

HEGEMONIC POLITICS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND FORMATION OF
NEOLIBERAL SUBJECTIVITIES: FORMER *GECEKONDU* RESIDENTS IN
GÜLVEREN - ANKARA

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ABSTRACT

HEGEMONIC POLITICS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND FORMATION OF NEOLIBERAL SUBJECTIVITIES: FORMER *GECEKONDU* RESIDENTS IN GÜLVEREN - ANKARA

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This thesis examines the new private property regime under AKP rule in the form of the TOKİ homeownership program for *gecekondu* residents, which initiates home-owning processes for *gecekondu* residents. Studies by critical urban and political-economy scholars have approached private property as taken-for-granted. By questioning the formation and dissemination of the ‘conception’ of private property in the form of homeownership among former *gecekondu* residents and its implications for their conduct, this study attempts to give an explanatory account for the assumptions of private property. For this aim, qualitative research was conducted in Yatıkmsluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project, located in Gülveren – Ankara, and examined the process of homeownership for former *gecekondu* residents through TOKİ’s indebted homeownership program. By developing an alternative theoretical position, which is based on the hegemony perspective of Gramsci and its elaboration with Foucauldian governmentality concept, the new private property regime is approached as a hegemonic project of the AKP aiming to re-consolidate neoliberal hegemony. Accordingly, the ‘conception’ of private property constitutes an ‘ethico-political’ ground of the AKP’s hegemonic project, which aims to ‘cement’ and ‘unify’ society into the neoliberal accumulation regime. Therefore, this thesis argues that the ‘conception’ of private property as homeownership is formed through relationships of ‘consent’ and ‘coercion’ between the former *gecekondu* residents and TOKİ. Moreover, neoliberal subjectivities, as the implication

of the hegemonic politics of homeownership on the conduct of former *gecekondu* residents becomes a re-productive force for such a conception, and hence the re-consolidation of the ‘ethico-political’ ground of the hegemonic project of AKP.

Keywords: neoliberal subjectivities, homeownership, hegemony, governmentality, Mass Housing Administration of Turkey (TOKİ)

ÖZ

EV SAHİPLİĞİNİN HEGEMONİK POLİTİKASI VE NEOLİBERAL ÖZNELLİKLERİN ÜRETİMİ: GÜLVEREN – ANKARA’DAKİ ESKİ *GECEKONDU* SAKİNLERİ

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Bu tez, AKP hükümetleri ile yürürlüğe giren, TOKİ’nin ev sahipliği programı biçimindeki yeni özel mülkiyet rejimini eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin ev sahibi olma süreçleri ile incelemektedir. AKP hükümetlerinin ‘devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri’ni tartışan eleştirel kent ve ekonomi-politik araştırmacıları çalışmalarında özel mülkiyete ‘verili’ anlamıyla yaklaşmışlardır. Bu çalışma, *gecekondu* sakinleri arasında ev sahipliği biçimindeki özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayış’ının oluşumu ve yayılmasını ve bu ‘kavrayış’ın eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin tutumu üzerindeki etkisini sorgulayarak, özel mülkiyetin ‘verili’ anlamını açıklamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla, Gülveren – Ankara’da gerçekleşen Yatıkmsluk *Gecekondu* Dönüşüm Projesi’nde, eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin TOKİ’nin borçlu evsahipliği programı ile ev sahibi olma sürecini inceleyen niteliksel bir araştırma yürütmüştür. Gramsci’nin ‘hegemonya’ perspektifinin Foucault’nun ‘yönetimsellik’ kavramı ile geliştirilmesine dayanan alternatif bir teorik pozisyon geliştirerek, bu çalışma, yeni özel mülkiyet rejimine AKP’nin neoliberal hegemonyayı sağlamlaştırmayı amaçlayan hegemonik bir projesi olarak yaklaşmıştır. Buna göre, özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayış’ı, toplumu neoliberal birikim rejimine ‘bağlamayı’ ve ‘bütünleştirmeyi’ amaçlayan hegemonik projenin ‘etiko-politik’ zemini oluşturmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez, ev sahipliği biçimindeki özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayış’ının, eski *gecekondu* sakinleri ve TOKİ arasındaki rıza ve zor ilişkisi ile kurulduğunu tartışmaktadır. Ayrıca, ev sahipliğinin hegemonik politikasının eski *gecekondu*

sakinleri üzerindeki etkisi olarak ‘neoliberal öznellikler’, bu ‘kavrayış’ı yeniden üreten bir güç olarak AKP’nin hegemonik projesinin ‘etiko-politik’ zeminini sağlamlaştırmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: neoliberal öznellikler, ev sahipliği, hegemonya, yönetimsellik, Türkiye Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı (TOKİ)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AKP | Justice and Development Party |
| ANAP | Motherland Party |
| EU | European Union |
| GEÇAK | <i>Gecekondu</i> to Modern Housing Project |
| HOPE VI | Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere Project |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| MÜSİAD | Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association |
| NAUTP | Northern Ankara Urban Transformation Project |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| NYC | New York City |
| RP | Welfare Party |
| SRS | Slum Rehabilitation Scheme |
| THKP-C | People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey |
| TOKİ | Mass Housing Administration |
| TTB | Title Assignment Document |
| TÜSİAD | Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Problem

Passengers on a bus which departures from the Atatürk Statue in Ulus (the old city center in Ankara) and moves towards Mamak district frequently chat about the ongoing transformations of *gecekondu*¹ to apartment blocks during the bus trip. If one pay close attention to these chats, it will be revealed that these passengers are not interpreting the transformation of urban landscape, which accelerated since the second half of 2000's in Mamak, but they are rather expressing their gains and losses, as former *gecekondu* residents, to each other within these processes of transformation. It is quite complicated to figure out what these passengers are talking about in the first instance, since they express their astonishment every time when they hear the amount of debt from one another. Eventually, careful attention to the content of these conversations reveals that the aforementioned debt is actually related with the indebted homeownership program of TOKİ following to *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects. This program aims to make *gecekondu* residents homeowners through the 'quasi-mortgage' payment system of TOKİ, which is based on an exchange system. Accordingly, the value of a *gecekondu* residence is calculated in terms of its land size, the exchange value of trees in *gecekondu* lot, and the debris of the *gecekondu*. Then, the total amount of this value is subtracted from the value of new housing and remaining amount is split into installments, which corresponds to 'quasi-mortgage' payment system. However, there is no standard criteria for the calculation of these assets, and the multiplier of them changes according to the project, and the negotiations between *gecekondu* residents and TOKİ. Therefore, former *gecekondu* residents express their astonishment when they hear about more profitable or unprofitable contracts in relation to indebted housing.

¹ Literally means 'built over night'.

Moreover, even the subject of disputes which can arise during the bus trip are caused by the stakes over the *Gecekondu* Transformations Projects. One instance of such disputes during the bus trip is worth mentioning. The disabled lift in one of the buses that goes to Mamak District was not working. Thus, a disabled person who uses the wheel chair asked for a lift in order to get off the bus. While a couple of passengers were trying to lift him, they could not provide the necessary balance and disabled person fell down from the entrance door of bus to the concrete sidewalk quite sharply. Following this moment of crisis, the bus moved on from the bus stop and eventually one of the passengers started to voice his thoughts about this accident. According to him, the disabled person was the main person responsible for this accident since he was the one who asked for help. Nevertheless, not all of the passengers agreed with this idea. Some were claiming that it was the municipality's guilt, not the disabled person's. In an unexpected way, the man who was accusing the disabled person then redirected his accusations to the latter group, who were directing culpability to the municipality. He said: "Because of people like you, who complain about municipality all the time, my *gecekondu* (pointing in the direction of *gecekondus* in Bentderesi) hasn't been able to be demolished for a decade, and I am still waiting to be a homeowner!". Following this statement, the subject of dispute turned from assigning blame for the injury of a disabled passenger into 'un-transformable' *gecekondu* settlements and individual stakes over the *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects.

Crucially, the objects of these everyday chats and disputes on the bus are informed by stakes over land rent, which is actualized by the state-led urban development projects² (i.e. *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects). This observation during the bus trip is illuminating since it reveals how 'new urban economies', which are enacted partly by the state-led development projects, triggers new forms of sociality that are based on calculative practices. Nevertheless, in order to make this relationship intelligible one needs to take a step back and probe the conditions for the possibility of 'new urban economies' in contemporary Turkey.

Since the AKP's coming into power in 2002, historic and informal settlements that causes the widening of 'rent gap' (Smith 1996) in the cities by their exclusion from formal property markets are targeted by the urban policies in order to include them to formal property markets (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010). Actually, these policies produce 'social', 'political' and 'economic'

² Renewal, regeneration and transformation are using interchangeably in the literature of Turkey's urban restructuring. '*Kentsel Gelişim*' -'urban transformation' is the formal discourse of state. This study adopts 'state led urban development project' in order to emphasize role of state in these projects.

interests in historic and informal settlements that address both to poor, working classes and capitalist classes. Starting from the ANAP's urban reforms in the second half of 1980's, vast numbers of informal settlements (i.e. *gecekondu*) have been subjected to transformation into apartment blocks, in which land rent is distributed between *gecekondu* owners and individual developers (Bayırbağ 2013, Buğra 1998, Erman 2011, Karaman 2013a). Nevertheless, this pattern encountered with an obstacle when the easily transformable informal settlements (in terms of not having disputes over the existing property structure) were already re-valued, and the remaining historic and informal settlements could not be re-valued due to their complex property structure and existing laws that protect the historical sites (Gündoğdu and Gough 2009, Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010). Hence, this widening rent gap has been operationalized for capital circuits with the state assistance by the consecutive AKP governments (Gündoğdu and Gough 2009). What makes this operationalization of rent gap within the AKP rule a novel strategy is not only the state's preparation of the conditions of capital accumulation, but in fact actualizing this with consent of the population in the targeted places and in tandem with 'roll out' neoliberal paradigm which aims to extend capitalist social relations by including hitherto excluded populations. Crucially, urban policies that are enacted with AKP rule for such settlements that have complex property structure do not allow the re-distribution of land rent between *gecekondu* owners and individual developers. Rather, land rent is re-distributed among the *gecekondu* population and capitalist fractions through the state with the re-structured instruments of TOKİ and laws that are related with urban renewal. In other words, production of space as commodity is realized by the state, as in the earlier periods. However, this time, the realization of a value of commodity, i.e. land rent, is not handed over to the *gecekondu* owners and individual developers; the state is the one who realizes the value and determines the balance of its redistribution (Kuyucu 2014, Türem 2017). Consequently, what marks 'new urban economies' in contemporary Turkey is the new private property regime³ which is enacted by the 'new' scheme for the re-distribution of land rent in order to overcome the 'obstacle' for the institutionalization of private property regime by including the hitherto 'excluded population' to the formal property markets.

³ This study adopts the conceptualization of 'private property regime', rather than 'private property', since it enables an ethnographic inquiry of 'property' (concrete social, political and economic process that constitute it), which has been defined by Verdery and Humphrey as "the dominant set of shared understanding about property in a given political economy" (2004: 12) which "presupposes a stable matrix of values (both monetary and normative), as well as relatively stable institutions for distributing them" (2004: 140).

Political-economy scholars (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013, Doğru 2016) have discussed this new re-distribution of land rent scheme within the hegemony perspective. Accordingly, production of ‘economic’ interests for the capitalists fractions and ‘economic’-‘social’ interests for the subordinate fractions are actualized through the new policy instruments (laws that are related with urban renewal and re-structuring of TOKİ) and articulated to the ‘political’ interests of AKP governments. Since this interpretation is based on a macro perspective, it does not engage with the ‘how’ question of this process. Namely, how are these interests constituted among the subordinate fractions? The macro scale of the object requires assuming certain factors as taken-for-granted. Therefore, in these studies, it is assumed that there is a mechanistic relationship between state and subordinate population, which is reflected by the simple equation: state provides decent living conditions through the social housing, and related population gives its consent because of their material interests. Accordingly, such a problematization envisions the *gecekondu* residents as the passive recipients of this policy. In this way, power becomes to be associated with macro structures (state, policies, etc.) and it disseminates from macro to micro structures. Even though hegemony perspective contradicts an envisioning of the problem in this way, disregarding the micro structures eventually attributes power only to the macro structures. Working against this ontological stance, critical urban scholars examine micro structures in order to shed light on the ways in which *gecekondu* residents actually actively challenge this one-way flow of power.

Critical urban scholars (Erdi-Lelandais 2014, Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010, Lovering and Türkmen 2011, Öktem-Ünsal 2011), have discussed this new scheme of land rent re-distribution predominantly through the grassroots resistance perspective. Accordingly, state’s intervention to historic and informal settlements during the AKP rule induced grassroots resistances which demanded their ‘right to shelter’ in their existing condition of neighborhood against the potential eviction of tenants, and financial burden caused by the social housing homeownership program of TOKİ for the *gecekondu* owners. Nevertheless, all these scholars emphasize that resistances ended with negotiations with the state to acquire social housing and induced the displacement of the most disadvantageous factions (tenants, TTB holders) of the related population. This trajectory of resistances has predominantly been interpreted by these scholars as ‘appetite for private gain’ (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010: 1481). However, such an interpretation approaches the question of private property in its pejorative and as its taken-for-granted understanding. It does not ‘problematize’ the private property in terms of

homeownership. Hence, ‘why’ this particular fraction of society gave up their claims of homeownership demands a more robust explanatory answer.

Apart from these problematizations in political-economy and critical urban literatures in Turkey, ‘new urban economies’ and its relation with real estate development have become an object of global gentrification literature. This literature defines gentrification as ‘state-led class re-make of urban space’ (Lees et al. 2015). By putting forward the role of ‘state’, global gentrification literature examines how new urban governance practices within the ‘roll out’ of neoliberalism increasingly transform urban space for upper classes at the expense of lower classes. Crucially, scholars discuss ‘class re-make’ in tandem with ‘roll out’ neoliberalism, in which the state becomes more interventionist, compared to ‘roll back’ neoliberalism, by assisting private sector investments in risky areas in cities, which induce the widening of rent gaps. Studies of the global South contribute to this literature by pointing the ‘social production of land markets and urban subjectivities’ within the ‘new urban economies’. While ‘social production of land markets’ emphasizes how the creation of land markets becomes a significant channel for neoliberal accumulation regimes, ‘social production of urban subjectivities’ underlines the new type of subjectivities that are enacted by aspirations for becoming a homeowner in the property led projects. These aspects in the global South arise from “different urban economic bases, social hierarchies, cultural histories and institutional frameworks” (Harris 2008), thereby differing from the gentrification experiences of global North. However, these differences do not overrule the object of global gentrification literature. On the contrary, the different experiences in the global South underline “diverse but increasingly interconnected trajectories of cities” (Lees et al. 2016), thus, experiences in both the global North and South mark gentrification as a ‘global urban strategy’ in contemporary neoliberal accumulation regimes.

Nevertheless, state-led urban development projects in Turkey are rarely connected to the discussions in global gentrification literature in either political-economy studies or critical urban studies. Moreover, even if the new private property regime that is enacted with the AKP rule partly through the state-led development projects brings the questions related with state, private property and subjectivities (as the main axis of gentrification discussions in the global South), academic studies in Turkey have not yet questioned the relationship between these aspects. This is why this study opts to problematize the private property regime in the form of TOKI homeownership programs as a feature of AKP rule and discuss it through the process by which former *gecekondu* residents achieved home ownership through the social housing

program TOKİ. To do so, this study asks, ‘How is the ‘conception’ of private property (in the form of homeownership program of TOKİ) constituted and disseminated among the *gecekondu* residents?’ and, by extension, ‘What is the implication of the ‘economic’ understanding within the new private property regime for the conduct of *gecekondu* residents?’. This study seeks to contribute global gentrification literature by specifically through formulating questions in this way, in order to explain the aforementioned ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions that arise from political-economy and critical urban studies.

In order to answer these questions, this study adopts an alternative theoretical position, which strategically combines hegemony perspective of Gramsci and governmentality conceptualization of Foucault. This governmentality conceptualization is utilized address lacuna of Gramscian hegemony perspectives. Hegemony literally means leadership of a class alliance and it is a particular approach to power, which understands power as a dynamic relationship rather than mere domination, between a state and civil society (Gramsci 2000). It does not isolate or prioritize the ‘economic’ dimension (i.e. mode of production), but explores how ‘economic’ and ‘ethico-political’ (i.e. moral, cultural and intellectual force) dimensions reciprocally construct social reality. In other words, class interests are not regarded as taken-for-granted; the main concern is their construction process within the civil society through an ‘ethico-political’ ground that is compatible with the interests of the class that has a quest for leadership. In that regard, hegemony perspective constitutes an un-orthodox understanding of Marxism in which knowledge and beliefs of civil society are neither interpreted as ‘false consciousnesses’ nor the reflection of ‘structure’. For Gramsci, hegemonic projects of a particular class aim to subject the population to a particular mode of production through an ‘ethico-political’ ground. This ground does not reflect class interests openly; rather, it envisions itself as transcending class interests, and hence, it is a ground that gather different classes. The ‘conception of world’ is a critical element of ‘ethico-political’ ground through which the prevailing common sense of civil society is attempted to be re-made in tandem with hegemonic conception. Accordingly, this study opts to discuss new private property regime from the hegemony perspective. The main reason for this adoption is to understand the new private property regime as a particular way to construct the relationship between a state and a society. The hegemony perspective attempts to understand this relationship without prioritizing either the ‘economic’ dimension or the ‘ethico-political’ dimension, but instead by examining their interrelatedness. Because of this ontological stance, it presents a critical

analytical angle, which enables to exceed existing deficiencies in political-economy⁴ and critical urban studies of Turkey by giving an explanatory account of them.

The Foucaudian conceptualization of governmentality is concurrently utilized to refine the analysis of the hegemony perspective in this study. Despite the fact that Gramsci was emphasizing the implication of a particular ‘conception of the world’ for the constitution of ‘new personalities’ (2000: 340) of the masses, he does not provide necessary analytical tools to examine this ‘new personality’ in detail. This study attempts to open up this dimension in order to discuss its role in hegemonic politics, which has generally remained unexplored in existing studies that problematize hegemonic politics. For this aim, Foucault’s governmentality conceptualization is adopted in order to discuss how a particular ‘conception of the world’ transforms the conducts of population and induces new type of subjectivities that reproduces a particular ‘ethico-political’ ground. Governmentality literally means governmental rationality, and aims to understand how particular type of rationality in governmental practice enables both control and self-control, hence the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 2008). In that regard, this study examines the implications of neoliberal rationality, which is enacted by the new private property regime, on the social relations and subjectivities of former *gecekondu* residents.

Within this alternative theoretical position, this study argues that the re-consolidation of neoliberal hegemony within the AKP rule occurred through the ‘ethico-political’ ground based on the new private property regime. Through an examination of the re-structuring of state since the 1980s, marked here as the beginning of neoliberal measures in Turkey, this study investigates how the constitution of neoliberal hegemony in Turkey becomes possible. With a particular focus on the urban governance reforms of the successive governments since the 1980s, it discusses the ways in which re-distribution of land rent sustains the class alliance between capitalist and subordinate classes. By extension, it argues that the private property regime becomes a ‘hegemonic project’ of AKP rule ‘from above,’ which is enacted through the passage of laws that are related with urban renewal and re-structuring of TOKİ. In order to discuss the re-consolidation of neoliberal hegemony, this study examines how the private property regime, in the form of homeownership in the social housing of TOKİ, is enacted

⁴ Although majority of the political-economic accounts approaches to the state-led development projects from a ‘hegemony’ perspective, due to their macro object of scale, constitution and dissemination of a particular ‘ethico-political’ ground becomes out of the explanatory effort.

among the *gecekondu* residents (a part of the subordinate population). In this way, it investigates the ways in which formation and dissemination of a particular ‘ethico-political’ ground ‘from below’ legitimizes the re-structuring of state ‘from above’. Since hegemony is a continuous process of formation, this study probes the transformation of *gecekondu* residents’ conduct synchronically with the constitution and dissemination of the private property regime, as the reproductive force of neoliberal hegemony in Turkey.

This study opted to carry out qualitative research with former *gecekondu* residents as an exploration of the ways in which a private property regime is constituted and disseminated among former *gecekondu* residents and how the form of TOKI social housing homeownership transforms their conduct in tandem with the rationality of private property. Since the quantitative research for this study’s objective cannot present the meaning of social processes for the subjects, qualitative research was adopted in order to gain deeper understanding for the meaning-making processes of subjects. Moreover, only through such a method can deficiencies that are inherent in the macro perspective of political-economy studies be transcended, since the assumptions of these macro studies are actually questions that demand answers from the real, empirical processes. To address these questions, a qualitative research project based on the semi-structured in-depth interviews with the former *gecekondu* residents in the Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project in Gülveren-Ankara was conducted during July and August 2017. Qualitative research aimed to understand the process of becoming a homeowner for former *gecekondu* residents and transformations in their conduct within this process. In this way, empirical material enabled the researcher to analyze the formation and dissemination of this ‘ethico-political’ ground through the disarticulation and rearticulation of the elements in quotidian ‘common sense’ perspectives in tandem with the hegemonic vision of private property. Participant observation together with interviews, enabled to analyze transformation of conducts which are reflected in former *gecekondu* residents ways of dealing with every day and professional tasks.

The significance of this research stems from its threefold effort to understand social dimension of political-economic transformations. First, locating the private property regime at the center enables the investigation of a core element of the new scheme toward the re-distribution of land rent within AKP rule, which has been characterized as an outcome in previous political-economy and critical urban studies. Second, problematizing the private property regime through the hegemony perspective and elaborating it with through the conceptualization of governmentality as an alternative theoretical position sheds light on the ‘ethico-political’

aspect of the constitution of social order and the forces that reproduce it without losing its linkage to political-economic dimensions. In this way, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions that arise from solely focusing on macro or micro perspectives unfold and themselves become an object of explanation. Third, locating this framework within global gentrification discussions connect the ongoing ‘social production of both land markets and urban subjectivities’ in Turkey to the contemporary literature on gentrification, which is lacking in studies that are based on the re-structuring of cities in Turkey.

1.2 Organization of the Thesis

Having clarified the research problem of this study in the Introduction, Chapter 2: Alternative Theoretical Position begins with a literature review on the ‘global gentrification debate’ and presents prominent studies related to state-led urban development projects during AKP rule in Turkey. Crucially, it critically discusses the understanding of gentrification within these studies on Turkey, and explains how this study will locate itself in the ‘global gentrification debate’. Then, this chapter presents an alternative theoretical position based on the elaboration of Gramsci’s hegemony perspective with Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality in order to problematize private property regime under AKP rule. Chapter 2 ends with the explanation of methodological devices and methods for this research.

Chapter 3 is titled Re-structuring of State ‘from above’ and Its Implication on the Urban Governance in Turkey, and discusses the construction process of neoliberal hegemony through the re-structuring of the state in Turkey since the 1980 military coup, with a particular focus of urban governance reforms. More specifically, it points the ways in which class-based alliances are secured or challenged through the reforms enacted by successive governments. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the production of new private property regime as the particular ‘hegemonic project’ of AKP, which aims to re-consolidate neoliberal ‘hegemony’ in the contemporary Turkey.

In the fourth chapter, Hegemonic Politics of Homeownership, the particular conception of private property, which is enacted by the Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project, is described as enabling a legitimizing popular force ‘from below’ toward the restructuring of state ‘from above’ examined in the previous chapter. By examining the homeownership processes of former *gecekondu* residents through TOKİ social housing (as part of the Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project), this chapter sheds light on the consent and

coercive mechanisms which re-make the common-sense perspectives of former *gecekondu* residents in tandem with a particular conception of private property, namely ‘TOKİ as the sole path to homeownership.’

Chapter 5 is called Formation of Neoliberal Subjectivities, and sheds light on the ways in which the particular conception of private property discussed in Chapter 4 transforms the conduct of former *gecekondu* residents, starting from the contract process for homeownership. In order to make the transformation of conduct intelligible, this chapter begins with a description of the practice of ‘economy’ during times of *gecekondu* residence, which differs from the one that is enacted with the conception of private property. Sahlins and Polanyi’s ‘substantivist’ economy paradigm is used to argue that the former practice enables the elaboration of the Foucauldian concept of ‘neoliberal subjectivity’ by emphasizing the constitutive outside of it. Following a discussion to how conduct transforms processurally, this chapter ends with an elaboration of new subjectivities that are enacted through subjection to an indebted homeownership program.

In the Conclusion, arguments in each chapter are tied together and discussed in relation to initial research problem. Crucially, the gentrification debate is re-visited in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2

ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL POSITION

2.1 Literature Review

In this section, gentrification literature will be reviewed, as this study aims to contribute gentrification literature. In order to emphasize the relationship between neoliberal accumulation regimes and gentrification, this section starts with a brief introduction of the particular understanding of neoliberalism that this study adopts. Accordingly, this will be followed by a discussion of how gentrification becomes a global urban strategy within neoliberal accumulation regimes. Through an investigation of governance practices, social inequalities and discursive formations related to contemporary gentrification practices in global North and South, regularities that make gentrification as a global urban strategy will be opened up. Since this study takes place within the context of the global South, gentrification discussions in global South will be examined in detail. Then, empirical studies that problematize state-led urban renewal projects in Turkey will be reviewed, investigating how these empirical studies operationalize gentrification in their analyses of Turkey. This chapter will conclude by mentioning how this study problematizes its subject-matter, and where it locates itself.

2.1.1 Actually Existing Neoliberalism

The conceptualization of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is a dialectical understanding that challenges reductionism of implementation of abstract neoliberal rules by individual countries through studying the conversions in power geometry that make neoliberal transformations concrete. Peck and Tickell (2002) render these transformations through the changing role of state in economy and society. Accordingly two important shift occurred in the ‘neoliberal project’: (1) from Austrian School’s theoretical assertion of ‘free-market’ determination to marketization backed by state power (materialized in Thatcher and Reagan’s projects) and (2) from institutional and political limits generated by latter projects’ marketcentric consequences

-that hinder accumulation regime unsustainable- to socially interventionist regulation of economy (materialized in Clinton and Blair's projects) (2002: 41). Former shift that took place in late 70s had a 'destructive' character (Brenner and Theodore 2002, Harvey 2007) directed at the Keynesian-welfarist institutions; nevertheless 'roll-back' of the state through deregulation subjected majority of population to devastating social effects of market which rendered accumulation regime fragile due to the inadequate capacity to incorporate population into reproduction of this regime (Peck and Tickell 2002). Latter shift which has initiated by the early 90s had been "extending and bolstering market logics by socializing individualized subjects and disciplining the non compliant" (2002: 42) by 'creating' (Brenner and Theodore 2002, Harvey 2007) new (extra market) institutional forms of governance (as 'roll out') that deepens the reproductive capacity of this regime (Peck and Tickell 2002: 42-43).

2.1.2 Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy

According to dialectical construction of neoliberalism, social processes and relations are subjected to rescaling through the organization and exercise of state power at different geographical scales (Smith 2002: 82-83). The new urban economies constitute the platforms of global production of capital by cross-cutting national and regional scales (2002: 85-87). In this respect, cities become critical politico-institutional arenas (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 20). Different experiences of neoliberal urbanism throughout the world are indeed varied and contrastable; nevertheless, cities play a central role of in the global production of capital as a neoliberal accumulation regime (Smith 2002: 91).

Capital switching from primary (industrial production) to secondary (built environment) circuits as a response to over-accumulation crises has been discussed since the Keynesian 'spatial fix' of suburbanization; it resonated again in the urban restructuring which occurred as a response to the 1980s political-economic crisis (Harvey 1985). In his seminal work 'Urban Revolution', Lefebvre ([1970] 2003), designates the core of the secondary circuit as real estate speculation and forecasted its role in terms of becoming "the principle source for the formation of capital" (p.160). Accordingly, value extraction from land in the form of 'land rent' comes to the forefront in secondary circuit, in place of the extraction of value from labor (Harvey 1989a). Uneven acceleration of value extraction in real estate circuits of capital by speculative financial capital in the contemporary era expresses itself in the re-structuring of cities in both the global North and South through the securitization of space, megaprojects and comprehensive transformations (Lees et al. 2016). Within these different ways of re-

structuring, new urban economies of global South challenge the traditional urban centers of global North with these new forms of urbanism (Harris 2012, Smith 2002). What is intrinsic in these new urban economies -as the global production of capital- apart from the investment in real estate sector is the 'state-led class restructuring of urban space' (Lees et al. 2015). Gentrification, in the contemporary 'global gentrification' literature, has been designated to frame above mentioned characteristics in order to understand "persistently diverse but increasingly interconnected trajectories of socio-spatial change in different parts of the world" (Ward 2009 cited in Lees et al. 2016: 13). Starting with the mutation of gentrification in regard to political-economic changes, the following section will elaborate the ways in which gentrification becomes a 'global urban strategy' of contemporary urban process.

2.1.2.1 Changing Understanding of Gentrification

Conceptualization of gentrification has been subjected to change since Glass's pioneering definition, which points to the "rehabilitation of working class residential neighborhoods by middle class homebuyers" (Smith 1982 cited in Lees et al. 2007: 9). This change occurs in tandem with dynamics of urbanization that began their transformation in the early 1980s. Earlier definitions of gentrification emphasized its inner city, residential, and rehabilitative aspects (Smith 1982, Lees et al. 2007). However, these categories in particular are challenged by the new dynamics. Gentrification had been discussed in terms of its contrasting relation with suburbanization in peripheries, as it was associated with inner city; nevertheless, the binary relationship of center-periphery has been resolved both through the re-investment of capital into areas that were posing a barrier before (i.e. public housing, slums, industrial complexes) and by a blurring of the distinction between the two due to concurrent and resembling investments in the extended urban areas (Lees et al. 2016). Apart from housing, touristic and consumer-oriented complexes (hotels, convention centers, shopping malls), waterfront re-development, luxury office developments are additionally replacing older public spaces and working class neighborhoods (Lees et al. 2007). While gentrification was associated with residential upgrading and rehabilitation, re-development was differentiated by its demolition and new-build character (Smith 1982). However, according to Smith (1996), it is no longer meaningful to make such distinction as both rehabilitation and redevelopment are complementary aspects of property-led regeneration policies in the contemporary era. Despite the changing dynamics of urbanization, capital-led restructuring leads to the 'class remake of urban landscape' (Smith 1996, Lees et al. 2015). Modification of gentrification's definition, with respect to the new dynamics of urbanization mentioned above, enables an elaboration of

the understanding of urban transformations according to a “relational and dialectical class-oriented power analysis” (López-Morales 2016: 1110).

Although the consequences of these processes (class remake) are compromised and thus related knowledge is expanding cumulatively, major conflict arises from the variously identified causations of these processes. The consumer sovereignty paradigm asserts that the form of cities are determined by ‘rational choices’ of individuals’ preferences (Slater 2015: 116). According to this ontological position, the growth of the middle-class professional class resulted from a post-industrial occupational structure, which brings gentrification into forefront of urbanization (Lees et. al. 2007: 124). Rather than isolating one component as a determinant, neo-Marxists explore broader political-economic changes through the dialectical relationship between different scales in the making of historical spatiality (ibid.). However, consumerist approaches charge them for being economically deterministic and denying ‘agency’ (Smith 1996). In the consumer sovereignty paradigm, developers, bankers and state officials do not have power vis-à-vis middle classes in the making of gentrification, thus the ‘agency’ that is in the neo-Marxist approaches has not only been rejected, but also its power is concealed (Slater 2015: 121). Following the movement of capital rather than people enables the critical angle that explores the political construction of particular spatialities instead of accepting them as natural consequences (2015: 118). To this end, Smith examines gentrification in relation to the rent gap; an adequate difference between ground and potential rent allows developers to purchase property in certain places cheaply with the expectation of selling it with a sufficient return (Hackworth 2007, Lees et al. 2007, Slater 2015, Smith 1996). Gentrification generated by rent gaps leads ‘uneven development’: when the ground rent is capitalized through satisfactory returns without leaving any realizable potential rent, that particular “area creates barriers to further development, thus leading to underdevelopment, and that the underdevelopment of that area creates opportunities for a new phase of development” (Smith 1996, Slater 2015). Although this presentation of the logic of capital accumulation focuses on the mechanics of uneven development for analytical purposes, it has significant implications for social inequalities since it transforms social spaces through the “diverse forms of land exploitation, stigmatization, displacement and exclusion” (Lees et al. 2016: 210). Thus, the political-economic perspective on gentrification focuses on the social production of urban economies through the study of “contextual reconfigurations of state policies and embedded class and power relations” (Lees et al. 2016: 33).

Consequently, contemporary gentrification processes within the broader context of ‘roll out’ neoliberalism, restructure cities throughout the world at a much greater scale and with more offensive social policies when compare to earlier experiences of gentrification. Although the processes are occurring in diverse ways, exploration of the regularities that inform them will shed light on the ways in which gentrification becomes a global urban strategy in the contemporary era. In this regard, regularities are analyzed according to governance practices (new urban and economic policies), social inequalities and discursive formations.

2.1.2.1.1 Governance Practices

Following a neoliberal path of urban governance by the cities who have very different governing mechanisms is not their individual response over against capital flight. Rather, the role played by bond-rating agencies in global North and the IMF & World Bank in global South respectively, form and the timing of capital investment throughout the world constitute institutional constraints by finance capital on the governance of cities (Hackworth 2007: 17-18). In the context of this institutionally organized interurban competition, cities adopt an entrepreneurial approach to urban governance by operationalizing market logic that is expressed by place-marketing (Harvey 1989b). By implementing spatially targeted social policies instead of the distribution policies oriented towards social reproduction of labor (Smith 2002: 84), cities turn into a global competitive actor (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). According to Harvey, interurban competition “operate[s] not as a beneficial hand, but as an external coercive law forcing the lowest common denominator of social responsibility and welfare provision within a competitively organized urban system” (Harvey 1989b: 12). Growth is the first approach towards urban development, as the naturalization of market logic prioritizes the integration of places rather than citizens, and redevelopment of places rather than people who need jobs (Swyngedouw et al. 2002: 217). Although place-focused developments publicize themselves through social issues in order to gain political legitimization, targeted places for development render inhabitants problematic and the prioritization of the places for development postpones the creation of jobs, as they can be addressed after investment has been secured (Peck and Tickell 2002: 47, Swyngedouw et al. 2002: 217). According to Schindler (2005), the shifting object of urban governance from improving populations to transformations of space implies a ‘territorial moment’ in which power and place come to the forefront of governance practices.

As Peck and Tickell assert in ‘roll-out’ phase of neoliberalism, new institutional forms of governance were created in order to strengthen the reproductive capacity of political-economic regime (2002: 42-43). ‘Public-private partnership’ is the new institutional arrangement that expresses the “ideal of cooperative and coordinated mode of pluralistic governance” (Swyngedouw et al. 2002: 214). Through such quasi-private and autonomous arrangement, global capital⁵ penetrates into the local neighborhood (Smith 2002: 94) and local government becomes a stakeholder in a project, which implies its altered position vis-à-vis the formal governmental arenas (2002: 209-214). In order to maintain partnership with capital, localities appear business friendly (for sustaining their credit rating) and keep business-like ledger sheets (implied by lending communities in the U.S, against the risk of bankruptcies as in 1970s) (Hackworth 2007: 470). Nevertheless, these partnerships are mutually needed by capital and state for capital accumulation; without state assistance, re-investment of capital into the risky areas⁶ (public housing, far distance locations, public spaces, and slum areas) would not be possible (Hackworth and Smith 2001, Lees et al. 2016). Thus, the state becomes a key actor in such arrangements by opening new spaces for financial reinvestment, destroying outmoded physical and social infrastructures, blighting or stigmatizing spaces, up-zoning places and so forth (Lees et al. 2016: 81). In this way, the risks and costs that block further investment are transferred to the public sector; in turn, the investment environment is made both secure and welcoming for the market by public sector (Harvey 1989b: 7). Nevertheless, state-led and financed projects of this kind are deeply speculative since the economic sustainability depends on the future realization of urban rents, which are themselves dependent on global economic situations (Harvey 1989b, Swyngedouw et al. 2002, Smith 2002).

2.1.2.1.2 Social Inequalities

Through state-led redevelopment projects, re-distributive concerns give way to disciplinary market solutions to social problems which are leading to territorial stigmatization and displacement (Hackworth and Smith 2001, Slater 2015, Peck and Tickell 2002). According to Slater, redevelopment projects that are engendered by rent gap are essentially about class

⁵ Apart from the business corporations, international NGO’s are also part of this global capital since their intervention (either in the form of infrastructural investment or community organizing) have particular impacts on the trajectory of re-development projects (Doshi 2013, 2015, Roy 2005).

⁶ During 1980s capital had benefitted from the wide rent gap in the urban cores throughout the world for profitable and easy gentrification, however by the late 1980s this gap was considerably closed; thus, those risky areas become the new frontier for the capital accumulation led by rent gap (Hackworth and Smith 2001).

struggle between “those at risk of displacement and the agents of capital who produce and exploit rent gaps” (2015: 132). Since the rent returns are vital for the projects’ survival, upper classes or high economic production promised activities are targeted (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). To this end, invasive social policies are enacted towards the issues of crime, immigration, homelessness and oppositions that can limit the realization of such projects, as was the case in the ‘roll back’ phase (Peck and Tickell 2002). These new forms of social policy-making express the state’s socially interventionist approach in ‘roll out’ phase of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002). Thus, ‘revanchist’ strategies (anti-homeless, anti-squatter campaigns, zero-tolerance techniques, police violence) (Smith 1996) are legitimized in order to make city ‘safe’ for gentrification (Atkinson 2006: 821, Smith 2002: 95). Especially the ‘zero tolerance’ policies, as an expression of revanchism during 1990s in NYC, (Smith 1996) became a modifiable blueprint with the potential for ferocious policy implementation in the cities of global South⁷ (Lees et al. 2016). On the one hand, gentrification generates the income of a highly paid and skilled workforce; on the other hand, it displaces low-income groups whose precarization is heightened by regressive welfare reforms and the deregulation of labor markets (Peck and Tickell 2002). Furthermore new economic activities that are engendered by a new workforce displace existing local business environments (Atkinson 2006, Swyngedouw et al. 2002). According to Lees et al. (2016) the impact of gentrification policies, namely, the displacement of low income groups, is quite similar in every city, in contrast to Peck and Theodore’s (2010) claim that the same policies tend to render different impacts in different places due to their embeddedness into local power dynamics. Consequently, cities’ socio-economic polarization may be spatially expressed through ‘the island of decay in seas of renewal’⁸ (Wyly and Hammer 1999)’ (Atkinson 2006, Swyngedouw et al. 2002).

2.1.2.1.3 Discursive Formations

Balancing a particular accumulation regime and its legitimization requires compelling work in which rules of science and law construct ‘truths’ in order to justify the actions of a state

⁷ Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro have enacted these policies in differing degrees with the advice of ex NYC Mayor Giuliani who was the leading actor of ‘zero tolerance’ policy (Lees et al. 2016).

⁸ Wyly and Hammer (1999) modify Berry’s conceptualization of ‘islands of renewal in seas of decay’ which indicated the presentation of city in 1980s, into the ‘islands of decay in seas of renewal’ which indicates the ways in which inner city has largely been gentrified in contrast to landscapes in earlier decades.

(Weber 2002: 177). Law routinizes state power into rational procedures, thus rendering political issues administrative and therefore increasing popular acceptance of state authority (ibid.). Re-regulations and disciplining through new forms of social and penal policy making, which take place in 'roll-out' phase in order to prevent questioning of and resistance to gentrification projects, encourage the reproduction of this spatially grounded accumulation regime (Peck and Tickell 2002: 42). Science, through its ascendancy over irrationality, grounds the political aspects into a natural and neutral order, as if they have an independent existence from social-power relations (Weber 2002: 177). Defining spatial interventions through the terminology of biology emphasizes their 'naturalness', as concretely manifested in adopting the term 'regeneration' which has a biomedical and ecological origin, instead of 'gentrification' which has a clear emphasis on class shift (Smith 2002: 98). Through transformations in discursive formations, the power geometry that characterizes these spatial interventions unfold. Urban policy that is characterized by managerial approaches, justifies re-development plans and subsequent demolition through the discourse of 'blight', which is characterized as destruction with public purpose, i.e. promise of new low income housing. On the other hand, the entrepreneurial stance towards urban policy has opted the term 'obsolescence' which emphasizes temporal aspects in order to justify demolition for re-valuation (underlining exchange value rather than use) that are promised in gentrification projects (Weber 2002: 179-186). While the former term was coming with the responsibility of state, the latter moved away from the issues of responsibility and blame by asserting the natural quality of commodity, suggesting that it can be solved by the technical means of the market, i.e. gentrification. Furthermore, Lovering discusses the circulation of discursive articulations in their 'performativity' and 'visuality' as a formal strategy to modify gaze as a justifying mean (Lovering 2007: 360-362).

Consequently, new urban policy as the institutional form of governance in which social forces are articulated in a particular way –the geometry of social power–, produces, accomplishes, involves and forms the new political and economic regimes (Swyngedouw et al. 2002: 199). Cities engender future growth and conduct competitive struggle in order to attract investment through real estate development –the essence of gentrification–, which constitutes the object of this new urban policy (Harvey 1989b, Brenner and Theodore 2002). Hereby, local social settlements and the socio-spatial relations that constitute them are subjected to disciplinary force of neoliberalization (Peck and Tickell 2002: 39). Cities, by reproducing the logic of inter-urban competition, turn into "accomplices in their own subordination" (2002: 46).

Accordingly, socio-economic restructuring, as neoliberalization, is concurrently the restructuring of spatial scales (Smith 2002: 87-88). In this context, gentrification expresses “the rescaling of the urban vis-à-vis national and global scales” (2002: 97).

New urban policy and gentrification as its object present certain regularities, as discussed in this section. Nevertheless, these policy ideas are not diffusing in an imperial or unidirectional manner from global North to South (Harris 2012, Lees et al. 2015, 2016). Rather, gentrification as a global strategy results from the “interplays between global and local politico-economic forces, intertwined with an ample array of different institutional arrangements that characterize the currently hyper-connected capitalist world” (Lees et al. 2016: 63). Accordingly, in places that do not have the notion of Western democratic public space or where the welfare state has not been constituted, the experience of the commodification of dwellings and land for the first time express variegated trajectories of gentrification (Lees et al. 2015). Thus, going against the one model of ‘Gentrification’ that circulates around the world, multiple gentrifications, which are ‘mediated by the context’, take place in different cities throughout the world (Lees et al. 2015, 2016).

Since this thesis take place in the global South context, the gentrification debate will proceed through an examination of global South experiences.

2.1.2.2 Gentrification in Global South: Social Production of Land Markets and Urban Subjectivities

Cities of the global South have long been subjected to labeling from the Euro-centric perspectives as ‘backward modernity’ or ‘underdeveloped’ places (Roy 2009). The implicit assumption in such labels is the dichotomous position of global Southern cities as ‘problems’, and global North cities as ‘models’ (Roy 2005). When an ontological position is constituted in such way, analyses of urban processes in global South tend to be made by categories that are coming from completely different historical conditions. Harris (2012) identifies two problematic aspects that tend to frame urban change in global South cities. First, he identifies the interpretation of every spatial transformation as being a result of global forces’ impact (global competition, global aesthetics). Although he does not reject influences from those forces, he contends that other factors such as local social hierarchies, cultural histories, and so forth have mutual impact on the spatial transformations. The second problematic aspect is the tendency to formulate such transformations as a natural part of post-Fordist economies. There

is no doubt that finance and service sectors have been expanding at an accelerated pace since the 1980s; however, informal sector and sub-contracted labor are equally growing in the slums of many global South cities; the context does not accurately reflect arguments about ‘declining industrial production’ (ibid.). Informed by a perspective which views differential conditions as embedded in the constitution of global trends in urban change, Harris (2008) asserts that gentrification research should focus on the actors who are shaping and justifying gentrification in relation to “different urban economic bases, social hierarchies, cultural histories and institutional frameworks” (p.2410). In this way, it is possible to comprehend particular gentrifications’ interconnectedness and interdependency to the wider processes –such as neoliberalization-, rather than viewing them as separate and having been implemented on localities. In this regard, Lees et al. (2016) points to how, increasingly, the governments of global South accumulate capital through the remaking of their cities. Within the era of rapid capital flows, creation of land markets in global South ensures channels for such flows (Desai and Loftus 2013). More precisely, states are opening new spaces for re-investment (Lees et al. 2016). Alliances of state and business through the institutional arrangements for remaking the cities result in speculation of urban land, increased ground rent transfer from low income populations to (trans)national developers and the provision of expensive residential units that target middle and upper classes (ibid.). Apart from the production dimension of land/housing markets, Schindler (2015) claims that middle and higher classes tend to invest in the real estate sector instead of productive sectors due to the perception of greater risk; however, such an accumulation strategy, which is favored by governments, furthers the existing disconnect⁹ between capital and labor. Thus, places where low-income populations resides in the global South (slums, old working class districts), have been targeted by both global and local developers with the state’s assistance in order to transform these places into productive assets for real estate (Doshi 2013, 2015, Lees et al. 2015,2016, Nijman 2008).

As a result of such interventions, low income populations are faced with housing affordability problems in private market or the increasing costs of transformation that result from the location of state-subsidized housing (Lees et al. 2016). Since many countries in global South did not have welfare state experience, or this experience was completely abandoned due to military coups, housing as part of redistribution policies has not been found in the social policy

⁹ Southern metropolises have an abundance of both capital and labor, however they are not linked due to the lack of capital in productive sectors which would otherwise corresponded to the labor’s need (Schindler 2015).

agenda (Lees et al. 2015, Salcedo 2010). Property-led transformation thereby is not occurring from the housing that was a social right to its commodified form, as in the global North. Instead, transformation is from the places that the state allowed to exist outside formal housing systems to their formalization for the real estate market; thus, housing was always a property but in a manner which differs significantly from the Western understanding (Doshi 2013, 2015, Lees et al. 2016, Ley and Teo 2014, Salcedo 2010). In this regard, aspirations of achieving homeownership within the extensive growth of real estate discourse, although often resulting in displacement, adds another dimension to gentrification discussions: production of particular urban subjectivities besides the class restructuring of urban space (Doshi 2013, 2015, Ley and Teo 2014, Salcedo 2010). Accordingly, the interplay of neoliberal urban policies and their objects, which are embedded in specific historical socio-spatial contexts, shapes gentrification in the global South and problematizes the gentrification literature. The social production of both land markets and urban subjectivities, constituting the main dimensions of gentrification in the global South, will be analyzed according to discursive formation of informality, slum transformations, state-subsidized housing and renewal programs. Furthermore, each section is organized according to its subject matter's contribution to the gentrification debate.

2.1.2.2.1 Discursive Formation of Informality

Depicting informality as a problem and developing solutions to such a problem, especially through making it productive, is more than a simple policy response to a natural problem. The peculiar relationship between identifying the cities of global South as dominated by informality, and the capital accumulation strategies that are constituted by the very target of informality, offers space for critical inquiry of the political construction of informality. Accordingly, Roy (2005) points to the ways in which three foundational assumptions of such problematic is related with certain politico-economic interests: namely, the dichotomous positioning of formality and informality leads to the conceptualization of former as the domain of capitalism and latter as the isolation from capitalism; equating informality with poverty conceals the power relations that constitute the very structure of both phenomena; and within a framework with such a deliberate link between informality and poverty, the responsibilities of a state (excluded as a category from the construction of such an equation) are transferred to individuals themselves. Nevertheless, the power of states in the determination of informality cannot be neglected; it is the state, in the first place, that decides what is informal, thereby, it furthers the valorization-devalorization-revalorization cycle through the production of

informal spaces (Roy 2009). Accordingly, rather than identifying informality as unregulated space, it is deliberately produced as a mode of regulation by the state (Doshi 2015, Roy 2005). Ongoing debates over the formalization of land rights, which were initiated by the Peruvian economist de Soto during the second half of the 1980s, constitute one of the significant justifying forces of the regulations by informality in the global South (Desai and Loftus 2013, Doshi 2015, Lees et al. 2015, 2016, Lemanski 2011, Roy 2009). de Soto claimed that although the slum areas are very valuable potential assets for real estate, they do not contribute to the urban economy due to their exclusion from real estate markets. By creating the possibility of their inclusion to formal markets through legalizing their property rights, residents of slum areas could become economic agents by operating their now-liquidated asset, and the state could expand its tax base by the new tax paying citizens (Desai and Loftus 2013, Lees et al. 2016). Moreover, within this win-win situation, the state is assigning the task of solving poverty to the market by offering title deeds to the individuals; it thus withdraws from the responsibility of resolving poverty (Desai and Loftus 2013). Nevertheless, the evidence resultant from the legalization of property rights from the global South disprove these assumptions by pointing to outcomes which further deepen class inequalities (Lees et al. 2016). The allegedly beneficial relationship between rising property values and economic well-being of former informal residents is challenged by the tenancy composition of many informal places in global South: since not all the dwellings are occupied by landlords, an increase in property values leads to the eviction of tenants and their relocation to cheaper areas that are more likely to be in the peripheries (Desai and Loftus 2013, Lees et al. 2016, Lemanski 2011). Landlords (identified as small-scale entrepreneurs), on the other hand, are selling their properties to (trans)national developers for quite low prices compared to the potential rent value that developers gain (Desai and Loftus 2013). Thus, behind the discourse of being a solution to poverty, it is seen that legalized property rights lead to gentrification in which class-monopoly powers are constituted by the (trans)national developers (ibid.). In this regard, Roy (2005) critically differentiates between ‘having a right to participate in property markets’ and ‘actual participation in property markets’. Thus, informal spaces are flexibility and negotiation zones for all classes in which diverse interests of state and business are enacted by the patronage networks, toleration in exchange for electoral support and class re-make through developmental projects (Desai and Loftus 2013, Doshi 2015). Rather than defining such informal areas as spatial problems, they constitute a ‘flexible mode of regulation’ (Doshi 2015) for urban governance. Furthermore, targeting areas, that are constituting wide rent gaps, with spatially defined social problems (informality discourse in global South and concentrated

poverty discourse in global North) legitimize their transformation for the interests of the real estate sector in both the global South and North, thereby, two different contexts converge with a similar formulation of the problems and policy schemes.

2.1.2.2.2 Slum Transformations

Since the 1990s, slum areas in global South have been increasingly targeted by the state in order to open new spaces for real estate development. These particular interventions into the slum areas have been conceptualized as slum gentrification, clearance, redevelopment, rehabilitation and upgrade in the literature (Desai and Loftus 2013, Doshi 2013, 2015, Harris 2008, 2012, Lees et al. 2015, 2016, Nijman 2008, Roy 2005). What makes this process salient, compared to earlier piecemeal slum interventions, is the shift in neoliberal policy-making towards a more ‘roll-out’ (Peck and Tickell 2002) approach, and its lasting transformative power on the entire urban socio economic systems of the global South cities (Lees et al. 2016, Nijman 2008). In this regard, Nijman (2008) identifies three components of neoliberal policy-making in relation to slum transformation: first, relying on free market for the better results, rather than the government who have allegedly failed in the past development projects; second, the involvement of civil society institutions such as community organizations, neighborhood associations and NGOs for the efficiency of the developments; and finally the increasing responsibility of local governments -as a result of rescaling- in order to engage the first two components better and compete for attracting capital. As these components explicitly express, new institutional forms of governance rely on market forces and extend market logic through civil society involvement, which constitutes the unique character of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism. Within the new institutional framework of 1990s, slum areas transformed into socially ‘upgraded’¹⁰ places through property-led (re)investment, at the expense of low income populations through direct/indirect displacement (Lees et al. 2016).

A critical inquiry of a particular institutional framework, the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) in India, elaborates and challenges gentrification discussions by emphasizing the ways in which existing social hierarchies shape and are shaped by re-development process for the social production of both land markets and urban citizenship. Compared to earlier attempts at

¹⁰ by incoming (or the interests of) higher-income groups (Lees et al. 2016).

slum transformation, SRS has distinguished itself by the re-configuration of two areas: on the one hand, private developers are encouraged to enter into the slum transformation business through new incentives in development rights¹¹ and sales¹², which expresses how the SRS relies on and operationalizes the re-valuation of land. On the other hand, SRS supplies the community with legal land titles in order to make slum dwellers eligible for resettlement (Doshi 2013, Lees et al. 2016, Nijman 2008). Although the SRS has developed at the state level, there is no central government policy for slum areas, which makes the trajectory of slum transformation open to the market forces' initiative; thereby, SRS constitutes the instance of 'land market governance' (Doshi 2013, Nijman 2008). A new institutional framework enables the government to "remain flexible enough to meet political pressures across class constituencies" (Doshi 2015: 104) while "targeting the elite and middle classes who rejected spending public funds to relocate the poor but would accept offering public housing to the 'legitimate poor', land tax revenues for the state, beautification for the upper classes, and redevelopment profits for developers" (Lees et al. 2016: 151). According to Doshi (2013), the politics of the evicted which are formed by the disputed category of 'legitimate poor' provides an alternative interpretation of urban capital accumulation in tandem with 'actually existing neoliberalism' (Brenner and Theodore 2002) framework, which points to "the social processes involved in capital accumulation and the negotiations and conflicts they entail" (Doshi 2013: 845). In this regard, uneven displacement of slum dwellers that is caused by the inclusive – that is, consensual- and exclusive –that is, forced- evictions explain the ways in which land markets and urban citizenship are socially produced in the slum re-development processes of Mumbai (Doshi 2013, 2015, Lees et al. 2016). Research that took place in one of the slum transformation areas in Mumbai demonstrates this uneven displacement process: on the one hand, one group of slum dwellers are rendered as eligible for resettlement through the mediation of an NGO that ensured the slum dwellers' participation in redevelopment projects on the basis of gendered domesticity¹³ which meets evictees' desires for formal housing

¹¹ "If there is not sufficient space to build over and beyond the slum dwellers' needs, the developer/ builder is entitled to the so-called Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) that allow him to construct additional housing elsewhere on publicly owned land" (Nijman 2008: 77).

¹² "A developer or builder constructs the new homes on this (slum area) land and is compensated with the sale of dwellings beyond what the slum dwellers need" (Nijman 2008: 77).

¹³ NGO frames the women as "ideal stewards and beneficiaries of resettlement due to their knowledge of the home, water provision duties, and special sanitation needs" (Doshi 2013: 855). Thus, "slum dwellers have mobilized around feminized and ostensibly non-political social reproductive needs and aspirations for housing and domesticities" (Doshi 2013: 854).

through a distant resettlement area; on the other hand, another group of slum dwellers are excluded from this resettlement due to their ethno-religious¹⁴ roots and as a consequence of their mobilization to demand more equitable resettlement conditions, which were class-based (Doshi 2013, 2015). In both instances, slum dwellers are “both displaced and become (willingly or not) complicit in the dispossession of others” (Doshi 2013: 853). Thus, by re-configuring the class, ethno-religious and gender inequalities, the slum redevelopment process generates ‘accumulation by differentiated displacement’ and shapes the boundaries of urban citizenship (Doshi 2013, 2015). In this regard, the contribution of slum transformation in India to the larger gentrification discussion is threefold: first, dominance of class content in the broader discussions of gentrification is challenged by the articulations of ethno-religious, gender and class hierarchies which are produced through the different experiences of displacement; next, the ‘right to benefit from development plans’, as the demand of mobilizations that take place in slum transformations, questions the uncritical spread of anti-capitalist ‘right to the city’ discourses by pointing to its historical-political conditions of possibility; and finally, the NGOs decisive role for the slum community enriches discussions about governance arrangements which have been mainly analyzed through state and business frames (Doshi 2013,2015, Harris 2008, Nijman 2008).

2.1.2.2.3 Home ownership through State-Subsidized Housing

Although in different forms, promotion of homeownership in relation to property-led redevelopment is a widespread phenomenon in global South. Geographies that are embodying informal, dilapidated and substandard conditions of housing but not in the form of South Asian slum formation, have generated the social production of land markets primarily through the incentives of home ownership in state-subsidized housing (Lees et al. 2016, Ley and Teo 2014, Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009b). The main departure from the South Asian practice is the absence of a context of land rights formalization and the revanchist attempts against the poor and their living environment. Targeting these areas for property-led redevelopment mainly arises from regime shifts, and the question of how to integrate a former regimes’ legacy of an unproductive population into the broader strategies of economic growth (Chen 2013, Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009a,b, Ley and Teo 2014, Wu 2016). In this regard, East Asian developmental states and the Chilean post-coup democratic state present an analytical angle to explore the ways in which

¹⁴ Muslim and non-Maharashtrians: who are subjected to discrimination by the Hindu Nationalist government. (Doshi 2013: 850).

regime shifts are operationalizing an ‘unproductive population’ for economic growth in particular through the incentives of home ownership (Chen 2013, Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009b). Despite the fact that these two instances are expressing reverse regime shifts, making home ownership affordable, specifically for the poorest population, is the common target of shifting regimes’ urban economies.

Within the transition from socialist to capitalist orders, East Asian developmental states have operationalized cities as economic engines in their quest for economic reforms (Chen 2013, Lees et al. 2015). Although this aim reflects the global tendency towards the neoliberalization of urban policies, the entrepreneurial formation of state through close relationships between the private and public sector contextually diverges from Western formations as a result of the peculiar adoption of capitalism with the purpose of empowering state control¹⁵, rather than dismantling it (Chen 2013, Ley and Teo 2014). The particular relationship between state and capital are resolved in the operations of the Chinese land market: due to the socialist legacy, urban and rural¹⁶ land are owned by the central state, which has a moral duty as the social protector; local governments, on the other hand, requested to achieve local economic accumulation by selling the use-rights of land in a competitive land market (Chen 2013, Shin 2009b). Because of this divided role, local officials are, on the one hand, under the pressure of meeting the requests from central state, who is concerned with social protection and stability; on the other hand, they are expected to achieve economic growth; thus, local government embodies public interests in a quite entrepreneurial way (Shin 2009b, Wu 2016). Within this framework, urban development projects function to “achieve entrepreneurial objectives, create entrepreneurial image, and promote structural competitiveness” (Wu et al. 2007 cited in Chen 2013: 79). In addition to Chinese practice, Hong Kong, with its similar land regulation¹⁷ to/of China, implements an urban development program in which an elite growth coalition “shut out foreign competition, permitting the creation of fabulously wealthy local commercial empires”, thus, it diverges from Chinese urban governance arrangement, which includes an

¹⁵ In line with this particular formation, Roy asserts the conceptualization of ‘alternative modernities’ which “calls into question the Western origins of modernity, arguing instead that it is important to take seriously the emergence of the modern outside the geography of the West and in the circuits of production and exchange that encircle the world” (Roy 2009: 828).

¹⁶ Compare to urban land, rural land is more strictly protected: “it is subject to the constraint of development rights, which means market-centered gentrification from rural to urban land is not possible” (Wu 2016: 634).

¹⁷ “Land is publicly owned, and a clause in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong’s future prescribed the normal release of only 50 hectares of public land onto the market annually”. (Ley and Teo 2014: 1291)

increasing number of transnational corporations (Ley and Teo 2014). On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Chile is trying to solve the socially problematic economic legacies of military dictatorship. In this regard, Chile has initiated a central policy of subsidized housing units in order to make home ownership more affordable for poor citizens, which has been viewed as a success story with the highest percentage of homeownership among the poor in the world at %80 (López-Morales 2011, Salcedo 2010).

During the 2000s, new policies that aimed to make homeownership more affordable for low-income population have been enacted both in East Asia and Chile (Ley and Teo 2014, Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009a, b). While East Asia has opted for a subsidized public housing system or the cash based compensation model to finance homeownership among low-income populations whose dwellings are demolished for more profitable redevelopment projects, Chile provisions a complete subsidy for the evictees of the same sort of projects (Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009b). A striking aspect in both of these homeownership policies is the powerful ‘home owning’ aspiration of low-income populations. A ‘culture of property’ in Asia leads to the naturalization of demolition and eviction, as the inevitable aspect of urban life, with the expectation and hope for improved public housing accommodation (Ley and Teo 2014). Furthermore, the socialist legacy for the protection of land constitutes a ‘moral imperative’ that makes residents more receptive to demolitions as well (Shin 2009b). For the Chilean urban poor, homeownership is the ultimate goal that can change their disadvantaged condition and stigmatized image (Salcedo 2010). According to the narratives of the evictees in both geographies, “households will enter, if necessary squat, in designated redevelopment areas so that they can establish residency and claim eligibility for a compensation package, including potential transfer to a superior public housing” (Ley and Teo 2014: 1299). Through the state-subsidized public housing, new subjectivities, which are based on individualism, upward social mobility and new consumption practices¹⁸ develop among the poor households at the expense of loosening social contacts and privatization of everyday life (Salcedo 2010). Hereby, with the promotion of homeownership, new urban subjectivities and social production of land markets are generated rather than being designated as a cost of redevelopment,. Although the targeted spaces of urban redevelopment are clearly leading to class makeovers with the displacement of low income population, the class dimension of these redevelopment projects are under-represented in the public discourse due to the powerful aspirations of

¹⁸ Such as “home improvements, buying an automobile, sending children to college” (Salcedo 2010: 99).

homeownership in both geographies (Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009b, Ley and Teo 2014). Because of this affirmative stance toward urban redevelopment, class remake as the signifier of gentrification in global North is rendered irrelevant in these places (Ley and Teo 2014). Despite an observable convergence in terms of increasing intervention of the state and a high-rise urban landscape, a critical interpretation of class-remake constitutes an angle of divergence between the respective conceptualizations of gentrification processes in global North and South (ibid.). Thus, emphasis on the multi-layered relationality of property, in which historical, political and cultural structures are configured, elaborates the henceforth one-dimensional class aspect of gentrification discussions.

2.1.2.2.4 Renewal Programs

While Chile's high rate of homeownership among its poorest has led to an interpretation of its policies as a success story, renewal programs disclose the other side of this story: namely, state interventions that are in tandem with the interests of powerful private economic forces (Lees et al. 2016). Urban renewal programs in Chile have been enacted in the 2000s, following the period of 1990s which demonstrated the easy stage of renewal, in order to revive urban capital accumulation through eliminating the barrier that prevents the private sector to benefit from wide rent gap that is constituted by the risky areas of industrial sites and *pablociones*¹⁹ in peripheries (López-Morales 2010). State policies promote such investments through the absence of laws that prevent land speculation and the under-implementation of social programs (López-Morales 2010, 2011, 2016). Regarding the first component, developers hold vacant the land -which is purchased at low prices- until the authorities loosen the building regulations, which leads both to speculation of land and the de-valuation of place (López-Morales 2010, 2011). The second component expresses the complex role of state: on the one hand, the national state promotes social housing upgrading; on the other, the local state prioritizes high-rise construction; thus, local state under-implements policies that are centrally defined in order to open the way for investment (López-Morales 2010). With the limitation of upgrading in *pablociones*, residents could not add value to their properties; the only way to realize value is by selling it to the developer who increases the potential ground rent through renewal projects (López-Morales 2011). Thus, while residents are displaced by the 'ground rent dispossession', acquisition of potential ground rents by a certain group of developers leads to the 'class

¹⁹ "Owner occupied residential plots in traditional working class enclaves" (López-Morales 2010: 146).

monopolization' of land (López-Morales 2010, 2011). Furthermore, the inner-city housing market simultaneously increases its prices for the newcomers and decreases the living space in the new buildings. This prevents members of lower socio-economic groups from entering the renewed urban space due their inability to share the same dwelling with other household in the reduced space of dwellings (López-Morales 2016). With the increasing interventions of state, oligopolist urban renewal projects displace the low-income population from the whole city in regard to both inner city exclusion, and peripheral 'ground rent dispossession'. Gentrification that is actualized by renewal projects in Chile, challenges the rent gap theory's assumptions of devaluation and the causes of rent gap widening by pointing the role of state in these areas –the limitation of housing upgrading by the state constitutes an institutional redlining, thus devaluation- in place of the banks or finance institutions which are the primary agents in the global North context (López-Morales 2011). Accordingly, Chilean practices contribute to the gentrification literature by providing a broader definition of it: “a class monopolized spatial restructuring that generates material and symbolic exclusion of less affluent original users” (López-Morales 2016: 1127).

Consequently, conceptualizations of 'informality as mode of regulation' (Roy 2005, 2009), 'accumulation by differential displacement' (Doshi 2013, 2015), 'culture of property' (Ley and Teo 2014) and 'ground rent dispossession' (López-Morales 2010, 2011, 2016) emphasize the interplay of specific political histories (post-colonial, post-socialist, post-dictatorship) and contemporary power relations (in the form of neoliberal urban policies) in the production of gentrification in the global South. These components of gentrification in the global South point to the taken-for-granted dichotomy of formal-informal (Roy 2005, 2009), ethno-religious and gender inequalities beside the class (Doshi 2013, 2015), affirmative view of urban redevelopment (Ley and Teo 2014, Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009b) class-monopoly power in the social production of markets (López-Morales 2010, 2011, 2016) and new urban subjectivities (Doshi 2013, 2015, Salcedo 2010, Schindler 2015). Therefore, dynamics of gentrification in the global South challenge the assumptions of gentrification discussions that are based on global North experiences. Nevertheless, increasing intervention of the state through the normalization of urban redevelopment in urban policymaking and the displacement of low-income populations are the converging aspects of gentrifications both in the global South and in the North (Desai and Loftus 2013, Harris 2008, Lees et al. 2015, 2016). Accordingly, gentrification as the current capitalist power of urban transformation serves to exacerbate inequality and the polarization of societies (Leet et al. 2016). Within the challenges and

contributions of research on global South practices to the larger debate, gentrification may be seen as a ‘global urban strategy’ for cities in the contemporary era.

2.1.3 Empirical Studies on State-Led Urban Renewal Projects in İstanbul and Ankara

With the enactment of urban renewal laws in the second half of the 2000s, many *gecekondu* and historical settlements were targeted for demolition and the subsequent re-development. İstanbul, in particular, has become the major focus of academic attention due to it being the very first place for such interventions -with the aim of transforming İstanbul into a ‘global city’- and grassroots mobilizations against them. Critical urban scholars have problematized the urban renewal projects in terms of their implications for social inequalities and the dynamics of grassroots mobilizations.

According to study of Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu (2008), which analyzed the daily experiences of former *gecekondu* residents (who were displaced from Ayazma *gecekondu* settlement) in a new public housing estate of TOKİ’s in Bezirganbahçe, a public housing project leads to a ‘symbolic inclusion and material exclusion’: although there were attempts at ‘social inclusion projects’ such as a career center, losing the material means of livelihood subsequently causes the ‘relocation of poverty’. Through the new forms of poverty, which are mostly arise from the financial burden of TOKİ payments; social exclusion; and ethnic tension that are experienced by former *gecekondu* residents, public housing projects have thus been conceptualized as ‘urban captivity’ (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008). Zayim (2014), another scholar who studied the same public housing project, claims that the exclusion of some categories of citizens -i.e. tenants- from having rights to public housing projects generates ‘differentiated citizenship’ that points the differentiation and inequalities among the poor, outside of social exclusion. Sakızlıoğlu (2013), on the other hand, focuses on the ‘threat of displacement’ that Tarlabası residents are experiencing in the aftermath of designation of Tarlabası as an urban renewal zone. She asserts that the state deliberately created a period of uncertainty by being vague about the projected date of the demolitions –as devaluation- in order to open a path to neighborhood decline, which would disempower residents and thus legitimize the urban renewal.

Other research has focused on the evolving stances of grassroots mobilizations towards urban renewal. Scholars who have studied the dynamics of grassroots mobilizations in the

neighborhoods targeted for urban renewal, Tarlabası, Sulukule, and Başbüyük, revealed that uncompromising resistance against urban renewal at the beginning stages transforms into bargaining processes for having a right in TOKİ social housing projects, namely taking the opportunity to be a ‘homeowner’ through the ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment scheme of TOKİ (Erdi-Lelandais 2014, İslam and Sakızlıoğlu 2015, Karaman 2013a, 2014, Kuyucu-Ünsal 2010, Lovering-Türkmen 2011).

According to Kuyucu & Ünsal’s (2010) comparative study of the dynamics of resistance movements in Tarlabası and Başbüyük, tenure structure (tenants and owners) of existing neighborhoods determine the form and strength of resistance. Accordingly, while the resistance in Başbüyük -where the majority are tenants- was becoming fragile due to the divisions that were caused by the bargaining process; resistance in Tarlabası -where the majority are formal owners- presented a unified front against the renewal project. The researchers claim that, although the ‘appetite for private gain’ is the common aspect of both movements, lack of legal rights for property (a formal title deed), as in Başbüyük, intensifies the ‘collective action problem’, which in turn makes the implementation of renewal project easier and leads to the displacement and dispossession of the majority (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010). Lovering and Türkmen (2011), in their comparative study of the outcomes of resistance movements in Ayazma, Gülsuyu and Başbüyük, assert that the variations in the implementation of renewal projects are related to the targeted population’s relationship to their existing housing and state’s use of physical coercion, rather than the tenure structure, as Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010) claim. Accordingly, movements that are containing pressing fractions who have stakes in property ownership –i.e. becoming a ‘homeowner’ in TOKİ housing- are making the implementation of renewal projects easier compared to the organized movements in which state either uses brutal force or withdraws the project. Thus, both studies conceptualize the claims on private property as pejorative -which is clearly expressed by the phrase of ‘appetite for private gain’ (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010: 1481) and the characterization that the “best interest lies in increasing the value of their house rather than protecting the neighborhood and community as a whole” (Lovering and Türkmen 2011: 83) - and as the leading force that disrupts collective action toward protecting the neighborhood. Also, both studies point the variegated aspect of neoliberal restructurings, as opposed to pre-determined processes, through the local dynamics and power relations which interrupt the implementation of projects to certain extents. In relation to this latter point, in Öktem-Ünsal’s (2011) study of

the grassroots mobilization occurring in Tozkoparan social housing estate²⁰, she explores the ways in which a constellation of organized local resistance, the local government's stance against TOKİ's renewal project and cooperatives were able to prevent the actualization of the renewal project. She also indicates that the existing tenure structure (the majority having title deeds) caused TOKİ to withdraw from project since TOKİ officials openly declared to writer that "legal title makes the citizens' position stronger in law, and so gives them more confidence during the property appropriation process. In contrast, squatters are in a weaker position due to the complex nature of their housing tenure and ownership structure" (p.1310). In this way, she complements the critical role of tenure structure in the implementation of renewal projects, which was alternately related on the grounds of resistance dynamics by Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010). Erdi-Lelandais (2014), on the other hand, discusses grassroots resistances against the renewal projects in Sulukule and 1 Mayıs neighborhoods, in the context of 'right to the city'. She claims that, resistance against re-appropriation of these neighborhoods generated new forms of citizenship which were based on lifestyles and ethnic origins, collective memory and a sense belonging to certain spaces. According to Erdi-Lelandais (2014), these aspects are enough to analyze in a 'right to the city' framework since they are challenging 'the system', in spite of resistances ending with the implementation of renewal projects.

Karaman's (2013a, 2014) study of Başbüyük, Sulukule and Tarlabası grassroots resistances challenge the above mentioned works in two senses. First, he criticizes Kuyucu and Ünsal's (2010) claim of tenure structure as the sole determinant of the strength of grassroots resistance. Since the struggles in neighborhoods had been continuing when Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010) published their work, for Karaman (2014), it was too early to reach a conclusion that one grassroots organization is more successful than another, at that time. As time passed by, it became clear that renewal projects were fully implemented and displaced almost all the communities, despite the early assertion of the correlation that Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010) made between tenure structure and the strength of resistance. Furthermore, Karaman (2014) also found 'the sole determining factor of tenure structure' methodologically deficient, since other factors, such as extra-local support, or neighborhood identities, equally determine differences

²⁰ The targeted area of Tozkoparan is a large social housing estate in which majority of people bought their homes from the state under formal market conditions. In this respect, it contrasts to the other targets of urban renewal which are mostly *gecekondu* settlements and old historical districts (Öktem-Ünsal 2011). Since it is a formal housing estate with lower-middle class residents, the legitimization of renewal could not be based on the crime, blight and decay, which have been used for justifying the renewal projects in *gecekondu* settlements. Therefore, a proposition of renewal for Tozkoparan clearly expresses the state's view that this neighborhood is an obstacle to the actualization of potential land rent.

between resistances (see İslam and Sakızlıoğlu 2015). Secondly, Karaman (2014) criticizes the adoption of the ‘right to the city’ concept for any resistance that is against displacement. As Kuymulu (2013) discusses in his elaborated study of ‘The Vortex of Rights: ‘Right to the City’ at a Crossroads’, Lefebvre developed the ‘right to the city’ concept as a radical critique of capitalist urbanization, not a claiming of ‘use value’ of a city in capitalist relations²¹ -the latter of which was adopted by Erdi-Lelandias’s (2014) study. Within the framework of these critiques, Karaman (2014) asserts that the context of the resistances is changing. Compared to the earlier struggles of *gecekondu* residents which were against the demolition, demanding better public infrastructure and acquiring legal title deeds, contemporary grassroots resistances are based on “right to legal ownership by virtue of their (*gecekondu* residents’) status as long-established occupants and users of the space” (2013a: 730). For Karaman (2014), the underlying reason for such change is the state’s new stance towards the urban transformation: rather than destroying *gecekondu* settlements and not offering anything in place of *gecekondus* (in a way, ‘roll back’ neoliberalism), the state in the contemporary moment compensates demolition with ‘market-friendly’ plans (such as TOKİ’s ownership-based social housing system). In the context of ‘roll out’ phase of neoliberalism, the state extends market logic by including the poor residents into market relations through a ‘quasi- mortgage’ housing scheme, rather than leaving them out as in the prior ‘roll out’ phase (Brenner and Theodore 2002, Karaman 2013a, 2014, Kuymulu 2013). Rather than expecting the older characteristics of *gecekondu* resistance (which was evident in the works of Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010, Lovering and Türkmen 2011), Karaman (2013a, 2014), emphasizes the changing stance of the state and the changing character of resistances in a dialectical manner. Accordingly, rather than blaming the residents for their ‘appetite for private gain’ and rendering this as an underlying reason of the weakness of collective action (as seen in Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010, Lovering and Türkmen 2011), Karaman (2013a, 2014) critically investigates the ‘politics of compensation’ as a ‘modality of inclusion’. Through evolving the problematic of urban renewal toward a ‘politics of compensation’ in which the incorporation of residents into markets is the main concern (rather than displacement), he claims that the state attempts to discipline *gecekondu* residents within the ‘quasi-mortgage’ system of TOKİ. Thus, a ‘politics of compensation’ rightly addresses the impacts of contemporary neoliberalization process on the ‘social’ itself – as the production of social. Nevertheless, his study is limited both by the narratives of *gecekondu*

²¹ “Only the integration of value and use value, without the mediation of exchange value, would reveal use value as the ultimate form of value, which is possible only outside of capitalist relations” (Kuymulu 2013: 938).

residents who are not relocated to the TOKİ housing yet and an insufficient analysis of secondary literature.

Although Ankara, which contains a huge amount of *gecekondu* settlements, has been subjected to many state-led urban renewal projects under the AKP regime, critical academic interest in renewal projects in Ankara have scarcely been developed. The main reason for such indifference hypothetically could be interpreted in terms of a lack of any organized grassroots resistance towards the contemporary renewal projects. Nevertheless, certain *gecekondu* neighborhoods - Portakal Çiçeği, Geçak, Dikmen- in Ankara experienced ‘transformation’ during the 1990s which constituted one of the very first examples of state-led urban transformation projects. However neither of them were transformed through the ‘social housing’ scheme of TOKİ, as in the latest phase of state-led renewal.

Portakal Çiçeği, Geçak and Dikmen projects were studied in the contexts of planning, displacement, dispossession, gentrification, conflicts between different participants of the projects and grassroots mobilization in specific to Dikmen (Aykan 2011, Dündar 2001, Güzey 2009, Türker-Devecigil 2005,2006, Uzun 2005, Varlı-Görk and Rittersberger- Tılıç 2009). Due to the Ankara’s rooted academic tradition of city and regional planning, these studies were mostly conceptualized according to the dynamics of planning, namely transformation zones’ broader physical-environmental impact on the city of Ankara, rather than social aspects. Still, studies on contemporary state-led renewal projects have been conducted mostly within the discipline of city and regional planning, rather than through a critical urban approach.

Nevertheless, analyses of contemporary state-led urban renewal projects made by Açıkgöz (2014), Armağan (2014), Aslan-Güzey (2015), Bektaş-Türkün (2017) and Danişan (2012) - who are located in the field of city and regional planning- focus more on the social implications of the projects when compared to the earlier approaches. Namely, their studies emphasize the increasing financial hardship caused by TOKİ housing; new strategies of making livelihood; differences of rent appropriation between popular and neoliberal urban governance; and social segregation in mixed-income projects. Since these analyses confirm the findings of İstanbul-based urban renewal studies, their elaborated review will not be included in this section. Rather, Erman’s (2011, 2016a, b) and Erman & Hatipoğlu’s (2017) work will be reviewed in more detailed way due to their fruitful contribution to the critical urban literature which furthers our understanding of the social implication of contemporary state-led renewal projects.

Erman (2011, 2016a, b) discusses the social outcomes of the Northern Ankara Urban Transformation Project (NAUTP) for the *gecekondu* population who used to reside in Karacaören, where the renewal project had transformed the settlement into TOKİ housing. This project was actualized by the urban transformation law (no.5104) that was enacted specifically for the transformation of this area in 2004. Further, this is the very first law that enables state-led urban renewal through TOKİ (Gümüş 2010). ‘Beautification’ of the area constitutes the main aim of this renewal law; compared to other laws that target *gecekondu* settlements, this aim presents an exception which cannot be legitimized in the same way other laws were (Gümüş 2010, Erman 2016a). Nevertheless, the project was implemented without any remarkable resistance by the *gecekondu* population. According to Erman (2011, 2016a), the *gecekondu* population’s unconditional support of AKP, inexperience with ‘collective action’, and contracts that were made on individual bases prevented the development of any grassroots resistance to projects. Erman’s (2016a, b) problematization of urban renewal in Karacaören *gecekondu* settlement differentiates itself from other renewal studies that are based on İstanbul through its ontological position: rather than victimizing the *gecekondu* population, she explores the ways in which this population actively transforms their new environment, namely TOKİ social housing. Accordingly, she conceptualizes the state’s intervention into *gecekondu* population’s life as ‘formalization’, which differentiates itself from the ‘formalization as legalization’ that has been discussed in the context of ‘making new property regime’ by Gülöksüz (2002), Kuyucu (2017) and Türem (2017). ‘Formalization’ in this new conceptualization corresponds to the regulation of *gecekondu* population’s life through incorporation of urban poor into the formal market system and management of the housing estate by TOKİ’s private company (Erman 2016a, b). By following Karaman’s (2013a) conceptualization of urban renewal as a ‘market-disciplinary tool’, she furthers the discussion through pointing out the ‘informalization’ of TOKİ housing by former *gecekondu* residents according to their ‘own cultural habitus’ in the subsequent leave of the management company. Against the management company’s imposition of the ‘rules’ for apartment life, former *gecekondu* residents “re-appropriate spaces via their cultural practices of place-making in everyday life and by setting up their own block management system” (Erman 2016b: 438). However, practices of ‘informalization’ are made up of conflict-ridden processes due to a separation of former *gecekondu* residents along the lines of those who desire a new way of life through apartment living, and the ones who hold on to their cultural habitus (Erman 2016b). Besides the conflicts among the former *gecekondu* residents on the basis of ‘way of life’, financial hardship due to the payments causes longing for the ease of *gecekondu* life,

which leads Erman (2016a) to conceptualize the contradictory conditions of apartment living as a ‘-mıř gibi site’²². Within the ‘multiple discrepancies’ that residents are experiencing in TOKİ housing, Erman (2016a) claims that the development of ‘neoliberal subjectivity’, which is targeted through the incorporation of poor into formal housing market, does not resemble the Western notion of ‘neoliberal subjectivity’ since the conditions of inclusion into formal market and its transformative affects are quite different than the Western context. However, the underlying assumption in such formulations is the adoption of the ‘superior’ countries’ neoliberalization characteristics by ‘inferior’ countries, which limits the understanding of contemporary neoliberal restructurings rather than expanding it, as in the dialectical understanding of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, which points the variegated forms that are generated by the particular articulation of local power relations and broader principles of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, a more recent study by Erman and Hatipođlu (2017) problematizes the new subjectivities of women in social housing of TOKİ in a more elaborated way when compared to the reduction of the neoliberal subjectivity to the Western context, as in Erman’s (2016a) earlier work. This recent study revealed that urban renewal generates gendered effects through the intersection of traditional gender order by the new status as ‘working women’; their new subjectivity reproduces “the ideal of docile women in patriarchal family arrangements” (Erman and Hatipođlu 2017: 1299) through subjectifying cultural conservatism which defines “women as devoted mothers and wives working for the interest of their families and men as the head of family” (ibid.), along with the desire of homeownership which is made possible by the neoliberal restructurings. Thus, women’s new subjectivity is framed within their enduring capacity to undertake an increased workload –within the limits of patriarchal family order- in order to become a ‘homeowner’.

2.1.3.1 Gentrification Debate in Turkey

Gentrification as an analytical tool to delve into neoliberal urban restructurings has not been developed in Turkey to the extent that it has in international literature. Early -and some new- works on gentrification in Turkey (İslam 2005, Uzun 2003, řalgamcıođlu and Ünlü 2014, řen 2006) adopted classical gentrification approach in their analysis of Cihangir, Tarlabası and Kuzguncuk, with templates that are exported from the global North context. According to İslam and Sakızlıođlu (2015), this is mostly because gentrification in İstanbul includes the

²² Direct translation of it corresponds to ‘as if a gated community’, which reflects the points about ‘symbolic inclusion and material exclusion’ that Bartu-Candan and Kolluođlu (2008) discuss in their study of Bezirganbahçe TOKİ.

main elements of gentrification in global North, namely socio-economic and physical upgrading, which brings subsequent displacement. With the implementation of early state-led urban renewal projects in Ankara (Dikmen and Geçak projects), international discussions of state-led gentrification were introduced to academia in Turkey by the works of Güzey (2009), Uzun (2003) and Varlı-Görk & Rittersberger- Tılıç (2016). Nevertheless, contemporary state-led urban renewal projects under the AKP regime did not draw much academic attention on the basis of a gentrification framework.

Critical urban literature has been growing by problematizing the contemporary state-led urban renewal projects under the AKP regime -as discussed in the previous section- and they actually parallel discussions of gentrification in global South in key aspects. Conceptualizations of ‘relocation of poverty’ and ‘urban captivity’ (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008); ‘differentiated citizenship’ (Zayim 2014); ‘property-led resistances’ (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010, Lovering and Türkmen 2011); ‘urban renewal as market disciplinary tool’ (Karaman 2013a, 2014), ‘re-informalization of state-subsidized housing’ (Erman 2016b) and ‘constitution of new subjectivities of women through state-subsidized housing’ (Erman and Hatipoğlu 2017) challenge the assumptions of gentrification discussions that are based on global North experiences and are actually contributing to discussions of ‘social production of both land markets and urban subjectivities’, which constitutes the core of gentrification in the global South. It is clear that the researchers of contemporary state-led urban renewal projects in Turkey have been conceptualizing gentrification in different ways, which in turn prevents a direct interpretation of those studies in relation to international gentrification literature. Nevertheless, Zayim (2014) and Öktem-Ünsal (2016) conceptualized contemporary state-led urban renewal directly in relation to state-led gentrification literature. Güzey (2009) furthers Zayim (2014)’s and Öktem-Ünsal’s (2016) account of state-led gentrification by differentiating two forms of state-led gentrification. One occurs in the inner-city *gecekondu* areas with historic significance- with public-private partnerships and a high level of displacement; the other occurs in the peripheral *gecekondu* areas with mainly public sector investment and a low level of displacement. Although Varlı-Görk & Rittersberger- Tılıç (2016) study was of an early state-led urban renewal project (Geçak), they nonetheless, emphasize the ‘gentrification by force’ character of contemporary state-led urban renewal projects. Karaman (2013a, 2014), on the other hand, interprets contemporary state-led urban renewal projects according to two different forms: redevelopment of peripheral informal neighborhoods and state-led gentrification of an inner city slum. It is clear that his separation

is based on Smith's (1982) earlier differentiation of redevelopment (characterized by demolition and new buildings) and gentrification (characterized by residential upgrading and rehabilitation). However, as it is mentioned in the 'Changing Understanding of Gentrification' section, Smith's (1996) later work emphasized the non-necessity of such distinction since both are working in a complementary manner for property-led regeneration policies. Furthermore, Karaman's (2013a, 2014) separation is also based on the differentiation of inner city and periphery, however, as Lees et al. (2016) note, distinctions in those in terms of the mode of intervention are highly blurred in the contemporary era, since investments in both spaces quite resemble one another. Lastly, Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010) mention gentrification only by stating that 'urban transformations lead to gentrification', which -possibly- understands gentrification as displacement. The remaining literature does not mention gentrification at all. Nevertheless, it is possible to claim that gentrification ontologically exists in the literature of critical urban studies; however, it has not been expressed epistemologically, as in Hong Kong (Ley and Teo 2014).

According to İslam and Sakızlıoğlu (2015), it is crucial politically to use the analytical tool of gentrification in Turkey, since within the contemporary neoliberal urban restructuring, state authorities are appropriating urban space and resources from the poor with their expansive power, in order to re-distribute them, in particular, to the rich. In this regard, İslam and Sakızlıoğlu assert that

gentrification literature in Turkey has tended to focus on cases of classical gentrification taking place in historic city centres, and has been quite disconnected from other urban literatures such as on *gecekondu* transformations or on informal urbanisation...There is a need for integrating theories of power and state into gentrification theories to grasp the crucial role of the state and the interchangeable use of formality and informality in cities outside the Global North.

(2015: 260)

2.1.4 Thesis Position in the Literature

As it is evident from the empirical studies that are related with state-led renewal projects in İstanbul and Ankara, increasing social inequalities and aspirations of private property as the destructive force of resistance movements are emerging as two crucial outcomes. Nevertheless, apart from the studies of Erman (2016a) and Karaman (2013a, 2014), private property has not been problematized as an object of research. Rather, the majority of the studies approach the question of private property as a foregone conclusion. Although Erman

(2016a) and Karaman (2013a, 2014) challenge this dominant pattern by bringing forward the state's strategies (individual contracts) and a new form of politics (the politics of compensation), the meaning of private property in the form of homeownership in TOKİ social housing for the former *gecekondu* residents, and the processes by which this meaning are constructed are still lacking in critical urban studies. Moreover, the implications of neoliberal urban restructuring for the *gecekondu* population have been examined only in terms of social inequalities (except Erman's (2011, 2016a, b) studies which focused on the continuity of *gecekondu* social practices in the TOKİ social housing). However, neoliberalism, as a particular economic rationality, highly contrasts with the *gecekondu* residents' hitherto practices of 'economy' and embedded 'social relations'. Hence, the organization of 'social relations' within the new practices of 'economy' have not yet been questioned.

With regard to aforementioned gaps in the critical urban literature, this study problematizes the constitution of a private property regime in the form of homeownership through TOKİ social housing projects and their implications for the conduct of former *gecekondu* residents. Crucially, this problematization is framed within the hegemony perspective of Gramsci and elaborated with Foucault's concept of governmentality. In this way, following İslam and Sakızlıoğlu's (2015) emphasis, this study brings the theories of power and state to the gentrification debate in Turkey by offering a new theoretical framework to examine 'social production of both land markets and urban subjectivities' as the main axis of gentrification discussions in the global South.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

This study aims to contribute to gentrification literature, in particular in the global South, through analyzing the formation of the private property regime in the state-led urban development projects and its implications on the urban poor. For this purpose, this study opts to adopt Gramsci's hegemony perspective and builds upon it using Foucault's concept of governmentality. In order to construct such a theoretical framework, this section starts with Gramsci's theoretical perspective of hegemony and then analyzes Foucault's concept of governmentality. After each discussion of theory, the subject-matter of this study will be opened up through them. This separation is made for analytical purposes; in the last section, an articulation of these two theories and their new formulation for the subject-matter of this study will be discussed.

2.2.1 Theoretical Perspective of Hegemony

Actualization of a successful revolution in Russia and failure of revolution in Europe during the early 20th century triggered Gramsci to develop his political and theoretical project which aim to understand social and historical power structures in Europe and re-conceptualize revolutionary processes in accordance with that reality (Fontana 2010: 342). Conditions that made the revolution in Russia successful were quite different than in Europe since the structuring of 'state' in West and East were not same, thus the strategies for revolution could not be parallel (Gramsci 2000: 223). Gramsci elaborated the concept of hegemony in accordance with the particularity of the state in West, which, compared to the East, was not all-encompassing, but merely an 'outer ditch' behind the civil society (ibid.). In contrast to the understanding of Leninist state, where the power is directed from the center, the concept of hegemony aims to capture the ways in which power is produced and re-produced within the broader context of society in which state and civil society are reciprocally constituted (Crehan 2002: 166, Fontana 2006: 27). Thus, hegemony, within the expanded conceptualization of power, is a particular 'relation', rather than the domination (Simon 1982).

In order to elaborate the relational character of hegemony, Gramsci constructs the concepts of 'historical bloc' and 'relations of force', which are specifically positioned against the economism of Marxist literature. In contrast to the mechanical historical materialist understanding that attributes determinative force to the structure and renders superstructure as the simple reflection of structure, Gramsci asserts that structure and superstructure form a dialectical unity, a 'historical bloc', in which classes that are constituted at the economic level combine at the political level; however, it is far from a simple convergence (2000: 192-193). In order to emphasize complex and dialectical relation between them, Gramsci discusses it through the reverse illustration of it: collapse of structure does not necessarily lead to destruction of superstructure, on the contrary, certain elements from superstructure survive and operationalize in the new 'historical bloc' (2000: 198). 'Relations of force', on the other hand, is a concept that opposes a simple understanding of class domination. Different social groups arise from the objective conditioning of forces of production in the structure and each group represents a specific function in relation to their position in the production (2000: 204). A decisive factor for achieving political force lies in the ability to move from particular economic-corporate interests to the universal plane in which represented interests embrace interests of subordinate groups (2000: 205). Constituting not only a unity of "economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral" body on the entire social area is what Gramsci

attempts to demonstrate with the concept of hegemony (ibid.). Thus, leadership for the entire social body transcends economic-corporate interests and even leads to the certain sacrifices in these interests (2000: 211). While Gramsci is rejecting the simple economic reductionism in the making of leadership in this way, he deliberately constructs a dialectical understanding of structure and superstructure by asserting that “though hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (2000: 212).

2.2.1.1 Relationship of State and Civil Society in the Construction of Hegemony

Gramsci’s elaboration of the relationship of ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ sheds light on the ways in which hegemony is constructed. ‘State’ in the West, for Gramsci, is not something to be captured –as it is in the East. Rather, it is “a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups” (Gramsci 2000: 206). Accordingly, the ‘state’ coexists with the existing social formation in the West, as opposed to the East (Anderson 1976: 40). Although Gramsci delineates ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ as “one and the same” (Gramsci 2000: 210), he methodologically distinguishes them in order to elaborate on the particular contexts of hegemony (Crehan 2002: 103). When Gramsci demonstrates the ways in which hegemony is relationally constructed between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’, he emphasizes the productive and educative aspects of ‘state’, rather than understanding it as solely repressive (Hall 2006: 360). In that regard, the ‘state’ is,

creating new and higher types of civilization; of adapting the 'civilization' and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; hence of evolving even physically new types of humanity.

(Gramsci 2000: 210).

Accordingly, bringing ‘civil society’ in compliance with “the needs of the productive forces of development” (hence the ruling class) through the enhancement of population into a “particular cultural and moral level” is what Gramsci means by ‘ethical state’, i.e. productive and educative state (2000: 234). In that regard, school, media, culture, etc. constitute apparatuses of ‘consent’ for the conception of the social world imposed by a fundamental group (2000: 307). Nevertheless, emphasis on the ethical role of ‘state’ does not eliminate the ‘coercive’ dimension of ‘state’, which is practiced by courts, police, military, etc (ibid.). According to Crehan (2002), Gramsci interprets power relations as the continuum between

two poles, which are constituted by direct ‘coercion’ and willing ‘consent’ (p.101). Relations between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ reveal the ways in which a changing balance of power relations are produced and re-produced (2002: 166). However, as Anderson (1976) rightly notes, neither ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ nor ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’ have fixed positions in the writings of Gramsci. Since those concepts are the conclusions at which Gramsci arrived through his efforts to understand failure of revolution in Italy in the early 20th century, they do not have a monolithic theoretical claim. Rather, they provide “a way of approaching the problem of how power is produced and reproduced, an approach that provide us with certain questions to ask of the empirical realities of power” (Crehan 2002: 166). In that regard, on the one hand, the changing relationship of ‘state’ and ‘civil society’; on the other hand, conceptualization of ‘hegemony’ in relation to these changing relations reveal the ways in which power take different forms in different contexts. In the context of the role of intellectuals, Gramsci positions ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ as the two levels of superstructure in which hegemony constitutes the synonym of ‘consent’ and operates within the ‘civil society’ while the ‘state’ is constituting the ‘coercive’ power (2000: 306-307). In the discussion of the parliamentary regime in France, Gramsci renders the ‘state’ as encompassing ‘civil society,’ whereby hegemony is “the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent” (1992: 80). Accordingly, the concept of ‘state’ has been expanded to ‘integral state’ in order to embrace both ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’, through which “hegemony (is) protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 2000: 235). Anderson (1976) interprets the last configuration of ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ as their merging into a greater unity of ‘integral state’ in which the ‘oneness’ and ‘sameness’ of ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ are reflected (p.35).

Through his conceptualization of an ‘integral state’, Gramsci attempts to challenge the delineation of ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ as two distinct and opposing spheres. By exploring the different configurations of them in various contexts, Gramsci exposes the complex relationship between them, as opposed to accounts that render ‘civil society’ in terms of the sphere of free individuality or render ‘state’ in terms of the sphere of the sole power (Crehan 2002: 101, Fontana 2002: 169, Gramsci 2000: 224). Although the relation between them is re-configured in relation to subject matter of the problem, ‘civil society’ as the terrain on which hegemonic struggles take place abides. By asserting that “between the economic structure and the State with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society” (Gramsci 1992: 208), Gramsci clearly emphasizes the critical role of ‘civil society’ for the unification of structure and superstructure,

as the significant condition for constructing hegemony. Furthermore, from such an assertion it is possible to distinguish Gramsci's formulation of 'civil society' from Marx's, who has discussed 'civil society' in relation to its position in the relations of production (by particularly focusing on the factories and plants) as the continuum of economic structure (Anderson 1976: 35). In order to emphasize intermediary role of 'civil society', Gramsci deliberately excludes factories and plants from the discussion of 'civil society' and includes organizations such as culture, family, school, etc. which do not openly reveal the class relations, but 'private' interests in broader sense (Hall et al. 2007: 281). Since those 'private' interests are constituting the combination of ideological and economic aspects of the social formation, 'civil society' as the ensemble of 'private' interests becomes the terrain of hegemonic struggles in order to develop "new types of humanity" (Gramsci 2000: 210) which is line with the "necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production" (ibid.). In that regard, when the articulation between 'private' interests and "the needs of the productive forces of development" are greater, the 'state' appears to be more 'ethical' and less coercive (Gramsci 2000: 236). Thus, through the "well-articulated civil society, individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby entering into conflict with political society –but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement" (Gramsci 2000: 238). This is what Gramsci attempted to demonstrate with the 'integral state' in which 'state' and 'civil society' become "one and the same" (2000: 210).

2.2.1.2 Conception of the World in the Construction of Hegemony

According to Gramsci, a critical aspect that enables dominant social group to articulate 'civil society' and "the needs of the productive forces of development" in the form of 'integral state' is the production of "intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a conception of reality" (2000: 334). In that regard, development and elaboration of a particular conception of world, moral and intellectual structure, way of life by the dominant social group constitutes the 'material' expression of hegemony. Since particular conception of the world is embedded in 'practical activity', it affects many aspect of social activity and thought; hence Gramsci states that "popular beliefs' and similar ideas are themselves material forces" (2000: 215) (Crehan 2002: 174, Hall et al. 2007: 281). Material effectivity of a particular conception of the world depends on the extent that a social group gives "a personality to the amorphous mass element" (Gramsci 2000: 340), a personality that is "both conscious and self-disciplined" (Fontana 2002: 173). Hegemonic struggle of a social group for shaping the moral/intellectual personality of subordinate groups does not take place "within a given structure, but over the

very nature of the structure itself” (Fontana 2002: 170-173) in order to innovate new schemas for conceiving the world (Gramsci 2000: 335). Gramsci’s (2002) emphasis on the production of a particular conception of the world as a decisive aspect of the social groups who claim to be hegemonic represents his effort to transcend traditional Marxist accounts that explain power relations solely through the relations of production. For Gramsci, these accounts are unable to go beyond pointing to the class character of the ruling bloc; however, for him, the crucial aspect of the ruling bloc is their ability to gain strategic measure of the consent of subordinate groups that sustain the hegemony of the ruling group (Hall 1988). In that regard, his concern is to question “empirical realities of power” (Crehan 2002: 166). However, this concern does not make him to move away from the exploration of class interests in a particular conception of the world; on the contrary, he examines the ways in which social practices, demands and interests that do not emerge directly from the relations of production are operationalized for the class interest of the social group who claim to be hegemonic (Simon 1982: 27). In other words, class interests are not given, but produced by the methods used in the exercise of power, i.e. dissemination of a particular conception of the world (Fontana 2002: 174, Hall 1988: 167). ‘National-popular collective will,’ which neither directly arises from class relations nor openly reflects class interests, is the material form of the unified, common conception of the world (Gramsci 2002). Hence, the capacity to produce ‘national-popular collective will’ constitutes a crucial condition for the hegemonic struggles in question.

For Gramsci, ‘commonsense’ is the terrain on which ‘national-popular collective will’ is generated. Against the hegemonic conception of a leading group, which has to have a unitary and coherent character in order to produce common moral and intellectual structure, ‘commonsense’ is “fragmentary, incoherent, inconsequential” (Gramsci 2000: 343) and a “chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions” (2000: 345). Nevertheless, it reflects the conditions of life of people in which certain elements from prior social and cultural environments survive; hence, for Gramsci, ‘commonsense’ is “the folklore of philosophy” (2000: 343). Informed by the experiences of growing up in a peasant culture, Gramsci is neither sentimental nor derogatory about ‘commonsense’, rather he approaches it as a contradictory complexity which needs to be transformed by critical practice in order to arrive at a coherent conception of life that will lead to counter-hegemonic claims (Crehan 2011: 282, Crehan 2002: 105, Gramsci 2000: 333). Thus, ‘commonsense’ is what is at stake in hegemonic struggles.

Through the expressions of 'ideology', 'philosophies' and 'systems of thought', Gramsci emphasizes the ways in which particular conceptions of the world disseminate by providing an extensive interpretation of the material and social world (Gramsci 2000). It is the "common material and mental framework" (Roseberry 1994: 363) in which particular ways of thinking, feeling, talking and calculating are naturalized, hence the re-making of 'commonsense'. In that regard, the hegemonic conception of a ruling group exercises "material and ideological force into the daily lives of ordinary people" (Hall 1988: 6). Through the convergence of the conceptions of the world of ruling and subordinate groups, in the form of renewed 'commonsense', the ruling class becomes a social authority, marking the moment of hegemony's institutionalization. Despite this, hegemony must not be thought as an accomplished mission; on the contrary, construction of social authority necessitates a continuous effort in order to sustain ruling group's claim of leadership over the whole social body (Hall 1988: 133). Thus, hegemony, for Gramsci, is a continuous process which is open to contestation. Internalization of the hegemonic conception of the world by the masses in its heterogeneous forms rather than pure, constitutes a significant dimension of this contestation (Gramsci 2000: 339). Contradictory unity of thought and action, as the heterogeneous conception of the world, generates "two theoretical consciousness or one contradictory consciousness" (2000: 333) for the conduct of an individual. On the one hand, a hegemonic conception of the world of leading group, as the borrowed conception, is affirmed verbally by the masses since it is the conception that they attend to in their normal times and believe to be following; hence, it makes the world intelligible (2000: 328). For Gramsci, the very fact of verbal affirmation is what generates the submissive and subordinate condition of the masses. Crucially, he notes that this affirmation is determined "not by reason but by the faith" in the leading group, who convinced them that this particular conception of the world is what makes the world intelligible for them. Thus, putting forward the arguments by the masses in a logical way is not necessarily a condition for following them (2000: 339). On the other hand, the masses' own conception of the world manifests itself in their actions, which can express contradictions to what they believe themselves to be following; however, it is only effective when the group acts as an organic totality (2000: 328). According to Femia, the incongruity between the 'bourgeois ethos' of the ruling group and the realities of the class position of the masses is what underlies the contradictory co-existence of thought and action (1981: 45). Nevertheless, for Gramsci, verbal affirmation of the masses has concrete implications for the hegemony of the ruling group:

It attaches one to a specific social group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often powerfully enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity.

(Gramsci 2000: 333)

Significantly, Gramsci does not interpret this passivity or submission to a particular conception of the world as self-deception, since it does not occur solely for an individual or for small groups, but in large masses (2000: 328). What is at stake here are not truth claims, as in the ‘false consciousness’ thesis, but the extent to which this particular conception preserves “the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and to unify” (2000: 330). In this regard, Gramsci is concerned with the “practico-social function of ideologies” (Hall et al. 2007: 288) which are fastening the structure and superstructure. Therefore, by emphasizing the function of ideologies, Gramsci moves away from the Marxist accounts that render ideology solely as the reflection of relations of production (Hall et al. 2007: 281). Nevertheless, he contributes to Marxist literature more generally through exploring the function of ideologies (in putting together classes and subordinated class sections) at their ground level, that is, by approaching ideology as a “lived relation” (Hall et al. 2007: 283), a process of re-making the ‘commonsense’ of masses which provides a common material and mental framework in order to deal with everyday life. Thus, inquiry of ideology for Gramsci, according to Rehmann, is a “comprehensive mapping of the hegemonic landscape” (2014: 137). When compared to the conceptualizations based in electoral-party politics or the capture the state power, the terrain of politics in this regard is much more expansive (Hall 1988: 168).

2.2.1.3 Contemporary Interpretations

In contemporary times, certain scholars attempt to “‘think’ our problems in a Gramscian way” (Hall 1988: 161), among them, works of Crehan (2002, 2011), Davies (2014a, b), Hall (1988) and Roseberry (1994) shed light on the appearance of hegemony in concrete historical contexts. These scholars’ concerns are centered on the relationship of subordinate and dominant groups, which keep subordinate groups ‘subordinate’. In that regard, Hall’s seminal work (1988), which adopted a hegemony perspective in order to explore the ways in which Thatcherism became a social authority in England during the 1980s, furthers the Gramscian perspective through the notion of ‘authoritarian populism’. Following Poulantzas’s concept of

‘authoritarian statism’²³, he examines the ways in which the construction of popular consent to the novel forms of authoritarian state under the Thatcher regime became possible (Hall 1988: 126). ‘Authoritarian populism’ marks the intensification of coercion and repression in the context of crises in the moral order while gaining the strategic measure of popular consent (1988). However, Hall (1988) does not explore crises of moral order as if they are self-evident; rather, he points to how the Thatcher regime strategically operationalized the non-class character of popular morality (crime, delinquency, the people, nation, culture, etc.) in the construction of consent. Crucially, although the popular morality is ideologically constructed, it had been represented as if it were awakened from a deep sleep (1988: 143). By shifting the formerly existing disposition of social forces in the terrain of popular morality, Thatcherism was able to harness contradictory strands of morality (nation, family, tradition, etc.) and offensive neoliberal conducts (self-interest, competitiveness, etc.) within its discourse, hence forming a new commonsense (1988: 157). Articulation of morality and neoliberalism in the form of new commonsense had a legitimizing force for the coercive interventions of Thatcher regime, which marked the moment of ‘authoritarian populism’: “this shift ‘from above’ was pioneered by, harnessed to, and to some extent legitimated by a populist groundswell below” (1988: 151). Although Hall discusses ‘authoritarian populism’ as a particular form of hegemony in which movement towards a coercive pole is legitimized by the extensive populist base, he never claimed that Thatcher regime achieved hegemony, rather, he pointed the ways in which Thatcher regime becomes “hegemonic in their conception” (1988: 154), thus he approached ‘hegemony’ as a project, a claim, a quest of Thatcher regime. While Hall is emphasizing the role of re-making commonsense in the legitimation of particular social order, Crehan (2002, 2011) focuses on the implications of this re-made commonsense on the subordinate population. She discusses commonsense as the product of hegemonic accounts, in terms of its role in the making of conception of the world that subordinated populations inhabit as inevitable and inescapable; “both constitutive of our subjectivity and confronts us as an external and solid reality” (2011: 286). In this way, she draws attention to the production and re-production of inequalities in a particular social order, in other words, the normalization of inequalities. Although both Crehan (2002, 2011) and Hall (1988) demonstrate the development and implication of the dialectical relation between consent and coercion in the

²³ “Intensification of state control over every sphere of economic life combined with radical decline of institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called ‘formal’ liberties” (Poulantzas 1978: 203-204 cited in Hall 1988: 126).

making of social order, Davies (2014a,b) and Roseberry (1994) claim that the coercive dimension of it has a particular importance for understanding the contemporary political regimes. For Roseberry (1994), hegemonic projects' attempt to create certain kinds of subject rely on "state's regulative and coercive forms and agencies" (p.357), which actualize this attempt "not simply through its police and armies but through its offices and routines, its taxing, licensing, and registering procedures and papers" (ibid). Davies (2014 a,b), in similar vein, claims that coercion is constituting the pre-condition of neoliberal urban governance in which 'administrative domination' works as the practical everyday enforcement: "juridical arbitration, rent collection, zoning and traffic management: practices which are generally non-violent in themselves, but nevertheless directly coercive" (2014a: 592). Furthermore, he draws attention to gentrification as an expression of 'administrative domination': "the displacement of working class people is a routine tactic for municipal authorities, using coercive tools such as demolition, eviction and rent increases" (2014b: 3226). Consequently, all these scholars adopt and further the hegemony perspective in order to understand the contemporary political landscape. Crucially, they all approach state-society relations as an ongoing processes in which the hegemonic projects of ruling groups shape the commonsense of masses through differing equilibria of consent and coercion in order to actualize a particular social order that is compatible with the "decisive nucleus of economic activity" (Gramsci 2000: 212). Hence, what is problematized is the reciprocal constitution of 'state' and 'civil society' within a particular social order.

This study is built upon the theoretical perspective of Gramsci and contemporary interpretations of his work in order to explore role of private property regime in the hegemonic project of the AKP. Property relations that have been enacted by re-structuring TOKİ and through urban renewal programs have a particular importance for holding together dominant and subordinate class fractions within the leadership of AKP regime. In that regard, the private property regime constitute one of the instruments that AKP utilizes in its quest for hegemony. More specifically, this study focuses on homeownership as an expression of this private property regime. However, as Gramsci reminds, hegemony is both economic and ethico-political. Hence, in addition to explaining the economic dimension of homeownership, it is also necessary to explore the ways in which the 'conception' of homeownership proliferates and becomes a practical force in society. In this regard, this study opts to focus on subordinate populations who are becoming formal homeowners through TOKİ social housing projects. Analyzing the proliferation of a particular conception of world through a group in a context in

which such a conception expresses a stark contrast to their prior living conditions (i.e. *gecekondu*) constitutes a distinctive analytical angle to explore the social implications of such conceptions. The re-making of commonsense in accord with the new conception of homeownership is a complex process in which consent (i.e. aspirations for a decent housing) and coercion (i.e. administrative domination) are entangled with each other. It is this complex process of commonsense's re-making which reflects the empirical realities of power. Careful analysis of this complex process sheds light on the ways in which the re-structuring of a state institution (TOKİ) 'from above' accompanies a legitimizing popular force 'from below', hence the constitution of 'authoritarian populism' as a form of hegemonic politics in the urban governance regime of AKP. As this study is based on the theoretical perspective of Gramsci, politics is not conceptualized in terms of electoral/party politics, but rather through a particular relationship of 'state' and 'civil society' expressed in the formation and proliferation of a common material and mental framework, which legitimizes the leadership of ruling group. In that regard, the conception of homeownership as a common material and meaningful framework is not approached in terms of its truth or falsehood (i.e. false consciousness), but in terms of its practical social function in the processual formation of ruling group social authority. Since certain ways of thinking, feeling and calculating are embedded in this conception of the world, the extent of this conception's power to become renewed commonsense is decisive for the generation of a 'conscious and self-disciplined personality of the amorphous mass' which legitimizes the social authority of ruling group, hence the appearance of 'ethical state'. Complex processes of remaking commonsense in line with the conception of homeownership attempts to generate a 'new personality' of the masses, which is compatible with the social order that ruling group aims to maintain. Although the constitution of 'new personality' of the masses is critical for the hegemonic claims in Gramscian framework, Gramsci does not examine this 'new personality' on the subjective level, rather he emphasizes its role for the construction of hegemony and later Gramscian scholars point the mechanics of the construction of this 'new personality' in terms of the consent-coercion equilibrium. As this study adopts a hegemony perspective of Gramsci, the point where Gramsci and Gramscian scholars carry the discussion of hegemony needs to be further elaborated in order to understand what hegemony produces, that is, the implications of this 'new personality' for the masses. Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality provides the necessary analytical angle in order to explore the 'new personality' of masses. By complementing Gramsci's discussions of hegemony with Foucauldian governmentality, this study aims to "improve Gramsci's thought by Foucault" (Kreps 2015: 8). Following section

will examine Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality and neoliberal rationality in particular, in order to shed light on the 'new personality' of masses, in Foucault's words, to expose the 'production of particular kinds of subjectivities'.

2.2.2 Conceptualization of 'Governmentality'

The concept of governmentality was the topic of Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France, in particular in his lectures on Security, Territory, Population (1977–1978) and The Birth of Biopolitics (1978–1979). According to Jessop (2011), these lectures constitute a turning point in Foucault's broader research interests due to his attempt to link micro and macro relations of power through putting the question of "how specific governmental practices and regimes were articulated into broader economic and political projects" (p.60) at the center. It is through this particular concern of linking micro and macro relations of power that Foucault's concept of governmentality complements Gramsci's theoretical framework of hegemony. In a way, both theoreticians oppose the delineation of 'state' and 'society' as separate spheres and explore their relational constitution. While Gramsci is approaching this relational constitution through the macro-powers, Foucault approaches it through the micro-powers and neither of them attribute ontological priority to their object of scale since both of them are concerned with the totality of micro and macro power relations that produce the particular social order in a particular historical era. In this regard, Kreps (2015) asserts that both theoreticians are "focused upon differing aspects of a wider picture that do not exclude each other" (p.2). Having clarified the conditions of their methodological complementarity, following sections will examine Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality.

First of all, government for Foucault is not 'imposition' but 'disposition' through using certain tactics to arrange things in particular way with certain means in order to achieve particular ends (Foucault 1991: 93-95). What he means by 'things' is actually "men in their relation" with diverse activities which include habits, wealth, accidents, etc. (1991: 93). Accordingly, population constitutes the object of government. However, rather than being a trans-historical object, population was problematized in the 18th century and became the target of government. Emphasis on 'problematization' comprises a crucial aspect of Foucault's perspective since he discards the notion that certain 'things' can be self-evident. He points to the ways in which certain things, constructed as a problem, make them visible, allowing certain solutions to be developed for them (Miller and Rose 2008: 14). Thus, for Foucault, problematization of the population in 18th century induced the birth of new science of 'political economy' which is

characterized by the type of interventions made in governing with new tactics and techniques (1991: 101). Until the 18th century, power relations had been formed on the basis of sovereignty which is characterized by the practice of authority over the subjects of a state in a particular territory by the sovereign power, and discipline, which is characterized by the regulation of bodies of the subjects in this particular territory (1991: 102). Transitions in the form of political regimes in 18th century to a government of population did not replace concerns about sovereignty and discipline, but rather articulated these claims in a new science of ‘political economy’ which “regards these subjects, and the forces and capacities of living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimized” (Dean 1999: 29). Concern for optimization, for Foucault, marks a “particular type of rationality in governmental practice” (2008: 3), namely ‘governmentality’. Rather than imposing the rule (which was the issue prior to 18th century), governmentality works through managing the ‘conduct of conduct’, which has been explained by Dean as such:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.

(Dean 1999: 18).

Therefore, governmentality means both control/management by the intervention techniques (such as agencies, procedures, institutions, etc.) and self-control of the subjects themselves by a particular type of rationality (Lemke 2001: 191). In other words, governmentality encompasses both exercising authority over others and governing ourselves (Dean 1999: 19). Because of this dual character of governmentality, Foucault renders governmentality as “internal and external to the state” (1991: 103). Moreover, state is “correlative of a particular way of governing” (Foucault 2008: 4), which means it is a “given—since one only governs a state that is already there, one only governs within the framework of a state—but also, at the same time, as an objective to be constructed” (ibid.). Thus, rationalizing the ways of doing things (i.e. practices) in order to bring a state into its normative condition (i.e. what the state should be) constitutes the ‘art of government’. Foucault uses the phrase ‘art’ on purpose since governing, for him, necessitates artisanship and creativity. At this point, Gramsci’s concept of ‘ethical state’ and Foucault’s concept of ‘art of government’ share a common concern: linking government, politics and administration to lives, selves and masses. While the former approaches this concern by emphasizing the enhancement of population into a “particular

cultural and moral level” (i.e. “new types of humanity” (Gramsci 2000: 210), the latter approaches it through emphasis on the shaping the ‘conduct of conduct’. What they demonstrate through these is the ethical or normative appearance of state.

Rationalities that underpin governmentality are not abstract entities for Foucault; rather they are ways of thinking, representing and knowing a phenomena that makes reality conceivable, practicable and manageable (Bröckling et al. 2011: 11, Miller and Rose 2008: 16). In order to realize these rationalities they need to be rendered instrumental; thus, ‘technologies of power’ constitute the actual mechanisms that enable ways of acting upon these rationalities (Miller and Rose 2008: 16). Through these technologies, various authorities aim to shape conduct of people, individuals and groups (2008: 32). Technologies are made up of mundane mechanisms which work in an indirect way, hence they enable one to govern at distance (2008: 33). In this way, technologies amount to the microphysics of power (ibid.). By asking ‘how’ questions of government (how we govern and are governed) it becomes possible to distinguish between these technologies (Dean 1999: 33). Since the answers to ‘how’ questions delineate particular processes through which we make sense of and act on reality, technologies define certain discursive fields that are embedded in practices (Dean 1999: 33, Miller and Rose 2008: 30). More clearly, this definition structures the fields of possibility through which “practices and thinking about these practices” (Bröckling et al. 2011: 11) are connected in a certain rational way. Therefore, the ways in which people appeal to move within the fields of possibility is what governmentality studies focus on.

2.2.2.1 Political Rationalities of Liberalism and Neoliberalism

As described above, the concept of governmentality emphasizes the role of political rationalities in the organization of social, subject and state (Brown 2006: 693). Transformation of the domain of economy in relation to state and society (which has reflected in the concerns of optimization of population in the 18th century) has been examined in distinct ways by the political rationalities of liberalism and neoliberalism. For Foucault, the ways in which these rationalities interpret the relationship of economy, state and society have profound implications for the production of the social realities within which we move. Therefore, in order to give an account of lived contemporary social reality, Foucault examines the political rationalities of liberalism and neoliberalism, with a particular focus on their implications for the social reality.

Problematization of populations in the 18th century was induced by the society being interpreted as an obstacle to economic progress, and, hence, to the constitution of economic society. The political rationality that underlies liberalism was an attempt to strengthen the economic domain through a particular envisioning of the relationship between state, society and individuals. In that regard, a critical aspect for the justification of market as natural and self-regulating was the conceptualization of the individual, by attributing it to a specific human nature, which is based on the tendency of exchange (i.e. *homo economicus*, man of interest rather than right). Accordingly, the state must facilitate the market through opening it a free space among other domains within a given society (Foucault 2008: 131). With minimal intervention by the state, markets and individuals were expected to function in a harmonious and optimal way. Thus, liberalism was a critique of “too much government” and it attempted to formulate a new rationality in the art of government on the basis of “governing less, out of concerns for maximum effectiveness” (Foucault 2008: 327).

Neoliberal political thought attempted to improve conditions for the functioning of economic society in the 20th century through criticizing and re-constructing the assumptions of liberalism. Informed by the irrationalities and dysfunctionalities of capitalism in previous periods, neoliberalism claimed that market could not exist naturally and in self-regulatory manner, but rather that it needed to be produced through the politico-institutional inventions (Lemke 2001: 195). In that regard, the state is more than a facilitator of economy; it must be constructed in market terms. In other words, the market is envisioned as the organizing principle of the state (Brown 2006: 694, Lemke 2001: 200). In order to achieve a full-fledged market society, neoliberalism renders economy and social not as separate domains but redefines the social domain as a form of the economic. In this way, the economy extends to the totality of human actions, in particular to the areas that are not exclusively economic (i.e. family, birth, delinquency, etc.) (Foucault 2008: 323). What is key to the expansion of economic fields for Foucault is the expansion of the economic perspective (strategic choices for allocating scarce means to alternative ends) in which calculative practices (cost-benefit calculations) direct the decision making processes of individuals (Foucault 2008: 222, Miller and Rose 2008: 11, Read 2009: 28). As the phrase ‘expansion’ indicates, the economic perspective is not an immanent feature of human beings, rather, it becomes possible through the economization of subjects, namely, through the transformation of their calculative capacities (Brown 2015, Miller and Rose: 27). Thus, it is a particular kind of subjectivity that is needed to be made on the basis of *homo economicus* (Brown 2015: 33).

2.2.2.2 Formation of Neoliberal Subjectivity

Although the conceptualization of homo economicus is based on the liberal understanding of the concept, in terms of not being homo juridicus (i.e. a legal subject of the state), it reflects, in Read's words, a particular shift in the "anthropology" of homo economicus, namely, from a man of exchange to a man of enterprise (2009: 28). According to Foucault, the formation of this new type of homo economicus is directly related with the critique of theorization of 'labor' in classical economics (2008: 221). Neoliberals claim that capitalism does not make real labor abstract (as Marx asserts), rather, labor becomes abstract in the economic discourse of classical liberalism, which centered on the processes of capital, investment, machine and product (2008: 221-222). Because of the very object of their economic analysis, classical economists failed to understand the specificity and qualitative mutation of labor (2008: 222). By framing economic analyses on the basis of 'strategic choices for allocating scarce means to alternative ends', neoliberalism shifts the object of economic analysis from an 'analysis of the production, exchange and consumption processes' to an 'analysis of an activity' itself, in other words, the internal rationality of action: "how the person who works uses the means available to him?" (2008: 223). In such framework, the worker is not conceptualized in terms of labor power any more; rather, they are an active economic subject, 'human capital' who receives income in order to invest in himself. This reconfigures "homo economicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (2008: 226).

Economic, social, cultural and educational policies, for Foucault, are the material basis through which neoliberal subjects (i.e. homo economicus) are actualized (2008: 148). Social policies under neoliberalism do not have equality as their objective (since such objective can only be anti-economic); instead, such policies "let inequality function" through generalizing the instrument of private property for all social classes (2008: 144). In such framework of social policy, social protection (in the form of public housing and education, social security, etc.) is not offered, but in fact the individual themselves are responsible for the all kinds of risks (2008: 145). In other words, the cost of the development and reproduction of 'human capital' is transferred to the individual and s/he can purchase them in their privatized forms (debt-financed education and housing, personal savings, etc.) (Brown 2015: 42). When inequality is envisioned as legitimate and normative, it becomes the medium and relation of 'responsibilised' 'human capital's who seek to maximize their profit through competing with one another (Brown 2015: 38). Competition becomes an indispensable mean in in order to

facilitate certain ends since members of society are not on an equal plane, they need to compete with another to ensure their self-sustenance. Competition is not naturally given under the neoliberal understanding, it has to be produced and reproduced by the neoliberal state, which needs to

intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market.

(Foucault 2008: 145)

In this way, society is subjected to the dynamics of competition, rather than protected by the anti-competitive mechanisms (social policies) of Keynesian welfare state (2008: 147). To refine this point, it can be said that economic growth becomes the fundamental social policy through which individuals are enabled “to achieve a level of income that will allow them the individual insurance, access to private property, and individual or familial capitalization with which to absorb risks” (2008: 144). Thus, a policy of growth constitutes a “form of investment in human capital” (2008: 232) which aims to generalize ‘enterprise’ form within the society by “making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society” (2008: 148).

2.2.2.3 Neoliberal Governmentality

The formation of subjectivities in relation to a particular political rationality is at the core of governmentality, since governing operates through subjects. As Read puts it,

Capital no longer simply exploits labor, understood as the physical capacity to transform objects, but puts to work the capacities to create and communicate that traverse social relations. It is possible to say that with real subsumption capital has no outside, there is no relationship that cannot be transformed into a commodity, but at the same time capital is nothing but outside, production takes place outside of the factory and the firm, in various social relationships. Because of this fundamental displacement, subjectivity becomes paramount, subjectivity itself becomes productive and it is this same subjectivity that must be controlled.

(Read 2009: 33)

It is because of this formulation of subjectivity as both empowering (in terms of giving birth to the new ways doing things) and subjecting (in terms of limiting the sense of possibility) individuals to the particular political rationality that the relationship between state and citizen transforms according to the mode of governmentality (Brown 2015: 109). Neoliberal governmentality in particular transforms the calculative capacities of individuals through

‘responsibilization’ and competitive positioning, which, in turn, bring new models of economic conduct into the decisions and judgements of individuals in their professional and everyday tasks. Since this economic conduct is not innate, it needs to be made within a broader strategy, a political technology of state, which facilitates economic growth in the name of social policy (Gordon 1991: 38). It is the construction of the state in market terms, through embracing economic principles as the model for state conduct, by making economy the main object of state concern and policy, and through expanding the domain of market into every sphere as state projects that the individual self becomes human capital to be invested in (Brown 2015: 62). In this way, neoliberal governmentality attaches the rationality of government to the rational action of individuals (Lemke 2001: 200). More precisely, economic-rational individuals, formed by entrepreneurial and competitive behavior, become a resource and ally for the political, economic and social objectives of government, hence fostering the strength of the state (Gordon 1991: 10, Miller and Rose 2008: 42). However, rendering the citizens as *homo economicus* replaces the notion of citizen as a constitutive part of sovereignty, members of publics and holders of rights to human capital who “may contribute to or be a drag on economic growth; who may be invested in or divested from depending on their potential for GDP enhancement” (Brown 2015: 111). Thus, for Ong (2006: 78), what specifies the relationship between state and citizen under neoliberal governmentality is the populations’ relevance to global capital, which means “the neoliberal subject is granted no guarantee of life (on the contrary, in markets, some must die for others to live), and is so tethered to economic ends as to be potentially sacrificible to them” (Brown 2015: 111).

Informed by the Foucault’s conceptualization of neoliberal governmentality and formation of neoliberal subjectivity along with it, this study discusses the former *gecekondu* residents’ everyday life in TOKİ social housing projects of as a particular way of the formation of neoliberal subjectivity in the contemporary Turkey. While living in the *gecekondu*, the majority of these residents had not experienced any long-term debt with banks, since their socio-economic status was not even sufficient to qualify for bank credit. However, through the hegemonic politics of homeownership (i.e. complex process of consent and coercion in the re-making of commonsense on the basis of homeownership), they are subjected to long-term indebtedness with TOKİ through a particular private bank (a quasi-mortgage system) in order to become a homeowner. Indebtedness, especially if it exceeds the solvency of households, necessitates a particular economic perspective (strategic choices for allocating scarce means to alternative ends) since falling short on payments has significant implications (taking away

the apartment, in the case of TOKİ payments). In that regard, the indebtedness wrought by TOKİ social housing constitutes a technology of government, which attempts to economize subjects through transforming the former *gecekondu* residents' calculative capacities. On the one hand, the economic perspective engendered by indebtedness fosters a new model of economic conduct in which the professional and personal lives, the decisions and judgements of residents of social housing; this varies from enduring the exploitative conditions of work to limiting the solidarity networks which on which the socialization practices of *gecekondu* residents were based. On the other hand, indebtedness enables subjection to financialized capitalism through the inclusion of hitherto unproductive populations into financial markets. Thus, the indebted social housing of TOKİ, as a technology of government, fosters neoliberal subjectivities in the contemporary Turkey. In this way, this study follows Miller and Rose's proposition:

Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' can be usefully developed to analyse the complex and heterogeneous ways in which contemporary social authorities have sought to shape and regulate economic, social and personal activities. In advanced liberal democracies such as our own, these technologies (technologies of government) increasingly seek to act upon and instrumentalize the selfregulating propensities of individuals in order to ally them with sociopolitical objectives

(Foucault 2008: 51)

This study adopts and furthers Gramsci's hegemony perspective with Foucault's concept of governmentality. In this section, these two theories and their implication for the thesis subject matter were discussed separately in order to give a clear account of their theoretical stance and the ways in which their theories make it possible to understand contemporary phenomena by shedding light on the different but complementary aspects of it. The remaining passages in this theoretical framework will discuss these two perspectives together with the purpose of giving a clear analytical angle of their complementarity and their implications for this research.

2.2.3 Improving Gramsci's Hegemony Perspective with Foucault's Conceptualization of Governmentality

As this study explores the role of private property regime in the hegemonic project of AKP by focusing on the relationship between neoliberal state re-structuring and production of neoliberal subjectivities through the state-led urban development project (i.e. TOKİ social housing), it is necessary to briefly mention why the researcher combined political-economic accounts and political technologies of power in the exploration of neoliberal transformations.

In the contemporary period, some scholars have pointed to the danger of strict attachment to particular theories in order to understand social transformations, since such strict attachments reduce the social reality to ‘either-or debates’. More specifically, Hilgers (2011, 2012), Larner (2000) and Keil (2002) point out that explorations of neoliberalism or neoliberal transformations are stuck in separate perspectives of ideology/culture (i.e. Hall 1988), system/policy (i.e. Harvey 2005) and governmentality (i.e. Foucault 2008). They claim that although each perspective significantly contributes to the exploration of social transformations, their strategic combination develops a much deeper understanding of contemporary social transformations, compared to their isolated. In this regard, they draw attention to the reciprocal constitution of neoliberal systems/policies and culture/ideology/subjectivities by asserting that “even when representations and practices are partially a product or effect of infrastructures, they become embodied, undergo a relatively autonomous development and are deployed in a way that continues to affect the structures that produced them” (Hilgers 2012: 91). Furthermore, Keil (2002), in his study of neoliberal transformation in Canada, complements neo-Marxist political economic approach with Foucauldian strand in order to illuminate the ways in which urban everyday becomes both a plane and product of neoliberal transformation. He claims that urban neoliberalism as the combination of political-economic restructuring and new technology of power ‘cements neoliberal hegemony over the everyday lives (of Canadians)’ through re-regulating urban everyday (2002). Thus, in order to gain deeper understanding of contemporary neoliberal transformations, strategic combination of theories enables the necessary means. For this purpose, the remaining part of this theoretical framework will discuss how the strategic combination of hegemony and governmentality provides an analytical angle to illuminate state-led urban development projects (as an instance of neoliberal transformation) in contemporary Turkey.

Although they have been analyzed separately, it is necessary to overview Gramsci’s and Foucault’s conceptualization of state and society, economy and conception of world in order to clarify on which ground hegemony and governmentality complement each other. For both theoreticians state nor society are taken for granted; rather, they are relationally and reciprocally constructed. Gramsci is approaching this relationship through the formulation of ‘integral state’ in which state and society converges on the basis of shared interests, hence they become one and the same. Foucault approaches this relationship through the ‘political rationality’, which constructs state and society through the shared rationality of government.

What is key to their studies is the appearance of state as ethical or normative force, which opposes the understanding of state as the center for the dissemination of power or sheer violence. Both theoreticians are anti-economistic in the sense that they reject explanations of social reality solely as a reflection of relations of production. However, their anti-economistic stands rest on contextually different formulations; namely, Gramsci examines the role of economy in hegemonic projects while Foucault demonstrates the generation of the economic field. For the former account, economic-corporate interests (which are coming from relations of production) are not adequate for becoming a social authority, for a group that claims leadership must sacrifice from these interests to some extent and construct an ethico-moral unity on the basis of a new common sense. For the latter, constitution of social reality is related with the operationalization and dissemination of certain rationalities, namely the rationality of market in which relations of market are organized. Thus, both theoreticians point to extra-economic processes in the constitution of economic field. Although demonstrated by different concepts (ideology, philosophies, systems of thought, commonsense, rationalities, conduct), the conception of the world that is embedded in practices have a significant place in the theoretical perspectives of Gramsci and Foucault. In a way, they both emphasize the conception of the world in order to transcend economistic accounts for understanding the social reality. Crucially, their formulations of conception of world differ from the ‘false consciousness’ thesis or the understanding of it as merely an imaginary, non-material force since it is a part of the ways in which our ways of doing and subjectivity are constructed. Rather than examining the relative truth or falsehood of these conceptions, they consider it in terms of its generation and function for the social order. Even though both are pointing at the constellation of different forces (historical, social, cultural, political, economic) for the origination of conceptions (thus, opposing to assertion of ‘the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas’), in Gramsci’s thought they are examined in relation to operationalization of them by the particular social groups in the quest for hegemony, while in Foucault’s thought they are not relating to any social groups.

On the basis of these three pillars (state-society, economy and conception of the world), conceptualizations of hegemony and governmentality attempt to move beyond the mechanical relation between structure and superstructure through “two way relationship between macro and micro powers of governance” (Joseph 2014: 7). Both concepts assert that the constitution of social reality can only be intelligible within the careful examination of the articulation of mundane practices (common sense or conduct) to the broader economic and political projects.

As it mentioned earlier, although these mundane practices are quite crucial for the theoretical perspective of hegemony, Gramsci does not expand on them apart from demonstrating their function for social order, that is at stake in hegemonic struggles. In Foucault's work, mundane practices (micro practices) are scrutinized since "power always emerges at a given place and time as an ill developed cluster of relations (Joseph 2014: 7). In that regard, Foucault gives a detailed account of techniques (technologies of power) embedded in certain rationalities (liberalism and neoliberalism) through which conduct is shaped and new forms of subjectivities come into existence that lead "subjects to perform actions that reinforce their own subjection" (Hilgers 2011: 358). Thus, the concept of governmentality deals with the questions of what the rationality is behind mundane practices and how they work, while the concept of hegemony explains how and why this rationality is dominant (Joseph 2014: 12). In a way, micro practices are the resources on which hegemonic struggles takes place, hence the concept of governmentality provides hegemony with an essential feature of tangibility (2014: 15). However, as mentioned in the discussion of governmentality, Foucault formulates governmentality as a 'governance at a distance', in other words, leaving individuals to govern themselves with a particular rationality, which is enhanced by the state policies. In that regard, Foucault does not examine coercive practices since his concern is to delve into transformations in the conduct of individuals (i.e. becoming homo economicus). Nevertheless, the implementation of state policies, in the first place, contain various forms of coercion. Thus, the question of 'how this rationality is dominant' enables Gramsci to consider coercive aspects of this process (Joseph 2017: 9). Moreover, the questions that Gramsci tackle (how and why this rationality is dominant?) leads to an investigation of the agents that enable such policies of a state, namely the political projects of social groups. Thus, for Joseph, "hegemony provides an important agential element, relating governmentality to the actual projects of particular social groups" (2014: 15). In other words, the theoretical perspective of hegemony leads to investigate "ontological conditions that make this (rationality) possible and which enable certain agents to utilise various powers in a strategic way" (2017: 13). Consequently, concepts of hegemony and governmentality examine the ways in which mundane practices and broader economic and political projects interdependently constitute the social reality. In that regard, hegemony focuses on macro practices, social groups (fundamental and subordinate groups) and 'why' questions, while governmentality deals with micro practices, rationalities and 'how' questions. These differences are not incompatible since neither perspective rejects the other's but instead examines the gaps another leaves. In that sense, the differences constitute complementary aspects that enable a more robust investigation of social reality.

Informed by the complementary nature of the two concepts, this study opts to locate the hegemony perspective in the foreground, and seeks to improve on the gaps in the hegemony perspective has left by also utilizing the concept of governmentality. The process of making the former *gecekondu* residents homeowners through TOKİ social housing is not only a social policy that a benevolent regime in the AKP has enacted. Rather, it is a part of a hegemonic project that enables to gather different class fractions around the AKP regime. Formalization process of informal settlements (i.e. *gecekondu*) attract both capitalist factions who take advantage of the potential land rent in these areas and the urban poor (*gecekondu* residents) who seek decent living conditions. Crucially, it is a political project that is characterized by the ‘roll out’ neoliberal rationale since it intends to deepen capitalist market relations with the integration of hitherto excluded urban poor population. In that regard, TOKİ social housing constitutes an instrument for this integration by its ‘quasi-mortgage payment system’; in other words, its indebted homeownership program. Thus, TOKİ social housing integrates different parts of society on the basis of property relations. However, as Gramsci (2000) asserts, hegemony necessitates ethico-political ground in order to ‘cement’ and ‘unify’ the society in a ‘decisive nucleus of economic activity’. Constitution of this ground becomes possible through the dissemination of particular conception of the world, which re-makes the commonsense in line with the hegemonic vision. Accordingly, subjecting *gecekondu* population to an indebted homeownership program of TOKİ requires a particular conception of homeownership which is distinct from their already existing housing conditions (i.e. *gecekondu*) and any other housing form in the private market, hence, it is a conception that allows to become homeowner only through the mechanism of TOKİ. Actualization of such a conception is a complex process through which combinations of consent (i.e. aspirations for a decent housing) and coercion (i.e. administrative domination) re-make the commonsense of subordinate population in line with this particular hegemonic vision. Moreover, as Gramsci (2000) claims, material effectivity of any conception depends on making the ‘personality’ of masses in tandem with the development of productive forces, i.e. economy, which results in ‘new types of humanity’ (p.210). Although the new personality of the masses is a crucial dimension of the theoretical perspective of hegemony, Gramsci does not elaborate this point. This study furthers Gramsci’s hegemony perspective by exploring this point using Foucault’s concept of governmentality. As the particular conception of world contains its rationality, conception of homeownership under the neoliberal political project embraces neoliberal rationality, which is operationalized through the debt relation that ‘quasi-mortgage payment system’ of TOKİ enhances. Accordingly, indebtedness fosters a new model of economic

conduct in the former *gecekondu* residents' decisions and judgements. Thus, the indebted social housing of TOKİ, as a technology of government, cultivates neoliberal subjectivities, which reinforce subjection to 'decisive nucleus of economic activity'. Consequently, this study investigates the production of neoliberal subjectivities through the hegemonic politics of homeownership. For this aim, this study analyzes the hegemonic project of AKP in terms of the ways in which the re-structuring of state from 'above' (i.e. urban governance reform) accompanies a re-making of commonsense from 'below' (i.e. conception of homeownership); hence, it asks 'how and why' neoliberal urban governance regime of AKP is dominant. By tracing the implications of this re-made commonsense, this study explores the production of new personality of masses (i.e. neoliberal subjectivity); hence it asks 'what' is the rationality behind mundane practices and 'how' they work, as a crucial but unexplored dimension of hegemonic politics.

2.3 Methodology

Since the methodological standpoints of Gramsci and Foucault have been thoroughly discussed in the theoretical framework, this section intends to present the methodological devices that enable an appropriate linkage between the theoretical framework and empirical material of the research. In that regard, assertions of Cultural Political Economy are significant for developing such devices. Cultural Political Economy has been developed by Jessop and Sum in order to combine "the analysis of sense- and meaning making with the analysis of instituted economic and political relations and their social embedding" (2013: 1). For this 'pluralistic logic of discovery' they enlarge the neo-Gramscian analysis of hegemony with Foucauldian arguments since an un-orthodox perspective of Gramsci and Foucault's later research agenda provides the necessary analytical angle to delve into complex-concrete social reality. They approach hegemony as a "tendential emergence of macro- structural properties and their role in selectively reinforcing certain micro- level behaviours" (2013: 183) and Foucauldian concepts strengthen this framework by providing "a better understanding of the mechanisms of capitalist societalization and its relative stabilization, the inevitable fragility and provisional nature of these fixes" (2013: 213). This framework is operationalized through the 'discursive material approach' which emphasizes both the 'material aspects of discourse' and 'discursive aspects of the material' (2013: 198). To clarify, the 'discursive material approach' is elaborated with 'strategic relational approach' (structural and agential

selectivity²⁴) and ‘critical discourse analysis’ (discursive and technological selectivity²⁵). Nevertheless, the aforementioned methodological devices have mostly developed for the analysis of international relations. Due to the scale of the object of analysis, the scope of these devices includes macro-level institutions and the explanatory effort is given to these institutions. With regard to this thesis scope in terms of its scale of analysis and its position in the academic context (as a master’s thesis), rather than full adoption of the Cultural Political Economy’s approaches, its methodological premises will be approached as directive for the appropriate methodological devices for the context of this study. In that regard, while the ‘discursive material approach’ is appealed to as a methodological premise, its elaboration will be actualized through the ‘ideology critique’ approach found in Hall (1988) and the ‘governmentality inspired ethnographies’ of Brady (2014), which provide an appropriate analytical angle in order to link this thesis’ theoretical framework and its empirical material.

Hall’s (1988) ‘ideology critique’ approach examines the ways in which commonsense is shaped through the hegemonic projects and provides ‘strategic measure of popular consent’. Crucially, Hall does not view commonsense as false-consciousness, but as the way in which the layers of commonsense are ‘disarticulated’ and ‘rearticulated’ in tandem with the hegemonic group’s new conception of world. Following Hall’s (1988) ‘articulation of elements’ in the re-making of commonsense, this study examines how the former *gecekondu* residents’ commonsense in relation to homeownership is shaped by the consent and coercive mechanisms of the state-led development project which ‘disarticulates’ certain elements and ‘rearticulates’ them to the re-made commonsense in line with the hegemonic vision of ruling group.

In order to investigate the implications of this re-made commonsense as a new ‘mental and material framework’, this study examines the conducts of former *gecekondu* residents through the ‘governmentality inspired ethnographies’ of Brady (2014). Through this approach, Brady

²⁴ Structural selectivity: “how a given structure may privilege some actors, some discourses, some identities, and some strategies over others” (Sum 2004: 7). Agential selectivity: “how actors orient their strategies in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture, their strategic calculation about their ‘objective’ interests, and the recursive selection of strategies through reflection and learning” (ibid.).

²⁵ Discursive selectivity: “the differential articulation and co- evolution of the discursive and extra- discursive moments of social processes and practices, and their conjoint impact in specific contexts and conjunctures” concerns the manner in which different discourses (whether everyday or specialized) enable some rather than other enunciations to be made within the limits of particular languages and the forms of discourse that exist within them” (Jessop and Sum 2013: 215). Technological selectivity: “asymmetries inscribed in the use of technologies (and their affordances) in producing object and subject positions that contribute towards the making of dispositives and truth regimes” (Jessop and Sum 2013: 216).

challenges the traditional methods of investigation of governmentality by using archival documents. He claims that

governmentality inspired ethnographies focus on actual people located within a specific place over a period of time, the researchers are thrust into the multiplicity and dynamics of everyday social life. In turn this gives these researchers greater insights into the multiplicity of power relations and practices within the present, as well as the actual processes through which subjectivities (such as an enterprising self) are formed.

(Brady 2014: 13)

With the adoption of ‘governmentality inspired ethnographies’, this study examines how the re-made commonsense of former *gecekondu* residents economizes the subjects according to neoliberal rationality.

Consequently, combination of these two methodological devices enables an empirical investigation of how the hegemonic vision of homeownership is constituted and disseminated among the *gecekondu* residents, and by extension, how this vision shapes the conduct of its target subjects.

Having clarified the appropriate methodological devices, the remaining part of this section will present the methods for gathering the empirical materials. In order to shed light on the ethico-political dimension (i.e. private property relationship) of the hegemonic project of the AKP, this study opted to investigate the homeownership process of former *gecekondu* residents through the social housing of TOKİ. For this aim, one of the ‘*Gecekondu* Transformation Projects’ of TOKİ in Ankara was chosen. There were several principles informing the selection. There are 10 transformation projects in Ankara. However, 3 of them are not finished yet. Hence, first principle was constituted according to the project’s progress. Even if the former *gecekondu* residents made contracts, they have not started to live in the social housing, hence they do not have any experiences in their new housing. Therefore, these three projects are not applicable for this study. The remaining 7 projects have finished, but among these, the Aktaş, Gültepe and Northen Ankara Entrance Projects were already studied by other scholars. Accordingly, the second principle was determined by the saturity of knowledge production. In order not to repeat the findings of existing studies, these 3 projects were eliminated. The third principle was specified according to the accessibility of the project area. The remaining 4 projects are located in Yenimahalle (Pamuklar, Macunköy) and Mamak (Kusunlar and Gülveren). Among them, Kusunlar *Gecekondu* Transformation Project is located at the periphery of Mamak District. Due to long duration of transportation to the area

(a two-hour bus trip each way from the researchers' residence), the Kusunlar Project was eliminated. The fourth principle was constituted according to the earliest delivery of the housing units to the beneficiaries. Since the experiences of both the new housing and indebtedness due to the quasi mortgage payment system of TOKİ are crucial both for the constitution of new conception of world and formation of new conducts, the amount of time that the former *gecekondu* residents have spent in the social housing is correlated to the depth of their experiences, hence their conception of the world and conduct as well. Therefore, among the remaining 3 projects, Yatıkmsluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project in Gülvören was chosen because it delivered the social housing units earliest.

The next stage of research design involved a selection and refinement of research methods, including the selection of a sample from the residents of the TOKİ social housing project. Since both the 'ideology critique' approach and 'governmentality inspired ethnographies' rely on narratives and everyday practices of individuals, this study adopted a qualitative research method for the gathering of data. Accordingly, a purposive sampling technique was applied for the determination of the individuals to participate in the qualitative research. Among the former *gecekondu* residents (either as a tenant or owner of *gecekondu*) in social housing of TOKİ, the ones who became an indebted homeowner through the quasi mortgage payment system of TOKİ constitute the main condition for the inclusion in the sample. Although the qualitative research method is applied to individuals, the sample unit corresponds to the households since the ones who share the same flat contribute to the payments collectively. Among the indebted households, individuals whose age are between 25 and 75 were chosen. Since the gender is not problematized in this study, ratio of women and men was expected to be equal. Nevertheless, due to the time period of this research (12-8 pm in weekdays) men were mostly inaccessible as they had to work, reflecting the dominance of traditional gender divisions of labor in the neighborhood. Therefore, rather than prioritizing the ratio of gender, accessibility was the foremost determinant. With regard to this framework, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 64 households (corresponding to 80 individuals). Moreover, 3 focus group interviews were made. Apart from the semi-structured interviews, oral history and participant observation techniques were also employed in order to gain richer understanding of everyday life in *gecekondu* times and social housing respectively. These qualitative research techniques began to be applied to the aforementioned sample towards to the end of May 2017. However, throughout the June 2017 interviews had to paused because of the Sunni- Islamic religious practices (fasting) that took place around one month (Ramadan

period). For almost all of the respondents, practicing their religious duties were priorities, therefore interviewing them during the Ramadan when they were fasting was not appropriate. Hence, interviews started again at the beginning of July 2017 and ended towards the end of August 2017. As a result, qualitative research in Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project took approximately two months. As mentioned earlier in this section, ‘governmentality inspired ethnographies’ constitutes one of the methodological devices of this study. This study does not give a full account of the ethnographic research conducted (due to the limited amount of time –two months- and semi-structured interviews). Nevertheless, this study follows Brady’s expanded understanding of ethnography for the ‘governmentality inspired ethnographies’:

studies that are primarily interview-based may be considered ethnographic if they are conducted with an ethnographic imaginary that involves providing “a detailed, in depth description of everyday life and practice” and seeking deep contact that allows one to understand the cultural context within which decisions and choices are made and actions unfold.

(Brady 2014: 27)

During the process of data analysis, all of the interviews and field notes were evaluated in order to reach patterns that provides necessary content for the ‘disarticulation’ and ‘re-articulation’ of the layers of commonsense in relation to homeownership and for the transformation of the conducts of former *gecekondu* residents through the state-led development project. However, as will be evinced in following chapters, not all of the interviews are directly referenced for the discussion of the subject matter. Rather, only the ones opted for direct quotation or paraphrasing (which correspond to 37 households, 44 individuals (see Table 1 in Appendix A for the socio-demographic information of these respondents) and one focus group) were chosen, because they represent the necessary patterns for analysis in the most explanatory manner.

Moreover, although this study is based on qualitative fieldwork in order to shed light the formation of new commonsense in relation to homeownership and new conducts of former *gecekondu* residents, another dimension of this study’s subject matter is the re-structuring of state as the crucial part of the hegemony perspective. Nevertheless, within the limited scope of this master thesis, the main emphasis is given to the fieldwork, thus, materials for the discussion of this other dimension are reached through secondarily (generated by another researcher (Blaikie 2005: 184)) and tertiary (analyzed by another researcher (ibid.)) types of data, rather than primary (generated by the researcher (ibid.)). In other words, secondary and

tertiary data for the discussion of re-structuring of state were approached to answer a different research question than the original studies. As a result, while the following chapter (Chapter 3) relies on secondary and tertiary data, the remaining chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) rely on the primary data that was gathered through fieldwork.

CHAPTER 3

RE-STRUCTURING OF STATE ‘FROM ABOVE’ AND ITS IMPLICATION ON THE URBAN GOVERNANCE IN TURKEY

This chapter seeks to discuss neoliberal²⁶ hegemony’s construction process through the re-structuring of the state in Turkey after the military coup in 1980, with a particular focus on urban governance reforms. For this aim, the political-economic interventions of ANAP and AKP governments (in line with ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ neoliberal policies, respectively) will be examined in terms of a quest for leadership over a class-alliance based on capitalist class interests. Accordingly, rather than a hegemony of a political party, this chapter investigates how class interests are actualizing through the practices of political parties. In that regard, while the re-structuring of state in line with the neoliberal measures with the military regime and ANAP, as the subsequent civil government, marks the beginning of neoliberal hegemony, interventions of AKP governments constitutes the re-consolidation of the neoliberal hegemony in contemporary Turkey.

3.1 Neoliberal Restructuring of State as the New Hegemonic Strategy

The coup that took place on 12 September 1980 occurred within a political-economic crisis which was composed of two different systemic crises. On the one hand, the global capitalist crisis of the 1970s led to a transformation of capital accumulation strategies, in which financial capital was replacing the role of productive capital. On the other hand, a rising class-consciousness among the working class in 1960s’ and 1970s’ Turkey was challenging the

²⁶ As it has been mentioned in the theoretical framework, this thesis approaches political-economic and Foucauldian accounts as complementary. Accordingly, neoliberalism will be discussed through the political-economic perspective in this chapter. In that regard, neoliberalism, in here, is understood as the re-vitalizing global capital accumulation by re-defining capitalist classes (with the new accumulation regime, money capital earning fractions are also added) and re-storing their power (Harvey 2005). Hence, neoliberal hegemony points the capitalist classes’ hegemony. Moreover, rather than discussing neoliberalization according to theoretical framework of Austrian School, ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ framework is adopted since this approach emphasizes the practices that differ from the theory (on the issue of state intervention, in particular) through examining the transformation of state in terms of its institutional, regulatory and executive re-structuring. A more detailed explanation of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ has presented in the literature review.

power of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which was rendered as a threat to the existing social order (Yalman 2002). Economic unsustainability of import substitution industrialization vis-à-vis the global capitalist crisis constituted an economic default and the polarization of class relations resulted in the loss of political legitimacy (Yalman 2002, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010). In such context, military regime carried out structural adjustment policies in which the mode of articulation of Turkish economy with the global economy and state's role in the economy radically transformed (Akça 2014, Şenses 2016). Financial liberalization due to the deregulation put forward export-oriented trade, privatization and market-led system of redistribution as the core aspect of capital accumulation, which were introduced by the 'measures of 24 January'²⁷ (Şenses 2016, Yalman 2002). In this way, industrialization as the key factor of pre-1980s hegemonic strategies gave way to integration with the global economy as the new hegemonic strategy (Yalman 2002). Not only the political-economic regime, but the form of state also re-structured into an authoritarian form through which this new hegemonic strategy developed (Akça 2014, Yalman 2002). Change in the balance of class forces within the new hegemonic strategy expressed the re-configuration of state-society relations (ibid.). Class-based politics of the pre-1980 period were terminated by the new hegemonic strategy, which highlights the authoritarian state as the guarantor of economic individualism (Yalman 2002, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010). The 'law and order' discourse of the military regime became effective in the working class neighborhoods, which had experienced severe conflicts during the 1970s (Akça 2014, Yalman 2002). ANAP (Motherland Party) became the first civilian ruling party. This rule was established in the new political-economic context, which was prepared by the military regime. As a representative of New Right Politics -which is based on 'free economy and strong state'- ANAP articulated neoliberalism, conservatism and authoritarianism in a particular way in order to accomplish a new hegemonic strategy that was initiated by the radical rupture from the previous military regime (Akça 2014). Neoliberal economic policies, that are directed by the structural adjustment programs of the IMF in the direction of export-oriented growth strategies, resulted in the suppression of wage incomes due to the increasing power of the market economy in this 'roll back' phase of neoliberalism (Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010, Şenses 2016). Market

²⁷ These measures were prepared 9 months before the Coup by Turgut Özal (who was nominated by Süleyman Demirel who was the last prime minister before the Coup). Crucially, structural transformation from Import Substitution Industrialization to integration with global economy had mentioned first time in this document. However, actualization of this program became possible only with the Coup (Political Economy of the January 24, 1980 Reforms 2004).

society, as the necessary complement of a market economy, was the core of the new governmental rationality of neoliberalism (Akça 2014). In this way ‘individualism’ became the core aspect for the organization of this new social reality (Yalman 2002). In such a conceptualization of reality, the market became the remedy for socio-economic problems. The conservatism of ANAP was based in particular on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which aims to gather liberal, nationalist, religious and conservative political elites in the strategy of conservative modernization (Akça 2014). Such a strategy was effective for the gaining subordinate classes’ consent by enabling them to benefit from the material achievements of modernization without losing their identity based on nation, religion, and family in particular (Akça 2014, Yalman 2002). Articulations of neoliberalism and conservatism became a strategic measure of consent both for capitalist and sub-ordinate classes. Discourses of ‘law and order’ and technocratic policies –as the expression of authoritarianism- rendered political issues as technical matters that should be sorted out by experts (Akça 2014, Yalman 2002).

3.1.1 Urban Governance Reform of ANAP

Urbanization came to the forefront for accumulation strategies within the neoliberal hegemonic strategy of ANAP (Bayırbağ 2013, Şengül 2009). Transformations in urban governance express the ways in which the urban becomes the core object of hegemonic struggles. ANAP initiated an urban governance reform in 1984, just after coming to power, in which a two-tier municipal structure in the metropolitan cities became possible for the first time (Balaban, 2013, Bayırbağ 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014, Şengül 2009). This particular act (no.3030) enabled both decentralization and centralization of power. For the former, the financial capacities of metropolitan municipalities were increased, and municipalities became responsible for the preparation, approval and implementation of development plans and the control of district municipalities through auditing and approving their plans. (Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014). For the latter, the new municipal structure empowered the mayors, who remained under the strict control of the prime minister, to act to benefit policy coordination between central and local governments (Bayırbağ 2013). Furthermore, even though the municipalities’ financial capacity was increased, their control by the central government became tighter and did not result in financial autonomy (Bayırbağ 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014). Adding to the impacts of this new urban governance configuration, with the new zoning law in 1985 (no.3194), zoning and planning powers transferred to local governments, which resulted in the increment of construction activities, especially in the cheap urban lands of the

periphery (Balaban 2013, Bayırbağ 2013, Erman 2011). The establishment of TOKİ (Mass Housing Administration) in 1984 was another underlying reason for the growth of the construction sector. TOKİ's mass housing fund was actualized for encouraging the production of housing by providing cheap credits²⁸ and financing for housing developers and cooperatives (Balaban 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014). Instead of following the pre-1980s resource allocation to industrialization in the support of import substitution, this administration, as the institutional structuring of state, expresses the state's resource allocation in relation to the built environment, (Balaban 2013). Accordingly, the ratio of the investments in the construction sector to the GNP increased from 5.2% in 1982 to 7.3% in 1987²⁹ and 1987 marked as the year that investments in construction sector reached its maximum level (ibid.). Nevertheless, such encouragement for the production of housing benefitted the middle and higher classes; when it comes to urban poor, tenure legalization and succeeding commodification of land constituted neoliberal redistribution schemes that enabled gaining consent of subordinate classes who were deprived by ANAP's anti-labor policies (Balaban 2013, Bayırbağ 2013, Erman 2011).

3.1.2 Commodification of *Gecekondu*

The relationship of urban poor –as the subordinate population- to the state within the urban regime was transformed qualitatively by the post-1980s neoliberal redistribution scheme. The pre-1980s were marked by a populist urban regime in which *gecekondu*³⁰ constructions were allowed by the state through the *gecekondu* law (no.775), in the context of resource scarcity and for the concerns of keeping the costs of labor low (Bayırbağ 2013, Buğra 1998, Erman 2011, Türem 2016). The state's turning a blind eye to the construction of *gecekondus* served a pragmatist urban coalition comprising “politicians seeking loyalty, industrialists in need of cheap labor profit, *gecekondu* dwellers seeking affordable housing, state that was more interested in national industrialization than social welfare provision, including social housing for poor (Erman 2011: 75)”. According to Buğra (1998), the phenomenon of *gecekondu* in this pre-1980s period was conceptualized in the context of ‘reciprocity relations’ rather than formal

²⁸ Funding was made possible through the revenues of privatization (Akça 2014).

²⁹ Investment in public infrastructure was also significantly increased throughout the 1980s. For his reason Balaban (2013) claims that there is a correlation between growth of construction sector and public investments.

³⁰ Since this study opts to problematize *gecekondu* transformation in the 2000s, through state-led redevelopment in particular, the immense literature on *gecekondu* politics (Keleş 1978, Şengül 2009, Şenyapılı 2004) will not be covered. Rather, different political economic regimes' (from 1980s onward) conceptualization of the *gecekondu* “problem” and subsequent intervention methods, within the context of state-society relations, will be explored.

redistributive practices, in which it would have been regarded as violation of property rights. Due to the state's deficiency in redistributive practices, the informal character of *gecekondu* was socially legitimized through public generosity, which is based on the moral economy principles of socially defined human needs rather than on the principles of property and market economy (ibid). Furthermore, during the 1960's and 1970's class-based political regime, *gecekondu*'s, as the working class neighborhoods, were a significant spaces of the leftist-progressive social mobilizations (Erman 2011 Şengül 2009). However, towards the end of 1970s, individual developers started to purchase enclosed land in order to rent them to the newcomers (Balaban 2011). ANAP's neoliberal redistributive scheme radically transformed this institutionalized generosity of *gecekondu* policy by the amnesty law (no. 2981) in 1984, which legalized the all *gecekondus* that were built before that date and issued TTB (tapu tahsis belgesi)³¹ (Karaman 2013a). Moreover, this law allowed the construction of apartments –up to four floors- on *gecekondu* lots. The commodification of *gecekondu* land through this law enabled the development of peripheral land by market forces and the re-distribution of land rent between *gecekondu* owners and individual developers³² (Bayırbağ 2013, Buğra 1998, Erman 2011, Karaman 2013a). According to Balaban (2011), with the tenure legalization, the early character of the *gecekondu* as a progressive social mobilization of self-help became a leading mechanism for the commodification of land. Since some of the *gecekondu* residents improved their economic conditions by obtaining several apartment units, new class fractions emerged in the hitherto working-class neighborhoods (Erman 2011). Some of the *gecekondu* owners gained an economically quite advantageous position, but new-comer migrants were the new victims of this commodification (Balaban 2011). Furthermore, earlier attempts at mobilizations in *gecekondus* for self-help housing rights, along with the commodification processes, engendered a conservative fraction who struggled for property-based privileges (ibid.). Accordingly, new conflicts emerged, on the one hand, between the interests of big developers and *gecekondu* owners for the hitherto non-commodified peripheral lands; on the other hand, the view of *gecekondu* people in the media as well-off individuals who are

³¹ Title assignment document: “document that recognizes the occupant's right to use the space, entitling the document holder to legal ownership after a ‘cadastral plan’ and a subsequent ‘improvement plan’ (imar islah plani) are prepared and approved by the local municipality. The document grants the occupants the right to stay and use the space, but it does not confer full ownership rights. Although a TTB does not have an exchange value from a legal point of view (it is non-tradable), within informal property markets it still has greater value than a *gecekondu* without a TTB (albeit less than a completely legal property) (Karaman 2013: 722)”.

³² Yap-satıcı: “buys the land from *gecekondu* owner in exchange for several apartments in the building built on the *gecekondu* plot (Erman 2011: 79)”

acquiring middle class life without paying taxes (Buğra 1998). In this context, the prior period's populist urban regime that was based on 'moral economy' gave way to an 'immoral economy' in which informal relations of generalized reciprocity turned into negative reciprocity through adherence to market logic (ibid.). Thus, for Balaban, "enclosure created new spaces (modern apartment buildings), new class positions (emerging petty bourgeoisie in working class neighborhoods) and new ideas (urban religious conservatism) (2011: 2176)". Consequently, ANAP's urbanization policies furthered socio-economic polarization by selective re-distribution policies, which benefitted the earlier *gecekondu* owners while leaving the new migrants in the worsening conditions of the labor process and housing market. Hence, urban poverty became a sustainable problem (Balaban 2013, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2001). Moreover, even though there was excess of housing stock due to the growth in construction sector, this stock was unreachable for the urban poor, i.e. new migrants (Bayırbağ 2013).

3.2 Crisis of Hegemony

Although the hegemonic strategy undertaken by the ANAP initiated a radical re-structuring of the state, it failed due to the consequences of its very own strategy: economic instability and exclusionary populism (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010, Öniş 2009, Yalman 2002). Starting at the end of 1980s, this capital account openness put the Turkish economy in a very fragile position due to the lack of a regulatory framework that would have controlled inflow of short-term capital (Öniş 2009: 3). This embrace of de-regulation –which is proposed with Washington consensus- occurred without the necessary state capacity lead to three subsequent crises (1994, 1998, 2001) (Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010, Öniş 2009). Exclusionary populism (Bayırbağ 2013, Yalman 2002) -whose clear expression in *gecekondu*'s is discussed in the above section-, according to Akça (2014), generated a 'two nation' hegemonic project which

“was able to manufacture an urban and market-oriented social base, the second nation of its hegemonic project remained very wide, including workers, peasants, civil servants, the new urban and rural poor, trade unions, leftists, Kurds and Alevis. These societal sectors, excluded from the ANAP's neoliberal market fetishism and Muslim-Turkish conservative identity politics, were the main social components of a second nation that posed a threat to the wealth and security of the first nation.”

(2014: 22)

For Bayırbağ (2013), not only the sub-ordinate population of second nation, but also certain fraction of capitalists – i.e. Anatolian Tigers³³ – were excluded from the clientelist network of an export-oriented market. Consequently, towards the end of 1980s, ANAP lost its majority of votes and, with the sudden death of Özal, the political scene opened for counter-hegemonic struggles which based their strategy on the concerns of the ‘losers’ of the ANAP government. The subsequent coalition governments aimed at new redistribution policies, democratization and delivering a solution to the Kurdish question. However, an economy worsened by further economic liberalization process as well as conflicting perspectives on the Kurdish question lead to a crisis of political hegemony throughout the 1990s (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013, Bedirhanoglu and Yalman 2010, Öniş 2009). The rise of political Islam in this period based its counter-hegemonic strategy on the systematic critique of the socio-economic order of the previous period through the discourse of a ‘just economic order³⁴’ (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013). RP (Refah Partisi-Welfare Party), as the representer of political Islam, on the one hand, was able to attract capitalists -Anatolian Tigers- who were excluded from ANAP’s clientelist networks; on the other hand, they were able to mobilize militant grassroots organizations in the wide range of localities (Bayırbağ 2013). Regarding the latter aspect, Balaban (2011) claims that early migrants who became property owners due to tenure legalization acts of the ANAP government allied with these Islamist organizations. Not only the conservative property owners, but also the poor tenants of *gecekondu* neighborhoods benefitted from the ‘service delivery’ of Islamist organizations (Bayırbağ 2013, Şengül 2009). Nevertheless, RP’s quest for hegemony did not last long, as in 1997 the party was closed down with the fear of its potential hegemonic power challenging the ‘secular’ bloc (Akça 2014). Following the closure of RP, the last coalition government in 1999 accepted the IMF strategy, which proposed long-term structural and institutional reforms, nevertheless, the government did not actualize the key elements of reform in order not to lose voters who were already the victims of prior neoliberal policies (Öniş 2009). The Marmara earthquake in 1999 and the subsequent crisis in 2001 constituted the climax of a political legitimacy crisis, which began with post-coup

³³ Anatolian Tigers corresponds to industrialists (in the form of small and medium scale enterprises) from Anatolia that were able to accumulate capital with the openness of Turkish economy to the global during the ANAP government. They became in an advantageous position due to the competitiveness under free market rule. However, their rise threatened İstanbul-based capital class interests. The social power that is acquired by İstanbul-based capital had long been supported by state and, therefore, they were capable of influencing the state elite. For this reason, they could benefit from economic legislations in contrasts to Anatolian Tigers. This situation led to the formation of clientelist networks, which are based on İstanbul-based capital (Demir, Acar and Toprak 2004).

³⁴Based on an egalitarian petit-bourgeoisie society, religious communitarianism, anti-monopolist, anti-rent seeking, anti-statist, pro-market (Akça 2014: 26)

neoliberal restructuring, and continued with the unsuccessful hegemonic attempts of coalition governments (Akça 2014, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010, Şenses 2016).

3.3 Expanded Hegemony of Neoliberal Capitalism under AKP Rule

AKP's (Justice and Development Party) coming into power in 2002 cannot be dissociated from either the political Islamist re-structurings in post-1997 or the existing hegemony crisis of 1990s. Following the closure of RP in 1997, political cadres of the party re-structured into two opposing camps as the traditionalists and reformists. Traditionalists were characterized by the commitment to the ideals of a 'just economic order' and National Outlook Movement, which emphasized pro-equality discourse with an anti-globalization approach (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013). Reformists, on the other hand, embraced the pro-globalization discourse with the alliance of Islamist capitalists based on the organization³⁵ of Anatolian Tiger's (ibid). AKP, as the representative of this latter camp, was able to attract the broader society with its divergence from radical Islam through a conservative democrat image, pro-EU discourse and promises of new re-distributional policies (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013, Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010).

Despite the fact that the AKP was implementing IMF's structural and institutional reforms without any hesitation –which was seen as risky by the prior coalition governments due to the fear of losing their voters-, it achieved macro-economic stability in contrast to the prior implementation of neoliberal reforms (Kuyucu 2017). Nevertheless, this success did not amount to a correct choice by the AKP, who executed strict implementation of the IMF reforms. With regard to the devastating effects of 'roll back' neoliberal reforms throughout the world, and in the global South in particular, a new consensus –i.e. a Post-Washington consensus- was established by the IMF in order to protect capitalists' gains. For this aim, the regulatory capacity of the state increased in certain areas and new social disciplinary mechanisms were enacted in order to include hitherto-excluded populations (during the 'roll back' phase of neoliberalism) to formal market services (Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010, Peck and Tickell 2002, Öniş 2009). With the implementation of this new configuration of 'roll out' neoliberal reforms, the banking sector and public finances were re-regulated through independent regulatory agencies which in turn decreased the inflation and interest rates and have attracted private investment by gaining the confidence of investors (Kuyucu 2017, Öniş

³⁵ Organization is called MÜSİAD, which was generated by the Anatolian industrialists who were excluded from ANAP's clientelist networks and gained strength during the RP's golden years of early 1990s. It was also organized against TÜSİAD which was an Istanbul based organization of big bourgeoisie.

2009). Although the improved regulatory capacity of state imposed a tight fiscal discipline through this institutional re-structuring; privatization of state-enterprises –i.e. electricity, tobacco production-, reduction in the agricultural subsidies and promotion of competitiveness expressed a continuation of de-regulation policies, which was able to attract foreign capital inflows with a more stable and credible environment of economy (Bedirhanoglu and Yalman 2010, Öniş 2009). The re-structuring of state in line with its integration to the global economy, have been legitimized both by the prospect of EU membership and possible material benefits³⁶ of such, and the rule based economy which presents a clear break from the previous decades’ unstable patterns of development which rested on the clientelist networks (Bedirhanoglu and Yalman 2010, Kuyucu 2017, Öniş 2009). Based on this ‘improved’³⁷ macro-economic framework, the AKP was able to gather dominant class fractions which are composed of İstanbul based big bourgeoisie, Muslim-conservative sections of small-medium scale bourgeoisie, Sunni-Muslim urban conservatives and upwardly mobile secular middle class (Akça 2014: 31). Although the intra-class contradictions did not fade away, economic-corporate interests of these diverse sections were articulated in a successful way, which expressed a clear break from the two decades long exclusion of Islamic bourgeoisie (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013). Subordinate classes, on the other hand, were the main object of neoliberal social policy programs, which aimed to discipline the poor masses (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013, Özden 2014, Yalman 2011). Social security reform, housing as a new social policy instrument and charity-based anti- poverty schemes were able to manufacture the consent of the poor masses –i.e. unorganized and informal fractions of working class- who were excluded by neoliberal policies up until then (Akça 2014, Bayırbağ 2013, Özden 2014). What had been proposed by IMF and World Bank under the ‘roll out’ neoliberal paradigm is making the poor ‘active agents’ of development in which the social identity of the poor is re-configured as that of a ‘self-maximizing entrepreneur’ (Yalman 2011). In such a framework, the elimination of poverty is no longer an aim; instead, integrating the poor into the political-economic regime by disciplining and perpetuating their livelihoods are at stake (Özden 2014,

³⁶ Democratic reforms that proposed for the EU membership, such as elimination of death penalty and recognition of minority rights, attracted even the ones who criticized AKP’s Islamic orientation. Thus, these political reforms appealed not only international capital, which seeks long-term stability of business environment, but also the liberal domestic community (Öniş 2009).

³⁷ ‘Improved’ with regard to capitalist interests, since such performance was possible at the expense of labor which became precarious due to the reduction of real wages and subcontracting. Bedirhanoglu and Yalman interprets this situation as ‘jobless growth’ in which “increases in labor productivity have not been accompanied by an improvement in either real wages or labor participation rates (2010: 120-121)”.

Yalman 2011). In tandem with the ‘poverty reduction’ schemes of the IMF and the World Bank, the AKP implemented neoliberal social policies with a peculiar articulation of religious charities, in the form of

social aid, Green Card, conditional cash transfers, free distribution of school books, and the subsistence aid given by both the Social Aid and Solidarity Fund of the Prime Ministry and foundations connected to it at the centre, as well as through local government

(Akça 2014, Özden 2014)

According to Bayırbağ (2013), dispossession and proletarianization of urban and rural population, class polarization and the increasing hardship of making minimum requirements of livelihood are compensated by the neoliberal social policy program, which actually “turns the working class into working poor dependent on the social policies of AKP (p. 1141)”. Islamic charities, which began to organize at *gecekondu* neighborhoods in 1990s RP period, became an inseparable partner of neoliberal social policies in the 2000s under the AKP governments. Aids³⁸ that are distributed through Islamic charities, for Karaman (2013b), constitute ‘a relation of gift exchange³⁹’ (p.3422) which are based on ‘the religio-moral obligation to provide and care for another’ (p.3419). Under AKP regime, these Islamic charities work as a ‘political and economic network resource’ that are carefully organized in order to strengthen both the Islamic communities and AKP as the party of the oppressed majority, rather than empowering local politicians in a place-based clientelist relationship (2013b: 3421). Despite the fact that ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘Islamism’ have divergent political rationalities, “‘thin’ instrumental rationality of the free market is supplemented and guided by the ‘dense’ moral context of ‘moderate and democratic Muslim society’ (Öniş and Keyman 2003 cited in Karaman 2013b: 3419)”. Accordingly, the AKP government ensures cross-class alliance with the articulation of Islamic networks to the neoliberal re-structuring project, which expresses the ways in which neoliberalism is reproduced, mutated and reconstituted with the embedded local power relations, as the ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ paradigm asserts (Brenner and Theodore 2002). Thus, for Akça (2014), “after two decades of crisis of political hegemony under neoliberal capitalism, AKP could manufacture expanded hegemony, on the basis of neoliberal, conservative and authoritarian populism (p.44)”.

³⁸ Due to the irregular basis of distribution and positioning outside of formal state policy, it creates an ambivalent area which prevents the development of welfare-dependent subjects (Karaman 2013b: 3423).

³⁹ Such a particular relationship does not let to conceptualize ‘aids’ in terms of right-based approach (Karaman 2013b: 3422).

3.3.1 Urban Governance Reform of AKP

The re-scaling of state, as an integral part of state re-structuring, has been operationalized through the urban governance reforms of the AKP government. Accordingly, public administration reform was undertaken in order to fulfill EU requirements. The Greater Municipality Law (no.5216) and the Municipality Law (no.5393), implemented consecutively in 2004 and 2005, constituted the first instances of decentralization in the history of Turkish Republic (Balaban 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014, Kuyucu 2017). With these new laws, local administrations became the only authorities for using the rights that are determined by law (Balaban 2013, Güzey 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014, Kuyucu 2017, Türkün 2011). In contrast to earlier municipality laws in 1980s, which expressed the central government's power over local governments, these laws entitle increased financial and administrative power to localities which aim to prevent the center's influence on them (Kuyucu 2017: 53-54). Nevertheless, localities are not totally autonomous –i.e. not able to raise local taxes⁴⁰, in fact they are dependent on the center's financial distribution scheme (Kuyucu 2017: 54). According to Karaman (2013b), with these new powers, local governments rendered as 'semi-autonomous market actors' who now have the right to privatize public assets, to designate areas and prepare plans for urban renewal with TOKİ, to make public-private partnerships, to constitute private firms and to borrow credit from financial institutions (Balaban 2013, Güzey 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014).

Reforms in land and housing markets, on the other hand, have expressed a clear centralization of power in contrast to public administration reforms (Doğru 2016, Bayırbağ 2013, Kuyucu 2017, Yeşilbağ 2016). The motivation for the reforms in this area are related with the effort to re-consolidate a neoliberal accumulation regime in Turkey, rather than the implication of external forces (requirements of EU membership), which was the leading force behind public administration reforms (Kuyucu 2017). Restructuring of TOKİ, from a credit dispensing institution in the 1980s to the most powerful actor in urbanization in 2000s, constitutes the crucial part of land and housing market reforms. Between 2004 and 2007 (until the crisis in 2008) construction sector growth 12% with the help of TOKİ's restructuring, which constitutes the most growing sector among others (Balaban 2013). With the legislative regulations between 2002-2008, TOKİ became the policy maker, regulator and service provider, planning

⁴⁰ Determination of the local land tax by the localities in global North, constituted a generative force of inter-urban competition in the neoliberal era.

authority, constructor and developer (Çavuşoğlu and Strutz 2014a, Kuyucu 2017). The ways in which TOKİ has consolidated all these different roles will be briefly explained according to four dimensions. First, despite the fact that TOKİ is a de jure public institution, its exclusion from the general budget -which means it produces revenues in order to finance projects-excludes TOKİ from being a public institution by definition (Doğru 2016, Kuyucu 2017). Nevertheless, TOKİ is tied directly to the Prime Minister (which means it is only responsible to the P.M) and it is exempt from parliamentary auditing, taxes and Public Procurement Law, which strengthens its extraordinary status (Doğru 2016, Kuyucu 2017, Türkün 2011). Secondly, TOKİ has the authority to develop plans at all scales, change existing ones and regulate zoning. This weakens the legitimacy of planning institutions by centralizing all these planning powers (Balaban 2013, Gündoğdu and Gough 2009, Güzey 2013, Türkün 2011). Third, TOKİ became the biggest landowner in Turkey through the transfer of land assets from the Urban Land Office and other ministries to itself (Balaban 2013, Perouse 2013, Türkün 2011). Moreover, it can determine the value of these lands (Perouse 2013, Türkün 2011). Lastly, TOKİ initiates projects through the ‘revenue sharing model’ in which it opens vacant state-owned land to the private sector for high-income housing and, in turn, it acquires a share from the revenue in order to build state-subsidized housing for low-middle income populations (Doğru 2016, Karaman 2013a, Kuyucu 2016, 2017). According to Çavuşoğlu & Strutz (2014a) and Karaman (2013a), the transfer of state-owned land to private sector with a value less than the market price leads to an unfair competition since this system “works as a hidden subsidy to the developer (Karaman 2013a: 723)”. Furthermore, TOKİ does not only ‘invite’ the private sector through these land openings, but also it establishes companies and partnerships in order to create revenue (Balaban 2013, Karaman 2013a).

Along with the re-structuring of TOKİ, urban renewal programs have constituted a significant part of the reforms occurring in land and housing markets. Regeneration of *gecekondu* areas and social housing for low- income population were set as main objectives regarding the urbanization in the Emergency Action Plan (2002) of the AKP. Targeting *gecekondu*s for regeneration expresses a clear break from the previous period’s tenure legalization-led development of multi-storey apartments. This paradigm shift regarding the trajectory of *gecekondu* settlements was legitimized by the 1999 earthquake and the specific identification of *gecekondu*s as the core of crime, blight and decay (Çavuşoğlu and Strutz 2014a, Kuyucu-Ünsal 2010). The very first law that actualized this aim was the new Criminal Code in 2004 (no.5237) which regarded construction of *gecekondu* as criminal offence with a prison

sentence, for the first time in the urbanization history of Turkey (Kuyucu-Ünsal 2010). Such a law expresses the state's 'zero tolerance' attitude towards *gecekondu*s, as the criminalization of poverty. With the subsequent law of 'Conservation of Deteriorating Historic and Cultural Property through Renewal and Re-use' (no.5356) in 2005 and new regulations for the *Gecekondu* Law (no.775) in 2007 and 2008, the transformation of *gecekondu* settlements, by the cooperation of TOKİ and municipalities, was made possible (Güzey 2013, Kuyucu 2017, Kuyucu-Ünsal 2010, Türkün 2011). Furthermore, in 2007, housing credits were introduced by a new law (no.5582) in order to develop housing finance sector with an institutionalized mortgage system (Kuyucu-Ünsal 2010). Under the legally determined framework of urban renewal, local authorities identify derelict, obsolete and unsafe areas in the city -i.e. *gecekondu* settlements or old historical districts; the area becomes an 'urban renewal zone'; and TOKİ and the municipality work together in order to settle up the existing property relations (Gündoğdu-Gough 2009, Karaman 2013a). Accordingly, existing owners can either sell their property to TOKİ or purchase affordable housing⁴¹ from TOKİ, which does not necessarily have to be in-situ housing; tenants, on the other hand, are given chance to buy flats from TOKİ's housing projects, which are located at the peripheries (ibid.). Despite the fact that TOKİ announces these relocation programs as 'social housing', they are far from the practices of 'social housing' in the global North, which are based on the state ownership of property, and renting at affordable prices (Kuyucu 2016). Thus, 'social housing'⁴² in Turkey is a de-facto homeownership program which is based on 'property-led redevelopment' (Karaman 2013a). Recalling from the Literature Review, redevelopment projects that take place in the global South -where housing has never been an object of social right, as in the welfare state experiences of the global North- aim to make related population property owner through the state subsidized housing within these projects. In this way, low income population can acquire higher standards of living, which is envisioned as the remedy for socio-economic problems, and will not constitute a financial burden for the state by financing these standards of living by themselves. In that regard, TOKİ's homeownership program in the name of 'social housing' follows the logic of the global South.

⁴¹ According to the quality of title deed -TTB or formal- and the size of the *gecekondu*, value of the existing property is calculated and count as a down payment, remaining cost of the housing is asked to be paid by monthly installments to a bank contracted by TOKİ for 15 to 20 years (Karaman 2013a: 723).

⁴² In overall, TOKİ has produced 143.021 social housing within the *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects, which corresponds to 17.2% of the total production (including other types of housing) (TOKİ Konut Üretim Raporu 2018).

According to critical urban scholars (Gündoğdu and Gough 2009, Güzey 2013, Karaman 2013a, Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010, Türkün 2011) the impetus behind the ‘property-led redevelopment’ is far from the state’s declared claims of ‘fixing’ socio-economic problems of urban poor –which are presented as spatial problems- by the new ‘social housing’ policy. Rather, targeted areas (inner city *gecekondu* and old historical settlements) were causing a widening of the rent gap in the cities. Easily transformable areas were exhausted by the construction wave of 1980s, and so these areas became new frontier for the actualization of potential land rent (Gündoğdu and Gough 2009, Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010). Accordingly, such risky⁴³ areas demanded state assistance to actualize the potential rent⁴⁴, for which state-led ‘renewal programs’ were initiated in 2000s (Gündoğdu and Gough 2009). In this way, de-valued areas of the inner city (*gecekondu* and old historical settlements) were razed for re-development –which promise higher rents- and through these in-situ or peripheral re-development projects it was attempted to make the the existing population ‘homeowners’ (Gündoğdu and Gough 2009, Karaman 2013a, Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010, Türkün 2011). Nevertheless, ‘affordable’ housing schemes for urban poor’s in these areas did not quite realize this initial aim of making the urban poor into ‘homeowners’ due to the disaccord between proposed payment scheme and urban poor’s economic conditions, which –mostly- end-up with the displacement of urban poor and re-placement (i.e. re-settlement) with well-to-do urban residents (Türkün 2011). Thus, Güzey (2013) claims that urban renewal programs that are enacted with the cooperation of TOKİ are a “unique approach- a recipe to be applied in every city and every location with the same rules of place marketing, ending with unfair level of rent increase and rent transfer, displacement, and increased social exclusion (p.67)”. In this way, urban renewal programs constitute a form of ‘state led class remake of urban landscape’ (Smith 1996, Lees et al. 2015), in other words, gentrification, in contemporary Turkey.

3.3.2 Authoritarian Form of Urban Re-structuring

Growth of construction sector since the 1980s gained a new momentum with the AKP’s institutional and legal re-structuring (empowerment of TOKİ and legal framework for urban

⁴³ Risky according to private investor. Due to the complex property structure private investor hesitated to invest in.

⁴⁴ Recalling from the Literature Review, state assistance for the investment in risky areas was a widely applied governance strategy both in global South and in North for securing capital accumulation in ‘roll-out’ phase of neoliberalism.

renewal, respectively) which enabled the generation of a construction-based accumulation regime. According to political-economic approaches (Balaban 2013, Çavuşoğlu and Strutz 2014a, b, Doğru 2016, Karaçimen and Çelik 2017, Kuyucu 2017, Yeşilbağ 2016), the construction sector is not only an apparatus for solving the problems of re-structuring capitalism in the aftermath of 2001 crisis. It is equally embedded with the political interests of the AKP, who seek to ensure and maintain mass political support, to compensate decreasing real wages with urban rent, and to address short-term resource and financing needs. Nevertheless, for Kuyucu (2017), the crises of 2008 led to a qualitative change in the dynamics of construction-led accumulation regime and forms of politics. Due to the high current account deficit, the decline of business in the EU zone, and a slowdown in export and conflicts in Middle East & North Africa following Arab Spring⁴⁵, Turkey became one of the most fragile economies (Kuyucu 2017, Yeşilbağ 2016). Decreasing rates of growth and declining votes for the AKP in the elections of 2007 lead to a questioning of government's power and legitimacy (ibid.). In such framework, the AKP government withdrew from structural reforms in order to undertake authoritarian and centralist political-economic agenda, which is built upon the "direct appropriation of urban rents (Kuyucu 2017: 49)". Accordingly, decentralization attempts of local governments were overturned by the recentralization of urban policymaking, which is expressed by the announcement of new mega projects in Istanbul⁴⁶ -a 3rd airport, a 3rd bridge, a canal project- in 2009; by disempowering the lower level local governments through the changes in Municipality Law⁴⁷ in 2010; empowering the greater municipalities –both qualitatively and quantitatively- through the new Greater Municipality Law⁴⁸ in 2012; by the establishment of the Ministry of Urban Development and Environment⁴⁹ in 2011; and by the

⁴⁵ Social uprising against the dictatorship, violations of human rights and rising social inequalities (including class inequalities) led by neoliberal accumulation regimes, that started in 2010 in Tunisia and spread to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain (Al-Sayyid 2015)

⁴⁶ Announcement of such urban development projects by the prime minister, rather than any local authority expresses the by-passing of the authority of localities.

⁴⁷ With this change, municipalities can no longer determine the transformation zones. (Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014, Kuyucu 2017)

⁴⁸ New Greater Municipality Law on the one hand increases the number of metropolitan municipalities, on the other hand, enables metropolitan municipalities to change planning regulations (Kuyucu 2017).

⁴⁹ New ministry became the powerful agency of government which accelerates the urban re-development by centralizing the zoning and planning authority on itself (Balaban 2013, Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014, Kuyucu 2017).

new Disaster Law⁵⁰ (no.6306) that de facto worked for urban rent generation (Balaban 2013, Kuyucu 2017). Through the centralization of policy-making, legal and administrative obstacles that prevent appropriation of direct urban rent have been overcome and urban renewal and mega projects, as the core of the construction sector, have led to economic growth (Kuyucu 2017, Yeşilbağ 2016). The introduction of mega projects have played a crucial role in the sustaining of hegemony in the aftermath of 2008 crisis. On the one hand, legal loopholes (that were generated by legal changes) and concealment of tendering process (by the centralization of power and the changes in the Public Procurement Law⁵¹) led to the clientelism in the construction sector in which capitalists that have organic relations with AKP government were favored. On the other hand, with the discourse of ‘modernization’ and ‘developmentalism,’ mega construction and energy projects were able to generate consent on the sub-ordinate populations (Adaman et al. 2017, Paker 2017, Yeşilbağ 2016). Besides Kuyucu’s (2007) assertion of ‘authoritarian’ urban re-structuring in particular in the post-2007 period, Doğru (2016) claims that, TOKİ, from the beginning of its restructuring in 2003 and through the subsequent legal and administrative changes – which Kuyucu (2017) builds upon his claims-, expresses the neoliberal authoritarian form of state itself in the housing sector. Accordingly, TOKİ became an ‘over-capacitated state agency’, with increased autonomy (accountable only to the Prime Minister) and its quasi-private structure (revenue producer state institution), in parallel with proposition of increasing state capacity by the post-Washington Consensus (Doğru 2016). Kayasü and Yetişkul (2014), on the other hand, claim that the “roll-out phase of neoliberalism in Turkey encompass only attempts for power shifts between central and local governments (p.216)”. However, such a perspective assumes a certain scheme of ‘Neoliberalism’ that can be equally applied to every single country. This actually contradicts the ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Peck and Theodore 2010) perspective that they employ, since this perspective asserts that same policies tend to render different impacts in different places to their embeddedness into local power dynamics. Rather, this study adopts the analyses of Doğru (2016), Kuyucu (2017) and Yeşilbağ (2016) which demonstrate that the expansion of capitalist social relations in contemporary Turkey is in tandem with the highly centralized urban governing system as an expression of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, in which ‘neoliberalization’, by definition, “does not necessarily lead

⁵⁰ Although the law justified by the Van earthquake in 2012, its initial mission of targeting risky areas turned out to be targeting the areas that are posing wide rent gap (Kayasü and Yetişkul 2014). For a more detailed analysis of this law see Güzey (2016).

⁵¹ Which was changed 35 times until 2013 by adding of exceptions (Kuyucu 2017).

to decentralization and state devolution as it usually does in advanced capital contexts (Kuyucu 2017: 45)”.

3.3.3 Making of a New Property Regime

Although through different means, urban policies under AKP government have been studied by political economy and critical urban scholars as a particular way of constructing hegemony. For Türkün (2011), the urban coalition that is made of central and local governments, private sector, property developers, landowners, professionals and media organs express their interests in increasing urban land rents and real-estate development through the hegemonic neoliberal discourse of urban transformation. Kuyucu (2016, 2017) discusses the urban rent as a significant source of AKP to maintain its hegemonic power on society, as well. However, in addition to the dominant class fractions, he also studies the role of social housing in the manufacturing of hegemony for the subordinate populations. According to Penpecioglu (2013), urban re-development projects are the ‘hegemonic projects for the production of space’ in which governmental agents are constructing a ‘capacity to produce consent’ through the hegemonic and dominating discourses with the collaboration of civil society institutions. Çavuşoğlu & Strutz (2014a, b) and Yeşilbağ (2014), on the other hand, claim that ‘construction’ as a ‘national-popular project’ of AKP ensures cross-class alliances by providing the reproduction of labor power in this sector and thus enabling the actualization of ‘homeownership’ desires -for part of subordinate population- which leads to near-monopolization of the sector by a few large construction firms and developers -for the part of dominant classes-. In fact, all these scholars point to different ways in which built environment and its related sectors (construction, urban renewal, TOKİ, social housing) under AKP rule deepen capitalist market relations by integrating different parts of society on the basis of property relations i.e. private property rights, private ownership of housing and financialization of housing. Hence, this study approaches to the new private property regime that is enacted by the urban governance reform of AKP as a particular hegemonic project (among other projects which are organized in different social spheres) which aims to establish political class dominance by ensuring the unity of dominant classes and the consent of subordinate classes. Crucially, the ‘national popular’ character of this hegemonic project conceals the class dimension (i.e. the appropriation of the surplus value by the capitalists; more specifically, in this context, appropriation of the savings and income of the subordinate population through TOKİ’s quasi-mortgage payments system).

The complex property structure of informal settlements –i.e. *gecekondu*– have posed an obstacle for the institutionalization of a private property regime prior to the AKP’s coming into power. The dynamic informal market, which was generated by the previous populist urban policies, left large amounts of land outside of the capitalist circuits, which led to the widening of rent gap in contemporary cities (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010). Formalization of informal settlements through urban renewal programs, on the one hand, actualizes the potential land rent for capitalist fractions; on the other hand, it integrates urban poor to the formal market by indebting them through the ‘quasi-mortgage’ payments of TOKİ (Doğru 2016, Kuyucu 2016). Compared to the earlier post-hoc rationalization of tenure legalization, the formalization under AKP urban regime produces land, in particular, as property and as commodity (Çavuşoğlu and Strutz 2014a, Türem 2017). In other words, rather than laying the ground for commodification that is handed over to the *gecekondu* community for the realization of value, the state itself becomes the realizer of the value. According to Türem (2017), this is an expression of the change in statehood, in which new constellation of state sees through the market. In that regard, the making of private property for the market necessitates certain legal norms, law being the protector of property, by definition. For Kuyucu (2014), the determination of legality is a highly political process and the state is the one who draws the boundaries between legality and illegality. Presentation of informal settlements as illegal by the state conceals the embedded relationship of informal and formal in the production of urban regime. Therefore, rather than posing legality as the natural opposition of illegality, re-definition of them according to certain political interests sheds light on the fluid nature of their determination (Gülöksüz 2002, Kuyucu 2014, Perouse 2012). For instance, Perouse (2012) points the ways in which ‘public land’ can be leased to the private sector under the name of ‘common interest’, while concurrently eliminating *gecekondus* on ‘public land’ for the same ‘common interest’. Thus, relations of power are the foremost determinant of legal certainty and ambiguity for the property system. In terms of creating a formal property regime from informal settlements, power relations that were inherited from older informal order play a significant role in the new system of property (Gülöksüz 2002). When the complex property structure of *gecekondu* settlements (legal deed owners, TTB holders, illegal occupiers, multiple flat owners, informal tenants) is subjected to formalization by the new property regime, new forms of inequalities are generated in addition to inequalities being transmitting to the new structure (Kuyucu 2014). According to Türem (2017), both the reproduction of existing inequalities and new forms of inequalities are the outcome of ‘selective distribution’ of wealth, which is in accord with “those who are visible and legible to a neoliberal logic” (p. 36). Thus, uses and abuses of the legal

ambiguity in the formalization process of *gecekondu*s become crucial in the making of a new property regime for the expansion of capitalist relations (Kuyucu 2014).

Consequently, this chapter examined the formation and re-consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in Turkey by focusing on urban governance reforms of ANAP and AKP government's. It is claimed that these reforms developed different schemes for re-distribution of land rent according to 'roll-back' and 'roll-out' neoliberal frameworks, which aim to ensure class-alliance. Even though the urban governance reforms of ANAP have provided economic interests (in the form of land rent) for both capitalist and subordinate classes (i.e. certain fraction of *gecekondu* owners) through tenure legalization, they also left a considerable amount of *gecekondu* settlements and, by extension, populations excluded from formal land markets. It is argued that these excluded factions became an object of the hegemonic project of AKP, which is based on a new private property regime, for re-consolidating neoliberal hegemony in the 2000s. In line with the 'roll-out' neoliberal framework, the new private property regime as the hegemonic project of AKP aims to deepen capitalist market relations by including hitherto-excluded factions to the formal land market through the reforms in land and housing market, which has actualized by the laws that are related with urban renewal and re-structuring of TOKİ. Nevertheless, this examination of the hegemonic project of AKP constitutes only the 'economic' dimension of neoliberal hegemony in contemporary times. Institutional and legal re-structuring of state 'from above' for the re-consolidation of neoliberal hegemony requires an 'ethico-political' ground that incorporates population to 'economic nucleus' by a particular conception of the world, as well. Without an analysis of the constitution and dissemination of this particular conception 'from below', hegemony perspective will be reduced solely to 'economic' ground. In order to overcome this problem, the following chapter will examine how the conception of private property (in the form of homeownership) is constituted and disseminated among the *gecekondu* residents, as the 'ethico-political' ground of AKP's hegemonic project..

CHAPTER 4

HEGEMONIC POLITICS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP

This chapter aims to explore how the restructuring of state ‘from above’ accompanies a legitimizing popular force ‘from below’ through a particular conception of private property. Recalling the Theoretical Framework, a particular conception of the world, which is inherent in hegemonic projects in order to ‘cement’ and ‘unify’ society (Gramsci 2000: 330) to ‘decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (p.212), re-makes the commonsense of society, as the “common material and mental framework” (Roseberry 1994: 363) for conceiving the world. The process by which this particular conception of the world is constructed is itself an object of hegemonic struggle that takes place between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ through the complex intertwining of consent and coercion (Crehan 2002: 175). By focusing on Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project (in Tarlaiçi/Gülveren) by examining the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents who reside at the social housing of TOKİ, this chapter argues that the process of generation and dissemination of the conception of private property actualizes through the ‘hegemonic politics of homeownership’. In order to elaborate the ‘hegemonic politics of homeownership’, this chapter starts with the analysis of the conditions that made the Tarlaiçi neighborhood a target of a state-led urban development project. Through the construction of consensual and coercive mechanisms, the following section investigates how the commonsense of Tarlaiçi inhabitants is re-made in tandem with the conception of homeownership, as the object of ‘hegemonic politics of homeownership’. In the last section, the points of rupture in this hegemonic conception will be explored; however, by discussing the ‘idea of state’ afterwards, it investigates how these points of rupture could not delegitimize the hegemonic project of the AKP.

4.1 ‘Un-transformable’ *Gecekondu* Neighborhood: Tarlaiçi

The borders of the district of Mamak are not only indicating administrative boundaries, they are drawing the northeast limits of the inner city (which are constituted by the districts of Çankaya and Altındağ-Ulus). Embracing the highest population (%56 of district population)

and the widest area (%33 of district area) of *gecekondu* settlements among the districts of Ankara (Ankara 2023 Plan Report), Mamak had been generating rent gap by the potential rent that was possessed by *gecekondu* settlements due to its frontier position to the inner city until the AKP's coming into the power. It was the first time that a government was able to actualize potential rent in Mamak through reforms in urban governance. Accordingly, it is not a coincidence that the highest number of urban development projects⁵² (including private, public and public-private partnership projects) in Ankara were initiated by the AKP regime in this district. Yatıkmusluk Urban Development and *Gecekondu* Transformation Project in this district provides a significant analytical lens for an exploration of AKP's hegemonic politics of homeownership due to Yatıkmusluk neighborhood's social (stigmatized status due to the criminal activities), spatial (locational advantage due to its closeness to city center and labor market, involvement of social facilities) and economic characteristics (low income population and complex property structure). In order to explore the ways in which these characteristics are articulated into hegemonic politics of homeownership, following section will briefly analyze the conditions that generate such characteristics, which makes this neighborhood a target for the state-led urban development project.

First of all, Gülveren has been the formal name of this neighborhood since 1951 (Şenyapılı 2004: 348); however, it is not the only name that is attributed to this neighborhood. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents in this neighborhood, during the second half of 1960s the neighborhood was known as Tarlaıçi-Yatıkmusluk both by the inhabitants and wider population which also connotes the stigmatized status of this neighborhood due to the criminal activities that are associated with this neighborhood (such as burglary and drug dealing). Gülveren is a more neutral name that indicates the wider area including the cluster of *gecekondu* settlements and the commercial center. Finally, Altınevler is the latest name of the neighborhood that is expected to substitute the name Gülveren, after the whole area is transformed. Adoption of any one of these names reflect the perspective of subject in terms of the ways in which s/he socio-politically positions her/himself vis-à-vis the transformation process. Since this study explores the transformation of the commonsense of former

⁵² Doğukent urban regeneration project, Araplar squatter housing prevention area, Gaz Maske urban regeneration project, Yatık Musluk urban development and *gecekondu* transformation project, Altıağaç-Karaağaç-Hüseyingazi urban regeneration project, Southeastern Ankara Imrahor urban regeneration project, Kazım Orbay urban regeneration project, Kıbrıs Village South Bayındır urban regeneration project, Samsun Road Eastern Ankara urban entrance project, 50. Yıl urban regeneration project, Anayurt-Gülseren urban renewal and *gecekondu* transformation projects, Yeni Mamak urban transformation project, Kusunlar urban renewal project (Güzey 2009: 33, toki.gov.tr)

gecekond residents in relation to conception of homeownership, their adoption of one particular name of the neighborhood among others expresses a significant element in the constitution of commonsense for determining the extent that this conception becomes a “common material and mental framework” (Roseberry 1994: 363). Thus, in order to give clear account of the subjects’ conception of the world, their specific preference for the name of neighborhood is reflected as stated.

According to the first wave of rural-to-urban migrants and their children who literally built this neighborhood, the area in which they constructed their *gecekond*s was marshland in which barley and wheat fields were developed by the villagers nearby this area. Since the *gecekond*s were constructed in these agricultural fields (by the displacement of existing agricultural land use), the very first inhabitants of *gecekond* settlement called their neighborhood ‘Tarla-ıçı’ which literally means ‘in the field’. The very first migrants opted to build their *gecekond*s in this area during the 1950s due to its locational advantage,, which is constituted by the area’s flat surface and close proximity to the city center (mainly Ulus at that time) and the railway. Although Tarlaıçı had been lacking the basic infrastructure as the other *gecekond* settlements in Ankara during these years, its locational advantage compared to others was enough to pull migrant populations who worked in labor-intense jobs (small scale manufacturing, transportation, construction), the service sector (horse-drawn carriage driver, doorman, janitor) and unqualified jobs in state institutions. With the establishment of Siteler⁵³ at the northern border of the neighborhood, the Community Health Center of Hacettepe Institution which included a mother and child care and family planning center, and primary-high schools in the neighborhood during the 1960s, Tarlaıçı became an attractive place for rural-to-urban migrants who were mainly from Erzurum, Kars, Yozgat and secondarily from the villages of Ankara (Kadıoası, Kazan, Kavaklı, Çamlıdere, Gıcık, Kızılcahamam), Çorum, Çankırı, Amasya, Bayburt, Kayseri, Gümüşhane, Samsun, Kastamonu, Sivas, Zonguldak, Giresun and Bolu. At the end of 1960s Tarlaıçı was already full of *gecekond*s with the increasing opportunities of work (especially through Siteler), social and health services. Gülistan, who still resides in one of the few remaining *gecekond*s in Tarlaıçı, expresses why her family chose to buy a *gecekond* in Tarlaıçı in the 1970:

When we were buying this place we had a relative who was residing in Şentepe (another *gecekond* settlement area). We went to their place, they were building *gecekond* as we did.

⁵³ Siteler is one of the early industrial zones in Ankara in which furniture manufacturing and retail shops are located. (Ankara Kalkınma Ajansı 2011)

Then we came to this neighborhood where my aunt's husband was building a *gecekondu* as well. In Şentepe there were no lights, water and roads. Then I realized that they were maintaining their life with gas lamps and providing water with tanks. When I looked around in this neighborhood, I said, the road is close, a school is there, high school and primary school are there; in order to reach the school there is only one road to pass. There is a mother and child center where I gave birth to my youngest son. I really liked this place. You know, it is not hilly but flat. I looked around, every opportunity is normal, good, and then I liked this place because every facility is comfortable. I never intended to leave.

Furthermore, inhabitants of *gecekondus* transformed their environment with countless trees and plants, including growing of fruits and vegetables for personal use. Animal husbandry (cow, goat, chicken, etc.), with which many of the *gecekondu* residents were familiar from their rural background, was quite common in the *gecekondu* settlement as a strategy of making living beside the victuals that are coming from their rural settlements. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents, in the 1970s Tarlaiçi transformed into a lively place with two open air cinemas, many kiosks and coffee houses at nearly every corner, and shops that sold construction materials for building *gecekondus*. Nevertheless, the neighborhood was not free of socio-spatial hierarchy. In spite of the outsider's unitary image of Tarlaiçi neighborhood as *gecekondu* settlement, old inhabitants claim that eventually the name Tarlaiçi identified with the Kurdish population who originated from Erzurum and Kars and made their livelihood mostly by driving horse-drawn carriage and working in Siteler on daily basis. On the other hand, the population that originated from villages of Ankara, Sivas and Kayseri mostly worked in state institutions as regular wage earners. While the latter group was residing at the sub-neighborhood of Duvardibi⁵⁴, the former group occupied the more central locations close to the basic facilities such as road. According to the ones who do not belong to the former group, Kurdish inhabitants were like 'landlords' (ağa) and 'looters' who engaged in petty crime. Their stigmatized image was reflected in the spatial practices of neighborhood; the ones who do not belong to this group were not allowed to pass from their territory; if they pass, this former group would 'make the fur fly'⁵⁵.

Since *gecekondu* neighborhoods were the center of active political struggle in the 1970s' heightened political climate (see Şengül 2009), Tarlaiçi took part in the political polarization between left and right as well. According to the former *gecekondu* residents who were actively struggling in the political organizations of either camps, neighborhood was identified

⁵⁴ Since it was located just by the walls of Cebeci cemetery inhabitants of this sub-neighborhood called their place as 'beside-the-wall' (duvar-dibi).

⁵⁵ 'Maraza çıkartırlardı. '

dominantly by the right-wing politics of MHP. On the other hand, leftists who belong to organizations of left fractions (THKP-C⁵⁶), though very few, were also residing in the neighborhood. Due to the neighborhood's seemingly homogeneous political orientation, though, armed conflicts were not very common in Tarlaiçi. However, according to one of the oldest inhabitants of the neighborhood whose sons were members of THKP-C, the dominant camp of the right occasionally harassed these few left-oriented inhabitants with armed attacks. With regard to narratives of this family, these few left-oriented inhabitants had to keep their political orientation under a low profile in order to maintain their lives in this neighborhood. This strategy took place at the expense of claiming right in the situations of attacks from the right-wing inhabitants. Since the families were living in a nested order of *gecekondu*s and developed dense neighborhood relations, informing against the neighbor who shot one of the family members was avoided in order not to ruin the neighborhood relations and not be relegated from the neighborhood.

With the ANAP's ascendance into power in 1983 and the following reforms of urban governance, Tarlaiçi inhabitants took the advantage of the amnesty law (no.2981) in 1984, which legalized all the *gecekondu*s that were built before that date and issued TTB's. As it discussed in the Chapter 3, this law's other critical function was allowing the construction of apartments on *gecekondu* lots. However, *gecekondu* residents in Tarlaiçi could not transform their *gecekondu*s into apartments. Since Tarlaiçi was a popular neighborhood due to its locational and employment advantages, and with relatively developed social and health services, the demand for renting a *gecekondu* never decreased. Thus, even if the original owners of *gecekondu*s have left the neighborhood, they kept their *gecekondu* for renting purposes. Moreover, having the dynamic *gecekondu* renting market in their mind, they divided their deeds or TTB's into many shares in order to either informally sell to potential buyers or bequeath to their children as a potential income generator. With ever-increasing fragmentary ownership, demands for the number of apartment flats in exchange for *gecekondu* share was also increasing, which decreased the potential profit of the contractor. Therefore, contractors did not consider this neighborhood profitable, and Tarlaiçi kept its *gecekondu* pattern until the early 2000s, despite the many enactments (revision and rehabilitation plans) that encouraged the construction of apartments to this date. Besides the fragmentary ownership, the stigmatized population of Tarlaiçi deterred the constructors initiation of construction activities due to the

⁵⁶ Marxist-Leninist political organization that is founded in 1970 (see <https://thkp-c.com/category/tarih>)

reluctance of contractors to negotiate with this group, and the fear that apartment flats would not be sold in such a stigmatized neighborhood. Tarlaiçi, as a ‘un-transformable’ *gecekondu* settlement, continued to be an advantageous place for the newcomer rural-to-urban population until the mid 2000s. Meanwhile, criminalization of the neighborhood gradually increased through the negative representation of *gecekondu* residents in the media (see Erman 2001) and certain factions of newcomers who engaged in drug dealing and petty-crime activities. Hence, despite Balaban’s (2011) claims about the creation of new spaces (modern apartment buildings) and new class positions (emerging petty bourgeoisie in working class neighborhoods) with the urban governance reform of ANAP (which was discussed in the Chapter 3), Tarlaiçi neighborhood and its inhabitants could not follow this pattern.

4.2 Tarlaiçi Neighborhood: Target of State-led Urban Development Project

Because of the ‘un-transformable’ conditions of Tarlaiçi, the Municipality of Mamak initiated a seven-stage transformation project in 2001 through the authority that it gained through the urban governance reform of ANAP (Somalı 2013: 136). The first stage of the project started in the area, which is owned by EGO (directorate of electricity, gas and buses) and used as gasworks in order to distribute gas for heating to the developed neighborhoods of Ankara. Since the area in which the transformation started was public land and did not involve any *gecekondus*, it was a relatively smooth process of transformation. At the end of 2004, the first stage of the project was accomplished with six apartment blocks, which is called ‘GOP Sitesi’. However, due to the state ownership of the land, the municipality did not involve *gecekondu* residents in this project and the prices of the apartment flats were exceeding the purchasing power of this population. Hence, new blocks were occupied by the groups who differed from the *gecekondu* population in terms of their socio-economic status: military officers, teachers, healthcare professional who worked in related workplaces (military, school, hospital) in the immediate vicinity. In the next stages, municipality planned to relocate a definite number of *gecekondu* residents in these blocks in exchange with their plot (Somalı 2013: 136). However, the remaining stages of the project could not be actualized due to the municipality’s lack of financial and administrative capacity (2013: 139). Hence, in 2005 the municipality had to transfer the transformation project to TOKİ, which was empowered by the urban governance reforms of the AKP. From 2005 onwards, TOKİ continued the project under the category of ‘squatter transformation project’. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents, when TOKİ took over the project more than half of the *gecekondu* population left the neighborhood either because they were tenants and they would not be able to afford to reside

in this project, or they were *gecekondu* owners who couldn't imagine affording the costs of this project. The second stage of the project started in 2005 with the demolition of *gecekondus* and finished in 2008 with four blocks of apartments called 'Mehmet Sultan Mehmet Sitesi' (FSM). This stage of the project entitled individuals to become homeowners; not only for those who had formal title deeds or TTB, but also those who can prove their residency in the *gecekondu* with various sorts of documents (telephone, water and electricity bills). Accordingly, the amount of land size registered in title deeds (value of the formal title deed and TTB are calculated differently) and the value of trees⁵⁷ are counted as the down payment for the former group. The value of the rubble of the *gecekondu* were also counted as a down payment for the latter group. The remaining amount of the payment was calculated by subtracting the amount of down payment from the value of the new apartment flat. These remaining payments were expected to be paid in 15 years with the quasi-mortgage system of TOKİ through Ziraat Bank. However, the other five stages of the project did not have the same strategy. As it is discussed in the Chapter 3, in the aftermath of 2008 crisis the political-economic agenda of AKP government transformed into a more authoritarian and centralist strategy which is reflected through the advancement of the authority of TOKİ in urban renewal programs. With the new additions to the law, bureaucratic obstacles that prevent the acceleration of the renewal projects were removed and direct appropriation of urban rents by the state became possible. This authoritarian transformation in the urban policy making was revealed in the remaining five stages of the transformation project in Tarlaiçi. First of all, the five stages of the project were combined into one stage in order to prevent the delays that were caused by demolition and negotiation processes. In this way, the whole area of the project could be 'cleaned-out' at once. Although it had been merged into one stage, the five-stage plan of the initial project was reflected in five different site's (building complexes) whose construction finished between 2010 (Duru, Kardelen, Sancak, Ay-Yıldız Siteleri) and 2013 (Erkut Sitesi). More importantly, in this last stage, the eligibility criterion for becoming homeowner in the TOKİ's housing project differed from the previous stage, which actually openly expresses the concerns of the direct appropriation of urban rent. It was not enough to hold formal title deed or TTB for the enrolment of social housing; formal title deeds needed to be more than 50 m2 and TTB's needed to be more than 100 m2 in order to benefit from the affordable payment scheme. Since the ownership pattern was very fragmentary in Tarlaiçi, the

⁵⁷ *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects assign exchange value for trees, which are included in the lot of *gecekondu*, according to type and age of the tree.

ones who met this requirement corresponded only to a minority. The majority that had deeds below this criterion could also enroll for the social housing and the amount of land they owned would also be counted as a down payment. However, it would not be under the affordable scheme as in the second stage; in other words, the total value of the house sold for a more expensive price compared to the second stage and thus, monthly payments over 15 years of installments was much more than in the second stage. Moreover, proving the residency with various kinds of bills was not accepted in this stage. Thus, the rapid pace of transformation and increasing the eligibility criterion for affordable housing in this last stage of the project shows how the transformation of the political-economic strategy of AKP (which was discussed in the Chapter 3 under the ‘Authoritarian form of urban re-structuring’ section) regime enables the direct appropriation of urban rent.

4.3 Re-making the Commonsense of ‘Homeownership’

Having clarified the conditions that made possible the state-led urban development project in Tarlaiçi neighborhood, this section will explore how the private property regime in the form of homeownership was actualized through this project. As it is discussed in the Chapter 3, these projects are constituting a significant element of the hegemonic project of AKP. As Gramsci argues, any hegemonic project requires ethico-political ground for unifying the society into a ‘decisive nucleus of economic activity’. Thus the conception of private property in the form of homeownership is a particular conception of the world that constructs the ethico-political ground of the hegemonic project of AKP. However, dissemination of such conception is a complex process by which consent and coercion are articulated in a particular way in the re-making of commonsense in line with this particular conception. Hence, this section seeks to analyze the complex processes of consent and coercion in the transformation project as the re-making of commonsense of the former *gecekondu* residents in line with the conception of private property, in other words, the hegemonic politics of homeownership. By exploring hegemonic politics at the ground level, it links the re-structuring of state from ‘above’ (which has been discussed in the Chapter 3) to the legitimizing popular force from ‘below’.

4.3.1 Construction of Consent

If it is a question of providing an organic leadership for the entire economically active mass, this leadership should not follow old schemas but should innovate.

(Gramsci 2000: 335)

As Ocak (2011) asserts, becoming a homeowner is the crucial aspiration of the urban poor (i.e. *gecekondu* residents) in Turkey due to the lacking conception of social housing in the social policy history of Turkey. In other words, homeownership is a normalized, naturalized and taken-for-granted popular idea among the urban poor in Turkey; hence, it constitutes a particular commonsense in relation to private property. As Rehmann (2014) asserts, Gramsci's understanding of commonsense is like a "quarry consisting of several layers of different geographical periods deposited upon each other" (p.128) which are constituting the "raw materials to be processed and transformed" (ibid.) by the hegemonic struggles. According to Hall (1988), these layers consist of elements from prior social and cultural environment and the hegemonic projects depends

not the substitution of one, whole, new conception of the world for another, but the presentation of the novel combination of old and new elements, a process of distinction and of change in the relative weight possessed by the elements of the old ideology.

(Hall 1988: 158)

In that regard, 'becoming a homeowner through the social housing of TOKİ' is a novel combination of old and new elements of commonsense that constitutes a significant part of the hegemonic politics of homeownership. Consequently, this part will explore how the articulation of different layers in Tarlaiçi generates an aspiration for becoming homeowner and how such aspiration leads to the consent for state-led urban development projects.

4.3.1.1 A Decent Image of Apartment Flat

The physical conditions of *gecekondu* were quite compelling for the women of Tarlaiçi, where the traditional gender roles were quite dominant. While men, as the breadwinners, were spending their daytime in workplaces, women had to take care of the *gecekondu* as full-time domestic labor. Due to the socio-economic conditions of the households, *gecekondus* were mostly covering the basic shelter needs; thus, proper roof, tiles for the wet floors, parquet for the rooms, shower cabin, proper toilets and central heating system were constituting 'luxury' items. However, the absence of such items made the cleaning of *gecekondus* quite challenging for women, who are the main party responsible for such labor. Moreover, the necessity of sharing certain fundamental items (i.e. toilet, bathroom) with several households due to the inadequacy of the financial condition for providing such items for each household, was leading to exasperation because of the lack of privacy for basic needs. Ela expresses her aspiration for a decent apartment flat as:

We, also, would like to experience some civilized conditions, conformity was required for us, as well. Toilet and bathroom were together; when somebody uses the toilet you would not use the bathroom. By the time, concrete surfaces of *gecekondus* were transforming into black, you had to brush it non-stop, our nails were pierced as the result of cleaning. Brush it, brush it together with rats! There was only one toilet in the courtyard and three households were using the same toilet. There were three families on the same plot, people were spying each other in the toilet in order to make the right decisions of at what time to use the toilet.

Moreover, undertaking the cleaning work of *gecekondus* by the women regardless of their age, obstruct the young girls' education process. Mehtap, whose mother had to take her son to the hospital each and every day because of his chronic illness, explains how she had to take over a bundle of work in the *gecekondus* starting from the age of nine:

I was going to the school, coming from the school around one o'clock, cleaning the house, cooking the food, washing the dishes, doing the ironing; then my brothers were coming, I was cooking food for each of them: one wants potatoes, other wants eggs, another wants something else. I was taking care of them. Then I was sweeping the house again, washing the dishes again, and it had already been evening: time for sweeping the garden and giving water to the animals. As you see, I did not have time for studying and so forth.

On the other hand, stoves, in place of a central heating system, additionally produced multiple hardships for the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi: carrying heavy buckets of coal each and every day, chopping wood when coal was not available, painting the inside of the *gecekondus* two times a year in order to cover permanent soot caused by coal and wood fire and the chronic illnesses induced by inhaling the coal and wood smoke. During the conversation about the problems of stoves with Mualla, her daughter Nalan and their neighbor Reyhan, they present the compelling experiences in an explicit way:

R: Our water was freezing due to the closeness of pipes to the walls. Think about the frost of Ankara, there is no water. You cannot have a shower, cook food, you cannot do nothing.

M: I took a shower with cold water in the winter.

N: In a way, you get used to the cold since only the living room gets warm. Apart from the living room all the other rooms are cold as ice. You had to be teleported in order to pass from one room to another.

M: You run to the kitchen, wash the dishes then run back to the home (kitchen was outside of *gecekondus*).

N: And the illnesses were occurring more than today. You are coming out of the living room and entering into an ice-cold room. Kids were getting sick in the winter due to the coldness of the rooms. You are passing from a warm room to a cold one in a flash. No matter how long you keep the kid in the warm room, s/he gets worse since the other side is cold enough to get sick.

Consequently, as Erman and Hatiboğlu (2017) indicate in their research that takes place in *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects in Karacaören and Aktaş, the challenging material conditions of *gecekondu* life induced aspirations for a decent apartment flat especially for women who were solely or primarily responsible for the maintenance of the *gecekondus* in Tarlaici *gecekondu* settlement. While the material conditions of *gecekondu* are one side of the aspiration for a decent apartment flat, the other side of the coin is constituted by the comparison of the conditions of living in *gecekondu* with an apartment flat. The encounter of decent apartment flats in various ways (media, visiting the apartment flats of relatives/neighbors/friends) is another significant component informing such aspirations. Papatya reflects how the encounter with an apartment flat produces both a certain desire and disappointment as:

Of course, everyone has a dream of moving to a better house. A person sees on tv or she sees a good apartment flat with very clean furniture when she visits her neighbor or relative. A person emulates (that flat) with every work contained in it, with everything (in it). When she comes back to her home, she tries to implement that house in *gecekondu*. However, you cannot transform a *gecekondu* into an apartment flat, but we were trying to do this.

Moreover, such encounters allow class differences to be materialized and generates the sentiment of shame from the materialized image of class difference (Erdoğan 2016). Ahmet, whose socio-economic status was higher than the rest of the neighborhood and who positions himself socio-culturally superior to rest of the neighborhood, explains his feeling of shame and also the critique of it:

Because of the social structure (of the neighborhood), I had always attended schools in other neighborhoods. Fine, we like it (the neighborhood), but you see, we could not invite our friends, neither girls nor boys, to the neighborhood. You were visiting your boy friends' houses. Our house was decent, but you see, neighborhood was a bit tumbledown. In other words, I had always been ashamed of it. However, why was I ashamed of it? It was the condition of the people. I would not be ashamed of it now, but the conditions were like that back then. Other people's poverty should not make me to be ashamed, or keep it as my misbehavior. If your house is tumbledown, it is because you cannot afford it. Back then, I was like that, if it happens now I would not be ashamed of other's poverty.

Since decent living conditions has never been an object of social rights in Turkey, its acquisition depends on the economic capital of the individuals. Therefore, the ones who acquire such conditions are identified as upper-class individuals. Thus, when the challenging conditions of the *gecekondu* combines with class differences, the desire for a decent apartment flat becomes a symbol of upward class mobility.

4.3.1.2 Rumors of a Transformation Project

As it has been discussed in the beginning of this chapter, although many *gecekondu* neighborhoods in Turkey had been transforming into apartment blocks since the urban governance reform of ANAP, Tarlaiçi could not be transformed due to the fragmented ownership pattern and stigmatized image of the neighborhood. However, almost all of the respondents mentioned that rumors about transformation that had begun during the second half of the 1980s. Some of the newcomers were even warned before they attempted to buy a *gecekondu*; people were reportedly told ‘do not buy it, they are going to be transformed’ or ‘do not make any improvements, it will be demolished anyway’. However, despite the warnings, many new comers/ residents bought or improved *gecekondu*’s since it was their only alternative for survival in the city. Moreover, these rumors about the transformation, far from disappointing the residents, generated an expectation for the actualization of the decent image of an apartment flat. Encountering the municipality officials while they were making calculations, marking *gecekondus* and drawing borders, constituted material proof of such expectations. According to Esma’s narrative, every time the officials came by, they were jubilating and rejoicing with the expectation of demolition and the chance to ‘finally’ reside at the apartment flats. Thus, inhabitants of Tarlaiçi were convinced that the transformation would be actualized in spite of the uncertainty about the timing of the transformation. At this time, there was rapid transformation of *gecekondu* settlements into apartment blocks in Ankara in general; furthermore, residents would occasionally encounter the officials in the neighborhood. Thus, the failure of the transformation of this neighborhood both furthered expectations and generated frustration because of the unrealized transformation. Hence, TOKİ’s taking over of the transformation project following the failure of the municipality’s transformation attempts, ‘finally’ put an end to the ‘un-transformable’ trajectory of the neighborhood. Rather than the ‘threat of displacement’ that Sakızlıoğlu (2013) observed in the state-led gentrification process of Tarlabası neighborhood in İstanbul, Tarlaiçi inhabitants were grateful to TOKİ, because of the actualization of a long-awaited transformation project. This gratefulness is frequently reflected during the interviews through phrases such as:

It took maybe more than twenty years. In the end, when Tayyip Erdoğan came to power they started (the transformation). (Adalet)

Apart from TOKİ, this place would not be tidied up since I know this place for forty years. (Ahmet)

I born and raised in here, before TOKİ nobody would able to initiate such a project in here, TOKİ demolished and cleaned-up here, and I am glad that it happened. We are convinced that this government can make anything! Hence, we did not vote for this government (AKP) for no reason. (Binnaz)

God bless, nonetheless there is Tayyip Erdoğan, they promised a house and they made it. They said ‘people should not live with rats, they should live in decent houses’. (Cavidan)

When we first moved into an apartment flat we were praying a lot since finally we moved out from *gecekondu* and we started to live in an apartment flat. (Ela)

Was there any ‘homeownership’ before TOKİ? The state introduced us to the notion of ‘right’! (Women of Ay-yıldız sitesi)

As it can be clearly understood from such phrases, not only TOKİ has been legitimized for actualizing the long-awaited transformation project, but also the AKP government and its leader Erdoğan are glorified as the power behind the project. In other words, it is a significant moment that reflects the legitimization of the leadership of AKP as the social authority, which, by definition, ‘hegemony’ seeks to construct

4.3.1.3 Homeownership vs. Tenancy

However, as it is emphasized in the quotes from residents above, TOKİ is legitimized by its homeownership program, and not by renting or any other alternatives. The ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment model has a crucial role for legitimizing homeownership as opposed to renting. Installments that are spanning over 15 years lead to envision this payment system as ‘just like a paying rent, but in the end becoming a homeowner’ for the former *gecekondu* residents. Even in the Emergency Action Plan of the AKP, it states, “Our low-income citizens will be enabled to become homeowners like by paying rent in a couple of years.”⁵⁸ (2002: 105) was indicated under the ‘Urbanization and Habitation’ section. Although time plan does not correspond to actual practice, the core idea of this assertion disseminated among the society through the channel of media. Moreover, according to narratives of former *gecekondu* residents, TOKİ administration mentioned this during the process of contracting. Hence, such discourse renders tenancy ‘uneconomic’ compare to indebted homeownership program of TOKİ. This system provides a significant new element for the formation of ‘common material and mental framework’ based on the private property regime. Recalling from Hall’s (1988) statement, re-making commonsense does not correspond to substitution of a totally new conception for another, but a “novel combination of old and new elements, a process of distinction and of

⁵⁸ “Dar gelirli vatandaşlarımızın, kira öder gibi birkaç yıllık süre içinde ev sahibi olmaları sağlanacaktır”. (AKP 2002: 105)

change in the relative weight possessed by the elements of the old ideology” (p.158). In that regard, ‘old’ aspirations for a decent apartment flat combines with ‘new’ way of becoming a homeowner, i.e. the ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system..

Moreover, apart from the economic dimension of being a tenant, a compelling relationship between landlord and tenant legitimizes the conception of private property, as Döndü reflects:

God bless everyone with homeownership. You are comfortable in your own house, you say, it is my own house, but if it is rented, God forbid! You cannot even drive a single nail. Sometimes landlord does not like you without a reason and makes you to move from his/her flat by certain excuses such as ‘you need to move another apartment, my relative will move in’. How can you be comfortable apart from in your own house? May god make everyone a homeowner. Since it is mine, it depends on me to pay or not. When the water bill is issued and if I do not pay on time, it is my business; when the electric bill is issued and if do not pay on time, it is my business, again. Got it? But you cannot do like that when you are a tenant.

On the other hand, illegitimate pressure on the monthly payments furthers the justification of homeownership as in the case of Hülya:

He (landlord) starts calling before the payment day: ‘What did you do, did you pay the money, or not?’ He starts calling before the payment day! Be calm! It has only been two weeks since the last payment time!

Although it is not about comparing tenancy with homeownership, representative of the AKP’s hegemonic project (as the professionals who acquire necessary knowledge in their area) has an impact for the legitimization of homeownership with TOKİ. During the interview with a personnel of Emlak Yönetim (TOKİ’s operator company), who works as a building manager in one of the apartment blocks in the neighborhood, personnel frequently emphasized TOKİ as the sole alternative for affordable housing in Turkey:

If TOKİ have not been existed, if they had not done those apartment blocks, believe me, the cheapest flat would be amount to 500 thousand TL. Countrywide, if TOKİ have not existed, the cheapest flat would amount to 500 thousand TL. There is no appropriation of land rent, do not think that in that way. Contractors are stating that interest rates are decreasing for the bank credits, you are attempting to buy a house, if the price is 100 TL a month ago, it increases to 150 TL due to the decreasing of interest rates. Then, interest rates are increasing but the price of the house remains at 150 TL. This is all about opportunism of people. If TOKİ did not exist, today, in Republic of Turkey, nobody could buy a house under 500 thousand TL.

Consequently, becoming a homeowner through this new payment model of TOKİ changes the “relative weight possessed by” (Hall 1988: 158) other ways of satisfying the aspirations for an apartment flat, namely, renting or buying a flat from market. The discursive force of ‘just like a paying rent, but in the end becoming a homeowner’ materializes in the comparisons with economic and social difficulties of being a tenant, and the means of market for becoming a

homeowner. In that regard, these discursive articulations (which are enacted by the experiences of former *gecekondu* residents and representatives of the AKP's hegemonic project) reflects how "popular beliefs' and similar ideas are themselves material forces" (Gramsci 2000: 215).

4.3.1.4 Cleaning the Criminal Elements of Neighborhood

On the other hand, transformation of *gecekondu*'s into apartment blocks implies the revision of the neighborhood's stigmatized image as 'cleaning'. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, certain groups in the neighborhood were identified with their petty-criminal activities and they were frequently described as 'Roman, creepy people or looters'. For almost all of the respondents, cleaning the neighborhood of such groups became possible only with TOKİ's transformation project; hence, transformation as the solution to criminalization legitimates TOKİ's interventions. In Papatya's words:

This place was very complicated, many lots were jumbled, you were not able to remove anybody, there were many brigands, I mean, there were many filthy people. How did they manage to remove them? The municipality said, it's a flat area, let's build TOKİ in here, I mean, this is my own opinion of course. We can only remove these people if we promise them a house, if we promise them a right. Indeed, they did well. Many of these people fell apart, they could not harbor after the transformation.

As Hall (1988) asserts in his analysis of the hegemonic project of Thatcherism, when the crime, delinquency and moral permissiveness rise, a "cry for discipline from 'below'" (p.137) legitimates "enforced restoration of social order and authority from 'above'" (ibid.). Hence, the stigmatized image of the neighborhood as the obstacle for transformation constitutes a cry from 'below' and it legitimates authority of TOKİ from 'above' as the institution who provides 'law and order' in the neighborhood.

Consequently, this section analyzed the layers of commonsense as the 'raw materials' through which the construction of consent becomes possible. More explicitly, consent is constructed by giving responses to each layer in the transformation project. However, it does not only give a response. As a hegemonic project, such transformation articulates these layers with a new conception: 'becoming a homeowner through the social housing of TOKİ'.

4.3.2 Construction of Coercive Mechanisms

The coercive aspect of hegemonic processes are mostly understood as overt violence (police, punitive law, military, etc.) in the studies, which adopt a Gramscian framework. However, as

Bodirsky (2016), Davies (2014a,b) and Roseberry (1994) point, apart from the overt violence, there are also structurally coercive mechanisms that function as coercion in hegemonic projects. For Roseberry (1994), state “offices and routines, its taxing, licensing, and registering procedures and papers” (p.357) are constituting “state’s regulative-coercive forms and agencies” (ibid.). Furthermore, Davies (2014b) discusses “demolition, eviction and rent increases” (p.3226) as coercive tools of administrative domination. Images of the struggle between police and grassroots organization during the demolition process of *gecekondu* settlements are widely known from the media and academic studies alike⁵⁹. However, as described above, Tarlaici inhabitants were not opposed to the transformation; moreover, they were quite thankful to TOKİ, the AKP government and Erdoğan for initiating the long-awaited transformation project. Nonetheless, the existence of consent for such project does not eliminate the structurally coercive dimension of the project, which is reflected in the contract process between *gecekondu* residents and TOKİ. Thus, this section will explore how the contracting process of transformation works as a coercive dimension of hegemonic project of homeownership. Through such an exploration it will also further the understanding of structurally coercive mechanisms.

TOKİ’s social housing project in Tarlaici is a ‘*gecekondu* transformation project’, which rests on the idea of exchange between *gecekondu* residents and TOKİ. How this idea of exchange is materialized through the process of contract constitutes a significant dimension of the hegemonic politics of homeownership since it is the exact point that ‘becoming homeowner through the social housing of TOKİ’ transforms into ‘TOKİ as the *only* way to become a homeowner’. As it mentioned both in the beginning of this chapter and in the Chapter 3, the exchange system of TOKİ is based on the compatibility of the economic values of *gecekondu* and TOKİ apartment flats. The economic value of the *gecekondu* is calculated according to the amount of land size that is registered in the deed (either formal or TTB) multiplied by the current value of land per square meter, quality of the deed (multiplier effect of formal deed is higher than TTB), value of trees (multiplier of older and rare trees are higher) and the quality of construction material of the *gecekondu* (concrete, briquette, etc.). If the total amount of these factors corresponds to the price of the flat, the owner of the the *gecekondu* becomes

⁵⁹ Resistance movements against the renewal projects in Turkey (mostly in İstanbul) witnessed severe conflicts between inhabitants and police, which were reflected in the works of Aykan (2011), Erdi-Lelandais (2014), İslam and Sakızioğlu (2015), Karaman (2013s, 2014), Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010), and Lovering and Türkmen (2011).

entitled to obtain one flat for free. If it falls behind the price of the flat, the value of *gecekondus* is subtracted from the price of flat and the rest of the payment is expected to be returned by a 15 years installment plan, which can be considered as TOKİ's quasi-mortgage system. Thus, almost all of the respondents of this research did not get any free flat; moreover, due to the low value of their *gecekondus*, they have been subjected to installments which exceed their solvency. So, the obvious question is 'why did they accept this?', 'Is it because of their long-standing desire for a decent apartment flat?' Rather than a straightforward answer to this question as 'yes' or 'no', data from the interviews show that coercive mechanisms articulate into the aspirations of becoming a homeowner, through which residents are 'forced' to become homeowners during the process of contracting. TOKİ has used several means that directly or indirectly enforced selective inclusion of *gecekondus* residents into the social housing of TOKİ.

4.3.2.1 Abuse of (Financial) Illiteracy

Due to illiteracy, certain segments of *gecekondus* owners signed contracts with very limited knowledge of the payment process. Neriman cites how her illiterate husband has signed the contract as:

a man comes from the municipality and says 'uncle, you are going to sign, you have to sign'. I asked my son to accompany his father (since the husband is illiterate). They went to the office, however they just accepted my husband; they did not let my son enter into the office. If my son had been present in the office he could have read the contract and we would have known the amount of the payments.

Apart from the basic illiteracy, financial illiteracy was also a factor that caused individuals to sign without knowing the consequences. According to the contract, the price that is written in the agreement is subject to an interest rate, which increases every six months in tandem with the wage of civil servants. Nevertheless, informants regard such an increase over the initial price as an injustice, and they blame the bank or contractor for the payment increase due to this interest rate. Nezahat interpreted this situation as

There was injustice, I would not say it did not happen. The contractor was unfair. First, we made a deal with the state for 80.000 TL, then it increased to 120.000. This is injustice, a big injustice, it is the rent business! The state transferred it (payment) to the contractor, the contractor made the 80.000 TL value flat to 120.000 TL. Some say TOKİ is responsible, they are blaming the state, but state withdraws at a certain moment and transfers it to Ziraat Bank or TOKİ, then they (Ziraat Bank/ TOKİ) increase the price and sell it back to you.

As it is evident from Nezahat's interpretation, the interest rate regarding the price of the flat was not well understood during the process of contracting. Besides, informants of the research frequently reflected their puzzlement regarding how the sizable amount of the payments that

was already made were calculated as an interest rate. Since a certain amount of their payment was regarded as interest rate, they were confused about paying the money that actually did not count for the actual price of the flat. It is also necessary to indicate that the majority of the inhabitants in Tarlaiçi experienced institutionalized financial operations for the first time in their life with the ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system of TOKİ. Except the one sentence inscription, which indicates that the price of the new flat is subjected to an interest rate, the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi were not provided with further information. Hence, a group that did not have knowledge about how interest rates work were subjected to a 15 year long TOKİ housing credit (i.e. ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system of TOKİ). In this way, groups (who are either illiterate or financially illiterate) were made to sign a ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment agreement with TOKİ. This is constituting a particular way of misleading which obliges this group with an incomprehensible payment scheme for 15 years. Consequently, such misleading conduct constitutes an indirect mechanism of coercion that incorporates a group, which operates out of formal financial operations until the moment of contact, into the financial circuits by making them homeowners. This type of coercion is indirect because interest rates are gradually affecting the livelihood of this group. In that regard, the former *gecekondu* residents eventually find themselves in a situation which, had they been informed, they would not have given their consent in the first place.

4.3.2.2 Actual Practice of Legal Rights

Despite the lack of financial knowledge, some of the *gecekondu* residents were cautious about the payment system by taking their financial solvency into consideration. Legally, the *gecekondu* transformation program of TOKİ offers to pay the exchange value of *gecekondu* for the ones who do not opt to get an apartment flat. Hence, this cautious group demanded their exchange value of their *gecekondu* as their legal right, however the ‘actually existing’ procedures of TOKİ prevented the actualization of this legal right, as Murat, Nuriye and Cavidan openly explain:

I even said ‘give my money back, I do not want it’. They raised difficulties, they said ‘we will put you in a list, if your name drafts, you will get your money back, if not, you have to wait for another year. If they had not raised such difficulties we would not participate in (the social housing of TOKİ). How can I pay with a single wage for 15 years, do we have that much lifetime? Nevertheless, if we do not participate in the housing program it will be more difficult since it is not certain that they are going to pay back... We did not have any chance, they frighten the people, ‘you either get your place or you will lose it’, ‘if you are a cooperative, maybe you could have a chance’ they said. If you demand your money, it will take many years to get it. They calculated our *gecekondu* for 33.000 TL. When we demanded this exchange value of *gecekondu* they told us that ‘it can take 1 or 2 or 3 years to get the

money'. (What they actually mean is) either you participate in the housing program of TOKİ or we will not pay you (i.e. it will take too long to get the money). Thus, many inhabitants got into a jam, they left the *gecekondu* and went away since they could not get their money. We were obliged to participate. Compared to paying a rent, at least in the end we will have a house (when the payment is finished). (Murat)

Lots were drawn, my husband was not there, just my daughter, me and my son. My son said 'Mom, what do you say, let's get our money and not participate in the TOKİ housing program at all'. However, TOKİ was going to pay in three years, each year 20.000 TL. So, I would rather move into my house and pay my debt in three years. I said to my son 'if we get that money, we will not be able to buy a house. The contractor will not wait for me to gather that money in three years, you give the money to a contractor and you get your house'. He said 'is it really so mom?', I said 'go and sign it son, 50.000 or 60.000, whatever, at least we will have a house. In the end we will have a house (Nuriye)

If they would have paid us 50-55 thousand TL we were going to move to Kıbrıs Köy. They did not. They calculated our *gecekondu* as 37.5 thousand TL, I will say 40 thousand TL. However, if we opt to get the money, they would pay just 20 thousand TL. (Cavidan)

Accordingly, getting the exchange value of *gecekondu* on installments prevented *gecekondu* residents to figure out alternative solutions for sheltering and made social housing of TOKİ with its 'quasi-mortgage' payment system the only viable alternative.

Furthermore, *gecekondu* residents have a right to sue TOKİ if they are dissatisfied with the calculation of the exchange value of the *gecekondu*. The ways in which this right raises further difficulties is explained by Alaattin as

A man cannot become a right-holder just by claiming his right. TOKİ says (if you are dissatisfied) go to court; a man sues TOKİ, then the case finalizes and the court says to the man 'here, 280 TL, current market value. Calculate the exchange value of your *gecekondu* according to 280 TL per square meter. Take your money and sod off!' Many went away like that. The court says 'brother, the state expropriates here, it gives you a right, it calculates your *gecekondu*'s value according to 280 TL per square meter, and it says we will make you a homeowner.' If you are dissatisfied with that, go and sue TOKİ. The court finalizes. The president of TOKİ deposits the money into your account, a point from which there is no turning back. You cannot withdraw from suing, you cannot claim for becoming homeowner (with TOKİ) anymore, you've lost your right. They tore people apart in this way, as well. They really did.

Accordingly, uncertainty about court decisions and losing homeownership rights by becoming homeowners through the social housing of TOKİ in the cases of those dissatisfied with court decisions prevented people from using their legal right to sue. Consequently, the actual practice of legal rights forced *gecekondu* owners to participate in the project. In this way, legal rights, which aim to compensate the use value of *gecekondu* with exchange value, re-value the exchange value and by extension not to participate in the project, transforming into coercive mechanisms in actual practice..

4.3.2.3 Penalty against the ‘Undeserving’ Population

Punitive sanctions of law, on the other hand, constitute more direct coercive mechanisms in the cases of disputes regarding the *gecekondus* that are built on the public treasury. Mualla accounts for one of the disputes and its implications:

First they imposed a penalty for building a *gecekondu* on the public treasury. People did not agree. When they did not agree, this time they imposed another penalty that amounts to 80-90 TLs. In the end, people had to agree because of the fear of more penalties.

What this quotation reveals are not only the implications of punitive practices, but also how such practices target one of the most disadvantaged groups, namely, the ones who hold TTB. Since the land on which they built their *gecekondu* is on the public treasury, they do not have a right to obtain a formal deed until the state changes the status of land to private. Since the state did not initiate such a change, but, on the contrary, expropriated the whole neighborhood, these groups became more disadvantaged regarding the calculation of exchange value of *gecekondu* compared to the ones who hold a formal deed. Even if the amount of land that is registered on their TTB is identical with the ones who hold a formal deed, the multiplier for the calculation of exchange value is much less than the latter group. Moreover, by definition, TTB legitimizes the right of use, not exchange. According to the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi, especially the ones who hold TTB, they are at the benevolence of the state to include TTB holders into the transformation project who otherwise would get into a scrape. Cezmi, who is a TTB holder, expresses why the inhabitants regard the inclusion of TTB holders to the project as the benevolence of the state:

How is it possible that TTB and formal deed holder's amount to the same status? You are educated, I am not, are we the same? The state is right, you came and appropriated the land of the state, and you did not pay. State is right. You cannot say anything to the state, he is right. You are paying for the electricity, the heating but you are not paying for the land. But you see, state did not victimize them, TOKİ included them into the project, they entitled TTB holders as right holder as well. If the formal deed owners get 5 TL, they get 4 TL.

Accordingly, these groups become more vulnerable to the actions of state due to their self-identification as an ‘undeserving’ population, which is actually generated by the benevolent image of the state which also cares about this ‘undeserving’ population. Once delineated as an ‘undeserving’ population, their opposing claims easily legitimize the punitive actions of the state against them. Because of this vulnerable position, the punitive actions of the state work directly as coercive mechanism, which enables them to incorporate opposing groups into TOKİ social housing.

Moreover, recalling Chapter 3, the distribution of social aid under the AKP regime has a particular importance for delineating aid recipients as docile subjects, rather than right-owner subjects, who are dependent on the state (Karaman 2013b). In another but similar context, delineation of the status of TTB holders as ‘undeserving’ subjects, whose field of action was strictly determined by the decisions of state (depending on their claim, they are subject either to ‘benevolent’ state or ‘punitive state’), contributes to Karaman’s (2013b) argument that points to how the policies that are initiated during AKP rule prevent ‘right-based’ claims.

4.3.2.4 Judgement of Majority

Apart from the coercive mechanisms that directly derive from the state (official) procedures, Disaster Law (no. 6306) empowers the majority by declaring that if two thirds of the related population agrees with the state on the conditions of transformation, the remaining one third of the related population have to agree on these conditions, as well. Berna explains how such law works as a coercive mechanism against opponents, saying

Urban transformation project (officers) told us that ‘if 10 people give their *gecekondu* and only 1 remains, I will not forgive at all, I will bulldoze it’. I went there (to the office) and said that ‘I do not want to move, what will I do?’, they directly said ‘then, you should be ready for what might happen to you’.

By empowering the majority with the law and legitimizing itself through the majority, the state enables the use of coercion behind the mask of the majority. Actually, this instance reflects the very definition of hegemony for Gramsci, namely, “hegemony (is) protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 2000: 235). However, Berna’s experience points another dimension of it. When the state is on the side of majority who share the same hegemonic vision, it separates and polarizes subordinate groups. In this way, the state’s coercive practices transfer to a certain group in the subordinate population. In other words, not the state, but a certain fraction of subordinate group becomes the implementer of coercion.

Consequently, basic and financial illiteracy, legal rights, penalty and judgement of the majority transform into coercive mechanisms during the process of contracting; such mechanisms enable the perception that TOKİ social housing is the *only* alternative among Tarlaici inhabitants. By preventing non-participation in the project through such coercive mechanisms, the actions of the state produce a particular form of inequality that disseminates itself into the Tarlaici inhabitants’ conception of the world as the “common material and mental framework” (Roseberry 1994: 363). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, commonsense contains multiple

layers that reproduce certain forms of inequality. Accordingly, rather than a specific kind of power (i.e. only coercive), an “extremely complicated intertwining of force and consent, and of the entanglement of accounts of reality with hard realities that are more than discourse” (Crehan 2002: 175) intervene on and through these layers by articulating them in a certain way that

the subordinated come to see the hierarchies of the world they inhabit as inevitable and inescapable, the will of God or the law of nature. They may not like their subordination, but they cannot see how things could possibly be other than as they are

(Crehan 2011: 275)

The ways in which this intertwining of force and consent reproduces “the conditions of subordination and of hegemonic accounts (i.e. how the world appears from the perspective of society’s dominant groups)” (Crehan 2002: 116) is expressed in an illuminating way during the interview with Dilşad and her daughter Esra:

D: We leaned about the idea of becoming homeowner when we were living in a *gecekondu*. However, the high amount of debt...You see, I keep explaining, actually people were obliged.

E: The attitude (of the state) was like ‘whether you want it or you do not want it, we will demolish it (*gecekondu*) anyways’. It (state) says ‘whether you give (your *gecekondu*) or do not give it, if you have a deed for 22 square meters, I am paying for you 22.000 TL; I will demolish this place, whether you accept or not’.

D: You see, we did not have a chance, we did not have any chance. Even if they were going to pay 50.000 TL, we did not have any other chance (apart from agreeing).

E: You can buy another *gecekondu* with that 20.000 or 50.000 TL, whatever, in a place you do not know, and which will take around 10 years for you to figure out your way.

As is reflected in this interview, the articulation of consensual and coercive elements generate the hegemonic idea of ‘TOKİ as the only way to become a homeowner’ as a “common material and mental framework” (Roseberry 1994: 363) that keeps the subordinate in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the ruling group. The discussion up until now has sought to explore ‘hegemonic politics of homeownership’ by the construction of consent and coercive mechanisms (which are analytically distinguished) in the particular empirical context. Nevertheless, as Gramsci emphasizes, hegemony is a “continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria” (2000: 206); therefore, it is a dynamic process which is open to contestation. The following section will shed light on the points of rupture that induce questioning of this hegemonic landscape.

4.4 Points of Rupture in the ‘Hegemonic Politics of Homeownership’

Although the complex process of consent and coercion, i.e. the hegemonic politics of homeownership, limits the ground of action to a certain extent, it cannot prevent the reflections about how the interest of the ruling group prevails in the actualization process of the project at the expense of subordinate groups; that is, the constitution of points of rupture in the hegemonic project of AKP.

4.4.1 Promises that ‘Fell Through’

According to the accounts of Tarlaiçi inhabitants, TOKİ made promises on the issues of price affordability, rent allowance, the delivery date of the new flats, and new social and commercial facilities in the neighborhood during the process of contracting. However, failure to deliver on these promises induced inhabitants to question the ‘social’ dimension of social housing project. This is because a social policy that is enacted to socially and economically compensate particular group of population, who could not meet their shelter needs in the market, increases the hardships for making their living and social welfare.

To begin with, the delay of the delivery dates of the new flats (up to 5 years) without any rent allowance constitutes a particular financial difficulty for the *gecekondu* residents in Tarlaiçi, since they had to become tenants and pay rent before the TOKİ quasi-mortgage payment system started. This means that not only payments to TOKİ, but also the waiting period generates a financial burden. One of the respondents in this research even stated that she thought about selling the right to the new flat since she had to spend her savings in order to afford the rent. However, TOKİ provides rent allowance for former *gecekondu* residents in some projects and Erman (2016) claims in her research on Karacaören TOKİ that rent allowances were a significant factor for gaining consent of the *gecekondu* residents. Nevertheless, due to the lack of rent allowance in Yatıkmusluk Transformation Project, Erman’s (2016) claim is not valid in this instance. Rather, this lack of rent allowance leads to a particular way of questioning. Furthermore, witnessing the variation of rent allowance from project to project manifests the unequal treatment in an explicit manner, as Dilşad expresses

Aforetime, when they (TOKİ) were demolishing this side (Tarlaiçi) we needed to rent a flat; however, when they were demolishing the other side (Gülseren) they paid the expenses of the rent. They did not give that opportunity to us. Despite the claim of delivering new flats in a year, we lived as tenants for 4 years. They demolished my house and you know, they told us that the expenses of rent were going to be covered. However the truth is, nothing

happened like that! They even paid the transportation costs in there (Gülseren), however they did not give us that chance.

During the process of making contracts, inhabitants were convinced that the price of the new flats were going to be in accordance with their affordability, since it was a social housing project that was promoted by its affordable payment scheme in the Emergency Action Plan of AKP in 2002, in the media and in the meetings. Nevertheless, the target group of this project, namely the ones who earn minimum salary, retiree's or those who make his/her living through informal labor, disaffirms the affordable payment scheme:

They told that this will be the housing for the poor, the poor will live in these houses; in truth, the poor became in need of bread. It is built for poor (people) but in reality it is housing for the rich. The rich are living like the rich. They are saying that 'we are making a house at a discount'; it is not true. (Gönül)

For whom was TOKİ made? A low income group. In order to make people homeowners. Where is it? In the first place, you are taking the land from the person, and then you are going to the shady contractor who uses cheap construction material. The workmanship is very bad. Then, it (TOKİ) makes people homeowners! How did they become homeowners, people are getting exhausted because of the payments. Hence, I tell people 'may god give you the solvency' when they are buying a flat. (Kartal- real estate agent)

Whoever says that this is for low income groups, they make a great blunder. It is not like that at all. Imagine, sister Nilüfer is the only wage-earner in the family, her wage is 1400 TL, she pays 750 TL for the installments every month and 750 TL is left from that wage. Where is the housing for the poor? Where is her profit? Where is the budget for the poor? See, another one, her husband is not working and they need to pay 900 TL for monthly installments. Where is the housing for the budget of poor? There is no such housing. I have never seen or known it. If somebody does... (Ela)

Moreover, Macit explicitly expressed how class interests are revealed through the state-led urban development project as

They could not make their living! The state must consider this. It gives 1500 TL (as the minimum wage), how could these people move into the apartments? Their expenditure is already 2000 TL. What could these people eat, iron slag? How could he maintain his family? It (the state) must consider these, and make a discount. I am speaking for the benefit of state, not for its disadvantage. You have to be kind. You need to see what is going on under your very eyes. It (AKP) gradually loses its vote potential. Why does it lose it? It begins to give weight to rich, not to lower strata. First the lower strata, second the laborer, these are very important; it is finished unless it gives weight to them. I am telling it like it is.

Hence, TOKİ social housing is not only questioned in relation to the increasing hardships in Tarlaıçı inhabitant's ability to make a living, but also in terms of representing the interests of upper classes. This constitutes a powerful critique of the hegemonic project of AKP since the subordinate classes are not only experiencing how the interests of upper classes are increasingly becoming the concern of ruling groups, but also how this happens at the expense

of their interests. Such a situation contradicts the basic claim of ‘hegemony’, namely the leadership of cross-class alliance.

According to narratives of Tarlaiçi inhabitants, TOKİ promised to build social facilities such as parks, a social club and a swimming pool in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, despite four years passing since the delivery of the last apartment flats, only two parks have been built. Moreover, with the transformation project, a wholesale market area was generated at the Plevne Boulevard, which constitutes the southeast border of the neighborhood. Nevertheless, such kinds of market are far from meeting the social needs of the neighborhood, since the target group of this wholesale market are large-scale business owners rather than residents of the neighborhood. Nezahat claims that the neighborhood has not changed since the time that she moved to Gülveren:

Gülveren is the same, TOKİ just built high-rise buildings. It was much better in old times dear. When I moved in here, 29 years ago, we had a bank, there were many facilities. It was a dynamic place. When this urban transformation started, they demolished everything, they turned everything upside-down. They make promises and then go away. Now there is a wholesale market which stretch out to Siteler, and nothing else exists.

Şerif interprets these unrealized promises as a particular way of misleading:

First they show you the plans of the project, and then they make you to sign it. After a while, they change the project; if the project is planned for 500 people, it becomes 2000. It (TOKİ) jerks around over for 2-3 years, after it jerked over you, it builds the apartment blocks. I mean, they deceived people all the way down, they deceived people quite well.

Feriha explains how the misleading actions of TOKİ affect the people, saying,

Actually we went to the meeting, they told us that there will be a swimming pool, whatever, they promised everything! They promised, but nothing happened! Gazi Kartal (the previous mayor) promised that the new flat will be delivered in a year. For us, everything is a lie now. We do not trust anybody, anybody!

Hence, a state-led urban development project that is initiated in order to respond the sheltering needs of subordinate population, generated a ‘mistrust’ with regard to the state because of the unrealized promises. Since these unrealized promises directly affect the livelihood of Tarlaiçi inhabitants, the meaning of this ‘mistrust’ contains the worsening conditions of making one’s living, thereby such ‘mistrust’ unsettles the very ground that the quest for hegemony depends on, namely the convergence of hegemonic conception of the world and the material realities that the subordinate population experiences.

4.4.2 Corruption that Everyone Knows

With regard to the contractual process, bribery was not an extra-ordinary situation during the transformation process in Tarlaici. Each respondent of this research was either aware of the bribery rumors or participated in their dissemination. Although they criticize this situation because of its unethical and unfair implications, it became the norm and was even seen as the only alternative for becoming a homeowner. The normalization of bribery in spite of its unethical dimension furthers Erdoğan's (2015) question of 'Is Turkey a society?'. Erdoğan's (2015) article, which adopts a Gramscian framework, claims that, what holds society in Turkey together is not a positive 'ethico-political' ingredient (freedom, justice, equality, etc.) but the 'complicity'. He describes the linkage that holds society together as a negative linkage, a 'complicity' because despite unethical, unfair considerations, people are maintaining their life as if nothing has happened. Furthermore, the knowledge that 'everyone does it' empowers and relieves the fact that one is perpetrating the law. The (reported) incidence of bribery in the Yatıkmusluk transformation project contributes to Erdoğan's claim of 'complicity' when bribery is considered to be an inherent part of becoming homeowner. In other words, the private property regime in the form of 'hegemonic politics of homeownership' normalizes bribery. Güllü's words reveal the naturalness of bribery in the project as

At that time, 500 TL was given to Berat (TOKİ officer who accepts a bribe), he demanded the money. When he demanded, I paid to him, I was obliged to pay him in cash because it was going to my house.

Moreover, Recep and his wife Leyla explain how they were subjected to norm of bribery in order to become homeowners as

R: Every time that I visit Berat I brought presents to him.

L: I went there with my daughters, every single day we were in there, every single day!

R: My brother is a little bit aggressive as a person. Berat told me that he could not get along with my brother. One day he came to the neighborhood and wanted to take a picture of our *gecekond* (a routine process for the calculation of the value of *gecekond*). When he was trying to do this, my brother swore at him. Then Berat tore up all the documents. When I went to his office in order to convince him to calculate our *gecekond*'s value, he told me that he was not going to calculate our 60 year old walnut tree (which corresponds to a greater amount of exchange value) and that he was not going to make us a rightful owner for TOKİ; rather, he was going to pay us only the exchange value of the *gecekond* (itself). I begged him, I brought presents to him and in the end, he told me that he did not want to deal with my brother, but he could agree with me. He even he gave further instructions for making each of my siblings a homeowner.

Like bribery, favoritism in order to become eligible for the social housing project was widely observed case in the transformation project. Since small amounts of land that are registered in deeds were sufficient for being eligible for the social housing, many *gecekondu* residents in and outside of the neighborhood negotiated with deed owners in order to buy a certain share of it. Nevertheless, what constitutes favoritism with regard to the project is not those negotiated transactions, but the actualization of such transactions by the municipality officers of Mamak and the ones who have connections to these officers. Ferihan explains how she figured out that such favoritism existed and how such favoritism generated an unfair ground as

I remember very well, it was municipality personnel, they were entitled to become homeowners with the amounts of land that correspond to 3000 or 5000. After one year, the price of the flats multiplied, they sold them around 30000 or 40000 TL. Also, they bought flats which have façades in the south direction, in each apartment block, all these flats that have such façade were occupied with municipality personnel. I realized this later. Before I was saying why the door numbers are starting from the left, it was very hard when you were trying to collect management fees. Normally, it starts from the right. Then I realized this and started to think about why this happened. At the same time, I remembered that someone else occupied the flat, to which I was entitled from the draw. We were checking the flats during the construction, and I remember well that the flat I visited had a façade in the direction of south. Afterwards, I went to this flat, which normally should be entitled to me, and questioned the lady who lives in there about why she lives in my flat. She told me that, in order to distribute favorable flats to municipality personnel, TOKİ has changed the ordering of door numbers, hence the flat that I had been entitled to was changed. So, these kinds of injustices occurred. When I was checking other apartment blocks I met with a lady who also encountered this situation. However, she reported this problem and they changed her flat to a more favorable one. Then, I told myself, oh, we had to report it, at that time.

Recep, on the other hand, expresses how the municipality officers entitled to become right owners at the expense of their rights in the following manner

So they robbed the wretch in here! Let's say I have a relative in the municipality of Mamak, he sells 5 square meters land to me and I say that I became right owner with this piece of land from my relative...The reality is, we did have a land which is registered in TTB, we paid around 3500 TL for it to the special offices during the ANAP period. Nevertheless, the municipality distributed shares of land from our land to the relatives, friends, etc. of municipality personnel as if we did not have TTB. The municipality gave 5 square meters or 10 square meters from our land to friends of the municipality personnel and they became homeowners. They all became rightful owners in here. Now, the most obtrusive house was our house, we had a two-storey house just there. We asked people about how they became homeowner, and they said 'You know, there was a two storey house there, we bought shares of land from it..

Furthermore, witnessing the injustices in the form of favoritism illegitimizes the municipality of Mamak in the eyes of the social housing residents. Feriha depicts how she was affected by such favoritism as

Do you know that personnel of municipality made themselves, their relatives, friends, etc. homeowners? Here, Mr. Fati is working in the municipality, he bought flats for himself, his relatives, and now he is renting one of his flats. The municipality personnel have 2, 3, 4 houses. Injustices are happening. Our rights were gone! It happened. I do not want to go to the municipality anymore. I have to go there in order to renew my ID card, but I do not want to since I hate it so much there

4.4.3 Appropriation of Land Rent

Land values per square meter in Tarlaiçi increased 52.7 times with the Yatıkmusluk transformation project in 2012 compared to 2002 (Somalı 2013:108). Considering the surrounding of Tarlaiçi neighborhood (public hospitals, military, schools) and Tarlaiçi's flat surface (compared to other *gecekondu* settlements in the area), Tarlaiçi was constituting a potential ground rent with its 'un-transformable' condition until the Yatıkmusluk transformation project. Hence, the potential ground rent is capitalized by a state-led urban development project. Since the status of the project is a *gecekondu* transformation project, the costs of it are covered by TOKİ's other revenue-sharing projects. Therefore, the state, by definition, does not make any profit from this project. Nevertheless, the number of flats in the social housing project exceed the number of households in the former *gecekondu* settlement, and the payments of social housing that exceed the costs of the production of social housing induce Tarlaiçi residents to question TOKİ for the appropriation of capitalized ground rent. Papatya reflects her doubts that are generated by the unrealized promises in particular as

There are 50 flats in an apartment bloc which corresponds to the whole population of old Gülveren. There are many site's, many apartment blocks, but the state does not attempt to do anything in here. It only builds and sells houses; I do not have consent for this. These people have many needs. First of all, they had to build a big shopping mall in here. Even a school was built (only) after a very long time. This is either state's disordered, unguided planning or favoritism to certain people, I understand it in this way. For instance, they did not build a school and social club where they promised. They told us that there will be a park and swimming pool, but it did not happen; instead, houses are built. Does someone in municipality initiate favoritism or whatever, because we, as the people, do not give our consent. This many people have to have living space. If a shopping mall is built, they would not be able to produce land rent. How many flats are sold in an apartment bloc? Many people have a role in this. As a municipality it has, as a contractor it has. If a shopping mall is made, they will serve for the people, it means serving to the people, but they do not serve for the people.

Although many inhabitants suggested that they are incapable of interpreting such large-scale economic transactions due to their low education level or illiteracy, observing the very material changes in their neighborhood made them to understand the economic concerns underlying it, as Özlem expresses

The state is profitable in here, don't you think? Of course the state is profitable, it built how many apartment blocks in place of four *gecekondus*, even a kid knows it. Although this is far beyond my comprehension, I learned by observing and thinking. Let's assume there were five *gecekondus* in there, in place of them they built two blocks of fifteen-storey apartments. Who is profitable in this? Of course it is the state. Does TOKİ not belong to the state? There is even a saying for this: 'the state would not step on a wet floor'.

Considerable differences between the production cost of the apartments and the selling price of the apartments calls the former *gecekondu* residents into doubt about the 'affordable' dimension of social housing, as Murat points out

See, Duru Sitesi is over there, I worked as a security guard in there after I retired. There were engineers in there and I asked them to calculate the production cost of an apartment flat. Including the price of land, cement, sand, engineer, worker, they calculated the total price of a flat as 38.000 TL. However, they sold me that flat for 120.000 TL 8 years ago.

Thus, observing the material changes in the neighborhood and investigating the production cost of new flats caused former *gecekondu* residents to interpret the transformation project in a particular way, namely, for the appropriation of land rent by the state. Moreover, a social housing project that has hegemonic claims does not only reveal the dominant group's interests through these observations, but also appropriation of subordinate group's income. As Cezmi states

As we heard from the engineers, the production cost of these flats was 38.000 TL. The ones who work there tell us this. So, it (the state) sold (the flat) to us for 15 years installments, it will correspond to 200-300 thousand TL. Maybe more. Every 6 months the prices are increasing, which means it appropriates the increment in wages. This month my wage increased 53 TL, so? For six months we are going to pay this. In January, another price increment. What did it pay for a civil servant? Did it pay 53 TL? No!

Consequently, unrealized promises, blatant corruption and appropriation of land rent by the state generated doubts about the representation of the subordinate group's interests in the social housing project. Nevertheless, it did not prepare a ground for counter-hegemonic claims. Interviews reveal that the particular constitution of the 'idea of state' has a significant factor for the prevention of the constitution of such a ground.

4.5 'Idea of State' for the Subordinate Population

According to Abrams, "a cluster of institutions of political and executive control and their key personnel, the state elite" (2006: 119) constitutes the 'state-system'. Through the administrative, judicial and educational agencies, the state politically organizes their subjection, in other words, through such agencies the state appears to be a unified symbol. Nevertheless, for Abrams, the image of a unified symbol is a concealment: "it conceals the

real history and relations of subjection behind an a-historical mask of legitimating illusion” (2006: 123). Hence, the ‘idea of state’ legitimates the ‘state-system’ by mystifying the actual disunity of it. Therefore, Abrams approaches the ‘idea of state’ and ‘state-system’ as two facets of the same process (Mitchell 2006: 170). However, as Bodirsky (2016) rightly asks, when taking into consideration that the ‘idea of state’ is significant in the politically organized subjection, how does this happens in ‘unmasked states’? In other words, when there is no concern for mystifying the practices of state, how the subjection is achieved?

As emphasized through the obviously unrealized promises, corruption and appropriation of land rent in the previous section, the state idea is neither unitary, nor serving the common interest of the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi. Moreover, within such observations and experiences, their subordination is perpetuated. In this regard, Bodirsky’s question becomes critical for understanding the consolidation of the hegemonic project of AKP despite its ‘unmasked’ practices. Interviews reveal that subjection at the expense of the blatant nature of state practices are related with the particular state idea that is constructed within the experiences of state practices of previous governments. Hence, historical layers of commonsense in relation to state constitute a particular ‘idea of the state’ that is neither unitary nor serving the common interest, in contrast to Abrams’s ‘idea of state’. In order to understand implications of this particular ‘idea of state’, the following section will discuss the meaning of politics, justice and state for the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi, as a reflection of this commonsense.

The meaning of politics for most of the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi does not exclude personal gain. Gönül, who supports the AKP regime, expresses explicitly what politics means as

They just fight with each other, they just think about themselves. Do they also care about us? We are fighting with neighbors, and other people for them in here. Is there anybody who thinks of us? Is there anybody who asks ‘are you hungry?’ No, right?

For Esma, on the other hand, personal gain is a natural aspect of life, hence, it is natural that TOKİ will also have claims for profit. The state, for her, is no different than an actor in a market:

Shall I say something to you? Nobody makes anything without a personal gain. Nobody gives someone a house or money without personal gain. Think about a tradesman, would he do that business without any profit? No.

Moreover, for Ali, personal gain in politics is legitimate if such politics serve the common interest:

They say he is playing ducks and drakes with money. If I come to the same level as him, I would make my family rich as well. To the extent that he works for the common benefit, it is fine. The person who makes Ankara Ankara is Melih Gökçek (the former metropolitan mayor). He indeed did it, he worked. What have the previous municipalities done? My sister, (and) I like the one who works.

According to these three accounts, personal gain is the natural aspect of politics; nevertheless, not all of them agree that such politics are serving the common interest. Hence, what unites the ground of politics is personal gain, rather than serving a common interest.

The meaning of justice for the inhabitants of Tarlaiçi corresponds to injustice. Even they consider the law itself as unfair. Experiences of clientelist relations in *gecekondu* amnesty during the ANAP period made them think that the law works only for the dominant groups. Furthermore, reaching the means of justice depends on one's socio-economic status; 'equal citizens who have equal rights', as defined by the constitution, contrasts to their practical experiences. For them, inequality starts at the beginning of seeking justice. Neriman's words reveal how the inequality on the basis of socio-economic status prevents the seeking of justice and informs the interpretation that unfairness is an inevitable aspect of life for subordinate groups:

Misery loves company, if it happens to you (as a subordinate group), then it will happen to me as well. The court is on their side. Who embraces the outcasts? Nobody but God. You are rich, you plunk down money and your word will be valid, not mine.

Within this framework, transformation of the practice of legal rights into coercive mechanism for accepting the social housing program of TOKİ, as discussed in previous sections, does not violate the rules of the game since the state has never served on behalf of the subordinate population. Injustices that occurred during the process of contract (abuse of legal rights, calculation of exchange value, favoritism, bribery) are inevitable consequences for the subordinate population. Consideration of injustices as inevitable were not only revealed in the boundaries of interviews. Conversations among the residents of social housing also show how the injustices are naturalized in their view. When one of the residents was complaining to others about how she does not understand the cut of rent allowances while she is still waiting for the delivery of her new flat in other transformation project in Gülseren, the other residents were making fun of her about her unfamiliarity in relation to these injustices. They were interpreting her situation as 'she will also encounter the injustices of TOKİ'. Nevertheless, their witty attitude reveals how the injustices are naturalized, and how they even become a subject of humor. Moreover, in another interview, when two dissident residents were in a heated debate about the injustices, the only matter on which both of them agreed was the

inevitable consequence of ‘being cheated by TOKİ’ when it comes to the subordinate population. Thus, the meaning of justice for former *gecekondu* residents has always been ‘injustice’ with regard to past experiences; injustices that occur in state-led development projects are not seen as an exception, but as an inevitable part of life for a subordinate population.

The meaning of the state for the inhabitants of Tarlaici are revealed through encounters related with both the processes of legalization of *gecekondu* and transformation projects. When the inhabitants were mentioning problems in these processes in the past and present, they made comments such as “state would not step on a wet floor”, “how could you contend with state”, “there is no such state (that serves for interests of subordinate groups)”, “what did state do, it did its ‘stateness’, it did not serve me” or “state is unreliable, next thing you know you will be losing your house”. These phrases about the state openly emphasize its ‘unmasked’ character as opposing the interests of subordinate groups, and concerning itself with the interests of dominant groups and coercive power. In this view the state is not transcendent in terms of serving the common interest, but rather is transcendent in actualizing the reverse of it. The ‘Idea of state’ is not a mystification in Abrams’ sense which provides a symbolic identity that is separated from real practice; on the contrary, the ‘idea of state’ for the subordinate population reflects the state’s real practice. Furthermore, the ‘unmasked’ state did not just come to light in the second half of 2010s through AKP’s coercive practices against the dissidents as Bodirsky (2016) claims. For the subordinate population, who does not even contradict state practices most of the time, the state has always been ‘unmasked’. Hence, even the obviousness of unrealized promises, corruption and appropriation of land rent cause inhabitants to question the hegemonic claim of the AKP regime through the social housing project. They do not delegitimize the hegemonic project of AKP since they are inherent in the ‘idea of state’; in other words, the ‘unmasked’ state does not pose an obstacle for the hegemonic project.

This chapter sought to explore how the hegemonic politics of homeownership enables to link the restructuring of state ‘from above’ to the legitimizing popular force ‘from below’. In other words, by focusing on micro-level dynamics, this chapter investigated how and why neoliberal urban governance of AKP is dominant. As it is discussed in the Chapter 3, the restructuring of state under the AKP government is in line with a particular form of ‘roll out’ neoliberalism. The particularity of this form comes from the inclusion of hitherto excluded populations into capitalist social relations with the increasing centralization of power, rather than the

decentralization and devolution that are evident in Western contexts. Through the reforms in land and housing markets, the AKP government transformed TOKİ into an ‘over-capacitated state agency’ and initiated urban renewal programs for the generation of an urban economy, which is based on the capital accumulation through the built environment. *Gecekondu* Transformation Projects are constituting the critical political-institutional arena in which two significant aspects of the AKP’s urban reform (TOKİ and urban renewal) work together in the form of state-led urban development projects. Nevertheless, the AKP’s hegemonic project is not only based on novel economic reforms, it also subjects the population to ‘the needs of the productive forces of development’ by a particular ethico-political ground, namely private property relations. As Gramsci asserts, the construction of ethico-political ground depends on new schemes for conceiving the world, hence it necessitates a struggle not “within a given structure, but over the very nature of the structure itself” (Fontana 2002: 170-173). In that regard, the conception of homeownership, as a form of private property regime, constitutes a new scheme especially for the population who has hitherto been excluded from the capitalist social relations to a certain extent, namely *gecekondu* residents. Dissemination of this new scheme among the *gecekondu* residents can be thought of as the hegemonic politics of homeownership, that is, a particular form of hegemonic struggle in which the complex intertwining of consent and coercion take place. By focusing on the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents in Yatıkmsuluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project, this chapter analyzed how the hegemonic conception of TOKİ as the *sole* path to homeownership subjects a particular faction of society into ‘the needs of the productive forces of development’. With the careful analysis of consent and coercive mechanisms, this chapter explored the process of convergence between the conceptions of ruling and subordinate groups. It has been claimed that the moment of convergence reflects itself through the adoption of this hegemonic conception to the extent that it becomes inescapable and inevitable for the subordinate population. Nevertheless, as is evident from the discussion above, the quality of this popular consent ‘from below’ to the restructuring of state ‘from above’ is in line with the conceptualization of ‘consent without consensus’ which Hoşgör describes as

There is no compelling reason to demarcate crude dichotomies between consent and force—as if one would stop where the other starts. Yet as the dialectical unity of the moments of consent and coercion blurs, consent without consensus becomes a structural aspect of hegemony.

(Hoşgör 2015: 224)

This quality of popular consent gives shape to ‘the hegemonic politics of homeownership’ an ‘authoritarian populist’ form, in particular. The ‘authoritarian’ dimension comes from the re-structuring of state, -in particular with the urban governance reforms, in a way that the power to control every aspect of urban life centralizes in certain institutions in which no other social force able to intervene apart from the state. The ‘populist’ dimension comes from legitimizing this ‘authoritarian’ re-structuring with a ‘consent without consensus’ of the subordinate population, in other words, the adoption of a hegemonic conception by the subordinate population. In that regard, ‘in spite of “becoming dependent on state for a lifetime (Dilşad)” due to the long duration of debts, “at least we got rid of *gecekondu*, we could not become homeowner in any other way (Ahmet)”’ and “only the TOKİ can be a remedy for poor (Berna)⁶⁰” express how the authoritarian neoliberal policies of the AKP enables the generation of popular consent ‘from below’ on the basis of an hegemonic conception of private property.

Since hegemony is a continuous process of formation, its effectiveness depends on the reproduction of a hegemonic conception by the new ‘personality’ (Gramsci 2000: 240) of masses through which subjection to the ‘decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (2000: 212) is sustained. The following chapter will shed light on the formation of this ‘new personality of masses’ within the hegemonic vision of private property in order to explore how such hegemonic vision is sustained among former *gecekondu* residents.

⁶⁰ “*yoksulu anca 72.8DNODU*” (Berna)

CHAPTER 5

FORMATION OF NEOLIBERAL SUBJECTIVITIES

Having clarified the complex intertwining of consent and coercion for the hegemonic conception of private property in the form of ‘TOKİ as the *only* way to become a homeowner’, this chapter seeks to examine implications of this conception of the world in terms of the production of new subjectivities. According to Gramsci, material effectivity of any particular conception reflects itself through

creating new and higher types of civilization; of adapting the 'civilization' and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; hence of evolving even physically new types of humanity

(Gramsci 2000: 210)

In other words, giving “both conscious and self-disciplined” (Fontana 2002: 173) “personality to the amorphous mass element” (Gramsci 2000: 340) is significant for the reproduction of the hegemonic project of the ruling group. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 2, this significant dimension of the hegemonic project had not been elaborated in Gramsci’s work. In order to give a more comprehensive account of hegemonic politics, the ‘new personality of masses’ will be discussed through Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ and the ‘production of subjectivities’ in particular. By examining the particular rationalities behind mundane practices, Foucault’s theoretical framework explores how conduct is shaped through control and self-control. Neoliberal rationality in particular induces a new model of economic conduct through the expansion of an economic perspective marked by entrepreneurship, responsabilization and competitiveness, as discussed in the theoretical framework. However, such a perspective is not an inherent feature of human beings; rather, it needs to be made by particular technologies. In that regard, indebted social housing of TOKİ (i.e. the quasi-mortgage payment system) constitutes a particular technology of government that enables transformation of the calculative capacities of Tarlaici inhabitants. In order to shed light on this transformation, this chapter begins with an examination of the practices of ‘economy’ during *gecekondu* times. Crucially, the context of economy differed from the (current)

neoliberal economic perspective by its substantive character. For this reason, Polanyi's and Sahlins's conceptualization of 'substantive economy' and its transformation process will be discussed in relation to their implications for conduct and the organization of social. The following section will elaborate the new subjectivities through their material expressions that are enacted by the subjection to an indebted homeownership program.

5.1 Substantivist Understanding of Economy

Polanyi and Sahlins, as the two most prominent figures of the substantivist understanding of economy, approach economy "as an instituted process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want satisfying material means" (Polanyi 1992: 33) in contrast to a formalist meaning of it, which put forward rational action for the choice of means in relation to ends (1992: 31). Since these scholars examine the constitution of a field of economy, rather than working on an assumed definition of economy, their approach has been considered as 'non-economistic' along with Foucault's approach. Accordingly, an economic system is not a separate domain, it is a function of social organization; in other words, economy is embedded in social relations. In this regard, Polanyi (2001) claims that Adam Smith's naturalization of the motive of gain through "man's propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another" which bases the homo economicus is not a trans-historical fact, but instead occurred because of the separation of economy from social relations during the 19th century. In other words, society becomes an adjunct to the market. In a similar vein, Foucault (2008) discusses the liberal rationality of the 18th century in terms of opening a separate space for economy among other domains. He discusses neoliberal rationality of 20th century, on the other hand, in terms of defining the social domain as a form of economic through which economy extends to the totality of human actions, in particular to the areas that are not exclusively economic (i.e. family, birth, delinquency, etc.). As this chapter investigates the production of neoliberal subjectivities through the indebted nature of TOKİ social housing, the separation of economy from the social relations of *gecekondu* residents marks a significant moment for their new subjectivities. For this reason, the following section will elaborate the organization of economy during *gecekondu* times in relation to a substantive understanding of economy.

An assertion of the embeddedness of economy and social relations is based on the particular principles of behavior that organize the order of production and distribution. Reciprocity, redistribution and householding constitute these principles, which are in line with the

institutional patterns of symmetry, centricity and autarchy (Polanyi 2001: 57). In such a framework, individuals' motives are disciplined by the principles of behavior. In Polanyi's words:

He does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end.

(Polanyi 2001: 48)

In this way, the effort to maintain social ties outweighs self-interest, because reciprocal social obligations serve the individual interests best in the long run (ibid.). Accordingly, what determines the context of social life is the idea of reciprocity, namely, "today's giving will be recompensed by tomorrow's taking" (2001: 53). Sahlins (1972) gives a more detailed account of reciprocity relations by defining three types of it: generalized, balanced and negative reciprocity. What differentiates these three forms of reciprocity is the qualitative and quantitative expectation of returns. Generalized reciprocity is marked by the indefinite expectation of returns in terms of their timing, quantity and quality (1972: 194). Sahlins describes this form as one-way flow: "Failure to reciprocate does not cause the giver of stuff to stop giving: the goods move one way, in favor of the have-not, for a very long period" (ibid.). Thus, in such a form of reciprocity, social and moral concerns outweigh the material ones. Balanced reciprocity is determined by the expectation of return in the same quantity and without delay. In this form of reciprocity, material concerns are in balance with social ones, because of that, it is less 'personal' and more 'economic' compared to generalized reciprocity and there is no toleration of one-way flows as in generalized reciprocity (1972: 195). According to Sahlins, such kind of flows are reflected in trade relations. Negative reciprocity is marked by pure personal interests and each participant aims to maximize its utility at the expense of others, which is very close to Adam Smith's description. Thus, this form of reciprocity is the most impersonal one, and includes theft, raids, violence and guile (ibid.). As is evident from these classifications, each form corresponds to a particular social distance, hence Sahlins interprets these forms as the "intervals of sociability" in a continuum (1972: 191). While reciprocity is occurring symmetrically between two individual parties, redistribution is the collective action of a group (1972: 188). In redistribution, products of collective effort are concentrated in one center and then they are redistributed. Consequently, in this framework, the flow of goods and their specific transaction determine the social relations.

5.2 Embeddedness of ‘Economy’ and ‘Social Relations’ in Tarlaiçi *Gecekondu* Settlement

The empirically, reciprocal formation of economy and social relations are reflected in *gecekondu* settlements in Turkey. According to Şen (2011) and Buğra (1998), due to the lack of formal welfare mechanisms, the urban poor had to develop their own informal welfare mechanisms in order to survive in the cities. In his research with Kurdish and Alevi groups in *gecekondu* settlements, Şen (2011) claims that embeddedness of economy and social relations takes the form of ‘kinship based solidarity’ for the urban poor. He contributes to the reciprocity and redistribution framework of Polanyi and Sahlins with an emphasis on the ethnic dimension, which determines the inclusion into solidarity networks of reciprocity. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents in Tarlaiçi about the organization of everyday life during the *gecekondu* times, they had also developed solidarity networks, which are in line with generalized and balanced forms of reciprocity. Nevertheless, kinship had not been the main determinant of these relations. In spite of the stigmatized image of Kurdish groups in the neighborhood, heterogeneous networks of solidarity for survival outweighed the homogenous formations. Alevis, on the other hand, were a minority group in the neighborhood, hence they either hid their identity or adapted themselves to Sunni practices for the maintenance of social ties and survival. Thereinafter, the ways in which solidarity networks of reciprocity in Tarlaiçi was enabled to embed economy and social relations will be discussed.

During the interviews, former *gecekondu* residents who literally built their *gecekondus* frequently mentioned themselves and their relations as ‘coming from the soil’, ‘dropped from soil’, ‘from the roots, not late comers’ and ‘foundational neighbors’⁶¹. These idioms symbolize the reciprocal production of space and their identity. Suna and Şermin express this reciprocal production through their self-made rhyme as

We are as old as the foundation of this neighborhood,
We built up our houses together,
We purified by the mud,
We slept with night prayers,
We landed on the foundation,
We were covered by the briquettes⁶².

⁶¹ ‘topraktan yetişmek’, ‘topraktan düşme’, ‘sonradan gelme değil, kökten olma’ and ‘temel komşular’, respectively.

⁶² “Bu mahallenin temelli eskiyiz, beraber kurduk evimizi, çamuruylan arındık, yatsıylan yapıldık, *temeline konduk, birkitile UWÖĞA*”

As it is reflected in this rhyme, belonging is determined by the collective production of use value. Accordingly, collective materialized labor (as the substance of use value according to Kuymulu (2014)) generates the social relationships on the basis of neighborliness. In that regard, mechanisms of reciprocity and redistribution among the neighbors reflect how the collective effort for survival produces a particular form of ‘economy’ that is not based on self-interest.

Since the women were responsible for the maintenance of the *gecekondu*, reciprocity and redistribution mechanisms primarily occurred among the women of Tarlaiçi. Preparing food and food storage for different seasons, wool scouring, etc. were significant factors in lowering the cost of sustaining a liveable livelihood for low-income populations. Collective handling of the labor-intensive processes of these domestic tasks brings the social dimension of this labor to light. According to their narratives, the division of labor for such tasks were based on talents for related processes of preparation. The ones who did not assist in the preparation or cooking process supplied the necessary ingredients; hence, there were unwritten rules for the organization of work. Furthermore, due to the composition of neighborhood by the people from different regions of Turkey, women of Tarlaiçi took advantage of this by learning various regional, localized methods of cooking food. Rather than the ethnic0based homogenization of groups, which was evident in Şen’s research, Tarlaiçi’s heterogeneous composition enabled female residents to make use of difference through their collective work. Papatya expresses the advantage of the heterogeneity of the neighborhood as

Sometimes a cultural mix is much better, people are more different, they do not think in the same way, this improves you as well. For instance, some of my friends were from Adapazarı, others were from Antep, another from Çubuk, Erzurum, etc. Each region has its own way of doing things. Nevertheless, when the hearts are united you do not treat each other differently, then it becomes quite good. If you were relatives you would respect because of the kinship relations, but you are not related in this situation, hence the social relationships become much better.

Reciprocity mechanisms did not only occur in the completion of collective tasks. It was common to pick fruits and vegetables from one another’s gardens without asking. According to the accounts of residents, coming across people in the gardens of one’s *gecekondu* was not a surprise. Moreover, having the knowledge that neighbors will be gathered instantly in the event of a health emergency strengthened the idea of generalized reciprocity in the neighborhood. Hence, compelling material conditions, especially in the financial hardship, approximates the social distance between the people who share common conditions. Ahmet

interprets this solidarity on the basis of survival through an emphasis of socio-economic conditions as “if everyone becomes rich, nobody would care for another”.

Redistribution mechanisms were relevant in the provision of food items that were required to be purchased from the market and the supply of infrastructural needs. Since households were not able to afford food items by themselves, neighbors gathered money on a regular basis for the provision of food items for each household. In order to fulfill the needs of households for long periods, the unit of measure for the food items was ‘sacks’ rather than kilogram. Döndü gives an account for this mechanism as

We were making special days with 10-20 people. Each week we were piling up potatoes, onions, rice, etc. to one household. I do not remember buying potatoes in kilograms, we were buying them in sacks. We were buying 6 sack of potatoes, 2 sack of onions at once. Each week we were buying all together for the one household. There was not any money, but when each one of us put money in small amounts, when we gather that money, we were able to purchase them.

The supply of infrastructural services, on the other hand, were redistributed from one household, who had an access to electricity, water, etc. There was no expectation of payback for these services, rather they were considered as ‘free gift’ in Sahlins’ sense. Due to the generous practices of sharing in *gecekondü* times, respondents interpret these practices as a ‘culture of *gecekondü*’.

As it has been discussed in the Chapter 2, due to the compelling landlord-tenant relations many *gecekondü* residents desired to become homeowners. However, exceptional forms of reciprocity took place between landlord and tenant as well. This novel form of reciprocity occurred mostly in situations where the landlord resided on the same plot with the tenant. According to the narrative of one former *gecekondü* resident, who rented her *gecekondü*’s first floor, the tenant (who had no kinship relationship with the landlord) was experiencing financial hardship and she let them reside one year without asking for a rent. Moreover, she shared their food, provided them with a stove and coal. The tenant did not reciprocate its landlord with material returns, but the friendship continued over the course of many years. When this tenant turned into a landlord after some years, they continued this form of generalized reciprocity relationships with their tenant, which reflects how it became a particular ethic that organized ‘economy’ and ‘social relations’.

Trust is another form of reciprocity that does include material goods, but also a moral basis that protects the material goods. As mentioned in Chapter 4, some groups in the neighborhood

made their living by robbery. In the framework of Sahlins, this could have been interpreted as a negative form of reciprocity; nevertheless, in order to maintain their social standing in the neighborhood, these groups did not steal anything from the inhabitants of Tarlaıçı. What differentiates one group's fulfillment of two different forms of reciprocity is the social distance that organizes a particular balance between social relationships and economy. In order to reproduce conditions of survival, this group put forward their social and moral concerns, rather than material ones in the neighborhood that they inhabited. Former *gecekondu* residents claimed that despite the lack of any solid doors, no one attempted to steal anything from the *gecekondus*. Moreover, the extent of the trusting relationship between neighbors ensured the idea that if something bad were to happen, the whole neighborhood would gather instantly in order to help the troubled household.

These different forms of reciprocity and redistribution that are based on common interest are generated as particular idea and practice of 'commons'⁶³ that is reflected in the production of social space. As a low-income group, former *gecekondu* residents, within their limited financial means, developed spatial relations not with the city, but with their neighborhood in particular. Especially women who took care of the maintenance of *gecekondu* through collective work, carried this 'collectivity' into their socializing practices in the neighborhood. Since they could not reach to the public spaces of the city due to high transportation costs, they transformed the streets of the neighborhood into (public) social spaces. According to narratives of former *gecekondu* residents, neighbors used to eat breakfast collectively in particular corners of the street called Meydancık. Literally 'small square,' the name of these spaces also emphasizes their public character. Each woman brought certain ingredients for the breakfast and they would prepare collective breakfasts frequently. Since the size of *gecekondus* were quite small, the streets were more suitable for the gathering of women whose numbers were around 10-20. Moreover, they did not only bring food, but also sofas, beds, carpets, samovers, etc. to the streets. The appropriation of the streets reflected itself through their maintenance as well; when they were cleaning their *gecekondus*, the streets were also included into this

⁶³ 'Commons' in here is understood according to Harvey's conceptualization: "The common is not to be construed, therefore, as a particular kind of thing, asset or even social process, but as an unstable and malleable social relation between a particular self-defined social group and those aspects of its actually existing or yet- to-be-created social and/or physical environment deemed crucial to its life and livelihood. There is, in effect, a social practice of commoning. This practice produces or establishes a social relation with a common whose uses are either exclusive to a social group or partially or fully open to all and sundry. At the heart of the practice of commoning lies the principle that the relation between the social group and that aspect of the environment being treated as a common shall be both collective and non -commodified-off-limits to the logic of market exchange and market valuations." (2012: 73)

cleaning, since it was a space that they frequently made use of. Until dinner time, women were mostly together in the streets, parks or gardens. When their husbands came home from work, they were eating dinner as a family; however, after the dinner they went back outside again where they continued to socialize while drinking tea, playing games, watching movies in the open-air cinema. Around 12 am they were returning back to their *gecekondu*'s, but collective social practices continued even then in the *gecekondu*s; each night one elder was assigned to tell stories to the children.

Consequently, collective materialized labor on the basis of reciprocity and redistribution as the condition of survival in the city for a low-income population that lacks formal mechanisms of welfare constituted a particular form of 'economy' that is based on common interests rather than motives of gain. The provision of raw materials (for preparing food or infrastructural services), preparation of food stock and landlord-tenant relationships are the material expressions of the reciprocity and redistribution mechanisms that existed in the Tarlaiçi *gecekondu* settlement. Difference as the resource for developing new skills, trust as the moral base of protection and transforming space as the production of 'commons' reveal how the particular form of economy on the basis of reciprocity and redistribution organizes social relations, hence the economy becomes embedded in social relations. In that regard, 'neighborliness' is a key concept that holds this particular form of economy and social relations together, which has been clearly manifested in Döndü's words as "what we predicated on was not money, but our excellent neighbors" ("bizim esas aldığımız para değil de, komşumuz çok iyiydi").

5.3 Disembedding of 'Economy' and 'Social Relations': Introduction of Market Rule

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Polanyi claims that the motive of gain becomes possible through the separation of economy and social relations. What Polanyi means by this separation is the creation of a specific institution for the control of the economic system, namely the market. In a market economy, the economic system is "controlled, regulated, and directed by market prices; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism" (Polanyi 2001: 71). In this framework, all the production is made for sale on the market. Crucially, not only industrial goods, but also land, labor and money must be made for sale. Nevertheless, Polanyi claims that these three elements are not produced for sale, hence, they are not real commodities:

Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance. None of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious.

(Polanyi 2001: 75-76)

Mechanisms of reciprocity and redistribution as the institutional base of a substantive economy cannot function under a market economy since they are forms that inherently exclude sale. Moreover, since everything is for sale in the market economy, ‘gain’, rather than ‘subsistence’ becomes a central motive of the economic system. In that regard, “society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a market society” (2001: 60). However, subjecting society to market laws in order to produce the conditions of market society has particular consequences for the society itself, namely the destruction of society (2001: 77). Since the subsistence economy puts forward the maintenance of ‘social’, it protects the collectivity by preventing the motives of gain through the particular reciprocity and redistribution mechanisms. When the motive of gain become the central conduct through the market economy, the cost of it for the society is interpreted by Polanyi as follows: “Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation” (2001: 76).

Turning back to Tarlaiçi *gecekondu* settlement, specific mechanisms of reciprocity and redistribution were significant factors for the maintenance of social relations. As described in Chapter 4, the ‘un-transformable’ conditions of Tarlaiçi prevented the commodification of land there to a certain extent; meanwhile, *gecekondu* settlements in Turkey were under a massive transformation of hitherto un-commodified lands. Moreover, as it discussed by Balaban (2011), Buğra (1998) and Erman (2011), the commodification of *gecekondus* during the second half 1980s with the ANAP government produced new class factionalization through the re-distribution of land rent between *gecekondu* owners and individual developers. The destructive effects of the commodification of land and motive of gain reflected itself through the increasing polarization of society in terms of the exclusionary image of the newly emerging petty bourgeoisie in the media and the conditions of new migrants, who are excluded from this land rent and subjected worsening conditions of labor process and housing market (Balaban

2011, Erman 2011). Nevertheless, the ‘un-transformable’ conditions of Tarlaıçı until the second half of 2000s made it possible to protect the inhabitants of Tarlaıçı from the destructive implications of the market economy through reciprocity and redistribution mechanisms. As it has been thoroughly discussed in the Chapter 4, the *Gecekondu* Transformation Project that was undertaken by TOKİ in Tarlaıçı subjected inhabitants of Tarlaıçı to a private property regime through the intertwining of consent and coercion mechanisms. Compared to the re-distribution of land rent by the commodification of land in 1980s and 1990s, state-led urban development projects under AKP government do not allow the re-distribution of land rent between *gecekondu* owners and contractors. Instead, state and capitalist factions that are related with state appropriate it. Regarding the *gecekondu* transformation history of neighborhoods in Turkey, Tarlaıçı skipped the 1980s and 1990s re-distribution scheme of land rent and was directly subjected to state-led urban development project of the AKP government. Subjection to market economy (in terms of the commodification of land) and its peculiar laws (as the motive of gain) through TOKİ’s *gecekondu* transformation project induced destructive implications for the embedded nature of the economy and social relations of Tarlaıçı inhabitants. That is, the disembedding of economy and social relations via the market economy enabled the development of motive of gain at the expense of ‘neighborliness’ as the basis of the ‘*gecekondu* culture of sharing’, in Polanyi’s words “protective covering of cultural institutions” (2001: 76). The following section will analyze the ways in which the process of transformation substituted the concern of ‘subsistence’ for the ‘motive of gain’ and destroyed ‘neighborliness’ as the solidarity network for survival in the city.

5.3.1 Generation of the ‘Motive of Gain’

As it has been discussed in the Chapter 4, a decent image of apartment flat, endless rumors of transformation, being a homeowner rather than tenant and the hope for dissolution of criminal elements in the neighborhood were the historically articulated factors that generated consent for the *gecekondu* transformation project of TOKİ and a new commonsense on the basis of private property ownership. The generation of this new commonsense through the commodification of land had its initial effects, in terms of disembedding economy and social relations in the process of contract. The motive of gain by the introduction of market rule in the neighborhood through the homeownership program of TOKİ had started with seeking individual benefits at the expense of collective benefit and, in turn, resulted with increasing inequalities among the inhabitants. According to narratives of former *gecekondu* residents,

neighbors who were eligible for getting free apartment flat/s due to their large size of lands, and who were in the most disadvantaged positions in terms of having only the TTBs or being tenant were the ones who accepted the agreement of TOKİ in the first place. Hence, the socio-economic conditions that were not constituting any conflict until the commodification of land by TOKİ became the very first drivers for the dissolution of solidarity networks that were based on common benefits. Former *gecekondu* residents who paid the price of their neighbors' immediate decision to accept the agreement expressed the beginning of the generation of motive of gain at the expense of common benefit in the following ways

Everyone agreed individually, there were not any collective action. Everyone was preoccupied with their own troubles. Brother Mahmut proposed to act collectively with one voice in order not victimize anyone, nevertheless, nobody listened to him. (Vesile)

There was not any collective action here. Nobody proposed protesting and claiming their rights. Everyone went there and secretly signed the contracts. Hence, we became victims. Some did not have any deeds, some did have deeds. TOKİ entitled the former group as eligible for participating in the project and it suited their book. (Feriha)

There were 2-3 storey *gecekondus* and there were no small amount of them. When they took the first step for exchanging *gecekondus*, the ones who had small amounts of land did not have any chance. So, when they made the first move, you are (then) obliged to exchange, the state turns up, you are obliged to accept. (Dilşad)

She said 'I don't care', he said 'I don't care' (*O dedi bana ne, bu dedi bana ne*). These people got their money, I heard that they bought several houses. (Suna)

Everyone, every neighbor secretly sold their neighbor out. I mean, everyone looked after their own interest (*gemisini kurtaran kaptan oldu*). Everyone exchanged their *gecekondu* on the sly. Nobody was on our side. With whom could you act in solidarity? Your neighbors had already exchanged their *gecekondu* with TOKİ on the sly and they already had moved into flats. You were out of touch! What could you do? (Esma)

On the other hand, the narrative of individual struggle for the material gain by the two former *gecekondu* residents reveals how individual tactics enabled the solution of certain obstacles related with becoming eligible for TOKİ's social housing project and payment system. Both residents were quite proud of their struggle which ended up for their benefit; however, there was not any reference to collective action or collective benefit in these accounts. This is in contrast to their emphasis on solidarity in *gecekondu* times. In that regard, these narratives lend credence to Esma's interpretation that "everyone looks after their own interest". Notably, struggles were addressed to municipality personnel or employees of Ziraat Bank, hence, rather than a claim of structural transformation as found in the social movement perspective, the very individuality of these struggles induces a continuation of the existing system. Güllü, who had been offered just the exchange value of her *gecekondu*'s debris, became eligible for the social

housing following her dispute with the municipality personnel. She expresses this dispute as such:

I swore like a trooper at the municipality. I beat the computers. I shouted like ‘you are all pimps and whores of Gazi Kartal (former mayor)’. Since Gazi Kartal was cheating his wife with his secretary, nobody was able to utter a word. Then the director came out, he invited me to his office to talk about thing. Despite the smoking ban, I smoked my cigarette in his office. I asked him to buy me a cup of tea. Then we started to talk. When it appeared that we were fellow citizens, he said ‘you are a women with balls!’. Then I continued to swear, like, ‘fuck you, fuck a fellow citizen like you! You are all pimps!’. So, he gave up, he directed me to public housing department in order to make me eligible for the project. Then I swore to the personnel in this department as well. In the end, they gave me chance for all the different options for apartment flats.

On the other hand, Zümrüt, as a retired person, was having difficulties with the due date of installments. She went to Ziraat Bank and argued with the personnel in order to change the due date according to the date that retired people get their monthly payments. Nevertheless, her struggle ended up with a change in the due date just for herself. She narrates this process as

(Following the first dispute) I said, I am not going anywhere. We yelled each other. There was a security guard, he told me to take the path of least resistance. Why would I? I said ‘look at my feet, I am coming here with slippers, they are sitting in there with their smart suits, why do not they wear the old clothes?’. Then I yelled at the officers again ‘you charge with interest rates when I do not pay even for 3 days. Why did you determine the due dates of payments at the 15th of the month, you know that we, as retired people, get our wages at the 25th of the month? Why did not you determine the 25th of the month as the due date? We are not civil servants.’ Now I am paying at the 25th of the month. There is a huge difference of time between 15th and 25th of the month. Hence, I made it in this way. Then I left the bank, the security officer came and he said ‘sister, halal, good for you! Well done. Everyday many people come here with their nice clothes, some of them are paying 1000 TLs for installments, but they keep their mouth shut’. I said ‘why would I not argue, I came here but I do not have any money for even one bread. I bring my money here in order to become homeowner at the expense of bread.’

As it is evident from Güllü’s and Zümrüt’s narratives, the re-making of commonsense on the basis of private property induces particular motives of gain reflected through the individual struggles, which are at the expense of their subsistence and collective benefit.

In the subsection ‘Actual Practice of Legal Rights’, Chapter 4 discussed how the ambiguous decisions of the court prevented people from using their legal rights for the reassessment of the exchange value of *gecekondu*’s and how this ‘actual practice’ transformed into a coercive mechanism for participation in the project. Nevertheless, according to the interviews, certain people (headman-*muhtar*-, grocery owner-bakkal) who were in an advantageous position in terms of social, economic and symbolic capitals sued TOKİ and gained large amounts of

money with respect to reassessed exchange value of *gecekondus*. This situation not only strengthened the idea of ‘justice is always on the side of powerful’ among the Tarlaici residents, but also induced the prevention of building TOKİ’s social housing while the former *gecekondu* residents were waiting for their apartment blocks to be finished. Feriha expresses this process as

There was the Bakkals (grocery) land over there. They got 100.000 TL after the court. There were a few *gecekondus* including the Bakkals which were still not demolished. We had been waiting for many years for the construction of our apartment blocks. They told us that due to these remaining few *gecekondus*, our apartment blocks could not be constructed since those *gecekondu*’s were exactly on the land on which our apartment blocks were planned to be build. Hence, the Bakkal got a huge amount of money, but we became victims.

With regard to Feriha’s experiences, individual motives of gain turned against the common interest of the neighborhood and generated increasing financial hardship for the former *gecekondu* residents, who resided as tenants while waiting for their flats to be finished. Hence, when the attempt for claiming rights are not based on the collective interest, new inequalities were generated for the rest of the former *gecekondu* residents.

5.3.2 Inequality: Basis of Social Policy

Apart from the individual struggles in informal or formal ways, inequality becomes a structural condition for those who seek to become homeowners without meeting the eligibility conditions, namely the tenants in *gecekondus*. These groups of former *gecekondu* residents negotiated with the *gecekondu* owners who opted to sell their rights due to the future costs of TOKİ’s payment scheme, which they presumed to exceed their solvency. Although TOKİ’s project appears to provide equal conditions for the ones who have legal proof of ownership (TTB, formal title deed, bills in certain stage of the project), what determines the actual benefit is the solvency for a payment scheme rather than the seemingly equal rights. Papatya gives voice to this dilemma regarding the process of becoming eligible for the project, saying

A person who was a tenant in a *gecekondu* like me bought the title deed from a *gecekondu* owner (who was actually an old neighbor of Papatya) for a small fee, hence I became eligible for participating in the project. Since I did not have any chance of buying a house due to the lack of money and land, I became homeowner thanks to this *gecekondu* owner, who sold his house for a small fee. So, TOKİ displaced these people while making someone a homeowner who could not become homeowner otherwise. How did this happen, is it fair? I do not know if it is fair or not. Despite the subjection of many people to injustice in this way, it really worked well for me, of course it was unjust for these people. A person who resided in his *gecekondu* for many years was displaced by the municipality. This person resided in *gecekondu* for many years, he embraced it as his home, residing there for maybe 30-35 years. The state displaced this person. Then it made someone a homeowner who has bought the

right of this *gecekondu*. However, I do not understand how this person can be ignored while he was living there and paying the electricity and water bills. I mean, great inequities have happened, but many people become delighted as well.

Papatya's honest narrative reflects how the motive for private property outweighs the conditions of equality by the commodification of land. As it is evident from her narrative, the primacy of use value that is based on the idea of subsistence economy questions the market rule; nevertheless, once the market law is established by the commodification of land, the motive of gain legitimizes inequalities since the conditions of possibility for the subsistence economy and the related idea of common benefit are removed by the field of possibility that is defined by the market economy. Mitchell, in his Foucauldian research about the generation of a particular idea of 'economy' in Egypt, claims that "The power of the market economy reveals itself not only in the transforming of people's lives and livelihoods but in its influence over the way we think" (2002: 244). In that regard, Papatya's approach to perceived inequalities presents the ways in which the transformative power of the market economy delineates the field of possibility in particular through practices and 'the ways of thinking' about these practices, as the implication of governmentality by definition.

Hence, neoliberal housing policy that is enacted by AKP government 'let inequality to function' through generalizing the instrument of private property (Foucault 2008: 144). As the informal and formal individual struggles for gain, and acquisition of gain at the expense of other's right have demonstrated, inequality is legitimized and normalized at the beginning of the transformation process through the commodification of land. Rather than approaching the motive of gain as an inherent feature of human beings, as in Adam Smith's theory, this section sought to discuss how the policies of state enable to produce a ground of inequality in which members of society are required to compete with each other in order to ensure their self-sustenance. In this way, rather than the economy being the function of the organization of social relations on the basis of the 'neighborliness' practices, the expansion of an economic perspective through the very policies of state enables a "general regulation of society by the market" (Foucault 2008: 145) since a "market economy can function only in a market society" (Polanyi 2001: 60).

5.4 Dissemination of the Model of Market into the Relationships of 'Neighborliness'

Since 'neighborliness' was a significant material reflection of the 'economy's embeddedness in 'social relations' in Tarlaiçi *gecekondu* settlement, subjection to market rule, as the transformation of the relationship between 'economy' and 'social relations', has effects on the

practices of ‘neighborliness’ in the everyday life in TOKİ social housing. Following the replacement of ‘common interest’ by the ‘motive of gain’ in the process of contracting, this section will discuss the implications of market rule on ‘neighborliness’ through the experiences of everyday life in TOKİ.

5.4.1 ‘Modern Life’ at the Expense of ‘Neighborliness’

According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents, living in an apartment flat symbolizes the upward-class mobility, as discussed in the Chapter 4. Moreover, the increment of the minimum wages and pensions compare to much lower wages, so the physical conditions of the *gecekondu* and the symbolic image of the *gecekondu* during the early 2000s caused former *gecekondu* residents to interpret their life in social housing of TOKİ as a more upper class lifestyle. However, living standards rise at the expense of ‘neighborliness’, as the various respondents emphasize

Money has been mounting up, but trust has diminished. Ever after, this is the condition of life. You cannot compare the neighborliness here to the *gecekondu* times. You cannot compare the old ways of fraternity to the current ones. In old times there was more faithfulness, love, trust and respect. Unfortunately, we lost all of it. (Mualla)

When everyone reaches the higher financial opportunities, nobody recognizes one another. There is not any social activity, only greeting each other when you pass by. It was not like that before, it was much better in *gecekondu* life. For instance, you were calling your neighbor, saying ‘let’s drink tea’; then either he visits you or you are visiting him. Now, this gathering on the basis of drinking tea has disappeared, the conversations disappeared. Only encounters; neighborliness is over. Do you know what this is? Actually, it is an open prison (referring to social housing of TOKİ)! You are entering into your flat and you are not able to go out again. There are bedrooms, toilet, kitchen; eat, drink, meet your needs and nothing else. There are not any heart-to-heart talks or exchanges of ideas about difficult situations. Now, when people gather, the only things that they are concerned about is their financial situation: do you have a house, do you have a car, what is your job, how much is your salary; it’s all the same, nothing else. When people moved into apartment flats, it happened in this way. There was nothing like that back in the *gecekondu*. Now, people even have the knowledge of the number of people that bring money into the household. They make these calculations! Hence, relations between people broke apart, the old society is over, and empathy is over. (Şerif)

Now, we are living with people side by side (referring to the organization of multi-storey apartment blocks) but the relationships are breaking off. In *gecekondu* times, when someone baked pancakes (gözleme), not only the scent of it, but also pancake itself was coming to you. You were encountering people whose *gecekondu* was stuck in the snow or you were encountering *gecekondu* chimneys which were reeking for several days, and you were providing them with five sacks of coal. There was solidarity. Now, how can you understand if someone is out of gas in his flat? In that regard, it was very good. I think modern life causes the deprivation of our humanity. (Ahmet)

Hence, all these narratives link the subsistence economy of *gecekondu* times with a particular social organization that is based on ‘humanity, trust, fraternity, solidarity, respect and sharing’. Disembedding of this linkage through the social housing of TOKİ, which has been reflected as ‘modern life’, and financial opportunities that corresponds to the period of moving into TOKİ transforms the organization of social relations into a model of the market as reflected by Şerif’s emphasis on the new calculative practices of former *gecekondu* residents. In that regard, this transformation reflects how the “neoliberal rationality disseminates the model of the market to all domains and activities — even where money is not at issue — and configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and everywhere as homo oeconomicus” (Brown 2015: 31). ‘Deprivation of our humanity’, as expressed by Ahmet, constitutes a particular cost, in terms of loss of values, of this transformation. According to Brown (2015), Marx’s “double freedom” (freedom from the acquisition of means of production and freedom to sell labor power) as the condition of proletarianization of feudal subjects, is ‘ironically’ repeated in neoliberal regimes. This time, the neoliberalization of state (through social policies that aim to include poor into the market system rather than the concern of their welfare) and economization of subjects (through the replacement of “homo politicus and humanism itself” (p.42) by the homo economicus) generate “a new double freedom — from the state and from all other values — permits market-instrumental rationality to become the dominant rationality organizing and constraining the life of the neoliberal subject” (p.108).

As it is evident from Mualla, Şerif and Ahmet’s accounts, life in the social housing of TOKİ symbolizes ‘modern life’ and ‘mounting of money’ despite the dissolution of organization on the basis of ‘neighborliness’. Esra, on the other hand, approaches to the material conformity of social housing in a more critical manner:

We became more like people who are in the social class of civil servants. Even though we do not work in a state institution, our living standards are like those of the civil servant class. I mean, the civil servant has a right for a holiday for three months in a year; for instance, a teacher can stay in a guesthouse that is made for teachers during the holidays. You can go to any place that has a guesthouse and stay for free. If we are two teachers in different cities we can contact each other and meet in one of the guesthouses. Nevertheless, we do not have this chance here.

Esra’s account reflects the ‘illusive’ dimension of upward-class mobility through pointing the actual linkage between lifestyles and conditions of work. In that regard, her narrative reveals how the appropriation of income by state (or in Doğru’s interpretation of TOKİ as “extracting savings out of the working classes” (2016: 206)) becomes possible with the particular conception of private property in the form of owning a decent apartment flat. Hence, aligning

itself to the payment scheme of TOKİ in order to become homeowner leaves no room for other expenses, as expressed later on in the same interview through when she noted, “you are dependent on the state for a lifetime. Man makes you indebted for a lifetime, dependent on him/herself” (Esra). Crucially, what Esra implies with this phrase is not dependency on the welfare mechanisms of the state. Rather, she emphasizes how the subject’s relationship to the state is determined according to an obligation of debt. In that regard, the obligation to pay back the debt becomes a duty, just like the other duties of citizenship (military service, paying taxes, etc.). Therefore, obligations of debt outweigh all other expenses. Financial hardship due to the ever-increasing installments of the TOKİ ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system has a particular implication for a population who had hitherto been avoiding financial transactions in banks (in terms of receiving loans). Consideration of the meaning of this financial hardship due to the indebtedness experienced by the former *gecekondu* residents reveals another dimension of the dissolution of ‘neighborliness’ apart from the material effects of the upward-class mobility.

5.4.2 Morality of Debt: ‘Courageous Action’ to ‘Obligation by Fear’

As a low-income population, most of the *gecekondu* residents of Tarlaici did not previously apply to a bank for credit in financial hardships, since they were either not eligible for receiving a loan or worried about not being able to repay the credit due to the high interest rates. Rather, they borrowed money from their neighbors in such situations, a reflection of ‘balanced reciprocity’ (Sahlins 1972: 194) in the subsistence economy of *gecekondu* times. In that regard, being indebted to a bank, as an impersonal system in contrast to subsistence economy, for the *gecekondu* residents of Tarlaici corresponded to a ‘courageous action’ which reveals itself by the expressions of Nafiz and Murat as “We did not have such courage for receiving a loan from a bank” (Nafiz) and “banks destroy one’s family (Banka ocak söndürür)” (Murat). Nevertheless, when this same population was subjected to a ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system of TOKİ via a bank, ‘courageous action’ of *gecekondu* times transforms into an ‘obligation by fear’, as Murat describes:

Since it is a *gecekondu* population, people are afraid of debt. They compel themselves in order to pay the installments. Of course, there are situations of falling behind the payment scheme for 1 or 2 months. For instance, a person who is not from a *gecekondu* receives a loan for 60-70 thousand TL and does not care about his solvency, he says ‘I will make repayment when I have the money’. In contrast, if my father had a debt for 50 kuruş, he would not be able to sleep that night. He would say ‘I have a debt, I shall repay it and sleep tight’. There are people who get scared from debt, and those who do not.

This fear of debt has particular implications for the well-being of former *gecekondu* residents. Semra and her husband struggled with paying the ever-increasing installments for two years (which started with 530 TL in 2010 and increased to 700 TL by 2012) while the only income earner was her husband, who earned 1500 TL monthly at that time⁶⁴. Following these financially compelling 2 years, they asked their parents to pay off the whole debt of TOKİ. Semra expresses the implications of the obligation of paying the installments for 2 years as:

My husband started to go into hysterics every time that we needed to make payments for installments. Even though he is self-employed (as an electrician) right now, we do not have much income, it only covers the expenses of market, needs of children, food and so forth. I cannot imagine that he still would be paying for the installments, I guess he would become insane.

Crucially, ‘going into hysterics’ due to the compelling conditions of paying the installments is not unique to Semra’s family. Cavidan presents how this situation is widely experienced on the basis of her observation in the neighborhood and how it dissolves the ‘neighborliness’ as

No one invites or visits his/her neighbor here. People are inviting and visiting each other in the apartments that are made by contractors. However, people are tense in TOKİ. People are very tense due to the payments, due to the price of bread. Some women’s husbands got fired, some men’s make their wife go to work. Some lost their mind. There was a man in here who could not pay the installments, now he is in the psychiatric hospital. People fall into depression due to failing to pay the instalments. The one who gets his raki (a type of liquor) goes to the park, the one who gets his drugs goes to the park. Right there we had a neighbor from *gecekondu* times, the women fell into depression and ran away while leaving her children behind.

As it has been previously discussed in this chapter, sharing similar livelihood conditions in terms of financial hardship was a significant factor for the constitution of subsistence economy on the basis of ‘neighborliness’ in Tarlaiçi *gecekondu* settlement. Even though they are still sharing similar conditions of livelihood due to TOKİ’s ‘quasi mortgage’ payment system, the dissemination of the market model into social relationships transforms the pre-existing meaning of ‘neighborliness’ for former *gecekondu* residents and dissolves the “protective covering” (Polanyi 2001: 76) of ‘neighborliness’. Accordingly, within the subsistence economy of *gecekondu* times, the ‘measure of man’ (Lazzarato 2012: 58) (as the respectability of person in its particular socio-cultural setting) was defined in relation to his/her social relations, i.e. neighborliness. When quasi-mortgage payments of TOKİ reformulate the morality of debt from a ‘courageous action’ to an ‘obligation by fear’, the ‘measure of man’

⁶⁴ According to TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute), hunger limit and general poverty line for a family of four in 2010 corresponded to 934 TL and 2.952 TL, respectively. According to this scheme, Semra’s family was just above the hunger limit and they were definitely fell behind the poverty line (DISK 2010, TÜİK 2012).

begins to be defined in relation to an individual's solvency, in which social relationships have no place.

5.5 Implication of Indebtedness on the Conducts: Formation of Economic-Rational Individuals

According to Brown, a non-economistic understanding of economy, which this thesis adopts as well, requires an examination of the constitutive outside of a particular form of economy:

Every image of man is defined against other possibilities — thus, the idea of man as fundamentally economic is drawn against the idea of him as fundamentally political, loving, religious, ethical, social, moral, tribal, or something else. Even when one image becomes hegemonic, it carves itself against a range of other possibilities — tacitly arguing with them, keeping them at bay, or subordinating them. So it is not enough to know that humans are economic in their drives and motivations — we must know what this means we are not, and especially what has been sent packing, what we are adamantly not... That is, what *homo oeconomicus* is depends upon how the economy is conceived and positioned vis à vis other spheres of life, other logics, other systems of meaning, other fields of activity

(Brown 2015: 81)

In that regard, up until this point this chapter has sought to examine practices of subsistence economy as the constitutive outside of market economy. In order to give a clear account of the new model of economic conduct under a market economy, the previous sections discussed, how the motive of gain and the legitimate ground of inequalities generated through the replacement of 'other' values (i.e. common interest) in the process of contract as well as how this model of conduct disseminates and transforms the 'other' ways of sociability (i.e. 'neighborliness') by the peculiar articulation of the aspirations of 'modern life style' and the 'morality of debt'. Nevertheless, without the analysis of the operationalization of this new model of economic conduct (in terms of implementing a new economic framework to the professional and everyday tasks) it will not be possible to understand how such conduct (as part of neoliberal governmental practice) enables the sustainment of the hegemonic project of the AKP. In that regard, this section will investigate the new model of economic conduct of former *gecekondu* residents through their ways of dealing with TOKİ's debt obligation, and new ways of thinking emerging under these practices. Crucially, debt here constitutes a particular technology of government that enables the operationalization of such economic conduct (i.e. neoliberal rationality). To refine this point, the combination of the aspiration of a decent apartment flat and a particular understanding of 'debt' for the former *gecekondu* residents enable a novel way of governing, namely 'governing by debt'. In that regard, on the one hand, indebted TOKİ social housing enables the appropriation of the incomes and savings

of a population for 15 years by subjecting them to the financial markets via a bank. In this way, the state controls the steady flow of money from low-income population to itself and related fractions of capital; in Lazzarato's words, the state reduces the uncertain flow of money by exerting "control over (the) future" (2012: 46). On the other hand, debt obligation itself enables a novel way for the self-control of subjects by allowing "one to foresee, calculate, measure, and establish equivalences between current and future behavior" (ibid.). Within the framework of 'governing by debt' this section will focus on the implications of this latter aspect, namely, formation of economic-rational individuals as the "vital resources and allies for the 'government' of economic life" (Miller and Rose 2008: 27).

5.5.1 Experiences of New Work Regime

Being indebted to a bank for 15 years requires a particular calculative capacity in which subjects guarantee to make monthly payments on regular basis. As a low-income group, residents of Tarlaici had mostly worked at a minimum wage rate in informal jobs or state institutions; however, women generally were not included in these labor processes. Actualization of such a calculative capacity reveals itself through the new work regimes of former *gecekondu* owners. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents neither minimum wage nor the single wage earner in a household are sufficient for affording the monthly payments. Hence, men have started to work in two jobs, or if they are retired they have started to work again. Women, on the other hand, have started to work in precarious jobs.

Compared to other strategies, working in more than one job was not very common for the former *gecekondu* residents. Nevertheless, it has been revealed in two of the interviews that men, as the single wage earners, they have started to work in more than one job. Due to assumed traditional gender roles, the possibility of women becoming wage earners was never considered in these two households. Therefore, the men, with their second jobs, fulfill the need for two wage earners by themselves. Crucially, bearing the exploitative conditions (in terms of overwork) in order to afford the monthly payments has never been mentioned during the interviews. Instead, it was considered as normal and legitimate in order to become a homeowner. Hüseyin is able to afford the monthly payments with his total income (which amounts to two minimum wages) that were generated by working as the neighborhood headman (*muhtar*) and as a worker in the municipality. Although his wife has expressed how they were barely making their livelihood with Hüseyin's two jobs, and how their life is arranged accorded to the payments to TOKİ for 15 years, Hüseyin, in a separate interview,

emphasized that no one in the neighborhood has suffered due to the payment scheme; on the contrary, everyone “turned out to be profitable” since finally they all “obtain an opportunity for modern houses”. According to another interview with Nilüfer, her husband has been working as delivery person since *gecekondu* times, however due to the increasing payments of TOKİ, he started to work overtime in the same job, to carry furniture on weekends and to load goods on trucks for cross-province transportation as a night job. She expresses the naturalization of her husband’s overwork in order to afford the payments, saying, “I have never asked for five kuruş from any of my relatives or neighbors, I bite the bullet (*sıktım dişimi*), my husband worked in 2-3 jobs but I became able to afford the payments”. Hence, as it is evident from both accounts, the indebted homeownership program of TOKİ induces a particular calculative logic in which aspirations of acquiring a ‘modern house’ outweigh the obligations of overwork and also a particular ethic of work that puts forward the ‘individual’ ability to pay as the praiseworthy behavior.

It was quite common for the retired former *gecekondu* residents in the neighborhood to start working again in response to their indebtedness. Nevertheless, respondents did not regard this situation as normal and legitimate, as in the former instance. Regarding the age and exhaustion of the retired workers, their obligation to work again was approached in terms of immorality. Dominantly, retired men of the neighborhood had started to work again as watchman in construction site of TOKİ houses in the neighborhood or as worker in Siteler. Özlem’s, Cavidan’s and Mualla’s emphasis on the exploitative conditions of working as a retired person reflects Brown’s claim of “the neoliberal subject is granted no guarantee of life (on the contrary, in markets, some die for others to live), and is so tethered to economic ends as to be potentially sacrificible to them” (2015: 111) at the ground level as

My husband works (as a hammersmith in Siteler) because he is obliged to. He walks with a limp; if we are not indebted, he would not be working. Who wants to work as a retired person? He would like to practice his religious duties in the mosque, however he comes to home at night after work and perform his prayer in a very tired state at home. (Özlem)

My 75 year old father still works; wherever he finds job, he goes there. Now he is a night watchman in the TOKİ construction site in the neighborhood. If you do not pay the installments one month, they take back the house the next month. The state sends a warning and if you do not pay it, it counts the installments that you had paid as rent. For instance, if you are required to get 40 thousand TL, it pays you only 20 thousand TL following the cuts that are counted for rent and depreciation. In this way, the state kicks you out of the house. (Cavidan)

We cut every other expenses. My husband’s pension amounts to 1700 TL, we are paying 700 TL for the monthly installments here, the management fee is 85 TL; taking into consideration the increasing expenses (heating, etc.) in the winter only 200 TL will remain from that

pension. Make your livelihood with that 200 TL, if you can... Moreover, my husband works as a cook in the restaurant in Polatlı from time to time. He used to work even at nights, but he quit this kind of work 2 month ago. At that time, he was working in 2 jobs at the same time, one at the TCDD (Turkish State Railways) and the other at a restaurant in Eymir. He used to come home around at 1 or 2 am. Sometimes he even did not come back to home since Gölbaşı is so far away. (Mualla)

With the total income that is constituted by the pension and the wage of new jobs, households are barely making a living. Mualla and her family are thinking about selling their flat due to her husband's exhausted condition. Nevertheless, because of the remaining 9 years of installments and the demanded value as down payment for the amount of money that Mualla's family had paid for 6 years, potential buyers abstain from purchasing. On the other hand, according to the narrative of Hayriye, they were getting food aid due to their desperate financial situation; however, when her husband started to work as a retired person in order to be able to pay the installments, the state cut this aid. Hayriye's experiences openly reveal how a social housing policy of the state appropriates the income of low-income groups by making them to work in order to benefit from 'social' policy. At the same time, the state prevents the individual from becoming eligible for another social policy (food aid) because of the 'actually existing' conditions of social housing policy.

When concern of making ones livelihood had outweighed the view of traditional gender roles, women had to work mostly in precarious jobs as a cleaning lady, a worker in the textile industry, and so forth. Compared to working as a retired person, women's attitude towards compelling jobs are close to the men who work in two jobs in terms of the ethic of work. Although many women expressed how they endured the compelling conditions of precarious labor in order to be able to afford the monthly payments, Esma's narrative, in particular, is worthy of detailed consideration. Esma had never worked outside the home until they moved into TOKİ social housing and she used to have much higher standards of consumption during *gecekondu* times in terms of being able to go on holiday, shop from luxury stores and be able to go out for dinner due to owning a *gecekondu* and not paying any rent. However, when they moved into TOKİ and her husband's wage was not sufficient to pay the monthly payments she started to work in a precarious job with compelling conditions. Crucially, the aspiration of having a middle-class social environment in terms of a 'modern house' and higher income neighbors, outweighs the consumption standards in *gecekondu* times and makes her to stand out against the compelling conditions of work. She thoroughly expresses how such aspirations mask the exploitative conditions:

At that time, I got into a scrape. We were young, I wanted to buy, I wanted to eat, I wanted my lifestyle during the *gecekond* times in here. May God not put anybody back from what she sees. I was in such hardships that I could not buy bread. May God forbid anyone from such hardships! Only this year we are good, the past 6 years of my mine were like poison. I would not say that I had lived and enjoyed. For instance, the kitchen in my workplace was very cold, I could not feel my feet in boots. I worked in such conditions for a year without insurance and for only 600 TL per month.

My life struggle was different, I said I am young, I can work. Still there are women who work as cleaning ladies in order to pay the installments. There are people who dress up their children with the old clothes of neighbors. What else they can do? Thanks God, I had never dressed up my children with other people's old clothes, but my life struggle was much bigger.

I did not ask anything from anybody, I did not say anything about my compelling conditions. It depends only on myself. However, I pray a lot to God, like, do not disappoint me, I worked very hard in order to acquire a flat. I pray a lot for having a flat here. We wanted to buy a house from other places, but it had not been possible. We tried to receive a loan from the bank when all these credits started, but it was not possible. However, we became homeowners from such a small land. I have a house that I could not dream for.

I experienced every difficulty, now my life is much better. The school bus gets my children from the door, they collect the garbage from my door. You can send your children to social activities such as tennis, basketball. For instance, my neighbor sends her children to these activities and asks if I would also like to send. Back in *gecekond* times no one offered such activities. No one could afford for it. Now we are living with good people. I am very happy. I am so glad that it happened. I am not regretting for any of the difficulties. I am so glad that the state gave us this opportunity. I am not angry, but the payments are very high. Nevertheless, the state gave us a good life. We have learned to live like a human.

As it is evident from the narratives that are related with the three different conditions of work (working in more than one jobs and working in retired status for men and entrance to the labor market for women), calculative capacity which is triggered by being able to make debt payments in order to acquire a 'modern house', 'middle class social environment' and not to be 'kicked out of social housing' induces a new model of economic conduct based on a particular ethic of work that causes acceptance of exploitative work conditions which maximizes the 'workability' of subjects. The only opposition to such working conditions came from the ones whose biological limits (in relation to aging) did not allow them to maximize their 'workability'. In that regard, it is possible to assert that this model of economic conduct redefines the biologically necessary conditions of work, which outweighs the 'socially necessary' ones.

As it can be remembered from the beginning of this section, 'governing by debt', as a particular form of governmentality, contains both 'governing ourselves' and 'authority over others'. In that regard, this new work regime has a critical role for the latter aspect as well. According to critical political economy scholars, neoliberal social policies are replacing the welfare programs with workfare which is aimed at getting the surplus population (unemployed and

underemployed) to work (Soederberg 2014). With regard to the neoliberalization process in the global North, Peck claims that

The essence of workfarism [in its variegated national forms]... involves the imposition of a range of compulsory programmes and mandatory requirements for welfare recipients with a view to *enforcing work while residualizing welfare*. This does not mean that welfare itself completely disappears, but it does mean that the logic, structure and dynamics of the system of poor relief are transformed so as to maximize work participation while minimizing 'dependency' on welfare.

(Peck 2001: 10 cited in Soederberg 2014: 58-59)

Accordingly, the indebted social housing of TOKİ presents a peculiar case for workfarism under neoliberal social policies, since social assistance programs⁶⁵ of the state in the global North, as the critical tool for disciplining subjects in tandem with market rule, is lacking in this instance. Rather, the social housing policy of TOKİ leaves the disciplining of subjects directly to market rule. Moreover, as it can be recalled from Hayriye's experience of the cutting of social aid due to her husband's employment status, according oneself to the market rule has a retributive dimension which furthers the minimizing of 'dependency' to welfare.

5.5.2 Entrepreneurial Strategies

Apart from the new work regime, new model of economic conduct under indebtedness induces entrepreneurial strategies for making profit, regaining *gecekondu* life and earning a livelihood. Rather than a narrow meaning of 'entrepreneurship,' which corresponds to making one's own business, 'entrepreneurial strategies' reveal the ways in which the logic of enterprise (risk-taking, innovation, continuous improvement, etc.) are implemented towards a wide array of goals.

Although for different aims, Mehtap's and Nalan's relationship to indebted housing presents how the quasi-mortgage payment scheme of TOKİ leads to a conception of housing as a financial asset. Mehtap, as the only woman among her siblings, was not able to further her education at the university level due to the view of traditional gender roles in the family which envision women as the 'wife' and 'mother' whose only duty is caring for the family. However, Mehtap's mother Döndü challenged this dominant view by letting her daughter attend courses

⁶⁵ HOPE VI program in U.S. initiated in the early 1990s in order to transform public housing's which were identified with concentrated poverty. Especially with the re-structuring of the program in 1994, former public housing tenants subjected to a new disciplinary mechanisms (such as behaving in acceptable ways, being under the threat of eviction if any member of the household involves in a criminal activity, mandatory community service (Hackworth 2007: 51)) in order to continue to receive their housing benefits.

secretly in order to become cosmetician. When she got her certificate and started to work as a cosmetician, she eventually started to contribute to the income of the family and, by extension, the male members of the family did not oppose to Mehtap for her money-making job. Moreover, Mehtap enrolled in new courses and she became Pilates teacher and a life coach which induced the increment of her income by the new job opportunities that promise higher wages. In the meantime, Döndü realized that all the income that Mehtap earned had been appropriated by her brothers. In order to prevent the wasting her daughter's income by her sons and transform her daughter's income into a 'profitable' investment, she convinced Mehtap to buy an indebted flat from the social housing of TOKİ. Hence, Mehtap paid 35.000 TL to a *gecekondu* owner in order to transfer his right for social housing to her. In this way she became an indebted homeowner in the social housing of TOKİ. However, she opted to live with her parents and youngest brother in the flat that their family had been entitled by their own *gecekondu*. Hence, she rented the new flat and so the monthly payments of the indebted flat are compensated by the rent that comes from the tenant. Moreover, following this purchase, Mehtap bought another indebted flat (again following the suggestion of her mother), but this time, she bought it from a former *gecekondu* owner, who could not make the monthly payments, for 70.000 TL and rented this flat as well. Nevertheless, at the time when she bought these flats she did not have any savings, hence she received a loan from several different banks and changed her employment with regular hours of work and insurance to a non-standard employment with flexible hours of work and without insurance, in order to be able to pay the loan. As she thoroughly explains:

When I got these houses, I asked myself 'how will I pay 3500 every month for the bank loans?'. I was off my oats, I was thinking what to do, like, 'shall I sell my car?' or 'shall I start drinking?! I was working at Bilkent Sports International when I bought my first house. At the time (2013) my wage was 1200 TL together with 500 TL premium. Also, I was giving a few private courses. However, when I bought the second house (in 2016), I started to work part-time at Medicana Hospital. I was working there until 12-1 pm, then giving private courses (Pilates, massage) until 11 pm. Nevertheless, I quit my part-time job 6 months ago and started to give only private courses, since I need to work two times harder in order to be able to pay the bank loans. I can work in a standard job for 2000 TL from 9 am to 6 pm however private courses are more profitable as I got the same amount of money (on a daily basis) with 2-3 customers in a day. For instance, if I worked yesterday and not today, yesterday's income compensates for today's. Also, I can organize my time according to my decisions and I do not need to give an account to anyone. I am free! Of course, I had the freedom to choose customers before, I was not giving courses to everyone. However, the compelling conditions of bank loan forced me to quit my part-time job as well. I got into a psychology of 'gain from demand'. If my friends determine the price of their course as 150-200 TL, then I had to accept one who gives 100 TL. I am gaining from demand. I cannot choose customers, I am accepting every customer. Of course, there are difficulties and problems, but you just do not see it. In order not to see these things, I became a life coach. I started the treatment for myself; then I began to cure other people.

Now, I am able to pay the bank loans for two houses, installments of my car, my nephew's private school installments, my credit card's installments and also I am helping my youngest brother. Of course, there are some expenses for my personal care as well. You see, when I started to count all these expenses it corresponded to a great amount of money. Sometimes I told myself that all these expenses are exceeding my income; I am getting shocked from all these. If you ask about savings, I do not have any. All these are investment. I do not have any cash, but somehow it goes.

As it is evident from Mehtap's account, TOKİ's homeownership system that is based on installments enables one to view homeownership as a financial asset among the beneficiaries of the social housing. Approaching homeownership as a financial asset induces to the development of an active economic subject who is tethered to entrepreneurial strategies for guaranteeing the future payments. What Mehtap's narrative reveals in this context is a conception of the self as human capital. She invests in herself with the certificate programs, through which she increases the income that comes from this particular 'capital'.

Nalan and her husband, on the other hand, had to develop entrepreneurial strategies not for investment purposes, as in Mehtap's case, but because of the inability to make monthly payments for the social housing. Nalan's husband used to be a self-employed hairdresser, however when the costs exceeded the profit, he closed his shop and became wage-laborer in another barber shop. Nevertheless, they are still struggling for affording the monthly payments. During the period that this interview took place, they were trying to sell their indebted house and planning to initiate an olive oil business (Nalan's father-in-law has an olive grove in Selçuk) with the money that will come from the sale of the house. Nalan explains the generation of this entrepreneurial strategy as:

There is no way other than selling this house. There are 9 more years (to finalize the payments), 9 years later my son will serve his military duty. My husband graduated from primary school. You can work as a hairdresser up to a certain point. When he comes to 40-50 years old he has to quit. As long as we have an indebted house, we will not own anything since we will not be able to make an investment anywhere else, but if we sell our house right now we will be able to generate capital. If God allows and we make profit from olive oil business we can buy another house. Business will bring a house to us, a house does not bring business. My husband gets 1800 TL and we are paying 850 TL for the installments. However, when our two children grow up their expenses will increase together with the payments of the house. Therefore, we decided to sell our house and make our business while we are still young. There is no other possible way. In the future we can apply to KOSGEB⁶⁶. However, first you need capital to buy the necessary equipment and then KOSGEB pays you back. Since we do not have any capital we cannot apply to KOSGEB. When we sell our house, we are planning to buy a car and make a mobile olive oil business, then we will open a shop. You need to establish a regularity, opening a shop in the first place is too risky. We are

⁶⁶ Small and medium industry development organization: State institution that provides credits for small and medium enterprises.

planning to open a shop in Çankaya or Çayyolu, somewhere there. So, everything depends on this house. As soon as this house is sold, we are directly going to Selçuk. Right now there is a flyer on our window. We are demanding 140.000 TL with regard to the payments that we already paid and the expenses that we made for the house (cupboards, wardrobes, etc.). Many people got interested but the remaining debts dissuade people from buying it.

Although the main purpose of social housing is to provide sheltering for a population that cannot meet their housing need through the market, these two cases present how the indebtedness itself generates a new model of economic conduct that transforms the initial purpose of social housing into an investment tool. Even if the aim of those investments contrast each other, the logic behind the economic conducts is the same, namely, leaning towards entrepreneurial strategies in order to struggle with future uncertainties.

Going back to a *gecekondu* in the same neighborhood constitutes another entrepreneurial strategy that has been developed by the beneficiaries of the TOKİ social housing. Crucially, the ones who opt to return to *gecekondus* are not moving there because of the difficulties of their payment. Rather, they prefer the ‘conformity’ of *gecekondu* to the ‘modernity’ of apartment flat. However, the condition of moving back to *gecekondu* is to guarantee future housing needs with other means, since the place where *gecekondus* are located are planned as commercial parcels, and eventually they will be demolished. In that regard, continuing the *gecekondu* life has a cost. Kartal and Nevin are the two beneficiaries who moved back to their *gecekondus* using entrepreneurial strategies.

Kartal is a real estate agent who was born and raised in the neighborhood. He became a real estate agent with the beginning of the state-led urban development project in the neighborhood. Becoming a real estate agent at the beginning of the transformation process reflects a highly rational action and constitutes an instance of entrepreneurial strategy. By the time he managed to make savings with the commissions that he earned by renting and selling flats and buying the flats from the ones who cannot afford the payments and selling them with profit. In this way he became one of the richest in the neighborhood (according to narratives of the former *gecekondu* residents) and reconditioned the *gecekondu* in which he was born. Moreover, a debtless flat is inherited from his father-in-law which is in the construction process. He leans towards the idea of exchanging his *gecekondu* with a shop when the commercial buildings begin to be constructed. Because of his entrepreneurial strategies, he is one of the ‘winners’ to come out of these neoliberal urban policies, however, quite ironically, the winner rejects the promised ‘modernity’ and acts against the purpose of this project by moving back to the *gecekondu*.

Nevin and her extended family, on the other hand, had several *gecekondu*s in the neighborhood, as well as in Ulus and Keçiören. When she was working as a civil servant, she bought a flat in Esat from a tax sale (haciz satışı). With the beginning of the transformation in the neighborhood she became a right-holder from her old *gecekondu* and moved from Esat neighborhood to Gülveren. After a while, she sold her indebted house and moved back to another *gecekondu* in the neighborhood. In the meantime, she rented the flat in Esat and struggled for the increment of the current value of her *gecekondu* in Ulus. The entrepreneurial strategies of Nevin and her family started to develop with the construction wave of the 1980s. Exchanging their *gecekondu* for a constructor-made apartment bloc in Keçiören during the late 1980s led to the development of economic conduct among the members of this family. With the knowledge that they acquired during the transformation process in Keçiören, they implemented specific strategies to increase their profit in Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project and the up-coming transformation in Ulus. Although they became one of the ‘winners’ of the neoliberal urban policies, Nevin fervently opposed the urban transformation projects in Turkey due to the unfairness based on the exchange value. Remarkably, the motive of gain together with entrepreneurial strategies that she developed during these processes were ‘accidentally’ revealed during the interview when she was asked me not to write down the number of properties that she owns and the “real” reason behind her moving back to *gecekondu*. Even though she opted to move back to the *gecekondu* and reconditioned it for the ‘conformity’ purposes, she demanded it to be written because of her ‘desperate financial situation’. Actually, she was not desperate, but playing according to the new rules of the game, namely, trying to maximize her profit in every possible way. In that regard, her attitude reveals how the new model of economic conduct also leads to the legitimization of fraud. In this way, such conduct reproduces the negative linkage of ‘complicity’ that holds society together in place of a positive ‘ethico-political’ ingredient (Erdoğan 2015), which has been mentioned in the Chapter 4.

Hence, *gecekondu* life as the critical strategy of a subsistence economy, transforms into a ‘privilege’ in the roll-out phase of neoliberalism that only the ‘winners,’ with their entrepreneurial strategies, can acquire. Nevertheless, apart from the acquisition of *gecekondu* life, the *gecekondu* itself becomes an instrument for entrepreneurial strategies as well.

Nazlı and Mehmet (Döndü’s youngest son), instrumentalized their *gecekondu* in an entrepreneurial way in order to make their livelihood. Nazlı, who moved to Keçiören in 2000 when she got married, moved back to the neighborhood following the transformation process.

When her husband's jewellery business went bankrupt, Nazlı and her nuclear family used Nazlı's parents' right to social housing in the neighborhood instead of being a tenant in Keçiören. Meanwhile, Nazlı's parents' opted to move to Karapürçek in order to continue stock farming, which they used to do in the neighborhood until the transformation project started. Due to the bankruptcy, Nazlı and her nuclear family had financial difficulties which led them to put their indebted flat up for sale. Despite waiting for two years, they could not sell the flat and in the end Nazlı rented one of the old *gecekondu*s in the neighborhood in order to make a grocery (bakkal) business upon her mother's advice (since they did this business back in the *gecekondu* period as well). In this way, they managed to fix their financial conditions and decided not to sell their flat. Moreover, the new model of economic conduct on the basis of entrepreneurial strategies, which is induced by indebtedness, not only reflects itself with the initiation of small business, but also with financial transactions. Instead of paying the ever-increasing installments, Nazlı and her nuclear family made her mother receive a loan for stock farming, and used this loan to pay off their entire debt for social housing. Compared to the interest rate for social housing, this loan has a much lower interest rate and the amount of the debt is stable in contrast to social housing. Hence, with novel entrepreneurial strategies Nazlı and her nuclear family managed to transform their financial difficulties in relation to indebtedness into a financial opportunity.

Mehmet's instrumentalization of his *gecekondu* reflects another entrepreneurial strategy. While working as a gardener in the Greater Municipality of Ankara, Mehmet rented a *gecekondu* in the neighborhood and started poultry husbandry. He invested the money that he borrowed from his brother to buy the special type of chickens whose eggs promise a much higher exchange value (10 TL per egg) when compared to standard chickens. At the time this interview took place, the chickens were young, therefore he had not started to make profit from this business yet. Nevertheless, apart from renting a *gecekondu* for this purpose, his novel entrepreneurial strategies were reflected in the idea of marketing these eggs as well. He knew from his sister Mehtap, who gives private courses in the 'rich' districts of Ankara that her customers are eager to consume 'expensive' and 'healthy' food. He asked her sister to sell these eggs to 'rich' customers. Even though the chickens had not laid their eggs yet, Mehmet was already taking orders from these customers.

Consequently, *gecekondu* has been instrumentalized for entrepreneurial strategies in two different ways; for the 'winners' (as in Kartal's and Nevin's cases) of neoliberal urban policies it became a means for 'privileged' life and for the 'losers' of these policies (as in Nazlı's and

Mehmet's cases) it became a means for fixing their financial conditions. Moreover, a generalization of entrepreneurial strategies (to the extent that it cross-cuts both 'winners' and 'losers') implies how it becomes a 'conduct' that organizes every sphere of life.

5.5.3 Judgements on the Responsibilization

As is evident from both the new work regime and entrepreneurial strategies, market-led economic conduct induced by indebtedness ensures that beneficiaries accept employment under any conditions or develop new ways for earning a livelihood in order to be able to make quasi-mortgage payments. Under these conditions, the individual itself is "forced to engage in a particular form of self-sustenance" (Brown 2015: 84) in which s/he becomes responsible for all kinds of risks. Moreover, such conduct shapes the judgement of individuals in relation to this form of responsabilization. As the narratives of Nilüfer and Esma recall, the individual ability to pay is praised as normative behavior. Moreover, such ability has been related to the 'bigger life struggle' in Esma's account. This comparison of 'struggles' implies that the ones who are not able to pay the debts are not struggling enough; hence, it is all about self-responsibility. Crucially, judgements that praise self-responsibility are uttered by those who 'appropriately' took the responsibility of paying the debts, namely, the ones who accord themselves to market rule and fulfill the necessary conditions for it. Furthermore, according to those who made 'rational' decisions before the transformation project began are also regarded as necessary 'responsible' actions. By extension, the ones who did not foresee the transformation project and did not fulfill necessary conditions (not getting the title deeds or not making an effort to own a *gecekondu*) are judged as 'irrational', hence, 'it is their fault'. Galip's and Ali's narratives shed light on this dimension of responsibility.

Galip and his parents used to reside in a *gecekondu* in another district of Mamak called Kayaş. During the electoral period in 2007 the municipality promised them to give formal title deeds if they made the necessary payments for the deeds. According to Galip's narrative, nobody in the neighborhood believed the promise of the municipality (since they had experienced unrealized promises in the previous elections) and they did not pay the expenses of the deed, except Galip's family. With regard to their formal title deed, which contains a large tract of land, they were entitled to three debtless flats in the social housing of TOKİ in Kayaş. Nevertheless, due to the delay in the construction of the social housing, they opted to buy another *gecekondu* in Gülveren in order to have right for the social housing of TOKİ in Gülveren, where construction had already started. Hence, while waiting for their other flats,

they continued to make ‘rational’ decisions and became indebted homeowners in Gülveren. Meanwhile, they started to get rent allowances for their upcoming flats in Kayaş and they used this allowance for the monthly payments on their indebted flat in Gülveren. With regard to their rational decisions, they became one of the ‘winners’ of the neoliberal urban policies. Nevertheless, according to Galip, people who did not foresee this will pay much higher installments since they did not make use of the opportunity that enabled them to get formal title deeds. Galip blames these *gecekondu* residents themselves for their high amounts of debt since they did not act in ‘rational’ way. What this ‘rationality’ implicates is the ability to foresee the speculative valuation of land rent and making the right decisions in relation to that. However, ‘speculation’ itself is a form of gambling, and foreseeing the consequence of it requires a market logic, in particular. Thus, Galip approaches the embodiment of ‘market rationality’ as the normative reason and the lack of it is the individual’s own mistake.

Ali, on the other hand, worked as a porter in Siteler and delivered furniture to the newly constructed apartment blocks in many districts of Ankara during the construction wave of the 1980s. Witnessing the transformation of the urban landscape made him think that investment in land is a most profitable decision for guaranteeing one’s future. Hence, since the 1980 he gradually invested all of his income in four *gecekondu*s in Gülveren, building plots in Gülseren and one apartment flat in Cebeci. Through the periodic buying and selling of *gecekondu*s, building plots and flats, he, in the end, became the owner of two apartment flats made by a contractor (which he gave to his two sons, respectively) and the right-based owner for two debtless flats in the TOKİ social housing in Gülseren (just across from Gülveren). While waiting for the finalization of the construction in Gülseren, he resided in the TOKİ social housing in Gülveren as a tenant. When the construction ends, he will move into one of the flats in Gülseren and give the other flat to his daughter. Throughout the interview, Ali kept mentioning how clever he was to invest all his savings in the land. Moreover, in his judgement, those who are paying higher amounts of rent indicate how the ‘market rationality’ responsabilizes the individuals:

There was a man who lived here for 60 years, brother Cemil. He had a girl and 3 sons. However, he does not have anything. Now, he resides in his flat with 100 thousand TL debt. He pays 800 TL per month for the installments, his wage goes to the installments. He cannot even buy cigarettes. The children are working but they barely feed themselves. Do not you think that he is in financial difficulty? Nevertheless, if he were a clever man, he would buy a *gecekondu* from here, maybe 2 *gecekondu*s, then he would have 2 flats. Then, his children would also be homeowners. If he were a clever man, if he had the intelligence, all of his children would be homeowners right now. It was a big opportunity. However, only the clever ones utilized this opportunity. If I said ‘I did not have anything inherited from my father,

what will I do with all these lands?', my sons would be in a rough situation, me as well. I would have just my pension and reside as a tenant, in which I would be paying 500 TL. Another 500 TL would go to fuel, etc. So, I would be starving with the remaining 500 TL. However, now, I have a house and 1500 TL pension. My wife and I, we are kings!

Hence, as it is evident from all these accounts, the embodiment of market rationality induces judging every decision on the basis of this rationality. When it becomes a normative condition, the responsibility for each act that contradicts this particular rationality must be undertaken by the individual itself. Accordingly, financial difficulty or poverty becomes a matter of individual responsibility.

As a result, this chapter sought to explore the rationality behind the hegemonic conception of private property relations on the basis of homeownership and how such rationality generates new forms of subjectivity as the "new types of humanity" (Gramsci 2000: 210). Following Foucault's 'governmentality' framework, this chapter discussed the formation of subjectivity in relation to changing practices of 'economy'. It has been claimed that the 'subsistence economy' of *gecekondu* times prevented individual motives by the embeddedness of 'economy' and 'social relations' on the basis of 'common interest' and 'neighborliness'. Nevertheless, the very process of hegemonic politics of homeownership (complex intertwining of consent and coercive mechanisms) led to the new model of economic conduct among the former *gecekondu* residents in which the 'motive of gain' and 'inequality as the legitimate ground' replaced 'common interest'. Aspirations of 'modern life' and 'obligation of debt' within the social housing program of TOKİ induced dissemination of the market model into the social relations in which 'neighborliness' lost its prior function. Through indebtedness in particular, these elements of the new model of economic conduct materialized in the new work regime, entrepreneurial strategies and the responsabilization of former *gecekondu* residents. Hence, the enactment of a new private property regime through the social housing of TOKİ within the hegemonic project of AKP lead to the formation of economic-rational individuals as the 'neoliberal subjectivities' which reproduce the ethico-political ground of private property relations. Recalling from the theoretical framework, hegemony, for Gramsci, is a 'continuous process of formation' (Gramsci 2000: 206). In that regard, 'formation' of new subjectivities becomes an indispensable aspect of hegemonic 'project's as the "vital resources and allies for the 'government' of economic life" (Miller and Rose 2008: 27).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Research Problem Revisited

This thesis problematized the new private property regime in the form of homeownership program of TOKİ within the AKP rule and attempted to discuss it through the homeownership processes of former *gecekondu* residents within said TOKİ programs. This problematization is conceptualized through the hegemony perspective of Gramsci and is elaborated by the governmentality discussions of Foucault. Within this framework, two interrelated questions were formulated: ‘How is the ‘conception’ of private property (in the form of TOKİ’s homeownership program) constituted and disseminated among the *gecekondu* residents?’ and, by extension, ‘What is the implication of the ‘economic’ understanding within the new private property regime for the conduct of *gecekondu* residents?’.

In order to contextualize this problematization, this study approached the new private property regime as a particular hegemonic project of the AKP, which aims to re-consolidate neoliberal hegemony. Within this context, two research questions examined the ‘ethico-political’ ground of this hegemonic project. However, as Gramsci emphasizes, hegemony is both ‘ethico-political’ and ‘economic’ (2000: 212). In other words, hegemonic projects intend to ensure class alliance by “adapting the ‘civilization’ and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production (2000: 210)”. In this regard, Chapter 3 investigated the ‘economic’ ground of the hegemonic project in order to clarify conditions of possibility for the constitution of an ‘ethico-political’ ground. Nevertheless, such a formulation does not intend to give a determinative force to ‘economic’ ground. Rather, how the neoliberal accumulation regime has been enacted by subsequent political parties’ urban reforms since the 1980’s through restructuring the state-system was investigated. ‘Economic’ ground, in that regard, means the production of class interests for both dominant and subordinate classes in order to re-consolidate neoliberal hegemony. Accordingly, this chapter sheds light on the class interests that are enacted by

different schemes for re-distribution of land rent since the 1980's. As this study focuses on a particular fraction of subordinate population (i.e. *gecekondu* residents), emphasis has been given to hegemonic struggles for the production of this faction's interests. In that regard, this chapter analyzed the transformation of institutional mechanisms that enable the commodification of *gecekondu* settlements and redefine schemes for the distribution of land rent between *gecekondu* residents, individual developers and the state. This transformation was examined according to 'roll-back' (reflected by the ANAP government) and 'roll out' (reflected by AKP governments) neoliberalism periods. Urban governance reforms during the 'roll back' neoliberalism period commodified *gecekondus* for the first time in Turkey's urbanization history by tenure legalization (either through formal title deeds or TTB's) and, in this way, led to the construction of apartment blocks in place of *gecekondus*. This practice of post-hoc rationalization distributed land rent between *gecekondu* residents and individual developers. Nevertheless, not all of the *gecekondu* settlements benefitted from this practice. *Gecekondu* settlements that had complex property structure or stigmatized image (i.e. core of crime) were excluded from the formal land market, and further caused the widening of the rent gap until the early 2000s. With the 'roll-out' neoliberalism period, which was marked by the AKP governments' political-economic interventions, urban governance reforms removed the obstacles that prevent the institutionalization of private property regime in such *gecekondu* settlements and historic areas. Laws that are related with urban renewal and re-structuring of TOKİ initiated a new scheme for the re-distribution of land rent. What was new in this scheme was two-fold. On the one hand, land rent in *gecekondu* settlements were not directly handed over to *gecekondu* residents and individual developers, as before. Rather, the state becomes a realizer of value (through cooperation of urban renewal programs and TOKİ) and re-distribute land rent to *gecekondu* residents and individual developers according to its own rationale. On the other hand, *gecekondu* residents, who were excluded from formal land market until the AKP's urban governance reform, aimed to be included to formal land and financial markets through the indebted home ownership program of TOKİ (i.e. TOKİ 'quasi-mortgage' payments system). In this way, the new private property regime becomes a particular hegemonic project of AKP that aims to deepen capitalist market relations by integrating hitherto excluded factions of population in the 'roll-out' phase of neoliberalism. In its broader context, this project aimed to ensure class-alliance by attracting capitalist classes for the potential land rent in the historic and informal (i.e. *gecekondu*) areas, which are targeted by the urban renewal projects, and offering indebted social housing of TOKİ for the related population in these areas. Hence, Chapter 3 investigated how the institutional and legal re-

structuring of state under successive AKP governments ensured class-alliance ‘from above’ through a hegemonic project based on the new private property regime. Having clarified the re-structuring of the state for the re-consolidation of neoliberal accumulation regime as the ‘economic’ dimension of the hegemonic project, Chapter 4 and 5 examine the ‘ethico-political’ dimension of it, as the subject-matter of research questions.

For Gramsci, civil society is not only understood through its position in the relations of production. What also needs to be examined is how a ruling class gains the strategic measure of the consent of subordinate fractions in civil society. In that regard, hegemonic projects require an ‘ethico-political’ ground in order to ‘cement’ and ‘unify’ (Gramsci 2000: 330) subordinate fractions to the ‘decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (2000: 212). This ground is constituted by an “intellectual unity and ethic in conformity with a particular conception of reality” (2000: 334) of a ruling class. A particular conception of reality provides a “material and ideological force into the daily lives of ordinary people (Hall 1988: 6)”, thus, it re-makes the commonsense in which certain ways of thinking, feeling, talking and calculating are naturalized and become inevitable. Hence, commonsense of subordinate fractions is a critical terrain on which hegemonic struggles take place in order to construct and disseminate a particular conception of reality. Within this framework, Chapter 4 tried to understand ‘How is the ‘conception’ of private property (in the form of homeownership program of TOKİ) constituted and disseminated among the *gecekondu* residents?’ as the ‘ethico-political’ ground of the hegemonic project. Based on qualitative research conducted with former *gecekondu* residents about their experiences in the home ownership process through the indebted homeownership program of TOKİ in Gülveren – Ankara, Chapter 4 examined the mechanisms of consent and coercion that re-make the commonsense of former *gecekondu* residents in tandem with the ‘conception’ of private property. Since power relations between the state and civil society, for Gramsci, are envisioned as the continuum between the poles of consent and coercion, framing the ‘conception’ of private property within this analytical lens provides to exceed locating a particular conception of reality solely on consensual or coercive practices. In that regard, this chapter investigated how the intertwining of consent and coercive mechanisms enable the construction of a ‘conception’ of private property in the form of TOKİ’s homeownership program. Accordingly, consent and coercion are approached as the forces that articulate different layers of commonsense for the constitution new conception of reality based on private property. For the analytical clarity, consent and coercive mechanism are examined separately.

A decent image of an apartment flat due to the difficult physical conditions of *gecekondu*, encounters with neighbors, relatives, etc. who moved to apartment flats and its symbolic weight as upward class mobility constituted a significant dimension for aspiring to inhabit an apartment flat, whether constructed by TOKİ or by individual developers. Moreover, long-standing rumors of transformation projects in Gülveren, while the many other *gecekondu* settlements were transforming into apartment blocks in Ankara since the 1980s, generated a solid expectation for acquiring a decent apartment flat. However, the fragmentary ownership pattern and stigmatized image of the neighborhood (as the core of crime) prevented individual developers from investing in this neighborhood. Hence, *gecekondu* residents of Gülveren were quite grateful to TOKİ for actualizing their long-awaited apartment flats. Moreover, the ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system of TOKİ makes homeownership more economic when compared to tenancy, since the monthly installments of this payment system are quite similar to paying rent every month, but in the end, they can be a homeowner. As this payment system requires a regular wage for at least 15 years, *gecekondu* residents who engage in criminal activities could not afford regular payments and they had to move out of the neighborhood. According to former *gecekondu* residents’ narrative, TOKİ, as a state institution, ensured ‘law and order’ in the neighborhood, which could not be possible in any other ways. These four different but related layers (a decent image of an apartment flat, rumors of transformation project, homeownership vs. tenancy, cleaning the criminal elements) are responded to within the indebted homeownership program of TOKİ in Gülveren and constituted as a mechanism for the construction of consent. Therefore, interventions of the state are legitimized and materialized in the conception of ‘becoming a homeowner through the social housing of TOKİ’. Nevertheless, contracting processes between *gecekondu* residents and TOKİ reveal that the construction of such a conception is not exempt from coercion. Although the former *gecekondu* residents were grateful to TOKİ for the ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system, what they encountered were the actual prices that they have to pay every month (which are subject to incremental increases every six months due to the interest rates) for 15 years during the contracting process. Moreover, not all of the residents had solvency for such a long period of time, and not all of them understood the implications of the interest rates. However, TOKİ officers made those residents sign the contracts without the necessary information about the increasing amount of payments due to the interest rates. In this way, TOKİ abused the financial illiteracy of *gecekondu* residents in order to make them to accept the conditions of the payment system. Even though residents have a right to sue TOKİ if they are not satisfied with the conditions in the contract (such as exchange value of *gecekondus*), in actual practice, legal

rights prevent them from suing TOKİ. To illustrate, when they do not want to become a homeowner through TOKİ, they are getting the exchange value of their *gecekondu* via paid installments that span over 3 years. This situation prevents them from buying another apartment flat from the market since contractors demand the down payment in batch payments. Moreover, if residents are not satisfied with the current value of the *gecekondus*, they can make TOKİ re-value it, however, the demand of re-valuation causes them to lose their right to social housing. Hence, legal rights provided to citizens to disaffirm TOKİ's decisions, by definition, force *gecekondu* residents to participate in the project in their actual practice. TTB holders, on the other hand, as one of the most disadvantaged groups, and became more vulnerable when compared to formal title deed owners. Their TTB does not count as a formal title deed, but they became eligible for the project just as formal title deed owners. Since they are 'undeserving' subjects, their field of action is strictly determined by the decisions of state, which causes them to accept every condition of TOKİ, whether it contradicts their legal rights or not. Nevertheless, not all coercive mechanisms originate directly from the state. Disaster Law (no.6306) entitles the majority (two third of the related population), rather than absolute majority, for the decision of transformation. In this way, a minority of the population, who disagrees about the conditions of transformation, have to accept the decision of the majority, which actually forces the ones who disagree to participate in the project. Hence, when the coercive mechanisms articulate into consensual aspects 'becoming homeowner through the social housing of TOKİ' becomes 'TOKİ as the only way to become a homeowner'. This particular conception of private property, which subjects the subordinate population to the neoliberal accumulation regime, becomes a new commonsense for *gecekondu* residents in relation to homeownership. Nevertheless, former *gecekondu* residents are not unaware of the capitalist class's interests that are inherent in the *Gecekondu* Transformation Project. With the encounter of unrealized promises (about the delivery dates of flats, affordability of the flats and social facilities), corruptive practices in TOKİ (such as bribery and favoritism) and appropriation of land rent by the state and capitalist factions related with the state, former *gecekondu* residents became aware that this whole project reflects the capitalist class's interest, in place of theirs. However, the openness of class interests do not generate counter-hegemonic claims from the subordinate population. According to the experiences of former *gecekondu* residents, as a subordinate population, politics, justice and state have never served the common interest, but rather the capitalist classes'. In that regard, the openness of class interests in this project are not an exception. As a result, consent and coercive mechanisms, on the one hand, dis-articulate homeownership by the means of market and being a tenant, on the other hand,

re-articulate homeownership only through the social housing of TOKİ. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents who reside in TOKİ social housing, this conception of homeownership is both an inevitable and an inescapable feature of contemporary social reality. This is the point where the conceptions of ruling and subordinate groups converge, and, hence, reflect the strategic measure of consent (even if it does not contain ‘consensus’) that is given from subordinate population ‘from below’ to the hegemonic project of the AKP.

According to Gramsci, material effectivity of a new conception of reality, as the reflection of ‘ethico-political’ ground that hegemonic projects aim to construct, depends on the formation of a “new types of humanity” (2000: 210), a new “personality” (2000: 340) of the “amorphous mass element” (ibid.) which is adapted to the “needs of the productive forces of development” in a “conscious and self-disciplined” (Fontana 2002: 173) way. Inquiry into this “personality” (2000: 340) of masses constitutes the object of second research question: “What is the implication of the ‘economic’ understanding within the new private property regime for the conducts of *gecekondu* residents?”, which Chapter 5 sought to examine. However, while Gramsci provides necessary analytical tools (i.e. analytics of consent and coercion) to investigate ‘how’ the new conception of reality is constituted, he does not elaborate the new “personality” (2000: 340) that is induced by the “new schemas for conceiving the world” (2000: 335). In order to shed light on this unexplored dimension of ‘ethico-political’ ground, this study opted to discuss it through Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality and neoliberal rationality, since his analytical framework enables a more elaborate understanding for the constitution of new subjectivities.

Crucially, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 did not follow a chronological order. In other words, the aforementioned inquiry did not start directly from the analysis of the ‘new personality of masses’. Rather, in order to give a clear account of this ‘personality’, Chapter 5 started the analysis with the constitutive outside of this ‘personality’, namely, the organization of ‘social relations’ and ‘economy’ during the *gecekondu* times. For this aim, Sahlins (1972) and Polanyi’s (1992) ‘substantivist’ understanding of economy provided necessary analytical tools to examine this organization. According to the narratives of former *gecekondu* residents, reciprocity and redistribution mechanisms (mostly related with the provision of basic needs such as preparing food, infrastructural services, preparation of food stock) during the times of residence in a *gecekondu* were based on common interests rather than motives of gain. The economy, led by common interests, was a function of social relations, in other words it was embedded in social relations, rather than other way around. Material manifestation of social

relations in this particular cultural setting was ‘neighborliness’, through which economy was organized. The process by which the new commonsense on the basis of private property was constituted (as the subject of Chapter 4), was then discussed in Chapter 5 as the introduction of market rule. In other words, how this new commonsense dis-embeds hitherto organization of ‘social relations’ and ‘economy’ is examined according to a generation of motive of gain and naturalization of inequality. Accordingly, during the contracting process with TOKİ (which became possible with the intertwining of consent and coercion mechanisms) some residents signed the contract for their gains in place of common benefit. Some residents developed individual tactics in order to be eligible for the project without considering collective action as in the *gecekondu* times; and some residents who were advantageous position in terms of their socio-economic status gained increased exchange value for their *gecekondus* by suing TOKİ. However, this process was against the benefit of the rest of the residents, whose apartment blocks were delayed until the time that court decisions had been declared. In these ways, the motive of gain was constituted against the common benefit. Since not all of the *gecekondu* residents had solvency for the 15 years long ‘quasi-mortgage’ payment system of TOKİ, their rights were bought by tenants in *gecekondus* who could not be eligible for the project otherwise. Although these ineligible residents did not consider this situation to be fair (since the ones who were displaced were their old neighbors), they legitimized it by their own benefit. Hence, when the housing policies of the state produce a ground of inequality, competition in order to benefit from scarce resources becomes the new way for self-sustenance, as opposed to solidarity during the *gecekondu* times. In this way, the conception of private property, in the form of homeownership through TOKİ, introduces a motive of gain and competition to the economic perspective of *gecekondu* residents, which contradicts to the ‘substantivist’ understanding of it. With this introduction, a “general regulation of society by the market” (Foucault 2008: 145) becomes possible. Crucially, market rule transforms the hitherto practices of ‘neighborliness’ as well. Everyday life in the apartment flat of TOKİ, as the symbol of ‘modern life style’, and the financial burden due to the TOKİ ‘quasi-mortgage’ payments system bring forward calculative practices in order to sustain this ‘modern life style’. These calculative practices leave no room for ‘humanity, trust, fraternity, solidarity, respect and sharing’, which marked the ‘neighborliness’ described of the *gecekondu* times. As a low-income population, *gecekondu* residents did not experience indebtedness to the extent that ‘quasi-mortgage’ payments system requires. Once they were interpreting debt as a ‘courageous action’, they become ‘obliged’ to make debt payments. This situation led to a redefinition of the individual. During the *gecekondu* times, an individual was defined according its position


in ‘neighborliness’ relations (its duties to sustain ‘neighborliness’). With the obligation of debt, the individual began to be defined according to its solvency, which leaves no room for sociability. Consequently, the introduction of market rule through the homeownership program of TOKİ induced a new model of economic conduct for *gecekondu* residents. This conduct was defined by the motive of gain and competition, rather than common interest. Moreover, the obligation to pay debt for sustaining a ‘modern life style’ that is induced by this conduct brings forward individuality, rather than sociability that is based on ‘neighborliness’.

Having clarified the new model of economic by emphasizing its constitutive outside of it and its implication on the organization of ‘economy’ and ‘social’ in this cultural setting, Chapter 5 continued to investigate how this conduct induces organization of the quotidian and professional tasks of former *gecekondu* residents. TOKİ’s debt obligation is understood as a particular technology of government, which operationalizes the neoliberal rationality. In other words, this study asserts that ways of dealing with the debt obligation in order to become homeowner through TOKİ enables a novel way of governing, namely ‘governing by debt’.

As the concept of governmentality corresponds both to control and self-control, the remaining part of Chapter 5 investigated how this indebtedness induced new ways for governing individuals’ economic life, which reproduces the conditions of a neoliberal accumulation regime. Accordingly, in order to shed light on the material implications of the indebtedness on the organization of economic life, former *gecekondu* residents’ experiences of new work regime, their entrepreneurial strategies and their judgements on the assignment of responsibility are discussed. As a low-income group, former *gecekondu* residents changed their work regime in order to be able to make debt payments. These changes include individuals working in two jobs simultaneously, retired residents starting to work again and the entrance of individuals who had never worked before into precarious labor markets. However, overwork and precarious jobs are legitimated by former *gecekondu* residents as necessary conditions for acquiring a ‘modern life style’. When this aspiration articulates with debt payments, an individual’s ability to pay debts becomes a praiseworthy behavior, which determines the new ethic of work. Apart from the new work regime, former *gecekondu* residents developed entrepreneurial strategies in order to afford their regular debt payments. While struggling to make payments, some of the former *gecekondu* residents developed novel ways to generate income. One of the ways this has been done is by approaching the TOKİ flat as financial asset and utilizing it as an investment. The very process of dealing with this financial asset transforms former *gecekondu* residents into actively neoliberal economic

subjects who have to implement the logic of enterprise to the professional and daily tasks in order to guarantee their ability to make future payments. Instrumentalizing (remaining) *gecekondu*s for making businesses (such as a grocery stores or poultry husbanding) is another novel way to generate income. The utilization of the *gecekondu* as an entrepreneurial instrument reveals how the commodification of *gecekondu* transforms approaches to means of survival, as well. Market-led economic conduct, which is reflected by new work regimes and entrepreneurial strategies, responsabilize individuals themselves for the future risks. When according oneself to the market rule (individual ability to pay debts) interpreted as the ‘appropriate’ action (new ethic of work), those who do not comply with market rule become ‘irrational’, and hence they are responsible for every risk that originates from their ‘irrational’ behavior. Accordingly, financial difficulty or poverty become the object of self-responsibility which must be undertaken by people who act in opposition to market rationality. As a result, the ‘conception’ of private property, which is formed through the complex intertwining of consent and coercion mechanisms, leads to a new model of economic conduct for the former *gecekondu* residents, which replaces hitherto organization of ‘social relations’ and ‘economy’ with a (new) market model. This conduct is based on motive of gain, competitiveness, entrepreneurial strategies and self-responsibility (as the reflection of neoliberal rationality) and transforms former *gecekondu* residents into economic-rational individuals, which constitute a particular form of ‘neoliberal subjectivities’. Moreover, ‘neoliberal subjectivities’ as the outcome of renewed commonsense based on private property become a re-productive force for the ‘ethico-political’ ground of the hegemonic project. Since hegemony is a ‘continuous process of formation’ (Gramsci 2000: 206), subjectivities (whose continuous formation is ensured by the indebtedness) provide the necessary resources for it.

The figure below presents the main argument of this thesis by emphasizing the relationship between research questions, key concepts, chapters and time line.



Consequently, this thesis demonstrated that an examination of the formation of a particular ‘ethico-political’ ground and its concrete implications on the subjects provides a deeper understanding of the contemporary political-economic regime, namely neoliberal hegemony. Approaching ‘political economic’ and ‘Foucauldian’ formulations of neoliberalism as complementary accounts, rather than as independent from each other, was a significant factor in the formulation of this understanding. This alternative theoretical position enabled the researcher to problematize formulations that were taken for granted in the literature and, by extension, provided an explanatory account through re-formulating them. In that regard, three points about this theoretical position are worth emphasize. First, focusing on the complex intertwining of mechanisms of consent and coercion for re-making the commonsense of the subordinate population (such as the formation of particular ‘ethico-political’ ground) in line with the hegemonic conception of private property challenged the dominant understanding of private property by presenting how this new commonsense is actually produced by the very relationship between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’, rather than solely by the ‘free will’ of civil society or ‘sheer force’ of state. Moreover, focusing on this ‘relational’ character of hegemony prevented envisioning subordinate classes as the passive receivers of social policies. Second, investigating the legitimation of the hegemonic project of AKP rule for the re-consolidation of neoliberal hegemony ‘from below’ revealed that new subjectivities are the crucial force for sustaining this legitimation. In other words, consent, coercion and governmentality are inseparable forms of power relations, but combining them in a strategic manner is necessary in order not to lose differences in each formulation, as the crucial aspect of their complementariness. Thus, third point, two-way relationship between hegemony and governmentality enables to exceed deficiencies in each formulation by the very differences. On the one hand, examining subjectivities through transformation of conducts explain ‘what hegemonic politics produces?’ in a tangible manner. On the other hand, social groups that enact hegemonic projects for maintaining class-alliance imply an agential element. Accordingly, this agential element provides the ontological condition of governmentality by relating it to the actual projects of definite social groups.

6.2 Gentrification Debate Revisited

As related in the Literature Review of this thesis, gentrification discussions in global South are conceptualized as the ‘social production of both land markets and urban subjectivities’. Urban renewal laws and the re-structuring of TOKİ under AKP rule in Turkey attempted to operationalize wide rent gaps in cities for the capitalist classes. Crucially, historic and informal

(i.e. *gecekondu*) areas, either through laws that protect historic areas or dynamic informal land markets in informal areas, were the main reason for the widening of the rent gap until the AKP government's urban governance reform. With the cooperation of urban renewal laws and a re-structured TOKİ, informal areas and their associated populations became a target for state-led development projects. These projects, on the one hand, opened new spaces for investment, on the other hand, led to the formation of new subjectivities based on conceptions of homeownership.

Within this framework, state-led development projects in Turkey follow larger patterns of gentrification in the global South. Nonetheless, the alternative theoretical position and qualitative research of this thesis made possible a novel contribution to gentrification discussions in the global South. A qualitative research study that took place in one of the state-led development projects in Ankara, namely Yatıkmusluk *Gecekondu* Transformation Project, has demonstrated that more than half of the former *gecekondu* residents were displaced before the project started. This displaced fraction of former population, according to narratives of the beneficiaries of project, were the most disadvantaged group in terms socio-economic status (mostly tenants and partly TTB holders that have lacking solvency for the 'quasi-mortgage' payment system of TOKİ). However, encounters with former *gecekondu* residents who became a tenant in the social housing of TOKİ has revealed that certain part of this primarily displaced group opted to return transformed neighborhood either in order to maintain connections with their relatives who reside in the social housing (especially since, as a low-income group, they benefit from the informal safety net of kinship in the form of childcare) or because their workplace is in Sıtlar and social housing's close location to Sıtlar lowers the transportation cost. They rent flats social housing either from foreign people (who never resided in the neighborhood before the transformation or afterwards) who bought flats for investment purposes or from former *gecekondu* residents who opted to rent his/her flat and reside somewhere else.

Hence, relying on the interviews and observations conducted, it is possible to assert that the tenure structure of the social housing is predominantly composed of former *gecekondu* residents. This observation challenges the 'class remake' aspect of gentrification in several ways. First, the incoming upper-class population is limited in this project. According to interviews, the upper classes do not want live in a place where the majority of residents are composed of lower classes. Even if some parts of upper-class reside in social housing, they protect their symbolic boundaries. To illustrate, they just use their flat as a basic sheltering

need; they socialize with people who share the same class conditions in other parts of Ankara; they do not let their children play with former *gecekondu* residents' children, and keep their contact with former *gecekondu* residents to a minimum despite latter group's efforts at socialization. Second, even if the former *gecekondu* residents' objective conditions of class (in terms of position in the relations of production) do not imply any upward mobility, due to the changes in the material conditions of housing (which has reflected as 'modern life', 'civilization') they interpret their social position as upwardly mobile. Moreover, their new ways of dealing with the 'quasi-mortgage' payments of TOKİ and their thoughts about this dealing reveal that the 'image' of being upper-class provides a necessary motivation for enduring worsening work conditions. Consequently, even if the 'class remake' was not actualized objectively, subjectively, it was. In that regard, this study argues that investigation of the new subjectivities that are enacted with the transformation projects enables a deeper understanding for the social implications of projects, as opposed to a 'one-dimensional' class analysis.

Aside from 'class remake' discussions, this study also questions the 'displacement/dispossession' assumption of the gentrification literature. Karaman (2014) has already pointed how contemporary urban renewal practices in Turkey are actually not aiming at direct displacement but in fact incorporating-in fact,indebting- hitherto-excluded populations into the formal financial services sector through 'quasi-mortgage' payments system of TOKİ. However, his formulation did not rely on the research with former *gecekondu* residents who reside in social housing; rather, he made this assertion through the narratives of *gecekondu* residents who wait for their flats to be constructed. In a way, this research took up where he left off, and investigated the implications of 'indebtedness' on the subjectivities of these individuals. In that regard, this study proved his hypothesis and thus became the second research that demonstrates the challenge the Turkish context places on the 'displacement' assumption of gentrification literature. Moreover, focusing on the complex intertwining mechanisms of consent and coercion in order to include former *gecekondu* residents into formal financial services, and by extension appropriate their income and savings, contributes to the gentrification discussions that problematize state-subsidized housing programs in the global South. These discussions have predominantly focused on the 'aspirations' for becoming a homeowner (Lees et al. 2016, Ley and Teo 2014, Salcedo 2010, Shin 2009b), however, this thesis included coercive mechanisms informing said 'aspirations' as well. In that regard, this

study argues that both consensual and coercive dynamics are significant for the 'legitimation' of and, thereby, subjection to market rule.

Consequently, problematizing the new private property regime, enacted via state-led urban development projects under AKP rule, through an alternative theoretical position informed by both the hegemony perspective of Gramsci and governmentality conceptualization of Foucault, contributes to the gentrification literature in the global South by putting forward dimensions of the complex intertwining of consent and coercion and new subjectivities. In this way, assumptions of 'class remake' and 'displacement' are questioned, resolved and explained with new dimensions, which enable a deeper understanding of contemporary social, political and economic transformations.

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APPENDICES

A. TABLE 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF THE (CITED) RESPONDENTS

| Table 1: Socio-Demographic Information of the (cited) Respondents | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|-----|--|---|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Respondent | Gender | Age | Occupation of the respondent | Occupation/s of the income generator/s in household | Income of household (TL) | House hold size | Family origin | Extended family's migration date to Gülvören | Date of moving into TOKİ | Monthly payments (TL)(2017) |
| Döndü | W | 57 | not working (worked as cleaner) | retired husband | 1600 | 5 | Kars | 1974 | 2008 | 800 |
| Mehtap (Döndü's daughter) | W | 35 | pilates teacher | | | | | | | |
| Mehmet (Döndü's son) | M | 26 | gardener | | | | | | | |
| Hayriye | W | 47 | not working (making handi craft) | retired husband | 1600 | 3 | Kazan | 1990 | 2008 | 425 |
| Güllü | W | 67 | not working | retired husband | 1600 | 2 | | 1990 | 2008 | 630 |
| Neriman | W | 59 | not working | son: waiter, daughter: cleaning lady | | 7 | Amasya | 1973 | | 500 |
| Nezahat | W | 49 | not working (worked in garment industry) | husband retired as cabinet maker, still working | | 4 | Kayseri | 1989 | 2010 | payed off |
| Macit | M | 54 | grocer | | | 4 | Erzurum | 1971 | 2013 | tenant (800) |
| Şerif | M | | police officer | | | 4 | | 1998 | 2008 | |
| Adalet | W | 52 | not working | relatives' financial support | 1400 | 2 | Erzurum | 1980 | 2013 | 833 |
| Binnaz | W | 48 | not working | husband: grocery store clerk | 1400 | 3 | Ümitköy | 1969 | 2011 | 620 |
| Berna | W | 30 | not working (worked as cleaner) | husband: carwasher | 1500 | 5 | Balgat | 2005 | 2011 | tenant (380) |
| Murat | M | 65 | retired civil servant | wife: cleaning lady | | 2 | Erzurum | 1954 | 2011 | 675 |
| Cavidan | W | 44 | not working | retired father, still working as watchman | | 4 | Erzurum | 1942 | 2010 | 500 |
| Ali | M | 75 | retired porter | | 1500 | 2 | Erzurum | 1956 | 2010 | tenant (800) |
| Feriha | W | 63 | not working | husband: retired, still working | | 3 | Samsun | | 2011 | |
| Esmâ | W | 43 | not working (worked in garment industry) | husband: shopkeeper | | 4 | Mühye | 1994 | 2011 | 780 |
| Gönül | W | | not working | | 1000 | 2 | | | | tenant |

Table 1 (continued)

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|---------------------------------------|---|------|---|--------------|------------------|------|-------------------------------|
| Gönül | W | | not working | | 1000 | 2 | | | | tenant |
| Gülistan | W | 74 | not working | retired husband | | 2 | Beypazarı | 1965 | | gecekond |
| Kartal | M | 48 | real estate agent | | | 4 | Erzurum | 1963 | | gecekond |
| Ferihan | W | 56 | not working | husband retired as worker,still working as driver | | 3 | Kazan | 1981 | 2010 | 1000 |
| Ahmet | M | 43 | grocer | | 5000 | 5 | Kars | 1960 | 2010 | 700 |
| Dilşad | W | 48 | not working | | | 4 | Çorum | 1999 | 2010 | 800 |
| Esra (Dilşad's daughter) | W | 32 | not working | | | | | | | |
| Hüseyin (Dilşad's husband) | M | 51 | worker in municipality and headman | | | | | | | |
| Recep | M | 57 | retired as worker | | 3000 | 2 | Kırıkkale | 1953 | 2010 | 790 |
| Leman (Recep's wife) | W | 51 | not working | | | | Peçenek | | | |
| Papatya | W | 43 | not working | husband: upholsterer | | 4 | Kırkkonaklar | 1998 | 2012 | 750 |
| Mualla | W | 58 | not working | husband: retired as cook, still working | 1700 | 2 | Zonguldak | 1986 | 2011 | 700 |
| Nalan (Mualla's daughter) | W | 32 | not working | husband: hairdresser | 1800 | 4 | | born in Gülveren | 2011 | 855 |
| Nilüfer | W | | not working | husband: delivery person | | 3 | Çorum | 1989 | 2011 | payed off |
| Reyhan (Nilüfer's daughter) | W | 19 | student | | | | | | | |
| Cezmi | M | 63 | retired as welder | | | 3 | Çorum | 1955 | 2011 | |
| Suna | W | 76 | not working | retired husband | 1300 | 1 | Kazan | 1962 | 2011 | 270 |
| Şermin | W | 71 | not working | retired husband | 1300 | 1 | Erzincan | 1962 | 2011 | 660 |
| Zehra | W | 79 | not working | retired husband | 1300 | 1 | Ankara | 1962 | 2008 | |
| Vesile | W | 53 | not working | husband: retired, still working as tea-seller | 1300 | 4 | Giresun | 1985 | 2011 | 840 |
| Zümrüt | W | 65 | not working | retired husband | | | | | 2008 | 400 |
| Nafiz | W | 55 | retired | Son is financially supporting | 1500 | 4 | Giresun | 1962 | 2012 | 1000 |
| Semra | W | 29 | not working | husband: small business owner (electrician) | | 4 | | born in Gülveren | 2007 | payed off |
| Özlem | W | 52 | not working (worked as cleaning lady) | husband: retired , still working as hammersmith | | 4 | Samsun | | | 890 |
| Nevin | W | 54 | retired | husband has land rent from other real estate properties | | 2 | Erzincan | | | gecekond |
| Nazlı | W | 37 | grocer | husband: grocer | 4000 | 5 | Erzurum | 1978 | 2011 | payed off with another credit |
| Galip | M | 33 | electrician | rent allowance from another TOKİ flat | | 3 | Kayaş | 2010 | 2010 | 1200 |
| Ela | W | 32 | not working (worked as salesperson) | father: retired, still working in precarious jobs in Siteler. brother's income. | | 7 | Erzurum | 1957 | 2015 | 935 |
| (certain cells are left empty due to the lacking information from the respondents) | | | | | | | | | | |

B. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TRKE ZET

Bu tez AKP hkmetleri ile yrrlge giren TOKİ'nin ev sahiplięi programını, yeni zel mlkiyet rejiminin inřaası baęlamında incelemektedir. Bu baęlama, 'hegemonya' perspektifinin 'ynetimsellik' kavramı ile detaylandırılması sonucu geliřtirilen alternatif bir teorik pozisyondan yaklařılmaktadır. Bylece, ekonomi-politik ve eleřtirel kent alıřmalarında 'verili' olarak tartıřılan zel mlkiyet kavramının 'taban'dan nasıl kurulduęu arařtırılarak bu kavramı, 'ekonomik' ve 'etiko-politik' boyutları ieren bir politik proje iinde aıklanması amalanmıřtır.

Ekonomi-politik literatrnde (Aka 2014, Bayırbaę 2013, Doęru 2016) TOKİ'nin ev sahiplięi programı, AKP hkmetleri ile oluřturulan, kentsel rantın yeniden daęıtım mekanizmaları erevesinde 'hegemonya' perspektifi ile tartıřılmıřtır. Buna gre, sermaye sınıfları iin 'ekonomik', tabi sınıflar iin ise 'ekonomik'-'sosyal' ıkarlar, yeni siyasa araları (kentsel dnřm ile ilgili kanunlar ve TOKİ'nin yeniden yapılanması) ile AKP hkmetlerinin 'politik' ıkarlarına eklemlenmiřtir. Ancak, makro perspektife dayanan bu aıklama srecin 'nasıl' sorusu ile ilgilenmemektedir. Yani, bu ıkarlar tabii sınıflar iinde nasıl oluřmaktadır? Arařtırma nesnesinin sorunsallařtırıldıęı leęin (makro) kendisi belli etkenleri 'verili'/'kendinden menkul' olarak kabul etmektedir. Buna baęlı olarak, bu erevede, devlet ve tabi sınıflar arasında mekanik bir iliřki kabul edilmiřtir: tabi sınıflar, toplu konutlar ile saęlanan iyi yařama kořullarına karřılık devlete rıza gstermektedir. Bu iliřki biimi, tabi sınıfları (*gecekondu* sakinleri) bu siyasanın pasif alıcıları olarak nitelendirilmesine neden olmaktadır. Daha soyut bir dzlemde, problemin bu biimde ele alınması, iktidar iliřkilerini makro yapılarla (devlet, siyasalar, vs.) zdeřleřtirirken, iktidarın makrodan mikro yapılara yayıldıęını var saymaktadır. 'Hegemonya' perspektifinin kendisi problemin bu řekildeki tasavvuru ile eliřmesine raęmen, mikro yapıların ihmali iktidar iliřkilerini yalnızca makro yapılara atfetmektedir. Bu ontolojik pozisyona karřı (iktidar iliřkilerinin 'tek ynl akıř'ı) eleřtirel kent literatr, mikro yapıları, *gecekondu* sakinlerinin iktidar iliřkilerini sorgulaması baęlamında incelemiřtir.

Buna gre, eleřtirel kent literatrnde (Erdi-Lelandais 2014, Kuyucu and nsal 2010, Lovering and Trkmen 2011, ktem-nsal 2011) kentsel rantın yeniden daęıtımı, aęırlıklı olarak, tabandan gelen toplumsal muhalefet perspektifinden tartıřılmıřtır. AKP hkmetleri

altında, *gecekondu* sakinlerinin mahallelerinden tahliyelerine ve TOKİ ile ev sahipliğinin yol açacağı ekonomik yüke sebep olan devletin tarihi ve enformal yerleşimlere müdahalesi, bu yerleşimlerde tabandan gelen ‘barınma hakkı’ taleplerini harekete geçirmiştir. Yine de, bu literatürdeki araştırmacılar, direnişlerin, *gecekondu* sakinlerinin toplu konutta hak sahibi olabilmek için devlet ile pazarlık yapması ve ilgili nüfusun en dezavantajlı kesimlerinin (kiracılar, TTB’liler) yerinden edilmesi ile sonuçlandığını vurgulamışlardır. Direnişlerin bu şekilde son bulması, bu alandaki araştırmacılar tarafından, ağırlıklı olarak, “bireysel kazanç arzusu” (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010: 1481) olarak yorumlanmıştır. Fakat, bu yorum, ev sahipliği biçimindeki özel mülkiyeti ‘sorunsal’laştırmaktansa, özel mülkiyete küçümseyici –pejoratif- ‘verili’ anlamı ile yaklaşmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bahsi geçen nüfusun taleplerinden TOKİ ile ev sahibi olmak adına ‘neden’ vazgeçtiği ‘verili’ kabuller dışında açıklayıcı yanıtlara ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Türkiye’deki ekonomi-politik ve eleştirel kent literatürlerindeki sorunsallaştırmaların dışında, ‘yeni kent ekonomileri’ ve emlak sektöründeki gelişme, küresel soylulaştırma (*gentrification*) literatürünün araştırma nesnesi olmuştur. Bu literatür soylulaştırmayı ‘kent mekanının sınıf yapısının devlet öncülüğünde yeniden düzenlenmesi’ (*state-led class re-make of urban space* (Lees et al. 2015)) olarak tanımlamaktadır. Devletin rolünü öne çıkaran küresel soylulaştırma literatürü, açılan (*roll out*) neoliberalizm bağlamında yeni kentsel yönetim uygulamalarının kentsel mekanı üst sınıflar için alt sınıfların aleyhine nasıl dönüştürdüğünü incelemektedir. Bu literatürdeki araştırmacılar, ‘sınıf yapısının yeniden düzenlenmesini’ devletin açılan neoliberalizm evresinde geri çekilen (*roll back*) neoliberalizme göre nasıl daha müdahaleci olduğunu, devletin kentte rant açığına (rent gap) sebep olan yatırım için riskli alanlarda özel sektörü desteklemesi bağlamında tartışmaktadır. Küresel Güney’deki çalışmalar bu literatüre ‘yeni kent ekonomileri’ içinde ‘arsa piyasasının ve kent öznelliklerinin toplumsal üretimi’ni vurgulayarak katkı yapmaktadır. ‘Arsa piyasasının toplumsal üretimi’ arsa piyasasının neoliberal birikim rejimleri için nasıl bir kanal işlevi gördüğünü belirtirken, ‘kent öznelliklerinin toplumsal üretimi’ ev sahibi olma arzusu ile şekillenen yeni öznelliklerin mülkiyet temelli projelerle nasıl oluşturulduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Küresel Güney’deki bu boyutlar, “farklı kentsel ekonomi temelleri, toplumsal hiyerarşiler, kültürel tarihler ve kurumsal çerçeveler”den (Harris 2008) kaynaklanmaktadır ve bu yüzden Küresel Kuzey’deki deneyimlerden farklılaşmaktadır. Fakat, bu farklar, küresel soylulaştırma literatürünün araştırma nesnesini geçersiz kılmamaktadır. Aksine, küresel Güney’deki farklı deneyimler “çeşitli ama giderek birbirleriyle bağlantılanan kentlerin gidişat”ını (Lees et al. 2016) öne

çıkarmaktadır. Böylece, küresel Güney ve Kuzey'deki deneyimler soylulaştırmayı günümüzdeki neoliberal birikim rejimlerinde 'küresel kentsel strateji' haline getirmektedir.

Ne ekonomi-politik ne de eleştirel kent çalışmalarında, Türkiye'de gerçekleşen 'devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri'nin küresel soylulaştırma literatürü ile ilişkisi kurulmuştur. Buna ek olarak, AKP hükümetlerinin 'devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri' ile harekete geçen yeni özel mülkiyet rejimi - küresel Güney'deki soylulaştırma tartışmalarının ana eksenini olarak - devlet, özel mülkiyet ve öznellikler konusunda sorular getirmesine rağmen, Türkiye'deki akademik çalışmalar bu konular arasındaki ilişkiyi henüz sorgulamamıştır. Bu sebeple, bu çalışma, AKP hükümetleri ile harekete geçen TOKİ ile ev sahipliği biçimindeki özel mülkiyet rejimini sorunsallaştırmaya karar vermiş ve bunu eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin TOKİ'nin toplu konut programı ile ev sahibi olma süreçleri üzerinden tartışmayı hedeflemiştir. Bu amaçla, bu çalışma 'Özel mülkiyet (TOKİ'nin ev sahibi olma programı biçiminde) 'kavrayış'ı *gecekondu* sakinleri arasında nasıl oluşur ve yayılır?' ve bununla bağlantı olarak, 'Yeni özel mülkiyet rejimindeki 'ekonomik' anlayışının *gecekondu* sakinlerinin tutumuna etkisi nedir?' sorularına yanıt aramaktadır. Soruları bu şekilde kurgulayarak ekonomi-politik ve eleştirel kent çalışmalarında (yukarıdaki paragraflarda bahsedilen) 'nasıl' ve 'neden' sorularını açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Böylelikle, küresel soylulaştırma literatürüne katkı yapmayı hedeflemektedir.

Bu soruları cevaplamak için, bu çalışma, Gramsci'nin 'hegemonya' perspektifini Foucault'nun 'yönetimsellik' kavramı ile geliştirilmesine dayanan alternatif bir teorik pozisyon benimsemiştir. 'hegemonya', iktidar ilişkilerini kavramsallaştıran bir yaklaşım olup sınıf ittifakının liderliği anlamına gelmektedir. İktidar ilişkilerini devlet ve sivil toplum arasında yalnızca tahakküm üzerinden kurulmasındansa dinamik olarak kurulan bir ilişki biçimi olarak tarif etmektedir. 'Ekonomik' boyutu (üretim tarzı) ne izole etmektedir ne de ona öncelik vermektedir. Daha ziyade, 'ekonomik' ve 'etiko-politik' (ahlaki, kültürel ve entelektüel güç) boyutların karşılıklı olarak toplumsal gerçekliği nasıl inşa ettiğini araştırmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, sınıf çıkarları 'verili' olarak ele alınmamaktadır; temel sorun bu çıkarların sivil toplumdaki üretim süreçlerinin, 'etiko-politik' zemin aracılığıyla, liderlik arayışı olan sınıfın çıkarları ile nasıl uyumlu hale geldiğidir. Bu anlamda, 'hegemonya' perspektifi Ortodoks olmayan bir Marksizm anlayışını oluşturmakta ve bu anlayışın içinde sivil toplumun bilgisi ve inançlarını ne 'yanlış bilinç' ne de 'alt yapı'nın bir yansıması olarak ele almaktadır. Gramsci'ye göre belirli bir sınıfın hegemonik projesi, nüfusu belirli bir üretim tarzına 'etiko-politik' zemin aracılığıyla tabi kılmayı amaçlar. Bu zemin, sınıf çıkarlarını

açıkça yansıtmaktansa, kendisini, sınıf çıkarlarını aşan ve bu sebeple de sınıf ittifakını kurma kapasitesine sahip olarak tasvir eder. ‘Dünyayı kavrayış biçimi’, ‘etiko-politik’ zeminin önemli bir unsurudur ve sivil toplumun ‘ortak kanı’sını (*commonsense*) hegemonik kavrayış ile paralel olarak yeniden düzenlemeyi hedefler. Buna göre, bu çalışma, özel mülkiyet rejimini ‘hegemonya’ perspektifinden tartışmaktadır. Bunun sebebi, özel mülkiyeti devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişkinin inşasında belirli bir yol olarak kavramsallaştırmasıdır. ‘Hegemonya’ perspektifi, bu ilişkiyi ne ‘ekonomik’ ne de ‘etiko-politik’ boyutu önceleyerek, ancak, bu ikisinin birbiriyle ilişkisi bağlamında anlar. Bu ontolojik pozisyon, Türkiye’deki ekonomi-politik ve eleştirel kent çalışmalarının eksikliklerini aşmayı ve açıklamayı sağlayan kritik bir analitik açı sunar. Ancak, önceden de belirtildiği gibi, ‘hegemonya’ perspektifinin ‘yönetimsellik’ kavramı ile geliştirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Gramsci’nin belli bir ‘dünyayı kavrayış biçimi’nin toplumda ‘yeni kişilikler’in (2000: 340) oluşumundaki vurgusuna rağmen, Gramsci ‘yeni kişilikler’i (ibid.) incelemek için gerekli analitik araçları sağlamaz. Bu çalışma, özel olarak, bu boyutu açıp, bunun hegemonik politika biçimlerindeki rolünü tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Foucault’nun ‘yönetimsellik’ kavramı, belirli bir ‘dünyayı kavrayış biçimi’nin toplumun tutumlarını nasıl dönüştürdüğü ve hangi tip öznelliklerin oluşumuna sebebiyet verdiğini açıklamak amacıyla benimsenmiştir. ‘Yönetimsellik’, yönetim rasyonalitesi anlamına gelir ve yönetim pratiğindeki belirli bir rasyonalitenin nasıl hem kontrolü hem de öz-kontrolü nasıl sağladığını anlamaya çalışır. Bu anlamda, bu çalışma, yeni özel mülkiyet rejimi ile harekete geçen neoliberal rasyonalitenin eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin toplumsal ilişkilerini nasıl dönüştürdüğünü ve öznelliklerin oluşumu üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir.

Araştırma sorularına bahsi geçen perspektiflerle cevap bulma amacıyla, bu tez için, eski *gecekondu* sakinleri ile niteliksel araştırma gerçekleştirilmiştir. Nicel araştırma yöntemleri, bu çalışmanın araştırma konusu olan, öznelere toplumsal süreçleri anlamlandırmalarını açıklayamayacağından, bu konuya daha derin bir anlayış sunan niteliksel araştırma yöntemi benimsenmiştir. Ayrıca, sadece bu yöntem ile makro perspektifi benimseyen ekonomi-politik çalışmaların eksiklikleri aşılabilmektedir. Bu amaçla, 2017 Temmuz ve Ağustos ayları süresince, Gülveren – Ankara’da gerçekleşen Yatıkmsluk *Gecekondu* Dönüşüm Proje’sine dahil olan eski *gecekondu*lularla yarı-yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Bu yöntem ile, ampirik veri, özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayış’ının ‘ortak kanı’daki unsurları ayırarak ve yeniden eklemleyerek nasıl bir hegemonik anlayış haline getirdiği, ve böylece, ‘etiko-politik’ zeminin nasıl kurulduğu ve yayıldığı açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Mülakatlarla birlikte katılımcı

gözlem yöntemi, eski *gecekondu*luların tutumlarının gündelik ve profesyonel görevleri ile uğraşırken nasıl dönüştüğünü anlamaya yardımcı olmuştur.

Ampirik veriler ışığında, bu çalışma, yeni özel mülkiyet rejimine AKP'nin neoliberal 'hegemonya'yı sağlamlaştırmayı amaçlayan hegemonik bir projesi olarak yaklaşmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, araştırma soruları hegemonik projenin 'etiko-politik' zeminini incelemiştir. Ancak, Gramsci'nin vurguladığı üzere, 'hegemonya' hem 'etiko-politik' hem de 'ekonomik'tir. Başka bir deyişle, hegemonik projeler sınıf ittifakını "geniş halk kitlelerinin 'medeniliğini' ve ahlakını, üretimin sürekli gelişen ekonomik aygıtının gerekliliklerine uyarlayarak" (Gramsci 2000: 210) sağlamayı amaçlarlar. Bu bağlamda, tezin 3. Bölüm'ü, 'etiko-politik' zeminin oluşturan koşullara açıklık kazandırmak için hegemonik projenin 'ekonomik' zeminini araştırmıştır. Ancak, bu araştırma, 'ekonomik' zemine belirleyicilik atfetmez. Daha ziyade, neoliberal birikim rejiminin, 1980'den itibaren, farklı partilerin kent reformları ile devlet-sistemini yeniden yapılandırarak nasıl yürürlüğe girdiğini araştırır. Buna bağlı olarak, 'ekonomik' zemin, neoliberal 'hegemonya'yı sağlamlaştıran sınıf çıkarlarının, hakim ve tabi sınıflar için nasıl üretildiği anlamına gelir. Bu doğrultuda, 3. Bölüm, 1980'den itibaren kentsel rantın yeniden dağıtım şemaları ile şekillenen sınıf çıkarlarına ışık tutar. Bu çalışma tabi sınıfı oluşturan belirli bir gruba –*gecekondu* sakinleri- odaklandığı için, 3. Bölüm'ün temel kaygısı bu grubun çıkarlarının üretimi için verilen hegemonik mücadeledir. Bu anlamda, bu bölüm, *gecekondu*ları metalaştırmaya olanak sağlayan kurumsal mekanizmaları ve buna bağlı oluşan kentsel rantın *gecekondu* sakinleri, müteahhitler ve devlet arasında nasıl dağıtıldığını incelemiştir. Ancak, bu mekanizmalar geri çekilen (ANAP hükümeti) ve açılan (AKP hükümetleri) neoliberalizm dönemlerinde, rantın yeniden dağıtımında farklı şemalar, dolayısıyla da farklı sonuçlar göstermiştir. Geri çekilen neoliberalizm döneminin kent reformları, Türkiye'nin kentleşme tarihinde ilk defa *gecekondu*ları metalaştırmaya olanak sağlamıştır. *Gecekondu* mülkiyetinin yasallaşması (formal tapular ya da TTB) *gecekondu*ların yerine apartman bloklarının inşasına neden olmuştur. *Post-hoc* rasyonelleşmenin bu pratiği, kentsel rantı *gecekondu* sakinleri ve müteahhitlerin arasında paylaşmıştır. Ancak, tüm *gecekondu* yerleşimleri bu pratikten yararlanamamıştır. 2000lerin başına kadar, karmaşık mülkiyet düzenine sahip olan ve suçla damgalanmış *gecekondu* yerleşimleri formal arsa piyasasının dışında kalarak rant açıklığının artmasına neden olmuştur. AKP hükümetlerinin politik-ekonomik müdahaleleri ile geçilen açılan neoliberalizm döneminde, kent reformları, *gecekondu* yerleşimlerinde ve tarihi alanlarda özel mülkiyet rejiminin kurumsallaşmasını engelleyen faktörleri kaldırmıştır. Bu reformlar, kentsel yenileme ile ilgili kanunlar ve

TOKİ'nin yeniden yapılandırılması ile kentsel rantın yeniden dağıtımını için yeni bir şema belirlemiştir. Bu şemayı yeni olarak tarif eden iki boyut vardır. Birincisi, önceki pratiklerde olduğu gibi, *gecekondu* yerleşimlerindeki kentsel rant direkt olarak *gecekondu* sakinlerine ve müteahhitlere aktarılmamıştır. Daha ziyade, devlet, bu alanlarda değeri bizzat kendisi gerçekleştirip (kentsel yenileme programları ve TOKİ'nin iş birliği ile), ortaya çıkan rantı *gecekondu* sakinlerine ve müteahhitlere kendi rasyonalitesine göre yeniden dağıtmıştır. İkincisi, bu şema ile, AKP'nin kent reformlarına kadar formal arsa piyasalarının dışında kalan *gecekondu* sakinlerinin bu piyasalara TOKİ'nin borçlu ev sahipliği programı (TOKİ'nin mortgage-benzeri ödeme sistemi) ile dahil edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Bu yolla, açılan neoliberalizm döneminde yeni özel mülkiyet rejimi, AKP'nin, kapitalist piyasa ilişkilerinin derinleşmesini şimdiye kadar bu ilişkilerin dışında kalan grupların içerilmesi ile amaçlayan, belirli bir hegemonik projesi haline gelmiştir. Bu proje, daha geniş bağlamında, sınıf ittifakını şu şekilde sağlamayı amaçlamıştır: kentsel yenileme projeleri ile sermayeder sınıfların enformal ve tarihi alanlardaki potansiyel kentsel ranttan, ve bu alanlarda barınan tabi sınıflarınsa, TOKİ'nin borçlu toplu konutlarından yararlanması. Böylelikle, 3. Bölüm, AKP hükümetlerinin, devleti yasal ve kurumsal yeniden yapılandırması ile 'yukarıdan' sınıf ittifakını yeni özel mülkiyet rejimine dayanan hegemonik proje ile nasıl sağladığını göstermiştir. AKP'nin hegemonik projesinin 'ekonomik' zemini olarak neoliberal birikim rejiminin devletin yeniden yapılandırılması ile nasıl sağlandığını bu bölümde açıkladıktan sonra, 4. ve 5. Bölümler, araştırma sorularının ana konusu olan, bu projenin 'etiko-politik' boyutunu inceler.

Gramsci'ye göre sivil toplum, yalnızca üretim ilişkilerindeki konumu ile anlaşılamaz. İncelenmesi gereken, egemen sınıfın, toplumun tabi sınıflarının rızasının stratejik oranını nasıl kazandığıdır. Bu anlamda, hegemonik projeler, tabi sınıfları 'ekonomik aktivitenin belirleyici çekirdeği'ne 'bağlamak' ve 'bütünleştirmek' için 'etiko-politik' zemin gerektirirler. Bu zemin, hakim sınıfın "belirli bir gerçeklik kavrayışı ile uyumlu entelektüel bütünlük ve etik"ten (Gramsci 2000: 334) oluşur. Belirli bir gerçeklik kavrayışı "sıradan insanların gündelik yaşamlarına maddi ve ideolojik bir güç" (Hall 1988: 6) sağlar ve bu yolla 'ortak kanı'yı belirli bir tür düşünmenin, hissetmenin, konuşmanın ve hesaplamanın doğallaştırıldığı ve kaçınılmaz hale geldiği şekliyle yeniden düzenler. Yani, tabi sınıfların 'ortak kanı'sı, belirli bir gerçeklik anlayışının inşası ve yayılması için verilen hegemonik mücadelelerin kritik bir alanını oluşturur. Bu çerçevede 4. Bölüm, 'Özel mülkiyet (TOKİ'nin ev sahibi olma programı biçiminde) 'kavrayış'ı *gecekondu* sakinleri arasında nasıl oluşur ve yayılır?' sorusunu,

hegemonik projenin ‘etiko-politik’ zemini olarak anlamaya çalışmıştır. Gülveren-Ankara’daki eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin TOKİ’nin borçlu ev sahipliği programı ile ev sahibi olma süreçlerinin incelenmesine dayanan niteliksel araştırmanın verileri ile 4. Bölüm, eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin ‘ortak kanı’sının özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayışı’ ile paralel olarak, zor ve rıza mekanizmaları ile nasıl yeniden oluştuğunu incelemiştir. Gramsci’ye göre devlet ve toplum arasındaki iktidar ilişkisi, zor ve rıza uçları arasında kurulan bir süreçtir. Özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayışı’ nı bu analitik lens ile düşünmek, belirli bir gerçeklik ‘kavrayışı’ nı sadece rızaya ya da zora dayalı pratiklere yerleştirmenin önüne geçer. Bu çalışmanın bağlamında, zor ve rıza, ‘ortak kanı’nın farklı katmanlarını birbirine eklemleyerek özel mülkiyete dayalı yeni bir gerçeklik ‘kavrayışı’nın oluşumunu sağlayan mekanizmalar olarak ele alınmıştır. Aslında birbirine geçmiş halde işleyen bu mekanizmalar analitik olarak anlaşılabilmesi için ayrı ayrı incelenmiştir. Apartman dairesinin nezih imajı, uzun süredir devam eden kentsel dönüşüm söylentilerinin son bulması, kira öder gibi ev sahibi olmak ve mahallede suç teşkil eden grupların temizlenmesi *gecekondu* sakinlerinin TOKİ ile borçlu ev sahipliğine rıza göstermesini sağlayan mekanizmalardır. Bu dört farklı ama birbirleriyle ilişkili katman ile devletin bu mahalledeki müdahalesi meşrulaşmış, ‘TOKİ’nin toplu konutları ile ev sahibi olma’ fikri yeni bir ‘ortak kanı’ haline gelmiştir. Ancak, TOKİ’nin ev sahipliği programı için *gecekondu* sakinleri ve TOKİ arasında gerçekleşen sözleşme süreci bu ‘kavrayış’ın inşasının zor’dan azade olmadığını göstermektedir. Finansal okur yazarlığı olmayan sakinleri, kavrayamadıkları finansal işlemler içeren sözleşmeyi yeterli bilgilendirme yapmadan imzalatırmak; sözleşmede belirlenen ödeme miktarına itiraz etmeyi sağlayan yasal hakların fiili uygulamasında itiraz etmeyi engellemesi, TTB’li grubun normal şartlarda ‘hak etmeyen’ grup olarak nitelendirilmesi ile herhangi bir sebepten projeye karşı çıkmalarının önlenmesi ve *gecekondu* sakinleri içinde projeyi onaylayan grubun çoğunluk olması durumunda karşı çıkan azınlığa karşı yasal olarak meşrulaştırması bu sürecin zor mekanizmalarını oluşturmaktadır. Böylece, rıza mekanizmalarına eklenen zor mekanizmaları ‘ev sahibi olmanın tek yolu olarak TOKİ’ fikrini yeni ‘ortak kanı’ haline getirir. Bu ‘ortak kanı’nın oluşum süreci, projedeki sermayader sınıfların çıkarlarının tabi sınıflar tarafından fark edilmediği anlamına gelmez. TOKİ tarafından eski *gecekondu* sakinlerine verilen sözlerin tutulmaması (evlerin teslim tarihi, dairelerin karşılabılır olması, sosyal tesisler), projede karşılaşılan yolsuzluk ve kayırmacı ilişkiler, ve kentsel rantın devlet ve onunla ilişkili sermaye kesimleri tarafından el konulması *gecekondu* sakinlerinin bu projenin kendileri yerine sermaye sınıfının çıkarlarını yansıttığını düşünmelerine neden olmuştur. Ancak, çıkarların bu açıklığı tabi sınıfın karşı-hegemonik pratikler oluşturmaya yol açmamıştır. Bunun temel sebebi, tabi bir sınıf olarak

eski *gecekondu* sakinleri için politika, adalet ve devlet kavramlarının hiçbir zaman müşterek çıkarları gözetmediği ve her zaman sermaye sınıfı lehine çalıştığını düşünmelerini sağlayan geçmiş deneyimleridir. Buna bağlı olarak, bu projede sermaye sınıfının çıkarlarının açıklığı bir istisna oluşturmamıştır. Sonuç olarak, zor ve rıza mekanizmaları piyasa ile ev sahibi olmayı ya da kiracı olmayı ‘ortak kanı’ndan ayırırken, yalnızca TOKİ’nin toplu konut projesiyle ev sahibi olmayı ‘ortak kanı’ya eklemlemiştir. TOKİ’nin toplu konutlarında ikamet eden eski *gecekondu*lular için ev sahipliğinin bu ‘kavrayış’ı toplumsal gerçekliğin kaçınılmaz ve doğal bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Hâkim ve tabi sınıfların ‘kavrayış’ı tam da bu noktada kesişmekte ve tabi sınıfların rızasının stratejik oranı (‘uzlaşma’ya dayalı olmasa dahi) AKP’nin hegemonik projesine ‘tabandan’ verilmektedir.

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Gramsci’ye göre, gerçekliğin yeni ‘kavrayış’ının maddi geçerliliği “yeni insanlık tipleri”nin (2000: 210) oluşumuna, “amorfe kitle” (2000: 340) nin yeni bir “kişilik” (ibid.) kazanmasına ve bunların “bilinçli ve öz-disiplinli” (Fontana 2002: 173) bir şekilde ‘gelişimin üretici güçlerinin gereksinimlerine’ uyumlu olmasına bağlıdır. Kitlelerin bu ‘kişiliği’nin incelenmesi, ‘Yeni özel mülkiyet rejimindeki ‘ekonomik’ anlayışının *gecekondu* sakinlerinin tutumuna etkisi nedir?’ biçiminde formülize edilen ikinci araştırma sorusunun nesnesini oluşturmaktadır ve 5. Bölüm’de açıklanmaktadır. Ancak, Gramsci, gerçeğin yeni ‘kavrayış’ının ‘nasıl’ oluştuğu sorusuna gerekli analitik araçları (zor ve rıza mekanizmaları ile) sağlarken, “dünyayı kavramak için yeni şemalar”ın (2000: 335) sonucunda oluşan yeni “kişilikler” (2000: 340) i detaylandırmaz. ‘Etiko-politik’ zeminin bu yeterli ilgi görmeyen boyutunu incelemek için, bu çalışma Foucault’nun ‘yönetimsellik’ ve neoliberal rasyonalite kavramlarını kullanmayı tercih etmiştir. Bunun sebebi, Foucault’nun öznelliklerin oluşumu ile ilgili sunduğu anlayışın Gramsci’nin ‘kişilik’ olarak kullandığı kavramı detaylı olarak incelemeye olanak sağlamasıdır. Belirtmek gerekir ki, tezin 4. ve 5. Bölümleri kronolojik bir sırayı takip etmez. Diğer bir deyişle, bahsi geçen inceleme direkt olarak ‘kitlenin yeni kişiliği’nin tasviri ile başlamaz. Daha ziyade, bu ‘kişiliği’ daha anlaşılır kılmak için 5. Bölüm, bu ‘kişiliği’n ‘ne olmadığı’nın analizi ile başlar, yani, *gecekondu* zamanlarındaki ‘toplumsal ilişki’lerin ve ‘ekonomi’nin düzenlenmesini. Sahlin (1972) ve Polanyi’nin (1992) ‘asli’ ekonomi anlayışı, *gecekondu* zamanlarındaki bu düzeni incelemek için gerekli analitik araçları sunmaktadır. Eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin anlatılarına göre, *gecekondu* zamanlarındaki ‘karşılık’ ilişkisi ve ‘yeniden dağıtım’ mekanizması (yemek yapımı, alt yapı hizmetleri, mevsimlik erzak üretimi için temel ihtiyaçların sağlanmasına yönelik) kazanç güdüsündense ortak çıkara dayalıdır. Ortak çıkarın yönettiği ekonomi

toplumsal ilişkilerin bir işlevidir, diğer bir deyişle, ekonomi toplumsal ilişkilere eklemlenmiştir. Bu kültürel ortam içinde, ekonominin düzenlendiği toplumsal ilişkiler ‘komşuluk’ ilişkileri biçiminde maddileşmiştir.

Özel mülkiyete dayalı yeni ‘ortak kanı’ın oluşum süreci (4. Bölüm’ün temel konusu olarak), 5. Bölüm’de piyasa hükmünün başangıcı olarak tartışılmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, yeni ‘ortak kanı’ın ‘toplumsal ilişkiler’in ve ‘ekonomi’nin şimdiye kadarki düzenlenişini nasıl birbirinden ayırdığı, *gecekondu* sakinlerinin TOKİ ile sözleşme sürecinde oluşmaya başlayan kazanç güdüsü ve eşitsizliğin doğallaşması bağlamında incelenmiştir. Ortak çıkar yerine (projede hak sahibi olabilmek için geliştirilen bireysel taktiklerde maddileşen) kazanç güdüsü ve dayanışma yerine (sınırlı sayıdaki apartman dairesine ulaşmak için) rekabet, yeni ‘ortak kanı’ın eski *gecekondu* sakinleri üzerindeki iz düşümünü oluşturmaktadır. Böylece “toplumun piyasa tarafından genel düzenlenişi” (Foucault 2008: 145) mümkün hale gelmiştir. Ayrıca, piyasanın hükmü, şimdiye kadarki ‘komşuluk’ ilişkilerini de dönüştürmektedir. ‘Modern yaşam tarzı’nın sembolü olarak TOKİ’nin apartman dairesindeki gündelik yaşam ve bu yaşam tarzını devam ettirmek için ‘mortgage benzeri’ ödeme sisteminin getirdiği finansal yükün altından kalkabilme çabası hesabi pratikleri ön plana çıkarmıştır. Bu hesabi pratikler, ‘insanlık, güven, kardeşlik, dayanışma, saygı ve paylaşma’ ile biçimlenen ‘komşuluk’ ilişkilerine yer bırakmamaktadır. Ayrıca, şimdiye kadar ‘mortgage benzeri’ ödeme sisteminin tanımladığı boyutta bir borç deneyimi olmayan *gecekondu* sakinleri için borcun anlamı, ‘cesaret gerektiren bir hareket’ten ‘zorunlu olarak yapılması gereken bir ödeme’ye dönüşmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, *gecekondu* zamanlarında ‘komşuluk’ ilişkilerindeki konumu ile tanımlanan birey, piyasa hükmünde, özel mülkiyet kavrayışı ile şekillenen ‘ortak kanı’ içinde ödeme gücü ile tanımlanmaya başlamıştır. Bu yeni ekonomik tutum modeli içinde, toplumsallığın hakim olduğu komşuluk yerine bireysellik ön plana çıkmaktadır. Yeni ekonomik tutum modelinin ‘ne olmadığı’nı ve bu modelin ‘toplumsal ilişkiler’ ve ‘ekonomi’yi nasıl yeniden düzenlediğini açıkladıktan sonra, 5.Bölüm, bu yeni ekonomik tutum modelinin eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin gündelik ve profesyonel yaşamlarındaki görevlerini nasıl düzenlediğini incelemiştir. Bir yönetim teknolojisi çerçevesinden bakılan TOKİ’nin borçlarını ödeme zorunluluğu, neoliberal rasyonaliteyi operasyonelleştirmede önemli bir boyut oluşturmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak, bu çalışma, ev sahibi olmak için ödenmesi gereken borçlarla baş etme yöntemlerinin, ‘borçla yönetmek’ olarak ifade edilen özgün bir yönetim biçimini mümkün kıldığını öne sürmektedir. ‘Yönetimsellik’ kavramının hem kontrol hem de öz-kontrol anlamlarına karşılık geldiğini hatırlatarak, 5. Bölüm’ün kalan kısmı, borçluluğun,

bireyleri, kendi ekonomik yaşamlarını yönetmek için hangi yollara başvurmaya ittiğini araştırmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, borçluluğun, somut olarak ekonomik yaşamı nasıl düzenlediği, eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin yeni iş rejimleri, girişimci stratejileri ve sorumluluk üzerine yargıları bağlamında incelenmiştir. Borcu ödeyebilmek için aynı anda birden fazla işte çalışmak, emekli olduktan sonra yeniden iş hayatına dönmek ve güvencesiz işlerde çalışarak ilk defa iş hayatına girmek yeni iş rejiminin somut karşılıklarıdır. ‘Modern yaşam tarzı’na ulaşabilmenin koşulu olarak meşrulaşan bu iş rejimi, ‘bireyin kendi borcunu ödeyebilmesi’ni övgüye layık bir özellik olarak tanımlayarak yeni bir iş etiği de getirmektedir. TOKİ dairesine finansal bir varlık olarak yaklaşp, onu yatırım aracı olarak değerlendirmek ve (mahallede kalan) *gecekondu*ları iş mekanı olarak yeniden işlevselleştirmek eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin girişimci stratejileridir. Bu yollarla operasyonelleşen girişim mantığı, eski *gecekondu* sakinlerini aktif ekonomik öznelerle dönüştürmektedir. Ayrıca, piyasa hükmündeki ekonomik tutum, gelecekteki riskler için bireylerin kendilerini sorumlu tutmaktadır. Kendini piyasa hükmüne adapte etme, toplumsal olarak ‘uygun görülen’ bir davranışa dönüştüğünde, buna adapte olamayanlar ‘mantıksız’ olarak nitelendirilmekte ve gelecekteki her türlü riski kendi ‘mantıksız’ tutumlarının sorumluluğu olarak üstlenmeleri beklenmektedir. Buna göre, ekonomik zorluklar ve yoksulluk öz-sorumluluğun parçası olarak bireyin kendisi tarafından yüklenilmesi gereken ‘riskler’ haline gelmektedir. Sonuç olarak, rıza ve zor mekanizmaları ile şekillenen özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayış’ı eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin *gecekondu* zamanlarındaki ‘toplumsal ilişkiler’ ve ‘ekonomi’nin düzenlenişini piyasa hükmüne tabi tutarak yeni bir ekonomik tutum modelinin oluşumuna neden olmaktadır. Bu tutum, neoliberal aklın yansıması olarak, kazanç güdüsü, rekabet, girişimci stratejiler ve öz-sorumlulukla şekillenmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, eski *gecekondu* sakinlerini, ‘neoliberal öznellikler’in bir biçimi olarak ekonomik-rasyonel bireylere dönüştürmektedir. Ayrıca, ‘neoliberal öznellikler’, özel mülkiyete dayalı yeni ‘ortak kanı’nın bir sonucu olmanın dışında, AKP’nin hegemonik projesinin ‘etiko-politik’ zeminini yeniden üretmeyi sağlayan güç haline gelmektedir. Böylece, borçlulukla kendini yeniden üretmesi sağlanan ‘neoliberal öznellikler’, ‘sürekli bir oluşum süreci’ (Gramsci 2000: 206) olarak (neoliberal) ‘hegemonya’ya bu oluşum için gerekli kaynağı sağlamaktadır.

Sonuç itibariyle bu tez, ‘etiko-politik’ zemin oluşumunu inceleyerek ve bu zeminin somut olarak nasıl özneler ürettiğini tartışarak, güncel ekonomi-politik rejim olarak neoliberal ‘hegemonya’ya derinlikli bir anlayış sunmuştur. Neoliberalizmin ‘ekonomi-politik’ ve ‘Foucault’cu formülasyonlarına, birbirinden bağımsız olmasından ziyade, birbirini

tamamlayıcı perspektifler olarak yaklaşmak, bu anlayışın inşa etmede önemli bir undurdur. Bu alternatif teorik pozisyon, literatürdeki ‘verili’ anlayışları sorunsallaştırmaya ve bunları yeniden formülize ederek açıklayıcı bir nitelik kazandırmaya olanak sağlamıştır. Bu anlamda, teorik pozisyonla ilgili üç nokta vurgulamaya değerdir. Birincisi, rıza ve zor mekanizmalarının birbiri içine geçerek, tabi sınıfın ‘ortak kanı’sını özel mülkiyetin hegemonik ‘anlayış’ı doğrultusunda nasıl yeniden düzenlediğine odaklanmak özel mülkiyet ile ilgili hakim anlayışları sorgulamayı sağlamıştır. ‘Ortak kanı’nın, aslında, devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişkinin kendisiyle nasıl inşa edildiğini tartışmak, ‘ortak kanı’nın ne yalnızca toplumun ‘özgür irade’siyle ne de bütünüyle devletin ‘baskı’sı sonucu oluştuğu açıklamalarını aşmayı sağlamıştır. Ayrıca, ‘hegemonya’nın ilişkisel karakterini vurgulamak, tabi sınıfların sosyal politikaların pasif alıcıları olarak tahayyül edilmesini engellemiştir. İkincisi, neoliberal ‘hegemonya’yı sağlamlaştırmayı amaçlayan AKP’nin hegemonik projesinin ‘tabandan’ nasıl meşrulaştırıldığını incelemek, öznelliklerin bu meşruiyetin devamlılığında önemli bir unsur olduğunu ortaya çıkarmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, rıza, zor ve ‘yönetimsellik’ iktidar ilişkilerinin birbirinden ayıramaz boyutlarıdır. Ancak, birbirini tamamlayıcı olmanın koşulu olan özgül farklılıkları kaybetmemek için bunları stratejik olarak bir araya getirmek önemlidir. Bu yüzden, üçüncüsü, ‘hegemonya’ ve ‘yönetimsellik’ arasında iki-yönlü olarak kurulan ilişki, bu kavramların belirli kısıtlarını, her kavramın özgül farkını diğerindeki belirli kısıtlılığı açıklamak için kullanarak aşmayı sağlamaktadır. Bir yandan, öznellikleri, tutumlardaki dönüşüm ile incelemek ‘hegemonik politika ne üretir?’ sorusunu somut olarak açıklamaya olanak tanımıştır. Diğer yandan, belirli toplumsal grupların sınıf ittifakanı sağlamayı hedefleyen hegemonik projeleri belirli bir faili gerektirmektedir. Buna göre, bu fail, yönetimselliği belirli toplumsal grupların fiili projeleri ile ilişkilendirerek, yönetimselliğin ontolojik koşulunu sağlamaktadır.

Hatırlanacağı üzere, bu çalışma, ampirik bir araştırma ile inşa ettiği alternatif teorik pozisyonuyla, küresel Güney özelinde, küresel soylulaştırma literatürüne katkı yapmayı hedeflemişti. 2000li yılların başına kadar formal arsa piyasalarının dışında kalan *gecekondu* yerleşimleri, AKP’nin kentsel reformlarını oluşturan kentsel yenileme ile ilgili kanunlar ve TOKİ’nin yeniden yapılandırılması yoluyla sermaye birikimi için yeni bir kanal haline gelmiştir. Açılan neoliberalizm paradigması ile paralel bir biçimde, burada ikamet eden nüfusların formal arsa ve finansal piyasalara tabi tutulması, özel mülkiyet ‘kavrayışı’nın yaygınlaşmasına ve yeni öznelliklerin oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Bu boyutları bakımından Türkiye’de ‘devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri’ küresel Güney’deki soylulaştırma

pratikleri ile benzerlik göstermektedir. Ancak, bu çalışma, saha çalışmasından çıkan iki bulgu bağlamında küresel Güney'deki soylulaştırma tartışmalarından farklılık göstermektedir. Birincisi, 'kent mekânlarındaki sınıf yapısının üst sınıflar lehine yeniden düzenlenmesi' Gülveren'de karşılaşılan bir olgu değildir. Daha açık bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, 'objektif' anlamda 'sınıf yapısının yeniden düzenlenmesi' gerçekleşmemiştir. Daha ziyade, eski *gecekondu* sakinlerinin 'ev sahibi olma arzuları' ve apartman dairesi özelinde, ev sahipliğinin sembolik olarak temsil ettiği 'modernlik' ve 'sınıf atlama' olguları ile 'sınıf yapısı', 'özel' anlamda yeniden düzenlenmiştir. Bu anlamda, öznellik boyutunun incelenmesi, 'devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri'nin 'tek boyutlu' sınıf analizlerinin aksine, bu projelerin toplumsal sonuçları bakımından daha derinlikli bir anlayış sunmuştur. İkincisi, 'devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri'nin alt sınıfları 'yerinden etme/ mülksüzleştirme' kaygısından, toplumun formal arsa ve finansal piyasalarının dışında kalan bu kesimlerinin, TOKİ'nin 'mortgage-benzeri' ödemeye dayanan ev sahipliği programı ile bu piyasalara çekilmesinin, açılan neoliberalizm döneminde, neoliberal birikim rejimlerinin devamlılığı için daha önemli bir unsur olduğunu göstermiştir. Ayrıca, bu piyasalara dahil edilme yolunun ne yalnızca rızaya, ne de zor'a dayandığının; ancak bu iki mekanizmanın birbiri içine geçmesiyle mümkün olduğu tartışmıştır. Böylece, 'devlet öncülüğündeki kentsel gelişme projeleri'ne rıza, zor mekanizmaları ve öznellik boyutunu ön plana çıkaran, 'hegemonya' perspektifinin 'yönetimsellik' kavramı ile geliştirilmesi biçiminde formülize edilen alternatif bir teorik pozisyonla yaklaşılması 'kentsel mekanlardaki sınıf yapısının yeniden düzenlenmesi' ve 'yerinden edilme/ mülksüzleştirme' tartışmalarını sorgulamış ve bunları yeni boyutları ile açıklayıp, güncel toplumsal, politik ve ekonomik dönüşümlere daha derinlikli bir anlayış getirmiştir.

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