WORLDVIEWS AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION:
AN INTEGRATION OF POLARITY THEORY, DUAL PROCESS MODEL,
AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÜLDEN SAYILAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

AUGUST 2018

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____

Prof. Dr. Canan SÜMER
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu CİNGÖZ-ULU
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members (first name belongs to the chairperson of the jury and the second name belongs to supervisor)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Derya HASTA (Ankara Uni. Psychology) ————————

Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu CİNGÖZ-ULU (METU, Psychology) ————————

Prof. Dr. Türker ÖZKAN   (METU, Psychology) ————————

Asst. Prof. Dr. Yonca TOKER   (METU, Psychology) ————————

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nevin SOLAK   (TEDU, Psychology) ————————

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Gülden SAYILAN

Signature   :

ABSTRACT

WORLDVIEWS AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS:
AN INTEGRATION OF POLARITY THEORY, DUAL PROCESS MODEL, AND
MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

Sayılan, Gülden

Ph.D., Department of Psychology

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu

August 2018, 139 pages

Scholars in the field of political psychology examined the psychological factors that underlie political orientation and contributed greatly to our understanding of the concept. However, there is still more to learn on the processes by which these factors result in ideological orientations. Integration of worldviews in the study of ideology would be valuable since they have effects on a wide range of sociopolitical beliefs attitudes and they show the route from feelings and ideas about everything, to concrete and organized ideological orientations. After reviewing Polarity Theory, Dual Process Model and Moral Foundations Theory and their postulations related to links between worldviews and ideological orientation, this thesis tests an integrative model examining the links between worldviews and ideological orientations. Results indicate that dual social worldviews of Dual Process Model constitute the schematic bases upon which the worldview constructs of Polarity Theory (i.e., humanism and normativism) and moral foundations (i.e. individualizing and binding moral foundations) build and predict the ideological orientations of individuals in an integrative manner.

Keywords: worldview, political ideology, Polarity Theory, Dual Process Model, Moral Foundations Theory

ÖZ

DÜNYA GÖRÜŞLERİ VE İDEOLOJİK YÖNELİMLER:
KUTUPLAŞMA KURAMI, İKİLİ SÜREÇ MODELİ VE AHLAKİ TEMELLER
KURAMININ BÜTÜNLEŞTİRİLMESİ

Sayılan, Gülden

Doktora, Psikoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Banu Cingöz Ulu

Politik ideolojilerin temelinde yatan psikolojik etmenler alanyazında sıklıkla incelenmiş ve ideoloji konusunda pek çok faydalı bakış açısı ortaya atılmıştır. Ancak, bu etmenlerin ideolojik yönelimlere dönüşme süreci hakkında öğrenilmesi gereken çok şey vardır. Dünya görüşlerinin ideoloji hakkındaki çalışmalarla dahil edilmesi, sosyopolitik inanış ve tutumlara olan etkileri ve her şey hakkındaki duygu ve düşüncelerden daha somut ve organize bir kavram olan ideolojik yönelime giden yolu göstermeleri bakımından önemlidir. Bu tez, Kutuplaşma Kuramı, İkili Süreç Modeli ve Ahlaki Temeller Kuramı ile bu kuramların dünya görüşleri ve ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkiye dair önermelerini derledikten sonra dünya görüşleri ve ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkileri inceleyen bütünleştirici bir modeli test etmektedir. Elde edilen bulgular İkili Süreç Modelinin bir parçası olan ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin Kutuplaşma Kuramının iki dünya görüşü (hümanizm ve normativism) ile ahlaki temellerin (bireyselleştirici ve bağdaştırıcı temelleri) üzerinde şekillendiği ve bütüncül biçimde bireylerin ideolojik yönelimlerini belirledikleri şematik temeller olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: dünya görüşü, politik ideoloji, Kutuplaşma Kuramı, İkili Süreç Modeli, Ahlaki Temeller Kuramı

To Pia, my better half,

and to a better world…

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENS

APPENDICES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The difference between political attitudes of individuals with a left-wing orientation and those with a right-wing orientation could be seen as a fundamental topic in the study of political psychology (Jost, 2006). One of the first attempts in examining ideological differences of individuals identifying themselves with either political left or right mostly is the seminal study of Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Since then researchers have studied on the psychological variables underlying ideological differences and came up with different explanations (see Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003 for reviews).

Despite these efforts, there is still need for a more integrative framework on the structure of ideology. In my view, an integrated study of ideological orientation should take worldviews into account since worldviews, as broad patterns of meaning, affect individual variation in a wide range of sociopolitical attitudes as well as political variations (Tomkins, 1963). A widely supported view of Duckitt and his colleagues (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plesis, & Birum; 2002) suggests that ideological attitudes of individuals are rooted in a dual process in which threat and dominance-based worldviews as well as personality traits predict individual variability in ideology. Tomkins' (1963) Polarity Theory suggests that left wing and right wing ideologies are rooted in two worldviews, namely humanism and normativism. These worldviews are composed of biological, psychological and social factors and show how these broad patterns of meaning might turn into concrete ideological positions. They could be considered as the affective basis that structures the personality of individuals and determines the direction of interactions individuals form with others, as well as emotional experiences and appraisal of those

14

experiences. A more recent perspective of Haidt and his colleagues; on the other hand, argues that ideological differences are rooted in the moral foundations of individuals (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007, 2009). I believe that an integrative model including these perspectives will shed light on the relationship between worldview and ideology since it shows us how the broadest patterns of meaning might turn into more organized beliefs and principles about the social world which determines the ideological orientation of individuals.

This paper is divided into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is the Introduction Chapter which I summarize the differences between political right and left, define the construct of worldview within the boundaries of psychological research, review Polarity Theory, Dual Process Model and Moral Foundations Theory as well as their postulations on ideological differences and present an integrative model examining the links between worldviews and ideological orientations. Chapter 2 includes two studies (Study 1a & 1b) aiming at adaptation of dual social worldview scales into Turkish cultural context. Chapter 3 includes two studies (Study 2a and 2b) conducted to adapt polarity scale into Turkish cultural context and test the factor structure. Chapter 4 includes one study; i.e. the main study, where the proposed model examining the relationship between worldviews and ideological orientation is tested. Finally, Chapter 5 includes a general discussion and implications of findings from all studies conducted.

1.1. The Differences between Ideological Left and Right

Although various definitions of political ideology are in use in the literature, it could be defined in the broadest terms as

> a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern, (2) are held by significant groups, (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy, and (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community (Freeden, 2003, p. 32).

Similar to this, Lane (1962, pp. 415-416; italics added) suggested that "for any society, an *existential base* creating certain *common experiences* interpreted

through certain *cultural premises* by *men with certain personal qualities* in the light of certain social conflicts produces certain political ideologies" As these definitions suggest, political ideologies are all common in explaining individuals' beliefs, values, and behaviors related to politics. Hence, the study of political ideologies from a psychological perspective focuses on how and why individuals are attracted to certain political ideologies as well as the outcomes of ideologies.

Scholarly interest of social and political psychologists in political ideologies begins with analysis of personality differences between right wingers and left wingers. After Jaensch (1938; as cited in Brown, 2004) who compared the two types of personalities on the assumption that personalities represent a 'unity of style', Adorno and his colleagues published their famous study, The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al, 1950). In their book, the authors focused on the differences between the ideologies of potential fascists and those of democratic individuals and argued that the authoritarian personality type is characterized by a cluster of nine traits (i.e. authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, conventionalism, anti-intellectualism, antiintraception, superstition and stereotypy, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, power and 'toughness', and elevated concerns over sex). Moreover, they argued that these traits form a 'structural unit' making individuals predisposed to an attitudinal syndrome including ethnocentrism, intolerance of ambiguity and mental rigidity, submission to and idealization of the authorities, generalized prejudice, glorification of the in-group, outgroup hostility, and economic and political conservatism (Adorno et al., 1950). Upon its publication, the work has been widely discussed and faced a number of theoretical and methodological criticisms the shared emphasis of which was that there were no significant psychological differences between right wingers and left wingers (see Brown, 2004 for a review of critiques, see also McClosky & Chong, 1985).

The critiques were well-embraced by the end-of-ideology theorists of the era who argued that (a) political attitudes of ordinary citizens are not consistent and coherent enough to be considered as ideological, (b) political ideologies have lost their power to prompt individuals into action, (c) the political and ideological content

of contemporary left wing and right wing ideologies are not substantially different from one another, and (d) supporters of left wing and right wing ideologies are similar in terms of their psychological portraits (Jost, 2006). Moreover, the political climate and societal concerns of 1960s led researchers to focus on other topics (Levinson & Sanford, 1982). These arguments and the 'political climate' slowed down the research on the psychological bases of political ideology and its effects on the lives of individuals, but after two decades, ideology has resurged as a topic in social and political psychology (Jost, 2006) resulting in various perspectives examining the link between psychological variables and ideological orientations. Although mentioning each of the valuable theories on ideological differences in detail goes beyond the scope of this review, it is crucial to mention them since they have critical importance in building today's work on political ideology.

In a comprehensive review, Jost and his colleagues (Jost et al., 2003) grouped major perspectives aiming to conceptualize political ideology (a) theories focusing on personality factors and individual differences (e.g. Altemeyer, 1988; 1996; 1998; Rokeach, 1960; Tomkins, 1963), (b) theories emphasizing epistemic and existential needs (e.g. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Higgins, 1997; 1998; Kruglanski, 1989) and (c) theories focusing on the rationalizations of the social systems (e.g. Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Later on, the perspectives of these theories have been integrated in a new approach named "Ideology as a Motivated Social Cognition" (Jost, 2006; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007). This approach suggests that psychological variables have an effect on political positions as well as sociopolitical attitudes. In particular, individuals' basic epistemic, existential and relational needs determine their positions on the issues of equality (i.e. supporting vs. rejecting equality) and social change (i.e. supporting vs. resisting social change), which are seen as the core dimensions differentiating political left and right (Jost, 2006; 2009).

When we take a closer look into the differences between proponents of right wing and left wing, it can be seen that these individuals are different from one another not only in terms of psychological tendencies (i.e. epistemic and existential

17

needs; Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009) and personality differences (i.e. differences in openness to experience and conscientiousness; Caprara, Barbaraneli, & Zimbardo, 1999; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbanelli, 2006; Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; see also Block and Block, 2006 for a longitudinal account), but also in neurological features (i.e. differences in brain anatomy, brain functioning and genetic makeup; Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Jost & Amodio; 2012) and sociopolitical attitudes (i.e. differences in attitudes towards equality and social change; Altemeyer, 1998; Conover & Feldman, 1981, Duckitt, 2001; Goren, 2004, 2005; Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; as well as in prejudiced attitudes towards members of disadvantaged groups such as ethnic and gender minorities; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, et al., 2002; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

As briefly summarized above, the differences between individuals with left wing and right wing political orientation have been studied from a variety of different perspectives in political and social psychology. Although all these perspectives are fruitful in understanding the components of political ideologies and variables associated with them, how basic feelings and ideas related to human nature and the world turn into more complex notion of political ideology still needs to be questioned. In other words, there is still more to thoroughly understand the structure and development of political ideology from a psychological standpoint. Believing that worldviews could be of critical importance in development of ideological orientation, this thesis focuses on the different constructs of worldview and their relationships with ideological orientation. Hence it reviews the study of worldviews in the field of psychology, as well as three different perspectives examining the link between worldviews and political orientation, although they might not explicitly use the term worldview; namely Polarity Theory (Tomkins, 1963), Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002), and Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and tests an integrative model of worldviews predicting political ideology.

1.2. Worldviews in the Study of Psychology

Derived from the German Weltanschauung – which can be defined as a subjective perception of reality and universe which is "used to describe one's total outlook on life, society and its institutions" (Wolman, 1973, p. 406) – the construct of worldview has been widely used in psychological research (e.g. Overton, 1991 for developmental psychology; Kelly, 1955 for personality theory; Ibrahim, 1991, 1999 for psychotherapy; Altman & Rogoff, 1987 for environmental psychology; Kontos & Breland-Noble, 2002 for sports psychology) yet the construct is largely studied under the name of different concepts such as values or schemas and it is somewhat neglected in mainstream theorizing (Koltko-Rivera, 2000; Naugle, 2002). Moreover, in the literature, the term worldview mostly refers to shared systems of thought such as religions, political ideologies, philosophies, and cultures, rather than worldviews of individuals (Naugle, 2002). Indeed, regarding the underrepresentation of the worldview concept in standard textbooks and handbooks, worldview might be seen as "the most important construct that the typical psychologist has never heard of" (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 4).

Although the construct of worldview has been defined by various scholars from psychology and other disciplines (see Koltko-Rivera, 2000, 2004, and Naugle, 2002 for reviews on the perspectives on worldviews), there is no single definition that researchers have compromised upon. In one of the most comprehensive attempts, Koltko-Rivera (2000, p.2) defines the construct of worldview as follows:

> A world view is a way of describing the world and life within it. It is a set of beliefs that includes limiting statements and assumptions regarding what the world is, what exists in the world, what experiences are good or bad, and what types of behavior and relationships are proper or improper. A world view defines what can be known in the world, and how it can be known; it defines what can be done or accomplished in the world, and how it can be done. In addition to defining what goals can be sought in life, a world view defines what goals should be pursued. World views are composed of assumptions that may be unproven, even unprovable.

Hence, it is possible to interpret worldviews as broad patterns of meaning describing the nature of human beings as well as the nature and meaning of life. The

concept is closely related to the concepts of value, belief, and schema; however, it should be distinguished from them. To begin with values, on the basis of Rokeach's (1973) definition of values, Koltko-Rivera (2004) suggests that worldviews and values are similar concepts since they can be both interpreted as beliefs; however, worldview is a much more comprehensive concept including both descriptive (i.e. evaluative) and prescriptive (or proscriptive) beliefs while values tap only the beliefs of the second kind. Secondly, in relation to schemas, worldview can be seen as related to yet distinct and more comprehensive than the concept of schema, which could be defined as socio-cognitive frameworks of reference or attitudinal orientations (McClelland, 1951) functioning as working models on social world, and providing frameworks for individuals to respond to novel experiences and situations (Baldwin, 1992; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Worldviews are similar to schemas since they are both socio-cognitive structures helping us make sense of the world around us. However, for Koltko-Rivera (2004, pp. 25 - 27), they are distinct concepts in terms of the entities they address (i.e. concrete everyday objects vs. abstract objects), the mechanism by which they are formed (i.e. generalization from direct experiences in daily life vs. cultural transmission or culturally mediated abstraction of daily life), their conceptual structure (i.e. monopolar vs. multipolar structure), ease of disconfirmation (easy to difficult vs. difficult to extremely difficult), the consequences of disconfirming them (i.e. minimal vs. catastrophic).

As suggested previously, worldviews can be regarded as an important concept in psychology since they occupy places in discussions on both applied; e.g. the relationship between the counselor and the client in a therapeutic relationship, (Fischer, Jome, & Atkinson, 1998; Goldfried & Wolfe, 1996) or the differences in the assumptions of reality among ethnic (Barnouw, 1985) and religious groups (Wulff, 1997), and theoretical psychology; e.g. worldview related factors, or metatheses, affecting theory building process (Hoshmand, 1996; Slife & Williams, 1995). However, since worldview is a broad and comprehensive construct difficult to measure with common tools in psychological research (Koltko-Rivera, 2000), the construct is widely understudied in the mainstream psychology. This study hopes to fill this gap by developing a model of worldviews which can be used to predict

ideological orientation of individuals by integrating the worldview components of three theories, namely, Polarity Theory (Tomkins, 1963), Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2001); Duckitt et al., 2002), and Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).

1.3. Polarity Theory

Developed by Tomkins (1963), Polarity Theory focuses on worldviews and ideologies and suggests that the differences between left wing and right wing ideologies depend on the polarity between two poles, namely, humanism and normativism. In humanism (which constitutes the left), human beings are essentially good and valuable, and he is viewed as "the measure, an end in himself, an active, creative, thinking, desiring, loving force in nature" (p. 391). In normativism (which constitutes the right); on the other hand, human being is portrayed as neutral, if not negative, and he might "realize himself, attain his full stature only through struggle toward, participation in, conformity to a norm, a measure, an ideal essence basically prior to and independent of man" (p. 392).

For Tomkins, this fundamental polarity has a number of derivatives including assumptions related to metaphysics (i.e. reality is constructed vs. reality and value exist independent of humans.), human nature (i.e. humans are inherently good vs. bad.), approach towards affect (i.e. positive vs. negative approach towards emotions and their displays), satisfactions of needs and drives (i.e. all needs should be satisfied and drive satisfaction should be maximized vs. satisfaction of needs and drives should be controlled by reason and social norms), interpersonal orientations (i.e. human beings should be loved and respected unconditionally vs. love and respect should be earned via achievement and conformity), socialization patterns (i.e. a child centered approach focusing on child's uniqueness vs. a norm centered approach focusing on rearing child in expected route), and political values (i.e. promotion of individual rights and well-being vs. maintenance of order) (Tomkins, 1963; Nilsson, 2014).

Although humanism and normativism are conceptualized as broad patterns of meaning, they also reflect the structure of individuals' worldviews, alternatively named as ideo-affective postures, and defined by Tomkins as "any loosely organized set of feelings and ideas about feelings" (p. 389). These worldviews primarily result from systematic differences in the socialization of affect during the course of development in which tolerance or intolerance towards primary human affects; (i.e. enjoyment, excitement, surprise, distress, fear, anger, shame, and contempt, for Tomkins' perspective) designates the direction of individuals' feelings about oneself and others. In addition to affect, innate biological tendencies such as shyness or negative affectivity; developmental factors such as parenting, peer relations, and life events; cultural and contextual elements such as institutions, war, or economic growth; as well as individual appraisals and narrative accounts of personal experiences contribute to development of worldviews, or ideo-affective postures of individuals (Tomkins, 1963).

For Tomkins, all individuals have ideo-affective postures since they refer to feelings and ideas related to anything; however, they might not have ideological postures, defined as "highly organized and articulate set of ideas about anything", since ideological postures necessitate coherence and articulation (Tomkins, 1963; p. 389; see also Converse, 1964; Koltko-Rivera 2000; 2004). Ideo-affective postures may turn to ideological postures through a process of ideo-affective resonance in which the sets of more loosely organized feelings and ideas engage in close relationships with ideologies that are similar to them so that they strengthen one another. Tomkins likens this process to a love affair between similars. However, ideo-affective postures might also resonate with ideologies that are not so similar to them if the alternatives are restricted or ideo-affective resonance may not even occur if the individuals do not have the chance to form close associations with the philosophy, art, and knowledge surrounding ideologies (Tomkins, 1963).

Moreover, since individuals' ideo-affective postures are organized in accordance with the polarity between humanism and normativism, ideological orientations and sociopolitical attitudes should also be organized according to the

polarity between left and right despite the differences in the content of ideologies (Tomkins, 1963). Recent research supports this postulation by showing that these dimensions are apparent in various societies (Aspelund, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013; Jost, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2014).

Measured via the Polarity Scale - developed by Tomkins (1964; reprinted in Stone & Schaffner, 1988) and revised by Stone and Schaffner (1988; 1997), de St. Aubin (1996), and Nilsson (2014) respectively, humanism and normativism have been found to be coherent yet distinct worldviews (de St. Aubin, 1996; Nilsson, 2014; Stone & Schaffner, 1997). Moreover, they are associated with a wide range of psychological phenomena including affectivity (Nilsson 2007; 2013; Stone & Schaffner, 1997), religiosity (de St. Aubin, 1996; 1999; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006), values (de St. Aubin, 1996), beliefs related to discipline and control (Alker, Tourangeau, & Staines, 1976; Gürşimşek & Göregenli, 2004; Williams, 1984), and prejudice (Alker & Poppen, 1973; Alker et al., 1976; Caldwell, 2007; see also Nilsson, 2013 and Stone, 1986 for reviews).

Political orientation has been another topic of interest among scholars studying affective polarity. Tomkins' postulation that individuals' worldviews would be related to their ideological orientations in such a way that humanism is associated with left wing political orientation and normativism is associated with right wing orientation (Tomkins, 1963; 1965) has been widely supported with subsequent research (Albaugh & McAdams, 2007; de St. Aubin, 1996; Nilsson & Jost, 2017; Schultz, Stone, & Christie, 1997; Stone & Schaffner, 1997). All of these studies support Tomkins' argument that humanism and normativism constitute distinct patterns of meaning, which are resultant of distinct processes and which lead to different - and opposing - consequences in people's lives, including their political orientations.

1.4. Dual Process Model

Dual Process Model developed by Duckitt and his colleagues (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009a) suggests that social and political

attitudes are rooted in two separate dimensions, namely Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO); rather than a single dimension from left to right. Moreover, these two dimensions have distinct antecedents and consequences including prejudice against outgroups, sociopolitical attitudes, and political orientation (Dicktt & Sibley, 2009a; 2010).

RWA and SDO are among the widely used variables in social and political psychology. RWA, which has been presented by Altemeyer (1996; 1998; 2006) as a readjustment of authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950), can be defined as a combination of (a) "a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate"; (b) "a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities"; and (c) "a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society" (Altemeyer, 1996; p. 6). Although RWA is not necessarily associated with right wing as an ideological identity (Altemeyer, 2006), research so far generally connected it to right wing attitudes including partisanship, pro-capitalist attitudes, punishment of those deviating from in-group norms, ethnic and sexual prejudice, victim blaming, and religious conservatism (Altemeyer, 1996; 1998; 2006).

SDO; on the other hand, can be defined as ''a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical'' (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). Moreover, since it represents one's inclination to accept some groups in the society - preferably one's in-group - as superior over others and to favor ideologies and policies enhancing the hierarchical structure of the society (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Pratto et al., 1994), it can be suggested that SDO is a "a route to superiority and power in a 'dog eats dog' world" (Lippa & Arad, 1999; p. 488). In line with this, research on SDO has associated it with a variety of social, political, and intergroup phenomena associated with right wing including pro-war attitudes, capital punishment, ethnocentrism, sexism, as well as ethnic and sexual prejudice (Jost &

Thompson, 2000; Pratto et al, 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994).

According to Duckitt's Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009a; 2010), the motivational goals and values expressed by RWA and SDO are rooted in individuals' worldviews, which consist of dispositions and socialization practices of individuals. Specifically, individuals who are born into and socialized in contexts that appear to be dangerous and threatening and who have the personality traits of high conscientiousness and low openness to experience tend to develop the worldview that the world is a dangerous, threatening and unpredictable place (rather than a secure, safe, and stable one). And this worldview makes them predisposed to develop RWA as an ideological attitude and have the motivational goal of maintaining a stable, cohesive and secure societal order (as opposed to a social order in which autonomy, individual freedom, and self-expression are valued). All of these factors, in turn, produce the outcomes associated with RWA such as support in right wing ideologies and policies, nationalism, ethnocentrism, and intergroup prejudice.

The route to political and intergroup outcomes is different for SDO. Individuals who are born to and socialized in social contexts where groups are not equal to one another and compete for dominance over others and who have the personality trait of tough-mindedness (i.e. low agreeableness) tend to develop the worldview that "the world is a ruthlessly competitive jungle in which might is right, the strong win, and the weak lose, as opposed to a place of cooperative harmony, in which people care for, help, and share with each other" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; p. 1869). Affected by this worldview, these individuals tend to have the dominance, power and superiority over others as motivational goals and SDO as an ideological attitude, which in turn produces the aforesaid outcomes.

As summarized above, Dual Process Model suggests that although RWA and SDO produce similar results, the process by which they emerge and produce their outcomes are distinct (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009). As for their political outcomes, it is suggested that individuals' political orientations and political part preferences are

rooted by the threat-based process of RWA and dominance-based process of SDO. Although both result in right wing orientation, individuals who are high in RWA do it in order to manage the threat they feel, the ones high in SDO since they value group-based dominance and superiority of in-group over others. Similarly, although both groups vote for right wing parties, high RWAs prefer the ones defending traditional and religious values and putting emphasis on order and law whereas high SDOs prefer the ones emphasizing antiwelfare policies and free-market capitalism (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009).

The postulations of Dual Process Model have been tested in a wide range of studies with experimental and longitudinal designs and gained empirical support for both the processes and outputs included in the model (See Duckitt & Sibley, 2009a; 2010; and Perry, 2013 for reviews). In relation to political consequences, Weber and Federico (2007) found that RWA and SDO correlate with individuals' political orientation. Extending this finding, Federico, Hunt, and Ergun (2009) found that the dangerous world and competitive jungle worldviews predict individuals' positions on a left-right spectrum and that expertise in politics reinforces the link between the worldviews and political orientation by increasing the effect of worldviews on RWA and SDO.

Although in Dual Process Model the worldview variables are suggested to be rooted in the personalities and socialization practices, a recent study (Nilsson & Jost, 2017) showed that they might be associated with humanism and normativism, the two worldviews of Tomkins' (1963) Polarity Theory. They found that humanism which brings human beings and their well-being into the fore has a negative relationship with both competitive and dangerous world beliefs, whereas conservatism, which focuses on the group norms and social order, predicted competitive and dangerous world beliefs in a positive fashion.

A recent study by Federico, Weber, Ergun, and Hunt (2013), on the other hand, suggests that the route from dual social worldviews and ideological attitudes to political orientation is not a direct one, rather, it is mediated by moral intuitions of individuals, which will be reviewed next.

26

1.5. Moral Foundations Theory

Moral Foundations Theory has been developed by Haidt and Joseph (2004) in an effort to understand the bases of and variability in moral reasoning across cultures and individuals. The 'moral domain', which is described by Turiel (1983; p.3) as "prescriptive judgements of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other" has been a topic of interest for psychologists since Kohlberg's (1969) developmental account of moral reasoning. The Moral Foundations Theory benefits from Kohlberg's (1969; 1971) developmental account and as well as Gilligan's argument that morality cannot be based on a single foundation (Gilligan; 1982; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987), Nucci and Turiel's (1978) emphasis on the social context in which moral development occurs, and, most importantly the perspective of Schweder and his colleagues on the cultural variability and breadth of morality (Schweder, 1990; Schweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Schweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park, 1997). Moreover, it extends these perspectives with evolutionary perspective as well as the process of moral development (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007; see Haidt, 2012 for a review of studies on morality).

The theory is built on three arguments one of which is an evolutionary claim, the other is a developmental claim and the last is a cultural one. The evolutionary claim of the theory is that, as a result of natural selection, human beings are predisposed to learn how to notice and react in accordance with five patterns of morality; namely harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (Haidt, 2012). The developmental argument of the theory is that the moral foundations enable children to acquire some virtues while making harder to learn other ones in accordance with the specific cultural context they grow in. Although moral foundations are considered to be innate mechanisms, they are not closed to change; rather they can be considered as a first draft of a book which is revised by experience throughout one's life. As the individuals grow up, they learn how to behave in a culturally appropriate manner and have the correct intuitive reactions to cultural patterns of morality. The cultural/historical argument of the

27

theory is that cultures differ from one another in terms of the importance they attach to each foundation and the virtues, norms, and institutions they build in accordance with them (Haidt, 2012).

Moreover, Moral Foundations Theory assumes that moral decisions are given automatically and rapidly on the basis of intuitions and emotions; rather than conscious reasoning. In accordance with Social Intuitionist Model developed earlier by Haidt (2001), they argue that when faced with stimuli, individuals respond with gut feelings or intuitions, which can be defined as "judgments, solutions, and ideas that pop into consciousness without our being aware of the mental processes that led to them" (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; p. 56) and that the outputs of intuitions are edited by a subsequent reasoning process, which is considered to be an intentional and effortful process. Moral intuitions; are considered as a subset of intuitions which include an evaluative feeling (i.e. good/bad, like/dislike) and an approval/disapproval response about the social stimuli (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2001) and these intuitions are organized in five modules, or foundations.

According to the theory, a moral foundation can be explained as a psychological system which constitutes a basis upon which cultures construct their moral systems and which helps individuals to decide whether others behavior is to be trusted or to be blamed (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). In other words, moral foundations could be viewed as the principles about human nature and social world, or as the 'taste receptors of moral sense' if I borrow Haidt's (2012) analogy. Similar to taste receptors of human tongue, everyone in the world have these foundations; however, 'the moral cuisines' are varied across the world since cultures build their values, norms, virtues, etc. by benefiting from the foundations in their own degrees and ways (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The foundations proposed by the theory are as follows:

The foundation of Harm/Care focuses on concerns related to nurturance and welfare of human beings and animals as well as suffering and it is associated with virtues such as caring, kindness, and the emotion of compassion. The foundation of Fairness/Cheating, secondly, focuses on making sure that everyone gets what he/she

deserves and treated equally and is related to concerns with equity, justice and individual rights and virtues such as fairness, justice, and trustworthiness. The third foundation, namely, Loyalty/Betrayal, focuses on group concerns such as loyalty to the group, self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group, and aggression towards the deviants and it is associated with virtues such as loyalty and patriotism. The foundation of Authority/Subversion focuses on the hierarchical structure of the society and is associated with concerns such as respect, obedience, and performance of role-based duties in the society and deference. The last foundation, Sanctity/Degradation; on the other hand, focuses on physical and spiritual contamination and related to virtues of bodily and religious cleanliness (See Haidt, 2012 for wider definitions of the foundations; the foundations will be named throughout the text as follows: harm, care, loyalty, authority, and purity).

Although the theory has initially focused on four foundations of morality (Haidt, & Joseph, 2004) the foundation of authority has been added as a separate foundation in the early phases of development (Haidt & Bjorklung, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Moreover, the theory is open for further developments; any candidate could be accepted as a moral foundation on condition that they meet the five criteria, that is, having a concern for third party moral decisions, leading to automatic affective reactions, varying in accordance with cultural context, having some evidence for innateness, and presenting adaptive advantages (Graham et al. 2013). For example, Liberty/Oppression has been suggested as a new foundation and included in the theory (Haidt, 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).

All of the moral foundations are of similar importance for the theory, none of them is prioritized or credited more. However, the prevalence and importance of each foundation might vary from one culture to another. Defining cultures as moral systems that are "interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible", Haidt (2008, p.70) suggests that cultures throughout the world could be grouped into two: the individualizing cultures which deals with human selfishness by focusing on individual rights and welfare and the binding ones

which try to repress selfishness by taking institutions and groups -rather than individuals - into the fore and binding individuals into duties and social roles. The moral foundations of care and fairness tend to be emphasized in the first type of cultures and named individualizing foundations whereas the foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity tend to be prioritized in the cultures with a binding approach and named accordingly as binding foundations.

According to Moral Foundations Theory, the modern and westernized societies put a specific emphasis on the individualizing foundations while deemphasizing or even reversing the worth of the binding ones. However, in nonwestern cultures of the world; i.e. rest of the world, binding foundations are also considered as important in building the 'moral cuisine' (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 2009).

When the postulations of Moral Foundation Theory have been applied to the field of political ideology, it has been found that moral foundations prioritized by individuals vary according to the place they put themselves in the ideological spectrum. The ones who identify themselves with political left value the foundations of care and fairness (i.e. individualizing foundations) more than other three (i.e. binding foundations), the ones identifying themselves with political right value all five foundations more equally (see for example Graham, et al. 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Haidt, & Graham, 2007; 2009; Haidt et al, 2009). When this result is interpreted with an ideological differences perspective, it can be concluded that individuals with left wing orientation value individualizing foundations more than the ones with a right wing orientation and individuals with right wing political orientation value binding foundations more than the ones with a left wing orientation do. Graham and his colleagues (Graham et al. 2009), for example, showed that this difference is consistent across four different measures including moral foundations questionnaire (measuring both agreement with foundation specific moral concerns and explicit judgements of moral relevance), willingness to violate foundation related taboos in exchange of money, and a content analysis of liberal and conservative church sermons. Similar results have been

obtained in narrations of religious and politically active individuals living in USA (McAdams et al. 2008) and in a recent web-based study comparing responses of individuals from eleven different regions of the world (Graham et al. 2011). Although the content of political left and right might vary from one culture to another, the theoreticians of Moral Foundations Theory suggest that this approach could be beneficial to understand the 'culture war' between the right and the left from a psychological perspective (Graham et al. 2009; Haidt, 2008; 2012).

The finding that political left and right could be differentiated according to the moral foundations has had broad repercussions among researchers studying political ideology. Haidt and his colleagues argued that the binding foundations, namely loyalty, authority, and purity, are 'moral', not 'amoral' or 'immoral' as long suggested by the literature of social psychology and that they should be incorporated into social psychological research to increase political diversity and dialogue between the parties (Duarte et al. 2015; Haidt & Graham, 2007).

As a response to them, Jost (2009; as cited in Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2009) argued that the 'moral' characteristics attributed to political right by the Moral Foundations Theory (e.g. defending the norms of the in-group, valuing the authority figures and rank order in the group and applying the standards of purity and divinity) are similar to right wing authoritarianism, which has been long characterized as a combination of conventionalism, submission to authorities and aggression towards the ones who break the norms of the group. In line with Jost's argument, van Leeuwen and Park (2009) found that individuals' places on a left-right spectrum and the moral foundations they value can be predicted by their beliefs in a dangerous world, which is considered as an antecedent of RWA in Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al, 2002). Then, based on a study conducted in New Zeeland on a large and nationally representative sample, Milojev et al. (2014) concluded that binding foundations have positive and moderately correlations with RWA and positive yet low correlations with SDO whereas individualizing foundations are negatively and moderately related to SDO and unrelated to RWA. The study by Federico and his colleagues (Federico et al., 2013) contributes to these

31

findings by showing that individuals' moral foundations are, in fact, predicted by individuals' levels of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientations, as well as the competitive jungle and dangerous world beliefs, which are considered as the antecedents of RWA and SDO in Duckitt's (2001; Duckitt et al, 2002) Dual Process Model. Specifically, they have found that individuals' belief in a competitive jungle positively and strongly predicts their level of SDO, which, in turn, negatively and moderately predicts concerns on individualizing foundations whereas individuals' beliefs in a dangerous world positively and strongly predicts their levels of RWA which positively and moderately predicts their concern on the binding foundations. In a Turkish sample; on the other hand, it has been found that RWA predicts binding foundations whereas SDO predict each of the 5 moral foundations. Moreover, when the role of moral foundations in the link between ideological attitudes (i.e. RWA and SDO) and ideological orientations was explored, it has been found that only authority foundation has a mediatory role in this relationship (Sayılan, Türkoğlu, & Cingöz-Ulu, 2017; see also Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; but also, Kugler et al., 2014, for different perspectives on the link between moral foundations and ideological orientations). Moreover, a recent study suggests that moral foundations individuals value might be predicted by humanistic and normativistic tendencies and that moral foundations mediate the link between worldviews and ideological orientations (Sayılan & Cingöz-Ulu, 2018). Specifically, it has been found that humanism predicts ideological orientation through the mediation of both individualizing and binding foundations whereas the link between normativism and ideological orientation is mediated solely by binding foundations.

1.6. An Integrative Model Examining the Links between Worldviews and Ideological Orientations

The literature that has been reviewed provides a synthesis on how the study of ideology could be enriched with the perspectives on worldview. So far, the relationship humanism and normativism have with ideological orientation has been tested as well as the links between dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs and the ones between individualizing and binding foundations and ideological

orientations. Humanism and normativism, to begin with, are found to have small to moderate correlations with ideological orientations in the sense that humanistic tendencies are related to left wing orientations and normativistic tendencies are related to right wing orientations (e.g. Albaugh & McAdams, 2007; de St. Aubin, 1996; Nilsson & Jost, 2017; Schultz, Stone, & Christie, 1997; Stone & Schaffner, 1997). For the link between dual social worldviews and ideological orientations, secondly, high levels of both dangerous and competitive social beliefs have been found to be related to right wing ideological orientation as well as sociopolitical attitudes and the strength of the relationship has ranged from, again, small to medium (e.g. Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009a; Federico, Hunt, and Ergun, 2009; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2017; Weber and Federico, 2007). Lastly, for the link between moral foundations and ideological orientations, individualizing foundations are related to left wing ideological orientation whereas binding foundations are related to right wing orientation, the strength of which ranging from small to moderate (e.g. Federico et al., 2013; Graham et al. 2009; 2011; McAdams et al. 2008; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015).

In addition to these links, some binary combinations among the proposed worldview variables have been tested in relation to their link with ideological orientation and gained empirical support. In fact, two perspectives have been put forward so far on how these constructs of worldviews could be integrated to one another. One perspective suggests that dual social worldviews and moral foundations could be studied integratively since, (a) the moral foundations individuals value can be predicted by their levels on dual social worldviews (i.e. dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs) as well as their levels on RWA and SDO (Federico et al., 2013; Sayılan, Türkoğlu, & Cingöz-Ulu, 2017) and (b) moral foundations mediate the link between dual social worldviews and ideological orientations (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). The other perspective; on the other hand, implies that the relationship among the worldview constructs could be more complex since the two worldview dimensions of Tomkins' (1963) Polarity Theory (i.e. humanism and normativism)

predict both the dual social worldviews (Nilsson & Jost, 2017) and moral foundations (Nilsson and Jost, 2017; Sayılan & Cingöz-Ulu, 2018).

However, no integrative framework showing the route in which worldviews in the broadest sense would turn into more specified beliefs and principles about social world and, in turn, determine the ideological orientation of individuals has been suggested. What I suggest is that the worldviews included in the Polarity Theory (Tomkins, 1963), Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2001) and Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) could be integrated in a model of worldviews that can be used to predict ideological orientation.

As depicted in Figure 1, I consider humanism and normativism (i.e. the worldviews in Polarity Theory) as the affective basis upon which the more specific beliefs and attitudes about human nature and social environment (i.e. dangerous world and competitive jungle worldviews of Dual Process Model) are formed and which give rise to even more specific principles about the social world (i.e. the individualizing and binding foundations of Moral Foundations Theory).

As one may infer, all the theories I reviewed in this paper have similar arguments related to their concepts. They all argue that the worldview variables they suggest is the underlying mechanism shaping the relationships individuals form with the social world, including their ideological orientations. In my model, I have included the variables in accordance with their place in the process by which worldviews in the broadest sense would turn into more specific beliefs and principles about social world and predict ideological orientation of individuals.

Figure 1. An Integrative Model Examining the Links between Worldviews and Ideological Orientations

      I believe that humanism and normativism should be the predictor variables in the model because they can be considered as the cognitive and affective bases that designate the characteristic affects and direction of emotional experiences as well as appraisals of those experiences and forms the personalities of individuals. Moreover, they can be considered as the bases upon which more specific beliefs and principles related to social world develop. Second comes in the model the dangerous world and competitive jungle worldviews of Dual Process Model. These worldviews, or social beliefs in Duckitt's (2001) terminology, can be considered as more organized beliefs about human nature and the social world. In other words, in accordance with the position individuals place themselves within the clash between two poles, individuals might develop more organized beliefs about the social world and the nature of individuals in that world as Tomkins (1963) suggested. Individuals may develop the belief that the world is a threatening and dangerous place or that it is a safe and secure place. Similarly, they may develop the belief that the world is a competitive jungle where only the mighty wins or they might believe that it is a cooperative harmony in which individuals help and care for each other. In accordance with these beliefs, then on, they might develop more organized principles related to social world and value either the individualizing foundations (i.e. care and fairness) or binding foundations (i.e. loyalty, authority, and purity) more. All these worldviews, then, predict ideological orientations of individuals in an integrative manner.

Specifically, I believe that humanistic tendencies would have a negative relationship with beliefs in a competitive jungle since humanist individuals would tend to portray the world as a cooperative place and value forgiveness and support for the weak ones rather than a harsh place where one should be toughened to win the struggle over resources. Secondly, I expect that normativism would be positively related to beliefs in a dangerous world since normativistic individuals tend to believe that human beings are inherently bad, and they should be disciplined by rules and social norms.

As for the relationship dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs have with moral foundations, I expect that competitive jungle beliefs would have a negative relationship with individualizing foundations (i.e. care and fairness) since these foundations are related to equity and justice among individuals Dangerous world beliefs; on the other hand, should have a positive relationship with binding foundations since the focus of these beliefs is one's need for the maintenance of a safe and secure social environment. Moreover, I expect that humanism and normativism would affect moral foundations both indirectly through the mediation of dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs. In particular, I expect to find that humanistic tendencies would have a positive relationship with individualizing foundations since humanism favors individual rights and well-being as well as empathy and forgiveness towards others. Normativism; on the other hand, because of its focus on conformity with the in-group norms and traditions, would have a positive relationship with binding foundations.

In the upcoming chapters, I present findings from studies to adapt dual social worldview scales (Chapter 2) and polarity scale (Chapter 3) into cultural context of Turkey, the main study where I test the integrative model examining the links between worldviews and ideological orientation (Chapter 4) and, finally, overview and discuss the findings from the entire thesis (Chapter 5).

CHAPTER 2

ADAPTATION OF DUAL SOCIAL WORLDVIEW SCALES INTO TURKISH CULTURAL CONTEXT

This study was conducted to adapt the Dangerous World Scale and Competitive Jungle Scale developed by Duckitt and his colleagues (Duckitt et al., 2002) into Turkish cultural context and to conduct the reliability and validity tests in two samples. The scales were adapted into Turkish through a four-step procedure described below:

As a first step, researchers translated the scales into Turkish separately and created a joint form by comparing their translations. Secondly, the joint forms along with the original forms and construct definitions were presented to 8 bilingual social psychologists who checked the forms in terms of both authenticity and fitness to measure the intended constructs. Upon their feedbacks, the Turkish forms were revised and sent to a professional linguist who back-translated them to English, which constitutes the third step. Lastly, an independent bilingual social psychologist compared the original and back-translated forms to decide on the authenticity of the back-translated form and the form was finalized on the basis of the feedback provided by them.

2.1. Study 1a - Exploring Factor Structures of Dual Social Worldview Scales in an Adult Sample

In Study 1a, the factor structures of the adapted scales were explored in a Turkish adult sample and the reliability and validity tests were conducted. In accordance with the postulations of Dual Process Model, it was expected that individuals' scores on these scales would be related to their scores on the measures of personality traits, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and political ideology. Specifically, endorsement of belief in a dangerous world was

expected to have a positive and consistent relationship with RWA, a nonsignificant or small and negative relationship with SDO; a positive relationship with conscientiousness trait, and a negative relationship with openness to experience trait. The belief in a competitive jungle; on the other hand, it expected to be positively and consistently related to SDO, negatively yet poorly related or unrelated to RWA, and negatively related to agreeableness trait. Also, the relationship between dual social worldviews and the two worldview dimensions in Tomkins' (1963) Polarity Theory; i.e. humanism and normativism were tested. For this relationship, it was expected that beliefs in a competitive jungle would have a negative and significant relationship with humanism whereas beliefs in a dangerous would be positively and consistently related to normativism.

2.1.1. Method

2.1.1.1. Participants and Procedure

Participants were 376 adults (251 women, 121 men, and 4 unspecified) who were reached through various social media channels and voluntarily participated in the online study. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 68 ($M = 30.93$, $SD = 9.83$). Majority of participants had a university degree, or higher (169 participants had bachelor's degree; 128 of them had postgraduate degree, 73 participants had a high school degree, 2 of them were primary school and 2 of them were secondary school graduates.). Most participants had a religious identification (65 %) although they did not consider themselves as faithful ($M = 4.34$, $SD = 3.24$) or conservative ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 2.65$) on a 0-10 Likert type scale. As for their ideological self-placements, participants were in the left of the center ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 2.72$ in a 11-point Likert type item where 1 represents extreme left, 6 represents center and 11 represents extreme right).

Subjects participated in the online study voluntarily and were free to leave the study at any time they wished. Firstly, they read and signed the Informed Consent Form mentioning the aim of the study as "getting information on their worldviews and ideas related to various social issues". They completed the scales presented in separate blocks in the following order: Dual Social Worldview Scales, Basic

Personality Traits Inventory, Polarity Scale, Social Dominance Orientation Scale, Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale, and the demographic form. The questions were randomized in each block in order to prevent possible effects of question order. After completing the battery, they were fully debriefed regarding the nature of the study and variables tested.

2.1.1.2. Measures

2.1.1.2.1. Demographic and Background Variables. The participants were asked to indicate their gender (woman, man, and other), age, the city they were born and live, education, piety, and conservativeness (See Appendix A).

2.1.1.2.2. Ideological Orientation. Both ideological self-placements and ideological identities of the participants were measured. As for ideological self-placement, a single 1 (left) to 11 (right) Likert type question was asked in which higher scores reflect more rightist ideological orientation. As for ideological identities, a modified version of Sayılan and Türkoğlu's (2015) 12-item scale (Anarchism, Atatürk's ideology, Communism, Conservatism, Conservative Democracy, Ecologism, Fascism, Feminism, Idealism, Kurdish Political Movement, Liberalism, Libertarianism, Marxism, Nationalism, Nationalist Conservatism, National Vision Movement, Radical Islam, Socialism, Social Democracy, and Turkism) was used in which participants rated their identification with the ideologies of in a 1 (it does not reflect me at all) to 11 (it totally reflects me) Likert type scale (See Appendix B). The original scale included 3 components, namely, right wing ideological identity ($\alpha = .91$), left wing ideological identity ($\alpha = .81$), and central ideological identity ($\alpha = .78$).

Principal Component Analysis with Promax rotation was conducted on 20-items modified ideological identities scale, which was used to measure ideological orientations in the model. The score of Kaise-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test was found to be .87, reflecting that the items were suitable for factor analysis. According to results, 5 components were found with eigenvalues over 1.00 and 69.11 % of total variance was explained by these 5 components. However, the analysis of scree plot and parallel analysis revealed that a 2-components solution was

more admissible. Therefore, the analysis was repeated by forcing the items into 2 components. The 2-component solution explained 46.63% of total variance and it was observed that two items (i.e. Libertarianism and Social Democracy) loaded to both of the factors and two items (i.e. Atatürk's ideology and Liberalism) had loadings lower than .50. In order to avoid any problems in tests of validity, the analysis was repeated after removing these 4 items. The resultant two components explained 58.18 % of total variance in ideological identities. The first component included 9 right wing ideological identities and explained 40.80 % of total variance with an eigenvalue of 6.53. The second component included 7 left wing ideological orientations and explained 15.38 of total variation in ideological identities with an eigenvalue of 2.46 (See Table 1 for an overview of components.). Both components were found to be reliable.

2.1.1.2.3. Belief in a Dangerous World Scale. The 10-item balanced Likert type scale developed by Duckitt and his colleagues (Duckit et al. 2002) was used to measure participants' intention to have the social belief that the world was a dangerous and threatening place rather than a safe and secure place where essentially good people lived. The internal consistency coefficient of the original scale was found to be .80 (See Appendix C for original and revised scale.). Participants rated each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree).

2.1.1.2.4. Belief in a Competitive Jungle World Scale. Duckitt and his colleagues' by Duckitt et al. (2002) 20-item-balanced-Likert type scale was used to measure participants' tendency to believe that the world was a ruthless and competitive jungle, rather than a cooperative and peaceful harmony where individuals helped and cared for one another. The alpha coefficient of the original scale was .84 (See Appendix D for items of the original and adapted scale.). Participants rated each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree).

2.1.1.2.5. Personality Traits. Gençöz and Öncül's (2012) 45-items and 6-factors scale was used to measure basic personality dimensions of the participants. The internal consistency coefficients were reported as α = .89 for extroversion, α =

.85 for agreeableness, α = .85 for conscientiousness, α = .83 for neuroticism, α = .80 for openness to experience, and α = .71 for negative valence. Participants rated their personality characteristics on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree).

Table 1

Results for Principle Components Analysis Ideological Orientations Scale

Items	M	SD	C1[1]	C2[1]
12. Nationalist Conservatism	3.17	3.19	.84	
11. National Vision Movement	3.91	3.44	.82	
15. Radical Islam	1.95	2.10	.81	
19. Nationalism	5.10	3.52	.79	
14. Conservatism	3.17	2.97	.78	
18. Turkism	4.32	3.57	.77	
13. Conservative Democracy	3.44	3.00	.74	
4. Fascism	1.66	1.64	.70	
20. Idealism	3.21	3.03	.62	
10. Marxism	5.67	3.25		.86
6. Communism	5.61	3.37		.85
17. Socialism	7.46	2.92		.71
1. Anarchism	4.28	3.30		.70
5. Feminism	7.18	3.35		.64
7. Kurdish Political Movement	3.74	3.33		.64
3. Ecologism	7.25	2.87		.57
		Eigenvalue	6.53	2.46
		Variance (%)	40.80	15.38
		Cronbach's α	.91	.83

[1]C1 = Right Wing Ideological Identity; C2 = Left Wing Ideological Identity

2.1.1.2.6. Right Wing Authoritarianism. Weber and Federico's (2007) 12-item version of Altemeyer's (1996; 1998) RWA scale was used to measure individuals' tendency to conform to social authorities as well as social order (α = .72). The scale was adapted into Turkish by Göregenli (2010) and the internal consistency coefficient of the adapted form was reported as α = .71. Participants rated each item on a scale ranging from -4 (strongly disagree) to +4 (Strongly agree), as instructed by Altemeyer (1996, 1998).

2.1.1.2.7. Social Dominance Orientation. Turkish version (Akbaş, 2010) of Pratto et al.'s (1996) balanced 16-item and 2-factor SDO scale was used to measure the

extent to which participants supported the social hierarchy and inequality among social groups. Both the original (α = .91) and adapted (α = .81 for group-based dominance and α = .91 for opposition to equality subscale) versions of the scale were found to be internally reliable. Participants rated each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree).

2.1.1.2.8. Polarity Scale. Nilsson's (2014) 30-item and 2-factor Polarity Scale was used to measure individuals' tendency to have humanistic and normativistic worldviews. The alpha coefficients were reported as .89 for humanism and .87 for normativism in the original sample. The scale has been adapted to Turkish by Sayılan, Tunç, & Cingöz Ulu (2016). In Turkish sample the internal consistency coefficients are .76 for humanism and .76 for normativism (See Appendix E for the original and adapted scale). Participants rated each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree).

2.1.2. Results

Principle Component Analyses with Promax Rotation were performed in order to determine the factor structures of Belief in a Dangerous World and Belief in a Competitive Jungle measures. The number of factors were decided through Kaiser criterion of eigenvalues over 1.00, the Catell scree plot test, Monte Carlo parallel analysis and the interpretability of scores.

2.1.2.1. Exploratory Factor Analyses of Belief in a Dangerous World Scale

The score of Kaise-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test was found to be .82, reflecting that the 10 items were suitable for factor analysis. Initially, 3 factors were found with eigenvalues over 1.00 and 56.23 % of total variance was explained by these 3 factors. However, the analysis of scree plot and parallel analysis revealed that the original 2 factor solution was more appropriate. Therefore, the analysis was repeated, and Item 9 was excluded because of loading into both factors.

The 2 factors, together, explained 50.70 % of total variance. The first component included 5 items (items 2, 3, 6, 8, and 10) and accounted for 37.36 % of total variance with an eigenvalue of 3.36. When the items were interpreted, it was

seen that the items were depicting the world as a dangerous and threatening place full of unreliable people, as expected, and this component was named as "Presence of Dangers and Threats". The second component; on the other hand, comprised of reversed items (i.e. items 1, 4, 5, and 7) and accounted for 13.41% of total variance with and eigenvalue of 1.20. The items of this component were inferred to depict the world as a stable and secure place. Therefore, this component was named as "Absence of Safety and Security". The internal consistency coefficients of the two components were .73 and .68, respectively, indicating that the reliabilities of both component were in expected range (See Table 2 for an overview of the components).

Table 2

Results for Principle Components Analysis of Belief in a Dangerous World Scale

Items	M	SD	C1[1]	C2
8. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else	5.48	1.45	.78	
10. My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral people's values and way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people	5.39	1.34	.76	
6. Every day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person's chances of being robbed, assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.	5.95	1.18	.72	
3. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all.	5.38	1.55	.68	
2. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All the signs are pointing to it.	5.23	1.51	.47	.20
7. My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, stable and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good.	4.99	1.59		.85
1. Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn't so. Every era has its problems, and a person's chances of living a safe, untroubled life are better today than ever before.	4.76	1.72		.72
5. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do not live in a dangerous world	5.47	1.48		.68
4. Despite what one hears about "crime in the street," there probably isn't any more now than there ever has been.	5.19	1.66		.54
	Eigenvalue	3.36	1.20	
	Variance (%)	37.36	13.34	
	Cronbach's α	.73	.68	

[1]C1 = Presence of Dangers and Threats; C2 = Absence of Safety and Security

2.1.2.2. Exploratory Factor Analyses of Belief in a Competitive Jungle Scale

Similar to Belief in a Dangerous World Scale, the factor structure of 20-item balanced Belief in a Competitive Jungle World Scale was determined with Principle Component Analysis with Promax Rotation. The score of Kaise-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test was found to be .90, reflecting that the items were suitable for factor analysis. Initially, 3 factors were found with eigenvalues over 1.00 and 45.41 % of total variance was explained by these 3 factors. However, the analysis of scree plot and parallel analysis revealed that the original 2 factor solution was more suitable. Therefore, the analysis was repeated, and it was seen that resultant 2 factors explained 38.82 % of total variance.

The first component included 10 items (i.e., items 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 18) and accounted for 29.53 of total variance with an eigenvalue of 5.91. The items reflected the world as a ruthlessly competitive jungle, as intended; therefore, the component was named as "Presence of Competition and Ruthlessness". The second component; on the other hand, included the 10 reversed items of the scale (i.e., 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, and 20) and explained 9.29% of total variance with an eigenvalue of 1.86. since the items in this component depicted the world as a cooperative place in which individuals helped and cared for one another, this component was named as "Absence of Mutual Care and Cooperation". Four items in the component 1 (i.e. items 1, 6,17, and 4) and 2 items of component 2 (i.e. items 19 and 8) loaded to both of the components; however, since the cross-loadings were not above the cut-off (.32) suggested by Tabachnick and Fidel (2001), they were kept in the analysis. Both components were found to be reliable measures of beliefs in a competitive jungle, the internal consistency coefficients of the two components being .81 and .77, respectively (See Table 3 for an overview of the two components.).

2.1.2.3. Results for Validity of Dual Social Worldview Scales

In accordance with the postulations of Dual Process Model, the correlations Dual Social Worldview Measures had with personality traits and attitudinal orientations of RWA and SDO were tested in order to learn on the construct validity

Table 3

Results for Principle Components Analysis of Competitive Jungle Scale

Items	M	SD	C1[1]	C2
1. Winning is not the first thing; it's the only thing.	2.43	1.5	.83	-.21
11. You know that most people are out to "screw" you, so you have to get them first when you get the chance.	2.18	1.36	.68	
15. There is really no such thing as "right" and "wrong." It all boils down to what you can get away with.	2.05	1.25	.67	
9. It's a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times.	3.87	1.69	.65	
3. If one has power in a situation, one should use it however one has to in order to get one's way.	1.87	1.27	.63	
6. Money, wealth and luxury are what really count in life.	1.90	1.25	.61	.21
18. Basically, people are objects to be quietly and coolly manipulated for one's own benefit.	4.49	1.90	.55	
13. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a competitive "jungle" in which the fittest survive and succeed, in which power, wealth, and winning are everything, and might is right.	3.47	1.87	.52	
17. One of the most useful skills a person should develop is how to look someone straight in the eye and lie convincingly.	1.60	.96	.51	.32
4. If it's necessary to be cold blooded and vengeful to reach one's goals, then one should do it.	1.93	1.26	.50	.21
14. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.	2.23	1.25		.76
19. One should give others the benefit of the doubt. Most people are trustworthy if you have faith in them.	3.01	1.32	-.26	.65
12. All in all it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.	1.54	.79		.65
5. Life is not governed by the "survival of the fittest." We should let compassion and moral laws be our guide.	2.03	1.29		.63
2. The best way to lead a group under one's supervision is to show them kindness, consideration, and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors.	1.90	1.04		.58
10. Charity (i.e., giving somebody something for nothing) is admirable not stupid.	1.75	1.00		.58
16. Do unto to others as you would have them do unto you, and never do anything unfair to someone else.	1.38	.65		.57
8. It is much more important in life to have integrity in your dealings with others than to have money and power.	1.74	.91	.23	.51
20. We can make a society based on unselfish cooperation, sharing and people generously helping each other, and NOT on competition and acquisitiveness.	2.52	1.48		.51
7. It is better to he loved than to be feared.	1.68	.96		.45
	Eigenvalue	5.91	29.53	
	Variance (%)	29.53	9.29	
	Cronbach's α	.81	.77	

[1]C1 = Presence of Competition and Ruthlessness; C2 = Absence of Mutual Care and Cooperation

of these measures. Additionally, their relations with the two worldview measures of Tomkins' Polarity Theory (i.e., humanism and normativism) were tested. Results indicated that the Dual Social Worldview measures had the anticipated relationships partially. To begin with Dangerous Worldview measure of Duckitt and his colleagues, it was expected that the social belief that the world was a dangerous and threatening place would have a positive relationship with conscientiousness and a negative relationship with openness to experience. However, results indicated that it was unrelated to both traits. Although not directly asserted by DPM, van Hiel, Cornelis, and Roets (2007) suggested that neuroticism might be another antecedent of belief in a danger since it predicted both the dangerous world social belief and RWA in a positive manner. The findings from this study supported their suggestion since neuroticism was found to be positively related to belief in a dangerous world (r = .19, p < .01). As for its relationships with attitudinal orientations, this worldview was expected to be positively and consistently related to RWA and unrelated or poorly related to SDO. However, it was found to have a small positive correlation with RWA (r = .13, p < .05) and a small yet significant negative correlation with SDO (r = -.13, p < .05). Apart from these, this worldview was found to have a positive relationship (r = .15, p < .01) with Normativism measure of Polarity Scale, as expected.

The Competitive Jungle measure developed by Duckitt et al. (2002); on the other hand, had the relationships in the expected directions. According to Dual Process Model, it was expected to be negatively related to Agreeableness trait. The results confirmed this expectation (*r* = -.30, *p* < .01). Moreover, it was expected to have a positive and relatively strong relationship with SDO, and a relatively weak relationship with RWA. This was also confirmed by the results as the social belief that the world was a ruthlessly competitive jungle was positively and moderately related to SDO (*r* = .35, *p* < .01) whereas its correlation with RWA was nonsignificant. Moreover, it had a negative relationship with Humanism dimension of Polarity Scale (*r* = -.41, *p* < .01), as expected. (See Table 4 for an overview of bivariate correlations.).

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Zero-Order Correlations between Variables[1] [2]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1.BDW	(.73)														
2.BCJ	.09	(.85)													
3. RWA	.13*	.06	(.53)												
4. SDO	-.13*	.35**	.24**	(.91)											
5. AGR	.12*	-.30**	.18**	-.17**	(.83)										
6. OE	-.03	-.12*	.06	-.02	.45**	(.66)									
7. NEU	.19**	.23**	.09	.04	-.22**	-.23**	(.78)								
8. NV	-.09	.35**	-.09*	.22**	-.48**	-.33**	.40**	(.71)							
9. EXT	.07	-.09	.00	-.09	.42**	.48**	-.12*	-.26**	(.70)						
10. CON	-.04	-.27**	.14**	-.01	.39**	.31**	-.18**	-.35**	.26**	(.84)					
11. HUM	-.01	-.41**	.11*	-.33**	.43**	.26**	-.09	-.27**	.19**	.25**	(.75)				
12. NOR	.15**	.38**	.39**	.39**	-.20**	-.14**	.09	.16**	-.21**	-.04	-.23**	(.78)			
13. ISP	-.23**	-.04	.37**	.41**	-.09	.00	-.04	.10	.06	.10*	-.04	.23**	-		
14. RWII	-.09	.02	.41**	.43**	-.01	-.03	.05	.10	-.01	.18**	-.02	.28**	.67**	(.91)	
15. LWII	.13*	-.01	-.37**	-.38**	.09	.12*	.07	-.03	.06	-.10	.08	-.25**	-.61**	-.42**	(.83)
Mean	5.31	2.58	5.39	2.27	4.16	3.57	2.86	1.63	3.47	3.59	5.70	4.12	4.10	3.40	5.87
SD	.91	.71	1.15	.94	.46	.56	.64	.49	.79	.70	.54	.78	2.72	2.32	2.27

[1](BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World; BCJ = Belief in a Competitive Jungle; RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; AGR = Agreeableness; OE = Openness to Experience; NEU = Neuroticism; NV = Negative Valence; EXT = Extroversion; CON = Conscientiousness; HUM = Humanism; NOR = Normativism; ISP = Ideological Self-Placement; RWII = Right Wing Ideological Identity; LWII = Left Wing Ideological Identity)
[2]Internal consistency coefficients for the scales are presented in parentheses.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

47

2.1.3. Discussion

To sum up, the results of adaptation study indicated that the Dual Social Worldview measures that were adapted into Turkish in this study were reliable measures. However, the correlations they had with the mentioned variables indicated that the Dual Social Worldview measures were comparatively valid measures of worldviews in terms of construct validity since some of the relationships of belief in a dangerous world measure were not in the expected pattern. In order to learn better on the relationships duals social worldviews has in Turkish cultural context and test the factor structures obtained in Study 1a in another sample, a second study was conducted.

2.2. Study 1b - Testing the Factor Structures of Dual Social Worldview Scales in a Student Sample

This study was conducted to test the factor structures of dual social worldview measures in another Turkish sample and perform further tests of reliability and validity. Confirmatory Factor Analyses were conducted in order to test the factor structures of the scales and bivariate correlations of the variables with identical variables in Study 1a were tested in order to test the construct validity of the measures.

Since this study was planned to be a replication of Study 1a, the procedure was identical to the previous one with two exceptions. Data of this study was gathered from university students in order to test whether the findings of Study 1a which were based on adult sample can be generalized to a student sample. Secondly, as previously reported, the expectations regarding the relationships the belief in a dangerous world belief had with other variables tested were only partially confirmed since its relationship with RWA was a positive yet small one. In order to better understand whether it was a methodological problem related to the measure employed in Study 1a (i.e. item wordings, low internal consistency coefficient, etc.) or it was the nature of the variable in this cultural context, a different and longer measure of RWA was employed in this study.

2.2.1. Method

2.2.1.1. Participants

Participants were 272 students (153 women; 118 men; 1 unspecified) of Middle Technical University who joined the online study in exchange of course credit. Their ages ranged from 19 to 32 (M = 21.83, SD = 1.82). They were a predominantly religious (M = 1.36, SD = .48) sample yet their scores in both in faith (M = 4.02, SD = 3.07 in a 0-10 Likert type scale) and conservatism (M = 3.15, SD = 2.62 in a 0-10 Likert type scale) were low. As for ideological self-placement, they were slightly leftist (M = 4.15, SD = 2.18). The procedure of the study was identical to Study 1a.

2.2.1.2. Measures

The measures employed for data gathering were identical with the ones used in Sample 1, except the Right-Wing Authoritarianism measure. In sample 2, Altemeyer's (1996) 22-item Likert type scale that has been adapted into Turkish by Güldü (2011) has been employed in order to measure participants' levels of right wing authoritarianism. The scale has two factors, namely, Turkish version, namely, authoritarianism (α = .82) and conventionalism (α = .78). Participants rated the items on a 9-points Likert type scale ranging from -4 to +4, as instructed by Altemeyer (1996).

2.2.2. Results

A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted with LISREL 9.3 Student Version to test how well the factor structures of Dangerous World and Competitive Jungle measures obtained in Study 1a fits the data. In the analyses, covariance matrix was used as an input and Maximum Likelihood Estimation was employed for parameter estimation. The chi-square test χ^2, the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), standardized root mean residual (SRMR), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), and the comparative fit index (CFI), were used to assess the model fit. A nonsignificant χ^2 statistic, a χ^2/df ratio ≤ 3, a RMSEA $\leq .08$, a SRMR $\leq .05$, a comparatively lower

AIC (for nonnested models), an AGFI ≥ .90, and a CFI ≥ .90 were taken into account as indicators of good fit (Bollen, 1989; Hu & Bentler, 1999.). In addition to fit indices, the chi-square difference test and interpretability of the solutions were used to compare fit for nested models.

For Belief in a Dangerous World Scale, the 9-item and 2-factor adapted version (Model 1 – the model obtained in Study 1a) was tested against 3 alternatives: The original 10-item single factor measure (Alternative Model 1), a 9-item single factor measure (Alternative Model 2) and a 2-factor 10-item version (Alternative Model 3). Results indicated that proposed model (Model 1) fit the data better than the alternatives as indicated by comparatively better goodness of fit statistics and also by lower AIC levels (See Table 5 for model statistics). When it was compared to Alternative Model 2 (the nested alternative) Chi-Square difference test was found to be significant, $\Delta\chi2$ (1, N = 272) = 177.75, $p < .01$

For Belief in a Competitive Jungle Scale, the 20-item and 2-factor adapted version (Model 1) was tested against the 20-item single factor version proposed by Duckitt et al (2002). Similar to Belief in a Dangerous World Scale, the adapted version obtained in Exploratory Factor Analysis provided significantly better fit to data, when compared to Duckitt e al.'s original single factor version, $\Delta\chi2$ (1, N = 272) = 12.50, $p < .01$ (See Table 5 for model statistics).

As for the reliabilities of the scales in this sample, it can be concluded that both scales were reliable. The internal consistency coefficients were found to be $\alpha =$ .77 for belief in a dangerous world measure (the coefficients of the subcomponents of the scale were $\alpha = .71$ and $\alpha = .58$, respectively) and $\alpha = .86$ for belief in a competitive jungle measure (the coefficients of the subcomponents of the scale were $\alpha = .82$ and $\alpha = .81$, respectively).

For further tests of validity, the correlations dangerous world and competitive jungle worldviews had with personality traits and attitudinal orientations components of Dual Process Model as well as the humanism and normativism dimensions of Polarity Theory were tested. In accordance with Dual Process Model, dangerous

worldview was expected to have a positive correlation with conscientiousness and a negative correlation with openness to experience trait. According to results, these expectations were partially confirmed since it was found to be unrelated to conscientiousness yet negatively related to openness to experience ($r = -.15$, $p < .01$). In relation to attitudinal orientations, dangerous worldview was expected to positively and strongly related to RWA and unrelated to SDO. However, according to results, it was found to be negatively related to both these variables ($r = -.12$, $p < .05$ for RWA and $r = -.16$, $p < .01$ for SDO). As for the two worldview dimensions of Polarity Theory, it was found to be unrelated normativism.

Table 5

Model Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analysis on Dual Social Worldview Scales

Model	χ^2	df	p	RMSEA	CI	SRMR	AIC	AGFI	CFI
Belief in a Dangerous World									
Model 1 (EFA Model)	48.08	26	.00	.06	.03 - .08	.05	88.83	.93	.95
Alternative Model 1	77.44	35	.00	.07	.05 - .09	.06	122.93	.91	.91
Alternative Model 2	60.58	27	.00	.07	.04 - .09	.05	101.11	.92	.93
Alternative Model 3	65.32	34	.00	.06	.04 - .08	.05	111.25	.92	.93
Belief in a Competitive Jungle									
Model 1 (EFA Model)	296.38	169	.00	.05	.04 - .06	.06	380.89	.88	.91
Alternative Model	474.13	170	.00	.10	.09 - .11	.08	727.27	.76	.79

Note. The values reported in the table are approximate.

Competitive jungle worldview; on the other hand, had correlations in the expected directions for all the variables tested. For personality traits, it was negatively correlated with agreeableness ($r = -.29$, $p < .01$); for attitudinal orientations, it was unrelated to RWA and positively related to SDO ($r = .34$, $p < .01$). Moreover, it was found to be negatively correlated with humanism ($r = -.45$, $p < .01$), as expected (See Table 6 for an overview of bivariate correlations between the variables tested.).

2.2.3. Discussion

This study was conducted to test the factor structure as well as the reliability and validity of dual social worldview measures in a Turkish student sample. For both measures, results yielded by CFA indicated that the factor structures obtained in Study 1 provided good fit to data in terms of both goodness-of-fit statistics and comparison against alternative models. As for the reliabilities, both measures were found to be reliable although the reliability of one of the subcomponents of belief in a dangerous belief measure (Component 2 - "Absence of Safety and Security") was lower than it was expected.

For validity of the measures, it was seen that belief in a competitive jungle had all the relationships with tested variables in expected pattern and direction. The belief in a dangerous world measure; on the other hand, met the expectations only partially. Moreover, the reliability of the second component of the belief in a dangerous world measure had a comparatively low reliability ($\alpha = .58$ for "Absence of Safety and Security"), which implies that the reversed coded items might be problematic.

The use of reversed coded items in scales, in fact, a controversial issue in scale development and measurement literature. Although including reverse coded items to identify and control for acquiescence bias is a common practice in the development of multi-item scales (e.g. Churchill, 1979; Hersche & Engelland, 1996), sometimes, as it is the case in both of the dual social worldview measures adapted in Study 1a and 1b, reverse coded items might produce artificial factors although a single construct is intended to measure throughout the scale (Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 1997) hence confound the measurement. Moreover, some researchers argue incorporating these type of items is not a good strategy to reduce the acquiescence bias because these negatively worded items tend to be less reliable and valid than the rest of the scale (Harvey, Billings, & Nilan, 1985; Krosnick & Presser, 2009; Swain, Weathers, & Niedrich, 2008; Wong, Rindfleisch, & Burroughs, 2003); therefore, it is a better strategy to avoid using such items. On the grounds of this discussion in the literature, I have decided to avoid the second

components of both belief in a dangerous world (i.e. Absence of Safety and Security) and competitive jungle (i.e. Absence of Mutual Care and Cooperation) and use only the first components of both scales (i.e. Presence of Dangers and Threats & Presence of Competition and Ruthlessness, respectively) in further analyses in order to prevent any reliability and validity problems.

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Zero-Order Correlations between Variables[1][2]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1.BDW	(.77)														
2. BCJ	-.04	(.86)													
3. RWA	-.12*	.02	(.91)												
4. SDO	-.16**	.34**	.44**	(.92)											
5. AGR	.12	-.29**	.07	-.11	(.81)										
6. OE	-.15*	.00	.03	.10	.35**	(.74)									
7. NEU	.21**	.12	.08	.00	-.17**	-.17**	(.81)								
8. NV	-.10	.45**	.18**	.20**	-.38**	-.16**	.30**	(.64)							
9. EXT	-.02	.03	-.04	-.03	.38**	.55**	-.11	-.14*	(.87)						
10. CON	-.04	-.12*	.09	.08	.22**	.22**	-.13*	-.21**	.17**	(.84)					
11. HUM	.03	-.45**	.01	-.34**	.42**	.17**	-.12*	-.30**	.13*	.18**	(.81)				
12. NOR	.08	.32**	.22**	.35**	-.20**	-.08	.17**	.24**	-.21**	-.07	-.23**	(.77)			
13. ISP	-.25	-.02	.60**	.34**	-.03	.06	-.03	.16**	-.03	.08	.03	.09	-		
14. RWII	-.06	.09	.69**	.37**	.14	.09	.08	.08	-.03	.10	.03	.12	.49**	(.90)	
15. LWII	.14	-.05	-.41	-.31	.10	.05	.00	-.09	.05	-.11	.06	-.25**	-.50	-.13*	(.83)
Mean	5.00	2.65	3.57	2.73	4.08	3.52	2.84	1.72	3.24	3.48	5.52	4.37	4.15	3.42	5.16
SD	.83	.70	1.35	.97	.48	.62	.67	.49	.79	.69	.62	.69	2.18	2.17	2.13

[1]BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World; BCJ = Belief in a Competitive Jungle; RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; AGR = Agreeableness; OE = Openness to Experience; NEU = Neuroticism; NV = Negative Valence; EXT = Extroversion; CON = Conscientiousness; HUM = Humanism; NOR = Normativism; ISP = Ideological Self-Placement; RWII = Right Wing Ideological Identity; LWII = Left Wing Ideological Identity
[2] Internal consistency coefficients are presented in parentheses.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

CHAPTER 3

ADAPTATION OF POLARITY SCALE INTO TURKISH CULTURAL CONTEXT

This study was conducted to adapt the Polarity Scale developed by Nilsson (2014) as a refinement of Tomkins' Polarity Scale (1964; reprinted in Stone & Schaffner, 1988) into Turkish and to conduct the reliability and validity tests. The adaptation of the scales into Turkish was conducted employing the four-step procedure described below:

As a first step, researchers translated the scales into Turkish separately then created a joint form by comparing their translations. Secondly, the joint forms along with the original forms and construct definitions were presented to 10 bilingual social psychologists who checked the forms in terms of both authenticity and fitness to measure the intended constructs. Upon their feedbacks, the Turkish forms were revised and sent to two professional linguists who independently back-translated them to English, which constitutes the third step. Lastly, an independent bilingual social psychologist compared the original and back-translated forms to decide on the authenticity of the back-translated form and the form was finalized on the basis of the feedback provided by them.

3.1. Study 2a - Exploring Factor Structure of Polarity Scale in an Adult Sample

This study was conducted to explore the factor structure of the Polarity Scale in Turkish cultural context as well as to conduct tests of reliability and validity. The reliabilities of the scales were determined by the internal consistency coefficients (i.e. Cronbach's alpha) whereas the construct validity was tested on the basis of correlations humanism and normativism had with ideological orientation as well as the attitudinal orientation measures of DPM (i.e. RWA and SDO). As for the

relationship with ideological orientation, in accordance with the postulations of Polarity Theory, it was expected that humanism would be related to left wing ideological orientation and normativism would be related to right wing ideological orientation. As for the relationship with attitudinal orientations, it was expected that humanism would be negatively related to both RWA and SDO and whereas normativism would be positively related to both of the variables.

3.1.1. Method

3.1.1.1. Participants

Participants were 315 adults (161 women, 149 men, and 2 unspecified) who were reached through various social media channels and voluntarily participated in the online study. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 72 ($M = 30.31$, $SD = 10.90$). Majority of participants had a university degree, or higher (140 participants had bachelor's degree; 89 of them had postgraduate degree, 81 participants had a high school degree, 1 of them were primary school and 1 of them were secondary school graduates.). Most participants had religious identifications (64 %) although they did not consider themselves as faithful ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 3.31$) or conservative ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 2.65$) in a 0-10 Likert type scale). As for their ideological self-placements, participants were in the left of the center ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 2.74$). The procedure was identical to the one in Study 1a apart from the measures. Participants completed the measures in the following order: Polarity Scale, Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale, Social Dominance Orientation Scale, and demographics form.

3.1.1.2. Measures

The measures employed in this study were Polarity Scale (Nilsson, 2014; TR: Sayılan, Tunç, & Cingöz Ulu, 2016), Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 1996; TR: Göregenli, 2010) and Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto et al., 1994; TR: Akbaş, 2010) as well as the demographic and background variables and the measures of ideological orientation (brief definitions of the scales were presented in Study 1a).

3.1.2. Results

Principle Component Analysis with Promax Rotation was performed in order to determine the factor structure of 30 item Polarity Scale. Since the scale had two subscales, namely humanism and normativism, the EFAs were performed separately for each subscale. The number of factors were decided through Kaiser criterion of eigenvalues over 1.00, the Catell scree plot test, Monte Carlo parallel analysis, and the interpretability of scores.

3.1.2.1. Exploratory Factor Analyses on Humanism Subscale

The score of Kaise-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test was found to be .76, reflecting that the items were suitable for factor analysis. According to results, 5 factors were found with eigenvalues over 1.00 and 59.91 % of total variance was explained by these 5 factors. The factor structure was generally compatible with 5 facets Nilsson (2016) suggested for Humanism subscale with only 1 item (item 1) loading onto a different factor than it should have been.

The 4th component included 3 items (7, 11, and 15) and explained 7,45% or total variance. Since the items were compatible with the epistemology facet of the original scale, the component was named accordingly. The last component included 3 items (3, 6, and 13) and explained 7,23% of total variance. Since the items were compatible with the political values facet of the original scale, the component was named accordingly. The internal consistency coefficient of the whole scale was .76 (See Table 7 for an overview of the components.).

3.1.2.2. Exploratory Factor Analyses on Normativism Subscale

For Normativism subscale, the score of Kaise-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test was found to be .77, reflecting that the items were suitable for factor analysis. According to results, 4 factors were found with eigenvalues over 1.00 and 52.05 % of total variance was explained by these 4 factors. However, the analysis of scree plot and parallel analysis revealed that a 3-factor solution was more appropriate. Therefore, the analysis was repeated by forcing the items into 3 factors. The 3-factor solution explained 44.34% of total variance and several items (items 4,

Table 7

Results for Principle Components Analysis of Humanism Scale

Items	M	SD	C1[1]	C2	C3	C4	C5
10. You need to be open to your feelings to learn from them and understand who you are.	5.70	1.08	.79				
8. You must always leave yourself open to your own feelings – alien as they may sometimes seem.	5.18	1.30	.78				
2. Feelings are the most important aspect of being human, because they give our lives meaning.	5.59	1.23	.74				
4. People are basically kind and helpful.	3.74	1.57		.89			
12. Human beings are basically good.	4.09	1.74		.88			
9. Human beings should be treated with respect at all times.	5.92	1.17			.79		
14. When people are in trouble, they need help and should be helped.	5.70	1.06			71		
1. All persons are in themselves valuable.	5.42	1.69			.60		
5. Human beings should be loved at all times, because they want and need to be loved.	5.48	1.35			.42		
11. Creativity and curiosity are the most important tools in the search for knowledge.	6.02	.97				.78	
15. A scientist must rely on creativity and intuition.	5.35	1.42				.66	
7. The main purpose of education should be to enable the young to discover and create novelty.	6.11	1.03				.58	
3. The most important purpose of society is to protect people's rights, freedoms, and dignity.	6.32	1.01					.70
6. It is necessary to break the laws and rules of society when these lead to unfair treatment of some people.	4.54	1.80					.67
13. The most important goal for a society is to make sure that its members have a chance to lead a good life.	6.18	.97				.36	.56
	Eigenvalue		3.78	1.76	1.25	1.12	1.09
	Variance (%)		25.17	11.74	8.32	7.45	7.23
	Cronbach's α		.71	.78	.63	.53	.42

[1]C1 = Attitudes to Affect; C2 = Human Nature; C3 = Interpersonal Attitudes; C4 = Epistemology; C5 = Political Values

11, and 14) loaded into more than factor. After omitting them, the total variance explained by the final 3-component and 12-item solution increased to 48.98%.

The first component included 5 items: 3 items of the attitudes to affect facet of the original scale, (3, 6, and 13) and 2 items from the epistemology facet (1 and 15) and it explained 25.7% of total variance with and eigenvalue of 3.09. When the items were interpreted, it was seen that they were related to attitudes towards affect and reasoning; therefore, this component was named "Attitudes to Affect and Reasoning". The second component included 4 items: items 2, 7, 9 (the human nature facet of the original scale), and 8 (item belonging the interpersonal attitudes facet of the original scale). This component explained 13.04% of total variance with an eigenvalue of 1.56. since the items reflect attitudes related to human nature, the component was named accordingly. The last component; on the other hand, included items 5, 10, 2, the three items comprising of the political values facet of the original scale. This component, named as "Political Values", explained 10.22% or total variance with an eigenvalue of 1.23. The internal consistency coefficient of the whole scale was found to be $\alpha = .75$ (See Table 8 for an overview of the components).

3.1.2.3. Results for Validity of Polarity Scale

In order to test the validity of Polarity Scale in Turkish cultural context, the correlations humanism and normativism had with right wing authoritarianism, social dominance and ideological orientations were tested. According to Tomkins' theorizing, it was expected that humanistic tendencies would be negatively correlated to both RWA and SDO whereas normativism would be positively related to both of them. As for ideological orientations, humanism was expected to be positively related to left wing ideological orientations and negatively to right wing ideological orientations. For normativism, on the contrary, a positive correlation with right wing ideological orientation and a negative one with left wing ideological orientation was expected.

The results generally confirmed the expectations. Humanism, firstly, was found to be negatively related to RWA ($r = -.10$, $p < .05$) and SDO ($r = -.10$, $p < .01$) and positively with left wing ideological orientation ($r = .21$, $p < .01$). Its correlation with right wing ideological orientation was nonsignificant ($r = -.05$, $p > .05$)

Table 8

Results for Principle Components Analysis of Normativism Scale

Items	M	SD	C1[1]	C2	C3
6. Feelings must be controlled by reason, because they can make you do stupid things.	4.55	1.67	.80		
3. Human beings would be lost without reason, because feelings cannot be trusted.	4.11	1.66	.71		
1. Reason has to be continually disciplined and corrected by reality and hard facts	4.10	1.67	.62		
13. Feelings are often an obstacle to seeing how things really are.	4.31	1.54	.60		
15. Imagination leads people into self-deception and delusions	2.57	1.52	.58		
2. People don't really care what happens to the next person.	4.18	1.64		.75	
9. The bad people in the world outnumber the good people.	4.03	1.72		.72	
7. When people do good deeds, it is almost always out of an expectation to receive something in return.	4.32	1.58		.67	
8. When people are in trouble, they should help themselves and not depend on others.	2.98	1.55		.38	
12. A society must enforce its laws and rules strictly in order not to deteriorate.	3.75	1.78			.78
5. People who commit crimes must be punished severely so that they are deterred from repeating the crime.	4.60	1.73			.76
10. The maintenance of law and order is the most important duty of any government.	5.23	1.62			.74
Eigenvalue			3.09	1.56	1.23
Variance (%)			25.74	13.04	10.22
Cronbach's α			.71	.54	.64

[1]C1 = Attitudes to Affect and Reasoning; C = Human Nature; C3 = Political Values

however, its correlation with ideological self-placement measure was significant and negative, indicating a negative relationship with right wing political orientation.

For normativism, similarly, the correlations were in expected pattern and direction. This tendency had positive correlations with RWA ($r = .39, p < .01$), SDO ($r = .36, p < .01$), right wing ideological orientation ($r = .21, p < .01$), and ideological self-placement ($r = .16, p < .01$), and a negative one with left wing ideological orientation. $r = -.30, p < .01$ (See Table 9 for descriptive statistics, internal consistency coefficients, and zero-order correlations between variables tested.).

3.1.3. Discussion

The results of Study 1a indicated that the adapted scale was a reliable and valid measure in Turkish cultural context. As for the reliability, the internal consistency coefficients of both subscales were found to be in expected levels, in terms of both facet variables and whole scales (the internal consistency coefficients for the facet scales of humanism and normativism scales could be found in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, and the coefficients for the total scales were presented in Table 9). In terms of validity; it was seen that humanism and normativism had correlations with tested variables in expected pattern and direction.

Table 9

Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Zero-Order Correlations between Variables[1] [2]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. HUM	(.76)						
2. NOR	-.33**	(.76)					
3. RWA	-.10*	.39**	(.84)				
4. SDO	-.32**	.36**	.50**	(.86)			
5. RWII	-.05	.21**	.71**	.42**	(.89)		
6. LWII	.21**	-.30**	-.58**	-.39**	-.37**	(.83)	
7. ISP	-.12*	.16**	.56**	.33**	.58**	-.60**	-
Mean	5.43	4.17	4.36	2.68	3.37	5.57	4.37
SD	.64	.78	1.63	1.05	2.45	2.26	2.74

[1]HUM = Humanism; NOR = Normativism; RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; RWII = Right Wing Ideological Identity; LWII = Left Wing Ideological Identity; ISP = Ideological Self-Placement
[2] Internal consistency coefficients are presented in parentheses.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

3.2. Study 2b – Testing the Factor Structure of Polarity Scale in a Student Sample

As a test of whether the factor structures obtained in Study 2a fit the data better than the original factor structure obtained by Nilsson (2014), a second study was conducted. The data used in this study was collected by Tunç (2016) and included in this thesis upon his permission.

3.2.1. Method

3.2.1.1. Participants

Participants were 320 university students (225 women, 75 men, and 20 unspecified) who completed the scales within another project investigating the relationship between worldviews and sociopolitical attitudes. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 42 ($M = 21.00$, $SD = 2.10$). Most participants had religious identifications (92 %) and they considered themselves as moderately faithful ($M = 6.97$, $SD = 2.89$) and conservative ($M = 5.90$, $SD = 2.58$) in a 0-10 Likert type scale). As for their ideological self-placements, participants were in the slightly right of the center ($M = 6.29$, $SD = 2.99$).

3.2.1.2. Measures

Similar to Study 2a, participants were asked to fill a demographic form including information on their gender (woman, man, and other), age, the city they were born and live, education, piety, and conservativeness. Their ideological orientations were measured via ideological self-placement measure; i.e. a single 1 (left) to 11 (right) Likert type question was asked in which higher scores reflect more rightist ideological orientation. Also, they filled the adapted Turkish form of Nilsson's Polarity Scale.

3.2.2. Results

The adapted Turkish form has been tested with confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). The CFAs were performed on Humanism and Normativism subscales of Polarity Scale with LISREL 8.8 in order to see how well the data fit the 5-factor solution proposed by Nilsson (2014) and the solution suggested by the EFA conducted in Study 2a.

The 3-item facets were used as manifest variables in CFA and the models tested were generated in accordance suggestions of Nilsson (2014). In Model 1, one latent factor representing humanism and normativism dimensions as two opposite ends of one bipolar worldview dimension was used. In Model 2, one latent factor (worldview) including error terms between corresponding facets of humanism and

normativism was used. In Model 3, humanism and normativism were used as orthogonal two latent variables with no relations between them. In Model 4, humanism and normativism were represented as distinct but negatively correlated latent variables with a relation added between these two latent variables. In Model 5, the model proposed by Nilsson (2014), relations between the error terms of corresponding facets were added so that humanism and normativism were represented as distinct but negatively correlated latent variables across their facets. In Model 6 (the nonnested alternative), the solution suggested by EFA in Study 2a was used so that the model suggested by Nilsson (2014) were also tested against the adapted version.

In the analyses, covariance matrix was used as an input and Maximum Likelihood Estimation was employed for parameter estimation. The chi-square test χ^2, the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), standardized root mean residual (SRMR), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), and the comparative fit index (CFI), were used to assess the model fit. A nonsignificant χ^2 statistic, a χ^2/df ratio ≤ 3, a RMSEA $\leq .08$, a SRMR $\leq .05$, a comparatively lower AIC (for nonnested models), an AGFI $\geq .90$, and a CFI $\geq .90$ were taken into account as indicators of good fit (Bollen, 1989; Hu & Bentler, 1999.). For nested models, the chi-square difference test and interpretability of the solutions were used to compare fit.

According to results, Model 5, the model proposed by Nilsson, provided better fit to the data when it was compared to all nested alternatives: $\Delta\chi2$ (4) = 231.02, $p < .01$ for Model 1, $\Delta\chi2$ (1) = 155.89, $p < .01$ for Model 2, $\Delta\chi2$ (4) = 114.10, $p < .01$ for Model 3, and $\Delta\chi2$ (3) = 98.04, $p < .01$ for Model 4. As for the nonnested alternative, although Model 6 provided lower AIC than Model 5 did, the model proposed by Nilsson (Model 5) was decided to be taken as the final model. According to theory, this model had a better grasp of the facets of humanism and normativism proposed by Tomkins (1963) (See Table 10 for details).

The standardized parameters of Model 5 are presented in Figure 2. The 5 facets of humanism dimension loaded between .41 and .71 (p < .001) on the

63

humanism factor and the facets of normativism dimension loaded between .39 and .65 (p < .001) on the normativism factor. Similar to what Nilsson (2014) found in his study, the standardized estimates for the relationships between the facets of human nature, interpersonal attitudes and attitudes to affect were significant and negative whereas the relationship between the facets of political values and epistemology were negative yet nonsignificant. Additionally, the relationship between the facets of humanism and normativism was found to be significant and negative ($r = -.20$, $p < .01$), a finding supporting Nilsson's postulation that humanism and normativism were distinct yet negatively related constructs rather than bipolar ones as Tomkins formulated them.

Table 10

Model Statistics for Polarity Scale Sample 2

	χ^2	df	p	RMSEA	CI	SRMR	AIC	AGFI	CFI
Model 1	346.99	35	.00	.19	.17 - .20	.13	466.67	.67	.60
Model 2	270.86	30	.00	.17	.16 - .19	.16	365.43	.70	.69
Model3	229.07	35	.00	.13	.12 - .15	.12	271.70	.80	.75
Model4	213.01	34	.00	.13	.12 - .15	.10	265.77	.80	.77
Model 5	114.97	31	.00	.09	.07 - .11	.08	160.34	.88	.89
Model 6	71.09	17	.00	.10	.08 - .12	.08	108.40	.89	.89

3.2.3. Discussion

The results of this study indicated that both the factor structure obtained in Study 2.1 and the one proposed by Nilsson (2014) fit the data poorly yet adequately. The model obtained in Study 2.1 (Model 6) provided lower AIC levels than Nilsson's model (Model 5); however, Model 5 yielded better goodness of fit statistics (χ^2/df = 3.70, RMSEA = .09) than Model 6 (χ^2/df = 4.18, RMSEA = .10) and it was a more theoretically plausible alternative by representing all of the dimensions of humanism and normativism postulated by Tomkins (1963); therefore, Model 5 was decided to be taken as the final model and be used in further analyses.

Figure 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Polarity Scale

CHAPTER 4

TESTS FOR THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN WORLDVIEWS AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS

This study was conducted in order to test how well the integrative model examining the links between worldviews and ideological orientations fit the data as well as the relationships among worldview variables suggested by Polarity Theory, Dual Process Model and Moral Foundations Theory. As previously discussed in the Introduction chapter, it was hypothesized that humanism and normativism would be the affective bases upon which the more specific beliefs and attitudes about human nature and social environment (i.e. dangerous world and competitive jungle worldviews of Dual Process Model) were formed and which gave rise to even more specific principles about the social world (i.e. the individualizing and binding foundations of Moral Foundations Theory) and that all these worldviews would predict ideological orientations of individuals in an integrative manner.

Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1, it was hypothesized that humanism would predict ideological orientation indirectly through the mediation of belief in a competitive jungle and individualizing foundations, respectively. Moreover, it was hypothesized that humanism would predict individualizing foundations through the mediation of belief in a competitive jungle. As for normativism, it was expected that this worldview would predict ideological orientation indirectly through the mediation of belief in a dangerous world and binding foundations. Moreover, it was hypothesized that normativism would predict binding foundations indirectly, through the mediation of belief in a dangerous world.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants

Participants of this study were 1042 students from 10 different universities in Turkey (826 women; 211 men; 5 other), of which 857 were undergraduates and 185 were postgraduate students enrolled in M. Sc. or Ph.D. programs. The ages of participants ranged from 18 to 50 (M = 20.65, SD = 2.50). They were a predominantly believer (81 % had religious identifications) sample with moderate levels of piety (M = 5.47, SD = 3.00) and conservatism (M = 4.54, SD = 2.75) in a 0-10 Likert type scale). As for their ideological self-placements, participants were in the center (M = 5.14, SD = 2.66).

Subjects participated in the online study in exchange of course credit and were free to leave the study at any time they wished. Firstly, they read and signed the Informed Consent Form mentioning the aim of the study as "getting information on their worldviews and ideas related to various social issues". They completed the scales presented in separate blocks in the following order: Polarity Scale, Dual Social Worldview Scales, Moral Foundations Scale and the demographic form. The questions were randomized in each block in order to prevent possible effects of question order. After completing the battery, they were fully debriefed regarding the nature of the study and variables tested.

4.1.2. Measures

Polarity Scale, Dual Social Worldviews Scale, Ideological Self-Placement Measure, and the demographic form was identical to the ones in Study 1a. Moral foundations individuals value were measured by the Moral Foundations Scale described below. Also, a different version of Ideological Identities Measure was employed in this study.

4.1.2.1 Moral Foundations Scale. The 30-item Likert type scale developed by Graham et al. (2009) was used to measure the extent to which individuals prioritize five moral foundations; i.e., care (α = .69), fairness (α = .65), loyalty (α = .71), authority (α = .64), and purity (α = .64) in terms of agreement with foundation-

specific moral concerns as well as explicit judgments of moral relevance. The scale was adapted into Turkish by Yalçındağ and Özkan (Yalçındağ, 2015; Yalçındağ et al., 2017) and the internal consistencies of each subscale were α = .64 for care, α = .70 for fairness, α = .66 for loyalty, α = .78 for authority, and α = .79 for purity in the Turkish form). Participants rated the items in terms of whether they 1(I do not care et al) 6 (I care very much).

4.1.2.2. Ideological Orientation. In order to explore the factor structure of the 20-item Ideological Identities Measure, which was used to measure ideological orientations in this sample, Principal Component Analyses with Promax rotation were conducted.

The score of Kaise-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test was found to be .87, reflecting that the items were suitable for factor analysis. According to results, 5 components were found with eigenvalues over 1.00 and 67.77 % of total variance was explained by these 5 components. However, the analysis of scree plot and parallel analysis revealed that a 2-components solution was more admissible. Therefore, the analysis was repeated by forcing the items into 2 components. The 2-component solution explained 46.26% of total variance and it was observed that loadings of some items were lower than expected. Since low loadings might create estimation problems in model testing, items with loadings lower than .50 (i.e. Fascism, Feminism, Atatürk's ideology, and Kurdish Political Movement) was omitted and the analysis was repeated. The resultant two components explained 53.38 % of total variance in ideological identities. The first component included 8 right wing ideological identities and explained 31.55 % of total variance with an eigenvalue of 5.05. The second component included 8 left wing ideological orientations and explained 21.84 of total variation in ideological identities with an eigenvalue of 3.49 (See Table 11 for an overview of components.).

4.2. Results

A correlational research design was employed to examine the relationships worldviews and ideological orientations. In this regard, univariate statistics and correlations between study variables were presented firstly and tests of the proposed

model with Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was introduced secondly. Data was analyzed with SEM since is a valuable approach enabling researchers to test causal models that are too broad or complex hence difficult to test experimentally and it shows how well their causal models fit the data obtained.

Table 11

Results for Principle Components Analysis Ideological Orientations Scale

Items	*M*	*SD*	C1[1]	C2
12. Nationalist Conservatism	4.50	3.24	.87	
18. Turkism	6.36	3.51	.82	
20. Idealism	4.41	3.22	.81	
11. National Vision Movement	6.42	3.30	.81	
13. Conservative Democracy	4.37	3.08	.77	
14. Conservatism	4.67	3.35	.77	
19. Nationalism	6.57	3.14	.71	
15. Radical Islam	3.21	2.79	.68	
17. Socialism	6.92	2.83		.77
10. Marxism	5.05	2.83		.74
6. Communism	4.86	2.99		.72
9. Libertarianism	5.15	2.58		.62
3. Ecologism	6.54	2.69		.62
16. Social Democracy	7.77	2.57		.59
8. Liberalism	5.93	2.87		.57
1. Anarchism	4.09	2.94		.57
	Eigenvalue		5.05	3.49
	Variance (%)		31.55	21.84
	Cronbach's α		.91	.81

[1]C1 = Right Wing Ideological Identity; C2 = Left Wing Ideological Identity

4.2.1. Tests of Univariate Statistics and Correlations between Variables

Several patterns emerged among correlations between variables tested. The correlation between left wing and right wing ideologies, to begin with, were nonsignificant; therefore, the ideological orientation of individuals (i.e. the outcome of the proposed model) were measured in two variables, namely, right wing and left wing ideological orientations. Secondly, since the correlations Dangerous Worldview and Competitive Jungle measures of Dual Process Model had with other variables are not in expected direction and strength in studies 1a and 1b, only positively worded items of each scales were included in the analyses (Descriptive statistics,

internal consistency coefficients, and zero-order correlations between study variables are presented in Table 12).

The correlations humanism had with right wing ($r = .03$, $p >. 05$) and left wing ideologies ($r = .01$, $p >. 05$) were nonsignificant whereas normativism dimension of the Polarity Scale was unrelated to left wing ideological orientation ($r = -.01$, $p >. 05$) and weakly and negatively related ($r = -.06$, $p <. 05$) to right wing ideological orientation. Although Tomkins (1963) suggested that ideological orientations of individuals were rooted in their humanistic and normativistic tendencies, the proposed model assumed that the relationships between these two worldviews and ideological orientations were not direct ones, rather, they were mediated by other worldviews.

As for the relationships dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs had with moral foundations, it was expected that the relationship between belief in a dangerous world would have a positive and consistent relationship with the binding foundations (i.e. loyalty, authority, and purity); however, the correlations were small yet positive for loyalty ($r = .11$, $p <. 01$) and authority ($r = .11$, $p <. 01$) and the correlation it had with purity foundation was a small and negative one ($r = -.09$, $p <. 01$). For the belief in competitive jungle, the main concern of which was intergroup competition and protection of (if not enhancing) the status one's in-group has in the social hierarchy, it was expected that it would have a consistent and negative relationship with individualizing foundations (i.e. care and fairness) since these foundations were related to equity and justice among individuals. Although the correlation between competitive jungle belief and individualizing foundations were in expected direction, the correlations were found to be small ($r = -.28$, $p <. 01$ for care and $r = -.20$, $p <. 01$ for fairness). All other correlations were in expected pattern and direction.

4.2.2. The Test of Structural Equation Models

In order to assess the proposed model, structural equation analyses with LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006) was employed, using maximum likelihood for parameter estimation. Following the suggestions of Hu and Bentler (1999), the

model fit indices were assessed with chi-square test, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the non-normed fit index (NNFI), the standardized root mean square residuals (SRMR) the adjusted goodness of fit indices (AGFI) and the comparative fit index (CFI). a comparatively lower AIC (for nonnested models), an AGFI ≥ .90, and a CFI ≥ .90 were taken into account as indicators of good fit (Bollen, 1989; Hu & Bentler, 1999.). In addition to fit indices, the chi-square difference test and interpretability of the solutions were used to compare fit.

The two-step approach (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) was followed to evaluate both the determinants of latent variables and test the proposed hypotheses. In the measurement model, confirmatory factor analysis was used to specify indicators and enable the modifications for a better model. Structural model allowed me to test my hypothesis among given structural relations between constructs.

The proposed model had the two worldview dimensions of Polarity Theory; i.e. humanism and normativism as predictor variables and 4 mediator constructs, namely dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs of Dual Process Model and individualizing and binding foundations of Moral Foundations Theory. The outcome construct, namely, ideological orientation, was indicated by individuals' tendencies to have right wing and left wing ideological identities. (see Figure 1 for the Integrative Model Examining the Links between Worldviews and Ideological Orientations).

The measurement model included eight latent variables and their indicators. For humanism and normativism facet variables were used as indicators. For Dual Process Model measures, positively worded items were combined into parcels in order to simplify the measurement models; two parcels were generated for dangerous worldview and three for competitive jungle worldview. For Moral foundations, each of the five subscales including moral relevance and moral judgement items were used as indicators of latent variables; i.e. individualizing and binding foundations. For ideological orientations, three parcels were generated from the ideological identities scale for each of the left wing and right wing ideological orientations. The metric of all latent variables was set by constraining the first factor loading for each

Table 12

Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Humanism	(.73)											
2. Normativism	-.18**	(.75)										
3. Dangerous World	-.00	.37**	(.76)									
4. Competitive Jungle	-.22**	.44**	.28**	(.81)								
5. Care	.44**	-.09**	.08**	-.28**	(.63)							
6. Fairness	.32**	-.01	.18**	-.20**	.60**	(.54)						
7. Loyalty	.17**	.14**	.11**	-.00	.27**	.17**	(.63)					
8. Authority	.09**	.23**	.11**	.13**	.14**	.05	.66**	(.75)				
9. Purity	.19**	.17**	-.09**	-.06	.27**	.17**	.61**	.68**	(.72)			
10. Right Wing Ideologies	.03	.12**	-.00	.03	.04	-.05	.57**	.56**	.55**	(.91)		
11. Left Wing Ideologies	.01	-.01	-.06*	.13**	-.00	.09*	-.22**	-.24**	-.24**	-.04	(.81)	
12. Ideological Self Placement	-.01	.06*	-.12**	-.09**	-.00	-.10**	.39**	.42**	.45**	.59**	-.42**	
Mean	5.55	4.19	5.01	2.95	5.01	5.06	4.00	3.50	3.85	5.07	5.79	5.14
SD	.55	.70	.99	.91	.59	.59	.77	.86	.87	2.51	2.52	2.66

Note: Internal consistency coefficients of the scales are presented in parentheses.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

to 1. Correlations between error variances of corresponding facets of humanism and normativism were added. The measurement model provided adequate fit to data, (χ^2 (263, N = 1042) = 1499.23, p = .00, χ^2/df = 5.70, RMSEA = .07 with 90 % CI = [.07 - .09], SRMR = .08, NNFI = .90, AGFI = .86, CFI = .92). All the indicators loaded significantly on their latent variables and loadings ranged from .35 to .86 (See Figure 3 for the measurement model of the study variables).

Figure 3. Measurement Model for the Integrative Model Examining the Links between Worldviews and Ideological Orientations.

In the structural model, the fit indices indicated an adequate fit to the data, χ^2 (277, N = 1042) = 1887.09, p = .00, χ^2/df = 6.81, RMSEA = .08 with 90 % CI = [.07 - .08], SRMR = .10, NNFI = .90, AGFI = .86, CFI = .92 (See Table 12 for results from the models tested.). An examination of standardized path coefficients let me conclude that most of the proposed relationships were significant with t values greater than +/- 1.96 (p < .05). The total variance the proposed model explained was .16 for left wing ideological orientation and .63 for right wing ideological orientation (See Figure 4 for an overview of the results for the proposed model).

Individualizing foundations had a positive direct effect on left wing ideological orientation (β = .09) and a negative one on right wing ideological orientation (β = -.21). The direct effect of binding foundations; on the other hand,

Figure 4. Proposed Structural Equation Model Examining the Link between Worldviews and Ideological Orientations.

Note. Standardized estimates are shown, factor loadings for latent variables are not shown.

was negative on left wing ideological orientation (β = -.42) and positive on right wing ideological orientation (β = .83). However, the results yielded that the relationships humanism and normativism had with ideological orientations were not mediated by dual social worldviews and moral foundations since the indirect effects of humanism and normativism on right wing and left wing ideological orientations were found to be nonsignificant. As for the relationships dual social worldviews had with the ideological orientation, it was found that the relationship belief in a dangerous world had with right wing and left wing ideological orientations were not significantly mediated by binding foundations whereas the relationship belief in a competitive jungle had with right wing and left wing ideological orientation was significantly mediated by individualizing foundations, despite the fact that the effects were small (β =- .05 for left wing ideological orientation and β = .18 for right wing ideological orientation).

In order to get a better grasp of relationships worldviews had with ideological orientations, the proposed model was tested against a DPM version in which the dual social worldviews were taken as predictor variables whereas the worldview variables of Polarity Theory and Moral Foundations Theory were taken as mediators, respectively. Results indicated that Alternative Model provided a significantly better

fit to data when compared to the model proposed, $\Delta\chi2$ (0, N = 1042) = 64.34, p < .01 indicating that humanism and normativism were predicted by dual social worldviews rather than vice versa. Hence, Alternative Model was taken as the final model, χ^2 (279, N = 1042) = 1822.75, p = .00, χ^2/df = 6.53, RMSEA = .08 with 90 % CI = [.07 - .08], SRMR = .09, NNFI = .89, AGFI = .84, CFI = .90.

An examination of standardized path coefficients let us to conclude that all the proposed relationships were significant with t values greater than +/- 1.96 (p < .05). The total variance the final model explains on left wing ideological orientation is .17 for left wing ideological orientation and .64 for right wing ideological orientation. Individualizing foundations had a positive direct effect on left wing ideological orientation (β = .10) and the direct effect of binding foundations was positive on right wing ideological orientation (β = .82). Moreover, the results yielded that the relationships dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs had with ideological orientation were significantly mediated by humanism, normativism, and moral foundations. Accordingly, the indirect effect of dangerous world beliefs on left wing ideological orientation was negative (β = -.08) whereas its indirect effect on right wing ideological orientation was positive (β = .27). For competitive jungle beliefs; similarly, the indirect effects were negative yet for left wing ideological orientation (β = -.02) and positive and significant for right wing ideological orientation (β = .08). Additionally, the indirect effect of competitive jungle beliefs on individualizing foundations was negative (β = -.11) whereas the indirect effect of dangerous world beliefs on binding foundations was a positive one (β = .11) (The standardized estimates of Final Model are presented in Figure 4).

4.2.3. The Exploratory Tests of Alternative Structural Equation Models

Although both and the final models provided valuable information regarding how different worldview constructs might be integrated in a model of worldviews that can be used to predict ideological orientation, some exploratory models were also generated with an aim to better understand the relationship among the worldviews constructs as well as their links with ideological orientation. The first model was a saturated version of the proposed model (Exploratory Model 1) in

which all parameters in the model were allowed to predict one another rather than in a dual pathway fashion; a trimmed version of Exploratory Model 1 in which nonsignificant paths were deleted and the model was rerun (Exploratory Model 2); a different version of the Alternative Model in which dual social worldviews were predictors but the sequence of mediator variables was changed; i.e. the worldview variables of Moral Foundations Theory came first and they were followed by the worldview variables of Polarity Theory (Exploratory Model 3); a model in which moral foundations were taken as predictors, the worldview variables of Polarity Theory and Dual Process Model were taken as mediators, respectively (Exploratory Model 4); and finally, an alternative version of Exploratory Model 4 in which moral foundations were, again, taken as predictors but the sequence of mediator variables was different; i.e. the worldview variables of Dual Process Model came before the worldviews of Polarity Theory (Exploratory Model 5; See Table 13 for Model Statistics for all the models tested).

Table 13

Model Statistics for Study 3

	χ^2	df	p	RMSEA	CI	NNFI	SRMR	AGFI	CFI
Measurement Model	1499.23	263	.00	.07	.07 - .07	.90	.08	.86	.92
Proposed Model	1887.09	279	.00	.08	.07 - .08	.88	.10	.84	.90
Alternative Model	1822.75	279	.00	.08	.07 - .08	.89	.09	.84	.90
Exploratory Model 1	1530.55	265	.00	.07	.07 - .07	.90	.08	.86	.92
Exploratory Model 2	1557.38	276	.00	.07	.07 - .07	.90	.09	.86	.92
Exploratory Model 3	1511.50	264	.00	.07	07 - .07	.90	.08	.86	.92
Exploratory Model 4	2096.19	279	.00	.09	.08 - .09	.86	.11	.81	.88

According to results, both Exploratory Model 1 and 2 provided better fit to data than both the proposed model, [$\Delta\chi2$ (12, N = 1042) = 356.54, p < .01 for Exploratory Model 1 and $\Delta\chi2$ (3, N = 1042) = 329.71, p < .01 for Model 2] and the final model [$\Delta\chi2$ (14, N = 1042) = 292.20, p < .01 for Exploratory Model 1 and $\Delta\chi2$ (3, N = 1042) = 265.37, p < .01 for Model 2], as expected. However, these alternatives were rejected because they were data driven models with few free parameters. Exploratory models 4 and 5 were also rejected since it was not possible

to test these models; i.e. they did not converge. However, Exploratory Model 3 was an important alternative requiring more attention since it implied that the relationship between worldviews might be different than expected in the proposed model. However, it was also rejected since both the proposed [$\Delta\chi2$ (0, N = 1042) = 209.10, p < .01] and final models [$\Delta\chi2$ (0, N = 1042) = 273.44, p < .01] provided better fit to data, compared to this model.

Figure 5. Final Structural Equation Model on the Relationship between Worldviews and Ideological Orientation.

Note. Standardized estimates are shown factor loadings for latent variables are not shown.

4.3. Discussion

This study has been conducted to explore the relationship between worldviews and ideological orientation as well as the relationship among different worldview constructs through the tests of an integrative model on worldviews and ideological orientation. Based on Tomkins' (1963) postulations on ideo-affective polarity and attempts of integrating humanism and normativism to dual social worldviews and moral foundations separately (Nilsson & Jost, 2017; Sayılan & Cingöz-Ulu, 2018) it has been expected that humanism and normativism would constitute the ideo-affective bases upon which dual social worldviews and moral

77

foundations built and predicted ideological orientation. However, the results yield that this might not be the case since the indirect effects of humanism and normativism on ideological orientations through the mediation of dual social worldviews and moral foundations are not significant, despite the fact that the general model fit the data adequately.

As briefly discussed in Chapter I, all the perspectives included in the Integrative Model Examining the Links between Worldviews and Ideological Orientation suggest that their worldview variables would be the psychosocial bases for the development of ideological orientation. Moreover, although no integrative model examining the relationships among these three sets of worldview constructs as well as their links with ideological orientation has been suggested so far, there is an accumulating evidence on how these relationships might be formed alternatively. As previously discussed, studies conducted from a DPM perspective imply that dangerous world and competitive jungle beliefs might constitute alternative bases upon which the worldview constructs of Polarity Theory as well as Moral Foundations Theory are built. Therefore, the proposed model has been tested against a DPM alternative in which dual social worldviews are the predictors and it has been seen that it provides a significantly better fit to data, compared to the proposed model. In other words, results indicate that the two worldview dimensions of Tomkins' (1963) Polarity Theory are predicted by the dual social worldviews in the Dual Process Model of Duckitt and his colleagues (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002), rather than vice versa. The models have been also tested against some exploratory alternatives in order to better learn the process by which broad patterns of meaning about the human nature and the social world may turn into concrete ideological positions. According to results, none of the alternative models has been seen as more plausible than the final model since (a) although some of them provides a better fit to the data, they are not theoretically plausible alternatives and (b) the theoretically plausible alternatives provide significantly poorer fit to data or even do not converge.

When results of this study are interpreted from a Dual Process Model perspective, it can be concluded that humanism and normativism dimensions of Tomkins' Polarity Theory as well as the individualizing and binding foundations of Moral Foundations Theory are organized in accordance with the two dimensions of ideological attitudes, namely RWA and SDO. In fact, according to DPM, humanism and normativism can be listed among the socio-political attitudes and values corresponding to RWA and SDO (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009a). From this perspective, one of these two dimensions (i.e. characterized with authoritarianism or RWA) is characterized as a bipolar construct where authoritarianism, social and cultural conservatism, high normativism, and traditionalism on the one pole and openness, autonomy, low levels of normativism, liberalism, individualism, or personal freedom at the other one. The second dimension (i.e. characterized with SDO); on the other hand, has sociopolitical attitudes and values such as equality, humanism, social welfare, and egalitarianism on the one pole whereas economic conservatism, low levels of humanism, power, belief in hierarchy or inequality constitutes the other pole. Based on the findings from this study and existing literature (e.g. Federico et al., 2013; Van Leeuwen and Park, 2009) it can be suggested that individualizing and binding foundations can be added to the list of sociopolitical attitudes or values that are in line with the two ideological attitude dimensions of DPM where individualizing foundations could be listed under SDO-related constructs whereas binding foundations could be listed with RWA-related ones.

DPM suggests that having certain personality traits (i.e. social conformity and tough-mindedness) and chronic accessibility to corresponding sociocultural schemas (i.e. threat and security) may generate social worldviews related to the nature of human beings and the social world which may, in turn, activate two relatively orthogonal sets of motivational goals and attitudinal orientations expressed in these two dimensions (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009a). Specifically, the social schema of threat and the trait pattern of social conformity (i.e. low openness and high conscientiousness) might lead individuals to develop the social belief that the world is a threatening, dangerous, and unpredictable place rather than a safe, secure, and

stable one. In effect, this social belief might activate the motivational schema that can be expressed in the sociopolitical attitudes and values aligning with RWA. This study; on the other hand, shows us that this pattern might be better developed with the inclusion of normativism and binding foundations. In line with this, individuals who have the motivational goal of maintaining social control and security might develop a normativistic stance (i.e., they might value norms, rules, and institutions more than the individuals and their well-being) and with the joint effect of dangerous world social belief and normativistic tendencies, they might put special emphasis on binding foundations, which make them more inclined to right wing ideological orientation. On the other hand, individuals who have developed the social belief that the world is a safe, stable, and secure place as a result of their personalities and the social schema of security, might have the opposing motivational goal of personal autonomy and freedom, develop non-authoritarian sociopolitical attitudes and values as well as low levels of normativism and they might not focus on binding foundations. In effect they will be less likely to develop right wing ideological orientation.

As for the individuals who have developed the social belief that the world is a competitive jungle rather than a cooperative harmony where individuals care and help one another as a result of personality trait of tough-mindedness (i.e. low agreeableness) and the social schema of dominance, this social belief might activate the motivational goal of seeking superiority and dominance over others as well as power. In turn, they might have the sociopolitical attitudes and values enhancing and justifying the hierarchical structure of the society and superiority of their ingroup over others including low levels of humanism (which might incline them to view human beings in a less positive frame) and individualizing foundations. The ones who have developed the social belief that the world is a cooperative harmony as a result of their personalities and the social schema of cooperation; on the other hand, might have the motivational goal of viewing and treating others as equals as well as helping them. In turn, they might have the sociopolitical attitudes and values supporting egalitarianism including high levels of humanism and individualizing

foundations (i.e. caring for the human beings and animals as well as the suffering as well as valuing fairness among and equal treatment of individuals).

In fact, the theories included in the Integrative Model Examining the Links between Worldviews and Ideological Orientation have shared emphasis. For example, they all focus on the developmental process and socialization practices. DPM suggests that the socialization practices and family environment are crucial factors in worldview development; since punitive and unaffectionate socialization might affect the personality traits of individuals as well as their likelihood of exposure to social schemas of threat and dominance (Duckitt, 2001). Polarity Theory also states that family context and environment are crucial for development of worldviews since the main context of ideo-affective socialization is stated to be the family. In other words, it is the family context where children learn what types of emotions are appropriate to feel as well as proper ways and limits of expressing them. As a consequence of the influences of the socialization practices and experiences in the family context, individuals become oriented towards humanism and normativism which affect how they maintain their lives (Tomkins, 1963). Similar to them, the process of socialization is important for Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). In fact, it is one of the three major arguments of the theory which states the context of socialization enable children to acquire some values and virtues whereas making harder to learn others. Moreover, it is the socialization context where children primarily learn to behave in culturally appropriate manners, all of which influence the emphasis they put on each of the five moral foundations. Although the model tested in this study does not include socialization practices as components they are thought to be inherent in the worldviews individuals have.

A second shared emphasis of the perspectives included in the model, is their focus on personal experiences as well as the cultural context in which individuals grow up. DPM underlines the socio-cultural and political context by integrating dangerous/threatening and intergroup dominance/competitive social and group context in the model as well as the social schemas making these contexts salient

during the developmental process of individuals. For Polarity Theory, similarly, the sociopolitical context is viewed as one of the most important factors shaping ideo-affective socialization and development of worldviews. Moreover, the theory underlines the importance of personal experiences as personal interactions are considered as crucial for any change or adaptation in worldviews. For Moral Foundations Theory, lastly, the sociocultural context is stated as one of the three basic arguments of the theory which states that moral foundations individuals prioritize are directly influenced by the sociocultural context individuals are raised because cultures vary in terms of both the importance they attach to each foundation and the norms, virtues, and institutions they build on the bases of these foundations. Similar to socialization practices, sociocultural context is not a variable measured in this study; however, it should be taken into consideration that the sociopolitical context of contemporary Turkey is inherent in the process of worldview development. Hence, cross cultural research is needed in order to compare the findings from this study to other contexts.

Although the models have shared emphasis in such important aspects as briefly mentioned above, no single study so far have indicated that they can be combined in a single model that can be used to predict such an intricate topic as ideological orientation in an integrative manner. Hence, this study is believed to fill an important gap in the study of worldviews as well as the field of political psychology.

An important point to note about the model is that although the model aims to explore the psychosocial background of ideological orientation, ideological orientation is not measured as a single dimension ranging from left to right, which is the common practice in studies focusing on ideological orientation (e.g. Nilsson & Jost, 2017; Weber & Federico, 2007; 2013). Rather, it has been measured in terms of ideological identities under two latent constructs, namely, right wing and left wing ideological orientation comprising of ideological identities. This strategy has been used for two reasons, one methodological and one theoretical. The methodological reason is that although single item measures can be used in studies with SEM

approach under certain conditions, they are generally viewed as problematic in terms of both reliability and validity, especially for the complex models such as the one tested in this study (Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuchs, Wilczynski, & Kaiser, 2012; Fuchs & Diamantopoulos, 2009). Theoretically; on the other hand, the structure and content of left wing and right wing ideologies might differ across countries although this orientations and identities exist throughout the world (Aspelund, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013; Jost, 2006; Tomkins, 1963). For the sociopolitical context of contemporary Turkey, empirical research suggesting that left wing and right wing ideologies are the opposite ends of a single left-to-right is lacking. Yet, we have some basic support to suggest that ideologies do not emerge as bipolar constructs, rather the ideological identities seem to be multi-polared (Sayılan & Türkoğlu, 2015). Moreover, the results in this study suggest that ideological orientations are distinct and orthogonal concepts with no significant correlations between them (See Table 11 for correlations between ideological orientations). Therefore, it has been concluded that measuring left wing and right wing ideologies as separate constructs is an appropriate strategy both theoretically and methodologically.

Although the findings of this study are valuable for us to better grasp the transformation of worldviews and their relationship with ideological orientation, it is not free of limitations. To begin with ideological orientations, the outcome of the model, it has been seen that the model is not equally successful at explaining variance in right wing and left wing ideological orientations. In fact, the explained variance in right wing ideological orientation ($R^2 = .64$) is quite higher than the left wing ideological orientation ($R^2 = .17$). This is a problematic issue for a thesis aimed at understanding the psychosocial bases of ideological orientations. However, this is a widely shared problem considering the fact that since the works of Adorno et al. (1950) the focus of researchers in the fields of social and political psychology has mostly been the ideological right rather than ideological left. Hence most of the theories and models try to explore individuals' tendencies to adapt right wing ideologies and sociopolitical attitudes. The possible reason behind this might be that ideological right is associated with psychosocial characteristics that are viewed as problematic ranging from cognitive closure to prejudice and discrimination against

disadvantaged groups in the society (See Chapter I for a brief review of differences between ideological left and right). For example, the Dual Process Model, the predictor worldview in the model, mostly focuses on right wing ideologies and sociopolitical attitudes. Another possible factor affecting the inequality between the explained variances in right wing and left wing ideological orientations, is the sociopolitical context in which they study has been conducted. Although we don't have cross-cultural evidence to compare the findings from other sociopolitical contexts, the fact that both Polarity Theory and Moral Foundations Theory; i.e., two of the three perspectives included in the model, have assumptions regarding both the left wing and right wing ideologies yet they have not been successful at explaining variance in left wing ideological orientation can be attributed to the sociopolitical context of contemporary Turkey, where a political Islamist and rightist party has been ruling for 15 years.

Secondly, this model focuses on the link between worldviews and ideological orientation; therefore, it excludes other important factors affecting ideological orientation such as personality traits, values, and sociopolitical attitudes. Further research is needed to combine the worldviews with such factors so that we can get close to seeing the big picture of ideological orientations from a psychological perspective. Moreover, similar to most of the research conducted in the field of political psychology, this model has a bottom-up approach in the study of ideological orientations suggesting that ideology might be rooted in psychological factors. Since the study of ideological orientations is characterized with both bottom-up and top-down approaches (Jost, 2009) further research is needed to see how psychological variables interact with top-down processes like leadership and influence of political elites through political discourse and mass-media communication.

Another limitation is that the relationships among the study variables have been found to be smaller than expected. Even if the final model explains a good proportion of variance in ideological orientations - especially in the right wing – small to medium correlations among the worldview constructs do not allow us to make strong speculations regarding that they might be alternate versions of the same

construct (i.e. the dual social worldviews might be the psychosocial bases upon which the other worldviews and moral foundations develop). However, this limitation is not specific to this study, either. Duckitt (2001) suggests that the relationships between worldviews and ideological orientations might not be as strong as expected in younger and student samples as well as in countries where politics are not organized in accordance with a single left-right continuum. Hence, considering the characteristics of the sample and the sociopolitical context of Turkey, these results seem reasonable.

Last but not least, the correlational and cross-sectional design of the study limits the strengths of speculations on the basis of findings. To begin with correlational nature of the study, as posited before, this design has been preferred over an experimental one because it would be difficult to manipulate all the worldview constructs in such a complex model. A causal path model with SEM approach; on the other hand, has been preferred because this approach enables researchers to test their proposed model in terms of its fit to obtained data as well as to compare it to other possible alternatives. In this study, the final model is the best fitting alternative to data in terms of various indices of fit as well as comparison to other alternatives; however, this does not rule out reverse causality among the variables tested. It might be suggested for future research to manipulate each of the worldview constructs separately and test their causal effects on ideological orientations. As for the cross-sectional nature of the study design, again it limits the speculation on the causal order among the worldview constructs included in the model. Further research with longitudinal design would be beneficial to speculate on the causal order of the worldviews as well as to better understand development of worldviews and the relationships among them.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Political ideology has been an important topic in the field of political psychology since the seminal study of Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno et al., 1950) and although a loss of interest in the topic has taken place for a few decades, it regained its popularity in the last two decades (Jost, 2006). Although the content and structure ideologies are defined in accordance with the social, cultural and political conditions of the context they emerge from, most studies of political ideology in the field of political and social psychology have focused on the (political) left and the right and shown that meaningful differences exist between them (Jost, 2006; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Since the first use of these terms with a political connotation in the French Parliament (Bobbio, 1996), political left has been identified with egalitarian ideas and social change whereas political right represents political ideas that are hierarchical, conservative and in favor of status quo. Moreover, recent studies show that these ideological orientations are rooted in the clash between the basic feelings and ideas related to human nature such as being human versus norm oriented, preferring change versus stability, complexity versus order, and creativity versus conformity (Jost, 2006; 2009; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).

For more than 60 years now, scholars in the field of political psychology examined the psychological factors underlying political ideology and contributed greatly to our understanding of the concept today. However, there is still more to learn on the processes by which these factors result in ideological orientations. In my belief, integration of worldviews in the study of ideological orientations would be valuable since these broad patterns of meaning have effects on a wide range of sociopolitical beliefs including political orientation.

So far, the construct of worldview has been defined by scholars in social psychology and other disciplines in various ways. Koltko-Rivera (2000; 2004) and Naugle (2002) have provided comprehensive and interdisciplinary reviews of these perspective. However, it should be noted that the construct of worldviews still lacks a comprehensive model. Hence, this thesis aims to provide an integrative model which can be used to understand the psychosocial background of ideological orientation as well as other sociopolitical attitudes. In Chapter I of this thesis, I have reviewed major theories focusing on the link between worldviews and ideological orientation and suggested a synthesis of them in an integrative model so that we can better understand "love affair of a loosely organized set of feelings and ideas about feelings with a highly organized and articulate set of ideas" (Tomkins, 1963; p. 389).

Duckitt's (2001) Dual Process Model view worldviews as orthogonal yet related components in a dual process underlying ideological orientation as well as sociopolitical attitudes. According to this perspective, worldviews are schematic beliefs related to the nature of human beings as well as the social world. Duckitt and Sibley (2009b, p. 309) summarize the central role of worldviews in shaping ideological orientations and sociopolitical attitudes as follows:

> … two motivational goals result in dual ideologies that justify existing and desired social arrangements by emphasizing quite different characteristics of outgroups and that stratify and position groups based on qualitatively different evaluations. To understand the process by which ideologies legitimate social systems, then, it is necessary to understand the motivational bases of these two different ideological dimensions, the conditions under which they will cause the individual to espouse different legitimizing myths, and importantly, the conditions under which these different domains of legitimizing myths may combine to form an integrated ideological system that maintains the existing social order through multiple ideological mechanisms.

From the perspective of Polarity Theory (Tomkins, 1963), similarly, ideological orientation might be rooted in worldviews, affective tendencies, ways of thinking and living. Specifically, Tomkins suggests that worldviews, or feelings and ideas about everything, might turn into more concrete and organized ideological orientations through ideo-affective resonance (Tomkins, 1963). Finally, Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2012) suggests that five basic

patterns of morality underlie the breadth and depth of morality across cultures and individuals, and they influence variation in ideological orientations and sociopolitical attitudes. As previously reviewed, ideo-affective resonance can be defined as a process by which loosely organized feelings and ideas affiliate with factors creating an internal harmony. I believe that during the process of resonance, beliefs related to social world and human nature (i.e. the worldview variables of Dual Process Model) might come together with humanistic and normativistic perspectives (i.e. the worldview constructs of Polarity Theory) as well as principles and rules about social relations (i.e. the individualizing and binding foundations of Moral Foundations Theory) that are consonant with them.

In Chapters 2,3, and 4 I have presented finding from 5 studies aiming to adapt dual social worldview scales (Chapter 2) and polarity scale (Chapter 3) into Turkish cultural context and a test of the integrative model examining the links between worldviews and ideological orientation (Chapter 4). Findings from Chapter 2 and 3 indicate that both the scales of dual social worldviews and ideo-affective polarity are reliable and valid, although the validity of belief in a dangerous world scale is comparative (i.e. some of the relationships it has with other variables are not in expected pattern). Findings presented in Chapter 4; on the other hand, where the main study has been tested, indicate that worldviews included in the model can be studied in an integrative manner and they have a joint effect in explaining ideological orientation. Moreover, findings imply that worldviews underlying ideological orientation are organized in a dual pathway fashion despite the fact that the final model (i.e., the one in which dual social worldviews are predictor variables, and Tomkins' worldview constructs and moral foundations are the mediators) is not the one originally proposed (i.e. the one in which Tomkins' worldviews are the predictors, dual social worldviews and moral foundations are the mediators).

The proposed model makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it shows that the major perspectives focusing on the link between worldviews and ideological orientation could be studied in an integrative manner since their postulations are compatible with one another. So far, no single study has argued that

these perspectives could be integrated conceptually although their links with ideological orientation and some binary combinations among them have been studied. Moreover, this model sheds light on the process of ideo-affective resonance by which loosely organized feelings and beliefs turn into more concrete structures, which, in turn, predict ideological orientation.

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality.* New York: Harper and Row.

Akbaş, G. (2010). Social identity and intergroup relations: The case of Alevis and Sunnis in Amasya. (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University.) Retrieved from https://tez.yok. gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/

Albaugh, M., & McAdams, D. P. (2007). Personality, politics, and personal ideology: Right and left. Paper presented at the ISPP 30th Annual Scientific Meeting, Portland, OR.

Alker, H. a, & Poppen, P. J. (1973). Personality and ideology in university students. Journal of Personality, 41(4), 653-671. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1973.tb00116.x

Alker, H. A, Tourangeau, R., & Staines, B. (1976). Facilitating personality change with audiovisual self-confrontation and interviews. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 44(5), 720-728. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022006X.44.5.720

Altemeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other "authoritarian personality". *Advances in Experimental Social Psycholog*y, *30*, 47-92.
doi: 10.1016/S00652601(08)60382-2

Altemeyer, Bob (2006). *The authoritarians*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba

Altman, I., & Rogoff, B. (1987). World views in psychology: Trait, interactional, organismic, and transactional perspectives. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), *Handbook of environmental psychology* (Vol. 1, pp. 7–40). New York: Wiley.

Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism. *Nature Neuroscience*, *10*, 1246-1247. doi: 10.1038/nn1979

Aspelund, A., Lindeman, M., & Verkasalo, M. (2013). Political Conservatism and Left-Right Orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European Countries. *Political Psychology*, *34*(3), 409-417. http://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12000

Baldwin, M. W. (1992). Relational schemas and the processing of social information. *Psychological Bulletin*, *112*, 461-484. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.112.3.461

Barnouw, V. (1985). *Culture and personality* (4th ed.). Homewood, IL: Dorsey.

Block, J., & Block, J. H. (2006). Nursery school personality and political orientation two decades later. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*(5), 734-749. http://doi.org/10.1016/jjrp.2005.09.005

Bobbio, N. (1996). *Left and right: The significance of a political distinction*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bollen, K. A. (1989) *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York.

Brown, R. (2004). The Authoritarian Personality and the Organization of Attitudes in J. Jost & J. Sidanius (eds), *Political psychology: Key readings* (45-86). New York: Taylor and Francis. (Reprinted from Social Psychology, 1965, pp. 477-546).

Caldwell, A. C. (2007). Attitudes of juvenile staff towards intellectual, psychiatric, and physical disabilities. *Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities*, *45*(2), 77-89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1352/1934-9556(2007)45[77:AOJJST]2.0.CO;2

Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1999). Personality profiles and political parties. *Political Psychology*, *20*(1), 175-197. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00141

Caprara, G. V., Schwartz, S. H., Capanna, C., Vecchione, M., Barbaranelli, C. (2006). Personality and politics: Traits, values, and political orientation. *Political Psychology*, *27*, 1–28. doi: 10.1111/j.1467 9221.2006.00447.x

Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. *Political Psychology*, *29*(6), 807-840. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00668.x

Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1981). The origins and meaning of liberal/conservative self-identifications. *American Journal of Political Science*, *25*, 617-645. doi:10.2307/2110756

Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and discontent* (p. 206-261): New York: Free Press.

Churchill, G. (1979). A Paradigm for developing better measures of marketing constructs. *Journal of Marketing Research*, *16*(1), 64-73. doi:10.2307/3150876

de St Aubin, E. (1996). Personal ideology polarity: its emotional foundation and its manifestation in individual value systems, religiosity, political orientation, and assumptions concerning human nature. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*(1), 152-165. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.L152

de St. Aubin, E. (1999). Personal Ideology: The Intersection of Personality and Religious Beliefs. *Journal of Personality*, *67*(6), 1105-1139. http://doi.org/10.1111/1467- 6494.00084

Diamantopoulos, A., Sarstedt, M., Fuchs, C., Wilczynski, P., & Kaiser, S. (2012). Guidelines for choosing between multi-item and single-item scales for construct measurement: A predictive validity perspective. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, *40*(3), 434-449. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11747-011-0300-3

Duarte, J., Crawford, J., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. (2015). Political diversity will improve social psychological science. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *38*, E130. doi:10.1017/S0140525X14000430

Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *33*, 41-113. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(01)80004-6

Duckitt, J., & Fisher, K. (2003). The impact of social threat on worldview and ideological attitudes. Political Psychology, 24, 199-222. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00322

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009a). A Dual-Process Motivational Model of Ideology, Politics, and Prejudice. *Psychological Inquiry*, *20*(2-3), 98-109. http://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028540

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009b). A dual process motivational model of ideologicalattitudes and system justification. In J.T. Jost, A.C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), *Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification* (pp. 292–313). Oxford: Oxford University Press

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Personality, Ideology, Prejudice, and Politics: A Dual-Process Motivational Model. *Journal of Personality*, *78*(6), 1861-1894. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00672.x

Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(1), 75-93. doi: 10.1037/Z0022-3514.83.L75

Federico, C. M., Hunt, C. V., & Ergun, D. (2009). Political expertise, social worldviews, and ideology: Translating "competitive jungles" and "dangerous

worlds" into ideological reality. *Social Justice Research*, *22*(2-3), 259-279. doi: 10.1007/s11211-009-0097-0

Federico, C. M., Weber, C. R., Ergun, D., & Hunt, C. (2013). Mapping the Connections between Politics and Morality: The Multiple Sociopolitical Orientations Involved in Moral Intuition. *Political Psychology*, *34*(4), 589-610. doi: http://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12006

Fischer, A. R., Jome, L. M., & Atkinson, D. R. (1998). Reconceptualizing multicultural counseling: Universal healing conditions in a culturally specific context. *The Counseling Psychologist*, *26*, 525–528. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000098264001

Fiske, S. T. & Taylor, S. E. (1991). *Social cognition* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.

Freeden,M. (2003). *Ideology*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Fuchs, C., & Diamantopoulos, A. (2009). Using single-item measures for construct measurement in management research: Conceptual issues and application guidelines. *Die Betriebswirtschaft*, *69*(2), 195.

Gençöz, T. & Öncül, Ö. (2012). Examination of personality characteristics in a Turkish sample: development of basic personality traits inventory, *The Journal of General Psychology*, *139*(3), 194-216, doi: 10.1080/00221309.2012.686932

Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., & Dowling, C. M. (2011). The Big Five Personality Traits in the Political Arena. *Annual Review of Political Scienc*e, *14*(1), 265-287. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051010-111659

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C., and Wiggins, G. (1987). The origins of morality in early childhood relationships. In Kagan, J. and Lamb, S. (eds.), *The Emergence of Morality in Young Children*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Goldfried, M. R., & Newman, C. (1986). Psychotherapy integration: An historical perspective. In J. C. Norcross (Ed.), *Handbook of eclectic psychotherapy* (pp. 25–61). New York: Brunner/Mazel.

Goren, P. (2004). Political sophistication and policy reasoning: A reconsideration. *American Journal of Political Science*, *48*, 462–478. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00081.x

Goren, P. (2005). Party identification and core political values, *American Journal of Political Science*, *49*, 882–897. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00161.x

Göregenli, M. (2010). Farklı Toplumsal Gruplarda Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne Girişine Yönelik Tutumlar, TÜBİTAK Proje Raporu, Proje No: 107K082

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *47*, 55-130. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4

Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *96*(5), 1029-1046. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141

Graham J, Nosek BA, Haidt J (2012) The moral stereotypes of liberals and conservatives: Exaggeration of differences across the political spectrum. *PLoS ONE, 7*(12): e50092. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0050092

Graham, J., Nosek, B. A, Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(2), 366-385. http://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-199107000-00016

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The causes and consequences of the need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private* self (pp. 189-207). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Güldü, Ö. (2011). Sağ kanat yetkecilik ölçeğinin Türkçeye uyarlanması. *Ankyra: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2*(2), 27-51. doi: 10.1501/sbeder_0000000033

Gürşimsek, I., & Göregenli, M. (2004). The relationship between normative-humanistic attitudes and discipline beliefs in a Turkish pre-school teachers' sample. *Teacher Development*, *8*(1), 81-92. http://doi.org/10.1080/13664530400200228

Gürşimşek, I., & Göregenli, M. (2005). Humanistic attitudes, values, system justification, and control beliefs in a Turkish sample. *Social Behaviour and Personality*, *34*, 747-758. doi: 10.2224/sbp.2006.34.7.747

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review*, *108*(4), 814-834. http://doi.org/10.1037//0033- 295X.

Haidt, J. (2008). Morality. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *3*(1), 65-72. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00063.x

Haidt, J. (2012). *The Righteous mind - Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York: Pantheon.

Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral psychology: Vol. 2. The cognitive science of morality* (pp. 181- 217). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize. Socia*l Justice Research*, *20*(1), 98-116. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z

Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2009). Planet of the Durkheimians, where community, authority, and sacredness are foundations of morality. In J. Jost, A. C. Kay & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), *Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification* (pp. 371-401). New York: Oxford.

Haidt, J., Graham, J., & Joseph, C. (2009). Above and Below Left-Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations. *Psychological Inquiry*, *20*(2-3), 110-119. http://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028573

Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. *Daedalus: Special Issue on Human Nature*, *133*(4), 55-66. Retrieved from http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.joseph.2004.intuitive-ethics.pub035.pdf

Harvey, R. J., Billings, R. S., & Nilan, K. J. (1985). Confirmatory factor analysis of the Job Diagnostic Survey: Good news and bad news. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70(3), 461-468. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.70.3.461

Herche, J., & Engelland, B. (1996). Reversed-polarity items and scale unidimensionality. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, *24*, 366-374. doi:10.1177/0092070396244007

Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. *American Psychologist*, *52*, 1280-1300. Retrieved from http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/higgins/papers/higgins1997.pdf

Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *30*, 1-45. doi: 10.1016/S0065- 2601(08)60381-0

Hoshmand, L. T. (1996). Cultural psychology as metatheory. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, *16*(1), 30-48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0091151

Hu, L. & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, *6*(1), 1-55, doi: 10.1080/10705519909540118

Ibrahim, F. A. (1991). Contribution of cultural world view to generic counseling and development. Journal of Counseling and Development, 70, 13–19. Ibrahim, F. A. (1999). Transcultural counseling: Existential worldview theory and cultural identity. In J. McFadden (Ed.), *Transcultural counseling* (2nd ed., pp. 23–57). Alexandria, VA: American Counseling Association

Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J. (2012). Understanding libertarian morality: The psychological dispositions of self-identified libertarians. *PLoS ONE*, *7*(8). http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0042366

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, *61*(7), 651-670. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.6L7.651.

Jost, J. T. (2009). "Elective Affinities": On the Psychological Bases of Left-Right Differences. *Psychological Inquiry*, *20*(2-3), 129-141. http://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028599

Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. *Motivation and Emotion*, *36*, 55-64. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-011-9260-7

Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system- justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*,1-27. doi: 10.1111/j.20448309.1994.tb01008.x.

Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo. *Political Psychology*, *25*(6), 881-919. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467- 9221.2004.00402.x

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *60*, 307-337. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*(3), 339-375. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3339.

Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated with Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33*(7), 989-1007. http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207301028.

Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. a., & Gosling, S. D. (2008). Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *3*(2), 126-136. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00070.x

Jost, J. T., & Thompson, E. P. (2000). Group-based dominance and opposition to equality as independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social policy attitudes among African Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *36*(3), 209-232. http://doi.org/DOI 10.1006/jesp.1999.1403

Jöreskog, K.G. & Sörbom, D. (2006). LISREL 8.80 for Windows [Computer software]. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, Inc.

Jugert, P., & Duckitt, J. (2009). A motivational model of authoritarianism: Integrating personal and situational determinants. *Political Psychology*, *30*, 693-719. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00722.x

Kelly, G. A. (1955). *The psychology of personal constructs: Vol. 1. A theory of personality*. New York: Norton

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of socialization theory and research* (pp. 347-480). Chicago: Rand McNally.

Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), *Psychology and Genetic Epistemology* (pp. 151-235). New York: Academic Press.

Koltko-Rivera, M. E. (2000). The Worldview Assessment Instrument (WAI): The development and preliminary validation of an instrument to assess world view components relevant to counseling and psychotherapy (Doctoral dissertation,

New York University, 2000). Dissertation Abstracts International, 61(04), 2266B. (UMI Microform No. 9968433)

Koltko-Rivera, M. E. (2004). The psychology of worldviews. *Review of General Psychology*, *1*(8), 3-58. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232554126_The_Psychology_of_Wo rldviews

Kontos, A. P., & Breland-Noble, A. M. (2002). Racial/ethnic diversity in applied sport psychology: A multicultural introduction to working with athletes of color. *Sport Psychologist, 16*, 296–315

Krosnick, J. A., & Presser, S. (2010). Questionnaire design. In J. D. Wright & P. V. Marsden (Eds.), *Handbook of Survey Research* (2nd Ed.). West Yorkshire, England: Emerald Group

Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). *Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational basis*. New York: Plenum.

Kugler, M., Jost, J. T., & Noorbaloochi, S. (2014). Another Look at Moral Foundations Theory: Do Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Explain Liberal- Conservative Differences in "Moral" Intuitions? *Social Justice Research*, *27*(4), 413431. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-014-0223-5

Lane, R.E. (1962). *Political ideology: why the American common man believes what he does*. Oxford, England: Free Press of Glencoe.

Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, N. (1982). *The authoritarian personality* (Abridged ed.). New York: Norton.

Lindeman, M., & Aarnio, K. (2006). Paranormal beliefs: Their dimensionality and correlates. *European Journal of Personality*, *20*(7), 585-602. http://doi.org/10.1002/per.608

McAdams, D. P., Albaugh, M., Farber, E., Daniels, J., Logan, R. L., & Olson, B. (2008). Family metaphors and moral intuitions: How conservatives and liberals

narrate their lives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(4), 978-990. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0012650

McClelland, D.C. (1951) *Personality*. William Sloane Associate: New York.

McClosky, H., & Chong, D. (1985). Similarities and differences between left-wing and right-wing radicals. *British Journal of Political Science*, *15*, 329–363.

Milojev, P., Osborne, D., Greaves, L. M., Bulbulia, J., Wilson, M. S., Davies, C. L., . . . Cibley, C. G. (2014). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation predict different moral signatures. *Social Justice Research*, *27*(2), 149-174. doi:10.1007/s11211-014-0213-7

Naugle, D. (2002). *Worldview: The history of a concept. United States*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Nilsson, A. (2007). Worldviews: Personal ideology, values, and beliefs concerning metaphysics, epistemology, human nature, and morality. Master thesis, Lund University. Retrieved 2013 01 09 http://www.uppsatser.se/uppsats/d1f5d3f0cc/

Nilsson, A. (2013). The psychology of worldviews: Toward a non-reductive science of personality. (Doctoral Dissertation, Lund University). Retrieved from http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5733804/3738786.pdf

Nilsson, A. (2014). Humanistic and normativistic worldviews: Distinct and hierarchically structured. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *64*, 135-140. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.02.037

Nilsson, A., & Erlandsson, A. (2015). The Moral Foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *76*, 28-32. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.11.049

Nilsson, A., & Jost, J. (2017). Rediscovering Tomkins' Polarity Theory: Humanism, Normativism, and the Bipolar Structure of Left-Right Ideology in the U.S. and Sweden. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/9zbq3

Nucci, L., & Turiel, E. (1978). Social interactions and the development of social concepts in preschool children. *Child Development*, *49*, 400-407. doi:10.2307/1128704

Overton, W. F. (1991). Historical and contemporary perspectives on developmental theory and research strategies. In R. M. Downs, L. S. Liben, & D. S. Palermo (Eds.), *Visions of aesthetics, the environment and development* (pp. 263–311). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Perry, R. (2013). On the Dual Process Model of Ideology and Prejudice: Identifying Causal Personality Effects and Revising Worldview Measures. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Auckland.) Retrieved from http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2006). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *17*(1), 271-320. http://doi.org/10.1080/10463280601055772

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*(4), 741-763. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022- 3514.67.4.741

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The open and closed mind*. New York: Basic Books.

Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: The Free Press.

Sayılan, G. & Cingöz-Ulu, B. (2018). *Predicting Ideological Orientation from Worldviews and Moral Foundations*, Oral Presentation, 29th International Congress of Applied Psychology (ICAP), Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

Sayılan, G., Tunç, M. N., & Cingöz-Ulu (2016). *Kutuplaşma ölçeğinin Türkçeye uyarlanması*. Unpublished Manuscript.

Sayılan, G. & Türkoğlu, B. (2015). *Politik Tutumlar ve ideoloji: Hangisi tavuk, hangisi yumurta? [Political attitudes and ideology: Chicken or egg?]*, Oral Presentation, 14th Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi, Ankara, Turkey.

Sayılan, G., Türkoğlu, B., & Cingöz-Ulu, B. (2017). *The Mediatory Role of Moral Foundations in Predicting Ideology from RWA and SDO*. Poster Presentation, 40th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Edinburgh, Scotland.

Schultz, P. W., Stone, W. F., & Christie, R. (1997). Authoritarianism and mental rigidity: The einstellung problem revisited. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *23*(1), 3-9. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167297231001

Schwartz, S.H., Caprara, G.V., Vecchione, M. et al. (2014). Basic personal values underlie and give coherence to political values: A cross national study in 15 countries. *Political Behavior*, *36*(4), 899–930. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9255-z

Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural psychology: What is it? In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), *Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development* (pp. 143). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., and Miller, J. (1987). Culture and moral development. In Kagan, J. and Lamb, S. (eds.), *The Emergence of Morality in Young Children*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1-83

Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., and Park, L. (1997). The "big three" of morality (autonomy, community, and divinity), and the "big three" explanations of suffering. In Brandt, A. and Rozin, P. (eds.), *Morality and Health*, Routledge, New York, pp. 119-169

Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2009). A Dual-Process Model of Ideology, Politics, and Prejudice: Commentary and Response to Questions. *Psychological Inquiry*, *20*(2-3), 168-171. http://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028656

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1996). Racism, conservatism, Affirmative Action, and intellectual sophistication: A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*(3), 476-490. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.703.476

Slife, B. D., & Fisher, A. M. (2000). Modem and postmodern approaches to the free will/determinism dilemma in psychotherapy. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, *40*, 80-107. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167800401008

Spector, P. E., Van Katwyk, P. T., Brannick, M. T., & Chen, P. Y. (1997). When two factors don't reflect two constructs: How item characteristics can produce artifactual factors. *Journal of Management*, *23*(5), 659-677. doi: 10.1177/014920639702300503

Stone, WF (1986). Personality and ideology: Empirical support for Tomkins's Polarity Theory. *Political Psychology*, *7*, 689-708. doi:10.2307/3791209

Stone, W. F., & Schaffner, P. E. (1988). *The psychology of politics*. New York: Springer- Verlag.

Stone, W. F., & Schaffner, P. E. (1997). The Tomkins polarity scale: Recent developments. *Bulletin of the Tomkins Institute*, *4*, 17-22.

Swain, S. D. Weathers, D. & Niedrich, R. W. (2008). Assessing three sources of misresponse to reversed Likert items. *Journal of Marketing Research*, *45*(1), 116-131. doi: 10.1509/jmkr.45.1.116

Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). *Using multivariate statistics*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Tomkins, S. S. (1963). Left and right: A basic dimension of ideology and personality. In R. W. White (Ed.), *The study of lives* (pp. 388-411). New York: Atherton Press.

Tomkins, S. S. (1965). Affect and the psychology of knowledge. In S. S. Tomkins & C. E. Izard (Eds.), *Affect, cognition, and personality: Empirical studies* (pp. 72-97). New York: Springer.

Turiel, E. (1983). *The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tunç, M. N. (2016). *The relationship between openness to affect and ideological orientations*. Unpublished Manuscript.

Van Hiel, A., Cornelis, I., & Roets, A. (2007). The intervening role of social worldviews in the relationship between the five-factor model of personality and social attitudes. *European Journal of Personality, 21*, 131-148.

van Leeuwen, F., & Park, J. H. (2009). Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations, and political orientation. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *47*(3), 169-173. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.02.017

Weber, C., & Federico, C. M. (2007). Interpersonal attachment and patterns of ideological belief. *Political Psychology*, *28*(4), 389-416. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467- 9221.2007.00579.x

Williams, S. (1984). Ideological Differences in Blaming Victims. *Political Psychology*, *5*(4), 573-581. http://doi.org/10.2307/3791228

Wolman, B. B. (Ed.). (1973). *Dictionary of behavioral science*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Wong, N., Rindfleisch, A., & Burroughs, J. E. (2003). Do reverse-worded items confound measures in cross-cultural consumer research? The case of the Material Values Scale. *Journal of Consumer Research*, *30*(1), 72-91. doi: 10.1086/374697

Wulff, D. M. (1997). *Psychology of religion: Classic and contemporary views* (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.

Yalçındağ, B. (2015). Searching for the content and scope of morality: With a framework of moral foundations theory (Doctoral dissertation, Middle East Technical University).
Retrieved from https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/

Yalçındağ, B., Özkan, T., Cesur, S. et al. (2017). An investigation of moral foundations theory in Turkey using different measures, *Current Psychology*, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-017-9618-4

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Demographic and Background Variables

1. Cinsiyetiniz:

☐ Erkek　　　　　☐ Kadın　　　☐ Diğer _____

2. Yaşınız: _____

3. Doğum yeriniz: _____

4. Yaşamınızın büyük bölümünü geçirdiğiniz yer:

☐ Büyükşehir　　　　　☐ İl　　　☐ İlçe　　　　　☐ Semt　　　　　☐ Köy

5. Eğitim durumunuz:

☐ Okuma yazma bilmiyor　　　　　☐ İlkokul　　　　　☐ Ortaokul

☐ Lise　　　　　☐ Üniversite　　　　　☐ Y. lisans / Doktora

6. Toplumun geneline kıyasla kendinizi hangi gelir grubuna ait görüyorsunuz?

☐ Alt　　　☐ Alt-Orta　　　☐ Orta　　　☐Orta-Üst　　　☐Üst

7. Hangi etnik kökene mensupsunuz? _____

8. Herhangi bir dini gruba mensup musunuz?

☐ Evet　　　　　☐ Hayır

9. (Evetse) Hangi dini gruba mensupsunuz? _____

10. Kendinizi ne ölçüde inançlı tanımlarsınız?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç										Oldukça fazla

11. Kendinizi ne ölçüde muhafazakâr olarak tanımlarsınız?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç										Oldukça fazla

Appendix B: Measures of Political Ideology

Ideological Self-Placement Measure

Lütfen politik olarak yakın durduğunuz yeri aşağıda belirtilen aralıkta bir sayıyı işaretleyerek belirtiniz.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Sol					Merkez					Sağ

Ideological Identities Measure

Lütfen aşağıdaki politik görüşlerinin her birinin sizin görüşünüzü ne ölçüde yansıttığını belirtiniz.

(-5= Hiç yansıtmıyor; 0 = Emin değilim; +5 = Oldukça fazla yansıtıyor.)

Anarşizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Atatürkçülük	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Ekolojizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Faşizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Feminizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Komünizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Kürt Siyasi Hareketi	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Liberalizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Liberteryenizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Marksizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Millî Görüş	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Milliyetçi Muhafazakârlık	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Muhafazakâr Demokratlık	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Muhafazakârlık	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Radikal İslam	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Sosyal Demokrasi	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Sosyalizm	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Türkçülük	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Ulusalcılık	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülük	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix C: Belief in a Dangerous World Scale

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her bir ifadeye ne ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz.

Hiç katılmıyorum   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Tamamen katılıyorum

Original form	Turkish Form
1. Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn't so. Every era has its problems, and a person's chances of living a safe, untroubled life are better today than ever before.	1. Dünya gittikçe daha tehlikeli ve karmaşık bir hale geliyormuş gibi görünse de, işin aslı öyle değil. Her dönemin kendine has sorunları vardır, hatta insanların bugün güvenli ve sorunsuz bir hayat yaşama olasılığı her zamankinden daha da fazladır.
2. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All the signs are pointing to it.	2. Bugün yarın çevremizde kaos ve anarşi patlak verecek gibi; bütün işaretler bunu gösteriyor.
3. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all.	3. Toplumumuzda, sırf kötülük olsun diye, hiç yoktan birine saldırabilecek pek çok tehlikeli insan var.
4. Despite what one hears about "crime in the street," there probably isn't any more now than there ever has been.	4. Sokaktaki suçun arttığına dair ne denirse densin, muhtemelen şu anki suç oranları eskisinden daha fazla değildir.
5. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do not live in a dangerous world.	5. Eğer insan birkaç makul önlem alırsa, başına muhtemelen hiçbir kötülük gelmez; o kadar da tehlikeli bir dünyada yaşamıyoruz.
6. Every day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person's chances of being robbed, assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.	6. Toplum her geçen gün hukuk tanımaz ve daha vahşi hale geldikçe, insanın soyulma, saldırıya uğrama ve hatta öldürülme olasılığı da artıyor.
7. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, stable and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good.	7. Bilgilerim ve tecrübelerim bana, içinde yaşadığımız dünyanın aslında sağlam, istikrarlı ve güvenli bir yer, insanların da özünde iyi olduğunu söylüyor.
8. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else.	8. Öyle görünüyor ki, her geçen yıl, saygıdeğer insanların sayısı azalırken, herkesi tehdit eden ahlak yoksunu insanların sayısı artıyor.
9. The "end" is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be about to destroy the world are being foolish.	9. Dünyanın sonu yakın değil; depremleri, savaşları ve kıtlıkları Allah'ın dünyayı yok etmek üzere olduğunun işareti olarak görenler saçmalıyorlar.
10. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral people's values and way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people.	10. Bilgilerim ve tecrübelerim bana, içinde yaşadığımız dünyanın iyi, düzgün ve ahlaklı insanların değerlerinin ve yaşam biçimlerinin kötüler tarafından alt üst edildiği, tehlikeli ve öngörülemez bir yer olduğunu söylüyor.

Appendix D: Belief in a Competitive Jungle World Scale

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her bir ifadeye ne ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz.

Hiç katılmıyorum   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Tamamen katılıyorum

1. Winning is not the first thing; it's the only thing.	1. Kazanmak en önemli şey değil, her şeydir.
2. The best way to lead a group under one's supervision is to show them kindness, consideration, and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors.	2. Sorumlu olduğunuz bir grubu yönetmenin en iyi yolu, onlara nezaket ve duyarlılık göstermek ve onlara astlarınız gibi değil, çalışma arkadaşlarınız gibi davranmaktır.
3. If one has power in a situation, one should use it however one has to in order to get one's way.	3. Gücü elinde bulunduran kişi, istediğini elde etmek için gücünü gereken her şekilde kullanmalıdır.
4. If it's necessary to be cold blooded and vengeful to reach one's goals, then one should do it.	4. Eğer bir insanın hedeflerine ulaşması için acımasız ve kindar olması gerekiyorsa, öyle olmalıdır.
5. Life is not governed by the "survival of the fittest." We should let compassion and moral laws be our guide.	5. Yaşam "en güçlünün hayatta kalması" ilkesiyle yürümez; rehberimiz merhamet ve ahlaki değerler olmalıdır.
6. Money, wealth and luxury are what really count in life.	6. Hayatta en önemli şeyler, para, varlık ve lükstür.
7. It is better to he loved than to be feared.	7. Sevilmek korkulmaktan daha iyidir.
8. It is much more important in life to have integrity in your dealings with others than to have money and power.	8. Yaşamda, diğer insanlarla ilişkilerinizde erdemli davranmak, para ve güç sahibi olmaktan çok daha önemlidir.
9. It's a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times.	9. Dünya, bazen acımasız olmayı gerektiren bir kurtlar sofrasıdır.
10. Charity (i.e., giving somebody something for nothing) is admirable not stupid.	10. Birine karşılıksız bir şey vermek gibi hayır işleri aptalca değil, özenilecek hareketlerdir.
11. You know that most people are out to "screw" you, so you have to get them first when you get the chance.	11. Pek çok insanın, seni kazıklamak için hazır beklediğini biliyorsun; o yüzden fırsatını yakaladığın an ilk davranan sen olmalısın.
12. All in all it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.	12. Nüfuzlu ve hilekâr olmaktansa, mütevazı ve dürüst olmak daha iyidir.
13. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a competitive "jungle" in which the fittest survive and succeed, in which power, wealth, and winning are everything, and might is right.	13. Bilgilerim ve tecrübelerim bana, içinde yaşadığımız dünyanın sadece en güçlünün hayatta kaldığı ve gücün, zenginliğin ve kazanmanın her şey olduğu, rekabetçi, vahşi bir "orman" olduğunu söylüyor.
14. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.	14. Dürüstlük, her durumda en iyi yoldur.
15. There is really no such thing as "right" and "wrong." It all boils down to what you can get away with.	15. "Doğru" ya da "yanlış" diye bir şey yoktur; sonuçta önemli olan paçayı kurtarabilmektir.
16. Do unto to others as you would have them do unto you, and never do anything unfair to someone else.	16. Kendine yapılmasını istemediğini başkasına yapma ve asla bir başkasına haksızlık etme.
17. One of the most useful skills a person should develop is how to look someone straight in the eye and lie convincingly.	17. İnsanın geliştirmesi gereken en faydalı beceri, birinin gözünün içine baka baka ikna edici bir şekilde yalan söyleyebilmektir.

18. Basically, people are objects to be quietly and coolly manipulated for one's own benefit.	18. Aslında insanlar, kişinin çıkarı doğrultusunda sessiz ve sakince yönlendirilebileceği nesnelerdir.
19. One should give others the benefit of the doubt. Most people are trustworthy if you have faith in them.	19. Başkalarına iyi niyetli yaklaşmak gerek. Çoğu insan, eğer onlara inanırsan, güvenilirdir.
20. We can make a society based on unselfish cooperation, sharing and people generously helping each other, and NOT on competition and acquisitiveness.	20. Rekabete ve açgözlülüğe değil, bencilce olmayan iş birliğine ve paylaşıma dayalı; insanların birbirine cömertçe yardım ettiği bir toplum oluşturabiliriz.

Appendix E: Polarity Scale

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her bir ifadeye ne ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz

Hiç katılmıyorum   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Tamamen katılıyorum

Humanism	
1. All persons are in themselves valuable.	1. Bütün insanlar insan oldukları için değerlidir
2. Feelings are the most important aspect of being human, because they give our lives meaning.	2. Duygular insan olmanın en önemli yanıdır, çünkü hayatımıza anlam verirler.
3. The most important purpose of society is to protect people's rights, freedoms, and dignity.	3. Devletin birinci vazifesi kişilerin haklarını, özgürlüklerini ve itibarlarını korumaktır.
4. People are basically kind and helpful.	4. İnsanlar özünde kibar ve yardımseverdir.
5. Human beings should be loved at all times, because they want and need to be loved.	5. İnsanlar her daim sevilmelidir, çünkü sevilmek hem istek hem de ihtiyaçtır.
6. It is necessary to break the laws and rules of society when these lead to unfair treatment of some people.	6. Toplumun kanun ve kuralları bazı insanlara haksız muameleye yol açtığında, onları çiğnemek gerekir.
7. The main purpose of education should be to enable the young to discover and create novelty.	7. Eğitimin ana amacı gençlere keşif ve yenilik yaratma olanağı sağlamak olmalıdır.
8. You must always leave yourself open to your own feelings – alien as they may sometimes seem.	8. Kimi zaman çok yabancı gelseler bile, insan kendini duygularına açık bırakmalıdır.
9. Human beings should be treated with respect at all times.	9. İnsanlara her zaman saygıyla muamele edilmelidir.
10. You need to be open to your feelings to learn from them and understand who you are.	10. Duygularınızdan bir şeyler öğrenebilmek ve kim olduğunuzu anlayabilmek için duygularınıza açık olmalısınız.
11. Creativity and curiosity are the most important tools in the search for knowledge.	11. Bilgiye ulaşmak için en önemli araçlar yaratıcılık ve meraktır
12. Human beings are basically good.	12. İnsanlar temelde iyidir.
13. The most important goal for a society is to make sure that its members have a chance to lead a good life.	13. Toplumun en önemli hedefi, mensuplarına, iyi bir hayat sürebilme şansını sağlamak olmalıdır.
14. When people are in trouble, they need help and should be helped.	14. İnsanlar, başı derde girenlere yardım etmelidir.
15. A scientist must rely on creativity and intuition.	15. Bilim insanı yaratıcılığa ve sezgilere güvenmelidir.

Normativism	
1. Reason has to be continually disciplined and corrected by reality and hard facts	1. Düşünceler somut gerçeklerle dizginlenmelidir.
2. People don't really care what happens to the next person.	2. İnsanlar aslında bir başkasına ne olduğunu pek umursamazlar.
3. Human beings would be lost without reason, because feelings cannot be trusted.	3. Mantık olmasaydı insanlar kaybolurdu, çünkü duygular güvenilmezdir.
4. Human beings should be treated with respect only when they deserve respect.	4. İnsanlara, sadece hak ettikleri zaman saygıyla muamele edilmelidir.
5. People who commit crimes must be punished severely so that they are deterred from repeating the crime.	5. Suç işleyen kişiler sert bir şekilde cezalandırılmalı ki, suçu tekrarlamaktan caysınlar.
6. Feelings must be controlled by reason, because they can make you do stupid things.	6. Duygular mantık tarafından kontrol edilmelidir çünkü aptalca şeyler yapmanıza sebep olabilirler.
7. When people do good deeds, it is almost always out of an expectation to receive something in return.	7. İnsanlar iyi şeyler yaptıklarında, bunu genellikle karşılığında bir şey elde etme beklentisinden yaparlar.
8. When people are in trouble, they should help themselves and not depend on others.	8. Zor duruma düşenler başkalarından yardım beklememelidir.
9. The bad people in the world outnumber the good people.	9. Dünyadaki kötü insanların sayısı iyilerden fazladır.
10. The maintenance of law and order is the most important duty of any government.	10. Kanun ve nizamı muhafaza etmek devletlerin en önemli görevidir.
11. To observe objectively and describe in a neutral language is crucial to the pursuit of knowledge.	11. Nesnel bir şekilde gözlem yapmak ve bunu tarafsız bir dille anlatmak bilgi arayışı için çok önemlidir.
12. A society must enforce its laws and rules strictly in order not to deteriorate.	12. Toplumlar yozlaşmayı önlemek için kanun ve kurallarını katı bir biçimde uygulamalıdır.
13. Feelings are often an obstacle to seeing how things really are.	13. Duygular sıklıkla gerçekte olan biteni görmemize engel olur.
14. Human beings should be loved only when they have acted so that they deserve to be loved.	14. İnsanlar ancak sevgiyi hak edecek şekilde davranırlarsa sevilmelidir.
15. Imagination leads people into self-deception and delusions.	15. Hayal kurarak insan ancak kendini kandırır.

Appendix F: Curriculum Vitae

Gülden SAYILAN

CONTACT INFORMATION

E-mail	: sayilan.gulden@gmail.com
Telephone	: +90 312 324 1463
Address	: Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Department of Psychology. Esenboga Campus, Room: A/232, Esenboga, Ankara, Turkey.

EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION

2013 – (Ongoing)
Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
Department of Psychology
PhD in Social Psychology
CGPA: 4.00 /4.00
Passed the PhD Qualifying Exam in November 2015
Expected Graduation Date: July 2018

2010 – 2013
Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
Department of Psychology
MSc in Social Psychology
Thesis Title: Conscientious Objection in Turkey: A Study of Social Representations (Supervised by Prof. Dr. Bengi Öner Özkan) CGPA: 3.88 /4.00

2006 – 2010
Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
Department of Psychology
BSc in Psychology
CGPA: 3.59 /4.00

2005 – 2006
Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
Preparatory School, Department of Basic English
Grade: S (Satisfactory)

2001 – 2005
Edirne Anatolian High School
CGPA: 4.91 /5.00

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Social Psychology of Gender, Intergroup Prejudice & Discrimination, Masculinity Studies, Political Psychology, Ideology, Worldview, Social Representations

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

01/2013 – Ongoing : Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Department of Psychology, Research Assistant

04/2017 – Ongoing : Project on Establishment of Social and Cognitive Psychology Laboratory, Project Assistant, AYBU Projects Office.

12/2015 – 06/2016 : "YBU Psychology Congress: Acquisition and Transmission of Experience III", Project Assistant, YBÜ Projects Office.

05/2012 – 11/2012 : Turkish Red Crescent Society, Disaster Management Unit, Psychologist

9/2011 – 01/2012 : United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), External Relations Unit, Intern

10/2010 – 09/2011 : World Health Organization, Johns Hopkins University and Middle East Technical University, Research on Traffic Safety, Interviewer

03/2010 – 05/2010 : Middle East Technical University Psychology Department and TUBITAK, Research on Traumatic Events in Adult Life, Interviewer

07/2009 – 08/2009 : Directorate General for Social Aids, Social Reliefs Department, Intern

07/2008 – 10/2008 : Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies and Directorate General for Status of Women, Interviewer

01/2008 – 02/2008 : Trakya University Faculty of Medicine, Psychiatry Unit, Intern

06/2007 – 07/2007 : Trakya University Training and Research Center for Mentally and Physically Handicapped Children, Intern

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES (ORGANIZED)

04/2018 YBU Psychology Congress: Acquisition and Transmission of Experience IV, Ankara, Turkey, Member of Organizing Committee.

04/2016 YBU Psychology Congress: Acquisition and Transmission of Experience III, Ankara, Turkey, Congress Secretariat & Member of Organizing Committee.

09/2014 1st International Conference on Men and Masculinities: Identities, Cultures, Societies, Izmir, Turkey, Member of Organizing Committee.

04/2014 "Manful men: The Unbearable "Heaviness" of Manhood" Workshop organized by Initiative of Critical Studies for Men and Masculinities, Ankara, Turkey, Member of Organizing Committee.

11/2013 "Man as a Political Category", Workshop organized by Initiative of Critical Studies for Men and Masculinities, Trabzon, Turkey, Member of Organizing Committee.

08/2013   Masculinity Studies in Turkey, Workshop organized by Initiative of Critical
                   Studies for Men and Masculinities, İzmir, Turkey, Member of Organizing
                   Committee

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES (PUBLICATIONS)

Çukur, C.Ş. & Sayılan, G. (ongoing project). *Uygulamalı Sosyal Psikoloji (Applied Social
   Psychology)*. Edited book in progress.

Sayılan, G. (in progress). Sosyal Psikolojinin Siyaset Alanına Uygulanışı (Applying Social
   Psychology to Politics). Chapter in an edited book in progress.

Sayılan, G. (under revision). Is Every Turk Born a Soldier? Representations of Military
   Service in Contemporary Turkey. *British Journal of Social Psychology*.

Sayılan, G. (2017). Kitap Eleştirisi: Öldüren Erkek(lik)ler: Eşine Şiddet Uygulamış
   Cezaevindeki Erkekler, *Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture*, 8. (Book
   Review: Öldüren Erkek(lik)ler: Eşine Şiddet Uygulamış Cezaevindeki Erkekler)
   Retrieved from http://masculinitiesjournal.org/tr-tr/makale/olduren-erkeklikler--esine-
   siddet-uygulamis-cezaevindeki-erkekler-/220/pdf

Cingöz Ulu, B., Türkoğlu, B., & **Sayılan, G.** (2016). Kadın Şiddet Mağdurlarına Yönelik
   Tutumlarda Mağdurun Trans Kimliğinin Etkisi (The Effect of Victim's Transgender
   Identity on Attitudes towards Female Violence Victims), *Türk Psikoloji Yazıları*, 19,
   94-104.

Türkoğlu B. & **Sayılan, G.** (2016). *Politik Psikoloji Çalışmalarında Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve
   Cinsel Azınlık Gruplarına Yönelik Tutumlar*, Dirilen Gümüş, Ö. (Ed.) Siyaset
   Psikolojisi – 2. Cilt. Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık. (*Gender and attitudes
   towards sexual minorities in political psychology research*. Dirilen Gümüş, Ö. (Ed.)
   Siyaset Psikolojisi – Vol. 2. Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık.

Türkoğlu, B., **Sayılan, G.**, & Haywood, C. (2015). The 1st International Symposium in
   Turkey on Men and Masculinities: 'Identities, Cultures, Societies'. *NORMA:
   International Journal for Masculinity Studies, 10*(2), 179 - 184.
   http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18902138.2015.1050866

Sayılan, G., & Çevirgen, N. (2014). Yazılı basında çocuk temsilleri: Bir bekleme odası
   olarak çocukluk (Child representations in the printed media: Childhood as a waiting
   room), *İletişim ve Diplomasi*, *2*, 97-115.

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES (INVITED TALKS & SEMINARS)

Sayılan, G., (2018). *Toplumsal Cinsiyet Atölyesi*. Ruh Sağlığı Çalışanları İçin Cinsel
   Yönelim ve Cinsiyet Kimliği Atölyeleri, Türk Psikologlar Derneği, Ankara Türkiye.
   (*Gender Workshop*. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Workshops for Mental
   Health Professionals Organized by Turkish Psychological Association, Ankara,
   Turkey.)

Sayılan, G., (2016). *Cinsel Azınlık Gruplarına Yönelik Önyargı ve Ayrımcılık*. AFSAD
   Toplumcu Gerçekçi Belgesel Fotoğraf Atölyesi Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitsizliği ve
   Şiddet Projesi kapsamında gerçekleştirilmiş Davetli Konuşma, Ankara, Türkiye.
   (*Prejudice and Discrimination against Sexual Minorities*. Invited talk given to Gender

Inequality and Violence Project of AFSAD Realist Documentary Group, Ankara, Turkey.)

Sayılan, G., (2016). *Sosyal Psikolojide Gruplararası Önyargı ve Ayrımcılık: Cinsel Azınlık Grupları*. 1. TPÖÇG Ankara Psikoloji Günü, Ankara, Türkiye. (*Intergroup Prejudice in Social Psychology: The Case of Sexual Minorities*, 1st TPOCG Ankara Psychology Symposium, Ankara, Turkey.)

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES (PRESENTATIONS)

Sayılan, G. & Cingöz-Ulu, B. (2018). Predicting Ideological Orientation from Worldviews and Moral Foundations, Oral Presentation, 29th International Congress of Applied Psychology (ICAP), Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

Sayılan, G. Türkoğlu, B. & Cingöz-Ulu, B. (2018). The Ultimate Others: Social Psychological Precursors of Transprejudice in Turkey, Oral Presentation within a Symposium, 29th International Congress of Applied Psychology (ICAP), Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

Sayılan, G. Türkoğlu, B. & Cingöz-Ulu, B. (2018). The Ultimate Others: Social Psychological Precursors of Transprejudice in Turkey, Data Blitz, Preaching to the Choir, An International LGBTQ Psychology Conference, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

Sayılan, G., (2018). Is Every Turk Born a Soldier? Representations of Military Service in Contemporary Turkey (TR), Oral Presentation within a Panel, AYBU Congress of Psychology: Gaining and Transferring Experience-IV, Ankara, Turkey.

Sayılan, G., Türkoğlu, B., & Cingöz-Ulu, B. (2017). *The Mediatory Role of Moral Foundations in Predicting Ideology from RWA and SDO*. Poster Presentation, 40th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Edinburgh, Scotland.

İslambay, M., Fidan, M., Türkoğlu, B. & **Sayılan, G.** (2016). *Sociopolitical Attitudes and Ideological Identities as Predictors of Attitudes towards Freedom of Expression* (TR), Oral Presentation, the 1st Social Psychology Congress, Ankara, Turkey.

Türkoğlu, B. & **Sayılan, G.** (2016). *The Individual and Sociocultural Models of Prejudice against Transgender Individuals*, Poster Presentation, 39th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Warsaw, Poland.

Tunç, M. N., **Sayılan, G.** & Cingöz Ulu, B. (2016). *Humanism and Normativism: Orthogonal or Bipolar?*, Oral Presentation, 39th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Warsaw, Poland.

Sayılan, G. & Türkoğlu, B. (2016). *Qualitative research in social sciences* (TR), Workshop, YBU Congress of Psychology: Gaining and Transferring Experience-III, Ankara, Turkey

Sayılan, G. & Türkoğlu, B. (2015). *Political attitudes and ideology: Chicken or egg?* (TR), Oral Presentation, 14th Turkish Social Sciences Congress, Ankara, Turkey.

Tunç, M. N., **Sayılan, G.** & Cingöz Ulu, B. (2015). *Worldviews, Ideological Identities, and Crystallization of Ideology: Preliminary findings* (TR), Oral Presentation, 14th Turkish Social Sciences Congress, Ankara, Turkey.

Sayılan, G. (2014). *Conscientious Objection in Turkey: An Intersection of Militarism, Nationalism, Patriotism and Hegemonic Masculinity*, Oral Presentation, 37th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Rome, Italy.

Sayılan, G. & Çevirgen, N. (2014). *Child Representations in the Printed Media: Childhood as a Waiting Room* (TR), Oral Presentation, 18th National Congress of Psychology, Bursa, Turkey.

Sayılan, G. (2013). *Conscientious Objection in Turkish Media: A Study of Social Representations* (TR), Oral Presentation, 13th Turkish Social Sciences Congress, Ankara, Turkey.

OCCUPATIONAL & SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY (ATTENDED)

02/2017	Advanced MAXQDA Training for Studies with Mixed Methods, Sociological Association, Ankara, Turkey.
02/2015	Training on In-depth Interviews and Focus Group Techniques, Atilim University, Ankara.
02/2013	Workshop on Qualitative Data Analysis with MAXQDA, METU, Ankara.
08/2012	Training on Project Management, Turkish Red Crescent Society, Ankara, Turkey.
07/2012	Training on Psychosocial Support during Disasters, Union of Psychosocial Supports in Disasters, Izmir, Turkey.
06/2012	Training of Trainers, Turkish Red Crescent Society, Ankara, Turkey.

MEMBERSHIP OF SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL BODIES

09/2017 – Ongoing	Political Psychology Lab at METU, Member
07/2015 – Ongoing	Social Psychology of Gender (SPoG) Lab at METU, Member
02/2014 – Ongoing	Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture (https://masculinitiesjournal.wordpress.com/board/), Member of Editorial Board, Review Editor
08/2013 – Ongoing	Initiative of Critical Studies for Men and Masculinities (ICSM), Member
06/2012 – Ongoing	Union of Psychosocial Supports in Disasters (UPSD), Member

AWARDS & HONORS

2010 – 2018	TUBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) scholarship for national graduate study
2006 – 2010	High Honor student in Middle East Technical University (METU) for 8 semesters

LANGUAGES

Turkish	Native
English	Advanced (YDS Foreign Language Exam: 95/100)

Appendix G: Turkish Summary / Türkçe Özet

Sağ kanat ve sol kana ideolojik yönelimlere sahip bireyler arasındaki farklılıklar politik psikoloji alanının başlıca konularından biri olarak görülebilir (Jost, 2006). Bu bağlamda yapılmış ilk çalışmalardan biri Adorno ve arkadaşlarının sağ ve sol ideolojik yönelimlere sahip olan kişilerin kişilik özeliklerini inceledikleri çalışmalarıdır (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson ve Sanford, 1950). Bu ufuk açıcı çalışmadan bu yana araştırmacılar ideolojik farklılıkların altında yatan psikolojik faktörleri araştırmış ve birbirinden farklı pek çok açıklama öne sürmüştür (konu hakkında yapılmış derlemeler için bkz. Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski ve Sulloway, 2003). Bu çabalara ve elde edilen bilgi birikimine rağmen ideolojinin yapısına ilişkin bütüncül bir çerçeveye duyulan ihtiyaç devam etmektedir. Bana göre, ideolojik yönelimler hakkındaki bütüncül bir çalışma dünya görüşlerini içermelidir zira geniş anlam örüntüleri olarak tanımlanabilecek dünya görüşleri bireylerin pek çok sosyopolitik tutum ve politik farklılıklar bağlamında nasıl birbirinden ayrıldığını anlamamıza yardımcı olmaktadır (Tomkins, 1963).

Duckitt ve arkadaşlarının (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plesis ve Birum; 2002) geniş ölçüde desteklenen bakış açısı, bireylerin ideolojik yönelimlerinin soldan sağa uzanan tek bir skalada değerlendirilemeyeceği iddiasındadır. Aksine, ideolojik yönelimler ikili bir süreç sonucunda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kurama göre bireylerin içine doğdukları ve yetiştikleri sosyal çevrenin özellikleri ile bireylerin sahip oldukları kişilik özelliklerinin etkisi ile oluşan tehdit ve baskınlık temelli dünya görüşleri (tehlikeli ve tehditkâr inanışı ve rekabet dolu orman inanışı) bireylerin sahip olduğu tutum örüntülerini ve dolayısıyla sahip oldukları sosyopolitik tutumları ve ideolojik yönelimleri belirlemektedir.

Tomkins'in (1963) Kutuplaşma Kuramı ise sağ ve sol ideolojilerin kaynağının hümanizm ve normativism isimli iki geniş anlam örüntüsü olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Kurama göre bu geniş anlam örüntüleri kendilerini biyolojik, psikolojik ve sosyal etmenlerden oluşan dünya görüşlerinde de gösterir ve her şey hakkındaki duyguları ve bu duygular hakkındaki düşünceleri kapsayan bu geniş anlam örüntülerinin nasıl yapılandırılmış ve somutlaşmış ideolojik yönelimler halini

119

aldığını anlamamıza yardımcı olur. Bu dünya görüşleri bireylerin kişiliklerini şekillendiren ve gerek bireylerin başkalarıyla kurduğu ilişkilerin gerekse de bu deneyimlere ilişkin değerlendirmelerin yönünü belirleyen duygusal bir temel oluşturmaktadır.

Haidt ve arkadaşları tarafından ortaya atılan daha yakın zamanlı bir bakış açısı ise ideolojik farklılıkların temelinin bireylerin önemsediği ahlaki temeller olduğunu ileri sürmektedir (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007, 2009). Kurama göre, kültürlerin kendi ahlaki temellerini zerine bina ettiği temeli oluşturan ve bireylere neyin doğru neyin yanlış olduğuna ve diğerlerinin davranışlarının güvenilir olup olmadığına karar vermelerinde yardımcı olan psikolojik sistemler olarak tanımlanabilecek ahlaki temeller, bireylerin hemen her konudaki tutum ve davranışlarını etkiledikleri gibi onların ideolojik yönelimlerini belirlemede de etkilidir (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Bir başka deyişle, ahlaki temelleri insan doğası ve sosyal dünya hakkındaki prensipler olarak görmek mümkündür. Kuram, evrimsel, gelişimsel ve kültürel temeli olan bakım, adalet, sadakat, otorite ve kutsallık olarak adlandırılabilecek beş ahlaki temel önermektedir. Dahası, bu temeller zaman zaman ikiye bölünerek bireyselleştirici (bakım ve adalet) ve bağdaştırıcı (sadakat, otorite ve kutsallık) ahlaki temeller olarak da ele alınmaktadır (Graham ve ark., 2009; Haidt, 2012).

Bahsi geçen kuramlar tarafından ortaya atılan dünya görüşlerinin ve bu dünya görüşlerinin bir takım ikili kombinasyonlarının ideolojik yönelimler ile ilişkisi test edilmiş ve görgül destek kazanmıştır. Ancak alanyazında bahsi geçen dünya görüşlerinin birbiri ile nasıl bütünleşeceği konusunda ortaya atılmış bir model bulunmamaktadır. Bana göre, bu bakış açılarını içeren bütüncül bir model, her şey hakkında oluşturulan en geniş anlam örüntülerinin nasıl sosyal dünya hakkındaki daha düzenli inanış ve prensiplere ve nihayetinde bireylerin ideolojik yönelimlerine dönüştüğünü bize göstererek dünya görüşleri ile ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkiye ışık tutacaktır. Bu tez kapsamında oluşturulan ve test edilen Dünya Görüşleri ve İdeolojik Yönelimler Arasındaki İlişkiyi İnceleyen Bütünleştirici Bir Model başlıklı model, Kutuplaşma Kuramı tarafından ortaya atılan iki dünya görüşünün

(hümanizm ve normativizm) insan doğası ve sosyal çevre hakkındaki daha belirli inanış ve tutumların (İkili Süreç Modeli tarafından ortaya atılan tehlikeli ve tehditkar dünya ile rekabet dolu orman dünya görüşleri) üzerinde bina olduğu ve sosyal dünya hakkındaki daha da belirlenmiş prensiplerin (Ahlaki Temeller Kuramı tarafından ortaya atılan bireyselleştirici ve bağdaştırıcı ahlaki temeller) oluşmasına sebebiyet verdiği ideo-afektif bir temel olduğu ve tüm bu dünya görüşlerinin bütüncül biçimde bireylerin ideolojik yönelimlerini belirlediği varsayımından hareketle oluşturulmuştur.

Bu tez kapsamında gerçekleştirilen çalışmalar 3 başlık altında toplanabilir. Bölüm II'de rapor edilen ilk 2 çalışma (Çalışma 1a ve 1b) model kapsamında ele alınan değişkenlerden ikisini oluşturan ikili sosyal dünya görüşleri ölçeklerinin Türkiye'nin kültürel bağlamına uyarlanmasını, ve ölçekler üzerinde gerçekleştirilen geçerlilik ve güvenirlik testlerini içermektedir. Bölüm III'te rapor edilen sonraki iki çalışma (Çalışma 2a ve 2b) de benzer şekilde modelde ele alınan hümanizm ve normativizm değişkenlerinin ölçüm aracı olan Kutuplaşma Ölçeği'nin Türkiye bağlamına uyarlanmasını kapsamaktadır. Bölüm IV'te rapor edilen tek çalışma, bu tezin ana çalışmasını oluşturmakta ve edilen Dünya Görüşleri ve İdeolojik Yönelimler Arasındaki İlişkiyi İnceleyen Bütünleştirici Bir Model başlıklı modele ilişkin analizleri içermektedir.

Çalışma 1 – İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşü Ölçeklerinin Türkçeye Uyarlanması

Bu çalışma Duckitt ve arkadaşları (2002) tarafından oluşturulan Tehlikeli Dünya İnancı ve Rekabet Dolu Orman İnancı ölçeklerinin Türkiye'nin kültürel bağlamına uyarlanması; bu kültürel bağlamdaki faktör yapısının 2 farklı örneklemde test edilmesi, geçerlilik ve güvenilirlik testlerinin yapılması amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ölçeklerin Türkçeye uyarlanmasında 4 aşamalı bir prosedür izlenmiştir:

İlk aşamada ölçekler araştırmacılar tarafından bağımsız biçimde İngilizceden Türkçeye çevrilmiş ve sonrasında yapılan çeviriler birbiri ile kıyaslanarak ortak tek

bir form oluşturulmuştur. 2. aşamada, bu form, orijinal ölçekler ve yapılara ilişkin tanımlar ile birlikte her iki dile de hâkim olan 8 sosyal psikoloğa sunulmuş ve çevirileri aslına uygunluk ve ölçülmesi istenen yapıya uygunluk açısından değerlendirmeleri istenmiştir. 3. Aşamada, uzmanlardan elen geribildirimler doğrultusunda güncellenen ölçekler orijinal dilleri olan İngilizceye çevrilmesi amacıyla profesyonel bir dilbilimciye gönderilmiştir. 4. ve son aşamada ise her iki dile de hâkim bağımsız bir sosyal psikolog orijinal ölçekler ile İngilizceye çevrilmiş olan ölçekleri birbiri ile kıyaslayarak çevrilmiş olan formun aslına uygunluğunu değerlendirmiş ve ondan gelen geribildirimler doğrultusunda ölçeklere son halleri verilmiştir.

Çalışma 1a: İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşü Ölçeklerinin Faktör Yapılarının Yetişkin Örnekleminde İncelenmesi

İkili Süreç Modelinin varsayımları doğrultusunda bireylerin bu ölçeklerdeki puanlarının, kendilerinin kişilik özellikleri, sağ kanat yetkecilik [right wing authoritarianism], sosyal baskınlık eğilimi [social dominance orientation] ve ideolojik yönelim ölçümlerindeki puanları ile ilişkili olması beklenmiştir. Özel olarak bakıldığında, tehlikeli dünya inanışının sağ kanat yetkecilik ile olumlu ve istikrarlı bir ilişki içinde olması; sosyal baskınlık eğilimi ile düşük düzeyli negatif bir ilişki içinde ya da ilişkisiz olması; temel kişilik özelliklerinden sorumluluk [conscientiousness] özelliği ile olumlu bir ilişki içinde ve deneyime açıklık [openness to experience] ile olumsuz bir ilişki içerisinde olması beklenmiştir. Rekabet dolu orman inancının ise sosyal baskınlık eğilimi ile olumlu ve istikrarlı bir ilişki içerisinde olması; sağ kanat yetkecilik ile olumsuz ve güçsüz bir ilişki içerisinde ya da ilişkisiz olması ve son olarak temel kişilik özelliklerinden uyumluluk [agreeableness] ile olumsuz bir ilişki içinde olması beklenmiştir. Bunlara ek olarak, ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin Tomkins (1963) tarafından ortaya atılan iki dünya görüşü (hümanizm ve normativizm) ile olan ilişkisi de test edilmiş; ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin hümanizm ile olumsuz ve kayda değer bir ilişki içinde olması, normativizm ile kurdukları ilişkininse daha istikrarlı ve olumlu bir ilişki olması beklenmiştir.

Yöntem

Çalışmanın verileri çeşitli sosyal medya kanalları aracılığı ile ulaşılan ve web tabanlı çalışmaya gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak katılan 376 yetişkinden toplanmıştır. Çalışma kapsamında kullanılan ölçekler aşağıdaki gibidir:

1. *Sosyo-demografik değişkenler*. Katılımcıların cinsiyeti, yaşı, doğdukları ve yaşadıkları şehir, eğitim, inanç ve muhafazakarlık seviyeleri bu form aracılığıyla ölçülmüştür (Bkz. Ek A).

2. *İdeolojik Yönelimler*. Katılımcıların ideolojik yönelimleri kendini konumlandırma ölçeği ve ideolojik kimlikler ölçeği aracılığı ile ölçülmüştür. Kendini konumlandırma ölçeği katılımcıların kendilerini sağ-sol skalasında nerede konumlandırdıklarını ölçen 11'li Likert tipi bir sorudur (1: Sol – 11: Sağ). İdeolojik kimlikler ise Sayılan ve Türkoğlu (2015) tarafından oluşturulmuş 12 maddelik ölçeğin genişletilmiş bir versiyonu ile ölçülmüştür. 20 maddelik bu ölçekte katılımcılar kendilerini Türkiye'deki hâkim ideolojilerle (Anarşizm, Atatürkçülük, Ekolojizm, Faşizm, Feminizm, Kürt Siyasi Hareketi, Komünizm, Liberalizm, Liberteryenizm, Marksizm, Millî Görüş Hareketi, Milliyetçi Muhafazakârlık, Muhafazakarlık, Muhafazakâr Demokratlık, Radikal İslam, Sosyalizm, Sosyal Demokrasi, Türkçülük, Ulusalcılık ve Ülkücülük) ne ölçüde özdeşleştirdiklerini 1-11 arası bir değeri işaretleyerek belirtmektedirler (Bkz. Ek B). Orijinal ölçek sağ (α = .91), sol (α = .81) ve merkez (α = .78) ideolojik yönelimler olmak üzere 3 faktöre sahiptir.

Ölçeğin genişletilmiş versiyonunun faktör yapısının belirlenmesi amacıyla gerçekleştirilen Temel Bileşenler Analizi sonucunda toplam dağılımın %58,18'ini açıklayan 16 maddelik 2 faktörlü bir yapıda karar kılınmış. Bu faktörler 6.53 öz değeri ile toplam dağılımın %40,80'ini açıklayan ve 9 sağ kanat ideolojik yönelimden oluşan sağ ideolojik yönelim ile 2.46 öz değeri ile toplam dağılımın %15.38'ini açıklayan 7 maddelik sol ideolojik yönelimdir (Bileşenler Tablo 1'de kısaca özetlenmiştir).

3. *Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı* Ölçeği. Duckitt ve arkadaşları (2002) tarafından geliştirilmiş olan ve bireylerin (dünyanın güvenli ve emniyetli bir yere nazaran) tehlikeli ve güvenilmez bir yer olduğu inancına sahip olma eğilimlerini ölçmeyi amaçlayan 10 maddelik bu ölçek bu çalışma kapsamında Türkçeye uyarlanmıştır (Orijinal ve uyarlanmış ölçekler Ek C'de sunulmuştur). 7'li Likert tipi ölçek tek faktörden oluşmaktadır (α = .80).

4. *Rekabet Dolu Orman İnanışı Ölçeği*. Duckitt ve arkadaşları (2002) tarafından geliştirilmiş olan ve bireylerin dünyanın (iş birliği ve barış ile nitelendirilebilecek bir yerdense) acımasız ve rekabet dolu bir orman olduğu inancına sahip olma eğilimlerini ölçmeyi amaçlayan 20 maddelik bu ölçek bu çalışma kapsamında Türkçeye uyarlanmıştır (Orijinal ve uyarlanmış ölçekler Ek D'de sunulmuştur). 7'li Likert tipi orijinal ölçek tek faktörden oluşmaktadır (α = .84).

5. *Temel Kişilik Özellikleri*. Gençöz ve Öncül (2012) tarafından geliştirilen, 45 madde ve 6 faktörden oluşan bu ölçek katılımcıların 6 temel kişilik özelliğine ne ölçüde sahip olduklarını ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. 5'li Likert tipi sorulardan oluşan orijinal ölçekte aktörlerin iç tutarlılık katsayıları dışadönüklük için α = .89, uyumluluk için α = .85, sorumluluk için α = .85, duygusal tutarsızlık için α = .83, gelişime açıklık için α = .80 ve olumsuz değerlik için α = .71 olarak bulunmuştur.

6. *Sağ Kanat Yetkecilik (SKY)*. Sağ Kanat Ölçeğinin (Altemeyer, 1996) Weber ve Federico tarafından yeniden düzenlenmiş 12 maddelik versiyonu olan ölçek bireylerin sosyal otoritelere ve sosyal düzene uymaya yönelik eğilimlerini ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır (α = .72). Türkçeye Göregenli (2010) tarafından uyarlananan ölçek -4'ten +4'e uzanan 9'lu Likert tipi sorulardan oluşmaktadır (α = .71).

7. *Sosyal Baskınlık Eğilimi (SBE)*. Pratto ve arkadaşları (1994) tarafından geliştirilmiş olan 16 maddelik Sosyal Baskılık Eğilimi Ölçeği bireylerin toplumsal gruplar arasındaki eşitsizliği ve toplumsal hiyerarşik yapısını ne ölçüde desteklediklerini ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır (α = .91). Akbaş (2010) tarafından

Türkçeye uyarlanan 7'li Likert tipi ölçek grup temelli baskınlık (α = .81) ve eşitlik karşıtlığı (α = .91) olmak üzere 2 faktörden oluşmaktadır.

8. *İdeo-Afektif Kutuplaşma.* Nilsson (2014) tarafından geliştirilen ve 2 bölümden oluşan Kutuplaşma Ölçeği bireylerin hümanistik (α = .89) ve normativistik (α = .87) dünya görüşlerine ne ölçüde sahip olduğunu ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Toplamda 30 maddeden oluşan 7'li Likert tipi ölçek Sayılan, Tunç ve Cingöz-Ulu (2016) tarafından Türkçeye uyarlanmış; Türkçe versiyonda iç tutarlılık katsayıları hümanizm için α = .76, normativizm için α = .76 olarak hesaplanmıştır.

Bulgular

Bu çalışma kapsamında Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı ve Rekabet Dolu Orman İnanışı ölçeklerinin Türkiye kültürel bağlamındaki faktör yapısının belirlenebilmesi amacıyla Promax döndürmesi ile bir dizi Temel Bileşenler Analizi gerçekleştirilmiş; faktörlerin sayısı Kaiser'in öz değerlerin 1.00'in üzerinde olması kriteri, Catell çizgi grafiği [scree plot] testi, paralel analiz ve puanların yorumlanması ile belirlenmiştir.

Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı

Temel Bileşenler analizi sonucunda öz değeri 1.00'in üzerinde olan ve toplam dağılımın %56,23'ünü açıklayan 3 faktör olduğu görülmüş ancak paralel analiz ve çizgi grafiğinin yorumlanması sonucu 2 faktörlü yapının daha uygun olacağı görüldüğünden maddeler 2 faktöre sınırlandırılarak analiz tekrarlanmış ve her iki faktöre yüklenen 9. Madde analizden çıkartılmıştır. Elde edilen 2 faktör toplam dağılımın %50,70'ni açıklamaktadır. 5 maddeden (2, 3, 6, 8 ve 10) oluşan ilk faktör 3.36 öz değeri ile toplam dağılımın %37,36'sını açıklamış, maddelerin yorumlanması sonucu bu faktörün dünyanın güvenilmez insanlarla dolu tehlikeli bir yer olduğu inancını betimlediği görüldüğünden bu faktör "Tehlike ve Tehdidin Varlığı" olarak adlandırılmıştır (α = .73). 4 ters maddeden (1, 4, 5 ve 7) oluşan 2 faktör ise 1.20 öz değeri ile toplam dağılımın %13,41'ini açıklamış ve maddelerin yorumlanması sonucu "Güvenlik ve Emniyetin Yokluğu" olarak adlandırılmıştır (α = .68). Analizin bulguları Tablo 2'de özetlenmiştir.

Rekabet Dolu Orman İnanışı

Temel Bileşenler Analizi bu ölçek için de başlangıçta 3 faktör önermiş, paralel analiz ve çizgi grafiğinin yorumlanması sonucu 2 faktörlü yapıda karar kılınmıştır. Bu nedenle analiz tekrarlanmış ve elde edilen 2 faktörün toplam dağılımın %38,82'sini açıkladığı görülmüştür. 10 maddeden oluşan ilk faktör (1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 ve 18) 5.91 öz değeri ile toplam dağılımın %29,53'ünü açıklamaktadır. Maddelerin yorumlanması sonucu bu faktör "Rekabet ve Acımasızlığı Varlığı" olarak adlandırılmıştır (α = .81). 10 ters maddeden (2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19 ve 20) oluşan 2. faktör ise 1.86 öz değeri ile toplam dağılımın %9,26'sını açıklamıştır. Maddelerin yorumlanması sonucu bu faktör "Karılıklı İlgi ve İşbirliğinin Yokluğu" olarak adlandırılmıştır (α = .77). Analizin bulguları Tablo 3'te özetlenmiştir.

İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşlerinin Geçerliliğine İlişkin Bulgular

Bu çalışmada İkili Süreç Modelinin varsayımlarından hareketle ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin kişilik özelikleri, sağ kanat yetkecilik ve sosyal baskınlık eğilimi ile nasıl ilişkilendiği irdelenmiş; bunlar ek olarak bu dünya görüşlerinin Tomkins'in Kutuplaşma Kuramı bağlamında önerdiği iki dünya görüşü olan hümanizm ve normativizm ile olan ilişkileri de araştırılmıştır. Sonuçlar ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin beklenen ilişkileri kısmen karşıladığını göstermektedir.

İlk olarak, tehlikeli dünya inanışının temel kişilik özelliklerinden sorumluluk ile olumlu, gelişime açıklık ile olumsuz bir ilişki içerisinde olması beklenirken her iki özelik ile de ilişkisiz olduğu bulunmuştur. Bu inanışın tutumsal yönelimler ile ilişkisi bağlamında ise SKY ile olumlu ve istikrarlı bir ilişki içinde olması SBE ile ise ilişkisiz ya da olumsuz ve güçsüz bir ilişki içinde olması beklenirken sonuçlar SKY ile olumlu ve güçsüz bir ilişki, SBE ile ise olumsuz ve yine güçsüz bir ilişki içerisinde olduğunu göstermiştir. Bunların yanı sıra, bu inanışın beklendiği üzere Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin normativizm boyutu ile olumlu bir ilişki içinde olduğu görülmüştür.

Diğer yandan, rekabet dolu orman dünya görüşünün beklenen tüm ilişkilere sahip olduğu görülmüştür. İkili Süreç Modeline göre, bu dünya görüşünün uyumsuzluk özelliği ile olumsuz ilişkili olması beklenmiş ve sonuçlar bu beklentiyi doğrulamıştır. Tutumsal örüntüler bağlamında ise SBE ile olumlu ve nispeten güçlü bir ilişkiye ve SKY ile nispeten zayıf bir ilişkiye sahip olması beklenmiş ve analiz sonuçlarına göre SBE pozitif ve orta derecede ilişkili olduğu, SKY ile ilişkisiz olduğu görülmüştür. Dahası, beklendiği üzere, bu dünya görüşü Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin hümanizm boyutuyla olumsuz bir ilişki içerisindedir (Bulguların özeti için bkz. Tablo 4).

Özetle, uyarlama çalışmasının sonuçları, İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşü ölçümlerinin güvenilir ölçekler olduğunu göstermiştir. Bununla birlikte, söz konusu değişkenler ile olan korelasyonlar, tehlikeli bir dünya ölçeğine olan inanç ilişkilerinden bazılarının beklenen örüntüde olmadığından, İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşü ölçümlerinin yapı geçerliliği açısından dünya görüşlerinin kısmi olarak geçerli ölçütleri olduğunu göstermiştir. İkili ilişkilerin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için sosyal dünya görüşlerinin Türk kültürel bağlamında olması ve Çalışma 1a'da elde edilen faktör yapılarının başka bir örneklemde test edilmesi amacıyla ikinci bir çalışma yapılmıştır.

Çalışma 1b: İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşü Ölçeklerinin Faktör Yapısının Öğrenci Örnekleminde Test Edilmesi

Bu çalışma, ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin faktör yapılarını bir başka Türk örnekleminde test etmek ve daha fazla güvenilirlik ve geçerlilik testi yapmak amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ölçeklerin faktör yapılarını sınamak için Doğrulayıcı Faktör Analizleri yapılmış ve yapı geçerliliğini test etmek için dünya görüşlerinin Çalışma 1a'daki değişkenlerle korelasyonları test edilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın Çalışma 1a'nın bir tekrarı olması planlandığından, çalışmanın prosedürü iki istisna dışında bir öncekiyle aynıdır. Bu çalışmanın verileri, yetişkin örneklemine dayanan Çalışma 1a bulgularının bir öğrenci örneğine genelleştirilip genelleştirilemeyeceğini test etmek amacıyla üniversite öğrencilerinden toplanmıştır.

İkincisi, daha önce bildirildiği gibi, tehlikeli bir dünya inanışına olan inancın, diğer değişkenler ile olan ilişkisine ilişkin beklentiler, sadece kısmen karşılanabilmiştir. Bu durumun Çalışma 1a'da kullanılan ölçüme ilişkin bir metodolojik sorundan mı (madde sözcükleri, düşük iç tutarlılık katsayısı, vb.) yoksa bu değişkenin Türkiye bağlamındaki doğasının böyle olmasından mı kaynaklandığını tespit edebilmek amacıyla bu çalışmada SKY farklı bir ölçek kullanılarak ölçülmüştür. İnternet ortamında gerçekleştirilen çalışmanın katılımcılarını 272 üniversite öğrencisi oluşturmuş olup kullanılan SKY Ölçeğine ilişkin temel bilgiler aşağıda sunulmuştur:

Sağ Kanat Yetkecilik. Güldü (2011) tarafından Türkçeye uyarlanan Altemeyer'in (1996) 22 maddelik Likert tipi ölçeği, katılımcıların kanat yetkecilik otoriterlik düzeylerini ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Orijinali tek faktör olan ölçeğin Türkçe versiyonu, yetkecilik (α = .82) ve gelenekselcilik (α = .78) olmak üzere iki faktörden oluşmaktadır. Katılımcılar, Altemeyer (1996) tarafından belirtildiği üzere, maddeyi -4 ila +4 arasında değişen 9 dereceli Likert tipi bir ölçekte değerlendirmiştir.

Bulgular

Çalışma 1a'da elde edilen Tehlikeli Dünya ve Rekabetçi Orman önlemlerinin faktör yapılarının verilere ne kadar uyduğunu test etmek için LISREL 9.3 Öğrenci Sürümü ile Doğrulayıcı Bir Faktör Analizi (CFA) yapılmıştır. Analizlerde, girdi olarak kovaryans matrisi kullanılmış ve parametre tahmini için Maksimum Olabilirlik Tahmini [Maximum Likelihood Estimation] kullanılmıştır. Ki-kare testi (χ^2), yaklaşık hataların ortalama karekökü [Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)], standardize edilmiş kök ortalama rezidüeli [Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR)], Akaike Bilgi Ölçütü [Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)], düzeltilmiş uyum iyiliği indeksi [Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)] ve karşılaştırmalı uyum indeksi [Comparative Fit Index (CFI)] model uyumunu değerlendirmek için kullanılmıştır. Uyumun iyiliğinin ölçütleri manidar olmayan bir χ^2 istatistiği, $\chi^2/df \leq 3$, RMSEA $\leq$ .08, SRMR $\leq$ .05, (iç içe geçmiş olmayan modeller için) nispeten düşük AIC değeri, AGFI $\geq$ .90 ve CFI $\geq$ .90 olarak belirlenmiştir (Bollen, 1989; Hu & Bentler, 1999.). Uyum indekslerine ek olarak, ki-kare fark testi

ve çözümlerin yorumlanabilirliği modellerin uyumunu karşılaştırmak için kullanılmıştır.

Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı Ölçeği için, 9 maddelik ve 2 faktörlü uyarlanmış versiyon (Model 1 - Çalışma 1a'da elde edilen model), Orijinal 10 maddelik tek faktörlü çözüm (Alternatif Model 1), 9 maddelik tek faktörlü çözüm (Alternatif Model 2) ve 2 faktörlü 10 maddeli versiyon (Alternatif Model 3) olmak üzere 3 alternatife karşı test edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, önerilen modelin (Model 1), uyum istatistiklerinin göreceli olarak daha iyi oluşu ve aynı zamanda düşük AIC seviyeleri bağlamında, eldeki veriye diğer alternatiflere nazaran daha iyi uyduğunu göstermiştir (Model istatistikleri için bkz. Tablo 5). Alternatif Model 2 ile karşılaştırıldığında (iç içe geçmiş alternatif) ki-kare fark testi anlamlı bulunmuştur, $\Delta\chi2$ (1, N = 272) = 177.75, p <.01.

Rekabet Dolu Orman İnanışı Ölçeği için ise 20 maddelik ve 2 faktörlü uyarlanmış versiyon (Model 1), Duckitt ve arkadaşları (2002) tarafından önerilen 20 maddelik tek faktörlü versiyona karşı test edilmiştir. Tehlikeli Dünya İnancı Ölçeğine benzer şekilde, Açımlayıcı Faktör Analizinde elde edilen uyarlanmış versiyonun orijinal tek faktörlü versiyona kıyasla veriye daha iyi uyduğu görülmüştür, $\Delta\chi2$ (1, N = 272) = 12.50, <.01 (Model istatistikleri için bkz. Tablo 5).

İç tutarlılık katsayıları değerlendirildiğinde hem Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı Ölçeğinin (ölçeğin tamamı için α = .77; alt faktörler için sırasıyla α = .71 ve α = .58) hem de Rekabet Dolu Orman İnanışı Ölçeğinin (ölçeğin tamamı için α = .86; alt faktörler için sırasıyla α = .82 ve α = .81) güvenilir ölçekler olduğu görülmüştür. Ancak Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı Ölçeğinin ikinci bileşeninin iç tutarlılık katsayısının görece düşük oluşu ters maddelerle ilgili bir sorun olabileceğine işaret etmektedir. Yapı geçerliliği bağlamında ise elde edilen sonuçlar Rekabet Dolu Dünya İnanışı Ölçeği için beklenen yönde ve beklenen etki büyüklüğü aralığında olduğunu, Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı için ise beklentilerin yine kısmen karşılandığını göstermiştir (bkz. Tablo 6).

Çok maddeli ölçeklerin geliştirilmesinde tanışıklık yanlılığını [acquiescence bias] kontrol etme ve önleme amacıyla ters maddelerin kullanılması yaygın (örn. Churchill, 1979; Hersche & Engelland, 1996) olsa da tartışmalı bir durumdur. İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşleri ölçeklerinin Türkçe versiyonlarında ölçeklerin orijinallerinin tek faktörlü olmasına (her iki ölçeğin de ölçmeyi amaçladığı tek yapı olmasına) rağmen ayrı faktörler oluşturmuştur. Alanyazında başka araştırmacılar tarafından da karşılaşılan bu yapay faktörler (örn. Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 1997) ölçümü karıştırma olasılığına sahiptir. Dahası bazı araştırmacılar, olumsuz ifadelerin kullanımının, bu maddelerin ölçeğin geri kalanından daha az güvenilir ve geçerli olma eğiliminde olması nedeniyle önyargı yanlılığını azaltmak için iyi bir strateji olmadığını öne sürmekte ve bu nedenle bu maddelerin ölçekten çıkartılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır (Harvey, Billings, & Nilan, 1985; Krosnick & Presser, 2009; Swain vd., 2008; Wong vd., 2003). Bu tartışmalarda hareketle, olası güvenirlik ve geçerlilik sorunlarının önüne geçebilmek amacıyla, tez kapsamında yürütülen diğer çalışmalarda bu iki ölçeğin sadece düz maddelerden oluşan ilk faktörlerinin (Tehlikeli Dünya İnanışı Ölçeği için Tehlike ve Tehdidin Varlığı ve Rekabet Dolu Orman İnanışı Ölçeği için Rekabet ve Acımasızlığın Varlığı) kullanılmasına karar verilmiştir.

Çalışma 2 – Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin Türkçeye Uyarlanması

Bu çalışma, Tomkins'in (1964, Stone ve Schaffner, 1988'de yeniden basılmıştır) geliştirilmiş olan ve Nilsson (2014) tarafından güncellenen Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin Türkçe'ye uyarlanması, faktör yapısının iki farklı örneklemde test edilmesi ve güvenilirlik ve geçerlilik testlerinin yapılması amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ölçeklerin Türkiye kültürel bağlamına uyarlanması Çalışma 1a'da tarif edilen prosedür izlenerek yapılmıştır.

Çalışma 2a: Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin Faktör Yapısının
Yetişkin Örnekleminde Araştırılması

Çalışmanın verileri çeşitli sosyal medya kanalları aracılığı ile ulaşılan ve araştırmaya gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak katılan 315 yetişkinden toplanmıştır.

İzlenen prosedür, kullanılan ölçekler haricinde Çalışma 1a'daki ile aynı olup bu çalışmada katılımcılar şu ölçekleri tamamlamıştır: Kutuplaşma Ölçeği (Nilsson, 2014; TR: Sayılan, Tunç ve Cingöz Ulu, 2016), Sağ Kanat Yetkecilik Ölçeği (Altemeyer, 1996; TR: Göregenli, 2010), Sosyal Baskınlık Eğilimi Ölçeği (Pratto vd., 1994; TR: Akbaş, 2010), demografik form ve ideolojik yönelimler ölçümleri.

Bulgular

Çalışma 1a'ya benzer şekilde, 30 maddelik Kutuplaşma Ölçeği'nin faktör yapısını belirlemek için Promax Rotasyonu ile Temel Bileşen Analizi yapılmıştır. Ölçeğin hümanizm ve normativizm olmak üzere iki alt boyutu olduğundan, analizler her bir ölçek için ayrı ayrı gerçekleştirilmiştir. Faktörlerin sayısı Kaiser'in 1.00 üzerindeki öz değerler kriteri, Catell çizgi grafiği testi, Monte Carlo paralel analizi ve puanların yorumlanabilirliği ile belirlenmiştir.

Hümanizm Alt-Ölçeği

Temel Bileşenler Analizi sonuçları ölçeğin toplam dağılımın 59,91'ini açıklayan toplam 5 faktörden oluştuğunu ve faktörlerin Nilsson (2014) tarafından önerilen yapıyla büyük ölçüde uyumlu olduğunu göstermiştir. 3 maddeden oluşan ilk faktör (Duygulanıma Yönelik Tutumlar) toplam dağılımın %25,17'sini; 2 maddeden oluşan 2. faktör (İnsan Doğası) toplam dağılımın %11,74'ünü; 3 maddeden oluşan 3. faktör (Kişilerarası Tutumlar) toplam dağılımın %8,31'ini, 3 maddelik 4. faktör (Epistemoloji) toplam dağılımın %7.45'ini ve 3 maddelik 5. faktör de (Politik Değerler) toplam dağılımın %7,23'ünü açıklamıştır. Ölçeğin bütünü için hesaplanan iç tutarlılık katsayısı .76'dır (Temel bileşenler Analizi sonuçları için bkz. Tablo 7).

Normativizm Alt-Ölçeği

Temel Bileşenler Analizi toplam dağılımın %52,05'ini açıklayan 4 faktör önermiş ancak paralel analiz ve çizgi grafiğinin yorumlanması sonucu 3 faktörlü bir yapının daha uygun olacağına karar verildiğinden analiz maddeleri 3 faktöre zorlayarak tekrarlanmıştır. Elde edilen 3 faktörlü çözüm toplam dağılımın %44,32'sini açıklamış, birden fazla faktöre yüklenen 3 madde analizden

çıkartıldığında açıklanan dağılım %48,98'e yükselmiştir. Beş maddeden oluşan ilk faktör (Duygulanım ve Mantığa İlişkin Tutumlar) toplam dağılımın %25,7'sini; 4 maddelik ikinci faktör (İnsan Doğası) toplam dağılımın %13.04'ünü; 3 maddeden oluşan üçüncü faktör ise (Politik Değerler) toplam dağılımın %10,22'sini açıklamıştır (Temel bileşenler Analizi sonuçları için bkz. Tablo 8).

Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin Geçerliliğine İlişkin Bulgular

Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin Türkiye kültürel bağlamında geçerliliğini test etmek için, hümanizm ve normativizmin SKY, SBE ve ideolojik yönelimlerle ilişkileri test edilmiştir. Tomkins'e göre, hümanist eğilimlerin hem SKY hem de SBE ile negatif bir ilişki içinde olması, normativizmin ise her iki değişkenle olumlu yönde ilişki kurması beklenmiştir. İdeolojik yönelimlere gelince, hümanizmin sol kanat ideolojik yönelimle olumlu ve sağ kanat ideolojik yönelimle olumsuz olarak ilişkili olması; normativizmin ise, tam tersine, sağ kanat ideolojik yönelim ile olumlu ve sol kanat ideolojik yönelim ile olumsuz biçimde ilişkilenmesi beklenmiştir. Elde edilen bulgular (değişkenler arasındaki ikili korelasyonlar için bkz. Tablo 9) bu beklentileri genel olarak destekler niteliktedir.

Sonuç olarak Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin bu çalışmada Türkçeye uyarlanan her iki alt ölçeğinin de kuram tarafından öngörülen ilişkileri test etmekte kullanılabilecek geçerli ve güvenilir ölçekler olduğu görülmüştür.

Çalışma 2b: Kutuplaşma Ölçeğinin Faktör Yapısının Öğrenci Örnekleminde Test Edilmesi

Çalışma 2a'da elde edilen faktör yapılarının Nilsson (2014) tarafından elde edilen orijinal faktör yapısından daha iyi olup olmadığının test etmek amacıyla ikinci bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmada kullanılan veriler Tunç (2016) tarafından toplanmış ve kendisinin izniyle bu teze dahil edilmiştir.

Çalışmanın örneklemini dünya görüşleri ile sosyopolitik tutumların ilişkisini irdeleyen bir başka proje kapsamında bu ölçeği dolduran 320 üniversite öğrencisi

oluşturmuştur. Katılımcılar, Çalışma 2a'ya benzer şekilde demografik form ve ideolojik yönelimler ölçümlerini ve Kutuplaşma Ölçeği'ni doldurmuşlardır.

Bulgular

Uyarlanmış Türkçe formun eldeki veriye Nilsson (2014) tarafından önerilen 5 faktörlü yapıya kıyasla ne kadar iyi uyduğunu test edebilmek adın hümanizm ve normativizm alt ölçeklerine LISREL 8.8. programı kullanılarak bir dizi Doğrulayıcı Faktör Analizi uygulanmıştır.

Nilsson (2014) tarafından önerildiği üzere, her iki ölçek için de 3'er maddeden oluşan beş faset değişken oluşturulmuş, bu değişkenler gözlenen değişkenler olarak analize dahil edilmiştir. Nilsson (2014) tarafından önerilen model (Model 5), kendisi tarafından önerilen 4 iç içe geçmiş alternatife ve Çalışma 2a'da Açımlayıcı Faktör Analizi sonucu elde edilen iç içe geçmiş olmayan alternatife (Model 6) karşı sınanmıştır. Modellerin veriye uygunluğunu test etmek için kullanılan ölçütler Çalışma 1b ile aynıdır.

Elde edilen sonuçlar, Nilsson tarafından önerilen modelin (Model 5) veriye uygunluğunun tüm iç içe geçmiş alternatiflerden daha iyi olduğunu göstermektedir: Model 1 için $\Delta\chi2$ (4) = 231.02, $p < .01$, Model 2 için $\Delta\chi2$ (1) = 155.89, $p < .01$, Model 3 için $\Delta\chi2$ (4) = 114.10, $p < .01$ ve Model 4 için $\Delta\chi2$ (3) = 98.04, $p < .01$. İç içe geçmiş olmayan alternatif için ise, Model 6, Model 5'ten daha düşük AIC değerine sahip olsa da Nilsson tarafından önerilen model (Model 5) hümanizm ve normativizmin Tomkins tarafından önerilen alt boyutları bağlamında daha kapsayıcı olduğundan bu modelin nihai model olarak alınmasına karar verilmiştir (Modellerin detayları için bkz. Tablo 10). Model 5'in standartlaştırılmış parametrelerine bakıldığında, modelin dataya uygunluğunun ve modele dahil edilen değişkenlerin birbiri ile ola ilişkilerinin Nilsson'un (2014) bulguları ile örtüştüğü görülmüştür.

Çalışma 3 - Dünya Görüşleri ve İdeolojik Yönelimler Arasındaki İlişkiyi İnceleyen Bütünleştirici Bir Modelin Test Edilmesi

Bu çalışma, dünya görüşleri ve ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkileri inceleyen bütünleştirici modelin veriye uygunluğu ile Kutuplaşma Kuramı, İkili Süreç Modeli ve Ahlaki Temeller Teorisi tarafından önerilen dünya görüşlerinin birbirleri ve ideolojik yönelimler ile kurdukları ilişkileri test etmek amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Hümanizmin ideolojik yönelimleri rekabet dolu dünya inancı ve bireyselleştirici ahlaki temeller üzerinden dolaylı olarak yordaması; normativizmin de benzer şekilde ideolojik yönelimleri tehlikeli dünya inanışı ve bağdaştırıcı ahlaki temeller aracılığı ile dolaylı olarak yordaması beklenmiştir. Dahası Tomkins'in dünya görüşlerinin ahlaki temeller ile kurduğu ilişkide ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin aracı rol oynaması beklenmiştir.

Çalışmanın katılımcılarını Türkiye'nin çeşitli üniversitelerinde eğitim görmekte olan 1042 öğrenci oluşturmuştur. Katılımcılar internet ortamında düzenlenen çalışmaya bonus puan karşılığı katılmışlar ve diğer çalışmalarda kullanılan Kutuplaşma Ölçeğini (Nilsson, 2014; TR: Sayılan, Tunç ve Cingöz Ulu, 2016), İkili Sosyal Dünya Görüşü Ölçeklerini (Duckitt vs., 2002; TR: Sayılan & Cingöz-Ulu, 2018), demografik formu ve ideolojik yönelimler ölçümlerini doldurmuşlardır. Bu ölçümlere ek olarak, katılımcıların önemsedikleri ahlaki temeller, Ahlaki Temeller Ölçeği aracılığıyla ölçülmüştür.

Ahlaki Temeller Ölçeği. Graham ve arkadaşları tarafından (2009) geliştirilmiş ve Türkçeye Yalçındağ ve Özkan (Yalçındağ, 2015; Yalçındağ vd., 2017) tarafından uyarlanmış olan 30 maddelik 6'lı Likert tipi ölçek katılımcıların kuram tarafından önerilen beş ahlaki temel olan bakım ($\alpha = .69$; TR: $\alpha = .64$), adalet ($\alpha = .65$; TR: $\alpha = .70$), sadakat ($\alpha = .71$; TR $\alpha = .66$), otorite ($\alpha = .64$; TR: $\alpha = .78$) ve kutsallık ($\alpha = .64$; TR: $\alpha = .79$) temellerini ne ölçüde önemsediklerini o ahlaki temele ne ölçüde ilgili oldukları ve her bir temele ilgili yargıları ne ölçüde benimsedikleri üzerinden ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bulgular

Dünya görüşleri ve ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemek üzere korelasyoel bir araştırma deseni benimsenmiş olup verilerin analizinde deneysel araştırma deseni ile test edilmek için fazla geniş olan nedensel modellerin test edilmesine olanak sunan ve nedensel modellerin veriye ne ölçüde uygun olduğunu gösteren bir yöntem olan Yapısal Eşitlik Modeli yaklaşımından faydalanılmıştır. Çalışmanın verileri LISREL 8.80 aracılığı ile analiz edilmiş, test edilen modellerin veriye uygunluğunun sınanmasında Çalışma 1a'da sunulan kriterlerden faydalanılmıştır. Hem gizil değişkenlerin belirleyicilerinin değerlendirilmesinde hem de modellerin test edilmesinde iki-aşamalı yaklaşımdan (Anderson & Gerbing, 1998) faydalanılmıştır.

Önerilen model iki belirleyici değişken (hümanizm ve normativizm), 4 aracı değişken (ikili sosyal dünya görüşleri ile bireyselleştirici ve bağdaştırıcı ahlaki temeller) ve 2 sonuç değişkeninden (sağ ve sol ideolojik yönelimler) oluşmaktadır. Ölçüm modeli, sekiz gizli [latent] değişken ve bunların göstergelerini içermektedir. Hümanizm ve normativizm için faset değişkenler gösterge olarak kullanılmıştır. İkili Süreç Modeli ölçekleri için, ölçüm modelini sadeleştirmek amacıyla her iki ölçüm için düz maddeler parseller halinde birleştirilmiş, her iki ölçek için de üçer parsel oluşturulmuştur. Ahlaki temeller için, ahlaki geçerlilik ve ahlaki yargılarla ilgili maddeleri içeren beş alt ölçeğin her biri gizli değişkenlerin (bireyselleştirici ve bağdaştırıcı temeller) göstergeleri olarak kullanılmıştır. Son olarak, ideolojik yönelimler için, ideolojik kimlikler ölçümünün maddelerinden sağ ve sol ideolojik yönelimler için üçer parsel oluşturulmuştur. Ölçüm modelinin veriye uygunluğu kabul edilebilir düzeydedir, χ^2 (263, N = 1042) = 1499.23, p = .00, χ^2/df = 5.70, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .08, NNFI = .90, AGFI = .86, CFI = .92 (Ölçüm modeli Şekil 3'te özetlenmiştir.) Benzer şekilde, yapısal modelin veriye uygunluğu da kabul edilebilir seviyede olduğu ve önerilen ilişkilerin büyük oranda manidar olduğu görülmüştür, χ^2 (277, N = 1042) = 1887.09, p = .00, χ^2/df = 6.81, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .10, NNFI = .90, AGFI = .86, CFI = .92. Buna göre, bireyselleştirici ahlaki temeller beklendiği şekilde sol ideolojik yönelim üzerinde olumsuz, sağ ideolojik

135

yönelim üzerinde olumlu bir doğrudan etkiye sahiptir. Bağdaştırıcı temellerin doğrudan etkileri ise sol ideolojik yönelim için olumsuz, sağ ideolojik yönelim için olumludur. Ancak hümanizm ile normativizmin sağ ve sol ideolojik yönelimler üzerindeki dolaylı etkileri manidar olmadığından bu ilişkilerde ikili sosyal dünya görüşleri ile ahlaki temellerin aracı rol oynamadığı görülmüştür.

Dünya görüşlerinin ideolojik yönelimler ile ne şekilde ilişkilendiğinin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi adına önerilen model İkili Süreç Modeli yaklaşımına uygun şekilde oluşturulmuş (ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin belirleyici değişkenler olduğu ve sırasıyla Kutuplaşma Kuramı ile Ahlaki Temeller Kuramının dünya görüşü değişkenlerinin aracı değişkenler olarak ele alındığı) bir alternatif modele karşı sınanmıştır. Sonuçlar bu modelin (χ^2 (279, N = 1042) = 1822.75, p = .00, χ^2/df = 6.53, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .09, NNFI = .89, AGFI = .84, CFI = .90) veriye uygunluğunun önerilen modele kıyasla daha iyi olduğunu göstermiştir, $\Delta\chi2$ (0, N = 1042) = 64.34, p <.01. Modelin açıkladığı toplam dağılım sağ ideolojik yönelim için %64, sol ideolojik yönelim için ise %17 olarak bulunmuştur. Dahası, bu model kapsamında test edilen tüm ilişkilerin manidar olduğu görülmüştür. Buna göre, tehlikeli dünya ve rekabet dolu orman inanışları ile ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkilerde hümanizm, normativizm, bireyselleştirici ve bağdaştırıcı ahlaki temeller aracı rol üstlenmektedir. Tehlikeli dünya inanışının sağ ideolojik yönelim üzerindeki dolaylı etkisi olumlu, sol ideolojik yönelim üzerindeki dolaylı etkisi ise olumsuzdur. Rekabet dolu dünya inanışının da benzer şekilde, sağ ideolojik yönelim üzerinde olumlu, sol ideolojik yönelim üzerinde olumsuz bir dolaylı etkiye sahip olduğu görülmüştür. Bunlara ek olarak, rekabet dolu orman inanışının bireyselleştirici ahlaki temeller üzerindeki dolaylı etkisinin olumsuz, tehlikeli dünya inanışının bağdaştırıcı temeller üzerindeki dolaylı etkisinin ise olumlu olduğu görülmüştür. (Nihai modelin özeti Şekil 4'te sunulmuştur).

Bu modele ek olarak, önerilen model ile nihai modeli sınamak ve dünya görüşleri ile ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkilere daha yakından bakabilmek amacıyla bir dizi keşifsel model oluşturulmuş ancak yapılan analizler sonucu,

oluşturulan bu modellerin hiçbirinin teorik ve metodolojik açıdan önerilen model ile nihai model kadar uygun alternatifler olmadığına karar verilmiştir.

Tartışma

Dünya görüşleri ile ideolojik yönelimler arasındaki ilişkiyi bütünleştirici bir model üzerinden test etmeyi amaçlayan bu çalışmada Tomkins'in ideo-afektöf kutuplaşma ile ilgili varsayımları ve hümanizm ile normativizmin ikili sosyal dünya görüşleri ile ahlaki temeller ile bütünleştirilebileceğine ilişkin bulgulara dayanılarak hümanizm ve normativizmin ikili sosyal dünya görüşleri ve ahlaki temellerin üzerine bina oldukları afektif temeller olabileceği ve bu dünya görüşlerinin aracı etkisiyle ideolojik yönelimleri dolaylı olarak belirleyebileceği varsayılmıştır. Önerilen modelin veriye uygunluğu kabul edilebilir seviyede olsa da dolaylı etkilerin manidar olmayışı bu ilişkilerin varsayılan şekilde olmadığına işaret etmektedir.

Alanyazında şu ana kadar bu dünya görüşlerinin tamamını bir arada test eden bir çalışma bulunmasa da bu ilişkilerin alternatif biçimde nasıl kurulabileceğine ilişkin yaygınlık kazanmakta olan bir görüş mevcuttur. İkili Süreç Modeli bakış açısını yansıtan bu görüşten hareketle ikili sosyal dünya görüşlerinin belirleyici değişkenler olarak ele alındığı alternatif bir model oluşturulmuş ve bu modelin hem veriye uygunluk hem de test edilen ilişkilerin manidarlığı açısından bahsi geçen ilişkileri açıklamada önerilen modele kıyasla daha başarılı olduğuna karar verilmiştir.

Elde edilen bulgular İkili Süreç Modeli bakış açısı ile yorumlandığında hümanizm ve normativizm ile bireyselleştirici ve bağdaştırıcı ahlaki temellerin SKY ve SBE ile nitelendirilen ikili sürece dahil olabileceklerini söylemek mümkündür. Buna göre normativizm ve bağdaştırıcı ahlaki temeller SKY üzerinden açıklanan tehdit temelli süreçte, hümanizm ve bireyselleştirici ahlaki temeller ise SBE üzerinden açıklanan baskınlık temelli süreçte yer alacaklardır.

Model kapsamında ele alınan akış açıları dikkatle incelendiğinde, gelişimsel sürece sosyalleşme pratiklerine, bireylerin içinde yetiştikleri sosyokültürel bağlama ve bireysel deneyimlere verdikleri önem bağlamında büyük oranda ortaklaştıkları görülmektedir. Ancak şu ana kadar bu bakış açılarının tek bir model olarak bir araya

gelebileceğini ve bütüncül biçimde bireylerin ideolojik yönelimleri gibi kritik ve karmaşık bir kavramı açıklamada kullanılabileceklerini gösteren bir çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Dahası, bu model, düşük düzeyde organize olmuş duygu ve düşüncelerin daha somut yapılara dönüşmesi ve sonuç olarak ideolojik yönelimleri belirlemesi süreci olarak adlandırılabilecek ideo-afektif rezonans sürecini anlamak bağlamında da önem taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın hem politik psikoloji literatürü hem de dünya görüşü çalışmaları bağlamında literatürdeki önemli bir boşluğu giderdiği düşünülmektedir.

Appendix H: Tez İzin Formu

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname   : Sayılan

Adı / Name   : Gülden

Bölümü / Department : Psikoloji / Psychology

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English) : Worldviews and Ideological Orientation: An Integration Of Polarity Theory, Dual Process Model, and Moral Foundations Theory

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master   ☐   **Doktora /** PhD   ☒

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for   ☒
 access worldwide.

2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or

proprietary purposes for a period of two year. *

3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six

months.

* *Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu Kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.*
A copy of the Decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library
together with the printed thesis.

    Yazarın imzası / Signature   **Tarih** / Date