

THE NEO - KEMALIST ARGUMENTS ON THE
COUNTER - REVOLUTION DEBATES IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis traces the origins and eventual construction of the discourse of “counter – revolution” in Turkey. The main actors of this discourse could be analysed in three intellectual circles which are former Cadre members, two leftist Kemalists: Mihri Belli and Doğan Avcıoğlu and the Neo – Kemalists. Although these groups set forth their ideas regarding “counter – revolution” in very different historical contexts, there is an ideological intertwinement between them. The Neo – Kemalists, an intellectual group emerged as a reaction to the 12 September 1980 military coup in Turkey, rise of Islamism and the Second Republicans will be the main focus of this dissertation as the bulk of the arguments on the “counter – revolution” in Turkey are asserted by them. In order to analyse this discourse, firstly the origins of the concept of the “counter – revolution” in French and Russian Revolutions and the influence of these two revolutions on the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the Kemalist Revolution will be researched.

Keywords: counter – revolution, Kemalism/Atatürkism, the Atatürk Revolution

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE NEO – KEMALİSTLERİN KARŞI – DEVRİM TARTIŞMALARINDAKİ ARGÜMANLARI

Bengisun, Egemen

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma Türkiye’de “karşı – devrim” argümanlarının tarihsel kökenlerinin ve inşasının araştırılmasına yöneliktir. “Karşı – devrim” söylemini ortaya atan üç ana düşün gurubu eski Kadro dergisi üyeleri, iki sol - Kemalist olan Mihri Belli ve Doğan Avcıoğlu ve Neo – Kemalistlerdir. Bu üç çevre farklı tarihsel bağlamlara tepki olarak farklı “karşı – devrim” argümanlarını ortaya attılsa da aralarında düşünsel bir etkileşim söz konusu olmuştur. 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesine, İslamcılığın yükselişine ve İkinci Cumhuriyetçilere bir tepki olarak doğan Neo – Kemalistler adlı grup, “karşı – devrim” argümanlarını en çok ortaya koyanlar olduğundan bu çalışmanın da ana odağını oluşturacaktır. Türkiye’deki “karşı – devrim” söylemine ilişkin argümanların incelenmesinden önce, “karşı – devrim” kavramının Fransız ve Rus İhtilallerindeki tarihsel kökenleri ile bunların Kemalist Devrimin de yapıldığı Türkiye’nin kuruluş sürecine etkileri araştırılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Atatürk Devrimi, Atatürkçülük/Kemalizm, karşı – devrim.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democratic Party
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JP	Justice Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NDR	National Democratic Revolutionaries
RPP	Republican People's Party

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Subject Matter and the Research Question

In the famous and award – winning German film called “Good Bye, Lenin!” a hardliner socialist and East German citizen Christiane is shocked when she sees a Lenin memorial being carried away by a helicopter over the streets just after the collapse of German Democratic Republic. A similar shock has been valid for the Kemalist circles in Turkey. Although none of the Atatürk statutes have been carried away yet there has been a fear of a counter – revolution against the revolution of Atatürk¹. These circles were mainly the Kemalist intellectuals, namely a group of middle class academics, journalists, doctors, teachers etc. In my thesis I would like to group these intellectuals into three as following: 1. The former *Kadro* members 2. Two radical leftist – Kemalists: Mihri Belli and Doğan Avcıoğlu 3. The Neo – Kemalists.

The Kemalist Revolution or the Atatürk Revolution is an intensive political and social change which took place between 1919 and 1946 in Turkey. The Atatürk Revolution was a political modernization process which aimed an intensive societal change and involved positivism, secularism and also a state – led industrialization model (Kili, 2011: 194). As a radical transformation took place in 1920s and 1930s in Turkey, the Atatürk Revolution faced many counter – revolutionary challenges in that period. In the mainstream Kemalist historiography the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925, assassination attempts against Atatürk and the Menemen/Kubilay incident (1930) are considered counter – revolutionary incidents. However especially after

the 1980 military coup the Neo – Kemalists started to conceptualize the counter – revolution with historical and social arguments.

The Atatürk Revolution was a cultural revolution whose central motive had been secularism (Mango, 2004: 534). For Mango it was not a social revolution which aimed to change the property relations. The aim of this thesis is not to compare the Atatürk Revolution with the revolutions (and counter – revolutions) in France and Russia. However their significance will be analysed. The French counter - revolution which took place almost a century just after the Revolution of 1789, was the history of the struggle of pro – revolutionary secularist republicans between monarchists, conservative groups and religious brotherhoods which were all counter - revolutionaries. Especially after the Dreyfus incident the revolutionary groups won ultimately. On the other hand in Russia counter – revolution made its crucial attack with the Civil War (1917 – 1922). The Russian Civil War and the Turkish Civil War (1919 – 1923) are both remarkable for their simultaneity. For these reasons I included these two countries in my work in order to compare with the Turkish “counter – revolution” process.

Since the Kemalist Revolution is carried out in a top – down manner, it is called a “Revolution from above” like that of the modernization process of Japan and Nasser’s movement in Egypt (Trimberger, 1978). As every revolution creates its own ideology to legitimize itself, “Kemalism” or “Atatürkism” came in to circulation in early 1930s. During the single party period (1923 – 1946), a “bourgeois revolution” took place in Turkey with the support of local landlords, military, bureaucracy and urban – middle classes (Ahmad, 2014: 89). After 1950, the supporters of Kemalism were the military, universities, high - educated urban dwellers and high judiciary. These circles launched an opposition to the ongoing conservative governments since 1950s by calling them “counter – revolutionary governments”.

The “counter – revolution” is conceptualized as the total or partial reversal of the Atatürk Revolution although some of the so – called “counter – revolutionary” Turkish political leaders such as Celal Bayar, Turhan Feyzioğlu and Kenan Evren are called rightist – Kemalists by Bora and Taşkın (2015: 531, 540). It is not a

coincidence that (leftist) Kemalists reject this distinction. Akşin remarked that there is no “rightist Kemalism” since Kemalism is by default on the left (2011 – b: 160). Akşin argues that being on the left means struggling against the landlords, sheiks and being progressive, anti – status quo, pro – Enlightenment and revolutionary. Accordingly these are all properties entailed by Kemalism. As socialism could not be considered on the right of the political scale, Kemalism is on the left too (Akşin: 160)².

The “counter – revolution” concept has been in circulation for decades in Turkey. Lately a parliamentarian from the Republican People’s Party (RPP in short) called the new presidential system of 2017 a “new phase of the counter – revolution” (NTV, 2016). In 2014, Taner Timur published a new book, “AKP’nin Önlenebilir Karşı – Devrimi” (*The Preventable Counter – Revolution of the Justice and Development Party*). On the other hand long before this new book of Timur, he had criticized his “former democrat” Kemalist colleagues who claim the transition to multi – party regime in 1946 is a “counter – revolution” (2003: 7 - 8). The term “counter – revolution” is not only in circulation in Turkey. A book about Russia by Robert Horvath called “Putin’s Preventive Counter - Revolution: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution” has been published in 2013.

This dissertation aims to respond to these questions: How was the concept of the counter – revolution invented in France, Russia and Turkey? How was this concept used by Kemalist fractions? How did the counter – revolution discourse in Turkey appeared and changed over time?

In order to answer all these questions one has to look at when the counter – revolution theses came out. Generally Kemalists point out that it was when the political party of Atatürk lost the elections in 1950 and the Democratic Party (the DP in short) came to power in 1950. Accordingly after this year the main “enlightenment centres” of the Atatürk Revolution, People’s Houses and Village Institutes were closed down, Imam and Preacher Schools proliferated and almost became a parallel education system to that of the secular schools and religious brotherhoods became more visible, protected by the governments and started to penetrate the bureaucracy.

However the most traumatic shock for Kemalists happened under the military rule of 12 September 1980 coup. This coup claimed to be carried out in order to “reinstate” Kemalism (Taşkın, 2015: 570). On the other hand especially after 1980 military coup of Turkey, Kemalist circles were alerted that the “Turkish – Islamic Synthesis” was embraced by the perpetrators of the coup and several ideological attacks against Kemalism and anti – secularist actions were carried out by them in the name of Kemalism during the military era of 1980 – 1983 (Akşin, 2007: 283 – 284). After the democratization in 1983, Turkey was faced with the rise of political Islam and the emergence of Kurdish political movement along with the armed Kurdish insurgency in the Southeast Turkey which all constituted major challenges to the Kemalist circles. The headscarf controversy and the ascendance of the political Islamist Welfare Party in the 1990s raised the tensions between Kemalists and the rest.

Parallel to the increasing social and political reactions to Kemalism many intellectuals contended that the republic should be democratized. They argued that Kemalist nationalism, Kemalist secularism and the nation – state are inadequate and unsatisfying for their democratic wills. This significant attack to Kemalism came from the liberals and leftist liberals. These groups called themselves “Second Republicans” (*İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler* in Turkish), supporters of “globalization” and “civil society”. With the collapse of the communist bloc in late 1980s, these groups were influenced by post – modernism as opposed to “one true civilisation model” of Kemalism. They were against the values of Enlightenment. Hence they were of the opinion that Turkish Enlightenment process, i.e. Kemalist reforms were imposed from above between 1923 and 1950, hence it should be eliminated sooner or later. The coup perpetrators of 1980 were even equal to that of the rule of Atatürk for these groups as both were relying on the support of military.

For the Kemalist circles all these developments were major blows and threats to Kemalism. They established Association of Kemalist Thought (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* in Turkish) on 19 May 1989 and The Association for the Support of Modern Living (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği* in Turkish) in February

1989. The authors of the newspaper Cumhuriyet (*The Republic*) such as Nadir Nadi, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu, İlhan Selçuk, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı also contributed to this campaign. This front is called the “Neo - Kemalists” (Bora, Kıvanç, 1996: 778; Erdoğan, 2001: 236). According to Erdoğan, the Neo - Kemalism was different than the official version of Kemalism as it had a civilian, defensive, anti - state, pro - military, anti - imperialist, anti - globalization and anti - privatization approach. Their aim was to re-establish the “golden” and revolutionary era of 1930s in a nostalgic manner (Özyürek, 2006: 11). The Neo - Kemalists sought for the restoration of Kemalism as a response to the traumas of the 12 September 1980 coup, the rising of opposition of political Islamists, Kurdish movement and leftist - liberals. Also the “inadequacy of the RPP” to protect the Atatürk Revolution was something that the Neo - Kemalists had always complained about. This became another reason for their establishment.

In the academic literature an important paradigm of the Neo - Kemalists is overlooked. This paradigm is the concept of the “counter - revolution against the Atatürk Revolution” (*Atatürk Devrimi'ne karşı devrim* in Turkish). Many scholars just see this as a demonization set forth by Kemalists by calling their opponents, namely political Islamists, leftist liberals and Kurdish political movement, “reactionaries” or “obscurantists”. However the concept of “counter - revolution” incorporates a historical periodization attempt, human type, society type and several other features which will be analysed in depth in this dissertation.

Also it will be analysed how and to what extent “counter - revolution theses” could serve for a periodization and evaluation of Turkish political life. Actually there are existing paradigms of modern Turkish history based on antagonism of religious conservatives vs. secularists. For instance Carter V. Findley (2010) comes up with a significant thesis in his book “Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789 – 2007”. Findley claimed that two ideological currents are interacting and shaping the last two centuries of Turkey which are secularism and Islamism. He stated that that the secularists were mainly in power during the Tanzimat era (1839 to 1870s), the Committee of Union and Progress era (1908 to 1918), the National

Struggle era (1919 to 1922) and the single - party period of the RPP (1923 to 1946). The rest is the governance of Islamism according to Findley.

Another quite significant evaluation of modern Turkish history is created by Şerif Mardin's well - known and oft - quoted article "Center - Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" (1973). Mardin's approach was an attempt to theorize the socio-political cleavage of the Republican Turkey on the basis of the center - periphery paradigm. Mardin associated founder elites of Turkey who were Young Turks and Kemalists with secularism and center whereas for him the periphery symbolized conservatism, religion, Islamic resurgence and ethnic demands. Similarly Emre Kongar (1985) has a similar reading on modern Turkey. He argued that the main conflict in Turkey is between the traditionalist liberals and statist elitist secularists and the ruling of Turkey shifts between these groups periodically.

According to historian Sina Akşin (2016: 173), a historian has three main duties which are finding out which incidents are historical, doing a historical narrative, doing the periodization within the history. As Akşin explained so Republic of Turkey's history is made up of two main parts which are the Atatürk Revolution that took place between 1923 and 1950 and the counter - revolution which began in 1950 and lasted until today. According to Akşin Turkey's main conflict is between the Atatürk revolution/democratic - bourgeois values/contemporary civilization and the counter - revolution/backwardness/medieval age/feudal values.

1.2. Research

This thesis is based on a qualitative research. Also the discourse of "counter - revolution" of the Kemalist circles will be analysed. This study is on the ideological atmosphere of a political group, the Neo - Kemalists which means this work is on intellectual history. The major works of Neo - Kemalists will be the backbone of this research. Although the articles in the magazines *Kadro*, *Yön* and the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* will not be covered one by one, the key books issued by the authors of

these circles will be fundamental in this work. Also secondary resources written on these circles and their intellectual atmosphere will be another significant resource.

As mentioned before the arguments of three significant Kemalist circles are going to be covered in this thesis. These are the former Cadre members, leftist Kemalists Mihri Belli and Doğan Avcıoğlu and the Neo – Kemalists. Although they have all arguments regarding to the “counter – revolution”, these groups have different claims and concerns because their foci are on different time zones. It should be remarked that all these circles share the tendency to mark the beginning of the “counter – revolution” as the election of the DP to the government in 1950.

The former Cadre members are the first ones to react against the DP governments of 1950s. The DP’s acts such as allowing the Arabic call to prayers, closure of the Village Institutes and People’s Houses are mainly targeted and concerned as backlashes of the Atatürk Revolution. As for the former Cadre members, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu’s novels “Yaban” (*the Outsider*) (first edition: 1932), “Panorama” (first edition: 1954) and articles in the book “Atatürk” (first edition: 1946); Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s “Tek Adam” (*The Only Man*) (first edition: 1963) and “Kahramanlar Doğmalıydı” (*Heroes Should Have Been Born*) (1974); Vedat Nedim Tör’s “Kemalizmin Dramı” (*The Drama of Kemalism*) (1980) are the key works to be covered.

In 1960s the DP’s successor Justice Party (shortly the JP) had electoral victories. Mihri Belli’s and Doğan Avcıoğlu’s criticisms appeared as a reaction to the JP governments. Belli used the term “counter – revolution” and elaborated on this concept in his book “Yazılar: 1965 – 1970” (*Articles: 1965 – 1970*) (1970). Doğan Avcıoğlu set forth his understanding of the “counter – revolution” in his book “Devrim Üzerine” (*On the Revolution*) (1971).

The Neo – Kemalists’ focus was especially on the 1980 military coup. The emergence of Neo – Kemalism happened through two significant works in early 1980s: Nadir Nadi’s “Ben Atatürkçü Değilim” (*I am not an Atatürkist*) (first edition: 1982) and Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu’s “12 Eylül Karşı – Devrim” (*12 September: the Counter – Revolution*) (1989). The former book conveys the message that if the

coup perpetrators of 1980 call themselves Kemalists, famous Kemalist author and editor-in-chief of newspaper Cumhuriyet, Nadir Nadi would not call himself a Kemalist anymore whereas the latter book formulates the 12 September 1980 coup as a counter – revolutionary step. İlhan Selçuk’s book “Atatürkçülüğün Alfabeti” (*The Alphabet of Kemalism*) (1981) is another work on the counter – revolution in Turkey.

Many books were issued on the issue of counter – revolutionary infiltration of religious brotherhoods into the state organs. For instance Uğur Mumcu’s “Rabıta” (first edition: 1987) and “Tarikat – Siyaset – Ticaret” (*Religious Brotherhood – Politics – Commerce*) (first edition: 1988) are among them. The headscarf controversy and the reactions to the ascendance of political Islamists are covered in Bahriye Üçok’s “Atatürk’ün İzinde Bir Arpa Boyu” (*Just a Little Progress after Atatürk*) (first edition: 1985) and Muammer Aksoy’s “Laikliğe Çağrı” (*Call for Secularism*) (first edition: 1989). Ahmet Taner Kışlalı reacted against the attacks of the Second Republicans to Atatürk and the inadequacy of the RPP to protect the Atatürk Revolution in his book “Atatürk’e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği” (*The Unbearable Lightness of Attacking to Atatürk*) (first edition: 1993). Sina Akşin’s books “Atatürkçü Partiyi Kurmanın Sırası Geldi” (*It is High Time to Establish a Kemalist Party*) (2002) and “Yakın Tarihimizi Sorgulamak” (*Questioning Our Recent History*) (first edition: 2006) are almost on the same issues which is covered by Kışlalı’s book.

1.3. Organization of the Thesis

In this thesis firstly the concept of “revolution” will be analysed to set forth how “counter – revolution” is theorized. The French and Russian cases will be two significant cases to be covered. The French and Russian revolutions and counter – revolutions will not be analysed for comparative purposes. The French Revolution is a staggering incident in history which culminated in the execution of the king and an establishment of a republic for the first time. The Russian Revolution is first in

history for resulting in the foundation of a socialist state. Both of these revolutions are also important for going through various counter – revolutionary processes.

In the chapter of “The Features of the Atatürk/Kemalist Revolution and the Counter – Revolutionary Incidents during the Kemalist Era (1923 – 1946)” the positivist, pro – Enlightenment, anti – clerical stance of Atatürk revolution will be analysed. The issues such as the role of the RPP, leadership of Atatürk and second president İnönü, mass mobilization, the application of secularism and modernization are going to be main discussion themes. The traumatic Civil War of 1919 – 1921, incidents of Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, Kubilay incident of 1930, attempts for the multi – party regime of 1924 and 1930 will be underlined in the light of its reflections on the reactions of (Neo)Kemalist authors.

The main discussion part of this project will take place under the heading of the “Conceptualization of the Counter – Revolution in Turkey”. Firstly I will deal with how various authors mark the beginning of the counter – revolution. Some say that it begins with İnönü’s election as the president in 1938, some believe that İnönü’s “early decision” of transition to multi – party regime in 1945 and some believe that it is beginning of the multi – party regime in 1950.

Secondly, I will set forth the ideas of former Kadro movement, namely Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Vedat Nedim Tör, especially on the issue of their first reactions towards the multi – party regime. Then, two leftist Kemalists, Doğan Avcıoğlu and Mihri Belli’s ideas will be set forth who are significant for making class – based analysis. Also in 1968 Mihri Belli became the first person who claimed that there has been a “counter – revolution” in Turkey. After this part, the backbone of this dissertation will follow which is the Neo - Kemalists’ conceptualization of counter – revolution.

CHAPTER 2

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER – REVOLUTION

Eisenstadt once stated that “the ‘real’, ‘true’ great revolutions have occurred only in very few societies – the Great Rebellion and the Glorious Revolution in England; the American Revolution; the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions; possibly the revolt of the Netherlands; and the Turkish and the (North) Vietnamese revolutions” (1981: 127). This thought involves the fact that revolutions happens very seldom. However this definition does not concern the uniqueness and differences of several revolutions. Before proceeding a closer analysis to inquire into the features of the Kemalist Revolution to prepare the analytical ground for a discussion of the counter - revolution debate in contemporary Turkish politics, this chapter will elaborate on the theorization of revolution, perspective, origins and the evolution as well as the comparative uses of the concept of the counter - revolutions by both scholars and also by the proponents of this concept.

2.1. Theorizing Revolutions and the Modes of Revolutionary Transformations

Skocpol defined “social revolutions” as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from below” (1997: 5). As Skocpol underlined the social revolutions happen from below. Also one could infer from this definition that there is a type of revolution called “revolution from above”. France, Russian and China are the examples of social revolutions for Skocpol.

At this point we have to have look at the works of another significant academician in this field, Barrington Moore. In his famous work “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant In the Making of the Modern World”, he contended that bourgeois revolutions turn into parliamentary democracies, revolutions from above end up with fascist dictatorships and peasant revolutions became Communist regimes eventually (1966: xii – xiii). British, French and American parliamentary democracies are the cases of the first, the fascism in Germany and Japan are the examples of the second and Soviet Russia and China are the samples of the last one according to him. It is important to denote that first and third group come under the umbrella of social revolutions.

In this scale Turkish case is mostly near to the “revolution from above”. However one could object that Turkey could not fit into the case of Moore’s “revolution from above” since it did not end up with fascist regime at all. Also Skocpol held that the theoretical framework of Ellen Kay Trimberger is better than Moore’s on the issue of revolution from above. According to her only the German case is fitting into Moore’s model (1997: 42 – 43). In regards to that Trimberger highlighted that “fascism has only triumphed in countries with considerable industrialization, perhaps it was never an option in Turkey. But the German and Japanese bureaucratic states achieved national integration and began industrial takeoff in the nineteenth century” (1978: 135).

Trimberger aimed to “develop a model of revolution from above by military bureaucrats as distinct from either coup d’etat or mass-bourgeois or socialist-revolution from below” in her book “Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru” (1978: vii). At first Trimberger (1972: 191) called it an “elite revolution”, but changed this name later to the “revolution from above”. She compares the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Atatürk revolution, the regime of Nasser in Egypt between 1952 and 1970 and the takeover of Velasco in 1968 in Peru in this work. Accordingly these “revolutions” are questioned in the academic literature because there is a lack of mass movement or upheavals in them. Thus she comes up with a new model.

Trimberger defines five characteristics of a revolution from above which could be summarized as 1) subversion of the current political regime and foundation of a new social, economic and political order by the bureaucrats of the former regime, 2) few mass participation or absence of mass participation, 3) few degrees of violence, execution, emigration and counter – revolution, 4) a pragmatic wait and see policy, no radical ideology, 5) unlike a coup, the destruction of economic and political base of aristocracy or upper class (1978: 3). One might denote that these features is fitting to the Atatürk revolution as it will be elaborated in the next chapter.

In Trimberger’s analysis unlike the Meiji Restoration, the Nasserism and the military government of Peru, Atatürk partially destroyed the economic base of the Ottoman notables (1978:3). Indeed it could be argued that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his party RPP carried out a collaboration with local landlords and notables (ağalar ve eşraf in Turkish) starting from the beginning of the Turkish Independence War in 1919.

On this issue, Ali Kazancıgil questioned why Atatürk carried out a revolution from above. Kazancıgil noted that on the eve of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the bureaucratic elite did not choose to carry out a social revolution because of the strong patrimonial characteristics of the society (1981: 38). Indeed there was no “individual” in the Ottoman society and the people were regarded as “subjects” (tebaa/kul in Turkish). The people were connected to the Sultan and Caliph with feudal and religious dues. Thus the pro – modernization elite of Ottoman Empire did not await a social revolution.

2.2. Models of Revolution

To start with there are many types of revolution indicated in the literature. James Meisel points out the types of revolution as a mass rebellion of peasants, a religious and/or sectarian revolution, an anarchist rebellion i. e. a reaction or a counter – revolution, a Jacobin communist revolution, a coup d’etat, a militarized mass insurrection such as the guerrilla activities of Mao in China, a revolution staged

by army leaders due to the lack of social and civilian forces (1966: 211 – 212). Also there is the social revolution and revolution from above, as mentioned before.

A significant model of revolution is the positivist model. In this model, throughout subsequent historical stages religiosity of the society decays and in the last stage which is the positive stage, superstitions, religions, beliefs would be replaced with experiment and reason. Although this model is quite revolutionary in the field of thoughts, it is quite conservative in the social and economic realm. That was because of the fact that the pioneers of this model were horrified by the bloody and staggering parts of the French Revolution. For this reason positivist model embraced an evolutionary development model rather than a revolutionary one.

Next to that, the Marxist model of revolution has a significant place in the literature. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels created this theory in 19th century. Marxist theory is determinist as well. According to the evolutionary model of Marx the stages that the society go through are primitive/communal communism, slavery, feudal and capitalist stages. The very last stage will be carried out by the working class, with a revolution. Capitalist state and the ruling class of it, the bourgeoisie would be overthrown and the dictatorship of proletariat would be established. Thus the socialist and communist stages would be the last stages. In the Marxist theory history is a matter of a class - based conflict. There have been several examples of the Marxist revolutions. The first revolution took place in Russia, then a more agrarian – based one in China, in many Southeast Asian and African countries and lastly in Cuba.

According to this theory each society is based on means of production and relations of production. The means of production consisted of machines, property, tools and people. This is also called “base” (Heywood, 2012: 118). The base shapes all the social institutions and structure through various mechanisms. Thus, education, law, religion, ideology, science, media etc. which are called “superstructure” in general are shaped by the base (Heywood: 118).

It is important to point out that both of positivist model and the Marxist models presume that history marches towards “better” in a linear way. This means

there are no turn backs. It could be said that this is a common value with Atatürkism. Positivist ethos of Kemalism was grounded by the Young Turk movement in the late Ottoman period.

2.3. Counter – Revolution and Preeminent Theorists of Counter – Revolution in France

Counter - revolution is a phenomenon intertwined with the revolution (Meisel, 1966: 31). The counter – revolution attacks at a moment when the revolution is weak. It competes with revolution through abusing and imitating methods, hopes and frustrations of the revolution. To some extent it is fed by the revolution. Counter - revolution is not only a “turning back of the historic clock”, but also it “partakes of the revolutionary current” (Meisel, 1966: 20).

Counter - revolution is against the establishment of the revolution. Thus it has to influence and organise the masses against the revolution during or after the revolution. Hence it is more planned than a revolution. In regards to that Meisel highlighted that “a counterrevolution usually is a reaction to a revolutionary action already in progress, it is likely to be the result of conscious intent, of a carefully mapped plan. Complete surprise of the opponent, his elimination by a *coup d'état* performed with lightning speed, is the identifying feature of most counterrevolutions” (1966: 21).

On the other hand one of the main features of a revolution is the lack of a purpose. Also there is the probability that the purpose may be revealed after a long time, when everything is under the control of the revolutionaries. For that reason many people would contribute to it without any intention to serve the main aim of the revolutionaries. Meisel denotes that “revolutions seem to start with what to contemporary witness looks like a mere accident, and only afterward comes the realization that it had been ‘in the cards’ for a long time” (1966: 21).

The counter - revolution is fed by the stability provided by the revolutionaries in the post - revolutionary era. It grows upon it, benefits the opportunities created by

it and struggles against it. It catches a momentum when the revolutionary stability is weak and do a final stroke (Meisel, 1966: 32). Counter – revolutionaries try to defame the revolutionary leaders and their historical roles. They are envious of their opponents. Meisel highlighted that a counter - revolutionary “desperately tries to prove them wrong and himself the better, more authentic revolutionary” (1966: 33).

Also counter - revolutions have doctrines. First time in the history the counter – revolutionary ideas were set forth against the French Revolution of 1789 as it was a quite staggering and bloody revolution with universal claims. Jacques Godechot highlighted that there is fallacy in the literature that the counter - revolutions only try to re-establish the overthrown regime or restore things happened before the revolution, thus have no ideology (1971: viii). On the other hand for the French case anti – republican i. e. counter - revolutionary ideas were set forth long before (and after) the revolution.

Before the French Revolution of 1789, many philosophers came up with anti –republican ideas. According to Godechot the main anti – republican, i. e. counter – revolutionary currents before the revolution were the proponents of historical conservatism, enlightened despotism and integral absolutism (1971: 3). After the Revolution of 1789, the “rightist deputies, journalists, pamphleteers, scribblers” came up with the idea of restoration of the “ancien regime” (Godechot, 1971: 32). Writer Antoine de Rivarol, minister Ferrand, writer Senac de Meilhan, Irish author and politician Edmund Burke were empiricist pro – Enlightenment people but they were conservative anti – republican counter – revolutionaries. They were favouring a type of limited monarchy whereas priests Barruel and Duvoisin were pro – absolute monarchy and alleged that the philosophers and pro – enlightened despotism circles were responsible for the Revolution (Godechot, 1971: 39 - 41).

Godechot held that among all the counter - revolutionary theorists Edmund Burke was “the first whose works created an international stir” (1971: 50). Edmund Burke is also known as one of the pioneers a political ideology, “conservatism”. He summoned his counter - revolutionary ideas in the book “Reflections on the Revolution in France” which was sold out. He attacked the French Revolution and

the people who tried to establish a republic in Britain and the circles who claimed that there is a similarity between the French Revolution and British Revolution of 1688. For him the 1688 Revolution was just a restoration, not an attempt to establish a republic in Britain.

The importance of this book of Burke was that it was a “solid, coherent program, based on a complete philosophy of history” (Godechot, 1971: 58). According to Godechot, Burke’s book had a universal impact not only in France but also in Europe and America. Many authors such as Hippolyte Taine, Maurice Barres in France, Friedrich von Gentz in Germany, Joseph de Maistre in Italy, Mallet du Pan and Sir Francis d’Ivernois in Switzerland, right wing circles in the United States, Catherine II in Russia were influenced by Burke’s book.

Burke was against secularism and the construction of a rational society to some extent. In this regard Godechot argued that Burke had a very conservative sense of reason and indicated “revolutionaries believe that reason, the development of science, will enable mankind to make limitless progress and to secure happiness on earth; Burke does not share this belief” (1971: 59). Thus he attacked all new institutions created by the new regime in France.

Burke was organising conferences against the revolutionary France and struggling against the English Jacobins. Burke even aimed to urge the English government to help the French counter – revolutionaries in Vendée. At first the government did not follow this recommendation and when the government decided to take action two years later in 1795, it was too late. However he was at least successful on the struggle against the revolutionary people in Britain and urged the government to take measures against these circles (Godechot, 1971: 66).

The last significant counter - revolutionary group was the group of theocrats, namely Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald. They were against individualism, secularism, the Enlightenment and the republic. Their ideal was the establishment of a radically “religious society, under the guidance of God” (Godechot, 1971: 84). According to them the Revolution of 1789 was satanic and it was an intrusion into the religious and moral values of Christianity. In his book “Considerations on

France” which was published in 1797, Maistre openly used the term of “counter – revolution” and discussed “how the counter – revolution will come” which also reveals the fact that this term was in circulation just after the revolution (2003: 77). Bonald even claimed that the Declaration of the Rights of Man should be nullified and the Declaration of the Rights of God should be proclaimed since the individual has no rights, just has duties (Godechot, 1971: 98). Naturally they were in favour of absolute monarchy.

These theories are quite significant for the Turkish case too. As I will analyse in the next chapters, the issues such as secularism, the Enlightenment, republic, an Islamic republic are the main themes for the antagonism between the revolutionary and counter – revolutionary circles in Turkey. Also French case is very important for Turkey because the French Revolution influenced the Turkish revolutionaries.

2.4. French Revolution of 1789 and Counter – Revolution in France

The French revolution was a bourgeois – democratic revolution, as it was stated before. In that respect, Skocpol held that this is the prevailing Marxist interpretation which is widely accepted in the literature. She indicated that the French Revolution “was led by the bourgeoisie to displace feudalism and the aristocracy and to establish capitalism instead” (1979: 174). The main tenets of this revolution were “the centrality of bourgeoisie, transition from a feudal to capitalist mode of production, bureaucratization, democratization, emergence of a politico – legal framework favourable to capitalism, political struggles for state power, peasant struggles against seigneurial rights” (1979:175).

Skocpol highlighted the state transformation impact of this revolution. According to her, “the French Revolution was chiefly the transformation of an absolute monarchy encumbered by ‘medieval rubbish’ into a centralized, bureaucratic, and mass – incorporating national state” (1979: 181). The military consolidation was carried out by the Jacobins, in the era of the National Convention

of 1792 – 1795 and administrative consolidation waged under the military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte (1979: 283).

The French Revolution went through various revolutionary and counter – revolutionary phases (Akşin, 2014: 11). The Bourbon dynasty was enjoying the absolute monarchy before 1789. Between 1789 and 1792, a parliamentary monarchy appeared. Serfdom was banned, the properties of Church were confiscated and the priests were obliged to take an oath for staying loyal to the state. However the Bourbons attempted to collaborate with the counter – revolutionaries and Austria and Prussia intervened. Thus the revolution radicalized, the republic was proclaimed and the king was executed (Popkin, 2010: 72 – 74). The subsequent revolutions and counter – revolutions began with the Vendée counter – revolution.

In his book “The Vendée”, Charles Tilly held that the War of Vendée of 1792 or the Vendée counter – revolution or shortly the Vendée was “a great uprising in the West of France threatened the very life of the Revolution” (1966:1). The anti – clerical stance of the French revolution culminated in the anger of the Vendéans since they were pious peasants and still holding on their feudal dues. The decree of the revolutionaries in 1792, which deported all priests who refused the oath of submission triggered the revolt in Vendée (1966: 2). In a broader sense, the Vendéans opposed the revolution for these reasons: “1) royalism (being in favour of the absolute monarchy) 2) resistance to conscription 3) religious reasons, fidelity, fanaticism and subservience 4) self – interest among the leaders” (1966: 7). On the contrary, Skocpol reduces the reasons only to “conscription”. She contended that “[s]purred by the threat of conscription to the national army, the peasants of the Vendée rose against the revolutionary government” (1979: 188).

Regarding that, Moore comes up with a more sociological interpretation. According to him, Vendée was one of the most underdeveloped regions of France. Diffusion of capitalism and industrialization brought by the revolution in that region were not welcomed by the Vendéans (1966: 92 – 93). Not coincidentally, the most prosperous and developed regions, Lyon, Marseilles, Toulon and Boudreaux revolted against the revolution too. The rich people collaborated with the privileged

classes in these regions (1966: 102 - 103). During the “terror” era of the Convention, including the aforementioned developed areas and Vendée 17.000 people executed by the civil servants and 35.000 – 40.000 people died because of the social chaos and revolutionary violation (1966: 103).

After the era of Jacobins/Terror, the period of Directory (1795 – 1799) began in which the bourgeoisie gave the power to the executive organ. Thus a republican general, Napoleon Bonaparte came into prominence, carried out a coup in 1799 and claimed himself the “consul”. Eventually in 1804 he became the emperor.

This might seem to be a u – turn from a republican revolution, as Napoleon subverted the republic into a monarchy. The legal framework of the revolution remained intact. Also Napoleon claimed war against European states, thus he proliferated the principles of the revolution, namely liberty, equality, fraternity and secularism in Europe. Hence, for some people Napoleon was a revolutionary. However, Meisel denotes that “Napoleon I was the son of revolution and the general of counter – revolution. He is the greatest counterrevolutionist of modern history. What obscures the true dimensions of his counterrevolutionary role is that he *also* represented and carried into Europe some of the ideas of the revolution” (1966: 31 – 32).

When Napoleon was defeated in Waterloo in 1815, Bourbons came back to France and the counter - revolution began. The King Charles X attempted to restore the absolute monarchy which resulted in the upheaval of Parisians. In 1830, a second revolutionary step happened and Louis Philippe from the Orleans dynasty became the king. In 1848, again the republic was proclaimed which is called the “Second Republic”.

In 1848, all over Europe, there was a revolutionary current for the monarchies. When this current started to set back, Karl Marx started an initiation of resistance to the Prussian Emperor as he aimed to close down the parliament. Karl Marx was tried for this and acquitted eventually. In the court Marx called this situation a “counter – revolution” of the Prussian Emperor. His arguments on his defence was summoned in the book “Revolution and Counter Revolution or

Germany in 1948” (Marx, 1907). Thus around the year 1850, Marx contributed to the literature by setting a framework for a counter - revolution and blaming some circles for carrying out a counter – revolution.

If we return to France, one should say that the social structure was quite different after 1848 Revolution. In 1848, the working class appeared with their own demands. Large scale landowners were in support of the Bourbons whereas the fiscal bourgeoisie was favouring the Orleans dynasty. Only the petit bourgeoisie was pro – republic.

However the Second Republic imitated the presidential system of United States of America. In order to defuse the working class, the right to vote was introduced to all men since the majority was conservative peasants (Marx, 1988). Therefore, the tyranny and kingdom of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon III), the nephew of Napoleon I whose reign consolidated through subsequent referendums. He was elected as the president in 1848, later made a coup and eventually claimed himself the emperor in 1852. He arrested “the slow progress of the French Revolution toward the Bourgeois Republic for another twenty years” and he became a “premature totalitarian” who paved the way of Hitler and Mussolini (Meisel, 1966: 26, 94, 95).

The counter - revolution of Louis Bonaparte came to end when he was kept as captive in the War of Sedan with the Prussians. Instantly the Parisians established a republic in 1870 and eventually in 1875 the “Third Republic” was proclaimed in France. Starting from 1870s, the rightist counter – revolutionary monarchist circles, namely pro - Bourbon dynasty, pro – Orleans dynasty, pro – Bonaparte dynasty groups, the Church, religious brotherhoods -especially Jesuits- became very active and initiated a political struggle against the revolutionaries. On the revolutionary front there were secularists, deists, Darwinists, positivists, leftist republicans, intellectuals such as Victor Hugo and Emile Zola, authors and academicians (Bayet, 1970: 118, 120, 124, 125).

On the issue of secularism there were controversies. Especially under the Third Republic, the political power subsequently shifted between these two fronts. The former was in favour of religious education in primary schools and they were

anti – secularists whereas the latter was supporting a free, obligatory and secular primary school education, Church and state separation and the closure of illegal religious brotherhoods. In 1890s, the tension between them reached to the climax in the trial of Jewish officer, Alfred Dreyfus. The majority of the Church, antisemitists, ultra – nationalist circles and a part of the media converted this trial into an issue of religious intolerance and an attack to the republic.

In the first decade the 20th century the secularist revolutionaries won eventually. The ban of any type of education of priest organizations came into force in 1904. Next to that the guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion, the separation of Church and state and ban of state's financial backing to religious organizations were stipulated in 1905 (Bayet, 1970: 125 – 126). In his third (re -)trial, Dreyfus acquitted in 1906. This was the absolute triumph of secularism, free thought and revolution.

To sum up, the French revolution was under the threat of various and serious counter - revolutionary attacks. Shortly these backlashes were the Vendée revolt (1793 – 1796), the partial counter – revolution of Napoleon I (1799 – 1814), the Bourbon restoration (1814 – 1830), the Orleans monarchy (1830 – 1848), the era Louis Bonaparte (1848 – 1870), the counter – revolutionary activities of monarchist rightists under the Third Republic and the Dreyfus Affair (1894 – 1906). These show that the bulk of the 19th century was a counter - revolutionary period for France. In this context, Meisel highlighted the view in the literature that

the French revolution had to continue for another century, until the system finally equilibrated in 1875, when France adopted the constitution of the Third Republic. (Even that date may be wrong, because the system did not really function until the 'Republic of Notables' was displaced by the middle – class regime that came to power through the Dreyfus revolution of 1890s) (1966: 24).

The aftermath of the French Revolution shows us that the struggle between the revolution and counter - revolution could last very long. As I will explain later, Atatürk was aware of this fact. For these reasons, the French Revolution is very important for the Turkish case.

2.5. Russian Revolution of 1917 and Counter - Revolution in Russia

The Russian case fits with the Marxist model of revolution. Although Karl Marx presumed that the workers will be the main element of a proletariat revolution, the peasants were the pioneers of the Russian revolution of 1917. Marx's provision was for a developed and industrialized country such as Germany. However the Marxist, communist Bolshevik revolution were carried out by the Russian peasants because Russia was an underdeveloped and unindustrialized country at that time as there was not a significant working class in Russia.

Russian Empire joined the Allies in the World War I. Since the beginning of the war in 1914, the conscription of 15 million people waged a great burden to the Russians. The people in the cities were not able to find food and fuel and the production dropped off. The other Allies could not pass the Dardanelles, defeat the Ottoman Empire and help the Russians through Black Sea (Akşin, 2014: 79, 92). Under these circumstance the first revolt began in March 1917.

The arbitrary rule of Czar Nicholas II was another factor. He had to establish the Duma, i. e. the parliamentary of Russia, after the first unsuccessful Soviet revolution of 1905. Over the course of time the Czar limited the authority of the Duma and it became an ineffective institution. The representatives of the bourgeoisie were in majority in the Duma. After Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917, the provisional government of the Duma and local soviets appeared at the same time. This dual administration came to an end, when the soviets prevailed. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks, soldiers and workers seized power in the capital, St. Petersburg.

The base of this revolution was peasants, as stated before. Skocpol highlighted the key role of the peasants. Serfdom was banned in 1860s in Russia. Thus they formed a strong community based upon collective ownership. They owned the 60 per cent of the land and controlled the process of production in Russia. Because of the aforementioned reasons, when they revolted against the Czar and all private landed property in 1917, the state dissolved (Skocpol, 1979: 156 – 157).

One of the other key elements of this revolution were the Bolsheviks, the majority group from the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. They were in pro – socialist/Marxist revolution. The Mensheviks, the minority group in this party were in favour of a bourgeois – democratic revolution. Later, they founded another party. The Bolsheviks played a significant role during the revolution and the Russian Civil War which took place between 1917 and 1922. Several socialist people such as Lenin and Trotsky and some intellectuals seized power and lead this process. They formed the Red Armies of the revolution which were fighting against the White Armies of the counter – revolutionaries.

The White Armies consisted of a range group of parties. According to George Stewart, the anti – Bolsheviks Whites were “the nobility, officers of the army and the navy, the professional classes, the Church, the landowner and manufacturer, Cossack communities whose large liberties and soldierly training made them antipathetic to town – made radicalism, and large masses of loyal, pious, illiterate peasantry” (1970: 23). These groups were the proponents of the monarchy. Also Stewart remarked that several political groups such “Mensheviks”, “Constitutional – Democrats”, even “Socialist – Revolutionaries”, “republicans” and “liberals” opposed both to the Czar and Lenin and his party.

After the outbreak of revolution in 1917, the western allies took a hostile stance towards the Bolsheviks. During this civil war Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan claimed their independence and the western allies instantly recognized them. British, German, Austrian, American, Polish, French, Czechoslovakian and Japanese armies fought in Russia against the Red armies.

A significant part of the peasants involuntarily supported the Bolsheviks during the civil war, although some other were in favour of the Whites. Skocpol held that “much peasants may have resented *both* Red and White attempts to involve them and their resources in the Civil War, they feared (especially in the core areas of Russia) that White victories would entail the return of the landlords they had expropriated” (1979: 218). The confiscation of the products of the villagers caused serious problems with the Bolsheviks and worker class.

Only during the years of 1918 and 1919 nearly ten thousand people were put to death by the “Soviet terror” (Trimberger, 1978: 33). The Civil War of Russia was another devastation for the Russian economy and manpower. Also taking the advantage of the death of Lenin, Stalin who was pro – “socialism in one country”, established his repressive, totalitarian one – party dictatorship through eliminating all his opponents. For instance Trotsky, a leading figure of 1917 Revolution, had to escape the country in 1929 because he was a proponent of international socialism.

The Bolsheviks won the Civil War. However the Socialist Russia eventually collapsed in 1991. In parallel to that Akşin comes up with a significant issue that whether the Mensheviks were right to say that without a proper bourgeois – democratic revolution, one cannot be successful in carrying out a Marxist model of revolution. The dissolution of the Socialist Russia in 1991 might be a proof of the truth of the arguments of the Mensheviks (Akşin, 2014: 95). This fact raises another staggering question: Did the counter – revolution win in Russia after 74 years? Indeed, Russia would be a remarkable case for the social scientists as the triumph of the counter - revolution took place very long time after the revolution.

CHAPTER 3

THE FEATURES OF THE ATATÜRK/KEMALIST REVOLUTION AND COUNTER – REVOLUTIONARY INCIDENTS DURING THE KEMALIST ERA (1919 – 1946)

The Atatürk revolution is a political and social change which took place between 1919 and 1946 in Turkey. It was launched by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his associates and the political party, the RPP. For many Kemalist social scientists, the Atatürk revolution arose in two phases which are the Turkish War of Independence (1919 – 1922) and the intensive reforms carried out by Atatürk and his associates between 1923 and 1946.

For instance Kongar denoted that the Atatürk revolution (*Atatürk İhtilali*) consisted of the Turkish Independence War (*Kurtuluş Savaşı*) and Atatürk's reforms (*Atatürk Devrimleri*) (1985: 478). Similarly Kili stated that “Atatürkism provides the *ideational* foundations of the liberation of Anatolia. This system of thought encompasses both the Turkish War of Independence and the rapid and radical transformation of Turkish society entailed by the Atatürk Revolution” (2011: 195).

Thus Kemalists imply that Turkish War of Independence was carried out for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and proclamation of a secular and modern republic. Zürcher held that Mustafa Kemal Pasha began his great speech of 1927 by remarking his arrival to Samsun in 1919 on purpose, which marks the beginning of the Turkish Independence War in mainstream Turkish historiography. Zürcher noted that this Great Speech is considered as “the basis for nearly all Turkish historiography on the period to the present day” (2013: 175). Zürcher objected that

Turkish Liberation War's interpretation as a struggle in favour of the establishment of the republic is an obvious "distortion of the historical truth, it presents the independence struggle not as one to preserve parts of the Ottoman Empire, but as a movement for the establishment of a new Turkish state" (2013: 175).

For Zürcher, the Turkish War of Independence was carried out in the framework of a "Muslim Nationalism". During the Independence War the Mustafa Kemal Pasha frequently used an Islamist terminology such as religious community/umma (*ümme*), all Islamic elements (*bilcümle anasır-ı İslamiye*), all Muslim compatriots (*bilumum İslam vatandaşlar*), Muslim rights (*hukuk-u İslamiye*), Ottoman and Islamic community (*camia-ı Osmaniye ve İslamiye*) and Turkish and Islamic fatherland (*Türk ve müslüman memleket*) (Zürcher, 1999: 84 – 85).

Kansu argued that there is a continuity between the revolution of 1908 carried out by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP in short) and the Kemalist era. This argument is shared by Zürcher too. Kansu contended that this fact is overlooked by the Kemalists and mainstream Turkish historiography. "The establishment of second Constitutional regime" (*İkinci Meşrutiyetin ilanı*) in 1908 is not called a revolution on purpose (1997: 5). Turkish historiography portrayed the real change, the real revolution as the proclamation of the republic in 1923 and the Atatürk revolution. Thus it is set forth that there is a "discontinuity" between the pre - 1923 era and the republic. In this respect Kansu claimed "[m]istakenly identified as a revolution, the *coup d'état* of 1923 which brought into power Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the commander - in - chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, is claimed to have modernised Turkey by the so – called Kemalist Reforms" (1997:5).

The "adoption of Sunday as weekly holiday, the acceptance of the Gregorian calendar, the metric system, the western dress and the Latin alphabet" were nothing more than "superstructural changes" for Kansu (1997: 13). According to him "[r]eal issues – least of all, economic issues – are left undiscussed" (1997: 13) which means "the base" remained untouched. Many left – liberal thinkers, especially the Second Republicans are of the same opinion. The "pioneer of Second Republicanism",

Kemal Tahir said that the reforms of Atatürk were not even superstructural reforms (as cited in Akşin, 2011 – b: 159). Famous second republicans, İdris Küçükömer, Asaf Savaş Akat, Mete Tunçay, Murat Belge, Ahmet Altan and Mehmet Altan followed Tahir for doing such a reductionism on the Atatürk revolution (Akşin, 2011 – b: 159). From their angle, Atatürk and his associates followed anti – democratic, authoritarian, Jacobin, elitist, solidarist and corporatist methods. Kemalist intellectuals in early Republican era favoured the “chieftaincy” (*şeflik*) system, tutelage of the military on democratic mechanisms, single party system, put the state in the centre of their policies, asserted that especially liberalism and all other ideologies except Kemalism is detrimental to state and nation (Demirel, 1996: 767 - 768).

One would state that this is a reductionism because the Atatürk revolution was more than a military coup and superstructural reforms. The Atatürk revolution struggled against the feudal values, the landlord system (*ağalık*) and sheikdom (*şeyhlik*). It was representing the transition from subject (*kul*) to citizen (*yurttaş*). Thus it was an Enlightenment movement. It has an economic dimension too. Kemalism was a national developmentalist movement. Kemalist regime adopted a state – led industrialization, political modernization and non – aligned foreign policy which was in favour the principle of complete independence (Kili, 2011: 193 – 194, 197).

Similar to the critics of the “Second Republicans”, two other important political groups criticized Kemalism too. These were political Islamists and Kurdish political movement. The political Islamists saw Atatürk’s secularization and modernization programme as “idolatry”, “infidelity” and “imitation of the West” (Mango, 2004: xi). Also the Kurdish political movement contended that Atatürk was responsible for a “policy of assimilating Kurds within the Turkish nation” (Mango, 2004: xii). Especially after 1990s both these circles argued that they were undergone a “trauma” during the single party era of Turkey.

However famous biographer of Atatürk, Mango stated that Atatürk was liberal but he fell short of liberalism in practice because of various conditions (2004:

469). This was due to the lack of an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy at that time (Mango, 2004: 536). For a democracy, a proper income for individuals, a well – educated society, a strong net of communication and transportation and an organized society are needed which were all absent in Atatürk’s era (Ateş, 1996: 774). During the Kemalist period the personal income was almost 50 - 60 dollars and the literacy rate was nearly 5 per cent. Also especially in winter there was a country - wide lack of transportation and communication. Under these conditions Mango highlighted that with no agreement on fundamentals of democracy, such as free elections, secularism, freedom of expression etc., the democratic arena would turn into clash of tribes, sects and religious groups (Mango: 536).

3.1. The Ideology of Kemalism and the Ideological Currents which Influenced the Atatürk Revolution

The term Kemalism came into circulation in a relatively late period. It did not exist prior to Turkish Independence War. When the RPP was founded in 1923 the party did not have a substantial ideology. The ideological dimension of Kemalism has appeared later in 1930s with the “six arrows” which also became the symbol of Atatürk’s political party. The six arrows of Kemalism are secularism, republicanism, nationalism, revolutionism/reformism, étatism and populism.

Republicanism, secularism, populism and nationalism were embraced in the by – law of the RPP of 1927. This by – law was revised in the party congress of 1931 and two other principles, étatism and revolutionism were added to the list (Demirel, 1996: 768). The six arrows became a part of the Turkish Constitution in 1937.

As for the reformism/revolutionism principle of the RPP, in the by – law of 1931 of the RPP, it was defined as the defence of the Turkish revolution which was carried out by a great sacrifice of the nation (Demirel, 1996: 770). This principle “sometimes meant a commitment to specific Kemalist reforms, and sometimes a more general commitment to permanent change and progress, as well as a rejection of gradualism and evolutionism” (Özbudun: 1981: 91). Also this principle is

evaluated by Özbudun as “the vaguest and the least clearly articulated of the six arrows” (1981: 91).

It should be denoted that this principle was deeply related to “counter – revolution” attempts. For Karal revolutionism is the essence of other five principles and safeguard against a counter - revolution. Karal indicated “Revolutionism takes into consideration the undoubted fact that every revolution is followed by a counter – revolution, and so it is persistent in holding on to the targets reached by the revolution” (1981: 23).

Indeed Atatürk was of the same opinion. It is very important that Atatürk himself was aware of a probability of a counter - revolution of the very beginning of his revolution. The two following speeches of Atatürk are in accordance with this argument which are given respectively in 1922 and 1923:

Should one take Turkey forward gradually or at once? There are two systems regarding this question. One of them is the way carried out in the French Revolution. Regimes would change, counter – revolutions would be performed against revolutions, the right would topple the left, the left would sweep away the right... This process would proceed one and a half century. Does our nation have so much blood to be shed and have such a lot of time? (as cited in Kocatürk, 2007: 206, translated by the author).

The French people worked for the accomplishment of their revolution for nearly a century. However, we are on the third year of our revolution. Nobody would assert that our revolution would not encounter a counter - revolution. It would be a prudent act to keep in mind such a possibility. In order to prevent more bloodshed of the first three years, a reactionary incident should be suppressed as soon as possible (as cited in İnan, 1999: 329 – 330, translated by the author).

The relatively late emergence of Kemalism was partly due to the stance of Atatürk on this issue. When an associate of Atatürk, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu said that the RPP had no doctrine, Atatürk responded “[o]f course it doesn’t, my child; if we had a doctrine, we would freeze the movement” (as cited in Özbudun, 1981: 88). Özbudun remarked that during the interwar era (1918 – 1939) the totalitarian one - party states had ideologies whereas the authoritarian single – party regimes only had official mentalities. The “official mentality” of the RPP was a positivist mentality (Özbudun: 90). Therefore “[t]here was little systematic ideological indoctrination in or by the RPP” (Özbudun: 93). In the book “Atatürk:

An Intellectual Biography”, Hanioglu stated that “Atatürk was no thinker of the order of Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, or Vladimir Il’ich Lenin. He was not a philosopher who produced a systematic theory attempting to encompass all aspects of life and society. He was not even a devout disciple of an ideology” (2011: 226). For Hanioglu Atatürk’s ideas were pragmatic and thin in content.

The course of “History of the Turkish Revolution” was added to the curriculum of universities in 1934. This was not a sign of indoctrination. It was only to protect the youth from other contemporary Western ideological currents such as communism, fascism, social democracy etc. Thus in 1930s several pioneers of Kemalism took the responsibility of interpret various dimensions of Kemalism such as Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (for international policy of Kemalism), Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk (for economic policy of Kemalism), Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (for the comparison of the Atatürk Revolution with other revolutions) and Recep Peker (for the comparison of the Turkish single – party regime with other political parties and regimes) (Akşin, 2011 – b: 102 – 103).

The ideology and ethos of the RPP were deeply related to that of the Young Turks or CUP, which was in government during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire. Hanioglu stated that “Mustafa Kemal’s attitudes and policies were to be shaped to an extraordinary degree by the ideas he encountered and the experiences he underwent as an activist in the Young Turk movement” (2011: 48).

The mind – set of the Young Turk movement was positivist. They were heavily influenced by the French Revolution. Atatürk’s ideas were an “amalgam of scientism, materialism, social Darwinism, positivism, and other popular theories” (Hanioglu: 228). To be specific Atatürk was influenced by “German vulgar materialism; Thomas Henry Huxley’s moral Darwinism; H. G. Wells’s cosmological juxtaposition of time, space, and the human in history; Gustave Le Bon’s elitism; nationalism; racial anthropology; and early-twentieth-century authoritarianism, as well as the ideas of the Enlightenment” (Hanioglu: 228- 229).

The Young Turks’ motto was “science reigns supreme” and they viewed history as “an epic struggle between religion and science, one that inevitably end

with the triumph of science and its coronation as the new and definitive belief system” (Hanioğlu: 51). This rejection of religion was reflected in Atatürk’s famous aphorism of “The most truthful guide in life is science”. This was not only a remark on the importance of science, but also saying that religion’s acceptance as a guide is “thoughtlessness, prevarication, and ignorance” (Hanioğlu: 53).

According to Mango, Atatürk and the bulk of the ruling class during the single – party era were “agnostics or perhaps non – doctrinaire deists” (2008: 163). However this generation, the late Ottoman devotees of scientism was believing that the “[r]eligion is the science of the masses, whereas science is the religion of the elite” (Hanioğlu: 56). Thus the Young Turks were convinced about the creation of a new religion. They would “reconstitute Islam as a materialist philosophy that would serve as a cultural resource to build the religion – free society of the future. The idea of a new religion, one free of dogma, myth, ritual, and supernatural commands, was taken from the French philosopher – poet Jean – Marie Guyau and became a tenet of the Late Ottoman scientific vision” (Hanioğlu: 55). In this respect religion was used as a tool of modernisation and nation – building during the Kemalist era. The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1924 was a result of this. The duty of this institution was to create almost a reformed Islam. In this respect Mango highlighted that “by controlling and bankrolling orthodox Sunni Islam through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the secular state in effect tends to impose it on society, which can be more relaxed in its religious practices or lack thereof” (2000: 122).

3.2. The Aim of the Atatürk Revolution

Atatürk himself was clear on the aim of his revolution. Once he said

The aim of the reforms we have already carried out and are continuing to carry out is to form Turkish society into a modern society in every aspect. This is the basis of our reforms. Up till now, the nation has been dominated by concepts which are disabling to the functioning of the mind. If the wars which have resulted from this concept are not done away with, it will be impossible to enlighten the mind (as cited in Karal, 1981: 15).

From this citation it could be seen that the main objective of the Atatürk Revolution was the enlightening of the Turkish society. Atatürk believed in the march of Turkish society towards progress in a linear direction. As Akarsu (1969: 10), Akşin (2007: 227) Kili (2011: 337) and Mango (2004: 528) indicate so, Atatürk revolution was the Turkish Enlightenment. The Enlightenment means “[a]n intellectual movement that reached its height in the eighteenth century and challenged traditional beliefs in religion, politics and learning in general in the name of reason and progress” (Heywood, 2012: 26). The aim of the Atatürk revolution was the re-shaping of the mind – set of the Turkish society in accordance with reason, science, overcoming of the fear of the religion, otherworld, tradition and sin (Akarsu, 1969: 10; Akşin, 2007: 227).

Sinanoğlu asserted that the Atatürk Revolution was another attempt of the humanism, which began with Ancient Greece and Rome and later went on with the French and Italian renaissance and German neo – humanism (1998: 24 – 25). Akşin remarked “Atatürk was a humanist. Even in the most dangerous moments of the War of Independence, he did not declare a holy war. His gentlemanly conversation with the Greek Commander Trikupis who had fallen prisoner in 1922, his refusal to tread on the Greek flag that was laid out at his fleet, the words he pronounced for the Anzac dead in 1934, attest to his humanism” (2000: 211). Humanism was the stressing of values such as love of mankind, art, country, human dignity and objection of dogmas (Akşin, 2007: 228). The current of humanism reappeared during the era of “Renaissance” in Europe in which the Westerners decided to turn back to the values of Ancient Greek and Rome. As a new chain on the current of humanism, the Atatürk Revolution sought for tolerance, the objection of ascetic non – secular ethics of the society and bringing a down-to-earth mind – set. (Sinanoğlu: 22).

Atatürk always targeted “oriental fatalism” and “ignorance” and his political ideas were “a separation from the philosophy of the Middle Ages, which had required individual sacrifice and immersion of oneself in mystical thoughts” (Karal, 1981: 15). Atatürk always criticized “under – valuing human life, vagabondage, laziness, considering life a burden, elevating to moral quality of poverty, not being considered

about nature, being unable to assess the actual value of any concept, turning one's back on free thought" which were all very common at his time among the society (Karal: 15).

In his Great Speech which was given in 1927, Atatürk criticized this medieval mind – set of his society with following words: “Could a civilized nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of Şeyhs, Dedes, Seyyits, Çelebis, Babas and Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to palm readers, magicians, dice – throwers and amulet sellers?” (Atatürk, 2005: 714). Kemalist intensive secularization attempts such as the closure of tekkes, madrassas, tombs, embracing of modern clothing and hat were a result of this stance. The aim of all these was to limit the religion in the social realm and make religion a personal issue which is clear of any superstitions.

3.3. Kemalism and Democracy

As it is stated above Atatürk's era was criticized for lack of multi – party regime, therefore lack of democracy. Regarding the lack of multi – party regime, Duverger stated that the RPP government always had the final aim of establishing a multi – party regime because they were “ashamed of political monopoly” and had a “bad conscience” for it (as cited in Özbudun, 1981: 91). It should be denoted that the Kemalist era had several democratic features. From Atatürk's manuscripts, we know that Atatürk portray republic as the best version of democracy (Atatürk, 2010: 345 – 346). Atatürk wrote that one of his principles “republicanism” includes democracy. Although during Atatürk's lifetime many European countries switched from democracies to single – party regimes, Atatürk initiated establishment of multi – party regime in 1924 and 1930.

On the other hand Zürcher (2013: 168, 174 - 175) and Tunçay (1981: 147) argued that Atatürk eliminated the political opposition with a dictatorial manner by being empowered by an extraordinary measure, the Law of Maintenance of Order (1925). It should be denoted that the opposition party Progressive Republican Party

(1924 – 1925) was not a liberal party unlike Zürcher and Tunçay tried to portray it as a liberal one. This party was openly conservative, pro – Sultanate and pro – caliphate (Ahmad, 2014: 86).

Similarly Atatürk was alleged for launching significant reforms during the period of the Law of Maintenance of Order which gave extraordinary powers to the government. On the other hand in his Great Speech Atatürk remarked that even in the absence of the Law of Maintenance of Order they would practice their reforms such as closing of tekkes, tombs and Hat Reform of 1925 (2005: 714 – 715). Atatürk set forth that their aim is to kill the idea of despotism and to enlighten the masses.

On the issue of “enlightening of the masses” Tunçay contended that Atatürk’s enlightenment programme was deeply related to an old tradition of the West which is “enlightened despotism” (Tunçay, 1981: 326). For Tunçay “enlightened despotism” is a dictatorial and elitist rule of a king and his “enlightened” associates who decide for the best of his society, without the consent of the society. However, “enlightened despot” is the modern version of “philosopher king” of Plato (Ağaoğulları, 2011: 535).

Interestingly several Kemalist historians portray Atatürk as a philosopher king, a concept which was created by Plato in Ancient Greece as the best model of governing (Mango, 2004: 484 – 485). For instance Akşin (2014: 215) and Karal (2003: 24) praise Atatürk for acting like a philosopher king. This was majorly for Atatürk’s famous evening meetings in which he decided his reforms in a “platonic” and “dialectic” way with his associates. For these Kemalist historians, this dialectic decision – making process based on common sense which was another democratic feature of his era because these evening gatherings functioned almost like a constitutional institution.

The process of the abolishment of Sharia law gradually happened during the Ottoman era. Starting from 1826 Sultan Mahmut II showed great efforts to secularize the state (Berkes, 1998: 92). After Mahmut II’s reign this trend continued and secular schools and secular courts were established which were accompanied by religious ones. The total abolishment of Sharia happened during the Kemalist era (461). This

move of the Kemalist rule is portrayed as a democratic of aspect of Kemalist reforms (Akşin, 2002: 25). Under the Sharia laws, the testimony of women counted as the half of a man, slavery is allowed, a man may marry up to four woman, man could divorce a woman with words “I divorce you” whereas the women are not allowed the same, adultery is punished with stoning to death, beating is accepted as normal in education and for wives (Akşin, 2007: 194).

The abolishment of Sharia happened gradually. On 3 March 1924 the Caliphate was abolished and all religious schools were closed. In the same year all religious courts were closed down too. In 1926 the Civil Code of Switzerland was translated and adopted in Turkey. This was a “decisive moment of secularism” as “the wheels of the society were thus put on a new track” (Berkes, 1998: 467). With this law the supremacy of Sharia on the realm of Turkish civil law came to an end. This was also a major development for women rights especially for the reason that polygamy was banned. In addition to that in 1930 for local elections and in 1934 for general elections women were given the right to vote by the Turkish Grand National Assembly before several European countries such as France, Italy and Switzerland. Mango stated that Turkish women owe their rights to Atatürk (2004: 535).

Lack of mass mobilization was another significant democratic feature of the RPP for its time. Zürcher stated that Atatürk never held mass rallies although his contemporaries such as Hitler and Mussolini did it frequently (2013: 186). When RPP’s secretary general Recep Peker argued that the party should dominate the state, Atatürk took the contrary view and “subordinated the party to the state” and later dismissed Peker (Mango, 2008: 166). Although there was a party – state unification between 1935 and 1939 the RPP had no organization in 12 provinces in the Eastern Anatolia in 1936 (Uyar, 2012: 221). During Atatürk’s presidency, maximum rate of the membership to the RPP was 7.8 per cent whereas this number raised to 9.5 during İnönü’s presidency which were quite low for a single – party state (Uyar: 218).

Mango remarked that the RPP had a flag but had no uniforms or shock troops. It was a “disciplined country” under an “unopposed pragmatic government” which respected institutions of democracy such as a liberal constitution of 1924, a

parliament and a strong belief in multi – party system (2004: 480). The ultimate transition to multi – party regime happened in 1950, with the initiation of president İsmet İnönü, who was Atatürk’s successor and prime minister of Atatürk era. Rustow stated that İnönü has the honour of being the only politician who voluntarily limited dictatorial powers and improved democracy in the world (as cited in Kongar, 1985: 162).

3.4. Counter – Revolutionary Challenges against Kemalism

In order to trace the counter - revolutionary incidents one needs to handle the emergence of the term “irtica” (obscurantism/fundamentalism). The term “irtica” came into circulation with the “31 March incident” (which actually happened on 13 April 1909 in Gregorian calendar) which was a counter – revolution attempt in 1909 against the proclamation of parliamentary monarch by the Young Turks in 1908. The Young Turks labelled the insurgents “*erbab-ı irtica*” (lords of religious fundamentalism) and the term “irtica” started to take place in dictionaries after 1909 (Zürcher, 2001: 216 – 217).

This had an impact on the Kemalist rule too. Zürcher remarked that “the Kemalists saw the struggle as one between progress (represented by them) and reaction (represented by religious organizations outside state control)” which was partly caused by the “trauma of 31 March incident” (2001: 216). Indeed when the Sheik Said Revolt happened in 1925, in the Kurdish – majority regions of Turkey, the prime minister Fethi (Okyar) equated the rebellion with 31 March incident (Zürcher: 217).

However the 31 March incident took place in the Young Turk era. The Kemalists encountered with a great reaction especially in the Turkish Independence War. Especially in mainstream Turkish historiography the series of insurgences are called “internal rebellions” (*İç İsyanlar*). (Aydemir, 1966 – a: 300).

Nevertheless this is a distortion to not call it a “civil war” when it is considered that there is no term called “external rebellion”. In her book, the “Turkish

Ordeal” these rebellions are called the “Turkish Civil War” by Halide Edib (Adıvar) (1928), a witness of Turkish National Struggle. In his book “İç Savaş ve Sevr’de Ölüm” (*The Civil War and Death in the Treaty of Sevres*) Akşin (2010) embraces this conceptualization too and draws attention to the simultaneity of the Civil War and the Sevres Treaty which was the “death warrant” of the Ottoman Empire and Turks.



Figure 1: Rebellions against the Ankara government between 1919 and 1923 (Commission of Turkish National Education Ministry, 2011: 40, translated by the author).

As one could see from the Map 1 the there was a countrywide resistance against the Ankara government. Just after the Nationalists (under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha) established a parliament in Ankara on 23 April 1920, the Damat Ferit Pasha government in Istanbul and the last sultan Vahdettin issued fatwas (religious orders) against the Nationalists. These fatwas were distributed all over Anatolia by the aeroplanes of occupier Greek and British armies in the name of protecting Sharia laws (Aydemir, 1966 – a: 304). Meanwhile an organization of ulema, namely “Association of the Advancement of Islam” (*Teali-i İslam Cemiyeti*) was propagating that the occupier Greek army should be counted as the army of caliphate (Aydemir: 305).

The Istanbul government was organizing the Caliphate Army, Kuvayı İnzibatiye Armies and Anzavur Revolt in the Marmara region whereas Düzce, Konya

and Yozgat Revolts were being instigated by them too because these regions were the surroundings of Ankara. When the insurgent groups came very near to Ankara (namely Beypazarı and Ayaş), the Ankara government was under a tremendous jeopardy (Aydemir: 303).

Meanwhile there were many ethnic revolts. In the Kars region there was a rebellion of the Armenians whereas in the Black Sea region there was a revolt of the local Greeks. Several Kurdish tribes revolted too such as Milli Aşireti, Koçgiri and Cemil Çeto Rebellions. Also several commanders of the Ankara government revolted against the Nationalists when the Ankara government embraced the organization of a proper army rather than independent fighter groups. Çerkes Ethem and Demirci Mehmet Efe Revolts were the examples of these.

In this context Akşin held that the Greek armies took the advantage of the Civil War and made a great offence in Western Anatolia including Bursa, a former capital of the Ottoman Empire. Akşin depicted the “darkest moment of all Turkish history” as following:

At the time of the Greek attack, the Turkish people of the west were fully engaged in the Civil War and in these circumstances the Greek victory was not surprising. Since the Civil War had been instigated and to some extent directed by Vahdettin, it is no exaggeration that the Greeks owed their victories to him. However, he could not have been pleased by the defeat of the National Forces, since this left him no choice but to accept the Treaty of Sevres, which gave the death sentence of the Ottoman rule (2007: 158).

Also it is very important to understand how Atatürk approaches these rebellions against the Ankara government. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal Pasha said:

Bloody revolutions are solid; bloodless ones are not permanent. But we have shed sufficient blood to come to this revolution. It has been shed not only on battlefields, but within the country... There have been many risings, all of which have been suppressed. Let us hope that there will be no more bloodshed. The first duty of our educated people is to enlighten and guide the opponents of our happy revolution (as cited in Mango, 2004, p. 371).

From these sayings of Atatürk, one could come to the conclusion that the Turkish Independence War was not only launched against the occupier armies but also against the non – enlightened opponents of the Ankara government.

The other counter - revolutionary challenges took place after the proclamation of republic (1923). In the mainstream Turkish historiography the results of two multi – party system attempts are portrayed as counter - revolutionary challenges because they were followed or preceded by Sheikh Said Revolt, assassination attempts against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Menemen incident (Azak, 2010: 25). In 1924 the Progressive Republican Party was founded by conservative former commanders of the Nationalists such as Kazım (Karabekir), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Refet (Bele) and Rauf (Orbay). They were pro – sultanate and pro – caliphate. Akşin argued that “this party was to the right of the RPP, the Progressive Party would quite likely become a magnet for conservatives and reactionaries of all kinds, and with its first branch established in Urfa, a conservative stronghold, the likelihood increased” (2007: 200).

Indeed the Sheikh Said Revolt in 1925 happened just after establishment of the Progressive Party. It was Kurdish – nationalist, counter – revolutionary and feudal movement (Akşin: 200). Trimberger highlighted that “[t]he Kurdish Rebellion of 1925 was the most severe outbreak of armed counterrevolution; it was a reaction to attempts at central control and secularism of the bureaucratic revolutionaries (1978: 31). After this rebellion special tribunals were founded and less than fifty people were executed which is a small number when it is compared to “French and Russian terror eras” (Trimberger: 33).

However Tunçay argued that it was not a counter – revolutionary obscurantist movement, just a nationalist one (Tunçay: 1981: 129). Also many see the suppression of this revolt by the Law of Maintenance of Order as the suppression of political opponents. For instance Zürcher (2013:174) and Azak (2010: 23) argue that this law consolidated the political power of the RPP and gave it almost dictatorial powers. Thus without proper proofs the leaders of the Progressive Party was associated with assassination attempts against Atatürk in order to eliminate them (Zürcher: 174). Although they were accused without evidences, “all of the moderates were acquitted, but six were sentenced to exile and a few others escaped overseas before being arrested” (Trimberger: 35).

The counter – revolutionary challenges took place in Erzurum and Rize after the reform of 1925, in Kurdish – majority regions such as Ağrı and Tunceli, in Menemen (1930) and in Bursa after the adoption of Turkish call to prayers (*ezan*) in 1933 (Azak, 2010: 31, 59). Lewis calls the insurgences of Kurdish – majority regions as the “Turkish La Vendée” which brings the Atatürk Revolution into the context of French Revolution (2002: 482). The Menemen incident became a historical event when it is compared to other counter – revolutionary challenges and the narrative on it caused a “perpetual conflict between Islamists and Kemalists” (Azak: 22).

On 23 December 1930 the followers of religious order revolted against the Republic in the name of Sharia and they beheaded a republican officer, Kubilay. Kubilay, “the heroic victim of the incident, has become an icon of Kemalist secularism” (Azak: 22). This incident created a “trauma” on the Kemalists as their opponents “beheaded” a young republican officer which was a quite feudal and medieval act in the eyes of Kemalists. The simultaneity of the Menemen incident and people’s interest for a newly – established political party, the Free Republican Party evoked anger among Kemalists. Thus this token opposition party, Free Republican Party had to dissolve itself just few days before the Menemen incident.

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE “COUNTER – REVOLUTION” IN TURKEY

The concept of “counter – revolution” came into circulation in 1960s. “Counter – revolution” means the partial or total subversion of the secular regime. According to Akşin a “total counter – revolution” would include “reestablishment of the Arabic script, sultanate and caliphate” (2014: 411). If the counter – revolutionaries only re - establish the Sharia law without adopting the caliphate, sultanate and Arabic alphabet, it would be deemed as a “total counter –revolution” for Akşin, too (411). However these are not carried out yet in Turkey. Thus there is only a “partial counter – revolution” in Turkey (Akşin, 2014: 410 – 411). Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mihri Belli and İlhan Selçuk were the very first people to introduce the concept of “counter – revolution”.

Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, İlhan Selçuk and their associates established the journal *Yön* (the Direction) in 1961. This journal was published until 1967. It is quite important that this term is only used by left Kemalists. Left Kemalism is an ideological current that began in 1930s. The left Kemalists consisted of three main groups which are the *Kadro* members, *Yön* and National Democratic Revolution movement (*Milli Demokratik Devrim Hareketi*) (shortly NDR) and the Neo – Kemalists (Alpkaya, 2015: 477 – 480). Thus only these three circles became the subjects of this study.

The *Kadro* was a political magazine which had the idea of creating the ideology of Kemalism. This magazine was issued between 1932 and 1935. The *Yön*

and NDR movement emerged in the liberal political atmosphere of 1961 constitution. The *Yön* was issued between 1961 and 1967. Both these groups made a leftist interpretation of Kemalism. The *Kadro* and *Yön* were close to the dependency theory of Immanuel Wallerstein whereas the Neo – Kemalists see the major conflict of Turkey not on economic basis but more on cultural conflict that of Enlightenment vs. feudalism or medievalism (Akşin, 2011 – b: 58; Kongar, 1983: 89).

Many Neo – Kemalists such as Kili, Akşin, Kongar are pro – modernization theory (Kansu, 1997: 10). Among them Akşin blames *Kadro* and *Yön* for reducing all social issues to economy and étatism, i. e. “economism” (2011 – b: 58 - 59). Akşin contended that at least the *Kadro* embraces Kemalism however the leftist Kemalists of 1960s (Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mihri Belli etc.) saw the Atatürk Revolution as an accomplished fact. They were hardly ever speaking of Atatürkism. Their focus was merely on development, production, economy and socialism.

It should be denoted that it is not a coincidence that there have been many interactions and transitions between these three groups since they are the branches of left Kemalism as it was aforementioned. For instance a former member of the *Kadro*, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was an author of the *Yön* and later became a columnist in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (the Republic) in 1970s, which was a prominent political centre of Neo – Kemalists. Similarly İlhan Selçuk, one of the pioneers of Neo – Kemalism was one of the founders of the *Yön* and one of the supporters of the NDR movement in early 1970s and tortured for it during the interim era of 1971 military rule. The Neo – Kemalists became an effective circle just after the “trauma” of “so called Kemalism of 12 September 1980 coup”. They were active until mid – 2000s but they are still active to some extent. In this group the most prominent “ideologue” of the counter – revolution could be deemed as Sina Akşin.

4.1. The Periodization Debates on the Counter – Revolution

There are many debates about when the counter - revolution began in Turkey among Kemalist authors. One of them, Çetin Yetkin argued that the counter –

revolution began on 11 November 1938, i. e. the day after Atatürk died (2009: 17). In his book “Counter – Revolution: 1945 – 1950” (*Karşıdevrim: 1945 – 1950*) without questioning whether it had an ideological content or not, Yetkin contended that Atatürk’s successor İnönü immediately purged the associates of Atatürk such as Kılıç Ali, Hüsrev Gerede, Cevat Abbas Gürer, Hasan Rıza Soyak, Neşit Hakkı Uluğ, Tahsin Uzer, Celal Bayar, Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Şükrü Kaya (2009: 37 – 38). Also the prominent people of Progressive Party such as Kazım Karabekir and Rauf Orbay were made members of parliament in 1939 (2009: 47). A critical person to Atatürk Revolution, Halide Edib Adivar was made professor by İnönü administration (2009: 48).

As one could understand from the title of the book of Yetkin, this book is on the period of 1945 – 1950. For Yetkin just after the end of the World War II, İnönü decided to establish the multi – party regime in order to become a part of the so – called “liberal West”. Yetkin argued that “several concessions from the Atatürk Revolution” began by the İnönü administration after İnönü decided to make Turkey an “outpost of the United States of America” as a measure against the threats of Soviet Russia on Turkey. This required concessions such as “victimization of the education system of Village Institutes, closure of leftist parties, abandoning the land reform, taking debts from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (shortly IMF), opening of Imam and Preacher courses, theology faculties and several tombs” (Yetkin: 597 – 603).

Mihri Belli from the NDR movement criticized the İnönü administration too. Belli gave a speech at Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences on 5 December 1968. The title of the speech was “The Counter – Revolution in Turkey” (Belli, 1970: 85 – 149). Because of this speech Belli was tried and was acquitted later. For Belli, the “Kemalist counter – revolution” began in 1942, the year which marks the beginning of the Şükrü Saracoğlu government (101). For Belli Saracoğlu should be accused of “worst economic policies, collaboration with fascist and pro – Nazi circles” (102 – 103). However it is questionable whether these factors make Saracoğlu a counter – revolutionary. Belli asserted that the RPP failed to apply the

land reform, thus could not overcome the dominance of landlords and sheiks and began a race in compromising on obscurantism with the DP. For Belli the leaders of the RPP were forgetting something: “the RPP was the party of Atatürk” and the imperialism would never ever support the RPP for this reason, indeed the West supported the DP (104).

In the mainstream leftist Kemalism generally the election of the DP to the government in 1950 is generally deemed as the beginning of the counter – revolution. Unlike Yetkin, Akşin remarked that the 1946 – 1950 was just a transition period to (partial) counter – revolution (2014: 410). Although the DP arose from the RPP as a right wing party, there are many reasons why Kemalist circles called the DP “counter – revolutionary”. One of the very first acts of the DP was the return to Arabic call for prayers in 1950. The DP tried to get the votes of conservative Sunni peasant masses. Thus the DP adopted some Islamic – populist policies such as supporting religious brotherhoods, increasing of the budget of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs, opening of the Imam and Preacher schools, permission to broadcasting of readings from Quran on the state radio (Sarıbay, 1991: 128).

Before the conceptualization of the term “counter – revolution” Nadir Nadi, a columnist of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (the Republic) and the former members of *Kadro* (The Cadre) gave the first reactions to counter – revolutionary tendencies of the DP which came to the government with the first free and fair elections of 1950. When the DP allowed the Arabic call to prayers instead of Turkish, Nadi pointed out that the DP would subvert the Hat Reform and Alphabet Reform of Atatürk too on 7 June 1950 (1981: 14).

For Nadi, the multi – party system in Turkey was established after the San Francisco Conference of 1945 where it was decided by the West that multi – party regime is the fundamental term to become a member of their side. Although Nadi was a German supporter during the World War II (and this might make him a “counter – revolutionary” from the perspective of Belli), with a pejorative stance Nadi remarked that this “San Franciscan democracy” was imposed by the West and it was to open up discussions on the reforms of Atatürk in order to get the votes of

conservative masses (1965: 201). Nadi pointed out that indeed the prime minister of the DP government, Adnan Menderes set forth an antagonism which is the “Atatürk reforms accepted by the nation vs. unaccepted reforms” when he was dismantling the ban on principle that the call to prayers could not be made in any other language than Turkish. Also Menderes blamed the ones who were against this change as “revolutionary reactionaries” (*inkılap yobazları*) (Nadi, 1965: 279).

Three former Cadre members, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and Vedat Nedim Tör saw the history as written by heroes which is close to the Carlylean philosophy of history. These heroes were to apply the elitist principle of “for the people, despite the people”. Atatürk and to some extent İnönü were these kind of heroes (Aydemir, 1974: 31; Karaosmanoğlu, 2012: 173; Tör, 1980: 27).

Tör highlighted that with the end of the era of heroes and beginning of the multi – party regime a “demagogic degeneration” began and the principles and reforms of Atatürk were put up for a “negative auction” (*açık eksiltme*) one by one by the “vote hunters” (1980: 28). This is the “Drama of Kemalism” (*Kemalizmin Dramı*) according to Tör. Similarly Aydemir held that because of this “vote hunting” system and abuse of religious beliefs of the electorate, Turkey became a semi – independent state and the Turkish nation became a victim of imperialist - colonialist powers and exploitative classes, thus the ideals of Kemalism could not be realized (1974: 32). Karaosmanoğlu set forth the link between the multi – party system and anti – secularist vote hunting mechanism in a novel, “Panorama”. In this novel it is held that after 1950 elections, Arabic call to prayers were allowed, religious brotherhoods became more visible, attacks to Atatürk monuments and Kemalist people became widespread, the Hat reform was violated and last but not least obscurantism awakened (2008 - a: 588 - 591).

As it is portrayed by many, the election of the DP in 1950 is not the “victory of the people”, however it is the “consolidation of Kemalist counter – revolution” according to Belli (1970: 104). The perpetrators of 27 May 1960 military coup were tackling with the counter – revolution but the base of this coup was unaware of a

counter – revolution so they were insufficient to overcome it (112 – 113). The bureaucratic institutions adopted by the 1961 constitution such as High Council of Judges, Constitutional Court, Council of State, Court of Appeals and universities were deemed as the “strongholds of Kemalism” and thus a blow to “Kemalist counter – revolution”.

Belli’s was the first usage of the term “Kemalist counter – revolution”. One year later, on 10 November 1969 another leftist Kemalist İlhan Selçuk wrote an essay for the anniversary of Atatürk’s death. Therein he called the post – 1945 process a “Kemalist counter – revolution” (1981: 20). Selçuk argued that during this process Turkey became “a satellite of the Western bloc, étatism and revolutionism principles of Atatürk were destroyed, imam and preachers are militantly raised with a Sharia – based education in Imam and Preacher Schools, the usage of Arabic script became widespread, the Arabic call to prayers was allowed and the mosques became ideological clubs for political Islam” (20 -21).

Between 1950 and 1960 the DP closed down the Village Institutes and People’s Houses, two significant institutions established during the single party period. Also a governmental co – option policy was carried out for the religious brotherhoods, especially Nurcus. On this issue Berkes pointed out that “[t]he governments of the 1950’s gave free reign to all sorts of obscurantism under the guise of restoring the freedom of religion and in the name of democracy” (1998: 503). In the spring of 1960, the DP aimed to ban the RPP which paved the way of a military coup according to many Kemalists. After the Turkish military seized power in May 1960, the DP was banned and the leaders of this party were tried. A liberal constitution was enacted and came into force by the popular vote in 1961.

In 1965 again a successor party of the DP, the JP won the elections. The leader of the JP, prime minister Süleyman Demirel again “benefited from his religious connections” and had close ties with Nurcus (Arat, 100). The political success of pro – American and conservative parties in each election raised criticism among leftist Kemalists, namely *Yön* group and the NDR movement. For them “Turkey had fallen under the hegemony of conservative powers, an alliance of

comprador bourgeoisie, local gentry and feudal landlords [ağas] which had become the internal agent of US imperialism” (Ulus, 2011: 27).

In 1971, another leftist Kemalist and the founder of the *Yön* group Doğan Avcıoğlu clarified his opinions on counter – revolution in his book “On the Revolution” (Devrim Üzerine) (1971: 133). Avcıoğlu contended that the counter - revolution took place after 1945 except for the short interim period following the 1960 military coup. For Avcıoğlu in each election, the coalition of conservative powers i. e. landlords, sheiks, money landers and middlemen “came out from the ballot box” because of their economic “dictatorship” on peasant masses (1971: 133). This “dictatorship” was to be eradicated by a revolution carried out by the “vigorous forces” (*zinde kuvvetler*) namely “workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, progressive intellectuals, revolutionary military officers and the national bourgeoisie” according to Avcıoğlu (Ulus, 2011: 24).

The subsequent electoral victories of the JP culminated in harsh criticism of these leftist Kemalists. To be elected by the voters and struggling in the parliament were no choice for them. This parliamentary method was called “parliamentarism” (*parlamentoculuk*) with a mocking manner by them and it was no solution because the parliamentary system and elections were under the tutelage of the United States and the conservative powers remarked before (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 135). With a pejorative stance, Avcıoğlu argued that due to this tutelage in Turkey and in the developing world, this type of democracy should be called “Philippine democracy” or “petty democracy” (*cici demokrasi*) or “multi –party fascism” (1971: 147-8). It should be also denoted that Avcıoğlu exploited the ideas of Duverger and Lambert who argued that “parliamentary democracy would, as a rule, bring conservative parties to power in underdeveloped countries” (Ulus, 2011: 39). Thus Avcıoğlu elaborated on the projection of an anti – democratic regime ruled by the military which is similar to the Ba’ath regimes of Syria or Iraq (Ulus: 3).

4.2. The Counter – Revolution Theses of the Neo – Kemalists

The expectations of leftist Kemalist circles from the army were overturned by two interventions of the Turkish army: the memorandum of 12 March 1971 and coup d'état on 12 September 1980. After 1971 memorandum, Doğan Avcıoğlu and İlhan Selçuk were tortured and tried because of their plans to carry out a tentative “national democratic revolutionary coup d'état” which was failed on 9 March 1971. Later, in 1987 Selçuk published a book “Ziverbey Köşkü” (*Ziverbey Mansion*), the place where he was tortured during that era. In that book he set forth his reactions to the interim period that followed the 12 March memorandum.

As for the 1980 military coup, the allegedly anti – secularist actions of General Kenan Evren during the interim era of 1980 - 1983 were blows to the many Kemalists. Evren was criticized as he cited from Quran and Prophet Muhammad's sayings in his public speeches, closure of Atatürk's political party (the RPP), attempting to abolish Turkey's first - adopted national day which is the 23rd April or the “National Sovereignty and Children's Day” in 1982, making “Culture of Religion and Knowledge of Ethics” lesson compulsory in schools, building Sunni mosques in Alevi villages and appointment of university personnel from conservative groups and religious brotherhoods (Akşin, 2007: 283; Mumcu, 2013: 123; Velidedeoğlu, 1989: 468).

In spite of the fact that Evren portrayed himself as a devout Kemalist, the Kemalist circles argued that Evren was strongly influenced by the “Turkish – Islamic synthesis”, “a conservative ideology founded in 1970 by influential people from the business world, the universities and politics to break the monopoly of left-wing intellectuals on the social political and cultural debate in Turkey” (Zürcher, 2013: 288). Especially the decision of cutting off the financial support of the Turkish Language Institution and Turkish History Institution from Atatürk's bank accounts against the will of Atatürk and making of these independent institutions ordinary state organs by the military leaders of this era culminated in reactions of Kemalists. Not only for this reason, but also for the other reasons remarked above the editor of newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, Nadir Nadi wrote the book “Ben Atatürkçü Değilim” (I am

not an Atatürkist) to show this “hypocrisy” of the military leaders and to argue that “Evren’s policy was presenting his un – Kemalist, even anti – Kemalist moves as Kemalism” (Akşin, 2007: 291). Similarly Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, the founder of Association of Kemalist Thought, wrote the book “12 Eylül: Karşı – Devrim” (*12 September: the Counter – revolution*) based on the very same reasons.

Many Neo – Kemalists highlighted that especially Evren and also all other pro - partial counter - revolution political parties intended to conceal the fact that the Atatürk Revolution was “frozen”³. “Kemalist anniversaries were commemorated within increasing fervor and Atatürk’s iconography filled every corner of public life” (Akşin, 2000: 218). Kenan Evren made such moves in this framework. For instance Evren publicly “professed himself as an enthusiastic and loyal Kemalist” and his administration decided to make the “principles of Atatürk” course compulsory in the universities (Akşin, 2007: 283 - 284). This is called the “ceremonial Atatürkism” (*tören Atatürkçülüğü*) by Akşin (2000: 218) and Mumcu (2013: 122). Other Kemalists such as Avcıoğlu calls it the “Menderes-style Atatürkism” (*Menderes Atatürkçülüğü*), whereas Kili names it the “so-called Atatürkism” (*sözde Atatürkçülük*) and Selçuk calls it the “wardrobe Atatürkism” (*gardrop Atatürkçülüğü*) (as cited in Tekiner, 2010: 168).

Contending that Evren and many other prominent military leaders were influenced by the “Turkish - Islamic synthesis”, Zürcher highlighted that “[t]he army had been conditioned to see socialism and communism as Turkey's most deadly foes and it saw indoctrination with a mixture of fierce nationalism and a version of Islam friendly to the state as an effective antidote” (2013: 288). However Ömer Laçiner (1996), Tanıl Bora and Ümit Kıvanç (1996) held that this was due to the irreconcilable fracture between “official conservative Kemalism of the state” and the leftist – social democratic Kemalist circles. For Özyürek, this was due to “the loss of political monopoly in public space” of early Republican elite and their children in 1980s (2006: 17).

In this framework with the rise of political Islam in 1980s the demands of the women wearing headscarf to become a part of the public space were harshly rejected

by the Neo – Kemalists. Aksoy and Üçok asserted that the head covering for women is not obligatory in Islam and thus headscarf is only a symbol of Islamism and protesting the Atatürk Revolution in a counter – revolutionary manner (Aksoy, 1990: 35 – 37; Üçok, 1993: 205). Kili asserted that the headscarf was a political symbol which “is being used as a threat to the laic republican regime with the intention of changing it to an Islamic regime” (2011: 287). Although Kenan Evren was deemed as “counter – revolutionary” by the Neo – Kemalist circles, it should be denoted that Evren was of the same opinion with the Neo – Kemalists regarding headscarf.

Not only the rising opposition of political Islam but also the Kurdish political movement along with the armed insurgence, the questioning the Kemalist establishment by the leftist – liberal “Second Republicans” contributed to the process of the foundation of “Neo – Kemalism”. Kemalism was no more a hegemonic ideology “but rather a fragile ideology in needs of citizens’ protection” and this resulted in the establishment of many Neo – Kemalist associations starting from 1989 (Özyürek: 16). The Neo – Kemalism or the “privatized version of Kemalism” has both similarities and differences when it is compared to its classical form as the Neo - Kemalism “promotes nationalism, secularism, and modernization, yet it is organized by independent groups of individuals who define themselves as outside the state organization even when they receive extensive help and support from the army” (Özyürek: 18).

On 19 May 1989, the date which marks the 70th anniversary of the official beginning of Turkish Independence War, the “Association of Kemalist Thought” was established by academicians, former bureaucrats and journalists especially from the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* etc. The prominent founders were Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Anıl Çeçen, Mustafa Coşturoğlu, Özer Ozankaya, İlder Ertuğrul. Also Uğur Mumcu was a member. Sina Akşin still serves for the science and counselling organ of this association. For Akşin, this association served for “crystallization of Kemalism into an ideology” and played a significant role in the “resurgence of Kemalism” (2007: 291). Again in 1989 the

“Association for the Support of Modern Living” was founded by professor Türkan Saylan along with many other academicians and women (Erdoğan, 2001: 235 - 237).

Some other establishment of Neo – Kemalist foundations and associations continued this trend. The Foundation of Modern Education (Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı), the Union of Turkish Women (Türk Kadınlar Birliği), the Association of Modern Lawyers (Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği), the Association of Republican Women (Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği) were among them. However the most efficient ones were the “Association of Kemalist Thought” and the “Association for the Support of Modern Living”.

In the statute of the Association of Kemalist Thought, one of the aims was written as “to carry out enlightening and cautionary services in order to tackle the counter – revolutionary powers of Turkey” (Erdoğan: 237). Similarly Saylan argued that the growing of new Neo – Kemalist associations was to overcome the actions of counter - revolutionaries who were trying to subvert the democratic system of Turkey (as cited in Erdoğan: 240). It should be highlighted that the Association of Kemalist Thought became “the country's largest civil society organization with more than 500 branches and nearly 100.000 members” in 2002 (Akşin, 2007: 292).

4.2.1. Counter – Revolution at Individual Level

The burden of counter – revolution was on the unenlightened, otherworldly majority of Turkey according to some Kemalist authors. Nadi pointed it out in his column in *Cumhuriyet* in 1966. Nadi contended that a “minority” in Turkey is taking the profit of the Atatürk Revolution and sending their children to Europe for education, entertaining themselves in balls and cocktail parties whereas the “majority” of Turkey is amusing themselves with the beauties of the paradise, underestimating or could not reveal their wide range of abilities under the great influence of obscurantist people (1986: 18).

In 2013 with a sarcastic and to some extent mocking manner, Akşin called this people “homo ahretikus”, i.e. the otherworldly human type (2013: 103).

Accordingly, the otherworldly human sees this world as a “deceptive guesthouse” and a “preparation place for the afterlife”. Thus the person should carry out good works to get the divine blessing (*sevap işlemek*) and refrain from sins (*günah*) (2013: 103). Akşin elaborated on this concept in the article “Homo Ahretikus” in 2017. Akşin highlighted that he set forth this term in contrast to “homo economicus” and “homo politicus”, the former acts within the framework of his/her economic profits whereas the latter for political profits (2017: 225). Akşin held that these are the human profiles of the modern age whereas the otherworldly human is the human profile of medieval age (225).

Accordingly this “medieval aspect of the majority of the Turks”, especially the rural and uneducated people, became apparent during the Turkish Civil War (Akşin, 2013: 103). Akşin pointed out that the rebellions against the Ankara government were instigated mainly in the surroundings of Ankara, namely Bandırma, Düzce, Bolu, Yozgat and Konya and the last sultan Vahdettin triggered these insurgencies on purpose⁴. However Akşin questioned why these people obeyed the “illegitimate and anti – nationalistic” orders of the sultan. Akşin held that the sultan is on the top of feudal pyramid. The sultan is like a “super – landlord” (*süperağa*) and with the title of caliph he is a “super – sheikh” (*süperşeyh*) which culminates in the fact that all otherworldly people have to obey him in a “robotic” manner (2013: 103). For them this obeying constitutes a “religiously good work” (*sevap*) and if they would have supported the nationalists in Ankara, it would have been a sin according to Akşin (103).

For Akşin, due to the early closure of Village Institutes and People’s Houses, the rural masses “could not be enlightened” which culminated in the remaining of the majority of the voters in the multi – party era as “otherworldly human beings” (2017: 227). Indeed, the homo ahretikus became the “hero of multi – party era” (226). According to Akşin voting a secularist or Atatürkist party the (namely the RPP) would be a “sin” for the otherworldly people because it would carry them into the hell. Since the feudal relationships are not abolished totally, these people still vote in accordance to the will of their landlords and/or sheikhs (228)⁵.

It should be remarked that this view underestimates that a significant reason of the electoral support of the DP and JP governments was the economic growths of 1950s and 1960s which were provided by these governments (Ahmad, 2014: 109; Arat, 2002: 97). Accordingly, the DP and JP governments adopted nepotist and clientelist policies. Although Neo – Kemalists tend to assert that these critics are in the framework of “economism”, the Neo - Kemalists have a very “culturalist” approach, i. e. they generally emphasize the importance of cultural matters without concerning the economic issues. Also it should be denoted that there are no quantitative research data that the “majority of the Turkish voters” are voting for otherworldly reasons. There are quantitative results on the increases in the attendance to pray in mosques and headscarf wearing but Akşin does not concern himself with these, as he only focuses on election results.

If we return to Akşin’s claims, Akşin held that the party of Atatürk Revolution (the RPP) never gained the majority of the seats in the parliament since 1950 for all the aforementioned reasons⁶. A homo economicus or homo politicus would vote for a party which offers tax decreases, wage increases etc (2017: 228). On the other hand the otherworldly humans are aware of the economic disadvantages such as “high fertilizer and diesel fuel prices”. However they choose to ignore these and pay attention to finding out and voting for the “most medievalist political party” in order to go to the paradise and reach eternal felicity (228)⁷.

Thus the multi – party regime came under suspicion by the Neo – Kemalists. For them the multi – party system is anti – democratic because it is a perpetual continuation of the governments of partially or totally pro – Sharia political parties and counter –revolution. The Neo - Kemalists come to the conclusion that an Atatürkist party has never got the majority of the seats in the parliament until now and will never get the majority in the future because of the majority of otherworldly masses in Turkey.

Although it is true that the RPP never gained the majority in the parliament since 1950, it is a speculative assertion that it will never get the majority in future. Also another significant point here is that there is an almost “demonization” of the

multi – party regime. As answer to this critique, Akşin argued that the multi – party regime can only be respected if it only functions in favour of the democracy. Akşin asks how the multi – party regime could be embraced if it culminates in the election of Hitler and the subversion of democracy (2011 – b: 127). Akşin went even further and asserted that post – 1950 period in Turkey is another single party period, because the majority of the parliament has always been won by the partial or total counter – revolution(ary parties) (2014: 535). It could be argued that this thinking of Neo – Kemalists is paving the road to their desire to turn back to the single – party period of Atatürk instead of a counter - revolutionary single – party period. It should be underlined that this stance of Neo - Kemalists could not be deemed as an anti – democratic stance in the contemporary world and it is highly criticized.

The critique of multi – party regime does not result in a call for a military coup among Neo – Kemalists unlike leftist Kemalists of 1970s, Avcıoğlu and Belli. This could be due to “traumas” of 1971 memorandum and 1980 coup as it was mentioned above. Akşin “brainstormed” for various possibilities such as making easier to ban a counter – revolutionary party, banning the attendance of the counter – revolutionary parties to elections or limitation of parliamentarian numbers of counter – revolutionary parties (2011 – b: 206).

4.2.2. Counter – Revolution at Societal Level

The reflection of the otherworldly humans to the society is the Neo – Kemalists’ arguments on “schizophrenic society”. This concept is set forth by one of the founders of the Association of Kemalist Thought, Coşturoğlu (2005) in his book “Sosyal Şizofreni ve Yaratıcı Düşünce” (*Social Schizophrenia and Creative Thought*) which was published first in 1974. This “schizophrenic split” in the Turkish society was pointed out by Akşin too (2007: 322).

According to Coşturoğlu a “secular minority” and a “pious majority” live in Turkey. Thanks to the Atatürk Revolution, Turkish society is getting “developed” and “improved” (Coşturoğlu, 2005: 75). However these “developments and

improvements” are “only performed by the secular minority” according to Coşturođlu. Akşin held that thanks to the Atatürk Revolution, the secular minority is apparent in numerous places of intellectual and scientific realms in Turkey such as universities, theatres, cinemas, conservatories, opera and ballet houses, newspapers, magazines, TV channels and radio stations (2009: 322 - 323). However the rest is economically and culturally “primitive” according to Coşturođlu (2005: 76).

Akşin and Coşturođlu argued that the counter – revolutionary critique comes from this unenlightened masses. Accordingly this situation is based on the “alienation” of Kemalist/secular minority and the religious majority, because their worldviews, ethical understandings and economic situations are significantly different. This “alienation” is depicted in the novel “Yaban” (*the Outsider*) of Karaosmanođlu (2008 - b). In “Yaban”, the description of days of a nationalist Turkish officer in a remote village of Eskişehir is influenced by Karaosmanođlu’s own experiences.

The nationalist officer Ahmet Celal asks “How a Turk can’t be in favour of Mustafa Kemal Pasha?” to the villagers during the days of Turkish Independence War. One of the peasants, Bekir Çavuş, a former sergeant who is most likely to get the concept of nationhood as he served many years for the army, responds that “they are not Turks, they are a part of the umma of Islam” and adds that “Turks are nomadic [and thus inferior] people” (153). Also Ahmet Celal cannot understand the cordial commitment of the villagers to their sheikh and their trust in sheikh’s words: “the occupier armies are not here to occupy, they are actually the ulema with green turbans and come to rescue them from the nationalist gangs of Mustafa Kemal Pasha” (121).

For Coşturođlu this “alienation” results not only in a class struggle but also a fractionated, divided society which is the “schizophrenic society” (2005: 77)⁸. Accordingly the majority votes for the counter - revolutionaries which results in the subversion of the Atatürk revolution (88). Coşturođlu contended that a two – pieced society is ill and weak and this could be healed in a certain way. Coşturođlu argued that Turkey should embrace the “creative thought” instead of the “ill/schizophrenic

thought” and the Turks should become a “secular society” which is the contrary of the schizophrenic society (153). Again, it should be denoted that there is no quantitative proof of a so – called “schizophrenic society” and the assertion that the majority votes for the subversion of the Atatürk revolution in Turkey.

4.2.3. Education and Counter – Revolution

The Neo – Kemalists argue that the counter – revolution made itself perpetual by taking measures on education. The main aim of counter – revolutionaries were to obstruct Turkish Renaissance which was started by Atatürk (Çeçen, 1990: 251). For the Neo – Kemalists two significant “enlightenment centres” were targeted which were the Village Institutes and People’s Houses and Chambers. Thus Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, the successor of the minister of education Hasan Ali Yücel, one the founders of the Village Institutes, “set about to denature these ‘miracular’ Village Institutes” during the last years of the single – party era (Akşin, 2000: 217). The DP closed them eventually in 1954.

The DP government confiscated the properties of the RPP in 1951. Thus the People’s Houses (and Chambers) as institutions organically related to the RPP, were confiscated and closed down too. The libraries of the People’s Houses were raided and many books were burned according to Çeçen. Many People’s Houses became “public toilets” (Çeçen, 1990: 255). Indeed after their closure, the buildings of former People’s Houses were used for many irrelevant purposes by the state. Many were made city halls, high schools, revenue offices of state, health centres etc⁹. Also many were demolished (Gurallar Yeşilkaya, 1999: 202 - 206). However few were made into theatres, opera houses and public education centres.

The Neo – Kemalists assert that after the closure of these significant “enlightenment centres”, the counter – revolutionary governments opened up so many Imam and Preacher Schools. They argued that after the proliferation of these schools, Imam and Preacher schools almost become a religious education system parallel to the secular schools which was in contradiction with the “Law of Unity of

Education of 1924”, which was deemed as an important step of Atatürk to secularize the education system (Sinanoğlu, 1998: 11; Üçok, 1993: 107). The proof of this is the admission of girls since 1972 to these schools who cannot be imams according to the religious principles according to Akşin (2014: 411).

However Neo – Kemalist circles tend to portray this process in another way. For them the proliferation of Imam and Preacher Schools were carried out almost physically in the place of closed down Village Institutes and People’s Houses and Chambers. Velidedeoğlu contended that the counter – revolution opened up Quran courses as a response to the Nation’s Schools (*Millet Mektepleri*) which were opened up by the RPP to raise the literacy level in Turkey, used religious brotherhoods and Imam and Preacher Schools to fill the gap of the closed down Village Institutes and People’s Houses and Chambers (1989: 455). More importantly these schools teach Sharia law which should only be taught in faculties of law, in the courses of legal history in a totally secular country (1989: 193).

However the Villages Institutes were made physically Teachers’ Schools by the DP, not Imam and Preacher Schools. Also the numbers of these schools were generally low when it is compared to the regular schools. Additionally, these schools existed in the very first years of the single – party period too (see Table 1).

As for the arguments on a “*de facto* two – pronged (secular and religious) secondary education system” and breach of secular foundations of Turkey through proliferation of Imam and Preacher Schools, Acar and Ayata indicate that one could reach considerable evidence when “the academic performance of graduates of Imam-Hatip lycées in the nationally competitive centralized university entrance examinations are compared with those of regular lycées” (2002: 92). Accordingly the “Imam-Hatip graduates’ intentions to continue academic education in the university system in fields unrelated to religion, as well as their success in being placed in the higher education system, has consistently paralleled those of regular lycée graduates since the mid-1980s” (92). Also the girls’ attendance to the Imam and Preacher Schools appealed conservative masses in Turkey as these schools enabled a *de facto* single – sex education system (92).

Table 1: Numbers of Regular High Schools and its students and numbers of Imam and Preacher High Schools and its students. Data collected from Akyüz (2015: 357, 373-374), Katoğlu (2000: 432) and Sarpkaya (2008: 3).

Year	Total number of Regular High Schools	Total number of students of Regular High Schools	Year	Total number of Imam and Preacher High Schools	Total number of students of Imam and Preacher Schools
1923	23	1.241	1925	26	n/a
1931	57	5.699	1927	2	n/a
1940	82	24.862	1931	0	n/a
1950	88	22.169	1955	7	2540
1960	194	75.632	1959	16	n/a
1971	518	244.569	1966	19	13.478
1980	1108	531.760	1971	40	49.308
1991	4089	1.580.729	1977	103	n/a
2003	6512	3.593.404	1980	333	201.004
			1982	341	n/a
			1995	561	493.000
			2002	450	71.000
			2013	854	474.000

On the other hand it could be contended that the closure of the People's Houses was a blow to the stage and performing arts in Turkey, especially to theatre and opera. In 1950 there were 479 People's Houses and many of them were containing stages with orchestra pits, which meant most of these buildings were also the theatres and opera houses of their cities. Now, Turkish State Theatres have nearly fifty stages and the Directorate of State Opera and Ballet only performs in six cities of Turkey, namely Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Mersin, Antalya and Samsun (see table

2). Although there are some private theatres, there are no private opera houses yet in Turkey.

Table 2: Numbers of People’s Houses and Chambers, State Operas and State Theatres. Data collected from a special publication of Directorate General of Turkish State Theatres and Directorate General of Turkish State Opera and Ballet (2009) and from Zeyrek (2006: 24, 25, 35)¹⁰.

Year	Total number of People’s Houses	Total number of People’s Chambers	Year by year total number of State Operas in Provinces	Year by year total number of stages of State Theatres
1932	14	0	1948: 1	1957: 3
1935	103	0	1969: 2	1960: 5
1940	379	141	1982: 3	1983: 12
1945	438	2688	1992: 4	1986: 14
1950	479	4322	1999: 5	2008: 49
			2008: 6	

Performing arts were one of the nine branches of People’s Houses. The others were language, literature and history; fine arts; sports; social welfare; educational courses; publications and libraries; village welfare and museum and exhibitions (Akşin, 2007: 211). Many of these branches were not substituted by the state. The Public Education Centres of state could not fill the gap of the People’s Houses because the Public Education Centres were nothing more than a place for leisure or developing new hobbies (Geray, 2013: 131).

Another Neo – Kemalist, Sinanoğlu contended that a significant blow to pro – Enlightenment and secular education system was the lifting of Latin language

courses in high schools and universities and “classical departments” of high schools which were founded by Hasan Ali Yücel, in which ancient Greek and Latin were taught (1998: 11). Also according to Akşin the vocation of teaching was a respected and well paid job during the early Republican era. However as a part of the counter – revolutionary programme the vocation of teaching was made a second – class job and the compulsory education remained five years for decades (Akşin, 2009: 315). The compulsory education was made eight years only by the intervention of military in 1997 (302).

4.2.4. Religion, State and Economic Dimensions of Counter – Revolution

The intertwining of the trio of “religious brotherhood – politics – commerce” prevail in Turkey, as one of the books of Mumcu has this name (*Tarikat, Siyaset, Ticaret*) (1988). The Neo – Kemalists fear that the state is “under the occupation” of various religious brotherhoods, thus the counter – revolutionaries (Günel, 2015: 487). Balbay argued that either by “capturing” the state mechanism or winning the elections, political Islamists aim to come to power, rule the country and eventually subvert the secular republic into an Islamic state (2011: 31). Accordingly, the capturing of the state happens through two significant instruments which are the graduates of Imam and Preachers schools and the Islamist religious brotherhoods.

For the Neo – Kemalists most of the graduates of the Imam and Preacher Schools do not become imam and preachers, instead they choose to become architects, engineers, lawyers, teachers, judges, governors, undersecretaries of ministries, general directors in the state (Aksoy, 1990: 50; Mumcu, 1988: 163). This is a “spoils system” and infiltration to the cadres of the state for them. Üçok argued that the sixty per cent of the graduates of Imam and Preacher Schools changed their area of specialization such as law (1993: 107). In addition to that Mumcu harshly criticized the “strong ties” of Turgut Özal, the leader of conservative Motherland Party and prime minister, with the Islamist religious brotherhoods (especially Nakshibendis) and their foundations (1998: 43, 154).

The Islamist religious brotherhoods are allegedly supported by the state too. Accordingly this is due to the “infiltration of religious brotherhoods into the state” and counter – revolutionary political parties. Mumcu held that religious brotherhoods are funded by the state or by especially two countries which aim to do “Islamic regime exportation”, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran (1988: 20). In his book “Rabita” Mumcu came to the conclusion that the Turkish state allowed the paying of the wages of imams abroad by the Saudi Arabian political Islamist foundation called “Rabita” (2010). The president Evren and prime minister Özal approved this. Evren responded to these ideas by saying that he would sign it again because the state was in shortage of foreign currency (Velidedeoğlu, 1989: 315).

For the Neo – Kemalists with all these supports Islamists gradually reached a significant level of economic power. Accordingly they opened up schools, universities, foundations, companies, holdings, media organs etc¹¹. This was due to great efforts of the “counter – revolutionary state”, which embraced a “materialistic development model” of “oil – rich Arab sheikdoms” instead of Atatürk’s “integral or wholesale development model” for Akşin (2007: 228 - 229).

Accordingly the integral development model of the Atatürk revolution was trying to get developed in all aspects of the life i. e. infrastructure, technology, economy, industry, science, culture, women’s rights etc. However the counter – revolution’s programme of materialistic development model only focuses on “motorway – dam – factory construction”, thus social and cultural development was put aside in Turkey (Akşin: 229).

Akşin asserted that unlike the oil – rich Arab countries, Turkey did not have “petro - dollars”. In order to import technology, cars, planes and computers Turkey needs to barrow from financial markets abroad. For Akşin thus the counter – revolution made Turkish economy “addicted to barrowing debts” (*borçkoliklik*) and bankrupted (2011 – b: 11). Akşin contended that this triggered corrupted economic relationships of counter – revolutionary governments and an ethical breakdown too (2009: 316). In addition to that in post – 1980 era, the counter – revolutionary governments’ first choice to overcome economic difficulties became to privatize

public enterprises which were majorly founded in the single – party era according to Akşin (2011 – b: 13).

4.2.5. The Role of the Republican People’s Party in Counter – Revolution

For the Neo – Kemalists two significant factors concealed that there has been a counter – revolution taking place in Turkey. These were the “ceremonial Atatürkism” and the RPP. For them the ceremonial Atatürkism was accompanied by the apathy of the RPP towards the counter – revolutionary developments in Turkey. “The RPP somehow was unable, or unwilling to conduct an opposition based on the demand for a return to the Kemalist revolution” (Akşin, 2000: 218). Maybe the RPP was deceived by the ceremonial Atatürkism and the Kemalists were deceived and also relieved by the existence of the RPP.

For these reasons Akşin calls the RPP “the onlooker party of the counter – revolution” and the “opium of the Atatürkists” (2011 – b: 57). The RPP played the role of a “loyal opposition” to the counter – revolution in the post – 1950 era (11). For Akşin this started with the “early decision” of İnönü to embrace the multi – party regime. As cited above Akşin and Yetkin criticized this period, especially the ministry of national education Reşat Şemsettin Sıralı and prime ministry of Şemsettin Günaltay since both had conservative tendencies. After the closure of Village Institutes and People’s Houses and Chambers by the DP neither the leader of the RPP, İnönü nor the so – called Kemalist perpetrators of the 1960 military coup projected to open up these two “enlightenment centres” again (Akşin: 62 - 63).

Accordingly the RPP could not catch the “main conflict of Turkey”. This is the antagonism of the Atatürk revolution versus counter – revolution (Akşin, 2018: 17). Akşin indicated that by accepting “left of the centre” (*Ortanın solu*) strategy or social democracy in 1965, the RPP overlooked this main conflict. In other words for the Neo – Kemalists the conflict of the Enlightenment vs Islamism, the modern age vs. medieval age prevails in Turkey. For them the ideologies like fascism, social democracy and socialism are the products of enlightened and industrialized societies

(Akşin, 2018: 16). This view contains the argument that Turkish society is still not a developed and enlightened society.

The third leader of the RPP, Bülent Ecevit is heavily criticized in this framework. As the foremost promoter of “left of the centre” strategy or social democracy of the RPP, Ecevit and his followers made the six arrows/principles of Atatürk the “grandma’s picture on the wall” (Akşin, 2016: 176) and imported social democracy from Europe. Although the RPP almost had an “allergy” towards the left before 1965 the shift to social democracy was for catching the votes of leftist circles. However this shift was carried out through a re – emphasis on “Atatürkism” and its policy of national independence (Kili, 2011: 274).

Ecevit is attacked by the Neo – Kemalists not only for “importing social democracy” but also for “legitimizing an Islamist political party”, namely the National Salvation Party by accepting it as a coalition partner in 1973, “reductionism” of Atatürk’s hat reform to a “superstructural reform” and his sympathy for the Islamist religious brotherhood of the preacher Fethullah Gülen (Akşin, 2011 – b: 60, 63; Işıklı, 2001: 46, 86). In 1980s and 1990s several social democrats stated that they would get rid of the six arrows/principles of Atatürk. This was a shock to the Neo - Kemalists (Akşin: 63, Kışlalı, 1994: 120 – 122).

Deniz Baykal’s leadership of the RPP in 1990s and 2000s are criticized by the Neo – Kemalists too. Baykal’s embracing of the pro – IMF economic policies and invitation of pro - IMF politicians to the party were considered as attacks to the “étatism” principle of Atatürk (Kili, 2003: 330). Also the RPP nominated a professor of theology as a parliamentarian candidate in 2002 who insisted on the Arabic calls to prayers instead of Turkish and this culminated in the astonishment of Atatürkist voters according to Kili (328).

For all these reasons above Akşin wrote the book “Atatürkçü Partiyi Kurmanın Sırası Geldi” (*It is High Time to Establish a Kemalist Party*) (2002). The political party Akşin referring to was the Independent Republican Party (*Bağımsız Cumhuriyet Partisi*). In the leadership of Mümtaz Soysal, several Neo – Kemalists

such as Sina Akşin, Birgül Ayman Güler, İlder Ertuğrul and Cevat Geray established this political party in 2002. This party remained inefficient up to present.

4.3. The Counter – Revolution Debates in 21st Century and Responses to the Counter – Revolution Arguments of the Neo – Kemalists

The “counter – revolution” arguments of Neo – Kemalists are still ongoing although it is not very strong as it was until the presidential election of 2007. Neo – Kemalist civil society organizations organized a political offensive: the Republic Meetings (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) of 2007. This was to prevent the election of an Islamist president and eventually this attempt of the Neo - Kemalists failed. In the first decade of 21st century the Neo – Kemalist foundations lost its support from the state and army. This was due to the election of Islamist JDP in 2002 and the purging of Kemalist officers in the army through Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) cases. The head of the Association of Kemalist Thought, Şener Eruygur and the Association for the Support of Modern Living, Türkan Saylan were also associated with the Ergenekon case and they were tried for plotting against the JDP government.

Also with the constitutional amendments carried out with a referendum in 2010, the structure of high judiciary was changed and the Kemalist judges lost the majority in the Constitutional Court, Court of Appeals, Council of State, High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. After all these the Neo - Kemalist associations became inefficient and this revealed the fact that there was almost an organic relationship with these associations and purged state elite and army officers.

Meanwhile the newspaper Cumhuriyet went through an era of alteration in parallel to this process. The editor of this newspaper, İlhan Selçuk died in 2010 while he was being tried in Ergenekon case. Also hardliner Kemalist authors such as Deniz Som, Oktay Ekinçi and Oktay Akbal passed away.

The administration of the newspaper were handed to a more liberal group in 2013. Kemalist columnists such as Mustafa Balbay, Bedri Baykam, Alev Coşkun, Bekir Coşkun, Coşkun Özdemir, Ümit Zileli stopped writing whereas “liberal”

authors Aydın Engin, Ahmet İnel and Nuray Mert started to write. The circulation of this newspaper decreased significantly whereas another Neo – Kemalist newspaper, Sözcü (the Speaker) gradually reached a very high circulation with Kemalist authors such as Emin Çölaşan, Bekir Coşkun, Yekta Güngör Özden (former head of the Association of Kemalist Thought), Uğur Dündar and Yılmaz Özdil.

The opposition of Sözcü, the Kemalist fractions in the RPP and in the newspaper Cumhuriyet still pursuing the arguments on counter – revolution. For instance in November 2016 a parliamentarian of the RPP, Özgür Özel argued that the presidential system proposal of the JDP is another serious phase of counter – revolution (NTV, 2016). Also dropping of teaching the evolution theory whereas adding of the Sharia related terms of jihad, ukubat (Islamic criminal law), muamelat (Islamic property law) into the curriculum of state schools and the allowance of imams/muftis to perform an official marriage ceremony for the first time in the Republican history were associated again with the “counter – revolution” in 2017 by a columnist of the newspaper Cumhuriyet, Zeynep Oral (2017).

Also the RPP is still being criticized by the Neo – Kemalist circles. Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership of RPP came under attack as he sought a moderate approach towards the issues related to secularism. The RPP did not keep on a harsh opposition on lifting the ban of headscarf for university, high school and middle school students and civil servants. The RPP’s nomination of the former head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu for the presidential election of 2014 resulted in the reactions of the Neo – Kemalists. The reactions of the Neo – Kemalists to the RPP remind one an aphorism “those who make revolutions by halves do nothing but dig their own tombs” which is attributed to a French revolutionist, Louis Antoine de Saint Just.

The secular Turkish republic is still untouched and the Sharia is not partially or totally applied yet. Here the discursive part of the “counter – revolution” theses become apparent. Until 1990s from political left to the right every political movement had to legitimize itself only by Atatürk and his ideology (Özyürek, 2006:

14 - 15). This is called the Kemalist “logocracy”, i. e. hegemony of the word “Kemalism” in Turkish political life by Hanioglu (2012). Hanioglu asserted that the end of this Kemalist logocracy starting from late 1980s was reflected as the “counter – revolution” by the Neo – Kemalists in the “post – Kemalist society”. The Neo – Kemalist circles were the “fastest political group” to catch up with and give a reaction to the “post – Kemalist framework”. Although they came up with consistent arguments, their arguments are anachronical and do not match the “needs of a post – modern society” (Hanioglu, 2015).

Last but not least the “counter – revolution” arguments might have significant results on democracy. The understanding of the Atatürk revolution by the Neo – Kemalists is a teleological one. They argue that the otherworldly and unenlightened people do not or would not resist an “imperialist occupation” or the Treaty of Sevres. This “traumatic” treaty was a “shock” because its main aim was to push Turks out of Anatolia. The Atatürk Revolution was carried out in order to “make the Treaty of Lausanne permanent” and “enlighten the socially, culturally, politically backward masses” in order to prevent new civil wars and dangers of new treaties similar to that of Sevres (Akşin, 2000: 2016 – 217; Kili, 2011: 292). However the “Second Republicans” call this anxiety of the Kemalists on the possibility of a new Sevres, a “paranoia”, in other words the “Sevres paranoia” (Akşin, 2011 – a: 314).

For the Neo - Kemalists the Atatürk Revolution is “frozen” and the multi – party regime serves for the “counter – revolution”. Thus they came up with a limited democracy approach which promotes bans or restrictions on Islamist political parties and their any potential “allies” such as Kurdish political movement. Vural Savaş, the former chief public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals, wrote two books “Militan Atatürkçülük” (*Militant Atatürkism*) (2001) and “İrtica ve Bölücülüğe Karşı Militan Demokrasi” (*Militant Democracy Against Obscurantism and Ethnic Separatism*) (2003) in this context. In these books he elaborated on why he demanded the closure of Islamist “Welfare Party” while he was in office in 1997. Accordingly, the militant democracy should be embraced in order to prevent from another phase of the counter – revolution which began in 1950 (2003: 16).

The argument of carrying out restrictions on anti – democratic political movements is a controversial issue in the academic field. Starting from Ancient Greece it has been disputed. In 2003, an institution deemed as reliable and significant for human rights and democracy, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECHR) decided that the closure of the Islamist “Welfare Party” was in accordance with the human rights and was in the framework of the protection of the secular Turkish state. This was welcomed by the proponents of militant democracy.

However the militant democracy approach is highly criticized. In the contemporary world any disrespectful act or idea against the will of people that comes out of the ballot box is deemed unacceptable. An opponent of militant democracy, Kirshner turned the tables by naming the militant democracy arguments a “democratic counter – revolution” (2014: 1). The supporters and challengers of militant democracy are still keeping on making this controversy.

Without any doubt any disrespectful action towards democracy and ballot box is unacceptable but one cannot overlook the threat on democracy coming from the political movements which aim to subvert democratic regimes especially when they have electoral success and support of masses. For the continuation of human rights and democracy in a country, limitations on such political movements is approved even by the ECHR and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. On the other side of the medal these restrictions could lead demonization of other political groups which are allegedly related to the anti – democratic movements.

It could be easy to find out a fig leaf to prove that some other groups are connected to the “counter – revolutionaries” or “anti – democrats”. For instance Akşin indicated that the most of the Second Republican authors are columnists in Islamist newspapers (2011 – a: 315). The Neo – Kemalists come to the conclusion that the Islamists are not the only counter – revolutionaries. The supporters of the Second Republic and globalisation, post – modernists, Kurdish political movement and even social democrats critical to Kemalism are allegedly carrying out an alliance with Islamists (Kıslalı, 2000: 17 – 18; Kili, 2011: 295). Consequently the ambiguity or subjectivity of the scope of “anti – democrats” or “counter – revolutionaries”

might cause serious problems for a democratic regime if the irrelevant political groups' rights are restricted too.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

My main aim throughout this dissertation was to trace how the arguments on the “counter – revolution” changed over time in Turkey. In that framework the ideas of French counter - revolutionaries and the counter - revolutions in France and Russia are analysed. This analysis was made on purpose. Karahanoğulları argued that there is a similarity between the Republican and religious circles’ struggle in the Third Republic of France and that of contemporary Turkey especially in the realm of judiciary (2015: 212).

On 15 July 2016, the “religious brotherhood” of preacher Fethullah Gülen which is later called a “terrorist organization”, attempted to carry out a military coup which failed. After this tentative coup it turned out that nearly the half of the generals of the army, two judges of the Constitutional Court, 140 judges of the Court of Appeals, 48 judges of the Council of State, one fourth of all judges and prosecutors, dozens of academicians were the members of this brotherhood or suspected to have strong ties to this religious brotherhood and thus these people were all purged. This culminated in the reproaches of the Neo - Kemalists that they warned the Islamist “Justice and Development Party” (shortly the JDP) government on the infiltration of religious brotherhoods to the state.

This process again triggered the “counter – revolution” arguments of the Neo – Kemalists. For instance Akşin argued that if Gülen and members of his religious brotherhood had succeeded in this failed coup, they would proclaim a full - blown Sharia just like that of Iran or Saudi Arabia and this religious brotherhood would rule

the state by establishing a caliphate (2018: 16). One could assert that this struggle between conservatives/religious brotherhood(s) and secularist republicans in contemporary Turkey might resemble that of Third Republic of France as Karahanoğulları pointed out.

In Russia the revolution was consolidated for decades. Akşin held that the Russians came to the conclusion after seven decades that the revolution could not stay robust where the revolution's base is medievalist (2002: 113). After a long time, seventy years later the counter – revolution appeared and gained success in Russia. Similarly in Turkey the secular republic is still in existence more than ninety years. However there is a danger of counter – revolution like the Russian one for the Neo - Kemalists. Although the Neo – Kemalists contended that only a partial counter – revolution is taking place since 1950, they argue that the signs of a full counter – revolution are apparent since 2002, which marks the election of JDP to the government (Akşin, 2011 – b: 11; Kili, 2011: 289).

These signs are “surrendering from the ceremonial Atatürkism” and the ban on the two national day celebrations in the open – air stadiums, namely 23 April and 19 May celebrations (Akşin, 2017: 226; Sidar, 2013: 230). Also adoption of “pink” public buses for women in conservative cities such as Kahramanmaraş, Malatya and Şanlıurfa, adoption of elective religious courses, Arabic courses, Ottoman Turkish courses in primary, middle and high schools, several expressions of parliamentarians of the government party such as calling the republic “a century - old of fetters on Turkish people” or “commercial break of the history of the Ottoman Empire”, their critics on co – education are other significant developments for the Neo – Kemalist circles. These all trigger the fears of Neo – Kemalists that even after decades a robust revolution could be subverted just like the Russian one.

The Civil War during the Turkish Independence War, counter – revolutionary incidents such as the Sheikh Said Rebellion, assassination attempts against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Menemen incident in early Republican era are significant historical facts. These are accepted as counter – revolutionary incidents in academic literature. The rebellions in Kurdish – majority regions in Eastern Anatolia are called

“Turkish La Vendée” by Lewis (2002: 482). It could be denoted that Lewis aimed to show the resemblance between the French Revolution and the Atatürk Revolution and the counter – revolutionary incidents in these two revolutions.

As it is stated above, Trimberger highlighted that the Sheikh Said Revolt was the “most severe outbreak” of a counter – revolutionary attempt (1978: 31). However Trimberger emphasized that the repression of the counter – revolutionary incidents in Turkey were relatively weak when it is compared to that of French and Russian (counter -) revolutionary eras. Trimberger contended that the “Kurdish Rebellion in Turkey was not very bloody, but afterward 40 rebels were executed. This violence, however, in no way compares with that in the French Revolution, when 400,000 perished in the Vendée reaction and 700,000 French soldiers were killed in foreign wars during 1792 – 1800” (31). Also during the “French terror era” 17,000 were “guillotined” and nearly 10,000 were executed during the “Soviet terror era” only in 1918 and 1919 whereas less than 50 people were executed after the Sheikh Said Revolt in Turkey (33). Trimberger set forth that this was due to the fact that a “revolution from above” does not “necessitate a reign of terror” and pursues a “selective political repression” method (33). In a revolution from above “the initiation of change is accompanied by very little violence, execution, emigration, or counter – revolution” (3).

Although the academic literature covers the Sheikh Said Rebellion, assassination attempts against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Menemen incident as counter – revolutionary incidents, the Neo – Kemalists tend to call another era, the post – 1950 process in Turkey a counter - revolution. In the academic literature the multi – party era of Turkey is not deemed as a counter – revolutionary era. Mango held that the “counter – revolution concept of Akşin” should be rather called a “*partitocrazia*” which is the “domination of all aspects of national life by an ever increasing number of political parties, degenerating into mutual protection societies” (2000: 120, 122).

Mango agreed on the Akşin’s claims that “there have been certainly losses” on “Atatürk’s belief that cultural and material progress should go together”. In this

context the closure of the Village Institutes and People's Houses (and Chambers) could be perceived as "significant losses" and it "set back the process of cultural modernization" (Mango, 2000: 122 – 123). However Mango held that the state does not have to be the only actor in culture. Also the state and the private sector kept on supporting cultural activities and the Turkish state "does retain a role in promoting culture, but is not the only or even the main actor as in the West today" (Mango, 2000: 123). Thus the closure of the Village Institutes and People's Houses (and Chambers) does not mean a counter – revolution in Turkey for Mango.

The counter – revolution arguments of the Neo – Kemalists might be concerned as consistent. However it is not supported by academic literature. This fact contributes to the arguments of many academicians that the Neo – Kemalists' "counter – revolution" claims have a discursive and subjective aspect. However one cannot determine whether the significant academicians in international literature are sharing such a discourse and making subjective remarks or not.

Consequently it could be denoted that the "counter – revolution" arguments of Kemalists came into circulation in late – 1960s. Belli, Avcıoğlu and Selçuk were the first people to introduce this "concept". It is remarked in this dissertation that Avcıoğlu "exploited" the international academic literature to criticize the multi – party regime in Turkey. Avcıoğlu and Belli were in favour of a dictatorship led by the military. The Neo – Kemalist circles appeared in 1980s, under other circumstances. They did not (openly) favour a military coup but they criticized the multi – party regime too. They aimed to limit the rights and liberties of the "counter – revolutionaries" and favoured a "militant democracy". It could be highlighted that being against the multi – party system is not deemed democratic in the contemporary world.

ENDNOTES

1.1. The Subject Matter and the Research Question

1) A remarkable incident happened on this issue short time before. In September 2015, the municipality of Rize, a conservative city in the Black Sea region which is famous for tea production, came up with a plan to change the place of Atatürk monument and erect a “tea glass monument” in its place. This plan triggered the reactions of the Kemalist circles. That plan was not applied. Later in December 2016, the municipality carried the Atatürk monument to its new place in front of the governor’s office in order to erect another monument to commemorate the martyrs of failed military coup of 15 July 2016 in the former place of Atatürk monument. The carriage of Atatürk monument “on the back of a truck” into a new place resulted in harsh reactions of the representatives of the Association of Kemalist Thought in Rize and Neo – Kemalist newspaper *Sözcü* (the Speaker) (2016).

2) I should indicate that I use the “Kemalist revolution” and “Atatürk revolution” interchangeably because Kemal is the forename of Atatürk. Again, Kemalism and Atatürkism are same for me. However I should remark that I might be using the concepts of the Atatürk revolution and Atatürkism more than the Kemalist revolution and Kemalism as the mainstream Kemalist scholars generally use the former conceptualizations and my primary resources will be the works of orthodox Kemalists for this thesis. Also it should be remarked the state generally uses the term Atatürkism, especially the perpetrators of 1980 military coup because probably “Kemalism” involved a leftist evocation for them.

4.2. The Counter – Revolution Theses of the Neo – Kemalists

3) Accordingly, this trend began with the DP governments. The completion of the construction of Atatürk’s mausoleum and putting back the pictures of Atatürk on stamps and banknotes by the DP were the proofs of this fact (Akşin, 2014: 410).

4.2.1. Counter – Revolution at Individual Level

4) On the other hand, Akşin highlighted that in Adana, Antep, Urfa and Maraş the otherworldly people consciously or unconsciously served for nationalistic causes because the fatwas approved by the sultan were not distributed there.

5) Nadi’s and Akşin’s otherworldly human type is academically analysed by Delaney, in the book “The Seed and the Soil: Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society” (1991). For doing this research Delaney lived two years in a Sunni and Turk village in a county of Ankara, namely Ayaş in early 1980s. She came to the conclusion that the every aspect of life of the Turkish village society is penetrated by the rules of Islam and also women are degraded. According to her observations the villagers believe that the world is a guesthouse to make provisions for eternal life, each man will be attended 40 or 70 virginal maidens in the paradise, most probably women will not go to the heaven, western style dressed urban Turks should considered to be atheists (1991: 285, 319, 323). The villagers’ mind-set is set forth in Table 3.

Table 3: The division of cosmos for the Turkish village society according to Delaney (1991: 225, 230, 284, 285)

Creation	God/creator
this world	other world
Dar el Harb	Dar el Islam
secular republic	Islamic state
political left	political right
Evil	good
Lower	upper
Matter	spirit
Female	male
perishable aspects of this world	eternal aspects of the other world
Dissension	unity by the bond of Islam
secularism/materialism/capitalism/communism	Islam
Sexual	spiritual
foreigners/urban dwellers	villagers
Outside	inside
Infidel	Muslim

6) Although the RPP sometimes became coalition partners in the multi - party era, Akşin's assertion is true. The RPP (or another leftist Kemalist party) have never gained the majority of seats in the Turkish parliament. The highest vote of the RPP was obtained in 1977 general elections. The RPP won 41.4 per cent. However it fell short of 13 seats to form a RPP government. In December 1977 Ecevit formed a RPP government by making some conservative independents who were former JP and Reliance Party parliamentarians (Ahmad, 2014: 143 – 144). This government lasted 23 months.

7) During the writing-up process of this dissertation, an interesting incident happened regarding “otherworldly voting”. For the referendum campaign of 2017 during a mass rally in Bursa the president of Turkey declared that a person should vote in favour of the constitutional amendments in this referendum if he/she wants to guarantee his/her felicity in this world and in the other world on 5 April 2017 (Sözcü, 2017).

4.2.2. Counter – Revolution at Societal Level

8) There is similarity between Coşturoğlu’s “social schizophrenia” and Schayegan’s cultural schizophrenia. In his book “Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Confronting the West”, Shayegan set forth the epistemologically incompatible worlds of the West and East (1992). After the prophet Mohammad, Muslim majority societies “have been on holiday from history” (12). On the other hand innovative and dynamic West carried out the industrial revolution and came to a more advanced political and economic position. With fear of losing their identity, the East resisted to most of cultural influences from the West (22). When the East encountered with the culture of the West, the split between these two cultures resulted in a “cultural schizophrenia”. Schayegan’s analysis is on the East and West confrontation worldwide whereas Coşturoğlu’s analysis is on a specific eastern society which had a significant cultural modernization/westernization process in the past and its results.

4.2.3. Education and Counter – Revolution

9) A sarcastic and fictional example was given in a Turkish film “Beynelmilel” (*the International*) which was produced in 2006. In that film the former People’s House building of a small city was made a second – class night club by the military administration during the interim era after the military coup of 1980.

10) In year 2018 the total number of stages of State Theatres decreased to 46 and number of State Operas in provinces remained 6 in Turkey (I gathered this

information through counting the numbers one by one from the official internet sites of the State Theatres and State Operas).

4.2.4. Religion, State and Economic Dimensions of Counter – Revolution

11) Balbay argued that the foundations of religious brotherhoods and the so – called “Islamic bourgeoisie” eventually became “very strong” that they held the 25 per cent of the economic power in Turkey in 2007 (2011: 147).

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE NEO – KEMALİSTLERİN KARŞI – DEVRİM TARTIŞMALARINDAKİ ARGÜMANLARI

Bu çalışma Atatürk Devrimi’ne yönelik “karşı – devrim” tezlerinin/söyleminin nasıl ortaya çıktığı, hangi Kemalist fraksiyonlar tarafından hangi biçimlerde kullanıldığı ve bu söylemin zaman içinde nasıl bir değişim yaşadığını incelemeye yöneliktir. Bu yapılırken önce Fransız ve Rus İhtilallerinde karşı – devrim kavramının veya söyleminin nasıl ortaya çıktığı, nasıl teorize edildiği araştırılacaktır. Atatürk Devrimi 1920ler ve 1930larda gerçekleşmiş, yoğun bir toplumsal değişimi, pozitivizmi, laikliği ve ayrıca devletçiliği içeren bir siyasal modernleşme dönemi olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Kili, 2011: 194). Kemalist çevreler ise “karşı – devrim”i Atatürk Devrimi’nin kısmen veya tamamen tersine çevrilmesi olarak tanımlamışlardır. Bu Kemalist çevreler “karşı – devrim” tezlerini/söylemini üretmeleri bakımından üç grupta inceleneceklerdir: 1) Eski Kadro Dergisi yazarları 2) İki Sol Kemalist: Mihri Belli ve Doğan Avcıoğlu 3) Neo – Kemalistler. Bu grupların hepsi orta sınıf akademisyen, gazeteci, doktor, öğretmen ve entelektüellerden oluşmaktadır.

Bu araştırma niteliksel bir araştırmadır ve Neo - Kemalistlerin “karşı – devrim” söyleminin analizine yöneliktir. Öte yandan Fransa ve Rusya ile bir karşılaştırmalı çalışma yapmak gibi bir hedef söz konusu değildir. Bu iki ülke karşı – devrim kavramının dünyada nasıl ortaya çıktığı araştırılmak için eklenmiştir. Tezde Kadro, Yön dergisi ve Cumhuriyet gazetelerinin birer birer incelenmesi gibi bir araştırma yöntemi kullanılmayacaktır. Bahsi geçen üç Kemalist fraksiyonun

ortaya koyduğu temel eserlerin veya kitapların yanı sıra ikincil kaynaklar da kullanılacaktır. Eski Kadro yazarlarından Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu'nun “Yaban” (ilk basım: 1932), “Panorama” (ilk basım: 1954) ve “Atatürk” (ilk basım: 1946), Şevket Süreyya Aydemir'in “Tek Adam” (ilk basım: 1963), “Kahramanlar Doğmalıydı” (1974), Vedat Nedim Tör'ün “Kemalizmin Dramı” (1980) eserleri ile Mihri Belli'nin “Yazılar: 1965 – 1970” (1970), Doğan Avcıoğlu'nun “Devrim Üzerine” (1971) kitapları bu tez için önemli kaynaklardır.

1980 askeri darbesine tepki olarak doğan Neo – Kemalistler adlı gruptan en çok Nadir Nadi'nin “Ben Atatürkçü Değilim” (ilk basım: 1982) ve Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu'nun “12 Eylül Karşı – Devrim” (1989) kitapları bu tez için önem teşkil edecektir. Yanı sıra İlhan Selçuk'un “Atatürkçülüğün Alfabeti” (1981), Uğur Mumcu'nun “Rabita” (ilk basım: 1987), “Tarikat - Siyaset – Ticaret” (ilk basım: 1988), Bahriye Üçok'un “Atatürk'ün İzinde Bir Arpa Boyu” (ilk basım:1985), Muammer Aksoy'un “Laikliğe Çağrı” (ilk basım: 1989), Ahmet Taner Kışlalı'nın “Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği” (ilk basım: 1993), Sina Akşin'in “Atatürkçü Partiyi Kurmanın Sırası Geldi” (2002) ile “Yakın Tarihimizi Sorgulamak” (ilk basım: 2006) adlı kitapları da bu tez için önemli kaynak oluşturan kitaplardır.

Bu tezde Fransa'da karşı – devrim kavramının nasıl teorize edildiği araştırılacaktır. Karşı – devrimin nasıl teorize edildiği araştırılmadan ise devrim kavramına ve modellerine yönelik uluslararası akademik literatürde ortaya konanlar araştırılacaktır. Ardından Fransa ve Rus İhtilalleri ve bu iki ülkede akademik literatürde karşı – devrim(cil olaylar) olarak adlandırılan süreçler ele alınacaktır. Üçüncü bölüm olan “Atatürk/Kemalist Devrim(in) Özellikleri ve Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Karşı – Devrimci Olaylar (1919 – 1946)” başlığı altında Atatürk Devrimi'nin temel nitelikleri, bu devrimi yapanları etkileyen düşünsel akımlar, bu devrimin amacı, erken Cumhuriyet döneminde uluslararası akademik literatürde karşı – devrimci olaylar olarak adlandırılan Şeyh Sait İsyanı (1925), Kubilay Olayı (1930) ve Atatürk'e yönelik suikast girişimleri gibi konular ve bu iddiaların dayanağı olup olmadığı araştırılacaktır. Bir sonraki bölümde ise adı geçen

üç Kemalist fraksiyonların “karşı – devrim” iddiaları ve bu iddiaların dayanağı olup olmadığı araştırılacaktır.

İkinci bölümde “devrim ve karşı – devrim” kavramları ele alınmıştır. “Devrimlere İlişkin Teoriler ve Devrimsel Değişim Biçimleri”, “Devrim Modelleri”, “Karşı – Devrim ve Fransa’da Önde Gelen Karşı – Devrim Teorisyenleri”, “1789 Fransız İhtilali ve Fransa’da Karşı – Devrim”, “1917 Rus İhtilali ve Rusya’da Karşı – Devrim” bu bölümde ele alınan konular olmuştur. Eisenstadt devrimlerin dünya tarihinde sayıca az olduğunu ve nadiren gerçekleştiğini belirtmektedir (1981: 27). Fakat devrimler sayıca az olsa da farklılık arz ettiğinden akademik literatürde niteliklerine göre ayrı ayrı incelenmiş ve gruplanmıştır.

Skocpol Fransa, Rusya ve Çin’de yaşanan devrimleri “sosyal devrim” olarak nitelemiştir. Skocpol sosyal devrimlerin tabandan geldiğini ve halk ayaklanmaları ile oluştuğunu belirtmiştir (1997: 5). Moore ise burjuva devrimlerinin parlamenter demokrasilere dönüştüğünü (örneği Britanya, Fransa ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleridir), tepeden inme devrimlerin faşizme evrildiğini (örneği Almanya ve Japonya’dır), köylü devrimlerinin ise komünist rejimler haline geldiğini (örneği Rusya ve Çin’dir) iddia etmiştir (1966: xii - xiii). Skocpol “tepeden inme devrimler” konusunda Moore’un değil, Trimberger’in analizinin daha sağlam dayanaklara sahip olduğunu ifade etmiştir (1997: 42 - 43). Ellen K. Trimberger Japonya’da 1868 Meiji Restorasyonu dönemi, Türkiye’de Atatürk Devrimi, Mısır’da Nasır dönemi (1952 – 1970) ve Peru’da Valesco dönemini “tepeden inme devrim” olarak analiz etmektedir. Trimberger’e göre bu tip devrim temel özellikleri eski rejimin bürokratlarının yeni rejimde hizmeti sürdürmesi, kitle katılımının azlığı veya yokluğu, düşük derecede zor içermesi, pragmatik oluşu ve son olarak üst sınıfların ekonomik ve siyasal gücünün yok edilmesidir (1978: 3).

Meisel’e göre devrimler çok çeşitli kategorilerde ve isimlerde ele alınabilir (1966: 211 - 212). Ancak akademik literatürde en çok adı geçen modeller pozitivist ve Marksist modellerdir. Pozitivist model Atatürk Devrimi’ni önemli oranda etkilenmesi bakımından bu tezde incelenmeye değerdir. Bu modele göre toplum belli tarihsel aşamalardan geçerek son aşama olan pozitivist aşamaya ulaşacaktır. Pozitivizmin kurucuları son aşamada dinin topluma etkisinin azalacağını, bilimin ve

aklın esas alınacağını iddia etmişler ayrıca Fransız İhtilali'nin kanlı taraflarından olumsuz etkilenecek devrimci değil evrimci bir yol savunmuşlardır. Karl Marx ve Friedrich Engels'in 19. yüzyılda ortaya koyduğu Marksist modelde de belli tarihsel aşamalardan geçilerek son aşamada işçi sınıfının önderliğinde bir ihtilal yapılacağını iddia edilmiştir. Bu teoriye göre toplumlarda üretim ilişkileri ve üretim araçları başlıca belirleyicilerdir. Üretim araçları; makineler ve diğer araçlar, mülk(ler) ve insanlardan oluşmakta, teoride buna aynı zamanda "altyapı" da denmektedir (Heywood, 2012: 118). Bu teoriye göre "altyapı"; din, eğitim, bilim, ideoloji, hukuk, medya gibi sosyal kurumları, yani "üstyapı"yı belirler (Heywood, 2012: 118).

"Karşı – devrim" kavramı ilk önce Fransa'da ortaya çıkmıştır. Meisel karşı – devrimi bir "kavram" olarak ele almış ve bu kavramla ilgili çeşitli iddialarda bulunmuştur. Meisel'e göre karşı – devrim devrimle iç içedir, devrimin zayıf olduğu bir anda saldırıya geçer, devrimin kimi yöntemlerini kullanır, devrimin kimi yanlarından beslenir, devrime göre daha kapsamlı ve daha sağlam bir temele dayanan bir plana sahiptir (1966: 20, 21, 31). Godechot Fransız İhtilali olduktan sonra önde gelen karşı – devrim teorisyenleri olarak Burke, Maistre ve Bonald'ın üzerinde durmaktadır. Godechot'ya göre Edmund Burke'ün Fransız İhtilaline ilişkin yorumlarını içeren kitabı ulusları aşan bir etki yapmış, Maistre dahil pek çok "karşı – devrim teorisyeni"ne esin kaynağı olmuştur (1971: 50 , 58). Maistre de 1797'de yayınladığı kitabında Fransız İhtilali'nden tam sekiz yıl sonra "karşı – devrim" kavramını açık bir biçimde kullanmış, bu kavramı temellendirmiş ve ayrıntıları ile ele almıştır (2003: 77).

Skocpol'e göre Fransız İhtilali, feodalizm ve aristokrasinin egemenliğini yıkarak yerine kapitalizmi koymayı amaçlayan burjuvazi önderliğinde gerçekleşmiş bir tarihsel gelişmedir (1979: 174). Uluslararası akademik literatürde Fransız İhtilalinden kısa zaman sonra, 1792 yılında gerçekleşmiş olan Vendée Ayaklanması bir "karşı – devrim" olarak ele alınmaktadır (Tilly, 1966: 1). Vendée halkı, kraliyet yanlısı ve cumhuriyet karşıtı olma, askere alınmaya karşıtlık, dini duygular veya bağlılıklar gibi gerekçeler ile ayaklanmıştır ve bu ayaklanma kanlı bir biçimde bastırılmıştır (Tilly, 1966: 7, 103). Fransa'da 1804'te Napoleon Bonaparte'ın cumhuriyeti yıkarak kendi imparatorluğunu ilan etmesi de Meisel tarafından karşı –

devrim olarak nitelenmiştir (1966: 31 - 32). 1875'te III. Cumhuriyet'in ilanından sonra seküler cumhuriyetçiler ile kilise ve tarikatlar (özelikle Cizvitler) yanlısı monarşistler arası bir çekişme yaşanmıştır. Dreyfus olayının sona ermesine dek bu çekişme sürmüştür ve seküler cumhuriyetçiler nihai zafer elde etmişlerdir (Bayet, 1970: 118, 120, 124, 125).

Rus İhtilalinin daha önce bahsi geçen Marksist devrim modeline uygun düştüğü literatürde belirtilmiştir. Yalnız Marx'ın öngördüğü üzere gelişmiş ve sanayileşmiş bir toplumda işçi sınıfının önderliğinde gerçekleşen bir devrimin aksine az gelişmiş bir ülke olan Rusya'da, köylülerin ön planda olduğu bir ihtilal söz konusu olmuştur. Rus İhtilalinde başlıca rol oynayan bir diğer grup Bolşeviklerdir ve bu grup ihtilalden sonra gücü ele geçirmiştir. Bolşevikler Rus Sosyal Demokrat İşçi Partisi içindeki bir gruptur. Bu partide muhalifleri olan Menşeviklere kıyasla burjuva devrimi aşaması olmaksızın Marksist modele uygun bir devrimin yapılabileceğini savunmuşlardır. Stewart'a göre Rus İhtilalinden sonra Bolşeviklere karşı Menşevikler, aristokrasi, ordunun bir kısmı, kilise, Kazaklar, dini bağılıkları kuvvetli olan köylüler ayaklanmış ve iç savaşı başlatmışlardır (1970: 23). Bu iç savaşı Bolşevikler kazanmıştır. Akşin'e göre 1991'de ise Rus İhtilali nihai başarısızlığa uğrayarak, Sovyet Rusya sona ermiş ve "karşı – devrim" galip gelmiştir (2015: 95).

"Atatürk/Kemalist Devrim(in) Özellikleri ve Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Karşı – Devrimci Olaylar (1919 – 1946)" bölümünde "Kemalizm(in) İdeolojisi ve Atatürk Devrimini Etkileyen Düşünsel Akımlar", "Atatürk Devriminin Amacı", "Kemalizm ve Demokrasi", "Kemalizme Yönelik Karşı – Devrimci Olaylar" bölümleri yer almıştır.

Kongar'a göre "Atatürk İhtilali" iki aşamadan oluşur. Bu aşamaların birincisi Kurtuluş Savaşı, ikinci ise Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı takip eden dönemde gerçekleşen Atatürk Devrimleridir (Kongar, 1985: 478). Zürcher ise Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın ulusal duygulardan çok dini duygularla yapıldığını, bir ulus – devlet kurmak ve ardından laikliği içeren toplumsal değişim süreçlerinin yapılması amacıyla gerçekleştirilmediğini iddia etmiştir (2013: 175). Kansu da Türk tarihinde esas devrimin veya değişimin 1923'te Cumhuriyetin ilanı değil de 1908'te II.

Meşrutiyet'in ilanı olduğunu belirtmiştir (1997: 5). Kansu, Atatürk'ün yaptıklarının "altyapı"ya dokunulmadığı için "devrim" olarak adlandıramayacağını ve "üstyapısal reformlar" olarak adlandırılması gerektiğini belirtmiştir (1997: 5, 13). Akşin ise İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler adlı grubun (Kansu'nunkine benzer) görüşlerini ele almış, bu kişilerin Atatürk Devrimine yönelik düşüncelerinin ve eleştirilerinin "indirgemecilik" olduğunu iddia etmiştir (2011 – b: 159).

Kemalizm kavramı görece geç bir dönemde, 1930larda ortaya çıkmıştır. Atatürk'ün altı ilkesi 1927 ve 1931'de Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (kısaca CHP) tüzüğüne girmiştir (Demirel, 1996: 768). Bu altı ilkeden "devrimcilik/inkılapçılık" Özbudun'a göre diğer beş ilkeye kıyasla en az sağlam biçimde temellendirilmiş veya teorize edilmiş bir ilke olmuştur (1981: 91). Karal ise bu ilkenin "olası bir karşı – devrime güvence" amacıyla ortaya konmuş bir ilke olduğunu belirtmiştir (1981: 23). Atatürk de 1922 ve 1923'te verdiği iki demeçte karşı – devrim beklentisine sahip olduğunu, çünkü bunun Fransa'da da olduğunu belirtmiştir (İnan, 1999: 329 – 330; Kocatürk, 2007: 206). Hanioglu ise Atatürk'ün Jön Türklerin sahip olduğu görüşlerden etkilendiğini veya bu görüşleri paylaştığını, bu çerçevede materyalizm, Darwinizm, pozitivism, seçkincilik, milliyetçilik, Aydınlanma gibi görüşlerden veya düşünsel akımlardan etkilendiğini savunmuştur (2011: 228 - 229).

Atatürk bir demecinde devrimin amacının her bakımdan modern bir ulus yaratmak olduğunu ifade etmiştir (Karal, 1981: 15). Akarsu (1969: 10), Akşin (2007: 227), Kili (2011:337) ve Mango (2004: 528) Atatürk Devrimi'nin amacının aydınlanma olduğunu savunmuşlardır. Sinanoğlu ise Atatürk Devrimi'nin hümanist bir hareket olduğunu belirtmiştir (1998: 24 - 25). Karal ise Atatürk'ün kadercilik ve cehaleti yenmek amacıyla Atatürk Devrimi'ni gerçekleştirdiğini belirtmiştir (1981: 15).

Özbudun, Duverger'in Atatürk döneminde siyasal iktidar tarafından siyasal tekelden memnuniyetsizlik duyulduğunu ifade ettiğini belirtmiştir (1981: 91). Ancak Tunçay (1981: 147) ve Zürcher (2013: 168, 174 – 175) 1925'te çıkarılan Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu ile siyasal iktidarın (CHP'nin) olağanüstü bir güç elde ederek siyasal rakibi Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nı kapattığı ve yöneticilerini elimine ettiğini savunmuşlardır. Tunçay, Atatürk dönemi ile "aydınlanmacı despotluk" arasında bir benzerlik olduğunu iddia etmiştir (1981: 326). Akşin (2014: 215) ve

Karal (2003: 24) ise daha “idealize edici” bir yaklaşım ile Atatürk’ü Platon’un ortaya koyduğu “filozof kral” a benzetmişler ve bu gerekçeyle övmüşlerdir.

Zürcher “irtica” kavramının Gregoryen takvimi ile 13 Nisan 1909’da gerçekleşen “31 Mart vakası” olarak bilinen olaydan sonra sözlüklere girdiğini tespit etmektedir (2001: 216 – 217). Bu olayın erken Cumhuriyet dönemine de etkileri olmuştur. Örneğin Şeyh Sait isyanının bastırılması sırasında dönemin başbakanı Fethi (Okyar) bu isyan ile 31 Mart vakası arasında benzerlik kurmuştur (Zürcher: 217). Akşin ise “İç Savaş ve Sevr’de Ölüm” adlı kitabında Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Ankara hükümetine karşı olan ayaklanmaların aslında bir iç savaş olduğunu iddia etmiştir (2010). Literatürde Şeyh Sait isyanı (1925), Menemen olayı (1930), Atatürk’e yönelik suikast girişimleri “karşı – devrimci olaylar” ele alınmakta iken Azak’a göre bu olaylar tek parti yönetimince toplumsal hafıza yaratmak ve siyasal muhalifleri engellemek amacıyla kullanılmıştır (2010: 23, 25).

Tezin bu bölümünde Türkiye’de “karşı – devrim” kavramsallaştırmasına yönelik tezler incelenmiştir. Akşin’e göre Türkiye’de hilafetin, saltanatın, Arap alfabesinin geri getirilmesi “tam karşı – devrim”dir. Akşin bu sayılanlar yapılmaksızın sadece şeriatın ilanını da “tam karşı – devrim” olacağını, henüz bunlardan hiçbiri olmadığından Türkiye’de “kısmi karşı – devrim” olduğunu iddia etmiştir (2014: 410 - 411). Mihri Belli, Doğan Avcıoğlu ve İlhan Selçuk Türkiye’de ilk defa “karşı – devrim” tezlerini ortaya atanlar olmuşlardır. Bu gelişme 1960ların sonlarında vuku bulmuştur. “Karşı – devrim” kavramına yönelik atılan tezlerde Sina Akşin’in ön planda olduğu iddia edilebilir.

“Karşı – devrim”e ilişkin dönemselleştirme tartışmaları da ele alınmıştır. Türkiye’de “karşı – devrim” iddialarının ortaya atılmasında “karşı – devrim”in ne zaman başladığını yönelik tartışmalar söz konusudur. Çetin Yetkin “karşı – devrim”in 1938’de Atatürk’ün vefatı ile başladığını söyledikten sonra “karşı – devrim”in esas olarak İnönü tarafından 1945 ile 1950 arasında gerçekleştirildiğini iddia etmiştir (2009: 17, 37, 38, 47). Mihri Belli ise 1968 yılında Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi’nde yaptığı bir konuşmada “karşı – devrim” kavramına yönelik tezler ortaya atmıştır. Mihri Belli bunun başlangıcı olarak Saracoğlu dönemini, 1942 yılını işaret etmiştir (1970: 101). Akşin ise 1950 yılında Demokrat

Parti'nin (kısaca DP) iktidara gelişini “karşı – devrim”in başlangıç yılı olduğunu savunmuştur (2014: 410). Nadir Nadi (1981: 14), Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1974: 32) ve Vedat Nedim Tör (1980: 28) ise DP döneminde Atatürk devrimlerinden verilen tavizleri vurgulamışlardır.

Neo – Kemalistler 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesini yapanların Atatürkçülüğü kullanarak aslında Türk - İslam sentezini savunduklarını ve yaymaya çalıştıklarını iddia etmişlerdir. Bu bakımdan kendilerini 12 Eylül 1980’de gerçekleşen askeri darbeye yönelik reaksiyoner bir hareket olarak tanımlamışlardır. Nadir Nadi’nin “Ben Atatürkçü Değilim” (ilk basım: 1982) ve Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu’nun “12 Eylül Karşı – Devrim” (1989) kitapları bu çerçevede ortaya çıkmıştır. Kenan Evren’in konuşmalarında dini referanslarda bulunmasının yanı sıra 1982’de 23 Nisan Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı’nın kaldırmaya çalışması, CHP’nin kapatılması, Türk Dil Kurumu ve Türk Tarih Kurumu’nun “Atatürk’ün vasiyetine aykırı biçimde” devlet kurumu haline getirilmesi Neo – Kemalistlerin tepkisiyle karşılaşmıştır (Akşin, 2007: 283, 291; Mumcu, 2013: 123; Velidedeoğlu: 468). Bunların yanı sıra siyasal İslamcı hareketin yükselişi, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler”in cumhuriyetin erken dönemine ilişkin eleştirileri gibi kimi başka etkenler de Neo – Kemalistlerin ortaya çıkışına katkı sağlamıştır. Bu gerekçelerle Neo - Kemalistler 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesini “karşı – devrim”in önemli bir aşaması olarak gördüklerini iddia etmişlerdir.

Nadir Nadi ilk defa 1966 yazmış olduğu bir yazıda toplumun önemli bir kısmının “öbür dünyacı” olduğunu, sadece bir azınlığın Atatürk devrimlerinin yarattığı ortamdan faydalanabildiğini savunmuştur (1986: 18). Sina Akşin ise küçültücü ve alaycı olduğu değerlendirilebilecek bir kavram ortaya atmıştır: *homo ahretikus* (2013: 103) Akşin bunu bu dünya için yaşamayan, ahiret için yaşayan insan anlamında kullanmıştır. Akşin’e göre bu “insan biçimi” ilk defa Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasındaki “iç savaş”ta ortaya çıkmış, çok partili hayata da damgasını vurmuştur (2013: 103, 2017: 226 - 227). Akşin bu değerlendirmeyi yalnızca seçim sonuçlarına bakarak yapmaktadır. Akşin’in görüşlerini destekleyecek bilimsel bir araştırma sonucu mevcut olmayıp Akşin’in bu görüşleri kültüralist bir bakış açısı olarak değerlendirilebilir. Yani Akşin kişilerin yalnızca kültürel gerekçelere oy

verdiğini savunduğundan ekonomik gerekçelerle oy verme ihtimalini dışlamaktadır. Bu gerekçelerle Akşin'in bu konudaki fikirlerinin bilimsel dayanaktan yoksun olduğu iddia edilebilir.

Mustafa Coşturoğlu “Sosyal Şizofreni ve Yaratıcı Düşünce” (ilk basım: 1974) kitabında Türkiye’de gelişmiş ve ileri bir seküler azınlığın bulunduğunu, çoğunluğun ise ekonomik bakımdan ve kültürel yönden “geri kalmış” olduğunu iddia etmiştir (2005: 75). Coşturoğlu (2005: 75 - 76) ve Akşin (2007: 322) bu gerekçe ile toplumda bir “şizofrenik yarıma” olduğunu ve bu iki kesim arasında bir “yabancılaşma” olduğunu savunmuşlardır. Bu “yabancılaşma” temasını Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasındaki gözlemlerine dayalı olarak yazmış olduğu “Yaban” adlı romanda, “Ahmet Celal” adlı karakter üzerinde de ortaya koymuştur (2008 – b: 121, 153). Tıpkı Akşin’in *homo ahretikus* tezlerinde olduğu gibi, özellikle Coşturoğlu’nun ortaya attığı “şizofrenik toplum” a yönelik herhangi bir bilimsel veri yoktur. Bu konuda ortaya atılan fikirlerin bilimsel dayanaktan yoksun olduğu iddia edilebilir.

Eğitim ve “karşı – devrim” ilişkisi de Neo – Kemalistlerin üzerinde durduğu bir konu olmuştur. Neo – Kemalistlerce DP tarafından Köy Enstitüleri ile Halkevleri ve Halkodalarının temelli kapatılması “karşı – devrim” in en önemli hamlesi olarak görülmektedir. Akşin bu gidişin DP iktidara gelmeden CHP döneminde başladığını belirterek daha tutucu bir çizgideki Reşat Şemsettin Sırer’in Hasan Ali Yücel yerine Milli Eğitim Bakanı yapılmasını ve Köy Enstitülerinin izlediği eğitimden tavizler verilmesini de vurgulamıştır (2000: 17). Köy Enstitüleri DP tarafından tam olarak 1954 yılında temelli kapatılmıştır. DP, CHP’nin 1951 yılında mal varlığına el koyması da Halkevleri ve Halkodalarının temelli kapatılması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Neo – Kemalistler bu iki kurumun kapatılarak yerlerine İmam – Hatip Okulları açıldığını ve yaygınlaştırıldığını iddia etmişlerdir (Akşin, 2004: 411; Velidedeoğlu, 1989: 193, 455). Halbuki fiziksel olarak Köy Enstitüleri “Öğretmen Okulu” yapılmıştır. Halkevleri ve Halkodaları binaları ise daha sonra vilayet konağı, lise, defterdarlık, sağlık ocağı, tiyatro, opera vb. haline gelmiş, bazıları işlevlerine uygun olarak, bazıları binanın yapım işlevine uygun olmayarak kullanılmış, bazıları ise (zaman içinde) yıkılmıştır (Gurallar Yeşilkaya: 202 – 206). Neo – Kemalistler

tarafından Kuran kurslarının yaygınlaşması, lise ve üniversitelerden Latince derslerinin kaldırılması, öğretmenlik mesleğine yeterince değer verilmediği gibi konulara da değinilmektedir (Akşin, 2009: 315; Sinanoğlu, 1998: 11).

“Karşı – devrim”in din, devlet ve ekonomiye ilişkin boyutları konusunda Uğur Mumcu’nun “Rabıta” (2010) ve “Tarikat – Siyaset – Ticaret” (1988) kitapları öne çıkmaktadır. Akşin ise “karşı – devrim”in bir ekonomik modeli olduğunu savunmuştur (2007: 228 - 229). Akşin’e göre Türkiye Atatürk devrimi “bütünsel kalkınma modeli”ni benimseyerek hayatın her alanında, örneğin altyapı, teknoloji, ekonomi, endüstri, bilim, kültür, kadın hakları gibi konularda kalkınma amaçlanmış iken “karşı – devrim” döneminde “maddi kalkınma modeli” benimsenmiştir. Akşin’e göre “maddi kalkınma modeli” yol yapımı ve baraj yapımı gibi konulara odaklanmakta, diğer konular göz ardı edilmektedir. Akşin Türkiye’nin üretimde bulunmadığı için bir “borçkoliklik” içine düştüğünü de savunmaktadır (2001 – b: 13).

Akşin CHP’nin “tören Atatürkçülüğü”ne “kanarak” Türkiye’de “karşı – devrimin seyircisi” ya da “Atatürkçülerin afyonu olan parti” rolünü oynadığını iddia etmiştir (2000: 218, 2011 – b: 57). Akşin, İnönü’yü çok partili hayata “erken geçme müsaadesi” verdiği için eleştirirken, Ecevit’in Atatürk devrimlerinin bir kısmını “üst yapı devrimi” olarak değerlendirdiğini iddia etmiş, Ecevit’in CHP’ye benimsettiği “ortanın solu” stratejisini de eleştirmiştir (2016: 176). Akşin’e göre Ecevit Türkiye’deki “temel çelişki”nin Atatürk devrimi ile “karşı – devrim” arasında olduğunu saptayamamış ve bu gerekçe ile hataya düşmüştür (2018: 17). Suna Kili de Deniz Baykal’ın CHP genel başkanlığı dönemini eleştirmiş, Baykal’ı IMF (Uluslararası Para Fonu) yanlısı olmak ve devletçiliğe uymayan politikalar izlemekle itham etmiştir (2003: 328). Akşin tüm bu nedenlerle “Atatürkçü Partiyi Kurmanın Sırası Geldi” (2002) yazmış ve 2002’de Birgül Ayman Güler, İter Ertuğrul ve Mümtaz Soysal gibi başka Neo – Kemalistler ile “Bağımsız Cumhuriyet Partisi” adında bir siyasi parti kurmuştur. Adı geçen siyasi parti daha sonra siyasal arenada bir etkinlik gösterememiştir.

21. yüzyılda karşı – devrim tartışmaları ve Neo – Kemalistlerin “karşı – devrim” argümanlarına verilen yanıtlara da tezde yer verilmiştir. Neo –

Kemalistlerin “karşı – devrim” konusundaki iddialarına 21. Yüzyılda da devam ettiđi gözlemlenmektedir. Bu tezlerin çokça dillendirildiđi “Cumhuriyet” gazetesi bu konudaki etkinliđini yitirirken Emin Çölařan, Bekir Cořkun, Yekta Güngör Özden, Uđur Dünder gibi Neo – Kemalist yazarların yazdıđı “Sözcü” adlı gazetesinin yüksek baskı ve satıř sayılarına ulařtıđı bilinmektedir. Hanođlu “Kemalist logokrası”nin yıkıldıđını, “post – Kemalist” döneme geçildiđini, Neo – Kemalistlerin buna cevap veren en hızlı grup olduđunu, bu gerekçe ile “karşı – devrim” tezlerini ortaya attıklarını savunmuřtur (2012, 2015).

Farklılıklar olsa da deđiřik Kemalist fraksiyonların genel olarak DP’nin iktidara geldiđi 1950 tarihini bir “karşı – devrim” olarak nitelediđi görölmüřtür. Mango bunun bir “karşı – devrim” olarak adlandırılmayacađını belirtmiřtir (2000: 122 – 123). Farklı Kemalist fraksiyonların (bazılarının Duverger gibi akademik literatürde ön plana çıkan kimselerin tezlerini de kullanarak) çok – partili hayata yönelik olumsuz eleřtiriler yapmalarının günümüz dünyasının demokrasi anlayıřı ile bađdařamayacađı belirtilebilir.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Bengisun
Adı : Egemen
Bölümü : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : The Neo – Kemalist Arguments on the Counter –
Revolution Debates in Turkey

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