

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITION FROM THE HISTORICAL IDEALISM OF
THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT* INTO THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISM OF
THE *SCIENCE OF LOGIC*

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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITION FROM THE HISTORICAL IDEALISM OF THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT* TO THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISM OF THE *SCIENCE OF LOGIC*

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In this study, our aim is to show how Absolute Knowing completed the process of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*(1807) written by G.W.F. Hegel. In the second chapter of the study, the concept of the science of the experience of consciousness or the system of the experience of Spirit has been reconstructed in the light of some evaluations concerning the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the third and fourth chapters of the study an analysis of the final form of the experience of Spirit and a possibility the transition into the speculative philosophy (*Science of Logic*) through this last form has been discussed.

Keywords: Consciousness, Experience, Dialectic, Idealism, Absolute Knowing.

ÖZ

TİNİN GÖRÜNGÜBİLİMİ'NİN TARİHSEL İDEALİZMİNDEN MANTIK BİLİMİ'NİN SALTİK İDEALİZMİNE GEÇİŞ SORUNU

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Bu çalışmanın amacı, Saltık Bilgilenmenin Hegel'in *Tinin Görüngübilimi*'ndeki süreci nasıl tamamladığını göstermektir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, bilincin deneyiminin (ya da görgüleniminin) bilimi ya da Tinin deneyiminin (görgüleniminin) dizgesi kavramı *Tinin Görüngübilimi*'nin "giriş" bölümüne ilişkin çeşitli değerlendirmelerin ışığında yeniden kurulmuştur. Üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümlerde, Tinin görgüleniminin son biçiminin bir çözümlemesi ve bu son biçim yoluyla kurgusal felsefeye (*Mantık Bilimi*) geçişin bir olanaklılığı tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Bilinç, Deneyim, Eytişim, İdealizm, Saltık Bilme.



To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

WORKS BY HEGEL

PhdG : Phänomenologie des Geistes

PS : Phenomenology of Spirit

PM : Phenomenology of Mind

PN : Philosophy of Nature

LHP : Lectures on the History of Philosophy

LPR : Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

EL : Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part One, Logic

SL : Science of Logic

*Difference Essay : Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of
Philosophy*

WORKS BY HEIDEGGER

HCE : Hegel's Concept of Experience

BT : Being and Time

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is a well-known fact that with Descartes' principle of "Ego cogito" modern philosophy or philosophy of self-consciousness (or of subjectivity) and its grounding or founding of the thinking in self-consciousness or in the "I" begins. Kant and the German Idealists, firstly, developed the different and complex theories of subjectivity, which affected the neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism and also the transcendental phenomenology of the twentieth century, and whose friends or partisans and foes are present today. To be sure, from Kant and Hegel the original meanings of the traditional theories are subjected to change due to the various effects and interests.

Different waystations in the development of German Idealism always reflect the fundamental and original innovations of the philosophy of self-consciousness. The early Fichte improvises a theory of finite human consciousness (or spirit) in his *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge* (1794/95). This, he does according to Kant's theory of apperception in the transcendental deduction of the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason*- the doctrine of a finite self-consciousness at the horizon of an unknown Absolute. Later, Fichte tried to solve some of the problems related to the content and method of the *Doctrine of Science* in the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* (1797-1799). This new framework of the *Doctrine of Science* already universalized the *idealist*

history of self-consciousness. The young Schelling, then, attempted to fulfill this program in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) without knowing particularly the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*. Before everything, Schelling expanded, thereby, the theory of the "I" into the stages of the philosophy of nature and the aesthetics of genius in which the Absolute manifests itself aesthetically as the completion of the theory of transcendental subject. With Schelling, the development of transcendental philosophy was completed in the aesthetic idealism as the theory of subjectivity.

Hegel replied to these undertakings, before everything, on the one hand, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), which, as is well known, includes a new form of the *idealist history of consciousness*. Through "self-completing scepticism" or "throughgoing scepticism" upon the different stages of knowing the history of consciousness progresses into the speculative knowing of the Absolute. On the other hand, in the speculative logic or in the *Science of Logic*, the categories or pure concepts are a progressive exposition of the self-thinking thought (*noesis noeseos*). Contrary to this, the old Schelling takes place, metaphysically speaking, at the side of a position similar to his early idealism. Here, the Absolute cannot be adequately comprehended, but must reveal itself from itself as "*unvordenkliches Dasein*".* What is common to these idealist theories is that they fundamentally state or arrange a certain relationship between the subjectivity and the Absolute. However, this relationship is conceived differently in each one with regard to its content and system.

In the following study, the question which must be replied is with what meaning or sense must the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) be approached as the systematic introduction or propaedeutic into the speculative logic in the development of the idealist thought. Hegel himself later comprehended the meaning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* within this historical development while preparing a second edition of it. He wrote: “*das abstrakte Absolute*- herrschte damals” (“the abstract Absolute- then prevalent”)¹, and he, thus, made an allusion to the immediate and preparationless intellectual intuitive, “Absolute” as the “Absolute Indifference” in Schelling’s system of the Absolute Identity. Hegel tried to demonstrate as opposed to this that the knowing of the Absolute cannot be the immediate intuition; that it must be accomplished further as the speculative thinking through the sublation of the temporary forms of knowing. Thus the structure of the Absolute which is thought speculatively cannot be the simple or mere indifference, but it is the absolute, self-thinking thought.

The nineteenth century was determined through the readings or studyings on Hegel’s philosophy and especially his *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807 by the later idealists, by Feuerbach, Marx or Kierkegaard who developed the basic premises of a possible critique of Hegel. From Feuerbach’s and Marx’s views later H. Marcuse² and G. Lukacs³ started. The reaction to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the early twentieth century was usually given from a different viewpoint. J. Wahl reorganized the forms of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* from the stand-point of Unhappy Consciousness.⁴ A. Kojève in his effectual lectures on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* organized the entire *Phenomenology*

from the relation of Master and Slave.⁵ M. Heidegger in his winter semester lectures (1930/31) on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* attached this work to a specific conception of system in Hegel, which differs from the *Encyclopedia*-system; he interpreted the first chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with a cautious and careful accentuation of the perspectives of *Being and Time*. He, later on, commented upon the "Introduction" of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely, from his own metaphysical view-point; for his understanding this "Introduction" is the significant basic text for the entire *Phenomenology*, even significant for the whole metaphysics which has arrived at its end-phase.⁶

In the following phase, by virtue of the innumerable titles concerning the specific themes of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the various commentaries the detailed understanding and knowledge of the work is aimed at. In particular, J. Hyppolite gave special prominence to Hegel's own concrete insights and distinguished an existentialist self-appropriation from such interpreting, even if he, thereby, partially sympathized that kind of interpretation.⁷ W. Becker's short, concise commentary sees Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a continuation of the idealist theory of the "I".⁸ Werner Marx interprets Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the theory of the relations between the finite consciousness/self-consciousness and the absolute Subjectivity by means of the "Preface" and "Introduction" and also of the chapters on "Self-consciousness" and "Reason".⁹ Therefore, he accepts in principle, the metaphysico-historical arrangement of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* via Heidegger. H.F. Fulda investigates the structural and systematic problems of the conception and fulfillment of the *Phenomenology of*

Spirit in his discussions or confrontations with the older advises of interpretation.¹⁰ C.A. Scheier in his commentary insists upon the structural programme, the mutual connections of the different forms of consciousness in general and the dialectical movement of the thought.¹¹ Th. Haering discusses the problem of the necessity of the series of the consciousness-forms and claims that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* ends, in fact, with the chapter on “Reason”.¹² Particularly, J. Schwarz and H. Schmitz interpret the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the light of its developmental history within the context of Hegel’s Jena period.¹³ J. Stewart attempts to reconstruct the systematic structure of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* with respect to its formal unity.¹⁴ R. Pippin’s Kantian-Fichtean reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* regards the Spirit as an extension of the Kantian and Fichtean concept of a necessarily apperceptive consciousness into a search for the conceptual conditions of “otherness” in experience.¹⁵ R.K. Maurer reads the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a metaphysics of history or philosophy of history.¹⁶ W.H. Werkmeister approaches the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a development of Kant’s fundamental ontology.¹⁷ W. Maker finds in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* an immanent critique of metaphysics.¹⁸ R. Solomon presents us a pragmatist and existentialist Hegel¹⁹; and he also finds an attempt in the “Introduction”, the first three chapters and the first few pages of the section on “Reason” of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to rework and make consistent the key arguments in Kant’s “Transcendental Analytic” of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.²⁰

In few interpretations, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has been taken into consideration as the modification and renovation of the systematic programme of

an idealist history of consciousness; only W. Marx compares one time in detail the conceptions of Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*(1800) and of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*(1807).²¹ Also W. Bonsiepen points out that kind of an idea.²² In addition to this, E. Behler provides the historical origins of that kind of a programme.²³ G. Gretic interprets Absolute Knowing in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the completion of the history of self-consciousness.²⁴

In the following study, it will be demonstrated that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* must be interpreted in terms of the *idealist history of consciousness* or *Historical Idealism*. It will also be shown that Hegel was never a Kantian, a Fichtean, or a Schellingean in his new conception of consciousness and Science. The distinctive characteristic of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the discovery of the natural consciousness in it and through the historical development of it the establishment of the genuine, authentic philosophy or Absolute Idealism. In this study, we will confine ourselves to the "Introduction" and the final chapter, "Absolute Knowing", of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The biographical questions concerning the composition, logic, the history of the development of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will not be treated since this would require a study in itself. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* must establish itself *in and for itself*. This study will hold the view that Hegel himself realized the true beginning of philosophy.

END-NOTES

* *unvordenklich*: that principle prior to which thought cannot take place (the *Prius* of all thinking). See Paul Tillich, “Existential Philosophy”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol.5, 1944, p.48.

¹ *Phänomenologie des Geistes* ed. by J. Hoffmeister, 6th ed., p.578. Quoted in G. Gretic, *Das Problem des absoluten Wissens in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Diss. Köln, 1975.

² H. Marcuse, *Hegel's Ontology and Theory of Historicity and Reason and Revolution*.

³ G. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness and The Young Hegel*.

⁴ J. Wahl, “Extract from *The Unhappy Consciousness in the Philosophy of Hegel* (1929)”, in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, pp.284-310

⁵ A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*

⁶ M. Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel's Concept of Experience*

⁷ J. Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. By the way, J. Wahl, A. Kojève and J. Hyppolite tried to rediscover in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* the existentialist titles. However, by the fact that Hegel discovered a new conception of consciousness and Science or philosophy in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he was far away from the titles or subject-matters of his early Jena period. The French interpreters, therefore, overlooked the fact that such

bits of an existentialist matters were no more typical for the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For Hegel's Jena period, see W. Bonsiepen, *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften*

⁸ W. Becker, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Eine Interpretation*. He, in *Idealistische und Materialistische Dialektik*, regards the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as presenting a continuation of the steps of Descartes and Fichte with the self-reflective of the "I" and asserts that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* mixes up the theory of self-consciousness developed in virtue of Descartes and Fichte with the social intersubjectivity. It will be shown that the programme of a "history of the education of consciousness" in the "Introduction" starts from the experience of consciousness and strongly dissents from the "pragmatic history of human mind" of Fichte's *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (Foundations of the Entire Doctrine of Science)*. In point of fact, Becker does not consider the methodological ideas of the "Introduction" and, therefore, does not see that point. For the developmental (progressive) conception of consciousness in the "Introduction" would never permit the position of Fichte's abstract, formal idealist concept of the "I" as the basis.

⁹ W. Marx, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Das Selbstbewusstsein in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* and K.E. Kaehler/W. Marx, *Die Vernunft in Hegels Phänomenologie*.

¹⁰ H.F. Fulda, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*.

¹¹ C.A. Scheier, *Analytischer Kommentar zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

Die Architektonik des erscheinenden Wissens.

¹² Th. Haering, “Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Phänomenologie des Geistes”, in *Verhandlungen des dritten Hegelkongresses vom 19. Bis 23. April 1933 in Rom*.

Cf. O. Pöggeler, “Hegels Phänomenologie des Selbstbewusstseins”, in O. Pöggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p.269ff.; H.F. Fulda, “Zur Logik der Phänomenologie von 1807”, *Hegel-Studien Beiheft 3*, 1966, pp.75-101; Klaus

Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft*

15). The problem amongst the different approaches is that which *Logik* in the developmental history of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* is the most appropriate for its arrangement.

¹³ J. Schwarz, “Die Vorbereitung der Phänomenologie des Geistes in Hegels Jenenser Systementwürfen”, *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Kulturphilosophie*, vol.12, 1936, pp.127-159; H. Schmitz, “Die Vorbereitung von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes in seiner Jenenser Logik”, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*,

vol.14, 1960, pp.16-39.

¹⁴ J. Stewart, “The Architectonic of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol.55, 1993, pp.747-776.

¹⁵ R. Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*.

¹⁶ R.K. Maurer, *Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte*.

¹⁷ In *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*.

¹⁸ W. Maker, "Understanding Hegel Today", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol.19, 1981, p.345ff.

¹⁹ R. Solomon, *In The Spirit of Hegel*.

²⁰ In "Hegel's Epistemology", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol.2, 1974, pp.277-289.

²¹ W. Marx, "Aufgabe und Methode der Philosophie in Schellings System des transcendentalen Idealismus und in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes", in *Schelling: Geschichte, System, Freiheit*, pp.63-99.

²² W. Bonsiepen, *op. cit.*, pp.127-141.

²³ E. Behler, "Die Geschichte des Bewusstseins. Zur Vorgeschichte eines Hegelschen Themes", *Hegel-Studien*, 7, 1972, pp.169-216.

²⁴ G. Gretic, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER 2

PRE-CONCEPT OF A NEW SCIENCE

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with a familiar idea for a philosophy student. The introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents us the traditional epistemological programme. The main line of this program is generally a Kantian one. What is determinative in the Kantian conception of knowledge and what philosophy has to realize, is a critical examination of the faculties of knowledge. The idea is that before arriving at knowing (or cognition), in the sense that of “absolute knowing of what actually is”, first of all, we have to determine what can be known, what to regard as knowledge. Or, more strictly, we must define the limits or boundaries beyond which our knowledge could not go.

For Kant, the result that this examination or inquiry will reach is obvious: we can recognize or know the objects only to the extent that they appear to us, or, in other words, they can be known or recognized only as appearances, phenomena. What is the in-itself in them is a realm of being outside our faculty of knowledge. As the realm of this being-in-itself transcending that of appearance is a place independent of knowledge and a place our knowledge cannot arrive at, the task to be realized is to determine or draw the limits our faculty of knowing can reach. According to Kant, an inquiry into the truth (or reality) of our knowledge does not come before the inquiry which critically examines wherein our faculty of knowledge reaches. What is to be examined or investigated is the limits of our

faculty of knowledge, not the reality and the criterion (or standard) of knowledge. In this sense, Kant holds the view that knowledge differentiates itself from that which truly is or from the Absolute. In Kant, thus, knowledge is confined to the formal problem and is of a formal nature; the content, what is more, the truth, what actually is, put outside the relation of knowing.

The distinctions of knowledge and the Absolute and of knowledge and the truth in Kant constitute the basis of Hegel's criticism. Kant's problem was to show the difference between knowledge and the Absolute, knowledge and the truth, relying upon the critical examination of the faculties of knowledge. To Hegel, the job of philosophy is not an inquiry into the faculties of knowledge.¹

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel tries to demonstrate that knowledge (knowing or consciousness) arrives at Absolute Knowing at the end of a historical (dialectical) development. On the road to Absolute Knowing he attempts to overcome some presuppositions or ideas belonging to the "natural assumption" or "natural supposition" which form obstacles before knowing (esp. "real, actual knowing of what truly is"). In criticizing Kant and the Kantians in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel does not make any quotation from them; furthermore, he mentions, for instance, Kant's name in a few places in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The reason for this is that Hegel directs his criticism not only to Kant and the Kantians, but also in general to the conception of *knowing as such* which regards knowing (or knowledge) as an "instrument", "medium", or "method". In point of fact, Hegel concentrated his criticism to Kant because Kant

was so close to him from the standpoint of both the time he lived in and the problems he worked up, but he was not the only target of Hegel.²

Hegel in this sense offers a new science in that it will demonstrate the contradictory situation in finite knowing and in this respect render possible Absolute Knowing because Kant's project of the critical examination of our faculties of knowledge is futile in itself and the Kantian inquiry leads to the psychological explanations and the formal-abstract discussions or controversies. Thus, Hegel develops the *science of the experience of consciousness*, or the science (system) of the dialectical movement or development of the natural, ordinary consciousness. In the "Introduction" of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel justifies his new concept of science. In this part of our study, we will try to reconstruct Hegel's own arguments in the "Introduction" of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to comprehend his new conception of science in terms of the science (system) of the experience of consciousness. This new science (this introductory, preparatory science) is not concerned with the critical examination of our faculties of knowledge. In reconstructing the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the determinations of consciousness (natural, ordinary consciousness or phenomenal knowing), experience (dialectical movement or exposition, development), and science (system) must be clarified further in the light of the different intents to this part.

2.1 The Determination of the *Exposition of Phenomenal Knowing* or Natural Consciousness

Hegel begins the introductory part of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* with an *anxiety* included in a "natural assumption" belonging to knowing as such. This natural assumption is the conception of knowing of the Kantian philosophy. To this part he also begins with the critique of this assumption in order to overcome it. This is the critique of the definition of knowledge (or knowing) as "instrument", "medium", or in general "method". He writes: " It is a natural assumption that in philosophy, before we start to deal with its proper subject-matter, viz. the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded either as the instrument to get hold of the Absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it. A certain uneasiness seems justified, partly because there are different types of cognition, and one of them might be more appropriate than another for the attainment of this goal, so that we could make a bad choice of means; and partly because cognition is a faculty of a definite kind and scope, and thus without a more precise definition of its nature and limits, we might grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth"(PS,73/PM,131). Hegel refers to the idea of knowledge "as the instrument to get hold of the Absolute" or "as the medium" through which the Absolute is observed and defines that such thoughts or ideas naturally lead to a specific form of scepticism.³ If knowledge is an instrument, when it is applied to the subject-matter it will have changed the applied thing and in this situation it will not present us the subject-matter as it is in itself. In a similar fashion, if knowledge is a medium through which we can obtain the proper subject-matter,

again even in this way the proper fact could not be known as it is in itself, but only through this medium. It is easily defined that this type of scepticism is a Kantian one. To Kant, knowledge is possible only if experience can be organized by means of the forms of space and time and concepts in harmony. Pure forms of intuitions, viz. space and time, and the pure concepts of understanding, all of these are our contributions, or forms which we impose upon the subject-matter. Thus, we are not able to know the things-in-themselves, but in and through these forms, we are able to know things as they appear.

As regards with the explanations mentioned above, preliminarily and generally it can be said that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is an overwhelming of the Kantian scepticism, its destruction, and the demonstration of the possibility (or rather, necessity) of Absolute Knowing. Generally speaking, for Hegel philosophy (actual, true knowing) is knowledge of the Absolute, or "the actual knowing of what truly (actually) is."

The most important point Hegel criticizes in Kant is that Kant brings a limit into the knowing subject and differentiates the realms of knowledge and the in-itself. For Hegel, this type of scepticism proceeds in the light of some presuppositions; but, before accounting this, it is seen that this anxiety transforms itself into an assurance: "(...) the whole project of securing for consciousness through cognition what exists in itself is absurd, and (...) there is a boundary between cognition and the Absolute that completely separates them"(PS,73/PM,131).

At the end, the understanding of knowing as “instrument”, “medium”, or, in general terms, as “method” illustrates itself as a really absurd one.

The understanding of knowing as that which causes no alteration in the absolute Being determines itself as a trick: “(...) if the Absolute is supposed merely to be brought nearer to us through (...) instrument, without anything in its being altered, like a bird caught by a lime-twig, it would surely laugh our little ruse to scorn, if it were not with us, in and for itself, all along, and of its volition. For a ruse is just what cognition would be in such case, since it would, with its manifold exertions, be giving itself the air of doing something quite different from creating a merely immediate and therefore effortless relationship.”⁴ Here it should be noted that Hegel’s concept of Absolute Knowing is not at the side of *immediate knowing* of the Absolute. To catch a bird with trickery illustrates the concept of a knowledge of the Absolute, which uses an *instrument* that seemingly does not change its object. This approach seems to indicate a kind of the intuitive apprehension of the Absolute. This intuitive apprehension is purely passive and receptive and leaves the Absolute unchanged. But then, the real activity is that of the Absolute that allows itself to be caught. Such knowledge could not then be a development of consciousness towards the Absolute, and is close to accepting that it is the Absolute itself which makes itself known, for, otherwise, the trickery of knowledge could not work. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* exhibits, instead of the direct revelations of the divine or of the sound common sense that has never brought itself up, the long development of consciousness towards Absolute

Knowing or *genuine philosophy*, a process as rich as it is profound, and through which Spirit achieves knowledge.

Knowing as “instrument”, as “medium” or as “method” is for Hegel is the result of the *fear of falling into error*. Hegel regards this attitude in philosophy as a *standstill*. This fear of falling into error feeds a feeling of the mistrust to Science actually knowing. But the essence of this fear relies upon that which is in need of the examination to see whether it is or not. That is to say, “it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an *instrument* and as a *medium*, and assumes that there is a *difference between ourselves and this knowing*”(PS,74/PM,133). Knowing as such or in general presupposes the distinction between the Absolute and knowing, irrespective and separated from the Absolute. Furthermore, this view presupposes that knowing separated from the Absolute or the in-and-for-itself is also separated from the truth, but assumes itself as true. However, it is seen that the truth of the fear of falling into error is the fear of the truth.

The presuppositions upon which the above ideas or representations are relying are that “the Absolute alone is true, or the truth alone is absolute”⁵ (PS,75/PM,133). This attitude, or knowing as such, states that it is not able to conceive the knowledge of the Absolute and it claims to know other kinds of truths. This kind of an understanding posits “other kinds of truth” against an absolute truth or the view that “the Absolute alone is true or the truth alone is absolute”. However, a distinction between an absolute truth and other kinds of truth includes an obscurity in itself. For the “Absolute”, “knowledge”, “truth”, etc.

are the concepts or terms that are to be attained, and this attitude presupposes the meanings of these concepts or terms.

Knowing as such or in general shows itself “an empty phenomenon of knowing”. Knowing as “instrument” or “medium” or, generally speaking, knowledge as “method” leads to the representation or idea of knowing which separates itself from the Absolute and from which the Absolute is separated. What can be done to begin with, instead of knowing as such? These different conceptions or ideas of knowing do not concern us. Thus, they can be seen as the presuppositions, which create a mistrust of Science or the incapacity of Science. Thus, these ideas or representations or presuppositions could be regarded as “adventitious and arbitrary” ideas or representations; and “the words associated with them like ‘absolute’, ‘cognition’, ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’, and countless others whose meaning is assumed to be generally familiar, could even be regarded as so much deception”(PS,76/PM,134). In this situation, against these representations and forms of expression which attempt to hinder Science itself, against this empty phenomenon of knowing, Science posits itself immediately. But this immediate existence of Science is a phenomenon. In this its own immediate existence the Science is not yet the developed and presented or exposed Science or truth.

The discussion up to this point can be summarized in the following way: at one side of the discussion stands knowing as such or in general. That kind of knowing holds the view that although the absolute truth cannot be known, other kinds of truth are knowable. However, this approach relies upon a presupposition:

that the Absolute alone is true, or the truth alone is absolute. The understanding which relies upon this presupposition determines itself as an empty phenomenon of knowing. On the other side of the discussion as opposed to the view that prevents Science, there is the view that Science brings itself forward or comes into the being. But the being of Science is yet still its own appearance. Therefore, the problem for Science is to free itself from this appearance. How could this freedom be realized? This can be realized only by turning against the appearance. Science cannot disregard an untrue knowing as a usual way of knowing of the things, while putting forward itself as an authentic way of knowing for which this usual way of knowing does not have any value. If Science declares its power to dwell in its being, the usual way of knowing can consult to the fact that its power lies in its being; so it can be seen clearly that “one bare assurance is worth just as much as another”(PS,76/PM,135). The next step that Hegel takes is to determine or announce his conception of the phenomenology of consciousness. To Hegel’s analysis, Science cannot also consult to the better intuitions in the untrue knowing, to the better intuitions which will direct Science.⁶ For one thing in this position it would be applying to the mere being, or immediate existence, and, for another, it would be applying to itself and in fact to itself in the form which dwells in the untrue knowing or to the bad form of its existence, namely, to its appearance, but not to what it is in and for itself. Now what is in front of us is phenomenal or appearing knowing. Hence, Hegel declares the program: “It is for this reason that an exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance will here be undertaken” [“*Aus diesem Grunde soll hier die Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens vorgenommen werden*”] (PS,76/PM,135/PhdG,72).

Now, Hegel determines the object of the presentation or exposition as phenomenal knowing. The subject of this knowing is natural consciousness. The problem for natural consciousness is to elevate itself into the level of true knowing. The presentation of phenomenal knowing or natural consciousness is, thus, the development of it into its true existence, absolutely true knowing. At that point Hegel models the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the image of Christ's Passion and Resurrection, the final point of which is the crucifixion of finite, phenomenal knowing, the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit or Soul. The presentation of phenomenal knowing or the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is, therefore, determined as the road of the Soul which traverses through the waystations of its own forms. On this road, the Soul purifies itself for the infinite life of the Spirit and tries to complete its own experience and tries to gain the self-consciousness of its actual, true existence.⁷

2.2 The Determination of *Experience* (or *Dialectical Movement*)

“Natural consciousness” sees itself directly or immediately as the true knowledge; but it will begin to doubt this view at the stage of “perception-consciousness” and it does not know up to where this doubt can reach. The phenomenological development it will realize will demonstrate to itself that knowledge which it has is not true knowledge. “Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the Concept of knowledge, or in other words, not to be real knowledge”(PS78/PM135), says Hegel. To be sure, natural consciousness itself is not aware of what it will show. Contrary to this, natural consciousness has the

knowledge which it thinks of as real and it is certain of it. For natural consciousness, phenomenal knowing is the truest and the most authentic knowing.

In this context, Hegel holds the view that natural consciousness is full of illusions and that these illusions originate from the “immediacy” and abstractness of the knowledge that it has. The loss of natural consciousness’ own immediacy and its gaining of concreteness are the loss of its own self, namely, the loss of its illusions. For Hegel, this is the realization or actualization of natural consciousness and this realization or objectification or externalization will open the pathway which will form the reality in it. This is the “realization of the Concept”. “But since it directly takes itself to be real knowledge, this path has a negative significance for it, and what is in fact the realization of the Concept, counts for it rather as the loss of its own self”(PS78/PM135). The “realization of the Concept” is the liberation of natural consciousness from its immediate appearance, or the appearance of the simple Concept and the discovery of its own self, its own truth.

Before phenomenal knowing or natural consciousness has comprehended its unreality, the pathway in question must signify for it the loss of its own self; in other words, on the road to grasp the truth, there is the loss of its own self and this loss for consciousness “can therefore be regarded as the pathway of *doubt*, or more precisely as the way of despair”(PS78/PM135). Hegel calls this doubt of the loss of its own self “thoroughgoing scepticism”(sich vollbringende Skeptizismus) and distinguishes it from the scepticism which up to then prevailed in the European thought. This thoroughgoing scepticism is neither the methodological

doubt in the Cartesian sense nor the scepticism in the agnosticism of Kant: “Therefore this thoroughgoing scepticism is ... not the scepticism with which an earnest zeal for truth and Science fancies it has prepared and equipped itself in their service: the *resolve*, in Science, not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, upon mere authority, but to examine everything for oneself and follow only one’s own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself, and accept only one’s own deed as what is true”(PS78/PM136). Here the problem is that how this thoroughgoing scepticism moves or affects natural consciousness. It is known that natural consciousness regards itself as *real knowledge*; thus, in this sense, for natural consciousness there must be no problem viz. “doubt” or “despair”. That is to say, natural consciousness does not doubt. “Doubt” or “despair” is the result of the loss of natural consciousness’ own immediacy or the realization of the Concept.

How does this “thoroughgoing scepticism,” which will free natural consciousness from its simple, immediate knowing, fulfill this? What is more, how does natural consciousness transcend its immediate state? How will natural consciousness follow the necessity of the exposition, development and progression? Heidegger’s interpretation of this passage is in the following way:

“From the view point of the science of phenomenal knowledge, the road of the presentation is for natural consciousness the road of despair, though natural consciousness does not know it. But natural consciousness itself never despairs. Doubt that leads into despair is the business of the presentation, that is, of absolute knowledge. But even the presentation does not on this road despair of itself- it

despairs of natural consciousness, because this consciousness never wants to realize what it constantly *is*- the mere concept of knowledge- and yet never ceases to arrogate to itself the truth of knowledge and to pretend being the sole standard of knowledge. The more completely the presentation follows the road of despair, the sooner science completes its own appearance”(HCE,65). Here Heidegger’s interpretation that “doubt” or “despair” is the problem of the exposition or presentation does not explain how natural consciousness will fit to this exposition. For this exposition or presentation itself or the pathway itself is not a subject but the subject-matter or the process of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Of course, at the beginning of the process, natural consciousness does not fall into doubt in the sense of despair. But in the course of the process of knowing, consciousness gains an insight into the untruth of its knowledge. Neither doubt nor despair makes the beginning. The form of the perceptual consciousness is the first example of this state of doubt or despair. Heidegger does not take into account the term “realization” in his study. What is the realization of the Concept of knowledge in the structure of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? The realization is *experience*. For that reason the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not a study of the foundations of knowledge, but it examines the reality or truth of knowledge. Heidegger reads the presentation or exposition as Absolute Knowing.⁸ If neither natural consciousness nor Absolute Knowing doubts or despairs, then what or who despairs or doubts? Phenomenal knowing or phenomenal consciousness is the untrue knowing or untrue consciousness. The moment at which doubt or despair begins is the moment at which the true knowledge of natural consciousness begins to dissolve.

Absolute Knowing in this sense is not this “thoroughgoing scepticism”, but the completed and sublated scepticism and despair.

While differentiating his own conception of scepticism, i.e., “thoroughgoing scepticism”, from others, Hegel adds also another concept which will complete his own understanding of scepticism: the concept of “determinate negation”.

The “determinate negation” is at the same time closely related to the method of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; on the road of the presentation, the transition of consciousness from one shape into an other is accomplished by means of the contribution of the determinate negation. This exhibits at the same time why it is “determinate”.

The “determinate negation” is the simplicity and certainty in the shapes of consciousness and a certain, determinate knowledge is the form of a certain, determinate consciousness. That is, it is determinate form of consciousness. In contrast to the abstract scepticism, the “determinate negation” negates the “determinate” form of appearance in every consciousness and negates the truth-form which corresponds to this form. The determinacy comes to it from this characteristic.

The negation of all these determinate forms in a developmental becoming presents a determinate process, a totality of the forms of consciousness, the negated totality of all these forms. Now this totality itself, which the determinate negation constitutes from the forms of consciousness, the totality of the forms

bound to each other, forms Hegel's conception of the phenomenology of consciousness. The expressions "thoroughgoing scepticism" and "determinate negation" are those which set up the connection of every form or stage in the whole. For Hegel, "the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss"(PS,79/PM,137).⁹

The abstract scepticism Hegel criticized is the negation or scepticism which does not direct itself into the stages of consciousness in its process of knowing. What is important here is that the scepticism or negation is not abstraction; otherwise, the scepticism or negation itself becomes the purpose. However, for Hegel these conceptions, "thoroughgoing scepticism" and "determinate negation", are the moving-forces in the exposition (presentation) of phenomenal knowing, in the adventure of natural consciousness pressing itself forward to the only true knowledge.

Hegel's own scepticism or negation gains its essential functions in the concrete developmental (progressive) stages of consciousness; they are not abstract concepts for themselves outside of consciousness. The scepticism and negation as abstractions for themselves outside of consciousness are the attitudes which do not grasp the phenomenological development, progression of consciousness. "This is just the scepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which *it results*"(PS,79/PM,137). For Hegel, the

scepticism or the negation which only sees the pure nothingness in the result cannot reach in any conclusion. But Hegel's own view is that the "nothingness" or the negation has a content in itself: "For it is only when it is taken as the result of that from which it emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a *determinate* nothingness, one which has a *content*"(PS,79/PM,137).

The nothingness Hegel mentioned is that which emerges from the negation of the knowledge in a determinate form of consciousness. That means, this nothingness is not that which aims at the "pure nothingness"; contrary to this, it is "nothingness" in the sense of the negation of a determinate form of consciousness. For this reason, it is also positive and has a determinate content in itself.

The certainty of natural consciousness, which includes the negativity, and the positivity of the pathway which natural consciousness will take in the process of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are the same planes. According to Hegel, what natural consciousness defends is a negativity, but the pathway of it the positivity: "The necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness will by itself bring to pass the *completion* of the series. To make this more intelligible, it may be remarked, in a preliminary and general way, that the exposition of the untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely *negative* procedure"(PS,79/PM,137). Together with this Hegel emphasizes that the negative evaluation of this road, this one-sidedness is peculiar to the natural consciousness: "The natural consciousness itself normally takes this one-sided view of it"(PS,79/PM,137). For Hegel, not to see the positivity of the pathway is a one-sided view, or the poverty of the view (comprehension). However, a form of

consciousness or knowing which will develop itself into its true essence, will take its departure-point from this one-sided view: “and a knowledge which makes this one-sidedness its very essence is itself one of the patterns of incomplete consciousness which occurs on the road itself, and will manifest itself in due course”(PS,79/PM,137).

So far Hegel determines the road of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a series of the forms of consciousness and their development. Every new consciousness appears at the result of the sublation of a previous consciousness by negation. What is the *goal* of this process? It is the full, completed correspondence of the Concept and the object, knowing and the truth. As regards with the determination of this goal, Hegel writes: “But the *goal* is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Concept corresponds to object and object to Concept”(PS,80/PM,137-8). In which knowledge is the goal evident? The goal itself can be understood only in so far as the incessant developing knowledge of consciousness is looked for its correspondence to the object in every stage. At every stage consciousness looks for the object which will correspond to its Concept, or knowledge, and performs this in a certain extent. But consciousness in every situation is confronted with an object not corresponding to its Concept. Now, the “thoroughgoing scepticism” of consciousness will at the same time bring into the unsatisfactory research of it. But this research or progress is not without a direction; but it is a course which develops itself in every stage and that which progresses by means of the new

unsatisfactoriness of every development, and that which has a certain goal. Consciousness' being aware of the certain goal brings itself into light only in the development of its long-term experience during which the Concept and the object, knowledge and the truth, develop as *contents*. For the objectivity corresponding to the Concept, which is attained in every stage, (or the conceptuality corresponding to the object) must be an end. The development of the contents of the Concept and the object must end up with a point. This is carried out only at the point where the Concept completely corresponds to the object and *vice versa*, without leaving anything outside of themselves. "Hence the progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations on the way. Whatever is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond its *immediate existence*; but it is driven beyond it by something else, and this uprooting entails its death"(PS,80/PM138). Here Hegel does not expressly state what this "something else," which will move the natural life, is. But the moving-force of the natural consciousness, which at the same time prepares the ground of its death, is the "realization of the Concept".

The death of the naturalness in consciousness is the beginning of the uneasiness which is subject to the contradiction in consciousness; in other words, the death of the natural consciousness, to the extent that it includes an end, forms the beginning of the uneasiness which will develop itself into the goal and which will provide the movement of the Concept.

The transition of the natural consciousness from the certainty as truth into the uneasiness as consciousness, its doubt on this certainty shows its becoming of

the Concept for itself. Consciousness itself now begins to be the Concept. To be the Concept is to see or be aware of the being of other forms and the truth outside of consciousness' own truth and to fall into doubting itself. This beginning is that which kills the one-sided and finite, limited natural consciousness: "Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Concept of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits and since these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself. With the positing of a single particular the beyond is also established for consciousness"(PS,80/PM,138).

Now consciousness discerns for itself the beyond of its limits; in this sense what is under consideration for consciousness is the uneasiness or anxiety in the sense of falling into the contradiction. Consciousness ceases to be natural consciousness and grasps its limitedness by transcending it. With this consciousness comprehends its own development, progression; for consciousness has now understood what its limitedness is. The comprehension of consciousness' own limitedness, its own place requires at the same time its own violence (necessary violence) "at its own hands"; for the doubt and anxiety which recognize its own limitedness take the place of the intent which illustrates itself in natural consciousness immediately the true, real knowledge.¹⁰

In this sense the source of the violence is the comprehension of consciousness' own limitedness. What is important here in the determination of the relation between the violence and the fear or anxiety is that by means of the comprehension of its own limitedness, for consciousness, not the fear or anxiety but rather the violence arises. Consciousness' fear or anxiety comes after its own

necessary violence against itself. As Hegel mentioned, this its anxiety arises “when consciousness feels this violence”(PS,80/PM,138). Consciousness fears because it intuits that it enters into a process in which it will corrupt itself and it sees that in this process it will completely lose itself. To be sure, for Hegel the incessant uneasiness of the fear in question is the source of the development of consciousness. “But it can find no peace. If it wishes to remain in a state of unthinking inertia, then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs its inertia”(PS,80/PM,138). The uneasiness of the fear is renovated continuously by which consciousness comprehends at every stage the road in front of itself being full of the contradictions. Every development creates the fear of a new development. In this sense the anxiety which consciousness has in itself can be thought of a force which brings consciousness into a level at which consciousness will completely change. Hegel insists upon the fact that the anxiety (fear) cannot remain in any form of consciousness: “Or, if it entrenches itself in sentimentality, which assures us that it finds everything to be *good in its kind*, then this assurance likewise suffers violence at the hands of Reason, for, precisely in so far as something is merely a kind, Reason finds it *not* to be good”(PS,80/PM,138).

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* each stage of consciousness expresses a relation. This relation is between consciousness’ knowledge and the object, and in each form of consciousness it leads to the having-been-known of an unknown in-itself (or truth). This “in-itself” outside of the relation of knowing is an objective

essence independent of every kind of subjective judgements. What will be known in the process is this objective essence.

The objectivity of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is constituted by the comprehension of this “in-itself”; for the “in-itself” is the truth-criterion (or standard) of consciousness. The method which will carry out the inquiry will be immanent or intrinsic to the subject of the inquiry.

Hegel calls knowing (*Wissen*) and truth (*Wahrheit*) as the abstract determinations of consciousness. For the time being, for Hegel, these are abstract determinations since what is included in these determinations has no further interest for him. These determinations are identical to each other at the beginning of and at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. But with this it is not meant that from the view-point of consciousness the beginning and the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are the same, because at the beginning consciousness does not recognize the identity of these two abstract determinations in itself: it is not a consciousness of this. That is why consciousness progresses by more recognizing itself in each form in the development of its phenomenological forms.

Consciousness frees itself from its unconscious state which it has at the beginning. It accomplishes this by differentiating progressively the identity of the determinations of knowing and the truth. For Hegel will try to demonstrate in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that, first of all, consciousness will dissolve the identity in itself and, then, will arrive at a further form of the identity; but this further form of the identity will be reached as consciousness’ awareness of its own development.

The first step to be taken on this road is to fulfill partially the having-been-known of the identity which is present in consciousness itself, but it is not recognized. Each form of consciousness performs this having-been-known according to its own. Consciousness makes this “having-been-known” last until it will arrive at Absolute Knowing. That is to say, in its every new form of development consciousness will make for itself the part of the immanent truth in itself by knowing it more and more and at the end there will be no “in-itself” which is not known. This is also a re-constitution of the identity of knowing and the truth; but this time, consciousness will recognize whence and how this identity has been formed.

We have to follow more closely this process of knowing. How does consciousness make the beginning? How does consciousness obtain its first knowledge? Consciousness’ first knowledge, which implicitly has in itself and will dissolve this identity of knowing and the truth that it is not aware of, includes for Hegel an activity of “distinguishing”: “Consciousness simultaneously *distinguishes* itself from something, and at the same time *relates* itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists *for* consciousness”¹¹(*PS,82/PM,139*). What Hegel mentions here as “something” is that which consciousness *distinguishes from itself*. This is that which *is for consciousness*. That consciousness shows what kind of a relation (or connection) it will set up with something which it has distinguished and “the determinate aspect of this *relating*, or of the *being* of something for a consciousness, is *knowing*”(PS,82/PM,139). Here there is a threefold thought which constitutes in itself a unity: (i) “distinguishing-activity”

of consciousness; (ii) “relating-activity” of consciousness; (iii) the activity of knowing.

What is important for Hegel is to comprehend the first two activities of consciousness as a whole. “Distinguishing-“ and “relating-activities” are not independent from each other, but they are rather those which include each other. At the end of this activity an element which has been known and has become knowledge comes on the scene.

Something from which consciousness distinguishes itself is that consciousness has in its entirety. Consciousness as the identity of knowing and the truth, first of all, distinguishes the object from itself and with this “distinguishing-activity,” an “in-itself” or the truth outside of knowing appears. But this something as the “in-itself” does not lose its relation to consciousness; contrary to this, consciousness establishes the relation to this “in-itself” which it has distinguished from itself. The relation of the “in-itself” or truth to consciousness is not that activity or desire which springs from the object, because this relation is determined through and in consciousness.¹²

Consciousness does not only determine its relation to the object, but it also determines what the object itself is. That which is *not* knowledge and is outside of knowing is *being-in-itself*. This being (*seiend*) is that which consciousness determines for itself and is again *being-for-consciousness*.

The most important point here is that how and where the thing that consciousness distinguishes as being-in-itself (*seiend*) begins to be knowledge.

This something as being is not knowledge before consciousness' "distinguishing-" and "relating-activities"; for consciousness did not make it an object for itself; it is only a determination present in the identity of consciousness.

Hegel thinks that consciousness has to untie this identity in itself. Consciousness must show what is implicit in itself by breaking it off its identity; and only after that, consciousness can start its dialectical development in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Now, the dissolution of this identity forms the *genesis of knowledge*; this is necessary for the process of knowing of consciousness. For consciousness has knowledge in itself through the state of identity but it is not aware of its being, and that is why it is natural consciousness. The problem here is that consciousness must recognize the determinate aspect in its own totality. This recognition provides at the same time that the process of knowing is determined in a certain relation. This "determinate aspect" (*bestimmte Seite*) determined by consciousness itself becomes its recognized aspect and this is the very concept of knowledge.

The totality of the activities which is constituted by "distinguishing-" and "relating-activities" and is necessary in the genesis and determination of knowledge is a movement taking place merely in consciousness itself. In other words, to Hegel, consciousness' distinguishing something from itself and this something itself are the aspects which consciousness has intrinsically in itself. For that reason, in the determination of consciousness there can be no effect or contribution outside of consciousness and from the outer conditions. Consciousness is an identity in-itself even though it is, firstly, an abstract identity

and the object or something which is present in this identity is that which is peculiar to consciousness itself and that which is irrespective of every kind of outer determinations. The illustration and determination of this object means that this is an immanent activity being peculiar to consciousness itself.

For Hegel, knowledge requires an analytical distinction and this distinction is that which originates from consciousness. Consciousness itself again determines its determinations, knowledge and the truth. That is why there is no need for us to put a criterion or whatever else from without. “The essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that these two moments ‘Concept’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-other’ and ‘being-in-itself’ (or ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’-e.a.k.), both fall *within* that knowledge (or consciousness-e.a.k.) which we are investigating. Consequently, we do not need to import criteria, or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the *matter in hand* as it is *in and for itself*”(PS,84/PM,141). Hegel takes one step further. Now consciousness is not only that which determines its own criterion from itself or from within but also that which compares itself with itself. “But not only is a contribution by us superfluous, since Concept and object, the criterion and what is to be tested, are present in consciousness itself, but we are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and really *testing* them, so that, since what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is simply to look on”¹³(PS,85/PM,141). Consciousness’ examination points out a movement in its own self; the relationships in and for consciousness of knowledge and the truth

include at the same time the progression by examination which has a moving role in the process of consciousness which tries to arrive at the only true knowing. In point of fact, the movement of consciousness is determined through the actuality which it has gained in the examination.¹⁴ Our undertakings of the examination being peculiar to ourselves are unnecessary efforts from the standpoint of the examination which consciousness will carry out from within itself. Consciousness *performs* or provides the requisite examination for its movement from within itself. In this sense, that “all that is left for us to do is simply to look on”, as Hegel tried to demonstrate, is a conclusion derived from consciousness itself. “For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are *for* the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not”(PS,85/PM,141).¹⁵

The important point here is what Hegel means with the phrases “consciousness of the object” and “consciousness of itself”. What is meant here by the “object” is that which is *in-itself*. What is meant or expressed by the “consciousness of the object” is neither the world of phenomena in the sense of material world nor in the sense of knowledge. It is the object which is not determined by an other and is being-in-itself and the moment of truth in consciousness. What Hegel means by the “consciousness of itself” is not that of the truth (in-itself) but that of its knowledge of the truth (in-itself). This

knowledge is essentially knowledge related to the object as truth, in-itself. That is to say, it is knowledge, the source of which is the truth-in-itself. But it is knowledge, which is not truth or in-itself.

At first sight there seems to be a contradiction; it can be investigated that consciousness' knowledge of the object (the seeming aspect of the object for consciousness) and knowledge related to the object as truth, in-itself, are the same thing. If Hegel's deductions concerning consciousness are kept in mind, this is not a contradiction. For the object here as truth, in-itself, is not the appearing material object, but a determination of consciousness; it is determined and produced in and through consciousness. In relation to this, the appearing aspect of the object for consciousness is also determined by consciousness itself. In this sense the truth includes being a determination of consciousness but not that of the realm of phenomena; and consciousness' knowledge of it is *merely a knowledge*, "mere knowledge", but not true knowledge.

Therefore, for Hegel, consciousness is both consciousness of the true, being-in-itself, and consciousness of the being-for-another. These determinations are not determined from without, nor are they posited by the philosophers; they are determined and posited in and through consciousness itself.

Before proceeding its development in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, consciousness has immanently or intrinsically in itself these determinations, knowledge and the truth; on the one hand, knowledge for it and, on the other hand, the "in-itself" in the sense of truth. What is fundamental and determinative here is not only the comparison of these determinations in consciousness, but

rather they are peculiar to consciousness and form the very conception of consciousness. The most important difference between Hegel's and Kant's concepts of consciousness lies in the fact that for Hegel the truth, in-itself is not outside of consciousness, but it is in consciousness and peculiar to it; however, for Kant, the in-itself is independent of consciousness and is outside of consciousness. Hegel's observation concerning this difference is that: "The object, it is true, seems only to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is *in itself*, and hence, too, cannot test its own knowledge by that standard. But the distinction between the *in-itself* and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is *for it* the *in-itself*; and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is, *for it*, another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination rests"(PS,85/PM,141-2).

Being peculiar to consciousness and the mere comparison in consciousness which are the determinative elements in Hegel's concept of consciousness are the same positions. What is meant by the conception of "being peculiar to consciousness" is that both moments, the in-itself and *for consciousness* (or *for another*), whether they are grasped or not in consciousness, are the immanent, intrinsic characteristics, determinations in consciousness' own self. The object is peculiar to consciousness and is not outside of it. The duality formed by this disunion of the object which consciousness is not, firstly, aware of, takes place on this ground. This double conception of the object in consciousness renders

possible again the examination of them in consciousness and the standard or criterion which will be formed by this examination. What is meant by the conception of “comparison in consciousness” is that the determinations of knowledge and the truth, in-itself examine themselves in consciousness. This is also what Hegel means by saying that “since both are *for* the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison”(PS,85/PM,141). By means of *being-for-consciousness* both determinations are compared and examined with each other. In this examination “it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to object or not”(PS,85/PM,141). For Hegel, consciousness means the examination or includes the examination. The examined determinations are not outside of consciousness; but rather they are peculiar to consciousness: (i) the “in-itself”; (ii) knowledge or being of the object for consciousness. For Hegel, the examination of knowledge and the truth, in-itself and the truth-criterion that will emerge from this examination are determined by consciousness and occur in consciousness.

Hegel puts the in-itself which he regards as the truth outside of the relation of consciousness into knowledge. At that point the object-in-itself is in indeterminacy. But this indeterminacy of the being-in-itself is not that which will remain without change. In the general meaning of the term this indeterminacy is the initial position of the *in-itself*; this is at the same time the initial position of consciousness and what is indeterminate enters into the process of determination step by step and proceeds. This progression begins, first of all, with consciousness’ differentiation of knowing from truth: “the distinction between the

in-itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is *for it* the *in-itself*, and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is, for it, another moment”(PS,85/PM141-2).

It must be understood that this is the elevation of the *being-in-itself* by consciousness itself into the level of awareness. To be conscious or aware of something means to obtain knowledge of it. When determining above that in knowing an object at all consciousness signifies a distinction, Hegel also makes clear a situation, which happens together with the relation of knowing, namely, the distinction between knowledge and the truth. For that reason, the truth, in-itself determines itself for consciousness through the relation of knowing. However, Hegel had determined the truth in-itself independent of consciousness' relation of knowing before, that is, “we distinguish this being-for-another from *being-in-itself*, whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside of this relationship”(PS,82/PM,139).

Here it seems that there are two contradictions. Concerning the first contradiction, firstly, Hegel puts the in-itself in consciousness outside of the relation of knowing being peculiar to consciousness. He states that consciousness makes a distinction while knowing something and that with this distinction it attains the awareness of the moment of the truth outside of the moment of knowing. Since making a distinction between knowledge and the truth in-itself and the illustration of the being of the in-itself which is indeterminate has, in fact, a character of knowledge, this being-in-itself or the truth becomes for

consciousness, i.e., it becomes that which has been known. Thus, what matters for consciousness is, on the one hand, knowledge of the object and, on the other hand, knowledge of the being-in-itself of its own object.

Concerning the second contradiction, the truth in-itself, which is in consciousness but is not knowledge, is continuously transformed into knowledge in the distinction of knowledge and the truth, which is determined and posited by consciousness itself. In this transformation the “in-itself” seems to contradict with consciousness’ determination independent from the relation of knowing.

For this contradiction and its removal it should be kept in mind that knowledge being for consciousness and the truth which is not knowledge are compared with each other again in consciousness. Of course, their comparison with each other is by degrees in the development of consciousness; until consciousness elevates its knowledge into the truth, until consciousness makes its knowledge the truth, there will always be an “in-itself- outside of this comparison with each other or outside of knowledge.

The in-itself, which Hegel has pointed out before when he stated the in-itself and knowledge for consciousness in the sentence “since both are *for* the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison”(PS,85/PM141), is now that which has entered into the field of knowledge and that which has become the *theme* of knowledge for knowledge. With regard to the “thematized” in-itself or the “in-itself” which has become known, L.B. Puntel says that in the knowledge of consciousness concerning the object both moments, the in-itself and being-for-another, are present as a fact. Since both are in knowledge, so is the in-

itself as such, because it is for consciousness an in-itself. The being-for-consciousness of the in-itself is, if another term as different from Hegel's own is used, the "direct" or "thematic" knowledge of consciousness about the in-itself: on the level of this direct or thematic knowledge is there the differentiation of the being-for-another and the being-in-itself, so that on this level the in-itself can be understood as that which remains outside of the relation.¹⁶

Later on, Hegel insists upon the fact that if knowledge does not correspond to its object, it must be altered: "If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object"(PS,85/PM,142). The object is the valid element in the examination carried out for the criterion of the truth. But this object is not an independent object which subsists in the material essence. In a certain sense, this object is an independent one, the object in-itself; its distinctive characteristic from the object which contains the material essence is that it relies upon an "in-itselfness" determined by consciousness itself. The knowledge to be altered is also knowledge of this object independent of which is, in fact, posited by consciousness. Hegel continues his explanation: "But, in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge"(PS,85/PM,142). The object must change in consciousness. The reason of this necessity is the relation of the object into its own knowledge and the object, in-itself in this

relation is that which is elevated into consciousness through its mediation with knowledge.

Consciousness' being aware of the object, the in-itself means that the object has become a *theme*. The thematization is subject and peculiar to the knowledge itself, and each alteration of the knowledge shows that a new object has been elevated into consciousness. Hegel clearly expounds that this movement does not spring from the object itself, but from the knowledge related to the object: "as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it *essentially* belonged to this knowledge".

Consciousness departs from the knowledge of the object and it realizes this without taking into consideration the in-itself, the object; but this departure spontaneously requires a distinction: to speak of the object means, at the same time, to show its being. Thus, the distinction has occurred in consciousness itself. It is known that in order to examine the reality of its knowledge consciousness compares the knowledge and the object. However, at the beginning, the object or in-itself in question has not been determined; yet consciousness has not still recognized it and has not adopted a criterion from without. In fact, when it is known, the object is taken away from its "in-itselfness", and it is *thematized*: "Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the *in-itself* is not an *in-itself*, or that it was only an in-itself for *consciousness*. Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its object, the object itself does not stand the test; in other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that for which it was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test;

and the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion of what knowing is”(PS,85/PM,142).

Later, consciousness directs itself into a new “in-itself”, new object, criterion which has not yet been known and thematized. The process of the having-been-known of the new object will also be repeated through the same activity or movement of consciousness.

2.3 The Determination of the *Scientific* Aspect of the Exposition: New Object and *Necessity*

Hegel explains consciousness’ knowledge of the object through a distinction in consciousness. This distinction at the same time constitutes the basis of Hegel’s concept of experience. Experience (*Erfahrung*) is the transcendence of the distinction in the first determination which begins in consciousness as the distinction of knowledge and the object, knowledge and the in-itself, truth. In this context, the concept of experience has no relation with the perception of the sense-data. The object in the distinction of the knowledge and the object is that which is present merely in consciousness and is formed through the activity of knowing. That is why experience departs from the relation which consciousness fulfills in itself. Experience is a movement or becoming which is performed in consciousness by means of the dialectic of the knowing and the object: “*Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience [Erfahrung]*”(PS,86/PM,142).

The most important determination in Hegel's definition of experience is that it includes a dialectical movement. But in this definition it is seen that the mere dialectical movement is not sufficient. From this movement the new true object must appear. This means a new criterion, a new "in-itself", truth. The criterion does not stand the test in the dialectical movement of consciousness. For Hegel *experience* includes in itself the qualitative alteration which will produce the new in-itself, criterion. Experience, at the same time, also causes the alteration of the criterion. The problem here is that how this experience occurs.¹⁷

The alteration of knowledge and the object happens in a twofold manner in the dialectical movement or experience of consciousness. First of all, in knowing the object, the being-in-itself, consciousness transforms it into the being-for-consciousness. That object was the in-itself outside of consciousness and when it is known by consciousness it becomes the in-itself for consciousness. This is the first illustration of the analytical distinction mentioned above. Consciousness which has gained its new knowledge starts its dialectical movement through a new in-itself so as to know it. Secondly, consciousness constitutes in itself the new object being adequate to itself through this new knowledge which it has obtained; for the old object in this sense has lost its objectivity or the character of being the criterion; it has become *knowledge*.

The designation, determination and becoming of the new object pre-require a qualitative alteration. Instead of the defence of the old object or of making an addition to it, to be conscious of the nothingness of the old object is a movement to be realized in the conception of experience which Hegel put

forward. But the true, real experience must be comprehended in or brought into a continuation. This is possible through the transcendence of the old object in the new one. Even knowledge which is obtained and qualitatively changed at the end of the experience will lose its value in the dialectical process of the knowledge and the object.

For Hegel experience is not only the transition from the first object into another, but, at the same time, it is also the comprehension of the untruth of the first object. The untruth, which is the result of the disagreement between knowledge and its object, is that of consciousness. When consciousness in its dialectical movement experiences its untruth, it continues its experience with an other object. At the end of the dialectical movement, which relies upon the nothingness of this old object and shows its untruth, the transition into the new object is made.

Consciousness is initially not aware of the object in-itself; the important factor in this is that the object stands outside of the relation of knowing. Since consciousness does not grasp the object which it has produced or rather it has created *via* its own knowledge, it is not also able to comprehend the dialectical movement between knowledge and the object. But by means of the experiences that it will carry out, consciousness will also arrive at the awareness of the fact that the object is not merely the in-itself; that it is in the close relation with consciousness' knowledge; that it is conditioned by this knowledge. In this way consciousness will also conceive the totality of the experience. By insisting upon these two forms of consciousness W. Bonsiepen determines these different

conducts as *naive* and *reflecting (reflective)*. For him, the naive consciousness distinguishes the being of the object for consciousness from the in-itself of the object, knowledge from the truth. It has to bring its knowledge with the being-in-itself, true object into an appropriate form. Precisely observed, there is, however, not an object being-in-itself and a different knowledge of it; but the object and knowledge form a unity from the very beginning. The naive consciousness does not recognize that the new object has been formed through a determinate knowledge related to the old object. The object in the naive consciousness is not simply present as independent from knowledge, but it is constituted by knowledge. If consciousness reflects that its knowledge also conditions the being of the object, it knows also that the being-in-itself of the object must be searched in a determinate manner of the knowledge.¹⁸

Consciousness' awareness of the fact that the object of consciousness is reflected by its knowledge and that this object is its own object, are not sufficient but important progressions for the comprehension of the process of the dialectical experience, because in this progression which consciousness itself has accomplished the relationship between the knowledge and the object has been examined; but the role which this relation has in the becoming or genesis of the object has not yet been understood. What is necessary so as to be seized upon the whole phenomenological process is actually to understand and apprehend the essential or crucial relationship between the old object and the new object. For Hegel it is only possible for consciousness to arrive at such perfection in Absolute Knowing.

Consciousness does not conceive the new object which it has obtained by the naive and reflective conducts in the awareness of the “determinate negation”. For it the new object is an “external” determination, i.e., negation, as if it were abstract and irrespective of the relation between the knowledge and the object. For that reason, the new object is for consciousness an “in-itself” or criterion which it has found in its first stage “by chance and externally”(PS,87/PM,143).

This new “in-itself- is that which is not found “by chance and externally” and that which shows itself as a necessity at the end of a certain, determinate relationship, i.e., that of the knowledge and the object, and a process. What consciousness is not able to comprehend is this necessity: “(...) the new object shows itself to have come about through a *reversal of consciousness itself* (*Umkehrung des Bewusstseins selbst*)”(PS,87/PM,143). By the conception of the “reversal of consciousness itself” Hegel states a relation. This relation happens in consciousness’ own relation between its knowledge and object and creates the new object. With this, consciousness becomes consciousness of a necessity and scientificity. This is what differentiates the dialectical movement of consciousness from the ordinary understanding of experience. What Hegel means by the reversal of consciousness itself is that consciousness begins to comprehend the fact that its new object which appears at the end of the dialectical relationship between its knowledge and object is its own product.

The reversal of consciousness itself constitutes the new object. But while it is a necessity “for us”, for natural consciousness or phenomenal knowing that “we are observing” it is a stage which it has not gained an insight related to this

necessity. “This way of looking at the matter is something contributed by *us*, by means of which the succession of experiences through which consciousness passes is raised into a scientific progression- but it is not known to the consciousness that we are observing”(PS,87/PM,143). “Our contribution” (*unsere Zutat*) is merely “to look on” (*das reine Zusehen*) without any interference. This pure, simply looking on is, at the same time, a looking on which provides the scientificity and necessity that the consciousness, which we are observing, cannot perform. “But it is just this necessity itself, or the *origination of the new object*, that presents itself to consciousness without its understanding how this happens, which proceeds for us, as it were, behind the back of consciousness”(PS,87/PM,144).

Consciousness gains more awareness in its each new object; what is more, it enters into the process of awareness, but it is not in the awareness or consciousness of its necessity or scientificity. For Hegel there is no problem with this situation; our simply looking on the dialectical movement of consciousness from without is sufficient for its necessity and scientificity. Here there is no contradiction between that which Hegel calls “our contribution” and that he again stated that any contribution by us is superfluous, because “our contribution” does not interfere to the consciousness and it does not give any advice to it.¹⁹

The origination of the new object, which Hegel regards as the result, from the nothingness of the old object (or the first “in-itself”) is possible only again by rendering appropriate the “nothingness” with the “determinate negation”. This is again not a pure nothingness or scepticism which sees in the result merely the

pure nothingness. As Hegel says: “(...) we have here the same situation as the one discussed in regard to the relation between our exposition and scepticism, viz. that in every case the result of an untrue mode of knowledge must not be allowed to run away into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be grasped as the nothing *of that from which it results*- a result which contains what was true in the preceding knowledge”(PS,87/PM,143-4). Since the new object is not an “empty nothing” of the old one, it contains “what was true in it” and, thus, the road of the phenomenological process of consciousness is opened.

Even though consciousness is not aware of the necessity of the new object and its emergence from the result of the relationship between the knowledge and the object and even though it does not recognize the necessity of the new content for its own development, Hegel frequently repeats that all these, however, occur in the phenomenological development or progression of the consciousness. What Hegel at that point insists upon is the aspect or determinacy of the new object: “It shows up here like this: since what first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to the level of its way of knowing it, and since the in-itself becomes a *being-for-consciousness* of the in-itself, the latter is now the new object. Herewith a new pattern of consciousness comes on the scene as well, for which the essence is something different from what it was at the preceding stage”(PS,87/PM,144).

Hegel determines, for this time, this entire process, namely, the process for “us” and for consciousness, with regard to the “form” and “content” of the *process*: “Thus in the movement of consciousness there occurs a moment of

being-in-itself or *being-for-us* which is not present to consciousness comprehended in the experience itself. The *content*, however, of what presents itself to us does exist *for it*; we comprehend only the formal aspect of that content, or its pure origination. *For it*, what has thus arisen exists only as an object; *for us*, it appears at the same time as movement and a process of becoming”(PS,87/PM,144).

The content is the objectivity of consciousness, its side of the “in-itselfness” and contains in itself the necessity of the permanent development. When consciousness takes its new object into itself as the content, however, it does not see the necessary connection between the old object and the new object, each content is an in-itself or content which is included in the knowledge of the consciousness. In this consciousness is the consciousness of the experiences which it has itself performed. The “We” comprehends the movement and becoming of the series of these experiences. In the exposition or presentation of phenomenal knowing or in the dialectical movement of consciousness the “thoroughgoing scepticism” and the “determinate negation” are the moving-forces of the scientific progression. The object of these powers or the object which is developed by these powers is the essential content of the consciousness in its each form.

The pathway itself from the natural consciousness into the absolutely true knowing, i.e., Absolute Knowing, is a necessity due to the above explanations. Therefore,

“Because of this necessity, the way to Science is itself *Science*, and hence, in virtue of its content, is the Science of the *experience of consciousness*”(PS,88/PM,144).



END-NOTES

¹ To begin with, it must be stated that the distinctive characteristic of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that it is "an inquiry into the examination of the reality of knowledge". This is the most accurate, precise and definite determination and meaning of this work. So, this explanation tells us more things. Firstly, it should be noted that this inquiry and examination are not dealt with the *possibility of knowledge*. For example, R. Pippin claims that like Kant, Hegel is, from the start, interested in the conditions of knowledge (in *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness*, p.95). Secondly, it does not inquire into whether there is knowledge or whether knowledge is that of the "real". What Hegel admits at first glance is that there *is* knowledge and he accepts it in the way it is accepted by the natural, ordinary consciousness. With this, Hegel accepts or admits that all forms of knowledge as regards to consciousness are "real knowledge". Again, Hegel does not inquire or examine whether knowledge is possible, what are the conditions of the possibility of knowledge or what are the limits of knowledge.

² At that point it should be noted that it does not matter to discuss the problem with respect to whom Hegel interpreted or referred. Most of the interpreters, commentators have argued that here Hegel referred to Kant or that without any reference he formulated the epistemological programme in the Kantian intent. At different occasions Hegel illustrated his concern with Kant in the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Here are some examples:

"A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of

all to examine the faculty of knowing and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw knowing from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of the instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Socrates, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim”(EL,10).

“(…) the philosophy of Kant is likewise called a critical philosophy because its aim, says Kant, is first of all to supply a criticism of our faculties of knowledge; for before obtaining knowledge we must inquire into the faculties of knowledge. To the healthy human understanding that is plausible, and to it this has been a great discovery. Knowledge is thereby represented as an instrument, as a method and means whereby we endeavour to possess ourselves the truth. Thus before men can make their way to the truth itself they must know the nature and function of their instrument. They must see whether it is capable of supplying what is demanded of it-of seizing upon the object; they must know what the

alterations it makes in the object are, in order that these alterations may not be mixed up with the determinations of the object itself. This would appear as though men could set forth upon the search for truth with spears and staves. And a further claim is made when it is said that we must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know. For to investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them; but how we are to know without knowing, how we are to apprehend the truth before the truth, it is impossible to say. It is the old story of the scolasticus who would not go into the water till he could swim. Thus since the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing, it cannot attain to what it aims at because it is that already- it cannot come to itself because it is already with itself; the same thing happens as happened with the Jesus, the Spirit passes through the midst of them and they know it not”(LHP, vol.3,428ff.).

One of the most important commentators on Hegel, Jean Hyppolite’s judgement is different. For him, Hegel criticizes Reinhold, the celebrated Kantian, in the “Introduction”: “In his introduction to the *Phenomenology* Hegel again takes up his criticism of any philosophy that is only a theory of knowledge... Hegel’s criticism of knowledge remains valid... One cannot, he argued, remain like Reinhold, forever in the square before the temple... It is a mistake to imagine that, before we can truly know, we must examine knowledge as an instrument or a medium”, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp.6-7. Cf. Hegel’s *Difference Essay*, p.88: “The peculiarity of Reinhold’s philosophy (...) consists in its founding and grounding concern with different philosophical views... His love of, and faith in, truth have risen to an elevation so pure and so

sickening that in order to found and ground the step into the temple properly, Reinhold has build a spacious vestibule in which philosophy keeps itself so busy with analysis, with methodology and with storytelling, that it saves itself from taking the step altogether; and in the end, as a consolation for his incapacity to do philosophy, Reinhold persuades himself that the bold steps other have taken had been nothing but preparatory exercises or mental confusions.”

³ For a reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an attainment of Absolute Knowing in terms of the overcoming of scepticism, see Robert Pippin's, *op.cit.*, Terry Pinkard's *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*.

⁴ Heidegger's *Hegel's Concept of Experience* provides for us to seize the difference between Hegel and Heidegger. Heidegger reads Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the *parousia* of the Absolute. Heidegger pays attention to the hidden sub-clause in the quoted passage that the Absolute in itself is with us and wants to be with us. For him, the first step which knowledge of the Absolute must take is to accept and receive the Absolute in its absolute essence, namely, in being-with-us or being-present-to-us (*parousia*). He holds the view that Hegel's concern at the beginning and throughout the first section is to point out that the Absolute is in its Advent with us. But from this Heidegger's reading of Hegel arrives at the point that if knowing is not a means, then the examination, too, can no longer consist in an assessment of the mediating characteristic of knowing. Werner Marx in *Heidegger and the Tradition* argues that the way in which consciousness as a subject-object relation (a Reinholdian reading-e.a.k.) represents the Absolute to itself, as presence (*parousia*), is thus the presentation or

unfolding of the the Absolute itself, whose will is a first step to Nietzsche's "will to will". For him, the violence of the interpretation can be shown from traditional Hegel research in many respects, e.g., Heidegger's determination of the "goal" of the road of the experience as a goal already attained at the beginning of the pathway; the overinterpretation of the expression of that the Absolute "wants" to be with us, which for Heidegger becomes the "will of the *parousia* of the Absolute". But the most violent interpretation is the reading of the passage(*PS,87/PM,143*), whereby it is not the *self-comprehending Concept* which causes its "reversal" but the "ontic-ontological dialogue" which is "our contribution"(pp.135ff., note29). It must be determined before that Heidegger tries to observe a Fichte and a Schelling in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This problematic reading of Heidegger will be criticized throughout the analysis of the "Introduction" of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

⁵ Heidegger reads these statements as if they were Hegel's own. He goes on to say that these statements are put forward or posited without grounds being offered. To him, no grounds can be posited, because no grounding or founding can reach their ground. It never attain their ground because in positing grounds it always moves away from their ground. The statements cannot be grounded. They have determined that which itself offers ground first of all. "There speaks in them the will of the Absolute whose very nature it is to will to be with us"(*HCE,38*). Heidegger reads Hegel's phenomenological project in terms of a Cartesian one as a quest for an unconditional self-certainty: philosophy is now unconditional knowledge within the knowledge of the unconditional self-certainty; it is self-

justifying or grounding rigorous science; philosophy has made itself completely within knowing as such; the entire nature of philosophy is the result of the unconditional self-knowledge of knowledge; philosophy is the science *par excellence*; when the term “Science” takes the place of the term “philosophy” in absolute metaphysics, it draws its meaning from the nature of the subject’s self-certainty which knows itself as unconditional. What is seen from these explanations is that Heidegger places Hegel within the Cartesian-Fichtean tradition, regarding the Absolute as Spirit: that which is present and by itself in the certainty of unconditional self-knowledge(*HCE*,33-39). Heidegger confuses Hegel with a Reinhold or a Fichte. Heidegger’s reading of Hegel as a Cartesian is not only misleading and unfair to Hegel, but also it is a great error. Moreover, if Heidegger seeks a subjective idealism as the transcendental philosophy which in the Cartesian sense grounds philosophy as a rigorous science, then he should have referred to Reinhold or Fichte, but not to Hegel, as the true epigone of Descartes. Thus, Heidegger’s reading of Hegel as a Cartesian is a distortion. For a close connection between Descartes and Fichte, see Hegel’s *LHP*, vol.3, sections on “Descartes” and “Fichte”. Also Cf. Fichte’s expositions regarding the discovery of the first, absolutely unconditioned principle of all human knowledge in his *Doctrine of Science*, pp.93-94. Also see Robert Williams, “Hegel and Heidegger”, in *Hegel and His Critics* ed. By W. Desmond, pp.135-157, Eric von der Luft, “Commentary on Robert Williams’s ‘Hegel and Heidegger’ “, in *Hegel and His Critics*, pp.158-162.

⁶ What Hegel has in mind is Fichte and Schelling. Fichte in the *Science of Knowledge* (or Doctrine of Science) writes that the intellectual intuition which is the basis of his doctrine of Science, finds no place in Kant. But, for him, it is nonetheless possible to refer to the precise point in the Kantian system at which the intellectual intuition (or intuitive understanding) should have been mentioned. Fichte here refers to the categorical imperative. It is a kind of consciousness which Fichte looked for. To him, Kant forgot to ask himself this question, since Kant nowhere dealt with the foundation of all philosophy, but treated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* only of its theoretical side in which the categorical imperative could not appear. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, in the practical side, the questions about the form of consciousness involved could not arise. To Fichte, this consciousness is certainly immediate and not sensuous; therefore, it is precisely what he calls “intellectual intuition”. See *The Science of Knowledge*, p.46. Schelling developed his system of Science, *System of Transcendental Idealism*(1800) from Kant’s conception of intuitive understanding in the *Critique of Judgement*.

⁷ H.S. Harris, “Hegel’s image of phenomenology”, in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, p.73, closely parallels Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* with St. Bonaventura’s *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* (*The Soul’s Progress in God*), Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, and Fichte’s *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (*The Vocation of Man*). Dante goes from *despair* through vision to faith; Fichte moves from doubt through knowledge to faith. Hegel proceeds from *doubt* or *despair* through unhappy consciousness or faith to knowledge.

⁸ For Heidegger, the presentation is a pathway, but not that from pre-philosophical knowing to philosophy. For Heidegger, philosophy is the road. He asserts that what Hegel means by natural consciousness is alive in all shapes of Spirit, lives all of them in its own way, including esp. the form of Absolute Knowing. Hence, Heidegger restricts philosophy to a few thinkers who possess essential intuition. Thereby, Heidegger holds the view that the possibility of Absolute Knowing lies in the fact that if knowing begins with the absoluteness of the Absolute or Absolute Knowing. Is it not a contradiction to say that phenomenal knowing begins with Absolute Knowing? At that point Heidegger mixes up “real knowledge” with Absolute Knowing. This point will be made clear in the course of the discussion.

⁹ In the review of a work of the sceptic G.E.Schulze (Aenesidemus) entitled “The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy, a Presentation of Its Different Modifications, and Comparison of Modern with Ancient Scepticism” in *Between Kant and Hegel*, pp.313-362, Hegel, arguing that the ancient scepticism was superior to the modern one, asserts that the latter involves a dogmatic imprisonment to the “facts” of common sense and sense experience. Modern sceptics like Schulze, Hegel asserts again and again, prefers to restrict themselves to the “facts of consciousness” alone; they claim that there is no possible inference “beyond” or “behind” such immediate experience; and they conclude that if there is, such an “act” is itself just another immediate experience. Hegel’s point which inspires him to develop a Phenomenology of Spirit is that it is not the existence

and presence of sense-data and feelings that the ancient scepticism have doubted but *what experience teaches*.

¹⁰ This original insight concerning the essence of natural consciousness is the distinctive characteristic of the Hegelian concept of consciousness, which differentiates itself from Kant's, Fichte's and Schelling's concepts of consciousness. In his *Doctrine of Science*, in the "Deduction of Presentation", pp.203-217, Fichte tries to lead common consciousness from immediate sensuous knowledge to the philosophical knowledge. He constrains consciousness to discover in its own essence that which the philosopher attained *via* reflection. Schelling, following the epochs of the formation of self-consciousness, had taken the same step in his *System of Transcendental Idealism*(1800), pp.42-154 (Cf. Also a possibility of a presentation of a "history of self-consciousness" Schelling's "Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the *Science of Knowledge*", in *Idealism and the Endgame of Theory*, pp.62-138). Philosophical knowing (or Absolute Knowing), being presupposed, was to be rediscovered by the ordinary knowing. But, precisely, the philosophical knowing is already presupposed in these works, the history of consciousness, despite their intents, remains *artificial*. What is considered here, is not the experience of the natural consciousness, but are the artificial reflections through which the ordinary, natural consciousness is risen from its immediate existence to the philosophical essence. In these contrapositions of phenomenal knowing to the philosophical knowing, Fichte and Schelling are failed to demonstrate how the two are linked. Here it is not clear, for example, for Schelling, how phenomenal knowing is possible once Absolute Knowing is put

forward. Likewise, phenomenal knowing remains cut off from Absolute Knowing. It is obviously seen that Hegel returns to the natural consciousness, that is, phenomenal knowing, and tries to demonstrate how the presentation or exposition of phenomenal knowing necessarily leads to Absolute Knowing. Is this a return to the view-point of consciousness, the view-point that was Kant's and Fichte's and Schelling's? No, These philosophers did not develop any doctrine of consciousness as Hegel did. Hegel now insists on the need to place oneself at the view-point of natural consciousness and to lead it step by step to Absolute Knowing: one cannot begin with Absolute Knowing. In the "Preface" Hegel insists upon this point: "*Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this Aether as such, is the ground and soil of Science or knowledge in general. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness dwell in this element. But this element itself achieves its own perfection and transparency only through the movement of its becoming... Science on its part requires that self-consciousness should have raised itself into this Aether in order to be able to live (...) with Science and in Science. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that Science should at least provide him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within himself... The standpoint of consciousness which knows objects in their antithesis to itself, and itself in antithesis to them, is for Science the antithesis of its own standpoint... When natural consciousness entrusts itself straightway to Science, it makes an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk on its head too, just this once; the compulsion to assume this unwonted*

posture and to go about in it is a violence it is expected to do to itself, all unprepared and seemingly without necessity”(PS,26/PM,86ff.).

One more point: Heidegger errs in interpreting the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a dialogue between natural consciousness and Absolute Knowing or as “a dialogue between ontic and ontological consciousness”(HCE,144,146). This is not what Hegel means by the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Thus, Heidegger confuses Hegel with Schelling. Schelling in his Munich lectures describes the method of his *System of Transcendental Idealism*(1800) as a “Socratic dialogue” between natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness: “The principle of progression or the method rests on the differentiation of the I which is developing or is concerned with the production of self-consciousness from the I which is reflecting on this, which, so to speak, is watching it, is thus philosophizing. By this moment a differentiation was posited in it only for the watcher, not *for it itself*. Progress therefore always consisted in the fact that what had been posited in the I in the preceding moment just for the philosopher was posited objectively in the succeeding moment for the I itself- for the I itself in the philosopher, and that in this way the objective I itself was finally brought to the standpoint of the philosophizing I, or that the objective I became completely the same as the philosophizing, thus subjective I; the moment at which this sameness begins, at which, then, exactly the same was posited in the objective I as in the subjective I, was the closing moment of philosophy, which had thereby definitely assured itself at the same time of its end. Between the objective I and the philosophizing I there was roughly the same relationship as between the pupil and the master in the

Socratic dialogues. In the objective I *more* was always posited in a developed way than it itself knew; the activity of the subjective, of the philosophising I now considered in helping the objective I itself to knowledge and consciousness of what is posited in it, and of finally bringing it in this way to complete knowledge of itself”, *History of Modern Philosophy*, p.112f. Hegel, on the contrary, describes natural consciousness much more than constructs it. The philosopher disappears in the course of the experience, natural consciousness enters into its own experience. The determinations are not added to it from without, nor posited in it more or less in an artificial way; rather, *consciousness is for itself its own Concept*. For the same error, see Kenley R. Dove, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method”, *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol.23, 1970, p.640, reprinted in *New Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy*, ed. By W.E. Steinkraus, p.55.

¹¹ K. Reinhold states his first principle in that form: “In consciousness, the representation is *distinguished* from, and *related* to, the subject and object, by the subject”. Quoted in Frederick Beiser’s *The Fate of Reason*, p.253.

¹² The meaning of Idealism lies in these explanations. Consciousness is *activity*. Historical Idealism defines consciousness as *Activity*. Idealism explains the determinations of consciousness on the basis of the activity of *consciousness*. Consciousness is never *passive*. Knowing and the in-itself are the products of the “distinguishing-“ and “relating-activities” of consciousness. Out of the activity of consciousness all its relations to the objectivity are deduced. See Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, p.21, and Hegel, *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, “Phenomenology”, pp.55-56.

¹³ So Hegel evades the “hermeneutical circle”, which implies that we cannot proceed without presuppositions. If Hegel does not evade it, then his result must be like that of all other philosophies: a philosophical system which has the same validity as its presuppositions. In Heidegger this hermeneutical structure has been stressed as the necessary result of all finite human knowledge. Hegel formulates the problem as follows: the nature of the object which we are examining surmounts the separation between Science and phenomenal knowing, philosophical consciousness and natural consciousness, and appearance of the separation, and presupposition. Consciousness provides its own criterion in itself. The investigation or examination will thereby be a comparison of itself with its own self, because that just made falls within itself. Thus, the hermeneutical circle is not effect here, since the criterion by which a consciousness or a form of knowing is measured is not presupposed from Science or Absolute Knowing. It must be said that “our” consciousness is only directed at the examination that consciousness exercises within itself.

¹⁴ Heidegger reads Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the presentation of Absolute Knowing. For Heidegger’s hermeneutical reading of Hegel Absolute Knowing is presupposed. However, it must be deduced from the hitherto inferences that the investigation of all the possible forms of knowledge or of the truth, reality of all possible forms of knowledge is the comparison of the reality of knowledge with the actual knowledge in any form. Thus, it must be understood that Heidegger confuses the “real knowledge” with Absolute Knowing. As for the “reality of knowledge”, it must be determined that it has a double meaning. The

“reality of knowledge” tells us that *all* knowledge is real knowledge, being knowledge at all; and Science or the highest knowing, being a form of knowledge like all the other forms, is “real” in the same sense. However, by means of this common element in all forms of knowing it is necessary to point out the difference between what is Science or the highest knowing and what is ordinary knowing. Thus, through this distinction, Science appears as the *only real* knowing or the *true reality of knowing*. Therefore, it must not be supposed that Absolute Knowing or Science is present in each form of consciousness or knowing and that by means of this the comparison or examination is possible. This is neither necessary nor possible. It is not necessary because every form of consciousness or knowing has its own specific truth or the “in-itself”; and by this alone the comparison or examination can be made. It is not possible because, as Hegel stated, if we posit Science immediately at the beginning, it appears as one “bare assurance” amongst many. So the point of the inquiry or investigation, examination cannot be that we presuppose Science or Absolute Knowing as the standard or the criterion of our comparison or examination.

Rudiger Bubner reads Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* as Criticism. The critique requires a critical element. He sees this element in Hegel as Absolute Knowing. In replying to J. Habermas’s remarks on the “Introduction” of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which culminates in the claim that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* sticks to “something half-hearted” (*Knowledge and Human Interests*, p.10), Bubner writes that Habermas could not deny the principal character of the Hegelian critique. Concerning Habermas’ explanations on the Hegelian

appreciation of the critique of knowledge Bubner remarks that Habermas insistently repeats the often mentioned *skepsis* against a dogmatically presupposed end-point of an “Absolute Knowing” without remarking that he deprives of the criterion of philosophical knowing isolating the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which is exactly taking away the critical possibilities to which he refers. See R. Bubner, “Problemgeschichte und systematischer Sinn einer Phänomenologie“, *Hegel-Studien*, vol.5, 1969, p.155, note 62a. With this interpretation, it is seen that Absolute Knowing is presupposed. If a critical element will be looked for in the examination of consciousness, Absolute Knowing is not necessary. The truth-content of every form of consciousness provides it. What is more, if Absolute Knowing is regarded as a critical element, then the dialectical nature of the movement of consciousness collapses.

¹⁵ Cf. Robert Pippin, *op.cit.*, p.104, replies to the discussion with regard to the psychological aspect of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* by holding the view that consciousness is not a psychological subject-matter: “Hegel does not say that consciousness, in knowing an object, is also (or even ‘really’) aware of its mental states and activities... the passages just quoted (*PS*,85/*PM*,141-e.a.k.) at least indicate that he holds that consciousness is indeed ‘of the object’ as well as ‘of itself’. Moreover, he passes ‘of itself’ as ‘consciousness of its own knowledge of that truth’, not ‘consciousness of its mental states, or subjective, constituting activity’, and so on”.

¹⁶ L.B. Puntel, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur*, p.289.

¹⁷ It must be noted that in Miller's English translation of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* the phrase "*die wissenschaftliche Seite*" is not translated: "In this connection there is a moment in the process just mentioned which must be brought out more clearly, for through it a new light will be thrown on exposition which follows"(PS,86). In J.B. Baillie's translation of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* this phrase is translated: "In this connection, there is a moment in the process just mentioned which should be brought into more decided prominence, and by which a new light is cast on the *scientific aspect* (my emphasis-e.a.k.) of the following exposition"(PM,142). The German text edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel writes as follows: "Es ist in dieser Beziehung an dem soeben erwähnten Verlaufe ein Moment nach näher herauszuheben, wodurch sich über die *wissenschaftliche Seite* (my emphasis-e.a.k.) der folgenden Darstellung ein neues Licht verbreiten wird"(PhdG,78).

¹⁸ W. Bonsiepen, *Der Begriff der Negativität in der Jenaer Schriften Hegels*, *Hegel-Studien Beiheft* 16 (1977), p.138.

¹⁹ Heidegger, in *op.cit.*, pp.124-133, discusses the reversal or inversion at some length and states that this "inversion [*Umkehrung*] is the basic characteristic of the experience of consciousness". He focuses on this reversal of consciousness to interpret both the "contribution" and the "We". He claims that our contribution of the reversal, "in which we turn to look at what appears as something that appears... consists in letting phenomena appear as such... turns experience around, and makes it presentable". As the "skepsis into [the] absoluteness" of the Absolute, the inversion "inverts everything that appears in its appearance." At the

same time, it opens the place “where appearance appears to itself” and “the domain through... which consciousness gathers” and “forms itself”. Heidegger errs in his repeated insistence that *we* contribute the reversal. The meaning of Hegel’s text- that “this way of looking at the matter is something contributed by *us*”- is that we contribute seeing consciousness’ reversal *as* an reversal; roughly posited, we contribute the name, not the act, of reversal. Here the term “itself” (*selbst*) in Hegel’s phrase should be noted.

Wolfgang Bonsiepen, *op.cit.*, pp.138-140, points out that the examination in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a self-examination and thematizes the role of consciousness as, at some point in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, actively performing the *reversal*. Consciousness must reach a point where it explicitly makes its own experience itself. At that point, consciousness must be active in the *reversal* and dialectical movement, which happen “through” consciousness, rather than have them happen to it. Bonsiepen locates scepticism as this point. He overlooks the sceptical nature of the perceptive consciousness. The first sceptical conduct of consciousness exhibits itself in the perception-consciousness. Bonsiepen thinks that the necessity and scientificity of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is produced by the *Logic*. Against Bonsiepen, it must be emphasized that at every point of the experience consciousness makes its own experience itself and it makes it at every point actively. Thus, the active nature of consciousness must be observed in its each form.

According to Otto Pöggeler whose explanation is the most convincing one, the *reversal* of consciousness is between truth (the in-itself, the first object) and

certainty (or knowledge, the way in which the in-itself is for consciousness), in which the next object (the new in-itself) is found. Through realizing a *reversal*, consciousness comprehends the truth that lies in its knowledge. Since what consciousness then declares as the (new) in-itself was implicitly within consciousness' certainty, the new object is necessarily, not contingently, set up ("Hegels Phänomenologie des Selbstbewusstseins", in Otto Pöggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, pp.240-241). In Pöggeler's interpretation Hegel's point that both moments, namely the moment of truth and the moment of knowing, are found *within* consciousness must be kept in mind. Hence, it would be possible for consciousness to turn from one moment to the other as a *reversal of consciousness itself*.

Concerning the role of the "We", Werner Marx in *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* writes in the following way:

"the phenomenologist (i.e. "We"-e.a.k.)... is in the *first* place he who takes phenomenal knowledge 'along' on the road. *Secondly*, he is the initiator of the movement of the history of experience, and hence also that of the dialectical history of experience. *Thirdly*, by means of his superior knowledge, the phenomenologist surveys the dialectical movement of experience and the category of necessity underlying it, which makes possible the exoteric presentation, and hence 'justification' vis-à-vis natural consciousness. *Fourthly* as a result of the foregoing history of experience, there arises for the phenomenologist the synthesis positively apprehended as a principle. *Fifthly*, he can act as a 'guide' for phenomenal knowledge.

“If we attend to the ‘expositions’ which mostly precede the presentation of any given history of the experience of phenomenal knowledge, or are often inserted within the presentation of a given shape, we are able to observe the following: Before phenomenal knowledge enters into the examination, the *phenomenologist* shows that and how, a ‘principle’ has arisen for him out of the preceding dialectical movement of experience. He thereby reveals the nature of the ‘transition’ from the preceding object to the ‘new one’ “(pp.91-92).

“So the philosopher not only has to relate his anticipatory reflections to phenomenal knowledge, but must also launch the latter on the road of experience. This is the manner in which the presentation ‘takes’ phenomenal knowledge ‘along with it’, and in so doing compels it to self-examination, eliciting despair in it by the method of self-realizing scepticism. By this very encounter with the critique demonstrated by the phenomenologist, phenomenal knowledge itself will also be made to adopt a critical attitude. It is only by ‘immersing’ himself in the ‘content’ of consciousness through the presentation that the phenomenologist evokes this movement, whose dialectical nature he had discerned in the ‘necessity’ of its phases. Not only is the presentation of phenomenal knowledge ‘exoteric’ on that account; the same is true of its preceding exposition. Above all, however, the exposition is the ‘guide’ for the history of experience of phenomenal knowledge. If the latter still as natural consciousness often knows its standard only vaguely, and often ‘professes’ other standards than those which actually guide it, it still always follows precisely the standard of the phenomenologist, at the outset of the presentation of any given shape, and within its projected

phases”(p.94). Contrary to W. Marx’s interpretation, it must be considered that Hegel holds the principally superfluousness of the philosopher’s contribution. What is to be discussed here as a problem is that whether Hegel could actually carry out this program and a further problem is that whether in the determinate formulations at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* the unsuccessfulness of the program will become visible. Cf. also Werner Marx’s “Dialectic and the role of the phenomenologist” in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments* ed. by Robert Stern, vol.3, pp.57-63.

K.R. Dove, *op.cit.*, pp.630ff., arranges the different appreciations of the “We” in the Hegel-literature: Herbert Marcuse, Georgy Lukacs, Nikolai Hartmann, Jean Hyppolite, Richard Kroner, Martin Heidegger. It will clearly be seen that the position of W. Marx does not fundamentally differ from those of Hyppolite and Kroner.

Lu De Vos reads the “our contribution” as the logical-speculative intervention. He reads the “determinate negation” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a logical-speculative moment but not a determination of the “thoroughgoing scepticism”; L.DE Vos, “Absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology” in *Hegel on Ethical Life, Religion and Philosophy* ed. by A. Wylleman, p.267.

L.B. Puntel, *op.cit.*, postpones the status or position and function of the “We” up to the page 301. At the page 295, he writes: “The status (or position) and function of the ‘We’ in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is one of the basic problems, which provides an appropriate interpretation of this work. An adequate meaning

of the 'We' can be attempted only in virtue of a detailed analysis of the concrete phenomenological presentation (or exposition)." At the page 301, it is read: "The 'We' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the expression for that which means 'thinking' in the noological dimension of the method." But this 'thinking' refers to logic and valid only in logic itself.



CHAPTER 3

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FORM OF ABSOLUTE KNOWING IN *THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*¹

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* demonstrates the elevation of knowing that is consciousness, i.e., phenomenal knowing, into Absolute Knowing. Absolute Knowing is the necessary result of the exposition of phenomenal knowing and necessary for speculative philosophy. It is likely the most problematic and troublesome zone of Hegel's philosophy. Absolute Knowing concludes the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and transforms it into the *Science of Logic*. It is both an end and conclusion and a new beginning for a new science. With Absolute Knowing the concept of philosophy was attained. With Absolute Knowing philosophy as a whole is possible. The further system of philosophy or Science is only the development of the Concept (*Begriff*). Thus the determination of Absolute Knowing is crucial for the justification of Hegel's philosophy itself.

The task of the following chapter is to present some difficulties being present in the chapter "Absolute Knowing" and to find the possibilities of solution. In this part Absolute Knowing is explained as Hegel presented it in the text with all its structure and terminology.

Our question as follows: How is it possible that Spirit in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which at the end of its pathway has come to its own will

illustrate itself as Science, Nature and History? According to Hegel, Spirit, on the one hand, in the last form of its development or unfolding (or history), has obtained the true element of its existence, the Concept, and has become Spirit which knows itself as Spirit. It intuits, on the other hand, “its Being as Space”, as Nature, as “its living immediate Becoming” and presents “its becoming Spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*” (PS,807/PM,806-7). *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is the exposition or presentation of appearing (phenomenal) knowing and, therefore, has the task to bring consciousness (natural consciousness) into the stage of Absolute Knowing. The authentic philosophy is the Science in a system out of the development of Spirit, both in its immediate being, namely consciousness, and in its authentic, proper being, namely Spirit itself, or out of the self-knowledge in the other-being, in which at every respect Spirit knows itself as Spirit.

However, in our consciousness knowing and the object (truth) are not identical, but they are opposed to each other. Our consciousness knows the object as such which stands over and against it, but is not identical with it. Hegel calls it “natural consciousness”. Hence, this consciousness has two moments: knowing and the object (truth). This object is always, for consciousness, that which it is not itself, that the object is always in natural consciousness the other, it is for natural consciousness negative. At the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* consciousness and its object become identical and this happens according to a whole series of the externalizations and alienations of Spirit and to its progress through all possible forms of its own. Consciousness arrives at the Absolute in absolute knowing, and

has no object outside of itself. Therefore, consciousness also arrives at the absolute truth in Absolute Knowing. But at the same time it should be noted that all other shapes of the development of Spirit are not, therefore, simply untrue; on the contrary, each of them contains in itself the truth in its appearance, but not the absolute truth. Seen from this standpoint of the Absolute, the position of the problem for our interpretation arises. When Spirit arrives at its true existence, it leaves the sphere of phenomenal (appearing) knowing and transforms into the pure, Absolute Knowing. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* transforms into the *Science of Logic* or Science of Pure Reason (Noumenology), with which it should form a System of Knowing (or Science).

On the other hand, however, even in the attained Absolute Knowing Spirit will again point out its beginning, sensuous-certainty, sensuous consciousness. Since Spirit has experienced its Concept and elevated itself into the immediate certainty of its own, it has won the certainty of immediacy or sensuous certainty. Hegel said further: "This release of itself from the form of its Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of its self-knowledge"(PS,806/PM,806). As it is mentioned at the beginning, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents the history of consciousness. From sensuous certainty to Absolute Knowing, this history of consciousness as the development of phenomenal knowing is the pathway of Spirit into itself through all its forms. Besides, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the history of appearing (phenomenal) Spirit. However, Spirit illustrates itself in Absolute Knowing or the attained absolute as the World-History and Nature. Therefore, we have the following situation before us. Spirit unfolds the history of

consciousness as the history of appearing (phenomenal) knowing; when Spirit arrives at itself, when it has experienced its Concept in Absolute Knowing, so it presents itself as the actual history.

These two forms of the history of Spirit form the second problem of our presentation (or exposition). The problem is: In which relation do these two forms of the history of Spirit stand to each other? In the discussion of this problem and in the exposition of its entire scope for Hegel's thought it seems for us necessary to make the last chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, "Absolute Knowing", dependent upon a full comprehensive inquiry. In order for these two above mentioned general problems to find a more possible precise solution, we must make the text, being an essential summary of the whole *Phenomenology of Spirit*, before everything, dependent on a fundamental conceptual investigation.

3.1 The Content of Absolute Knowing

3.1.1 Absolute Knowing as Spirit knowing itself in the form of Spirit or in the form of the Concept

The first pages of the chapter "Absolute Knowing" give us a summary of the previous chapters in which the development of consciousness presented in its essential goal.

To begin with we have to bear in mind two things: (1) the development or appearance of self-consciousness within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is twofold², that is, it can be seen from two points. On the one hand, the *Phenomenology of*

Spirit shows the opposition between consciousness and the object (truth). Since it examines or inquires consciousness itself, it determines that the real opposition- or the object of consciousness- is another consciousness. On the other hand, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* examines or inquires the relation of consciousness to the object. (2) All forms of consciousness and stages of overcoming of the opposition to the object were necessary. Only from this totality, from the pathway of Spirit to its own self, the appearance of Spirit's self-consciousness or Absolute Knowing is possible. The last form of Spirit, whose content has the form of 'Self', is that which has realized its concept and remains in its own concept in this realization; therefore, it is Absolute Knowing or self-consciousness. Spirit in its spiritual form is Spirit that knows (or knowing Spirit) or comprehending (conceiving) Spirit. The truth of this shape is not only in itself the same with the shape of certainty, but also it has the shape of certainty of its own (self-certainty), that is to say, its existence has the form of knowledge of its own (or self-knowledge). In this "form", Spirit at the same time gives to its content the form of the Self. Hence, the Concept has become the element of existence or the form of objectivity for consciousness. That which is the essence itself is the Concept. Spirit- so manifesting or appearing- is Science. With Hegel's words: "This last shape of Spirit- Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Concept as remaining in its Concept in this realization- this is absolute knowing; it is Spirit that knows itself in the shape of Spirit, or a comprehensive knowing [in terms of the Concept]. Truth is not only in itself completely identical with certainty, but also it also has the shape of self-

certainty, or it is in its existence in the form of self-knowledge”(PS,798/PM,797-8).

Here we have a first definition of Absolute Knowing. To this, Absolute Knowing is: (i) the last form of Spirit; (ii) Spirit which has the form of the Self in its content; (iii) in Absolute Knowing the concept of Spirit has been realized, and Spirit remains also in its concept.

Now we must analyze these three moments.

1. The last form of Spirit means that, therefore, the development, or progress, or the road of Spirit into itself, its own has been completed. Absolute knowing is the completed Spirit.

The entire *Phenomenology of Spirit* illustrates the development or unfolding of the different forms of Spirit. “Form” or “shape” means here not only the determinacy through which a thing differs from an other thing, but such that which stands in itself and retains as a specific relation of consciousness to the object. So, the relation of consciousness to the object is always arranged in a unity or in a “form”, “shape”. We cannot now here appropriate this dialectic of the overcoming of form, but more generally, what is under consideration here, is the overcoming of the object or, due to this, that Spirit recognizes or knows its other being as itself or its own. But the existence of the different stages, stations or forms of Spirit is necessary. Thus, Absolute Knowing appears, at first sight, as the last form (shape) of Spirit.

2. In its different shapes Spirit stands always in relation to its other being, to the object which should be grasped. However, if Spirit now has the form of the Self, it means that it has arrived at its goal: in Absolute Knowing the object has been superseded, or Spirit knows itself in its other being.

3. Hereby does the problem of the concept of Spirit arise. The concept of Spirit expresses itself as the unity of the three determinations:

a) Spirit is “essence, or that which has being in itself”(PS,25/PM,86).

“Being in itself “ means that which is present in distinction to everything, that which only is, since it stands in relation to the other and only is from such a relation to the other. The being-in-itself is present in its own self and, therefore, Substance. For this reason, Spirit is, first of all, Substance.

b) In addition to this, Spirit is being-for-itself or self-consciousness; by the fact that this is something, it is for its own self. Therefore, Spirit is thinking, and also its-relation-to-itself, and as its own-relation-to-itself Spirit is a self-differentiation from itself. But since Spirit is absolute, this self-differentiation is not a self-differentiation from the other; however, it is itself the other-becoming. Thus, Spirit is, at the same time, the other-being, the other-becoming of itself, the going-out of itself.

- c) Since this other which Spirit sets against itself as self-consciousness is Spirit itself, this being-outside-of-itself is identical with a being-remaining-in-itself. So, Spirit in-and-for-itself is neither alone in-itself, that is, Substance, nor alone for itself, namely, self-consciousness as a pure self-differentiation of itself.

Thus, the essence of Spirit presents itself as the movement of “in-itself” by way of “for-itself” into “in-and-for-itself”. Spirit is in its essential completeness the unity of “in-itself” and “for-itself”, the unity of substantiality and self-consciousness. If it were merely substantiality, then it would not be thinking. If it were merely self-consciousness, then it would not be the substance of beings. Only as being in-and-for-itself it is that self-consciousness which makes up the essential presence of the object or as being-in-itself it is a presence-in-itself. As being-for-itself it is being-outside-of-itself, because it sets itself over against itself. Since it is presence-in-itself or being-in-itself in being-outside-of-itself, so it is the unity of “in-itself” and “for-itself”, it is in-and-for-itself.

Now we can say this in a comprehensive form: Spirit is essentially the outgoing of itself, self-revealing, but precisely through this way it finds itself as Spirit. It is its own self during the return of itself into itself. These three determinations in their unity are not solely sufficient for a definition of Spirit. As we now think of Spirit as being in-and-for-itself, its essence lies as it is only for us as thinking, but not for its own Self. Spirit is not yet being-in-and-for-itself, but self-knowing Spirit as being in-and-for-itself. These three essential moments must, therefore, form the object of Spirit’s knowing. Hegel adds: “It must also be

this for itself, it must be the knowledge of the spiritual, and the knowledge of itself as Spirit, i.e., it must be an object to itself, but just as immediately a sublated object, reflected into itself. It is for itself only for us, in so far as its spiritual content is generated by itself. But in so far as it is also for itself for its own self, this self-generation, the pure Concept, is for it the objective element in which it has its existence, and it is in this way, in its existence for itself, an object reflected into itself”(PS,25/PM,86).

The object of Spirit, which is also that Spirit knows, is Being as such and in totality. Therefore, if it knows Being in totality as Spirit, and if it knows itself in totality, then Spirit first knows itself as Spirit. This is the first situation that Spirit has developed itself into a System of Knowing, into the Science.

These are also the three constitutive elements of Absolute Knowing. Hegel upholds further that they are the truth of the last form of Spirit: of Spirit, which has attained the certainty of itself. The truth means, for Hegel, in conformity with the tradition the correspondence of the concept with the object, and this means that here the accomplished certainty of this correspondence has been come up with. But Hegel supplements this determination with two things: (1) Spirit has now “the shape of the certainty of itself”; (2) the existence of Spirit is now in “the form of knowledge of itself”.

This means that Spirit has grasped itself in its own last form. Through this movement, Spirit realizes its Concept. This realization is a realization in Spirit itself. Absolute Knowing is thus that Spirit that knows itself in this form as Spirit. It is the knowing of Spirit that, in that Absolute Knowing, knows itself. Expressed

in another way, Spirit is now no longer in the form of consciousness, because consciousness is always a reference to the other-being, to the object; in this way, the opposition of consciousness is surmounted in principle. But Spirit is now in the form of self-consciousness, that is to say, it has no object more out of itself. When the shape also has the form of the Self, so the Self or the essence of the Self, that is, Concept, has become the object for and of the knowing Spirit.

Here we must clear up what Hegel understands by “Concept”. By Concept Hegel no longer understands the representation of something in general, but thinking (or thought) which comprehends itself the essence of the object itself, and which handles in itself its difference with the object. Therefore, Concept is, to its structure, the unity of the identity and the difference. For the Concept is, as such, not only the truth, but also the knowing form of the objective truth. Concepts are no longer the rigid representations or self-remaining universals, but they are those which move themselves.

Now Hegel continues: “Spirit, manifesting or appearing in consciousness in this element, or what is the same thing, produced in it by consciousness, is Science”(PS,798/PM,798). According to its true essence, Spirit is the Concept and, since it has itself for the object but not the represented objects which are different from it, its exposition or progression is not the science or system of phenomenal (appearing) knowing, but science as such and this is the exposition of Concept itself. In the element of the Concept, Spirit is brought forward as the conceptual whole of knowing through consciousness, which itself knows its knowing as the Concept. Thus, Science, which thinks the conceptual movement of

Spirit for consciousness, is Spirit whose concept is here not only the knowing Spirit but also the self-conscious positing of itself. Spirit is this self-conscious positing of itself and its concept of its Self.

In relation to this Science, the internal necessity of knowing is first demonstrated.³ The conceptual knowing of Spirit in Science presents itself as pure being-for-itself of self-consciousness, according to its nature, moments and movement. Knowing is self-consciousness or “I” that has reached itself as “I” through opposition. This is the immediately mediated or sublated universal ‘I’, which is “this and no other ‘I’ “(PS,799/PM,798). This concrete “I” is Absolute Knowing as Science, which is for-itself. Its content differentiates itself from itself; it is pure negativity or self-dividing, that is, it is consciousness. At that point, this content is itself in its difference the “I” or the movement which supersedes itself. In this content, as differentiated, the “I” is reflected into itself, and the content is grasped or comprehended when the “I” is with itself in its other-being⁴. Thus, this content is the movement or Spirit. Spirit runs through its own self and has so the shape of the Concept in its objectivity.

Now we have obtained the last shape of Spirit and, at present, to the character of this Absolute Knowing we have to interrogate. First of all, Hegel says that it is a shape of Spirit, a concrete shape, as much as even another shape of consciousness. This will mean that the consciousness of the “outer” still exists. Only this shape of consciousness cannot be surmounted, because it is exactly the last one. Nevertheless, primarily Science produced by the same Spirit is able to comprehend the total Being and in this sense to overcome consciousness. It is now

no longer the subjective or special, particular Being, but the Being itself in its totality. So comprehended Being, or so comprehended knowing, is Spirit. The same Self is also at the same time a form of Spirit and Science, which, on the one hand, includes the total Being and, on the other hand, the total Being is Spirit. This is why the Self is not only a form of Spirit, but also Spirit itself: “The Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of Self”(PS,798/PM,797).

So, the Self is, on the one hand, in distinction to Science an ‘I’, which has produced this Science through its work or activity in the course of the history of consciousness; and, on the other hand, this ‘I’ is Science itself, that is, self-consciousness. In such a way knowledge (knowing) of the ‘Self’ is at the same time pure, Absolute Knowing. For this reason the content of this knowing as such is also that of Spirit. This Self as Spirit has realized its Concept and in this realization it remains in its own Concept, namely, Spirit has gained its own Concept in and through Absolute Knowing.

The Self produces Science which comprehends everything. It grasps Being which is Spirit, and because the Self is Science, it is also Spirit. As far as that goes, the Self knows its content as Being or it is comprehensive knowing. (It, by the way, differs from the religious consciousness. In both cases there is an Absolute Knowing with the same content, but in religious knowing it is dealt with a transcendent God and in Absolute Knowing with the Self.)

Accordingly, now self-consciousness has another object, namely, the Concept or knowing. The Self is an existence, and as the consciousness of the

outer world it has no more the world or the Nature for the object, but, as its own production or accomplishment, as the production of its own activity or work, Science.

The Concept, thus, becomes for the Self an existential object. But this self-differentiating object from the Self-the Concept- is to the content the same with the Self, its 'I' is the universal 'I' and remains also "this and no other 'I' (*PS,799/PM,798*), i.e., sublated, universal 'I'.

Here we determine a double meaning of the Self.

It is an individual 'I' and as individual it is dialectically overcome in the universal. But it should be noted that the particularity of the Self is not lost in this absolute. The Self is rather a synthesis of the individual and the universal. The present prevailing relation of the Self to its object still expresses the connection of 'I' and 'not-I'. To its essence, the negative 'I' should overcome or sublimate this 'not-I'. But the 'I' might not do this by means of its activity which can always supersede particular objects but never the objectivity in itself. So only by means of Science that conceives and manifests the Being, every opposition or contrariness, inclusive of the subject and the object, is sublated. Science itself is the negative just as the Self, and when the Self objectifies or concretizes itself as Science, it remains "with itself in its otherness"(*PS,799/PM,798*).

This Science, which is the same with the Self, has the same knowing, namely, the same dialectical movement with and as the Self.

Hegel repeats that this Concept or Science appears in time and actuality first when Spirit has obtained its consciousness concerning itself and not before. Spirit, which knows what it is, exists after the “completion of the work”, that is first when its consciousness has provided the shape of its essence and also has equated or equalized with its self-consciousness. Spirit, being in and for itself, differentiated into its moments, is “knowing that is for itself”(PS,800/PM,799) or comprehension in general which, as such, substance has not yet arrived at, i.e., it is not yet Absolute Knowing.⁵

Here Hegel reiterates once more, as we have seen, that Science does not appear in the history of consciousness at some time or other, but rather first after the completion of Spirit’s work, and that is again the whole history of Spirit itself. All foregoing stages of the development or process of Spirit were necessary, in fact, as an entire series of the externalizations, alienations and sublations of the “incomplete, imperfect formations”; therefore, at the end, Spirit comes to a synthetic unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. Hegel expresses this in the following manner:

“Spirit that is in and for itself and differentiated into its moments is a knowing that is for itself, a comprehension in general that, as such, substance has not yet reached, i.e. substance is not in its own self an absolute knowing”(PS,800/PM,799).

That is to say that Spirit as “knowing that is for itself” or “comprehension in general” is in the form of self-consciousness. Therefore, the problem here is for

it with the second moment, the in-itself or the substantiality which will render possible for it Absolute Knowing.

In addition to this, Hegel explains: “Now, in actuality, the substance that knows exists earlier than its form or its Concept-determined ‘shape’. For substance is the as yet undeveloped in-itself, or the Ground and Concept in its still unmoved simplicity, and therefore the inwardness or the Self of the Spirit that does not yet exist. What is *there*, exists as the still undeveloped simple and immediate, or as the object of the *picture-thinking* consciousness in general”(PS,801/PM,799).

We must here clarify more Hegel’s concept of Substance. The name ‘Substance’ means that which amounts to the permanency of the things, or the essential existence of the Being. According to the traditional metaphysics, thus, the Being of the existence is the Substance; or an existence is through its existence that it is itself and not other. Substance (or essential existence) consists of its selfhood with itself or, in Hegel’s terminology, in its self-identity (self-equality). If an existence becomes unidentical to itself, it dissolves itself, it ceases to be or disappear. So, Substance is the selfhood, self-identity (self-equality) of a being (or an existence) with itself. These determinations of Substance are those of the traditional metaphysics which has been worked out by Hegel in a considerable elaboration.

“In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*”(PS,17/PM,80).

Thus, Hegel also asks for advice in which or by which means the Being lies. The essential existence of the Being reveals itself for itself as Subject, or the true essence of Substance is Subject itself. Subject, as the self-knowing unity of knowing and the object, is the absolute Self in its true essence, and for that reason Concept-opposed-to-Subject is Substance. Subject proves itself as the truth of Substance. So, Subject is the truth of Substance as the self-knowing being with itself in the object, which, as such, is not yet the comprehending Subject as Subject. The True is Subject as the self-knowing being with itself in the object. Substance is also a form of knowing which has not yet experienced itself as knowing. At that respect Hegel adds: “At the same time, it is to be observed that substantiality embraces the universal, or the *immediacy of knowledge* itself, as well as that which is *being* or immediacy for knowledge”(PS,17/PM,80).

The problem is here that: when will the substantiality be comprehended as Subject, being absolute, as the self-knowing unity of knowing and the object?

The substantiality is to its essence also knowing, in fact, on the one hand, the immediacy of knowing and, on the other hand, the immediacy for knowing. What is immediate, is a knowing that has no knowledge of itself and that is not a self-conscious knowing. Such knowing presents only the object of knowing, but not its knowledge of itself. Therefore, for knowing the object is simply the existence (being), Substance. But Hegel says that in such an understanding or conception of Substance self-consciousness was perished. “If the conception of God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was proclaimed, the reason for this was on the one hand an instinctive awareness that, in this definition, self-

consciousness was only submerged and not preserved. On the other hand, the opposite view, which clings to thought as thought, to *universality* as such, is the very same simplicity, is undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality”(PS,17/PM,80).⁶

Here Hegel maintains two things: (1) while thinking (thought) thinks the Being as Substance, self-consciousness has been perished; (2) the conception or understanding of the Being as Substance is the self-seizing thought as thought, the universality as such.

As we have ascertained, the essential existence of a Being, Substance, consists in the selfhood, its self-identity (self-equality) with itself. But only the thought of the self-identity (self-equality) is the essence of thinking itself. Pure thinking is not other than a permanent relating of itself to itself. So, it can be said that thinking as self-identity (self-equality), as its unity and identity of itself, is not other than the substantiality. Hence, self-consciousness is the ideal of the substantiality in general. However, this self-seizing, self-clinging-to-itself, pure thinking is at the same time one-sided and abstract, because it does not embrace in itself the inequality, non-identity, the difference.

The substantiality has two sides. On the one hand, it is the immediacy in which only the object of knowing exists, but not knowing of its own self. On the other hand, it is self-identity (self-sameness) from which its self-seizing (self-holding) thinking rises in its purity. It can be maintained from these two sides that Substance as Subject is not yet comprehending Subject.

Substance will be first grasped as Subject when it becomes the “living Substance”. Moreover, says Hegel:

“Further the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject*, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, *simple negativity*, and is for this reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its anti-thesis [the immediate simplicity]. Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself-not *original* or *immediate* unity as such- is the True”(PS,18/PM,80).⁷

What is living, is generally self-moving from itself. Hence, the Being has its existence (or presence) not in the self-sameness (self-identity), but in a self-moving from itself, that is, in the liveliness.

But Subject as the Absolute is essentially the self-moving from itself; it is what it is, since it knows itself as what it is, it is Spirit. Yet, in order to be able to know itself, it must alienate to itself, it must oppose itself to itself so that in it the negativity, the difference, the opposition comes on the scene. In this its self-opposition, in this its self-knowing it remains as being with itself, i.e., as Subject. The Absolute returns upon this self-other-becoming (self-othering), upon this self-opposing-with-itself into the unity of itself with itself and, as a returning, is first of all, a self-knowing being with itself. Therefore, at the end, Subject is what truly is, self-knowing being with itself, Spirit.

Thinking, which thinks the essential existence of Being as Subject, does not hold on to itself abstractly. It includes rather the inequality, the dissimilarity, the self-other-becoming or self-othering, the opposition in itself. In this sense being is the absolute living Substance which has arrived at its self-sameness through the mediation of self-other-becoming.

After this explanation of the concept of Substance, Hegel's text becomes understandable. With the substance that knows or the knowing Substance Hegel refers to the philosophy of reflection (*Reflexionphilosophie*)⁸; the knowing Substance is the whole of Spirit, and is prior to the form of this substance, namely, it appears earlier than its shape of Concept. This substance is the inwardness of Spirit that is not yet there as the Concept. For its shape of Concept is the superior result of the entire development of Spirit. As simple Substance it is the "undeveloped in-itself" or the immediate. Thus, Substance expresses only the imperfectness or the one-sidedness of Spirit in this stage of its development; hereby does Spirit unfold itself in an imperfect shape. This simple and immediate, accordingly, expresses the relation of the "picture-thinking consciousness" or the representative consciousness. What is there is the object of representative consciousness as such. The picture-thinking (or representative) consciousness is a knowing of the object, which represents itself to consciousness; but this knowing is not reflected, and it is not knowing of knowing itself.

Now this exposition can also be differently interpreted, and that is so:

The knowing Substance is Absolute Being in-and-for-itself.⁹ Then, it can be said that the consciousness of the Absolute Being in-and-for-itself, i.e.,

religion, exists earlier than philosophy. Surely religion, esp. Christianity or Manifest Religion¹⁰, on its part, manifests the Absolute Being in-and-for-itself; but the religious manifestation or disclosure is dissimilar to its content. There is sameness (identity, equality) first with Absolute Knowing. Hegel says that Substance is the “undeveloped in-itself”, namely, it exists as the stuff, undifferentiated, but as the inwardness of Spirit which should develop itself. What exists, is the object of the picture-thinking (representative) consciousness, religion.

Further determinations in addition to this are sounded by Hegel as follows:

“(Knowing-e.a.k.) ... is the spiritual consciousness for which what *is in itself* only *is*, in so far as it is a *being for* the Self and a being of the *Self* or Concept...”(PS,801/PM,799).

For that reason, Substance and its consciousness are richer in contrast to knowing. So, the disclosure or manifestation of Substance is, after all, secrecy or concealment, a self-less being, since for it (Substance) only the certainty of itself is manifested. Therefore, first of all, only the abstract moments of Substance are related to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness enriches itself in its pure movement until it takes away substance from consciousness.

Knowing receives all essentialities of consciousness from consciousness into itself, produces self-consciousness out of itself and, therefore, restores consciousness. This happens through the sublation (*Aufhebung*) of the negative relation or attitude of consciousness against the objectivity which is now posited

as positive. From the other side, in the Concept which knows itself as Concept, the constitutive elements come on the scene earlier than the Whole which is precisely the movement of these moments in its becoming. By means of consciousness the process is inverted. So, the Whole is found, but as inconceivable or incomprehensible, earlier than the moments themselves.

Thus, substance and its consciousness, i.e., religion which knows and interpretes the historical life, to the content, is richer than philosophy which does not know or interpret the historical becoming, since for philosophy what is in itself only is “a being for the Self and a being of the Self or Concept”. It means that in the course of history philosophy is self-consciousness and speaks of self-consciousness or consciousness of the Self. Therefore, in history philosophy is understood less and less than the consciousness of substance, and although it is poorer than religion, it is more essential or truer than religion. The disclosure or manifestation of religion is fundamentally the concealment, self-less being, since it can only manifest to itself the certainty of itself.

~~On the other hand,~~ philosophy is abstract; it indicates the different moments of substance, not yet the Whole. In the dialectical movement self-consciousness enriches itself and receives the entire substance of consciousness with its essentialities. Thus, self-consciousness manifests or exposes the totality of the Being. Thereby, philosophy turns into Science, and this produces again for consciousness the actuality which, therefore, changes into the object of self-consciousness. This object as the production or formation of self-consciousness is the comprehending becoming of Spirit but not the transcendent object; it is the

immanent and inward object of knowledge, that is, the Concept. This Science manifests the totality of the actuality, and the sole difference between them is that in actuality the Whole appears earlier than the moments. By means of Science it treats itself as inverted: consciousness stands over and against the totality of the actuality and does not understand it, or understands it only partially, or abstractly. It also manifests the Being always only in different moments. Contrary to this, Science knows that the Being is a synthesis of the different elements. In religious consciousness it knows differently. It knows the Being as the Absolute Being in-and-for-itself before it has become acquainted with the elements of its development, and, therefore, it is the “uncomprehended” Whole. For Science the Whole is the Being, which is manifested through Science, the same Being like that of the knowing Self, which has manifested Science.¹¹

The first proposition (or judgement) of the paragraph concerning Time runs: “Time is the Concept itself that *is there* and which presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition”(PS,801/PM,800).¹²

This signifies that Time as abstract negativity and as “intuited becoming” presents itself to consciousness as “empty intuition”, and therefore it is there or exists for consciousness as the empty Concept.¹³ The paragraph continues in the following manner: “for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears in Time just so long as it has not *grasped* its pure Concept, i.e. has not annulled Time”(PS,801/PM,800). Until the Concept has been grasped as pure Concept, Time remains the intuited Concept, which, as consciousness’ intuition, is destroyed by comprehension.¹⁴

Now the problem is how Spirit will comprehend itself. To its essence Spirit is the Concept, namely the Concept as “I=I”¹⁵ in the specific Hegelian terminology, that is, as the absorption and sublation of the other-being. This absorption and sublation of the other-being, as Heidegger formulated it in *Being and Time*, means that the pure Concept is “the grasping of this differentiation, a differentiation of the difference”(BT, 484). If that is so, then it is necessary that Spirit appear in Time, because it must comprehend or grasp its essence, its Concept, and this comprehension presents a temporal process. Time is only “the outer, intuited pure Self which is *not grasped* by the Self, the merely intuited Concept”(PS,801/PM,800).

If Spirit is firstly only “the outer, intuited pure Self” and not “pure Self” as the absolute negation or the negation of negation, so it necessarily appears in Time, to its essence, since self-comprehension or Concept carries itself out only as the temporal process. As it comprehends itself and becomes true Concept, which is, as we have discussed, eternal, its Time-form will be sublated.¹⁶

Because it is the goal of Spirit to comprehend its Concept, Time appears as “the destiny and necessity of Spirit”(PS,801/PM,800), or Time constitutes the outer necessity of Spirit, indeed of Spirit, which has not yet been completed within itself or which has not yet grasped its Concept or the form of the Self. For the certainty of Substance, the form must be manifested from Substance through Time. This is the process of the transformation of consciousness into self-consciousness or of the in-itself into the in-and-for-itself.

In consciousness Substance is of course in the form of the “*immediacy of the in-itself*”(PS,801/PM,800), or the in-itself is Substance, what is inward, which has to manifest itself. The self-realization and self-manifestation is the temporal happening of Spirit. Spirit must acquire the certainty of its own, that is, it must know or recognize itself in its other-being. This vindication of its self-certainty means that the completed Spirit, Spirit in its Concept, arrives at its beginning, at sensuous consciousness.

Since Spirit is a temporal coming-into-itself, Hegel puts forward the following thesis: “For this reason it must be said that nothing is *known* that is not in *experience*, or, as it is also expressed, that is not *felt to be true*, not given as an *inwardly revealed* eternal verity, as something sacred that is *believed*, or whatever other expressions have been used”(PS,802/PM,800).

Here does the term “experience” which passes through the entire *Phenomenology of Spirit* rise up. Under the term “experience” Hegel understands the following: consciousness explains through its single steps the object as the in-itself, as the true; however, it must always over and over again experience that to it this, its true, sinks into a mere knowing. Thus, it always undergoes anew the loss of its truth, but through this process, meanwhile, it becomes more knowable. So, the pathway of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is entirely the experience of consciousness.

Consciousness always suffers from again the loss of which it holds for the true, and, as it experiences the loss of its truth through its every single shape, it becomes more knowable. It always seems to him again that the claimed or

asserted truth sinks down it into knowing. From this, it develops for itself a new object as being-in-itself, but over and over again comes to the insight that this new object is also a knowing for consciousness. Therefore, with the term “experience” Hegel means the whole development of Spirit, which is the truth of consciousness, or the experience is the history of Spirit, and for that reason, Hegel can claim that all or everything that is known is in experience. “For experience is just this, that the content-which is Spirit-is *in itself* substance, and therefore an *object* of *consciousness*”(PS,802/PM,800-1). Hegel again goes on with: “But this substance which is Spirit is the process in which Spirit *becomes* what it is *in itself*”(PS,802/PM,801). This knowing spiritual Substance is the becoming of Spirit to what it is in-itself.

Here Hegel reiterates the fundamental characteristic of Spirit, which is the historicity¹⁷: at the end of the road to be as itself or “it is only as this process of reflecting into itself that it is in itself truly *Spirit*”(PS,802/PM,801).

So, Spirit presents itself to us as the movement, as the movement of the spiritualization of Substance, as the dialectical transformation of the in-itself into the for-itself, of Substance into Subject, and of the object of consciousness into the object of self-consciousness, or into the sublated object, that is, into the Concept. This movement is a “circle that returns into itself”(PS,802/PM,801).

The beginning of this movement is presupposed and will be reached at the end. This movement is the reflection in which Substance presupposes itself as the beginning, and only at the end reaches itself truly as Spirit. Thus already in-itself, Spirit is the movement of knowing in which the object of consciousness becomes,

in itself, an object of self-consciousness or the Concept. This dialectical movement, which is just Time or the pathway of Spirit to itself, is also in itself circular. The movement is, thus, a circle, and Science, which reveals this movement, must also be circular. This circular movement is Time or the essence of Spirit that presupposes its beginning and reaches it at the end.

Now the question is: what is present at the beginning? The dialectical movement of Spirit into itself or the history of consciousness? The history of consciousness is the opposition between consciousness and its natural world, so the beginning must be without this opposition, or, what is the same thing, without the Self. If the circle presupposes consciousness, then this means that consciousness presupposes the world.

This first identity between consciousness and the world is, so to speak, before consciousness or the uncomprehended beginning, and that is to say that this identity of the world is not revealed, since it separates consciousness from itself. This beginning of the world does not exist for consciousness; for the Being means for the Self that the Being is manifested through the Concept, but if there is a manifestation or disclosure of the Being, so is also consciousness. Consciousness is but the opposition between consciousness and the object, and that is the dialectical movement or Time. Consciousness means to be in the situation of knowing. Knowing is always also a self-knowing of knowing, or if I know something, then I also know that I know that, and while I know something, I know my own knowing. So, knowing is always a knowing of self-knowing. Time, that of consciousness has its beginning in a natural, given world. History-i.e. in the

Phenomenology of Spirit the history of Spirit as the surmounting of the opposition between consciousness and its object- has necessarily its end as the sublation of the historical Time and gaining or production of the absolute Identity. It is the end of the movement, and, in opposition to the first and presupposed, now is the attained or reached Identity or the comprehended Identity. It is the conceptually manifested Identity, and, therefore, Spirit reaches its presupposition only at the end. The end is the comprehended (known), absolute Identity.

For that reason, Science also, which manifests the entire activity of consciousness, is circular. This circular movement is the sole standard (or criterion) for its absolute truth.

If the history of consciousness is becoming or the process, none of its partial manifestations is true, since they are, again and again, sublated. The Concept is true in one moment, but in an other one untrue, and this happens in so far as only the whole of the moment does not change or modify itself; the totality of the process (or becoming) is always identical with itself. That is why only the manifestation of the totality-and that is Science- is the absolute truth.

The appearance of Science, therefore, signifies, at the same time, the end of consciousness and Time. Science is as circular as History, and only the circle of Science reiterates itself. The absolute Science maintains in itself no formal, absolute opposition (or negativity); it unfolds only the whole of the Being. Science appears firstly when consciousness has reached its identity with the object or when it has ceased to be a negative.¹⁸ The content of Science itself relates only to itself; the content is the Whole which must, therefore, continually renew itself.

This movement or Spirit is in itself different, and that is, in its Concept as “Time and the in-itself”(PS,802/PM,801).¹⁹ Hence, Substance as Subject has at first the “inward necessity” of unfolding itself, what it is in-itself, as Spirit, namely, the substantial content or Substance must present itself, first of all, as Spirit. This Spirit is Substance becoming a Self. The “inward necessity” means here to comprehend the necessity of Subject, of Spirit itself in its other-being. “Consequently, until Spirit has completed itself *in-itself*, until it has completed itself as world-Spirit, it cannot reach its consummation as *self-conscious Spirit*”(PS,802/PM,801).

That means, the history of consciousness has its end as world-Spirit, and firstly when Spirit has completed itself as world-Spirit, self-conscious Spirit or Science appears as the absolute truth.

Therefore, Hegel can say that religion articulates formerly what Spirit is, but only Science has the true knowing of itself, or philosophy is not only the true knowing of the Absolute, but it is also the true self-knowing of the Absolute. So, at the end of Time the totality manifests itself as the actuality, and Science as atemporal has the true Concept of the actuality. Hence, it can be said that Science is not temporal, but the Eternity which has manifested itself.

3.1.2 Actual History

At that point we can state that “world-Spirit” means world-History and that “self-conscious Spirit” is Science. In this connection we have already spoken of the relation between Time and Science, but now we must ask ourselves for the

relation between “world-Spirit”, or actual History, and Time, and for the character of the entire development which is called History. Hegel says the following: “The movement of carrying forward the form of its self-knowledge is the labour which it accomplishes as actual History”(PS,803/PM,801).²⁰ In this sentence Hegel apparently considers the actual History as the history of philosophy. So, the sentence is the first suggestive expression of Spirit which has come to itself.

Spirit knows that the dialectical movement of knowing, which it accomplishes as actual History, is its own activity, or what Hegel says: it is the labour which Spirit performed to produce the form of its self-knowing. This knowing is that which the Self has concerning itself. Thus, History appears as the historical development of self-consciousness or of philosophy into Absolute Knowing. With this the Self could manifest through Absolute Knowing its peculiar and historical concept of consciousness and its complete self-consciousness. In this regard, History presents itself as the synthesis of actuality and Time.

The foregoing quotation indicates also that Hegel knows Time only as historical Time and the true actuality only as temporal actuality. At all events in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he knows no actuality which outlives as kosmos or biological life, but only a temporal actuality: history of Spirit coming-to-itself. Again this quotation signifies that the dialectical movement of Spirit, which amounts to the actual History, is the necessary ground for the appearance of the absolute Science—certainly and solely in the completion of Spirit. Consequently, for Hegel, to its essence, actual History is history of philosophy.

At present, Hegel's following statements can be understood; for otherwise it could be now expected that he will speak about the actual History; instead of this, Hegel once more comments upon the difference between theology and philosophy and gives a summary of the whole modern philosophy. The problem (or question) here is why exactly here a summary of the modern philosophy takes place. As we have already known, for Hegel, philosophy or Absolute Knowing is the synthesis of consciousness and self-consciousness. According to this, every genuine philosophy aspires to such a synthesis, or at least, it strives after such a synthesis. To that extent, philosophy produces self-consciousness and renders possible self-knowing in the other-being. In this sense it is a matter of the self-comprehension of the spiritual Substance, and such a matter is examined in the first seven chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In these, consciousness is always opposed to self-consciousness.

Every genuine philosophy had tried to hold into the synthesis of consciousness and self-consciousness. But this synthesis is possible, from the Hegelian standpoint, only at the end of the history of consciousness. As long as there is History, that is, Spirit has not yet come into itself, consciousness always stands in opposition to its object; and thus, every synthesis is incomplete, since it stands in opposition to the actuality; and therefore, a form of consciousness or form of the world substitutes for another, because it is impossible to obtain the totality of thinking before it had actually accomplished itself.

Spirit starts from the religious community, which in its conscious existence has the substance of Absolute Spirit as an alien content. The labour of

Spirit consists in overcoming that alienation in different manners after it could not be overcome or ended within the religious Spirit. The sublation or overcoming of that alienation is the return into self-consciousness and its own world. It discovers the world as its own property. Thereby, it not only comes out of the intellectual world but *also* spiritualizes this abstract element with its actual Self.

First, coming out of the *intellectual world* through observation self-consciousness finds existence as thought and comprehends it and within its thinking it comprehends existence. In this way the immediate unity of thinking and being is expressed. With this, the *self-less* substance is taken up again in thought though only as abstract unity.

Second, individuality is posited over and against this *self-less* substance. Only through externalization in culture this individuality is brought to existence and established in all that *is there*. In this way Spirit comes to the thought of utility.

Third, only after this utility is grasped in absolute freedom as universal determination and existence as Spirit's will does Spirit turn into the thought of its inmost depths outwards and expresses the essence of thought as "I=I". This "I=I" is further determined as the movement that reflects itself into itself. In the "I=I", Substance has become Spirit and the movement of knowing itself is thus reached in-itself. This reflective movement is explained as the identity of the Self with its temporal development. This "I=I" thus includes the unity of thinking and Time, a unity that is, nevertheless, the pure identity with itself or the "I". Since "I" is identical to "I", the "I" is, as the form of Spirit's knowing, *the identity of the Self*

to itself. With this, this subject also has become Substance or immediate unity. The “I=I” is thus, in opposition to the “I”-individuality, the knowing or existence of the identity of Substance and subject. In this way, the knowing Substance is reached. Thus, the elements of phenomenology are historically present for consciousness, consciousness as self-certain “I” in its own totality.

Hegel characterizes the final situation before Absolute Knowing or philosophy as such illuminating form that it needs to be quoted:

“Substance, just by itself, would be intuition devoid of content, or the intuition of a content which, as determinate, would be only accidental and would lack necessity. Substance would pass for the Absolute only in so far as it was thought or intuited as *absolute unity*; and all content would, as regards its diversity, have to fall outside of it into Reflection; and Reflection does not pertain to Substance, because Substance would not be Subject, would not be grasped as reflecting on itself and reflecting itself into itself, would not be grasped as Spirit. If a content were to be spoken of anyway, it would, on the one hand, only be spoken of in order to cast it into the empty abyss of the Absolute, and, on the other hand, it would be a content picked up in external fashion from sense-perception. Knowledge would seem to have come by things, by what is different from itself, and by the difference of a variety of things, without comprehending how and whence they come”(PS,803/PM,803).

In this summary of the modern philosophy, later on, Hegel settles a matter with, especially, Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophies.²¹

Thereby, it is a question of Spirit which is self-consciousness, Absolute Knowing. For Fichte, says Hegel, Spirit is “the withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness”(PS,804/PM,804); and for Schelling “the mere submergence of self-consciousness into substance, and the non-being of its [moment of] difference”(PS,804/PM,804). Against that, for Hegel, Spirit is “*this movement* of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content”(PS,804/PM,804). Here the principal theses of the three thinkers stand opposite in a too comprehensive form. For Hegel the theses of Fichte and Schelling are untenable, because Spirit is neither the withdrawal of self-consciousness into itself from the world-this applies rather to the self-consciousness of the poet which lives in an imaginary world-, nor the submergence of it into substance and the loss of its own Self.

“Spirit is the movement of the Self”, which stands in opposition to the world and sublates this opposition. By the object the Self is taken into itself, but the Self brings itself forth at the same time in it as Subject.

Furthermore, Hegel designates Fichte’s philosophy as “the Subject’s differentiation of itself from its substance, or the Concept’s separation of itself from itself, the withdrawal into itself and the becoming of the pure ‘I’”(PS,804/PM,804) and Schelling’s thinking as a thinking in which “this difference is the pure act of ‘I’, the Concept is the necessity and uprising of *existence*, which has substance for its essence and subsists on its own account”(PS,804/PM,804).

For Hegel the absolute Spirit is “the Concept posited in determinateness and is thus also its *immanent* movement...which is Subject only this negativity and movement”(PS,804/PM,804). Here it is seen that Hegel opposes the movement of the Self to Fichte’s abstract ‘I’ and Schelling’s Substance. This movement of the Self is the History as the self-becoming of Spirit itself, and so only in their unity substance as the natural being and the subject or Spirit as historical world are those that render possible the appearance of the negative itself.

However, Hegel considers obviously the Fichtean and Schellingian positions as the necessary conditions of the absolute Spirit, or expressed differently, as the necessary development of consciousness; then the presence of existence as that of the Concept posited in determinateness is the immanent dialectical movement, that is to say, the movement consists therein that the Concept goes down into the simple substance (Schelling’s position), and through its negativity (Fichte’s position) and the dialectical movement (Hegel’s position) thus becomes Subject. Absolute Knowing which is the revelation of Substance, Spirit must, first of all, comprehend the self-becoming of Spirit itself.

In the last part of this paragraph Hegel once more turns against Fichte’s and Schelling’s theses. He defines Fichte’s position as a “self-clinging-to-itself” of the ‘I’ “in the *form of self-consciousness* as against the form of substantiality and objectivity, as if it were afraid of the externalization of itself”(PS,804/PM,804) and Schelling’s position as a “*tertium quid* that casts the differences back into the abyss of the Absolute and declares that therein they are all the same”(PS,804/PM,804).²² Against these Hegel holds the following thesis:

“The power of Spirit lies rather in remaining the selfsame Spirit in its externalization and, as that which is both *in itself* and *for itself*, in making its *being-for-itself* no less merely a moment than its in-itself”(PS,804/PM,804).

Contrary to Fichte and Schelling Hegel claimed that the dialectical movement of Spirit is a movement of opposition into identity and has to put being-for-itself and being-in-itself as its constitutive elements.²³

It means that at the beginning there is not yet a unity of Spirit, that in general it is not in any case recognisable, but that it, firstly, develops in Time as the surmounting of the opposition between knowing, ‘I’, certainty and the object, substance, the truth.

Now Hegel says further: “(...) knowing is this seeming inactivity which merely contemplates how what is differentiated spontaneously moves in its own self and returns into its unity”(PS,804/PM,804). So, knowing is “seeming inactivity”, since it only contemplates this eternal movement. This inactivity is “seeming”, because the fundamental presupposition for this contemplation is the activity or the movement of Spirit. The eternal identical Being appears at the end of the pathway of Spirit, i.e., Science as the contemplation of Being presupposes this activity. To that extent Science is also activity, and in fact as the contemplation of the activity and as the eternal circular movement.

With this Science is necessarily dialectical, since it discloses or manifests the dialectical Being: Being, which is the becoming or process and manifests itself in and through Time.

Beyond this, the dialectic of Science means something else; for after the appearance of Science the movement quits to be the movement of phenomenal knowing and turns into the movement of pure Concepts. The opposition between self-consciousness and its object has been overcome, and this dialectic is the pure conceptual dialectic of the eternal identical Being, of the Absolute.

The following paragraph begins with the essential determination of knowing. In it Hegel determines the obtained Absolute Knowing irrespective of its historical-phenomenal forms. Hegel says that in Absolute Knowing the movements of the shapes of Spirit are concluded: “In this knowing, then, Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has shaped itself, in so far as this shaping was burdened with the difference of consciousness [i.e. of the latter from its object], a difference now overcome. Spirit has won the pure element of its existence, the Concept”(PS,805/PM,804-5).

Knowing in which the shapes of Spirit are concluded is Absolute Knowing. At that point we must elucidate Hegel’s concept of knowing and the Absolute. For this we, first of all, examine the formal concept of knowing and thereafter Hegel’s concept of Absolute Knowing.

3.1.3 The Formal Concept of Knowing

It is peculiar to knowing that it must be always determined with respect to the known. Knowing is always only when the known exists, or the being of knowing is presence of known. Because if I do not know anything, then the known is no more there, or it has withdrawn from the presence, and at present no

knowing exists. But the known is the actual state of affairs or factual situation, that is, knowing conceived what the thing as such is. With this, the known, or what the thing is, appears as the essence. On the other hand, the thing, however, has on its part the presence in knowing. That means, knowing holds that thing, and thereby also itself as knowing in the presence.

By means of the disappearance of the thing itself, knowing itself also vanishes. As a further moment of the knowing, the knowing of knowing itself appears. Knowing does not know only what the thing is, the known, but it knows also itself as knowing. Therefore, knowing is not only the being of the known, but it knows the known as the knowing. When knowing and the known have one and the same presence, so the problem of the character of this presence has to be asked. When, firstly, the presence of the thing itself is knowing, and also knowing itself knows itself as knowing, so knowing knows itself as that thing itself, and it is itself the presence of that thing as such.

At that point we can now determine the following:

The self-knowing Knowing is the subjectivity and the known thing is the objectivity. The subjectivity knows itself as that which is the objectivity, as its own essence. So this knowing is one and the same presence of knowing and the known, of the subjectivity and objectivity. Here it can be seen that both are joined into an absolute unity as knowing and in knowing. From the Hegelian standpoint we can describe this unity of knowing as follows:

Knowing is, in the first place, self-knowing, subjectivity, unity of thinking and the thought, its self-determination, Spirit. Secondly, knowing is also the presence of that which is the object, the essence of the object as the presence of the known, that is, as the presence of that which does not determine itself, of the objectivity. This knowing which knows itself, is at the same time the presence of that which is the object. It knows itself as knowing of the object itself and so the presence of both. Hence, knowing is the self-knowing unity of itself and the object.

Knowing so understood is for Hegel the Absolute, because it fulfils the essence of the Absolute. If this is so, then this knowing must accomplish in itself the unification, or unity, of the opposites, and in that way the opposition exists, first of all, in such a unity. Such knowing must, therefore, be the unity of, e.g. the infinite and the finite, of the necessity and the freedom.

The infinite will be thought through the subjectivity, since thinking itself has always itself for the object. Thinking as such is not restricted and limited by means of its object; it is infinite. The object in return which does not think itself and has not itself for the object, has its limit in the subject as another, it ends in it; it is not a knowing-substance unity as Spirit, but it is just simple object and to that extent finite.

But the self-knowing Knowing does not know itself in the opposition to the object; it knows itself exactly in substance as that which is the object, as the essence of that which is the object. In the apprehension of the object in itself as its own content knowing truly is infinite. A knowing which retreats itself from the

object, so that this object becomes for this knowing finite, is not true infinite, but only a knowing which contains in itself the opposite of itself-namely, the object-and therefore, nothing more stands opposed to it at all. This infinite has no longer its limit in the infinite; it is with itself only in and with the finite. Knowing has the character of being with itself if it knows itself in the other, in the object.

The subjectivity is that which is free and self-determining, since it is not determined by an object as another. The object is, however, determined always through the other; it is, therefore, that which is necessary. Knowing is determined by that which it knows, by the object, and this forms the character of the necessity, which rules over every knowing. But knowing knows itself, in fact, as that which is the object; that is to say, the object is not for it foreign or unknown, the other; yet, it is the knowing itself in its own content. That means, further, determined by the object, knowing is determined only by that which is itself, but to be determined by itself is the essence of freedom. With this, both necessity and freedom are unified in knowing as one and the same.

The problem here is in what way or to what extent knowing actually unifies the opposition. Knowing knows itself as that which is the known, the object; so both the subject and the object are united in knowing and as knowing. Knowing as self-knowing, however, is a withdrawal (or returning) into itself of the self-differentiation from the known, object. It seems that in knowing the subjectivity (certainty) and the objectivity (truth) are both united and separated so that these opposites exist in knowing as separated only through their unity. Therefore, their unity is at the same time in itself a self-differentiation of

something from another thing. Knowing knows itself as the actual knowing only when it is that which is the object. If it would constitute itself only as knowing of itself (self-knowing) at the demarcation from the object, then were it a mere imaginary or fictitious, an empty, formal self-consciousness. So, it must realize itself as the essence of that which is the object. It must relate itself to itself as a self-knowing, and so the difference of knowing and the known is posited; yet, it knows itself in this self-differentiation exactly as that which is the object, and therein just lies the unity.

This unity of the subjectivity and the objectivity has thus no opposition. It has in itself the extreme opposites viz. Freedom and Necessity, the Infinite and the Finite. So, this highest unity is a self-knowing unity which can be, hence, called the subjectivity. This is the absolute subjectivity to which nothing stands opposed, since it cannot be related to any opposition outside of itself. It already contains in itself the other, the objectivity, and while it relates to the other, it relates exactly to itself. Hence, this absolute subjectivity is also the absolute objectivity.

3.1.4 The Pure Element of Spirit's Existence: Concept

After this discussion of the formal concept of Knowing, we can come again back to the related part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the preceding quotation we have already seen that Absolute Knowing is the final shape (or form) of Spirit, but this becomes only after the overcoming of the differences of consciousness. This means that the hitherto movement flows only within those differences of consciousness or that Absolute Knowing as the surmounted

difference is unhistorical. The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, so far “Absolute Knowing”, keeps this opposition in the unity of knowing and the object (truth). Hegel comprehends, therefore, the history of consciousness as the process or becoming of its knowing of self-aspiring-Spirit.

Thereby, “Spirit has won the pure element of its existence the Concept”(PS,805/PM,805). The Concept is this seemingly inactive knowing. Spoken traditionally, and Hegel thinks so, the truth is the agreement between the object and the Concept, and for that reason he can hold the view that the Concept has won its existence in knowing.

Spirit which discloses the Being, manifests also itself, or it wins its Concept through Absolute Knowing which is the totality of the Being. With this, Spirit turns into the Concept. This Concept is identical with its object, and accordingly, it is no more a matter of the Concept which has its ground in the negative ‘Self’ or in Time. It is, on the contrary, the Concept which is identical with itself, that is, the Concept that is identical with the same-remaining-Being which manifests the Concept. It is the absolute Concept. Consequently, the actual ground of this Concept is Science.

The following complicated and difficult propositions treat the problem of the Concept, or the problem of why now the existence of Spirit is the Concept and no more a shape of consciousness.

“The content, in accordance with the *freedom* of its *being*, is the self-alienating Self, or the immediate unity of self-knowledge. The pure movement of

this alienation, considered in connection with the content, constitutes the *necessity* of the content. The distinct content, as *determinate*, is in relation, is not 'in itself'; it is its own restless process of superseding itself, or *negativity*; therefore, negativity or diversity, like free being, is also the Self; and in this self-like *form* in which existence is immediately thought, the content is the *Concept*"(PS,805/PM,805).

These propositions illustrate two things: (1) in these propositions Hegel succeeds in setting up the main characteristics of his philosophy; (2) as a basic summary these propositions have an explanatory function in the development of consciousness (or self-consciousness) into Absolute Knowing.

This situation can be articulated in the following manner:

The content of knowing, according to the "freedom of its being", is, on the one hand, the self-externalizing (or alienating) Self and, on the other hand, "the immediate unity of self-knowing".

Here we recognize knowing in two respects: (1) free, self-externalizing, alienating Self, or the historical pathway of consciousness; (2) the Self as the immediate unity of self-knowing or the performed, realized Identity, namely, self-consciousness.

This "pure movement", the externalization and alienation, considered from the view-point of the content, is necessary for the progression or development of Spirit into Absolute Knowing, as it is unfolded in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is considered as the "pure movement", but also as the "distinct content" which is,

“as determinate, in relation”, or every historical stage of knowing (or consciousness), which is not in itself, but in relation, has in itself the anxiety or restlessness, the negativity, self-superseding process. For that reason, the necessity of Absolute Knowing is regarded as the "free being" and the "Self".

If the content is brought into existence in this “self-like form,”-and that it is in Absolute Knowing, where “the existence is immediately thought”- the content is Concept, that is, knowing has won existence as Concept in the form of self-consciousness. In the next sentence Hegel develops the thesis of Spirit which has won its Concept: “Spirit, therefore, having won the Concept, displays its existence and movement in this ether of its life and is *Science*”²⁴(*PS,805/PM,805*).

3.1.5 Science²⁵

With the acquirement of its Concept Spirit becomes Science, and by this Science is not a science concerning Spirit, but Spirit is Science. For Spirit is the Being manifested through the Concept, but the Concept which manifests the Being is Science; and, thus, Science and Spirit are the same. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* explicates the essence of thinking from the stand-point of natural consciousness which has not reached its own truth. In that manner, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* shows that natural consciousness in all its shapes is only appearing or phenomenal, but still not true, knowing. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents consciousness in its progression from the opposition of consciousness to the object into Absolute Knowing, or as the unity of knowing (certainty) and the object (truth).

This pathway runs through all the possible relationships of consciousness to the object and has for the result the concept of Science, the unity of knowing (certainty) and the object (truth). Thereby, on this course all the shapes (or forms) finally dissolve in Absolute Knowing as their truth. Absolute knowing turns out to be the truth of all forms of consciousness, because in it every separation (or, rather, opposition) of the object and knowing is overcome and, thus, knowing and the truth together become the same. Science, that is, the Science or System of Pure Reason, presupposes the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.²⁶

As for Science, Hegel says in the *Science of Logic*: “Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development and has the shape of the Self, so that the absolute truth of being is the known Concept and the Concept as such is the absolute truth of being”(SL,I,p.49).

The “thought” means here the thought of that which absolutely is, and what it is, is the “thing in itself”. But the thing in itself is not present here in such a way that thinking only wants for apprehending it. In this situation we would be again at the stand-point of mere phenomenal knowing, of natural consciousness. The truth of natural consciousness is Absolute Knowing; yet, it cannot be reached by consciousness, in so far as it remains a natural consciousness.

The thought is self-knowing Thinking, but it is just in the dimension of Absolute Knowing as much the thing in itself, and this self is just as much the

thought. Here, within the dimension of Absolute Knowing the Concept receives, as mentioned before, another meaning. The Concept will be now no more understood as a representation of something in which what is conceived is the Being; however, the Concept does not relate itself to the Being as another, since the Concept itself is what the Being is, and since what the Being is, is the Concept.

Thus, the Concept has no more that which it grasps as another out of itself, but it is itself what it comprehends. Such a Concept is an absolute Concept; that is to say, its relation to the thing is a self-relation of itself to itself. This thought, the unity of itself with what it is, or the absolute Concept, is just the object of the Science of Pure Reason. This Science can no more be developed within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Science, having for the object the absolute Concept, is then the *Science of Logic*. Its object is the Absolute, the true Self, the absolute identity of knowing and the truth, of Concept and the object. The *Science of Logic* has for its principle the Absolute Knowing, namely the sublated being of consciousness' object, being a subjective being-for-itself, on the one side, and a second being, objective one, on the other side. In Absolute Knowing the Being is known as the pure Concept in itself, as far as it comprehends that which it grasps as the Being in itself. The Concept is thus known as the true Being itself. That means, however, that both moments, the Concept, on the one hand, and the Being, on the other hand, are also preserved in Absolute Knowing.

If it were not the case, then generally no knowing would be possible, but only the undiscernible (or undistinguishable) Nothing of all-in-a-Being. Only in

mere phenomenal knowing both moments are represented as being-for-itself; on the contrary, in true, actual knowing they are known as the unity of an inseparable togetherness, and this unity constitutes the element of Science proper, or of the Science of Pure Reason. All differences which appear in the genuine, actual Science, all determinacies in their entire wealth are preserved in the element of the unity of the Concept and the object.

This is the Absolute; therefore, Science and its exposition (or presentation) are no more the exposition of phenomenal knowledge, i.e., no more the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but that of the Absolute in its pure conceptual and true, actual form, namely the *Science of Logic*. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is still yet the unfolding of Spirit only in its self-appearance; the *Science of Logic*, on the contrary, is the presentation of pure Reason, or of the Absolute in its Being-with-itself. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* transforms itself into the *Science of Logic*, in fact, at the point where consciousness succeeds in arriving at its truth, where the appearance of the opposition of consciousness against an object which is being-for-itself has been discarded and become Absolute Knowing.

At that point do the following questions arise: In what way does the existence of Spirit as Science differentiate itself from the existence of Spirit as the shape of consciousness, or in what way does the eternal revelation differentiate itself from the historical one?

Thereby, we have to ask the question: What is the difference between the goal of Spirit's becoming (or process) and the Becoming of Spirit itself?

Hegel says, moreover: “In this, the moments of its movement no longer exhibit themselves as specific (determinate) *shapes of consciousness*, but—since consciousness’ difference has returned into the Self— as *specific (determinate) Concepts* and as their organic self-grounded movement”(PS,805/PM,805). The *Phenomenology of Spirit* grasps the distinct shapes (or forms) of consciousness and exhibits in them the becoming of Spirit. In Science, however, the difference between the Self (knowing, certainty) and the object (truth, “in-itself”) “has returned into the Self”.

Therewith, this difference falls into the Self, or self-consciousness relates itself only to itself, and it has no object out of itself. So, self-consciousness remains in the identity with itself, and the movement of the Concept is no more a process (or becoming) of Spirit into itself; but it is a self-grounded movement of the Concept or Science.

Hegel formulates this difference as follows:

“Whereas in the phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of knowledge and Truth, and is the movement in which that difference is cancelled, Science on the other hand does not contain this difference and the cancelling it. On the contrary, since the moment has the form of the Concept, it unites the objective form of Truth and of the knowing Self in an immediate unity. The moment does not appear as this movement of passing back and forth, from consciousness or picture-thinking (representational consciousness) into self-consciousness, and conversely: on the contrary, its pure shape, freed from its

appearance in consciousness, the pure Concept and its onward movement, depends solely on its pure *determinateness*”(PS,805/PM,805-6).

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents in its each moment the difference between knowing and the object, consciousness and the Truth. In the dialectical movement this difference sublates itself always into a higher stage. In opposition to the dialectical-historical character of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* each moment in Science is in the form of the Concept, that is, in the identity of the Self and the object. This movement is now no longer temporal, but a movement of the Concept in accordance with its pure determinateness or a logical movement, and this constitutes the essence of Science.

So, the logical movement of Science explicates the movement of the manifested Being, and the movement of Being is in Time or as Time. Time, on the other hand, is the process of Spirit, and this means that the actual movement of Spirit's becoming complies with the ideal movement of Science. For that reason, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is just the first part of and an introduction to Science. It exhibits the historical movement of Spirit, and Science develops the eternal and logical movement of the absolute Concept, of the manifested Being.

Thus, it follows from this the necessity of the second part of the System of Science: the exposition of Spirit in its self-coming-to-itself, that is, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; and the exposition of the absolute Concept in its pure determinateness or the *Science of Logic*.

The following quotation illustrates the relation between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*:

“Conversely, to each abstract moment of Science corresponds a shape of manifest Spirit as such. Just as Spirit in its existence is not richer than Science, so too it is not poorer either in content. To know the pure Concepts of Science in this form of shapes of consciousness constitutes the side of their reality, in accordance with which their essence, the Concept, which is posited in them in its *simple* mediation as *thinking*, breaks asunder the moments of this mediation and exhibits itself in accordance with the inner antithesis”(PS,805/PM,806).

To every historical shape of consciousness corresponds an abstract determinateness of the Concept of Science. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents in the first seven chapters the gradual development of Spirit. The succession of these shapes exhibits the necessary process or becoming of Spirit into itself. Herein lies the necessity that Spirit in its becoming or in accordance with its different externalizations returns to itself, but these externalizations and sublations develop as the formation or unfolding of its pure Concept. Science as conceived or comprehended becoming of Spirit is the movement of the pure Concept of Spirit in its totality which necessarily embraces in itself every appearing (phenomenal) shape of Spirit in the form of abstract moment; and for that reason the content of appearing Spirit and the content of Science are the same. The totality of Being, Spirit, is just that which is in Time. The Being forms or unfolds itself, or it is produced, but it does not overcome itself, since there is nothing outside of the Being. Hence, the Being is not determinable or definable spatially

or temporarily; however, the Being is (or exists), since it manifests itself through the Concept.

Here we see again the same content of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science*. The movement of the absolute Concept in *Science* appears in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the temporal movement of Spirit. Therefore, fitting the “Preface” of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the science of consciousness and Spirit must be understood as the temporal appearance of Spirit and *Science* or the *Logic* as that which is Spirit in its absolute Concept or in-and-for-itself.

Thus, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* form a unity and only in this unity lies the truth of both. After the *Phenomenology of Spirit* we have to pass in to the *Logic* in order to understand or, rather, know what the pure knowing or the pure Reason is in-and-for-itself.

In the *Science of Logic*, it is known that Spirit is the pure Reason or the absolute Idea which comprehends or reveals itself, and that this manifestation or comprehension is just now possible, because Spirit as becoming or process is Time; in order to comprehend Spirit as becoming and Time, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* must be comprehended. In what way and to what extent Hegel succeeds in comprehending this purpose, namely the System of Knowing as the unity of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*, in compliance with the “Preface” to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we will discuss later.

3.1.6 The Externalization of the Concept

3.1.6.1 As Consciousness

In the next paragraph Hegel formulates his thesis concerning the circle of knowing or knowing as repetition.

“Science contains within itself this necessity of externalizing the form of the Concept, and it contains the passage of the Concept into *consciousness*. For the self-knowing Spirit, just because it grasps its Concept, is the immediate identity with itself which, in its difference, is the *certainty of immediacy*, or *sense-consciousness*-the beginning from which we started. This release of itself from the form of its Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of its self-knowledge”(PS,806/PM,806).

Science which is chiefly the result of the entire development of consciousness must, thus, necessarily²⁷ externalize itself and render possible the passage of the Concept into consciousness. The self-knowing Spirit which has grasped its Concept is, as it is argued, the identity with itself, identity of knowing and the object. Yet Spirit is in its difference the “certainty of immediacy”, or it knows its object as itself. This certainty of the self-knowing Spirit in its other-being is equal to the certainty of sensuous consciousness, and this is just the beginning of the whole development of Spirit.

Natural consciousness which stands at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, therefore, upholds to be the knowledge of the True.

It is true that Absolute Knowing turns out to be the Truth, but natural consciousness is, therefore, not simply false. It contains, in opposition of its every shape, so also in the shape of sensuous consciousness, the truth in itself, with the restriction yet that it is not the truth in its essence (or being), but only the appearing (or phenomenal) truth in its appearance. This first appearance of the truth is, thus, already the sensuous certainty which knows the 'Here' and the 'Now', the spatio-temporal determinateness. In Absolute Knowing, at the upshot of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the certainty turns into the truth, since it knows the truth as itself. Consciousness no longer clings itself to its opposition to the object; it is no longer mere subjectivity which is opposed to the objectivity, but it externalizes, at the same time, its subjectivity, relates itself into the object so as to find itself exactly in it. It is, thus, in itself a knowing being which relates to itself. So, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the whole shows that the pure, no longer infected with an alien (external) object, is the essence of the truth. It exhibits how consciousness necessarily progresses from shape to shape and only in Absolute Knowing obtains the truth which handles in itself with everything. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the doctrine of consciousness, the presentation of it and that consciousness has for itself for the result the Concept of Science, the Absolute Knowing, or the absolute Concept.

As the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has for its presupposition the sensuous certainty (or sensuous consciousness) from which it is started, so the *Science of Logic* has its beginning that which follows from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the result, namely that consciousness has arrived in the element of pure knowing,

of the self-knowledge in the other-being. The *Logic*, therefore, is the pure Science, Absolute Knowing in the entire sphere of its development.

Hegel manifests this as follows:

“The beginning is logical in that it is to be made in the element of thought that is free and for itself, in pure knowing. It is mediated, because pure knowing is the ultimate, absolute truth of consciousness. In the Introduction it was remarked that the phenomenology of spirit is the science of consciousness, the exposition of it, and that consciousness has for result the Concept of science, i.e., pure knowing. Logic, then, has for its presupposition the science of manifested spirit, which contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so the truth, of the standpoint occupied by pure knowing and of its mediation. In this science of manifested spirit the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous consciousness and this is immediate knowledge in the strict sense of the word; in that work there is discussed the significance of this immediate knowledge. Other forms of consciousness such as belief in divine truths, inner experience, knowledge through inner revelation, etc., are very ill-fitted to be quoted as examples of immediate knowledge as a little reflection will show. In the work just mentioned immediate consciousness is also the first and that which is immediate in the science itself, and therefore the presupposition; but in logic, the presupposition is that which has proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration—the Idea as pure knowledge. Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the entire range of its development. But in the said result, this Idea has determined itself to be the certainty which has become truth, the certainty which, on the one hand, no longer

has the object over against it but has internalized it, knows it as its own self and, on the other hand, has given up the knowledge of itself as of something confronting the object of which it is only the annihilation, has divested itself of this subjectivity and is at one with its self-alienation”(SL,I,pp.68-9).

In this element of pure knowing the complete development (or exposition) of Science remains to be included in its entire range.

To be sure, new differences appear continuously in this development, but they are known through and in pure knowing. Yet, what is present, for us, at the beginning of the *Logic* is just the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: knowing, which has sublated all the relationships to the other. That is something completely indiscriminate, simple immediacy in which all the differences are sublated. It is the simple immediacy of which nothing is to be said, as that it is. Therefore, this mere “it is”, the mere Being, is present without all relations and distinctions. Even this pure Being constitutes the beginning of the *Logic*.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* has, of course, for its result Absolute Knowing in which all the relationships to the other has been overcome. This is the simple immediacy by the fact that it says of itself that it only is. Now this knowing is also a self-knowing. So, the Absolute knows itself at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* only in simple way that it is; it knows itself as Being.

But now another question arises here, namely whether the Absolute does not, thereby, fall back into the stage of the sensuous certainty where the truth was equally the mere Being. Sensuous certainty (or sensuous consciousness) knows

only that it is. However, this knowing differentiates itself essentially from the knowledge of the Absolute or Absolute Knowing. Sensuous certainty knows in its representation the individuality of the individual as such a thing; it knows that the This-being of 'This' is the 'Here' and the 'Now', through which the individual-being is determinate. Moreover, in sensuous certainty the 'I', on the one side, and the object, on the other side, are separated.

Being, on the contrary, as which here shows itself the Absolute, means nothing other than Being as such, but not as the individual; it means that one, in which everything is an indiscriminate (distinctionless) one.

So, the *Logic* begins also with the pure Being. Since here it is the matter of Spirit, this means that the only thing that Spirit, the Absolute, thinks of itself is that it is. Because the Absolute thinks itself as Being, we must elucidate what this pure Being, with which the *Logic* begins, signifies.

Being is completely self-identical or equal to itself, it has not any distinction or diversity within itself, and it is not also distinguished against another. It does not illustrate any sort of determinacy in itself; since as far as a determinacy would have been identified in it, it would no more been held fast in its purity, it would be a determinate Being and not the pure Being itself.

So far it is but still known, so far it is that, as which the Absolute knows itself, then it must be held in a determinacy. The unique determinacy, in which it is held, is the complete indeterminateness, not-something-being, Nothing. In this sense to be a nothing constitutes the unique determinacy of pure Being. This

happens in Hegel so: "Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its immediate determinacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not equal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it; or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more or nor less than anything"(SL,I,p.82).

While pure being is thought as that which it is, it passes over (or, more truly has passed over) into the opposite of itself, Nothing. Being *is*, thus, while it passes over into nothing. Consequently, the Absolute knows itself as nothing.

To nothing, however, no determinacy belongs, because any determinacy would turn it into a something; it is, therefore, simple indeterminate. The only determinacy, in which it could be comprehended, is that it is. For it is that as what the Absolute thinks itself. Therewith, being is, in view of what it is, nothing; its sole determinacy is not to be something, but merely to be. So, Hegel must say: "Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content- undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing *is* (or exists) in our

intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition or thought itself and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as pure being”(SL,I,p.82).

In what sense are pure being and pure nothing the same? Neither is being in the sense that it exists for itself, since it, because it is, passes over into nothing, nor is nothing in the sense that it is (or exists) for itself, since it, as it is, is also being. What truly and actually is, is this that being has passed over into nothing, and that nothing has passed over into being. Thus, one transforms into other and does not sink down into a simple unity; rather, they are separate, however, so that they are inseparable, since every one transforms into the other. What, therefore, is present or exists, what truly is, is neither being nor nothing, but the movement of the disappearance of the one in the other. That is, thus, becoming, becoming in general and as such, the absolute essence of the becoming. Becoming means, thus, the transformation of the one into the opposite other, of being into nothing, and of nothing into being. Taken for themselves, being and nothing express themselves as abstractions, as one-sidednesses, because nothing of them alone constitutes the truth. Both are altogether in the transition into one another. Thus, the first truth of the Absolute is that the Absolute is neither being nor nothing, but becoming, the unity of being and nothing. What being in general destined in being, or the Being is now becoming. Concerning this, Hegel says: “Pure being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being- does not pass over but has passed over-into nothing, and nothing into being. But it

is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself'(SL,I,pp.82-3); and also says Hegel: "The same must be said of being and nothing, as was said above immediacy and mediation..., that nowhere in heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain within itself both being and nothing"(SL,I,pp.84-5).

Every being is being through the unity of being and nothing. This unity underlies as the first truth and constitutes the element of all further explications of the *Science of Logic*. Thus, all further determinacies of the *Science of Logic* are examples of this unity of being and nothing.

We cannot here trace all further unfoldings of the *Science of Logic*, because it was only our intent to show that to what extent or in what way the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the necessary presupposition for the beginning of the *Science of Logic* and to what extent both form in a necessary manner a unity.

Now here a general question appears relative to the system in Hegel, the question namely, in which way the *Science of Logic* as the Science of Pure Reason, genuine Science, or Noumenology, which has for the presupposition the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, with the *Phenomenology of Spirit* actually

forms the System of Science. This question to be explained we will discuss later on.

At present we would like to return again into our analysis of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The last sentence of the previously quoted paragraph writes: “This release of itself from the form of its Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of its self-knowledge”(PS,806/PM,806).

With this sentence at the end of the chapter “Absolute Knowing” the essential determinations of the becoming or process of Spirit as historicity (or historicity) begin. Seen from the stand-point of Absolute Knowing, the hidden necessity of History is the freedom of Spirit’s externalization of itself in space and time. Spirit knows that the whole history presents only the externalizations, objectifications or recollections of itself or that it exists in itself always only with itself and for that reason it lets itself happen in history. Since Spirit happens or is manifested in history, -but not in the “form of its Self”, yet in the other-being- it brings about only its freedom: Freedom that to be what it is. Therefore, the becoming of Spirit, its knowing becoming, is the history of its externalization and intensification, a self-externalizing release of that which it actually is; it is a release, in which it exactly presents and produces its genuine freedom. Here Hegel continues further:

“Yet this externalization is still incomplete; it expresses the connection of its-self-certainty with the object which, just because it is thus connected, has not yet won its complete freedom. The self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to

sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the externalization in which Spirit displays the process of its becoming Spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure Self as Time outside of it, and equally its Being as Space. This last becoming of Spirit, *Nature*, is its living immediate Becoming; Nature, the externalized Spirit, is in its existence nothing but this eternal externalization of its *continuing existence* and the movement which reinstates the *Subject*”(PS,807/PM,806-7).

This externalization, which has for the object the certainty of itself, is, because it is the relation with the other, not yet the complete freedom.

Knowing, having not for the object itself, is limited, that is, its limit lies in the external or alien object. Thus, the limit is the negative. Here does the concept of ‘limit’ emerge, which is not further developed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In order to explain completely, why the limit is the negative or sacrifice, we must clear up this concept more precisely.

The concept of limit is scrutinised in the *Science of Logic*, in that it means: “(...) the limit which something has relatively to the other is also the limit of the other as a something, its limit whereby it keeps the first something as its other apart from it, or is a non-being of that something; it is thus not only non-being of the other, but non-being equally of the one and of the other something, consequently of the something as such” (SL,I,p.126).

Something, being-in-itself, differentiates itself from such a thing that which is out of it, from the other; it is thus always a something in the preservation

against an other, in fact it is that what it is, since it denies the other.

What each thing joins closely with itself and equally differs from the other, is the limit. Thus lies in the limit, as Hegel says, non-being, or nothing of the other. The limit keeps the other off something or prevents the other from something, and precisely because something keeps the other off itself through itself, it maintains itself as that which it is. Now the other itself is a something: the limit, through which something keeps the other off itself, and this is at the same time the limit of the other. It means that each thing, whereby the other keeps something on its side off itself, is the limit; it means not only the non-being of the other, but also the non-being of the one as of the other. Something is thus that by which each of both ceases and by which its non-being begins; something has its limit not only against something other, but also in itself as its determinacy. It is, what it is, only by means of the limit. So, the limit is the middle between both, in which both quit. Both get their existence beyond from each other and from the limit. The limit is thus for each of both always the other, each is distinguished by its limit, since it has this exactly in the other, in which what it is not. But each thing is at the same time identical with its limit, because this constitutes its determinateness. From the determination which something itself has its determinative limit in the other, in which, what it is not, follows that it shows in itself more things about itself, that it shows the other through which it actually is that what it is. With this it determines the limit as its being and passes over into this.

If so to have one's limit means to pass over into the other of itself, then, on the one hand, the contention of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is clarified in that the relation of the certainty manifests the unfree connection, and, on the other hand, the necessity of Spirit's new externalization is grounded or justified. Spirit is, so, essentially that which expresses itself, it is, according to its essence, self-revealing, but in such a way that only coming out of itself, it truly is itself, in the return of itself into itself. Its becoming of itself displays itself "in the form of free contingent happening". What does now "in the free contingent happening" mean?

With this the following is meant: If the becoming or process of Spirit is free and contingent happening, then, from the stand-point of Spirit, as the result of the becoming, therefore from the stand-point of the Absolute, its pathway or its process can be reconstructed. However, this pathway cannot be predicted from the beginning. Since Spirit is the identity of being and the Self, from this the previous difference and the road of its sublation might be deduced.

But from the original division neither the sublation of the difference nor the pathway which leads to this sublation is known a priori. For this reason, this process, namely History, is the free flowing or course of contingent events.

This externalization or this becoming of itself into itself (or for itself) is, on the one hand, "pure Self as Time outside of it" and, on the other hand, "its Being as Space".

The one side of the externalization is thus History, the other Nature. Here the inner equivocation of History seems as the self-production of Substance

displaying itself, as the side of for-itself and its other-being, as the pure Being for-itself as Time and Being as Space. This ambiguity finds its strangest expression in the essential determinations of History concluding the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

3.1.6.2 As Nature

The freedom that consists in externalizing the form of the Concept is the highest freedom. This freedom is not completely comprehended in the form of self-consciousness. In sensuous certainty, sensuous consciousness, the object remains connected with consciousness, which is always consciousness of this object. The externalization into the sensuous certainty is sufficient for the *scientificity* of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in so far as it justifies its beginning through it. Science itself, however, must know not only the forms of consciousness (knowing), but also the other, the negative of knowing. This negative is the externalization of Spirit as Concept: Nature.²⁸

Nature is “immediate becoming” of Spirit, therewith it is, as the externalized Spirit, always that which remains the same with itself; and the being of Spirit as Space and Nature is eternal, that is, it is outside of Time. The eternal externalization of Spirit embraces in itself the becoming and the movement, but this is really a concern of an atemporal movement. This movement of Nature does not include in itself any negativity, and, therefore, this movement of Being as Space remains eternally the same with itself. But Nature is not a shape within the history of Spirit, however, it is rather the essential moment of Spirit or the peculiar (genuine) presupposition of Spirit or History.

Spirit is in its occurrence always Nature; or it happens with and against and in Nature. Thus, Nature must be, so to speak, adjudged a genuine becoming by the side of the peculiar History, in which Substance occurs as self-consciousness. In the becoming of Nature Substance is a being-for-other.

But, through that, the unity of the Whole, of Spirit is not understood in two independent manners of Being, because the Being-concept of Spirit includes in itself the unity of being-for-itself and being-for-other and the unity of self-consciousness and of Being.

Thus, in accordance with the traditional scope of Being, both essential moments of Spirit split only likely, on the one hand, into being-in-itself for other as “living immediate becoming” of Nature, as Being in Space, and, on the other hand, into Self for itself as “the movement (or becoming) which reflects itself into itself”, into self-consciousness as “pure Self” in Time.

However, both ways of Spirit unifies in the unity and totality of the existing substance as Subject, of the actual and manifested Spirit, because Spirit is Nature as much as self-consciousness. Therefore, it makes in its becoming, in History, the ahistorical Nature in itself historical, as it knows and comprehends it as the manner of its existence, but it lets it become at the same time into its World.

Consequently, Nature is in its truth the dissolution and sublation of that what it is in itself immediate: the negation and sublation of its thinghood. Hence, says Hegel, that: “Nature, the externalized Spirit, is in its existence nothing but

this eternal externalization of its *continuing existence* and the movement which reinstates the *Subject*”(PS,807/PM,807).

Now, nevertheless, the relation (or connection) between Nature and History becomes unclear. It is, of course, obvious that Nature cannot be determined as a specified manner of Being, and in fact of History. Now we have before us the following situation:

On the one hand, History pertains to the happening of the whole of Being as Spirit, and with this it is the unity of “living immediate becoming” and “the movement which reflects itself into itself”. Thereby, Nature is involved in this History and becomes in itself historical. On the other hand, however, History signifies only “the movement which reflects itself into itself” of self-consciousness, which has always before itself Nature and with which it comes to an understanding with itself in its occurrence. This equivocation of History, a becoming next to the other and also the entire becoming, Hegel sublates in the following manner:

3.1.6.3 As History

In the history of the whole Spirit the “living immediate Becoming” is transcended in the “movement that reflects itself into itself”. These ways of Becoming are the ways of the externalization of the entire Spirit, but only in so far as the externality of Nature is taken into the history of self-consciousness and transferred into the form of self-consciousness. Now, but, “the movement which reflects itself into itself” is also as history of the entire Spirit an externalization or

an occurrence in the other-being; however, this externalization means at the same time the coming-into-itself of the absolute Spirit, its recollection (inwardizing).

Decisively Hegel explains once more this inner ambiguity of History that it is in itself at the same time externalization and recollection, negativity and negation of negation. Therefore, Hegel says:

“But the other side of its Becoming, *History*, is a *conscious*, of self-*mediating* process- Spirit emptied out into Time; but this externalization, this kenosis, is equally an externalization of itself; the negative is the negative of itself”(PS,808/PM,807).

Having been seen from Absolute Knowing, and this is merely the actuality of Spirit, its History is the movement or becoming “which reflects itself into itself”. This is no longer an immediate becoming but rather a becoming that knows itself and that mediates Nature and itself within this knowing. It is a sacrifice and externalization, a free self-release into the other-being. The actual History is a “succession” of the actual shapes. But, this succession happens “in the form of free contingent happening”. None of these shapes is in the form of Absolute Knowing, only the last one which concludes and sublates all shapes and alone presents Spirit’s pure “form of the Self”. Again, however, this succession of the different actual shapes is essentially the negation of Spirit in its self. This succession of the shapes develops in Time, and Time is the outer existence and simple universal medium for the exposition of the truth of Spirit, which is not yet self-equality. As far as this succession is the negation of Spirit, Time is the authentic, proper element in which Spirit externalizes itself.

“History is... Spirit emptied out into Time”. So long as the becoming or process of Spirit settles itself in a succession of the distinct actual shapes and thereby falls into parts viz. past, present, and future, Spirit is always a “no more” or not yet, or it is not still completely itself or with itself.

Time itself is thus negative, or Time is the negativity of Spirit, and in this negativity and externalization the sublation and the coming-into-itself of Spirit are carried out. Thus, the externalization becomes an “externalization of itself”, i.e., “the negative is the negative of itself”. However, Hegel continues further:

“As its fulfilment consists in perfectly *knowing* what *it is*, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its *withdrawal into itself* in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection”(PS,808/PM,807).

The fundamental characteristic of History demonstrates itself as the reciprocal process of the externalization, objectification and recollection, and the sublation of them. In its fulfilment or completion, in its absolute self-Knowing, its Knowing is at the same time the release of its outer existence and sinking, at times, into the objective mode of its Being. This its occasionally sinking into a concrete shape is, however, an actual “empire of the world”, because every “empire of the world” is in itself only an externalization of Spirit. If it gives its sublated or transformed existence in its withdrawal into itself over to recollection, then this recollection (or inwardizing) is above all pure self-consciousness, pure being-for-itself.

Hegel expresses moreover as follows:

“Thus absorbed in itself, it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness; but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved, and this transformed existence—the former one, but now reborn of the Spirit’s knowledge— is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit”(PS,808/PM,807).

This “night²⁹ of self-consciousness” is actually a unity. On the one hand, it is negative as the mere inwardness, on the other hand, positive as the intensification or as the empire of the authentic, genuine recollection.

The concept of recollection, which is a decisive concept for the essential determination of the historicity, is analysed by Hegel in its essential double meaning. In the “night of self-consciousness” the “transformed existence” of Spirit is sunk in its temporal shape or in its concrete “empire of the world”; but Spirit is through this not lost, however precisely preserved and sublated.

Time comes into effect, thereby, as “pure freedom against the other”. Time is the simple universal medium, in which itself all the differences of the movement are dissolved. The differences of the movement, in regard to the medium of Time, are past, present, and future. They are the performed shapes of Time, in which the entirety of Spirit moves itself.

Time itself essentially exists in these differences as the permanently preserving and moving Self, or Time exists only as past, present and future. Time is not absorbed in these distinctions, but rather it sublates all these distinctions in their unity and includes this in itself as universal Self.

So, Time is in its pure form the permanent and free self-equality (or self-identity) in the other-being. Thus, the totality of Spirit is united in this “simple universal medium”, in this self-moving unity of past, present and future. The totality of Spirit is so in its authentic actuality “Absolute Knowing” or “Science”, and, therefore, Spirit is in Time and appears in Time.

For this reason, since Time is the form of its actuality, Spirit, being in Time, cannot let its past shapes be lost, but it sublates them in itself and mediates through knowing its present with the past.

Time, which, on the one hand, constitutes the externalization of Spirit, renders possible, on the other hand, the recollection, that is, the surmounting of this externalization. If Spirit goes into the “night of self-consciousness” from the withered existence of its shape, then it finds therein the recollected (or intensified, inwardized) shapes of its withered outer (external) existence. This existence is now open to the true knowing of self-consciousness and can be known in its truth. For the externalized existence of Spirit as such is also a barrier which knowing cannot exceed for the existing knowing in the externalization.

Only a sunk, but recollected shape of the existence might render possible the true knowing of that which has existed: a new born existence from knowing. So long as Spirit is in the related present shape of the existence or in the empire of the world, it is in the externalization, and accordingly its knowing about itself is caught in this externality; or, it cannot reach its true existence of itself, its essence. Only in the destruction, in the absorbed being of each external existence and its sublation the true knowing of itself is possible. Only the recollecting Spirit is free

by itself and for itself, and this makes possible for it from the true knowing of itself to carry out a new existence. For this reason, the recollection is the inwardizing and “in fact the higher form of the substance”(PS,808/PM,808).

Here we see once more that in the history of Spirit each shape happens always necessarily from the decline and from the recollection of a preceding shape, and that the following shape of the world is always grounded necessarily in the recollection of the former, in its knowing and in its truth.

The recollection characterizes in fact the relation of the recollection to its preceded externalizations, but the reference to its following shape of the existence must also yet be discussed and argued.

The recollected Spirit, which has comprehended the truth of its perished shapes in the inwardness of its self-consciousness, must produce a new shape of existence from this knowing. It belongs to the essence of Spirit that it reveals itself, since it is in the externalization and in the manifestation of that which it is, that what it is. A new existence, “a new world in the shape of Spirit” comes from the transformed or sublated existence. The new existence is but again the immediate externalization. In it, “in the immediacy of this new existence, the Spirit has to start afresh to bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits. But recollection, the *inwardizing*, of that experience, has preserved it and is the inner being, and in fact the higher form of the substance”(PS,808/PM,808).

In such a manner Spirit in its history goes from one shape to the other, it enriches and performs itself always deeper and deeper and takes itself into itself more and more from its externalization until it has sublated in Absolute Knowing all its externalizations and knows itself in self-knowing as all actuality. Consequently, History has a goal:

“The realm of Spirits which is formed in this way in the outer world constitutes a succession in Time in which one Spirit relieved another of its charge and each took over the empire of the world from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of the depth of Spirit, and this is the *absolute Concept*”(PS,808/PM,808).

Thus, the truth of the totality of Spirit lies in the Concept of comprehending Spirit, and the existence of this truth is as such the absolute Concept.

The final thoughts reflect in Hegel in the following way:

“This revelation is, therefore, the raising-up of its depth, or its *extension*, the negativity of this withdrawn ‘I’, a negativity which is its externalization or its substance; and this revelation is also the Concept’s Time, in that this externalization is in its own self externalized, and just as it is in its extension, so it is equally in its depth, in the Self”(PS,808/PM,808).

The manifestation of that which is Spirit in its “depth” happens only as the externalization which is at the same time the sublation of its extension, its Space-

existence. The force of this sublation, that is, the sublation of the other-being, is the negativity of 'I' and Time.

The definite *goal* is Absolute Knowing or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit. The road to this goal is the recollection of the Spirits themselves as they appear in their succession and elaborate their realms. In this recollection, they are preserved in two ways: as History and Science of phenomenal knowing. History is the side of their free existence in Time which appears in the form of contingency or external (outer) necessity. The science of phenomenal knowing is the side of the conceived organization. Where both come together, Knowing is absolute and History is conceived. Only there coincide the internal necessity of the *Knowing* and the external necessity of *History*. For Hegel, this *conceived History* forms Absolute Knowing, the recollection and the "Golgotha of Absolute Spirit".

Through this, History, which is essentially in the externalization happening recollecting itself, is the condition of the possibility of Absolute Spirit: "the actuality, truth, and certainty of its throne"(PS,808/PM,808), as in itself recollecting and recollected, knowing and known History. Spirit does not unite with mere History. In History it knows the Spirit as itself, namely, as its Absolute Concept.³⁰

END-NOTES

¹ The stratification of the chapter on “Absolute Knowing” can be found in the following texts: H.F. Fulda, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, p.97; R. Maurer, *Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte*, pp.72-73; H. Kianz, *Hegel's Phenomenology*, vol.2, p.173; L.De Vos, “Absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology” in *Hegel on Ethical Life, Religion and Philosophy* ed. by A. Wyyleman, p.232. For the overviews which do not give any structure, see R. Mcrae, *Philosophy and the Absolute*, pp.25-34; Q. Lauer, *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp.286-300; J. Hyypolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp.573-606; Friedrich Grimmlinger, “Zum Begriff des absoluten Wissens in Hegel's ‘Phänomenologie’ “, in *Geschichte und System*, pp.279-300; Claus-Artur Scheier, *Analytischer Kommentar zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, pp.652-702.

² Cf. R. Devos, “How Absolute is Hegel's Absolute Knowing?”, *The Owl of Minerva*, 30, No.1, Fall 1998, p.50, note 19. In connection with Hegel's passage that “Science contains within itself the necessity of externalizing the form of the Concept, and it contains the passage of the Concept into consciousness. (...) This release of itself from the form of the Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of its self-knowledge”(PS,806/PM,806), Devos argues that “Hegel suggests here that the *Phänomenologie* has a double movement and a two-fold structure. The first movement is the experience of consciousness itself, a series of self-tests whereby new objects before consciousness and consciousness evolves from one form into another. This is the text as it is *for consciousness itself*. The second movement is

the text *für uns* whereby we know the movement as necessary. This gives the series of experiences a conceptual character and constitutes it as the science of the experience of consciousness, as indicated in the original title of the *Phänomenologie, Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins.*”

³ Cf. *PS*,5: “The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it. But the *external* necessity, so far as it is grasped in a general way, setting aside accidental matters of person and motivation, is the same as the inner, or in other words it lies in the shape in which time sets forth the sequential existence of its moments. To show that now is the time for philosophy to be raised to the status of a Science would therefore be the only true justification of any effort that has its aim, for to do so would demonstrate the necessity of the aim, would indeed at the same time be the accomplishing of it.”

⁴ “Being with itself in its otherness” or “*Pure* self-knowing in absolute otherness”: This formula is characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy. It restates more fundamentally and precisely that the *true* must be viewed “not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*”(PS,17/PM,86). Cf. H. Marcuse, *Hegel’s Ontology and Theory of Historicity*.

⁵ Cf. L. De Vos, *op.cit.*, pp.244ff.: “Spirit as science must appear not only as conceiving but also as an ‘I’ that is there. The science of the appearing spirit cannot appear as concept that is-there before spirit has come to consciousness about itself or to the being-there of the knowing ‘I’. Only after the completion of

the labour of history has spirit itself temporarily come to the configuration of the concept. For the consciousness of spirit, its self-consciousness is united with its consciousness, the content of spiritual consciousness within itself. Spirit, however, insofar as it is conceiving in general and thus only the movement of knowing itself, has not yet grasped the whole of spirit's givenness in being-there."

⁶ The historical allusions here are, on the one hand, Spinoza and, on the other hand, Kant and Fichte. Cf. *PM*, 80.

⁷ With this Hegel differentiates his concept of Spirit or Subject from Fichte's and Schelling's concepts of *intellectual intuition* or Absolute Subject.

⁸ For the philosophy of Reflection, see Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge*.

⁹ De Vos, *op.cit.*, p.245, note 39, writes: "Knowing substance is absolute knowing in-itself or substance."

¹⁰ We prefer the name "Manifest Religion" to "Revealed Religion", because in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel emphasizes upon the divine produced in consciousness more than on revelation as an activity being external to consciousness. For the *revealed* character of Christianity, the absolute Religion, see Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. Also R. Devos, "The Significance of Manifest Religion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*", in *Hegel on Ethical Life, Religion and Philosophy* ed. by A. Wylleman.

¹¹ L. De Vos, *op.cit.*, p.247ff., reads the passage in the following way: "Cognizing as conceptual movement only knows the abstract moments of substance. But

insofar as these pure moments drive themselves along, the concept, which as the 'I' is at first negative as against substance, becomes equally a positing of all the essentialities of substance. In this way, the moments of the concept come before the concept as a whole in the positing of the concept or in the presentation of phenomenology. Yet the becoming of the fulfilled whole is the movement of the abstract, pure moments. In consciousness, however, the unconceived and represented whole that is-there is prior to the moments.”

¹² For a further exposition of the concept of Time in Hegel's philosophy, see in this study the supplementary section “Time and Concept”.

¹³ Cf. Maurer, *op.cit.*, p.80ff.

¹⁴ Temporal becoming thus transforms itself into pure movement in and through Absolute Knowing.

¹⁵ See the supplementary part on “Time and Concept” in this study.

¹⁶ For a reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a phenomenology of Time, see Michael Murray, “Time in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*”, *Review of Metaphysics* 33,1981, pp.682-705.

¹⁷ Cf. H. Marcuse, *op.cit.*

¹⁸ Cf. *PS*,37: “The disparity which exists in consciousness between the 'I' and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the *negative* in general... Now, although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the

'I' and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the 'I', it is self-like or the Concept... With this, the Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded. What Spirit prepares for itself in it, is the element of [true] knowing."

¹⁹ Cf. De Vos, *op.cit.*, p.246: "Precisely because of this structure of spirit as cognizing itself, the intuited whole, which itself break up into content ("in-itself"-e.a.k.) and intuited concept ("Time"-e.a.k.) differentiates itself from simple cognizing self-consciousness."

²⁰ Cf. Marx's understanding of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "The greatness of Hegel's phenomenology and its end result- the dialectic of negativity as motive and productive principle- is thus... that Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process, objectification as de-objectification, as alienation (*Entäusserung*) and the overcoming of this alienation; in other words, that he grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man, who is true man because of his reality, as the result of his own labour"; cited in Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p.43.

²¹ Hyppolite, *op.cit.*, does not comment upon this.

²² Cf. *PS*,16: “Nowadays we see all value ascribed to the universal Idea in (..) non-actual form, and the undoing of all distinct, determinate entities..... is allowed to pass muster as the speculative mode of treatment. Dealing with something from the perspective of the Absolute consists merely in declaring that, although one has been speaking of it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute, the $A=A$, there is nothing of the kind, for there all is one. To pit this single insight, that in the Absolute everything is the same, against the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such fulfillment, to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black- this cognition naively reduced to vacuity.”

²³ L. De Vos, Hyppolite, Lauer, Scheier in their works do not mention Fichte and Schelling. For the historical configurations related to the actual History, see Baillie’s English translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *PM*,802-3.

²⁴ Cf. *PS*,26/*PM*,86: “Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this Aether as such, is the ground and soil of science or knowing in general.”

²⁵ Concerning the status and the content of the term “Science” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*(1807) and more particularly in the chapter on “Absolute Knowing”, Otto Pöggeler and the members of the Hegel-Archiv at Bochum refer to the speculative philosophy of the *Realphilosophie 1805/06* as the most appropriate logical science of the period, as one to which the development or movement in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be set parallel: see O. Pöggeler, “Die Komposition der Phänomenologie des Geistes”, *Hegel-Studien, Beiheft*

(Supplement) 3, 1966, pp.27-74, O. Pöggeler, "Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes" in O. Pöggeler's *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, pp.231-298, H. Kainz, *Hegel's Phenomenology*, vol.2, pp.183-184, W. Bonsiepen, *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften*, J.H. Trede, "Phänomenologie und Logik", *Hegel-Studien*, vol.10, 1975, pp.173-209.

For the different approaches: see H.F. Fulda, "Zur Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes von 1807", *Hegel-Studien, Beiheft (Supplement)* 3, 1966, pp.73-101, H. Schmitz, "Die Vorbereitung von Hegels 'Phänomenologie des Geistes' in seiner 'Jenenser Logik' ", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, vol.14, 1960, pp.16-39, J. Schwarz, "Die Vorbereitung der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* in Hegels Jenenser Systementwürfen", *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Kulturphilosophie*, vol.2, 1936, pp.127-159. Scheier, *op.cit.*, gives a strange logical structure. J. Heinrichs parallels it with the logic and metaphysics of *Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature 1804/05*, in J.H. Trede, "J. Heinrichs: Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bonn:1974)", *Hegel-Studien*, vol.11, 1976, pp.228-234. Mc Rae, *op.cit.*, p.41, in an appendix, without further comment, parallels it with Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which is impossible to prove. De Vos, *op.cit.*, p.250, note 57, does not specify here whether Science is just *Logic* or the entire further system. For him, everything points first of all to logic, which structures the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

²⁶ De Vos, *op.cit.*, p.267, and F. Grimmlicher, *op.cit.*, p.283, see a relation of mutual presupposition between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of*

Logic. But to this understanding Hegel's attempt to justify the speculative philosophy *fails*. With this approach, the totality *sui generis* of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is repudiated. For this view, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is only one example of method, i.e., "determinate negation", concretized in consciousness, and not a possibility condition of the *Science of Logic*. It should be mentioned that the process working in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the "throughgoing scepticism" or self-completing scepticism". Contrary to this, the *Science of Logic* is the sublated scepticism and in it the "thoroughgoing scepticism" does not work. In point of fact, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is also the historical presupposition of the *Science of Logic*.

²⁷ This necessity rests upon the fact that knowing comprehends its self-differentiation from itself as consciousness (*PS,799/PM,798*) and of comprehensive (conceptual knowing) (*PS,805/PM,804-806*). J. Hyppolite, *op.cit.*, pp. 601ff., reads this passage as the return from speculative philosophy to *phenomenology*.

²⁸ To De Vos, *op.cit.*, p.252, note 64, Nature is not defined here with regard to the relation to the Idea but with regard to Spirit, with Spirit being an all-inclusive category which contains both the *Science of Logic* and *Realphilosophie*.

²⁹ Cf. The concepts of "night" and "recollection" (*Erinnerung*) in the *Jenaer Systementwürfen (Hegel and the Human Spirit)*. When in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* the recollection (inwardizing) is understood as *going-into-itself* of Spirit "in the night of its self-consciousness", this terminology fits to that of the

Realphilosophie (Philosophy of Spirit of 1805/06) in which the night of the Self that the object is sunk into is spoken. See *Hegel and the Human Spirit*, p.87.

³⁰ For “Golgotha”, see S. Crites, “The Golgotha of Absolute Spirit”, in *Method and Speculation in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp.47-56; cf. also “Speculative Good Friday” in Hegel’s *Faith and Knowledge*, p191.

For divergent views in the recent discussions on Absolute Knowing, see S. Houlgate, “Hegel and Fichte: Recognition, Otherness, and Absolute Knowing”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.26,1,(Fall 1994), pp.3-39, J. Burbidge, “Hegel’s Absolutes”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.29,1, (Fall 1997), pp.23-37, S. Lumsden, “Absolute Knowing”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.30,1, (Fall 1998), pp.3-32, Rob Devos, “How Absolute is Hegel’s Absolute Knowing?”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.30,1,(Fall 1998), pp.33-50, S. Houlgate, “Absolute Knowing Revisited”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.30,1 (Fall 1998), pp.51-67, J.C. Flay, “Absolute Knowing and the Absolute Other”, *The owl of Minerva*, vol.30,1 (Fall 1998), pp.69-82, R.R. Williams, “Towards a Non-Foundational Absolute Knowing”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.30,1 (Fall 1998), pp.83-101, J. Burbidge, “Absolute Acting”, *The Owl of Minerva*, vol.30,1 (Fall 1998), pp.103-118.

CHAPTER 4

THE RELATION OF THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT* INTO THE *SCIENCE OF LOGIC* (NOUMENOLOGY)

The totality of Hegel's philosophy is divided into (or composed of), in conformity with the "Preface" of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* as speculative philosophy.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with the sensuous certainty or consciousness which knows the 'Here' and the 'Now' as the spatio-temporal determinateness and it includes, just as every further shape of consciousness, the truth in itself, certainly with the limitation that in this it does not concern itself the truth in its essence, but solely the truth in its appearance, and hence from this follows that the exposition or unfolding of the natural consciousness is the exposition of phenomenal (appearing) Spirit in its appearance, so the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

At the moment when consciousness gave up the last appearance, that it was burdened with an alien thing, that the object was for him something alien, being for itself, that self-relation to the object related itself to itself, or that it knew itself in the object itself, - here, at that point the appearance transforms into the essence and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* into the *Science of Logic*.

If the being for it of the object is at the same time its being-in-itself, if the being for consciousness and the being-in-itself fall down into the one, then the point is arrived at which consciousness has reached in its goal.

In other words, consciousness would reach there in the goal where it no longer knows itself in the difference with the object, but precisely in the object itself. Then, of course, the in-itself is the for-it and at the same time the for-it the in-itself, and then both have arrived at: consciousness and knowing in accordance with the object. Therefore, what is arrived at, is Absolute Knowing, self-knowledge in the other-being. Before consciousness arrives at this point, it always differentiates the being-for-it of the object from that which is the object in itself, or it differentiates its knowing from the truth. But for consciousness the being of the object is in distinction to the being-in-itself of the object, only that which appears or is the appearance. Hegel calls what the object-in-itself is, the essence, and accordingly appearance becomes identical with essence at the point in which the being-for-consciousness of the object and its being-in-itself fall into each other.

“In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what is only for it, and some sort of ‘other’ at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with the authentic Science of spirit. And finally, when consciousness itself grasps this its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself”(PS,89/PM,145).

That is, however, also the point, where the first part of philosophy passes over into the second part, where the abstractly progressive Knowing develops itself into Science, into the System of philosophy.

The original title of the first part of philosophy sounds: "Science of the Experience of Consciousness". It can be wondered that by which means or how this exposition or development itself turns into Science. The fundamental characteristic of knowing is the necessity of the known, and, for Hegel, therefore, the exposition of the experience of consciousness already has thereby the character of Science that every passage of consciousness from shape to shape in its necessity becomes comprehensible.

We have seen in our discussion of the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* how from the object given at any time of consciousness an always new one, and of course with necessity, comes out and how hereby at the same time the transition of consciousness from shape to shape in its necessity is also unfolded. With this, however, the road to Science itself is also Science, namely the science of the experience of consciousness. So, the science of the experience of consciousness develops the natural consciousness into Science which knows itself as knowing of the unity of itself and the object, as the self-knowledge in the other-being. The authentic, genuine Science, in which knowing and essence are one, is the *Science of Logic*.

We have dealt with in detail the problem of the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* into the *Science of Logic*, that is, we have examined to

what extent, or in what way, the beginning of the *Science of Logic* presupposes the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Now if we agree or submit especially to the connection or relation between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* or to the *System of Science*, which both should form, then it is meaningful to repeat shortly once more some previously made arguments or discussions. This is here, therefore, necessary since we must now treat the end of the *Science of Logic* and must explain this difficult and troublesome situation in its entire significance.

The result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is, thus, pure knowing, the self-knowledge in the other-being, or Absolute Knowing as the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is at the same time the beginning of the *Science of Logic*.

The beginning of the *Science of Logic* is “pure knowing”, pure, therefore, since it is no longer affected with an object, since no other thing stands over against it. Manifested differently, it is Absolute Knowing itself. But this beginning of the authentic speculative philosophy is mediated, so far this pure knowing, with which the *Science of Logic* begins, is the final truth of the natural consciousness, of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Accordingly, the *Science of Logic* as the science of the essence of the truth has for its presupposition the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the doctrine of the phenomenal knowing. It is the proof for that which pure, but no longer burdened with an alien object, knowing is the essence of the truth. Thus, the

Phenomenology of Spirit is the presentation of that which consciousness has for its result the concept of Science, pure knowing.

And as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has for its presupposition the sensuous certainty from which it begins, so does the *Science of Logic* have for its presupposition that which results from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: consciousness so far it reaches in the element of pure knowing, of the self-knowledge in the other-being. The *Science of Logic* is, therefore, the pure science of Absolute Knowing in the entire scope of its development.

Thus, the over-all development of Science in its entire scope is preserved in this element of pure knowing and does not leave it in any way. Of course, in this development, furthermore, new differences or distinctions appear, because without distinction or difference there would be no movement, but they are known from pure knowing, pure movements of the Concept and the unity remains in that element.

So, from the beginning of the *Science of Logic* on, pure knowing is its constitutive element. For this, Hegel says:

“Now starting from this determination of pure knowledge, all that is needed to ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, or rather, ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, simply to take up, what is there before us”(SL,I,p.69).

“Pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless,

ceases itself to be knowledge; what is present is only simple immediacy”(SL,I,p.69).

What lies, however, before, is just the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: knowing, which has sublated all references (relations or connections) to the other; and hereby it is itself something completely distinctionless. It is nothing other than this simple immediacy in which all distinctions (differences) are sublated. This again is the simple immediacy about which nothing can be said other than that it is. Hence, what lies before here, is the mere “it is”, the sole Being (pure Being) without all relations or references and differences or distinctions. Consequently, the Absolute as pure Being is the beginning of the *Science of Logic*.

Now knowing is also self-knowing, the Absolute knows itself at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* only in the mere fact that it is: it knows itself so as Being and knows that it is Being.

Hereby, we have once more shortly exhibited, on the one hand, the relation of the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the beginning of the *Science of Logic* and, on the other hand, the beginning of the *Science of Logic* itself, to keep it always in mind, if we now pass over into the end of the *Science of Logic*.

At that point we must refer to the ambiguity of the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. We have just illustrated that the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Absolute Knowing, constitutes necessarily the passage into the *Science of Logic*. But the same result, Absolute Knowing, Spirit which

comes to itself, sends also back to the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to the sensuous certainty. This fact is of the decisive meaning and gives some hints for the clarification of some immanent difficulties of the System or of the relation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Science of Logic*.

If the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* must form a System, then the end of the *Science of Logic* will be mediated with the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For that reason, we must now see how the end of the *Science of Logic* is constituted.

The theme of the *Science of Logic* is the Absolute, the thought which is just as much the thing in-and-for-itself, or this thinking knows or recognizes no opposition of the 'I' and its object, and thus this thought is what truly is. The end of the *Science of Logic* constitutes the absolute Idea, and it is the highest stage of the Concept, of self-thinking thought. In compliance with the tradition, one understands under term "Concept" always representation of something in general as the form of that which is thought in distinction to the sensuous (empirical) intuition which imagines or represents everything as an individual one. Here, nevertheless, what is treated, is the absolute Concept which is just as much the thing in-and-for-itself. The absolute Idea is, therefore, the highest essential form of the Concept, since it is that which is the Concept, which goes together in its totality only with itself, which comprehends itself in its reality itself. Every concept is the concept of something; it has an object, a content, and a reality. This reality of the concept is the essential being of the object. As the absolute Idea the Concept is immediately identical with the object, as it forms or constitutes the

essential existence of the Being; it is self-knowing Concept, knowing which relates itself into itself. It is the 'I' as thinking in the other in which, what it thinks, in the object, has for the object exactly itself.

Now the question is: What is the absolute Idea? However, Hegel pronounces this question inadequately, since by means of the answer the specification of a determinacy will be already made.

At the end of the *Science of Logic* comes into light that the object of the entire *Science of Logic* from the beginning on is the Idea, so far, yet, always in a determinacy: as Being, as Becoming, as Determinate Being, as Something, as Limit, As Necessity, As Freedom, and so on.

So long as the Idea appeared in such a determinacy, we could ask the question what it was. In its stage of completion the Idea recognizes itself as the Idea and no longer only in a categorial determinacy. So, the Idea is, on the one hand, in the moment when it recognizes or knows itself as the absolute Idea, free from all determinations, and, on the other hand, the determinations must be thought when thinking is always a determining. Besides, says Hegel, that the absolute Idea is the wealth of all determinations, that they are, nevertheless, not contents against the form, but the manners of self-thinking thought (*noesis noeseos*) itself. There are no contents in the absolute Idea, since all the so-called contents are the forms of its self-thinking.

“(...) the absolute Idea itself has for its content merely this, that the form determination is its own completed totality, the pure Concept. Now the

determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject-matter of the science of logic, from which course the absolute Idea itself has issued into an existence of its own; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape of a content, but exists wholly as form, and that accordingly the Idea is the absolutely universal Idea. Therefore what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form- that is, the method”(SL,II,p.825).

We can no more follow up the further development, the structure and the movements of the absolute Idea, because this exceeds the limits of our study. What shows itself at the end of the *Science of Logic*: “(...) the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth”(SL,II,p.824).

But just this absolute Idea as the fullness of all Being itself does not yet constitute the conclusion or termination of the speculative philosophy, and that is indeed wholly unexpected in consideration of the System which is to be formed by means of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*.

In addition to this, Hegel writes:

“Secondly, this Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine Concept. True, the systematic exposition is itself a realization of the Idea but confined within the some sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the urge to sublata

this, and pure thought as the last result becomes also the beginning of another sphere and science”(SL,II,p.843).

“The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise”(SL,II,p.843).

Thus, it is now seen that the result of the speculative Logic develops the beginning of an other sphere and of an other science. This other sphere is the realm of Nature, and the other Science corresponds to the philosophy of Nature.

With this we now have the following situation before us:

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with the sensuous certainty and ends with Absolute Knowing. The end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* refers on one side to its beginning, to the sensuous consciousness, on the other side, it constitutes the passage into the *Science of Logic*. Thus, the beginning of the *Science of Logic* is already mediated, since it has overcome all the relations or connections to the other, to the object in self-relations, since it is already the conclusion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

This result is no doubt self-finding of Spirit in its disunion or inner strife, in its other-being, in the absolute division of it from itself. So far the *Science of Logic* begins, thus, with the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Spirit has the self-externalization already behind itself and, after all, is self-knowing Spirit, the unity of self-knowing and the actuality. So far the *Science of Logic* begins, however, with the absolute, self-thinking thought, Spirit has still the self-

externalization before itself, through which it presents itself then only as *Spirit*, as the Actuality.

Hereby now the beginning of the *Science of Logic* becomes the disputable point of the System.

Spirit unfolds itself in twofold manner: once through the mediation, through the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*- here it requires no new self-externalization of Spirit at the end of the *Science of Logic*, because it has this already behind itself; on the other hand, Spirit has, if the *Science of Logic* begins with the absolute thinking which thinks itself "I am", the self-externalization still before itself. But thereby the whole System becomes questionable.

If the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* are to build a System, then the *Phenomenology of Spirit* must be the exposition of knowing in its appearance and the *Science of Logic* (Noumenology) the exposition of knowing in its truth, and if, furthermore, the *Science of Logic* is the exposition of the Absolute in its absoluteness, then it must be demonstrated that in what manner there is phenomenal knowing, consciousness, knowing itself in opposition to the object, out of absolute knowing, or to what extent the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is mediated with the end of the *Science of Logic*. Instead of this, it has been demonstrated that how the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the beginning of the *Science of Logic* are mediated. Contrary to this, the end of the *Science of Logic* is the beginning of a new Science.

The *Science of Logic* in the shape in which it is present the so-called “Bigger Logic”, completes itself in the absolute Idea, which externalizes itself in the freedom of its own self, but not in the natural consciousness, not in the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but in Nature itself, in the separation of Space and Time.

As known, Hegel has later written his System in tripartite form: *Logic*, *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Spirit*.

However it is not suitable here to discuss that why Hegel had gave up the twofold form of the System and reorganized the tripartite System, and which position the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has in this System.

We can only indicate that Hegel himself had given a sign for the solution of the problem in a few notes at the time when a second edition of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was planned. In thinking about his early work, Hegel says, among others, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is:

“a) Voraus der Wissenschaft

das Bewusstsein auf diesen Standpunkt zu bringen.

b) Gegenstand für sich fortbestimmen,

Logik hinter dem Bewusstsein

c) Eigentümliche frühere Arbeit, nicht unarbeiten,

-auf die damalige Zeit der Abfassung bezüglich

-in Vorrede: des abstrakte Absolute herrschte damals” (Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Zur Feststellung des Textes,s.578).

To this position, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is thus “before Science”. It is thereby neither the System itself (Science itself), nor does it belong to it as part. It has, however, the task to bring consciousness only into the stand-point of Science, through the method of self-forward-determining object up to the unity of knowing and the object. But this unity, the absolute Concept, stands behind consciousness, because that which goes before this is the knowing in opposition to the object.

Therefore, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* takes for granted as its starting-point a determinate (certain) historical situation, so the then provided shape of disunion which had found its manifestation in the philosophies of Kant and Fichte.

A further hint for the explanation of the failure(s) or miscarriage(s) of the twofold System would be the fact that the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* refers to the beginning, to the sensuous certainty.

Hence, it is suggested that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a self-enclosed work in itself, just equally a “before Science”.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this study, our aim has been to show how the encouragement of consciousness for Absolute Knowing completed the process of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the second chapter of the study, the concept of the *system or science of the experience of consciousness* has been reconstructed in the light of some evaluations concerning the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In this chapter, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has been defended as a necessary reply to the need of time. This does not mean that it has a limited meaning. This part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in fact, is an illustration of the possibility of a scientific or systematic propaedeutic to philosophy or Absolute Idealism. While modern undertakings still prepare themselves to introduce into philosophy, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* fulfilled this task before. The distinctive essence of the *science of the experience of consciousness* was defended against Fichte's "pragmatic history of human mind" and Schelling's "history of self-consciousness". In the last two chapters of the study an analysis of the final form of the experience of Spirit and a possibility of the transition into the speculative philosophy through this last form have been realized. It has been argued that Absolute Knowing differs from Fichte's and Schelling's concepts of Science or philosophy; and that it is not an immediate intellectual intuition; and that Absolute Knowing is the truth of finite human knowing. The most important

accomplishment of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that it demonstrates the truth of finite knowing, phenomenal knowing as Absolute Knowing by means of the dialectical movement of natural consciousness: For Hegel, the possibility of Absolute Knowing, both historically and systematically, lies in the contradictory nature of the finite, phenomenal knowing.

The unprecedented labour of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* precisely causes speculative-logical-pure knowing or Absolute Knowing to come into existence or being from the knowing of a finite consciousness. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* demonstrates this strictly through a scientific propaedeutic to the *Science of Logic* (Science of Pure Reason or Noumenology) and this makes the *Phenomenology of Spirit* interesting and important. After and by means of its success, speculative knowing cannot be considered as meaningless. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* has shown the impossibility of a *Phenomenology of Spirit* or the science of the experience of consciousness or the *system of the experience of Spirit*. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* shows the impossibility of a *Critique of Pure Reason* and the possibility of the speculative knowing of the Truth. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* described this advanced step to Absolute Idealism as a new era:

“Besides, it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward... the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape,

dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world”(PS,11/PM,75).



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APPENDICE A

TIME AND CONCEPT

In the discussion of Substance we have dealt it with a temporal relation. The movements of Substance show themselves also as the determinations of Substance in Time. The dialectic of Substance or that of consciousness and self-consciousness is a temporal process or becoming. Thus, says Hegel: “In the Concept that knows itself as Concept, the moments thus appear earlier than the filled [or fulfilled] whole whose coming-to-be is the movement of those moments”(PS,801/PM,800).

The Concept which knows itself as the Concept is Spirit, having won its essential shapes, and this means again that it has exceeded or overcome its former (earlier) in complete formations. This process, whose result is the equality or, rather, identity, unity between self-consciousness and consciousness, develops itself in Time. On this ground Hegel discusses or argues now the essential determinations of Time.

Hegel’s determinations of Time in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are exceptionally limited and suggestive; that is why we would like to expose Hegel’s concept of Time through an analysis of the paragraphs in question in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

The second part of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* is the “Philosophy of Nature” and here Hegel argues in the first section under the title “Mechanics” the concepts of Space and Time.

In a short classification of the first section, “Mechanics”, Hegel contemplates “the entirely abstract outside-of-one-another, Space and Time”(PN,253).

Space and Time are discussed separately one after the other, and this succession is necessary because “Time is the truth of space”(PN,257,Remark). That means, if space is thought rigorously over, then it shows itself in accordance with its essence as time. For that reason we must analyse firstly the concept of space so as to reach Hegel’s concept of time.

“The first or immediate determination of Nature is the abstract universality of its being outside-of-itself, -whose mediationless indifference, Space”(PN,254). This being-outside-of-itself of space is abstract, since it has no determinate difference in itself. Space is the “ideal next-to-each-other” of the points and thus “absolutely continuous”. So space is the abstract multiplicity of the in itself distinguishable points: it is something abstract. Space remains without any differences: the multiplicity of the points cannot “constitute the positive element of space”(PN,254), as the distinctionless points, differentiating this space, are space itself.

The point is only to its possibility the difference of space, since it, if it differentiates something in space, denies or negates space; but it remains the same

with the space, because it itself is space. The point does not stand itself out of space as an other, but remains rather in space. With this, space is the distinctionless outside-of-one-another of the multiplicity of the points. Space is, therefore, “absolutely continuous” and the “ideal next-to-each-other” of the points without the determinate difference in itself.

Further, Hegel ascertains that space in itself has qualitative differences: (i) the negation of space itself as an immediate distinctionless being-outside-of-itself, which is the point; (ii) this negation of space is as negation of itself spatial, the point is space. So, the line comes into existence as the first other-being of space, or “the line is the spatial being of the point”(PN,256); (iii) negation of the negation as the truth of the other-being is surface as the sublated line, and the point is at the same time the sublated negation of space, the reconstructed spatial totality.

However, for Hegel, space is not mere point or a succession of the points, but ‘punctuality’(PN,254,Remark). Therefore, the transition from space into time is accomplished. It is characterized as follows:

“Negativity, which relates itself as point to space, and which develops in space its determinations as line and surface, is, however, just as much for itself in the sphere of Being-outside-of-itself, and so are its determinations therein, though while it is positing as in the sphere of Being-outside-of-itself, it appears indifferent as regards the things that are tranquilly side by side. As thus posited for itself, it is time”(PN,257).

If space is represented in the indifferent subsistence of its differences, the negations are simply given. This representation does not grasp, thus, the being of space. That is possible only in dialectical thinking through thesis, antithesis and overcoming synthesis. That means, space is grasped, firstly, then in its being, if negation is not thought as a simple subsistence in its indifference but as the sublated, that is, self-negating. Hence, the point puts itself in the negation of the negation for itself and steps out therewith of the indifference of the subsistence. As for itself posited the point differentiates itself from this one and that one, or it is no more this and no more that. This point's positing for-itself puts the succession or the next-to-each-other in the sphere of the Being-outside-of-itself which is now the negated negation.

The sublation of punctuality, of the indifference means a through-breaking of the "paralyzed tranquillity" of space (*PN,257,Remark*). This self-positing means now within the sphere of "being-outside-of-itself" an earlier and a later and a next-to-each-other or a succession, and thus a temporal relation occurs. Therewith the "paralyzed tranquillity" of space or the "ideal succession" of the points is overcome or transmuted, the point spreads itself apart contrary to all others.

According to Hegel, this negation of the negation, this self-spreading apart of the points is time. This means that every point's positing-of-itself-for-itself is "Now-Here", or every point is a "Now-point" posited for itself. With this, it can also be said that every point as a self-positing can be only a Now.

“The ‘now’ is the condition for the possibility of the point’s positing itself for itself. This possibility-condition makes up the Being of the point, and Being is the same as having been thought”(M. Heidegger,*BT*,482).

Consequently, space, in so far as it is thought as the punctuality, or else, the ‘Now’, is time.

By means of this, the ‘now’ appears as the possibility of the point’s positing-itself-for-itself. However, if space is thought as the “now” and the being-outside-of-itself of the “now”, then it must be also at the same time thought as time.

Time itself is determined thus: “Time, as the negative unity of being-outside-of-itself, is likewise something simply abstract, ideal. It is that Being which, in that it is, is not, and which, in that it is not, is: it is intuited becoming. This means that those differences which, of course, are simply momentary, sublating themselves immediately, are determined as external, yet as external to themselves”(PN,258).

Time is thus the “intuited becoming”. Becoming as becoming is the transition from being into nothing and also from nothing into being. So, becoming is an arising (*Entstehen*) and passing away (*Vergehen*). With regard to time this means that time is the “now”. However, every “now” is strictly taken as a “no-longer” or a “not-yet”, that is, the “now” can be displayed as a “not-being”, or “nothing”. The intuited becoming signifies that this transition is intuited simply as a “now-series”. To this, time can be defined just so as space as “pure form of

sensibility or of the intuition”(PN,258). So precisely, for time and for space the difference of the objectivity and as regards to it a subjective consciousness are different. Otherwise would space be pure objectivity and time pure subjectivity. Against this, it concerns the pure conceptual determinations.

Besides Hegel says: “Time is the same principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness”(PN,258).

Now, we must discuss what the ‘I’ means in Hegel’s philosophy. The ‘I’ is, firstly, the Being-with-itself in the other-being, a grounded unity in itself, as free self-relating to itself and self-bringing out of the negativity. “But the I is, first, this pure self-related unity, and it is so not immediately but only as making abstraction from all determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it is universality”(SL,II,p.583).

Furthermore, however, the I essentially is that what it is, namely it is determinate through its individual determinacy which the I does not have simply in itself, but, since it relates itself to itself negatively, that is, it posits itself in holding and annulment, it exists only as the posited-being. “Secondly, the I as self-related negativity is no less immediately individuality or is absolutely determined, opposing itself to all that is other and excluding it- individual personality”(SL,II,p.583).

Therefore, the I is universality and equally immediate individuality.

Hegel says, moreover, that these determinations “constitute the nature of the I as well as of the Concept; neither the one nor the other can be truly comprehended unless the two indicated moments are grasped at the same time both in their abstraction and also in their perfect unity”(SL,II,p.583).

For Hegel the Concept is not the intuited universal of a kind or genus, but the form of self-thinking thought itself. “The Concept, when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is none other than the I or pure self-consciousness”(SL,II,p.583).

If the Concept has consequently come into the free existence in the being of the ‘I’, then the Concept as such must signify a form of being itself. Hegel determines this essential identity as follows:

“With the Concept, therefore, we have entered the realm of freedom. Freedom belongs to the Concept because that identity which, as absolutely determined, constitutes the necessity of substance”(SL,II,p.582). And “true, I have notions, that is to say, determinate concepts; but the I is the pure Concept itself which as Concept has come into existence”(SL,II,p.583).

Freedom as the essential determination of the “I” means that the Self sublates every negativity, every other-being and being-for-other and takes into its essence and thereby posits itself in this negativity. The Subject is not determined immediately free in its existence or determinate being, but only in virtue of this positing. Since the Self overcomes its other and takes into itself, freedom takes the character of objectivity. This freedom as the relation of the universality and the

individuality constitute itself as the existence of the Concept. If freedom is an essential Being-determination of the Subject, then the Concept as free must simply be a form of the subjectivity, and, thus, determines Hegel, the Concept as the Subject of comprehending Being.

The Concept itself or the universality of the Concept is a mode of Being, but not an existence, because the existence is always only an individuality. But if the existence is an existence in-and-for-itself, then it has its actuality merely through something that which always is in every “here” and “now”. That is the “universal nature” of the existence or its Concept. Hence, the Concept constitutes the actual, genuine, peculiar, authentic Being of the existence, i.e., the existence is actual only in its Concept. Herewith the Concept is posited as the universal nature of the existence whereby the existence is occasionally that what it is, what underlies every existence.

That is, the existence is only “in its Concept” what it actually is; through its Concept all its separations are posited and proved in the universality of the Concept. Only with this here the existence “has entered the realm of freedom”, that is, to be what it actually is. Such an existence or determinate being is possible only for a Being (or, rather, Essence) which can grasp itself, and that is self-consciousness.

Hegel constructs different arguments with regard to the identity of the “I” and the Concept, since he settles a matter with Kant. According to the ordinary usage, says Hegel, “I possess concepts and the Concept, just as I also possess a coat, complexion, and other external properties”(SL,II,p.584).

The great merit of Kant was that he went beyond this external relation. So, Kant determines “objectivity” and “objective validity” through the Concept of the object, and subsequently through the occurring synthesis of the comprehending ‘I’ in the Concept. Hence, the “objectivity” is present only in the synthesis of the “I”, and this is at the same time the essence of the Concept and the objectivity. The unity, which constitutes the essence of the Concept (*Begriff*) is the “original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness”(SL,II,p.584).

Hereby Kant has demonstrated that something becomes an object only by means of the Concept. For Hegel, however, with this is demonstrated that the Concept is the Being of the “I”, and the original synthetic unity of apperception in which the Concept is grounded is actually the unity of the “I” with itself.

For Hegel the comprehension (or conception) of an object consists in the “I” thinking. The “I” makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form. To this, the object is at the same time sublated in the universality and posited in the immediate determinacy- “the universality that is immediately a determinateness or determinateness that is immediately universality”(SL,II,p.585). Thus, the object becomes only through the comprehension a being in-and-for-itself, or only in thinking (or in thought) is it so, as it is in-and-for-itself. Now Hegel speaks of the speculative proposition concerning the identity of the “I” and of the Concept.

“The object therefore has its objectivity in the Concept and this is the unity of self-consciousness into which it has been received; consequently its objectivity,

or the Concept, is itself none other than the nature of self-consciousness, has no other moments or determinations than the I itself”(SL,II,p.585).

Thus, we have shown wherein lies the Hegelian structure of the “I” and of the identity of the “I” and of the Concept.

If Hegel says that time has the same principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness, then he adds to this that time is “the same or the simple concept, still in its complete externality and abstraction”(PN258). With this it is meant that time cannot carry out the synthesis of the universality and the individuality, since time is the mere becoming, i.e., the permanent transition from being into nothing and *vice versa*.

Or to say it with Hegel’s words: “the pure being-in-itself, as simply a coming-out-of-itself”(PN258). For that reason time is “the negativity which abstractly relates itself to itself”(PN258), or the incessant coming-into-existence (raising) and passing away of the “now”-series in which no difference develops.

Hegel sets the thesis of time as the essence of “raising” and “passing away” against the ordinary representation of time in which everything raises and passes away. The real object is on the one side different from time, but, on the other side, essentially identical with time. The object indeed is limited or confined, it is not unity under the “total negativity” in itself, but the “determinacy” which “is in itself external to it”: therewith, the other, the negation, is outside of it. This constitutes the contradiction of its Being. However, the “abstraction of the externality”(PN258) is time itself. Consequently, the finite is transitory and

temporal. The Concept out of the complete, total negativity in itself is the “universal essence” of the object; but the object is one-sided and relates itself to the Concept as to its power. The Concept, however, in its free, for-itself existing, identity with itself, as $I=I$, is intrinsically the absolute negativity and freedom, time is accordingly not a power over it, it is not in time and something temporal; rather it is the power over time, time which is only this negativity as externality. Therefore, only the natural or the finite is transitory and temporal; yet, the True, Idea, Spirit, is over time, because such is the conceptual nature of time; it is eternal, in and for itself, is not pulled along in time, because it does not lose itself in one side of its own process (PN258).

Therefrom the concept of the eternity follows, which is here, firstly determined in a negative manner. On the one hand, it is not an abstraction of time in the sense that it exists, as it were, with time; on the other hand, it does not come after time, since, thus, the eternity will be understood as a moment of time, in fact, as future.

Time has three dimensions: past, present, future. These three dimensions display the becoming of the externality and its sublation or dissolution into the differences of the Being- of the Being as the “transition into the Nothing” and of the Nothing as the “transition into the Being”(PN259).

Now the problem is that how a concrete “Now” constitutes itself. “The immediate disappearance of these differences into the unity is the present as Now”(PN259).

This signifies that the individuality as an existence (determinate being), in which the difference is immediately overcome, presents the present as Now.

Now, this “now” is not constant, but “absolutely continuous”, a continuous transition into the other moment, and thus the “Now” itself is the disappearance of its Being. Therefore, the “Now” differentiates itself from the negative as “being fixed” or as “concrete unity” and from the abstract moments of the past and the future. So, the “Now” presents itself as the affirmative difference (negative), although its own Being is that which is “abstract, disappearance into the Nothing”(PN259).

Hegel notices also that time in the nature is only a now, namely incessant and distinctionless transition of the Being into the Nothing and the Nothing into the Being. Only in regard to the subject, to the subjective representation, the past and future exist “in the recollection and the fear or hope”(PN259).

Martin Heidegger in his *Being and Time* has discussed the problem of the nature of Time in Hegel’s philosophy and the connection between Spirit and Time. He opposed to the Hegelian view in the light of the results of his own existential-ontological or hermeneutical-phenomenological analysis of the temporality of Dasein. It is obvious that he was the first who has discussed this problem.

Heidegger begins his discussion by noticing that “when a philosophical Interpretation of time is carried out, it gets a ‘locus in a system’; this locus may be considered as criterial for the basic way of treating time by which such an

Interpretation is guided”(BT, 480). He remarks that Hegel analyzes the concept of Time at the first part of his *Philosophy of Nature* in the discussion of Space, Time and Movement under the title of “Mechanics”. Heidegger goes on interpreting or discussing Hegel’s concept of Time from these sections. Since we attempted to explain the dialectical movement from Space to Time above, it will be enough to state that following Hegel’s exposition that “the transition from space to time does not signify that these are treated in adjoining paragraphs; rather ‘it is space itself that makes the transition’ “(BT, 481), Heidegger obtains Time from Space through a negation of a negation. With this, he refers to the formal characteristic of Time as the negation of negation in Hegel’s concept of Time, saying that this is the “most appropriate expression”(BT, 484). “Only from the standpoint of this formal-dialectical conception of time”, writes Heidegger, “can Hegel produce any connection between time and spirit”(BT, 484) through which can be mediated the fact that Spirit falls in Time.

Abstractly, for Heidegger, Spirit can be considered as negation of the negation in so far as the formal process of Spirit is “conceptual”. Moreover, the actual historical becoming of Spirit includes this formal characteristic of the negation of the negation; it is “ ‘absolutely restless’ in the spirit and also its self-manifestation, which belongs to its essence. The ‘progression’ of the spirit which actualizes itself in history, carries with ‘a principle of exclusion’ “(BT,p.484). Some quotations from *Reason in History* are made, that is to say, at every stage of its progress, Spirit has itself as “the truly malignant obstacle to that goal”. “In its development spirit aims ‘to reach its own concept’. The development itself is ‘a

hard, unending battle against itself" "(BT,p.485). "Because the restlessness with which spirit develops in bringing itself to its concept is the negation of a negation, it accords with spirit, as it actualizes itself to fall 'into time' as the immediate negation of a negation"(BT,p.485). Thereby, Heidegger mediates the fall of Spirit into Time on the basis of the formal characteristic of the negation the negation.

Heidegger's this presentation does not precisely fit to Hegel. It must be remarked that this is an over-formalization of the connection between Spirit and Time. True, for Hegel, both Spirit and Time can be evaluated in compliance with the dialectical-speculative (or conceptual) movement of the negation of the negation. However, the common conceptual characterization (or formalization) is one thing, and the specific, profound connection between Spirit and Time is an other thing. It is quite well known that Hegel determines the specific significance of Time in two definite passages in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. At first, Hegel says, "As for Time... it is the existent Concept itself"(PS,46/PM,104). And further in a passage which Heidegger also quotes, "Time is the Concept itself that is there [*da ist*] and which presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time"(PS,801/PM,800). It is seen that Spirit appears in Time, not because Time is a 'Concept' and has the formal-conceptual character of the negation of the negation, but because Time is "the existent (or existing) Concept", or "Time is the Concept itself that is *there* [*da ist*]". With these words, it should be noted that Time is intrinsic to the (immediate) existential mode of Spirit, thus if Spirit will exist "existentially", as "being-there", as

“Dasein”, it must exist in Time, Time which is intrinsic to “immediate existence”, “being-there”, “Dasein” is simply *there* [da].

Another significant connection between Spirit and Time is suggested by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “[Time-e.a.k.] is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped by the Self, the merely intuited Concept”(PS,801/PM,800). Again, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel says of Spirit “intuiting its pure Self as Time outside of it, and equally its Being as Space”(PS,807/PM,806ff.). Thus, Hegel illustrates hereby a direct, immediate connection between Spirit’s Self and Time: Time is not simply an intuition form of the Self, but the Self itself as intuited. This close connection between the Self and Time is confirmed, as mentioned above, in the *Philosophy of Nature*: “Time is the same principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness, but the same or the simple Concept, still in its complete externality and abstraction, as mere becoming intuited- the pure being-in-itself, as simply a coming-out-of itself”(PN,258).

It should be remarked that this point was not developed further by Hegel; but it illustrates that the connection between the Self and Time contains more profound bound, namely, this relation or connection cannot be limited to a formal-dialectical character as negation of the negation.

Heidegger treats the “existential” or “being-there” characteristic of Time less as intrinsic to Spirit. He rather treats it more as “present-at-hand”(BT, 485). He writes, “As something present-at-hand and thus external to spirit, time has no power over the concept, but the concept is rather ‘the power of time’ “(BT, 485). However, Heidegger errs when he relates the power of Spirit over Time with the

characterization of Time as 'present-at-hand' and as external to Spirit. But, for Hegel, the fact is rather that the power of Spirit over Time must be regarded in the light of the immediate conceptual relation between the two. With this, it will be seen that through this relation Time is contained in Spirit. To Hegel, not by means of the characterization of Time as external to Spirit, but rather as internal and intrinsic to Spirit, Spirit's power over Time is comprehended. Hegel states that the finite things are temporal and transient, and since they are limited they are infected with negativity. Unlike the Concept, the finite does not contain the absolute negativity in its own structure; the finite is one-sided, it does not exist in accordance with its own universality and, finally, is dependent upon negativity, a power over it.

“The Concept, however, in its free, for-itself-existing identity with itself, as I=I, is intrinsically the absolute negativity and freedom, time is accordingly not a power over it, nor is it is time and something temporal-, rather it is the power over time, time which is only this negativity as externality”(PN,258).

The Concept as I=I is the absolute negativity and freedom, and so is over Time. Since Time is the same principle as the I=I, the power of Spirit over Time is grasped in virtue of this conceptual bond. Furthermore, Time is the same absolute negativity as that of the “Concept”, only as externality. Being as such externality, it is not “external to Spirit”, as Heidegger claims it, but rather through being the same absolute negativity, it is the same principle, the same I=I, internal to Spirit, despite in its simplest, most abstract, immediate form. The internality of Time in Spirit is sounded in the following way:

“The Idea, Spirit, is over Time, because such is the conceptual nature of Time; it is eternal, in and for itself, is not pulled along in Time, because it does not lose itself in one side of its own process”(PN,258,Remark).

It is obvious from this quotation that for Hegel, Spirit is not in Time, not something temporal, because Time is in it, as one moment, one side of its eternal becoming; and Spirit is only “in Time” in so far as it can be in one side of itself.

How can this be understood? Hegel makes clear this situation in terms of the universal as law. By mentioning law Hegel introduces the universal together with the Idea and Spirit as other forms of the concrete universal. He says, we must distinguish whether something is the whole process or only a moment of the process. The universal as law has a process in itself and lives only as process, but not part of the process, not in process; on the contrary, it contains its two sides and it is itself processless. Here a contradiction between the law as process and processless can be seen. However, it should be noted that whereas the law lives only as process, it is itself processless. Hegel further says: “in accordance with the side of appearance, the law appears in time, in which appearance the moments of the ‘Concept’ have the semblance (or appearance) of independence; but in the ‘Concept’ itself the mutually exclusive differentiations are reconciled and withdrawn into peace”(PN,258,Remark). If Time is “contained” within Spirit as one particular moment of its becoming, then Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel’s view is questionable when he says that Hegel puts forward “the within-time-ness of spirit” as “a fact”(BT, 480). But the truth for Hegel is “the within-spirituality of Time” and “the within-time-ness of Spirit” on the ground of “the within-

spirituality of Time". So, Heidegger's approach to the problem that "Time must be able, as it were, to take in spirit" does not lead to "and spirit in turn must be akin to time and its essence"(BT, 480).

As it is seen that Heidegger's analysis rests upon two points: firstly, concerning the appearance of Spirit in Time, he emphasizes that Time is "existential", "being-there"; and secondly, as for Spirit as the power over Time, he determines Time as "being-there", as "existential" and as external to Spirit. Heidegger finds that in Hegel the source of Time remains hidden. However, it is shown that Hegel places the source of Time in Spirit. Since for Heidegger the source of Time remains obscure, Time stands over and against Spirit as "present-at-hand". Because of this externality, for Heidegger Spirit must fall into Time. Because of this misunderstood externality the ontological significance of this "falling" and the "actualization of Spirit" therein remains obscure to Heidegger. Heidegger thinks the problem of the connection between Spirit and Time in Hegel in terms of the "falling" of Spirit into Time. However, the true point in the connection between Spirit and Time is not that of the "falling" of Spirit into Time, but rather the coming-into-itself of Spirit *via* Time.

With regard to the connection between Time and the Concept, the important figure is Alexander Kojève. In his *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, he claims that Hegel identifies Time and the Concept: "Hegel is the first to identify the Concept and Time"(p.131); "For Hegel, Time *is* the Concept"(p.154). To justify this Kojève refers to a passage in Chapter VIII of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Here, as written above, Hegel says: "Time is the Concept itself that is

there”(PS,801/PM,800). But if the passage is checked, it can be seen that such an identification of the Concept and Time is not clear or apparent. Hegel continues: “and [it-e.a.k.] presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Concept, i.e. has not annulled Time”(PS,801/PM,800). What can be inferred from this? Time is in consciousness only as empty intuition, and it cannot be identical with the pure Concept. If Spirit is in Time and has not comprehended its Concept, the element of its true existence, then it seems obvious that the pure Concept is completely different from Time.

Although Hegel does not simply identify Time and the Concept in the way Kojeve does, he maintains that they are related- that Time is the Concept as it exists (or *is*); that Time is the Concept as it is intuited, rather than comprehended. Thus, there is a connection between them despite the fact that there is a basic difference.

APPENDICE B

THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE WORLD-HISTORY

In our examination of the chapter “Absolute Knowing”, as it is suggested in the Introduction, it is verified that in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* two forms of the history of Spirit comes to light. On the one hand, it is clear that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents the history of consciousness in its course or progress from the sensuous certainty into Absolute Knowing. So, it is the history of appearing or phenomenal consciousness.

On the other hand, however, in the conclusive reflections of the chapter “Absolute Knowing” Spirit, after it has comprehended its Concept and arrived at the absolute self-knowledge of itself, displays itself also as the happening of the world-History. So, at the end of the chapter Hegel speaks of the actual shapes of the world and says:

“Their preservation, regarded from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; but regarded from the side of their [philosophically] comprehended organization, it is the Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearance”(PS,808/PM,808).

This is an old story (or problem) in the interpretation of Hegel, and, generally speaking, it is the problem of that: Does the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

develop a confusion or disorder of the history of consciousness and the world-History, as Rudolph Haym in his work "Hegel und seine Zeit" has purported, or does it include, on the one hand, the "science of phenomenal knowing" and, on the other hand, a philosophy of history?

This question Martin Heidegger formulates as follows:

"Because of this, Spirit must first of all fall 'into time'. It remains obscure what indeed is signified ontologically by this 'falling' or by the 'actualizing' of a spirit which has power over time and really 'is' ['seienden'] outside of it. Just as Hegel casts little light on the source of the time which has thus been levelled off, he leaves totally unexamined the question of whether the way in which spirit is essentially constituted as the negating of a negation, is possible in any other manner than on the basis of primordial (original) temporality"(BT, 485ff.).

We have intended to show, in the analysis of the problem of the relation between Time and Concept, why Spirit must appear in Time, and we have, thereby, stated that if Spirit must appear in Time, then its temporal occurrence as the world-History is necessary.

Now the question is: How can both forms of the history of Spirit be sufficiently interpreted and comprehended? As it seems to us, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered- except taking into consideration the basic determinative of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that is to say, it is an investigation and examination of the truth or reality of knowledge.

We must be satisfied with the assertion that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents the history of consciousness as the dialectical movement of phenomenal knowing. That is, Hegel grasped in a homogeneous way these forms of the history of Spirit and the history of Spirit as the world-History as an exposition of the basic determinative factor.



APPENDICE C

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC OR SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY AS SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

The *Science of Logic* must be looked at as the content of pure Reason. Pure Reason is the final form of the development of the experience of consciousness. In pure Reason consciousness, i.e. the immediate existence of Spirit, the appearance of Spirit, realizes or actualizes its highest life and purpose, namely, to be at home in its object or otherness. Pure Reason is Spirit itself, the realization of its essential nature.

In the *Science of Logic* we have the most complete form of the self-consciousness of Spirit, “the crown of a world of Spirit”(PS,12/PM,76). In the content or system of pure Reason Spirit knows its essential self, its constitutive and final, complete, absolute essentialities. They are its own distinguishing essence. As Hegel puts it, in the *Science of Logic* Spirit “knows itself in the form of the Self”; the Concept is its true realization, that is to say, the Concept is in the form of the Self. Thus, Spirit cannot be developed further from than this, and with the *Science of Logic* the experience or development of Spirit as a process towards its self-consciousness must be completed.

The *Science of Logic* should be called ultimate Science, Absolute Knowing. That knowledge of the Concepts is Absolute Knowing is evident from

the fact that the object which Spirit knows is nothing but Spirit itself. The object is not independent of Spirit which knows it; Spirit, again, does not refer to an alien object which lies beyond the reach of its life. If knowledge deals only with the Self which knows, it is completely self-constituted, self-determined. To be completely self-sufficient is precisely what is meant by being Absolute. And such knowledge, Absolute Knowledge is ultimate and final.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* demonstrates that the final truth of experience or knowledge is Spirit which knows itself as Spirit, i.e. Absolute Knowledge. The truth of knowledge or consciousness is pure self-conscious knowledge, pure Reason. The *Science of Logic* is the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit.

Because of its intimate relation to religion, from which it can be said to originate, the *Science of Logic* can be seen as the philosophical-speculative presentation of the object of the religious consciousness. If so, then it can be thought of at once Theology and Revelation. Hegel determines that it is both. The *Science of Logic*, Hegel writes, contains the unfolding of God as it is in its eternal essence before the creation of a finite nature and of a finite spirit (*SL*,I,50). It is seen that such an expression is precisely what a theology proper aims at. Again, throughout the *Science of Logic*, Hegel continually emphasizes the theological reference of the *Science of Logic* by his recognition of the Concepts as determinations of the Absolute Being in-and-for-itself. This will be found from beginning to end of the *Science of Logic*. The *Science of Logic* may be described as the Revelation. It is the self-exposition of the Absolute Being in-and-for-itself.

Revelation means simply the manifestation or disclosure of the inner life realm and truth of the Absolute Being. Hegel holds the view that the true form of Spirit is to be what is revealed or manifest; this is its Concept. Further than this, Hegel writes that “Here... God is *revealed as He is*; He is immediately *present* as Spirit. God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge alone and *is* only in that knowledge, and is only that knowledge itself, for He is Spirit; and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge of the *revealed* religion. Speculative knowledge knows God as Thought or pure Essence, and knows this Thought as simple Being and as Existence, and Existence as the negativity of itself, hence as Self, as the Self that is at the same time *this* individual, and also the *universal*, Self. It is precisely this that the revealed religion knows. The hopes and expectations of the world up till now had pressed forward solely to this revelation, to behold what absolute Being is, in it to find itself”(PS,761/PM,761).

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