

THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ARTICULATIONS AND
POLITICAL SUBJECTIFICATION MECHANISMS IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ARTICULATIONS AND POLITICAL SUBJECTIFICATION MECHANISMS IN TURKEY

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This thesis analyzes the articulation and political subjectifications in the contemporary radical popular and mass political experiences. It aims to respond how the radical contemporary popular and mass political experiences become possible and delimited. It indicates the theoretical and analytical limits of the universalist and essentialist perspectives. Also, it criticizes the perspectives that neglect the role of the agency and the local social and political conditions. Thus, it concentrates upon the Turkey and explores the social movements and political experiences during AKP era in the case of the Gezi events and People's Democratic Party (HDP). From an empirical standpoint, it contributes to the theoretical discussions on the ontology of politics and on the workings of the contemporary political articulations and subjectifications emerged within the post-structuralist thought. For this task, it presents how the political and social conditions, political dispositions and the habitus of the agents make possible and delimited the Gezi and HDP during AKP era. According to the conceptual framework and the cases' findings, the study shows the role of the agents, local conjunctures and conditions making possible and delimiting the contemporary radical articulations and political subjectifications.

Keywords: Radical popular politics, political common, political subjectification, articulation, Turkey

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE EKLEMLEMELER VE SİYASAL ÖZNELEŞTİRME MEKANİZMALARININ OLANAKLARI VE SINIRLARI

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Bu tez çağdaş radikal popüler ve kitle siyasal deneyimlerindeki eklemlemeleri ve siyasal özneleştirmeleri analiz eder. Çağdaş radikal popüler ve kitle deneyimlerinin nasıl mümkün hale geldiği ve sınırlandığı sorusunu irdeler. Bu soruyu cevaplayan evrenselci ve özcü yaklaşımın kuramsal ve analitik sınırlılıklarını işaret eder. Aynı zamanda, faillerin ve yerel toplumsal ve siyasal koşulların rolünü göz ardı eden yaklaşımları eleştirir. Bu vesileyle Türkiye'ye yoğunlaşır ve Gezi ve HDP vakaları üzerinden AKP dönemindeki toplumsal hareketler ve siyasal deneyimleri inceler. Post-yapısalçı düşünceye ortaya çıkan siyasetin ontolojisi ve çağdaş siyasal eklemlemeler ve öznelleştirmelerin işleyışı üzerine ortaya çıkan kuramsal tartışmalara ampirik bir bakış açısından katkı sunar. Bu amaçla, AKP dönemindeki siyasal ve toplumsal koşulların ve faillerin siyasal eğilim ve habituslarının Gezi ve HDP'yi nasıl mümkün kılıp sınırladıklarını ortaya koyar. Çalışmanın kavramsal çerçevesi ve vaka bulguları, faillerin ve yerel durum ve koşulların çağdaş radikal eklemlemelerin ve siyasal özneleştirmelerin mümkünluğu ve sınırlanması üzerindeki rolü gösterir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Radikal popüler siyaset, siyasal ortaklık, siyasal özneleştirme, eklemleme, Türkiye

*To the living memories of
Alper Sapan and Ali Kitapçı*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	Hata! Yer işaretü tanımlanmamış.
1.1. The Topic of the Study	Hata! Yer işaretü tanımlanmamış.
1.2. The Problem of The Study in the Case of The Gezi and HDP	7
1.3. The construction of the commonality: Possibilities, Limits and Limitations of the Gezi and HDP	12
1.4. The Research Question and The Argument of the Study:	16
1.5. Habitus and Political Commonalization and Commonalizing Mechanisms ...	21
1.6. The Habitus and Political Commonalization.....	31
1.7. Research Methods and Methodology	34
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE	38
2.1. Gezi Events and Unpredictability: Analysis Between Science and Political Discourse	39
2.1.1 Constitution of a Revolutionary Political Subject: Analysis Between Realism and Romanticism	42
2.1.2. Analysis of the Social and Political Profiles of the Agents	46

2.1.3. How pro-AKP Authors Negate the Events: from Conspiracy Theory to Scientific Analysis	48
2.2. HDP and its Images: from Turkey-ization Force to Enemy of the Country ...	59
2.3. General Overview of the Literature.....	72
3. THE MULTITUDE AND HEGEMONIC SUBJECTIVITY: LIMITATIONS OF POLITICAL SUBJECTIFICATION AND ARTICULATION.....	76
3.1. Multitude and Bio-Politics:	79
3.2. Radical Democracy and Populism: Constitution of the Hegemonic Subjectivity.....	87
3.3. The Multitude versus Populism: The Theoretical Limits and Possibilities....	94
3.4. Deleuze and Bourdieu: Agency-Structure Problem	100
3.5. Gezi, the Multitude and Populism.....	103
3.6. HDP, Radical Democracy and Representation.....	108
4. THE HISTORY OF RADICAL AND LEFTIST SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCES: THE CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES DURING AKP ERA	112
4.1. AKP and The New Turkey Project.....	113
4.1.1. AKP's Formation: From Islamism to Post-Islamism or Conservative Democracy	113
4.1.2. Populism, Neo-Liberalism and Service Politics	120
4.1.3. Construction of the AKP's Project: Inclusion and Exclusion or the Alliances and The Allies, The Rivals and Enemies.....	123
4.2. Social and Political Movements and Political Opposition and Alternatives Against the AKP: During the AKP Era	127
4.2.1. The Opposition and Alternative Politics in Parliament During AKP Governments	128
4.2.2. The Social and Political Movements and anti-AKP political opposition between 2002 and Gezi	135
4.2.3. The Political Alternatives and Opposition to the AKP between the Gezi and 15 July Military Coup.....	145
4.2.4. The Political Experiences After 15 July	149

4.3. A Short History of the Left and the Kurdish Movement in Turkey after the Military Coup.....	151
4.3.1. Left and Marxism in Turkey: A Short History of the Unification Experiences and of Changes	151
4.3.2. A Short Note on The Left and Marxism between 2002 and 2010: Divisions and Conflicts.....	155
4.4. The Emergence of the HDP: The Changing Political Outlook of the Kurdish Movement and PKK and The Unification Experiences of the Left in Turkey	157
4.4.1. Kurdish Movement: PKK and Legal Politics from the HEP to HDP	157
5. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GEZI AND HDP.....	166
5.1. The Gezi: The Agents and Commonalizing Practices and Mechanisms.....	167
5.1.1. The Events in the Streets: The Coming Together of Different Social and Political Agents	170
5.1.2: Constitutive Practices: From Street Clashes to Park Forums, Squats and Collective Gardens	183
5.1.3. Limitations of the Gezi	185
4.1.4. The Workings of the Political Through Commonalizing Mechanisms in the Gezi.....	188
5.2. HDP: The Construction of a Bloc and Alliance	192
5.2.1: Conjunctures for the Construction of the Block: Demonstrations, Social and Political Practices and Elections	193
4.2.5. After 15 July: Dark Times for the HDP and the Left	209
5.2.2. HDP: Past and Future Possibilities and Limitations	210
6. CONCLUSION	215
BIBLIOGRAPHY	235
APPENDIX	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	267
B. CURRICULUM VITAE	285
C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	286

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
BAK	Academicians For Peace
CHP	Republican People's Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
DEHAP	Democratic People's Party
DEP	Democracy Party
DEV-SOL	Revolutionary Left
DEV-YOL	Revolutionary Way
DHF	Federation of Democratic Rights
DHKP-C	Revolutionary People's Liberation Front/Party
DİSK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
DTK	Democratic Society Congress
DTP	Democratic Society Party
DYP	True Path Party
EU	European Union
EMEP	Labour Party
ESP	Socialist Party of the Oppressed
FETÖ	Fethullahist Terrorist Organization
FP	Virtue Party
HADEP	People's Democracy Party
HEP	People's Labour Party
HES	Hydroelectric Power Plant
HDK	Peoples' Democratic Congress
HDP	Peoples' Democracy Party
HÖC	The Front of Rights and Freedoms

HPG	People's Defence Forces
HTKP	People's Communist Party of Turkey
IHD	Human Rights Association
IKD	The Progressive Women Association
IP	Workers' Party
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union
KESK	Confederation of Public Workers' Unions
METU	Middle East Technical University
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MKP	Maoist Communist Party
MLKP	Marxist Leninist Communist Party
MNP	National Order Party
MSP	National Salvation Party
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
OHAL	State of Emergency
ÖDP	Freedom and Solidarity Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PODEMOS	We Can
SDE	Institute of Strategical Thinking
SDP	Socialist Democracy Party
SP	Felicity Party Saadet Partisi
SYRIZA	The Coalition of the Radical Left
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party
TAK	Kurdistan Freedom Hawks
TBMM	The Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TSK	TSK: Turkish Armed Forces
TGB	TGB: Youth Union of Turkey
TIKKO	Liberation Army of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey

TKP	Communist Party of Turkey
TKP-ML	Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist
TMMOBB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TUSIAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
USA	United States of America
VP	Patriotic Party
YDG-H	The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Topic of the Study

Since the AKP Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 it has brought about political, economic, cultural and social transformations in Turkey.¹ These transformations on the one hand were the maintenance of the previous economic, cultural and social policies in the country especially framed by neoliberalism,¹ while on the other hand new policies were initiated to change the political system in Turkey and to make conservative values hegemonic in social life.¹

During this time, the AKP had an opportunist¹ and pragmatist² outlook and developed means to construct its political project of a new Turkey.³ The discursive

¹ This opportunist outlook made AKP to develop means flexibly to become the power itself and to realize its political projects in different conjunctures. In this framework, until 2012, its relationships with TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association), most active business organization in the country comprising of big and dominant companies in the country and the western countries was very positive in the sense that these forces were supporting its policies and considering AKP's political project positive for the democratization of the country and articulation of the country to the world system. Therefore, it gained the very support of these forces as well as the liberals and some of the leftists in Turkey. However, after 2010 referendum for the Constitutional Change (2010 Referendum, hereafter) AKP's relations became worse with Western countries and the TUSIAD and with its alliances in the country such as liberals, democrats and some leftists due to the changing interests of these forces and groups and AKP's changing political perspective and discourse from the pluralist democracy to more conservative and majoritarian democracy. There are a lot of reasons for this change including the repositioning of the forces in the country and changing international relations. Until that time, AKP was considered as a model to construct a democracy in combined with the local cultural and Islamic values for middle east. However, later on AKP were coded as authoritarian and Islamic political force. For a study analyzing the reasons of the change see (Tuğal, 2016). During these times, the relationship with the groups like Kemalists and the nationalists like Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) wasn't positive. After the Gezi, AKP more distanced from the Western countries and TUSIAD. However, after 15 July military coup attempt, AKP and Erdoğan closed to

content of this project and the means and mechanisms to actualize it constantly changed over time and in different circumstances.⁴ In parallel to this pragmatism and opportunism⁵, AKP made alliances with other political and social groups, including

Kemalists, some of the representatives of TUSIAD such as Aydin Doğan and to Russia, was enemy for AKP because of the Syrian civil war. Shortly, the conditions and situations changed its alliances, but its aspirations to become a hegemonic force reconstructing the social, economical, political and cultural life in country and reorder the power of the social and political forces making itself the hegemonic and dominant political power never changed.

² The word pragmatist is used here in the sense of William James' ideas on pragmatism. For James, pragmatic is what works usefully for an aim within the given conditions. For James, what is a pragmatic change according to the new conditions and the new means to be developed to follow these conditions. Thus, pragmatic for the AKP is that which is useful to realize its political projects under the given conditions. For James' ideas see, (James, 1995). And also see, (Lapoujade, 2009).

³ The new Turkey signifies a political project and utopia, the content of which has changed over time but maintains the idea that the AKP will end the old social and political system, limiting the power of the elites, considered to be opposing the will of the nation, constructing a new social and political system according to which the nation and people will possess power through its real representatives.

⁴ Thus, while the discourse of this project especially between 2002-2010 brought to the fore the democratization of Turkey and the reconstruction of the country's political, social and cultural life through the abolishing of the old Kemalist regime, it later emphasized the introduction of a presidential system for a strong and united people and nation in the country. Since the beginning, the AKP has argued that it aims to constitute a "national will" and considered itself as its representative against the "elites" and the tutelage system, according to which the nation was excluded. These tutelage elites were seen as the barrier to change in the country. "According to the AK Party's concept of politics, the will of the people is the ultimate source of legitimacy. Any other option that could overshadow the will of the people cannot be tolerated." (AK Parti, 2012: 10). This theme of the political tutelage and its abolition was one of the themes in the AKP's discourse. "By breaking the political tutelage, AK Party has made it possible for the will of the people to be reflected in institutions and organizations." (ibid: 10).

⁵ It is not claimed here that pragmatist and opportunist politics are peculiar to the AKP. The study will argue that pragmatism, to develop useful means to work, is the very foundational element of politics. Thus, this study rejects the distinction between the ethical and pragmatic, derived from Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas on morality. In a schematic way arriving from Nietzsche, the claim made here is that moral values are constructed according to the interests of individuals in interaction with others. (Nietzsche, 2007) On the other hand, some other philosophers, such as Levinas, have tried to develop a politics that is exempted from interests and based on the ethics of disinterestedness (Levinas, 1969). However, this study will argue that even if the political emerges out of disinterestedness, this disinterestedness ultimately is the product of desires and interests. For example, the conscience as an ethical mechanism has a role to construct a politics as some philosophers like Critchley have argued. However, this study argues that conscience is one of the feelings or affections (Critchley: 2014). Given these, the pragmatic is here very close to Gilles Deleuze&Felix Guattari's ideas on pragmatism, that is to develop means to organize life in every area and there is nothing outside the pragmatics to organize life. For a study of Deleuze and Guattari's connections to pragmatism see, (Bowden&Bignall&Patton, 2014; Deleuze&Guattari, 1987). Thus, it in parallel with James' ideas that what is pragmatically useful is that which works under normal and habitual conditions. Hence, politics also develops means according to its strategies and what an ethical pragmatism or the pragm-ethical politics is to develop new means to construct a new political in the Levinasian sense.

leftists, liberals and the Kurdish political movement between 2002-2010⁶, while it is now allied with and some Kemalists and nationalists.

The other element to construct a new Turkey was the construction of the support of the majority of the population through different mechanisms and including the Islamist groups⁷ and capital owners in its active construction.⁸ In parallel with this, the AKP practically aimed at the democratization of the country and the resolution of economic and ethnic problems such as the Kurdish problem through the discursive and practical means of service politics.⁹ However, this process has been carried on amidst conflicts and struggles with other forces in the country. Even if the components of the alliance and opponents and alternative groups to the AKP changed in different conjunctures, AKP's project to construct governable society and

⁶ A lot of authors periodize the AKP governments into two eras. The first era was between 2002-2010, when the AKP used a more democratic discourse, such as democratization of the country and tolerance for differences. In the second era, after 2010, it is argued that the AKP has used a more exclusive discourse and practices. In the first era, until the 2007 general elections, AKP's implementation of policies could somehow be blocked by the bureaucracy; however, after 2007 AKP's power to implement its policies increases. In the second era, starting with the 2010 referendum, the AKP increased its repression of opposition forces. Increasingly after the Gezi events, AKP's majoritarian political practices increased. There are studies from different perspectives as to how the AKP became a hegemonic force in Turkey. In spite of this periodization, this study claims that AKP's policies and means has a continuity in the sense that from the beginning it has always excluded opposition forces and alternatives to it constructing the boundaries of the us and them discursively and practically. Therefore, the pluralism in the first era was pluralism for the social and political forces close to its hegemonic alliance practices.

⁷ After the Gezi events, the AKP used a more Islamist discourse, the product of a new strategy, according to which the AKP's alliance with liberals and leftists around the discourse of democratization changed to an alliance with Islamic groups. For the continuities and discontinuities in AKP's discourse and its changing contents see, (Kalaylıoğlu, 2017a). For the continuity of the Islamic elements in AKP's discourse and political practices see, (Ateş, 2017).

⁸ None of the groups supporting the AKP was passive, but had their interests. Therefore, AKP could construct a web of social and political relations involving a common interest and institutionalization for the different social and political forces.

⁹ The service politics framed by the political outlook that is destined to produce a harmonious society exempted from the conflicts and enmities satisfying the economic and social needs of the population through neo-liberal policies and terminating conflicts and uncompromising attitudes in the social and political field. This concept is framed by conservative democracy. For service politics and conservative democracy see, (Yavuz, 2006; Akdoğan, 2004). For critical studies on the concept of service politics see, (Türk, 2014; Özsölçük, 2015).

its project to become the power itself¹⁰ has encountered criticism, opposition, dissent and antagonism from different social and political forces in the country.

This opposition has gained social and political expression both from reactions to and symptoms and products of AKP's policies and from ongoing social and political conflicts and problems such as the Kurdish problem and the demands of groups like Alevis and political and social movements led by the leftist labor unions and social and political organizations and the Kurdish political movement. Especially between 2002-2010, the different groups, from some of the leftist and Marxist groups, Kemalists and nationalists¹¹ to Alevis and Kurds¹² produced political positions and experiences critical of and opposed to the AKP.¹³

¹⁰ There is a tension in the AKP's project. For, on the one hand, the AKP desires to create a sovereignty that is an impersonal and transcendental body exempted from the subjectivity of Erdoğan and the production of the immanent mechanisms of the new Turkey, on the other hand, this project is being imposed within the body and existence of Erdoğan. For, increasingly by the mid 2010s, the AKP's project has become identified with Erdoğan's leadership despite the web of relations that include the multiple social and political forces constituting the AKP. In other words, like the function of the leadership in populist practices, that is to articulate social and political positions around a political project constructing a common political position and ideal, Erdoğan's leadership has a role to produce the unification and homogenization of the multiple social and political forces as the imaginary representative of AKP's common political ideal and position. For how the leadership functions in populism see, (Laclau, 2005). On the other hand, the increasing involvement of Erdoğan in party politics and the real identification of its representation with this reality has made the AKP's fate identified with Erdoğan himself.

¹¹ The Marxist and leftist groups had ongoing struggles in every area of the country before the AKP era, but some of them were also unhappy with the AKP's policies in economic and cultural areas, emphasizing the neo-liberal and conservative sides of the AKP's policies, while some leftist groups and Marxists supported AKP's policies, especially its democratic promises, until 2010. Apart from this, the AKP era produced a particular opposition of Kemalists and nationalists. These groups were concerned that the AKP's policies would end democracy and secularism in the country in parallel with the aim of global forces, including international capitalist and imperialist forces, through neoliberalism and conservatism. As existing leftist and Marxists social and political movements and ethnic and cultural problems were reformed during AKP governments, other opposition groups emerged due to the AKP's policies.

¹² The Kurdish problem is a historical one and the Kurdish political movement since the 1990s has been seeking a democratic solution, that is a solution not involving armed struggle. During AKP governments, the Kurdish political movement tried to force the AKP to implement a legal framework to solve the problem in parallel with its democratic promises. Therefore, the Kurdish political movement was one of the forces outside AKP's policies, but different from other forces, developing a political outlook directly opposing the AKP. Ultimately, the AKP started a peace process in 2010.

¹³ Even before the AKP era, there were a lot of political and social movements from left to right. Left wing and Marxist organizations and groups, in particular, were active in NGOs such as human rights organisations, in labor unions and in urban struggles. However, as will be mentioned later, the leftist social and political movements and experiences were reformed during the AKP era that brought huge transformations in the social and political field and restructuring of social and political positions in the country. Side by side with these, other social and political perspectives such as Kemalism and

Thus, even as the AKP constructed a new culture and life for its supporters combined with neo-liberalism and conservatism¹⁴, controled¹⁵ and tried to construct a hegemony¹⁶on the population¹⁷ including its components into the systems of sovereignty¹⁸ through populist means and mechanisms of power,¹⁹ there have been

nationalism were visible in the social and political movements. Ultimately, the social and political movements in the country intersected with and transversed the political and social field where the AKP and the opponents to it became active in restructuring the political experience.

¹⁴ For a case study analysing the production of the conservative subjectivities by AKP see (Akçaoğlu, 2017).

¹⁵ As mentioned before, this study argues that the AKP used multiple power mechanisms as a means of discipline to control society. And this study avoids claiming that the AKP is a modern or post-modern political movement or the product of post-modernity. For this study criticizes the perspectives labelling contemporary societies totally as post-modern, as Jean Baudriallard and others did or as post-industrial like Alain Touraine (Touraine, 1971), even if it doesn't reject the dominance of post-modernity and post industrialism globally. For a study about post-modern ideas see, (Best&Kellner, 1991). Thus, the study uses the terms post-modernity, post-industrial or neo-liberalization not to signify a universal reality as the boundaries of contemporary societies, but to signify the particular means. For example, as the mechanisms of repression signify the classical power mechanisms, the control apparatuses signify some of the contemporary experiences of globalization. (Deleuze, 1992)

¹⁶ The term hegemony is used here in the Gramscian sense. For Gramsci, the hegemony of any social project requires the consent of the population through the construction of a common sense and popular will. Even if this study does not consider hegemony as the sole power mechanism, it derives from the Gramsci's question of how the people approve hegemony. This question is closely related to the question posed by La Boetie regarding how the subordinated desires the subordination (La Boetie, 1997), later used by Deleuze&Guattari (Deleuze&Guattari, 2000) and Frederic Lordon, indifferent sense through the presentation of the power mechanism that produces the subordination of the individuals into any political and social system (Lordon, 2014). These thinkers emphasized the role of the unconscious mechanisms for the workings of the power mechanisms and went beyond Gramsci's hegemony in the sense that while for Gramsci the hegemony of any political and social project was framed by the conscious wills of the agents, for these thinkers unconscious mechanisms is the place where the power operates. These points will be discussed in detail in the second chapter. On the other hand, Laclau&Chantal use Gramsci's concept in a very different way. Like Gramsci, for them hegemony is the construction of power relations where the different subjectivities were subjected to the totalization around a political project through a construction of a popular will. However, for Laclau& Mouffe this totalization is only a discursive practice, because to create such a totalization in the social realm is impossible, because there would be fragmentations in a social milieu and the hegemony is realised by the operation and working of the unconscious mechanisms (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001). On the other hand, some of the thinkers criticize the concept of hegemony in politics, because for them hegemony in the sense of constructing a popular will and consent, whether through institutionalization in the social realm, according to Gramsci's thinking, or through the construction of a collective discursive formation that articulates the subjectivities around a hegemonic project in Laclau&Mouffe's sense, is impossible. For a critic of hegemony politics, see (Beasley-Murray, 2010).

¹⁷ For a case study of how AKP constructs its hegemony among the population, especially among the underclasses, see (Doğan, 2016). Also for the construction of AKP hegemony from different perspectives see, (Uzgel & Duru, 2009; Yalman, 2012).

¹⁸ Sovereignty is used here in the way Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri use it.(Hardt&Negri, 2004) For Hardt&Negri, every sovereignty project tries to constitute a political and social system which uses the mechanisms to transform the heterogeneity and flexibility of the multitude into a part of it. In other words, sovereignty aims at the territorialization of the multitude through hierarchical and

always silent and voiced resistance, discontent, troubles and social and political struggles to disintegrate and disturb the homogenization and unification of the population around its sovereignty project. Namely, the implementation of AKP's project has produced rival and oppositional and alternative political forces. Sometimes, these forces could be included and absorbed, sometimes excluded. Thus, the result was simply sometimes their control, absorption and articulation,²⁰ sometimes their non-governability and unpredictability. On the other hand, opposition and dissenting forces and their political actions sometimes shocked the existence, perception, and affection of the AKP because of the violent, unfamiliar and powerful characteristic of these forces, as in the case of the Gezi events²¹ So, the political field of Turkey has not been neutral and has included antagonisms, alternatives and opposition to the AKP, and social and political movements during the AKP era.

Given all this, it is evident that the social and political experiences in the country during the AKP era, the product of both continuities and discontinuities in local and global social, cultural and economic developments, have played a crucial role in forming the social and political field. This study is about the radical mass collective

representative ways, always including changes due to the character of the multitude, like other social and political practices. In that sense, the abolition of the old Turkey and the construction of a new Turkey on the one hand deterritorializes the habitual social and political fields in the country, while on the other hand reterritorializes them through practices in parallel with the idea of a new Turkey.

¹⁹ For a study which analyzes the power techniques used by the AKP and how and for what they work from a perspective close to post-structuralist thought see (Madra, 2015). The studies in this work analyze the changing forms of the power mechanisms and techniques of AKP and their working spaces and their links to neo-liberalism and conservatism and the resistance emerging in the country in relation to AKP policies.

²⁰ The concept of articulation used in this study is based on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's ideas. For Laclau&Mouffe, articulation is to bring together the different subjectivities around empty signifiers, operating to construct the commonness between these subjectivities. Arriving from this idea, the term articulation is used here meaning that it is one of the commonalizing mechanisms bringing together the different subjectivities through the social, political, discursive, cultural and economic mechanisms and practices. Therefore, as Laclau&Mouffe's articulation is chiefly a discursive mechanism producing empty signifiers, here the term articulation is used for all practices in human life (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001). The details will be discussed in the following pages.

²¹ The Gezi events have been referred to as the Gezi Resistance, June Events, Gezi protests, Gezi movement etc. All of these terms refer to its different characteristics and this study will use the term, "the Gezi" to emphasize and include all of its characteristics.

politics and collective alternatives and opposition movements to the AKP during the party's time in power. The study will explore the experiences of collective mass movements during the AKP era, concentrating upon the Gezi events and Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP), considered here as contemporary forms of radical collective politics and political subject constitutions.²² Therefore, the study will analyze how the collective political experiences emerged during the AKP era, concentrating upon the reasons and conditions which both made them possible and limited their scope.

1.2. The Problem of the Study in the Case of the Gezi and HDP

In the AKP era, there have been a lot of collective and mass social and political movements and experiences, however, the Gezi and HDP are different from both previous and other alternatives and opposition movements to the AKP and collective mass and popular politics, because of their radical character, producing new forms of politics as an alternative to the existing political system and having different characteristics as regards modes of carrying out politics. Through the Gezi collective mass and popular politics gained new characteristics differentiating it from previous political experiences, because the previous political opposition and alternatives in Turkey were dispersed among different political positions and gained no unified form except in some cases like Republic meetings.²³ In other words, despite the proliferation, multiplication and intensification of discontent and alternatives around

²² These cases were very different from the previous and existing political experiences. They were radical in the sense that at least discursively, but not in the context of their effects, producing entirely within the political field in the country radical social transformations that had the possibility to change the political and social life in the country. In the case of the Gezi, Gezi was radical due to its being an unhabitual political experience and had the possibility to and was able to produce a possibility to block AKP's force and produced and reformed the political field where the political forces constructed new positions. For example, AKP after Gezi reformed its alliances and developed new means to control social and political movements in the country. Whereas the HDP was a force to end the one party government of AKP and developed along these lines.

²³ The Republic meetings took place in 2007 in different cities of the country. The meetings expressed a strong opposition to the AKP and called for a more democratic and free country. for the characteristics of the Republic Meetings and the reasons and conditions that sparked it see, (İşik, 2007; Alyanak, 2010).

previous political expressions, no common opposition had emerged to gather the different social and political agents around common practices.

It was also formally different from previous collective political experiences. With the Gezi, the political oppositions and alternatives became more heterogeneous, including different social and political subjectivities, agents and groups partially constructing common discourses. The other point is that the experiences in the Gezi created a political disposition in the political field acting collectively around blocks and alliances of different political positions from left to right. These had a populist character in the sense of articulating and becoming multiple and heterogeneous subjectivities together around common political ideals such as justice, democracy and equality and experiences like park forums and street protests. Therefore, the Gezi included the experiences and practices of the political subject constitutions and produced new types of political subjectivities.

HDP is also different from the existing political organizations, even if it is part of the representational system. As being the project of the Kurdish political movement²⁴ and an alliance and block organization around leftist politics, it intends and intended to produce new forms of doing politics. It is not an organization that directly opposes itself to the existing political and social system in Turkey, but offers alternatives within the system. But its political programme aims at reordering social and political relations in society. Therefore, its political lines are designed to reconstruct the social and political system of the country expressed around the aim of democratic autonomy.²⁵

²⁴ The term the Kurdish political movement here includes the legal Kurdish political parties that began to be founded in the 1990s close to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In addition to these political organizations, there are other Kurdish parties and organizations in Turkey. When they are mentioned, their names will be listed.

²⁵ The democratic autonomy ideal, developed by the Kurdish political movement and Öcalan will be explained in the subsequent chapters of the study. It is designed as a social and political system aiming to constitute horizontally organized popular self-management mechanisms and to produce an alternative economic, cultural and social order to capitalism. Based on the framework of the solution to the Kurdish problem and creating equality between the different ethnic and social groups in the country, it aims to create a political system according to which every member of society would be part of the self-governance political system under equal conditions. For the concept of democratic autonomy see, (Gürer, 2015).

These characteristics distinguish it from the other political parties in parliament, namely CHP and MHP. Even if the CHP is mainly a leftist and social democratic party which gains support from the radical and traditional leftist sections of society and from the social and political movements in the country, the HDP's party programme and political perspective emerged as an alternative to the CHP.²⁶ This is due to the fact that the HDP's political line is framed by a radical democratic discourse and autonomist radical ideas. Correspondingly, its political discourse interpellates to construct more radical political experiences and social systems in the country.²⁷

As for the MHP, the HDP's political line and ideals contrast starkly with the MHP's nationalist outlook and its methods of doing politics. This contrast is evident in the perspectives to the Kurdish problem and the ideals about the social and political system of Turkey. While the MHP supports the unitary state based on Turkish identity, the HDP aims to deconstruct this identity, end the “dominance of Turkishness” in constitutional law and reconstruct the country based on equality between the ethnic identities.

Additionally, the HDP is also very different from the Marxist and leftist tradition in the sense of its organizational and political practices. Side by side with the traditional Marxist and leftist organizations, its political line is not based on hierarchical organizational structures and includes different social and political power relations, rather than favouring any one group.²⁸ Thus, it produces different political

²⁶ For the different outlooks of the CHP and HDP, their party programmes were useful. While the CHP bases its leftist and social democratic ideals on the ideology of Kemalism and supports maintaining the old regime with democratic social and economic reforms to the political and social systems in the country, the HDP's party program aims at constructing a new political and social system in the country. For the details of the political outlooks of these parties see the party programs, (<http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/chpprogram.pdf>; <http://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/parti/partiprogrami/8>)

²⁷ The CHP uses a more “ideological” discourse based on the synthesis of Kemalism, leftism and social democracy, even if it elasticizes this discourse in the election campaigns to gain the support of different social and political agents from the conservatives to nationalists. However, the HDP uses a very flexible and populist discourse to include all of the population, even if it has “ideological lines” based on the ideals of leftism from Marxism to libertarian leftism.

²⁸ It is important to note that there are other political organizations close to the HDP's political ideals and forms of doing politics, from libertarian to anti-authoritarian social and political organizations. But none of them were successful like the HDP in entering parliament with the support of different social and political agents and groups in society. Moreover, the HDP also included the traditional

subjectivities and ways of doing politics. As a result, the HDP has emerged as a mass and collective political opposition and alternative both to the AKP and the existing political system differing from the political organizations and practices both on the left and right. To sum up, the Gezi and HDP were different from the other mass opposition and alternative experiences in the country due to historical changes and having formally different characteristics. The Gezi and HDP were able to articulate and link the different social and political subjectivities and groups around common demands and perceptions through different political practices.

Hence both the Gezi and HDP generated strong, mass political experiences, becoming the expression of antagonism and alternative to the AKP and producing alternative ways of doing politics. While the Gezi included different and heterogeneous social and political agents and subjectivities drawing the mass of agents into its political practices, such as street demonstrations and park forums²⁹, the HDP, as the project of the Kurdish movement with an alliance of leftist organizations, became a strong political organization in the country. Both cases, with their alternative characteristics such as production of the new modes of political subjectivities and of doing politics for both left and right emerged as alternative radical collective politics in the country.

However, both the Gezi and HDP's politics encountered and generated limits while bringing their political experiences and power to the whole population of Turkey, due to political and social developments and conditions in the country. These limitations were also evident for the radical collective and mass politics in other contexts and localities.³⁰ Thus, while the Gezi shares limitations with the popular

Marxist groups supporting traditional Marxist organizational structures and ideology concentrating upon economic problems. However, as an institutionalized alliance organization, the political practice of HDP went beyond these limits.

²⁹ Park forums were the experiences designed as the collective and horizontal decision-making mechanisms and organized cultural activities which tried to construct solidarity and communication between the agents taking part in the Gezi (Özdek, 2013).

³⁰ The Gezi and HDP share the same characteristics as the contemporary mass political oppositions and alternatives. As the Gezi, like the uprisings that emerged in Egypt, Greece, USA and Spain, was organized horizontally and without any destination in the sense that it wasn't organized by any political and social group's strategies and tactics, was able somehow to construct common political positions from the different and multiple subjectivities and agents, this prevented any one of them becoming a hegemonic force. For a brief information about Gezi's similarities and differences see,

uprisings as regards forming institutionalized organizations to reorder and reorganize social and political life producing commonalized political and social practices and position-taking, the HDP, like the radical democratic politics, has encountered the limitations of the existing political systems.³¹ Consequently, this study is an analysis of the limitations and possibilities of the Gezi and HDP as contemporary radical collective political experiences in Turkey.

Therefore, this study investigates the characteristics of the contemporary radical collective politics, delving into the conditions of their possibilities and limitations through the analysis of cases from Turkey. The study will deal with how these politics became possible and delimited and it will respond empirically around the experiences of the Gezi and of the HDP. Because these political experiences were formed and emerged out of local political and social conditions and developments in the country, the analysis about them must include the historical and contextual conditions in Turkey, that is important to form structurally and contingently the possible universe of doing politics.

(Castells, 2015: 227-229). On the other hand, the HDP, like the radical democratic political parties such as Greece's The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and Spain's We Can (PODEMOS), articulated and brought together different demands and interests around leftist ideals and tried to reconstruct a representational political system making the different voices visible. For a study on Syriza see, (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014) and a study on PODEMOS see, (Errejon&Mouffe, 2016; Augustin&Briziarelli, 2017). Also for a comparison between PODEMOS and Syriza, see (Kioupkiolis&Katsambekis, 2016).

³¹ On the other hand, the Gezi, like other experiences in the world was able to bring together different social and political agents around common discourses, hopes and desires and common political practices in opposition to existing politically hegemonic powers and existing social and political systems around the demands and hopes of democracy, justice and freedom. The HDP, like Syriza and PODEMOS, has articulated the demands of different social and political groups around the discontent produced by the existing social and political order, and their desires and hopes for the construction of a new social and political system. However, these cases like their similar counterparts in the world had limitations stemming from the local and global conditions and the limits due to their formal ways of doing politics. For example, in the case of the Gezi and other popular political experiences it was evident that even if the groups and agents were able to come together around common demands and were able to produce political alliances spontaneously, they couldn't maintain the commonality that emerged during these events around politically institutionalized organizations including the multiplicity of the agents and these uprisings were limited to the social and political agents' opposition and constituting an alternative to the existing governments. This was evident in Egypt and Spain. In the case of the HDP, even if PODEMOS and SYRIZA were able to organize the discontent both with existing governments and totally with neo-liberalism around the hopes of democracy and equality, they were unable to attract all of the population. Due to the local conditions in Turkey, the HDP could not attract the population in the country as much as PODEMOS and SYRIZA were able to. Therefore, the limitations and possibilities of the Gezi and HDP were framed both by the local conditions in the country and by the global problems of radical collective politics in the world, as the other experiences demonstrate. These points will be explored in detail later.

1.3. The construction of the commonality: Possibilities, Limits and Limitations of the Gezi and HDP

Days before the Gezi, different social groups, such as students, workers, young people and women and political groups from nationalists and Kemalists to the Marxists and feminists were carrying out demonstrations and protests and trying to construct political positions around particular issues. All of them somehow concentrated upon the AKP's policies, from the intention of the law that restricts abortion to the law that limits the sale of alcohol, and from the AKP's foreign policy in Syria to its policies excluding opponents and its neo-liberal and conservative policies. The criticism hinged on the idea that the government was doing whatever it wanted, neglecting the demands, interests and needs of some sections of the population. Thus, there was a common political position shared by the different social and political groups as regards criticism and objection to the AKP's policies and none of them were content with the AKP, but there was no organization that united them in a common front.

Under these circumstances, the Gezi erupted throughout the country. The Gezi, starting with a demonstration to prevent the government's project to build Artillery Barracks in Gezi Park, Taksim, by some of the urban activists, members of NGOs and members of leftist organizations³², spread quickly all over the country including and gathering the different social and political positions, subjectivities and groups and continued for months. These events had the possibility to articulate and link different social and political groups, demands and interests from leftists, rightists, socialists, Kemalists to libertarian and anti-authoritarian groups, agents from Kurdish political movements into a common but not institutionalized front and block that partially constructed their joint action and common political positions with the expression of hate and opposition to AKP and the demands for democracy and freedom. In that sense, the Gezi produced a common political position for the

³² The demonstration was initiated by Taksim Solidarity, which had been established by different groups to prevent the government's building projects like shopping malls and plans to close old public spaces like the Emek Cinema, in Taksim.

different social and political agents articulating and linking their particular demands, interests, positions through common practices.³³

In this context, some remarks are important: The Gezi emerged within and in between the political and social conditions such as AKP's strong hegemony over society and the increasing dissatisfaction and discontent of some sections of the population with the AKP's policies. Before it, there was opposition, resistance and criticism against AKP's policies by these sections, including different social and political groups. Therefore, it did not emerge within a void. It is just that the conditions existed for the possibility of making Gezi the basis for a common block of opposition and of constituting a new collective political subject against the AKP for the different social and political subjectivities and positions.

However, even if it had the possibility to reach most of the population of Turkey, it was limited to the AKP's opponents, even if there were some cases in which some AKP supporters joined the demonstrations in the first days of the events. Moreover, some of the experiences, such as park forums being non-representational decision-making mechanisms, alternative life and culture spaces and collective gardens as alternative agricultural production experiences could not attract and organize wide sections of the population. Therefore, even if the Gezi was able to create a common political position and practice for about half of the population, it could not maintain the common block for a lot of reasons. These reasons can be summarized as follows: Firstly, the counter strategies and mechanisms used by the AKP to disarticulate the Gezi utilising different mechanisms, from police violence to divide the articulation and its counter articulation of the population organizing meetings were crucial. Secondly, the absence of a permanent common political block and organizations because of the divisive influences of the struggles and rivalries between different

³³ There is a huge literature on the Gezi concentrating on production, from the usage of language to organizational structures. The literature analyzes clearly the changing forms of doing politics and everyday practices from the interpersonal relationships to political forms differing from existing forms. This literature will be analyzed in detail in chapter 1. However, when it is asked what they produced commonly, it is evident that the events constituted and constructed a collective political subject that is the articulation of the infinite multitudes of the social and political positions, interests and demands into a temporary common block. This block produced a strong opposition to the AKP's policies.

groups was another factor. In short, the possibility of producing a common political block for most of the population was limited due to multiple reasons.

Like the Gezi, the HDP emerged as a common block claiming to articulate the demands of different sections, subjectivities and groups of the population with leftist and radical democratic politics.³⁴ HDP's production of a common political position for the different social and political agents gained different expressions according to the changing conjunctures. For example, during the Turkish Presidential Election in 2014 with the effective election campaign of Selahattin Demirtaş, the HDP became prominent in society and the political arena of Turkey.³⁵ With this election campaign HDP emerged as an independent political force with the claim of articulating for all of the population.

After this period, the second moment of articulation started with the eruption of the 6-7 September 2014 Kobane events both in the east and west of Turkey. During these events, the HDP mobilised most of the leftists, Marxist and Kurds into the demonstrations and other activities.³⁶

³⁴ Before the HDP's emergence onto the political scene in Turkey, there had been attempts to form a block for the elections by the Kurdish movement and other leftist groups since the 2002 general elections. Through these blocks, independent candidates were elected to the parliament of Turkey. However, the HDP is different from the previous blocks, because the HDP attracted not only the Kurds and Marxists, but a lot of groups in the society of Turkey. In other words, it attracted Kemalists, Alevis, Marxists, LGBTT movements and groups and the Kurds, as well as the supporters of the Kurdish movement close to the PKK. So, the HDP made it possible to attract different social and political groups and subjectivities into a common block with different political aspirations than the AKP's.

³⁵ Demirtaş's candidacy for the election not only attracted the politically organized leftist and Marxist groups and individuals and Kurdish population but also the non-political individuals, rightist peoples, some Islamic democratic and liberal groups and Kemalists. Even some of the supporters of MHP expressed their sympathy with Demirtaş. Even if Demirtaş took the most of the votes from the Kurdish regions of Turkey, many of the leftist groups and individuals supported him.

³⁶ Before the emergence and formation of HDP within the political arena of Turkey, there was Peoples' Democratic Congress (HDK) as a block organization of Kurds and some of the leftist groups in Turkey. However, it couldn't articulate all of the groups and organizations of leftists and Marxists in Turkey. Some of the groups such as United June Movement and other Marxist organizations were critical of HDP. Before Kobane events, there was a struggle between HDP with PKK and some of the groups for being the main force to articulate the organized and non-organized leftists, Alevis and democrats. In this process, some of the members were imposing HDP as the main leftist socialist actor for the left of Turkey. They were arguing that they were the true successor of the tradition of Marxism of Turkey. However, during the Kobane events most of the leftist and Marxist groups acted together with HDP except some of the leftist Kemalists like Aydınlık Movement. Even some of the Marxist groups, critical to PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan and HDP, were carrying the symbols and flags of Kurdish movement during the events. Adding to these, some of the peoples such as some Alevis,

The HDP's political influence increased and forced its limits before the Turkish General Election of June 2015. In this election the HDP gained a significant success in passing the electoral threshold through taking 13.12% of the votes. Different social and political groups and subjectivities supported the HDP, from leftist Kemalists, Alevis, democrat Muslims to Kurdish people, minorities, social democrats, anti-authoritative and libertarian groups, socialists and communists.

However, after the June 2015 election, Turkey entered into an era of increasing war with the Kurdish movement and increasing terror attacks on civilians and state institutions by Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) and Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK). The process began with ISIS's bombing attack on different leftist youth groups gathering to go to Rojava to act with solidarity for Kobane. At the same time, the peace process between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish state came to an end. The Kurdish youth Organization, the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) consisting of young people organized around the PKK, declared democratic autonomy and in order to defend this declaration became armed and dug ditches in a lot of Kurdish towns.³⁷

During these conditions of violence because of the conflict between Kurdish young people and the Turkish State and bombings by ISIS, Turkey went to the polls again on 1 November 2015.³⁸ During the conjuncture of the increasing war, violence and the closure of the political spaces to the HDP, on 15 July 2016 a group in the Turkish army, mostly affiliated with the Gülen Cemaat, tried to carry out a military coup.

very distant from Kurdish movement, supported the demonstrations for Kobane. The Kobane events and demonstrations made closer most of the leftist groups, some of the Alevis and of the Kemalists, democrats and secularists to the Kurdish movement and HDP.

³⁷ This process was the restart of the conflict between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish state. On the other hand, the HDP's approach to the Kurdish problem was to restart the peace process with non-violent and public politics rather than intensifying the war. Under these conditions, the HDP's non-violent and popular politics were ineffective, even if the HDP tried to involve itself in the conflict process making emphasis on peace.

³⁸ Under these conditions the HDP'S votes dropped, even if it again passed the electoral threshold. However, AKP took %49.50 of the votes and gained the chance to form the government alone. (Retrieved 14.06.2016, from <https://secim.haberler.com/2015/>) After the elections, the bombings by ISIS and the conflict between the state and YDG-H continued and the violence increased. The process was the re-creation of the opposition to the AKP articulated around the HDP because of the disappointments coming from the 10 October bombings, the 1 November elections and increasing war.

After this unsuccessful coup attempt, the government declared a state of emergency and the AKP began to form a new alliance with Kemalists, Islamists and the MHP against the PKK and the Gülen Cemaat using a mostly nationalist and statist discourse expressed with the slogan “Yenikapı Ruhu”, which was used after the demonstration against the attempted military coup that included parties in the parliament and other groups except the HDP at Yenikapı, İstanbul in July 2016. In this process, the HDP was excluded from this new alliance by the discourse that equated the HDP with PKK or terrorism.³⁹

During the process from the establishment of the HDP to the conjuncture after the 15 July attempted coup, the HDP'S claim to articulate for most of the population of Turkey fluctuated between strong attraction of the population and limited influence. In this process, until the 7 June the HDP had possibilities for its claim, however, the conjuncture beginning with the Suruç bombing restricted its attraction and its effectiveness. Increasing repression on the HDP, war and violence distanced some people from the party and isolated its supporters and sympathizers from the publicly expressed political actions and practices. Moreover, the HDP was unable to develop a response to the emerging conjunctures in order to develop strong and effective practices in parallel with the strategy to structure and constitute a permanent block.

1.4. The Research Question and the Argument of the Study

It is evident that both the Gezi and HDP had the possibility to produce a common political position and block against the AKP and for the hopes and desires for an alternative society and politics in Turkey, bringing together different social and political groups and positions, subjectivities and their interests, perceptions and demands. However, due to the multiple reasons framed by the political conjunctures

³⁹ Such a discourse equated all of HDP's existence, including its discourses, aims and ways of doing politics with terrorism and confined it m to more limited spaces and planes of politics distant from most of the population. HDP members, leaders and sympathizers were imprisoned. The conjuncture began with the state of emergency creating a repression process for leftist newspapers, TV's, NGO's and institutions. Leftist organizations and the HDP became more ineffective and were never able to create a strong opposition block against the AKP during this process.

and conditions in the country, they were also limited. Therefore, the study will dwell on the question of how the Gezi and HDP became possible and how they were delimited.

Before anything else, both the Gezi and HDP constituted collective political subjects bringing the different social and political positions, demands, interests and subjectivities into common political positions and expressions through political practices. There were such attempts before the Gezi and HDP in Turkey, however, none of them created an attraction for the multiple social and political positions, demands, interests and wide sections of society.⁴⁰

As mentioned above, before the Gezi, while the AKP articulated and attracted about half of the population into its political and social hegemony, it also, by constructing alliances with groups such as some of the leftist and liberal groups, involved them in its political projects, expressed around the discourse of democratization.⁴¹ Meanwhile, other Kemalists, socialists and nationalists were criticizing the AKP because of its policies and were critical of the AKP's policies, arguing that the AKP would construct a more authoritative and Islamic country. The opposition and criticism was divided and most of the population was supporting the AKP, even if the demonstrations and criticism of AKP's power and policies were increasing,

⁴⁰ As will be mentioned in the following chapters, there were other collective political experiences forming a block against the AKP. In that sense there were some demonstrations during AKP governments which brought together the different social and political subjectivities, such as the protests against the USA's military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Also, in 2006 with the Diyarbakır events, many Kurds in Kurdish regions of Turkey protested the killing of PKK guerrillas with chemical weapons by the Turkish army. The former demonstrations were not directly against the AKP's increasing power and policies in Turkey and the latter were limited to the Kurds. However, the Republic meetings of 2007 in Istanbul, İzmir and Ankara and in other cities of Turkey for laicism and the maintenance of Kemalist republicanism and against the increasing power of the AKP was directly antagonistic to the AKP and formed a strong and mass block. The block included army members, secularists, social democrats, some leftists and Kemalists, most of whom were supporters of the second largest party in parliament, the CHP. Even if these meetings attracted wide sections of society, they could not attract the different social and political positions, groups and subjectivities such as Kurds and socialist, communist and Marxist organizations, because its political discourse was limited to nationalism and Kemalism and to protect the existing political and social order.

⁴¹ In particular, during the 2010 Turkish constitutional referendum process, some of the leftist groups supported the AKP, arguing that such a new law that the AKP offered would make Turkey a more democratic and free country. Moreover, as the Kurdish movement was trying to create a peace process it decreased its criticism of the AKP.

because of its project to construct a new Turkey, its policies in the Middle East and repression of opponents.

It is under these conditions that the Gezi became possible. Its organizational forms, new modes of doing politics and the increasingly negative perceptions or hate of the AKP and the emergence of desires and hopes to construct a new society brought together groups that had not formerly acted in unison. The open structure of the organizational forms, formation of common feelings like hate and negation towards the AKP's policies and the emergence of the condensation and articulation of the hopes, desires, demands and interests of individuals and political groups and subjectivities into a common political expression made it possible to bring multiple different social and political groups all over the country together. This produced a strong antagonistic block against the existing hegemonic political and social forces around the AKP and constructed new social relations and forms of doing politics. Therefore, the political conjuncture that produced the discontent in society and the usage of new modes and forms of doing politics made possible the coming together and articulation of multiple social and political subjectivities around a common political position and the production of a commonality. On the other hand, the counter strategies of the AKP, the division of the political groups and agents and their political habits in addition to the majority of the population's critical distance to the events delimited it. So the Gezi did not emerge in a void automatically, it became possible within and was delimited by the social and political conditions and conjunctures in Turkey.

In the case of the HDP, it utilised the existing social and political conditions and its pragmatically useful and opportunistic organizational and articulation mechanisms to attract the agents, making it possible to articulate and organize the different and multiple social and political demands and interests into a block of commonality. In other words, the processes and conditions⁴² within which the HDP emerged as a

⁴² The establishment of the HDP was the product of the changes in the political perspective and strategy of the Kurdish political movement. In order to solve the Kurdish problem democratically it developed a Turkey-ization strategy that is to go beyond the Kurdish problem and include the other problems in Turkey. It is thus founded within the conditions, when the discontents from AKP's policies have been gaining antagonistic form. On the other hand, the Kurdish political movement was increasing its influence among the Kurds, at the same time as it was becoming an attraction center for social and political groups close to leftist ideals.

political actor made it possible for the HDP to attract different hopes, desires, demands and interests together into a common block, while in some situations the HDP's articulation was delimited by existing forces and conditions. In that sense, the emergence of the individuals and political subjectivities and groups with the hopes and desires to create a new society and political conditions based on equality and democracy emerged after Gezi. Combined with the ongoing hate and fear of the AKP and Erdoğan's policies, HDP's useful strategies and mechanisms, such as using flexible discourses to include all of the population, made it possible for the HDP to influence the agents. On the other hand, the political developments in Turkey, increasing repression of the HDP by state and other political forces and the HDP's ineffective way of doing politics delimited its possibilities.⁴³

It is thus evident that both the Gezi and the HDP did not emerge within a void, because there were historical and contextual conditions and reasons that both made them possible and delimited them. On the other hand these conditions and contexts did not lead automatically to their emergence. Therefore, the production of the commonality of and between the different agents required mechanisms and means to attract and organize the different social and political subjectivities within the political and social conditions. For, even if the demands, interests and positions of political and social groups and subjectivities existed before these experiences, the production of the commonality included a pragmatic politics involving commonalizing mechanisms within and under the given political conditions and developments, social and political structures, the relations between the social and political forces that structure the political field⁴⁴ and habits and positions of the subjectivities that frame their attitudes.

⁴³ This ineffectiveness was to some extent related to the HDP's structural and internal characteristics. For, the HDP as a political party had limits that were drawn by the Kurdish political movement and its interests and its way of doing politics was framed by representative parliamentary politics, even if its party program aimed at constructing direct-democratic institutions within the party and building social and political institutions beyond the party structure. These limits constantly pulled it into the problems of the Kurdish issue and prevented it from developing different means beyond the requirements of hegemonic alliance politics, which were based on discursive practices rather than constitutive practices.

⁴⁴ The concept of political field, developed by using Pierre Bourdieu's ideas, will be detailed below. The political field consists of the social and political forces that construct the political positions in the political field where the limits and the rules of politics constantly change according to the

Additionally, the pragmatic means and mechanisms of the politics do not automatically attract and constitute political subject constitutions. To reiterate, the political articulation and political subject constitutions emerge within the conditions through political practices and mechanisms. The social positions, demands and interests are not automatically political and transform into political experience, but become political through the commonalizing practices and mechanisms working on the singular and multiple demands, interests, perceptions and social and political dispositions of the subjectivities and agents.

In the case of the Gezi and HDP⁴⁵, it is also evident that these political experiences are the product of the work of the articulation forces and commonalizing mechanisms on the singularities and agents articulated through making their interests, social and political dispositions, perceptions and demands political.⁴⁶ As mentioned above, the demands and interests of the individuals are not themselves political and do not lead automatically to political acts, but become political through commonalization practices and mechanisms.

For example, before Gezi there was hate, criticism and anger towards the AKP and wide sections of the population had alternative political hopes and desires. However, these complex and infinite effects of the individuals were not themselves part of politics, even if they were caused by politics. In other words, they might be political effects but these were not part of a collective doing of politics and had no common

conjunctures and new position-taking of the forces to each other and through the emergence of the new position-takings by the agents and groups.

⁴⁵ As mentioned the Gezi and HDP are different from each other in the sense of using different forms, mechanisms and means of doing politics. As the Gezi used horizontal organizational forms and semi-representational political experiences, the HDP mainly used discursive mechanisms and formed as a representative force for the agents that were attracted by it. Thus, while the Gezi was very close to political experiences, lacking an organizational force and organization as the representative of the agents and singularities, the HDP constructed itself as a representational political force for the different subjectivities and agents. This distinction makes evident that in each case different processes and mechanisms worked on the agents and singularities to form the commonality of the agents.

⁴⁶ This is saying that as this study will emphasize many times, the construction of the political common is produced out of the relationality between the articulating force and articulated agents and the common and the singularities according to which both articulated and articulator and the singular and common act on each other and for the construction of the political commonality.

point expressed around common political actions. They became part of a collective political action through the formation and constitution of the common experiences during Gezi. These complex effects as well as demands construct and are constructed the political expressions and experiences, when they commonalized each other within a common point. On the other hand, politics also constructs effects, interests and demands through commonalization. So, the political commonalization constructs a relationship between the articulator and the articulated and common and singular. On the one hand, the individual agent with their interests, demands, effects and lives, on the other hand the commonalizing forces try to articulate and link these into a politics through different mechanisms from constructing discourses for the attraction of subjectivities and organizational structures to demonstrations, resistance and alternative life models.

Within this framework, the study will analyze the processes and conditions of the Gezi and HDP's possibilities, limits and limitations in their articulation and commonalizing processes to bring together and link different social and political subjectivities. Related to the general question of the study, that is how the Gezi and HDP became possible and were delimited, the study will explore how the agents and political and social subjectivities were able, and unable to, be articulated, linked, organized and brought together and how the articulation and coming together of the agents dissolved and were delimited. What were the reasons, interests and demands that were able or unable to attract them into these political commonalization experiences formed in the political fields of Turkey? As emphasized above, the study will not treat the demands, interests and effects emerging before the political experiences as the causes that determined the emergence of the Gezi and HDP. However, it considers these demands, interests and effects as used and transformed by the Gezi and HDP through commonalization.

1.5. Habitus and Political Commonalization and Commonalizing Mechanisms

This study is mainly framed by concepts such as habitus and political commonalizing practices and mechanisms deriving from the theoretical and historical discussions about political subject constitution and the experiences of contemporary collective

and popular politics and social movements.⁴⁷ Especially, the study uses the concept of political commonalization referring to Laclau&Mouffe and Hardt&Negri's ideas on the ontology of politics and the contemporary experiences of collective political subject constitutions and forms of doing politics. These thinkers analyze how the collective political experiences in contemporary mass and popular politics emerge within the process and experiences of doing politics and political subject constitution. Their investigations and analysis from different perspectives provides the theoretical and analytical tools for the commonalization processes and mechanisms in the constitution of the collective political subjectivity.

According to this study, political commonalizing mechanisms work for the production of the common through political experiences in which multiple and different social and political subjectivities are linked, articulated and brought together.⁴⁸ Within this framework, this study first and foremost claims that none of

⁴⁷ This study will concentrate on the discussions and ideas developed within post-structuralist and postmodernist theory, especially that of Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe. As will be mentioned in the second chapter of the study, these thinkers offer the analytical tools to analyze the contemporary experiences of collective and popular politics and political subject constitution processes and mechanisms, discussing the ontology of the politics and philosophy of the subject and subjectivity in politics. Their ideas are framed by the post structuralist and postmodernist thinking that criticize the essentialist and given nature of doing politics and political subject formation. Within this framework, they criticize the modernist usage of categories such as class deconstructing and reconstructing the modernist categories of social and political analysis presenting new ideas and concepts.

⁴⁸ Georg Simmel claims that social forms are the social mechanisms that frame the social interactions between individuals or subjectivities producing the collective and social forms of life. Emerging before the social experiences and being their conditions, these forms emerge within the complexity and multiplicity of the subjectivities and functions as the objectifying forms for the subjectivities. Thus, in Simmel's thinking the social forms have the tension between the subjective and objective and the singular and common. This is saying that, as the social forms function for the production of the common and objectivity for the different subjectivities, the subjectivities tend to produce heterogeneous and complex interactions. About the social forms in Simmel especially see, (Simmel: 1971). Simmel's ideas are very contrary to Durkheim's ideas, because for Durkheim social forms have an independent reality and do not include a tension between the subjectivities and objective. For Durkheim, the collective and social mechanisms have an independent reality above the subjectivities and every tension within the common is seen as a deviation. Thus, for Simmel the production of the common through social and collective forms emerges with the tension between subjective and objective, whereas for Durkheim it is the imposition of the collective on the subjectivities. In other words, the common is not above the subjectivities, but emerges within and with the relations between the subjectivities as being the linkage of individuals and subjectivities for social collectivity. As for Durkheim the subjectivities disappear when the collectivity is constructed, for Simmel the collectivity and the common produced by the social forms are like a container in which individuals and subjectivities are collectivized. For Durkheim's ideas on collectivity especially see, (Durkheim, 1995). It is true that the forms also have a reality exempted from the subjectivities as being ahistorical and transcendent like the a priori categories of Kant, as in Kant's thinking there is no content without forms and no form without content, even if the contents has multiplicity and are complex and forms have independent reality, the social forms function when the subjectivities emerge through the

the given social and political positions and agents and none of the interests, demands, perceptions and effects produced by the given social and political conditions are themselves political and causes of political experiences. Moreover, even if any social and political agent has such a potential, it does not lead automatically and spontaneously to politics and the constitution of political subjects. However, some perspectives can assign a potential to any social group such a political role.⁴⁹ In other words, the political commonalizing mechanisms work on the actual and given social and political positions of the subjectivities and agents, but these actual and given positions do not themselves lead the construction of the political common, but the processes and practices in the politics link, articulate and bring together different and multiple subjectivities and agents around the political common.

These points have similarities and parallelism to Laclau&Mouffe's ideas. For Laclau&Mouffe the common produced by the political mechanisms and practices is not inscribed and given in the existing social conditions or in any of the social subjects. It is the product of the articulation processes requiring a political practice of an articulating force and its experiences that do not necessarily and automatically produce the common. Thus, the construction of the political subjectivity is the product of the relations between the forces that develop means to articulate the subjectivities. These points are clear in Laclau&Mouffe's criticisms of traditional Marxist perspectives which are according to them essentialist (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001). For traditional Marxist perspectives, the conditions produced by capitalism and its effects on the working class lead the working class to become a force of and destined to be the subject of revolutionary politics. Namely, the conditions created by capitalism assign a potential to the proletariat and to constitute the proletariat as a revolutionary subject is to realize this potential through politics. For, it is assumed

containment of the social forms. For Kant's ideas on form and content see, (Kant, 1998: 193-195). In parallel with Simmel, for this study commonalizing mechanisms include the forms of the politicability that produces the relationality between the subjectivities in politics. In other words, these mechanisms include the practices and processes that produce the forms of the politicability for the different subjectivities. The commonalizing mechanisms have a unification and commonization role for the multiplicity and the heterogeneity of the subjectivities and agents. They do not have an independent reality above the subjectivities, but emerge when a commonalization process works. Through these forms subjectivities are subjected to the processes of commonalization.

⁴⁹ Thus, this study claims that none of the social and political positions in themselves are essentially political and frame the political experience.

that the social conditions of the workers also create the potential for the emergence of a revolutionary politics and its subject. This is a teleological approach arguing that the conditions immanent to capitalism lead the workers to a subject formation that existed before them and is waiting there to articulate the workers into a revolutionary politics. The articulation and organizational mechanisms are there to realize the potential to organize the workers into a revolutionary politics. However, this perspective neglects the role of the articulation and organization processes and practices for a political subject constitution. This is plainly contrary to this study's claim that the effects, positions, demands and symptoms produced by the given social conditions are not themselves political, but become part of the politics through political practice within the given conditions. The conditions become possible for the political subject constitution through the mechanisms and practices of the politics.

Likewise, Laclau&Mouffe (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001) argue that the practices of an articulation as a commonalizing practice produces a relation between the articulating force and the articulated agents' demands, effects and social positions created by the conditions. The social conditions and its symptoms and effects become possible for any political articulation practice as long as the individuals are articulated into the politics and political practices. Through this relation a common as the representative of the positions, demands, feelings and interests is produced.⁵⁰

Therefore, the social conditions do not lead automatically to political articulation for a political subject formation and constitution. Thus, it is the political practices and their mechanisms within given conditions that construct the common through political practices.⁵¹ Namely, the subject of the politics is not also given, it is the

⁵⁰ It is important to note that this common as the representative of multiple demands functions as a unification procedure, that is to produce the common in which different and multiple social and political positions are represented. This representation is not required to correspond to the reality of the agents and singularities, nor is it the mirrored representation of their conditions. But it is production through the discursive practices that produces discursively. Thus, the common produces a new relationality between the subjectivities within the politics through discursive mechanisms. This point is important for this study, because in the case of the production of the political commonality in different modes, the things represented and produced by the common produces a new position that does not mechanically apply one to one to the singular and multiple demands of the agents.

⁵¹ As this will be explained in detail later it is sufficient here to note that Laclau&Mouffe call this practice a hegemonic practice that with strategies and tactics of an articulating force acts within given political conditions on the different and multiple demands, effects and perceptions of the agents producing a commonality for them (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001).

product of the articulation processes which emerge within the conditions and contexts. In the case of the constitution of the proletariat as a political subject, it is evident that the proletariat is constructed through the articulation of the workers through politics. The form of the political subjectivity was not there before, even if there was a concept and idea of this political subjectivity, but is constructed by means of the articulation processes through which the demands, interests and effects of the different agents and subjectivities are articulated through the construction of the common point and experiences. For, on the one hand they are not themselves political and on the other hand the conditions created by capitalism do not lead them automatically to politics. Therefore, the teleological essentialism of these perspectives neglects the fact that there is a gap between the conditions that may create the potential to produce social positions, subjectivities and effects, and the political subject constitution. For, the positions, effects and subjectivities emerge within given conditions that are not themselves political, but become part of the political through the articulations. Precisely speaking it is not possible for the conditions themselves to produce a political subject, but this become possible through the mechanisms of politics.⁵²

Given these for Laclau&Mouffe, the existing and given social and political positions and dispositions of the multiple and different subjectivities are not themselves part of a common, but the political commonalization mechanisms and its processes and practices works on these dispositions and positions. In other words, the dispositions and positions do not necessarily in themselves automatically produce the common. On the other hand, Hardt&Negri(Hardt&Negri, 2004) argue that the multitude as both being an ontological category before any political action and practice and being

⁵² This is saying that the social conditions and relations immanent in a given historical moment may create the effects, demands, interests and positions and these may have a disposition for the political practices becoming the potentials for the articulation, however, these become the possibility for a political subject constitution of a political project through the articulation mechanisms. In other words, the potential becomes the disposition for the politics through the mechanisms of political experiences. Therefore, as it is stated above none of the social subjectivity and position and their expressions created by the given conditions are the conditions for the possibility of the political subject constitutions. To persist in the teleological and mechanistic perspectives makes it impossible to explain the reasons why all of the workers could not be articulated into revolutionary practice. For example, as regards the formation of class consciousness, it is barely that this consciousness is not given as an end to realize the revolutionary politics, but it is a product of an articulation. There is no passage from false consciousness to true consciousness, but construction of a specific political consciousness through articulation.

an historical social and political subject conditioned by the contemporary experiences of the power have a disposition that produces the common for different and multiple subjectivities.⁵³ Thus, for Hardt&Negri, the multitude potentially and possibly includes in itself the political commonalization. The political practice through the constitutive experiences against the mechanisms and practices of the power that works on the multiplicity, horizontality and openness of the multitude to construct the sovereignty⁵⁴ Thus, the political practice of the multitude is to express the common against the existing power mechanisms. Namely, the political commonalization practices work for constructing the common of the multitude through the reorganization of life through the constitutive experiences being horizontal. However, for Hardt&Negri, despite multitude having a potentiality, the political commonality is also to be constructed. Their studies give examples and

⁵³ When it is derived from Hardt&Negri's perspective, it is clear that the multitude is the collective social and political subject form that is a commonality despite the multiplicity of the subjectivities being different and unconnected to each other. Multitude as an ontological category is the expression of this fact signifying that the multitude is open to changes in form and content and comprises the multiple differences and in every era power mechanisms work on it to transform its multiplicity and terminate the differences into the part of the Same in which every subjectivity is uniform and into the part of the political system and social subject forms that homogenize it and make it the part of a closed One rather than constructing a common, not terminating the differences between the subjectivities and its heterogeneity (Hardt&Negri, 2004). These points will be detailed in chapter 3, but it is important to note that the multitude had a disposition to act together in spite of its heterogeneity before the functionings of the power mechanisms on it, on the other hand, the contemporary experiences of the power, named as the Empire, works on multitude in a different way. It maintains the heterogeneity of the multitude through the contemporary forms of life producing on the one hand infinite differences between the subjectivities, while on the other hand producing common conditions for the subjectivities. Thus, Empire conditions the possibilities for the heterogeneous subjectivities to act together. Therefore, today's social and political expressions as an alternative to the existing system have a disposition producing a commonality for the different subjectivities. Thus, the multitude as a political subject that is the expression of the common for the different subjectivities is conditioned by the existing social and political conditions. Contemporary working of life produced by the current practices of bio-power produce a world that creates a potential for different subjectivities acting in common through horizontal organizations (Hardt&Negri, 2001). In other words, despite the differences between the agents the different subjectivities and agents come together around the social and political forms of the multitude against the existing power mechanisms that work on the subjectivities and agents to transform them into the social subjects for the system through homogenization of the multiplicity of the singularities. However, these conditions do not lead necessarily to the political action of this commonality. In that sense, the political commonalization for Hardt&Negri includes the constitutive experiences for the common and the social and political struggles of the multitude, which may bring together the different subjectivities around the common organized horizontally.

⁵⁴ The sovereignty aims to homogenize the heterogeneity of the multitude, totalize its multiplicity into the One and Same and develop the means to make it predictable. Sovereignty works on the multitude in different historical eras using different methods that aim to produce social subjectivities for the system.

cases of how the common is produced horizontally through the political and social experiences in contemporary collective and popular politics (Hardt&Negri, 2004).

As is seen for Laclau&Mouffe, the commonalization is constructed through the discursive mechanisms to form the common for the different subjectivities, whereas for Hardt&Negri it is done by the constitutive mechanisms.⁵⁵ For each thinker, the common is different from the simple aggregation of the singularities, but is a product that includes the different agents and subjectivities. On the other hand, as Laclau&Mouffe concentrate upon the articulation processes for political commonalization, Hardt&Negri analyze how the existing social and political conditions lead to the formation of the multitude.⁵⁶

As a result, it is evident that for all of these thinkers, the production of the political commonality is not a given, and the product of the political practices of either through the hegemonic and representative practices or the horizontal and constitutive practices. These two perspectives offer the tools to analyze contemporary collective politics providing the commonalizing mechanisms that constitute the common political positions and experiences of the different agents. As will be detailed in chapter 2, as these commonalizing mechanisms is useful to analyze the Gezi and HDP, but they leave aside how the agents joined into the political experiences.

⁵⁵ Rather than empty signifiers and a representation politics, the practices of the multitude from the constitutive experiences to the construction of the common effects, demands and interests is the expression of the common experiences of the different singularities. The political action of the multitude transforms this potentiality into a political practice of the multitude acting together. The singularities, despite their differences, are common in their life conditions produced by contemporary capitalism that provide the horizontal mechanism of life organization acting in common. Therefore, the political experiences of the multitude, such as resistance, have the potential to constitute a new society.

⁵⁶ Political commonalization was and is a subject matter for different authors from different disciplines and perspectives of social and political sciences. This literature is on the one hand interested in the alternative social and political experiences to the existing order and in how the common is produced for the existing order working on the masses. As will be mentioned in chapter two, the main interest in this literature is how the common and collective social and political experiences produce articulating, linking and bringing together the different social and political positions. What is new in Laclau&Mouffe and Hardt&Negri's thinking is that on the one hand they offer the tools to analyze the experiences of contemporary collective politics in commonalization processes and mechanisms, and, on the other, to widen the limits of the theoretical perspectives of modernist thinking. As will be argued in the second chapter, their tools for political commonalization are also useful to analyze the Gezi and HDP in the sense that the mechanisms of commonalization worked in the emergence of the Gezi and HDP.

However, as it will be discussed they left aside how the subjectivities in the process of the working of these mechanisms could be articulated and brought together.

Based on their concepts, offering two ways of the working of contemporary politics and commonalizing practices, the study will concentrate on how the commonalizing mechanisms work on different social and political positions. At this point, Bourdieu's concepts such as habitus and field are also useful and complementary to the perspectives that leave aside the processes in which the agents take an active role in the construction of the common to analyze how the agents join the commonalizing practices. Bourdieu stated that the dispositions and the schemes of action are the expressions and products of the habits or habitus. Namely, the habitus frames how the agents act in an interaction. It is constructed and structured through the agent's interactions with others according to its social positions. It is the structured schemes of the action as being the expression of the social position of an agent in the determinate social fields. The structured characteristic of the habitus is not that it does not change in the interactions, however, it is a disposition of an agent structured as habits of the action and this disposition leads the agents to act in the same way in every case. The social position of an agent structures the schemes of the action giving the determinate ways of acting in the determinate states (Bourdieu, 1995: 55-55).

However, for Bourdieu the habitus of the agent is reformed in different social fields, despite its disposition to act habitually. For Bourdieu, the dispositions structured by any field do not form the disposition of an agent in other fields. Namely, for example the dispositions gained through the economical field do not produce their mirrored and representative dispositions in the cultural field automatically. This is saying that you can be a poor worker or a rich businessman, but your dispositions can be different from the other workers in the political field. So, the political habitus of any individual is formed by the political field and political practice, not by the essential characteristic of an individual's class position. The conditions that produce these are different from the conditions in that they become the politics. This is not saying that these fields are not connected to each other, but that there is a problem of causality that sees an effect that is produced within a condition and making a static thing. The

dispositions of any field are reconditioned, reconstructed and reformed by the political field through the interactions within this field.⁵⁷

Therefore, the habitus of the agents emerges and is formed as the actions and expression within the social fields which include the types of the interactions between the forces and positions. The habitus is not itself a potential but is a toolbox of the actions of the agents. This characteristic of the habitus is that it only emerges within the field, but not in a void. It is not an essential and natural characteristic of an agent and individual and has no teleology and is an expression of the interactions of the forces that make it. In the fields, the positions may interact with other forces in different types from the struggles and antagonisms to reconciliations and alliances. So, neither the field nor the habitus is static but constantly changes according to the interactions between the forces. Therefore, even if the habitus has a characteristic that leads the agents to act in a peculiar way and includes a repetition for an agent, the repetition does not produce the same actions for the agents.⁵⁸

It is true that some of the social groups can have the political habits or habitus such as being resistant and revolutionary or complicit, reactionary and submissive. However, these dispositions and schemes of action emerge within a political field. The habitus gains expression within the field and the habitus is reformed by the changing relations of the fields. In short, the demands, interests, perceptions and effects are reformed within the conditions of the field through politics. The individuals may have habits that form their mode of existence and may give such a potential, however, these habits must be placed into the fields. The habits emerge within the political field. To connect these ideas with the discussions of the potentiality, it is evident that the habitus has the schemes of action that dispose the agents to act in a determinate way that is reformed by the interactions within the social field or the social positions. Subjectivities as the schemes and structures of the

⁵⁷ For an example of how “field” works see, (Bourdieu, 1993).

⁵⁸ These ideas have similarities to Deleuze&Guattari’s ideas. Even if Bourdieu’s habitus implies a static structure of the schemes of action internalized by the agents because of its repetitive character, it includes transformations. Deleuze&Guattari’s view is that repetition does not produce the same as being the representation of a given, but it constantly produces transformations. Accordingly, the field and the habits that emerge are not closed structures, but are open to changes because repetitions are never the repetition of the same (Deleuze&Guattari, 1987: 310-350).

action do not themselves become part of the political and mechanically and spontaneously lead to the formation of a political subjectification.

To sum up, the production of the political commonality emerges within political fields that include the conditions of possibility and limitations emerge with the types, modes and forms of the interactions between the forces. Any political commonalization practices operate within this field to constitute a political subject and do politics. None of the practice emerges within a void and none of the social subjects in a void is articulated and linked in the production of the common. Therefore, there is no potential for an agent to become part of a commonalization of the politics and it does not spontaneously and automatically become part of it. It becomes part of the political commonalization within the conditions that do not guarantee possibility and limitations, but there emerge the political relations between the forces and the relations between the articulated and articulator or singular and common through the commonalizing mechanisms and practices.

Neither the habitus nor potential of the social and political positions of the subjectivities nor the commonalizing mechanisms alone produce the possibilities and limitations of political experiences and practices. In other words, neither the habitus and positions of agents as individuals or groups guarantees and automatically and mechanically produces political articulation, nor can these be passively articulated by politics. Within this perspective, neither the Gezi nor HDP emerged as the expression of any social group's essential potentiality or dispositions. Rather they, being types of the political commonalization, emerged between the articulated and articulations through the construction of the demands, interests and positions of the political and social groups and subjectivities into politics as the product of the relations between the social and political forces, of the political experiences and mechanisms within the conditions of Turkey.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ For example, some may argue that the Alevis of Turkey were the most active social group during the Gezi events, on account of their potential for resistance because of their habitus formed by the memories constructed by events in history. This does not say anything about the conditions and the political articulation processes attracting the Alevis to the Gezi. Such a deduction cannot analyze how the Alevis in Turkey joined demonstrations concentrating upon their political habitus and its role in their articulation into the events. Or it may be argued that the Kurds are there to be articulated by the HDP, because of the conditions produced by the Kurdish problem and its effects on Kurds. However, not all of the Kurds are close to the PKK and HDP and not all of them are politically active. Such a

1.6. The Habitus and Political Commonalization

The above discussions make clear that the political dispositions of the subjective and collective positions and habits are not themselves political and do not lead to a constitution of political subjects and subjectivities, but become political within the political fields during the moments and processes of political commonalization through the different mechanisms and practices. Neither the habitual ideological, political, social and cultural expressions nor the expressions that emerge that are different from the habitual ones limit or give possibility to the articulation. It is the political commonalization that constitutes and constructs the political re-organizing and attracts the dispositions and habits or the breaking and changing of habits.

Precisely speaking, the conditions and the political fields and planes that emerged within these conditions and the political position-taking of the subjectivities and agents within the political field and conditions that are produced by the political practices and mechanisms had the role to form political experiences. The moments, the situations and the processes within the conditions produced by the forces in the political fields, striving to produce political experiences, use the habits constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing the habits. Those constructs the forms, types and modes of the political commonalization producing the possibilities and limits and the forces of political commonalization tries to attract, articulate and link the social and political subjectivities.

However, it is not claimed that pre-existing social and political positions and habitus are not important for the schemes of action in the political field, but the capacities, the habitus and the potentials included by the social and political habitus became political through the mechanisms of the politics. Of course, it is true that some social

perspective neglects on the one hand the moments and processes that made the HDP attractive for the Kurds and on the other the HDP's efforts to attract the Kurds. Or not all of the moments could attract the Kurds, even those close to the HDP and PKK. During the YDG-H's ditches politics, despite calls to support the young people, the Kurds did not actively support this policy.

and political subjectivities and groups are inclined to and have a disposition for politics that frames and conditions their position-taking in politics.⁶⁰

For example, many of the Alevis and leftist organizations quickly joined Gezi and supported the HDP due to their political position-taking and habitus. To reject the role of the habitus has the risk of missing the point of answering the question as to how some of the members of the same social groups and classes easily participated in the determinate political commonalizations and positions as in the case of the Gezi and HDP rather than others. To speak concretely, some of the social and political subjectivities and groups' positions and habitus in Turkey make them closer to the leftist political articulations, but others not. However, to reiterate, these become political within the moments and processes that emerge within precise conditions.

On the other hand, politics and political situations can change the habits of the agents.⁶¹ According to these theoretical discussions, the general and theoretical hypothesis of the study is that both the Gezi and HDP became possible and limited by multiple reasons and conditions. Neither only the production of political and social habitus, nor the effects, perceptions, demands and interests of agents produced by the conjunctures and moments and the social and political structures automatically made them possible and limited. It is the processes and practices during the political experiences that linked and articulated the agents into the common, producing the relations and links between the singular and common and the articulated. These work on and within the habits and social and political positions, breaking them, using and

⁶⁰ For example, Alper Sapan, killed by the ISIS bombing in Suruç, joined the group to act in solidarity with the Rojava experience of Kurds in Syria for the reconstruction of Kobane. Even though he was an anti-militarist and conscientious objector, and had problems with armed political groups, his political positive ideas on the self-governance of peoples and their autonomous governmental experiences led him to act in close relationship with the Kurds in Syria. Another story is about Ali Kitapçı, who was killed in the 10 October suicide bombing and was an anarchist trade unionist. He sympathized with the Kurdish movement and acted in solidarity with the HDP.

⁶¹ For example, some anarchists called on anarchists to vote for the HDP in the 7 June elections, even though in principle they opposed elections. This was partly for political reasons to block Erdoğan's power and on account of desires to solve the Kurdish problem. Similarly, some feminists supported Demirtaş's candidacy for the presidency and the HDP at the 7 June and 1 November elections, even if they were in principle against representational politics. These cases show that the political habits of the agents can be changed by political articulation. The attitudes of some of the agents close to Kemalist political positions regarding the HDP at the 7 June elections are another example of the change of habits in politics. In this case they were able to soften their attitude to the forces of the Kurdish movement.

reforming them. Therefore, the political and social developments in Turkey and globally, the efforts of the political and social forces, the creation of the common including the interests, effects, demands and perception through the processes and relations between the singular and common and articulated and articulator made them possible and limited.

What were processed and on what was worked by political commonalization before anything else are the everyday and singular demands, effects, perceptions, interests and hopes produced by their social and political positions. These may create conditions and elements of commonalization and may delimit them. Accordingly, political commonalization become possible and limited through the articulation, link of the effects, demands, interests and experiences produced by the habitus and social and political positions, situations and contexts and articulation practice. What political commonalization does is produce a relation between the singularities and common, forming the actions and expressions of the social and political habitus and positions, breaking them and changing and producing new effects, demands and interests through politics. In another sense, the habitus and social and political positions condition and form through the political commonalization and thus they have a role in the conditions of the possibility and the limitations for commonalization. Therefore, other theoretical questions are related to general question of the study: What are the roles of the social and political habitus and positions making possible and delimiting commonalization? How do these elements becomes part of the commonalization? So, where are the limitations and possibilities conditioned? Whether by the political and social situations and conditions or by the habitus? Within this framework, it is evident that the Gezi and HDP are articulated and linked by the demands, effects, perceptions and interests of individuals and groups as the product of social and political habitus and positions into the political commonalization. The possibility and the limitations coming from the attitudes and dispositions and their products as effects, interests, demands and perceptions emerged within these situations affecting the political field.

Therefore, sometimes the effects, perceptions, demands and interests of agents can be included by the common, sometimes they cannot. Some of them can be articulated and linked into the common through the inclusion, or can not be included due to the

absence of relations between the singular and the common. Sometimes limits and possibilities come from the habitus, sometimes from the situations and sometimes from the other forces' acts who are also active producing new effects, demands, interests and perceptions.⁶² Thus, it is evident many of these elements were active for the possibility and limitation of political commonalization.

1.7. Research Methods and Methodology

Given all this, the study will analyze how the Gezi and HDP became possible and limited by the effects, demands, perceptions and interests produced by the social and political positions and habitus, by the situations of the interactions of the political and social forces within the conditions and fields of the politics and by the political and social situations in the country. It will investigate the role of the political and social dispositions of the agents, the workings of the political forces to construct the political commonalization, the situations and conditions within the political field in the country and the social and political developments in the country together. Therefore, it will delve into the problematic regarding whether the habits of the agents, the pragmatics of the articulation forces and the AKP's policies made the Gezi and HDP possible or delimited them. In a way, the questions are simply these: do the ideological and affective dispositions of the agents make possible or delimit them? Whether the Gezi and HDP could break these habits? Whether the Gezi and HDP could organize them into political positions constructing common points? Could these common points include or exclude the different social and political positions? What were the role of the modes of political project and of doing politics and mechanisms and practices of political commonalization? Whether the emerging social and political situations had a role or not? If that was the case, how?⁶³

⁶² For example, in the case of the Gezi, leftist organizations quickly joined the demonstrations, as it was their political positions and projects that attracted them.

⁶³ Here we are not interested in intentions and motivations as the causes of articulation. The problem is how these make possible the articulations or how they made possible the articulation. Also, how did these become the issue of articulation? As emphasized the effects etc. Are not they themselves political, but become political expressions. How do these become part of politics? The study does not ask the question why, but asks the question how.

To respond to these questions, the study will use secondary sources such as reports done by the research companies, and books, particularly concentrating on interviews with the agents and individuals carried out by this literature. The contents of party documents, TBMM speeches and public statements of HDP, CHP, MHP, AKP and the documents, public statements, leaflets of leftist parties and organizations such as Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP), Labour Party (EMEP), Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), People's Communist Party of Turkey (HTKP), Socialist Party of the Oppressed (ESP), Patriotic Party (VP), Federation of Democratic Rights (DHF), Partizan, The Front of Rights and Freedoms (HÖC) and Halkevleri and the documents of the leftists unions and chambers also analyzed. Moreover, the daily newspapers in the mainstream media and the journals and newspapers issued by the political groups in the country are reviewed. All of these sources analyzed to explore the common political position takings and experiences formed by the different localities and subjectivities. The study does not attach any significance to locality and subjectivities, but attaches significance to the processes involved in constructing the commonality of the localities and subjectivities through articulation. This is not to say that the contexts produced by the subjectivities and localities are not important. They are crucial to limit the articulation practices to construct a common, however, here the problem is not to map the social showing the multiple and different parts of the elements, but to analyse how these multiple differences did and did not articulate the common. Therefore, the types of the subjectivities and agents analyzed here are not to generalize from the particularities using an inductive method. Nor do they use a deductive method treating the agents as the representative of a generality expressed around the Gezi and HDP. Here this epistemological duality is undone, because it will treat the agents within the processes of the constructing common. Their subjectivities will not be modeled on others, but efforts will be made to make evident the common points of the articulation of the different subjectivities.

The first chapter will analyze the literature on the Gezi and HDP, focusing on local studies in a critical way. This chapter aims to pose the conceptual and theoretical limitations of this literature and its epistemological and methodological perspective to analyze the Gezi and HDP around its main question of how the Gezi and HDP

became possible and delimited. Thus, the first chapter shows that both the literature on the Gezi and HDP answers the question as to how they became possible and delimited either giving weight to the structural local and global conditions and its symptoms and the actions of the articulating forces external to the agents and to the end-product of the processes and practices of the political experience, or to the stable social and political positions in forming their political attitudes. On the other hand, this study will offer to analyze the role of the agents in the construction of the commonality in the Gezi and HDP.

The second chapter is about the theories and concepts used by this study. It will also explore the discussions about the concepts of contemporary popular and mass politics, how to use them in this study and determine their theoretical limitations. Focusing on Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe's ideas on political ontology, political subject constitution and contemporary collective popular and mass politics, this chapter claims that while their ideas are useful for analyzing the formal workings of contemporary collective mass and popular politics, they leave aside the role of the local conditions that form and structure the dispositions of agents included by the political commonalization. To widen their ideas including the role of the habitus of the agents and local conditions for the political subject constitutions and political commonalization, the study combines Bourdieu's ideas on agency, habitus and field with Deleuze's ideas.

Therefore, the third chapter will analyze the role of the local political and social conditions and the local history of the social and political experiences in the country both before and during the AKP eras. It makes evident that the position-taking of the agents according to local conditions in the political field made the Gezi and HDP possible. In other words, it investigates how local conditions and political dispositions formed and reformed according to these local conditions constructed the political field in the country where the Gezi and HDP emerged. Thus, it provides the historical and structural background to the conditions and elements in the country that made and delimited the Gezi and HDP.

The fourth chapter focuses on the agents involved in the Gezi and HDP. It analyzes the role of the political and social dispositions of the agents that were included and

excluded by the Gezi and HDP. How the political dispositions had the role to articulate and bring them together around the political commonalization is the main question of this chapter. Hence, it will analyze the role of the political dispositions of the agents and the role of the commonalizing practices in the Gezi and HDP in articulating and linking the agents into the political experiences working on the political dispositions of the agents within the limits of the political field in Turkey. In other words, how the Gezi and HDP became possible through the commonalizing practices working on the agents, and how these commonalizing practices were delimited by the agents' dispositions and position-taking in the political field, constantly changing according to the position-taking of the political forces.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE

The objective of this chapter is the problematization of some of the theoretical and analytical limits characterizing the literature on both the Gezi uprising and the HDP. With a specific focus on the work done by local scholars, the multiplicity of analytical perspectives is stressed and the gaps in the literature are identified. In brief, the argument of this chapter is that the existing literature examines and explains only to a certain extent both the conditions of possibility and the limitations of the Gezi uprising and the HDP.

A lack of acknowledgment of the agency role constitutes a shortcoming shared by the various literary sources under review. Scholars do not pay the due attention to the active role of the agents who have contributed to the constitution and construction of the Gezi and HDP experiences. Most of the studies analyze the reasons and the conditions of possibility that led to their emergence by examining the economic, social, cultural and political developments of the country as well as by examining the symptoms affecting the agents. In this way, it can be explained how and why the agents' political attitudes and experiences emerged and were formed. However, most of these studies address agents as if they were passive subjects. So far, two are in fact the main analytical perspectives emerging from the existing literature, which either privileges external conditions without taking agents into account or takes agents into account without considering them as politically active subjects

Taking distance from the above-mentioned methodological tendencies, this study is not limited to the analysis of how collective political experiences form the agents' and subjectivities' commonality. Rather, the analysis is extended to the understanding of how agents and subjectivities constituted this very commonality. A similar approach is not entirely novel, given that several are the studies focused on

how participants took active part in the Gezi uprising and in the political experience of the HDP. However, previous studies remain limited and partial. Most of them propose structural explanations based on the analysis of the products emerged through political practices and yet omit the analysis of the processes and the practices that included, formed, constituted and articulated the agents into collective political experiences. Conceived as static, the agents' political attitudes are understood as either potentialities for political action or expression of social and political stance. Political experience is instead the outcome of processes and practices, which are important insofar as agents construct collective political experience. Aiming at understanding how social and political characteristics became part of the political experience, previous studies provide explanations by analyzing the symptoms of the country's actual developments on the agents, and by examining structured social and political attitudes. Nonetheless, these studies do not include analytical connections with the role of the agents.

Given these premises, this chapter is thought as a critical review of the theoretical and analytical shortcomings marking the literature on the Gezi uprising and the HDP. Mainly focusing on the local literature's approach to the problem of agency – and highlighting the diversity of epistemological procedures, perspectives and explanations – this chapter describes how the social and political developments that occurred in the country influenced the emergence of the Gezi uprising and the political experience of the HDP.

2.1. Gezi Events and Unpredictability: Analysis Between Science and Political Discourse

According to the chaos theory, small things and events may cause big effects (Gleick, 2008). Fired by the government, Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça resorted to hunger strike as form of protest. The police forces' reaction and the measures taken against their hunger strike were due to the suspect that such a form of resistance aimed at organizing a large-scale event similar to the Gezi uprising⁶⁴. The

⁶⁴ Nuriye Gülmen is one of the signatories of the declaration by the Academics for Peace. She is an academician who used to be employed at Selçuk University in Konya. Semih Özakça used to be a

protests for the conservation of the Gezi Park started as a routine and predictable resistance in the Taksim area, but they soon became an event that spread to all the rest of the country⁶⁵. At the beginning, it was a form of patterned, usual and predictable resistance. However, the pattern⁶⁶ changed and the Gezi protests became a mass popular uprising. In other words, the events started in a specific local area in İstanbul as a protest organized by a small group of ecologists, urban activists and some leftist groups. Soon after, it extended to the various localities and included socio-political agents and singularities across the whole country⁶⁷.

teacher in a primary school in Mardin, a city in the southeast of Turkey. Gülmən and Özakça are members of a leftist public workers' union called Eğitim-Sen. They have been fired during the state of emergency declared by the government after the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016. After their dismissal, they started a sit-down-strike in Yüksel Street, which is one of the most significant streets of Ankara city-centre. The scope of the initial protest was to get back their job but then they transformed it into a hunger strike. Following a house raid, the police forces imprisoned them on the 75th day of their hunger strike, on May 23, 2017. During their interrogation, the police asked them if they were aiming at organizing events like Gezi through their protest and resistance (Retrieved 01. 07.2017, from

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/746410/Gulmen_ve_Ozakca_vicdanlari_kanatan_bu_soruya_tutuklandi_Olunden_cikariniz_nedir_.html).

⁶⁵ Initially, it was about an ordinary resistance similar to protests and demonstrations that had been previously organized many times with various scopes: protecting public areas in İstanbul as well as in other regions of the country or demonstrating against the government's construction and renovation projects. Before the Gezi events, activists of urban and ecologist movements had organized a lot of demonstrations to oppose and prevent the government's projects. For instance, the case of the Emek Sineması resistance is emblematic. The Emek used to be one of the oldest cinema buildings in country and it was a historical asset. Activists opposed the government's project of demolishing it and rebuilding it as shopping mall. Another example of resistance is provided by the many protests organized against the construction of the hydroelectric power plants in the Black Sea region.

⁶⁶ The Gezi events started as a form of habitual resistance, but they created a change in the habits. The excess of habits was unpredictable according to the patterns of habitual resistances. The unpredictable character of the events was excess within the repetition of the habit: before the resistance, there had not been calls to organize an event that would have reached the masses across all the country, but there had been a call to protect Gezi Park. It is this exactly this excess that science and government had to cope with. The point is not understanding whether political movements are the outcome of an ontological excess or a lack. Rather, it is important to understand how they emerge. Hence, the Gezi events constituted an excess in the political field of resistance both for the government and both for the agents. For the government, it was so because it couldn't be controlled at the beginning and therefore the police used the violence that is ordinarily and habitually used to end small resistances like the Gezi protests. However, people have been called to take to the streets through social media and through other organizational techniques. People responded quickly to the call, even if it was not the first time that police used so much violence. In brief, the protests shifted in aim: from protests for the the "protection of the trees" they became protests for the democratization of the country and for the construction of a new Turkey. Thus, they gave rise to an unpredictable event within the patterns of the habitual resistances that were already characterising the country.

⁶⁷ People gathered in all cities of the country, with the only exception of Bayburt, which is a city in the inner region of the Black Sea area. The slogan "Everywhere is Taksim, everywhere resistance" was one of the main slogans of the events. The development of the events brought novelties for political

The Gezi events were unforeseeable and therefore they shocked the AKP government, whose trauma was accompanied by the paranoia of being overthrown⁶⁸. Neither the government nor scientific analysts and political strategists could have predicted the emergence of such an event⁶⁹. Therefore, what was surprising was how such a usual, ordinary and local resistance was transformed into a resistance extended to all places across the country. Also, it was surprising how it increasingly

experiences in Turkey that can be understood by comparing the Gezi uprising with the case of the Tekel resistance. TEKEL used to be a tobacco and alcoholic beverages company owned by the state. In 2009, the workers started a resistance against its privatization. They set up tents and occupied Sakarya Street, which is one of the most important streets in the city-centre of Ankara. Despite the lack of support by their labour union and other obstacles to their actions, the workers managed to continue the resistance, which instead received popular support as well as support by political groups including leftist groups, Kemalists and nationalists. The workers constituted a very heterogeneous group insofar as they were supporters of different ideological and political groups. The Gezi and Tekel resistances shared the form of the occupation (the tents) and yet they are different because the Tekel resistance remained localized in Ankara and did not spread to the rest of the country even if its characterizing political positions included an antagonistic attitude against the AKP as well as criticism of neoliberal politics, especially with regards to the precarization of the working conditions in the country. Conversely, the Gezi events started with the occupation of Gezi Park but they spread to all localities of the country.

⁶⁸ It is not properly evident that these events really caused a trauma and paranoia for the AKP. However, the knowledge on Gezi produced by the pro-AKP authors highlights that the events were mainly aimed at overthrowing the AKP and that they would have led to such an outcome.. Many of these authors refer to Gezi as the enemy of both the country and the AKP. This occurred especially during the years following the events, i.e. when a political opposition emerged against the AKP and as alternative to it in a way that led those authors to compare it to Gezi. For example see here, (Retrieved 06.12.2017 from <http://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/akpli-burhan-kuzu-gezi-olaylari-bir-feto-projesi-198672>). In this sense then, it can be said that the Gezi events produced a paranoia for the AKP, one that was not groundless, considering the relationship between the events and the emergence of powerful negative feelings and enmity against both the AKP and Erdoğan. Before the events, in fact, there was already enmity against AKP. The AKP supporters' emphasis on similar feelings is therefore quite understandable. However, some of the analyses focus on the personality of Erdoğan and explain the paranoia as one of his inner personal characteristics. Furthermore, there also analysts who argue that Erdoğan and the alliance formed around his leadership became paranoid because of the political developments aiming at preventing and ending Erdoğan's and the AKP's political power. In brief, paranoia, the memory of the Gezi events and the demonstrations preceding them (e.g. Republican Meetings) are the elements that played a crucial role in the construction of the discourse of AKP's paranoid reactions. However, it is not about a psychological mechanism that is internal to Erdoğan's AKP. Rather, the discourse is produced by the political conditions and struggles against AKP and Erdoğan. At the same time, it is important to remark that a similar discourse focused on paranoia is useful to the AKP. The definition of hostile forces is in fact useful to maintain hegemony, to use the state power and to control the country. Therefore, the paranoia is also a product of the AKP's position. Instead of compromising with rival and enemy forces, Erdoğan constructed an antagonistic discourse on Gezi using the paranoia discourse based on the threat of being overthrown with a coup organized by the powers. In other words, it represents the political preference expressed by Erdoğan and the AKP.

⁶⁹ Even if some of the leftist and radical small political groups (e.g. anarchists) were willing to organize it and hoped for the emergence of popular uprisings like the Gezi one, none could have guessed the emergence of the Gezi uprising.

gained a collective political tone that led to the production of common affections, demands and perceptions, including demands for a new country characterized by democracy, freedom and justice as crucial values that shaped the highly negative criticism and antagonism against the AKP⁷⁰. Soon after the shock⁷¹, both local and international authors produced a literature on the Gezi events by focusing on the following questions: What were the reasons that led to the events? What were the motivations and the demands of demonstrators and agents? How these events became possible? What were and will be the potentials and limits of the events for a radical transformation of the society in Turkey? What will be the effects of the events for the social and political life in the country? How must the government react to the events? The literature addressing these questions is wide and it analyzes mechanisms, patterns, causes and agents of the events.

2.1.1 Constitution of a Revolutionary Political Subject: Analysis between Realism and Romanticism

Based on the above-mentioned questions, analytical studies include political negation and affirmation of the events according to different political positions. Most of the leftist and anti-AKP authors positively acknowledge the events, whereas pro-AKP authors analyze the events mostly in a negative way. In particular, leftist authors and leftist groups interpret the events as bearers of potential for the constitution of a revolutionary collective political subject (see for instance Kaldıraç, 2013). Their emphasis is on the potential created by the alternative political and social practices such as the park forums, the construction of solidarity and the common experience in Gezi Park. Nonetheless, they also remarked the limitations by stressing that the

⁷⁰ Here, it is not claimed that the events produced affects, demands and organizations that were common among all the agents who participated in the Gezi resistance. However, there were certain communizing practices shared by the singularities, including antagonism against AKP, demand for democracy and refusal of authoritarianism.

⁷¹ However, even if the events were shocking, surprising and unpredictable as already emphasized, they emerged as result of the political and social conditions of the country that, in turn, generated different political groups' hate and criticism against AKP (from right-wing to left-wing groups). Moreover, the accumulation of political and social experiences of autonomous and anti-authoritarian groups trying to construct new leftist experiences must be accounted. The events allowed the inclusion of those groups into a popular resistance and multitudinous uprising. These are points that will be analyzed in the following chapters of the dissertation.

influence of the events could disappear if the events are not followed by the creation of organizations that could hold the masses⁷². In other words, the events created a revolutionary mass potential and yet masses need to be articulated around leftist politics in order to maintain this potential and to lead it to a leftist politics. In fact, agents are not spontaneously and mechanically able to create revolutionary leftist politics⁷³.

Within this framework, leftist authors analyze the events locating them within the global context. Comparing them with other similar experiences emerged in other geographical areas, scholars analyze the effect of global conditions (e.g. neo-liberalism) with the purpose of showing similarities and differences between local conditions⁷⁴. Their comparative analyses focus on the role of the conditions created by the neo-liberal policies in Turkey as well as elsewhere in order to show the existence of revolutionary potential and possibilities. Scholars mostly argue that the events were due to the intersection of AKP's neo-liberalism and authoritarian Islamic policies. Accordingly, Gezi was possible as reaction to the symptoms and effects of actual capitalism and neoliberalism or, in other words, the events were mainly a reaction to neo-liberalism.

Another issue that has been tackled is the difference between Gezi and other experiences. The question whether the Gezi experience is different from previous leftist mass experiences is related to the question whether a new form of political subjectivity emerged with Gezi. This means asking questions about the agency and,

⁷² For example, Ahmet Soysal (2013) has very negative ideas about Gezi because masses are not revolutionary when they are out of control and have neither aim nor destination. Rather, organizations must be created in order to transform the potential into a revolutionary politics and therefore to shape revolutionary politics.

⁷³ These ideas are shared by both local and foreign Marxist and leftist authors such as Slavoj Zizek and Michael Hardt. They share the emphasis on the need to develop strategies for a radical transformation of the society in order to constitute a defined political subject as well as political institutions around political programs and practices. In Turkey, some of the Turkish Marxist authors proposed strategies to form a revolutionary politics from the revolutionary potential of the masses who joined the Gezi events. At this regard see Benlisoy (2013).

⁷⁴ These studies analyze the conditions that prepared the Gezi events and place AKP policies within neo-liberalism in a global context. For example, see Boratav (2013), Sönmez (2013) and Gürçan&Peker (2015). Foreign leftist and Marxist thinkers resort to different perspectives to place the events in a global context and to analyze the role of neo-liberalism and globalism (Zizek, 2013; Castells, 2015).

furthermore, whether the agents have a revolutionary reach. Hence, the questions can be formulated as follows. What were the main reasons of the events and, more specifically, did cultural, economic or political relations mainly determine these causes? Was it about a class action or a popular uprising? Who were the main agents of the events? This kind of questions aims at finding reasons that constituted the conditions of possibility of the events⁷⁵. The given answers differ a lot among each other, but there are several common points.

One of them is the argument that the events emerged as outcome of the opposition to local and global conditions as well as alternative to the symptoms caused by the existing political, social and economic powers. Nonetheless, the studies vary according to specific perspectives of analysis. For instance, some scholars analyze the economical reasons, while some others focus on the cultural reasons.

Economic studies mostly emphasize the government's economy political practices and their results. Analyzing the government's neo-liberal policies, they examine how these policies formed the political attitudes of the agents. Without rejecting the popular character of the events, some of the scholars consider the events as a class action shaped by the symptoms of AKP's neo-liberalism (Boratav, 2013; Tonak, 2013a; Sönmez, 2013).

Cultural analysis delves into the government's cultural policies, its effects and the agents' discontents. This kind of analysis focuses on the government's interventions in the life styles of certain social groups, namely the middle classes. The argument is that the events were mostly the outcome of discontent as effect of the repression of social and cultural practices that are not expression of Islamic and conservative values⁷⁶.

Despite the diversity between these two perspectives, the studies give clues that are important to analyze the conditions created by the dominant socio-political power and to understand how their effects were transformed into political action. Whether

⁷⁵ These questions are supposed to determine the class composition of the events. For instance, Boratav (2013) argues that it was a proletarian class action, while some other leftist scholars argue that it was the result of middle classes' action.

⁷⁶ For these analyses and their criticism see (İnal, 2013).

approached as outcome of cultural policies or as outcome of economic policies, the events are argued to have been possible as reaction to the existing conditions and their symptoms.

These perspectives of analysis can be considered mechanical, because the events are interpreted as a spontaneous reaction to power. However, most of these studies show how the symptoms became political. Showing the role of the left as well as of social and political movements in the country, the analysis of the conditions of possibility is mainly centered on the leftists' role and to the activities of the left. Although these studies do not neglect the popular character of the events, their focus is on the problems of the left and on the political strategies of a leftist politics. In this way, they do not include the analysis of the role of commonalizing political practices that emerged without the intervention of given social and political agents such as trade unions and other socio-political organizations. In other words, the role of new social and political subjectivities emerged during the events has not been analyzed.

In the same vein, these studies analyzed the limits of the events in relation to the requirements and pragmatism of the leftist politics. Accordingly, they are mostly focused on the AKP's actions aimed at preventing the events in order to try to widen the effects of the events on the population. This political pragmatism led scholars to analyze the limitations from multiple perspectives. As framework, this literature has been very useful but it lacks the examination of how agents joined the events. These studies mostly focus on local as well as global discontents, but they only partially show how these discontents have been transformed into political action, because they do not include the analysis of processes and practices that preceded and followed the events under examination. They only construct causality relationship or the links among the conditions, their symptoms and the products of the events, but they do not address the processes activated by the participants. Therefore, these studies reveal the existence of a gap between causes and effects.

The existing literature includes also the studies conducted by pro-AKP scholars who produce negative ideas. As it will be mentioned below, they do not entirely reject and negate the agents and the events approving the masses' demands. However, their strong criticism and negativism are due to the direction traced by the events, which

gave rise not only to a violent enmity and antagonistic tone against Erdoğan and the AKP but also to a different politics, i.e. a politics alternative to the AKP's political line.

2.1.2. Analysis of the Social and Political Profiles of the Agents

Some other scholars and research companies approach the events more directly in order to produce "more scientific and objective knowledge". These studies analyze the motivations and the causes that prompted the agents to join the demonstrations. One of the remarkable themes of this literature is the study of the social and political profiles of the agents who joined the events⁷⁷. Sencer Ayata argues the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the social and political profiles of the participants, and yet he also argues that the kernel of the protesters was constituted by the new Turkish middle classes and by the Y generation, the latter referring to the youth born in the 1990s. Ayata defines the new middle classes as the highly educated and skilled labor force consisting of students, women and youth.

A report provided by the CHP (2014) also argues that the new middle classes constituted the largest group of demonstrators. This report makes a distinction between the new middle classes and the traditional middle classes, the latter composed by craftsmen and shopkeepers who live in Anatolia. The new middle classes adopted urban and western values. Their social conditions formed and framed their political attitudes, because they internalized a disobedient attitude and because they hope for a freer and more democratic society based on the values of the West (CHP, 2014). Next to the new middle classes, the other crucial social group of the events is argued to be the Y generation. This argument is due to the fact that most of the demonstrators were young people. This new generation was born in historical conditions that were different from the ones of their parents. Subjected to the AKP

⁷⁷ Even if scholars share the idea of the multiplicity of localities and agents, sociological studies and studies in other disciplines of social analysis analyze the dominant socio-political agents and groups by resorting to socio-political categories such as class, ethnicity and political subjects.

government's policies, they grow up with different social values and this leads them to express novel political attitudes⁷⁸.

These analyses do not reject the multiplicity of both agents and localities forming the events and yet they are partial⁷⁹. In fact, they fail to explain the complex composition of the localities and agents, and they fail to analyze how the articulation of localities and agents produced common political attitudes in every locality (e.g. antagonism and enmity against the AKP). Within this framework, the analyses generalize some of the profiles and therefore reduce the complexity and the multiplicity of singular and collective agents. Moreover, they make use of ready-made concepts (e.g. class)

⁷⁸ Both the CHP's report and Ayata (Retrieved on November 19, 2016 from <http://t24.com.tr/haber/prof-ayatadan-gezi-parki-eylemcileri-icin-cem-yilmaz-cocuklari-yorumu,231748>) define the new young generation and the new middle classes as having common political attitudes and inclinations such as disobedience and passion for democracy and freedom. These are the characteristics that framed and produced their political attitudes during the events (CHP, 2014). However, there is no evidence that disobedience and desire for more freedom/democracy led to the production of social positions, whereas it is evident that political attitudes included feelings, senses and perceptions. In other words, affects and attitudes were not internal characteristics of these groups. Rather, these are the product of the events that attracted those people. As previously emphasized, political articulation connects people's political habits and their political action. Independently from previous inclinations and dispositions, political practices reshape them into political experiences. On the other hand, political practice construct, deconstruct and reconstruct the dispositions as result of given social positions. For example, before Gezi, not only fear and anxiety were increasing, but also a powerful desire to overcome the existing political conditions. These affects were felt by some sections of the society, which include Alevis, Kemalists and leftists rather than AKP's supporters. Nevertheless, these affects were the product of politics, and they were not the outcome of a specific social position, namely being member of the new middle class or belonging to the Y generation. These affects constituted the initiators of the events and, as such, they attracted people to take to the streets, but the events produced perceptions and affections that made the very events possible. For example, the desire for a new country replaced the fear that the AKP's would establish an authoritarian state. This empowered people to the point of feeling powerful in the face of the government. However, none of these feelings were ready for the political experience. As a result, the emergence of political attitudes must be analyzed taking into account the political practices, because political practices produce, re-articulate and change habits and dispositions. With the political practice, the political field gains new positions and products, in which agents produce positions. These analyses are crucial to show how social and political conditions, inclinations and habits prepare the emergence of articulating expressions. Therefore, they link the events to the conditions based on the idea that the events did not emerge within a void.

⁷⁹ At this point, it is must be noted that scientific analysis is partial due to the complexity of chaotic events, even when it tries to entirely grasp the reality. Therefore, the analysis will be limited to show common trends and institutionalizations, but these cannot be generalized and considered valid for the events including all agencies and localities. However, the events showed evidence that there were the communalizing practices (i.e. the construction of common affections, demands and perceptions such as the desire for the democratization of the country and antagonism/hatred against the AKP and Erdoğan). It is also evident that the agents formed initiatives to construct institutionalized forms of new political expressions and social relations. Those practices partially and limitedly articulated some of the supporters, agents and singularities into common block-like organizations such as park forums and squats. Despite being limited, all these practices allowed the continuation of the events and the coming together of different singularities and agents.

although they emphasize the elements of novelty (e.g. the “new” class). In brief, these analyses impose concepts on the complexity of the events⁸⁰. Nonetheless, they remain important insofar as they give some clues on the articulation processes.⁸¹

2.1.3. How pro-AKP Authors Negate the Events: from Conspiracy Theory to Scientific Analysis

Pro-AKP authors resorted to the epistemological procedures reviewed so far. However, this specific part of the literature includes ideas and analyses that produced negative images of the Gezi events. These authors present the agents’ violence and vandalism as an issue of governmentality and emergency. In this way, they link the events to the political problems of the AKP. These authors are supporters of the AKP and therefore their ideas derive from their political standpoint. As a result, they approach the events as a matter of emergency and a threat to the existence of the AKP and Erdoğan’s leadership. In other words, their ideas are the pragmatic outcome of the willingness to support the existence of the AKP and the preservation of its policies.

Even if some of the AKP members criticize the government for the excessive use of police violence, they do not try to understand the agents’ demands, affections and perceptions. A similar attitude would have in fact harmed the future of the AKP and its plans to govern the population according to its ideal of building a “new Turkey”⁸².

⁸⁰ As argued by Saygin and Öğütle (2013), most of the analyses on Gezi use ready-made concepts imposing them on the facts. Thus, these analyses reduce the events to these concepts.

⁸¹ There are a lot of studies analyzing the socio-political profiles and the class composition of the events (Konda, 2013; Ete and Coşkun, 2014; Bilgiç and Kafkashı, 2013). These are very important studies and yet they examine how such a multiplicity came together and disintegrated. Therefore, the problem here is not determining the social and political profiles of the agents, but rather questioning how the articulation of different social and political profiles was possible and, at the same time, limited.

⁸² For instance, Haluk Özdalga was an MP of the AKP who suggested the government not to be violent and to consider of the demands of the demonstrators (Retrieved June 16, 2016 from <http://www.internethaber.com/ak-partiden-eylemvere-ovgu-47831h.htm>). Some other MPs shared Özdalga’s thoughts (Retrieved June 16, 2015 from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ak-parti-de-iki-aykiri-ses-siyaset-1721518>). Some of the authors close to AKP rightly emphasize the crisis at stake: none of the political forces could have represented the demonstrators. According to them, the government should have not missed this political representation crisis. Rather, the government should have tried to understand the masses and must have changed its policies to co-opt these sections into

The general trend of the AKP's attitude towards the events is constructed through the emblematic meeting organized by the President Erdoğan in Kazlıçeşme meeting⁸³. At that meeting, Erdoğan argued that the events aimed at overthrowing the AKP and he stigmatized the events and the agents by drawing attention on their use of vandalism and violence against police forces and state institutions⁸⁴. In his speech, he constructed a discourse that divided the country's population according the logic of "us against them": the AKP's supporters against the enemies of the AKP and Turkey.

Pro-AKP authors' stance is the result of the two following tendencies. On one hand, they try to analyze the events with the purpose of preserving the AKP's hegemony and political power. On the other hand, they put emphasis on the external and internal powers, namely the organizers of events threatening the AKP's future and existence, which is instead conceived as Turkey's fate. For instance, emblematic is a question posed by the Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE)⁸⁵. Given that these groups had never acted together, how is it possible that they came together? The proposed answer is this: there must have been an organization that brought them together⁸⁶. In other words, authors answer the question about the modality in which

the system (Ertem and Esayan, 2013 248-250). See also Ethem Mahçupyan (Retrieved June 16, 2016 from <http://www.duzceyelhaber.com/Etyen-MAHCUPYAN/17065-Bireyici-baticilar>). Similar to Mahçupyan, Esayan emphasizes the need to consider the demonstrators' demands in order to maintain the AKP's government (<http://t24.com.tr/haber/akpli-vekilin-gezi-parki-raporu-hata-yapildi-basbakan-yanlis-yonlendirildi.236619>).

⁸³ During the first days of the events, Erdoğan was in Tunisia. After his return to the country, he organized a meeting against the events in Kazlıçeşme on the base of the argument that there also masses and people supporting both the AKP and himself vis-a-vis the events. Erdoğan claimed in fact that he had forced the 50% of the country to stay home during the first days of the events. By stating this, he meant that there were also people criticizing the events. What is true is that not the whole country sympathized with the events and yet it is not possible to say whether the 50% of the population stayed hardly at home (Retrieved on June 16, 2016 from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-yuzde-50-yi-evinde-zor-tutuyorum-23429709>).

⁸⁴ In his speech, Erdoğan traced the line between "us" and "them": on one side the AKP supporters addressed as "us" and, on the other side, those who constructed and supported the events as "them". He declared: "These hundreds of thousands of people are not the ones who have burned and destroyed; these hundreds of thousands of people are not traitors like those who throw Molotov cocktails at my people. Whatever we do, we'll remain within the frame of democracy and the rule of law. We have never pushed the limits of legality". (Retrieved on June, 16 2016 from <http://www.hurriyedailynews.com/police-lock-down-taksim-as-pm-erdogan-shows-off-in-istanbul-48921>).

⁸⁵ SDE is a think-tank set up by pro-AKP authors, academicians and scientists.

⁸⁶ The below sentences are emblematic of the perspective assumed by pro-AKP authors in the analysis of the issue of the possibility of the events. Yasin Aktay (Aktay, 2013a: 4) writes: "Considering the

multiple social and political groups acted together by trying to identify the agents who organized the events and the tactics they used. In their opinion, those agents were already at work to overthrow the AKP before Gezi events, because the AKP's policies contradict their own aspirations and interests (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2013)⁸⁷. These authors do not neglect the agents' complexity and multiplicity. They even show approval for their environmental concerns, political discontents and hatred of the AKP⁸⁸. Nonetheless, they argue that the finance lobby and other forces tried to use the masses. With regard to this, the literature produced by these authors includes some common themes and points.

As already discussed, pro-AKP literature recurrently refers to the events as characterized by enmity towards Erdoğan and the AKP. According to these sources, the scope of the events was the overthrow of both Erdoğan and the AKP through the organization of a military coup⁸⁹. More precisely, these authors argue that the

subsequent stages of the events, it emerges that there were planners having their fingers in the events, and that planners and their fingers multiplied, variated and mobilized different alliances as the events developed". Aktay stressed that in the course of the events, it could be better understood that the organization of an uprising beyond the protection of Gezi Park was actually the aim of the resistance movement from the very beginning. Previous and yet unsuccessful attempts include the Reyanlı# events and the ODTÜ events during Erdoğan's visit to the campus in the occasion of the ceremony for the launch of TUBITAK's satellite. Aktay remarks that Gezi deserves to be extensively discussed insofar as it was more successful than other events in uniting all the opposition accumulated against the AKP by merging it through the sensibility towards the trees, nature and the city. The author points out that what is interesting is that the symbol of the "tree" allowed the formation of the alliance, whereas symbols like the flag, Atatürk and secularism could not be able to fulfill the task.

⁸⁷ It is true that Western powers, some capitalist groups and kemalists were in conflict with the AKP even before the Gezi events. Although Western oriented capitalist groups and civil society groups were allied with the AKP, these groups started criticizing the AKP even before the Gezi events. Therefore, pro-AKP authors consider the events as the result of the pre-existing conflicts between the AKP and national as well as foreign forces.

⁸⁸ Some authors interpret the agents' discontents as paranoia, as if there were groundless and fictional constructs due to psychological mechanisms. Nonetheless, authors like Ertem&Esayan (Ertem&Esayan, 2013) tried to understand the masses. In particular, Ertem&Esayan puts emphasis on the forms of doing politics emerged with post-modernity and anti-globalization movements but, ultimately, they argue that the events constituted the beginning of a new style of military coup aimed at overthrowing the AKP.

⁸⁹ Aktay (2013) and Ertem & Esayan (2013) provide examples of this discourse. According to them, Gezi was a military coup attempt organized by the forces aiming at ending the AKP's "new Turkey" project. Aktay focuses on Kemalists as the agent who used and manipulated the masses, while Ertem and Esayan focus on international forces, namely the financial lobby and their local partners. Aktay (2013a: 6) points out that not everyone who ran to Taksim can be incriminated in the same way. In fact, when trees are cut to construct a shopping mall, it can only be appreciated that in the society there are people reacting with sensitivity to the cause. Aktay remarks that the sensitivity to the protection of green areas and the city cannot harm the country. Conversely, it is an important sign of

objective of the events was such from the very beginning, given that Kemalists as well as other forces hostile to AKP were planning it since years⁹⁰. The Gezi events maintained the same purpose and exploited the affections, demands and perceptions of masses and ordinary people. In this way, the multiplicity characterizing socio-political singular as well as common positions is reduced, and the same goes for the multiplicity of socio-political affections, demands and perceptions⁹¹. In other words, the agents' multiplicity is neglected and overlooked. Their multiplicity is in fact reduced when the focus is reduced to the organizers, meaning the agents planning the events or the leading subject (e.g. "Finance Lobby", capital groups, Kemalists,

the society's vitality and it deserves nothing but respect. Even if – says Aktay – these masses were deceived by some groups through a successful propaganda. According to the author, it is exactly this sensitivity that some other people instrumentalized. Recalling previous examples of social manipulations that addressed concerns about religion secularism and the regime, Aktay argues that this was probably the first time that the masses were mobilized under the slogan "the trees and the green are lost" by means of a total Patrona Halil. For him, once the event had come to a determinate phase, it was clear that it was a typical Ergenekonist or putschist operation." (Aktay, 2013a: 6).

Similar to Aktay, Ertem&Esayan (Ertem&Esayan, 2013: 11) argue the manipulation of protestors, but they do it from a different perspective, i.e. focusing the attention on the role of the financial lobby. They remark how the capitalist crisis led to the formation of the so-called Occupy movements, which brought to the fore issues such as the welfare state, fair sharing, freedom and protection of the environment. These were the demands of the activists who occupied the central areas of a quite number of important cities in the world. However, Ertem and Esayan argue that this essentially libertarian attitude of the activists is manipulated by the global oligarchy and by its local compradors in Turkey, Egypt and Brazil, thus forming the peaceful and developmentalist fault line. Especially in Turkey and Egypt, a coup was endeavored to produce benefits for the libertarian side of the occupy movement by disseminating the discourse that the life spaces of the secular sections are under threat by the political power.

⁹⁰ For a typical example see (Aktay 2013b).

⁹¹ Even if some authors do not neglect the stories and the multiplicity of the demands, positions and affections in the events, they argue that the events had been constructed on the base of a common aim, namely targeting the AKP. It was a hasty prediction that the events would evolve into enmity towards the AKP, because such an event has no aim and destination, even if some of the directing forces and flows tried to construct the links. In the course of the events, however, the groups dissolved and different aims emerged. The theoretical problem here concerns the way in which antagonism is constructed. Pro-AKP authors do not approve that the AKP policies created the conditions for the emergence of the agents' discontent. In other words, the problem can formulated as such: how did those discontents become part of antagonism towards the AKP? In the Turkish political sphere, it is true that the antagonism towards the AKP became one of the articulating discourses of the agents. However, the content, the political groups and individuals constantly changed. Therefore, these arguments can only reproduce the AKP's logic of the AKP instead of explaining the complex reality, desires and aims characterizing the events. As already stressed, in fact, the preexisting discontents, affects and perceptions gain a new form through communalizing practices that were not previously given. In other words, none of the targets and scopes were given, because discontents, affects and perceptions became part of the political experience through politicizing practices that constructs, deconstructs and reconstructs the political field in which the forces encounter themselves in the attempt to build antagonist positions.

external and internal powers aiming at overthrowing AKP). This perspective of analysis can only lead to the generalization of specific examples that are approached as if they were representative of all the events: certain powerful groups are considered big and active, while the rest of the agents and masses are simply seen as passive⁹².

Another issue to be discussed is the accumulation of new modes of doing politics, i.e. a process that has been neglected. The historicity of the development of political forms is the outcome of local expression of global changes, which include the emergence of populism, anti-authoritarianism, mass uprisings and organizational innovations. Ultimately, the perspective proposed by this literature exempts the politicalness of the events from the singularities. In AKP supporters' writings, the politicalness of the events is in fact neglected through distinctions between political groups. On one side, there are leftists, anti-authoritarians and Kemalists, who are described as vandals. On the other side, there are people that had never been organized by any organization, who are considered innocent participants. In this way, participants are distinguished between good and evil forces⁹³.

Another issue that deserves detailed discussion is antagonism. Enmity towards AKP is in fact one of the topics dominating the pro-AKP literature, which is problematic because it addresses it as if it were the only common political attitude that protesters

⁹² The passivity of the masses is the result of discursive procedures that homogenize the multiple and heterogeneous agents by neglecting the perceptions and affections that lead to political events. This perspective neglects in fact the politicalness of the events. Political activity implies two sides: the organizations and the organized. However, the perspective proposed by this literature does not acknowledge how the subjectivities organized around the organizations, and it therefore fails to explain how processes and mechanisms produce the subjectivities' commonalities through political practices. For instance, people do not always join actions due to criticism and fear. In fact, the feeling of weakness vis-a-vis the police forces may keep people away from the streets and the organizations must therefore develop new tactics. In the case of the Gezi uprising, instead, a lot of agents felt powerful vis-a-vis the government. This feeling was crucial insofar as it allowed people to gather in the streets and to become a part of the "mass". Becoming part of a mass produces a feeling of powerlessness and this is something that Elias Canetti (1973) analyzed quite well.

⁹³ This is an issue of political theory. With regard to politics, AKP's theoretical framework is based on problem solving and the notion of governmentality. Its political utopia is based on the creation of a peaceful, united and harmonious society. From this perspective, political forces are considered bad if they do not support the AKP's program and projects, and if they go beyond its alliances. There is also another problem: affects are reconstructed by politics. According to the conceptualization of antagonistic politics proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), preexisting demands and affections are brought together by discursive mechanisms to create common. This issue will be explained in detail in the second chapter.

shared (SDE, 2013). People who participated in the Gezi events shared not only antagonistic and negative attitudes towards AKP but also positive affections, perceptions, demands and practices deriving from alternative ways of doing politics. The latter include the park forums, which are one of the main outcomes of the Gezi events and have an articulating role in the construction of a new society⁹⁴.

In addition to this, it must be noted that this perspective is characterized by logical fallacy. Approached as product of the Gezi events, antagonism becomes the articulating mechanism of the events and it is therefore considered as the cause of the events. In this way, the effect of the events is exchanged for the cause of the events. Seen from this perspective, the articulation process is frozen, because one of the various elements is used to analyze the articulation⁹⁵. This approach totalizes the part into the whole and neglects the processes that took place during the events.

So far, two are then the points made to show how the multiplicity of both agents and practices has been neglected. Practices articulated, connected and linked the agents' affections, demands and perceptions into a commonality. Yet, what pro-AKP literature does is precisely silencing the singularities demands, affections and perceptions. This perspective is therefore marked by hasty generalization, which neglects the diversity of the various contexts and localities where the events took place⁹⁶.

⁹⁴ It was evident that these practices were very limited and that they never reached the massive scale that street demonstrations instead reached. Also, it was also evident that some political groups tried to divide the forums. Yet, it cannot be overlooked that these were crucial products of the events and, more importantly, that their organization aimed exactly at preserving the events by organizing the agents through common decision making structures.

⁹⁵ This process includes the changes affecting the attitudes of agents and singularities that joined the events. Their attitudes were in fact constantly changing, and they were influenced by government and other forces' strategies and tactics. Within these conditions, practices emerge as flexible, unstable and fluid: they gained new forms in every moment of the events. For instance, the scale of street demonstrations was massive prior to the police intervention. After the interventions, instead, agents distanced from the demonstrations and meetings. There are also further examples. At the beginning, some people were not so much antagonist towards the AKP, while their antagonism increased during the events.

⁹⁶ This is valid not only for one political practice, but also for the multiplicity of political mechanisms. It is wrong to argue that all localities and singularities shared the previously mentioned commonalities. However, communalizing mechanisms were present, and they functioned as powerful catalyst to gather singularities and localities.

From the observations made so far, it emerges that pro-AKP authors neglect two important aspects of the events. First of all, they neglect the social and historical conditions in which the events emerged. In fact, they neglect affections, perceptions and demands that emerged before the Gezi events as response to AKP's policies as well as to global changes. In other words, what they neglect are the organizational accumulation, the struggles and the forms of resistance that emerged before Gezi. In addition, they neglect the articulation processes that made those conditions and their symptoms political, i.e. the processes that partly gave rise to communalizing practices by combining a multiplicity of social and political positions. As a matter of fact, finding motivations and causes determining the events is actually a difficult task, all the more so given that the agents' motivations changed in the course of the events. Nonetheless, it can be argued that pro-AKP literature overlooks the social and historical conditions of the events.

Some of the pro-AKP authors look at the local events as a specific case of structural and global changes. They place them into the wider context and yet they do it in a way that reflects the AKP's standpoint. Therefore, the resulting analysis of the context is anyway very partial⁹⁷. The events are in fact reduced to a struggle between the AKP government and the political forces that criticized it, including both national and international political forces. This perspective is based on the argument that all these forces tried to prevent Turkey's political, economic development and its increasing regional influence.

Undeniable is the pre-existence of struggles in the Middle Eastern area, and undeniable is also the fact that Western countries had tried to prevent AKP's policy making. Yet, focusing only these issues is like neglecting the rest of the elements that, all together, constituted the conditions of possibility of the Gezi events. For

⁹⁷ Communalizing practices include linking, connecting and articulating the singularities into the political articulation. Negating them, the literature overlooks the conditions of the possibility of the events, namely the articulation and the linking mechanisms that constructs the singularities' block and their commonality within the social and political conditions. The multiplicity of the political subject and the multiplicity of the organizations is formed by singularities, i.e. the same singularities that these authors ultimately neglect by homogenizing them as if homogenization and communalization were pre-given to the complex relations constructed by political practices. By doing this, the literature neglects the similarities between the events and events happened in other contexts. The conditions are reduced to the political struggle against the AKP, but this struggle changes and it is not something static. In brief, the processes and their intersection are what they neglect.

instance, most of the authors resorting to this framework neglect the effects of the AKP's neoliberal and neoconservative policies on the local population. Even if some authors mention the discontents caused by the AKP, they approach them as if they were the unreal and artificial product of psychological mechanisms⁹⁸. It follows that pro-AKP authors' analysis neglect the conditions producing the agents' affections and perceptions, which the events reconstructed through political practices.

Next to all this, worthy of being problematized are also some of the reports provided by research companies, which resorted to social sciences' procedures with the purpose of producing social scientific knowledge. For what concerns them, it must be noted that their focus is on the agents' motivations, interests and affections. Their scope is in fact the identification of the agents' common characteristics. In order to accomplish this task, two are the leading questions emerging from the reports. First, what were the social and political conditions that led the agents to organize and participate in the events? Second, who were the agents or, in other words, what were their demands and political aspirations⁹⁹?

These are questions that can be useful to determine the agents' horizon and the horizon of their expressions. In doing so, the questions are however assumed as limitations of the events, too. Framing possibility and limitations of the events by framing the limitations of their agents implies the reduction of the agents' expressions into given categories. Starting from the multiplicity of the localities where the events took place, the reports provide lists of forms and types of the subjectivities involved in order to identify their common characteristics. These analyses are indeed useful to identify what the communalizing practices are, and yet the communalizing practices are ultimately generalized into the multiplicity.

⁹⁸ From this perspective, it is argued that some political forces and some socio-political sections of the society produced artificial problems through the production of a paranoid fear that AKP would have seized every sphere of life. For instance, Aktay (2013a) argues that people's feelings are not the result of the interactions with AKP's policies but rather the product of psychological problems.

⁹⁹ For the most part, these reports criticize the arguments that pro-AKP authors adduced in order to find a determined agent leading the events. Also, they stress the agents' plurality by highlighting the government's role in the emergence of the events.

The reports on the Gezi events mention the role of the AKP and they even emphasize the multiplicity and the heterogeneity of social and political agents. However, they fail to link the conditions that emerged before the Gezi events and that prepared the terrain for the Gezi events and practices to emerge. Instead of doing this, the reports approach the agents' actions as the expression of social and political positions analyzed through the use of categories that make them look as if they were static insofar as they are not analyzed in relation with the social and historical conditions. The reports mention some of the stories, common affections and common characteristics that emerged during the events, but they neglect the social and political conditions as if the events emerged within a void. At first glance, these analyses seem different from the studies that neglect the agents, but they take the events as the expression of social profiles. During the events, subjectivities and political positions were affected by changes, which the reports instead overlook. These analyses therefore risk of misunderstanding the events insofar as the events are interpreted as if they were the direct effect of social profiles. De facto, these studies do not omit to argue that social profiles influence the events and that, at the same time, are influenced by the events as part of political actions. Describing the events as expression of social categories is politically important but it is not sufficient to describe their objective reality. The perspective proposed by these studies is therefore not adequate to show how social profiles came together on the base of a political practice, because socio-political conditions and communalizing practices are neglected in this case, too. What cannot be explained is in fact how the affections preceding the Gezi events were transformed in a way that they became part of a political practice.

At this point of the argumentation, the gaps in the literature are evident. Previous studies do not take into account elements that are crucial to understand the events, namely the conditions emerged before the events, agents, their organizational structures, and articulation mechanisms produced during the events. The latter are important because they allowed the production of common points and practices of the singularities. Articulation mechanisms produced, reproduced and changed demands, affections and perceptions that constituted part of the political articulation. The events were in fact the outcome of the correspondence and combination of all

these elements. Neither the potentialities could have been sufficient to make the events possible, nor could the limits internal to the events have been sufficient to delimit them. Several are the other elements that need to be taken into account: political fields and the changes affecting them, conjunctures and the actions of the agents, the agents' need to act together and pragmatically in order to react to the fear of the intensification of authoritarianism inspired by Islamic principles and to therefore attempt at overthrowing the AKP government in view of a more democratic country¹⁰⁰. Without all these elements and conditions, the Gezi events would have been impossible. If they are not all taken into account, the analysis can only neglect the actual conditions and therefore risk falling into transcendentalism.

As mentioned in the introduction, the case of the Gezi events provides evidence of the following facts. Political articulation did not emerge spontaneously, for it requires articulation and an articulating force. Some of the agents were very active from the beginning of the events, but organizations created by traditional leftist activists also emerged during the events. It was a leaderless articulation and there was not a center, even if organizations like the Taksim Solidarity (*Taksim Dayanışması*) tried to represent the protestors. Every locality had different demands and protestors were beyond the control of the institutions. The active agents were many (from Kemalists to Alevis), but none of them could become a hegemonic force. At the beginning, there was not a unique predetermined and predictable scope of the events, which were not destined to realize any specific political aim. Agents tried to

¹⁰⁰ Detached from the analysis of the existing conditions, political forces are approached as if they were transcendental and the political field is neglected, whereas the political field forms the actions of the forces. The emergence of political organizations and the emergence of their strategies are assumed as if they were previously given and transcending the political developments, as if political organizations had covert agendas. Within this perspective of analysis, limits are understood only as internal limits of the political forces. It is true that political organizations have their own agendas as well as discursive and ideological frameworks that frame their ways of doing politics. However, there are no given essential potential and limits. Limitations and possibilities are in fact shaped by the conditions, which include political fields, agents and articulated people. The perspective under examination is instead the product of a framework that neglects the active role and the influence of the masses forming the strategies of the political movements. As emphasized more than once, desires, hopes and affections of the articulated and articulating force must find a place for mutual correspondence. Thus, these analyses neglect the way in which conditions affected the agents' political attitudes. For instance, political conditions were the reason leading people to be afraid of death and to retreat from politics, thus limiting political imaginations and creating paranoia. The paranoid fear of being killed by the government led people to narrow their political perspectives: instead of reclaiming a more radical model for the society, people opted for a liberal model. This example shows how the political field affected people's affections and discourses.

create political aims but they were indeed different: they included both umbrella organizations and leftist groups. Therefore, the agents of the events constituted a heterogeneous mass transforming the political groups.

Given these premises, this study argues that several are the literature's shortcomings due to the reduction of the events to the expression of social and political positions: social and political processes as well as conditions are frozen, and the political practice that attracts people is overlooked¹⁰¹. In addition to this, the question about the limitations of the events remains unanswered. Conversely, the Gezi events and other political practices were not the expression of any social and political position. Rather, they displaced and de-territorialized social and political positions through the de-territorialization and the re-territorialization of habits and dispositions by providing new habits to the political practice¹⁰².

Seeing the events from this perspective means acknowledging the agents' position takings and disposition, which changed during the course of the events. The dispositions of the political position takings sparked the emergence of the events, but agents came together with different practices that led their political habits. For instance, the Turkish left is characterized by internal rivalry¹⁰³. Yet, even rival forces acted together and experienced different organizational forms¹⁰⁴. Both political and social positions based on class and ethnicity categorization experienced new practices. Political mechanisms of articulation built the relation between the

¹⁰¹ Here, it is important to ask why on this date rather than on another date. Leaving this question unanswered is like mystifying the events. If political practices are neglected, it seems that the events either come from heaven or are the outcome of supposed agents' plans as pro-AKP authors claim.

¹⁰² During the events, political practices and struggles shaped the course of the events and reconstituted political positions. No matter when the antagonism and the enmity towards Erdoğan and the AKP emerged (whether before or during the Gezi events), it is evident that the antagonism towards the AKP and Erdoğan was one of the articulating elements. Elements leading people included affections and perceptions that both preceded the Gezi events and that were developed during the process. Moreover, these affections and perceptions emerged as reaction to Erdoğan and AKP's attitudes.

¹⁰³ Within the Turkish left, many groups are hostile to each other because of sectarianism.

¹⁰⁴ The events included horizontal and anti-authoritarian organizational forms. Many Marxist groups criticized the principles of these methods. During the course of the events, they however changed their organizational principles, showed self-criticism and started to write about anti-authoritarian and horizontal organizations.

articulated and articulation, thus making these facts possible independently from the identity of the agents and their intentions. The condition of possibility was constituted by the construction of a political practice through common perceptions, affections and demands.

The epistemological approach of this study is however different. The definition of categories is useful to understand facts and yet is not considered sufficient because also the temporal nature of the reality needs to be examined. The above-mentioned categories are in fact important to analyze habits as well as their structured and static expressions. However, the analysis must focus on the flows if the aim is the understanding of the new that is always present and that was abundant in the Gezi events. The importance of this approach lies in this: if the Gezi events are understood as expression of social and political profiles, then it follows the impossibility to analyze how social and political profiles changed in a way that produced common political practices and attitudes. For instance, several are the critical issues. How was antagonism towards the AKP reconstructed? How did the new articulating and communalizing points emerge through the political practices of organization that changed attitudes? If the elements of the events are not linked to each other, it follows the risk of reducing all the events to the mechanical expression of either political conditions or socio-political positions. In other words, the analysis of both conditions of possibility and limitations of the events requires the interconnection of old and new, static and astatic elements, without overlooking the fact that the latter ones act as the former ones.

2.2. HDP and its Images: from Turkey-ization Force to Enemy of the Country

Selahattin Demirtaş's candidacy for the 2014 presidential election marked the increase of HDP's role as political force in Turkey. Close to the PKK and under its influence, the Kurdish political movement expanded the focus on the Kurdish question to include further problems affecting the country. A similar shift is what

paved the way to the HDP's establishment. Called Turkey-ization¹⁰⁵, this strategy aimed at including all social and political groups to be organized around leftist ideas. The strategy encountered a partial success in the general elections that took place on 7 June 2015, allowing surpassing the threshold¹⁰⁶.

HDP's political program and discourse are inspired by the hope of radically changing the country and the life of its citizens. Based on the principles of self-government, democracy and equality, the program aimed at putting an end to the systems of domination causing inequality. These are the ideas that partially attracted different sections of the population¹⁰⁷. Furthermore, the HDP nourished the hope and the will to put an end to the war between the state and the PKK. Accordingly, it promised to build the necessary framework to guarantee the recognition and the respect of the legal and institutional rights of both Kurds and other ethnic groups living in the country. With the purpose of reshaping the political and social constitution of the country, it also proposed_a new economy, one based on the premises of collective ownership.

This partial success of the HDP changed the political balances between the Turkish parliamentary and oppositional forces. It was precisely the radically democratic program that allowed the party to enter the political scene as representative of the whole population and not only as representative of the Kurdish oppositional forces¹⁰⁸. Like the CHP and the MHP, the HDP also claimed to represent the whole

¹⁰⁵ According to this strategy, the HDP's program focuses on the Kurdish question but it also tries to address other groups and sections of the Turkish society by proposing ideas concerning ecological, gender, ethnic, economic and political issues.

¹⁰⁶ The Turkish electoral system requires political parties to win at least 10% of the national vote in order to enter the Parliament.

¹⁰⁷ Both the party program and its declaration for the 7 June election stress different types inequality issues afflicting the country: ethnic, class and gender inequality. The inclusion of wide sections of the society is the aim of a similar discursive use of flexible and heterogeneously multiple meanings of social inequality.

¹⁰⁸ As previously mentioned, the members of the legal Kurdish movement constituted the largest part of the HDP's predecessors and they entered the parliament through block organizations. However, the number of the parliamentarians increased with the 7 June election and the HDP became the third party in the parliament.

population of the country in the parliament. This representation strategy made the HDP a crucial oppositional force and a political alternative to the AKP¹⁰⁹.

The HDP's political potential consisted in the capability to organize social struggles and mass demonstrations by bringing together social and political movements. However, the HDP's political influence starting decreasing due to the events that happened in the Kurdish area of the country on October 6-7, namely the Kobane events. In the November elections, the percentage of votes dropped and the HDP did not have the chance to organize the social and political movements of the country. The HDP could not manage to organize strong demonstrations and political activities even after Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ were arrested. The Turkey-ization strategy revealed its limits.

The literature offers valuable clues to analyze the change of the HDP's influence in the Turkish political field¹¹⁰. The amount of the existing literature on the HDP is not extensive, but it includes reports, field studies and political analyses. These sources examine the reasons of the 7 June electoral success, they explain the party's potential and its limitations as political force within the Turkish context, and they tackle the issue of the loss of support from the society¹¹¹.

The various sources share the idea that the Turkey-ization strategy is the reason why the HDP gained support from the society¹¹². Most of the sources agree also on attributing the inefficacy of its strategy to the end of the peace of process between the PKK and the Turkish state. They argued that the HDP failed to attract singularities

¹⁰⁹ It might be argued that HDP's political agenda and line were in some way in harmony with the AKP before, because the HDP had collaborated with the AKP in order to start the peace process between the state and the PKK. However, the situation changed and the HDP's consensus to the AKP ended precisely because of issues related to the context of the Kurdish question.

¹¹⁰ The HDP had such a power to attract social and political agents that it could have become a strong mass organization. The reasons and the conditions of HDP's increasing and decreasing political influence have been analyzed by research companies and by many scholars, whose political positions, epistemological procedures and methods are different.

¹¹¹ With regard to the elections, see the analysis done by the research companies, (Konda, 2015a; Konda, 2015c; Stratejik Düşünce, 2015c; Stratejik Düşünce, 2015d; Stratejik Düşünce, 2015h Çilekağacı, 2015a; Çilekağacı, 2015b).

¹¹² This strategy aimed at building an oppositional force that could have been able to constitute an alternative to the other parties within the political field. Accordingly, it aimed at attracting CHP's supporters by putting emphasis on laicism, democracy and so on.

and agents to the political practices once it focused the attention back to the Kurdish question and therefore stopped opening itself to the rest of the society. In other words, distancing itself from the Turkey-ization strategy and returning to the Kurdish issue, the HDP posed the limitations to the expansion of its own potential as political force¹¹³.

As discussed so far, the HDP had been potentially able to attract and articulate a variety of social segments and political forces of the Turkish population and this is something that none of the sources omit to discuss¹¹⁴. However, the analyses differ from each other with regard to the reasons and the conditions that limited this capability and determined the partiality of the HDP's success.¹¹⁵ The literature

¹¹³ As it will be argued afterwards, the return to the Kurdish question was not the outcome of a conscious preference choice. Rather, it was the result of political developments, namely the interruption of the peace process. The HDP tried to continue with its Turkey-ization project, but the situation confined the party into the boundaries of the Kurdish issue,. On the other hand, it must be remarked that pro-AKP authors referred to the HDP as a Kurdish political party. This is true in the sense that one of the main aims of the HDP is indeed the solution of the Kurdish question through the constitution of democratic-autonomy in the Kurdish regions and through the change of the Turkish governmental system according to Öcalan's theory on democratic autonomy. The party's program contains in fact information about the HDP's position on the question of the democratic autonomy. This means that the solution of the Kurdish question is indeed one of the main political aims of the HDP. Nonetheless, the HDP is not only interested in the Kurdish question. With leftists, it shares in fact ideals of a democracy to be applied not only in Turkey and in the Middle East but also in the whole world. The Kurdish question and its developments both effects and dominates the HDP's political agenda thus making other issues become of secondary importance. Nonetheless, the HDP is not only interested in the Kurdish question. This means that it cannot be referred to as a mainly Kurdish political organization.

¹¹⁴ Even if HDP aimed at articulating the majority of the population of the country, it actually limited its attention to the Kurds, to some of the secularists, to some of the Alevis, to the leftist liberals, to Marxists and to libertarian groups. Even if it took the votes from different sections of the Kurdish society (from supporters of the PKK to liberal and religious Kurd), it failed to attract right-wing voters and nationalist people in the West.

¹¹⁵ Most of these analyses were done by pro-AKP authors and research companies. The analyses done by the pro-AKP authors were mostly political analyses including field studies and writings on political strategies. These are focused on the AKP's understanding of the HDP with regard to specific events and processes such as the elections and other political developments. For example see Stratejik Düşünce (2015c and 2015h). The research companies' analyses are focused on the period preceding and following the elections in order to identify the profiles of the social and political groups that supported or that did not support the HDP. The questions they asked are the following. What were the reasons that moved people to vote the HDP? What are the effects of the votes received by the HDP? At this regard, see Konda (2015a and 2015c). These analyses are important in order to answer questions about people's articulation in the cases of the elections. However, as it will be analyzed in detail afterwards, these analyses focus on the results and assume the articulation moments as expression of social positions. This implies theoretical limits insofar as people's choices are assumed

includes in fact a variegated range of sources that include analyses with political significance¹¹⁶, pro-AKP authors' scientific analyses that intended to be neutral, and reports carried out by research companies.

Initially, studies of political value reacted to the HDP in a largely positive way. Most of the authors stressed the HDP's possibilities to reach a peace agreement between the PKK and the state¹¹⁷. The reason for the positive reactions to the Turkey-ization project was the flexibility of a discourse centered on the interests of wide segments of the society and, as such, designed to call for the support of different agents. The positivity of the reactions was in fact related to the HDP's proposals to reach compromises through a more peaceful and non-violent way of doing politics. These were considered the advantages that made the HDP's political line possible¹¹⁸. These ideas were common especially among pro-AKP authors, who nonetheless criticized the HDP when its political line was in disagreement with the AKP's policies. However, this sort of positive reactions started to change in the period before the 7 June elections¹¹⁹.

Especially after June 7, analysts and authors started to increasingly criticize the HDP's political line and strategies proposed during and after the elections.

as unchangeable. In any case, these analyses are not sufficient to explain how the HDP is the result of historical and political processes.

¹¹⁶ Here it isn't claimed that scientific analysis can be objective exempted from the values of the scientist. However, the types of the analysis are different. The value-loaded analysis are the ones that directly produce the knowledge and had no aim to be objective. The other ones use scientific procedures on the base of the values with the claim of being scientifically objective.

¹¹⁷ On the other hand, some argue that HDP's political line is different from the PKK's one, because the aim of the HDP is not dividing Turkey nor using violence and armed struggle against the Turkish state. Rather it exploits Demirtaş's image as potential moderate leader of the whole Turkey (Retrieved, 04.09. 2016, from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/mhp-den-demirtas-a-sasirtan-ovgu/siyaset/detay/1918670/default.htm>).

¹¹⁸ HDP's political activities in Turkey include meetings and election campaigns. Its existence has been constantly rejected by some political groups including Aydinlik Group, ultra-nationalist Kemalists and right-wing groups. However, media groups and the AKP had developed positive ideas before.

¹¹⁹ As it will be mentioned afterwards, pro-AKP authors criticize the HDP's increasing antagonistic discourse especially during the 7 June 2015 election campaign. The slogan "We will not let you be president" is emblematic of the process through which Erdogan was referred to as enemy. For the authors, this political attitude against the AKP was destructive insofar as it was based on the politics of dissent rather than on the politics of consensus.

Condemning the close relationship of the HDP to the PKK, they blame the HDP for being under the hegemony of PKK and for distancing itself from the agents it had previously managed to articulate.¹²⁰ Especially this last argument and increasing criticism shaped the image of the HDP as an organization that supports terrorism and the PKK. In addition to this, it has been also claimed that the HDP collaborates with agents of foreign forces with the aim of dividing the country and annihilating its independence.¹²¹

This change of attitude towards the HDP is quite common among pro-AKP authors and it is particularly evident in the writings following the 7 June elections (Aktay, 2015a).¹²² Negative ideas and images about the HDP frame and dominate the political and scientific analysis of these authors. The central arguments of this literature are constantly formed in accordance to the AKP's changing political attitudes towards the HDP. However, these authors resort also to theoretical and epistemological

¹²⁰ Most of the criticism is based on the argument that the HDP is not independent from the PKK's policies. According to this picture, the PKK leadership gives orders to the HDP and the HDP obeys. At this regard, it must be noted that is undeniable that the HDP project was initiated by the PKK leadership, especially by Abdullah Öcalan. The political position of the HDP is in fact mostly determined by the Kurdish question, and the changes of the Kurdish political movement's political positions determine the HDP's stance with regard to the Kurdish question. As political force, the HDP is however not only interested in the issues of the Kurdish movement but also in other kind of issues affecting the Turkish context. This is confirmed by the HDP's participation in demonstrations organized to demand the resolution of a variety of issues (e.g. economic, gender etc.).

¹²¹ Aydinlik and Sözcü are examples of Kemalist and nationalist sources addressing the HDP as equal to the PKK and terrorism. The equivalence is based on the argument that the HDP is a project of the Kurdish movement and of leftist groups close to the Kurdish movement. Moreover, the HDP has been even described as the project of local and foreign forces that are hostile to the AKP and that therefore want to put an end to its existence and to its governance.

¹²² As in the case of the analysis of the Gezi events, the discourse has been framed by the change of the relations between the AKP and the HDP. The political position of the AKP shifted from sympathy to enmity, and the AKP started blaming the HDP for being the supporter of terrorism in Turkey. This change of the discourse is evident in the literature produced by AKP's supporters and sympathizers, and it can be traced in the whole period starting from Demirtaş' candidacy for the presidential election to nowadays. The AKP itself also contributed to the production of negative ideas about the HDP. At this regard, crucial is the discourse produced by the AKP when the HDP's political actions and attitudes were not in agreement with its own positions. For instance, the Gezi events provide evidence of the positive attitude of the AKP towards the HDP and the Kurdish movement. Demirtaş had in fact expressed doubts about the events. Although he had never blamed the events, he was worried that they might have put the peace process at risk. Conversely, the Kobane events provide a different example of the dynamic at stake. During the Kobane events, Demirtaş was blamed for being responsible because of his way of talking about them. However, HDP had already started being considered the project of the enemies of the AKP and the country, namely the supporters of PKK's terrorism. Therefore, it is evident that the AKP's changing political attitude framed its discourse and analysis of the HDP. In brief, the AKP's political attitude was positive when HDP acted in agreement with the AKP, whereas it became negative in the opposite cases.

procedures that go beyond partisan and politically sloganist ideas. Therefore, this literature is a mix of field studies and ideas resulting from the combination of methods and procedures of social and political sciences with the analysis of political strategies, the latter evaluated and calculated according to their divergence from the AKP's political line and to their detrimental effects on it.¹²³

Following the 7 June election, pro-AKP authors' increasing criticisms reduces the image of HDP to a puppet of the PKK and the foreign forces. Even its success is considered a product of its passive attitude. For instance, some of the authors argue that its electoral success was not real, claiming that it received the votes of the majority of the population of the Kurdish regions through the use of repression and violence in collaboration with the PKK. Put it in other terms, part of the Kurdish population living in the Eastern part of the country would have unwillingly voted for the HDP only because it was scared of it.¹²⁴ Following this, the narrative related to the period between 7 June and 1 November is marked by criticisms of the alleged dependence from the PKK.¹²⁵ In addition to this, the literary sources attack the HDP's political attitude to specific events insofar as it is considered detrimental to

¹²³ For instance, pro-AKP authors' comments on the HDP's declaration for the 7 June election are very negative. As mentioned above, they criticize the HDP for using an antagonistic language against the AKP and Erdogan, whose political aim is the construction of consensus and alliance between political parties in view of the solution of the real problems of the society. They therefore criticize the HDP's attitude, because it is contrary to the political perspective developed by the AKP. According to them, the declaration is populist, unrealistic and inconsistent. Moreover, it is contrary to the AKP's program and its political proposals to solve the actual problems of the society. The HDP is accused of being a pragmatic form of populism, because its program is the expression of an idealist discourse designed to attract people by leveraging their affects instead of offering solutions to the problems of the society (Alkan, 2015a: 24-28). This sort of criticism is grounded on the idea that politics is a means to solve the effectively solve the problems of the society. Within this framework, the AKP's political program is instead considered as the real and most truthful program able to provide actual solutions.

¹²⁴ An example of sources supporting these ideas is the SDE's evaluation report, but Aktay (2015a and 2015b) is surely one of the prominent authors claiming them. However, Aktay remarks that the success of the HDP cannot be entirely due to the PKK's pressure on the HDP, given that there were Kurds who willingly voted for the HDP and there were also other sections of the population in the West who did the same. Despite this remarks, Aktay describes the HDP as an undemocratic organization that is not truly representative of the Kurds and that act in accordance with the PKK.

¹²⁵ It must be reminded that the period between 7 June and 1 November refers to a period marked by a process aimed at ending the peace negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state. During this process, ISIS's attacks increased and the violence used by the PKK militants and its young supporters increased, too. The AKP blamed the HDP for collaborating with the PKK and for supporting terrorism instead of transforming its electoral success in a way that could be useful to develop peace. These critiques are partly true, but the HDP never supported armed violence explicitly.

the country's stability. It is in fact blamed of collaboration with internal and international forces aiming at creating chaos and disorder in Turkey.¹²⁶ It can be therefore argued that this literature reduces the political existence and emergence of the HDP to a part of a wider plan.¹²⁷

On the base of these ideas, the authors question why and how the HDP became a political force being able to be successful in the 7 June elections and unable to maintain its political influence in the 1 November elections.¹²⁸ The understanding of both success and limitations of the HDP's strategies requires the analysis of several elements: its way of doing politics, its connections with other political, economic and social forces, and the economic as well as political conditions of the country. For instance, understanding how the HDP could articulate and attract socio-political subjects and groups in the 7 June election must be analyzed within this frame. The same goes for the understanding of the decrease of votes in the 1 November election.

With regard to the November elections, the literature is focused on HDP's support to the so-called terrorism and to the increasing violence developed by the YDG-H (Bolat, 2015).¹²⁹ Support to terrorism and tutelage by enemy forces do not however

¹²⁶ Davutoğlu made a public statement on 10 Ekim (the ISIS's attack in Ankara) and argued that the HDP was involved in the attack (Retrieved on 13.11.2016 from <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/basbakan-davutoglundan-ankaradaki-patlamaya-iliskin-akilama.GpJPYDJmHk6fw6mPIUKNzA>). Some other authors claimed similar ideas (Orakoğlu, 2015; Yılmaz, 2015).

¹²⁷ See Aktay (2015c) and Bolat (2015).

¹²⁸ As already discussed, the HDP's political influence on its supporters decreased increasingly after November, 1.

¹²⁹ Sources argue that the HDP lost their votes because it could not take distance from the PKK. Some authors argue that this attitude determined the distination of Kurdish people insofar as they had previously voted for the HDP in view of the peace process. This analysis is partially true, but it cannot be generalized and considered valid for all Kurdish voters. Aktay is one of those advocating this argument and he approves the fact that there are a lot of Kurds who would vote for HDP under any circumstances because of their close relationships with the Kurdish movement. Among the HDP voters, there are tendencies in support of peace, but similar tendencies and dispositions cannot be considered the exhaustive cause of the distance or attraction of the singularities. These tendencies are unlikely to repeat themselves. Rather, they quickly change. For instance, people can support the PKK use of violence and in fact some of the agents criticized the peaceful political line of the HDP. Moreover, it is self-evident that the HDP would not get the votes of the Kurds supporting the PKK without the support of the PKK. In other words, they would not vote the HDP if it would renegade the existence of the PKK. Therefore, the reasons for the loss of votes cannot be found by looking for the failures of the HDP. They must be analyzed through the analysis of the conditions and limits coming from the political climate that obstacle the HDP's activities and articulation strategies. The process is

exhaust the topics, which include also the loss of support by its previous voters. According to the sources, none of the Kurds was satisfied with the HDP's politics, which is argued to have been unable to meet the interests of its supporters and to have not provided adequate response to their economic, cultural and social problems. The literature argues that the initial success is due to the following reasons: first, the populist and eclectic character of a discourse that aimed at including different socio-political groups and, second, the connections with the PKK and other local as well as global socio-political forces. Accordingly, the loss of influence and attraction is explained with the argument of the party's distantiation from the masses' expectations and desires. In other words, the limits of the HDP's political practice that the literature identifies are several: the strategy to attract the masses, the role played in the political field, and the overall image that the party conveyed. In brief, the literature on limitations and conditions of possibility of the HDP is based on the analysis of its discourse and activities. Hence, it must be remarked that this sort of analyses does not pay the due attention to an important question, namely how people's articulated habits and changing interests shaped the HDP's political lines and strategies (Alkan, 2015a: 24-28). Pro-AKP authors share in fact the perspective of analysis on the HDP's possibilities and limitations for what concerns the case of the elections.

Pro-AKP authors mostly focus on the political field as the game arena where forces take their own positions with respect to each other. By doing so, they neglect the modalities in which the HDP attracted different socio-political singularities and groups. Despite the attempt to analyze the relationships between the HDP, articulated agents and singularities, the authors mostly focus on the party's strategies and evaluate them according to the party's success in mobilizing the interests, affections of the articulated subjects. This attitude is particularly evident in the analysis of the HDP's limits. Claiming that unsuccessful leadership, organization and political practices constitute the limits of the HDP, the sources explain the conditions of possibility and the limitations of the success and failure of the HDP's strategies as if

two-sided. On the one hand, there are the party's strategies. On the other hand, there are the articulated people. In any case, these two sides are also influenced by the given political conditions.

they were only a matter of leadership and organization.¹³⁰ Their analysis in fact based on the AKP's official stances on one side and on the HDP's practices and strategies to attract people on the other side. Undeniable is that the HDP's strategies were crucial, but this perspective of analysis fail to explain how socio-political subjectivities and groups responded to the organizational strategies. This is a crucial question, given that the agents' political stance influences the strategies implemented by the articulating force. Furthermore, it must be noted that the agents' political stance does not always necessarily change, even in case of disagreement with the strategies and the political line put forward by the organization.¹³¹

Given these premises, it follows that excessive emphasis on the leadership tactics of the organization makes insignificant the role of the agents in the formation of the organization's political strategies. The perspective discussed so far cannot explain the

¹³⁰ On this ground, the literature interprets the limits of the HDP as failure of its leadership. By this, the sources under examination claim that the failure is due to the fact that the HDP acted according to PKK's political agenda. This is something that cannot be neglected because it is partly true. As a matter of fact, the HDP's project was in large part created and supported by the PKK and its leader. However, the PKK was not the only organization involved. In addition to the PKK, other were in fact the leftist forces involved in the HDP's project and the HDP's strategies and tactics were shaped also by their attitudes and agendas. It might be claimed that these leftist forces were partially are under the hegemony of the Kurdish movement and yet it must be remarked that the organization's experiences and practices exceed the influence of the Kurdish movement. In other words, the PKK is not the only political group and agent that shaped the experiences of the HDP, whose organization and development were influenced also by external conditions, both national and foreign. Neglecting this fact means neglecting that the HDP constitutes a block and alliance organization. The failure in acknowledging this character of the HDP implies the homogenization of the organization and the exclusion of its internal tensions from the analysis. Even if the Kurdish movement close to the PKK constitutes the main force, the HDP is in fact constituted by a variety of internal ideological and political orientations that, in certain cases, are not only different but also conflicting. An example is given by the case of Altan Tan, who is a Kurdish, Islamic oriented and nationalist member of the HDP as well as of the parliament. For instance, he objected to the HDP's leftist tone and its acting in accordance to the interests of the Turkish left on the base of the argument that this specific political orientation would have distanced the party from the Kurdish question. Another example is offered by the case of some of the constituent leftist groups, whose criticism was directed at the party's alleged lack of attention on the economic issues affecting the society. As it will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 4, the formation of the alliance around HDP has a history, it was not something given as such. If this fact is neglected while the issue of the PKK's influence receives too much attention, then the analysis fails to take into account the processes and the experiences that shaped the HDP as an alliance organization.

¹³¹ For instance, even if some social and leftist political groups expressed criticism towards the HDP, they continued to support it. Even when people were not satisfied with the HDP's actions, some of them grouped around it. This is precisely the meaning of the HDP as a block and alliance organization that built a common political stance in response to the developments affecting Turkey. In other words, the HDP's strategies allowed the emergence of an articulation and this happened precisely through the production of common interests, affections and demands. For instance, this dynamic is evident after November, 1, when most of the leftist groups acted together with the HDP albeit their criticism.

recreation of the agents, because it does not take into account the fact that their changing attitudes were influenced by the change of political situations. These are in fact the conditions under which the organization acts in order to attract agents and to organize them by developing not only discursive strategies and tactics but also social practices (e.g. institutions) and political practices (e.g. demonstrations, meetings and campaigns). Therefore, it can be argued that the analyses reviewed so far fail to explain how the political situations shaped and influenced the political attitudes of the HDP's potential supporters.

Following the 7 June elections and the subsequent process, mass movements and social movements have entered a decrease phase. The process resulted in the recreation of the masses through political activities undertaken by the HDP (e.g. meetings).¹³²Certain political practices reshaped the agents according to several agents: the feeling of both weakness and powerfulness vis-a-vis the government, the disappointment followed to the hope of building a new, democratic Turkey founded on the principle of equality, and the worries due to everyday life needs. For instance, the 10 Ekim attack was one of the main events that affected leftist agents and masses in a particular way. Following the events, many were the agents who started being afraid of attending mass meetings due to the fear of being killed by ISIS. Another example of the effects of the process following the November elections is given by the increase in violence dominating the political arena. The immediate consequence of the escalation of violence has been the distantiation of the agents from political activity. Clearly, these facts explain the development of the agents' political attitudes according to a logic that prioritizes passivism and anxiety vis-a-vis the government. Although all this is undeniable as it is undeniable that some groups did not vote for HDP because of its deep involvement in the Kurdish question, the reasons for the HDP's loss of support cannot be understood in a reductive way as if they were the

¹³² After 1 November, the HDP tried to organize meetings but both the number of participants and the effect of the meetings were low. Some of the pro-AKP authors explained this fact resorting to the argument that HDP's political ineffectiveness and incapacity to organize mass meetings attests the decrease of attraction and support from the society, Kurdish population included. For instance, after the arrest of Demirtaş and Yüksedağ, low has been the response to the calls to take into the streets. Aktay explains this arguing that the masses do not like HDP. Yet, this is argument is not truthful, because it does not take into account the fact that fear prevents masses of people to join street demonstrations.

mere outcome of the organization's inabilitys. Any analysis of this sort of repulsion and dis-articulation requires the conditions limiting the actions of the HDP's leadership to be taken into account. The HDP's influence cannot be adequately understood without considering the effects of its exclusion from the official political arena, i.e. without considering the limits posed by the Turkish state to both militants and organizers of the HDP who have been imprisoned.

The HDP has not been able to propose new strategies, tactics and ideological as well as political lines to respond to the changing conditions of the masses. This is undeniable and yet neglecting the political conditions that influenced the HDP, its supporters and the population in general is like assuming that the attitudes of both the HDP and the agents are static. This perspective de-historicizes the HDP and overlooks the influence of social and political developments. In other words, the literature's shortcoming lies in the transcendentalism that it implies. Detached from the analysis of crucial empirical facts, it results in over-generalization. From the perspective criticized so far, the agents' political expressions and attitudes are assumed as the product of stable identities and positions, as if the HDP were an articulating force able to implement a stable strategy. A similar perspective of analysis can only be the outcome of abstraction. Both the HDP and the agents are abstracted from the political field where different forces act on each other and therefore change strategies and tactics. Overemphasizing the relations with organizations that are accused of being terrorist, this perspective freezes the images of the HDP and all its activities

From the literary review proposed so far, it emerges that pro-AKP authors analyze reasons, elements and conditions that constituted both the conditions of possibility and limitations of the HDP's capacity and power to attract and organize people. However, they overlook the fact that the political conditions changed as much as the political balances between the various forces changed, and they therefore do not take into account the fact that these changes influenced the HDP's strategies, its supporters and the whole population. As a result, it can be argued that this literature

fails to analyze the shaping role of the masses.¹³³ It does not analyze how the articulation processes are formed by the actual political conditions that produce the agents' affections, demands and perceptions. Even if the literature does not omit to mention the masses, it gives too much weight to the party. Even if the literature does not omit to mention the antagonism to the AKP and the alternatives to it, it analyzes this aspect only through the use of negative images. In fact, the literature approaches the habitual political position takings as if they were the product of stable positions. Therefore, it fails to analyze the product of the politics that builds the political positions. This is due to the tendency to neglect the political conditions and their products. Moreover, when the literature mentions the political conditions, it anyway fails to show how they change affections.¹³⁴

The other group of literary sources on HDP is constituted by analytical reports of the elections made by research companies (Konda, 2015a; Konda, 2015c; Çilekağacı, 2015a; Çilekağacı, 2015b). Compared to the pro-AKP authors, research companies give weight to the articulated agents and they focus more on the relation between the HDP, the population and their changing attitudes. However, they analyzed the limitations approaching people's dispositions as if they were stable, thus interpreting the correspondence between the articulating force (the HDP) and the articulated as if they would mechanically match. Although the agents' political habits and dispositions are quite important, the political field breaks habits and reorganizes them in political practices. To be crucial are in fact not only ideological and cultural tendencies, but also the feelings emerged during the various situations. For instance, the HDP is argued to have taken the support of the CHP's voters due to their discontents towards AKP's policies and to the fear of the upcoming Islamic authoritarian state. Nowadays, CHP's voters are however very critical towards the HDP and this fact confirms two crucial points: political attitudes change and political

¹³³ The constitution of a political organization and the formation political subject require both the articulated agents and the articulation force. Given this, there is a gap between the articulated and the articulation. In order to fill this gap, the analysis must look at the relationship of attraction and articulation between the articulated agents and the articulating force.

¹³⁴ The argument is not that pro-AKP authors rejected entirely the role of agents. What is claimed is that their analyses consider the agents as passive, because they never analyze their role. From the perspective they propose, the masses are there but they wait to be articulated.

organizations work within unstable and flexible conditions. Therefore, the evaluation reports freeze the processes and fail to show how new position takings emerge through politics.

On the base of these premises, it is important to remark that field studies and research companies' reports share common points. First, they include the political analysis of the AKP and the authors' scientific and theoretical analysis. Second, they take the fixed variables as conditions. For instance, the questions they posed are the following: Why did you support? What is your ideological orientation? What were your expectations? Posed in this way, the questions reveal that the social and the political are assumed as stable positions presumably framed and limited by categories such as class and religious/cultural/political affiliation. Surely, these categories constitute limits and yet it must be specified that the limits exceed them. In fact, the limits could be pushed by the political articulation.

In conclusion, the analysis of how the HDP could and could not articulate social and political subjectivities must take into account the following further elements: social and political conditions, mechanisms of the articulations, and the correspondence between the articulated and articulation. For instance, the Kobane events confirm the evidence of the failure of the HDP in organizing people through mass demonstrations, but the reason of the failure cannot be explained only adducing the argument that the HDP's close relationship with the PKK constitutes a limit of its politics. This argument is in fact not sufficient to understand how the HDP could attract people's stable interests and affections in certain cases while it could not do it in other cases. Accordingly, the other elements that require detailed analysis include the political climate of the country, the emergence of a collective consciousness based on fear, disappointment, and despair about the future of politics.

2.3. General Overview of the Literature

This chapter analyzed the theoretical and analytical limits of the literature on the Gezi events and the HDP. The reviewed literature examines the conditions of possibility and limits of the Gezi events and the HDP. It is characterized by a variety of perspectives of analysis that differ according to the variety of methods, theories

and procedures that the sources make use of. Despite being characterized by a diversity of theoretical and methodological assumptions, the various studies present some common arguments and issues. The main problematic aspect of the literature is that it focuses the analysis on political and social developments, on political and social conditions, and on their symptoms insofar as it assumes that these constitute the conditions of possibility and the limitations of the facts under examination.

With regard to the Gezi events, the literature includes positive evaluations that analyze the role of global process and their local economic, cultural and social policies by examining the results achieved by AKP and by examining how these created the conditions of possibility for the events to become a political experience. Accordingly, these studies give weight to neo-liberalism and the AKP's policies insofar as they constitute two of the changing structural socio-political reasons and developments that shaped the agents' political attitudes from the outside.

Conversely, the negative evaluations draw attention to local and global political developments that prevented the AKP from increasing its power. These analyses frame the local and global conditions producing the symptoms that led the agents to undertake political actions and practices. Yet, they do not analyze how these symptoms became part of the political actions and experiences under examination. Accordingly, the emergence of the events is reduced to the outcome of the political attitudes of the AKP's enemies. Neglecting the role of the AKP's policies in shaping the events, this approach fails to analyze the processes and the practices that attracted the agents to the Gezi political experiences.

Given these remarks, it is possible to claim that the reviewed literary sources share theoretical and analytical shortcomings. The role of the agents is overlooked, because their affections, demands and perceptions are excluded from the analysis. The literature does not delve into the processes under examination. It does not take into account the communalizing practices that link the agents in the political experience. Constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing the agents' habits and experiences, the communalizing practices shape in fact the political practices. Moreover, the analysis of the agents frames their descriptive profiles and tackles the question on how social, cultural and political positions shaped the agents' political experiences in

the Gezi events. However, the literary sources mostly focus on the stable social and political positions, thus excluding the analysis of the political dispositions that changed during the political experience.

With regard to the HDP, the literature analyzes how its experiences have been conditioned by the country's political developments, which form the practices and the political field within which the various political organizations take position according to each other's stance. Mostly assumed by pro-AKP authors, this analytical perspective relies on the conceptualization of politics as power game, problem solving and service to the population with the purpose of creating a harmonious society. Within the framework traced by these standards, the literature analyzes the HDP's political experiences by questioning whether they have been conditioned by the deviation from these standards or not. Accordingly, it interprets the HDP's political experiences as conditioned by the political field that results from the local and global political developments. For the most part, this analytical perspective fails to take into consideration the processes and the practices that lead the agents to support the HDP and to get organized around it. In fact, the literature analyzes the HDP by mainly focusing only on the strategies and the tactics that leadership and representatives formed by taking political position towards the AKP. In this way, the agents' political attitudes are considered static insofar as they are considered the expression of social and political positions that can only wait to be attracted by truthful and rational strategies proposed by the leadership. As a consequence, this perspective overlooks how political and social developments produce the agents' political attitudes. As a result, the agents' political dispositions are frozen and therefore approached as if they were passive and static.

With regard to the field studies on the agents either supporting or taking distance distant from HDP, it must pointed out that they examine the processes and practices shaping the agents' political attitudes. They provide the analysis of the agents' socio-political interests, affections and perceptions, showing how these are the outcome of several fagents: the agents' social, cultural and political identities, their political positions, and the processes happening in the country. Also, the field studies include the analysis of how the agents' socio-political interests, affections and perceptions frame their political attitudes. However, these studies analyze the agents' political

attitudes according to stable social and political categories. Therefore, they overlook the existence of two interrelationships. On one hand, they do not consider the interrelationship between stable identities and changing conditions. On the other hand, they do not consider the interrelationship between the agents' changing dispositions and the HDP's changing strategies and tactics, which have changed according to the socio-political developments and opportunities.

It is therefore evident that both the literature on the Gezi events and the literature on the HDP tackle the question on their conditions of possibility and limitations in one of the two following ways. Either it stresses the stability of social and political positions that shape the agents' political attitudes or it stresses the structural conditions, the actions of the articulating forces external to the agents, and the end-product of the political processes and practices. In conclusion, it can be argued that the literature overlooks the processes and the practices that make political experiences possible and that limit them. These processes and practices constitute the conditions of possibility and the limitations of the events precisely insofar as they allow the construction of commonalities through the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of experiences within given social and political conditions. Given the gaps and the shortcomings of the literature reviewed so far, this study is intended to give credit to the role of the agents.

CHAPTER 3

THE MULTITUDE AND HEGEMONIC SUBJECTIVITY: LIMITATIONS OF POLITICAL SUBJECTIFICATION AND ARTICULATION

Both Gezi events and HDP had similarities with the experiences and practices of other localities throughout the world, as well as shared differences, because of the conditioning elements coming from the particularities of each case due to them being local. Some of the authors coming from post-structuralist and post-modernist theories tried to give a name to these collective movements and their political subject constitutions and created the conceptual tools to analyze them. Therefore, this chapter will deal with the conceptualizations of the political experiences like Gezi and HDP by discussing and showing the limits of Hardt & Negri, and Laclau & Mouffe's theories and analyses, while putting a contribution in hopes of widening their ideas.

Before anything else, their theories are mostly framed by the postmodernist and post-structuralist thinking. The emergence of the post-structuralist and post-modernist thought¹³⁵ brought about the criticism and problematization of the modernist conceptualization of the subject and subjectivity, and produced different ideas on political ontology. These criticisms problematized the ideas on conceptualizations of the unified, self-coherent, homogeneous and autonomous subject constitution developed by different philosophical and theoretical perspectives in social and political theory. The common point of this

¹³⁵ The terms post-structuralist and post-modernist signify a wide scope of thinkers from Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida to Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard and Jean-François Lyotard. Even if they are very different from each other regarding their philosophical and theoretical sources, they have in common the criticism of modernist and structuralist thinking. For an introductory information on post-modernist and post-structuralist thought see (Best and Kellner, 1991; Sarup, 1993; Ritzer, 1997; Belsey, 2002; James, 2005).

problematization can be expressed as such that heterogeneity, difference, plurality and unconsciousness rather than unity, sameness and homogeneity is taken as the constitutive aspect of the subject.¹³⁶ Within this framework, the modernist ways of making politics, and the modes, ways and forms of the political subjects are interrogated. Also, there emerged counterparts of these discussions in the context of formation and constitution of the collective political subjects. These led to the proliferation of the discussions about new ways of doing politics, and the constitution of new political subjects and subjectivities differentiating from the modernist ones. However, it can be said that the dominant disposition of the discussions in this brand of thought did not offer to determine and define political subjects since their problems were related to the nature and constitution of the political subject in a philosophical and theoretical way. As a result, such criticisms and interrogations, on the one hand, can be regarded as a source for a nihilistic over-negation of politics. On the other hand, it can be seen as seeking new ways of constituting the political subject.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ The common target of these criticisms is the Cartesian notion of subject. From Lacan to Deleuze there is an emphasis on relationality and “externality” for the constitution of the subject and subjectivity. The argument behind this emphasis is that the constitution of the subjectivity is not the self-realization of the self with an independence from the relationality and cultural, social and biological contexts and planes. (*ibid*) For example, Lacan tries to show how language and the unconscious construct the subject in his books while Foucault analyses how power relations construct the subject. For a short information on Foucault and Lacan, see (Sarup, 1993: 5-31; Ritzer, 37-75; Best and Kellner, 1991: 34-75) Of course, such a role of the external of the self in the constitution and construction of the subject and subjectivity was there before post-structuralism and post-modernism, however, they make an emphasis on the contingent, unstable, flexible and open workings of these relationalities and contexts. (Best and Kellner, 1991; Ritzer; 1997).

¹³⁷ For a systematic analysis of the ideas on post-modernist and post-structuralist analysis see especially (Best and Kellner, 1991). In this brand of thought some of the thinkers such as Foucault and Deleuze&Guattari offer new decentralized and flexible modes and areas of doing politics. Foucault with micro-politics, and Deleuze&Guattari with minor politics concentrate upon new areas of politics from sexuality to psychoanalysis and criticize the modes of politics that aspire centralized and rigidly structured forms of doing politics and developed a new conceptualization of the political subject and subjectivity with a post-modernist and post-structuralist critic. For Foucault see (Best and Kellner, 1991: 34-75) and the term for minor and minority and its relation to politics; and for the political ideas of Deleuze&Guttari see, (Deleuze &Guattari, 1980; 232-339; Buchanan and Thoburn, 2008). Adding to this, Derrida and Immanuel Levinas searched for new modes of doing politics. As Simon Critchley argues; Derrida and Levinas are much related to the politics and their ideas give a possibility to conceptualize new modes of doing politics and forms of political subjectivity (Critchley, 2014). On the other hand, some of the thinkers such as Baudrillard, were very critical to politics even if it were post-modernist and post-structuralist, and argued that formation of a political subject is caused by the changing historical conditions of life brought about by post-modernism, such as flexibility and liquidity of the social relations that annihilate the formation of any productive and constitutive act. For Baudrillard's ideas especially see, (Baudrillard, 1982).

Related to these discussions, in recent years, some of the thinkers such as Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe, who were influenced by the different traditions of post-structuralist and post-modernist thought, developed new concepts of political subjects as a part of radical and leftist emancipatory politics, and as categories of analysis for social and political sciences rather than rejecting the idea of the impossibility of politics and the constitution of the political subject. In this sense, the multitude is developed by Hardt&Negri, and the hegemonic subjectivity is offered by Laclau&Mouffe (Hardt & Negri, 2004; Laclau&Mouffe, 2001). These concepts differentiate from the modernist ones regarding the context of the modes, ways, functioning and forms of doing politics, political organization and constitution of the political subject. Adding to this, these concepts also assume to be alternatives to right-wing political subjects, and to some extent have the capacity and potential to force the boundaries of the social subjects of the existing orders. Difference, plurality, flexibility and instability, as the constitutive forces of collective political subjects, characterize the differences from the social subjects of the existing orders and the traditional emancipatory politics' subjects. So, they imply the new forms and the contemporary practices and experiences of resistance, social movements and efforts to construct new social and political relationships.

Adding to these conceptual and theoretical discussions, these writers also draw attention to the changing forms of collective political practices and political subject constitution which are conditioned by the historical economic, social and cultural changes. By this way, these writers analyze the workings of the contemporary collective politics and political subjectivities. Therefore, these discussions are useful in explaining how contemporary modes of politics and practices of political subject constitutions in Gezi and HDP framed their practices by attracting and articulating agents. Because HDP and Gezi practices have similarities with the characteristics of the forms and modes of doing politics that are offered around these concepts, these frames partly determine the formal and ontological limits, and also the possibilities of doing politics in such experiences. On the other hand, these concepts were also used to analyze the contemporary mass politics in other parts of the world.

3.1. Multitude and Bio-Politics:

Hardt&Negri's thinking on the contemporary collective mass politics revolves around the experiences and practices of the multitude, and designates the contemporary forms of social subjectivity and political collective subject.¹³⁸ They considered the multitude as the common social and political form of different subjectivities in the world which have the potential for being the collective political subject to give an end to the existing domination of systems of power, and to construct a new social order framed by direct democracy and communal sharing of goods.¹³⁹ Based on the social experiences conditioned by the contemporary forms of power, namely bio-power, multitude as a collective political subject has a capacity, on the one hand, for deconstructing the social, political, cultural and ecological acts, mechanisms and experiences of contemporary sovereignty in different localities of the globe. On the other hand, for reconstructing the society constituting the common along the lines of the democracy for all and commonwealth through horizontal organizations.¹⁴⁰ So, multitude has two sides: one is the resistance of the different

¹³⁸ As it will be explained below, they argue that the new social conditions and their types of social subjectivities produced by capitalism frame the forms and modes, and creates the schemes of political actions and practices of the multitude.

¹³⁹ Therefore, like the proletariat, the multitude is considered as the subject of the constitution of communism. However, there were a lot of differences between the proletariat and classical communism, and also between the multitude and their communism. (Negri&Hardt: 2004)

¹⁴⁰ The capacity or the possibility of the multitude to construct a new world is related to the new forms of life brought about by the Empire that is the contemporary mechanisms of power in the globe. Because it "creates a greater potential for revolution than it did in the modern regimes of power because it presents us alongside the machine of command with an alternative: the set of all the exploited and the subjugated, a multitude that is directly opposed to the Empire, with no mediation between them." (Hardt&Negri, 2001: 393). Therefore "The possibility of democracy on a global scale is emerging today for the very first time... The project of the multitude not only expresses the desire for a world of equality and freedom, not only demands an open and inclusive democratic global society, but also provides the means of achieving it." (Hardt&Negri, 2004: xi). For them, multitude has such a possibility to organize life in new forms, and therefore it is the only subject having this possibility in the case of the construction of a true democracy or democracy for all: "The multitude is the only social subject capable of realizing democracy, that is, the rule of everyone by everyone." (ibid: 100) Given these multitude exists on the same world next to the productions and acts of Empire, but it changes it with its acts: "When the multitude works, it produces autonomously and reproduces the entire world of life. Producing and reproducing autonomously mean constructing a new ontological reality. In effect, by working, the multitude produces itself as singularity. It is a singularity that establishes a new place in the non-place of Empire, a singularity that is a reality produced by cooperation, represented by the linguistic community, and developed by the movements of hybridization." (Hardt&Negri, 2001: 395). A close reading of above ideas give the sense that the multitude as a political subject finds a place for its expression with the emergence of Empire, because

singularities coming together against the existing order, and the other is their constitutive experiences and practices through the production of horizontally organized new social relationships. Both resistance and social struggles and the project of constructing the commonality between different singularities is to be organized through linking the differences by not homogenizing and totalizing them into the hierarchical structures, and not producing any privileged position for any one singularity; but rather, constructing a commonality of multiplicity, heterogeneity and diversity through rhizomatic links and articulations.¹⁴¹

The multitude is both an empirical concept that designates the contemporary figures and forms of the social subjectivities and their potential to change the existing orders with an abstract concept of a collective political subject, differing from

it creates decentered, flexible and horizontal life practices, experiences and forms. On the other hand, the multitude can be seen as having an immanent power to constitute a new life as a political subject and it somehow spontaneously emerges from the existing forms of life as a political subject. In other words, the planes of life created by the Empire spontaneously lead to the organization of the multitude. This very immanence that the Empire gives a possibility to the multitude becoming spontaneously a radical political subject is criticized. This criticism, will be mentioned below, by the thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau, Simon Critchley and Jacques Ranciere that the contemporary social developments and the characteristics given by the Empire to the multitude doesn't automatically lead to the emergence of a multitude as a political subject. The problem for them is how to organize the political subjectivity from the multiple, decentralized and instable singularities through their articulation and linking around the construction of their commonality. The commonality is to be produced through the articulations, and thus, it must be organized politically (Critchley, 2008; Laclau, 2001: 3-10; Ranciere, 2010: 84-90). Later, Hardt&Negri confronts this problem and argue that they do not offer a spontaneous organization of multitude to become a political subject of radical politics, and emphasized it must be organized. This question is as such: "How can the actions of the multitude become political? How can the multitude organize and concentrate its energies against repression and incessant territorial segmentations of Empire?" Especially in their electronic pamphlet about the recent uprisings, they try to respond these criticisms and try to give ideas on how to organize the multitude. The section entitled "Constituting the Common" is useful to understand their perspective for linking the multiplicities into a political subjectivity (Hardt&Negri, 2012).

¹⁴¹ The multitude and its characteristics can be found in their books. Also, for the ideas on how the multitude can organize and constitute the common as commonwealth, democracy of all and life in horizontal forms is explained by them in many texts. Especially see (Hardt&Negri, 2001; 2004; 2009). The concept rhizomatic used here comes from Deleuze&Guattari's rhizome. For the rhizome, see (Deleuze&Guattari, 1987: 3-25).The concept signifies linguistic, semiotic, social, biological etc. assemblages or organizations that aren't hierarchical, homogenous and closed, but horizontal, multiple and open. They compare it with the tree or root which is somehow stable. "...any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order." (ibid: 7) In that sense, "There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root." (ibid: 8) In this sense, Alexandros Kioupkiolis uses the concept "rhizomatic articulation" for multitude, meaning that multitude connects the singularities in a rhizomatic way. "In effect, Hardt and Negri propose the deleuzian 'rhizome' of the networked multitude as an alternative to both the hegemonic sovereignty of modern politics and the post-modern anarchy of dispersed differences." (Kioupkiolis, 2014: 152).

constituting the collective political subject as identity and unity. Speaking theoretically, the multitude is a concept signifying the multiplicity of differences against the subject constitutions as transforming the multiplicity into unity and identity of one. So, on the one hand, there is multitude as being the expression of many and having the characteristics such as heterogeneity and comprising of multiple differences of the singularities; with, on the other hand, the political and social operations and workings of the sovereignty and other political subject constitution forms to make it a unity. Empirically and historically speaking, the multitude is the forms of the contemporary social subjectivities whose characteristics are multiplicity and heterogeneity.

Here, Gezi isn't taken as the example of the experience of the multitude, but the rhizomatic organizations linking the people to each other explains how Gezi worked. This form of the organization is a connective synthesis of the singularities into the common like the park forums, as well as the discursive practices. However, on the other hand, there are empty signifiers such as democracy and freedom, whose meanings differentiate according to each agent. Therefore, there was the populistic character, but it was different from the populism developed by Laclau according to which a representative organization articulates the agents. There were empty signifiers developed by different agents and were used by different groups. There were the clashes of the empty signifiers and different articulating forces. In that sense, none of the forces could construct hegemony.

On this ground, the multitude is a historical concept of the subject and is the producer of the contemporary forms and planes of the production of life in the globe with the advent of post-modernity and peculiarity of the Empire. The Empire, as a new form of sovereignty, tries to order life with the new paradigms of the biopower that changed the modern mechanisms of the human and non-human life.¹⁴² Empire's characteristics such as heterogeneity, flexibility and instability in its productions are evident when it is compared to the modern mechanisms of the power:

¹⁴² For the detailed information on how empire as a contemporary biopower works, their book *Empire* is useful (Hardt&Negri, 2001).

Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a *decentered* and *deteritorializing* apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. (Hardt&Negri, 2001: xii)

Like Empire's productions, because the contemporary social forms of it are produced by Empire, multitude is decentered, instable and heterogeneous. So, multitude consists of the different singularities in all the areas of life in different localities throughout the globe brought about by the changing social forms of the production of life:

The multitude is composed of innumerable internal differences that can never be reduced to a unity or a single identity-different cultures, races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations; different forms of labor; different ways of living; different views of the world; and different desires. The multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences. (Hardt&Negri, 2004: xiv)

However, the singularities constituting it can produce the life in common despite of its complexity and multiplicity: "The multitude, although it remains multiple and internally different, is able to act in common and thus rule itself." (ibid: 100) Therefore, it "too might thus be conceived as a network: an open and expansive network in which all differences can be expressed freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so that we can work and live in common." (ibid: xiii).¹⁴³

As it is seen, the Empire, a form of sovereign power in contemporary times, and the multitude are different subjects within the same spaces of the globe. As Empire is

¹⁴³ The Internet is taken as a model to show how the multitude works: "A distributed network such as Internet is a good initial image or model for the multitude, because, first, the various nodes remain different but are all connected in the Web, and, second, the external boundaries of the network are open such that new nodes and new relationships can always be added." (Hardt and Negri, 2004, xv).

disposed to control life through its contemporary forms and mechanism of the bio-political paradigm, the multitude has a disposition to produce life being in common. In that sense, contemporary sovereignty tries to make from the innumerable differences of the multitude an identical and unified subject through different power mechanisms of control.¹⁴⁴ However, even if the multitude is also the producer of the social figures of unity and identity within the Empire, it has a tendency to flee from these figures and construct an alternative social and political subject:¹⁴⁵

The kinds of movement of individuals, groups, and populations that we find today in Empire, however, cannot be completely subjugated to the laws of capitalist accumulation – at every moment they overflow and shatter the bounds of measure. The movements of the multitude designate new spaces, and its journeys establish new residences. (Hardt&Negri, 2001: 397)

Hardt&Negri tries to show this tendency analyzing both the forms of production of life in the Empire and the contemporary cases of collective resistances and practices. In their analysis, the contemporary social struggles and resistances – such as mass demonstrations and resistance by anti-globalization movements, the uprisings of Arab Spring, %99 movement of USA and the Indignados of Spain – and certain experiences of alternative life styles and organizations as developed by the Zapatistas,¹⁴⁶ are considered as the contemporary forms of resistance and social struggles, and as alternative ways of the constitution of the political and social experiences and practices. What it can be seen in these cases is that the multitude constitutes a flexible, democratic and heterogeneous form of political and social subjectivities.

¹⁴⁴ About this contradiction immanent to contemporary conditions of life and the antagonism between contemporary sovereignty and the multitude see, (Hardt&Negri, 2001; 2004; 2009).

¹⁴⁵ The contradictory relationship between sovereignty and multitude or between biopower and biopolitics can be seen in their works. Some of the parts in their books clarify the different productions and workings of biopower and biopolitics(Negri&Hardt, 2001: 22-66, 351-413; Hardt&Negri, 2004: 36-95).

¹⁴⁶ See, (Hardt&Negri, 2001; 2004; 2009; 2012).

In this sense, from the anti-globalization movements to the recent uprisings in different localities of the globe, there is a disposition of being together despite the differences of race, class and sexuality, i.e., the multiplicity of singular differences of the agents and social subjects. As they argued in their books, *Multitude*, *Empire*, *Commonwealth* and *Declaration*, the multitude as a political project constitutes a political plane, and its practices and experiences of political organization are horizontal and directly democratic. Therefore, these experiences of the multitude differ from the productions of sovereignty which include the unifying and identifying forms and mechanisms of power such as representative democracy, despotism, dictatorship and expropriation of the common productions of the multitude in different areas of life such as economics, culture etc. In a sense, as the contemporary forms of sovereignty has a disposition to make up multitude identity and unity through power mechanisms. The multitude, as a political subject, is against this transformation of heterogeneity, plurality and difference of the singularities into the social, political, economic and cultural planes of homogeneity by making them same through unity and identity.

Adding to its contemporary empirical contents, as it is mentioned above, sovereignty in all historical times tries to produce identity and unity from the multiplicity of differences. In that sense, the multitude emerges in the determinate historical and social contexts of contemporary life. Sovereignty, in all times, has had a relationship with the multitude, and in different times exerted its power on it to turn it into a unified identity through its mechanisms. Therefore, there is an abstract dimension to the concept of multitude in a sense that the multitude always has the characteristic of being comprised of innumerable different singularities along with their disposition to act together against the sovereignty that exerts its power mechanisms to homogenize and unify them. In other words, the multitude as an excessive force is the heterogeneous producer and constitutive of life that stands against the operations of sovereignty to turn it into a unity (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 328-357).

These mechanisms of constituting the homogenized and unified social and political body from the multiplicity of the multitude are not only pertaining to the sovereignty, but also to the other social and political subject constitution projects

such as the radical and leftist ones function as to produce a single identity and unity from the multitude. These criticisms aim at not only the traditionalist and classical Marxist theoretical frameworks, but also at some of the post-Marxist thinkers such as Laclau&Mouffe. Even if the latter agrees with them to approve the heterogeneity of the contemporary social life, Laclau&Mouffe's hegemonic subjectivity of the people is nothing other than the transformation of the multitude into a totality and unity: "Hegemony represents the plurality of singularities as a unity and thus transforms the multitude into a people, which because of its unity is deemed capable of political."(Hardt&Negri, 2009: 167).¹⁴⁷ As for classical Marxism, they criticize their reduction of politics to class politics, which also can be seen as making the multiplicity as part of a unity and totality and reducing the class relations and production into economical ones.¹⁴⁸ As they have argued in many places, the biopower influences and produces exploitation and oppression in different areas such as gender, class, ecology etc. "Production today has to be conceived not merely in economic terms but more generally as social production- not only the production of communications, relationships, and forms of life."(Hardt&Negri, 2004: xv). Therefore,

...the multitude is composed of innumerable internal differences that can never be reduced to a unity or a single identity-different cultures, races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations; different forms of labor; different ways of living; different views of the world; and different desires. The multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences.(ibid: xiv)

However, as it is said above, although the multitude is composed of the multiplicity of differences, it can act together and this acting together does not require making it

¹⁴⁷ In that sense, the constitution of the people does nothing other than as sovereignty's operation making up the multitude as unity and totality (Hardt&Negri, 2009: 166-167).

¹⁴⁸ With their concept bio politics and immaterial labor, they argue that the production in question is not only the production of economical goods, but the production of feelings, ideas and all of the things in life. Also, not only does biopower work on economical areas, but on the entirety of life itself. In that sense, labor is not only about production in economical areas but all of life. For the criticism how they differentiate their conceptions of labor with the concepts biopolitics and immaterial labor see especially, (Hardt&Negri, 2001: 22-41).

a homogenous unity and identity. In sum, the multitude is the subject of a political project as to constitute the common, that is, the production of the direct and horizontal forms of life, social and political organization of democracy and sharing the productions in all areas of the life in common (Hardt&Negri, 2009). It can be seen, multitude as a form and logic of a constitution of collective political subject tries to maintain the plurality and heterogeneity in contemporary political practices and experiences. The problem for the project of the multitude is the linking of these innumerable differences to constitute a political subject, a will of the constitutive of the common.¹⁴⁹ Because even if the subjectivities in the multitude have a disposition to act together, given by the contemporary forms of production of life, it has to be organized as a constitutive force. Therefore, the multitude as collective political subject expresses the articulating procedures and ways of the different singularities to construct the common which differs from the transformation of its multiplicity and heterogeneity into the identity and unity of the same and one as the disposition of the sovereignty, and of the other leftist and radical emancipatory politics. So, one of the problems of Hardt&Negri is the way to constitute the multitude as political subject through the articulation and the linking of the singular differences and constitution of the commonality of the multiplicity around the common in all areas of life.

As it is seen, the emergence of multitude as a common collective political subject bringing together all the different subjectivities around is the product of the contemporary forms of the power. In that sense, the political practices of nowadays such as the collective mass movements were the symptoms of empire. Therefore, they were conditioned by the emergence of the multitude as a radical political subject and its experiences.

¹⁴⁹ As it was mentioned above, after the criticisms, Hardt&Negri made an emphasis on how to organize the multitude as a political subject through the rhizomatic forms of articulation and linkings. See especially, (Hardt&Negri: 2012).

3.2. Radical Democracy and Populism: Constitution of the Hegemonic Subjectivity

In parallel with Hardt&Negri, Laclau&Mouffe together and separately deals with how to articulate the heterogeneous and plural social and political subjectivities and actors into the political subject constitution. That is, to construct the commonality of the singularities by not transforming them into the totalized and closed homogenous unities. In *Hegemony and Strategy*, co-written with Mouffe, Laclau tries to develop the logic and procedures of this articulation. The concept of hegemony has a crucial place for this task: “Our approach is grounded in privileging the moment of *political* articulation, and the central category of political analysis is, in our view, *hegemony*.¹⁵⁰” (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001: x).

Hegemony is a unifying mechanism of politics that brings together the heterogeneous demands and identities and different singularities that emerged within a given actuality.¹⁵⁰ Hegemony is considered as one of the mechanisms and forms of making politics and the constitution of political subject. However, its constructions and constitutions differ according to its expressions.¹⁵¹ Laclau&Mouffe tried to develop a concept of hegemony as part of emancipatory politics, which is nothing other than radical democracy.¹⁵² Radical democracy, as a project, aims to start a democratic revolution and to constitute its political subject, which differs from classical Marxism and the right-wing liberal politics because of its emphasis on maintaining the heterogeneity, plurality, and internal splits between the singularities and in society (Laclau&Mouffe: 2001).

The latter ways try to construct a political subject as to fill the task of constructing a society to satisfy the different demands emerging within a given actuality, and institutionalizing the differences into stable identities. This is nothing other than

¹⁵⁰ Detailed information on how hegemony works to constitute a political subject can be found in the books *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* and *The Populist Reason* (Laclau& Mouffe, 2001; Laclau, 2005).

¹⁵¹ Hegemony can take the forms of left and right.

¹⁵² To see how their conceptualization of hegemony differentiates from the other ones (Laclau& Mouffe, 2001: 7-92).

constructing the social around homogenizing procedures that transform the internal splits and differences of the multiple demands and subjectivities into a closed unity. However, such placement of the differences on a plane called as society, locating the individuals through stable identities is ontologically impossible.¹⁵³ That is because constructing a society by placing the differences into stable and fixed identities and existences can never succeed in constructing a harmonious society. In other words, the society is a failed totality, and there can never be a successfully closed totality to give an end to the antagonisms, internal splits and differences of the singularities in a society¹⁵⁴ (*ibid*, 93-148). On the other hand, it is also actually an impossible task to

¹⁵³ So, hegemony and its political project, as Laclau&Mouffe understands, do not work to saturate the demands. If there is the saturation of demands, there can be no politics. And thus, the articulation through hegemony does not construct a closed society. "The general field of the emergence of hegemony is that of articulatory practices, that is, a field where the 'elements' have not crystallized into 'moments'. In a closed system of relational identities, in which the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed, there is no place whatsoever for a hegemonic practice. A fully successful system of differences, which excluded any floating signifier, would not make possible any articulation; the principle of repetition would dominate every practice within this system and there would be nothing to hegemonize. It is because hegemony supposes the incomplete and open character of the social, that it can take place only in a field dominated by articulatory practices." (Laclau&Mouffe,2001: 134) So, what he understands from hegemony is: "There is the possibility that one difference, without ceasing to be a particular difference, assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality. In that way, its body is split between the particularity which is still is and the more universal signification of which it is the bearer. This operation of taking up, by a particularity, of an incommensurable universal signification is what I have called hegemony." (Laclau, 2005: 70).

¹⁵⁴ The conception of the society as a totality meaning that it is a closed structure and system is the very target of Laclau's criticisms. Such a conception of society is ontologically impossible and the following quotation explains Laclau's theoretical perspective: "...we must begin by renouncing the conception of 'society' as founding totality of its partial processes. We must, therefore, consider the openness of the social as the constitutive ground or 'negative essence' of the existing and the diverse 'social orders' as precarious and ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of differences. Accordingly, the multiformity of the social cannot be apprehended through a system of mediations, nor the 'social order' understood as an underlying principle. There is no sutured space peculiar to 'society', since the social itself has no essence. Three remarks are important here. First, the two conceptions imply different logics of the social: in the case of 'mediations', we are dealing with a system of logical transitions in which relations between objects are conceived as following a relation between concepts; in the second sense, we are dealing with contingent relations whose nature we have to determine. Secondly, in criticizing the conception of society as an ensemble united by necessary laws, we cannot simply bring out the non-necessary character of the relations among elements, for we would then retain the necessary character of the identity of the elements themselves. A conception which denies any essentialist approach to social relations, must also state the precarious character of every identity and the impossibility of fixing the sense of the 'elements' in any ultimate literality. Thirdly, it is only in contrast to a discourse postulating their unity; that an ensemble of elements appears as fragmented or dispersed. Outside any discursive structure, it is obviously not possible to speak of fragmentation, nor even to specify elements. Yet, a discursive structure is not a merely 'cognitive' or 'contemplative' entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations." (*ibid*, 95-96). Rather, Laclau maintains a relational character of society and according to this perspective it is impossible to assert a conception of society that is stable and therefore it cannot be intelligible: "But if we maintain the relational character of any social identity and if, at the same time, we renounce the fixation of those identities in a system, then the social must be identified with

form a society through the production of fixed identities as part of a closed system, because, with the advent of modernity and capitalism, it is seen as the multiplication of social actors due to the dislocating effects that create a social that is not static and closed:

...there not simple class contradictions, constituted at the level of the relations of production and represented then at other levels, but instead a plurality of antagonisms, not all of them reducible class contradictions, which establish between them relations of inter-determination. This was clear in the direction of what we were seeking: on the one hand, a variety of antagonisms constituted political subjectivities, which escaped a direct class determination... (Laclau, 2014: 5).

In a way, with the advent of modernity and capitalism, there emerged more plurality and heterogeneity. With such a development, the antagonisms in the social multiplied (Laclau, 1990: 41-60). Therefore, the hegemony must deal with the articulation of this multiplicity, and Laclau supports it for a political logic of how to articulate these into a commonality.

In that sense, the ways of doing politics, aspiring to solve the antagonisms and internal splits between differences through a construction of a political subject tries to realize the satisfaction of the demands and needs that emerged within the given actual conditions such as classical Marxism and liberalism.¹⁵⁵ This way of doing politics tries to construct a new society through a constitution of a political subject.

the infinite play of differences..." (Laclau, 1990: 90).

¹⁵⁵ For the criticism of such ideas in Marxism see especially Laclau's book, *New Reflections On the Revolution of Our Time*. (Laclau, 1990:3-89) Here is a long quotation on the criticism of the projects to construct a society exempted from power relations and antagonisms by Laclau, when he writes about some emancipation projects to construct a free society: "...a free society is one from which power has been totally eliminated. But as we saw, if power is the prerequisite of any identity, the radical disappearance of power would amount to the disintegration of the social fabric. As we shall see later, it is this profound contradiction which underlies any project of global emancipation. By global emancipation we do not mean specific or even a broad and articulated set of emancipations, but the notion of an emancipation aimed at transforming the very 'root' of the social. A harmonious society is impossible because power is the condition for society to be possible (and, at the same time, impossible, for the reasons adduced earlier). Even in the most radical and democratic projects, social transformation thus means building a new power, not radically eliminating it. Destroying the hierarchies on which sexual or racial discrimination is based will, at some point, always require the construction of other exclusions for collective identities to be able to emerge." (ibid: 33) Also see his book, *Emancipation(s)* (Laclau, 2007). For the criticism of liberalism see, (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001:xv-xii and pp. 171-176.).

In this way, the constitution of the political subject is seen as the constructor of universality and commonality that is to homogenize the differences around the assimilation of the differences, heterogeneity and plurality by transforming the particularities and singularities into a unified universal homogenous subject. As it is mentioned above, these projects try to solve the internal divisions and antagonisms in a given actuality, constructing a new society as the expression of saturating the demands in a totalized unity, in which the differences are fixed. However, the hegemony, as Laclau&Mouffe support it, has a different working since it does not work to produce a full harmony of the social: "Without equivalence and without frontiers, it is impossible to speak strictly of hegemony." (Laclau&Mouffe, 2001: 136).¹⁵⁶

As it is seen, there are ways of doing politics and constitution of a political subject aiming at the satisfaction and saturation of the demands of the singularities in the existing order and direct them to the construction of a new society. In these, the differences are located in stable social subjectivities and identities to end internal divisions and antagonisms. However, a radical democratic project is a way of making politics that does not transform the plurality and the difference into parts of closed totalities through a construction of a society. As it is said above, politics are differentiated from the construction of the society as a closed totality which is an impossible project because of the ontological thesis that states that there can never be a social and political life to put an end to internal divisions and antagonisms. This is the end of politics and the collapse of the constitution of the projects of political subjects. However, the problem of politics as an articulating procedure of differences and singularities is not transforming them into the part of closed totalities. For Laclau&Mouffe, politics is to articulate different subjectivities and demands that emerge within a given actuality around a commonality that transcends the particular demands, expressed by the multiple of individuals, and it is an

¹⁵⁶ The hegemony doesn't articulate the differences into the society as giving the differences in stable identities: "The reason is that in order to speak of hegemony, the articulatory moment is not sufficient. It is also necessary that the articulation should take place through a confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices - in other words , that hegemony should emerge in a field crisscrossed by antagonisms and therefore suppose phenomena of equivalence and frontier effects" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 135-136).

impossible desire that will never be realized by satisfying needs and demands. According to this framework, empty signifiers, crucial means for politics function to articulate the differences in a totalizing process of the multiplicities.¹⁵⁷

Therefore, the hegemony for Laclau&Mouffe operates to construct a collective political subject that is heterogeneous, unstable and plural but constituted as a commonality around the empty signifiers. Hegemony through the empty signifiers produces discursive formations that articulate particular demands into a commonality. In these discursive formations, one particular demand operates as a nodal point and condenses all of other demands through becoming the universal name of all of the demands.¹⁵⁸ It is so: "...in a hegemonic relation, one particular difference assumes the representation of a totality that exceeds it."¹⁵⁹ (Laclau, 2005: 72). Namely, in this constitution a particularity becomes the universal name of all of the articulated particularities, as long as all of the demands are emptied from their actual connotations to form a unification and totalization around a common demand. In semiological terms, the signifier does not refer to the signified; however it designates a different content from the actual meaning of this demand. As Laclau&Mouffe points out, this role of a particularity to become the universal signifier of the totality of the particularities in the hegemonic articulation or relation is very evident:

¹⁵⁷ In many of their studies, Laclau&Mouffe together and separately develop a political ontology according to which politics is not the epiphenomena of the social. Rather, it is somehow an independent area and has its logic. In other words, politics is not mechanically the effect of the social developments. It is not a superstructure formed by the substructure or economic relations. Therefore, the social developments will not automatically lead to a formation and constitution of a revolutionary and emancipatory subject. Even if some demands emerge within the social, these demands cannot lead to the formation of the political subject. The hegemony emerges here and it operates to constitute as the logic of politics constitute a political subject. Within this framework Laclau makes a distinction between politics and policy inspiring by Ranciere. The former is directed to a different area than the latter which is about to saturate demands and construct stable identities in a society. Since politics lead to the constitution of the political subject, the latter operates to construct a society. This is also why Laclau argues the independency of politics with a different logic, nothing other than to articulate the demands to form political subjects.

¹⁵⁸ This is evident, when Laclau writes on the constitution of popular identities: "Two aspects of the constitution of popular identities are important for us. First, the demand which the popular identity crystallizes is internally split: on the one hand, it remains a particular demand; on the other, its own particularity comes to signify something quite different from itself: the total chain of equivalential demands. While it remains a particular demand, it also becomes the signifier of a wider universality." (Laclau, 2005: 95).

¹⁵⁹ ibid, 72.

What, in that case, is the specific universality inherent in hegemony? It results, we argue in the text, from the specific dialectic between what we call logics of difference and logics of equivalence. Social actors occupy differential positions within the discourses that constitute the social fabric. In that sense they are all, strictly speaking, particularities. On the other hand, there are social antagonisms creating internal frontiers within society. Vis-a-vis oppressive forces, for instance, a set of particularities establish relations of equivalence between themselves. It becomes necessary, however, to represent the totality of the chain, beyond the mere differential particularisms of the equivalential links. What are the means of representation? As we argue, only one particularity whose body is split, for without ceasing to be its own particularity, it transforms its body in the representation of a universality transcending it (that of the equivalential chain). This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call a *hegemonic relation*. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2000: xiv)

When it is thought with the impossibility of constructing a harmonious society and the ontology of politics, the hegemony is not to saturate the needs and demands. However, as it is seen, the hegemony must construct an equivalential link that articulates different demands around an empty signifier arriving from the multiple demands expressed and existed in a concrete actuality.¹⁶⁰ It isn't to satisfy these

¹⁶⁰ There is a difference between equivalential and differential link or chain: "So we have two ways of constructing the social: either through the assertion of a particularity - in our case, a particularity of demands - whose only links to other particularities are of a differential nature (as we have seen: no positive terms, only differences); or through a partial surrender of particularity, stressing what all particularities have, equivalently in common. The second mode of construction of the social involves, as we know, the drawing of an antagonistic frontier; the first does not. I have called the first mode of constructing the social *logic of difference*, and the second, *logic of equivalence*." (ibid: 77-78). The latter operates to institutionalize the demands constructing the different identities in the social. In this sense, in such an articulation and linking, the hegemony is disposed to the construction of the harmony and this can give rise to the end of politics. However, in equivalential link the demand articulated in a chain that is discursively constructed around an empty signifier. This provides the totalization and unification of the particular demands through a process of the construction. In the constitution of political subject equivalential logic and its link is "the expansion of the equivalential logic at the expense of the differential one." (ibid: 78). This is what hegemonic articulation does with empty signifiers. Laclau writes about the construction of popular identity: "...the empty the unification of a plurality of demands in an equivalential chain; the constitution of an internal frontier dividing society into two camps; the consolidation of the equivalential chain through the construction of a popular identity which is something qualitatively more than the simple summation of the equivalential links." (ibid: 77). The relationship between empty signifiers and equivalential link for the constitution of the political subject can be seen in the case of the constitution of people as a political subject: "Secondly, our argument has to dovetail, at this point, with what I said above about

multiple demands by locating them into stable places and identities which is the expression of a totality and unity of the homogeneity. It empties the actual contents and connotations of these demands and links them in an equivalential link while maintaining heterogeneity and plurality. In other words, the hegemony assumes the role of interplay between a differential link and equivalential link articulating the multiplicity of the demands through an operation that transforms these demands into a part of equivalential link emptying their actual content and connotations. Therefore, hegemony assumes the role that it acts as if it will realize, and satisfy the needs and demands. However, it links them around the empty signifiers which produce the unification and totalization processes of politics to constitute a political subject from the multiplicity of the singularities:

So we have here the formation of an internal frontier, a dichotomization of the local political spectrum through the emergence of an equivalential chain of unsatisfied demands. The *requests* are turning into *claims*. We will call a demand which, satisfied or not, remains isolated a *democratic demand}*." A plurality of demands which, through their equivalential articulation, constitute a broader social subjectivity we will call *popular demands* — they start, at a very incipient level, to constitute the 'people' as a potential historical actor. (Laclau, 2005: 74)

It is these functions of hegemony, the unification and totalization of the different singularities and demands, that constructs a commonality. This is the ground of the constitution of the political subject as the part of radical politics. On this ground political subject constitution requires to construct an antagonism that unifies and homogenizes the different demands into a commonality through hegemonic articulation.

the production of 'empty signifiers'. As we know, any popular identity needs to be condensed around some signifiers (words, images) which refer to the equivalential chain as a totality. The more extended the chain, the less these signifiers will be attached to their original particularistic demands. That is to say, the function of representing the relative 'universality' of the chain will prevail over that of expressing the particular claim which is the material bearer of that function. In other words: popular identity becomes increasingly full from an *extensional* point of view, for it represents an ever-larger chain of demands; but it becomes *intensionally* poorer, for it has to dispossess itself of particularistic contents in order to embrace social demands which are quite heterogeneous. That is: a popular identity functions as a tendentially empty signifier." (ibid: 95-96).

This political subject is named by Laclau and Mouffe as hegemonic subjectivity, and later in *On Populist reason as the people* by Laclau. Based on the above mentioned ideas, the constitution of the people requires a hegemonic function according to which the multiplicity of particular demands is linked or articulated around the nodal points constructing an equivalential link.¹⁶¹ This constitution will unify and totalize the multiple demands around an antagonism to the assumed, outside of this unification and totalization.

It can be said that the constitution of people has a capacity and potential to construct a social and political plane where the plurality and heterogeneity of the multiplicity is maintained through the continuous antagonism and internal divisions rather than constructing the homogenous society. This is a continuous play of the politics differentiating from the social projects and utopias of a harmonious society. Constructing such politics requires a political subject that maintains the internal divisions, heterogeneity and plurality despite of totalizing and unification processes of hegemonic articulation. Actually, the hegemonic radical politics are projected by Laclau against the totalitarian forms of emancipatory politics and liberal democracy. Adding to this, this project and its constitution of political subject is designed to form a political subject unifying the demands or the lack that was never can be satisfied by the existing orders and future orders to construct a harmonious society. As a result, Laclau's people are situated against the homogenized subjects of existing orders.

3.3. The Multitude versus Populism:¹⁶² The Theoretical Limits and Possibilities

Around the experiences and constitution of the multitude and the people and

¹⁶¹ It is very evident when he writes: "Two aspects of the constitution of popular identities are important for us. First, the demand which the popular identity crystallizes is internally split: on the one hand, it remains a particular demand; on the other, its own particularity comes to signify something quite different from itself: the total chain of equivalential demands. While it remains a particular demand, it also becomes the signifier of a wider universality." (Laclau, 2005: 95).

¹⁶² This title was inspired from the book on contemporary collective movements titled, *Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of Multitude against People*. (Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis, 2014).

hegemonic subjectivity, both Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe deal with the nature and ontology of politics, relating theoretical discussions to the ways, mechanisms and workings of contemporary politics from leftist mass movements and organizations, as well as right-wing politics and to the workings of mechanisms of power and sovereignty. Therefore, their analysis includes the contemporary mass politics and organizations and their limitations and possibilities, and includes the strategies and tactics to widen the potentialities to produce a revolutionary political subject.

Their main problematic was the production of the radical collective political subjectivity from the multiplicity of the agents and social and political singularities side-by-side with other political subject constitutions and modes of politics doing of the existing rightist forces. In other words, contemporary politics work on the multiplicity and heterogeneity whether it is rightist or leftist politics, which have different aims and different modes of doing politics.

These ideas were formed and arrived from the idea, common point for all of these authors, that post-modernity brought the multiplication of social actors and singularities. In relation to these developments, the problem of the constitution of political subject is to construct the ways and procedures as to articulate and link the multiplicity of the singularities constructing the commonality between them. This articulation procedures and ways of the constitution of collective radical leftist political subjects are assumed as maintaining the heterogeneity and plurality rather than transforming them to the agents and subjectivities of the homogenous units of existing and new social and political orders.

On the other hand, the constitution of the multitude and the people are different from each other. This is related to the diverse ideas and perspectives on political and social ontology as developed by each thinker. This differentiation includes the modes and ways of doing politics in the case of representation and democracy, antagonism and resistance, and the ways to construct a new society. Therefore, each thinker poses the limits of their concepts by drawing the boundaries in the practices and experiences of doing politics with the different characteristics, ways and procedures. In that sense, these political subject constitutions differ among them and

from other political and social subjects theoretically.¹⁶³ Therefore, the experiences of the multitude are assumed as the direct-democratic and anti-representational politics that produce new social subjects and their organizations. Populism and radical democracy are representation politics that revolve around the articulation practices of the hegemonic politics through the ways of constructing the unification and commonalizing the heterogeneous social and political agents.

Within this framework, authors highly differentiate from each other in conceptualizing and affirming different types of politics. As Hardt&Negri reject the political experiences around populism, and are highly critical of antagonistic politics; Laclau and Mouffe criticize the ideas developed around the multitude and bio-politics being apolitical. These differentiations are somehow based on the perspectives on the conditions of politics, and turns around the contemporary radical politics' limitations. As Hardt & Negri argue against populism, both theoretically and empirically, and argue for a new politics accorded to the new conditions of capitalism. On the other hand, Laclau and Mouffe make emphasis on the nature of politics and argue for representation and antagonism. For them, the multiplication of the social actors must be organized around a hegemonic project, otherwise there can be no politics. On this ground, they argue that social conditions and their symptoms and effects produced by the existing capitalism and power mechanisms do not lead in themselves into the constitution of a radical collective political subject, and the constitution of a new social and political life. On the other hand, Hardt&Negri criticize the representational politics around hegemonic projects and the constitution of a political subject, such as the people, from the multitude as a sovereign project. Instead, they argue for a new type of the politics as being horizontal and directed itself towards constitution of new forms of the sociability.¹⁶⁴

These theoretical differentiations shape their ideas in analyzing the conditions and elements making the political practice possible. For example, as Hardt&Negri

¹⁶³ The theoretical and empirical differences between the multitude and the people especially see, (Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis, 2014). Also for the criticisms to the multitude and the perspectives on radical democracy see (Thonder and Thomassen, 2005).

¹⁶⁴ One of the chief discussions between these two camps turns around immanentism and transcendentalism and abundance and lack.

concentrate upon the unrepresentable political organizations, Laclau and Mouffe concentrate upon the hegemonic political practices and the political practice of the representative force as the thing that makes radical politics possible. Therefore, their analyses on contemporary politics were limited by their perspectives as Laclau and Mouffe reduce politics into hegemonic projects and politics based upon antagonism. Within this perspective, the mass demonstrations were seen as antagonistic, even if they had no such direction, and these experiences were criticized. On the other hand, Hardt&Negri exclude the antagonistic politics as negation.

So, as for Hardt&Negri, the contemporary political movements become possible because of the resistances caused by empire; for Laclau, through hegemonic procedures. These types are useful in the sense that to analyze the formal sides of the today's mass movements. For example, the potentialities of direct democratic and representative politics that led the practices inclusive and destined to create communizing practices around the experiences of "multitude". Or they pose the groupings of the agents around representative politics and the potentialities coming from the pragmatic and flexible usage of the discourses.

It is evident in these discussions that, whilst Hardt&Negri lacks how the symptoms and effects produced by the bio-power transformed into the politics, Laclau lacks the empirical conditions that lead to resistance, and the organizational practices which turn into populism and antagonism. In other words, as Hardt&Negri overlooks the political processes making the symptoms and effects immanently produced by existing social and political conditions as the part of political practices, Laclau&Mouffe lacks the historical changes and how contemporary power mechanisms and sovereignty leads to the political alternatives of resistance and opposition.

These discussions were framed by highly abstractionist and universalist frameworks, because of the fact that the authors are primarily interested in the nature of politics and the ways to construct radical political subjectivity. The other point is that both of the authors leave aside the local conditions and contexts, because their activity is directed to produce universalist concepts. Therefore, their schemes and theory discuss the limitations and possibilities of the contemporary radical movements

formally, and try to analyze the universal conditions.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, there are some common limits due to the boundaries of their theoretical perspectives' horizons.

Even if they well pose the potentialities of the contemporary politics, analysing the role of the changing forms of politics and how they have emerged according to the changing historical conditions. Because of their political pragmatism for a radical leftist politics, they exclude the types of politics, were not included by their concepts. Therefore, they can not grasp totally the subject formations and contemporary politics that made their emergence possible. On the contrary, neither only antagonism nor the positive and affirmative expressions included by mass movements and organizations can explain them.

They analyze the political facts through the lenses formed by their political ontology. For example, for Hardt&Negri, multitude comes primary before any political action, and the acts on it somehow transform its potential as having horizontal and direct-democratic characteristics into the projects of the construction of the power mechanisms. That is an opposition between the immanent political acts of the multitude versus transcendentalism of the sovereign project destined to construct the representation of the multitude around the political bodies such as nation, people etc. Every politics is therefore perceived as the encounter between the multitude and the power in any historical and local context. In this encounter, as the multitude emerges vis-a-vis representative political practices expressing the immanent force of the life. As the political practice of the multitude is conditioned by the constitutive disposition of the multitude as well as by its resistance to the transcendentalist forces, as the expression of the immanent conditions of the life, the bio-power and its practices emerge out of its disposition to maintain the sovereignty on the multitude and life. On the other hand, for Laclau&Mouffe the politics is conditioned by the ontological fact that every society can never abolish the differences and the conflicts within the society, the political actions and practices will emerge to solve these conflicts with different styles. To analyze the conditions according to the nature of the politics making the mechanisms as the ontology

¹⁶⁵ This formalism and universalism is of course based on their theme of trying to create the ideal types of the radical politics.

overlooks the empirical elements. Their formal ideas offer useful concepts, which include the different types of politics doing and how these formalities can not be generalized as empirical data.

As Hardt&Negri give the universal conditions of emergence of the symptoms, Laclau&Mouffe show how these become part of the politics through political practices. However, both of them overlook the localities. These discussions show how the attitudes and actions formed by the workings of politics, both conceptually and historically. Even if they do not reject the role of the localities forming the attitudes and the habitus of the agents, they do not delve into these elements. This is because their studies about the formal characteristics and the concepts are highly universalized. As it is seen, both the experiences of multitude and radical democratic and populist politics partly explain the contemporary mass politics' workings. As a result, both Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe show how the different subjectives can come together due to the communizing practices around the mass politics and how they operate in different styles. However, because their analysis mostly turns around the ontology of politics, they overlook the local conditions.

Therefore, they link the emergence of popular movements and organizations to the conditions brought about by the global changes. For example, Hardt&Negri argue that the dominance of the horizontal organizations are due to the bio-power and changing capitalist production. On the other hand, Laclau&Mouffe mention the representational crisis caused by modernist politics. Adding to these historical global and structural changes, they interpret the political practices from their theoretical perspectives. They frame the limitations and possibilities according to the way of politics. Therefore, for Hardt&Negri, politics become possible because of the immanent effects and symptoms of the any given social and political order, be it pre-modern forms of power, or the types of capitalism being industrial or post-industrial. In this perspective, the existing orders make up the conditions of the alternative. For Laclau, politics are only possible because of the antagonistic nature of the social. The positive, beyond negation, can be the political. They generalize these ontic or actual facts and the theoretical ones into the localities.

They mention the structural changes and the role of politics forming the habits and

dispositions in politics, but they do not show how the political field is consisting of local forces and their possibilizing and delimiting effect; due not only to the lack of hegemonic projects. Therefore, the locality is also important alongside these formal workings and structural elements. They do not show how these modes work in the contexts and localities, or in the field formed by the agents and structures of the locality. They point out the changes of politics, but do not show how they emerge within localities. As a result, they are useful in analyzing the contemporary workings of collective movements and organizations: their similarities, and the structural and global changes, and the similarities of these in all of the localities. However, because of their analysis is directed to theory and abstraction, it is wrong to generalize them into all experiences.

3.4. Deleuze and Bourdieu: Agency-Structure Problem

As it is seen, even if Negri&Hardt analyze the mechanisms making the resistance possible by articulating and linking the agents and singularities through political practices; Laclau and Mouffe mentions about the role of the desire and interests, and their studies exclude the processes of the linking and articulating singularities around communalizing practices. In that sense, their analysis does not concentrate upon the question on how the agents actively produce the communalizing practices, but on the acts of the communizing practices exempted from the agents.¹⁶⁶

Therefore, a duality between agency and structure, content and forms, historical and ahistorical, local and global, actual and theoretical exist in their schemes due to their interest on theoretical discussions. Even if their schemes analyze the types and different expressions of the multitude and hegemonic subjectivity in different contexts, and historical conditions undoing the mechanical and teleological perspectives, the concentration upon the structures, conditions and mechanisms exclude the intersection of these elements. On this point, it is important to undo these dualities by recoursing to both Deleuze&Guattari and Bourdieu. Deleuze&

¹⁶⁶ This method is very evident in Hardt&Negri. They try to show the types and models of today's radical political subjectivity to create a new society. On the other hand, they show the types of politics and how they operate. But none of them concentrate upon the processes.

Guattari were the thinkers who concentrated upon the agency with the question of how peoples' desires lead to domination, and also how different political expressions emerge (Deleuze& Guattari: 2000: 38). The common point of these questions was the insert of the agency.

Before Deleuze&Guattari, in the history of political thought, there were thinkers dealing with the active role of the agencies in the construction of sovereignty. Etienne de La Boetie was asking how the people subordinate to power and sovereignty, despite of its negative effects on them¹⁶⁷ (La Boetie, 1997). This question tried to analyze the ways and mechanisms of the subordinating power to construct its power and the production of the people's desire to subordinate to that power. This question is very different from Machiavelli's (Machievelli, 2008) analysis concentrating upon the acts of the sovereign power to create its hegemony, because it inserted the agencies' role for the construction of sovereignty. In other words, domination and subordination is not only imposed from top to bottom on the masses, but also the masses actively internalize the acts of the sovereignty.

Following this question, the authors like Wilhelm Reich (1980), Elias Cannetti (Canetti, 1973) and Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci, 2003) were also interested in the masses' active role in the construction of the sovereignty by using different perspectives and concepts. The common question was that how the masses participated to the calling and practices of the sovereign power. Therefore, they analyze, on the one hand, the mechanisms to attract the masses for particular political projects, on the other hand, the social and psychological conditions that make their working possible.

With the emergence of structuralism and post-structuralism, different writers also drew attention on the role of the agency in the construction of power relations.

¹⁶⁷ In the *Prince*, Machiavelli analyzes how sovereignty constructs its power and hegemony on the people through different mechanisms. It precisely shows how the different pragmatist mechanisms work for this construction and what their effects and functions are (Machiavelli, 2008). On the other hand, La Boetie shows how these mechanisms work on the people (La Boetie, 1997). Therefore, La Boetie was one of the first philosophers that interrogated how obedience was desired by the obedient rather than how obedience was imposed by the power. However, these actions and relations of power were not passively approved by the agents. Voluntarily or not, as the product of false consciousness or not, around these questions, it is evident that the active role of agency can be seen.

However, even if these writers analyzed and revealed the mechanisms of the power working on the agencies, they left the question of how these workings were internalized by the agencies. For example, as Althusser tried to show how the ideological apparatuses of the state work and what the effects of them are, he did not show what these apparatuses were (Althusser, 2014). Foucault's perspective is also very similar to Althusser's.¹⁶⁸ As Certau points out that even if he showed how power mechanisms work on the bodies to produce the subjectivities and the life in determinate ways, he leaved aside how these were internalized (Certau, 1988).

These discussions are important, including the ways and mechanisms of how politics work, and how the political subject constitutions emerge in the case of the internalization of the subordination by the masses. Even if they left aside the question on how the alternatives and resistances become possible, their discussions are about how the collective identities and subject formations emerge, and how politics work through the mechanisms and the processes linking the singularities and agents into commonalities by emphasizing the active role of the agents. Therefore, to follow this line of thought, it should be remembered that the fact that the constitution of the collective political identities were not the products of the mechanical processes through which the agents unconditionally respond to the commonalizing processes of politics. In other words, the political practices include the ways to attract the masses and agents, but the political mechanisms do not always have a capacity of attracting the people. There might be an objection here that points out that these are also evident in Hardt&Negri, because they also try to analyze the conditions that make political practices possible. Hardt&Negri analyze the symptoms for the emergence of the multitude and the sovereign projects such as the changes in social and political life. However, they left the participation of the agents aside. As implied before, they well analyzed the historical and ahistorical mechanisms of the politics, and the effect of the universal changes in politics and the products of the contemporary political process, both in left and in right, and both for

¹⁶⁸ Foucault's thinking changed in time due to the changing interest of the topic and methods, (Best&Kellner: 34-75) but it was mainly interested in how power constructs subjectivity through different procedures and this question is not interested in how the power is internalized by the agents. For Foucault's perspective in his different periods, see, (Foucault, 1973; Foucault, 1995; Foucault, 1990; Foucault, 1988).

the power relations and the alternatives and resistances to them. But they did not analyze how politics work in processes including the relations and links between the actual and the political, agents and political mechanisms leaving aside the question of how agents become political: the two actual developments that produce politics.

Likewise, even if Laclau and Negri draw attention to the mechanisms of resistance and counter politics, and constructed their concepts from empirical and historical conditions, because they concentrated upon the theoretical discussions and universality, they leaved aside the local conditions and the agencies' role in making possible and limiting mass politics. As it is mentioned, it is because their discussions primarily deal with the theoretical limits, or they analyze the empirical and actual areas with their theoretical perspectives. They do not reject the role of agency, locality, but they do not analyze the limitations and possibilities coming from the localities and agencies. Therefore, to widen their theoretical limits concentrated upon the universal and structural limits and possibilities is also useful to arrive from their ideas that the construction of the political commonality requires the processes and mechanisms working on agencies and localities.¹⁶⁹

To bridge the gap between the formal workings of the contemporary mass politics and their contextual workings, the idea that frames the perspective of this study is that it is important to analyze the local conditions to see how the forms of contemporary politics as they were conceptualized emerged. Therefore, Bourdieu's concepts in relation with Deleuze&Guttari's question on the agency are useful to analyze the actual workings of the contemporary political experiences framed by both Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe.

3.5. Gezi, the Multitude and Populism

As it is seen, both Negri and Laclau offers the analytical and theoretical tools to

¹⁶⁹ There is a common idea in both authors, as emphasized before, different from mechanisms and teleologism. The authors argue that the political subjectivity is different from and it includes the production processes, and these bring about the changes in social subjectivities. Therefore, both authors analyze the mechanisms working on the agents and their dispositions to constitute the political subjects. In that sense, their theoretical limit is to leave aside the possibilities and limitations coming from localities and agencies.

explore and analyze work of contemporary mass politics and subject constitutions' limitations and the possibilities while analyzing the historical changes in the workings of contemporary experiences of politics of power and sovereignty and the alternatives and resistance to them. On the other hand, they discuss the ontological characteristics of politics. For example, the multiplication of the social and political positions brought about the problem of how to deal with the heterogeneity and multiplicity and the weakening of the modernist politics. On this ground they explore the modes and types of doing politics, from left to right, to cope with this heterogeneity and multiplicity. Their analysis, therefore, present mechanisms and experiences of the contemporary politics to determine the similar characteristics of the contemporary political experiences in different localities and their differences according to the structural and historical changes and to the nature of politics. Through their perspectives the theoretical and empirical limits, and possibilities of the types of the politics such as liberal and orthodox Marxist politics, populism and the autonomist and anarchist politics can be framed.

On the other hand, even if their theories provide analytical and theoretical perspectives for the analysis of the contemporary types of politics, they have theoretical limits such as being universal and structural, leaving aside the localities and agencies. Therefore, as it is argued that Deleuze&Guattari's and Bourdieu's theoretical discussions will be useful to contribute to the empirical and theoretical analysis of the workings of the contemporary politics in the case of collective politics which are alternative and antagonistic to existing orders. For example, the concept of multitude frames the changes in social and political structures of power, subjectivity types and the mechanisms producing their expressions. Multitude also shows the ways of alternative collective politics works such as horizontal and autonomous politics. On the other hand, Laclau and Mouffe investigate how contemporary hegemonic projects from left to right work and what their mechanisms are to constitute political subject forms. Through these they expose the role of the discursive practices and representational polities, through articulation, to construct the unification of the subjectivities around a political project. However, even if they provide the mechanisms and structures of the politics and how they work, they leave aside their workings in processes concentrating upon the end-products of politics.

Therefore, they leave aside the processes of the construction of the common political expressions of the agencies and subjectivities which include the social and political struggles, developments and moments that structures, destructure and restructure the agents' dispositions producing their political experiences.

It is now time to discuss the concrete cases that make evident the theoretical limitations and their usefulness. For example, Gezi shares similar characteristics with the other characteristics of the uprisings and occupy movements that emerged in the globe, even if the local causes and conditions leading to them were different. These characteristics were expressed as democracy and equality. These expressions were taken as the symptoms of neo-liberalism and the representational crisis. These uprisings and events were also similar to each other in terms of their organizational structures and experiences of politics. They have no leadership and representational structures, and were mostly organized horizontally. These characteristics were very evident in the Gezi events, because even if there were organizations, such as the Taksim Solidarity with the claim of representing the masses and agents, none of the organizations and agencies could construct the representational structures of the events. Therefore, some of the authors argue that Gezi was the expression of the multitude-like political stance, because it was beyond representation.

However, even if Gezi events share some characteristics of the category of multitude such as the dominance of the flexible and horizontal organizational structures, the singularities coming together outside hierarchical organizations, it can not be taken as an example of contemporary experiences of the multitude created by actual expression of the sovereignty. In other words, even if the Gezi events can be categorically placed under the name of the multitude, it is not clear that they were totally conditioned by the existing paradigm and practices of the bio-power and empire. It is true that the global facts operating in all of the localities of the world has a role in creating the discontent and the desire for a new and alternative political and social system to replace the existing orders, the other components coming from the locality is important. These components include the local developments in Turkey which are certainly influenced by the other forces and developments in the globe, and the political tradition of the country.

Therefore, in Turkey, especially after the 1980 military coup, some of the minor and small groups tried to organize minor horizontal organizations and aspired to create the mass organizations like the multitude, however, even if these were influenced by the experiences in other localities, it is absurd to say that these organizational experiences were the direct result of the empire. Hardt&Hardt are true that in radical politics the organizations have a widespread and dominant disposition, acting like multitude and the changing social forms of life as being flexible get partly transferred into political organizations. But we can not say that today's political experiences only consist of the experiences of the multitude.

As a result, around the concept of multitude, it might be argued that the emergence of the Gezi events is the product of the disposition of the radical collective politics acting as multitude, and it is conditioned by the empire and its local expressions through the production of new subjectivities and experiences. But, the local conditions such as the habits in the left's politics doing, the formation of the political opposition acting together despite of the ideological and social differences because of the opposition's disposition to gather around antagonism to AKP and the role of some groups' inclination of being active in politics such as the Alevis, Kemalists and leftist and anti-authoritarian social and political movements. Adding to this, even if the neo-liberal experiences in Turkey by AKP produced the symptoms and effects from negative feelings to the positive and constitutive hopes to construct a democratic country, and they can be seen as the local examples of the bio-politics of Empire. The political experiences are also the product of the local developments and processes works on the habits and dispositions of the agents and the political field going beyond the experiences of the multitude. In that sense, the Gezi events weren't only conditioned by the global developments and global dispositions, but also by the local conditions. Even if the events of Gezi shared the common characteristics with other uprisings and were influenced by them, it can not be named as an act of the multitude. Rejection of such a name is important, because the naming frames the conditions of limitations and possibilities.

On the other hand, from Laclau&Mouffe's perspective, it is true that the conflicts and struggles and political opposition gathered around an antagonism against AKP as an articulating element of the heterogeneous and multiple subjectivities.

However, it was not the product of a hegemonic force with the claim of representation of a “we”. In other words, the antagonism against AKP was an antagonism without representation. Therefore, from Laclau’s perspective it might be argued that this antagonism was destined to get lost, because of the lack of an hegemonic force. However, the habit emerged during the time of AKP governments that the expression of any political opposition under the name of anti-AKP to become an independent force. Without any political projects, the “masses” had very negative attitudes towards AKP. This was not only the product of the political and social agents against AKP, but was also the product of AKP. Correspondingly, in their perspective of this fact can be considered as the product of AKP’s policies, and shares the characteristics of any political projects as producing the exclusions and the construction of a “they”. Therefore, it can be seen as the product of the representation crisis produced by AKP in a concrete way, and conditioned by the ontological nature of the social based on the antagonism. However, it can not explain the particular conditions and developments in Turkey beyond the representation crisis and the ontological nature of the social where politics emerge and become successful through hegemonic strategies. According to this perspective, the politics is the product of the emergence of the antagonism, and Gezi was antagonistic politics, because there were the articulating discourses from negative antagonistic and constitutive positive common perceptions towards the feelings, even if there was not a determinate hegemonic force present. However, even if antagonism to AKP as the expression of the reordering the power relations in the society had a strong role and it has historicity, these emerged through the political processes and practices in the events. In other words, there were the emergence of the dispositions and the change of these very dispositions to those in Negri’s way. Because their theory do not delve into these processes, but is interested in the articulation.

Moreover, their perspective offers to articulate such an event as representation politics. Because, they rightly argue that the potential included by events like Gezi must be organized through hegemonic projects. However, such a perspective neglects the practices to organize a common political structure and organization. This is evident in the case of Gezi. Even if not all of the population was included by

these experiences, the park forums were the experiences of the constitutive practices as the product of the alliances through horizontal organizations..

Given these, Negri&Hardt's conceptualization of multitude is useful to present the role of the mechanisms and practices of constitutive politics and positive affections. Laclau&Mouffe's theory of the workings of the antagonistic politics with the discursive articulation mechanisms also work in the case of Gezi. Thus, their theoretical and conceptual tools offer to analyze the political mechanisms to make the political experiences working on the agents and within the localities in Turkey. On the one hand, Hardt&Negri are not interested in how the potentials become political by bypassing the link to the symptoms of the conditions produced before and how they become politicized, Laclau&Mouffe bypass the events before the developments. Therefore, they neglect the processes in locality which involves the experiences of the agents and their commonalizing practices.

3.6. HDP, Radical Democracy and Representation

The same theoretical limits and problems are also evident in the case of HDP. For Hardt&Negri's perspective, HDP is a representational organization different from the multitude, and it might be seen as a mode of politics doing that works on the multitude by transforming its heterogeneity and multiplicity, organized horizontally into the homogeneity around representational vertical organizational structures. In that sense, can we ask that HDP's emergence was a political project, very different from the ways of doing politics as conceptualized through the multitude, and is it controlling the potential of the multitude? In other words, is the agents' disposition to HDP as representational politics show the change of the disposition of the multitude by the politics of hegemonic projects? For Hardt&Negri's perspective, organizations like HDP act within the existing political systems with the claim of representing the agents and subjectivities is the perversion of the multitude's revolutionary potential.

However, this perspective is problematic, because it takes the radical democratic and hegemonic politics as wrong politics doing since it considers the multitude-like politics as the primary political condition. In this way, it considers the

representational politics as a different form conditioned by the desire to power based on lack. On the other hand, the emergence of the hegemonic politics can be the multitude's desire and disposition to constitute a new society based on direct democratic institutions or the creation of such a desire and disposition by the articulating force. Therefore, political organizations like HDP can't be seen as the perversion of the multitude. Such a perspective excludes some of the dispositions and desires of the multitude as wrong. In the case of HDP, its emergence was not only the product of the organizational strategies of leading agents like the elements of the Kurdish movement and the leftist organizations, but also the desire of agents to support HDP. Hardt&Negri's framework neglects the local conditions and the agency's role conditioned by the social and political developments in the country. HDP as a political project shows not only the will of representative force or the party's top leaders, but the agents are also crucial to construct the common will around HDP. If there is a difference from multitude like politics, the answer must not be based on the idea of the perversion of the multitude, but on the idea that it is a mode of politics.

On the other hand, Laclau & Mouffe is very useful to analyze HDP. Because, like in other hegemonic projects, HDP's discourse revolves around the signifiers such as new life, constructing a new world based on the peoples' will, calls to the affections, perceptions of the heterogenous agents and subjectivities. By this way, HDP's discourse was constructed to articulate the different social and political groups and subjectivities of the population of Turkey around the feelings based on antagonism towards AKP, and the hopes and desires to construct a new country. As mentioned before, the strategy of Turkey-nization provides opportunities for HDP to represent the population and the space for the leftist political activities and experiences. This strategy was the project of the Kurdish movement as the leading agent and it organized this project with the contribution of the leftist organization. Therefore, like in the populist movements, one of the groups articulated the other groups around its project by constructing empty signifiers such as new life and new Turkey. This change of strategy made possible HDP's success in the elections. This strategy required to construct a positive image around the leadership of Demirtaş by attracting the population.

However, not only the strategic changes in the Kurdish movement and the leftist groups provided this possibility. Because, before anything else, some of the conditions emerged and were conditioned by the political developments and moments affected the agencies and subjectivities, from organized agencies of the leftist and Kurdish organizations to the unorganized agencies. HDP well worked on these conditions such as forming enmity to and fears from AKP's hegemony. I parallel this to some of the leftist groups with strategic choices who decided to act with the Kurdish movement because of their political aspirations of a revolution, and with their critics that AKP is constructing an Islamic conservative and neoliberal society. So, HDP worked on the conditions and their symptoms produced by the political and social development in the country, affecting the social and political agencies and subjectivities. Therefore, not only the strategies developed by the Kurdish movement and its articulating mechanisms such as using empty signifiers structured as flexible to include the demands and affections emerged within the country and producing positive images around the leadership of Demirtaş made it possible. But also, the interests of the agencies and the political habitus of the political and social groups were important.

However, Laclau's theoretical limits isolate these questions: How did the strategies become possible through the strategies developed by the components of HDP? How did these strategies become possible? How these strategies did became limited? Under which conditions and developments the changes could and could not make HDP to articulate its agents? To neglect these questions would be to exclude the elements of the limitations and possibilities conditioning the strategies of the hegemonic project. In another sense, the local and global forces, developments and moments emerge vis-a-vis limiting and possibilizing lines. For example, the end of the peace between the PKK and the Turkish State made HDP's strategies unsuccessful. It is also evident in other cases similar to HDP. These examples show the concrete limits to the radical democratic politics. To answer these questions one must take into consideration the changes in the social and political developments in a country, and its results, both in the population and the social and political organizations, and their response to these. Because, these changes also produce their own attitudes and dispositions. In other words, these strategies worked on the

history of the agencies and the local developments in interaction with these histories.

Given these, Laclau and Mouffe's theories on hegemony, populism and radical democracy is useful to analyze the ways and mechanisms of the articulation of the subjectivities around leftist radical collective politics such as Syriza, Podemos and HDP. However, their theories leave aside the local conditions and histories, and the stories of agencies and political fields in any locality which form and reform the political dispositions and the habitus of the agencies. They analyze the changes in the global social and political structures and their local experiences empirically and theoretically by presenting the political mechanisms and procedures of articulation. Though, do not show how these changes work in the localities and their limitations and possibilities coming from the stories and histories of the localities.

As a result, there is a theoretical limit common in both the conceptualization of politics of multitude and hegemonic politics, because of the exclusion of the local political and social developments and the preparation for the political experiences that produce the affections, demands and perceptions of the agencies and their political dispositions' expression within a political field of any locality. Since universal developments are one part of the structuring elements of political fields in any country, the political experiences and habituses are also the limiting and possibilizing forces. In that sense, analyzing how the contemporary types of radical collective politics doing and collective political subjectivity constitutions emerge requires delving into local histories and developments. In the case of Gezi and HDP, this interest involves the social and political changes brought about by the AKP era and its symptoms in the population and the changes in the political movements and organizations of the country. Therefore, the next chapter will deal with the history of AKP's hegemony and the political and social movements and organizations in the country.

CHAPTER 4

THE HISTORY OF RADICAL AND LEFTIST SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCES: THE CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES DURING AKP ERA

As mentioned above, the emergence of the Gezi and HDP was partly related to the political and social developments in Turkey and the symptoms and effects on social and political agents of AKP governments.¹⁷⁰ For during AKP governments the political and social structures and mechanisms in Turkey changed and these changes created content and discontent for different social and political positions and groups in the country.¹⁷¹ Therefore, these changes and transformations on the one hand produced strong support for the AKP's policies, especially in elections, while on the other led to political opposition and alternatives both to the AKP and to the existing social and political order independent of the AKP.

In this framework, the social and political movements and organizations that emerged within the political field of Turkey are both related to the AKP's policies and its existence and to the already continuing social and political struggles from the left to the right, which were certainly reformed by the developments in the country. Therefore, as the AKP era produced opposition and alternatives to it in the political field, the continuing social and political struggles and their accumulation, especially by the leftist and Marxist social and political organizations and the Kurdish political movement, intersected with these social and political positions which emerged during the AKP era. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the internal developments

¹⁷⁰ This is not rejecting the global economic, cultural and social changes brought by the neo-liberalism and post-modernity and their influence in the Turkey.

¹⁷¹ For a study from a critical perspective for AKP's policies and its influences in the country ,the means of AKP to construct its hegemony and the conditions that made AKP's hegemony possible see (Uzgel&Duru, 2009). For the discontents from and the oppositions to AKP see, (Waldman&Çalışkan, 2017; Cizre, 2016). And a study for the possibilities and limitations of AKP's politics see, (Taşkın, 2013).

and historicity of the leftist, Marxist and Kurdish politics were reformed in the political field that was shaped by the AKP era. As framed by these intersections new political positions emerged in the political field and spaces in Turkey both in opposition and antagonism to the AKP and in alternative political perspectives going beyond pure antagonism and opposition to the AKP. The emergence of the Gezi and the formation of the HDP were influenced by this reconstruction of the political field in the country forming political dispositions.

Therefore, this section will try to discuss and analyze the role of the AKP's policies and their role in producing the political experiences and changes on the left of Turkey, including the Kurdish political movement. Additionally, how the political opposition in Turkey was formed during AKP governments will be analyzed, summarizing the history of the political opposition and alternatives during the era of AKP rule.

4.1. AKP and The New Turkey Project

4.1.1. AKP's Formation: From Islamism to Post-Islamism or Conservative Democracy

Since 2002 the AKP has governed the country, transforming the social and political fields and spaces due to its increasing hegemony over the years. Despite the other political forces from legal parties to social movements in opposition to it, it has taken the opportunity to reshape the country in line with its conservative and neo-liberal policies in every space and sphere of the country. This opportunity was provided by the historical transformations stretching back to the military coup of 1980 and the subsequent government's neo-liberal policies that reconstructed life in the country. Therefore, it is on the one hand the product of the social, economic and cultural transformations brought about by the neo-liberalism implemented after the 1980 military coup, while on the other it emerged out of the changing political perspectives within the legal political Islamist tradition in the country, dating back to

the foundation of the National Order Party in 1970.¹⁷² Hence, the AKP is the product of the changing political line in the political Islamic tradition brought about to respond to transformations in the country and to find a place in the political field to address the social groups inclined to rightist and conservative politics.

The AKP¹⁷³ was founded after the political Islamist party, the Virtue Party (FP), was banned by the Constitutional Court. The Virtue Party's origins stretched back to the 1970s, when the first legal Islamist party, the National Order Party (MNP), appeared on the political scene of Turkey. The MNP was founded in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan¹⁷⁴ and it was closed down by the military coup of 12 March, 1971. Then, the National Salvation Party (MSP)¹⁷⁵ was founded in 1972 and it also was closed down by the 12 September 1980 military coup. When the military regime ended in 1983,¹⁷⁶ the Islamists founded the Welfare Party (RP), which gained electoral success at the 1995 elections, forming a coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP). However, the RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court after the process of 28 February,¹⁷⁷ and a new party, the FP, was founded. In the FP, there were two groups, the traditionalists and the reformists. The traditionalists gathered around Erbakan and advocated maintaining the party's emphasis on Islamism, aiming to change the political and social system in Turkey around Islamic

¹⁷² The AKP's coming to power is closely related to the cultural, economic, social and political transformations brought about by the military coup of 1980 and the governments of the Motherland Party (ANAP), which started to implement no-liberal economic and social policies. Related to these transformations, religious and conservative sections in society increased and these sections started to look for alternative political positions beyond center rightist parties like the ANAP. The tradition of legal Islamist movements as well as the religious communities took this opportunity to articulate these conservative and religious subjectivities.

¹⁷³ For very short information about the predecessors of the AKP see, (Yıldız, 2003: 187-188).

¹⁷⁴ The founder of the Islamist group, the National Vision Movement, Erbakan was the leader of the legal political parties coming from the Islamist tradition from 1970s to 2000s.

¹⁷⁵ The party was founded by former members of the MNP and after 1973 was led by Erbakan.

¹⁷⁶ In 1983, the military government ended and elections started again. However, a lot of laws issued by the military government are still in force.

¹⁷⁷ In 28 February 1997, the Turkish Armed Forces issued a memorandum accusing the coalition government's partner, the RP, as acting against one of the foundational principles of the Republic of Turkey, secularism. After the memorandum the RP resigned from the government and a new government was formed by the other parties in parliament. This was called as post-modern coup, because the government was not overthrown by a military regime, but the RP was forced to resign from the government legally and after this the government fell. After this resignation the Constitutional Court filed a case to close down the RP.

principles.¹⁷⁸ The reformists, of whom Recep Tayyip Erdoğan¹⁷⁹ was one of the leading figures, advocated reforming the political line of the FP around liberalism and neo-liberalism and was against clashing with the existing republican system in Turkey. Their political strategy was to reconcile with the regime, avoiding conflict with the constitutional principles of the republic. These political and economic ideas were particularly contrary to the Islamist ideology of the traditionalists, who advocated an economic program critical of liberalism and capitalism, putting the emphasis on equality and stressing the need to change the principles of the republic.

After the FP's closure by the Constitutional Court in 2001, these different outlooks became concrete around organizational practices. As the traditionalists founded the Felicity Party (SP) and aimed to attract the support of the people through Islamist ideology, the reformists, under the leadership of Erdogan, constructed a new political outlook through the foundation of the AKP. Consequently, the Felicity Party preferred to adhere to its traditional Islamic support base, despite the drastic political changes occurring both at home and in the world. In contrast, the reformists "constructed a new identity for their party which was 'moderately religious' and neo-liberal in its essence." (Dinçşahin, 2012: 619).

Hakan Yavuz argues that this new political identity was a change from Islamism to post-Islamism in harmony with neo-liberalism and called it conservative democracy rather than Islamism¹⁸⁰ (Yavuz, 2006: 2-3). Conservative democracy is defined as a political perspective emphasising compromise in the political field, rather than taking a position of conflict vis-a-vis political groups and the political system as the Islamist political line generates, to construct a harmonious and peaceful society eliminating internal contradictions and conflicts in society. Therefore, "according to the conservative democrats, the field of politics should be firmly grounded in the culture

¹⁷⁸ The political, economic and social perspectives of the Islamism as expressed around the "Just Order (Adil Düzen)" programme of the RP (Erbakan, 1991).

¹⁷⁹ Bülent Arınç, former president of the TBMM and Abdullah Gül, a former president of Turkey, were the other prominent figures in this reformist movement.

¹⁸⁰ This conversion from Islamism to conservative democracy did not mean the abandonment of Islamic principles to form the political discourse and perspective of the AKP, but it omitted Islamism as a political aim. On the other hand, the AKP continued to use Islamic discourse and a conservative democracy mainly framed by Islamic ideas.

of reconciliation. It is possible to solve social differences and disagreements in the political arena on the basis of reconciliation.” (Akdoğan: 2006: 50). Around conservative democracy, the AKP put emphasis on plurality, tolerance and democracy.

Politics should be established on that basis of reconciliation, integration, and tolerance instead of conflict, the formation of cliques, and polarization. Presently, a radical rejection of the existing political structure through the establishment of a totally new order is not viewed as viable or feasible. In order to enable gradual change vis-a-vis the overall structure, it is necessary to maintain some of the values and features of the existing structure.¹⁸¹ (Akdoğan, ibid: 51)

As related to conservative democracy, this emphasis on compromise rather than conflictual Islamist politics was called service politics. Yavuz explains this perspective well:

In the case of Turkey, we see such a process, the process of post-Islamism or the shift from the politics of identity to the politics of services- hizmet partisi. One sees the realization/materialization of liberal politics in Turkey in the sense that a political movement is not engaged in the politics of identity, which tend to be conflict-ridden and confrontational, but rather in the politics of services, based on compromise and cooperation. A new social and political contract, as a result, is evolving in the case of Turkey on the basis of neo-liberal economic and political values. This can be seen as the normalization of Turkish politics since it hints at the positive integration of the country into many of the macro trends taking place on a global scale. The JDP, being the product of these transformations, is not a party of identity but rather a party that strives to provide better services. It does not develop or articulate any claims on the basis of Islam or other forms of identity, but acts as an agent of the country’s integration into neo-liberal economic and political spaces. (Yavuz, 2006: 3)

According to Yavuz, the changes in the political perspective of legal Islamism embodied by the AKP is related to responding to the demands of the emergence of a

¹⁸¹ Erdoğan’s ideas were very similar to these ideas. For the concept of conservative democracy see (Erdoğan, 2006; Akdoğan, 2004).

new bourgeoisie in Anatolia organized around the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD).

Based on the activities of the JDP, it is possible to conclude that the Islamic political movement has helped to consolidate democracy in Turkey by offering the country's marginalized groups an alternative avenue for political participation. Yet this positive role is very much an outcome of expanding opportunity spaces and the contacting of military-legal institutions, made possible in large part through the actions and the trendsetter role played by a new and rising Anatolian bourgeoisie who have refused to support confrontational policies. The democratic bargaining between the state establishment and the JDP forced the latter group to give up any search for governmental hegemony... (Yavuz, 2006:3)

In other words, some of the groups constituting the AKP played a role in forming the AKP's political perspective. This new emerging class was the product of the neo-liberal policies implemented after the military coup which created new economic opportunities for the middle capital groups both in the country and abroad side by side with the traditional business class organized around TUSIAD. During the RP era, there was a balance between capital groups and the workers' organizations organized around it. Therefore, the party's programme was formed giving equal weight to the interests of social classes, especially in economic policies. This was evident in the Just Order perspective, according to which the economic system was based on a social state that defended workers' social rights vis-a-vis the conditions of unbridled capitalism.

However, after the foundation of the FP the members of MUSIAD started to criticize the political line of the traditionalists, both economically and politically. They were on the one hand demanding support for neo-liberal economic policies, while on the other hand advocating a more moderate political line to avoid conflict with the regime's forces. For, this new bourgeoisie wished to benefit from the opportunities created by neo-liberalism rather than getting involved in conflict with the regime. With the foundation of the AKP, the political line was in harmony with these capital groups, because the AKP both supported neo-liberal economic policies, excluding

the demands of the working class, and developed a politics of compromise avoiding direct conflict with the regime.¹⁸²

On this basis, the AKP developed a political outlook framed by concepts of service politics interrelated to conservative democracy to construct a society and political field free from social and political contradictions and antagonisms. This idea to construct a peaceful and harmonious society formed the political experiences of the AKP in the political field of Turkey. On the other hand, in relation to the project to construct a peaceful and harmoniously constituted society with politics in accordance with this project and destined to solve and satisfy the needs of the population, the service politics needed to be implanted. Therefore, the politics were reduced to policy-making with the effective functioning of the government, whether by pluralist democratic or majoritarian means and discourses.¹⁸³ Given these, the AKP's political discourse and practices were constructed upon the creation of a new Turkey aimed at building a harmonious and peaceful society, even if its means changed according to the period.

The political line of the AKP gained expression after the 2002 elections. As mentioned above, according to pro-AKP authors, the social and political developments in the country created an opportunity for the AKP's coming to power.

"In this turbulent atmosphere decent politics and honest, hardworking politicians who sought to represent the Turkish people seemed non-existent. It is precisely for this reason that the JDP, untested but also untainted, emerged as the only party possessing the momentum to fulfill the expectations of a discouraged electorate. The political success of the JDP (AKP) was thus not based on its ability to articulate and project an identity that resonated with a large portion of the population, but rather on the electorate's dissatisfaction with the general state of politics in Turkey."(Akdoğan, 2006: 52)

¹⁸² This was clearly evident in the AKP's programme. Even if the AKP, like its predecessors, aimed to change the political and social system in Turkey, it supported reformist politics. For this change as mentioned before, it constructed alliances and always used elections as legitimate political means. However, it was not exempt from conflicts with groups in society and the political field.

¹⁸³ As will be mentioned, the AKP's means of realizing its project used different methods in the political field from pluralist democracy to security policies.

Based on these ideas, the AKP implemented policies around the project for the building of a new Turkey aiming at changing the political system and social relationships in the country, maintaining it in different areas with different methods. Thus, the means and style of doing politics change according to the period. For, as many authors argue, in the first era, between 2002 and 2010,¹⁸⁴ the AKP developed a political discourse around conservative democracy, putting emphasis on plurality and tolerance for other political and social forces in the country.¹⁸⁵ However, increasingly after the Gezi events, the AKP developed a more majoritarian rather than pluralist discourse and mode of doing politics. In the second period, even if the AKP continued to put emphasis on reconciliation between political forces in the country and accused other political parties of being antagonistic and uncompromising, its political discourse became more aggressive to other political forces in the country.

Despite these changes, there is some continuity in the AKP's political discourse and practices. For even if in the so-called first period, while the AKP put emphasis on reconciliation, tolerance and a harmonious political field in the country concentrating upon solving the contradictions and tension in the country, its political discourse always codified the rivals and enemies in the country. For example, with its emphasis on the old elites consisting of the Kemalist army and the old bourgeoisie around TUSIAD, AKP constructed an antagonistic discourse. After the Gezi events, enemies included Western countries, leftists and then the Gülenist movement. Despite these changes, the AKP constantly formed alliances around its political line, changing its

¹⁸⁴ In 2010 a referendum to change the Constitutional Law was held.

¹⁸⁵ On 12 September 2010, the AKP held a referendum to change constitutional law with the intention of democratizing the country by eliminating the constitutional law introduced by the military government. In this referendum, some of the political groups, from leftists and liberals to Islamists like the SP and rightists, voted yes, hoping for the democratization of the country, even if especially some of the Marxist groups argued that voting yes was not enough for the full democratization of the country, arguing that it created an opportunity for a more democratic country and opened space to solve the Kurdish problem, resolve state repression on alternative and opposition political and social forces to the existing system organized around the slogan of 'not enough but yes'. Therefore, the supporters of change mainly claimed that this change would enable the country to become more democratic, solving internal conflicts in the country like the Kurdish problem and creating a more pluralistic society and politics. However, the objectors mainly argued that this would give power to the AKP to construct its hegemony in the country, giving it the opportunity to use repression and uncompromising style and means. Such a hegemony would give the AKP the chance to change society however it wished along with its conservative politics terminating parliamentary democracy, pluralism and secularism.

emphasis from pluralist democracy to majoritarianism, security and the fate of the country.

Close to and after the 7 June elections, the AKP continued its antagonistic politics to rival and alternative social and political forces. This was the beginning of the new era and the AKP and Erdoğan announced new enemies of the country and its existence. As in the first era, when the rival forces were codified as enemies of the nation and barriers to the development and democratization of the country, preventing the creation of a more peaceful and stable country, the new enemies were codified as enemies, with the emphasis on stability and effective government as well as the fate of the country. This political perspective peaked after the 15 July attempted military coup when the AKP constructed new alliances, changing the composition of the list of enemies.¹⁸⁶

As a result, the AKP realized political and social practices framed by service politics related to conservative democracy after the changes made in the legal Islamic party tradition. These practices produced the hegemony and power of the AKP in the social and political fields of the country and created alliances, rivals and enemies. Its political perspective with the continuities and discontinuities in its methods and procedures could be seen as producing on the one hand friends and allies, and on the other, opposition and alternatives.

4.1.2. Populism, Neo-Liberalism and Service Politics

As has been mentioned, the service politics of the AKP related to ideas developed around conservative democracy were destined to produce the practices of politics that must be consensual rather than conflictual and to construct such a political practice requires satisfying the demands of society and must direct itself to solving the actual social, cultural and economic problems of society. It is supposed by mostly pro-AKP authors that the AKP emerged as a political force as the result of a need in an economically, socially and politically unstable climate that was not satisfying the

¹⁸⁶ These constantly changing allies and rivals on the AKP's list according to the different periods of its existence will be mentioned below.

demands of the people.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, the AKP developed its political line to satisfy the supposed need and desire of the people for a more stable social and political climate. Constructing its discourse around this supposed lack and need, the AKP offered service politics as well as conservative democracy to solve the problems in society, that is, to construct a new Turkey, in which politics were envisioned to solve the problems of the country, eliminating conflict and tension.

This service politics and its general perspective of political practices have been conceptualized by some authors as an example of populism. Even if some of these authors reduce the AKP's political practices in governing the population and gaining their support to the concept of populism,¹⁸⁸ this study will treat the populism of the AKP not as the sole explaining framework of its political experiences. However, the conceptualization of the AKP's politics as populism provides a useful framework for an analysis of the mechanisms used to attract the political support of the population for realizing the project of a new Turkey, resulting in the construction of AKP hegemony and the building of new forms of social and political subjectivities in the country.

Around an analysis of the AKP based on the concept and means of populism, some authors analyse the AKP's service politics in providing and satisfying the economic and daily needs of the population in relation to neo-liberalism. According to them, due to the conditions brought about by neo-liberalism the population lost the secure

¹⁸⁷ This discourse was evident in the AKP's 2002 elections pamphlet (AK Party, 2015a). There was a narrative that the country was in crisis because of instability and the AKP promised that it would put an end to this instability through its politics of solving the problems of the country. Around the idea that the AKP filled a gap and met a yearning expressed by the population for a stable and secure country is a common narrative developed by pro-AKP authors. It was true that at the 2002 elections, the population voted for a new party and the political and social climate gave the AKP the opportunity to gain the votes of the population. Relying on this fact, the AKP defined itself as a political organization that satisfied the needs of the population and solved problems, from ethical and cultural problems to economic ones. Therefore, the AKP acted on these needs and constructed them. On the other hand, the desire was defined according to the political perspectives of the party. As its political experiences were seen as the true ones, the rival political organizations were considered to be against this. This discourse was used many times. Therefore, it was not only the population's political preferences that were based on the satisfaction of needs. But the AKP interacts with agencies according to this framework of service politics and tries to make this political experience the hegemonic political perspective in the country.

¹⁸⁸ Jan-Werner Müller places the politics of the AKP and its leader, Erdogan, under the category of populism (Müller, 2016).

economic conditions that were provided by the state, resulting in precarious life conditions. Therefore, the population needed support to supply their daily needs from health to education. The AKP provides the economic and daily needs of the population through state aid and the support of religious organizations. These mechanisms played a role with the population articulating them at elections and in the social practices constructed by the AKP's political line. Not only did the service politics promote neo-liberal policies aimed at the lower classes in society, but they also served the capital groups in society. Through privatization and creating opportunity for the capital groups by the implementation of laws, the interests and demands of the capital groups were met (Yıldırım, 2009; Köse&Bahçe, 2009).

Adding to these practices and mechanisms to satisfy the material needs of the population, the AKP also uses discursive mechanisms to call on the affection and perceptions of the people. As the satisfaction of the daily needs of the population operates to constitute the differential links in Laclau and Mouffe's sense, the discursive practices are based on the construction of the us against them¹⁸⁹ (Laclau&Mouffe: 2001). Based on these ideas, Laclau argues that this construction of an antagonistic line is the logic of populism (Laclau: 2005). A lot of authors have analysed how the boundaries between us and them were drawn by discursive mechanisms in different eras. One of the main themes in the AKP's discourse, especially in its party programs, is the emphasis on a united and harmonious society, as mentioned above. The rival and oppositional forces were seen as the enemies and rivals of this harmony. Service politics as a discourse were used by the AKP to construct these antagonistic frontiers between us and them through the idea that the AKP's existence is for the satisfaction of the needs of the population, and that other

¹⁸⁹ On the basis of this antagonistic construction, until 2010 the alternative and oppositional political forces were considered in total as the representatives of old Turkey whose acts and power were against the interests of the nation due to their insistence on the maintenance of their hegemony versus the democratic demands of the nation. These forces are codified as the tutelage forces, including Kemalists, CHP, military and other forces criticizing and objecting to the policies and political aims of the AKP. Increasingly after the Gezi events, the enemies of the nation, as constructed discursively desiring stability and occupied with the satisfaction of their daily material and immaterial needs, included the Western countries, the finance lobby and their collaborators in the country such as the capital groups gathered around TUSIAD. After the Gülenist 17-25 December operation against Erdoğan and the AKP, these enemies included Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ). After the Gülenist military coup attempt, the enemies included the leftist groups, the Kurdish movement, the Gülenists and all of them were homogenized around the label of terrorists.

forces in opposition to the AKP and outside its alliances constructed temporally according to circumstances were seen as the enemies and as forces of disorder (Türk, 2014; Özsölçük: 2015).

Taken together, while the service politics on the one hand as social and political mechanisms and experiences were implemented to satisfy the needs of the country, on the other hand they operated discursively as the construction of an antagonistic line. However, this is not to say that the mechanisms supplying the daily needs of the population were inclusive for all parts of the population. On the contrary, as some of the authors argue, the distribution of the material sources through aid was exclusive in the sense that this aid was given only to supporters of the AKP. Therefore, the boundaries between us and them were also drawn in material practices (Köse&Bahçe, 2009).

As mentioned above, the main idea signified by service politics is to construct a united and harmonious society free of conflict. The discourse and policies to realize this idea has changing according to the period. Hence, since the AKP started to govern the country, it has implemented policies to construct a new Turkey through service politics. This political practice was developed to satisfy the demands of the population and thereby maintain the AKP's political power and hegemony in the country. Around these policies the AKP was able to articulate and gained the support of about half of the population in the elections and constructed new social and political subjectivities.¹⁹⁰ However, this inclusive political outlook was not able to create a harmonious society and some sections of the population and social and political agents in the country experienced exclusionary practices.

4.1.3. Construction of the AKP's Project: Inclusion and Exclusion or the Alliances and The Allies, The Rivals and Enemies

To realize its project of a New Turkey, the AKP's methods and attitudes to rival and

¹⁹⁰ Not including and dispersing to the whole population, the AKP created the conditions for the emergence of new Islamic and conservative subjectivities with middle and upper class values. İhsan Eliaçık was one of the critics of these new subjectivities. There are a lot of studies of how the AKP constructed new social and political subjectivities and their characteristics.

alternative political and social forces and agents changed according to the period. As mentioned, it included continuity in the sense that the AKP's existence and hegemony strategies were produced through two different means and mechanisms: the exclusion of critical and rival social and political forces, and the inclusion of the population through social and economic policies and of groups through the construction of alliances around discourses and projects which changing according to the period. As mentioned above, the inclusion was realized especially around populist mechanisms from discursive practices to the satisfaction of the demands in society framed by neo-liberal policies.¹⁹¹

The continuities and discontinuities of the AKP's political attitudes is evident in its changing political methods in different conjunctures. As mentioned above, in the initial period, between 2002 and 2010, it used legal means to carry out democratic reforms and the democratization of the country, and the main element in its discourse to constitute a new country was fostering plurality in social and political fields. This discourse included solving ethnic problems and giving equal rights and recognition to different social and ethnic identities, constructing an inclusive political system that recognized different political positions and strengthening civil society. However, these policies to satisfy the daily needs of the population were also based on the exclusion of social and political groups. Therefore, the supporters of the AKP benefited from this. In this period the AKP on the one hand put emphasis on a strong and stable economy, while on the other stressing the democratization of the country, which involved saving the country from the old possessors such as the army and Kemalist bureaucrats, and solving the Kurdish problem by recognizing the Kurds.

¹⁹¹ As mentioned above, some authors argue that populist politics is always based on exclusion and inclusion. It is important to note here that according to Laclau populism is logic of politics based on the antagonistic division of an us and them. To construct this us, therefore, always requires an us. Not implementing these ideas in all political practices, the AKP's construction of the us around populist political mechanisms and means constructed a them. Not reducing the AKP and Erdogan's leadership into an example of populism, it is important to emphasize that populism was one of the main mechanisms of the AKP's project. Based on these ideas, the AKP used populist means to realize the relation between inclusion and exclusion. This is the main characteristic of populism. On the other hand, this exclusion is the way of things, because in any case some social and political groups with different social, cultural and political strategies and dispositions would be outside the inclusive policies. Therefore, here is the intersection of the AKP's inclusion and exclusion mechanisms and the dispositions of the agents. These are interrelated in the sense that they are neither solely the AKP's policies nor the dis-attraction of some of the population. This can be followed in the era of the AKP.

Based on this exclusion and the continuity to maintain economic liberalism policies, the AKP era in the country has involved pursuing different procedures and rules of government and of politics. When it came to power, the AKP's relations with Western countries were based around "conservative democracy". In the beginning, the capital groups in the country and in Western countries supported the government. Increasingly after 2007, some of the leftist groups and liberals started to support the AKP, because of its democracy policies. In this first period the AKP constructed hegemony with an alliance of liberals, leftists and capital groups in the country and amongst the electorate. However, with the eruption of the Gezi, this alliance dissolved, because the leftists, the Western countries and the capital groups gathered around TUSIAD became critical and sometimes antagonistic to the AKP. The other factor in the dissolution of the alliance came from within the AKP, because the struggle between the AKP and Gülenists to possess the power in the country started. Therefore, the forces critical of and opposition groups and agents to the AKP multiplied. Within this process, the AKP constructed new alliances directing itself at Islamic groups and communities. Whereas the Kemalists, nationalists and some of the leftist and Marxist groups critical of it were outside the alliance.

In the second period starting after the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2010, the AKP's alliances and positive relations changed both in the country and in international relationships. Some authors argue that the relations between Western countries and the AKP worsened because the West, especially the USA, gave up on the moderate Islam model. The moderate Islam Model was envisioned as a democratic system in accordance with Islamic values. The AKP was seen as the generative force of this model and it was assumed that after its success, it might be implemented in other Islamic countries, especially in the Middle East's Muslim countries. In parallel with this abandonment by the West, the AKP continued its foreign policy in the Middle East of becoming a model for other countries. Therefore, like the Western countries, the AKP supported the popular uprisings and Islamic groups taking power, especially in Egypt and Syria. However, despite the change of Western policy, the AKP continued its support for Islamic countries and constructed a policy called neo-Ottomanism. According to neo-Ottomanism, the AKP considered itself the leading country in the region and a model regime.

These developments intersected with the increasing and intensified discontent produced by the AKP's policies during its government practice. The groups supporting the AKP's democratic promises among liberals and leftists began to criticize the AKP's foreign policy and argued that it had become authoritative and anti-democratic. The opposition was growing everywhere: the Kemalists, nationalists, Marxists, Alevis and feminists were holding demonstrations when the Gezi erupted. With the eruption of the Gezi, as mentioned above the AKP started to construct a new alliance in the country especially directing itself to Islamic groups.

After the 7 June elections, conflict between the Gülenists and the AKP began. At the 1 November elections the AKP gained a victory, taking 49% of the total votes and gaining 317 deputies out of a total of 550. After the 1 November elections, with the increase of violence in the country due to the conflict between the YDG-H and the armed forces, the AKP used repressive methods, especially against leftist organizations, the Kurdish movement and the Gülenists.

After the military coup attempt of 15 July 2016, AKP declared a state of emergency on 20 July and the state of emergency has been extended. After Turkey's entry into this third period, the AKP constructed new alliances to eliminate the Gülenists from the bureaucracy, army and police. Side by side with the Gülenists, leftists and the Kurdish movement and institutions and organizations from NGOs to the media have been closed down. Public servants, Gulenists and leftists, from academics to police officers have been dismissed and jailed. Mayors, members of the HDP, in the Kurdish cities have been dismissed and trustees appointed in their place. These arrests have also included media institutions and the press outside the leftist and Kurdish media, like Cumhuriyet and Sözcü.¹⁹²

As has been mentioned, the AKP's policies have created discontent in every period and its allies and opponents have changed according to the changing components of

¹⁹² Cumhuriyet and Sözcü are known as Kemalist newspapers.

the AKP's alliances, always excluding some political and social groups.¹⁹³ Within these developments, alternative and antagonistic collective politics have emerged.

4.2. Social and Political Movements and Political Opposition and Alternatives against the AKP: During the AKP Era

Despite the AKP's project to construct a harmonious society and a political field based on compromise, it has not been able to eradicate social conflict, contradictions and political opposition and movements in the country. These dispositions and expressions of dissent have gained political form by either directly producing an expression based on opposition to the AKP or by being political or social expression going beyond a pure anti-AKP political stance. The first group expressed and constructed political experiences with an enmity to the AKP due to the policies and political standpoint of the AKP and as the product of the symptoms that emerged during the AKP era. These include the opposition developed by parliamentary forces and meetings and demonstrations.

The second group of experiences was not directly a product of the AKP. These were continuous political and social experiences which emerged before the AKP, like the Kurdish movement and leftist political experiences. In the case of leftist movements, which increased after the Gezi events, the distinction between being against the AKP and a third line disappeared. These social and political movements were also reformed during the AKP era due to the AKP's policies. That is to say that before AKP governments there were social movements, class struggles, student and youth movements and political organizations of the left and Marxism. These were not the direct product of the AKP era, but were reformed and reconstructed due to political developments and the political position-taking according to these developments.

Taken together, these experiences produced strong alternative and antagonistic politics to the AKP around demonstrations, meetings and resistance, which sometimes gained the support of the population. The other crucial point is that the

¹⁹³ It is interesting that the AKP's alliances have never included Alevi institutions, the CHP and some Marxist groups.

opposition directly to the AKP and alternative politics in Turkey gained different characteristics and had changing agents that constituted these experiences. For example, at the Gezi events some groups on the left and liberal political groups that partly supported the AKP's so-called reforms for a more democratic country, and more antagonistic groups of the national left, Kemalists and critical Marxist groups came together in some political experiences. Or one of the most virulently critical political groups to the AKP, the Aydınlık Movement,¹⁹⁴ acted together with the AKP after the 15 July attempted military coup. These examples were numerous in these changing political attitudes. Hence, the political and social movements during the AKP era will be analysed according to their periods and characteristics.

These social and political movements are mentioned, because these produced political position-taking for the agents such as enmity and antagonism to the AKP and desires and hopes for alternative political and social systems and forms of doing politics, such as horizontal articulations and alliance politics to be articulated by the Gezi and HDP.

4.2.1. The Opposition and Alternative Politics in Parliament During AKP Governments

Social and political movements before the Gezi events were expressed both in parliament by the parties and by social and political groups in the country. The opposition in parliament was carried out by the CHP, MHP and the Kurdish movement.¹⁹⁵ From the beginning, the CHP was critical of the AKP's political practices with the emphasis on the one hand of the AKP's neo-liberal policies, while on the other it opposed its aspirations to change the system. Its opposition peaked during the Republic Meetings organized against the AKP with the emphasis on the

¹⁹⁴ The origins of the Aydınlık Movement go back to Turkey's 1968. Led by Doğu Perinçek, this movement is a Maoist organization approving the principles of Kemalism in a leftist way. The movement's party, the Labour Party (İP) since the 1990s and its mass youth movement, Youth Union of Turkey (TGB) since the 2000s is very active in pursuing a political line synthesized by nationalist leftism and Kemalism. The Aydınlık movement now acts in the legal arena with the Patriotic Party (VP) as a block of nationalists, nationalist leftists, Marxists, Maoists and Kemalists.

¹⁹⁵ During the first government of the AKP, there was only one opposition party in parliament, the CHP.

maintenance of the republic's founding tenets, such as democracy and secularism.¹⁹⁶ During Deniz Baykal's leadership, the CHP's discourse was mainly framed by this emphasis on preserving the values of the republic, such as secularism, with a critique of neo-liberal policies. During Baykal's leadership, the CHP used more antagonistic language.

Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the CHP has multiplied its discourse. Even if under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership the CHP has sometimes used hostile language against the AKP and Erdoğan, it has offered a politics according to which the political parties must have common principles like democracy. In this sense, the AKP was not seen as an enemy and its existence was not denied, but criticized due to its violation of the common values of the republic. Therefore, during Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership the CHP has constructed a more antagonistic discourse.

Hence, from the beginning of the AKP era the CHP has been the main opposition party, active both in parliament and in social and political movements and demonstrations in the country. It was very active in the organization of the republic meetings, in the Gezi events, despite its representational limits on its supporters and the opposition after the Gezi events. Involved in the Gezi actively, the CHP became the most active force in the political field, developing an alternative politics to the AKP and becoming a focus for opponents of the AKP. Increasingly after the Gezi, the CHP was involved in all social and political struggles until the 7 June elections and developed a discourse to end the hegemony of the AKP and tried to draw the AKP to take different and alternative political positions into consideration and become more moderate.

Thus, in this process, like other opposition forces to the AKP and Erdoğan, the CHP defended a political position that prevented the increasing authoritarian means and Erdoğan's project to construct an executive presidential system. The CHP tried to articulate the views of Kemalist, social and leftist Islamist groups, leftists and Marxists and developed alliances with different groups including the MHP. Accordingly, the CHP supported a joint candidate with the MHP in the 2014

¹⁹⁶ For Republic Meetings see, (İşik, 2012).

Presidential Elections. Rather than otherizing and excluding the AKP's voters discursively, its strategy went beyond hostility to the AKP's voters. So, as it was endeavouring to block Erdoğan's power in the country, it aimed to gain support from AKP voters at elections. Like other AKP opponents in the country, it was also a component of anti-AKP and Erdoğan political positions with its social democratic and leftist party programme articulating the different social and political agents that had an anti-AKP and Erdoğan position.

This political line was developed on the one hand to prevent the AKP's coming to power and on the other to increase and create a discourse of being an alternative political force to govern the country, going beyond a pure anti-AKP position it offered to reconstruct the country around democracy, equality and justice, in parallel with the ideas of Kemalism and social democracy, which were considered to be threatened by AKP policies. They considered the AKP and Erdoğan to be a barrier to reconstructing the country through these values. This was exemplified in its election campaign motto: Let's Vote to Make Them (AKP) Go.¹⁹⁷ Their opposition, like other parties such as the MHP and HDP in these elections was aimed at Erdoğan's wish to change the constitution of the republic with the construction of an executive presidential system. Such wishes were seen as a threat to parliamentary democracy and the values of the republic. While not rejecting the idea of constructing a new constitution, Erdoğan's project was seen as being against the will of the people in Turkey to construct a more democratic country.

This political line was maintained after the 7 June elections, seeing itself as an alternative and opposition political party in the country being the advocate of contemporary democratic values such as pluralism, the popular will and equality in all areas of life.¹⁹⁸ Calling Erdoğan's wish for an executive presidential system one-

¹⁹⁷ This was the motto of the CHP's election video. For the video see, (Retrieved 12.03.2016, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHNOUsuhty4>). Also for CHP's election manifesto see, (Retrieved 04.02.2016, from <https://medium.com/chp/101-maddede-chp-nin-ya%C5%9Fanacak-bir-t%C3%BCrkiye-plan%C4%B1-74d46c864f25>).

¹⁹⁸ For instance, for the CHP's election manifesto for the 1 November 2015 elections see, (CHP, 2015).

man rule, it developed a discourse that this project would lead to the abolishing of parliamentary and popular will, and dictatorship. In some circumstances, the CHP tried to construct an image of Erdoğan as dictator. During the process between 7 June and the 15 July failed coup, the CHP placed itself at the center of a political position which appealed to alternative and oppositional AKP agents involved in social and political movements in the country.

The CHP's concerns increased after the 15 July attempted coup and it criticized the declaration of a state of emergency, claiming that these threaten justice and democracy, and accused the AKP of using the coup attempt to realize a counter coup against the people of Turkey. The state of emergency and the increasing arrests of journalists, leftists and members of NGOs were considered as the means of totalitarianism. These methods were considered as a de facto construction of the executive presidential system. These ideas were maintained by the CHP during the 16 April 2017 Referendum campaign. The CHP was the most visible political party during the referendum campaign for a no-vote and called on the population, placing itself as the leading political force to increase the no-voters. Therefore, like other no-vote forces, it developed a discourse emphasizing common values such as democracy, justice and the popular will and developed a moderate rather than antagonistic discourse to Erdoğan. It did not target Erdoğan, but took aim at the proposed system and criticized and objected to this project as being authoritarian and unjust. Within this framework, it developed a discourse that the system was not only negative to its voters and the anti-AKP population, but to the whole of the population.

This populist discourse to articulate the entire population around common values operating as empty signifiers in Laclau and Mouffe's sense, peaked during the Justice March. Around the symbol of Justice, Kılıçdaroğlu started a march after the arrest of CHP parliamentarian Enis Berberoğlu in June 2017 on the accusation of being a spy.¹⁹⁹ Not defining justice strictly, Kılıçdaroğlu referred to the all the discontent in society produced by the AKP and Erdoğan's political position. The symbol of justice denoted the negative feelings in society and positive wishes to

¹⁹⁹ For the Justice March see, (Balbay, 2017; Cengiz, 2017; CHP, 2017; Küçükşahin, 2017).

construct a more democratic country, include all sections of the population, even AKP voters. Like the Gezi, Kılıçdaroğlu's march aimed to construct common political positions for different agents. Different political groups from Marxists, leftists, HDP members to nationalist, rightist and Kemalist groups and agents joined the march with their demands and wishes. Therefore, Kılıçdaroğlu's march was able to attract these groups and agents, providing a common political position through the empty signifier of justice. The march was the best attended social and political event in the country in recent years and caught the attention of the public. It was important in the sense that components of the no-voters could come together in the streets. On the other hand, when thought of as a process of the silence of the social and political movements in the country, it was crucial to produce sympathy within society and to politicize it.

As a result of being the most active alternative legal political force, the CHP, from the beginning of AKP governments, has had a role in constructing political expressions as an opponent and alternative in the country. It has tried to represent worries and discontent with the AKP and to raise political demands for democracy and equality in every area of life, producing a political perspective opposing and being an alternative to the AKP and trying to include different social and political agents from Kemalists to leftists with the emphasis on the ideals of Kemalism and social democracy. Not only being a parliamentarian force, it has been crucial in organizing and increasing the power of social and political movements in the country involved in almost all the political demonstrations and events in the country. Therefore, especially after the Gezi, it has made alliances with leftist and Marxist organizations and movements, including the Kurdish movement as well as Kemalist and nationalist forces.

The MHP was the other important political party in the country and when it entered parliament it became virulently critical of the AKP. From the beginning the MHP's discourse was framed by nationalist ideas. It criticized privatization and the AKP's reforms, because they undermined the unitary structure of the state and society. Until the 2010s, MHP members constructed alliances with Kemalists to save the country

from the AKP's policies and to end its existence.²⁰⁰ In this period, the MHP's political line supported all the nationalist political positions. The other controversial issue for the MHP is the Kurdish problem. When the AKP started peace negotiations and reforms for Kurdish society, the MHP objected, saying they were also undermining the unitary structure of the republic and the nation. During and after the Gezi events, the MHP increased the intensity of its tone of discourse. Especially during the 7 June coalition negotiations, Bahçeli's tone was very harsh and rejected being a coalition partner of the AKP. However, after the 15 July coup attempt, Bahçeli and the leadership of the MHP changed their attitude to the AKP.²⁰¹

Even this change to looking positively on making an alliance with Erdoğan and the AKP did not mean the MHP's political ideas changed. From the beginning, they put emphasis on the fate of the country, insisting on nothing other than a unitary state and one nation, Turkishness, against the so-called divisive forces like the Kurdish political movement and external Western countries targeting the independence and will of the nation due to their interests in the country.²⁰² Therefore, it had strong objections to the AKP's neo-liberal policies such as privatizations and the spoils system in state institutions excluding people who did not support the AKP, and the AKP's democratic reforms in parallel with the law of harmonization as part of the accession process to the EU, including a solution to the Kurdish problem, as these were seen as threats to the nation and country and the AKP was seen as the agent of Western forces. This nationalist outlook was the main basis for the MHP to criticize the AKP and the MHP's opposition to the AKP emerged when AKP policies contradicted this outlook.

²⁰⁰ This was not party policy, but some members constructed with nationalist Leftists, Kemalists and nationalists the Red Apple Coalition. For a critical study of the Red Apple Coalition see, (Atalay, 2006). On the other hand, MHP members were targeted by the Balyoz and Ergenekon trials.

²⁰¹ Despite opponents in the party led by Meral Akşener, Koray Aydin and Ümit Özdağ, MHP supported the executive presidential system and approved of Erdoğan as the country's leader. For the leadership of the MHP, Erdoğan was not only the leader of the AKP, but of all the country and for them imperial western forces had started plots to take power in Turkey to further their aims in the Middle East, which included destroying Turkey. These threats were aimed at Turkey and were personalized in the body of Erdoğan. Against these forces, for the future of the country, the MHP supports Erdoğan, because Erdoğan and the AKP's attitude and wishes represent the interests of the country and the nation. On the other hand, opponents maintained the MHP's old line, distancing themselves from an alliance with the AKP and Erdoğan in parallel with the AKP's wishes.

²⁰² For the MHP's political line see, (MHP, 2009).

On the other hand, the MHP also supported social and political movements in the country. Party members were involved in ecological struggles in the Black Sea Region, supported the TEKEL²⁰³ workers' resistance²⁰⁴ and later, even if Bahçeli warned members of the party not to join in the Gezi, considered the Gezi as a just and legitimate action of the people. With their nationalist outlook, the MHP positioned itself in the anti-AKP camp and supported the demonstrations that started after 17-25 December and created an image of Erdoğan as a repressive and corrupt leader. It developed a discourse of being a nationalist political force and an alternative to the AKP. The MHP maintained this nationalist and statist alternative political position until the 15 July military coup.

The other important oppositional and alternative force in parliament was the Kurdish movement, which had evolved into the HDP. Entering parliament in 2007 with independent candidates through alliances with leftists, Marxists, democrats and liberals, developments in the Kurdish issue formed their agenda. The Kurdish movement's position to the AKP changed over time, this change being framed by the interests of the Kurdish political movement. Increasingly after 2007, the Kurdish political movement with its legal counterpart, the DTP [predecessor of the BDP and HDP], tried to force the AKP to start a peace process. Their opposition and political perspective, thus, was mainly framed by this issue and they considered the AKP's democratic reforms to be positive and endeavoured to include the demands of the Kurdish political movement in these reforms. After the founding of the BDP, the Kurdish political movement continued its pressure on the government and these efforts resulted in the start of a peace process between the PKK and the state.

However, with the foundation of the HDP, the Kurdish political movement, as will be shown later, increased its anti-AKP political position and placed itself in the anti-AKP camp. In addition to its opposition and presence as an alternative force in parliament, the Kurdish movement was active especially in economic, ecological and gender issues, and with leftists and Marxists in organizing and participating in

²⁰³ TEKEL is a state-owned tobacco company.

²⁰⁴For MHP'S support of TEKEL resistance see, (Retrieved 03.03.2016, from <https://www.haberler.com/mhp-den-tekel-iscilerine-destek-ziyareti-haberi/>).

demonstrations of labor unions, social movements and Kurdish popular meetings and demonstrations. Therefore, they were also one of the constitutive forces in the political field producing an alternative and opposition to the AKP and building social and political experiences in the country going beyond mere opposition to the AKP.

As a result, the parliamentary forces side by side with social and political organizations in the country from right to left, were the constitutive agents of the politics that was alternative and oppositional to the AKP and to the existing social and political order. The common point between the above mentioned parties was that all of them were the components of political positions in opposition and alternative to the AKP. Therefore, from their political perspectives, they produced schemes of political action for the agents that could become common in opposition and as an alternative to the AKP, despite their different social and political positions and dispositions. Correspondingly, the different social and political agents were able to come together in some political experiences like the Gezi and the Justice March and during the 2017 Referendum around the no-vote position.

4.2.2. The Social and Political Movements and anti-AKP political opposition between 2002 and Gezi

During the AKP era, a lot of demonstrations and meetings took place, both directly against the AKP's policies and framed by political perspectives and positions beyond an anti-AKP political position. Some of them included numbers of the agents and influenced the country's political agenda of the country, being debated in the media and by public opinion.

The first most important collective and mass political action in the AKP era were the demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces led by the USA and the AKP's support and wish to act in collaboration with coalition forces.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ To support the invasion of Iraq the AKP put forward a motion in parliament for the Turkish army to support military action in Iraq and to open the way for coalition forces to occupy Iraq. However, the motion was rejected by the TBMM due to public pressure including on AKP members. The demonstrations peaked when the proposal was debated in parliament and different political and social groups held a demonstration in Ankara while voting was going on in the TBMM. The demonstrations continued after coalition forces entered Iraq.

Differing in political perspectives and aims, multiple social and political actors from Islamists and communists to anti-war activists joined the demonstrations.²⁰⁶ These demonstrations were part of an international campaign against the invasion of Iraq and thus were not directly against the AKP. However, the AKP's support for the invasion also made it the target of the demonstrations.

Partly expressed around this demonstration, the AKP's policies continued to produce discontent and this discontent was expressed around rallies, press conferences and individual protests. Especially, the AKP's placing its own cadres and sympathizers into public offices, the privatizations and its economic policies led to the exclusion of people who were distant to and critical of the AKP and its policies. On the other hand, the AKP's aspirations to make political reforms were producing fears regarding the future of the republic and the construction of an Islamic-based country. The AKP's aspirations to weaken the old elites and to take control of the power mechanisms of the state produced concerns about the future of the country. Thus, on the one hand the AKP's economic and cultural policies and on the other hand its political aspirations were producing discontent and worries.

This discontent and concern was sometimes expressed at rallies organized by social and political forces critical of the AKP. Thus, towards the end of the AKP's first term in government, the reactions and criticism directly targeting the AKP government and its policies began to gather around mass meetings and demonstrations.²⁰⁷ One of these was protests by hazelnut producers in the Black Sea region in 2006. The hazelnut producers, political parties and the union of Turkish agricultural chambers held a rally in Ordu against the AKP's support for hazelnut merchants and the decrease of state subsidies for hazelnut producers.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Different groups including leftist labor unions and NGOs, Islamist NGOs and different political organizations from the left to Islamists formed a platform to act together called No War In Iraq Coordination. For the demonstration in Ankara to prevent the mandate for military action in Iraq see,(Retrieved 12.11.2016, from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/100-bin-kisi-baris-icin-yurudu-662448/>). Moreover for this organization see, (Önen, 2015).

²⁰⁷ During this first government of the AKP, particular and singular reactions started to emerge especially targeting the AKP's economic policies of privatization and its agriculture policies to decrease state subsidies and support for public agriculture cooperatives.

²⁰⁸ This policy resulted in the decrease of the price of hazelnuts, and the merchants paid low prices while exporting the hazelnuts at a high price. Therefore, as the earnings of the producers decreased,

Demonstrators coming from different cities in the region occupied highways and clashed with the police. These rallies were protests that were partially against the AKP, concentrating upon its agricultural policies rather than targeting its existence.

However, with the republic rallies of 2007 the political actions targeting the AKP's existence became visible and widespread in the sense that the opposition to the AKP was expressed not with regard to particular issues but over holistic issues from the economic to political issues. These rallies were the beginning of the mass anti-AKP political actions bringing different social and political agents and groups together around common political discourses. The rallies and the agents expressed on the one hand their wish for democracy and economic equality and on the other hand expressed an anti-AKP position considering the AKP in conflict and against democracy, freedom and equality.

Most studies and authors, especially from the left and the AKP, considered the Republic Rallies as an expression of Kemalism and Nationalism and it was true that the organizers of the gatherings were mostly nationalist and Kemalist politicians and former army officials. It was an opposition to the AKP around nationalist and Kemalist symbols and discourses. Moreover, even if the rallies were criticized as being putschist, the agents and the supporters of the rallies were heterogenous and there were individuals for whom the reason to attend the demonstrations was to prevent a military coup. (İşik, 2007: 9) It was a popular political action including discontent, worries and fears of the existing government and the policies of the AKP expressed around the loss of the values of the republic (Layanak, 2010), as well as the hopes and desires for a democratic and free country. Criticism seems to focus on an impression that the Republic rallies did not concentrate on the neo-liberal policies of the AKP, but on the threat to the republic. But this was not true, as a lot of participants also expressed their discontent with the AKP's economic policies for creating inequality and deepening the adverse consequences of the exploitation mechanisms in the country.

the merchants' profits increased. For this rally see, (Retrieved 04.03.2016, from <https://www.haberler.com/ordu-ordu-daki-olayli-findik-mitingi-haberi/>).

The most important characteristic of the rallies was that the agents joined the demonstrations through the calls and efforts of the organized forces such as the CHP, İP, SHP, ADDand TGB.²⁰⁹ On the other hand, the meetings were not inclusive of all the political groups in the country that were critical of the AKP. Especially, the leftist and Marxist organizations and agents that were critical of the AKP were not supporters of the demonstrations. Ultimately, the demonstrations included heterogeneous agents, but were homogenous discursively due to the hegemonic discourse being Kemalism and nationalism. But this does not prevent characterizing it as being part of the political opposition to the AKP.

These demonstrations also exemplify the AKP's uncompromising and antagonism-producing way of doing politics, even if the AKP put emphasis on compromise. As a result, despite the fact that the Republic rallies included different social and political agents and groups, the rallies were unable to develop a more inclusive political discourse beyond nationalist and Kemalist signifiers and therefore could not include different political and social groups, such as the majority of the critical Marxist and leftist groups and the Kurdish movement, because these signifiers produced a negation among groups criticizing the rallies for being putschist, Kemalist and nationalist. In that sense, it could not construct an anti-AKP political position for the multiple social and political agents and groups in the country, even if it constructed strong signifiers to articulate the millions in the country around the demands for democracy and freedom and against the AKP's neo-liberal policies. As a result, despite the multiple social and political positions that took part in the rallies, the criticism and opposition to the AKP was about different issues, from the cultural to economic ones, the common articulating discourse being framed by Kemalism. Therefore, the political unification point of the different agents was reduced to Kemalist discourses.

Hydroelectric Power Plant (HES) demonstrations concentrated in the Black Sea region of Turkey maintained the opposition to the AKP in different forms.²¹⁰ Not

²⁰⁹ This is an obvious difference from the Gezi events. Because even if the organized groups peaked at the beginning of the events, the agents were not organized by the determinate organized forces. For an article comparing the Gezi with the republic rallies, see (İyiekici, 2013).

²¹⁰ For a detailed field study about the HES demonstrations see, (Hamsici, 2011).

having certain ideological discourses, like the Republic rallies, the protests around the daily needs of the inhabitants in this region intertwined with ecological worries and the anti-neo-liberal stances of political activists had a more widespread discourse. Towards the end of the 2000's the AKP government started to build hydroelectric power plants concentrating on the Black Sea region, which is rich in water sources.²¹¹ The inhabitants of the HES construction regions held a lot of demonstrations objecting to the AKP government's policy of the commercialization of rivers, renting them to local and international companies and capital groups with different economic and ecological interests. The demonstrations included the inhabitants of the regions, outsiders including ecological and environmental activists, political parties and groups and local community organizations. Ultimately, these demonstrations raised opposition to the AKP's neo-liberal policies and its anti-democratic decisions in the sense that they did not consult the inhabitants, and from NGO's interested in ecological problems in the country. The government was also criticized for using violence against the demonstrators rather than listening to their demands and interests. This attitude of the government created antipathy towards the AKP and increased the common enmity among different social and political groups.

The demonstrations on May Day since 2007 in Taksim were important in producing negative feelings towards the AKP.²¹² These May Days attracted large numbers of people, drew the interest of the population and increased criticisms of the AKP's methods towards these rallies. They raised and constructed an anti-AKP political

²¹¹ The roots of the popular and grassroots organizations in the environmental and ecological struggles in Turkey date back to the movement of the Bergama villagers, who objected to a mining project. With the HES demonstrations, the leftists, especially anarchists, tried to form popular and grassroots organizations such as The Black See in Insurrection. For this group see, (<http://karadenizisyandadir.net/>)

²¹² After the military coup of 1980 any political action for 1 May Day in Taksim was banned by the state, even if some small leftist groups tried to hold demonstrations in Taksim on May Day. Therefore, the trade unions from left to right held May Day rallies in other places in Istanbul. However, in 2007 the leftist trade unions and leftist groups decided to organize a May Day rally in Taksim. This was the 30th anniversary of the 1977 May Day rally in Taksim, when demonstrators mostly consisting of Marxist groups, leftist Trade Unions and supporters of the CHP were killed by shots from unknown gunmen. However, the decision to hold a rally was declared to be unlawful. Except for 2010, 2011 and 2012, May Day rallies in Taksim were declared unlawful. Therefore, between 2007 and 2013 the police used violence and there were clashes between demonstrators and the police. (Retrieved 03002.2016, from <http://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/155348-1-mayis-in-10-yillik-kronolojisi-2004-2013>)

stance before the Gezi events. The police violence against demonstrators and the AKP's stance approving the police violence were seen as anti-democratic and repressive actions. Therefore, these eventful May Days produced negative feelings and perceptions for labor unions and leftist and Marxist social and political movements towards the AKP. In that sense, the AKP was considered a repressive political force that allowed the use of violence against different social and political perspectives.

The other important social movement and action before the Gezi events was the strike of the TEKEL workers.²¹³ As mentioned before, TEKEL workers from different cities gathered in Ankara to protest against their wage being reduced by a law²¹⁴ but they were subjected to police intervention. After repeated police interventions, the workers occupied Sakarya Street, one of the main streets in Ankara, setting up tents. Due to the precarious conditions in the public sector after the privatizations, that had started previously but increased in the AKP era, the TEKEL resistance was a resistance to deteriorating life conditions. Starting with demands relating to the workers' economic interests, the resistance produced an opposition to the AKP that gained support from different political agents and organizations from the left to the right. The criticisms and opposition by the workers and their supporters focused on the government's attitude. The government was targeted because of it not taking a step back from its neo-liberal policies.

For days, the workers, from different ideological and political backgrounds from AKP supporters to sympathizers of the Kurdish movement constructed a common attitude against the neo-liberal policies and the precarious conditions with a critique of the AKP. The resistance brought different political and social orientations and organizations together in support of the workers. The resistance was important in the

²¹³ For a study about the TEKEL resistance see, (Tosun, 2011).

²¹⁴ These sentences summarize the background of the resistance: "TEKEL is a privatised former state economic enterprise – the state monopoly of tobacco and alcoholic beverages – which employs 12,000 workers in 43 factories and workplaces in 21 cities across Turkey. British-American Tobacco, the new owners, sacked thousands of workers at the beginning of 2009. TEKEL workers decided to resist the '4-C' status by which their average monthly wages were reduced from TL1, 200 (roughly US\$800) to TL800 (roughly US\$550), and the fact that they were offered job contracts of 10 months, with no guarantee of renewal." (Özgür, 2011: 180).

sense that the workers constructed a grassroots movement gaining the solidarity and support of political and social groups producing a common criticism and discontent with the AKP. It was symbolically the unification of different social and political groups with their demands against the AKP.

The demonstrations, protests and meetings held by mostly by students of METU inclined to leftist and libertarian political ideas were also among the important political actions against the AKP and Erdoğan. The first demonstration took place in 2011 under the slogan of We are Revolting against the AKP's intention to give permission to deploy police in the universities permanently on 5 January 2011. Students from different universities gathered at the university and wanted to march to the AKP's central office, but the police blocked their way and clashes between students and police started. The AKP's stance was criticized by the demonstrators and the police for using disproportionate force.

In 2012, new events erupted at METU, against Erdoğan's coming into the university. The demonstration was held after Erdoğan went to METU to watch a blast-off by TUBITAK at the university. Erdoğan entered the university accompanied by police and bodyguards, but when the students wanted to protest against him, the police used violence on the students.²¹⁵ After this demonstration, university components including the rectorship, academics, workers, employees and students with the support of leftist groups organized boycotts and a series of forums. The university criticized the AKP and expressed discontent with the government's repression on universities, especially on METU. For the METU components, AKP's interventions and pressures on students and management were considered as the AKP silencing different voices in the universities as part of a project to terminate the independence of the universities and to establish universities in tune with AKP policies. Based on these particular issues, the AKP's policies on the universities were considered as part of its general repressive and anti-democratic policies.

²¹⁵ For details of the events see (Retrieved 06.03.2016, from <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/erdogan-odtuden-ayrildi-polis-geri-cekildi-haberi-64487>; Retrieved 06.03.2016, from <http://sendika62.org/2012/12/odtu-ayaga-kalkti-76110/>).

Shortly before the Gezi events, demonstrations by the women's movements and organizations against a draft law inhibiting the right to abortion were the main opposition to the AKP's policies. In different cities, feminist groups held demonstrations and issued public statements, some of them were prevented by police violence. The law as seen as a signifier of conservative politics through which the AKP used authoritarian methods on women's bodies as part of its repressive and controlling means on society. This intention was seen by feminists as the imposition of the role of motherhood on women and as delegating women into a submissive role. Erdoğan wanted women to have at least three children and this demand and the intention of the law was criticized by feminists, because this demand was to maintain the workforce. Erdoğan's position was an example of its patriarchal framework (Özcan, 2015: 25).

The Diyarbakır Events of 2006, while not directly aiming at the AKP, but being a product of the Kurdish problem, raised discontent with the AKP's stance on the Kurdish issue. On 28 March 2006, the Kurds and the Kurdish movement, especially young people, held massive demonstrations and clashed with the police. The events erupted after the funeral of 4 People's Defence Forces (HPG)²¹⁶ guerrillas, after claims that the guerrillas had been killed by the army with chemical weapons. The events continued for five days and ended with the leadership of the PKK calling on the demonstrators to end the protests. Even if in the 1990s and 2000s the Kurdish movement organized mass meetings and uprisings, these events were very different, as the events started spontaneously with no forces calling the people onto the streets²¹⁷ and they were popular demonstration in the sense that nearly the whole city supported the events, either being at the demonstrations or by boycotting through not going to school, or by striking and closing their workplaces. This is not to say that there was no organizing force, but there was no intention to organize an uprising.

²¹⁶ HPG is the military organization of PKK.

²¹⁷ Even if Kurdish parliamentarians and figures in the Kurdish movement made statements blaming the government and army and claiming that chemical weapons were used to kill the guerrillas, the events erupted during the funerals. The people attended the funerals and after the funerals started to walk towards the city center and on the way the number of people grew spontaneously. Therefore, there was no aim or covert plan by members of the Kurdish movement to organize an uprising.

The events were an explosion of the Kurdish people and Kurdish legal politicians against the insolubility of the Kurdish problem.²¹⁸

These events were important because with these protests the new method of the Kurdish movement's political practice emerged. This method included organizing large scale resistance and uprisings with horizontal methods and with popular masses rather than using guerrilla warfare. This new style of popular political action was also the sign of a new era for both the legal Kurdish movement and the PKK, due to their being able to mobilize the masses through mass movements and organization. Alongside the PKK's armed methods, the Kurdish movement spread civil disobedience through boycotts and began to organize a mass movement from rallies to demonstrations.²¹⁹

These events were an expression of the Kurds' wish for a solution to the Kurdish problem directed against both the AKP and state institutions. Such events erupted whenever a solution of the Kurdish problem entered into deadlock in the form of boycotts and mass demonstrations. Therefore, with these methods, not only armed struggle, but other methods were used by the Kurdish legal and illegal movement to force the state to solve the Kurdish problem. Another important aspect of the events was that a new generation of Kurdish youth, mostly born in the 1990s, was subjected to state violence. These young people organized autonomous groups affiliated with the legal and illegal Kurdish movement, and developed self-defence tactics using violence against state forces and constructed an ability to organize mass demonstrations, sometimes peaceful and sometimes using violence. Taking together these points, after the 2006 Diyarbakır Events, the Kurdish movement gained a capability to organize popular demonstrations.

In addition to these demonstrations having heterogenous political actors, the leftists, Marxists and libertarian and anti-authoritarian groups organized demonstrations and meetings going beyond pure opposition to the AKP and focusing on global issues.

²¹⁸ At this time, there were negotiations between the government and the PKK leadership. Before the events, there were Newroz celebrations on 21 March which were peaceful. For the development of the events see, (Retrieved 14.04. 2016, from <http://www.hafizakaydi.org/31mart/2006-diyarbakir/>).

²¹⁹ The changing political mechanisms and methods of the time will be mentioned below. For a study of the PKK's changing methods see, (Toplum ve Kuram, 2011).

One of these events were the demonstrations during the NATO summit in Istanbul in 2004.²²⁰ These demonstrations included leftist, Marxist, feminist and anarchist groups and organizations and leftist trade unions and civil society organizations and, like the anti-globalization demonstrations, tried to block and prevent the summit. What the protesters from different political perspectives²²¹ had in common was that the summit was militarist and the agent of capitalism. These demonstrations also put an emphasis on the AKP's collaboration with global capitalist and militarist forces. However, these rallies did not spread to other social and political forces, except the leftist groups, or to other cities, even if the demonstrators aimed to gain the support of the country in their struggle against capitalism and its military institutions.

Similarly, the protests against the IMF summit in Istanbul in 2009 expressed anti-capitalist criticism and the discontent of the protesters with the AKP's attitude to capitalism and neo-liberalism. These protests were also unable to include wide sections of society. However, both the anti-NATO and anti-IMF protests introduced new forms of doing politics like horizontal and bottom-up organization in mass rallies. It made visible anti-authoritarian groups and their new methods of protest.²²²

These two political actions were mostly carried out by Marxist, leftist and anti-authoritarian groups that were unable to disperse the protests into the population in general and throughout the country, but produced new forms of mass street demonstration. Different political groups formed alliances and maintained the political experiences for days acting in common using different methods from street clashes with the police to forums.²²³ In these experiences, anti-authoritarian and

²²⁰ The summit continued for 3 days and the demonstrators tried to enter the area of the summit through clashes with police, civil disobedience and peaceful methods, but were blocked by the police.

²²¹ While the traditional Marxists considered the summit as an act of imperialism, groups like anarchists put emphasis on the globalization process.

²²² These included joyful and humorous slogans and colorful corteges at the protests. These methods were used many times by the LGBTT, anarchist, feminist and libertarian groups at 8 March Women's Days, May Day rallies and at other demonstrations. But through these rallies and demonstrations these methods became more visible in public opinion.

²²³ In Turkey, the leftist, Marxist and anti-authoritarian groups have always organized the political experiences through alliances and forming blocs at particular events like May Day. This was a known method to organize for them. But especially at the anti-IMF demonstrations, the political experiences became more horizontal and spread over days.

autonomous social and political groups became more visible and the modes of the political experiences included more grassroots and from down-to-top methods.

As a result, before the Gezi, the country experienced a lot of social and political experiences and movements directly against the AKP and going beyond an anti-AKP position mostly maintained by the leftist, democratic, Marxist and anti-authoritarian groups and organizations for the democratization of the country and constructing a new society and country. The anti-AKP political position and discourse was the main expression at the social and political experiences in the country and in time the social and political alternatives and opposition became to gather around this position. Therefore, the political and social actions mentioned above make it evident that before the Gezi the criticism, hate and discontent increased amongst the different social and political agents from left to right, from the political organizations who produced an image of the AKP and Erdoğan as repressive, controlling and authoritarian agents, silencing and neglecting the different and alternative political and social voices in the country. On the other hand, these actions produced an anti-AKP political position in the political field by different agents and organizations being separate, but with their concentration and expression of their political perspectives through this opposition to the AKP. It is the Gezi events that restructured this opposition into a new form bringing together the different political and social positions, going beyond mere representations of these expressions of opposition to the AKP and its political practice. This opposition included the political forces that approved of the existing system in the country, from the currents of Kemalism to the existing rightist parties, and those that rejected it and wished for the construction of a new society and politics, from the leftist Kemalists, social democrats, democrats to Marxists, anti-authoritarian groups and leftists.

4.2.3. The Political Alternatives and Opposition to the AKP between the Gezi and 15 July Military Coup

The political opposition to the AKP peaked and took on a new form as the Gezi events continued. After the recreation of political experiences from the streets to park forums and efforts to construct alliances for popular organizations, in September

2013 the demonstrations erupted again. Not being as widespread as the Gezi, the events were sparked in METU, when the mayor of Ankara, Melih Gökçek, announced a road project passing through the METU woodland despite the unwillingness of the METU administration and the components of the university from students to academics and the criticism of civil society institutions under the influence of leftist organizations. The events widened mostly to localities in the country where leftist and Marxist groups were strong.²²⁴ Not only leftist groups, but also other political forces opposing the AKP also criticized this project.

Opposition was expressed through demonstrations on all occasions after Gezi. In particular, the 17-25 December operation by the Gülenists issuing video and audio records of the evidence of AKP corruptions sparked demonstrations in the country. The political and social agents from left to right and from parliament to the streets criticized the AKP's economic policies and its foreign policy in Syria acting with Islamist groups against the Assad regime. Even if no institutionalized political alliance was founded, a lot of groups constructed a common discourse seeing the AKP as an authoritarian and corrupt political organization.

This common political opposition was present during Berkin Elvan's²²⁵ funeral in Istanbul. Even if Berkin Elvan was a leftist boy sympathetic, all of the groups opposing the AKP embraced him as a symbol of the people. For example, the MHP's leader Bahçeli said that "...Berkin is a loss of all of us, the sadness of all of us and our common pain."²²⁶ This common political attitude also led to alliances between

²²⁴ The first reaction came from Armutlu, Hatay, where the opposition to AKP was very strong both before and during the Gezi due to the AKP's Syria policies. During the September events, Ahmet Atakan, a leftist university student, was killed by the police and thus Armutlu became the symbol of the September events. Likewise, in Istanbul and Ankara the events spread into the leftist and mostly Alevi neighbourhoods like Tuzluçayır and Dikmen where the state wanted to build Mosque-Djemevi (Cemevi) buildings. These projects, announced as bringing together the different sects of Islam were objected to by Alevis because for them these projects aiming at the assimilation of Alevism into Sunni Islam, because the mosque as a place of worship is very different from the Cemevi, the ritual place of Alevis.

²²⁵ Berkin Elvan was a young boy living in Okmeydanı and after being injured by the police during the Gezi fell into a coma. He died after being in a coma for 267 days after his injury. In different cities the leftist political organizations, labor unions and NGO's organized the funeral in Istanbul and demonstrations everywhere. The funeral was before the local elections in Turkey and the demonstrators everywhere used violence towards AKP election offices and buildings.

²²⁶ For Bahçeli's speech about the death of Berkin Elvan see, (Retrieved 16.03.2016, from <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/928871-bahceliden-berkin-elvan-aciklamasi>).

different political groups at the 2014 local elections. For example, the CHP stood Mansur Yavaş, a former MHP member, as its candidate for Ankara's mayor.²²⁷

One of the other common political attitudes developed by the opposition to the AKP was with regard to the Soma mine disaster. 301 miners were killed in the mine owned by a private company. The reactions to the disaster brought to the fore criticisms that the AKP government protected businessmen, who are its supporters and members, to the detriment of workers and society. This was the case at Soma and critics argued that the AKP did not take responsibility for the disaster and did not punish the owners of the mine. Also, this disaster was seen as a symbol of the AKP's economic and social policies framed by neo-liberalism and conservatism being detrimental to society.

These cases and contexts show that even if there was no common institutionalized political alliance between different social and political groups, the political groups found common ground in criticizing the AKP and producing a strong anti-AKP political position in the political field after the Gezi events. Even if political groups had their political lines and agendas, doing politics concentrated upon anti-AKP position-taking aiming to end the AKP's hegemony and preventing it coming to power again. This was also evident at the 7 June elections when the CHP, HDP and MHP developed an anti-AKP discourse in the election campaign.²²⁸

After the 7 June elections, Turkey entered into a new process. After the elections none of the political parties were able to form a government alone. Coalition negotiations were unsuccessful and ultimately Erdoğan as president enabled the AKP to form of a coalition government. Except the HDP, the other parties rejected joining a coalition and an early election was called. During this process, as mentioned previously, the peace negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state ended. A

²²⁷ It was very interesting that around the opposition to the AKP some leftist authors and activists supported developing a political attitude against the AKP at the local elections.. For example, Gün Zileli, an anarchist activist and author, recommended that to defeat the AKP in local elections the people should vote for the strongest candidates against the AKP candidates in localities. In other words, the people were urged to vote for the MHP or CHP candidate in the Western regions and the HDP candidate in Kurdish regions against the AKP.

²²⁸ However, this is not to say that they constructed their political discourse only negatively targeting the AKP, as they also had alternative policies to govern the country.

suicide bombing against young leftists and Marxists was carried out by ISIS and subsequently armed conflict between the YDG-H and Turkish armed forces started.

Increasing conflict between the YDG-H and the Turkish state produced nationalist reaction and the AKP organized flag demonstrations which nationalist forces from both the left and the right joined. In different cities, the demonstrators used violence against HDP buildings. For example, in Ankara the demonstrators set fire to the HDP's central office and tried to enter Konur Street to clash with leftist groups. Despite this conflict,²²⁹ the anti-AKP position was maintained by the political groups in the country until the 1 November elections. After the elections, the conflict between the YDG-H and the Turkish state continued. During this process, political and social groups criticized the state's armed actions in Kurdish cities due to the violence used against civilians. Accordingly, some academics, Academicians for Peace, put out two declarations criticizing the use of violence in the Kurdish problem and called for peace between the PKK and the Turkish state. After the first declaration, the government and president Erdoğan used a violent discourse accusing the academics of being supporters of terrorism and being terrorists. Then some of the academics were arrested and charged.²³⁰ Following the declaration, the war between the YDG-H and the state's armed forces and ISIS' and TAK's bombings increased and the state started to exert repression on leftist and Kurdish political organizations, and to close down media institutions.

Even if the rallies and demonstrations continued and political parties such as the CHP, MHP and HDP criticized the AKP and Erdoğan from their perspectives, there was no common opposition between the forces and the numbers of participants at protests decreased. This was the situation especially for the left and the Kurdish movement within the opposition and alternatives to the AKP and the political system. As mentioned many times, even if the agents of the leftist and Kurdish political

²²⁹ From the beginning, there were conflicts between anti-AKP political groups. For example, even if some MHP members had a positive view of the HDP, the MHP always accused the HDP of supporting the PKK and the Kurdish movement of being divisive. Especially during 7 June Coalition discussions, the MHP said that they would never come together with the HDP to govern the country. Moreover, some other groups like Aydınlık and Sözcü always had a negative attitude to the HDP's existence.

²³⁰ Ultimately, most of the members of BAK were fired after the 15 July coup or fled abroad.

organizations did try to develop and do politics both against the AKP and in accordance with their political strategies and perspectives, they were ineffective in the sense of blocking the AKP's policies or triggering huge social and political movements. Even if in some cases, the leftist political and social organizations from the CHP, ÖDP, HDP, and Halkevleri to Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) and Confederation of Public Workers' Unions (KESK) tried to form institutionalized alliances and bloc-like actions and organizations, they were ineffective.

4.2.4. The Political Experiences After 15 July

After the 15 July attempted coup the AKP tried to organize an alliance between the political parties, excluding the HDP, which it listed under the category of terrorist forces consisting of Gülenists, ISIS, PKK and other illegal Marxist groups such as the Revolutionary People's Liberation Front/Party (DHKP-C). The political and social groups came together during democracy rallies and one of these took place at Yenikapı. The MHP and CHP participated at this rally. While the MHP supported the rallies and Erdoğan's demand to declare a state of emergency, the CHP emphasized the reconstruction of democracy. On 20 July 2016 the AKP, with the support of the MHP in parliament, declared a state of emergency (OHAL).²³¹ However, this declaration was criticized by the CHP.

The dismissals of academics and public officials accused of being members of terrorist organizations was mostly criticized by the leftist organizations and labor unions. KESK in particular organized a lot of demonstrations in different cities to object to the dismissals of its members. On 17 February, after the dismissal of BAK members and leftist and democratic academics from the universities, Eğitim-Sen organized demonstrations. Concentrating upon the dismissals from Ankara University, Eğitim-Sen raised its voice against OHAL. Gülmen and Özakça's protests were part of these protests. Not being able to trigger massive

²³¹ Since this date, the AKP with the support of the MHP has extended the state of emergency every 3 months.

demonstrations, Gülmen and Özakça's protest took public attention with their non-violent passive resistance.

As mentioned above, the CHP was the main opposition force after the coup, active both in parliament and in street demonstrations objecting to and criticizing OHAL and the laws issued by it. CHP argued that the AKP had carried out a coup on 20 July 2016 by declaring a state of emergency and using it to make Erdoğan's power in the country stronger and parliament ineffective. These are signifiers of the authoritarian and anti-democratic. The CHP maintained these criticisms during the 16 April 2017 Constitutional Referendum. It formed a strong No front and took an active role to increase the No-vote.

The referendum process was also crucial for anti-AKP politics. During the referendum campaign, the supporters of the No campaign from the right and left developed a common discourse. Even if there is no evidence that these different social and political forces acted in common around organizational and institutional practices,²³² it was evident that all the supporters of the no-vote put emphasis on the fear of increasing authoritarianism in the country. The no-voters did not raise their voices in the streets and public areas, instead forming a silent bloc. This is a passive and silent political attitude developed after the 1 November elections. This attitude was the product of the political climate in the country that silenced and decreased social and political movements in the country, leading to a decreasing number of people at demonstrations, rallies and social and political organizations, especially those developed by leftist organizations and social and political movements. Under these conditions, the characteristic of this attitude is that the agents conceal their political feelings, perceptions and demands rather than expressing them explicitly.

In that sense, during the referendum process, a bloc of the social and political agents formed around the fears and worries that the political system might be transformed into an authoritarian regime through the executive presidential system. As the CHP and some of the other forces like the opponents to the MHP leadership tried to

²³² Erdoğan and other AKP members claimed that all the no-voters acted, although unaware of it, in unison with terrorist groups like FETÖ, DHKP-C and PKK. (Retrieved 16.06.2017, from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/will-voting-make-you-a-terrorist-or-a-coup-plottter-109716>).

organize public meetings and speeches, other groups from leftists, Marxists to Kemalists expressed their ideas on the proposed presidential system by using mass communications. All of these efforts left aside their political ideologies, bringing to the fore the common feelings and attitudes formed in the country.²³³

4.3. A Short History of the Left and the Kurdish Movement in Turkey after the Military Coup

4.3.1. Left and Marxism in Turkey: A Short History of the Unification Experiences and of Changes

The 12 September 1980 military coup was something of a milestone for Marxist and leftist politics in Turkey.²³⁴ Before the coup, a lot of illegal and legal organizations in the country were very active in trade unions, social movements and student and youth movements. They were able to organize mass demonstrations and gain social and political experience. However, with the 12 September Military Coup, the leftist and Marxist organizations lost their popular support. In the mid 1980s the leftist organizations reappeared on the political scene of Turkey especially in the universities and neighbourhoods where the sympathizers of Marxist and leftist organizations lived. The reappearance of the leftist organizations and politics continued on the one hand maintaining their forms of organization, especially around Marxist-Leninist principles based on a hierarchical structure led by executive committees, according to their tradition, while on the other hand emerging with new organizational structures through anti-authoritarian methods.²³⁵

²³³ For more information see, (Retrieved 14.01.2018, from <http://cilekagaci.com/2017/04/26/how-did-erdogan-win-an-analysis-of-the-turkish-referendum-results/>).

²³⁴ Increasingly after the 1960 military coup, the leftists, especially through the youth and student movements, were gaining in force. This process peaked during Turkey's 1968 due to the student and youth movements on the one hand and the labor movements led by the Marxist-oriented organizations on the other. Even if the 12 March 1971 military coup blocked Turkey's 1968 through the imprisonment and death sentences passed on young Marxists like Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan and the killing of young militants like Mahir Çayan, the Marxist organizations gained force amongst the workers, students and youth.

²³⁵ Before 1980, not all of the Marxist organizations were structured like the Communist parties sympathetic to the Soviet Union that founded organizations in different politicized areas from the workers to student movements through organizations that were directly connected as Komsomol

Towards the end of the 1980s, the labor unions and the opposition to the neo-liberal policies implemented by the ANAP increased. Within this process, some of the leftist groups started to discuss the formation of a united organisation and creating alliances of leftist and Marxist organizations around blocs and parties. These discussions emerged with a strategy to involve Marxism in society and in political spaces and fields and make it a hegemonic and strong force. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc countries, a lot of groups joined this process to reorganize the socialist movement in the country. These groups included the influential Marxist groups in the country such as DEV-YOL, Kurtuluş and members of the TKP. The process ended with the establishment of the ÖDP.²³⁶

The ÖDP included political groups, ideologies and agents from liberals and social democrats to traditionalist Marxists, new leftism, anarchists and feminists.²³⁷ Differing in their political strategies and outlooks the common aim was to articulate different social and political movements and organizations in the country, to become a mass organization and to pave the way for the revolution in the country as well as to make reforms in the political structures of the country putting emphasis on democratization and criticism of neo-liberalism. However, in 2001, after discussions about the party's political line and organizational structure, a lot of groups left the party and established new organizations. Therefore, the party lost its heterogenous character and its social and political influence in the country.

organs. Some of the organizations like Dev-Yol were organized as grassroots movements, having self-decision mechanisms and semi-independent organizations from the executive committee, among the youth, villagers and workers. In particular they were organizing resistance committees designed as direct democratic and self-governance organizations of the future society. These efforts were apparent in Fatsa, a town in the Black Sea region, where the people were organised, excluding MHP members, around self-governing popular committees. These were the means for the construction of socialist power from top to bottom, but not as organizations of the 'revolution now' groups. For, some authors argue that even if they were constructing new forms of sociability and politics, they were mainly designed as tactical organizations (Bozkurt, 2008). Despite these limitations, these organizational traditions produced new forms of politics close to autonomous, direct democratic and self-governance politics. The experiences in Fatsa were prevented by the state and the army's intervention through prison sentences and detention before the coup, because the state considered the Fatsa experience to be communism.

²³⁶ There are a lot of studies about the unification experiences of the Marxist organizations in Turkey. Seyfi Öngider's article summarizes these experiences critically, mentioning their limitations and possibilities (Öngider, 2007). Also about the experiences until the ÖDP was established (Kara&Koç&Sayın&Yavuz&Baykal, 1995).

²³⁷ For a study about ÖDP see, (Demirer, 1996).

Some of the organizations maintained alliances around new organizations and they mostly developed alliances with the Kurdish movement in the elections. In the 2007 elections, in particular, with the active support of the legal Kurdish Party, HADEP, some individuals entered parliament. This alliance continued at the 2011 elections and most of the leftist organizations also joined the election alliances developed by the Kurdish movement and leftists. These alliances initially took an organizational form with the HDK and elements of the HDK, then formed the HDP.

The alliance and bloc experiences of the left in Turkey emerged side by side with the traditional legal and illegal organizations such as DHKP-C, Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML) and Maoist Communist Party (MKP).²³⁸ Even if these organizations used the methods of grassroots movements and popular self-management organizations, they mostly organized around hierarchical structures led by executive committees. For example, the DHKP-C²³⁹ started to organize in the neighbourhoods, where Marxist organizations always gained support from the inhabitants, such as Okmeydanı, Gazi and 1 Mayıs Mahallesi in Istanbul.²⁴⁰ These mass and popular organizations were led by militants, but they were designed as self-governing mechanisms being front organizations connected to the party.²⁴¹

Alongside these developments and changes on the left and in Marxism in Turkey, there was the emergence of different political currents within the left. These currents comprised feminists, LGBTTI's, anarchists, libertarian socialists and autonomist groups. They tried to produce new forms of doing politics, differing from traditionalist Marxism. Some of them were also active in the unification and alliance

²³⁸ However, except for the DHKP-C, these organizations entered into the alliance with the HDP and PKK, forming an illegal armed organization.

²³⁹ It is an organization founded after the abolishing of DEV-SOL, which was an active and illegal armed political organization which carried out armed actions against the state, police and army both before and after 1980. Its members were active in neighbourhoods of the big cities until the 1990s.

²⁴⁰ These were the neighbourhoods where the poor Alevi and Kurdish people lived. They were very active in the Gezi. Side by side with these neighborhoods were areas such as Dikmen and Tuzluçayır in Ankara, where leftists and Marxist organizations gain support. In these neighbourhoods, the leftist organization, Halkevleri, is very active.

²⁴¹ These illegal organizations were very important for the Marxist tradition in the country, creating the type of revolutionary subject dedicating itself to socialist and communist ideals and being identified with the organization. These organizations also were subjected to changes over time, producing new forms of leftist militants. For the limits of the study, these changes will be excluded.

experiences of the left in Turkey. These groups were active both in social and political movements organized by the leftist groups and organized different social and political movements and experiences independent of leftist organizations.

They started to create new political spaces, focusing not only on labor problems, but also sexuality and authority. Even if they were quantitatively small, these political groups were influential in social movements outside the traditional Marxist and leftist organizations. For example, the feminists created a political space that attracted the attention of the public and of political groups. The emergence of feminism in Turkey dates back to before the 1980s with the foundation of the The Progressive Women Association (İKD) by the TKP. In the post-coup era, the feminist movement differentiated from the previous experiences of the PWA in the context of its methods of organization and its perspective on women's issues. (Özçürümez&Cengiz, 2011) After the military coup feminists established independent organizations from the leftist and Marxist organizations. Bringing the issue of women into the political arena, they organized solidarity institutions like Mor Çatı to prevent violence against women. They also started to organize 8 March demonstrations and produced political experiences to make the women's voice heard in the political field. The feminist movement in Turkey is crucial in the sense that they brought direct-democratic decision-making mechanisms into the political practice of the left and Marxism and influenced their political perspectives through bringing criticism of political and social inequality into economic issues.

Meanwhile, the autonomous and libertarian groups like autonomist Marxists, anarchists and autonomous social and political movements like the organizations pursuing ecology struggle were also changing the political perspective of the left in Turkey. Anarchists, in particular, were interested in conscientious objection, anti-militarist politics, feminism and LGBTT politics, their anti-hierarchical organizational structures and new modes of protest were humorous and creative, influencing other leftist groups in the country. By influencing leftist and Kurdish political activists and organizers, they encouraged them to declare conscientious objection, organizing other groups around the Anti-war Union in the 1990s and the Conscientious Objectors Union since the 2000s. Also, the anarchists' emphasis on ecological issues and environmental politics led to the establishment of organizations

criticizing capitalism and modernity and efforts to produce new life forms from non-industrial agriculture to veganism.

As a result, these groups were not able to make their political organizations attractive for the population, except for the feminists, as their emphasis on the daily problems of women created public opinion,²⁴² but they did lead to the emergence of new forms of politics for the left and Marxism in Turkey. In fact, the libertarian and anti-authoritarian mode of politics was not alien to the leftist and Marxist tradition in the country. This tradition tried to organize mass movements using horizontal organizational mechanisms. One of the most visible of these was the student events of the 1990s against the YÖK and the increasing student fees organized by the Student Coordinations. Student Coordination organized themselves around horizontal structures trying to include all students around their everyday problems such as the high cost of university fees, as the youth organized around the Revolutionary Way.²⁴³

4.3.2. A Short Note on the Left and Marxism between 2002 and 2010: Divisions and Conflicts

During the first period of AKP rule, the leftist and Marxist organizations were divided between supporting the AKP and positioning themselves in opposition to it. The latter criticized the AKP's neo-liberalism and objected to its reforms because they ultimately reconstructed its authority in parallel with neo-liberalism. Including groups like the ÖDP, TKP and Halkevleri, the latter group considered the AKP as a force of imperialism and capital and being a conservative and anti-democratic force. Thus, they claimed that all of its policies served the interests of global capitalism and

²⁴² As mentioned previously, during abortion demonstrations, the feminists became very visible and influential in setting their agendas in the political field. Adding to this, they were very active during the AKP era with their demonstrations attracting the attention of the government and public opinion.

²⁴³ As mentioned above, Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way) was the strongest organization before the 1980 military coup. After the coup different groups emerged from this group claiming to be the successor of the Revolutionary Way. The methods used by the Student Coordination, such as organizing people around everyday problems were used before by Revolutionary Way. Therefore, this way of doing politics were considered as hegemony politics by some authors. Therefore, the mode was not new, but the organizations were more flexible and autonomous organizations.

local capital groups, which supported the AKP's hegemony in the country and its political desires to construct a more conservative society. These ideas had similarities to Kemalist leftists like Aydinlik and the leftists in the CHP in the sense that these groups also considered the AKP to be a threat to the country's independence through its neo-liberal policies such as privatization and taking over the power of state institutions designed as institutions of the popular will in parallel with the interests of the European Union (EU) and USA. For these groups, the aim of the AKP was not to democratize the country, but to strengthen its power and hegemony and thus its reforms in parallel with EU laws were nothing other than to make room both for neo-liberalism and conservatism.

On the other hand, even if the Marxist groups never objected to the reforms in the country, such as a solution to the Kurdish problem and democratic reforms, not being sceptical like the Kemalists,²⁴⁴ other groups were sympathetic to the AKP and argued that it would put an end to the 12 September Constitutional Law and would create the space for the organization of different political ideologies rather than repressing differences. These groups in parallel with liberals, democrats and conservative democrats hoped to block the power of the elites, especially the Army and parallel state forces, seen as the agents of anti-democratic policies, and to make room for different voices such as the Kurds and other minorities and the social and political movements of the left, providing them with legal rights and freedom.

The division between the leftists and Marxist became more visible and peaked during the 2010 referendum. As mentioned before, some groups voted for Yes in the hope of a more democratic and free country, believing that such a change in the country would make space for the development of the left. However, after the 2010

²⁴⁴ The criticism of Marxist groups was framed by their perspectives. For example, a lot of Marxist groups, especially the illegal organizations like DHKP-C were always sceptical about the reforms and rejected negotiating for democratic policies with the state. On the other hand, a lot of groups always supported the democratic reforms and made politics within NGOs like the Human Rights Association (IHD) to force the state to make reforms, especially to prevent the anti-democratic effects of the 1983 Constitution and to expose the state's secret forces' unlawful killings and torture of leftist and Kurdish militants and supporters. In other words, the democracy struggle for the left was always an issue of politics side by side with their labor and gender politics. However, the AKP's wish to change the Constitution was rejected, because for these groups even if changes to the Constitution included reforms, the weight of the changes would give an extraordinary legal power to the AKP, which was considered as leading an authoritarian regime.

referendum, the AKP's more majoritarian way of doing politics, its changing relations with the West and its foreign policy in Syria, supporting Islamist groups, made these Yes voters distant and critical of the AKP. Hence, the divisions between the groups became invisible and they constructed a common discourse towards the AKP, seeing it as a repressive, conservative and authoritarian political force.

4.4. The Emergence of the HDP: The Changing Political Outlook of the Kurdish Movement and PKK and The Unification Experiences of the Left in Turkey

4.4.1. Kurdish Movement: PKK and Legal Politics from the HEP to HDP

Both the PKK and the legal Kurdish movement, starting with the establishment of the People's Labor Party (HEP), are important political organizations and experiences for the HDP.²⁴⁵ Until the 1990s, the PKK'S ideology was Marxist-Leninist and it aimed at the liberation of the Kurdish people through armed struggle and for the construction of a new Kurdish national identity and subjectivity for the Kurds in all the countries in which they lived through the establishment of an independent socialist Kurdish state in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. So, the solution offered to the Kurdish problem was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. However, in the 1990s the PKK's methods and perspective changed from the struggle to establish an independent Kurdish State to democratic autonomy.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ Along with different Kurdish political organizations, the PKK and the legal parties that started with the HEP were called the Kurdish political movement. Before the 1980 military coup, there were a lot of Kurdish organizations including nationalist, Marxist and leftist sections. One of them, he PKK, was established in 1978 by Turkish and Kurdish Marxists, mostly comprising university students, led by Öcalan to establish a socialist independent Kurdish state. After the military coup, the PKK became the strongest organization in the Kurdish political movement in Turkey. It also had influence on the legal parties and these legal parties' political perspectives were always in accordance with the PKK.

²⁴⁶ The concept of democratic autonomy is used by Öcalan as interchangeable with concepts like democratic nation, democratic republic and democratic confederalism. All these concepts show that Öcalan's and the PKK's ideology has changed from a traditional Marxist-Leninist perspective to solve the Kurdish problem through constructing an independent Kurdish state designed as a socialist state. Öcalan explains the difference of democratic autonomy from establishing a Kurdish state in his writings on democratic confederalism. He proposed to solve both the Kurdish problem and a new political and social system for the peoples and nations of the Middle East, rather than construct a Kurdish state. Thus, the democratic autonomy project as designed to constitute a society and life organized horizontally and with self-management organizations to produce a society with the principles of equality, justice and freedom is not only for the Kurds and for the solution of a national

Some authors argue that the ideological changes in the PKK started in the 1990s,²⁴⁷ gaining its total expression after Öcalan's capture by the Turkish state in Kenya (Gürer, 2015:135). The PKK started to change its ideological and political ideas from classic Marxist-Leninist socialism and solutions to the national problem expressed in the PKK's ideology as the establishment of an independent Kurdish state to the new leftist and communist, post-structuralist and libertarian ideas inspired by Murray Bookchin, Negri and Laclau. With this change, the constitution of democratic autonomy was offered as a solution for the Kurdish problem.²⁴⁸ This change means

problem, but also for the other peoples in the region and in Turkey and for the other social and political forces struggling for a society and life based on the ideals of leftism, libertarianism and Marxism. In his writings Öcalan criticizes the concept of state and solving the Kurdish problem by constructing a state, because for him the state cannot provide freedom for the peoples and humanity. It differentiates autonomy from the state: "The right of self-determination of the peoples includes the right to a state of their own. However, the foundation of a state does not increase the freedom of a people. The system of the United Nations that is based on nation-states has remained inefficient. Meanwhile, nation-states have become serious obstacles for any social development. Democratic confederalism is the contrasting paradigm of the oppressed people. Democratic confederalism is a non-state social paradigm. It is not controlled by a state. At the same time, democratic confederalism is the cultural organizational blueprint of a democratic nation. Democratic confederalism is based on grassroots participation. Its decision-making processes lies with the communities. Higher levels only serve the coordination and implementation of the will of the communities that send their delegates to the general assemblies. For limited space of time they are both mouthpiece and executive institution. However, the basic power of decision rests with the local grassroots institutions." (Öcalan, 2001, 33) For Öcalan, democratic autonomy can construct new social subjectivities different from modernist and liberal ones and imagined as giving freedom and rights to the people with the framework of a new citizenship through which individuals can find a place within society with equal rights and freedom. For a study of the concept of democratic autonomy and the practices in Turkey around this concept by the Kurdish political movement see, (Gürer, 2015;Bakar, 2015).

²⁴⁷ In 1993 the PKK started a negotiation process with the Turkish State to end the armed conflict and to solve the Kurdish problem by legal means. Therefore, the idea of a united Kurdish state in the four countries started to be replaced, even if it did not gain a discursive expression in the PKK 's perspective and ideology. Therefore, the replacing of a united independent Kurdish state with democratic autonomy as a solution to the Kurdish problem matured in the 2000s with Öcalan's new ideas (Gürer, 2015: 142-145).

²⁴⁸ These ideas were influenced by contemporary philosophers and thinkers like Hardt&Negri and Laclau in synthesis with Marx and anarchism. Çetin Gürer's study explains well the ideological changes in the PKK's political perspective and ideology and the role of historical developments in this change (Gürer, 2015). The ideological framework developed by Öcalan also informed the legal Kurdish movement and Kurdish political and social practices leading to new forms of organizations and the construction of a new Kurdish political identity. Around democratic autonomy, the local governments of the Kurdish movement tried to realize the democratic autonomy project through the construction of democratic and political mechanisms. For a case study in a neighborhood of Istanbul of how democratic autonomy is constructed by the Kurdish movement see. (Bakar, 2015) These mechanisms included giving equal rights to different ethnic groups, communal economy and grassroots decision-making mechanisms. Side by side with these ideas, the PKK's organizational structure also changed. Even if it did not totally terminate the hierarchical and bureaucratic

that the Kurdish problem in Turkey can be solved not through the division of the country, but with a common life according to which the Kurds and Turks will live together through giving equal rights to the different identities in the country and creating self-determination mechanisms without the construction of a new state involving division. Öcalan developed these ideas in his articles and books under different names: democratic autonomy, democratic nation, democratic republic (Gürer, 2015: 134). These ideas are designed to change the political system of the country.

The passage from the establishment of an independent Kurdish state to democratic autonomy formulated by Öcalan brought about new political practices for the Kurdish political movement, under the hegemony and influence of the PKK (Toplum ve Kuram, 2011). The PKK's political activities gained different expression through three stages after 1980. In the first phase, between 1984 and 1990, the PKK tried to increase its guerilla forces in the formation phase of the armed struggle. In the 1990s, its methods included gaining popular support and popular uprisings were organized. Not only guerilla forces, but also the Kurdish people were armed for a revolutionary uprising to take over the Kurdish regions in Turkey. Via this method, the PKK created liberated zones in the Kurdish regions, but the state's response was violent. On the other hand, in the 1990s the PKK also declared ceasefires for a democratic and political solution and approved negotiations with the Turkish state. However, this process ended in 1993 and since then the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has caused the death of more than 30,000 people and the forced migration of millions of people, mostly Kurds, from the region.

After, Öcalan's detention, the PKK increased its emphasis on a democratic and political solution. In the mid 2000s, the maturing ideas of Öcalan around democratic autonomy led to new political practices for the Kurdish political movement. The PKK and its sympathizers used new political methods from popular organizations to the construction of new social experiences and institutions in Kurdish society by

mechanisms, the PKK organized its different parts around web-like organizations, and different organizations from women to the youth developed self- decision mechanisms independent of the central committee of the PKK. All of these changes also constructed a new political Kurdish political identity. For the influence of Öcalan's ideas around democratic autonomy see Gürer's study, (Gürer, 2015: 241-348). Moreover for the organizational changes in the PKK see, (Toplum ve Kuram, 2011).

constructing communes and starting new methods of local governments in municipalities.²⁴⁹ This was the era of the construction of democratic-autonomy. Therefore, the PKK increased its constitutive political practices side by side with its resistance politics. That is, the PKK evolved from opposition to construction and the discourses and practices of the Kurdish political subjectivity multiplied and changed. Not only guerilla forces and an armed people was the subject of the liberation of the Kurdish people, but the subjects and subjectivities in the practices' popular self-decision mechanisms and the construction of new life experiences is the subject of the Kurdish political movement.

Side by side, new political organizations working amongst the masses were founded such as the Democratic Society Congress (DTK). The DTK is an umbrella organization built to include the different social and political forces and agents in Kurdish society from the religious people to the members of the Kurdish political movement and other sections of Kurdish parties and organizations. The DTK has called for and organized a lot of popular demonstrations and boycotts during AKP governments. It has also constructed new municipal experiences in parallel with self-governance and direct democratic methods (Gürer, 2015).

These tactical and strategic changes formed by local and global developments reflected in Öcalan's thinking also had a counterpart in the legal Kurdish political movement initiated by the establishment of legal Kurdish parties in the 1990s. In parallel with the search for a peaceful and political solution to the Kurdish movement by the PKK and Öcalan in the 1990s, the legal Kurdish political parties developed political practices to strive for a democratic and political solution to the Kurdish problem. Defining itself not merely as a Kurdish organization, but as a party of Turkey and as leftist, the first legal party founded by members of the Kurdish movement was the HEP.²⁵⁰ The members of HEP were people, not directly affiliated

²⁴⁹ This is not to say that the PKK and the Kurdish political movement did not strive for the construction of a new Kurdish identity through cultural and social practices. In the 1990s the Kurds started to establish cultural institutions both in Kurdish regions and in other parts of the country. However, the armed struggle was dominant and the war limited these experiences.

²⁵⁰ The emphasis on leftist ideas and on the declaration of being a party of different sections not only Kurds was evident in the party program. The party put emphasis on the construction of democracy and objecting to forms of exploitation. See its program, (HEP, 1990).

with the PKK and some of its prominent figures came from other Kurdish organizations. After its foundation in 1990, the HEP made an electoral alliance with the Social Democratic Populist Party, (SHP)²⁵¹ and entered the TBMM with 18 parliamentarian from the SHP list in 1991.²⁵² The HEP was closed down by the state in 1993 and a new party, (Democracy Party) DEP was founded. The parliamentarians of HEP continued their political activities in DEP; however the party was closed down shortly after its foundation.²⁵³

The Kurdish legal movement continued its activities and organizing the Kurdish population around a democratic solution and efforts to enter into parliament with the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) founded in 1994. Like its predecessors, the party located itself as a leftist party calling on the whole population, not only Kurds. Therefore, the party's program declares itself to be responding to the need for a left and democratic mass party.²⁵⁴ They also tried to gain the votes of leftists and called on them to support them in elections. HADEP organized an election bloc with leftist and socialist parties in the country called the Labor, Peace and Freedom Bloc at the 1995 general elections. HADEP continued until it was closed down in 2003, with its political activities concentrating on the Kurdish problem²⁵⁵ locating the Kurdish problem in the general framework of the left in Turkey.²⁵⁶

In parallel with a democratic and political solution to the Kurdish problem the parties before 1999 strived for a politics without arms and tried to organize mass

²⁵¹ The SHP was a social democratic and leftist party and it was effective in parliament. In 1995 the party united with the CHP, abolishing itself.

²⁵² In 1992 the HEP members in TBMM had to resign from the SHP, because Leyla Zana, one of the members of HEP, ended her swearing-in speech in Kurdish saying 'this vow is for the brotherhood of the Kurdish and Turkish peoples'. In 1994, the immunity of 14 members of the HEP in parliament was lifted and in the same year Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak were imprisoned for ten years.

²⁵³ A lot of members of both the HEP and DEP were murdered by unidentified assailants or imprisoned. The Increasing war between the PKK and the Turkish state was a limiting factor for legal Kurdish politicians.

²⁵⁴ For more details of the party's program see, (HADEP, 1994).

²⁵⁵ It was seen as the main obstacle to construct a democratic political and social system in Turkey. In other words, according to HADEP'S political perspective, unless the Kurdish problem as one of the issues of inequality in the country was solved, there would not be a democratic country.

²⁵⁶ The party was accepted into the Socialist International in 2002.

demonstrations and popular resistance. These parties located themselves within the leftist and socialist tradition of the country with the main emphasis on the Kurdish problem.²⁵⁷ However, although they were mainly interested in the Kurdish problem, they were not isolated from the social and political movements of the left and Marxism in the country. Thus, the tradition of becoming a party of Turkey started with the establishment of these parties. These characteristics distinguish the legal Kurdish movement from the traditional ideology of the PKK, even if it began to change in the 1990s, as mentioned above, due to the lack of emphasis on an independent Kurdish state, but on an emphasis on the construction of a new social and political system according to which Kurdish people had equal rights. This project of Turkey-ization was limited, because most of the members of the party came from the Kurdish movement and they were hegemonic in these parties that were mainly interested in the Kurdish problem despite the emphasis on leftist ideas for the whole population.

After HADEP was closed down, the legal Kurdish movement continued with the foundation of new parties. In 2003 the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) was founded and like its predecessors, it made a synthesis of the Kurdish problem and leftism. It also continued efforts to make alliances with leftist and Marxist groups in the country. At the 2004 local elections, it made an alliance with different social democratic, Marxist and socialist parties including EMEP (Party of Labour), SDP (Socialist Democracy Party), SHP and ÖDP called the Democratic Union of Forces and gained the administration of 5 city and 33 district municipalities. This was the beginning of the increasing management and power of the Kurdish movement in the regions where the Kurds live. After a trial to ban it, the party closed itself down and the legal Kurdish movement organized around the Democratic Society Party (DTP).²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ These parties' programs approved of socialism and put the method of solving the Kurdish problem through democratic and political mechanisms into their program. Gürer argues that these parties were never purely Kurdish parties and had the aim of Turkey-ization calling on socialists and leftists in Turkey (Gürer, 2015: 147).

²⁵⁸ For a history of Kurdish legal parties in Turkey until the DTP was founded see, (Retrieved 13.04.2016, from <https://m.bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/118826-dtp-nin-kisa-tarihi>).

The foundation of the DTP, in 2005, started a new phase for the legal Kurdish movement, because during the DTP years, the Kurdish movement increased its influence and organizational activities among the Kurds, becoming more popular. It criticised the DEHAP for being disconnected with the peoples in Turkey and other political forces, even if it tried to make alliances with other groups in the elections. Therefore, the party imagined itself more as a party of Turkey and it give weight to the activities of Turkey-ization. The legal Kurdish movement became more visible with legal and non-armed politics in the political field and arena of Turkey. The most important characteristic of the party was that Öcalan's new ideas found a place in the party program and its political activities gained more management of municipalities and the construction of new social and cultural institutions. Even if the previous Kurdish parties had gained the representational power among the Kurds at elections, peaking with HADEP's increasing votes, the DTP increased and made visible this power in both local and general elections. To overcome the election threshold, the party formed alliances with leftists, Marxists, democrats, social democrats and Kurdish social and political organizations and entered the elections with independent candidates. These efforts resulted in the party gaing 22 members²⁵⁹ in Parliament at the 2007 elections through the alliance with other political and social groups and forces, called the 1,000 Hopes Candidates.²⁶⁰

Like its predecessors, the party dealt with the democratic and legal struggle, but was more influential in popular and mass politics and in developing institutionalized and permanent organizations to make an alliance with the left and Marxists in Turkey and other Kurdish social and political forces and to include wide sections of the Kurdish people. For example, the party founded Peace. All of these activities were framed by Öcalan's non-violent methods to construct democratic autonomy. In this framework, the DTP was influential and effective in establishing social, economic, cultural and political organizations for the Kurdish people and institutionalization and

²⁵⁹ With DTP members, two politicians from socialist parties in Turkey entered parliament. After their election, they returned to their parties. One of them was Ufuk Uras, former chairman of the ÖDP; the other was Akin Birdal, the former chairman of the SDP.

²⁶⁰ With these elections, the other parties took very few votes in the Kurdish regions and the Kurds began to be represented by only two parties, the AKP and DTP. This characteristic continued and resulted in other parties losing almost all their seats in elections.

organization of its representative force through the municipalities, social and political organizations. It also produced and organized the discontent of the Kurdish people through political and social mechanisms and methods from mass demonstrations to non-violent activism and producing political hegemony in the social fields among Kurdish people. Its organizational power and political activities forced the state and AKP to make partial reforms for the Kurds from the foundation of official Kurdish TV channels to the recognition of the Kurdish problem and to hold negotiations with the PKK, resulting in the start of the peace process. The DTP's political experiences paved the way and created political spaces for the representational, hegemonic and constitutional force of the legal Kurdish movement in parallel with Öcalan's ideas on democratic autonomy producing new forms of Kurdish politics and a Kurdish political subjectivity for the later parties of the Kurdish movement continuing with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the HDP.

The DTP was also closed down²⁶¹ after massive detentions of its members accused of being members of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).²⁶² Then the BDP was founded and it continued the DTP's methods of making alliances at elections, to gain municipalities and to maintain peace and democracy activities for a solution of the Kurdish problem. At the 2011 elections, the party organized a bloc called the Labor, Democracy and Freedom Block including more leftist, socialist and Marxist organizations and agents and the other social and political forces in Kurdish society. The party took 35 seats out of the total of 550 including members of the socialist and Marxist parties as well as Kurdish politicians. The party institutionalized the bloc under the name of the HDK (People's Democratic Congress), widening its range from Marxists to feminists, anarchists and LGBT activists and organizers. With these efforts, the Kurdish movement increased its Turkey-inzation project and side by side with components of the HDK the HDP was founded.

²⁶¹ About the history of state repression of the Kurdish legal parties in Turkey including DTP see, (Retrieved 14.05.2016, from <http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/117387-1990dan-bugune-hepten-dtpye-kurtlerin-zorlu-siyaset-mucadelesi>).

²⁶² The KCK is an umbrella organization of the PKK including different organizations from the guerilla forces of the PKK to its political organizations in Europe.

As mentioned many times, Öcalan's ideas found expression in the HDP's party program and it was operated as a master discursive element to include the different political and social agents and groups in a flexible way.²⁶³ This strategy of Turkey-ization received a response from groups both in Kurdish politics and in leftist and Marxist organizations and from agents with different reasons. It gained electoral success on 7 June in a bloc with other parties to prevent the AKP coming to power alone. But with the process of increasing violence starting after the Suruç bombing, the HDP became ineffective in its popular political activities and was blocked by state repression. This repression and limitation was actualized in the imprisonment of the party's co-presidents, members and organizers which increased the party's ineffectiveness and impotence.

As a result, the changes in the PKK's methods and ideology led by Öcalan have developed new strategies in the Kurdish political movement producing new forms of politics. These changes have also paved the way for the foundation of the HDP. These changes have intersected with the developments in the country influencing the political position-taking of the organized leftist and Marxist groups and social and political movements. Thus, positioning itself in the political field of Turkey with an alliance with other groups, the Kurdish political movement initiated the HDP and through the HDP its influence has gone beyond Kurdish people in Turkey, attracting the support of different social and political agents in the country.

²⁶³ For example, democratic autonomy was approved in the party's program and constitution as a project to construct horizontal self-management institutions, alternative social relations against capitalism and social subjectivities alternative to modernist and liberal ones, creating equality between different ethnic and social groups for all of the country. Therefore, the democratic autonomy project was designed to change the social and political system in Turkey to solve the ethnic problems and inequalities in every area of life.

CHAPTER 5

AN ANALYSIS OF THE GEZI AND HDP

As has been mentioned, during the period of AKP governments the social, economic and cultural changes and developments in the country, especially the implementation of neo-liberal policies with the conservative democracy in parallel with the project for the construction of a new Turkey, has produced political and social positions and movements in the country against the AKP. Additionally, there have been ongoing social and political experiences in the country going beyond a pure anti-AKP position, which have been reformed during the AKP era. However, these changes do not explain how the agencies joined the practices of Gezi and HDP, because their political attitudes were not an automatic effect of these changes, even if they were framed by them. In chapter 2, it is argued that not only the structural changes nor the social and political positions produced and framed by these changes can analyze the emergence of any political practice.

Therefore, the symptoms and products of the cultural, social and economic developments during the AKP era and the workings of the social and political systems and orders in Turkey, the formation of the political positions vis-a-vis AKP's policies and the political dispositions of the social and political agents formed the political field where the Gezi and later HDP emerged. It is within this field that the political positions and symptoms including the discontent, perceptions, discourses and affections of the agents became part of the political experiences through commonalizing practices. The commonalizing practices reforms and reconstructs the political positions and works within the political field. This chapter will analyze how the different social and political agents were articulated and

attracted to the Gezi and HDP through commonalizing practices.²⁶⁴ Thus, it will analyze the role of the political dispositions of the agents and the role of the commonalizing practices in the Gezi and HDP to articulate and link the agents into the political experiences working on the political dispositions of the agents within the limits of the political field in Turkey. In other words, how the Gezi and HDP become possible through the commonalizing practices working on the agents and how these commonalizing practices were delimited by the agent's dispositions and position-taking in the political field constantly changing according to the position-taking of the political forces. On the other hand, the role of the agents and the local conditions is analyzed here to make evident the conditions of the possibility and the limitations of the Gezi and HDP.

5.1. The Gezi: The Agents and Commonalizing Practices and Mechanisms

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a tendency in the literature on the Gezi to identify certain agents and subjects of the Gezi which are considered to have defined the course of and framework of the events through their structured political dispositions and intentions. In that sense, it has been argued from different perspectives that it was an uprising of the middle classes, Y generation or a plan of the finance lobby. These perspectives generalize the characteristics and demands of some agents into all of the events. For example, the middle classes, comprising individuals with secularist and Western values and lifestyle who were unhappy with the AKP's policies framed by authoritarianism and conservatism, triggered the events with the feeling that their lifestyles were under threat. Thus, the events were considered as a reaction to this interference in the lifestyles of the new middle classes by the AKP. Deriving from this idea, the common feelings that brought together the agents were reduced to this cause. Likewise, the other efforts to identify the subject of the events are similar to this in the sense that they reduced the event to the will, characteristics and intention of this particular subject.

²⁶⁴This study defines the commonalizing mechanisms in politics as pragmatic mechanisms to bring the different agents together producing common political experiences where agents are involved. As has been mentioned many times, the working of these mechanisms construct, deconstruct and reconstruct the political dispositions in the political field.

However, these analyses explain the Gezi partially, because there were different subjectivities, groups and agents involved in the events with different impetuses, or which expressed different subjective feelings, demands and perceptions of why they were involved in the events.²⁶⁵ On the other hand, despite this complexity and multiplicity, the events included and produced common feelings, perceptions and demands bringing heterogeneous and multiple agents, subjectivities and groups together. In a sense, the Gezi provided common social and political practices for the different agents and groups to act together.²⁶⁶ On this basis, the Gezi worked like the multitude in the sense of bringing the different singularities together through commonalizing mechanisms and practices. Regarding going beyond any hegemonic force's representation of the different agents, the common experiences were the forms through which the different singularities produced the common.²⁶⁷

These common practices worked on and reconstructed the political field where the political position-taking emerged as the symptoms and results of the political and social relationships formed globally and locally by the political experiences, affections and discourses. Thus, on the one hand, the Gezi reconstructed the political dispositions framed by the discourses, experiences and perceptions as the production of political position-taking before they emerged, on the other hand they changed this political position-taking, linking and articulating them through the political experiences of the Gezi. Hence, before it emerged, even if there was an accumulation

²⁶⁵ For an analysis of the positions of the different agents, revealing the multiplicity of the Gezi see, (Konda, 2014; Acar&Gülsüm, 2014; CHP, 2014; Bilgiç&Kafkaslı, 2013; Göztepe, 2013; Ete&Taştan, 2013). These studies also exhibit the common points of the agents.

²⁶⁶ It is important to remember that this study argues that these commonalizing practices cannot be generalized as regards all the agents that participated in the events.

²⁶⁷ The empty signifiers such as democracy, honour and justice constructed through the image of the AKP and Erdoğan as repressive and anti-democratic forces were very important in producing the common. It is true that one of these signifiers, like the hate of the AKP, became an equivalential link to include the singularities transcending them, however, these discursive practices were not the product of any hegemonic force. To reiterate, this study claims that the features and characteristics of the Gezi including different agents coming together around the common were similar to other experiences of popular revolts. However, these formal characteristics cannot totally analyze how the different agents came together in the context of Turkey. Therefore, the local stories are crucial to answer the question of how the Gezi emerged.

of social and political practices in the country and growing discontent, there were no common political and social practices for the different social and political agents.²⁶⁸

To reiterate, the Gezi events emerged within the conditions and situations that produced an accumulation of enmity, hate and opposition to the AKP by different social and political agencies.²⁶⁹ These agents and groups consisted of Kemalists, nationalists, Marxists, including members of the CHP and MHP, Alevis, leftists, anti-capitalist Muslims, anti-authoritarian groups, football fans and individuals not affiliated to any organization or to any political group and from different social classes. It brought these political and social positions and agents together in a very different way. Therefore, it was not a simple composition of different social and political agencies, but was a new composition of these social and political positions and agents through the political and social practices of the Gezi. It was abundance within the given political field, because it went beyond the given representable political and social positions of each particular group and agent.²⁷⁰ For, during the practices of the Gezi events, the new forms of political subjectivities and doing politics transformed the singularities, creating new common representable and unrepresentable political positions through commonalizing practices.

So, even if some of the social and political profiles were quantitatively predominant during the events, like the “new middle classes”, Alevis and Kemalists, these social and political positions were become part of the commonalizing practices and none of the commonalizing practices can be ascribed to the internal characteristics of any of

²⁶⁸ The above mentioned studies make these points clear in the sense of exhibiting the common points of the agents whatever their previous positions were. Thus, see, (Konda, 2014; Acar&Gülsüm, 2014; CHP, 2014; Bilgiç&Kafkaslı, 2013; Göztepe, 2013; Ete&Taştan, 2013).

²⁶⁹ For a study from a Marxist perspective of how the AKP’s policies historically produced the collective discontent analyzing how these became a part of a collective political action in the Gezi see, (Gürçan& Peker, 2015)

²⁷⁰ On the other hand, it was evident that the unorganized agents’ attitudes in the events were excessive when compared with the organized forces. For example, in an interview, an Alevi male says that the wishes of the agents in Tuzluçayır differentiated from the leftist organizations in the sense that as the agents continued the events with their demands, the leftist organizations believed that the events would end in a few days. However, the wish of the non-organized agents to continue the events independent of the wishes of any political groups changed the hesitant attitudes, on account of the course of the events being very different from the habitual way of doing politics for the leftist organizations. In that sense, it was an abundance for a lot of groups that positioned themselves in the political field through these habitual attitudes (Uluğ&Acar, 2014: 29).

them. As their characteristics might pave the way for the events for any political articulation, the moments during the events produced their taking part in the events. In other words, the political practice reformed the political and social dispositions, without this there were no commonalizing practices to bring together the different social and political groups, including enmities and hostilities.

It is these commonalizing practices, including the discursive and affective expressions like an enmity to the AKP and Erdoğan, demands for democracy, experiences of new decision-making mechanisms in the case of park forums and production of the political subjectivity forms that produced the acting together of the different subjects restructuring their political dispositions. In other words, the commonalizing practices and mechanisms go beyond the particular and singular social and political positions, including them in the new experiences.

5.1.1. The Events in the Streets: The Coming Together of Different Social and Political Agents

The different social and political agents, with their particular and subjective stories, demands and past experiences, were involved in the events constructing common perceptions, affections and experiences together with other groups. In other words, their particularities found a place within the entirety of the events through these commonalizing expressions and practices, not abandoning their particular demands, affections and perceptions.²⁷¹ This was the most interesting issue in the Gezi events, that the agents constructed an expression of “becoming us without being one.”²⁷² Thus, without mentioning the stories, particular demands, affections, experiences and perceptions of the agents, it is difficult to analyze the processes and mechanisms

²⁷¹ This is saying that the common political position of being against the AKP with the feeling of discontent from AKP policies was shared by almost all of the agents.

²⁷² This is a title of a book, *Becoming Us without Being One*, by Özden Melis Uluğ and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar (Uluğ&Acar, 2014). In their different studies, they argued that despite the differences and rivalries between the agents in the events, these agents could act together due to the collective political subject constitution mechanisms. This idea is also shared by this study in the sense that the commonalizing practices were the forms of the political experiences which brings together the different contents and subjectivities, creating a space for their expression through collective political positioning.

bringing the different agents together. This point is important because the commonalizing practices were also constructed through their active experiences and processes during the events, and were not ready-made mechanisms.

CHP members were one of the most active and largest groups during the events. Some of the reports and authors argued that CHP members took part in the events because the CHP was not able to represent the demands of its members and their discontent.This idea implicitly expresses the opinion that, if the CHP had been able to represent its voters through correct politics, the CHP members would not have attended the events.But here it is important to ask whether the CHP members' participation in the events was the result of a representation crisis, or because of the Gezi's immanent characteristic of being a case of non-representational politics producing a crisis at the heart of representational politics.²⁷³ To place CHP members within a structural representation crisis in the politics implies that their political dispositions formed before the events produced this crisis during the events. Adding to and in related to this, such a perspective portrays a CHP member-type, whose discontent and hopes for the country could not be satisfied and were at the events to satisfy these. That considers the political dispositions of the CHP supporters as its internalized character before the events and their political attitudes as its direct expression neglects how they were in the events, implying that the intentions of the CHP supporters existed before the events.²⁷⁴

Contrary to this interpretation, it is more reasonable to assume that even if CHP members had a disposition and were ready for political position-taking, such as opposition and hate to the AKP, which paved the way for their political experiences, that their participation in the events became possible through commonalizing practices. In that sense, there were new political practices transforming their political

²⁷³ In a way, CHP members with other agents produced the crisis of representation. Laclau&Mouffe argue that the political emerges out of a representation crisis. On the other hand, Laclau&Mouffe argues that this representation crisis was present before any political practices and hegemonic force constructs from this structural representation crisis a political practice. However, this study claims in the case of the Gezi that without any hegemonic force's project the Gezi was an abundance within a given political field that created an expression going outside the representational political positions, not as the expression of the lack of representation within the very heart of the political field.

²⁷⁴ This is also true for the other groups, as this study argues that whatever the political dispositions, political practice reforms these dispositions through commonalizing practices.

positions and their dispositions expressed through demands. Within this framework, like other groups in the events, the CHP members expressed common demands like democracy, common desires for a new society and life in the country, and enmity and opposition to the AKP's policies. As mentioned before, the CHP, being the strongest and main opposition and alternative force to the AKP, was criticizing the AKP's policies in every area of life in the country. These included fears regarding moving towards a more conservative and religious system that would end the democratic system and secularism in the country. These discourses also had counterparts in its supporters and the electorate, expressed at the Gezi by its supporters. Therefore, in a way, the political position-taking of CHP members as expressed at the events, were formed by the CHP, even if these attitudes went beyond the CHP leadership's call for non-violent protests.²⁷⁵

Even if their perspectives on democracy and for the construction of a new country, and the tone and style of their enmity to AKP and Erdoğan were framed by different affections and perceptions, such as concerns regarding the republic as the expression of secularism and democracy and as offering the possibility to construct equality and justice in all parts of the country, they were able to come together with other groups that defined their content differently. Hence, it was not their particular affections and perceptions around the issues of the AKP and Erdoğan's existence and politics and the particular demands and affections about the future of the country formed by their political standpoint and position-taking formed before the events, but their cooperation and similarities with other agents that permitted them to act together with other groups. This is not to say that they abandoned their particular political and social positions, but they found a meeting-point through commonalizing practices such as enmity to the AKP and the desire to construct a new country.

These points were also true for other agents in the sense that even if they came with their histories, they could find a place within the events through the emergence of common perceptions, demands and affections constructed through discourses and interactions with other agents during the events. For example, the football fans of the

²⁷⁵ To emphasize the point that the CHP could not represent its voters in the events, as its means of politics, such as parliamentary and reconciliatory attitudes, were not satisfactory for its voters, is important. This is the crisis of representation when CHP voters went beyond CHP politics.

big clubs in İstanbul and Ankara that were discontented with the policies of the government about football raised their criticism of the AKP and Erdoğan, emphasizing democracy, difference and diversity in the country. In the first days of the events, the fans of the big football clubs in İstanbul formed an alliance named İstanbul United.²⁷⁶ The fans of these different clubs are adversaries during football matches; however they acted together in criticizing the government's intervention at the demonstrations and supported democratic values. Their discontents with the government's policies were also increasing before the events, as the government had introduced new policies and rules for fans.²⁷⁷

Even if football fans supported the events, placing emphasis on democratic and environmental values and criticizing the government's policies and its attitude to the demonstrators, some of the football fans distanced themselves from the political organizations and did not want them to be involved in the events. In other words, they considered their involvement not to be political, but framed by the common values of democracy. For example, as the events continued, the fans of GS in particular made clear that they were happy to show their support for environmental and democratic issues they did not want to be affiliated to any political organization. Despite this, football fans in different cities were very active in the street demonstrations in support of democracy.

On the other hand, the members of Çarşı,²⁷⁸ one of the biggest fan groups of Beşiktaş, did not hesitate to express their political ideas. For example, some of the

²⁷⁶ These clubs included Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş. Not only in İstanbul, but also in other cities, the fans of these clubs actively joined in the events. Along with these clubs, the fans of clubs in other cities also took part in the events.

²⁷⁷ For example, the government enforced a requirement for fans to have ID Cards to enter stadiums. According to the law, the fans were required to buy the ID Card to watch all of the matches in a season, rather than buying the tickets for each match. This was a problem for the economically disadvantaged fans and spectators, the majority of spectators. Another issue raised by the fans was match-fixing. In 2011, a match-fixing scandal implicating the directors of football clubs and state officials emerged concerning Fenerbahçe in particular. This case was perceived by the fans of Fenerbahçe as an attempt by the AKP government to take over the management of the club. Moreover, the fans were also unhappy about police violence against fans, and increasing police control of fans and spectators during matches. These football fans joined the events, also criticizing the AKP's policies and its influence on the population.

²⁷⁸ Çarşı members were always sensitive to political developments and issues in the country and they have on many occasions displayed banners with leftist slogans expressing opposition to the

Çarşı fans said that they were at the events due to the repression and violence exerted by the government on different social and political groups. They argued that these were violations of rights and that there was a struggle for democracy (Beşiktaş Çarşı, 2013: 222). First of all, they draw attention to the fact that they were already supporting the social and political struggles for justice, equality and democracy in the country and that they were criticizing the government (Beşiktaş Çarşı, 2013: 221-223). They said that they had always had a political attitude in support of oppressed people and that they were struggling against oppression and inequality in the country. Therefore, they wanted to be in solidarity with the groups against injustice and oppression and to campaign for democracy.²⁷⁹ As a result, the participation of members of football fan groups, differing in their political attitudes to the events, in the Gezi with their criticism of the government's attitude during the events and its policies, originates in part in the government's policies with regard to football, with the emphasis on democracy, the respect for different lifestyles and freedom.

During the Gezi, the demonstrators who died due to police violence during the events were all Alevi young people. Both pro-AKP authors²⁸⁰ and state documents analyzing the events, such as reports compiled by the Turkish National Police, labelled the events as an Alevi uprising.²⁸¹ It is evident that it was not an Alevi uprising,²⁸² but the Alevi neighbourhoods in Istanbul, Ankara, Hatay and in other cities were very active during the events. The Alevis have concerns about the AKP's policies on Alevis in the sense that they fear the AKP will assimilate and repress Alevi identity. These worries have become apparent over particular issues like the

authorities. Therefore, the Çarşı has always has a political attitude expressing resistance against inequality, repression and authority with the emphasis on freedom, democracy and equality.

²⁷⁹ In parallel with these ideas, Çarşı members were initiators of the park forums (Beşiktaş Çarşı, 2013: 224-225).

²⁸⁰ For example see, (Retrieved 13.03.2016, from <http://www.ensonhaber.com/460-nagehan-alci-gezi-olaylari-bir-alevi-ayaklanmasidir-2013-11-29.html>).

²⁸¹ For the report of the Turkish National Police and the criticizms raised by some Alevis see, (Retrieved 14.04.2016, from <https://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/151578-emniyet-in-gezi-raporu-alevilerin-fislendiginin-gostergesi>).

²⁸² As is apparent, to reduce the events into one in which only one social group participated overlooks the other social and political agents and their commonalizing practices. On the other hand, the Alevis are also a heterogeneous group and not only their cultural identity, but also political affiliations form their political attitudes and dispositions.

AKP's policies in the Syrian civil war. In that sense, the Arab Alevis (Nusayris) in Hatay have criticised the AKP's involvement in the Syrian Civil War and its support of Jihadist Islamist groups. Around these themes, the Alevis, especially in Samandag, a district of Hatay, organized regular demonstrations²⁸³ (Retrieved from 16.06.2016, from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/06/130611_gezi_parki_samandag).

There were other particular issues that made Alevis unhappy with AKP policies. For example, the name given to the third Bosphorus Bridge, Yavuz Sultan Selim, was one of the symbols of AKP attitudes to the Alevis.²⁸⁴ This was a symbol of the construction of the hegemony of Sunni Islamic values and lifestyles, and Alevis in Turkey critical of AKP's policies in social and cultural life are concerned that the AKP will construct an Islamic society assimilating and terminating other cultures, especially Alevism. Around these issues, Alevis shared the general discontent with AKP policies, considering them working against the entire population and producing inequalities and authoritarian policies threatening democracy and homogenizing society through conservatism, not leaving any space for different cultures and ethnicities (Ağcabay: 2103; Retrieved 14.04.2016, from <https://www.alevinet.com/2013/06/14/aleviler-icin-gezi-direnisi/>).

Feminists and members of LGBTT groups were also prominent at the events. Despite their discontent with other agents at the events for their usage of sexist idioms, they did not leave. Instead they tried to find common ground, for instance, encouraging the use of non-sexist idioms in slogans and making evident the presence of women and the voice of LBGTT individuals and disseminating their ideas and modes of doing politics. Therefore, they were at the events with their particularities and singularities constructing commonalizing practices. For example, some of the feminist groups explained why they were at the Gezi events, emphasising the gender policies of the AKP, criticizing its androcentric perspective and policies,

²⁸³ Not only in Hatay, but in other cities like Adana and Mersin, the Nusayri people's discontent and opposition to the AKP was increasing. From the AKP's cultural politics directed at a conservative lifestyle to the economic problems of the Nusayris caused by the Syrian war, the Nusayris had concerns and worries. For an analysis of the reasons and conditions that led Nusayris to the Gezi see, Gümüş, 2003: 204-237; Karadaş, 2014: 233-239).

²⁸⁴ Yavuz Sultan Selim was an Ottoman Emperor known for carrying out massacres of Alevis. Therefore, the name Yavuz connotes massacre.

characterized with the inhibition law and lenient treatment by the judicial system of murder, violence and sexual harassment of women and LGBTT individuals by the state. This perspective was evident in some of the authors of Socialist Feminist Politics, who criticized neo-liberal economic policies due to their parallelity with conservative and patriarchal practices (Çelebi&Kalkan, 2013: 9-10). Their political expressions were focused on opposition and criticism of the AKP and Erdoğan along these lines (Başer, 2013: 245-250).

LGBTT individuals joined the events to be in solidarity with other social and political groups and with the hope of not being excluded from society and by the other political groups (Hüroğlu, 2013: 220). During the events, different LGBTT movements and organizations formed a block called the LGBTT Block to act together (*ibid*: 218). Alongside criticism of the AKP's policies on LGBTT and criticism of its conservative ideology excluding the rights of LGBTT individuals and insensitivity to violence against LGBTT individuals, they also called for the construction of a new society where LGBTT individuals could construct their subjectivities. Therefore, like other social and political movements like feminists, and the Çarşı, LGBTT were interested in other political and social practices in the country outside their particular political practices and made efforts to be involved in other social and political practices (Hüroğlu, 2013).

On the other hand, they particularly raised the influence of the AKP's policies on LGBTT members, emphasizing that the AKP narrowed their space and that the intervention by the police in Gezi Park was a concrete example of this policy. As Cihan Hüroğlu says, the public space has an importance for LGBTT individuals as these spaces are seen as places where they develop their relationships and socialization outside the family and relatives (Hüroğlu, 2013: 218-219). Hence, the LGBTT members got involved in the events against the repression by the AKP on account of their particularities, considering it as part of the AKP's entire policies. In this way, they commonalized their particular discontent and demands with other agents in the Gezi (Retrieved 16.06.2016, from <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/62587/gezi-direnisi-ve-lgbt-hareket>; Retrieved 16.06.2016, from <https://onedio.com/haber/halkevleri-baskani-lgbt-ile-iliskimiz-gezi-ile-basladi-149252>).

In the foreign media, the events were described as an uprising of white Turks, focusing on Turkish flags and pictures of Atatürk. However, there were differences in their perception of the meaning of the flag and Atatürk, as for these groups these symbols were the expression of democracy and the republic. For example, for supporters of the TGB and Aydınlık, these symbols were an expression of the unitary country and republic as the providers of secularism, democracy and equality combined with socialist and anti-imperialist ideas. Thus, even if these groups were very distant from the Kurdish movement, their ideas were not simply nationalistic, but were mostly framed by socialist and Marxist ideas, which for them were partly embodied by Kemalism. Like other groups this group and other Kemalists were critical of the AKP's policies, arguing that they threatened the values of the republic, such as democracy, justice and equality and a unitary country.²⁸⁵ Additionally, these groups were also strongly opposed to the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, considering them as part of the methods and means of the AKP's attempt to end the republic.²⁸⁶

Kemalists were one of the most visible groups at the events in all the cities with their expressions of hate for AKP and Erdoğan, and their desire to put an end to the AKP government was one of the main political agents in the construction of an anti-AKP politics. Although, they differed in their political perspectives, they shared common ground as regards seeing the AKP and Erdoğan as a threat to the republic, targeting secularism, democracy, justice and the will of the people. These perceptions and feelings were also expressed in the Gezi. Therefore, they were able to find commonalities with other groups in their criticism of the AKP and Erdoğan, such as the increasing authorization of the AKP, and demands for a democratic country.

There were other agents and groups that played active roles in the events, such as Marxist and socialist organizations including Halkevleri, Kaldıraç, Partizan, HÖC,

²⁸⁵ Uluğ and Acar's reports exemplify the TGB's and İP's political position on Gezi (Uluğ&Acar, 2014: 371-405). For example, a female university student and member of TGB said that they were against the AKP, because of its policies as part of the USA's policies to terminate the republic, which is the basis of the independence, secularism and democracy of the Turkish people and a force for the construction of a new world based on the values of equality and democracy. These points was the organization's reason for joining the events (*ibid*: 377-378).

²⁸⁶ For the different Kemalist positions on the Gezi see , (Uluğ&Acar, 2014: 371- 422). Moreover, other studies present how the Kemalists joined the events (Konda, 2014).

HDK, organizations affiliated with the HDP such as the ESP, SDP, ÖDP, TKP, anarchists, and members of the Kurdish Movement. These groups mostly considered the Gezi as a democratic and popular uprising against the existing government's repressive and neo-liberal policies, creating the potential for revolutionary change in the country. They also shared common ground with other agents in opposing and criticising the AKP's policies. As mentioned above, during the Gezi events, the leftist and Marxist organizations jointly opposed the AKP, despite previous divisions over whether to support the AKP. For the leftist and Marxist organizations, the AKP's existence was a barrier to the construction of a new country based on left wing ideals. Therefore, for them it was not simply a reaction to the existence of the AKP, but to the existing global social and political order of which the AKP was the local agent. It seems that this political perspective provided the leftist and Marxist organizations with an outlook that went beyond the particular issues in the country that were created by the AKP's existence.

Hence, anti-AKP political position-taking for these agents and groups was a circumstantial situation, as their political experiences go beyond the AKP's existence. Their anti-AKP political positions were the means for their political ideologies and this position-taking enabled them to come together with other agents. For them, the Gezi was the re-expression of their ongoing political experiences and thus they quickly found a place with their political experiences and ideas within the Gezi uniting with other agents.

Most of the Marxist and leftist organizations saw the events as the resistance of the people, rather than the simple coming together of different agents. A Marxist male was quoted as saying that the Gezi transcended any particular group's interests and political position-taking (Ulug&Acar, 2014: 273). Therefore, it included a potential going beyond the aspirations of the Marxist organizations. Despite aiming to organize the agents around their organizations, leftist groups somehow left aside their political strategies of becoming the vanguard of the events, or the events did not give space for these aspirations, and the attitudes and dispositions of the Marxist groups changed. In a sense the mass of participants took the groups inside, changing and reproducing them. But this was not a mass in Cannetti's sense, but very similar to a multitude having a disposition to produce commonalities between the agents.

This characteristic of the events partially produced a possibility that changed the habitual political dispositions of the groups including the leftists, anarchists and Marxists, even if they did not abandon their ideas, but make the part of the common their political ideas and practices within the events.

Therefore, despite the fact that for the Marxist organizations the events were the continuation of their ongoing political experiences, most of their members joined in the events beyond their organizational aspirations and aims and shared common feelings with the other agents. The most important effect of the Gezi for the leftist and Marxist organizations was that they became more interested in the different modes of doing politics and in political issues like gender and ecology. Despite their sectarian dispositions and habitus to become the vanguard of popular movements, they did not place their agendas in front of the agents' demands. In a way, the agents were also able to absorb them without allowing any group to lead them.

The attitudes of the members and sympathizers of the Kurdish political movement were interesting. For, despite the distance of the Kurdish political movement, including the PKK and BDP, to the events in the beginning due to worries that the events included Kemalist and nationalist groups²⁸⁷ that might dominate the events aiming to bring an end to the peace process, a lot of Kurdish activists took part in the events. These activists considered the Gezi as a common space for the expression and construction of their ideas, such as democratic autonomy and socialist and leftist ideals and as a resistance to the AKP's increasing repression of the whole of society, including the Kurds. Rather than making their particular issues such as the Kurdish problem a divisive political line, these activists contributed to the construction of the common political position-takings deriving from the particular issues. So, contrary to the leaders of the Kurdish political movement, they did not use their political

²⁸⁷ This produced a disposition among the Kurds to attach little importance to the Gezi: Even if in Kurdish regions, there were also demonstrations, they were not strong like in other parts of the country. The worries of the Kurdish movement were unnecessary because even if there were groups like Kemalists and nationalists having enmities to the Kurdish political movement, their main target was the AKP and thus they were very careful to avoid any conflict and provocation with the Kurdish movement. In the following days of the Gezi, both the PKK and BDP made self-criticism and became actively involved in the events. On the other hand, the important point of the events was that despite the enmities of some members of Kemalist and nationalist organizations, the attitudes of the nationalist and Kemalist people to the issues of the Kurdish political movement changed during the events.

position-taking formed by the interests of the Kurdish political movement to separate and distance themselves from the commonality of the Gezi, making their particular political position-taking part of the commonalities.

Known from the writings of İhsan Eliaçık,²⁸⁸ Anti-Kapitalist Muslims and the revolutionary Muslims were another of the visible groups in the Gezi. These groups criticised the AKP due to its neo-liberal and capitalist policies that produced inequality, repression and exploitation in every area of life, which they considered as contradicting the principles of Islam. Contrary to these policies, the Gezi was considered political practice as an alternative to the AKP's policies based on hierarchy, exploitation, injustice and oppression, due to the solidarity and horizontal relations between the agents of the Gezi. Thus, for them the Gezi was on the one hand an objection to injustices in society from the Islamic principles very close to the ideals of the left, such as equality in every area of life and democracy, and on the other opened a space for the creation of a new society (Uluğ&Acar,2014).

Based on these ideas, anti-capitalist and revolutionary Muslims found a place for their political perspectives within the diversity of the agents and contributed to the construction of the experiences that provided common action between the agents. For example, during the events they organized communal meals during Ramadan, especially in Ankara and Istanbul. These communal events were considered as eating practices that constructed equality between the people contrary to the *iftar* [meal breaking the fast] organized by the government in expensive hotels.

The other group in the events comprised MHP members (*Ülküçüler*) [extreme nationalists]. One of the male participants was quoted as saying that, contrary to other members of the MHP, these agents were close to the ideals of secularism and the republic. These agents were at the events, despite the MHP leadership calling on its members not to take part in the events. They expressed their criticisms of the AKP for implementing conservative and Islamist policies and using anti-democratic means. One of them expressed his opposition to the AKP putting pressure public servants to join into its parallel union and its system of patronage. So, *Ülküçüler*

²⁸⁸ İhsan Eliaçık has tried to develop a new Islamist perspective reinterpreting the Quran. For a summary of his ideas especially see, (Eliaçık, 2014;Eliaçık, 2015a, Eliaçık, 2015b).

joined in the events on account of their discontent with the AKP's policies, coming together with different political and social groups, amongst which were rivals and enemies. Correspondingly, they contributed to the events with their particular issues, not abandoning them, but making them part of the common opposition to the AKP (Uluğ&Acar,2014).

Apart from these groups, the agents who were not affiliated to an organization were very important. Concerns for democracy and worries about repression, increasing control and authorization silencing other voices in society were common perceptions, demands, interests and affections intersecting all the agents and groups in the events. While not being involved in any political action except for voting in elections, these agents actively contributed to commonalizing practices, interacting with other groups. In other words, along with active usage of social media for the organization of events, the experienced political groups provided organization. For most of these agents the events were considered as a means to stop the government's interference in lifestyles and were somehow an honourable uprising against repression, oppression and bad situations in society. These feelings, affections and perceptions found an expression during the events and became politicized through commonalizing practices. Thus, their discontent and interests transformed into a political position, finding a place through the commonalizing practices.

As has been seen, the different particular demands, feelings and perceptions, while not being left aside, became part of the construction of commonalizing. This was due to the fact that none of the political and social groups were able to become hegemonic leading the events. This was on account of there being no representational force and group, while there were the common perceptions, feelings and demands. Even a lot of agents, mostly organized, acted in the events according to their subjective positions, but were not able to act according to their organizational strategies. It might be argued that some of the political organizations and agents left aside their wish to become a hegemonic force strategically along with their strategy for the overthrowing of the AKP, but the course of events transcended these intentions or reorganized them into new practices.

On the other hand, the above cases makes it apparent that without commonalizing practices the singular cannot become the part of a common, because the commonalizing practices reconnect these in the political practice, producing and reproducing new organizational forms, emotions, discourses and demands. It is also evident that the dispositions as framed by the habitus of the agents were reformed during the political practice changing their disposition and restructuring them in the process. Without commonalizing practices working on the agents, the singularities' stories could not have come together and produced such a popular political experience.²⁸⁹

Along with the emergence of common political ideas expressed as enmity to Erdoğan and the AKP, or opposition to authoritarianism and demands for democracy as the product and producer of the disposition of the different agents to come and act together, some other psychological and affective mechanisms and organizational forms were very important for the Gezi experiences to create common ground. The sense of being powerful vis-a-vis the government and throwing off negative feelings of fear, despair and hopelessness about the future of the country played a role in increasing the intensity of the events. This was due to the number of the demonstrators and increasing support from the population.

As a result, commonalizing mechanisms created a space for different agents to come together in the practices of the events. These mechanisms and their products, such as the perception of a common threat from Erdoğan and the AKP, and common ideals like democracy made it possible for the agents to transcend their habituses, as regards not being together with other groups, and their habitual political issues. Therefore, just as the commonalizing mechanisms provided the possibility of the Gezi to bring together different groups and agents, the habits of doing politics were limiting factor. However, despite these facts, the interests, the fears and the hopes created the strategic and tactical common political position-taking. This political

²⁸⁹ It is important to remember the perspective of the study. This study argues that the collective political experiences required the production of the common, which had to exceed the existing dispositions, because it was not a sum of the positions. These positions constantly change due to the new social, economical and cultural conditions and with the political practice of political organizations.

position-taking did not already exist, but was constructed during the process by the agents' active construction.

On the other hand, the lack of any representational force and the power to lead and to force the agents to follow a plan created a space for the expressions of different agents. Therefore, the events were somehow the product of the working of the multitude in the sense of bringing together different agents around the common. These commonalities with the existence of particularities were evident in the slogans shared and expressed in all of the cities. In other words, as the groups used their slogans, they also shouted the common slogans such as "shoulder to shoulder against fascism", "everywhere Taksim everywhere resistance", "It is only the beginning, continue the struggle". So the Gezi produced common forms of political action for different subjectivities, with them finding a place for their particular social and political positions.²⁹⁰

5.1.2: Constitutive Practices: From Street Clashes to Park Forums, Squats and Collective Gardens

The work of the commonalizing practices on the political dispositions and habits of the agents produced a common political position-taking expressed as opposition to the AKP and a desire for ideals such as democracy and freedom. Moreover, the events did not end after the demonstrators gradually started to give up street clashes with the police. In the middle of June, some of the protestors and political groups started to organize park forums as the decision-making organs of the people. These practices were also important, because through these forums different political and social agents started to construct direct-democratic decision-making mechanisms, rather than being represented by any political group.

²⁹⁰ For example, whatever the political disposition of an agent, the *capulling* [a term *çapulcu* - marauder, used by then Turkish PM Erdogan to describe the protestors] as a form of the subjectivity, as being disobedient to the state, being humorous and not being part of an political affiliation included different agents and subjectivities. It became a form and mode of action shared by the protestors during street demonstrations.

However, due to the arguments and enmities between the groups, the park forums were divided in the cities between the groups. As well as being divided, the idea of the popular and direct democratic idea of the park forums was maintained by these groups. Despite the potential for the park forums to develop popular decision-making mechanisms, the park forums were unable to reach the whole population, and, despite initiatives to construct coordination between the forums all over the country, they were unable to construct an institutionalized, organizational countrywide structure.

The other important commonalizing mechanism was the construction of social relations around solidarity. Not only the construction of solidarity around common political position-taking against the AKP and around the ideals of democracy, justice and equality, but also the solidarity relations symbolized by the Gezi commune were crucial in connecting agents and producing positive feelings. These solidarity relations and the construction of new social and political relations were also expressed through the construction of collective gardens in different cities through the occupation of public areas. These collective gardens, which continue to exist, aimed to realise alternative modes of agriculture and communal sharing of products. Positing these alternatives to neoliberal and commercialized agriculture, they were constructed as places where everything was produced commonly and shared commonly.

The squats were the other example of the occupation movements in the cities. The squats worked as centers to organize social relations horizontally. These cultural centers operated for the different agents to construct common political attitudes and develop solidarity relations.

Hence, all of these mechanisms were products destined to maintain the solidarity and horizontal social and political relationships that emerged in the Gezi. However, they were not able to become an attraction center for the agents involved in the street clashes and demonstrations during the Gezi. Thus, even if they were constructed to constitute alternative political and social organizations within the political field, their influence did not disperse all over the country.

5.1.3. Limitations of the Gezi

Despite the heterogeneity of the social and political agents in the events, the events did not gain the support of AKP voters and members and the demonstrators mostly consisted of agents critical of and distant from the AKP. These limitations stemmed from the characteristics of the events, such as constructing a discourse in opposition to and mostly antagonistic to the AKP and Erdoğan. However, these limits were not the internal characteristic of the Gezi in the sense that it was not against conservative people and AKP supporters, and did not have an intention to take over the government and take a direction to exclude some of the population. Even if some of the groups had structured political feelings against conservatism, the common attitude was the construction of the events in the process. That is, the limits emerged during the events, like the antagonism to the AKP they were not already present, but were constructed during the events as part of a process.

So, at first glance, it might be said that the political affinities and habits of the AKP supporters were conservative and that their dependent relations with the AKP prevented them and the political groups close to the AKP joining the events. This explanation argues that the demands and interests of the AKP supporters could not be included by the events. This was true in the sense that the events developed a strong anti-AKP position, but this position was the expression of the feelings, demands and perceptions of the agents.

The perceptions of AKP supporters are important in analyzing the limitations of the events, because during the events they developed a perception that these events were targeting the AKP, their party. However, this perception was not already there and this is in line with the opinions constructed by both pro-AKP authors and the AKP. At first glance, these limits can be related to the conservatism and habits of the people supporting the AKP. But rather than conservative feelings, the AKP constructed an antagonistic line and used a lot of discourses calling to the cultural and political identities during the events, constructing its discourse about the events and making them a common feeling through meetings and the media. Erdoğan and the AKP were also important in constructing such a position of criticism and distance to the events, because they emphasized in their discourses the antagonistic side of the

events to the AKP, neglecting the positive feelings and desires to construct a democratic and new country for the whole population and practices such as the construction of solidarity.

Given all this, the AKP constructed commonalizing attitudes to distance the population that was supportive and sympathetic to it. One of these was emphasis on the fate of the country with the discourse that the events were targeting the AKP and its policies, policies that were positively changing the country. (Retrieved 15.05.2016, from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/muhafazakarlarin-pencesinden-gezi>) Therefore, it was the AKP that reconstructed the political dispositions to producing a negative reaction from the population. The AKP utilised the positions taken by some of those who took part in the events to keep its supporters distant. Whether they were triggered by the AKP or not, these dispositions were the elements, used to construct the distance of these agents. Therefore, the enmity and antagonism to the AKP was one of the limiting factors distancing some of the people from the events.

As a result, Erdoğan and the AKP's counter discourses and political strategies to codify the Gezi as the enemy of us, namely the AKP and Turkey, were part of efforts to call on the affections and perceptions of the agents and groups close to it. Presenting images of the demonstrators as marginals led by enemies of the nation, such as the finance lobby, as being immoral persons who disrespected the religious values of the people and as vandals opposed to the service politics of the AKP appealed to conservative values. These strategies and the dispositions of the agents close to the AKP, independent of the AKP's efforts, that were also assisted by the products of the Gezi including the apparent anti-AKP political positions, kept AKP supporters at a distance from the events. In the same way, participants from the MHP argued that some MHP members did not join the events partly due to the MHP leadership's call and on account of their cultural dispositions being conservative. As one explained that contrary to his conception of Islam framed by laicism, some MHP supporters felt distant from the events as they were considered to contradict their conservative lifestyle values.

There were also internal limitations due to problems between groups such as the members of the Kurdish movement and Kemalists etc. In addition to these, the organized forces like the leftists and some of the Kemalists like the TGD and İP could not leave their political ideas aside in some circumstances. For example, one participant said that the leftist and Marxist organizations' habits compelled them. These conflicts and distances did not lead to division in the street events, but were effective in the constitutive experiences. For instance, at the beginning the park forums included all the agents, but conflicts about the Kurdish problem and the wishes of organizations to become hegemonic in the decision-making processes of the forums led to divisions and agents' distancing themselves from these experiences.

The alternative constitutive political and social experiences like the park forums and the communal meals were unable to include both the distant and sympathetic people to the Gezi. This was due to the limits to these experiences dispersing into everyday relationships. In other words, as the Gezi produced a common political position among the agents, such as being against Erdoğan and the AKP and sharing ideals of democracy, these political ideals were unable to find a place within the heart of the social relationships reorganizing life in Turkey.

As a result, both the ineffectiveness of the Gezi to deconstruct the dispositions of some of the parts of the population, allied to the AKP's work on these dispositions to produce a counter political position to the Gezi, and the internal limits of the creation and dispersing of the institutionalized organizational structure of the politics and social relations delimited Gezi's political and social influence in the country. Even if it had reformed the political field in the country, strengthening the anti-AKP position and solidarity around this position leaving aside the particularities, its political influence could not have gone beyond a temporal and oppositional political experience.²⁹¹

²⁹¹ A lot of authors used the term 'the Gezi spirit' to emphasise on that Gezi was continuing. Some of the groups tried to organize such a political institutionalization, referring to the Gezi spirit, but were unable to disperse into the population and remained limited among some groups. The park forums, collective gardens, squats and the football leagues organized against industrial football were also referred to as the Gezi spirit. The HDP was also the other force to represent the Gezi spirit and claimed to be the representative of this spirit, synthesizing the democratic autonomy idea with the

4.1.4. The Workings of the Political Through Commonalizing Mechanisms in the Gezi

As we have observed, working with diversity to bring together the different social and political subjectivities around the common, the Gezi operated on habitual political dispositions and given social and political positions, transforming them into part of the political experiences, such as the construction of common discourses as the expression of the negative and positive affections and perceptions and of the horizontal political organizations and modes of the resistance. Thus, it was abundance through its expressions within the given political field in Turkey producing an antagonism and opposition to the AKP with the hopes of democracy and a new country based on equality and respect for differences.

Prepared by the social and political experiences of the power exerted by the AKP's practices, the particular demands, interests, perceptions and emotions produced by the existing social and political systems and practices in the country expressed a common political positioning against the AKP and Erdoğan and in favour of ideals like democracy and justice against the repressive mechanisms in the country. In other words, the common conditions of the different particularities gained a political expression through the Gezi practices. These conditions and their products became part of the political, not by a hegemonic force producing the representational political center for the different agents, but by the interactions of the different agents among themselves and their interactions with the AKP. The common interests led these different agents to act together horizontally and these horizontal structures of the events were an important factor for the continuation of the events.

Therefore, the common feelings about the future of the country and worries about the AKP and Erdoğan produced a common political position that limited the habitual dispositions of the groups that took part in the events. This fact made the being and acting together of the different groups possible, with their leaving aside the particular

practices of the Gezi. Therefore, the Gezi spirit continues, but not in micro ways. However, it is important to reiterate that while it is true that the groups at the Gezi came together in different circumstances, these groups were unable to institutionalize this coming together.

enmities and rivalries among the groups. In a way this sense of acting like a multitude was the result of the weight of the common on the particularities and this prevent the emergence of any hegemonic force. This wasn't an automatic attitude, but came about through the construction of the common through the process of events as a result of agents leaving aside sectarian attitudes and bringing to the fore commonalities like opposition to the AKP and ideals like democracy, solidarity and equality.

According to these characteristics Gezi worked like the multitude, but it was not the example of the multitude. It was true that while the common conditions and their symptoms produced by the power mechanisms used by the AKP in the country produced common political position-taking by different agents and groups and common emotions, reactions and perceptions within the population critical of the AKP, it was the commonalizing practices that made them part of the political. Formally working like the multitude as a political subject, the Gezi shared similar characteristics with other experiences in the world that were organized horizontally and produced common political positions around demands and interests against the existing power. Like other experiences, it also had limits as regards maintaining this common through institutionalized organizational structures, even if the park forums and other collective constitutive practices aimed to produce these organizational structures. On the other hand, the discursive political products, like antagonism to the AKP, also demonstrated the limits of the events. These limits operated as the distancing factor for different sections of the population in the country. The hegemonic force of the AKP and the weakness of the Gezi to work and break the social and political dispositions of the segment of the population that was close to the AKP were important factors in limiting the diversity of the Gezi within the political field, reducing the potential to constitute a new country and block Erdoğan's power.

These contextual limits share characteristics with other experiences in the world. These other experiences have also produced common political positions against the existing power, but these common political positions have mostly remained as resistance and have not been able to construct common political organizations of participants. Ultimately, after the events the common political positioning among the different groups has collapsed. For example, in Egypt the protesters blocked

Mubarak's power, overthrowing him, but after this act, the organizations became rivals. As the Muslim Brotherhood imposed its political perspective on the different agents, it abandoned the common ground that had been constructed. This is similar to the case of the Gezi. After the street clashes had ended the groups increasingly emphasized their differences and particularities.

On the other hand, it was evident that the concept of the multitude is not enough to analyze the conditions of the possibilities and limitations of the Gezi. There was more in the Gezi coming from local political and social situations and conjunctures and the characteristics of the agents in the country that framed their political dispositions than the concept of the multitude. For example, the Gezi events were not the product of the positive affections and desire for a constitutive politics as Hardt&Negri conceptualized through the multitude. Rather the resentment of the AKP and Erdoğan were also important factors for the emergence of the Gezi. Namely, not only constitutive practices and desires, but also the condensation of the enmity and opposition to the AKP and Erdoğan during the Gezi produced a common political position-taking for different agents. Without such a conjunctive fact, the agents would not have been able to come together.

The agents of the Gezi did not have an internal disposition to produce a new society and politics. That is to say that the Gezi was not an expression of a desire to constitute a new society, but had simple demands for democracy, not an absolute desire for a direct democratic and horizontal ideal social and political system, even if ideals and practices in parallel with them emerged. On the other hand, the political positions framed by the tradition of the left and other political positions like Kemalism and nationalism were operating in the Gezi. It was these traditions, not the potentiality of the multitude as being a universal revolutionary subject, but local agents and conditions that framed the Gezi. It was these agents with their habits that formed Gezi, even if their habits changed with a new position-taking in the political field.

Therefore, the increasing discontent with the policies of the AKP and an emerging intensified enmity against the AKP paved the way for the Gezi. Within this atmosphere, the dispositions and political position-taking developed. Rather than the

social conditions, it was the highly politicized atmosphere in the country and its symptoms that was expressed by the agents. These were not the expression of the multitude as conditioned by the existing global bio-power. The highly increasing methods of populism, the exclusionary mechanisms of opponents and the power mechanisms from the control to the repression exerted by the AKP that constructed the political position-takings. Hence, it was not the multitude's immanent character, but the habits of the political groups framed by their ideological orientations and the conjunctural effects of the AKP's policies on the social and political groups that made Gezi possible.

In the same vein, Laclau&Mouffe's ideas on political articulation and political subjectification are not enough to analyze the conditions of the possibilities and the limitations of the Gezi. For Laclau&Mouffe the main political articulation and subjectification mechanism is the empty signifier through which the construction of us against they as an antagonism is produced. This requires a representative force which claims the representative of the empty signifiers. It is true that the empty signifiers are with the claim of the representation of democracy, freedom and a new country by the agents and an antagonism is constructed against the AKP. However, the empty signifiers and antagonism were not the condition, but the mechanisms of the political articulation and subjectification. These were also not the construction of a representative force, but the construction of the agents in the Gezi. Therefore, the dispositions and political position-taking before the Gezi were the main factor for a political articulation and the production of the subjectivities. In that sense, the Gezi was the re-emergence of these dispositions and political position-taking, in this re-emergence the empty signifiers were only the means, not the condition of the political. Therefore, the habits of the agents had an important role, thus without the political accumulation of the social and political movements and their constructed political position-taking, there was no working of the empty signifiers. Thus, the above stories of the agents make it evident that the political habits of the agents were formed both due to their identities and affinities with political ideologies and by the political position-taking during the AKP era. These historical and actual situations and conjunctures were important.

As a result, even if the Gezi produced common political position-taking between the different agents and groups, it was not able to institutionalize it. The Gezi was not able to block Erdoğan's increasing political determination to exclude groups that were not in his party's block and to intensify control and repression on the population. In a way, the Gezi made the AKP more intolerant of other political forces and led it to increase emergency mechanisms in the country. Therefore, the Gezi formed the actions of power exerted more violently by the AKP on their opponents. However, despite these facts, in the political field of the country, the anti-AKP political position became a common political means for different groups and this provided the coming together of different political groups discursively and around political organizations like the HDP and in opposition to AKP at meetings, demonstrations and elections.

5.2. HDP: The Construction of a Bloc and Alliance

As mentioned above, the HDP was on the one hand the product of the development of the Kurdish political movement gaining capacity for hegemony and influence among the Kurds through political, cultural, economic and political organizations and institutions, while on the other hand attracting different social and political forces around blocks and alliances and appealing to social and political movements in the country. In this way, the HDP tried to bring together different social and political agents and groups producing commonalities. Therefore, it was able to have a capacity to influence and attract different social and political groups and to produce political discourses and perspectives for these groups, providing them with the opportunity to find a place for their demands, emotions and perceptions.

Based on the project of Turkey-ization, calling on all the cultural, economic, political and social problems in society, the different conjunctures in the country made its project possible and delimited. These conjunctures drew the boundaries of its actions in the political field and in the political spaces to attract and articulate agents and groups. Therefore, it was endeavouring to produce commonalizing social and political practices for the agents in parallel with its political perspective within the political field, interacting with other social and political forces in different

conjunctures which also constantly formed the political positions of the agents. Correspondingly, it was trying to link its commonalities to the demands, emotions and perceptions of the agents and groups in the political field which was constantly changing. This section will mention the workings of these commonalizing practices of the HDP in different conjunctures.

5.2.1: Conjunctures for the Construction of the Block: Demonstrations, Social and Political Practices and Elections

5.2.1.1 The First Efforts for Turkey-ization: March 2014 Local Elections and Demirtaş' Campaign for the Presidency

Founded in 2013, most of its components, mainly Marxist and leftist organizations, were active in the Gezi, even if the Kurdish movement, constituting its main part, had hesitations about the events. For example, as mentioned above, Dermirtaş expressed concerns about the Gezi, arguing that the events might threaten the peace process and be directed towards a putschist political action. Despite these worries, members and sympathizers of the Kurdish movement and parliamentarians like Sırrı Süreyya Önder²⁹² were very active in the events. However, the HDK, which later transformed into the HDP, with its all components became involved and interested in the social movements and events after the Gezi.

After its foundation, the HDP tried to develop an alternative politics, calling on the agents of the Gezi and declaring itself to be the representative of the Gezi spirit with the strategy of Turkey-ization and discursively going beyond mere opposition to the AKP. Calling its political perspective a third line, differentiating its politics from the perspectives that were solely antagonistic to Erdoğan with negative feelings, the HDP offered a political struggle not abandoning and remaining at bay the opposition and criticism to AKP. Therefore, on the one hand it offered and made visible its political program of reconstructing the country based on radical democratic and democratic autonomist ideas concentrating upon a solution of the Kurdish problem and democratization of the country, while on the other maintaining a distant and

²⁹² Önder was in the park in the first days of the events and was injured by the police.

critical position vis-a-vis the AKP. That is, it placed itself within the political field in an anti-AKP position with its political ideals.

With this perspective and strategy, it took part in the March 2014 local elections trying to attract different sections of the population.²⁹³ For example, in parallel with this strategy it presented itself as the heir of the Gezi, standing Sirri Süreyya Önder as the candidate for Istanbul. However, it was not successful in gaining support in the Western cities, even if its main component, the BDP, took the majority of the votes in the Kurdish regions. On the other hand, the leftist agents in the West did not support the HDP, because these elections were important to block the AKP's increasing power. Therefore, they maintained a strategy of supporting candidates close to the left, including CHP candidates, to prevent AKP candidates' victory in localities. Additionally, most of the Marxist and socialist organizations were critical of the HDP.

After the local elections, the HDP continued its Turkey-ization strategy and took an active role, becoming closer to the social and political opposition to the AKP and constructing its alternative discourse, on the one hand criticizing and opposing the AKP, while on the other trying to put emphasis on its social and political program. Therefore, it was combining enmity to the AKP with its program producing a common discourse of the different discontent and hopes in society and the political field. These strategies made the HDP part of the social and political opposition to the AKP and led it to develop discourse for the agents who were antagonistic and opposed to the AKP.

The strategies around Turkey-ization were framed by the discourse corresponding to the emotions and perceptions mostly formed by the negative and critical perception about the AKP and Erdoğan's increasing authoritarianism. This political strategy was maintained during Demirtaş' candidacy for the presidential elections and was

²⁹³ While in the western cities the HDP stood candidates, it stood no one in the Kurdish regions. For, in these regions, the BDP, as the largest group in the HDP, stood candidates due to worries that the Kurdish people were still not interested in the HDP and did not consider it to be a Kurdish party. This process was a unification process of the Kurdish people with the political forces in the West. Throughout Demirtaş' candidacy for the presidency, the party became attractive for the Kurdish people in the sense that they perceived the HDP as a Kurdish political force.

partially successful.²⁹⁴ During the elections, Demirtaş created an image of not only being a Kurdish candidate but of also representing the population in the west. On the other hand, he did not seek to conceal his Kurdish identity and its attractiveness for the Kurdish population. Developing a humorous discourse,²⁹⁵ he became a sympathetic figure, overcoming fears that he was a representative of the PKK. However, even if he was able to generate a sympathy, attraction and interest amongst some sections of the population, it was a partial success, because he was unable to transcend all negative feelings. Large swathes of the population still saw him as the representative of the PKK and nationalist groups and individuals protested against him. Moreover, some of the Marxist and leftist groups were critical of Demirtaş' candidacy and did not declare their support.

5.2.1.2 The Increase of the HDP's Attractiveness for the Left: Kobane Events

The Kobane events of 6-7 October 2014 were very important as regards the HDP increasing its influence on the Kurds and the leftist and Marxist agents and groups. For, during these events the Kurds in Turkey responded positively to the HDP's call²⁹⁶ onto the streets to protest against the AKP and ISIS, producing a close relationship between the Kurdish people and HDP's political line on the Kurdish problem. Moreover, leftist and Marxist movements and organizations became closer to the Kurdish movement. Therefore, the Kobane events produced a common position between agents involved in and supporting the events. While the Kurds were involved in the events with their interests, affections, demands and perceptions constructed around Kurdish identity and a desire for a solution of the Kurdish

²⁹⁴ In this election, Demirtaş took 9.76% of the votes (Retrieved 14.05.2016, from <https://secim.haberler.com/cumhurbaskanligi-secimi/>).

²⁹⁵ This discourse was maintained by Demirtaş and made him and his party sympathetic for those who had taken part in the Gezi.

²⁹⁶ The leftist organizations put emphasis on antagonism to the AKP, objecting to "imperialism", and on humanity and the common fate with the Kurds: if Kobane were to be conquered by ISIS, it would also affect Turkey. For example see, (Retrieved 12.03.2016, from <http://portal.odp.org.tr/diren-kobane-halkinin-yanindayiz>; Retrieved 14.01.2018, from <http://sendika62.org/2014/10/halkevleri-kobane-icin-mezhepciler-fasist-karanligi-durdurmak-icin-herkes-harekete-gecmelidir-219270>; Retrieved 12.03.2016, from <https://www.emep.org/tr/kobane-icin-ses-ver>).

problem, the other agents, especially leftists and Marxists, were active in the events with an emphasis on secularism, antagonism to Islamism and criticism and opposition to the AKP. In other words, the Kurds, Marxists, leftists and other groups supporting and involved in the events objected to the ISIS invasion of Kobane. It was perceived and felt as a threat by the Kurds because the invasion threatened the experiment in Kurdish self-government in Rojava, while for the other agents it was seen as the representation of an authoritarian Islamic force which was against the democracy and freedom of peoples.

The other common ground of the agents was that they identified the ISIS political perspective and its actions with the AKP and its authoritative, repressive and Islamic-conservative discourses and projects. Therefore, while the HDP criticized the AKP and Erdoğan's discourses on Kobane, codifying them as enmity to the Kurdish people and acting with Islamic groups, in parallel with the HDP the Marxist groups expressed both their enmity to the AKP and Erdoğan as the supporter of Islamist and authoritative projects neglecting Kurdish rights, and for being involved in a civil war. They supported Kobane as the symbol of a construction of a peaceful, laicist and democratic government in the region. The Marxist and leftist organizations also put emphasis on the common fate of Kurds with Turkey.

Not only Marxists, leftists, anti-authoritarian groups and Kurds, but also the Alevis supported the events. Even CHP members and parliamentarians supported the events and the CHP criticized the government's foreign policy in Syria, arguing that it was partly responsible for these events due to its support for Islamist groups. The CHP also emphasised the common fate of Kobane with society in Turkey on the grounds that if Kobane were conquered by ISIS, Turkey would also become an Islamist country (Retrieved 14.02.2006, from <http://t24.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-kobane-eylemleri-hakkinda-konusuyor,273319>). The Kobane events were a starting point for the alliance of the Kurdish movement with the Marxists, leftists, anti-authoritarian groups and social democrats. These groups commonalized their interests, affections and demands with the Kurdish movement around the HDP. On the other hand, the HDP developed a discourse for these groups involving their demands, affections and perceptions about the country and around their opposition to the AKP and their perspectives to construct a new country.

On the other hand, the events were opposed by both government and nationalist groups like the MHP and leftist-Kemalists like Aydınlık. The MHP criticized and objected both to the government of the AKP and to HDP and those who participated in events. Bahçeli said that AKP was mainly responsible for Kobane because of its policies. However, it objected to the events as support for terrorism, because for Bahçeli the PYD and YPG were nothing more than the agency of the PKK in Syria (Retrieved 14.03.2016, from https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/3549/index.html). Given all this, the events were important for the HDP, because, first and foremost, they increased its capacity to include and attract different political and social agents' discontent and enmity towards the AKP around the common themes of opposition to the AKP and the construction of a new country.

5.2.1.3. The Increase and Decrease of the Possibilities of Turkey-ization: Between 7 June and 1 November Elections

As mentioned before, the process between the Gezi and 7 June was the process of increasing discontent, worries, criticism, political antagonism and opposition to both the AKP and Erdoğan. These political positions were framed by perceptions that emphasized the increasing authoritarianism and termination of alternative political and social experiences and perspectives by the AKP and Erdoğan. Immediately before the elections, the antagonism and opposition around concerns about the increasing authoritarianism were intensified on account of Erdoğan's expressed wish to construct an executive presidential system combining with worries and discontent with previous AKP policies.

This opposition was expressed by different social and political agents in the country, from the Kurds, Alevis, Kemalists, social democrats to liberals, nationalists, socialists and anti-authoritarian groups. In parallel with these, increasingly after the Gezi events, the leftist and Marxist political groups and social movements and anti-authoritarian groups and organizations increased their opposition and criticism to the AKP and Erdoğan. This was due to concerns about the AKP's increasingly

transforming power into repression of alternative political movements and homogenizing the political field, eliminating its plurality. Therefore, the political struggles and expressions were dominated by opposition to the AKP and Erdoğan. Within this framework, the leftist groups to some extent established a strategic and tactical partnership with the HDP to prevent Erdoğan's wish to construct an executive presidential system.

Turkey entered the 7 June elections in this atmosphere that constituted the emotions, perceptions and demands in the political field. Therefore, the HDP developed an election discourse on the one hand objecting to Erdoğan and AKP power expressed around the wish to construct an executive presidential system, and, on the other, presenting an alternative radical leftist political perspective aiming to solve the Kurdish problem with the democratization of the country and to construct a new society eliminating the domination and exploitation mechanisms in all areas of life under the title of New Life. Therefore, its New Life perspective was offered as an alternative to the AKP's New Turkey perspective around the presidency system and on the existing political and social orders in Turkey, considered to be the producer of the cultural, gender, ecological, economic, ethnic and social inequalities, repression, exploitation and control.

This new life perspective included practical solutions to a lot of structural and actual problems in society produced both by the AKP and by the existing social and political system. Therefore, the HDP's discourse and political activities during the election campaign called on the discontent, worries, hate and enmity to the AKP and desires and hopes for the construction of a new social and political order in society. Consequently, the HDP was able to attract partial support from some sections of society, including different social and political agents and groups.

At the 7 June 2015 elections, the HDP received 13% of the votes and entered parliament with 80 members (Retrieved 16.06.2016, from <https://secim.haberler.com/7-haziran-2015-secimi/>). This success was related to the synergy created by the support of different social and political groups and media

institutions.²⁹⁷ As regards receiving the support and sympathy of the different social and political agents, it is argued that most of the votes that enabled the HDP to pass the 10% election threshold came from CHP voters. Their votes were called ‘emanet oy’ -[a kind of tactical voting]. However, some reports argue that these votes mostly came from Kurds who had voted for the AKP in previous elections. Additionally, the White Turks in Istanbul, Alevis, leftist and Marxist organizations and anti-authoritarian groups also voted for the HDP.

Given all this, it was evident that the most important group supporting and attracted by the HDP were Kurds in Turkey. Contrary to its predecessors, the HDP was able to obtain votes of Kurds critical of and distant from the Kurdish movement close to the PKK. Adding to its traditional supporters, the HDP was also able to attract the votes of “conservative Kurds”, that had never supported the Kurdish political movement.²⁹⁸ It is claimed that the Kurds supported the HDP due to Erdogan starting to use a nationalistic discourse about the Kurdish problem, rejecting the existence of the Kurdish question. Thus, it is correct to argue that the political dispositions of the Kurds were formed by their Kurdish identity and that the HDP was able to succeed, because it developed a discourse appealing to the problems of the Kurds. Therefore, the Kurds found a place for their daily needs and interests in the HDP’s call.

As mentioned above, pro-AKP authors claimed that the reason for the Kurds’ preference for the HDP was partly due to the repression exerted on the Kurds in the eastern and south eastern part of Turkey. However, this only partly explains the preferences of the Kurds. For, other studies argue that the Kurds supported the HDP due to its emphasis on peace and that their Kurdish identity was the most important factor in their support.

²⁹⁷ Even if the HDP’s votes mostly come from the Kurds, the alliances with other groups and declaration of support by different artists, journalists and intellectuals made it a simple sum of the groups producing an atmosphere around the HDP which made it attractive for agents who were not affiliated to any social or political group. In other words, it went beyond the sum of its parts.

²⁹⁸ The reason for this support was explained by pro-AKP authors as the PKK’s repression and they claimed the voters had not been convinced by the HDP. However, some authors argued that the AKP’s election campaign, especially Erdogan’s discourses, were important in the swing of votes from the AKP to HDP. For example see, (Muğurtay, 2015).

This is related to the fact that one of the studies on the Kurds in Turkey argues that the main factor influencing the voting preferences of Kurds is formed by their Kurdish identity. Therefore, the Kurds vote for any political party, regardless of their lifestyle, including religious preferences, as long as this political party promises to solve the Kurdish problem, includes ethnic, economic and social issues. In parallel with this, the HDP's strategy and political perspective to become the representative of all Kurds independent of their class, religion and gender identities enabled it to increase its votes and influence among the Kurdish population both in the Kurdish regions and in the western cities.

Thus, the HDP were successful in taking their votes, because the HDP worked well on the political dispositions, affections, perceptions and expectations of the Kurds due to positioning itself as the representative of the Kurds and as the force to respond to the demands and interests of the Kurds, such as peace in the Kurdish regions, by being the mediator between the PKK and the Turkish state, gaining their rights and solving their economic problems (Çilekağacı, 2015a).

As mentioned above, alongside the Kurds, a lot of social and political organizations from women's organizations to leftist and Marxist organizations, Alevi organizations, artists, intellectuals and authors declared their support for the HDP in the 7 June elections. In parallel with this support, the HDP formed election alliances and stood members of Marxist, leftist and feminist organizations, LGBTT members, prominent figures in the Alevi community and members of other Kurdish organizations as candidates.

Therefore, for 7 June, some Marxist organizations that had previously withheld support for the HDP in elections, declared their support. This support was based on the discourse of opposition to the AKP and Erdoğan, emphasizing the AKP's economic, political and social practices and the search for a new social and political order and system. This was in parallel with the HDP's election declaration that presented itself to prevent the AKP's increasing power in the country and to construct a new country and a new life in the world. For example, the Halkevleri, one of the strongest Marxist groups in Turkey, Partizan and DHF[40], that had not

previously called on its supporters to vote for the HDP, declared their support and worked for the HDP's election campaign.

In the Halkevleri's declaration, they explained their support for the HDP on the grounds that the HDP was the sole leftist force in the country that could prevent Erdoğan and the AKP's increasing power and could make a space for the strengthening of leftist politics (Retrieved 14.01.2016, from <http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/basin-aciklamalari/akp-yi-sokakta-da-sandikta-da-geriletelim>). Partizan supported the HDP to strengthen the democratic block in the country and to enable the Kurdish people to be represented in the TBMM (14.01.2016, from <http://siyasihaber3.org/ydk-ve-partizandan-secimlerde-hdpye-destek-aciklamasi>). The DHF as a group was critical of the Kurdish political movement, but for the 7 June elections declared an election alliance with the HDP. In their common declaration, the DHF and the HDP stated that the HDP's entering the TBMM would strengthen the struggle for the revolution in the name of the oppressed people both in Turkey and the Middle East (Retrieved 15.01.2018, from <http://sendika62.org/2015/04/dhf-ve-hdpden-secim-ittifaki-aciklamasi-256280/>).

Therefore, it is evident that in the case of these three organizations, the HDP was considered able to block the AKP's increasing power, which was seen as a repressive and authoritarian political force both for the population and for leftist social and political positions and to provide a space to strengthen leftist and Marxist ideals and politics. Thus, the interests and political perspectives of these organizations considered their political position-taking as sharing common ground with the HDP.

Alevi were the other group from which the HDP could gain support. Although, even if some of the Alevi organizations in the country and abroad expressed their support for the HDP, the majority of Alevi supported the CHP. In spite of this fact, the HDP increased its votes among Alevi. Some Alevi families even divided themselves to vote for both the CHP and HDP. The HDP was also able to take votes from Alevi who had previously voted for the CHP. Increasing support for the HDP amongst Alevi was down to several factors. One was Erdoğan and AKP's increasing power which was considered as a sign of the increasing authoritarianism and conservatism in the country. Moreover, the HDP's emphasis on the rights of Alevi, secularism,

respect for the different cultures in the country and democracy both in its election booklet and in its programme made it attractive for Alevis. Therefore, Alevis found a place in the HDP and offered to support the HDP strategically.

Furthermore, Alevis and other groups found common ground with the HDP as regards their particular political perspectives, emphasizing that they found a place for their voices and political struggles in the HDP. For example, in Feminist Politika, the feminists expressed their reasons for supporting the HDP. For them, the AKP produces patriarchy and represses women's organizations, and implements neo-liberal policies such as precarious working conditions. They supported the HDP, because the HDP promised to give equal rights to women and women had equality in the party organization (Feminist Politika, 2015,4-5).

The feminist groups issued a common declaration to support the HDP in the elections. They stated that even if the women's issue could be solved by representational politics, they would support the HDP, because the HDP gave prominence to women's issues and equal representation to women in the party and their feminist perspective could make the voice of women heard in parliament. Besides this, they also found in the HDP a place for their opposition to the AKP's increasing authoritarianism, conservatism and neo-liberal economic policies and, in particular, the negative influence of these on women, strengthening patriarchy. So they constructed a parallelity between the increasing authoritarianism in society and its effect on women. Moreover, the HDP stood some feminist figures as candidates in the elections.

The LGBTT movement was the other anti-authoritarian group which supported the HDP. They based their support on the HDP's promise to open space for the rights of LGBTT members in society and because the party had a stance against heterosexism. In addition to these particular issues, the HDP was also considered as a force that could act as a barrier to the effects of the AKP's repressive politics on the population. Barış Sulu, a LGBTT individual who was a candidate of the HDP in Eskişehir, said that the HDP had a possibility to construct a society that would put an end to homophobia and to provide space for different cultures in society. (Retrieved

13.04.2016, from <http://t24.com.tr/haber/ilc-escinsel-erkek-vekil-adayi-toplum-escinsel-vekile-hazir-degil-soylemi-guclememiz-icin-atilan-bir-yalan,290199>)

Some anarchists also decided to vote for the HDP despite the views of different anarchist groups in the country. For example, Kürşat Kızıltuğ, an anarchist author, argued that the HDP's entering the TBMM would block Erdoğan's aspirations to dictatorship and could assist efforts to produce anarchist politics. In other words, the HDP was seen as a democratic bloc of different agents and under the actual political conditions that produced the AKP's hegemony, control and repression of different political perspectives and organizations the HDP was a force for all of these groups and agents to strengthen their political struggles²⁹⁹(Retrieved 14.04.2016, from <http://www.dunyaninyerlileri.com/oy-kullanmak-politik-bir-eylemdir-kursad-kiziltug/>).

As has been seen, worries about Erdoğan and the AKP's increasing power, and discontent that developed during the AKP era were important reasons for other groups to support the HDP. Some of these groups, like Marxists, feminists and Aevis felt close to the HDP because of affinities between their political ideas and perspectives as well as their strategic choices and preferences, while some other figures' preference was mostly framed by conditional and opportunist choices. Worries about the future of democracy in the country and increasing authoritarianism led them to find a commonality with the HDP, despite the HDP's understanding of these issues being very different, hence some figures wanted to block Erdoğan and the AKP. For example, Emin Çölaşan, a journalist who is critical of the Kurdish political movement and who has very negative ideas about it framed by nationalist ideas, declared his support for the HDP to prevent Erdoğan and the AKP increasing its power and achieving their wishes to construct an executive presidential system.

Another group to support the HDP was the “white Turks” in Istanbul, who mostly dwell in rich neighbourhoods of the city and have secular and Western values. HDP

²⁹⁹ For examples of critiques by other anarchist groups of the political positioning of Kızıltuğ see,(Retrieved 18.04.2016, from <https://itaatsizler.wordpress.com/2015/06/05/oy-kullanmak-apolitik-bir-eylemdir-dilaver-demirag/>; Retrieved 18.04.2016, from <http://sosyalsavas.org/2014/02/hdpnin-secimi-ve-anarsi-istanbul-anarsi-inisiyatifi/>).

was the leading party in these neighbourhoods. The party's success was related to its developing a discourse that put an end to worries that the HDP was a supporter of PKK and terrorism. The HDP was able to become a focus for them to end their worries and a force to block Erdoğan and the AKP. As a Kurdish taxi driver said, the rich and the poor came together around the HDP.

Given all this, the HDP became both the party of Kurds and of other agents and sections in the country apart from the Kurds at the 7 June elections, constructing a possibility, even if it was very limited. Therefore, the HDP on the one hand was Kurdicized and on the other Turkey-iased [spread all over Turkey]. That is, the HDP was able to create a commonality between Kurdish voters and other sections in the country with its flexible discourse during the electoral campaign, attracting and producing an interest from different sections in society. Not only this discourse, but there were changes coming from Kurdish society, with the increasing influence and power of the legal Kurdish movement and the PKK through social and political institutions and organizations which constructed support for Kurdish identity in line with Öcalan's ideas. Additionally, developments in the country led social and political agents from leftists to Alevis and CHP voters to vote for the HDP on account of fears and worries about the future of the country and desires and hopes to construct a new country.

At the 1 November elections the HDP's vote dropped from 13.1% to 10.8%. Turkey entered the 1 November elections under circumstances that included the increasing conflict between the YDG-H and the Turkish State, and bombings by ISIS in Suruç on 20 July and in Ankara on 10 October. In this process, the HDP criticised the AKP government for not preventing these bombings and consciously leading the country into chaos and war. The decision to hold an early election on 1 November by Erdoğan was considered as based on his wish to construct an executive presidential system and the increasing war and violence were seen as the means to create panic and fear in the population, and consequently to gain the support of the population and silence the other political perspectives and voices in society. Therefore, during the process of the 1 November elections, the HDP increased its opposition to the AKP,

considering it an authoritarian and repressive force on the population and accusing it of using all means to maintain and construct its hegemony.

Within this framework, the HDP placed and positioned itself as the force for peace and democracy against war and the AKP's politics of chaos. Despite it cancelling election rallies during the campaign, it maintained its Turkey-ization project and the ideas it developed around its 7 June manifesto booklet. Around criticism of the AKP's changing policies regarding the Kurdish problem, it constructed parallels between the Kurdish problem and other problems in society. Its anti-AKP position was one of the discursive practices that combined it with the increasing repression and violence. Therefore, the HDP tried to position itself as the party of peace for the whole country considering itself a democratic and alternative political force to the AKP.

However, in spite of these strategies and continuing alliances with groups and ongoing support from the different social and political agents like Kemalists and Alevis, the HDP was unable to increase its votes despite analysis that the HDP's share of the vote would rise and would constitute a barrier to Erdogan and the AKP. In fact, the HDP's vote fell all over the country, including in the Kurdish regions.

The reasons for this fall in the vote were explained from different perspectives. Whatever the political perspective was, reports and analysis on the reduced vote for the HDP focused on the idea that the political and social climate in the country after the Suruç bombing, the instability, emergency problems and increasing war and violent and terrorist methods used by ISIS and the PKK, had influenced the preferences of voters. In the case of the HDP's voters, it was clear that some of the Kurds, in particular, had voted for the AKP again. The pro-AKP authors argued that the fall in the HDP's vote was connected to its relations with the PKK.

While pro-AKP commentators argued that HDP voters had switched to the AKP, some other analyses argued that the fall in the HDP's vote was due to abstentionism by HDP voters, especially Kurds in the region. While the first perspective argued that the Kurds voted for the AKP on account of the rise in violence, the other perspective argued that the preferences of HDP voters had not changed, but that they had not

gone to the polling stations to vote. On the other hand, even if the decrease in the HDP's vote was due to small numbers of voters returning to the AKP, and, to a lesser extent, to the CHP, an explanation is required.

This drop was partly due to the process of increasing conflict after the Suruç bombing creating new feelings. Even if some commentators argued that the HDP had changed its Turkey-ization project, it continued to put emphasis on its Turkey-wide project. However, the changing strategies of the PKK and its affiliated groups like the YDG-H had increased violence and the politics of war. On the other hand, the HDP cancelled its electoral meetings in the country due to the emergency situation. Some studies argue that the switch by supporters of the HDP and the boycott by sympathizers of the PKK had decreased the HDP's votes. This process of violence both by the PKK and its affiliated groups and the state's wish to use armed force as the solution to the Kurdish problem broke the spell which had been created by the peace process. These developments partially distanced some sections from the HDP, even if it did not lose its influence in the political field.

While the HDP's discourses and political practices included potential for some sections of the population, it also constructed limits for different social and political agents during these elections. For example, for MHP supporters and some Kemalists, it was nothing other than a representative of terrorism. These segments perceived the HDP as an enemy due to their perspectives on the Kurdish problem. On the other hand, there were AKP supporters who also saw it as the agent of terrorism, but did not totally reject the Kurdish problem, only opposing the PKK. These limits were not just constructed by the HDP, but by the political position-taking where the agents found a place.

During the 7 June and 1 November elections, the HDP worked to form an alliance through the construction of the common including different interests, demands and emotions in society. On the one hand, it put emphasis on antagonism and opposition to the AKP and Erdoğan, while on the other it offered an alternative political and social system expressed around the name of New Life. Around these, it developed a discourse including different demands and interests in society to include all diverse elements. This appeal received a response from social and political agents in society

that saw a correspondence of their interests, demands and affections with the HDP's promises and tactics, leading to the formation of an alliance around common interests, emotions and strategies. In particular, leftist and Marxist groups and the leaders of some of the Alevi organizations supported the HDP, both to prevent the AKP and Erdoğan consolidating their power, and on account of the HDP's promises to democratize the country and campaign for the construction of a society based on equality. The Kurds supported the HDP in order to solve the Kurdish problem and for peace.

This flexible and inclusive political discourse symbolized by the leadership of Selahattin Demirtaş was an important factor in making the HDP an attraction center for the groups and organisations. Some individuals explained that they voted for the HDP because Demirtaş' humorous style led them to see him as a person like them. This identification with Demirtaş as well as other reasons, such as considering the HDP a counter force against the AKP and Erdoğan made the HDP an attraction center.

On the other hand, the habitus of the social and political groups forms their political dispositions and according to the conditions and moments their dispositions are reformed by strategies and tactics. The HDP worked well on these political dispositions and constructed alliances with political groups, developing a discourse to gain the support of social groups. For instance, to gain the support of Kemalists and Alevis its discourse put the emphasis on democracy and secularism, while for the Kurds' votes it presented itself as the representative of the Kurdish identity developing a discourse on peace and a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem.

5.2.1.4 The HDP between 1 November Election and 15 July Military Coup: Increasing War, Limitations and Ineffective Politics

After the 1 November elections, the peace process between the PKK and Turkish state ended and the parties increased the use of violence against each other. In the Kurdish regions of Turkey, the YDG-H dug a lot of ditches in urban areas as an expression of democratic autonomy. Like the Rojava experience, the YDG-H wanted to start a popular armed uprising. However, the armed forces of the state responded

violently, killing the militants and destroying the parts of towns where the militants had constructed fronts against the state and during the conflict thousands of Kurds left the region. Ultimately, the state captured the areas from the militants, filling in the ditches and forcing the militants to retreat. During this process, the HDP constantly made calls to the parties to end the conflict and to seek a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem. HDP parliamentarians even tried to enter conflict areas to protect civilians and called for demonstrations to stop the war. However, their efforts failed due to the conditions of conflict and they were unable to organize mass rallies and civil resistance.

Along with the HDP, other social and political agents and organizations, including Marxists and leftists called for an end to the conflict, but they were unable to organize strong public and popular voices through demonstrations. However, on 10 January 2016, academics under the name of Academics for Peace (Barış İçin Akademisyenler, BAK) issued a declaration with the title of ‘We Will not be a Party to This Crime’.³⁰⁰

As a result of the conflict between the PKK and YDG-H and the state producing conditions where non-violent and unarmed political practices became ineffective, the HDP’s capacities were limited. The conflict was criticised and there was opposition to its ending the peace process,³⁰¹ but except for the BAK’s declaration, none of the voices that emerged were organised.

Along with these developments, the components of the HDP and its organized support from the leftists and Marxists also began to have worries about the future of the country. The sense of weakness and disappointment among social and political agents became widespread and the numbers of people attending meetings,

³⁰⁰ For details of the declaration see, (<https://barisicinakademisyenler.net/node/63>). The declaration was criticized, especially by the AKP and Erdoğan, who argued that the declaration gave support to terrorism, because it did not mention the actions of the YDG-H and only criticized state forces. After the criticisms, the BAK issued a new declaration.

³⁰¹ Even if the majority of the Kurds criticized the state use of violence, some Kurds also criticized the PKK and HDP for not being able to use the peace process which was supported by voters. In addition to support for the ditch digging politics, this process distanced them from the HDP and PKK. (Yanmış, 2016a; Yanmiş, 2016b).

demonstrations and political activities decreased. That is, the social and political movements retreated from the streets. This situation was partly due to the traumas caused by the ISIS attacks on Suruç and on the peace rally in Ankara on 10 October. Under these conditions, it is understandable that the HDP was not able to organize mass popular rallies. Even if the number of the individuals was low when compared with previous years, the leftist organizations and the HDP continued to organize meetings.³⁰² As a result, the process between the Suruç bombing and 15 June 2016 saw repression on leftist organizations, leading to a retreat by the social and political movements from the streets. Alongside these developments, the HDP was not able to organize civil and non-violent methods of politics with popular and mass support, even if it maintained its social and political institutions in the country.

4.2.5. After 15 July: Dark Times for the HDP and the Left

As mentioned above, after 15 July, the AKP, with the support of the MHP and some Kemalists, mostly from the Vatan Partisi, declared a state of emergency . After this declaration, a lot of HDP supporters and members, including Demirtaş, Yüksekdağ and other MPs, were arrested. Under this state repression, the HDP continued its political practices criticizing the AKP and maintaining its political perspective for the democratization of the country and resolving the Kurdish problem. Like other political organizations, the HDP voiced the discontent and worries in society during the OHAL both in parliament and through rallies and meetings. However, as mentioned above, this situation weakened the Kurdish movement's institutional and organizational capacities in Kurdish society. This was due to the appointment of trustees by the government through the OHAL laws. Thus, the Kurdish movement lost most of the municipalities it was in control of in local government, which were very effective to organize its activities and politics. Hence, its organizational force among the Kurds was undermined.

During the referendum campaign over granting president Erdoğan sweeping new powers on 16 April 2017, HDP was one of the forces opposing the introduction of an

³⁰² The survey conducted by Konda presents well the depressed mode of HDP voters and supporters (Konda, 2015b: 11).

executive presidential system from its perspective, even if it did not organize popular meetings and demonstrations, but carried on its campaign using face-to-face methods, since conditions prevented it campaigning openly. In its campaign leaflet, the HDP objected to the executive presidential system, as for it the system would bring about authoritarian one-person rule to the country, terminating democratic conditions for the alternative political and social forces and voices in the country with the emphasis on parliamentary democracy. Therefore, rather than mentioning its political perspectives, such as democratic autonomy and leftist ideas, HDP set forth a simple perspective emphasizing the negative effects that might be brought about by allowing the President to have further powers. It seemed that it was aiming at increasing the numbers of the no votes.

Despite the HDP's campaign, a majority of the Kurds in the east voted for yes. When compared with 1 November, the no votes were below the HDP's vote. Some researchers argue that the Kurds voted yes because of their discontent with the violent situation and their worries caused by uncertainties due to the Kurdish problem with hopes of more peaceful conditions in the region,³⁰³ others argued that the vote dropped because of the massive migration of HDP supporters from the region, a boycott and repression targeting the no campaign of the HDP. Whatever the reason was, the two perspectives show that the uncertainties and lack of a solution to the Kurdish problem and its economic and social effects on individuals reduced the HDP's effectiveness, even if it was the strongest political force in the region.

5.2.2. HDP: Past and Future Possibilities and Limitations

Deriving from Laclau and Mouffe's ideas, a plebeian constructed a commonality for the other subjectivities and parts within the HDP. But, this possibility was the product of the force and power of the legal Kurdish political movement and the PKK

³⁰³ For example see, (Retrieved 16.09.2017, from <http://www.internethaber.com/gezici-arastirmadan-dikkat-ceken-referandum-sonucu-analizi-1771265h.htm>). The Kurdish no voters were lower than the HDP votes on 1 November especially in the trustee-appointed cities and towns. This analysis argues that this was due to the economic and social stability brought by the trustees that created content and positive conditions for the Kurdish people. On the other hand, other analyses argue that it was not certain the Kurds voted for the positive conditions created by the trustees' administration, and that it might be the migrations from the region that had played a role in this decrease. For example, Konda's report on the referendum argues like this(Konda, 2017).

through its organizational and institutional practices among the Kurdish people as well as the increasing social and political movements. The HDP has constructed alliances with groups both within it and outside it and calling on the emotions, demands and perceptions within the political field.

Therefore, it has created the possibility to organize and gain the support of different agents calling on emotions, demands, perceptions and discourses produced by the political, social and cultural conjunctures and by the local and global structures at times of the increasing social and political opposition and alternatives to the existing order and government, but it became limited due to the increasing conflict, retreat of the social and political movements and changing political dispositions and attitudes of the agents. Due to being a legal political party, the HDP has a parliamentary politics and civil social and political struggles, even if its components' used violence. Not only electoral campaigns, but also the constitutive experiences of the Kurdish movement provided its force.

As a result, the political and social conditions produced by the conjunctures and structural elements formed its limitations and possibilities. Therefore, the changes in the Kurdish problem and the strategies and tactics of the Kurdish movement, under the influence of the PKK and Öcalan, draw the boundaries of the HDP's actions in the political field, even if it did not concentrate upon relating a solution of the Kurdish problem to the other problems of society. Whether a tactic or strategy of the Kurdish movement, the HDP was able to include other agents. The other limiting factor was the conditions of the social and political movements. In the case of the HDP, the decline of the power of the leftist and Marxist movements and organizations in the country and their social and political struggles intersected with the limits of the Kurdish political movement in legal and democratic spaces.

The HDP has declared itself a radical democratic party, not the representative of Laclau&Mouffe's ideology, but combining different thinkers like Negri&Hardt, Öcalan and Bookchin to construct its political ideology, and in parallel with radical democratic ideas has positioned itself as the representative of a new society and politics . Therefore, the discursive practices around the leadership of Demirtaş were important to position itself for this representation. However, this usage of politics in

Laclau and Mouffe's way became successful not only through the discursive practices, but also through material practices such as municipal experiences and alternative social and political organizations in the localities of the Kurdish population that provided a hegemony for the entirety of the Kurdish political movement, mostly under the influence of the PKK, and a space for these discursive practices. Also, the emerging political position-taking in the country against Erdoğan and the AKP due to local and global developments by the different social and political agents were crucial to make its discursive practices an attractive and articulative force for some of the groups in society. In Laclau and Mouffe's perspective, the HDP was able to develop a strategy around the empty signifiers through affectional and perceptual mechanisms and constructed relationships with other groups, appealing to their political and social interests and demands. Thus, the HDP was able to generate hope.

Under these facts, Laclau&Mouffe's ideas are limited to analyzing the HDP's political experiences, because the HDP claimed the right to possess the empty signifiers like a new Turkey, democracy and equality, which were also used by other political organizations in the political field. The role and hegemony of the Kurdish movement had a material hegemony over the Kurdish population and the tactics and strategies of the leftist movements and their positioning in the political field aimed at becoming powerful and to possess power. The methods of the HDP including demonstrations and the use of violence in the streets were used together with discursive mechanisms. Acting legally and using the methods of non-violence, its politics were framed by democratic politics using parliament and mass meetings, not the use of arms. These are the limits that determine the HDP's mode of politics, even if its relationships expose it to other methods, as has been the case with its relations with the PKK. So, without the PKK's hegemony, the interests of the leftist groups and their strategies, there was no HDP. Therefore, not only the claim of being the representative around the empty signifiers, but the past experiences of the Kurdish political movement, its successful strategies, the strategies against the AKP and the political position-taking formed in a political field where an antagonistic and counter hegemonic and alternative political positions against the AKP were increasing were important.

These political positions emerged before the HDP, when it was only one of the political forces acting within the political field where the increasing dissentive political positions against the AKP, the violent and uncompromising positions between the AKP and its opponents and the doubts, fears and worries about the AKP's existence expressed by the different social and political groups increased. For example, without the secularist and democratic political positions shared by groups like the Alevis and Kemalists and the demands of the Kurds for a solution to the Kurdish problem, the political position that the HDP formed was empty. In other words, without these groups, whose political and social demands formed under the historical and structural problems of the country, the antagonism and alternative to the AKP claiming to be the representative of the empty signifiers life democracy and new life in the country were empty. On the other hand, in a situation where the AKP's increasing power resulted in the exclusion of opponents and its policies produced discontent, the habits of the political and social groups and the conjunctures creating discontent constructed an anti-AKP position. This led the searches for the political and social groups to prevent the AKP's increasing power and thus, the HDP became a strategic choice. Therefore, the HDP's political strategies and the agents supporting it formed its politics. That is to say that not only the HDP's hegemonic force, but also the changing political position-taking according to the conjunctures produced a need to make an alliance among agents.

As a result, the HDP's limitations and possibilities were framed by the political field in the country as the product of the interactions with other forces. Its problems related to the Kurdish movement and the Left and Marxism in the country in the sense that the Left, especially the Marxist Left after the 1980 military coup, has never been able to become influential among the population. On the other hand, even though it exceeded the votes of previous leftist organizations in the country, the HDP was not able to appeal to the rightist and conservative voters. This is related to the habits and dispositions of the agents formed historically. Even if it was able to change the habitus of some of the agents, the AKP's hegemony over society was the important factor. By placing itself at the heart of society and claiming to represent the interests of the population, the AKP maintains its influence and satisfies the needs of the population, and in this way it disperses its political hegemony in the

political field leaving no room for alternative and oppositional politics. The HDP was and is also influenced by these facts that made its politics an attraction and a force of articulation for the agents.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Sociology is no science, and even if it were, revolution would elude scientific analysis for different reasons.” (Landauer, 2010:110)³⁰⁴

Hope, superior to fear, is neither passive like the latter, nor locked into nothingness. The emotion of hope goes out of itself, makes people broad instead of confining them, cannot know nearly enough of what it is that makes them inwardly aimed, of what may be allied to them outwardly. The work of this emotion requires people who throw themselves actively into what is becoming, to which they themselves belong. (Bloch, 1986a: 3)³⁰⁵

This study has explored and analyzed the alternative and oppositional mass, and popular political experiences and social movements vis-a-vis the existing political and social order in Turkey during the AKP era by focusing on the Gezi events and

³⁰⁴ In German the sentence is as follows: “Soziologie ist keine Wissenschaft; auch wenn sie es wäre, wäre die Revolution aus besonderen Gründen einer wissenschaftlichen Behandlung verschlossen.” (Landauer, 2003:27). Gustav Landauer was a Jewish philosopher known for his anarchist ideas and was influenced by thinkers and philosophers like Martin Buber, Ernst Bloch and Immanuel Levinas. For Landauer’s life and thinking see, (Kuhn & Wolf, 2010). He argues that the revolution as an unpredictable event cannot be predicted by science, as science concentrates upon the becoming, making it static, thus its analysis includes static categorizations of the reality. In that sense, the reality and the revolution is abundant from science’s predictions. In parallel with this idea, it is claimed here that science has a limited potential to grasp surprises and unpredictable events. However, the social and political events aspiring to change the existing order of things and existing social and political orders emerge within existing conditions. It is only science, due to its epistemological procedures, that focuses on the continuities and unchanging static realities, overlooking the possibilities for social and political change framed by the desires and hopes existing within the actuality that has not yet manifested itself, and therefore excludes it from the reality. Therefore, deriving from Landauer’s thinking it is evident that surprises and unpredictable events are outside the limits of science (Landauer, 2010: 110-185).

³⁰⁵ The social and political movements include the affections. Hope being one of them emerges within the existing order of things like Landauer’s revolution having a force to limit the existing social and political orders. It is a possibility that does not come from the sky for Bloch, but like Landauer’s revolution it is the very product of the existing social and political conditions (Bloch, 1986a).

the HDP. In this era, there have been a lot of social and political experiences and movements, due to increasing discontent and worries about the AKP government and its policies. Within these political experiences, the Gezi events and HDP have a particular place, because they had the power to reorder the political field in the country, and construct new modes of doing politics similar to the contemporary modes and forms of radical libertarian and leftist politics. On the other hand, these experiences constructed a strong common political position by being the expression of alternatives, and opposing the existing political and social system in the country. As a popular mass political experience, the Gezi experience included horizontal and direct democratic ways of doing politics, differing from the existing parliamentary forces and the leftist social and political organizations, even though the previous political activities of these forces and organizations had a preparing role for the emergence of the Gezi experience. Likewise, HDP became a popular center for the anti-AKP political position, bringing different and multiple political and social positions together, and becoming a center of alliance for alternative political perspectives, and especially the leftist, Marxist and anti-authoritarian groups.

These political experiences had counterparts in other parts of the world. Just as Gezi had similar characteristics with the popular uprisings and mass political movements that started at the beginning of the 2010s, HDP is one of the radical democratic and leftist populist political parties which became successful in general elections, and were effective in the political fields of countries like Greece and Spain. As it is well known, in Tunis, twenty-six-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in flammable liquid, and set himself on fire on 17 December 2010. After this incident, Tunisian people started an uprising – demanding economic equality, democratic rights, and freedom – which led to the overthrow of the long-running dictatorship in the country while inspiring the subsequent uprisings in the Arab world. In June 2013, the Gezi events started after a demonstration by a handful of leftist and environmental activists against an artillery barracks building project in place of the Gezi Park in Istanbul. Similar mass movements and popular uprisings erupted in other countries like Greece, USA and Ukraine after particular demonstrations, spreading all over those countries.

Even if these events had no destination or programme, and were not part of any political ideologies at the beginning. However, all these cases produced and expressed a strong common discontent for multiple social and political agents, with the existing political powers in the countries concerned, and demanded for changes in the social and political structures. In each case, the conditions, elements, and reasons making them possible, and their effects on politics and products were different. Before these events, these countries were subjected to different economic, cultural, political and social situations, and the agents and subjectivities produced affections, demands, and perceptions vis-a-vis these situations (Castells, 2015). These cases, on the one hand, included different and heterogeneous subjectivities and agents, while on the other, produced a popular content which produced common political position-taking.

Despite the similarities in these cases, with regard to their horizontal organizational practices, and construction of common political position-taking, despite the heterogeneity, and the differences between the singularities, each case followed its route: in Egypt, the uprisings led to president Hosni Mubarak's resignation; Syria was plunged into civil war; in Turkey, Gezi produced a strong opposition to the existing AKP government, but there was no institutionalized political force organizing this popular energy. The common point of these events was that they produced a mass and popular energy. Therefore, on the one hand, these events generated a potentiality and possibility due to this popular energy, producing a common for the supporters and participants in the events, and also creating political experiences that affected the fate of these countries. On the other hand, they did not prove possible to transform the heterogeneity and multiplicity of these agents into institutionalized political structures. Therefore, while these events had the possibility to produce a common political position for change to the existing order, they had limitations with regards to institutionalizing and constituting this possibility through social and political institutions.

Even if these events faded away, and lost their force in the countries in question, in the sense that they were not able to create permanent political organizations that included wide sections of the population, they maintained their influence in the political fields of these countries. They represented a collective and popular wish,

and a desire for change in the existing social and political systems in these countries. For example, after Gezi, “the spirit of Gezi” sought the building of a democratic society, and constructed a political position of opposition to AKP, maintaining its political experiences. In other words, discontent with the existing social and political order, and the demands and desires for a new alternative society, and politics continued.

It is within this field of discontent with, and opposition to the existing social and political order, and the quest for alternative social and political constitutions that differ in characteristics, that radical democratic and leftist populist movements like Syriza of Greece and Podemos of Spain produced a strong popular energy around common political positions and institutionalization. These radical democratic and leftist populist political experiences tried to organize and articulate different social and political discontent, opposition, and alternatives to the existing political and social order, and to the agents and forces; which implemented this order around a common political position framed by the leftist ideals of equality, democracy and freedom. Declaring and positioning itself within the popular energy of the anti-AKP political position, and hopes and desires for a new country, HDP also benefited from this popular energy.

However, the radical democratic and leftist populist politics were different from the uprisings and events that were mentioned above. (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis: 2014) As initiated by the determinate political and social subjects, and transcending the aspirations and intentions of the initiators, these events did not come under control of any subject, even if in the course of the events, determinate subjects tried to lead the events like it happened in Egypt. On the other hand, the radical democratic and leftist populist organizations and movements acted according to their strategies and tactics. While the events were created from below, or from subjectivities in common, radical democracy was from top down. This is not to say that the organization attracted directly, and took the support of the subjectivities while the subjectivities had no role. On the contrary, the subjectivities also played a role in leading the organizers to form their tactics, strategies and political mechanisms. Despite these differences in the form of doing politics, radical democratic and leftist populist politics had the possibility to mobilize and organize the popular energy around leftist ideals and

demands. These political experiences had the possibility to produce common political position-taking, and practices for the heterogeneous and multiple agents, and subjects working on the discontent, demands, and desires emerging out of the existing social and political problems. In each case, the particular characteristics and localities framed the course and emergence of these facts. In Greece, Syriza came to power, while Podemos and HDP were able to become one of the opposition and alternative forces in the country and the third party in parliament. (Errejon&Mouffe, 2016). However, although Syriza promised to change the social and political system, and to realize the demands of its supporters and voters for a radical change in society, it became limited because of the balance of forces (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). As for HDP, it lost its influence on the politics of Turkey, and became neglected and repressed by the system.

Given all the above, this study is about the reasons and conditions that made possible and delimited the Gezi events and HDP. Considering Gezi as having similarities with the popular and collective uprisings that started in the 2010s, and HDP as a case of radical democratic and leftist populist politics, the study is mainly interested in how the contemporary radical popular political experiences have emerged in the context of Turkey. It analyzed Gezi and HDP as cases of the radical mass and popular political experiences through questioning how they became possible and delimited. Concentrating upon the production of the political common for the agents, that is the formation of the common political position-taking and experiences, in Gezi and HDP for different social and political subjectivities and agents, the study has endeavored to determine the role of the elements, and the reasons for the enabling and delimiting conditions of both Gezi and HDP. Therefore, it investigated the role of local and global political, economic, cultural and social conditions, structures, symptoms and conjunctures and their symptoms, and products as experienced by the agents and subjectivities, and how the agents expressed their political attitudes and position-taking that were formed within these conjunctures and conditions. Deriving from this problem, the study presented how the social and political conditions and conjunctures, the political dispositions of the agents and the political practices and mechanisms of Gezi and HDP framed the emergence and limitations of Gezi.

As mentioned above, events like Gezi included diversity within the given political field in the sense of being unpredictable and un-habitual. Both Gezi and HDP were able to bring and construct the common political positioning of different and multiple subjectivities that were considered unable in coming together. In the Gezi resistance, hostile groups were part of the common political position-taking against the AKP, and they expressed the ideals of democracy and freedom: nationalists versus leftists, Kemalists versus the Kurdish political movement. During the electoral campaign of HDP, even if it was only partially so, groups distant to the Kurdish political movement supported the party. Therefore, in that sense, around these political experiences, the political habits of the agents changed, and this change was an abundance and unpredictability within the given limits of the political position-taking of the political field. This unpredictability, surprise and un-habitual position-taking is a fact which science must face.

This study asserts that this unpredictability and surprise is immanent to the political field, because the political field has no fixed character and new situations produce new political position takings. Even though there was increasing and intensifying discontent with the social and political problems, and desires and hopes for change in the social and political order of things, the emergence of these events was still somehow surprising.

These ideas on unpredictability and un-habituality are framed by the idea that social conditions and their products and influences on agents do not lead automatically and mechanically to political experiences, nor are the dispositions produced by the social and political positions of the agents a condition of the political practice. In other words, neither is political experience inherent in the social and political conditions and in their effects and symptoms as experienced by the agents and producing the affections, demands and perceptions of the agents, nor is it inherent in the internal characteristics of the agents produced by their social and political positions. On the other hand, the political projects and organizations, and their tactics and strategies in themselves can analyze any political experience. Therefore, the political experience is not the actualization and expression of the given and inherent characteristics, forms of doing of the social and political conditions, structures and position-taking of the agents, and the projects of the political agents. On the contrary, this study claims

that the political practices and mechanisms work on the agents, within given conditions, producing the possibilities and limitations of the political practice.

Framed by these ideas, this study questions how this unpredictability and these unhabitual political experiences emerged. Did the social and political conditions immanently and inherently possess this political experience, and were these cases the expression of this potentiality? Or was the potential and possibility inherent in the agents whose political dispositions were produced by social and political structures, and conjunctures? The other crucial question was whether these were the success of the political projects and political organizations?

In the literature, Gezi, like other social and political movements, has been analyzed by different authors. The analysis mostly concentrates upon the contemporary workings of social and political systems. One of the most prominent analyzers is Manuel Castells (Castells, 2015). Castells analyzed these events presenting their similar characteristics framed by the global workings of the existing social and political orders, and different characteristics framed by the particular local, social and economic developments. Castells argues that all of the events from Turkey to Egypt can be considered as new social movements in the sense that these events were not the political expression of any social or class position. In another sense, these events included heterogeneous social and political positions, and therefore comprised of multiple differences between the agents. Castells draws attention to the role of the new techniques and methods of doing politics in these events. These new techniques and methods, including the horizontal and non-hierarchical organizational structures brought about by the usage of new social media, made it possible to bring together different and multiple social and political agents. Therefore, the contemporary social and political conditions and their effects and the new social relations produced by these conditions made the events possible.

On the other hand, authors like Zizek consider these events as symptoms of the global workings of capitalism. For him, contemporary capitalism and discontents with it prepared the ground for the events. However, even if these events had potential for the radical transformation of the existing capitalist system in the globe, they cannot produce such a revolutionary change. These events cannot organize the

agents around any social and political programmes due to dispositions of the agents in the events to distance themselves from organization and institutionalization. This characteristic limit the revolutionary potential of these events (Zizek, 2013). Likewise, for Hardt&Negri, these events are expressions of resistance to the conditions that are produced by global capitalism and contemporary forms of power, and the desire to construct a new social and political order (“empire”). Therefore, they approach these events as an example of the multitude, and try to show how they were conditioned by the contemporary workings of capitalism and power relations. As mentioned above, these writers concentrate upon the social and political conditions to analyze the reasons and conditions making them possible in a global way (Hardt&Negri, 2012).

For Hardt&Negri, the multitude is the new form of the subjectivity produced by the contemporary workings of capitalism and power. For them, today's radical political movements are the expression of this category, having the disposition to make politics, and around the constitutive experiences for a new society being directly democratic and horizontally organized. Thus, the limits of the possibilities in politics is somehow immanent within the given social and political conditions, and today's political experiences are the expression of these possibilities. Being heterogeneous, and bringing together the multiple subjectivities around the desire to constitute a new social and political order, the multitude is conditioned by the immanent social and political relations that gives this expression. In that sense, these events are the actualization and expression of the political dispositions of the multitude to constitute a new society organized around direct-democratic and horizontal institutions immanently produced by the existing social and political orders against the existing power mechanisms and capitalism. They mention the agents and their dispositions as end-products, neglecting the processes and situations that politicized the agents, and transformed the agents and their dispositions into political subjectivities and position-taking (Hardt&Negri, 2004).

All these writers consider these events to be somehow conditioned by the existing social and political systems, and their symptoms and their influence on the agents. Therefore, the events are the expression of the dispositions and possibilities emerging from the given social and political conditions in localities and worldwide

alike. The existing order of things produce the subjectivities, and the subjectivities express and actualize the possibilities within the given conditions. This analysis is crucial to understand how social conditions and their symptoms prepare the political experiences, and, in the case of Castells and Hardt&Negri, present the mechanisms to make politics. However, they do not explain how the agents get involved in these events, as they focus on the social and political conditions and the forms of the political mechanisms, and of the subjectivities. Hence, they leave aside how the stories, affections and demands of the agents form their political position-taking that is produced by the localities. They give weight to the global workings of today's societies, even if they do not reject the differences between the localities. Therefore, they analyze, and present the forms and conditions of politics, and their actualization and expression separate from the agents, neglecting the agents, their dispositions and the processes and situations that politicized the agents, and transformed them and their dispositions into the political subjectivities and position-taking.

In parallel with these ideas, in the local literature, authors from leftist and Marxist standpoints have concentrated upon the social and political conditions of capitalism, even if they present the role of the local economic, political and social conditions. Some of them considered these events to have been made possible by the class positions that offered the schemes of political action. Their analysis demonstrates clearly the conditions that formed and triggered the agents' political dispositions, but they also leave aside how these dispositions became part of the political experience in Gezi. Differing from this focus on the social and political conditions as somehow transcendentally forming the political dispositions of the agents, and creating the possibilities immanently ready-made for the political action of the agents, some other studies try to determine the social and political profiles of the agents. However, these studies consider the political experiences and positions of the agents as the expression of the static social and political positions formed by the social and political structures. In most of these studies, there are no processes and situations before the events and the political experiences during the events. They freeze the agents taking their attitudes as ready-made and analyze the changes of the political position-taking during the Gezi process in a limited way.

These efforts to determine the social and political profile of the agents is crucial to analyze the heterogeneous and multiple character of the agents, but these studies mostly omitted to explain how this heterogeneity and multiplicity produces the common or how they are linked into the process of political commonalization. Thus, they give weight to the idea that the characteristics of the social and political profiles made the Gezi possible. Therefore, the common point in this literature is the omitting of the political commonalizing mechanisms, leaving a void between the agents' dispositions and the processes and practices of the construction of the political common for the multiple subjectivities and agents.

On the other hand, the pro-AKP authors consider the agents involved and taking part in the events as passive, focusing on the powers and global international relations that formed and led the multiple and heterogeneous agents. Typically expressed by Aktay, for pro-AKP authors such multiple and heterogeneous agents cannot come together, thus there must have been a leading subject organizing the events. In this scheme of things, the role of the agents and their stories are seriously underplayed. These theoretical and analytical limits are also evident in the case of HDP. Most studies concentrate upon the agents' attitudes as the expression of the static social and political position-taking and habits. Other studies, mainly written by pro-AKP authors, only analyze the leadership and organizational strategies and tactics. Therefore, there is the agency that is the leadership, and other agents were passivized.

These discussions are about how the political common is constructed. Rather than giving weight to structures nor the agents as structured and disposed by the given characteristics essentially and inherently, this study focused upon the political experiences and mechanisms that constantly reproduce these dispositions in political practice. The study does not reject the role of habitual dispositions nor the preparing role of social and political conditions. Therefore, the attitudes and expressions of the agents were not static, ready-made dispositions and characteristics, nor were they inscribed as the potentiality within the social conditions and political experience, but were the product of the political field where the political practice emerges.

This study used Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe's ideas on the contemporary construction of the political common for the agents and subjectivities. Their ideas are useful, because around the concepts of multitude Negri&Hardt analyzed how the multiple social and political positions become together, despite the heterogeneity and differences between the agents. Rather than being any social and political position's internal expression, the multitude brings together different subjectivities and agents around horizontal political experiences. Likewise, Laclau and Mouffe's ideas on hegemonic projects, and later Laclau&Mouffe's ideas on the formation of the people also demonstrates how different social and political positions are articulated into the political common. While constructing representation by any hegemonic force, the subjectivities link and articulate through the construction of the empty signifiers. In the same way as the concept of the multitude is useful to analyze the horizontally organized which lack any leading political subjectivity presenting the mechanisms, Laclau&Mouffe's radical democracy and hegemonic politics provides the tools showing how representational politics works. Around these discussions, the contemporary forms and mechanisms constructing the political common are presented.

Therefore, the study uses political commonalizing mechanisms and practices to bring together and articulate the different subjectivities and agents into a political common, presented through the concept of the multitude and radical democracy and leftist populism. In this way, the political commonalizing mechanisms of the multitude and of radical democracy and leftist populism worked in Gezi and HDP to produce the political common. However, while not considering multitude as an example of the multitude, and not imposing the working of radical democracy and hegemonic politics conceptualized by Laclau&Mouffe on HDP's political practices, the study used these concepts to analyze the forms of political mechanisms active in Gezi, and used by HDP. At this point, the study neither solely concentrates upon the constitutive practices and means, nor considers the discursive mechanisms as the sole means for political action to analyze Gezi and HDP.

In parallel with this, the study strives to transcend the theoretical and analytical limits of Negri&Hardt and Laclau&Mouffe. For, Negri&Hardt and Laclau&Mouffe's ideas and analytical categories are useful to understand how contemporary mass and

popular politics work in presenting its forms and processes of doing politics. Their ideas present clearly the ontology of the politics and mechanisms exempted from the localities offering their formal workings. Like Kant's idea that there is no content without form and no form without content, these thinkers constructed the contemporary forms of doing politics with reference to the localities and agents, but they are highly formalized and universalized in content. In another sense, like phenomenon, their knowledge is provided in unity in the form of the universals.

However, this study claims that the multiplicity of the agents and social and political conditions and historicity of the localities is excessive from the forms and their universalized characteristics. In that sense, contributing to the discussions made by Negri&Hardt and Laclau&Mouffe, the study tried to go beyond the universalization and formalization of these discussions to analyze how the contemporary forms and mechanisms of the political common works are produced. On the other hand, to arrive from these forms and the produced common is risky as regards analyzing the political common which is given and ready-made. That is to say that using Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena, the phenomena is always processed by understanding in the forms of unity and universals and thus it is claimed here that the processes and situations and their products with the agents are the conditions and limitations of the political common and way of doing politics. Their ideas are very due to the presenting the different modes and ways of the forms and mechanisms in the case of the multitude and hegemonic politics and populism to construct the political common and analyzing the historical and global conditions and changes constructing these forms and mechanisms, however, because they focus on these forms and political commonalization forms as categories and as end-product, they leave aside the surpluses and excesses of the localities and agents. Correspondingly, they do not analyze the historicity of the localities and the stories and position-taking of the social and political agents are framed and formed by these localities and histories.

Deriving from this epistemological idea, the study treated Gezi and HDP as products of the dynamic and astatic processes of the locality and agents and the political field that includes the static and astatic, habitual and un-habitual position-taking framed by the political practices and mechanisms that produce the possibility and limitations

of political experiences. Therefore, neither the social and political conditions and their symptoms nor their effects and products through the agents and the political commonalizing mechanisms are analyzed as given, but as intertwined and interrelated to each other. From this perspective, the noumena is not reduced to the phenomena as frozen by the categories overlooking the excesses of the phenomena and not assimilating the un-habitual and surprising dynamics, elements and situations within the static and habitual, considering the social and political conditions and the end-product of the expressions of the agents and politics as the conditions of the political experiences. On the contrary, it places Gezi and HDP as political commonalizing experiences within the dynamic processes of the political field and the historically changing social and political situations and their workings on the agents to produce a commonality.

In line with these ideas, it was briefly stated in the study that there were more than the ideas of Hardt&Negri and Laclau&Mouffe in Gezi and HDP. Firstly, differing from the concept of the multitude, Gezi included an enmity and antagonistic political expression against AKP. This position constructed negative feelings and included vengeance against AKP rather than being an expression of a productive political disposition of the multitude. On the other hand, not being an expression of the multitude against the working of the “empire” in Turkey, the habits of the agents in Turkey were crucial. For example, groups like the Kemalists and the Alevis (among the most active groups in Gezi) had a disposition to react against policies and political practices incompatible with secularism. Or, most of the Marxist groups had doubts about AKP, considering it an Islamist movement. These habits were very important for the formation of the political position-taking of the groups before Gezi due to AKP’s policies. In that sense, the ongoing struggles in the country that prepared Gezi were not the effect and symptoms of global capitalism, but emerged within the political conditions in Turkey which were framed by an enmity and negative feelings against AKP. Given these facts, without the increasing opposition to AKP directing itself into antagonism to the AKP’s conjuncturally changing policies, there would have been no Gezi.

On the other hand, in Gezi, the different agents used and claimed to be the representative strong empty signifiers, such as democracy, labeling AKP as

authoritarian vis-a-vis AKP's claims to be building a new country, in order to construct common political positions. Therefore, the new country as an empty signifier was the issue of political struggle regarding which political forces clashed. This was like Voloshinov's ideas that claim that symbols have a political value due to different political and ideological positions striving to claim their real representative (Voloshinov, 1973). This dimension produced a claim for the Gezi agents as the representative of the empty signifiers. These empty signifiers enabled the coming together of different agents within a political struggle in an antagonistic way vis-a-vis the rival forces forming AKP. However, without any representative force, the agents were able to construct common political position-taking against AKP. However, the formation of enmity and the disposition to make a distinction of 'Us' as Gezi agents and 'Them' as AKP and Erdoğan, not the voters of AKP, was not a product of the empty signifiers, but had emerged before Gezi. Hence, the multiple social and political agents from their position-taking constructed and used these empty signifiers without any group claiming representation.

In the case of HDP, the local strategies and interests of the leftist organizations and HDP's affinities, and the Kurdish movement's hegemony over the Kurdish people were crucial for HDP's power in the political field in Turkey. Not only the empty signifiers but the constitutive practices, and the establishment of the social and political institutionalization in social life among the Kurds by the Kurdish political movement in parallel with the aims of the Kurdish movement provided a space for HDP's politics. However, the matter was not only about the struggle around antagonism to AKP, as the desires and practices of the Kurdish political movement to solve the Kurdish problem were also important. Therefore, without the role of the Kurdish political movement and the increasing opposition to AKP, there would have been no HDP.

The other point is that the social and political agents and their affinities with the groups formed their political positions-taking. For example, some Alevis considered HDP's politics as parallel with their lifestyles and a strategic means to prevent AKP and Erdoğan's increasing power that were considered as threats to secularism and democracy. In the same vein, some Kemalists supported HDP due to worries about AKP's increasing power, considered as a threat to the republic's constitutional values

such as secularism and democracy. Thus, the conjuncture made AKP a hegemonic force in the country, producing discontent amongst opponents, with the political dispositions framed by the ideological and social positions making HDP a strategic center for different social and political groups. Rather than the attraction of the empty signifiers such as new life, democracy and being an alternative to AKP, but the interests and dispositions of the social and political agents constructed the commonality around HDP. Therefore, without these, the discursive practices of HDP would have been empty.

Within this framework, the study concentrated on the question of how the political, social, cultural and economic conjunctures and situations during the AKP era and the social and political positions of the agents, vis-a-vis these conjunctures and situations produced the affections, demands and perceptions of the agents for a political experience. How the political experience included them in the processes of the political experiences of Gezi and HDP was one of the main problematics of the study. In other words, how the affections, demands and perceptions produced by the existing social conditions, formed by AKP's policies and its symptoms and products, motivated the agents to join Gezi and HDP's political experiences. In the case of Gezi and HDP, it was evident that the AKP era produced on an antagonism and opposition against itself, and opportunist ways of politics and opportunistic political subjectivities. That is to say that AKP as an existing governing power created opposition and alternative political positions. But this antagonism as well as the opportunism was neither the product of post-modernity, nor the "empire" as producing the flexible subjectivities or related to the nature of politics as Laclau and Mouffe argued. Even if it offered these ways, it was the political situation in the country, and the increasing discontent with the increasing repression and exclusion of opposing social and political groups interested in their social and political aims, and the continuing contradictions in the country like the Kurdish problem were the key.

However, to follow this question, it was argued that both Gezi and HDP did not emerge mechanically as an expression of the existing conditions. Namely, Gezi and HDP emerged within the conditions which were produced by discontent with AKP's policies, gaining political expressions and experiences. In this framework, it was

argued that without the emergence of an enmity to AKP, no political practice would have been possible. None of the political mechanisms were useful outside the conjuncture and the processes that Turkey was experiencing during the AKP era reconstructed the country and the political field. Without these changes, rival groups like the Kurdish movement-Kurds in the country could not have come together. This fact also continues nowadays, because the groups were rivals to each other in constructing alliances. Thus, not only the empty signifiers and the hegemonic strategies of any movement, but also the agents' construction of the positions forces the political organizations' actions. Therefore, the worries and discontent before any political practice is crucial in order to analyze Gezi and HDP.

According to these points, these conditions are not enough in themselves to explain the conditions of the possibility and limitations of Gezi. As a result, this study argues that none of the social and political conditions themselves led to the emergence of the political experience mechanically. The other point is that the political dispositions of the agents formed, deformed and reformed by the political and social conjunctures and situations in the country and by the position taking of the political forces in the political field were not an automatic effect of these conditions. Correspondingly, the study did not consider the attitudes and expressions of the agents as the expression of their class, cultural and habitual political positions.

The other point is that it was evident that even if the social, political and cultural conjunctures produced the political dispositions framed by the symptoms and products of the existing social and political conditions for the political experiences of Gezi and HDP, these dispositions became the elements of the political experience through the politicization of these symptoms and products by the political forces and the political position-taking of the agents in the political field. That is, this study did not take these conditions as the causes and motives of Gezi and HDP, but only the preparing conditions. Thus, on the one hand, both Gezi and HDP did not emerge within a void exempted from the historical and local social and political developments in the country, while on the other hand, the social and political conjunctures and situations did not definitely and mechanically lead to these political actions.

This study also claims that the social symptoms and products, including position-taking, dispositions, affections and demands, are transformed into the political through political mechanisms. The main political mechanism that produces the political is the commonalizing mechanisms working for the construction of the common for the different social and political subjectivities. These mechanisms including the political expressions and experiences work on the agents to produce a common for them. Thus, from discursive practices to political actions, politics work within the political field to constitute a common. The political forces and practices try to form the political common or the political experiences. At this juncture, the study investigated the multiple commonalizing mechanisms for politics, not only the means of radical democracy and populism as conceptualized by the people.

Within this perspective the study analyzed how the policies of AKP, how the dispositions of the agents produced by their social and political positions, and how the commonalizing mechanisms worked within the political field to construct the political common making possible and delimiting Gezi and HDP. Given all this, as mentioned above, this study argues that, despite the similarities of Gezi to popular uprisings, and the HDP to radical democratic and leftist populist political experiences, they became possible and were delimited by the local conditions in the country. Correspondingly, the study analyzed how the local and global social and political conditions framed and formed the political position-taking of the agents, producing affections, perceptions and demands and interests for any political action. The study also explored how within these conditions the political commonalizing experiences emerged and acted to construct the common political position-taking.

The study also analyzed how the social and political conditions and situations formed by AKP and existing social, economic and cultural relations framed by AKP's policies and global neo-liberalism produced the discontent, affections and demands. Therefore, it tried to reveal the role of the changing and structural social conditions. These conditions had the preparing role for any political practice within the political field. It is within this political field that the political practice uses these affections and dispositions to form the political experience. Therefore, the study made it clear that Gezi and HDP were made possible by the efforts of political practices. In Gezi, this political practice did not involve any determinate organization. The discontent

with the AKP's policies prepared the emergence of Gezi, which was produced by the common political position-taking through commonalizing practices from the emergence of the common discourse of being oppositional and antagonistic to the AKP and the desires and hopes for a new society. In the case of the HDP, the organization was the project of the Kurdish political movement and the strategies and tactics of the left and Marxism in the country acted to articulate the alternative political desires and hopes to solve the Kurdish problem and to construct a society framed by leftist and libertarian ideals and discontent with the AKP's policies.

The study also presented the role of the strategies, tactics and mechanisms of the political practices, which always had limits due to the agents' dispositions being distant to the experiences and acts of the AKP and other rival political forces within the political field. Namely, the political groups and agents in the case of Gezi and HDP strived to form a common for the different subjectivities and agents. They worked on the habits, affections, demands and the political commonalization strived to form a common where the different subjectivities and agents found a place. Thus, on the one hand, they called to the interests, demands, affections and dispositions of the agents, while on the other hand they tried to form new ones. Therefore, the limits and possibilities of the working of the commonalizing mechanisms are related to the response and reception of the agents framed by their political habits and dispositions. Correspondingly, without the active involvement of the agents, there would have been no alliance or construction of the commonality around Gezi and HDP. This active involvement, as analyzed in the study, is closely related to the conjunctures in the country during the AKP era that produced the worries and threatened the social and political interests of the agents.

However, this study asserts that the agents were not passive and that they also had their interests. Therefore, Gezi and HDP emerged out of the political mechanisms forming and constructing the common. The political dispositions and social habitus of the agents and position-taking within the political field framed the limits and possibilities. Therefore, this study makes evident how the interests and political position-taking produced both by the structural and conditional economic, social and cultural elements were crucial for the emergence of Gezi and HDP.

As a result, this study claims that neither Gezi nor the HDP were the products of chance or emerged within a void. It argues that the social and political conditions in each case prepared the emergence of these facts. In other words, the social, cultural and political conditions framed by the structural and situational problems produced the discontent, perceptions and affections negative to the existing political and social order, and the alternative social and political affections for the different social and political agents. That is, the water was boiling and there were negative and positive affections, perceptions, demands and political position-taking emergence to produce a commonality for different subjectivities, but there were no united and common political organizations. It was Gezi and the HDP with their political experiences and mechanisms that provided this commonality.

It is evident in this study that the discontent and the positive emotions produced a possibility for political practice in Turkey. In the case of Gezi, the AKP's policies and the political ideals of the agents' independent of the AKP's policies and their symptoms prepared it. Likewise, some of this discontent is related to structural problems like the Kurdish problem and other economic, cultural and social problems, contradictions and dissent expressed by the agents in the history of the social and political movements close to leftist political positions. The agents' discontent with the existing social and political orders in the country was articulated into a common political position-taking by the HDP. The structural conflicts, discontent, negative feelings and political position-taking vis-a-vis the AKP and the existing social and political order continues and positive affections and demands are still being expressed in social and political movements, but the political climate in the country restricts political expression. The singular political acts and efforts to form blocs against the AKP and around alternative political ideals are being maintained by the social and political agents. However, there is no collective institutionalized mass politics to change the existing order of things and to reorder social and political fields in the country. Singular acts cannot lead a mass and popular political experience like Gezi around alliance politics. Although there are constant strategies developed by the organizations, they are unable to destabilize the balance of forces. In that sense, there is a gap between the discontent and politics and therefore the discontents and hopes

cannot gain any expression. For instance, some unemployed individuals in the country have set themselves on fire like Bouzzazi did in Tunisia.

The final question is: will this discontent and singular acts form a collective and popular action as an alternative and opposition to the existing dominant political and social power and social order? If there is such a possibility, why and how can this possibility lead to political practice? These are the questions that science cannot answer with any certainty and cannot predict what direction and what form the contradictions, discontent, hopes and desires for a new ordering of social and political life in the country will take, if there is such a possibility. Landauer argues that science with epistemological procedures and the existing dominant political powers in the country using political actions will always avoid and omit this possibility. On the other hand, the forces and agents seeking surprise and unpredictability will continue to form alternative and oppositional politics. Therefore, they will follow the rules of theology and will try to realize the hopes and desires with their political practices. This is the current situation in the country: on the one hand, the AKP, and on the other, the alternative and oppositional agents divided between political positions of the left and right. The other actor in the picture is the agents having a potentiality and possibility to form a mass and people traversing the situations producing a surprise with un-habitual and unpredictable political position-taking. Finally, this study deals with how this unpredictability and un-habituality has the possibility to change the existing order of things in ecological, social and political life, emerging and delimiting the forms in which it is expressed.

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Appendix A

TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Gezi Olayları ve HDP'yi odak noktasına alarak AKP dönemindeki AKP'ye alternatif ve muhalif kitlesel ve popüler siyasal deneyimleri ve toplumsal hareketleri inceliyor ve analiz ediyor. Bu dönemde AKP egemenliği ve onun siyasal, toplumsal, kültürel ve ekonomik pratikleri toplumun farklı kesimlerinde farklı dönemlerde endişeler, rahatsızlıklar, olumsuz duygular ve karşı çıkışlar üretmiştir. Bütün bunlar belirli siyasal konumlanışlar ve toplumsal ve siyasal hareketler ve deneyimlerle ifade bulmuştur. Bu siyasal deneyimler arasında, Gezi ve HDP özel bir yere sahipti, çünkü bunlar ülkedeki siyasal alanı yeniden kurma ve çağdaş radikal, özgürlükçü ve sol siyaset tarzları ve biçimlerine benzer biçimde yeni siyaset yapma tarzları inşa edebilme gücüne sahip oldular. Diğer taraftan bu deneyimler ülkedeki var olan siyasal ve toplumsal sisteme karşılığın ifadeleri bakımından güçlü bir ortak siyasal pozisyon ürettiler. Ülkedeki özellikle sol eğilimli siyasal ve toplumsal örgütlenmelerin daha önceki deneyimleri Gezi için oldukça hazırlayıcı bir role sahip omasına rağmen, popüler bir kitle siyaseti deneyimi olan Gezi var olan parlamenter güçlerden ve sol toplumsal ve siyasal örgütlenmelerden farklı olarak, yatay ve doğrudan demokratik siyaset yapma biçimlerini içerdi. Aynı biçimde, HDP farklı ve birçok siyasal ve toplumsal pozisyonu bir araya getirerek AKP karşıtı siyasal bir pozisyonun popüler bir merkezi oldu.

Hem Gezi'nin hem de HDP'nin dünyanın başka yerelliklerinde ve coğrafyalarda muadilleri vardı. Gezi, 2010'ların başından itibaren Mısır, Ukrayna, Yunanistan, Tunus, Brezilya ve ABD (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri) gibi dünyanın başka coğrafyalarda da zuhur eden popüler ve kitlesel siyasal ve toplumsal hareketlerle benzer özelliklere sahipken, HDP ise Yunanistan ve İspanya gibi ülkelerde genel seçimlerde başarılı olan ve siyasal etki oluşturabilen radikal demokratik ve sol popülist siyasi partilerle ortak yönler taşır.

Gezi ve benzeri siyasal ve toplumsal deneyimler başlangıçta herhangi bir ereğe ve programa sahip olmamasına ve herhangi bir siyasal ideolojinin parçası olmamasına rağmen, ortaya çıktıkları ülkelerde birbirinden farklı birçok toplumsal ve siyasal failin var olan hakim siyasi güçlere karşı güçlü bir ortak rahatsızlığını ve sosyal ve siyasal yapılarda değişim arzusunu üretti ve ifade etti. Bahsedilen bu deneyimlerin her birini mümkün kılan koşullar, unsurlar ve nedenler ve onların ortaya çıkardığı sonuçlar ülkelerin özgün koşulları nedeniyle birbirinden oldukça farklıydı. Birçok analizcinin ve kuramının bu olayları haklı olarak küresel sistemin farklı coğrafyalardaki tekil semptomları olarak ele almalarına rağmen, bu olaylardan önce her bir ülke farklı ekonomik, kültürel, siyasal ve toplumsal durumlara maruz kaldılar. Bu açıdan hemen hemen her örnekte demokrasi, özgürlükler vurgu ve var olan siyasal yönetimlerin hakimiyetine karşı çıkış anlamında belirli bir ortaklık olmasına rağmen, her ülkedeki faillerin ve öznelliklerin yerel koşullar karşısında ürettiği duygular, algılar ve taleplerin içerikleri farklıydı. Öte yandan, her bir örnek birbirinden farklı ve heterojen öznellikleri ve failleri bir araya getirip onlar için ortak bir siyasal pozisyon alış ortaya çıkarabildi.

Fakat, her bir örnek kendi yolunu izledi: Mısır'daki ayaklanmalar devlet başkanı Hüsnü Mübarek'in istifası ile sonuçlandı, fakat ülkedeki rahatsızlıklar ve talepleri ortaklaşdıracak bir siyasal ortaklığa evrilmedi ve en nihayetinde ülkede darbe yönetimi kuruldu. Ukrayna'da muhalif tepkilerin bir kısmı sağ popülist ve ırkçı siyasetlerle ifade edilmeye başlandı. Suriye'de toplumsal kalkışmalar farklı siyasal hareketler etrafında kümelendi ve barışçıl gösterilerin ardından birçok grup silahlandı ve ülke iç savaşa sürüklendi. Yunanistan ve İspanya'da olaylar sol siyasi akımların ve örgütlerin güçlenmesine yol açtı. Ve Türkiye'de Gezi kurumsal bir örgüt etrafında olmamasına rağmen AKP hükümetine karşı filİ bir güçlü muhalefet belirli momentlerde ve siyasal deneyimlerde farklı siyasal ve toplumsal failleri buluşturabilse de, ortaya çıkan popüler enerjiyi örgütlü hale getiremeyecek güçlü bir kurumsal örgütlenme ortaya koyamadı. Bu nedenle, bu olaylar var olan siyasal ve toplumsal düzenleri değiştiremeyecek ortak bir siyasal pozisyon kurabilme olanağına sahipken, bu olanağı toplumsal ve siyasal kurumlar etrafında inşa edebilme konusunda sınırlı kaldılar.

Bu olaylar bir süre sonra ülke nüfusunun geniş kesimlerini içerecek kalıcı siyasal örgütler oluşturamamaları anlamında sönümleseler ve güçlerini kaybetseler de, ortaya çıktıkları ülkelerin siyasal alanlarındaki etkilerini devam ettirebildiler. Var olan siyasal ve toplumsal sistemleri değiştirmeye dönük güçlü bir kolektif ve popüler umut ve arzuyu temsil ettiler. Mesela, Gezi Olayları'ndan sonra, "Gezi ruhu" siyasal deneyimleri devam ettirerek demokratik bir toplum inşasının takipçisi oldu ve AKP'ye karşı güçlü bir muhalefet pozisyonu inşa etti. Başka bir deyişle, var olan siyasal ve toplumsal üzerinden rahatsızlıklar ve yeni bir alternatif toplum ve siyaset talepleri ve arzuları ortadan kalkmadı.

Yunanistan'ın SYRIZA'sı ve İspanya'nın PODEMOS'u gibi radikal demokratik ve sol popülist hareketler, var olan siyasal ve toplumsal üzerinden rahatsız ve onlara muhalefetin ve alternatif toplumsal ve siyasal kurumsallaşma isteklerinin ortaya çıktığı bu alanda ortak siyasal pozisyonların ve kurumsallaşmaların etrafında güçlü bir popüler enerjiyi üretebildiler. Bu siyasal deneyimler solun eşitlik, demokrasi ve özgürlük idealleri çerçevesinde var olan siyasal ve toplumsal düzen ve bu düzeni uygulayan güçler ve faillere karşı farklı toplumsal rahatsızlıklar, muhalefetleri ve alternatifleri eklemleyebildiler ve örgütleyebildiler. Benzer bir biçimde, HDP de kendini AKP'ye karşı bir siyasal pozisyonu ve yeni bir ülkeye dair umut ve arzuları popüler enerji alanında ilan ederek ve konumlandırarak, bu enerjiden yararlanmaya çalıştı.

Bununla birlikte, radikal demokratik ve sol popülist siyaset, Gezi-benzeri siyasal deneyimlerden farklı özelliklere sahiptir. Belirli siyasal ve toplumsal öznelerce başlatılan, fakat yine de başlatıcıların niyet ve amaçlarını aşan, Gezi-benzeri deneyimler, bazı özneler onu yönlendirmeye ve ortaya çıkan çokluğu ve heterojenliği belirli siyasal özne modelleri etrafında bir araya getirmeye çalışalar da, herhangi bir siyasal ve toplumsal grubun kontrolü altına girmemişlerdir. Öte yandan, radikal demokratik ve sol popülist örgütler ve hareketler kendi stratejilerine ve taktiklerine göre siyaset yaparlar. Gezi-benzeri deneyimler tabandan ortaya çıkarken, radikal demokrasi yukarıdan tabana yayılan bir örgütlenme modeli izlerler. Radikal demokratik siyasetin bu özelliği, bu siyaseti yapan örgütlerin, faillerin hiçbir aktif rolü olmadan doğrudan onları çektebildikleri ve desteklerini aldığı anlamına gelmez. Aksine, örgütlenmeye çalışılan failler örgütleyicilerin taktiklerinin, stratejilerinin ve

politik mekanizmalarının şekillenmesinde oldukça önemli rol oynarlar. Bütün bu farklılara rağmen, radikal demokratik ve sol popülist siyaset de sol idealler ve talepler etrafında popüler bir enerjiyi harekete geçirme ve örgütleme olanağına sahip oldular. Böylelikle, bu siyasal deneyimler birbirinden oldukça farklı faillerin var olan toplumsal sorunlar etrafında ortaya çıkan rahatsızlık, talep ve arzuları üzerinde çalışarak ortak siyasal konumlanışlar ve pratikler üretme olanağına sahip oldular. SYRIZA Yunanistan'da iktidara gelirken, PODEMOS ve HDP ülkelerinde muhalif ve alternatif siyasal güçlerden biri olabildiler. Bununla birlikte bu deneyimlerin hiçbirini ülkelerindeki siyasal ve toplumsal düzeni değiştirebilecek kadar güçlü olamadılar. Her birörnekte, tekil özellikler ve yerellikler bu deneyimlerin yönünü ve ortaya çıkışını şekillendirmekte önemliydi. SYRIZA toplumsal ve siyasi düzeni değiştirmeye ve destekçileri ve seçmenlerinin radikal bir toplumsal dönüşümü taleplerini gerçekleştirmeyi vaat etse de, ülkedeki güçler dengesinden dolayı amaçları ve siyasal yatırımı sınırlandı. PODEMOS muhalif gücünü sürdürürken, HDP bir dereceye kadar siyasal etkisini kaybetmeye başladı ve sistem tarafından dışlanır ve baskılanır hale geldi.

Bütün bunlara binaen, bu çalışma Gezi Olayları'nı ve HDP'yi mümkün kıyan ve sınırlayan koşullar ve nedenlerle ilgilidir. Gezi'yi 2010'ların başında başlayan popüler ve kolektif ayaklanmalarla benzerliklere sahip olarak ve HDP'yi radikal demokratik ve sol popülist siyaset biçimlerinin bir parçası olarak ele alan bu çalışma, temel olarak çağdaş radikal, popüler siyasal deneyimlerin Türkiye bağlamında nasıl ortaya çıktığı ile ilgilenir. Çağdaş radikal, kitle ve popüler siyasetin birer parçası olarak Gezi ve HDP'nin nasıl mümkün olduklarını ve nasıl sınırladıklarını analiz eder. Farklı siyasal ve toplumsal failler için ortak siyasal konum alış ve deneyimler demek olan siyasal ortaklığun Gezi ve HDP örneklerindeki üretim, pratik, mekanizma ve süreçlerine yoğunlaşan bu çalışma, Gezi ve HDP'yi mümkün kıyan ve sınırlayan unsur ve nedenleri analiz etmeye çalışır. Bu nedenle, yerel ve küresel siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve toplumsal koşullar, yapılar, semptomlar, konjonktürleri, bunların üretimlerinin failler tarafından deneyimlenmesinin rolünü ve faillerin bu koşullar, yapılar ve konjonktürlerde hangi siyasal tutumları ve konum alışları ortaya koyduğunu inceler. Bu problemden hareketle, çalışmada sosyal ve politik koşullar ve konjonktürlerin, faillerin siyasal eğilimlerinin ve Gezi ve HDP'nin siyasi pratikler ve

mekanizmalarının bu deneyimlerin ortaya çıkışını ve sınırlarını nasıl şekillendirdiği ortaya konulur.

Literatürde, Gezi-benzeri toplumsal ve siyasal hareketler, birçok yazar tarafından analiz edilmiştir. Bilinen analizcilerden birisi Manuel Castells'tir. Castells, bu olayları var olan küresel toplumsal ve siyasal düzenlerce şekillendirilmiş benzerliklerini ve yerelliklerin toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasi gelişmeleri dolayısıyla farklılıklarını ortaya koyarak analiz eder. Castells Türkiye'den Mısır'a bu olayların herhangi bir sosyal veya sınıf pozisyonunun ifadesi olmadığını iddia eder. Ona göre, bu olaylar birbirinden çok farklı toplumsal ve siyasal pozisyonları içermesi itibarıyla oldukça heterojen yapılara sahiptir. Ayrıca Castells, bu olaylarda kullanılan yeni siyaset yapma tekniklerine ve yöntemlerine dikkat çeker. Yeni medyanın kullanımı sayesinde ortaya çıkan yatay ve hiyerarşik olmayan örgütsel yapıları içeren bu yeni teknikler ve yöntemler birbirinden oldukça farklı ve çoklu toplumsal ve siyasal faillerin bir araya gelmesini mümkün kıladı. Bu nedenle, çağdaş toplumsal ve politik koşullar ve onların etkileri ve bu koşulların ürettiği toplumsal ilişkiler bu olayları mümkün kılmıştır.

Diğer yandan, Zizek gibi yazalar da bu olayları kapitalizmin evrensel işleyişinin semptomları olarak görürler. Zizek'e göre, çağdaş kapitalizm ve ondan kaynaklanan rahatsızlıklar olayların zeminini hazırlamıştır. Fakat, ona göre bu olaylar var olan küresel kapitalist düzenin değişmesi için bir potansiyele sahip olmalarına rağmen, böylesi bir değişimi ortaya çıkaramadılar, çünkü faillerin örgütlenme ve kurumsallaşmadan uzak kalmaya dönük eğilimleri dolayısıyla, failleri herhangi bir toplumsal ve siyasi program etrafında örgütleyemediler. Bu özellik olayların devrimci potansiyelini sınırlamaktadır.

Benzer biçimde, Hardt&Negri'ye göre bu olaylar küresel kapitalizm ve iktidarın çağdaş formlarının (imparatorluğun) ürettiği koşulara direnişin ve yeni bir toplumsal ve siyasi düzene dönük arzunun bir ifadesidir. Bu nedenle, bu olayları çokluğun bir örneği olarak ele alırlar ve onların kapitalizmin ve iktidar ilişkilerinin çağdaş işleyişlerince nasıl şekillendirildiğini göstermeye çalışırlar. Hardt&Negri'ye göre çokluk, kapitalizm ve iktidarın çağdaş işleyişlerince üretilmiş yeni bir öznellik formudur. Onlara göre, doğrudan demokratik ve yatay biçimde örgütlenmiş yeni bir

toplumu kuracak deneyimler etrafında bir siyaset yapma meyli taşıyan günümüz radikal siyaset hareketleri bu kategorinin bir ifadesidir. Bu nedenle, siyasi pratiklerdeki imkanlar ve sınırlılıklar bir şekilde verili toplumsal ve siyasal koşullara içkindir ve günümüz siyasal deneyimleri bu imkanların bir ifadesidir. Birçok öznelliği bir araya getiren ve heterojen bir yapıya sahip olan çokluk da bu içkin toplumsal ve siyasal koşulların ve ilişkilerin ifadesidir.

Bütün bu yazarlar bu olayları bir şekilde var olan toplumsal ve siyasal sistemler ve onların semptomları ve bunların failler üzerindeki etkilerince koşullandığını düşünürler. Bu yüzden, bu olaylar yereliklerdeki ve dünya genelinde verili toplumsal ve siyasal koşulların oluşturduğu eğilimler ve imkanların ifadesidir. Şeylerin var olan düzeni belirli öznellikler üretirler ve bu öznellikler verili koşullarda bu imkanları ifade ve aktüelleştirirler. Bu analizler toplumsal koşullar ve onların semptomlarının siyasal deneyimleri nasıl hazırladığını incelemeleri ve Castells ve Hardt&Negri örneğinde siyaset yapmanın mekanizmalarını sunmaları bağlamında önemlidir. Fakat, faillerin bu olaylara nasıl katıldığını açıklamazlar. Bu nedenle, faillerin hikayeleri, duygulanımları ve taleplerinin onların siyasal pozisyon alışlarını nasıl etkilediği kenarda bırakılır. Böylelikle, failler ve onların eğilimleri ve failleri politiklestiren ve onların eğilimlerini siyasal öznelliklere ve konum alışlara dönüştüren süreçleri ve durumları göz ardı ederek faillerden ayrılmış biçimde siyasetin biçimleri ve koşullarını analiz ederler ve sunarlar.

Bu fikirlere paralel olarak, yerel literatürdeki sol fikirli ve Marksist yazarlar da yerel toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasi koşulları göz ardı etmeden kapitalizmin toplumsal ve siyasal koşullarına yoğunlaşırlar. Onların analizleri, koşulların faillerin siyasal eğilimlerini nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve tetiklediğini çok iyi açıklar, fakat onlar da bu eğilimlerin Gezi'de nasıl bir siyasal deneyimin parçası haline geldiğini dışında bırakır. Bu yaklaşım sanki bir yandan toplumsal ve siyasal koşulların aşkin bir biçimde faillerin siyasal eğilimlerini şekillendirdiğini ve diğer yandan failleri siyasal eyleme yönelik hazır bulunan imkanları ürettiğini varsayarlar. Bunlardan farklı olarak, başka çalışmalar da faillerin toplumsal ve siyasal profillerini ortaya koymaya çalışırlar. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışmalar faillerin siyasal deneyimleri ve konumlanışlarını, toplumsal ve siyasal koşullarca biçimlendirilen sabit toplumsal ve siyasal konumlarının ifadesi olarak görürler. Bu çalışmaların çoğunda, olaylardan

önceki süreçler ve koşullar ve olaylar sırasındaki siyasal deneyimler yoktur. Oysaki Gezi Olayları'ndan önce ülke siyasetinin yeniden biçimlendirdiği siyasal ve toplumsal konum alışlar ve olaylar sırasında faillerin siyasal alışkanlıklarının ve konum alışlarının değişmesinin rolü çok önemlidir. Bu çalışmalar ise tam tersine, faillerin tutumlarını hazır biçimde ele alarak dondururlar ve Gezi sürecinde siyasal alışkanlıkların değiştiğini çok sınırlı bir biçimde sunarlar.

Bu açıdan, faillerin siyasal ve toplumsal profillerini belirlemeye dönük bu yaklaşım onların heterojen ve çoklu yapısını açıklamak için önemli olsa da, bu çokluk ve heterojenliğin bir ortaklıği nasıl ürettiği ve bunların siyasal ortaklaşmada birbirine nasıl bağlandığını es geçerler. Bu da, faillerin toplumsal ve siyasal profillerinin Gezi'yi mümkün kıldığı ya da ona katılmayanların profillerinin Gezi'nin farklı kesimlere yayılmamasının nedeni olduğu fikrine ağırlık verilmesine yol açar. Bu nedenle, bu yaklaşılardaki ortak yön, faillerin eğilimleri ile çoklu ve heterojen yapılı öznellikler ve faillerin siyasal ortaklığını kuran pratikler ve mekanizmalar arasında bir boşluk bırakarak siyasal ortaklaşırma mekanizmalarının analiz ve açıklamalara dahil edilmemesidir. Bu açıdan, Gezi'de siyasal olanın rolü bir şekilde dışında bırakılır. Diğer yandan, AKP yanlısı yazarlar da olaylara katılan failleri genellikle pasif addederler. Daha çok kitleleri yönlendirdiklerini varsayıdıkları faiz lobisi gibi belirli özneler bulmaya çalışırlar. Bu açıdan, faillerin hikayeleri ve rolleri hesaba katılmaz.

Aynı teorik ve kavramsal sınırlılıklar HDPörneğinde de mevcuttur. Özellikle yerel yazarlar tarafından analiz edilen HDP üzerine yapılan çalışmaların çoğu HDP'yi destekleyen geniş kesimleri ve failleri ya pasif görürler ya da onların siyasal eğilimlerini sabit toplumsal ve siyasal konumların ve habitusların birer ifadesi olarak ele alırlar. Yine özellikle AKP yanlısı yazarlar HDP liderliğinin stratejilerini ve taktiklerini onu mümkün kılan ya da sınırlayan nedenler olarak ele alırlar. HDP'yi sınırlayan ülkedeki siyasal koşullar ve AKP'nin ve ona uzak olan siyasal güçlerin siyasal alanda onu nasıl sınırladıkları üzerinde durmazlar. Buna ek olarak ülkedeki siyasal koşulların failleri nasıl etkilediği sorusu da dışında bırakılır.

Diğer yandan, bu olumsuz değerlendirmelere ve failleri ve özellikle AKP döneminin HDP'nin ortaya çıkışındaki rolünü göz ardı eden analizlere rağmen, özellikle sol ve

Marksist fikirli yazarların birçoğu HDP’yi radikal demokratik ve özgürlükü bir sol siyasetin parçası olarak görürler. Bunların birçoğu, HDP’nin geniş kesimlere yayılabilme potansiyeline vurgu yaparlar. Fakat bu çalışmalar da genellikle siyasi alanda HDP’nin potansiyellerini ve sınırlarını açıklarken onun kendisine çekebildiği ve çekemediği geniş kesimlerin rolünü dışında bırakırlar.

Belirtildiği gibi, HDP’nin eklemlediği, örgütlediği ve genel seçimler ve Kobane olayları gibi belirli toplumsal olaylar etrafında destegini alabildiği geniş faillerin HDP’nin siyasal alandaki stratejilerinin karşılığını üretmeye nasıl katkı sundukları genellikle dışında bırakılır. Bu açıdan, HDP’nin belirli momentler ve konjonktürlerde, özellikle de seçimlerde, failleri nasıl çekebildiğine ilişkin alan araştırmaları mevcuttur. Bunlar HDP’nin siyasi pratiklerinin faillerde nasıl karşılık bulduğunu faillerin siyasi eğilimleri ve toplumsal, kültürel ve ekonomik konumlarının etkileri bağlamında açıklarlar. Fakat, bu çalışmaların çoğu faillerin siyasi eğilimlerini sabitleyecek etnisite, sınıf ve kültürel alışkanlıklar gibi kategoriler etrafında iş görürler ve faillerin bu alışkanlıklarını nasıl değiştirdiklerini kısmi olarak açıklarlar. Haklı olarak var olan siyasi koşulların faillerin konum alışlarını değiştirdikleri koşullarda da yine sabit konumlara ve eğilimlere referans vermelerine rağmen, yine de birçok çalışma gibi faillerin HDP’nin stratejilerini ve taktiklerini ve siyasal hattını nasıl şekillendirdiklerini analiz etmezler. Tek taraflı bir biçimde, daha çok HDP’nin politikalarının, stratejilerinin ve taktiklerinin bu sabit eğilimlere karşılık gelip gelmediğine yoğunlaşırlar.

Diğer yandan, bahsedilen yaklaşımlarda başka sınırlılıklar da vardır. Bunlar Gezi ve HDP’yi mümkün kılan unsurları ya var olan siyasal ve toplumsal koşullara içkin olarak görürler ya da siyasal deneyime katılan faillerin sınıf, kültür ve diğer özelliklerinden gelen içsel karakteristikler olarak görürler. Bu açıdan, siyasal pratiğin nedeni olarak ya faillerin içinden çıktıkları koşulların doğrudan sonucu ya da faillerin eğilimlerinin doğrudan sonucu olarak görürler. Oysaki bu çalışma, özneleştirme ve eklemleme pratiklerinin ürettiği siyasal ortaklığun faillerin eğilimlerini ve potansiyellerini üreten, yeniden üreten ve dönüştüren belirli siyasal süreçler, mekanizmalar ve pratiklerle ortaya çıktığını iddia eder. Bu açıdan, siyasal deneyimler ne var olan toplumsal, siyasal ve kültürel koşulların doğrudan bir sonucu ne de faillerin özselt özelliklerinin otomatik bir sonucudur.

Bu açıdan, bütün bu tartışmalar siyasal ortaklığın nasıl kurulduğu ile ilgilidir. Çünkü Gezi ve HDP örneklerinde siyaset etrafında birbirinden farklı faillerin ve siyasi pozisyonların birbirine bağlandığı, eklemendiği ve bir araya toplandığı siyasal ortaklık kurma çabaları vardır. Bu açıdan bu çalışma farklı faillerin siyasal özneleşme ve ekleme mekanizmaları, pratikleri ve süreçleri ile siyasal ortaklığın nasıl kurulduğunu ele almıştır. Bunun için Hardt&Negri'nin fikirlerine başvurulmuştur. Hardt&Negri ve Laclau&Mouffe Gezi-benzeri olayların ve HDP gibi radikal demokratik ve sol popülist siyasetlerin nasıl işlediğine dair fikirler sunmuşlardır. Hardt&Negri heterojen ve birbirinden farklı öznellikler ve faillerin bir araya geldiği yatay örgütlenme mekanizmalarını sunarlarken, Laclau&Mouffe temsil ve hegemonya siyasetinin boş gösterenler etrafında ve toplumsal talepleri gerçekleştirmesi ile birbirinden farklı failleri nasıl ortak siyasal projeler etrafında ortaklaştırdıklarını analiz ederler.

Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma Gezi ve HDP'nin kullandığı bu mekanizmalar için Hardt&Negri ve Laclau&Mouffe'un siyasal ortaklığın nasıl kurulduğu üzerine fikirlerine başvurur. Hardt&Negri'nin çokluk kavramı etrafında yatay ve kurucu siyasal pratiklerin ortaklığını nasıl kurduğuna dair fikirleri özellikle Gezi örneğinde oldukça kullanışlıdır. Çünkü Gezi herhangi bir siyasal ya da toplumsal grup ve özneden hegemonyası olmadan heterojen ve çoklu faillerin nasıl bir araya geldiğini iyi örnekler. Sokak eylemlerinin örgütlenisi ve park forumları gibi doğrudan demokratik deneyimler Gezi'de ortaklığın kurulabilmesi için önemli siyasal pratiklerdi. Belirli grupların ortak platformlar kurduğu ve Gezi'nin temsiline kalkışıtı olsusunu ve bu grupların Gezi'ye katılan bileşenler üzerinde hegemonya kurmaya çalıştığı gerçekini göz ardı etmeden, Gezi'ye katılan birbirinden farklı gruplar AKP ve Erdoğan karşılığı, demokrasi ve özgürlük talepleri gibi ortak söylemler etrafında bir araya gelebildiler. Bu ortaklığın işleyişi herhangi bir grubun diğerlerini etrafında geçici ve kurumsallaşmamış olsa da bir blok oluşturabilmeleriydi. Yani herhangi bir belirli özne olmadan Gezi'nin failleri demokrasi ve özgürlüğü ortak olarak temsil etme iddiasıyla ortaklaşabildiler.

Diğer yandan HDP örneğinde Kürt siyasal hareketinin ülkedeki tüm gruplar için demokrasi, eşitlik ve çoğulculuğu içeren "Yeni Yaşam" ve Erdoğan karşılığı gibi

belirli söylemler ve ortak çıkarlar etrafında birbirinden farklı grupları bir araya getirebildiği aşikar. Tıpkı Laclau&Mouffe'un hegemonya siyasetinde olduğu gibi HDP'nin önemli bir bileşeni olan Kürt siyasal hareketi ve Kürt siyasal hareketiyle yakınlık ve ittifak deneyimi olan bazı sol ve Marksist örgütler ortak bir söylem etrafında birbirinden farklı toplumsal, kültürel ve siyasal konumları eklemlemeye çalışmışlardır. Öte yandan bu eklemleme pratikleri sadece basitçe özgürlük, yeni bir yaşam ve demokrasi gibi boş gösterenleri temsil etme iddiasıyla açıklanamaz. Başka siyasal pratikler, hem solun hem de Kürt hareketinin geçmiş deneyimleri hem de ülkedeki AKP karşılığı ve onun politikalarından ortaya çıkan olumsuz algı ve ruh halleri oldukça etkili olmuştur

Bu açıdan bakıldığında ne Gezi çöküğün bir örneği, ne de HDP'nin siyaseti bütünüyle Laclau&Mouffe'un boş gösterenlerinin ve hegemonya ve antagonizm siyasetinin ürünüdür. Bu kavramlar etrafında önerilen siyaset yapma araçları, ülkenin koşullarında mümkün olabilmiştir. Bu sınırlılıkları ortadan kaldırabilmek için bu çalışma Türkiye'ye özgü faillerin özelliklerine ve konjonktürel gelişmelere değinmiştir. Laclau&Mouffe HDP benzeri siyasal hareketlerde belirli bir grubun diğerlerini eklememesi gerekiği konusunda oldukça haklı olsalar da, bu eklemleme pratiklerini sadece boş gösterenler ve antagonizma üretme kapasitesiyle sınırlı tutmuşlardır. Oysa Kürt siyasal hareketinin Kürt halkı üzerindeki ekonomik, kültürel ve siyasal kurumsallaşmalarla kurduğu hegemonya ve Türkiye'de solun birlik serüveni ve AKP karşılığının ortaya çıkan siyasal konum alışlar olmadan ve konjonktürel olarak Alevilerin, bazı Kemalistlerin ve sol, Marksist ve anti-otoriter gruplar ve faillerin siyasal çıkarları ve kaygılarından bahsedilmeden boş gösterenler, hegemonya ve blok kavramları oldukça boş kalmaktadır.

Bu saikle bu çalışma, Pierre Bourdieu'nun alan ve habitus kavramlarından hareketle Türkiye'de siyasal alanın tarihsellliğini ve faillerin alışkanlıklarının siyasal konumlanışlarını nasıl belirlediğini ve bu siyasal alışkanlıkların siyasal alandaki değişimlerle nasıl değiştigini açıklamaya girişmiştir. Bu vesileyle AKP dönemindeki siyasal, toplumsal ve kültürel değişimler ele alınmıştır. Mesela Gezi örneğinde Gezi'nin ortaklaşa olduğu siyasal konumların oluşumda AKP karşılığının ve onun politikalarının hazırlayıcılığı ele alınmıştır. Gezi olayına dair üretilen en sıradan soru olan "Nasıl oldu da birbirine rakip ya da birbirine uzak gruplar bir araya

gelebildiler ve belirli siyasal alışkanlıkları geride bırakarak ortaklaşabildiler?” sorusu cevaplanmaya çalışıldı. Bu açıdan grupların nasıl değişimler geçirdiği analiz edildi ve bu değişimlerin siyasal pratiğe ve ortaklaşmaya etkisi analiz edildi. Diğer yandan HDP örneğinde de AKP karşılığı gibi ortaklaştıracı unsurların birbirinden farklı grupları nasıl eklemleyebildiği ve bir dereceye kadar Kürt siyasal hareketinin projesi olan bu oluşumun Kürt siyasal hareketine uzak grupları nasıl çekerdiği analiz edildi. Bu açıdan yine AKP döneminin ürettiği rahatsızlıkların rolü vurgulanmıştır.

Düzen yandan Gezi ve HDP’yi desteklemeyen ve onlara uzak duran siyasal ve toplumsal kesimlerin habituslarının ve siyasal eğilimlerinin bu uzaklıktaki etkisi ve diğer yandan bu habituslar ve eğilimler üzerinde siyasetin nasıl işleyip onları bu pratiklerden uzak tutmaya çalıştığı ele alınır. Bu açıdan AKP’nin Gezi karşısındaki söylemleri ve bu söylemlerin failler üzerindeki çağrısı, bazı siyasal ve toplumsal grupların ülkedeki siyasal uzaklıkları burada gösterilmeye çalışılır. Bütün bunların siyasal alandaki konumlanışları ve pratiklerle nasıl işlediği ele alınır.

Bütün bunlara binaen tezin birinci bölümünde Türkiyeli yazarların Gezi ve HDP’nin nasıl mümkün olup sınırlandığı sorusuna verdikleri cevabin sınırlılıkları ve bu sınırlılıkların oluşmasındaki epistemolojik prosedürleri ve yöntemleri analiz edilir. Yerel literatürde ortak olan nokta, çalışmaların ya toplumsal ve siyasal koşullara ya da faillere ağırlık verip bunları birbiriyle bağlantısız biçimde ele almalarıdır. Yerel siyasal ve toplumsal koşullar ve failerin yerelikte biçimlenen siyasal eğilimleri ve alışkanlıkları iyi bir biçimde betimlenmiş olsa da, bunlar arasındaki bağlantılar çok az degenilmiştir. Bu açıdan bu analizler hem Gezi hem de HDP örneğinde kısmi açıklamalar yapabilmişlerdir.

İkinci bölümde çalışmanın kullandığı kuramlar ve kavramlar ele alınıyor. Bu açıdan Gezi ve HDP’nin analiz edilebilmesi için çağdaş siyasal öznelerin nasıl kurulduğu ve çokluk ve radikal demokrasi etrafında Hardt&Negri ve Laclau&Mouffe’un yürüttüğü tartışmaların ve kavramların Gezi ve HDP’yi analiz etmedeki kullanılabilirlikleri ele alınıyor. Bunlara binaen çokluk ve radikal demokrasinin Gezi ve benzeri ve HDP gibi siyasal deneyimlerde yatay örgütlenme, temsil ve hegemonya siyasetlerinin nasıl işlediği ve bu işleyişlerin Gezi ve HDP’yi ne dereceye kadar açıklayabileceği ortaya konuluyor. Çalışma Negri&Hardt’ın çokluk kavramının Gezi’deki siyasal

mekanizmaların işleyişine dair yatay örgütlenmelerin ve bu yatay kurucu örgütlenmelerin siyasal ortaklığını kurmadaki rolüne dair analitik araçlar sunduğunu savunmasına karşın, çokluk kavramının Gezi'nin bütününe açıklamada sınırlı olduğu iddia ediliyor. Bu iddiayla çokluğun siyasette sadece kurucu pratiklere yer vermesi ve olumlayıcı duyu ve arzuları ön plana çıkarıp, olumsuzlayıcı ve hegemonik eklemleme biçimindeki antagonistik tutumları dışlamasından kaynaklandığı ön plana çıkarılıyor. Böylelikle, açıdan Gezi'yi açıklamak için Laclau&Mouffe'un boş gösterenlerinin de farklı grupların nasıl bir araya geldiğini açıklaması açısından kullanışlı olduğu iddia ediliyor. Bununla birlikte Laclau&Mouffe'un perspektifine göre Gezi ve benzeri deneyimler herhangi bir siyasal grubun eklemleme pratiklerinden yoksun olduğu için sınırlıdır. Fakat gösteriliyor ki, bunlara rağmen gruplar bir ortaklık oluşturma yetisi gösterebiliyorlar. Buna ek olarak Hardt&Negri'nin ve Laclau&Mouffe'un kavramlarının nasıl biçimsel ve evrensel kavamlar olarak kullanıldığı ve bunların yerellikleri ve bu yerelliklerde faillerin siyasal eğilimlerini göz ardı ettikleri vurgulanıyor. Bu açıdan çalışma Deleuze&Guattari'nin ve Bourdieu'nun fikirlerinden hareketle faillerin siyasal ortaklığun kuruluşunda nasıl aktif olarak ele alınabileceğine vurgu yapıyor.

Tezin üçüncü bölümü, AKP dönemindeki siyasal uygulamaların toplumsal ve siyasal hareketler üzerindeki etkisi ve siyasal alanı nasıl dönüştürdüğüne yoğunlaşıyor. Bu dönüşüm içerisinde toplumsal ve siyasal hareketlerin hem Gezi'nin hem de HDP'nin ortaya çıkışındaki rolü ele alınıyor. Öte yandan ülkedeki toplumsal ve siyasal hareketlerin tarihsel deneyimlerinin ve geleneğinin hem Gezi'nin hem de HDP'nin ortaya çıkışını nasıl şekillendirdiği inceleniyor. Bu açıdan ülkedeki siyasal ve toplumsal hareketlerin birikimlerinin Gezi için hazırlayıcı bir rolü olduğu gösteriliyor. Diğer yandan ülkede özellikle Marksist, sol, özgürlükçü ve anti-otoriter siyasetlerin tarihselliği ve Kürt siyasal hareketinin söylemsel ve pratik değişim ve dönüşümlerinin HDP'nin ortaya çıkışındaki etkilerine dephiniliyor. Bu açıdan Kürt siyasal hareketinde barışçıl çözüm arayışlarının ortaya çıkışının Kürt siyasetinin kitleleşmesine etkisi ve yeni sol siyaset arayışlarını biçimlendirdiği gösteriliyor. Öte yandan, solun AKP dönemindeki değişim ve dönüşümleri solun siyasal konumlanışlarını etkileyerek onu Kürt siyasal hareketi ile nasıl yakınlaştırdığı gösteriliyor.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü Gezi ve HDP'ye katılan faillerin hikayelerine, duygularına ve eğilimlerine yoğunlaşıyor. Bu bölümde hem Gezi hem de HDP'ye destek veren ve vermeyen ve ondan uzak duran faillerin bir yandan siyasal eğilimleri ve alışkanlıklarını, diğer yandan bu eğilim ve alışkanlıkların değişiminin belirli mekanizmalar, pratikler, araçlar ve süreçlerle nasıl siyasal ortaklığa dönüştürüldüğü gösterildi. Gezi örneğinde, sokak eylemlerinde, park forumlarında ortak söylem, algı ve duyguların ve deneyimlerin nasıl ortaya çıktığı gösterildi. Siyasal ortaklığun verili olmadığı ve bu ortaklığun faillerin çıkarları, duyguları, algıları ve siyasal konumlanışları ve faillerin ortak katılımı ile nasıl ortaya çıktığı gösterildi. Gezi örneğinde, bizlik ve ortaklık halinin ve kimliğinin faillerin kendi duyguları, algı ve çıkarlarını terk etmeden diğer gruplarla söylem ve deneyim ortaklılarını kurduğu ortaya konuldu. Aynı şekilde HDP örneğinde de grupların çıkar, algı ve duyguları ile siyasal konumlanışlarının HDP etrafında nasıl ortaklaştırıldığı ele alınıyor. Farklı failleri bir araya getirmek için farklı konjonktürlerde HDP'nin kullandığı stratejiler, söylemler ve diğer pratiklerin failleri nasıl HDP etrafında kümelendirebildiği ve HDP tarafına çekebildiği gösteriliyor. Diğer yandan ülkedeki koşulların failler üzerindeki etkisi ve bu etkilerin failleri HDP'ye nasıl yaklaştırıldığı ele alınıyor. Bu açıdan AKP politikalarının ve farklı siyasal ve toplumsal umut ve arzu arayışlarının bundaki etkisi ortaya konuluyor. Diğer yandan, faillerin siyasal eğilimlerinin hem bu koşullarda hem de HDP'nin ortaklaşırma mekanizmalarının mümkün hale gelmesindeki rolü ve etkisi araştırılıyor. Bu açıdan faillerin daha önceki siyasal ve AKP karşılığı gibi konjonktürel konum alışlarının HDP etrafında çıkar, duyguları ve algılarını ortaklaşımındaki rolü analiz ediliyor.

Bütün bunlarla birlikte düşünüldüğünde çalışma Gezi ve HDP örneğinde siyasal ortaklığun nasıl kurulabildiği ve sınırlandığını ortaya koydu. Bu ortaklığun siyasal özneleştirme ve eklemleme araçlarıyla siyasal alanda faillerin hem siyasal ve toplumsal habituslarından kaynaklı hem de ülkedeki konjonktürel ve yapısal koşullardan ortaya çıkan duyguları, çıkar, algı ve söylemler üzerinde çalışarak bu ortaklığını kurduğu gösterildi. Bu açıdan hazır olarak verili olmayan siyasal ortaklığun mekanizmalarını, hem süreçleri kullanan siyasi örgütler ve güçler tarafından, hem de failler tarafından nasıl kurulduğu gösteriliyor. Bunu da ülkenin özgün ve konjonktürel koşulları içine yerlestiren çalışma, çalışmanın kullandığı çokluk benzeri

ve radikal demokrasi ve sol popülist pratiklerin yerellikte ve faillerin rolüyle nasıl mümkün olabildiğini gösteriyor.

Bu noktalar açıklanırken, tez temel olarak ne Gezi ne de HDP'nin boşlukta ortaya çıkmadığını göstermeye çalıştı. Bu açıdan çağdaş radikal siyasetin farklı örnekleri olarak Gezi ve HDP'nin ortaya çıktıığı yerel toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel ve ekonomik koşullar analiz edildi. Bu açıdan, çalışmanın kullandığı çokluk, radikal demokrasi ve sol popülizm gibi kavramlarda içeriklimesen Türkiye'ye has koşullar ortaya konuldu. Böylelikle, AKP döneminin belirleyici rolü ve ülkedeki siyasal tepkileri, muhalefeti ve alternatiflerin nasıl biçimlendirdiğine vurgu yapılarak, ülkede var olan egemenlik ile direniş, muhalefet ve egemenlik dışı siyasal pratiklerin ortaya çıkışları açıklandı.

Diğer yandan bu koşullar içinde failleri mekanizmalarla, süreçlerle ve pratiklerle eklemleyerek ve siyasal özneleşme süreçlerine katarak siyasal ortaklık kuran bu siyasi deneyimlerin ve örgütlenmelerin olanaklı ve sınırlı hale gelmesinde faillerin rolü de hesaba katıldı. Bu açıdan çalışma, failleri Gezi ve HDP'ye yaklaşır, çekerken ve örgütleyebilen ve uzaklaştırın, iten ve dışında bırakılan unsurları ele aldı. Bu unsurların siyasal alanda nasıl yeniden üretildiği, bozulduğu ve değiştirilebildiği ele alındı. Öte yandan, faillerin siyasi eğilimleri ve habituslarının şekillendirdiği siyasal konumlanışlarının siyasal deneyimlerin ortaya çıkışındaki rolü de gösterildi. Bu açıdan çalışma ne sadece sınıfal özelliklere ne de kültürel özelliklere ağırlık verdi. Sonuç itibarıyla, bütün bu unsurlar ülkenin siyasi konjontürleri, koşulları ve durumları ve onların ürettiği semptomların içinde ele alındı. Bu açıdan ne failler ne örgütleyiciler ne de toplumsal koşullar aşkinsal bir konuma ya da bir ağırlık merkezine yerleştirildi. Bütün bu unsurların, birbirine karşı ve birbirinden farklı siyasal konumları ifade eden güçlerin birbirile sürekli etkileşim halinde olduğu siyasal alanda nasıl ortaya çıktıği ele alındı.

Bütün bu analizlerden yola çıkarak, bu çalışma belirli sonuçlara ve sorulara vardı. Gezi Olayları'nın diğer ülkelerdeki olaylar gibi hafızalarda bir yer teşkil etmesine rağmen üzerinden uzun zaman geçti. Bütün bu olaylar, değişimde gibi etkilerini kaybetmiş olsalar da üretikleri deneyimler ve pratikler hala ülkelerindeki siyasal alanlarda belirli arzular ve umutlarla sürüyor. Çünkü, hem Gezi'de hem de diğer olaylarda faillerin ve kitlelerin talepleri, arzuları ve umutları çok da gerçekleşmiş

görünmüyor. Gezi örneğinde, Gezi sürecinde ortaya çıkan bazı kültür merkezleri, alternatif futbol ligleri, alternatif tarım deneyimleri ve forumlar biçiminde ortaya çıkan doğrudan demokratik deneyimler gibi alternatif siyasal ve toplumsal kurumsallaşmalar ve kurulan siyasal blok ve ittifaklar bir şekilde belirli siyasal ve toplumsal gruplarca devam ettiler. Gezi var olan siyasi iktidarı yerinden etmemiş olsa da, AKP iktidarı herhangi bir siyasal ve toplumsal harekette Gezi'nin yeniden belireceği korkusunu sürekli ifade ediyor. Bu anlamda kestirilemez ve tahmin edilemez bir siyasal olgu olarak Gezi ruhu, iktidarin siyasal alandaki kestirilemezlikleri sürekli göz önünde bulundurmasını ve bu vesileyle artırılan güvenlik önlemlerine yol açıyor. Diğer yandan Gezi AKP için kendisine tehdit oluşturacağini düşündüğü siyasal ve toplumsal alternatifleri ve muhalefetleri kodlaması için bir söylem işlevi görüp, AKP'nin siyasal kimliğinin inşasında da önemli bir rol oynuyor.

Öte yandan, 7 Haziran seçimleri sonrası ve 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi'nin ardından ilan edilen Olağanüstü Hal ile ülkede siyasal ve toplumsal hareketler kitlesel gücünü oldukça kaybetti ya da failler artık siyasal tepkilerini ve eğilimlerini görünür olmayan bir biçimde ifade ediyorlar. Böyle bir koşul ile Marksist, özgürlükçü ve sol siyasi örgütlenmelerin ve HDP'nin iktidarın güvenlik uygulamaları ve birçok kurumunun kapatılmasından dolayı siyasal alanda hareket alanları sıkışmış görünüyor. Yine de hem ülkede AKP'den kaynaklanan rahatsızlıklar ve endişeler devam ediyor hem de siyasal ve toplumsal protestolar kendilerini az da olsa ortaya koyuyorlar. Hatta bazı momentlerde geniş kitleler sosyal medyada ya da mitinglerde bir araya gelip siyasal söylemler ve pratikler gösteriyorlar. Mesela, 16 Nisan Anayasa Referandumu öncesinde, birbirinden farklı kesimler kurumsal olmasa da Hayır Oyu Verme etrafında ortak bir siyasal pozisyon oluşturabildiler. Yine CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)'nin lideri Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'nun başlattığı Adalet Yürüyüşü'ne birçok toplumsal ve siyasal grubun yanında kitleler de oldukçaraigbet gösterdi. AKP ise bu eylemlere, Gezi'yi yeniden ortaya çıkaracağı suçlamasını yöneltip, bazı marjinal grupların böylesi amaçları olabileceği endişesini belirtti.

Yine HDP'nin eş başkanları tutuklansa, partinin Kürt siyasetine vurgusu bir yandan hala Kürtlerin önemli bir kısmını partiye çekme anlamında önemli bir rol oynarken diğer yandan Kürt siyasetine uzak olan kesimlerin taleplerini dışında bırakır

görünüp onları uzaklaştırırsa da ve partinin hedef kitlesinin birçoğu siyasal ve toplumsal hareketlerden çekilmiş olsa da, HDP ülkedeki önemli muhalefet odaklarından biri olmayı sürdürüyor. Bu anlamda HDP bir yandan sistem ve var olan siyasal koşullarda sınırlanmış olsa da, hala birçok siyasal ve toplumsal grup için çekim merkezi ve bir ittifak odağı olmayı sürdürüyor. Bütün bunlara binaen, AKP ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'a karşı muhalefet ve onlardan rahatsızlıklar ve diğer siyasal ve toplumsal alternatifler ülkede güncellliğini koruyor. Öte yandan ülkede Kürt Sorunu, Alevi Sorunu gibi kronik ve yapısal sorunlar ve doğrudan AKP egemenliği ile ilgili olmayan siyasi ve ekonomik düzenden kaynaklı rahatsızlıklar ve yeni bir ülke arzusu ortadan kalkmadı. Bu açıdan, bunlar herhangi bir kolektif popüler siyasal deneyime dönüşmese de, HDP ya da ondan bambaşka bir siyaset yapma biçimine sahip radikal popüler bir sol siyasal deneyim üretmese de bazı tekil direnişler ve protestolar, kent hareketleri, feminizm, anti-otoriter siyasetler biçimindeki mikro ve minör siyasetler, özellikle sola yakın sendikal hareketlerin pratikleri, işçi grevleri ve toplumsal hareketler bir şekilde beliriyor. Bunlara ek olarak son zamanlarda ülkede bazı işçi grevleri ve bazı işsizlerin kendini yakma eylemleri ortaya çıkıyor. Bunlardan özellikle kendini yaktılar, Tunus örneğinde olduğu gibi herhangi bir kitlesel ve popüler bir siyasete yol açmıyor. Diğer yandan OHAL uygulamalarına karşı özellikle sol ve Marksist eğilimli gruplar ve kişiler yasal mücadeleler veriyor ve protestolar yapıyorlar. Bunlardan Nuriye Gülmen ve Semih Özakça'nın açlık grevi ön plana çıkanlardandır. AKP hükümeti ve devlet yetkilileri bu eylemin Gezi Olayları'na benzer eylemlere yol açacağı endişesine kapıldılar.

Ülkedeki siyasal ve toplumsal koşullar değerlendirildiğinde ve aynı zamanda küresel ekonomik ve siyasal sorunların da çözülemediği düşünüldüğünde ikili bir soru sormak anlamlı oluyor. Radikal ve kolektif popüler siyasal örgütlenmelerin toplumsal rahatsızlıkları birçok ülkede hem temsili siyaset hem de çokluk benzeri siyasal hareketler etrafında kümelemesi olanağının oldukça sınırlı olduğu bir koşulda, nasıl oluyor da hem dünyada hem de Türkiye'de yeni siyasal pratikler ortaya çıkmıyor sorusu anlamlı hale geliyor. Bu soru, bu imkanların ortadan kalktığı değil, tam tersine hala var olduğunu ileri sürüyor. AKP iktidarının hem kendi dışındakileri olumsuz bir biçimde kodlaması biçiminde söylemsel bir işlev olarak hem de her egemenlik projesinin sürekli önceden kestirme ve tahminlerle siyasal

alandan sapmaları tespit etme dürtüsü ile Gezi'ye referans göstermesi bunun bir göstergesidir. Bu açıdan var olan siyasal iktidar Gezi ve HDP örneğinde olduğu gibi siyasal alanda sürpriz ve fazlalık üretebilecek siyasal deneyimlerin her zaman ortaya çıkabileceği fikriyle hareket ediyor. Bu fikirden hareketle yine de Gustav Landauer'in şu fikri anlamlı hale geliyor: Landauer bilimin siyasal alandan ortaya çıkan toplumsal bir dönüşüm yol açabilecek kestirilemezlikleri önceden tahmin edemeyeceğini iddia ediyor. Bu açıdan, bu çalışma şöyle bir arguman öne sürüyor: Ülkede var olan siyasi rahatsızlıkların ve alternatiflerin yeni bir siyasal ifade ve deneyime dönüşme olasılığı vardır, çünkü hala failler siyasal alanda pasifist ve kamusal olarak açığa vurulmayan siyasal tepkiler biçiminde siyasal eğilimlere var olsa da, AKP'den rahatsız olan birçok kesimin siyasal alternatif arayışı vardır. Bu failler açısından var olan siyasal örgütlerin ve partilerin siyaset yapma biçimini onları tatmin etmekten oldukça uzaktır. Bu açıdan bu rahatsızlıkların hem yeni siyasal biçimler halini alması hem de var olan siyasi yapıları yeniden şekillendirmesi olasıdır.

Dünyada bu siyasal biçimlerin aldığı hale bakılacak olursa burada bazı tahminler yapılabilir. Birçok ülkede toplumsal rahatsızlıklar ya sağ popülizm biçimini alarak bu siyaset yapma biçimini savunan siyasi partileri iktidara getirdi, ya da özellikle sol, Marksist, anti-otoriter ve özgürlükçü siyasetlere yakın kesimler siyasal alandan çekildiler. Bu faillerin birçoğu siyasal alanda yeniden etki kazanmanın yollarını arıyorlar. Özellikle Türkiye'de sola ve HDP'ye yakınlık taşıyan faillerin siyasal alandan geri çekilmesi ve umutsuzluk hisleri, ülkede siyasal alanın var olan siyasi iktidarca hegemonya altına alınması, failleri ya pasif siyasal konumlara itiyor ya da failler özellikle siyasal şiddet arzusunu içinde barındıran reaktif duygular üretiyorlar. Bunların siyasal alanda bir ifadeye ve deneyime dönüşüp dönüşmeyeceği ve dönüşse bile nasıl biçimlerde ortaya çıkacağı kestirilemeyeceği ifade edilirken, bu çalışma şu sonucu çıkarıyor: Ülkede siyasal ve toplumsal rahatsızlıkların dışlandığı ve siyasal alanda bir rakip ve alternatif olarak ifade bulamadığı bu koşullarda, belki de tekil eylemler ne biçim ne de boyutu ve etkisi kestirilebilir siyasi ve toplumsal deneyimlere yol açabilir. Ülkenin özellikle sol toplumsal ve siyasal hareketler tarihi ve devam eden rahatsızlıklar düşünüldüğünde bunların hiçbir kestirilene, sabitliklere ve öngörülene yoğunlaşan epistemolojiler dışında hiçbir açıdan sürpriz olmayacağıdır.

Sonuç itibarıyla, ülkedeki hem özel olarak AKP egemenliğinden kaynaklanan hem de genel yapısal sorunların ürettiği rahatsızlıklar ve endişeler ve tekil siyasal eylemler ve pratikler herhangi bir genelligin ifadesi olmasalar da, geniş kesimleri siyasal pratiklerde ortaklaşdırabilecek deneyimlere dönüşme ihtimalini barındırıyorlar. Bahsedildiği gibi bunlar var olan siyasi pratiklerin dışında ifadedeler de kazanabilir, HDP gibi sol siyasi yapılar etrafında ya da var olan siyasi örgütler ve grupların ittifaklarında bir araya gelerek hem sisteme hem de AKP'ye alternatif ve karşıt popüler siyasi pozisyonlar ve deneyimler üretebilir. Fakat, bu hem geniş kesimlerden oluşan faillerin isteklerine ve siyasal ifadelerine hem de ülkede var olan siyasal alanda güçler dengesinin değişimine bağlıdır. Bu açıdan, ülkede AKP karışıtı ve ona alternatif siyasal ortaklık ve özneleşme ve eklemleme süreçlerinin ortaya çıkma ihtimalleri olmasına karşın, bunlar otomatik biçimde ve kendiliğinden ortaya çıkmayacaktır.

Appendix B

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Akgün, Recep
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 14 July 1982, Espiye-Giresun
Marital Status: Single
Phone: +90 543 573 26 70
email: recocemalakgun@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Marmara University, Sociology and Anthropology of Middle East	2009
BS	Istanbul University, Philosophy	2006
High School	Hamdi Bozbağ Anatolian High School, Giresun	2000

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2010- 2011	Sociology Department, KMU	Research Assistant
2010-2017	Sociology Department, METU	Research Assistant
2018-Present	Sociology Department, KMU	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGE

Advanced English, Intermediate German, Intermediate French

Appendix C

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü | <input type="checkbox"/> |

YAZARIN

Soyadı : RECEP
Adı : AKGÜN
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI : The Possibilities and Limitations of Articulations and Political Subjectification Mechanisms in Turkey

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora X

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. X
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: