

THE GREEK POLITICAL ELITE AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY: IMPACT
OF THE DEBT CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

THE GREEK POLITICAL ELITE AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY: IMPACT OF THE DEBT CRISIS

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This thesis aims to analyze the possible impact of the 2008 Greek Debt Crisis on the Greek elites' perception of belonging to the European identity. It will argue that the 2008 Debt Crisis has negatively affected the Greek elites' perception of identity. It is assumed that this negative change has been reflected in their discourses throughout the crisis. Therefore, this thesis will try to demonstrate the change through discourse analysis of the political elites' speeches from 2002 to 2015. In doing so, it will test some major premises of Constructivism. The thesis first examines the European identity as a form of collective identity. Then, it focuses on evolution of the crisis with special emphasis on the Greece's ongoing Europeanization process. Lastly, speeches of the Greek political elite are analyzed with broader references to the nature of European identity and Greek self-perception of Europeanness.

Keywords: The Greek Political Elite, 2008 Debt Crisis, European Identity, Discourse Analysis, Identity Change

ÖZ

YUNAN SİYASİ ELİTİ VE AVRUPA KİMLİĞİ: BORÇ KRİZİNİN ETKİSİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Bu tez 2008 Yunanistan borç krizinin, Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliğine ait olma algısı üzerinde oluşturduğu olası etkiyi araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda borç krizinin Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimlik algısını olumsuz etkilediği öne sürülmektedir. Bu olası değişim, Yunan siyasi elitinin 2002 ve 2015 yılları arasındaki konuşmalarına söylem analizi yöntemi uygulanması yoluyla gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu şekilde Yapısalcılığın bazı temel önermelerini test edecektir oluşturmaktadır. Bu tez kapsamında ilk olarak, bir toplumsal kimlik türü olarak Avrupa kimliği incelenecektir. Sonrasında, Yunanistan'ın halen devam eden Avrupalılaşıma süreci ve krizin gelişim sürecine vurgu yapılarak borç krizi ele alınacaktır. Son aşamada Yunan siyasi elitinin bahsedilen dönem aralığında yaptığı konuşmalar teorik çerçeve, Avrupa kimliğinin özellikleri ve Yunanistan'ın kendine özgü Avrupalı tanımı çerçevesinde analiz edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunan Siyasi Eliti, 2008 Borç Krizi, Avrupa Kimliği, Söylem Analizi, Kimlik Değişimi

To all who inspires me

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EC	European Community
ECB	European Central Bank
EU	European Union
Grexit	Greek Exit from the EU
ND	New Democracy
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
SEA	Single European Act
SYRIZA	The Coalition of the Radical Left
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Description of the Problematique

Greece has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1981. EU membership played a prominent role in the country's modernization history. Through European course, the country has undergone a process of democratization which brought it closer to Western European countries. The twentieth century witnessed turbulent times for the country in its process of Europeanization. In this transformation process, becoming European turned out to be equal to becoming a modern and developed nation. Therefore, being part of European identity, which is achieved through becoming member of the EU, seems to be important for Greece. Yet the sovereign debt crisis in 2008 constituted a crucial point in the European vocation of the country because apparently it caused questioning of Europeanness of the Greek people, first and foremost the Greek political elite.

This thesis will ask how the 2008 Greek Debt Crisis has affected the Greek elites' European identity. It will argue that the Debt Crisis has negatively affected the Greek elites' self-perceived European identity.

As far as the 2008 crisis was concerned, Greece was not alone. Other European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland also experienced economic crises. The crisis became wide spread in Europe in a very short period of time. At the beginning, it was treated as a national problem that Greece had to deal with. However, Greek economy is tied to 19 other European member states in the Eurozone (EZ). Therefore, it could have broader effects on those economies as well. When it became clear that Greece was not able to survive this crisis on its own, the

European institutions decided to intervene. From that moment on, there started cycles of bailouts, memoranda, and austerities. Greece was forced to implement strict measures to recover from the crisis. When Greek governments started to take these measures, an outrage spread throughout the country. Greek governments were trying to survive this environment with the help of the EU institutions. Solutions were bailouts which would be provided through the contributions of other member states. However, these bailouts were conditioned on the implementation of structural reforms by the Greek side. Thus, negotiations with EU institutions regarding the bailout conditionalities did not bear fruit for the Greek side which tried to soften these conditionalities. Both domestic pressures and EU's non-conciliatory stance created turbulent times for the Greek political elite. From that moment on, the Greek political elite's attitudes towards the EU started to change. In this line, language they adopted in their speeches signaled a shift in their self-definition as Europeans. Binary oppositions such as "us vs them" became more visible in their speeches. There appeared a detachment from their European counterparts.

Being European cannot easily be defined or measured because it has complex connotations that differ according to context and time. Arguing that the Greek political elite gave up on their European identity as a result of the crisis would necessitate further evidence gained through sociological and psychological data which are beyond the limits of this thesis. However, this kind of change would be reflected in the elite's language use through adopted word choices. It is assumed that this negative change has been reflected in their discourses throughout the crisis. Therefore, existence of a change or shift in Europeanness of the Greek political elite can be captured through discourse analysis of the political elites' speeches from 2002 to 2015. Europeanness will be assessed within the context of the EU. To better understand the change, the term 'identity' and particularly European identity will be analyzed from different angles. To provide a theoretical perspective that will put findings in a meaningful framework, the thesis will mostly benefit from Constructivist approaches. In this respect, the first working hypothesis of this thesis is that the Greek political elite's identity and hence interests are shaped by Europeanness and they would display solidarity with Europe. As the second working

hypothesis of this thesis it is expected that there would be a detachment from European identity whenever interests collide if rationalist theories have more explanatory power.

1.2. Methodology

Discourse analysis is being adopted as a method in this thesis. The Greek governmental elites' speeches from 2002 to 2015 will be analyzed using this method. The reason for choosing elites as the research object is that the direction of the EU has been mainly driven by the efforts of political elite and also it is the elite who lead mass public opinion. The Greek elites, who were the governing elite from 2002 to 2015 in Greece, are George Papandreou, Antonis Samaras, Alexis Tsipras and others (see the appendixes for the whole list). The period covered by the thesis starts from 2002 because Greek membership to Eurozone dated January 1, 2001. However, English language documents are only available starting from 2002.

The speeches from this period are collected from various websites. Then, these speeches are valued according to the Likert-scale in the coding process. After coding of documents, the data are visualized. At the end, data are analyzed in line with the literature from a theoretical perspective.

Moreover, it is observed that the level of attachment with to the EU differentiates according to different issue areas in speeches of Greek political elite. To better evaluate the change caused by crisis, this thesis came up with categories including Eurozone, European integration, and foreign and security issues. Later, documents regarding these topics are separated into two periods (before and during the crisis) to better present the impact of the crisis. The topic of Eurozone will be only analyzed in the second period since it did not have significant coverage before the crisis in speeches.

It is assumed that the Greek political elites' European identity would be reflected in their speeches. Thus, through analysis of these speeches, this identity change will be observed. In this sense, it is considered as vital to detect what kind of

words the elite use in their references to the EU side, and how they describe the EU in relation to Greece. Any change observed in this usage would have substantial importance within the context of this thesis. Also, it is important to notice that identity manifested in speeches is mainly the self-representation of the political elite revealed through language use. Therefore, level of identity or attachment will be deduced from self-representation of the Greek political elite in their language use. Throughout the text, these concepts will be used interchangeably.

1.3. Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of six parts. The order of chapters aims to provide a coherent outlook. It starts with theoretical framework and methodology to provide approach. Then, literature on this area is detailed to clarify the borders of conceptual framework. Also, the incident that is assumed to have impact on European identity is detailed. At the end, findings are analyzed.

In this sense, the first chapter will provide a general outline of the thesis. There will be short introduction regarding the methodology adopted. Contents of each chapter will be explained in order.

The second chapter will provide the theoretical framework. Constructivist and rationalist theories will be explained in this chapter. Also, Discourse Analysis as a method will be detailed along with the research process.

The third chapter will be about European identity. Starting from the adoption of the term “identity” in social science literature, European identity will be detailed. It will also shortly cover the historical evolution of the idea of Europe from the Ancient Greece. At the same time, elite identity and its importance on the European matters will be touched upon. The literature on European identity will be mainly covered in this chapter.

The fourth chapter will focus on the evolution of the Greek debt crisis. In this respect, the historical background of the Greek-Europe relations will be emphasized. The transformation that Greece has undergone through Europeanization will be mentioned. After that, the 20th century developments in the political life of Greece

will be underlined to give a historical perspective to the current crisis. Later in this chapter, the development of the Greek debt crisis will be detailed focusing on its impact on the country.

The fifth chapter will be devoted to the analysis. Findings will be analyzed in accordance with the theoretical framework and European identity literature. Analysis will be based on two periods (before and during the crisis) to better evaluate the impact of the crisis.

In the conclusion chapter, there will be overall assessments regarding the premises of this thesis. Its stance and contribution to the literature will be stated in this part.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Methodology

This part provides a general overview regarding the methodology deployed in this thesis. The methodology will be based on the discourse analysis of speeches of George Papandreou, Antonis Samaras, Alexis Tsipras and others (George Papandreou-FM from PASOK during 2002-2004, Petros Molyviatis-FM from New Democracy during 2004-2006, Dora Bakoyannis-FM from New Democracy during 2006-2009, George Papandreou-PM from PASOK during 2009-2011, Lucas Papademos-PM as independent during 2011-2012, Antonis Samaras-PM from New Democracy during 2012-2014, Alexis Tsipras-PM from Syriza from 2015 onwards), who are the Greek governing elites from 2002 to 2015.

Discourse analysis provides better understanding of social processes through which perceptions are created. That is, “whereas other qualitative methods provide well-developed approaches for understanding the social world and the meaning it has for the people in it, discourse analysis goes one step further in embracing a strong social constructivist epistemology”.¹ Its elaborations with respect to the process where actors’ understanding of the world are quite relevant for the purpose of this study.

Although it is now widely used in other disciplines such as political science, sociology, and international relations, etc. discourse analysis was an extensive subject area of linguistic at the beginning. In linguistic terms, James Paul Gee describes the usage of discourse analysis among scholars as “the study both of the connections among and across sentences as they follow one after the other, and for

¹ Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). *The social construction of reality: A treatise on the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City, NY. Anchor.

the study of language-in-use in specific contexts which gives meaning to words and words give significance to context”.²

Moreover, discourse analysis³ is also described as “the actual practices of talking and writing” in the post-modern literature. Practice of the term is similar to that of Ian Parker’s “definition of discourse as an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception that brings an object into being”.⁴ In other words, it refers to the point that social reality is production of discourses, and it would not be possible to understand the social phenomenon without taking the discourse into consideration. Since it is the discourse that makes these social events meaningful. Therefore, we should be able to see the relation between discourse and reality.

In general, discourse *stricto sensu* (in the strict sense) means a text (written and/or oral) having a certain content and *lato sensu* (in the widest sense) a multidimensional phenomenon with sociological basis. Thus, discourse can be regarded as the linguistic/textual representation of the socially existed phenomenon.⁵ Discourse analysis studies can be broadly divided into two main categories which are linguistic based and social context-based analysis.⁶ There might also be third category which includes both of them. At that point, referring to subjective assessments and interpretations when conducting discourse analysis is considered as an indispensable part of discourse analysis studies.

“Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration... Discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently.”⁷

²Gee, J. (2014). *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. London. Routledge, p. 14.

³ Woodilla, J. (1998). *Workplace conversations: The text of organizing*. In D. Grant, T. Keenoy, & C. Osrick (Eds.), *Discourse and Organization*. London: Sage. pp. 31-50.

⁴ Parker, I. (1992). *Discourse Dynamics*. London. Routledge.

⁵ Bal, H. (2013). *Qualitative Research Method [Nitel Araştırma Yöntemi]*. Isparta: Fakülte Kitabevi Press. p.248.

⁶ Bal, p. 256.

⁷ Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. In Phillips, N., & Hardy, C. (2002) *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction*. Sage University Papers Series on Qualitative Research Methods, Vol. 50. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage. p.4.

Importance of context is largely embraced among scholars. Teun A. van Dijk asserts the importance of embedding social contexts in which discourse arise as “text and talk in many ways signal their contextual relevance, and therefore context structures need to be observed and analyzed in detail; settings, participants, and their communicative and social roles, goals... institutional or organizational structures...”⁸

Together with the text and context division, there is also another dichotomy in discourse studies: the one concerning the power dynamics, knowledge and ideology relations or the other one focusing on social construction processes.⁹ In the first category, discourse is considered as a kind of information that reveals the ideology and power relations. This literature mainly derived from Michael Foucault’s works. For the second category, scholars are mainly concerned with the creation/construction/alteration of reality through discourses.

Furthermore, studying identity through discourse analysis is a challenging task for two reasons. First the term identity is difficult to capture due to its contested nature. It is even more challenging when trying to capture it by adopting discourse analysis that does not provide an easily adopted tool to the researcher.

Post-modernist literature also needs to be taken into consideration when studying identity through discourse analysis. In this literature, it is suggested that “language can be employed not only to reinforce social relations but can also fundamentally alter those relations”.¹⁰ Also, language is treated as “socio-historical product” and a tool “forming and transforming social order”.¹¹ On the other hand, Marx argues that “language is mostly a reflection of a given set of social relations”.¹²

Discourse is mostly related with the external dimension of identification within this literature. It is accepted as a tool of authority to influence the

⁸ Van Dijk, T.A. (1997). *Discourse as Structure and Process*. Vol. 1. London. Sage.

⁹ Phillips and Hardy.

¹⁰ Bucken-Knapp, G. (2003). *Politics of Identity: Norwegian Case in Comparative Perspective*. Albany: State University of New York. p.6.

¹¹ Hall, J., K. (2013). *Teaching and Researching Language and Culture*. New York: Routledge. p.45.

¹² *Ibid*.

identification processes of masses through “the formalized, codified, objectified systems of categorization developed by powerful, authoritative institutions”.¹³ The modern state stands out as a vital agent which does the identification work.

In this respect, the state is assumed to have legitimate power, referred as symbolic force by Bourdieu, “to name, to identify, to categorize, to state what is what and who is who”.¹⁴ For some scholars like Foucault and those who share similar understandings regarding the nature of the state, this identification and categorization power of the state lays in the ontological essence of the state. This identification power of the state is better described by Christopher A. Ford as follows:

“The state is thus a powerful “identifier”, not because it can create “identities” in the strong sense – in general, it cannot – but because it has the material and symbolic resources to impose the categories, the classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting with which bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and doctors must work and to which non-state actors must refer.”¹⁵

Furthermore, identification work can be performed by other means of “discourses” and “public narratives”.¹⁶ Although, discourse is regarded in terms of its *reflective* disposal rather than *constructive*, emphasis made on the role of state and state elites to influence the identity of masses would be beneficial within the framework of this thesis. Also, along with the adopted understanding of identity as flexible, adaptable and inclined to change depending on the different contexts, discourse analysis is considered as the closest to capture these aspects of social identity.

This thesis employs discourse analysis as a methodological tool which functions as a mirror in the sense that it would reflect the self-image of the Greek

¹³ Brubaker, R. and Cooper F. (2000). *Beyond ‘Identity’*, Los Angeles: California University Press, p.15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Ford, C. A., (1994), *Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in Race-Conscious Law*, *California Law Review* 82: 1231-1285. In Brubaker, R. and Cooper F. (2000). *Beyond ‘Identity’*, Los Angeles: California University Press, 29: 1–47.

¹⁶ Hall, S. (2003). "Introduction: Who Needs Identity", pp.1-17. in Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (1996). *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: Sage Publication.

state elites. James Paul Gee asserts that discourse allows us “saying things, doing things and beings things”.¹⁷ In this thesis, it is assumed that discourse allows us to capture how Greek state elites perceive their European identity.

“Discourse is the social and cognitive process of putting the world into words, of transforming our perceptions, experiences, emotions, understandings, and desires into a common medium for expression and communication, through language and other semiotic media. Discourse is more than letters and words, appearing one at a time or strung together, reflecting bits of thoughts and bits of meaning.”¹⁸

Among the literature on discourse, *politicolinguistic* approach needs special attention since it constitutes the preeminent frame in the studies concentrating on political discourses. *Politicolinguistic* approach can be summarized as “brings together and connects rhetoric, critical discourse analysis and concepts in political science”.¹⁹ There are three primary dimensions that politicolinguistics designate: polity, policy and politics.²⁰ It needs to be indicated that this approach is utilized in a variety of *the field of political action*²¹ from political advertisements i.e. during election campaigns of political parties to the international negotiations taking place in interstate relations and international organizations. Reisigl and Wodak suggest five questions which are regarded as useful guidelines during conducting political discourse analysis:

1. How are social actors -either individual persons or groups – linguistically constructed by being named (nomination);
2. What positive or negative traits, qualities and features are attributed to the linguistically constructed social actors (predication);
3. Through what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify or delegitimize claims containing specific

¹⁷ Gee p. 20.

¹⁸ Strauss, S. & Feiz, P. (2014). *Discourse Analysis: Putting our Worlds into Words*. New York, Routledge.

¹⁹ Reisigl, M. (2008). *Analyzing Political Rhetoric*. In Wodak, R., & Krzynazowski, M. (2008). *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ The field of political action can be defined as the “places of social forms of practice” (Bourdieu, 1997; Girnth, 1996) or “framework of social interaction” (Reisigl, 2003, p.148).

nominations and predictions (for example claims of discrimination of others);

4. From what perspective or point of view are these nominations, predications and argumentations expressed (perspectivation);
5. Are the respective utterances (nominations, predications, and argumentations) articulated overtly, are they intensified or are they mitigated (mitigation versus intensification)?²²

In his analysis Reisigl employs a model based on dichotomy of us/them since most of his works focused on fascism, populism and extreme radical ideologies in which binary oppositions can be vividly observable. Although, this thesis does not deal with any of these ideologies, identity change within the context of crisis would reveal itself in “us versus them” dichotomy. Therefore, increasing employment of us/them language or even existence of this kind of differentiation might indicate a shift in self-definitions of research objects. Inspired by Reisigl’s model of analysis, the following scheme will be adopted to this thesis.

Table 1. Nomination and Predication categories to be used.

We/Us/Greeks		They/Them/Europe	
Nomination	Predication	Nomination	Predication
How they refer to themselves in the European related issues.	Positive or negative attributions to this category in the texts.	How they refer to European side in the same context.	Positive or negative attributions to be meant to the EU side in the texts.

²² Wodak and Krzynazowski, p.100.

2.1.1. Case Selection

There is a rich literature on the European Debt Crisis, but this thesis focuses on a neglected aspect of the crisis: the impact of the debt crisis on the Greek political elite and their identity. Also, there is an extensive literature scrutinizing the European identity in the times of crisis. Much of this literature focus on the failure of Europe in creating a robust identity capable of bearing harsh times. Others look for the causes in already existed uneven relations among member states i.e. core-periphery relations.

So, why insisting on working such a popular topic? The reason for that lays on the founding characteristics of the European Union and integration process. By definition, the EU is regarded as an elite project. Therefore, any change taking place in the course of European integration would start with the change of attitudes among elites. In this sense, apprehension of any change or continuity in the way that Greek state elites define themselves as a European would give us insight for the future of European integration.

2.1.2. Data Sampling

The initial bunch collected for discourse analysis included the news, press briefings, announcements, statements and speeches, top stories and interviews published by the Ministry between the years 2002 and 2015 on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was composed of around 15 thousand documents.²³ The primary texts were Prime ministers' and Ministers' of Foreign Affairs addresses. The rationale for choosing prime minister and minister of foreign affairs assumes that they represent the general political stance of their respective countries. Also, they are assumed to possess the highest political impact in domestic politics. Any change occurred in their perception of belonging to European identity might echo on the society. Besides, these people are representatives of their society as they gain

²³ Mfa.gr. (2018). *News Archive*. [online] Available at: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/news-archive.html> [Accessed 17 Jul. 2017].

their positions through winning the national elections. Thus, it can be asserted that their perceptions are not in contradiction with those of people.

As the research progressed, the aforementioned initial bunches of documents were sorted out. In the second step, some of the documents were eliminated, such as the ones that do not include any of these words: the EU-, Euro-, or European. Yet remaining documents still constituted huge amount since a great majority of official documents/statements included a reference to the EU as one would expect from any member state. Therefore, another attempt was necessary to decrease the number of documents to a reasonable point allowing for a manageable analysis. In the third step, certain themes were identified in order to clarify the level of identification. The identification was based on common topics frequently appeared in the documents. Therefore, these topics were selected as the main categories. These topics are: European integration (future prospects, Constitutional Treaty, enlargement to the Balkan region and Turkey's candidacy), Eurozone and respective crisis (austerities, memoranda, debt negotiations, referendum for repayment of loans), European security concerns, and other (Cyprus issue, migration, FYROM name issue). The rationale for selection of these themes can be summarized as following;

1. **European integration:** as it was foreseen at the beginning of the European integration eventual aim of the process is to enhance political unity at the end, thereby any pro or con statements regarding integration would give a clue on the Greek commitment towards the EU. Thus, statements supporting integration, institutions' competence areas or power are included under this topic.
2. **Eurozone:** common currency is particularly regarded as a nation-state tool and an important symbol of it. Therefore, supporting Euro would also indicate certain level of attachment to the EU. Likewise, troubles occurred in this area i.e. considering Grexit signal in detachment from European identity.
3. **European Foreign and Security Issues:** it is a known fact that achieving unity in foreign and security issues is a demanding work for international organizations. We refer to the EU as a *sui generis* entity which is mostly defined as something between international organization and federal state. In

this sense, adopting a unified perspective with the EU in these areas and even supporting creation of a unified understating demonstrate the high level of we-feeling among these agents.

- 4. Daily Political Agenda:** Political agenda does not only consist of aforementioned issue areas. Although the topics that did not fall into the above categories were eliminated, we realized that some seemingly irrelevant topics contain reference points for European identity. Therefore, those are categorized as others.

Table 2. Main topics determined in the sampling process and adopted in the coding phase

CODING SCHEME		
Main Themes	Content of Themes	Keywords
European Integration	Any positive or negative statement regarding the integration process would reflect degree of affiliation with the EU. In this sense, documents containing topics regarding future of Europe, European citizenship, Constitutional Treaty, enlargement to the Balkan region and Turkey's candidacy were evaluated within this	Further integration, political integration, EU competence area, transfer of further competences, power of the EU institutions, Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, enlargement, Balkans region, EU-Turkey relations, European citizenship

	theme.	
Euro zone	Euro is considered as an important identity marker for the EU as a state-like entity as nation-states. Thus, any Euro related statements will be evaluated within this theme. Topics for this theme meant to be; European Common Market, Troika, austerity measures, memoranda, debt negotiations, referendum for repayment of loans, reconstruction of debts, Germany, European Central Bank.	Euro, ECB, Troika, austerity measures, Memoranda, bailout, Germany, EMU, repayment of debts, negotiations, reconstruction of debts, IMF
European Foreign and Security Issues	Security and foreign policy issues are considered as national concerns for member states. Therefore, stating a unified understanding of foreign and security policies would indicate high level of approximation with the EU cause.	Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security, NATO, EU-USA security partnership, Middle East and EU relations, UN Security Council, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
Daily Political Agenda	Some documents do not	NA

Table 2 cont'd

	correspond to any of these categories with their contents, yet still contain references to European identity therefore considered as relevant.	
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Lastly, Likert type scale is adopted to determine the degree of identification revealed in the documents. Likert scale is widely used by researchers researching opinions, attitudes and descriptions of people through tests, polls and surveys. In this scale from 1 to 5, the following values are determined:

Values 1: Represents the least identification with the EU and holding negative view about the EU. To value a document with 1, the following key words are used: “our partners in Europe”, “our European partners”, “the EU side”, “they”, and “them”. These documents also contain high level of anger and animosity directed towards the EU.

Value 2: Represents some identification but with caution. These documents contain negative attribution for the EU and adopt “us vs them” language. Key words are: “our partners”, “the EU side”, “they”, and “them”. These documents differ on their relatively low level of anger and animosity directed towards the EU.

Value 3: Represents neutral position regarding their self-description as Europeans. These documents have both negative and positive attributions for the EU side. There are no specific key words determined for this value.

Value 4: Represents holding positive image of the EU but do not have direct attribution to the European identity. Certain key words are: “common interests”, “common position”, “common values”. Also, general positive language of documents is interpreted to value.

Value 5: Represents self-definition as “European” and having mostly positive attitude about the EU and European identity. Key words are: “we, as Europeans”, “our European family”, “we need more Europe”.

Along with these terms, the general attitude towards the EU was also taken into consideration. For instance, there appeared strongly negative predications used for the EU side in certain documents while the same documents do not contain any differentiating phrase or word as listed above. Therefore, the language and tone of each document are also evaluated.

In general, the documents valued as 1, in this study contain clear demarcation with nominations as “we, Greek people” vs “they, Europeans out there, the EU side”. Documents valued as 2 have still “us vs them” language but animosity level is relatively low compared to documents valued as 1. In the documents valued as 3, there is again “us vs them” nominations in the language use but there is continuity in referring themselves as European. In the value 4 documents, general tendency is positive towards the EU, but there are no direct references as being part of European identity compared to value 5 documents. Documents which have 5 values contain direct references to be part of European identity.

After detailing the method employed in this thesis, the theoretical framework, which would provide the approach to study European identity and the impacts of challenging factors to the identity, will be touched upon.

2.2.Theoretical Framework of the Thesis

Identity issue is given wide coverage among constructivist theories whilst largely ignored by rationalist approaches. In that respect, while some of European identity scholars give credit to the issue of identity in their works, others basically ignore this variable.²⁴ Neo-functional theory, developed by Ernst Haas, underlines the elite roles and functional imperatives that derive the elites to follow the European

²⁴ For instance, for further information regarding European identity see works: Fligstein, N. (2008). *Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*. New York, Oxford University Press, stein, N. (2009). *Who are the Europeans and How Does This Matter for Politics?*, Green, D. (2007). *The Europeans: Political Identity in an Emerging Polity*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner., Habermas, J. (1992) *Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe*, *Praxis International*, Vol.12, pp. 1-19, Katzenstein, P., J., Checkel, J., T. (2009). *European Identity*, New York. Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, T. (2010). *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, New York. Cornell University Press,

cause in the integration process.²⁵ According to him, driving force of the integration lays under the cost-benefit analysis of elites. That is, elites as rational decision makers take part in the integration since staying outside would be highly expensive. Haas accepts the interest changes occurred as a result of staying in the integration process, but he describes this change as involuntary. In line with neo-functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism also allows for cooperation in international organizations only to the extent that these organizations provide solutions at cheaper prices i.e. removing transaction costs.

Furthermore, rationalist approaches in IR (i.e. neorealism, neoliberalism, and variants of them) underpin the rational choices made by entities in decision-making processes. According to these approaches, actors as “rational decision makers” try to achieve their national interests through cost-benefit analyses. Deciding on “preferences” and “constraints” would be based on this cost-benefit analyses. On rationalist account, European integration is also driven by this cost-benefit analysis of member states. Stanley Hoffmann, one of the prominent scholars of intergovernmentalism, suggests that “integration might work very well in the realm of low politics (i.e. economic integration) but encountered impermeable barriers if it tried to spill over to questions affecting key national interests”.²⁶

Likewise, liberal intergovernmentalism, which is developed from the works of neofunctionalism (E. Haas) and intergovernmentalism (Stanley Hoffman) by Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, provides crucial explanations regarding the European integration and main motives of member states to continue this process. Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that member states will remain primary actors in the integration process as “masters of treaties”.²⁷ Moreover, as a leading figure in this approach, Moravcsik, reiterates intergovernmental bargaining processes and pursuing state interests during these bargaining stages. According to him, integration might take place in specific economic areas in which nation states consider that they

²⁵ Haas, E. (1961). International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization*, Vol.15, No.3, pp.366-392.

²⁶ Hoffman, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No. 3, *Tradition and Change* (Summer, 1966), pp. 862-915.

²⁷ Moravcsik, A., Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: Diez, T., Wiener, A., (2009) *European Integration Theory*, Oxford. Oxford University Press p. 68.

would gain more if these areas are transferred to the EU level. Main premises of this theory listed by Moravcsik are:²⁸

- “national preferences were driven by general geopolitical ideas and interests or by issue-specific (generally economic) interests;
- substantive bargaining outcomes were shaped by the manipulation of information by supranational entrepreneurs and information asymmetries or by intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of asymmetrical interdependence;
- the choice of EU institutions reflected federalist ideology, the need for technocratic management, or an interest in securing credible member state commitments.”

Basically, the nation states of the EU contribute to the process to the extent that it enables them to pursue their national interests. Governmental elites take part in the process as acting through rational choices to achieve these interests.

On the other hand, constructivist approaches differ substantially in their explanations regarding the EU and its characteristics. For instance, as one these approaches Europeanization allocates a broad place to the formation of European identity along with national and regional identities within the integration process. It foresees that European institutions have profound effects on the national states through employment of different instruments henceforth creation of a collective identity became inevitable in this sense. This approach puts too much emphasis on the EU institutions. It leaves no room for the counteractions of nation states which are able to fight back the attacks of institutions.²⁹

Besides, sociological and constructivist theories allow for identity-based explanations and “assign the highest salience to identity issues, and both regard the formation of a collective identity as desirable and possible”.³⁰ Due to this reason, Constructivism will be used as the theoretical framework of this thesis. Constructivism employs the notions such as ‘ideas’, ‘values’, ‘norms’, ‘culture’,

²⁸ Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NJ. Cornell University Press.

²⁹ Checkel, J., T. & Katzenstein, P., J., (2009). *The Politization of European Identities*. In Katzenstein, P., J., & Checkel, J., T. (2009). *European Identity*, New York. Cambridge University Press, p.219.

³⁰ Walkenhorst, H. (2009). *The Conceptual Spectrum of European Identity: From Missing Link to Unnecessary Evil*, Vol.3.

‘identity’, ‘institutions’, and analysis their relationship with ‘interest’. These concepts have an extensive coverage in its premises for international politics. Identity is considered as an outcome of social and political actions, development processes of collective consciousness and actions or identity is vital in this respect.³¹ Moreover, this theory attributes identity a role that shapes the interests, threat perceptions, choices and actions of nation states in this approach. Without taking identity into consideration, it would not be possible to make sense of the state actions and choices. It also draws attention to the popular discourses within the society since they reflect general opinion and interest, and in some cases change them.³²

In addition, social structures that agents are surrounded with play a prominent role in making sense of their behaviors. This is mainly referred as “contextualization”. For this perspective, it provides explanations embracing transformative powers that structures have on actors’ preferences and identities through constant interactions and norms/values they privilege in these interactions. State identities and interests are constituted as a result of social interactions.³³ However, it should be kept in mind that change occurs on both sides of the interaction, which is called as co-construction. That is, structures shape actors while actors shape structures. In the process, actors choose to act in accordance with their corresponding groups. By means of constant interaction, they substantially adopt appropriate behaviors previously determined in the structure. Actors develop *logic of appropriateness* in their actions. Also, adopting certain behavior patterns might occur as a result of negotiation and persuasion processes took place within the international institutions. These processes are expected to result in comprise. This is what is argued as the third premise; structures hold constitutive power to alter actors’ preferences in certain directions. As actors behave according to the institutions’ rules and adopt parallel preferences, their identity also come into terms with those of the

³¹ Brubaker, R. and Cooper F. (2000). Beyond ‘Identity’, Los Angeles. California University Press, 29: 1–47.

³² Akdemir, E. (2013). Identity and Culture Discussion in the European Union and Turkey. [Avrupa Birliği’nde Kimlik ve Kültür Tartışmaları ve Türkiye]. Bursa. Ekin Publishing. p. 9.

³³ Checkel, T., J., (1998). The Constructivist Turn in International Relations, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No.2.

institutions. The European Union is no exception to this process of identity change.³⁴

International politics is also one these structures through “state interaction in which identities are defined and sustained or changed”.³⁵ In other words, actors’ identities are not estimated as unchangeable or “given but are developed and sustained or transformed in interaction”.³⁶ Wendt’s description of “world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and do, is one in which “anarchy is what states make of it”. Moreover, it is accepted that “states may be self-interested but they continuously (re)define what that means, thus their identities may change”.³⁷ Ultimately, Wendt proclaims that “identities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone”.³⁸ In addition, one of the core premises that Constructivism adopts for the international politics reflects the way in which possibility for change might take place; “state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics”.³⁹

Indeed, a constructivist explanation of the origins of interest is a crucial differentiation point among others. National interests are defined as “intersubjective understandings about what it takes to advance power, influence and wealth, which survive the political process, given the distribution of power in a society”.⁴⁰ In this respect, it is suggested that “the social construction of identities ... is necessarily prior to more obvious conceptions of interests: a “we” needs to be established before its interests can be articulated”.⁴¹ International organizations in the sense that “we” is

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Zeyfuss, M. (2001). Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.37, No.3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Zeyfuss, M. (2002). *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. p.4.

³⁸ Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p.21.

³⁹ Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *American Political Science Review*, Vol.88, No.2, pp.384-396. doi:10.2307/2944711.

⁴⁰ Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.3, p. 337.

⁴¹ Hall, J., A. (1993) Ideas and the Social Sciences. In Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.3, p. 337.

created “not only constrain but also constitute states and their interests”.⁴² This thesis will try to analyze whether “we” created by the EU has also shaped interests of the member states.

Indigenizing a collective identity may provide a stimulus for identity changes as in the case of the EU. Actors may choose to redefine their interests in the line with their group identity in which we-feeling supersedes the rational/individualistic interests. They develop a feeling of solidarity and loyalty among group members. Then, it is assumed that collective identity has “the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be ‘altruistic’, who may still be rational, but the basis on which they calculate their interests is the group or “team”.⁴³ Therefore, it can be asserted that new identities can be created, or old identities can be redefined in the light of new contexts and environments. In this respect, constructivists leave a space for change through different means. They believe that “norms, laws, economic interdependence, technological development, learning, and institutions can fundamentally change state interests”.⁴⁴

This thesis will test whether the constructivist premises. It expects that European identity would shape political elite’s preferences and interests. In that respect, the Greek political elite is expected to display a sense of solidarity with Europe and accommodate Greek interests in such a framework rather than distancing themselves from Europe and presenting the crisis as a “war” between two different sides.

In the following chapter, theoretical framework will be enriched with identity literature. In line with the theoretical approaches, conceptual framework of European identity will be provided. Among different usages of European identity in the literature, the one adopted within the context of this thesis will be explained.

⁴² Checkel, p.331.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Mercer, J. (1995). Anarchy and Identity. *International Organization*, Vol.49, No.2. pp. 229-252. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706971> Accessed: 01-08-2017 07:03 UTC

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Zygmunt Bauman observes that “you tend to notice things and put them into the focus of your scrutiny and contemplation only when they vanish, go bust, start to behave oddly or otherwise let you down”.⁴⁵ Recent sovereign debt crisis of Greece is no exception to that. Identity issue during a severe crisis especially draws attention. This premise has wide coverage in identity studies. For instance;

“In times of crisis, identity issues become more important than during times of equilibria, as all international tensions, at the individual, collective, or national, and even supranational level, rise to the surface in confrontational ways... Questioning identities, perceptions, and definitions can be particularly insightful, constructive, and enriching experience and process...”.⁴⁶

In this chapter of the thesis, identity issue is going to be discussed in a broader scale. Firstly, the conceptual framework of the term identity will be addressed. Due to the nature of the term as being extensively used in a variety of contexts, it is necessary to provide a conceptual framework.

Secondly, this chapter will touch upon the development of the idea of Europe from early ages i.e. Ancient Greek world where the very idea of Europe came to existence. This part will try to answer such questions: ‘How idea of Europe came into existence in the first place?’, ‘Did Greece and Europe share the same spatiotemporal meaning in Ancient Greece?’ ‘What did Europe mean for the Greek people at that time?’

Thirdly, social and collective identities will be mentioned since what it is referred as the European identity is a form of social and collective identities. In this sense, literature on European identity will be detailed. Also, Euro and European

⁴⁵ Bauman, Z. (2013). *Identity*. New York, NY. John Wiley & Sons.

⁴⁶ Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., & Kouki, H. (2013). *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

citizenship as two of the main identity symbols of the European identity will be explained with references to the social and collective identities. Therefore, it will be suggested that any crisis occurring in one of these symbols would have a broader meaning for the European identity.

Fourthly, when addressing the European identity, elite identity will also be touched upon. As integration scholars argue, political elites have been the driving force behind the integration process of the EU. State elites' impact on the direction of integration cannot be ignored and needs to be taken into consideration while studying European identity. Therefore, elite identity constitutes an essential component of this thesis. Lastly, the relevance of discourse as an identity demonstrator will be briefly mentioned.

2.3. The Concept of 'Identity'

As a widely used concept, the problem with identity is that it “arises in different contexts, and each has generated a rich tradition of discourse”.⁴⁷ In the social sciences, identity is a relatively new term came into use in the second half of the twentieth century. Increasing usage of the term in social sciences coincides with the period when the social sciences have gained reputation and became more relevant in the solution of the problems that the world experienced during the World War I and World War II. In the environment of two catastrophic world wars, it was testified that “the social sciences could unlock the secrets of the human condition”⁴⁸. Therefore, growing popularity of the social science among intellectuals and politicians is “an act of faith ... that social science is ready to contribute to the solution of the manifold problems which vex mankind”⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ Parekh, B. (2009). Logic of identity. *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, Vol.8, No.3, p.267. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X09105387>.

⁴⁸ Gleason, P., (1983). Identifying Identity: A Semantic History. Oxford. Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of. *The Journal of American Histories*, Vol.69, p.923.

⁴⁹ Eulau, H., (1951). Social Science at the Crossroads, *Antioch Review*, 117-28. In Gleason, P., (1983). Identifying Identity: A Semantic History, Oxford. Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of. *The Journal of American Histories* 69, 910–931.

The same reason with the growing interest towards social sciences for the solutions of troubles that humanity was experiencing, paved the way for adoption of the identity. The era started with the character studies which mainly focused on the national-characters of societies especially in America.⁵⁰ Later, the term identity has replaced the character and gained larger use in the field. Hence, there is a correlation between development of the social sciences and term's increased use in 1950s.⁵¹

First usage of the identity as an analytical concept was in the fields of psychology and sociology. The most famous person in this respect was Erik Erikson who coined the term 'identity crisis'. According to Erikson, identity (for a person) develops in "a process 'located' in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities".⁵² In his definition, the growth of self is achieved in a constant relation with the society as acquiring social values such as hope, purpose, competency, care, and wisdom. Yet, in his definition of identity, Erikson considers identity as something definite. There might be change and crisis in identity-acquiring process but "inner sameness and continuity" were constant.⁵³

The inclusion of the term into sociology by the symbolic interactionists constituted milestone in spread of the term to the other disciplines, particularly political science. Usage of the term in the literature of European identity substantially benefited from sociological interpretation of identity. Sociologists attributed a prominent role to the social interaction for the growth of self of the individual. Different from Erikson and psychoanalysts, sociologists' perception of "the self is no longer a solid and given entity". It is rather considered as evolving in the process. That is, identity is "continuously created and re-created in each social situation that one enters".⁵⁴

Even further, identity was considered as identical with social relations;

⁵⁰ Merton, R., K. (1968). *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York. Free Press. pp.24-60.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity: Youth and crisis*. New York. Norton. p.22.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Nelson N. Foote, (1951). Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation, *American Sociological Review*, pp.14-21.

“We have treated social relationship and identity as merely different terms for referring to the same phenomena: the establishment of mutually recognized, expected sequences of behavior in a transaction. Identity refers to the individual’s sequence of acts; relationship refers to the ensemble of acts made up by the sequences of all the parties involved”.⁵⁵

In the same line with the sociological conceptualization of the term, the following description by Stuart Hall would be relevant:

“Identity emerges as a kind of unsettled space, or an unresolved question in that space, between a number of intersecting discourses. ... [Until recently, we have incorrectly thought that identity is] a kind of fixed point of thought and being, a group of action ... the logic of something like a ‘true self.’ ... [But] Identity is a process, identity is split. Identity is not a fixed point but an ambivalent point. Identity is also the relationship of the Other to oneself”.⁵⁶

Hence, this thesis’ approach to identity is similar to the sociological use as it would enable to analyze the possible influence of crisis on the Greek political elite’s identity change. For this reason, it was necessary to benefit from the sociological usage of the term.

3.2.Social Identity

As another widely used term, boundaries of the social identity concept need to be clarified for the sake of simplicity. Since there is an extensive literature focusing on different aspects of the term in various fields, it might be necessary to state this thesis’ approach concerning the term. To begin with, social identity can be defined as “the desire for group distinction, dignity, and place within historically specific discourses (or frames of understanding) about the character, structure, and boundaries of the polity and the economy”.⁵⁷ In general terms a “social identity

⁵⁵ Scheff, J. T. (1970). On the Concepts of Identity and Social Relationship, in *Human Nature and Collective Behavior: Papers in Honor of Herbert Blumer*, ed. Tamotsu Shibutani, Englewood Cliffs, p.205. In Gleason, P., (1983). *Identifying Identity: A Semantic History*, Oxford. Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of. *The Journal of American Histories* 69, pp.910–931.

⁵⁶ Hall, S. (1989). Ethnicity: Identity and Difference. *Radical America*, Vol.23, pp.9–20.

In Fearon, J. D. (1999). What Is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)? Department of Political Science (Stanford University), pp.1–43. <https://doi.org/http://w>.

⁵⁷ Fearon,

represents the way in which individuals situate and orient themselves in the world”.⁵⁸ In this sense, an individual can define himself/herself from different angles such as gender, ethnicity, or political orientation. From all these different standpoints, an individual has varied degree of understanding regarding the world and its way of working.

Moreover, these identities do not exist as different layers of the self, but they constantly interact with each other. There is a widespread acknowledgement that individuals are inclined to define themselves with some of these identities more than others. Moreover, each one of these social identities relate us with particular groups, “makes us part of its historical narrative, and gives our lives meaning and depth, the plurality of them offers us multiple belongings, loyalties and sources of meaning, and enables us to construct several overlapping narratives of our lives”.⁵⁹

Most of the definitions of the social identity concept are originated from Tajfel and Turner’s works on social identity theory. Tajfel defines social identity as “that part of individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership”.⁶⁰

Brewer suggests four main conceptualizations of social identity in social science; “person-based social identities, relational social identities, group-based social identities, and collective identities”.⁶¹ First two categories generally deal with different aspects of individual self; the development of a person’s self with regard to his/her socialization processes, and definition of himself/herself in relation to other people around in dyad relations. The latter two categories consider the self as an integral part of a larger unit/group. In group based social identity, perception of belonging to a group for a person in his/her self-categorization is a determinant factor since the group identity influence the individual self to a great extent.

⁵⁸ Parekh, p.276.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Tajfel, H. (1982). Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, [online] 33(1), p.24.

⁶¹ Brewer, M. B. (2016). The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology, *International Society of Political Psychology*, Vol.22, No.1, pp.115–125. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791908>.

In other words, the feeling of “groupness”, “connectedness”, “catness”, “netness” or as it is referred as *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* by Max Weber is what this thesis called collective identity in this part.⁶² Therefore, description of collective identity, which is the most relevant category of social identity as far as the topic of the thesis is concerned, would be as follow:

“...the concept of collective identity involves shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences, but it also refers to an active process of shaping and forging an image of what the group stands for and how it wishes to be viewed by others. Thus, collective identities represent an achievement of collective efforts, above and beyond what category members have in common to begin with. As such, the concept of collective identity provides a critical link between social identity (at both individual and group levels) and collective action in the political arena (Gamson, 1992) and is a key concept in the study of ‘identity politics’”.⁶³

Moreover, an individual may adopt more than one collective identity. That is, a person can have affinity of more than one group on different circumstances reflecting divergent interests. Brewer argues that there are at least four different methods that a person can handle multiple identities. One of these is committing to one dominant collective identity over other subordinate affiliations like in the case that “selecting national identity as primary and supporting subgroup interests only to the extent that they converge with national interests, as opposed to selecting a subgroup identity as primary and subscribing to national identity only when not in conflict with one’s own subgroup interests”.⁶⁴ Another method can be disposing different group affiliations to separate fields to prevent their simultaneous functioning as “adopting national identity in the international arena, occupational identity when economic interests are at stake, and ethnic identity in the cultural domain”.⁶⁵

Brubaker and Cooper provide a comprehensive conceptual framework of identity, also underline a similar phenomenon. They argue that “how one identifies

⁶² For further information regarding collective identity in this sense, see Charles Tilly “From Mobilization to Revolution”, “Citizenship, Identity and Social History” (1996) and Harrison White “Identity and Control” (1996), “Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge” (2008).

⁶³ Brewer, p.120.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 122.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

oneself – and how one is identified by others – may vary greatly from context to context; self- and other- identification are fundamentally situational and contextual”.⁶⁶

Approaching collective identity from this point of view i.e. considering it as interchangeable and adaptive in different circumstances would strengthen the hypothesis of this thesis that European identity of Greek political elite’s might be affected from the debt crisis. Before discussing European identity, it would be helpful to devote some attention to the historical development of the idea of Europe from Ancient times.

3.3.Development of the Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the Modernity

Greek and European civilizations developed in close geographies as interacting with each other. Despite their geographical closeness, Greek and European identities have different connotations occurred in a long historical process starting from Antiquity. Even though it is widely acknowledged that origins of the modern European values -democracy, human rights, rule of law- date back to the Ancient Greece, development of the idea of Europe, which currently refers to the Western European countries, has followed a different path whereby Greece was influenced by the political, economic, and societal aspects but never experienced in the same way as other ‘European’ countries have. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, this difference of experience is visible on the ‘underdog’ culture of Greece against modernized Europe. The core-peripheral nature of relations among member states is an underlining phenomenon that can be interpreted as deviation of Greek identity from European identity in that respect.

Tracing back the historical roots of present nature of identity relations, Ancient Greek and Roman stories provide us certain evidences regarding different paths of Greek and European identities. The first idea of “Europe” and its geographical indicators found diverse connotations in various texts. While in certain

⁶⁶ Brubaker, R. and Cooper F. (2000). *Beyond ‘Identity’*, Los Angeles. California University Press, 29: pp.1–47.

storytelling even the term ‘Europe’ itself refers to the difference between Greek and European worlds, ‘Europe’ might also be used to give the same meaning for these two worlds. One of the most famous tales on the origins of the name ‘Europe’ is found in the Greek mythology.

In this tale, Zeus saw the Phoenician princess Europa and fell in love with her. Then, he disguised himself as a white bull and abducted her to the Crete Island. Zeus and Europa had three sons who would spread around the region and had mystical features as their father. Then her father sends his four sons to find Europa. In their search for Europa, these four brothers Cilix, Thasus, Phoenix, and Cadmus resettled in different land and established their own cities. For instance, Cilix finds Cilia, Thasus landed on Thassus, Phoenix found Africa and lastly Cadmus found Boetia and changed its name as Cadmia.⁶⁷

Another story told by Herodotus removes the mystery in the story. According to Herodotus, Cretan merchants abducted Europa in a ship shaped like a bull and took her to be bride for their king Asterius, since the Cretans were what later generations would come to call “Europeans,” and Europa herself an Asian woman, her abduction was taken by all Asians to be an affront.⁶⁸ As a revenge to this abduction Trojans took Helen and a huge war started between them. Later, the enmity between two continents was maintained by the successors in the following centuries. And, the name “Europe” was given to the region after the girl Europa. Therefore, in this mythology and history told by Herodotus Europe as a civilization grew from the same origin which was Asia.

In these versions of histories, for the Greeks, Europe had sometimes been only the area in which the Greeks lived, a vaguely defined region that shaded into what was once Yugoslavia in the North and is still Turkey in the South.⁶⁹ Assuming that the Europe is the area where Greek once people lived, and their civilization grew is equal with the understanding of European and Greek world as one and identical.

⁶⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, (2016). Europa. Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Europa-Greek-mythology>.

⁶⁸ Pagden, A. (2006). The idea of Europe: from antiquity to the European Union. Washington. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Furthermore, for some considerations, European world was not a peculiar and specifically designated area, indeed not considered as more important relative to other parts of the known world in the ancient times. The concept of Europe referred to the world where Greeks lived and some wider region, not even necessarily the whole continent. It is argued that European civilization has been defined as opposed to the Orient. In the first place, the name, religion and civilization of the Europe have been transferred from the Orient. Even the name Europe was belonged to an Asian woman. Geographically, it was roughly defined as the shores of the continent and partly belonged to the Mediterranean.

Besides, religion constitutes an important element of European identity. For some references of European identity, it is an indispensable part of being European. Christianity, which was considered as one of the most important features of the European civilization, advanced under the Roman Empire. When Greeks lost the Peloponnesian war, its position fell below the Latin world. The expansion of the Christendom accelerated under the Latin world while Greeks losing their place.

In addition, European world with its culture and geopolitical references was more related with the Latin Christendom than Greek Christianity. This might have a point because of the fact that association of Europe with the Christianity has been completed during the Roman Empire and under its rule. Also, narratives told and written by the historians show us the fact that European civilization did not necessarily originate from the Ancient Greece, instead it has origins in the Orient. From these arguments, it might be inferred that Greek and European worlds, do not refer to the exact same phenomenon on cultural aspects.

Virtually, the religion Christendom originated in the Asia and the prophet Jesus Christ was from the Orient. One of the arguments regarding the origins of the Christendom suggested that the rise of the religion in Europe owes its position to the rise of Islam in the Asian and African worlds. In other words, “the limits of Europe in the crucible of Christendom were set by the Muslim advance, and Christianity became the territorial identity of medieval Europe”.⁷⁰

In the writings of Aristotle, there are different connotations used for the

⁷⁰ Delanty, G. (1996). *Inventing Europe: idea, identity, reality*. Basingstoke. Macmillan.

Greek and European worlds. According to him, Greek world other than the Europe, Asia, and Libya (refers to the Africa at that time) as a distinctive world was the only one important. Apart from Greece, all other worlds were barbaric. Aristotle in his book *the Politics* divided the worlds in three categories.⁷¹ In the first world, the Greeks lived and considered as a civilized land. In the second and third world Europeans and Asians lived respectively. People who lived in these second and third worlds were seen as ‘Barbarians’ by the people who lived in the first world.⁷²

As it is a known fact that the slavery was a phenomenon in the Ancient Greece, we see the comparison of these ‘other’ worlds in terms of their position as slaves. In his reflection on the nature of kinship in *the Politics* he argued that the barbarians were more slavish than the Greeks, and Asiatic more so than Europeans.⁷³ Aristotle may be one of the rare authors of ancient times who had a certain kind of understanding on the difference between Greek and European worlds.

In the same way with Aristotle, Plato had also emphasized the same difference between the Greek world and the world of barbarians which meant all of the lands beyond the Greek world in his book *The Republic*.⁷⁴ On the other hand, there was no obvious reference to the Europe in his works.

Likewise, in the writings of Aeschylus especially in *the Persians* he referred to the confrontation between the Persians as representatives of the Asian civilizations and Greeks as a symbol of civilized lands.⁷⁵ In this book, while he genuinely described the Persians as barbarians and the ‘other’ of the civilized lands, European world did not take place as a visible concept or a geographical place. Instead, the term ‘Europe’ referred to the lands which go beyond the north of Greek lands.

After the weakening of the Greek city states as a result of the defeat in the Peloponnesian war, Alexander the Great, the Emperor of the Macedonia, fought against the Persians and spread his reign over the Greek lands. Thereby, Greek

⁷¹ Aristotle. (1998). *The Politics*. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis. Hackett Publishing.

⁷² Delanty

⁷³ Puzzo, D. A. (1964). Racism and the Western Tradition, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.25, pp.579-86.

⁷⁴ Pappas, N. (2007). *Plato and the Republic*. London. Routledge.

⁷⁵ Delanty

culture and civilization moved beyond the former territories of Greeks. The idea of Greek superiority against the “barbarians” of Europe diminished and a broader concept of Europe emerged. Europe came to refer to the area what was previously defined as Asia Minor and Greek lands. Asia remained as the focal point of Otherness for this new European world.⁷⁶ Later, the idea of Europe would be further shaped and evolved under the Roman Empire. In this process, Greece would constitute part of a broader European civilization.

Division between Orient and Occident and attachment of the idea of Europe to the Occident has occurred during the Roman Empire. After Roman Empire was divided into Eastern and Western Roman Empires, these two parts developed certain differences. The term Europe subsequently referred to the western part, on the other hand the Orient that was the Byzantine east was connoted with the notion of Empire.⁷⁷ In other words, as emphasized above, in certain literature the term Europe has referred to the same geographical place as Greek people lived in the ancient world of Greece. On the other hand, Europe might have referred to the northern lands beyond the Greek world therefore it was a different land they were talking about. Geographical connotations of the term were not clearly defined.

As to the Greek civilization constituting the core of the European civilization, it can be argued that Greeks, through their language and culture, might have affected the European civilization and became a constitutive element of it, but it is unlikely that Greek civilization was what European civilization has in its center. Europe and European civilizations were deeply affected by clashes with the Orient (Asian civilizations), been evolved under the rule of Macedonia with Alexander the Great, and mostly shaped with the Roman Empire.⁷⁸ Following statement would depict the point in more elusive way:

“Widely regarded by Greeks and Europeans alike as Europe’s foundational civilization, its history tells a very different story. Greek civilization was not foundational in the sense of having existed apart from the influence of Africa,

⁷⁶ Baldry, H. C. (1965). *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought*, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁷ Delanty, p.44

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Egypt, and the eastern Mediterranean, to which it was linked intimately. Athena was most likely neither black (Bernal 1987) nor white (Slack 2006), but brown. Greece as a civilizational foundation of a Europe set apart from Islam is also difficult to comprehend – in light of the country’s incorporation into the Ottoman empire for half a millennium”.⁷⁹

Hence, the Greek civilization was not the only civilization that the European civilization was originated from but became a constitutive element of it which will also be shaped with the impacts of the Hellenism and Roman Empires. Later in modern ages, while Europe increased its wealth through colonialism and experienced industrial revolution, Greece was a latecomer and not able to catch up with the development level that other European countries achieved by that time. Therefore, Greece was at the periphery of Europe that became synonymous with the Western European countries which was equated with modernity.

Despite different historical development processes, it would not be easy or possible to provide a clear division between Greek and European civilizations since they were evolved in interaction with each other and became interconnected in the process. Especially, the relations with the EU in the twentieth century have profound impact on Greece as a stimulator for democratization. As discussed in previous chapter, Greece was in a period of substantial changes thereby Greek identity and European identity became closer.

3.4. European Identity

Zygmunt Bauman tells the story of him getting honorary PhD from Charles University in Prague. According to the tradition when a person is getting honorary PhD, his/her national anthems play. But Bauman left his home country Poland for years ago and the government expatriated him. He still felt as outsider in his host country Britain even though he held citizenship. Therefore, he chose the European anthem to play as national anthem. He tells that in the words on European anthem he finds the essence of his identity; “alle Menschen werden Brüden [all mankind are

⁷⁹ Katzenstein, P., J., Checkel, J., T. (2009). *European Identity*, New York. Cambridge University Press, p.219.

brothers] [. . .] The image of ‘brotherhood’ is the epitome of squaring the circle: different yet same, separate yet inseparable, independent yet joined”.⁸⁰

After this short anecdote from Bauman, it seems appropriate to start with the conceptual complexity of the European identity concept. A careful examination of the literature reveals the fact that there are several European identities underlining different attributions to the term. Therefore, it appeared as necessity to shortly address these variations of the term and present the particular usage within the context of this thesis.

Extensive academic works on the European identity generally fails to “differentiate sufficiently between different understandings as depicted in ‘Europe’s identity’, ‘cultural European identity’ or ‘identity amongst Europeans’; depending on historical, political, social or normative understandings of European identity we need to acknowledge the existence of different contexts, theoretical frameworks and political realities”.⁸¹

Underlining this necessity of categorization for the concept, Walkenhorst offers five different categories of identity in the European context; historical-cultural identity, political-legal European identity, social European identity, international European identity and European post-identity commonness in his frequency content analysis study with the European Convention Documentation Centre (ECDC).⁸² In his categorization, identity models are identified according to their characteristics, purposes, concerns, course of development, and construction method of each one of them. For the sake of clarity, his categorization will constitute the framework of European identity debates covered in this chapter.

3.4.1. Historical Cultural European Identity

Historical cultural European identity emphasizes the common history of the Europeans. According to this model, common historical consciousness is primary

⁸⁰ Bauman, p. 10.

⁸¹ Walkenhorst, p.3.

⁸² Walkenhorst,

aspect of being European. It assumes that even before the nation states there was continental unity in which European folks have produced the common traditions.

In the political arena of the European integration, a well-known representative of this model was Czech President Vaclav Havel. He attributes the common values of the Europe to “its historical roots in classical antiquity and Christianity”. He also emphasizes the historicity of the common values currently represented by the EU, that “Europe further developed these values during the course of the Renaissance, the Humanist movement, and the Enlightenment, which led in turn to the development of democracy, the recognition of fundamental and human rights, and the rule of law”.⁸³

This model is the mostly embraced identification of Europe among citizens as a culturally defined entity. As it was demonstrated in an important study by Michael Bruter regarding the relevance of European civic and cultural identities, there is visible difference between people’s perception of belonging to a culturally defined non-territorial European identity and an identity represented by a political institution i.e. the EU.⁸⁴ In his work, Bruter observes that people with certain degree of “nationalist European identity” are primarily inclined to think of Europe in terms of cultural aspects when they were asked to choose between “a civic component that makes people identify with the European Union as a significant ‘superstate’ identity, and a cultural component that makes people identify with Europe in general as an area of shared civilization and heritage”.⁸⁵

On the other hand, characterization of Europe through culture, civilization, history and heritage was scrutinized from different points. As one of these points, Bo Strath problematizes the culturally and historically underlined European identity. Starting point of criticisms of this notion is that “identity becomes a problem when there is no identity, particularly in situation of crisis and turbulence, when

⁸³ Eurit.it. (2018). *A CHARTER OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY*. [online] Available at: <http://www.eurit.it/Eurplace/diba/citta/cartaci.html> [Accessed 27 Mar. 2018].

⁸⁴ Bruter, M. (2005). *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.

⁸⁵ Bruter, p.114.

established ties of social cohesion are eroding or breaking down”.⁸⁶ In the case of Europe, the turbulent time causing the search for an identity was the late twentieth century. Global context of the late twentieth century, marked by the breakdown of Bretton Woods system triggered by the disagreements between USA and European counterparts over the Vietnam War and the Oil Crisis (1973), prompted the European decision makers to design the European identity concept in 1973 European Commission Summit at Copenhagen.

Continental triggering factors were also vital that “idea of Europe became, historically and sociologically, a political idea and mobilizing metaphor at the end of the twentieth century, particularly in the wake of 1989” through stressing particular characteristics as a “distinctive cultural entity united by shared values, culture and identity”.⁸⁷ Collapse of the Iron Curtain unveiled a geography of fear and vagueness which would put Western democracies in a challenging test to cope with.⁸⁸ States that came to existence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and searching for a place in the ‘new world order’ put a heavy burden on Western European countries.

Also, return of the nationalism, ethnocentrism and racism which were meant to be diminished ghosts of the continent over half a century ago in the newly reunified Germany and other European states that experienced the same developments against immigrants.⁸⁹ Moreover crisis driven Balkan region was only another problem area demanding solution from Europe. Therefore, a European identity that would provide required cohesion for the continent was a deliberative political choice. As it was also mentioned in the section on historical roots of the idea of Europe, this particular European identity refers to the common legacy of the European nations. For instance, the constituting components of the European civilization, which are “Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, and the ideas of Enlightenment, Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy”, are common to the

⁸⁶ Stråth, B. (2002). A European Identity. *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol.5, No.4, p.387.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Delanty,

⁸⁹ Geary, P. (2003). *The Myth of Nations: Medieval Origins of Europe*. Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, pp.11-23.

European countries.⁹⁰

The problem with historically-culturally defined European identity is that it is being depicted as having reached its limits. Strath argues that this kind of identity should be seen as a “historical concept which played a crucial role during a difficult phase of European integration between 1970s and the 1990s”.⁹¹ New conceptualization should be based on a more Universalist (less Eurocentric) and less culturally chauvinistic feelings.

3.4.2. Political-Legal European Identity

Political-legal European identity model is the opposite of the historical-cultural identity model. Its emphasis is on the “democratic values and practices, such as constitutionalism, republicanism, citizenship, civicness, representation and participation” rather than ethnicity or culture based shared values as claimed by the historical-cultural model. As it was expressed by one of its prominent authors, Jürgen Habermas: “Our task is less to assure ourselves of the common origins in the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidence commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of twenty-first century” (Habermas, 1992).⁹² Hence, it is suggested that the EU shall encompass an identity model which underlines equality and rule of law from liberal tradition as the main components.

As it was mentioned above, this model is basically what Bruter calls as the civic (political) identity built on the political representations of the EU (i.e. democracy, human rights, rule of law, market economy). Political identity of Europe is notably meaningful among the European elites. For the public side, it can be argued that there is a correspondence between the EU’s self-representation as a political entity and the image of the EU in the eyes of European citizens. In annually

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Strath, p. 390

⁹² Habermas, J. (1992). Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe, *Praxis International*, Vol.12, pp. 1-19 as cited in Walkenhorst, H. (2009). *The Conceptual Spectrum of European Identity: From Missing Link to Unnecessary Evil*, Vol.3.

conducted Eurobarometer surveys it is observed that people have positive attitudes towards the political image of the EU. There is regularity on the polls regarding people's opinion on the meaning of the EU as "freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the EU" (49%), euro (35%) and peace (27%).⁹³

3.4.3. Social European Identity

Social European identity model provides alternatives for the first two models at the points that trigger the arguments on lack of legitimacy due to the technocratic nature of the EU institutions where most of the decisions are taken and exclusion of minority and migrants living in member states since they belong to the "other" cultures rather than "core", "civilized" and Christian European culture. It underlines the socialization and collectivization processes that help to create a 'cross-national solidarity', 'non-hierarchical social framework', 'ever closer union', and 'people's Europe' in the EU, henceforth it would lead to weaken the lack of legitimacy allegations grounded on the elite driven nature of the EU integration and large competence fields of the EU institutions. This model of identity does not have an extensive place on the EU policies apart from occasional usage by the pro-integrationists.

Previous parts on the social and collective identities are mostly relevant to this variant of identity grounded on sociological tradition of the European integration studies. Identities of the masses are mainly studied within this context. While considering European identity in terms of identity of masses, description by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, two prominent authors in the field of European identity, would be highly relevant:

"Identities refer to shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. They consist also of collective beliefs about the definition of the

⁹³ European Commission (2015). *Standard Eurobarometer 83- Spring 2015- "Public opinion in the European Union"*. Standard Eurobarometer 83. [online] Brussels: European Commission, pp.90-92. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_publ_en.pdf [Accessed 16 Apr. 2018].

group and its membership that are shared by most group members. We understand identities to be revealed by social practices as well as by political attitudes, shaped by social and geographical structures and national contexts”.⁹⁴

Thomas Risse’s works on the dimensions of Europeanization of identities need special attention in the study of European identity. In contrast to conventional understanding of uniform collective identity that a polity needs, Risse reads the Eurobarometer data in a more optimistic way to present Europeanization of different identities i.e. national and local identities. In his study with the opinion polls between 1992-2004 to get the level of identification with Europe, he states that even though extensive identification only with Europe is low, around 70 percent of people define themselves as proud Europeans. Also, above the 50 % of European citizens adopt the European identity, which they consider the synonym of the EU, as their second identity.⁹⁵ According to him, “there is little in the data to suggest that the EU suffers from a fundamental legitimacy problem because of a lack of identification with it”.⁹⁶ Instead of that, he concludes that data are sufficient for the legitimization of the EU as a political entity.

Moreover, he suggests that the so called “core” elements, such as common language and existence of public spheres for a uniform identity, appear in different forms in the case of the EU. In this respect, public spheres are Europeanized wherever the EU issues are discussed. That is, European public sphere occurs even in the national debates in which affairs of Europe are incrementally politicized. Also, increasing communication among people through technological tools especially with the social media would be considered as a substitute for the common language instrument since they both provide necessary communication on public sphere. Furthermore, Risse shed light on another crucial interpretation of the “amount” of the identity needed for the EU:

“the complaints about the lack of a European demos are largely exaggerated. A European polity that the European peoples consider legitimate does not

⁹⁴ Katzenstein & Checkel, p.4.

⁹⁵ Risse-Kappen, T. (2010). *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, New York. Cornell University Press, p.8.

⁹⁶ Risse-Kappen, p. 227.

require a strong sense of collective identification. Multiple identities suffice, as long as the European project respects the heterogeneity and diversity of local as well as national communities”.⁹⁷

Widening the way in which we think about collective identity in the case of Europe, this interpretation may provide us with more comprehensible understanding of European identity. To explain it with Risse’s words, “the European polity does not require a demos that replace national with European identities, but one in which national and European identities coexist”.⁹⁸ Indeed, he believes that even the small amount of identification with Europe would be sufficient to legitimate the EU and to gain support among citizens.

In his understanding of collective identity in the case of the EU, “even a low degree of identification with Europe correlates with rather high support levels for EU membership, perceived benefits from EU membership and support for faster European integration”.⁹⁹ His argumentation is also supported by certain group of scholars who work on the social-psychological perspective of European identity. Emanuele Castano and Vincent Yzerbyt’s study, conducted with Belgians and Italians on the assumed positive relation between level of identification with Europe and allocation of decision-making power to the EU on the national, regional and European levels, reveals that there are “no negative correlation between the three levels of identification”.¹⁰⁰

On other hand, Risse draws attention to the delicate nature of European identity as only a secondary identity.¹⁰¹ He argues that this kind of identity is not strong enough to hold on to when it faces with a severe crisis. A community would need stronger solidarity among people to overcome a bad crisis. It is necessary to

⁹⁷ Risse-Kappen, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Risse-Kappen, p. 182.

⁹⁹ Risse-Kappen, p. 179.

¹⁰⁰ Castano, E., & Yzerbyt, V. (1997). Building a European identity. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/2550/>

¹⁰¹ For further information regarding different forms of collective identity that might appear along the national identities i.e. European identity, see Risse-Kappen, T. (2010). *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Lawlor, E. (1992). “Affective Attachments to Nested Groups”. Brewer, M. B. (1993). “Social Identity, Distinctiveness, and In-Group Homogeneity”. “Multiple Identities and Identity Transition”. Diez Medrano, J. and Gutierrez, P. (2001). “Nested Identities: National and European Identity in Spain”.

highlight this warning since it provides a reference point for the broader framework of the thesis.

Building on Karl Deutsch's understanding on the evolution of the sense of *nation*, Neil Fligstein focuses on the mostly Europeanized strata (middle and upper-middle) of society, another prominent author who produces influential works in the field of Europeanization of identities. His works also needs special attention since it is directly related to the main argumentation of the thesis. According to Deutsch, to which Fligstein also refers:

“Group identities are based on commonly held meanings and values and they require face-to-face interaction with other members of the group in order to come into existence and persist. National identity is a peculiar kind of identity that implies that a group pf people decide on some bases of pre-existing solidarities to express its collective identity in the context of creating a state to enforce rules to preserve that identity”.¹⁰²

Therefore, Fligstein concludes that regularity of social interaction among groups would eventually lead to the existence of certain level of *sameness*. In other words, he describes the Europeans being among those people “who have the opportunity and inclination to travel to other countries, speak other languages, and routinely interact with people in other societies in the Europe-wide economic, social, and political fields”.¹⁰³

Like Risse, Fligstein also worked with the Eurobarometer data but from different angels. Fligstein's study with Eurobarometer data from 2004 draws attention to the socio-economic dimension of the integration process. In his study of *Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* he underlines the correlation between self-interest and level of identification with Europe.¹⁰⁴ According to him, “the more a citizen stands to gain economically from EU integration, the more he or she identifies with Europe”.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, he indicates that integration process created winners and losers. While former refers to the people

¹⁰² Deutsch, K. W. 1966 (1953). *Nationalism and Social Communication*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT.

¹⁰³ Fligstein, N. (2008). *Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*. New York, Oxford University Press, p. 126.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Davis Cross, M. (2012). *Identity Politics and European Integration*. *Comparative Politics*, Vol.44, No.2, p.234.

who have “greatly” and “partially” benefitted, latter refers to people who are damaged.¹⁰⁶ In his words: “these groups map closely onto conventional measures of social class such that the upper-middle class are the most European, the middle classes are more national, but still partly European, and the working and lower classes are the least European”.¹⁰⁷

He observes that people who have certain degree of identification with Europe are inclined to work in high paid jobs. That is, these people are “amongst the dominant material beneficiaries of European economic integration”.¹⁰⁸ They have their own businesses, work as professionals in their fields and mostly in manager positions of firms. Also, identification level is higher among people who are “male, young, left wing or educated” and lower among those who are “less educated, female, or right-wing”.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, he adds that people who hold certain degree of European identity and also have economic well-being have the most mobility in society. That is, cross-border connections take place among these people who are “government officials, businessmen, educators, and researchers”.¹¹⁰ Hence, “people who interact most across borders are more likely to feel European”¹¹¹. The same logic applies to the opposite side. Citizens who do not actively participate “in European trade and associational life have become increasingly national in their orientation and wary of the idea of Europe because they see the EU as a threat to national sovereignty”.¹¹²

Fligstein draws attention to the complicated nature of relations between “identity”, “interest”, and “interaction”. He underlines the relation between European identity, functioning market and constantly evolving integration process. Well-functioning market economy that provides benefit for wide range of people would create more Europeans in the end. Since people who have the opportunity to travel in

¹⁰⁶ David Cross, p. 239.

¹⁰⁷ Fligstein, p.18.

¹⁰⁸ Fligstein, p. 126.

¹⁰⁹ Fligstein, p. 145.

¹¹⁰ David Cross, p. 239.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² David Cross, p. 240.

the market area for business, trade, etc. would interact with more people from other nations. Therefore, their identification would substantially deploy another dimension of identity.

At that point he brings the concept “situational Europeans” into the use. He uses this notion for people who “sometimes think of themselves as Europeans” depending on the circumstances.¹¹³ Their preferences mostly depend on their personal and national interests. If a certain problem or policy area is better resolved or enhanced at the EU level, their preferences would incline towards European level. This thesis might reinterpret this argument from backward for argumentation. If a particular problem (i.e. being unable to sustain repayment of debts in the Greek case) creates more troubles than solutions searched on the European level, in this “situation” we might expect a change on people’s Europeanness.

In line with Fligstein’s approach to the Europeanized identities, Adrian Favell also asserts that only a small percentage of elite, what he called Eurostars, would be considered as “the Europeans”. According to Favell, Eurostars are those “professional, skilled, and educated people who circulate in the European knowledge economy locating and relocating between the various “Eurocities,” that is, London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Amsterdam, Brussels, and others”.¹¹⁴ However, Eurostars are not the business professionals or political elite as in Fligstein’s understanding. These people do not belong to the upper class rather they are from the middle classes of the society. They have mobility as Fligstein’s elites, not for business related reasons but because of their life style. In that respect, Eurostars can be referred as:

“Individuals who live their lives in a post-integration Europe. They often have ability or desire to be flexible in where they work. Typically, they have been exposed to different European countries at a young age, often through educational exchange or growing up in multinational families. Some have an innate sense of adventure, risk, or curiosity that drives them to live in various Eurocities. Others feel that a transnational romance is reason enough to move or want to enrich their own lives by internationalizing themselves. Interestingly, they do not see themselves as expats. They do not even like to

¹¹³ Fligstein, N. (2009). Who are the Europeans and How Does This Matter for Politics? In: J. Checkel And P. Katzenstein, ed., *European Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.81.

¹¹⁴ Risse, p. 48.

describe themselves as migrants. They self-define as European”.¹¹⁵

Following dialogue between Favell and an interviewer is worth to mention here;

Adrian: *Do you ever think of yourself as a migrant?*
Alan: *Not really [laughs]. I think of myself more as an alien than a migrant ... [pause]*”¹¹⁶

“Adrian: *Do you ever think of yourselves as migrants?*

Carmen: [long pause] *No.*

Franz: *We are Europeans.*

Adrian: *How would you describe yourself? What term should I use in my book to describe people like you?*

Franz: *Europeans.*

Adrian: *You are not expats?*

Franz: *No.*

Carmen: [emphatically] *No!*

Adrian: *Some people use this word.*

Franz: *No, no, no.*

Adrian: *Free movers?*

Franz: *I just say: Europeans.*¹¹⁷

Favell acknowledges that Eurostars compose a small percentage of people (around 2 percent) in European societies. On the other hand, their impact is beyond the number as “they are not the only ones transforming their lives, but the populations they inhabit are also changing, creating new and interesting dynamics”.¹¹⁸ Hence, we might conclude that existence of a European collective identity among masses is visible even with a small proportion.

Besides, Favell draws attention to the sustainability of the life form that Eurostars have chosen. In his interviews he has conducted over years with the same people (Eurostars), he observes that when Eurostars decided to settle for reasons such as having a baby, buying an apartment, or seeking a permanent job, they confront difficulties. For instance, national social security and care systems, which remained under the competence of nation states, force them to go back to their home

¹¹⁵ Favell, A. (2008). *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe*. Oxford. Blackwell Publishing. p.103.

¹¹⁶ Favell, p. 101.

¹¹⁷ Favell, p. 103.

¹¹⁸ Favell, p. 244.

country reminding where their actual home is. Also, immobile pension systems create future anxiety since they generally work in temporary jobs for short periods of time. Admittedly, the most vital concern arises from xenophobia through their integration process of settled lives. When they decided to settle and buy home, their economic status only allow them to settle in countryside where nationalism prevails at most. Then, their lives turn in a difficult phase as their levels of interaction rise. In the end, it might end with returning to home for “attaining any sort of decent quality of life”.¹¹⁹

The authors and their works focusing on the societal aspect of European identity which are covered in this part are affirmative of the existence of a European identity among citizens. Even though they are cautious about the nature of identity that citizens hold which is highly dependent on the well-functioning of the market in the Union and economic benefits citizens gain from the integration process, the possible impact of these people and their life styles on the evolution of European identity should not be ignored. Also, data, especially in Risse’s work, show the undeniable existence of European identity not only among the main beneficiaries of the market like Eastern and Southern European countries where to be European is a matter of modernization or regaining their place in the post-communist era.¹²⁰

3.4.4. European Post-Identity Commonness

In this model of European identity, exclusivity of adopting a certain type of identity was problematized. It suggests that the EU is better in adopting a model which enables the coexistence of different cultures in European society. ‘Multiculturalism’, ‘cosmopolitan-communitarianism’, ‘supranationalism’, ‘unity in diversity’, ‘multi-identitism’, ‘utilitarian and civic identity’ and ‘European multicultural identity’ are the mostly used concepts in this context. This model has very limited place in the political discourse of the EU, rather it is deployed while describing the relations with the ‘other’ of Europe (i.e. to describe the relations with

¹¹⁹ Favell, p. 169.

¹²⁰ Risse, p.200.

Turkey). On the other hand, citizens' increasing identification with the notions that the EU represents such as "internal diversity", coexistence of various life styles and tolerance for different opinions and values emphasizes future possibilities for European identity.¹²¹

David M. Green and Neil Fligstein's works in this area are worth mentioning. As discussed above Fligstein claims that the Europeanization of identities happens on the upper—middle class level among people who are well-educated, professionals, and have economic well-being. More importantly, these people have tendency to hold left wing ideology and cosmopolitan views for the Europe that they attach themselves.¹²²

Green has conducted substantial work on the nature of European identity in his studies which mainly focused on the "declaration of being European", "the variance in the levels of declared European identity", "nature and content of European identity", and "the depth of European identification".¹²³ Green describes the nature of European identity as "a trend away from a rather emotional attachment towards forms of identity "built on cognitive calculations dispassionately assessing that which best serves the welfare of Europeans, based on the universalism of their shared interests".¹²⁴ Therefore, he underlines that European identity would develop rather differently than national identities.

Diversity appears as a main theme in the formation of European identity. Coexistence of different identities is only possible with "trumps of diversity, multiculturalism, and tolerance... over every other notion of the meaning of European identity".¹²⁵ In Green's argument, approaching identity from different

¹²¹ Kaelble, M. (2009). Identification with Europe and Politicization of the EU since the 1980s. In: Katzenstein, P., J., Checkel, J., T. (2009). *European Identity*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p.81.

¹²² Fligstein, p. 145.

¹²³ Krossa, A. S. & Green, D. M. (2007). *The Europeans: Political Identity in an Emerging Polity*. Boulder, COL: Lynne Rienner. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, [S.l.], Vol. 4, n.1, pp. 61-62, mar. 2008. ISSN 1815-347X. Available at: <<https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/98>>. Date accessed: 15 May 2018.

¹²⁴ Green, D. (2007). *The Europeans: Political Identity in an Emerging Polity*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. p.150.

¹²⁵ Green, p. 128.

conceptual frameworks, for instance from post-modern perspective, would lead to think about “Europe today neither as an anomaly among identities nor as an example of typical identity development in its early evolutionary stages”.¹²⁶

According to Green, key characteristics of the developing post-modern collective identity would be its being “compatible with diversity and multiplicity”¹²⁷ and “built and maintained on a set of normative civic values, rather than on essentializing or ‘primordial’ characteristics, or as contradictions against an ‘Other’ of some sort”.¹²⁸ Lastly, he reminds that formation of identities is based on the principle of *quid pro quo*. Therefore, developing an encompassing collective identity which enables the existence of diversified cultures would have high probability to succeed.

3.4.5. International European Identity

The model of international European identity differs from other models on its exclusion from any kind of identity formation processes either on political or social levels. It deals with the international image of the Union. Adopting a narrowly defined identity for Europe is instrumental only for providing a coherent model on the international level. In this respect, the introduction of the European identity is considered as an effort to create a uniform image for the Union. Two documents, which lay the foundation for the European identity - ‘Document on European Identity’ (1973) and Maastricht Treaty provisions of European identity -, serve to this purpose. That is, deploying an external European identity would be advantageous when forming a coherent image on these policy areas. Its identity aspect is only visible on “homogenization solely as occurring at the structural, policy and elite level with the aim of enhancing international recognition”.¹²⁹

At the end, it can be seen that these different usages of European identity

¹²⁶ Green, p. 153.

¹²⁷ Krossa, p. 62.

¹²⁸ Green, p. 158.

¹²⁹ Walkenhorst, p.15.

underpin certain characteristics of being European. For some of them, European identity is taken in an instrumental sense to better serve the common interests of member states i.e. economic benefits through integration or as a leverage in international politics. It can also be utilized to provide coherence within the Union, so that more effective management will be ensured in the integration process. Moreover, it might provide solutions to the challenges that the continent is experiencing i.e. rising radicalism, xenophobia, and populism. On the other hand, European identity might occur among people as a natural result of the integration process. Constant interaction and increasing mobility throughout the country might provide the necessary stimuli for creation of a collective European identity.

The Greek political elite's European identity is similar to that of social European identity in the sense that political elite are those who constantly interact with their counterparts at the EU level. Therefore, they might acquire European identity through these interactions faster than other strata of societies. It is also a political identity that is shaped through the institutions of the EU. Moreover, being member of the EU – describing oneself as European through this membership – provides leverage in international arena especially in national foreign policy issues. In Greece's case, some of these issue areas are Cyprus issue, and bilateral relations with Macedonia and Turkey. In fact, the political elite can easily utilize common history and culture to state their Europeanness when they need. Above all, member states substantially benefit from economic advantages of the EU, i.e. single market. Starting from the membership processes, member states empower their economies to reach an ideal stance within the Union. As a paradigm of modernity and development, being European brings tremendous advantages for actors. Hence, European identity can be analyzed from all of these aspects depending on the context.

In line with this discussion on the nature of European identity, it would be helpful to touch upon the European elite identity. Elites have played prominent roles in the directions that the EU has taken from the beginning. Therefore, elite identity is an important indicator of the European identity. In a sense, degree of Europeanness among the elite would have an impact on society through their policy actions.

3.5. European Elite Identity

Considering the elite notion in the EU is a problematic issue in a wide range of issue areas i.e. exercising democracy in the Union, development of integration process as an elite-driven project. As it is clearly stated by Victor Olivieri, studying elite identity is commonly established on the general acceptance that “some individuals and actors (including elite, state and EU institutions) have greater power to affect the discourse of identity” and these actors are assumed to have “very strong effects in the formation of European identity at the aggregate level, especially in appropriating symbols and critical junctures or inflection points in the formation (or demise) of European identity”.¹³⁰ Moreover, it is widely argued and to certain extent agreed that evolution of European identity reflects what is called as the “top-down” nation-building process. In this sense, any discussion of European identity would not be complete if it does not include the elites of Europe. As Giessen emphasizes:

“The idea of Europe has principally been the ideology of intellectuals and the political class. As such it has tended to be a counter-revolutionary ideology of the elites, those groups who claim to be the representatives of society. It is in their language that the idea of Europe has been codified. Intellectuals generally play a leading role in the shaping and codification of collective identities”¹³¹

There is a rich literature focusing on the political elites’ role on identity formation. In this literature, use of the identity in terms of “prescriptive representations of political actors themselves and of their relationships to each other” is widely acknowledged.¹³² That is, national identity is reflected through the representations of political elites. On the other hand, it is suggested that political elites have also important roles on the formation of national identities.¹³³ In this sense, it is crucial for state elites to achieve a consensus on the national narrative of

¹³⁰ Olivieri, M. V. (2014). *The Trajectory and Political Implications of European Identity*. In: Radeljic, B., ed., *Debating European Identity: Bright Ideas, Dim Prospects*, 1st ed. Bern: Peter Lang AG, p.203.

¹³¹ Delanty,

¹³² Fearon, J. D. (1999). What Is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)? Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1–43.

¹³³ Flistein, p. 132.

identity. After they achieve this national narrative, they are required to make people believe they belong to the same “homogenous group”. The duty of delivering this nationalism among society belongs to the political elites.¹³⁴

In the process of a national identity formation it is relatively obvious for political elites to promote such process. However, if a collective identity formation is the matter of national sovereignty like in the case of the EU which has potential of eventually evolving to a federal state with fellow Europeans, political elites might not show willingness to promote this kind of identity. According to Gellner, “if state elites do not back a nationalist collective identity – or indeed, oppose it – then the possibility of its success is not very good”.¹³⁵ In addition to that, if we take into consideration the fact that people’s preferences are reflected on the decisions of political elites in democratic states, then we might assume that willingness among citizens to hold a secondary identity will be a determinant factor on national elites on their decisions to promote European identity.

At that point, political identity, which has been discussed above, becomes more relevant since, the state elites’ actions eventually affect and, in the end, reflect the political identity. Therefore, without considering the political identity within which governmental elites’ preferences are constructed, it would not be possible to make inferences regarding elites’ role on identity changes. Juan Diez Medrano suggests that political identity is a multidimensional phenomenon:

“There is the political self-understanding reflected in the documents that shape a polity (e.g. treaties, laws, decrees). There is also the political self-understanding reflected in the actual behavior of those interpreting and implementing the content of those documents. Finally, there is the political self-understanding that transpires in public discourse”.¹³⁶

The first dimension Medrano refers is the one that described in the above section regarding the political identity of the EU. This section in particular and the thesis in general are concerned with the last dimension of political identity, the one

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press.

¹³⁶ Medrano, J. (2009). *The Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity*. In: Katzenstein, P., J., Checkel, J., T. (2009). *European Identity*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p.81.

that is reflected in discourses of political elites. Medrano used two databases that compiled content analyses on the newspapers of eight-member states (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Poland). He argues that “there is currently an unbridgeable mismatch between the national leaders’ conceptions of the EU and those of a significant minority of citizens and, at the same time, a strong disagreement among the elites about Europe’s political identity”.¹³⁷ Medrano argues that citizens have more ethnically and culturally defined attitude towards the EU in contrast to elite’s description. This ‘mismatch’ is what Medrano refers in the first place. He further underlines the different attitudes of political elites regarding the architecture of the EU in terms of its institutions and transfer of sovereignty from nation states to the EU level during the integration process.

The most relevant part of Medrano’s research for this thesis is where he reveals the elite’s attitudes towards the EU. In his analysis, Medrano reveals that the EU is characterized in terms of economic prosperity and as a political entity by political elites in public discourses. Data from content analysis shows that 20 percent of the statements “portrays the EU as a big market, needed for competition in a global economy and consequential for economic growth, inflation, and unemployment”.¹³⁸

Likewise, political elites are prone to refer to the EU with the notions of democracy, rights, and citizenship. The EU as a democratic political entity that represents a politico-cultural model and an economic community prevails the religious and ethnical characterizations. Medrano’s results only differ in Poland where ethno-religious connotations of the EU surpass the democratic or economic descriptions.

Furthermore, another important contribution is provided by Holly Case in her analysis of East and West axis of European identity. She provides a detailed process of Europeanization processes of both Western and Eastern European countries. For the former, Europeanization acts as a release from the dark history of the continent

¹³⁷ Medrano, p. 82.

¹³⁸ Medrano, p. 94.

where two devastating World Wars took place. For the latter, it is again a matter of salvation but from a different history i.e. communist heritage of the USSR. In general, Case claims that widely agreed “East” and “West” opposition might be more complicated than expected when we take into consideration the fact that “structural similarities in the way European identity has been formulated by invested national elites in both “halves” of Europe”.¹³⁹ Also, Case argues that realization of national interests in the course of European integration is another common feature of national elites in both axis of Europe. In other words, she restates the fact that national elites associate with the EU in the course of achieving national goals since the EU “enables states to feel they are gaining power, national unification, and territorial expansion”.¹⁴⁰

After skimming through the literature on European identity and its usage within this thesis, it might provide a better understanding to look at the instruments which make the EU “real” in peoples’ eyes. Nation states employ special markers like anthem, flag, or even geographical maps to symbolize their unity. These markers are instrumental in the sense that they remind people of their national identities. Therefore, explaining EU’s identity markers would be important to comprehend the relation between the Euro crisis and the European identity.

3.6. Making the EU Real: EU’s Symbols of Identity

As an example of collective identity, the EU also needs certain identity markers that will make it “real” in the eyes of people. It is widely acknowledged that “for identification with the EU to occur, the EU must be perceived as a real entity”.¹⁴¹ Creation of the people's Europe with the “symbols, history and invented

¹³⁹ Case, H. (2009). Being European: East and West. In: Katzenstein, P., J., Checkel, J., T. (2009). European Identity, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p.131.

¹⁴⁰ David Cross, p. 237.

¹⁴¹ Castano, E. (2004). European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective. In: R. Hermann, T. Risse and M. Brewer, ed., Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham. Rowman and Littlefield, p.53.

traditions” resembles the ‘imagined communities’” notion from Anderson.¹⁴² Anderson emphasizes that for a community to become visible among its people needs to remind itself through certain symbolic markers. In addition, Shore (2000), who focused on the anthropology of European identity and culture, suggests “to look more closely at the way Europe is being constructed as a symbolic and political entity - and therefore as a more knowable and governable space”.¹⁴³ Even though Hobsbawm states this need for Europe in the aftermath of the World War I as “dramatically transformed social groups, environments and social contexts called for new devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity and to structure social relations”, this depiction still applies for the current European politics.¹⁴⁴

Therefore, nation-states constitute a profound example at that point with its special mechanisms that help to create a sense of unity among its citizens. Risse makes lists of these identity markers; “the national flag, the national anthem, the currency, passports, and particular national holidays to commemorate extraordinary moments in nations history”.¹⁴⁵ He also adds the grand historical narratives that would make people believe in their common roots. For instance, Schengenland serves as a functional mechanism in terms of removing borders and inside/outside (us/other) division. Also, Eurozone has the similar role with Schengenland since changing currency while travelling is a constant reminder of being outside the home country. In this sense, Schengenland and Eurozone are two vital identity markers of the EU.

Furthermore, European citizenship is another identity marker of the EU, which plays crucial role in the enhancement of European identity among citizens. Each individual who is a national of one of member state holds a second passport stating that this person is a European citizen. European citizenship and Euro have the widest coverage among other identity markers, therefore they need to be handled in a

¹⁴² Anderson, Benedict (1983), *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso.

¹⁴³ Shore, C. (2000). *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. London. Routledge. p.4.

¹⁴⁴ Hobsbawm, E. (1983), *Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914*, in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1983. p.263 .

¹⁴⁵ Risse, p.56.

separate section.

3.6.1. Euro as Identity Marker of the EU

If you open a website to learn about a country you are curious about, currency appears on the top of that websites along with the information like geographical location, flag, population, system of government, etc. If you are planning trips abroad, among first things you are looking for is the currency of that country you wish to visit. Euro represents the similar image for the EU. Even the images on Euro coins and banknotes show the “unifying representation of Europe and diverse national identities”.¹⁴⁶

Risse asserts the role of Euro played in the EU as follows:

“the introduction of Euro bills and coins has already begun to affect Euroland citizens' identification with the EU and Europe in general. The Euro makes Europe real and reifies it as a political order, since it provides a visible link from Brussels to the daily lives of the citizens. On the other hand, existing collective identities pertaining to the nation- state explain to a large degree how comfortable people feel using and dealing with the Euro”.¹⁴⁷

Risse further draws parallels with different identity patterns among member states to their enthusiasm for adopting Euro as their currency. For instance, Britain having considerable Euroscepticism abstains from switching to Euro. Even though it is not the only condition for Europeanization of identities, it can be clearly proclaimed that “the euro makes the EU more visible and increases its ‘psychological existence’ as an imagined community”.¹⁴⁸ On this basis, it can be argued that “the experience of the single currency has given an empirical support to the idea that people coordinate and behave on the basis of common ways of thinking when there

¹⁴⁶ Montanari, A. (2013). Representation of Identity: Euro and Dollar as Identity Builders. In Moro, G. (2013). *The Single Currency and European Citizenship: Unveiling the Other Side of the Coin*. New York. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. p.142.

¹⁴⁷ Risse, T. (2003). The Euro between national and European identity, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.10, No.4, p.487.

¹⁴⁸ Risse, T. (2013). Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Euro and Europeanization of Collective Identities. In Moro, G. (2013). *The Single Currency and European Citizenship: Unveiling the Other Side of the Coin*. New York. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. p.118.

are common linkages in the reality that they refer to”, which is the single currency.¹⁴⁹

Besides, for the recent sovereign debt crisis Risse appreciates the importance of framing euro as an “issue of common European concern in the various public spheres” since it would “contribute positively to increased identification with Europe and the EU”.¹⁵⁰ In this reasoning, crisis of an identity symbol would require solutions from the community it represents. Therefore, Eurozone crisis is basically a European identity crisis as well.

3.6.2. European Citizenship

European citizenship filled an important gap in the integration process. When European identity first introduced in Copenhagen Summit (1973) with the Declaration on European Identity, it was considered “to be the missing ingredient that could reinvigorate European integration by eliciting people’s interests in and support for European affair”.¹⁵¹ In this course, establishing a legal framework that people can resonate with European identity was an instrumental choice. Kostakopoulou contends that “the establishment of common European rights would bring ‘European Union close to its citizens’ and create a feeling of identification with the Union as a whole, in order to make ‘a people’s Europe’ a reality”.¹⁵² Having a passport which is definitely a state ‘thing’ is expected to lead a close connection with the Union.

Even though European citizenship has developed through the entire process of the European integration, the usage of the European citizenship term in the treaties and other documents of the Union started with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Seven years later, when the Nice Treaty was signed in 2000, European citizenship

¹⁴⁹ Piana, D. (2013). The Unintended “Litmus Test”: The Euro as a Factor of Center-Formation, Trust Enhancement, and Identity Building. In Moro, G. (2013). *The Single Currency and European Citizenship: Unveiling the Other Side of the Coin*. New York. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. p.109.

¹⁵⁰ Risse, p.121.

¹⁵¹ Kostakopoulou, D. (2014). Political Alchemies, Identity Games and the Sovereign Debt Instability. In: Radeljic, B., ed., *Debating European Identity: Bright Ideas, Dim Prospects*, 1st ed. Bern: Peter Lang AG, pp.167-190.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

reaffirmed in another treaty of the Union. Despite these positive initiatives, the status of the citizenship still remained an ambivalent issue among member states. In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, it was clearly stated that the European citizenship has only a supplementary role rather than a replacement of the national citizenship. European citizenship is defined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as follows:

“In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it”.¹⁵³

The rights stem from this citizenship are listed as:

- “move and take up residence anywhere in the EU;
- vote and stand in local government and European Parliament elections in their country of residence;
- diplomatic and consular protection outside the EU from the authorities of any EU country if their country of nationality is not represented;
- petition the European Parliament and appeal to the European Ombudsman;
- address the European institutions in any of its official languages and to receive a reply in the same language;
- non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, gender, race, religion, handicap, age or sexual orientation;
- invite the Commission to submit a legislative proposal (citizens' initiative);
- access EU institutions' and bodies' documents, subject to certain conditions”.¹⁵⁴

Even though stronger European citizenship has been envisaged by subsequent European officials to the extent of ‘subordination of national citizenship’¹⁵⁵, any tendency or move to this end was not observed by now.

Moving on now to the conceptual development of the term in literature, the notion of European citizenship has a wide coverage as far as relationship with the identity is concerned. The citizenship is a decisive indicator of the European

¹⁵³ Lisbon-treaty.org. (2018). *Article 9*. [online] Available at: <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-2-provisions-on-democratic-principles/77-article-9.html> [Accessed 5 Jun. 2018].

¹⁵⁴ Eur-lex.europa.eu. (2018). *Glossary of summaries - EUR-Lex*. [online] Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/citizenship.html> [Accessed 5 Jun. 2018].

¹⁵⁵ Kostakopoulou, p. 174.

collective identity. Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski emphasizes the close relation between the type of citizenship promoted by a polity and collective identity established in that polity.¹⁵⁶ Different models of citizenship may convey various collective identities. Karolewski depicts three models of citizenship; republican model of citizenship, liberal tradition of citizenship, and caesarean citizenship model. Republican model of citizenship is mainly derived from Aristotelian idea of citizen in which citizens have obligations and duties in their corresponding democratic communities; thereby they achieve decent and good lives. In liberal tradition of citizenship, established in the works of John Locke and David Hume, interests of individual compose the essence model. Citizens' 'rights' to achieve their individual interests are the primary concern.

In Caesarean citizenship model, which has its roots in the Thomas Hobbes's philosophy, citizenship and state relation are defined on the basis of security concerns of individuals. Protection against enemies is the incentive for citizens to accept the authority of state. In this sense, ensuring the survival of its citizens needs effective political decision from political entity. Therefore, as long as the state sustains danger-free environment for its citizens through effective means, its presence would last.

For these three categorizations of citizenship models, Karolewski suggests that each one of them would necessitate different degrees of bonds in their corresponding communities to exist.¹⁵⁷ Liberal model can be formed within a weak collective identity. However, caesarean model exists in homogeneous communities rather than multicultural ones. Likewise, republican model of citizenship would be formed in the existence of strong and resilient collective identities.

Furthermore, regarding these different models of citizenships that exist in different cases, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski suggests that European citizenship is a hybrid model of citizenship consisting of a mixture of the caesarean citizenship and liberal model of citizenship.¹⁵⁸ According to him, European model of citizenship has originated from caesarean model of citizenship. In his explanation, after the World

¹⁵⁶ Karolewski, I. and Kaina, V. (2006). *European identity; Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights*. Berlin. Lit. pp.44-52.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

War II, France and Germany have transferred some of their sovereignty to an international organization, thereby establishing a mechanism to create an environment in which the war is difficult to occur. In the following years, effectiveness of the European integration project under the dual leadership of France and Germany has caused approval of their authority among the peoples of Europe as an example of *permissive consensus*.

In the process of making the consensus possible, Eastern bloc has played a crucial role as being the major threat to the political and economic model of the Western Europe. The perceived external threat to their life style leads to effortless creation of *permissive consensus*. The role of integration in this context is better explained in Alan S. Milward's words: "integration was not the supersession of the nation state by another form of governance as the nation state became incapable but was the creation of the European nation states themselves for their own purpose, an act of national will".¹⁵⁹ In this respect, European citizenship that was occurred in the integration process resembles caesarian (Hobbesian) model of citizenship under the shadow of communist threat.

After having examined the European identity from various aspects, it is vital to explain how this thesis conceptualizes "identity change". As mentioned, constructivism acknowledges identity change. Identity change is also covered in the European identity literature. Therefore, referring this literature would better demonstrate how change has occurred in European identity.

3.7.Identity Change

As emphasized above, identity is considered as changeable within the framework of this thesis. Since identity change constitutes an essential part of this thesis, it would be a necessity to touch upon the possibilities and circumstances of changes taking place in social identities. The literature covered so far, mostly derived from constructivist approaches, allows for changes occurring in a certain period of time with the impact of social forces. Among different branches of social sciences

¹⁵⁹ Karolewski, I. and Kaina, V., p.18.

that study identity, sociology regards identity change a possibility whereas psychology disregards it. Also, there is general acknowledgement of constantly changing identity in post-modern approaches where the emphasis is put on discourse and identification.

As mentioned above, most of the European identity literature acknowledges the existence of a European identity but only as a secondary or weak identity for very small percent of people around Europe.¹⁶⁰ Starting from this assumption, Risse further argues that “weak collective identities change more frequently and adjust to changes in interests and circumstances more often than strong feelings of loyalty to a community”.¹⁶¹ He adds that in the case of having strong feelings for something (an idea, a family, partner, etc.) there needs to be huge amount of effort to change the feeling reverse. Risse applies the same reasoning to the social identities. Hence, a weak or secondary European identity would not endure when faced with a severe crisis.¹⁶² It is possible to make the similar argument for the Greek debt crisis. As will be analyzed in the next chapter, debt crisis has an impact on the level of Greek state elite’s identification with Europe.

Furthermore, the way identity change might occur is relevant as well since it would help determine the specific time periods (how long it takes for change to settle) and variables (does a specific event/happening constitute an impact on identity). According to sociology and social psychology literature, “we should distinguish between at least two types of identity change, namely gradual and incremental transformation, on the one hand, and rapid and radical change on the other”.¹⁶³

Firstly, incremental transition was advocated by neofunctionalism for European integration process. According to Ernst Haas, identity change would take place through the integration process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political

¹⁶⁰ See Works from Risse, Fligstein, Katzenstein, Checkel, Fawell

¹⁶¹ Risse-Kappen, p. 31.

¹⁶² Risse-Kappen,

¹⁶³ Risse-Kappen, p. 31.

activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation states".¹⁶⁴ This process is called as *socialization*. In this approach it is proclaimed that interaction with a particular group on a regular basis would lead to a high level of identification with that group.

As seen in the works of Risse, Fligstein, and Fawell, identification with Europe is more common among those who benefit from integration process (limitless mobility beyond the national borders, removal of trade barriers, job opportunities in other countries, etc.) at most through their frequent interaction. It is also true for the state and political elites of national governments since they constantly interact with the EU institutions.¹⁶⁵ They might even acquire a new sense of identity and interest as a result of this process. Therefore, their identity comes into terms with the European identity as a result of this process. It would be reflected in domestic politics where they would promote more pro-European policy decisions.

Furthermore, identity change might also reveal itself as an act of rational choice. Checkel mentions about two main arguments that try to explain incentives for compliance. The one is based on the constructivist arguments emphasizing the role of social learning, interaction and identity change at the end of socialization process as mentioned above. The other one is formed on the rationalist arguments underlining the role of cost-benefit analyses of individuals. According to the second approach, agents comply with the institutions to the extent that their material gains coincide with those of the institutions. There is still room for interaction in this argument, but the nature of that interaction is different than constructivists. That is, "interaction that leads to compliance is again understood as strategic exchange among egoistic, self-interested actors" and these actors are inclined to "make choices on the basis of cost/benefit calculations".¹⁶⁶ After that, Checkel reminds the fact that we need to consider the social context in which agents are taking decisions in order to fully comprehend the nature of their decision. They might appear to take decisions

¹⁶⁴ Haas, E. (1961). *International Integration: The European and the Universal Process*. *International Organization*, Vol.15, No.3, p.366.

¹⁶⁵ Fligstein, 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Checkel, J. (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization*, Vol.55, No.3, pp.553-588.

based on rational calculations but even in that case social contexts still matter. Checkel mentions that slow changes occurred in the interests of agents even in their instrumental interactions.¹⁶⁷

Secondly, there is always possibility of a severe crisis that might cause the identity to lean on a certain direction. Risse restates the positions of scholars, who agree on the rapid changes of identity, that “in specific historical moments, even deeply held beliefs and convictions can undergo profound and fast transformations”.¹⁶⁸ He further develops this argument on Europeanization processes of Germany, Spain, France, Poland, and Britain. Germany’s ‘critical juncture’ was the World War II, while for Spain and Poland it was an urgent concern for ‘returning to Europe’ and democracy. In the case of France, ‘critical juncture’ was the unification of Germany which would challenge the position of France in Europe.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, bringing French identity to the European line was a matter of survival for French elites. However, Britain constitutes a distant example as regularly staying outside of the integration process.

Furthermore, the recent Eurozone crisis revealed a notable aspect of European identity. Kostakopoulou restates a common expectation that identities would be proliferated in times of crisis which “requires sacrifices on the part of some members for the interest of the whole; after all, identification with a polity, be it at national or a European level, is meant to elicit popular support”.¹⁷⁰ It was not possible see this “we-feeling” neither among the Greeks who stand on the losing side nor on the Germans who were expected to help their “fellow” Europeans.

At that point, Kostakopoulou’s explanation would provide an important insight that “the sovereign debt crisis makes notions of national or European identity less relevant it also shows that ‘Europeanness’ may have very little to offer in particular settings which require concrete measures, imaginative solutions and

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Risse-Kappen, 2010, p. 32

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Kostakopoulou, p. 183.

credible policy ideas”.¹⁷¹ In this conjuncture, calling for mobilization of collective identities would not have a response on the public side. Therefore, Kostakopoulou concludes that identity change cannot be observable during the recent debt crisis.

On the other hand, this explanation fails to note that the Greek political elite have been exposed to constant ineffective negotiations with their European counterparts. Outcome of these negotiations were almost always further measures that the Greek government has to take despite massive public outrage. Thus, constant exposure to this negative experience has had an impact on the Greek political elite which would indirectly affect the society through policy choices in the long run.

In conclusion, European identity is a complex concept that has different connotations in different contexts. It can be defined as a cultural identity as well as a political identity. It might not only refer to a small percent of society that define themselves only as European but also to a larger community of states that aim to attain their interests because they are part of this community. The political elite play an important role in the sense that they both reflect the attitudes of their societies and hold a power to change these attitudes. This study will reveal the causal relationship between the Greek debt crisis and identity change.

¹⁷¹ Kostakopoulou, p. 184.

CHAPTER 4

THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS

The Greek debt crisis has several underlying causes and multiple outcomes in definite ranges. It is a widely argued premise that “crisis are transformative; they offer both an opportunity for growth and a risk of deterioration”, and from 2009 onwards “Greece is facing a crisis on multiple fronts as it is undergoing a deep economic and financial crisis, and, much more importantly, it is undergoing probably the deepest and most fundamental political, institutional, and societal crisis since the restoration of democracy in the mid-1970s”.¹⁷² In this respect, figuring out the crisis with its roots and progress would help us infer the prospective identity changes at the end.

In this chapter, political and economic dynamics of the crisis are going to be analyzed. In doing so, a periodization will be made. As such the covered period will be first divided into two: pre and post crisis periods. Then, sub phases of the crisis will be covered with an eye on differing attitudes of the Greek political elite. These dynamics are: the socio-political structure of Greece, which create suitable environment for ‘vicious cycles of troubles’ in the history of the country, and systemic relations among the EU member states. That is, modernization and Europeanization processes of Greece in the road to the EU membership, and center periphery relations among EU member states will detailed as creating the suitable environment for the crisis circles in Greece. Lastly, the development of the crisis in which these dynamics become more visible will be examined in detail.

In this regard, firstly, the 20th century political developments in Greece will

¹⁷² Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., & Kouki, H., p.21.

be addressed as the current situation has several similarities with that era. Therefore, it would be essential to mention factors of the crisis emerged at that time period and development of the Greece and EU relations. Secondly, modernization and Europeanization linkage in the case of EU membership processes will be discussed.

Later, core-periphery relations and the impact of the EU membership on Greece will be touched upon. Hence, both current position of Greece among the member states of the EU and the 2008 Greek Debt Crisis be better understood. In the last part of the chapter, 2008 Greek Debt Crisis will be examined in detail.

4.1. 20th Century Developments in Greek Political Life

In this section, recent Greek political history will be covered since it is crucial to develop a historical understanding to have a better grasp of today's world. Looking through the history would provide us with certain answers for making sense of today. Based on this logic, in the third part of the chapter, a short summary of the 20th century developments in the Greek political life should be included. In Greek case, this is particularly true since it is argued by some authors that crisis which Greece is dealing now is not a new phenomenon but rather part of a continuation of crisis circles which took place in the 20th century Greece. In other words, as Takis Pappas explained that Greece's political history looks like a pendulum that swings, slowly and heavily, between deep spirals of crisis and periods of relative normalcy.¹⁷³ Therefore, without examining at those circles of crisis and their reason no analysis of the 2008 crisis would be complete.

Indeed, it is suggested that these circles of crisis in Greek political history is strongly connected with the modernization process. Greece modernization process became possible with the restoration of democracy in “1974 that a number

¹⁷³ Pappas, T. (2017). Greece's current modernisation failure, Greek history's déjà vu, Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, p.18.

of significant changes brought the country towards the long-desired path to modernization”.¹⁷⁴ According to Pappas, ‘modernization’ as an achieved situation of “steady socioeconomic progress based on, and propelled by, legitimate liberal democratic institutions” has confronted with several obstacles in Greek case.¹⁷⁵ There were factors which underlined these circles of crisis in Greek modernization process such as economic crisis, lack of democratic institutions and culture, and geography of the country.¹⁷⁶ In her way of modernization, Greece has shown particular development in her democracy, democratic institutions, and economy for a certain period of time. After these processes of development, a circle of crisis hit the country. Even the country manages to get over the crisis, in the next era of normalization and development, Greece had to deal with the problems caused by the previous term’s troubles.

These circles started to hit the country a few decades after Greece became independent from the Ottoman rule. The country went into bankruptcy in 1893 and it lasted until 1910. During this first crisis, country’s public financial sector was controlled by the International Financial Control until 1936. This crisis is accelerated by the war between Greeks and Turks in 1912 with the new loans borrowed to cover the war expenses. Alongside the economic instability, political life of the country was not stable until the 1910 election when Eleftherios Venizelos won the elections. This relatively stable time in the history of the country lasted until 1935. Developments such as the friction between Venizelist and Anti-Venizelist groups, Asia Minor disaster as a result of the Greco-Turkish war in 1922 and lasting effects of it led the country towards the second spiral of crisis starting in 1935.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., & Kouki, H., p.11.

¹⁷⁵ Pappas, p.19.

¹⁷⁶ Diamandouros, P. N. (2013). Postscript: Cultural Dualism Revisited. pp.208-232. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., & Kouki, H. (2013). *The Greek Crisis and European Modernity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁷⁷ Pappas,

The rivalry between Venizelist and Anti-Venizelist groups has resulted in the latter evolving to an authoritarian rule under Ioannis Metaxas until 1940 when German occupation of the country started. When Nazis were defeated in 1944, it was not an end of the dark ages for Greece. Instead, a civil war that would last until 1949 was spreading through the country. It caused “enormous human and material damage to the country”.¹⁷⁸ When the civil war finally ended, establishment of the political stability in the country was not completed until 1952 when Alexander Papagos who were a former marshal won a landslide victory.¹⁷⁹

One important phenomenon of the post-civil war period was that the urgency of civil-war-related problems and the inability of a divided and paralyzed government to handle the domestic situation effectively led Greek politicians to allow the United States a significant presence in Greek internal affairs.¹⁸⁰ With the Truman Doctrine (declared on 12 March 1947), the US started to get involved in European and Greek affairs. Greece benefited large share of the Marshall Plan, “proclaimed in June 1947, was \$1.7 billion in economic aid (loans and grants) and \$1.3 billion in military aid between 1947 and the 1960s”.¹⁸¹ American aid helped Greece in its reconstruction after the civil-war.

Papagos’ regime, which marked the end of the civil war period, was known for its position against communist ideas and support for the rapid economic development. For certain period of stability and economic growth in the country, another wave of political crisis has resulted in turmoil in the country’s political life. When Papagos died in 1955, Constantine Karamanlis became the leader of the Right in Greece. At that time, a new rivalry emerged with the rise of George Papandreou who was the founder of the Center Party and representative of both Venizelists and conservatives. Papandreou’s successful attacks against the government born the fruits in 1961 and 1964 elections, so that “the post-Civil Was

¹⁷⁸ Kalyvas, S. N. (2015). *Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford. Oxford University Press, p.115.

¹⁷⁹ Pappas,

¹⁸⁰ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T. (2010). *Modern Greece*. Malden, MA. Wiley-Blackwell, p.127.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

status quo” started to be challenged.¹⁸²

Period after the elections was not as peaceful as one would have expected. Papandreou’s regime could not succeed to stop the polarization and social dissatisfaction among people. Also, independence of Cyprus under the guardianship of Turkey, Britain, and Greece was considered as a foreign policy failure in domestic circles, which caused the acceleration of turmoil in the country.¹⁸³ As a result, the King interfered, and Papandreou’s government fell. With the fall of the government, political instability grew once again. During that time, Greece witnessed “a severe political crisis known as the July events (Louliana), replete with demonstrations and riots”.¹⁸⁴ In the year 1967, military junta took over the control in the country.

Military dictatorship ruled the country until 1974 when they tried to annex Cyprus through a coup d’état. The attempt was not successful and resulted in the partition of the island. With this failure military regime withdrew and Constantine Karamanlis was recalled from exile to establish democracy in the country once again. In this context, “social and political emancipation became significant concerns of the 1970s, once the old specter of the civil war had faded and the incubus of the junta removed, and the rising expectations of the Greek public that had been stifled by the military regime on the political front surfaced with increased vigor”.¹⁸⁵

Democratic consolidation has accelerated during Karamanlis’s second term in the government. Economic recovery took place, democratic institutions were empowered, and maybe the most important development that took place in that period was strengthening relations with the European Economic Community (EEC), which would result with the full membership in 1981.¹⁸⁶ There was a

¹⁸² Kalyvas, p.107.

¹⁸³ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T. p.131.

¹⁸⁴ Kalyvas, p.108.

¹⁸⁵ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T. p.158.

¹⁸⁶ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T.

general belief that Greece would now finally fulfill its original goal of becoming a truly modern European country by combining a dynamic and prosperous economy with stable and liberal democratic institutions.¹⁸⁷

The period between 1974 and 1981 and political developments took place during that time are crucial for our understanding of today's domestic politics of Greece. Since two significant parties that led the most of the 2008 Greek Debt Crisis, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND), were formed. New Democracy founded by the Constantine Karamanlis on the heritage of National Radical Union (ERE) and won the elections in 1974. As mentioned already, ND and Karamanlis have played vital role for the restoration of democracy in the country. On the other side of the conundrum, after the death of George Papandreou, his son Andreas Papandreou returned to the Greece from the US where he had to escape during World War II. After he returned, he founded the PASOK which would win the 1981 elections when Greece became member of the EEC.¹⁸⁸ PASOK era was a crucial turning point in the modernization process of the country since it has been “mostly governed by western-oriented elites that drew their inspiration more from the values of the Enlightenment, emphasizing individual effort and favoring the competitiveness inherent in the function of free markets”.¹⁸⁹

Greece's EEC membership process took place under the impact of the Cold War. Constantine Karamanlis who was the initiator of the process saw the EEC as an opportunity to consolidate democracy; therefore, he made the political move. From the EEC's perspective, the decision to admit Greece was also primarily motivated by political concerns. For the EEC, the motivation to accept Greece as a member was the same with their rationale when they admitted Spain and Portugal, preventing the spread of communism in the new born democracies.

¹⁸⁷ Kalyvas, p.118.

¹⁸⁸ Kalyvas,

¹⁸⁹ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T. p.162.

On the other hand, it was not odd to accept a country which was considered as part of the European civilization from early times. Therefore, it was painless to justify the acceptance of Greece in spite of all its shortcomings, both in political and economic respects. As it was figuratively and genuinely put in words Greece's membership of the community is "fitting repayment by the Europe of today of the cultural and political debt that we all owe to a Greek heritage almost three thousand years old."¹⁹⁰

The twentieth century history of Greece witnessed turbulent times because of world wars, civil wars, and political, social and economic instability. EEC membership served as a stabilizer for these unstable conditions of the country. Transformation of the country to a modern and developed state was associated with being a member of the EEC at that time. In fact, there was a strong belief that modernization was actually "catching up with Europe, or more specifically, 'catching up with the EU', just as EU membership is essentially perceived as representing the accomplishment of modernity and the formal confirmation of 'being' European".¹⁹¹

4.2. Modernization of Greece through the Europeanization

Many scholars relate the Greek debt crisis with the incomplete process of modernization. According to them, the crisis erupted in Greece due to the fact that country has failed to modernize enough. Europeanization is considered as a vital aspect of this as a true path to modernization. Popular wisdom regarding the interconnectedness of modernization and Europeanization leads us to consider these two phenomena together. In this regard, as the crisis escalates, the questions that dominate the public sphere as pointing the root causes were about the Europeanization and modernization level of Greece: "whether and to what extend

¹⁹⁰ Kalyvas, p.126.

¹⁹¹ Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki, p.16.

Greece has Europeanized or modernized enough”, or, more aptly, “why it has not Europeanized or modernized enough”, and “what are the factors that have defined its ‘resistance’ to ‘more’ Europe, or more of a ‘particular kind of Europe’”.¹⁹²

Likewise, the EU was perceived as a convenient tool to achieve a well-functioning democracy and economy which Greece was aiming to achieve for a long period of time. Europeanization as synonym of modernization was a charming pull factor for the country, which would ensure the “organic Greek presence in the West”.¹⁹³ Therefore, it is understandable that Greece was willing to take part in the European institutions to modernize the country and gain international reputation.

According to Calliope Sponau, Europe, as the immediate geopolitical environment of Greece shaped by history and intentional political choice, i.e. EU- and Euro-membership, came to define modernity as it represents at the same time a challenge and a driver of modernization.¹⁹⁴ In other words, in the case of Greece, Europeanization as taking part in the European institutions which came with certain constrains in politics and economic management were considered as modernization of Greece. The following words of Konstantinos Karamanlis better explain the status of Greece in the EU:

“In the mid-seventies, Konstantinos Karamanlis was asked if Greek Society was ready to be in the European Economic Community (EEC). He said something that describes the history of modernization in Greece till 2010. ‘I’ll throw them into the sea and they will be forced to swim’. He didn’t ask, he didn’t consider, he didn’t examine the possibility that this society might not adapt as smoothly expected or as rapidly as he thought was needed. He decided, and he did it”.¹⁹⁵

The EU and the constrains it imposed on its membership candidates provided stimuli to modernization of these countries. Membership processes in

¹⁹² Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki, p.17.

¹⁹³ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T. p.158.

¹⁹⁴ Sponau, C. (2017) *Modernization: The End of External Constraint Approach?* Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, p.23.

¹⁹⁵ Mandralevis, P. (2017) ‘Discussion’, *Greece: Modernisation and Europe 20 years on*, Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, p.95.

which the candidates have to fulfill the conditionality is a crucial pathway for Europeanization of the candidate countries. Europeanization often refers to the process in which differences between candidate countries and EU countries cease to exist. Therefore, it is assumed that there are two different political cultures existed among member states. One of these cultures is behind the other in modernization level. In this context, the relation between Greece and Europe was described as “the cultural dualism that was deeply entrenched in post-1974 (post-dictatorship) Greece as a tug of war between an ‘underdog’ and a modernizing political culture” by Nikiforos Diamandouros in the early 1990s.¹⁹⁶ This dualism is essential to understand the current nature of bilateral relations.

The former of the two cultures is a “pre-democratic, nationalist, defensive culture, favoring clientelistic networks of power, bearing a strong imprint of the Orthodox Church, phobic of the Western world view, and rather ambivalent towards capitalism and its market forces”, the latter – described in a more favorable light – is “inspired by European Enlightenment, promotes rationalization in society and politics along the lines of liberalism, secularism, democracy, and free-market economics, and privileges the exercise of power through modern political parties”.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, the modernization process of the candidate countries includes establishing modern nation states with its institutions and administration principles as in the Western countries.

Notwithstanding, practicing Western modernization in Greece and in other underdog cultures is challenging because of the traditionalist, closed, and inward-looking nature of these societies.¹⁹⁸ Since the other side of the relation represent the total opposite characteristics of the former, their relation in the European Union has always been problematic. Hence, the integration of these countries to the EU has reflected this difference in various aspects. This thesis assumes that this structural discrepancy is one of the immediate causes of the 2008 Greek Debt Crisis. Further

¹⁹⁶ Diamandouros, N. P. (1994). *Cultural dualism and political change in postauthoritarian Greece*. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.

¹⁹⁷ Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki, p.3.

¹⁹⁸ Diamandouros in Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki, p.8.

explanations regarding the crisis will be detailed in the following sections of this chapter.

4.3. The Impact of the EU Membership on Greece

As it was discussed in the previous part, in the process of the EU membership, candidate countries are required to adopt certain changes which will enable them to catch up with the ‘developed’ European nations. As far as the Greek case is concerned, the work of Panayotis C. Ioakimidis is relevant. According to him, Europeanization means “that the imperatives, logic and norms of the EU become intrinsically absorbed into domestic policy, to the extent that the distinction between European and domestic policy requirements progressively ceases to exist”.¹⁹⁹

Ioakimidis defines EU’s position among its member states in terms of Gramscian hegemony. According to him, Europeanization resembles modernization and dependency theories with respect to its attempts to explain the demarcations drawn in the member countries. In other words, “Europeanization has been asynchronic (involving a dualistic system of modern, Europeanized elites clashing with Helleno-centric, traditional opponents) and autarkic (with elites seeking to subsume EU impacts under a traditional clientelistic culture)”.²⁰⁰ Therefore, three premises were suggested regarding the impact of the EU on its member states in the context of Gramscian hegemony, and modernization and dependency theories. As first of these premises, due to lack of coordination, distinct nature of different EU institutions, and contested administrative attitudes, it is difficult to provide consistency among member states. Therefore, it is vital to draw the boundaries of this sui generis system.

¹⁹⁹ Ioakimidis, P. and Kazakos, P. (1994). Greece and EC membership evaluated. London. Pinter. In Kevin Featherstone (1998) ‘Europeanization’ and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s, South European Society and Politics, Vol.3, No.1, p24.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

Secondly, one of the explicit features of the relations among the EU member states is core-periphery relations. It is mostly apparent in the integration process. Membership process of highly divergent peripheral candidate countries -in terms of their status in the modernization process- puts extra burden on their shoulders. The last and maybe the most relevant premise is the hegemonic nature of the EU's position on Greece and other countries resembling the case of Greece. The reason of the EU being a hegemon in terms of Gramscian understanding has shown itself in a number of different cases. These are:

“the narrowing of the domestic agenda; the importation of previously alien policy philosophies; and the inculcation of a ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’; external penetration of the state administration; dependence (on EU aid and market regulation); fragmentation (elite cultural divisions in the response to EU impacts); and a differentiated executive empowerment (a core executive dominance over EU implementation, separated between distinct policy sectors)”.²⁰¹

That is to say, the EU imposed this same prescription to Greece and other peripheral countries without considering domestic distinctiveness of each country from a “top-down” perspective. The peripheral countries with their relatively weak political and economic structures struggled to fully adopt their structures to these changes. However, once they started to adopt to these changes through Europeanization, then they would be embedded within the EU. In fact, it is argued that “states do not exist outside the European Union” at that point.²⁰²

Furthermore, among these various effects of the EU on the member states political economy stands as the field on which 2008 Greek Debt Crisis was built upon. Kevin Featherstone lists the impacts of the EU in this field as following; “a monetary and fiscal strait-jacket, a penetrated state administration, power to the market, imported policy philosophies, core executive dominance, and fragmentation effect”.²⁰³

²⁰¹ Featherstone, K. (1998). ‘Europeanization’ and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.3, No.1, pp. 23-39.

²⁰² Featherstone, K. & Radelli, C. M. (ed) (2003). *The Politics of Europeanization*. New York. Oxford Publishing. p.173.

²⁰³ Featherstone, 1998.

First of all, a single monetary and fiscal policy among all member states who are also member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) does not give space for the states to maneuver in this domestic area.²⁰⁴ All member states have to comply with the rules established by the EU institutions. For instance, convergence criteria to join the Eurozone make it necessary for Greece to have price stability as an indicator of the controlled inflation, strong and durable public finance, limited government borrowing and national debt, stable exchange rate mechanism for at least two years without severe deviations, and stable long-term interest rates.²⁰⁵ These extensive constraints in almost all areas of monetary and fiscal policies cause the problems which cannot be overcome without considering the peculiar circumstances of Greece and other member states in the same position.

Secondly, integration process has two inevitable results as the inclusion of the EU in the state administration and making member states dependent on the aid provided by the EU. This situation is problematized on the basis that “the adoption of EU regulations that are out-of-step with long-standing domestic orientations can impose heavy adjustment costs [...] and be politically costly for governments”.²⁰⁶ That is, in the Greek case, the European Commission intervened in several domestic issues from cutting government expenditures to the infrastructure projects. As a result of the Commission’s becoming part of the state administration, decentralization of the governance was an accepted phenomenon in member states. Thanks to that, many German, French, and British firms are able to take part in tenders initiated in Greece. Moreover, dependency on the EU funds was another result of the ‘penetrated state administration’²⁰⁷ in Greece. During the integration process, Greece started to benefit from cohesion funds and was able to invest in various areas such as transportation and agriculture which otherwise could not get

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ European Commission - European Commission. (2018). *Convergence criteria for joining*. [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-criteria-joining_en [Accessed 8 Feb. 2018].

²⁰⁶ Kassim, H. (2003). Meeting the Demands of EU Membership: The Europeanization of National Administrative Systems. In Featherstone, K. & Radelli, C. M. (ed) (2003). *The Politics of Europeanization*. New York. Oxford Publishing. p.84.

²⁰⁷ Featherstone, 1998.

enough investment.

Thirdly, EU membership has provided great deal of opportunity for the market forces. That is, aids provided by the EU were conditioned to be spent on the private enterprises, thereby empowering the market economy in the country. At some point, EU obligations on strengthening of the market led to privatization of energy and telecommunication sector which were indisputably considered as being under the government control. As one would expect from these developments, foreign investments were also flourished. Market friendly policies promoted with the help of the EU encouraged the foreign investors to invest in the country.

Fourthly, what Featherstone implies with the imported policy philosophies with regard to management of economy in the same way with core states of the EU, is that Greece only became *agency* in the implementation of the decisions taken On the EU level since it has not enough power to initiate a policy with its weak and dependent economy. This was the case during the negotiations of the EMU on the issues such as whether or not the EU has right to impose sanctions on member states when necessary. Even though Greece was opposed to this provision, it was not enough to make change for a country which is on the periphery of the Union.

On the other hand, according to Featherstone, Greek governments had some positive gain from this *agency* role in domestic politics. They could lie back to the EU when a policy pursued by a government was not popular among the public. For instance, when farmers started to protest in 1996, Simitis' government was able to stand against them thanks to the EU obligations previously accepted by the Greek government. Furthermore, another 'imports' from the EU are mostly related with the single market such as deregulation which was totally alien to the domestic economic culture. With the Maastricht Treaty, these imports became easy to adopt in the periphery countries.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

Fifthly, the term ‘core executive’²⁰⁹ used by Featherstone but developed by Rhodes and Dunleavy, meaning the privileged position of the political elites who run the government is vital to understand the decision-making process in the member states and the Union. The member states which are in the periphery of the EU, do not have a determining role in the decision-making process as it has been touched upon before. They only take part in implementation part of the decision. Furthermore, other domestic actors do not take part in the decision-making process and do not have any possibility to reach that information. Therefore, this difference in terms of the interaction with the EU gives political elite of Greece an opportunity to enjoy a privileged position.

Lastly, fragmentation of the society concerning the European affairs is a well-known phenomenon among the member states. As it is stated by Ioakimidis, in the Greek case, “Greek public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of deeper integration into the EU, but sections of society are better informed of, and more willing to internalize, EU demands than others”.²¹⁰ The paramount example on this can be seen in the change of attitude of the PASOK. When the party was founded by Andreas Papandreou, it had an anti-Europe rhetoric. This rhetoric has changed over the time. When they came to power, “PASOK gradually tempered its agenda and adopted moderate policies”.²¹¹ During the 1990s the programs of Costas Simitis, Theo Pangalos, Yiannos Papandoniou and Vasso Papandreou in the governing PASOK party were largely occupied with constant references to the obligations of EU membership.²¹² In other words, political elites who have been in constant interaction with the EU institutions were more informed on the EU issues and more pro-European than those who were not.

²⁰⁹ Rhodes, R. and P. Dunleavy. (1995). *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive*, London. Macmillan. Cited in Kevin Featherstone (1998) ‘Europeanization’ and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.3, No.1, pp.23-39.

²¹⁰ Ioakimidis, P. (1996). Contradictions between policy and performance, in Kevin Featherstone (1998). ‘Europeanization’ and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s, *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.3, No.1, p.35.

²¹¹ Kalyvas, p.132.

²¹² Ioakimidis,

Hence, all these impacts of the EU membership, as called Europeanization by some and modernization by others on Greece and other periphery countries are contradictive. These changes the country has undergone as a part of the Europeanization process from the beginning of the membership have affected Greece in terms of losing sovereignty to other more influential member states as it occurred in the decision-making process of the Union, implementation of one-size-fits-all economic decisions which do not consider the domestic natures of the country's political economy and favoring clientelistic relations among the political elites in the member states.

Even though Greek modernization was highly affected from its interaction with European modernization at different points of history, 'Europe' remained as a target for the country. This perception of Europe as a goal/target became more visible with Greece's entrance to the Eurozone. It was described by Yannis Papandoniou, who was the Greek Finance Minister at that time, as "an historic day that would place Greece firmly at the heart of Europe".²¹³ This stance was similar to that of K. Karamanlis who were describing the EEC membership of Greece as affirmation of "organic presence in the West".²¹⁴ Expectation was incredibly high among politicians. For instance, Costas Simitis was revealing his excitement with these words; "we all know that our inclusion in EMU (European Monetary Union) ensures for us greater stability and opens up new horizons".²¹⁵

This negligence among the Greek political elite is properly described as "hubris"²¹⁶ which is an old Greek word meaning "exaggerated pride or self-confidence".²¹⁷ Although the risks to enter in single currency with a weak economic

²¹³ Polychroniou, C. (2011). An unblinking glance at a national catastrophe and the potential dissolution of the Eurozone: Greece's debt crisis in context. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Retrieved from <http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6425943.pdf>.

²¹⁴ Koliopoulos, G. and Veremēs, T. p.158.

²¹⁵ Polychroniou,

²¹⁶ Manolopoulos, J. (2011). Greece's 'Odious' Debt: The Looting of the Hellenic Republic by the Euro, the Political Elite and the Investment Community. New York. Anthem Press. p.20.

²¹⁷ Merriam-webster.com. (2018). Definition of HUBRIS. [online] Available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hubris> [Accessed 18 Jun. 2018].

status were widely argued by economists, Greek political elites were mainly concerned with their “public relations campaign on convincing the citizenry of the great historical opportunity provided by joining the Eurozone”.²¹⁸

4.4. Economic Outlook of Greece before the Crisis

Economic outlook of Greece was promising at the beginning of the 2008 Crisis. Global parameters indicated economic growth and prosperity. For instance, “an average real GDP growth rate of close to 4 percent had led to a per capita GDP of \$32,100 (Purchasing Power Parity, PPP), bringing Greece into the exclusive club of the forty richest nations on earth” (ELSTAT data).²¹⁹ Moreover, maybe more profound was that “Greece ranked 26th globally on the Human Development Index (HDI), which combines indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income” (ELSTAT data).²²⁰ Also, living standards are on the rise, the percentage of population who has second housing was increasing, fertility rates was decreasing, the percentage of people living in the urban was raising, and life expectancy was much longer than before. In short, Greece was enjoying a prosperous time.

On the contrary to these positive developments, Greece was lacking public trust to the institutions and politicians, and there was constant unemployment rate which directly targeted the country’s youth. Moreover, corruption and the lack of a feasible economic model were other dangers which Greek economy was dealing with. In fact, the Greek economy was not resembling the economy of developed countries in the sense that it still “significantly reliant on tourism, shipping, agriculture, and then later, real estate”.²²¹ Additionally, Eurozone membership

²¹⁸ Polychroniou,

²¹⁹ ELSTAT data, <http://m.euro2day.gr/1250650/article.aspx>. in Kalyvas, S. N. (2015). *Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford University Press).

²²⁰ Kalyvas, p.153.

²²¹ Manolopoulos, p.16.

paved the way for the foreign capital to invest in Greece, thereby the economic growth of the country was highly dependent on the domestic consumption rather than long term production investments, which would cause permanent damages in the economy.²²²

Furthermore, serious economic problems listed as: “structural weakness”, “market by low competitiveness”, “an inefficient infrastructure”, “a rigid labor market”, “limited productive capacity”, “several financially unsustainable public-sector companies”, and “an ineffective and often inefficient public-sector administration” were creating convenient environment for economic troubles.²²³ Due to these problems Greece’s economy was not satisfactory to join the Eurozone when it was accepted. In this line, it is argued that when Greece entered into Eurozone, it did not “even qualify as ‘emerging’ market” instead it was “categorized as ‘developed world’”.²²⁴

In addition to that, in the import and export equilibrium, import was growing faster and outperforming the export. As mentioned above, energy and transportation sectors were privatized during the process of Europeanization. Due to this fact, there was lack of competition in these areas and low quality of service. Likewise, country was behind the other countries in the Union in fields of education, research and development, and transparent public sectors. In short, there were two images of Greece before the crisis broke out in 2008. On the one hand, country was enjoying the prosperous moment in her history. On the other hand, it had institutions which shared profound similarities with the Third World countries.

In the year 2001, Greece joins the Eurozone and converges the drachma to Euro. However, as it became clear later that the country disguises its financial overlook to meet the Eurozone criteria. In actual fact, its budget deficit was above the 3 percent. Also, the debt level of the country was much higher than the 100 percent of the GDP. It is subsequently made public that U.S. investment bank

²²² Kalyvas,

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ Manolopoulos, p.18.

Goldman Sachs helped Greece conceal part of its debt in 2001 through complex credit-swap transactions.²²⁵ This reality was overlooked by both sides for the next few years. Truth about the economy was revealed as it was made public that the fiscal status was fabricated to join Eurozone with the help of the Goldman Sachs. When Eurostat announced in October 2004 that the Greek budget deficit was 4,1% of output in 2000, 3,7% in 2001 and 2002, and 4,6% in 2003, these figures were in complete contrast with the figures reported by Greece and Eurostat in March 2004 which were 2,0% for 2000, 1,4% in 2001 and 2002, and 1,7% in 2003.²²⁶

Thus far, the historical portrait of the country in the twentieth century, transformation process experienced through the Europeanization, and the final economic outlook before the crisis were detailed in this chapter. Based on this information, it is argued that Greece's economic and political structure differentiates from those of other developed countries of the EU. This differentiation can be considered within the context of unfinished modernization of the country in the European course. Reminding that EEC membership was perceived as a way to survive the turmoil in which the country was struggling throughout the twentieth century, it can be asserted that the European course was highly relevant for Greece. Given the fact that economic and administrative structures of member states are embedded in EU institutions, it is expected that the Greek political elite would seek solutions at the European level. However, it does not necessarily mean that this European course is an irreversible phenomenon. Until now, the EU has meant prestige in international arena providing the title of "European state" and economic prosperity for Greece. However, the debt crisis incredibly changed this image of the EU. Eventually, this would have repercussions on the Greek side on their understanding of being European. After giving background information, looking through the evolution of the crisis would be more comprehensible.

²²⁵ Council on Foreign Relations,

²²⁶ Gavazza, A., & Lizzeri, A. (2009). Transparency and economic policy. *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol.76, No.3, pp.1023–1048. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00547.x>

4.5. The Timeline of the Greek Debt Crisis

What is called as the Greek Debt Crisis is basically continuation of the mortgage crisis started in 2007 in the US. After the collapse of the banking sector in the US, global financial crisis was triggered as a result of that and swiftly reached to Europe. The quick spread of the financial crisis that started in the United States in 2007 to Europe created a panic environment among the European countries; henceforth governments from London to Berlin took precautionary measures for faltering banks.²²⁷ The situations in Ireland and Iceland were threatening since the governments of these countries were struggling to save banks. While other European countries fell under the influence of a global financial crisis, the Greek government appeased the concerns and refused to take emergency measures.²²⁸ In a short while, banking crisis turned into a debt crisis in which Greece took the lead. In the next phase when the prospects of “Greece defaulting on its huge debt burden became quite real, the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) moved in with a massive rescue plan that included a structural adjustment program that contained harsh austerity measure”.²²⁹

As we have explained above, the crisis has its roots in the traditional nature of the Greek economy which experienced the same circles of economic crisis in the twentieth century. Thus, with the inclusion to the EU, this traditionally troublesome economy and its problems started to be felt in a wider European circle. As a result of that, European institutions took part in the resolution of the crisis so that they would have saved the Eurozone as a whole.

The EU has established a tripartite authority (known as the “Troika”), consists of the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and

²²⁷ Mark Lander, “The U.S. Financial Crisis Is Spreading to Europe,” *The New York Times* (October 1, 2009), p. C1.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ Polychroniou,

International Monetary Fund (IMF) since it lacks capacity in terms of an appropriate institution which is able to govern the crisis. As the crisis escalates, interactions between the European side represented by the Troika and the Greek governments have resulted in various outcomes for both sides. The inclusion of the IMF was both unusual and controversial and was justified on two grounds: first, due to the “EU’s lack of expertise in handling this type of crisis; and second, as a means of signaling strict conditionality, both to avoid the moral hazard associated with a no-strings-attached rescue and as a way to punish the irresponsible behavior of Greek governments”.²³⁰

Later in 2004, Greece hosted the Olympic Games which has caused the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio level to more than 110 %. Already troubling financial status and substantially increasing debt of the country created a stimulus for the European Commission to put the country’s financial status in monitoring process for the following years. On the other side, while the country slowly moved into the crisis, popular unrest started to show itself on different occasions. One of them was the riots started in December 2008 and lasted for two weeks after the shot of 15 years old student, Alexandros-Andreas Grigoropoulos by a police officer.²³¹

The events spread through the media. Several other protests took place in other cities of Europe. The Greek government was insisting on their position that demonstrations took place in different parts of the country were not related with the upcoming crisis. Indeed, this can be regarded a complete denial of the existing structural problems of the economy such as maladministration, clientelism, bribery, and etc. Failure of the government to settle the demonstrations and unrest among people concerning economic status of the country created turbulent. At the end, government had to reshuffle.

The events also had broad repercussions in the international media. For instance, *the Guardian* published news underlining statements like “It is a

²³⁰ Kalyvas,

²³¹ *Ibid.*

government that does not protect, serve or even respect its people... a government out for itself, and the people respond accordingly by dodging taxes, refusing to pay social insurance, polluting the environment, flouting the law, paying bribes, coveting public sector jobs, and doing what they please without punishment".²³²

In October 2009, right after PASOK won national elections with great support George Papandreou being the then PM made a public speech revealing the real numbers of the public deficit. The number is revised as above the 11% of GDP which was foreseen as 3.7% before. In the coming days, the number was increased to 15.4%. As a consequence of this revelation, international credit agencies downgraded the economic status of Greece.²³³

May 2010 is the date Greece was provided with the first bailout to avoid default of the country by Troika. Upon the request of the country the commission consisted of IMF, ECB and Eurozone representatives signed the first Memorandum of Understanding regarding the financial package of 110 billion euros and austerity measures attached to repayment of this loan. These measures that the government agreed caused another wave of outrage among the public. The unions called for general strikes. People took the streets and protests spilled over towards the whole country. On the side of the government, necessities to adopt these measures were repeatedly restated. For instance, the Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou publicly announced that "the only way to avoid bankruptcy is to take the money from our European partners and the IMF and to do that we need to enforce these measures".²³⁴

In the following year, in June 2011, the government and Troika members agreed to renew the Memorandum with implementation of further austerity measures. Troika members offered cancellation of 50% of debt in exchange of

²³² Christofer, K. (2017). *Kat Christofer: The Greek riots are symptomatic of a society sick of its corrupt political class*. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/dec/08/greece> [Accessed 10 Dec. 2017].

²³³ Christodoulakis, p.12.

²³⁴ Smith, H. (2017). *Greece approves sweeping austerity measures*. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/06/greece-crisis-approves-austerity-measures> [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017].

austerity measures. Again, 24-hour general strike began in the country and tens of thousands of protesters marched on parliament to oppose government efforts to pass new austerity laws.²³⁵ Moreover, Greece's rating level was decreased to a level which was considered as carrying high level of default risk.

Due to popular outrage against austerity measures, Prime Minister Papandreou proposed a referendum for the next bailout which was under negotiation at that time. However, Papandreou called off the referendum after the center-right opposition agreed to back the revamped EU-IMF deal. As a result of that, Papandreou was forced to step down, and economist Lucas Papademos was appointed to head a unity government tasked with implementing further austerity and structural reforms.²³⁶

In February 2012, European finance ministers approved another bailout and Second Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies was signed and later ratified in the national parliament of Greece. With this Memorandum, 53,5% of Greek private bondholders' debt was written-off and the amount of 130 billion euros was agreed to be provided until the end of 2014. In exchange of that, Greece was obliged to cut down current debt-to-GDP ratio from 160 percent to 120.5 percent by 2020 with the implementation of further austerity measures.²³⁷

Economic and political turmoil that Greece was experiencing for three years escalated to an upper level through the year 2012. In May and June, country went to the polls twice. Neither of them was successful to establish majority in the national parliament. The vital points of these elections were that support for far-left and far-right parties which promoted anti-austerity policies during their campaigns increased, even the far-right party of Greece (Golden Dawn) took part in the national parliament. Antonis Samaras, the leader of New Democracy, had to form a coalition with PASOK and other small socialist parties. Samaras stated his commitment to the bailout conditions hoping to calm the markets and prevent the outflow of foreign investment from country:

²³⁵ BBC News,

²³⁶ Council on Foreign Relations,

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

"I will demand that the new government ... works hard so that we can offer tangible hope to our people," "With God's help, we will do whatever is in our hands to get out of this crisis earlier."

"We wanted to send a message to markets and foreign governments that we have a leader and tomorrow we will have a government,"

"We didn't want to protract the sense of instability and insecurity. We wanted to show that ... step by step, day by day, stability is returning to Greece".²³⁸

As the newly elected government started to put the measures into practice, people took the streets and protests spread country-wide. Around 200,000 people marched to protest austerity measures as a result of trade unions' call for 24-hour general strike against government austerity measures.²³⁹

At the end of the year, Eurozone finance ministers and the IMF agreed to a revised aid deal for Greece, including lower interest rates on Greek bailout loans and a debt-buyback program.²⁴⁰ Under the new agreement reached in Brussels, Greece was being required to cut its debt-to-GDP ratio to 124 percent by 2020, compared with a previous target of 120 percent that was regarded by the IMF as the maximum sustainable level.²⁴¹

In the following year of the crisis, the Greek government asked to the parliament for the approval of new austerity measures which included job cuts and deductions in the salaries of thousands of civil servants. The changes that are "the plans to put 25,000 civil servants, including teachers, municipal police officers and school janitors, into a "mobility plan" by the end of the year, docking their wages ahead of forced transfers or dismissals have stoked the most public anger".²⁴² In return for these, labor unions prepared for to hold a general strike across the country. Also, the state broadcaster ERT was closed down to cut

²³⁸ Smith, H. (2017). *Antonis Samaras appointed Greece's prime minister*. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/20/antonis-samaras-greece-prime-minister> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2017].

²³⁹ BBC News,

²⁴⁰ Council on Foreign Relations,

²⁴¹ Volker, C. (2017). *Bankruptcy Averted: Europe Agrees on New Aid Package For Greece - SPIEGEL ONLINE - International*. [online] SPIEGEL ONLINE. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/euro-zone-finance-ministers-avert-greek-bankruptcy-in-marathon-talks-a-869487.html> [Accessed 18 Dec. 2017].

²⁴² Kitsantonis,

spending along with other belt-tightening policies. This action antagonized the junior left-wing partner of coalition and the party left the coalition. As expected, another wave of demonstrations started in the country.

In 2014, positive developments took place in Greek economy. For instance, Greece raised nearly four billion dollars from world financial markets in its first sale of long-term government bonds for four years, in a move seen as an important step in the country's economic recovery.²⁴³ In return to this positive development, Troika agreed to provide more funds from bailouts. Along with that, Greek government continued to adopt necessary legislative actions to come to terms with austerity measures. On the public side, anger against government's position and policies was not easily deterred by these developments and showed itself in the European parliament elections.

In the European elections, the Radical Left coalition (Syriza) getting 26.6 % of votes came on top and the far-right party (Golden Dawn) gets nearly 10 percent of the vote.²⁴⁴ Another significant development in the domestic politics was Alexis Tsipras: the leader of the radical leftist Syriza, becoming prime minister of the country as a result of the parliamentary elections.

The success of Alexis Tsipras with Syriza laid behind his solid stance against previous governments' policies in dealing with the crisis. For instance, he opposed cuts and heavy taxes (single property tax-ENFIA), decreased low-income pensions, and privatizations imposed under the terms reached between the previous governments and Troika. Also, Tsipras defined more structural problems of the country such as excessive government spending, corruption, clientelism, and ill-functioning health care system. At that time, Tsipras' biggest promise took place in the news as "repealing memoranda with one bill, one article in Greek Parliament" when Syriza won the elections. Despite these robust pledges, after he

²⁴³ BBC News,

²⁴⁴ Christodoulakis, p.13.

took the Office, he signed the third Memorandum of Understanding with the harshest austerity measures that literally brought Greek society to its knees.²⁴⁵

In the first half of the 2015, the government and Troika negotiated over the possible extension of Greece's bailout and launching new reform programs supported by the Eurozone members. During negotiations, Tsipras had to take steps backwards from his presidential campaign pledges'. For instance, promise to give priority to raise the amount of money spent on the humanitarian needs was limited to the "non-pecuniary" aids. Promise to raise the minimum wage was postponed. Promise to terminate the privatizations was not applied to the already completed privatizations. At the end of the negotiations, Tsipras' statements claiming the end of the Troika and bailout terms lost their validity when the German government, the IMF and the ECB emphasized the opposite, that the austerity terms agreed in return for the rescue funds had to be observed or at least matched in fiscal impact and that the Troika remained the referee.²⁴⁶

After six months, negotiations failed to reach a solution and resulted with the cut of emergency funding provided to Greece by ECB. Government had to close banks and impose controls over the capitals. Moreover, the result of the referendum called by Tsipras on the bailout terms revealed the rejection of terms by the majority. In spite of the referendum results and Tsipras' campaign for rejection of the terms, Greece and its creditors agreed on a third bailout packet amount of 86bn euros which necessitated further cuts on the country's spending to prevent bankruptcy and precluded any exit scenario from the Eurozone.²⁴⁷

The peak of the migration crisis drew the attention away from economic crisis for a year. In July 2016, when Greece had to pay installment but failed to do it, Eurozone members provided further 10 billion euros. Also, certain amount of

²⁴⁵ Chrysopoulos, P. (2017, 1 26). *What the SYRIZA Government Promised and Never Delivered to Greek People*. Greek Reporter: retrieved from <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/01/26/what-the-syriza-government-promised-and-never-delivered-to-greek-people/>.

²⁴⁶ Traynor, I., 2015. *Greece secures eurozone bailout extension for four months*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/24/greece-secures-eurozone-bailout-extension-for-four-months> [Accessed: 20 Feb 2018].

²⁴⁷ BBC News,

Greece's debt was relieved, and the period during which Greece had to pay its installments was extended. Lastly, interest rates of the debt were decreased.

4.6. The Impact of the Crisis with Numbers

In the year 1999, before Greece entered into Eurozone the growth rate of the Greek economy (3,5%) was higher than the corresponding EU average (2,3%). Positive developments happening in the Greek economy in the pre-membership period to Eurozone were a continuation of the trends in the previous five years as a result of the implementation of the 1994-1999 Convergence Programme.²⁴⁸


In the Economic Report of the Bank of Greece, indicators of the economic situation were given as: “the employment rate increased from 55.9% in 1994 to 57.2% in 1998, but remains lower than the corresponding EU rate (61 %), which in turn is much lower than in the United States or Japan (75 %)”, “The part-time employment in Greece (6.0%) is lower than the corresponding rather high rate in the EU (17.4%)”, “unemployment is higher among young people and women” in 1998 the unemployment rate reached “29.8% for people under 25 (EU: 19.4%), 16.5% for women (EU: 11.9%) and 39.4 % for young women (EU: 20.7%) in contrast, the unemployment rate for men over 25 was 5.1%, i.e. lower than in the EU (7.3%)”. Moreover, the debt-to-GDP ratio was decreasing with the impact of the Programme; “the consolidated debt of general government fell by one percentage point to 104.4% of GDP in 1999”.²⁴⁹

In continuum with these developments in Greek economy, there was no sign of a possible crisis in the first after Greek inclusion to the Eurozone. After country entered into recession period, these numbers were starkly reversed. In the following figures, changes in these numbers can be seen as the crisis progressed.

²⁴⁸ Bank of Greece (1999). *Annual Report*. [online] Athens: the Bank of Greece Printing Works, pp.8-9-192. Available at: <http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Annrep1999.pdf> [Accessed 28 Feb. 2018].

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

As it is argued by scholars that following a deep and prolonged depression, during which real GDP fell by 26%, the economy is projected to grow again in the course of 2016 and 2017, even though it is foreseen that a full recovery would last longer (OECD, 2016) (see the Graph 1).²⁵⁰ As it is seen from the graph, despite the slight decrease in 2015, the unemployment rate is still high with 25%.




Graph 1. Change in the real GDP and unemployment rate

Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Greece (2016)

As another significant indicator of the negative impact of the crisis on social life, sharp decline in life satisfaction was apparent throughout the crisis (see the Graph 2).


²⁵⁰ OECD, 2016. *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece*, OECD.



Graph 2. Rapid decline in life satisfaction during the crisis

Note: Data is obtained from the European Commission opinion polls published in Eurobarometer (OECD, 2016).


Likewise, unemployment, poverty, and inequality rates reveal the similar negative trajectory regarding the social cost (see the Graphs 3 and 4).



Graphs 3 and 4. Increasing unemployment rate, poverty, and inequality

Source: OECD National Account database; OECD (2015), In It Together Why Less Inequality Benefits All; ELSTAT, Eurostat, OECD Economic Surveys: Greece, OECD (2016)

Youth unemployment rate as another significant indicator of the economic outlook speedily increased along with the acceleration of the crisis. Despite the recent tendency to decrease, it still remains high vis-à-vis EU average (see the Graph 5).



Graph 5. High youth unemployment rate

Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Greece (2016)

In conclusion, the Greek debt crisis has a number of aspects that need to be taken into consideration for a comprehensive understanding of it. History of the country is one them which sheds lights on the development course of the country. In this sense it can be asserted that the country is not Europeanized enough to endure a challenging crisis. Another aspect of the crisis is related with the EU and its transformative power on the member states. For peripheral states, the membership process means an immense transformation process in which structural reforms need to be implemented for being eligible. Greece as one of the peripheral countries of the EU had to modernize itself through top-down Europeanization process. It can be argued that this process is not finished yet. In this ongoing process of modernization, Greece experienced a bad crisis which has negatively affected the life in the country with increasing inflation, poverty, inequality and unemployment. The EU as the ‘idea’ of modernization and development for Greece has taken a compelling attitude towards Greece for the solution of the crisis. Greece was forced to implement structural reforms that are considered to help acceleration of the development

process. Implementation of these reforms needed strict belt-tightening measures to be taken, which would cause popular unrest in society. As stated above, it is assumed that the EU's positive image as a model of modernity changed in the eyes of the Greek political elite as a result of the EU's intimidating stance during the crisis. This thesis assumes that this change can be captured through the language of the Greek political elite. Thus, the next chapter will analyze the speeches of the Greek political elite in this sense.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, the findings obtained from coded documents will be analyzed with respect to the economic crisis and identity change reflected in the discourse. Within the context of the aforementioned theoretical framework, the findings will be discussed assessing their impact on the Greek political elites' hesitation concerning their self-definition as *Europeans*.

Before proceeding, there are certain points that need to be mentioned for a thorough analysis. The method adopted for the coding process, illustration type chosen to visualize the findings, and interpretation of data will be shortly summarized.

5.1. Method

Analysis of the documents was done according to the model previously adopted by Reisigl (2008). Firstly, nominations regarding the both sides (Greek vs Europeans) were identified in the texts. Then, positive or negative attributions (predications) regarding these nominations were singled out. In the last phase, these predications were scaled according to the five-point Likert scale. In order to measure the intensity of feelings, in this case attachment to the European identity, Likert scale is designed according to the following criteria:

Value 1: Corresponds to the least level of identification with the EU (holding negative view and containing clear demarcation in nominations as “we, Greek people” vs “they, Europeans out there, the EU side”)

Value 2: Corresponds to a cautious level of identification with the EU (containing negative attribution for the EU; using us vs them language but animosity level is relatively low compared to the first category)


Value 3: Corresponds to a prudent position with regard to being part of European identity (containing some negative references and using us vs them language but still describing themselves as Europeans). Since they contain both positive and negative references, they are valued as 3.

Value 4: Corresponds to a positive image of the EU on the Greek side in a vigilant way

Value 5: Corresponds to the self-definition as “European” in the same vein with the EU (containing mostly positive attributions about EU and European identity)

At that point, it is important to note that the terms “identification with the EU” and “European identification” are used interchangeably. The reason for this is that European identity is promoted by EU institutions’ policies in great extent as detailed in the chapter three. In fact, the Eurobarometer polls conducted for measuring European identity and used mostly by the scholars working on the subject equate the EU identification with European identity.


Furthermore, the documents are classified according to their topics in four groups. These are a) European integration, b) Eurozone, c) European Foreign and Security Issues, and d) Daily Political Agenda. Such a classification is needed since certain topics occupy larger space and are emphasized more than others in the documents. Therefore, one prevailing topic is singled out for each document. Hence these categories constitute the basis of the thesis’ coding scheme. A detailed table presenting these categories and their contents is provided in the methodology section of the second chapter. Graph 6 illustrates the distribution of documents on the basis of these categories and their corresponding coding values. Later, in this chapter, a detailed time graph for each one of these categories will also be presented.



Graph 6. Documents on the basis of categories and coding values

5.1.1. Visualization

In the second step, documents which have been coded in the line with the aforementioned technics, are visualized. Thus, a graph is produced that shows the time (date of the speech) on the x axes and identification level on the y axes (for instance, see Graph 7). It is a temporal graph illustrating the Greek political elites' representation of themselves as Europeans from 2002 to 2015.



Graph 7. Illustration of the Greek political elites’ level of identification with European identity from 2002 to 2015 (all documents- 4 issue areas).

5.2. Findings and Analysis

There are two main time periods presented in the graphs: 2002-2009 and 2009-2015. The profound impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the identity discourses of the state elites is evident on the right-hand side of the Graph 7. Likewise, high level of identification seen at the left-hand side of the Graph 7 can be associated with the enthusiasm generated by the first years of Eurozone membership. These periods can be divided as the following: a) the one in which there was no sign of the crisis and the country was enjoying the early years of Eurozone membership; b) the second one is the early period of the crisis hitting the country and causing some fluctuation in the identification level, and also corresponds to the worst period of the crisis in which identification level is substantially decreasing. In the following sections, each one of these periods will be discussed in detail as well.

Lastly, the political elites’ European identity reveals itself differently among different issue areas, i.e. topics. For instance, the level of attachment manifests itself in the domain of Eurozone is different than it reveals itself in the domain of European integration. Similarly, the responses towards the debt crisis are different in

different domains. For instance, identity change observed in the domain of European Foreign and Security Issues is different than identity change observed in the domain of European Integration. Politicians consistently define themselves as European when they talk about contributing to European integration. On the other hand, more irregularities can be observed in their self-definition in the topics of euro and Eurozone. These differences will also be reflected upon through the chapter.

The number of documents used for this thesis is 192 in total. Among these 19 (10%) documents are valued as 1 meaning the least identification with the EU. 13 (7%) documents are valued as 2 corresponding to low degree of identification. 45 (24%) documents are valued as 3 meaning being doubtful about European identity. 83 (43%) of documents are valued as 4 representing the positive identification with the EU. Lastly, 76 (40%) of all documents are valued as 5 meaning highest level of European identification. See Figure 6 for visualization of these numbers.


When the documents are distributed on the topic basis, Eurozone topic has the highest number of documents (87). 14 of these 87 (16%) documents are valued as 1. 12 of them (14%) are valued as 2. 32 of them (37%) are valued as 3. 16 of them (18%) are valued as 4. 13 of them (15%) are valued as 5. Secondly, European integration topic consists of 62 documents. None of these 62 documents are valued as 1 or 2. 4 of them (6%) are valued as 3. 29 of them (47%) are valued as 4. 29 of them (47%) are valued as 5. Thirdly, European Foreign and Security Policy topic has 57 documents. 2 of these 57 (4%) documents are valued as 1. 1 of them (2%) is valued as 2. 4 of them (7%) are valued as 3. 26 of them (46%) valued as 4. 24 of them (42%) are valued as 5. Lastly, daily political agenda consists of 29 documents. 2 of these 29 (7%) documents are valued as 2. None of them is valued as 2. 5 of them (17%) are valued 3. 12 of them (41%) are valued 4. 10 of them (34%) are valued as 5.

5.2.1. Europeanness of Greek Political Elites until the Beginning of the Crisis (2002-2009)

As can be seen from the graph 8, the discourses of the Greek political elite show a high level of identification with Europe (Also see Graph 8 for a detailed illustration of before crisis period). This tendency lasts until the early period of the

crisis. There is only one document that is inconsistent with the rest of the texts during that time. This speech is about the distribution of the community budget to the developing countries of the Union. The Greek side is not satisfied with the amount allocated to Greece, so that there appears a critical language directed towards the EU. This speech is especially included to show the delicacy of economic issues in European affairs.

There are 74 documents coded for the before period. None of them are valued as 1 or 2 for this time period. Only one of them is valued as 1. 42 of them are valued as 4. 31 of them are valued as 5.



Graph 8. Illustration of high level of European identification before the debt crisis in the period between 2002 and 2009 through all 4 issue areas covering 74 documents.

5.2.1.1. Europeanness of Greek Political Elites in Foreign and Security Issues

Starting with the very first document dated 27.05.2002, high level of identification reveals itself in concerning the Euroforce, Cyprus' prospective membership to the EU, and common position towards the third parties. In the context of the Euroforce, establishment of an autonomous European force and its respective relations with the USA and NATO are discussed, position of the Greek side is

presented as favoring the “autonomy of the European Union- European identity, defense and security” and sharing the “similar or the same” views with other European countries (No.1, p.2).²⁵¹ Also the similarity between the “autonomy of the Euroforce and Greece’s national anxieties” is clearly stated in the document. Enthusiasm of Greece in European affairs can be seen in the following statement:

“Greece, I remind you, in all the negotiations leading up the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice was at the forefront of the member-states of the European Union who supported the strengthening of European defense and security policy, who supported the autonomy of the European Union... strategically we are among those countries who are especially interested in the course of, and the extension of, the political unification of the European Union, and the formation of a genuinely autonomous defense and security policy” (No.1, p.3).


Furthermore, George Papandreou, the then Foreign Minister urges local political leaders to follow “the course of the European Union, the future of Europe, and therefore the future of its common policies” (*ibid*). In the following period, there are frequent references to the Ankara Text, which is a framework agreement between NATO (also Turkey) and the EU on the necessary adjustments for the establishment of Euroforce. Greece’s stance was reflected as: “for our part as the “15”, as the EU, we have created the framework of the agreement” (referring to the amendments of the Ankara Text) and in the process “the Presidency speaks for, negotiates for and binds the 15 member states” (No.2, p.5). In the context, Turkey was referred as a third party “an extra European factor”. In these examples ‘us vs them’ nominations work to strengthen the European identity. For instance, “our part as the “EU” refers to the ‘us’, on the other hand, Turkey was referred as the ‘other’ of Europe.

European security independent from the US involvements generates more pro-European revelations by the Greek side. Documents in this context mostly valued as 5. Some documents should even be considered as 5+. For instance, in a speech delivered by Papandreou at Oxford University, identification level stood out as 5+: “we might not be as strong as we could and should be in terms of our defense capabilities, but in other areas – in our economic, political, and diplomatic strength –

²⁵¹ References from documents will be used as the number of document at first and page number in the second place. List of all documents will be given at the end.

we are just as powerful as the US” (No.12, p.3). In the same speech, Papandreou embraces the common history of the continent “we have gone through many conflicts [...] we have had terrorism on our continent. But we have learnt from this past experience, of old Europe if you like, and we have created a new Europe out of this experience” (*ibid*). The below graph presents the tendency of the Greek political elites to identify themselves as European if the subject of the speech is overwhelmingly European Foreign and Security.

There are 36 documents in which European Security and Foreign Policy issues are extensively mentioned in the period between 2002 and 2009. None of them are valued as 1, 2 or 3. On the other hand, 21 of them are valued as 4 and 15 of them are valued as 5. This positive tendency can be seen in the following Graph 9.



Graph 9. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in the Subject of European Foreign and Security in the period between 2002 and 2009.

Moreover, common stance with the EU is even more obvious in texts such as: “we have the statutory potential, as well as the operational potential, to proceed as the EU, with our own means” (No.2, p.8). As a result of that, the Greek political elites expect the EU to follow a “common policy and stance” (No.3, p.1). They

emphasize the need “for a firm foreign policy of the European Union and guaranteeing of the collective interests of the European Union, as well as the interests of the member states” (*ibid*). This necessity is repeated by the Greek political elites at every opportunity: “we must be ready to develop a common notion of the new security environment so that we can tackle with efficiency new challenges and threats” (No.13, p.3). It can be argued that level of identification with the EU increases when security issues are concerned: “all citizens of the European Union should have the same feeling of security against external dangers, whether they live in Luxembourg or in Kastelorizo” (No.48, p.1). In that vein, the rationale for “the promotion of collective European goals” in foreign and security areas is supported by the Greek political elite is based on that “the interests of Greece are indissolubly bound with the common interests of the EU” (No.18, p.1).

For instance, when Greek Israeli relations was turbulent due to two Palestinians hosted in the Greek territory, Greece chose to stick by common position of the EU. It is defined as binding to the “wider political interests, the European Union and the 15 member states” (No.1, p.6). For instance, concerning illegal immigration there are constant references for a common EU stance and solutions; “we have a framework within which, in due course, we can work with the third countries as the EU to increase the effectiveness of the prevention of illegal migration into the EU” (No.2, p.12). Yet it needs further examination to see whether Greece has equated its interests with those of the EU with regard to “all” foreign and security policy issues. Even though this thesis cannot cover “all” foreign and security policy issues, it can still make an assessment concerning “the most important foreign and security issues that Greece faces.

5.2.1.2.Europeanness of Greek Political Elites as Leverage in Cyprus Issue and Macedonia Name Issue

Furthermore, the Cyprus issue appears as a crucial topic in which identification with Europe stays consistently high. The documents retrieved from years between 2002 and 2004 coincide with the time when prospective membership

of Cyprus occupies the political agenda of Turkey, Greece, and the EU. Therefore, there are widely used expressions indicating the common position adopted by both Greece and the EU; “we will be collective on the part of the European union” on the Cyprus question (No.1, p.4). Expectations regarding Cyprus’ future status are expressed as “Cyprus... must have a unified international representation, a unified citizenship, and be functional within the EU – something which, for us, is very important for the future Cyprus, as well as the future of Europe” (No.6, p.1). Also, Greece’s wishes for a unified Cyprus to become a member of the EU is expressed on the EU level in most of the documents: “the two Communities... expect the accession of a united Cyprus to the European Union, and we must not disappoint those expectations... this is the message of the European Union, and this is the message of Greece” (No.11, p.2). When Cyprus finally became member of the EU in 2004, the political elite describe it as a “development of national dimensions and historic significance, which, in its turn, vindicates our European orientation” (No.22, p.3).

In the next phase, when the Cyprus issue became an obstacle for the candidacy of Turkey, the Greek political elite appear to position themselves on the same page with the EU. During the accession negotiations with Turkey, the Greek political elite clearly emphasize that “whatever is European is Greek, and whatever is Greek is European” (No.25, p.4). In the documents which are widely preoccupied with the accession negotiations of Turkey, there are considerable number of nominations that equate Greece with the EU i.e. “the European Union as a whole”, “within a European framework”, and “the whole of European Union” (No.26, p.4). Especially, the following sentences reflect such attempts by the Greek political elite clearly: “You know that the great interest in the respect for religious freedom by Turkey is a firm stance and view that is not just Greece’s, but that of European Union as a whole” (*ibid*). Moreover, it is firmly defended that Turkey negotiates with “Europe as a whole, including Greece – I am not excluding Greece from this discussion; of course, we have our own interests, which are also European” (No.27, p.6).

The Greek political elites display a similar attitude towards the accession process of Macedonia. Greece has long refused to recognize Macedonia with its official name, instead uses the term Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Greeks oppose the usage of the name 'Macedonia' by arguing that the term Macedonia historically connotes with the Greek Macedonia and only a small portion of soil belongs to the current Macedonian territory, thus the name claim by Macedonia does not reflect the historical facts. Therefore, the membership application of Macedonia to the EU restored these discussions on the EU level. The Greek side emphasizes the need for a solution on the name issue by clearly stating that "the dialogue and consensus attitude are absolutely necessary preconditions to achieve a mutually acceptable solution [...] FYROM should comprehend that the EU could not accept states that do not function with a consensus attitude" (No.30, p.1). Nomination of "the EU" as the side which is not acting with Macedonia but Greece in a way that equates the EU with Greece validates the tendency of the Greek political elites to reveal high level of identification with the EU on their national foreign policy concerns. Later on, Greece reasserts its position on different stages of the negotiation process of FYROM:


"We believe that the time has come for a final and effective answer to be given on the question of irredentist and dangerous propaganda. These definitive and clear answers are not being requested by Greece. This is not just a Greek issue - it is not just Greece requesting answers. It is first and foremost a demand of the European political and institutional reality of the thinking, principles and values of the EU" (No.34, p3).

Even further, statements regarding the Macedonia issue seem to put the bilateral relations of Greece and Macedonia in the same equation with the EU and Macedonia relations. That is, position taken by Macedonia towards Greece is considered as the position taken towards the EU as a whole: "the public stances and actions of our neighbouring country, like those of all the countries that have European aspirations, are a basis and part of the evaluations made by the member states, among which is Greece, regarding how ready these countries are to approach Europe" (No.37, p.12). Manifestation of high level of attachment to the European identity as far as foreign and security policies are concerned may indicate convergence of interests between Greece and the EU rather than Constructivist

identity building. This point will be discussed in more detail below.

5.2.1.3. Europeanness of Greek Political Elites in the Course of European Integration

There seems high level of European identification among the Greek political elite on the European integration issues. Issues which are considered as related to integration process can be listed as: integration of Balkan countries into the EU, EU treaties promoting deeper integration within the Union such as the Constitutional Treaty, and European citizenship discussions. There are 46 documents from 2002 and 2009 period, which are categorized under the topic of European integration. Among these, 24 of them are valued as 4. 22 of them are valued as 5. None of them is valued as 1, 2, or 3 for this period. This positive tendency can be seen in the following Graph 10.



Graph 10. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in the Subject of European Integration in period between 2002 and 2009.

In addition, the Greek political elites seem to position themselves on the European side when the issue is the integration of Balkan region to the EU. This positioning is important in the sense that Greece represents itself as part of the EU and sharing the same course in this specific area. Thus, it is crucial that the meaning given to “Greece’s role to promote the European direction of... countries in the region” is underlined in different circumstances (No.4, p.1). It is indicated that Greece is interested “to strengthen the ties between the European Union and the Balkan countries” (*ibid*). It is noted that “European perspective works as a powerful catalyst in the direction of such a future; a future of cooperation, security and mutual benefit” and “no Western Balkan state [...] can be excluded from such a future” (No.62, p.1). Moreover, European expansion towards Balkans, “participation of the countries of South East Europe in a common European future”, is evaluated as a “strategic choice for Greece” (No.30, p.1). The reason for that is explained as “more countries from the same region with us, and naturally, with similar interests, are to have the ability to help in order that the European Union will promote policies closer to our interests” (No.31, p.1). At this point, it is important to note that driving force for supporting the European expansion in this region seems to be rather originated from national concerns as reflected in these two documents. Despite these nationalistic concerns, it is still repeated that “our firm belief that Europe can never be complete, if the Balkans are not included in the European family” (No.66, p1). As it was the case with the foreign and security policy issues, the debate on the nature of European identity – people who define themselves as Europeans are those whose interests are in parallel with the EU – parallel interests with the EU seem to contribute to European identity.

Furthermore, Greece held the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2003. During this time period, Greek politicians seem to be enthusiastic about the European issues. Hence, documents retrieved from this time period contain very high level of European identification. For instance, the then Foreign Minister George A. Papandreou’s statements regarding the future Greek Presidency reflect this enthusiasm. He defined their priorities as reinforcing “the cultural dimension of the European Union now, when we are 15, but even more

when we become 25, 27 or even more countries” (No.5, p.1). Also, Papandreou defined European expansion as another priority area in which Greek Presidency will be dedicated to “bring Europe forward as a powerful force that can play important role, first of all for the European citizens of the new Europe we are creating” (No.6, p.1). He called the next round of enlargement, which is the biggest ever, as one of the most crucial events in the EU history since it would remove the artificial borders in the continent and allow them “to reunite with all those European nations that share the Union’s values of freedom, solidarity and democracy” (No.12, p.1). Papandreou’s statements regarding the forthcoming Greek presidency and expectations deserve to be ranked as 5+ in its European identification value:

“With our unprecedented expansion to the east and the south, with the potential of many new members in the future we are building on Europe a unified continent. But this continent goes beyond geography, uniting us by shared values and mutual interests. If you like, we are building a community of values. Now our swallow is trying to symbolize these values, it symbolizes the freedom we cherish, it symbolizes the security, it finds a nesting in our balconies and on our rooftops, it symbolizes the prosperity that spring brings to us, it symbolizes the balance of justice we have in nature, it symbolizes the transparency of our democracies in clear blue skies” (No.7, p.1).

This level of enthusiasm can be found in almost all of the documents belonged to that period. For instance, following wordings and sentences can be frequently seen in the documents: “our wider Europe”, “dealing with global challenges we will bring our special identity, that is this community of values”, and “we need to protect our borders from illegal migration” (No.7, p.1). Even further, priorities of the Greek Presidency were brought into a text named as “Our Europe”. Moreover, the Greek Presidency’s efforts for a unified Union is repeatedly stressed in a speech delivered by Foreign Minister Papandreou by emphasizing that “it is a Union that believes in common values, and those common values are a departure point for our approach to the problems of our age” (No.10, p.1). Besides, European identity is openly signaled as a priority area for the Greek Presidency. Papandreou clearly stated that:

“We have a question of our identity. Europe as a whole certainly after seeing its identity as the sum of all its linguistic, religious and other affiliations. Creating a new Europe, means creating a new concept of identity for Europe itself, for all the countries in it and to a certain extent for the world too” (No.12, p.5).

Reminding the previous parts on the European citizenship and its importance as an identity marker, it is acknowledged that European citizenship is one of the areas in which the Greek political elites display a high level of European identification. Especially, references to the European citizens as “our citizens” support this finding. As an example, these references might be listed as: “our own citizens are by no means immune to global events”, “within the European Union, we are so interwoven -positively interdependent - that most of our citizens benefit enormously”, “In a world of irresponsible states, deep global inequalities [...] European values, norms and structures may not be completely sufficient to protect us from new security threats beyond our frontiers” (No.12, p.4). In addition to that, the Greek political elites seem to be concerned about the role of citizens in the future scenarios of the EU. For instance, when “the Plan-D of the European Committee for democracy, dialogue and debate regarding the Future of Europe” was discussed, Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Valinakis described their objective for the plan as “Europe in-centre of the citizens’ dialogue, Citizens’ in-centre of European policies” (No.38, p.1). Moreover, the strong European vision is conditioned on the European citizens taking part of the integration process. It is argued that in the process of integration while “shaping a common European future, citizens are not and must not be simple observers” (No.53, p.1).

Likewise, the Greek political elite are inclined to present themselves as being ‘more European’ when they talk about further European integration. The Graph 11 better displays this tendency. There appears only one speech that is considered as ‘Value 1’ on the European integration subject among all the documents. The so-called “European soul” is well displayed on this domain. Greek position is clearly stated as: “Greece believes that the answer lies in more Europe, not less, Europe” (No.52, p.4). It is asserted that all actions taken by the Greek side in the course of the

European integration “placed themselves at the front line of European integration” (*ibid*).

In this respect, the Greek political elites directly support any effort that will bring Europe into a deeper union. The Constitutional Treaty, which is defined as “a new contract between our people” (No.12, p.6), is an important subject area in that vein. They seem to take the Constitutional Treaty seriously. Its proposed reforms for institutional architecture of the Union are perceived as a matter of representation i.e. “who should represent and act on behalf of Europeans” (*ibid*). Since, the EU is not defined “simply a confederation” but as a “pluralist, transnational federal union, a union of nation-states, and a union of peoples” (*ibid*), assigned political value to the issue say a lot about the European identity of the political elites. The same position is later adopted by future foreign ministers in this period. They believed that the Constitution would “strengthen the dynamic for the development of the European Union towards a political and social union with a federal aspect” (No.17, p.1). It is interesting to note that the Greek political elites prefer to use “we” nominations for the EU when they talk about the Constitution. For instance, Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis described the negotiations for the Constitutional Treaty as “now that we are 25 member states, it is natural for things to be more difficult [...] we therefore – this is mainly what I want to express – want to reach, shortly, a positive result regarding the Constitutional treaty” (No.21, p.1).

When the Constitutional Treaty went under the ratification process, the Greek political elite actively supported it both at domestic and the European levels. Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis, in a speech to inform the citizens on the European Constitutional Treaty, states that “the European Constitution benefits both the European idea and our national interests” (No.28, p.1). Also, he further restates that “we want a Greece that is at the heart of European developments; at the hearth of Europe [...] The European Constitution makes this possible [...] with the European Constitution, Greece wins” (*ibid*). Even though, ratification process failed with French and Dutch no votes, the Greek political elites displayed optimism and restated that “the effort for European integration should continue [...] to work together for the common vision of peace, stability and prosperity in our continent”

(No.33, p.1). In that vein, Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis asserts that Greece will “continue to meet whenever necessary” with the German presidency to reach a solution for the problem with the “Friends of the Constitutional Treaty” (No.51, p.1). Whatever the outcome will be, Valinakis noted that “our country is in favour of more Europe and that, [...] the European integration’s objective should be pursued” (No.54, p.1) and “we want more and not less Europe” (No.55, p.1). The below statement which was delivered after a meeting for a comprise on the Constitutional Treaty reflects the level of support to the integration process on the Greek side:

“I hope that everyone will realise that Europe is the business of each and every one of us; that there will not be winners and losers. Everyone should realise that there will be only winners if we succeed in making the ship of Europe move ahead. If we don’t succeed, we will be responsible to the citizens of Europe, who are asking that we move ahead at long last” (No.56, p.1).

When the negotiations resulted in the Reform Treaty (Lisbon Treaty), the Greek political elites continued to support it. The then Foreign Minister Bakoyannis’ address to the Hellenic Parliament on the ratification of the treaty demonstrates how Europeanized she was: “as I said, I am absolutely certain that the Hellenic Parliament will act based on both our country’s interests and those of the great European family, to which we belong” (No.68, p.1). Moreover, in the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty Greece’s position is reiterated by Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis as “in order for enlargement go ahead, all candidate countries must respect the criteria and prerequisites set by the European Union” (No.74, p.1).

In addition to these, the Greek political elites seem to believe that “the Greek people in its overwhelming majority accept and defend the European vision” as well (No.14, p.1). It is widely stated that “Greece and Greek public opinion are among the pro-Europeans of the EU” (No.36, p.7). In this line, it is indicated that “the accession of Greece to the European family” is appreciated by the Greek citizens because it provides strength and acceptance to the country in the international arena. The speech delivered by Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis on the celebration of the “Europe Day” certainly reflects that attitude:

“Our European identity coexists with and enriches our unique, national, Greek identity. Greece and Greeks believe in Europe - not only because they

want a continent of peace, democracy and prosperity, but also, and mainly, because they are convinced that Greece gains from being a member of this Europe; because they believe in democracy and prosperity with a human face; because, like all EU citizens, they believe in and respect Europe's fundamental principles and values. Because they believe that as Europe moves ahead, Greece wins" (No.32, p.1).

Documents coincided with the "Europe Day" celebration events contain the highest level of European identification of the Greek political elites. They are also important in terms of marking the anniversary of Greek membership to the "European family" (No.44, p.1). Greek European perspective is reiterated in these events: "we want a strong Europe", "we want a more political Europe", "we will implement an extensive programme for open and productive dialogue that will embrace the options of citizens regarding the identity and the future of Europe", "we are driving force behind the Europeanisation of our neighbourhood" (*ibid*). This tendency remains the same throughout years. The day is considered to symbolize the "hope for a common future for all Europeans" (No.50, p.2). In this context, they give strong messages for the future such as "our future lies in Europe" (*ibid*).

Along with these, future of the European integration occupies a large space in the speeches as the period coincides with the time when negotiations for the adaptations to the Constitutional Treaty were ongoing. In one of these speeches delivered by Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis at the "Greek-German symposium on Europe's perspectives", she indicated that in order to move ahead "we must provide solutions on key issues, such as unemployment, social cohesion and protection of the environment [...] we must offer solutions as a Union not merely of states, but also of peoples" (No.52, p.4). It needs to be pointed out that seeking solutions on the European level for future is considered as an important indicator of the European identity within this context.


On the other hand, only contradicting speech with the rest of the documents is about the Community budget during this period. As mentioned above, the Greek political elites revealed their negative feelings towards the EU when the community budget planned for the 2007-2013 time period fell behind the expectations of Greece. Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis explained their expectations from the European side as: "we want to see less selfishness" (No.39, p.1). After, he reiterated that "our

country, as you know, now and in the past undertook initiatives, promoted cooperation and has a positive contribution in effort for a better tomorrow for Greece and Europe” (*ibid*).

5.2.2. Europeanness of the Greek Political Elites During Debt Crisis

In this section of the analysis, 119 documents are valued in total. Among them, 16 are valued as 1. 12 of them are valued as 2. 41 of them are valued as 3. 27 of them are valued as 4. 22 of them are valued 5. In accordance with the main argument of this thesis, hesitation of the Greek political elite regarding being part of the European identity can be seen in the following graph (see Graph 11). In the beginning of the crisis, a remaining high-level identification on the Greek side can still be observed. This tendency continues until the first bailout was provided (April 2010) with certain demanding austerity measures attached to it.

During that time, statements by government figures were inclined to assess the situation on the European level, meaning that the crisis is taking place in European economy not in Greek economy. Therefore, solutions needed to be searched on the European level. For instance, the then Deputy FM Valinakis expressed that “through coordinated actions on the part of the EU, policies can be implemented directly to strengthen the economy, cushioning the effects of the crisis” (No.76, p.1). He further stated that “it is particularly important that the EU adopt a common stance, thus sending a positive message to European citizens in the midst of the current, difficult state of affairs” (No.75. p.1).



Graph 11. Illustration of declining level of European identification during the debt crisis in the period between 2009 and 2015 through all 4 issue areas.

On 18 October 2009 the then PM George Papandreou gave a speech revealing the real status of the Greek economy and introducing spending cuts as a first step. As mentioned before, international credit agencies started to downgrade the country’s credit rating. Even before his speech, rumors of crisis were occupying the daily agenda of the country. Yet the accurate picture was not known until his statement. In this time period, Papandreou’s speeches contain moderate attitude towards the EU. For instance, in a speech he delivered in the European Council, Papandreou asserts that:


“the new Greek government is very well aware of its responsibilities to revamp the Greek economy, to modernise the public sector, to fight chronic problems such as corruption and clientelism, to make sure that we have a sound, viable economy, with a budget which is going to be reduced, a deficit which is going to be reduced [...] So we are absolutely determined, and I believe we have the strong backing of the European Union in the necessary changes we’ll be making in favour of the Greek people and of course in favour of our common family” (No.87, p.1).

This phrase, “we have a strong backing of the European Union” (No.88, p.1), was reasserted in different occasions at that period. However, this rhetoric started to change direction while crisis was deepening. It first started as to share the guilt of the crisis. For instance, Papandreou stated that “the EU should have controlled more

rigorously in the past to ensure that the stability pact being observed [...] the EU needs to look at this carefully to see this as a failure of the European institutions” (No.90, p.1). The phrase “we have a strong backing of the European Union” (No.88, p.1) turned into “we need the EU’s backing” (No.90, p.1). This change will be examined in detail in relation to different topics in the following sections.

5.2.2.1. Europeanness of Greek Political Elites in Foreign and Security Issues

Along with the general tendency in this time period, the Greek political elite seems to have hesitation in their self-definition as European in the foreign and security policy issues. Following graph illustrate this tendency in the period between 2009 and 2015. There are coded 22 documents for the foreign and security issues in this time period. 3 of them are valued as 1. 1 of them is valued as 2. 4 of them are valued as 3. 5 of them are valued as 4. 9 of them are valued as 5. The Greek political elite’s European identification in this topic for that period can be seen in the following graph (see Graph 12).



Graph 12. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in the Subject of European Foreign and Security in the period between 2009 and 2015.

Before the crisis was revealed with its real dimensions and austerities started to be implemented, identification level was still high. The Greek political elite was restating that “Greece is a European country” (No.77, p.6). For instance, the then PM George Papandreou described the extreme nationalism spreading through the continent as “one of our big challenges as Europeans” (No.86, p.1). In the same speech, Papandreou also extensively uses the words such as “European family”, “our diversity”, “we” (meaning Europeans).

Like in the early period, bilateral issues between Turkey and Greece are discussed on the European level within the context of Turkey’s accession process. For instance, in the continental shelf issue the then FM Dora Bakoyannis stated that “if Turkey wishes to become an EU member state – as it says it does – then it should honour its signature” (referring to the Ankara Protocol on the continental shelf) (No.80, p.2). Even further, Bakoyannis asserted the Greek position that “we want to see Turkey become a full member of the EU [...] We think it is in Greece’s interest and in Europe’s interest [...] But without shortcuts bypassing our principles” (No.82, p.2). This statement regarding similarity of interest should be noted. The same position continues on the Macedonia’s membership process which Greece consistently tries to block. Macedonian membership to the EU, which is stated as joining to “our European family”, is conditioned on the resolution of the name issue in line with the Greek position (No.83, p3). In both cases, the Greek political elite consistently refers to the EU as the side of the issues: “we argued that the European Union must have dignity and that its word must be credible to third countries [...] I think that through our positions we can only defend this credibility of the European Union” (No.85, p.1).

However, as the crisis deepens, the Greek political elite started to emphasize on alternatives for the foreign policy orientations for the country. For instance, when Syriza won the elections and Alexis Tsipras became prime minister, one of the first steps he took was to reestablish the ties with Russia.²⁵² Even though, this attempt was

²⁵² Anon, (2018). [online] Available at: <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201609101045182553-greece-tsipras-deepening-ties-russia/> [Accessed 2 Aug. 2018].

not welcomed on the EU side²⁵³, A. Tsipras was insisting on his stance in a way that appear as making choices between different options:

“I’d like to address the many comments and public statements made in the past days by European officials regarding Greece’s intention to reestablish its relations with Russia. To be clear, Greece is a sovereign country with the right to engage in a multifaceted foreign policy and to utilize its geopolitical role as a European, Mediterranean and Balkan country, a country of the wider Black Sea neighborhood. We fully respect our commitments to all international organizations that we are a part of, while also exploring all possibilities at the international level to promote mutually beneficial partnerships with a view – always- to defending the interests of the Greek people” (No.166, p.1).

As can be seen from the above passage, A. Tsipras states his position as “defending the interests of the Greek people” through engaging in a “multifaceted foreign policy”. Greece is described not only as a European country but also as a Balkan and Mediterranean country. The same description of Greece with reference to these regions continued in A. Tsipras’ speeches: “as a European, Mediterranean and Balkan country, as well as one belonging to the wider Black Sea neighborhood, Greece seeks to be a bridge of cooperation in its region” (No.178, p.1). Therefore, it can be argued that it holds different geopolitical identities at the same time. In this sense, utilizing one of these identities can be justifiable on the basis of “the interests of the Greek people”. In this role that A. Tsipras attributes to Greece, emphasis on establishing different partnerships and enhancement of relations with Russia play a crucial role. A. Tsipras pledged that he will “seek to become a bridge of cooperation both in our region and beyond, with our traditional friends such as Russia, but also with new global and regional organizations” (*ibid*). References for strengthening relations with Russia is important in the sense that Russia traditionally constitutes the “other” of Europe.²⁵⁴ Even though it does not necessarily mean that alignment with Russia is giving up on Europe, in times of crisis it tells about the hesitations occurred on the European identity of the Greek political elite.


²⁵³ Nougayrede, N. (2018). [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/02/tsipras-moscow-risks-putin-useful-idiot> [Accessed 2 Aug. 2018].

²⁵⁴ Thomas Diez (2004). Europe's others and the return of geopolitics, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17:2, 319-335, DOI: 10.1080/0955757042000245924, p.325.

After discussing the identity change occurred in the area of foreign and security policy, it is time to continue with another topic area that the Greek political elite show high level of identification before the crisis.

5.2.2.2. Europeanness of Greek Political Elites in the Course of European Integration

The Greek political elite used to display positive identification with the EU on the integration issue before the crisis. This tendency continued until the early time of the crisis. There are 16 documents coded in this topic area. None of them are valued as 1 or 2. 4 of them are valued as 3. 5 of them are valued as 4. And, 7 of them are valued as 5. It might be argued that there is no sharp decline in this topic. However, in an area which consistently displays the highest level of identification, even the value 3 reflects certain change. Graph 13 shows the tendency in this topic area between the years 2009 and 2015.



Graph 13. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in the Subject of European Integration in period between 2009 and 2015.

The Greek political elite restated their expectation that “we want more Europe” at that period (No.78, p.1). Also, empowerment of European citizens within the European integration is continued to be supported on the Greek side. For instance, regarding the pessimism reflected in the 2009 Eurobarometer data among citizens for the future of Europe, the then Deputy FM Valinakis stated what needs to be done on the side of Europe as “there is no greater challenge than our winning back the trust of European citizens as a united Europe” (*ibid*).

Likewise, the tendency to support the integration of Balkan region to the EU continues at that time. This issue is important in the sense that the Greek political elite describe integration of Balkans as “bringing the Balkans to our European family” (No.89, p.6). This “European family” was further described as a “family of common values” (*ibid*). The then PM G. Papandreou clearly expressed that in their efforts for “building a federation of nation-state” in Europe, they expect to embrace the Balkans in future (No.89, p.5). In his words, this future is described as “our common European future, a future based on common principles, common values, common institutions, common economic development, which would become the glue keeping us together” (No.89, p.2). Moreover, emphasis on the further integration was restated as it was before: “we need more Europe, not less” (No.98, p.2).

As the crisis deepens, rhetoric changes, and identification level starts to decrease. It is suggested that “the extent of the crisis and of the associated recession and unemployment has undermined the confidence of EU citizens in the very idea of European integration” (No.145, p.3). The situation prevails in the process of European integration at that time (20.07.2013) was described as:


“After six years of crisis, with many of its countries in recession and suffering from high unemployment, the great political question facing the EU is the deconstruction of the classical historical narrative of Europe [...] Now we are facing new forms and new waves of Euroscepticism in almost all the countries [...] Consequently, the biggest problem facing the EU and European integration is not institutional, but political and, I would say, more value-based and intellectual: it concerns the way we think about these issues” (No.142, p.1).

The crisis is assumed to damage European integration. The Greek political

elite constantly reiterate its support for the integration process as mentioned earlier. It is described as a way to the final “united Europe”. They indicate their wish to be “at the center-heart” of Europe. This stance is evaluated as an important indicator of European identity. Now, it is suggested that European integration facing challenges which damage “the very idea of European integration”. An important symbol for European identity is eroding for the Greek political elite.

5.2.2.3. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in Daily Political Agenda

There are some speeches that are mostly occupied with daily political agenda i.e. a speech given in an opening ceremony of a research institute, a statement regarding a natural disaster, opening speech in a celebration event, etc. These documents are mainly shorter than others and cannot be categorized within the other four categories. Also, none of these topics is repeated more than twice among all the documents. However, they contain references for European identity. Therefore, they are categorized under daily political agenda topic for the sake of brevity. There are 29 documents coded under this category. Two of them are valued as 1. 7 of them are valued as 3. 10 of them are valued as 4. And, 10 of them are valued as 5. The illustration regarding these numbers can be seen in the following Graph 14.



Graph 14. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in Daily Political Agenda (2002-2015)

In line with other categories, the level of European identification shows ups and downs during the crisis. Before the crisis there is constancy with 4 and 5 values, and trend line stay in between these values. However, as the crisis deepens, identification level starts to fall so as the trend line. There appears only one document which is valued as 4 during the time of crisis. This speech belongs to the then PM Antonis Samaras. During the time that A. Samaras delivered this speech, Greece was experiencing growth at first time from the beginning of the crisis. Therefore, the political elite were employing more moderate tone in speeches.

On the other hand, the Greek political elite demonstrate a distant position from their European “partners” with the impact of the crisis. For instance, the PM A. Tsipras’ interview with the German *der Tagesspiegel*, which is about the accusations that German people are providing the Greek pension system with their taxes, reveals anger and contains predications targeting the other side. Following paragraph from this speech is an excerpt:

“when the dialogue is ongoing with no end in sight then the methods used are akin to those described by the great German philosopher Schopenhauer in “The Art of Always Being Right”! [...] Benjamin Disraeli used to say that there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics. Let us not allow an obsessive-compulsive use of indices to destroy the comprehensive agreement that we prepared over the previous period of intensive negotiations. The duty rests on all of our shoulders” (No.177, p.2).

The side that is described as “being always right” and “obsessive-compulsive” is being accused of destroying the “comprehensive agreement” prepared by the Greek side. The Greek side which are working hard in the making of this “comprehensive agreement” is emphasized. In this line, the Greek side is described as the one that has undergone a period of “intensive negotiations”. On the other hand, the other side tells lies through statistics which is considered as one form of lies in Benjamin Disraeli’s sense. Hence, this division in the language use reflects the attitude of the Greek political elite concerning the existence of different beings: the Greek side and the other side. Even though, the other side is not directly named in the document, it can be deduced that this other side has a power to “destroy” an agreement within the Union, so is from Europe. Therefore, it can be argued that the Greek political elite distance itself from certain parties of Europe.


Now, it is time to proceed with the Eurozone topic that will reveal further confirmations for the impact of the debt crisis on the Europeanness of the Greek political elite.

5.2.2.4. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in the Subject of Eurozone

The Eurozone topic constitutes the core theme of this thesis. Therefore, the argument of this thesis will be confirmed or refuted in this topic area. There are 86 coded documents for the period between 2009 and 2015 for this topic. 14 of these documents are valued as 1. 12 of them are valued as 2. 31 of them are valued as 3. 16 of them are valued as 4. And, 13 of them are valued as 5. The detailed illustration of this topic in the period between 2009 and 2005 can be seen in the following graph (Graph 14).

As mentioned before, at the beginning of the crisis the Greek political elite was not critical of the EU or their place within it. This might be a result of policy expectations from the EU side with regard to the solution of the crisis. This expectation is expressed by the then PM George Papandreou: the EU can back Greece by giving message to the markets, which “we are here to guarantee that

Greece will not have a problem in borrowing” (No.91, p.1). Moreover, this expectation is expressed in such a way that it frames the Greek crisis as a European crisis which would have domino effect throughout the continent. For instance, Papandreou stated that “standing by Greece, as it makes deep and reasonable reforms, is in the interests of Europe, so price of not acting together will be higher [...] not only for Greece but for all Europe” (No.92, p.3). The following words better explain attitude of the Greek political elite at that time: “I would prefer a European solution. I would prefer a European solution as part of the Eurozone, as a European, as an ardent European myself, and being able to show the world that Europe can act together” (No.93, p.6). This position regarding the nature of crisis, whether it is a Greek or a European crisis, regularly restated in speeches throughout the crisis: “if the last year has been a critical test for Greece, it has also been a major test for Europe, a test of our collective ability to react swiftly and effectively, to find innovative solutions to unprecedented problems, a test of the construct and the architecture of our common currency called the euro” (No.101, p.2). Also, it continues with the restatement of the belief that solution will be reached with the help of the EU and it will not “simply be a Greek success, it will be a success for what Europe stands for: solidarity, cooperation, strength, peace and unity” (No.103, p.2).



Graph 15. European Identification of the Greek Political Elites in the Subject of Eurozone in period between 2009 and 2015.

As the crisis deepened, the rhetoric also started to change. Direction of accusations regarding the causes of crisis shifts from Greece’s structural problems i.e. clientelism, lack of transparency, etc. to the EU. For instance, the then PM G. Papandreou replied a question, which is asked in the parliament by the then leader of Syriza Alexis Tsipras regarding the responsibility of the crisis, as “do you know why this happen? Officially, it’s because of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty [...] Unfortunately the European Union is also partly responsible for not detecting what was going on in time” (No.95, p.2). This blame shift is important in the sense that it shows the attitude change on the Greek political elite in their expectations from the EU for producing a solution to the crisis. EU side was not willing to support Greece at the beginning. The EU decided to step in when it became obvious that the country could not manage to get out of the crisis by itself.

When the EU decided to help, the attitude was expressed as “we could have been quicker in our response but if four months ago you said that Europe would have in place a fully functioning support mechanism and Greece would be well on its way to fiscal consolidation a few would have believed us” (No.97, p.4). With a moderate tone, Greek call for help from the EU was restated at every occasion during that

time:

“As Europeans, but as progressive citizens and states people too, we must define a Europe that is unified in more than its name, a Europe where financial and political coordination is possible, but also a place where the old can be cared for, the young can find employment, the migrants can feel at home, the entrepreneurs can innovate and the politicians – well, we must make this a place where politicians are neither the servants of the market nor the servants of a state but simply servants to their citizens” (No.99, p.4).

One important feature of the speeches delivered at time is that they constantly try to assert Greece’s importance for the Union. For instance, the then PM G. Papandreou described the Greece’s position as: “Greece also has many other unique advantages. We are not an isolated economy. Greece is not only a core member of the European Union. We are geopolitically and economically linked to emerging economies to the east, north and south, from Turkey to the Middle East, from the Black Sea to the Balkans” (No.102, p.3).

When Greece and Troika agreed on the first bailout package and started to negotiate austerities attached to it, ambivalence regarding the EU’s, especially regarding the member states’ attitudes concerning providing bailout for another member state, the Greek position became visible in speeches. The then PM G. Papandreou expressed this situation as:

“I think we need to create more of a solidarity even in Europe, because what we saw also in Europe was a tendency to say, “oh, these bad Greeks,” “oh, these bad Irish,” or whatever, sort of trying to say that the problem was inherent in some sense of a DNA. No such thing. Each country has its problems, and we have to live up to them. But we have to work together to solve these” (No.105, p.6).

This attitude that the EU is not doing its part for the solution of the crisis and not showing the necessary solidarity became widespread in the documents starting from the end of 2010.

“The financial crisis in 2008 seemed a perfect opportunity for the world to push through these and many more reforms [...] And what we have able to achieve over the years, these past years is to create an understanding among ourselves that our individual, national and global interest and political agenda are one and the same. But we need to communicate this to our societies and in particular to the younger generation. One that sees that we do have common problems, that humanity is united and facing common problems. But,

however, we are not working and acting in a way which is cooperative and successful and that's why our youth feels very disempowered, often very disenchanting with politics. However, we have seen the lack of will [...] But why aren't we moving? What is lacking is quite simple: political courage, political will, for a new agenda and new policies" (No.106, p.3).

This feeling turned out to be anger on the next phase when bailout to Greece created outrage in other member states'. Along with Greece, other member states experiencing crisis (Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain) were targeted. These countries were even called PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain).²⁵⁵ This response from other member states for helping another "fellow Europeans" was met with disappointment and anger on the Greek side. The then PM G. Papandreou expressed his feelings as:

"...the democratic spirit we must not lose today in Europe. I say that because I see nationalism and scapegoating creeping into our public discourse. I say that, for example, because I belong to a group called the PIGS. Yes, I don't know if I look it, but I am also one of the PIGS. And I am proud to be one of the PIGS, which stands for Portugal, Italy or Ireland, Greece and Spain" (No.108, p.5).

However, the Greek political elite seem to be cautious with their rhetoric at that time (2010-2011). Criticisms are made along with the restatement of their continuing European vision. For instance, three days later from the above speech the then PM G. Papandreou asserted that "the European vision is still alive in our citizens, in Greece and at the level of individuals" (No.109, p.2) in a meeting with the then President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso in Brussel. This can be explained on the basis that the Greek political elite is well aware that Greece cannot survive the crisis without European help. Therefore, the Greek political elite thought that solution must be sought on the EU level. In accordance with these premises – trying not to antagonize the EU side in return for help to survive the crisis -, the then PM G. Papandreou thanked Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel with following words: "A year ago, Greece was on the verge of bankruptcy. We then in the European Union together took important decisions. These decisions gave us the time, gave us the necessary resources to save our

²⁵⁵ Polychroniou,

country, but also to chart a very different course, a viable course for our economy” (No.113, p.2). In the time he was delivering this speech, the Troika was imposing the second round of austerity measures to the first bailout provided in 2010. Labor unions were calling for general strike throughout the country. The people were taking the streets to protest these measures. Hence, taking into consideration these developments in the country, this positive language of the Greek political elite can be explained by pragmatic policy choice.

Likewise, right before the second bailout was agreed to Greece (July 2011), the then PM G. Papandreou expressed his gratitude to the then President of the Eurogroup Jean Claude Juncker on his efforts to reach a solution to the crisis while emphasizing that “we have all become aware that this crisis has become a crisis of our shared European home” (No.122, p.1). He also indicated that “if there is a strong commitment from the European Union there will be a strong commitment from Greece at the same time” (No.120, p.1). Again, this time Greece’s financial outlook was downgraded by the international rating agencies. Also, protests were spreading throughout the country. Despite the national outrage taking place in the country, Papandreou was insisting on the European solution:

“In these challenging times we need a political discourse, a political spirit that says: I am proud to be German, as I am proud to be Greek, as I am proud to be French, to be Spanish, to be Dutch, to be Polish, as I am proud to be European. And this crisis must unite us, to make Europe a stronger Europe, one that lives up to the common aspirations of our citizens” (No.124, p.5).

In the following period, when discussions about write-off of 50% of Greece’s debts were conditioned on further austerities, Papandreou’s rhetoric was shifting again. He started criticizing the EU side for not responding needs which are necessary for the EU to sustain its existence:

“...now is the time for Europe, for collective decisions in Europe, because over the last period we have seen a growing lack of faith by our citizens, not only Greek citizens but a European-wide lack of faith of the citizens of Europe, in our governance structures, in the fact that we are moving into a Europe which is seeing the cohesion undermined, economic cohesion, political cohesion and social cohesion, being undermined” (No.125, p.1).

Then, he called for referendum to get confidence vote to continue with the rescue package that contained further austerities (No.126). Given the fact that “the

threat of a Greek exit from the Eurozone if Athens failed to approve a bailout accord hammered out by EU leaders last month” (October 2011), this action was met with strong opposition among the political elite.²⁵⁶ Papandreou resigned, and a coalition government was formed with the support of PASOK, New Democracy and LAOS. The very first thing the then new PM Lucas Papademos did was to send a letter to “the heads of the European Council, European Commission, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, Herman van Rompuy, Jose Manuel Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker, Mario Draghi And Christine Lagarde”, asserting that the main task of the new government is “to implement the decisions of the Euro Summit of 26 October, 2011 and the associated economic policies [...] the government is strongly committed to fulfilling this task” (No.130, p.1). This incident is important in the sense that the Greek political elite still strongly believed in the European solution to the crisis and any obstacle which would undermine this course would be prevented. Even though there were critical points in which the EU’s position was questioned as mentioned before, the Greek political elite was defending this attitude.

From November 2011 until June 2012, this coalition government tried to implement the austerities showing the European side that Greece remained on the European course. However, when another bailout was agreed with tougher austerities, Greece went to the poll for early election in which anti-austerity propaganda gained incredible support.²⁵⁷ The importance of this election is that far-right, and far-left parties increased their vote through their anti-austerity propaganda. New Democracy under the leadership of Antonis Samaras, who was propagating against the austerities, established a coalition government with PASOK. Even though these two parties and their leaders were agreed to keep going on the current European path, critics on the EU became more visible in their language in Greece. The then PM A. Samaras replied a question on the European manner to treat Greece

²⁵⁶ Smith, H. and Kington, T. (2011). Papandreou out as Greek leaders agree unity government deal. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/papandreou-greek-leaders-unity-deal> [Accessed 14 May 2018].

²⁵⁷ Smith, H. & Treanor, J. (2014). [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/29/greece-crisis-president-snap-election> [Accessed 2 Aug. 2018].

as:

“Expectations were that we were doomed. It would be a matter for the Europeans to solve as to whether to accept us or not, with very high chances of us being kicked out of the euro zone. I cannot allow a third party to decide on my country’s future. I have to make sure that we are changing things so this alternative for the Europeans is not there. Some of them would love to have a Greek exit. I do not want Greece to become the negative paradigm for the others — i.e. “make sure you follow exactly what we tell you, otherwise you will be like Greece” (No.133, p.3).

Despite the fact that A. Samaras reinstated their position on remaining on the European course, wording tells a lot about the binary opposition manifested. He uses the “us” nomination to refer to Greece and Greek people, while choosing to use “Europeans” and “them” to refer to the European side. Given the fact that this coalition government was criticized for its pro-European stance, this statement constitutes an important turning point as far as the Greek political elites’ perception is concerned. Samaras’ ruling period from June 2012 to December 2014 shows a lot of ups and downs (see Graph 14) in identification with Europe. The Greek political elite continued to emphasize their “European perspective” in sentences starting with “we, as Europeans” (No.140, p.5). On the other hand, the then Deputy PM Venizelos described the EU in a way that shows division within it:

“There are two institutional worlds: The institutional world described in the Treaty of Lisbon, with the increased competencies of the European Parliament, the role of the Commission and the Council, and the real institutional world of the Eurozone, of the Eurogroup, of the European Council, of the fast, high-pressure intergovernmental decisions aimed at confronting the recycling of the crisis. But the most important thing is that it voids the basic notion of the institutional equality of the member states; a notion on which European integration is founded. There are now two blatant inequalities. There are governments that decide, and there are governments that are obliged to carry out orders to save their countries. There are countries that belong to the hard core of “virtuous” countries, and governments that belong to the periphery of “prodigal” countries. There are lenders and borrowers. There are those who answer to their Parliaments and their peoples, but in the end feel that they have the capacity to decide for other countries as well” (No.142, p.2).

This statement is crucial within the framework of this thesis. As mentioned earlier regarding the existence of two different development cultures (underdog and

modern cultures) and core-periphery relations among the member states within the Union, the European world was described in a way accepting this difference. In the year 2013, Greece was going through one of the worst crises ever experienced in the history of the country. Unemployment rate arise to 26.8% which constitutes the highest rate among the member states. Likewise, youth unemployment was measured around 60%.²⁵⁸ During that time, the then Deputy PM Venizelos answered a question regarding the possibility of further measures to ensure the growth in Greece:

“Our stance is very clear. The Greek economy and society – and Greek politics – do not need and cannot bear new, restrictive measures. What we are doing through such hard work and at such a cost is the only feasible and safe path out of the memorandum. But we need a comprehensive National Reconstruction Plan. Ours. But it is unfair and dangerous for some political forces to bear the weight of this responsible and difficult choice while others stand on our shoulders and play the hero, the good guy – play it sensitive in the name of a return to the bad aspects of the past that created this crisis. This is a treacherous, dead-end road. It is a cheap and tragic game played on the anxiety of our people” (No.144, p.2).

For a government who pledged to remain in the path of memoranda, these words reveal a lot about the impact of the crisis. Reforms and measures that Greece is forced to undertake are resulted in the discussions between Greece, EU institutions and IMF. However, these reforms are based on the neoliberal principles called as “neoliberal pledge”.²⁵⁹ It necessitates strict cuts in public spending (resulting in people losing their jobs), privatization of state undertakings from health care to transportation, and other measures that are expected to lead to the growth in economy. The EU’s insistence on the implementation of these measures causes an outrage among the Greek political elites even for the moderate ones such as A. Samaras and his government. As seen in the paragraph above, in this context the Greek political elite prefer to differentiate the sides through the words employed such as “we”, “ours”, “others”, “our people”, and “Greek society”.

Furthermore, Greece was experiencing small recovery in its economy in the year 2014. It was met by pleasure among the political elite. The then PM A. Samaras

²⁵⁸ BBC News. (2018). Greece profile. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17373216> [Accessed 3 Jan. 2018].

²⁵⁹ Polychroniou

reasserted his belief in Europe. The following phrases are retrieved from his speech revealing the growth rate achieved through from 2013 to 2014: “common sense of belonging”, “developing common identity”, “common past”, and “common future” built through the efforts of “we, Europeans” (No.152). However, it cannot be defined as total revival of the European feelings. The then PM Venezilos commented on Greece experiencing growth as “those who are mistrustful do not understand, because they do not want to admit that Greece has, thanks to the sacrifices of its citizens, shaped the conditions for a definitive exit from the crisis” (No.153, p.2).

Syriza winning the national elections and Alexis Tsipras becoming prime minister resulted in sharp decline in the European identification of the Greek political elite. Syriza is known for its anti-austerity stance during the crisis. In line with that, PM A. Tsipras’ speech, in the parliament when he was presenting the Government’s program, clearly indicates the difference between Europeans and Greeks in his language. He repeatedly employed the “us vs them” language in his indications: “Greece and its European partners” (p.3), “the Greek people and the European people” (p.2) “The previous governments as well as our partners are responsible for an austerity program imposed on the Greek people” (p.2) “To serve the interest of our people. To serve the national interest.” (p.1) “the restoration of our country’s equal role within the institutional framework of the European Union, the restoration of our peoples’ dignity” (p.1). These word choices such as the “Europeans” and “Greeks”, which were seldomly seen in any speech until that time at this frequency, clearly demonstrates that the Greek political elite do not identify themselves with “Europeans” as referred in these sentences. Predications attached to these nominations also demonstrate this argument. For instance, in the sentence of “the previous governments as well as our partners are responsible for an austerity program imposed on the Greek people”, Tsipras locates the partners and Greek people on different sides. On these different sides, partners are the ones that are found responsible for the current situation in Greece. Also:

“We are witnessing historical moments. During the dramatic developments of the last days, the final word was expressed by the Greek people. It did not assign responsibility. It deposited its soul. It did not authorize anyone. It took its fate into its own hands. It did not vote against. It honored the previous generations that resisted and supported this country and safeguarded the hope

for the coming generations. It did not simply defy the blackmails and the ultimatums. It stood up. This people only deserve admiration. It deserves to walk proudly, it deserves to live with dignity. The current government can simply be the voice of this people. Regarding the honor, history and culture that this people carry in their luggage, we can only be its will. This is why we are not going to negotiate our history. This is why we are not going to negotiate the dignity of this people. These are sacred and unnegotiable values. We are flesh out of the flesh of this people, we originate from the pages of the history of this people, it is this people that we will serve” (No.158, p.13).

This passage from the same speech shows how Greek people are positioned against the other with its deeds. The Greek people represent the side that stand out against “the blackmails and ultimatums” of the other. The other side is the one that forces the Greek people “to deposit its soul”, and that “assigns responsibility on Greek people” and “authorize” it. In this context, the political elite position itself on the side of Greek people and identify it with these words: “We are flesh out of the flesh of this people” (p.13).

Besides, the Greek political elite increasingly deepen the division among the EU and Greek sides in its language. For instance, A. Tsipras described the negotiation process with the EU as a war between the EU and Greece:

“I want to thank from the button of my heart all of you, the big majority of the people, for standing by the side of the Greek government. That was our strongest weapon during negotiations. With this decisive support we managed to win the battle, but not yet the war. The real difficulties, not only those having to do with the negotiations and with the relations with our partners, are ahead of us” (No.159, p.1).

This description of the relations in which a war taking place is an important indicator of the main argument of this thesis. If someone likens negotiating with a partner to a war, then he or she definitely does not share the same identity with this partner. War takes place between different sides not within the same side. A. Tsipras further reiterated his position in different speeches: “We ask from the citizens, the people, the social classes –the memorandum victims- to stand beside us in this difficult and tough fight, to support this national effort, our effort to lift our country and people out from the memoranda mud” (No.165, p.3). He repeatedly emphasized this fight taking place between Greece and Europe as “following five months of tough negotiations, our partners submitted a proposal-ultimatum at the Eurogroup

meeting, taking aim at Greek democracy and the Greek people” (No.180, p.1). Moreover, he continues to employ “us vs them language” in his references: “We call on the other side, after five consecutive years of unrealistic targets and continuous failures, to adhere to realism” (No.168, p.5). He even called the EU as “the kingdom of Europe” while describing the policies imposed by the EU “to achieve a sustainable growth” (No.168, p.2).

In line with its anti-austerity stance, Syriza and A. Tsipras started to negotiate new terms instead of austerity measures since they formed the government. Even though, they strongly criticized the European administration’s policies imposed on the Greek side, they also continued to refer to the “European” values and solidarity as a key to the solution of the crisis. As mentioned above, their calls revolved around the normative meaning of the Europe, which would make other member states to unite to save Greece out of crisis. A. Tsipras stacked to this tradition among political elite. Therefore, there still appear certain documents valued as 4 or 5 during that time (see Graph 14).

However, the negotiations were not resulted as expected by Greece. A. Tsipras expressed his disappointment:

“I must confess, to you and to the Greek people, that the proposal submitted to me by EC President Juncker, on behalf of the three institutions, came as an unpleasant surprise. I would have never imagined that the institutions would submit a proposal that would not take into account the common ground reached following the three-month negotiation with the Brussels Group. I could not imagine that the Greek Government’s honest efforts to reach a fair and comprehensive solution would be perceived by some as a sign of weakness [...] I want to reassure the Greek people that they should be proud of this effort and they should be calm. Proud, because the Greek government will not bow to unreasonable demands. And calm, because our patience and our perseverance while negotiating, our endurance, will soon bear fruit. We will defend, as best we can, the right of all of our people to live with dignity, but above all, to live in conditions that will allow for a future of prosperity, progress, hope and optimism. And I am confident that we will succeed” (No.173, pp.2-4).

In addition, the Greek political elite continued to express its disappointment regarding attitude of European side insisting on the austerities. As seen in the previous statement, this disappointment is reflected in the language which constantly

employs “us vs them” references. For instance: “This is the great challenge for Europe and Greece” (No.174, p.1), and “We call on our partners to be clear on their goals: Do they want to achieve a solution to the Greek problem or do they want this problem to continue without end?” (No.176, p.3). This rhetoric became substantially tougher in time: “If Europe supports such an incomprehensible attitude, if political leaders insist upon this, then they should be prepared to bear the cost of what happens next—which would not be favorable for anyone in Europe” (No.175, p.1).

Likewise, predications deployed for the European and Greek sides also differ. Greek political elite constantly used negative attributions in their references for the former, while positive attributions for the Greek people substantially increased. It is reasserted that they represent the Greek people henceforth identify with the Greek people in their fight against “undemocratic management” of the crisis:

“We have a four-year mandate. We received a country which was a debt colony. This is the challenge we are facing. A challenge that will be determined largely by the support of the Greek people. We have their support, and will continue to have it, so as long as we are honest with them and we passionately defend their interests” (No. 176, p.4).

When they call for a referendum to decide on implementing the austerities asked from Troika, they restate their stance with the Greek people who are assumed to have an anti-austerity therefore anti-European attitude. In a speech A. Tsipras propagated for the “No” vote in referendum:

“We are facing a historic responsibility to not let the struggles and sacrifices of the Greek people be in vain, and to strengthen democracy and our national sovereignty—and this responsibility weighs upon us. Our responsibility for our country’s future [...] tomorrow I will ask for a short extension of the program -in writing- from the leaders of the EU and the institutions, so that the Greek people can decide free of pressure and blackmail, as stipulated by our country’s Constitution and Europe’s democratic tradition [...] A Europe without democracy will be a Europe without an identity and without a compass” (No.180, p.2).

Before, the Greek political elite were widely accepting Greek responsibility for the solution of the crisis. They were also indicating the necessity of burden-sharing in the causes and solutions of the crisis with the EU. In moderate speeches, they were using the phrase “European dimension of the crisis” in their addresses.

However, as the crisis deepened, and the EU was not responding in a “democratic” manner as called by the Greek political elite, this burden-sharing turned to blame-shifting to the EU side. For instance, in a speech A. Tsipras stated that: “Let us not fool ourselves: the so-called Greek problem is not a Greek problem. It is a European problem. The problem is not Greece. The problem is the Eurozone, and its very structure” (No.178, p.2).

During the period ahead of referendum, A. Tsipras’ speeches became more visible in his detachment from the European identity. He continued to employ the term “war” to describe the relations with the EU, such as: “We are a nation that loves peace. But when war is declared on us, we know how to fight, and we know how to win” (No.181, p.2)” and “They will finally understand that Greece is not going to surrender, that Greece is not a game that is over” (p.3).

Furthermore, A. Tsipras accused the EU for their “non-European” practices during his “No” campaign. He represented the “No” vote as standing against the “ultimatums, to blackmail, to fear” imposed by the EU (No.184, p.1). In return, he positioned himself and his approach, which he utilized for the administration of the EU, on the “real” European side:

“The European Union foundation principles were democracy, solidarity, equality, mutual respect. These principles were not based on blackmails and ultimatum. And especially in these crucial times, no one has the right to put in danger these principles. The Greek government will continue decisively to give the fight in favor of these principles. We’ll continue to give the fight on behalf of the European people and of course on behalf of the Greek people. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ statement after the European Summit” (No.179, p.1).

He stated that the Greek people will remind the “true” nature of Europe. “The dignity of the Greek people in the face of blackmail and injustice will send a message of hope and pride to all of Europe” (No.182, p.1). He accused people sitting on EU institutions for being “timid politicians who are unable to think as Europeans” and Europe for behaving “in an undemocratic manner” (No.183, p.2). Moreover, he repeated his position as: “the Europe that we knew, the Europe that stands for its founding values, doesn’t involve blackmail and ultimatums [...] and today, at this hour, all of Europe has its eyes on you, on the Greek people, on the three million

who are poor, on the 1.5 million who are unemployed” (No.185, p.1). Furthermore, A. Tsipras utilized the mythology to support his position: “Greece, our country, was, is and will remain the cradle of European civilization [...] According to mythology, it was from this very place that Zeus abducted Europe. It is from this very place that the austerity technocrats want to abduct Europe again (No.185, p.1).

After referendum resulted with the rejection of austerities, A. Tsipras appreciated the results in a sense that strengthened the anti-European attitude he adopted: “The Greek side will continue their efforts, having the strong support of the Greek people’s verdict” (No.188, p.1) and “Greece will continue to fight, and we will continue to fight, so that we can return to growth, regain our lost national sovereignty. We earned our popular sovereignty. We sent a message of democracy, a message of dignity throughout Europe and the world” (No.191, p.1).

Besides, it is important to notice that criticisms, which are directed to the EU’s position towards the crisis and Greece, revolve around the non-European practices of the EU. That is, the Greek political elite constantly underline the importance of acting on the basis on European values -solidarity, unity, common values, democracy - which are definitive characteristics of European identity. It is suggested that “we need a “European” European Union” (No.146, p.7), a “Europe that again shines brightly and focuses on its values: democracy, the rule of law, social cohesion, justice and solidarity” (No.150, p.4). Reviewing the positive statements during the crisis reveals that almost all of them emphasize this similar point i.e. need for a “European” Union that represents the core values of being European i.e. “solidarity among Europeans” (No.155, p.1). Greece has a place in this description of Europe in the eyes of the Greek political elite. According to A. Tsipras, Greece has reaffirmed its place during the 1861 Greek Revolution which he describes “the most European moment in the history of modern Greece” (No.164, p.1). From that moment onwards, “the progressive features of the Greek Revolution present and gain a European dimension through their violent clash with the old regime” (No.164, p.2) and Greece became “an irreplaceable part of the European reality” (No.164, p3). For instance, see Table 3.

Furthermore, the Greek political elite called for “a decisive shift in favour of collective interests and popular aspirations” and legitimized this call on the basis that “this is the only way to regain the heart of Europeans and restore the prestige of the European project” (No.163, p.1). The need for the policies, ensuring the so called prestige of Europe, is asserted as: “We owe this to Europe and its peoples, who have the right to preserve their history and to wish for a future free from all kinds of totalitarianism” (162, p.1) and “The EU, of which Greece is a member, must rediscover its true course by returning to its founding statutory principles and declarations: solidarity, democracy, social justice” (No.178, p.1). At the end, he asserts that “a Europe without democracy will be a Europe without an identity and without a compass” (No.180, p.2). As can be seen from all these calls for a “more European” EU, the EU the Greek political elite referred to is different than the European identity that exists in Europe. In line with European identity literature, a nation-state like identity which makes the sacrifices easier in times of crisis does not exist in Europe.

Moreover, European identity is regarded in the sense that only small percent of elite hold to the extent of their coinciding interests. At the beginning, when the Greek political elite called for European solution underlining the solidarity which necessitates to help each other in time of crisis, indeed they were calling for others to give up their interests to help Greece. However, European identity, which existed among the member states, continued to be alive thanks to their shared interests. Therefore, it can be asserted that the Greek political elite detach themselves from European identity which is shaped by the current EU practices. In this case, helping Greece survive the crisis would be costly for the EU side especially on the member states’ side, so their response was slow and inefficient until the crisis started to threaten the whole Eurozone region. Hence, reluctance on the common interests would not make it possible to talk about European identity. Greece and the EU are experiencing the eroding of their European identity when they differed on their interests. Greece was more concerned with getting out of the crisis and keeping its credibility in international arena, whilst member states found it difficult to bailout a country for the sake of solidarity. Also, domestic politics made this decision difficult

to take with increasing populism and extreme ideologies throughout the continent.

At the end, as Risse finds out that half of the European population still define itself in exclusive national and mostly national terms.²⁶⁰ In other words, there is no sufficient European identity constructed in the process, henceforth interests are still relevant in the motivations of member states. In this sense, the level of European identity is not powerful enough to supersede the interest driven preferences of national governments. It might be argued that theoretical perspective and conclusion are not in contradiction with each other. However, it does not necessarily reflect the point. Constructivists like rationalists accept the importance of national interests. The difference appears on the point of possibility for change of interests. Constructivists believe that interest would change with enough time passed through constant interactions among actors. In this case, Europe faced with a great challenge in the process of making a collective identity. Hence, national interests based on cost-benefit analysis of each member states came to light.

²⁶⁰ Risse, 2010

Table 3. Some of the phrases adopted in the language of the Greek political elite to refer to the Greek side and European side before and during the crisis.

The Era between 2002 and 2009 (before the crisis outbreak)	
We/Us/Greeks	They/Them/Europe
Nomination/Predication	Nomination/Predication
How they refer to themselves in the European related issues.	How they refer to European side in the same context.
“we, as Europeans” “European citizens (“we” as being part of it) “peoples of Europe (“we” as being part of it)”	“our common family” “our European family”
The Era between 2009 and 2015 (during the crisis)	
“Greek people” “our Greek citizens” “our citizens (versus European citizens)” “Greek government (against EU institutions)” “our lost national sovereignty” “our fight”	“Greek citizens (versus) European citizens” “Europeans at EU institutions” “selfish” “totalitarian” “undemocratic manner” “timid politicians” “European technocrats” “blackmailing” “brutal manner” “injustice” “ultimatums”

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzed the impact of the 2008 Debt Crisis on the Greek political elite's Europeanness. It demonstrated that there has been a decline in attachment to the European identity on the part of the Greek political elite as a result of the 2008 Debt Crisis as has been displayed through use of language.

The Greek political elite started to question their European identity as the crisis has deepened. This hesitation is reflected in their language. Hence, examination of their speeches would reveal this change. To prove this assumption, discourse analysis is employed as a method.

This thesis has tested the Constructivist arguments with regard to identity construction and change. It subscribes to the notion that identities can change over time. Constructivism argues for identity change as a result of constant interaction and social learning. Interests of the actors change as being endogenous to the process. Therefore, the first working hypothesis of this thesis is that the Greek political elite's identity and hence interests are shaped by Europeanness and that they would display solidarity with Europe. On the other hand, rationalist theories see change as an outcome of cost-benefit analyses of rational actors in international arena. They refer to convergence of interests rather than change of interests. If this group of approaches have more explanatory power, then this thesis expects to see a detachment from European identity whenever interests collide as the second working hypothesis.

The thesis first assessed the concept of European identity from various perspectives offered in the literature. As a form of social and collective identity, European identity is utilized for different meanings in accordance with the context. It can be defined as a cultural identity as well as a political identity. As an identity of

masses, it might refer to small percent of society that enjoy the benefits of the EU more than other people and that define themselves as European. It can also refer to a larger community of states that aim to fulfill their interests as being part of this community since it provides less costly ways for certain soft policy areas. Within the context of this thesis, European identity is regarded as an amalgamation of the different usages of the concept. Furthermore, most importantly European identity has been treated as unique for each entity. That is, being European would mean a different thing for a German or for a French, and even more different for a British. For Greece and Greek people, Europeanness as being member of the EU was synonym of being a modern and developed nation throughout the twentieth century.

European Union became the symbol of Europeanness in international arena. In political sense, European identity was introduced by the EU in 1973 and from that moment the EU has substantially tried to empower it. Creation of a collective identity would serve the needs of the continent which was facing with increasing xenophobia, radicalism and populism. In time, the EU adopted nation state tools i.e. anthem, flag, currency, passport in the integration process. These tools provided the EU with concrete symbols in the eyes of people. Moreover, the political elite as the driving force behind the integration process play a crucial role for enhancement of a collective identity for Europe. They both reflect the attitude of their societies and hold a power to change this attitude. Thus, the Greek political elite's European identity is an important indicator of the future Europeanness of the Greek society.

Furthermore, the debt crisis has revealed some aspects of the Greece's adventure on the way of being a member state. Through Europeanization, Greece has gone through transformation process which was expected to bring the country to the line of other developed European countries. It did work in a sense that political instability went away, and democracy was restored. However, problems in economy and administration were lasting. When Greece became a member of the EU in 1981 and member of Eurozone in 2001, the challenges of the country in economy and administration still remained. Transformation of the country with the reforms asked by the EU was not finished yet. The EU was mainly ignoring these problems until the crisis broke out. The solutions, which were offered to Greece, considerably

damaged the life in the country. Greece was asked to undertake challenging structural reforms which caused outrage among people and politicians of the country. The EU side was perceived as demanding and forcing these reforms during the negotiations. EU's positive image as an 'ideal' model of modernity changed on the eyes of the Greek political elite and people as a result of EU's intimidating stance during the crisis.

This stance was confirmed through the discourse analysis of the Greek political elite's speeches from 2002 to 2015. It was observed that the Greek political elite used to define themselves as European. That is, they show high level of support to European integration through which Europeanization of societies become possible, which corresponds to a social European identity. They also strongly supported the common foreign and security initiatives, which can be associated with international European identity. With the beginning of the debt crisis, this picture has substantially changed. At first, the stance of the Greek political elite was contradictory showing ups and downs in their language use. They were not totally detaching themselves, but they held a prudent stance towards the EU. This was a legitimate position for the elites of a country which persistently sought the ways to modernize itself through European course. Apparently, they still saw the EU as their only chance to recover.

As the crisis deepened, the contents of speeches expose a substantial decrease in their level of identification with the EU. The political elite started to adopt more divisive words when referring to the EU and Greece in their speeches. The speeches now more frequently portray two different worlds, being the EU on the one hand and Greece on the other as opposed to earlier speeches which depicted one world, one people, i.e. Europeans.

This apparent change of identity in the shape of detachment from Europeanness can be explained by the deep impact of a crisis. As Risse argues that a weak or secondary European identity might not survive a crisis.²⁶¹ The Greek political elite might have developed a European identity since membership as a social, collective identity. This can be demonstrated by the high level of attachment to the European identity or Europeanness expressed in the speeches of the Greek

²⁶¹ Risse, 2010.

political elite. Yet it is debatable whether this newly-acquired identity is explained better by constructivist or rationalist/instrumentalist approaches. Constructivism would argue that the political elite has acquired a new identity through socialization, and internalization of new norms while the rationalist/instrumentalist approaches would emphasize the side benefits of “becoming European” such as enhancement of Greek national interests through the EU. However, findings from the post-crisis period offer more support to the rationalist/instrumentalist approaches. When things were agreeable for the Greek side or compatible with the Greek interests, as it was the case with the foreign and security policies, then the Greek political elite did not display any hesitance concerning their “European identity”. But when there is apparent divergence of interest between Greece on the one hand and the EU or “Europeans” on the other, the political elite’s attitude changes. In that respect, Fligstein and others who emphasize the interconnectedness of self-interest and level of identification with Europe are important to note. According to them, the more someone gains from the EU, the more s/he identifies with it. The post-crisis attitude of the Greek elite might be considered as a testimony to the relationship between self-interest and attachment to Europeanness. Furthermore, one can even argue that pre-crisis attachment to Europeanness was a result of the process in which Greek national interests were served better in the context of the EU or with the help of the EU. For that matter, it is not possible to talk about newly-acquired interests as a result of Europeanization in the Greek case as Constructivism would expect to see. Even though the Greek elite have displayed a new identity, i.e. European identity as a result of Europeanization (pre-crisis), as the debt crisis demonstrates they have not acquired new interests replacing national ones. Therefore, they have promoted pro-European policies in domestic arena only when those policies complied with national interests.

One other conclusion of this thesis is that European identity, as a collective identity, which can mobilize masses to save one of the member state of crisis at the expense of their national interests, does not exist in Europe yet. Process of Europeanization of identities has not produced an identity that makes this scarifies easier. Therefore, European states conditioned bailouts with strict austerities which

would dramatically affect Greece. As a result, the Greek political elite adopted a distanced position from their “European partner”.

In conclusion, this thesis contributed to the literature with its consideration of identity change occurred on the elite level with the impact of the debt crisis. This change in the Greek political elite’s European identity is expected to have impact on the Greek society in the long run. European identity is not a form of collective identity that nation states enjoy. Even though it is reiterated that European identity exists along with the national identities of member states, emergence of European identity among majority of people on member states would take longer time than emergence of a national identity in a nation state. The political elite is a crucial factor that affects the process of Europeanization of identities in Europe. For the Greek political elite, the debt crisis created a pause moment in their Europeanness.

This study can be further developed with extension of discussion to the other political actors in the country. Also, other European countries that experienced economic crisis at the same with Greece can be included to the research. In this respect, the crisis’ impact on Europeanness of the political elites would be reflected in a broader sense.

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APPENDICES

A. LIST OF SPEECHES USED IN THE ANALYSIS

Table 4. List of Speeches Used in the Analysis

Document No	Date of the Doc.	Level of Identification	Person	Political Party
1	27.05.2002	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
2	27.06.2002	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
3	18.07.2002	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
4	5.09.2002	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
5	1.11.2002	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
6	8.11.2002	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
7	20.12.2002	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
8	7.01.2003	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
9	20.02.2003	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
10	12.03.2003	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
11	15.04.2003	4	George Papandreou	PASOK

Table 4 Cont'd

12	7.05.2003	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
13	4.06.2003	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
14	8.09.2003	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
15	9.10.2003	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
16	6.11.2003	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
17	12.12.2003	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
18	26.01.2004	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
19	16.03.2004	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
20	7.04.2004	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
21	17.05.2004	5	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
22	3.06.2004	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
23	1.07.2004	5	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
24	9.09.2004	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
25	26.10.2004	5	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy

Table 4 Cont'd

26	15. 11.2004	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
27	7.12.2004	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
28	25.01.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
29	17.02.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
30	4.03.2005	5	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
31	25.04.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
32	9.05.2005	5	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
33	2.06.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
34	6.07.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
35	2.08.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
36	29.09.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
37	6.10.2005	5	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy

Table 4 Cont'd

38	28.11.2005	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
39	8.12.2005	3	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
40	24.01.2006	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
41	23.02.2006	4	Petros Molyviatis	New Democracy
42	9.03.2006	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
43	12.04.2006	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
44	9.05.2006	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
45	13.06.2006	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
46	13.07.2006	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
47	14.09.2006	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
48	9.10.2006	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
49	20.11.2006	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy

Table 4 Cont'd

50	20.12.2006	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
51	29.01.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
52	9.02.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
53	6.03.2007	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
54	13.04.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
55	16.05.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
56	18.06.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
57	19.07.2007	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
58	15.08.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
59	4.09.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
60	17.10.2007	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
61	6.11.2007	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
62	24.12.2007	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
63	17.01.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
64	19.02.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
65	11.03.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
66	14.04.2008	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
67	9.05.2008	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy

Table 4 Cont'd

68	12.06. 2008	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
69	10.07.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
70	29.08.2008	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
71	2.09.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
72	29.10.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
73	20.11.2008	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
74	1.12.2008	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
75	24.02.2009	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
76	13.03.2009	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
77	10.04.2009	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
78	22.05.2009	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
79	16.06.2009	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
80	28.07.2009	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
81	25.08.2009	4	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
82	9.09.2009	5	Dora Bakoyannis	New Democracy
83	27.10.2009	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
84	17.11.2009	4	George Papandreou	PASOK

Table 4 Cont'd

85	9.12.2009	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
86	9.10.2009	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
87	10.12.2009	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
88	17.12.2009	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
89	4.01.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
90	22.02.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
91	23.02.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
92	8.03.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
93	18.03.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
94	29.04.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
95	30.04.2010	2	George Papandreou	PASOK
96	25.05.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
97	11.06.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
98	23.06.2010	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
99	12.07.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK

Table 4 Cont'd

100	19.07.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
101	24.09.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
102	23.09.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
103	3.10.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
104	5.10.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
105	11.11.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
106	15.11.2010	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
107	15.11.2010	2	George Papandreou	PASOK
108	3.12.2010	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
109	6.12.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
110	20.12.2010	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
111	6.01.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
112	27.01.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
113	23.02.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
114	11.03.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
115	24.03.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
116	12.04.2011	5	George Papandreou	PASOK

Table 4 Cont'd

117	19.05.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
118	16.05.2011	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
119	3.06.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
120	23.06.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
121	30.06.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
122	11.07.2011	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
123	5.08.2011	3	George Papandreou	PASOK
124	27.09.2011	4	George Papandreou	PASOK
125	22.10.2011	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
126	31.10.2011	5	George Papandreou	PASOK
127	16.11.2011	5	Lucas Papademos	Independent
128	30.11.2011	3	Lucas Papademos	Independent
129	16.01.2012	4	Lucas Papademos	Independent
130	1.03.2012	4	Lucas Papademos	Independent
131	19.03.2012	3	Lucas Papademos	Independent
132	18.04.2012	3	Lucas Papademos	Independent

Table 4 Cont'd

133	15.09.2012	1		New Democracy
134	22.09.2012	5	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
135	4.10.2012	4	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
136	15.11.2012	5	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
137	16.01.2013	4	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
138	22.02.2013	4	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
139	21.04.2013	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
140	25.04.2013	5	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
141	19.05.2013	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
142	20.07.2013	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
143	25.08.2013	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
144	1.09.2013	1	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy

Table 4 Cont'd

145	18.10.2013	5	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
146	10.10.2013	2	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
147	29.11.2013	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
148	17.12.2013	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
149	11.02.2014	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
150	8.03.2014	4	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
151	15.04.2014	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
152	1.04.2014	5	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
153	13.05.2014	2	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
154	23.06.2014	3	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
155	29.09.2014	4	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
156	6.12.2014	4	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
157	6.12.2014	5	Antonis Samaras	New Democracy
158	8.02.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza

Table 4 Cont'd

159	21.02.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
160	27.02.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
161	27.02.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
162	10.03.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
163	12.03.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
164	26.03.2015	5	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
165	30.03.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
166	9.04.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
167	16.04.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
168	16.05.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
169	19.05.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
170	2.06.2015	4	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
171	3.06.2015	4	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
172	4.06.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
173	6.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza

Table 4 Cont'd

174	9.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
175	17.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
176	17.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
177	18.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
178	19.06.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
179	26.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
180	27.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
181	28.06.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
182	28.06.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
183	1.07.2015	2	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
184	3.07.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza

Table 4 Cont'd

185	4.07.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
186	5.07.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
187	6.07.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
188	8.07.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
189	8.07.2015	3	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
190	11.07.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
191	13.07.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza
192	23.07.2015	1	Alexis Tsipras	Syriza

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tez kapsamında Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliđi ve 2008 borç krizinin bu kimlik üzerinde bıraktığı etki incelenmiştir. Tezin araştırma sorusu 2008 borç krizinin Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliđini nasıl etkilediđi olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda tezin hipotezi ise 2008 borç krizinin Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliđini olumsuz yönde etkilediđi şeklinde ifade edilebilmektedir. Ayrıca bu olumsuz etkinin siyasi elitin söylemlerine yansıdığı ve siyasi elitin söylemlerinin incelenmesi yoluyla bu olumsuz etkinin gözlemlenebileceđi varsayılmıştır. Bu noktadan yola çıkarak, bu tez kapsamında Yunan siyasi elitinin 2002 ve 2015 yılları arasında yaptıđı konuşmaların analiz edilmesi ile birlikte Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupalı kimliđinde meydana geldiđi düşünölen deđişimler gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Yunanistan 2008 yılından bu yana borç krizi ile mücadele etmektedir. Krizin başladıđı dönemlerde diđer İspanya, Portekiz, İtalya ve İrlanda gibi diđer bazı Avrupa ölkeleri de benzer krizlerle mücadele etmekteydi. Yunanistan'ın deneyimlediđi bu kriz kısa süre içerisinde bütün Avrupa'da yankı buldu. Başlarda krizin ulusal çapta kalacağı beklenmekteydi. Ancak ölkenin Eurozone üyesi olması ve ölk ekonomisinin diđer 19 Eurozone ekonomisi ile bađlı olması krizi doğrudan Avrupa Birliđi (AB) düzeyine taşımaktaydı. Yunanistan'ın krizi tek başına çözemeyeceđi anlaşıldığında AB duruma müdahale etmek durumunda kaldı. Bu noktadan sonra, yardım paketleri ve kemer sıkma paketlerinin tartışıldığı bir dönem başlamıştır. Yunanistan krizin çözümünü sağlamak adına bir dizi zorlayıcı önlemler almak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu önlemlerin uygulanmaya başlanması ile ölk içerisinde büyük çaplı protestolar ve iş bırakma eylemleri meydana gelmeye başlamıştır. Yunan hükümeti bu kriz ortamında Avrupa Birliđi (AB) kurumları düzeyinde çözüm arayışlarına devam etmektedir. Diđer AB üyesi ölkelerin katkıları ile sunulacak olan yardım paketleri ile Yunanistan ekonomisinin gerekli iyileşmeleri gerçekleştirebileceđi düşünölmektedir. Ancak bu yardım paketleri Yunanistan'ın bir

dizi yapısal reformu hayata geçirmesini gerekli kılmaktadır. Yunan tarafının, bu politikalar ve reformların daha az zorlayıcı bir şekilde uygulanması konusundaki ısrarlarına rağmen görüşmeler beklenen şekilde gelişmemiştir. Gerek ülke içerisindeki baskılar gerekse de AB tarafının taviz vermeyen tutumu Yunan siyasi eliti için zorlayıcı bir durum ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu noktadan itibaren Yunan siyasi elitinin AB'ye karşı olan tutumu değişmeye başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda, konuşmalarında kendilerini Avrupa Birliği'nin temsil ettiği ölçüde Avrupalı olarak tanımlamalarına ilişkin bir değişim gözlemlenmeye başlamıştır. Dil kullanımlarında “biz” ve “onlar” şeklinde ikili karşıtlıkların görünürlüğü artmıştır. Bu anlamda Yunan siyasi elitinde Avrupa tarafından bir uzaklaşma gözlemlenmektedir.

Yunanistan 1981 yılından bu yana AB üyesidir. AB üyeliği ülkenin modernleşme tarihinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Avrupa rotasında ilerleyen ülke bu çerçevede önemli kendisini diğer gelişmiş Avrupalı ülkeler ile aynı seviyeye taşıyacak bir demokratikleşme süreci geçirmiştir. Bu bağlamda yirminci yüzyıl ülkenin Avrupalılaştırma/modernleşme sürecine yönelmesine neden olacak iktisadi ve siyasi krizlere sahne olmuştur. Geçirdiği gelişim sürecinde, ülke için Avrupalı olmak modern ve gelişmiş olmak ile aynı anlam ifade etmekteydi. Buradan yola çıkarak denilebilir ki Avrupa Birliği üyesi olmak yoluyla edilecek Avrupa kimliğinin bir parçası olma durumu Yunanistan için oldukça önem ifade etmektedir. Borç krizi bu bağlamda düşünüldüğünde daha da önemli hale gelmiştir. Yunanistan siyasi eliti, kendisi için modernleşme ve gelişim anlamına gelen Avrupa rotasını ve Avrupa kimliğini sorgulamaya başlamıştır. Bu tez kapsamında Avrupa kimliği ile Avrupa Birliği benzer anlamlarda kullanılacaktır. Bunun nedeni ise Yunanistan için Avrupalı olmanın anlamının Avrupa Birliği üyesi olmak ve bunun sağlayacağı şekilde modern ve gelişmiş olmak anlamına gelmesidir. Bu nedenle AB'den uzaklaşma Avrupa kimliğinden de uzaklaşma anlamında değerlendirilmiştir.

Diğer taraftan, Avrupalı olmak terimi kolayca tanımlanacak veya belirlenebilecek bir ifade değildir. Farklı bağlamlarda ve zamanlarda farklı çağrışımlar ifade etmektedir. Yunanistan elitinin Avrupa kimliğinden vazgeçtiğini iddia etmek sosyolojik ve psikolojik verilerle elde edilecek daha fazla verilerle kanıtlanması gereken ve bu nedenle de bu tezin kapsamını aşan bir iddiadır. Ancak

bu tür bir deęişim, siyasi elitin dili kullanma şekline yansıyabilmektedir. Bu nedenle, Avrupalılık tanımlarında oluşan bir deęişim veya dönüşüm siyasi elitin konuşmalarının incelenmesi yoluyla da bir ölçüde gözlemlenebilmektedir. Bu noktada Avrupa aidiyetinin konuşmalara yansımaları noktası dikkat edilmesi gereken bir husustur. Avrupa aidiyeti siyasi elitin konuşmalarından yapılan çıkarımlar ölçüsünde anlaşılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Konuşmalarında Avrupa'ya yaptıkları atıflarda kullandıkları kelimeler ve bu konuşmaların içerikleri bu hususta önem taşımaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, bu tez söylem analizi yöntemini kullanarak 2008 borç krizinin Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliğine aidiyeti noktasında meydana getirdiği olası etkiyi bu siyasi elitinin yaptıkları konuşmaların incelenmesi yoluyla analiz etmeye çalışmıştır. Siyasi elitin 2002 ve 2015 yılları arasındaki söylemlerinin incelenmesi yoluyla bu deęişim gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. 2002 ve 2015 yılları arasında George Papandreou, Antonis Samaras, Alexis Tsipras ve diğer yönetici elitin de aralarında bulunduğu siyasi figürlerin konuşmaları analiz edilmiştir. Bu zaman aralığı ülkenin Eurozone üyeliğinin başlangıcı esas alınarak belirlenmiştir. 2015 ile sınırlanması ise krizin halen devam ediyor olması nedeniyle incelenecek dönem ile arada belirli bir zaman olmasının bilimsel doğruluk ile uyumlu olacağı gerekçesiyle açıklanmaktadır. Konuşmalar Yunanistan Dışişleri Bakanlığının internet sitesinde yer alan arşivlerden elde edilmiştir.

Konuşma metinleri Reisingl'in çalışmalarında kullandığı adlandırma ve atfetme (Nomination-Predication) yönteminden esinlenerek yapılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda Yunan siyasi elitin kendilerine ve Avrupa tarafına hitap ederken kullanmayı tercih ettiği kelimeler, her iki taraf için de kullandığı olumlu ya da olumsuz sıfatlar ve metinlerin bütünü itibariyle içerdikleri olumlu veya olumsuz üslupları değerlendirilmiştir. Elde edilen konuşmalar Likert tipi ölçek kullanılarak kodlanmıştır. Bu ölçekte 1 en düşük Avrupa aidiyetini ifade ederken 5 en yüksek Avrupa aidiyetini göstermektedir. Bahsedilen adlandırma ve atfetme yöntemiyle metinler içerisinde en düşük Avrupa aidiyeti barındıranlar 1 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu metinler içeriği itibariyle fazla sayıda "biz" veya "onlar" şeklinde keskin karşıtlıklar ve yüksek düzeyde öfke ile olumsuz görüş içermektedir.

2 olarak değerlendirilen metinler 1 kapsamında değerlendirilen metinlerden farklı olarak biraz daha az olumsuz referanslar içermekte olup halen oldukça düşük düzeyde Avrupa aidiyeti göstermektedirler. Bu metinlerde “biz” ve “onlar” şeklinde ayırım gözlenmeye devam etmektedir. Diğer taraftan 3 olarak değerlendirilen metinler içerikleri itibariyle hem olumlu hem de olumsuz ifadeler barındırmaktadırlar. Bu metinlerde bir taraftan Yunan siyasi elit kendilerini Avrupalı olarak tanımlamaya devam ederken diğer taraftan da Avrupa Birliği tarafına öfke görülmektedir. Her ikisini de barındırması itibariyle bu metinler 3 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Metinler içerisinde 4 ve 5 olarak değerlendirilenler için Avrupa aidiyeti bakımından yüksek düzeyde Avrupalılık kimliği gösterdiği söylenebilmektedir. Bu metinlerde Yunan siyasi elitinin kendisini Avrupa tarafı ile aynı tarafta gösteren ifadeler kullandığı görülmüştür. “Biz” ve “onlar” ikiliğinin yerini yalnızca “biz, Avrupalılar” şeklinde ifadeler almıştır. 5 olarak değerlendirilen metinlerde bu birliktelik daha açık bir şekilde ifade edilirken 4 olarak değerlendirilenlerde daha dolaylı şekilde gösterilmiştir.

Analiz kapsamında toplamda 192 konuşma metni incelenmiştir. Bunlardan 18 (%9) tanesi 1 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 13 (%7) tanesi 2 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 45 (%24) tanesi 3 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Diğer taraftan 83 (%43) tanesi 4 ve 76 (%40) tanesi de 5 olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Kodlama sırasında metinler, dış politika ve güvenlik, Avrupa bütünleşmesi, Eurozone ile günlük siyasi gündem olarak dört kategoriye ayrılmıştır. Bu ayırım krizin etkisini daha detaylı göstermesi bakımından önemli görünmüştür. Yunan siyasi elitinin her bir alandaki kriz öncesi ve kriz dönemindeki aidiyeti görseller yardımıyla gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Kodlama sonunda elde edilen veriler grafikler yardımıyla görselleştirilmiştir. Son noktada ise literatür ve kavramsal çerçeve dahilinde analizler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Analiz kriz öncesi ve kriz dönemi olmak üzere iki dönem bazında gerçekleşmiştir. Kriz öncesi periyot genel olarak Yunanistan’ın Eurozone üyeliğinin ilk yıllarında kriz belirtisi olmayan ve yüksek Avrupa aidiyetinin görülebildiği bir dönemi kapsamaktadır. İkinci dönem ise krizin başladığı zamanlarla birlikte aidiyet düzeyinde dalgalanmaların meydana geldiği ve krizin giderek derinleştiği bir zaman dilimini göstermektedir.

Dış politika ve güvenlik kategorisinde toplamda 57 belge kodlanmıştır. 2 (%4) tanesi 1 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 1 (%2) tanesi 2 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 4 (%7) 3 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 26 (%46) tanesi 4 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak da 24 (%42) tanesi 5 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu kategoride kodlanan metinlerin konuları, Avrupa içinde bağımsız bir Euroforce oluşturulması, Kıbrıs'ın AB'ye üye olması, Makedonya'nın AB üyelik süreci ve Yunanistan ile devam eden isim problemi, Türkiye ile ikili sorunlar ve Türkiye'nin AB üyelik süreci gibi noktalarda yoğunlaşmaktadır. Kriz öncesi dönemde Yunan siyasi elitinin söylemlerinde bu konularda Avrupa ve Yunanistan'ın duruşu bir ve aynı olarak vurgulanmıştır. Avrupalı olan her şeyin aynı zamanda Yunan olduğu ve bunun tersinin de geçerli olduğu, bu konularda yapılan konuşmalarda sıkça vurgulanmıştır. Kriz sonrası dönemde ise bu alanda da diğer alanlara benzer şekilde olumsuz bir değişim görülmeye başlamaktadır. Alexis Tsipras'ın liderliğinde Syriza'nın 2015 yılında seçimleri kazanmasıyla birlikte A. Tsipras ilk yurt dışı ziyaretlerinden birini Rusya'ya gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu dönemlerde yaptığı konuşmalarda ise Yunanistan'ın çok taraflı dış politika arayışları vurgulanmıştır. AB dışındaki alternatifler siyasi elitin söyleminde sıkça yer edinmiştir.

Metinler içerisinden Avrupa bütünleşmesi kategorisi çerçevesinde toplamda 62 belge kodlanmıştır. Bunlardan hiçbiri 1 veya 2 olarak değerlendirilmemiştir. 4 (%3) tanesi 3 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 29 (%47) tanesi 4 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Diğer 29 (%47) tanesi de 5 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Avrupa bütünleşmesi kategorisinde değerlendirilen konulardan bazıları şunlardır; Balkan ülkelerinin AB'ye üyelik süreçleri, Avrupa bütünleşmesini mümkün kılmaları bakımından birlik içerisinde yapılan anlaşmalar ve bu anlaşmaların müzakere süreçlerinde takınılan tutumlar ve Avrupa vatandaşlığı. Genel eğilimin gösterdiği şekliyle Avrupa bütünleşmesi Yunan siyasi elitinin yüksek düzeyde Avrupa aidiyeti gösterdiği alanlardan biri olmuştur. Ancak kriz itibarıyla bu genel eğilimde dahi değişimler gözlemlenmeye başlamıştır. Yunan eliti söylemlerinde krizin Avrupa bütünleşmesini olumsuz yönde etkilediği ve Avrupa vatandaşlarının gözünde AB'ye olan güveni zedelediği gibi ifadeler yer vermeye başlamıştır.

Eurozone kategorisinde ise toplamda 87 belge kodlanmıştır. Bunlardan 14

(%16) tanesi 1 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 12 (%14) tanesi 2 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 32 (%37) tanesi 3 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 16 (%18) tanesi 4 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak da 13 (%15) tanesi 5 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Eurozone kategorisi tezin odak noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu alanda ortaya çıkan değişimler tezin hipotezinin doğrulanması bakımından önemlidir.

Krizin başladığı dönemlerde Yunan siyasi elitinin söylemlerinde dikkate değer bir eleştiri ve öfke gözlemlenmemektedir. Krizin çözümüne yönelik AB tarafının desteğini aldıklarını ve bu sayede çözüme ulaşılabileceğine dair olumlu denebilecek beklentiler görülmektedir. Dönem başbakanı George Papandreou Yunanistan'ın borçlanmada sorun yaşamayacağını garantisini vermekte ve AB tarafına olan inancını tekrarlamaktadır. Krizin derinleşmeye başlaması ile birlikte siyasi elitin retoriği de değişmeye başlamaktadır. Krizin nedenlerine yönelik eleştirilerin yönü de ülke temelli sorunlardan AB yapısında ve anlaşmalarda aranmaya başlanmıştır. Bu değişim özellikle George Papandreou'nun söylemlerinde görülmüştür. Bir meclis toplantısında krizin nedenlerine yönelik kendisine yöneltilen sorulara Papandreou sorumlu olarak AB tarafını ve Maastricht Anlaşmasını göstermiş ve krizin Maastricht anlaşmasının getirdiği yapıdan kaynaklandığını aynı şekilde de AB tarafının bu yapıyı gerektiği şekilde gözlemlemediğini iddia etmiştir. Bu eleştiriler sonrasında Alexis Tsipras döneminde daha da ağırlaşarak devam etmiştir. Tasarruf tedbirlerine karşıtlığıyla bilinen Syriza'nın seçimleri kazanmasıyla birlikte Yunan siyasi elitinin söylemlerine yansıdığı ölçüde Avrupa aidiyetinden daha sert bir ayrılma ve uzaklaşma görülmeye başlanmıştır. A. Tsipras konuşmalarında AB tarafı ile devam eden müzakereleri savaşa benzetmiştir. Bu tür benzetmeler dönemin söylemlerinde fazlaca görülmektedir. Savaş benzetmesi AB tarafı ile olan karşıtlığı göstermesi bakımından tezin hipotezine önemli bir destek noktası sunmaktadır. Daha öncesinde “ortak Avrupa ailesi” olarak tanımlanan bir grubu aralarında savaşın meydana geldiği bir tarafa dönüştürmek, Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliğinden ne ölçüde uzaklaştığını göstermesi bakımından önemlidir.

Son kategori olarak günlük siyasi gündem kategorisi kapsamında toplamda 29 belge kodlanmıştır. Bunlardan 2 (%7) tanesi 1 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Hiçbiri

2 olarak değerlendirilmemiştir. 5 (%17) tanesi 3 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 12 (%41) tanesi 4 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. 10 (%34) tanesi 5 olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Diğer alanlarla benzer şekilde günlük siyasi gündem kategorisinde de kriz öncesi ve sonrası dönemde farklılar görülmektedir. Kriz öncesi dönemde oldukça yüksek bir Avrupa aidiyeti söz konusuysen krizin başlaması ile birlikte söylemlerde daha düşük bir Avrupa aidiyeti kendini göstermektedir.

Bütün kategoriler kriz öncesi ve sonrası dönemde bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde Yunan siyasi elitin kendini Avrupalı olarak tanımlama eğiliminde bir düşüş olduğu sunulan grafiklerde net bir şekilde görülmüştür. Bu düşüş Avrupa entegrasyonu ve dış politika gibi alanlarda daha az görünür nitelikteyken Eurozone alanında çok daha belirgindir. Yunan siyasi elitinin söylemlerinde Avrupa ile olan ilişkiler “aile” olarak tanımlanmaktan bir “savaş” durumuna benzetmeye dönüşmüştür.

Bu tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Bütünlük oluşturması açısından öncelikle metod ve kavramsal çerçeve ortaya konulmuş ardından ise kriz incelenmiş ve son olarak bu temellerde analiz gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu düzen içerisinde birinci bölüm tezin genel bir çerçevesini çizmiş ve kavram çerçeve ile metoda ilişkin bir giriş sunmuştur. İkinci bölüm ise yapısal ve rasyonalist yaklaşımlar anlatılmıştır. Bu noktada yapısal yaklaşımların kimliğe ilişkin getirdiği açıklamalar ile rasyonalist yaklaşımların ülke çıkarlarının halen geçerli olduğuna dair vurgularına değinilmiştir. Yapısal yaklaşımların, Avrupa kimliğinin Yunan siyasi elitinin önceliklerini ve çıkarlarını değiştirmesinin bekleneceğine dair öngörülerinin tez kapsamında sınanmıştır. Yapısal yaklaşımlar çıkarların sürekli etkileşim ve sosyal öğrenme yoluyla süreç içerisinde değişeceğini öngörmektedir. Diğer taraftan rasyonalist yaklaşımlar aktörlerin fayda maliyet analizleri doğrultusunda davranışlarda bir değişim olabileceğini iddia etmektedirler. Bu tez kapsamında söz konusu yaklaşımların öngörülerini çerçevesinde Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupalılık kimliği değerlendirilmiştir. Bir taraftan Yapısal yaklaşımların öngördüğü şekilde kimliklerinde bir değişim olup olmadığına bakılmıştır. Diğer taraftan da Rasyonalist yaklaşımların bekleyeceği şekilde çıkarların halen geçerli olduğu şeklindeki iddialarına Yunan siyasi eliti nezdinde yanıt bulunmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca

kullanılan metot bu bölümde detaylı bir şekilde sunulmuştur.

Üçüncü bölüm Avrupa kimliğine ayrılmıştır. Kimlik teriminin sosyal bilimlerde kullanılmaya başlamasından yola çıkarak Avrupa kimliği bir sosyal kimlik olarak incelemeye alınmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Avrupa fikrinin tarihsel gelişimi ve günümüzde ifade ettiği anlamı da ele alınmıştır. Sonrasında Avrupa kimliğinin farklı bağlamlarda farklı unsurlarının öne çıkarılması ile çeşitli anlamlar ifade ettiği belirtilmiştir. Bunlar: ortak tarih ve kültür temelinde tanımlanan Avrupa kimliği, siyasi ve hukuki kimlik olarak Avrupa kimliği, ulusal kimliklerin erozyona uğraması sonrası ortaya çıkan bir çoklu tanımlama olarak Avrupa kimliği, toplumsal kimlik olarak Avrupa kimliği ve son olarak da uluslararası ortak bir duruş ifade eden uluslararası Avrupa kimliğidir. Bu tez çerçevesinde Avrupa kimliği bunların bir bütünü olarak tanımlanmıştır. Avrupa kimliği hem ulus devletlerin ortak çıkarları temelinde bir araya geldikleri bir hukuki ve politik çerçeve, hem de entegrasyon süresinde edindikleri bir toplumsal kimlik olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Ancak sunulan literatür çerçevesinde Avrupa kimliğinin ulusal kimliğe benzer bir toplumsal kimlik kadar güçlü olmadığı, Avrupa bütünleşmesinden faydalanmaları ve sürekli bir iletişim halinde olmaları ile doğru orantılı bir şekilde toplumun yalnızca küçük bir kesiminin sahip olduğu ikincil bir kimlik olarak var olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bu kapsamda toplumları etkilemeleri ve toplumların görüşlerini yansıtmaları bakımından siyasi elitlerin kimliklerinin önemi vurgulanmıştır. Avrupa kurumları ile olan sürekli iletişimleri siyasi elitlerin Avrupa aidiyeti geliştirmelerinin toplumun diğer katmanlarına göre daha hızlı ve daha mümkün olduğu ifade edilmiştir. Ancak ulus çıkarlarının temsilindeki konumları nedeniyle girdikleri iletişimlerinde sürekli bir fayda maliyet analizi içerisinde olmaları durumunun da altı çizilmiştir.

Dördüncü bölüm krizin nedenleri ve gelişimin açıklanması ile Yunanistan'da Avrupalılaştırmanın ifade ettiği anlam üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu süreçte ülkenin yirminci yüzyıldaki durumuna göz atılmış ve Avrupa rotasında geçirdiği değişimler ele alınmıştır. Bu noktada Yunanistan'ın Avrupa'nın çevre ülkelerinden biri olması nedeniyle tepeden aşağı uygulanan Avrupalılaştırma sürecinin henüz tamamlanmamış olduğu bu nedenle de krizlere diğer ülkelerden daha az dayanıklı olabileceğinin altı çizilmiştir. Avrupalı olmanın ülke için ifade ettiği anlam vurgulanmıştır. Son noktada

ise krizin gelişimi anlatılmıştır. Krizin yarattığı olumsuz etkilerin, ülke için bir gelişmişlik ve modernlik imgesi olan “Avrupalılık” üzerinde olumsuz etki edebileceği öngörülmüştür.

Beşinci bölüm ise son aşamada konuşmaların analizine ayrılmıştır. Krizin Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa aidiyeti üzerinde bıraktığı etki kriz öncesi ve sonrası iki dönem ve dört kategori temelinde analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu analiz çerçevesinde iki unsur öne çıkmaktadır. Birincisi Yunan siyasi eliti kriz dönemi boyunca dayanışma, birliktelik ve demokrasi gibi Avrupa değerlerine vurgu yapmaya devam etmiştir. Bu vurgular, Avrupa Birliği’nin görüşmelerdeki katı duruşu karşısında yer almaktadır. Yunan siyasi elitinin AB tarafını “Avrupalı” olmamak temelinde eleştirmekte olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Avrupa kimliğine dair sunulan kavramsal çerçeve ışığında bu çağrı ve eleştirilerin önemi daha iyi anlaşılabilir. Avrupa kimliği bir Alman’ı ya da bir İngiliz’i diğer bir Avrupalı için, bu krizin aşılması için gerekli fedakarlıkları gerektirecek kadar gelişmiş bir toplumsal kimlik değildir. Aslında A. Tsipras “daha Avrupalı bir Avrupa Birliğine” (No.146, s.7) ihtiyacımız var diye ifade ettiğinde aslında Avrupa kimliğinin de yeterince var olmadığını kabul etmektedir. Bu bölümde vurgulanan ikinci bir nokta ise Yunan siyasi elitin dil kullanımında oldukça yüksek oranda ortaya çıkmaya başlayan ikili karşıtlıklardır. Kriz öncesi dönemde sıklıkla kullanılan “ortak Avrupa ailemiz”, “biz Avrupalılar” gibi ifadeler yerini “bizim Yunan halkımız”, “o Avrupalılar” ve “Avrupa’daki ortaklarımız” gibi karşıtlıkları vurgulayan ifadelere bırakmıştır.

Ulaşılan bu sonuçların bu tezin temel argümanını doğrular niteliktedir. Yapısalcı teorilerin öngördüğü ölçüde bir Avrupa kimliği henüz tamamlanmış değildir. Aktörlerin davranışları halen büyük ölçüde fayda maliyet analizi temelinde şekillenmektedir. Krizin gelişim sürecinin ortaya koyduğu bu durum Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa aidiyetine bu temelde olumsuz etki etmiştir. Ülkenin modernleşme sürecinde bir model olarak algılanan Avrupa imgesi kriz döneminde zorlayıcı reformları ve kemer sıkma politikalarını dayatan “totaliter” bir kurum imgesine dönüşmüştür. Bu temelde de Yunan siyasi eliti kendisini Avrupa Birliğinden ve Avrupa kimliğinden ayrı tanımlamaya başlamıştır.

Sonuç olarak 2008 borç krizinin Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimliğini olumsuz yönde etkilediği kanaatine varılmıştır. Kriz derinleştikçe Yunan siyasi eliti Avrupa kimliğini sorgulamaya başlamıştır. Bu olumsuz etki siyasi elitin söylemlerine yansıdığı ölçüde gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Avrupa Birliği'nin 'ideal' modernlik algısı, müzakereler süresinde sergilediği göz korkutucu tavırlarının etkisiyle olumsuz yönde değişmeye başlamıştır. Kriz öncesi dönemde görülen yüksek Avrupa aidiyeti krizin etkisiyle birlikte düşüşe geçmiştir. Krizin ilk dönemlerinde söylemlerde görülen iniş çıkışlar ilerleyen dönemlerde daha da derinleşmektedir. Ancak halen Avrupa'dan tamamen bir ayrı düşme de görülmemektedir. Yunan siyasi eliti söylemlerinde halen Avrupa vurgusuna devam etmektedir. Krizin çözümünün Avrupa kurumları ile iş birliği yapmak olduğunu ve alternatiflerinin de oldukça sınırlı olduğunu farkında olan bir ülke için bu durum anlaşılabilir niteliktedir.

Risse'nin çalışmalarında görüldüğü üzere zayıf ve ikincil toplumsal kimlikler krizlerden daha fazla etkilenmektedir. Avrupa kimliği de sonradan oluşmaya başlayan, toplumun oldukça az bir oranında tamamen oluşabilmiş, zayıf ve ikincil bir toplumsal kimliktir. Aynı zamanda bu kimlik, büyük ölçüde çıkarların AB'nin getirdiği menfaatlerle uyum göstermesi ile görünür olmuştur. Avrupa aidiyetinin yüksek olduğu insanlar aynı zamanda AB'nin sunduklarından en fazla yararlanabilen kişilerdir. 2008 borç krizi Yunan siyasi elite avantajların dışında zorlayıcı sorumluluklar yüklemiştir. Bu noktada ise Yunan siyasi elitinin tutumu Yapısalcıların öngördüğü ölçüde çıkarların AB kurumları düzeyinde uyumlu hale geldiği ve herhangi bir çatışma olmadan çözüm noktasında uzlaşılabilceğine ters düşmektedir. Aksine Rasyonalistlerin yaklaşımına uygun bir şekilde Yunan siyasi eliti ülke çıkarlarının AB beklentileri ile uyumlu olmadığını anlamış ve müzakerelerde karşılaştığı tutum karşısında kendini Avrupa'dan uzaklaştırmıştır. Bu nokta ise tam olarak da Fligstein ve diğerlerinin çıkarların ve aidiyetin karşılıklı bağımlılığına yaptıkları vurgu ile örtüşmektedir. Kriz sonrası Yunan siyasi elitin tutumu bu çıkar-aidiyet ilişkisini kanıtlar niteliktedir. Bir adım ileri giderek denilebilir ki kriz öncesi Yunan siyasi elitinde görülen yüksek Avrupa aidiyetinin Yunan çıkarlarının AB düzeyinde daha iyi temsil edilmesi ile doğrudan ilişkisi vardır. Krizle birlikte bu niteliğin değişmesi aidiyette bir sorgulamaya yol açmıştır.

Avrupalılařma süreci belirli ölçüde Avrupa kimlięi yaratmada başarılı olsa dahi aktörlerin AB ile uyumlu yeni çıkarlar tanımlamalarına yol açtıęını kesin olarak söyleyebilmek mümkün deęildir. Bir kolektif kimlik olarak Avrupa kimlięi ulusal kimliklerden daha zayıftır ve oluşması daha uzun zaman alacaktır. Siyasi elit Avrupalılařma sürecinde bu kimlięin yerleşmesinde önemli bir aktördür. Yunan siyasi eliti ise borç krizi ile birlikte Avrupalılıęını sorgulamaya başlamıřtır. Bunun etkileri ilerleyen dönemlerde toplum üzerinde de görülecektir. Son noktada bu tez kapsamında, Yunan siyasi elitinin Avrupa kimlięinde bir duraklama anı meydana geldięi söylenmektedir.

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