

POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL EMANCIPATION IN NIETZSCHE

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ABSTRACT

POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL EMANCIPATION IN NIETZSCHE

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This thesis analyzes whether political emancipation is possible or not in Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. In fact, it is an ongoing debate whether Nietzsche is a political thinker. Therefore, despite the fact that the issue of freedom is analyzed in several other places, political emancipation is not analyzed in the literature. Hence, this thesis aims to fill this theoretical gap. Nietzsche's works have extensive criticisms of modernity. In this regard, firstly, looking at the theories of political freedom, which are conceptualized in modernity, and how Nietzsche criticizes these theories are necessary in order to find out indications of political emancipation in Nietzsche. From this criticism, Nietzsche's concept of politics will be deduced. It will be seen that the politics is the struggle between nihilists and anti-nihilists and it is a struggle of their values. Secondly, the subjects of this political struggle will be analyzed in detail. Thirdly, the problem of values will be discussed. Finally, the issue of the political struggle for Nietzsche will be elaborated to reach a final answer. This dissertation attempts at bringing a different perspective on Nietzsche's philosophy.

Keywords: Nietzsche, Political Emancipation, Subject, Value

ÖZ

NIETZSCHE'DE SİYASAL ÖZGÜRLEŞMENİN İMKÂNI

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Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu tez, Friedrich Nietzsche'nin felsefesinde politik özgürleşmenin mümkün olup olmadığını analiz eder. Halihazırda, Nietzsche'nin politik bir düşünür olup olmadığı zaten tartışmalı bir meseledir. Bu nedenle, literatürde siyasal özgürleşme şeklinde bir kavramsallaştırma bulunmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez bu teorik boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Nietzsche'nin eserleri modernite hakkında kapsamlı eleştirilere sahiptir. Bu bağlamda, ilk olarak, Nietzsche'de siyasal özgürleşmenin emarelerini gün yüzüne çıkarmak için modernite içinde kavramsallaştırılan siyasal özgürlük teorilerine ve Nietzsche'nin bu teorileri nasıl eleştirdiğine bakmak gerekir. Bu eleştiriden Nietzsche'nin siyaset kavramı çıkarılacaktır. Siyasetin, nihilistler ve anti-nihilistler arasında geçen ve değerler üzerinden gerçekleştirilen siyasal bir mücadele olduğu görülecektir. İkinci olarak, bu politik mücadelenin özneleri ayrıntılı olarak analiz edilecektir. Üçüncü olarak, değerler sorunu tartışılacaktır. Son olarak da Nietzsche için siyasi mücadele sorunu, nihai bir cevaba ulaşmak için detaylandırılacaktır. Nietzsche'de siyasal özgürleşme hakkındaki bu tez, Nietzsche'nin felsefesine farklı bir bakış açısı getirmeye çalışır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nietzsche, Siyasal Özgürleşme, Özne, Değer

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A: The Anti-Christ

BGE: Beyond Good and Evil

BT: The Birth of Tragedy

D: Daybreak

EH: Ecce Homo

GM: On the Genealogy of Morals

GS: The Gay Science

HAH: Human All Too Human

PTAG: Philosophy in the Tragic Age of Greeks

TI: Twilight of the Idols

WP: The Will to Power

Z: Thus, Spoke Zarathustra

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The problem of political emancipation is not directly discussed by Nietzsche. In fact, there is an ongoing debate about whether Nietzsche is a political thinker at all.¹ Therefore, it is not unexpected that Nietzsche has not touched this issue directly. Whether the political emancipation is possible or not, is the main question of this dissertation. In other words, does emancipation anticipate a final reaching point? In search of an answer, this thesis also raises four other questions.

Before expounding the other questions, it is undeniable that Nietzsche's writings contain a criticism of the values of Christianity and modernity. He mercilessly criticizes the values that Christianity and modernity bring about. According to him, modernity is the age of nihilism because it continues the dominance of nihilist values which Christianity has discovered. And this criticism constitutes the core of his attack on modernity. Therefore, in order to find out the possibility of political emancipation in Nietzsche, looking at this criticism is inevitable.

Nietzsche's approach to emancipation develops around this criticism of the values of modernity and Christianity. Because they are the nihilist values, they make people slave. One should dispose of these values. Only then, s/he can become free to create own values. It is not possible without a political struggle which is given against towards nihilist values, because they make human a herd animal, docile body. Autonomy of human is precluded by such values.

¹ This debate will be discussed in the part of "Political or Antipolitical".

The political emancipation does require a negation of the nihilist values. This negation is necessary, however not enough. There is a necessity for the affirmation of new own values of individual by process of creation. In other words, both negation and affirmation are the sine qua non for the political emancipation. They are indispensable for a subject who wills to emancipate. They are “will to power”² of the anti-nihilist subject against the will to end of nihilism.

According to Nietzsche, “life is will to power.”³ This approach does not exclude the political. Accordingly, life approximates to political, because the core of life becomes a power struggle. Both nihilists and anti-nihilists seek for the power, nothing else. However, there is a clear distinction between the anti-nihilist will to power and nihilist understanding for the power. Nihilism is “powerless in the face of power”⁴. As he states:

Life itself appears to me as an instinct for growth, for survival, for the accumulation of forces, for power: whenever the will to power fails there is a disaster. My contention is that all the highest values of humanity have been emptied of this will—that the values of decadence, of nihilism, now prevail under the holiest names.⁵

On the one hand, there is a sublimation of life. This kind of power provides one to survive. On the other hand, there is nihilist power which makes the life unsustainable. Because of this kind of power, life inescapably goes to the end. Nietzsche openly sides with the will to power of anti-nihilists by criticizing the modern and Christian understanding of freedom. According to him, one should emancipate all of these values which are imposed by nihilism. Besides, he is also aware that nihilists and

² WP, Book I, §74

³ Ibid, Book II, §254

⁴ A, §16

⁵ Ibid, §6

their values are dominant in all sphere of life. Therefore, they seem to be powerful against the anti-nihilists.

The first question of this dissertation will be that: how does Nietzsche criticize the modernity? Answering this question is necessary to figure out why modernity is supposed to be an age of nihilism according to Nietzsche. The modernity, as a “willing of an end”⁶, should be stopped according to him. This claim occupies a very important place in Nietzsche’s thought. Therefore, it needs to be explained in detail. Also, making this analysis from the theory of freedom will approximate us to understand the problem of emancipation in Nietzsche.

At that point, we will reach a formula which elucidates the problem of emancipation in Nietzsche. The formula is that: the emancipation is a political struggle, which ends with the absolute defeat of nihilism, on the values between nihilists and anti-nihilists. There are three components of this formula—the subject, the values, and the political struggle—and every component will be discussed in a separate chapter in detail after the criticism of modernity.

The second question will revolve around the first component. It regards the nihilist and anti-nihilist subjects of the political struggle. In this part, characteristics of these subjects will be analyzed on the basis of “being” and “becoming”, as well as forming “collective” and “individual” distinctions. The aim of this part is to find a depiction of a subject of emancipation. This aim reveals us directly the opponent of this subject who is a nihilist.

The third question is about another component which is the values. According to Nietzsche, there are two sets of values, which should be elaborated, in the same vein with subjects: Nihilist values and anti-nihilist values. Nihilist values are dominant values which means they seem as powerful. As long as, they are dominant, going to

⁶ WP, Book I, §74

the end is inevitable. Especially, Nietzsche targets the religions and morality which breed such nihilist values in his writings. These values transform a human into a herd animal, in other words, a slave. They despise this world by grounding the values metaphysically. Against these values, there are dominated values which have the will to power for sublimation of life. These values should be emancipated from the dominance of nihilist values. Nietzsche favors the worldliness against the metaphysics, being master rather than a slave. The emancipation of dominated values of the anti-nihilist subject from dominant values of nihilist subject makes human master rather than a slave, sublimation of this world rather than the metaphysical world.

The last but not least question is about the political struggle. This part aims to reveal power relations between the subjects. Since nihilism and nihilist subjects are powerful, the anti-nihilists subject should reverse this power relation. In this part, the main tools, which are introduced by Nietzsche, and the problem of how they can be used in the political struggle by the subject of emancipation, will be discussed. These tools are genealogy, the will to power and eternal recurrence. All of them will be used by the anti-nihilist subject in order to defeat his/her opponent. Besides, there is a substantial aim of this part which is to figure out the main question of the dissertation which is the possibility of political emancipation. Namely, is political emancipation possible in Nietzsche? Does emancipation anticipate a final reaching point in Nietzsche?

The results, which are reached, will be analyzed in the final part of the dissertation. The answer to the main question of the dissertation will be given in this part.

CHAPTER 2

MODERNITY AND NIETZSCHE

2.1 His Life and Works

Nietzsche was born in 1844 as a son of a priest in a small German village. His father died when Nietzsche was a five-year-old child. He grew up with his mother and younger sister. He entered the University of Bonn as a theology and philology student and became a professor at the University of Basel when he was just 24 years old, and then he resigned at age 34. In 1888, he got a mental breakdown, and until he died in 1900, he never got better.

Despite his short life, Nietzsche is one of the main thinkers who influence contemporary intellectual life. Even though he is a philologist, his works involve much broader subjects than philology—namely art, religion, morality, politics, culture, psychology. Literature distinguishes his works into three periods of his life⁷. First is an early period that contains the influence of Richard Wagner and Arthur Schopenhauer. *The Birth of Tragedy* and four books of *Untimely Meditations* (1873-76) belong to this period. The middle period from *Human, All Too Human* (1878), to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883) is the transitional period from the influence of Wagner and Schopenhauer to his own philosophy. In the last period begins with *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche develops his own philosophical concepts some of

⁷ See for detail: Robert Wicks, “Nietzsche's Life and Works”.

which are “will to power”, “eternal return”, “genealogy”, “overman” and “master-slave morality”.

Nietzsche’s effect encompasses a wide range of thinkers such as Freud, Heidegger, Foucault, Arendt, Deleuze and so on. His effect is extensive because his intellectual life is developed around the deficiency of which modernity brings to us. This deficiency comes into existence as a result of the melting away of the old. If we put it with the words of the Marx and Engels:

All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.⁸

Nietzsche was four years old when the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* was firstly published in order to explain what modernity brings and takes away. When Nietzsche grew up and became a scholar, he, too, encountered with the state of that there did not remain any holiness, all solid melted away. His most famous statement of “God is dead” from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, refers to what “holy is profaned, and the all fixed, fast-frozen relations”, which are established by the values of religion, “are swept away”. In other words, premodern society is justified by religions and aristocratic values. However, the rise of the natural science brings the death of the God, and transformation in economic relations results with the end of aristocratic rules. These two make the annihilation of the old through extracting justification elements from the premodern society. If we put it by Weber’s words, “the world is disenchanted. One need no longer has recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed.”⁹

⁸ *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, p.16

⁹ Weber, *Science as a Vocation*, p.117

All modern thinkers, including Nietzsche, see this annihilation process, and their intellectual lives have passed away dealing with around this process. Well, how does Nietzsche see the modernity and modern subject? This is a crucial problem in order to understand the possibility of political emancipation in Nietzsche because his reactions towards modern society would contain answers to my main question of whether political emancipation is possible or not in Nietzsche. This chapter's main aim is to find out answers to these crucial problems about the modernity.

2.2 Political or Antipolitical

Before finding out answers to these questions, I should mention that there are two fundamental approaches regarding Nietzsche's philosophy in literature¹⁰. On the one hand, Nietzsche is an antipolitical philosopher and he cannot be evaluated as a political theoretician because of the absence of the systematic political theory in contrast to thinkers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who deal with systematically politically-related questions of state, freedom, individual, equality and so on. As Ansell-Pearson explains:

Nietzsche's political thought is often dismissed and ignored because it fails to conform to liberal and democratic sentiments which have prevailed over the last two hundred years. The moralistic way in which Nietzsche's political thought has been treated hitherto polarizes the debate between moral decency (the good liberal) and immoral or amoral power (the bad elitist-Nietzsche).¹¹

These two reasons pave the way for regarding Nietzsche as an antipolitical philosopher. For instance, Walter Kaufmann, author of *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, and Antichrist* (1974), appraises Nietzsche as an antipolitical German

¹⁰ Knoll and Stocker, "Introduction: Nietzsche as Political Philosopher"

¹¹ Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, p. 2

humanist in his book. Bernard Williams, Alexander Nehamas, Brian Leiter are the others who are in line with Kaufmann.¹²

On the other hand, there is another strong line of argument which sees Nietzsche's contribution to contemporary political thought as a significant one. For instance, Bonnie Honig, Wendy Brown, Dana Villa, William Connolly, alongside with numerous Nietzsche scholars such as Lawrence Hatab, Alan Schrift, and David Owen who benefit from his theory in analyzing the American democracy on a radicalized, postmodern and agonistic basis are the first to mention.¹³ Also, Keith Ansell-Pearson, among many, is one of the Nietzsche scholar, who analyzes him as a political thinker, and contributes contemporary liberal and feminist schools through an examination of how Nietzsche's thoughts resonate in.¹⁴

I will be in line with the second stream, which analyzes Nietzsche as a political thinker. Even though there is a lack of systematic analysis of the political questions, we cannot say that Nietzsche does not deal with politics. For instance, we can see his direct interest towards the state in his writings, such as *The Greek State* (1871) and the chapter "A Glance at the State" in *Human, All Too Human* (1878). Or, the topic of democracy is analyzed in his books *Human, All Too Human* (1878-80), *Daybreak* (1881) as well as the first four books of *The Gay Science* (1882). However, Nietzsche never envisages a clear form of the state or democracy. His criticisms and assessments give us only clues about how he thinks. This is valid for the political

¹² See Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An essay in genealogy*; Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche Life as Literature*; Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics".

¹³ See for detail Hugo Drochon, *Nietzsche's Great Politics*; Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*; Dana Villa, "Arendt, Nietzsche, and the "Aestheticization" of Political Action"; William Connolly, "Nietzsche, Democracy and Time", "The Nobility of Democracy: Nietzsche and Democracy", *Political Theory and Modernity*; Lawrence Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy*, "Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans"; Alan Schrift, "Nietzsche for Democracy?"; David Owen, *Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity. A Critique of Liberal Reason*.

¹⁴ See for detail Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, and "Nietzsche, Woman and Political Theory" in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*.

emancipation, as well. Therefore, I try to catch these clues from his writings and try to unfold Nietzsche's understanding of political emancipation.

Political emancipation comes into existence at the end of the political struggle. The political struggle¹⁵ occurs between the adversaries and their aim is to make their values dominant to the other values. These values are the principles, the norms which are created by the subjects of adversaries. These two moralities are referred in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. One is "master morality" which is appreciated as the creator of higher culture. The "overman" has such morality and is one of the adversaries in politics. The other is "slave morality" which serves to decadent, nihilist and lower culture. The agent of this culture is the "last man". The political is the struggle between the overman and the last man, the higher culture and the lower culture.

Another problem is the political emancipation. In the case of Nietzsche, I prefer to use word of emancipation rather than freedom or liberty, because the meaning of emancipation as a word is that the "process of giving people social or political freedom and rights" according to *Cambridge Dictionary*. That is to say, while we are using the word of emancipation, the action¹⁶ is preconditioned to freedom. When we look at Nietzsche, he defines himself as a philosopher with a hammer. His hammer is driven to stones, which keep him in a prison, in order to get free from all obstacles, i.e. the prevailing nihilist values, in the way of becoming "Übermensch" (higher man or overman).¹⁷ Therefore, destroying—namely stepping into action—is preconditioned by Nietzsche in order to be an overman.¹⁸

¹⁵ Christa D. Acampora conceptualized the struggle in Nietzsche in her book of *Contesting Nietzsche*. She named it agon and it is not only a political struggle according to her. Life's itself is an agon, a struggle. (Acampora, *Contesting Nietzsche*, p. 22) Besides, the issue of political struggle will be elaborated in the fifth chapter.

¹⁶ Namely, process of giving. However, all throughout thesis rather than giving, action should be thought in the sense of getting the freedom by getting rid of limitations, obstacles.

¹⁷ EH, part III, Thus Spoke Zarathustra §8

¹⁸ Ibid

Now we can analyze how Nietzsche criticizes the modernity. I propose to conduct this analysis on the basis of the theory of freedom. By this way, I aim to show both criticism of Nietzsche towards modernity and how Nietzsche's thoughts on emancipation differ from the other thinkers of modernity. This analysis will guide us in later chapters.

2.3 Theory of Freedom: Will, Reason, and Consciousness

The question of freedom has been a central one for almost all modern thinkers. Before moving into Nietzsche's own ideas, presenting a survey of how the question of freedom has been analyzed will give a good starting point. This analysis will also help us to understand Nietzsche's thoughts on emancipation.

Freedom will be explained by grounding on three main characteristics of the subject. These characteristics are "will, reason, and consciousness"¹⁹. All these three-modern understanding of freedom supposes a final point of emancipation or liberation. The freedom comes into existence as the result of the political. They aim to get this result. They aim at freedom as a final point.

2.3.1 Will

In this part, there will be an analysis of three thinkers who identify freedom with free will. These thinkers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke²⁰.

¹⁹ There are wide-range definitions of freedom—such as liberal, libertarian, republican, socialist. However, rather than using their definitions and become lost in ideological cleavages, I would like to highlight the subject of freedom and its characteristics. Since Nietzsche's thought of freedom is not bounded with ideological cleavages and it compels us to investigate subject profoundly—as will be analyzed next chapter in detail. This classification in searching idea of freedom would help us to understand Nietzsche better. Therefore, I follow the methodology of looking from the perspective of which characteristics of subject are put forward by the thinkers of modernity.

²⁰ I choose these three thinkers because all of them have conceptualization of subject in the state of nature and their understanding of freedom take form in this conceptualization.

According to them, as long as, the will is free and not determined by an external authority rather than by oneself, we can talk about freedom.

We begin with Jean-Jacques Rousseau who is one of the contractarian thinkers:

Free will is the first faculty that Rousseau attributed to the ‘Metaphysical and Moral side’ of man. Man is distinguished from the beasts that are guided solely by instinct; when man feels the impetus of the Nature ‘he realizes that he is free to acquiesce or resist’. Man’s freedom consists in nothing more than the ability to choose whether or not to follow his natural inclination or to choose between different inclinations.²¹

However, it is not easy to preserve this free will in the modern civil society and Rousseau searches to find a way to preserve it. According to him, freedom comes into existence in general will of society. One can be free as long as “each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”²² That is to say, each will give his power to decide and act to the general will of society and establishes the republic. In that way, “each individual will be forced to be free”²³ and general will, which is formed by each individual’s will, “legitimizes civil commitments which would otherwise be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to frightful abuses”²⁴.

According to another contractarian thinker Thomas Hobbes, “liberty, or freedom, signified properly the absence of opposition” and “a free man is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to.”²⁵ In the absence of any hindrances, “he classes all motives of the will

²¹ Douglass, “Free Will and the Problem of Evil: Reconciling Rousseau’s Divided Thought”, p. 642

²² Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book I, §6

²³ Ibid, §7

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part II, §11

as free and defines the limits of liberty in terms of things external to our consciousness. Any movement, therefore, whether the line of causality runs through the mind or from an external force, is a free movement if it is unimpeded.”²⁶

Because all humans have such a free will and human’s nature is selfish—in contrast with Rousseau—Hobbes’s main fear is that individual could be hindered in the state of nature by the other individual, therefore he employs the state on duty to protect individuals’ freedom which crystallizes in the will of individuals.

The final thinker, whom I will mention, is John Locke. Locke distinguishes freedom into two; one is in the state of nature, another is in a society. In the state of nature, “Freedom of nature is being under no restraint except the law of nature.”²⁷ In the same logic in society, “Freedom of men under government is having a standing rule to live by, common to everyone in the society in question, and made by the legislative power that has been set up in it.”²⁸ Namely, “a liberty to follow one’s own will in anything that is not forbidden by the rule, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.”²⁹ Like Hobbes, Locke defines freedom as an absence of hindrance. However, different from him, Locke mentions that there are three main rights of human—life, property, and liberty. These rights constitute the existence of human. Therefore, we can say that “Locke expands the formula to make freedom hinge on ‘the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it,’ so that for him freedom consists in ‘our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.’”³⁰ That is to say, free will is the existential part of human and nobody can prevent it.

²⁶ David van Mill, “Hobbes’s Theories of Freedom”, p. 445

²⁷ Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, chapter 4

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Scanlan, “J.S. Mill and Definition of Freedom”, p. 195

These are some thinkers of modernity who identify freedom with a will. All of them think that subjects have own will and act according to this will. Freedom crystalizes itself in the act of the will. If the will is master of oneself and its actions are determined only by oneself, we can say that the subject is free. Freedom goes along with the free will—namely acting, choosing and determining of oneself freely. As a result of the political, they would like to make all individual free by signing the social contract. The social contract is the guarantee of the will of the freedom in the society.

2.3.2 Reason

The second characteristic is the subject's reason. Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant³¹ are the main representatives of this stream. According to this stream, freedom goes along with the reason. As long as, subjects make a choice which is convenient to reason, they are free.

According to Descartes, “As for animals that lack reason, it is obvious that they are not free because they don't have this positive power to determine themselves; what they have is a pure negation, namely the power of not being forced or constrained.”³² The reason, as a faculty of judgment, is the determinant at that point. One should act according to what is true and good. And, what is good and true can be determined only by reason.

In Descartes, there are two grades of freedom. One is the highest grade of freedom, another is a lower grade of freedom. The highest grade of freedom is the making judgment through reason in order to find out what is true and good. And, “the will

³¹ I choose these two thinkers because they are the foremost thinkers of scientific rationalism in modernity. Firstly, Descartes is the founder of rationalist stream in philosophy, therefore it is must to address him. Secondly, explaining Kant's thoughts in this part will be helpful to understand Nietzsche's criticism of him—that will be analyzed further parts in detail.

³² Descartes, “(Letter) to Mesland”, 2.v.1644

(being freed from the bonds of custom and habit) spontaneously assents to them”.³³

On the other hand,

In terms of the lower grade of freedom, the true nature of the will is least realized because it can turn away from the clear-sightedness of reason as a result of the long occupation with custom and habit, and it is thus determined by external forces; all this is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in knowledge or a kind of negation.³⁴

That is to say, if one does not filter the knowledge, which comes from external, from the own reason and makes his/her choice according to unfiltered knowledge, s/he is in the state of lower freedom. Unfiltered knowledge abolishes the spontaneity of will because it offers to the will determined actions which can be predicted beforehand. It shows us our “souls are weak if there is a gap between our firm and decisive judgments concerning good and evil and our volitions to pursue or to shun. In other words, our wills are weak if our choices are not in accordance with our values.”³⁵ Contrarily, the will’s faculty of judgment or reason helps the will to free from these determined actions. All of these shows us “the highest grade of freedom the will and the intellect are not external to each other, something that is most evident in the will’s spontaneous assent to such perceptions.”³⁶ From the perspective of Kant, there are two aspects of freedom.

Practical freedom, in its negative aspect, is the will’s power to act (or to choose to act) without being causally determined by sensuous impulses, and, in its positive aspect, it is the will’s power to act motivated by principles whose source is not in sensuous impulses but rather in rationality itself.³⁷

³³ Christofidou, “Descartes on Freedom, Truth, and Goodness”, p. 640

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Hoffman, “Freedom and Strength of Will: Descartes and Albritton”, p. 256

³⁶ Christofidou, “Descartes on Freedom, Truth, and Goodness”, p. 640

³⁷ Pereboom, “Kant on Transcendental Freedom”, p. 541

Kant suggests to us a definition of freedom which entails mainly indeterminate action of the will. There are two sources of this indeterminate action. One is our sensuous impulses, another is our reason. Clearly, Kant favors the latter one because the first one cannot be grounded as a universal rule of morality. Only the latter can achieve this aim. In other words, “for Kant, freedom of the will only make sense, could only be made intelligible, as the determination of the will by a law of reason (the moral law)”³⁸.

Kant’s approach brings us a transcendental definition of freedom. This approach does not define the freedom as an ability to do otherwise. That is to say, freedom is not such an ability to break the chains or to abolish the limitations or to do immoral actions. Freedom is to do what is morally good or right and;

For as to what is to be morally good, it is not enough that it conforms to the moral law, but it must also happen for the sake of this law; otherwise, that conformity is only contingent and precarious, because the unmoral ground will now and then produce lawful actions, but more often actions contrary to the law.³⁹

In order to do what is morally good for the sake of the moral law, the reason is requisite. Therefore, for the freedom of the will, it is requisite as well. For Kant “Only a rational being has the faculty to act in accordance with the representation of law i.e., in accordance with principles, or a will. Since for the derivation of actions from laws reason is required, the will is nothing other than practical reason.”⁴⁰ If we try to put it with different words, “freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally refer to each other”⁴¹ and as long as wills of subjects, which are their reasons, autonomously conform this unconditional law, they become free.

³⁸ Uleman, “External Freedom in Kant’s Rechtslehre”, p. 597

³⁹ Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Preface*, (Ak 4:390)

⁴⁰ Ibid, Ak 4:412

⁴¹ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book I, Ch. 1, §6:29

To sum up, both Descartes and Kant aim to make free in the reign of reason or rational morality. It is the end where everyone is free. In such a state, everyone emancipates from the non-rational obstacles.

2.3.3 Consciousness

The third characteristic is the consciousness of the subject. Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx are the main representatives who advocate freedom comes with the consciousness of the subject. If we start with Hegel, we should analyze the progress of history or spirit in order to find what freedom is. According to him, freedom is to overcome the necessities. If we put it with different words, “a thing is unfree or subject to necessity, when it is bound to something that is external to itself and thus irrelevant to making it what it is. Such an external bond prevents the thing from being self-determining, and so from being free.”⁴² One should determine oneself without encountering any external necessity if we would like to say s/he is free. The consciousness of self-comes up at that point. According to him:

Personality begins not with the subject’s mere general consciousness of himself as an ego concretely determined in some way or other, but rather with his consciousness of himself as a completely abstract ego in which every concrete restriction and value is negated and without validity...Individuals and nations have no personality until they have achieved this pure thought and knowledge of themselves.⁴³

One can gain his/her personality only being conscious of oneself. Then, s/he can get rid of necessity and can be free. However, this is not possible for the human being as a finite⁴⁴ and socially dependent creature. In order to show this impossibility, Hegel

⁴² Dudley, *Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom*, p. 17

⁴³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §35

⁴⁴ For the discussion of finite and infinity in Hegel see: Andrew Davis, “Hegel’s Idealism: The Infinite as Self-Relation”.

gives example from the marriage. “They (couples) come to understand themselves not as individuals with pre-established and separate identities who are accidentally connected to each other, but as members of a union in which their very identity as individuals is constituted.”⁴⁵ Hence, in such unity “one is in it not as an independent person but as a member.”⁴⁶ Civil society and state are the other organizations which show independence of individuals each other. However, neither marriage, nor the others are unavoidable in the progress of history. On the contrary, the state is the best achievement of human beings. Well then, who is free, if such organizations put us into the relation of necessities and show us no one can escape such necessities?

...he is free who finds his interest in the public interest. As the public interests are the visible framework of the reason of the universe, to spend one’s self for them is not to negate one’s true being, but to enter into it. He who becomes one with a reasonable society in all its ramifications, becomes, also, one with the divine; and such a man is free.⁴⁷

As we saw, there are two moves of Hegel. Firstly, he destroys the freedom and then, he discovers in the progress of spirit—namely in the history. The goal of this progress is to be completed. The embodiment of this completeness is the state. “The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom; and it is an absolute end of the reason that freedom should be actual.”⁴⁸ Finally,

This completed spirit is self-consciousness, now at last wholly realized, and this realized self-consciousness is... “freedom”. History is nothing else than the development of the conception of freedom, and human beings are free if their insight corresponds to the reason realized in the world.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Dudley, *Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom*, p. 19

⁴⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §158

⁴⁷ Dyde, “Hegel’s Conception of Freedom”, p. 661

⁴⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §258

⁴⁹ Dyde, “Hegel’s Conception of Freedom”, p. 664

Marx transforms Hegelian historical idealism into historical materialism. According to Marx and Engels:

Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.⁵⁰

Because there is a history of the material production and the material intercourse, the subject of the history should be the one who changes the material world. I mean that if we look at the famous master and slave dialectics of Hegel, the main actor, who changes the material world, is the slave, not master. Therefore, a slave's life, his production and his intercourse with the material world determine his consciousness, not the other way around. Altering the world means altering the social relations at the same time. Marx carries Hegel's dialectics to prevailing social relations. On the one side, there is a working class which changes the material world, on the other, there is a bourgeois class which does nothing in the material realm other than exploiting the working class. Therefore, the agent of the history should be the working class.

Different from Hegel, according to Marx, the history's main goal has not been completed yet. The state is only one of the stages of the history. The main goal of the history embodies in communism where all classes will be abolished and thereby freedom will be actualized. Now, the working class is not free at all because it is exploited, and is estranged from its labor, which is the main characteristic of being human. Therefore, the estrangement of workers to their labor means being estrangement to the humanness. So that, the emancipation of the working class means to overcome this estrangement. This can be realized through the abolishment of the private property which is the main resource of exploitation.

⁵⁰ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, part 1

At that point, what is the role of consciousness in this process of emancipation of the working class? As I indicated, even though Marx transforms Hegelian historical idealism, he still uses the Hegelian dialectic. In order to answer my question, we should look at the notions of that class in-itself, class-for-itself, and class in and for itself. First is a thesis, second is the antithesis and the last one is the synthesis. Class in-itself is that:

Each mode of production - slavery, Asiatic, feudalism, capitalism - has a division of labor or set of interrelated but qualitatively distinct economic functions to be fulfilled. The different economic functions are the bases of the different classes in themselves. The goal of each mode of production is to extract surplus labor from the productive classes.⁵¹

Class in-itself explains us “objective life of classes”.⁵² Class for-itself is the realization of that there is a group of people which shares a common economic position and interests subjectively.⁵³ “The class-for-itself is a composite class consciousness and organization.”⁵⁴ This stage will unite the workers because they would have realized that they have the same goal. Finally, the last stage is the class in-and-for-itself. “This category represents of class-conscious organizations in political practice to transform the empirical world.”⁵⁵ Transformation of the world is realized at this stage and it paves the way for communism where the emancipation of workers—therefore humanity—realizes, as well. Passing one stage to another requires having different consciousness and these shows us freedom depends upon the consciousness of the working class.

⁵¹ J. Russel, “Dialectics and Class Analysis”, p. 478

⁵² Ibid, p. 479

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid

Hegel and Marx aim to reach a final point where everyone is free. On the one side, this final point crystalizes as the end of the history in Hegel; on the other side, it becomes communism in Marx. Everyone emancipates in such states as a result of the political.

2.4 Nietzsche's Reaction Towards Modernity

Modernity disenchant the world. It breaks the old relations, makes profane what is holy. In other words, the ground of all social relations flows away. Older power relations give their place to new ones. While all solid is melting into air, it invalidates what is the truth which belongs to old. Modernity means a social change which was never seen in history.

There are two main reasons for this social change. The first reason is the rise of the scientific knowledge; owing to it, religions lose their power, thereby dead of God actualizes. Secondly, change in economic relations; by means of it, new classes were born. Aristocracy loses its power to the bourgeoisie, vassals become the workers. These two main factors also bring an ungrounded society, take away justification of old relations and all thinkers of modernity try to understand what is happening. They attempt to create new grounds, on which new social relations can be established.

For instance, it is not a coincidence that one of the impressive books of Kant is the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). Morality has no any ground after religions lose their power. Religions have dominated morality for a long time, and even morality and religions could not be separated. Kant's work is to make this separation and grounds the morality on a new foundation because the religious knowledge loses its validity. Another important work of him, *What is Enlightenment?* (1784) directly shows us the curiosity of what is happening in the modern age. What the truth is unknown at this age because the old is no longer valid. Or, Marx sees that

exploitation of aristocrats ends, and in place of it, there establishes a new exploitation relation in which bourgeoisie exploit the working class.

In the previous section, I tried to expound how thinkers of modernity evaluate the freedom which is disposed of olden relations, thereby we can see how they attempt to make a new ground to new social relations. Now I will attempt to explain Nietzsche's approach and reaction towards modernity. While expounding it, I try to find indications which help me to understand whether emancipation is possible in Nietzsche and to answer that: does Nietzsche presupposes a final point where everyone becomes free?

First of all, I should indicate that there is the twofold aim of Nietzsche's works. One is to find a ground for the social change and to fill the void which modernity brings about. Another aim is not only to ground what modernity brings about but also to criticize what modernity engenders. In other words, Nietzsche reacted against the modernity. Now I would like to expound how these two are explained by Nietzsche and what modernity means to him.

According to Nietzsche, modernity is the age of nihilism. Then, what is nihilism? Nihilism is the disappearing of the meaning, depreciation of the life. It is the flowing of the ground under the values, meanings, institutions as a result of the death of God⁵⁶.

According to Lawrence Hatab:

[T]he death of God is not simply a religious issue, and it cannot be taken lightly. European thought had been gradually losing its religious core since the Renaissance, but the terrible implications of a godless world were not being faced. For Nietzsche, the death of God is equivalent to the end of truth.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ I confine myself to give a brief definition of nihilism for now. There will be a detailed discussion on nihilism in the following chapter.

⁵⁷ Hatab, "Nietzsche, Nihilism and Meaning", p. 93

Even though the death of God is necessary for Nietzsche, its impact is unignorable because all institutions had been justified until the death of God. Death of God is necessary, thanks to it, an illusion withered away as well.⁵⁸ According to him, god, religion, and morality are illusions which should be destroyed. However, without any justification human cannot live and this unjustified world goes to end. There is the necessity of a ground and of a meaning to the world. However, neither modern human nor modern institutions could have provided this justification and ground to this new world. In the passage, named as a “Critique of Modernity”⁵⁹, in *Twilight of the Idols*, he openly makes reference to that disintegration of the meaning of the world and it is going to end. All institutions of modernity serve this going to end. “The things that make an institution into an institution are despised, hated, rejected”⁶⁰ in the age of modernity. It is the age of “the radical repudiation of value, meaning, and desirability.”⁶¹ And, he says, despite many interpretations on this nihilism, that its root is, in fact, one particular interpretation, which is the Christian-moral one. At that point, we should ask that: how does modernity pave the way for such a radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirability and how does modernity continue to harbor nihilism despite the fact that God is dead, and religions begin to lose their power?

⁵⁸ Therefore, rise of science and its results are admired by Nietzsche. From this perspective modernity is an achievement. He says that “The historical and the natural sciences were necessary to overcome the Middle Ages: knowledge against faith.” (Nietzsche, *Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe* cited in Brobjer 2016; see also a detailed discussion about what science means to Nietzsche: Thomas H. Brobjer (2016), “Nietzsche’s Reading and Knowledge of Natural Science: An Overview” in *Nietzsche and Science*) Main problem for him, modern individuals cannot accept it. He explains this denial by a metaphor: while Zarathustra is climbing down from mountain, he encounters with a saint, who has not heard of that God is dead, in the second prologue of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The saint is a representative of the modern individual who denies the death of God. (Z, Prologue, §2)

⁵⁹ TI, p. 213

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ WP, Book I, part, §1

There are two answers to these questions. Firstly, he claims that modernity levels all ranks. It abolishes the differentiation among the different ones. Namely, it brings sameness to people. In the aristocratic order, people's rank is determined and there are boundaries between them. Modernity abolishes all these boundaries and makes people equal. It destroys the *pathos of distance*. The second critique is not specific to modernity, but Nietzsche still criticizes it for holding onto the same quality. This critique is that human should establish a relation with oneself without any mediators—namely having master morality. Before the modernity, religion is the mediator which establish a relationship between one and oneself. Despite the fact that God is dead, the mediator between one and oneself did not disappear but transforms its shape.

2.4.1 The Pathos of Distance or Equality Problem

The question of equality has been one of the main sociological problems. Judeo-Christian precept claims that all souls are equal in the eyes of God. This claim is brought to the political sphere by the French Revolution and its motto; “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*”. In the modernity, Judeo-Christian claim of equality has been secularized with the death of God. It brings its place to “the implications of scientific rationalism, which presumes a common capacity to apprehend universal and demonstrable truths” and “a metaphysical model of enduring, unified self that stands as a ‘substance’ behind its attributes”⁶². Descartes’ and Kant’s universalism, which base freedom in the human’s reason, are the example of scientific rationalism. The thinkers, who identify freedom with the will of the subject, enter “the metaphysical model of enduring” claiming that there is a “unified self that stands as a ‘substance’

⁶² Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy*, p. 57

behind its attributes”. In this part, I will attempt to show how Nietzsche criticizes these two approaches by claiming that equality is a sign of nihilism.

Nietzsche’s approach towards equality crystallizes itself in the notion of “pathos of distance”. Hence, we should track this notion. It is developed by Nietzsche in the last period of his writings. In *Twilight of the Idols*, it is well-defined: “‘Equality’... essentially belongs to decline: the rift between people, between classes, the myriad number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out what I call the *pathos of distance*, is characteristic of every strong age.”⁶³ And, he claims that in the age of modernity “The tension, the expanse between the extremes is getting smaller and smaller... the extremes themselves are ultimately being blurred into similarity.” Thus, “All of our political theories and constitutions...are consequences, necessary results of the decline...”⁶⁴

Horstmann defined this pathos “as the socially inherited ability to have a sense for differences in rank between persons, to accept these differences as pointing to differences in distinction (defined as a positive quality of worthiness), and to strive for higher distinction.”⁶⁵ In short, if a class has the pathos of distance, they are higher than the other, because they are “more complete people”⁶⁶ which means having will to be themselves, will to enhance the human. Their aim is “self-overcoming of man”⁶⁷. That is to say, according to Nietzsche, not everyone can overcome oneself. Only one, who can make a rank among people, his/her feelings, among the values of society and of oneself, has the pathos of distance. And, only one, who has such pathos, can overcome oneself.

⁶³ TI, p. 212

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ BGE, Introduction, §5

⁶⁶ BGE, §257

⁶⁷ Ibid

As we see that thanks to the pathos of distance, one establishes two-way relations at the same time. Firstly, one establishes a relationship with society. In this relation, one ranks the people and values of them and determines their places by saying that such is higher or lower than other. Secondly, one establishes a relationship with oneself. This relation helps oneself with self-overcoming and self-realization by determining of which values of him/her is higher or lower than other, and then by attempting to reach higher values for himself/herself. The latter relation could transform the first relation, because if one can realize oneself, it makes a higher position in society, as well. Since the latter can affect the first, it is more important. I will explain the second relation in the next part in detail, so let us focus on the first relation.

Descartes' and Kant's idea of freedom depicts a freedom which everyone can achieve it by using their reason. This brings about a radical equality among the people. No one remains outside of their theory. According to them, everyone has an equal ability to comprehend what the truth is. On the basis of this ability, all people are equal. Inevitably relation among the people should be based on this equality. Everyone has the faculty of reaching absolute morality, which is named as a value by Nietzsche. This attempt by Kant and Descartes, firstly, makes people equal because all of them have a reason since they were born. Secondly, it makes values equal by pulling them out of their context and creating a set of values which can be universally acknowledged.

However, according to Nietzsche, this equality abolishes differences between people. It levels people on the same ground. "The great are great in virtue of the feeling of difference between them and the ordinary. To make all equal is not to raise the lowest to the level of the highest, but rather to level down."⁶⁸ Descartes' and Kant's approach destroys the differences among people faculty of perceiving the world.

⁶⁸ Stern, "Nietzsche, Freedom, and Writing Lives", p. 94

Focusing on Nietzsche's criticism of Kant can help us to understand what equality means to him. Kant's theory of freedom aims to make human autonomous. At the same time, according to him, there should be moral values because they provide a ground where human sustain its life while attributing a meaning to it. Because of the death of God, religion no longer justifies moral values and this situation makes a desperate human condition. Moral values cannot be conditional and if they are, they would lose their validity. For the human condition to gain back its meaning moral values should be unconditional and universal. Conforming to unconditional and universal moral values which can be found by reason will make subject free and autonomous. This process makes human and its moral values inevitably equal.⁶⁹

Nietzsche sees this Kantian endeavor as cutting free of moral law from their religious sources. Even though this endeavor is valuable, he blames Kant not going further enough; because the subject could be autonomous not only by liberating moral law from its religious sources, but also thinking the moral law as a non-universal phenomenon. On contrary,

...Kant's response to the problem of the value of morality displaces the worth of morality from the moral subject (and the moral law) to what would redeem its strivings. But if what would redeem the strivings of the moral subject are external to it, then the worth of those strivings cannot be autonomous.⁷⁰

Nietzsche denominates Kant's effort as "absoluteness of feeling" which orders "here everyone must judge as I do (as Kant does)"⁷¹ and therefore this is selfishness.

For it is selfish to consider one's own judgement a universal law, and this selfishness is blind, petty, and simple because it shows that you have not yet

⁶⁹ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, part II, §5

⁷⁰ Bernstein, "Autonomy and Solitude", p. 197

⁷¹ GS, Book V, §335

discovered yourself or created for yourself an ideal of your very own—for this could never be someone else's, let alone everyone's, everyone's!⁷²

Because every description of action is only appearance “that our opinions about ‘good’ and ‘noble’ and ‘great’ can never be proven true by our actions because every act is unknowable...”⁷³ This renders Kant's moral values only one of the possible perspectives rather than universal. Claiming a perspective as universal paves the way for leveling of all human on the ground of being herd which is the subject of nihilist values. In order to explain well let us look at how he thinks about Christianity.

Christianity has been the most disastrous form of arrogance so far. People who were not high and hard enough to give human beings artistic form; people who were not strong or far-sighted enough, who lacked the sublime self-discipline to give free reign to the foreground law of ruin and failure by the thousands; people who were not noble enough to see the abysmally different orders of rank and chasms in rank between different people. People like this, with their “equality before God” have prevailed over the fate of Europe so far, until a stunted, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something well-meaning, sickly, and mediocre has finally been bred: the European of today.⁷⁴

In fact, Kant's universal morality works in the same way according to Nietzsche. It abolishes the rank between the people, ‘equality before God’ turns into ‘equality before the morality’ and a perspective, which cannot prove its truthfulness, dominates. This domination continues to reveal a herd animal and mediocre.

Nihilism as a normal condition leads Kant back to the postulates, but this compensatory mechanism could have been anticipated since the categorical imperative itself is heteronomous, driving a wedge between the self and its willing that undermines the autonomy of the will and alienates man from himself.⁷⁵

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ BGE, part 3, §62

⁷⁵ Bernstein, “Autonomy and Solitude”, p. 198

That is to say while Kant attempt to find a ground for the change in the modern society which comes with the death of God, this ground based on the equality of all. In the sense of equality, Kantian morality works as how Christian morality works according to Nietzsche. Naturally, this does not help people in order to get out from nihilism. Beforehand, Christianity breeds the mediocre and herd animal, which cannot actualize oneself, now Kant's compensatory mechanism does so by abolishing the difference between people. Hence, Kant's autonomous person has no such autonomy as Kant thinks and the reason is not enough to render a free person.

Now let us proceed to the second problem; the will. The will is perceived as "a metaphysical model of enduring, unified self that stands as a 'substance' behind its attributes" by the modern thinkers. I will examine them through how to make them human equal. The common criticism of Nietzsche lies on "the state of nature" theory.

In order to expound my claim, firstly I will begin with Rousseau. In Rousseau's theory, consent of subjects makes human free. That is to say, the subject thinks that "I shall obey only those powers to which I have freely granted my consent. It is the 'will' which is located at the source and ground of this consent."⁷⁶ This consent transforms into the "general will" of all. Every particular free will merges in general will. Therefore, as long as a subject obeys this general will, it makes every subject free. The general will is the symbol of the society's freedom.

Here arises a question: how does a subject choose in a good way? Because if a subject cannot choose in a good way, the general will become corrupted inevitably. Rousseau finds a solution by claiming that human is naturally good and "the free will wills only the good. All wrongdoing is the result of external causes whether that be a weak will or social degeneration."⁷⁷ As we see that according to him, a human can only will

⁷⁶ Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche, and Problem of the Will in Modernity", p. 167

⁷⁷ Ibid

what is good. This makes all human equal because human is equally good in the state of nature.

The other main defenders of “the state of nature” theory are Hobbes and Locke who comes from the liberal approach. If we start with Hobbes, he lived during the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the aim of all his theory is to protect the individual from such a war. He finds the solution as the creation of the strong state. According to him, a human has equal abilities and:

From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end...endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.⁷⁸

Therefore, the human is naturally selfish and there should be a guardian which protect one from another. At that point, there arises the state which is a protector. If only, everyone transfers their ability to harm the state, individuals can be free.

Even though Locke is a liberal too, he thinks in a different way. Locke thinks that “A state of nature, properly understood, involves men living together according to reason, with no-one on earth who stands above them all and has authority to judge between them.”⁷⁹ Because every individual lives according to reason and they have an equal reason, the state of nature is different than Hobbes’ state of nature and it is peacefully. Yet similar to Hobbes, Locke establishes his theory of freedom as having equal human nature and same abilities.⁸⁰ However, while Hobbes aims to justify the existing of state, Locke’s main is by assuming of equal capacity to justify market

⁷⁸ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part 1, §13

⁷⁹ Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, chapter 3

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, chapter 2

society.⁸¹ In other words, his individuals are equally rational men who can pursue their advantages freely in the market regardless of existing any government or ruler.

As we saw that ideas of freedom of Rousseau, Hobbes, and Locke are based on the equality of free will. Equality and freedom interlace together. When one is abolished, the other one has swept away. Well then, now we can look at how Nietzsche criticizes the “free will” and by criticizing it, opens a way unequal ranking between subjects.

According to Nietzsche, the logic behind the free will is that every subject could will the same thing and in the same way. Therefore, this logic ignores the pathos of distance—namely sense for the difference between people, things, and values. Equality of all brings into the open responsible human from his/her deeds. If one chooses not to participate general will of Rousseau, or not to transfer his/her ability to harm to state, or not to be part of market society, s/he is responsible for his/her choice because s/he is equal with others and others already made their choices against him/her.

That particular task of breeding an animal with the prerogative to promise includes, as we have already understood, as precondition and preparation, the more immediate task of first making man to a certain degree necessary, uniform, a peer amongst peers, orderly and consequently predictable.⁸²

From this aspect of “free will” is not free at all. On the contrary, human, who has such a “free will”, is an example of “sublime self-deception, whereby the majority of the dying, the weak and the oppressed of every kind could construe weakness itself as freedom, and their particular mode of existence as an accomplishment.”⁸³ Therefore, “...Nietzsche is exposing the illusion of sovereign individuality which

⁸¹ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p. 245

⁸² GM, Essay 2, §2

⁸³ Ibid, Essay 1, §13

consists in believing oneself to be free when one, in fact, is enslaved.”⁸⁴ Hence, equality of all, in fact, is being equal in being enslaved. Modernity, as an age of nihilism, degrades human’s value to the fewest value and at the fewest value, all humans become equal. Therefore, modernity is the age of that mediocre man and his values are dominant to higher values. If one realizes that s/he and his/her values are not equal to this mediocre man and his values, and then, s/he becomes free and autonomous. And, this realization is the very first step in the way of emancipation.

Until now, we saw that Nietzsche’s theory of freedom excluded both “reason” and “will” of the subject. The subject cannot be free by his/her “reason” and “will” in the sense of modernity, because both make the subject equal. Equality results with the devaluation of higher values, namely nihilism. Now, we can look at the second criticism of Nietzsche towards modernity.

2.4.2 Master Morality

Nietzsche’s second main critic towards modernity is that modernity is the rising of slave morality against the master morality. Throughout *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887) which belongs to the last period of his writing life, he makes a comparison between master morality and slave morality and searches for the origin of them. He explains how slave morality defeats the master morality and becomes dominant. This domination is not special to modernity. It begins with Plato⁸⁵, goes forward with Christianity, and finally, transforms into the shape of modernity. In this part, I will expound what master morality is.

⁸⁴ Ansell-Pearson, “Nietzsche, and Problem of the Will in Modernity”, p. 175

⁸⁵ See for detail about how Plato is the very first nihilist: WP, §141, §142, §143, §195, §202, §214, §374, §412, §427, §428, §430, §431; also, Catherine Zuckert, *Nietzsche's Rereading of Plato*, Lawrence J. Hatab, *Nietzsche, Nihilism and Meaning*, Daniel R. White and Gert Hellerich, *The Liberty Bell: Nietzsche's Philosophy of Culture*.

Nietzsche's one of the main aims is to explicate that one should establish a relationship by oneself without any intermediary or mediator. In order to explain this claim, we should look at the master morality, because master morality is the crystallization of how one should establish a relationship by oneself without any intermediary. This relationship is directly established by the master with him/herself.

This relationship can be explained by contrasting how the master and the slave evaluates 'good' and 'bad' respectively. Nietzsche looks at the origins of these concepts and shows us that:

[T]he judgment 'good' does not emanate from those to whom goodness is shown! Instead, it has been 'the good' themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as good, I mean first-rate, in contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was from this pathos of distance that they first claimed the right to create values and give these values names: usefulness was none of their concern!⁸⁶

That is to say masters and their actions are *good* because they are the noble, powerful and higher. *Good* refers to the masters who have the pathos of distance and decide what good is. If we look at the notion of *bad*, it refers to what is not *good*. By way of explanation, the notion of *bad* grows out of a negation of *good*. This is how the masters form their values. Their nobility gives them the right to name things as *good* or *bad*. Therefore, they establish a relationship by themselves without any intermediary.

When examining the slave morality, this claim will be understood more clearly. "[S]lave values are somehow a product of the feeling of resentment" and "slave morality differs from noble morality in that it involves a distinct method of valuing (i.e., reactionary as opposed to spontaneous) and not just a distinct (i.e., inverted) set

⁸⁶ GM, Essay 1, §2

of values.”⁸⁷ Let us proceed with notions of *good* and *bad*. Because of the resentment, slaves, who are low-minded, common and plebian with no pathos of distance, feel anger against the nobility. This anger affects their evaluation of values. According to them, because masters are mightier, more powerful and higher than slaves, they and their actions should be *evil*. From this moment on, the method of evaluation is inverted. *Good* is no longer good. It becomes *evil*. Then, slaves begin to think that if they are *evil*, and we (slaves) are not one of them, we and our actions should be *good*. From now on, all values are reversed. All higher values become lower and lower become higher.

This process shows us how slave morality paves the way for establishing a relationship of slaves through themselves. Intermediary interrupts the relationship of which is established by oneself. There should be a mediator in order to complete this relationship. This mediator becomes nobility, in this case, however, if we define nihilism as J.M. Bernstein, we can generalize that in order to defeat nihilism, we should abolish all kind of mediators. According to Bernstein:

...nihilism is the socio-historical actuality of object-oriented, heteronomous moral thought. In its most emphatic sense, nihilism refers to the fact that peoples have sought the meaning of their lives in objects outside themselves, in objects that they, or their ancestors or betters, have created.⁸⁸

In this regard, slave morality is object oriented-morality, because slaves objectify the masters and their actions, then meanings—namely values—consist these objects which are outside themselves. In order to have a master morality, one should establish a relationship by oneself without an intermediary—such as an object. One should define oneself and his/her actions directly, not through a mediator.

⁸⁷ Morisson, “Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals”, 231-32

⁸⁸ Bernstein, *Autonomy and Solitude*, p. 196

For instance, Nietzsche's all criticisms towards socialism are welded socialist party's domination of the subject.⁸⁹ This domination paves the way for that subjects cannot create a unique value set, because, in order to create a unique value set, one should establish a relationship by oneself without an intermediary—such as class. In the same vein, one cannot define oneself as being an agent of history. If history has such an aim, the individual becomes only part of it. It means that we start to define the individual not directly, contrarily through history. Every attempt which loads to individual a mission through a mediator effaces the individual's freedom because we start to define it by the mediator. Therefore, the individual becomes a slave rather than a master. Master has own set of values and it defines itself through values which are created by oneself. This brings about to the individual an unmediated relation through oneself.

To sum, Nietzsche depicts two main characteristics which subject must have but modern subjects lack. One is the *pathos of distance*—having a sense of ranking between people and values—another is the master morality—to establish a relationship without an intermediary. These two characteristics give subject new weapons which will be used in creating the subject's own values and defeating nihilism. On the other side, even though modernity purports to make subject free and autonomous, it is only continuity of nihilistic Christianity ideas. Death of God only gives these ideas secular shape. While thinkers of modernity have been grounding the unfounded society because of the death of God and birth of the new social classes, they take the values, which will ground these changes in society, from Christian world and present as they are new. Therefore, for Nietzsche, modernity is not more than a cohesion to nihilistic Christian values.

⁸⁹ Criticisms of Nietzsche towards socialist party will be explained in the following chapter in detail.

2.5 Implications and Afterwards

For Nietzsche, modernity is the age of nihilism. It is nihilism because it harbors the Judeo-Christian values in itself. These values could be transformed by the thinkers of modernity; however, they preserve the substance of Judeo-Christianism—such as equality of all and relationship by oneself with an intermediary. Emancipation could be realized only by defeating the nihilistic values and creating higher values in place of them. At that point, we encounter with what is political in Nietzsche. The political is the struggle between the subject of nihilism and the subject of higher values, which actualized through the values. On the one hand, there is a subject who tries to preserve the olden values of nihilism. On the other hand, there is a subject who attempt to create new values which help him/her to realize oneself. Thereby, political emancipation means to emancipate from the nihilistic values and realize oneself.

From this perspective, there are two main problematics. One is the subject and another is the value. Therefore, I should analyze them in detail in order to answer my question of the possibility of political emancipation in Nietzsche. In the second chapter, I will be dealing with the subject, and in the third, I will look at the value. In the final chapter, I will analyze the problematic of political in detail and I will attempt to find the final answer through this problematic.

CHAPTER 3

THE SUBJECT OF EMANCIPATION

In order to answer the question of whether political emancipation is possible in Nietzsche's philosophy, we, firstly, should analyze the question of the subject as it is inherently related to the problem of political emancipation. The possibility of emancipation requires the existence of a subject. Refusing the possibility of the subject of emancipation in the first place would directly mean that political emancipation is not possible. Therefore, this problematic compels me to search for a political subject in Nietzsche's philosophy. Also, as Warren argues "...no political theory, post-modern or otherwise, can do without concepts that in one way or another, identify capacities of subjectivity. The reason is that concepts of subjectivity unavoidably define what it means to view humans 'politically'"⁹⁰. Therefore, the discussion, which will be held in this chapter, becomes more important.

Moreover, this chapter argues that in Nietzsche's writings, there should be a subject which is considered as a politically constitutive agent. As Ansell-Pearson states that:

By attempting to formulate questions of freedom ('will') and action ('power') in a way which shows their inseparability, Nietzsche is subverting traditional construals of the relationship between the subject (the 'free' will) and power in political theory. Thus, instead of conceiving of a subject which exists prior to its social and historical formation by relations in terms of their being constitutive of the human subject.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, p. 6

⁹¹ Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche contra Rousseau*, p. 111

Therefore, we cannot think a subject who is apolitical and remains outside this power relations. However, whether the Nietzsche's subject could be understood as the active agent of political emancipation is a different question and it is this chapter's aim to elaborate on that.

The Nietzschean political subject is a non-metaphysical subject. He approaches the issue of the subject in that way:

Pointing out that Western philosophy gradually has reduced all categories of the agency to “willing”—the ultimate ground of the soul, the ego, the “I”—Nietzsche reduced willing itself to a series of contingent processes that no longer have a strictly “internal” or subjective character. In this way, he removed the last and most fundamental ground of metaphysics, the idea of a unified agent as the underlying originator of phenomena.⁹²

Therefore, he thinks the subject “as self-interpretations possessing value as conditions of willing.”⁹³ This aspect of the subject makes it active because there is a subject which wills to interpret oneself and to have own values. This active subject destroys all the metaphysical interpretations. By this way, s/he becomes able to create values. On the one side, there are the nihilistic values which attribute to subject metaphysical presuppositions—i.e. soul, ego, or “I”, and on the other side, Nietzsche puts, a subject who wills to abolish all these presuppositions regarding the subject. At that point, the subject attempts to overcome nihilism by overcoming metaphysics. This is the power struggle of determining the values—hereby a political struggle on values. The subject wills to power for being free to determine oneself.

If I put it in different words, as Ansell-Pearson indicates, all subjects are the part of this power struggle, namely they are the part of political struggle—because Nietzsche abolishes the all metaphysical presuppositions about the subject, there does not remain any subject other than who is the part of the power struggle. Every subject is

⁹² Warren, “Nietzsche and Political Philosophy”, p. 195

⁹³ Ibid

affected by this power struggle. However, only when the subject becomes active—namely the creator of his/her own values—s/he becomes the subject of emancipation.

Nietzsche “views modern forms of subjectivity as ambiguous achievements: valuable in their capacities, but uncertain in their identities.”⁹⁴ Therefore Nietzsche attempts to ascribe certain characteristics to the subject. The aim of this chapter is to identify these certain distinctions.

There are two main distinctions of the subject of emancipation in Nietzsche. The one is that being the subject of emancipation is a never-ending process, it is a becoming. Ansell-Pearson indicates that:

What is required to realize this task is the coming into being, the birth, of what Nietzsche named the over-human, that is new human beings who have gone beyond man the sick animal and constituted themselves as the over-human (Übermensch). ‘We’, Nietzsche taught, ‘must become those that we are’...In becoming those that they ‘are’, the over human ones will become men and women whose identities surpass anything...⁹⁵

Lippit claims that: “For Nietzsche, there is no unchanging entity that constitutes the self.”⁹⁶ This endless changing of self, which is becoming of political subject, is in evidence in the book which is *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the part of *The Three Metamorphoses*. Therefore, I will analyze this part in depth in order to find out the meaning and the process of becoming as the first distinctive quality of the political subject.

Secondly, I will analyze the subject from the principle of individuality and collectivity. In other words, could the subject of emancipation be collective or individual? Let me put it another way: While “Nietzsche's political thought centers

⁹⁴ Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, p. 2

⁹⁵ Ansell-Pearson, “Nietzsche, Woman and Political Theory”, pp. 45-6

⁹⁶ Lippit, “Nietzsche, Zarathustra and the Status of Laughter”, p. 42

on what it sees as the need for a ‘self-overcoming of man’⁹⁷, what is the place of the collectivity of human being; namely the society in a self-overcoming of man? Can we say that the Nietzsche’s philosophy is individualistic? From this analysis, I will attempt to specify certain characteristics which belong to the subject.

3.1 Three Metamorphoses

Now I would like to touch on a famous part of Nietzsche’s most well-known book which is *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. This book “is the first fully mature work, in which one can find most of the central themes and arguments of the mature period.”⁹⁸ Also,

“Nietzsche assigns to Zarathustra as a teacher of redemption who appears at a certain juncture in man’s evolution to deliver a teaching of redemption. It is a teaching about the nature of time and history designed to show how nihilism can be overcome and a Dionysian affirmation and celebration to life attained”⁹⁹

Among all parts of the book, we can find the most crystallized version of subject’s becoming in this part of the book. Besides the characteristic of becoming, we can also find that how nihilism can be overcome, how subject redeems to be a nihilist. “*The Three Metamorphoses*” where Nietzsche tells us three metamorphoses of a spirit—namely the subject. Also, we will find out how active and passive subject are depicted by Nietzsche through these metamorphoses.

⁹⁷ Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, p. 28

⁹⁸ Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, Preface, p. xiv

⁹⁹ Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche contra Rousseau*, p. 152

3.1.1 The Camel, the Lion, and Nihilism

The camel and the lion are the first two metamorphoses of the spirit. Even though they are different from each other, their commonality is to be a nihilist. As they, cannot create any newness in their own states, we can call them representatives of nihilism. Therefore, I think we can analyze them together based on this commonality. Firstly, I will expound the metamorphoses and then I will try to show how they are nihilists.

When we look at the metamorphoses of spirit, we see that spirit firstly changes into a camel. Camel is an animal whose one of the most important characteristics is to carry the things that belong to others. It is very strong to carry heavy loads without any reluctance and tiredness. It can travel in one of the most unfavorable places, i.e. deserts. Spirit is loaded with burdens of others. These are not the spirit's own burdens but rather the prevailing values of the society in which spirit lives. For instance, moral laws, religions and their values, which have been revealed for many years, are burdens that spirit is loaded with. Nietzsche says that "All these heaviest things the weight-bearing spirit takes upon itself: and like the camel, which, when burdened, speeds into the wilderness, so the spirit speeds into its wilderness."¹⁰⁰ We understand that spirit as a camel does not live in a place where is good for itself. It is wilderness as no plant can flourish neither in the desert nor in camel itself. As Gooding-Williams stated that: "Nietzsche's protagonist normally enacts the first metamorphosis of the spirit, symbolized by the figure of a camel, upon encountering representations of repetition that discourage his desire to create new values and to inspire others to do the same."¹⁰¹ In other words, the camel does not bring any newness. It is the agent of

¹⁰⁰ Z, part I, §1

¹⁰¹ Gooding-Williams, *Zarathustra's Dionysian Modernism*, p. 32

prevailing values and these values seem to it as a burden. At this state, it is not possible to create new values.

However, this stage is bound to transform itself.

But in the loneliest wilderness, the second metamorphosis happens: here the spirit becomes a lion; it will seize freedom and become master in its own wilderness. Here it seeks its last master: it will fight him, and its last God; for victory, it will struggle with the great dragon. What is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer inclined to call Lord and God? “You shall,” is what great dragon is called. But the spirit of the lion says, “I will.”¹⁰²

This metamorphosis is important since it is the first-time which spirit disobeys external rules and it no longer accepts to carry other’s burdens. It says, “sacred No”¹⁰³ to the values of others. It cannot be loaded by burdens. By repudiation of carrying the burden, camel is no longer a camel since it also denies being a camel. It lost its main characteristic; therefore, it changes into a lion. Lion is a powerful animal which could negate the values that do not belong to itself. Lion is “in defiant opposition to this representation of repetition”¹⁰⁴ of the old values. According to Nietzsche, it is not enough to be opposed, and there still is a way to go in front of the spirit. Lion cannot create anything. Nevertheless, lion’s importance comes from that “As a figure of intermediate between the camel and the child, the lion personifies a freedom *from* Christian values and a freedom *for* the creation of new ones (emphasizes original).”¹⁰⁵ However “in becoming a lion Zarathustra can persist in his commitment to becoming a new-values creator, because as a lion he believes that he can create new values—though in fact, *qua* lion, he cannot.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Z, part I, § 1

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Gooding-Williams, *Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism*, p. 32

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 39

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, pp. 39-40

At that point, there arises the problem of nihilism. If spirit dwells in this stage, it becomes nihilist as was a camel. Camel's nihilism comes from not questioning the values in which it lives. Its life consists of absolute conformism. Lion's nihilism is destroying all of the values; therefore, its life becomes meaningless and ungrounded. One may ask that if a camel's life has a meaning and ground, how can it be a nihilist? It is because, the values of the camel are illusionary, false and in decay. And this ground is destined for melting away. Hence, both are living in the desert which "is Zarathustra's figure for the impoverishing impact of ascetic self-denial human existence."¹⁰⁷

Now we can expound what nihilism is. There are two kinds of nihilism that Nietzsche talks about. The one crystallizes in this definition: "What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves."¹⁰⁸ By this definition, Nietzsche refers to the attitude of a camel. Camel does not question the prevailing values. All it can do is to carry them. In order to do that it degrades the highest values because it cannot attempt to reach these highest values by carrying the lowest ones. These values are welded from the Christianity and the morality that comes with Christianity. "Rather: it is in one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is rooted."¹⁰⁹ Christianity is responsible for the abolishment of the pathos of distance and inventor of the intermediary while one is establishing a relationship by oneself. This intermediary is the God. Because of the Christianity one defines oneself and his/her values through the God. These people who have slave morality, have neither power to determine own values, nor will to such power. Therefore, Christianity and its values are decadent and nihilist.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 36

¹⁰⁸ WP, book I, §2

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, book I, §1

Kantian “morality is the continuation of religion but by other means; knowledge is the continuation of morality and religion but by other means. The ascetic ideal is everywhere, but means of it change, they are no longer the same reactive forces.”¹¹⁰ That is to say, despite the morality seems to not share the same foundations anymore, this not true. Morality is the continuance of religion. Both serve the nihilistic values which are a repudiation of the highest values. Kant’s morality continues to be the characteristics of slave morality as discussed previously.

As Ansell-Pearson indicates the highest values in that way: “Western metaphysics and religion have denied, or denigrated, the sensual, bodily aspects of finite human existence.”¹¹¹ This denial of worldliness paves the way for “will to nothingness”¹¹². According to Weber, “the greater other-worldliness of Catholicism, the ascetic character of its highest ideals, must have brought up its adherents to a greater indifference toward the good things of this world.”¹¹³ This ascetic ideal wills nothing in this world and the individual, who lives according to this ideal, namely the camel, is the agent of these nihilistic values and those values do not allow an individual to bring newness to his/her life. Ansell-Pearson puts it in that way: “When Nietzsche speaks of the advent of nihilism in terms of the arrival of the un-canniest of all guests, he claims that he is describing what is coming and what can no longer come differently.”¹¹⁴ In other words, camel’s burdens were determined long before from the birth of camel. It is destined to live with these burdens which bring nothing new

¹¹⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, part III, §12

¹¹¹ Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, p. 200

¹¹² GM, Third Essay, §14

¹¹³ Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 7

¹¹⁴ Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, p. 200

rather than a repudiation of this world. This is the nihilism which is named by Deleuze as “negative nihilism”¹¹⁵.

Now I would like to mention the second type of nihilism which is the “reactive”¹¹⁶.

This type of nihilism is:

...that becoming has no goal and that underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself completely as in an element of supreme value, an escape remains: to pass sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a *true* world. But as soon as a man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a *true* world. Having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the *only* reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities – but *cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it*. (emphasizes original)¹¹⁷

Now we can clearly see in which way the lion is a nihilist. We can also understand the lion’s world perspective. Lion is no longer a camel. It does not believe in the metaphysical world. However, it seeks neither becoming nor unity as a camel does. However, this standpoint makes the lion look at the world as worthless because “...the categories “aim,” “unity,” “being” which we used to project some value into the world-we pull out again...”¹¹⁸ If we put it in that way, the camel has values even if these values are the lowest ones. However, the lion does not have any values including even the lowest ones. This state of having no value, on the one hand, differentiates the lion to the camel but on the other hand, they meet on a common point of the nihilism.

¹¹⁵ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, part V, §1

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid, part III, §12

¹¹⁸ Ibid

This latter type of nihilism is preferable than the former because lion “creates itself freedom for new creating...”¹¹⁹ Namely, the state of being of a lion is inevitable if one wants to emancipate. Deleuze states lion’s situation in that way:

Nihilism has ... more colloquial sense. It no longer signifies a will but rather a reaction. The supersensible world and higher values are reacted against, their existence is denied, they are refused all validity—this is no longer the devaluation of life in the name of higher values but rather the devaluation of higher values themselves. Devaluation no longer signifies life taking on the value of nil, the null value, but the nullity of values, of higher values.¹²⁰

In order to make my point clear: the lion repudiates the prevailing values. At this stage, the spirit realizes that there are no objective values. Until that point, religions, and moralities are structured on the claim that their values are the objective and only truth. However, the lion sees that these claims are not true. Despite being aware of all values are the result of a perspective, it cannot create new values. Therefore, it is still nihilist. Reginster defines nihilism in that way: “nihilism is the belief that existence is meaningless”.¹²¹ It is the feeling of falling down to void or a nothingness due to slipping out of the ground which is under the subject. Let me elaborate it in that way: if there is no god and all religious values, which grounds the life, the values become the “perspective standing” rather than “objective standing”¹²², and our existence falls into nothing. Our lives become meaningless because our values are not more than a lie, an illusion which is imposed upon us by the false authorities and this is the state of second nihilism in which lion dwells in.

To sum explanations of these two kinds of nihilism, the commonality of them is to not bring any newness to human’s life. They do not allow an individual to create new values. One does it by conforming to prevailing values, and by paving the way for

¹¹⁹ Z, part I, §1

¹²⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, part V, §1

¹²¹ Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life*, p. 21

¹²² Ibid, p. 26

the devaluation of the highest values—i.e. camel. Another does it by bringing an existential crisis, which is meaningless of life, to human—i.e. lion. And, their life is ungrounded.

Nevertheless;

The advent of nihilism has become necessary for our time because it represents ‘the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals’, and this means that we have to experience nihilism before we can find out what values these ‘values’ really had.¹²³

That is to say being a lion is a stage of preparation for creating new values in the name of life. In other words, without negating the prevailing values and entering into a state of a lion, one cannot create new values. Repudiating the old values is a necessary step in the way of emancipation.

After this step, the lion changes into a child. This is the third and the most important metamorphosis as the spirit emancipates through this change by creating its own new values. “Innocence is the child, and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes.”¹²⁴

3.1.2 The Child

Spirit is no longer a nihilist because it does not repudiate this world and its own worldliness for the sake of the values of others, and the meaningless of life fades away after the creation of the spirit’s new own values by the child. I think the metaphor of a child explains us enough. Children’s main characteristic is to have the will to create new things, i.e. new games and their rules...

¹²³ Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, p. 200

¹²⁴ Z, part I, §1

Children do not think about the metaphysical world because they cannot. They have only this world, and they live the world like playing the game. For this game, they need new rules and they make these rules on their own without asking any other. Their rules are not a burden for themselves because they know that they are the rule makers and whenever they want, they can change the rules. They play the game according to their will. No one can get the child carried the burden of which child does not want to. However, the child knows that s/he cannot play a game without any rule. Therefore, spirit knows, as well, it cannot live without any value.

Both his view that untruth is a condition of life and his metaphor of the eternal child imply that Nietzsche denies the possibility of a millennial elimination of illusion and falsification. To recognize, as the free spirits do, the necessity of illusion is not to realize that everything is false and that the only thing one can do is to produce more and more “mere” illusions and interpretations for their own sake.¹²⁵

A game’s rule could seem objective and unchangeable, likewise, the world seems to camel based on unchangeable values. But for the child, these values are illusionary and changeable. As Reginster states “Although objective values do not really exist, we can create them much in the same way as, when we were children, we invented games to play.”¹²⁶ What child—as a free spirit—does, is to produce more and more illusions and interpretations for its own sake to play the game. It produces them because of the necessity of illusion. The life, as a game to a child, must go on, and for the sake of going on, there must be the values which are created by the child. This metamorphosis stage is very important because it emancipates the spirit from the nihilistic values thanks to the creation of spirit’s new own values.

I would like to expound this claim through a characteristic of the children. The children always will to have or to do something. To will is one of the main characteristics of a child. If it is appropriate to say that while the child is growing up,

¹²⁵ Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, p.61

¹²⁶ Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life*, p. 10

s/he rationalizes her/his will according to the demands of the society. This rationalization process of society teaches one to that when, where and how to will something. While growing up, everybody preaches one, you are not a child anymore and you should will properly and reasonably. So, as a child, one can will anything as opposed to an adult. The spirit, after the third metamorphosis, wills to create its own new values. The will of the child is not like lion's will, because lion destroys everything without replacing them with the new ones. The child's will, on the other, is the will that affirms the creation of a life with new values. Thus, this creation process is the canonizing of the life. Therefore, it is the defeat of the nihilism. This means political emancipation of the subject from the nihilist values.

Now I would like to elaborate child's characters of will to create by returning to Kant's freedom understanding. As Cartwright states that: "Friedrich Nietzsche found little to recommend in Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy. Besides considering it to be a poorly written, unconditional statement of some basic German moral prejudices, he even warns us against the dangers of Kant as a moralist."¹²⁷ Kant puts in that way: "For the enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all- freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters."¹²⁸ While Kant is ascribing the freedom and emancipation only to be mature using reason in the public sphere, Nietzsche thinks contrarily because he thinks that public use of reason, means to become lost in the public. David Owen indicates that:

Enlightenment, for Kant, requires only that the public use of reason be free; indeed, not only does the restriction of the private use of reason not hinder enlightenment, such restriction may be in the public interest... Within a civic

¹²⁷ Cartwright, "Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity", p. 83

¹²⁸ Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'"

post, it appears, the individual must be conceived simply an instrument for the achievement of public goals.¹²⁹

Becoming lost in the public means taking on others' values back. Maturity means getting out the own game, whose rules are made by oneself, and playing others' game, whose rules were already made before one entered. These rules and values are sacred, so no one can change them, and the public use of reason is another way of saying it is sacred. The individual is no more than an instrument, which is used by the public, in order to win the game and to achieve the goals. Deleuze puts it in that way: "Nietzsche thinks that the idea of critique is identical to that of philosophy but that this is precisely the idea that Kant has missed, that he has compromised and spoilt, not only in its application but in principle."¹³⁰ Nietzsche says that:

This, however, is the other danger, and my other sympathy: –he who is of the populace, his thoughts go back to his grandfather, –with his grandfather, however, does time cease. Thus, is all the past abandoned: for it might someday happen for the populace to become master and drown all-time in shallow waters. Therefore, O my brothers, a new nobility is needed, which shall be the adversary of all populace and potentate rule and shall inscribe anew the word "noble" on new tables.¹³¹

Thus, we can say maturity is getting along with prevailing values well. Maturity does not question the values and hence, it cannot be a representation of creating new values. At the very outside, maturity is the contrast of creating. Maturity is curbed of will; therefore, it cannot create new values. This is the compromise with old values without making any change. It is same to be camel for Nietzsche.

Now, we can clearly understand why Nietzsche uses the child as a metaphor for the last stage of the emancipation. No one can curb the will of the child. The child has

¹²⁹ Owen, *Maturity and Modernity*, p. 8

¹³⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, part III, §7

¹³¹ Z, part 13, §12, p.160

such a broad imagination that, s/he can will a thing that no one has ever willed until that time.

According to Nietzsche: "To them sounds it pleasant to have preached in their ears: "Nothing is worthwhile! you shall not will!" That, however, is a sermon about slavery...Willing emancipates: for willing is creating: so, do I teach. And only for creating shall you learn!"¹³² Namely, being mature is to be a slave to the populace. On the other hand, being a child is willing to change by creating new. Willingness for creation is the emancipation of the spirit. Being a child is to move out from nihilism. And it means emancipation.

At that point, there arises a question: can we be a child? As I attempted to show this is a becoming of self which crystallizes best in the three metamorphoses of the spirit. Life's itself is becoming of the child which never completes until death comes because the creation of new values never ends.

3.1.3 Becoming of Subject

The result that we have reached, is to be the subject of emancipation is a never-ending process, it is a becoming. Individual's "life is the idea that life is constant movement and change, it is becoming not being."¹³³ So, we should use becoming rather than being in order to refer subject in Nietzsche. That is to say, there is not a fixed essence of the subject. Yet this becoming does not bring us to denial of the subject. And, I have attempted to show that there is still a subject which only has not a fixed essence through this chapter. Now, I would like to expound on Nietzsche's refutation of the fixed subject and how he praises becoming.

¹³² Ibid, p.163

¹³³ Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche contra Rousseau*, p. 106

Nietzsche showed us subject is changeable—firstly camel, secondly the lion and finally a child. One can claim that in Nietzsche, the child is the unchangeable essence of the subject. However, this totally wrong because a subject could never be a child. Becoming of the subject continues as long as life continues.

That is to say, there would always be toing and froing on camel, lion, and child. I mean that it is inevitable to load up with burdens of others: even if we throw some of them, we take new ones. We could create new values as a child, however, these new values could be new burdens to us after a while. We get stuck on these values. We have become camel of our own values if we cannot continue to create new values. Subject always goes back and front.

When we look at the last part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra hears the cry of the higher man and all part is about finding the higher man. Zarathustra encounter with many characters, however, none of them is a higher man and he never finds a higher man. This shows us finding the higher man is impossible, but it is important to search. In the way of search, there are different stations that Zarathustra encounters with—such as kings, ugliest man in the world, donkey which is equal with a camel. We can think that in the way of higher man, we not only encounter these characters but also, we become these characters. If we apply Nietzsche's eternal recurrence¹³⁴ to his book, I mean if we start our life again and again, and, every time, we change into that characters without finding a higher man. This is a never-ending process.

People projected their three 'inner facts' out of themselves and onto the world—the facts they believed in most fervently, the will, the mind, and the I. They took the concept of being from the concept of the I, they posited 'things' as beings in their own image, on the basis of their concept of I as cause. Is it any wonder that what they rediscovered in things later is only what they had put into them in the first place? Even the 'thing', to say it again, the concept of a thing, is just a reflex of the belief in the I as the cause...¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Eternal recurrence and will to power will be discussed in chapter 4 in detail.

¹³⁵ TI, p. 178

We understood that humanity sees itself as a cause of everything and such causal relationship arises from an understanding of having a will in itself which is stable, unchanging. For instance, God creates the world for the human being and other than human, all living things are there for the human. Or another example is that history has a will which goes somewhere according to its will. These are a very different example but there lies the same logic under them. Both depend on a causal relationship. As I mentioned before, according to Nietzsche there is no such causal relationship. Therefore, Nietzsche is fully against such a will which allow that causal relation.

3.2 Collective or Individual

Until that point, I attempted to analyze the one quality of the political subject—who is on the way to emancipation—which is the becoming. We saw that the political subject is always in the state of becoming, namely, there is no fixed, unchanging character. The second quality will be analyzed by trying to answer the following questions: whether the political subject is a collectivity or an individual? While the individual is becoming a child, what is the role of collectivity? What is the characteristic of bonds between individual and collectivity? Answering these questions makes us closer to depict the political subject of Nietzsche. My claim is that there is an interdependency between collectivity and individual in the way of self-overcoming, hence, of emancipation in Nietzsche and I will try to show how this interdependency is crystallized.

3.2.1 Individual as a Subject of Culture

Now I think, we can look what Nietzsche thinks on this issue of collectivity and individual. Let me problematize it in order to explain myself properly. What is the

relationship between the individual and the collectivity? Which is more important according to Nietzsche? In fact, there is no simple answer to this question. But if I have to answer as simply as I could, my answer will be that both are very important to him.

Firstly, I think, we should talk about collectivity. I will show that how Nietzsche fears from the domination of any collectivity over the individual. But that is not to say there is no collective structure in Nietzsche. Collective structure refers to the culture. For instance, while Nietzsche is praising a collectivity, he does not directly praise the collective itself. He praises the culture that collectivity has. Therefore, culture refers to collectivity in Nietzsche's philosophy. To illustrate, he states that:

Here too there still remains another counter-question and the possibility of a counter-reckoning: if it had not been enfeebled by the poison referred to, would one or other of these vigorous peoples, the German possibly, have perhaps been capable of gradually finding a higher culture for themselves, one of their own, a new one? - of which, as things are, mankind has not now the remotest conception?¹³⁶

As we saw Nietzsche puts on par with collective people and its culture. Or, while Nietzsche is admiring ancient Greeks, he does not admire to be Greek, he admires the culture that ancient Greek had. Therefore, we could not say that a new collectivity is formed; only a new culture can be formed in Nietzsche's vocabulary. Or, collectivity can be judged by its culture which is created by the collectivity, not within itself. That is not to say, collectivity is not important. On the contrary, it is important because, without any collectivity, there would not be a possibility to create a culture.

Nietzsche's main critic towards the collectivity is that: such collectivities exist on an aim or goal and without them, they lose their meaning. However, such aims make the collectivity more important than individuals. If I may say so, collectivity dominates

¹³⁶ HAH, §224

the individuals in order to reach the goal. Nietzsche targets three cultures and criticizes them—namely, Christianity, Kantian morality and socialism.

Christianity's aim is the afterlife. It proposes ascetic life if individuals want to have salvation. This ascetic life becomes a lifestyle of a Christian community. All rules are determinate and fixed. There is no flexibility in such collectivity. Individuals cannot pursue their own ends and goals because of the domination of the church. Individuals neither change the prevailing values nor the create the new. Christianity despises the worldliness of the individual and aims the afterlife rather than life. Despising the worldliness of life means despising the individual because there is no life other than this world according to Nietzsche.

Let us turn back to the problem of Kant for Nietzsche. According to Kant:

...in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them to public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey.¹³⁷

In other words, when it comes to collective ends and goals which are the values of collectivity, such ends and goals are much more crucial than individual's ends and goals. Instead, one should accept to be governed in order to reach these aims in the case of conflicting individual's own interests and collective ends. By doing that, they imagine reaching true world thanks to this collective's goals and ends. In this true world, every member of collectivity will be happy. However, Nietzsche thinks that:

The true world - unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And as unattained also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, obligating either: how could we have obligations to something unknown? ... The 'true world' - an

¹³⁷ Kant, *Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, p. 42

idea that is of no further use, not even as an obligation, - now an obsolete, superfluous idea, consequently a refuted idea: let's get rid of it!¹³⁸

Nietzsche is targeting not only the Christian world afterlife and Kantian morality; but also, socialists. He thinks that socialists fetishize the goal of the community, thereby members of the community become a robot of this goal rather than a human, as well. He thinks that “socialism subordinates the goal of culture to that of social justice and gives rise to a society dominated by bureaucracy.”¹³⁹ He targets the socialist party in that way:

When a party notices that a member has changed from being an unconditional adherent to a conditional one, it is so little capable of enduring this that it tries, through incitements and insults of all kinds, to bring him to the point of outright defection and turn him into an opponent: or it has the suspicion that the intention of seeing in their faith something of relative value that admits of a For and Against, a weighing and distinguishing, is more dangerous to it than a wholesale opposition.¹⁴⁰

We see that the collectivity and its values become more important than the individual itself. There is no room for change in such collectivities “because of the persistence, hatred, and strength of the collective supporting the doctrine. All individuals who have will to create, have been suppressed and the reason for this is that the weak have imposed their belief system—religious or democratic—on everybody.”¹⁴¹ Emden indicates that:

Moral communities can be porous and open to change, but the normative force of the underlying commitments invariably stands in some contrast to such openness. Nietzsche is quite correct that the moral communities which dominate political and social life in the nineteenth century – the nation, a

¹³⁸ TI, p. 171

¹³⁹ Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, p. 40

¹⁴⁰ HAH, Vol. II, part 1, §305

¹⁴¹ Aspers, “Nietzsche’s Sociology”, p. 487

particular confession, the Church, a professional ethos – require precisely those absolutes that, during the 1880s, are the subject of his genealogy.¹⁴²

However, we saw that in the part of *Three Metamorphoses*, change is a must for an individual in order to emancipate, and this change cannot be provided under the strong doctrines, normative forces which compels one to conform to the values of collectivity.

In such collectivity, in order to be part of it, an individual is transformed into a camel. There is no opinion of an individual. S/he acts in accordance with collectivity's values. For instance, if fighting for collectivity is sacred and dying for it names one as a martyr, individual fights for it regardless of thinking what s/he is fighting for. For the sake of values of collectivity, individuals could kill or die, and nobody can refuse it. If someone refuses to fight, community ostracizes her/him. Nietzsche states that:

Most people are nothing and count for nothing until they have clad themselves in general convictions and public opinions – in accordance with the tailor's philosophy: clothes make the man. In regard to exceptional men, however, the saying should read: only the wearer creates the costume; here opinions cease from being public and become something other than masks, finery, and camouflage.¹⁴³

That is to say, in collectivities whose values are more important than the individual, one may not exist without it. S/he exists only with the opinions of the public. As long as they have not their own opinion, they cannot be themselves. So, there cannot be individual as a subject, rather there are camels who are loaded by burdens of others. At that point, there arises the very important question: Why do people accept to be part of such collectivities and to be agencies of their values?

¹⁴² Emden, "Political Naturalism Realized", p. 322

¹⁴³ HAH, Vol. II, part 1, §325

According to Nietzsche, there are two reasons. The first reason is that “Public opinions” are the “private indolence”¹⁴⁴. That is to say being part of public or collectivity gives individual laziness and indolence. Therefore, one can live without thinking or acting because always there is someone or a group of people who think on behalf of him/her. S/he only repeats what others are doing or what others are saying. There comes into existence of docile bodies rather than human beings. This indolence does not bother individual rather s/he enjoys being lazy. On the contrary, to start thinking or acting is more difficult than being lazy. Nietzsche names it as “grand politics”¹⁴⁵. State dreams to be the leader of the world. In order to realize this dream, it makes many wars and spends too much money. However, the real cost is not how much money that state spend. On the other hand:

...so, a people which set about practicing grand politics and ensuring to itself a decisive voice among the most powerful states does not incur the highest costs where these are usually thought to lie. It is true that from this moment on a host of the most prominent talents are continually sacrificed on the 'altar of the fatherland' or of the national thirst for honor, whereas previously other spheres of activity were open to these talents now devoured by politics. But aside from these public hecatombs, and at bottom much more horrible, there occurs a spectacle played out continually in a hundred thousand simultaneous acts: every efficient, industrious, intelligent, energetic man belonging to such a people lusting after political laurels is dominated by this lust and no longer belongs wholly to his own domain, as he formerly did: questions and cares of the public weal, renewed every day, devour a daily tribute from the capital in every citizen's head and heart: the sum total of all these sacrifices and costs in individual energy and work is so tremendous that the political emergence of a people almost necessarily draws after it a spiritual impoverishment and enfeeblement and a diminution of the capacity for undertakings demanding great concentration and application.¹⁴⁶

As we saw, the real cost is not how much money is spent. The real cost how many talented, industrious men gave their lives and still are still giving after the war because

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, Vol. I, Part 8, §482

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, §481

¹⁴⁶ Ibid

of thinking about national interests. However, this thinking does not put into practice and it stays on the discourses of politicians. After the war has been started, docile bodies repeat endlessly public opinions which are formed by politicians. If someone says different from public opinions, s/he becomes a traitor and evil. However, despite this causes fear, most of the people do act differently not because of fear but because of the laziness. Laziness is a more powerful factor than fear. Even if someone could be against the war, it becomes easier to think and talk in the same manner what everybody thinks and talks. The interest of collectivity becomes sacred and blessed at that point and to Nietzsche “‘blessedness’: the ideal state of sloth”¹⁴⁷.

The second reason is an existential problem. An individual has searched for a cause for his/her life. There should be a cause to rationalize his/her life. As an individual, it is hard to find a cause of his/her existence because the ungrounded life makes one interrogate the meaning of existence. One seeks the ground in order to make the life meaningful. At that point, collectivity comes to his/her rescue. For instance, religions say that God creates the human for its own sake and God gives duties to one such being a good person, going to church or mosque. If s/he obeys the rule of god, then s/he will live eternally in the heaven. On the other side, states claim that individual lives for the sake of states’ well-being. If it is necessary, s/he should kill and die. Political parties encourage their members in order to gain the power of the state. All of these gives the individual a cause to live. However, they ignored the individual oneself for the sake of collectivity. They can, easily, sacrifice individuals for the goal of collectivity. Nietzsche directly refuses this causality principle by saying that:

...we want there to be a reason why we are in the particular state we are in, - why we are feeling good or bad. It is never enough just to establish the fact that we are in a particular state: we only let this state register, - we only become conscious of it -, once we have assigned it a type of motivation. - The memory that unconsciously becomes activated in such cases is what leads back to earlier states of the same type and the associated causal interpretation,

¹⁴⁷ WP, Book II, part 2, §335

- not their causality. Of course, memory also interjects the belief that the ideas, the accompanying train of consciousness, had been the cause. This is how a particular causal interpretation comes to be habituated; this interpretation, in fact, inhibits an investigation into the cause and even precludes it.¹⁴⁸

As Nietzsche shows, we have searched for a cause for every small case and it becomes habitual behavior. Thus, we do not find giving our lives to collective goals as alienating. It comes to us very normal to die in a war for the sake of nation or to dedicate our lives to a religion no matter how inconsistent and unreasonable it is. As I mentioned above Nietzsche refuses such a causality.

The well-being of the universal demands the devotion of the individual—but behold, there is no such universal! At bottom, man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e., he conceived such a whole in order to be able to believe in his own value.¹⁴⁹

That is to say, being part of a collectivity makes the individual feel valuable, thus s/he can overcome his/her existential crisis. Nietzsche makes another psychological explanation for this behavior. Familiarizing something unfamiliar is comforting, reassuring, satisfying, and produces a feeling of power as well. Unfamiliar things are dangerous, anxiety-provoking, upsetting, —the primary instinct is to get rid of these painful states.¹⁵⁰ That is to say, without finding any cause for our life, we feel powerless and we cannot live without power. We should rationalize our life by finding a cause to it. The easiest way to find a cause is to articulate the cause of a collectivity such as eternal life in the heaven or good life after the revolution, or national interests of a state.

Now, we can proceed with the problem of the individual. In fact, while I was discussing Nietzsche's approach to the collectivity, we would think that Nietzsche's philosophy of subject based on the individualism. However, this is not absolutely true

¹⁴⁸ TI, p. 179

¹⁴⁹ WP, Book I, part 1, §12A

¹⁵⁰ TI, p. 17

as I mentioned in the first place. Nietzsche is an individualist in the light of his criticisms that was discussed above. In order to find out how he is an individualist, let us look at how he criticizes liberal individualism and then, his approach to individualism will be clarified. Nietzsche attacks the main characteristics of liberal individualism which is private property. Its main characteristics because liberal

... individualist view of the purpose of government as protecting individuals' rights and allowing them maximum scope to pursue their interests owes much to Locke, on the one hand, and to the Utilitarians, on the other. Lockean liberalism stresses a view of the government's role as *protector* (original emphasis) of the life, liberty, and property of its citizens—above all, their property. The Utilitarians, on the other hand, provided the rationale for the liberal view of government as holding the ring, as referee, night watchmen or traffic-policeman, while individuals pursue in harmonious competition, their several interests.¹⁵¹

Although utilitarians do not make direct emphasis on the private property, they are not against the limitless accumulation of private property because it could be one of the several interests of individuals. On the contrary, Nietzsche is aware of this meaningless effort of continuing accumulation of property. To him rather than accumulate property, what is important how to use it.

Only he who has spirit ought to have possessions: otherwise, possessions are a public danger. For the possessor who does not know how to make use of the free time which his possessions could purchase him will always continue to strive after possessions: this striving will constitute his entertainment, his strategy in his war against boredom. Thus, in the end, the moderate possessions that would suffice the man of spirit are transformed into actual riches - riches which are in fact the glittering product of spiritual dependence and poverty.¹⁵²

Nietzsche does not think the private property could be the aim of the individual. Let us think it in that way, an individual, whose aim is endless accumulation, is the same with a person whose aim is the collectivity's goal. Since both of them cannot be

¹⁵¹ Lukes, *Individualism*, pp. 76-7

¹⁵² HAH, Vol. II, part 1, §310

themselves. Their aim is the only mediator which uses in establishing a relation to themselves. One defines oneself by how rich s/he is, other defines with aim of the collectivity. They become dependent to these aims. Nietzsche states that:

It is only up to a certain point that possessions make men more independent and free; one step further - and the possessions become master, the possessor becomes a slave: as which he must sacrifice to them his time and his thoughts and henceforth feel himself obligated to a society, nailed to a place and incorporated into a state none of which perhaps meets his inner and essential needs.¹⁵³

This shows us according to him when endless accumulation becomes the aim of the individual, s/he loses his/her freedom, as well, because his/her existence is dependent on this accumulation. S/he could not know to live otherwise. Therefore, he is aware of the endless accumulation of private property is destructive of individuals by making them a slave. For this reason, this deviation from liberal individualism shows us that we should look for a different individualism from liberal understanding in order to understand Nietzsche's perspective.

In order to elaborate Nietzsche's approach, we should depict an individual, on the one hand, whose aim should be oneself not the collective goals, on the other hand, while s/he is realizing oneself, s/he enriches the society—i.e. collectivity. This kind of person should add new values to the collectivity. I would like to make another quotation which shows us better, how Nietzsche thinks of a free spirit.

He who has attained to only some degree of freedom of mind cannot feel other than a wanderer on the earth –though not as a traveler to a final destination: for this destination does not exist. But he will watch and observe and keep his eyes open to see what is really going on in the world; for this reason, he may not let his heart adhere too firmly to any individual thing; within him too there must be something wandering that takes pleasure in change and transience.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Ibid, §317

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, Vol. I, part 9, §638

Nietzsche defines the free spirit as a wanderer who has an own road without any final destination to arrive. Nevertheless, this wanderer should be aware of where to world is going, which change becomes among the others. Therefore, we can say that while free spirit follows the own way, yet it is not indifferent to others.

... ‘individual’, as peoples and philosophers have understood them so far, are a mistake: individuals are nothing in themselves, they are not atoms, they are not ‘links in the chain’, they are not just legacies of a bygone era—each individual is the entire single line of humanity up through himself... If he represents descending development, decay, chronic degeneration, disease—illnesses are fundamental consequences of decay, not its causes—then he is of little value and in all fairness, he should be taking away as little as possible from those who have turned out well. He is really just a parasite on them...¹⁵⁵

That is to say, we should not expect that individual could create own values totally independent from society and these newly created values do affect the others because it has heritage from the past and it will bring the legacy to the future and I think we can name these heritages and legacies as a culture. Culture gives the individual a place where one can create new values. In this place, the individual creates his/her own new values. While these new values are created for oneself, they pave the way for a higher culture. In short, culture is worthwhile as long as it gives an individual place and permits the creation of new values. The individual is worthwhile as long as attempts to create new values and to make the culture higher.

However, I should indicate, the individual does not do that purposefully. “Great human beings are necessary, the age in which they appear is accidental: they almost always become masters of these ages, because they are stronger and older and represent a greater accumulation.”¹⁵⁶ These individuals are compulsory to be part of this higher culture. It could not be different. If history has started from the beginning, again and again, these individuals would be the part of this higher culture every time.

¹⁵⁵ TI, p. 208

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 218

Therefore, their action does not create the way which goes to the determinate point. That is to say, history does not progress to a specific point. The subjects of the history are the part of this high culture not for they aim to reach the end of the history. There is no such end likewise there is not a goal which would be achieved.

I think it is already understood that these subjects, who are part of the higher culture, are the emancipated subjects because they have the ability to negate the old values and to affirm own new values. They are emancipated by themselves through these abilities. Nevertheless, we cannot say that these subjects could directly emancipate the others. They open new areas where the others can emancipate too, in culture. But, this is the unintended result of subjects' actions. This emancipation is never planned by them. Namely, one can only emancipate the others only unintentionally. One can only create an area of culture, others should determine the way in which they can follow in this area. Nothing more can one do.

As I mentioned above in Nietzsche, the issue of collectivity and individual is complicated. Now we can say that they are interdependent and meet in culture.

Politics presupposes that individuals have the capacities of agents: the ability to choose and evaluate goals, to take responsibility for actions, to enter into agreements and obligations, and to determine the future. In Nietzsche's way of thinking, where such capacities develop at all they do so within the medium of culture.¹⁵⁷

That is to say, culture is essential for a political collectivity. However, the individual is an essential part of this culture because the individuals are the creators of this culture by their actions, therefore, for the collectivity. The subject is crystalized itself through being part of this collective higher culture by creating new values. This

¹⁵⁷ Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, p. 46

culture is higher because it permits and helps the individual in order to find their own way in the culture¹⁵⁸. It should be suitable for the birth of a higher man.

3.2.2 Subject as a Tragic Artist

Now, we can define the subject as a tragic artist. In the previous part, I attempted to expound on how individual and society is interdependent with each other. The subject is both part and creator of higher culture. So, if it is not unexpected to think of that the tragic artist as a subject of Nietzsche's philosophy. A tragic artist both realizes oneself and creates new values through his/her arts and this action could affect the others in an unintentional way.

The tragic artist is both subject and object of its art. While s/he is creating its art, s/he creates oneself. S/he reinvents oneself every time.

Only insofar as the genius, during the act of artistic procreation, merges fully with that original artist of the world does he know anything of the eternal essence of art; for in this condition he resembles, miraculously, that uncanny image of fairy-tale which can turn its eyes around and look at itself; now he is at one and the same time subject and object, simultaneously poet, actor, and spectator.¹⁵⁹

The tragic artist is a creator of both his/her product and oneself. His/her "Creative activities produce a basis for self-identity. In transforming the social and natural worlds, one both creates and recognizes oneself in the worlds one participates in and transforms."¹⁶⁰ His/her creativeness produces his/her own values, with the values of oneself, s/he creates again and again. The one exists with own values which are created by him/her. S/he becomes a child with the process of creation. "That is, as the tragic wisdom of Dionysian yea-saying (*affirmation*) posits the negation of the will

¹⁵⁸ The problem of higher culture will be discussed in following chapter in detail.

¹⁵⁹ BT, §5

¹⁶⁰ Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, p. 180

to live as the morality of decadence, the will to life...is affirmed, in Dionysian thought, through the abandonment of resistance to nihilism.”¹⁶¹ S/he can overcome the nihilism of lion and camel with this process by saying Yes to life and affirming it.

These newly created values by the tragic artists give form to the culture which holds the collectivity together. The tragic artist is both subject of the culture and object of it. The tragic artist is subject of it because doer of the culture is the tragic artist. S/he is the object of it, because culture, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, contains “values, power relations, social formations, ways of knowing, popular and philosophical notions about reality and god.”¹⁶² All these affect the tragic artist how and what s/he creates. These shape the tragic artist’s actions in his/her creation in the way of emancipation. That is to say, his/her creation is nourished by the old culture. At the same time, the new and higher culture is nourished by the creation of the tragic artist.

“Without his knowing it, his task becomes that of making mankind childlike; this is his glory and his limitation.”¹⁶³ Three metamorphoses of spirit results with a tragic artist. The creation process of tragic artist results with a subject who is on the way of the emancipation of both oneself and others by unintentionally within an endless process of becoming.

In other words, there is a subject of emancipation as long as one creates the new values like a tragic artist without thinking its results. This process is the becoming of both subject and object of higher culture and higher culture itself. Only this subject could emancipate oneself and paves the way for the emancipation of others by creating a higher culture.

¹⁶¹ Ellerman, “Nietzsche’s Madness: Tragic Wisdom”, pp. 340-41

¹⁶² White and Hellerich, “The Liberty Bell: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Culture”, p. 1

¹⁶³ HAH, Vol. I, part 4, §147

3.3 Inferences on Nietzsche's Subject

I have attempted to answer that question in the whole chapter: who can emancipate according to Nietzsche and who cannot? At the end of the chapter, I have reached two main characteristics of the subject of emancipation. One is that subject can never complete its metamorphoses. That is to say, in order to be a child, you should not stop your metamorphoses. It is a lifelong process. It is a becoming which never stops. Therefore, one could not say that it finished and now I am a child. Being child has only been realized in the way of searching and, the individual, in this way, is now subject to the emancipation. If one is stabilized, fixed values—i.e. camel, s/he cannot be subject of emancipation.

The second characteristic is that: subjects are tragic artists¹⁶⁴. That is to say, it is a creator of a new culture. However, not only creates it but also it is created. It is the work of his/her art. It is both the object and subject of his/her art. If one has no ability to create—i.e. lion, despite being not camel s/he cannot be subject of emancipation. The one should learn to create in order to be subject of emancipation. Now, we can proceed to analyze which values are a nihilist, which values are not.

¹⁶⁴ The difference between artist and tragic artist will be discussed in following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

VALUE PROBLEM

In the previous chapter, I attempted to find an answer to the question of the subject of emancipation in Nietzsche's philosophy. My answer was a tragic artist—as the subject of the never-ending process of becoming—can emancipate. In this chapter, I will attempt to find another answer to a different question: what does a tragic artist emancipate from? Emancipation as a word requires a burden upon the subject who carries with the action of emancipation. This action is a political struggle of the one which goes through the values. That is to say, the subjects become political by destructing the nihilist values and creating new ones. By using Nietzsche's vocabulary, the re-evaluation of nihilist values is the essence of politics. In order to understand this re-evaluation process firstly, we need to understand the values which should be re-evaluated. Then, the values of which should be put and created in place of old values, need to be understood. Finally, this process of re-evaluation of nihilist values will bring us to the formation of a higher culture and formation of the higher culture is the state in which subjects emancipate from nihilist values.

There are two kinds of values in Nietzsche. One is the dominant values which are a nihilist, the other is dominated values. If we put that another way, one is unfavorable, another is favorable values. According to him, all unfavorable values dominate the favorable ones. It is this domination which should be broken by the free spirits. The aim of the politics is to break this domination and when this domination ceases, subjects can emancipate.

This chapter aims to analyze these favorable—anti-nihilist—and unfavorable—nihilist—values in detail. By this way, we will see the scope of politics. Only after this analysis of values, we can proceed with the emancipation struggle between the subjects or parties because subjects and values are interdependent to each other. The former question of the subject was scrutinized in the previous chapter, the latter one will be discussed in this chapter. After finishing this chapter, we will have a better understanding of the interdependence between this two.

In order to realize my aim, firstly, I will discuss the dominant values. Following, I will continue with the dominated one. Finally, I will attempt to depict a higher culture.

4.1 Dominant Values

I will discuss the dominant values under the two headings¹⁶⁵; the first one is religions; the second is morality. Values of religions and morality have domination upon the other values not only at the time in which Nietzsche had lived but also before and after him. Therefore, it is not strange that Nietzsche attacks them. Maybe, we can say that the main targets of his whole philosophy are religions and morality. But why does Nietzsche attack these values endlessly, even though he knows that religions and morality have dominated the other values for ages? If we can answer this question properly, we will have covered a significant ground in order to answer the main question of this chapter.

In order to answer the question, we should look at how dominant values work. There are two functions. The first function is that dominant values negate the naturalness of man—therefore, life itself. By saying naturalness of human, I do not mean “that

¹⁶⁵ Even though I will separate these two, I am aware of that these are interdependent to each other. Therefore, sometimes their distinctiveness could disappear while I am discussing. It should be kept in mind that to discuss under the two headings is not to say that they are wholly separated, or Nietzsche sees them as they are separated phenomena.

everything about human reality is to be explained and understood in terms of the same sorts of deterministic causes encountered in natural-scientific theories and explanations more generally...”¹⁶⁶ I mean that “everything in the world (human reality included) started out as merely ‘natural.’”¹⁶⁷ Nietzsche “does suppose it to be the case that everything about human reality—and everything that goes on in human life and experience—has ‘become’ as it is by way of developments of an entirely mundane character.”¹⁶⁸

The second function is that will to power of these values. They aim to power to control the man. This is the will to power of nihilist values. It dominates the man, and as a consequence of this domination, there comes to existence the herd animal which has no control over his/her life. Now, we can elaborate on these two functions by explaining religions and morality.

4.1.1 Religions¹⁶⁹

Nietzsche’s main criticism is clearly seen in religions. This criticism is the establishing of the relationship between one and oneself with a mediator. God has become this intermediary in the monotheistic religions. However, he reveals that God is only an invention of a man. According to him, the man’s “... most unselfish act hitherto has been to admire and worship and to know how to conceal from himself

¹⁶⁶ Schacht, “Nietzsche’s Naturalism”, p. 187

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p.189

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Despite the fact that Nietzsche especially targets Christianity, I will take all religions under this heading. Even though Nietzsche had knowledge of other religions as well—such as Islam and Judaism and Buddhism—he targeted generally Christianity. Underlying causes of that, I think, Christianity had a great domination on all around Europe and, because his main concern is to create a higher culture in Europe, that target is very reasonable. However, I do not hesitate to take them all, because I think that their commonalities are more than their differences.

that it was he who created what he admired. —”¹⁷⁰ That is to say, man creates the values, evaluate the things regardless of thinking oneself is the creator, the man as a creator is the valuable one rather than created things.

Thus, it is the man who is the creator of God at some point in the history and not vice versa. However, s/he has forgotten and started to live for God, not for oneself. The creation of God by the man abolishes the mundane characteristics of a man. Then, it searches the metaphysical cause for what happened in the world. This metaphysical cause—namely god for religions—dispossesses the main man characteristic which is a power of creating values. In other words, man transfers his/her will to power to God. I will attempt to show that there are two main reasons to criticize the religions. First is that religions destroy the mundane characteristics of man and put God as a metaphysical cause in place of these characteristics. As a result of first reason, secondly, the man becomes a herd animal like a slave which has no power over his/her life.

The Christian faith as Nietzsche depicts it has been and is the chief instrument of a slave morality—the morality of the weak, the timid, the unfit—in short of life’s “losers.” It’s eternal “shall not” contradicts a fundamental fact of life - that all life activity exemplifies a will to power. Christianity “explains” this will to power as evil, but Nietzsche explains Christianity as a peculiarly self-defeating expression of the will to power.¹⁷¹

Since man is weak to create new values anymore, Christianity puts its values in place of the man’s own values. God is set in the center of the Christian values. This is the metaphysical claim, which abolishes the man’s worldliness and therefore makes it the slave by taking the will to power of the man.

Nietzsche explains the psychological explanation of the creation of God by a man in that way:

¹⁷⁰ WP, Book II, part 1, p. 85

¹⁷¹ Keaton, “The Force of Nietzsche’s Criticism of Christianity”, p.78

When a man is suddenly and overwhelmingly suffused with the feeling of power and this is what happens with all great affects—it raises in him a doubt about his own person: he does not dare to think himself the cause of this astonishing feeling—and so he posits a stronger person, a divinity, to account for it.¹⁷²

For instance, a poet writes the good poems or, a sculptor creates an astonishing statue, everybody shows the cause as divine God, not the artist. Or, the talent of influencing the people. There always is a search for the intent of God. All of these seem like a gift from God, instead of appropriating the doers. These are publicly reflecting the power of someone to God. We make it in our daily life as well. To illustrate that, sometimes we feel blue or alive ourselves without any reason. We feel sometimes good, sometimes bad regardless of any cause because we are human and able to feel these feelings. At that point, we begin to search for the intention of God behind the feeling in such a way. However, there is no need for God. If we put God as a cause, we give up our mundane characteristics which give us power and then we need a metaphysical cause for every moment of our life. However, we cannot find because there is not. Then, we start to look for another guidance who represent oneself as God of spokesman. Because gods are unable to talk, always there pops up such spokesman who claims that s/he knows the intent of God. This spokesman begins to determine values instead of us. At that point, we transform into a herd animal whose only ability is to conform. Thus, we become a slave. In short, losing will to power removes the mundane man naturalness and makes a man a member of the herd. Nietzsche's concern on criticizing religions is to bring "an embrace of life, and an emancipation of value creation centered in *this-worldliness*."¹⁷³ The emancipation of value creation means to become the master rather than a slave.

Let me elaborate this transformation process of man to herd animal. One—as a man—should create its own way. This is the nature of man. In religions, everything is

¹⁷² WP, Book II, part 1, §135

¹⁷³ Evans, "Nietzsche on Christ vs. Christianity", p.573

already determined by the others without asking one who is a member of this religion. One should follow the path of the others. There is no place for new makings in religions. Regardless of following one's own way, no one could create new values. And so, to Nietzsche, this is nothing more than enslavement because you sacrifice one of the main characteristics of being a man which is following your own way and being different.

A man should not follow the way which is determined by the church or spokesman of God. According to Nietzsche "From the beginning, Christian faith has been the sacrifice: the sacrifice of all freedom, of all pride, of all self-confidence of the spirit; it is simultaneously enslavement and self-derision, self-mutilation."¹⁷⁴ Religions will to sacrifice of the individual. They order to live a humble life and prepare the afterlife for man. Humble life makes the man a camel which is loaded by the others' values. You cannot say "No". If you are a camel or a donkey, your work is to carry the others and to say "Yes" without thinking. If one is listening to a sermon in the mosque or church, there is no way to say "No". One comes from the sanctuary as loaded with many things.

Christianity and other religions show this world as a place of suffering because they promise eternal life where man rests in peace. This world is temporary, so no one should will more than what they have. If the one is well-behaved according to values of religions and not will more, they will have the salvation in eternal life. All religions point to man an ascetic life. Ascetic life transforms a man into docile bodies.

Nietzsche explains that religions use two main psychological tools on the man in order to transform it into herd animals. One is punishment in the afterlife, and the other is the resentment of human which is also related to former reason.

...the whole conception of the world is polluted by the idea of punishment; with the object of representing the priestly life as the non plus ultra of

¹⁷⁴ BGE, part 3, §46

perfection, life itself is transformed into a defamation and pollution of life; the concept “God” represents a turning away from life, a critique of life, even a contempt for it; truth is transformed into the priestly lie, the striving for truth into study of the scriptures, into a means of becoming a theologian—¹⁷⁵

Under the fear of punishment, no one could live in this world properly. The only way not to be punished is to live like a clergy. This is the ascetic life. Let me put it in another way, the only way not to be punished is not to live in this world and to prepare for the eternal life. Even if one does not prepare, and does not live the ascetic life, can you think that one could live her/his life properly in fear? The answer is simple: no one could live in fear because it sparks off dubiousness in every action of an individual. Always this question arises: if I behave in that way, would I be punished? Thinking in such before every behavior paves the way for sickness. This sickness prevents to live the world mundanely.

Religions promise people a certain eternal life by doing nothing in this world, at least you should sail in the well-known seas if you must act. This is an ascetic way of life. It paves the way for dispraising of this-worldliness and making the human docile body.

Religions determine the man’s behaviors. Other than these determined behaviors, they make man passive. Now, we can see that how religions prevent the living this world as a man. Being a man, to Nietzsche, identifies with creating new values; and without acting, creating new values is impossible, because creating itself is an action. Religions take away our ability to create new values hereby makes man passive by putting mediator into the relation which is established between man and himself, and Nietzsche tries to show us there is no such a mediator because God is dead. And so, a man can create as what human always does.

¹⁷⁵ WP, Book II, part 1 §141

The other characteristics of human are to forget and forgive. However, religious people are not able to do these according to Nietzsche. They cannot forget and forgive. This is the result of the repression of religion. Namely, the behavior of an individual is repressed by religion and it advises an ascetic passive life. This advice causes a feeling which is resentment. The Christian concept of “justice is based in ‘reactive affects’, in feelings of being wronged...owing to their animosity toward ‘active effects’ such as the lust for mastery, which Nietzsche takes to have more value than reactive feelings.”¹⁷⁶

One, who feels resentment, never behaves in order to defeat this feeling. For instance, someone damages another. At that point, according to Nietzsche, the aggrieved party should whether call another to account for her/his damage or forgive the other. Both pave the way for forgetting the incident what is lived between the two parties. However, by saying that God will punish the damaging party, one could neither forget nor forgive. Thereby, one starts to feel resentment. This feeling is reactive, and it is the result of passivity and indigestion. This is the feeling of anger which never goes away from human and human lodges in.

All of these feelings comes to human because man has not dared to credit himself with all his strong and surprising impulses—he has conceived them as “passive,” as “suffered,” as things imposed upon him: religion is the product of a doubt concerning the unity of the person, an alteration of the personality: in so far as everything great and strong in man has been conceived as superhuman and external, man has belittled himself—he has separated the two sides of himself, one very paltry and weak, one very strong and astonishing, into two spheres, and called the former “man,” the latter “God.”¹⁷⁷

That is to say, a man who is determined by religions is not complete. On the one hand, there are powerful characteristics—such as creating values—which are attributed to God. On the other hand, all weak characteristics are attributed to human.

¹⁷⁶ Hatab, “Nietzsche’s Will to Power and Politics”, p.119

¹⁷⁷ WP, Book II, part 1 §136

This incomplete man becomes passive a herd animal inevitably. This passive personality is praised by religions because it is more controllable. There is no surprise in the animal spirits because their behaviors are predictable. Their lives become a puppet which actualizes determinate rituals. Nietzsche puts it in that way: “Christianity is a way of life, not a system of beliefs. It tells us how to act; not what we ought to believe.”¹⁷⁸ This shows us religions are closer to politics rather than a private life of the individual. If someone could order you how to act, s/he is the master of you. This must not be direct; one can do that by creating values which are acceptable by everyone. Religions are the main example and Nietzsche unfolds this understanding by showing that the religions are the tool of a caste who will to power based on the lie of God.

He symbolizes that man should awake and step into action by killing God metaphor. If it is appropriate to say that religions passivize the man by polluting the man naturalness and change it into an animal for the sake of God, and solution: killing God is to take an action against these passivizing values. Nietzsche aims to uncover the complete man which harbors both strong and weak sides. In other words, killing God is the taking power back of a man. From this perspective, this is very radical political action; because religions make man herd animals by praising truth of God and promising eternal life; and then these herd animals, who are lack of their strength, are easily governed. Killing God means taking control back, being master rather than slave and becoming complete human by praising worldliness of human.

4.1.2 Morality

Under the headings of religions, I endeavored to show that how human naturalness is polluted and how the values of it are decreased by human itself through the using

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, §212

religions. Through devaluation of man, there does not remain a difference between man and animal.

At that point, I should indicate that morality and religions are not independent variables. Religions cultivate the morality, morality legitimizes the religions. Therefore, we can clearly say that what was discussed under the religions are valid for the morality. However, there is a clear-cut difference between morality and religions for Nietzsche. What is the advantage of moral laws against the religions, is that moral laws can organize all sphere of life. Even if there is no religion, there would be morality. Despite Nietzsche has no religious affiliation, he accepts man cannot do without morality and depicts two different moralities. One is master morality, another is slave morality. What will be told in this part is valid for the slave morality because slave morality is dominant and unfavorable one. On the other hand, master morality is dominated and favorable. Nietzsche criticizes the domination of slave morality which causes nihilism. Slave morality, in line with religions, despises human and makes it herd animal. While religions are targeting worldliness and naturalness of human, morality is targeting becoming of human by claiming the existence of unchangeable metaphysical moral laws. This turns human into a herd animal. Let us start with this main question: what is morality according to Nietzsche?

...morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating. In things in which no tradition commands there is no morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of morality.¹⁷⁹

That is to say, traditions and morality are the synonyms for him. We always think that morality is a truth which is unchangeable, even we cannot discuss to change it. On the other hand, if we look from the perspective of Nietzsche, "...there is no

¹⁷⁹ D, Book I, §9

absolute morality”¹⁸⁰, there is no such truth which is unchangeable because the traditions could be changed. Traditions are not absolute, they change even society to society. Nietzsche’s main criticism towards morality comes at that point. He

...denies the applicability of general principles, abstractions, and the unconditional. General principles are necessarily...merely surface interpretations and abstractions. Nietzsche’s interest and emphasis go deeper, to the instinctual and the non-intentional and nonrational. Hence, much of Nietzsche’s critique of morality goes outside what is conventionally regarded as morality and he questions even the possibility of generalization.¹⁸¹

Therefore, if morality bases upon general metaphysical laws, no one could change them. Absoluteness of these metaphysical laws dominates the human’s becoming.

Well then, what is this morality used for? What is the aim of supporters of this absolute morality? Nietzsche reveals the common ground which is shared by Kant and Luther:

Long before Kant and his categorical imperative, Luther had, out of the same sensibility, said that there must exist a being in which man could have unconditional trust –it was his proof of the existence of God; coarser and grounded more in the people than Kant, he wanted man unconditionally to obey, not a concept, but a person; and Kant, too, made a detour around morality only in order, in the end, to arrive at obedience to the person...¹⁸²

In this quotation, Nietzsche criticizes the Kant’s attitude towards the German state and Frederick II. In the eyes of Nietzsche, Kant’s understanding of morality is no more than searching a ground for the Christian morality in the age of secularization. We can say that behaviors had already been shaped by Christianity. However, with the Renaissance, church, old traditions and therefore, morality lost its power over the people. According to Nietzsche, the Reformation and the Enlightenment movements were the attempts of gaining back the power for these nihilist components. While

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, Book II, §139

¹⁸¹ Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue, p.66

¹⁸² D, Book III, §207

Christianity loses its power over behaviors, they become ungrounded. Searching for an absolute morality aims to find a ground for them. However, claiming that there are absolute metaphysical laws, is the same for claiming that existence of a God for Nietzsche. He sees such an understanding of morality as no more than a continuum of Christianity. Therefore, we can put the absolute morality and religions' ideas into the same basket.

Moral laws work in the same way as religions. They are used for making the individual part of the herd. They dispossess the power of creation by claiming absoluteness of metaphysical laws. These laws depict a known area where a man can live. No one can go out from this area; if one can attempt, then s/he is branded as immoral and evil.

Morality is no more than to forbid unknown behaviors of individuals. If someone is predictable and his/her behaviors are known, you can govern him/her easily. However, if someone refuses to conform to it, this is perceived as a threat to all existing power relations. Nietzsche puts it in that way: "The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more thoroughly is it proscribed."¹⁸³ In the same vein with these thoughts, the more there are laws which determine the behaviors, the easier controls one the individuals.

Therefore, firstly, moral laws work by determining every space of individuals' lives. Then if someone develops a different attitude towards these laws, these attitudes seem like a threat to the whole and they are immediately forbidden. There come existence herd animals which are predictable and known.

Thus: the demand for truthfulness presupposes the knowability and stability of the person. In fact, it is the object of education to create in the herd member

¹⁸³ WP, Book II, part 2, §276

a definite faith concerning the nature of man: it first invents this faith and then demands “truthfulness.”¹⁸⁴

Well then, how are the moral values produced?

The morality which prevails in a community is constantly being worked on by everybody: most people produce example after example of the alleged relationship between cause and effect, between guilt and punishment, confirm it as well founded and strengthen their faith: some observe actions and their consequences afresh and draw conclusions and laws from their observations: a very few take exception here and there and thus diminish faith on these points. —All, however, are at one of the wholly crude, unscientific character of their activity; whether it is a matter of producing examples, making observations or taking exception, whether it is a matter of proving, confirming, expressing or refuting a law—both material and form are worthless, as are the material and form of all popular medicine. Popular medicine and popular morality belong together and ought not to be evaluated so differently as they still are: both are the most dangerous pseudo-sciences.¹⁸⁵

I think this fragment of Nietzsche is very important because it reveals how people, themselves, are the workers of the morality without noticing. People who are the members of the herd are the producers of the morality by their actions, discourses, and observations. Maybe, the last part of the fragment is more striking than the first part. Hearing that people are the producers of moral values from Nietzsche is very expected since he has already defined the moral values as the customs. However, he also considers moral values equal with popular medicine. If one is an immoral, s/he is sick because s/he does not take the medicine. Only when one takes this medicine, s/he could be well. Every behavior in line with these moral values or every making better with these pseudo-sciences’ medicine, makes these values stronger. Stronger they become, harder it makes that one could revolt against these moral values. People attach themselves to stronger bonds. They react against the questioner of these moral

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, §277

¹⁸⁵ D, Book I, §11

values rigorously. It is harder to untie these bonds. Even though they are sick, they believe that they are healthy thanks to these popular medicines.

At that point, Nietzsche sees that values are upside down. Besides sick people supposes that they are healthy, they tried to make healthy people sick. He shows us what is true is not true. Moral laws are not moral, contrarily, they make us fool.

Custom represents the experiences of men of earlier times as to what they supposed useful and harmful –but the *sense for custom* (original emphasis) (morality) applies, not to these experiences as such, but to the age, the sanctity, the indiscussability of the custom. And so, this feeling is a hindrance to the acquisition of new experiences and the correction of customs: that is to say, morality is a hindrance to the creation of new and better customs: it makes stupid.¹⁸⁶

The logic behind the moral laws is that as their roots go long way back, so they are true and incontestable. The expectation from the people, who live under these laws, is to obey them without any question. To create new values not only seems impossible but also it seems unnecessary. However according to Nietzsche, as I mentioned many times, man's main characteristic is to create new and change the old, and thus to evaluate. If human abandons this characteristic, it also gives up its humanness. It becomes an animal. Therefore, submitting to the moral laws makes us immoral rather than moral because morality is only a specialty which belongs to human, not animal.

“Subjection to morality can be slavish or vain or self-interested or resigned or gloomily enthusiastic or an act of despair, like subjection to a prince: in itself, it is nothing moral.”¹⁸⁷ Then, we reached another conclusion which is that morality controls a man like how prince controls his slave. We observe a will to power on a man. This kind of will to power forms a specific power relation which makes a man more controllable and predictable because it abolishes the characteristic of creating

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, §19

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, Book II, §97

new things. Absolute moral laws bring about a specific kind of man which is herd animal.

This is provided not only by morality but also religion. Both create sacred values which are unchangeable—if you attempt to change them, you are punished with being immoral and evil—then they expect from us to obey them. However, while these unchangeable laws were creating, they do not ask us how they should be. We are born into a place where these laws were already created. If you choose to become part of the herd, there is no necessity for punishment; however, if you attempt to question these laws and to create new values, in other words, you will to preserve your humanness, the danger gets the start for you because there are already established power relations in such a society. Challenging the sacredness of values in such society means, at the same time, challenging the power relations¹⁸⁸.

4.2 Dominated Values

Now, I would like to expound the dominated values which are oppressed by the values that are discussed before. These values are favorable to Nietzsche. In Nietzsche, these are discussed in two ways.

One is the values which belong to the past. Nietzsche praises the culture of Ancient Greek which had until Socrates; or the culture of Europe which had in Renaissance. After a time, these cultures are dominated by dominant values. The other way is that he discusses the values which should be reached in the future. However, these two ways are not independent of each other. We could see that in his interpretation of Dionysus clearly. Dionysus refers to both a God in the Ancient Greek and a precursor of a culture that should be reached. Yet, I will not discuss in this vein. I will attempt to discuss according to the essence of these values.

¹⁸⁸ The power relations of herd animal will be discussed in following chapter.

The first characteristic of dominated values is the worldliness which means to be anti-metaphysical. Worldliness is the main component to be a man. Therefore, when values of man are grounded metaphysically, it transforms into a herd animal. As I discussed under the headings of religions and morality, these both values abolish the worldliness of man. By doing it, they transform a man into a herd animal. At that point, Nietzsche's proposition is to become a man again. As I indicated above, this proposition refers to both bringing back the oppressed values, which Ancient Greeks and Europeans of Renaissance had, and creating a new culture based on these experiences.

The second characteristic is an enabling culture. That is to say, we should have such values that allow and encourage us to create new. Until that point, I tried to explain the importance of change in Nietzsche many times. For this part, it is also valid. Values should not be static and unchangeable likewise man itself. On the contrary, they should push us to create new values and things. We should enjoy such a culture in which we can realize ourselves. In such a culture, there could not be static values. The most static one is the first characteristic which prioritizes the man and changes itself. Therefore, I choose to explain these main characteristics of values.

4.2.1 Worldliness

Nietzsche's main contestation against prevailing values is that they are metaphysically grounded. It paves the way for dissolving being worldly of man and changing it into a herd animal. Therefore, he thinks we should create such values which are not metaphysically grounded and restored being worldly.

Nietzsche thinks that human is mundane. He puts forward “naturalistic account of agency”¹⁸⁹, which means a human has “non-moral responsibility, simple ownership of actions, as part causal and part conventional, the result of a social practice of holding responsible and influencing behavior.”¹⁹⁰ That is to say, the human is a natural being and, therefore, our values should embrace the world. A human can only be complete if it embraces all naturalness and worldliness. For instance, if someone is continuously happy, after a while, s/he lost his/her humanness. Besides happiness, all other our feelings are part of the mundane characteristics of a man. While Christian ascetic life aggrandizes suffering, it despises joy, happiness. However, this is sickness because it despises the life itself by despising man’s natural feelings. According to him “Objections, minor infidelities, cheerful mistrust, a delight in mockery –these are symptoms of health. Everything unconditional belongs to pathology.”¹⁹¹ Unconditional suffering highlights the man’s some characteristics—such as resentment, pain etc.—and ignores others. This divides man into two and abolishes a side.

Nietzsche finds the example of this values in the Ancient Greeks:

They took this all-too-human to be inescapable and, instead of reviling it, preferred to accord it a kind of right of the second rank through regulating it within the usages of society and religion: indeed, everything in man possessing the power they called divine and inscribed it on the walls of their Heaven. They do not repudiate the natural drive that finds expression in the evil qualities but regulate it and, as soon as they have discovered sufficient prescriptive measures to provide these wild waters with the least harmful means of channeling and outflow, confine them to definite cults and days. This is the root of all the moral free-mindedness of antiquity. One granted to the evil and suspicious, to the animal and backward, likewise to the barbarian, the pre-Greek and Asiatic, that still lived on in the foundations of the Hellenic nature, a moderate discharge, and did not strive after their total annihilation.

¹⁸⁹ Jenkins, “Morality, Agency, and Freedom in Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morals’”, p. 68

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 69

¹⁹¹ BGE, part IV, §154

The entire system of such procedures was comprehended in the state, which was constituted to accommodate, not individual people or castes, but the ordinary qualities of mankind... The constitution of the state and of the state religion was determined, not by a circumscribed priestly or caste-dominated moral code, but by the most comprehensive regard for all human actuality.¹⁹²

Greeks accept that they are natural being and establish their state, culture, religion on this humanness. There occurs a culture which is based on values that are human all too human. They affirm themselves in a completeness.

“Nietzsche’s naturalism is a heuristic principle that leads him to develop interpretations of phenomena that are consistent with a nonteleological developmental picture of the natural world.”¹⁹³ On the contrary, Christianity and slave morality depict a metaphysical world. And then, the natural world become meaningless, because their metaphysics bring a teleological understanding. They get human to become carefree in its life by despising the natural world. Nietzsche says that:

Why should one live? All is vain! To live—that is to thresh straw; to live—that is to burn oneself and yet not get warm. —Such ancient babbling still passes for “wisdom”; because it is old, however, and smells mustily, therefore is it the more honored. Even mould ennobles... Such persons sit down to the table and bring nothing with them, not even good hunger: —and then do they rail: “All is vain!” But to eat and drink well, my brothers is truly no vain art! Break up, break up for me the tables of the never-joyous ones!¹⁹⁴

At that point, we see that moral and religious laws order to us not to live our life. They aim to control us with their sacred unchangeable rules. Affirmation and embracing our lives mean taking over the control back. Before the affirmation of our worldliness, we are told that which feelings are evil, which feelings are not. They have control not only of our actions but also feelings. In order to be a good man, some

¹⁹² HAH, Vol. II, part 1, §220

¹⁹³ Andresen, Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Falsification, p. 473

¹⁹⁴ Z, part III, §13

feelings have to be dismissed because they are bad in itself. For instance, one shall not be jealous. One shall love his/her neighbor. Or one shall help out the poor people. Or, one shall not lust another person if they are not married. Reginster elaborates in that way:

If the realization of our highest values requires the intervention of God, or the existence of another, metaphysical world, then these values must be of a particular sort. Specifically, they must be values that cannot be realized under the conditions of our life in this, the natural, world. They are, accordingly, values from the standpoint of which this life “deserves to be repudiated.” For this reason, I propose to call them life-negating values.¹⁹⁵

Life-negating values dominate all the values by claiming that they are the higher values; however, because they are life-negating values, they cannot be higher. On the contrary, they are the lowest values. If we want to abolish the domination of life-negating values, we should completely affirm our worldliness and naturalness. If we do not affirm, we do not live as well because according to Nietzsche:

What are our evaluations and moral tables really worth? What is the outcome of their rule? For whom? In relation to what? - Answer: for life. But what is life? Here we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept “life.” My formula for it is: Life is will to power.¹⁹⁶

As religions and slave morality are despising the worldliness of human, they gain power over a human. Therefore, affirmation of worldliness means willing to the power of determining our life. It is taking back our ability to evaluate the new values in this world. These values make us care about the world and give us the power to reshape the world. Embracing the worldliness allows us to establish a new world which is not against our life. It allows us to be complete human again regardless of the fact that while all moral and religious values are trying to make us a docile body

¹⁹⁵ Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life*, p. 45

¹⁹⁶ WP, Book II, part 2, §254

and a herd animal which have no power in their lives. Nietzsche calls such a mode of life as Dionysian life:

Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types –that is what I called Dionysian, that is the bridge I found to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not to escape horror and pity, not to cleanse yourself of a dangerous effect by violent discharge – as Aristotle thought -: but rather, over and above all horror and pity, so that you yourself may be the eternal joy in becoming, - the joy that includes even the eternal joy in negating.

This life has fully metaphysics-free, worldly and natural values; therefore, it is complete. Such a worldly life is under control of the individual oneself. It is determined by him/herself. Affirmation of worldliness of life means to take back the individual's will to power in his/her life.

4.2.2 Enabling Values

Nehamas states that Nietzsche

prefers to think of truth as the product of creation rather than as the object of discovery. His attitude toward the self is similar. The people who “want to become those they are” are precisely “human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.”¹⁹⁷

This project of Nietzsche on self-requires certain values. These are the values which provide a suitable environment in which subject can create oneself. One of the main problems which Nietzsche deals with is that the dominant values hinder the creation of subjects themselves. How do they hinder? They hinder the subjects by claiming that their values are static and unchangeable. Therefore, firstly, values should be changeable. Secondly, “a valuable culture is that which encourages or allows for the flourishing of exceptional individuals.”¹⁹⁸ For flourishing such exceptional

¹⁹⁷ Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p. 174

¹⁹⁸ Ward, Nietzsche's Value Conflict, p. 6

individuals, values should be changeable, questionable and encouraging. I will name such values as enabling values.

Firstly, values should be changeable just as subjects are. No one can claim the values that s/he has, are universal. As subjects are a never-ending process, becoming, the values which are created by these subjects are also changeable. That is to say, dominant values make the subjects lazy thereby accustoming them static values. However, these values could be overcome, and they should be. Not only olden created values but also the values which will be created in the future, would be overcome. In that way, we are talking about the process of creating values that never ends. Such a culture never ends its becoming.

Heraclitus is one of the first philosophers in history who promotes the becoming rather than the being. Becoming is represented by Heraclitus' famous metaphor of the flowing river which cannot be the same. On Nietzsche's thoughts about changeable values, there are undebatable effects of Heraclitus.

For, like Nietzsche, Heraclitus is using the tradition against the tradition to show that it is a tradition, and by no means the only way of thinking or speaking that is available, and that from another perspective, what it takes to be true or holy or good might appear just the opposite.¹⁹⁹

Nietzsche employs "perspectivism" against the universalism.²⁰⁰ The perspectivism makes the values changeable by taking out their universalistic essence. By employing perspectivism, Nietzsche shows that values are the product of becoming, hence they are changeable.

Straight at that mystic night in which was shrouded Anaximander's problem of becoming, walked Heraclitus of Ephesus and illuminated it by a divine stroke of lightning. "Becoming' is what I contemplate," he exclaims, "and no one else has watched so attentively this everlasting wave beat and rhythm of things..." I see nothing other than becoming. Be not deceived. It is the fault

¹⁹⁹ Waugh, "Heraclitus: The Postmodern Pre-Socratic", p. 615

²⁰⁰ WP, Book III, Part 1, §481

of your myopia, not of the nature of things, if you believe you see land somewhere in the ocean of coming-to-be and passing away. You use names for things as though they rigidly, persistently endured; yet even the stream into which you step a second time is not the one you stepped into before.” Heraclitus’ regal possession is his extraordinary power to think intuitively.²⁰¹

Just as no one can stop the flowing of the river, no one can claim that the values are static, and they are unchangeable as well. The becoming is unstoppable. If one persists that the prevailing values are unchangeable, we should say to them, it seems to you in that way because your eyes cannot see far away from the prevailing values. The people believed so much correctness of their values, they even do not think the values could be changed. However, at that point, Nietzsche revives the thoughts of Heraclitus, and accordingly, he attempts to heal from this sickness of myopia.

Karl Jaspers explains in that way:

Nietzsche’s philosophizing is not intended to allow a thinking man to sink peacefully into the undisturbed innocence of becoming. On the contrary, he should be able to, by listening to the source of the possible, to learn what is historically called for by his own specific situation. Insofar Nietzsche’s thinking is intended to lead us through these self-destructive antitheses into the clarity of the audible, where the concrete and the determinate law gives way before the encompassing law that becomes known only historically, this thinking must itself lose all definiteness. Hence, Nietzsche is not content with such final statement as “the innocence of becoming has been restored” or “all is a necessity—all is innocence”; rather he wishes to hit upon the productive factor in this extreme freedom. He calls it creation.²⁰²

In other words, becoming teaches us to the contingent way of thinking of values. If we were born into a set of values—indeed, it is inevitable—it does not mean we have to submit these values. In other words, if one has a religious family, s/he has not to be religious. Becoming makes him/her free to become whatever s/he wants to be. One becomes aware that values are transient. However, this transition is not independent

²⁰¹ PTAG, §5

²⁰² Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity*, p. 151

of the individual. On the contrary, without the intervention of individual, this transition can never be realized. Thus, the innocence of becoming does not passivize the individual, it gives freedom to act. It only provides a suitable environment to create new values. In this environment, the individual can realize oneself.

This concept of becoming apparently opposes the concept of being which is claimed by dominant values. God, the thing-in-itself, universal truth: —all of them signify as a being. These are unchanging values. These are assumed as a final state by the dominant values. Even though there occurs a change in the dominant values, the agents of these values suppose that these changes happen in order to reach the final state. However, Nietzsche has not such an understanding of becoming. Change does not happen in order to reach the final state. He puts that:

If the motion of the world aimed at a final state, that state would have been reached. The sole fundamental fact, however, is that it does not aim at a final state; and every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e.g., mechanistic theory) which necessitates such a final state is refuted by this fundamental fact. I seek a conception of the world that takes this fact into account. Becoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions; becoming must appear justified at every moment (or incapable of being evaluated; which amounts to the same thing); the present must absolutely not be justified by reference to a future, nor the past by reference to the present.²⁰³

According to Nietzsche, becoming should be explained, regardless of past or future, only by the present. According to him, “The absolute necessity of a total liberation from ends: otherwise we should not be permitted to try to sacrifice ourselves and let ourselves go. Only the innocence of becoming gives us the greatest courage and the greatest freedom!”²⁰⁴

²⁰³ WP, Book III, part 2, §708

²⁰⁴ Ibid, §787

Well then, why is there such an inclination to determine a knowledge of the future, the past, or a universal truth which is even unquestionable? Nietzsche explains it with the concept of *will to truth*.

The will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. "Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered-but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end-introducing truth, as a *processus in infinitum* (original emphasis), an active determining—not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the "will to power."²⁰⁵

In other words, the will to truth is a tool of will to power. The dominant values by determining what truth is and not, attempt to stabilize the truth in order to get control of the individual and to make him/her a herd animal. This is the will to power of dominant values. Their aim is to make human a herd animal by using truth as a tool of will to power.

Nietzsche puts forward the becoming against this making firm of truth. On the other hand, the truth is created and re-created again in the becoming of life. Therefore, no one has the right to determine a universal truth which dominates the others. Becoming takes back the authorization of determining truth from a specific group which could be clergy, scientists, philosophers etc., and gives back to the individual. Becoming makes individuals free to create new truths.

Even a revolution, which could reverse all truths, does not achieve what becoming achieves, because "It is well-known that the most radical revolutionary will become a conservative on the day after the revolution."²⁰⁶ Therefore, the values should have

²⁰⁵ Ibid, Book III, part 1, §552

²⁰⁶ Arendt, "Civil Disobedience", p.78

the perpetual changing character of becoming. They should be open to new revolutions after a revolution.

However, being open is not enough by itself. Besides it, secondly, values should encourage the subject to create new values. But how is it possible?

Let us look at the Ancient Greek. The culture of the Ancient Greek is based upon reaching the best. Namely, all individuals aim to do something in the best way. If someone is good at in art or sports, another will to make it better. To elaborate:

To the Ancients, however, the aim of the agonistic education was the welfare of the whole, of the civic society. Every Athenian for instance was to cultivate his Ego in the contest, so far that it should be of the highest service to Athens and should do the least harm. It was not unmeasured and immeasurable as modern ambition generally is; the youth thought of the welfare of his native town when he vied with others in running, throwing or singing; it was her glory that he wanted to increase with his own; it was to his town's gods that he dedicated the wreaths which the umpires as a mark of honor set upon his head. Every Greek from childhood felt within himself the burning wish to be in the contest of the towns an instrument for the welfare of his own town; in this, his selfishness was kindled into a flame, by this, his selfishness was bridled and restricted. Therefore, the individuals in antiquity were freer, because their aims were nearer and more tangible.²⁰⁷

This shows us Athenian culture encourage every individual to do best and by doing the best every individual realizes oneself, however, this realization not only glorifies the individual but also paves the way for a higher culture. Every individual struggle to make their best in every space of life. This struggle originates from the culture, namely the values. The selfishness of individual glorifies the culture thereby, whole people in the state.

The Greeks' battle against time was thus first won through the establishment of a collective way of life that sharply differentiated between a glorified life based on a will to immortality, and mere life driven by the need to survive from one moment to the next. This desire for immortality itself grew out of

²⁰⁷ Nietzsche, "Homer's Contest", pp. 58-59

the ability to experience the present as a moment of apotheosis liberated from the mere repetition of life's self-consuming cycles.²⁰⁸

A collective way of immortality encourages every individual to create own values. Thereby, they can become who they are. By becoming who they are, they aim to be immortal in a contest in which individuals, who will to be immortal, compete. The immortality of individuals glorifies not only the individuals themselves but also the culture as well.

What is the implication of this contest culture in the political sphere? "That is the kernel of the Hellenic contest-conception: it abominates autocracy and fears its dangers; it desires as a preventive against the genius—a second genius."²⁰⁹ This is "the ancient Greek agon the basis for a new vision."²¹⁰ The agonistic basis politics gives freedom to every individual think on the political issues. No one could underestimate another because everyone will attempt to be better. It will not be enough an individual's orders to govern others because the others also compete. If everyone would be on the way of self-fulfillment in such a society, no one even attempts to dictate the others. Even if someone attempts to dominate the others, the others will question and will not allow this attempt, because everyone will be capable to understand what this attempt means. It is the will to power of one on to others.

4.3 Higher Culture

Now, I can sum what was discussed in the whole of this chapter. While I was starting this chapter, my main question is that: what or who is the dominant and what or who is the dominated? I endeavored to answer these questions by analyzing the values. Firstly, I looked at the dominant values which are created by prevalent religions and

²⁰⁸ Gambino, "Nietzsche and the Greeks: Identity, Politics, and Tragedy", p. 420

²⁰⁹ Nietzsche, "Homer's Contest", p. 58

²¹⁰ Gambino, "Nietzsche and the Greeks: Identity, Politics, and Tragedy", p. 415

moral laws. Secondly, I looked at dominated values whose main characteristics are being worldliness and enabling. If we try to depict what Nietzsche desires, it is the searching for a higher culture. What makes a culture higher one? In order for a society to have a higher culture, it should bear the characteristics of worldliness and of enabling. Then, the decadent, nihilist values will be got over. Under this heading, I will try to look at the components of these higher and lower cultures.

In Nietzsche's philosophy, there are the two-fold meaning of the values. One is the values which are serving to lower culture. Dominant values which are created by prevalent religions and morality are a good example of this kind of values. On the other hand, the second meaning is the morality which will be created by dominated values. This will be serving to higher culture. In order to understand this two-fold meaning, let us analyze it through examples.

Firstly, I would like to analyze the art. As I indicated in the first chapter, while on the one hand, Nietzsche praises the tragic art, on the other, he criticizes the art which is inspired by nihilist values. This is the main reason why I named the subject of Nietzsche who is on the way to emancipation, as a *tragic artist*, not only as an artist. Let us dig a little bit more to understand what kind of art component a higher culture can have.

Art reminds us of states of animal vigor; it is, on the one hand, an excess and overflow of blooming physicality into the world of images and desires; on the other, an excitation of the animal functions through the images and desires of intensified life; -an enhancement of the feeling of life, a stimulant to it.²¹¹

And;

Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding. Empathy with the souls of others is originally nothing moral, but a physiological susceptibility to suggestion: "sympathy," or what is called "altruism," is merely a product of that psychomotor rapport which is reckoned a part of spirituality...One never communicates thoughts:

²¹¹ WP, Book III, part 4, §802

one communicates movements, mimic signs, which we then trace back to thoughts.²¹²

That is to say, the art, firstly, reminds us we are a man. It enhances our worldliness. This helps to communicate with and understand each other. Communication and understanding are the core of living together. These are a common ground where a culture can flourish. We can affirm the life through art. Only if the artists can affirm the life, then the audiences of the artist could affirm. At that point, Nietzsche makes a separation between artist and tragic artist:

To divide the world into a ‘true’ half and an ‘illusory’ one, whether in the manner of Christianity or in the manner of Kant (an underhanded Christian, at the end of the day), is just a sign of decadence, —it is a symptom of life in decline... The fact that artists have valued appearance more highly than reality is not an objection to this proposition. Because ‘appearance’ here means reality once again, only selected, strengthened, corrected... The tragic artist is not a pessimist, he says yes to the very things that are questionable and terrible, he is Dionysian...²¹³

Now, we can clearly understand that art could be both a component of lower culture’s values and higher culture’s values. If the art makes us man, enhances the life, makes us familiar with this world, it is tragic and Dionysian art. This kind of art can be productive and paves the way for higher culture. On the other side, if art follows the way of metaphysical thought and be an agent of slave morality and Christianity, then this kind of art is useless and part of nihilist values. Therefore, we cannot say this individual as a tragic artist.

Secondly, I would like to discuss the science which is also one of the main components of the culture. The two-fold meaning also shows itself in science. This two-fold meaning should be explained because the science, by producing the knowledge, resources the culture and provides the continuity of culture. At that point,

²¹² Ibid, §809

²¹³ TI, p. 170

the essence of knowledge becomes crucial because according to it, the culture will be either higher or lower.

Nietzsche thinks that because there is no such thing as “in-itself”, we cannot know without interpretation.

“There are only facts”—I would say: No, facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact “in itself”: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing. “Everything is subjective,” you say; but even this is interpretation. ...In so far as the word “knowledge” has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. - “Perspectivism.” It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their “For and Against”. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.²¹⁴

This approach is very important because Nietzsche endeavors to abolish the understanding of universal truth. Every knowledge wills to be the norm. It wills to be a universal truth. However, Nietzsche, by saying that every knowledge is an interpretation, opens us to a place in which we can advocate for our knowledge without submitting to prevailing nihilist knowledge.

Well then, what kind of knowledge leads us to higher culture? Deleuze puts it in that way:

For rational knowledge sets the same limits to life as reasonable life sets to thought; life is subject to knowledge and at the same time thought is subject to life. Reason sometimes dissuades and sometimes forbids us to cross certain limits: because it is useless (knowledge is there to predict) because it would be evil (life is there to be virtuous) because it is impossible (there is nothing to see or think behind the truth) ...A thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life. Life would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the affirmative power of life. Both would go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each

²¹⁴ WP, Book III, part 1, §481

other step for step, in a burst of unparalleled creativity. Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life.²¹⁵

What knowledge should do is the affirmation of life likewise tragic art does. I think the science which produces such knowledge could be named as *gay science* in the terminology of Nietzsche.

Indeed, at hearing the news that ‘the old god is dead’, we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel illuminated by a new dawn; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, forebodings, expectation—finally the horizon seems clear again, even if not bright; finally our ships may set out again, set out to face any danger; every daring of the lover of knowledge is allowed again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; maybe there has never been such an ‘open sea’.²¹⁶

The workers of gay science dare to challenge old knowledge and to create new instead of them. They are sailors of undiscovered seas. The gay science, by affirming the life, pushes all sets of boundaries forward. In such way, science helps the individuals in the way of the realization of themselves because gay science does not negate the life by creating unchangeable truths. On the contrary, it helps the individual to question the truths and to create the new values. Gay science helps individual to take back the power.

The tragic art and the gay science help a society in order to reach a higher culture. They are offered as a healer of decadent and nihilist culture. They carry the main characteristics of dominated values.

As Kaufmann indicates that:

Culture consists of the overcoming of any discrepancy between inside and outside, and the uncultured man is not really embodied in his acts, thoughts,

²¹⁵ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, part 3, §13

²¹⁶ GS, Book V, §343

and desires. A cleft remains in him between appearance and reality, between his nature and his true nature.²¹⁷

The culture which is formed by the tragic art and the gay science, close the cleft between appearance and reality, between one's nature and one's true nature by making the human complete. When a man gets rid of the dominant values and achieves to create new values, it emancipates as well. However, because the creation process is continuous and never-ending, man can only enjoy being on the way to emancipation, the higher culture will never be completed. When a society assumed that it reached the higher culture, the tragic art, and the gay science will show that there can be reachable higher than what is reached.

²¹⁷ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist*, part 2, p. 158

CHAPTER 5

EMANCIPATED SUBJECT

Until that point, firstly I looked how Nietzsche reacts towards modernity through analyzing the theory of freedom and I see that Nietzsche reacts against the nihilist values of modernity. Political emancipation can only be realized by emancipation from these nihilist values. Then, I looked at the subject of this political emancipation by asking that: who is the subject that is on the way to emancipation? The answer was the tragic artist. Then, I searched nihilist values, which are dominant, and the higher values, which should be emancipated from nihilist values, in detail. As a conclusion, there came out a higher culture which is the result of the emancipation from dominant values and of the creation of new values.

Now, we can consider which emancipation tools are used in the political emancipation process. Before proceeding to the tools of the political, I will attempt to elaborate the political in detail.

The political is the struggle between tragic artist and the herd animal. The tragic artist aims to defeat nihilist values and to put the new values in place of nihilist values. Nietzsche defines three main concepts, which help the tragic artist in this struggle, in his late period. These concepts are the will to power, eternal recurrence, and genealogy. They lead tragic artist in the way of political struggle, thus, political emancipation. Finally, I will try to sum all up under the headings of Overman, who is the emancipated subject in Nietzsche, in the conclusion part.

This chapter aims also to reach a final answer to my thesis's main question: whether political emancipation is possible in Nietzsche or not.

5.1 The Political

What is the political in Nietzsche? According to Mark Warren:

Nietzsche did not give his own philosophy a plausible political identity. He failed to elaborate on the broad range of political possibilities that are suggested by his philosophy in large part owing to unexamined assumptions about the nature of modern politics.²¹⁸

Because of that, Nietzsche's understanding of politics is open-ended. Nietzsche's concept of political is analyzed by two main perspectives: aristocratic radicalism and radical liberal or democratic political views.²¹⁹ I will benefit from both perspectives while I am elaborating what is political in Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's understanding of political is based upon a struggle. This is an antagonistic struggle which is between the tragic artist and the herd animal. On the one side, the tragic artist represents the higher values of the higher cultures. On the other side, the herd animal represents the nihilist values of the decadent culture. As William Connolly shows that:

Such a perspective would stand to Nietzsche as Marx stood to Hegel: in a relation of antagonistic indebtedness. It would appreciate the reach of Nietzschean thought as well as its sensitivity to the complex relations between resentment and the production of otherness, but it would turn the genealogist of resentment on his head by exploring democratic politics as a medium through which to expose resentment and to encourage the struggle against it.²²⁰

In line with Connolly, Lawrence Hatab:

²¹⁸ Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, p. 246

²¹⁹ See for aristocratic radicalism: Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*; Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*; Don Dombowsky, *Nietzsche's Machiavellian Politics*. See for radical liberal or democratic political views: Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*; "The Nobility of Democracy: Nietzsche and Democracy"; "Nietzsche, Democracy, Time"; David Owen, *Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity*; Lawrence J. Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy*.

²²⁰ Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*, p. 175

A radical agonistics rules out violence because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. In a later work, Nietzsche discusses the “spiritualization of hostility (*Feindschaft*)” wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one’s opponents as implicated in one’s own posture (*TI* “Morality as Antinature,” 3). And in this passage, Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations.²²¹

Even though Connolly and Hatab have divergences, they converge on that Nietzsche’s understanding of political is based upon struggle.

However, in Nietzsche’s mind, there is a different understanding of democracy rather than modern democracy. Since “modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of state.”²²², he is “speaking of democracy as of something yet to come.”²²³ It is obvious that this democracy is founded on the struggle between the higher type of human and lower type. Higher type is the embodiment of the higher values. The lower is, on the other hand, the embracement of nihilist values. Since Nietzsche’s main aim is to defeat nihilist values, the object of political struggle should be values—thus culture. Paul Patton states that Nietzsche “is fully aware that there is an intimate connection between politics and the cultural development of humanity.”²²⁴

Therefore, this is the struggle of inequal subjects on values. From this perspective, Nietzsche is anti-egalitarian. According to Frederick Appel, Nietzsche’s “radically aristocratic commitments pervade every aspect of his project, making any egalitarian

²²¹ Hatab, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans”, p. 135

²²² HAH, Book I, §472

²²³ Ibid, Book II, §293

²²⁴ Patton, “Nietzsche on Power and Democracy circa 1876-1881”, p. 95

appropriation of his work exceedingly problematic.”²²⁵ Nietzsche, openly, favors one of the subjects and their values of this political struggle and disfavors the other.

While aristocratic conservatives and egalitarian radicals have been plentiful in recent times, it is difficult to think of another modern of Nietzsche’s stature whose political orientation is both as aristocratic and as radical as his. Among modern philosophers, Nietzsche stands virtually alone in his insistence that the goal of society should be the promotion and enhancement of the highest type even at the expense of what has traditionally been thought to be the good of all or of the great number.²²⁶

In the age of nihilism, there is domination of lower type of man and of its values. These lower values make all man equal and degrade the higher values. By this way, there occurs domination of mediocre. Higher type should emancipate from the domination of lower and higher man aims to achieve higher culture. This is the essence of political struggle between aristocratic-higher and mediocre-lower man.

Now we can turn back to the concepts which are deduced from the previous chapters. On the one side, there is a tragic artist, who is the subject negating the dominant values and then affirming his/her own new ones. Tragic artist aggrandizes the worldliness and knows how to evaluate the life. S/he is the subject of becoming, of a never-ending process. S/he is both a work of his/her art and artist. S/he corresponds to the higher type of man.

On the other side, there is a herd animal. However, this herd animal is distinguished into two kinds: the shepherd and its herd. It is hard to analyze separately because they are interdependent. As they are, we see them together as a creator of the slave morality in Nietzsche. However, it will be helpful to attempt analyzing them separately to understand the political struggle well. Since tragic artist was scrutinized before in detail, we should examine the shepherd and herd now.

²²⁵ Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, p. 5

²²⁶ Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, p. 189

5.1.1 The Herd and the Shepherd

Nietzsche uses mostly the herd in order to explain these subjects. However, we need a shepherd to this herd. Nietzsche makes this separation—as a shepherd and herd—in the first essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887) where he investigates the origin of the morality. He introduces the “aristocratic or noble priest”²²⁷ which is the shepherd of the herd. Bernard Reginster shows that two distinct groups of nobility “compete for political superiority”.²²⁸ One of these groups is the knights or the masters—namely, the tragic artist. The other is the noble priests. Lanier Anderson claims that for Nietzsche “the slave morality was invented not by slaves at all, but by priestly nobles”²²⁹ as a conclusion of the slave morality revolt against the masters. Both Anderson and Reginster are using categories of master and slave not as “concrete social groups, but as psychological type concepts”²³⁰. Both show us the main determinant of this distinction between the groups is resentment of slave morality.

That is to say, shepherd, as a man of God, leads the herd—thus, it uncovers that there is the difference between herd and shepherd. He leads by saying what good and evil are in the name of god. The herd makes this law of God actual by its action. In the morality, these shepherds become family elders—if we think families live as a community in the villages, these elders are the authorities of these communities—and these elders decide what good and bad are in the name of morality. Then, the laws of morality and religion change into unchangeable laws by the doing of the herd. They change into custom by their doings. It becomes harder to question these laws,

²²⁷ GM, First Essay, §6-7

²²⁸ Reginster, “Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation”, p. 285

²²⁹ Anderson, “On the Nobility of Nietzsche’s Priests”, p. 33

²³⁰ Ibid, p. 30

according to the size of the herd and to doings' continuity at the time. The shepherd should be part of the herd if s/he wants to continue his/her shepherding.

Shepherd has absolute power and domination on the herd as long as s/he is part of the herd²³¹. This is one type of the power relation. Shepherd should be part of the herd, therefore there should be another type of power relation which makes shepherd part of the herd. Thus, we can claim that there are bilateral power relations between shepherd and herd. In the first type of power relation, the shepherd feels powerful because s/he owns the herd. In the second, powerful side is the herd because without the existence of the herd, the shepherd is useless, and every member of the herd feels this power in oneself. In the end, both shepherd and herd are powerful as long as they could sustain these power relations.

Well then, what makes the human part of this power relation? Like Reginster and Anderson, Iain Morrisson explains the competition of the political superiority between the tragic artist and shepherd with a psychological trait, i.e.: resentment²³². However, they do not explain the relations between the noble priest and slaves—namely shepherd and herd. This relation is also determined by psychological traits. Walter Kaufmann states about characteristics of shepherd and herd:

The reason why most men fail to heed the voice of their true self is twofold. Nietzsche hesitates to decide which is the most universal human characteristic: fear or laziness. Both keep a man from heeding the call to achieve culture and thus to realize himself. Men are afraid of social retaliation and do not dare be their own unique selves.²³³

²³¹ Shepherd is differing from herd by characteristic of having *pathos of distance* likewise tragic artist. S/he regards oneself higher than herds. However, s/he does not manifest it openly because one of their nihilist values is equality. From this perspective, s/he is distinguished tragic artist. (Reginster, "Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation", p. 294)

²³² Morrisson, "Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals", p. 231-232

²³³ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist*, part 2, p. 158

Therefore, fear and laziness are the main characteristics of shepherd and herd. Shepherd has a fear to lose his/her power over the herd. Like real shepherd fears to lose control of a sheep, also Nietzsche's shepherd fears to lose the control of herd. For instance, the inquisition of the church's oppositions, which was realized by the Christian church in the middle age, is a good example of this fear of shepherds. Shepherd's fear tends towards the individual who wills to change. S/he fears to lose power. There always is an enemy who questions the power of the shepherd. This enemy could come from inside of the herd or outside of the herd. When we think three metamorphoses of Nietzsche, the camel could change into lion and child. And shepherd endeavors to prevent these metamorphoses because s/he fears from the change of camel.

On the other side, an animal of the herd has also fear. In fact, one may think that shepherd fears from losing the power, but why do herd fear even they seem as dominated by the shepherd? But this thinking is wrong because we should think the herd as a whole with its shepherd and members. If the shepherd is powerful, every member of herd feels this power with the shepherd. If the shepherd begins to lose its power, the herd also feels this impotence. Hence, herd fears of powerlessness of shepherd. From this perspective, they are perfectly interdependent on each other.

This interdependency comes from the sameness—or claim of equality—in the herd from the shepherd to last member of the herd. Sameness makes the herd feel more powerful and they fear from discrepancies because, according to them, a discrepancy of one is a threat to the herd. Therefore, the members of herd also fear of lions and children likewise shepherd.

Also, fear is a tool for keeping the herd together in order to hinder metamorphoses of the camel. If one attempts to question the power relations, s/he is immediately punished. For instance, there exists a punishment for an immoral or evil individual. They could be exiled from a society or be put in jail or be executed. All of these

punishments are given in order to make every individual feel the fear, and thereby, to preserve power relations from individuals who are seemed enemy to power relations which are felt by every individual of the herd.

If we proceed to laziness, we are born into a society in which there already exists established power relations. One could say that in this society, I will create new things, by creating I will show my power. This creating is in a positive sense. Other could say that I will be part of the herd by creating as well. This creating is in a negative sense. It provides the continuation of the decadent values. For instance, when capitalism goes into crises, one could create new methods in order to sustain the capitalism. The stages of capitalism that we have experienced, are the creation of this kind of individuals. Or, when the church lost its power in the Renaissance, Martin Luther reformed these nihilist power relations. Why do these people not use their creativity in the positive sense? The answer will be laziness. Creating new things in a positive sense is much harder than creating in a negative sense. In the negative sense, one makes only repair by small changes. Even these small changes make them a shepherd of the herd, why do they not attempt to make a big change? By making a small change, they transform the power relations in their favors. Creation in a positive sense requires much more effort. At that point, the lazy individual chooses the easy way of creating²³⁴.

On the other side, the ordinary members of the herd are so lazy, they even do not create. They reproduce the existing the values by their action. In that way, they are separated from the shepherd. Their effect is very limited with the reproduction of the customs. They make the fixated power relations stronger because the easiest way to live, behaving like the others, doing whatever they do without creating anything neither in a positive sense nor in a negative sense. According to Nietzsche, "...men

²³⁴ According to Lanier Anderson, thanks to this creativity of priest, Nietzsche classifies them as noble. This makes priest different than slave. ("On the Nobility of Nietzsche's Priests", p. 36)

are even lazier than they are timid, and fear most of all the inconveniences with which unconditional honesty and nakedness would burden them.”²³⁵

Fear and laziness make a man choose the easiest way in life, however, realizing oneself and becoming a tragic artist is the hardest way of living. The state, the church or the elders; being as a shepherd of herd entails the individuals this easiest way by using the fear and laziness of them. Then, it paves the way for a nihilist culture.

To sum up: the shepherd creates the values of nihilism, which transforms the individual into a docile body and establishes a power relation between shepherd and herd and prevents herd animal being the enemy of power relation. Herds are docile bodies who provide the continuation of prevailing values. And, their relations are sustained by means of fear and laziness.

If it is necessary to indicate the difference between a tragic artist and the other two, it is that tragic artist revolts against laziness and fear by non-conforming the prevailing values. Tragic artist wills to create new values in which individuals can realize themselves and are not overwhelmed with their fear and laziness. That point is important because the tragic artist has also such feelings, however, s/he does not submit them. On the other hand, shepherd and herd not only submit the fear and laziness but also encourage the others to submit them. From this perspective, the tragic artist challenges the prevailing power relations by challenging the nihilist values.

As a conclusion, the political is the struggle between the two—tragic artist and herd animal—in Nietzsche, even though there are three kinds of subjectivity. Herd and shepherd work together and create nihilist values. They have sacred values. On the other hand, the tragic artist challenges the dominance of these values, and challenging the sacredness of the values in a society means at the same time challenging the power

²³⁵ UM, Book 3, §1

relations. Besides, the tragic artist not only challenges them but also create the new set of values, thereby new kind of power relations in which overman is the higher than the last man, higher values dominate the nihilist values.

As a conclusion, the political shows itself in the struggle among the subjects on values in Nietzsche. One side attempts to preserve the nihilist values which are dominant now and at the time of Nietzsche. Another side attempts to question the dominance of these values and power relations which are established by these values and this political struggle is a process which is never-ending. According to Nietzsche, there is no end of time or goal of history, therefore political struggle never ends. Sometimes the values of the tragic artist can be dominant likewise in the time of Ancient Greek until Socrates, but it does not mean the struggle is over. Then, the values of shepherd can be dominant as it is in the age of Nietzsche, that also does not mean the end.

5.2 The Tools of the Political

In this part, I will discuss the tools, which are used in the political struggle. These tools, which belong to the tragic artist, work for questioning the nihilist values and creating the higher values. I will explain three main tools, which are genealogy, will to power, and eternal recurrence.

5.2.1 Genealogy

The main problem of nihilist domination is that these nihilist values seem unchangeable and fixated. Therefore, the tragic artist must show that these nihilist values are changeable. As they seem unchangeable, they are supposed to be sacred. The tragic artist should show that they are not sacred and could be changed. At that point, Nietzsche introduces a tool in the book of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887). He shows the sacred is not sacred, moral is, in fact, immoral. He does it by

using the genealogy. “[T]he genealogy is primarily a critique: it seeks to assess the value of moral value judgments by determining their origin.”²³⁶ It is a method which shows that:

...under what conditions did man invent the value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves have? Have they up to now obstructed or promoted human flourishing? Are they a sign of distress, poverty and the degeneration of life? Or, on the contrary, do they reveal the fullness, strength, and will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future?²³⁷

He searches the origin of the values that human has. He finds that there has occurred a replacement between the values of good and bad, and good and evil. In the past, what is good was defined by the nobility. Nobles are good because they are powerful to give names to things and to create the own values. These values were good because they are created by nobles. Namely, the goodness of things determined by the nobles. Bad is what is not good. Bad is defined by the contrast of good. He puts in that way:

... ‘noble’, ‘aristocratic’ in social terms is the basic concept from which, necessarily, ‘good’ in the sense of ‘spiritually noble’, ‘aristocratic’, of ‘spiritually high minded’, ‘spiritually privileged’ developed: a development that always runs parallel with that other one which ultimately transfers ‘common’, ‘plebeian’, ‘low’ into the concept ‘bad’.²³⁸

However, at some point in the history, there happened a replacement. The good and evil took place of the concept of this kind of good and bad. According to Nietzsche, this is one of the results of Christian morality understanding. Good has no longer defined by noble, aristocratic characters. On the contrary, weak people who cannot name the things and are unable to create, become good. They are good because they are not evil. That is to say, good is no longer defined as being good. It is defined as being not evil. If I am not evil, then I am good. In the first state, I am good because

²³⁶ Reginster, “Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation”, p. 282

²³⁷ GM, Preface, §3

²³⁸ GM, First Essay, §4

of my own actions which are to create my own values. In the latter state, good is a reactionary.

This replacement results in the triumph of weaker, lower and plebian. Noble one is no longer powerful despite its creativity. As a matter of fact, creating and naming the things are not good, on the contrary, they have been evil characteristics, in the latter state. The reactive one, on the other hand, has become the powerful side in this relationship because the values of them have become dominant. They have determined what good and evil are and determining someone as an evil, you can judge and punish him/her for being an evil. By this way, Nietzsche tries to reveal the logic behind what is sacred.

Nietzsche was supremely confident that if we truly understood the manner in which our moral judgments had originated, this would “spoil” the “grand words” of duty and conscience for us. A genealogy would aim to uncover or make visible what was previously concealed. If it could be successfully deployed in the service of philosophy practiced properly, it would allow us to see that “behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain form of life.”²³⁹

Nietzsche uses the genealogy in order to break the dominance of sovereign nihilist values. Nihilist values show themselves as unchangeable. People think of them as they are fixated. The dominant values incline to seem like nobody could change them. However, the people who live under these dominant values should be aware that these values are contingent, and they are only a perspective. They could be also otherwise. If people be aware of this contingency of values, they can think to change and replace them with new values.

It is the height of psychological mendaciousness in man to frame according to his own petty standard of what seems good, wise, powerful, valuable, a being that is an origin and “in-itself” and therewith to abolish in his mind the entire causal process by means of which any kind of goodness, any kind of

²³⁹ French, “Nietzsche, Genealogy and Political Authority”, p. 11

wisdom, any kind of power exists and possesses value. In short, to posit elements of the most recent and contingent origin as not created but “in-themselves” and perhaps even as the cause of creation in general—. ²⁴⁰

Nietzsche brings into question of values by investigating the origin of the values. The genealogy is to problematize values through their roots. Nietzsche realizes that the values which seem unchangeable only can be changed by showing that they could be otherwise. They were created at some point in history. If something was created by man, it can be recreated differently and replaced by other things through the creation of human. Genealogy is a tool which negates the claim of universal values. It is a method which developed against “one that is manifest by the scholar’s unselfish devotion of the ‘truth’, for which he is ready to sacrifice anything, including himself.”²⁴¹ By this way, he shakes the ground of nihilist values because “such a total devotion to ‘the truth’ eventually leads every good scholar away from the lie which supports belief in God; and in this respect, the will to truth brings about the complete self-overcoming of Christianity and Christian morality.”²⁴² Genealogy abolishes sacredness of them. Thereby, the power relations, which are established by nihilist values, become interrogable. Nietzsche also says that:

One has to take back much of the defamation which people have cast upon all those who broke through the spell of a custom by means of a deed - in general, they are called criminals. Whoever has overthrown an existing law of custom has hitherto always first been accounted a bad man: but when, as did happen, the law could not afterward be reinstated, and this fact was accepted, the predicate gradually changed; –history treats almost exclusively of these bad men who subsequently became good men!²⁴³

He shows us how the values judged the man contingently. At some time in history, one man could be judged as an evil, nevertheless, it is not unchangeable judgment;

²⁴⁰ WP, Book II, part 1, §244

²⁴¹ White, “The Return of the Master: An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morals’”, p. 691

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ D, Book I, §20

because if the values change, this judgment would change as well. This gives one power to intend replacement of the values with new valuation. As Deleuze puts it in that way:

Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values. Genealogy is as opposed to absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference or distance in the origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness, nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in the origin. The noble and the vulgar, the high and the low - this is the truly genealogical and critical element. But, understood in this way, critique is also at its most positive. The differential element is both a critique of the value of values and the positive element of a creation. This is why critique is never conceived by Nietzsche as a reaction but as an action.²⁴⁴

That is to say, genealogy reveals not only origins of the values but also distance among the values. Nihilist values can be discovered after making the genealogy. It provides the *distance of pathos* to human. It is a tool for discovering higher values and lower values and determining that they are unequal. From this perspective, genealogy is a critique of the lower values. However, it is not only destructive, but also creative. It shows us which values are a nihilist, therefore they should be replaced with the new values. It also shows us which values are worldly and, by doing that it makes us reach to higher culture. In such a culture, every individual could use the genealogy, and no one can fixate the values for the sake of oneself. This paves the way for a set of values by which an individual can realize oneself.

To sum, while shepherd and herd attempt to fasten up the prevalent values by showing them as unchangeable, sacred and divine; tragic artist undermines this process of fixation through using the tools of genealogy. In other words, genealogy is to show that the values could be different from prevailing values.

²⁴⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, part 1, §1

Since the political is a struggle between subjects on values, genealogy is a gun, which tragic artist should gird on, in that struggle. That gun helps him/her by showing that the values of anti-nihilist should be created, otherwise values of nihilism will rule the whole society by claiming they are universal and unchangeable. This process of creation can never be stopped. It abolishes all mediators between human and oneself. Thus, it gives the innocence of becoming back to the human beings by showing that human is good by his/her action. S/he does not define himself or herself by defining the others as evil and it helps to create the higher values in the political struggle.

5.2.2 Will to Power

Importance of the concept of will to power is evident in Nietzsche. Nietzsche substantiates the will to power with life²⁴⁵. Starting from this point of view, I think we can say that if there is the will to power in the center of life, it is also the center of the political, at the same time.

Let me put it in that way: I define the political as the struggle on the values between the tragic artist and the herd animal, namely between values of the anti-nihilist and values of a nihilist. At that point, there arises a very significant question: what is the point of this struggle? Nietzsche's answer is that all of this struggle is for the will to power. Both anti-nihilist and nihilist make the struggle in order to become powerful and to defeat another side. Therefore, we can claim that there are two kinds of power. The first is the will to power of the tragic artist. The second is the power of nihilists—namely, herd animals.

Let us begin by analyzing the claim that life is the will to power. Why do some people accumulate so much property, they, even, cannot spend all the money which comes

²⁴⁵ WP, Book II, part 2, §254

from this property? Or why do some people want to participate in a community, even though they should give their freedom in exchange? Or why do some people join the army, even though they could die in a war? Or why do some people vote the ruling party, even though they get poorer with every election term? Or why do some people paint a picture or write a book, even though they live at the edge of hunger in a capitalist society?

All of these questions can be answered differently, however, Nietzsche sees a common feature of individuals who act in such a way. This feature is the will to power. All these people desire to feel the life in a different way but powerfully. They want to be more powerful than the others. Even someone helps the other and says that s/he does it without provision, Nietzsche reveals how this help establishes a power relationship among the individuals.²⁴⁶ Therefore, Nietzsche sees that the will to power is located in the center of life. “Reality has only one intrinsic quality: the will to power. At the same time, the will to power is the only principle of interpretation for reality.”²⁴⁷

Now we can proceed to will to power of the tragic artist. Emancipation of tragic artist is explained with the will to power by Nietzsche:

The degree of resistance that must be continually overcome in order to remain on top is the measure of freedom, whether for individuals or for societies—freedom understood, that is, as positive power, as the will to power. According to this concept, the highest form of individual freedom, of sovereignty, would in all probability emerge not five steps from its opposite, where the danger of slavery hangs over existence like a hundred swords of Damocles. Look at history from this viewpoint: the ages in which the “individual” achieves such ripe perfection, i.e., freedom, and the classic type of the sovereign man is attained—oh no! they have never been humane ages! One must have no choice: either on top or underneath, like a worm, mocked, annihilated, trodden upon. One must oppose tyrants to become a tyrant, i.e.,

²⁴⁶ HAH, Vol. I, §44

²⁴⁷ Aydin, Nietzsche on Reality as Will to Power: Toward an “Organization—Struggle” Model, p. 25

free. It is no small advantage to live under a hundred swords of Damocles: that way one learns to dance, one attains “freedom of movement.”²⁴⁸

This is a very important quotation because we see that Nietzsche talks about freedom in an active way. And he defines this activity by searching for freedom by being more powerful than the other people.

Walter Kaufmann explains in that way: “Power is enjoyed only as more power. One enjoys not its possession but its increase: the overcoming of impotence. Since impotence is the equivalent of dependence, one might say that the achievement of independence is the source of pleasure.”²⁴⁹ That is not to say, one appreciates the power itself. Power is also a tool in the eyes of the individual. “...man wants neither power nor independence—as such. He wants not freedom from something but the freedom to act and realize himself.”²⁵⁰ Therefore, if someone wills to power, s/he does not for the sake of power, but for the sake of emancipation of oneself and of the higher values.

At that point, what is at stake is the tragic artist’s will to power. In Nietzsche, “‘willing’ involves a becoming, an interpreting, and a feeling of power in the realization of its goal.”²⁵¹ From this perspective, “Nietzsche believes the will to power ontology follows directly from his rejection of metaphysics and is grounded in a critical form of naturalism.”²⁵²

Tragic artist wills to power in order to emancipate from nihilist values. S/he rejects the metaphysical values and attempts to put worldliness and becoming instead of them. S/he wills to power because s/he knows that no longer metaphysical values

²⁴⁸ WP, Book III, part 3, §770

²⁴⁹ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist*, part 2, p.186

²⁵⁰ Ibid

²⁵¹ Owen, *Maturity and Modernity*, p. 28

²⁵² Miyasaki, “Nietzsche’s Will to Power as Naturalist Critical Ontology”, p. 251

could be ground of the world. Nihilistic values should be abolished. Instead of them, higher values of the higher culture should be dominant. Only then, the tragic artist will be powerful. Only then, the emancipation of him/her will realize. In order to emancipate, s/he challenges the existing power relations and attempts to reverse them by contesting slave morality. By this contestation, “will to power is not just the desire to dominate, but also to be free from domination, to be free for one's own pursuits.”²⁵³ Nietzsche names that “will to power as the ‘instinct for freedom’”.²⁵⁴ The tragic artist has such an ‘instinct for freedom’. S/he has the will to power both to dominate nihilist culture and to be free for own creation of new values.

It is obvious that will to power is the main tool of the tragic artist in order to win the political struggle against the herd animal. His/her will to power works by negating and affirming. S/he negates the nihilist values and the power relations which are created by these values, then s/he affirms the worldliness and the becoming. By this way, s/he has the power to create new values and new power relations in which s/he becomes higher than a slave. S/he becomes the master in the new power relations.

I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, for power: when there is no will to power, there is a decline. My claim is that none of humanity's highest values have had this will, —that nihilistic values, values of decline, have taken control under the aegis of the holiest names.²⁵⁵

Tragic artist's will to power requires inevitably another power. As Ciano Aydin states that:

[P]ower is the only power in relation to another power. Nietzsche says: “A power quantum is characterized by its effect and its resistant.” The concept “power” would be meaningless if a power were detached from an opposite power. That power is inherently relational implies further that it is

²⁵³ Genone, “Genealogy and Will to Power”, p. 289

²⁵⁴ Ibid; see also: GM, Second Essay, §18

²⁵⁵ A, §6

characterized by a relation without relata that precede it or that can exist independent of it.²⁵⁶

That is to say, only if there is another power, tragic artist's power can work. While the will to power of tragic artist aims to the domination of the higher culture against the nihilist culture and to be free in own way, on the contrary, herd animal insists on the continuation of prevailing power relation. Shepherd wills to continue its power on the herd. Herd wills to dominate all individual who are not part of the herd. Shepherd wills to create docile bodies, docile bodies will to the continuation of their values from the shepherd and their power comes from absolute interdependence to each other. However, this will to power is not the same as the tragic artist's will to power. It is the will for the decline, it is the will for nihilism.

In other words, on the one hand, there is the will to power which enhances life and aims for higher culture. This is the tragic artist's will to power. This is the will to power which paves the way for higher culture. On the other hand:

Wherever the influence of theologians is felt, value judgments are turned on their heads and the concepts of "true" and "false" are necessarily inverted: whatever hurts life the most is called "true", and whatever improves, increases, affirms, justifies life or makes it triumph is called "false" ... When theologians use the "conscience" of princes (or peoples—) to reach out for power, let us be very clear about what is really taking place: the will to an end, the nihilistic will willing power...²⁵⁷

This is the herd's and shepherd's understanding of the will to power. According to Nietzsche, "they are powerless in the face of power"²⁵⁸.

[T]he slave is supposed to be powerless and ruled by resentment, and this implies that his actions are entirely determined by a principle of sensibility. His revenge against the master and his denial of the active powers of man

²⁵⁶ Aydin, "Nietzsche on Reality as Will to Power: Toward an 'Organization—Struggle' Model", p. 26

²⁵⁷A, §9

²⁵⁸ Ibid, §16

suggest that he is the embodiment of 'heteronomy', insofar as his will is always determined from outside itself.²⁵⁹

Because slave does not establish a relationship by oneself without a mediator, its will is determined from outside itself. Despite the fact that, its values are dominant, this dominance is the manifestation of powerlessness, since this understanding cannot be sustainable, thereby it is nihilistic, they are powerful in their powerlessness. For instance, one can relentlessly accumulate property by exploiting the human life and s/he can be seen as powerful in today's society. Nevertheless, as Nietzsche reveals that s/he is not powerful because s/he negates the life. Negation of worldliness, establishing the relationship with a mediator, having no pathos of distance means the negation of life. Even though they are dominant against the higher values, they are the sign of nihilism. Therefore, they are meant to be annihilated by the will to power of the tragic artist.

At that point, it is important to find out in which way power works; either by way of affirmation of life or its negation. Tragic artist wills to power and use it in order to affirm, on the other hand, herd and shepherd will to power and use it to negate the life. Latter gives away the domination of nihilistic values, first paves the way for a higher culture. Political struggle actualizes between the affirmation of life and negation of life, nihilist values, and higher values, herd and tragic artist.

To sum, the political is the struggle of subjects on the values. These subjects make this struggle in order to be powerful than other. The will to power is the center of this political struggle. The subjects differentiate how to use this power, either for the sake of life or of the negation of life. Negation of life makes the human powerless despite it seems powerful. Such culture, in which nihilist values are dominant, is the sign of annihilation. Therefore, Nietzsche needs to reevaluate the concept of power and he reverses the prevailing meaning of power as he does it for the other values, as well.

²⁵⁹ White, "The Return of the Master: An Interpretation of Nietzsche's 'Genealogy of Morals'", p. 689

He shows that in fact powerful is powerless, and powerless is the powerful one. Only when higher values become dominant, then master becomes master and slave becomes a slave. And it will be actualized when higher values defeat the lower values in the political struggle.

At that point, because Nietzsche claims that nihilist values are unsustainable, thereby they are powerless, there arises a problem of unsustainability of nihilistic power. Sustainability of the tragic artist's will to power makes it powerful than herd animal. Nietzsche uses the tool of eternal recurrence in order to support this claim. Because of that, we should analyze this concept in detail.

5.2.3 Eternal Recurrence

Nietzsche states his understanding of eternal recurrence.

Everything goes, everything returns; eternally rolls the wheel of existence. Everything dies, everything blossoms forth again; eternally runs on the year of existence. Everything breaks, everything is integrated anew; eternally builds itself the same house of existence. All things separate, all things again greet one another; eternally true to itself remains the ring of existence. Every moment begins existence, around every 'Here' rolls the ball 'There.' The middle is everywhere. Crooked is the path of eternity.²⁶⁰

While Nietzsche is dismantling the old values, he puts new values in place of them. And, he puts "In place of "metaphysics" and religion, the theory of eternal recurrence (this as a means of breeding and selection)."²⁶¹ Metaphysics and religion bring to nihilism and do not allow human to choose its life. The contrast between them, eternal recurrence gives a permission to a man to live its life by choosing and every choice brings affirmation of life. Affirmation of life paves the way for flourishing a culture

²⁶⁰ Z, part 3, §13

²⁶¹ WP, Book II, part 3, §462

in which man can eternally enjoy its life. Every choice in the way of affirmation goes and return eternally.

The reversal of Platonism finds its fullest expression in the teaching of eternal recurrence which represents a repudiation of the beyond, the timeless, and an affirmation of this life and the moment. Change and tension are not any longer something outside being, but they are necessary parts of being itself. Reality is no longer to be understood by pure reason but is a reality which is lived, experienced, suffered. It is a reality based upon the fundamental concept of the will to power.²⁶²

Eternal recurrence is the basis of the becoming. Becoming approaches to the being mostly in the theory of eternal recurrence. “That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being: –high point of the meditation.”²⁶³ Eternal recurrence is the tool for accepting the becoming and becoming is a contrast to teleological understanding. Therefore, Nietzsche, in order to abolish such understanding of teleology, puts in place of it the understanding of eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence is the contrast of metaphysical and religious idealism. Non-teleological understanding brings the innocence of becoming which gives individual independence to choose own way. He explains in that way:

If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force—and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless—it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum. This conception is not simply a mechanistic conception; for if it were that, it would not condition an infinite recurrence of identical

²⁶² Pfeffer, “Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's Philosophy”, p. 283

²⁶³ WP, Book III, part 1, §617

cases, but a final state. Because the world has not reached this, the mechanistic theory must be considered an imperfect and merely provisional hypothesis.²⁶⁴

If this kind of game is really played, we should accept our life with its becoming and worldliness—namely all pain, agony, suffering, happiness and all other that we experience which is outstretching in the time both past and future. However, it is not a blind fatalism because the affirming the life means that the life is in our hands and our experiences were and will be results of our choices. We are powerful in front of life.

Let us think in that way: if we will live our life eternally, we cannot endure without affirming, accepting the pain, suffers, or happiness that we have lived in the past. Eternal recurrence encourages us to affirm all of those. For the future, this method helps us to make choices because, in every choice, we start to think that we should decide in such a way in which we can bear to live this moment eternally. Making the choice by using eternal recurrence ensures us that our choices were the best choices of time when they were made. In other words, these choices were necessary and thinking such makes one free from regretting the past.

“Recurrence is, first and foremost, the recurrence of the present moment. This is the point of application common to all of the will to power's strategies. Covetousness consists in attempting to hold on to the present moment, whereas renunciation implies letting it pass away.”²⁶⁵

Alexander Nehamas explains:

Nietzsche is thinking of his view that every one of my past actions is a necessary condition for my being what I am. If, therefore, I am even for a moment such as I would want to be again, my past actions can be seen in retrospect to have been essential to, and therefore constitutive of, the self which I would want to repeat. What is thus changed is not the past, but its significance. This is accomplished by creating, on the basis of the past, a

²⁶⁴ Ibid, Book IV, part 3, §1066

²⁶⁵ Small, “Eternal Recurrence”, p. 600

future which is at some point acceptable, and which therefore justifies what made it possible.²⁶⁶

Accepting past and future can only possible by eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence provides the tragic artist make choice in the present which can return eternally to oneself. From this perspective tragic artist emancipates from his/her past:

To redeem what is past, and to transform every “It was” into “Thus would I have it!” - that only do I call redemption! Will - so is the emancipator and joy-bringer called: thus, have I taught you, my friends! But now learn this likewise: The Will itself is still a prisoner. Willing emancipates: but what is that called which still putts the emancipator in chains? It was”: thus, is Will's teeth-gnashing and most lonesome tribulation called. Impotent towards what has been done - it is a malicious spectator of all that is past.²⁶⁷

Emancipation from the past means being free in the present and it gives independence to the tragic artist to create new values which would never be regretted in the future. Thanks to this independence, the tragic artist's life can return eternally and the tragic artist's past and future combine in his/her present.

Nietzsche is aware that we have lived in a society and our life is not determined by only our choices. Therefore, he sees the world in which there is a definite number of centers and a definite quantity of forces. These forces play dice games whose results are indefinite—namely, this game is contingent. One affirms contingency of life, becoming of life and necessity of his/her choices at the same time through the eternal recurrence. “To will recurrence is to will the present moment in a certain way: it is to affirm the moment as changing and yet necessary.”²⁶⁸ That is to say, eternal recurrence is the affirmation of becoming of a whole life—including the whole centers of power and quantities of power—at one time.

²⁶⁶ Nehamas, “The Eternal Recurrence”, p. 349

²⁶⁷ Z, part 2, §20

²⁶⁸ Small, “Eternal Recurrence”, p. 601

Nevertheless, only the tragic artist can affirm one's choices in its wholeness—namely, contingency, becoming and necessity—in the past and in the future. The tragic artist affirms the life by affirming the choices that s/he made in the past and will make in the future. By this way, ring of the eternal recurrence can be completed.

On the other side, the herd animal lives the life nihilistic way which is a negation of life. This kind of life goes to nihilism—namely end of life; because this kind of life is lived without pathos of distance, with establishing a relationship by oneself with a mediator. For this reason, life cannot return in this kind of life. It brings void, nothingness. This life has no ground which permits the present to eternally recur. For instance, herd animal struggles in the resentment. It is the state of indigestion. The herd animal can never digest its past; therefore, it cannot affirm the life. Thus, its values bring it to annihilation. Its values cannot endure the method of eternal recurrence because it will be annihilated. They are unsustainable because they are going to the end.

If we turn back to the political struggle, it helps the tragic artist in the creation of values. Eternal recurrence shows us some values cannot return in eternal recurrence, on the other hand, some can return. Therefore, these values which cannot endure to eternal recurrence, are named nihilist and decadent. In short, they are unsustainable. The values should be created according to eternal recurrence by the tragic artist. The values, which can resist eternal recurrence of the present, should be created. Also, it gives tragic artist redemption from the past to create new values in the present. Thereby, one can become who one is.

5.3 Political Implications of the Tools

Now I would like to sum by showing that the political implications of these three tools. The political is defined as a struggle between two subjects—herd animal and tragic artist—on the values. According to Nietzsche, there is a domination of herd

animal and its values. These values are a nihilist because they do not permit to flourish new values of individuals. This nihilist-lower culture compels people to be a herd animal. At that point, the revolt of the tragic artist begins against the nihilism. Its aim is to create a higher culture. And this higher culture compels every individual to be a tragic artist. In this struggle, genealogy, will to power and eternal recurrence are the tools of tragic artists.

There are two functions of genealogy. The first is that it is used in order to show that the values are not universal and fixated. They are changeable. The herd animal's main claim is that its values are universal. One should live according to these universal unchangeable values. Therefore, there is no another way to live. Tragic artist attacks this claim by using genealogy. Becoming, which is the sign of change, is unraveled thanks to the genealogy. It shows many ways to live. There can be created new values and new forms of man's living. The tension between universalism and perspectivism, being and becoming turns to the advantage of the tragic artist's perspectivism and becoming. The second function is to show that there is the distance between the tragic artist and herd animal and between their values. The tragic artist searches for the root of the values by genealogy and discovers the distance between the herd animal and oneself. By this way, s/he can make ranking among the values and people.

The will to power is the essence of political struggle. It is made for being more powerful and being more powerful means to be independent, autonomous and free. Therefore, tragic artist searches for being more powerful than the herd animal. Herd animal has the same motivation as the tragic artist. However, its power understanding is different. Domination of tragic artist and its culture brings about higher culture. In this culture, everyone could be different and seek for own realization. On the other hand, domination of herd animal paves the way for a lower culture which imposes upon the individual to be the same. There is a common goal in such culture—e.g. salvation—and this culture enforces everyone to live in order to reach that goal—e.g. ascetic life. In such a culture, there is no individual and its own values. On the other

side, higher culture enforces every individual to pursue own goal and own realization. Every effort of the individual in the way of own realization makes powerful both individual and culture against the lower culture. Hence, the main tool of the tragic artist in political struggle is to seek more power against the nihilist herd animal.

Eternal recurrence is the answer to the problem of choice in political struggle. Every action is made as a result of choice in a political struggle. Therefore, one should choose according to something. At that point, Nietzsche's tool of eternal recurrence is at stake. Eternal recurrence works in two ways. One way makes individual affirm becoming of his/her life by affirming his/her past, thereby individual could be independent in his/her choices of creating new values. Another way, which is dependent on the first one, these individuals can create the new higher values, which can endure the endless return of the life, by choosing. Hence, eternal recurrence is a tool which breeds the life and helps the individual in the value creation process—thus, creating a higher culture against to lower culture.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Overman

Overman is the end of the way, in which man can go, in Nietzsche. Overman is the end of the realization of an individual and the highest culture that can be ever reached. Overman has the highest values. All of the tools—genealogy, will to power, eternal recurrence—are used by the tragic artist and s/he won the struggle over herd and shepherd at the end. By this achievement s/he not only becomes the creator and creature of his/her art but also s/he becomes a perfect master and masterpiece. S/he is the perfect example of the art of living. This is the emancipated subject and the culture emancipated from the nihilism. Kaufmann defines overman as follows;

[t]he man...who has organized the chaos of his passions and integrated every feature of his character, redeeming even the ugly by giving it a meaning in a beautiful totality—this *Übermensch* would also realize how inextricably his own being was involved in the totality of the cosmos: and in affirming his own being, he would also affirm all that is, has been, or will be.²⁶⁹

At this stage, one emancipated and s/he is no longer a man. S/he becomes the overman.

Well then, there arises an important question: is such an emancipation of the subject and culture possible? Is it possible to be overman? Is it possible to end the political struggle between tragic artist and herd animal? Is it possible to reach a culture in which it is not necessary to create new values? My answer is that it is not possible

²⁶⁹ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist*, part 3, p. 320

because the overman is a fixation of a state. However, it is not possible to reach such a state. Tragic artist, who is subject of the overman, and higher culture are always in the process of becoming. Subject and its values are a never-ending process of becoming. They can never reach such an emancipation. The political struggle between nihilism and anti-nihilism always continues. The man can never be overcome and every attempt, which tries to overcome, turn back. In order to clarify, we should look at the last aphorism of the *Will to Power*:

This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size...set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be “empty” here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil”, without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself...This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!²⁷⁰

We can understand that there is no goal other than enjoying the becoming of life powerfully. One has lived his/her life by self-destroying and self-creating regardless of reaching an end. S/he recreate his/her values eternally. Therefore, there is no such emancipated subject. Instead of it, there is a life which consists of the struggle for

²⁷⁰ WP, Book IV, part 3, §1067

power. On the one hand, the power of nihilism, on the other tragic artist's will to power. Sometimes, the power of one of them increases, sometimes the other.

In other words, overman can only be an indefinite goal²⁷¹ which no one could ever reach. As Keith Ansell-Pearson states George Simmel's thought on the overman:

As he put it, "within each period, humanity could be vested with only a limited number of forms of evolution, which could be constantly repeated, whereas the ideal of the overman demands a straight line of evolution heading toward the future."...He thus proposes that the overman is to be understood "not as a rigid structure with an absolutely determined content, but as a functional ideal indicating the human form that is superior to the present real one."²⁷²

From this perspective, no one can achieve to be an Overman and no culture can reach the complete state. It is the state in which becoming ends, where the circle of eternal recurrence is broken off by the tragic artist—as it was broken, nihilism begins again. When the tragic artist reached that point, s/he no longer destroys or says No, or negates—thus, no need for the creation—because it is the final state of perfection. However, it is not possible. One cannot live without both—destroying and creating, without saying Yes and No, without negating and affirming.

The overman is the production of the end of the political struggle. It comes into existence as a result of the last victory of the tragic artist against the nihilism. However, one can only be on the way to emancipation; therefore, the political struggle never ends as well. An individual can choose to enter the way of emancipation and attempt to be overman, or not to choose and accepts to be part of the herd. In the first choice, individual approaches to be an emancipated subject, namely the overman. S/he takes the control of life as a tragic artist and creates the

²⁷¹ At this point, indefiniteness is important. Nietzsche is against towards idea of goal which is determined by the others. Instead of it, Nietzsche suggest a goal which is to be determined individuals themselves.

²⁷² Ansell-Pearson, "Who is the Übermensch? Time, Truth, and Woman in Nietzsche", p. 311, see also Simmel, *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*, p. 174

higher culture which enables the others to be a tragic artist. In the second, s/he is not different from an animal or slave. S/he loses all control of his/her life.

Nietzsche was by no means under the illusion that the rule of the overman would be lasting, but he took comfort in the thought that though there would be periods in which the slaves would assert themselves and establish an era of the herd animals, the overman would nevertheless assert himself from time to time and this was what he called his “doctrine of the eternal return”—the gospel of his philosophy.²⁷³

According to Nietzsche, people should seek the overman as Zarathustra has sought all around the world, even though they will have never found anywhere. What makes the life meaningful is the joy of seeking and struggling, of approximation to what can never be discovered. In the way of seeking, struggling and discovering, the tools of Nietzsche could help the individuals. And I attempt to show how individuals could approach overman—namely, emancipated subject—by using these political tools—genealogy, eternal recurrence and will to power.

As a conclusion, in Nietzsche, political emancipation is the end of the political struggle. If political struggle ends up with the defeat of the nihilism, it will be the political emancipation of tragic artist and his/her values. However, this struggle never ends. What is political is not understood in terms of a structured political regime but in terms of a continuous becoming, hence there is no final emancipation. Even though time to time higher culture could be victorious against the lower culture, it does not show that political emancipation has been realized. The two reasons reveal that political emancipation cannot be reachable according to Nietzsche.

The first reason is the principle of becoming. Because of this principle, neither tragic artist nor his/her values could be completed. They are constantly involved in the formation. There is no such end in their becoming. The tragic artist has never been an overman. If s/he has reached, s/he can no longer negate. That is to say, s/he is no

²⁷³ Carus, “Friedrich Nietzsche”, p. 233

longer a tragic artist. S/he will be rather a herd animal because the process of creation depends on the negation and affirmation duality.

In other words, emancipation is a state of being rather than a becoming. Becoming can only approximate the being. Becoming can never change into the being. If so, the subject of emancipation transforms into the slave, herd animal. Hence, the becoming of the subject of emancipation and of his/her values should continue to become.

The second reason is the principle of will to power. When Nietzsche identifies life with the will to power, it does mean there will always be a political struggle between the subjects as long as life continues. Sometime nihilist subjects and their values become dominant, another time, the tragic artist would become. Therefore, political struggle will never end. Hence political emancipation will never be realized. The essence of the political struggle is not to reach to an end, namely political emancipation, it is to feel the power and to be powerful.

To conclude, the emancipation of the subject is impossible in Nietzsche. Besides, to reach such a state is not important according to him. It is important to be on the way to emancipation. It is important to be more powerful against the nihilism. It is important to make a struggle for emancipation.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

NIETZSCHE'DE SİYASAL ÖZGÜRLEŞMENİN İMKANI

Friedrich Nietzsche 1844 yılında Almanya'nın küçük bir köyünde, bir rahibin oğlu olarak dünyaya gelmiştir. Kendisi aslında filolog olmasına rağmen teoloji, siyaset, müzik, psikoloji gibi pek çok disiplinle ilgilenmiş ve kendisinden sonra gelen düşünürleri fikirleriyle etkilemiştir. Nietzsche'nin yazılarında en çok değindiği şey ise yaşadığı çağın bir nihilist çağ olduğudur.

Nietzsche'nin nihilizmden anladığı yok oluşa, bir sona doğru gidiştir. Hristiyanlık ve modernite sunduğu değerler vasıtasıyla insanı bir yok oluşa götürmektedir. Nietzsche'nin Hristiyanlık ve modernite eleştirisi de bu ekseninde dönmektedir ve eleştirileriyle bu yok oluşun önüne geçmek istemektedir.

Bu tez, Nietzsche'de siyasal özgürleşmenin imkanını ararken bu temel ekseninden dört temel soruyla yola çıkmaktadır ve her bir soru bu tezin bir bölümünde incelenmiştir. İlk soru Nietzsche'nin modernite eleştirisi üzerinedir. Bu noktada modern düşünürlerin özgürlük sorununa nasıl baktığı konusu öncelikle tartışılmış, daha sonra Nietzsche'nin bu fikirlere getirdiği eleştiri detaylandırılmıştır. Bu bölümün sonunda Nietzsche'de özgürleşme nasıl gerçekleşebilir sorusuna cevap verilmiştir.

İkinci soru ise Nietzsche'de özgürleşecek özne kimdir? Nietzsche'deki özne sorununa bu bölümde değinilecektir. Fakat özne sorunu çok daha geniş bir şekilde incelenebilecekken, tezin temel sorunundan uzaklaşmamak için özne özgürleşecek özne olarak ele alınmıştır.

Üçüncü olarak, değer sorunu üzerinde durulmuştur. Hangi değerler Nietzsche için nihilist, hangi değerler değil sorusu bu bölümün temel olarak cevaplamaya çalıştığı sorudur. Nihilist değerlerin özellikleri nelerdir; anti-nihilist değerler onlardan nasıl ayrılırlar?

Son olarak siyaset sorunu ele alınmıştır. Nietzsche'ye göre siyaset nedir? Kendini nerede ve nasıl görünür kılar soruları bu bölümün ilgilendiği sorulardır.

Sonuç bölümünde Nietzsche'de siyasal özgürleşmenin mümkün olup olmadığı sorusuna ulaştığımız cevap açıklanmıştır.

İlk soruya geri dönersek, Nietzsche'nin modernite eleştirisi nasıldır? Bu soruyu cevaplamadan önce şunu belirtmeliyim ki, literatürde Nietzsche'nin siyaset üzerine bir teorisi olduğuna dair bir ortaklaşma yoktur. Örneğin, Walter Kaufmann, Bernard Williams, Alexander Nehamas, Brian Leiter gibi akademisyenler, Nietzsche'nin apolitik bir düşünür olduğunu ve sistemli bir siyasal düşüncesi olmadığını savunmaktadır. Diğer tarafta, Nietzsche'nin siyasal düşünceye katkısının büyük olduğunu düşünen pek çok fikir insanı da bulunmaktadır. Bonnie Honig, Dana Villa, William Connolly, Lawrence Hatab, David Owen, Keith Ansell Pearson bu düşünürlerden bazılarıdır. Bu kişiler Nietzsche'de siyasal olanın varlığının yadsınamaz olduğunu düşünmektedirler ve Nietzsche'nin düşüncelerini siyaset biliminin konusu haline getirmektedirler. Bu tez yazılırken ilk sayılan isimlerin düşüncelerinden de yararlanılmakla birlikte, esas olarak ikinci akım takip edilmiş ve Nietzsche'nin fikirlerini siyasal olarak tartışmıştır.

İlk soruya dönersek eğer, bu soruyu cevaplamanın en güzel yolunun modernite düşünürlerinin özgürlük düşüncelerini öncelikli olarak tartışmak, daha sonra Nietzsche'nin eleştirilerine bakmak olduğunu düşünüyorum. Böylelikle literatürdeki düşünürlerin özgürlükle ilgili fikirlerini de gün yüzüne çıkarmak fırsatına kavuşmuş olacağız.

Özgürlük fikrini açıklayan çok fazla düşünce sistemi—örneğin, liberal, liberteryen, sosyalist, cumhuriyetçi—olmasına rağmen konuyu ben bu şekilde incelemedim. Çünkü bu özgürlük tanımlarının doğrudan Nietzsche’de bir karşılığı bulunmamaktadır. Bunun yerine insanın sahip olduğu özellikler vasıtasıyla özgürlük ve özgürleşme fikrini incelemek bizi Nietzsche’ye daha çok yaklaştıracaktır. Ben de bu nedenden ötürü, modernite düşünürlerini üçe ayırdım. “İrade, akıl ve bilinç”. Modernite düşünürlerinin özgürlük düşüncesini ele alırken kullandığı üç temel insani özelliktir.

İnsanı doğa durumunda ele alan üç düşünür—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes ve John Locke—insan bir iradeye sahip olduğu için onun özgür olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bunları açmak gerekirse, Rousseau bireyin iradesinin ancak genel iradeye bağlandığı zaman, genel iradenin parçası olduğu zaman özgürleşebileceğini söylemektedir. Hobbes insanın özünde bencil olduğunu düşünmekte ve doğa durumunda insanların bir engelleme olmadığı sürece istediklerini yapabileceğini söylemektedir. Bunu her bir insanın öz iradesinin varlığıyla açıklamaktadır. Locke da özgürlüğü aynı şekilde insanın iradesinin önünde engelleme olup olmama durumuyla açıklamaktadır.

Rene Descartes ve Immanuel Kant ise özgürlüğü her insanın bir akla sahip olmasıyla açıklamaktadır. Descartes’a göre insan hayvandan aklının varlığıyla ayrılır. Akli yoluyla kendi yaşamını belirler. Bu noktada Descartes özgürlüğü üst seviye ve alt seviye olarak ikiye ayırır. Üst seviye özgürlüğe sahip olan kişi aklını, doğru ve iyi olanı bulmak için kullanır. Burada dışarıdan gelen bilginin akıl tarafından filtrelenmesi söz konusuysa, alt seviye özgürlüğe sahip kişide bu filtreleme söz konusu değildir. Kant’ta da özgürlüğün iki farklı durumu bulunmaktadır. Birisi pratik özgürlük dediğimiz, aklın duyuların etkisi altında kalarak belirlenmesi, diğeri ise aklın prensipler tarafından belirlenmesi. Ona göre özgürlük sadece ahlaki olanı yapmak değil, bunu aynı zamanda ahlak kurallarının kendisi için yapmaktır.

Son olarak, özgürlüğü bilinçle açıklayan düşünürler vardır. Bunlar Friedrich Hegel ve Karl Marx'tır. Hegel'e göre özgürlük zorunluluklardan kurtulma durumudur ve kişi ancak ve ancak öz-bilinçle sahip olduğu zaman özgür olabilir. Marx, Hegel'in tarihsel idealizmini tarihsel materyalizm haline dönüştürür. Ona göre insanlar burjuva ve işçi sınıfı diye iki sınıfa ayrılır. İşçi sınıfı, burjuva sınıfının tahakkümü altındadır ve sömürülmektedir. İşçi sınıfı ancak ve ancak sınıf bilincine ulaştığı zaman özgürleşecek ve tahakkümden kurtulacaktır.

Peki Nietzsche'nin modernite eleştirisi nedir ve yukarıda adı geçen düşünürlerden nasıl ayrışıyor? Nietzsche'ye göre modernite büyük bir sosyal değişimi simgelemektedir. Bu değişimin iki nedeni bulunmaktadır. Birinci neden bilimsel bilginin yükselişidir. Bu sayede dinler eski gücünü kaybetmişlerdir. Bu da Nietzsche'nin ünlü "Tanrı öldü" sözünde kendini kristalize etmektedir. İkinci neden ise ekonomik ilişkilerdeki değişim sonucunda olmuştur. Aristokrasi sınıfı eski gücünü burjuvalara kaybetmiştir. Bu iki neden, toplumu temellendiren eski değerleri yok etmiş ve temelsiz bir toplum haline getirmiştir. Nietzsche bu yönüyle toplumu anlamaya ve temellendirmeye çalışan düşünürlerden birisidir sadece. Ona göre temelsiz kalan toplum yok oluşa doğru gitmektedir. İnsan varlığını meşrulaştıran bütün değerleri kaybetmiş ve çaresiz bir şekilde yok oluşa gitmektedir. Bu veçhede ortaya çıkan yeni değerler insanları yok oluştan kurtarmaktan çok, zaten sıkıntılı olan insan durumunu daha kötü hale getirmektedir. Modern kurumlar ve onların değerleri bu yok oluşa hizmet etmektedir. Bu noktada var olan değerlerin hangi özellikleriyle insanı yok oluşa götürdüğünü incelemek anlamlı olacaktır. Nietzsche'ye göre bunun iki önemli nedeni vardır. Birincisi modern değerler, insanları eşitlemeye çalışmaktadır. İkincisi ise insanın kendisiyle doğrudan ilişki kurmasına engel olmaktadır.

Eşitlik konusu temel sosyolojik problemlerden biridir. Hristiyanlığın, tanrı önünde insanların eşit olduğu varsayımı, modernite ile birlikte seküler bir hal almıştır. Bu eşitlik savı ardında tüm insanların evrensel doğruyu anlayabilme kapasitesine sahip

olduđu ve insanın eylemleri ardından bütüncül bir öznenin varlığı fikirleri bulunmaktadır. Kant'ın ve Descartes'ın evrenselciliđi ilk, doğa durumu düşünürlerin irade fikri ise ikinci sebepten dolayı insanları eşit hale getirmektedir.

Nietzsche ise mesafe pathosu olarak çevrilebilecek “pathos of distance” fikrini geliştirir. Bu mesafe pathosuyla insanların ve onların değerlerinin eşit olmadığını savunur. Bu pathosa sahip kişi, insanlar ve değerler arasında hiyerarşiyi belirleyebilme kabiliyetine sahiptir. Eşitlik iddiası insanlar arasındaki bu farkı yok eder, üstün olanı aşağı olanla eşitler. Böylece vasatlığın egemenliği topluma sirayet eder.

Nietzsche'ye göre bir kişi kendisiyle aracısız ilişki kurmalıdır. Aracılı ilişki kurmanın bir örneđi dinlerin insanı tanrı vasıtasıyla açıklamasıdır. Nietzsche bunun kabul edilemez olduğunu düşünmektedir. Kişi kendi değerlerini kendisi koyabilmeli, bunu da aracısız bir şekilde yapabilmelidir. Nietzsche sosyalist partilerin insanı parti yoluyla tahakküm altına aldığını açık bir şekilde eleştirir. Bu partilerde insan kendisiyle parti yoluyla ilişki kurar. Partinin hedefleri ve değerleri, bireyin hedefleri ve değerleri haline dönüşmüştür. Hegel'in tarih, Marx'ın sınıf anlayışı içinde birey hep dolaylı olarak kendisiyle ilişki içerisine girer.

Nietzsche'ye göre nihilist değerler ve anti-nihilist değerler arasında siyasal bir çatışma vardır ve bu çatışma öznelerin değerleri üzerinden sürmektedir. Ancak nihilizm ve onun değerleri kesin bir mağlubiyete uğrarsa özgürleşme sağlanacaktır. Şimdi sırasıyla özne, değer ve siyasal çatışmayı inceleyebiliriz.

Nietzsche'de her özne bu çatışmanın içerisindedir. Bu bir güç çatışmasıdır ve bireyler birbirine üstünlük sağlamaya çalışmaktadırlar. Nihilist özneler kendi yok oluş değerlerini sürdürmek isterken, anti-nihilist özneler kendi değerlerini yaratmaya çalışmaktadırlar. İşte kendi değerlerini yaratmaya çalışan özneler özgürleşme yolunda olan öznelerdir. Bu bölümde bu öznelerin özelliklerini belirginleştirmeye çalışacağım. Nietzsche'ye göre iki belirgin özelliđi var bu öznenin. Birincisi özne

oluş halinde bir öznedir. Bu yüzden Nietzsche varlığın karşısına varoluşu koymaktadır. Bu yönüyle varlık hiçbir zaman tamamlanamaz, sürekli bir oluş halindedir. İkinci olarak Nietzsche'deki özne, ne tek başına toplumdan bağımsız bir bireydir, ne de sadece toplumla birlikte var olan sosyal bir canlıdır.

Öznenin oluş halinde olduğunu görebilmemiz için Nietzsche külliyatının en önemli eserlerinden olan *Böyle Buyurdu Zerdüşt*'e bakmamız, bu kitabın en önemli bölümlerinden biri olan "Üç Dönüşüm Üzerine" kısmını incelememiz gerek. Burada Nietzsche ruhun önce deve, sonra aslan, en sonunda da çocuk oluşunu anlatmaktadır.

Deve burada toplumun bütün yüklerini taşıyan bir hayvan olarak anlatılmıştır. Devenin kendine has değerleri bulunmamaktadır. Toplumun değerlerini olduğu gibi kabul eder ve taşıyıcısı olur. Ahlaki, dini değerler bu hayvanın yüklerinden başlıcalarıdır. Bu yönüyle deve nihilist öznenin temsilidir. Belirli bir noktada, deve dönüşüm geçirir ve aslan olur. Aslan artık yük taşımaz. Aslanın en büyük özelliği var olan değerlere hayır deyişidir. Artık kimse bu ruha değerlerini dayatamayacaktır. Fakat bu haliyle aslan da nihilisttir. Çünkü Nietzsche'ye göre insan değersiz yaşayamaz. Değersizlik insanı yok oluşa götürür. Fakat aslanın nihilizmi deveninkine tercih edilebilir. Aslan var olan bütün değerleri yıkmış, böylece yeni değerler yaratmaya, yani kendiyile doğrudan ilişki kurmaya hazırdır. Fakat bu haliyle bunu başaramaz. Bunun için son bir dönüşüm geçirerek çocuk olması gerekmektedir. Çocuğun en büyük özelliği kendi koyduğu kurallara göre hareket edebiliyor olmasıdır. Örneğin, oyunlar çocuklar tarafından kurulur ve kuralları belirlenir. Çocuk bu kurallara göre oyun oynar, istediği zaman da değiştirebilir. Çocuk yaşamı olumlayabilir, çünkü yaşamak da artık sadece kendi koyduğu kurallara göre oyun oynamaktan ibarettir onun için. Bu nedenlerden ötürü çocuk olan ruh, artık nihilist değildir. Fakat çocuk olmak demek var oluşun sonlandığı anlamına gelmemektedir. Çünkü zaman zaman çocuk tekrar aslan veya deve olabilir. Geri dönüşler yaşayabilir. Kendi koyduğu kuralları tekrar yıkmak zorunda kalabilir. Bu açıdan var oluş hiçbir zaman sona ermez.

Nietzsche'ye göre özne kültürün ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Öznenin koyduğu değerler kültürü oluşturur. Kültür de öznenin değerlerine yön verir. Fakat birey tek başına bir kültür oluşturamaz. Bunun için bir topluluğa ihtiyaç vardır. Burada dikkat edilmesi gereken en önemli husus topluluğun özneye kendi değerlerini dayatabilme olasılığıdır. Toplumun buna meyilli olduğu açıktır ve Nietzsche bunu amansızca eleştirmektedir. Ona göre toplumun sahip olduğu kültür değişimlere ve yeniliklere açık olmalıdır. Hatta ve hatta bireyi bu değişimleri yapması için kültürü, üst kültüre ulaştırabilmesi için cesaretlendirmesi gerekir. Kültür bireyi kendini gerçekleştirebilmesi, kendi yolunda ilerleyebilmesi için bireye alan açmalıdır. Diğer taraftan Nietzsche, kültürü ve kendini gerçekleştirmeyi hedeflemeyen bireyseliği de eleştirmektedir. Bu en çok burjuva kültürünün getirdiği sınırsız mülk birikimini eleştirdiği noktada kristalize olmaktadır. Birey bu noktada yine kendisiyle ilişki kurarken araya aracı koymuştur. Bu aracı mülktür. Sonuç olarak, ortaya trajik bir sanatçı olarak özne ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu öznenin amacı nihilist değerlerden kurtulup kendisinin hem sanatı hem de sanatçısı olmaktır. Bu özne kültürün hem doğal bir sonucu hem de doğal bir yaratıcısı durumundadır. Birey ve toplum bu öznedeki birleşmekte ve ortaya çıkmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, Nietzsche'nin siyasal özgürleşme yolunda olan öznesi sürekli oluş halinde olan bir trajik sanatçıdır.

Nietzsche'de diğer bir sorun ise değer üzerinedir. Burada nihilist ve anti-nihilist değerler Nietzsche'ye göre nelerdir ve nasıl oluşurlar konuları tartışılmıştır. Buradaki temel ayrımı tahakküm kuran değerler ve tahakküm altında olan değerler şeklinde yaptım. Tahakküm kuran değerler, dinler ve ahlak tarafından insanlara dayatılmaktadır. Diğer tarafta tahakküm altında olan değerlerin iki önemli özelliği bulunmaktadır: Dünyevilik ve yeni değer yaratım sürecine fırsat yaratan değerler.

Dinler, nihilist değer yaratım araçlarından en önemlisidir. Dinler tanrı kavramını yaratarak insanla kendisi arasını aracı koyar. Bu aracı insanın kendisiyle ilişki kurmasını engeller. Belli bir süre sonra insan tanrı kavramını kendisinin yarattığını dahi unuttur. Artık tek yaratıcı tanrıdır. Bu yolla dinler insanın en büyük özelliği olan

yaratıcılığı, onun elinden alır ve tanrıya transfer eder. Artık bu güce bir tek tanrı sahiptir. Tanrının adına da din adamları kullanmaya yetkilidir. Bu noktadan itibaren değer yaratım gücü kalmayan insan sürü hayvanı halini alır. Din adamları, sürünün çobanıdır ve onun üstünde büyük bir güce sahiptirler. Ayrıca dinler bu dünyanın önemini olmadığını söyleyerek insanı, insani olmaktan çıkarmaya devam ederler. Artık kişi bu dünyadan uzak, öbür dünya için yaşamaya başlar. Öbür dünyada verilecek ceza iddiası sayesinde din adamları sürü hayvanları üzerindeki etkisi artar. Kurtuluşun, pasif bir hayat sayesinde öldükten sonra cennette olduğu salık verilir. Bu da insanları pasifleştirir. Bu insanda hınç duygusunu uyandırır. Çünkü pasif insan, olanları sindirememiş insandır. Nietzsche’de pasif dindar insan karşısında tanrıyı öldürmüş insanın yanında yer alır. Tanrıyı öldürmek demek, aktifleşmek demektir. İnsanın kendisiyle kurduğu ilişkide aracıyı çıkarıp atmak demektir.

Ahlak konusuna gelecek olursak, öncelikle belirtmek gerekir ki, din ve ahlak birbirinden bağımsız fenomenler değildir. Birbirlerini besleyebilir ve geliştirebilirler. Fakat birbirlerinden şu şekilde ayrışırlar: Kaçınılmaz olarak dinler belirli bir ahlak sistemi ortaya koyarken, ahlak sistemleri belirli bir din ortaya koymak zorunda değildir. Örneğin, Nietzsche’nin belirli bir dini eğilimi olmamasına rağmen, ahlakı köle ve efendi ahlakı diye ikiye ayırıp efendi ahlakının hâkim ahlak olması gerektiğini söyler. Burada da eleştirilen esas olarak köle ahlakı olduğunu söylemek gerekir. Temel olarak köle ahlakı, insanın oluşunu tehdit etmektedir. Köle ahlakı, değiştirilemez ahlaki yasaların varlığını iddia ederek, insanı ve onun değerlerini sabitlemeye çalışmaktadır. Fakat, Nietzsche’ye göre ahlak geleneklerden başka bir şey değildir. Gelenekler ülkeden ülkeye değişiyorken birinin bir ahlaki yasanın evrensel olduğunu söylemesi kabul edilemezdir ona göre. Nietzsche bu noktada Kant eleştirisine devam eder ve Martin Luther ile benzerliğini ortaya koyar. Ona göre, Kant’ın çabası Hristiyan ahlakının kurtarıma çabasıdır. Bu ahlaki anlayış, insanı tanrı yerine metafizik yasalarının varlığına inandırır ve değiştirilemez kılar. Bu da insanı sürü hayvanına dönüştürür. Ahlakın dinler

karşısındaki avantajı ise ahlakın hayatın her alanını düzenleyebilecek kapasitesinin oluşudur.

Tahakküm altındaki değerleri açacak olursak, Nietzsche'nin yazınında bunlar tarihsel olarak hem geçmişe hem de geleceğe uzanmaktadır. Nietzsche Antik Yunan kültürünü överken bu değerlerin geçmişte var olduğunu, diğer taraftan geleceğin filozoflarına sesleniyorum derken de gelecekte yaratılacak kültürden söz etmektedir. Bu iki kültürün ortak özellikleri şunlardır: Dünyevi oluşları ve insanların kendilerini gerçekleştirebileceği bir ortam sağlayabilecek oluşlarıdır. Dünyevilikten kasıt, metafizik yasaların ve öbür dünya anlayışının yok edilmişidir. Nietzsche dünyevilikle insanı bütün halinde kabul eder. Aklıyla, hisleriyle. Bunların hepsi insan denen canlıyı oluşturmaktadır. Dinler ve ahlak yasaları, insanın doğallığını reddeder ve onlara hangi duyguların doğru, hangilerinin yanlış olduğunu dayatır. Böylece insanın nasıl davranması gerektiğine hükmeder. Nietzsche buna dünyeviliği savunarak karşı çıkar. Bu sayede insan kendini tüm bir şekilde, duygularını yanlış doğru ayırt etmeksizin kabul eder. İnsan böylece kendi kontrolünü tamamıyla almış olur.

Diğer tahakküm altındaki değerlerin özelliği ise, cesaretlendirici, yardım edici değerler olması. Bunlar insanı yeni değerler yaratması için cesaretlendirir. Ona yardım eder. Tahakküm kuran değerler evrensel değerler olduğunu öne sürerken, bu değerler sadece bir perspektif olduklarını kabul ederler. Bu da insanların oluşlarının sürmesine yardımcı olur. Bütün değerler olumsuzdur. Başka türlü olabilirlerdi ve ileride olabilirler. Bu da insana kendi hayatının kontrolünü geri verir. Diğer tarafta dinler ve köle ahlakı, tek hakikat kendilerinin olduğunu öne sürer. Bu onların hakikat istencidir ve insanların üzerindeki tahakkümün araçlarından bir tanesidir. Bu nedenle değerlerde sürekli bir oluş halinde olarak, öznelere kendilerini gerçekleştirebilmeleri için yardım eder. Ayrıca değerlerin insanları yarış içerisine sokması gerekir. Bu yarış kendini gerçekleştirebilme yarışıdır. Nietzsche Antik Yunan'daki kültürden örnek vererek, orada herkesin kendini gerçekleştirmeye çalıştığını, böylece yüksek kültürün kendiliğinden oluştuğunu göstermektedir. Özne yapılamayacak şeyleri yapmaya

çalışarak ölümsüzlüğü hedeflemekte, bu da kaçınılmaz olarak yüksek kültüre sebebiyet vermektedir. Böyle bir ortamda hiç kimse diğerleri üzerinde tahakküm kuramaz. Çünkü herkesin farklı olsa da iyi olduğu alan bulunmaktadır. Bu da insanın özgüvenini yükseltmektedir.

Değer sorunsalının sonucu olarak Nietzsche yüksek bir kültürün hedefini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yüksek kültürün değerleri de değişebilir öznenin bir parçası olarak, değişebilir olmak zorunda, aynı zamanda onlara kendini gerçekleştirebilecek araçları sağlayabilecek bir kültür olmak zorundadır. Bu kültür dünyevi değerleri yüceltmeli, metafizik değerlerden kurtulmuş olmalıdır.

Son olarak, Nietzsche'deki siyasal olan nedir sorusuna değinmek gerekiyor. Nietzsche'de siyasal olanın nasıllığı sorusu literatürde iki şekilde tartışılıyor. Birincisi radikal liberal veya demokrat perspektif, ikincisi aristokratik radikalizm. Birinci akım Nietzsche'nin düşüncelerindeki antagonist çatışmayı ön plana çıkarırken, ikincisi Nietzsche'deki eşitsizliğe vurgu yapmaktadır. William Connolly ve Lawrence Hatab ilk akımda yer alırken, Frederick Appel ikinci akımda yer almaktadır. Bu ikisinden yararlanarak ortaya çıkarabileceğimiz düşünce Nietzsche'de siyasal olan, eşit olmayanlar arasında geçen antagonist bir çatışmadır. Nietzsche bu çatışmada açıkça taraf tutar. Kendisi trajik artistin yanındadır. Trajik artist sürü hayvanıyla sürekli bir çatışma halindedir ve çatışma değerler üzerinden gerçekleşir. Trajik artist önceki bölümde detaylıca anlatıldığı için şimdi sürü hayvanını analiz edebiliriz.

Sürü hayvanı yeknesak bir özne gibi görünse bile aslında içinde çobanını da barındırır. Nasıl ki gerçek bir sürü, bir çobana ihtiyaç duyarsa bizim sürümüz de bir çobana ihtiyaç duyar. Çobanla sürü arasında, karşılıklı bir güç ilişkisi vardır. Çoban sürüyü yönlendirirken, sürü de çobanın çoban olabilmesine imkân verir. Çoban, tanrının ve ahlaki yasaların neleri emrettiğini sürüye bildirir, sürü de bu yasaların hayata geçmesini sağlar. İkisi arasında mutlak bir iktidar ilişkisi vardır. Bu mutlaklık

onların yeknesak görünmesine sebebiyet verir. Peki bu mutlak ilişkinin sebebi nedir diye soracak olursak Nietzsche bize iki temel sebep söyler. Korku ve tembellik. Çoban sürüsü üzerindeki gücü kaybetmekten korkar. Sürü de çoban gücünü kaybederse kendisinin de güçsüz düşeceğini düşünerek çobanın korkusuna eşlik eder. İkisinin arasındaki güç ilişkisinin mutlaklığı o kadar barizdir ki her bir sürü hayvanı, çobanın gücünü kendinde hisseder. Diğer taraftan cezalandırılma korkusu her bir sürü hayvanının pasifleştirilmesine katkıda bulunur. Tembellik duygusuna geldiğimiz zaman bu mutlakiyet bozulur. Çünkü sürü hayvanı o kadar tembeldir ki gücünü kaybedecek olsa bile korkudan dolayı başka bir şey yapamaz. Bu noktada çoban sahneye çıkar ve yitmekte olan gücü toplayabilmek için küçük değişiklikler yapmayı göze alır.

Şimdi çatışma esnasında trajik artistin kullanacağı araçlara geçebiliriz. Bu araçlar, “soy kütük, güç istenci ve bengi dönüştür”. Soy kütük nihilist değerlerin kendilerini değiştirilemez göstermesine karşı bulunmuş bir araçtır. Soy kütük değerlerin kökenine iner ve değiştirilebilir olduğunu gösterir. Her değer insan yapımıdır, dolayısıyla başka insan yapımı değerlerle değiştirilebilir. Ayrıca soy kütük trajik artistin hangi değerın üst hangi değerın aşağı olduğunu bulmasına yardım eder. Siyasal çatışmada nihilist değerlerin evrensel olduğu iddiasına karşın onların birer perspektiften ibaret olduğunu gösterir. Güç istenci ise hayatın kendisidir Nietzsche’ye göre. Bu nedenle siyasal çatışmanın merkezinde olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmaz. Trajik artist sürü hayvanından güçlü olmak ister. Fakat gücü, gücün kendisi için istemez. Onu kendini gerçekleştirebilmek, üst insan olabilmek için arzular. Diğer tarafta sürü hayvanı da güç istencine sahiptir. Fakat bu güç istenci, onu sona götürür. Bu yüzden aslında güçlü gözüğe dahi hiçbir zaman trajik artistin anladığı türden bir güce sahip olamaz. Bengi dönüşe geldiğimiz vakit, bengi dönüş siyasal çatışmada trajik artiste yaptığı seçimlerin, aldığı kararların her zaman doğru olduğunu ve pişmanlık duymaması gerektiğini öğretir. Trajik artistin geçmişte aldığı kararlar zorunludur ve bu zorunluluk ona büyük bir özgürlük alanı açar.

Sonu olarak, tezin esas sorusuna gelirsek, karřımıza Nietzsche'nin st insan diye kavramsallařtırdığı bir znelik řekli ıkar. st insan trajik artistin son halidir. Trajik artist sr hayvanını yenmiř ve kendini gerekleřtirebilmiřtir. Bu haliyle toplumdaki her birey bir st insan olmuřtur. Yksek kltr son halini insanlar zerinde almıřtır. Artık yıkıma gerek kalmamıřtır, dolayısıyla yeni řeyler yaratmaya da. Fakat byle bir durum iki sebepten gerekleřemez. Birincisi var oluř hibir zaman tamamlanmaz, varlıęa dnřemez. Dnřtę noktada tekrar nihilizm ortaya ıkar. İkinci olarak g istenci siyasal atıřmanın bitmesine izin vermez. Siyasal atıřma hibir zaman sonlanmaz. Dolayısıyla, Nietzsche'de hibir zaman tam anlamıyla siyasal zgrleřmeden bahsedemeyiz.

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