

FREEDOM IN THE SOCIAL CONTEXT:
THE POSITIONS OF ARISTOTLE AND JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims at examining and comparing the concept of freedom in the social context from the viewpoints of Aristotle (384–322 BC) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). In order to do that, Aristotle’s ideas on slavery, the position of women in city-state, freedom of citizens, and democracy are emphasized for his position; and Rousseau’s ideas on state of nature, social contract theory, and ideal education are stressed on for his position. As both Aristotle and Rousseau mainly seek for an ideal system on the basis of city-state, and thereby its concomitants of “virtuous citizens”, the primary aim of this thesis is to analyse and compare their ideas on human nature, citizenship, woman, and education in order to discuss the concept of freedom in the social context.

Keywords: Political State, Social Contract, Freedom, Aristotle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

ÖZ

ARİSTOTELES VE JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU BAKIŞ AÇILARINDAN SOSYAL BAĞLAMDA ÖZGÜRLÜK

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Bu çalışma sosyal bağlamda özgürlük kavramını, Aristoteles (384–322 MÖ) ve Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) bakış açılarından incelemekte ve karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu amaca yönelik Aristoteles’in kölelik kavramı, şehir devleti içindeki kadının pozisyonu, vatandaşların özgürlüğü ve demokrasi üzerine düşünceleri; Jean-Jacques Rousseau’nun ise doğa durumu, toplum sözleşmesi teorisi ve ideal eğitim üzerine düşünceleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Her iki filozof da şehir devleti ve onun beraberinde gelen “erdemli vatandaş” temellerine dayanan bir ideal sistem inşa etme arayışında olduklarından, tezin başlıca amacı bu iki filozofun insan doğası, vatandaşlık kavramı, kadın ve eğitim üzerine düşüncelerinin analizi ve karşılaştırılmasıdır; böylece toplumsal bağlamda özgürlük kavramı tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi Yapı, Toplumsal Sözleşme, Özgürlük, Aristoteles, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

To Cennet and Yasemin

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims at examining the concept of freedom in the social context from the viewpoints of Aristotle (384–322 BC) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). In order to do that, I will try to find answers to the questions such as “whether it is possible to build a relationship between the political philosophies of Aristotle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau”, “if it is possible, which concepts can guide us to draw a framework for freedom in the social context” and “in which ways these philosophers’ thoughts are different from each other or similar to each other”.

These two philosophers’ views on what is natural and what relationships are natural differ considerably. Aristotle claims that a human being is by nature a social animal, and that the state is by nature prior to the individual. In line with the first claim, being a social animal means being both a rational and “political animal”¹. “To be a rational animal is to be a language-using animal, a conversing animal, a discursive animal; and to live a human life is to live a life centred around discourse.”² It is also speech which shows what is useful and what is harmful, and what is just and what is unjust in the society. To be a political animal is not only to be “an animal that lives in groups or sets up governments; rather, it is to cooperate with others on the basis of discourse about shared ends.”³ In this way, Aristotle thinks that not living a solitary life but living in a community of households and families with a shared

¹ *Politikon zoon*, “who lives/whose nature is to live, in a *polis* (state)”.

Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 59.

² Roderick T. Long, “Aristotle’s Conception on Freedom”, *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (June 1996): 781.

³ *Ibid.*

pursuit of the human good makes one both a rational and political animal. In line with the latter claim, the state is a member of the class of objects which exist by nature, and “it has priority over the household and over any individual among us”.⁴ It seems that this is not a historical or chronological explanation but a logical framework. That is, since the part without the whole it belongs to loses its function and capacity which define it, Aristotle claims that the whole must be prior to the part. For example, if an organ such as a leg is separated from the whole body, it will not be a leg except in name because it is not able to actualize its function anymore. Similarly, if an individual is separated from the state, he is no longer self-sufficient. Therefore, the state is prior to the individual, and the individual is a part of the state.⁵

On the other hand, Rousseau thinks that human beings are social because of circumstances rather than nature. What makes it possible to explore what human beings are by nature is his concept of the state of nature. This natural state is a pre-rational and pre-social state. In the state of nature, human beings are “timid, peaceful and content”⁶. Because their needs are not much, each of them satisfies those by themselves with ease. They live separately; they do not have knowledge about others’ opinions; any interaction they have, such as coupling, occurs by chance, unintentionally; they do not need other people; therefore, they are amoral and act on sentiment in the state of nature.⁷ As is seen, the conceptions of the family, property and the faculty of speech are not natural for Rousseau. Rousseau claims that after many developments were experienced such as developments of human faculties and industry, especially emergence of the notion of private property, human beings left the state of nature, and the origin of the civil state emerged. Rousseau says that “it is very likely that by then things had already come to a point

⁴ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 59-60.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 58.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 58-60.

where they could no longer remain as they were.”⁸ The characteristics of human beings in civil society are totally opposite of those in the state of nature. Human beings are now getting together and start relating to each other on a moral level. In this sense, the institution of family, private property and the faculty of speech appear in the development from natural man to civilized man.

As it is seen above, Aristotle and Rousseau have opposite ideas on whether human beings are by nature social; however, they both try to build an ideal system on the basis of the city-state⁹ together with its virtuous citizens in the framework of freedom in the social context. There are more than two thousand years between Aristotle and Rousseau. However, in my opinion, what makes them comparable is that their social and political philosophies are based on the concept of freedom.

It is possible to see the different meanings and uses of the concept of freedom, *eleutheria*, in Ancient Greece. For example, *eleutheros*, which is the adjective form of *eleutheria*, means being free as opposed to being a slave. Or, as a status, *eleutherus* is being free-born in the sense of being a born citizen.¹⁰ In this sense, when it comes to Aristotle’s views on it, it is a bit hard to find a clear definition of freedom in his books such as *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. However, it is possible to discover it slowly by scrutinizing a set of passages wherein Aristotle speaks of the existence of the natural slave and forms of democracy.¹¹

As for Rousseau, although a lot of politicians and scholars have been examining Rousseau’s works for almost 250 years, they do not agree upon the interpretation

⁸ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁹ “Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born in the independent Calvinist city-state of Geneva in 1712.” Being a citizen of Geneva and living in a city-state had influence on his political philosophy.

Christopher Bertram, “Jean Jacques Rousseau,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, June 21, 2017, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/rousseau/> (accessed June 17, 2018).

¹⁰ Mogens Herman Hansen, “Democratic Freedom and the Concept of Freedom in Plato and Aristotle,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 50 (2010):1, 2.

¹¹ Moira M. Walsh, “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4 (1997): 495.

of his concept of freedom. However, it seems a bit clearer to talk about this concept when his books, the *Social Contract* and *Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men*, are referred to. Indeed, it is possible to point out from the *Social Contract* three kinds of freedom which are natural freedom, civil freedom, and moral freedom.¹² Therefore, to clarify Aristotle's and Rousseau's point of views on freedom, it is necessary to examine their political philosophies comprehensively.

In this sense, to be able to discuss the concept of freedom in the social context as a main question, first I will look at Aristotle's views on freedom in detail. Aristotle's views of politics and ethics are closely related to each other. According to him, all states as a certain kind of association were established for some good purpose.¹³ Namely, the target of the state must be the highest good. What is the origin of the State for Aristotle? The ruler and the ruled as a pair. The household as a next part of the State consists of a man, a wife and a slave. The following part is the village which fulfils other purposes than the daily ones. The state, which was comprised of several villages, is the only association of total self-sufficiency.

The distinction between the ruler and the ruled is such a significant principle that it regulates the concept of freedom, thereby, social order in Aristotle's philosophy. That is, ruling and being ruled are necessary and beneficial to society. One who is able to use his intellect, as in being able to look ahead, is by nature the ruler, i.e., master. The slave is the one who is physically strong enough to labour and the one who, in this sense, does not have a deliberative element at all. Moreover, the female does have a deliberative element which is not effective; the child does have it, but it is not developed.¹⁴ Therefore, they all are ruled.

Furthermore, in Aristotle's philosophy, that kind of partaking in deliberative element closely influences partaking in virtue. That is to say, all of them must take

¹² Matthew Simpson, *Rousseau's Theory of Freedom*, (London & New York: Continuum, 2006), 1.

¹³ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 54.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 95.

part in virtue, but it does not happen in the same way. This participation happens to such an extent that each can fulfil their own functions in a sufficient way. In this sense, the ruler must entirely have virtue and others must have it as much as it relates to their functions. As it is seen, the capacity for deliberation is closely associated with freedom as the thing that controls social order in Aristotle's philosophy. His description of slavery also helps him to build on his concept of freedom. Moreover, Aristotle's ideas on the position of women in the city-state, on the freedom of citizens and on democracy are the useful to further know his concept of freedom in social context.

The position of women in the city-state is clearly understood on the basis of the relation between women and household. Namely, the woman's role in the household is not only the bodily service, which belongs to slaves. The role is to keep and protect the items, which men have made. According to Aristotle, since men are quite better at maintaining authority over people and having responsibilities for these people than women are, it seems women are in a kind of subordinate position. Together with, having deliberative capacity without authority and having virtues in accordance with their deliberative capacities make women ruled easily, and these determine their positions in the city-state. Despite being in this position, Aristotle claims that women are half of the free population in the city-state.

In this way, it is possible to foresee that being a citizen should mean meeting some criteria in the society in Aristotle's philosophy. Those who are not under the control of a master and are not doing labour for requirements for life are called citizens. In other words, those who are not responsible for servitude are the citizens. This is a life which enables the citizens to be involved in shaping their own futures, the community's future and the well-being of the society. In this sense, citizens take part in political activities which lead to the process of growing, changing, or advancing of the city. That is to say, citizenship is not right for the slaves who work at drudgery and for artisans or merchants who do vulgar work.

When it comes to democracy, Aristotle speaks of many kinds of democracy. There are two causes of this variety. The first cause is differences of population including farmers, mechanics, labourers etc. The second cause is the various properties and

characteristics of democracy. All these variously combine in accordance with principles, characteristics, and aims of states. This situation makes a difference in form of democracy possible. In other words, when these elements come together in different ways, the varieties of democratic government arise. Aristotle also thinks that a form of democracy where people live as they wish is such a democracy which is defined badly. According to Aristotle, in general, the best form of democracies occurs when the *demos* earns a living by agriculture and husbandry, and those who are notable rule. In this way, the notables feel satisfied because of not being ruled by inferiors. Everyone should be accountable to each other; therefore, it is not possible for anyone to do what they please. Besides, all should be elected to offices; however, the great offices should be peopled with ones who have certain qualifications. This, for sure, should be done by election.

The second step to discuss will be Rousseau's views on freedom in detail. At this point, the discussion on human nature and natural man is the primary issue. According to Rousseau, natural man is naturally good because he cannot yet have passions to be directed. Natural state is a state which includes pre-reflective wholeness and contentment.¹⁵ It is possible for the man in the state of nature to harm another if and only if he is at risk of losing his life.¹⁶ Arthur M. Melzer describes the state of nature below:

Rousseau suggests that the root of life is not a negative relation to the other but positive affection for oneself and for simple *being*.¹⁷

Natural man is blessed with total freedom. He is capable of doing what he basically wishes to do. He is free because he is not constrained by any apparatus or controlled by his fellow men. He is also not enslaved by needs to have artificial things. State

¹⁵ Richard L. Velkley, "Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal," in *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 149.

¹⁶ Pervin Yiğit, "The Question of Freedom in Political Philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau" (Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007), 5.

¹⁷ Arthur M. Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990), 38.

of nature is the state where man does not live corrupted by society. In this sense, natural man is not acquainted with morality because morality will be discovered in the social order. The theory of the state of nature displays the passage of human beings from a natural state into a civil society and the differing virtues of this transformation.

As it is seen, natural man to Rousseau is a savage man, does not own anything acquired from society. That is, he does not own a language and relationships, accordingly family and property. The faculty of reason he has is undeveloped. Although he has something in common with animals, he does have capacity to advance and go beyond the state of nature in comparison with animals. However, together with the expansion of reason, man's desires expand. Satisfaction of those desires exceeds men's powers as individuals. Men, thereby, started becoming dependent on others and look for ways to control them. This is the growth of complexity of social life without limit and the simple beginning disappears.¹⁸

Rousseau suggests that we can regain freedom by his social contract theory. In this context, the recovery in natural freedom, which has been lost, is possible by civil freedom. That is to say, as Rousseau frequently states that it is not possible to go back to the state of nature and acquire the freedom there, he defines a concept of freedom acquired by the social contract, which at least approximates to the freedom owned in the state of nature. Thus:

What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and he can reach; what he gains is civil freedom and property in everything he possesses.¹⁹

The most important concept related to the freedoms above is the "general will" in Rousseau's theory. According to Rousseau, man plays the leading role in the

¹⁸ Richard L. Velkley, "Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal," in *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 149.

¹⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 53.

political society, and it is his consent that provides the sovereign with the authority to make orders and commands. That is, subjects give themselves to the sovereign of their own accords and renounce their rights. It means that they give up their complete freedom by their free will so as to own their limited liberty in safety.²⁰ However, for Rousseau, the subjects and the sovereign are not completely different parts of the society. He describes it in this way:

Each citizen puts his person in common under the supreme direction of the general will, thus, each member becomes an indivisible part of the whole body.²¹

Individuals are not only subjects to the laws of the state but also citizens because of participating in the sovereign authority. In this way, the multitude becomes one under the sovereignty. This is thought as exercises of the general will.²² Moreover, the political aim of the social contract is to give civilized human beings the sense of moral equality. In a way, Rousseau attempts to set up a society that is not corrupted and retains virtue as its main concern. Accordingly, he suggests an ideal education to keep virtue as a main concern. This education system, at first, is formed to understand childhood and then to create a new and more natural human being who is not only a good individual but also a good citizen. Only this kind of education can remove society's vices. As a result, entering this kind of society and becoming masters of themselves, i.e., obeying the laws made by themselves, are how they acquire civil freedom.

Finally, it is also important to discuss the points where Aristotle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau agree and disagree in order to be able to grasp an overall point of view. Aristotle believes that the best way to understand the nature of things is to grasp their purposiveness. That is, his natural teleological approach implies that there is a reason for everything. Accordingly, Aristotle's stress on teleology affects his

²⁰ Pervin Yiğit, "The Question of Freedom in Political Philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau" (Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007), 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²² *Ibid.*

philosophy throughout. In this sense, it would not be wrong to say that he looks for *telos* of human beings in his philosophy. On the other hand, Rousseau, as one of the prominent philosophers of the modern period, does not give attention to teleology, but he looks for universal and objective human nature where ethics and politics can originate from. However, despite the fact that there are differences in Aristotle's and Rousseau's methodologies, they both agree on the necessity of a political life to fulfil their own ends. In this sense, their views on human nature, man, society and citizenship, the status of women, and education should be compared.

The thesis is composed of five chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter deals with Aristotle's position on freedom. The third chapter aims to clarify Jean-Jacques Rousseau's position on freedom. The fourth chapter attempts to present similarities and differences between Aristotle's and Rousseau's views on freedom and criticizes them. The last chapter gives a summary and a final analysis of which philosopher's thoughts are more enlightening and useful in the twenty-first century within the context of freedom.

CHAPTER 2

ARISTOTLE'S POSITION ON FREEDOM

2.1 Aristotle's Views Concerning Freedom

The city-state of Athens is thought as a place where intellectual freedom and democracy were born, and the main themes that the Greek philosophers were interested in were the questions of “justice,” “virtue,” “the good,” and “the beautiful”.²³ These general concepts were important in the sense that they were associated with the discussions regarding freedom. Two questions specifically focused on were what kind of freedom it was that the Greeks valued, and whether or not that kind of freedom is a good thing.²⁴ Kurt Raaflaub, in his book *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, emphasizes freedom, not as a philosophical concept, but as a genuine part of social and political history. He also defines the conceptual field of freedom within “complementary ideas such as power and contrasting concepts such as slavery.”²⁵

However, when it comes to Aristotle, it is hard to see an explicit definition of freedom either in the *Nicomachean Ethics* or in the *Politics*. At this point, Moira M. Walsh suggests that we can discover Aristotle's notion of freedom slowly, applying a set of passages in the *Politics* where Aristotle talks about the existence of the natural slave, the understanding of freedom underpinning certain forms of

²³ Richard M. Ebeling, “Did the Ancient Greeks Believe in Freedom?” *Foundation for Economic Education* last modified September 22, 2016. <https://fee.org/articles/did-the-ancient-greeks-believe-in-freedom>

²⁴ Zena Hitz, review of *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* by Kurt Raaflaub and Renate Franciscono, *The Journal of Philosophy* 102, no. 11 (November 2005): 594.

²⁵ Ryan Balot, review of *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* by Kurt Raaflaub and Renate Franciscono, *The Classical Review* 55, no. 1 (March 2005): 207.

democracy.²⁶ Namely, Aristotle conceives of freedom as the capacity to direct oneself to those ends which one's reason rightly recognizes as choice-worthy, and this concept of freedom as rational self-direction can be found underlying Aristotle's discussions of natural slavery and democracy.²⁷ That is to say, it is possible for us to learn something about his conception of freedom from his description of slavery. We will also see the concept of freedom shaped by a few concepts such as rationality, virtue, *thymos*.

When Moira M. Walsh claims freedom as rational self-direction, she builds a relationship between Aristotle's notion of freedom and his notion of rationality in this way: Rationality is both the element of deliberative capacity of finding out means to ends and the capacity to grasp these ends that are both the intermediate and final end of human happiness. Accordingly, freedom is the thing that provides one not only with the capacity to move himself towards whatever ends he²⁸ wishes but also with the capacity to order his life by right reason such as moving himself towards the *telos* that his reason has discovered.²⁹ Moreover, freedom requires two kinds of virtues, one of which is intellectual virtue and the other is moral virtue. The former is necessary to see what the good life demands, the latter encourages one to desire and to act in the way the intellectual virtue leads.³⁰

Let us see the link between practical wisdom, which is an intellectual virtue, and freedom according to Aristotle. Practical wisdom is "a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods."³¹ The man who has practical wisdom

²⁶ Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 495, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 496.

²⁸ In commenting on Aristotle, the general use of "man" and of masculine pronouns will be seen on purpose.

²⁹ Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 503-4, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 504.

³¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999), 95.

is freer than those who do not have it. It might be said that the man who lacks practical wisdom is not truly free because of not being able to follow his own best judgement and because of being passive or ignorant of what the judgement should be. Therefore, he is limited. That is to say, the free man has the ability to both judge well of the particular and to know the universal, which it is related to; in this sense, the rational man is free.³²

It is worth mentioning some critiques of Aristotle's idea of freedom. Some commentators point out that only a certain class can achieve that kind of freedom. For example, Moira M. Walsh states that it is more likely that Aristotle's concept of *eleutheria*³³ is intended to relate to only wealthy aristocrat in terms of his claim

³² J. G. Clapp, "On Freedom," *The Journal of Philosophy* 40, no.4 (1943): 95.

³³ Let us look at the survey of the concept of *eleutheria* in the essay, *Democratic Freedom and the Concept of Freedom in Plato and Aristotle*, by Mogens Herman Hansen. There are different meanings and uses of the ancient Greek concept of *eleutheria*. Both the noun form *eleutheria* and the adjective form *eleutheros* were employed by classical Greek writers. At first, being free contrary to being a slave was the oldest and the most prevalent meaning of *eleutheros*. Secondly, *eleutheros* referred to being a born citizen which meant being free-born in terms of status. Moreover, it referred not being exposed to a despotic ruler or a narrow group of oligarchs. Furthermore, all citizens were not only given the right to but also supposed to take part in the running of the democratic institutions. That is to say, *eleutheria* was described as to rule and be ruled in terms. What is more, the idea that everybody lived as they wished without making them limited by others or the authorities was the most controversial form of democratic liberty. The focus here is that democratic laws limited a person's *eleutheria*. In addition to these, *eleutheria* frequently amounted to the independence of a *polis*. In this way, *eleutheria*, indeed, was not being dominated by others. It was also described as self-government in the sense of self-control in Plato's dialogues and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. In other words, it was inevitable for human beings to be caught in a fight between rationality and the wish in order to fulfil their desires. When human beings permit their desires to control their way of life that was uncontrolled by rationality, then they were enslaved by their desires and they were not anymore free. Finally, freedom with regard to leisure existed. For instance, Plato claims that there was the difference between the citizens who were politically active and people practicing philosophy from youth was very similar to the difference between slaves and free persons. That is, leisure was necessary for the freedom of the philosopher.

Now, let us look at Aristotle's view of *Eleutheria*, there is no talk concerning the free person and the concept of freedom in the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. The adjective *eleutheros* does not have a place and the noun *eleutheria* is explained as a basic value for democrats in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. What appeared in both the *Ethics* is talk concerning *eleutheriotes* with regard to generosity. In the *Politics*, Book I, he considers the household in a particular way: *eleutheros* is employed conventionally and uncontroversially concerning the family members who are born free contrary to the slave who is household's unfree member. In Book II, *eleutheros* exists with regard to citizens of equal status. In Book

that true freedom and manual or paid labour do not coexist. Kurt Raaflaub also indicates that Aristotle defined *eleutheros* on purpose in order that it would adapt merely members of the propertied, educated class.³⁴ After these explanations, let us start first clarifying the relationship between freedom and his ideas on slavery.

2.2 Aristotle's Ideas Concerning Slavery

Aristotle's view of ethics is closely related to his view of politics. Therefore, his most important ethical and political concepts appear together. He begins in his book, *Politics*, by asserting that every state is a certain kind of association, and that every association is formed for some good purpose.³⁵ He goes on asserting that since all people intend to achieve doing what they think is good for all their actions, the association formed by these people, which is the State, must aim at the highest good. Thus, first of all, it is better to scrutinize the State and its component parts.

To talk about the origin, the growth and the purpose of the State, the ruler and the ruled as a pair are the first component parts. One who can use his intellect to look ahead is by nature ruler, i.e. a master. One who has enough bodily strength to do labour is by nature ruled, who is a slave. Their mutual aim is preservation of life. In addition to this, Aristotle emphasizes the difference between female and slave. Whilst the slave subserves many tasks, the female does one. The next part is the

III to VI, *eleutheros* is often employed to show the adult male citizen of a *polis*. The status of free citizen, *eleutheros*, is thought as a sufficient condition to have political rights in democracies. Aristotle criticizes this conception of freedom. In Book VII and VIII, Aristotle draws a bigger picture of freedom. He also tells us that the effect of climate plays a role on people, particularly the state of loving freedom. On the other hand, Aristotle does not mention freedom as self-determination in the sense of self-control in the *Politics*, that is to say, rationality over feelings and desires. He also disagrees with people who defines freedom as leisure that is needed for someone who wants to be philosopher. *Eleutheria* as the independence of the *polis* is not mentioned. All these issues will be elaborately explained in the main text.

Mogen Herman Hansen, "Democratic Freedom and the Concept of Freedom in Plato and Aristotle," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 50, (2010):1-10.

³⁴ Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 505, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

³⁵ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 54.

household that is the first association arising from a man with a wife and a slave. However, because this association is only able to satisfy daily purposes, the second association, which is called village, arises to fulfil other purposes than the daily ones.³⁶ Finally, the complete association is the state. The state, which arises from several villages, is at the limit of total self-sufficiency.³⁷ Accordingly, the state is one of the things that exist by nature as the first associations did and “has priority over the household and over the individual.”³⁸ This historical explanation, which is not factual but logical, is seen clearer in the relationship between man and the state.

Aristotle claims that man is by nature an animal fit for the state.³⁹ Man alone has the ability of speech that serves to clarify what is beneficial and what is harmful and also what is just and what is unjust. That is, compared to other animals; man alone has a sense of good and evil, justice and injustice. Accordingly, an association in these matters makes a household and a state.⁴⁰ The state is by nature a thing existing before the household and before each of us individually. The whole is necessary for a part to perform its function, so the whole must exist before the part. For example, an eye’s function is to see, and it can only perform when it is functioning within the whole, i.e., human body.⁴¹ In other words, when the eye is removed from the body, it is impossible for the eye to perform its function. Then, there is obviously no problem in saying that man loses his function which defines him when he is separated from the state.

After examining Aristotle’s view on the state, it is time to deal with his thoughts on slavery, especially in the framework of the stratification of society. As Aristotle

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 60.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 12.

continues going into detail of the household and its management, he claims that there are some physical needs to satisfy in order to make the life and good life possible. Here, it is necessary to have some tools, which can be either animate or inanimate, so that the task can be performed. He explains that the slave is the animate tool to perform the task. Because production and action are different in kind, the two demand different kinds of tools. For life is also not production but action, the slave is an assistant in the class of things that promote action. That is to say, the slave is a part of another and belongs to it wholly; however, the master is a master of the slave and does not belong to it.⁴² So, the slave is a piece of property such as a tool.

Accordingly, what is the Aristotle's justification of slavery? He thinks that ruling and being ruled are both necessary and beneficial. Certain things such as whether one is to rule or to be ruled are determined right after birth. Living creatures get this typical quality from nature as a whole. What makes this difference is that the living creatures consist of soul and body. That is to say, the soul is by nature ruler and the body is by nature ruled, according to Aristotle. Therefore, the thing natural and beneficial for the body is to be ruled by the soul. This is similar for the relationship between male and female. The one, who is male, is ruler and the other, who is female, is ruled.⁴³ At this point, Aristotle tries to justify the pattern of the ruler and the ruled teleologically. However, it is hard to see obviously the distinction between free men and slaves in nature. It seems that his attempt embodies justification of the rule of rational over irrational rather than slavery. Moreover, Moira M. Walsh suggests that Aristotle distinguishes between the political status of slavery and the naturally slavish condition. This distinction can also enable this political status to be legitimate by itself. That is to say, the definition of freedom as a condition of

⁴² Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 65.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 68.

soul may derive from the difference between the man who is naturally fitted for slavery and the man who is naturally fitted for freedom.⁴⁴

Let us scrutinize this distinction in the explanation of master and slave. Those whose function is to use their bodies are natural slaves. Therefore, it is better for them to be subject to this rule. Because he who can belong to another and he who participates in reason as far as he can apprehend but not possess it, is a slave by nature. These provide the master with bodily help to supply the essentials. In fact, using tame animals and slaves are not different from each other because men fulfil the bodily essentials by using both of them. This gives rise to a natural difference in the bodies of freemen and slaves. Aristotle also makes a distinction between 'State of slavery' and 'slave'. State of slavery refers to the state of being a slave which is defined in laws, and the person is not a slave by nature. For example, some people conquered in war can be sold although they are noble. What Aristotle claims is that these people are not slaves by nature. Many experts may have a lot of different thoughts and opinions on slavery by law. Here is the place where opposing claims exist.

After these explanations, Aristotle asks whether it is possible to connect the rule of a master with rule of a statesman? This question is important to take the explanations above to the political ground. That is to say, if they are not the same thing, what is the difference? Aristotle states that the rule of a master and the rule of a statesman are not the same thing because the rule of a statesman is a rule over free and equal persons.⁴⁵ However, the rule of a master is a rule over slaves, and this rule by a household-manager is a monarchy because every household possesses one ruler.⁴⁶

At this point, it is possible to give an example of what the rule is in the household. According to Aristotle, the skill of household-management has three parts. These

⁴⁴ Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 496, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 74.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

are the skill of a master, the skill of a father and the marital skill. The rule over wife and children is a rule over free persons, but this rule does not involve the same style of rule. That is to say, whereas the rule over a wife is in the manner of a statesman; the rule over children is in the manner of a king. Because woman is less fitted to be in command than man, man is in command. This relationship between male and female is permanent. In Aristotle's words in the *Politics*:

Rule over children is royal, for the begetter is ruler by virtue both of affection and of age, and this type of rule is royal.⁴⁷

In accordance with the order above, let us consider what Aristotle suggests about partaking of virtue. Does a slave have some other virtues than the virtues that he has because of being a tool and a servant? Are those others less valuable than the virtues he already has? Or, does he not have the virtues apart from the virtues required by his bodily services? If he does have some virtues besides the ones that he has as a servant, in what respect will these virtues be different from the virtues that free men have? Or, if he does not have them, how can we prove the fact that they are human beings and they share in reason? These questions are also applicable to both women and children. At this point, in order to clarify the subject, Aristotle makes this kind of suggestion:

All these questions might be regarded as parts of our wider inquiry into the natural ruler and ruled, and in particular whether or not the virtue of the one is the same as the virtue of the other. For if the highest excellence is required of both, why should one rule unqualifiedly, and the other unqualifiedly obey? If on the other hand the one is to have virtues, and the other not, we have a surprising state of affairs.⁴⁸

This is a bit problematic because if the ruler is not moderate and just, how well is he able to rule? Or, if the ruled is not so, how can he be ruled? It is also impossible to perform his tasks if he is intemperate and corrupt. Therefore, it is understood that both the ruler and the ruled must partake in virtue; however, there are, of course,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 94.

differences in it. To solve these problems in the framework of virtue, our guidance will be the soul. Aristotle focuses on the soul where we find natural ruler and natural subject as noted below:

...that is, one being that of the rational element, the other of the non-rational.⁴⁹

It is clear that this kind of difference will be seen in other cases. In other words, the rule of freeman over slave or male over woman or man over children will be applied in different ways. It is because the parts of the soul are present in them in different ways. Namely, “the deliberative element in the soul is not present in a slave at all; in a woman it is present but ineffective; in a child present but undeveloped.”⁵⁰ Accordingly, this similar situation will influence moral virtues; all of them must take part in virtue but not in the same way. However, this participation occurs to such an extent that they can sufficiently fulfil their own functions. Specifically, the ruler must have moral virtue completely, and each of the others ought to possess as much as it relates to them. To illustrate, a man and a woman do not have either courage or justice in the same way. The former has them as a ruler, the latter has them as a servant, and likewise with other virtues too.⁵¹

At this point, Russell Bentley claims that Aristotle’s natural slaves are not intellectually inadequate as mostly assumed, but they do not have enough of an emotional faculty, *thymos*.⁵² Bentley’s argument is that the lack of *thymos* is preceded by the lack of *logos* in Aristotle’s account. The psychological basis of natural slavery means the lack of certain essential desires produced by *thymos*. Namely, natural slavery shows inclination to live slavishly because those who have absence of *thymos* also do not have these desires.⁵³ Current studies on the meaning

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Russell Bentley, “Loving Freedom: Aristotle on Slavery and the Good Life,” *Political Studies XLVII*, (1999): 100.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 100-101.

of natural slavery has had a wide variety, yet it is ambiguous and cannot even reach a consensus. Fortenbaugh thinks that Aristotle's view of slavery does not mean being psychologically unwise or morally extremely unpleasant. He also adds that since no slaves exist in the world, the view continues to be theoretical.⁵⁴

While Fortenbaugh leaves the pertinence to natural slavery generally unknown, D. Dobbs gives us noticeably different explanation. According to Dobbs, the way that we should conceive the 'natural' part of natural slavery is the main step of his argument. He lets us know that 'natural' does not need to mean 'native', rather it may relate to something existing in accordance with nature. Indeed, his very purpose with the help of this distinction is the claim that natural slaves are not innately slavish, but they are normal people having been corrupted by social conditions.⁵⁵ Darrel Dobbs states the following:

The pervasive and unrelenting influence of a dysfunctional culture can inculcate a slavishness so ingrained by habit as to become a second nature. This second nature forecloses all independent access to the human telos.⁵⁶

If a natural slave had not had a deliberative faculty, then this would have caused great damage to him. The absence of that faculty would also mean being at an extreme mental disadvantage. Aristotle obviously intends to say something else. In this sense, it is better to take his ethical theory into account, so that we could understand what he wanted to reveal by slaves and deliberation. Aristotle establishes a link between deliberation and choice when he deals with moral responsibility in *Ethics* Book III. He describes deliberation as reasoned consideration of alternative means that are within a person's power.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁵⁶ Darrel Dobbs, "Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle's Defense of Slavery," *The Journal of Politics* 50, no.1, (1994): 78.

⁵⁷ Russell Bentley, "Loving Freedom: Aristotle on Slavery and the Good Life," *Political Studies XLVII*, (1999): 106.

Here, Moira M. Walsh says that it can be concluded that the free man has the ability to know or judge what will happen in the future and has a capacity for deliberation. That is to say, he is able to achieve cleverness which is the skill in deciding which means to given ends he should use. Above all, he succeeds in attaining *phronesis*.⁵⁸ Here, when we take deliberation as one of the characteristic task of the free man, it is easier to conceive Aristotle's view that those who do not have any deliberative responsibilities in the *polis* would mean enslaved people and being an enemy to the constitution.⁵⁹

Accordingly, what is understood from natural slave is that the slave cannot direct himself to the end without having the direction of his master. On the other hand, the naturally free man is someone who is capable of self-direction, maybe of directing others as well. In other words, the naturally free man does not need to be given any particular end by another person. The obviously free man understands the best end, which is possible to achieve in human action, and successfully aims himself at it. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the free man to aim himself at a limited end as though it were his final end. It would be slavish to make an effort for the purpose of any good less than the virtuous life.⁶⁰

As it is seen above, there are three different natural types in the household. The slave by nature "participates in reason so far as to recognize it but not so as to possess it."⁶¹ Woman does have a deliberative faculty without authority, and a child does have it, but it is immature. The focus here is that the slave does not have

⁵⁸ Walsh explains, in the journal of *Aristotle's Conception of Freedom*, *phronesis* as a facility not only in determining means to arbitrarily given ends, but in choosing means towards appropriate ends apprehended as such through the use of reason. Aristotle's conception of freedom.

Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 497, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

⁵⁹ Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 497, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 499.

⁶¹ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 65.

enough deliberative capacity to live virtuous life. Russell Bentley states that the deliberative faculty under discussion must be related to moral virtues that Aristotle has been interested in. It has already been determined for the slave to have to take part in these virtues. Because of not having capacity to deliberate about these virtues, strict habituation and exact despotic oversight must make the slave's participation happen; in this sense, this will necessarily restrict the slave to perform appropriate actions and to have an extended formation of virtuous character.⁶² It is necessary to base moral character on moral responsibility, according to Aristotle. However, not having capacity to deliberate, to make choices about what is good, makes the position above impossible, which breaks the connection between action and character. Here is how Bentley summarizes this issue:

Aristotle does not deny the slave has a deliberative faculty as such; he denies the ability to deliberate about the good life for man. While the slave needs some of the attributes that a good man has, these attributes will never be a reflection of an ethical character for the slave. Nevertheless, the slave can be appropriately employed in a variety of tasks that require some deliberation and foresight. These tasks, however, will always be limited to those with highly determinate ends.⁶³

On the other hand, the free man thinks particularly of his own well-being rather than an end outside himself. He, therefore, acts in accordance with it. This is clear in *Metaphysics*: That human being "is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another".⁶⁴ Lastly, if we go back to the concept of *thymos* in detail, Aristotle, who characterizes *thymos* as the quality of the soul that is the father of the friendship and allows us to love, describes a causal relationship between thymotic deficiency and enslavement. According to him, this quality brings about the power of command and the love of freedom in all men. For example, the Asiatic races possess intelligence and skill, but they lack *thymos*. They, therefore, are

⁶² Russell Bentley, "Loving Freedom: Aristotle on Slavery and the Good Life," *Political Studies XLVII*, (1999): 108.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 108-109.

⁶⁴ Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, trans. John H. McMahon (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2008), 6.

always subject to be defeated, be ruled and be enslaved. Europeans, on the other hand, are full of *thymos* but lack of intellect and skill. They continue to keep a certain amount of freedom, but they are not capable to rule over others. They are neither slaves nor a master.⁶⁵ That is to say, as seen in this comparison, it is a slavish indication to lack both love of freedom and the desire to be in command. Nevertheless, the existence of *thymos* is not alone enough to live the good life. *Thymos* must exist as the source of the desire to be free, but the ability to actualize this desire is also necessary. Murray also takes it into account:

It is spirit that accounts for the difference. Human beings
will not be free, unless they have the passion to be free.⁶⁶

2.3 Aristotle's Ideas Concerning Position of Women in the City-State

As stated above, the positions of freemen and slaves in the society is clear. What is the position of woman as a part of society in the city-state? What is the freedom in the social context for women in the city-state? According to Aristotle, in discussing women, there is no doubt about their inferior domestic roles, when the relation between women and household is taken into consideration. It is possible to see this clearly in a few points. First, men are much better at controlling people and being responsible for them than women are.⁶⁷ Women's role is to preserve the items men produced for the household. In this way, women's role is not bodily service which was the role of slaves.⁶⁸ Moreover, in the framework of virtue, Aristotle stresses the virtues suitable for different types of persons including women. He accepts that

⁶⁵ Russell Bentley, "Loving Freedom: Aristotle on Slavery and the Good Life," *Political Studies XLVII*, (1999): 109.

⁶⁶ Andrew Murray, "Freedom and Nature in Aristotle's *Politics*," (presentation, Biennial Conference in Philosophy, Religion and Culture: God, Freedom and Nature, Sydney, October 3-5, 2008).

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 92.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

virtue is associated with function and applies this to women.⁶⁹ In this sense, he expects women to have the virtue which is a sign of their domestic role. For instance, they neither need as much courage as men, nor have they the courage of command. It is the courage of subordination that they must have.⁷⁰ Whether or not to have deliberative faculty gains importance, when it comes to logical and alogical sides of the soul. Namely, women have deliberative faculty which is ineffective. For this reason, women are overruled by their emotions and alogical sides. It means they are generally guided by pleasures and pains.⁷¹ Having deliberative capacity without authority makes them ruled by men easily.⁷² W. W. Fortenbaugh sees this situation as obscure:

At first glance, it may appear that Aristotle is simply referring to the subordinate position of women. He may seem to be saying that while women possess reason, it does not prevail in the society of men.⁷³

Moreover, when women's bodily condition is compared with men's bodily condition, women's bodily condition is one of weakness in Aristotle's opinion. That women have this weakness is another reason for women to have a retiring domestic role within the home and to be ruled by easily.⁷⁴ However, it might be a mistake to think that Aristotle accepts that women are entitled to a role either slavish or silly. It is the role which is subordinate on the basis of women's logical side in relation to their alogical side.⁷⁵ ⁷⁶ That is to say, women are credited with having reason by

⁶⁹ W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Slaves and Women," in *Aristotle's Practical Side: On His Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric*, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006): 245.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 244.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 245.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁷⁶ In the *Politics*, which all my references are from, the part saying that female does have deliberative faculty which is ineffective was translated into English as "women have a deliberative faculty, it is without authority (*akuron*) in other translations of the book. W.

Aristotle, and they are distinguished from natural slaves who do not have reason and from children who do have reason in an undeveloped way. Therefore, this subordinate role is not an obstacle to be free. In this sense, Aristotle suggests in the *Politics* that women and children should have proper education by taking the constitution into consideration. This education is important both because women are the half of free population and because children will grow up to be citizen in the state.⁷⁷

2.4 Aristotle's Ideas Concerning the Freedom of Citizens

According to Aristotle, population is the first necessary material for a state to come into existence.⁷⁸ So, it is better to consider what the size and the character of the citizens should be. That is, he thinks of citizens as a species and tries to define its characteristics. He also starts *Politics* Book 3 by claiming that people do not usually reach a compromise over what makes one a citizen. Namely, a person who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy.⁷⁹ In this sense, he suggests evaluating citizenship in accordance with that current constitution in the state. As is seen, the constitution has a significant role to play. In this sense, he suggests that the criteria related to moral and intellectual values that is prescribed in the framework of the current constitution should be instructed to the citizens. For instance, imagine a freeman is seen saying or doing what is prohibited. If he is not old enough to recline at the public meals, he should be whipped, on the other hand, if he is older, then he should be deprived of certain privileges which belong to freemen because of his slavish behaviour.⁸⁰

W. Fortenbaugh points out that women's logical side in quotation refers to *akuron*, and alogical side refers to emotional side of women.

⁷⁷Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 97.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 403.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 446.

Who is a citizen, according to Aristotle? Let us question characteristics of citizenship. Aristotle first explains what the obstacles are on the way to being a citizen. Those obstacles are blood, birth, ancestry, location and the ability to sue and be sued. Because these qualifications were given by accident, they are not able to characterize citizenship, and these are not merely enough to make someone a citizen. To illustrate, if someone is under commercial treaty, then he can sue and be sued at law.⁸¹ But this does not make him a citizen. Moreover, those who live agriculturist life do not have enough time to fulfil citizen responsibilities.⁸² Thus, they cannot be a citizen. In Aristotle's mind, indeed, citizens belong to such a class which those who work as a labourer or a trader can never belong to.

Those who are able to be free from servitude, that is, free from both being dependent on a master and labouring for requirements of life are called citizens. Those also have a life outside the household. In other words, it is the life that provides those with having a relationship with other free people not just with the people who are family members or servants. This life makes citizens capable of being involved in forming their own futures and the well-being and future of the community.⁸³ The freedom sought and focused here is freedom for action and for involvement in political activities which bring about the growth and development of the city. At this point, it cannot be said that this freedom is proper to slaves who are engaged in drudgery and to artisans, craftsmen and merchants, who do vulgar work. Although these people may be free, compared with slaves, they live lives directed away from the highest things.⁸⁴ In *Politics*, Aristotle states:

The citizens should not live a vulgar or a merchant's way of life, for this sort of way of life is ignoble and contrary to virtue. Nor, indeed, should those who are going to be [citizens in such a regime] be farmers; for there is a need

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 415.

⁸³ Andrew Murray, "Freedom and Nature in Aristotle's *Politics*," (presentation, Biennial Conference in Philosophy, Religion and Culture: God, Freedom and Nature, Sydney, October 3-5, 2008).

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

for leisure both with a view to the creation of virtue and with a view to political activities.⁸⁵

The result we may reach here is the link between being a citizen and being involved in the deliberative faculty in the framework of political activities Aristotle states above. Who the citizen is, then, is evident from these things. Whoever is entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or decision is, we can now say, a citizen in this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-sufficient life, to speak simply.⁸⁶ At this point, it might be inferred that women do not meet the criteria as a citizen in the society. Women are dependent on their masters, and they cannot take part in offices involving deliberation, despite accounting for half of the free population. Therefore, they cannot be called a citizen. In brief, there are three main characteristics linked to being a citizen. One of them is to have an interest in and to participate in declaring and judging, the second is to take a role in the legal and deliberative offices of a *polis*, the last one is to rule and be ruled.⁸⁷ In addition to these, being a citizen requires being dependent on institutions since education, laws and political and social institutions of that certain constitution are the ones to determine what can and cannot be shared.

2.5 Aristotle's Ideas Concerning Democracy

In general, freedom is one of the important characteristics by which democracy is considered to be defined. As for Aristotle, democracy has two main characteristics, one of which is sovereignty of the majority, the other is freedom.⁸⁸ In democracy, what is just is identical to equality, accordingly, the majority's decision on what is equal has supreme power. Freedom is defined as the state in which people do as they wish. In such democracies, therefore, people lives as they please. Aristotle

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 171.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 167-185.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 332.

thinks that this is all inappropriate. For example, according to them, abiding by the constitution means the loss of the essence of the freedom they have.⁸⁹ What Aristotle claims is that many democracies come to nothing because freedom as one of the characterizing features of democracy is defined badly.⁹⁰

Here Moira M. Walsh interprets the relationship between freedom and desire. Walsh says that according to Aristotle, even if someone might do what he desires, that does not mean the person is very free if his desires are slavish or if he does not aim at ultimate end. Namely, not only does Aristotle's free man do what he desires, but he also desires what is truly good. The free man follows the *telos* that he has found with the help of his reason and deliberative capacity.⁹¹ In addition to this, Andrew Murray says that the state in which everyone has the ability to do what they want or simply enjoy themselves is the cause of declining in virtue. This situation is at odds with the ends of the city thus damaging to human life and finally to freedom like the time when tyranny takes root.⁹²

Aristotle claims that there is a variety of democracies. This has two causes, one of which is differences of population including farmers, mechanics; the other is the various properties and characteristics of democracy. When all this variety merges according to principles, characteristics and aims of states, a difference in the form of democracy and quality of democracy emerges. At his point, realizing each democracy's differences is beneficial to establish a new model of democracy or

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Moira M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35, no.4, (1997): 502, doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0081.

⁹² Andrew Murray, "Freedom and Nature in Aristotle's *Politics*," (presentation, Biennial Conference in Philosophy, Religion and Culture: God, Freedom and Nature, Sydney, October 3-5, 2008).

remodel the existing one. In this sense, according to Aristotle, those who try to bring several constitutions together are mistaken.⁹³

When argued about how equality is realized, those who are in favour of democracy think it is justice that the majority agree on. Those who are in favour of oligarchy think that it is justice that the wealthier class agree on. Aristotle states here that both ideas have inequality and injustice to some extent. What is required to do is to examine their respective ideas of justice to reach a principle of equality on which everyone agrees.⁹⁴ Afterwards, what model is the best form of democracy? Aristotle thinks that the best form of democracies occurs in a place where the *demos* earns a living by agriculture and husbandry, and those who are notable rule. Since they do not have a large amount of wealth, they have no leisure, thus they rarely take part in the assembly. Moreover, because they are always at work, they have necessities of life. Therefore, they do not envy others' properties. Why Aristotle thinks this democracy is the best in detail:

It is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed.⁹⁵

Aristotle believes that the citizens are governed well under such a form of government. They are willing to elect and are not resentful of the things others have. Those who are notable also feel satisfied in terms of not being ruled by inferiors. Due to the fact that the citizens have a right to call the elected to account, the elected rule justly. Everyone ought to be responsible to each other. Everyone ought not to be allowed to do whatever they please. If one is free to do as he pleases, the evil

⁹³ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 360-361.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 366.

⁹⁵ Aristotle, "The Politic," in *The Politics and The Constitution of Athens*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 157.

that is inherent in every man cannot be restrained. It is important to follow this principle, not being free to do whatever they want, in states in order to be ruled by the right persons and to be prevented from doing wrong.⁹⁶ According to Andrew Murray, Aristotle's final thought on democracy is a balanced mix of oligarchy and democracy, when Aristotle describes his best applicable constitution in Book IV by adding to the best possible constitution of Book VII. This form, often translated 'polity' but better understood as 'republic', is planned for a particular purpose to permit the highest participation in rule of the city together, for it acknowledges dissimilarities of wealth and capability.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 367-372.

⁹⁷ Andrew Murray, "Freedom and Nature in Aristotle's *Politics*," (presentation, Biennial Conference in Philosophy, Religion and Culture: God, Freedom and Nature, Sydney, October 3-5, 2008).

CHAPTER 3

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S POSITION ON FREEDOM

Although both politicians and scholars have been studying Rousseau's works for almost 250 years, it is quite difficult to come to an agreement on how to interpret his concept of freedom. However, it is possible to speak of three kinds of freedom Rousseau himself discussed, referring to the *Social Contract*. Natural freedom, civil freedom, and moral freedom are the terms that Rousseau used for the three kinds of freedom. Natural freedom is important to understand his theory of social contract. The remaining kinds of freedom occur just within political society. Because each sense of freedom is necessary, they cannot be simply classified from the most to the least important.⁹⁸ He describes firstly natural freedom as a kind of freedom that someone would have unless that person dwelled in a political society. Secondly, civil freedom is the first type of freedom within political society. In accordance with the social contract, the whole community must keep its members from harm or injury coming from outside, and the law must keep people from violating each other's choices.⁹⁹ Thirdly, "Obedience to a law that one has prescribed to oneself means moral freedom."¹⁰⁰

After giving a brief definition, it will be very useful to firstly mention Rousseau's ideas about knowing human beings to be able to talk about state of nature as the first title. Rousseau begins in his book, *Discourse on the Origin and the*

⁹⁸ Matthew Simpson, *Rousseau's Theory of Freedom* (Great Britain: Continuum, 2006), 1

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

Foundations of Inequality Among Men,¹⁰¹ by asserting that we are not be able to figure out inequality among people without knowing people themselves. Here, we should know the human being, however the question is which human should we know? The answer is essence of human being; he goes on, human being at the beginning although it might be a bit difficult. It is difficult because all progresses of human beings cause them to go further from its primitive state. That is, as we have more new knowledge, we deprive ourselves of the means of getting the most significant knowledge for him¹⁰². Accordingly, the origin of the differences that separate someone from another is continuous variations in man's constitution. This makes what we want to talk about unknown to us. Therefore, what is needed is to clarify some notions to speak of human.

Rousseau heartedly claims that we need to have exact concepts so that we can accurately judge of our present state without thinking about what is original, what is artificial in man's present Nature etc. However, he sees that the difficulty arising here is on the definition of natural Law. However, it is impossible to reach a clear agreement because we know nature so little and do not agree about the meaning of the word Law. He also believes that there is no use in trying to find out the Law that is either accepted by human being or most suitable to his constitution as long as we do not know the natural man. Here, Rousseau does not deny the existence of natural Law which is based on the two principles, one of which is our well-being and our self-preservation, and the other one is our natural repugnance to observing

¹⁰¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men or Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

All my references of the *Second Discourse* are from this book. I will refer to its page number.

¹⁰² In commenting on Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the general use of "man" and of masculine pronoun will be seen on purpose.

any sentient Being who perishes or suffers, prior to reason.¹⁰³ He says in the *Second Discourse*:

...I am obliged not to harm another being like myself, this is so less because it is a rational being than because it is a sentient being...¹⁰⁴

In other words, according to Rousseau, these two principles, self-preservation and pity, coming before reason reach us from the voice of nature. At this point, how does he describe human nature or changes in human nature? Is there anything that remains unchanged? What is the balance between the changed and the unchanged, if there is? Generally, in Rousseau's political philosophy, the state in which people are not living in a political society is the state of nature. Let us examine this concept.

3.1 Rousseau's Views Concerning State of Nature

According to James Delaney, in the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau's views on human history, the socialization process, the origins of reason and morality, and human nature are explained more explicitly than in his other works.¹⁰⁵ According to Matthew Simpson, the *Second Discourse* and the *Social Contract* appear to contradict each other, especially in terms of the meaning of the state of nature. While the *Social Contract* discusses that the state of nature is a state of conflict, the *Second Discourse* depicts the state of nature as a benign, self-sustaining, radically peaceful condition. This situation makes us question whether these works state two different theories of the state of nature or two different views on the same theory.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 128.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁰⁵ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 49.

¹⁰⁶ Matthew Simpson, *Rousseau's Theory of Freedom* (Great Britain: Continuum, 2006), 9.

If we return to the *Second Discourse*, in general, Rousseau describes that the state of nature is hypothetical, prehistoric in terms of place and time where human beings live untainted by society. The most significant feature of the state of nature is that people have total physical freedom and are at liberty to do essentially as they wish. Morality has not yet been discovered by human beings.¹⁰⁷ Rousseau starts to explain the state of nature by complaining about the philosophers who dealt with the foundations of society. He complains because he thinks that they are not even able to explain the state of nature truly while aiming at reaching the foundation of society. For instance, people talk about greed, oppression, desires, referring to the state of nature; in contrast, these are attributes of human beings in society rather than the state of nature. Rousseau particularly dwells on the state of nature to be able to speak of men and starts to examine human beings by describing their passage from their natural state to a civil society and by trying to understand different virtues of each state. While examining human being, he assumes that they have always appeared in their present condition rather than considering them as hairy beasts with claws. He states:

I see an animal less strong than some, less agile than others, but, all things considered, the most advantageously organized of all I see him sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first Stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.¹⁰⁸

If savage man had had an ax, could his wrist have cracked such solid branches? If he had had a sling, could he have thrown a stone as hard by hand?¹⁰⁹

As it is seen, he endeavours to separate human being from his both supernatural gifts and faculties which are gained in progress of time. Rousseau stresses the distinction between savage man and animal before comparing the distinction

¹⁰⁷ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 167.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 135.

between savage man and civilized man. Even, he notes, in the context of this comparison, savage man makes the comparison. Savage man who lives dispersed amongst the animals has to measure himself against them, then makes comparison in terms of strength and skill, and he learns not to fear them. As a result, savage man is idle, alone and always near danger, according to Rousseau. As follows:

To go naked, to be without habitation, and to be deprived of all the useless things we believe so necessary is, then, not such a great misfortune for these first men nor, above all, is it such a great obstacle to their preservation.¹¹⁰

In addition to this physical aspect of Man above, now time to bring up metaphysical and moral aspects. Rousseau argues that there are three other faculties, freedom, perfectibility and reason, that human beings have, and these are peculiar to him solely.¹¹¹ The first step to examine is savage man as a free agent. While main factor in the operations of Beast is Nature alone, the factor in the operations of man is man himself. That is to say, Man has ability to say ‘No’ to things imposed by Nature. In other words, while nature commands all animals not only human but also non-human through instinct, humans possess the distinctive capacity to act or to refuse to act on this command. A spiritual capacity, which cannot be expressed and comprehended, is freedom of the will.¹¹² Rousseau says:

It is not so much the understanding that constitutes the specific difference between man and the other animals, as it is his property of being a free agent. Nature commands every animal, and the Beast obeys. Man experiences the same impression, but he recognizes himself free to acquiesce or to resist.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 139.

¹¹¹ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 50.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 51.

¹¹³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 141.

The faculty of perfectibility is another very specific property that distinguishes man from animal. The concept of perfectibility is the thing that permits human being to alter in time, and human being is compelled to adapt to his environment and permits himself to be formed by it. That is to say, a long series of chance events is necessary for the faculty of perfectibility so as to importantly alter human beings.¹¹⁴ Yet Rousseau also sees this faculty as the source of all man's miseries. As follows:

...that is the faculty which, by dint of time, draws him out of that original condition in which he would spend tranquil and innocent days....¹¹⁵

Accordingly, passion and reason are of concern. When they become subject matter, Rousseau claims that to perceive and to sense will be savage man's first state, which is shared by both man and animals. Notwithstanding, to will and to not will, to desire and to fear will be both the initial sole operations of his soul till new conditions lead to new improvements in it. Human understanding is improved under our needs and also has an influence on them. That is to say, reason and passion owe mutually a lot to each other. Reason perfects itself thanks to the passion's activities.¹¹⁶ It is possible to think that a being that has the capacity for self-perfection is one who is capable of linking freedom with the potential to develop reason. Freedom and reason which are innate natural faculties of human beings enable human beings to change while exercising them. And this is self-perfection.¹¹⁷ At this point, Rousseau asks:

What progress could Mankind make, scattered in the Woods among the Animals? And how much could men perfect and enlighten one another who, having neither a fixed Dwelling nor any need of one another, might

¹¹⁴ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 52.

¹¹⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 141.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹¹⁷ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 52.

perhaps meet no more than twice in their life, without recognizing and speaking with one another?¹¹⁸

Here it is better to consider speech as a new concept of the process. Does it actually have a place? In primitive state, nobody has any kind of house or property; everybody sleeps randomly in a place, females and males unite by chance without any need for interpreter of what they said to each other; that is, they do these due to opportunities, desires, chance. In this case, there is no need for languages; on the contrary, the idea of language derives from society rather than primitive state. At this point, Rousseau does not think that this situation is misery of savage man. He, indeed, dissents from those who think that savage man is miserable, especially from Hobbes. In return, he says that he should very much like to get the answers of the questions below:

What kind of misery there can be for a free being, whose heart is at peace, and body in health? I ask, which of the two, Civil life or natural life, is more liable to become intolerable to those who enjoy it?... In instinct alone he had all he needed to live in the state of Nature, in cultivated reason he has no more than what he needs to live in society.¹¹⁹

Rousseau holds the opinion that the state of nature is, by and large, an amicable and happy place which consists of free, independent men. He puts forward the fact that the kind of war Hobbes describes is not achieved until man leaves the state of nature and enters civil society. Rousseau asserts that according to Hobbes man is naturally wicked because he has no idea of goodness; man is vicious because he does not know virtue; he does not definitely owe any kind of services of his to others; he reasonably claims the right for the things he needs; he insanely imagines himself as the only owner of the whole universe. Rousseau remarks that these are all inappropriate. Furthermore, Rousseau postulates Hobbes reaches wrong

¹¹⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 144.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

conclusions about state of nature although he clearly sees the missing sides of all modern definitions of Natural right.¹²⁰ Rousseau makes the following point:

Hobbes should have said that the state of Nature is the state in which the care for our own preservation is least prejudicial to the self-preservation of others, it follows that this state was the most conducive to Peace, and the best suited to Mankind. He says precisely the contrary because he improperly included in Savage man's care for his preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions that are the product of Society and have made Laws necessary.¹²¹

Rousseau also says in the *Social Contract*:

It is the relation between things and not between men that constitutes war, and since the state of war cannot arise from simple personal relations but only from property relations, private war or war between one man and another can exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no stable property, not in the social state, where everything is under the authority of the laws.¹²²

As it is understood, what Rousseau means is that evil comes out just in society. Maybe his main question that will be asked to Hobbes is whether we can mention virtue without any social relationships. According to Rousseau, there is no other thing than the calm of the passions to keep savages from evil doing. The main point that separates Rousseau from Hobbes is Pity which is accepted as the only natural virtue in the state of nature by Rousseau. Rousseau describes Pity as follows:

A disposition suited to beings as weak and as subject to so many ills as we are; a virtue all the more universal and useful to man as it precedes the exercise of all reflection

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 151.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 46.

in him, and so Natural that even the Beasts sometimes show evident signs of it.¹²³

Here one more part from Rousseau's notes about it in the *Second*

Discourse:

Self-love is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.¹²⁴

In Rousseau's philosophy generally, a human being does not break his connection with sentiment. Pity is a natural sentiment that helps the mutual preservation of the whole Species by slowing down the activity of self-love in every man. Pity is also the sentiment which carries one to the assistance of those who are observed to be suffering without thinking deeply. In the state of nature, pity takes the place of laws, morals and virtue. It is also possible to find the cause of the aversion to evil-doing in this natural sentiment. In other words, pity is the key to understanding that human beings are good in the state of nature. For instance, whereas savage man is amoral, he does have the ability to be moral with the help of faculty of self-perfection. Unless this faculty existed, human beings would almost not be different from a monster in either the state of nature or civil society.¹²⁵ Furthermore, because man does not have the notion of thine and mine at all, he is not prone to doing extremely bad things. It can be seen this with the explanation of notion of *amour propre*, which has a relation with evils for Rousseau, below:

Amour propre (vanity) is only relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone

¹²³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 152.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 218.

¹²⁵ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 55.

else, inspires men with of the evils they do one another,
and it is genuine source of honor.¹²⁶

In the state of nature, there is not education or progress, and generations multiplies uselessly, centuries come and go with the crudeness of the first ages. Rousseau believes that all his struggles until the end of the first part in the *Second Discourse* are to show how far the state of nature is from inequality and its influences. At this point, it is quite hard to explain what subjection and domination mean to savage men. As Rousseau shows below:

A man might seize the fruits another has picked, the game he killed, the lair he used for shelter; but how will he ever succeed in getting himself obeyed by him, and what would be the chains of dependence among men who possess nothing? If I am tormented in one place, who will keep me from going somewhere else?¹²⁷

If someone becomes incapable of doing something because of above, ties of servitude are shaped only by men's mutual dependence and needs that unites them, and then it is possible for him to be subjugated. Therefore, the law of the stronger is meaningless in the state of nature where men are free of the yoke. After Rousseau showed that slavery is hardly ever perceptible in the state of nature, he attaches importance to show its origin and its progress through development of Human Mind accordingly society.

3.2 Rousseau's Views Concerning Social Contract

In this part, the freedoms in society which are civil and moral will be examined. It is difficult to give any other short and exact definition for these apart from what is written above, but following explanations will make it possible to arrive at extensive inferences. According to Rousseau, the liberty which people experience in civil society is superior to the sole physical equality which they experience in the state of nature because the commitment of an individual to the state is moral while natural

¹²⁶ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 218.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 158.

man is not capable of being moral. Accordingly, his book, the *Second Discourse*, tries to express how human beings have passed from a free and equal state in nature into slavery and inequality in civil society, whereas his book, the *Social Contract*, is planning for the future and endeavours to express new ideas of how freedom can be regained. What the political aim of the Social Contract looks for is “to take civilized human beings -those who have a developed sense of reason- and give them a sense of moral equality.”¹²⁸ Furthermore, not only the *Discourse on Political Economy* but also the *Social Contract* explains the same vision of the ideal political regime. In addition, both present general account of virtue. Rousseau’s aim is to suggest a system of government that would be the most likely one for human beings.¹²⁹

Before analysing the account of ideal political regime, let us see civil society’s origin, the passage and progress of human beings in the civil society. To Rousseau’s mind, civil society’s origin itself can be shown up with an act of deception, when one man invented the notion of private property by enclosing a piece of ground and simply persuading his neighbours “this is mine”, while possessing no truthful basis at all.¹³⁰ Here is the quotation from the *Second Discourse*:

How many crimes, wars, murders, how many miseries and horrors Mankind would have been spared by him who, pulling up the stakes or filling in the ditch, had cried out to his kind: Beware of listening to this impostor; You are lost if you forget that the fruits are everyone's and the Earth no one's.¹³¹

The institution of private property is the point that causes human beings to lose the last elements of the state of nature. Rousseau thinks that the notion of property did

¹²⁸ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 114.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 103-104.

¹³⁰ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 161.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

not suddenly emerge in human being's mind. Before this last stage of the state of nature was reached, many developments were experienced, division of labour emerged, people reached some kind of enlightenment, and moved from one age to the next. On the other hand, natural "man's first sentiment was that of his existence, his first care that for his preservation."¹³² Also, thanks to the Earth's products, man met his necessary needs; thanks to his instinct leading him, he used those products.¹³³ However, what had already come to this point could not remain as they were.¹³⁴ With the loss of last elements of the state of nature, man started to settle in the woods where he was idling about until now, and he united in various troops.¹³⁵ Rousseau addresses this change and the notion of property which partially emerged through this change as follows:

The more the mind became enlightened, the more industry was perfected. Soon ceasing to fall asleep underneath the first tree or to withdraw into caves, they found they could use hard, sharp stones as hatchets to cut wood, dig in the ground, and make huts of branches which it later occurred to them to daub with clay and mud. This was the period of a first revolution which brought about the establishment and the differentiation of families, and introduced a sort of property.¹³⁶

After the establishment of families and being united in troops, men created particular nations united in morals and character, not by rules or laws. Families began to have neighbours and to build connections among them.¹³⁷ They got used to making comparison among them. They obtained ideas of merit and of beauty which generate sentiments of preference. As ideas and sentiments followed in quick succession each other, the mind and the heart got closer; mankind goes on to become

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 165.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 165.

tame. People commenced to come together and spend time. Moreover, songs and dance that are children of love and leisure became people's occupation. This moment is when people meet each other, look at others and wish to be looked at themselves. Rousseau explains the process in this way:

This was the first step at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, shame and envy on the other; and fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually produced compounds fatal to happiness and innocence.¹³⁸

Another statement about this feeling that can support this case from the *First Discourse* is that people desire to please one another with the works of Arts and Letters, which is a way of gaining social approval and being a more sociable person.¹³⁹ Now it is necessary to notice how far these people already were from the state of nature. To understand this better, let us remember the introduction of the *Second Discourse*. It will be easier to grasp by combining here and there or by comparing them. Rousseau does not think some differences in age, health, and weight become a problem in the state of nature. These differences turn into having advantage or disadvantage in political life, which means inequality among people for Rousseau. Here, he emphasizes not the source of natural inequality or not relationship between the two inequalities, but the moment when Nature was subjected to Law at. In Rousseau's words:

I conceive of two sorts of inequality in the human Species, one which I call natural or Physical, because it is established by Nature, and which consists in the differences in age, health, strengths of Body, and qualities of Mind, or of Soul; The other which may be called moral, or political inequality, because it depends on a sort of convention, and is established, or at least authorized by Men's consent. It consists in the different Privileges which some enjoy to the prejudice of the others, such as to be

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹³⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Sciences and Arts or First Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 6.

more wealthy, more honored, more Powerful than they, or even to get themselves obeyed by them.¹⁴⁰

In contrast to the state of nature, the new enlightenment that stemmed from this development raised human being's superiority over the animals. For instance, he began to set a trap for them and trick them. Furthermore, man realized others; and that all other people behaved as he did under similar conditions. He also concluded that other people's way of thinking and feeling is very similar to his own. What is more, people developed languages definitely different from ones, which were much more refined than that of monkeys, and were not crude, imperfect as in the state of nature. Moreover, in this new state, people actually subdued themselves by inventing the means to make their lives easier. Rousseau draws attention to this situation as follows:

With a simple and solitary life, very limited needs, and the implements they had invented to provide for them, men enjoyed a great deal of leisure which they used to acquire several sorts of conveniences unknown to their Fathers; and this was the first yoke which, without thinking of it, they imposed on themselves.¹⁴¹

Rousseau addresses in the *First Discourse*, Letters and Arts exacerbate the subjugation of human beings in society. It is because they restrain the sentiment of freedom and make slavery be loved by people and shape civilized peoples.¹⁴² In addition to this, the Sciences contribute to idleness; thus, its influence on society is waste of time. As Rousseau says, in politics, as in ethics, not to do good is a great evil, and every useless citizen may be looked as a pernicious man.¹⁴³ That is to say, leisure is nothing other than harm or idleness. Accordingly, human need is

¹⁴⁰ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 131.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹⁴² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Sciences and Arts or First Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 6.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 17.

important as an element in Rousseau's comparison of modern society and the state of nature. In modern society, needs make people desire an object or activity; however, in the state of nature, they are limited to those things that ensure survival and reproduction.

As people made their lives easier, they lessened the strength of both their body and mind, and those conveniences mentioned above became habits. In addition, people replaced what were true needs with conveniences.¹⁴⁴ They started to feel unhappy to lose those conveniences. Meanwhile, Pity that was a natural virtue in the state of nature underwent some attenuation.¹⁴⁵ Afterwards, unhappiness and slavery were the realities waiting for people. When one man needed another man to help him; one man had what could be shared by two, equality disappeared, property appeared, and work became essential, the large forests turned into the places where evils, misery and slavery began to grow in this new state.¹⁴⁶ At this point, Rousseau depicts the state of nature as below:

So long as they applied themselves only to tasks a single individual could perform, and to arts that did not require the collaboration of several hands, they lived free, healthy, good, and happy as far as they could by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentleness of independent dealings with one another.¹⁴⁷

Another great part of this revolutionary progress was invention of the two arts: metallurgy and agriculture, causing ruin for Mankind. When men were needed to melt and forge iron and when others were obliged to feed them, cultivation of land led division of land. Here once property was recognized, the first rules of justice emerged: "for in order to render to each his own, each must be able to have

¹⁴⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 165.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

something.”¹⁴⁸ Accordingly, it is better to conceive the idea of property in terms of manual labour.¹⁴⁹ The inequality caused by this exchange order increased slowly through successive invention of the other arts, the progress of languages, the testing and exercise of talents, the inequalities of fortune, and the use and abuse of wealth.¹⁵⁰ Correspondingly, our faculties improved, memory and imagination were set in motion, *amour propre* peaked, reason became active, and the mind reached nearly the limit of perfection which it is able to reach.¹⁵¹ Therefore, all natural qualities set in action, and every man’s rank and fate became dependent on people’s goods. Beauty, strength, merit or talents became the qualities that could attract attention as well as goods they had. For this reason, it was necessary to have these qualities or to pretend to have them. To be and to appear became two entirely different things.¹⁵² And all the vices followed this. Man who had formerly been free and independent were now subjugated by a large number of new needs to the whole of nature and particularly to those of his kind.¹⁵³

In the *First Discourse*, Rousseau supports this by claiming the art of pleasing is locked in refined taste, and people are locked in constant demands for politeness and propriety; therefore, one no longer dares to appear what one is, and one is under society’s perpetual constraint.¹⁵⁴ He also shows another aspect of it: People act in the same way in similar circumstances unless there are more powerful motives that incline them in a different way. Thus, it is not possible to precisely know a man whom we are in contact with. That is to say, we need multiple occasions so as to

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Sciences and Arts or First Discourse,” in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 8.

really know them.¹⁵⁵ Here, in the context of criticism with regard to virtue and pomp, Rousseau asserts that virtue is not likely to go forth with so much pomp. Appeal is truly alien to virtue, which is the strength and vigour of the soul.¹⁵⁶ At this point, the *First Discourse* fundamentally stimulates us with two questions: Is it possible for a virtuous individual to exist in such a corrupt society? And what is the possibility of establishing a society giving essential priority to virtue?¹⁵⁷

Another influence of these needs and property was on Pity. Namely, wealth obtained through inheritance not through land, domestic animals; poverty resulting from weakness, looseness, not adapting to the change around them, being a servant to their neighbours all led to the usurpation of the rich and the banditry of the poor. Stinginess, wannabe and evil took the place of pity.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the land that was possessed by being fenced in aforesaid expanded later on. As the land expanded, the confidence did not take hold, so the landholders said that they should unite, which means that they started to legitimize inequality and slavery at the same time. Actually, it can be thought as a first contract among people. However, according to Rousseau, to legitimate inequality and slavery was the worst thing in society. As follows:

In the relations between man and man the worst that can happen to one is to find himself at the other's discretion.¹⁵⁹

Rousseau believes that the right to slavery is null not only because of being illegitimate but because of being absurd and meaningless, and that notions of

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵⁷ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 79.

¹⁵⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 171.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 176.

slavery and right are mutually exclusive. He states that the speech below between one man and another or between a man and a people will invariably be absurd:

I make a convention with you which is entirely at your expense and entirely to my profit, which I shall observe as long as I please, and which you shall observe as long as I please.¹⁶⁰

In the *Second Discourse*, related to this case, Rousseau focuses on property right which arose from the contract among people; that is, everybody benefits from their goods at their sweet will. On the other hand, essential Gifts of Nature, such as life and freedom make what human being is. Essence of human being! Everybody benefits from them, and giving up one of two means damaging human existence. No temporal good can compensate for life or freedom. As Rousseau indicates:

Freedom is a gift people have from Nature in their capacity as human beings... Just as violence had to be done to Nature in order to establish slavery, Nature had to be altered in order to perpetuate this Right.¹⁶¹

Rousseau also states in the *Discourse on Political Economy*:

It is certain that the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens, and more important in some respects than freedom itself.¹⁶²

What the latter quotation shows us is that Rousseau dignifies property but in a civil society. It is necessary to show greater respect to property because of having basis more directly on the preservation of life, being easier to usurp and harder to defend than persons. He sees it as the genuine basis of civil society and real guarantee of

¹⁶⁰ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 48.

¹⁶¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 179.

¹⁶² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 23.

the citizens' loyalties.¹⁶³ He also distinguishes property from greediness. What he mentions here is moderate property. That is to say, equality is the condition of free society. Equality means that earnings of citizens are almost close to each other. Since richness causes inequality to appear, expenditure on luxury emerges. The thing that Rousseau proposes is that what needs to be in economy is to keep needs under check not to increase incomes.¹⁶⁴ That is, it ought to prevent unnecessary consumption; luxury. There is another emphasis on luxury in his book of the *Social Contract* as below:

For luxury is either the effect of riches, or makes them necessary; it corrupts rich and poor alike, the one by possession, the other by covetousness; it sells out the fatherland to laxity, vanity; it deprives the State of all its Citizens by making them slaves to one another, and all of them slaves to opinion.¹⁶⁵

While Rousseau often states that it is impossible to go back to the state of nature and get freedom there, he defines the concept of freedom, which at least approximates the freedom enjoyed in the state of nature, gained by the social contract. Let us see this comparison between the two:

What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and he can reach; what he gains is civil freedom and property in everything he possesses.¹⁶⁶

He adds moral freedom to what man gained in civil state:

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 91.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

Moral freedom only makes man truly the master of himself; for the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to law one has prescribed to oneself freedom.¹⁶⁷

How should the contract away from corruption be? Before examining the extant corrupted administration and convention in that time, let us see Rousseau's formula, which is probably his attempt to solve inequalities and corrupted social system in his time. This formula for convention is to have a reciprocal engagement between the public and private individuals. Each individual, by contracting, finds himself engaged in a two-fold relation, namely, as member of the Sovereign toward private individuals and as member of the State toward the Sovereign. The importance here is that civil right which says no one is bound by engagements toward himself is not valid because of the great difference between assuming an obligation toward oneself and assuming responsibility toward a whole of which one is a part.¹⁶⁸ Statements in the *Second Discourse* also support the part above. Rousseau explains the contract that needs to be: The political body is the true contract between the People and the Chiefs who were chosen for itself. He goes on:

A contract by which both Parties obligate themselves to observe the Laws stipulated in it and which form the bonds of their union. The people having, in regard to Social relations, united all their wills into a single one, all the articles about which this will pronounces become so many fundamental Laws that obligate all the members of the State without exception, and one of which regulates the selection and the power of the Magistrates charged with attending to the execution of the other Laws. This power extends to everything that can preserve the Constitution, without going so far as to change it.¹⁶⁹

On the other hand, Rousseau describes the current corrupt administration and convention of his time in the *Second Discourse*: Tricks and intrigues took place in the elections, the parties became ill-tempered, and citizens' lives were sacrificed for

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁶⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 180.

the so-called state happiness.¹⁷⁰ While the people who adopted dependency, a comfortable and a simple life secured their servitude more to consolidate their own tranquillity and silence, the administrators started to regard the state as their own property and regard themselves as god.¹⁷¹ Consequently, law and property right became the first stage of inequality; thus, it reinforced the status of the rich and devastated the poor.¹⁷² The establishment of the authority of magistracy became the second stage of inequality, and this reinforced the power of the powerful whereas it made the weak weaker.¹⁷³ Legitimate authority turning into arbitrary force is the third stage of this inequality, and this solidified the master and slave situation.¹⁷⁴

After all these stages of the establishment and abuse of political societies, it is time to compare “savage man and civilized man”¹⁷⁵ briefly. Savage man and civilized man dissociate from each other in terms of heart and inclination. The thing that makes one of the two happy is what drives the other to unhappiness. Savage man lives in peace and freedom; that is, he just lives and enjoys idleness. Savage man lives by himself, civilized man, on the contrary, lives according to others’ opinions all the time, and his existence depends on the judgment of others in a society. Civilized man makes an effort for a more demanding work, sweats and works until he dies. He flatters the elders whom he is jealous of and feels rage towards, and the rich he despises. He does everything to serve them. He plays a role with his slavery.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ This is the classification made by Rousseau based on his political and social philosophy in the *Second Discourse* and the *Social Contract*.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

According to Rousseau, civilized man is powered by the inequality in the development of human reason. Moreover, this power becomes stable with the establishment of property and laws. At this point, Rousseau offers a solution for man's feelings¹⁷⁷, which are his wish to be looked at and to be found worthy. He narrates in his book *Considerations on the Government of Poland* that human beings should be rewarded in society for good qualities such as virtue, love for their country so that they can keep away from the influences of luxury. What he means is that human beings should establish a connection between the differences among people and the abstract things. That is to say, Rousseau does not deny that people try to be found worthy by others, but he also says that this sentiment can be limited when they are given rewards in society. In this way, they dedicate themselves to their country and try very hard to do good things for the country so as to be found worthy by others in society. He explains the aim of this act in his book, *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, as follows:

Might there not be some way to change the objects of this luxury, and so render its example less pernicious...Whoever goes about instituting a people has to be able to rule men's opinions and through them to govern their passion.¹⁷⁸

He also expresses in the *Discourse on Political Economy*:

It is certain that the greatest marvels of virtue have been produced by love of fatherland: this gentle and lively sentiment which combines the force of *amour propre* with all the beauty of virtue, endows it with an energy which, without disfiguring it, makes it into the most heroic of all the passion.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ The development of human reason, emergence of concept of private property, and establishing of laws led to these feelings of man.

¹⁷⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations on the Government of Poland" in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 188-189.

¹⁷⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on Political Economy," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 16.

In the *Discourse on Political Economy*, Rousseau claims that making people virtuous begins by making them love their fatherland not by separating them from that love.¹⁸⁰ That is to say, a society cannot be preserved by only laws unless the people have a genuine love for their fatherland and obey the laws. Moreover, the relationship between freedom and virtue about this love is that the fatherland is not capable of bearing without freedom. Freedom also cannot be separated from virtue affecting citizens. That is to say, without anything to form citizens one will have nothing but nasty slaves.¹⁸¹ In this sense, it is not destroying their passions but arranging them and forming citizens. This is not likely to be accomplished in a day, so it should start from childhood in the midst of equality with the ideas of laws of nature and the maxims of the general will.¹⁸² Afterwards, children can learn what surrounds them all the time, and they want what society wants rather than their individual desires.

Here, a question might come into mind: does Rousseau want to create prototype human beings and to yoke their souls after all these regulations? Does he see it as a way to subjugate people or to build good and worthy citizenship by saying mould men if you want to command men? At first glance, it appears a bit contradictory; however, if we catch some links in his works deeply, we answer with ease that he does not want to create prototype human beings. Namely, in the state of nature, people are indeed prototypes. They do not know each other, but their desires, needs, and life styles are almost the same. They are equal, free and happy. When they leave the state of nature, the factor that can bring people one more time to the opportunity of equality, freedom and happiness is this formation such as love of laws and all particular wills taking their bearings by general will. This does not yoke people and their soul but heal them and their soul with the help of the role of being a good citizen. Here is a part from the *Social Contract* to promote this argument:

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 21

The social pact establishes among Citizens an equality such that all commit themselves under the same conditions and must all enjoy the same rights.¹⁸³

Consequently, the genuine love of one's country that Rousseau describes cannot easily be expressed to the citizens. Moreover, the general will Rousseau defines differs from the will of all. It is better than the will of all because it relates to common interest, contrary to individual interests. Accordingly, only the people who are properly educated are capable of grasping his elusive notion of the general will. Together, people who attach more importance to their own private wills than the general will must be educated in accordance with the laws or restraints of nature.¹⁸⁴ He published his book *Emile* in a short time after publishing the *Social Contract* to express how the explanations above are possible and should be done. In this way, it is time to explain the major points of the ideal education that Rousseau suggests.

3.3 Rousseau's Views Concerning Ideal Education

Obviously, it has been accepted that it is not possible to return to the state of nature. It would have the meaning that, in some manner, we would have to leave our use of speech and our dependency on each other. And the most problematic thing is that we would also be in need of disfunctioning the use of reason in some way. Luckily, Rousseau does not suggest such a return to nature. There is a lot to speak about the roots of society's vices along with the possibility of refrainment from these vices through proper suitable moral education.¹⁸⁵ Actually, the whole aim of moral education Rousseau suggests enables one's character to be cultivated in a way that

¹⁸³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. & trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 63.

¹⁸⁴ Tony W. Johnson and Ronald F. Reed, *Philosophical Documents in Education* (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 75.

¹⁸⁵ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 73-74.

amour de soi is not damaged by *amour propre*.¹⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁷ In this way, the faculty of natural pity mentioned in the *Second Discourse* by Rousseau will be associated with this moral education.¹⁸⁸ At this point, to read *Emile*, which is Rousseau's book on education, and the *Social Contract* together will be proper for this aim.

The *Emile* explains how to correctly educate a person who dwells in an imperfect society where most of the people are interested in their private interests rather than general will. The focus is that the character of Emile represents the education of one individual. In contrast, the focuses of the *Social Contract* are the education of a whole people and developing virtuous citizens. At this point, what Rousseau tries to do is to create a new and more natural human being who is not only a good person but also a good citizen. He also plans to isolate those who are new human beings, Emile and Sophie, from corrupt institutions of social malaise in order to get an ideal and natural environment. This way will be able to teach Emile and Sophie that

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹⁸⁷ In Rousseau's notes in the *Second Discourse*, he states that "*Amour propre* (vanity) and *Amour de soi-meme* (self-love), two very different passions in their nature and their effects, should not be confused. Self-love is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. *Amour propre* is only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspires men with all the evils they do each other, and is the genuine source of honor." In fact, both are self-love. It would not be possible to live unless man had love of himself. However, in the state of nature, savage man cares only for survival and does not care others and their opinions. He does not harm others if he is not faced with the possibility of losing his life. This is *amour de soi* which is a basic desire to preserve oneself. On the other hand, civilized man pays attention to what others think about him and compare himself with others. It is necessary for him to be recognized by others with great value and respect. Thus, *amour propre* is relative to others and about comparative achievement or failure as a social being.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Second Discourse," in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. & ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 218.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 109.

freedoms come with responsibilities because freely chosen actions have consequences.¹⁸⁹

Let us start going into detail in *Emile*. Rousseau, at the beginning of his book, informs us that he tells the importance of a good education a little bit. He also says that he does not try to prove that the education of the day is bad.¹⁹⁰ He does so because he thinks that people do not know childhood. People attach importance to what is important for men to know in the framework of education, without taking into consideration what children are able to apprehend. Namely, they are searching the man in the child. That is to say, people do not attach importance to what the child was before he became a man.¹⁹¹ The ones apart from the education Rousseau suggests are barbarous education, because they sacrifice the present to an uncertain future. He shows that this kind of education oppresses children to make them ready for so-called happiness:¹⁹²

Humanity has its place in the order of things, and infancy has its place in the order of human life. We must consider the man in the man, and the child in the child. To assign to each his place, and to fix him there, to adjust human passions according to the constitution of man. This is all that we can do for his well-being.¹⁹³

Rousseau divides the book into five parts. What is seen in the book is that the system of education Rousseau suggests goes into detail about a specific practice of teaching for each stage of life. He believes that each age and state of life owns its proper perfection and different maturity, which belong only to each. In the first part of the book, he emphasizes that children should be given more “real liberty and less

¹⁸⁹ Tony W. Johnson and Ronald F. Reed, *Philosophical Documents in Education* (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 11.

¹⁹⁰ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, author’s preface to *Emile or Treatise on Education*, trans. William H. Payne (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003), xlii.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile or Treatise on Education*, trans. William H. Payne (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003), 44.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 46.

domination”¹⁹⁴ in order to enable them to do whatever they want by themselves. It also enables them to demand less from others. Therefore, they will be able to limit their desires by their power, when they are at an early age, and this causes them to wish the thing less that is not within their power.¹⁹⁵ In infancy, young children have no feelings, no ideas, and hardly any sensations. Even they are not aware of their own existence.¹⁹⁶

The second part of the book is the time when infancy properly ends. At the beginning of the second part of his book, Rousseau supports the view that Emile is allowed to play outside, so he can fall and bump his head, and his nose can bleed. These activities show the improvement in the pupils’ power. Since they are able to do many things on their own in this context, they need others to help them less. As they gain power, the ability to manage this power might improve. The life of the individual starts at this second stage, and he becomes aware of himself.¹⁹⁷ In this second part, the most important focus of Rousseau is the concept of freedom. Namely, he emphasizes that the chief good is not authority but freedom. “That man is truly free who desires what he is able to perform and does what he desires.”¹⁹⁸ It is the major principle which should be practiced on children. He believes that all education rules rise from this principle.¹⁹⁹ Naturally, the pupil has to obey his tutor but not in an addicted way. The pupil must want his tutor to meet his needs, but he should not order these.²⁰⁰ Accordingly, the child ought to feel his weakness, but he ought not to suffer from this. At this point, Rousseau puts “two kinds of

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁹⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or Education*, trans. Barbara Foxley (London & Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1921; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1921), 47. http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2256/Rousseau_1499_EBk_v6.0.pdf

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

dependence: dependence on things, which is the nature of work; and dependence on men, which is the work of society.”²⁰¹ The former does not have a moral side, so it is not harmful to freedom and it does not bring about evils. The latter brings misery with evils. Also, being dependent on others causes a relationship of master and slave, and they spoil their morality mutually.²⁰² He indicates this as follows:

Nature would have them children before they are men. If we try to invert this order we shall produce a forced fruit immature and flavourless, fruit which will be rotten before it is ripe.²⁰³

Rousseau also claims if we make the pupils dependent on others’ judgement, desires and wishes, they become more prone to lying.²⁰⁴ While educating a child, Rousseau criticizes other tutors’ authority in a way that their children are so dependent on their authority and that these children cannot do anything without taking directions. For instance, if it is not told that a child should eat, then he does not attempt to eat although he is hungry. He does not laugh when he is happy. He does not feel sorry when he is sad. All these are because these tutors think everything on the behalf of their pupils, because they want their pupils to think what they want them to think. In other words, if a child surely knows that his tutor is prescient, why does he struggle to be prescient?²⁰⁵

The pupil who Rousseau raised has limited but open thoughts. He does not know by heart; he knows by his experiences. He has never read books that others wrote, yet he knows and understands the environment where he is. He does not know customs, traditions, and habits; in this sense, what he did yesterday does not affect what he has done today.²⁰⁶ He does not stick to any authority or formulation; he

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 48.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 78.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 64.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 115.

acts in a way that he chooses. Therefore, it is not proper to expect from him the dictated discourses and mannered attitudes, but proper to expect the attitude rising from his disposition.²⁰⁷

Rousseau starts his third part of the book with the question of what the cause of man's weakness is. The answer is that it ensues from the discrepancy that exists between his strength and his desires.²⁰⁸ What makes one weak is his passions, because people need more power than the nature granted them to satisfy those passions. It seems that people have more strength if they limit their desires. This is the third stage of childhood, which includes Emile's education from twelve to fifteen. It is the period of intellectual education. Rousseau emphasizes how gradually he is approaching the moral notions that differentiate good from evil.²⁰⁹ As it is observed, Rousseau uses nature as a key for educational progress. He thinks that a young child is apolitical, asocial, and amoral. The important point here is the concept of negative education. Children are not capable of moral behaviour until puberty.²¹⁰ According to Rousseau's schema, negative education does not involve teaching virtue and truth but involves preventing the heart from being damaged by vice and the mind from being damaged by error. It is described in the book *Fifty Major Thinkers on Education* as follows:

During the period of negative education, the child is to be surrounded by an environment of artificial necessity, encountering obstacles which appear to be the inevitable outcome of his own behaviour, rather than willed by others. As a result, he should become "patient, steady, resigned, calm, even when he has not got what he wanted, for it is the nature of man to endure patiently the necessity of things but not the ill will of others."²¹¹

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 118.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 119.

²¹⁰ Joy A. Palmer, Liora Bresler and David E. Cooper, *Fifty Major Thinkers on Education: From Confucius to Dewey* (London; New York: Routledge, 2001), 57.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

The fourth part of the book includes Emile from fifteen to twenty, which is the period of moral and religious education. Moral nature is about the relations with human beings. That is to say, when Emile starts to feel his moral nature, he should look at himself carefully through his relations with men because “this is the business of his whole life”.²¹² For instance, Rousseau says that choosing a religion is a part of moral education. He questions how freely God and religion are discovered by children. He says that we should have the idea to reach God by questioning.²¹³ This can only happen at a certain age. Therefore, the mind should be kept inactive until it possesses all its faculties.²¹⁴

The final part of the book is about the perfect wife of Emile and ideal education of women. Sophie, Emile’s wife, has to be modest, devoted, and reserved. She also ought to show the world as to her own conscience testimony to her virtue. Sophie is at the mercy of Emile’s judgments as much for herself as for her children. In the context of Rousseau’s understanding of education and duties of males and females, he draws a rigid framework for them. It is necessary for Sophie to have all the features of humanity and of womanhood which will make her play her part in the physical and the moral order. Indeed, each sex makes equal contribution to the common end but in a different way. While one is active and strong, the other, woman, is passive and weak. Moreover, the sexes have common faculties, but these are not shared by them in an equal way; however, in spite of not being shared equally, they are well balanced.²¹⁵

²¹² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or Education*, trans. Barbara Foxley (London & Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1921; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1921), 160-161. http://if-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2256/Rousseau_1499_EBk_v6.0.pdf

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 234

²¹⁴ Tony W. Johnson and Ronald F. Reed, *Philosophical Documents in Education* (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 78.

²¹⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or Education*, trans. Barbara Foxley (London & Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1921; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1921), 290. http://if-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2256/Rousseau_1499_EBk_v6.0.pdf

According to Rousseau, if a woman is more womanly, she is better. However, if a woman tries to usurp man's power, she becomes man's inferior. Besides, to bring up her daughter to be like a good man is a big mistake for Sophie.²¹⁶ At this point, Rousseau states that a woman is not a slave but a companion for a man. Thinking her as a slave is absolutely against teaching of nature for him. That is to say, nature wants women to think, to judge, to love, to know and to cultivate the mind as well as countenance. All these provide women with an opportunity to compensate their lack of strength and to direct the strength of men.²¹⁷ In this sense, the special functions of women, their inclinations and duties above make this kind of education for them necessary. In Rousseau's words:

Woman cannot fulfil her purpose in life without man's aid, goodwill, and respect. Nature herself has decreed that woman, both for herself and her children, should be at the mercy of man's judgment. Worth alone will not suffice, a woman must be thought worthy; nor beauty, she must be admired; nor virtue, she must be respected...Hence her education must, in this respect, be different from man's education. "What will people think" is the grave of a man's virtue and the throne of a woman's.²¹⁸

In other words, as it is seen above, according to Rousseau, being dependent on the morals, the passions, the tastes and the happiness of men, giving men pleasure, being useful to men, winning men's love and esteem, making men and their children better in a bad situation are all tasks of women, and they should be trained from childhood. As a result, these different forms of education are complementary to each other to make them good men, good women, and good citizens.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 290-291.

CHAPTER 4

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S AND ROUSSEAU'S VIEWS OF FREEDOM

In the modern period, the project of prominent philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau was to find a basis for ethics and politics that was to be rooted in a basic understanding of human nature that was objective and universal. To do this, the method was to strip away all aspects of human beings that could be traced to the social conventions of any given culture. If one could strip away all these conventions, even if it could only be done in a theoretical sense, one would then be able to identify human nature at its core.²¹⁹

This main aim also provided these prominent philosophers in the modern period with an approach opposed to the traditional Aristotelianism to conceive the world.²²⁰ That is to say, while Aristotle's natural teleology lays emphasis on *telos*, which is the final cause of human beings, the modern thinkers focus on a process which defined the features of the transformation of human beings from state of nature to present-day civil society. In this sense, their question was not to find out the ultimate goal for which the human nature intended. Different from Aristotle, these philosophers' question was about how human beings lived in a simple natural state and arrived their present-day societal form.²²¹

²¹⁹ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 41.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

However, in spite of all the differences between Aristotle and Rousseau, it may be inappropriate to consider that they absolutely disagree with each other. Indeed, both Rousseau's *Second Discourse* and Aristotle's *Politics* examine whether political life is necessary for human beings to achieve their ends and how human beings need political life. This means a questioning of the features and the extent of the naturalness of political life.²²² In this sense, let us see to what extent Aristotle's and Rousseau's thoughts on human nature, man, society and citizenship, the status of women, and education coincide with each other. At this point, it would be suitable to pay attention to the epigraph which is given in Latin on the title page of Rousseau's *Second Discourse*:

What is natural has to be investigated not in beings that are depraved, but in those that are according to nature.²²³

4.1 On Human Nature

The theory of state of nature is where Rousseau starts to narrate his ideas on human nature. Rousseau suggests a basic change in the way that human essence is comprehended. He claims that humanity has been subjected to a big change since pre-rational and pre-social beginnings, which has challenged the idea that human nature owns a fixed character at its core.²²⁴ As seen before, Rousseau claims that the natural state is a state in which pre-reflective wholeness and contentment exist. In this sense, original man was guided so little by reason, and he could not possess passions because existence of passion was dependent on reflection. Namely, the process of getting reflection and development of it made passion and all human evils happen. Here, according to Rousseau, laws, social relations, and government

²²² Richard L. Velkley, "Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal," in *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 153.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 153. "Non in depravatis, sed in his quane bene secundum naturam se habent, considerandum est quid sit naturale."

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

are not the figures to correct the defects of state of nature because man is naturally good. Reason and society are the main sources of our ills.²²⁵

Rousseau extends this explanation by dwelling on metaphysical and moral side of natural man. He states that man is the one who possesses the power to choose freely. Here, the point as a distinguishing characteristic of man is freedom, not understanding. Namely, freedom is not a thing that can be explained in mechanical terms, but a spiritual power to accept or to resist. The next characteristic of human beings distinguishing them from the other creatures is perfectibility. Perfectibility is simply the ability to learn and thereby to discover new and better means to fulfil needs.²²⁶ Rousseau thinks that man is armed with perfectibility, which is the faculty that successively advances other faculties; however, this power is not a blessing. It causes a social world of deception, pretence, dependence, oppression, and domination.

Rousseau, in other words, argues that man in the state of nature means the one who was stripped of the features gained in terms of living in a society. This man, *savage man*, is quite different from civil man who is referred to present-day human beings. Savage man does not have any languages or relationships. Development of reflection is not totally completed. In this sense, his existence is rather identical to many other animals, but there is a significant difference here: human beings are able to move beyond the state of nature and create social groups and become moral creatures, but animals are not.²²⁷

Moreover, according to Rousseau, natural inequalities have no significance in human relations. However, while getting far away from the state of nature, passions come into existence and make people addicted to each other. All differences in

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

²²⁶ Christopher Bertram, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, September 27, 2010, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/> (accessed July 25, 2017).

²²⁷ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 4.

individual's power gain importance, and human beings try to build a relation of authority and obedience. Here we can establish a relation parallel to Aristotle's account of the connection between human being's composite nature and slavery.²²⁸

Let us remember Aristotle's thoughts about household and its management: There are three different natural types in the household. The slave has no deliberative faculty, a woman's deliberative faculty is without authority, and a child's is not mature. Apart from those, man is the one who has deliberative faculty, and the man rules his wife, children and slave. This disproportion in human being's composite nature, which is dependent on a deliberative faculty, means an inequality of ruling faculty among individuals. And this inequality is natural, according to Aristotle. For Rousseau, there are inequalities of ruling faculty among individuals, but its origin depends on the disproportion between one's power and desire as mentioned above, and these ruling relations are not natural. This is the difference in these accounts which seems parallel at first glance.

Furthermore, speech is the thing which takes place by perfectibility and, thereby, sociability. According to Rousseau, while the organ of speech is natural to man, speech itself is not natural to man. That is to say, the term 'organ' means a faculty specific to man not vocal chords or the physical capacity to gesture. It is the human perfectibility that makes speech active wherever communication is necessary. In other words, it is the state in which human beings have become sociable.²²⁹ Natural man possesses the power of speech, but it is getting active with socialization. Rousseau does not make an effort to explain the power of speech itself. What he argues is the problematic origin of the art of speech, which means conventional language. Like speech, property and family also take place by socialization. The place where natural man lives is a region that is between the simple animal and sociable man.

²²⁸ Richard L. Velkley, "Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal," in *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 161.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 167-8.

The important question here is what sort of thinking the pre-social thinking of natural man is. It seems that it is not possible to give an answer easily because Rousseau has hazarded guesses about the state of nature.²³⁰ However, he thinks what he hopes to do is not to resolve a question but to explain and make it clear.²³¹ It is hard to know a state of nature, which is not existent anymore or perhaps has never existed or is unlikely to exist. However, having the knowledge of state of nature is a necessity since it is not possible to know the basis of human society and the real definition of natural right without having the knowledge of state of nature or savage man.²³²

Unlike Rousseau, Aristotle focuses on two definitions of man. The first definition is that “from these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal.”²³³ The part of the definition saying, “man is by nature a political animal”, is translated into Latin as *animal sociale*.²³⁴ To clarify *animal sociale*, it is essential to take the importance of making partnership into consideration. Aristotle proposes different kinds of partnerships, i.e. communities, at the beginning of *Politics*. The first partnership is between female and male for the continuity of the species. The second is between master and slave for the sake of security. The last one is the household which is composed of these two partnerships in addition to village which is made up of several households. The city-state arises from all these partnerships, and it is self-sufficient.

Zoran Dimic states that “πολιτικὸν”, which refers to the word “political” in its English translation, does not mean social. Living in partnerships and being social

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 159.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ Zoran Dimic, “Zoōn Politikon and Paideia,” (presentation, Monday Seminar, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, May 8, 2017).

The first definition in Greek: ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

are not specific to human beings; other animals live in partnerships, as well. How should the term “πολιτικὸν” be understood then? In general terms, “πολιτικὸν” is about “πόλις” (city-state), but it also refers to the way of life relating to the citizens (πολιτες) of the city-state.²³⁵ That is to say, being political means being related to *polis* and fulfilling yourself in *polis*, according to Aristotle. At this point, the thing which will deepen the statement above is the second definition of man. The second definition is that “man alone of the animals possesses speech.”²³⁶ Its translation into Latin is *animal rationale*.²³⁷ “To be a rational animal is to be a language-using animal, a conversing animal, a discursive animal; and to live a human life is to live a life centred around discourse.”²³⁸ What is the point which makes having the ability to speak so special in a city-state? The mere voice is a thing which shows just pain and pleasure, and the other animals also possess it. On the other hand, speech designates what is good and bad or what is right and wrong in the city-state.

It can be concluded that while Aristotle claims that family and language are all parts of our nature and are also the components of natural sociability, Rousseau totally refuses the claim that these concepts are completely natural. However, it can be inferred that both philosophers emphasize the most significant aphorism of the Ancient Greek which is *know thyself*.²³⁹ In other words, they start by giving a definition of human being to construct their arguments. They are trying to know human being itself so as to talk about it.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ *Ibid.* The second definition in Greek: Λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ Roderick T. Long, “Aristotle’s Conception on Freedom”, *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (June 1996): 781.

²³⁹ Zoran Dimic, “Zoōn Politikon and Paideia,” (presentation, Monday Seminar, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, May 8, 2017).

4.2 On Man, Society and Citizenship

While talking about man, society or citizenship, it is a bit difficult to evaluate the texts as formulas free from the historical circumstances wherein they were written. Thus, when we compare thoughts of Aristotle and Rousseau on these issues, to keep this point in mind may be useful. Let us start with Aristotle's basic concept of *politeia*, 'regime' or 'form of government', in his political philosophy. *Politeia* is the organization of city to designate who is and who is not a citizen, and who has responsibilities for judicial, legislative, executive, and military activities. It is also decided what kind of education should be given to citizens according to *politeia*. In order for an individual to qualify as a citizen, it is not sufficient to settle within the borders of a city or to be subject to its laws. For a citizen in the strictest sense of the word, nothing is necessary except taking part in decision and ruling; thus, participating in the working of the city.²⁴⁰ To be able to participate in these, one should overcome some natural obstacles such as blood, birth, and wealth. Citizenship, in other words, is practice of status if one does pass these obstacles.²⁴¹

At this point, Aristotle considers a society consisting of homogeneous free men who are being educated with regard to some specific values and skills. Those free men also accept the duty to work for "the community in juries and as members of the assemblies".²⁴² This approach of citizenship leads to development of a sort of hierarchy theory. That is to say, whereas the wise are capable of serving in the policy-making office of the state, other free men may serve in the judicial offices in lesser administrative positions.²⁴³ Labourers and slaves, who cannot spend time in thinking about higher matters such as ideals and progress, are eliminated from

²⁴⁰ David Roochnik, "Aristotle's Topological Politics; Michael Sandel's Civic Republicanism," in *On Civic Republicanism*, eds. Geoffrey C. Kellow and Neven Leddy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 46.

²⁴¹ Peter N. Riesenbergh, *Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c1992), 46.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

citizenship because of not being able to cultivate their minds. Also, because tradesmen, craftsmen and women are not capable of being busy with civic duties despite being free, they are not citizens of the city-state. That is, Aristotle's citizens are always busy with civic duties. How David Roochnik describes Aristotle as follows:

...Aristotle is the moralist in search of the best being, who wonders what education and actions will bring the human being to his highest accomplishments and dignity. The polis exists for the sake of "worthy and beautiful actions." Within it the citizen who governs well when called and submits to law when obliged reaches his full human potential.²⁴⁴

As a result, an ordinary man is not equal to a citizen in the society Aristotle considers. In this sense, it is also possible to see the distinction between ordinary man and citizen, according to Rousseau, in a way that man follows his natural impulses in the state of nature whereas the citizen has to follow only the positive law that constitutes moral motivation within the society. That is to say, the individual gives his will and freedom not to another person but to the law which is the expression of general will.²⁴⁵ In Rousseau's opinion, if everyone in the society is subject to the law based on the general will, then it is possible for the natural equality of human being to be protected. What does Rousseau mean by general will?

Rousseau draws an analogy between political body and living body in order to explain his concept of general will. Political body is a whole, which has different parts as in a living body. These parts have specific functions. These specific functions together work for the good of the whole. In detail, the sovereign power corresponds to head of the body; laws and customs are likened to brain. Trade, industry, and agriculture are similar to the mouth and stomach. Public finances are like the blood. Lastly, citizens of the regime represent physical parts of the body

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

²⁴⁵ Jose Montoya, "Aristotle and Rousseau on Men and Citizens," *Philosophical Inquiry* XXI, no.2 (1999): 73.

such as arms and legs.²⁴⁶ Like all the parts of the physical body, the state's parts have to collaborate to stay alive. The general will represents not only one part of the being but also the being as a whole. This general will also provides the whole and of each part with preservation and comfort. Thus, citizens should obey the laws based on general will. At this point, there is a relation between obeying laws and the concept of virtue. To make an individual virtuous it is necessary that general will should be conceived and respected. According to Rousseau, only the virtuous citizen can love and appreciate laws. In conclusion, it seems that, according to both Aristotle and Rousseau, law and morality overlap, and the laws shape their understandings of citizenship and society.

4.3 On Women

Both Aristotle and Rousseau take a position that there are natural and undeniable differences between female and male. This difference is shown in the social places and purposes of the sexes. There is also hierarchy which makes women busy with lower work. In general, women's important role is to give birth and to have a life at home by looking after the house and family. Therefore, it seems that women are such a group inferior to men and, on surface level, just means for some ends.²⁴⁷ Here, Susan Okin claims that because these philosophers, Aristotle and Rousseau, described "women by their sexual, procreative, and upbringing functions", they could not succeed in using their philosophical methods of arriving at man's nature.²⁴⁸ She puts it as follows:

They have sought for the nature of women not, as for the nature of men, by attempting to separate out the effects of nurture, and to discover what innate potential exists beneath the overlay which results from socialization and other environmental factors. The nature of women,

²⁴⁶ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 105.

²⁴⁷ Chandrakala Padia, "Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel on Women: A Critique," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 55, no.1 (1994): 27.

²⁴⁸ Mary Nichols, review of *Women in Western Political Thought* by Susan Okin, https://isistatic.org/journal-archive/pr/13_01/nichols.pdf (accessed July 22, 2017), 242.

instead, has been seen to be dictated by whatever social and economic structure that philosophers favour and to be defined as whatever best suits her prescribed functions in that society.²⁴⁹

Let us start with Aristotle in detail. When it is explained why the world is the way it is, according to Aristotle, he thinks that things are the way they are because they have a function relating to each other and with the world as a whole. That is to say, there is a place for everything in a hierarchical and interconnecting world.²⁵⁰ Moreover, when the function of human beings -who are at the highest level of that hierarchy- is questioned, this function is defined merely regarding themselves as human beings.²⁵¹ At this point, Aristotle means by the function of something the actuality of that thing and an activation of its full potentiality. According to Aristotle, woman's primary function is reproduction. However, it is not women's only function. While the man acquires something for the household, the woman is responsible for storing and preserving them in household in Aristotle's well-ordered society.²⁵²

Furthermore, when it comes to moral virtues, Aristotle claims that the same moral virtues display themselves in men and women in a separate way. For instance, while a man ought to possess the courage of command, a woman ought to possess the courage of service. Some virtues are also suitable for women, some for men. In addition to these, he emphasizes that women should not be treated as slaves because slaves and women have naturally different purposes. Women cannot be subordinated like slaves. That is why women should not be put into a position making them an instrument to wills of others. Feminist philosophers, in response to these, claim that Aristotle's texts are misogynist because he explicitly says that

²⁴⁹ Susan M. Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 10.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 84.

women are inferior to men.²⁵³ Moreover, they allege that Aristotle's philosophical concepts²⁵⁴, i.e., form and matter are gendered, which leads to an interpretation that a female is an incomplete male or a deformity.²⁵⁵ Within this interpretation, Susan Okin asserts that form was invented by Aristotle so as to legitimate the political status quo in Athens, including slavery and the inequality of women.²⁵⁶

Like Aristotle, Rousseau has a tendency to define woman's nature within her function as a wife and a mother. The most important principle to determine woman's situation in society is education, according to Rousseau. And this education fails to apply to women liberty and equality. Rousseau's educational understanding aims at a free and independent man. However, the education for women is absolutely different from the one for men. Women should be educated in the laws and customs of her own country. In this sense, whereas man does not care

²⁵³ Charlotte Witt and Lisa Shapiro, "Feminist History of Philosophy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, November 3, 2000, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-femhist/> (accessed July 20, 2017).

²⁵⁴ "Aristotle introduces matter and form, in the *Physics*. He contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form." This is called theory of *hylomorphism*. "Hylomorphism" is formed from the Greek words "*hylê*" for matter and "*eidōs* or *morphê*" for form. He extends by putting it to work in a variety of contexts.

Thomas Ainsworth, "Form vs. Matter", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, March 21, 2016, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/#MattFormIntr> (accessed May 1, 2018).

In Aristotle's metaphysics, matter and form are unequal partners; form is better than matter. He claims on sexes that there is a relationship between form and being a male and matter and being a female. For example, "females contribute only matter and not form to the generation of offspring."

Charlotte Witt and Lisa Shapiro, "Feminist History of Philosophy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, November 3, 2000, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-femhist/> (accessed July 20, 2017).

²⁵⁵ Charlotte Witt and Lisa Shapiro, "Feminist History of Philosophy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, November 3, 2000, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-femhist/> (accessed July 20, 2017).

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

about others' opinions, woman has to pay attention to them.²⁵⁷ William Boyd also states that "plainly 'Nature' speaks the language of eighteenth century prejudice"²⁵⁸ for Rousseau's argument that women and men ought to be educated because their natures are different from each other. Naturally, as in Aristotle's view, Rousseau explains that woman is not seen as a purpose for others, as well. Women's position is legitimized within certain conventions.

Next point is general dependence of woman on her husband when Rousseau describes marriage of his ideal man Emile and ideal woman Sophie. This loss of autonomy means marital fidelity for woman.²⁵⁹ It is also possible to find the arguments that man and woman are mutually dependent, and that they possess complementary roles although they possess separate roles in family. However, these are not the arguments which may resolve woman's inferior position. In other words, although both philosophers, Aristotle and Rousseau, focus on importance of woman, it seems that the place or role of woman in society is somehow dependent on man or inferior to man. Susan Okin says that the dissimilarities between woman and man that Rousseau describes do not suggest the inferiority of woman to man at first²⁶⁰, but she goes on:

That tradition sees women as 'intuitive and equipped with a talent for detail', but 'deficient in rationality and quite incapable of abstract thought'.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Susan M. Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 163.

²⁵⁸ William Boyd, afterword to *Philosophy of Education The Essential Texts: Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. Steven M. Cahn (New York & London: Routledge, 2009), 250.

²⁵⁹ Mary Nichols, review of *Women in Western Political Thought* by Susan Okin, https://isistatic.org/journal-archive/pr/13_01/nichols.pdf (accessed July 22, 2017), 256.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ Susan M. Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 100.

4.4 On Education

Aristotle states his thoughts on education comprehensively, in his book *Politics* Book VIII. It is an important matter that citizens raise their children and educate them. Here, questions are what should be instructed, and how should it be instructed? Generally, it depends on the type of the State and what kind of a life is in demand. Aristotle says that “education must be related to the particular constitution in each case.”²⁶² It means that people ought to have particular education for democracy and another one for oligarchy so on.²⁶³ That is, the thing which controls or influences education directly is political order. Moreover, Aristotle expresses that “No one would dispute the fact that it is a lawgiver’s prime duty to arrange for the education of the young.”²⁶⁴ This clearly makes education a subject which is determined and resolved by law or constitution.²⁶⁵

What is more, education is a preparation program for all skills and arts. It is also an adaptation period to different types of work. These are actualized in accordance with virtue. Namely, the difference between what is appropriate and what is not for freeman should be noticed. Citizens should participate in useful occupations which do not make the actor inferior. Inferior things are everything that makes freemen’s soul and intelligence impractical for virtue. For example, those things that are harmful to the condition of the body are inferior. All jobs which are done for money are also inferior. The main purpose of citizen’s education is that he is able to use his intelligence and artistic competence to the end. Thereby, he is able to retain life within virtue and leisure. Education should not tend to create just one quality and to develop that quality more than others. On the other hand, in Book VIII it is

²⁶² Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 452.

²⁶³ Zoran Dimic, “Zoōn Politikon and Paideia,” (presentation, Monday Seminar, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, May 8, 2017).

²⁶⁴ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 452.

²⁶⁵ Zoran Dimic, “Zoōn Politikon and Paideia,” (presentation, Monday Seminar, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, May 8, 2017).

emphasized that character nobility should be the purpose, and that the soul and body should never be over-exercised. At this point, because it is not clarified whether intellect or character is prioritized, Book VIII, at first, seems a bit confusing. Aristotle also states that people do not agree on which one is the first priority:

It is clear then that there should be laws laid down about education, and that education itself must be made a public concern. But we must not forget the question of what that education is to be, and how one ought to be educated. For in modern times there are opposing views about the tasks to be set, for there are no generally accepted assumptions about what the young should learn, either for virtue or for the best life; nor yet is it clear whether their education ought to be conducted with more concern for the intellect than for the character of the soul.²⁶⁶

To tell the truth, Aristotle explains his thoughts not from theoretical perspective but rather from practical one. In *Politics*, he describes many kinds of possibilities. However, he does not present such a best system. He, indeed, thinks that the best system is up to the *polis*. Namely, it depends on many conditions in *polis*. The ones who should search what is best for them and dispute the best possible education are citizens themselves in *polis*. For example, in monarchy, citizens cannot dispute educational system, or they can only dispute in a low profile. That is, how and to what extent citizens can dispute depends on *polis*.²⁶⁷ In addition, because people always search for the best possible way, Aristotle's *paideia*²⁶⁸ never reaches its final point.

²⁶⁶ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, ed. Trevor J. Saunders (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1981), 453.

²⁶⁷ Zoran Dimic, "Zoōn Politikon and Paideia," (presentation, Monday Seminar, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, May 8, 2017).

²⁶⁸ *Paideia* is generally translated as education into English. However, it is more than education for the Greeks. "Education for the Greeks involved a deeply formative and life-long process whose goal was for each person to be an asset to his friends, to his family, and, most important, to the *polis*."

Jack Crittenden and Peter Levine, "Civic Education," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, December 21, 2016, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civic-education/> (accessed May 1, 2018).

When it comes to Rousseau's view of education, it is terminologically possible to say that the education he describes is a moral process. What Rousseau refers to by notion 'moral' is being related with others to act and live for an individual. Intervention of other people is needed in order to form the individual, but this relationship is not the one corrupted by society.²⁶⁹ At this point, Rousseau's focus is virtue in his education approach. Because virtue is concerning character, it cannot be attainable just by arranging a system of rules.²⁷⁰ So, education has an important role to play here. In this sense, like Rousseau, Aristotle stresses the idea that educational context should be grounded in virtue. That is, they both agree that an individual can develop morally with the help of other human beings. At this point, it could be claimed that Aristotle's education is always moral in a way that Rousseau understood. However, what is more important here is to examine Rousseau's educational context in two stages. In the first stage, one's character is shaped. In the second stage, moral notions are instructed. One learns to live for himself at first, and then he learns to live for himself with others.²⁷¹ For example, the relationship between environment and individual is built in the first stage. The child learns the things which surrounds him in the physical world. This relationship with environment develops as long as the child thinks of his surroundings, understands them, and learns something from them. On the other hand, "broad human relations to life as a member of society" emerge in the moral stage where they learn to act well in a society.²⁷² In this way, both Aristotle and Rousseau make an attempt to propose a modal concerning how moral and civic education ought to be dealt with. In other words, they emphasize the purpose that what is instructed

²⁶⁹ Aurora Bernal and Martinez de Soria, "Character Education and Moral Education in Aristotle and Rousseau: *Paideia: Philosophy Educating Humanity*," (presentation, The 28th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August 1998), 32.

²⁷⁰ James Delaney, *Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 110.

²⁷¹ Aurora Bernal and Martinez de Soria, "Character Education and Moral Education in Aristotle and Rousseau: *Paideia: Philosophy Educating Humanity*," (presentation, The 28th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August 1998), 34.

²⁷² William Boyd, afterword to *Philosophy of Education The Essential Texts: Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. Steven M. Cahn (New York & London: Routledge, 2009), 249.

should be based on virtue to enable citizens to be both a good person and a citizen in the society.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I examined and compared Aristotle's and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's views on freedom in the social context. There are more than two thousand years between these two thinkers. However, in my opinion, the thing which makes them comparable is that their social and political philosophies are based on the concept of freedom. Both Aristotle and Rousseau build an ideal system on the basis of city-state, and thereby its concomitants of "virtuous citizens" in the framework of freedom in the social context.

To be able to demonstrate the focus of the concept of freedom, I started with the chapter including views of Aristotle. I explained what freedom generally means for him. I, then, detailed his views on slavery, the position of women in the city-state, freedom of citizens, and democracy. Furthermore, I showed differing meanings and uses of the ancient Greek concept of *eleutheria*, freedom, in an extended footnote. It seems that freedom is the thing which regulates social order in Aristotle's philosophy, and that his description of slavery is helpful to know further his concept of freedom. In this sense, he claims that ruling and being ruled, which are the necessary and beneficial activities of a society, determine who the master and slave are, and in which position women are, thereby, who can be the citizen of the city-state. Namely, slave is the one who does not possess the deliberative element completely; the female is the one who does possess a deliberative element but not authority; the child does possess it in an undeveloped way. Therefore, they all are ruled. However, the free man is the one who has that capability, thereby, who rules. Accordingly, both the ruler and the ruled partake in virtue, as well. However, there are, naturally, differences in this activity. This participation takes place in such a way that they can fulfil their own functions as much as it is necessary. That is to say, the ruler has to hold moral virtue entirely, and the rest of them should hold

virtue as much as it is related to their functions. After considering all these relations between the ruler and the ruled, it is possible to see the criteria of being a citizen in Aristotle's philosophy. In short, those who have to labour and those who do vulgar work cannot be a citizen. Those who are capable of holding the deliberative element entirely can be free to be called citizens. Therefore, they can participate in political activities in the society. As for women's position in the city-state, despite being free, women are in a lower position than men are because of having ineffective deliberative capacity and partaking in virtue in accordance with that capacity. Aristotle also emphasizes that freedom, which is one of defining characteristics of democratic governments, should not be meant living as one pleases and should be related to the constitution of that state.

In the second chapter, I examined the views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on freedom in the social context. Before going into detail, I explained three kinds of freedom he himself discussed briefly which are natural freedom, civil freedom and moral freedom. Furthermore, I mentioned Rousseau's ideas on knowing human beings to be able to explain the state of nature comprehensively. In this context, I questioned how he describes human nature, changes in human nature, what remains constant in it, and if there are things that can be changed what the balance between the changed and the constant is. Afterwards, I focused on Rousseau's ideas of the state of nature, and this is the first part of the second chapter. He deals with the state of nature in a theoretical way. The state of nature is the state in which human beings do not go through the corruption introduced by society. They are totally physically free, and they are able to do what they basically wish to do. They are also not aware of morality. Morality is discovered in the social order. In this sense, Rousseau does not agree that some treatments and feelings such as greed, oppression, desires take place in the state of nature. On the contrary, these are based on society. Rousseau also attaches importance to the state of nature to see and show the movement of human beings from their natural state into a civil society and differing virtues of each state. That is, savage man, who is the man in the state of nature, does not own anything gained from society, which means that savage man neither has a language and relationships nor a family and property. He is with an undeveloped faculty of reason, so he has something in common with animals. However, he has the capacity

to progress and go beyond the state of nature as opposed to animals. The next part of the chapter is Rousseau's views on social contract. It is the part where he explains civil freedom in detail and moral freedom to a certain extent. The main goal of the contract is about how human beings can regain freedom, which has been lost. Moreover, the social contract politically aims to provide civilized human beings with the sense of moral equality. In a way, Rousseau tries to establish a society which is not corrupted and keeps virtue as its prime concern. To hold virtue as a prime principle, Rousseau suggests an ideal education. Thus, I focused on Rousseau's ideal education approach as the last part of his views on freedom. What he tries to do in this part is not dealing with the importance of a good education or unpleasant current education system. In this part, he tries to know childhood and to create a new and more natural human being who is both a good person and a good citizen. To prevent society's vices is possible through this proper moral education. Besides, Rousseau never breaks his connection with sentiment which exists in every part of his philosophy, because he thinks that pity is a natural sentiment helping to prevent human beings from selfishness. Rousseau states that this sentiment, Pity, and moral education will be linked to ideal education. As a result, in the society, this education makes it possible to develop one's character in such a way that *amour propre* (vanity) does not harm *amour de soi* (self-love).

Lastly, in the chapter 'Critique of Aristotle's and Rousseau's Views on Freedom', I tried to present the points of agreement and disagreement between them to be able to catch an overall viewpoint. Aristotle looks for *telos* of human being, that is, the goal for which human beings are made by nature. On the other hand, Rousseau, one of the philosophers of modern period, is not interested in teleology but he and the other modern period philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke look for a universal and objective human nature which ethics and politics can arise from. Although it seems that there is a methodological difference between Aristotle's and Rousseau's philosophies, they both question to what extent or how human beings need political life to fulfil their ends. In this sense, I juxtaposed their thoughts on human nature, man, society and citizenship, the status of women, and education in order to explore the commonalities between these philosophers' approaches.

Aristotle contends on human nature that human beings live in partnerships which connects them to the city-state. People are rigidly connected to the *polis*. They fulfil their duties, responsibilities, that is, they fulfil themselves in the *polis*. People, in this sense, are political by nature. Moreover, human beings are rational. It means that human beings have the ability to speak. Speech is not the kind of voice just for showing pain and pleasure. However, speech indicates what is good and bad and distinguishes between justice and injustice in the city-state. For Aristotle, the major focus is the city-state, that is, the act of living in a city-state. On the other hand, Rousseau's focus is on the distinction between state of nature and society. Although both Aristotle and Rousseau have opposite ideas on human nature, it can be inferred that Rousseau's thoughts about human beings living in a society in accordance with social contract is somehow similar to Aristotle's definition of "human beings are rational and political animals."

The next stage in this chapter is an examination of their approaches to man, society and citizenship. Aristotle's concept of *politeia* clarifies his thoughts on these issues. This form of government, *politeia*, means the structure of city. According to this structure, a citizen takes part in the judicial, legislative or executive workings of the city. At this point, being a citizen is a kind of membership to the class of free men. These free men are also different from labourers and slaves in the society in the sense that they are able to cultivate their minds and to be busy with civic duties. Therefore, a citizen and an ordinary man in the society are not identical. On the other hand, to be able to evaluate the relationship between man and citizen from Rousseau's perspective, I took his distinction between state of nature and society into consideration. In his political philosophy, the one who follows natural impulses in the state of nature is the man, savage man, whereas the one who has to follow only positive law in the realm of society is the citizen. In this context, according to Aristotle and Rousseau, that citizen and man belong to different realms for different reasons. Afterwards, I presented what Rousseau means by positive law which includes the concepts of general will and freedom. While explaining what general will is, Rousseau employed the analogy between the political body and the living body. In this way, it is possible to say that the general will is not the sum of each individual's will in the society. It is both a whole and a part, like a body with

different parts and functions protecting and comforting citizens in the society. Therefore, laws are based on the general will. Furthermore, to conceive and respect the general will make an individual virtuous. Indeed, what shapes these philosophers' understandings of citizenship and society is their systems of rules.

I, then, demonstrated Aristotle's and Rousseau's views on women. Although women are in the background, coming after men, they deserve freedom. In general, both Aristotle and Rousseau have such an attitude that there is a certain natural difference between the sexes. Women play a role relating to home and family relationships. According to Aristotle, women's primary function is reproduction. She should also take care of things acquired by her husband in the household. Furthermore, women take part in virtues in a different way than men do. Like Aristotle, Rousseau has a tendency to define woman's role within the framework of her function as a wife and a mother. Besides, women should be educated accordingly in the society. In this way, for Rousseau women's position is legitimized according to the conventions in the society.

Finally, I attempted to clarify these philosophers' thoughts on education. At first, I presented Aristotle's ideas about education, which is comprehensively outlined in his book *Politics* Book VIII. He thinks that it is a significant issue to know how citizens should raise and educate their children. As a part of his views on education, he focuses on what is suitable and not for freeman, which is compatible with his distinction between citizens and ordinary men in the society. Thus, this education should include principles of making freemen's soul and intelligence practical. However, while describing the details of this education, it is not clarified what he exactly prioritizes. Is it intellect or character? This attitude creates a bit confusion. Aristotle also emphasizes the constitutional order in the society in a way that education should be adjusted to a particular form of constitution. However, he does not define the particular form of this constitutional system. Later, I focused on Rousseau's approach to education in the framework of the concept of virtue. He believes that virtue is about character and that it can be achieved not only through a system of rules but also through education. Rousseau proposed two stages in education. In the first stage, one's character is shaped. In the second stage, one

learns moral notions. In these stages, two kinds of relationships are emphasized: in the first stage, the relationship between individual and nature is emphasized, and in the latter stage the emphasis is laid on the relationship between individual and other people. After all, it can be inferred that these two philosophers try to present a model as to how moral and civic education should be tackled. That is to say, they both focus on the idea that whatever one is instructed ought to be based on virtue in the sense that each citizen is able to be both a good person and a good citizen in the society although they had fundamentally different perspectives.

In my opinion, both philosophers' thoughts on freedom in the social context are not enlightening and valid in advanced industrial societies in the 21st century, although they presented some useful points on issues such as education. Aristotle lived in a society where slavery was a social institution. In accordance with this strict stratification in society, in Aristotle's view, freedom was not possible for those who do the labouring in the society. Thereby, those were not even able to be citizens. However, a privileged minority, who was not responsible for satisfying the physical needs of the whole society, was free, and thereby they deserved to be citizens. However, in the present, it is not possible to define a single class which is responsible for fulfilling the society's physical needs thanks to the advanced industry and technological developments. Therefore, as opposed to the definition of Aristotle citizenship is not deserved only by a single class. For example, in industrial democracy, workers take part in management and share responsibilities for running the business.²⁷³ People also possess sufficient time and energy for extensive contribution not only to workplace but also to public affairs.²⁷⁴ That is to say, definition of worker has been changed. Working hours are generally certain, so people do not need to work all day. In addition to this, people do not have to rely on their physical force owing to displacement of physical labour with

²⁷³ Daniel Bell, "Communitarianism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, June 21, 2016, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/communitarianism/> (accessed April 24, 2018).

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

mechanization. Thus, they have ample time to realize and actualize what they potentially have. In this context, the idea that freedom and citizenship defined in terms of a social class has lost its validity.

Unlike Aristotle, Rousseau's main concern is the process of bringing of the common good in a political association when he explains freedom in the social context. In this way, he thinks that order and security should be united with freedom and that corrupt institutions should be made pure and moral. However, the question is when all institutions are cured, will everybody be virtuous and free? It does not seem to be so. Is freedom the necessary and sufficient condition of virtue, or is virtue the necessary and sufficient condition of freedom? Moreover, according to Rousseau, people should give up their rights and power to be able to unite under the sovereign, and they should obey the sovereign since the sovereign makes equality of right and justice available thanks to the role of general will. At this point, Rousseau pays attention to individual will as well. In fact, people, i.e. all subjects, is the major element; they become sovereign and determine a set of laws in a political society. However, it is possible to see that the relationship between freedom and virtue in individual is weak in some societies such as "communitarian" societies because community relationships strongly affect individual's will and personality. The focus here is commitment to public affairs, cultural outlooks, and social prime concerns rather than individual will and freedom.

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APPENDICES

A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tez, Aristoteles (384-322 MÖ) ve Jean-Jacques Rousseau bakış açılarından sosyal bağlamda özgürlük kavramını incelemektedir. Bu doğrultuda, şu soruların cevapları bulunmaya çalıştım: “Aristoteles ve Rousseau’nun siyaset felsefeleri arasında bir ilişki kurulması mümkün müdür?”, “eğer mümkünse, hangi kavramlar sosyal bağlamda özgürlük başlığı çerçevesini çizmeye yol gösterici olabilir?” ve “bu iki filozofun düşünceleri ne şekilde birbirine benzer ve ne şekilde birbirinden farklıdır?”

Aristoteles ve Rousseau’nun siyaset felsefelerini çalışmayı seçme sebebim; Aristotelesçi teleoloji anlayışının on yedinci yüzyıla kadar büyük bir etkisinin olması ve bu anlayışın etkilerinin on yedinci yüzyılda yıkılması ve toplum sözleşmesi geleneği ile yer değiştirmesidir. Bu noktada, Rousseau bu geleneğin ona yeni bir çerçeve kazandıran önemli bir figürüdür. Aristoteles, doğadaki her şeyin bir amacı olduğunu savunur ve bu düşüncesi felsefesinde baştan sona etkilidir. Bu bağlamda, insanın amacını arar. Öte yandan Rousseau, diğer modern dönem düşünürleri gibi, ahlak ve siyasetin temellerini inşa edebilecekleri evrensel ve nesnel bir insan doğası tanımı arayışındadır. Metotları birbirinden çok farklı görünüyor olmasına rağmen, iki filozof da “insanın, amaçlarını gerçekleştirmek için ne ölçüye kadar ve nasıl politik hayata ihtiyaç duyduğu”nu sorgulamıştır.

Metotlarının yanı sıra, bu iki filozofun neyin doğal olduğu ve hangi ilişkilerin doğal olduğu üzerindeki düşünceleri kayda değer bir şekilde farklıdır. Şöyle ki, Aristoteles insanın doğası gereği toplumsal olduğunu ve devletin bireyden önce geldiğini iddia eder. Rousseau ise, insanın doğuştan değil, sonradan şartlar gereği toplumsal olduğunu iddia eder. Ancak bu karşıtlığa rağmen, iki filozof da özgürlük kavramı dahilinde ideal sistemlerini inşa etme çabasıdır.

Aristoteles bakış açısından bu durumu açarsak, Aristoteles’in insanın doğuştan toplumsal olduğu iddiasının altında insanın rasyonel ve politik bir hayvan olduğu

tanımı yatmaktadır. Rasyonel hayvan tanımı, konuşma becerisine sahip olmaya vurgu yapar; dil kullanabilmek, diyalog kurabilmek, tartışma yapabilmektir. Söylem odaklı bir hayat yaşamaktır. Bu konuşma yeteneği ayrıca neyin faydalı ve zararlı olduğunu ve neyin doğru ve yanlış olduğunu gösterebilir. Politik hayvan tanımı ise sadece bir grup içinde yaşamayı ya da devletler kurmayı belirtmez; aynı zamanda ortak amaçlar temelinde iş birliği yapmayı vurgular. Diğer bir ifadeyle, yalnız bir hayat yaşamak yerine, aile ve ev halkının birliği ile insan için iyi olanın peşinden gidilen hayatı yaşamak insanı hem rasyonel hem de politik yapandır. Aristoteles'in devletin doğada var olan şeyler sınıfına girdiği ve bireyden önce geldiği diğer iddiasını da bu bağlamda açarsak bu iddianın olgusal bir tarih anlatmadığını ancak mantıksal bir çerçeve çizdiğini düşünmek faydalı olacaktır. Parça, bütün olmadan onu o yapan gücü ve işlevi yitireceğinden, Aristoteles bütünü parçadan önce geldiğini iddia eder. İnsanı da devletten ayırdığımızda, artık kendine yeten durumunu kaybedeceğinden devletle beraber anlamlıdır ve dolayısıyla, devlet bireyden önce gelir.

Öte yandan, Rousseau'ya göre insanın sonradan şartlar gereği toplumsal olduğunu söylemiştik. İnsan doğası üzerine Rousseau'nun fikirlerini bulacağımız yer "doğa durumu" kavramıdır. Bu durum rasyonel ve toplumsallık öncesi durumdur. İnsan, sessiz sakin ve mutludur. Dağınık bir şekilde yaşar ve diğer insanların fikirleri hakkında bilgiye sahip değildir. Diğer insanlarla herhangi bir ilişki içinde olması kasıtsız ve tesadüfi şekildedir. Gereksinimlerini karşılamak için diğer insanlara ihtiyacı yoktur. Dolayısıyla ahlaki bir düzlemden uzaktadır, duygularıyla hareket eder. Aile, mülkiyet, konuşma yeteneği gibi kavramlara bu durumda rastlanılmaz. Dolayısıyla, insan, doğası gereği rasyonel ve toplumsal değildir. Fakat bu düzen böyle devam etmez; pek çok gelişmeler yaşanır; insan becerilerinin gelişmesi, endüstrinin gelişmesi, özellikle mülkiyet kavramının ortaya çıkması gibi. Bu gelişmelerin yaşanması ile insanın doğa durumunu terk etmesi ve toplumsal hayatın kökeninin ortaya çıkması söz konusu olur. Bu nokta artık hiçbir şeyin olduğunu gibi kalamayacağı bir noktadır. Ve toplumsal hayatın özellikleri tamamen doğa durumuna karşıt özelliklerdir. İnsanlar artık bir araya gelip birbirleriyle ahlaki düzlemde ilişkiler kurmaya başlamıştır; bu da aile kurumunun, özel mülkiyet kavramının, konuşma becerisinin olduğu bir hayattır.

Görüldüğü gibi Aristoteles ve Rousseau insan doğası üzerine karşıt fikirlere sahipler; ancak, Rousseau'nun toplumsal hayata geçen insan olgusuyla Aristoteles'in tanımladığı rasyonel ve politik olan insan arasında ilişki kurmak mümkündür. Ve bu doğrultuda iki filozofun da arasında iki bin yıldan fazla bir zaman olmasına rağmen, onları karşılaştırılabilir yapan sosyal ve politik felsefelerinin özgürlük kavramı temelinde olmasıdır.

Aristoteles'in özgürlük kavramının net bir tanımını bulmak kolay değildir; fakat *Nikomakhos'a Etik* ve *Politika* kitaplarında doğal köle ve demokrasi ile ilgili pasajları adım adım inceleyerek bir çerçeve çizmek mümkündür. Yaklaşık iki yüz elli yıldır Rousseau üzerine çalışma yapanların ise özgürlük kavramının yorumlanmasında aynı fikre sahip oldukları söylenemez. Ancak, *Toplum Sözleşmesi* ve *İnsanlar Arasındaki Eşitsizliğin Temeli* kitapları bu kavramı açıklamak için izlenilecek temel kitaplarıdır.

Bu doğrultuda, sosyal bağlamda özgürlük kavramını tartışabilmek için giriş bölümünden sonra Aristoteles bölümünde kölelik, şehir devleti içindeki kadının pozisyonu, vatandaşların özgürlüğü ve demokrasi alt başlıkları üzerinde durdum ve kapsamlı bir dipnotta Antik Yunan'da özgürlük kavramının formlarından bahsettim. Aristoteles'in etik ve siyaset üzerine düşünceleri yakından ilişkili olduğundan devlet tanımı verimli bir başlangıç noktasıdır. Aristoteles için, her devlet iyi bir amaçla kurulmuş bir topluluktur ve en üst iyiyi amaçlar. Peki bu devletin Aristoteles için temeli nedir? -Bir çift olarak yöneten ve yönetilendir. Erkeklerin kadınlar ve köleler ile bir araya gelmesiyle aile; ailelerin bir araya gelmesiyle köyler; köylerin bir araya gelmesiyle de kendi kendine yeten devlet meydana gelir.

Bu yöneten ve yönetilen çiftini açılırsak; yöneten ve yönetilen arasındaki ayrım Aristoteles'in siyaset felsefesinde sosyal düzeni kuran önemli bir prensiptir. Yönetmek ve yönetilmek toplum için zorunlu ve faydalıdır. Aristoteles, ortak bir birliği olan her şeyde yöneten-yönetilen ilişkisinin kesinlikle ortaya çıkacağını savunur. Akıl yürütme yetisine sahip olan ve ileriye görebilen yöneten, efendi olandır. "Doğası gereği köle" olan bir başkasına bağlı olabilen, akıl yürütme yetisinden onu anlayacak kadar pay alan; ancak, ona sahip olacak kadar pay

almayan kimsedir. Yani, bu yeti doğası gereği köle olanda yoktur. Kadında vardır ancak işlemez, çocukta ise gelişmemiş bir düzeyde vardır. Dolayısıyla hepsi yönetilir. Yönetme ve yönetilmeden doğan bu ilişki erdemden pay almaya da yansır. Herkes erdemden payını alır, ancak aynı şekilde değil, kendi işlevini gerçekleştirebilecek düzeyde pay alır. Yani, efendi tamamen erdem sahibi iken, diğerleri öyle değildir. İşte bu akıl yürütme yetisi, sosyal düzeni kontrol eden prensip olan özgürlük ile yakından ilişkilidir.

Kadının şehir devlet içindeki pozisyonuna bakacak olursak, bu pozisyon kadının ev halkı ile olan ilişkisi temeline dayanır. Elbette kadının görevi köleler gibi tamamıyla hizmet değildir, aynı zamanda erkeğin getirdiklerini muhafaza etmektir. Ancak erkeğin otorite sağlama ve onu sürdürmede kadından daha iyi olması iddiası ile Aristoteles bakış açısından kadın bir tür alt pozisyonda kalıyor. Ayrıca, var olan ancak işlemeyen akıl yürütme yetisi ve bu yeti uyarınca erdemden pay alması kadını kolay yönetilebilir bir pozisyona koyuyor ve onun toplum içerisindeki yerini belirlemiş oluyor. Fakat bu pozisyon, Aristoteles için kadınların özgür bireylerin yarısını meydana getirdiği gerçeğini değiştirmiyor.

Vatandaşların özgürlüğü bölümüne geldiğinde, Aristoteles'in vatandaş olabilmek için bazı kriterlere sahip olmak gerektiğini söylediği kolayca öngörülebilir. Bir efendi tarafından kontrol edilmeyen ve zorunlu kol işlerinden sorumlu olmayanlar vatandaşlık statüsünü elde eder. Bu durum vatandaşlara, kendi geleceklerini, toplumun refahını ve geleceğini şekillendirmeye yetkin kılan bir hayat sunar. Bu bağlamda, vatandaşlar devletin gelişmesini sağlayacak siyasi aktivitelere katılırlar. Yani, bu özgürlük angarya işleri yapan köleler, bayağı işlerle uğraşan zanaatkarlar için bir hak değildir. Bu noktada, kadınların özgür olmasına rağmen, bir efendi tarafından yönetildiğini ve akıl yürütme yetisi gerektiren devlet işlerinde yer almadığını göz önünde tutarsak vatandaşlık hakkını elde etmediğini söylemek yanlış bir çıkarım olmayacaktır.

Aslında bu tip bir vatandaşlık kavramı bir tür hiyerarşinin kurulmasıdır. Şöyle ki, bilginler devlet politikaları geliştiren mevkilerde yer alır, diğer özgür insanlar ise yargı ofislerinde ikinci derecedeki yönetici pozisyonlarında yer alır. Akıl yürütme yetisinden uzakta olan köleler ile boş zamana sahip olmayan zanaatkarlar, tüccarlar

vatandaşlık hakkını elde edemezler. Çünkü Aristoteles'e göre vatandaş her zaman vatandaşlık görevleriyle meşgul olmalıdır, başka işlerle değil.

Demokrasi konusunda ise Aristoteles pek çok çeşit demokrasinin olduğunu, bunun ise nedeninin halkların farklılığı ve demokrasiden ayrılamayacak olarak düşünülen ilkelerin hangilerinin anayasaya dahil edilip edilmediğidir. Bütün bunlar, devletin ilkelerine ve amacına göre farklı şekillerde bir araya gelerek sadece niteliksel değil tür bakımından da farklı demokrasilerin meydana gelmesine sebep olur. Ayrıca, Aristoteles, özgürlüğün herkesin dilediğini yapması olarak tanımlandığı demokrasilerin kötü tanımlandığını ve anayasana uygun bir şekilde yaşamının özgürlüğün özüne zarar vermediğini iddia eder. Onun için en iyi demokrasi formu ise halkın hayatını tarım ve hayvancılıkla kazandığı, saygın kesimin de yönetimde olduğu formdur. Saygın kesim kendinden aşağı olanlarca yönetilmediği için durumlarından memnundurlar. Diğer kesim de tarım ve hayvancılıkla uğraşmaktan yöneticiliğe zamanı olmayacağından yönetimde olmayı talep etmeyecektir. Ayrıca, bu demokraside herkes dilediğini yapamaz, herkes herkese karşı sorumludur. Herkes seçimle göreve gelir; yüksek nitelikli insanlar da yüksek dereceli mevkilerde seçimle yerlerini alır.

Tezin ikinci adımı olan Rousseau'nun özgürlük üzerine düşünceleri bölümünde ise doğa durumu, toplum sözleşmesi ve ideal eğitim tartıştığım başlıklar oldu. Bu başlıklar altında değinilecek noktalar doğal özgürlük, sivil özgürlük ve ahlaki özgürlüklerdir. Doğa durumu teorisi, insanın doğa durumundan sivil topluma geçişini ve bu dönüşümün değişen erdemlerini gösterdiği için kapsamlı bir şekilde süreci anlattım. Doğal insan tamamen özgürdür. Ne istiyorsa onu yapabilir. Ne bir araç ne de bir hemcinsi tarafından baskı altındadır. Yapay şeylerin kölesi değildir. Toplum tarafından bozulmamış ve ahlakın bilinmediği bir durumda yaşar.

Doğal insan toplumsal hayattan uzaktır ve hayvanlarla olan ortak noktaları oldukça fazladır. Ancak sahip olduğu gelişmemiş bir akıl yürütme yetisi geliştiğinde, onu bu durumun ötesine geçebilecek kapasiteye ulaştırır. Aklın gelişmesiyle insanın arzuları artar ve tüm arzularını gerçekleştirmesine bireysel gücü yetmez. Diğer insanlara bağımlılığı artar; onları kontrol etme yollarını arar. Bu sosyal hayatın karmaşasının büyümesi sınırsız bir şekilde devam eder ve o basit başlangıç

kaybolur. Bu noktada, doğa durumuna dönmenin imkânı yoktur, ancak toplumsal bir sözleşme ile kaybedilen doğal özgürlüğün telafisinin yapılması mümkündür. Sözleşmenin getirdiği sivil özgürlük, eğitim ile sağlanacak ahlaki özgürlük yeni durumun özgürlükleridir.

Toplumsal sözleşme özgürlüklerle ilgili önemli bir kavramı karşımıza çıkarıyor; genel istenç. Genel istenç nedir? Siyasal toplumda insan başrolü oynar. Ve insanın rızasıyla Egemen, yasa yapma otoritesini elde eder. Artık Yurttaş olan insan haklarından vazgeçerek, kendi isteğiyle Egemene teslim olur. Tabii, burada Rousseau için önemli nokta, egemen ve yurttaş tamamen birbirlerinden farklı parçalar değildir. Yurttaşlar devletin yasalarına uymakla beraber, o egemen gücün yasalarını yapandır; o egemen gücün kendisidir. Burada bir bütünlükten bahsederken şunu da vurgulamak gerekir; genel istenç, tüm yurttaşların tek tek istençlerinin toplamı değildir. Bu çoğunluğun egemen güç altında “bir” olabilmesidir. Hem bir bütün hem de bir parça olmak gibidir. Toplumda vatandaşları rahat ettiren ve koruyan farklı parçaları ve işlevleri olan bir beden gibidir. İşte bu noktada, insanın toplumsal sözleşme ile yitirdiği doğal özgürlük ve onu baştan çıkararak her şeyi sınırsız elde etme hakkıdır; kazandığı ise sivil özgürlük ve sahip olduğu her şeyde mülkiyet hakkıdır.

Bu doğrultudaki toplumsal sözleşmenin siyasal amacı, toplumsal hayattaki insana ahlaki eşitlik duygusunu vermektir. Rousseau'nun özel çabası yozlaşmamış ve erdemin başlıca unsur olarak kabul edildiği bir toplum kurmaktır. Buna bağlı olarak, erdemi bu pozisyonda tutacak ideal bir eğitim önerisi vardır. Bu eğitim sistemi, çocukluğu anlamak ve sonrasında iyi bir birey ve vatandaş olan daha doğal insan yaratmak amacıyla tasarlanmıştır. Ancak bu şekilde toplumdaki kötülüklerden arınılacağını düşünür. Rousseau'nun eğitim anlayışında iki evre görmek mümkündür. İlk evrede bireyin karakteri şekillenir, ikinci evrede ise birey ahlaki kavramları öğrenir. Yani, kişi önce kendisi için yaşamayı öğrenir sonrasında ise kendisi için diğer insanlarla beraber yaşamayı öğrenir. Bu bağlamda gördüğümüz negatif eğitim anlayışıdır. Negatif eğitim anlayışında, hakikat ve erdem gibi kavramların aklın olgunlaşması ile kavranılabileceği düşünüldüğünden çocuğun belli bir yaşa gelmesiyle öğretilmesi gerektiğini savunulur. Bu gibi kavramlar için

sorgulama yeteneđi ve toplumsallık bađının farkında olmaya ihtiya duyar, birey. Örneđin, dođa ve birey arasındaki iliŐki ilk evrede kurulur. Dođayı gözlemlemek ve onu onun yolundan izlemek önemlidir. Çocuk kendisinin içinde olduđu fiziksel dünyayı öğrenir. Ve bu dođa ile çocuk arasındaki iliŐki çocuk kendisini çevreleyenleri anladıka onlardan bir Őeyler öğrendike kısacası dođayı gözlemledike geliŐir. Öte yandan, toplumun bir üyesi olarak bireyin diđer insanlarla iliŐkili olduđu hayat, toplumda iyi bir Őekilde hareket etmeyi öğrendiđi ahlaki evrede ortaya çıkar. Ayrıca, Rousseau bütün bu sistem fikrinde hiçbir zaman insanın duyguyla olan iliŐkisini koparmamıŐtır. Merhamet yönetici duygudur ve yasalardan önce vardır. Toplumsal hayatta ortaya çıkan “kibir” duygusunun, dođal bir duygu olan, akıl ve merhamet duygusuyla geliŐen kendi yaŐamını koruma odaklı “kendini sevme” duygusuna zarar vermediđi bir yolda kiŐinin karakterinin geliŐebileceđi eđitimi mümkün kılmak hedeflediđi eđitimidir. Sonuç olarak, bu tür bir topluma girmek, toplumsal sözleşme bađlı olmak; insanlar için kendi yaptıkları yasalara uyarak kendisinin efendisi olmak sivil ve ahlaki özgürlüđünün nasıl elde edildiđini gösterir Rousseau için.

Son olarak, Aristoteles ve Rousseau'nun birbirlerine benzer ve birbirlerinden ayrı oldukları noktaları göstermek adına baŐladığım yeni bölümün baŐlıkları insan dođası, insan, toplum ve vatandaşlık, kadının statüsü ve eđitim oldu. İnsan dođası üzerine giriŐte belirtildiđi gibi Aristoteles insanın dođuŐtan toplumsal olduđunu ve devletin bireyden önce geldiđini savunmaktadır. Aristoteles'in bu iddiasını da insanın rasyonel ve sosyal olduđunu söylediđi tanımından temellendirdiđini dile getirmiŐtik. Rasyonel bir hayvan olmak yani konuşma becerisine sahip olmak ile insan, içinde bulunduđu toplumda neyin faydalı ya da zararlı ya da neyin dođru ve yanlış olduđunu belirleyebilir. Sosyal bir hayvan olması da sadece gruplar halinde yaŐaması ya da devletler kurması olarak görülmeyip içinde yaŐadığı toplumla ortak hedefler dođrultusunda iliŐki kurabilmesidir. Rousseau ise dođa durumu ve toplum durumu Őeklinde yaptıđı ayırım sebebiyle Aristoteles'ten farklı fikirleri göze çarpmaktadır. Dođa durumunda tamamen fiziksel bir özgürlüđe sahip olan ve ahlaki düzlemde hiçbir iliŐki kurmayan dođal insan, toplumsal durumda tam da Aristoteles'in iddia ettiđi gibi dile sahip olan, aile kurumunu oluŐturan ve içinde yaŐadığı toplum uyarınca ona bađlı bir varlıđa dönüşür. BaŐlangı noktası olarak

tamamen karşıt fikirlerde olmalarına rağmen, Rousseau ve Aristoteles'in bu bağlamda ilişkilendirilebilir olduğu açıktır.

Toplum ve vatandaşlık üzerine olan diğer başlıkta, Aristoteles'in *politeia* kavramı başlangıç noktası olarak karşımıza çıkar. *Politeia* şehir devletin yapısıdır ve bu yapıya göre vatandaşlar yönetim mevkilerinde yerlerini alır. Bu noktada vatandaş olmak özgür insanların oluşturduğu sınıfa üye olmak demektir. Bu özgür insanlar, toplumun fiziksel ihtiyaçlarını karşılayarak çalışanlardan toplumsal görevlerle meşgul olma ve insan aklını geliştirebilmeye yetkin olma açısından farklıdır. Dolayısıyla Aristoteles için, vatandaş olmak, toplumda sıradan insan olmaya karşılık gelmemektedir. Öte yandan Rousseau bakış açısından değerlendirirsek bu başlığı, doğa durumu ve toplum durumu arasındaki farkı göz önünde bulundurmamak gerekmektedir. Rousseau'nun siyaset felsefesi anlayışında, sıradan insan -doğal insan- doğa durumunda dürtülerini takip edenken, vatandaş toplum durumunda pozitif hukuku -sözleşme yasalarını- takip edendir. Bu bağlamda, Rousseau ve Aristoteles için vatandaş ve insan farklı nedenlerden farklı alanlara aittirler. Pozitif hukuk derken Rousseau'nun demek istediği genel istenç ve özgürlük kavramları dahilindeki hukuk sistemidir. Genel istenci ise Rousseau, politik bütün ve insan bedeni üzerindeki karşılaştırma ile anlatır. Bu noktada, parça-bütün ilişkisi görmek mümkündür. Genel istenç hem bütün hem de parçadır. Toplumdaki insanların refahını sağlayan parçaları ve fonksiyonları olan bir bütün gibi. Ve genel istenç tek tek istençleri toplamı olan bir bütün değildir, bu tek tek istençlerin onun altında bir olabildiği bir bütündür. Bu yüzden, yasalar genel istence dayanır. Ayrıca genel istenci anlamak ve ona saygı duymak insanı erdemli yapandır. Rousseau'nun Aristoteles gibi vatandaşlık kriterlerini sıralamamasına rağmen -ki bu kriterlerin belirlenmesinde içinde yaşanan toplum ve toplumdaki katmanlaşmanın etkisi görmek gerek- birbirine benzer sorumluluklara sahip vatandaş profilleri belirttikleri görülür ve iki filozof için de vatandaş ve toplum anlayışını şekillendiren, yasalar sistemidir.

Diğer bir başlık olan kadınlar üzerine fikirlerine baktığımızda bu iki filozofun fikirleri birbirine oldukça yakındır. Her iki düşünür için erkekten sonra gelen, arka planda olma durumuna rağmen kadınlar, sosyal bağlamda özgürlüğü elinde

tutmaktadır. Tabi bu özgürlüğü çizen ve çizmesi gereken yine erkektir, Aristoteles ve Rousseau için. Kadın ve erkek arasında doğal ve inkâr edilemez bir fark vardır. Kadının rolü ev ve aile ilişkilerinden doğar. Aristoteles için, kadının ilk görevi soyun devamı için üretilir. Kadın ayrıca erkeğin yönettiği evi yine erkeğin düzeniyle çekip çevirmelidir. Aristoteles'e benzer şekilde, Rousseau da kadının işlevini anne ve eş olması üzerinden tanımlama eğilimindedir. Ve kadın toplumda bu doğrultuda eğitilmelidir; eşini mutlu etmeyi, çocuklarına iyi bakabilmeyi, evinde huzuru ve mutluluğu sağlayabilmeyi öğrendiği bir şekilde. Bu şekilde kadının içinde bulunduğu durum, toplum düzeni ile onaylanır.

Bu bölümün son başlığı olan iki filozofun eğitim üzerine düşünceleri açıklanırken, Aristoteles için, eğitim hakkındaki düşüncelerini kapsamlı bir şekilde anlattığı *Politika* kitabının sekizinci bölümü incelenmiştir. Aristoteles, vatandaşların ve çocuklarının eğitimi konusunun çok önemli olduğunu savunur. Bu eğitim tanımladığı özgür insana uygun olmalıdır. Özgür insanın ruhunu ve aklını zarar vermeyecek aşağılaştırmayacak bir eğitim olmalıdır. Fakat, Aristoteles öngördüğü ideal eğitimi ayrıntılandırırken hangi özelliğe önem verdiğini net bir şekilde sunmaz; bu özellik akıl mı karakter midir? Ayrıca Aristoteles, eğitimin içinde yaşanan devletin anayasasına göre şekillenmesi gerektiğini vurgular; fakat, bu anayasal sistemin belirli bir formunu açığa kavuşturamaz. Öte yandan Rousseau'nun eğitim anlayışı doğada başlar toplumda erdem çerçevesinde devam eder. Öncelikle çocuğun kendini ve doğayı tanıması sonra da içinde yaşadığı toplum ve diğer insanlarla ilişki kurmaya başlaması yapılan vurgudur. Her iki filozofun da son olarak odaklandıkları ise her vatandaş hem iyi bir birey hem de iyi bir vatandaş yapabilmek adına erdem temelinde bir eğitimi sistemidir.

Sonuç olarak, yirmi birinci yüzyıl gelişmiş endüstri toplumlarında bu iki filozofun sosyal bağlamda özgürlük üzerindeki düşüncelerinin yol gösterici ve geçerli olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Aristoteles, köleliğin toplumsal bir kurum olduğu bir toplumda yaşadı. Bu katı toplumsal katmanlaşma doğrultusunda, Aristoteles'e göre özgürlük zorunlu kol işlerinden sorumlular için mümkün değildi. Dolayısıyla bu kişiler vatandaş olamazdı. Ancak öncelikli bir azınlık -ki bunlar toplumun fiziksel ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak ile sorumlu olmayan, özgür olan insanlar olarak

vatandaşlığı hak ediyordu. Fakat günümüzde gelişmiş endüstri ve teknoloji sayesinde toplumun fiziksel ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaktan sorumlu tek bir sınıftan söz edemeyiz. Dolayısıyla Aristoteles'in tanımına karşı, vatandaşlık hakkını tek bir sınıfın hak ettiği söylenemez. Örneğin endüstriyel demokrasilerde işçiler yönetimde yer alır ve iş sorumluluklarını yöneticiler ile paylaşır. Ayrıca insanlar iş ve özel hayatına kapsamlı bir katkı sağlayacak enerji ve zamana sahiptir. Başka bir deyişle, işçi tanımı değişmiştir, çalışma saatleri belirlidir, bu yüzden insanların tüm gün çalışmasına ihtiyaç yoktur. Ayrıca insanlar fiziksel güçlerine dayalı olarak çalışmak zorunda değildir; fiziksel iş gücü endüstrideki makineleşme ile yer değiştirmiştir. Dolayısıyla insanlar sahip oldukları potansiyelleri fark etmek ve gerçekleştirmek için yeterli zamana sahiptir. Bu bağlamda sosyal sınıf üzerinden tanımlanan özgürlük ve vatandaşlık fikri geçerliliğini kaybetmiştir.

Aristoteles'ten farklı olarak, Rousseau'nun temel kaygısı sosyal bağlamda özgürlük kavramını açıkladığında, toplumsal kuruluşlarda ortak menfaate ulaşma çabasıdır. Bu noktada toplumsal düzen ve güven özgürlükle birleştirilmeli, yozlaşmış kuruluşlar ahlaki bir yapıya kavuşturulmalıdır. Bu noktada şu soruyu sorabiliriz: Tüm kuruluşlar iyileştirildiğinde toplum erdemli ve özgür olacak mı? Bu soruya olumlu şekilde cevap vermek olası görünmemektedir. Ayrıca Rousseau'nun ideal sistemindeki vurgunun erdemın yeter ve gerek koşulunun özgürlük mü olduğu, yoksa özgürlüğün yeter ve gerek koşulunun erdem mi olduğu ayrıştırılabilir değildir. Dahası Rousseau'a göre insanlar tüm hak ve güçlerinden egemen güç altında "bir" olabilmek adına vazgeçmelidir ve egemen güce itaat etmelidir; çünkü egemen güç hak ve adalet eşitliğini genel istenç sayesinde sağlayabilmektedir. Bu noktada, Rousseau bireyin istencine de önem verir. İnsanlar yani tüm yurttaşlar toplumun temel ögesidir ve onlar egemeni oluşturur, siyasal düzendeki yasaları yapar. Ancak bireydeki bu özgürlük ve erdem arasındaki ilişki bazı toplumlarda; örneğin komüniter toplumlarda zayıf bir şekilde görülür; çünkü toplumsal ilişkiler bireyin istencini ve kişiliğini kuvvetli bir yönden etkiler. Bu tür toplumlarda göze çarpan nokta bireyin özgürlüğünden ve istencinden ziyade toplumsal ilişkilere, kültürel bakış açısına ve öncelikli toplumsal kaygılara bağlılıktır. Diğer bir deyişle, Rousseau'nun toplum sözleşmesi teorisi ile genel istençle beraber özgür iradeye verdiği önemin komüniter toplumlarda görülemeyeceğidir.

B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

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Adı : Nesil

Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Freedom in the Social Context:

The Positions of Aristotle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

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