

NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY IN TURKEY

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This study aims to investigate three phenomena that have emerged in the post-1980's Turkey by using the lens of neoliberal governmentality that is handled with regard to the topics of securitization, economization and subjectivation. In this context, first, the Temporary Village Guard System is examined with reference to the theme of the securitization and it is claimed that the state's attempt to share its monopoly of violence with the public is not a result of the nation state's retreat, but a result of the expansion of governmental technologies so as to permeate civil society. Secondly, with reference to the theme of economization, the unprecedented growth trend of the hydropower market in the 2000s is taken into consideration and it is claimed that this trend finds its condition of possibility in neoliberal rationality which defines public interest as competition. And lastly, on the basis of the subjectivation theme, the introduction of pay for performance system to health services is discussed and it is argued that this system is not an effect of a new organization of production, but rather of the neoliberal modes of subjectivation.

Keywords: Governmentality, Neoliberalism, Temporary Village Guard System, Hydroelectric Power Plants, Pay for Performance System in Health Services

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE NEOLİBERAL YÖNETİMSELLİK

Günok, Firdevs Ezgi

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, güvenlikleştirme, ekonomikleştirme ve özneleştirme başlıkları altında ele aldığı neoliberal yönetimselliği Türkiye’de 1980 sonrasında ortaya çıkan üç olguyu açıklamakta kullanmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu bağlamda, ilk olarak, güvenlikleştirme temasına referansla Geçici Köy Koruculuğu Sistemi incelenmekte ve devletin şiddet tekeli halkla paylaşmasının devlet kapasitesindeki bir küçülme sonucunda değil, neoliberal yönetimin sivil toplumu da içerecek biçimde genişlemesi sonucunda mümkün olduğu iddia edilmektedir. İkinci olarak, ekonomikleştirme temasına referansla 2000lerden itibaren hidroelektrik piyasasının girmiş olduğu benzeri görülmemiş büyüme trendi ele alınmakta ve bu trendin olabirlik koşulunu rekabeti kamu yararı olarak tanımlayan neoliberal rasyonalitede bulunduğu öne sürülmektedir. Son olarak ise, özneleştirme başlığı altında sağlık çalışanları için performans dayalı ek ödeme sistemi incelenmekte ve bu sistemin üretim tarzındaki bir dönüşümün değil, öznellik üretimindeki dönüşümün bir sonucu olduğu gösterilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yönetimsellik, Neoliberalizm, Geçici Köy Koruculuğu Sistemi, Hidroelektrik Santraller, Sağlık Hizmetlerinde Performansa Dayalı Döner Sermaye Primi Uygulaması

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. GOVERNMENTALITY	5
2.1. Genealogy of Governmentality	19
2.1.1. Pastoral Power.....	20
2.1.2. Raison D'état.....	25
2.1.3. Liberal Art of Government.....	32
2.1.4. Neoliberal Art of Government	44
3. NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY IN TURKEY	54
3.1. Governmentality as Securitization: Temporary Village Guard System	54
3.2. Governmentality as Economization: Hydroelectric Power Plants	80
3.3. Governmentality as Subjectivation: Pay for Performance System in Health Services.....	111
4. CONCLUSION	127
REFERENCES	133
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	159
B. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM	175

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Michel Foucault, in 1978 in a lecture series at the Collège de France called Security, Territory and Population, coined the term governmentality for the first time, which would both guide his subsequent work and reshape his previous studies in a retrospective manner. Despite the remarkable shift in the object of analysis after 1978, it is hardly possible to claim that the deployment of the concept represents a rupture in Foucault's work. Rather, what is at stake is an attempt to prove that there is no methodological difference between the analysis of micro-physics of power and macro-level questions of state and economy (Foucault, 2008, p. 186). If anything, the shift from power to government heralds a rich "tool kit" that brings the familiar concepts we use in political analysis -such as state, sovereignty, civil society, political economy, freedom, security, population and so on- into a uniquely new configuration through the micro-analytics of power. Governmentality, as a challenge against state theories, shows that the distinctions between state and society, politics and economics, private and public space are not universal and imperative boundaries, but are the effects of government technologies. This perspective, rather than dealing with how power can be shared between the state and society, focuses on the history of tactics of government which constantly defines and redefines what enters and does not enter the competence of the state and what belongs to the private sphere. In that, the shift from power to government not only fills in some gaps in his theory, it also presents possible critical responses to the present.

This study aims to approach the particular experience of neoliberal art of government in Turkey by using the lens of governmentality. To tackle

neoliberalism with a governmentality approach has the advantage of revealing the systematic ties between structure and agency, state and society, market and state, power and knowledge, freedom and security. This approach does not reduce neoliberalism to an ideology or an economic policy but considers it as a political rationality, a normative reason that governs ways of government of the self and others in every sphere of economic, political and social life. It enables us to see that the neoliberal transfer of operations of the state to non-state actors through promotion of individual responsibility, privatization of risk-management and generalization of entrepreneurial model across the society as a whole is not the domination of the market and concordant decline of state sovereignty, but an effect of governmental program. Besides, the historical nominalism of governmentality approach makes resistance a real possibility as it takes structures as the historical and contingent effects of power relations, which are not merely conceived as technologies of domination but as the play of open tactics and strategies.

In this regard, this study focuses on three concordant processes, which constitute the main footings of neoliberal art of government, namely securitization, economization and subjectivation, to understand three phenomena that are peculiar to post-1980's Turkey: the temporary village guard system, the hydroelectric power plants and the pay for performance system in health services. Accordingly in the first chapter, Foucault's journey from power to analytics of government is traced. First, the originality of the term government is depicted in a comparison with his previous conceptualization of power based on the war-struggle model. Then the "genesis of a political knowledge" (Foucault, 2009, p. 362) from the ancient Greek ideas on citizenship and care of the self to the early modern *raison d'état* and police state that Foucault traces in his lecture series, is to be summarized so as to reveal the evolution of his thought that takes him to the claim that the modern state is the product of the complex linkage between political and pastoral power. During this summary the special emphasis is put on what he calls the "state effect" (*ibid*, p. 276), that is the problem of how the state

is perceived as a unified entity, despite being a fragile structure that has been constituted on the basis of many different processes. Thereafter, the liberal art of government is discussed as the first instance of rationalization of governmental practice. It is argued that liberalism, from Foucault's point of view, is the junction of *raison d'état* and political economy that revolves around the belief that members of the population are naturally endowed with a capacity for autonomous action and that the most efficient way of governing the population is governing at a distance, by conducting their conduct. Lastly, neoliberal governmental rationality will be handled with reference to the innovations of Ordoliberalism and Chicago school in terms of redefining the relation between economy and government alongside offering new techniques of subjectification.

In the second chapter, first the Temporary Village Guard System that was established in 1985 as a response to the first armed struggle of the PKK will be discussed with reference to the theme of securitization. This subchapter aims to show that security and freedom are not binary opposites but two sides of the same coin and in that (neo)liberalism that operates through the organization of freedom is inherently authoritarian. However, it is argued that the invocation of security on the basis of terror is a tactic peculiar to neoliberal rationality. War against terror, legitimizes the elimination of some parts of the population that are not fully articulated in the system through market mechanisms, for the well-being of the population as a whole. The transition from the state monopoly on violence to the era of democratization of violence is marked by the establishment of this paramilitary organization. This is a tactic of government to proliferate efficiency, to reduce the costs of state action and to enhance the options in a security market. Security, in that, becomes an impulse towards more interventionist governmental action. Accordingly, it is argued that such transfer of responsibility to fight against terror is not a sign of nation state's retreat, but the expansion of sovereign reflexes to society as a whole. Second, the frenzy of hydroelectric power plants in 2000s is discussed within the theme of economization. In this subchapter it is argued that the extension of economic perspective as a grid of intelligibility to

whole spheres of life is the condition of possibility of the redefinition of nature as a bundle of resources to be used to enhance economic growth. However, it is claimed that whereas in the industrialized countries such odd coupling of ecology with economy is practiced within a sustainable development discourse, in Turkey protection of nature is seen irreconcilable with economic growth. In this part, it is argued that the economization of the definition of public good is the precondition of the competition of private companies to rent the rivers for 49 years with a claim to serve to the public interest. Third, the introduction of pay for performance system to health services is discussed on the basis of the human capital theme. Accordingly, it is argued that such professionalization and concordant precarization is made possible by a new mode of subjectivation that renders everyone as homo oeconomicus that tries to maximize his or her capital, rather than a new organization of production and distribution of wealth. Employees, through such economization of human behavior are subjectivized as resources for the organizations that employ them and as entrepreneurs of and for themselves.

CHAPTER 2

GOVERNMENTALITY

Governmentality is a neologism derived from the combination of the words *government* and *rationality*. Foucault uses the notion of government in a different fashion than the contemporary meaning of the word, which is almost solely limited to the political field. He shows that up until the emergence of a secular art of government in the eighteenth century, the term has taken on a wide variety of meanings ranging from the government of oneself, to the government of children; from the government of souls, to the government of a household, and to the government of the state by the prince (Foucault, 2009, p. 88). What is of interest to Foucault among these different definitions of government is that till the sixteenth century “one never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups” (ibid, p. 122) so as to lead, guide or direct them. This means that government is the way in which one conducts the conduct of others and of the self. What characterizes government and what differentiates it from a state of domination is that it is not exercised directly upon subjects. “Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (Foucault, 1982, p. 220) “in the light of certain principles or goals” (Rose, 1996, p. 41).

The determination of these, so called, principles and goals are possible only on the condition of a specific *rationality* underpinning them. Put it differently, technologies of power¹ cannot exist without an underlying political rationality for

¹ Technologies of power, encompassing a range of mechanisms, procedures and instruments, is a term used by Foucault, to indicate that power relations cannot be reduced to mere discourses as

that political rationality is “anterior to political action and a condition of it” (Dean, 2003, p. 181) in two aspects. On the one hand, a political rationality is a regime of representation in that it is the condition of possibility of the articulation of a discursive field within which power is exercised. In other words, “the delineation of concepts, the specification of objects and borders, the provision of arguments and justifications” (Lemke, 2001, p. 191) that enable such principles, goals, decisions and so forth, to be constructed are possible only within a system of representation. On the other hand, a political rationality “structures specific forms of intervention” (ibid) by “rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations” (Miller & Rose, 1992, p. 179).

Therefore, governmentality, as an analytical grid to analyze the relations of power, performs as a mediator in two crucial aspects. First, it mediates between power and subjectivity and indicates the systematic ties between “the technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (Foucault, 1988, p. 19). Referring to “the ways in which a conception of the self has arisen through distinct corporeal and discursive practices” (Sjöholm, 2013, p. 149) by the term technology, Foucault opts to make it possible to investigate how technologies applied on the self are linked to the forms of political government and exploitation, as well as how “the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination” (Foucault, 1993, p. 203). Second, it mediates between mechanisms of power and forms of knowledge since governmental practices are always bound up to a rationality which is the “way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government” (Gordon, 1991, p.3). In fact, power always acts within a regime of truth that is the

there is nothing “more material, physical, corporal than the exercise of power” (Foucault, 1980, pp.57-58). The term *technology* denounces the embeddedness of technical knowledges, which define and draw limits over possible actions, within certain discursive and non-discursive practices. Besides, the term implies the “profound reciprocity between technological innovation in the ordinary sense and the emergence of new techniques of power: mass production required both disciplinary power and new technology to emerge, disciplinary power itself being a technology much like the steam engine in this regard. Like all technologies, technologies of power are not socially or politically neutral but rather profoundly alter the way things operate in society” (Kelly, 2009, p. 44).

“ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 132) and thence there is “no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p. 27). That is to say, not only are power relations the precondition of knowledge, but also knowledge has a constituting effect on power relations.

To govern is to coordinate these two lines of technologies of the self and a governmental rationality that “conditions, legitimizes and circulates a particular regime of knowledge-power” (Brown, 2015, p. 116). Thereby, government is a conceptual tool paving the way to investigate the “analytical triad of forms of knowledge, technologies of power, and processes of self-formation” (Lemke, 2016, p. 3). And, as such, it reveals that the history of the modern state is at the same time the history of modern subject. The processes of state formation, through the articulation of heterogeneous power relations into the form of state, are simultaneously the processes of subjectification. This indicates a self-correction of Foucault in terms of his micro-physics of power, on two axes. First, he admits that he has “insisted too much on the technology of domination and power” (Foucault, 1988, p. 19) throughout his studies of docile bodies and disciplinary power, which “could not do justice to the double character of this process as a practice of subjugation and a form of self-constitution” (Bröckling, et. al., 2001, p. 1). Second, having deliberately suspended the question of state for so long, for the sake of focusing on local practices and institutions, Foucault now comes to admit the insufficiency of such an approach in terms of analyzing the relations between the society and the state; i.e. between the global forms of subjectification and the general forms of rule. In order to overcome these limitations, Foucault resorts to a “double expansion of the analytic apparatus” (ibid, p. 2) by introducing an analytics² of state alongside the notion of the

² Foucault uses the term *analytics*, as opposed to a theory of the state, in order to highlight the “specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist and change” by seeking “to

technologies of the self. And such expansion brings along a break in his approach which is “not between the genealogy of power and a theory of the subject, but inside the problematics of power” (Lemke, 2002, p. 52). After all, governmentality, says Foucault, is “the necessary critique of the common conceptions of power” (1997, p. 88).

Foucault’s interest in governmentality brings along that “necessary critique” to his war/struggle approach to power relations since governing is not about war, but about structuring the field of possible actions of the subjects. War/struggle approach, or “Nietzsche's hypothesis” (Foucault, 2003, p.16), is adopted by Foucault from the early 1970s till he introduces the concept of *biopower* in 1976 lectures. This approach, considers power relations as a struggle between unequal forces which ultimately ends up with the domination of some forces over the others. Accordingly, “[p]ower is war, the continuation of war by other means” (ibid, p. 15). In 1971, Foucault writes: “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (1998, p. 378). Such conceptualization of power is a clear rejection of what he calls the “economism in the theory of power” (Foucault, 2003, p.13).

The main representative of this economism is the classical juridical-liberal theory for modeling power “on a juridical operation similar to an exchange of contracts” (ibid). That is, power only exists when it is exchanged or is in circulation. It is regarded as a right that can be possessed like a commodity and can be transferred via a contract in order to constitute political sovereignty. This sovereignty is transcendent to any other struggle and it is the single center from which power emanates upon those who do not possess it. The legitimacy of such sovereignty,

attend to, rather than efface, the singularity of ways of governing and conducting ourselves” (Dean, 2010, p.30). An analytics of power does not posit a specific representation of power, but reveals how *things* -as temporarily fixed moments of self-identity- are constituted *between* relations of power. Therefore, it refuses to start off the analysis with taken for granted universals or logical necessities inherent in history.

questioned on the basis of a consent/coercion doublet, is the sole problematique that this theory revolves around. However, this juridico-legal understanding of power is utterly unacceptable for Foucault as he defines power essentially in relational terms: power “as something exercised rather than possessed; as existing in relations rather than in things or persons...as operating at all levels of the socius, not just in the relations between state and citizens, or between classes, or between superiors and subordinates” (Schrift, 2013, p. 141). Power is in-itself a relation of force; it is a mechanism, meaning that power relations only exist when they operate. There is no single individual exercising power; there is no single logic or secret mastermind that directs this “interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Another approach Foucault blames for being economist is, of course, Marxism. In this approach, power is ancillary to economy in that it finds “its historical *raison d'etre*, the principle of its concrete form and of its actual workings in the economy” (Foucault, 2003, p.14). Yet, for Foucault, power is never external to economic relations and cannot be reduced to the position of a superstructure. Instead, power relations provide the condition of the separation between politics and economy. That is to say, every economic formation resides in a general economy of power.

When it comes to the tools at hand to approach power in a non-economic fashion, we have on the one hand Reich’s hypothesis and that of Nietzsche, on the other. According to Foucault, Reich, following Freud, equates power relations with repression. Power as repression thesis is modeled on the assumption that there is a deeper reality, a substance, that has been concealed by repression mechanisms “as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social processes” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 282). And in the absence of such power/ repression the substance can “reestablish a full and positive relationship” (ibid) with its origin. This is because, repressive model takes for granted the idea that “truth does not belong to the order of power, but shares an original affinity with freedom” (Foucault, 1978, p. 60). This understanding, actually, finds its roots in Hegel for whom the end of history is achieved by the absolute liberation of Geist from all

dichotomies, at the point where “finding itself- coming to itself- and contemplating itself is concrete actuality” (Hegel, 2004, p. 25). Foucault goes against this model on two concordant criticisms. First, there is no essence, per se, to be liberated either in history or in the subject. Processes of liberation are crucial only with regard to states of domination, “in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen...by economic, political, or military means” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 283). But, on the contrary to Hegel and to repression model in general, there is no point of absolute freedom to be reached through successive moments of liberation, because liberation generates new power relationships. As there is no “ahistorical essence that can be either repressed or liberated” (Gordon, 2002, p. 134) and as “truth is not by nature free-nor error servile” (Foucault, 1978, p. 60), what comes out in the processes of liberation is actually the production of a new regime of truth that is imbued within power relations. The second criticism is that power as repression model conceals this productive aspect of power relations. Even though in particular cases power relations can repress, power is not limited to such a negative function. Power is not evil and it is not the opposite of freedom. It is, in fact, the condition of possibility of freedom and subjecthood. And the reason we obey is because power “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 119). Yet, this production neither implies the existence of a monolithic structure encompassing all social reality nor of a single dominant set of discourses constituting the subject; because “[p]ower comes from below” (Foucault, 1978, p. 94) and thence it is “an open, more-or-less coordinated...cluster of relations” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 199). To state differently, since power relations are always contingent, local and partial they cannot “solidify into states of domination so complete that they become physical determinations and subject people to the point of impotence” (Simons, 2013, p. 309). They are always fragile and open to contestation so that “[w]here there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). Resistance, being “internal to

all relations of power as a permanent possibility” (Schrift, 2013, p. 151), is a derivative of power relations as their “irreducible opposite”, and it functions as the “adversary, target, support” of the exercise of power. That is why, just like power relations, they are heterogeneous and local, and thereby they do not opt for an all-out revolution; but remain as a form of strategic power reversal. Unless they compose a unity through a “strategic codification” (Foucault, 1978, pp. 95-96), they continue to be a part of the same historical network of dominant power relations as they are rendered possible by the very same power/knowledge regime that they resist³.

Lastly, there is Nietzsche's hypothesis, the struggle-repression schema that Foucault admits to be the model that he has been trying to apply in previous years (2003, p. 17). Since the Lectures on *The Will to Know* (Foucault, 2013), where he conducts a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's conceptualization of power that dwells on the opposition between struggle and submission, Foucault postulates the clash between forces as the basis of civil society. This is a radical criticism of Hobbesian theory of social contract; because the foundation of civil society, to Foucault, does not represent a consensus among people to end the war in the state of nature. Rather a self-organizing war which “through the dynamic of the war itself forms civil society as a state of stabilization” (Kelly, 2009, p. 52). Therefore, for Foucault, as opposed to Hobbes, and in a similar vein with the “principle Clausewitz inverted” (2003, p. 48), war is not replaced by politics with the constitution of modern state sovereignty since civil society refers to the spread of power relations expressed in the war to the political order and to social relations in general. So, his war model aims to overcome the simplicity and apparent misrepresentation of power offered by juridical model of sovereignty by

³ The concept of *resistance* mentioned in this paragraph is based on Foucault's conceptualization in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality Vol. I*. In these works, as he uses war - repression schema, resistance remains as an underdeveloped notion. For that, as mentioned above, till the introduction of *governmentality*, the dual character of subjectification does not fall into place and the subject is almost bounded to its role in subjugation. Therefore, in these texts, repression is limited to a reactive force, or rather to a counter-strategy. Even though Foucault postulates resistance as the condition of possibility of power relations, his theoretical background in the mid-seventies, does not support this claim.

doing “precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was trying to do in *Leviathan*” (Foucault, 2003, p. 28) without falling into the trap of “the Marxist/Benjaminian conception of a singular totality of politics as war” (Neal, 2004, p. 383). Accordingly, he suggests we let power relations “operate in their multiplicity, their differences, their specificity, and their reversibility; we must therefore study them as relations of force that intersect, refer to one another, converge, or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another” (Foucault, 2003, p. 266).

Nonetheless, at the very same 1976 lectures, he starts to question whether the only possible means to conduct such study is to use the general form of war that serves as the grid of intelligibility of politics. He suggests the war model be “considerably modified and ultimately, perhaps, abandoned” (ibid, p. 17) mainly because it resembles the Hobbesian war of all against all. And, as such, war model, similar to traditional power theories, continues to point out the repressive dimension of power relations, rather than their performative and positive aspect. Thereby, “[i]nstead of cutting off the king’s head”, he turns “the conception that he criticized upside down by replacing law and contract with war and conquest” (Lemke, 2010, p. 33). That is, as he replaces the question of how “the discourse of truth or...philosophy...establish the limits of power's right” with the question of what “are the rules of right that power implements to produce discourses of truth” (Foucault, 2003, p. 24), he approaches right not “in terms of a legitimacy that has to be established, but in terms of the procedures of subjugation it implements” (ibid, p. 27). So, his problem is not “to discover how a multiplicity of individuals and wills can be shaped into a single will...known as sovereignty” but to “grasp the material agency of subjugation insofar as it constitutes subjects” (ibid, pp. 28-29). However, by formulating the questions of sovereignty, consent, nation etc. the other way around; i.e. from the point of the constitution of the subject, he cannot exhaust the problem of sovereignty, as such formulation does not provide the framework to explain how it is possible that the “headless body often behaves as if it indeed had a head” (Dean, 1994, p. 181). In other words,

postulating disciplinary power as “precisely the opposite” of sovereign power is not enough to show that micro politics constitute macro politics. This is because war schemata cannot help but create a dichotomy in terms of subjugation: between disciplinary power, on the one hand and sovereign, on the other. Disciplines that aim to produce docile bodies do not function like the law that is considered to be the singular reflection of the sovereign's will. Whereas the theory of sovereignty is about founding and legitimizing “absolute power around and on the basis of the physical existence of the sovereign” (Foucault, 2003, p. 36), disciplines work on the basis of complex systems of surveillance. Being radically heterogeneous, disciplinary mechanisms contrast sharply with the unitary, centralized, transcendent soul of the sovereign. The birth of the *dispositif* of discipline, from the seventeenth century onwards, marks the beginning of modern politics and the constitution of the modern individual through a calculation of power so as to maximize efficiency by extracting time and labor from bodies. Therefore, on the contrary to law, disciplinary techniques do not prohibit; but regulate and normalize. Such norms are produced on the basis of human sciences, clinical expertise and medicine; thence they are highly autonomous from the code of law and even, sometimes, come into collision with it. Normalization is performed through artificial and fixed spaces such as schools, hospitals, prisons, military and factory so as to constitute the modern individual via hierarchizing, standardizing, ranking, excluding etc. while at the same time homogenizing and individualizing them. In this manner disciplines seek to make politics “a continuation of war by other means” by virtue of implementing the order of the organized, disciplined armies into the civil society⁴. Therefore, the problem with this framework is that, these two apparatuses of power are “so heterogeneous that we can never reduce one to the other” (ibid) that Foucault’s

⁴ At this point, it should be underlined that disciplinary power does not replace sovereignty. The theory of sovereignty, for the sake of eliminating the hindrances in the advancement of a disciplinary society as a “permanent critical instrument to be used against the monarchy”; and of imposing a juridical code “on the mechanism of discipline a system of right” to conceal the “techniques of domination involved in discipline” has coexisted with the apparatus of discipline till the nineteenth century (Foucault, 2003, p. 37). And from the nineteenth century till the hegemony of neoliberal rationality, as it will be seen in the following chapters, it still is embedded in heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting discourses.

war model cannot serve the adequate tools to handle the process of subjugation in its complexity, both at the level of the state and at the level of the individual. Moreover, as neither of these apparatuses allow for an analytics of self-subjectification, he cannot inquire into the “conditions of a consensus or the prerequisites of acceptance” (Lemke, 2010, p. 36). That is, his analytics cannot overcome the dualities between law and discipline, state and institutions, repression and resistance, violence and consent.

Due to a discontent having arisen from these factors, I believe, in the lecture series of *Society Must be Defended*, Foucault distances himself from the war model by placing it into a genealogical perspective by asking: “How, when, and why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war” (ibid, p. 47)? Accordingly, he questions whether the notions such as strategy and tactics “constitute in themselves a valid and adequate instrument for the analysis of power relations” (ibid). Even though these questions are not directly answered throughout the course, “the conditions of a negative answer” (Patton, 2013, p.182) are sketched in the final lecture when he introduces the notion of *biopower* as a technology which appears in the eighteenth century for managing populations. Biopower refers to a set of discourses and techniques through which the basic biological features of the human species become the object of political strategies. And as such, it is different from sovereign power which takes the individuals as legal subjects who can commit voluntary act; and from disciplinary power that organizes the body so as to produce certain effects. Involving techniques of “mass surveillance, such as the census, and of mass control, such as health campaigns” (Kelly, 2009, p. 43), biopower performs as the condition of possibility of the constitution of the modern nation. This point in history, when the “the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity” of the human species come under control of the state “together with a whole series of related economic and political problems” (Foucault, 2003, p. 243), marks the emergence of the biopolitical right: “the right to make live and to let die” (ibid, p. 241). Dictating the strict opposite of the fatal sovereign right “to

take life or let live” (ibid) biopower aligns itself with disciplinary power as a productive technology of modern power. Also, instead of replacing the sovereign apparatus, biopower performs in tandem “with the right to kill, both within the state, with the state reserving a notorious monopoly right to use (lethal) force, and outside, with the right of the state to wage war” (Kelly, 2004, p. 60). This is because, to manage the population requires fragmenting and classifying the population for the sake of eliminating the bad, unhealthy and detrimental elements imbued with it. Therefore, those whose lives are to be regulated and protected are separated from those who are to be subject to the lethal mechanisms of sovereign power, within the economy of biopower.

In this context, it becomes clearer why Foucault challenges the war-repression schema. The militaristic language of tactics, manoeuvres, antagonism and strategies, despite being very useful with regard to an analysis of disciplinary power, are not sufficient to shed a light on this productive function of biopower. Moreover, this model cannot represent the inherent connections between technologies of biopower and discipline. That is, according to this model the only reason that they coexist is because they operate at different levels and thereby “they complement one another without conflict” (Kelly, 2009, p. 43). However, during the period 1976-78, Foucault cannot come up with an alternative to this strategic model of intelligibility which finds its significance in the schema of war. For instance, in an interview in 1977, he asserts that he does not feel prepared to answer the question of whether the relation between forces in the order of politics is a warlike relation, with a definite yes or no (Foucault, 1980c, p. 164). Similarly, in the *History of Sexuality* Volume I, he still relies on the concepts of forces and strategies, although it is clear that he is in search of an alternative. Force relations, he says, “can be coded-in part but never totally-either in the form of ‘war’, or in the form of ‘politics’; this would imply two different strategies (but the one always liable to switch into the other) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense force relations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). In other words, biopower goes hand in hand with disciplinary power,

because what gives power its access to the body is its “taking charge of life, more than the threat of death” (ibid, p. 143). Yet, the implication of “two different strategies” maintains the dichotomy between bodies that are ordered through war-like relations at the micro level, and populations that are regulated through biopolitics at the macro-level. The “transfer point” (ibid, p.103) between the anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population is formulated as sex, in this work, in that “[i]t was essential that the state know what was happening with its citizens’ sex, and the use they made of it, but also that each individual be capable of controlling the use he made of it. Between the state and the individual, sex became an issue” (ibid, p. 26). This, clearly is “a rudimentary way” (Lynch, 2013, p. 160) of associating the state and the individual. Positing sex as the interaction point between the two substance-like phenomena, i.e. the population and the individual, is hardly a more sophisticated version of Cartesian “pineal gland” (Descartes, 1975). Nevertheless, this “budding reformulation” (Lynch, 2013, p. 160) of power relations, with the introduction of the notion of biopower, heralds the subsequent work of Foucault.

The gap between the micro-physics and macro-physics of power is satisfactorily spanned when Foucault, in 1978, propounds the governmental model and places biopolitics in the framework of the liberal rationality. The model of government, by revealing the contingent nature of the divide between micro and macro levels, provides the sufficient tools to analyze macro phenomena within genealogical approach. In other words, Foucault finds within the governmental model, the framework that will allow him to study the macro phenomena with the same methodology that he used in order to investigate disciplinary technologies and local institutions, in his previous analysis. In this manner, he claims, it becomes possible to carry out an analysis of the state without referencing the terminology of sovereignty; i.e. legitimacy, law and right.

In his studies of discipline in the army, hospitals, schools and prisons, he undertook the method of, what he calls, “triple displacement” (2009, p. 116) to

conduct a genealogical analysis of the institutions, practices and knowledges. The first displacement was to move outside the “institutional-centric” approach, which tries to discover the internal structures and the “logical necessity” of the components of the institution, in order to replace it with the “overall point of view of the technology of power” (ibid, pp.116-117). In this manner, the analysis does not elaborate on the intrinsic qualities of institutions; but rather reveals how local institutions constitute a more general order. Besides, the notion of institution tends to be highly deceptive as “when we talk about institutions we are basically talking about both individuals and the group, we take the individual, the group, and the rules which govern them as given”, therefore “before tackling institutions, we have to deal with the relations of force in these tactical arrangements that permeate institutions” (Foucault, 2006, p.15). The second shift was to avoid functionalism so as to place the institution within the general economy of power. For that, the actual history of the institution is not commanded by its success and failure, but by strategies and tactics, which are mostly invented as a response to functional deficiencies. The final displacement is about refusing to start the analysis with readymade concepts, may it be madness or sexuality, and detaching “them from the privilege of the object”, so as to identify how they are reified and ordered within a system of knowledge. Put it differently, instead of approaching institutions and practices on the basis of the criteria and norms offered by such universals, a genealogical approach traces the constitution of the “field of truth with objects of knowledge” by way of analyzing the institutions and practices (Foucault, 2009, pp. 116-117). In this way, Foucault paves the way for an analysis of the state:

If this triple movement of a shift to the outside was tried out with regard to the disciplines, I would now like to explore this possibility with regard to the state. Can we cross over to the outside of the state as we could...with regard to these different institutions? ... After all, do not these general technologies of power, which we have attempted to reconstruct by moving outside the institution, ultimately fall under a global, totalizing institution that is, precisely, the state? (ibid, p. 118).

Thereby, it becomes clear that the analysis of *micro-power* is not about the scale of the object of analysis; rather it is about “a point of view” (Foucault, 2008, p. 186). Technologies instead of institutions, strategies and tactics instead of function, practices instead of objects provide the method for a state analysis which will avoid conceptualizing the state as “a transcendent reality whose history could be undertaken on the basis of itself” (Foucault, 2009, p. 358) , and make it possible “to place the modern state in a general technology of power that assured its mutations, development, and functioning” (ibid, p. 120). To invalidate any unitary body of state theory that would posit the state as a “mythicized abstraction” either as the “cold monster” (ibid, p. 109) dominating the society or as an instrument to fulfill some economic functions, one needs to see that state itself is “the result of a composition of more primary forces and relations” (Dean, 2003, p. 156). That is, state does not refer to an object; it is a practice that defines one form of governing among others. Therefore, in order to deal with the problem of the state one shall not start off the analysis with the state itself; rather one has to trace “how elements that will prove central to the formation of the modern state often emerged through separate innovations away from the centres of power” (Jessop, 2011, p. 65). That is, state needs to be addressed from the *outside*, on the basis of its relation to the practices of government, for that the “state is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing” (Foucault, 2009, p. 277) in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. That is why, the “question is no longer one of accounting for government in terms of ‘the power of the State’, but of ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government” (Miller & Rose, 1992, p. 177). In this sense, state is “nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Foucault, 2008, p. 77) which are “both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and what private” (Foucault, 2009, p. 109). Foucault’s account, therefore, is highly different from other state theories which presume that the nation states have been established as a result of the submission of

various areas of government to a central authority, as an entity vis-à-vis the society. For that, it evaluates the borders between state and society, politics and economics, private and public spaces not as universal and necessary demarcations, but as the contingent effects of governmental technologies. Posed from this perspective, what is important today is not “the state’s takeover (etatisation) of society, so much as ...the governmentalization of the state” (ibid) which is the “long process by which the juridical apparatuses, grounded in an economy of sovereignty and founded with the state of justice of the Middle Ages, and the administrative state based on regulation and disciplines, are gradually governmentalized” (Dean, 2010, p.30). On this ground, Foucault proceeds to expand on the elements that constitute the genealogy of the modern state, namely citizenship, pastoral power, *raison d’état* and the police.

2.1. Genealogy of Governmentality

Foucault makes it clear that his problem is not to lay out a genealogy of the modern state itself, but to “show some sides or edges of ...the practico-reflexive prism...in which the problem of the state appeared...at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century” (Foucault, 2009, p. 276). That is, he is concerned not with writing the history of the modern state, but with examining the reflexive processes within which the knowledge that allows for the appearance of the state in the discursive realm transforms the non-discursive organization of the state. In other words, he is interested in revealing the historical conditions of the particular regime of power-knowledge that organizes the state as an entity and how this innovation becomes a determinant factor “in the way in which the institutions of the state actually crystallized” (ibid). For that the “army, taxation, justice existed well before” the moment when the state was discursively formulated; but such formulation is “absolutely essential...for the entry of all these elements into the field of an active, concerted, and reflected practice” of the state (ibid). In this regard, he undertakes an analysis of the state on the basis of a genealogical investigation of the multiple forms of *rationality of*

government in four different historical domains: first, the idea of government as pastoral power in early Christianity, second as *raison d'état* and the police state in early modern Europe, third as the liberal art of government starting with the eighteenth century, and lastly the neoliberal art of government starting in the 1930s (Gordon, 1991, p. 3). However, the framework that Foucault sketches is much more complex than a “monolinear process of replacement” (Dean, 2010, p.30) of one form of governmental rationality with another, as these governmental rationalities do not “mark historical stages on the way to a continuous “modernization” of the state” (Bröckling, et. al., 2001, p. 4).

2.1.1. Pastoral Power

Foucault’s etymological inquiry of some dictionaries of the French language reveals that government has been first and foremost about defining the way in which one conducts the conduct of others and of the self, in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Accordingly, governing has almost never implied governing a political structure or a territory, but implied governing “people, individuals, or group” (Foucault, 2009, p. 122). However, confusingly, this idea of governing people is alien to Western antiquity. The object of government of Greek *politiká* is not the citizens of the polis; but the polis; i.e. the city-state, itself. Men “are only governed indirectly” (ibid, p. 123); because they become the object of government only on the condition that they are included in the status of citizenship.

Foucault finds the roots of the idea of governing people in “Egypt, Assyria, Mesopotamia, and above all...in the Hebrews” within the “theme of the king, god, or chief as a shepherd...of men, who are like his flock” (ibid). This form of government, namely the *pastoral power*, differs from the Greek game of city-citizen broadly in four respects. First, pastoral power is not exercised over a territory, but over the flock. This defines a “relation between the deity, the land, and men” (Foucault, 2001, p. 301) different from that of the Greeks: whereas the

Hebrew God guides and leads the “multiplicity in movement”, “the Greek god is a territorial god” (Foucault, 2009, p. 125) in that Greek Gods are the owners of the land and relate to men through the intermediary of this “primary possession” (Foucault, 2001, p. 301). That is, they confront with men only as they are defending or governing their land. Second, pastoral power is “fundamentally a beneficent power” (Foucault, 2009, p. 126); it is “a power of care” (ibid, p. 127). The shepherd “gathers together, guides and leads his flock” (Foucault, 2001, p. 301) towards salvation. Concordantly, as opposed to the game of city-citizen that organizes the polis around the universality and formality of law, the flock exists only on the condition of “the shepherd’s immediate presence and direct action” (ibid, p. 302). Third, the shepherd devotes himself for the sake of the salvation of his flock. His duty is to direct “all his care towards others and never towards himself” (Foucault, 2009, pp. 127-128). This kind of shepherd is thus different from the Greek God who occasionally punishes and torments the men on his territory. Besides the “selfless” (ibid, p. 128) shepherd does his duty “as a burden and effort” (ibid, p. 127), not for the sake of glory and honor as the Greek God does. Finally, the Greek king, whose task is to ensure the unity of the city, exercises a totalizing power due to the abstract and formal character of citizenship and law. Pastoral power, on the other hand, is “an individualizing power” (ibid, p. 128) for that the salvation of the flock requires an individual attention of the shepherd since such attention is the only way to make sure that “all the sheep, each and every one of them, is fed and saved” (Foucault, 2001, p. 302). However, such *omnes et singulatim* results in a paradox as the shepherd tries to save each member of his flock he might neglect the rest of the flock in the pursuit of the redemption of one. That is what Foucault calls the “paradox of the shepherd: the sacrifice of one for all, and the sacrifice of all for one” (2009, p. 129).

However, as Foucault admits as well, this is “an extremely vague sketch” (ibid, p. 135) of pre- Christian pastoral power, especially in terms of understating the role of the Greek Gods. Yet, this is probably because Foucault is not interested in

comparing the Greek and Hebrew Gods as an end in itself, but rather as a means of setting “the scene for Christianity and its positive valuation and expansion of the pastoral theme” (Carrette, 2013, p. 375). For that “the real history of the pastorate as the source of a specific type of power over men, as a model and matrix of procedures for the government of men” (Foucault, 2009, p. 148) only begins with the Church’s institutionalization of pastoral power. In other words, the unique event in the history that a religion constitutes itself as an institution marks the birth of pastoral technology, as the Church “lays claim to the daily government of men in their real life on the grounds of their salvation” (ibid).

As a result of his elaboration of the Christian texts from the third to the sixth centuries, Foucault claims that the “Hebrew themes are considerably altered in at least four ways” (Foucault, 2001, p. 308). First, in the Christian pastoralism the shepherd is responsible for “not only of each sheep, but of all their actions” (ibid) due to the “principle of the exhaustive and instantaneous transfer to the pastor of the merits and faults of the sheep” (Foucault, 2009, p. 170). So to say, the bond between the shepherd and the herd is related not only to the lives of individuals, but also to the details of their actions. Second, as Hebrew pastoralism depicts the shepherd as God, obeying him is indeed obeying the Law of God. But, in Christian pastorship the shepherd is an individual and thence obeying his will is a “personal submission to him” (Foucault, 2001, p. 309). Complete obedience as a “virtue” (ibid) in itself, in a way, refers to the “destruction of the self” (Foucault, 2009, p. 180) as an autonomous being. Third, “the shepherd now requires an in-depth individualizing knowledge...of the needs and deeds, and the contents of the soul” (Dean, 2010, p. 92) of each member of his flock. This constitutes the well-known Christian “link between total obedience, knowledge of oneself, and confession to someone else” (Foucault, 2001, p. 310). Finally, all these techniques of “examination, confession, guidance, obedience” (ibid) are linked to the general objective of “renunciation of this world and of oneself, a kind of everyday death” (ibid, p.311).

Early Christian pastorate, thus, invents “specific modes of individualization...in relation to the themes of salvation, the law, and truth” (Foucault, 2009, p. 184). Through the theme of salvation the individual is defined within the economy of merits and faults at every moment. This mode of “analytical identification” (ibid) is quite the opposite of earlier modes of self-identification by heredity and social status. Divine law puts the individual “in a position of absolute servitude to another and is thus in a kind of complete subjection” (Dean, 2010, p. 92). Finally, the individual enters into a new relation with truth in that it is made to produce, not only to recognize, “an internal, secret, and hidden truth” (Foucault, 2009, p. 184). That is, the individual is “subjectified...through the compulsory extraction of truth” (ibid, p.185). According to Foucault, through these triple techniques of “analytical identification, subjection, and subjectivation” Christian pastorship becomes the “prelude to governmentality” (ibid, p.184). The reason why Foucault considers this invention as the inauguration of governmental technology is because it links the production of truth of the individual himself with an institutionalized “conduct of souls” (Foucault, 2009, p. 193). That is, the novelty of the pastorate lies in this unique individualization technology as “pastoral institution that has the care of souls as its object” wipes out “the classical care of the self” (Foucault, 1997b, p. 278) of Ancient Greek. In fact, the game of shepherd-flock, “whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self- identity” (Foucault, 2001, p. 311), is, so to say, antithetical to the game of city-citizen as it is “salvation-oriented (as opposed to political power)”; “oblative (as opposed to the principle of sovereignty)” and “individualizing (as opposed to legal power)” (Foucault, 2001a, p. 333). Besides, it is “coextensive and continuous with life” (ibid), as opposed to “the game of the city surviving through the sacrifice of the citizens” (Foucault, 2001, p. 311). It is not till the sixteenth century that these two games come to be unified.

The condition of possibility of such unification is constituted by the crises of pastoral power. Foucault frames a highly sophisticated outline of the internal and

external factors⁵ that does not allow for the preservation and sustainability of pastoral power in its early Christian form. But, what is important for our purposes here is that these tactical games between conducts and counter-conducts, played within the grid of intelligibility of pastoral power, allows us to grasp “why and how political or economic problems that arose in the Middle Ages, such as the movements of urban revolt and peasant revolt, the conflicts between feudalism and the merchant bourgeoisie, were translated into a number of religious themes, forms, and concerns that finally result in the explosion of the Reformation” (ibid, p. 215), namely the great *crises of pastorate* in the sixteenth century. That is to say, unless we situate the great transformations of Middle Ages in the general matrix of “resistances, revolts, and insurrections of conduct” (ibid, p. 228) we will not be able to see the internal and dynamic relations between the elements that constitute these transformations and thence, inevitably end up with “the economic crises on one side and religious themes on the other” (ibid, p. 215). And to establish an external relation between these two reified phenomena, we will have to “return to the old conceptions of ideology to say that the aspirations of a group, a class, and so forth, are translated, reflected, and expressed in something like a religious belief” (ibid, pp. 215-216). For the sake of avoiding such fallacy it is crucial to read history on the basis of the problem of government as, for Foucault, the emergence of the modern state is conditioned by a historical shift from “the pastoral of souls to the political government of men” (ibid, p. 227). Such shift takes place in the junction of two historical processes. On the one hand, Reformist and counter-reformist movements, instead of leading to the annihilation of pastorate or to the transfer of the church’s power to the monopoly of the state, lead to the “broadening of pastoral power beyond its original ecclesiastical context” (Bröckling, et. al., 2001, p. 3) and beyond the institution of the Church. For that, with these movements, the questions of how to govern and how to be governed gradually disengage from their previous Medieval-

⁵ The word *factor* is chosen here only for the purpose of preserving the flow of the sentence. It should be underlined that, Foucault strictly opposes any *causal explanation* that the term, factor, may imply. Rather, he proposes the notion of *counter-conduct* to emphasize the “immediate and founding correlation between” (Foucault, 2009, p. 196) pastoral power as conduct of men and the resistance against it.

theological context. Such disengagement, for Foucault, coincides with the foundation of the “classical episteme” (Foucault, 2005), which replaces the consideration of a world ordered by “God’s pastoral government” with a world that is “laid out in terms of mathematical or classificatory forms of intelligibility” (Foucault, 2009, p. 236). On the other hand, the “gradual dissolution of feudal structures and the development of large territories and colonial empires” (Bröckling, et. al., 2001, p. 3) creates the need to reflect on the “premises, object, and goals” (ibid) of government so as to manage large populations in circulation. Thereby, with the proliferation of pastoral power and the empowerment of the state, the sixteenth century witnesses the “demonic” (Foucault, 2001, p. 311) combination of the two games of the city-citizen and the shepherd-flock in a hybrid and autonomous *art of government*: a secular political power that is centered on the government of omnes et singulatim- of all and of each.

2.1.2. Raison D’état

This hybrid and autonomous art of government “finds its first form of crystallization, organized around the theme of reason of state” (Foucault, 2001b, p. 212) which emerges in the seventeenth century as a particular type of “rationality that would enable the way of governing to be modeled on something called the state” (Foucault, 2008, pp.3-4). Raison d’état is defined in the seventeenth century -on the contrary to its current pejorative meaning- as an art; i.e. “as a technique conforming to certain rules” that derive from “a rationality specific to the art of governing states” (Foucault, 2001c, p. 406). This rationality is “autonomous insofar as it neither relies on theological-cosmological principles, nor can it be deduced from the person of the Prince that Machiavelli described” (Lemke, 2016, p. 14). Foucault summarizes the theological-cosmological principles with reference to Saint Thomas, claiming that in his understanding “the monarch’s government has no specificity with respect to the exercise of sovereignty” (Foucault, 2009, p. 232). Saint Thomas offers continuity between the sovereign King and the God, nature and the father of a family in that, just as

the God lets the soul be the governor of the body and the father the governor of the family; the King must be the shepherd of people leading them to salvation. In this manner, he equates being sovereign to governing, which means that the practice of governing has no autonomy and his model of “rational government is not a political one” (Foucault, 2001, p. 315). Furthermore, according to Foucault, the art of government, which finds its first expression in the *raison d'état*, cannot be found in Machiavelli's work; but in the anti-Machiavellian literature. This is because, Machiavelli is mainly concerned with the preservation of the land of the Prince, which indicates that for him the relation between the Prince and his land is an external, or rather, a transcendent relation. For Foucault, this reveals that Machiavelli's interest lies in the problem of governing territory; not of governing men. In this sense, even though there seems to be a rational form of political government in Machiavelli's thought that does not refer to the laws of nature or commands of God, he is far from opening up “the field of political thought to modernity” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). For that the objective of the *raison d'état* is not to increase “the power a prince can wield over his domain” but to “reinforce the state itself” (Foucault, 2001, p. 316).

That is, the state becomes both the foundation and the objective of the state reason, in that the art of government must “rationalize its way of doing things by taking as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4) . In this sense, the state becomes a grid of intelligibility that serves as “a way of conceiving, analyzing, and defining the nature and relations” of “certain already given elements and institutions” -such as the sovereign, law and territory- so as to retrospectively define them as the “elements of the state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 286). As such, the state performs as a regulatory idea in two senses. Non-discursively, it centralizes these elements and institutions within the “administrative apparatus of the territorial monarchies” (ibid, p. 100), which ultimately results in the gradual displacement of feudal structures. Discursively, on the other hand, it means that the principles of government are no longer derived from “divine, natural, or human laws” (Foucault, 2001, p. 317). “The

principles of state are immanent, precisely, in the state itself. To know how to govern, one must know the state and the secret springs of its interests” (Gordon, 1991, p. 9). Therefore, to govern “is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, and so that it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it” (Foucault, 2008, p. 4). What makes a ruler wise, is no longer his respect for tradition and law, but his “knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and must be attained, and the disposition one must employ in order to attain them” (Foucault, 2009, p. 100).

Such “epistemological shift” (Lemke, 2016a, p. 233) is centered upon the notion of *force* as what defines the nature of the state is no longer the “equilibrium between several elements that only a good law could bring and maintain together”, but a “set of forces and strengths that could be increased or weakened according to the politics followed by the governments” (Foucault, 2001c, p.408). 1648 Peace of Westphalia gives birth to the idea of Europe that defines a relation between history and politics - far from the imperial dream of the Roman Empire and the universal claim of Christianity in that they both consider the state as a form to be transcended- as from this point on politics must “deal with an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and competing in a limited history” (ibid, p. 409). That is, from the seventeenth century onwards, what defines the international relations is competition which is calculated on the basis of state’s wealth and strength. In this context, peace becomes a matter of balance that is attained, not through the unifying power of the Church, but from the existence of states in their plurality⁶. This balance of Europe, paves the way for a state to “maximize its growth without provoking its adversaries and without, therefore, leading to its own disappearance or enfeeblement” (Foucault, 2009, p. 297). This new governmental rationality, therefore aims, not “the preservation of the state

⁶ This re-formulation of peace, which requires the disposition of things in such a way that “the combination of several small powers can counterbalance the force of a superior power that might threaten one of them” (Foucault, 2009, p. 299), constitutes the first example of the apparatus of security in the Western political art, for Foucault. However, in dealing with *raison d’état*, he devotes his attention to the pastoral power, meaning that he postpones the examination of security apparatus to the lectures on liberal art of government.

within a general order so much as the preservation of ...dynamic of forces” (ibid. p. 296). This preservation is realized on the basis of a new “military-diplomatic apparatus” (ibid, p. 300) which is comprised of three instruments. First, war is used as a diplomatic solution when there is “too much power on one side and this can no longer be tolerated” (ibid, p. 301). The fact that the preservation of balance obliges the use of war as a diplomatic means indicates that the medieval continuum of war and law is replaced with the new continuity between war and politics. Second, the constant negotiation and consultation between states is achieved by the constitution of permanent embassies. With this invention, what posits the fundamental principle of diplomacy is “no longer a right of sovereigns”, but the “physics of states” (ibid, p. 303). Lastly, a permanent military apparatus is constructed through the professionalization of “military career” (ibid, p. 305) and scientific training of soldiers.

Whereas the technology of military-diplomatic apparatus preserves the European balance at the frontiers, via the instruments of war, diplomacy and military; the technology of the *police* attends to the preservation of internal order of the state⁷. This technology arises as an integral part of *raison d'état* at the midst of “the movement toward a form of absolutism and the decline of the feudal estates” (Dean, 2010, 106). The sixteenth and seventeenth century is, thus, marked by religious and civil wars, revolts and scarcity. In this permanent state of chaos and obscurity it becomes necessary to regulate the public, for the sake of bringing order. For Foucault, the important thing here -as much as the techniques of regulation, which is the police- is why such order is called for. The reason is that: to govern one has to *know* the nature of the object to be governed and such knowledge derives from order and classification, within classical episteme. That is, as the state appears as an autonomous and quasi-natural entity with its own principles and rules, within the political rationality of *raison d'état*, the problem of how to govern it can be answered neither by God nor nature. Rather, the secret

⁷ Police, here, obviously does not refer to a “police force, a body of officials” whose rationale is “the prevention and detection of crime” (Dean, 2010, p. 107). Instead, it implies “a governmental technology peculiar to the state” (Foucault, 2001, p. 317).

of how to govern is inscribed within the relations between the constituent elements of the state. The strength of the state and the means to increase this strength has to be known. This novel conceptualization of political knowledge renders necessary a “concrete, precise, and measured knowledge”, namely, “political arithmetic” or “statistics” which is “related not at all to probability but to the knowledge of state, the knowledge of different states’ respective forces”. (Foucault, 2001c, p. 408).

Police, in this sense, emerges as “the calculation and technique that will make it possible to establish a mobile, yet stable and controllable relationship between the state’s internal order and the development of its forces” (Foucault, 2009, p. 313). That is, police appears as a technique between the state and its forces; i.e. the individuals. The uniqueness of this technology lies in its inversion of the game of shepherd-flock. The happiness and salvation of the individuals is no longer the result and the aim of a government; but the vice versa. The happiness of the individuals is the condition, the sine qua non of the survival of the state. For that the aim is to “develop the elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters the strength of the state” (Foucault, 2001, p. 322). According to Foucault, the well-being of individuals, *omnes et singulatim*, for the first time, becomes the “object of analysis and intervention” (Pasquino, 1991, p. 115) of the governmentality of the state, with the emergence of police and statistics. This object of analysis and intervention is nothing other than the *population* which is a neologism defined *vis-à-vis public*. That is, the abstraction of public composed of rightful, autonomous and formal citizens, stand in stark contrast to the notion of population as living beings and with their own demographic properties⁸. This conceptualization of population is what defines the

⁸ The birth of population, therefore, marks the birth of biopolitics; which, at the same time, is “thanatopolitics” (Foucault, 2001c, p. 416). For that “the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake...the state is entitled to slaughter it”(ibid). This indicates the second reversal of shepherd-flock game by *raison d'état*, in that, the state does not sacrifice itself for the individual; rather the individual must be sacrificed for the state, when necessary.

social body as the prerequisite of the state's strength and thereby, paves the way for the identification of the state with its subjects. This is because, in so far as the population is disciplined and systematically organized by the police, it can work productively and thence contribute to the wealth of the state. Therefore, economic management is posited among the central tasks of the police with reference to the "development of commerce and the production of wealth" (Neocleous, 1998, p. 46).

The condition of possibility of such internal relation between wealth and population is provided by the reason peculiar to *mercantilism*⁹. Mercantilism, then, is not "simply an economic theory" -for that economy has yet to be defined as an autonomous mechanism- "but also a political practice" (Foucault, 2001d, p. 139), a technique of intervention in the population. For that, it is a "particular organization of production and commercial circuits" (Foucault, 2008, p. 5) in the pursuit of ensuring "maximum economic development through commerce within a rigid system of sovereignty" (Foucault, 2009, p. 15). The overall objective of enrichment of the state through gold accumulation and quantitatively increased population can only be realized in the configuration of Europe, in constant competition with other states. Because such competition is the only way to legitimize the fact that the police acts as an "economic pastorate" (Gordon, 1991, p. 12), organizing the lives and economic activities of the subjects.

Mercantilist policy, however, still remains as an articulation of the ancient theme of *oikos*, based on the model of a household, as it retains "all its implications of possession, domestication and controlling action" (ibid, p. 11). That is, economic government is in an endeavor of finding "the correct way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family...and of making the family fortunes prosper" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 207). As such it demands the "meticulous attention of the father" (ibid) from the government for the continuous

⁹ Mercantilism allows for the relation between wealth and money to be associated, for the first time, with "circulation and exchange", and no longer with the "'preciousness' of metal" (Foucault, 2005, p. 194). Thereby, mercantilism indicates the rupture from the episteme of Renaissance era.

reconstruction and supervision of the elements that constitute the economic machine. This is undoubtedly one of the points that shows such policy is far from being sustainable. Another point is that, mercantilism is essentially a discourse on “the order of sovereignty” (Neocleous, 1998, p. 46). To clarify this point it is sufficient to briefly recall their approach towards grain shortage. For mercantilists, scarcity is the source of evil and must be prevented at all costs. As the physiocratic apparatus of responding to reality through playing one force against the other such that “this response cancels out the reality to which it responds” (Foucault, 2009, p. 47) is yet to be invented, mercantilists responds to scarcity through “the traditional weapons of sovereignty”, that is “laws, decrees, regulations” (Foucault, 2001b, p. 212): “tight control of the marketing and circulation of foodstuffs, and of provisions made for times of shortage” (Foucault, 2009, p. 324). The aim of these actions is to produce grain at the lowest cost and export it to foreign countries in exchange of the greatest possible amount of gold that could then be seized by the sovereign. That is, mercantilism seeks “a way not so much to increase the wealth of the country as to allow the ruler to accumulate wealth, build up his treasury, and create the army” (Foucault, 2001b, p. 214). This example solely indicates that mercantilism endeavors to place the art of management into a structure of sovereignty which, by its very nature, is a hindrance to it. To sum up, with reference to these two points, Foucault asserts that the art government gets blocked between the model of family and the framework of sovereignty.

Alongside these inherent constraints of mercantilism, police is also “subject to external restraint through the operation of public law...concerning constitutions, rights and legitimacy” (Dillon, 2007, p. 42). Till the seventeenth century, law has functioned as a “multiplier of royal power” intensifying, rather than limiting the sovereign power. In the seventeenth century, though, “with the rise of parliaments, the bourgeoisie, and their correlative challenges to monarchical and aristocratic authority...juridical reason began to move against *raison d'état*, to constitute its limits, rather than a source of its elaboration and force” (Brown,

2015, p. 57). Contract and natural law theories, for Foucault, are obvious manifestations of the transformation in juridical thinking, shifting the emphasis from the sovereign's rights to the rights of the subjects. However, neither theories of contract and natural law, of the seventeenth century, nor Rousseau's revolutionary approach start their criticisms of the police state "from government and its necessary limitation, but from law in its classical form" (Foucault, 2008, p. 39). That is to say, these theories first conceptualize a human nature on the basis of fundamental or natural rights and then define the ideal and historical conditions that these rights can be limited or exchanged legitimately. In this manner, they reveal the founding principles of sovereign power, and concordantly its legitimate sphere of rule and the limits of sovereignty. And from these postulates they deduce the principles and limits of "governmental competence" (ibid). Therefore, these theories, for Foucault, are bound up with the same rationality that they criticize and cannot go beyond drawing external limitations to *raison d'état* in an effort to avoid the sovereign to cross legal limits. As such, albeit raising objections to the police state, such objections do not give birth to a counter-conduct as these theories remain "at the stage of the formulation of general principles of public law" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 214). What brings forth the "transition from an art of government to political science...from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government" (Foucault, 2009, p. 106) is the birth of liberalism in the eighteenth century.

2.1.3. Liberal Art of Government

Foucault claims that physiocratic approach towards the problem of famine is what constitutes the first step of the rupture from *raison d'état*, as such approach directs an internal criticism towards the police state. As opposed to the mercantilists, who are obsessed with preventing scarcity before it prevails, through juridical regulations; physiocrats consider scarcity as a natural phenomenon. Scarcity, therefore, is not something to be prevented, but to be

“nullified on the basis of the reality of the movement that leads to scarcity” (ibid, p. 40). Legal regulation violates the nature of things “since reality contains intrinsic mechanisms of its own self-regulation” and in that “it is harmful because it is likely to produce effects other than those desired” (Burchell, 1991, p. 126). Instead of fixing the prices and controlling the market, physiocrats allow “natural fluctuations in the price, supply, demand, and circulation of grain to occur” (Tierney, 2008, p. 92) as “the price of grain will not continue to rise indefinitely but will settle” (Foucault, 2009, p. 343) in a natural price and a balance will be reached where there is adequate supply of grain. This precursor introduction of *laissez-faire* principle necessitates a triple broadening of the analysis of market mechanisms: “the moment of production, the world market, and, finally, the economic behavior of the population, of producers and consumers” (Foucault, 2009, p. 41).

The integration of world market into analysis challenges the zero-sum game of mercantilist policies. That is, as mercantilism measures the wealth of states by means of gold and as there is, obviously, limited amount of gold in the world, the enrichment of one state, through taking from “the common stock of gold...consequently impoverish the others” (Foucault, 2008, p. 53). Thence, for this monetarist policy the survival of such game depends upon the existence of a balance which in turn depends upon the maintenance of inequalities so as not to obstruct the mechanism of competition. The introduction of *laissez-faire* and natural price, however, subverts this doublet of competition-balance in that the beneficial results of competition does not necessarily have to be shared unequally between each state. Rather, competition brings a reciprocal and correlative enrichment for all European countries. As a result of this unlimited economic game, “we are invited to a globalization of the market...that the whole world is summoned around Europe to exchange its own and Europe’s products in the European market” (ibid, p. 55). This fact that Europe appears as an economic subject for the first time, for Foucault, changes the definition of peace once more: “The larger the external market, the fewer its borders and limits, the more you

will have a guarantee of perpetual peace” (ibid, p. 57). The important thing is that, this proto-liberalism for the first time emerges as a grid of calculation as economy gives direction to political and legal practices.

The integration of the economic behavior of the population into analysis, on the other hand, brings along a major change in the definition of population. “It is no longer conceived of as a set of elements and forces contributing to the state’s greater wealth...or as the sum of useful individuals to be put to work” or as a “simple collection of legal subjects” (Burchell, 1991, p. 126). Instead, the population is considered to be “a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes” (Foucault, 2009, p. 70). Such naturalness signifies not the “processes of nature...of the world” (ibid, p. 349), or “an original and reserved region that sovereign power needs to respect” (Terranova, 2009, p. 238), but the spontaneity of human relations. Nature, in that sense, is something that “runs under, through and in the exercise of governmentality”; it is not government’s background, but its “permanent correlative” (Foucault, 2008, p. 16). The “movement of population to where the wages are highest, for example, is a law of nature” (ibid). Population, thence, appears here, for the first time, as a relative reality in that it is depended upon numerous variables such as laws, customs, moral and religious values, climate, birth rate etc. “which means that it cannot be transparent to the sovereign’s action and that the relation between the population and sovereign cannot simply be one of obedience or the refusal of obedience” (Foucault, 2009, p. 71). The population tends to exceed the will of the sovereign, for it is its naturalness that determines the conditions and limits of a possible intervention. However, this naturalness does not imply the impenetrability of the population. Rather, it is possible, through meticulous calculation and reflection, to incite their desire or aversion; encourage or discourage them towards a certain behavior by acting “on a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself” (ibid, p. 72). Desire, in fact, plays a key role here, if taken as “the pursuit of the individual’s interest” (ibid, p. 73) since on the condition “that it is given free play

within a certain limit and thanks to a number of relationships and connections, it will produce the general interest of the population” (ibid). Physiocratic government, in that sense, “works through and with interests” (Burchell, 1991, p. 127) in that interest is at once the subject and the object of government. Such ability to govern through interests requires the systematic knowledge of all variables that the desire of the individual may depend on. François Quesnay's Economic Table as the “abstract representation of the totality of exchanges between economic actors” (Dean, 2010, p. 134) is a clear example of such effort. The table is, then, about scientifically documenting the circulation of wealth and the aim is to make it possible for the sovereign to observe economic activities in society by reading the table. Therefore, the ruler can “permit economic subjects freedom of action just because, through the Table, the sovereign can still know what is happening in the economy” (Gordon, 1991, p. 15). As such, the Table expresses the physiocratic request for the sovereign to “pass from political activity to theoretical passivity in relation to the economic process” (Foucault, 2008, p. 286).

Adam Smith's invisible hand, however, rises a criticism not only against the art of *raison d'état*, but also against the physiocrats. For that the Table's objective of “mutual transparency of the economic and the political” (ibid, pp. 285-286) is an ideal impossible to attain, for Smith. His theory emphasizes the exact opposite of such ideal: the “benign opacity of economic processes” (Gordon, 1991, p. 15). Put it differently, there can be “no mapping of total economic freedom and political despotism because there can be no transparent model and knowledge of the economy” (Dean, 2010, p. 135). The selfish pursuit of individuals who seek their own interest in the market by exchanging goods “without really knowing why or how” (Foucault, 2009, p. 279), eventually contributes to the collective good. That is, the *homo oeconomicus*' self-interest spontaneously balances the supply-demand in the market and thereby generates the best outcome for mutual enrichment. In that, the “principle of rationalization of the art of government [rests] on the rational behavior of those who are governed” (Foucault, 2008, p.

312). The hand can coordinate the multiplicity of individual interests into public interest only when it is invisible, as “it is absolutely necessary that each actor be blind with regard to this totality” (ibid). Therefore, an economic sovereign is impossible. What a sovereign needs to do is not to know or monitor the market, either. Rather, the goal of enriching both the nation and the sovereign is best achieved by promoting the free action of economic subjects and by not interfering in the natural processes of the market. This reduces the role of the sovereign to the protection of the spontaneous order in the market.

This novel definition of sovereignty implies an epistemological break upon which the liberal art of government emerges. With the birth of political economy, the immediate association of knowledge and government, which is the defining characteristic of *raison d'état* and police science, is disrupted. A complex relationship between scientific knowledge and the art of government, which is principally separated from it, takes the seat of knowledge-government couple. For that, the state no longer imposes its own laws on the economy; instead it governs in accordance with the laws of the economy. “Governing is no longer ruling, asserting a power, but recognizing that truth...of the market” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 122). The main determinant in this break, therefore, is the transformation of the role played by the market. This transformation, in Foucault’s telling, as opposed to the Marxist reading, cannot be understood “exclusively as an internal product of the evolution of the economic logic of capitalism” (Terranova, 2009, p. 239). Rather, it is a “transactional and transitional reality” (Foucault, 2008, p. 297) that does not exist prior to governmental practices which are coordinated in a political rationality. In other words, the market as a “conceptually and practically distinguished space, characterized by autonomous laws and a proper rationality” is distinguished as such within a regime of truth; within the “internal differentiation” (Lemke, 2016, pp. 83-84) of liberal government. That is, market becomes an object only within “a form of schematization peculiar to a particular technology of government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 319). Accordingly, the schematization peculiar to liberal technology of government constitutes the

market as a site of veridiction¹⁰. For that market, starting from the eighteenth century connects different factors and practices such as production, consumption, supply, demand, value, price, etc. through exchange. The prices formed by exchange, as long as the natural mechanisms of the market work freely, are natural/good prices. In this manner, market constitutes a verification field within which natural price implies the truth, whereas unnatural prices implies an error. The fundamental assumption here is that, as long as the market's natural mechanisms are functioning, prices will provide a benchmark for governmental practices. Thereby, alongside generating wealth, as it is an auto-coordinating mechanism, the market allows for liberation from excessive regulation of the police. For that with the rise of political economy, any governmental intervention now has to prove that it is an efficient move by passing the market test.

Therefore, this unique formulation of market brings along a set of questions that are highly different from that of the previous art of government in that it shifts the focus from the problems of foundation and legitimacy of sovereignty to that of the efficiency of government. The question then becomes: “What makes government necessary, and what ends must it pursue with regard to society in order to justify its own existence” (ibid)? In that the anxiety of the police of not being able to regulate enough is replaced by finding the optimal between too much and too less government; or rather by the concern of governing as less as possible to reach maximum effects. Liberal governmentality, thence, is an economic government that intrinsically defines its own limitation¹¹, the

¹⁰ Such formulation of market is highly different from the market of police state which is defined as a site of justice. In the framework of *raison d'état*, production and trade are subject to legal arrangements, i.e. market operates through legal regulations. The aim of such legal arrangements is to guarantee the commitment of the subjects to the sovereign through the abundance of goods with a fair price, which means as cheap as possible. The market, in this sense, constitutes a system of jurisdiction: the fair distribution of goods is provided by the police whose task is to prevent and punish fraud in pricing and trade.

¹¹ The same principle of self-limitation can be detected in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998) where he attempts to draw intrinsic boundaries to reason. For Kant “[a]ll our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason” (ibid, p. 387) meaning that knowledge is limited to the phenomenal world, and as such any claim to knowledge about the

infringement of which does not make a government illegitimate, but a “clumsy, inadequate, government that does not do the proper thing” (ibid, p. 10). The form of rationality that makes possible that self-limitation is political economy. Political economy, as such, “introduces into the art of government for the first time the question of truth and the principle of self-limitation” (Lemke, 2016, p. 43) and thereby marks an extremely significant moment in the history of governmentality “since it establishes, in its most important features... a particular regime of truth” (Foucault, 2008, p. 17) “what could be called modern governmental reason” (ibid, p. 10). This principle of self-limitation, “unlike juridical thought, does not rise against the *raison d'état*, but within its general objectives such as the state’s enrichment and internal stability” (Terranova, 2009, p. 238). That is, this *de facto* limitation is intrinsic to government’s objectives and is also the fundamental tool for achieving such objectives. This means that governmental wisdom must comply with these limits “inasmuch as it can calculate them on its own account in terms of its objectives and [the] best means of achieving them” (Foucault, 2008, p. 11). Thus calculation, as Jeremy Bentham emphasizes, gives rise to the distinction between *agenda* and *non-agenda*. Therefore, the division is now within the governmental practice itself, “between what to do and the means to use on the one hand, and what not to do on the other” (ibid, p. 12).

Such distinction derives from the so called, scientific status of economy¹² in that the non-agenda implies the inviolable nature of economy. That is, as government

noumenal world, which is the condition of possibility of the former, indispensably results in a fallacy. That is because *Ding an sich*, independently of our representation of it, is not accessible to human reason. This internal limit of reason implies the impossibility of attaining knowledge about the totality of reality, in a similar vein that political economy declares the unknowability of the totality of economic processes. “Liberalism can thus be accurately characterized in Kantian terms as a *critique of state reason*” (Gordon, 1991, p. 15). And this is exactly the reason why Foucault claims that he is “inclined to see in liberalism a form of critical reflection on governmental practice” (2008, p. 321).

¹² It is important to note here that Foucault’s claim is neither that “the art of government finally became rational, nor that an epistemological threshold had been reached on the basis of which the art of government could become scientific” (Oksala, 2013, p. 59), but that liberalism, in this

“cannot override the natural dynamics of the economy without destroying the basis on which liberal government is possible, it must preserve the autonomy of society from State intervention” (Barry, et.al., 1996, p. 10). However, the trick is that such autonomy not at all refers to an immunity from governmental power in that, *civil society*¹³ is “brought into being as both distinct from political intervention and yet potentially alignable with political aspirations” (ibid, p. 9). That is, the individuals composing civil society are both the “non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest” (Foucault, 2008, p. 282) and the totalizable juridical subjects of rights. These two forms of subjectivities cannot be brought together with previous governmental techniques due to the impossibility of an “economic-juridical science” (ibid). However, as the art of government cannot “split into two branches of an art of governing economically and an art of governing juridically... the unity and generality of the art of governing over the whole sphere of sovereignty” (ibid, p. 295), which is respectful to economic science, must be preserved. And the liberal art of government becomes what it is, when it formulates “a wider political framework than that of the juridical society of contract, capable of encompassing individual economic agency within a governable order” (Gordon, 1991, p. 37). For that, only through the invention of

manner, constructs a new regime of truth within which things are arranged in a unique mode. In other words, he does not take such scientificness for granted, but considers the constitution of economy as an objective reality as a product of governmental technologies. Since, for Foucault, the innovation of liberalism lies not in its discovery of a politically neutral economy, but in its reorganization of “political ontology in carving out an autonomous realm of economy free of political interference” (ibid, p. 60). Liberalism, then, is unique due to this “new mode of objectification of governed reality” (Gordon, 1991, p. 16) that redraws the limit between economy and politics.

¹³ Civil society, according to Foucault, is another transactional reality as it is not a universal, but the contingent outcome and object of governmental practices. Therefore, there is “no opposition between state and civil society” (Foucault, 2001e, p. 237), per se; rather the “idea of an opposition between civil society and the state was formulated in a given context in response to a precise intention” (Foucault, 2001f, p.372) by political economists. To state differently, the duality of state-society does not refer to an objective reality since the conceptualization of civil society is an integral element of the very same historico-political conjuncture.

civil society as the “problem-space of government”¹⁴, liberal art of government becomes thinkable and practicable, since this space is “both what has to be governed and what government must produce or, at least, maintain in the optimum condition of what naturally it is” (Burchell, 1996, p. 25). Civil society, then, is much more than a region inhabited by a number of subjects, because it forms a complex and independent reality with its own mechanisms of action and organization. In that, this “historico-natural” (ibid, p. 24) reality constitutes “both the basis and limits of governmental action” (Bröckling, et.al., 2010, p. 5). Thereby, the main problem of politics becomes with liberalism “not so much the justification of state action as the governability of the social” (Gordon, 1991, p. 34).

Governing the social, as such, is governing the “liberties and capacities of the governed” (Dean, 2010, p. 63) as the survival of liberal governmental reason depends upon self-organization of the society that is composed of individuals who can freely conduct themselves in a *rational* way. Therefore, government means governing through freedom, as:

It operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action (Foucault, 2001a, p. 341).

Individual freedom, therefore, is the both the effect and the “technical precondition for rational government” (Lemke, 2001, p. 200), rather than the

¹⁴ What is at stake here, is not to open up space for subjects of interest who are always-already there; rather it is a matter of reciprocal constitution in that homo oeconomicus is “the abstract, ideal, purely economic point that inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil society. Or alternatively, civil society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so that they can be appropriately managed. So, homo oeconomicus and civil society belong to the same ensemble of the technology of liberal governmentality” (Foucault, 2008, p. 296).

ideal of a liberal utopia. For the freedom that surfaces here is “neither the old aristocratic question of exceptions and privileges to be granted to certain individuals nor the juridical question of legitimate individual rights¹⁵ as opposed to the abuses of power of government or sovereignty” (Gudmand& Hjorth, 2009, p. 108). Rather, the modern form of freedom is “the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things” (Foucault, 2009, p. 48) and thence governing through freedom cannot work without technologies of *security* which aims at providing “the best possible circulation” through “minimizing what is risky and inconvenient” (ibid, p. 35).

Security, in that, is the condition and the correlative of liberal freedom. Apparatus of security aims at a balance between public interest and individual interest, thence coordinates, calculates and organizes the structure of possible actions of free individuals. Therefore, liberalism only produces the freedom that it can consume. The principle of *laissez-faire*, then, implies not the freedom of individuals to do whatever they want, but a form of government that anticipates what people want to do. The apparatus of security, in that, is a different technology of power than that of sovereignty and discipline. The former, sovereign power, takes as its object, the individual as legal subjects who can commit voluntary act, whereas the latter bears on the individual body. Hence, they are both centered on the individual body as oppose to the security mechanisms which are centered on the ensemble of a population so as to assure the integrity of economic processes “while affirming the vulnerability of such natural processes and the need for a well-modulated intervention in relation to them” (Osborne, 1996, p. 102). If sovereignty is a power that employs the legal

¹⁵ On the contrary, the relationship between law and freedom is not a necessary and universal one, but rather a contingent and historical one. The fact that government “proposes to recast and constrain regulatory acts of state into a predominantly legislative format” (Gordon, 1991, p. 19) is mainly because “the law defines forms of general intervention excluding particular, individual, and exceptional measures, and because participation of the governed...in a parliamentary system is the most effective system of governmental economy” (Foucault, 2008, p. 321). That is to say, law is a tactic of governmental practice, not its source. And representative democracy is a means of limiting and regulating the “participation of the governed in the operation of government” (Dean, 2010, p. 144) in that such a mechanism educates the governed in terms of the proper ways of using their rights and freedoms.

system to say “no” to subjects by pointing out what is prohibited by law, disciplinary power uses techniques of control that say “yes” (Gambetti, 2011, p. 9). Security, on the other hand, instead of limiting itself with the binary distinction of sovereignty and discipline between permitted and prohibited, detects the optimal point and interferes with the lives of populations through the calculation of benchmarks. Therefore, it subjectifies, in both senses of the term, the living beings in their multiplicity “coexisting with each other in a set of material elements that act on them and on which they act in turn” (Foucault, 2009, p. 22). That is, security functions where there is “no pre-given and fixed political borderline between humans and things” (Lemke, 2015, p. 10) and this is what makes action at a distance possible. Therefore, security as governing an open *milieu*, an open spatio-temporality, stands in stark contrast with sovereign technology, which is exerting control over a fixed territory. Similarly, it is not like disciplinary mechanisms that operate in artificially fixed spaces, like institutions and prisons. Security mechanism, in contrast, does not define external boundaries as it is an “attempt to control things by working within their reality” (Yiu, 2005, p. 37). In other words, it is not a “matter of establishing frontiers, isolating a space” (Bigo, 2008, 97), but of planning a “milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements” (Foucault, 2009, p. 20). Whereas discipline is “centripetal” in that it “concentrates, focuses, and encloses”, security is “centrifugal” (ibid, p. 44) as it has a permanent tendency to expand and permit more circulations. This is because; security works through calculation and probabilities, not surveillance. Hence, on the contrary to the disciplinary mechanisms which allows no place to escape, security mechanisms let things happen and derive norm on the basis of the calculation of the average, the normal, the acceptable. In that, security is about *normalization* and establishes the norm through the interplay of different normalities, as opposed to the juridical and disciplinary power which are about *normation*; i.e. the process in which “due to the primacy of the norm in relation to the normal... the final division between the normal and the abnormal” (ibid, p. 57) is based on the ideal norm. Accordingly, as security apparatus works with what *is* rather than what *ought to be*, it stands

for risks and anomalies. It does not try to eliminate them, which already is not possible, but rather, nullify them by playing one force against the other. That is, minimizing the risk is attained not on the basis of prohibition or using a direct force upon the inconvenient element, but of exerting a counter-force against it, as in the examples of vaccine -inducing the pathogen into the organism to prevent any disease that might occur due to that same pathogen-, and of the physiocratic solution to scarcity – letting prices rise as much as possible when there is scarce product and starvation.

All in all, security is not the cost of freedom, but its essence. Hence, liberalism “does not only produce freedoms, which are permanently endangered... and require mechanisms of security” rather danger and insecurity are “essential conditions and positive elements of liberal freedom” (Lemke, 2016, p. 46). This complex relationship between liberty and security is where the brilliance of the study of liberalism as a rationality of government lies. That is, liberalism as a rationality, and not as a juridical or economic theory, or as an ideology, indicates a unique art of government that “has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security¹⁶ as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2009, p. 108) And this is actually what he calls the “governmentalization of the state” (ibid, p. 109). As opposed to Marxism, this governmentality does not rest on the liberal state’s concern with property rights, disavowal of class, market ideology, or capture by the interests of capital” (Brown, 2015, p. 58) since studies of governmentality does not reduce “the multiplicity of social struggles to the logics of capital or regarding the economy as a natural and self-evident” (Lemke, 2016, p. 84). Instead, liberalism as a governmental rationality indicates how economy is separated from politics

¹⁶ The innovation of security apparatus does in no way imply the eradication or trivialization of the other two technologies of power. “So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security...In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which...the techniques themselves change and are perfected...but in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security. In other words, there is a history of the actual techniques themselves” (Foucault, pp. 7-8).

through civil society and how the concordant subjectification of human beings as both free individuals and as a member of biological species takes place in the truth regime of liberal art of governing.

2.1.4. Neoliberal Art of Government

The homo oeconomicus is the vehicle of liberal art of government as it “forms an external limit and the inviolable core of governmental action” (Lemke, 2001, p.200) for that governmental technologies work by “calculating individual at the center of visibility and intelligibility” (Tellmann, 2011, p. 290) by conducting his interests. A crisis of liberalism emerges when this external limit “in particular the inviolable rights of the individual- became a pure and simple blocking factor on the ‘art government’ at a time then the latter faced economic and social issues that were at once novel and urgent” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 22). Neoliberalism, thus, emerges out of the crisis of liberal governmentality, not that of capital accumulation, in order to overcome the problem of intervention in economic and social domains by “uncoupling the market economy from the political principle of laissez-faire” (Brown, 2015, p. 61) and by “taking the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them to, projecting them on to a general art of government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 131). That is, “the separation between politics and economics is mobilized and articulated in” (Lemke, 2001, p. 200) neoliberal government. As such, neoliberal rationality ends the dichotomy between economic and political liberalism with the introduction of the market model so as to regulate the state and the society by the market through the economization of non-economic domains. For that neo-liberalism “admittedly ties the rationality of the government to the rational action of individuals, however, its point of reference is no longer some pre-given human nature, but an artificially created form of” (ibid) entrepreneurial behavior. In this manner, economy “is denaturalized and loses its liberal status” (Brown, 2015, p. 62) with neoliberalism. In this sense for Foucault, neo-liberalism is in no way the revival of old liberal theories, as it presents a totally new framework with regard

to both the role of the state and the relation between economy and society. Moreover, neoliberalism is not directly the criticism of Keynesian state for Foucault, as neoliberal critique is not “first an attack on specific institutions but is a problematization of certain ideals of government, diagrams of citizenship, and the formulas of rule they generate” (Dean, 2010, 43). Thence, these criticisms are first and foremost the reflections of the crisis of liberal government and such reflections are expressed in a criticism of the welfare state. Foucault tries to prove this argument with reference to the problems posed, especially in the thirties, by German and American neoliberal thinkers.

The theoretical foundations of German neoliberalism date back to the Freiburg School that was founded in the late 1920s by some economists and jurists, such as Walter Eucken, Ludwig Erhard and Franz Böhm. Not only are they contemporaries with the Frankfurt School; but also they share a common point of departure: “the irrational rationality of capitalism” as formulated by Max Weber as a correction to “the contradictory logic of capitalism” put forth by Marx. However, the two schools follow different directions as they approach the problem and eventually come up with strictly opposed prescriptions. Whereas the Frankfurt School opts for a “social rationality to correct economic irrationality” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 123), the Freiburg School is in search of an economic rationality that would abolish the social irrationality of capitalism. Similarly, both schools perceive the emergence of Nazis as a serious threat; yet their reactions are in stark contrast to each other. While the former considers fascism as a product of capitalism, the latter takes it to be a result of the absence of liberalism and “the growth of state power, which had the effect of destroying the bonds of community between individuals” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 79).

After the World War II, in the Federal Republic of Germany, this group reunited around a journal called “Ordo”. In order to draw attention to the significant novelty of the Ordoliberalism, Foucault (2008) talks about the state phobia that was openly uttered by Ludwig Erhard during the German Scientific Council of 1948.

Erhard, according to Foucault, while calling for an economy freed from state controls, questions the legitimacy of the German state. If the state intervenes in the economic realm, this is nothing but the violation of the basic rights of the citizens and this means that the state can no longer legitimately represent its citizens, Erhard claims. Two propositions follow from this argument: First, the Nationalist Socialist state exercised its sovereignty by imposing orders on its citizens; and as it is not possible to cancel this legitimate sovereignty and invalidate the orders retrospectively, German people cannot be held responsible for Nazi crimes. Second, since the state is not representative of its citizens anymore, the acts of Nazis cannot be attributed to the German people (pp. 80-82). Therefore, it is clearly not possible to “claim juridical legitimacy inasmuch as no apparatus, no consensus, and no collective will can manifest itself in a situation in which Germany is on the one hand divided, and on the other occupied. So, there are no historical rights, there is no juridical legitimacy, on which to found a new German state” (ibid, p. 82). In this context, it can only be a non-state space of economic freedom established and protected by an institutional framework that can provide legitimacy for a to-be reconstituted Germany. If and only if the individuals agree upon to take part within this framework of freedom, political sovereignty can be established legitimately. That is to say, the “economy produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84). So, the liberal problem is turned completely upside down: the problem is no longer finding a space within an existing legitimate state for market freedom, but to create a state that does not yet exist on the basis of an economic freedom that will secure the state’s legitimacy and self-limitation (Burchell, 1996, p.22). The free market, in this sense, becomes the “organizing and regulating principle of the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 116).

However, it should be underlined that the Ordoliberalists radically differ from the classical liberal conception of the market. Market is no longer conceived as a natural datum with its intrinsic laws and that must be respected by the state. As the Great Depression has proven, the market cannot function without the active

intervention of the state and an institutional framework; for the very reason that the market is a construct. The “naïve naturalists” (ibid, p. 120) failed to grasp the true essence of the market as they took market to be the arena of free exchange which alone can maintain the equivalence of values for that it is the exchange itself establishing an equivalence between two values. Yet, for the Ordoliberalists the essence of the market is competition rather than exchange. Competition “is a principle of formalization”; it is “a formal game between inequalities; it is not a natural game between individuals and behaviors” (ibid, p. 120). By being formal, competition is an ideal: it can never be attained, but only strived towards. So, what is at stake here is the replacement of the abstract logic of exchange among equals with the formal logic of competition between inequalities. This mechanism of competition can function only if the government provides the proper legal, institutional and political conditions for the market. In fact, the term *Ordo* “stems from these theoreticians’ shared stress on the constitutional and procedural order underpinning a market society and economy” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 74). Ordering policy, with the aim of a stable framework that would guarantee both the optimal functioning of a market, that is defined by the general norm of competition, and the consumer sovereignty, “intervenes directly in the ‘framework’ or conditions of existence of the market in such a way as to realize the principles of the economic constitution” (ibid, p. 87). This “legal activism” (Gordon, 1991, p. 42) of the economic government indicates the fact that the market and the state are interdependent and thence a separation between an economic structure and a legal superstructure is not meaningful. Capitalism, therefore, is an economico-institutional construct. There is no capitalism per se, as there is no single logic of capital. It takes different and historically unique forms depending on the interplay between various economic and institutional variables. Thus, a case of crisis, say monopolization, is a social phenomenon, rather than that of an economic, which indicates that it is the “result of a failed political strategy and inadequate forms of institutionalization mechanisms” (Lemke, p. 194). Hence, legal interventionism not only is legitimate, but also crucial for the invention of a new form of capitalism. And this is also why

Ordoliberalism refers to a neoliberal society instead of a neoliberal policy or neoliberal economics (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 11).

A neoliberal society is an economic game between autonomous individuals whose relation to each other is constituted by competition. Competition functions as a norm in social relations, in that it constitutes the morality of the individuals “as autonomous beings, who are free and responsible for their acts” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 93). Yet, the generalization of the enterprise form creates “warm moral and cultural values which are presented precisely as antithetical to the cold mechanism of competition” (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). This is because the Ordoliberal understanding rests upon the interdependence of all spheres of life: social, political and economic. This means that a social policy cannot function without an economy policy and vice versa. However, as opposed to the Welfare formulation, social policy must not and cannot function to compensate for the negative effects of economic processes since economic regulation, i.e. the price mechanism, can only be obtained through “a game of differentiations which is characteristic of every mechanism of competition and which is established through fluctuations that only perform their function and only produce their regulatory effects on condition that they are left to work, and left to work through differences” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 142-143). So, the social policy is “a means of keeping the individual in the framework of ‘equal inequality’ which ensures competition precisely because there is no exclusion” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 124). Ordoliberal rationality also implies “the individualization of social policy and individualization through social policy, instead of collectivization and socialization by and in social policy” (Foucault, 2008, p. 144) as it responsabilizes the individuals to confront the market risks -therefore, the risks of life in general- by themselves. This policy of inequality for all and responsabilization is what gives the market its moral character. The direct regulation of economic mechanisms is out of the question; but all other spheres of life are regulated on the basis of an enterprise model, so that the freedom of the individual, who is no more alienated to herself as on the one hand, a *homo juridicus* and on the other a

homo economicus, is guaranteed at all levels. In fact, Rüstow's biopolitical concept of Vitalpolitik is nothing other than the construction of a "social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have the form of the enterprise" (Foucault, 2008, p. 148) which establishes a match between the competitive freedom and culture (Dean, 2010, p. 71). Apart from setting this framework through the extension of the economic model, social policy must be very limited; such as subsidies below a certain income level and health and education services. And at these very limited cases that the state should intervene, the aim is not to compensate for the negative effects of the market, but to set the rules and to ensure that it is impossible for a player to "lose everything and thus be unable to continue playing" (Foucault, 2008, p. 202). Social policy can involve only a "marginal transfer from a maximum to a minimum", from "over-consumption" to "under-consumption" not for the sake of "maintaining purchasing power" of all by establishing a "regulation around an average" like the Keynesian policies tried to do; but in order to ensure "a vital minimum for those who, either permanently or temporarily, would not be able to ensure their own existence" (Foucault, 2008, p. 143). For that, as mentioned above, the legitimacy of the nascent German state depends not upon a juridical sovereignty, but on the free and willing participation of individuals in this game of economic freedom and therefore their being unable to play would violate this legitimacy. This idea of social market economy is an essential feature that distinguishes German neoliberalism from that of American.

Foucault's analysis of Chicago School is mostly based on the work of Gary Becker, Henry Simons and Theodore W. Schultz. In addition, he also stresses the importance of the German emigrants, i.e. Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, in terms of their contribution to the development of the nascent American neoliberalism via constituting an intellectual link between the two schools. Neoliberal rationality has sprung in the USA on the basis of an "overloaded state" critique inserting that the bureaucratic apparatus is over-expanded due to the state's interventionist character that finally ends up with over-taxation, inefficiency and infringement upon liberties of the individuals. The reaction was

against the ‘too much’ government stemming from the New Deal policies defined by a Keynesian framework; Beveridge plan that guarantees the socio-economic protection of the individuals during war times; and the expansion of the administration through economic and social programs in the post-war era (Foucault, 2008, p. 217). Even though this point of departure seems to share a common ground with German neoliberalism, it is not possible to claim that the American neoliberalism is simply the diffusion of Ordoliberalism in the USA, for Foucault, since liberalism and also the constant renewal of liberalism has almost been a tradition in the United States (ibid, p. 193). The peculiarity of American case is the ontological priority of liberalism as a founding principle of the state.

American neoliberalism tackles with an ambiguity inherent to the Ordoliberal thinking: social market economy. As mentioned above, the Ordoliberals suggest a social policy that would protect both the market from state intervention and also the society from fragmentation that could rise out of competition. Thus, they offer a vital policy that would atone the negative impacts of competition; and also the coding of social existence as an enterprise, which at the same time renders the social domain as economic. However, such a mechanism can only operate on the basis of a fundamental distinction between the “economic and social domains, with the concept of enterprise functioning as the intermediary between them” (Lemke, 2001, p. 197). In order to eliminate such reification and to abolish the difference between the two spheres, the Chicago School urges the systematic expansion of the economic sphere into the social (Bröckling et al., 2010, p. 6). That is, whereas the Ordoliberals advocate a society governed for the market – and eventually end up with the paradox of governing the society against the market-, the American neoliberals endeavor to redefine all society as an economic domain (Gudmand & Hjorth, 2009, p.120). American neoliberalism is about the “economization of the entire social field” (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). Yet, economization should not be confused with commodification as the former does not refer to the literal monetarization of all spheres. “Rather, the point is that

neoliberal rationality disseminates the model of the market to all domains and activities- even where money is not at issue” (Brown, 2015, p. 31).

Generalization of market logic to non-market domains, i.e. the application of economic grid, is used for two main objectives. First, economic analysis is extended to social relations as a form of reason. That is, the economic grid is applied in order to make social processes intelligible. This operation relies on an epistemological shift in the economic theory resulting from the introduction of a new object of analysis: human behavior characterized by the allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends. As opposed to classical economic theory that studies the mechanisms of production, exchange and consumption; and the relations between them, the Chicago school advocates that economics should concern “all purposive conduct entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means and instruments” (Gordon, 1991, p. 43). In other words, economy is not grasped as a separate sphere of human reality; rather it is the study of the entire human behavior. American neoliberalism coincides with Ordoliberalism in its refusal to regard homo oeconomicus as a natural entity. It is no longer the rational man of exchange or the inviolable limit of governmental action. Its rational action derives from an artificially constructed freedom of entrepreneurial and competitive behavior. But, different from the Ordoliberals, the homo oeconomicus here meets B.F. Skinner's behaviorism to the extent that adjustments in behavior follow from remodeling the environment according to the market rationality (Dean, 2010, p. 72). So, even though its strategic choices constitute the basis of economic analysis, it becomes a governable being who “responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment” (Foucault, 2008, p. 269). In this sense, neoliberal homo oeconomicus is a “behavioristically manipulable being and the correlative of a governmentality which systematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’ and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of the individuals” (Lemke, 2001, p. 200). That is to say, this is governing through the creation and manipulation of an open environment of milieu “in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an

effect from one point of view will be a cause from another” (Foucault, 2007, p.36). Through an “environmental interventionism” (Taylan, 2013) probabilities of the elements that would affect the behavior of the subjects are arranged by acting on their calculations. Therefore, economization of hitherto non-economic realms through an extension of “the subject of economic thinking, its implicit anthropology” (Read, 2009, p. 32) renders every realm of life, that involves the strategic planning towards a goal -from crime, to parenting- governable. For that, when “[a]ll conduct is economic conduct” and when “all spheres of existence are framed and measured by economic terms and metrics” (Brown, 2015, p. 10) government can produce, organize and consume individual freedom in all spheres of human reality. Economization, then, is a “strategy for governing through techniques of responsabilization, evaluation, accreditation, and motivation” (Tellmann, 2011, p. 290).

Second, the economic grid is used to test governmental action to calculate whether they are excessive or entail abuse. It makes it possible to critically scrutinize the exercise of public power in terms of efficiency and thereby to replace political criticism with a market criticism. Hence, “the market becomes the, rather than a site of veridiction” in two senses: “the market is itself true and also represents the true form of all activity” (Brown, 2015, p. 67). Hence, the economization of both the social relations and the governmental action together mark the transition of the role played by the market. It no longer functions as the natural limit of governmental practices as it now turns into a “permanent economic tribunal confronting government” (Foucault 2008: 247). For Foucault, this transformation of the truth regime of the market brings along the shift from the principle of laissez-faire to a ne-pas-laisser-faire directed at the government, “in the name of a law of the market which will enable each of its activities to be measured and assessed” (ibid, p.247). Therefore, the ultimate aim of the American neoliberals, similar to that of the Ordoliberal, is to coordinate the global performance of the public authorities on the basis of the principles of market economy. Only if the state limits itself with the task of spreading the norm

of competition and constructing the model of enterprise in every realm, it is considered to be legitimate. In fact, the new form of governing dictates the penetration of market driven truths and calculations into the political realm so as to recast governing activity in a mild technocracy.

All in all, as Donzelot claims, Foucault provides “a way of showing wonderfully well how the power of the economy rests on an economy of power, both at the time of the emergence of liberalism at the end of the eighteenth century as well as at that of neo-liberalism between 1930 and 1950” (2008, p. 116). He reveals that neoliberalism is not a singular logic, it disguises in many forms depending on specific historico-political conjunctures. Therefore, instead of developing a universal theory of neoliberalism what is needed is to analyze “the particular forms of political rationality and the ways in which they connect themselves to regimes of government” (Dean, 2010, p. 73).

CHAPTER 3

NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY IN TURKEY

In this chapter the particular experience of neoliberalism in Turkey will be examined with regard to three cases that emerged after the 1980s. First, with reference to the theme of securitization, the Temporary Village Guard System shall be examined for the sake of showing that the retreat of the state is not a universal reality inscribed in neoliberal logic; rather it is a tactic of government. That is, it is the state as the instrument of government defining the boundaries between the state and the non-state. Second, hydroelectric power plants in Turkey, within the theme of economization, will be examined in an attempt of revealing how competition redefines the notion of public interest in neoliberal governments. And lastly, on the basis of the human capital theme, the introduction of pay for performance system to health services shall be discussed so as to argue that precarization of labor through a wage flexibility system is not an effect of a new organization of production and distribution of wealth; but rather of the new modes of subjectivation.

3.1. Governmentality as Securitization: Temporary Village Guard System

Temporary Village Guard (TVG) System was established on 26 March 1985 as a response to the first armed struggle of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK). Although the TVG system derives its legal basis from the Village Law of 1924, the underlying logic, the objective and the implementation of the former differs radically from that of the latter. Considering the drastic qualitative and quantitative discrepancies between the contemporary paramilitary organization and that of the early Republic, it is possible to claim that the TVG system is not

simply a reincarnation of the village guardianship of the 1920s. Besides, the fact that Turkey is not the only country to adopt arming civilians as a strategy against terrorism, in that many countries such as Guantanamo, Colombia, Philippines, and South Africa in the 1980s have witnessed very similar experiences, indicates that tracing the dynamics of the TVG system within the particular national Turkish history or its strong state tradition would not be analytically fruitful. The aim of this study is neither to discuss whether the TVG is a legitimate system or whether it is an effective means of fighting against “terror”, nor to understand the personal motivations of the locals to participate in this system. Rather, this subchapter aims to show that this paramilitary structure, as a public-private partnership on the basis of security, marks the end of the traditional “state monopoly on violence”. The inauguration of the era of “democratization of violence”, instead of pointing out a lack of state capacity, indicates a shift in the rationality of government; a shift from liberal political rationality towards that of the neoliberal. It is the neoliberal government that paves the way for the condition of possibility of the discourse that articulates some practices under the label of terrorism, defines it as a security problem and renders “war on terror” –with the extra-legal collaboration of civilians, the military and the government officials as a possible solution to this problem. This discourse is a good example in terms of revealing how the liberal distinctions between friend-enemy, public-private, legal-illegal, and state-economy blur with neoliberalism. So, the main problematization of this chapter revolves around the question of how an extra-legal paramilitary structure consisting of civilians as an armed wing of the state became thinkable in the first place and as an effect of this how village guards were constructed as new subjectivities.

The answer to this question cannot be found unless it is acknowledged that violence is an integral part of (neo) liberal rationality and neither its side-effect nor its facilitator. That is to say, governing through freedom does not necessarily

refer to governing liberally without coercion or violence¹⁷. The reason is that (neo) liberal government produces and organizes freedom, which refers solely to the freedom of circulation, as an instrument so as to consume it (Foucault, 2008, p. 63). Therefore, “the art of government can take all sorts of stances towards freedom” (Dean, 2002, p.37). I argue that such link between coercion/violence and freedom is constructed on the basis of security dispositif as “violence is inherent to processes of securitization” (Gambetti, & Godoy, 2013, p. 1) and (neo)liberal freedom is “always associated at its limits with danger and insecurity” (Bigo, 2002, p.65). It is the mechanisms of security that “allow for the unlimited and excessive exercise of power” within a “form of rule based on the logic of limited government” (Opitz, 2011, p. 93).

Since Hobbes security has become “the constitutive principle of political statehood and selfhood” (Dillon, 2011, p. 780) as it is the cause, aim and justification of the Leviathan and citizenship. However, as already been mentioned, what defines security as the “essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2009, p. 108) of government is the invention of the population and political economy, i.e. the invention of the principle of internal limitation. Liberal art of government leans on market mechanisms for verification of governmental action which means that liberal political thought starts not “from the existence of the state” but “from society, which exists in a complex relation of exteriority and interiority vis-à-vis the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 319). Taking the market mechanism as a natural datum that regulates the conduct of its participants “not

¹⁷ It is hardly controversial that Foucault turns a blind eye to the authoritative dimension of (neo)liberal political rationality as he gets almost obsessed with the form of power that he calls “conduct of conduct”. This obsession, I believe, results from the shift of his focus as he declares that “not power, but the subject is the general theme” of his research (Foucault, 1982, p. 209). That is, he directs his focus away from how the security dispositif is “geared towards...the circulation of things” to “the interplay between a milieu and the wills and interests of the subjects” (Tellmann, 2009, p.12). This shift towards conduct of conduct, however, “actually narrows the conceptual understanding of the liberal security dispositif” (Tellmann, 2011, p. 286). Furthermore, the fact that the Anglo-American school carries out further studies on governmentality almost solely with reference to the framework of *advanced liberalism*, within which the population is governed through their “capacity for autonomous, self-directing activity” (Hindess, 2001, p. 100), has a hand in the omission of the “coercive, binding or obligatory dimensions of liberal governmental programmes and practices” (Dean, 2002, p. 38) from the governmentality literature.

only by the values, habits of thought and the like which they bring to their interactions but also by the signals of other actors” (Hindess, 2001, p. 96), that is the prices of goods and of labor, liberal rationality assumes that state interference does not simply result in “the distortion of the market but the distortion of the kinds of conduct associated with the market” (Dean, 2002, p. 50). Within such an auto-regulating system, intervention can be meaningful only for the sake of guaranteeing the “security of social and economic processes” for the “welfare of each citizen and the population as a whole is dependent” on them (Dean, 2010, p. 223). To put it another way, the security of economy can only be “assured by acting upon the social milieu within which production and exchange” occurs (Rose, 1996, p. 48). This indicates the liberal paradox of intervention: “governmental intervention is necessary because the processes in which it must not intervene are permanently threatened” and in that “intervention only intends to make non-intervention possible and feasible” (Opitz, 2011, p. 99). Security, therefore, is the condition of possibility of intervention in liberal rationality as it is the “principle of calculation for the cost of manufacturing freedom” (Foucault, 2008, p. 65). Liberalism becomes authoritarian by the instance that it makes such calculation for that this calculation introduces a break between what is governable through self-regulating market mechanism and what is not. In that, my argument is that a specific form of *racism* that functions “to fragment, to create caesuras” (Foucault, 2003, p. 255) within the continuum of population is always-already inherent to market mechanisms¹⁸. Market economy is where biopower is grounded within (neo)liberal art of government as a right to “indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for

¹⁸ In my opinion, Foucault leaves the notion of biopolitics undertheorized as in the *Discipline and Punish* and the *Will to Knowledge* the concept is used within the analytics of disciplinary power and body politics, and in the *Society Must be Defended* lectures it is used almost solely with reference to modern biology and eugenics. As such, he never attempts to sketch a “systematic linkage between...biopolitics and governmentality” (Lemke, 2011, p. 166). Therefore, Foucault does not handle the connection between market-security-biopolitics. This, I believe, results from his deliberate avoidance of mechanisms of economy. That is, Foucault “circumvents rather than takes up the issue of economy in his attempt to dislodge the economistic and totalizing strands of the Marxist tradition” (Tellmann, 2009, p. 9) and hence without taking into account the biopolitical regulation through security mechanisms within the market, he “follows the classical liberal understanding that the essence of things economic lies in the calculations or governing of interest” (Tellmann, 2011, p. 291).

some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (ibid, p. 256). This means that security is a *dispositif* that links the prerequisite of life to the existence of those who are left to die (Gambetti, 2009, p. 154) since the protection of life necessitates the elimination and devastation of the non-life; that is, of some parts of the population. The designation of whose life is to be sacrificed for the sake of the promotion of life in general is determined through such security calculations. That is, the “discourse on economy elucidates a specific rationality of the security-*dispositif*” (Tellmann, 2009, p. 13) in that “[l]ike market economy, security works by deducing the “norm” from life processes via normality curves” (Gambetti, 2011, p. 4).

This process of normalization guarantees the permanence of violence and the constant possibility of overstepping the limitation of direct intervention within the (neo)liberal rationality for the process results -at least- with two subject categories: on the one hand, those who are endowed “with the capacity for autonomous action” (Hindess, 2001, p. 100), and on the other, “who simply cannot, or cannot yet, be governed through freedom” (Dean, 2002, p. 46). Whereas for the former, security performs as an environmental technology in which governmental power “acts as a manager of freedom”, for the latter it “ceases to induce and incite, but draws on compulsory measures to secure the productive use of freedom elsewhere” (Opitz, 2011, p. 99). This latter category is performatively constructed as the dangerous subject who is an indispensable and non-governable element of (neo)liberal governmentality. In other words, this subject “embodies the constitutive outside of a wide field of liberally governable subjects and thus requires special, disciplinary, or even authoritarian treatment” (ibid). Yet, the criteria of danger, i.e. the criteria of non-governability depends upon the specific discourse that defines what is risky, such as pauperism in the welfare discourse (Procacci, 1991), homosexuality in Christian discourse, and, as it will be discussed further, terrorism in neoliberal patriotic discourse.

The security dispositif of neoliberal political rationality is not simply a quantitative proliferation of liberal security apparatus; but also a qualitative shift in the definition of security itself and its political effects. This is because, the economization of whole spheres of life with neoliberalism results in the penetration of the technologies of security into every realm of life. For that economization ends up in the “permanent instability...and continual blurring of all established lines of demarcation” (Gambetti & Güremen, 2005, p. 639) between state, society and economy which allows for the dissemination of authoritarianism that is inherent in the market to all spheres of life¹⁹. Within this amorphous structure that can be represented by the figure of Behemoth instead of Leviathan (Gambetti, 2007, p. 11) whereas the state is reactivated on behalf of market rationality, “that is, not simply profitability but a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes the measure of all state practices” (Brown, 2003, p. 42), the society is activated through an “alliance with the state, that pertains to serve the state, and which duly assumes the position of the state” (Reid, 2008, p. 88). Therefore, the simultaneous privatization of the functions of the state and etatisation of the society paves the way for the “socialization of risk accompanying the privatization of gain” (Brown, 2015, p. 72) within which “individual rights and (corresponding) public responsibilities lose prominence, “public rights” and (corresponding) individual responsibilities coming to the fore instead” (Lessenich, 2011, p. 311). That is to say, the major peculiarity of neoliberal security results from the fact that security is constructed as people’s “own responsibility and a part of their self-care” (Özcan, 2014, p. 39). This responsabilization is made possible by the very fundamental tenet of neoliberalism that casts market rationality and the rational action of the homo oeconomicus “as a norm rather than an ontology” (Brown, 2003, p. 43) since it “does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but rather takes as its task the development,

¹⁹ My intention here is not to challenge the novelty of the “religious-political project known as neoconservatism” (Brown, 2003, p. 37) and the unprecedented authoritarian techniques of intervention that this project brings into existence. Rather, I aim to show that the authoritarianism as the condition of possibility of generating the neoconservative discourse is imbued within the liberal rationality.

dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality” (ibid. pp. 40-41). This constructivism makes it clear that security in neoliberalism “does not amount to a simple double game of staged insecurity and guaranteed security, the interest-led generation of anxiety on the one hand, fearful submission on the other hand” (Krasmann, 2011, p. 124). Neoliberal security, then, is not simply a rhetoric used by political actors to manipulate the governed “within already existing institutional settings” (Opitz, 2011, p. 97). Instead, neoliberalism shapes “the domain and logics of the political...by invocations of security” (ibid). The invocation of security on the basis of terror as “a new form of governmentality” (Aradau, & Van Munster, 2007, p. 90) brings war “back into the epicenter of state politics and the permanent emergency through which it seeks to impose its peace” (Dillon & Neal, 2008, p. 9).

In order to understand how terror and the war against terror are peculiar to neoliberal rationality, it is meaningful to compare the Temporary Village Guard System with some earlier examples of paramilitary structures. In the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, the Kurds have been both the subject and the object of “the strategy of raising armed militias from the local population” for security “in exchange for some material benefits and rights” (Gürcan, 2015, p. 5) and the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments that were constituted in 1891 is the salient example of this strategy. The Regiments, consisting predominantly of Kurdish tribes, were established against the Armenians and, in case of a war, against Russia. The tribes “with the highest crime rate were preferred” (Özar, 2013, p. 146) so that their criminal activities would be pardoned on the condition that they agreed to collaborate with the state against the enemy. But, besides this conventional security function, the Regiments also functioned to “control the Kurdish “insurgencies”, to make them get used to be under strict surveillance of the state administration and to eradicate without exception the independence of all the Kurdish tribes” (Aytar, 2013, p. 19). In accordance with this aim, the Tribal School was founded in İstanbul in 1892 for the education of the children of the tribes’ chief; so as they graduated they could be placed in high-rank positions

in the Regiments. Hence, this system alongside aiming at using the tribes as an armed force against the enemy, sought to cease the nomadic life in the Kurdistan region. These regiments were seen as a means of extending central authority to the region, through establishing hierarchical relations between the tribes and making them loyal to the state. After the declaration of the Second Constitution, the dissolution of the Regiments has started; but the endeavor of assimilating the Kurds gained strength with the establishment of the Republic. During the 1920-30s this tactic of arming the civilians was implemented again, via the Riddance of Banditry Law (İzale-i Şekavet Kanunu) of 1923 that called citizens to “help against the bandits who wanted to take advantage of the post-war environment where there were not enough security forces available” (Uçarlar, 2013, p. 88) and also the 74th article of the Village Law that aimed at arming the villagers so that they could protect their own villages. According to these laws, one village guard would be assigned to a village with 500 inhabitants with the rationale of self-protection (Ekinci, 2011, p. 13). The Riddance of Banditry Law was revoked in 1962 for being unconstitutional and unnecessary; and the 74th article has not been implemented effectively.

It is clear that the TVG system shares the common features of Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments in terms of making use of a “divide and rule strategy” (Belge, 2011, p. 107) that protects both the members of the paramilitary troops and the state against accountability. However, despite this similarity and also despite the fact that the TVG system was established through an amendment of the 1924 Village Law, the *mentality* of the contemporary system is almost completely different from these two cases. The TVG system aims at internal rather than external security as opposed to the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, and it is a tactic of war rather than self-protection²⁰ as opposed to the Riddance of Banditry Law. So, the

²⁰ In fact, according to the non-documented contract the village guards were only tasked with protecting their villages. When the “bandit” arrives in the village the village guards would try to block him by alerting the security forces. Besides, they would guide the security forces and show their way in and out of the village, caves, etc. (Beşikçi, 1990, p. 153). However, this contract was totally ignored as the village guards “were sent on operations that lasted for days, from time to

first difference of the TVG system from the previous ones is that the system is established as an instrument of *civil war*, which means that the previous efforts of assimilation is replaced with a strategy of ethno-political cleansing. Secondly, the TVG system is revitalized within a strict rationale of *governance* that accounts for “the growing interdependencies between political authorities and social and economic actors” (Lemke, 2007, p. 56). The TVG system through the mechanisms of governance “valorizes public-private partnerships that imbue the market with ethical potential and social responsibility and the public realm with market metrics” (Brown, 2015, p. 49). In other words, the PPP strategy that is adopted by the TVG system brings “‘efficiency’ and post-Fordist flexibility into the military business” (Sundar, 2013, p. 154) while bringing citizens the responsibility of “the patriotic mission of protecting the unity and integrity of the nation-state” (Gambetti, 2013, p. 136). As such, on the one hand it manages to reduce terror to a “non-political and non-ideological problem that needs technical solutions” (Ong, 2006, p. 3) and on the other, “through isolating and entrepreneurializing responsible units..., through devolving authority” it binds them “to the powers and project of the whole” (Brown, 2015, p. 129). Lastly, the system is seen as an area of employment rather than a de facto and temporary solution that is activated in cases of emergency. That is to say, despite the prefix of temporary²¹, village guards are rendered *permanent* as they are public employees “who are paid by the government within a legal framework” (Gürcan,

time used as a human barrier between the soldiers and the PKK and were even included in cross-border operations” (Özar, 2013a, p. 9).

²¹ This prefix of temporary is removed on November 29, 2016 by the statutory decree no. 676 and the system is renamed as Security Guard. This fact alone makes it quite clear that the system will continue to be used in a prolonged fashion as guarding security itself is an indefinite and perpetual task. This securitization of security is actually in alliance with the neoliberal project which, according to Dean (2010), adds a new process to governmentalization of the state: the governmentalization of government. That is, what is at stake in neoliberalism is not “the security of processes considered external to the formal apparatuses of government” so much as “the security of governmental mechanisms themselves” (p. 224). This can be illustrated by “the shift of economic government from a government of economic processes of the production and distribution of wealth to one concerned to secure the governmental mechanisms of national budgets, interest rates, money supply, and the international competitiveness and efficiency of individual and institutional conduct” (ibid, p. 267).

2015, p. 2). Besides, the fact that by 2014 the number of the temporary and voluntary village guards still exceeds 70,000 (Balta, et. al., 2015 p. 15) is the most obvious demonstration of the permanence of the system. That is to say, the Temporary Village Guard System as a permanent paramilitary organization consisted of full-time employees is invoked within a logic of governance as the civil/private partner of public armed forces in times of civil war. In that, the TVG system is not simply the reactivation of the village guardianship of 1924. Rather, the inclusion of the civilians within the armed wing of the state, as opposed to the Village Law of 1924, does not point out a lack of state capacity; but rather an expansion of options; greater market choice in the use of violence. In order to understand how these three points- civil war, governance, and the permanence of the paramilitary organization-, which are indeed highly interlaced, are peculiar to neoliberal rationality, the history of the development of the system needs to be briefly outlined.

The discourse on *national security* has been a constant in Turkey since the 1980 military coup as it has been “transformed and expanded to include literally everything” (Özcan, 2014, p. 44) for even the coup itself was justified in the name of national security. With the constitution of 1982, the position of National Security Council “was enhanced to one of submitting to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions” (Cizre, 2003, p. 222) in a manner of empowering the military cadres with “executive authority to direct social, cultural, economic and technological developments in the country when needed” (Özcan, 2014, p. 44). The first armed action of the PKK “that took place in Siirt and Hakkari on August 15, 1984” (Uçarlar, 2013, p. 40) has been regarded as a case that the executive authority of the NSC was needed as it “served as an excuse for the military to maintain its influence in civilian politics” (Gambetti, 2013, p. 128). However, as the discourse on terror, so to say, has yet to be invented, the Turkish government considered the PKK attacks as the criminal activities of a few bandits and that is why instead of launching “a full offensive military attack”, the government “reactivated the system of village guardianship in 1985” (Gürcan,

2015, p. 9) with an amendment through Law no. 3175. The amended law, “as a sign of fear of collaboration of elected muhtars and also foreseeing coordination problems that might arise” (Balta, 2004, p.5), transferred the appointment of the village guards to a central level. Accordingly, the guards would be “appointed upon the proposal of the Governor and the approval of the Ministry of Interior Affairs” (Beşe, 2008, p. 196). The amendment, thereby, functioned to strengthen the executive branch. This expansion of executive authority, excluding the approval and control mechanisms of the legislation, paved the way for the legal basis of the extraordinary measures in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions (Kurban, 2009, p. 253) that began with the Martial Law for the first time in 1978 as a response to the massacre of Kahramanmaraş. As of July 19, 1987, the Martial Law was replaced by the declaration of State of Emergency, which would then be extended for 46 times till the end of 1994. The administration branch, thus, is accorded indefinite authority in the region as the law did not specify the conditions and limitations of the situations that require the government of State of Emergency. This illustrates the implication of law in a purely instrumental and tactical fashion in the age of governmentality, as Foucault (2001b) remarks while defining government vis-à-vis sovereignty:

...law and sovereignty were absolutely inseparable. On the contrary, with government it is a question not of imposing law on men but of disposing things: that is, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics -to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be achieved (p. 211).

That is to say, “governmentality exposes law as a set of tactics... their operation is 'justified' by their aim, but not through recourse to any set of prior principles or legitimating functions” (Butler, 2004, p. 94) as what is important for the neoliberalism is not the legitimacy of the state, so much as the efficiency of it. And the “result is a production of a paralegal universe that goes by the name of law” (ibid, p. 61). In this sense, “securitization organizes a governmental practice of legal exemption” which is a “classical prerogative of sovereignty” (Opitz, 2011, pp. 105-106). However, the sovereign of neoliberal rationality is different

both from the Foucauldian sovereign as a unified subject and from the Schmittian and Agambenian sovereign²² as a limit concept that transcends law by applying it. Exception, as it is formulated by Schmitt and Agamben, implies that “the encounter with the limit will produce relations of violence” and in that “the discourse of limit both reifies exceptionalism as a structural inevitability and overdetermines the philosophical problem of limits by assuming it is *always already securitized*” (Neal, 2008, p. 56). They consider exception to be the transcendental condition of rule and thence the limit of normal politics. As opposed to this, for Foucault, “security is not the result of a system of logic of exception or of an exceptional moment of emergency in which normality is suspended...It does not have its origin in something above and beyond politics” (Bigo, 2008, p. 105). Therefore, from the perspective of governmentality, exceptionalism does not have an ontology “apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (Butler, 1999, p. 173). That is, exceptionalism is not obtained in the practice of the sovereign to suspend the law, rather it “surfaces in the horizon of a liberal government operating in the name of security and produces law along this path” (Krasmann, 2011, p. 117). This means that the necessity of exceptionalism is itself a tactic, a political act and a governmental technology for that the act of suspending the law is a “performative one which brings a contemporary configuration of sovereignty into being or, more precisely, reanimates a spectral sovereignty within the field of governmentality” (Butler, 2004, p. 61). This neo-sovereignty is not a unified power, but is composed of prerogative “petty sovereigns” (ibid, p. 56) that are not subject to rule of law, but

²² Schmitt and Agamben conceptualize the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 1985, p.5), within a logic of dialectics of an inclusion-exclusion paradox. Their argument is basically that when the sovereign declares a state of exception it seems to be placing itself above the law by suspending the law and at the same time embodying the law at its will. Yet, the fact that it can declare a state of exception takes its legitimacy from the fact that the right of the sovereign to declare a state of exception is stated in the law. At this point, the boundaries between the legal and illegal, inside and outside are completely blurred in the sense that the sovereign by suspending the law is both inside and outside the law. In order to cease the state of exception, i.e. to re-enact the rule of law, the law, which is this time applying to the exceptional case, needs to be suspended again. Therefore, the thing is that excluding the rule of law means at the same time including it. So, in the sense of law’s always remaining as a potential even at times that it is suspended indicates the paradox of sovereignty: “There is nothing outside the law” (Agamben 1998, p. 29).

can suspend or deploy law tactically “to suit the requirements of a state that seeks more and more to allocate sovereign power to its executive and administrative powers” (ibid, p. 54). In other words, neoliberal security invokes the sovereign power as “neither a singularity nor a simple opposition of normativity and exception but a shifting and flexible ensemble of heterogeneous calculations, choices, and exceptions that constitute security, life, and ethics” (Ong, 2006, p. 10).

The State of Emergency, in this manner, has institutionalized “a regime of security” which is “a regime of politics in which governance and sovereignty intersect” (Dillon, 2004, p. 90) in the region from 1987 onwards through the broadening and the consolidation of the village guard system. The fact that despite the significantly increased security measures and high numbers of professional army members in the region, the TVG system was being institutionalized further, rather than dissolved, indicates that the miscalculation of confusing a guerilla war with banditry actually paid off as it proved effective as a counter-terror strategy. That is, alongside the expected advantage of fighting against the terror with lower cost -as arming civilians is much less costly than holding an army at disposal- and more output -as the villagers know the land much better than the army- the miscalculation produced unforeseen effects for that the system operated as a process of concentrating a milieu of violence in the region by damaging the “feelings of belonging, solidarity and trust within local communities” (Gambetti, 2013, p. 136). This damage ended up in the normalization of violence as indicated by the innumerable “crimes such as smuggling, rape, murder committed by the village guards” ²³(Uçarlar, 2013, p. 139) and their oppression on the people in order to receive more protection from the state and earn more access to the “economic resources, namely the drug trafficking and the black market” (Bozarlan, 1999, p. 23). Such normalization

²³ According to the report prepared by the Human Rights Association in 2009, the village guards have been involved in 38 village arsons, 14 village evacuations, 12 cases of sexual harassment and rape, 22 abductions, 294 armed attacks, 183 assassinations, 259 injuries, 2 casualties, 562 cases of torture and corporal punishment.

brought along a culture of fear in the region which in turn required more security responses that leads to the further suspension of the rights and liberties of the regular citizen whereas providing the “security agencies with more extensive powers” (Huysmans, 2004, p. 324) and more responsibilities such as participating in cross-border operations of the Turkish army in Iraq. The point is that, the policy of *using the Kurd against the Kurd* was not a part of a systematic plan, rather it came off and gained momentum during the process as more security brought more violence and insecurity. That is the system, in a way, turned into an auto-regulating security market.

Accordingly, the guards have been governed within the market through relatively accommodative strategies, i.e. through increasing the material and symbolic benefits and the *illegal rights* for the tribes having been participated in the organization. Thereby, competition has been created among the tribes which means that they have been, in a way, rendered as responsabilized entrepreneurs during the first five years of the system. In other words, they have been considered as, more or less rational actors defined with a consumer freedom of choice in that they were granted a freedom to choose to be a guard or not as a result of the negotiation process; but in return they were expected to be ready to pay the price for their decision. So, the first five years of the system, can be summarized as “governing their conduct while according them certain autonomy of decisional power and responsibility for their actions” (Rose, 1996, p. 157)²⁴. However, in my opinion, this government as conduct of conduct did not stem solely from a calculation of efficacy²⁵. Rather, I believe, the reason is that the security dispositif during the Cold War era was not flexible enough to penetrate

²⁴ Obviously, this is not to say that repression and coercion was absent in this period. However, these violent measures “become more predominant after 1992 as the state has changed its priority from external war-making to internal war-making and re-structured the whole army around the prerequisites of the internal security” (Balta, 2004, p.8).

²⁵ The accommodative policies, indeed, were inefficient as the PKK’s response to these policies was not as liberal: the party pointed out the guards as *jash*, i.e. traitor and employed hard measures towards them. “During 1987 it seemed the PKK would destroy the system as enrolment dropped from 20,000 to 6,000” (McDowall, 2007, p. 425).

into the neutral zones, i.e. the villages that were neither pro-PKK nor pro-state. That is because the dissident was formulated as the *enemy* with an identification determined by both ideological and territorial boundaries. After the Cold War, though, the *enemy* figure has been replaced by that of the *alien* as within the new world order “borders no longer define the limits of the nations, rather they are erected whenever /wherever there is a need to organize social space and political governance” (Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007, p. 152). The enemy had a certain identity; yet the alien “articulate ambivalence and therefore challenge the (modern) ordering activity which relies on reducing ambiguity and uncertainty by categorizing elements” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 241). The conceptualization of alien, therefore, “diffuse[s] the enemy (the PKK) into the whole fabric of society” meaning that danger is “no longer attached to an identity; it could come from anywhere, everywhere” (Gambetti, 2013, p. 131). Therefore, from 1991 onwards, security dispositif shifts surveillance from the boundaries to the territory as a whole in order to detect the alien²⁶ inside. Saying differently, the “purpose of this surveillance is not so much to identify a specific individual, but rather to monitor the population as a whole for behaviors that might represent a threat to the established order” (Perault, 2002, p. 124).

This transition from the perception of external to internal threat leads to the transformation of both the Turkish Armed Forces and the TVG system. The army from 1991 onward has been reorganized by the General Staff and replaced the all-out warfare strategy with that of a low-intense warfare (Balta, 2010, pp. 414-415) and thereby “shifted from a relatively cumbersome divisional and regimental structure...to a relatively flexible corps and brigades structure” (Jongerden, 2007,

²⁶ This alien is, obviously, the *terrorist*. It is true that the internal enemy that had been identified as anarchist/communist before 1980, was redefined in the in the post-coup neoliberalization process as the terrorist (Berksoy, 2007, p. 48) indicating that the formulation of dissidence is moved away from politics to technocracy. Yet, as a result of, what one might call “the syndrome of the Treaty of Sevres” (Gambetti, 2011a, p. 149) during this years of 1980-1991, terror is still externalized and the PKK is considered as part of a demonic plan of external forces that aim to divide Turkey. Therefore, the terrorist is defined as the alien inside, and the concept of terrorism becomes flexible only after the Cold War as the mentality of externality of threat is replaced. Or rather, the invention of the techniques of internal warfare paved the way for the condition of possibility of the performative production of the alien inside, as the threat to be eliminated.

p. 63) in order to increase flexibility and mobility vis-à-vis the guerilla. For that the military strategy of the Turkish army during the 1985-1991 that was “based on the doctrine of static territorial defense by a standing army against a coherent mega-threat” (ibid, p. 50) was highly ineffective towards the flexible and polycentric structure of the PKK. The Turkish security forces, in 1991, laid down a “new doctrine to control the area named ‘Cordon and Search Doctrine’” (Gürcan, 2015, p. 9). This implied the plan to shift “from ‘search and destroy’ sweeps to a ‘clear and hold’ penetration strategy” (Jongerden, 2007, p. 67) which was not “put into practice until after the reorganization of the army, initiated in 1992, was completed in 1993” (Jongerden, et. al., 2007, p. 3). Such clear and hold doctrine introduced environment destruction through “burning of forests, fields and villages in the Kurdish areas as a strategy in the conflict against the insurgent PKK” (ibid., p. 1). That is, the strategy of *draining the sea*, where “the civilian population is the ‘sea’ in which the guerrilla ‘fish’ swim” (Valentino, et. al., 2004, p. 385), has become the constituent element of war against terror. Within this strategy, the TVG system turned into an apparatus of racism that would be used to decide whose village was to be evacuated. In other words, “from 1992-1993 on, state began to use not village guards per se, but the system itself” (Balta, 2004, p. 2) as a mechanism of categorizing the subjects either as pro-state or as potential threats to the state. This declaration of the sovereigns that “if you’re not for us, you’re with the terrorists” (Brown, 2009, p. 105) annihilates the neutral zone and identifies any dissidence with terrorism. This policy shows how the TVG system is incorporated into a process of securitization that “shifts the emphasis from the prosecution of criminal acts that have already been committed” (Opitz, 2011, p. 109) to *preemptive* measures in order to naturalize the “threats and risks that are incalculable and that, on account of their expected magnitude, appear intolerable” (Krasmann, 2011, p. 126) in advance. In this context “the enemy is anyone who...does not participate in the maintenance of the paramilitary order” (Perault, 2002, p. 132), rather than the one who participates in the, so called terrorist organization. This definition renders the enemy imperceptible for that “all inhabitants are potential enemies”, and the TVG

system, concordantly, functions as an “internal surveillance mechanism [that] exists to uncover and reveal them” (ibid). This preemptive rationality, therefore, overrides the most fundamental principle of law: presumption of innocence. This makes it clear that “citizenship is no longer a merely legal concept but also an insider status whose boundaries are established through discourses and practices of volunteerism and vigilantism” (Gambetti, & Godoy, 2013, p. 1), and thence “the figure of citizenship is reduced to sacrificial human capital” (Brown, 2015, p. 220). When the citizen is figured as human capital “inequality becomes normal, even normative. A democracy composed of human capital features winners and losers, not equal treatment or equal protection” (ibid, p.38). Therefore, it is no coincidence that the winner of the displacement of the 1990s were the resourceful human capital; i.e. the big landlords, mighty tribes and the chieftains that had strong ties to the state, whereas the losers were the ones that did not serve their lives as a resource to be used by the state through refusing to participate in the TVG organization. Nonetheless, the inhabitants of the Turkish Kurdistan have been, more often than not, exposed to biopolitical regulations since the early republican period as many official reports regarding the Kurdistan region and the problems arising within the Kurdish population, particularly banditry and tribal system, were prepared by the specialists. However, even a brief review of the three major settlement plans of the 1930s is sufficient to justify the argument that, both in objective and effect, the displacement strategy of the 1930s were highly different from that of the 1990s.

Eastern Reformation Plan (Şark Islahat Planı) of 1925 was prepared as a response to the Sheik Said rebellion, because the insurrection was depicted as a nationalist movement behind the veil of religion. That is, the rebellion was believed to have resulted from the Kurdish identity’s not having been Turkified yet (Yayman, 2014, p. 78). According to the report, the number Kurdish population living in the East of the Euphrates was over a million and the Turkish population in the region was less than one fourth of the Kurdish population. In order to overturn the ethnic balance in the region the plan was to settle the Kurdish population to the West

and to inhabit 500,000 Turks in the region, within ten years. So, Turkification was to be “implemented either by settling Turkish elements in non-Turkish areas or by settling non-Turkish elements in Turkish areas” (Yeğen, 2009, p. 603). The plan did not reach its goal as till 1932 only 2774 Kurds could have been displaced. The first well-organized settlement initiative of the Republic was implemented in 1934. This plan, similarly aimed at organizing the population according to the principle of commitment to Turkish culture and accordingly, 25.831 people living in 5074 households were subjected to forced resettlement in Western Anatolia. Yet, the law no. 5098 issued in 1947 abolished the obligation to reside in the place that they were transferred by the Settlement Law. Upon this, 22.516 people living in 4128 households migrated back to their homelands (Kurban & Yeğen, 2012, p. 48). The last attempt of the Republic to Turkify the Kurds through settlement policies was realized after the massacre of Dersim in 1938 which resulted in the displacement of 5000-7000 people (ibid, p. 49).

In terms of both quality and quantity, the displacement of the 1930s was incomparable²⁷ to that of the 1990s as 1.5–3 million people (Yeğen, 2009, p. 604) is claimed to be unofficially displaced with the latter. Two fundamental differences can be depicted between two displacement waves. First, the displacement policies of the 1930s were implemented on a legal basis in that where to settle them was regulated by law down to the last detail. Similarly, on some occasions, their return was made possible with legal arrangements. In the 1990s, however, the forced immigration policy, which has been carried out by the partnership of the petty sovereigns, was implemented by means of totally extra-legal measures and therefore without any legal basis. As the displacement was

²⁷ Again, this is not to say that the military-bureaucratic cadres of the early republican period were more tolerant towards the Kurds or that they were more respectful towards human rights. Rather, the point is that, the political rationalities, which on the one hand construct regimes of representation and on the other hand render reality amenable to specific forms of political intervention, are different between these two periods. It is the discrepancy of such mentality that makes it possible to categorize a part of population as those cannot be governed through freedom and to invent techniques for the sake of articulating them to the governable population through disciplinary apparatus, or eliminating them through para-sovereignty technologies so as to promote the well-being of the population as a whole.

deliberately left out of the legal scope, no plan of settlement was prepared. This shows that, as opposed to both the Hamidiye Regiments and the displacements of the 1930s that mainly targets at settling the nomadic tribes, the 1990s call for the *renomadization* of the inhabitants of the Turkish Kurdistan. For that, the official criterion of success, from the 1980s on, is decentralization rather than centralization. This renomadization process first and foremost was about preventing the PKK militants from residing in the mountainous area and to break the ties between the Kurds and the party. The fact that such political cleansing was considered to be a part of economic development by the government officials can be depicted in the personal letter written by President Turgut Özal in 1993 to the prime minister Süleyman Demirel: “Given a tendency for the locals to migrate to the west of the country, it would appear that only 2 to 3 million people will inhabit the region in the future. If this migration is not regulated, only the relatively well-off portion of the population will have moved and the poor will have been left behind. Thus the area will turn into a breeding ground for further anarchy” (cited in Jongerden, 2007, p. 47). Such regulation was implemented, probably, in quite a different fashion than that Özal had in mind, but one way or another it gave the desired results as during the mid-1990s almost only the “well-off portion of the population” could settle in the region. Put it differently, there has been no legal arrangement to regulate the migration, rather it was implemented by brute force of village guards, gendarmerie and special teams comprised of commandos. That is, the villagers that were forced to participate in the paramilitary organization, on some occasions were exposed to different sorts of torture “such as; the villagers getting stripped naked and were forced to lay down or dragged on the snow,...their eyes [were] removed or their limbs were cut, their houses and crops were set on fire and even sometimes no news [would have been] received from these villages as the entrances and exits are prohibited when these kind of incidents are taking place” (Uçarlar, 2013, p. 104). Besides, “in the villages without village guards...in addition to the food embargo...medical treatment of the villagers, prescription of medicine and fuel consumption [was] subject to permission and restriction” (ibid, p. 108). If the

villagers, as a result of this systematic violence, agreed to become guards, instead of abandoning the village, this time they would be the target of the PKK that “threatened and even killed people it accused of collaborating with state authorities, especially the village guards, to prevent further recruitment by the state” (Balta, 2004, p. 11). Such strategy of “raising the costs of becoming a village guard” (ibid, p. 2) actually served to the objective of the sovereigns as the villagers that were caught between two fires were left with no options, but to leave. As a result, the Kurdish internal displacement in Turkey has ended up with the forced evacuation of “as many as 3,438 villages...since the beginning of the war in the eastern and southeastern provinces” (Gambetti, 2008, p. 100). The ones that were “left behind”, just like Özal hoped, were the big land owners, tribal aghas some of whom had already become members of the parliament and mayors alongside having connections with mafia organizations, and the, so called, devoted village guards. Those who have abandoned their hometowns, on the other hand, were forced to be articulated into labor power in big cities mostly with low salaries and no social security as seasonal or construction workers and waiters (Kurban & Yeğen, 2012, pp. 94-98). Meanwhile, the deserted land that had been hitherto “occupied” by the petty farmer was either being integrated into the market by privatization through initiations of tender process or by being appropriated by the guards and the landlords. Alongside these privatizations and land seizures, the further village and forest arsons and deepened tribal conflicts/inequalities it has been guaranteed that the displaced people would not be able to come back. In this sense, the Kurdistan of Turkey, in 1990s, has been rendered governable not through disciplinary technologies; but through mobilization.

This brings us to the second difference between the two displacement waves. That is, the goal of the 1990 displacements was not to assimilate or to Turkify. This discrepancy of objectives derives from the disaccord in the definition of the problem: the former describes it as a nationalist rebellion and responds to it through technologies of assimilation, whereas the latter considers it as an act of terror thence “the solution is not political but military” (Rojas, 2009, p. 232).

Assimilation is fundamentally a disciplinary technology that finds its condition of possibility in the liberal political rationality. That is, for the liberal thinking, reason is singular and is defined by autonomy. This is because; the capacity for autonomy that defines reason is considered to be natural and thence *universal*. As Kant (2013) argues, unless caused by “lack of understanding”, not being autonomous -i.e. “immature”- can only be “self-incurred” due to the “lack of resolution and courage to use [one's own understanding] without the guidance of another” (p.1). That is to say, those use their reason will be capable of self-government for that there is one, single form of reason that is the condition of possibility of autonomy. Accordingly, the ones that suffer from lack of understanding, which results from an organic pathology, will never be able to achieve autonomy and thence they will always be governed by others. Nevertheless, the real problem is, so to say, the cowards as they need to be disciplined through different techniques, including assimilation, so as to become autonomous²⁸. The important thing is that such autonomy is an *ideal*, not a fact. Therefore, the disciplinary techniques involve a process of normation and the norm derives from the ideal. The same logic goes for the nation state that seeks to reach the ideal correspondence between the people and the territory. Citizen, thence, is an ideal and the nation-state strives for configuring every individual within its borders into a favorable citizen; which is, turning individuals into docile bodies. Nation-state tries to guarantee the homogeneity of the population as it cannot tolerate difference. It categorizes, so that it renders the future predictable and does not face any risks. Consequently, it can render surveillance perpetual only in an artificially closed and regulated territory. The ideal citizen, therefore, is an amenable one that stays within such boundaries as an ethos whereas the non-favorable citizen needs assimilation techniques to fit in.

²⁸ Valverde (1996) makes a very similar argument with reference to the figure of “good despot” in the writings of John Stuart Mill, for whom, just like Kant, the doctrine of liberty could only apply to “human beings in the maturity of their faculties” and for the rest the ethical policing of the despot was required to improve their faculties.

Accordingly, the early republican period defined the ideal citizen as the Turkish speaking Muslim, who shares the republican values, such as secularism and modernity. The Kurd, on the other hand, was defined with the opposite values: “tribalism, religious reactionism, or banditry” (Yeğen, 2009, p. 599). They were considered as archaic and therefore, through education and discipline they could be developed and modernized. In this sense, Kurdishness had no reality, per se; it was rather an underdeveloped, pre-modern form of Turkishness. Their identity was to be corrected in that they were officially designated as “‘mountain Turks’ and their language [was] a ‘border dialect’ of Turkish” (Gambetti, 2008, p. 115). Settlement policies, therefore, was to serve for the actualization of the Turkishness that was already inherent in them as a potential. Hence, the Kurds were considered as “prospective-Turks” (Yeğen, 2009) that would, one day, be capable of self-government.

The discourse of terror, on the other hand, is made possible by neoliberal rationality, because it is intimately linked to the dispositif of security which is, above all, about freedom of circulation in that it “has less to do with protection and preservation than it does with circulation, cultivation, promotion and fructification” (Dillon & Neal, 2008, p. 11) . Security “refers to the temporal and uncertain within a given space, a milieu. But the milieu is destabilized by the dynamic of security which is centrifugal and then it is always an open milieu” (Bigo, 2008, p. 97). In this dynamic milieu, what is of importance is not the monolithic and universal faculty of reason that human beings are naturally endowed with, but *life* itself, that is constructed through “constant nonlinear adaptation and change” (Dillon, 2007a, p. 7). In that, governmental mechanisms in neoliberal societies do not operate with the ideal, but with the fact, concordantly they have to stand for risks and anomalies. Or rather, a web of capillary risk establishes the very basis of life in every sphere, meaning that risk is permanent and everywhere. Therefore, the aim of government is not to eliminate the risk, which already is not possible, but to govern it by finding the optimal level, the equilibrium by pitting force against force. The government of

risk in its omnipresence and permanence is not possible at a central level within a territorially defined nation-state; and as such the formal demarcation between state and society becomes invalidated in neoliberal rationality. Hence, in neoliberal reason, formal structures of belonging lose its comprehensiveness and the ideal citizen becomes the one that collaborates with the sovereigns in governing the risk. That is, the “emergence of a peculiar subjectivity, that of the ‘officer-citizen’” (Gambetti, 2013, p. 130).

Terror, in this sense, is exactly what this rationality brings into being²⁹, for how “violence is signified, as well as how violence signifies depends upon the specific features of historically specific discourses and relations of power” (Dillon, 1998, p. 547). That is to say, terror is a flexible word capable of encompassing and homogenizing, and thereby rendering governable the heterogeneous and omnipresent risk. The ambiguity of the term makes it possible to include any type of dissidence within the category of terror, alongside making the political demands behind it invisible. As such, terror is represented in and through neoliberal rationality, as if it is its own cause. To characterize the PKK, which is first and foremost “a political party that uses military means to achieve political ends” (Jongerden, 2007, p. 53), as a blood-thirsty terrorist organization that has no political aim rather than dividing the country and creating violence, calls for military and technical solutions to the problem. That is, the solution cannot be assimilation as the terrorist has no potential to be realized through assimilative discipline. In other words, the problem of terror can solely be solved through elimination and not through assimilation, as the problem is not political. The displacement wave of the 1990s clearly serves this aim of draining the sea, alongside articulating “the terror sympathizers” to the labor power through

²⁹ The intention here is not to deny the reality of the phenomena of terror, but to point out the “relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault, 1985, p. 115). So, the armed organizations with ethnic and political claims for recognition, in this case, is the reality which is problematized as terrorism. As the problematization renders the political conflicts invisible, as if terrorism is its own cause, the answer to the concrete phenomena of terror is “war” on terror.

nomadization and thereby rendering them governable in and through market mechanisms. Or rather, the forced immigration of the 1990s paves the way for the literal destruction and elimination of the terrorists, meanwhile rendering the migrants visible to a neoliberal logic as eligible market actors.

The climate of violence that had started from the 1991 on has gradually come to a halt with the events of the “unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK in 1998” (Gambetti, 2005, p. 51), the arrestment of Öcalan on February 17, 1999, “the election of HADEP / DEHAP to metropolitan municipalities in the southeast in March 1999, and the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, officially accepting Turkey as a candidate for full European Union membership” (ibid). However, these events did not immediately pave the way for a smooth “post-conflict reconstruction process” (Balta, 2004, p. 15). Returning back to the villages was not easy even after the war since most of the land had been seized by the guards. “The new owners of their lands... [did] not want villagers to return back and reclaim[ed] their land. In many cases, returnees face[d] with indiscriminate village guard violence, causing deaths and injuries” (ibid). Even though these hardships that the displaced people face have been tackled by some NGOs and a Compensation Law was enacted in 2004, no meaningful solution could be formulated. For that both the NGOs and the sovereigns approached the situation on the basis of the principle of good governance within which “problem solving replaces deliberation about social conditions and possible political futures” (Brown, 2015, p. 127). The NGOs invented new subject categories such as “internally displaced persons” to govern these people through homogenization and bring concordant technical solutions to their homogeneous problems. In other words, the new subject categories “objectify target populations by depoliticizing their plight and by assuming that their characteristics, needs and wants are homogeneous” (Ayata & Yükseser, 2005, p. 13). Furthermore, such objectification through categorization simultaneously produces a perception of danger as they are seen as the “partisans of the conflict” (ibid), rather than victims. The Compensation Law of 2004, on the other hand, reduced the

deliberate displacement policy of the 1990s to an undesirable result of terrorism, by covering up the discriminatory practice targeting the whole Kurdish population living in a geographical area. Thus, the quasi-genocide that ended up with the forced migration of more than a million of people is demarcated from its ethno-political aspect and reduced to individual and material harms (Kurban & Yeğen, 2012, p. 148).

Nevertheless, within the softening atmosphere that has been inaugurated in 1999, the abolishment of the system came to the fore as a possibility. During the discussion of the topic, the inutility of the system in the absence of shooting-war, the corruption of the system due to the crimes committed by the village guards and the fundamental illegality of the system for recognizing the tribes as legal personalities have been at the top of the agenda. In response, the TVG system, that has been executed for 15 years without a legal basis was legalized, with “the Regulation on Village Guard System which was published on the Official Gazette on July 1, 2000. Procedures and principles regarding the employment, duties, authorization to use guns, responsibilities, training, dismissal and other personnel rights and benefits of the village guards were specified by this regulation” (Özar, 2013a, p. 9). This regulation can be read as a step towards the removal of the system that has been carried out in a highly irregular manner (Balta, et. al., 2015, p. 15). That is, such regulations are required as the guards will be unemployed and left disarmed and unprotected in the face of a revenge attack of the PKK, after the abolishment of the paramilitary organization. However, today we can retrospectively claim that the main motivation behind this regulation was not to abolish the organization, but to individualize and standardize³⁰ it so as to

³⁰ This individualization and standardization, at the same time, marks the collectivization of the guards within the NGOs so as to demand further expansion of their rights. Accordingly, in 2005 the “village guards are allowed to have a green card for themselves and people whom they are obligated to take care of... And with a recent change in 2012, the general health insurance became valid for the village guards. Also, as of July 2013, pensions of village guards who are 55 or above are raised” (Özar, 2013, pp. 183-184). This expansion of rights brings further institutionalization of the system.

institutionalize the system as a permanent branch of the army (ibid). This is made clear by the fact that during the *Kurdish resolution process* in 2013, that was supposed to “mark the end of a 30-years-old conflict...no steps were taken to abolish the village guard system” (Gürcan, 2015, pp. 2-3). Accordingly, there has been no significant change in the quantity of the organization within this last phase of the TVG system. Furthermore, the village guards’ scope of task is extended in a more ambiguous fashion, as 190 village guards were sent on an operation in Afrin on February, 2018³¹ and as new guards are hired in the name of security officers to guard dams³², mines and hydroelectric power plants³³. Also, the Minister of Interior Affairs, Süleyman Soylu, declared on June 04, 2018 5,000 new security guards will be recruited in the following days³⁴.

Employment of new guards even at a period when the PKK attacks are considered to be relatively insignificant shows that the TVG system has different functions than that of guarding the villages against the terrorist attacks. That is, the tribal conflicts and competition strengthened by the paralegal system still serves to the goals of the sovereigns in terms of a divide and rule strategy. The division here is between the ones who are governable through freedom and who are not. Therefore, the long-term use of the TVG system makes it clear that the establishment of such a paralegal system is not a result of the state’s incapacity to fight against terror through its official monopoly on violence. Rather, the range of state actions, including the use of means of violence, is determined by specific

³¹In “Afrin Operasyonu’na korucular da katıldı” (Star, 2018). Retrieved from <http://www.star.com.tr/politika/afrin-operasyonunakorucular-da-katildi-haber-1312150/>

³²In “Güvenlikçi’ adı altında koruculuk” (Evrensel, 2015). Retrieved from <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/110064/guvenlikci-adi-altinda-koruculuk>

³³ Üstün, B. (June, 5 2015) in a panel discussion called “Hesler, barajlar ve siyanürlü aramalarının doğada yarattığı tahribat” Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeqVpCPBtxI&t=1362s>

³⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.kpsscafe.com.tr/kpss-haberleri/2018-de-guvenlik-korucusu-alimi-yapilacak-iste-sartlar-astsubay-h84554.html>

rationalities of government. And, in that, neoliberal rationality evokes the “de-institutionalization and disaffiliation, accompanied by a paradoxical re-institutionalization of the dismantled state through various ‘state effects’ and cultures of securitization” (Gambetti, & Godoy, 2013, p. 3). Hence, the TVG system is both the product and the vehicle of the *securitization of the political*, accompanied by the simultaneous processes of the *economization of a sector of security* through private-public partnership on war on terror. And terror, in this sense, is a discourse peculiar to neoliberal rationality which renders the actors governable that are not fully articulated in the system through market mechanisms, alongside making it possible to sacrifice some parts of the population for the well-being of the population as a whole. Such security environment within which terror and the war against terror can endlessly be each other’s cause and consequence indicates a desire to render the crises perpetual. For that “the infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy” (Butler, 2004a, p. 34).

3.2. Governmentality as Economization: Hydroelectric Power Plants

Long considered as a service that must be subsidized by the state, hydropower production has been commercialized at an ever increasing pace, especially from the 2000s on, in Turkey. As a result of this commercialization the installed capacity of the hydroelectric power plants has skyrocketed from an approximate of 12,000 MW in 2003 to 27.311 MW in 2017 (KPMG, 2018, p. 10). In the words of the AKP officials, the installed capacity in the field of hydroelectricity that has been put into service in a short span of 15 years has exceeded the total amount of installed power of a whole century (Aksu, et al., 2016, p. 12). Yet, what merits our special attention in this chapter is a specific and a relatively novel type of hydroelectric power plant (HEPP) known as the micro HEPP. A micro HEPP is a run-of-river system that has little or no storage reservoirs and thereby “minimizes the problem of flooding, as well as sedimentation capture” (Erensü,

2015, p. 63) that might be caused by a macro HEPP (dam). Run-of-river plants rely on the kinetic power of the “natural elevation gradient of a flowing body of water to generate electricity” as via these plants “water is diverted from the main channel through a series of pipes that eventually turns turbines in a power plant before returning to the river downstream” (Modal, et al., 2014, p. 5). This simple and relatively affordable mechanism of micro HEPPs, which require almost no infrastructural investment, creates the widely shared consensus that they are to be the source of renewable energy of the millennium as they reconcile “ecology with economically attractive power generation” (Greenpeace, 2010, p. 57). As such, both as a national and a global trend, micro HEPP projects attract private entrepreneurs as an efficient investment branch.

In Turkey, by the end of May 2016 the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization declared that the number of the macro HEPPs as 113 and micro HEPPs in operation as 457 (ÇŞB, 2016, p. 103). According to the data in the Annual Report of the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, the number of HEPPs in operation reached a total of 620 by the end of 2017, with an addition of 62 HEPPs in construction and 559 HEPPs yet to be constructed (DSİ, 2017, p. 70). This means that currently there are 1241 licensed HEPP projects in Turkey. What is more striking is that only the 69 of the 1241 projects (six of them having an installed capacity below 2 MW and three of them being in construction process) have been built by the State Hydraulic Works (ibid, p. 31) and the rest of the 1172 projects have been constructed and run by the domestic and foreign companies who are subject to private law provisions. These private companies are not limited to the ones that already operate in the energy sector, but rather include food companies, medical firms as well as professional sport clubs (Ürker & Çobanoğlu, 2012, p. 84). What paved the legal way for such a HEPP³⁵ frenzy in Turkey is the enactment of the Electricity Market Law No. 4628 on February, 20 2001 which aims to “facilitate an energy reform to establish a more

³⁵ For the rest of the chapter I will address the micro hydroelectric power plants as HEPP, and that of the macro as *dams*.

competitive structure that involves private investments and to improve the efficiency of energy production in Turkey” (Kentel & Alp, 2013, p. 37). As stated in the first article of the law, the objective is to establish a financially strong, stable and transparent energy market which is regulated and supervised by an autonomous body, namely the Energy Market Regulatory Authority. In order to accelerate the privatization of hydroelectric sector the Water Usage Right Agreement Bylaw is enacted on June, 26 2003 on the legal grounds of Law No 4628. This bylaw allows “the General Directorate of State Hydraulics Works (SHW) to lease sections of rivers and streams (often for 49 years) to private entities intending to build HEPPs” (Erensü, 2017, pp. 126-127). The legal structure of commercialization of water has taken final shape with the Renewable Energy Law No. 5346 which entered into force on May, 17 2005. This law “entails a ‘guarantee of purchase’ by the government as a strong incentive for private investment” (Kibaroglu, et. al., p. 291) in renewable energy sector alongside offering “up to 85% discount to rent out forest land for green energy projects” (Erensü, 2015, p. 70) Although it is not possible to list all the legal arrangements “that the hydropower renaissance owes its existence to” (Erensü, 2017, p. 127) for that there are numerous amendments and deregulations that directly or indirectly affect the construction of HEPPs and the commercialization of immovable properties including water, it would not be wrong to claim that these three enactments are the milestone of the constitution of an hydroelectricity business in Turkey. This chapter strives to understand how such water policy imaginaries have globally become ascendant in the 21th century by also underlining the fact that these imaginaries create contingent effects where they unfold. In other words, this chapter traces the neoliberal order of things that has made it possible to frame nature as a commercializable and governable object alongside looking into the specific outcomes of this global order in Turkey. Therefore, first we need to highlight the discourse that circulates the odd combination of ecology and economy.

Within the Marxist literature³⁶ there seems to be a common tendency to assert a causal relation- regardless of its level of sophistication- between commodification of nature and the energy scarcity resulting from the successive oil shocks of 1971, 1973 and 1979 that “recentred elite and popular thinking about the tie between national economic productivity [and] natural resources” (Luke, 1999, p. 125). That is, the West experiences accumulation crises in the 1970s, whether as a direct or indirect result of the oil shocks, and as a result it turns its face to nature as a new space for commodification so as to overcome the crisis and to establish the unrestricted sovereignty of capital. Thereby, capital turns the crisis that it has created into an opportunity (Yılmaz, 2013) through a permanent process of *primitive accumulation*, or *accumulation by dispossession*, as Harvey calls it. Therefore, starting from the 1970s the use-value of nature has been transferred to an exchange-value via the involvement of the wage-labor into the process of energy production and the subjugation of the final product, i.e. the energy, to the market mechanisms within which it can find its value in relation to other commodities.

Even though such argument certainly has a point, seen through a lens of governmentality it is problematic for at least two reasons. First, reading neoliberalism as a part of “capital’s eternal tendency to valorize itself through the expansion of the commodity form” implies that nothing really has changed “since

³⁶ Obviously, trying to bring together a whole range of different arguments and approaches under the label of “Marxist literature” is an over-simplistic attempt. However, as my intention here is not to discuss the Marxist concepts and approaches at length, but to indicate the problems that may arise from making a causal link between the accumulation crises of the 1970s and the commodification of nature, I hope such banality to be excused. In other words, the aim here is explaining the governmental approach through exemplifying what *it is not*, rather than providing a criticism of Marxism. Yet, it still needs to be stressed that this “literature” mostly does not claim that the crises of the 1970s result from the OPEC crises. Rather, it is argued, the 1970s have experienced an overaccumulation crisis -a crisis of the Fordist accumulation mechanisms - and a simultaneous decrease in the value of labor power. These crises have paved the way for the concordant increase in the inflation rates which in turn brought the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Hence, OPEC is a “crisis that never happened” (Mitchell, 2011, p. 173) and is used as an excuse to justify the cartelization of the capital and the precarization of labor. However, as my emphasis is on the problematization of “accumulation crises” itself, the possible reasons of such crises are rather irrelevant to my purposes here.

1867, when Marx expounded...the original accumulation that created the historical conditions for the transformation of commodities and money into capital” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 8). As such, this reading misses the very crucial fact that the 21st century is no longer the society of commodities within which the “exchange value will be at the same time the general measure and criterion of elements” (Foucault, 2008, p. 146) for that the regulatory principle in this society is not “so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition” (ibid, p. 147). That is, the distinctive essence of the neoliberal market is the “prioritization of competition over exchange” (Gudmand & Hjorth, 2009, p. 118). Besides, such prioritization of competition “has become a general political principle, which governs reforms in all areas, even those furthest removed from commercial confrontations in the world market” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 11). However, commodification approach does not refer to the replacement of the naturalism of exchange with the constructivism of competition as a political principle. It overlooks the fact that “economy and the political horizon” is structured in “an unbroken plane of governmental strategies and reflections [that] envelop both spheres” (Tellmann, 2009, p. 9). Therefore commodification approach looks for ‘additional’ political leverages in sustaining the process in the form of the authoritarian reflexes of the neoliberal states and points out some external dynamics such as populism, neo-conservatism, neo-fascism³⁷ and so on. I argue, on the contrary, authoritarianism is not created by the state as a means to eliminate the dissidence and the obstacles to the free flow of capital in the market for that authoritarianism is inherent in the neoliberal political rationality which “does not originate or emanate from the state, although it circulates through the state, organizes it, and conditions its actions” (Brown, 2015, p. 118). Put it differently, intervention is the constitutive function of neoliberal politics and the principle of rationalization of the state itself as “it is the responsibility of political government to actively create the conditions within which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct is possible” (Burchell, 1996, p.

³⁷ Again, I do not mean to deny the authenticity of these phenomena, but to argue that these are novel discourses that circulate in a specific governmental rationality that shapes economy, politics and subjectivity simultaneously.

10). For that the artificial structure of competition and the market “can only exist, under certain political, legal and institutional conditions that must be actively constructed by government” (ibid, p. 23). Also, on the other hand, the commodification theory ignores the novelty of neoliberalism that extends such competition and market logic not only to the political government as a whole, but also to the ethical realm concerning how individuals should rule themselves. Therefore, such perspective lacks any problematization regarding neoliberalism’s being, first and foremost, a grid of intelligibility that allows one to understand “noneconomic areas and forms of action in terms of economic categories” (Lemke, 2001, p. 198). In sum, as opposed to the Marxist literature, I believe these points to be the “clearest manifestation that we are dealing not with a ‘creeping commodification’, but with an extension of market rationality to existence in its entirety” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 11). Besides, I argue that there is no logic of capital that endlessly unfolds its essence as the motor of history. That is, capital does not have a logic, per se. If anything, such logic resides in the power relations that organize the capital as an emergent effect of multiple practices. “Any economy, whether Western or non-Western, can be studied as a series of effects produced by institutional arrangements” as “there is nothing non-social about the forces explaining their constitution” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009, p. 392). Leaning on the argument that “politics and economies are not so much separate as they are made separate” (Cochoy, et. al., 2010, p. 142), this chapter locates the HEPP frenzy in Turkey as well as the global concept of sustainable development, as a discourse that renders ecology and economy compatible, in a framework of *economization* rather than commodification. For that the process of economization highlights the political dimension of commercialization “especially when it means marketizing objects and behaviours that have previously defied marketization” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p. 23).

Second, asserting a causal link between the accumulation crises of the 1970s and the commodification of nature entails the imperative of seeking the dynamics of the latter in the ahistorical logic of the capital. This causality, thence, leaves out

any problematization regarding the political rationality that serves as the condition of possibility of enframing nature within an “economic discourse of efficient resource management” (Lemke, 2002, p. 56). That is, such attempt does not ask *how* it became possible to reduce the “hybrid and multiform” (Escobar, 1999, p. 2) of nature(s) to the abstract notion of *environmental resource* and to relate energy shortage to the inefficient use of such natural resources, at the outset. It turns a blind eye to the question of how nature is represented as a governable and manageable entity that is susceptible to specific forms of political intervention. In this sense, such approach relies on the very same concept of nature that it intends to criticize. For that the argument that nature is commodified when there is no place left for the capital to flow, holds the assumption that nature is an *object in-itself*, outside of power relations and social reality, awaits there to be drawn into the process of capital accumulation. It is as if the nature is natural in possessing an essence or an existence independent of its representation. In that, the commodification thesis shares the depoliticized view of nature with the neoliberals. On the contrary to that, a governmentality approach recognizes that it is not possible to talk about either the commodification or the economization of nature in the absence of a discourse that produces nature as a manageable and passive object. For that the construction of nature as a bundle of resources is not the consequence, but rather the condition of possibility of economization of nature. Therefore, a Foucauldian understanding depicts nature as always already political for it accounts for “how nature is invoked in knowledge and practices, and how that changes across time” (Alberts, 2013, p. 547). Hence, the issue is not so much about whether capitalism in the neoliberal era exploits the nature or not; as it is about how neoliberal rationality as a “governmental epistemic grid that aims to performatively bring to existence a particular calculative and calculable organization of the entire social field...including marketization and privatization among its policy options” (Adaman & Madra, 2014, p. 33), constructs nature as an exploitable entity. Hence, I argue that nature is a constructed phenomenon the historical formation of which needs to be put under a genealogical lens, and that in order to

understand the HEPP frenzy in Turkey the historical formation of power/knowledge that allows rivers to be “ripped from nature only to be returned as environmental resources, enveloped in accounting procedures and encircled by managerial programs” (Luke, 1995, p. 73) must be traced.

The modern concept of ecology has started to emerge in the post-WW2 period as part of the antiwar and antinuclear movements. These countercultural movements were the precursor of the forthcoming ecological movements for that concerns for environment was discovered for the first time in the declaration of these movements that defined the atom bomb as the “ecological weapon par excellence” that target “both human populations and the sustainability of their environment” by “resulting in huge ecological disasters and the potential destruction of Earth itself” (Malette, 2010, p. 15). Therefore, the antiwar movements of the late 1940s and 1950s can be considered as the first step of the discursive transformation of nature into environment as these movements made it clear that what has been at stake was not the crisis of nature so much as the crisis of the identity of nature. That is, such discourses that portray nature as “an entity discrete from humans and endangered by reckless human actions” (Agrawal, 2005, p. 201) have clearly a different assumption about the definition of nature from the, say “European Romantic literature and art of the 19th century” for which the nature denoted “an entity with its own agency” (Escobar, 1996, p. 331), or say the “Hegelian notion of nature struggling forward to final perfection” (Worster 1994, p. 323). The emergence of the New Social Movements during the Vietnam War, also gave momentum to the intensification of ecological discourse as, especially with the hippies of the 1960s, concerns for environment has started to be expressed outside the antiwar discourse.

It is, however, a scientific event that marks the entry of the planet Earth to the rational discourse. On November 10, 1967 the first photograph of Earth was taken from a spacecraft having made it possible to bring the Earth as a whole to the human vision. This photographic image brought the “depletion of the ozone

layer, the melting ice at the poles, the acidification of ocean, and the destruction of the Amazonian forests” (Malette, 2010, p. 18), i.e. the finitude of the Earth and the scarcity of its resources into gaze. In that, the image revealed the undeniable negative impact of the Homo sapiens on the environment. This scientific evidence, thereby, resulted in the encapsulation of nature in a new power/knowledge formation³⁸ having paved the way for the construction of an “eco-panopticon” (Luke, 1995, p. 80). A science-based discourse enveloped nature in an apocalyptic and depoliticized narrative that revolved around the “unchallenged consensus over the need to be more ‘environmentally’ sustainable if disaster” (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 265) that threaten the survival of humankind was to be avoided. The “precious fragility of a tiny planet in the immense cosmos” (Luke, 1995, p. 80) called for the protection from people through the careful management of its natural resources. This call implied the “reconceptualization of external nature in terms of an ‘ecosystem’” (Lemke, 2002, p. 57) and ushered in the possibility of a universal eco-knowledge of a “highly scientized life-world” (Rutherford, 1999a, p. 104). Thereby, nature has been rendered “as a security issue” governable through “a new mode of risk management” (Oels, 2013, p. 18). Thus, “[n]o longer gathering only radicals and hippies,...environmentalism soon became a political driving force to be reckoned with; it became the vector of a new problem of government penetrating all spheres of politics” (Malette, 2010, p. 19). From the end of the 1960s, “transnational research programmes on ecological issues...came increasingly to characterize scientific and political discourse on the environment” (Rutherford, 1999, p. 55). Garrett Hardin’s infamous article, *Tragedy of the Commons* (1968), where he proposes the allocation of private property and ownership rights so as to guarantee the prudent and efficient use of environmental resources as well as the

³⁸ Escobar (1996), on the other hand, claims that such technological event of the “20th century space exploration” does not point out an epistemic break “as it belongs to the paradigm defined by the spatialization and verbalization of the pathological, effected by the scientific gaze of the 19th-century clinician. As with the gaze of the clinician at an earlier time, environmental sciences today challenge the earth to reveal its secrets to the positive gaze of scientists... Disease is housed in nature in a new manner. In a similar vein, as the medicine of the pathological led to a medicine of the social space...so will the ‘medicine of the earth’ result in new constructions of the social that allows some version of nature’s health to be preserved” (p. 328).

legal restriction of reproductive activities as a solution to the problem of overpopulation illustrates such mentality that gave rise to the environmentalization of nature. But moreover than that, it illustrates how the scientific-political rationality has absorbed³⁹ the dissident political demands of the antiwar and countercultural movements through a cooption of the practices of freedom in its pervasive mode of regulation. In that, Hardin's text perfectly illustrates that what Foucault (1978) calls a strategy without a subject is at the heart of (neo)liberal governmentality, since it reveals how critiques and resistances are articulated in "the regulative grip of government rationalities" as "demands to be further and better governed" (Malette, 2010, p. 96) through the intentionality of power relations, rather than by the "choice or decision of an individual subject" (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). For that resistance is "not merely the counterstroke to power, it is also that which directs and shapes power...[by] serving to direct and shape the process of governing" (Malpas and Wickham, 1995, p. 43). That is "resistance, as long as it addresses itself to government for correctives, reinforces the role of government as a 'caretaker'" (Malette, 2010, p. 96). And this is how ecology by the end of the late 1960s, has evolved into "a public potential" that "called for management procedures" and "had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses" that aim "not the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximization of collective and individual forces" (Foucault, 1978, pp. 24-25).

³⁹ However, it is important to understand that such domestication of resistance by an all-pervasive governmentality is not the result of some sort of an ideological manipulation, but instead the effect of productivity of power relations. That is, considering this new discourse of environmentalism as a deception imposed upon us, say, by the bourgeoisie, "as a preconstituted subject...on the basis of an already developed ideology" (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 169) that conceals the authentic objective of opening up new spaces for capital accumulation, is highly inaccurate. For that such consideration separates true knowledge from ideology/ power by externalizing power relations immanent in the production of knowledge; or rather by postulating a cause-effect relation between power and knowledge so as to claim that power relations lead to the production of some sort of a wrong/manipulative knowledge. This is not meaningful as a discourse cannot be either true or false in-itself for that truth is nothing but the "ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 132). In other words, "truth offers itself to knowledge only through a series of 'problematizations' and that these problematizations are created only on the basis of practices" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 64) of visualization and articulation; meaning that knowledge is established only within a discursive formation. This is not because knowledge has no empirical grounds, but because these grounds cannot be articulated outside of power relations.

This strategy that resulted in the absorption of innovative potentials of social movements into techno-scientific hazard management called forth the search for clean and renewable energy resources in the 1970s and the concordant “foundation for public policies...particularly in terms of the regulatory intervention in the activities of industry” (Rutherford, 1999, p. 55). The “creation of ministries of the environment...in industrialized countries dates from only the 1970s” (Darier, 1996, p. 592) as the “goals of its protection in terms of ‘safety’ or ‘security’” (Luke, 1999, p. 122) has become institutionalized in this era. Accordingly, the OECD Environment Committee has been launched in 1970. Being first and foremost an economic organization “the OECD put special emphasis on the relationship of economy and environment” (Hajer, 1997, p. 98). One product of such combination of economy and ecology has been the introduction of the *polluter pays principle*, in an international seminar that the OECD held in 1971, in Paris. This principle, which simply means that “the cost of pollution abatement should be paid by the polluters and not by their governments” (Munir, 2013, p. 1), has been made possible by a cost-benefit mentality that leans on the idea that scarce resources will be better conserved when they are not served for free and when the users are held responsible and accountable for the damages they caused. Such integration of nature to the market system indicates one of the ushering governmental technologies of environmentalism and the construction of nature as a *public good*. To be more precise, this marketization of nature marks the transformation of from a free good “that can be used a sink” (Hajer, 1997, p. 28) to a public good. For that what makes it possible to come up with the solution of putting an “end to the externalization of economic costs to the environment” (ibid) is nature’s having been defined as *public*. And it is only within this power/knowledge formation that defines nature as a *good* it becomes possible to convert “all ecological impacts into a singular unit of measurement, namely dollars” (Malette, 2010, p. 41). Furthermore, the principle functions as a conduct on conduct, which does not limit procedure to direct legal coercion, “but through a governmental rationality

that establishes norms and procedures which channel problem solving in a particular direction” (Rutherford, 1999, p. 57). This form of conducting responsabilizes the subjects “for the cost of the degradation of the environment they are using” (Malette, 2010, p. 41). Also, the 1970s witnessed the institutionalization of another governmental technology at a transnational level, namely the *environmental impact assessment (EIA)*, first adopted in the 1969, by the US National Environment Policy Act. EIA is actually, a procedural approach that obligates “the preparation of detailed environmental impact statements for major development projects which had the potential to significantly affect the environment” (Rutherford, 1999, p. 57). However, in practice the EIA exceeds this juridico-legal definition as, similar to the polluter pays principle, it performs as a normative mechanism that also contributes to the formation of environmental subjectivities. That is, “[b]y establishing, continuously reaffirming and progressively legitimating environmental values...as standards by which individual actions are to be structured, chosen, and evaluated, EIA institutionalizes substantive ecological rationality” (Bartlett, 1990, p. 91). Despite the introduction of these two technologies that form the backbone of ecogovernmentality, though, governmentalization of nature has not reached its final form during the 1970s. The report of The Club of Rome in 1972 having provided “a distinctive vision of the world as a global system where all parts are interrelated” (Escobar, 1996, p. 329) warns us against a possible domino effect that may occur within the next one hundred years if “the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged” (Meadows, et al., 1972, p. 27). In that, the report presents the “arable land, fresh water, metals, forests, the oceans” as “tangible, countable items” which are the ingredients of “physical necessities that support all physiological and industrial activity” (ibid, p. 45). On this basis, it claims that these “countable items” can simply finish, unless taken care for. This breaks the news that the economic growth can come to a halt as these items are “the ultimate determinants of the limits to growth on this earth” (ibid). However, as we will

see, it will soon become clear that it is not the economic growth that reached its limits; but the discourse of the 1970s.

The scientification and securitization of nature, also, had considerable effects on the ecological movements of the 1970s, not simply in terms of a quantitative proliferation of protests; but also a qualitative shift in the form and demands of them. That is, alongside the increase in number and frequency of massive ecological movements -such as the enunciation of April 22 as the Earth Day in 1970 and the constitution of Greenpeace in 1971-, there occurred significant transformations in the structure of these movements. The scientification of nature, both in academic-technological and in political-economic discourse, resulted in the widely shared consensus that there is no alternative, but to save the planet. This perception, in return, resulted in the fact that “many groups that had been fighting various environmental causes came to the realization that they shared common values” (Malette, 2010, p. 19). For that they started to speak the same scientific language with the governmental authorities they intended to criticize. Foucault (1997a) asserts that this “criticism was authorized” in the very same articulation of ecology: “in the name of a knowledge [connaissance] of nature, the balance of life processes, and so on”. Therefore, the ecological movements of the 1970s could not “escape from a domination of truth” as they did not play a game that “was totally different from the game of truth but by play[ed] the same game differently” (p. 295). The fact that “critics frequently argue[d] more scientifically than the natural scientists they dispute[d] against” (Beck, 1995, p 60) clearly paved the way for the depolitization and universalization of political demands. But such demands remained political only in the sense of a “consensual governing and policy-making, centered on the technical, managerial and consensual administration (policing) of environmental, social, economic or other domains” (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 266).

It has not been difficult for governments to respond to the demands of these movements that politicized ecology “only in a noncommittal way and as a

nonconflict” within which “[a]bsolute and irreversible choices [were] kept away” (Diken & Laustsen, 2004, p. 99). Accordingly, the environmental discourses of the 1980s introduced a more pervasive model of ecogovernmentality that replaced the “restrictive notion of the limits of growth” of the 1970s with that of the “growth of the limits” (Lemke, 2002, p. 56). Such transformation was made possible by the discourse of *sustainable development*, coined in the World Commission on Environment and Development Report in 1987. This discourse heralded the possibility of governmentalization of the limits themselves:

The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities ... technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth (Brundtland, 1987, p. 8).

In other words, this report indicates that the limits of earth can be overcome if fully absorbed into governmental mechanisms, for that only the technological management and right disposition of environmental resources can guarantee the compatibility of “growth-based trajectories with biophysical planetary boundaries” (Beling, et. al., 2018, p. 304). Sustainable development discourse, in that, reconciles “two old enemies-economic growth and the preservation of the environment” (Escobar, 1996, p. 328) as it advocates the *efficient* and *rational* use of scarce resources. The underlying assumption is that, as rational beings there is no doubt that “sustainable development is what we want to achieve”; the question is rather “how we are going to achieve it” (Darier, 1996, p. 593). In that, such discourse constructs a “we” on the basis of the exclusion of the global South “not for their lack of industriousness but for their ‘irrationality’ and lack of environmental consciousness” (Escobar, 1996, p. 330). In that, lack of stable, competitive market mechanisms and the entrepreneurial subjects on the one hand, and responsabilizing each subject for environmental degradation regardless of the “great differences and inequities in resource problems between countries, regions,

communities and classes” (ibid, p. 334) on the other, institutes a hierarchy between the North and the South .

Concordantly, the 1990s have been the age of the rationalization of the irrational countries⁴⁰ through the *globalization* discourse. Although Foucault’s own work mostly references the territorially bounded nation state, his analytics of government provides us with the sufficient framework to understand the phenomena of globalization as an analytics of government. This analytics reveals “the practical conditions under which forms of statehood emerge, stabilize and change -combining and connecting different and diverse ‘elements’ in such a way that retrospectively an ‘object’ appears that seemed to have existed prior to the historical and political process, presumably guiding and directing it” (Lemke, 2007, p. 48). In that, this perspective allows us to see that globalization is not an indicator of the nation-state’s retreat, but of a different formation of statehood. That is to say that globalization is not an end result of a simple choice between the sovereign state that can intervene in the national economy, on the one hand

⁴⁰ Such political project does not mark an epistemological break, but a different articulation of the elements of liberal rationality that has been mentioned in the previous chapter with reference to Kant and Mill. The introduction of the economic element into the rationality is what creates the rupture between the Enlightenment autonomy discourse and the (neo)liberal development discourse which emerged right after the WW2. The development discourse since then has been an efficient apparatus for “creating a type of underdevelopment that has been... politically and technically manageable” (Escobar, 1995, p. 47). What enabled the articulation of the notion of underdevelopment was the ‘discovery’ of mass poverty in the two-thirds of the world after 1945 and the concordant invention of the Third World through the articulation of power/knowledge of development discourse. For that, the problematization of poverty as a global phenomenon brought into existence a new discourse that “the essential trait of the Third World was its poverty and that the solution was economic growth and development became self-evident, necessary, and universal truth” (ibid, p. 24). Till the end of 1970s such development reforms has been implemented, mostly in the form of aid policies that were coordinated by planning authorities. However, as the 1980s’ entrepreneurial mentality shifted the representation of poverty from “a consequence of economic patterns of growth” to “an obstacle to growth” (Rojas, 2004, p. 104) aid has been steadily replaced by structural adjustment plans “to impose the political framework of the competitive state, or the state whose activity tends to make competition the law of the national economy, whether such competition is that of foreign producers or national producers” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 18). Therefore, the neo-developmentalism of the 1980s did not require the “developmental state but its dismantling, ensuring that governments would be kept under the discipline of the market” (Rojas, 2004, p. 104). But, it was not till the demise of the Second World that this global trend has been named as globalization.

and a self-regulating market, on the other. For that the state and the market are not binary opposites, since neither of them is a pre-constituted homogenous or unified entity. Economic globalization⁴¹, thus points out the transformation in the conceptions of society, economy and state action under the impact of global neoliberalism. Accordingly, the task of national government is no longer to operate on the “naturally functioning and systemically integrated national population whose ‘social’ coherence is a condition for its economic security” (Rose, 2008, p. 87). Rather, “it is to reform those kinds of individual and institutional conduct that are considered likely to affect [the] economic performance” (Dean, 2010, p. 224) so as to construct subjectivities that are not dependent upon state services and assistance for their survival, but autonomous enough to take risks and govern their own conduct in accordance with the neoliberal norm of competition. The state sovereignty then, in the age of globalization has not reduced, but subsisted through a performance of reconfiguring the “technologies of citizenship” represented by the shift from free individuals with rights and interests to the “calculating individual entrepreneur of oneself” (Oels, 2005, p. 192). Also, the fact that “the state is regarded as an instrument tasked with reforming and managing society to place it at the service of enterprises” means that the state itself is bounded with “the rules of efficiency of private enterprises” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 240). Therefore state does not simply concern itself with the market, but is compelled think and behave “like a market actor across all of its functions, including law” (Brown, 2003, p. 42). States themselves are rendered as key elements in the “intensified competition, seeking to attract a great share of foreign investment by creating the most

⁴¹ The reason that I use the term economic globalization is to emphasize the multiplicity of globalizing governmentalities. For that “far from globalization being a unitary causal mechanism, it should be understood as the complex, emergent product of many different forces operating on many scales” (Jessop, 2001, p. 98). Approaching globalization as a *dispositif*, i.e. as a system of relations established between heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive elements (Foucault, 1980a, p. 194), shall pave the path to reveal the conditions of truth under which this plurality of globalizations acquire visibility. In this manner, we can go beyond the approaches that aim to unmask the hidden reality behind globalization (Perry & Maurer, 2003, p. xvii). In that, globalization cannot be posited as an *explanans* as it can be at most the end point of such analysis that focuses on how heterogeneous micro-practices become systematized and connected to form the macro-phenomenon of globalization.

favorable fiscal and social conditions for capital valorization” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 174). This shows that economic globalization is made possible by a political rationality that mandates the elevation of competition into every realm of life. Therefore, globalization is not simply a process of deterritorialization⁴² within which economy becomes financialized, people become more mobile and production becomes fluid in a so called borderless world. For that what is at stake is a process of “reterritorialization” (Larner & Walters, 2004, p. 497) within which the states have been increasingly “subject to the iron law of a dynamic of globalization” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 154) that replaces international trade with the “governmental perception of a global economic system that distributes countries and regions into winners and losers in a new ‘zero-sum’ competitive game” (Dean, 2010, p. 224).

This game has rewritten the rules of ecogovernmentality as “by 1992 a suite of environmental issues had become global concerns; global warming, species diversity, desertification and water” (Allan, 2003, p. 11). The meeting held in January 1992, in Dublin for the International Conference on Water and Environment was the first step to declare the imperatives of global governance of water. Accordingly, water was a finite and vulnerable resource essential for the survival of the human kind and environment and had to be recognized as an economic good the users of which had to bear its economic costs. The underlying logic was, obviously, that “if you don’t place an economic value on water, you

⁴² Such reading somehow locates the global “outside physical or geographic spaces: it somehow escapes territory” for that “this equation of globalization and deterritorialization reflects a particular, usually state-centric, definition of territory” (Larner & Walters, 2004, p.497). In another way of saying, such an understanding takes the nation-state for granted as an ahistorical territory; thence interprets globalization not as an act of reterritorialization; but only as the abolishment of preexisting borders (ibid, pp. 497-498). A similar troubled vein of globalization studies is “understanding space as a preexisting container and scale as a natural feature of the world in which states operate” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p. 994) ignoring the fact that “states themselves produce spatial and scalar hierarchies” (ibid, p. 995). From this point of view, the “global is often spoken of as if it were simply a superordinate scalar level that encompasses nation-states just as nation-states were conceptualized to encompass regions, towns, and villages” (ibid, p. 990). As opposed to both these views, a governmental approach suggests that globalization is “re-figuring the territory of the government” (Miller & Rose, 2008) since “space is also a doing, that it does not pre-exist its doing, and that its doing is the articulation of relational performances” (Rose, 1999, p. 248).

give an incentive to waste that water” (Ward, 2013, p. 95). The UN Conference on Environment and Development that was held in Rio De Janeiro at the same year along with the following report of Agenda 21 also recognized water as an economic good the governance of which must comply with the principles of sustainable development. The General Agreement on Trade in Services, that has entered into force in January 1995 as a treaty of the World Trade Organization declared who will be responsible for the production, marketing and distribution of the accessible water resources, and who and how the production and distribution of drinking water will be globally managed (Hamsici, 2010, 75). In 1996 the World Water Council was founded to combat the wastage of water that has been due to the low tariffing and the bribed bureaucracy, “economic rent-seeking, and slackness” (Adaman & Madra, 2014, p. 36) of the political governments in the global South. Lastly, the second World Water Forum in the Hague in 2000 generated much debate on the integrated watershed management (IWM) as a process that “promotes co-ordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital systems” (GWP, 2000, p. 22).

The underlying logic in all these declarations is that the competition in the marketplace provides “a powerful incentive for actors to acquire and discover information needed to enhance efficiency...in managing natural assets” (Adaman & Madra, 2014, p. 43). However, in the ‘irrational’ South, where the mechanisms of incentive and competition do not work spontaneously, the marketplace does not provide “the right signal to agents in their relationship with ecology” (ibid, p. 31). The sustainable development programme, alongside being a means of promoting environment friendly resource and energy efficiency, is an apparatus to show the countries of the Global South the way out of this irrationality. However, in practice, facilitation of market and environment friendly states in the Global South has not been “in the way that ecological modernization theorists suggest, i.e., that states are unified, rational actors and eventually graduate into

eco-rational modernity” (Goldman, 2001, p. 500). That is, such process of rationalization within which mechanisms of governance give birth to a spontaneous reformation of “organizational structures, institutional arrangements and decision-making processes...through which environments and resources are used” (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012, p. 121) by multiple actors at different scales has never been experienced in the South. Rather, what happened was a push from international financial organizations for “various forms of privatization, through conditions to loans, policy prescriptions or technical assistance” (Manahan , et.al., 2007, p. 1). That is to say that as opposed to the countries of North, within which the right to use the environmental resources remains in the state even when resources themselves are commercialized, the South has been forced to transfer the ownership rights of natural assets due to the hegemonic understanding that the dysfunctional bureaucracies in the South “governs too much” as they cannot apprehend the rationality of neoliberalism. This is because it does not matter who owns the right to use the assets as long as they are managed by an entrepreneurial rationality. Therefore although the IFIs emphasize that the policy envisaged at the outset was not the “privatization but merely a management hand over” (ibid, p. 46) the strategical outcome has been the full-blown privatization of nature.

The privatization of water and other renewable energy resources in Turkey, similarly, has not been inaugurated with a pre-developed programme of privatization of ownership rights. On the legal basis of the Law no. 3096: Authorization of Enterprises other than the Turkish Electricity Administration to Produce, Transmit, Distribute and Trade Electricity, enacted in 1984, Turkish governments have tried throughout the 1990s, new schemes such as the “transfer of operating rights (TOOR), build-operate-transfer (BOT), build-operate (BO) and auto-production” (Erensü, 2017, p. 125). Each of them “sought to ease the entry of entrepreneurs to the industry...without completely leaving the management of the energy field to the market” (ibid). However, all these schemes have been annulled by the higher courts on the basis that the “concessions given by the state to private entities over the service of a public good” (ibid, p. 126) is

counterintuitive to the definition of public good. Obviously, what we witness here is the confrontation of two different formulations of public good. That is, the definition that the higher courts embark on is the liberal articulation of public good that is always threatened by the particular interests of different individuals. Therefore, liberal rationality assumes that it is within the “agenda” of the state to protect the general will through an external intervention by the public law, when harmony of interests is not attained through natural processes of market. In the liberal rationality the sacrifice of general will for different particular wills is unacceptable as it diminishes the general utility of state action. However, the neoliberal articulation of public good assumes that “there is the general interest of all members of society in the establishment and maintenance of an order of competition governed by private law” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 102). For that, according to neoliberal thinkers, governments cannot decide the general interest of the public not only because such kind of knowledge that can be attained through a transcendent eye would be out of the reach of the epistemological limits of reason, but also because such public does not exist. As opposed to the liberal rationality that constructs the population as the “as a domain of needs”, neoliberal government “regards the population as a pool of resources whose potential for self-optimization needs to be unleashed” (Oels, 2005, p. 192). In that “there is no such thing as society” as Thatcher once declared, but multiplicity of entrepreneurial units that bear the full responsibility of their heterogeneous needs, desires, interests and so on. In other words, “when society is regarded less as a source of needs that are individually distributed and collectively borne and more as a source of energies contained within individuals’ exercise of freedom and self-responsibility” (Dean, 2010, p. 179) it becomes pointless to depict an object or objective as general will. In that, it can only be the legally protected procedure of competition that serves to the interest of each entrepreneurial unit for that “all individuals have the same interest in the competitive process and respect for the rules of competition” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 100).

It is on the basis of this transformation in the concepts of public-private that it became possible to challenge the articulation of modernization-development discourse that made popular the state sponsored infrastructural investment in dams, in the 1960s and 1970s. That is, the idea that the dams were made for the development of the country and therefore for the collective interest of the people, on the one hand, used to portray the state as a neutral actor who stands at equal distance to every segment of population and thence acts in the interest of population as a whole. On the other hand, it used to emit the belief that the economic growth attained through the construction of dams would promote the modernization of the population as a whole, regardless of the socio-economic inequalities (Adaman, et. al., 2016, p. 302). The neoliberal articulation of public good however, portrayed this father-state figure as the tyrant state (ceberut devlet) through a discourse that equates public with the state and the state with the dysfunctional, ungainly bureaucracy.

However, it is not possible to say that modernization-development discourse is totally replaced with sustainable development discourse even after the 2000s in Turkey for that environment has never been such a high priority. That is, although the neoliberal development paradigm has been indisputably adopted, it is not possible to say the same for the sustainability paradigm⁴³. “Environmental issues and environmental problems have always been under-estimated and under-qualified⁴⁴ compared to developmental issues” (Tuna, 2015, p. 291). This is

⁴³ This is clearly not to say that global North is very sensitive to the protection of environment. If anything, it is clear that sustainable development is a myth and there is nothing such as renewable or clean energy. Without exception, each and every kind of energy production destroys the habitat where the power plants are constructed. However, the thing is that environment-friendly energy production discourse has never made its way to Turkey: if there is no economic incentive, then environment is not a matter of debate. Similarly, until the Occupy Gezi movement, environmental movements and organizations have remained relatively marginal in Turkey.

⁴⁴ Such fact can be traced in the organization of the ministries regarding environment, as well: In 2003, The Ministry of Environment and The Ministry of Forestry, which is an executive organization that sees forests as commodities, were gathered together. In 2007, the General Directorate of State Hydraulics Works, which used to be the highest-budgeted General Directorate of Turkey in 2007, was also attached to the Ministry. This made the Ministry a fierce advocate of the HEPPs. With the amendments made several days before the elections on June 12,

because, Turkey has imported, or rather was forced to import, the discourse of growth of limits before it has reached the limits of growth. Turkey as a newly-industrialized country has never reached to a point of industrialization that environmental resources could not keep up with its pace. On the other hand, economic growth has been its mantra for so long, as opposed to the ecological discourse. From the post-WW2 on, Turkey has been subjectivized as a Third World country and came to recognize itself as underdeveloped, thence it has been envisaging economic development as the “precondition and the remedy for all the ills” (Akbulut & Adaman, 2013, p. 1). In that, sustainability has been an obstacle to its faster economic growth and its concordant integration into the economic global order, rather than a means for further economic development. That is why Turkey, especially in the early 2000s, faced the challenge of choosing between ecology and economy: the obligations of other multinational corporations and the European Union accession process on the one side, and the requirements of the free market economy on the other (Duru, 2013, p. 783). However, it did not take very long for the petty sovereigns to invent new ways out to discard the bureaucratic obstacles that are imposed by several international environment directives, while utilizing the economic incentives of the green market.

The EIA process, in this sense, has been considered as the biggest obstacle to accelerate hydropower investments and attract foreign capital. From the date that the first bylaw that regulates the EIA management was enacted in 1993 it has been revised fourteen times so as to reduce the process to a bureaucratic one that has to be completed by the investor. Thereby, the EIA process “has been rendered utterly ineffective for between 1993 and 2016, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization rejected only 43 EIA cases out of a total of 56,071” (Erensü, 2017,

2011, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has been combined with the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. As a result the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Urbanization has been established. However, only two weeks after the election, this ministry has been divided in two, thereby the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs have been constituted (Uğurlu, 2015, pp. 285-286). Today, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, “the name of which has become an oxymoron, as the environment is at the mercy of urban developers” (İğsöz, 2014, p. 27) is still in force.

p. 217). With the last amendment of the bylaw⁴⁵, the HEPPs with installed capacities of 10 MW or larger, are obliged to complete an EIA review whereas the projects with installed capacities between 1 MW and 10 MW are subject to the Selection and Elimination Criteria for which the investor prepares a project presentation file and the Ministry decides whether an EIA review is required or not. However, information on the installed capacity of some of the HEPP projects is not even published in the lists of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (WWF, 2013, p. 9). That is, the EIA process is not obligatory for each HEPP project in Turkey and for the obligatory ones there are some other corrupt methods to discard the EIA process. Although in the first feasibility reports of the review, the signatures of meteorology, geology and civil engineers must be absolutely required. However, as the projects are prepared with inadequate or even no field research and as certain parts of these projects are replicas of each other, it is not possible to find an engineer name in any of these reports (TMMOB, 2011, p. 81). Besides, although the construction and operation of the HEPPs must be supervised in every step, there is no sign that these plants are being audited at all. As such, the EIA reports turn out to be the official license to destroy the habitat where the HEPPs are constructed in ecological, socio-economical and aesthetical terms.

The construction phase of the HEPPs, gives rise to numerous ills including dust emissions, air pollution and noise alongside the danger of erosions due to the clear-cut of forests in the region and of landslides due to the dynamite explosions. “Especially dust and landslide are the major problems of the construction phase that cause health and environmental degradation problems” (Kentel & Alp, 2013, p. 39). Besides, although according to the legal regulations, the excavation debris generated during the construction is required to be stored in the designated areas, in practice these wastes are mostly being poured into the river beds due to transportation costs, time limitation and lack of inspection mechanisms. This leads to the filling of the creek bed, the reduction of dissolved oxygen in the

⁴⁵ Published on the Official Gazette No. 29186, on November, 25 2014.

water, the increase in water temperature and the concordant drop in the quality of life of aquatic organisms and in some cases, the death of the fish. During the excavation, the vegetation cover along the slope is also seriously damaged (WWF, 2013, p. 5). In the operation phase, on the other side, the HEPPs have even worse impacts. For that rivers have vital functions in terms of the natural cycle of life such as water filtration and cleaning, micro-climate conditioning and temperature control, mineral and oxygen transportation, forming forests, providing flood control, sediment transportation and storage, breeding underground influent, providing nutrients for plants and agriculture, providing a shelter for aquatic life, providing animals and all living beings drinking water (Hamsici, 2010, p. 105). Channeling water by diverting it from earth, however, affects both the land and the chemical composition of water and thence seriously damages all these functions of rivers. Legally speaking, in order to diminish the impacts of such degradation, the investors have to leave some amount of water untouched in the stream bed. This portion is called the lifeline water (can suyu) and it is “supposed to be enough for human livelihoods to persist and the ecosystem to continue” (Erensü, 2011, p. 5). However, the determination of the minimum amount of water that must be left in the riverbed has been highly controversial as the calculation does not take into consideration the fish populations, biodiversity and water quality of the rivers (İşlar, 2016, p. 151). That is, at first, a value of 50 liters/sec was determined for lifeline water without any distinction, regardless of the characteristics of the water. After this implementation, in the Water Usage Rights Bylaw, lifeline water was stated as the 10 percent of the total amount of water as this percentage was determined as the average rate of flow of the last ten years. Yet, such standardized amount totally ignores the diversity in terms of the climatic characteristics. The changes in the parameters of the basins feeding the water resources directly affect the flow of water in the rivers. In some seasons the flow is high and in some seasons the stream is almost completely dry. For this reason, the amount of lifeline water must be calculated separately for each basin and for each month (TMMOB, 2011, p. 69). Yet, as the process is not monitored by any governmental agency and as

the issue is left to the mercy of private investors, in most cases even the 10 percent lifeline water rule is violated. Moreover, as commonly there are multiple HEPPs on the same branch of the river and as one company channels the water where the other discharges it, this 10 percent amount converges to the limit zero before water is finally released to the riverbed.

Such construction of multiple HEPPs on a single river, despite the obvious harms it causes on the whole ecosystem, is legally possible as the EIA process is not planned with respect to the river basins, but on the basis of each investment project separately. A river basin refers to the whole land surface drained by a river and its tributaries and thence encompasses the whole ecosystem that is directly or indirectly affected by the river. Therefore, an EIA report, at a very commonsensical level, must calculate the cumulative impact that a HEPP project might have on the river basin. However, this is not the case in Turkey as the rationality is not about producing energy with the least damage to nature, but simply attracting more financial investments. Although the Turkish government adopted the principle of integrated watershed management imposed by the European Union Water Framework Directive on October, 3 2005 it seems as if the principle is interpreted quite differently. That is, the IWM principle suggests a holistic management model that takes into account all water-related sectors (industry, agriculture, urban development, fishing etc.) aimed at coordinating the protection, management and development of water, land and related resources, and at balancing environmental and socioeconomic interests (WWF, 2013, p. 9). In that, the IWM approach can be seen as a part of the effort “to work around the covetous ineptitude of state agencies and to neutralize the destabilizing effects that unexpected swings in political power have on environmental governance and development projects” (Ward, 2013, p. 92). However, as a result of such covetous ineptitude of state agencies in Turkey, the IWM is not taken to be a principle of planning, but of leasing the watersheds. In other words, in Turkey, the HEPP projects are not planned in accordance with this principle; but the land surface surrounding the water is rented out along with the rivers. As a result, it becomes

possible for investors to get HEPP licenses not for energy production, but for the appropriation of the land for different purposes, such as mining and extraction of shale gas⁴⁶.

Also, the investors have the right to use water for purposes other than energy production, such as irrigation, industry and the production of drinking water. This wide range of opportunities presented by the HEPP projects has increased the demand for HEPP licenses exorbitantly, and this has paved the way for the constitution of a black-market in the hydropower sector, especially between the years 2007 and 2013. The energy brokers, who are referred to as briefcase dealers (çantacı), traffic HEPP licenses or ready projects that need to be submitted to the Energy Market Regulatory Authority and the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works for a production license (Erensü, 2017, p. 135). Whereas these speculative investors make much money out of “commission fees from license trading” (ibid), such boom in the license fees result in the monopolization of licenses at the hand of large corporations, damaging the competition mechanisms in the energy market. In that, they are accused of creating a waste of money and time in the market for causing delays in energy growth capacity and for ostracizing small and medium investors out of the market. Therefore, the government officials consider these people as bad entrepreneurs, who cannot make a profit-loss account correctly and thereby maximize the social costs. That is, the AKP government, instead looking for the root cause of the problem in the paralegal EIA process that grants licenses without any supervision, brings the charge against the irresponsible behavior of the bad entrepreneurs (Aslan, 2016, pp. 126-127).

Such discourse on authentic entrepreneurialism does not only leave out the bad entrepreneurs from the decision-making process as reliable partners of water governance mechanisms, but also the local citizens who perceive the construction

⁴⁶ Üstün, B. (June, 5 2015) in a panel discussion called “Hesler, barajlar ve siyanürlü aramalarının doğada yarattığı tahribat”. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeqVpCPBtxI&t=1362s>

of the HEPPs in their villages as an attack against their livelihoods⁴⁷ and thence resist the process of commercialization of water. That is, the EIA Bylaw states that for the projects within the scope of EIA requirement a Public Participation Meeting must be held in order to inform the people who are expected to be most affected by the project about the investment and to get their opinions and suggestions about the project. This is not only a legal regulation that requires the consent of the local people for the realization of the HEPP projects, but also a governmental mechanism that promotes the constitution of a “‘citizen-consumer’ responsible for arbitrating between competing ‘political offers’” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 303). For that this governance mechanism holds the assumption that rejecting economic growth is not an option. In that, if locals are irrational enough to resist the HEPP projects, then they cannot be the participants of decision-making processes. Instead they are to be subject to persuasion techniques ranging from bribing to whacking and threat (Hamsici, 2010). And if they still insist on not giving out their land, then legal mechanisms have to be activated.

One of such legal mechanisms that play a huge role in the HEPP process is the Urgent Expropriation (UE). The UE is an administrative procedure that has been put into force in 1956, with the Article 27 of the Law No. 6830. Having been enacted with the intention of providing the cabinet “exceptional measures to confiscate private land and property for strategic purposes in response to possible foreign invasion” the law is clearly a “war-time effort” that “directly refers to a state of war or state of emergency as a condition that defines urgency” (Erensü, 2017, p. 127). This procedure has been rediscovered in 1983 with the Article 27

⁴⁷ In many cases the HEPPs directly threaten the economic means of living of the local people, such as the agricultural production, animal husbandry, piscary and beekeeping. In this respect, in the post-HEPP process many people have been forced to migrate to the urban areas. However, this economic factor is not sufficient to explain why the locals resisted commercialization of water as there are many regions, such as the eastern Black Sea where the HES struggle is strongest, within which river has almost no economic importance. For that, there is no need for a great deal of irrigation in this region for agriculture, since rain and snow meet the need. Also, in many places, spring water is used for drinking. This means that the anti-HEPP movements have also social and cultural dimensions. That is, the spiritual, cultural and social value that these people attribute to the nature they inhabit is a very important dynamic of the anti-HEPP movements (Çoban, et. al., 2015, pp. 430-433). Besides, it is clear that, these practices of resistance have contributed to their identity formation as environmental subjects.

of the Law No. 2942, in a whole different fashion. However, such rediscovery has not been quite popular till the 2000s. Whereas there have been six UE cases in the 1980s and four in the 1990s, the decade between 2000 and 2014 has witnessed a total of 1801 UE decisions, 1507 of which are related to energy production (Kaya, 2016, p. 79). Thus, it is clear that the UE procedure has been adopted as a solution to end the land disputes regarding HEPP constructions⁴⁸. However, what is of more importance is the transformation of the political rationality that constitutes the condition of possibility of using such procedure for accelerating the pace of energy investments. As already been mentioned, the economized definition of public good of the neoliberal rationality requires the construction of the competition of private interests. Hence, the conditions that require *urgent* expropriation are those in which market actors are not able to realize the supply and demand of goods and services in a competitive environment, and therefore there is no efficient exchange and distribution in the market (Kaya, 2011, p. 194). Besides, as the logic of global competition has structured the nation state as another enterprise among the others that must conform to the rules of efficiency, public good also defines the ability of a county to increase its share in the global market; for that such increase is what will generate further development which will in return benefit each and every member of the country, albeit not equally. In other words, at once “agents and objects of global competition”, states have been increasingly “subject to the iron law of a dynamic of globalization...seeking to attract a great share of foreign investment by creating the most favorable fiscal and social conditions for capital valorization” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 174). The idea is that, being the winner in this zero-sum game solves the internal problems of a nation by bringing further economic growth and thence more competitive market mechanisms. Neoliberal rationality, in this sense, reduces public to GDP. Therefore, it is not surprising

⁴⁸ “Overwhelmed by the volume of UE decisions, the cabinet has had to share its authority over taking UE decisions with other regulatory bodies” (Erensü, 2017, p. 127). Accordingly, some public institutions, independent boards and numerous private companies have been granted this authority. However, such irregularity made the UE decisions invisible to the public, and made it almost impossible to render an authority accountable for the decisions (Kaya, 2016, p. 78).

that the calls for utilization of hydropower are mostly enveloped in a patriotic discourse that equates the efficient utilization of natural resources with the nationalistic competitiveness within a global economy. In that, being against the HEPP projects is being against the national interest and public good, meaning that its environmental resistance “a type of civil disobedience, which endangers national security, expresses unpatriotic sentiments, [and] embodies treasonous acts” (Luke, 1995, p. 125).

Although the HEPPs have been indisputably effective in terms of rendering Turkey among the winners of the global race of attracting foreign direct investment, it is not possible to say the same for their contribution to the energy production. Given their low installed capacities, they constitute only the 6.5 percent of total hydropower capacity (Erensü, 2017, p. 130). The “smallest 451 [HEPPs] combined do not equal one Atatürk Dam (the largest HEPP in Turkey) in terms of the capacity to generate electricity” (ibid). Therefore, even if the target of bringing all hydroelectric energy potential to the national economy (DSİ, 2017, p. 38) is met, Turkey will maintain its position as a country dependent on foreign energy. In any case, solving the loss and leakage problem in electricity production and distribution, which has reached a ratio of 15.58 percent in 2016⁴⁹, through the renewal of transmission lines and the distribution of the generated energy to nearby areas to prevent transmission losses would be more efficient than constructing new HEPPs. However, as there are much different motivations than energy production behind the HEPP projects such “rational” solutions are not even discussed.

Obviously, the economic incentives presented by the carbon market have the top priority among such motivations. The almost unchallenged consensus over the need to reduce the CO₂ emission to stop global warming has paved the way for the construction of carbon markets based on the understanding that the best way

⁴⁹ In “Elektrikte 'kayıp kaçak' soygunu” (Cumhuriyet, January, 18 2018). Retrieved from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/ekonomi/912551/Elektrikte__kayip_kacak__soygunu.html

of dealing with environmental issues is “to put all our trust in the market...[that] frees initiatives, regulates the scarcity of resources and, in the long run, stimulates the innovations that will provide the solutions to humanity’s problems” (Callon, 2009, p. 535). The various institutions, structures and agreements designed within the process were first discussed under the UNFCCC in 1992. But, what gave the process its final shape was the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The implementation of the carbon trading system, began with the first project in 2006 with the Clean Development Mechanism (Yılmaz & Yılmaz, 2011, p. 121). The CDM is a mechanism that “allows industrialized countries to buy credits from greenhouse gas reduction projects in the developing world, thus allowing them to meet their greenhouse gas reduction targets at the lowest cost while providing sustainable development benefits” (Girling, 2010, p. 5). That is, instead of taxing the surplus with regard to an emission *permit*, the mechanism works through the Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) *credits*, that can be bought or sold at the market⁵⁰. This is an incentive mechanism that promote people, organizations, businesses and government to reduce their carbon footprint not by reducing emissions, but by investing in renewable energy sector, either directly investing in the green projects defined in the CDM or indirectly by “buying credits from verified emission reduction projects wherever they are cheapest, often in the developing world” (ibid, p. 6). These credits, in return can be used in fulfilling the carbon reduction obligations to generate further emission credits or can be exchanged for money in the stock market. This actually explains why Turkey has been attracting foreign investments in the form of HEPP projects. Besides, the participation of Turkish government to the Kyoto Protocol on August, 26 2009 has paved the way

⁵⁰ The marketization of carbon emission is quite a complicated process for that it requires emissions to be objectivized and standardized within a frame of economic calculation. The complication is due to the impossibility of calculating the greenhouse effect by abstracting the quantity of carbondioxyde emitted from a chemical component. For that it is the chemical reaction created by the combination of the elements that determines the potency of the greenhouse effect that the CO₂ emission inholds. However, as the condition of possibility of constructing a carbon market is “the fungibility of [emission] allowances and [emission] credits” different gases are made commensurable in the market by “a gas corrector meter” that converts different “masses of gas input into estimates of CO₂ output by using standard multiplication factors” (MacKenzie, 2009, pp. 443-444). As such, through the translation of “emissions of other greenhouse gases into their equivalents in CO₂” (ibid, p. 446) the carbon markets such as the CDM and the ETS are constructed performatively.

for the birth of Turkish energy brokers who can make money out of the HEPP licenses that they never put into operation.

To sum up, in this section it has been argued that environmental discourse “did not start in the corridors of power in Washington, nor in those of the multinational corporations” (Allan, 2003, p. 11). Rather, such discourse was a contingent outcome of neoliberal rationality that elevated competition to the global level. That is, globalization “occurred only through the general adoption of a new normative logic” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 167) of competition. Such globalization of competition resulted in the redefinition of the state as an enterprise evaluated by the criteria of efficiency, rather than of utility. And this gave birth to a whole different notion of public good that rendered it possible to present environmental destruction as a component of national interest. Besides, the chapter puts a special emphasis on the distinctness of the South and the North in terms of their sustainable development experiences. Accordingly, it is claimed that as opposed to the countries of North, in Turkey the promotion of the construction of hydroelectric power plants is more about attracting foreign investment than about producing energy as attracting foreign investment proves to be more efficient than the economic return of energy that the small plants are capable of producing. In that, whereas in the North ‘protecting’ environment in such a way as to utilize from it in the long run is a corollary of economic growth, in the South this protection is seen as a factor of cost; an obstacle for economic growth. Therefore, it is argued that whereas the mentality of competition that allows the economization of nature has made its way to the countries of the South fully, the discourse of sustainability has not. As a concluding remark, it would not be wrong to claim that the wide repertoire of corruptions that enabled the boom in the HEPP projects in Turkey, results from its resistance against sustainability discourse. In that, it is one of the instances in which governmental technologies are translated and subverted through strategic operations. However, this strategic reversal could not go further than playing the same game of truth of

economization that conceptualizes nature as a bundle of resources with different cards and as such it multiplied the hegemonic effects of neoliberal rationality.

3.3. Governmentality as Subjectivation: Pay for Performance System in Health Services

21st century has been witnessing the replacement of the traditional structure of public servant positions with casual, provisional and temporary forms of employment, contractualism and flexible wage mechanisms at an ever increasing pace. These technologies, with the aim of proliferating efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector through enhancing competitive positioning among public workers, give birth to an overall precarization of labor force. Under such conditions everyone is at constant risk of dismissal and failure regardless of how responsible and competent they are. The absence of security of employment and the provision for retirement proliferate labor exploitation to unprecedented levels as such absences condemn employees to prolonged and flexible working hours as well as obscured job definitions and increased work-load.

With the Healthcare Reform in Turkey, launched by the AKP government in 2003, healthcare professionals, too, had their share of such precarization of labor. This reform programme clearly is an extension of the wider objective of cutting off public expenses through a New Public Management approach that seeks to transform bureaucracy in the image of the private sector. This approach suggests that accountability, transparency and efficiency can be attained in the public sector if it imitates the private sector in terms of adopting its methods and principles. Accordingly, the Healthcare Reform Package gives way to the integration of social security institutions with the claim of preventing inequalities; the separation of service provision and financing with the claim of cost effectiveness; the adoption of Public-Private Partnership model in the healthcare services with the claim that the services carried out by the public are inefficient; the introduction of the principle of decentralization and self-regulation with the

assumption that if the Ministry of Health is moved from being a decision-making body to a supervising position, then the administratively and financially autonomous units will respond to the needs of the locals more effectively; the establishment of the family physician system that reconstructs primary healthcare with the understanding that it will provide the patients the freedom to choose their doctor; the establishment of the General Health Insurance system on the pretext of preventing informal employment; and finally the tariffing of patient share, in the form of contributory payment, so as to make sure that the beneficiary-pays and to prevent unnecessary applications (Hamzaoğlu cited in Atalay, 2015, p. 60). That is, this package recodes the healthcare system by substituting the citizens' rights with consumer rights, the public service ethics with competitive corporate ethics and the fixed-waged and lifetime employment conditions of the healthcare professionals with precarious employment.

As a matter of fact, the family physician system, which was enacted in 2004 with the Law No. 5238, constitutes an example of precarization of healthcare professionals in the full sense of the word. For that, this system obliges the family physician sign a one-year contract with either the governor or another body authorized by the governorate -usually the Provincial Health Directorate- and in the renewal of contracts, performance criteria such as number of patients, customer satisfaction, success rates are taken into consideration. If the number of patients registered to the family physician falls below 1000 in two consecutive months, the contract is terminated (Sallan & Dericioğulları, 2010, p. 327). Moreover, each family physician contracts at least one family health personnel that can be a midwife, a nurse or a sanitarian depending on the working conditions (Kasapoğlu, 2016, p. 149). This means that the physician becomes the employer of the health personnel who must now obey the directives of their boss in order not to lose their jobs. Besides, thanks to the introduction of this system, the number of subcontracted healthcare employees that was 6.000 in 1993 and 11.000 in 2002 has skyrocketed to 126.000 in 2012 (Balta, 2013, p. 161). However, in this chapter, another dimension of such technologies of precarization

that introduces a specific form of wage flexibility system will be put under the scope of analysis.

Performance based supplementary payment system has been introduced in public hospitals on the basis of an amendment of the 5th article of the Law No. 209 concerning the regulation of the working capital fund of public healthcare organizations and rehabilitation centers attached to the Ministry of Health⁵¹. In the same year, based on this legal arrangement, a Bylaw on the Supplementary Payment System, which introduces objective criteria for both individual and organizational performance evaluation, has been published on the Official Gazette No. 26166 on May, 12 2006. The main objective of the system is “to encourage job motivation and productivity among public hospital health staff, especially physicians, in order to improve performance of the public hospitals belonging to Ministry of Health” (Kaptanoğlu, 2013, p. 129). That is, the additional payments made to the healthcare staff in accordance with their level of contribution to the working capital fund aims to proliferate the performance of the organization in productivity, quality, and profitability by rewarding the high-performance of employees without increasing labor costs and compelling them “to identify their interests with those of the organization employing them” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 170). In order to guarantee such identification of interests, the *institutional performance coefficient system* is established to ensure that the overall efficiency of the organization directly influences the amount of additional payment that the individual employees would receive. That is, the institutional performance coefficient⁵², ranging from one to zero, determines the

⁵¹ The amendment entered into force on March, 7 2006 with Law No. 5471. However, the implementation of the system on the basis of a pilot scheme dates back to 2004.

⁵² The criteria of institutional performance evaluation stated in the Quality Improvement and Performance Evaluation Directive enacted by the Ministry of Health in 2007 can be summarized as follows: 1) Access to inspection units: Each physician is allocated a private inspection room. This criterion is intended to save patients from waiting in queues to see the doctor and to prepare the concordant competitive environment for patients to freely choose physicians. Besides, it aims to record the distribution of tasks during the working hours of the doctors, to create a central appointment system, and thus to ensure a balanced distribution of patients. 2) Audit of hospital

maximum percentage of the working capital fund that will be distributed to the employees. According to the law, the institution can distribute a maximum of 40% of its income as an extra payment; meaning that the corporate performance coefficient must be “1” in order to be able to distribute 40% of that period’s income. As the performance coefficient of the institution falls from “1” to “0”, the maximum amount of the additional payment to be distributed, as a result, decreases from 40% to 0% (Aydın & Demir, 2007, p. 70). The amount falls to one’s share from such additional payment to be distributed is determined on the one hand, by the coefficient of the department that the healthcare staff is employed. Accordingly, special units such as intensive care, newborn and burn units; emergency services and departments with high risk of infection are rated with higher coefficients (Eraslan & Tozlu, 2011, p. 51). On the other hand, the title of the healthcare personnel, the number of days worked and the mode of employment (full or part time) are important factors in determining the coefficient (Elbek, 2010, p. 434). The performance score is calculated by multiplying these coefficients by the individual points earned by the healthcare staff.

It is possible to claim that, up to a certain point, the performance based supplementary payment system has met the objective of reorganizing public hospitals in “a parallel approach to the one pioneered in the private sector in steering and governance” (Le Galès, 2016, p. 518). For that, the number of full-time physicians in the public sector has skyrocketed after the introduction of this

infrastructure and process evaluation: These audits are carried out within the framework of a control schedule by independent supervisory bodies. In this way, in addition to ensuring that the hospital is constantly inspected, the provincial managers are given the opportunity to become acquainted with hospital problems and take responsibility for resolving them. 3) Institutional efficiency: This coefficient is mainly determined by the occupancy rate of the beds and the average number of days of hospitalization. That is if the occupancy rate is high and the average number of days is low the institution is considered to use its existing physical resources efficiently. 4) Patient and patient relatives’ satisfaction survey: This coefficient aims to include the consumers of health services to performance measurement process. 5) Hospital Quality Criteria: These criteria focus on accessibility of services and information technologies such as laboratory, operating room, clinics; patient and employee safety, infection control and prevention; intensive care, dialysis and facility management; and security, pharmacy, emergency and other logistics services (Aydın & Demir, 2007, pp. 50-56).

system, as in 2002 the 89% of physicians working in public sector were employed part-time, earning both state security and private office income, after 2004 the rates have been totally reversed as 92% of physicians started to work full time in public sector (Kasapoğlu, 2016, p. 149). Due to the improvement of hospital infrastructure and quality, despite the increase in occupancy rates in hospitals the average waiting time of an outpatient have dramatically decreased (Öztürk & Swiss, 2008, p. 141). In that, the public hospitals have turned into autonomous enterprises that lean almost solely on their own working capital funds and require no state subsidies to survive. This system has been quite lucrative for the employees of these institutions, as well, for making it possible for them to earn additional incomes in some cases amounting to seven times more than their salaries (Kablay, 2014, p. 91).

However, regardless of the increase in their income, this system generated the precarization of their status as they have been transformed from being civil servants to corporate officers. That is, the amount of the additional payment for the doctors working in the departments which engage in less labor and expertise intensive procedures and where there is less need for surgery, anesthesia or interventional operations, is much lower. Besides, the practitioners, interns, nurses and other health personnel receive much less extra income than the specialists, both due to their title coefficient and due to the low scores of the transactions they undertake. In that, the system creates significant inequalities in terms of income and career development opportunities among different occupational clusters. This inequality results in an environment of brutal competition among the healthcare professionals to increase their scores, giving rise to a situation within which they work for longer hours, bear much intensified workload and willingly give up their right of leisure at weekends and annual leave in order not to lose their bonus (Kablay, 2011, p. 61). Furthermore, as these bonuses are not vested rights of the employees, they do not affect the retirement pensions (Hamzaoğlu & Yavuz, 2013, p. 655) and they are cut off in any situation that the personnel has to take a leave of absence, may it be for health

issues or pregnancy. Moreover, as the quantities determined by the legislation are ceiling amounts, the institution has the authority to pay under this amount for any reason (Nesanır, 2007, p. 275). That is to say that such pay for performance system that has no continuity and security, unlike a regular salary, leads to a progressive erosion of the rights attached to the status of employees and to the concordant precarization of healthcare labor. In this chapter, it will be argued that this specific type of precarization through pay for performance system is less of a product of the transformation of the organization of production and distribution of wealth than of an effect of a new mode of subjectivity. For that technologies of performance can be possible if and only if the active self-government of the subject complies with the norms of legitimate conduct defined by the evaluation criteria. Therefore, in order to understand what made this system thinkable in the first place, we need to understand “its construction of a subject, whose conduct will be guided by evaluation procedures and the sanctions linked to them” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 251).

If subject⁵³ is the one “over whom government is to be exercised, and whose characteristics government must harness and instrumentalize” (Rose, 1999, p. 40)

⁵³ Although here we solely focus on the governmental subjectivation processes, it is important to note that subject has always been a central concern for Foucault in his never ending search for a way out of the duality between structure and agency. In his early works in the so-called archeological period he aims to decentralize the subject that has been preserved, “against all decenterings”, with its sovereignty by “the twin figures of anthropology and humanism” (Foucault, 1972, p. 12). So, from these perspectives it becomes possible to assume an “almost uninterrupted development of the European ratio from the Renaissance to our own day” (Foucault, 2005, p. xxiv). However, an archaeological inquiry shows that it is not the reason as the source of knowledge that has been developed, but the transformation of the positivities of the “historical a priori” that produces the subject. That is, the subject is nothing but the product of the non-subjective mechanisms. And even as a product, the subject lacks any self-identity and unity for that subjectivity is only a momentary point between discursive practices, what Foucault calls “enunciative modalities” (Foucault, 1972, p. 50). In other words, discourses do not travel between subjects, rather subjects emerge between discourses. Although, in this period, Foucault has managed to take a significant step away from traditional structuralism by showing that the quasi-structures of a historical episteme are not non-changing, unbreakable, but contingent and always prone to be dissolved, as he did not cast any agency to the subject it is still possible to consider the Order of Things and the Archeology of Knowledge among structuralist literature. His genealogical period, on the other hand, does not take the subject as the passive product of non-subjective historical processes, rather “he insists that the subject constitutes itself...a process that Foucault calls ‘subjectivation’ using the techniques available to it historically, and doubtless under the influence of myriad factors outside its control” (Kelly, 2013, p. 513). Subjectivation, in

then the process of subjectification can be defined as the process within which the subject constantly works on himself to identify his self-image with the one reflected to him in the mirror of governmental rationality. That is, government at a distance becomes possible “when each [agent] can translate the values of others into its own terms such that they provide norms and standards for their own ambitions, judgements and conduct” (ibid, p. 50). In that for (neo)liberal government to work the subject needs to be formed as a specific type of agent “with particular capacities and possibilities of action” (Dean, 2003, p. 29). Technologies of the self, in that, are always about how forms of political government have recourse to the “processes by which the individual acts upon himself” (Foucault, 1993, p. 203). In this sense, Foucault’s emphasis upon Gary Becker and Theodore W. Schultz’s theory of *human capital* is important here in terms of discerning how the subject and the category of labor is redefined as a form of capital in neoliberal governmentality. That is, human capital, as a discursive tool, represents how neoliberal rationality constructs subjects “by deploying the means of governing [the subject] that he really does conduct himself as an entity in a competition, who must maximize his results by exposing himself to risks and taking full responsibility for possible failures” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 261).

that, “is less a history of the person than a genealogy of the relations that individuals and peoples have established with themselves -in which they have come to relate to themselves as selves” (Rose, 1998, p. 24). However, as the power relations are seen as the condition of possibility of docile bodies within the closed spaces of disciplines, subjection and subjectification become identical. That is, as there is no gap between the double meanings of subject in disciplinary power, it is possible to claim that Foucault could not have managed to overcome structuralism in these works, either. It is not till his study of liberalism that he comes up with a theory of action, as conduct on conduct, that he could overcome the duality between structure and agency by making resistance an actual possibility. For that, to govern means to constitute the possible field of action of others in their freedom, rather than to constitute the subject, or the body per se. In that, freedom becomes a condition of subjection just like subjection becomes a condition of freedom. The gap that is created by freedom, loosens the connection between subjectification and subjection and “the irreducibility of one to the other implies that their relationships and interactions are not necessarily always harmonious or mutually reinforcing” (Burchell, 1996, p. 21). That is to say that, an analysis of government does not assume that the subject is simply a product of power relations but that it produces its own reality within a regulated freedom.

Foucault (2008) finds it quite interesting that Becker and Schultz criticize the classical liberal theorists for not paying enough attention to the concept of labor. Adam Smith, for example, starts his economic analysis with the division of labor, but instead of analyzing labor in its own terms, he neutralizes labor by reducing it to the time factor. Similarly, Ricardo considers the increase in labor to be an increase in the possibility of putting more workers into the market and of using these workers for longer hours. For Keynes, labor is a production factor, yet it is only a passive factor that is activated on a certain rate of investment. Hence, Becker and Schultz share Marx's critique of political economy for considering labor as a passive and quantitative production factor, without even mentioning Marx's name and eventually coming up with strictly opposed prescriptions. According to Marx, the logic of capital reduces labor to labor power by reducing it to the effects of value produced. That is, for Marx, commodification of labor is attained through its abstraction within the capitalist mode of production. According to the neoliberals, on the other hand, such abstraction of labor is not a structural problem internal to the economic processes, but rather a result of how labor is represented in the political economy. Labor is considered by classical political economists as an abstract factor because they have mistakenly believed economic process to be restricted to the processes of production, exchange and consumption. In other words, the reason that political economists could not provide a concrete account of labor is because they misperceived the objects of an economic analysis. If they had proceeded from the subject, instead of the objective-mechanical laws of economy, by asking how people use their own labor, then they could have seen that economy is not limited to the formal market mechanisms but involves each and every process in which individuals allocate their scarce means to alternative ends. If they had realized that economic analysis needs to focus on the strategic programming of individual behavior, and not on the historical logic of abstract processes, then they could have unearthed the qualitative aspects of labor (pp. 218-223). In that, Becker and Schultz propose that "economics concerns all purposive conduct entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means and instruments; or, yet more broadly, all

rational conduct...or again, finally, all conduct, rational or irrational, which responds to its environment in a non-random fashion, or 'recognizes reality'" (Gordon, 1991, p. 43). This economic approach to human behavior adopts the "subjective vantage point of the person doing the work" in order to be able to "investigate the significance of work for those performing it" (Lemke, 2001, p. 199). Accordingly, they claim that people work so as to earn wage. However, this wage is not the price at which they sell their labor power, but rather is an income which is the return of capital. That is, capital being defined as any source of future income, labor is seen as a special type of capital, for unlike other forms of capital, the constituents of labor such as ability, skill and knowledge cannot be separated from the subject who possesses them. For Foucault, this unification of the skill with the worker renders the worker an ability-machine:

This is not a conception of labor power; it is a conception of capital-ability which, according to diverse variables, receives a certain income that is a wage, an income-wage, so that the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for himself (2008, p. 225).

This human capital is made up of two components: "an inborn physical-genetic predisposition and the entirety of skills that have been acquired as the result of 'investments' in the corresponding stimuli: nutrition, education, training and also love, affection, etc." (Lemke, 2001, p. 199). In this model, the worker is no longer the passive and dependent subject of the collective welfare, but an "entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Therefore with the theory of human capital we witness the birth of a new ethic of the "active individuals seeking to 'enterprise themselves', to maximize their quality of life through acts of choice" (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 57). Here, consumption arises as an entrepreneurial activity as consumer is not only a passive user of goods but also an active producer of its own satisfaction. In this framework, "the purchase of a good or service is not a concluding economic act; rather, it is a form of input in which the individual makes use of his resources,

especially the scarce factor of time, in such a way that the highest degree of satisfaction leaps out from this as output” (Bröckling, 2011, p. 257). When not only the working time but also the consumption time is drawn into economic terms, then each and every activity becomes one of entrepreneurial. The individual “appears here as an economic institution whose continued existence, like that of a company, depends on his or her choices” (ibid). Yet, although these acts of choice are defined as the ontological reality of the homo oeconomicus as if he has always and everywhere engaged in maximizing his capital, since these choices are assumed to be regulated by the supply and demand in a constructed and competitive market the homo oeconomicus turns out to be “someone who is eminently governable” (Foucault, 2008, p. 270). So, whereas there is an autonomous subject constituted by its active self-government, the content of such autonomy is organized through governmental technologies; that is through action upon action⁵⁴. This highly tricky conceptualization of homo oeconomicus that relates to himself on the basis of economic interest is the condition of possibility of the wholesale transformation of the public sector. In that, both the receiver and the provider of public services are reconfigured in novel ways, through extending economic perspective across all society as “a principle of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behavior” (Foucault, 2008: 243). For our purposes here, the implications of such transformation are twofold: first, when they are rendered autonomous beings this responsabilizes them for the consequences of their choices; second when those choices are considered to be based on calculations of cost-benefit their actions are rendered manipulable through modifications in the milieu in which enterprising selves make their choices.

⁵⁴ This paradoxical axiomatic derives from their definition of freedom that is itself an oxymoron. That is, they assume that human beings are free from nature, but as they consider such freedom as limited to freedom to choose between viable options they believe that human freedom can be shaped. In that, the neoliberals seem to be ignoring the well-known assertion of Kant: if freedom is defined, or rather if freedom is made an object of knowledge than it is no longer possible to talk about freedom.

Responsibilization in the pay for performance system is a part of the “new prudentialism” (O'Malley, 1996), which is the junction of the neoliberal risk technologies and political formulas of rule. In this new prudentialism, the healthcare personnel is devolved the responsibility for “improving and leveraging its competitive positioning and...enhancing its (monetary and nonmonetary) portfolio value across all of its endeavors” (Brown, 2015, p. 10). It is his responsibility to entrepreneurialize his capital by investing in himself so as to improve his title, enhance his performance scores and to attract more patients. That is, the employee can guarantee his income, which is the “revenue that is earned on an initial investment, an investment in one’s skills or abilities” (Read, 2009, p. 29), by constantly working on himself to “be as efficient as possible...to be totally involved in his work, to perfect himself by lifelong learning, and to accept the greater flexibility required by the incessant changes dictated by markets” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 263). Traditional forms of job security, regular monthly salaries and retirement pensions impede such a reconstruction of the subject. In this context, the workers become responsible for managing their own risks: of poor performance, of unemployment, of old age and of ill-health. It is their duty to insure themselves against future possibilities in that “responsibilities for risk minimization become a feature of the choices that are made by individuals” (Dean, 2010, p. 194). The active homo oeconomicus thus add to its obligations “the need to adopt a calculative prudent personal relation to fate now conceived in terms of calculable dangers and avertable risks” (Rose, 1996, p. 58).

Besides, this prudentialism is the condition of possibility of the patients’ being coded as, no longer the citizens that will be treated by the pastoral care of the welfare state, but as the consumers of healthcare services. For that not only the workers of health services, but receivers, too, are constructed as rational actors who are responsible for their ill-health. The underlying logic is simple: “whoever is sick has not adequately looked after his health; whoever falls victim to an accident or crime ought to have better seen to his or her security” (Bröckling,

2011, p. 261). Gary Becker (1976) explains how good health is an individual choice:

Good health and a long life are important aims of most persons, but surely no more than a moment's reflection is necessary to convince anyone that they are not the only aims: somewhat better health or a longer life may be sacrificed because they conflict with other aims. The economic approach implies that there is an 'optimal' expected length of life, where the value in utility of an additional year is less than the utility foregone by using time and other resources to obtain that year. Therefore, a person may be a heavy smoker or so committed to work as to omit all exercise, not necessarily because he is ignorant of the consequences or 'incapable' of using the information he possesses, but because the lifespan forfeited is not worth the cost to him of quitting smoking or working less intensively. These would be unwise decisions if a long life were the only aim, but as long as other aims exist, they could be informed and in this sense 'wise'. According to the economic approach, therefore, most (if not all!) deaths are to some extent 'suicides' in the sense that they could have been postponed if more resources had been invested in prolonging life (pp. 9-10).

Seen from this lens, the rationality that lies behind the innovations of Healthcare Reform, such as downscaling of publicly subsidized medical treatments, reducing the number of the publicly provided medicine, increasing contributory payments and promoting "supplementary private health insurance to cover other benefits not covered under social security systems" (Kaptanoğlu, 2013, p. 129) becomes transparent. Prudentialism, therefore, renders every aspect of human life calculable and in that it is not merely a privatization of risk management. Rather, the "management of risks through prudentialism involves shifts in many governmental relations, not least being that subjects are recast as rational, responsible, knowledgeable and calculative, in control of the key aspects of their lives" (O'Malley, 1996, p. 203).

Alongside being the active partner of the state and the hospitals in terms of cutting off the "wasteful expenditure" (Foucault, 2008, p. 246) as prudent actors, the subjects of pay for performance system also become the correlates of a governmentality who will "respond systematically to modifications in the

variables of the environment” (ibid, p. 269). That is, within this system, the healthcare personnel are considered to be the *human resources* at the disposal of hospitals, the use of which requires effective management as “this particular resource is the one that is the most difficult to imitate” (Weiskopf & Munro, 2012, p. 695). The search for “effectiveness or efficiency relies upon incentives and a metrics of performance that is supposed to guide the action of actors” (Le Galès, 2016, p. 518). Through these metrics of performance⁵⁵ authorities channel the flows of interest of the employees “by making desirable activities inexpensive and undesirable activities costly, counting on the fact that subjects calculate their interests” (Read, 2009, p. 29). The aim is not to dictate detailed demands on the healthcare professionals, but to create a milieu, in which selves can unfold their entrepreneurial potentials. Through this environmental intervention, it is guaranteed that the subject freely chooses to work harder as “no capital, save a suicidal one, can...be indifferent to the...parameters of success in a world of scarcity” (Brown, 2015, p. 42). The main innovation of such paradoxical technology of governing without government, by acting on the conditions of actions, “precisely consists in directly connecting the way a man ‘is governed from without’ to the way that ‘he governs himself from within’” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 254). That is, freedom and government coincides where choice becomes a calculable as well as a manipulable element. These performance technologies, in a sense, triggers a chain effect as once the subject constructs itself as human capital and internalizes the rules of entrepreneurial self-government, this in turn, further intensifies competition among different human capitals basically because human capital “is one who strategizes for her or himself among various social, political, and economic options, not one who strives...to alter these options” (Brown, 2006, p. 704).

⁵⁵ I believe, the reason why technologies of performance are introduced in healthcare system is the impossibility of disciplining healthcare personnel, especially the specialists, within market mechanisms due to the high demand and low supply in the health market. That is, these rewards and sanctions are expected to substitute for market sanctions in guiding individual conduct where market mechanisms do not function properly due to the strict disequilibrium in supply and demand. The fact that there are medical faculties in most of the universities established in the AKP era can be seen as an endeavor of correcting such disequilibrium.

Within this process, hospitals as autonomous units that have to allocate its financial acquisitions to its human resources are turned into “centres of calculation [that] subsume the substantive domains of expertise to new forms of formal rationality” (Dean, 2010, p. 200). For that, to calculate the performance of the different activities of dispersed actors need to be “made inscribable and comparable in numerical form... aggregated, related, plotted over time, represented in league tables, judged against national averages, and utilized for future decisions about the allocation of contracts and budgets” (Rose, 1999, p. 153). In that, numerous studies have been undertaken in public administration scholarship so as to find the most accurate measurement technique for the “interpretability and legitimacy of performance data” (Grundy, 2015, p. 161). This is obviously because; measuring performance shapes the reality of the process that is to be measured by “creating the categories of action, stabilizing representations of problems, indicating priorities” (Le Galès, 2016, p. 518). That is, the selection of the criterion and the norm that performance will be rewarded upon makes “certain aspects of a profession visible or invisible, valuing or devaluing them: what is visible in the activity assumes value at the expense of what is not visible” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 251). In that, the performance evaluation is a mechanism “where processes of flexibility and decentralization co-exist with rigid constraints” (Courpasson, 2000, p. 157). Such constraints replace *phronesis* of the healthcare personnel with a regulated and objective guideline of how the procedures that has to be followed while taking care of a patient.

However, as such a guideline is not an end itself but a means to make more money, it is always prone to abuse. In other words, if the healthcare personnel relates to the patients on the basis of performance score, then there is nothing more probable than this personnel will find ways for maximizing its benefits for minimal costs and effort. Yet, when such wiliness takes place in the healthcare ‘sector’ the conclusions are mostly irreversible. Accordingly, it is a well-known

fact that the performance system in Turkey is widely manipulated. The tendency among the doctors for spending less time taking care of a patient so as to see more patients in order to be able to collect more performance points, is quite a regular one (Ceylan, 2009, p. 68). Doctors are encouraged to request more laboratory and imaging tests and to engage in unnecessary operations (Öztürk, 2015, p. 84). As surgical operations bring more scores, especially the risk-free and relatively easy ones that can be handled in a short period of time are claimed to be ‘preferred’ by the doctors (Çetin & Sağlam, 2007, p. 60). Also, “when the care is possible in the secondary care units... more critical cases are sent to tertiary care” since “treatment of such cases are of...great cost to hospital’s revolving funds” (Kaptanoğlu, 2013, p. 128). Furthermore, in order to speed up the process which is called “patient transfer”, the number of days of hospitalization is decreased so as to serve more people (Kasapoğlu, 2016, p. 154). In that, it seems the “three E’s of management -‘economy, effectiveness, efficiency’- have erased the categories of professional duty and conscience from the logic of power” (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 254). Although this erasure is recognized and objected by many healthcare professionals with the claim that health cannot be commercialized and that medical care cannot be measured by performance system⁵⁶, the political authorities do not seem to be willing to give up such lucrative business. Ahmet Demircan, the current Minister of Health, states that with a new regulation of working capital funds, the upper limit of payments, which is currently at the level of 18 thousand Turkish Liras for qualified physicians, will be increased five times⁵⁷.

So, all in all, pay for performance system in health services has been adopted as a mechanism of fair wage. To reiterate, such fairness is defined within a neoliberal

⁵⁶ In “Hekimlik Performans Sistemi ile Ölçülemez” (Çanakkale gündem, March, 3 2018). Retrieved from <https://canakkalegundem.net/2018/03/10/hekimlik-performans-sistemi-ile-olculemez/>

⁵⁷ In “Hastanelerde yeni dönem! Sağlık Bakanı açıkladı!” (Mynet, July, 8 2018). Retrieved from <https://www.mynet.com/hastanelerde-yeni-donem-saglik-bakani-acikladi-110104251994>

rationality with the mantra of “equal inequality for all” (Lemke, 2001, p. 195). As such, it ended up with extending market relations to healthcare services and promoting diverse forms of competition among healthcare professionals. As a result, the system has initiated the process of precarization of healthcare workers. Furthermore, it turned patients into active consumers who are supposed to “want more choice, better quality and more responsiveness from public services” (Flynn, 2002, p. 160). As repeated more often than not throughout the chapter, this precarization is made possible by the economization of human *behavior*. For that, it is “not the structure of the economy that is extended across society but the subject of economic thinking, its implicit anthropology” (Read, 2009, p. 32). Within neoliberal rationality, human capital is “what we are said to be, what we should be, and what the rationality makes us into through its norms and construction of environments” (Brown, 2015, p. 36). In this sense, performance systems can be effective only if individuals are formed as human capitals by optimizing their relation to themselves and their work. That is, the individuals’ reconstruction of themselves as active economic subjects that calculate costs and benefits, as entrepreneurial selves that enhance their competitive positioning are the “conditions under which the laws of supply and demand can make themselves real” (Rose, 1999, p. 65) in an *active* labor market. In this new “care of the self” everyone is responsible for managing himself in the form of human capital to maximal effect; but no one is an end in himself who is intrinsically valuable. When we are rendered everywhere and only homo oeconomicus “no longer is there an open question of how to craft the self or what paths to travel in life” (Brown, 2015, p. 42).

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

In this study, I tried to show that state, society and economics are not things at hand defined with essential qualities, but are effects of governmental practices. Accordingly, I claimed that what characterizes neoliberal governmentality is not the shrinkage of the nation state and the concordant domination of the market, but the diffusion of an economic perspective of cost-benefit calculation to every sphere of life that in turn restructures the relations between state, society and economics. That is, I argued that Foucault's conceptualization of neoliberal governmentality as a grid of intelligibility that extends the notions of risk, entrepreneurialism and competition to whole spheres of society rendering everyone responsible for his/her well-being, security and success is more than useful to analyze the particular experience of neoliberalism in Turkey. Governmentality approach, in the analysis of Turkey, has been especially helpful in terms of revealing that there is no opposition between the government through freedom and technologies of domination. In that, I argued, the Temporary Village Guard System is made possible by the securitization of the political through a discourse of terror and it made possible the processes of the economization of a sector of security through private-public partnership on war on terror. Secondly, I argued that the redefinition of public good as the competition of private interests, accompanied by the reconceptualization of nature as a bundle of resources has been the historical condition of possibility of the micro hydroelectric power plant frenzy in the 2000s. Lastly, I claimed that the professional healthcare workers, who are human capitals for themselves and for the hospitals that employ them, are no longer the obedient and passive civil servants of disciplinary mechanisms. Briefly, I tried to show that, with reference to Foucault's words: terror, HEPPs,

and professionalism were established, not in the places formerly occupied by banditry, dams, and public service, but in an area where those forms of knowledge did not exist, in the space they left blank⁵⁸.

However, for the epilogue, I want to remark three points that I could not adequately emphasize or handle throughout the study. First of all, even though, more often than not I have resorted to present the uniqueness of the terminology of governmentality through a comparison with that of Marxism, my intention has been neither to engage in a full criticism of Marxist concepts and approaches nor to compare Foucault with Marx. Rather, through such comparison I tried to discuss the governmental approach with reference to what it is not and to highlight some dimensions of the *present* that has not been handled in studies that approach neoliberalism as an economic policy or an ideology.

Second, it should be mentioned that I never pretend to explain every dimension of neoliberal practices in Turkey. As a matter of fact, since this study is more of a literature review of genealogical studies rather than a genealogical study itself, it falls short of presenting some peculiar dynamics of Turkey, such as Islam. Furthermore, due to the structure of the study I could not handle the phenomena that I analyzed in all relevant dimensions. For example, the fact that security guards are rendered as human *resources* to be used by the sovereigns in an endeavor to fight against terror efficiently rather than citizens whose lives are to be protected, or that they receive premiums per terrorists they kill can also be analyzed in terms of subjectification. Or the fact that the HEPPs are used, in some cases, as part of a strategy of war against terror as well as a tactic of securitizing the political-environmental demands of the locals by labeling them as terrorists is definitely also a matter of securitization. At the end of day, securitization, economization and subjectivation are not different and disconnected dimensions

⁵⁸ The original quotation follows as: “philology, biology, and political economy were established, not in the places formerly occupied by general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth, but in an area where those forms of knowledge did not exist, in the space they left blank” (Foucault, 2005, p. 225).

of neoliberal rationality, but are strictly engaged processes of the same governmental plane.

Lastly, as my intention was more about investigating the condition of possibility of the birth of these three phenomena in Turkey, the multiplicity of forms of resistance against them, may it be from Kurdish politics, from the anti-HEPP activists or from the healthcare staff, did not receive the close inspection they merit. However, it should be noted that governmental practices are never coherent or complete, but rather they are always prone to be subverted, transformed or canceled by practices of resistance. In that, resistances are constituent parts of governmental technologies rather than simply being reactions against them. In other words, because freedom is ontologically prior to relations of power, freedom is not simply the condition of possibility of the latter, but also their point of resistance. Therefore, practices of government consist of the play of antagonistic strategies, which on the one hand resist to be governed in a particular way, and on the other hand try to limit such resistance. In this vein, it is not surprising that almost the totality of the techniques of government that I tried to cover in this study, such as environmental destruction as a counterterror strategy, forced urbanization and urgent expropriation, were formulated as responses to practices of resistance so as either to render the resisters governable by articulating them into formal market mechanisms, or to eliminate them once and for all. This means that as practices of resistance spread into new realms in an attempt to problematize the given visibilities and identities in them, technologies of government and domination expand further so as to include those realms in its rationality. Hence, because the Kurdish politics and the anti-HEPP movements have managed to create forms of counter-conduct strong and unified enough to lead to the collision between the program and the reality of governmental technologies; and because they have accomplished transforming the 'real' by articulating Kurdish identity and nature in novel discourses that security dispositif cannot tolerate, they faced even more interventionist and illiberal practices of government.

It seems to me that Occupy Gezi Movement also constitutes a turning point in terms of the articulation of these discourses within such doublet of resistance and domination. That is, the Occupy Gezi completely disrupted the ‘normality’ of neoliberal rationality as it paved the way for the unlikely alliances between the Kurds, Kemalists, anarchists, liberals, Marxists, anti-capitalist Muslims and so on. The movement marked, as well as was marked by, the performative constitution of publics since marginalized groups, such as Saturday Mothers and the LGBTQ+ members, challenged the government of individualization that tied them to a given identity and separated them from others. The freedom that disclosed itself in these struggles against technologies of subjectification had nothing to do with the freedom of choice; rather it was about calling something into being that did not exist before. Such practices of freedom obviously could not have been governed by technologies of environmental intervention as they did not respond to the reality that governmental rationality had constructed. The humor and the mottos that popped up during the struggles; the ‘standing man’, giving flowers and reading books to the police were forms of protests which were clearly outside the “bandwidth of the acceptable” of neoliberal rationality. As a result, the door of possibility of action upon action was closed for the petty sovereigns, and dramatic forms of violence were acted upon bodies so as to leave them with no other option, but passivity. The police brutality that ended up with the casualty of 12 civilians and the injury of 8163 people, marked the inauguration of an era in Turkey which witnessed the ever more ‘irrational’ technologies of government. That is, the AKP government got even more repressive as the discourses articulated during and after the Occupy Gezi could not be encompassed within the regulative grip of governmental rationalities as demands to be further governed. Therefore, as practices of resistance, in their heterogeneity, multiplied and diffused, the repertoire of governmental action has shrunk. In that, the AKP government started to take even harder measures to eliminate what it cannot govern, giving rise to the steady replacement of strategic relations with states of domination, which are strategic situations that emerge as effects of governmental technologies. Accordingly, freedom of speech has been

extremely violated after Occupy Gezi. The fact that social media and Wikipedia have been banned, thousands of journalists have been fired and arrested, 404 academics for signing the peace petition have lost their jobs and passports, the co-chairs and the deputies of the HDP have been imprisoned and 46,193 acts in law have been transacted for insulting Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are only few examples of such violations. Law has completely turned into an instrument to concentrate power in the executive branch with the declaration of State of Emergency on July 21, 2016. Till its abolishment on July 17, 2018, 32 statutory decrees have been enacted. As a result, 125,800 public officials have been dismissed from their professions and hundreds of broadcasting organizations, foundations and associations have been closed. The parliament and the higher courts have been almost nullified due to the immunity of statutory decrees from audit. With the Constitution of 2017, which introduced the presidential system, the normalization of the state of emergency has been legally guaranteed.

Despite not being able to mention these events that constitute the milestones of neoliberal governmentality in Turkey, I believe, it is still possible to claim that this study manages to show how neoliberalism swallows politics in the full sense of the word. In neoliberal rationality we are rendered everywhere and solely homo oeconomicus, meaning that we are no longer citizens with rights that constitute the inviolable limit of governmental action, but an accessory and partner of governmental technologies that can be easily sacrificed to the project of macroeconomic growth. When states, institutions and individuals are all governed by the same logic of competition then law becomes a support for efficiency and competition, rather than a means to protect rights. When every sphere of life is understood in economic terms, every issue becomes risky and technical. Economization, in that, points out a post-political era where certain political demands and conflicts can be labeled as terror acts and all politics is reduced to problem solving. For that, where the only reality is the reality of market logic then there is no need to encounter any political tension. Therefore, neoliberal rationality seems to be one that has no outside.

Nevertheless, the historicity of our beings and our capacity to reflect upon the contingency of power relations that constitutes us pave the way for the possibility of breaking free from neoliberal rationality. Through the never-ending task of Aufklärung, i.e. rejecting the readymade answers, taken for granted tutors and the unquestioned dogmas; and through experimental limit crossing actions there is always the possibility of “separating out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think” (Foucault, 1984, p. 46). This obviously does not explain what lies outside the rationality of neoliberalism, but if anything, it is only due to the impossibility of such an explanation that limit crossing action can be a practice of freedom.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'DE NEOLİBERAL YÖNETİMSELLİK

Türkiye'nin neoliberalizm deneyimini, Foucault'nun sunduğu yönetimsellik eksenini üzerinden anlamlandırmayı amaçlayan bu çalışma iki ana bölüme ayrılmıştır. Foucault'nun iktidar analizlerini savaş modelinden yönetim analitiğine kaydırmasındaki motivasyonun incelendiği ilk bölümde, savaş modelinin özneleşme süreçlerini ve iktidarın makro düzeyini açıklamadaki yetersizliği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu kayış Foucault'nun çalışmalarında metodolojik bir kopuştan ziyade yeni analiz nesnelerinin doğuşuna işaret etmektedir. Zira Foucault'nun yönetimsellik çalışmaları esasında, mikro-iktidar analiziyle devlet, sivil toplum, politik ekonomi, özgürlük, güvenlik ve nüfus gibi makro fenomenleri açıklama denemesidir. Konvansiyonel devlet teorilerine açık bir meydan okuma olan bu deneme, devlet ve toplum, siyaset ve ekonomi, özel ve kamusal alan arasındaki ayrımların evrensel ve zorunlu sınırlara tekabül etmediğini; bu ayrımların bizzat yönetim teknolojilerinin etkileri olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Yani, Foucault her ekonomik iktidarın altında bir iktidar ekonomisi yattığı konusundaki ısrarını yönetimsellik çalışmaları boyunca da sürdürür. Nitekim gouverner (yönetmek) ve mentalité (akıl) kelimelerini birleştirerek yaptığı söz oyunu, iktidar teknolojilerinin yönetimsellik kavramında politik rasyonaliteye bağlandığını gösterir. Bu çerçevede öznelliği de bir iktidar teknolojisi olarak kavramsallaştıran Foucault, devleti ve özneyi inşa eden rasyonalitenin aynılığına dikkat çeker. Modern devletin doğuşunu devletin kendisinden daha geniş teknolojiler bütününe bağlamak amacıyla kolları sıvayan

Foucault, hem nüfus üzerinde politik ekonomiye dayanarak güvenlik aygıtı aracılığıyla uygulanan iktidar teknolojilerini hem de yönetim sanatlarının kademeli bir şekilde devleti yeniden inşa edişini incelemek üzere yönetimselliğin tarihini yazmaya girişir.

Batı Avrupa toplumlarının yönetim çağına girişini 16. yüzyıla dayandıran Foucault, yönetim kavramının köklerini ise sürünün selametini sağlamak amacıyla sürünün tümünü ve her bir üyesini eşzamanlı olarak gözetmeyi gerektiren, bu açıdan da iktidarın bir toprak parçası yerine, hareket halindeki bir çokluk üzerinde uygulandığı İbranilerdeki çoban-sürü oyununda bulur. Hristiyan Kilisesi, pastoral iktidarın temalarını selamet, yasa ve hakikat unsurları üzerinden yeniden düzenleyerek papaz-sürü oyununu icat etmiş olur. Ruhların yönetimi fikrine dayanan bu pastorallik seküler ve siyasal formunu 15. ve 16. yüzyıllardaki politik ve dini çatışmalar sonucunda, Antik Yunan'daki site-yurttaş oyununu da yönetim nosyonuna dahil ederek kazanır. Bir tarafta feodalizme ait yapıların gitgide dağılması ve kolonyal zenginliğin inşası ile devletin güçlenmesi, diğer tarafta ise reform ve karşı reform hareketleri ile selamete ulaşma yönetiminin her daim sorgulanması ile bu iki oyun birleşir ve ruhların idaresinden insanların idaresine geçişin ilk izleri hikmet-i hükümet rasyonalitesinde ortaya çıkar.

Siyaset ve teoloji arasında serpilen ve devleti yönetme sanatına özgü bir rasyonelliğe işaret eden hikmet-i hükümet, devleti yönetimin hem kaynağı hem de amacı olan bir anlaşılabilirlik şeması olarak meydana getirir. Burada yönetmek, dinden, kozmolojiden ve hükümlerden bağımsız olarak kendi prensiplerini kendi içinde bulması gereken bir aktiviteye tekabül eder. Bu açıdan hikmet-i hükümet yasalar üzerinden değil, şartların gereklerine göre koyduğu kurallar üzerinden şeylerin idaresi yoluyla insanların yönetilmesini hedefler. Yönetimin merkezinde daha fazla toprağa hakim olmak değil, Avrupa dengesi sisteminde devleti rakip devletler karşısında ayakta tutabilmek için daha fazla altın biriktirmek, sayıca yüksek ve güçlü bir nüfus barındırmak ve üretim ve ticareti örgütlemek durmaktadır. Devletin gücünün arttırılmasının, devletin kapasitesinin

ve bu kapasiteyi genişletmenin araçlarının bilgisine bağlı olması sebebiyle hikmeti-i hükümet sanatı istatistik bilimi ile iç içe geçmiştir. Kendi demografik özellikleri üzerinden tanımlanan ve devlet gücünün ön koşulu olan nüfusun üretkenliği ve devletin zenginliğine katkıda bulunma kapasitesi istatistiki bilgi aracılığıyla işlev gören polis teknolojisinin sürekli ve ancak hukuk tarafından dışsal olarak sınırlandırılabilir biyopolitik müdahalelerine bağlıdır. Ancak, bir tarafta egemenlik sorunu ve diğer tarafa ise oeconomica çerçevesini aşamayan merkantilizm arasında sıkışıp kalan bu yönetim sanatı 17. yüzyıl sonlarına doğru krize girer. Bu krizden çıkışı mümkün kılan, yönetim sanatından siyaset bilimine, egemenlik yapılarının hakim olduğu bir rejimden yönetim yapılarının hakim olduğu bir rejime geçişi sağlayan liberal yönetimin 18. yüzyıldaki doğuşu olmuştur.

Yönetim alanında bir rasyonelleştirme ilkesi olan liberalizmin özgünlüğü, bireylerin özgür eylemlerini rasyonelleştirmesinde yatar. Laissez-faire ilkesi ile tanımlanan liberalizm insanların istediklerini yapmalarından ziyade onların ne yapmak isteyeceklerini önceden tahmin eden bir yönetimin, bu istekleri çevresel müdahaleler yoluyla düzenlenmesine işaret eder. Kendi menfaatini ararken toplumun genel yararına da hizmet eden homo oeconomicus'un özgürce eyleyebildiği alan olan pazar, politik müdahalelerden muaf olması ölçüsünde işleyebilen yarı-doğal bir mekanizmayı temsil eder. Piyasanın, yararlılık ilkesi üzerinden, yönetimi içsel mekanizmalarla sınırladığı bir hakikat alanı olarak ortaya çıkışını mümkün kılan politik ekonominin doğuşudur. Ancak buradaki sınır, sivil toplumu yönetim müdahalelerinden mutlak şekilde muaf tutmaz. Bilakis, sivil toplum, güvenlik mekanizmaları aracılığıyla homo oeconomicus'un özgür eylemi üzerine eyleyerek yönetildiği alandır. Bu açıdan, Foucault için, birbirine karşıt devlet-toplum ikilisi evrensel ve apriori bir ayrıma işaret etmez, bu liberal üzerinden faaliyet gösterdiği tarihsel / olumsal bir ayrılımdır. Bir başka deyişle, sivil toplum, yönetim teknolojilerinin bilimsel olduğu varsayılan ekonomik alanı politik alandan ayırmak üzere icat ettiği bir taktiktir. Bu bağlamda, homo oeconomicus liberal yönetim sanatının hem nesnesini hem de

dokunulmaz özü ve dışsal sınırını temsil eder. Fakat, liberalizmin olabilirlik koşulunu oluşturan bu dış sınır, 1970lerin başına gelindiğinde ve yönetim, çözümü aciliyet arz eden sosyal ve ekonomik problemlerle karşı karşıya kaldığında, yönetimsellik açısından engelleyici bir faktör haline gelir. Foucault'nun liberal yönetimin krizi olarak adlandırdığı bu dönemden çıkış, homo oeconomicus'un homo juridicus'a, ekonomik liberalizmin politik liberalizme galip gelmesinin, yani insanın her yerde ve her zaman yönetilebilir kılınmasının yolunu açan neoliberal rasyonalite ile mümkün olur.

Kökleri 1930lara uzanan Alman neoliberalizmi, nasyonal sosyalizmi piyasa ekonomisinin düzgün biçimde işleyememesinin bir sonucu olarak görür. Ordoliberalere göre, klasik liberalizmin kusuru laissez-faire ilkesine duydukları naif bağlılıkta yatmaktadır. Zira piyasanın kendi kendini düzenleyen doğal bir mekanizma olduğu yönündeki inanç, piyasanın kendiliğinden çözemediği sorunların çözümü için devlet müdahalesine davetiye çıkarır. İşte tam da bu yüzden, klasik liberalizm giderek liberalliğini kaybetmiş; her ekonomik sorunda devlet müdahalesine müracaat ederek piyasanın işlerliğini altüst etmiştir. Ordoliberaler için ise çözüm, piyasanın sonuçlarına doğrudan müdahalede bulunmakta değil, piyasanın işlemesini mümkün kılan koşullara müdahalede bulunmakta yatmaktadır. Yönetimin yönetimselleşmesi olarak adlandırılabilir olan bu rasyonalite, piyasanın işlemesini mümkün kılan koşulun rekabet mekanizmaları olduğunu öne sürer. Bu anlamda piyasa, dokunulmaması gereken doğal bir gerçekliği temsil etmez; bilakis ancak politik müdahalelerle oluşturulabilir ve korunabilir. Rekabet de, tıpkı piyasa gibi ve mübadelenin aksine, doğal bir olgu olmaktan uzaktır; düzgün şekilde işleyebilmesi ancak yasal düzenlemelerle mümkün olur. En nihayetinde rekabet, kuralları olan bir oyundur. Kuralların konması ve oyunun organize edilmesi tamamen devletin sorumluluğunda olsa da, bir oyun ancak gidişatı ve sonucuna müdahale edilmediği sürece anlamlı olduğundan, devletin piyasayı planlanmaması ve yönlendirilmemesi gerekir. Bu bağlamda, sosyal yardım ancak ve ancak, piyasanın olumsuz etkilerini telafi etme amacı yerine, bir oyuncunun sahip

olduğu her şeyi kaybederek oyuna devam edemeyeceği noktaya gelmesini engelleme amacı ile sağlanırsa meşru olabilir. Yani, devlet müdahalesi yalnızca rekabetin kurulmasına ve yaşatılmasına hizmet ettiği sürece mubahtır. Devlet ayrıca, her oyuncunun herkes için eşit eşitsizlik vadeden bu oyuna katılabilmesi için topluma kültürel müdahalelerde bulunmak durumundadır. Söz konusu kültürel müdahale, yaşamın her alanının girişimci bir ruhla yeniden inşa edilmesine, yani rekabeti işletecek olan toplumun girişim kültürü ile yeniden organize edilmesine işaret eder. Kısacası, hukuku bir üstyapı olgusu olmaktan çıkarıp girişim toplumunun inşası için araçsallaştıran, ve toplumu rekabetin sürekliliğini sağlamak için yöneten bu rasyonalite, klasik liberalizmin devlet tarafından gözlemlenen piyasasının yerine, piyasa tarafından gözlenen bir devlet anlayışını yerleştirir.

Amerikan neoliberalizmi, Ordoliberalere, tam da toplumsal olan ve ekonomik olan arasında ayırım yapmaları noktasında karşı çıkar. Chicago Okulu için mesele, ekonomik modelin toplumsal ilişkilerin analizi için kullanılacak bir anlaşılabilirlik şeması olarak yeniden kodlanması, bu sayede de toplum ve ekonomi arasındaki ayırımın büsbütün bertaraf edilmesidir. Bu saikle, ekonomik rasyonalite kar-zarar ve fırsat maliyeti hesaplamaları üzerinden ekonomik olmayan alanlara ve bireysel davranışlara devredilir. İleride ayrıntılı olarak bahsedilecek olan bu *ekonomikleşme* bir yandan toplumsal ilişkileri ekonominin bir biçimi olarak okuma işlevi görürken, diğer taraftan da yönetim pratiklerinin verimlilik kıstasınca ölçülmesini sağlar.

Özetle, görülmektedir ki, neoliberal rasyonalite klasik liberalizmden toptan bir kopuşa işaret eder. Zira neoliberalizm, klasik liberalizmin devlet-ekonomi ilişkisini tersine çevirir: Devlet artık piyasa özgürlüğüne yer açmaya çalışmaz; piyasanın kendisi devleti ve toplumu düzenleyen prensiptir. Ayrıca, bu özgürlük kaynağını doğadan alan mübadele süreçlerinde değil, yapay olarak imal edilen rekabet süreçlerinde ortaya çıkar. İşte bu iki radikal dönüşümdendir ki, neoliberal

rasyonalite ekonomiyi hayatın her alanına yayabilmiş ve insanı her yerde ve yalnızca homo oeconomicus kılabilmiştir.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümde ise, neoliberal yönetimsellik güvenlikleştirme, ekonomikleştirme ve özneleştirme olmak üzere üç başlık altında ele alınmış, bu başlıklara referansla 1980 sonrası Türkiye’inde ortaya çıkan geçici köy koruculuğu sistemi, hidroelektrik santraller ve sağlık çalışanları için performans dayalı ek ödeme sistemi incelenmiştir. Buradaki amaç, bu üç olgunun meşruiyetlerini sorgulamak veya etkilerini incelemekten ziyade, bu olguların nasıl olup da düşünülebilirlik ve işlerlik koşullarını neoliberal rasyonalitede bulduğunu anlamaya çalışmaktır.

Geçici Köy Koruculuğu sistemi, PKK’nin 15 Ağustos 1984’te Eruh ve Şemdinli ilçelerinde gerçekleştirdiği silahlı eylemlere bir cevap mahiyetinde kurulmuştur. Sistem, yasal dayanağını 1924 tarihli Köy Kanunu’ndan alıyor ve işleyiş biçimi açısından Hamidiye Alayları ile çarpıcı benzerlikler taşıyor olsa da, bu çalışmada gösterilmeye çalışıldığı üzere, sistemin 26 Mart 1985 tarihinde yeniden canlandırılmasının koşulu olan rasyonalite, diğer örneklerdekinden tamamen farklıdır. Zira GKK sistemi, 1970lerin sonuna dek icat edilmemiş bir kavram olan terör ile savaşta yerel halkın devletin güvenlik güçlerinin yanında aktif bir biçimde saf tutmasını garanti altına alma amacıyla kurulmuştur. Bu açıdan, sistemin önceki örneklerden esas farkı disiplin teknolojileri üzerinden değil, güvenlik teknolojileri üzerinden hayata geçirilmesinde yatmaktadır.

Güvenlik, disiplin teknolojilerinin aksine, bedenler üzerinde değil, nüfus üzerinde işler. Amacı, yasaklamak ya da bedenleri ideal bir norma göre hizaya sokmak değil, istatistikler yoluyla optimal olanı hesaplayarak ve güce karşı gücü devreye sokarak hayatın kendisini düzenlemektir. İnsanların ve şeylerin mümkün olan en iyi şekilde dolaşımının sağlayabilmesi uğruna yönetilebilir riskleri yönetilemeyenlerden ayıran güvenlik aygıtının işleyebilmesi için nüfusun bir kısmı toplumun genel refahı uğruna harcanabilir olmalıdır. Burada, kimin

yaşatılacağı ve kimin ölümüne terk edileceği arasındaki seçim aşkın bir yasaya göre değil, kaynağı süreçlerin kendisine içkin olarak tanımlanan risklere göre belirlenir. Politik ekonominin doğuşuyla birlikte, güvenlik aygıtı ekonomik terimler üzerinden, özgürlük üretiminin maliyetini hesaplama prensibi olarak yeniden tanımlanır ve işlerlik mekanını özgür dolaşımın alanı olan pazarda bulur. Neoliberal yönetim sanatının hakimiyet kazanmasıyla ve piyasa rasyonalitesinin tüm toplumsal formları içermesiyle birlikte ise, güvenlik teknolojileri toplumsal ilişkilerin tamamına sirayet eder. Özgürlüğü üzerinden yönetilebilen öznelerin toplumsal normaliteyi temsil ettiği neoliberal rasyonalitede güvenlik aygıtı, seçimlerini kar-zarar analizi üzerinden yap(a)mayan, yani neoliberalizmin gerçekliğine cevap ver(e)meyen özneleri risk faktörü olarak kodlar. Terörist, tam da bu uzaktan yönetilemeye verilen isimdir. Düşmandan farklı olarak bir kimliği yoktur; muğlaktır, irrasyoneldir ve her yeredir. Terör, tam da bu yüzden, her tür politik meseleyi bir problem çözümüne indirgeyen, kendi çizdiği sınırlar dışında yükselen her sesi ve nüfusun ekonomik-rasyonele uygun davranmayan her kesimini elimine edilmesi gereken risk faktörü olarak gören neoliberal rasyonalitenin bir ürünüdür. Aslında amacına ulaşmak için askeri yöntemler kullanan bir siyasi parti olan PKK de terör söylemi içinde anlamsızlaştırılmış, ideolojisizleştirilmiş ve adeta kendi kendisinin sebebiymiş gibi lanse edilmiştir. Teröre verilen cevap politik olamaz; çünkü terör söylemi gerçekliğin kendisini politik bir mesele olarak değil, teknik bir mesele olarak problemlleştirir. Yani, terörün çözümü asimilasyon değil, savaştır, zira terörist toplumun tolere edebileceğinin dışında durandır ve bu nedenle de genel refah için yok edilmesi elzemdir.

Terörle olan savaş bağlamında, Foucault'nun egemenlik, disiplin ve güvenlik teknolojilerinin kronolojik bir şekilde birbirini ortadan kaldırmak yerine, aralarından birinin olumsuz olarak diğerlerine baskın geldiği geçişli iktidar kompozisyonları oluşturdukları iddiası büyük bir anlam kazanır. Çünkü belirli bir nüfusu uzaktan yöneten iktidar teknolojileri, böyle bir yönetime direnen nüfuslarla karşılaştığında egemenlik iktidarına benzer biçimler almaktadır. Ancak

neoliberalizmde zuhur eden egemen, toplumun rızasını iradesinde temsil eden merkezi, tekil ve aşkın egemen değildir. Neoliberal yönetimselliğin yasayı meşruiyetini bir normdan değil, amacından alan araçlar kümesine çevirmesiyle, egemen de çeşitli hesaplamalar ışığında yapılan seçimleri gerçekleştirmede yasayı bir taktik olarak kullanabilen kişiler olarak yeniden tanımlanır. Terörle savaş çerçevesinde, egemenlik, GKK gibi paralegal bir örgütün kurulmasına olanak sağlamak için yasayı askıya alan yürütme ve güvenlik güçlerine yayılmakla kalmaz, silah taşıma ve teröristi öldürme hürriyeti kazanmış koruculara da devredilir. Dolayısıyla, neoliberal toplumlarda şiddet devletin tekelinde değildir; güvenlik adına demokratikleştirilmiştir. Devlet ve toplum arasındaki ayrımın bulanıklaştığı böylesi bir durumda vatandaşlık kategorisi hak kavramına referansla tanımlanan biçimsel kapsayıcılığını kaybeder. Neoliberal vatandaşlık, bu açıdan, hukuki bir kategoriye değil, sınırları sorumluluk ve gönüllülük söylem ve pratikleriyle çizilmiş egemenlik alanının içinde olma statüsüne tekabül eder. Vatandaş artık canı, malı ve özgürlüğü devletin güvencesinde olan kimse değil, risk yönetiminde aktif olarak devletle birlikte çalışacak ve gerekirse bu uğurda canını, malını ve özgürlüğünü feda edecek olan kimsedir. GKK sistemi açısından bu yeni vatandaşlık tanımının yarattığı sonuç açıktır: yerel halk için tarafsızlık bir opsiyon olarak ortadan kalkmıştır. Ya devletin yanındadır; ya da teröristisindir.

Devletin, PKK'yle silahlı çatışmanın durduğu 2013 Çözüm Süreci döneminde dahi sistemi tasfiye etmek yerine yeni korucu alımı yapması, bu paramiliter yapılanmanın devlet nezdinde terörle etkin mücadelenin ötesinde bir işlevi olduğunu kanıtlar niteliktedir. Bu işlev sistemin kendisinin nüfusun yönetilebilir ve yönetilemez kesimleri arasında, yani kimin yaşatılacağı ve kimin öldürüleceği arasında ayırım yapmak için kullanılan bir aygıt olmasından ileri gelir. Bu açıdan, GKK basitçe devletin terörle savaşma kapasitesinin düşüklüğünü telafi etmek ve yerel halkın desteğini almak için kurulmuş bir sistem değildir. Bilakis, bu sistem, bireysel haklar ve bunlara tekabül eden kamusal sorumlulukları, kamu hakları ve bunlara tekabül eden bireysel sorumluluklarla değiştiren neoliberal rasyonalitenin

bir üründür. Bu nedenle, devletin şiddet tekeli halkla paylaşması, devletteki yetersizlik sonucunda değil, neoliberal yönetimin sivil toplumu da içerecek biçimde genişlemesi sonucunda mümkün olmuştur. Kısacası, bu sistem, politik olanı terör söylemi üzerinden güvenlikleştirirken, güvenliği kamu-özel ortaklıklarıyla ekonomikleştiren ve sektörleştiren neoliberal yönetim teknolojilerinin bir ürünü olarak düşünülebilirlik ve işlerlik kazanır.

Çalışmanın neoliberal yönetimselliği ekonomikleştirme ayağı üzerinden incelediği ikinci kısımda, Türkiye’de 2000li yılların başından itibaren patlak veren nehir tipi hidroelektrik santral çılgınlığı ele alınmıştır. 2003 yılına kadar 12.000 MW civarında olan hidroelektrik kurulu gücünün 2017 yılında 27.000 MW’ı aşmış olmasıyla özetlenebilecek olan bu çılgınlığın yolu, hidroelektrik santral yapımı ve işletilmesinin özel şirketlere devredilmesini mümkün kılan 20 Şubat 2001 tarihli Elektrik Piyasası Kanunuyla açılmıştır. Düşük maliyetli ve çevreyle uyumlu enerji üretiminin yolunun rekabet ilkesi üzerine kurulu, istikrarlı ve denetlenebilir bir enerji piyasası oluşturulmasından geçtiğini öne süren bu yasanın ardından EPDK gibi yeni kurumlar yaratılmasının yanı sıra, DSİ gibi halihazırda var olan devlet kurumları da nehir ve derelerin kullanım hakkının 49 yıllığına özel şirketlere devrini kolaylaştırıcı ilkelerle bağdaşacak şekilde yeniden yapılandırılmıştır. Suyun piyasada fiyatlandırılabilen ekonomik bir mal olarak tanımlanabilmesinin koşulu olan rasyonalitenin anlaşılabilmesi için doğanın 20. yüzyıl ortalarından itibaren hangi hakikat rejimi içerisinde çevre (environment) olarak inşa edildiğinin soykütüksel bir analizinin yapılması gereklidir.

Çevreyi insandan ayrı olan ve korunması gereken bir nesne olarak kuran söylemin ilk izlerini 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortaya çıkan savaş karşıtı hareketlerde bulmak mümkün olsa da, bu söylemin iktidar teknolojilerinin düzenleme alanına girmesi 1967’de Dünya’nın uzaydan çekilen ilk fotoğrafıyla mümkün olmuştur. Doğal kaynakların kısıtlı olduğunu ve insan aktivitelerinin ozon tabakasına, okyanuslara, ormanlara, kutuplara vs. verdiği zararı gözler önüne seren bu fotoğraf, Dünya’nın bilimsel söyleme girişine yol açmıştır.

Bilimin insanın Dünya'ya verdiđi zarar üzerine bilgi üretebilmeye başlamasıyla birlikte çevre apokaliptik, antroposentrik ve apolitik bir söylemin içine yerleştirilmiştir. Ortaya çıkan bu teknik söylem, endüstrileşmenin mevcut şekilde devam etmesi durumunda oluşacak olan felaketleri önlemenin tek yolunun sürdürülebilir çevre yönetiminden geçtiđi yönünde tartışmasız bir görüş birliđi doğurmuş ve böylece çevre, risk yönetimi kapsamına sokulmuştur. 1970lerden itibaren, ekonomik çözümlene modelinin ekonomik olmayan alanları kapsamamasıyla, yani neoliberal ekonomikleştirme ile birlikte ekoloji, kıt kaynakları verimli kullanma meselesine dönüştürülmüştür. Varılan sonuç basitçe şudur: Doğal kaynakların kullanımına ekonomik bir bedel biçmemek, kaynakların israf edilmesini teşvik etmektir. İşte tam da bu noktada, çevre herkes tarafından kullanılan ve dolayısıyla herkes tarafından (verilen zararların parasal olarak tazmin edilmesi aracılığıyla) korunması gereken bir *kamu malı* olarak inşa edilir. Ekoloji ve ekonominin bu tuhaf kombinasyonu, 1987 yılında ilk kez ortaya atılan sürdürülebilir kalkınma kavramıyla birlikte somutluk kazanır ve bilim insanlarını, uluslararası finans kuruluşlarını, hükümetleri ve çevre aktivistlerini temiz enerji kaynađı arayışı noktasında buluşturur.

Ekonomik küreselleşme söyleminin zuhur ettiđi 1990lı yıllarda sürdürülebilir kalkınma stratejileri küresel çevre yönetişiminin temel ilkesi olarak koyutlanmış, ekolojik hassasiyete sahip olmadığı varsayılan küresel Güney ülkeleri, bu ilke doğrultusunda teknik yardım, ekonomik teşvik, şartlı borç ve benzeri iktidar teknolojileri yoluyla disipline edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Buradaki amaç, çevre yönetimi ve enerji üretimi konusunda beceriksiz ve verimsiz olduđu düşünölen bürokrasinin yerini formel rekabet mekanizmalarının almasını sağlamaktır. Yani asıl hedef, Güney ülkelerindeki doğal kaynakların özelleştirilmesi deđil, kaynak yönetiminin girişimcilik ilkelerine uygun olarak gerçekleştirildiđinin garanti altına alınmasıdır. Ancak, Türkiye örneđine bakıldığında bu hedefin gerçekleşmekten uzak olduđu görölmektedir. Zira üzerinde HES yapılması planlanan nehir ve derelerin hemen hepsi özelleştirilmiş; bununla birlikte, sürdürülebilirlik ilkeleri doğrultusunda oluşturulan ÇED süreçleri ve bütönlük

havza yönetimi kuralları aşılması gereken bürokratik engellere indirgenmiştir. Kısacası, ekonomi ve rekabet mantığı Türkiye'ye tamamen yerleşmiş olsa da, ekoloji söylemi kendine yer bulamamıştır. Bu konuda AKP hükümetinin tercihleri belirleyici bir rol oynuyor olsa da, büyük resme bakıldığında şurası açıktır ki Türkiye, Kuzey ülkelerinin aksine, hiçbir zaman sınai büyümenin limitlerine ulaşmamıştır. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'de çevrenin verimli kullanımı ekonomik büyüme açısından bir zorunluluk teşkil etmez. Bilakis, çevreyi sürdürülebilir kalkınma ilkeleri uyarınca yönetmek artı masraf kalemleri yaratması nedeniyle ekonomik büyümenin önünde bir engel teşkil etmektedir. Bir başka deyişle, Kuzey ülkeleri ve Türkiye arasında hakim yönetim rasyonalitesi açısından hiçbir fark yoktur, ikisinde de amaç ekonomik büyümedir. Aralarındaki tek fark, birinde ekonomik büyüme doğal kaynakların uzun vadeli kullanımını zaruri kılarken, diğesinde böyle bir zaruret (en azından şimdilik) olmamasıdır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında Türkiye'deki HES çılgınlığına yön veren motivasyonun enerji üretimi değil, temiz enerji kredilerinden nemalanma ve yabancı sermaye yatırımlarını çekme olması da şaşırtıcı değildir. Zira yarısına yakınının kurulu gücü 10 MW'ın altında olan HESlerden üretilen enerjinin ekonomik geri dönüşü, temiz enerji piyasasının ve yabancı yatırımlarınınkinin bir hayli altında kalmaktadır.

Santrallerin kuruldukları yerlerde doğal ve sosyo-ekonomik yaşam üzerinde yarattığı sayısız tahribatın AKP hükümetinin gözünde bir önem arz etmemesi de devleti yararlığı üzerinden değil, verimliliği üzerinden değerlendiren neoliberal rasyonalite ile son derece tutarlıdır. Neoliberal rasyonalitede ihtiyaçları üzerinden tanımlanan bir toplum yoktur; kendi ihtiyaçlarını karşılamakla yükümlü bireyler vardır. Bu da demektir ki, yararı gözetilecek bir kamu fikri neoliberal rasyonaliteye yabancısıdır. Kamu yararı, neoliberalizm için, özel çıkarların rekabetinin üretilmesinden başka bir şey değildir. Her bireyin eşit şekilde fayda sağlayabildiği(!) rekabet süreçlerinin garanti altına alınmasıyla bireyler kendi beşeri sermayelerini maksimize edebilecekleri koşullara kavuşurlar. Hidroelektrik piyasası tam da bu rekabeti üretmesi sayesinde kamu yararına hizmet sağlar ve

hidroelektrik santrallerin kurulduğu bölgelerdeki yerel halkın yaşadığı kayıplar bu kamu yararından bir şey eksiltmez; zira her rekabet sürecinin bir kaybedeni ve bir kazananı olmak zorundadır.

Öte yandan, devletin verimlilik ilkesi üzerinden değerlendirilmesinin bir diğer anlamı devletin kendisinin de küresel rekabet kurallarına tabi bir işletme olduğudur. Bu açıdan, kamu yararı bir ülkenin küresel pazardaki payını artırma yeteneğini de tanımlar, zira sıfır toplamlı bu oyunda kazanan olmak demek, daha fazla ekonomik büyüme ve daha rekabetçi piyasa mekanizmaları demektir. Bu bağlamda, ülkenin nehirlerini yabancı şirketlere kiralamanın bile son derece hamasi ve milliyetçi retoriklerle sunulması, neoliberal rasyonalitede, bir ikiyüzlülüğe veya paradoksa işaret etmez. Tam tersine, HESlere karşı olmak, ulusal çıkarlara ve kamu yararına karşı olmaktır. Hal böyleyken, yaşam alanlarını savunmak için direnen köylülerin terörist-vatan haini ilan edilmesinden daha doğal ne olabilir ki? Özetle, bu kısımda gösterilmeye çalışılan nokta şudur ki; problemin özü hidroelektrik piyasasını büyütmek için türlü yolsuzluğa başvuran AKP hükümetinden ziyade, doğayı ekonomik büyüme için kullanılacak kaynaklar olarak kuran neoliberal rasyonalitede yatmaktadır. En nihayetinde AKP, bu rasyonalitenin kurallarını koyduğu oyunda zafere ulaşmak için hile yapan bir oyuncudan fazlası değildir.

Çalışmanın son kısmında ele alınan ve 12 Mayıs 2006 yılında uygulamaya geçirilen sağlık çalışanları için performans dayalı ek ödeme sistemi, AKP hükümetinin 2003 yılında başlattığı, devlet hastanelerini finansal ve yönetsel olarak bağımsızlaştırmayı ve sağlık hizmetlerinin sunumunu yeni kamu işletmeciliği prensipleri çerçevesinde yeniden düzenlemeyi öngören Sağlıkta Dönüşüm projesinin önemli bir parçasıdır. Bir ücret esnekleştirme politikası olarak tanımlanabilecek olan bu sistem, sağlık çalışanlarının aldıkları ücretin önemli bir bölümünün, devlet bütçesinden dağıtılan maaşlar yerine, çalışanların ay boyunca yaptıkları işlemler sonucu topladıkları performans puanlarına göre paylaştırılan hastane döner sermaye primlerinden karşılanması ilkesine

dayanmaktadır. Böylelikle, yüksek performansın ödüllendirildiği sözde adil bir ücret mekanizması kurulması yoluyla kamu harcamalarının kısıtlanmasının yanı sıra, çalışanların çıkarlarının sermayedarlarla ortaklaştırılması amaçlanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu sistem işçi ve işveren arasındaki ilişkinin köklü bir değişimine tekabül etmektedir. Ancak bu çalışmada gösterilmeye çalışıldığı üzere, bu değişimin olabirlik koşulu üretim tarzındaki bir dönüşümde değil, öznellik üretimindeki dönüşümde temellenmektedir. Nitekim davranışın olasılığını yönlendirme mantığına dayanan performans sistemleri, ancak ve ancak sistem tarafından belirlenen yargı kriterlerini içselleştiren öznelerin varlığında işlerlik kazanabilir.

Foucault'nun altını çizdiği üzere, Gary Becker ve Theodore Shultz'un beşeri sermaye kuramı, neoliberal öznenin hangi rasyonalite ve teknolojiler doğrultusunda kendi için bir sermaye olarak kurulduğunu göstermesi açısından büyük önem taşır. Beşeri sermaye kuramı, klasik liberallerin soyutlayarak pasifleştirdiğini iddia ettiği emek faktörünü ekonomik analize dahil etme amacıyla ortaya çıkar ve ekonomiye özgü olduğu varsayılan nesnel yasalar yerine öznel iradeye bağlı yasalardan yola çıkılmasının gereğini vurgular. Bu kurama göre, ekonomik analizin sorması gereken asıl soru bireylerin sahip oldukları kıt kaynakları olası amaçlardan hangisine ve hangi saik doğrultusunda yönlendirdikleri sorusu olmalıdır. Her tür insan davranışının ekonomik analizin nesnesi olduğu iddiası, emeğin gelecekteki bir gelirin kaynağı olan bir sermaye biçimi olduğu anlayışını da beraberinde getirir. Ancak, bilgi, beceri ve yetenek gibi faktörlerden oluşan emek, diğer sermaye türlerinden farklı olarak, ona sahip olan insandan ayrıştırılmaz. Bu nedenle özel bir sermaye biçimine tekabül eden insan sermayesi, doğuştan gelen fiziksel-genetik yatkınlıklar ve kendine yapılan yatırımlar sonucunda kazanılan beceriler olmak üzere iki bileşenden oluşur. Eğitim, beslenme, spor, evlilik, entelektüel ve duygusal gelişim ve benzeri konularda atılan her adım kişinin kendi sermayesine yaptığı bir katkı olarak değerlendirilir. Bu klasik liberalizmin *homo oeconomicus*'undan farklı bir ekonomik insanın doğuşuna işaret eder: yatırım yapacağı yeri özgürce seçen, risk

alarak ve olası başarısızlıkların tüm sorumluluğunu üstlenerek kendi sermayesini maksimize etmeyi hedefleyen bir kendisinin girişimcisi. Fakat paradoksal olan nokta şudur ki, hayat kalitesini kendi aldığı kararlar doğrultusunda belirleyen bu otonom girişimci verdiği kararların tümünü ekonomik rasyonalite üzerinden hesaplanması bağlamında manipüle edilebilir bir nesneye dönüşür. Zira kar-zarar hesaplaması üzerinden ‘özgürce’ yapılan seçimler, tam da özgür olduğu momentte yönetsel teknolojilerin çevresel (milieu) müdahalelerine ve düzenlemelerine açık hale gelir. Beşeri sermaye kuramının, kamu personelini verimlileştirmek amacı güden performansa dayalı prim sistemlerinin düşünülebilirlik ve işletilebilirlik koşulunu oluşturduğunu anlamak için mesele, bir madalyonun iki yüzünü temsil eden özgürlük ve yönetilebilirlik boyutlarında ele alınmalıdır.

Seçme özgürlüğüne indirgenmiş bir özgürlüğün öznesi olduğu varsayılan sağlık personeli yaptığı seçimlerin tamamından sorumlu tutulur. Bu anlayışa göre, daha fazla hasta çekebilmek, unvanını yükseltmek, daha çok performans puanı toplamak ve piyasanın esnek gereksinimlerine cevap verebilecek yetilere sahip olmak personelin kendi sorumluluğu altındadır. Güvenceli istihdam modelleri ve özlük hakları, bu açıdan, çalışanın kendi sermayesine yatırım yapmasını engellemenin yanı sıra rekabeti baltalayarak toplumun genel çıkarlarına ters düşen, yanlış politikalarlardır. Hastanın müşteriye dönüşmesi sürecinin de altında yatan bu mantık, risklerin hesaplanabilir ve bireyler tarafından yönetilebilir olduğu anlayışına dayanan yeni bir ihtiyatlılık etiği kurar.

Öte yandan, özgür bireylerin seçim yaptıkları alan içerisinde yapılan düzenlemelerle yönetilebileceği düşüncesi, tüm insan davranışının ekonomikleştirilmesinden kaynaklanır. Toplumsal ilişkilerin ve bireysel davranışların ekonomik anlaşılabilirlik şeması içine yerleştirilmesiyle, bir kurumun sahip olduğu maddi kaynaklar ve personeller arasındaki özsel farklılık ortadan kalkmış olur. Bir hastane işletmesi, insan kaynaklarını tıpkı diğer kaynaklarını kullandığı gibi en verimli şekilde kullanmak ve yönetmek

durumundadır. Böyle bir yönetim ise ekonomik-rasyonel personeli göstermiş olduğu performanstan ötürü mükafatlandırmak veya cezalandırmaktan geçer. Burada amaç çalışanlar üzerinde doğrudan güç uygulamak değil, çalışanların daha çok çalışmayı ve daha verimli olmayı arzulayacakları bir rekabet ortamı yaratmaktır.

Şurası açıktır ki, niceliği niteliğe üstün kılan ve yapılan tıbbi işlemlerin sayısal değerlerle puanlanabileceğini öngören bu sistem, her zaman için, davranışı maddi teşviklerle güdülenen personelin suistimaline açıktır. Zira artık önemli olan hasta yararı değil, hastane işletmelerinin ve sağlık çalışanlarının kazancıdır. Daha fazla hasta daha fazla performans puanı anlamında geldiğinden, bir hastaya daha az zaman ayırmak doktorlar arasında yaygın bir eğilime dönüşmüştür. Doktorların hastalardan lüzumsuz laboratuvar ve görüntüleme testi talep ettikleri ve hastalar üzerinde gereksiz tıbbi işlemler uyguladıkları da bilinen gerçeklerdir. Kısacası, neoliberal rasyonalitenin yaygın yönetim stratejileri olan güvencesizleştirme ve profesyonelleştirme, sağlık alanını ele geçirdiği noktada geri dönüşü olmayan sonuçlar yaratabilmektedir.

Bu çalışmada incelenen üç olgu da neoliberal rasyonalitede insanların ve doğanın *kendinde-şey* olarak bir değer taşımadığına; ekonomik amaçlar uğruna kullanılacak kaynaklar olarak nesneleştirildiğine işaret etmektedir. Keza, siyaset de bu kaynakların verimli yönetimini sağlama becerisine indirgenmiştir. Verimli kaynak kullanımı ilkesiyle tanımlanan siyaset, bir yandan eğitim, sağlık, güvenlik ve enerji üretimi gibi hizmetlerin özel sektöre ve bireysel sorumluluklara devredilmesiyle kamu harcamalarının azaltılmasını hedeflerken, diğer yandan da yönetemediği sesleri susturmak için uğraşır. Kısacası, problem çözmeye dayalı yönetimden ve risk yönetiminden başka hiçbir şeyin meşru siyaset alanında görülmediği neoliberal rasyonalite post-politik olarak tanımlanabilecek bir çağda yaşadığımızın habercisidir. Tam da bu sebeple, neoliberalizme bir ideoloji olarak karşı çıkmak veya neoliberalizmi ekonomik bir siyasaya indirgeyip başarısızlıklarını sıralamak yeterli değildir. Neoliberalizmin dışına çıkabilmek

için bu rasyonelitenin dönüştürdüğü toplumsal ilişkilerin ve onda özneleş(tiril)en benliklerin dışına çıkabilmek gereklidir. Bu da ancak özgürlük pratikleriyle mümkün olabilir.

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