenges the agencies face in the post-resettlement area. The system brings a solid approach to the agencies when it comes to self-sufficiency through resettlement agencies. In fact, it is analytically possible to say that this approach is crystalized in the implementation of humanitarian governance under the paternalist attribute of the neo-liberal policies.

At that point, taking this point a step further, I formulate my argument that the process of creating self-sufficient refugees as a shift from consequentialist ethic to responsabilization of refugees. Self-sufficiency through entry-level jobs catalyzes this shift in the context of humanitarian governance. More specifically, in the post-resettlement area, we are talking about the stories of “saved lives” through “humanitarian action” of the international and national non-governmental organizations. Recalling Barnett’s arguments, humanitarian organization or agencies, as carriers of consequentialist reasoning, aim at providing the best benevolence for their beneficiaries and they seek to establish a balance with their benevolence to avoid further harm, or unintended outcomes. It is concise to state that the paternalist attribute of humanitarian governance to determine the best interest of subjects through humanitarian action is grounded upon a consequentialist ethic. More specifically, such an ethic invokes both “the intended outcome” and “the actual results” to measure its effectiveness (Barnett, 2005a; 2005b; 2012).

The catalyzer of the system is, as said above, self-sufficiency through entry-level jobs and US system straightforwardly actuates this catalyzer by adjusting the agencies as well as the non-profit sector to the neo-liberal rule of the overall system. This means that the agencies legally end up their task by encouraging them to have available entry-level jobs. This seems an obligatory step for the agencies since the government does not want to have additional dependent individuals. According to the logic of consequentialist reasoning, the best interest of individuals is to become self-sufficient in US; as a result, the agencies’ consequentialist reasoning cannot be divorced from the general logic of the neo-liberal order of the state institutions. In this sense, as Larner succinctly expounds that

Neo-liberal strategies of rule, found in diverse realms including workplaces, educational institutions and health and welfare agencies, encourage people to see themselves as individualized and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well-being. (2000:13).

The point where the agencies get a result through their consequentialist results and intended outcomes leads to the process of “responsibilization” in the word of Rose. This is important to see how the state formulates the system to reduce individuals’ dependence on assistance or aid provided by the state. Specifying the subject of dependency, Rose⁴⁵ points to the place of “the excluded individual” in US welfare system by highlighting the effort to “micro-manage the behavior of welfare recipients in order to remolarize them”. In fact, he also pinpoints that the ultimate purpose is to “get all those physically able to work off benefits entirely”. At that point, he demonstrates that people are targets of “professional reconstruction” through a set of strategies as well as “empowerment” and all of this process is, in a sense, designed to abolish the “patronizing” function of dependency by bringing a kind of autonomy to individuals to accept their responsibility. Furthermore, it is the construction of “ethical and cultural subjectivity” (2000:334-335). Following the arguments made by Larner and Rose, their arguments do not contain specifically refugees or immigrants; but there is a strong convergence that individuals, who are “excluded”, or who are living at the margins of exclusion, would be considered as responsible for their individual decisions. Beyond this line, everything will be their ethical or cultural issue, not more.

In integrating this strong theoretical stance into my research findings, I will argue that responsibilization is a binding process for Iraqi refugees, but this process is definitely different from responsibilization of American citizens and institutional structures. Refugees who are the individuals sharing the same public space like workplaces, schools, welfare organizations, and other common areas need to be made visible through their unique experiences in this sense. Therefore, when Iraqi refugees come

⁴⁵ Nikolas Rose emphasizes the characteristics of advanced liberal rule rather than that of the neo-liberal governance and develops his argument. In order to present a short capture of his approach, his following argumentation is quite fruitful: “Advanced liberal rule depends upon expertise in a different way, and articulates experts differently into the apparatus of rule. It does not seek to govern through ‘society’, but through the regulated choices of individual citizens. And it seeks to detach the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, relocating experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability and consumer demand” (2006:285).

up against the conditions of responsabilization, it is equally important to underscore that they also start experiencing virtual limits of getting to Americanized. More specifically, they also become aware of how American norms, principles, obligations work and what all of them mean for their new lives in Arizona. At this turning point, it becomes crucial for my research to turn to the Iraqi refugees' experiences in this responsabilization process along with the pros and cons of the system.

5.3.4.3. Responsibilization of Iraqi refugees: Chances and Hardships of New Americans

In 2015, the White House Task Force on New Americans' strategic action plan on immigrants and refugee integration⁴⁶ is an important loop to generate a discussion on how much the presence of immigrants and refugees is important for US in fact, the action plan contains lot of indicators based on a set of academic researches and institutional reports and basically relates that immigrations and refugees represent a huge contribution to US economic growth and diversity of social life although there are serious indicators for the appearing challenges of immigrant and refugee integration. The mentioned plan illustrates the main challenges like "limited funds for refugee integration and welcoming communities activities", "naturalization process", "linguistic integration", and "limited awareness about refugees through mainstream networks and communities". Literally, the plan projects to overcome all challenges to benefit from capacities of immigrants and refugees as "the cheap labor force". In the aging population⁴⁷ of US, the plan clearly raises up that immigrants and refugees can meet the labor force that the system necessitates for the sustainability of economic growth (The White House Task Force on New Americans, 2015). Therefore, the system calls this "the New American Workforce" saying that

⁴⁶ The plan was presented by White House Domestic Policy Council and US Citizenship and Immigration Services through the contribution of other relevant departments in order to Show gaps, challenges and opportunities in immigrants and refugee integration into US in the year of 2015.

⁴⁷ Ortman and Velkoff indicate that "Between 2012 and 2050, the United States will experience considerable growth in its older population (see Figure 1).² In 2050, the population aged 65 and over is projected to be 83.7 million, almost double its estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012. The baby boomers are largely responsible for this increase in the older population, as they began turning 65 in 2011.³ By 2050, the surviving baby boomers will be over the age of 85" (2014:1).

Like native-born Americans, new Americans aspire to obtain economic security for themselves and their families. Economic security provides new Americans self-sufficiency and the ability to give back to their communities' economy and growth. New Americans may also face significant risks of exploitation, particularly in low-wage occupations. These workers are most often employed in industries such as construction, agriculture, healthcare, hotel and motel, garment manufacturing, and restaurants where labor violations are most prevalent. (The White House Task Force on New Americans, 2015 :31).

Undoubtedly, the refugee admission program or refugee welcoming strategies put the construction of the New Americans at a central point when it comes to the refugee integration in US. From the point of view of my research, it is not arduous to see that the Iraqi refugees also undergo all of these challenges which are mentioned by the action plan during their pathway to become a New American. Naturalization, language competency, vocational skills and being entrepreneur, personal vulnerabilities and so forth are critical challenges and Iraqi refugees become aware of the fact that they need to spend a huge effort to survive in the competitive market order of US

Before going into detail, at this juncture, I will underline a very critical point that plays an important point in the analysis of responsabilization of Iraqi refugees. It is their length of residence. As already pointed out, US refugee admission program targets to place employable refugees in available entry-level jobs at the end of 180th day at most, meaning that they are granted a permanent residence permit with work permission and then they are offered some works to become self-sufficient during their stay in US. Until they get their citizenship in the US, they stay and work as residence permit holders. Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix make this clear in the following words:

you have to be here five years to become eligible for US citizenship after the first year they become permanent residence or get the green card we call it after five and they make an application for citizenship they go in for an interview they will be expected to speak English and they will be asked

questions on different kinds of history and civics kind of just to make sure that they understand...

Therefore, the horizon from responsabilization of Iraqi refugees to the construction of New Americans actually spreads over time. Therefore, they experience the same horizon through different chances and hardships in this process. In this regard, my research findings bring forward how the Iraqi refugees undergo the process of being reconstructed and remoralized as New Americans through certain responsibilities. When it comes to initial challenges which Iraqi refugees experience upon their arrival, the representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry delicately evaluate the situation in the following words:

It is difficult obviously. It is hard to place somebody in a job who potentially speaks no English, who is not educated and who has never worked in a... I don't wanna say business atmosphere, but in a Western business atmosphere before, it is difficult, I think it is very frustrating for a lot of refugees as well, because they want to work but the opportunities are extremely limited. So, luckily in Tucson there are quite few of businesses who are open to hiring refugees and as the agencies get to work out there, you know, there are businesses who become more and more open to hiring refugees and working with the agencies. It works best with the agency who has the direct relationship with the business. I can say I will be a cannibal for this person, this refugee client. I will make sure that they have all information. I will make sure that they understand and show to work on time. I will help them with transportation issues because if there piece of puzzle was not there, it would be very very difficult for any refugee to really be able to keep a job. I mean it is hard but there are opportunities, there are people who are volunteer to work with refugees to teach them how to act in a business environment.

Beyond shadow of a doubt, their words teach us lot of things concerning difficulties the refugees experience in their search for job and their working period. Iraqis come from totally different social and economic structure. Maybe it would be incorrect to

put forward that American marketplace are thoroughly incompatible with their understanding of working life. However, it is a reality to be emphasized that it is a “Western business atmosphere” with its own culture, norms and modalities so that Iraqi refugees are expected to adapt themselves to this new working environment after a very short orientation that they receive.

To make this point more concretely, one of my informants, EF/48/male, is with her family of six in Phoenix and prefers to speak English during our conversation and explains Western business atmosphere through his attempts to work in the following words:

Here, you must organize your life here. Our life in Iraq was not organized. But, now here, we should organize like Americans because Americans organize they have everything, they work, wife, husband, son work, everyone know what he got, everyone know how to pay, I mean we should respect the time here, we should respect work, we respect the money. In our country, we didn't respect the money. We didn't care. But here, you should work like a machine, I mean if you go to work, if you don't call your manager, you will lose your work, that means everything is organized, they pay you for four hours so you can't move like what we had in our country where I can call my friend. But here, no. They pay you for four hours. That means we should organize our life how the life is here.

EF/48/male has been staying for almost two years in Arizona with her sick wife and four children. His expressing of American working life comes from his several attempts to find a better job after he quits a few. It is important to stress upon that the rational, calculable and inflexible design of working zone is mostly compared to his conditions in Iraq. It is very critical to underline his words like “machine”, “organizing”, “wage per hour”, and “respect for money and time”. These words and more actually represent their new conditions in US in other words, the sum of these statements relate to the social and economic organization of America life. To be a good New American is therefore to respect time and money. Parenthetically, I will state that responsabilization of Iraqi refugees takes place in the process of Americanization, but

it is under the impact of McDonaldization. More specifically, as Ritzer points out, “Europe and the rest of the world are moving toward business and cultural worlds dominated by the principles of efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control through the substitution of non-human for human technology” (Ritzer, 1998:75).

At that point, New Americans are expected to adjust their skills and abilities in accordance with the operation of these dominant principles like efficiency, predictability, calculability and control and Iraqi refugees experience all the process by starting their new lives at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy. In addition this significant point, the rule is to internalize the idea of working if you are an employable individual. Therefore, I already underlined that the system assumes you will improve your social and economic conditions by increasing your competence over time, otherwise, the expectations for more assistance by the government actually demotivate and sets back refugees in US system. Nevertheless, after many catastrophes in their lives, refugees may keep their expectations by not accepting these given-conditions. During my interview with U/32/male, who was volunteer for refugee organizations in Arizona and who is also a researcher in this area shares his observation in this sense:

I heard about Iraqis during my volunteer activities. Iraqis are different than others. Iraqis come from different ethnic groups. Their education level was high but their diplomas was not recognized by the US; doctors started to wash dishes to make their life and they complaint a lot; especially, Sunni groups were not silent; they demanded assistance from the state by claiming that they were forced to migrate as a result of war the US triggered so that the state have to support or help them. However, such attitude was not acceptable for the US state that does not approve state-based expectations in parallel to its own state tradition.

In this sense, it would be important to underline once again that US state-tradition is associated with the neo-liberal organization of the social and economic life and spreads its power all over the world. Furthermore, its impact zone is not confined to economic terms as it aims at reinforcing its power means in a social and cultural lives of people

from the different regions of the world. As Ritzer and Stillman indicate, under the impact of McDonaldization, Americanization appears in the form of “economic imperialism” and “cultural hegemony”. In fact, these impacts are local, national and global when it is taken together with the global role of US marketplace. And it comes with a “standardization and homogenization” of consumption and production processes (2003:31-37). Therefore, I put forward that the plight of Iraqi refugees, or other refugees, need to be scrutinized under the impact of Americanization with reference to the culture of Americanization. Being competitive, adjusting to the competitive marketplace, empowering social and economic conditions need to be formulated under the conditions Ritzer et al. portray. Whether it would be easy or not is a critical question here since they have a different culture, language, religion, habits and so forth. One thing is clear that US will not support them in the way they demand, therefore their way of overcoming all difficulties would be their business.

In this sense, as I already pointed out, working in this Westernized business atmosphere is only alternative for Iraqi refugees to get a social and economic higher-position in their coming years in US. For instance, JM/50/male, who is one of the founders of IASPF in Arizona, came to US in the early 1990s and after many tough days and months he passed in US, he shares his observations on some refugees’ request on more assistance from the government in a critical way:

In America, they helped you for couple months and they told you find a job and work instead of waiting for public assistance. Public assistance is not enough, maybe, refugee get cash assistance, it is not enough to pay the rent. They give them food, it is enough... Public assistance is not enough and I believe it is fair, when refugees come here, especially refugees, they are able to work, they can start work and find a job after two months upon their arrival. And like a family, two or three, one of them can work and one then wife can be at home to take care of the kids or kids go to the school, then wife can also go to work. So public assistance is not enough for them. I am not supporting such that since they are always gonna be in the same level with public assistance.

Following this, I will once again repeat that accepting an entry-level job for initial self-sufficiency is a prerequisite for New Americans in US system. JM/50/male reveals what he has internalized through his social and economic achievements over years in US Upon their arrival to the obtainment of the citizenship, US system makes them experience the Western business culture and principles through the entry-level jobs in the beginning. In fact, the meaning of work is explored by many Iraqi refugees after they understand how much the system promotes their life in Arizona and then this prerequisite comes into existence in the form of cost of living. One of my informants, DR/36/male who has been living in Arizona with his wife and three children and who is not able to speak English enough but his Turkish is quite well explains:

Working is a prerequisite here. Assistance is ok but you have to pay your rent, clothes or gas for your car. You need a car here. Without having car, you cannot move from one place to another. The car is cheap here, you can buy a car for 1000 or 1500 \$ but gas is expensive. Everything costs here. If someone walks or goes to somewhere by walking here, he is homeless or beggar.

The stage where they try to establish their self-sufficiency is formed through the spillover of the entry-level jobs in the labor market, in other words, they gain minimum wage⁴⁸ with this sort of jobs and their social and economic challenges are mainly triggered by this sort of jobs. Furthermore, the system inculcates its own norm and principles to the refugees' lives through the channels materialized by the way of the entry-level jobs.

At this juncture, I will begin my arguments by underlying the fact that the majority of the refugees are not happy with their entry-level jobs which are offered by the resettlement agencies. Many complain about either terms of jobs and toughness of work offered by the agencies or lack of work or scarce of relatively good positions. To make this more concrete, I will turn to a few examples. H/48/male has been in Arizona for more than three years with his wife and three children and who is not able to speak

⁴⁸ During my research, this point is often by emphasized by my informants that refugees gain 8.50 dollar per hour through the entry-level jobs.

English, therefore he explains his initial experiences with the assistance of interpreter in a following fashion:

The organization found me job but the work was very far and it was too hard to work. Kind of work the organization found me, I prefer going back to my country instead of working with this kind of work. This kind of work is a kind of dying slowly. They put me in a carpenter factory and the roof is open, as you know, Arizona is too much hot. You work full time, all the week by carrying woods for the machine. They conduct you like homeless people, I mean, who don't have any attitude, they don't have any culture. You feel that you are working with some homeless people.

Indeed, in addition to difficult conditions of work, he also underlines the negative aspects of social relations at the workplace. Many informants do not speak of ethnicity and faith based discrimination, but some raise that they are not to be appraised through their work. In a similar vein , MB/47/male who has been in Arizona for three years with his wife and two children, who cannot speak English and he shares his experiences through the help of interpreter in the following fashion:

The agencies found a job for me. But, it is too hard and not good. They don't pay enough. I cannot carry heavy stuff because I had a surgery and problem with my stomach. And they shout me and I cannot carry heavy stuff. If I told them about my health problems, they would not give me any job. But later, I quit the job and I told my friends to find a different job.

As a matter of the fact, in case they cannot speak even a little English, they are placed in jobs that do not require communication, knowledge and skill. They are just harnessed to use their physical power if they can as they do not have anything to give. For instance, SH/40/female who has been in Arizona with her two children for almost four years, who cannot speak English and who also express her experiences with the interpreter as follows:

It is difficult for me to find a job because all they offer is housekeeping and things like that. We have to take it because we cannot speak English. I have also hijab and Islamic dressing also affects my working too because not everyone accepts that. I applied for many places but I didn't get a job. I believe because of my Islamic dressing.

Many are aware of how much important they should speak and write English to hunt a good job as compared to works like cleaning and carrying. On the other hand, it is in fact important to underscore the preponderance of religious and cultural factors against their prevailing conditions in US. In fact, the majority does not speak of discrimination in the labor market due to their dressing or hijab. According to my observations, it may be a matter in the context of Arizona under the impact of the increasing Islamophobia after 9/11. With some informal conversations, I have explored that the refugee women, who are wearing hijab, have difficulties in finding a job. When I specifically wished to learn the organizations' observations at that point, they did not specify anything concerning labor market discrimination based on ethnicity or religion, such as the program director of the organization of Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix expounds:

When it comes to the religion, I did hear, personally you know I haven't witnessed anything I mean as employers, any job, the law, any workplaces, do not discriminate any employee, I haven't heard unless maybe you have interviewed the clients who told you.

The representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry in Tucson, set forth in a similar way that

There is some discrimination against refugees in general because some employers hire refugees and then they realize how much they have to teach them and then they don't wanna hire anymore after that... Negatively, a lot of them do not know much about the religion, or even do not know Muslims personally. So, they get all information on media, it is not always accurate.

Although their statements are not instances of concrete discrimination practices, especially based on ethnicity and religion, it is valuable to understand that the diverse structure of the labor market does not lead to the increasing discrimination of refugees on their faith and ethnicities. It is also critical that the employers' general tendency not to hire refugees needs to be scrutinized as another form of discrimination out of the scope of this research.

Back to my argument on the dissatisfaction of the Iraqi refugees with the offered entry-level jobs, I will enlarge my argument by stating that challenges and difficulties they encounter during their early days in Arizona force them to detect alternative ways to have a different job. At this point, kinship and friendship relations have a critical place. NS/32/male who has been in Arizona for almost four years, who is able to speak English to express himself and who is living with his wife and his extended family members and who says that

There is friends, relatives that help you find a job. Or, if you are too perfect in English, there is a website to find a job too. So there is too many way to find jobs. My first job I worked, my friend helped me out and he find me a security job, at the same time, I continue my education so my friend helped me a lot. The organization offered for me but I didn't spend long time with the job. It took a week and I quit. I worked for a casino, I was like a servicer. I was like helping people, bringing dishes from the kitchen to the tables. This job, it is not for hundred percent. It is not forever job. I was always looking for something better. Now, I am working with a security job almost one year, but I wished to change my job, but you cannot change your work each month in US, you have to spend at least one year for your history job. You have to spend to get experience, it is not good to work two months and jump to another job, it is not good.

As mentioned before, Iraqi refugees need work to be able to survive in US. Their first attempt to provide their economic security in this sense. Nonetheless, they are trying to establish a balance between their economic security and their personal, cultural and religious values. During my interviews with some Iraqi refugees, some jobs like

working as signer, serviceman, and cleaners in hotel rooms, casinos or other entertainment places are raised not to be culturally or religiously appropriate. On the other hand, Iraqi refugees more than forty years old imply that they feel angry or upset with job offers, especially for those with high-education level, it means a sort of upward mobility or status loss.

Talking about the multiplicity of challenges in Arizona, the program director of the Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship touched upon other prominent aspects of this process as follows:

The challenges are finding jobs, because we have, recently we have clients that finished professional fields, degrees in Iraq when they come here, it is really very hard for them to find a job because, I mean, US does not recognize your profession. That's one of the challenges clients are facing. And also, finding job such as accepting to work in hotels as a housekeeping, that's really difficulty forces the majority of individuals to work and specially females as well. We have lack of English language. The majority of the employers ask for clients that could speak English to allow them work. Personally mapping, I think there are also cultural barriers as well, language and education barriers.

At that point, it should be conceded that IASPF is, at the same time, a gathering place for many Iraqis and therefore its director also derives her observations by witnessing lot of refugees in Arizona. Indeed, my research findings also presents the similar difficulties as already explained in detail. But, it is also important to point up that the refugees may also struggle with unemployment in case either they do not accept work offered by the agencies or they wish to have a different job than the offered. Finding alternative ways of working in US is related to educational and linguistic integration in a profitable manners. This takes us to the second challenge, which is English proficiency. The representative of Noor Women's Association from Tucson in Arizona summarize the importance of English knowledge in relation to better job opportunities in the following manner:

Refugee who does not have the language English, they suffer. So in the past, in my experience, if a refugee knows English or tries to learn English, and they can drive they have better opportunity of getting a job.

It is quite clear from my research findings that Iraqi refugees, who cannot communicate in English, become disadvantaged individuals in the long-term. At first, they come up against the risk of being confined to a limited social network, which prevents their social and economic improvement in US. Secondly, they are pushed by the system to learn English as quickly as they can while continuing their work. In order to explain this point in a bit detail, I interviewed QK/64/male, who has been in Arizona for six years with his wife and adult children and he has been working for the resettlement agencies as an interpreter as his English is quite well and explains what sort of difficulties that Iraqi refugees have in their search for better jobs in the following statements:

This is one of the important problems the refugee worried about. When I meet people, we discuss a lot of things. The main thing, the main concern for them, it is the job. This depends on how they are. Knowing English or not. Speaking English or not. People who speak English get job easier than others but the organizations try to find or help the refugee find a job, and usually it is level-entry job except people who have relatives here, they find a job different than the organization.

In the similar pathway, another interviewee, HA/24/female has been in Arizona for four years with her husband and she is good at speaking English and states that

You know it is very important like, it is good that we have enough language, so we can work and we can do our business. Maybe for the people like they cannot speak English, it is hard for them to find works and jobs. We have friends that they don't know any English so they cannot work anything and they just stay at home. I am working for perfume sales.

Speaking English is a very key instrument to work and socialize in US Without speaking English, it would not be possible to participate in the social life. Therefore, English knowledge is also critical for adjustment and integration into American community. Haines also emphasizes the importance of English knowledge for “successful adaptation to US” and “absorption into and commitment to mainstream American social, cultural and political life” (2010:147). The similar researches points to same results concerning the positive impact of English proficiency over immigrant integration. Bleakley and Chin (2010:165) stress upon that immigrants with English proficiency provide their economic integration more easily and so they can close the “wage gap” which is generally between US natives and immigrants. Following this point, I can say that Iraqi refugees explore another important aspect of the post-resettlement process; that’s English proficiency to get higher positions in the society. According to my observations, unless Iraqi refugees determine to have a language proficiency in English, the system will not support them till the end. To make this point more concrete, I will turn to the words of DR/36/male, who has been staying more than three years in Arizona and who says that

My wife worked as a cashier in Arizona but later she was kicked off because her English was not sufficient and now she goes to the college. We receive 320 \$ for our books, 600 \$ for our local travel for four months. But, it is not enough. I went to the language course for six months, but later I dropped. But I will continue again. Speaking English is very necessary here. In Turkey, I did not suffer from the language. But here, I suffered a lot as I did not know English. I cannot continue my daily life here without speaking English.

As already pointed out, speaking and reading English is naturally indispensable part of daily life in US, Iraqi refugees are assisted by the agencies and non-profit organizations like Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASPF) through English classes or interpreters. Besides, DR/36/male indicates that Arizona authorities provide a small amount of assistance for their enrollment in the colleague. They are also some other alternative available, but as understood from my informants, they do

not emphasize on these alternatives too much. As a matter of fact, there are various reasons of why Iraqi refugees cannot pursue their individual development.

As said before, the most important thing is the fact that they are survivors of violence or conflict, therefore they still deal with their personal problems or traumas. Additionally, their age, gender and education are also other factors in this process. In advance of these reasons, the majority looks for their subsistence means in US by determining their priority to work with the requirement of little knowledge of English. In Arizona, alternative language training programs are available for everyone. However, it is important to explore that English proficiency means English to be able to work for the majority of Iraqi refugees⁴⁹. At least, the majority of the adults do not motivate themselves to have English proficiency to continue their education and get a profession in Arizona. They know that it becomes difficult for them to work and study at the same time. Besides, the system does not give a priority to their English learning process in this sense. Concerning the weight of this last point, U/32/male, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson, underlines his observations just like that:

Language education depends on refugees themselves. They are not forced by the system to learn English. The priority is given to employ them. Unless knowing English, they can be employed. But also, they can learn English in libraries. In every neighborhood, there are some local libraries providing different services computer classes or English classes refugees can benefit from... Refugees can also benefit from community college after achieving a certain level of English knowledge. Such college provides some amount of assistance as well. The basic problem is that you have family and you have to continue the college in evenings.

⁴⁹ Capps and Newland et. al. analyze English proficiency rates among the refugee population in US and underline that “like other immigrants, refugees’ English proficiency increases with time in the United States. Nonetheless, in 2009 – 11,58 percent of refugees who had been in the United States for 20 years and more were Limited English Proficient (LEP). Limited English skills may slow the integration of some groups of refugees in particular (e.g. Cubans and Vietnamese) and lead to lower incomes and higher dependence on public benefits” (2015:2). To support this argument, we can also turn to Zong and Batalova’s analysis that 25.1 million foreign and US born immigrants are considered with Limited English Proficient (LEP) among the total population of immigrants, approximately 61.6 million, in 2013 (2015, web).

As underlined before, before English knowledge and proficiency, there may be a set of unskilled work that the agencies will bring as an available offer, but it seems from my research findings that many are not satisfied with these works and they are always in search for better jobs. In addition to this problematic aspect of the process, there are also Iraqi refugees who have high-education background and who are very proximate to the profile of New Americans, but they also suffer from unemployment. As US system does not recognize certificates, diplomas and credentials that refugees bring from their home country, the agencies pick up the entry-level jobs for them as well. However, my research findings indicate that this appears as a weak aspect of the reconstruction of New Americans by the system. As a result, under the consequences of forced migration, many high-educated refugees come up against the risk of loss of social status among his or her community unless they have financial means for the recredentialing that also takes time.

This point and more are actually emphasized by the program director for the IASPF during our interview and especially she underlines that different occupations groups need to be taken up separately when it comes to the matter of the recredentialing. She explains this in the following fashion:

You can't have higher jobs unless you pass some requirements, which is language and even experience. Those individuals, they have professional degrees, they usually do have English, English level or English skill. Some of them do accept to work as a security. Some of them, they don't accept that so what they do is they go back to the school. They try to get equivalent degree such as medical assistant and then to work, later on, with a professional, in a professional field. Some of them, I know, they are without work. Doctors and engineers, I hear without work because they don't wanna work as a housekeeping, they don't wanna work as a security. Some of them go back to Iraq, but the number is not huge... I mean, if you have medical degree from your country, it is hard to have the same degree here. It takes years. If you are physician, you have to take exams step one, step two and then based on the scores, you get residency to specialize your

work to do in US It is lot of studies before the exams even you have the same degree.

Although it is not a huge number of Iraqi refugees, it is excessively important to call attention to that few takes a risk of going back to their home country not to live with their loss of status in US In other respects, the majority go through all of the difficulties so as to establish their new lives in US while looking forward to facilitating the process of being New Americans. At that point, I will give a place to the words of EF/48/male, who was a computer engineer and journalist in Iraq and who have been resettled in US with his wife and four children. During our interview, he raised many problems concerning his involvement in the labor market upon his arrival in the following fashion:

They found me very bad job. I am a computer engineer. I am a journalist. I have OSHA a British certificate safety at factory. They do not accept this certificate because it is not from US Any kind of certificate, according to the law here, no one accept without getting it from US So that means I must find other work. It is ok. Our work as cleaning for me at forty-eight years, it is a kind of, I respect because I know, in Japan, people who clean there got more than eight US dollar in a month. I don't need that but I cannot do this kind of work. My son is now working as cleaning, he was a college student in my country, but he is doing this kind of work because he must work. But for me, I cannot work because I am forty-eight years old. But they find me only cleaning work and very far from my place. I worked more difficult than this job, eight to ten hours, at night shift... I just worked for ten days and I quitted my work. They told me you are too much slow. I worked with some company here, night shift which started from six thirty evening to five morning. People usually order online items so we prepared online items for people. So they think, within ten hours, you should have more than two thousand items. So if less than that, they will be upset. They said you are too much slow, they'll give you a warning with sign, and the second time or third time they'll quit you...

Unfortunately, it is possible to proliferate these examples in Arizona; because of these harsh conditions, many suffer from secondary-trauma in US, go into depression and they are stuck into their domestic life according to my observations. As a single woman staying in Arizona more than three years, B/31/female also says that she did refuse the entry-level job since she is looking for better chances in US and explains this as follows:

My master's degree in Jordan, it is from an American university. So, I think it is accepted here. But I feel like my language is not good and I don't have experience. When I apply, no one accepts me. I applied but no one called me for an interview because I don't have experience.

Indeed, my research findings show that they suffer from unemployment while looking for better job opportunities in US, but this job hunting process makes the high-educated persons dependent on their family members, who may also be abroad. If they are living with their adult family members, the adult children usually support their subsistence; otherwise, if they are single, they usually receive financial assistance from their immediate family members abroad. But, for both, this process corresponds to the appearance of financial dependence.

It is also explicit from these statements to repeat that US system does not recognize the refugees' certificates or diplomas which they bring from their country of origin. If they want to perform their vocations or handicraft, they have to take additional courses, classes and tests to prove their proficiency and competency through the fulfillment of US requirements. Resettlement agencies support the refugees by means of some certification programs as long as their skills and abilities are transferrable. However, if a refugee is doctor, engineer, lawyer and other occupations that are not easily transferrable, then s/he has to undergo a long process to be able to perform his or her job. One of my informants, Mr. Ferdinand Lossou from Catholic Community Service in Tucson, explains all the details of this process as following:

We develop our strategy based on what experience they had. For example, he cooked in Iraq and then he can cook in the US. So those are transferrable

skills. In a resume, we are going to mention those skills in client's eyes so that give him a chance to find a job in a hotel or restaurant. If you have a nursing background, here we can provide training we can pay for your certification. We pay for a nursing training; so you can get a certificate and you can get a job. Meantime, we have those who come as a lawyer and doctor. Those degrees in the US are not easily transferrable. For example, I came I have a law degree. When I came here, I had to take classes because my degree is a French law. I have to pay for my back classes. If you are a refugee, if you are a physician who came here, you have to go back to school to take more classes. At the same time, you have to work, that's the challenge. It is difficult. You will see that if you go to New York, and most of Chicago, you will see that only cap drivers, they are engineer, they are lawyers, they are physician from Pakistan, from India and from lost countries. Because when they come here, they have to take care of their family, they have to learn English and they have to take classes to revalidate their diploma; it takes time. Many many cases like this.

At that point, it deserves an emphasis that this process is extra difficult for single women and single women with children. In case they do not see any chance to perform their occupation, they again become vulnerable and dependent on the system or their relatives abroad. During my interview with M/48/female, I understand that she has a motivation to initiate a business on her vocational skills and knowledge, but she cannot due to costly and tough procedures as a single woman who has to take care of her child. She expresses her situation in the below-mentioned way:

At first times of mine here, hotel cleaning job was offered to me. It was a far distance. I have to take care of my son as single woman and I didn't accept the job. I have a car, but I have to find a job to provide my subsistence. I have applied for many jobs, but there is no response yet. I wish I could work for a beauty salon, but it was not possible. I have a long experience in a beauty salon, but I have to get certificate here to work for a beauty salon, but I cannot since I cannot get a license here, too difficult for me to get that certificate...

Indeed, the majority wants to take their lives' responsibility through work that they want. They state that they did not accept the cleaning job in related to long distances between their home and work. It is not ambiguous to figure out that distance or transportation is not underlying reasons for their lack of motivation. As a matter of fact, they cannot concretize their social mobility by way of entry-level jobs and they often compare their current conditions with their conditions in Iraq. Concerning this last point, this comparison does not lead to productive outcomes for Iraqi refugees. Rather, they try to find alternative jobs in Arizona, but it does not seem possible for them in a short-period.

In the matter of English proficiency, the plight of immigrants and refugee are usually spelled out through economic integration particularly. Though their economic integration is important for their future plans, it is still important to understand that English proficiency stands for refugees more different than immigrants. Iraqi refugees are not motivated individuals to come to US to work and make money. Iraqi refugees are forced to leave their home country and then go through various difficulties and hardships in their asylum countries and, in the end, they have reached a safe county like US.

In this sense, we need to draw a line here to distinguish their situation from immigrants' motivation. After they arrive in the US, they need to establish their new lives while trying to forget their traumatic experiences. Therefore, their economic and social adaptation to US may involve distinct stages. To be able to work as a doctor, perform their own occupation, English proficiency, obtaining a language proficiency may be seen as a problem or another obstacle on their long road. As a result, they firstly need to overcome this important obstacle in order to provide their social mobility in their responsabilization process. Therefore, while they are performing their initial responsibilities to get rid of being dependent on the system, they also have to improve their language skills in order to take a place in the system. That is to say, this responsabilization means that their individual development and entrepreneurship will take them to the inside of the circle of the system by keeping them away from the margins of the circle.

From this standpoint, I will remark that it is not an easy-going and a cost-free process for Iraqi refugees to become more educated, gain English proficiency and fulfill their integration in taking responsibilities by mobilizing their social status in US. One of my informants, the Director, Nicolle Trudeau, from Refugee Focus in Tucson in Arizona, explains this reality by analyzing the refugees' tough conditions:

I would say most people, this is a hard reality again to accept that most people accept the job way below their status and their experience level. We always try to tell people your first job is not your last job. Your first job is really that first year is to get here, start making some money, start paying your bills, get in your life here and then on your spare time is to try to become more educated, to have your English stronger, to come up with a plan, to get your applications out there, where then you can progress by higher-level, most people want to come in and start at that level, but I know very very few clients who are able to come in and start at a level they had before. Balancing work, family life, education, there is no alternative. Honestly, most clients, they end up living their lives, it is a tough life, and they sacrifice that to their children who can have better opportunities.

It is fairly pellucid that Iraqi refugees, and other, have a dual responsibility; on the one hand they have to provide their subsistence with minimum wage jobs to take care of their children or elderly family members and on the other hand they have to improve their English proficiency, education level while gaining work experience. That is to say, they have to learn the way of “balancing” everything and they have to grasp the way of “organizing” everything according to the requirements of the system. In balancing their pathways to become New Americans in the US, as Ms. Nicolle points out, they, to a certain extent, sacrifice themselves for their minor children in the case that they do not balance or organize their life with the requirements of the system. In the second scenario, with the supposition that they cannot perform their professional degree in US, they sacrifice their social status to initiate a new life from scratch. In the last scenario, granted that they grab a chance to improve their conditions by saving their social and economic status, they sacrifice their social and financial resources to do that. As a result of this, I will put forward that responsabilization of Iraqi refugees

upon their arrival is more often be associated with a sort of socioeconomic sacrifice in Arizona, meaning that becoming New Americans necessitates socioeconomic sacrifice for refugees in US.

CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF IRAQI REFUGEES IN ARIZONA: THREE LEVELS OF OPERATIONALIZATION

So far I have cleared up how US system makes refugees responsible for their new lives in Arizona. With their increasing responsibilities for themselves and their families, they learn how the system works and how they can take advantage of chances or opportunities to maximize their benefit in the competitive marketplace of US. To enlarge this point to come to the integration of refugees, I will repeatedly stress upon that refugees cannot choose their destination countries and therefore integration does not appear as an initial target for their situation more different than immigrants. However, it seems so that they initially become aware of the fact that they have to adjust themselves to the existent social, cultural and historical system. For instance, while Park and Burgess speak of integration and assimilation of immigrants in the US, they mostly emphasize the situation of immigrants by pointing to the requirements of integration. In this sense, they state that “the immigrants should not only speak the language of the country but should know something of the history of people among whom *they have chosen to dwell*” (1921: 765, emphasis added).

As I said, their point is clear when it comes to people who voluntarily leave their countries with the motivation to move to another country to live and work. To give a priority to the onerous conditions of refugees, it is important to re-emphasize that they are forced to leave their countries and their integration process is not the same as immigrants who voluntarily leave their countries with different motivations. Despite the fact that refugees’ coming reasons are different from other immigrants, their integration process requires the same pathway more or less within US system. Speaking succinctly, both refugees and immigrants experience acculturation, social integration and assimilation process in US irrespective of their individual ethnic and religious background and the literature mostly speaks of social integration of immigrants and refugees in the host community by looking at a set of processes.

From this standpoint, the strongest fundamentals of social integration can herewith be accentuated as employment and English proficiency on the basis of the empirical findings of my treatise. However, it is important to underline that there are invaluable studies, researches and reports that show the multi-faced and multi-dimensional aspects of social integration from one context to another. It is incisive to state that social integration of immigrants and refugees in US needs to be defined in order to determine an orientation point for further debates. In this regard, Bosswick and Heckmann put forward that “the inclusion of individuals in a system”, that is “the inclusion and acceptance of immigrants” into “institutions, relationship and positions of a host community” are defined as social integration (2006). From the point of view of my treatise, I agree with Bosswick and Heckmann’s theorization since the initial indicators of refugees in a receiving country can be gauged through the volume of their inclusion in a system utterly. In other words, their access to work, education, housing, medical services and other main rights and services is indicators of social integration. During my treatise, I have also concentrated on the different aspects of how Iraqi refugees experience their post-resettlement relations in their new social, cultural and economic environment.

By the same token, Cholewinski points to the availability of eleven factors in discussing immigrant integration in the scope of the Hague programme. When we look at the hinges of these factors, it is again underlined that “employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society...” (2005:705). More specifically, Ager and Strang develop a conceptual framework in order to make integration understandable when it comes to refugees and immigrants and they determine four main levels namely; “markers and means”, “social connection”, “facilitators”, and “foundation” and they link “employment”, “housing”, “education”, and “health” to “markers and means” and then connect “social bridges”, “social bonds” and “social links” to social connection, and attach “language and cultural knowledge” and “safety and stability” to “facilitators” and lastly link “rights and citizenship” to “foundation” (2008: 170). Bosswick and Heckmann, Cholewinski, Ager and Strang demonstrate these indicators on different levels to point to both diversity of process and challenges that need to be dealt with to be able to obtain positive outcomes. On the other hand,

the beginning point of analyses and policies is mostly employment. That is to say, the dominance of social and economic life is decisive when we start talking about refugee integration.

In addition to the analysis of the prevailing indicators, Castles, Korac, Vasta and Vertovec pinpoint the conditions of refugee integration in the U.K. by refocussing a set of sociological processes like adaptation, adjustment and assimilation rather than displaying the analysis of indicators. In fact, they do not underrate integration indicators that Bosswick and Heckmann, and Cholewinski, Ager and Strang analyze, on the contrary they investigate this sort of indicators of functional aspects of integration that establish the process of integration. They take up the concept of integration as two-way process in which refugees are expected to get access to rights and services and also they maintain their cultural and social identities (2002). This last point takes us to understand how immigrants and refugees develop their own strategies to protect their cultural identities right after their adaptation process in a host community. From this viewpoint, it would be fruitful to put forward that Esser's approach to immigrants' integration can be considered for the situation of Iraqi refugees. More specifically, he underlines that "acculturation or socialization" needs to be scrutinized by looking at the way in which individuals gain their social and economic position, establish social relations in the form of friendships, romantic relationships, and marriages by attaching themselves to "a social system" (Esser, 2000 cited by Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006).

Following the logic of Castles, Korac et. al., my research findings also show that social integration of Iraqi refugees into US takes place in a two-way process and it is important to underscore that Iraqi refugees' access to labor market and other services as well as public relief constitute the functional aspects of integration. During my analysis of the situation of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, I have often emphasized that Iraqi refugees have to establish their self-sufficiency since US system organizes their institutions and discourses so as to reinforce their refugee resettlement system through the way of making immigrants and refugees self-sufficient individuals through responsabilization. In this sense, their access to labor market in a new Westernized business culture and environment can be seen as the first zone of social interaction

among refugees and non-refugee community members. Therefore, it is important to underline that labor market access makes their social interaction functional at first. After that, I need to specify what sort of functionality they undergo during their working life. It is important to understand that they develop their social contact strategies with community members from native-Americans to Mexicans or refugees from different countries. In this sense, it is possible to put forward that their work determines their adaptation and socialization process and that kind of their work also resolves capacities and limitations of their adaptation and socializations. In other words, having work paves the way for social contact and adaptation while determining its limits and capacities. For either case, entry-level jobs are the backbone of this functionality that would be augmenting the conditions of integration in the host community or vice versa.

While talking about socialization of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson, stresses upon the importance of the relation between working and socialization in the following words:

Being employed means orientation as a part of adaptation into US. That is, if refugees were employed, they would be working with Americans; so, their English would improve so that they could socialize, learn American culture and solve their own problems.

As I have observed in the previous chapters, employment and English proficiency are two important mediums to lead to adaptation and socialization. On the other hand, it deserves a specified touch that kind of work refugees perform cannot be triggering such a socialization between refugees and natives and other community members due to kind of work they perform. U/32m adds that

They are placed in a metropolitan areas, not in rural. During my observation, Arizona was always on the top ten list when it came to the settlement of refugees since entry level jobs are a lot in Arizona; so to speak, tourism sector, hospitals, services for older persons are large. No need for a qualified education for this sort of jobs, they can work for

nursing homes at the end of two month certification program. Many come to Arizona and they are placed in metropolitan areas.

At this juncture, it is possible to define this process as ‘vicious cycle of refugee social integration’. To be able to socialize, refugees initially need work and English competence, but kind of work they do does not necessitate communication skills, but just physical strength and again it does not lead to social contact for a better formation of socialization and adaptation. In this sense, having entry-level jobs without communication leads to vicious cycle of refugee integration that chokes off refugee adaptation in a host community. While Bauman talks about the relation among “individual life”, “work” and “work ethics” with reference to the development of modern societies, he refers to the place of work as “the main factor of one’s social placement as well as of self-assessment” and as “the main orientation point, in reference to which all other life pursuits could be planned and ordered”, and he also adds that “the work career marked the itinerary of life and retrospectively provided the prime record of one’s life achievement and one’s failure” (2005:17). As Bauman points out, for modern societies, “the type of work colored the totality of life; it determined not just the rights and duties directly relevant to the work process, but the expected standard of living, the pattern of the family, social life and leisure, norms of propriety and daily routine” (2005:17). When Iraqi refugees talk about their entry-level positions, they often make a point that they are not satisfied with their work since they believe that they deserve better jobs owing to their education background.

Back to my argument in this sense, vicious cycle of refugee social integration needs to be formulated for Iraqi refugee parents and adults. First of all, they are responsible for achieving their self-sufficiency as possible as they can in US. Therefore, they have to accept the entry-level jobs and then they should pursue their work career by improving their skills and competencies in Arizona. For this, either they will use and advance their English proficiency for a better job opportunity or they will accept all hard-working jobs if they can find by the assistance of resettlement agencies and friends, and relatives. In case they start working, they need to study English while working and to improve their vocational knowledge to be able to find more decent jobs in a competitive marketplace. Along with the lowest-social scale of jobs, it is a reality that

some groups of refugees do not fulfill even the requirements of this sort of works as well since their individual, social and economic backgrounds do not fit to the offered jobs⁵⁰. I have also underlined thoroughly, the achievement of English proficiency, educational and professional competence is the key for social contact, hereby laying the foundations of social integration and mobility in Arizona. Secondly, even if they find a job, they still need to improve and adjust themselves to American lifestyle; otherwise they will be moving in a socially and culturally limited zone. Lastly, in case they decline job offers, they may remain dependent on public relief for a certain period of time; or they build up their own strategies by using their own sources or networks to be able to job. However, my research findings show that working is a must to survive in the US, therefore public assistance or relief is not a part of the long-term subsistence strategies.

For all of these three scenarios, it is a reality that Iraqi refugees need to have a qualified work and English competence to be more integrated in the host community, but to be able to have both a qualified job and a satisfactory social life, they also need English proficiency and vocational capability. This is the appearance of vicious circle of refugee integration. In this sense, I formulate this social reality as a problem of integration policies and I put forward that US system does not want to prove its adequacy to be able to overcome this vicious cycle of refugee integration in Arizona.

Why US system does not scrutinize this problematic area although they are quite aware of gaps and challenges with their integration strategies deserves a close look at the matter. As I have already indicated before, The White House Task Force on New Americans confirms “integration as a two-way process” and determines common challenges by emphasizing “limited capacity and funding for refugee integration activities, limited awareness about refugees and limited access to successful integration models”. On the other hand, the task force gives a priority to the role of “the welcoming communities’ movement” in different forms of initiatives and programs supported by the federal government. In this logic, there are some “federal strategic goals” that aim at strengthening “welcoming communities” (The White House Task Force on New Americans, 2015: 11-23).

⁵⁰ Ong emphasizes that Southeast Asian refugees still remain dependent on public assistance although they received specialized trainings on employment and English proficiency from the ORR according to the results in 1980s (2003).

In the end, the task force emphasizes the importance of citizenship that is associated with lot of additional benefits. More specifically, the naturalization process is considered as a process to “ensure that new citizens have the foundation to participate in civic institutions – skills such as the ability to read, write, and speak English, an a demonstrated understanding of US history and government” (2015:24). Moreover, it means “permanency in a community” and “certainty of their future” in US (2015:34). Then, it is easier to understand that US system does not tend to develop a strategic action plan on the state level, but their main policy is revolved around the effectiveness of welcoming communities since their integration policy is essentially to form new citizens as a part of American community rather than dealing with problems of a new underclass. From this standpoint, US policy does not concentrate on the negative results of vicious cycle of refugee integration, but stresses on the importance of new citizens and future Americans who succeed in surviving under the rules of American capitalism. In this regard, it is reasonable to take up “new citizens” as “American citizens” and “future Americans”, therefore it is also possible to put forward that Iraqi refugees are a bridge between Iraqi-Americans and future Americans or American citizens.

At this point, it is important to note that the system already recognizes Iraqi refugees as new Americans since US policies concentrate on new Americans to have a projection of future Americans. This is then to say that the roots of this recognition cannot be understood through the sole analysis of the social-economic indicators of refugee admission program. In addition to the weight of self-sufficiency policies, acculturation process of Iraqi refugees need to be unfolded so as to demonstrate what a refugee integration means for the case of Iraqis in Arizona. More specifically, US system organizes a kind of life for refugees through the implementation of self-sufficiency policy and of competence assumption strategies under the orientation of resettlement agencies and welcoming communities. In 1960s, Milton M. Gordon explains the spirit of what I allude in the following way:

as the immigrants and their children have become Americans, their contributions, as laborers, farmers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, artists, etc., have been made *by way* of cultural patterns that have taken their major

impress from the mould of the overwhelmingly English character of the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture or subculture in America, whose dominion dates from colonial times and whose *cultural* domination in the United States has never been seriously threatened. (1964:72, emphasis in original).

In analyzing American ethnic and sectarian groups, W. Lloyd Warner calls our attention to this point in 1950s. He mainly underlines “religious, national or cultural origin” differences by referring to “social minorities” living in “cities and large towns of the United States”. He adds that social minorities lose “their group identity” since their tendency is to “merge into the general population” through “acculturation and assimilation processes” (1952: 118). No doubt, he brings back the melting pot model of acculturation to our way of analysis as, after a certain period of time, immigrants or refugees undergo an assimilation process by leaving their cultural norms and values. But we know that this last point is quite discussable in many aspects through a broad literature of immigrant adaptation and integration.

As I have already discussed in a theoretical sense, Berry’s approach to adaptation and acculturation is revolved around how “cultural changes” occur when people start living in a different environment; in other words, “cultural groups” start experiencing the context of “plural societies” (1997). It is worth noting that he develops his argument in the distinction of the melting pot and the multicultural models and that he gives us the role of “cultural groups” in “plural societies” as constitutive parts of the “larger society”. He mainly refers to how immigrants develop their own intercultural strategies to maintain their own culture and identity and to participate in the larger society along with other ethno cultural groups (Berry, 2011; Berry, 2013). Therefore, immigrants, or refugees in my context, do not represent only social minorities, but they also appear as subjects of different processes of assimilation to marginalization. That is to say, it becomes important to concentrate on how “cultural changes” occur and how multiculturalism needs to be understood when it comes to integration immigrants. However, refugees’ situation in plural societies like US must be analyzed as regard to the socio-economic determinants of receiving countries as well.

Following this, I concentrate on the approach that Iraqi refugees can be considered as “cultural groups” and they develop their acculturative strategies in the context of plural societies as Berry puts forward. On the other hand, when it comes to American context, Gordon, Park and Burgess’s approach to accommodation and assimilation will be employed to understand Americanization process. At this juncture, I need to bracket “non-economic dimensions of adaptation” to be able to focus upon the process of refugee integration in particular by applying to Goldlust and Richmond (1974)’s multivariate model of immigrant adaptation and Kuhlman’s economic integration of refugees (1991) in order to demonstrate a comprehensive analysis of my research findings by emphasizing the fact that the economic analysis of adaptation, acculturation, integration and Americanization process is a necessity for the context of US. Therefore, I specifically need to point to how my arguments work with Kuhlman’s theoretical approach in aiming at a comprehensive analysis of Iraqi refugees’ integration in US

In light of Kuhlman’s arguments on economic integration of refugees, “demographic characteristics of refugees”, “socio-economic background of refugees”, “ethno-cultural affiliation of refugees”, “cause of flight”, “type of movement”, “attitude to displacement” need to be scrutinized at first. So far, I have examined and discussed the process of forced migration by focusing upon the particular situation of Iraq and of Iraqi refugees on their move to their countries of asylum. Secondly, his comprehensive model leads us to analyze “policies” with reference to “national policies”, “policies followed by regional or local authorities” and “policies of aid agencies”. During my study, I have given a detailed explanation of how US refugee admission program functions after admitting Iraqi refugees with respect to policies and roles of resettlement agencies and non-profit organizations. Thirdly, I have explained conditions of Iraqi refugees in their countries of asylum by emphasizing their particular circumstances. This also takes its own place in reference to the factors of “length of residence in the country of asylum” and “movements within country of asylum” in his model.

From this standpoint, I need to note that Goldlust and Richmond (1974)’s multivariate model of immigrant adaptation and Kuhlman’s economic integration of refugees

(1991) ultimately demonstrate a model for “economic adaptation of refugees” in developing countries. However, my ultimate purpose is not to solely understand the economic adaptation of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, rather I follow this model in order to bring more explanatory frame of “non-economic dimensions of adaptation” in order to demonstrate the passage from new Americans to future Americans. Therefore, I put forward that the analysis of economic integration of refugees are complementary parts to that of acculturation, assimilation and Americanization when it comes to refugees in the United States.

6.1. The First Operationalization: the Model of Economic Integration

6.1.1. Arizona: “Host-Related Factors”

The demographic, social, economic, cultural and political attributes of the United States differ from one state to another by forming the interstate effect of being Americanized. Ethnic and religious diversity of the states may not allow researchers to approach to the topics of adaptation, acculturation and integration without taking the socio-cultural indicators of social place into consideration⁵¹. As I have already indicated before, ORR data shows us that Arizona also receives a huge number of Iraqis in comparison to other states in US. Similarly, Texas, California, Michigan, and Illinois are also Iraqi-populated areas and it is important to underline the attributes of these states when we talk about Iraqi refugees’ adaptation and integration processes in America irrespective of its positive or negative impacts in the beginning.

As I have already pointed out, Goldlust and Richmond’s “situational determinants in receiving society” (1974) and later Kuhlman’s emphasis on “host-related factors” (1991) have a critical place for my treatise to be able to provide a holistic analysis of the case of Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Theoretically speaking, the situational determinants in receiving society and host-related factors lead us to see “macro-

⁵¹ For instance, one of the several researches in this area, Al-Ali gives us a benchmark for Detroit in order to make reader understand what conditions Iraqi community deals with during their adaptation in Detroit. She explains why Detroit was chosen and what conditions Detroit brings to Iraqi refugees (2007).

economic situation, natural resource base, ethno-cultural make-up, social stratification, socio-political orientation and auspices” (Kuhlman, 1991).

When we start talk about the macro economic situation of Arizona, it becomes important to understand how refugees change the economic situation of Arizona. According to the reports of the contributions of New Americans in Arizona published by New American Economy, New Americans have a great contribution to the economic and business life of Arizona by paying taxes and by establishing new businesses. Specially, in comparison to US-born residents, New Americans more actively played a role in the overall increase of economic indicators in Arizona for the years of 2014 and 2015⁵². In this sense, it can be derived from the data that immigrants take their places as producers and consumers in a significant way. The IRC also displays that the reports also include refugees under the category of immigrants in US. However, it should be noted that the report does not specify refugees’ contribution to the economy in this total rates. Therefore, the general situation of refugees cannot be visible when it comes to the assessment of the macro-economic situation in Arizona.

In order to make the conditions of refugees in the context of Arizona, I have also posed several questions about the specific condition of Arizona to comprehend how Iraqi refugees accommodate themselves under the social, economic and demographic conditions of Arizona. At that point, the state is assessed from the different angles by resettlement agencies and non-profit organizations as well as by Iraqi refugees themselves. In fact, although these assessments are not based on a statistical data, it is quite informative to see how much Arizona is fit to Iraqi refugees to establish a new life in many aspects, especially with a specific emphasis on macro-economic situation, natural resource base, ethno-cultural make-up, social stratification, socio-political orientation and auspices in Arizona. In our interview with the official of Department of Economic Security, in Arizona, when we were talking about why Iraqi refugees,

⁵² One of the reports published by a partnership of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, New American Economy, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce, Phoenix Mayor Gre Stanton, and AT&T shows that “In 2014, immigrants paid \$1 billion in federal taxes and \$534.7 million in state and local taxes. They also held \$4.9 billion in spending power; Immigrants living in Phoenix in 2014 helped create or preserve 14,052 local manufacturing jobs; 52.3% of foreign-born residents contributed to the rental property market, compared with just 45.8% of US-born residents; Foreign-born residents are more likely than US-born residents to start new businesses; In 2015, half of the Fortune 500 companies in Phoenix were founded by immigrants or their children” (New American Economy, 2017). Another report based on the data for the years of between 2010 and 2014 published by New American Economy in 2016 displays that “Arizona, which shares a 372-mile border with Mexico, is now home to more than 920,000 foreign-born residents; 113,760 people in Arizona were employed by immigrant owned companies in 2007; Immigrants were 31% more likely to work than native-born Arizonans; In Arizona, 70.5% of the foreign-born population is working aged, compared to only 46.8% of the native-born population” (New American Economy, 2016).

and others, leave Arizona, the official coordinator underlined a few reasons with reference to the changing socio-economic circumstances of the state in the following way:

Refugees leave the state of Arizona, yes they do yeah in the last few years in higher numbers than ever before, a lot of that, I think a few reasons: one is in 2009 the US economy crashed, there's Arizona and Nevada were the hardest hit states because we were the fastest growing states in the country at the time and development was huge. When economy crashed, development went way down so we were really hardly hard in Arizona. We have just been crawling back before 2009, the economy in Arizona was really good, and refugees could have two, three jobs. I mean they were doing quite well and the cost of living in Arizona is still quite low actually but then the cost of living was grate so housing was wonderful, jobs were pretty plentiful, but in 2009 it was really hard. There was a lot of meat industry cross the country and refugees were going those places, there's a lot of recruitment.

In fact, the state coordinator's emphasis on the global financial crisis of 2008 is important breaking point to be able to understand this macro-economic equilibriums, particularly in the institutional and sectorial context of Arizona. As a result, many refugees left the state due to financial/subsistence problems. It needs to be understood that the state cannot be considered as a land of opportunities in employment and business establishment. More concretely, when we look at the income-poverty statistics between the years of 2011 and 2015, median household income is \$50, 255 and the rate of persons in poverty is 17, 4 % (United States Census Bureau, 2016) and when we compare this data with the general statistics of the United States, there is a slight difference in the number of household income while the poverty goes down to 13, 5 % for the year of 2015 (United States Census Bureau, 2015). As a result, it needs to be properly analyzed that refugee acculturation, integration and assimilation processes are surrounded by the high rates of poverty in the US, particularly in the Arizona.

As already discussed, the majority of Iraqi refugees provides their subsistence through entry-level jobs with minimum-wage. While experiencing the lowest-conditions of socio-economic status in a new environment, they are also practicing their 'cost' of living in Arizona under the impact of the post-crisis circumstances. I had also opportunity to touch upon this issue during my interviews. For instance, the representative of Noor Women's Association in Tucson refers to the past years of the state when she talks about the socio-economic situation of refugees in Arizona:

As compared to other states in the US, Arizona is more lucrative from the point of view of, I will call it cheap state but affordable state, but, in the last three or four years, the economy of Arizona is not good. So even though the standard of living you can get food, apartment, good costs and jobs under, so that way is not as lucrative. Before, five years ago, it was a little better, people were hiring more and businesses were doing better. Because a lot of business do not hire refugees unless they are familiar with that. So in the past, four years had gotten difficult, as far as the standard of living, it was very good state to come here and not only with the standard of living economically but the real atmosphere which was much easier; people who come in from hard countries like Somalia and Iraq get easier to be adapted but job opportunity isn't great.

It is clear that the state in comparison to other states is still considered as an affordable state. However, this does not change the fact that cost of living is high and it is not easier for refugees to find a job which is fit to their expectations. Even it is also hard for them to be accepted and to be adapted to their new environment. In a similar vein, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson, shares his observations about Arizona after long working with refugees in Tucson:

Arizona is said to be a cheap state; but, I do not agree with this. Arizona is on the middle level. Food is cheaper since we are on the border of Mexico from where many food come and we are also close to California from where some products come as well. However, salaries are too low as well. Educated and older ones leave here. Let's say Arizona is at the middle

level; not poor but not rich either. Refugees belong to working class and they will remain so for long times; it would be difficult for them to move to middle class or upper class for especially the first generation of refugees at least. As a friend of mine said, you came here you are fucked for the first time, but your kids would be lucky... Republicans govern Arizona states and want to restrict social services as much as they can. They suppose that all must be responsible for themselves.

At this juncture, it is important to underline that the state is not promising for young educated refugees and older ones. This point is also emphasized by the state coordinator of Arizona. In case young refugees are motivated to find a better job, they leave the state because of several important reasons. In this sense, in addition to the ominous character of cost of living, the state has also some specific conditions due to its proximity to Mexico. This takes us to another important point that Kuhlman also underlines with respect to “ethno-cultural makeup of the settlement region”. Proximity to Mexico⁵³ displays the high number of Mexican immigrants who come to Arizona to work and live, and may also be affecting the increasing number of both undocumented immigrants and unemployment⁵⁴, hereby influencing the socio-economic conditions of labor market in Arizona.

When we take a close look at the population characteristics of the state, according to the data provided by United States Census Bureau, the population estimate of Arizona is 6,931,071 by July 1, 2016. Whites constitute 83.3 %, Black or African Americans form 4.9 %, Asians compose 3, 4 % and others for the rest. It is important to note that the percentage of Hispanic or Latino origins is 30.9 % and Whites alone are 55.5 %

⁵³ New American Economy’s report (2016:1) reveals that “Arizona—which shares a 372-mile border with Mexico—has recently emerged as a major destination for New Americans. In 1990, 7.6 percent of Arizona residents were foreign-born. By 2010, that figure had risen to 13.4 percent”

⁵⁴ New American Economy’s report (2016:24) explains that “Arizona is home to more than 284,000 undocumented immigrants. These individuals are far more likely than the native-born population—or even the broader foreign-born one—to be in the prime of their working years, or ranging in age from 25-64. They also contribute to a range of industries that could not thrive without a pool of workers willing to take on highly labor-intensive roles. In 2014, for instance, undocumented immigrants made up 18.5 percent of all employees in Arizona’s administrative, support, and waste management services industry, a sector that includes grounds maintenance workers, janitors and building cleaners, and security guards. They also made up more than one in four workers employed in the agriculture sector, as well as 8.3 percent of workers in the wholesale trade industry. Large numbers of undocumented immigrants in Arizona have also managed to overcome licensing and financing obstacles to start small businesses. In 2014, an estimated 10.9 percent of the state’s working-age undocumented immigrants were self-employed— meaning Arizona was one of about two dozen states where unauthorized immigrants boasted higher rates of entrepreneurship than either legal permanent residents or immigrant citizens of the same age group. Almost 25,000 undocumented immigrants in Arizona were self-employed in 2014, many providing jobs and economic opportunities to others in their community. Undocumented entrepreneurs in the state also earned an estimated \$464.2 million in business income that year.”

among these numbers. As to the percentage of foreign born persons between the years of 2011 and 2015, the percentage is 13.5 %. (United States Census Bureau, 2016).

When it comes to the demographical place of Iraqi refugees in the general population, it becomes important to know who is refugee and who is not. This distinction is also important to get rid of the matter of the undocumented as the diversity of refugees may be subjected to the risk of being threatened by a public generalization on the undocumented migration. From here, the executive director for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix, shares her observations in the following manner:

I think that agencies not just ours but have done a pretty good job of getting the word out of who are refugees. I also think the media has done hammering job on who are undocumented and so the undocumented in Arizona in the eyes of the population are generally Mexican, and so now you have a bunch of Somalis at the store and even joke you, public will say all those are refugees, but if they see Spanish speakers unfortunately, they could've been born and raised in Arizona and they think of them as undocumented so I think the stigma is more around being Hispanic...

It would not be incorrect to state that the diversity of Arizona deserves to be stressed upon in order to distinguish refugees from non-refugee population in various aspects. This is, on the other hand, a kind of awareness raising activity need to be conducted through the media, non-governmental organizations, welcoming communities and other private actors. In this sense, it is also equally significant to note that the executive director underlines some important breaking points to make refugees more visible in the eyes of the public. These are the public effects as a result of 9/11 and of ISIS. After these two historical moments, welcoming communities, non-profit organizations and resettlement agencies have conducted additional activities in order to re-form and maintain the refugee-friendly climate of Arizona. Iraqi refugees themselves also contribute to this process by showing their reaction even if too rarely as the program coordinator of the IASPF explains in this sense:

On the political issues that happened in Iraq with ISIS, we hosted in a protest, everybody came together, Christians, Muslims, Sunni, Shia. They came together, Lebanese, Iranians, Afghans. They all came together. They demonstrated to protest. They come together... For example, recently there was a protest that was going on by the mosque, everybody came together, Muslims, Christians, Jews. There are in cases they come together.

From this standpoint, I will enlarge this point by touching upon how the host community approaches to immigrants and refugees in Arizona. The officer from Arizona Department of Economic Security firmly emphasizes the “welcoming” character of the state during our interview. Additively, the representative of Noor Women’s Association explained with the following words:

I would define Arizona State as a refugee friendly state. Because in the past twenty years, there are an amount of refugees we helped and at one time we had people came and mentioned to us that being refugee friendly state between Tucson and Phoenix, they have the second quiet of refugees. So I would with my experiences call it friendly; but, as far as funding by the state, that is not great because the state keeps cutting the funding.

At this point, I find the word of “welcoming” very neutral since it does not represent anything negative or positive unless we gauge what it means by the local community. However, it can be noted that being a welcoming community is mostly associated with “friendship, hospitality, help and support” in the eyes of the majority of humanitarian organizations in Arizona. At this juncture, it is very critical to state that the function of welcoming communities is, in this senses, not to advocate refugee rights in supporting their social and economic integration in the state or not to change public opinion on refugees’ specific condition in a significant way.

To be more specific on this, my research findings show that there are problems in access to labor market because of their ethnic and religious attachments. I have already clarified the discriminative acts of some employers with reference to the observations made by the representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry. But also, I have touched

upon where refugees are placed upon their arrival is the neighborhood of immigrants or disadvantaged groups. When we look at problems and challenges, it is effortless to see the weight of “welcoming” character of the state. But, it deserves an emphasis that this weight needs to be increased in a right-based argument. From here, it is possible to say that there is a possibility to strengthen the local network on behalf of refugees since the communication exists between them according to the below words of U/32m:

Americans, who directly communicate with refugees in a way, approach that they are sweet, they come from foreign countries and they have their own foods; so, some of the locals are in mood of celebration. That is, the locals do not know who refugees are and where they come from. Indeed, the refugee organizations lead people to this sort of area; they are in the mood that let’s celebrate refugees who suffered much; we saved them and we feel alright now...It is difficult to make a general comment about the situation of Americans. They do not know who those people are and where they come from, depends on persons.

Until now, we understand from the social, economic and demographic features of Arizona that Iraqi refugees are placed in a metropolitan state and the socio-economic conditions of the state forces immigrants and refugees to settle their self-sufficiency strategy without depending on the state assistance programs. On the other hand, Arizona is generally defined as a welcoming state for refugees and the state receives lot of refugees from different countries. Its demographic structure represents a huge diversity and its economic structure is also mainly based on manufacturing, industrial production and service sector. The economic indicators of the state do not signal dramatic differences in comparison to the general situation of the country. But, it is clear that the state is still in the process of economic adjusting, which affects disadvantaged groups like refugees in a negative manner.

In light of Kuhlman’s arguments on economic integration, I need to specify that “adequate participation in the economy” and “an income which allows an acceptable standard of living” can be taken into consideration so as to present some outcomes without falling into generalizations. From here, I will formulate my arguments that,

first of all, it is important to see that Iraqi refugees become a part of the economic structure of Arizona through entry-level jobs and my research findings show that they have structural difficulties in finding jobs due to either their personal objections or English incompetence. Secondly, it is also crucial to underline that they gain minimum wage through their first jobs in these host-related factors of the state of Arizona and it is not an easy takeaway to put forward that they need multiple jobs at the same time to be able to have an income that allows an acceptable standard of living. But then, they are pushed to a position in which they have to work hard to the detriment of their 'acceptable' living. Lastly, as I said, the host-related factors of Arizona are comprised of social, political and economic practices and challenges in full. Methodically speaking, the backstories of refugees constitute an indispensable part of the analysis as they primarily appear as survivors of violence and conflict on the stage of history and it becomes important to know how they see themselves and their children in future.

6.1.2. Social Participation and Intercultural Relations

The majority of scholars concentrates on the concept of integration by underlying the level on which parts of integration processes encounter. Attributes of this encountering are analyzed by many as either one-way process or two-way process. While analyzing integration processes in the context of Europe, Castles, Korac, Vasta et.al. provides a basic frame of definition that the first is that the "normative usage of the concept" is associated with "a one-way process of adaptation by newcomers to fit in with a dominant culture and way of life" and this process of integration generally comes into sight as "a watered down form of assimilation" and that the second is that "a two-way process of adaptation" gives a place to the process of "change in values, norms and behavior for both newcomers and members the existing society" (2002:115).

At this juncture, I will start with an essential question of how Iraqi refugee experience their integration process: whether or not we can talk about a third way process beyond the conceptualizations of a one-way or a two-way processes. In Arizona, when we benefit from the observations of third parties like resettlement agencies and non-profit organizations, integration is mostly problematized on different levels. Without

thinking about individual factors or subjective conditions in the theoretical statements of identification, internalization and socialization, I will put forward that it is not a straightforward thing to put Iraqi refugees in a dichotomy between a one-way process and a two-way integration process. Therefore, from the viewpoint of my treatise, it becomes critical to understand the competition between both processes in terms of the socio-political implications.

First of all, I will underline that integration of Iraqi refugees in comparison to Somalis, Burma and other groups, there are some issues integral to Iraqi population itself. As a community, Iraqi refugees are generally considered more educated and urbanized refugees. Therefore, their integration process is taken up as a matter of their integration into the existent function of the system. Their participation into education, employment and vocational and language trainings is considered to be linked to their tendency to be integrated into American community. In fact, “participation” is an important element of integration process in a theoretical manner since separation of a community from the mainstream society can be challenged through social participation and contact in terms of acculturative and intercultural strategies in different contexts (Berry, 1997; Berry 1991; Berry; 1989). From here, I will specify that my research findings demonstrate that the directors or program coordinators of resettlement agencies observe this sort of participation when they start talking about Iraqi refugees at first. When I pose my integration question to Mr. Craig Thoresen from Refugee Focus in Phoenix, he explains his observations in the following manner:

The Iraqi population as compared to others tend to integrate very quickly and the reason for that is that they come from very sophisticated society, very urban in most cases, and most have a lot of skills, education and work experience, so those kinds of things will allow them to integrate much quicker. Of course, within the Iraqis, you have a full range of people who are professionals, lawyers, doctors, engineers whatever two people who were rural, agriculture, just laborers. So the more educated you are, the more exposed you are to urban society, to school opportunity, education opportunities, to employment, the quicker you gonna integrate here. So by and large, the Iraqi population is pretty sophisticated and does integrate

very quickly and they *disappear* in our community, to in our communities through positive way very quickly kids get in school, they learn English fast, parents or adults go to work, go to school, get additional training, they are making money, they're paying their bills and they go to the mosque, they become part of the organizations, they make friends and they just *disappear* and become a part of American society. (emphasis added)

From this point of view, I need to underline that the core components of contact and participation are crystallized with reference to where Iraqi refugees come from, whether they are educated or not, and what skills or profession they have. Usually, the resettlement agencies manifest a general view that integration of Iraqi refugees is easier than other groups because their education level is high and they know what an urban life is and they start their new lives by disappearing from the sight of resettlement agencies. However, “disappearance” may not always mean a well-functioning process of integration. Iraqi refugees who have personal vulnerabilities, who do not have community support, who are not educated or urbanized may be out of this ‘participation’ and ‘contact’. As long as the community of Iraqi refugees is accepted to be comprised of educated, urbanized and well-motivated individuals, the analysis of integration process will not be involving the mentioned-vulnerable Iraqi refugees, hereby not always correct to link disappearance to integration. Therefore, I tend to formulate the mode of explanation of “the disappearance” as a ‘blind spot of refugee integration’ that needs to be examined with reference to acculturative strategies of Iraqi refugees as I will discuss later.

By the same token, my research findings disclose the importance of being educated, urbanized and aspirant to develop oneself whenever third parties present their observations in this sense. However, it was also underlined with my research findings that being urbanized and education are not enough grounds to analyze this integration process since it does not elucidate integration process by involving household condition, role and status of women, conditions of rural regions and other decisive factors like vulnerabilities and specific needs. In other words, explaining integration with education and urbanization is a kind of determinism. To make this argument more

concrete, I give a detailed evaluation of integration of refugees by the executive director for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix:

I think in some cases it was a little bit easier for Iraqis, not because they are Iraqi, because they were primarily urban refugees and I think, for me, like you could've asked the same question 15 years ago about the Bosnians and I would've said the same thing. That was little bit easier for the Bosnians because so many of them had more similar lifestyles to what they are integrating into. And I think the most difficult thing for the Iraqis was that recertification that did not happen, because many of them are highly educated, but of course then what you do, right you say all the Iraqis are urban and highly educated and then you have this whole population here, you forgot about there are farmers that are from rural areas that the state may not have a high education what's the rate of women in world communities that have had the same education opportunities as men and so any population that come in mass like the Iraqis, an organization like us can't do that can't say it's can be easier for them because they are the urban even though that's what the first thing out of my mouth, because generally speaking it has been but that's not true for every household so we still have to think about what about the rural family and what about you see people who have been on the farms with large families but I have some families like that where the wife may not have ever had education looking in the same situation as I have any other rural family so for me a lot of it when I'm in my years of doing refugee settlement has really been more about what's your life experience before you come here for Iraqis a lot of come from urban areas a lot had been exposed to a lot of world ways you know...

In addition to these important points, I need to emphasize the gravity of the distinction between “a non-dominant group” and “an established dominant group” when it comes to the function of the “melting pot” (Berry, 1989:187). In this logic, the melting pot refers to the dominance of an established dominant group over immigrants and refugees’ lives in many aspects. As a result, in the context of Arizona, it would not be incorrect to recognize the dominance of American values and norms as well as the role

of Christians. Specially, when we recall the role and responsibilities of faith-based resettlement agencies and organizations, there is a strong non-profit organization of Christian groups.

Borrowing the concept of “intercultural relations” from Berry (2013:1123), I uphold that there are certainly intercultural relations among Iraqi refugees themselves, between Iraqi refugees and host community members; but it seems so that the dominant character of the socio-cultural structure of American society enables us to think this sort of intercultural relations in the melting pot model at first and then the multicultural model deserves an emphasis through the analysis of how all “ethno-cultural groups” manage to live together.

At this point, it is important to underline that intercultural relations take place in a social setting comprised of dominant and non-dominant dynamics and mostly he emphasizes the existence of groups while talking about minorities or ethno-cultural communities. In fact, such an analysis is not enigmatic when we look for the social structure of American society. Milton M. Gordon’s grasp of a “theory of group life” in analyzing assimilation in the context of America demonstrates that “a group life” as a “social setting” in which social relations are constructed among individuals of different race, religion and national origin and he underlines that Americans take their social position according to their groups which may be “primary and secondary groups, family groups, network of associations, racial, religious, and national origins groups, and social classes” (1964:234).

Without overstating the weight of this important argument in the intercultural relations between refugees and American society, it is important to underline that integration process of refugees is, both positively and negatively, affected by these intercultural relations at a group level. Iraqi refugees can be considered in their “primary groups” like “families, cliques, and associations” in the words of Gordon, and it is possible to state that family bounds and relations are important for them as the majority are extended-families. However, it is not possible to say the same things for their relations among their own community or for their efforts to come together as associations or organizations. Although their primary group relations differ from one province to

another, it is a fact that their community relations among themselves do influence their integration process in more different manner since they need to move to contact with American communities. The supervisor for all staff of La Frontera Arizona, Jacquelynn Villa-Baze states in this sense:

Iraqis are not organized in Tucson there is no trust among them. They cannot come together In Tucson. But, they are organized in Phoenix, it is different. Concerning Iraqi Christians and Muslims, they keep separate. But, they are not visible. We see other groups mostly. But Iraqis we cannot see.

In a similar vein, one of the representatives of Tucson Refugee Ministry in Tucson also underline that

It is the Iraqis that want to disappear from other Iraqis; they move out Iraqi communities to go to American communities, they do not want to be in the same community, they always say it is because they talk with, everyone is talking behind back... Some refugee groups form clubs to organize the support. But, not Iraqis depending on various factors, religion, education...etc.

And one of the representatives adds from the same organization that

I feel like Iraqis are integrated more easily into American community because most of them are more educated. They find it easier, apart from the religion aspect, integrated into American society just socially and functionally.

From this standpoint, Gordon's emphasis on the risk of "structural separation" is, in a sense, eliminated by Iraqi refugees who tend to develop their "secondary relations" with American communities. Whether or not their *disappearance* from their own communities facilitate their adjustment process still does not resolve the question of the possibility of maintenance of "cultural identity" in a dominant society.

At this point, I will specify two points in terms of integration with reference to Gordon's theoretical contribution to assimilation analysis in order to understand: The first thing is that "structural assimilation of immigrants" is not possible for the first generation adults with some exceptions, but also there may be a "generalization" for "immigrants of peasant, working-class, and lower-middle-class" that may "prefer the security of a communal life" through "their fellow-immigrants from the homeland" (1964:242). Concerning Iraqi refugees in my research, their disappearance needs to be analyzed in light of the possibility of whether they fall under structural assimilation or not. In fact, regarding their class origins and denominational backgrounds, it is possible to state that this is deeply related to their acculturative strategies that is usually formed individually. From here, their disappearance from their own community does not amount to an absolute clash among Iraqi refugee communities since my research findings show that Iraqi refugees keep their "communal life" with their trusted primary groups even if they do not present a strong tendency to enlarge this communal life to associations or unities on different societal levels.

At that point, I will demonstrate my second point by referring to role of "immigrant-adjustment agencies" that Gordon explains that their main role should be "the adjustment of the immigrant to American culture and institutions" through the channel of "secondary group and institutional contact" and this process should be directed to "acculturation or cultural assimilation" by "trainings, education, ways of raising children in basically middle-class American culture" because they must be familiar with the idea of their role "as a potential future citizen" in American society (1964: 243).

Here, the resettlement agencies undertake this task to provide institutional contact with refugees and to orient them to labor market, training, and education institutions. As I have already explained, their perspective is clear that Iraqi refugees must cooperate with the agencies so as to initiate a smooth adjustment to their new environment. Therefore, the underlying policy of the agencies is clear that New Americans must be familiar with conditions and culture in American life as soon as possible. Therefore, beyond ethnicities and religions, acculturation should be based on "element of the American culture" that "gradually incorporate" in refugee lives and "interpret that

culture to the newcomer in ways which he can understand” (1964:244). Of the point of view of the resettlement agencies, Ferdinand Lossou from Catholic Community Service in Tucson reinforce this argument by highlighting the importance of being a group in integration process:

Any refugee population is with its own community. If you are from Sudan, South Sudan, they have all ethnic community. If you are refugee from Iraq, you are Shia/Sunni, everybody try to have tendency to get together. So this is a fact that is part of human being and, but, as long as Sunni and Shia we can be a group together peacefully, we can forget about ethnicity, religion...

In the previous sections, I have explained in detail that the Bush administration emphasized Christian values and expressed their financial support to faith-based organizations and community associations in order to eliminate ethnic and religious distinctions on behalf of American cultural identity. In other saying, the dominant character of American cultural life was elevated through the institutions, the agencies and other non-governmental or volunteer organizations as a social entrepreneurship. The impact of these circumstances, some intercultural relations develop on the basis of the dominant effect of ethnic or religious affiliations by contributing to integration process on behalf of the melting pot model. In this sense, the Director, Nicolle Trudeau, from Refugee Focus in Tucson in Arizona explains how Christian Iraqis find more supportive communities to be adjusted more quickly than Muslim Iraqis:

I would agree that Iraqi Christians adapt and develop the support here much quicker than Muslim Iraqis. They are not much connecting with Iraqi community. They are connecting with Americans because they are reaching out in the open to those relationships and they are seeking them out, their English gets stronger because they are talking to Americans, they feel very happy with the way of being accepted. For the most part, unfortunately, maybe fortunately I don't know, a lot of Christian Americans are thrilled to me about Iraqi Christians and they are very welcoming and supportive and aren't as intimate as with Muslim Iraqis.

So that population I think adjusts much quicker way because of these dynamics... probably they have too many volunteers... You know, we have Iraqis, they have a hard time, I would say, of adjusting because they are just coming from harsh conditions. They also they didn't have education, they have high education. Iraqis coming from Turkey have done very well, they are used to urban living...

At this point, we find here a common instance of a kind of intercultural relations on the ground of ethnic and religious affinities across the world. As I underlined, irrespective of who are refugee or not, this sort of the intercultural relation means for some Americans to help other Christians coming from the harsh conditions because of their religious affiliations.

Back to my beginning point, my research findings demonstrate that the frame of integration necessitates a two-way process in which counterparts meet and produce the knowledge of living together; but this does not eliminate the fact of "a watered down form of assimilation". The resettlement agencies, non-profit organizations and volunteers mostly explain integration process of Iraqi refugees by saying that they are educated, urbanized, ready to take responsibilities of their lives, and they are highly motivated to communicate with American communities.

Their assessment is mostly stuck into how much they are ready to work and to participate in social and economic life in America, in this regard their statements work in a one-way process since the dominant culture of Americans requires educated and urbanized people so that they can easily be accepted and recognized; otherwise their involvement in American culture apparently takes time according to their clear statements. Therefore, disappearance of Iraqi refugees in public is mostly consolidated with a sort of integration process. However, it is clear from my treatise that they are pushed to accept entry-level jobs and then they are working hard, their education and English level is not high and they are studying while working, their professions and licenses are not recognized by the system and they are waiting with their secondary traumas, women are mostly staying at the home and they cannot even go out to see the

around, and the most important thing is that they have adjustment problems due to their traumatic past.

In this sense, I conceptualize ‘the blind spot of refugee integration’ against all assessments on disappearance of Iraqi refugees without giving a place to the traumatized, uneducated, rural, and vulnerable groups; in other words, to those who live on the margins of the system. Particularly, concerning the first generation of refugees who are the main issue of my treatise, this point becomes quite critical to be emphasized since their adjustment to new environment takes place with lot of partial processes.

From this standpoint, the group life of Iraqi refugees differs in relation to their ethnic and religious backgrounds as well as their living places. However, it is important to see that their structural assimilation is determined by their social participation and contact with the primary and secondary groups on different levels. Therefore, without taking into consideration their level of participation and contact with these groups, the frame of integration will be not completed. Therefore, in order to gauge the impact of the dominant society over non-dominant groups as Iraqi refugees, their intercultural relations deserve to be analyzed by reference to different dynamics of the process. At that point, I aim at enlarging the concept of integration by stressing upon their acculturative strategies with their prospects as Gordon indicates, “integration” is a comprehensive process that “involves easy and fluid mixture of people of diverse racial, religious, and nationality backgrounds in social cliques, families (i.e. intermarriage), private organizations, and intimate friendships” (1964:246).

6.1.3. Satisfaction: Decline of Social Mobility and Lack of Social Capital

Kuhlman speaks of integration or economic adaptation usually draws a detailed picture of the process started from the pre-forced migration factors to the post-resettlement process. In the end of his analysis, we reach three important areas of adaptation: “non-economic dimensions of adaptation”, “impact on refugees” and “impact on host community” (1991:17). From the viewpoint of my research, the non-economic

dimensions of adaptation need to be crystalized with regards to “impact on refugees” so as to present how social integration of Iraqi refugees in Arizona takes place. In this context, the non-economic dimensions of adaptation should be taken together in light of acculturation and assimilation theories. He explains these non-economic dimensions of adaptation by dividing the topic into two parts: “subjective aspects” and “objective aspects”. The former is associated with “attitudes towards refugees”, “identification”, “internalization”, and “satisfaction”. The latter is fulfilled by “legal rights”, “spatial integration”, “cultural change”, “social relations”, and “security” (1991:17).

In the previous sections, it has been deliberated over how US system constructs refugees under the impact of subjective and objective conditions in the socio-economic paradigms of the system. The complementary part of this analysis is, no doubt, an analysis of how Iraqi refugees form and denominate their new lives under the impact of the non-economic determinants of adaptation process. Their individual and social positions need to be understood in another comprehensive frame of acculturation so that social integration of refugees can be crystalized comprehensively.

To begin with objective conditions of adaptation process, it is a good starting point to talk about their class position after the resettlement into America. This is equally another important determinant of adaptation and integration processes so as to portray how their social and economic conditions have changed and to analyze how they plan their new lives in Arizona under these changing social and economic conditions. We understand from the resettlement agencies and other private actors that the integration process of Iraqi refugees quicker than other groups by focusing upon their education and professional levels. This assessment is substantially related to Iraqi refugees’ prevailing circumstances in Arizona, hereby veiling the negative or positive changes in their social and economic conditions in comparison to their past situation in Iraqi. This point is important since none of them have come to Arizona to gain money voluntarily like immigrants do. In this sense, Goldlust and Richmond’s term of socialization and Kuhlman’s term of “satisfaction” lead us to see the social and economic situation of Iraqi refugees to be able to compare their pre-forced migration process with their post-resettlement process.

Despite the importance of such a comparison, it is equally important to say that their pre-migration process cannot be considered as a consistent whole since, as I have explained already, the pre-forced migration area is a result of a set of historical processes. Especially, the social and economic status and class of Iraqis have been changed dramatically. Thereupon, it would be correct to underline that their comparison of socio-economic conditions generally goes back to 80s and 90s in Iraq and later they mostly touch upon their experiences in forced migration. In this regard, it would not be incorrect to state that home-related factors are also decisive in their experiences so as to analyze how they compare or determine the place of their 'losses' in their new beginnings in relation to the broader sense of acculturation and assimilation processes. Without portraying of their loss of social capital, of social network and mobility, their integration process cannot be comprehensible in various aspects.

In analyzing social structure of America, W. Lloyd Warner delineates that "social position" is not a fixed something since individuals can "move up or down" by their "own effort" or "the efforts of others" like their families. Therefore, "vertical mobility" in US is "accomplished by most people through the proper use of certain recognized sources of social power, the principal ones being occupation, entrepreneurship, education, talent, sexual attractiveness and marriage..."(1952: 77). Otherwise, individuals may experience "downward mobility", meaning that they may not have a qualified social position which provides vertical mobility from a low class to higher class. From here, he explains "social mobility" as "an incentive system, driving the man who climbs occupationally and his whole family, who share the rewards" (1952:79).

Milton also examines the contexts of Canada and US by linking "upward social mobility" to a kind of "moving up in the class system" and he also adds that "upward social mobility, then, involves the need for learning and adopting values and behavior in accordance with the standards of the class into which the upwardly mobile person is moving" (1964:46-47). It is also critical to know that upward mobility is, in this sense, something that is politically and socially inculcated by "American value

system” which always emphasis “bettering oneself”, the “rags to riches” and the “triumph of individual merit” (1964:56).

After this short introduction of social mobility in the United States, I will note that a detailed debate on a class system in the United States is beyond the scope of this research. However, it is important to underscore that Iraqi refugees are placed in entry-level positions and their work positions determine their social and economic scale in US. More clearly, they start their new lives from scratch. At this point, we know that socialization of refugees through internalization and satisfaction is a part of this process and their satisfaction level is directly linked to their individual backstories.

Under the negative impacts of forced migration, I put forward that social mobility of Iraqi refugees starts in declining in their country of origin and continues in the same route in Arizona. Besides, downward mobility is also applicable when it comes to their economic indicators as a result of their forced move to America. In this sense, the social and economic conditions of Iraqi refugees in the pre-forced migration area need to be emphasized in order to make their level of satisfaction clear. According to Goldlust and Richmond’s multivariate model, one of the subjective elements is “satisfaction” which refers to “relative comparisons with the immigrant’s situation before migration” (1974). Kuhlman also points to this subjective condition as a level of satisfaction. For my treatise, the term of level of “satisfaction” appears as indicators of loss of social capital, social status and social mobility. When their prevailing circumstances are discussed in detail, it becomes clear that the refugees compare their conditions in their country of origin by looking at their individual conditions.

In analyzing their satisfaction level with their conditions in Arizona, their age, gender, education and other individual factors are prevailing variables to understand their socialization process. My survey results also point to their education level, the majority of Iraqi refugees have a high school diploma despite their limited English language and this is important from the angle of integration according to many resettlement agencies. On the other hand, gender needs to be focused upon to understand the circumstances of Iraqi refugee women during this integration process. When we specifically look at the situation of the married Iraqi refugee women, the majority did

not work when they were in Iraq. This also appears another important matter when it comes to their participation and contact with the host community members on their daily life. Lastly and swiftly speaking, their age rank is between 18 and 70. It is clear that their median age is between 30 and 55 and all are a part of employable population. It is clear from the data that the decline of their social mobility needs to be taken up with their economic conditions at first and later it becomes important to evaluate how their social relations are affected after their settlement in Arizona.

During my interview with MH/47/male, he explained how Iraq was transformed through socio-political equilibriums and how he and his family have been affected by this transformation in the following way:

In Iraq, there was a time that we were living very very good; good life, good cars, good money, good salaries, everything cheap and life was wonderful. But, Iraq, because of the wars, was getting bad economic situation. We reached a point that you cannot buy a pack of egg. You have to buy one or two. The embargo, the war, the economic situation, it was too bad. I am talking for 2003. We were living good time. If I you want me to compare myself now, when I was used to live in 70s and 80s, I was living there much better than here. My was a big merchant in Iraq. We had a big house. We had a car. Later, we had a bad economy, we were hardly making our life. There is a time good in Iraq, but there is a time we are much better than Iraq here. For the social life, Iraq is much better than US. We used to live big social life there, communication, relatives, brothers, sisters, cousins, go there, do there, visit there, trip there, we missed this. Here, we cannot find this social life here at all. I think my social and economic situation, it is not going to be the same. Now, I am working, two of my kids are working, we are making some money to make our life good. Within the next five years, maybe if my son and my kids get good job on their degree, then they would get good salaries, maybe things will change.

It is clear from MH/47/male that he experienced two vital processes in Iraq in different times. The first one actually refers to the years with Saddam and he underlines that he

had succeeded in managing his economic situation very well until the late 1990s. However, under the impact of the worsening social, political and economic conditions of Iraq, he and his family also had lost their properties. In the end, they were forced to leave their country. Although he is engineer, he could not perform his profession in Arizona and he is working for a humanitarian organization as an interpreter. It is clear to conclude that MH/47/male has started to experience his losses in occupation, social position and income when he was Iraq and this economic aspect of the process has not process in Arizona. They are in a safe environment, but he attaches his hopes to his children since he believes that his children may have a good social position and occupation in case they have a good education in Arizona. Therefore, it is important to note that education is mostly seen as a medium to “moving up in the class system” of America. Secondly, he and his family have experienced of living away from their beloved relatives and friends. In fact, for Iraqi refugees in general, this does not mean a disappearing ties among them but it is clear that their life styles or their culture of being together has dramatically been affected by their settlement in Arizona so that he also knows that their social relations would not be the same as it was before.

Actually, MH/47/male explains a general situation in which Iraqi refugees experience both situations in different forms, but generally they go through with the same process. However, their mode of social contact with other refugees from Iraq also determines their perspectives or attitudes against this process. Their education level or their knowledge appears as a strong orientation point for their integration process when it specially comes to their contact with their own communities. For example, during our interview with FD/57/female, she explains her situation with reference to her previous social position. She was working as a lawyer in Iraq and she had a social network comprised of the people from the same education background and now she is working for a humanitarian organization as a teacher and volunteer in Arizona and she speaks of her situation by recalling her past in the pursuing manner:

It was better. I had my house so I didn't have to pay for rent. I had my car and I didn't have to pay any payment. My salary was more than now. I am also good now. My salary covers all my needs. I have a right to think how I can improve my financial situation, but not really too much. After four

or five years, my conditions may be better in Arizona. But, it would never be close to my conditions in Iraq. When I was in Iraq, I had my best friends that were close to my career. But here, of course not. I don't have friends like working like my career. I found most of them graduated from the high school. I worked here as a leader not a friend. I am guiding them. I cannot talk them about my problems but they need me to talk about their problems.

It is obvious that she points her loss of social network up at first and she socially repositions herself as a leader for the refugee community. She identifies herself with a social power in approaching other refugees and she puts a distance between herself and others when it comes to the disclosure of problems or sufferings. She focuses upon her own life to improve her standards and she shows us the particularity of this process by stressing upon her social and economic differentiation from others. However, this does not mean a fatal breaking from her own community, she positions herself in very productive location in order to support others. Therefore, it can be stated that she establishes her life by using her language and communication skills in Iraq, therefore she also presents herself as a potential for other Iraqi refugee women.

To focus upon another aspect of this process, I had an opportunity to interview a few Iraqi refugee women during my home visits. To my personal observations, Iraqi refugee women who are married and who have children are living an isolated world outside, meaning that they cannot participate in daily social life and that they are just moving in a limited network of close friends or relatives. There may be some key problems like language barrier and lack of education, which lead to this type of isolated life. However, it is also important to note that this does not mean the role of women and children is fixed and not open to a possible change. My interview with Y/37/female gives how much the women need to spend effort to establish their new lives while emphasizing her motivation to work and to socialize in Arizona. During the interview, she mostly emphasized the satisfaction of her life in Turkey while telling her life in the following words:

Before the war, my husband was working for a church. Our conditions were better than our current conditions in Arizona. There were difficult things in Iraq, but it is easier now. When I start the school, it would better, I will talk and write in English. My husband also needs to learn English for the citizenship. I spend my time in the house to care of my children. I don't have friends here. I have little communication with Iraqis on special days at a church.

When we look at the previous conditions of Iraqi refugees, they undergo the dissolution of their social networks in different contexts. That is to say, the direct impact of forced displacement takes place in their country of origin. After that, they had a different form of socialization in their country of asylum. In the end, they are placed in a procedurally permanent environment and they need to adjust themselves to the social, economic, cultural parameters of this last destination.

Their long journey indicates that they gradually lose their social and economic properties and they are pushed to a position where they have to learn and explore new strategies to be able to survive in the United States. The refugee women also have their own challenges and difficulties according to their education level. The particular situation of Y/37/female is different from that of FD/57/female. Y/37/female does not know a single word of English, did not work in Iraq, did not have a profession, and she takes care of her minor children while her husband is working. However, she is aware of her potential to be able to work and to be more productive. And also, she does wish to have more sociable life in Arizona against her loss of social network.

The loss of social network and the disappearing of social relations are important in comparison with their home country. It looks like that Iraqi refugees give the second priority to their extended family relations after their economic priorities in this safe environment. Here, I will give a place to another story by turning to the words of D/51/male:

I was in Iraq. My social and economic situation was much better than here. First of all, I was having my own house. There was no rent to pay. I had

my cars. I had my land. My family and relatives working. Much better. It is not possible to get the same conditions in five or ten years in Arizona. When the kids get the good job, then maybe we will be living better than this. I have all free time because I am staying at home. I talk with my children. I go to the backyard. Most of the time, I sleep and I lie down because my health is not good. I was in the emergency room two weeks ago. I don't have really any friends here. When I have problems or issues, I call my caseworker only. I feel safe here. It is time like we used to have it in the 1980s in Iraq. You can keep your door open. Nobody comes in. Everything is good here.

From this standpoint, we can understand that their understanding of social relations always goes back to their memories in Iraq. They do not much refer to their social relations among Iraqis in Arizona. During my interviews, this point is crystalized as a general point as they do not stand with each other. But also, it is clear that the resettlement agencies appear as the point where they can find answers for their questions and problems. For example, a case worker as a part of an institutional structure plays important role for a refugee since the institution is responsible for following and monitoring a refugee's case for five years. Therefore, many approach the agencies to consult on their issues. On the other hand, it is a general result that they estimate that their economic situation would not be the same in Iraq within the next five years at least. Usually, they attribute their dream of having 'richer' life to their children as they believe that having a good education will change their life positively and leads to upward mobility for themselves.

When start talking about their comfortable times, this generally refer to 1980s or earlier times. A Christian Iraqi or Ezidis or Turkmen, regardless of their ethnicity or religion, they accept the dominance of a brutal dictatorship, but they also usually emphasize that their condition was better than their current situation in Arizona. During our interview, DR/36/male explains this in the following words:

If Iraq would be Iraq in previous times, it would be thousands time better than Arizona. If Iraq was under the administration of Saddam, it would be

thousands time better for us. At that times of Saddam, nobody made difficulties for me in my country, my province. I had my work, my company. Yes, Saddam was a brutal man, but my province is US and times better than anywhere. After Iraq is collapsed, now Arizona is better for us. My province was collapsed. I have relatives there. I communicate with them through internet or phone. I do not know what would happen to here in Arizona. I hope it would be good for us in future. I would return to Iraq if the conditions were good. Turkey is better than here. I know their language. But living here is more difficult for me.

At this juncture, we need to underline that their assessment of their individual processes brings us to a common point where we can see their social and economic conditions are harmed and it is not easy for them to re-build their social positions in a new environment without any profession or langue competency. Therefore, their stay in Turkey or Jordan is usually stressed upon by the interviewees and some expressly point to their ‘good old days’ in these countries because of their ethnic or religious affiliations. It is a fact that they have difficulties in restoring their economic conditions in case there is a huge loss of social position. However, in terms of economic indicators, it would not be incorrect to state that the majority of refugees comes from working-class or middle-class and their loss of economic properties has been shaped by the impact of the reasons of forced migration in their home country. When they arrive in America through a country of asylum, they have already experienced lot of losses. As a result, it becomes more important to state how they manage their conditions as carriers of traumatic remnants. In this regard, personhood and identity really functions in different ways from one person to another as US system wants them to be participatory when it comes to their self-sufficiency.

From here, it worth paying attention to that they need ‘time’ to accommodate themselves to their new environment in order to make reasonable decisions on their lives. How much time they need differs from one person to another. However, it seems so that it spreads long years if they cannot create an alternative coping mechanism for themselves. As a result, it is important for refugees to find an alternative way that is close to their previous background, otherwise they suffer a lot. During my interview

with QK/64/male, I have noticed that some refugees are good at finding their alternative regardless of their age and genders; in this sense, QK/64/male shares his experiences when he compares his situation in Iraqi with his current condition:

Really, for me, I don't feel a lot of difference because of my work there (Iraq), I had many relations, let's say social, communication because I was working in a humanitarian organization so I had a relation with UN agencies, with NGOs, with government and with people. I was busy and, social life in our area, we knew each other, parents and relatives, our village let's say. Here, at the beginning, really I was bored. Many times I asked my son, I said my son, tomorrow you book me, I gonna return back to Iraq. Because, there was not a lot of community here, those people I know may two or three families and other families were new here. But, as far as others come, we met communication and our communities are through Church. What I did personally, I kept myself busy of studying. I will tell you something, I improved my English language better here. I was going by using two buses, going two hours to adult learning center.

It is interesting to hear QK's story since he had many difficulties when he arrived in Arizona. He could not find a job because of his age and he pushed the system to be able to find a job in Arizona. For this, he was proud of telling that he went to the adult learning center to improve his English and he received a scholarship from a college and he has improved his English and he has been working for a humanitarian organization as an interpreter. The key point of his strategy is not to give up his individual struggle to find a place for himself in the system.

From this standpoint, when it comes to the plight of Iraqi refugees in the United States, Nelson, Hess, Isakson and Goodkind's article also shows the importance of the long-term impacts over refugees in the post-resettlement area. It is known that the whole history of Iraqi does not allow us to confine the situation of Iraqi women to gendered roles. But also, forced displacement forms new environments in which they have to get used to living by developing their alternative strategies. Therefore, Nelson et.al emphasize "the malleability of identity and personhood" so that "displaced individuals

must be willing to alter sometime deeply rooted values in order to accommodate these new contexts” (2015:5).

They also discuss this identity and personhood around “feeling productive” since US system already promotes self-sufficiency strategies by contributing to the development of personhood in a productive manner. As a result, “the traditionally gendered Iraqi family, are accommodating new stressors, such as forced displacement, by reassigning such roles to its members based on the potential for productivity” (2015:6). In the end of their analysis, it is important to grasp that “productivity loss”, “shifting self-worth”, and “redistribution of roles” appear important outcomes when we look at Iraqi families. More specifically, women and children undertake new responsibilities to provide subsistence in the family, therefore the men does not appear only breadwinner in the unit of family while all the process does not much contribute to the increase of productivity (2015:13).

Following this, it is clear that Iraqi refugees cannot be put in a same pole because of their identities and personhoods. It is also a factual result that their most common strategy is to redistribute of roles in the family. Therefore, the process from forced displacement to settlement in Arizona needs to be understood in relation to the themes of “productivity loss” and “role inversions”. I will preoccupy these themes together with the term of satisfaction. First of all, my research findings show that forced displacement process has altered their social position. In terms of economic indicators, either they have lost their properties or they have transferred as much as they can, but both indicate that they have experienced a type of downward mobility in their economic conditions. Besides, entry-level jobs are also another aspect of this type of mobility upon their arrival in Arizona. As a result, it is important to derive that their subjective conditions do not point at a high level of satisfaction with their conditions in Arizona. Additively, this is also mingled with “productivity loss” as some can feel their power to continue or to improve his or her skills and competences but others cannot do anything. Therefore, the majority is not in a position to increase their productivity, especially in their first times in Arizona.

Secondly, the former shows that their loss of social position is not challenged by their early times in Arizona. More specifically, their loss is duplicated upon their settlement in Arizona. As a result, their vertical mobility or upward mobility necessitates a fast learning process so that they can accommodate and adopt themselves to the socio-cultural atmosphere of their new environment. They have to accept all offered jobs unless they create their own alternatives and therefore they need to establish their social mobility with their occupational mobility. This refers to Milton's emphasis on keeping pace with American value system in a working life particularly. In this sense, it is clear from my research that their satisfaction does not also indicate a good level of being adaptable. Many undergo a "shock" as their expectations are not fulfilled by the system. Therefore, it becomes reasonable to speak of a sort of 'disappointment' rather than "satisfaction".

Last but not least, their kinship relations and social relationships signal a common issue that they have lost their social network under the impact of forced displacement. They also do have a very limited social network among Iraqi refugees. Succinctly speaking, they suffer from the lack of social capital since they have also sacrificed their relations during their forced displacement process. In the context of forced displacement, Griffiths, Sigona and Zetter present a refined definition of social capital. Divorced from any economic or individualistic attribution to the term, it refers to "social networks and their role in enabling individuals and groups to access other forms of symbolic and material resources" (2005:34). In terms of integration, Berry also gives importance to the term to enable "intercultural living in plural societies" (2013:127). In light of the concept, my research findings show that it is not possible to speak of the availability of strong social networks that lead to them to advance their strategies to get access to more resources. Therefore, it becomes important to understand how they situate themselves in absence of social capital. This opens us a door to discuss integration further.

6.2. The Second Operationalization: Accommodation and Assimilation

6.2.1. Accommodation: Security and Safety in Arizona

It is clear from their changing social and economic conditions that each person tries to find its own coping mechanism to fill the gaps in their lives. The majority, regardless of their working-class or middle-class statuses, suffers from their social and economic losses. It is a fact that each person can experience their economic and social satisfaction at different levels according to their education and occupation backgrounds. Even so, their common point is to fill their gaps to achieve a kind of satisfaction in Arizona and it seems quite difficult for the majority as they move in a very limited zone of social relations. From their economic integration to their acculturative strategies, it is important to draw that Kuhlman's emphasis on satisfaction, identification, and internalization is deeply related to acculturation and assimilation processes. In this regard, their modes of identification and internalization needs to be scrutinized through the analysis of how they experience their acculturation processes in relation to another critical process of assimilation.

When we quickly underscore Gordon's point, assimilation and acculturation equally turn into the social processes dominated by the American culture. Here "cultural or behavioral assimilation" plays an important role to refer to the special term of "acculturation" to show how "cultural patterns to those of host society" changes (1964:71). Similarly, we know from Park that it is a process that individuals attain a different language, culture and habits by being incorporated in larger groups (1914). However, before the process of assimilation, it needs to be understood well that adjustment of Iraqi refugees to their new environment cannot directly be explained with reference to assimilation.

Following Park and Burgess's approach to accommodation, it is obvious to note that they inquiry accommodation by looking at communities, groups and social organizations in light of the literature and they say that accommodation is important in terms of Americanization and homesickness when it comes to immigration studies.

Actually, this is important point to understand Americanization process of Iraqi refugees as well. Along with these heads, it is important to point to their emphasis on “social organization” that leads me to understand how community groups like Iraqi refugees form their own community activities in their common accommodation strategies (1921:718-725).

At this juncture, I question their sense of security in relation to both economic security and cultural security. Kuhlman shows us that the impact of refugee influx over the host country as both an economic burden and a reason for antagonism (1991:16). Beyond this, Berry’s researches point to the availability of data that “cultural security/threat” can appear under the circumstances of “multiculturalism” and “ethno-centrism” in positive and negative manners respectively (2013:1129).

As Park and Burgess underline that “the person or the groups is general, though not always, highly conscious of the occasion... in the adjustment of the person to the formal requirements of life in a new social world” (1921: 736). Indeed, they emphasize this aspect of the process so as to differentiate the process of assimilation. However, at this point, I stress upon the mode of “being conscious of the occasion” in their adjustment to their new environment as I argue that Iraqi refugees are highly conscious of their own situation in terms of their sense of security and safety. They recognize the state of Arizona as a secure place when it comes to their physical conditions in general. When they start talking about the feeling of safety, it turns into more complicated social process in which they underline a set of social and economic indicators. And it would not be incorrect to put forward that they see the advantage of these social and economic indicators, hereby coinciding the necessity of conditions of safety, which leads us to observe their first step into the acculturation process.

From here, my research findings show that they explain their sense of security and safety in relation to various factors. The most important ones are language and cultural barriers. With my interview with DR/36/male, this point is emphasized in the following words:

I have a physical security here, but I do not feel safe in living here. I feel myself homesick here. In Turkey, I did not feel myself homesick, but here I feel too much. I wish I could go to my home country. I feel myself close to Iraqis because I cannot talk English. Also, Americans cannot help you and Americans do not have a sense of friendship and they have a structured lifestyle.

It is quite essential for them to speak of the availability of physical security as they flee from conflict and war. Besides the majority of them stayed in uncertain conditions during their asylum application. Therefore, they start their sense of physical security in Arizona and then they formulate their life by giving importance to their lacks.

Considering their age, education, social class and expectations, the sense of physical security does not change much, but includes a set of comparison with their asylum countries as an orientation point rather than their home country. In this sense, another interview show this with the following words of IM/62/male:

I am safe in Arizona. For example, I had a fear of having a car accident in crossing the street in Turkey. But here, all cars stop and allow you to cross. People are honest and they don't lie to you. They respect you.

By the same token, many are quite satisfied with the sense of physical security. At least, they comfortably link their religious and cultural identities to their social space without considering their individual problems. That is to say, the sense of physical security is well established by them because of the weight of their backstories in Iraq. They give importance to personal relationships on the ground of trust, honesty, or daily life order in details. In fact, this is important aspect of their sense of physical security. In analyzing the case of unaccompanied young refugees in the UK, Elaine Chase also refers to this aspect of the process with reference to Giddens's concept of "ontological security" by saying that "feeling secure in who we are stems from a sense of order, stability and routine that combine to give life meaning. Conversely chaos, turmoil and disruption threaten security, create a state of anxiety and erode any trust in the predictability of life" (2013:859).

On the other hand, it should also be underlined that they find the meaning of life in relation to their new stable and routine lives as well as they suppose how much important they link their religious and cultural identities to daily life practices without encountering any problem or trouble. During our interview with A/50/male, it was underlined that

Arizona is good. Here respects anybody. You know, I am Muslim. Right now, no one asked me to change my religion or something or invite me to come to another... no, no. Jordan is also worse than any country. They ask you, hey you are Sunni or Shia. But here, no one asks you.

This point actually takes us to their sense of safety in general rather than physical security as their religious or cultural identity is assumed to be absorbed by the host community as it is, or any other social filtration. However, this is also a difficult head to make some certain generalizations when it comes to whether discriminatory practices by the host community takes place or not.

In comparison with other states, they expand their sense of physical security to the social and economic indicators of the state since they are quite conscious of where they are resettled after sometime. For instance, EF/48/male states how much she likes Arizona since it is easier for her to find what she and her family need during their accommodation process:

If you think, US is better, but Arizona is the least state here about the economic situation. I have information about other states. I have a friend in Colorado and I have a friend in Michigan. They are better than us. Here is a new state. I think it is one hundred years old, this is the state. So everything is new here and I think the budget is not the same as other states. So I cannot blame them because they are working according to their budget. Yes, I plan to move to another state like Colorado. They give you more cash assistance but I am not sure. The positive side of Arizona, it is calm. You can find Iraqi people. This is the third state in numbers of Iraqis. You have Arabic shop. You have something like this. We care about the

kind of food. Here, we are sure that this food is Halal. We care about these things so it is good we can find Iraqi shops.

They apply to the knowledge of other refugees living in different states of the United States to learn the availability of jobs and assistances. Mostly, they get the information from their friends and relatives rather than any organization or institution and then they make decision if they move or not.

The basic motivation to move to other states is the availability of jobs they wish to have to make more and it is a cheaper state or not in terms of rent and food. Secondly, family unity comes in the picture since the majority are comprised of extended families and they always cannot live in the same state after their resettlement in US as a result, they prefer to move to the state where their extended family members live. Lastly, ethnic and religious affiliations affect their decisions to move to other states since they can assume the support of their ethnic or religious communities in other states. All of these factors reinforce their sense of physical security and social, economic and cultural safety, hereby affecting their decisions to move.

At this juncture, it is important to note that their decision will affect their accommodation and integration process because of the changing social environment since they also know that California or Michigan is different from Arizona in terms of social life or entertainment opportunities. However, they underline that living in these states costs a lot for many refugees. So they prefer Arizona to live as A/50/male explains:

I have travelled to Michigan. Iraqi people in Michigan are more than Arizona. The first group of Iraqis came to Detroit. There are many many Arabic stories in Detroit. They move to other states because they need jobs, they have friends and relatives. I like Arizona because the weather in Iraq is same in Arizona. I like there are many cheap stories, food is cheaper than any states, this is good for any family like me has big family.

As a result, their subjective position is formed by a general objective condition determined by the consequences of forced migration once again. As Castles indicate:

One side of this is connecting forced migration with social relations, ideas, institutions and structures at various levels (global, regional, national and local). The other is the study of processes of loss of identity and community disintegration and then the processes of redefining identity and of rebuilding community. (2003:22)

Under these objective circumstances, “process of redefining identity and of rebuilding community” necessitates the sense of physical security in the beginning of their new processes. Therefore, their accommodation process is the mainspring of their integration process in Arizona. On the other hand, it is important to note that there are several reasons for why they are living in Arizona rather than moving to other states; for instance, the older refugees or single women do not have the incentives to move to another state on the contrary to the younger males or families although sense of security and safety is decisive in their accommodation.

6.2.2. Accommodation: Social Contact and Social Organization among Iraqi Refugees

In light of the above arguments, I will also inquire whether the early adjustment of Iraqi refugees into their new environment of Arizona takes place in this sort of accommodation process or not. No doubt, after their experience of forced displacement from Iraq, they immediately engage in solving their problems that turn into conflicts in many aspects. Their resettlement process is a biggest part of the solution to their conflicts, but it is not a solution to “an accommodation of a conflict”, but as Park and Burgess point out, “an accommodation to a new situation” may contain a “revolutionary” form with “rapidity”, that’s it is a kind of “mutation of attitudes in conversion” (1921:736).

Taking this argument a step further, I need to put the terms of “accommodation” and “social contact” into question so as to frame my debates on how Iraqi refugees assess their own situation in this sense. To begin with, I will accentuate that the plight of Iraqi refugees as an accommodation group must be understood within the scope of the policies of self-sufficiency. I will endlessly repeat the same theme that their accommodation process is strongly linked to their employment as entry-level workers in Arizona. Therefore, their accommodation to a new situation is of course a revolutionary process since their expectations are destroyed and then they begin to have information on American system; briefly saying, there is no room for an easy life and working is a must rather than public relief. As a result, their early social contact and accommodation are formed through this employment process in a dramatic sense.

When Gordon talks about structural assimilation of immigrants, he points to a tendency of newcomers to look for their fellow-immigrants’ support (1964). Actually, this is a very strong argument when it especially comes to the situation of first-generation refugees and it is also a credible ground to discuss how social contact among themselves and with native community take an accommodation form. As I have already indicated in discussing loss of social position and social capital, Iraqi refugees move into a small social circle of friends and relatives and it seems so that they do not have social and financial means to enlarge this social circle in Arizona. As a result, their social contact among themselves appears as a problematic area when it comes to their accommodation process. At this point, it is also crucial to state that all individual factors like age, education, gender, civil status, and length of their stay, etc. must be embraced as decisive factors.

In this regard, within the scope of my research findings, I will analyze the accommodation process of Iraqi refugees while focusing upon their mode of social contact and organization at first. During my interview with D/51/Male, who is an Ezidi, clarifies the social contact with his own community in the following way:

We celebrate same events and occasions here. There is a lot of Ezidis here. But, we could not celebrate together. They came alone by themselves. There were a lot before then, some of them like 25 years ago. Sometimes

they call us when there is a celebration concerning our religion and we go to a hall and one time we went to a hall, we got together. If you see a person from your country, from your area or district, you would be happy.

Ethnic and religious affiliations are always an important factor to come all community groups together for a common purpose. In our case, it seems that the special holy celebrations can be seen as a cementing element for Ezidi community. At the same time, it is not speak of a strong social contact among them as a form of a social organization in Arizona. Ethnic and religious affiliations work for some certain groups, Ezidis come together or Christians come together and they give importance to this type of togetherness in America. Particularly, Iraqi refugees who are already American citizens form the process for new comers.

From the other side of the medal, the dissolution of ethnic and religious groups through war and conflict in Iraq still has a huge negative impact on their social contact among each other. This negative impact mostly limits their own social networking in many aspects. Therefore, it appears as a safety and security problem for Iraqi refugees in Arizona. MH/51/Male explains this during our interview:

No. I don't have any affiliation with Iraqis or organization. I hear here time to time people want to form something like organization, but it has never been successful because it is very sad to tell that Iraqis specially, they don't like to get together because of the problems back in Iraq, Shia, Sunni, Kurd, all of them are in trouble, everybody, they don't like to get involved together. Everybody has his own friends. I wish they could learn living together. There will be a time. Iraq is divided in Kurd, Shia and Sunni. It has gone. We reached at a point in our community that no one asks Shia, Sunni, Kurd; we are all brothers, we help each other. I have friends for twenty-five years, I don't know if they are Shia or Sunni and I never asked them and they never asked me. We are friends. Now, we are concerned, Shia, Sunni... It will take time.

As a result of this sort of social dissolution, their social contact is affected negatively and it seems difficult for Iraqi refugees to form a broader social organization for themselves. As MH/51/male underline they have their own networks of friends and relatives and they do not look for more socialization in this sense. For example, NS/32/male states that “I don’t know. Maybe there is an organization, but I didn’t contact with anybody. We visit each other every time. We are trying to go outside with each other. We are together. There is no problem with that.” When he is speaking of his social contact, he refers to his own friends and relatives. The majority of Iraqi refugees go to their relatives and close friends to seek for assistance as an alternative to the resettlement agencies. But, it is clear that they cannot build a broader social network to raise their demands or to be more visible.

Even if there were some good intentions or motivations to initiate this sort of the institutional forms among Iraqi community, economic or financial inadequacies appear as important aspect of this process. More particularly, it should be noted down that this type of initiatives are mostly taken by Iraqi refugees who are already American citizens with their long years in the United States. One of them is A/50/Male who has been in US for 12 years, who publishes a newspaper concerning Iraq in Arizona and who explain this in the following way:

I wanted to establish some organization for the education houses. All the people who play, who sign and who are writer. At least, we invited the people to go by the book to respect themselves. But we couldn’t because we don’t have enough money. This organization is good for us and good for America.

There are several challenges in front of the formation of a broader social organization by Iraqi refugee community in Arizona and this generally leads to loneliness or to apply for the resettlement agencies or non-governmental organizations. In this sense, DR/36/Male states his loneliness by underlying the similarities between Iraqis and Americans in the following way:

Here nobody cares you here. There is no social relation here. Even Iraqis do not contact with their relatives here like Americans. There is no one or institution here to share my problems. Even I could not find a house to rent without a sponsor. But, they look for a sponsor who gains much more than 2000 \$. There is an association for Iraqis here. But, I think it is not possible to help us much.

In fact, the common point from these interviewees is their emphasis on the weakness of Iraqi community as a form of social organization in Arizona. Moreover, this can also be assessed a kind of “mutation of attitudes in conversion” depending on the weight of survival in Arizona. Iraqi refugees limit their own network with their own priorities since their attitudes change due to the lack of “the security of a communal life” in the words of Gordon. As a result, they form their social contact in the already existent forms of social organization through kinship, friendship, church, mosque and the humanitarian agencies. It is clear that their social contact does not have a basis for their own community activities to be able to provide support or assistance for those who are in need.

6.3. The Third Operationalization: Berry’s Acculturation Framework for Iraqi Refugees in Arizona

6.3.1 Acculturative Framework for Iraqi Refugees in Arizona

The literature shows us that acculturation allows us to measure changes that take place at cultural level. This generally comes into existence as a result of intercultural contact and leads to several outcomes according to the social and economic context in which cultural groups experience acculturation process. Besides, as we see before, it may occur at psychological level so that individual human behavior can be measured through the analysis of psychological factors. Along with the frame of psychological acculturation, it is important to understand the place of individuals who undergo “behavioral shifts” and “acculturative stress” and this psychological and individual level affects their adaptation process in terms of psychological and sociocultural

factors (Berry, 2003: 20-21). During his analysis, he by all means sheds light on the acculturative framework by reference to the roles of dominant and non-dominant groups. All challenges leading to problems in “acculturating individuals” can be seen with the phenomenon of “acculturative stress” under the existent cultural and ideological system of the dominant groups (Berry, 1991:22).

From the side of my research findings, it is clear that the dominant cultural system is American culture and it can easily be asserted that American culture through language and lifestyle is dominant over immigrants and refugees. Therefore, Iraqi refugees experience their acculturation process quite different than each other although we find lot of common denominators for this process. Iraqi refugees have their “stressors” in their acculturation process, but this also shows us that some other refugees can grasp these stressors as “opportunities” as Berry underlines (1991). From the viewpoint of this research, I agree with his point that the relation among “acculturation experience”, “stressors”, and “acculturative stress” must be understood through a set of “moderating relationship” between acculturation and stressors (1991:30).

Moderating factors can be the social structure of the larger society, type of acculturation groups, modes of acculturation, and demographic, social and psychological characteristics of groups (Berry, 1991). As it is seen from this treatise, Arizona can be seen as a multi-cultural part of American society and Iraqi refugees as a cultural group experience their own acculturation process. As Berry indicates, in this process,

The maintenance and development of one’s ethnic distinctiveness in society, deciding whether or not one’s cultural identity and customs are of value and to be retained. The other issue involves the desirability of inter-ethnic contact. (1991:26).

At this point, it is also crucial to figure out that the above mentioned models take us to the point in which we see the functionality of “subjective and objective conditions” in explaining consequences of forced migration. Especially, when their personal characteristics such as age, gender, occupation, vulnerabilities and psychological

conditions, acculturative framework enables us to enlarge our query. In this sense, the components of cultural identity and customs need to be argued in a broader sense by reference to maintenance of mother tongue, cultural identity, cultural distance, integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. In the following chapters, this research will be analyzing these entities by presenting a comprehensive portrayal of moderating relationships in Iraqi refugees' new lives.

6.3.2. Acculturative Stressor: Maintenance of Mother Tongue

Following this pathway, I will start my analysis by stressing upon how Iraqi refugees keep their mother tongue in the beginning of their acculturation process and then I will argue other acculturative factors in this sense. At that point, it is important to note that their age, education level, knowledge of English, and length of stay in US are decisive factors in dealing with acculturative stressors to produce alternative ways to their daily problems. Beyond this, it is equally important to underline that they link their mother tongue to their culture and tradition and then they manifest their strong motivation to keep their own language at the home.

In this sense, during my interview with NS/32/male, who has a high school diploma from his home country, who speaks English, who is working as a worker for a security company and who is with his wife and a minor child in Arizona for almost four years. When we start talking about the native language, he says that he can prefer to send his child to the American schools that provide Arabic instruction as well, and he adds that

There are some schools, they give in Arabic language too. It is American school, but they give in Arabic classes. I like to get both. You are in the United States, they speak English. You have to learn this language. We teach him Arabic at house. In the school, they learn English hundred per cent. Sometimes, you can teach your children Arabic in house, you help them learn alphabet and you can help they read and write in Arabic.

He is a young guy with his family in Arizona and he has a self-esteem to teach Arabic to his child at the home, therefore he does consider learning and speaking English is more necessary than Arabic in US since he also takes up the matter as an important aspect of having qualified jobs and future rather than giving a prior effort to keep the language as he already knows that his child would not lose his mother tongue because of his family.

Another interview with MH/51/male who was an engineer in Iraq, who speaks English and who has been living in Arizona more than five years and who states:

I prefer they should go to American schools rather than Arabic schools because they live in this country, they need to learn the system and education and everything in this county although I want them to keep their mother language, it is very important for them. Because, here in United States, first of all, to keep language as mother tongue; secondly, here in America, always bilingual is preferable. Those who are bilingual are more in the jobs... By keeping on talking Arabic and seeing Arabic movies, reading books, they keep on doing this they keep their language. My sons are good in Arabic, they read and write. My daughter is also good in Arabic, she is the only one who has difficulties with Arabic because she came to US when she was eight years old. She learnt American system too fast. I wish she can write in Arabic... We will try to do our best to keep the language. There is lot of circumstances and future we don't expect what will happen. I am sure that when my kids get their kids, they will not know Arabic, they will go to American schools and they will speak only English. We will do our best to make them speak Arabic.

When it comes to the issue of the mother tongue, it is important to see that they make similar points. They are quite aware of the conditions in the United States. Having a perfect English competence and a good education allows people to get better jobs and economic situation. If they were bilingual, then they would be more eligible for many higher positions. Therefore, rather than falling into stress, they create their alternative

strategies to keep their language as they convert this process into something advantageous or with more opportunities.

This point becomes more apparent when I talk to Iraqi refugees who have arrived in US since the first Gulf War. JM/50/male who has been in Arizona over the last twenty-five years, who speaks English and whose children have been grown up in the United States and who emphasizes:

We try hard. They know some Arabic. They communicate with us in Arabic. I want them to keep our own language. There is a private school. We do have here Arabic classes every week. It is a good opportunity for them to speak two languages, to be bilingual. Maybe they can find a job easily... They have to learn our own language because they communicate with their relatives. Arabic language, maybe they can find a job here. Next to English, they can find another opportunity with a job. So, we try hard to keep both languages. They learn English at school, in the home we try to teach them.

The matter of mother tongue is mostly understood as an issue of opportunity rather than a stressor. However, it should be underlined that the length of stay is very effective factor since it necessitates a family's permanent support to keep their own language. For JM/50/male, this is important to keep their relations with their family members in their home country since the main stressor here seems a lack of communication between family members. In the same vein, A/50/male explains the similar things in different words. He has also been in Arizona more than twelve years and he links their language to their culture and tradition and he says that

We speak Arabic at home. Arabic is our education and our tradition. Maybe one day, we go back to Iraq, I need my family to speak Arabic. Right now, I am a citizen. I am proud because I get the citizen. I have to speak Arabic because Iraq is my native country.

In terms of the maintenance of the mother tongue, it is important to underline that the families who cannot speak and understand English feel the responsibility to learn English because of their children. For instance, D/51/male who cannot speak and understand English state that

My kids go to the school. They are all good in the schools. They are doing fine. Kids start speaking English between them. I prefer that they keep their mother tongue. But they speak English, sometimes to me and their mom, they say English so we also need to know English.

In this sense, the families also force themselves to learn English as they want to overcome possible difficulties coming out of their children' fast integration. Moreover, some families say their wish to send their children to the schools that also instruct in Arabic. DR/36/male

My three children go to the school here. They have small difficulties because of their names. They learn English in the schools. We are Kirkuk and we speak three languages namely Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic in our home. But they have to speak English in the schools. Here, if there was a school teaching in Turkish or Arabic Kurdish, I would send them to the schools. My little daughter speaks English and Turkish now.

Although there are alternative schools that instruct different languages in Arizona, it becomes difficult for them to send their children to these private schools due to their insufficient financial means. However, it should be noted that their only motivation to send their children to these schools does not come from their inadequate English knowledge. They want to keep their children from the negative possible impacts of another culture in the schools and they take up this issue by giving a strong importance to their cultural differences.

6.3.3. Acculturative Stressor: Cultural Maintenance and Cultural Distance

Berry argues acculturation strategies by showing how cultural groups develop their strategies through the channels of “prejudice”, “security”, “contact” and “similarity” in his analysis of multiculturalism in Canada. In this sense, “acculturative stress phenomena” are associated with “low contact” and “negative attitudes”. In his view, this sort of low contact or negative conditions may be brought about by the larger society and further outcomes can be formed as “social, economic, political and residential discrimination” (1991:31). For my research, his contribution is important to see how Iraqi refugees formulate their intercultural relations with other cultural groups and natives. It is also worth noting that their main tendency is to provide their cultural security since, as he indicates, they keep their “confidence” in “their individual identity” to exist in the social structure of Arizona. As I will enlarge this point later, it can be also considered around two important issues; “cultural maintenance” and “contact and participation”. The former contains all efforts to maintain their “cultural identity” while the latter includes their intercultural relations with other groups (Berry, 1997:9).

At this point, it becomes important to figure out how Iraqi refugees try to keep their cultural maintenance to keep their cultural identity and how they interact with other groups when it comes to their prejudices, similarities and dissimilarities. In this regard, to begin with, I will stress upon that they recognize their home or private zone as a cultural area where they keep their identity just like the way in which they maintain their language. Therefrom, when it comes to the case of the children in Arizona, the role of parents is to guard them by determining the borders of the cultural effect of the mainstream society. Regardless of whether or not they are successful, this is the way of limiting intercultural relations with others. For instance, when we talk about the importance of mother tongue, EF/48/male brings the topics to how much he gives importance to the maintenance of their original culture:

Just for my baby, I think it is important to study in Arabic. She will start her life from here, from zero. Life is different and culture is different than before. I must teach step by step both how is the life here, from the

beginning. Yes, she does not understand but step by step she will, because she will go to the school and she will find other life different than ours. So I must care about here. You know here it is a free country.

At this point, it should be noted that some refugees have prejudices against Americans as they assume that American culture and lifestyle are not acceptable in many aspects. In fact, it is right to put forward that their negative feelings can vary from one to another since their perspective may be formed through their religion and ethnicity, or their strong loyalty to their own traditional values. On the other hand, it is clear that freedom means a lot for them as the ones who are survival of the dictatorship in their home country and some have a fear of freedom for their children in this sense.

To more specific on what they understand by American culture, it is obvious that some do not attribute a positive quality to American culture when it comes to family relations. YS/62/female says that “my children should be Muslim, accordingly their mother and father will be their priority. American culture, no. When they turn to sixteen-years old, boys go and girls disappear and they look for their own lives.” By the same token, cultural maintenance takes the form of a kind of fear in the words of DR/36/male:

I am teaching my culture and habits to my children. Sometimes, I fear that my children may just like some Americans who drink and eat and go to clubs. I do not want this kind of things. But there are some Americans who go to work and return to their home, they are good.

In their acculturation process, as we see, there are certain distinctions when it comes the matter of culture and tradition. Indeed, it needs to be emphasized that the distinction is specially crystalized when it comes to their religious identity, especially for Muslims. For example, YS/62/female strongly emphasizes their language and culture in relation to their religion by saying that

My children will not forget our language and our culture. My grandkids will also learn Arabic since we are Muslims. It is very important for us. Arabic is the language of Qur'an.

Actually, there is a strong belief that she presumes that her grandchildren will not forget their language and culture, because their home, that's their private life, will always be a place to keep their language and religion.

From this standpoint, what is more prevailing than their fears is their mode of coping with 'these potential problems' in their view. In fact, if we talk with the arguments of Berry, this is another way of limiting intercultural contact with others by elevating their cultural values or cultural similarities among Iraqis rather than Americans. In this regard, during my interview with MH/51/male, I have been provided with a clear-cut explanation of what they want to provide:

I think everybody like their origin. No one says I am not Arabic, I am American. Only few those who don't understand what is the tradition and cultures. Everybody wants to maintain the culture, to maintain the tradition. If you don't maintain the language, you will not keep your culture and your tradition. Language is a culture, is a tradition. that's why you have to maintain your language and your origin.

MH/51/male clearly express that there is a constructive bound between language and culture, and religions. Their way of identifying themselves with their religion and ethnicity displays that they have a certain level of cultural maintenance so that they try to maintain their language, culture and tradition by determining their social and psychological limits.

At this juncture, I need to turn to Berry's arguments of "society of origin" and "society of settlement" so as to underline the dynamics of "group acculturation" in the way I explained above. It is clear from my research findings so far that it is possible to speak of a kind of "cultural distance" when it comes to their insist on keeping their language and keeping away their children from American culture. According to Berry, "cultural

distance” is of course formed through the dynamics of the society of origin. Therefore, economic, demographic and political factors of the society of origin are decisive and it means “the dissimilarity between the cultures in contact” (Berry, 1997:23). More specifically, Iraqi Muslims may develop a broader content of cultural distance than Iraqi Christians since their understanding and living of religion is different and they are also distinguished by the host community members under the impact of global events. And it is also underlined that “cultural distance” does not contribute to adaptation, on the contrary it leads to “poorer adaptation” (1997:23).

No doubt there is a cultural distance between cultural groups and dominant society members and this does not enable the progression of social contact to reinforce adaptation. However, this is also not a one-way process as prejudices can be seen in the form of Islamophobia. In this sense, JM/50/male emphasizes that

Discrimination depends on the education and persons. There are some complaints from specially, my daughter wears head craft. Someone, one of the students, make a fun, what is this?, showing in the news, one of them, you are from an Islamic country saying you are murder, you are killer, depends...

It is not realistic to state that they do not face discrimination in America. However, it is important to underline where they face discrimination or who mostly express their negative feelings against Iraqi Muslim refugees in Arizona. JM/50/male also underlines that religious based discrimination takes places in the schools, but also mostly in working places:

Discrimination is especially with the woman graduated from the universities because of head craft. We have girls with their bachelor degree from here, but they cannot find a job. So maybe they go to Walmart to work. It is a discrimination. I have a business as an American. I don't know about Islam and girl come to me with head craft and she wants a job. My knowledge or my information about Islam is just from the media and heard about ISIS, these girls come to me and they want a job. Of course, I am

gonna be suspicious. So maybe I don't have a job for them. There are many many girls who graduated from here, but they cannot find a job.

Under these circumstances, it is quite essential to know for me that many clearly express their ethnic and religious identity comfortably and they state that there is no antagonism or negative attitudes against themselves in Arizona. Whether or not many may not want to speak of the discriminatory incidents they face, but it is a reality that they have their own acculturative strategies in order to deal with this type of individual discriminatory incidents. In this regard, before concluding this part, I will give a place to two important expression to show the characteristics of "society of settlement" since Berry underlines that "public education and social legislation" can be important factors to "promote an appreciation of the benefits of pluralism, and of the societal and personal costs of prejudice and discrimination to everyone" (1997:28). This is significant to understand how much the mainstream society is aware of the diversity of Arizona or how much they care about ethnic and religious factors. My research findings display that it is not possible to speak of discriminatory tendency or trend against refugees as this may be related to the implementation of the well-established order of public education and social legislation. Or, it may be a form of ignorance or indifference to the diversity of Arizona. At that point, DR/36/male explains his opinions on discrimination in the following words:

I faced lot of difficulties here. But I have never faced a discrimination. Americans cannot figure out us because there are lot of Mexicans here. They think that we are Mexicans, our skin color is close to Mexicans.

By reference to Berry, the characteristics of society of settlement is important in acculturation process since people from different beliefs and languages are living in Arizona and Iraqis contribute to this extant diversity. More importantly, even if they are considered as Mexicans, many say that they do not feel discrimination on their daily lives. When we talk about the situation of Arizona, from the viewpoint of the resettlement agencies and of the non-profit organizations, it is usually emphasized that Arizona is a welcoming state and receives lot of refugees from different countries. At this point, it needs to be touched upon that the state's proximity to Mexico puts a risk

to the visibility of refugees and they actually do not face any discrimination or negative feelings because they are not visible. As a result, it may not be possible to speak of the lack of discrimination in this sense, but it is a sort of the invisibility of Iraqi refugees in public.

My second point is, in this sense, made by NS/32/male who wanted to share his experience in Arizona since he was surprised with what he experienced and explained in the following words:

There is no problem for me over there. I am an Arabic-Muslim. There is no problem in US. You can continue there, there is lot of Arabic-Muslims over there and all continue their life as like peaceful. No problem really for them. Just stay away problems, that's it. Stay away, nobody bother you. Even some situation happened with me, somebody was trying to open my door, I called the police and told them I am an Iraqi refugee. He said what can I do? It was not an opened door and they said me helicopter and three police cars came to me and they asked me questions and they keep one car waiting to check out and it was too normal. It was like American citizens, nothing different because of your religion and language. I can go to the mosque and visit my friends over there. It is a normal life over there.

With this incident, it seems from his words that his belief in the American system is reinforced since he was not subjected to any discrimination because of his religion and language and he was treated like a human being. It is obvious from many that segregation of Iraqi society due to their religion, ethnicity, beliefs and values have formed their perception of daily lives through the risk of being harmed due to their beliefs and values. Even if they have difficulties in overcoming cultural distance with Americans, they concede that they can express their language and identity on their daily lives in a comfortable manner. They also spend their efforts to maintain their language, religious and cultural identity by holding this cultural distance at a certain level. Therefore, it is not incorrect to state that the volume of this effort is that of their acculturation strategy and their acculturation strategy needs to be scrutinized to see how they re-build their values and identities in Arizona.

6.3.4. Acculturative Strategies: Integration, Assimilation, Separation, Marginalization

As I have analyzed in the previous section, cultural maintenance, contact and participation are the key components of acculturation strategies in all plural societies. Berry also underlines that “assimilation”, “separation”, “integration”, and “marginalization” come into existence through the relation or balance between “strategies of ethno cultural groups” and “strategies of larger society” (2003:23-24). However, at this point, it is important not to underestimate the function of “the dominant and the non-dominant” structures (1997: 9).

In light of the above arguments, my research findings need to be discussed whether or not Iraqi refugees can be fit to one of these strategies in their post-resettlement environment. It is clear from our analyses of accommodation and cultural maintenance that Iraqi refugees attributes a great importance to their cultural identity and they uphold their efforts to keep their culture and language. Besides, they also recognize the gravity of their relations or contact with other groups, or with “the larger society” as they assess and locate their future in the long-term consequences of this type of relations.

From here, it can be said that they establish a balance between cultural maintenance and contact/participation with others within the scope of their religion, language and tradition. Therefore, whether or not the main questions for “cultural maintenance” and “relationship with larger society” do correspond to adaptation and integration of Iraqi refugees in Arizona still keep their importance. Moreover, it may not be enough to amalgamate their acculturative strategies as a one unique strategy like integration or assimilation. By reference to Berry once again, “moderating factors to prior to acculturation” can be defined as “age, gender, education, expectations, cultural distance, personality” (1997:15). Thereupon, his definition of strategies leads us to see the fact that the case of a single women differs from that of an elderly guy with his family members. Although both want to keep their culture and to interact with the larger society, it is not a pure matter of integration or assimilation because of their expectations and capacity.

In this sense, I will argue their social contact and participation in social life, and also their communication with Americans. Following this, I will portray how they socially and culturally locate themselves as Iraqis in Arizona by prospecting conditions of next generations. Along with these point, I will expand their acculturation process to the horizon of integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization by looking at their experiences.

6.3.4.1. Impacts of Moderating Factors: Participation and Social Contact with Americans in Arizona

During my interviews, I have reached different outcomes when it comes to their relations with the larger community, especially Americans or to their way of identifying themselves at a possible social relation. To begin with, I will give a place to the words of MH/51/male to see how much their personal characteristics or subjective conditions are important in identifying themselves with a cultural group:

You know because of my age, I came when I was in forty six. My age always brings me towards Iraqis, not towards to American. If I would come to here at ten years old or fourteen years old, then I would be more American than Iraqis. So, in our age, we people we sure that we are close to Iraqis. When I meant by Iraqi means Iraqi tradition or culture. It is not that I don't like Americans.

As can be seen, MH/51/male primarily emphasizes on his age by explaining his proximity to Iraqis. Although he has been in Arizona more than five years, and although he has been working for a humanitarian organization as an interpreter, he makes us understand that “moderating factors” he brings from his society of origin are at work in his acculturation process. For instance, when I posed the same question to MY/19/female, she clarifies that “I am more close to Americans rather than Iraqis. I am young and I am living here. I am close to Americans.”

At that point, it is important to understand that those who are relatively young and who are studying and working in Arizona recognize their social potentials with the opportunities and advantages the American system may provide. As a result, their “expectations” and “personality” become more effective in relation to “moderating factors during acculturation” like their coping mechanisms, strategies and resources since those who are relatively younger and who have motivation to change their social and economic conditions give importance to acculturation strategies to be more included in the system.

Analyzing their social contact and participation in the larger society, the moderating factors prior to acculturation plays important role when it especially comes to tradition and culture. This may also be considered for Iraqi refugees due to their religious and ethnic structures since, as I have already mentioned, their social organization is mainly comprised of their relatives and their close friends, and it does not take the form of any institutional or organizational network. In this sense, for example, their length of stay in Arizona can be considered as one of the moderating factors during their acculturation process although the gravity of tradition and culture is strongly emphasized.

Considering their acculturation process, it is a clear distinction between those who are not citizen and those who are citizen in Arizona. Firstly, it should be underlined for the former group that the cultural distance mostly forms their contact with Americans since they strongly emphasize their tradition and culture by not determining about their societal attitudes in a mutual relation with the larger society. Secondly, for the latter group, they also emphasize their tradition and their proximity to Iraqis, but they are more flexible and their locus of control is more open to social contact and participation in the larger society. As a result, I can put forward that their length of stay is quite important factor when we start talking about their social relations with American in the larger society.

To be more concrete, with the first argument, EF/48/male who is not a citizen and who has been living in Arizona approximately two years and who speaks of his barriers for social contact with Americans in the following manner:

I heard from other people about some discriminatory behaviors by some locals. But I didn't face any. I feel close myself to Iraqis because Americans are like a machine. To be honest, morning time they go work and even sometimes they don't say 'hello'. Because I don't know how is their habit. It is their life. They care about bitch more than his mother. Maybe he can care of this bitch and he don't know where is his mother because life is different. But my people and my country are close to me because culture is different.

EF/48/male makes his arguments through his daily life experiences. It is also important to note that the majority get their first experiences with their entry-level jobs, and it makes their perception about Americans in the larger society. Therefore, their arguments are prominently surrounded by their early experiences in the society, so they turn to their religion and culture to cope with challenging issues in their lives. By the same token, KJ/36/female, who is a single parent, who has been in Arizona for three years, who cannot understand and speak English and who says that

I feel myself close to Iraqis because we speak the same language, it is better and easier for us to communicate. American, there is an organization, Catholic Charities, they respect us. I don't have any American friend here.

In this sense, it makes clear for us that language is another important barrier in front of social contact and participation even if you are motivated to interact with Americans. Besides, she recognizes her communication with Americans by referring to the resettlement agency. In fact, this is an expression of a sort of the institutional communication between Americans and refugees, not more. However, it is not a part of social participation on their daily lives. They can of course share their problems and demands with the agencies, but this is not a structured form of communication with Americans. Therefore, it becomes difficult to speak of integration possibilities in a mutual relationship since the volume of moderating factors during acculturation is not adequate to establish social mechanisms to include Iraqi women and families into the larger societies.

With my second argument on the length of stay in the United States, that's those who are citizens and who are relatively more settled individuals, it is clear to see that they also give importance to their tradition and culture, but they improve their personality and locus of control to be more open to social contact and participation; and they appreciate their friendships by overcoming barriers mutually. A/50/male who is an American citizen and who has been in Arizona more than twenty years, but he explains his social contact in the larger community in the following words:

I feel close myself to Iraqis, as you know, this is tradition. We are from Iraq, usually we sit together, we speak together, at night together. We want to talk about our country, what happened in Baghdad. I cannot talk with American people about my country. They don't know anything about Iraq. But, I have good American neighbors. We visit neighbors. When I was in Pittsburgh, I have friends there. Fortunately, last week, somebody came from Pittsburgh to visit Arizona, and he called me, I prepared some and cooked for him. His name is David and he is a pastor at a church. He was interested in me and my family when I was there. I liked him. I consider him, look like my brother. They take care for my family. I have a good friend.

The length of stay is, in this sense, connects them to Americans in a certain way despite the fact that they are living in their tradition and culture. No need to repeat that my research findings are concerned with the case of the first-generation adult refugees, it is clear that they come across with Americans, Mexicans and other cultural groups in their working places, mosques and public areas over time, this leads to a sort of friendship in order to know each other. Therefore, it is very important to understand the words of A/50/male about the American pastor since their 'friendship' helps them overcome their prejudices and negative feelings about each other and reinforces integration process in a mutual relation. In a similar vein, IM/62/male, who has been in Arizona for approximately five years, who is an elderly and single man, and who can understand and speak little English and who says that:

I feel myself to Americans. I have an American neighbor. Her name is Jimmy. She took me to the hospital when I was sick. If I asked an Iraqi guy for help, he would say he is busy. I have two sisters here, they would say the same thing. Americans are helpful.

In composition with Iraqis, he actually looks at his individual benefit through his contact with some Americans. Indeed, this does not mean that there is a strong indicator of integration by establishing a mutual acculturation process. However, he finds a kind of relation so that he can change his approach to Americans in a positive way. It is a sort of the process to overcome their individual barriers through neighborhood and friendship.

6.3.4.2. Integration or Assimilation: Where Would ‘Iraqi-Americans’ Stand ?

Integration as a strategy “when people have an interest in maintaining their original culture during daily interactions with other groups” (2003:24). However, at this point, Berry underlines that integration necessitates a process in which non-dominant groups, like Iraqi refugees, make a “free choice” when “the dominant society has open and inclusive orientation toward cultural diversity” (Berry, 2003; Berry, 1991). Although Arizona, to a certain extent, contains a cultural diversity, is it possible to say Iraqis will make their free choice for integration? Against this question, I put forward that it is not possible to produce a strong argument on specifically integration of Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Berry clarifies that “the dominant group must be prepared to adapt its national institutions (e.g., education, health, labor) to better meet the need of all groups now living together in the plural society” (2003:24). When we look at the economic aspects of integration concerning the situation of Iraqis, it is clear that their economic adaptation is full of individual troubles and problems because of the requirements of the refugee admission programs. Therefore, rather than multiculturalism or pluralism debates, American system does not adapt a well-organized structure of the refugee admission program by including refugees in the labor market as entry-level workers, and then they have their first experiences in America.

What does this early experience lead to? I respond to this that their attachment to their cultural identity and values becomes stronger through their fellows from Iraq and they put up with their stressors with their individual or group strategies. As I have already indicated with reference to Park and Burgess, their accommodation process takes place and they become “conscious of their occasion” under the requirements of the new social environment. Then, it is clear that this new social environment belongs to a common American culture and it is not incorrect to put forward that it is the dominant component of the life in the United States. The system is totally designed according to the priorities of this culture. Iraqi refugees can live their own culture by going to their holy places, by celebrating their special days, by organizing different cultural activities, but the system is based on the fact that one must learn English, work hard and get to Americanized as soon as possible to be able to get a social and economic mobility in America.

In view of these arguments, it is important to underscore one of the most important definitions during my research. It is the appearance of “Iraqi-Americans”. While many are explaining their future prospects about themselves and their children, they usually refer to the subject of Iraqi-American and they see this subject as the main player of their acculturative strategies. As we already discussed, the American system recognizes the first generation Iraqi refugees as New Americans without giving a place to their children or grandchildren. From ‘New Americans’ to future Americans, it is clear for Iraqis that Iraqi-Americans will appear as carriers of cultural and traditional origins to next generations.

From their view of point, as I have revealed before, responsabilization of Iraqi refugees brings about a sort of socio-economic sacrifice in Arizona and they usually attribute all future prospects to their children as they sacrifice themselves for their children. This point is very important in their worldviews since their children appears as real subjects of either integration process or assimilation process. During my research, MH/51/male defines an Iraqi-American subject while referring to their children in the following words:

They will be both, they will be Iraqi-Americans. I think they love Iraq and they love America. America may be more than Iraq because they live in here. Half of their life is here. We don't know what would happen in future in Iraq, maybe they cannot go to Iraq for ten years more and then we are more loyal and more love America more than Iraq. But, because of the origin, they still love their country, they have dual citizenship, two citizenships, and you have to be on both interest.

The identity of Iraqi-American refers to the loyalty to language, culture and religion as well as lifestyle in Iraq. According to their worldviews, their children would be a subject of social equilibrium and they will not give up their original identity.

Similarly, the parents also attribute a huge responsibility to themselves to be able to support their children to get an Iraqi-American identity. EF/48/male clearly explains both his responsibility and his belief in his children in the following manner:

I just told you. I care about them and I contact with them as my friends not a father. So I trust them. I decided to come here because I know what they have. You have something that affect here more and the future, it is more how to say, you know no one knows about the future. But I trust them, I am a good father for them so they will choose the right things. They will be Iraqi-Americans. There is a big difference between Iraqi-Americans and Americans. I saw some people here American-Iraqi, he does not feel about you. He does not care about you. And I see Iraqi-Americans here and they are more close to you. American-Iraqi means an Iraqi guy who came here thirty-five years ago, who got the citizenship, and he is living here, yes he is Iraqi talking but his habits are like American. When he is shopping, he doesn't care this is Halal or not. He took their habits. Their culture is American. But Iraqi-American, they are Iraqi and they respect American law, they respect to pay on time, but they can help and they can support you, other don't have time.

Here, EF/48/male brings us to an important point where we see that the first generation refugee parents undertake the role of a good mediator between the old and the new. The children are expected to learn their origin culture and tradition from their families under the impact of the dominant American culture. From here, we understand that Iraqi-Americans would be the subjects not only to keep their original culture and tradition, but also to transmit their culture and tradition to the next generations. By the same token, RZ/73/male emphasizes this point in the following way:

My children will be Iraqi-Americans. Iraqi-American will stay be loyal to tradition and culture of Iraq in every detail. They will have a different culture, additionally to Iraqi culture, they will know what freedom is, what discrimination is, and how to respect people.

Along with these sentences, I like to underscore the word of “loyalty” since it is important for many research in the immigration area. It includes a kind of hierarchical order when their religion, culture and language comes in the picture, therefore they see a binding attribute of the cultural groups through loyalty. Actually, this theme is emphasized by Park with reference to “its basis in a *modus vivendi*, a working relation and mutual understanding, of the members of the group” (1914: 609). Therefore, they point to the mode of staying loyal to tradition and culture by keeping their language and religion as well as their lifestyles.

From here, the question is clear: is this an easy going process? Gordon’s gorgeous analysis may demonstrate a very approximate response when it comes to the condition of refugees as well. According to his observation:

Exposed to the overwhelming acculturative powers of the public school and the mass communications media, the immigrants' children will proffer their unhesitating allegiance to those aspects of the American cultural system which are visible to them in their particular portion of the socio-economic structure... The tendency will be for native-born children to become alienated from their immigrant parents and the culture they

represent, as they respond affirmatively to the higher status American cultural values. (1964:244-245)

In fact, my research does not concentrate on the case of Iraqi refugees' children. It is possible to put forward certain outcomes about their children. But the parents recognize their role not to leave their children under the full impact of the American cultural system by pointing to loyalty to religious, linguistic and cultural origins.

Under the impact of the American cultural system that works as a “melting pot” and that leads to “Americanization”, the main purpose of the system is to “transmit patriotism, loyalty and common sense” to American society (Park and Burgess, 1921). As a result, it can be told that the function of Americanization through assimilation is to re-define loyalty for a “common cultural life” (1921). More concretely, some of Iraqi refugees are aware of the fact that the case of the next generations are different than that of Iraqi-Americans in terms of assimilation and Americanization. In other words, their self-confidence disappear when they produce opinions about their grandkids since some strongly become suspicious about maintenance of language and cultural values. Thereupon, although they cannot specify this process as either Americanization or assimilation, some are quite aware of the fact that the next generations would have some barriers to keep their cultural identity. In this sense, MH/51/male explains his worries in a precisely manner:

I have worries for second and third generations, not my kids. Those will have a problem with the language. But they will keep a lot of culture and traditions. It is not about religion. It is about Arabic tradition like for now, my kids don't take the dinner until I come home. Even they stay six or seven o'clock, they will not take the dinner until I come to home and then we get all together on the table and we start eating. It is a kind of tradition for my family. This kind of things should be maintained. But for language, I worry about that.

Considering the long-term possible effects of assimilation and Americanization processes, when we start talk about marriage issues in Arizona, their first reaction is

again formed by their moderating factors like religion, ethnicity, age, education and other subjective conditions. Those who are citizens and who spend longer times in US are less conservative than others who are new-comers in Arizona. For both of the groups, it is prominent to underline that religion is the mainspring of this type of intercultural relation. During my interview with D/51/male, this point is stressed upon in the following manner:

I can see that my kids are forgetting Iraq and now they become Americans. American community uses brain, mind how to live, how to work for life... If you would ask me, I would not accept that my children would get married. If the law forces me, I cannot do anything. I will give you an example. Now if you live with your mom and dad, and you go to other place, it would not be easier for you to find your mom and dad. You have to be close to your father and mother. Also, our religion, you have to understand that, if a person goes out of our religion, you are not be accepted by Ezidis social community. You will be tolerated but nobody will accept him. So, nobody does that you should go outside of the religion. For example, what it happened for the last time with ISIS when they captured Ezidis on the mountain. They called the women, they told them if you wanna Muslim, you can marry with us; otherwise we will kill you. The women told kill us. They refused to change their religion.

From this tragic story, it can be understood that their strong attachment to their religion does not allow them to get married with Muslims or Christians and others. There is a well-structured pattern of their social and cultural life, and outside of their internal network, this can be considered as a matter of honor or social stigmatization. Actually, this does not change for Muslim Iraqis as well. MH/51/male is an educated Iraqi person and he has been working in a multicultural working place but he expresses the importance of the religion; otherwise he cannot see a future in the following manners:

I don't know what answer for this. I am still wondering, one day I ask myself if I were in this situation, what I would do. It depends on the situation at that time. If my son loved the girl according to the original

religion aspect, we should go to the religion. She has to be like our religion. She has to be converted. Otherwise, I will not accept. These are the teaching.

In this regard, there is a superiority of religion over ethnicity and other moderating factors when it comes to other forms of intercultural relations like marriage. To reinforce this aspect of the matter, another interviewee who is an Iraqi-Turkmen, DR/36/male, explains his opinions in the following words:

My children will be Americans. America has helped me a lot and it has saved us from the death. We cannot deny. But there are some certain things. My children are getting used to harmonize with their environment. But, I cannot do that... I can allow my children to get married with a Muslim American. But, if he or she is not Muslim, I would not allow them to get married but it is up to my children. I want a Muslim one.

It is obvious from my research findings that religion is important factor for the parents. However, the refugees who are citizens and who have more enhanced social contact with Americans or who come from Christian background may think differently from other Iraqi refugees and my research findings show that they are more flexible or they don't want to control this process by emphasizing culture and tradition decisively.

6.4. In and Out of Social Integration: Being an American Citizen ?

Kuhlman and Berry's theoretical frameworks enables us to analyze the social, economic and cultural integration process of Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Transformation of primordial identities to new identities, cultures and lifestyles intersects lot of social processes and sub-processes in the post-resettlement area. Along with the impact of subjective and objective conditions, Iraqi refugees make their new lives in the United States. In this process, their legal status determines their access to rights and services, therefore it affects their social integration process by implication. Kuhlman and

Berry's frameworks do specify the length of stay in society of settlement without prioritizing the matter of the citizenship.

From the standpoint of my treatise, I give an important place to the subject of the citizenship so as to analyze how they evaluate the citizenship with their current situation. Some are already citizens, some with permanent residence and some with green cards; all of them spend their time in Arizona and expect to be naturalized by the American system. To my research findings, it is important to note that there is no direct relation between social integration and citizenship. But the obtainment of the citizenship is a target for refugees, therefore it is something to push refugees to integrate into the host society by learning English and by working and by participating in a social system.

In this regard, I will discuss what the obtainment of US citizenship means for both Iraqi refugees and refugee transnationalism. To begin with, I will underline that the obtainment of US citizenship is a hierarchal process for each refugee is admitted to America. This hierarchal process contains a set of steps. As already touched upon, upon their settlement in the US, they are permitted to work. Actually, it does not mean anything related to the citizenship procedures. It is the first step that refugees get their "legal permanent residence" to able to stay and work within the borders of US after a year, they are obliged to apply for a green card, which is the second mandatory step. As a last step, they "can apply for citizenship after having been resident in the United States for five years" (United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2017a: Web). After all conditions are fulfilled by them, they have to pass the naturalization test.

It is not a coincidence that the obtainment of American citizenship is comprised of several steps. Ong explains this point by turning to the history of American citizenship

As nationality has been shaped by a series of inclusions and exclusions on the basis of xenophobia, racism, religious bigotry, and male privilege. At its founding, the country excluded African slaves, Native Americans, and anyone not born in the colonies from citizenship—despite the fact that the

United States is a leading example of a “nation of immigrants,” in which the naturalization of residents has always been central to the theory and practice of citizenship. Today, the country has millions of legal resident aliens (visa holders and green-card holders), many of whom will eventually seek naturalization. (2003:79)

Similarly, in Arizona, lot of Iraqi refugees are seeking naturalization and, in this waiting process, they make their lives under the harsh conditions of the marketplace in America. However, it is a reality that US system gauges lot of impacts of resettlement process over them before granting a citizenship. On the other hand, it is important to note that the relationship between their obtainment of citizenship and their social integration in the host community is not taken for granted, and it needs to be elaborated in a sociological manner. Within the scope of my research findings, the meaning of the American citizenship for refugees varies from one to another according to their current status. In other words, those who are already citizens may consider some issues more different than those who are waiting for the obtainment of American citizenship.

For those who are already citizens, my findings reveal that many link their obtainment of citizenship to the utilization of benefits and advantages that make their lives easier in Arizona. Accordingly, M/48/female who is a single parent, who is already an American citizen and who says that

I have been here for 7 years. I am a citizen of the US, but it doesn't mean anything, but just means for my son's future. He is studying here. Also, when you decide to go to any country, when they look at your passport, then they will provide VISA. It is easy for me to travel to other countries.

At the first glance, it can be said that she looks at the matter of having an American citizenship in terms of benefits and advantages she can have. By the same token, Z/47/female, who is a single woman, who is an American citizen and who states that “I have been in US for seven years. I am a citizen. I swear God that it means nothing. I have just certificate. I did everything myself.”

At this point, it is also important to underline that their perspective on citizenship is shaped by their social and economic conditions at first. Both women have economic difficulties in Arizona and they do not have a job as they wish despite the fact that they have been in America for seven years. In addition to this, it should be noted that their English skills are still limited. In other words, two important material conditions are not still fulfilled, therefore their obtainment of the citizenship does not refer to any right-based arguments like political rights. On the contrary, those who have better economic conditions with higher jobs and language competence, the citizenship means loyalty to America since they are granted opportunities and properties.

For those who are not citizens and who waiting for their citizenship, the achievement of American citizenship firstly is associated with “freedom of travel”. Without the citizenship, refugee can travel abroad with a special travel document, but it also signals a risky situation in case they return to their country of origin since US government can ask for a justification of how they return safely. Therefore, the citizenship means the attainment of American passport that allows them to go to any country they wish. MH/51/male explains this situation in the following manners:

I have my citizenship interview in the next month. You know, because of the situation in Iraq, now no one can say that I can live in Iraq, everybody wants to leave Iraq. For me, if I have a citizenship here, at least I have another country to live in, I can live peacefully in this country which provides jobs, good life, security, much better than Iraq. For me, having citizenship means I have another home to live. My other home is destroyed, I have another safe and peaceful home for my family. Besides, it means getting the citizenship from one of the greatest countries. We are Iraqi, with Iraqi passports, we cannot enter any country, nobody allow us. Now, we can go everywhere and we are welcomed because we have an American passport. At least, you can feel that now you are a human. When we are Iraqis having passports, nobody accepts us to go in their country, we felt that we are not human. This is a fact.

It can be derived that the citizenship represents the construction of home where they can live without safety and security problem. In fact, their construction of home does not defeat the image of Iraq as a home for the first generation Iraqis at least. But, it is a prevailing point that they do emphasize their “freedom of travel” at first and then point to the importance of their lives in a new safe and peaceful home. By the same token, DR/36/male expresses the same things with an emphasis his freedom of move to other countries like Americans without any restrictions:

If I get the citizenship, I would be an American. Here would be my country. But now, I have a green card and I just stay here with this document. If I get citizenship, I can go anywhere.

On the other hand, it is significant to argue that the obtainment of the citizenship also refers to both the elimination of discrimination or bad treatment and the sentiment of safety and security in Arizona. EF/48/male

I come to this organization (IAFS) to meet Iraqis. We have some Iraqi friends here and we are visiting each other. I can say I feel safe 80 percent here. Because, last time I was shopping from Costco here. I was with my son. One man who was drunk came and asked us to take our stuff. He needed some food, he asked us and he was drunk. No one from people there talked with him and he took my bread, I was shocked. What should I do? I can't fight with him but if he fight with me, I can't defend myself according to they know here. I cannot fight with him, you know. First of all, I don't have a citizenship. If I am American, I will be equal. Yes, we are equal here, but I don't know what would happen, it is something strange. So my son was upset because he wanted to fight with him. This kind of things makes me really upset. And also, one of my friends here, his son was outside, six people came and beat him for cigarette or something like this. He was bleeding. We hear such stories and it gives us the situation is not safe one hundred percent. We should be careful. No one from my family is outside at night, I mean they do not go outside after seven o'clock

because we should organize our lives, we should be careful with all the steps.

They see that the obtainment of the citizenship is a formal guard against all discriminative and bad treatment from anyone in US. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to state that the citizenship means being equal with Americans. When they say that “if I am an American, I will be equal”, they actually refer to the above-mentioned hierarchy of legal statutes among permanent residency, green card and citizenship. They are quite conscious of the fact that the citizenship will provide them with a full provision of safety and security on the legal basis.

Concerning the sentiment of safety and security, they just do not focus upon their individual safety or security. Moreover, they give much importance to employment opportunities and education of their children within the provision of the citizenship. MA/48/female explains how she cares about the citizenship with the impossibility of return to Iraq in the following way: “It means a lot for me. It is big. Safety. I would not return to Iraq even if the conditions were good because my children are studying here.”

In comparison with their home country conditions, with their challenges and difficulties, they just enjoy being in a safe and peaceful environment without questioning what the citizenship is and what it provides them. D/51/male even cannot explain the difference between the green card and the citizenship, but he attributes the importance to the future of their children in the following words:

We came here in 2012. I have a green card. But, I do not know what the difference between green card and citizenship is. Everybody says that citizenship is better. The most important thing is that I got rid of problems in Iraq and I will get a citizenship. I think my kids will get citizenship in this country. Kids, one day, grow up with the citizenship. They study here, they live their life here, they get their jobs like engineer, like pilot. No body ask you that you are Muslim, you are Sunni, you are Christian, and you are Ezidi. You live your life. For me, I take the citizenship, it is ok. If I cannot

take the citizenship, it is also ok. The important thing is that my kids get the citizenship and live in this country. I am old now.

As already pointed that the age is important factor to assess their acculturative strategies. This is also very valid point for the citizenship as well. My research findings show that Iraqi refugees who are younger than other, who are motivated to study, to learn English and to work. They also approach to the matter of the citizenship in more detailed manner with respect to employment and education opportunities. In other words, as long as they see the opportunities and favorable circumstances, they think that it is worth spending their time to wait for the American citizenship. In this sense, I will give a place to the words of NS/32/male in the following manner:

For some higher positions, you need citizenship, they ask you for the citizenship. But for the rights, everything is the same, nothing changes. The meaning of the citizenship means for something too good. I didn't spend my time for nothing. It is good thing. When I get the citizen, I will be too happy. When I get the citizen, I have the right to go and fly anywhere. I can go to my country as well.

From this standpoint, I will touch upon once again that the obtainment of the citizenship appears as an invaluable target for refugees who are not citizen. They see the institutionalized form of their and their children' future. This process affects their integration positively, encourages them to participate in the social life by learning English, by accepting to work and by mobilizing themselves in the social, cultural and economic life in US. With the attainment of the citizenship, they see that their social and economic problems are not completely solved, but they see that they ensure their freedom of travel abroad and their safety. The citizenship brings them to a new home in which they can live peacefully. The citizenship increases their sentiment of belonging to the USA. Along with their diverse perspectives on the citizenship, it does not say much about the volume of the social integration of refugees. When it comes to their cultural and traditional understanding of living the life, to their efforts to keep their language and religion, to their way of making their lives in more private areas, they do not specify the citizenship or they do not uphold their social and political rights

to have a word for the future of US As a result, I can put forward that having citizenship does not correspond to their political rights in the US, it means more about their safety and their freedom of travel to other countries. Therefore, the citizenship does not appear a binding component for social integration in the case of Iraqi refugees in Arizona.

6.5. Transnational Capabilities of Refugees: remembering the Home

Theoretically speaking, the literature of transnationalism manifests an alternative grasp of immigrant movements by specifying immigrants in the context of the determinants like social and economic relations, social spaces, being here and there, and so forth. The common denominator of these definitions is to express that immigrants belong to a multi-layered network of social relations and therefore they always establish a socio-economic relation between their country of origin and their country of settlement. Moreover, Basch, Blanc and Schiller gives us the concept of transmigrants, who are subjects of this multi-layered social and economic networks (1994). Transmigrants take their place as a labor reserve for American capitalism. As they are subjects of the labor migration to America, their subjectivities and practices are formed by “hegemonic construct” (1994).

At this point, it becomes critical to explain what distinguishes refugees from transmigrants in the context of the United States. Considering the premises of the study of transnationalism made by Basch et.al. I will stress upon the first and second premises in order to discuss the transnational capabilities of refugees in analogy with transmigrants. The first premise is that “transnationalism” needs to be understood within the context of global capitalism (1994:24). It is clear that forced migration also needs to be analyzed under the impact of global capitalism. As I have presented before, the hegemonic power of the USA has altered the socio-political equilibriums in the Middle East at the cost of the destruction of Iraq. The second premise is that transnationalism is “a process by which immigrants, through their social, economic, political relations that cross national boundaries” (1994:28). How can we adopt this premise to the plight of refugees? Whether or not their social, economic and political

activities deserve to be understood. It means their relation with their home country. However, it is important to note that they are not immigrants and they have limited capabilities for their transnationalism.

It can be derived from their concept of hegemonic construct that US system makes immigrants to internalize American dominant culture; moreover this internalization is to “serve ultimately to empower and legitimate dominant forces in both the migrants’ societies of origin and of settlement” (1994:15). In this logic, I will put forward that transmigrants and refugees share the same destiny when it comes to hegemonic construct of American capitalism⁵⁵. However, refugees cannot construct their transnational relations as immigrants do. Therefore, transnational activities and capabilities of refugees need to be analyzed with respect to Khalid Koser and Al-Ali’s questions on transnationalism.

In this sense, I agree with their points that transnationalism does not say much when it comes to the plight of refugees. Whereas refugees live in more harsh conditions than any other voluntary immigrants because of their traumatic departure from their home country, it significantly becomes prominent if their possible relations or contacts with their countries will be conceptualized in transnationalism or not. According to Al-Ali et. al. points to difficulties of explaining the conditions of refugees within the context of transnationalism (2001a). Al-Ali et.al. also gives us a typology of capabilities in analyzing the situation of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe. They underline that “desire” and “capacity” are decisive when it comes to refugees’ participation in relief and reconstruction in their home countries; if a refugee does not have good economic conditions, or s/he is unemployed or depends on public assistance, then his or her participation would be low. Besides, in their typology of capabilities, we see that “economic”, “political”, and “social” capacities determine their desire to be active in economic, political and social areas of their home country (Al-Ali et. al., 2001a: 626)

⁵⁵ I want to note here that hegemonic construct of immigrants through conditions of capitalism puts immigrants in a process in which immigrants shape their identities and practices by building up social fields. Speaking succinctly, the US’s self-sufficiency policy, which is one of the main instruments in refugee resettlement, is based on the immediate involvement of refugees in the labor market to build up their lives as possible as they can in the USA and self-sufficiency which is the bedrock of the refugee admission program should be understood as a form of hegemonic construct of American system.

In this regard, I will underline that Iraqi refugees' capacity and desire need to be put into a transnational framework in order to analyze how they recall their home, Iraq. To begin with, the first thing must be underscored that their economic and social capabilities are limited in terms of various heads, which are highlighted by Al-Ali et. al., like employment, savings, secure legal status, freedom of movement within host country, gender equality, and social integration (2001a:626). In terms of their "capacity", they have to accept entry-level jobs with minimum payment, they have to make their own lives through their own money without any essential assistance. Their life conditions show that their consumption is also limited with the assistance of food stamps since they allocate their money for rent, communication and transportation and my research findings also show that there is no strong indicator of economic savings. Until they obtain their citizenship, they do not recognize their legal status in relation to safety and security indicators and they do not specify any political preferences or rights. Their movement from Arizona to other states is not possible because of being expensive and risky. Their social integration process is fragmented and comprised of different acculturative strategies and stressors and therefore it is not accomplished process.

Corresponding to their capacities, their desire to do something for their country or their relatives in their home can be understood by their responses in this manner. EF/48/male remembers his home by speaking of the conditions of Iraq in the following way:

I ask my friends every time, how is Baghdad? They said the worse than before, it gets worst and worst. I follow up Iraqi news and media every day. I want to see every time how it is going in Iraq because my family, my neighbors and my friends are still there. Every time they call me at night, hey your brother dead, your friend dead. I cannot see anything. But I don't much follow American news. To be honest, I love Iraq. Still, my brothers and my relatives are there. I spent my all life there. However, I don't like to go to there. You don't know what time exactly you will die. No better conditions in Iraq, because right now, the war between Sunni, Shia And Vahabi will stay forever. Yea, no change, no change. We don't

have a good government, good minister. Sunni or Shia, all they just think how they steal the money from Iraq. That's why I don't want to go back to Iraq. I have asked my children also, they said 'we don't like Iraq, we are American'. They don't want to go back to Iraq.

Despite more than twenty-years he left behind in Arizona, he lives his everyday with Iraq and with his relatives and friends in Iraq. It is of course important to underscore that Iraqi-Americans, in their words, do not know much about Iraq and this weak transnational link between the old home and the new home sinks into oblivion.

By the same token, JM/50/male, after twenty-five years in Arizona, does not hesitate to say that

If I am retired, I will go back to Iraq because of very extended family, I miss them. I am not gonna live there permanently. My children are born here, they are citizens of this country. They will not go to Iraq. Last year, we were in Iraq, we visited. They like the big family. They stayed at the house most of the time, they don't have friends.

In this sense, it is important to underline that length of their stay in the United States is an important factor to understand how they can improve their capacities to be able to invest in their home country. As can be seen, Iraqis who are citizens with a long-stay process in Arizona have their capacity and their desire to keep their contacts with Iraq, in other words, they live in here and there. However, we understand that Iraqi-Americans are not keen to keeping these transnational relations because of the disappearing image of Iraq as a home.

Additionally, it is significantly crucial to underline that the religious and ethnic minorities of Iraq does not show any desire to link themselves or their children to Iraq, even if they provide their economic, political and social capabilities. On the other hand, I can say that they do not have any hope about the consolidation of Iraq, they just care about their relatives and friends, not more. When D/51/male, of Ezidis, told what he

lived in Iraq, he did not leave any hope for his country and he said that his only relation with his country is because of his relatives:

There are a lot of reasons that I have these things in my mind. My brother and his sons were killed by ISIS in front of me and I cannot imagine that I can go back and live in Iraq. I do not follow up the news regularly. My kids watch and tell me what is going on in Iraq. I have many relatives in Iraq. We keep our communication with them. We are trying to reunion with these family members.

It was equally tragic to hear about his political interpretation was confined to security of ethnic and religious communities. When he was comparing the current situation of Iraq with the past, he added that

It was much better than now at the time of Saddam. It was much better. Simple thing is that the safety and security we had at that time. Even if you sleep in the street, nobody came to bother you, nobody can tell you, who are you, where are you, come on, kill you. It was safe. Now, they see and they kill you. If they say they will give me the whole Iraq in return for ten days stay, I will not stay.

One of the interviewees, RZ/73/male, who is a Christian Iraqi and who was a pastor in Iraq, expressed his despair about Iraq in the following words:

Iraq is not gonna be the same as it was before. This is impossible. For me, of course, if Iraq was good and everything was fine, I would visit my village and my church. Saddam was a dictator. But, one of the best thing he had was that security was too good, safe.

No doubt, their subjective conditions, ethnic and religious backgrounds are important factors to make a reasonable point on their transnational capabilities. However, there is a prominent common denominator that Iraq represents a dangerous zone for the majority, which hampers their long-term plans or prospects related to Iraq. None of

them want to stay there permanently, or do not show any desire to establish a life there. Their kinship relations determine their desire to move to Iraq for touristic purposes. As MH/51/male indicates that there is a new mode of belonging to America and this bound needs to be improved and reinforced as a promising one. He explains this in this way:

I would like to go back to Iraq if everything is nice and normal there. But, I will still come back to here. Now, I am a citizen. I am a part of this country. I have to serve this country as I was serving to other country. People treat you like a citizen here. You feel yourself American even if you are not a citizen. The law controls everything,

Considering their subjective conditions like age, gender, education, religious sect and so forth, I will specify again that reproduction of capacities by refugees does not correspond to that of desire to be more participatory in consolidation of home country. It is clear from my research findings that there are irreparable harms and breakings for some certain cultural groups from Iraq. This does not mean that they would forget their home country even if their country was consolidated one day. As can be seen, they live their cultural identity by keeping their language and religions in their social own fields. Moreover, aside from their physical move to Iraq, if the term transnational is put as “the fluidity with which ideas, objects, capital, and people now move across borders and boundaries” as Basch, Schiller and Blanc touch upon (1994:29). I can put forward that the first generation Iraqi adults carry their ideas, tradition and objects in Arizona. They bring their cultural instruments and worldviews to US and live the cross-national form of these cultural elements in Arizona.

Back to Al-Ali et. al., I will also point out the factor of gender in this transnational analysis as one of the most important factors. As already indicated, Iraqi refugee women suffer from their loss of social network more than men since they cannot adapt to working life and outside life easily because of the weakness of or lack of moderating factors during acculturation process. Therefore, Al-Ali et. al underline during their analysis that

Many professional women were unable to find comparable jobs in the host country and were either forced to take up menial work or stay at home with the children. This situation has not only undermined their self-confidence but has also increased their dependence on their husbands.

This is also totally consistent with my research findings that gender equality is also another important aspect of refugee transnational capabilities in order to encourage refugee women to make their own decisions independently of their husbands or male figures in their families.

In the context of the United States, it can be derived from my research findings that the next generations of Iraqi refugees become more close to the assimilation strategy and therefore they do not produce their mode of connectedness with their home country. It is clear that this is a capacity problem for them and their families. For Iraqi refugees, the citizenship seems as the strongest way to reinforce their transnational ties with their home. To be able to reinforce their social, economic and political capacities, the obtainment of the citizenship needs to be expedited. Along with the research findings, they 'desire' to shorten the distance by going to the neighboring countries like Turkey and Jordan even they do not want to enter inside of their home country. As a result, transnationalism will be a theoretical stance that will be open to be improved by the refugee studies.

In sum, Kvisto and Faist distinguish assimilation and transnationalism by saying that "assimilation refers to a mode of immigrant incorporation into a receiving society, transnationalism does not." (2010:150). Then, transnationalism enables us to see "a mode of connection" or "a mode of connectedness" between the two worlds in which people live in different forms of social life (2010). It is true that experiences of Iraqi refugees points to the availability of a mode of connections from their home to asylum countries and to their destination countries. They go through all the process in a mode of connectedness, but transnationalism requires the vitality of this mode of connectedness. For Iraqi refugees, there are various reasons of why they cannot keep their connections alive as mentioned in detail. Therefore, it is still prevailing argument for this research that Iraqi refugees are subject to integration and assimilation strategies

due to consequences of forced migration: When their cross-border activity is ended, their transnationalism takes place in a set of traditional, cultural and religious flows of things by leaving them to the processes of integration and assimilation.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This research opens out by the analytical reading of US-Iraq relations from 1950s to 2000s in association with the international and forced migration theories. Through the lens of the international migration scholars, the historical relations of these two countries are examined in order to dig out underlying reasons of forced migration. Since the beginning of the bipolar international system, Iraq was always a hot topic for both the Soviets and US since these countries had established their hegemonic position through the politics on Iraq in the Middle East.

The key foreign policy led by US to keep its regional interests against “the Soviet threat” came out during 1950s. US supported the British dominance for their common interests. The Secretary of State pointed to the importance of “the oil resources of the area” by strategically targeting the regional importance of Iraq and proposed to strengthen the alliance between US, France and Britain in the region against the explicit enemy, the Soviet regime. Borrowing from Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, this research eventually demonstrates that US revised its “structural dynamics” and developed its “strategic practices” to prevent the possibility of the “nationalization of the production of oil” since it would be an irresolvable obstacle in front of its free market policies.

At this juncture, until the 1970s, US determined its foreign policy by portraying the Soviet regime as an actual political target. What was critical for this period was the political position in which US was comfortably including the option of military intervention against Iraq in case the international equilibrium developed in the direction that US did not want. From the side of this research, US foreign policy can be considered as one of the objective conditions for forced migration from Iraq to other countries since US had been developing its hierarchical position by paving the way for “uneven development” in “rogue states” like Iraq by reference to Castles.

Between the years of 1970s and early 1990s, the relation between US regional interests and Iraq administration was not in a political alignment to meet economic demands of America. Saddam administration was in absolute power and towards late 1980s, Saddam also developed its strategy to hold oil resources for the benefit of its government policies through political discourses. This real situation turned into a crisis when Saddam administration invaded Kuwait in 1990. US increased its aggressive policy by forming new alliances against Saddam regime and implemented new economic sanctions over Iraq by strengthening its containment strategy. From the side of US, the new emerging threat was Saddam in a new political climate as the Soviets were in the process of dissolution in the beginning of 1990s. Objective conditions of 1950s and 1970s broke out in the First Gulf War formed US foreign policy when it comes to 1990s. As a result of these objective conditions, many Iraqis were forced to leave their homes by going to the neighboring countries like Turkey and Iran during early 1990s. For this period, Iraq was tossed under the economic embargo and also Iraqis suffered from Saddam's cruelties in terms of political corruption and human rights violations. In accordance with the theoretical premises of Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Castles, this research summarizes this period as a turning point for sustainability of uneven development of Iraq that had already been transformed into a refugee-producing country.

As to the period from 1990s to 2003, Saddam administration was anymore denounced by US and its allies as an enemy having WMDs. From our theoretical aspect, "containment" in the South refers to "humanitarian aid, peace-keeping missions and military interventions" as Castles indicates. Then, this research concludes that US foreign policy that triggered forced migration insisted on its containment strategy to control Saddam administration. In parallel to the emerging consequences of forced displacement, this strategy also ultimately led to the dissemination of the international organizations for humanitarian aid.

Containment strategy that the North usually implements was performed by US government in order to narrow the maneuver zone of the Ba'athist regime. US containment strategy was a global instrument of its "strategic practices" instead of military intervention for this period. On the other hand, it should be noted that US

frankly expressed its desire to remove Saddam at the level of international politics and endorsed Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 that was an important indication for this political purpose. Saddam did not give into US repressive policies; on the contrary the Ba'athist party managed to establish a counter block against US despite the international weight of US threats.

The result is clear that US structural dynamics need a strong attempt to re-construct of its foreign policy in responding to its capitalist growth and, for this, US expects two things from the Saddam's regime: "access to strategic natural resources" and "expansion of free markets". Without a strong political argument, "containment strategy" would be continued by US governments since UNSC did not provide any concrete result on the availability of WMDs. US containment strategy was thus elevated to "containment-plus strategy".

As Delgado Wise and Covarrubias indicate, the re-structuring of global capitalism necessitates that of structural dynamics and strategic practices. I put forward with this research that such a reconstruction needs to be framed in the analogy of North-South division in a strict and organized performance. Until the occasion of 9/11, the "containment-plus strategy" was in effect, but 9/11 allowed the Bush administration to revise its foreign policy in a neo-liberal context. The Bush doctrine was a new instrument of this purpose. Subsequently, this research puts forward by agreeing on the similar arguments that the post-9/11 period was a turning point for the necessity of this reconsolidation of US-EU led capitalism. As a result, it was clear that containment strategies and other political instruments were not satisfactory for US policies in general. The re-consolidation of the global capitalism would be based on two important strategic practices: The first one is that US needs another 'global enemy' in the unipolar world and the second one is that US require a justified political discourse for that. Correspondingly, the Bush doctrine was instrumentalized as a political agenda. Iraq was categorized as a terrorist supporting country and was politically considered as "a greatest threat after 9/11", and Saddam was also criticized as a cruel leader for Iraqi people. But still, the worst scenario was that Saddam's regime had WMDs against US.

The Bush administration started the invasion of Iraq in the year of 2003 unless decisions of UNSC were taken into consideration. The invasion led to “the societal devastation” in Iraq. This research points out that social transformation⁵⁶ of Iraq was a result of the above mentioned global processes. More specifically, social transformation of Iraq is not a matter of internal politics only; this research points out “forced-human displacement” in an analogy with Castle’s analysis of the relation between human mobility and global change.

From this standpoint, this treatise proves that the increasing volume of social transformation right after US invasion of Iraq has generated the first wave of forced migration in 1990s, but it did not take the form of New Wars leading to ethnic and religious antagonism in Iraq. When it comes to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, this treatise explores that New Wars⁵⁷ become an important instrument of US foreign policy towards Iraq and puts forward that the impact of New Wars is crystalized in the relation between forced migration and social transformation. More importantly, in the context of Iraq, New Wars re-produces conditions of forced migration in Iraq, thereby eventually leading to social transformation in different volumes.

Adhere to the analogy above, this treatise grasps the significance of New Wars in the division of North-South by arguing forced migration as “integral part” to such division. More clearly, “the North does more to cause forced migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international political order that causes underdevelopment and conflict”(Castles, 2013b: 18). Consequently, this study underscores in a quick analogy of North-South division that US has implemented its policies not to stop conflict, on the contrary to strengthen an “international political order” that leads to underdevelopment and conflict. More importantly, the re-production of forced migration has been motioned by the policy of New Wars in order to ensure a smooth consolidation of the neo-liberal policies.

⁵⁶ As discussed in detail, social transformation refers to “the complexity, interconnectedness, variability, contextuality and multi-level mediations of global change” (Castles, 2010:1566).

⁵⁷ As Kaldor explains New Wars so as to show how the non-state actors take place in this process by holding the political power on behalf of a certain part of population, or a designated identity

Secondly, this study produces its prominent outcome that the international politics of forced migration put in motion by US containment strategy produces the policies of humanitarian aid, new forms of humanitarian assistance through international non-governmental organizations and the UN agencies. In accordance with the analysis of forced migration through an interdisciplinary approach, I put forward that social transformation of Iraq is overseen through “the institutions” of “global governance” at an international level. At this point, it becomes visible that tasks and responsibilities of “the institutions” rather than “the states” are associated with a set of humanitarian actions. Then, this research underlines that this global governance is crystalized through “global governance of humanity”, in explicit statement through “humanitarian governance⁵⁸” (Betts, 2009 ; Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

In this sense, this research does not demonstrate a specific debate on “humanitarianism”, but agrees to explore characteristics of humanitarian governance that are quite adaptable to US refugee admission program. So this treatise says that refugee resettlement is a tool of humanitarian governance and that resettlement is a part of humanitarian action for millions of people living in countries of asylum and camps in remote regions of the world. Resettlement is not organized by the single decision of the states; on the contrary “the institutions” like the UN system, international aid organizations, non-governmental organizations and the states make an initial decision. As a result, this research puts forward that humanitarian governance led by US is a global project that US forms and shapes lives of a certain portion of Iraqi refugees after ‘saving’ them.

Thirdly, this research accordingly broaches that US humanitarian governance is structured through the hand of “non-profit sector” and that it corresponds to two levels; the first level is that US delivers its humanitarian message to all the world by covering refugees from different regions of the world to prove its tradition role in admitting to refugees and immigrants, thereby reinforcing its humanitarian responsibility as a safe haven for millions of people in front of international protection regime as long as it does not run into a contradiction with its national interests. The second level is arranged more locally than the first one since US regulates its humanitarian action

⁵⁸ In a general sense, “a global project to alleviate the suffering of the oppressed, and to form and shape lives, habit and dispositions of people” (Barnett, 2013).

through the refugee act of 1980 that is still in force and it is underlined once again in the law that “admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States”. Consequentially, this research proves that US organizes humanitarian governance of forced migration in a subsequent logic of these two levels by determining rules and principles of refugee admission program and by assigning the non-profit sector to the management of this process at a local level.

From here, I analytically disclose that US limits humanitarian assistances and free public services for refugees when it comes to local reflections of humanitarian governance in Arizona. The logic of humanitarian action is turned into the reality that US saved lives of people and admitted them to land of opportunities in a process I call it as “a politics of refugee lives” in reference to Fassin. Upon the arrival of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, this politics gives a hint that US state does not undertake a direct responsibility of taking care of refugees until they establish their lives in Arizona or another state. US does deliver this responsibility to “non-profit sector” by establishing a ‘business relation’. At this point, this research finds out that US confines its humanitarian governance to needs of the neo-liberal function of free market, meaning that refugees must be “good new cases” by adapting themselves to the labor market to be self-sufficient individuals as soon as possible.

It is clear from my analytical findings that US also organizes its humanitarian governance through power relations. This research underlines that US Department of State imposes “an institutional power” over the non-profit sector. Especially, the case of resettlement agencies is queried by the lens of the research that US Department of State determines working modalities of resettlement agencies during their services for refugees and it can be asserted here that resettlement agencies are not independent organizations although they define themselves as “non-governmental – non-profit organizations”. They are a party to “cooperative agreement” with Department of State and their roles and responsibilities in humanitarian governance is mainly subject to “power dynamics” of humanitarian governance.

On the other hand, I put forward that the resettlement agencies transform this institutional power into “productive power” when they face refugees from the

beginning to the placement. Refugees are initially welcomed by the refugee resettlement agencies and receive their first “supervision” and “orientation” from these organizations and to this research, this is a loop for the pressure of productive power over refugees. More importantly, the resettlement agencies reproduce the global and local logic of humanitarian governance by underling their responsibility as the organizations that carry American traditional way of helping vulnerable people with “kindness and compassion”. From this standpoint, this research underscores another important result that many of the refugees are expected to establish their lives in Arizona after receiving a temporary welcoming assistance from the state; that is to say, the resettlement agencies uphold their practices with kindness and compassion to make refugees “productive members of their new communities” and accomplish their practices through either “professional” and “expertise” or “faith-based” practices since many of the agencies are faith-based organizations. In this regard, this research claims that the faith-based performance of the resettlement agencies is a religious, conservative, and submissive organs of humanitarian governance in Arizona and they are organic “conveyers” of governmental discourses when it comes to the plight of refugees.

The “network” of the non-profit sector works like “a machine of intervention” as Department of State and resettlement agencies already determine what it is the best for refugees. The underlying logic of the system is clear that US system does not want to have anyone that would be burden on US neo-liberal system. As a result, a standard function of service delivery is constituted in accordance with the legal frame of 1980 refugee act and thus this research underlines that the formalized and authorized form of this standard services is determined through “cooperative agreement” between Department of State and resettlement agencies. The resettlement agencies are very attached to this cooperative agreement without presenting any single critique so this research denominates this process as a stage of “rationalization” of humanitarian governance. Briefly speaking, “rationalization is to standardize relief activities” and “cooperative agreement” is a formal organ of rationalization.

This research also epitomizes the importance of cooperative agreement as an indicator of the well-structured form of “bureaucracy” between Department of State and

resettlement agencies since the agencies must be accountable in front of the state. In a sense, as Barnett points out, the neo-liberal policies are to hand the state's roles and responsibilities over the non-profit organizations through a set of regulations and procedures in bureaucracies so this process constructs refugees as "clients" receiving some certain services from these organizations. More specifically, this treatise digs out that US delivers public services for "the poor, the disadvantaged and the excluded" through "street-level bureaucrats". This is one of the main forms of public delivery system in the U.S. In this regard, this research shows that the resettlement agencies also work in the same way by transforming "refugees" into "clients" that need to be assisted for a certain period of time in return for their 'mutual cooperation'. From the side of this research, this is the facet of "street-level neo-liberal conduct" to regulate the humanitarian field although there are always critiques of inadequate sources and services.

Fourthly, in this neo-liberal context, this research puts forward that one of the most important characteristics of humanitarian governance led by US is the emphasis of "faith-based" humanitarian action. This research proves that the Bush administration produces political discourses to canalize religious and conservative humanitarian action to the field and that this grant political discourse proliferates "faith-based programs" and "community groups". My findings do not demonstrate the weight of religious practices in delivering public services to refugees in Arizona, but it does reveal that the resettlement agencies that identify themselves with faith-based motives take their roles as "a social entrepreneurship" and that they show their references as Scripture by helping those who are hungry, thirsty, naked...etc. From here, this research explores that the faith-based organizations, and some of the resettlement agencies consider and base their humanitarian action as totally faith-based unless giving a single penny to secular human rights advocacy and this research concludes that the faith-based resettlement agencies perform their services to "help" people rather than "advocating" their rights and demands.

In the fifth aspect, based on what has been explained so far, US system does not want to have refugees who do not improve themselves and be self-sufficient timely for the benefit of American society. This study enlarges this point by bringing "paternalism"

to the heart of matter and puts forward that US humanitarian governance is associated with paternalism in refugee resettlement. In fact, this is also in accord that US military intervention is naturally paternalist. For both, US already decided what the best was for Iraqis with the discourse of bringing democracy. As a result, this research underscores in analyzing paternalist aspect of humanitarian action that this process always works irrespective of “consent” of Iraqis and that Iraqi refugees do not have the right to choose and to make a decision on their behalf. Following their departure from Iraq, they had to wait the completion of different procedures by the states of countries of asylum, the UN system, resettlement procedures, etc. When they arrive in Arizona, this research also shows that the whole function of the non-profit is to shape their lives in the “best” way for them.

In this function, the resettlement agencies use a standardized package of public assistances for refugees; on the one hand, this makes them different than other organizations and on the other hand this means that Iraqi refugees, or others, have to accept this standardized service as there is no other option. Regardless of their traumatic past, personal obstacles, age, gender, and culture, Iraqi refugees have to go along the offered services. At this critical point, this research makes three important concepts functional in this discussion: “competence assumption”, “a consequentialist ethic”, and “supervision”. This research understands paternalism in its own traditional implementation takes the form of a kind of poverty governance⁵⁹ in refugee resettlement.

From this point of view, this research encapsulates that refugees also correspond to “the poor” and that they need information of the system and supervision to be “good cases”. Therefore, in accordance with the neo-liberal requirements of the system, it is obvious for this research to put forward that supervision for refugees necessitates “individual efficacy” in the long term, meaning that the poor have to improve his or her competences in return for public assistances since “aid is not given as an entitlement, but in return for good behavior” (Mead, 1998:110). US humanitarian governance establishes such a structure in which refugees are supervised in order to

⁵⁹ To repeat the fact that “social policies aimed at the poor” is to “attempt to reduce poverty” through “close supervision” (Mead, 1997:2).

improve their competences to become self-sufficient individuals since this is a “poverty governance” (Soss, Fording and Schram, 2011).

In the sixth place, this research identifies philanthropic aspect of humanitarian governance as a “social entrepreneurship” (Tipton, 2008) with networks of voluntary organizations and embellishes this network with some certain features of “network functions in a humanitarian context” (Ramalingam, Mendizabal and Mierop, 2008). and also with “voluntary giving” and “voluntary association” (Payton and Moody, 2008). At this juncture, it is put forward that Noor Women’s Association, Iskashitaa Refugee Network, Tucson Refugee Ministry, and IASPF are four important “institutions” of humanitarian network functions in Arizona. This research argues that philanthropic aspect of humanitarian governance widens the humanitarian action by moving beyond the designated activities of the resettlement agencies. As a result, this treatise discloses that majority of these organizations do not receive any funding from the government except few professional projects; that these organizations serve to certain vulnerable groups like single women and single parents; that these organizations receive individual donations to be able to continue their services; that these organizations take actions according to gaps and problems and, as a main conclusion, these organizations lead to the re-production of “philanthropy” that is embedded in “solving public problems” through “collective attempts”. Therefore, these organizations establish a social entrepreneurship through collective efforts to solve refugees’ problems, whereby their philanthropic identity coming from what the resettlement agencies do not cover. All of these voluntary organizations is to make public opinion by calling or inviting people to help the poor refugees and, as Robert D. Putman contributes to my thesis by saying that “half of all personal philanthropy is religious in character” in America (2000:67-68). Once again, US humanitarian governance does not have a room for political or human rights demands in the context of refugees at a global level and this takes the form of the proliferation of philanthropic organizations in a network function in Arizona.

In the seventh place of the research in addition to the above, this research proposes that professionalism is another important feature of humanitarian governance when it comes to the function of the non-profit sector in Arizona. The short summary of my

findings is that the “institutions” of La Frontera Arizona and the IASPF are different than other organizations in serving their “specific” services for refugees. These organizations contain profession experts from different areas like health and education to help refugees solve their adaptation problems in Arizona. The research finds out that La Frontera Arizona classify refugees with adaptation issues or vulnerable refugees and treat them as “patients” or individuals that need “treatment”. The IASPF also serves its services in this professional manner as well. Their professional services are for “youth” and “women” basically. These organizations are working in a structured order of “hierarchic, segmented, programmatic, universalistic, and secular” (Salamon, 2012) and this research ultimately states that professionalism in humanitarian governance is to “change human behavior, values, or knowledge” of Iraqi refugees (Gronbjerg, 2001).

After explaining the function of the non-profit sector in Arizona, this treatise makes an eighth point by underlying the impact of 9/11 on this sector as well as Iraqi refugees. This research demonstrates that the first impact is to increase “security concern” as the US governments decided to implement restrictive policies over the refugee admission programs, meaning that refugee admissions to the county were suspended for a while and that the second impact is to deal with the negative influence of 9/11 on refugees and immigrants. This was done by the resettlement agencies and networks voluntary and professional organizations against consequences of discourse of “war on terrorism”.

This research shows that there are also some positive effects in this process since the resettlement agencies were pushed into a position where they had to tell people who refugees are and why they are coming to US. In a way, their usual modality of working was elevated to make public opinion to reduce adverse conditions for refugees. Also, in Arizona, a significant portion of Americans started to read on Islam to learn more about Muslims and Muslim refugees. I formulate this process as “security based awareness raising” in various aspects of re-constructing individual and social relations in Arizona.

In the aftermaths of 9/11, the Bush administration consolidated American global governance by invading Iraq. American hegemony was once again structurally and strategically reconsidered. As this research already mentions that all organizations of humanitarian governance of forced migration have also been re-designed and re-located to establish “a humanitarian zone” to respond to humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

On this basis, this research enlightens experiences of Iraqi refugees in the eighth aspect. Through the structuration of all of humanitarian organizations in the post-invasion era, power dynamics were to “shape the actions and/or conditions of action of others” in humanitarian governance. This is not only “an institutional matter or interactions of given actors”, but it is “irreducibly social” (Barnett, 2005:9). In this sense, it is put forward that the relation between humanitarian governance and a politics of life leads to a “politics of refugee lives” by selecting, saving and resettling them in US.

Succinctly speaking, after leaving Iraq under forced conditions, this research asserts that Iraqi refugees experience “uncertainty” in their asylum countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, etc.as they experience of living in deprivation of employment, food, shelter, education, and other basic needs. Humanitarian governance does not solve their basic problems and does not provide any permanent solution to remove their uncertainties during their stay in countries of asylum and they also mostly consider their stay as “temporary” in their asylum countries. On the other hand, this piece underlines the worst aspect of this process that they cannot return to their home country due to life-threatening new wars. Then, the only option seems to be resettled into a third country from their asylum countries. They are waiting to be formally “chosen” or “selected” to be resettled in US. All rules, principles and institutions of humanitarian governance function in the asylum countries to arrange this resettlement option for some portion of refugees in uncertainty. As a result, this treatise puts forward that Iraqi refugees cannot make a decision on their lives since they are not fully entitled to the basic human rights like health, education, employment, etc. in their countries of asylum; in other saying, they are waiting to be made a decision on what it is the best for them.

After they are selected for resettlement into US, this research clearly underlines that Iraqi refugees have their own American dreams. According to the field findings, the Iraqi refugees had an imagination on their future lives in US; that they had their high hopes on America or Americans in the way they watched on TVs; that they had lusts for having high life standards in work, business, accommodation, human dignity, etc., and they were in expectation of an easy life that would be provided by US. Having been resettled in Arizona, many state that their American dream does not last longer than two weeks as they face a very structured and complicated system in which they have to work to survive in Arizona. In that point, some of them, mostly Muslims, reveal that their social and economic conditions were better in their asylum countries due to religious, cultural, linguistic affinities. In other saying, the research findings indicate that many suffer from lack of financial resources, inadequate assistances, language competence, and cultural differences in Arizona and they try to overcome the problems through their own networks comprised of mostly relatives and intimate company. Strictly speaking, the Iraqi refugees in Arizona go through their cultural shocks by the assistance of their relatives and intimate environment in passing from “imagined lives” to American realities.

The ninth point of this research is to concretize the backbone of American realities as “self-sufficiency” policy. US refugee admission system is based on “self-sufficiency” in each stage of a politics of refugee lives. At this point, the research underlines that the resettlement agencies provide temporary assistance programs for refugees since the system does not allow refugees’ financial dependency on US system. As a result, US humanitarian governance constructs the post-resettlement area with the policies that target at “economically self-sufficient” refugees. In the well-structured order of “the institutions” in this process, the research discloses that the system does not establish any alternative mechanism for persons with vulnerabilities. In this regard, if we recall the debates on competence assumption that is a requirement of public service delivery through the resettlement agencies, it is easy to figure out limits of refugee assistance programs.

This piece reveals that RRP, 90 days, and the matching grant programs, 180 days at most, are temporary assistances provided by the resettlement agencies. Irrespective of

whether you are coming from traumatic past or very bad conditions, the resettlement agencies are expected to meet the basic needs for a temporary period of time by providing supervision and by showing their expertise in this process. They are officially responsible against the Department of State and they cannot provide more for the refugees. It is important to resolve from the viewpoint of this research that the resettlement agencies are aware of conditions of refugees, but their perspective is also to strengthen the current system with their power dynamics over refugees. In doing so, the research finds out that they do not withdraw themselves from their paternalistic position by underlying the fact that refugees must work for whatever is offered for them.

From here, I will underline how Iraqi refugees are transformed from the clients to the “flawed consumers” by reference to my earlier understanding of humanitarian governance as “poverty governance”. This research considers “self-sufficiency” as the backbone of American system in humanitarian governance, but simultaneously, in case the Iraqi refugees do not accept the offered entry-level jobs, they are easily considered as “flawed consumers” since they become dependent on assistances by the government and US system evaluates this as an unacceptable failure of the resettlement programs. In this regard, the increasing number of flawed consumers precludes the function of the neo-liberal policies from involving refugees into the labor market.

On this basis, the research indicates that US humanitarian governance ultimately wants to see refugees in the labor market; survivors of forced migration are transformed into subjects of economic migration through “self-sufficiency policy”. That is to say, this research finds out that Iraqi refugees, and others, meet the need for “a secondary industry” in the labor market following the words of Michael Piore (1979). In other words, the Iraqi refugees undertake “entry-level jobs” as members of the cheap labor force under the discursive construction of being a self-sufficient. Regardless of whatever their profession in their home country such as doctor, nurse, engineer, lawyer, etc., Iraqi refugees have to work for entry-level jobs unless they have re-credentialing by American authorities.

At this juncture, this research finds worthy of analyzing this process in connection with both Barnett's conception of "consequentialist ethic" and Rose's concept of "responsibilization". US system constructs the policy of self-sufficiency as the best solution for Iraqi refugees in Arizona. This is typically linked to the ethical lines of the humanitarian action⁶⁰ in a broader sense.). Then, after US saved and admitted Iraqi refugees, then US determines the best option for this humanitarian action with the fact that they have to be self-sufficient and that they do not have to be dependent on the system. From here, I put forward that US humanitarian system perform "responsibilization" of Iraqi refugees in Arizona by bringing abilities and skills of refugees to the forth rather than gaps and bad practices of the system. Therefore, American system requires to make refugees responsible for their lives. In that point, US system puts Iraqi refugees under the signifier of New Americans as subjects of responsibilization. This signifier does not correspond to "White Americans" or next generations of Americans, rather it meets the current presence of immigrants and refugees upon their arrival. This piece indicates that US humanitarian governance points to "New Americans" to remove all ethnic, religious, national, and racial differences among refugee and immigrant population. New Americans expected to serve to the benefit of America by being responsible for their own lives.

From this standpoint, my field findings by all means demonstrate more outcomes⁶¹ when it comes to what New Americans have during their responsibilization in Arizona. Under these conditions, they have to take care of themselves by accepting their responsibilities in the system; there is no room for flawed customers in the efficient and rational world of American society so the Iraqi refugees must have to control their own lives by improving their own competencies and capacities. This research explores the fact that US humanitarian governance uses power dynamics in order to make them responsible for their lives by producing "control" and that responsibilization of Iraqi refugees is to correspond to the construction of New Americans by keeping oneself from being excluded by the system.

⁶⁰Humanitarian governance claims to be based on "the rightness of an action" that "helps to bring about a better outcome" among other options (Barnett, 2012b)

⁶¹ To recall that the basic problems that New Americans raise up are "English incompetence", "having entry-level jobs", "ill-payment", "adaptation problems in Westernized working life", "inadequacy of public assistances until they recover themselves", "problem of re-credentialing", and "social and cultural barriers".

The actual plight of New Americans are full of hardships and challenges due to responsabilization that requires them to accept entry-level work without further questioning and then they have to get English competence to be able to provide their social and economic mobility. This is a very short summary of self-sufficiency policy in the United States and refugees are not independent of this policy. The socio-economic premises of their integration process is formed through the policy of self-sufficiency and then their ethnic, cultural and linguistic distinctions take place in their new social environment.

With the eleventh point, this research initially understands that the involvement of Iraqi refugees in the labor market through their entry-level jobs can be seen as the first phase of adaptation outside life in US. More specifically, after their initial contact with the resettlement agencies, they start exploring what they need and how they can manage in their new lives in Arizona and they are immediately aware of the quick results that English competence and employment are basics for their future life in US.

Iraqi refugees need English competence to get rid of entry-level jobs and ill-payment; in other saying they can provide their vocational mobility in the labor market as long as they acquire English competence well. The research findings prove that many types of entry-level jobs that they are offered do not require communication skills in English like cleaning or housekeeping and Iraqi refugees do not find a way to contact members of the host community in Arizona. From the point view of this research, it is clear that “the place of work” becomes decisive in their lives as “an orientation point” for the rest of their lives in analogy to Bauman’s thoughts on work (2005).

It can be conceded that Iraqi refugees who accept entry-level jobs put up with all troubles and challenges to be able to create a work career for their future plans. My research findings show that Iraqi refugees have impassable adaptation difficulties in their lives through their entry-level jobs. In a sense, they have to work for their subsistence and they simultaneously have to improve their English competence. Otherwise, their entry-level jobs do not take them to the point where they can easily improve their social relations in the labor market. I formulate this specific situation of

Iraqi refugees in Arizona as “a vicious cycle of refugee integration”⁶². It is clear that a strong integration process works with a good job, English competence, and a social position which goes with social contact, participation and cultural maintenance. Without these social, cultural and economic conditions, it doesn't seem possible for Iraqi refugees to develop their acculturative strategies. This gap or precarious area is the unfortunate function of vicious cycle of refugee social integration in this sense.

Iraqi refugees as new Americans fall into this vicious cycle of refugee social integration and then they concentrate on developing different acculturative strategies so as to overcome challenges and difficulties in their adaptation process. As I have already touched upon, “a social system” works for refugees who try to adapt to this new environment and they rebuild their identities, social positions and social relations in this new social system through “friendship, romantic relationships, and marriages by attaching themselves” to this new social world (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006). No doubt, in this social system, they do not appear as a part of a uniform cultural group. They bring lot of subjective conditions, that are also called moderating factors prior to acculturation and during acculturation, to their society of settlement. Therefore, their acculturative strategies start from individual level and take the form of group acculturation. At this juncture, the resettlement agencies make a point that Iraqis, who are educated, urbanized and motivated in comparison with other cultural groups, disappear easily and this is seen for them as an indicator of social integration.

This points brings me to my twelfth argument since it needs a special emphasis that US refugee admission programs do not need to improve strategic interventions to facilitate refugee integration in spite of the fact that US authorities are aware of all challenges in refugee integration. More clearly, it is obvious that US need productive power of New Americans and need children of New Americans as future Americans who lose their group identity on behalf of American identity. For this purpose, self-sufficiency policy forces us to analyze “economic integration” of refugees at first before presenting a comprehensive analysis of non-economic dimensions of

⁶² This research underlines the conceptualization of a vicious cycle of refugee integration as a ground process in US context through the report results of the White House Task Force on New Americans. The Task Force also approves “integration as a two-way process” and emphasizes the challenges such as “limited capacity and funding for refugee integration activities, limited awareness about refugees and limited access to successful integration models”. Moreover, the naturalization necessitates to “ensure that new citizens have the foundation to participate in civic institutions – skills such as the ability to read, write, and speak English, an a demonstrated understanding of US history and government”(The White House Task Force, 2015).

integration. Therefore, this research essentially states that characteristics of the social and economic integration of Iraqi refugees are mainly determined by the essential facts⁶³ that the state of Arizona requires Iraqi refugees as a labor force and that the state has a diverse population as a border state to Mexico. In this sense, the population diversity of the state leads to difficulties in distinguishing Iraqi refugees from others; as a result, Iraqi refugees are occasionally subject to risks of being treated like undocumented immigrants.

Along with, this research intends to demonstrate that personal backstories and backgrounds must be included in refugee integration analyses. The research findings show that Iraqi refugees are educated and urbanized in comparison with other groups in Arizona; that their integration is considered more easily than others since they are considered to have skills, professions, and work experiences; that their participation in American life is associated with their “disappearance” in the eyes of the resettlement agencies.

In that point, it must be underlined that a certain portion of Iraqi refugees are excluded through the lens of the resettlement agencies; the excluded is then the ones who are not educated, urbanized, experienced in work, or who have vulnerabilities and specific needs due to their individual experiences. Therefore, I formulate this last point in terms of refugee participation in social life by criticizing the emphasis on “the disappearance” through integration and I conceptualize the disappearance as “a blind spot of refugee integration” which underscores that personal characteristics of Iraqi refugees such as age, gender, ethnic or cultural diversities or traumatic experiences hamper their participation in the social and economic life. New Americans have different subjective conditions. They bring their subjective conditions from their society of origin. As stated before, there may be various moderating factors prior to acculturation. Their subjective conditions like age, gender, status, motivation, personhood and so forth may need to be taken up when it comes to their acculturative

⁶³This research finds out that the economic contribution of New Americans to American economy is significant according to the reports of New American Economy (2017) , but when it comes to the specific portion of refugees in this contribution, the system does not say much about refugees in general. This forces me to ask further questions on economic aspects of refugee integration in Arizona at first. It is clear for this research that Arizona is a cheap state for Iraqi refugees if the negative impacts of 2008 and 2009 financial crash and that the poverty rate of the state is relatively high. Along with these features, Arizona does not provide lot of job opportunities for refugees and its geographical proximity to Mexico gives rise to the increasing number of immigrants who are in need of work and residence. These are important indicators when Arizona is considered as an integration zone for Iraqi refugees.

strategies. In fact, their individual conditions lead to the common characteristics of group acculturation at a certain level. However, this does not alter the fact that each of new Americans cope with stressors, challenges and problems by using their own acculturative strategies and their disappearance does not mean that they are socially and economically integrated into the host community.

My thirteenth point is to highlight the relation between “participation” and “intercultural relations” by indicating American values and norms as “an established dominant group” and Iraqi refugees as “a non-dominant group” in this social integration process. Therefore, Iraqi refugees undergo their intercultural relations through a set of “group dynamics”. It means that, their social relations as well as intercultural relations are formed in a social setting in which they come together according to their race, religion, ethnic and national origin, and beliefs in the context of Arizona. As a result, this research gives a result that intercultural relations take the form of socialization among “ethno-cultural groups”. Christians separately come together and Muslims separately do according to the prevailing outcomes of the research. There is no a collective identity of being Iraqi.

In this regard, the research indicates that their “primary groups” are comprised of family members and associations among themselves, but when it comes to intercultural relations, they try to approach American society; that’s their “secondary relations” can be seen with American communities. This piece underlines the results that Iraqi refugees do not come together since they do not trust each other and they still suffer from religious and ethnic discrimination among their own communities. Therefore, their individual disappearance in Iraqi community does not contribute to solution to the question of the possibility of maintenance of “cultural identity” in an American dominant society.

At this juncture, this research concludes that “secondary group” and “institutional contact” are fulfilled by the resettlement agencies and voluntary organizations to facilitate their adaptation process. Therefore, the institutions’ efforts promote acculturation process through introduction of the American culture as Gordon indicates in the case of immigrants (Gordon, 1964). However, at this point, this piece

explores that the resettlement agencies and voluntary organizations strengthen American cultural identity in front of Iraqi refugees under the impact of the political discourse of social entrepreneurship for the benefit of American society and this smoothly becomes discernible for the case of Iraqi Christians that are said to be adapted to American communities in Arizona more easily than Muslims.

This research sorts out their situation by bringing their level of “satisfaction” in their post-resettlement conditions so as to enhance the analysis of the social and economic integration of Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Their subjective conditions such as age, education and work experience come out as significant variables. One of the most important outcomes is that “gender” deserves a specific emphasis when taken together with other variables like education and work experience: Many of married Iraqi refugee women cannot attain their social capital in Arizona since they mostly spend their time in taking care of their children and in doing housework. In case some of them are educated and experienced in work, they also experience a sort of “downward mobility” with their entry-level jobs, leading to the decline in their social mobility. But also, some who never worked before improve themselves to work and contribute to the household income.

There are also social and cultural obstacles in front of their socialization in Arizona so some of Iraqi refugee women confine themselves to their small networks comprised of “primary groups”. The case of single mothers and single women does signal that they cannot work for entry-level jobs since they cannot find this sort of jobs socially and culturally fit, thereby resulting in being stuck in a house or being dependent on the system or relatives abroad. Therefore, their level of satisfaction with their conditions in Arizona is low in comparison with their social mobility and social capital in Iraq. Without exception, Iraqi refugee females suffer from loss of social capital more than Iraqi refugee males in Arizona

By the same token, another important result associated with the variable of “age” is that many of Iraqi refugees from 40 to 60 suffer from their loss of social mobility and social capital. They compare their conditions usually back to Iraq of 1980s. Comparatively, Iraqi refugees from 18 to late 30s are eager to establish their lives in

Arizona since they see the opportunities to increase their social mobility and social capital, so there is no ground for many to compare their current conditions with the situation of Iraq. It is clear that Iraqi refugees heighten their social bonds with their kinship relations so as to overcome their social and economic obstacles in Arizona; this can be seen as a coping mechanism for them to deal with their losses in social mobility and social capital⁶⁴.

At this juncture, with the emphasis on the last point of social capital, I will state that their level of satisfaction encourages us to enlarge our query in investigating “the non-economic dimensions of adaptation process” in a more systematic manner. In fact, this last point makes the fourteenth of this research by stating that the sense of security of Iraqi refugees in Arizona determines their “accommodation” stage after their settlement in Arizona. It means that Iraqi refugees give more importance to their physical security in Arizona more than other things. In a broader sense, it is quite easy to figure out that Iraqi refugees also feel themselves in safety when it comes to non-discriminatory attitudes by the host-community in general.

This research also finds out that some compare the state of Arizona with other states in terms of employment and economic opportunities, but it is emphasized that they are accommodated in Arizona because of the social and economic fitness to their conditions. The research findings emphasize that Iraqi refugees who are settled for longer time than others assess their accommodation process in terms of social-economic terms. However, those who are relatively new in the state give their priority to sense of physical security and safety. Ultimately, it needs to be underlined that they are in a process of “redefining identity and of rebuilding community” in the words of Castles (2003) that they appreciate sense of physical security and safety in their accommodation before they identify them with further stages of social integration in Arizona.

This study brings some certain results to the front that their accommodation process also contains a rapid transformation of social environment (Park and Burges, 1921) so that their social organization can be understood in terms of their ethnic and religious occasions. For instance, Ezidis and Christians only come together in order to celebrate

⁶⁴Social capital is considered to refer to “social networks and their role in enabling individuals and groups to access other forms of symbolic and material resources” (Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter, 2005:34).

their special, traditional, or holy days while Muslims prefer not to come together because of their differences in ethnic and religious sects. On the other hand, it is a general outcome that Iraqi refugees do not have any affiliation with any Iraqi organization and are not a part of any effort to form an organizational structure to maintain their social and cultural identities. The findings allow us to figure out that they go through their accommodation process in relation to their kinship, friendship, church, mosque and humanitarian agencies.

Under the impact of American society and cultural identity as “a dominant established group”, all of the above mentioned process necessitates acculturative experiences of Iraqi refugees at an individual level to reach more general results. Their personal vulnerabilities and backstories are different than each other with their experiences of the pre- and post- forced migration. Then, the fifteenth aspect of this research presents its results by stating that experiences of Iraqi refugees need to be placed in acculturation framework including acculturative stress, acculturation experience and stressors by underlying “nature of the larger society”; “demographic and social characteristics of individual” and “psychological characteristics of individual” (Berry, 1991).

In this regard, this research examines how Iraqi refugees maintain their mother tongue for their children in terms of acculturative stress and finds out that the first generation does not take up the issue of mother tongue as a threatening stressor. They are quite aware of the fact that being a bilingual person will help find more jobs in the labor market; therefore they evaluate the issue of language by looking at their current subjective and objective conditions and they attribute importance to English competence before the mother tongue. Another important result that deserves to be emphasized that Iraqi refugees, as the first generation, are self-confident when it comes to the language issue since the majority believes that they will teach their mother tongue to their children in the house and their children would never give up on their native language. Since the matter of the language is not only that of the mother tongue, but also it is a bonding tool between next generations in Arizona and relatives in Iraq; and also, it is their tradition and religion. As a matter of fact, this research eventually puts forward that Iraqi refugees do not see the mother tongue as one of acculturative

stressors; on the contrary they experience English competence as stressor in their acculturation process, so they attribute a great importance to English competence as they believe that their children will have less stressors and find more opportunities with a good level of English in Arizona.

From this point of view, this treatise also ferrets out the process of how Iraqi refugees maintain their cultural identity and cultural distance in point of acculturative stressors. A significant portion of Iraqi refugees have prejudices against Americans upon their arrival in regard to culture and lifestyles. They feel responsible for teaching their own culture to their children to reduce the dominant impact of American culture in Arizona. Therefore, Muslims strongly link their language and culture to their religion; similarly, Assyrians or Ezidis also identify their culture with their language; both appear as languages of the religion and tradition; as a result, they develop a sort of “cultural distance” in their “intercultural relations” with Americans and other groups.

At this juncture, the research discloses that their cultural distance is formed through their social and cultural conditions in “society of origin” not in America; Muslims, Christians or Ezidis have their personal characteristics and socio-cultural norms in establishing their cultural distance. Their practice of cultural distance takes a new form in American society and decelerates their integration in Arizona. In fact, this is not a one-way process of cultural distance through Iraqis to Americans or other groups. It is a matter of discrimination as well. In this sense, Islamophobia needs to be emphasized since a few Muslim refugees touch upon discriminatory behaviors by the locals in schools, labor market, or public areas; but the research findings do not allow us to make generalizations on this.

From here, this research needs to assess “cultural distance” of Iraqi refugees in point of “society of settlement”. It is clear from the research findings that “public education” and “social legislation” are decisive in analyzing the basics of cultural distance among the refugee population. More specifically, this research finds out that Iraqi refugees do not speak of any discrimination against their children in schools or that they do not raise up any discrimination in access to rights and services in Arizona. However, this research grasps that the diverse structure of Arizona as “a society of settlement” makes

Iraqi refugees invisible in front of the public. Some clearly explain that they are time to time considered as Mexicans.

The sixteenth aspect of this research is then to demonstrate how Iraqi refugees develop their acculturative strategies to move on the horizon of integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. This research already reveals some certain results that personal characteristics and vulnerabilities of Iraqi refugees are decisive in their acculturative strategies in “a larger society”. These personal characteristics influence their level of participation and social contact with Americans, thereby determining their level of integration in a broader sense. It is a main result that the younger Iraqi refugees define themselves more close to Americans while the older ones attach themselves to Iraq and Iraqis.

Iraqi refugees, New Americans, in the definition of integration made by Kuhlman, are not able to participate in the host economy by using their skills or professions; they do not have a “standard of living” that satisfies them economically and culturally although they have access to employment, education and health services; their socio-cultural change process does not contribute much to their way of maintaining culture and language; economic decline and discrimination are not essential matters of their daily lives (1991:7).

Here, this treatise underscores that there is a clear distinction between Iraqi refugees having US citizenship and Iraqi refugees who are not citizen yet: the former is not conservative with their religion, tradition and culture in establishing social contact with Americans while the latter is more conservative, prejudiced and close to social contact with Iraqis in a larger society of Arizona. Rather than the integration strategy, especially for those who are not citizen and who have negative feelings and prejudices against their new social environment, the separation strategy is not a permanent one, but it is usually employed by some in order to maintain their own culture or tradition while “avoiding interacting with others”. Among these strategies, I state that assimilation is important place since it generally appears when individuals reinforce their relations with other cultures, or with the dominant culture, while pursuing to maintain their original cultural identity (Berry, 1991; 1997; 2003). At this point, it is

again crucial to mention that Iraqi refugees, new Americans, are the first generation adults and parents and they cannot employ the assimilation strategy after they are placed in Arizona. As a result, their length of stay in US is also another variable of social participation and contact with the local community as this variable brings a sort of “friendship” that allows them to know each other in the long term.

At this juncture, this treatise clearly explains that Iraqi refugees cultivate their integration as a strategy to maintain their cultural values and identities and they generally initiate their accommodation by raising their awareness on their “occasion” in their new environment which ultimately invokes Americanization. At this point, the research shows that Iraqi refugees do not attribute a pure American identity to either their children or their grandchildren or next generations. They define a new subject for this process: Iraqi-Americans who are respectful for his or her own culture and religion, who are educated, who have a profession and welfare, and who are ‘successful’ individuals of America. Briefly, building up their loyalty to their roots, they will be Americans. In this sense, the research reveals that the Iraqi refugees express that they will not leave their children to the dominant cultural impact of American society by having no room for Americanization in their prospects.

Form the viewpoint of New Americans, Iraqi-Americans appear as the real subject of social integration that they envisage. As already discussed, Iraqi-Americans represent American and Iraqi cultural values at the same time. They are educated, urbanized and careerist citizens of the United States. They are loyal to both America and Iraq when it comes to their culture, language and religion. Therefore, many see their children integrated well as Iraqi-Americans by keeping their cultural distance from Americans. This cultural distance stands against Americanization as a result of gradual assimilation process. New Americans are self-confident when it comes to teach their mother tongue to their children. They are self-confident to instill knowledge of culture and religion to their children. Therefore, they have a strong belief in that their children will have problems by carrying their religious and cultural values. The parents as mediators transmit their cultural heritage to their children to make them Iraqi-Americans. Most importantly, they expect their Iraqi-American generation to pass their culture and language to the next generations.

At this juncture, under the impact of the dominant mainstream society, that's of American cultural system, New Americans cannot make the ambiguous condition of the next generations clear by applying to their future prospects. There will be future Americans coming from the next generations of Iraqi refugees. They will be a part of American society. Their cultural identity or their loyalty to a cultural group are not clear by New Americans. Therefore, the melting-pot function of American system may alter their worldviews and their loyalty may be shifted towards America. As Park and Burgess show that "in assimilation the process is typically unconscious; the person is incorporated into the common life of the group before he is aware and with little conception of the course of events which brought this incorporation about" (1921: 736). Within the scope of my treatise, these sentences point out that either the next generations of Iraqi refugees would be conscious of the occasions the previous generations had suffered or they would be assimilated into the American system unconsciously as a matter of course. In any case, the latter represents a gap that needs to be filled by Iraqi-Americans to elevate the former on behalf of their cultural identity.

Under these circumstances, I will determine the horizon of social integration for three groups: New Americans/The first generation adult Iraqi refugees; Iraqi-Americans/Children of New Americans; and Future Americans/The next generations of Iraqi refugees. As can be seen, their position in this social integration horizon does not correspond to the same levels of acculturative strategies if we refer to Berry's concepts. More specifically, while the first group can be understood through a separation-integration nexus, the second group is located by the first generation in a point where a integration-assimilation nexus becomes more applicable. However, when it comes to the last group, the first generation cannot develop their arguments in a clear manner due to the increasing diversity of factors and conditions

The seventh facet of this research is to include the meaning of obtainment of US citizenship and transnational capacities of Iraqi refugees in the debates on integration, assimilation and Americanization, It is clear that the obtainment of US citizenship mainly refers to their freedom of travel for many at first. They consider the citizenship as an important stage to travel to other countries as well as Iraq. After that, Iraqi refugees underscore that US citizenship is an important step to ensure their lives in

US. Therefore, the meaning of obtainment of the citizenship varies from Iraqi refugees who are citizens to those who are not citizens yet. Younger refugees grasp the citizenship in relation to employment and education opportunities; single women or mothers, older refugees and vulnerable refugees do not dig out the meaning of the citizenship since they emphasize that the citizenship do not bring them to extra benefits or assistance in meeting their specific needs. All in all, this treatise shows that the obtainment of citizenship is a target for refugees; such a target motivates them to acquire some certain skills and records like English competence and clear registry, etc. and this process facilitates their integration in many aspects. Those who are not citizens target the citizenship and mobilize themselves to be more active in their integration strategies.

This research explores that a majority of Iraqi refugees who have obtained their citizenship shrinks the citizenship since they do not have social and economic capacities to be mobile and transnational individuals. Along with a critique of transnational approach, this research demonstrates that refugees cannot easily enjoy their freedom of movement or freedom of investing for their home countries. Iraqi refugees neither move to other states in US nor are able to return to Iraq. The great portion of Iraqi refugees does not have a desire to return to Iraq, at least for a visit although they long for their homes. Most importantly, they cannot improve their capacities to be transnational individuals because of their social and economic situation in Arizona. In this sense, as transnationalism does not contain any specific emphasis on consequences of forced migration through experience of refugees, this research states that Iraqi refugees' integration strategies do not pave the way for transnational worlds, but do enable us to find out the necessity to include "the objective condition of social and economic situation" to transnational analyses. As a result, this research finds worthy noting that transnationalism takes us to the point where US policies can be improved to contribute to the transnational conditions of Iraqi refugees in particular. They have relatives, friends, and social networks all over the world because of forced reasons and they need more flexible policies and formal contexts for their possible cross-border movements without having financial and legal concerns.

These last aspect of the research demonstrate what this treatise has discussed during the study. This research does not take up humanitarian governance of forced migration either a totally negative or positive process, it is purely contextual. I also put forward with this treatise that the civil nature of humanitarian governance must be advocated against the paternalist and civil-servant mentality of states and governments. In order to retrieve this, this research puts forward that humanitarian governance must be put in critique by studying different countries and different contexts. I have analyzed the neo-liberal context of US humanitarian governance by bringing the context of Arizona in order to present how humanitarian governance of forced migration has been build up from Iraq to Arizona.

In connection with this, this research aims at contributing to the literature on a sociology of forced migration by showing how the analysis of humanitarian governance is critical when it comes to the social and economic integration of refugees. In this sense, this treatise also promotes the necessity of a contextual analysis of the organizational structure of humanitarian governance in order to be able to discuss refugee integration in particularities. As a result, this research contributes to the integration literature by proving that refugee integration must be comprehended in the surrounding context of humanitarian governance independent of general theories on integration and acculturation. Refugee integration needs to be analyzed in a multi-disciplinary approach under the analysis of humanitarian governance of forced migration, which enables us to understand where forced migration crosses economic migration and international migration theories in terms of reasons and consequences. Above all, this work remains important questions to the literature: how can humanitarian governance of forced migration be analyzed when it comes to the countries like Turkey? Can America be a guiding example for the countries like Turkey in terms of its institutional and policy order? Would it be possible to compare US with Turkey in this sense? How other tools of humanitarian governance such as international and national refugee protection legislations, refugee camps, refugees in limbo and removal centers, etc. can be analyzed in different contexts?; How institutions and organizations of humanitarian governance can be mapped in different contexts to analyze specific conditions of refugees in different regions by differentiating resettlement countries like U.S. and Canada, etc. from asylum countries

like Turkey and Jordan, etc.?; Why refugee integration should differently be grasped from adaptation and integration of other migrant groups under the impact of humanitarian governance?; and Why a civil nature of humanitarian governance should be advocated against the increasing weight of states in decision making procedures on behalf of asylums and refugees all over the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, Emanuel and Steven Bernstein (2005) Knowledge in power: the epistemic construction of global governance, in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Cambridge University Press: New York & UK, p. 294-319.

Ager, Alastair and Alison Strang (2008) Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework, *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 21, No. 2.

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq (2002) *The War on Freedom, How and Why America was Attacked, September 11th, 2001*, Tree of Life Publications : California.

AI (Amnesty International) (1997) Middle East: Fear, Flight and Forcible Exile in the Middle East, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde01/001/1997/en/> [accessed on 12.07.2017]

Al-Ali, Nadjie S., Richard Black and Khalid Koser (2001a), Refugees and transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27:4, 615-634, [accessed on 07.02.2016].

Al-Ali, Nadjie S., Richard Black and Khalid Koser (2001b), The limits to 'transnationalism': Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational communities, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24:4, 578-600, [accessed on 07.02.2016].

Al-Ali, Nadjie S. (2002) "Trans-or-a -national? Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands", in *New approaches to Migration? : transnational communities and the transformation of home*, eds. Nadjie Al-Ali & Khalid Koser, Routledge: London and New York, 96-118.

Al-Ali, Nadjie S. (2007) *Iraqi Women, Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present*, Zed Books: London & New York.

Alba, Richard and Victor Nee (2003) *Remaking the American Mainstream, Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England.

Alnasrawi, Abbas (1992) Iraq: Economic Consequences of the 1991 Gulf War and Future Outlook, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 335-352.

American Immigration Law Foundation (2004) Targets of Suspicion: The Impact of Post-9/11 Policies on Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United States, Immigration Policy In Focus, Volume 3, Issue 2. <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Targets%20of%20Suspicion.pdf> [accessed on 07.05.2017].

Andersen, Margaret L. and Howard F. Taylor (2011) Sociology: The Essentials, Sixth Edition, Wadsworth: US.

Arizona Commerce Authority (2015a) “Resources: Data”, <http://www.azcommerce.com/resources> [accessed on 23.08.2015].

Arizona Commerce Authority (2015b) “Business First: Skilled & Available Workforce”, <http://www.azcommerce.com/business-first/skilled-available-workforce>, [accessed on 23.08.2015].

Arizona Department of Economic Security (2017) Arizona Refugee Resettlement Program, <https://des.az.gov/services/aging-and-adult/arizona-refugee-resettlement-program> [accessed on 10.07.2017]

Arizona Department of Economic Security (2007) Refugee Arrivals by Nationality and FFY of Resettlement, <https://des.az.gov/services/aging-and-adult/refugee-resettlement/about-refugee-resettlement>; https://des.az.gov/sites/default/files/REFREPT_July2017.pdf [accessed on 10.07.2017]

Arizona Department of Health Services (2015) “Refugee Statistics”, <http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/edc/odis/refugee/statistics/index.php>, [accessed on 25.08.2015].

Arizona Indicators (2015a) “Personal Income”, A Project Managed by Morrison Institute for Public Policy, <http://arizonaindicators.org/economy/personal-income>, [accessed on 25.08.2015]

Arizona Indicators (2015b) “Employment”, A Project Managed by Morrison Institute for Public Policy, <http://arizonaindicators.org/economy/personal-income>, [accessed on 25.08.2015]

Armbruster, H (2002) “Homes in crisis: Syrian Orthodox Christians in Turkey and Germany”, pp. 17-34, in *New approaches to Migration? : transnational communities and the transformation of home*, eds. Nadjie Al-Ali & Khalid Koser, Routledge: London and New York.

Aron, R (2003) *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick and London.

Azcentral (2015) “Valley's Iraqi community protests militant violence, ask for U.S. help”, <http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2014/06/25/phoenix-iraqi-refugees-community-protest-isis-violence/11378665/> [06/09/2015].

Barkdull, Carenlee, Khadija Khaja, Irene Queiro-Tajalli, Amy Swart, Diane Cunningham, and Sheila Dennis (2011) Experiences of Muslims in Four Western Countries Post-9/11, *Journal of Women and Social Work*, 26(2), pp. 139-153

Barkdull, Carenlee, Breet Weber, Amy Swart, and Amy Philips (2012) The Changing Context of Refugee Resettlement Policy and Programs in the United States, *Journal of International Social Issues*, Volume 1 Number 1, pp. 107- 119

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (2005) Power in global governance, in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Cambridge University Press: New York & UK, p. 1-33.

Barnett, Michael N. (2005) Humanitarianism Transformed, in *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 3, Issue 4, December, pp. 723-740

Barnett, Michael N. (2012a) “Where Is the Religion? Humanitarianism, Faith, and World Affairs” in *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs*, edited by Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft, Oxford Scholarship Online.

Barnett, Michael N. (2012b) International paternalism and humanitarian governance, *Global Constitutionalism*, Volume 1, Issue 03, November, pp 485 – 521.

Barnett, Michael N. (2013) Humanitarian Governance, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2013. 16:379–98.

Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1994) *Nations Unbound, Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States*, Routledge: London and New York.

Bauman, Zygmunt and Tim May (2001) *Thinking Sociologically*, Second Edition, Blackwell Publishing: New York.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2005) *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor*, Second Edition, Open University Press: New York, USA.

Bello, Walden, Shea Cunningham and Bill Rau (1999) *Dark Victory, The United States and Global Poverty*, Pluto Press with Food First and Transnational Institute: Amsterdam.

Bello, Walden (2001) *The American Way of War*, <http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2001/the-american-way-of-war.html> [accessed on 24.12.2016]

Berry, J. W. (1991) *Understanding and Managing Multiculturalism: Some Possible Implications of Research in Canada, Psychology and Developing Societies* Volume: 3 issue: 1, page(s): 17-49.

Berry, J. W. (1997) *Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation, Applied Psychology: an international review*, 1997.46 (1). 5-68.

Berry, J. W. (1999) *Aboriginal Cultural Identity, The Canadian Journal of Native Studies* XIX, 1:1-36.

Berry, J. W. (2003) "Conceptual Approaches to Acculturation", in *Acculturation, Advances in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research*, ed.by. Kevin M. Chun, Pamela Balls Organista and Gerardo Marin, American Psychological Association: Washington, DC, pp. 17-39.

Berry, J. W. (2011) *Integration and Multiculturalism: Ways towards Social Solidarity*, Peer Reviewed Online Journal, Volume 20, pages 2.1-2.21.

Berry, J. W. (2013) *Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies: Research Derived from Multiculturalism Policy*, *Acta de Investigación Psicológica*, 3 (2), 1122 - 1135.

Berry, J. W., U. Kim, S. Power, M. Young, and M. Bujaki (1989) *Acculturation Attitudes in Plural Societies*, *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 38(2), 185-206.

Betts, Alexander (2009) *Forced Migration and Global Politics*, Wiley-Blackwell: UK.

Blanc, C. Szanton, Linda Basch and Nina Glick Schiller (1995) *Transnationalism, Nation-States, and Culture*, *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 683-686.

Bleakley, Hoyt and Aimee Chin (2010) *Age at Arrival, English Proficiency, and Social Assimilation Among US Immigrants*, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* vol. 2, no. 1, January 2010 pp. 165-92.

Bosswick, Wolfgang and Friedrich Heckmann (2006) Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities, European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) at the University of Bamberg, Germany.

Bourne, Randolph (1916) "Trans-National America," *Atlantic Monthly* 118: 86–97.

Boucher, G (2008) A Critique of Global Policy Discourses on Managing International Migration, *Third World Quarterly*, 29:7, 1461-1471

Brekke, Jan-Paul (2004) While we are waiting, uncertainty and empowerment among asylum-seekers in Sweden, Report 10, Institute for Social Research :Oslo.

Brenda S.A. Yeoh , Katie D. Willis & S. M. Abdul Khader Fakhri (2003) Introduction: Transnationalism and its edges, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 26:2, 207-217.

Brown, Wendy (2005) *Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics*, Princeton University Press: New Jersey.

Bush, George H. W. (1991a) "We Have No Quarrel with the People of Iraq", in *American Foreign Policy Document 1990*, ed. Sherrill Brown Wells, Department of State: Washington.

Bush, George H. W. (1991b) <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/16/world/war-gulf-bush-statement-excerpts-2-statements-bush-iraq-s-proposal-for-ending.html> [accessed on 16.09.2016]

Bush, George W. (2001a) Inaugural Address, January 20, Social Security Online, <https://www.ssa.gov/history/gwbushstmts.html> [accessed on 19.03.2017]

Bush, George W. (2001b) Remarks by the President in Announcement of the Faith-Based Initiative, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/20010129-5.html>, [accessed on 19.03.2017]

Bush, George W. (2002a) A Decade of Deception and Defiance, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/13456.htm> [accessed on 17.05.2016]

Bush, George W. (2002b) U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm> [accessed on 15.01.2017]

Bush, George W. (2002c) President Bush Implements Key Elements of his Faith-Based Initiative, For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary December 12, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021212-3.html> [accessed on 15.01.2017]

Capps, Randy and Kathleen Newland, Susan Fratzke, Susanna Groves, Michael Fix, Margie McHugh, and Gregory Auclair (2015) The Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees, Successes and Challenges, Migration Policy Institute, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-outcomes-us-refugees-successes-and-challenges>, [accessed on 24/03/2016].

Castles, S. (2000) “International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues”, *International Social Science Journal* 52, No. 165 (2000): 269-281.

Castles, S. (2001) Studying Social Transformation, *International Political Science Review*, Vol 22, No. 1, 13-32.

Castles, S. (2003a) “The International Politics of Forced Migration”, *Socialist Register*, Vol. 39: 172-192, <http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5798/2694#.Vvbg3VWLTIU>, [accessed on 24/03/2016].

Castles, S. (2003b) Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation, *Sociology*, 37 (1), 13-34.

Castles, S. (2005) Nation and empire: hierarchies of citizenship in the new global order, *International Politics*, 42:2, 203-24.

Castles, S. (2006) “Global Perspectives on Forced Migration”, *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, Vol. 15, No.1, 7-28.

Castles, S. (2010) Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:10, 1565-1586.

Castles, S. & Godula Kosack (1973) *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press: London, New York, Toronto.

Castles, S. & Maja Korac, Ellie Vasta, Steven Vertovec (2002) *Integration: Mapping the Field*,

<http://forcedmigrationguide.pbworks.com/w/page/7447907/Integration%3A%20Mapping%20the%20Field> [accessed on 21.06.2017]

Castles, S. & Mark J. Miller (2009) *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Palgrave Macmillan: UK and US.

Catholic Charities Community Services (2017a) *Vision and Mission*, <https://www.catholiccharitiesaz.org/about-us/vision-and-mission>, [accessed on 06.05.2017]

Catholic Charities Community Services (2017b) *How You Can Help*, <https://www.catholiccharitiesaz.org/phoenix-refugee-assistance-programs-and-services/how-you-can-help>, [accessed on 06.05.2017]

Catholic Charities Community Services (2017c) *FAQ for Employers*, <https://www.catholiccharitiesaz.org/phoenix-refugee-assistance-programs-and-services> [accessed on 06.05.2017]

Chase, Elaine (2013) *Security and subjective wellbeing: the experiences of unaccompanied young people seeking asylum in the UK*, *Sociology of Health & Illness*, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 858–872.

Chatelard, Geraldine (2009a) *Migration from Iraq between the Gulf and the Iraq wars (1990-2003): Historical and socio-spatial dimensions*, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper No. 68, University of Oxford, https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/WP-2009-068-Chatelard_Iraq_Migration_1990-2003.pdf, [accessed on 11.07.2017]

Chatelard, Geraldine (2009b) *What visibility conceals. Re-embedding Refugee Migration from Iraq*, <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00370980>, [accessed on 11.07.2017]

Cholewinski, Ryszard (2005) *Migrants as Minorities: Integration and Inclusion in the Enlarged European Union*, *JCMS*, Volume 43. Number 4. pp. 695–716.

CNN (2015) *“Mohammed cartoon contest: Protest held outside Phoenix mosque”*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/29/us/mohammed-cartoon-contest/> [accessed on 05.09.2015]

Cohen, William S. (1998) *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*,

http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1998_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-153404-623 [accessed on 28.09.2016]

Congress of U.S. (1998) Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/4655>; <https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ338/PLAW-105publ338.pdf> [accessed on 28.09.2016]

Congress of U.S. (1999) Failed Policy on Iraq, Senate, February 25, <https://www.congress.gov/crec/1999/02/25/CREC-1999-02-25-pt1-PgS1996-2.pdf> [accessed on 28.09.2016]

Connor, Phillip (2017) U.S. Resettles Fewer Refugees, Even as Global Number of Displaced People Grows Break with past responses to global refugee surges, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/12/u-s-resettles-fewer-refugees-even-as-global-number-of-displaced-people-grows/> [accessed on 19.11.2017]

Critelli, Filomena M. (2008) The Impact of September 11th on Immigrants in the United States, *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 6:2, pp. 141-167.

Cruikshank, Barbara (1999) *The will to empower: democratic citizens and other subjects*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dawisha, Adeed (2009) *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation*, Princeton University Press : Oxford.

de Haas, H. (2006) Migration, remittances and regional development in southern Morocco, *Geoforum*. 37: 565–80.

Delgado, Wise (2009) Forced Migration and US Imperialism : The Dialectic of Migration and Development, *Critical Sociology* 35(6), 793 – 810.

Delgado Wise, Raul (2013) “The Migration and Labor Question Today: Imperialism, Unequal Development, and Forced Migration”, <http://monthlyreview.org/2013/02/01/the-migration-and-labor-question-today-imperialism-unequal-development-and-forced-migration/>, [accessed on 17.03.2016]

Delgado Wise, Raul and Humberto M. Covarrubias (2010) “Understanding the Relationship between Migration and Development: Toward a New Theoretical

Approach”, pp. 142-176, in *Migration, development, and transnationalization: a critical stance*. Eds. N. Glick Schiller and Thomas Faist. New York: Berghahn Books.

Delgado Wise, Raul, Humberto Marquez Covarrubias (2011), “The Dialectic between Uneven Development and Forced Migration : Toward a Political Economy Framework”, in *The migration-development nexus: Towards a transnational perspective*, (eds) T. Faist, M. Fauser and P. Kivisto. Palgrave Macmillan :New York.

Delgado Wise, Raul, Márquez Covarrubias H, Puentes R. (2013) Reframing the debate on migration, development and human rights. *Population, Space and Place* 19(4): 430–442.

Duffield, Mark (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars, The Merging of Development and Security*, Zed Books: London & New York.

Dodge, Toby (2009) “Grand ambitions and far-reaching failures, The United States in Iraq”, in *America and Iraq, Policy-making, intervention and regional politics*, eds. David Ryan and Patrick Kiely, Routledge: London and New York.

Faist, T. (1998) Transnational social spaces out of international migration: Evolution, significance, and future prospects. *Archives of European Sociology*, 39(2), 213–247, http://crossroads-asia.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Literatur/Migration/Faist_1998_Transnational_social_spaces_out_of_international_migration.pdf, [accessed on 07.02.2016]

Faist, T. (2000) Transnationalization in international migration: Implications for the study of citizenship and culture. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(2), 189–222.

Faist T. (2008) Migrants as transnational development agents: an inquiry into the newest round of the migration-development nexus. *Population, Space and Place* 14(1): 21–42.

Faist T. (2010a) Towards Transnational Studies: World Theories, Transnationalism and Changing Institutions. In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(10), 1665-1687.

Faist, T. (2010b) “Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners?”, in *Diaspora and Transnationalism, Concepts, Theories and Methods*, ed. by Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist, IMISCOE Research & Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam.

Ferris, Elizabeth G. (2008) *The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq*, Policy Paper, Number 5, August, Foreign Policy at Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-crisis-displacement-and-security-in-iraq/> [accessed on 12.07.2017]

Firestone, David (2001) "A Nation Challenged: The Immigrants; U.S. Makes it Easier to Detain Foreigners." *New York Times*, November 28, p. B7, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/us/a-nation-challenged-the-immigrants-us-makes-it-easier-to-detain-foreigners.html>.

Garnier, A., Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Liliana Layra Jubilut (2016) "Refugee resettlement as humanitarian governance, the need for a critical research agenda", <http://fluechtlingsforschung.net/refugee-resettlement-as-humanitarian-governance/> [accessed on 02.01.2016].

Gasparini, Giovanni (1995) *On Waiting, Time and Society*, Volume: 4 issue: 1, page(s): 29-45.

Geiger M and Pécoud A. (2013) Migration, development and the 'migration and development nexus'. *Population, Space and Place* 19(4): 369–374.

Gerson, Joseph (2007) *Empire and The Bomb, How the U.S. Uses Nuclear Weapons to Dominate the World*, Pluto Press: London, Ann Arbor, MI.

Glick Schiller, N, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton (1992) *Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration*, http://www.formazione.unimib.it/DATA/Insegnamenti/10_2246/materiale/glick%20schiller%20-%201992.pdf, [accessed on 02.01.2016].

Glick Schiller, N. and Thomas Faist (2010) *Migration, development, and transnationalization: a critical stance*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Gold, Steven J. (2007) "Russia", in *The New Americans A guide to Immigration since 1965*, eds. by Mary C. Waters & Reed Ueda with Helen B. Marrow, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts pp. 579-593.

Goldlust, John and Anthony H. Richmond (1974) A Multivariate Model of Immigrant Adaptation, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Special Issue: Policy and Research on Migration: Canadian and World Perspectives (Summer), pp. 193-225

Gordon, Milton M. (1964) *Assimilation in American Life, The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*, Oxford University Press : New York.

Griffiths, David, Nando Sigona, and Roger Zetter (2005) *Refugee Community Organisations and Dispersal, Networks, resources and social capital*, the Policy Press: UK.

Gronbjerg, Kirsten A. (2001) *The U.S. Nonprofit Human Service Sector: A Creeping Revolution*, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 2, June, pp. 276-297

Guarnizo, L. E. and Smith, M. P. (1998) "The locations of transnationalism", in M. P. Smith and L. E. Guarnizo (eds) *Transnationalism from Below*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 1–33.

Gupta A, and James Ferguson (1992) *Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference*, *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 6-23.

Haddad, Emma (2008) *The Refugee in International Society, Between Sovereigns*, Cambridge University Press : UK.

Haines, David (2010) *Safe haven? : a history of refugees in America*, Sterling, VA : Kumarian Press.

Halpern, Peggy (2008) *Refugee Economic Self-Sufficiency: An Exploratory Study of Approaches Used in Office of Refugee Resettlement Programs*, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, November.

Harvey, David (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press: New York.

Held, David, Anthony G. McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton (1999) *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Hopgood, Stephen (2008) "Saying "No" to Wal-Mart? Money and Morality in Professional Humanitarianism", in *Humanitarianism in Question, Politics, Power, Ethics*, edited by Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London.

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (1992) Endless Torment, the 1991 Uprising in Iraq And Its Aftermath, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm#_ftn75 [accessed on 17.08.2016]

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (1995) Iraq's Brutal Decrees Amputation, Branding and the Death Penalty, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/IRAQ955.htm> [accessed on 17.08.2016]

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2004) War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/25/war-iraq-not-humanitarian-intervention> [accessed on 16.12.2016]

Hybel, Alex Roberto and Justin Matthew Kaufman (2006) The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein, Deciding on Conflict, Palgrave Macmillan : New York.

International Rescue Committee (2017) How To Help Refugees in Phoenix, <https://www.rescue.org/announcement/how-help-refugees-phoenix>, [accessed on 14.06.2017]

Iraqi Body Count (2017), Documented civilian deaths from violence, database, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/> [accessed on 15.01.2017]

Iskashitaa (Web), What We Do, Harvesting and Gleaning, <http://www.iskashitaa.org/harvesting-and-gleaning/> [accessed on 15.06.2017]

Hyndman, J. (2000) Managing Displacement, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kaldor, M (2005) Iraq: the wrong war, https://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/wrong_war_2591.jsp [accessed on 17.11.2016]

Kaldor, M. (2006) New & Old Wars, 2th edition, Polity Press : UK and USA.

Kaldor, M. (2007) New Wars and Human Security: An Interview with Mary Kaldor, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/wp-content/files_mf/1391450911d11Kaldor.pdf [accessed on 11.07.2017]

Kaldor, M. (2013) In Defence of New Wars, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(1): 4, 1-16.

Kaldor, M. (2014) "Human Security", in *The Handbook of Global Security Policy*, eds. Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov, Wiley Blackwell: the UK, pp. 85-103.

Kifner, John (1991) *After the War; Iraqi Refugees Tell U.S. Soldiers of Brutal Repression of Rebellion*, March 28, *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/28/world/after-the-war-iraqi-refugees-tell-us-soldiers-of-brutal-repression-of-rebellion.html> [accessed on 19.03.2016]

Kivisto, P. and Faist, T. (2010) *Beyond a Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration*, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Koser, K. (2002) "From refugees to transnational communities?", in *New approaches to Migration? : transnational communities and the transformation of home*, eds. Nadjie Al-Ali & Khalid Koser, Routledge: London and New York, 138-153.

Koser, K. (2007) *Refugees, Transnationalism and the State*, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33:2, 233-254. [accessed on 17.02.2016]

Kuhlman, Tom (1991) *The Economic Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries: A Research Model*, *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol 4. No.1, pp.1-20.

Kunz, Egon F. (1981) *Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory*, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, *Refugees Today*, pp. 42-51.

La Frontera Arizona (2017) "What we do", <http://lafronteraaz.org/what-we-do/carf-accredited-programs/> [accessed on 26.06.2017]

Larner, Wendy (2000) *Neo-Liberalism Policy, Ideology, Governmentality*, *Studies in Political Economy*, 63:1, 5-25.

Lee, Erika (2006) "A Nation of Immigrants and a Gatekeeping Nation: American Immigration Law and Policy", in *A Companion to American Immigration*, ed. Reed Ueda, Blackwell: the USA, pp. 5-36.

Lee, Everett S. (1966) "A Theory of Migration", in *Demography*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 47- 57.

Levitt, P and Nina Glick Schiller (2004) *Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society*, *ZMR Volume 38, Number 3*:1002-1039.

Lipsky, Michael (2010) *Street-Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of The Individual in Public Services*, Russell Sage Foundation : New York.

Lutheran Social Services (2017) About Us, <http://www.lss-sw.org/about/about-us/>, [accessed on 25.04.2017]

MADRE (2007) *Promising Democracy, Imposing Theocracy, Gender-Based Violence and The US War on Iraq*, An international Women's Human Rights Organization, <https://www.madre.org/press-publications/human-rights-report/promising-democracy-imposing-theocracy-gender-based-violence>.

Maddern, Stacy Warner (2013) *Melting Pot Theory*, in *The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration*, Edited by Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 1-4.

Martin, Daniel C. (2010) *Refugees and Asylees: 2009, Annual Flow Report*, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2009.pdf [accessed on 25.08.2016]

Martin, Daniel C. and James E. Yankay (2012) *Refugees and Asylees: 2011, Annual Flow Report*, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2011.pdf [accessed on 25.08.2016]

Martin, Daniel C. and James E. Yankay (2014) *Refugees and Asylees: 2013, Annual Flow Report*, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2013.pdf [accessed on 25.08.2016]

Massey, Douglas S. 1990. "Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration" *Population Index* 56 (1): 3–26. [accessed on 25.10.2014]

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Edward, T. J. (1993) *Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal*. *Population and Development Review*, 19(3), 431–466. [accessed on 25.10.2014]

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Edward, T. J. (1994) *An evaluation of international migration theory: The North American case*. *Population and Development Review*, 20(4), 699–751. [accessed on 07.10.2014]

Massey, D. (2003) "Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century",
<http://worldroom.tamu.edu/Workshops/Migration06/GlobalMigration/Global%20Migration%20articles/Patterns%20and%20Processes%20of%20International%20Migration%20in%20the%2021st%20Century%202003.pdf>, [accessed on 07.09.2014].

Mead, Lawrence M. (1997) "The Rise of Paternalism", in *The New Paternalism, Supervisory Approaches to Poverty*, ed. by Lawrence M. Mead, Brookings Institution Press : Washington D.C., pp. 1-39.

Mead, Lawrence M. (1998) "Telling the poor what to do", *Public Interest* , n132 pp. 97-112, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/telling-the-poor-what-to-do [accessed on 20.05.2017].

Mittelman, James (2000) *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Moses, Jonathon W. (2006) *International Migration: Globalization's Last Frontier*, Zed Books: London & New York

Mossaad, Nadwa (2016) *Refugees and Asylees: 2015, Annual Flow Report*, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2015.pdf [accessed on 03.07.2017]

Moody, Tom (1999) US air strikes on Iraq, *Socialism Today*, Issue 35, <http://www.socialismtoday.org/35/iraq35.html> [accessed on 19.12.2016].

National Energy Policy (2001) *Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group*, May 16, <http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf> [accessed on 08.02.2017].

Nawyn, Stephanie J. (2006) Faith, Ethnicity, and Culture in Refugee Resettlement, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 49 Number 11, pp. 1509-1527.

Nawyn, Stephanie J. (2010) Institutional Structures of Opportunity in Refugee Resettlement: Gender, Race/ethnicity, and Refugee NGOs, *The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare*: Vol. 37: Iss. 1, Article 9.

Nelson, M., Julia Meredith Hess, Brian Isakson, Jessica Goodkind (2015) "Seeing the Life": Redefining Self-Worth and Family Roles Among Iraqi Refugee Families Resettled in the United States,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276411693_Seeing_the_Life_Redefining_Self-

Worth_and_Family_Roles_Among_Iraqi_Refugee_Families_Resettled_in_the_United_States [accessed on 23.07.2017]

Neuman, W. Lawrence (2007) *Basics of Social Research, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Pearson/Allyn and Bacon : Boston.

New American Economy (2016) *The Contributions of New Americans in Arizona*, August, <http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-az-report.pdf> [accessed on 23.07.2017]

New American Economy (2017) *New Americans in Phoenix A Snapshot of the Demographic and Economic Contributions of Immigrants in the City*, by a partnership of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, New American Economy, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce, Phoenix Mayor Greg Stanton, and AT&T, <https://www.rescue.org/announcement/new-report-details-economic-impact-immigrants-and-refugees>; http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Phoenix_brief.pdf [accessed on 23.07.2017]

Nixon, Richard (1991) *Op-Classic, 1991: Why*, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/ref/opinion/15opclassic.html> [accessed on 15.11.2016].

Nye, J. S., & Keohane, R. O. (1971) *Transnational relations and world politics: An introduction*. *International Organization*, 25(3), 329–346.

Odierno, Ray (2010) *U.S. Commander Fears Political Stalemate in Iraq*, the New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/middleeast/30iraq.html> [accessed on 23.11.2016].

O'Donnell, Kelly and Kathleen Newland (2008) *The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need For Action*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/iraqi-refugee-crisis-need-action>

Ong, Aihwa (2003) *Buddha Is Hiding, Refugees, Citizenship, the New America*, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

Ortman, Jennifer M. and Victoria A. Velkoff (2014) *An Aging Nation: The Older Population in the United States*, <https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf> [accessed on 04.08.2017]

Osgood, Kenneth (2009) “Eisenhower and regime change in Iraq: the United States and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958”, in *America and Iraq, Policy-making, intervention*

and regional politics, eds. David Ryan and Patrick Kiely, Routledge: London and New York.

Park, Robert E. (1914) Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups with Particular Reference to the Negro, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 19, No. 5, Mar., pp. 606-623.

Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess (1921) "Assimilation", in *Introduction of the Science of Sociology*, ed. by. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois, pp. 734-783.

Payton, Robert L., and Michael P. Moody (2008) *Understanding Philanthropy, Its meaning and mission*, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis.

Piore, M. J. (1979) *Birds of passage: Migrant labor in industrial societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. (2000) *Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore.

Portes, A (1997) *Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities*, WPTC-98-01, Princeton University.
<http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/portes.pdf>,

Portes, A (1999) Conclusion: Towards a new world - the origins and effects of transnational activities, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22:2, 463-477.

Portes, A (2010) *Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry*, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford.

Ramalingam, Ben., Enrique Mendizabal and Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop (2008) *Strengthening humanitarian networks: Applying the network functions approach*, Background Note, Overseas Development Institute, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/831.pdf>, [accessed on 25.06.2017]

Ravenstein, E.G. (1885) The laws of migration, *Journal of the Statistical Society*. 48, 2: 167-245. [accessed on 11.12.2015]

Refuge Council USA (RCUSA web) Priority Categories, U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, <http://www.rcusa.org/priority-categories>, [accessed on 11.04.2016]

Refugee Focus (2017) Cosponsor in Phoenix, <http://www.refugeefocus.org/sponsor/sponsor-phoenix/>, [accessed on 21.03.2017]

Rice, Condoleezza (2000) Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2000-01-01/campaign-2000-promoting-national-interest>, [accessed on 15.09.2016]

Ritchie, Nick and Paul Rogers (2007), *The Political Road to War With Iraq, Bush, 9/11 and the drive to overthrow Saddam*, Routledge : London and New York.

RISP-Net (Web), Refugee Integrated Services Provider Network, <http://www.rispnet.com/refugee-research/>, [accessed on 25.06.2017]

Risse – Kappen, T (1995a) “Bringing transnational relations back in: introduction”, pp. 3-37, in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions*. Ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cambridge University Press: UK.

Risse – Kappen, T (1995b) “Structures of governance and transnational relations: what we have learned?”, pp. 280-314, in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions*. Ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cambridge University Press: UK.

Ritzer, George (1998) *The McDonaldization Thesis, Exploration and Extensions*, Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.

Ritzer, George and Todd Stillman (2003) “Assessing McDonaldization, Americanization and Globalization”, in *Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Globalization*, ed. by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, Liverpool University Press: Liverpool.

Robertson, John (2005) *Iraq, A History*, Oneworld Book: London.

Rose, Nikolas (1993) Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism, *Economy and Society*, 22:3, 283-299

Rose, Nikolas (2000) Government and Control, *Br J Criminol* (2000) 40 (2): 321-339.

Rumens, C (2012) Poem of the Week: The New Colossus by Emma Lazarus, Guardian, 04 June 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jun/04/poem-week-new-colossus-emma-lazarus> , [accessed on 16.01.2016]

Salamon, Lester M. (2002) “The Resilient Sector: The Future of Nonprofit America”, in the State of Nonprofit America, ed. by Lester M. Salamon, Second Edition, Brookings Institution Press : Washington, D.C.

Samers, M.(2010) Migration, Routledge: London and New York.

Sassen. Saskia (1998) “The de facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy” in Challenge to the Nation-State, immigration in Western Europe and the United States, ed. by Christian Joppke, Oxford University Press : New York.

Sassoon, Joseph (2009) The Iraqi Refugees, The New Crisis in the Middle East, I.B.Tauris: London and New York.

Seidman, Irving (2006) Interviewing as Qualitative Research, A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences, Teachers College Press: New York and London.

Skrentny, John D. (2012) The Minority Rights Revolution, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press : Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England.

Soguk, N. (2009) States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacement of Statecraft, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis and London.

Soss, Joe and Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram (2011) Disciplining the Poor, Neoliberal Paternalism and The Persistent Power of Race, the University of Chicago Press: the USA.

Suhrke A and Aristide R. Zolberg (1999) “Issues in contemporary refugee policy”, in Migration and Refugee Policies: An Overview, Eds. Ann Bernstein and Myron Weiner, Continuum: London and New York, 142-183.

The White House Task Force on New Americans (2015) Strengthening Communities by Welcoming All Residents, A Federal Strategic Action Plan on Immigrant & Refugee Integration, April. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/tfna_progress_report_final_12_15_15.pdf [accessed on 20.06.2017].

Thies, Cameron G. (2006) "From Containment to the Bush Doctrine: The Road to War with Iraq", in *Presidential Policies and the Road the Second Iraq War, from Forty One to Forty Three*, ed. by John Davis, Ashgate: England and USA.

Thorn, Trlstan (2013) "Revisiting the Iraq War", <https://intpolicydigest.org/2013/06/09/revisiting-the-iraq-war/> [accessed on 24.12.2016]

Tipton, Steven M. (2007) *Public Pulpits, Methodists and Mainline Churches in the Moral Argument of Public Life*, the University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Tucson (2015), "Tucson refugees take oath as newest US citizens", http://tucson.com/news/local/tucson-refugees-take-oath-as-newest-us-citizens/article_2c790eec-3155-56e4-a0df-1a268614939e.html [accessed on 17.06.2015]

United Nations (UN) (1948) Treaty Series, Volume 18, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2018/v18.pdf>, [accessed on 18.04.2016]

United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2003), *Iraqi Refugee and Asylum-Seekers Statistics*, <http://www.unhcr.org/3e79b00b9.pdf> [accessed on 01.05.2017]

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2007) *Humanitarian Needs of Persons Displaced within Iraq and across the country's borders: an international response*, <http://www.unhcr.org/4627757e2.pdf>

United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>, [accessed on 16.01.2017).

United States Census Bureau (2015) "ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2011-2015 American community survey 5-year estimates", American Fact Finder, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13_5YR_DP05&src=pt, [accessed on 16.08.2015].

United States Census Bureau (2016) Quick Facts, Arizona, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AZ/PST045216>, [accessed on 14.02.2017].

United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2001) In the Aftermath of September 11: U.S. Refugee Resettlement on Hold, Refugee Reports, Vol. 22, No 9/10, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c5809994.html> [accessed on 24.05.2017].

United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, (1994) The Refugee Matching Grant Program: balancing flexibility and accountability, prepared by Inspector General June Gibbs Brown, August, <https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-92-00060.pdf> [accessed on 24.04.2017]

United States Department of Labor (2017) Local Area Unemployment Statistics, <https://stats.bls.gov/lau/home.htm>, [accessed on 20.06.2017].

United States Department of State (1952-1954), The Near and Middle East, Military and economic policies with respect to the Near and Middle East, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, pp.168-565, <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS195254v09p1.i0008&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v09p1&isize=M> [accessed on 08.10.2016]

United States Department of State (1955-1957), General United States military and economic policies toward the Middle East, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, Volume XII, p.1-675. <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS195557v12.i0008&isize=M> [accessed on 08.10.2016]

United States Department of State (1958-1960), General United States military and economic policies toward the Middle East, Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p.289-530. <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS195860v12.i0009&isize=text> [accessed on 08.10.2016]

United States Department of State (1969-1972), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, volume e–4, documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/ch6> [accessed on 08.10.2016]

United States Department of State (1999), Saddam Hussein's Iraq, prepared by the U.S. Department of State, September, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB167/13.pdf>, [accessed on 08.10.2016].

United States Department of State (2003), Iraq, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,

March 31, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18277.htm> [accessed on 08.01.2017].

United State Department of State (2017) Reception and Placement Program, <https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/> [accessed on 21.05.2017]

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General (2005) Report of Audit Review of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service's Reception and Placement Program, <https://oig.state.gov/system/files/128366.pdf> [accessed on 21.05.2017]

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (2015) Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/247982.pdf> [accessed on 30.04.2017].

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (2016) Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/262168.pdf> [accessed on 30.04.2017].

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (2017a) U.S. Refugee Admissions Program FAQs, <https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/266447.htm>, [accessed on 19.09.2017].

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions (2017b), Refugee Admissions Report October 31, 2017, <http://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/> [accessed on 31.12.2017].

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions (2017c), Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV-Iraqi FY07 – FY17 as of November 13, 2017, <http://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/>, [accessed on 19.11.2017].

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Office of Admissions (2017d), Historical Arrivals Broken Down by Region (1975 – Present), Arrivals Graph by Region, <http://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/> [accessed on 21.05.2017]

United States General Accounting Office (GAO) (1986) Refugee Program Initial Reception and Placement of New Arrivals Should Be Improved, Report to the Chairmen Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate and Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, April, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/144159.pdf>, [accessed on 05/26/2017]

United States Government Printing Office (1953) *Whom We Shall Welcome: Report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization*, Washington DC, https://ia600204.us.archive.org/31/items/whomweshallwelco00unit/whomweshallwelco00unit_bw.pdf, [accessed on 27.04.2016]

United States Government Publishing Office (1980) *The Refugee Act of 1980*, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg102.pdf>, [accessed on 27.08.2015]

United States Government Publishing Office (2003) *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, June 26, 2002*, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg86931/html/CHRG-107shrg86931.htm>, [accessed on 27.04.2016]

United States Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (2014) *Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program Fiscal Year 2014 Program Guidelines*, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/fy_2014_matching_grant_mg_program_guidelines_for_grantees.pdf [accessed on 27.04.2016]

United States Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (2015) *Fiscal Year 2014 Refugee Arrivals, February 11*, <https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fiscal-year-2014-refugee-arrivals>, [accessed on 25.08.2015]

United States Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (2016) *About the Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program*, <https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/matching-grants/about>, [accessed on 20.06.2017]

United States Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (2017) *Office of Refugee Resettlement Annual Report to Congress 2015*, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/arc_15_final_508.pdf, [accessed on 26 April 2017].

Van Selm, Joanne (2014) "Refugee Resettlement", in the *Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies*, eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press: United Kingdom, pp.512-525.

Vertovec, S. (2009) *Transnationalism*, Routledge: London and New York.

Waldinger R and Fitzgerald D (2004) *Transnationalism in question*. *American Journal of Sociology* 109(5): 1177–1195.

Waldinger, R (2013) Immigrant Transnationalism, *Current Sociology Review*, 61(5-6), 756 – 777.

Wallerstein, Immanuel, (2000) *The Essential Wallerstein*. The New York Press. New York.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (2003) *The Decline of American Power, The U.S. in a Chaotic World*, The New Press: New York –London.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2011. *The modern World System 4: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant 1789-1914*. London: University of California Press.

Warner, W. Llyod (1952) *Structure of American Life*, Edinburgh University Press: London.

Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (2017,Web) *Tanf and Support Services*, <https://www.dshs.wa.gov/esa/community-services-offices/tanf-and-support-services> [accessed on 31.07.2017]

Wolfowitz, Paul (2003) Paul Wolfowitz and the Reasons for Invading Iraq, <http://www.parliament.uk/edm/print/2002-03/1410>
<http://theinsider.org/news/article.asp?id=356> [accessed on 20.04.2016].

Woodward, Bob (2004) *Plan of Attack*, published by Simon & Schuster, Inc., N.Y http://www.economist.com/media/globalexecutive/plan_of_attack_e_02.pdf , [accessed on 27.04.2016].

Zerubavel, Eviatar (1981) *Hidden Rhythms, Schedules and Calendars in Social Life*, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles & London.

Zolberg, R. Aristide (1988) *The Roots of American Refugee Policy*, *Social Research*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 649-678.

Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo (1989) *Escape from Violence, Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, Oxford University Press: New York & Oxford.

Zong, Jie and Jeanne Batalova (2015) *The Limited English Proficient Population in the United States*, Migration Policy Institute, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/limited-english-proficient-population-united-states>, [accessed on 08.05.2016]

APPENDICES

1. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IRAQI REFUGEES

Address where the interview was conducted:

Accommodation Type:

1. Flat 2. Separate House 3. Other

Residence Type:

1. Temporary 2. Permanent 3. US Citizen 4. Other

Gender:

1. Male 2. Female 3. LGBTI ...

Nationality:

Religion:

Ethnicity:

Age:

Civil Status:

1. Married 2. Single 3. Divorced 4. Widow

Education:

1. Illiterate 2. Primary School 3. High School 4. University 5. MS/PhD

Mother Tongue:

| | | | |
|----------------|---------|------|----------|
| English Level: | Average | Good | Advanced |
|----------------|---------|------|----------|

What was your profession in your country of origin?

.....

How many kids do you have?

| | | | | | |
|--------|-----|-----------|--------------|------|------------|
| Gender | Age | Education | Civil Status | Work | Profession |
|--------|-----|-----------|--------------|------|------------|

IRAQ

How much was your monthly average income in Iraq?

.....(\$)

What region were you living in Iraq?

Was it rural or urban?

Were you a hirer or homeowner?

Did you have a car in Iraq?

What sort of job did you do before leaving Iraq?

How many people were making money in your family when you were in Iraq?

Did you have such income to save in Iraq?

.....

Have you ever been abroad before coming to Turkey? Where?

Who decided to leave Iraq in your family?

1. Myself 2. My Wife 3. My Husband 4. My family 5. My kids 6. Other

COUNTRY OF ASYLUM (CoA)

Do you have any relatives in CoA before coming to CoA?

1. Yes 2. No

How many times did you spend in CoA as a refugee?

1. 3 – 6 months 2. 1 – 2 years 3. 3- 5 years 4. More than 5 years

USA

With who are you resettled in US?

1. On my own 2. With my spouse 3. My spouse and children

4. Other.....

How many times are you in US?

1. 3 – 6 months 2. 1 – 2 years 3. 3- 5 years 4. More than 5 years

How many people do you stay in your house in US?

Your house's square meter?

Your home in Arizona in USA:

1. I am the owner of the home

2. I am a hirer\$ (Monthly)

3. I am the mortgage owner\$ (Monthly)

4. Other.....

How many do you spend averagely for water, electricity and gas?

How many do you spend averagely for food?

.....

How many do you spend averagely for local transportation?

How many do you spend averagely for communication?

Does the money, gold, or any save you have brought to USA contribute to your subsistence in USA?

Do you or one of your family members have a work permit since arrival in USA?

1. Yes
2. No

What is your work/profession in USA?

How much is your monthly average income in USA?.....\$ (If you do not have, your family's income?.....\$

Have you ever applied to any state institution or NGOs to receive a financial assistance for your subsistence?

If yes, which

institutions.....

Do you receive a financial assistance from any institution, foundation or person in USA?

1. Regular financial assistance
2. One time financial assistance.....
3. On and off financial assistance.....
4. Other.....

Could you please clarify which institutions or foundations assisting you?

.....

Which institution do you most trust in USA?

.....

How has your perception or opinion on USA changed since you have started to live in US?

1. Changed positively
2. Changed negatively
3. The same
4. I don't have any idea before arriving in US

Do you have a promising future for yourself and your children in USA?

1. Yes
2. No

2. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IRAQI REFUGEES

Background Information of Refugees who have been resettled in USA from Country of Asylum (CoA)

1. Why were you forced to migrate to your country of asylum? Could you please share your migration story briefly?
2. How you define or explain “being a refugee in your country of asylum” when you look at the past?
3. Which institution did you most trust in your CoA? Why?
4. How do you evaluate rights and services to which you were able to get access in your CoA?
5. Do you think you were discriminated in access to rights and services in your CoA? If yes, why?
6. Could you please explain the basic problems you faced in CoA?
7. Did you wish to be resettled in USA while you were in Turkey? If yes, why?
8. Could you please explain your expectations or opinions concerning rights and services in a resettlement country while you were in your CoA?
9. Did you make any inquiry concerning conditions, rights and services in USA after learning your case was recommended to USA in your CoA Did you have any contact with Iraqis in USA?

Resettlement Process, Conditions, Rights and Obligations in Arizona in USA

1. Could you please tell resettlement process (operations and stages) after arrival in Arizona? How was the orientation at first? Did you find guidance satisfactory in terms of your rights and obligations? Could you please tell your first impressions after arrival in Arizona?
2. Did you think you, as a refugee resettled from Turkey in USA, will have more rights than other foreigners in USA? If yes, please explain,
3. Do have information on difference between your current residence status and being a citizen in USA? If yes, please explain what sort of differences,
4. What does “having a citizenship in USA” mean for you?

Public Relief

1. Could you please explain how your accommodation problem is solved after the arrival in US?
2. Could you please explain what sort of assistance you receive from American State in terms of phone, water, electricity, rent and daily expenses? Is it enough?
3. Could you please explain how long public relief lasts if assistance is available from the State? How do you evaluate State assistance?

Right to Work

1. Do you have a work permit? How have you had the permit? How many people do have work permit in your family?
2. Could you please explain how you have found your current work, if you are experiencing any discrimination at the work and if you want to change your work in a short time?
3. Could you please explain reasons if you could not or do not work?
4. Do you think you are discriminated in the labor market due to your Iraqi identity in US? If yes, please explain shortly
5. What sort of work do you want to perform in the next ten years? Could you please tell reasons for this?

Right to Health

1. How do you get access to health services in US? Are there any difficulties in your access to health services in US? If yes, please explain
2. Could you please explain you will be getting access to health services in US easily?
3. Is there any person who has a serious medical condition or disability in your family? Do you get access to a special treatment for him or her freely? If yes, please explain

Right to Education

1. Could you please explain the obligatory criterion or conditions you have to complete to continue your education in US?
2. Could you please explain you can get access to education or you have any challenges in access to education? For instance, how does your obligation to work influence on your access to education? Please explain,
3. Could you please explain your children can get access to education in US and what difficulties your children face in access to such right?
4. Could you please explain you or your children have an opportunity to get access to education in Arabic? Do you want to have such opportunity? Please explain,
5. Could you please explain what kind of advantages it would bring to you if you have a good education as an Iraqi in US?

Questions Explaining Social and Economic Indicators

1. Could you please explain how your social and economic conditions have changed in US if compared to your conditions in Iraq?
2. Could you please explain how your social and economic conditions can be in your next ten years?
3. How do you spend your scarce time in US?
4. Do you have any information concerning other states in USA? Could you please explain you want to move to another state in your next five years? Why?
5. Could you please explain what advantages and disadvantages you have in Arizona?
6. What do you think you have had social and economic conditions in USA you targeted or imagined before arriving in US?

Questions Explaining Social Mobility and Integration

1. Could you please explain what your difficulties were in your early times in US? Are your these problems solve? Please explain,
2. Could you please explain which institution you will refer first if you see a Iraqi who is in a vulnerable or difficult condition in Arizona?

3. Could you please explain if you have any communication with or membership to the associations composed of Iraqis, if you are involved in any activities of these associations in Arizona?
4. Could you please explain if you face with difficulties or discrimination due to your religion, your language or opinions?
5. Could you please explain you feel safe in Arizona?
6. What group do you associate yourself with more? Iraqis or Americans in Arizona?
Please explain reasons,
7. Would like to marry with an American? If yes, why?
8. Would you accept if your children marry with an American? Why?
9. Would you like to live with your children in USA to the end of your life? If yes, please explain
10. Would you like to turn back to Iraq permanently if the conditions ameliorate even if you acquired an American citizenship?

3. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-PROFIT SECTOR: RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Questions to introduce the organization

1. Could you please explain your organization's staff capacity, background, purposes and activities?
2. Is your organization defined as a resettlement agency or as a non-governmental organization? Could you please define the differences between among both in terms of the legal requirements?
3. How long does your organization run to serve refugees in Arizona? What is your responsibility in the organization?
4. How long does your responsibility last to take care of refugees in Arizona following the resettlement?
5. How and in what conditions do you work with volunteers? How much is the presence of volunteers important for resettlement agencies?

Questions to flash the running of refugee resettlement system

1. Could you please explain the steps of resettlement process from the airport to settlement? (UNHCR, IOM, ICMC, Resettlement Agencies)
2. How long the state supports them financially? What is included in such financial support (rent, water, gas, electricity, food or clothing)?
3. Which nationalities does your organization support in this process? Could you please point to the statistical distribution of refugees in Arizona in general and Tucson in particular?
4. What are the main challenges in resettlement process in Arizona in general and Tucson/Phoenix in particular?
5. Could you please explain the way in which Iraqi refugees and others get access to labor market? (Work permission, average income, what sort of jobs they get, skills employed, discrimination in labor market, any difficulties)
6. Could you please explain the influence of undocumented migration over refugees in terms of their access to labor market?

7. Could you please explain the procedures in which they get access to health care under the medical insurance or not? (Limits in the health care system, prosthesis, eye treatment, time frame)
8. Could you please explain the procedures in which they get access to education services? (Obligatory, free or not, they continue from what grade they dropped in Iraq or in transit country in Turkey,
9. Could you please explain what your actions would be if there is/are
 - Unaccompanied children or separated children,
 - A single woman with accompanying children,
 - An older person,
 - A person with severe disability,
 - LGBTI person
10. Could you please compare Iraqis with other nationalities in terms of their integration into the social and economic conditions of Tucson? Are there any similarities or differences? (They come from different ethnic and religious backgrounds)
11. Could you please explain what about they complain often in their integration? (involved in criminal activities)
12. Could you please explain citizenship procedures? Until the finalization of citizenship procedures, what is difference between a citizen and a refugee?

Questions to point to sui generis condition of the state of Arizona in US

‘

1. How do you assess Arizona State for refugees when it comes to cost living standards, happiness index, criminality rates and other types of migration influx?
2. How do you explain advantages and disadvantages for a refugee living in Arizona?
3. Do refugees move to other states? Why? What nationalities do so?
4. What do resettlement agencies need more to develop their strategies in comparison (in the general state of Arizona)?

*** Additional Note.....

**4. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, REFUGEE STATE
COORDINATION UNIT**

**The Structure and Role of Department of Economic Security (AZDES) in
Arizona**

1. Could you please explain AZDES's role and activities? (how long /what capacity)
2. Could you please explain a state refugee coordinator's role and responsibilities in AZDES?
3. Could you please explain how AZDES coordinates resettlement agencies/resettlement of refugees? (in what capacity and facilities)

The Running of Refugee Resettlement System

1. Could you please explain the steps of resettlement program?
2. Could you please highlight if assistance is provided in resettlement process? If yes, what sort of assistance?
3. Could you please explain what conditions/indicators have changed for refugees in Arizona if you assess for the last 10 years?
4. Could you please explain which nationalities Arizona hosts by pointing to the statistical indicators of refugee population?
5. Could you please assess refugees' access to labor market, health care and education with reference to gaps and practices? (Age, Gender, Diversity and Vulnerability)
6. Could you please assess refugees' adaptation and integration in American society with reference to challenges and facilitators?
7. Could you please evaluate the condition of Iraqis in comparison with other nationalities when it comes to statistics, diversity, integration and adaptation?

The Social, Economic and Legal Context of the State of Arizona

1. Could you please explain how the refugee legislation of the US works in contributing to your work in Arizona? (if there are points which need to be filled or revised with reference to the international refugee law)
2. Could you please evaluate if Arizona is an appropriate state for refugees in terms of cost-living standards, employment opportunities and migrant diversity?
3. Is there undocumented migration in Arizona? If yes, how does influence the condition of refugees in the eyes of American society?
4. How do you evaluate if refugees leave Arizona and move to other states? If so, why they do so?
5. Could you please explain the main challenges/gaps in resettlement process in Arizona? What is most needed to develop the system?

5. LETTER OF INFORMATION

(...../...../2015)

Dear

I am a doctoral candidate in Sociology Department at Middle East Technical University. This interview is a part of my thesis research, the topic of which is “Migration experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled from Turkey to the US/Arizona and the role and perspectives of resettlement agencies in Arizona”. The main purpose of this study is to examine the migration experiences of Iraqi refugees (resettled from Turkey) in Arizona and the role and perspectives of resettlement agencies in Arizona as a whole. In this regards, the research aims at comparing their pre-resettlement experiences in Turkey with their post-resettlement experiences in the U.S.

Turkey is a transit country for refugees from the Middle East region. The U.S. receives many refugees from Turkey via the resettlement program undertaken by the UNHCR Turkey office. Refugees usually spend 2-3 years or more in Turkey as refugees before they are resettled to the U.S. During this period they experience problems in various aspects of their lives (employment, housing, access to health and education). Many hope that they will have much better conditions once they are resettled to the U.S. However, little is known about the experiences of refugees who are resettled from Turkey to the U.S. This research aims to fill the gap in the literature through adopting a holistic approach towards refugee experiences and refugee identity.

The interview is expected to last for one and half hours at most. The interview includes 45 open-ended questions. After the interview is completed, there will be no follow-up studies. Your participation in this research involves no known physical, psychological, economic or social risks.

Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any point during this interview and you can choose not to answer any question/questions that you are not comfortable with. If you think or feel that to continue the interview becomes unnecessary, troublesome or unsafe for you, you can stop participation.

With your permission, a tape-recorder shall be used to record the interview. This will assist me to analyze information more effectively. I also take notes during the interview. Your name and identity will be concealed (unless you explicitly consent to be quoted) in order to protect your confidentiality. The interview recorded on the tape will be transcribed immediately and my notes will be kept as computer files. Transcriptions and files will not include your name and contact information. All data in recordings, transcripts, notes and other materials will be kept in a secure place. Your name and any other individual's name that is mentioned during the interview will not be revealed. Your true identity will not be disclosed in any way in any written report.

The information collected in this interview will be used for academic purposes only and will be used as an input for my Ph.D. dissertation. The information will only be disclosed to my supervisor. My Ph.D. committee will be able to obtain the results and the analysis of the data collected. Yet, the committee will not be able to obtain the actual data. The data will be stored in a locked cabinet during the process of writing and analysis. After this process has finished, the data will be destroyed. My Ph.D. dissertation will be submitted to Middle East Technical University. Without the consent of Middle East Technical University, the access to the dissertation will not become possible. The dissertation may also be published in the form of a book or an article at a later stage and can be thus available to general public or as a secondary source for other researchers. In all these possible publications, your identity and the name of the organization will not be disclosed unless you explicitly want me to do so.

There is no remuneration provided for your participation in this research. If you have any concerns, require any further information related to this study, or would like to read final paper, please do not hesitate to contact me at e-mail

You may also address your concerns to:

6. LETTER OF CONSENT

Project Title: Migration experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled from Turkey to the US/Arizona and the role and perspectives of resettlement agencies in Arizona.

I have read the Letter of Information and have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction.

I am willing to participate in this project titled “Migration experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled from Turkey to the US/Arizona and the role and perspectives of resettlement agencies in Arizona.” I understand that:

- The interview in which I will be involved will be made by Volkan Deli.
- The purpose of this study is to examine “migration experiences of Iraqi refugees from resettled from Turkey to Arizona and the role of resettlement agencies”.
- My participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from the interview at any time.
- I can choose not to answer any question/questions that I feel comfortable with.
- The audio-recording of the interview will be made confidentially and with my permission. Information on the tape will be used for research purposes only. During transcription, names and addresses will not be disclosed (unless I agree otherwise). Instead of names discussed, different identifiers (number, nickname) will be used. After transcription, taped interviews will be destroyed.
- My identity and that of the organization will not be revealed in any written materials (unless I and my organization agree otherwise).
- If I have any questions or concerns about this research, I can contact any of the following individuals for further information:

Volkan DELİ, Principal Researcher, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, phone and e-mail

Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağatay TOPAL, Ph.D. supervisor, Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, phone and e-mail

Please choose one of the following:

_____ I hereby give explicit consent to the researcher to use my identity in his research.

_____ I prohibit the researcher from using my identity in his research.

I would like to receive a final copy of the research paper when it is completed:


_____yes _____no

Name: _____ Date: _____

Signature: _____

7. ETHICS APPROVAL

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER


 ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

DUMLUPINAR BULVARI 06800
ÇANKAYA ANKARA/TURKEY
T: +90 312 210 22 91
F: +90 312 210 79 59
ueam@metu.edu.tr
www.ueam.metu.edu.tr

Sayı: 28620816/172-467

26th March 2015

To : Assist. Prof.Dr. Çağatay Topal
Sociology Department

From : Prof. Dr. Canan Sümer 
Vice Chairperson of Human Researches Ethics
Committee

Subject : Ethics Approval


The study of Volkan Deli, in the supervision of Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağatay Topal, titled "Migration experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled from Turkey to the USA and the role and implementation of resettlement agencies in the USA :the case of Arizona" was approved by "Human Subjects Ethical Review Committee".

Yours Sincerely,

Ethics Committee Approval

Approved

26/03/2015


Prof.Dr. Canan Sümer
Applied Ethics Research Center
(UEAM) Vice-Chairperson
ODTÜ 06531 ANKARA

10.04.2015

25

8. TURKISH SUMMARY – TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Uluslararası göç teorileri ve zorunlu göç teorisi kapsamında ele alınan bir çok konu, sosyal, kültürel, iktisadi değişkenlerin analizine dayanan kapsamlı bir literatür oluşturmaktadır. Şüphesiz bu geniş literatür kapsamında, uluslararası göç kavramıyla ilişkilendirilebilecek bir çok tema ve kavram bulunmaktadır. Kimlik üzerine yapılan çalışmalar; devletlerarası sınırların geçirgenliği, insanların ve metaların sürekli hareket halinde olduğu bir dünyayı ifade eden uluslarüstü (transnasyonal) yer değiştirmeler; göçmenler ve mülteciler; farklı ikametlerle kendi ülkesinin dışında bir ülkede yaşayan insanlar; diasporalar ve ‘yabancı’ topluluklar bu kapsamda ele alınabilecek birkaç temel başlık olarak düşünülebilir.

Bu geniş literatür içerisinde, bu çalışmanın temel odağı Iraklı mültecilerin deneyimleridir. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışma uluslararası göç teorileri çerçevesinde ele alınan “zorunlu göç” kavramı etrafında temel tartışmalarını yürütmektedir. Bu çerçevede şunu belirtmek gerekir ki Iraklı mülteciler, iradi olmayan koşullar sonucunda ülkelerini terk etmişlerdir. Bu minvalde, onlar, iktisadi ya da eğitim... vs. gibi iradi amaçlarla ülkesinden ayrılanlardan hem sosyal hem de hukuki belirleyenler açısından farklılık göstermektedirler.

Bu çalışma kapsamında belirlenen araştırma sorusu, Iraklı mültecilerin deneyimlerini hangi boyutlarda ele aldığımızı göstermektedir. Çalışma, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin (ABD) Arizona eyaletine yerleştirilen Iraklı mültecilerin, yerleştirilme öncesi ve sonrası deneyimlerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, 1975 yılından bugüne yaklaşık 3.5 milyon mülteciyi kabul etmiştir. Bu mülteciler, dünyanın farklı bölgelerinden ve ülkelerinden kabul edilmiştir. Amerika Nüfus, Mülteci ve Göç bürosu tarafından verilen rakamlarda, Iraklı mültecilerin sayısının, Yakın Doğu ve Güney Asya ve Afrika bölgesi içerisinde oldukça önemli bir yer tuttuğunu belirtmeliyiz. 90’ların başı Birinci Körfez Savaşından, 2003 yılındaki Irak işgaline uzanan süreçte, Iraklı mülteciler yerlerinden edilmiş ve başka ülkelere sığınmak zorunda kalmışlardır. Ancak, Iraklı mültecilerin, istatistiksel olarak Amerika’ya kabullerinde 2007 yılı ve takip eden yılların önem arz ettiğini belirtmemiz gerekir.

2007 yılında Iraklı mültecilerin Amerika'ya kabulü, Bhutan mültecilerinin hemen ardından ikinci sırada yer alırken, 2009 ve 2011 yılları arasında Iraklı mülteciler sayı olarak birinci sırada yer almış ve benzer şekilde 2011 ve 2013 yılları arasında da aynı şekilde devam etmiştir. Bu sayılar devam eden yıllarda da bize şunu göstermektedir ki Iraklı mülteciler, Amerika'ya yerleştirilen en önemli mülteci gruplarından biri olmuştur.

Bu noktada literatürün yetersiz kaldığı ve boş bıraktığı bir araştırma sorunu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Iraklı mültecilerin, Amerika'ya yerleştirilmeden önce ve sonraki süreçlerini nasıl ele alacağımız; Iraklı mültecilerin tüm bu süreçleri nasıl deneyimledikleri ve bu sürecin diğer aktörlerinin hangi seviyelerde ve nasıl ortaya çıktıkları. Tüm bunların kapsamlı bir değerlendirmesini yapabilmek adına, Iraklı mültecilerin yoğun olarak yerleştirildikleri on eyaletten dördüncü sırada olan ve Meksika'ya sınırı olması sebebiyle önemli ölçüde veri zenginliği sağlayan Arizona eyaletindeki Iraklı mültecilerin durumu ele alınmıştır.

Çalışma literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmak ve teorik katkısını belirgin hale getirebilmek için, insani yönetim teorisi (Humanitarian Governance) kapsamında geniş bir tartışma yürütmüştür. Bu tartışmanın esas sorunsalı ise şu sorular etrafında tartışılmaktadır: Iraklı mültecilerin durumuyla ilişkisi bakımından, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin bu insani yönetim sürecini nasıl belirlediği ve yürüttüğü ? ABD'nin Iraklı mültecilerin ihtiyaçlarına nasıl cevap verdiği ve onların deneyimlerini nasıl şekillendirdiği? Iraklı mültecilerin kültürleşme, entegrasyon, asimilasyon, transnasyonalizm gibi süreçleri, insani yönetimin sebep ve sonuçları altında yerleştirme sonrası nasıl deneyimledikleri?

Tüm bu soruların teorik bir tartışma etrafında cevaplanabilmesi için, çalışma kapsamında dört aşamalı bir araştırma yapılmıştır. İlk aşamasında, 43 soruluk bir anketle, Arizona'da yaşayan 30 Iraklı mülteciyle anket yapılmış ve genel profile ilişkin bir ön bilgi çıkarılmıştır. İkinci aşamasında, 45 sorudan oluşan derinlemesine mülakatlarla Arizona'da yaşayan 28 Iraklı mülteciyle görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Üçüncü aşamasında, 21 sorudan oluşan derinlemesine mülakatlarla, yedi yerleştirme kuruluşu ve dört sivil toplum örgütü ve gönüllü örgüt temsilcileriyle görüşme yapılmıştır. Son olarak ise, 15 sorudan oluşan derinlemesine mülakatla Arizona Ekonomik Güvenlik

kurumundan, mülteci koordinasyon biriminden 2 devlet yetkilisiyle görüşülmüştür. Bu araştırmalardan elde edilen bulguların sistematik bir şekilde analiz edilebilmesi ve uygun bir teorik tartışmanın yürütülebilmesi için, Amerika ve Irak arasındaki tarihsel ilişkin uluslararası göç teorileri kapsamında ele alınması ve tartışmanın Iraklı mültecilerin durumuna ilişkin bir seviyeye çıkarılması planlanmıştır.

Amerika ve Irak arasındaki tarihsel ilişkinin analizi bu anlamda bu araştırma için bir zemin oluşturmaktadır. Bu tarihsel arka plan bize gösteriyor ki, iki kutuplu dünya siyasetinden günümüze kadar Irak hem Ortadoğu'da hem de Batılı ülkeler nezdinde her zaman önemli bir ülke olmuştur. 1950'ler boyunca, Amerika, Sovyet tehdidi üzerinden Ortadoğu'daki çıkarlarını korumak istemiştir. Bu süreçte İngiliz hegemonyasını destekleyen Amerika, ortak çıkarlar etrafında, Irak'ın petrol rezervlerinin önemini defaatle resmi raporlarında belirtmiştir. Bu ortak çıkarlar etrafında, bu süreçte Amerika, Fransa ve İngiltere'nin ortak bir düşman olarak, Sovyet rejimi karşısında hareket ettiklerini tespit edebiliriz. Bu tespit, Delgado Wise ve Covarrubias tarafından altı çizilen “yapısal dinamikler” ve “stratejik pratikler” kavramları etrafında ele alındığında şunu söylemek gerekir ki Amerika'nın serbest piyasa ekonomisinin gelişimindeki en önemli engellerden biri olan Irak petrolünün kamusallaştırılması ya da millileştirilmesi karşısında tüm yapısal dinamikleri ve stratejik pratiklerini yeniden kurgulandığı ve uzun yıllara yayacağı bir sürecin başlatılmasıdır.

1970'lere gelindiğinde bu politikanın belirgin unsurlarından biri, dünya siyaset arenasında, Sovyet rejiminin gerçek bir politik hedef haline getirilmiş olmasıdır. Bu durum aynı zamanda, “askeri müdahalenin” de bir alternatif olarak gündeme alındığını göstermesi açısından önemlidir. Castles'ın “hukuksuz/kanunsuz devlet” (rogue states) kavramına referans verirsek, 1970'lerdeki tüm bu politik açıklık, Amerikan dış politikasını, Irak gibi bir “kanunsuz devlette” zorunlu göçün nesnel koşulu haline getirmiştir.

70'ler ve 90'lar arasında, Amerika'nın bölgesel çıkarları ve Irak yönetimi arasındaki ilişki, büyük ölçüde Amerika'nın talepleri doğrultusunda gerçekleşmemiştir. Bunun en önemli sebeplerden biri Saddam rejimin göstermiş olduğu politik dirençtir. Bu direnç ve Saddam'ın politikaları, 90'lı yılların başında Kuveyt işgaliyle en yüksek

noktasına ulaşmıştır. Bu aynı zamanda, 50'lerden 90'ların başına kadar süren gerilimin ve nesnel koşulların yeni bir seviyeye ulaştığını göstermiştir. Bu koşullar altında, Amerikan dış politikası, Sovyet rejimin reel bir tehdit olma özelliğini de yitirmesiyle, Saddam rejimini ve Saddam Hussain'in kendisini "tehdit" olarak tanımlamıştır. 90'lı yılların başı bu anlamıyla, Saddam'ın bir tehdit olarak muamele görmesi ve bir an önce Kuveyt'ten çıkartılması üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu süreçte, Amerikan dış politikası Irak üzerinde hem ekonomik ambargo hem de askeri müdahale seçeneği ile bir "çevreleme" (containment) politikası izlemiştir.

Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Castles açısından bakacak olursak, bu sürecin Irak açısından "eşitsiz gelişmenin" (uneven development) koşullarını pekiştirdiğini belirtebiliriz. Kuzey ve Güney (North-South division) ülkeler arasındaki gelişme ya da kalkına paradigması üzerinden bir analogi kurulacak olursa, Güney her zaman çevreleme politikalarına, insani yardıma, askeri müdahaleye maruz kalmıştır. Bu perspektif içinde, Irak da benzer politikaların tamamına maruz bırakılırken, birçok Iraklı ülkesini terk etmek zorunda kalmış ve Türkiye, İran gibi ülkelere sığınma talep etmişlerdir. Buna mukabil, insani yardım ya da insani kuruluşların ve çabalarında eş zamanlı olarak geliştiğinin altı çizilmelidir. Kuveyt krizi etrafında şekillen bu süreç, Irak'ta uzun zamandır devam eden baskıcı/diktatör bir rejim altında başlayan "sosyal dönüşümü" gün yüzüne çıkartmıştır.

Kuzey ve Güney antolojisine referansla, Baas rejimi ve ideolojisi Amerika tarafından baskı altına alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Bütün bu baskı mekanizmaları ve çevreleme politikaları esasen Amerika'nın "stratejik pratiklerini" geliştirmesine yol açmış ve 90'lar boyunca askeri müdahaleyi çevreleme politikasının ana unsuru haline getirmemiştir. Bunun ana sebeplerinden bir tanesi, Amerika'nın Ortadoğu'daki imajını korumak istemesi ve işgalci bir pozisyon almak istememesi, ve daha da önemlisi "yapısal dinamiklerin" Amerikan dış politikasına uyumlu hale getirilmek istenmesidir. Bu amaçla, Amerika dış politikası güçlü bir siyasi argüman oluşturmaksızın, stratejik doğal kaynaklara erişimi ve serbest ticaretin gelişimini garanti altına alamayacağını farkına varmış olmasındır.

2000'li yılların başına gelindiğinde, 9/11 olaylarından sonra, Bush yönetimi tüm bu yapısal dinamiklerin restorasyonu anlamına gelecek bir Bush doktrinini kabul etmiştir.

Küresel kapitalizmin ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda geliştirilecek olan yeniden yapılandırma programı, aslında Amerika'nın içinde bulunduğu ekonomik gerilemeye de çözüm olarak planlanmıştır. 9.11 ile başlayan süreç, hem Saddam rejimini küresel bir tehdit olarak konumlandırmış hem de yeni bir strateji ve onun politik söylemi olarak, Irak'ı “teröristleri destekleyen bir ülke” olarak tanımlamıştır. Saddam rejimi, hem Iraklılar için hem de dünya için bir tehdit olarak ‘güçlü’ bir siyasi argümanın öğeleri haline getirilmiştir.

2003 yılında tüm bu yapısal ve stratejik müdahalelerin bir parçası olarak, Irak işgali gerçekleşmiştir. Irak açısından “sosyal dönüşümün” ikinci ve süregiden aşaması olan bu işgal, milyonlarca Iraklı'nın evini ve yurdunu terk etmesine sebep olmuştur. 90'ların başındaki sosyal dönüşümden farklı olarak 2000'li yıllarda yaşanan dönüşüm, Kaldor'ın işaret ettiği gibi, “yeni savaşlar” (New Wars) şeklinde ortaya çıkmış ve birçok Iraklı, etnik ve dini kamplaşma içinde yıllardan beri devam eden, “kazanani” olmayan bir savaş içine girmiştir. Yeni savaşlar bu anlamıyla Irak'tan dünyaya yayılan “zorunlu göçün” temel sebeplerinden biri olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Buradan hareketle, Castles'a referansla şunun altını çizmek gerekir ki, Güney ve Kuzey ayırımı analojisi üzerinden, yeni savaşlar, zorunlu göçün bir enstrümanı olarak ortaya çıkmış ve Kuzey Güney ayırımının içsel bir dinamiği olmuştur. Kuzeyin her zaman uluslararası politikayı tayin edici olması, az gelişmişliği ve çatışmayı artırmıştır. Bu anlamda, Irak'ın bu çatışmaların ve nihayetinde yeni savaşların arenası olması bir tarihin doğal ya da deterministik bir sonucu olarak görülemez. Aksine, Amerika bu yeni savaşların mimarı olarak, zorunlu göçün yeniden üretimine yol açarken, kendi lehine bir politika oluşturma çabasını Irak'la olan tarihsel ilişkilerin her aşamasında açıkça dile getirmiş ve uygulamıştır.

Amerikan dış politikası ve stratejik pratikleri her zaman çevreleme politikasını kullanmış, insani yardım veya insani yardımın yeni formlarıyla tarih sahnesine insani kriz dönemlerinde çıkmıştır. Bu insani yardım süreçleri her zaman uluslararası kuruluşlar, Birleşmiş Milletler örgütleri ve çeşitli sivil toplum kuruluşları aracılığıyla idare edilmiştir. Bu çalışma açısından bu idaresinin kendisi, Irak'taki sosyal dönüşümün sonuçları, Betts tarafından ileri sürülen “küresel yönetim” (global governance) kavramıyla açıklanabilir. Bu tür bir yönetim her zamana “kurumlar” (the

institutions) aracılığıyla yürütülür. Bu kurumların varlığı, devletlerin doğrudan sorumluluk ya da inisiyatif üstlenmedikleri insani alanları ifade etmektedir. Bu anlamda, çok aktörlü ve çok rollü olan bu yönetim, Barnett ve Duvall tarafından belirtildiği gibi, “insani alanın küresel yönetimi”, daha iyi bir ifadeyle “insani yönetim” (Humanitarian Governance) olarak ele alınabilir.

Zorunlu göç sonucunda yerinden edilmiş Iraklılar, Amerika’ya yerleştirildikleri ve Amerikan vatandaşı oldukları ana kadar bu tür bir yönetimin öznelidir. Bu süreç içinde gerçekleşen yerleştirme (resettlement) işlemi ise doğal olarak bu insani yönetimin bir parçasıdır. Iraklı mülteciler, devletlerin kendileri hakkında verecekleri kararları, kendilerine yapılacak yardımları, yerleştirilecekleri ülkeleri ve buna benzer bir çok konuyu ve süreci birden fazla aktörün yer aldığı ve karar verici olduğu bir sosyal, hukuki ve iktisadi yapı içerisinde deneyimliyorlar.

Fassin’in altının çizdiği hayatın politikası (a politics of life) kavramı bu noktada önemli bir işlevsellik sunmaktadır. Bu süreci analizimize uygun olarak “mülteci hayatların bir politikası” olarak da ele alabiliriz. Bu anlamda, Iraklı mülteciler bu çoklu aktörler tarafından seçilmektedir, kurtarılmaktadır, ve onlara bir hayat verilmektedir. Iraklı mülteciler belirsizlik içinde ve “geçici” olarak yaşadıkları iltica ülkelerinden, hayalini kurdukları Amerika’ya ulaşıncaya kadar bu tip bir politikanın bir parçası olarak bu süreci deneyimlemektedirler.

Nihai olarak, Amerika tarafından kabul edilen ve eyaletlere yerleştirilen Iraklı mülteciler, kar amacı gütmeyen bir sektör tarafından (Non-profit Sector), bu insani yönetimin birer öznesi olmaya devam etmektedirler. Bu yönetim biçimin insani yönetimin bir özelliği olarak ele alınması ve bu yönetimin karakteristikleri içinde değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu noktada hareketle, bu çalışma insani yönetimin en önemli karakteristiklerinden biri olarak “kurumsal güç” üzerinde durmaktadır. Amerika Dışişleri Bakanlığı (US Department of State), bahsi geçen kar amacı gütmeyen sektörle kurumsal bir güç üzerinden çalışmaktadır. Bu gücün somutlaştığı en önemli alanlardan bir tanesi, bu sektörün en önemli kuruluşu olan yerleştirme örgütleriyle (Resettlement Agencies) imzaladıkları “işbirliği anlaşmasıdır” (Cooperative Agreement). Bu anlaşma kapsamında yerleştirme örgütlerinin mültecilere sağlayacakları hizmetler ve yardımlar belirlenmiştir. Bu çerçevede, devlet

tarafından belirlenen sınırlar içerisinde, yerleştirme örgütleri hareket etmek zorundadır.

Benzer şekilde, yerleştirme örgütleri tarafından da mültecilerin hizmetlere ve haklara erişiminde uygulanan “üretici güç” (Productive Power) önemli bir unsur olarak belirlenmelidir. Bu süreç, mültecilerin “danışmanlık” (Supervision) ve “oryantasyon” aldıkları, ve bu yolla, Amerikan toplumuna uygun, toplumun beklentilerine karşılık gelen, aktif, çalışkan, üretici bireyler olarak var olmaları amaçlanmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu süreçte yerleştirme örgütlerinin yanı sıra, bahsi geçen kar amacı gütmeyen sektörün diğer aktörleri olan, inanç temelli örgütler ve gönüllüler de benzer bir amaçla hareket etmektedirler. Yerleştirme örgütlerinin büyük bir kısmının da inanç temelli örgütler olduğu düşünülecek olursa, bu örgütlerin devletin resmi söylemin ve pratiklerinin, birer taşıyıcısı ve ileticisi olduklarının altı çizilmelidir.

Arizona’da mülteciler için çalışan bu kar amacı gütmeyen sektörün her bir parçası , bir müdahale aracı olarak çalışmaktadır. Neo-liberal bir prensiple müdahale eden bu kuruluşlar, Amerikan sistemine yük getirmeyecek , sistemin dışında kalmayacak, kendi-kendine yeterli kişilerden oluşan bir amaca hizmet etmektedirler. Bu anlamda, insani yönetimin “rasyonel” mantığı içinde, bütün hizmetler ve aktiviteler “standart” hale getirilmiştir. İşbirliği anlaşması çerçevesinde bu hizmetlerin tamamı standart hale getirilmiş ve yerleştirme örgütleri tarafından uygulanması belirlenmiştir.

Barnett insani yönetimden bahsederken devletin bazı sorumlulukları ve görevleri, sivil toplum kuruluşlarına teslim etmesini, neo-liberal politikaların uygulanışı kapsamında ele almaktadır. Şüphesiz, bu tip bir sorumluluk aktarımı, bir dizi düzenlemeler yoluyla “bürokratik” bir çerçevede gerçekleşmektedir. Arizona’daki yerleştirme örgütlerinin faaliyetleri düşünüldüğünde, hem aktarılan sorumluluklar hem de devredilen görevler, işbirliği anlaşması kapsamında bürokratik bir ilişki doğurmaktadır. Bu bürokratik ilişkinin sonucunda, bu çalışmanın verileri gösteriyor ki Iraklı mülteciler, yerleştirme örgütlerinin karşısına “müşteri/alıcı” (Client) olarak çıkmaktadır.

Bu noktada, Amerikan sistemi içerisindeki, kamu hizmetlerinin sağlanmasına ilişkin temel mantığın önemi üzerinde durmak gerekebilir. Bu açıdan, yoksul, fakir, dezavantajlı, dışlanmış grupların da benzer şekilde hizmetlerden faydalandıklarını,

yine aynı mantık içerisinde “saha seviyesinde bürokratlar” (Street-level bureaucrats) tarafından bu kişilere doğrudan hizmet verildiğini görüyoruz. Bu husus bizim açımızdan önemli bir noktayı işaret ediyor, yerleştirme örgütleri sahada doğrudan Iraklı mültecilerle çalışırken, neo-liberal pratiklerini sahada uygulamaya başlıyorlar ve sürekli kaynakların yetersiz olması sebebiyle “müşterileri” tarafından eleştiriliyorlar.

Tüm bunlar göz önünde tutulduğunda, Amerikan sisteminin, kendini geliştirmeyen, ayakları üzerinde duramaya, kendi kendine yeterliliğini en kısa zaman içinde kuramayan Iraklı mültecileri istemediğini söylememiz yanlış olmayacaktır. Burada insani yönetimin bir diğer özelliği “himayeci” (Paternalist) olmasıdır. Iraklı mültecilerin “rızası” sorulmaksızın onlar için her şeyin “en iyisi” sistem tarafından daha onlar Amerika’ya ayak basmadan önce belirlenmiş olmaktadır. Iraklı mültecilerin zorunlu göç öncesinde ve sırasında ne yaşadıklarından bağımsız olarak, yerleştirilecekleri eyaletten, öncelikli olarak elde edebilecekleri hizmetlere kadar her şey önceden sistem tarafında belirlenmiş olmaktadır. Bu aşamada bu araştırmanın üzerinde durduğu üç unsurun altı çizilmelidir: “sonuca dönük etik” (Consequentialist Ethic), “yetkinlik varsayımı” (Competence Assumption) ve “danışmanlık” (Supervision).

Amerikan sisteminin genel mantığı içerisinde, bu paternalist mantık, yoksulluk/fakirlik yönetimi (Poverty Governance) söz konusu olduğunda belirgin hale gelmektedir. Iraklı mültecilerin genel olarak “fakir” olarak tanımlayabileceğimiz yaşam standartlarında yer aldığını ve Amerikan sistemi içerisinde “iyi bir duruma” erişebilmeleri için sistem tarafından kendilerine danışmanlık verilmesi gerektiğini belirtmemiz gerekir. Bu danışmanlık elbette ki sistemin nasıl işlediğini ve Iraklı mültecilerin sistemin içinde kalabilmeleri için neler yapmaları gerektiğini içermektedir. Bu aşamada, Iraklı mültecilerin, “bireysel etkinliği veya yararı” önem arz etmektedir. Mead’in belirttiği gibi verilen kamu hizmetlerinin hiçbiri birer hak sahipliği olarak tanımlanmamaktadır. Daha ziyade, bu hizmetler “iyi bir davranışın” karşılığında verilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Iraklı mültecilerden kendilerini geliştirmeleri, kendi-kendine yeterli (Self-sufficient) olmaları istenmektedir. Bu mülteci yoksulluğu ile mücadele etmenin en önemli aracı olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Arizona’da yerleştirme örgütlerinin mültecilere sunmuş olduğu hizmetlerin dışında, insani yönetimin “hayırsever” (Philanthropic) taraflarını oluşturan, gönüllü kuruluşların ve kişilerin varlığından da bahsetmek gerekmektedir. Bu yapılar genel olarak bir “sosyal girişimciliğin” parçaları olarak görülebilir. Bir “ağ” (Network) yapılanması içinde yer alan bu örgütler, “gönüllü olarak verme” ilkesi üzerinden aktivite yürütmektedir. Yerleştirme örgütlerinin yetersiz kaldığı hassas durumlar söz konusu olduğunda, belli gruplar için, örneğin yalnız kadınlar, yalnız çocuklu ebeveynler, sağlık sorunu olan kişiler...vb., yardımlar organize etmektedirler. Bu yapıların büyük bir kısmı inanç temelli yapılar olmasına rağmen, Amerikan toplumunun sorunlarına uzun vadeli çözümler önerdikleri için hayır kurumu gibi çalışmak yerine, hayırseverliği bir ödev olarak, toplumsal bir görev, ortak bir çaba olarak inşa ettikleri için daha çok bir sosyal girişimcilik ağı olarak tanımlanmaları gerekmektedir.

İnsani yönetimin bir diğer önemli özelliği “profesyonel” yapıları da barındırmasıdır. Bu önemli özellik Arizona’da iki kuruluş tarafından, La Frontera ve IASPF, tarafından yerine getirilmektedir. Yerleştirme örgütleri gibi, devletten proje desteği alan bu kuruluşlar önemli ölçüde eğitim ve rehabilitasyon hizmetlerine yönelmektedir. Bu anlamda, uzmanlar ve meslek uzmanları, sosyal çalışmacılar, doktorlar...vb., gibi meslek erbaplarıyla mültecilere hizmet vermektedirler. Bu çalışma açısından altı çizilen unsurlardan birisi, ihtiyaç sahibi Iraklı mültecilerin de, diğerleri gibi, “hasta” ya da “rehabilitasyona ihtiyacı olan kişiler” ve “eğitime ihtiyacı olan kişiler” olarak ele alınmaları ve bu meslek uzmanları tarafından gereken hizmetin, profesyonel ölçütlerde sağlanması hedeflenmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Iraklı mültecilerin Amerikan sistemine uyum sağlamaları için gereken müdahale bu vesileyle yapılmakta ve onların davranışlarının, değerlerinin ve bilgisinin dönüştürülmesi hedeflenmektedir.

İnsani yönetim kapsamında hareket eden kar amacı gütmeyen sektörün Arizona’daki rolü, 9/11 terör saldırılarından sonra kapsamlı olarak etkilenmiştir. Genel olarak Amerika’daki tüm algıyı olumsuz olarak etkileyen bu saldırıdan sonra, yerleştirme örgütleri ve diğer kurum ve kuruluşlar, Amerikan toplumun mültecilere, özellikle Müslüman mültecilere dönük tutumunda negatif bir değişim olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu süreç aynı zamanda, Arizona üzerinden belirtecek olursak, Amerikan toplumun

mültecilerin kim olduğuna ilişkin öğrenme çabalarının yükseldiği bir süreç olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu sebeple, Amerikalıların mültecilere ve İslam'a dönük öğrenme çabalarının arttığı bir dönem olarak tanımlanabilir. Tüm bu sürecin elbette güvenlik kaygılarıyla ortaya çıktığını ve şekillendiğini düşünecek olursak, bu çalışma bu sürecin tamamını “güvenlik temelli farkındalık yaratma” süreci olarak tanımlamaktadır.

İnsani yönetim anlayışının Amerika tarafından birçok açıdan restore edildiği bu süreç, yukarıda bahsi geçen “mülteci hayatların politikasını” yeniden tanımlamıştır. Kimlerin seçileceği, kurtarılacağı ve Amerika'ya kabul edilecekleri, yeni koşullarıyla belirlenmiş ve uygulanmıştır. Türkiye’de, Mısır’da, Ürdün’de ve diğer ülkelerde, vatandaşlık elde edebilecekleri Batılı bir ülkeye yerleştirilmeyi bekleyen Iraklı mülteciler, temel hak ve özgürlüklerinden yoksun olarak ve evlerine dönmenin imkansızlığı içinde “seçilmeyi”, “kurtarılmayı” ve “yerleştirilmeyi” beklemektedirler. İnsani yönetimin en önemli unsurlarından bir tanesi de üçüncü bir ülkeye yerleştirme politikası olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ancak, bu süreç bütün Iraklı mültecilerin için gerçekleşmemektedir. Bu süreç sınırlı sayıdaki mülteciler için geçerlidir.

Amerikan sistemine erişmeyi başaran Iraklı mülteciler için iki önemli unsurdan bahsetmek gerekir. Amerika'ya ulaşmadan önce sahip oldukları “Amerikan rüyası” ve Amerika'ya yerleştirildikten sonra deneyimledikleri “Amerikan gerçeklikleri”. İnsani yönetimin kar amacı gütmeyen kuruluşları, yani esas olarak yerleştirme örgütleri tarafından aktarılan bu gerçekliğin temelini Amerika'nın kural olarak belirlemiş olduğu kendi-kendine yeterlilik (Self-sufficiency) politikasıdır. Amerikan mülteci kabul ve yerleştirme sistemi bu politikanın üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Yasal olarak da belirtilen bu politika, mültecilerin en kısa zamanda ekonomik olarak kendi kendine yeterli hale gelmelerini önermektedir. Daha önce de belirttiğimiz üzere, tüm standartlar ve mülteciler için her şeyin “en iyisi” belirlenmiş olup, mültecilere yapılacak yardımlar en az 90 gün en fazla 180 gün olmak koşuluyla kısıtlanmış ve 180. Günün sonunda mültecilerin emek piyasasına dahil edilmeleri planlanmıştır.

Bu noktada, Iraklı mültecilere, diğer mültecilere olduğu gibi, “asgari ücretli işler” (Entry-level jobs) sunulmaktadır. Bu işlerin çoğu İngilizce beceresi ve özel bir bilgi gerektirmeyen, beden gücüne dayalı, temizlik, hizmetçilik, fabrika işçiliği, özel güvenlik ...vb. işlerden oluşmaktadır. Bu işler için ödenen ücretse Amerikan iş

piyasasındaki en düşük ücret olarak belirlenmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Iraklı bir mültecinin, eğitiminden, mesleğinden, sosyal ve kişisel becerilerini hesaba katmaksızın, bu tip bir işi kabul etmesi önerilmektedir.

Bir mültecinin doktor ya da mühendis olmasından bağımsız işleyen bu süreç aynı zamanda, Bauman'a referansla, “kusurlu tüketiciler” de yaratmaktadır. Bu işlerde çalışmayı kabul etmeyen, sisteme dahil olamayan Iraklı mülteciler sisteme daha fazla bağımlı hale gelme riskini taşımaktadırlar. Halbuki sistem bir an önce mültecilerin çalışma hayatına dahil edilmelerini talep etmektedir. Bu aşamada, bu çalışma, Amerikan mülteci kabul sisteminin, “zorunlu göçün öznelerini”, “ekonomik göçün öznelerine” dönüştürdüğüün altını çizmektedir. Iraklı mülteciler, travmatik geçmişleri ve onca kayıplarından sonra, sistem tarafından, Piore'nin ikincil sektör olarak tanımladığı alanlarda iradi sebeplerle gelmiş bir göçmenle aynı koşullara itilmektedirler. Bunun en önemli sebeplerinden birisi mültecilerin de “ucuz emek gücü” olarak sistemin ihtiyaçlarına karşılık gelmesidir.

Bahsi geçen bu kendi-kendine yeterlik politikası, sonuca dönük bir etik ve sorumlu kılma (Responsibilization) süreçleri üzerinden ilerlemektedir. Barnett tarafından insani yönetimin etik olarak her zaman iyi bir sonucu hedeflediğinin altı çizilmektedir. Ancak, bu çalışma açısından, Rose tarafından ortaya atılan, sorumlu kılma kavramının, bu tür bir “iyiye” erişmede insani yönetim sistemin eksiklerinden çok mültecilerin üstlenmesi gereken sorumlulukları ön plana çıkardığını belirtmeliyiz. Bu aşamada, Amerikan sistemi, “yeni Amerikalılar” (New Americans) olarak tanımladığı özneleri, sorumlu kılınacak kişiler olarak belirlemiş oluyor. Yeni Amerikalılar, hali hazırdaki göçmen ve mülteci nüfusunu işaret etmekten öteye geçmiyor. Yeni Amerikalılar, Amerikan çıkarlarına ve Amerikan toplumuna hizmet etmesi beklenen yeni sorumlu, kendi kendine yeten bireyler olarak Amerikan sistemi içindeki yerlerini alıyorlar.

Bu süreç aynı zamanda, entegrasyon meselesi etrafında da ele alınmayı gerektirmektedir. Yeni Amerikalıların, asgari ücretli işlerde çalışırken bir yandan da yetkinlik varsayımını yerine getirmeleri, yani İngilizcelerini geliştirmeleri, mesleki bilgi ve becerilerini artırmaları beklenmektedir. Ancak, Iraklı mültecilerin, bir entegrasyon sürecine girmeleri önünde ciddi engeller olduğunu belirtmekten ziyade,

sistemin nasıl bir kısır döngü yarattığını vurgulamak amacıyla bu çalışma, “mülteci entegrasyonun kısır döngüsü” (Vicious cycle of refugee integration) adlı bir kavramsallaştırmayı ileri sürmektedir. Kabaca ifade edecek olursak, birçok Iraklı mülteci için emek piyasası, entegrasyonun zorluklarının görüldüğü ilk aşama olabilir. Bu aşamada, mesleki bir gelişme, yukarıya doğru bir hareketlilik – mobilite - elde edebilmek için Iraklı mültecilerin kendilerini geliştirmeleri gerekmektedir. Ancak, içinde buldukları maddi koşullar ve kendilerinden beklenen arasındaki büyük uçurum buna imkan tanımamaktadır. İngilizce öğrenemedikleri süre içerisinde mesleki bir yukarı doğru hareketlilik elde edemeyecekleri, buna mukabil sosyal olarak da entegrasyonlarının gerçekleşemeyeceği belirtilebilir. Bu sürecin kendisi bu anlamda, mülteci entegrasyonun kısır döngüsü olarak adlandırılmıştır.

Amerikan sistemi bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde, sistemin mülteci entegrasyonu için özel bir program izlemediği açık bir şekilde görülmektedir. Sistem tarafından tüm eksiklikler ve sorunlu alanlar tanımlanmış olmasına rağmen, öncelik her zaman mültecilerin “ekonomik entegrasyonuna” verilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Yeni Amerikalılar, emek gücü olarak, Arizona eyaletinde yaşarlarken, Meksika’dan gelen hiçbir belgesi olmayan Meksikalı göçmenlerle aynı kaderi paylaşmakta ve, kamuoyu nezdinde, belgesiz bir göçmen muamelesi görme riskine maruz kalmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, genel olarak mültecilerin ve özel olarak da Iraklı mültecilerin kişisel hikayelerinin ve bireysel durumlarının mülteci entegrasyonu meselesinde ele alınması gerektiğinin altını çizmektedir. Yerleştirme örgütleri tarafından yapılan analizlerde, Iraklı mültecilerin eğitilmiş, şehirli, iş hayatını bilen kişiler olma durumu, ve onların yerleştirme süreçlerini takiben kısa zaman içinde “görünmez” olma durumu, çoğu zaman entegrasyonu kolay bir grup olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Ancak, bu çalışma bu süreci “mülteci entegrasyonun kör noktası” (Blind spot of refugee integration) olarak tanımlamaktadır. Yerleştirme örgütleri tarafından, mültecilerin büyük bir kısmı, yani eğitilmiş olmayan, kırsal alanlardan gelen, travmatik olan, özel ihtiyaçları olan, kimseler bu kör nokta altında kalmaktadırlar.

Iraklı mültecilerin, tüm bu entegrasyon tartışmaları içinde, ortak bir Iraklı kimliği üretmediklerini belirtmek gerekmektedir. Zengin bir etnik ve dini yapıdan oluşan Iraklı mülteciler grubu, Berry’nin teorik tartışmalarına referansla, dominant olmayan

kültürel bir grup olarak, dominant Amerikan kültürü içinde yer almaktadır. Bu bakımdan, hem kültürlerarası faaliyetleri hem de grup dinamikleri açısından incelendiğinde, Hristiyan Iraklılar kendi aralarında bir araya gelmeyi tercih ederken Müslümanlar kendi aralarında bir araya geliyorlar. Etno-kültürel gruplar olarak ortaya çıkan Iraklılar bu anlamda ortak bir kimlik altında kendilerini tanımlamamaktadır.

Grup ilişkilerine daha yakından bakıldığında, ana grup (Primary Group) olarak tanımlayabileceğimiz, aile üyelerinden ve yakın akrabalarından oluşan ağ içerisinde hareket ettiklerini belirtmeliyiz. İkincil ilişkilerini Amerikalılarla ya da Amerikan topluluğu ile kurduklarının da altı çizilmelidir. İkincil grup ya da kurumsal iletişim veya ilişki, yerleştirme örgütleri tarafından yerine getirilmektedir. İkincil ilişkinin kurulduğu alanlarda, Amerikan kültürel kimliğinin güçlendirildiği de bu noktada belirtilmelidir. Ayrıca, bu ikincil aşamaların hepsinde, Iraklı Hristiyanların, Iraklı Müslümanlardan daha kolay uyum sağladıkları önemli bulgular arasında sayılmalıdır.

Genel anlamda, Iraklı mültecilerin “memnuniyet” ölçütü, bireysel faktörler ele alınarak analiz edilmelidir. İçinde buldukları durumu yaş, cinsiyet, eğitim gibi faktörler göz önüne alarak değerlendirdiğimizde, “cinsiyet” faktörünün çok önemli bir değişken olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Özellikle, evli Iraklı kadınlar zamanlarının çoğunu evde, ev işleri ve çocukları için harcarken, çalışma hayatına katılma, dil öğrenme gibi pratiklerden uzak durmaktadırlar. Eğitimli ve meslek sahibi olan evli kadınlar da bu kesim içinde görülebilir. Bunun sebebi sunulan işlerin kültürel olarak yadırganması ya da işin çok zor ve işyerinin uzak olması sayılabilir. Her durumda şunun altını çizmek gerekir ki evli kadınlar sıklıkla, sosyal ve ekonomik anlamda aşağı doğru bir hareketlilik – mobilite- deneyimlemektedirler. Bu anlamda, çoğu kadın kendini ana grupları içinde tanımlamakta ve kültürlerarası diyaloga kapalı görünmektedir. Bu anlamda erkeklerden daha fazla sosyal sermaye kaybına uğradıklarını belirtmek gerekir.

Benzer şekilde, yaş değişkeni üzerinden yapılacak bir değerlendirme de bize şunu göstermektedir ki, 18 ve 30 yaş arası Iraklı mülteciler yaşamlarını Arizona’da kurmak ve devam ettirmek konusunda, 40 ve üzeri yaş grubuna göre daha istekli görünmektedir. Amerika’da kendileri için eğitim ve mesleki alanda değerlendirebilecekleri fırsatlar olduğunun farkında oldukları belirtilmelidir. Bu

anlamda, 40 ve üzeri yaş grubuyla karşılaştırıldıklarında, ne kazanacaklar ve ne elde edecekleri üzerinden bir muhasebe yaptıkları açıktır.

Memnuniyetlerini belirleyen diğer bir durum daha çok “güvenlik” “güvende olma” durumuyla ilişkilendirilen faktörlerdir. Arizona’ya yerleştikleri ilk günden itibaren önem atfedilen ilk unsur “fiziksel güvenlik” duygusudur. Bunu sağlayan en önemli etkenlerden biri de Amerikan toplumu tarafından genel olarak herhangi bir ayrımcılığın gösterilmemesidir. Burada şunun altı çizilmelidir ki, Arizona’daki kalış süresi memnuniyetin değişkenlerini belirlemektedir. Arizona’da daha uzun yıllar kalanlar kendi memnuniyetlerini çoğunlukla sosyal ve ekonomik durumlarıyla tanımlarken, yeni ulaşanlar için ilk dile getirilen fiziksel güvenlik duygusu olmaktadır.

Kültürleşme süreçleri açısından bakıldığında, bu araştırma tarafından “ana dilin” muhafaza edilmesi bir kültürleşme süreci içinde bir “stres etkeni” olarak ele alınmıştır. Ancak, çoğu Iraklı’nın herhangi bir şekilde bunu bir stres etkeni olarak görmediği tam tersine, çocuklarının yani gelecek nesillerin iki dil bilmesinin hayatlarını daha da kolaylaştıracağını, daha çabuk iş bulabileceklerini belirtmişlerdir. Bu anlamda, ilk nesil Iraklı mülteciler, çocuklarına ana dillerini öğretmek noktasında herhangi bir zorlukla karşılaşmayacaklarını, çocuklarına evde dillerini öğreteceklerinin altını çizmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla, ana dilin korunması noktasında herhangi bir stres etkeni, kültürleşme süreci içinde tespit edilmemiştir.

Ana dilin korunması üzerinden ele alınan kültürel kimliğin korunması ya da kültürel mesafenin inşa edilmesi hususları da birer stres etkeni olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Kültürleşme süreçleri açısından bakacak olursak, Iraklı mültecilerin önemli bir kısmı, Amerikan kültürel değerleri ve yaşam tarzları noktasında bazı çekincelere ve ön yargılara sahiplerdir. Bu anlamda, aileler kendilerini, çocuklarına kültürlerini ve dinlerini öğretmekle sorumlu tutmaktadır. Özellikle kültür ve din arasında önemli bir bağ kuran Iraklı mülteciler, çoğunlukla kendi dilleri ve dinleri arasında bir ilişki kurarak kültürlerine açıklık getirmektedirler. Geleneklerinin ve dinlerinin dili olarak, ana dillerinin önemi belirtmektedirler. Dinleri ve dilleri üzerinden de bir kültürel mesafe oluşturmaktadırlar.

Bu noktadan hareketle Őu noktaya açıklık getirmek gerekir: Iraklı mültecilerin kültürel mesafeleri, Amerika'da Amerikan toplumuna karşı oluşturulmuş değildir. Aksine, Iraklı Hristiyanların, Iraklı Müslümanların, Iraklı Ezidilerin hali hazırda kendi toplumları içinde sahip oldukları bir kültürel mesafe söz konusudur. Daha açık bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, Iraklı mültecilerin kültürel mesafe pratikleri kendi ülkelerinde şekillenmiştir. Bu pratik, Amerikan toplumu içinde entegrasyonları yavaşlatan bir biçimde yeni bir formda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu noktada, kültürel mesafenin tek yönlü bir süreç olmadığını altı çizilmelidir. Özellikle İslamofobi ya da diğer ayrımcı pratikler söz konusu olduğunda bu mesafenin daha da belirgin hale geldiğini belirtmek gerekir.

Teorik olarak belirtmek gerekirse, Arizona'daki Iraklı mülteciler, kültürleşme stratejilerini geliştirirken, entegrasyon, asimilasyon, ayrılma (Separation), ve marjinalleşme denklemi üzerinde yer alabilirler. Daha geniş bir toplumda yer alan Iraklı mültecilerin kişisel özellikleri elbette bu süreçlerin hepsinde belirleyici olacaktır. Ancak, Kuhlman'ın mülteci entegrasyonu tanımı içerisinde düşünecek olursak, Iraklı mültecilerin genel memnuniyet durumları ve entegrasyonları arasında bir uyumsuzluk olduğunun altı çizilmelidir.

Bu uyumsuzluğa daha yakından bakacak olursak, Amerika'daki kalış süresiyle ilintili olarak bir açıklama yapmamız mümkün olacaktır. Amerikan vatandaşlığını kazanmış Iraklı mülteciler, din, gelenek ve kültür konularında, Amerikalılarla iletişim kurma noktasında daha açık ve olumlu yaklaşırken; bunu henüz Arizona'ya yeni yerleştirilmiş bir Iraklı mülteci için söylememiz mümkün olmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Iraklı mülteciler bir kültürleşme stratejisi belirlerken, en başta kültürlerarası diyalogu önceleyerek bir strateji belirlemiyorlar, bunun tek yönlü bir süreç olmadığını da göz önünde tutarsak, Amerikan toplumu da benzer bir eğilim göstermiyor. Bu şartlar altında, ilk nesil için asimilasyon bir strateji olarak gerçekleştirilmiyor.

Kendi durumlarının hızlıca farkına varan, ilk nesil Iraklı mülteciler ne kendilerine ne de çocuklarına bir Amerikan kimliği de atfetmiyorlar. Ancak, bu çalışma gösteriyor ki Iraklı mülteciler, Iraklı-Amerikan portresini çoğunlukla çocukları için çiziyorlar. Iraklı Amerikan özne, gelecek nesillerin bir öngörüsü olarak, ilk nesil Iraklı mültecilerin usunda canlanıyor. Buna göre, Iraklı-Amerikan, hem kendi kültürüne ve dinine bağlı

ve saygılı hem de eğitilmiş ve başarılı bir Amerikalıyı temsil ediyor. Kısacası köklerinden kopmamış ama Amerika'da sosyal ve ekonomik olarak sınıf atlamayı başarmış bir Iraklı olarak çocuklarını tanımlıyorlar. Bu noktada, bu araştırma, birinci nesil Iraklı mültecilerin gözünden, Iraklı-Amerikalıları, sosyal ve ekonomik entegrasyonun gerçek öznesi olarak tespit ediyor.

Bir Iraklı mültecinin beş yıl sonra vatandaşlığa başvurma hakkını kazandığını düşündüğümüzde, kültürleşme süreçlerinin bu kalış süresi içinde ne kadar farklılık göstereceğini öngörmek çok zor değildir. Aynı zamanda, vatandaşlığın elde edilmiş olması asgari ölçüde bir entegrasyonun gerçekleşmiş olduğunun işareti olarak da analiz edilebilir. Iraklı mültecilerin büyük bir kısmı açısından vatandaşlık, pasaport anlamına geliyor. Pasaport da seyahat özgürlüğü olarak değerlendiriliyor. Ancak genç mülteciler arasında durum çok daha farklılaşabiliyor, iş ve eğitim haklarına tam anlamıyla erişmek için vatandaşlığın önemli olduğunu düşünen bir kesim olduğu da belirtilmelidir. Bu olumlu atıfların dışında, vatandaş olmuş ancak vatandaşlığa hiçbir değer atfetmeyen mültecilerin de olduğunu altı çizilerek, vatandaşlık meselesi, mültecilerin Arizona'ya ulaştıkları ilk günden itibaren ulaşılması gereken bir hedeftir. Bu hedefe ulaşma arzusu da entegrasyon açısından önemli bir pozitif değişken olarak göz önünde tutulmalıdır.

Uluslararası (Transnationalism) teorik argümanlar açısından baktığımızda mültecilerin durumuna ilişkin genel değerlendirmelerin çok kısıtlı olduğunu belirtmemiz gerekiyor. Mülteciler uluslararası hareketin öznesi olabilirler mi ? Sorusu, entegrasyon, asimilasyon, Amerikalılaşma sorunsalları gibi ele alındığında, öncelikli olarak mültecilerin fiziksel seyahatlerinin önündeki hukuki engellerden bahsetmek gerekecektir. Dolayısıyla, Iraklı bir mülteci, Amerikan vatandaşı olmadığı sürece hukuken seyahat özgürlüğüne tam anlamıyla hak kazanmış olmayabilir. Daha da ötesi, seyahat etmesi mümkün olsa dahi sosyal ve ekonomik koşulları sebebiyle, seyahatinin önünde birçok engelle karşılaşabilir. Bu çalışma açısından şunun altı çizilmelidir ki, Iraklı mültecilerin uluslararası kapasiteleri oldukça kısıtlı durumdadır. Öte yandan bu çalışma gösteriyor ki, Iraklı mültecilerin büyük bir kısmı ülkelerine dönmek de istemiyorlar. Kısa bir ziyaret için bile olsa, bunun güvenlik riski taşıdığına altını çiziyorlar. Bu minvalde, Iraklı mülteciler, ve diğer mülteciler açısından uluslararası göç teorileri geliştirilmeye ihtiyaç duyulan alanlar olarak karşımıza çıkıyor.

Bu çalışma boyunca ele alınan insani yönetim kavramı, karşımıza tamamen pozitif ya da negatif bir içerikle çıkmamaktadır. Bu çalışma kapsamında da pozitif ya da negatif bir anlam yüklenerek ele alınmamıştır. Ancak, insani yönetim kavramının, bağlamsal olduğu belirtmek gerekir. İnsani yönetimin sivil doğasının korunup geliştirilmesi gerekir. Bu anlamda, insani yönetim kavramı farklı ülkelerin durumu ve bağlamı ele alınarak analiz edilmelidir. Amerika'nın öncülük ettiği küresel dengeler içinde, insani yönetimin neo-liberal fonksiyonları da bu çalışma kapsamında ele alınıp analiz edilmiştir. Bu analizin temel amacı, yukarıda belirttiğimiz gibi zorunlu göçün insani yönetimin nasıl mümkün olduğunun altını çizmektir.

Bu kapsamda düşünüldüğünde bu çalışma literatüre, zorunlu göçün bir sosyolojisi mümkün müdür? Sorusu karşılığında, insani yönetimin bağlamsal analizinin önerilmesi ve entegrasyon süreçlerinin bu bağlamsal analizle birlikte ele alınması yoluyla mümkün olacağını belirtmektedir. Genel entegrasyon ve kültürleşme analizlerinin dışında, bu çalışma mülteci entegrasyonunun ayrı bir alan oluşturmaktadır. Mülteci entegrasyonu meselesinin, zorunlu göçün insani yönetimiyle birlikte ele alınması gerekmektedir. Bu tür bir analizin bize zorunlu göçün, sebep ve sonuçları itibarıyla, ekonomik temelli göç ve uluslararası göç teorileriyle nerelerde kesiştiğini göstermesi açısından önem arz edecektir.

Bu çalışma, insani yönetim kavramını, zorunlu göç bağlamında ele alıp zenginleştirmiştir. İnsani yönetimin özelliklerini, Arizona'daki Iraklı mültecilerin durumuna yoğunlaşarak haritalandırmıştır. Bu anlamda, bu alanda yapılacak diğer çalışmalar için yol gösterici olması arzu edilmiştir. Ancak, geride önemli araştırma soruları bıraktığı belirtilmelidir. Bunlardan bazıları, Türkiye gibi ülkeler söz konusu olduğunda zorunlu göçün insani yönetimi nasıl ele alınmalı ve analiz edilmelidir?, Türkiye gibi ülkelerde analizi yapılan Amerika'daki kurumsal yapılar ve politikalar örnek teşkil edebilir mi? Karşılaştırmalı bir analizi mümkün olabilir mi? İnsani yönetimin diğer araçları, örneğin uluslararası ve ulusal mülteci hukuku, mülteci kampları...vb. farklı bağlamlarda nasıl ele alınabilir? İnsani yönetimin etkisi düşünüldüğünde niçin mülteci entegrasyonu, diğer göçmen gruplarından farklı ele alınmalıdır? Mülteci alanında devletlerin karar alma mekanizmasında artan ağırlığı karşısından neden insani yönetimin sivil doğası korunmak ve savunulmak zorundadır?

9. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Deli, Volkan
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 20 August 1983, Amasya
Marital Status: Single
Phone: N/A
Email: volkandl@gmail.com

EDUCATION

| Degree | Institution | Year of Graduation |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|
| Ph.D. | METU Sociology | 2018 |
| MS | METU Sociology | 2010 |
| BS | Gazi Uni Labour Economics Industrial Relations | 2005 |
| Visiting Research Scholar | University of Arizona School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies | 2015 June to Sept. |

WORK EXPERIENCE

| Year | Place | Enrollment |
|--------------|---|--|
| 2016-Present | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) | Protection Associate |
| 2014 July | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) | Senior Protection Assistant |
| 2012 July | Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) | Satellite Cities Coordinator – Field Office Coordinator |
| 2009 October | Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) | Field Office Representative – Social Worker |

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS

1. “A Case Study: Discussing Social Integration among Iraqi Refugees in the city of Amasya under the influence of forced migration”, in Migration – global processes caught in national answers, Wiener Verlag: Wien, Österreich, 2014:85-110.

ACADEMIC INTERESTS

Refugee Law, Refugee Integration, Human Rights, Discourse Analysis, Industrial Relations, Labor Movements, Sociology of Politics and Sociology of Migration, Forced Migration, and Sociological Theory.

10. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Deli
Adı : Volkan
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Humanitarian Governance of Forced Migration:
Experiences of Iraqi Refugees Resettled in Arizona, United States of America

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: