

INCORPORATION OF THE OTTOMAN ECONOMY TO THE WORLD
CAPITALIST ECONOMY: A REASSESSMENT

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by

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ABSTRACT

The primary aim of this thesis is to re-evaluate the arguments and the conclusions of the studies concerning the incorporation of the Ottoman economy to the world capitalist economy. Among the controversial subjects, particularly the questions when the incorporation took place and whether the external or the internal factors were primarily effective in the dissolution and the transformation of the Ottoman social formation are re-evaluated in this thesis. The study consist of two chapters in addition to introduction and conclusion parts. Chapter one provides a theoretical framework especially to the second question mentioned above. On the other hand, chapter two consists of four different sections. After an introduction concerning the arguments about the incorporation of the Ottoman economy to the world capitalist economy, the conclusions of main approaches are re-evaluated in four different themes. In this assessment, it is argued that the 19th century was the incorporation period of the Ottoman economy rather than the 16th century. At the same time, it is also argued that the internal non-economic factors should have been primarily effective in the dissolution and the transformation of the Ottoman social formation. Accordingly, the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and Turkey in the 20th century was primarily the product of internal factors.

ÖZET

Bu tezin temel amacı, Osmanlı ekonomisinin kapitalist dünya ekonomisine entegrasyonuna ilişkin çalışmalar ile ilgili tartışmaların ve sonuçların yeniden bir değerlendirmesini yapmaktır. Çalışmada, Osmanlı toplumsal formasyonunun çözülme ve dönüşümünde içsel ve dışsal faktörlerden hangisinin birincil rol oynadığına ilişkin sorunlar ve söz konusu dönüşümün ne zaman gerçekleştiği ele alınmıştır. İnceleme, giriş ve sonuç dışında iki ayrı bölümden oluşmaktadır.

Birinci bölüm, yukarıda bahsedilen içsel ve dışsal faktörlere ilişkin sorunlara teorik bir çerçeve oluşturmaktadır. İkinci bölüm ise dört ayrı kısım içermektedir. Osmanlı ekonomisinin kapitalist dünya ekonomisine entegrasyonuna ilişkin tartışmalara bir giriş yapıldıktan sonra, temel yaklaşımlar dört ayrı tema altında değerlendirilmektedir. Bu değerlendirmede Osmanlı ekonomisinin entegrasyonunun 16. yüzyıldan ziyade 19. yüzyılda gerçekleştiği savunulmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, Osmanlı toplumsal kuruluşunun çözülmesinde ve dönüşümünde birincil olarak ekonomi dışı içsel faktörlerin etkin olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Osmanlı imparatorluğunun 19. yüzyılda ve Türkiye'nin 20.yüzyıldaki geri kalmışlığı birincil olarak içsel faktörlerin bir ürünüdür.

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INTRODUCTION

When we examine the historical developments of societies, we recognize the existence of the economic and political interaction between them through the history. Likewise, it is also known that there has never been a unique pattern and equal development of all societies. Nevertheless, structural characteristics of the interaction among the societies, the extent of the dependency as an outcome of the interaction for the 16th century and after which stands as the period of the dissolution of the feudal mode of production and the development of the capitalist production relations in Europe, have been a matter of interest of economic historians much more than the previous periods. Accordingly, there appeared various views and approaches related to the subject.

Today, the world economy exhibits quite an integrated and dependent structure among different nations. In this sense, the world economy can be defined as a single social economy where a division of labor exists among different nations in the production of various commodities and aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves exists for the whole capitalist world economy (1). Accordingly, one can not expect economic and politically autonomous development of any society.

However, the dimensions of the inequality of the development which is observed among different nations became much more severe in the 20th century. Today, there are basically three

different group of countries which can be classified according to economic and social criterions: developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. The consequence of the inequality and the interdependence of the development of different group of countries is the increasing controversy among them. However, the developed nations have been much more advantageous due to their positions in the world economy since they have a great power to influence the flows in the money and product markets. In this sense, the developed rich nations are called the core countries of the world economy where the underdeveloped and developing countries are called periphery and semi-periphery countries, respectively (Wallerstein,1974:38-54). So that the dependency of the development of the periphery and the semi-peripheral zones to core countries stands as a much more serious problem than the dependency of the core countries to periphery. On account of this, to understand the historical sources of today's integrated world economy with its internal and external dynamics became one of the most important topics of political and economic history.

Naturally, there appeared stimulating studies in underdeveloped and developing countries as they are in a position to understand the historical facts about the integrated world economy and to make some political and economic deductions for their current problems caused by the dependency to developed countries. In connection with this,

there have been many studies investigating the causes of the underdevelopment of Turkey which is considered as one of the semi-periphery countries.

There were basically two problems discussed in the increasing number of studies concerning the underdevelopment of Ottoman Empire and also modern Turkey together with the differentiation of social environment after 1960s in Turkey. One of them focused on the question of how the pre-capitalism of Turkey can be characterized. On the other hand, the second problem was whether the external or the internal factors were primarily determinant in the underdevelopment of Turkey (2). Contributors to the first debate discussed whether the dominant mode of production in the Ottoman Empire was a West European type of feudalism or Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) particular to most Eastern societies (3). Consistent with the argued "mode of production", some of the economic historians discussed the second problem, that is the primary determinant in the transformation and the consequent underdevelopment of the Ottoman social formation. However, the same problem was also discussed independently from the mode of production debate. Moreover, there was a sub-topic discussed in the second debate concerning the beginning period of the incorporation to the capitalist world economy, hence dependency to the core countries of the West. At this point, standard literature offers two different period. While a group of Ottoman historians suggest that the

incorporation was realized in the 16th century, others emphasize the 19th century as turning point.

In 1960s, number of studies appeared under the impact of the Annales History School (AHS) and particularly of Fernand Braudel, suggesting that the Ottoman economy had been dominated by West European countries and consequently became an integrated part of the European economy as an exporter of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods in the 16th century. Besides to the period suggested for the mentioned integration, there was an other important hypothesis in these studies. It was the primary role given to external factors namely international trade and\or population increase to explain the specific development path as well as the dissolution of the Ottoman social formation after the 16th century.

On the other hand, Wallerstein raised the question whether the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire should be dated from the late 18th century or from the early 17th century (Wallerstein, 1979:389-98). This was not so surprising since he was one of the most important contributor of the world system theory. According to this theory, the development of capitalist mode of production centered in west Europe in 16th century was led to the creation of social division of labor among the East and west European countries. By the passage of time, other zones of world was participating to the division

of labor where trade has been the basic link among these countries. Accordingly, a peripheral country which sells raw materials or primary goods and buys manufactured goods becomes economically and politically dependent to the dynamics of the core countries to a large extent as soon as it incorporates to the system. At this point, the theory stresses the historicity of the underdevelopment. On account of this, the period of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire was an important matter to interpret correctly the history of the Empire for the world system theory.

Wallerstein and Kasaba (1981) was the first direct answer to Wallerstein's question. According to this study the definite period of the incorporation was the second half of the 18th century (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981:511-13). Here, the most important point is that international trade is supposed to be the primary mover in the development of societies within the perspective of the world system (4).

At that point, it has to be emphasized that transformation of any social formation, peripheralization and underdevelopment are all universal facts discussed in the literature. Put differently, similar arguments discussed in the context of Ottoman Empire such as the problem of primary mover in the transformation of societies is also argued in the studies of the history of other countries. For example, world system theory puts forward primarily the external economic factors to explain the underdevelopment of all peripheral zones.

Nevertheless, the economic determinism of the world system theory has initiated a second debate which is known as Brenner debate in the literature. This debate originated from Brenner(1976). In his article, Brenner criticizes the economic determinism of the world system theory and puts forward primarily the class struggle as an internal dynamic determining the development path of societies. Indeed, Brenner debate was a continuation of the "transition from feudalism to capitalism debate" which took place in the 1950s. Dobb(1946) argued that the primary movers in the dissolution of feudal mode of production in Europe were internal to system. Then, counter arguments were developed against Dobb (Hilton,1978:9-29). Obviously, these counter arguments were suggesting the international trade and demographic factors as the primary movers causing the dissolution of the feudal mode of production. Although these debates originated from the development experiences of European societies, theoretical framework of debates have been employed to analyse the peripheral transformation of different social formations in the world. In this sense, the question of whether the economic or non economic factors were primary mover in the transformation of the Ottoman social formation was one of the debated subject in the Ottoman studies.

Up to this point, we have tried to introduce the problem. Now, we shall briefly summarize the hypothesis and the

general outline of the study. This study shall basically be a re-evaluation of the thesis about the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire to the world economy developed by historians influenced from the AHS. Ottoman Empire had always a certain economic and political interaction with the other parts of the world through its history. Accordingly, one can not deny the impact of the developments occurred in the 16th century Europe on the Ottoman Economy. Thus, what is needed to be done is to investigate the structural differences of the Ottoman economy between pre and after 16th century. Because, claiming that the 16th century was the incorporation period is not a simple proposition. It includes some other propositions about the structure of the Ottoman economy, such as the collapse of the Ottoman industry or the Ottoman Empire as the supplier of raw materials as a result of the above mentioned incorporation. Accordingly, structural changes in trade, changes in production structure and changes in land tenure can be expressed as the main indicators of the incorporation to world economy. For example, if a region specializes in the production of raw materials and becomes the exporter of these products and importer of manufactured goods, then, the region is accepted to be incorporated to the world economy as a peripheral area.

Did The Ottoman Empire Incorporate To The World Economy In The 16th Century ?

We are going to test whether the above propositions

concerning the structure of Ottoman Economy are correct or not from the available secondary sources. In this sense, the first conclusion of the study is that although there had been a dissolution and transformation in the Ottoman social formation after the 16th century, the incorporation to the world economy leading important internal \ structural transformation of the Ottoman social formation was realized in the 19th century. However, we reach the above conclusion by showing the facts related to the 17th and the 18th century Ottoman economy rather than analysing the developments in 19th century Ottoman economy.

The Question of the Primary Mover

Indeed, as it is noted before, another important conclusion of the Ottoman historians influenced from the AHS was that the external economic factors (particularly the international trade) were supposed to be primary movers in the transformation of the Ottoman social formation. In other words, there was an obvious economic determinism in the models developed by these historians as well as in the world system theory. It's true that one can not underestimate the determining role of external economic factors in the dissolution as well as the transformation of the Ottoman social formation. However, if it leads to a one sided approach based on economism, it needs to be criticized. Because, studies concerning the 17th and 18th century Ottoman

economy which shall be summarized in the second chapter and the Ottoman State structure points out the autonomy of the Ottoman economic development as well as the importance of the internal non-economic factors in the transformation of Ottoman social formation. Besides, if we consider the increasing economic gap between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century just after the industrial revolution, then it can be suggested that peripherization and the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century were primarily the product of the internal non-economic factors such as kinship, law, religion and class conflict materialized in the state policy after the 16th century. Thus, this proposition shall be discussed in the concluding part of this study as the second hypothesis. Nevertheless, this shall not be an original presentation about the non-economic factors specific to Ottoman Empire, but rather than an introduction to the kind of non-economic factors that has to be taken into account to explain the specific development path of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the world system perspective and historians influenced from AHS shall be criticized for their one-sided approach to peripheral transformation of Ottoman social formation based on economism, that is assigning potency and causality to changes in international trade in bringing about social, economic as well as political changes in the periphery.

In the study, there will be two different chapters in

addition to introductory and concluding parts. Having summarized the conceptual framework of "Transition" and "Brenner" debates concerning the primary movers in the transformation of societies to be employed in the analyses of the Ottoman economy in the first chapter, Ottoman historians influenced by AHS and their arguments shall be studied in the first part of the second chapter. Then, these arguments related to the structure of the Ottoman trade, industry and big farms (çiftlik debate) shall be reevaluated in three different sections. But before this, there will be a short section on the problems of Ottoman documents in order to emphasize the necessity of being careful in the interpretation of Ottoman history.

1. THE TRANSITION AND BRENNER DEBATES

In this part of the study, we shall summarize the debates on the transition from feudalism to capitalism particularly in connection with the transformation problems of the Ottoman Empire.

It is generally admitted that the period from 14th and 18th centuries is crucial for the world economic history in the sense that the economic and political structure of the world was to be radically transformed. The exact nature of these changes and their context as well as periodisation are all matters of dispute among scholars. Attempts to understand the nature of this transition and its dynamics gave rise to stimulating studies which in turn bring counter arguments into agenda. On account of this, there are two famous episodes among economic historians. The first series of debates which is known as "transition from feudalism to capitalism" or shortly "transition" debates originally published in Science and Society in the early 1950s, started after the publication of Dobb's famous book namely Studies in the Development of Capitalism (Hilton, 1978:1-3). On the other hand, the second one which is called the Brenner Debate originally published in Past and Present in 1970s and 1980s can be accepted as the continuation of the first transition debate although the content of subjects discussed are somehow different. As it is noted before, there are various themes

discussed in these debates. Nevertheless, the fundamental question of these debates can be expressed as whether external economic factors or internal non-economic factors have been primarily effective on the dissolution as well as the transformation of feudal societies. Hence, these debates provide a theoretical framework to study the development dynamics of different societies. Therefore, we shall summarize the basic points of arguments in order to employ some of them in the analysis of the Ottoman economy.

1.1 The Transition Debate

After the publication of Dobb (1946), there appeared a debate among marxist economic historians about the book in Science and Society in 1950s (1).

Dobb's work which employs the tools of marxist theory is on the decline of feudalism, mercantilism, the industrial revolution and some topics in the development of capitalism up to the second world war. This work has initiated a theoretical debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism which was a complex of various themes since marxist theory had not yet solved it's own problems. First, Sweezy has criticized Dobb's work on several counts. Within the context of the general problem, some particular questions were discussed; (i) the primary mover in the dissolution and the transformation of social formations, (ii) the character

of the English revolution, (iii) the alternative paths for the emergence of capitalist production, and (iv) the origin of towns. Here, its not aimed to review all the questions discussed, but rather the concept of the prime mover shall be examined due to its connection with Ottoman studies.

The first chapter of Dobb's book is about the capitalism where he summarizes basic points of his theoretical approach on the capitalist development. He criticizes definitions of capitalism, mainly, Sombart's conception of capitalism as primarily a commercial system (Dobb,1978a:5-7). He argues that it's now realized that money dealings and production for a market were much more common in medieval times and even in classical Greece and Rome. So that, if both are to be regarded as capitalist societies, one has to conclude that any search for the origins of the system is useless and capitalism must have existed throughout most of the history. Hence, it is necessary to describe the distinctive economic institutions of recent centuries. At this point, Dobb employs the original definition given by Marx who sought the essence of capitalism in a particular mode of production rather than capitalist spirit and commerce. By mode of production, its not referred only the state of productive forces, but to the way in which the means of production were owned and to the social relations between people within the production process. In Dobb's own words " Capitalism was not simply a system of production for the market -a system of commodity

production as Marx termed it—but a system under which labor power had itself become a commodity and was bought and sold on the market like any other object of exchange" (Dobb, 1978a :11). According to this, essential feature of the capitalist mode of production is the class division of society between propertyless wage earners and entrepreneurs who own capital. Dobb defined capitalism using Marxist terminology in order to reject the approaches that equates capitalism to growth in commerce. In the second chapter of his book on the decline of feudalism, he briefly explains the familiar story of the disruptive effect of the growth in commerce on more or less stable feudal societies (2). Then, Dobb raises some questions about the adequacy of such an interpretation. According to Dobb's own argument, if the destructive effects of trade on feudal mode of production is primarily important, then one could naturally expect that the disintegration of feudalism comes earlier in areas which were directly on the trade routes rather than in areas which were peripheral to the great trade routes. He continues to argue that the historical reality does not prove this; thus in the most backward Northern and Western regions of England, serfdom disappeared earlier than in the more advanced South-East. So too, the second serfdom in Eastern Europe coincided with a period of commercial expansion (Dobb, 1978a:35-45). Here, Dobb emphasizes the qualitative and quantitative differences of the trade in pre-capitalist and capitalist societies. In this sense, luxury commodities (light in bulk, high in value) were

constituting the greatest part of the pre-capitalist trade serving to the consumption bundle of upper classes. In other words, the influence of the sphere of trade on the dominant mode of production was very limited. On the other hand, increasing variation in the type of commodities and increasing consumption both by upper and lower classes in a society as a result of mass production and developments in transportation technologies stands as some of the characteristics of capitalism after industrial revolution. Accordingly, sphere of capitalist trade could influence the sphere of production. Hence, Dobb points out the differences in the power of the sphere of trade on the sphere of production between pre-capitalist and capitalist societies. This means that the sphere of pre-capitalist trade could not have transformed the feudal societies (Dobb,1978a:26-27). Therefore, Dobb concludes that the growth and dissolution of feudalism should have come as a result of elements operating within it (3). In Dobb's words " it was the inefficiency of feudalism as a system of production, coupled with the growing needs of the ruling class for revenue, that was primarily responsible for its decline" (Dobb,1978a:42). Accordingly, he notes that the need for additional revenue increased the pressure on the direct producers which finally became unendurable. This resulted in the flight of serfs from the land which in turn feed the towns with immigrants. And, the existence of towns with free peasants played a primary role in the growth of towns and also the decline of feudalism.

In fact, the most controversial problem in the debate between Dobb and Sweezy concerns the validity of Pirenne's argument on the role played by commerce on the growth and dissolution of feudalism. The arguments adopted by Sweezy in his critique of Dobb's study are close to Pirenne's thesis (Sweezy, 1978: 41). Sweezy argues that "feudalism is a system with a bias in favour of maintaining given methods and relations of production", so that, the dissolution of the system had to be external to it (Sweezy, 1978:36). Accordingly, Sweezy criticized Dobb's interpretation of the decline of feudalism on several counts. Sweezy claims that Dobb is not convincing in his historical reconstruction of internal dynamics of feudalism. That is, he could not explain why the feudal ruling classes growing need for revenue and the flight of serfs from the land were the natural consequences of feudal mode of production. On the other hand, he admits Dobb's remarks on the paradoxical development of towns under the impact of trade. That is the progress of trade was accompanied by an intensification rather than a relaxation of the bonds of serfdom in some regions of Western Europe. Nevertheless, he notes that "these temporary and partial reversals of trend should not be allowed to obscure the overall picture which is one of the steady replacement of demesne farming using serf labor by tenant farming using either independent peasant labor or hired labor" (Sweezy, 1978:44). Dobb, in his reply to criticism of Sweezy

underlines the point that the actual outcome has to be treated as a result of a complex interaction between the external impact of the market and these internal conflicts exerting the decisive influence (Dobb,1978b:60). He also finds the claims of Sweezy on the paradoxical developments of towns unsatisfactory and summarizes his own views once again. And finally, he rightly comments that " to say so (i.e that feudalism has no tendency within it to change) would be to make it an exception to the general Marxist law of development that economic society is moved by it is own contradictions " (Dobb,1978b:59).

Methodologically similar arguments advanced by Dobb, have also been formulated by Hilton. He also mostly refers to Marx in formulating the internal dialectic of feudal societies to move. According to him, the fundamental law of the society was the tendency of the exploiting class to realize the maximum surplus from the labor of direct producers which in turn conflicts with the requirements of social development and results in direct producers resistance to the exploiters pressure for the transfer of the surplus (Hilton,1978:115-118). Here, it is evident that the maximization of the surplus value or profit is the key factor to explain the development of societies.

In fact, number of historians who has participated to the debate is surely more than a few (4). While some of the

remaining historians (for example, Takahashi, Hill, Lefebvre, Procacci, Hobsbawm, Merrington) made contributions to the debate, others made only comments (Hilton, 1978:1-3). Nevertheless, contributions were not directly related to the question of "primary mover" but to other problems of the debate. On the other hand, comments made to the debate were not bringing new explanations to the primary role of either internal or external factors. Therefore, only the original arguments related to the concept of "primary mover" have been summarized in this section.

1.2 The Brenner Debate

The stimulating article of Robert Brenner's "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe" published in the Past and Present (1976) initiated a debate on the causes of transitions between different social formations. It might be regarded as the continuation of the original transition debate due to considerable overlap in subject matter which has been summarized in the previous section. The main difference between them lies in the fact that while the early transition debate was conducted among Marxists, the latter one was also covering the contributions of non-marxists.

Brenner in his article attacks to the construction of economic models concerning the long term economic change in

late medieval and early modern Europe on the basis of objective forces—as Brenner termed it— in particular demographic fluctuations and the growth of trade and markets. It's a familiar story that how the models work. That is, an initial impact of population expansion or growth in trade causes imbalances on the internal order of the system and finally results in the dissolution of it. Brenner calls the demographic determinism as neo-maltusianism and economic determinism by means of trade as neo-smithian marxism (5). He argues that, both of them are subject to analogous problems, in the sense that a market supply and demand mechanism is usually assumed to provide the elementary theoretical underpinnings. He refutes the assumption, demonstrating the same demographic or economic (growth of commerce) trends in approximately the same periods accompanied by opposite trends in the transformation of social formations in different European regions. He argues that while there was a shift in England, favourable to the lords against the peasants, on the other hand there was just the opposite shift favourable to peasants against the lords during the population increase of the 12th and 13th centuries under the same conditions. He also notes that there was an opposite shift in the evolution of societies in the West and East of Europe during the population downturn of the late medieval period (Brenner, 1987:220-23).

Then, Brenner attempts to penetrate to the essence of the

problem and reaches a conclusion that it is the structure of class relations which determines the manner and degree to which demographic and commercial changes affect long-term trends in economic growth. He points out that "...Different class structures, specifically property relations or surplus extraction relations once established tend to impose rather strict limits and possibilities, indeed rather specific long-term patterns, on societies economic development. At the same time...class structures tend to be highly resilient in relation to the impact of economic forces; as a rule, they are not shaped by or alterable in terms of changes in demographic or commercial trends " (Brenner,1987:11).

Accordingly, in order to comprehend the long-term economic developments, one has to analyze the particular class structures or surplus extraction relations which is also the key factor on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This conclusion of Brenner has important implications to understand the development of underdevelopment of some countries since the 16th century. Because, he rejects the view that economic backwardness in Eastern Europe can be regarded as economically determined, the result of dependence upon trade in primary products to the West. Instead of this, he tries to show the development path of Eastern countries, putting the class struggle to the center of his analysis.

The earliest responses to Brenner's article came from historians whom he called neo-malthusians,namely, Postan,

Hatcher and Ladurrie. They claimed that there are deficiencies and misconceptions in Brenner's article. Besides, they emphasized the primary role of demographic factors concerning the historical developments. They also ask a question: "Does Brenner mean that no causal factor can be proved true unless it can be shown to produce identical results in totally different circumstances " (Postan and Hatcher, 1987:66). Brenner replies the question with a similar question that " Do Postan and Hatcher really wish to argue that historical explanations can be counted adequate when the factor imputed to be cause (demographic increase\ decline) can be shown to produce the opposite effects in very similar conditions " (Brenner, 1987:220). At this point, it is evident that there are important differences between neo-Malthusians and Brenner on the methodology and interpretation of historical facts.

On the other hand, Guy Bois criticizes Brenner not for his attacks on the "neo-malthusian" model and his model that stresses the decisive role class struggle in long term evolution of societies, but his reasoning and methodological orientation. Bois claims that Brenner's study is a characteristic example " where ideology triumphs over scientific rationalism " since he starts with a fundamental principle of historical materialism: the driving role of class struggle (Bois, 1987:108). Nevertheless, Brenner rejects the comments of Bois and claims that Bois also suffers from a

similar difficulty -a failure to take into account the specific development paths of societies-.

Another reaction came from Croot and Parker. They questioned the Brenner's perception of agrarian structures and developments in early modern France and England despite the fact that they agree on the decisive role of class struggle (Parker and Croot,1987:80).

There have been some other contributions to debate, but the main controversies and the conceptual framework remained the same. Thus, there are two important points which we have derived from Transition and Brenner debates to extend into the analysis of the 17th and 18th century Ottoman economies. First of all, it can be suggested that there has not been satisfactory counter arguments against the argument why the same demographic or economic trends in approximately the same period accompanied by opposite trends in the transformation of social formations in different European regions. Indeed, we believe that the differentiation in the developments paths realized under the impact of the similar external conditions is an important indicator implying the potential role of the internal non-economic factors in the dissolution and transformation of societies. In connection with this, after showing the relative autonomy in the development of the Ottoman Economy in the next chapter, we shall point out the importance of internal non-economic factors (which is

neglected in the Ottoman studies influenced from AHS) to explain the specific transformation of the Ottoman social formation. At this point, it should be noted once again that this study does not refute the role of external economic factors, but rather it criticizes the economic determinism or one-sided approaches. It's obviously difficult to answer the question whether the external or internal factors were primarily effective in the dissolution of the traditional Ottoman social formation in the 16th century. However, we shall argue that it's also difficult to speak about the primary role of external factors in the transformation of Ottoman social formation after the 16th century as the certain historians claimed. The second point derived from the debates is the arguments related to the characteristics of the pre-capitalist trade. As it is rightly emphasized by Dobb, both the primitive technology in transportation and the characteristics of the commodities subject to trade (mostly luxury goods) were preventing the power of the pre-capitalist trade to influence the sphere of production. Therefore, if we can show that the Ottoman trade with West European countries exhibits pre-capitalist characteristics in the 17th and 18th centuries, then one can not speak about the domination of West European countries on the Ottoman economy.

2. A BRIEF SURVEY AND THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE HISTORIANS INFLUENCED FROM ANNALES HISTORY SCHOOL.

In this chapter, we shall summarize the arguments of the Ottoman historians influenced from the AHS and then re-evaluate these arguments by employing some of the latest secondary sources on the Ottoman economic and social history.

Despite the fact that the 16th and 17th centuries suggested as the incorporation period to the capitalist world economy mainly by these historians, there are some other historians who have not been directly influenced from AHS, but suggested also 16th or 17th centuries as the beginning periods of the European domination on the Ottoman economy by means of trade. Therefore, the survey and the re-evaluation should be viewed in a broad perspective covering the arguments of all historians proposing any period at least before the second half of the 18th century as the incorporation period. In this sense, the crucial point that will be inquired through this part is whether there has really been a structural change in the Ottoman Economy that signs the dependency of that economy to the center of capitalist world system which is supposed to emerge in the 16th century.

Annales History School and Fernand Braudel

In 1929, French historians Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch

founded a new historical journal, Annales d'histoire economique et sociale. This journal known as Annales: economies, societies, civilizations has become associated with a particular methodology of history and a particular group of historians. It is called Annales School in the literature (Earle,1972:5-7).

According to this school, there are not individual histories but a total history; the history of all human activities and their reciprocal relationships. Thus, an interdisciplinary approach is needed for such a research of history (Febvre,1985:50-52). At the same time, it is argued that an improved and more general use of a comparative method would lead to the discovery of real causes of the similarities and differences between societies (Bloch,1985:20-25).

On the other hand, the second generation of the school has begun to present their studies after 1945s. Among them, the pioneering work of Fernand Braudel, Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, was published in 1949. Braudel is the first historian approaching the problems of the Mediterranean from a global point of view putting forward the idea that the region formed in the 16th century as an interdependent historical and geographical unit, largely affected by similar social and economic forces, such as population and price movements.

Braudel's revolutionary historical approach has tended to replace the earlier view of the Mediterranean history, as divided between East and West with historical events happening along separate lines. According to Braudel, the main trends observed in the whole Mediterranean area during the 16th century were the increased trade activities, the increased circulation of precious metals originating from America and flowing towards Europe and a generalized increase in prices and population. Here, Braudel proposes that the similar trends of price and population movements observed both in West and East of Mediterranean Europe in the 16th century were indicators of the unity of the whole Mediterranean area (Braudel, 1972: 887-95). On account of this, the marked price and population increase were the primary movers distorting the internal order of the societies and leading them to be an integrated part of the whole. Put differently, external factors are supposed to be primary movers in the dissolution and transformation of societies. In this sense, Braudel was also trying to demonstrate that Ottoman Empire was an integral part of the Mediterranean world participating in its general development. It should be emphasized that he has successfully employed the methodological tools namely total history and comparative analysis of Annales School. Besides, he introduced two critical factors (prices and population) that would be used in the comparative analysis of late medieval societies of Mediterranean area. It's impact has been felt on the young

members of the Annales School as well as on some Ottoman historians. In connection with this, Chaunu, Goubert, Cipolla, Hoszoweski, Malawust, Chabert, and Le Roy Ladurrie can be given as examples (Braudel, 1972:5-7). However, one should pay attention specifically to the work of Ladurrie. Also interested with the late medieval periods in long-term perspective stressing the role of demographic factors, Ladurrie has been one of the active contributors of the Brenner Debate (1). Accordingly, this methodological change in the interpretation of historical facts has influenced the thinking about the Ottoman Empire's own history and about its relations with Western world.

Ottoman Studies Influenced From Annales History School

Ömer Lütfi Barkan, a distinguished scholar who did a lot of research work on the economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, might be considered as the most important name influenced from the AHS. The impact of the AHS and particularly of Braudel became evident in Barkan's studies related to the 16th century price and population movements in the Ottoman Empire (see Barkan 1963, 1970a and 1970b). In fact, Barkan states that the purpose of his research is to test the hypothesis of Braudel by a systematic study of the Ottoman archival sources (Barkan, 1970b:558-59). Accordingly, he has studied on population and price movements within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Concerning the prices, he

has published the results in various articles on the official price lists (narh), on the estates of deceased Ottoman soldiers in Edirne, on the prices paid for labor and materials during the construction of Süleymaniye Mosque, and on the expenditures of several imarets (Barkan,1970b:561). Despite the fact that Barkan has calculated the price indexes from different sources stating the possible deficiencies of each of them, there are more or less similarities between the trends of the price movements. Accordingly, it would be assumed that the price indexes of foodstuffs from imaret records approximately reflects overall price changes. Barkan's calculations are reliable since he has also produced a second index taking into consideration the debasement of the Ottoman currency (2). In Table 1, there are selected years price indexes both in akçe and grams silver.

Table 1: Price Changes During the 16th and 17th Centuries

<u>Year</u>	<u>Price Index(in Akçes)</u>	<u>Price Index(in gr.silver)</u>
1489	100.00	100.00
1555	142.26	135.41
1585	182.48	162.10
1586	268.20	134.10
1605	630.66	265.24
1623	593.43	249.57
1648	470.12	187.31

 Source: Barkan (1970b:136).

As it is obvious from the Table 1, both of the price indexes show a marked increase in prices especially from 1585 to 1605, although it begins to fall after this period, 17th century prices continued to be considerably higher than the 16th century price level.

On the other hand, Barkan's studies on Ottoman demographic history are not confined to 15th and 17th centuries, but rather cover a wider period that goes back to the establishment of the Empire (3). According to Barkan, the population of the Empire (for Asia minor and Balkans) was 12 or 13 million for the early 16th century (Barkan, 1970a:167). Barkan's calculation is based on the total number of households (hane) obtained by counting the entries in the general tax and population registers made in the period 1520-1530. According to Barkan's estimations, total number of households were approximately 2.200.000. Registers also include tax exemptions such as military in provinces but excludes the domestic servants and slaves. Barkan uses a multiplier of 5 for households and adds one million for those not included in the registers (Barkan, 1970a:168). Barkan calculates a 60 % growth in population between the years 1520-1600. Besides, he adds the population of areas conquered during this period and reaches a figure for the whole Empire as 30-35 million at the end of the 16th century (Barkan, 1970a

:169). In particular, Barkan examines the population increase in principal cities and towns for the 16th century and concludes that the rate of increase in urban areas is remarkably greater than rural areas approaching 90 % which can be compared with the figure of 84 % for the increase in the urban population elsewhere in the Mediterranean (Barkan, 1970a:170).

One can not deny the correspondence of the price and population movements in Ottoman Empire and Europe during 16th and 17th centuries (4). Price histories in Europe were also calculated employing the indirect data as Barkan made. However, this methodology certainly contains a margin of error. In this sense, Barkan's estimations concerning the price movements are reliable as there seems to be no additional problem than the price histories written about Europe (Spooner and Braudel 1967:432). On the other hand, Barkan's estimations and assumptions on population movements needs to be re-evaluated since the conclusions of various demographic studies imply an overestimation of population in Barkan's study (Erder, 1975:284-301 and Todorova, 1988:60-63). This seems to be due to data problems and methodology employed. Indeed, it implies an important problem related to the Ottoman sources, that is, the insufficiency of the empirical data. This is important, because it might cause overestimation or underestimation of a magnitude which in turn leads to differentiation in interpretation of facts.

Since Barkan proposes the marked increase in population as one of the primary movers in the dissolution of Ottoman social formation, it is worth to discuss whether the increase was so severe or not. Accordingly, we shall discuss the problem concerning the Ottoman documents within the framework of demographic studies in the next section.

Evidently, the only aim of Barkan was not to show the similarities of the trends in price and population in whole Mediterranean region but to investigate the role of economic factors as well as that of monetary problems in the dissolution and the transformation of the Empire originated outside of its boundaries. In fact, these investigations of Barkan are worth to discuss. First of all, he argues the originality and self-sufficiency of the Ottoman system until the end of the 15th century. The internal order of the system was supposed to be constitutionally and politically so strong that did not create any conflict and economic crisis (Barkan,1975:17-18). So that, only the external factors could cause the decline of the system. In Barkan's own terms "it was only when Europe began to develop its own political and economic power that the system was breached. The decline of the established Ottoman social and economic order began as the result of developments entirely outside the area dominated by the Porte and in particular as a consequence of the establishment in western Europe of an Atlantic economy of tremendous vitality and force at the end of the 16th century.

The economic system of the Empire decayed neither through a flaw inherent in its constitution, nor through an organic law, but because of immense historical changes that destroyed its equilibrium, arrested its natural economic evolution and condemned its institutions to irreparable damage" (Barkan, 1975:5). The history of the economic development in Europe is relatively well known. How the discoveries of 16th and 17th centuries enabled Europeans to bring into Europe tremendous amounts of gold and silver, how these injection of bullion created new activities in European commerce and industry which led them to look for new markets, and eventually how they penetrated to the periphery to realize higher profits are thoroughly established. Having summarized these developments, Barkan claims that the penetration of the "dominant economy" -in his terms- also into the Ottoman empire produced high inflation as a result of the excessive demand for Ottoman raw materials. Besides, he argues that the increase in population together with the inflation led to subsistence crises and distorted the economic order of the Empire.

According to Barkan, one of the important consequences of the European expansion was the decline of Ottoman industry. Relatively low price of raw materials in the Ottoman empire increased the demand of European industrialists, which in turn caused scarcity of raw materials for local industry. Barkan points out that the difficulty of local industry was

doubled with the free flow of cheaper and better European manufactured goods limiting the local market of Ottoman industries at the end of the 16th century. In addition, the mercantilist policies followed by the European nations was also left no market for Ottoman industry. Barkan gives the example of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair cloth (sof) industry and claims that they have declined at the end of 16th century and these regions have become only the supplier of raw silk and mohair yarn. Here, Barkan emphasizes the change in the character of the foreign trade of Ottoman Empire. He argues that till the beginning of the 17th century, only the luxury goods had been imported and both industrial goods (particularly textile products) and raw materials had been exported, however, since than Ottoman Empire became the exporter of raw materials and importer of all type of manufactured goods. Put differently, this means that Ottoman Empire has been incorporated to the world capitalist system taking its place in the division of labor at the end of the 16th century.

Besides, Barkan argues that another consequence of social and political disturbances was the financial crises of the state, which made necessary to find new sources of revenue.

Accordingly, timar system (which had been the main source of revenue until the beginning of 17th century) was replaced by tax-farming (iltizam) to compensate the urgent needs of the treasury. Nevertheless, tax-farming system provoked the rise

of local powers (ayans) and the formation of agricultural estates (çiftliks) particularly in the Western regions of the Empire. Barkan stresses that the commercial production of çiftliks were also exported to European markets which makes stronger the view on Ottoman Empire's role as supplier of raw materials (Barkan,1975:24-27). Thus, according to Barkan, de-industrialization, change in the character of foreign trade and formation of commercial large estates were the main indicators of the incorporation and dependency of Ottoman Empire to the world capitalist system at the end of the 16th century (Barkan,1963:19-22). The dependency is also supposed to explain the less development of modern Turkey.

It can easily be noticed that the theoretical approach of Barkan is quite similar to Sweezy-Wallerstein in the sense that the primary role has been given to external factors to explain the dissolution and transformation of Ottoman Empire.

The impact of AHS has led many researchers to study on population pressure in various parts of the Mediterranean in the 16th century. One of them, was Cook who has studied the Ottoman example (Cook,1972). Cook's study was supporting the Braudel thesis about the general correspondence of population movements in whole Mediterranean area concluding that the population pressure was the main source of upheaval and subsistence crisis in the 16th century Ottoman Empire. In other words, Cook admits the externally determined

demographic factors as the primary mover in the dissolution of the Ottoman system and its later development after the 17th century. On the other hand, Mustafa Akdağ is an important name who has studied on the economic and social development of 16th and 17th century of Ottoman Empire under the impact of AHS (Akdağ,1971:142-45). Akdağ also emphasizes the well known development in West Europe in 16th century as the primary cause of the dissolution of the self-sufficient Ottoman system. He points out that the Ottoman Empire became the raw material market of dominant economies in the second half of the 16th century which in turn increased the exploitative power of those nations and resulted in the financial and political crises of the Ottoman Empire (Akdağ,1971:146). In other words, Akdağ claims that the Ottoman Empire was incorporated to the world capitalist system as an exporter of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods which also implies de-industrialization in this period.

Halil İnalcık is also one of the eminent Ottoman historians who has produced some original studies on the Ottoman Empire. Though, İnalcık's views concerning the incorporation of Ottoman Empire are somewhat different than the others. He also speaks about the radical transformation and profound crisis of Ottoman Empire under the economic and military impact of Europe in the last decade of the 16th century. In İnalcık's own terms "...but changes in world trade routes at

the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th begun to take their toll on the Ottoman market with the result that the mercantilist states of the West were enabled to subordinate the Levant to their own economic systems" (Inalcık,1973:52). However, he does not speak about the de-industrialization and a change in the character of foreign trade but rather emphasizes the institutional changes. In contrast, Inalcık shows that there was not a considerable collapse of the Ottoman industry and economy in general before the last quarter of the 18th century in his various articles (Inalcık,1979:52-53). This seems to be in conflict with the earlier views of Inalcık, since a subordinated economy can not be expected to operate so much independently and continue to supply the manufactured goods as well as raw materials to the great part of the local market.

There has also been studies attempting to expand the direction of the Braudel thesis. One of them was Osman Okyar's study who has exercised the application of a new concept of economic growth for the pre-industrial historical period, suggested by the growth economist Simon Kuznets, on the 16th century Ottoman economy (Okyar,1980:116-120). Okyar employs the price and population data of Barkan to determine the economic growth of Empire. At the end of the study, he concludes that Ottoman Empire went through a period of long-term economic growth in Kuznetsian sense during the first three quarters of the 16th century. Accordingly, he points

out the similar trends observed in economic factors between West and East of the Mediterranean. However, he suggests that this coincidence does not always mean the similarities of causal relations between economic events. At this point, Okyar rightly emphasizes the role of internal dynamics to understand the different paths of development.

Other Studies Suggesting the 16th or 17th Centuries as the Incorporation Period.

Another approach related to incorporation period was suggested by Murat Çizakça (Çizakça,1985:353-77). According to him, incorporation was by no means a single event, that is different sectors were incorporated at different periods as a result of changing supply and demand conditions prevailing in the world trade. In other words, he claims that if a sector becomes mainly the supplier of raw materials, it might be regarded as incorporated to the world system. In addition, he notes that incorporation of regions had to follow the incorporation of sectors. Çizakça examines the developments in Bursa silk and Çukurova cotton and Ankara sof industries. From this work, he concludes that Bursa silk and Ankara sof industries were declined in the period 1550-1650 and accordingly these regions were incorporated to the world system as a supplier of raw silk and mohair yarn in this period. He calls it as the early incorporation period. On the other hand, he also points out the recovery of Bursa silk and

Ankara "sof" industries in the early 18th century and explains this as the shift in the European pressure to Indian ocean. That is the increase in the volume of European trade to Indian ocean. Eventually, he notes the second decline of these industries in the period 1830-1900 and calls it as the full incorporation period. Put differently, Çizakca argues that the developments of the Ottoman economy has been dependent to the swings in the demand structure of west European nations since the 16th century.

A further debated issue is the role of Çiftlik in the incorporation of Ottoman Empire to the capitalist world economy in the 17th century. The most stimulating contribution to the debate was the article of Stoianovich (1953) which compares the formation of Çiftlik in Balkans with the second serfdom of the Eastern Europe during the same period. Stoianovich (1953) argues as well as Braudel (1972) about the parallelism between the Balkans and Poland or Bohemia and he concludes that çiftlik operated as commercial estates of East Europe and supplied the raw material to West Europe. In other words, he claims that the Balkan region of the Ottoman Empire has incorporated to the capitalist world economy in the 17th century (Stoianovich, 1953:398-411).

Finally, we have to mention the names of some historians who have not specifically studied on the incorporation problem, but suggested the 17th century as the beginning of the

definite economic hegemony of the West on Ottoman economy. In connection with this, Timur, Berkes and Tezel can be given as examples (Timur,1989:43-35, Berkes,1970:111-114 and Tezel,1982:62). Thus, the arguments of historians (suggesting the 16th or 17th century as the incorporation period) related to the structure of Ottoman Economy can be classified in three different groups. It is generally suggested that Ottoman Economy was become the supplier of raw materials and importer of the manufactured goods as a result of the incorporation. So that, we shall study the structure of the Ottoman trade for the 17th and 18th centuries in order to test whether the argument is true or not. Closely related with the first argument, de-industrialization is suggested as the second product of the incorporation. Therefore, we shall also study the structure of the Ottoman industry in 17th and 18th centuries. And finally, formation of capitalist çiftliks supplying raw materials to Western Europe similar to large estates observed in the Eastern Europe in the second serfdom is supposed to be another result of the incorporation. Accordingly, the Çiftlik Debate shall constitute the third section. However, as it is noted previously, first of all, we shall discuss the problems related to Ottoman documents within the framework of demographic studies.

2.1 Problems of Ottoman Documents in the Context of Ottoman Demographic Studies for the 16th and 17th Centuries

What we are trying to do in this section is to show the drawbacks of Ottoman archives and therefore the difficulties of making generalizations at this stage of research about the Ottoman economic and social history giving the example of the demographic studies for the 16th and 17th centuries.

As it is emphasized before, one can not deny the coherence between the developments occurred in the 16th century Europe and Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, to establish causal links and generalizations starting from the coherence needs to be tested with respect to it is empirical and methodological proficiency.

The most important type of source about the economic and demographic life in the Ottoman Empire is the tax register or tahrir (5). Indeed, there are serious problems posed by the tax registers for researchers studying on the economic and social history of the Empire. Because, the survey of tax resources was made not for economic but for fiscal considerations by the state. Accordingly, only the indirect information is available from these registers which in turn causes problems and shortcomings for the economic analyses (Faroqhi, 1977:167). For instance, they enumerate the adult men and their settlement but the taxes to which any given man was liable are not listed individually, therefore this source tells us very little about

differences of wealth within the village. On the other hand, there are differences in the rate of taxes charged from one region to next which prevents to make adequate comparisons of the economic activity. At the same time, lack of standardized measure of tax base such as the variations in the extent of the farmstead (çift) also causes similar problems.

The examples of shortcomings can be increased, however, we shall specify the problem in the example of population studies in this section. As it is pointed out before, there are number of studies suggesting the population expansion and subsistence crisis in the 16th century and a considerable decline in population in the 17th century Ottoman Empire. Here, a probable question is whether the increase or the decrease in population were so severe in the Ottoman Empire as well as suggested or not. Since the Ottoman archives were made simply as a basis for taxation not for statistical purposes, one should have an expert knowledge about the specific Ottoman laws to interpret the demographic data accurately. Yet, the size of the Ottoman household (hane) and the meaning of the terms such as nefer, mücerred which changed regionally are all matters of dispute (Inalcık,1978:81-82). In connection with this, studies on population estimations and their implications related to the 16th century Ottoman Empire are also among the disputed subjects.

The question of hane is important since it represents the tax

unit based on group of persons in the Ottoman registers and it's used as a parameter for population estimations. This means that researchers have to employ a coefficient which represent the average number of adult men in hanes to compute the total taxable population (multiplying the total number of hane with this coefficient). Nevertheless, this is one of the drawbacks that causes the overestimation or the underestimation of population. Because, the number of adult taxable men in this kind of hane varies according to region, the period, the form and circumstances in which the taxable population lived (Faroghi,1977:167-68). Besides, it was necessary to estimate the number of people excluded in the registers, such as the domestic servants, members of the standing army and slaves. Hence, making generalization as Barkan did, mostly resulted in overestimation. For example, Inalcık stresses the overestimation in Barkan's study on population summarized in the previous section (6). In connection with this, he also argues about the difficulties of finding a universal coefficient and the fact that the increase in number of hanes signs the improvement in registration rather than the natural increase for some periods and regions. On the other hand, Erder examines the structure of hane applying a different methodology and finds that all coefficients are confined to a relatively narrow range between 3 to 4 which in turn implies a lower level of population expansion (Erder,1975:284-301). Likewise, Todorava(1988) emphasizes the similar problems related to the population movement in Balkan peninsula (Todorava,1988: 55-63).

Todorova's article focuses on the above mentioned overestimation and underestimation of population. She argues that there have been neither a marked increase in population in the 16th century nor a drastic fall in 17th century as some historians suggested. Accordingly, she examines Mc Gowan's scheme which shows the development of Christian population on the Balkan peninsula as an example. According to this scheme, Mc Gowan suggests that there was a demographic catastrophe on the Balkan Peninsula at the end of the 17th century, because he employs 3 as the coefficient for the period after 1691 instead of 5 which he uses for the pre-1691 period. (Mc Gowan, 1981:80-104). Todorova rejects the Mc Gowan's use of different coefficients as 5 for the period 1490-1691 and 3 for the period 1691-1831. By contrast, she illustrates from the Ottoman documents that the hane's of 16th and 17th centuries were identical with taxable persons. Thereafter, Todorova estimates the multiplier as 3 for the whole period and finds lower figures of population expansion for the period 1490-1691 (7). Besides, she also argues about the problems posed by the Ottoman sources and documents described above. Thus, Todorova's and Erder's study as well as Inalcik's remarks invite us to be more suspicious to the conclusions of the studies that claim drastic population movements for the 16th and 17th centuries associated with crisis for the whole Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, a recent study of Islamoglu on the peasant

economy in north-central Anatolia during the 16th century increases the doubts about the population issue (Islamoglu, 1987b:112-119). One of the question that the Islamoglu's paper addresses itself is to determine the main causes of the population increase during this period particularly in urban areas. She argues that there was a strong correlation between the political-social unstability such as wars, social unrest or economic crisis and fluctuations in the size of the urban population during the 16th century. In connection with this, she suggests that the main reason for the population increase in urban areas was the internal migration rather than natural growth (Islamoglu,1987b: 112). Moreover, she points out the involuntary migration employed by the state both as a means of settling newly conquered lands and in order to establish law and order (8). On the other hand, she proposes that the settlement of nomads encouraged by the state was the main reason for the growth in rural population (Islamoglu,1987b:114-15). According to Islamoglu, sedentarization of nomads or "peasantation " of them was a primary concern for the Ottoman State owing to the following facts. First of all, the state was trying to protect the peasant production which formed the basis of it's political authority. Secondly, there were revenue considerations of the state because of the financial difficulties. On this occasion, nomads constituted a potential source of income since they were not obliged to pay most of the taxes which the peasant had to pay. Hence, Islamoglu reminds us the documents demonstrating the increasing tendency of the

central state to register the nomads as ordinary reaya (taxpayers) and the lands they worked as peasant holdings (Islamoglu, 1987b:16-17). Briefly, she emphasizes the different factors that has to be taken into account other than the natural fluctuations in the population estimation. In addition to the above arguments, she maintains that there were no considerable subsistence crisis in the Anatolia during the 16th century. Islamoglu suggests that Ottoman peasants were aware of certain techniques of intensive land utilisation which means that they could have increased the production to a certain extent in response to population increase. Therefore, she gives examples such as the introduction of legumes in the rotation as an indicator of peasant attempt to soil fertilization and irrigation activities (Islamoglu, 1987b:117-20). Besides, she points out substitution of other food crops like fruit and vegetables instead of wheat and barley (when their supply is limited) by peasants. She concludes that there were no serious subsistence crisis during this period as some historians suggested.

Thus, the implications of the increasing volume of research on the demographic movements of 15th and 16th century Ottoman Empire lead us to draw some conclusions related to the subject that the dissertation discusses. First of all, it should be noted that there is a direct correlation between the power of the central state and both the sufficiency and the availability of proper documents related to Ottoman fiscal history. Put

differently, the Ottoman documentary material is the result of a direct function performed on the authority and competence of the central administration. That is why those Ottoman material related to the second half of the 15th century and to the whole of the 16th century are comparatively the most numerous. On the other hand, the documents belonging to the 17th and 18th centuries- the period of gradual increase in decentralization- are much less numerous and the data in these documents indicate that they were not kept regularly (Faroghi,1979:149-53, Genç,1987:346-50, and Todorova,1988:58-60). Accordingly, it is obvious that determination of the consequences of the political and economic relations of the Ottoman Empire with the West European nations for the period from 15th to 19th century is a difficult work. This point is important, because if the dependency of Ottoman Empire to these nations of the West has been realized in the 16th century as some historians suggested, then, one should be able to follow the impact of the dependency at least on the Ottoman economy with all it's peculiarity for the 17th and 18th centuries. However, this seems to be difficult at this stage of research, even it is not entirely impossible(9).

As it is described in the previous section, similar trends of the population movements and the consequent demographic crisis within the whole Mediterranean area was one of the main arguments of the historians who claim the 16th and 17th centuries as the beginning of the dependency of Ottoman Empire

to the core nations of the West. Nevertheless, the consequences of the studies summarized above proposes that neither the increase nor the decrease in population in 16th and 17th centuries respectively were so drastic as well as suggested. Besides, they also point out the difficulties of making generalization when so little is known about a period. So that, these arguments of some Ottoman historians that gives the primary role to an external factor (like demographic factors) to explain the transformation of the Ottoman social formation inspired by Fernand Braudel should be reconsidered. From this point of view, although the aim of this study is not to establish an original model concerning this transformation, it can be proposed that internal dynamics, especially the authority and the competence of the central state had a prominent role in this transformation. For example, as it is demonstrated in Islamoğlu (1987), both the revenue considerations and the desire of the central state to protect the peasant production were very effective to determine the demographic movements in the Ottoman Empire.

2.2 General Trends of Ottoman Trade with Western Europe in the 17th and 18th Centuries.

In this section, we shall try to clarify some characteristics and volume of Ottoman trade with Western Europe in 17th and 18th centuries putting forward the question whether the observed facts related to this trade supports the view that Ottoman Empire has been integrated to the capitalist world economy in the 16th century as a periphery which supplies only the raw materials to the core nations of this system or not. From this point of view, our primary concern shall be to identify the exact nature of imports from the Ottoman Empire to West European countries (10). On the other hand, the data related to the export of West European countries to the Ottoman Empire is insufficient to give an idea. However, since the above question can also be asked as whether the European goods caused the decline of the Ottoman industry or not, then the structure of the industry in the 17th and 18th century would give an idea about the extent of the exports. Accordingly, we shall only present the dispersed data related to the textile exports from the West Europe to Ottoman Empire in this section, however, the effects of exports from these countries on the Ottoman economy shall be specified in the next section when we argue about the structure of Ottoman industry in 17th and 18th centuries.

In fact, Anatolia became the main route for East-West trade

in the 13th century. Then, the rise of Ottoman Empire consolidated the role of Anatolia in this trade (Accordingly, commercial centers and markets developed in Anatolia such as Trabzon, Amasya, Erzurum, Kayseri, Ankara, Antalya, Istanbul (Constantinople), Bursa and Izmir. Among these centers, Bursa became the most important trading city, because it was like an entrepot between East-West trade). The merchants of Asia were bringing various commodities such as musk, rhubarb, Chinese porcelain, spices, dyestuff, drugs, and especially Persian silk passing through the commercial centers of East Anatolia to Bursa. Then, these merchants were taking back various European commodities such as, woollens, precious brocades, velvets, etc. However, they were preferring gold and silver coins in exchange, which had a higher value in Asia, rather than various European commodities. On the other hand, these European commodities were brought to Bursa by the merchants of Italian States, primarily from Venice. Likewise, they were taking back the Eastern goods where Persian silk formed an important part of them (Inalcik, 1973:134-36). Here, the point that should be stressed is that Bursa and other commercial centers were not only the meeting places of merchants from East and West. In other words, Ottoman merchants were also participating to the international trade both by selling the Ottoman goods such as wheat, raw silk, cotton, wool, hides, mohair cloth, silk cloth and by buying European goods brought to the markets by the merchants of Venice. Therefore, one should carefully distinguish the

intermediary status of Ottoman Empire in the East-West trade which means that Ottoman Empire was not the producer of all the commodities exported from its trading centers to Europe. With all these characteristics, monopoly of Venice handled the Ottoman trade with the Western Europe until 1569 (11). However, the situation has started to change after this date as a result of the rise of the capitalism in Western Europe and the discovery of a new trade route by sea between the Europe and the Far East through the South African coastline. That is, the pre-eminence of the Venice in the Mediterranean trade was challenged by the English, the Dutch (Holland) and the French. At the same time, Anatolia was no more an entrepot for Far East and West trade since the trade has been carried out by the new route. Therefore, Anatolian markets together with the other markets of Middle East have become trading centers for various Middle Eastern and European commodities.

Although, there has been a considerable increase in the trade of France with the Middle East at the end of the 16th century, the England had the greatest share in the Middle East trade during the 17th century (Mc Gowan, 1981:18). The establishment of the Levant Trade Company in England was the product of the expansionist policy of this country aimed at finding a way into Eastern markets and to secure a share of the imports to Europe of the various Eastern commodities. The company was a monopoly in the English-Levant trade and

settled its factors in Istanbul and Izmir soon after 1580's (12). Almost from the earliest years, raw silk predominated English imports from the Levant. The silk that came to England and to Europe through the Levant ports in the 17th century was produced in Persia. On the other hand, the share of the other silk producing areas in the Middle East that is the Anatolian valleys around Bursa and Tokat and the northern part of the Syria that belongs to Ottoman Empire were comparatively unimportant. Because, as the quality of the Ottoman silk, the so called "white silk", was considered as inferior quality, it found little favor with the European traders (Mc Gowan, 1981:41) (13). Therefore, the European demand for the Anatolian silk increased temporarily at the beginning of the 17th century due to relatively cheap prices in Bursa and Tokat. Likewise, Persian silk was temporarily replaced with the Syrian silk to meet European demand from the Levant because of the interruption of the regular roads of the Persian silk by Russian and Turkish invasion in 1722-24 in Persia and the civil war in 1717 in Persia (Davis, 1970:195-97). Nevertheless, Levant was not the only source of raw silk, besides, India, China, and Italy were also supplying raw silk to Europe (14). In fact, the data at hand related to the English silk imports for the 17th and 18th centuries suggest that Persia continued to be the basic source of raw silk for the English silk cloth industry until the second half of the 17th century. But the situation has started to change after this date.

Table 2. English Silk Imports (1)

(thousands of lbs. of 24 ozs.)

	Total	Levant	India and China	Other (Mostly Italy)
1663,1669 av.	366	264(72%)	1	101(27%)
1721-1725 av.	639	240(37%)	84(13%)	315(49%)
1741-1745 av.	555	145(26%)	116(21%)	294(53%)
1761-1765 av.	844	113(13%)	73(8%)	658(77%)

(1) Percentages are calculated based on data given in the Table 1.

Source: Davis (1970:199).

As it is shown in Table 2, while the share of the Levant in the English silk imports has declined continuously after 1663, the share of India, China, and particularly of Italy has increased. For example, the share of the Levant has decreased from 72 % to 13 % between the years 1663 and 1763. Meanwhile, the share of the other areas (mostly Italy) has increased from 27 % to 77 % during the same period.

Increasing competition of other core nations namely the Dutch

and the French, interruption of regular routes of Persian silk to England, and the increasing tendency of English industry for better silks than those of Persia and Syria were the basic reasons for the decline in the share of the British raw silk imports from Levant. For example, Italian silks were used for making high quality silk fabrics, and for clothing. But during most of the 17th century, English silk cloth industry was confined to make ribbon, thread, buttons and stockings for which the poorer in quality but much cheaper Levant silk was adequate. Then, by the passing of time, the development in the English cloth industry was reflected in a declining demand for the poorer Levant silk and a growing import of better Italian silk (Davis, 1970:198-99). Hence, it is obvious that Levant was not the basic and the only source of raw silk for the English cloth industry. Besides, the trends in the share of the Levant in the total raw silk exports to England during the 17th and 18th centuries gives an idea about the magnitude of the fall in English Levant trade as raw silk constituted almost more than half of the total imports from the Levant (Wood, 1964:111).

Indeed, when we consider the trends in other imported commodities from the Levant, the point shall be more clear. For instance, cotton was one of the most important product imported from the Levant in the 17th century. The cotton and the cotton yarn that came to England for the newly developing cotton cloth industry were produced in Western Anatolia,

Cyprus and Syria. Initially, Levant was the sole supplier of cotton to the English cotton cloth industry. Since it was a small industry, the magnitude of the trade was little.

Nevertheless, with the beginning of the production of cotton in the British West Indian Island (BWII), settled from 1620's onwards, the Levant has begun to lose its position as the sole supplier (Willan,1955:396-99). By the end of the 17th century, the supply of cotton from BWII exceeded the English demand for cotton. Therefore, as can be seen in Table 3, cotton and cotton yarn imports from the Levant declined considerably at the beginning of the 18th century. There were temporary recoveries in the face of competition as it has been in 1752-54 period, but it was much smaller than the cotton imports of England from the non-Levantine sources (Mc Gowan,1981:43).

Likewise, the imports of mohair yarn produced from the hair of Angora goat in the central Anatolia has followed a similar trend. It began to come to England in considerable quantities during 1630's, chiefly for making buttons and buttonholes (Davis,1970:199-200). The trade of mohair yarn grew rapidly to the extent that it was second to the silk at the beginning of the 18th century. But, later change in fashion led to a fall in English imports though it did not entirely disappear (See Table 3).

Table 3. English Imports from the Levant

(Thousands of pounds)

	1621,1630	1663,1669	1699-1701	1722-24	1752-54
	1634(av.)	(av.)	(av.)	(av.)	(av)
Raw silk	73	172	219	274	81
Mohair Yarn	9	45	32	40	13
Cotton and cotton yarn	25	28	25	12	20
Others	77	96	30	23	27
Total	184	342	306	349	141

Source: Davis (1970:202).

In addition to these products, many other Middle Eastern commodities such as goat and camel hair, dyestuffs drugs, textile fabrics, carpets and galls were imported to England. However, they were also in small quantities, therefore they are not worthy of special notice (15).

Thus, the import of almost all the principal Levant products to England reached to the highest level in the first decades of the 18th century and then began to fall away rapidly (Table 3). While the Levant accounted about 10 per cent of the total English trade in the 17th century, it was no more than 1 per cent by the 1770's (Davis, 1970:205). As it has been emphasized, silk was predominated in English imports from the Levant, but most of the silk that came to England was produced in Persia not in the Ottoman Empire. This point is crucial, because the silk cloth industry was the most important and the leading industrial activity until the 1740's in England as well as in other core nations of the West. On the other hand, although the other two raw materials (cotton and mohair) produced in the Ottoman Empire, their share in the total import of England was insignificant. On this occasion, the view that the Ottoman Empire has been the supplier of raw materials to England as well as to France and Dutch (which shall be discussed later) after the 16th century and therefore became underdeveloped country in the 19th century should be re-evaluated (16). In fact, even if we assume that the exported raw materials were mostly produced in the Ottoman Empire, this is also not sufficient to support the arguments of certain Ottoman historians. Otherwise, one can easily raise the question that why Italy has not been a periphery of capitalist world system. Because, as it is shown in Table 2, the share of the Italy in the total English silk import increased rapidly after the first quarter of the 18th

century and it was quite greater than the share of the Levant or in particular of the Persia. So that, there should be some other internal causes of the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.

On the other hand, exports from England to Levant were a function of the imports from there to a certain extent. Because, the trade of each nation from West with the Middle East were dependent in a special way on the capacity to absorb imports of Middle Eastern goods. That is, the merchants of Middle East and particularly of the Ottoman Empire were keeping away from paying money in exchange for the European commodities, although money or precious metals (gold and silver) were highly demanded by them in exchange for the exported commodities to Europe (Wood, 1964:13-16 and Inalcık, 1969:99-102). Because, the value of gold and silver was quite greater in the east than the west. Hence, the demand in Europe for Middle Eastern goods could be paid for, if European goods were not acceptable in return, by sending out coin but the opposite situation could not be realized. Therefore, the exports from England also declined after the last quarter of the 17th century. For example, the English cloth was the most important good exported to Ottoman Empire (17). According to records of Levant Company, the volume of the exports increased through the 17th century reaching approximately 30,000 pieces of all kinds of cloths per annum (most of them were silk cloths). However, it decreased to

11,000 pieces of all kinds of cloths per annum in the first half of the 18th century (Wood,1964:102-104). Most of the cloths were sent to Istanbul and it was sold to upper classes there (Wood,1964:105). A part of these cloths were also sent to Persian market as well as the other trading centers of Ottoman Empire. As it is discussed before, the total population of Ottoman Empire was approximately 20-25 million in the 17th and 18th centuries. Now, if we subtract the share of the Istanbul and the Persian market from the total cloth export to Levant, then, any comparison of the remaining part which is supposed to be sold in the Ottoman markets with the total population would give us an idea about the character of the trade (18). Despite the impossibility of giving exact shares, there can be no doubt about the insignificance of the quantities entering to the consumption bundle of peasants. In other words, English textile products were a kind of luxury commodity in the Ottoman market. As it is argued in the first chapter, this stands as one of the characteristics of the pre-capitalist trade. At the same time, the transportation was taking too much time in the 17th and 18th centuries due to its primitive technology. The sea road between England and Levant ports was taking about 40 days by ship (Wood,1964:232). Similarly, the transportation between these ports and other commercial centers of Middle East was taking long time too. For example, the road between Bursa and Izmir was taking about 7-8 days by caravans (Thevenot,1978:215). Accordingly, this primitive transportation was a great

physical obstacle for peasants to come to markets for shopping so often. This also stands as an indicator that shows the pre-capitalist character of the English-Ottoman trade. Therefore, the above examples point out the difficulty and even impossibility for the Levant Company to enlarge its activities in the rural markets and hence to increase its dominance on the Ottoman economy (19).

England was not, of course, the only country in the West trading with the Ottoman Empire during the 17th and 18th centuries. One of the rival of the England in the Levant trade was the Dutch for a comparatively short period of time after 1612. The main reason for the increase in the Dutch-Levant trade was the political struggles in England and therefore the more effective competition of Dutch on Levant trade (Mc Gowan, 1981:21). Starting from the early years of the trade, Persian silk and mohair yarn of Ankara constituted the greatest part of the total Dutch imports and it reached to the highest level during a few years around 1650. Then, this trade started to fall to negligible levels as a result of the following reasons; i) the Dutch was more heavily committed than England to Indian ocean trade. Therefore, the share of the Indian and Chinese silk in the total Dutch imports were increasing rapidly which associated with the decrease in demand for Levant products, ii) stability in the English political and economic life after 1650 enabled to increase in the competitiveness of Levant Company against the

Dutch merchants (Davis,1970:203). Although the Ottoman-Dutch trade has continued in 17th and 18th centuries, it's volume had never been so important. In this sense, it can not be so realistic to propose that the Ottoman Economy has become the periphery of the Dutch.

Another and much more serious rival of England was France in the 17th and most of the 18th centuries. The French became the chief rival to Venice in the Levant trade at the end of the 16th century; but war and civil war greatly damaged the industry in France on which this trade was dependent and French trade fell to small proportions during the middle decades of the 17th century (Issawi,1966:30). However, after the restoration of political stability as well as the recovery of commerce and industry in France, the magnitude of the French Levant trade started to increase at the beginning of the 18th century. Silk, cotton, mohair yarn, galls, saffran, hides, rice and drugs were among the most important Middle Eastern products exported to France (Issawi,1966:31). However, the share of the silk, cotton and mohair yarn were higher than others. French silk imports from the Levant, particularly Persian, which were in considerable amounts during the first decades of 18th century, started to decrease gradually after that time due to increase in the availability of alternative and better sources such as Italian, and French silk (see Table 4). In case of the mohair yarn, French import increased approximately three times between 1700-1750 period,

but with the change in the fashion, the import of mohair yarn declined too (Mc Gowan,1981:36). Nevertheless, the French Levant trade was growing rapidly in the 18th century mainly due to an enormous growth of the trade in a single commodity; cotton. At the beginning of the 18th century, cotton was much less important than silk in the total French imports. But the trade grew and by 1785 cotton accounted the greatest part of the total imports (see Table 4).

Table 4. Principal French Imports from the Levant, 1700-1789

(millions of livres)

	1700-2 (av.)	1750-4 (av.)	1785-9 (av.)
Silk	2,416	2,095	1,638
Cotton	1,528	5,684	12,792
Mohair Yarn	639	1,835	1,437

Source: Davis(1970:204), Owen(1981:7), Mc Gowan(1981:40-43).

Nevertheless, the thrust of the French-Ottoman trade was disrupted by the French revolution and Napoleonic wars

(Issawi,1966:30). The main reason of that increase until the revolution was the technological advances in the French cotton cloth industry. The cotton exported to France was produced in Western Anatolia, Syria and North Greece (Pamuk,1984:105). In this sense, it can be suggested that Ottoman Empire became one of the raw material source of the French cotton cloth industry and contributed to its development. On the other hand, this development reflected as an increase of the cotton cloth export from France to Ottoman Empire (20). While the export was 58,000 pieces per annum for the period 1736-41, it increased to an average of 85,000 pieces per annum during the period of 1763-73(Wood,1964:143). At that point, it should be noted once again that Istanbul together with the other important trading centers of Middle East were absorbing the greatest part of the cloth imports (Wood,1964:144). From this point of view, the import addressed to the consumption bundle of Ottoman peasants was insignificant. This point shall be much more clear when we argue about the cotton cloth industry of the Ottoman Empire in the next section. Indeed, if we reduce the question whether the mentioned amount of French cloths exported to Ottoman Empire implies the dominance of the France on the Ottoman Economy or not, then, one can ask why Ottoman Economy had not been a periphery of India since the supply of Indian cotton cloths were at least as significant as French cloths in the Ottoman markets. Here, it should be emphasized that the prominent technological advances of the industrial

revolution in the last quarter of the 18th century has materialized first in cotton cloth industry due to increasing competition in this market. The competition of West European countries was mainly against to the undisputable dominance of the Indian cotton cloths both in the Eastern and European markets. The main cause of the competition was the largeness of the market (Chaudhuri,1978: 238-40). Because, the greatest part of the population in Eastern countries (mostly the peasants in rural areas) were preferring cotton cloths rather than linen, woollen, and silk cloths because of the abundant supply of cotton and therefore its relatively cheap price. Accordingly, West European countries aimed at to have more share in such a large market in order to establish an irreversible dominance. Hence, the economic developments in the world after the industrial revolution should be carefully analyzed, because the division of labor in the world capitalist system and the consequent dependency and the underdevelopment of peripheral zones were the product of the industrial revolution. In this sense, it can be suggested that the rapid increase in the raw cotton exports to France in the last quarter of the 18th century was the first signs of the integration of the Ottoman Empire to the world capitalist system.

In the light of the above mentioned pre-capitalist characteristics and the figures related to the trade between three important West European countries and Ottoman Empire,

we conclude that the Ottoman economy performed fairly autonomous and self-sufficient developments during the 17th and 18th centuries. On this occasion, it is not justifiable to speak about the primary role of an external factor that is the change in the sphere of international trade in the transformation of Ottoman social formation after the 16th century and the consequent underdevelopment in the 19th century.

Otherwise, it can be asked that why the Ottoman economy had not been a dependent periphery zone of India as there were Indian cotton cloths in the Ottoman markets as much as the French cloths in the 18th century (Pamuk,1984:107). Likewise, as it is noted before, one can raise the question why Italy had not been a periphery zone of England as the Italian raw silk was the basic source of English silk industry in the 18th century. In other words, it has to be stressed that such a simple evaluation of trade patterns as some Ottoman historians made, can not be so meaningful from the point of view of economic theory. At this point, importance of some other economic and non-economic factors to understand the real causes of the dissolution and transformation of societies becomes apparent.

2.3 General Characteristics of Ottoman Textile Industry During The 17th and 18th Centuries

This section aims to bring up the general characteristics of the Ottoman textile industry during the 17th and 18th centuries in order to show that there had not been a serious crises and collapse in the industry until the end of the 18th century as it is suggested by some of the Ottoman historians (21).

Despite the existence of many documents and studies concerning the organization and structure of old Ottoman textile industry and its legal problems in general, our knowledge on the economic and social aspects of the industry, such as the methods and the amount of production, the level of local consumption are very limited. Nevertheless, recent studies, on the Ottoman documents as well as on the European sources, give an idea about the mentioned aspects of the textile industry for the 17th and 18th centuries. On this occasion, there are basically two types of sources that can be employed. One of them is the studies on the records of mukataa's related to the tax collection from the industrial organizations (e.g. Ergenç 1988 and Genç 1987). And the other one is the letters or the reports written by the foreign consuls, travelers, and the agencies of the trade companies of England and France, employed in the Levant.

Although the conclusions of the above mentioned studies are quite sufficient to suggest that Ottoman industry was as yet in no serious crisis at the end of the 18th century, recent works of some Ottoman historians such as, Pamuk (1984) and Quataert (1987) on the decline of the textile industry in the 19th century make the above suggestion stronger. In connection with this, we will summarize the studies related to the 17th and 18th centuries, and then complete it with remarkable conclusions of the works related to the decline of the textile industry in the 19th century.

2.3.1 Cotton Goods

The manufacture of cotton goods constituted the backbone of the Ottoman industry as it has a wide use for finery and furniture in the Ottoman society (22). There were three different types of organization in the production of cotton goods though they employed the same technology; i) urban textile production, ii) putting out system, iii) rural textile production (family production) (23). While the first two of them were organisations producing for the internal and external market, the last one was an activity for the direct consumption (Pamuk,1984:107). As it is noted before, about 80 % of the total population were living in rural areas and their clothing needs were met by themselves. Accordingly, it is obvious that the greatest part of the cotton goods were

produced in the rural areas. In this sense, it is usual to expect that the destructive effect of the foreign cloths has been materialized firstly in the organisations producing for both internal and external markets.

There were many urban cotton textile production centers in the Ottoman Empire. In such centers, Istanbul, Bursa, Hamid-eli (Isparta-Egridir-Bolu), Edirne, Kayseri, Tokat, Kastamonu, Sam, Halep, and Diyarbakır were the most important centers. Indeed, among the different centers, there was a division of labor. For example, the cotton cloth, called bogasi, was spun and woven in Hamid-eli but dyed in Bursa. Similarly, there were great dying houses in Edirne, Kayseri and Tokat (Inalcık, 1979:4). On the other hand, putting out system was dominant in the spinning activity. As it is mentioned, cotton yarn was the basic input of the cotton cloth and accordingly the demand for the cotton yarn was high for the weaving activities in urban handlooms. Nevertheless, as the spinning activity did not necessitate qualified labor, merchants have organized women in rural areas to spin (Pamuk, 1984:105). The division of labor reduced the costs since the wages paid to women were very low. At the same time, it increased the supply of cotton yarn, and accordingly the cotton cloths. The "putting out" system was heavily concentrated in the South-East Anatolia and Northern Syria regions. Therefore, they were mostly supplying to handlooms in Halep, Diyarbakır, Sam, and Antep (Göyünc, 1980:87-88).

Although the information about the extent and the capacity of the putting out system is very limited, through the work of Faroqhi (1987), Ergenç (1988), and Genç(1987), the performance of the urban cotton textile, handicrafts in the 17th and 18th centuries are more or less clarified. For example, Faroqhi examines the cotton cloth production in the provinces of Aydın, İçel, Hamid-eli, Antalya and Teke with their districts employing the records of tax-farmers (mültezim) who farmed stamp taxes (damga-ı boğasi, a kind of sales tax) on cotton fabrics (24). She investigates this issue under the assumption that the amount of stamp tax collected corresponded more or less to the amount of cloth offered for sale. In other words, the taxes were charged as a percentage of the amount of cloth offered for sale. Accordingly, if we know the tax charged per unit and the total amount of tax collected, a simple manipulation would give us an idea about the extent of the cloth production. Taking certain precautions to prevent the misinterpretation of the records since they were mainly compiled with fiscal purposes, she suggests that there was a considerable weaving activity in connection with the market in the above mentioned areas for the period 1523-31 (Faroqhi,1987:262-70).

On the other hand, the study of Genç on the stamp and dyeing tax records for the 18th century implies the existence of the rapidly increasing activity in the cotton cloth sector at

least until 1780s. However, records were far from representing the extent of the economic activity as the amount of revenues handed over to the Treasury did not change during the 18th century. Therefore, Genç made some calculations on these records to understand the real volume of the tax revenues (Genç,1987:346). This new system called "malikane" by the Ottomans was a special version of the "iltizam" system, one with the longest possible term. Now, what was decided by auction was the yearly amount (muaccele) that had to be paid by individual bidders to gain the right to life possession of the tax-farm. In other words, the potential purchasers were in a position to estimate the annual revenue yielded by the malikane or mukataa and the portion of the revenue that had to be paid to the Treasury and finally the remaining part was left as a profit to them (25). In fact, this is the point that Genç starts his calculations because he assumes that there would be a fixed relationship between the annual profit accruing to the purchaser of malikane and muaccele; and that for all mukataa's sold by auction in the same market in the same period of time. From this point of view, he makes a study of 150-200 cases on the Istanbul market where over 90 % of malikane's were concentrated during the periods 1700-1820. He finds profit rates ranging between 40 to 10 per cent. Then, he estimates a trend for the profit rates valid for all malikane's sold on the Istanbul market. Accordingly, if we know the sale price of a particular mukataa, it allows us to

determine the approximate amount of annual profits that the mukataa would bring to the purchaser at the year of purchase. Hereafter, if we take the owner's net profit and add to it the amount of tax that had to be delivered to the Treasury annually (muaccele), the amount of which was also recorded in the Ottoman documents, then, we obtain the gross annual income (GAI) accruing to the malikane owner. In this sense, taking the tax rates into consideration, the fluctuations in the GAI of all malikane's reflect more or less the real volume of the economic activity.

Thus, Genç examines the tax records of 21 different mukataa operating in different branches of trade and industry applying the above methodology. Among them, there are a few records related to cotton textile, stamp tax, such as Kastamonu, Niğbolu, Rusçuk, Hezargrad and Şumnu. According to Genç's calculations, all of them exhibit an increasing activity until 1780s. For example, while the GAI calculated from the Kastomonu cotton textile stamp tax (Mukataa-1 Resm-i damga-1 Kastomonu) was 4.080 kuruş in 1740, it became 7.020 kuruş in 1787 which represents approximately 80 per cent increase (Genç,1987:371)(26). On the other hand, there was about 90 per cent increase in the GAI calculated from the cotton textile stamp taxes of Şumnu for the 1752-82 period (Genç,1987:369). Indeed, as it shall be noted the increasing activity is observed not only in the cotton textile but in other branches of the industry as well. This point is

important, because it stands somehow a quantitative verification of the developing economy at least to the last quarter of the 18th century. It is true that Genç's estimations does not reflect the absolute volume of the economic development since they might contain a margin of error due to taxation costs and smuggling as was also emphasized by Genç. However, there can be no doubt that the estimations give us a much closer approximation of reality when utilized to indicate relative changes overtime in the volume of any particular activity.

Likewise, Ergenç's study on the 18th century mukataa's supports Genç's calculations (Ergenç,1988:501-33). In order to interpret the extent of the economic development, he examines different aspects of mukataa's, such as the change in the muaccele amounts when it is re-brought to auction or the rents of mukataa's when they are hired among malikane owners for a certain period of time during the 18th century. From this point of view, he determines the production areas of cotton cloth and the extent of it in the 18th century. Hence, he concludes that Kastamonu, Manisa, and Hamid-eli with its districts were the most important centers of cotton cloth production, meeting the greatest part of the domestic demand.

On the other hand, as it is emphasized before, there are some valuable private reports and documents showing the production

and export capacity of Ottoman cotton textile industry in the mid 18th century. One of them was the reports of French Consul; M. Peyssonel (Inalcik,1979:38-41). The reports were written with the aim of sending information to France in order to capture the Ottoman textile market. Peyssonel examines the characteristics of the Ottoman market and emphasizes the necessity of reducing costs of French cotton goods to be able to compete with the Ottoman cotton goods. In connection with this, he suggests a number of strategies to the French Government to reach this goal. In this sense, Peyssonel's work is quite important as it shows the fact that the Ottoman domestic market was not dominated by the Western nations during this period. At the same time, these reports contained quantitative data related to the cotton goods exports from Anatolia to North Black Sea region (NBSR) (27). According to Peyssonel's estimations, the greatest part of the cotton goods needs of the NBSR was met by the Ottoman Empire (28). And the high volume of the export was realized despite the competition of Dutch and Indian cloths at the same market. This point is crucial as it gives an idea about the development stage of the urban cotton textile industry of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century.

Similarly, there were some other examples proving the fact that the production techniques of Ottoman cotton textile industry were developed as much as the West European industries. For example, the technique of Edirne dyeing

houses was so famous that French and Dutch cotton textile industries had worked to copy these techniques for a long period of time in the 18th century (Sahillioğlu,1968b:68).

Hence, it can be argued from this scattered information that the cotton cloth industry maintained its position until the end of the 18th century. However, some detailed quantitative studies and also reports related to the 19th century cotton cloth industry leave no doubt on the truth of the above argument. As it is explained in the previous section, the share of England in the total Ottoman trade was at negligible levels at the end of the 18th century. Nevertheless, the increasing competition of England against the Indian cotton goods in European and Middle East markets resulted in the technological advances in England firstly in the spinning and then in the weaving activity of the cotton textile industry, which, in turn, led to mass production of cheap goods at the beginning of 19th century. These developments directed England and then other Western nations towards Middle East market. Ottoman Empire, having an abundant supply of raw materials and a large market, was affected from these developments. The impact of the British goods on the Ottoman cotton textile industry was felt firstly on the production of cotton yarns and then in the cotton cloths. With the growth of spinning machine in England, the cheaper British yarns started to replace the native handmade Ottoman yarns and accordingly imports of cotton yarn begun to increase dating

from 1820s. As can be seen in Table 5, there occurs considerable increases in imports of cotton yarn and in the share of England between the periods 1820-1911.

Table 5: Cotton Textile Imports of Ottoman Empire, 1820-1911
(annual averages, in tons)

<u>Cotton Yarn</u>		
<u>Years</u>	<u>Imports(1)</u>	<u>Share of England %</u>
1820-22	150	70
1840-42	2650	79
1870-72	7750	76
1880-82	6500	84
1894-96	11150	76
1909-11	12550	36

(1) The total imports of the region within the boundaries determined in 1911.

Source: Pamuk (1984:111,183).

But the first rapid increase was realized in the period between 1820-42. On the other hand, imports of machine-made cotton-cloths to Ottoman Empire increased during the same period, too (Table 6)

Table 6: Cotton Textile Imports of Ottoman Empire, 1820-1911

(annual averages, in tons)

Cotton Cloth

<u>Years</u>	<u>Imports(1)</u>	<u>Share of England (%)</u>
1820-22	450	55
1840-42	4100	68
1870-72	17300	73
1880-82	24700	87
1894-96	26950	81
1909-11	49350	58

(1) The total imports of the region within the boundaries determined in 1911.

Source: Pamuk(1984:111,183)

However, while the decline in the production of handmade cotton yarns was too fast, the disruptive effect of imported cotton cloths on the urban handlooms was moderate. There were two main factors that impeded the rapid decline of handlooms. First of all, with the large amounts of import of British yarns, local manufacturers were able to make use of this cheap raw material. Secondly, Turkey's backwardness in transportation delayed the penetration of European

manufactured cotton goods into the inner parts of the Empire (Inalcık,1979:55). At this point, it should be emphasized that the manufacture of cotton cloths were comparatively widespread than the production of cotton yarns extending into the inner parts of the Ottoman Empire. On this occasion, the decline realized earlier in the areas situated within easy reach of sea transportation that has close contact with Europe. For example, while there were 600 handlooms at Uskudar at the beginning of 19th century, it was decreased to 21 in 1821 (D.Urquhart, cited in Inalcık,1979:49). However, in the course of time, the crisis had begun to be experienced in many parts of the country. In Tirnova in 1812, there were 2000 looms, but in 1830, there were only 200. In the city of Halep, in 1884, only 150 out of 300 cotton textile factories remained (D.Urquhart, cited in Sarç,1966:48-49). Accordingly, the decline of the urban industries was more rapid than the family production, and this very case was also shown in papers and reports. For example, Urquhart states that " the profits have been reduced to one half, and sometimes to one third, by the introduction of English cottons, which though they have reduced the home price, and arrested the export of cotton-yarn from Ottoman Empire, have not yet supplanted the home manufacture in visible degree" (Urquhart, cited in Sarç,1966:50).

Thus, the above figures are quite sufficient to propose that the decline of the Ottoman cotton cloth industry (which was

the backbone of the industry) materialized in the 19th century.

2.3.2 Silk Goods

The silk textile production was another important industrial activity in the Ottoman Empire. As it is discussed before, collapse in the manufacture of silk in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 16th century is particularly emphasized by some historians as one of the consequences of the incorporation to the capitalist world economy (see, Barkan, 1963 and Çizakça, 1985). First of all, it should be noted once again that silk was itself a luxury commodity and therefore silk goods were usually not found in the consumption bundle of the people living in the rural areas which constituted the greatest part of the population (29). From this point of view, we proposed that it is not justifiable to speak about the domination of any country on the Ottoman market, selling their luxury commodities to upper classes even if there had not been silk industry in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the existence of the manufacture of silk is more or less understood through the work of Inalcık (1969) and Dalsar (1960) for the 16th and 17th centuries, Ergenç (1988), Genç (1987) and Sahillioğlu (1968a, 1968b) for the 18th century and Quataert (1987) for the 19th century. Here, we shall briefly present the conclusions of studies related to the 18th and

19th centuries to test whether the relative decline in the production of silk goods at the end of the 16th century has continued in the following centuries or not. Because the works of Inalcık and Dalsar demonstrate very well the existence of the highly developed silk industry in the Ottoman Empire exporting light and heavy silk stuffs of various types to supply both the internal and external market in the 16th century. Accordingly, there might have been a decrease in the production of silk cloths at the beginning of the 17th century as suggested, but this could not be interpreted as the decline of the industry since the studies of Genç, Ergenç and Quataert point out the presence of an increasing activity in this sector until the mid of the 19th century. Above mentioned studies of Genç and Ergenç are the same studies which we employed in the discussion of the cotton textile industry. On this occasion, Genç examines Mukataa's records related to tax on Bursa silk textile press, Bursa silk-dyeing tax and Edirne silk textiles stamp tax for selected years between the period 1750-1836 (Genç, 1987:367-68)(30). According to Genç's estimations, there was about 10% increase in the real volume of Bursa silk textile press and silk-dyeing activities between the years 1750-1780. Meanwhile, Edirne silk textiles stamp tax decreased considerably in the period 1774-1788, but increased again about 50% between the period 1793-1805. Hence, Genç argues that the increasing activity in two important centers is a good indicator of the existence of silk textile industry in

the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Ergenç examines Kadi's records and documents of mukataa's belonging to different stages of silk cloth production [spinning (Mancınık mukataası), weaving (Mizan-ı-harir mukataası), dyeing (Boyahane mukataası) and glazing (Mengene mukataası)]. However, as it is noted before, he does not produce any quantitative series related to the real volume of the silk cloth production but rather he tries to draw some qualitative conclusions indicating the seriousness of the silk cloth production in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th century. For example, Ergenç determines that a malikane owner in Bursa rents out his mukataa to 15000 kurus for a year in 1747 under the condition that the malikane owner also receives a certain part of the tax collected in addition to the rent (This mukataa was related to the taxation of raw silk brought to the spinning activity in Bursa. Therefore, there was a direct correlation between the profitability of the mukataa and the extent of the spinning activity or a negative correlation between the profitability of mukataa and the raw silk exports from Bursa). Then, Ergenç makes some calculations (considering that the malikane owner and the tenant had equal profits) to estimate the probable total profits accruing to the tenant and the malikane owner, and reaches the conclusion that the level of the total profit accruing to the malikane owner and the tenant was quite high. On account of this, he proposes that the greatest part of the raw silk both produced in and brought to Bursa was consumed also in Bursa, and this

implies the continuous demand of silk yarn producers as the raw silk was taxed before the spinning activity (Ergenç, 1988:509-513).

Likewise, he finds an increase in the number of handlooms and mancıniks (the tool that spins raw silk) between the years 1723-1747. On the other hand, he emphasizes that the taxes collected from silk goods had an important share in the total yields available from various mukataas.

Another important source concerning the 18th century Ottoman silk industry and in particular of Bursa silk industry was the reports of French consuls. These reports were also written with the aim of sending information to France to set up strategies to undermine the Ottoman silk industry (Sahillioğlu, 1968a:61-66). In fact, this is the most important indicator of the seriousness of the Bursa silk industry. At the same time, they contain some quantitative information about the extent of the production capacity. For example, there were about 2000 handlooms actively operating in Bursa in the mid-18th century. Similarly it is stated that there were about 2000 handlooms in Istanbul during the same periods (Sahillioğlu, 1968a:61-63). Besides, it is understood from these reports that the greatest part of the raw silk of Bursa was sent to other silk cloth production centers of Ottoman Empire such as, Istanbul, Halep and Edirne (Sahillioğlu, 1968a:61).

On the other hand, another report written by an English traveller at the end of the 18th century states that despite the competition of Chinese and Lyon silks, the price of Bursa products had not declined and approximately 100000 pieces of silk fabric were being exported (Sarç,1966:49).

And finally, Quataert's study demonstrates how the silk cloth manufacture of Bursa that lasted for centuries collapsed and the region turned to the production of only basic raw materials utilized in silk weaving, silk worm eggs, cocoons, and raw silk to European weaving facilities in response to French and Italian competition by the mid-19th century (Quataert,1987: 285-87). Quataert discusses the consequences of the technological improvements introduced into the reeling but not the weaving segment of the industry which implies the shift from finished to primary commodity production, and describes the foreign and indigenous elements involved in those changes. He supports the arguments quantitatively and illustrates the mechanisms transferring a region to a dependent zone specialized only in the production of raw silk.

Thus, it can be argued that the above mentioned conclusions of the studies and reports indicate that there were not a serious crisis and collapse in the silk cloth industry until the end of the 18th century as it is suggested by some of the

Ottoman historians.

2.3.3 Mohair Goods

As it has been discussed previously, mohair yarn and mohair cloth were among the most important traded commodities of the Ottoman Empire. Mohair yarn was produced from the Angora goats which were bred only in Ankara. Accordingly, the supply of mohair cloth was limited. At the same time, it was a higher quality cloth and therefore addressed to the consumption bundle of upper classes both in the Ottoman Empire and abroad.

The extent and the importance of the mohair cloth (sof) production in Ankara for the 16th century is more or less known through the work of Ergenç (1980). On the other hand, the most important source for the 17th and 18th centuries is the work of Faroqhi(1982). Faroqhi demonstrates the presence of the highly developed sof manufacturing in Ankara through the 17th century and concludes that the definite collapse of the industry dates back to the beginning of the 19th century. She reaches the conclusion by comparing the quantitative and qualitative structures of handlooms in Ankara for the periods 1593-1602 and 1687-1693. Indeed, Masson's study on the mohair cloth export to France from the Ottoman Empire supports Faroqhi's conclusions. Because, he estimates a considerable amount of export of mohair cloth to France until the 18th

century (Masson, 1911:457, cited from Faroqhi, 1982:252).

On the other hand, Ergenç's study on mukataas related to the Ankara region demonstrates the presence of the sof manufacture activity in Ankara as much as Bursa silk industry in the 18th century (Ergenç,1988:518). Here, Ergenç emphasizes the increase in the production of mohair yarn in the 18th century compared to the mohair cloth production in accordance with the increasing foreign demand for mohair yarn (Ergenç,1988:515). Indeed, Ergenç's conclusions support Masson's argument about the decline in the export of mohair cloth after the beginning of the 18th century. Nevertheless, the decline in the export did not prevent the presence of the industry through the 18th century. This is also emphasized in the reports of French consuls related to the economic life in Ankara. As stated in these reports, mohair yarn and mohair cloth production were the most important economic activity in Ankara by the mid-18th century (Sahillioğlu,1968a:65-66).

Thus far, we have discussed the general structure of the Ottoman textile industry in the 17th and 18th centuries from the secondary sources. Despite the insufficiency of the empirical data, it can be suggested that there was not a serious crises or collapse in the Ottoman textile industry at least until the end of the 18th century due to competition of imported textile products from the West European countries. In other words, imported textile products were a type of

luxury goods addressed to the consumption bundle of upper classes in the Ottoman market, and therefore they could not cause the decline of the industry anyway.



2.4 The Çiftlik Debate

As a result of incorporation of the Ottoman Economy to the capitalist world economy in the 16th century, formation of Çiftliks (big farms) and commercialization of agriculture producing primary products were one of the arguments of some historians. In connection with this, the genesis, frequency and economic role of plantation-like landholdings, that is large agricultural lands organised as a production unit under a single ownership and management usually producing for the internal and/or external markets, are being debated among scholars.

From the point of view of this study, the most important debated issue is whether a correspondence can be drawn between the plantation-like landholdings of East European countries after the 16th century and the formation of çiftliks particularly in Balkan and West Anatolian regions of the Ottoman Empire, during the same period. Accordingly, private property on land, change in production relations and the production of primary products for internal and external markets were supposed to be the basic elements proving the above mentioned correspondence. However, recent studies have shed new light on the real nature of these elements. For example, it's shown that private property on land was not a

direct consequence of the genesis of çiftlik (Pamuk,1988: 170). Despite the efforts of the central state to safeguard its control on state owned lands (miri), such lands came partly under the control of private individuals also before the 16th century (31). Influential figures from the palace or those close to palace circles obtained state lands in the form of apanages or property grants and subsequently turned them into evkaf or trusts for pious endowments (Inalcık,1973: 107). Nevertheless, extensive lands of miri origin were converted to privately owned farms (tax-farming system) as a result of the financial and administrative inefficiency of the state after the 16th century. Peasants in debt lost their fields to the local notables and tax farmers and through time such lands turned into privately owned big farms ranging between 500 and 1000 dönüms (Genç,1975:242). However, the genesis of Çiftlik was not only a product of the dissolving effect of the tax-farming upon the traditional Ottoman land system. For example, Inalcık stresses the Ottoman treasury's custom of granting unproductive land (mera'at) as the freehold property to whoever would cultivate it as the primary factor in the genesis of big farms (Inalcık,1983:108). If these abandoned or waste lands reclaimed by individuals, the state was granting freehold status to these lands. Nevertheless, despite the increase in the number of private property, as far as their economic organisation was concerned, they usually were not different from the land where production based on the çift-hane system. In other words, as a result of

commercialization of agriculture and subsequently the process of conversion of the state owned lands into plantation-like ciftliks, growing alienation of the peasants from the land and more intensive exploitation of them by landholders were developments which affected only certain regions (Mc Gowan, 1981:1-40). In fact, Balkan region is particularly emphasized by historians as the areas where plantation-like ciftliks came into being as in other East-European countries (Braudel, 1970:67 and Stoianovich, 1953:398-401). However, Mc Gowan's studies on the agricultural, demographic, and commercial structure of the 17th and 18th century Balkan region points out the limited importance of ciftliks during this time. He suggests that Balkan agriculture was commercialized only to a limited extent until the 19th century, and as a result, the plantation-like landholdings (ciftliks) remained a less significant phenomenon.

Similarly, Islamoğlu's study on the peasant economy in north-central Anatolia during the 16th century points out that there was no indication of widespread formation of plantation-like landholdings in this region (Islamoglu, 1987: 125). Thus, we conclude that there were considerable quantitative and qualitative differences both in the organisation and operation in the Eastern Europe and Ottoman Empire. In this sense, keeping in mind the limited importance of even the Balkan ciftliks, one should not exaggerate the role of ciftliks in the Ottoman Empire. Here, the crucial

point is that the formation of çiftliks did not bring a change in the çift-hane system as the pre-dominant organisation of agricultural production on these lands in the greatest part of the Balkan and west Anatolian regions. That is, although the areas covered by the çiftliks were too large, the land was mostly divided into small parts and hired to peasants, rather than the whole land organised as a production unit under a single ownership where peasants became wage earners. On account of this, shareholding was the most common form of hiring small lands to peasants (Pamuk, 1988:167-69). In this form, total product was divided up between the owner of the Çiftlik and peasants at a pre-determined rate after deducting the amount that has to be paid to the state as taxes.

However, despite the pressure of landholders on peasants in direct hiring and plantation-like çiftliks were greater than the shareholding form, Ottoman Empire's tendency to maintain family-sized farms (çift-hane) against to the rise of more powerful local nodules has always continued (Pamuk, 1984:70-103). In this sense, there were important differences between the situation of Balkan peasants and second serfdom of East European countries. Mc Gowan's reasons, supporting the above proposition are based upon the fact that while in Germany east of the Elbe, Poland or Bohemia, peasant serfdom was formalized and became part of the official constitution of the relevant states, the enserfment of Ottoman peasants was

never formally accepted by the central state (Mc Gowan, 1981: 73-79).

Finally, the picture would not suggest anything in contradiction with the general trends of Ottoman trade that analyzed in the second section, if one examines the importance of the çiftlik-produced grains in the total Ottoman exports. The volume of the production for market was limited in the Ottoman Empire mainly due to the primitive technology of transportation and the characteristics of the commodities. Therefore, plantation-like çiftliks producing for internal and external markets were established in the regions with special geographical conditions such as Blacksea and Aegean coastal plains and areas close to Tuna river (Pamuk, 1988; 169-70). But, as it has been argued, the share of the primary products supplied by the Ottoman Empire to the Capitalist world economy was also limited. In connection with this, it is not justifiable to exaggerate the importance of the çiftlik-produced goods supplied both to internal and external markets in the total production of Ottoman Empire. Indeed, this fact is also stressed in some consul reports. For example, Veinstein has analysed the reports of French Consul Peyssonnel who had also maintained close relations with the 18th century West-Anatolian Ayan Karaosmanoğlu Mustafa Ağa (Faroughi, 1986: 29). According to reports, Veinstein concludes that the 18th century Karaosmanoğlu family did not market the goods which had been produced on their own

çiftlik, but agricultural products which they obtained due to their position as the principal tax-farmers of the region. Bearing on this fact, he minimizes the importance of çiftlik in the west-Anatolian region and stresses the political sources of ayans and/or owners of big farm wealth.

In fact, unless a differentiation in trade patterns as a product of the development of çiftlik is shown by hard and fast evidence, then, the possibility of committing an error in the interpretation of çiftlik in the Ottoman Economy is obvious. Therefore, the fact that there is no hard and fast evidence about the Ottoman çiftlik should be kept in mind in the study of this subject.

CONCLUSION

Thus far, the general characteristics of the Ottoman economy in the 17th and 18th century have been discussed. Based on this discussion, it can be suggested that Ottoman economy followed quite an autonomous development path at least until the 19th century. The structure of the Ottoman trade, industry, and the organization of production units in the agriculture remained more or less in their traditional forms. That is, there was neither a serious crisis in the Ottoman industry nor Ottoman economy became the source for raw materials for West European economies. In this sense, it is not justifiable to speak about the dependence of the Ottoman Economy on West European economies. However, the economic and social developments and the interaction between countries in the world after the industrial revolution were radically different than the previous periods. The underdeveloped and dependent structure of the Ottoman Empire became evident in the 19th century. Indeed, there were various economic events in the Ottoman Empire, those also exhibiting somehow a continuity (that is, the cause of an event becomes the natural consequence of another event). For example, increasing foreign debt in 1850s resulted in the establishment of Düyün-u Umumiye in 1881 or the monetization in the economy coincided with the establishment of banks signalling the dependency of the Ottoman economy in the 19th century. On

this occasion, if we consider that the Ottoman Empire and the other European countries faced with similar economic and demographic external developments after the 16th century, and the relatively autonomous development of Ottoman Empire simultaneously during this period, then it can be suggested that explaining the underdevelopment of Ottoman Empire in the 19th century requires that non-economic factors internal to the Empire should primarily be taken into account.

At this point, it should be emphasized once again that despite the considerable differences in the methodology employed and the period suggested for the incorporation to the world economy, the priority given to external economic factors in explaining the specific development path of Ottoman Empire was common both in the world system theory and historians influenced from AHS. In fact, this study does not reject the importance of external economic factors in the transformation of societies, but emphasizes the role of non-economic factors or the superstructures particularly in pre-capitalist societies shaping the manner and the extent of changes in production systems and social relations of production. Here, it is not aimed to make a theorization of these non-economic factors determining the development path of the Ottoman Empire, on the contrary, we shall briefly introduce the probable factors that have to be taken into account in the analysis.

First of all, it can be proposed that the mentioned non-economic factors were materialized in the Ottoman state policy. That policy was mainly rested on the centralism and conservatism. Indeed, centralism was a natural consequence of being an Empire as governors were in a position to keep their authority on the society. In this sense, there was a strict state intervention on the functioning of the economic and social life in greatest part of the Empire in order to prevent a probable instability that could constitute a danger to the existence and authority of the Empire. One can not claim that Ottoman state always succeeded in keeping the economic and social stability as there had been many examples of instability after the 16th century, such as the Celali rebellions, smuggling, high inflation and provisioning problem of towns and cities including Istanbul. Nevertheless, intervention was generally implemented after the temporary instabilities even in the 19th century (Pamuk,1988: 221-27). Obviously, the most important and necessary condition for the realization of the centralism was the financial power of the state. In other words, there was a direct correlation between the economic and social instability and financial difficulty of the state. Therefore, fiscalism and provisionism to meet the subsistence demand of cities, towns, and rural areas for maintaining the existing production system and social relations of production were the basis of centralism (Toprak, 1988:193-95).

On account of this, Ottoman state intervention can be classified into three different groups; namely, on the sphere of production, exchange and distribution. The most important aim of the state intervention on the sphere of production was to preserve the integrity of small peasant holdings on cift-hane system which formed the basis of state's political authority as well as being an important source of revenue. Until the 17th century, timar system provided the administrative framework for state intervention to keep small peasant holdings in agriculture. But, later tax-farming system replaced the timar system due to developments familiar to the readers of the Ottoman history (Genç,1975:231-45). In fact, the administrative and legal framework of tax-farming provided much more freedom to local nodules to accumulate capital and to unify these small holdings into big farms, limiting the freedom of peasant. Nevertheless, as it is discussed in the ciftlik debate section, small holdings continued to prevail in the greatest part of the Empire, even in the 19th century. The state was trying to protect the free status of peasants and to limit the financial and political power of local notables against the peasants as much as possible within the legal framework of tax-farming system. Accordingly, there were a continuous struggle between these local notables and the state after the 16th century (Pamuk,1988:153-56). Although, the literature on the political-legal structure and the economic role of local

notables and their relationship with the central state are limited, existing studies provide important clues about this subject. For example, Cezar (1977) points out one of the key structural facts by which the central state maintained its strength against the Ayan; the institution of Müsadere (Confiscation) permitting a redistribution of the sources of wealth which had been appropriated by a deceased Ayan (Cezar,1977:41-79). From this, the central administration benefited in two ways; first, confiscation provided a financial advantage to the Treasury since the lands and goods of a former Ayan were re-sold in cash, secondly, it limited the attempts of the relatives of the deceased Ayan to retain his political power. There were exceptions where the state could not stop this retention of power, but, Cezar rightly emphasizes the confiscation as one of the crucial institutions where state maintained its power against the Ayans since in certain instances confiscations were practiced even though the owner of the property was not deceased (Cezar,1977:56).

Similarly Faroqhi's detailed work on the economic and political activities of an Ayan in Edremit region points out the limitations of the power of these local notables (Faroqhi,1986:29). Farouqhi finds that the political goals of the Ayan did not go beyond local tax collecting or extending loans to people in the provincial level. The most important aim or the struggle of the Ayan against the state was to

become and stay rich rather than to change the methods and purposes of the existing production. Moreover, the region was specialized in the production of olive oil which required orientation toward the market. At this particular point, Faroughi affirms that the production was oriented for the provision of domestic rather than the foreign market. Thus, the political and economic activities of the Ayan did mostly coincide with the policies of the central state.

On the other hand, the non-agricultural production in cities was subject to regulations of guild system. The system was organised on the basis of ethical principles rather than market oriented conditions. In this sense, internal dynamics of the system did not allow neither the capital accumulation nor the technological development. Therefore, the state tried to control the guild system to keep it in its traditional form consistent with its centralist policy. However, it can not be suggested that the state was entirely successful to maintain the traditional guild system everywhere in the Empire. Together with the rise of local notables in the 17th century, the system was also distorted in some parts of the Empire (Pamuk,1988:174). Nevertheless, the struggle of the state to prevent the distortion has always continued and the guild system prevailed more or less in its traditional form until the 19th century (Toprak,1988: 196).

At the same time, the state intervention on the sphere of production was also on the sphere of distribution as the policy of the state aimed to keep intact the small peasant holdings to limit the revenues and the authority of local notables.

On the other hand, the state also intervened on the sphere of exchange bringing a non-market rationality to exchange relations as there were strict regulations both to internal and external trade. For example, internal transactions were subject to hisba regulations enforced by the state (Islamoglu, 1987b:103). The state also directed the flow of agricultural goods to pre-determined areas to meet the demands of towns and cities (particularly Istanbul) as a part of its provision policy. Concerning the subject, Faroqhi (1987b) stands as an important example. In this work, Faroqhi attempts to show the intervention of the central state determining the manner and extent of the production and exchange on different provinces of the Empire in a particular example of Tekirdag-Rodoscuk to ensure the provisioning of the Istanbul. Similarly, the provisioning of towns and cities and the fiscal considerations were the most important principles followed by the state in the external transactions. In this sense, exports were a function of the provisioning of towns and cities and therefore the consent of the state. However, importation was encouraged by the state

as it provided a revenue by custom dues and supported the provisioning of cities and towns. For example, in 1555, there appeared a scarcity of bread in Istanbul for three days. On account of this, the central state immediately banned the export of grain. Then, the ban on the export of foodstuffs quickly became the rule. By 1574, the state enforced strict regulation on the flow of grain concerning both to internal and external transactions (Mc Gowan,1981:35). The controlling principle of the state on the grain trade was incorporated also into the so-called "capitulations" granted to France (1673 and 1740), England (1675), Holland (1680), and Russia (1783) (Mc Gowan,1981:36). Likewise, the state could ban the export of industrial raw materials as the Ottoman ban on the raw cotton export in the second half of the 17th century (Faroghi,1987b:242).

At the same time, markets and trade were important sources of revenue for the state as a part of fiscalist policy in the form of customs dues, market taxes and from sales of concessions to merchants. Therefore, an increase in the number of markets can not be simply accepted as an indicator of increasing commercialization because the state licensed markets more according to fiscal then according to economic considerations (Faroghi,1979:130). In other words, as Islamoğlu states "the integration of peasant household economy into the larger society in the market was not to a large degree a function of the peasants direct market

involvement but occurred through the mediation of taxation" (Islamoglu, 1987b:104).

At this point, it has to be emphasized that the state intervention influenced not only the sphere of production and exchange but also the various aspects of institutional and social life. In this sense, the influence of the state intervention on the demographic movements discussed in this study (Section 2.1) constitute a good example to have an idea about the role of the state. Moreover, another important aim of the state intervention on the trade markets was to prevent the excessive accumulation of commercial gains which can be considered as the other side of the intervention on the sphere of distribution. Thus, the political-legal structure of the state and its struggle against local notables to keep its authority as a part of its centralism policy stands as an important non-economic factor determining specific development path of the Ottoman Empire.

Up to this point, the importance of the state intervention on the functioning of the Ottoman Economy as a part of state's centralism policy has been emphasized. Consistent with this policy, execution of conservatist or non-receptive policies were one of the prominent characteristics of Empire's like Ottoman's (Eisenstadt, 1967; 1-10). In order to maintain the traditional mode of production, the conservatism was evolved mainly against to external new developments, particularly, to

the scientific developments during the uneven periods of these societies. In fact, scientific capacity of the Ottoman Empire was not less than European countries until the economic, geographical and scientific developments realized in the Western Europe in the 17th century. However, an apparent attitude as opposed to the science was evolved in the Ottoman Empire since the developments in the west was believed to be a consequence of fanaticism and atheism (Yurdaydın,1988;240). In connection with this, the importance of mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy courses started to diminish in the educational programs of Medrese's in the 17th century. Instead of this, courses in religious affairs were replaced the place of the above mentioned courses. At the same time, only a few books were translated into the Ottoman language. They were about history and geography. Besides, the incompetence of lecturers and administrators in Medrese's were a natural consequence of attitudes against the science (Yurdaydın,1988;293-294). However, the most striking example was the introduction of Press to Ottoman Empire. Because, the Press which had a wide use in Europe at the beginning of the 16th century was brought with great difficulty to the Ottoman Empire by İbrahim Mütefferika in 1727. Names of genius people (such as, Galileo, Descartes) who had important contributions to the science in the 16th and 17th centuries were firstly mentioned by Mütefferika at the appendix of the book named "Cihan-nüma", written by Katip Çelebi. The book was also published by Mütefferika after 1727 (Adıvar,1970; 180).

Similarly, developments in medical science were not followed. The old methods of 15th and 16th centuries were employed in 17th and 18th centuries (Yurdaydın,1988;248). Shortly, unawareness about the scientific and technological developments of the West was a natural consequence of the conservative or the non-receptive policies of the state. For example, while the West European countries were continuously sent consulars and travelers to the Ottoman Empire in order to follow the economic and social developments after the 16th century, the first permanent Ottoman consular was sent to Europe in 1791. Accordingly, it can be suggested that the concern of West Europeans about the developments in the World and their success in science and technology were the basic reasons leading them to industrial revolution and core position in the World economy. Here, it has to be stressed that there was not an important exogenous factor that could prevent the Ottoman Empire to benefit from the economic and scientific developments occurred in the West Europe.

In fact, unawareness of the Ottoman society from the scientific developments can not be explained only by the conservative or non-receptive policies of the state. Because, there were crucial differences in the material lives of Western societies and Ottoman society. These differences, such as the usage and custom of religion were basically originating from non-economic factors. This fact became apparent by the work of Jones(1982) which examines the

European miracle specifying the impressive non-economic differences between the Eastern and Western societies, and books of travels written by travelers visiting the Ottoman Empire in the 16th 17th centuries [Thevenot(1978), Reyhanlı (1983), Ortaylı(1973), and Jones(1982)]. One of the points noticed by almost all the travelers as soon as they arrived in Ottoman lands was the striking difference of the Ottoman material life than of the Europeans. For example, plainness of houses and clothing (i.e, there were not lock, keys, tables, etc. at houses), monotony of colours, differences of consumption habits (very little consumption of meat in the Ottoman Empire), lack of commercial mentality (for example, free distribution of food in caravanserais and foundations confused all of the travelers), were some of the points emphasized by all travelers. In other words, it can be suggested that Ottoman society had a traditional structure, perceiving the world as a temporary residence. Therefore, the variation of consumption or the demand from the market was very limited. On the other hand, Jones emphasizes the integrity of the European socio-economic structure and clarifies the economic and non-economic factors that differs the Ottoman Empire from this structure. According to Jones, usage of different calenders in Europe and Ottoman Empire until the 20th century was a good indicator of why Ottoman Empire had not been an integrated part of European system. Consequently, in addition to state policies, the role of non-economic factors specific to Ottoman society in the formation

of non-receptive structure can not be underestimated. Nevertheless, determination of how these factors came into being and interacted with each other throughout history and how did they influence the development dynamics of the Ottoman Empire together with the state policies necessitate detailed studies on sociology and anthropology.

Thus, there are two hypothesis suggested in this study. First of all, it's proposed that the incorporation and the dependency of the Ottoman Empire to the world economy were not realized until the 19th century. In connection with this, primary role of internal non-economic factors in the transformation of the Ottoman social formation have also been emphasized. Therefore, it can be suggested that the underdevelopment of the Empire in the 19th century was also a product of internal non-economic factors. However, it should be pointed out once again that this study does not refute the importance of external factors. In contrast, we believe that external dynamics effect the internal one, and we also think that one-sided determinism in the specification of social development is incorrect.

NOTES

Introduction

1. In fact, the term "capitalist world economy" was firstly developed by Wallerstein. In this study, we shall employ the same definition. For general theoretical formulations of this perspective see Wallerstein(1974) and (1980).

2. Here, we refer the population increase or decrease and the development in international trade as external factors which are supposed to be the primary factors distorting the internal organisation of any social organisation and determining its development path. Similarly, we refer non-economic factors (such as, religion,law,state) specific to dominant mode of production in any social formation as internal factors.

3. Şefik Hüsnü, İ.H Tökin, Halil Berktaş, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mübeccel Kıray are important names who claim that the dominant mode of production in the Ottoman Empire was feudalism. On the other hand, Sencer Divitçioğlu, İdris Küçükömer, Muzaffer Sencer, Asaf Savaş Akat, İsmail Cem, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, Seyfettin Gürsel, Çağlar Keyder, Hürri İslamoğlu-İnan suggest that AMP was the dominant mode of production in Ottoman Empire. However, there are certainly

differences in the interpretation of feudalism and AMP among the researches. See Berktaş (1988).

4. In addition to Wallerstein and Kasaba(1981), Keyder and İslamoğlu(1977), Kasaba(1988) are the general formulations of world system perspective applied to study of Ottoman history and social structure.

Chapter 1

1. A second series of debates on the transition problem took place between 1984-87 mostly appearing in Science and Society. Nevertheless, the content of the main controversies has not changed.

2. The primary role of commerce on the dissolution of feudal societies was first formulated by Pirenne (1936).

3. Here, Dobb refers to Marx's own conclusions that " what new mode of production will take the place of the old does not depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production itself " (Hilton,1978:148).

4. K.Takahashi, C.Hill, G. Lefebvre, G.Procacci, J.Merrington, E.Hobsbawm are among the other names that participated to the debate either by their contributions or comments, see Hilton (1978) for the whole series of articles that participated to the debate.

5. M. Postan, J. Hatcher and E.L Ladurrie are the most important names that Brenner designated as neo-malthusians. Indeed, these neo-malthusian historians are the members of AHS. Therefore, Brenner's criticism does not only pertain to these historians, but to AHS too. Although, there is a critic of commercial model in Brenner (1974), his weighty theoretical critique of commercial model had came in the article " The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism " published in New Left Review (1977). In this article, Brenner claims that like Adam Smith, both Paul Sweezy and Immanuel Wallerstein implicitly or explicitly equate capitalism with a trade based division of labor. Therefore, he calls them as "Neo-Smithian Marxists".

Chapter 2

1. Le Roy Ladurrie's book Les Paysans de Languedoc (1966) is one of the most interesting and influential work on French socio-economic history of the pre-industrial period.

According to Brenner, he was one of the contributors of the demographic model in the interpretation of long term economic change in the medieval and early modern Europe. See Brenner (1976).

2. The calculations of Barkan also gives us the value of akçe in real terms showing the weight of grams silver in each akçe see, (Barkan,1970:569).

3. The list of the demographic studies of Barkan can be found in Inalcık (1978:71).

4. The parallelism can easily be observed empirically. See, (Spooner,1967:458)

5. Kanunnames, Mühimme Defterleri, Ahkam Defterleri, Kadı Sicilleri are among the other type of sources. However, the information available from these sources related to economic and demographic life is very limited relative to Tahrir. For the content of the sources see (1977:161-65).

6. See Inalcık (1978:75-82). Here, it should be noted that Barkan accepted the coefficient as 5 and found the total population (excluding Balkans) growth rate as 60 % for the period 1520-1580 suggesting a figure 30-35 million at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, his estimation for the year 1520 was 12-13 million, then it is not clear how Barkan

arrives the figure 30-35 million with a 60 % growth even if he adds the new conquest in the period 1520-1580.

7. Mc Gowan's scheme to show the development of Christian population on the Balkan Peninsula;

1490- 3 million (600.000x5)

1530- 4 million (800.000x5)

1700- 2 million (635.835x3)

Corrected scheme of Todorova

1490- 1.8 million (600.000x3)

1530- 2.4 million (800.000x3)

1700- 1.9 million (636.000x3)

Todorova's scheme demonstrates a lower population in the 16th century than the Mc Gowan's estimations. Therefore, she suggest that there was no drastic fall in population in the 17th century.

8. See Islamoğlu (1987b:113). Here, it should be noted that she reaches these conclusions from varied and fragmentary data since there is no records of migration in any Ottoman sources and documents. For a detailed information about how Islamoğlu interprets these varied data and produces tables supporting the above conclusions see Islamoğlu (1987:113,137-140).

9. For example, increasing studies on European sources gives an idea about the trends in some economic variables such as the Ottoman trade with Europe, which shall be discussed in the next section.

10. There were basically two types of raw materials imported from the Ottoman Empire; grain products and industrial raw materials. However, the share of the grain exports to Europe was very limited in the 17th century and there was a little increase in the 18th century, particularly from the Balkan region (Pamuk, 1984:16). Therefore, in this section, we restrict ourselves with the study of the trends in the exports of industrial raw materials from the Ottoman Empire. And, we shall particularly show the trends in three strategic commodities namely silk, cotton and mohair yarn as they have been the basic raw materials of the textile industry. The textile was the most important and the leading industrial activity until the 19th century in the Western Europe. Accordingly, if we have an idea about the contribution of the Ottoman Empire to the development of European textile industries, then, it would be much more easier and correct to evaluate the arguments of some Ottoman historians concerning the integration of the Ottoman economy to the world capitalist system as the supplier of raw materials and the consequent collapse of the Ottoman textile industry. On the other hand, we shall study the trade of Ottoman Empire only

with three West European countries, specifically, the England, the Dutch and the French since they had the greatest share in the Ottoman trade from the 17th century to the last decades of the 18th century (Mc Gowan,1981:18).

11. This does not mean that Venetian presence in the Ottoman trade has entirely disappeared after 1570's. But it was never again among the chief traders with the Ottoman Empire. For further details see Faroqhi (1987:314).

12. From the point of view of English trade statistics, "the Levant" was the area of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, especially after the second half of the 16th century. Therefore, the terms "Levant" and "Ottoman Empire" can be used interchangeably. However, the Company was carrying out the trade of the area covering Persia and Arabia, in addition to the Ottoman Empire in Asia and Egypt at the same time. That is, the products of these areas were brought to trading centers of the Levant (Halep, Sayda, Tripoli) and exchanged there with the European commodities. So that English-Middle East trade has the same meaning as the English -Levant trade (Davis,1970:193). For the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East in the 17th and 18th centuries see Kunt(1988:185).

13. In fact, there is no direct and definite data about the

silk imports of England. But, records of the Levant company as well as the other secondary sources emphasize the insignificance of the Anatolian and Syrian silk compared to the Persian in the total English silk imports from the Levant (Davis,1970:194 and Wood,1964:87).

14. Among these centers, the silk of India and China were brought to England by the East India Company. The Company was also established in 1600 as a monopoly to carry out the trade between England and Far East with similar aims as the Levant Company (Chaudhuri,1965:10).

15. All these commodities grouped as "Others" in Table 2.

16. Here, we are referring to the arguments of the Ottoman historians discussed in the second chapter.

17. In addition to cloth , tin, lead, and furs were among the other exported goods to Levant.

18. This is not surprising, because silk was itself a luxury commodity for ordinary peasants and therefore the demand for the silk both in the Middle East and the Far East was very limited. On this occasion, there was no remarkable change in the traditional techniques of silk cloth production to increase the quantity produced until the end of the 18th century in England (Chaudhuri,1978:344).

19. In fact, there are no detailed studies related to the material life of Ottoman peasants like that of Bennett (1962) concerning the English peasant life in the manor to be able to understand the extent of the subsistence economy prevailing in the Ottoman Empire. However, some books and records of travelers for the 17th and 18th centuries give an idea about the life of peasants in the Ottoman Empire. From the point of view of this study, the most interesting observation of travelers from Europe was that Ottoman peasants had a very simple life that there were no substitute products in their consumption bundle. Put differently, they were eating and wearing just to survive. It was perhaps the outcome of the low productivity in the Empire or some beliefs about the eternal life assuming the world as a temporary residence. In this sense, the demand for various European commodities was also limited.

20. In addition to cloth, French exports consists of tin, iron, paper and hardware in negligible quantities (Issawi, 1966:30).

21. Although the textile was not the only industrial activity, it was certainly the most important and the developed one in the Ottoman Empire as well as in other pre-industrial societies (Pamuk,1984:103). In addition to textile, tanning, leather processing and pottery were some of

the other industrial activities operating in urban areas. The textile industry was basically comprised of cotton, silk, and mohair goods sectors. Accordingly, we shall study the situation in these sectors. One final point that should be noted is that the mentioned industries were simply the handicrafts not the machinery-using manufacturing activities.

22. It was expected due to the following reasons. First of all, the clothing needs of the rural population, which formed the 80% of the total, generally were met by the handlooms for direct consumption (Pamuk, 1984:105). Accordingly, peasants were preferring the most abundant raw material available for spinning and weaving, which was cotton for the mentioned period. Secondly, the severe climate of the Middle East were made the people to wear cotton and woollen cloths rather than silk and linen cloths.

23. There were three basic steps in the production of cotton goods; spinning, weaving, and dyeing. Firstly, raw cotton was spun to produce cotton yard. Then, the cotton yard was woven to produce cotton good, and finally cotton good was dyed and glazed. Although there were different names given to cotton goods according to color and design, they could be categorized as Dülbent (tülbent), Bogasi and Bez (Inalcık, 1979:19-20).

24. Mültezim (tax farmer) was the person who has been granted the right of tax collection from a certain tax unit. Indeed, the right was sold by auction to this persons for a year or any specified length of time and the system was called tax farming (iltizam) (Genç,1987:346).

25. For further information on the operation of the Malikane system, see Genç (1975).

26. Ottoman kuruş was equal to 120 akçes (Genç,1987:346).

27. Because, he was a black sea region consul in 1750. Then he was appointed to Cremian Khanate in 1753.

28. For further information on the type of goods, their prices and monetary value of yearly exports, see (İnalçık, 1979:39).

29. For example, books on travels usually emphasize the outstanding differences in the clothing between administrative classes and the ordinary peasants. That is the preference of upper classes, in particular of statesmen for silk clothes as an expensive and distinctive commodity, see (Thevenot,1978:88-89 and Reyhanlı,1983:17-20). The same point is also emphasized in (Dalsar,1960:21).

30. Bursa, Edirne, İstanbul, Amasya and Halep were important

centers of silk textile production. However, Bursa was the most important one among these centers with respect to its production capacity.

31. The Çiftlik-hane system as the basis of traditional Ottoman land system consisted of organisation of agricultural production on the basis of peasant households (hanes) each of which was given a çift, i.e, a plot of land of sufficient size (varied with the fertility of soil from 60 dönüm to 150) to sustain one peasant household and pay the "rent" to the state as the landholder (Inalcık,1983:106).

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